Social Crime Prevention In Late Modern Europe : A Comparative Perspective [1 ed.] 9789070289102

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe A Comparative Perspective

Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe A Comparative Perspective Patrick Hebberecht and Evelyne Baillergeau (eds.)

VUBPRESS

Criminological Studies In this series studies are published which contribute significantly to the development of the criminological sciences, through either theoretical elaborations, empirical research or criminal policy discussions. Studies originating from other scientific disciplines can also be considered if they are relevant to the criminological domain. The editorial board consists of academics from the criminological research institutes of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) and the Universiteit Gent (UG). All manuscripts are reviewed by at least two referees. Editorial Board: Prof. Dr. J. Christiaens (VUB), president Prof. Dr. T. Decorte (UG) Prof. Dr. C. Eliaerts (VUB) Prof. Dr. S. Gutwirth (VUB) Prof. Dr. P. Hebberecht (UG) Prof. Dr. S. Snacken (VUB)

The GPRC label (Guaranteed Peer Review Content) was developed by the Flemish organization Boek.be and is assigned to publications which are in compliance with the academic standards required by the VABB (Vlaams Academisch Bibliografisch Bestand).

Cover design: Koloriet, Leefdaal Book design: theSWitch, Antwerpen Print: Flin Graphic Group, Oostkamp © Patrick Hebberecht and Evelyne Baillergeau © 2012 VUBPRESS Brussels University Press VUBPRESS is an imprint of ASP nv (Academic and Scientific Publishers nv) Ravensteingalerij 28 B-1000 Brussels Tel. + 32 (0) 2 289 26 50 Fax + 32 (0) 2 289 26 59 E-mail [email protected] www.vubpress.be ISBN 978 90 7028 910 2 NUR 824 / 740 Legal deposit D/2012/11.161/018 All rights reserved. No parts of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Contents Introduction Patrick Hebberecht and Evelyne Baillergeau

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe. Towards a Comparative Analysis Evelyne Baillergeau and Patrick Hebberecht

21

The Turns in Social Crime Prevention in Belgian Crime Prevention Policy since the 1980s Patrick Hebberecht

37

La prévention de la délinquance chez les Anglais: From Community-based Strategies to Early Interventions with Young People Adam Crawford and Peter Traynor

63

Social Prevention in France. Erasure, Permanence, Regeneration? Jacques de Maillard and Séverine Germain

103

Social Crime Prevention in Germany. Balancing Social Policy and Crime Policy? Axel Groenemeyer and Holger Schmidt

121

Social Crime Prevention in Greece Sofia Vidali

151

‘Grandpa’s Fashion in the New Year’ – Innovative Theoretical Thoughts vs. Simplistic Crime Prevention Practices in Hungary Klára Kerezsi

181

Social Crime Prevention in Italy : A Never-Ending Story? Rossella Selmini

209

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe

Social Crime Prevention in the Netherlands in the 2000s. A Marginalised but Enduring Line in Crime Reduction Evelyne Baillergeau

235

Social Crime Prevention in Norway Marit Egge and Helene I. Gundhus

255

(Social) Crime Prevention in Portugal Josefina Castro, Carla S. Cardoso and Cândido da Agra

279

Social Crime Prevention in Slovenia – Recent Developments Gorazd Meško, Zoran Kanduč and Maja Jere

303

Social Crime Prevention Policies in Spain from 2000-2010 Amadeu Recasens i Brunet

321

Notes on Contributors

349

Index

357

6

Introduction Patrick Hebberecht and Evelyne Baillergeau

Since the end of the 1980s, several books have been published which have presented overviews of the recent developments in crime prevention policies in different European countries (Robert, 1991; Hebberecht & Sack, 1997; Hebberecht & Duprez, 2002). The latest evolutions in crime prevention policies in many European countries have been presented and compared by Adam Crawford (2009). Interesting handbooks on crime prevention have been brought out (Gilling, 1997; Cusson, 2010; Bousquet & Lenoir, 2009; Tilley, 2005, 2009; Evans, 2011). Other publications have focused on some specific prevention strategies, such as developmental prevention (Homel, 2005; Farrington, 2007), situational crime prevention (Clarke, 1995, 2000) and community safety (Hughes, McLaughlin & Muncie, 2002). All of these demonstrate that the rise of significant shifts in crime control in general and the rise of a ‘preventive turn’ in particular not only occurred in the USA and the United Kingdom, but also in Continental Europe. What is striking in these publications is the overwhelming influence of situational crime prevention since the 1980s, at the expense of social crime prevention, even in countries where the latter was strongly advocated by central governmental bodies in the early days of the ‘preventive turn’ (early 1980s in France and Barcelona and to some extent also in the Netherlands and Belgium). Situational crime prevention has been granted much attention in academic research and literature, while fewer publications are oriented towards social crime prevention. In a way, this is no surprise, as situational crime prevention, as well as related ethical concerns and its limitations with regard to crime control, have been much discussed by scholars across the Western world. Social crime prevention and the blending of social policy and crime reduction have also been discussed in academic circles (Knepper, 2007), although to a lesser extent. However, unlike some authors have suggested, social crime prevention is not dead; it is still advocated by a number of bodies involved in crime prevention in various European countries, Britain included (Baillergeau, 2008). What are

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe

the motives among the proponents of social crime prevention in a situational era? And what were (if any) the shifts in the social crime prevention ideal over the last few decades? Did the characteristics of late modernity (Hughes, 1998; Young, 2007) like globalisation, individualisation, neo-liberalism, the decline of the welfare state, etc. have an influence on the meaning of social crime prevention? So far, there are precious few clues about this in European literature (at least in English literature). With this book, our aim is to fi ll this gap and explore social crime prevention through its driving forces, its forms and its challenges in the first decade of the 21st century. In order to reflect the diversity as much as possible, our ambition was to edit a real European book on the evolution of social crime prevention by involving country-specific accounts from a number of countries in different parts (Northern, Western Southern, Central and Eastern) of Europe.

Towards a Common Understanding of Social Crime Prevention How do you get started with a concept like social crime prevention in a comparative European perspective? It is not an easy task. Whilst social crime prevention is fairly easy to conceptualise in a theoretical way, translating it into research is rather complex. So is prevention itself, especially given its connection to social policy, which varies enormously across Europe. To find some coherence in the different contributions, we started by proposing a definition of social crime prevention formulated by Jock Young (2001: 272): ‘Measures to prevent crime which are aimed at the social causes of crime rather than those concerned with the mechanical reduction of opportunities (situational crime prevention) or with deterrence (the criminal justice system).’ This definition shows social crime prevention as a guiding principle, but what kind of policies, programmes, measures and practices could be classified as social crime prevention? ‘Social causes of crime’ can include relative deprivation, social exclusion, restriction of opportunities and chances to make choices, social conflict situations and many more. Does social crime prevention therefore cover any kind of social policy, programme, measure or practice? Not in our understanding. Crime control or crime reduction or the reduction of fear of crime must be mentioned explicitly as the only objective, or as one of the objectives of a social crime prevention policy, programme, measure or practice. For instance, projects aiming at providing young dropouts suspected of crime, or with minor criminal records, with job training opportunities or additional educational programmes may

8

Introduction

fall under social crime prevention as well as under mediation of conflicts involving people facing fear of crime and suspected offenders. Conversely, technological surveillance cannot be regarded as social crime prevention. Social crime prevention measures and interventions can include some practices involving individuals, peer groups or families, but these have to be oriented towards social structures, relationships and situations in which people can commit crime, be victimised or develop feelings of insecurity. Social crime prevention interventions aim to build a social relationship with (potential) offenders or victims of crime. However, the boundaries between social crime prevention and other concepts, such as community safety or developmental prevention, and even with situational prevention, are sometimes rather unclear. Social crime prevention and situational crime prevention are sometimes combined in one project/programme (often in community safety programmes). Defining social crime prevention also entails the need to make clear what is meant by crime. In this book, we start with official definitions of crime, possibly set at a national, regional or local level, with the inclusion of all kinds of so-called ‘incivilities’, ‘nuisance’ and ‘anti-social behaviour’ that are officially associated with crime (involving either penal or administrative sanctions). In this sense, social crime prevention can also be oriented towards fear of crime and feelings of insecurity, not only caused by crime but also by incivilities, nuisance and anti-social behaviour. But we do not take this starting point in an uncritical way. The official definitions of crime, incivilities, nuisance and anti-social behaviour are not seen as ontological categories, but as the result of late modern economic, political, cultural and social transformations.

Outlines of the Country Chapters We suggested to the contributors to this book some outlines and central questions for their country reports. So, each country chapter provides a short historical overview of theories, policies, methods and projects concerning crime prevention in general, and social crime prevention in particular, from the 1980s until the present day. Attention is particularly given to the official and academic definitions of social crime prevention. For the past decade, the authors provide a more detailed description of social crime prevention policies and programmes at a national and local level, and in some countries

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe

also at a regional level. Illustrations of social crime prevention projects at a local level are presented. There is a particular focus on the reconfiguration of social crime prevention policies, programmes and projects within the broader developments of crime prevention and security policies. All these developments are put into context by the economic, political, social and cultural transformations of the past decades. Provisional versions of some country reports were presented and discussed at two meetings in Ghent: a French-speaking seminar, partly financed by the European Group for the Study of Norms (GERN) on December 10 2010, and an English-speaking seminar with a subsidy from the Law Faculty of Ghent University and from the publisher on May 31 and June 1, 2011.

The Structure of the Book The structure of the book is as follows. In chapter 1, Evelyne Baillergeau and Patrick Hebberecht begin by recalling the theories that are possibly involved in social crime prevention, and by exploring their connection to policies that have been designed under the banner of social crime prevention. Secondly, their intention is: to reconstruct the important changes in the development of social crime prevention; to analyse new forms of social crime prevention; to look at the countries that played a pioneering and innovative role in the elaboration of these new forms, taking into account their political context; and to search for the transfer of these new forms of social crime prevention to other countries in Europe. Finally, they try to make a prognosis about the future of social crime prevention during the coming decades of the 21st century and, more specifically, question the fate of the inclusive trend in crime prevention in the age of late modernity. The subsequent chapters present country-specific accounts of social crime prevention policies and their development in twelve European countries. In chapter 2, Patrick Hebberecht shows how in Belgium, social crime prevention is rooted in initiatives implemented inside and outside the criminal justice system from the end of the 19th century until the 1970s, under the influence of the ‘social defence’ theory. Initiated by the police, a ‘preventive turn’ took place in Belgium in the mid 1980s. In his first section, he positions social crime prevention policy within the national/federal crime prevention policy since 1985. For a good understanding of the evolution of

10

Introduction

(social) crime prevention policy, the period from 1985 until the present is subdivided into four periods, according to the coalitions of political parties governing at a national/federal level. Following this criterion, a distinction is made between four periods: first, 1985 to 1988, during which a coalition of Christian-democratic and liberal parties governed; second, 1988 to 1999, when a coalition of Christian-democratic and socialist parties was in power; third, the period 1999 to 2007 – a coalition of liberal and socialist parties (and from 1999 until 2003 also of green parties); and fourth, the period 2007 to 2011, with a coalition between Christian-democratic and liberal parties on the Flemish side and Christian-democratic, liberal and socialist parties in the French-speaking part of Belgium. Due to a lack of official reports and documents, and of scientific research results about local social crime prevention policy in the different Belgian cities and councils, he restricts his analysis of the place of social crime prevention within a local crime prevention policy to the city of Ghent, in his second section. Finally, he contextualises Belgian developments in social crime prevention during the last thirty years in the institutional framework, the organisation of the police forces and the political ideologies in Belgium, influenced by neo-liberal globalisation and confronted with a crisis of the nation state. According to Adam Crawford and Peter Traynor in chapter 3, the English approach to social crime prevention remains a largely neglected subject. In their contribution, they intend to address this lacuna and outline the dominant trends in the evolution of social crime prevention in England and Wales, and the manner in which these have been shaped by wider institutional, political and intellectual influences. They begin with a conceptual discussion of what they take social crime prevention to mean and its place within wider debates about the recent historic preventive turn in public policy. Their contribution goes on to provide an overview of (national) policy developments in the field of community safety and the elaboration of the anti-social behaviour agenda, both of which have advanced a particular variant of social crime prevention, rooted in a distinct normative understanding of the social causes of crime and the role of the state, communities, families and individual citizens in its prevention. They then turn to illustrate the prevailing trends, fault-lines and enduring themes that converge around the practice of social crime prevention in England through a number of case studies. Finally, they conclude with some speculative thoughts on the potential future direction of developments in England and, to a lesser extent, Wales.

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In crime studies, France is best known for social crime prevention endorsed by governmental bodies as early as 1982, both at a national and a local level, until a recent move towards situational crime prevention and an increasing focus on control and surveillance throughout the 1990s. However, Jacques de Maillard and Séverine Germain show in chapter 4 that, despite this ongoing trend, social crime prevention remains a significant policy area in France, even if it is no longer emphasised in policy discourse. Social crime prevention programmes are actually maintained and continued, as well as governmental financial support. Nonetheless, two shifts are noticeable. Firstly, social crime prevention is increasingly combined with other rationales within community-safety-like programmes. Secondly, there is an increasing focus on individual and family based interventions rather than on structural interventions. Besides, de Maillard and Germain highlight some local variations in public spending with regard to security policies. By comparing the cases of Lyon and Grenoble, it becomes obvious that social crime prevention may be handled in different ways, depending on local political agendas. The long-lasting emphasis on social crime prevention in French crime prevention policy implies, in the age of policy mix, a slightly different situation for frontline players such as ‘specialised educators’, compared to countries in which social crime prevention has never been given much emphasis beyond policy intentions. According to Axel Groenemeyer and Holger Schmidt in chapter 5, there are many difficulties in writing about social crime prevention in Germany. The first difficulty stems from problems of definition of (social) crime prevention. Secondly, there is an overlap of social crime prevention measures with programmes and interventions in the field of social policy. A third problem for analysing social crime prevention is to estimate the role and consequences of public and political discourse on the definition of social problems as crime problems, or social exclusion problems, or as public health problems. Fourthly, crime prevention is a highly fragmented enterprise of public or semi-public organisations at all levels of the political structure. Despite these difficulties, Axel Groenemeyer and Holger Schmidt try to give an overview of the development of crime prevention policies in Germany, especially since the 1990s, when crime prevention became a dominant public and political discourse. Further, they describe and discuss the organisation of crime prevention in Germany at a national, regional and local level. Finally, they formulate some perspectives on social crime prevention in Germany.

12

Introduction

In chapter 6, Sofia Vidali clarifies some features of crime prevention. Crime prevention is not an ideologically neutral issue but has to be understood in a concrete socio-political and economic context. For Sofia Vidali the crime prevention debate in late modernity is not new. Crime prevention policies are adaptive strategies to structural changes caused by the transition from one type of economy to another. Power relations have an impact on (social) crime prevention policies. Social crime prevention has to intervene on the micro and macro mechanisms of the market society (and in the case of Greece the Greek version), which are promoting crime. Further, she discusses the evolution of the meaning of social crime prevention in criminological writings and in criminal policies since the 1980s. The recent evolutions in crime patterns in Greece are analysed. She gives an overview of the main social crime prevention policies and measures in Greece. These concern in the first place extra-penal measures and social policy measures which are mainly victim-oriented and a form of secondary crime prevention. Klara Kerezsi outlines the situation in Hungary in chapter 7 as one that has been in constant flux and social turbulence in the past two decades. She underlines that the quality of life, especially in cities, is affected not only by an increase in crimes but also, by some violations of the law and unsettled legal issues experienced in public areas such as graffiti, prohibited or unlicensed trading, infringements related to the cleanness of public places, begging, the appearance of homeless people in the streets, or the loosening of order on public transport. By the late 1980s, the view that crime control can only be operated as a complex system, and that crime prevention is a multi-layered and complex social task that points beyond the tools of criminal law, became accepted. Since the Berlin Wall came down, the turning points of criminal policy have been strongly tied to government cycles. During the first freely elected conservative government (1990-1994), the police came to be the primary depositary of crime prevention. The institutionalisation of the multi-layered crime prevention system was undertaken by the socialist-liberal government (1994-1998). The winning Conservative Party’s rhetoric of ‘law and order’ was clearly reflected both in the new priorities of criminal policy and crime prevention during the central right government (1998-2002). Since 2002, when the socialist-liberal government won the election again (2002-2006 and 2006-2010), social crime prevention became a part of crime control policy. This has no longer been the case since the new conservative government took over.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe

Taking into account the post-socialist reality of Hungary and the context of the European Union, Klara Kerezsi analyses in detail the measures and practices elaborated by the National Strategy for Social Crime Prevention since 2003. In chapter 8, Rossella Selmini shows that until the 1990s, social crime prevention was given the overtone in Italy. While there was not yet any explicit extra-penal crime prevention policy at a national level, the commitment of Italian local and regional governments to crime prevention was not only based on a primarily sociological understanding of the causes of crime, but also embodied by measures aimed at tackling the social causes of crime in an inclusive way. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, early social crime prevention measures and practices targeted various groups, such as: residents of deprived neighbourhoods; young southerners at risk of getting enrolled in mafia activities; and vulnerable groups such as drug addicts and sex workers. Things gradually changed as from the mid 1990s. Firstly, as a response to the rise of new political concerns such as fear of crime, local governments launched local safety programmes. While these sound very similar to policy-mix approaches to crime reduction launched elsewhere in Western Europe, a typical new development in Italy was the emergence of the situational crime prevention logic, besides social crime prevention. Secondly, as of 2008, the central government – which had been somewhat absent in crime prevention until then – finally launched a national strategy for local urban safety policies and crime prevention. By giving priority to situational crime prevention and exclusive measures such as ASBOs, the recent policy shift seems to contribute to the further marginalisation of traditional social crime prevention, the latter being either subjected to severe budget cuts or to significant shifts in the content of the programmes. However, Rossella Selmini interestingly poses the question of whether disappearance or invisibility may apply to contemporary social crime prevention in Italy, since there are obvious signs of survival of traditional social crime prevention, even if this is scarcely emphasised by political or scientific commentators. The question also holds true for the Netherlands, although the situation is rather different. In Chapter 9, Evelyne Baillergeau shows that the central government launched an extra-penal crime prevention strategy as early as the end of the 1970s, merely of a situational kind to begin with. A strong emphasis of political discourse on social crime prevention developed all through the 1990s, although situational crime prevention was never pushed into the background in the Dutch version of the policy mix/local urban

14

Introduction

safety contracts. First of all there was a policy focus on young people in general and, since the 1990s, the scope narrowed to the young people of ‘non-Western descent’. Yet, social crime prevention goes beyond discourse in the Netherlands, since there is a long-lasting ambition of favouring crime reduction in an inclusive way in the Netherlands, namely by attempting to strengthen the link between the younger generations and mainstream society in general, and increase inclusion in the labour market in particular. Regarding the period starting at the end of the 1990s, Evelyne Baillergeau wonders whether the inclusive path in crime reduction is merely to be achieved through social crime prevention, or through developmental crime prevention. Indeed the latter has received tremendous attention both in Dutch policy circles and from academic commentators throughout the last two decades. While both formal and informal education, additional job training and work experience programmes for young people in the street still exist, there has been an increasing policy focus on early intervention among young families. In Norway, social crime prevention has been the leading perspective in crime prevention since the late 1970s. In chapter 10, Marit Egge and Helene I. Gundhus show that social crime prevention is a logical part of the Nordic model of the welfare state, based upon an universalist view of the role of the state with regard to the wellbeing of all citizens and, hence, a strong focus on social cohesion and reconciliation. Social crime prevention consists of a wide array of practices involving extra-judicial actors and ranging from education and professional training and job training programmes to subsidised loans enabling first-time buyers to access home ownership, outreach youth work, mediation and community building programmes involving both police and young people. This does not mean that social crime prevention is the only approach to Norwegian crime prevention. Actually, situational crime prevention has been carried out by the police, but Egge and Gundhus show that, when entwined with social crime prevention in local partnerships, situational crime prevention remained in a secondary position in Norway, unlike in most European countries. Moreover, a rising trend towards developmental crime prevention has been noticeable since the turn of the 21st century, backed by an increasing concern for policy efficiency and accountability, fuelling early intervention in young families and evidencebased programmes based on risk-profiling. Whether this is actually going to challenge social crime prevention in the traditional sense is questionable, and depends on the resistance of the social crime prevention field.

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According to Josefina Castro, Carla S. Cardoso and Cândido da Agra in chapter 11, in Portugal the concept of social crime prevention is not to be found in academic literature, official documentation and political discourse. Following Adam Crawford, they define the concept of social crime prevention as “any activity or intervention into the social world which may improve people’s quality of life or which may have some beneficial impact on the intended subjects, such they may be less inclined to commit crime”. With this definition in mind, they describe the nature of social crime prevention and its place in the broader configuration of crime control and its political and social context for each period in the development of prevention and security policies in Portugal since the revolution of April 25, 1974. In the development of social crime prevention they distinguish two main periods. In the first period from 1974 to the middle of the 1990s, the elaboration of social crime prevention forms part of a strategy of strengthening the conventional actions and means of preventing and controlling crime in Portuguese society. In the second period, from the mid 90s until the present, social crime prevention is a part of a much more multiple approach, pointing to a management model with characteristics earlier developed in other European countries (among others, community policing, public-private partnerships, new technological means of crime prevention and detection, social programmes to prevent crime, fear of crime and victimisation, etc.). For this second period, two categories of social crime prevention are analysed in a detailed and exhaustive way, namely (potential) offender-oriented social crime prevention and community-oriented prevention. According to Gorazd Meško, Zoran Kanduč and Maja Jere in chapter 12, in the former Yugoslavia, social crime prevention was integrated into social welfare programmes and activities in the 1950s, 1960s and at the beginning of 1970s. In the 1980s, social crime prevention was still a part of policies and crime response practices. After the formal establishment of political independence of the Slovene national state in 1991, social crime prevention almost disappeared with the introduction of more ‘promising’ Western ideas of crime prevention and ideas about quick fi xes of crime problems. For the past decade, they give not only an overview of the different national and local crime prevention initiatives but also of the broader social programmes, for example concerning social protection and social inclusion, domestic violence, children and young people, and gender equality, with possible preventive effects on crime. For Meško, Kanduč and Jere, many preventive activities are basically ‘cultural’ in their orientation. They aim primarily at challenging and changing ‘socially undesired’ values or unacceptable

16

Introduction

hedonistic strategies, happy-go-lucky approaches to health and other risks, deep-rooted aggressive behaviour patterns, die-hard ‘patriarchal’ gender roles, too-narrow concepts of ‘violence’ and accordingly, too-broad tolerance of its appearances in intimate or work-place relationships, etc. In chapter 13, Amadeu Recasens I Brunet tries to describe the basic aspects of the development of social crime prevention policies in Spain. Due to a lack of studies, discussions and policies, he feels the need to explain why social crime prevention policies have never been implemented in a systematic way. According to him, the first root cause is to be found in the transition from a dictatorship to a weak social security state, pointing toward a liberal democracy and even to a securitarianism reducing the responsibilities of the state. A second root cause is to be found in the tensions between the different levels of administration (state, autonomies and local-municipal level). Due to these tensions, a lack of coordination of different crime prevention policies is endemic. On each of the three political-administrative levels, a tension between police-type security policies and social ones occurred. In this tension, social policy actors appear increasingly more fragmented than police actors. Due to the fight against terrorism and later, to the confrontation with the problems of drugs and illegal immigration, Recasens cannot clearly identify crime prevention policies under the socialist (19821996) and conservative government (1996-2004) at a national level. Even if the policies of the socialist governments (2004-2011) became more sociallyoriented (towards youth and school problems, illegal immigration etc.) he cannot find social crime prevention policies except in the case of domestic violence. At the level of the autonomies, social crime prevention has not been an element of the various policies. At the local-municipal level, some large and medium cities organise actions concerning domestic violence, drug addiction, social integration, mediation and conflict resolution. In many cases, these actions show a preventive will, but explicit and specific activities in social crime prevention do not appear, even if some of these actions show indirect tendencies in this direction. In the 1980s Barcelona developed a local crime prevention policy with an important social dimension. Recasens analyses why this social dimension has become marginalised since 1993.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe

Bibliography Baillergeau, É. (2008). Intervention sociale, prévention et contrôle social. La prévention sociale d’hier à aujourd’hui [Social Intervention, Prevention and Social Control]. Déviance et Société, 32(1), 3-20. Bousquet, R., & Lenoir, É. (2009). La prévention de la délinquance [The Prevention of Delinquency]. Paris: PUF. Clarke, R.V. (1995). Situational Crime Prevention. In M. Tonry & D.P. Farrington (eds.), Crime and Justice a Review of Research (19) (pp. 31-50). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Clarke, R.V. (2000). Situational Prevention, Criminology and Social Values. In A. Von Hirsch, D. Garland & A. Wakefield (eds.), Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention (pp. 97-112). Oxford: Hart Publishing. Crawford, A. (2009). Situating Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective: Policy Travels, Transfer and Translation. In A. Crawford (ed.), Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective (pp. 1-37). Cullompton: Willan Publishing. Cusson, M. (2010). Prévenir la délinquance. Les méthodes efficaces [The Prevention of Delinquency. The Effective Methods] (3rd ed.). Paris: PUF. Evans, K. (2011). Crime Prevention. A Critical Introduction. London: Sage. Farrington, D.P. (2007). Childhood, Risk Factors and Risk-focused Prevention. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (4th ed., pp. 602-640). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gilling, D. (1997). Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy and Politics. London: UCL Press. Hebberecht, P., & Duprez, D. (eds.). (2002). The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe. Brussels: VUBPRESS. Hebberecht, P., & Sack, F. (eds.). (1997). La prévention de la délinquance en Europe. Nouvelles strategies [The Prevention of Delinquency in Europe. New Strategies]. Paris: L’Harmattan. Homel, R. (2005). Developmental Crime Prevention. In N. Tilley (ed.), Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety (pp. 71-106). Cullumpton: Willan Publishing. Hughes, G. (1998). Understanding Crime Prevention: Social Control, Risk and Late Modernity. Buckingham: Open University Press. Hughes, G., McLaughlin, E., & Muncie, J. (eds.). (2002). Crime Prevention and Community Safety: New Directions. London: Sage. Knepper, P. (2007). Criminology and Social Policy. London: Sage. Robert, P. (ed.). (1991). Les politiques de prévention de la délinquance à l’aune de la recherche; un bilan international [The Research of Prevention Policies of Delinquency; an International Evaluation]. Paris: L’Harmattan.

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Tilley, N. (ed.). (2005). Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety. Cullumpton: Willan Publishing. Tilley, N. (2009). Crime Prevention. Cullumpton: Willan Publishing. Young, J. (2001). Social Crime Prevention. In E. McLaughlin & J. Muncie (eds.), The Sage Dictionary of Criminology (p. 272). London: Sage. Young, J. (2007). The Vertigo of Late Modernity. London: Sage.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe. Towards a Comparative Analysis Evelyne Baillergeau and Patrick Hebberecht

When exploring the meaning and topicality of social crime prevention in the 2000s, it was striking to note that the idea of social crime prevention and related concepts, such as community safety, are relevant in most parts of Europe. However it was also striking that most authors of the twelve country-based chapters in this volume faced a scarcity of scientific literature on the subject of social crime prevention. With a couple of exceptions, social crime prevention looks like it is still an open field, with plenty of room left to explore, both with regard to policy analysis and to practice analysis. This holds especially true in decentralised jurisdictions such as Italy, Spain and Belgium, where there is a lack of aggregated data at a national level. Therefore, drawing links between the different country-based chapters can only been done in a cautious and modest way, merely as an attempt to suggest avenues for further research. There are at least two more reasons for caution. Firstly, in most countries involved in the volume, the concept of social crime prevention has taken a rather marginal position in academic debate about crime prevention. Since the 1990s, related concepts such as ‘community safety’, ‘community crime prevention’ and ‘social safety’ (‘sociale veiligheid’ in Dutch and Flemish) attracted significant attention amongst scholars, leading to interesting discussions, but also possibly resulting in confusion about what constitutes social crime prevention and what does not. Secondly, assessing how social crime prevention is turned into policy and practice also brings in the problem of which things are supposed to have an impact on crime reduction and which are not, which varies period to period and from country to country. For instance, in the Netherlands, a large range of social policy measures are meant to have an impact on crime and are evaluated accordingly, whilst in Germany, similar measures are not all meant to have an impact on crime

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe

(Baillergeau, chapter 9, this volume; Groenemeyer & Schmidt, chapter 5, this volume). Far from reflecting the richness and diversity of all questions raised in the forthcoming country-based chapters, the present chapter will, firstly, recall the theories that are possibly involved in social crime prevention and explore their connection to policies that have been designed under the banner of social crime prevention. Secondly, it will: reconstruct the important changes in the development of social crime prevention; analyse new forms of social crime prevention; look at the countries that played a pioneering and innovative role in the elaboration of these new forms, also examining their political context; and search for the transfer of these new forms of social crime prevention to other countries in Europe. Finally, we shall try to make a prognosis about the future of social crime prevention during the coming decades of the 21st century and, more specifically, question the fate of the inclusive trend in crime prevention in the age of late modernity.

1. Social Crime Prevention Caught between Theory and Policy What are the root causes of crime? Do they lie with the offender or beyond, in the social context? For those who consider that the root causes of crime are to be found in the social context, a second range of questions may apply: what could be done to the root causes in order to reduce the occurrence of crime? All of the above have been long-lasting issues in crime studies and at the core of numerous theories. With the new individual positivist perspective on the criminal in the second half of the 19th century – defined as criminal anthropology or criminology – a lot of attention was paid to the prevention of criminal behaviour. Influenced by the evolution of medical science into a clinical science, the study of the prevention of criminal behaviour was called criminal prophylaxis, which tried to intervene in the biological and psychological factors (psychopathological criminal prophylaxis), as well as the social factors influencing (potential) criminal offenders (social criminal prophylaxis). On the basis of these individual positivist views of the criminal, Enrico Ferri (1914) worked out a criminal law and penal theory: the social defence theory. In contrast to the classic criminal law theory, the dangerousness of the criminal, not the seriousness of the criminal act, was the determining

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Towards a Comparative Analysis

factor for the criminal sanction. The social defence theory was in favour of indeterminate imprisonment of criminals. Detention could only end when the criminal was no longer capable of endangering society. According to Ferri’s theory, crime prevention should play a major role in criminal policy. Furthermore, he made a distinction between police prevention and social prevention. The objective of police prevention is to prevent the commission of a criminal act when a person’s criminal predisposition is already developed. Social prevention tries to eliminate or reduce the social causes of crime. During the end of the 19th and 20th Centuries, these insights of the social defence theory had an important influence on the further development of criminal policy in some continental European countries, such as Italy, France and Belgium. Also, the social positivist perspective on crime, which gained prominence in the beginning of the 20th century in the United States (and especially in Chicago) had a special interest in providing understanding into the social causes of crime and responding to them. Starting in the 1930s, the deprived neighbourhoods of Chicago served as case studies for the ‘social disorganisation theory’, but were also the site of pilot projects which would be later labelled ‘community crime prevention’ in Northern American cities. According to Robert Merton’s strain theory (1938), accumulating wealth is a highly valued goal in American society. The problem, or strain, arises because many people cannot access a legitimate means to achieve material success, especially young people from the working class. This was regarded as an incentive to commit crime. From the 1960s, numerous programmes aimed at enhancing opportunities among young people, offering jobs and/ or professional training, inspired by the works of Cloward & Ohlin (1960; Szabo, 1968; Knepper, 2007), such as the Mobilisation for Youth project in New York City were initiated. By carrying out both programmes, either inspired by the strain theory or the social disorganisation theory, President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty was a significant factor in the growth of social crime prevention. In the 1960s and 1970s, critical criminological perspectives focused on structural economic, social divisions and inequalities on the basis of class, ethnicity and race, and also on gender relations and power differentials which were reflected by crime and criminality, and which social crime prevention, as a part of a political struggle for social empowerment and justice, could eliminate or reduce (White, 1996). From an opposition to the neo-liberalinspired crime prevention policy in England and Wales, and their influence

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on other English-speaking countries in the 1980s, social crime prevention was also a central concept in the critical left-wing realist criminological writings (Currie, 1988; Young, 1991; Lea, 1997). According to the left-wing realists, social crime prevention is related to relative deprivation as the social cause of crime. The community should be the most appropriate level to take social crime prevention initiatives because they see crime as a product of the institutions and structure of the community. They felt that social crime prevention must be realised using a multi-agency approach. These theories obviously reflect potential frameworks for social crime prevention policy. What was the impact of these theories within the sphere of crime prevention across Europe? What was left of them by the end of the 2000s, when actively promoting welfare for all was no longer a central ambition of most European states? With the different contributions in this volume, we would like to make an inventory of the different meanings given to social crime prevention in late modern Europe, with a focus on the period starting in the early 1980s and especially during the first decade of the 21st century. Did the characteristics of late modernity (Hughes, 1998; Young, 2007) such as globalisation, individualisation, neo-liberalism, as well as the decline of the welfare state, influence the meaning of social crime prevention? In Continental Europe, we found a rich elaboration of the concept of social crime prevention as a policy aimed at preventing economic and social urban processes of marginalisation and exclusion during the 1980s, by sociologists and socialist-oriented policymakers in France and in Barcelona, based rather loosely on the American inputs mentioned above. French sociological theoretical and empirical research about social exclusion (Dubet, 1987; Dubet & Lapeyronnie, 1992; Paugam, 1996) inspired the elaboration of this urban and structural view of social crime prevention. The French ‘Forum for Urban Safety’ in the 1980s sustained the development of a so-called French social crime prevention model, grounded in state driven policies aimed at changing structural conditions for young people at risk of crime in various fields such as education, leisure, and labour. This French Forum took the initiative to establish a ‘European Forum for Urban Safety’, which exported the French model to other countries in Europe, and even to other continents. Two world congresses on crime prevention, organised in 1989 in Montreal and in 1991 in Paris, were strategic initiatives in the propagation of the French social crime prevention model. Broadly framed, the French model could be described as mid way between the Nordic model – grounded in the idea that social and educational programmes, backed by the universalistic

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welfare state, are expected to have preventative effects on crime – with the works of critical criminologist Nils Christie as a source of inspiration (Egge & Gundhus, chapter 10, this volume) on the one hand, and the community crime prevention model, relying on affirmative action towards young people based in deprived areas, often portrayed as the prevalent alternative to situational crime prevention in Anglophone countries, on the other. Indeed, social crime prevention has often been introduced as an alternative to situational crime prevention, and has unfolded in this way over the past few decades, especially in France throughout the 1980s (de Maillard & Germain, chapter 4, this volume) and the beginning of the 1990s, and in Belgium (Hebberecht, chapter 2, this volume) and some Italian regions and cities (Selmini, chapter 8, this volume), also during the 1990s. In other countries, social crime prevention had scarcely gained a foothold, but it was, at times, influential enough to alter the general content of governmental crime prevention policy, which led to some degree of blending of situational crime prevention and social crime prevention. As reflected in several of the country-based chapters, this blending meant both opportunities for social crime prevention programmes to continue and to grow and the risk that it would lose its soul and eventually becoming an auxiliary of situational crime prevention.

2. Late modern turns in social crime prevention Many publications have analysed the ‘preventive turn’ in a general way, especially in the crime prevention and reduction policies of Englishspeaking countries (Hughes, 2007; Crawford, 2009). Changes in social crime prevention received only indirect scientific attention in English-languageliterature. The different contributions in this book make it possible to analyse in a more detailed and documented way the ‘turns’ in social crime prevention in the different European countries since the 1980s. From the post-war period until the 1970s, social crime prevention was mainly realised within the juvenile justice system. Interventions were primarily focused on the danger to society posed by individual young people. Outside the juvenile justice system, social crime preventive initiatives were oriented towards young people’s broader social environment. For example, at the end of the 1950s ‘specialised educators’ (éducateurs spécialisés), ‘neighbourhood clubs’ (clubs de quartier) and ‘prevention clubs’ (clubs de prévention) were

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set up in France to reach marginalised young people who fell outside the regular youth movements (Duprez, 1997: 65). Such practices also occurred in other European countries, although they were not explicitly labelled as crime prevention (community work in Dutch cities in the age of urban sprawl; detached youth work in Britain; outreach work in Norway, among others). In the functioning of the criminal justice system, a social crime preventive objective was also achieved by the reintegration and rehabilitation of convicted offenders. Outside the criminal justice system, a social crime preventive effect was expected from educational and social policies and from public housing policies carried out in the context of the developing social welfare state. In Britain, such social preventive interventions were mostly carried out at a local level in cities run by the Labour party. However, from 1979 onwards, the powers of the latter were gradually dismantled by the conservative administration of Margaret Thatcher. As a response to the crisis in crime control, the English ‘preventive turn’ in the 1980s (Hughes, 2007; Crawford, 2009) consists of the reinforcement of the deterrent effects of the criminal justice system and in the propagation of situational prevention, which aimed to reduce the opportunities to commit crime. Under British influence, this ‘preventive turn’ took also place in the Netherlands (Baillergeau, chapter 9, this volume) and in Belgium (Hebberecht, chapter 2, this volume), in the first half of the 1980s. The dismantling of the social welfare state in these countries was less pronounced than in Great Britain; the same can be said for the social crime prevention realised within the criminal justice system. Scandinavian countries, under the same British influence, developed situational preventive strategies in the 1980s. But this new orientation in crime prevention complemented the post-war social crime prevention efforts within the criminal justice system. In the Scandinavian example, the social welfare state was maintained (Egge & Gundhus, chapter 10, this volume). Under the influence of North-American conservative and neo-liberal developments in criminal policy, the law ‘Sécurité et liberté’ (Security and liberty) proposed by the conservative French Minister of Justice Alain Peyrefitte was adopted in 1979, under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. As in Great Britain, this law would reinforce the deterrent effect of the French criminal justice system and introduce situational crime prevention measures. Due to political developments, this ‘preventive turn’ was not realised in France. The left-wing government led by Pierre Mauroy abolished the law ‘Sécurité et liberté’ in 1982, under the presidency of the socialist François Mitterand (Badinter, 2011). In this French economic, social

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and political context the first ‘social crime preventive turn’ took place during the first half of the 1980s (Robert, 1991; Duprez, 1997; Crawford, 2002; Roché, 2002; Body-Gendrot & Duprez, 2002; Wyvekens, 2009, de Maillard & Germain, chapter 4, this volume). In 1982, a parliamentary commission was set up under the presidency of Gilbert Bonnemaison, a socialist MP, but also the mayor of a suburban city near Paris. In the final report of this commission ‘Face à la délinquance: prévention, répression et solidarité’ (Facing crime: prevention, repression, solidarity) a blueprint for a left-wing oriented security policy was formulated. A new addition of a social crime prevention policy formed part of this broader security policy. This new social crime prevention model was created in the context of a growing political consciousness in the French president and the government that, in 1982, the socialist project they had promised their voters could not be realised in a European context of increasingly neo-liberal economic reforms. The socialist plans to reform the capitalist economy were stowed away. The radical social reforms promised during the electoral campaigns were reformulated into urban and social policies with preventive effects on street crime, property crime and insecurity. We could argue that the so-called new French social crime prevention model was an adaptation of the post-war social policies, with effects on structural crime factors to fit a new neo-liberal economic context. Territorialisation, contractualisation and partnership between the concerned actors were the characteristics of these new policies. Specialised educators were no longer the only social professionals involved in the prevention of the rise of juvenile delinquency (Duprez, 1997: 67). Under the direction of the mayor who chaired the ‘Conseil communal de prévention de la délinquance’ (CCPD, Municipal Council for the Prevention of Delinquency) new actors were introduced in the field of (social) crime prevention. The ‘Conseil national de prévention de la délinquance’ (CNPD, National Council for the Prevention of Delinquency) financed different kind of preventive projects (mostly social preventive projects) of the local CCPD’s by means of ‘contrats d’action’ (action contracts). Other interdepartmental national commissions with responsibilities in the domain of social crime prevention were also set up. Started in 1981 the ‘Commission nationale pour le développement social des quartiers’ (CNDSQ, National Commission for the Social Development of Neighbourhoods) financed local projects with an emphasis on housing and public space renewal, resident participation, leisure time activities for youngsters, and

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affirmative actions in favour of immigrants. Since 1981 ‘Zones d’éducation prioritaires’ (ZEP, Priority Zones of Education) were set up in about 350 schools and colleges. ZEP created tailor-made programmes for young people and children at risk of dropping out of school. These different national initiatives took place in a partnership between different national departments, under the authority of the prime minister. The distinction between the broader social policies with a crime preventive effect and explicit social crime prevention policy realised within the criminal justice system was no longer made. Education policy, urban policy, social policy, housing policy, criminal policy merged in a social crime prevention policy that focused on the marginalised populations of run-down urban neighbourhoods. This new social crime prevention policy is territorialised and decentralised. Social crime preventive interventions are now flexible and react more directly to real local needs. The inhabitants of these neighbourhoods are encouraged to participate in the expansion of social crime prevention policy in their neighbourhood. Marginalised youngsters are encouraged to become professional community workers in their neighbourhood. Other social occupations are also created, such as ‘agent de développement social’ (agent of social development); coordinators of projects in the context of this new social crime prevention. Old and new local actors in social crime prevention like the police, judges, representatives, social workers, members of social organisations and associations, etc., are now working together and no longer against or in isolation from one other as they were before. In the 1980s, the city of Barcelona also joined the ranks of those embracing this first turn in social crime prevention (Recasens, 2002; Recasens, chapter 13, this volume). The second late modern turn in social crime prevention happened in the 1990s. This second turn was the result of an adaptation of the influence of the French reconfigured social crime prevention of the 1980s to the neoliberal situational prevention policy developed in 1980s Great-Britain, the Netherlands and Belgium. This second turn first took the form of ‘an integrated and administrative crime prevention policy’ in both Belgium (1990-1991) and the Netherlands (1988-1993), when after a long time in opposition, social-democratic parties re-entered the Belgian and Dutch governments. In England and Wales, this second turn was realised by means of the concept of ‘community safety’, as elaborated by the Morgan Commission in 1991 (Crawford, 2002; Hughes, McLaughlin & Muncie, 2002). This concept, rejected by the conservative government, inspired NGOs like the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders, (NACRO)

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(Ely and Stanley, 1990) and some socialist local authorities in England and Wales to implement prevention policies of their own. Left-wing realism inspired the elaboration of this English turn in social crime prevention. The influence of neo-liberal security logic upon this second turn in social crime prevention became stronger in Belgium (1992-1999) (Hebberecht, chapter 2, this volume) with its local ‘security contracts’ and in the Netherlands (19942002) with its ‘integral security policy’ (Baillergeau, chapter 9, this volume). This second turn of social crime prevention also occurred in France during the second half of the 1990s (de Maillard & Germain, chapter 4, this volume). This second turn in social crime prevention in Belgium, the Netherlands, England and Wales in the early and mid 1990s also had an influence on different ‘Länder’ in reunified Germany (Groenemeyer & Schmidt, chapter 5, this volume), in Italian regions such as Emilia – Romagna (Selmini, chapter 8, this volume) and in a smaller way in some Italian, Spanish (Recasens, chapter 13, this volume), Portuguese (Cardoso, Castro & da Agra, chapter 11, this volume) and Greek cities (Vidali, chapter 6, this volume), in many cases members of the ‘European Forum for Urban Safety’. This new orientation in social crime prevention reached its fullest development in the security and safety policy of the New Labour government of Tony Blair in 1997 (Crawford, 2002; Crawford & Traynor, chapter 3, this volume). The New Labour version of the second recent turn of social crime prevention strongly influenced the creation of the social crime prevention component of the prevention and security policy in the new Central and Eastern European member states of the European Union in 2004 (Kerezsi, chapter 7, this volume; Meško, Kanduč & Jere, chapter 12, this volume). The transfer of this British safety and security policy to these new member states was, significantly, realised by initiatives and interventions of the European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN), which was set up by the European Union on 28 May 2001. The influence of this second turn in social crime prevention was also significant in other countries, regions and cities in Europe where social-democratic parties enjoyed political dominance (Baillergeau, chapter 9, this volume; Hebberecht, chapter 2, this volume; Groenemeyer & Schmidt, chapter 5, this volume; Selmini, chapter 8, this volume). A third late modern turn in social crime prevention can be seen in the prioritising of the fight against anti-social behaviour and public nuisance and disorder under the New Labour governments at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century. Influenced by developmental criminology, the new social crime prevention programmes would have less and less of

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a community and neighbourhood orientation and more and more of an orientation towards the (potential) offender. The concepts of ‘community crime prevention’ and ‘community safety’, forged by the second turn in social crime prevention, would now ‘assume a developmental logic underpinning both the factors that render certain communities high crime places and those that foster the crime preventative capacities of certain communities.’ Social crime prevention now incorporates ‘interventions aimed at reducing individual motivations to offend via their social influences and institutions of socialisation and altering social relations and / or the social environment, through a collective focus on communities, neighbourhoods or social networks’ (Crawford & Traynor, chapter 3, this volume). This individual neo-positivist perspective on social crime prevention ties in with the individual positivist perspective in the second half of the 19th century. Developmental crime prevention, combined with a new focus on community crime prevention, is starting to influence the social crime prevention component of the security policy of other continental European countries.

3. The Fate of the Inclusive Line in Crime Prevention in Europe Over the past few decades, an ongoing question about social crime prevention has been to explore its connections to other crime prevention models. With the rise of community safety and ‘policy mix’ in the 1990s, social crime prevention was increasingly challenged by situational logic, as it was earlier noticed by observers based in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands: when the two logics are blended, the situational logic tends to prevail (Knepper, 2007; Gilling, 2009; Van Swaaningen, 2002). This challenge is now becoming obvious in areas with a strong social crime prevention tradition, such as France and Italy (de Maillard & Germain, chapter 4, this volume; Selmini, chapter 8, this volume). Yet an emerging question is that of the conceptual boundaries between social crime prevention and developmental crime prevention. Social crime prevention is now sometimes defined as a part of developmental crime prevention (Van Noije & Wittebrood 2008 quoted in Baillergeau, chapter 9, this volume). Conversely developmental crime prevention is sometimes defined as a part of social crime prevention (Crawford & Traynor, chapter

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3, this volume) or, even, defined in the same way, based on the same characteristics. Indeed both social crime prevention and developmental crime prevention may be understood as inclusive approaches to crime prevention, whilst situational crime prevention is mostly an exclusive one (Young, 2001). Does social crime prevention now equal developmental crime prevention? What are the fate and the form of the inclusive approach in crime prevention nowadays? Developmental crime prevention has been defined as a way to prevent ‘socially disruptive behaviour, cognitive defects and poor parenting’ (Tremblay & Craig, 1995). Providing parental support might indeed strengthen the ability of allegedly ‘at-risk’ families to incorporate into mainstream society and avoid getting into criminal careers. However, by focusing on early intervention on the basis of predesigned risk factors, long before the start of a criminal career, developmental crime prevention bears the risk of stigmatising, which may, in turn, result in exclusion and hence, endanger the inclusive power of developmental crime prevention. This question is likely to develop since, as shown by some contributors to this volume, the expectation that universal social programmes will have long term preventive effects is fading away and social prevention programmes are increasingly based on risk assessment and early intervention among young families. Hence the blending of social crime prevention and developmental crime prevention may result in a lower inclusive power in crime prevention. However, using risk factors as a tool in crime prevention does not require that these programmes are based on a predictive understanding of the risk factors. Actually, numerous programmes considered in this volume are based on a rather open definition of target groups, for example work experience programmes designed for low-skilled young adults or conflict mediation schemes. Further research into crime prevention should certainly not overlook the study of the underlying assumptions leading to the design of target groups as well as the study of how the notion of risk is handled in policy definition and implementation. Since social crime prevention programmes are increasingly based on individual and family intervention, one may also wonder about the ambition of these programmes to address the structural causes of crime and question at which level they intend to operate. This triggers the question of the conceptual boundaries between social crime prevention and community crime prevention. As stated earlier, the latter concept is very common in the British Isles and Northern America, where it was designed as an umbrella for ‘actions intended to change the social conditions that are believed to sustain crime in residential areas’ (Hope, 1995). Community crime prevention

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was blamed for missing the point when the social causes of crime lie not only beyond individuals but also beyond (residential) communities. Hence community crime prevention programmes have no effect on causes like unemployment or increasing individualisation (Hope, 1995; Gilling, 2009). For a long time, the concept of community crime prevention did not sound fully relevant for continental Europe, where the notion of community does not match meaningful social structures and where the proponents of social crime prevention clearly had the ambition to target the structural causes of crime. However, many contributors to this volume show that an increasing number of social crime prevention programmes are deemed to be limited to local projects, rooted within residential communities (Selmini, chapter 8, this volume; de Maillard & Germain, chapter 4, this volume; Baillergeau, chapter 9, this volume). This does not mean that there might not be any impact beyond communities. Analysing how social crime prevention is turned into practice invites us to view the issue differently and clearly, for example some conflict mediation schemes are meant to address negative images across conflicting groupings. Moreover, some employability programmes are designed in such a way that young people are challenged to travel out of their own circle and broaden the scope of their social network (Hebberecht, chapter 2, this volume; Groenemeyer & Schmidt, chapter 5, this volume; Baillergeau, chapter 9, this volume). The golden age of structural crime prevention, as seen in 1980s and the early 90s in continental Europe, is certainly behind us, but obviously, significant elements of it remain in crime prevention policy across Europe. Evidence of this continued effect can be seen in the way that social crime prevention does not limit itself to developmental crime prevention plus community crime prevention in a number of European countries. Broadly framed, the inclusive thread in crime prevention not only offers much ground for empirical observation but also for theoretical reformulation. Besides, most social crime prevention programmes share a common challenge: proving that promoting social welfare can have a positive impact on crime reduction. Evaluation of social crime prevention is a problematic issue in quite a few countries (Selmini, chapter 8, this volume; Egge & Gundhus, chapter 10, this volume; Crawford & Traynor, chapter 3, this volume). While the opposite – decreasing social welfare benefits result in more crime as argued by Graham and Bennett (1995) – still holds true, it is left to the proponents of social crime prevention to show evidence of its capability to contribute to crime reduction in a positive way.

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4. Concluding Remarks With the rapid economic, political, social and cultural changes that have taken place during the last decade, it is rather difficult to make a prognosis about the future of social crime prevention for the decades ahead. Will we be confronted with a new banking crisis as in 2008? Will we witness a deep economic recession? Which will be the next dramatic event to scandalise people like the recent riots in London and the fascist murders of Anders Breivik? How deeply will budgets for expenditure on social policies be cut? While crime rates and public concern about crime have decreased slightly in some countries (Groenemeyer & Schmidt, chapter 5, this volume), it will most likely remain a central characteristic of economic and social life, especially if the economic context continues to decline. With their increasingly threatened economic and social position, members of the middle class will be less inclined towards solidarity with groups who are excluded and marginalised. Stronger populist and punitive demands for more security and authoritarian and repressive control of ‘risk’ populations will be formulated. Will there still be a place for social crime prevention in the prevention and security policies of the future? If, financially and politically, there is still a place at a national level for social crime prevention policies oriented towards the most excluded and marginalised, the authorities will strongly feel the need to make them invisible or to legitimise them by highlighting their effects on the reduction of crime and insecurity. The place for a social crime prevention oriented towards structural crime factors and urban neighbourhoods and communities will depend on the further development of the social welfare state and of the criminal justice system. At a local level, the possibility of creating a social crime prevention policy will depend on the local political-ideological power relations and the financial means of the city or municipality. In addition, the professional resistance of social crime prevention workers to the pressure of local authorities and the police to react in an authoritarian and repressive way will play a significant role. It is also highly likely that in the future, certain forms of social crime prevention – those that are more individually oriented towards young people and children at risk and that favour early coercive intervention in their social environment to prevent them from committing anti-social behaviour, incivilities and public nuisance – will be favoured. Social crime prevention practices in a mixed form, with both situational and control elements, are very likely to find a place in local prevention and security policy.

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Social crime prevention was definitely impacted by late modernity. Most of the contributors to this volume portray declining political attention towards social crime prevention over the last decade. However, just as relatively high crime rates among low-income groups are still a common reality, material success is still a central value in Western societies and low-income groups still seem to have significantly lower opportunities than average to achieve material success in a legitimate way, as reflected in the riots in the French banlieues in 2005 and, more recently, the riots and looting in major English cities (Summer, 2011). Since developmental crime prevention programmes relying on predictive knowledge, even though they are not fully developed across continental Europe, have already raised significant concerns (Crawford, 2009; Crawford & Traynor, chapter 3, this volume), there will probably be space for empirical testing and re-conceptualisation for alternative inclusive approaches to crime reduction.

Bibliography Badinter, R. (2011). Les épines et les roses [Thorns and Roses]. Paris: Fayard. Body-Gendrot, S., & Duprez, D. (2002). Security and Prevention Policies in France in the 1990’s. French Cities and Security. In P. Hebberecht & D. Duprez (eds.), The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe (pp. 95-132). Brussels: VUBPRESS. Cloward, R.A., & Ohlin, L.E. (1960). Delinquency and Opportunity. New York: The Free Press. Crawford, A. (2002). The Politics of Community Safety and Crime Prevention in England and Wales: New Strategies and Developments. In P. Hebberecht & D. Duprez (eds.), The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe (pp. 51-94). Brussels: VUBPRESS. Crawford, A. (2009). Situating Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective: Policy Travels, Transfer and Translation. In A. Crawford (ed.), Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective (pp. 1-37). Cullompton: Willan Publishing. Currie, E. (1988). Two Visions of Community Crime Prevention. In T. Hope & M. Shaw (eds.), Communities and Crime Reduction (pp. 280-286). London: HMSO. Dubet, F. (1987). La galère: jeunes en survie [The Galley: Youth Surviving]. Paris: Fayard. Dubet, F., & Lapeyronnie, D. (1992). Les quartiers d’exil [The Neighbourhoods of Exile]. Paris: Seuil.

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Towards a Comparative Analysis Duprez, D. (1997). Le modèle français de prévention de la délinquance: la recherche d’un second souffle [The French Prevention Model of Delinquency: the Search for a Second Impuls]. In P. Hebberecht & F. Sack (eds.), La prévention de la délinquance en Europe. Nouvelles stratégies (pp. 61-82). Paris: L’Harmattan. Ely, P., & Stanley, C. (1990). The French Alternative. Delinquency Prevention and Child Protection in France: With Reference to the Dunkirk Conurbation. London: NACRO. Ferri, E. (1914). La sociologie criminelle [Criminal Sociology] (2nd ed.). Paris: Félix Alcan. Gilling, D. (2009). Crime Reduction and Community Safety: Labour and the Politics of Local Crime Control. Collumpton: Willan. Graham, J., & Bennett, T. (1995). Crime Prevention Strategies in Europe and Northern America. Helsinki: European Institute for Crime Prevention and Control. Hope, T. (1995). Community Crime Prevention. In M. Tonry & D.P. Farrington (eds.), Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (pp. 21-89). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hughes, G. (1998). Understanding Crime Prevention: Social Control, Risk and Late Modernity. Buckingham: Open University Press. Hughes, G. (2007). The Politics of Crime and Community. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. Hughes, G., McLaughlin, E., & Muncie, J. (eds.). (2002). Crime Prevention and Community Safety: New Directions. London: Sage. Knepper, P. (2007). Criminology and Social Policy. London: Sage. Lea, J. (1997). From Integration to Exclusion: the Development of Crime Prevention Policy in the United Kingdom Retrieved May 18, 2011 from http://www.bunker8.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/misc/polis.htm Merton, R. (1938). Social Structure and Anomie. American Sociological Review, 3 (October), 672-682. Paugam, S. (1996). L’exclusion, l’état des savoirs [Exclusion, the State of Art]. Paris: La Découverte. Recasens I Brunet, A. (2002). Security and Crime Prevention Policies in Spain in the 1990’s. In P. Hebberecht & D. Duprez (eds.), The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe (pp. 209-236). Brussels: VUBPRESS. Robert, P. (ed.). (1991). Les politiques de prévention de la délinquance à l’aune de la recherche; un bilan international [The Prevention Policies of Delinquency in Terms of Research: an International Appraisal]. Paris: L’Harmattan. Robert, P. (2009). Evaluation of Safety and Crime Prevention Policies in Europe. In P. Robert (ed.), Evaluating Safety and Crime Prevention Policies in Europe (pp. 11-39). Brussels: VUBPRESS. Roche, S. (2002). Towards a New Governance of Crime and Insecurity in France. In A. Crawford (ed.), Crime and Insecurity. The Governance of Safety in Europe (pp. 213-233). Collumpton: Willan.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Shaw, C.R., & McKay, H.D. (1942). Juvenile Delinquency in Urban Areas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Szabo, D. (1967). Les mesures de prévention sociale [The Measures of Social Prevention]. In D. Szabo (ed.), Criminologie en action. Bilan de criminologie contemporaine dans ses grands domaines d’application. Criminology in Action. Inventory of Contemporary Criminology. Its Principal Fields of Application (pp. 273-311). Montréal: Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal. Tremblay, R.E., & Craig, W.M. (1995). Developmental Crime Prevention. In M. Tonry & D.P. Farrington (eds.), Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (Vol. 19, pp. 151-236). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Van Swaaningen, R. (2002). Towards a Replacement Discourse on Community Safety: Lessons From the Netherlands. In G. Hughes, E. McLaughlin & J. Muncie (eds.), Crime Prevention and Community Safety: New Directions (pp. 260-278). London: Sage. White, R. (1996). Situating Crime Prevention: Models, Methods and Political Perspectives. Crime Prevention Studies, 5, 97-113. Wyvekens, A. (2009). The Evolving Story of Crime Prevention in France. In A. Crawford (ed.), Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective (pp. 110-129). Cullompton: Willan Publishing. Young, J. (1991). Left Realism and the Priorities of Crime Control. In K. Stenson & D. Cowell (eds.), The Politics of Crime Control (pp. 146-160). London: Sage. Young, J. (2001). Social Crime Prevention. In E. McLaughlin & J. Muncie (eds.), The Sage Dictionary of Criminology (p. 272). London: Sage. Young, J. (2007). The Vertigo of Late Modernity. London: Sage.

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The Turns in Social Crime Prevention in Belgian Crime Prevention Policy since the 1980s Patrick Hebberecht

Introduction Since the end of the 19th century, under the influence of the ‘social defence’ theory, social crime prevention was a central notion in criminal theory and policy in Belgium. The social defence theory was a criminal law and penal theory developed by Enrico Ferri (1914), based on the new individual positivist views of criminals in the second half of the 19th century, and defined as criminal anthropology or criminology. Influenced by the evolution of medical science as a clinical science, the study of the prevention of criminal behaviour was called criminal prophylaxis. It tried to intervene not only in the biological and psychological factors of (potential) criminal offenders (psychopathological criminal prophylaxis), but also in their social environment (social criminal prophylaxis). The notion of social crime prevention as an intervention by the criminal justice system in the social environment of the (potential) offenders inspired many reforms of Belgian criminal law in the fi rst decades of the 20th century, especially of the Child Protection Law (1912) and the execution of criminal sanctions. Also, in the period after World War II, the new ‘social defence’ theory, reformulated by Marc Ancel (1965), continued to influence the further elaboration of the notion of social crime prevention within the Belgian criminal justice system. The new Juvenile Protection Law of 1965 made a distinction between judicial and social juvenile protection. In the context of social juvenile protection, social crime prevention measures were undertaken. Many reforms of prison laws and regimes were oriented towards the social integration of convicted offenders. Outside the criminal justice system, a social crime preventive effect was expected from the economic, urban, educational, social and

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cultural policies executed in the context of the development of the postwar social welfare state. This notion of social crime prevention, and the post-war reforms of the criminal justice system inspired by it, were contested in the context of the economic, social, political and ideological crises of the 1970s. Neo-liberal conservatives criticised social crime prevention efforts within the functioning of the criminal justice system for their lack of deterrent effect on criminal behaviour. According to them, the social welfare state had created a culture of dependency. The radical left formulated a critique of the controlling and disciplinary effects of social crime prevention programmes. They stated that the social welfare state was the result of a reform of the capitalist system, obfuscating the real economic, political and social contradictions. In the mid 1980s, a ‘preventive turn’ took place in Belgium, some years later than in other Western European countries. This was initiated by the gendarmerie and by a number of communal police corps, especially in the Flemish part of the country. The police’s new prevention policy led to the Minister of the Interior’s Royal Decree of 6 August 1985, which formed the start of the development of a national/federal crime prevention policy. In the first part of this essay, we will attempt to position social crime prevention within this national/federal crime prevention policy since 1985. Due to a lack of official reports and documents and of results of scientific research into local social crime prevention policy in the different Belgian cities and municipalities, it is impossible to make an analysis of the similarities and differences between these local policies. For this reason, in the second part we will restrict our analysis of the place of social crime prevention within a local crime prevention policy to the city of Ghent. Finally, in the conclusion, we will contextualise Belgian developments in social crime prevention over the past thirty years, in the institutional framework, the organisation of the police forces and the political ideologies in Belgium, influenced by neo-liberal globalisation and confronted with a crisis of the nation state.

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Belgian Crime Prevention Policy and ‘Social Crime Prevention’ For a good understanding of the evolution of national/federal crime prevention policy and of social crime prevention in particular, the period from the 1985 Royal Decree on crime prevention to the present day is subdivided into four periods, according to the coalitions of political parties governing at a national/federal level.1 Following this criterion, a distinction is made between four periods: firstly, 1985 to 1988, during which a coalition of Christian-democratic and liberal parties governed; secondly, 1988 to 1999, when a coalition of Christian-democratic and socialist parties was in power; thirdly, the period 1999 to 2007, which witnessed a coalition of liberal and socialist parties (and from 1999 until 2003 also of green parties); and fourthly the period 2007 to 2010, with a coalition between the Christian-democratic and liberal parties on the Flemish side and Christian-democratic, liberal and socialist parties in the French-speaking part of Belgium. To date, the various political parties have not succeeded in forming a new government, due to the political conflicts and disagreements between the Flemish and French-speaking political parties. In the meantime, the last government, Leterme II, is still dealing with current affairs. For new developments in federal crime prevention policy, we shall have to wait for the formation of a new federal government.

Christian-democratic and liberal prevention policy (1985-1988): new national prevention policy and structure Because of an increase in problems of crime and insecurity, but also due to the reduction in detection rates, a new police prevention policy was developed by the gendarmerie and some local police forces, most notably in Flanders (Berkmoes, 1990; Carlier, 1990; Hebberecht, 1990). Potential victims were encouraged by police services to take techno-preventive measures. From 1981, the government, a coalition of Christian democratic and liberal parties, tried to restructure the Belgian Keynesian welfare state according 1 It is important to note that since the 1970s, due to the regional conflicts of interest within Belgium, almost all political formations are split into both a Flemish and French-speaking political party, which are totally independent from each other.

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to neo-liberal prescriptions. Only when the legitimacy of the government was heavily threatened by a combination of the unsolved killings by the so called ‘Gang of Nijvel’, acts of terrorism by the ‘Cellules Communistes Combattantes’ and the dramatic events during the football game between Juventus and Liverpool in the Brussels Heyzel stadium in 1985, did the government begin to outline a security and prevention policy aimed at several different types of crime. By means of his security plan (note that the word security was used for the first time in a government plan), the Minister of Justice, the French-speaking liberal Gol, sought to strengthen and improve collaboration between the gendarmerie, the communal police and the judicial police in their fight against banditry and terrorism. To fight property crime and vandalism, the minister of the Interior, the Frenchspeaking Christian-democrat Nothomb, created a new national prevention structure and policy by means of the Royal Decree of 6 August 1985. This new national prevention policy was inspired by the new police prevention policy. At that time, the institutions of the Belgian unitary state determined the structure of the prevention policy, the elaboration and implementation of which was centralised at a national and provincial level. This ‘preventive turn’ in Belgian governmental policy was predominantly situation oriented (Hebberecht, 1988). In the national crime prevention policy, there was no place for social prevention. Local prevention projects were initially coordinated by police forces. Local political authorities, administrative services and social welfare organisations were not involved in the developed partnerships (De Witte, 1988).

Christian democratic and socialist prevention policy (1988-99). From an integrated crime prevention policy to a crime prevention policy as a part of a local security policy run by the mayor and the police An integrated administrative prevention policy (1988-1992) After years of opposition, Flemish and French-speaking socialists entered a coalition with Flemish and French-speaking Christian democratic parties. This political coalition existed until 1999 in different governmental constitutions. During this period, Flemish socialists held the position of Minister of the Interior and were responsible for the further elaboration of the crime prevention policy (Cartuyvels & Hebberecht, 2002).

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Within the framework of what became known as the ‘Whitsun Plan’ of 5 June 1990, a government plan to reform the police and justice system, the Minister of the Interior, the Flemish socialist Louis Tobback, re-oriented national prevention policy towards a local, administrative and integrated approach (Poulet, 1995; Synergie, 1995). According to this new vision on crime prevention, the commitment of property crimes and vandalism as well as victimisation by those crimes could be explained by economic and social marginalisation and exclusion. The problem of delinquency was related to more structural and urban social problems of unemployment, immigration and marginalisation. The prevention of crime had to take into account a structural and urban social dimension. A social crime prevention policy had to be implemented at a local level and especially in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods of Belgian cities. The Mayor was given key responsibility for the development, integration and execution of this new crime prevention policy. The role of the police services and thus of their preferred situational and techno-prevention moved somewhat into the background. The government reorganised the communal police into a front-line police force and the gendarmerie’s role became secondary. According to this new division of police tasks, only the communal police had a limited role to play in local prevention policy. After all, the communal police exercise their administrative competences under the authority of the Mayor. Social and welfare organisations were given the important task of preventing crimes committed by vulnerable and marginalised young people, as well as of reducing victimisation and fear of crime among vulnerable social groups. In the opinion of the Minister of the Interior, the local administrative prevention policy had to integrate both situational and social approaches, as well as being oriented towards both (potential) victims and (potential) offenders, the Mayor had to ensure that the various actors in the field of prevention worked together in partnership. To implement this new vision, the Minister of the Interior financed 27 pilot prevention projects. To stimulate public, political and administrative support for the integrated local prevention policy, the Minister distributed a ministerial circular to all Mayors, OOP18 (30/01/1992), containing a model regulation for setting up a communal advisory board on prevention.

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Crime prevention policy as a part of a local security policy of the Mayor and the police (1992-1999) In May 1991, some Brussels’ districts were confronted with incidents between the police forces and some groups of young people, mostly from ethnic minorities. The immediate cause was a police stop and search action. The more fundamental cause was the marginalisation and exclusion of these young people in the Brussels region. These incidents received widespread media coverage and were represented as ‘riots’ (Brion & Rea, 1992). During the parliamentary elections of November 24, 1991, the Flemish extreme right political party (Vlaams Blok) had an electoral breakthrough in Flanders. It had conducted a campaign against immigrants and in favour of a repressive and tough crime control policy. Despite the fact that the previous coalition of Christian democrats and socialists lost almost 10 per cent of their votes, they still formed the new government. Moreover, the Flemish socialist, Tobback, remained at the Ministry of the Interior. The Council of Ministers approved the ‘Citizen Security’ guidelines drafted by the Interior and Justice Ministries on June 19, 1992 (Cartuyvels & Hebberecht, 2002). Amongst the principal objectives, these guidelines also mentioned tackling the social causes of insecurity. The principle of an administrative and integrated approach to local crime prevention was confirmed by the shape of the security and prevention contracts negotiated between the Minister of the Interior and the Mayor of a city or municipality. A security contract consisted of a section concerning community policing and a section covering prevention. About 75 percent of a security contract’s financing was channelled into projects that sought to improve the quality of communal policing and that were designed to bring police closer to citizens. In the section concerning prevention, projects that reflected the government’s new preventive philosophy were chosen. The main target groups were young people, especially from ethnic minorities living in underprivileged neighbourhoods, drug users and offenders, and victims of crime. In many cities and municipalities the more socially-oriented projects were set up without consultation with local youth assistance bodies, mental healthcare providers, and those providing specialised assistance for drug addicts, etc. (Mary, 2003; Franssen, 2003). By the summer of 1992, security contracts had already been signed with five large Belgian cities and seven at-risk municipalities from the Brussels Region

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for the period covering 1992 and 1993. Between the end of 1992 and 1995, the number of security contracts increased to 29 cities and municipalities. The Brussels and Walloon Regions agreed to play a mediating role between the federal and the local level in prevention policy and co-financed the crime prevention projects with a strong social orientation.2 This was not the case for the Flemish Region, because they were opposed to federal interventions in their areas of responsibility and were not willing to sustain a socialdemocratic inspired crime prevention policy. Prevention contracts consisted exclusively of preventive projects. For the period 1992 and 1993, 23 smaller cities and municipalities received a prevention contract. In 1995 the number of prevention contracts was extended to 29 cities and municipalities. The new orientations in the prevention policy were now framed within a broader local security policy run by the Mayor and the communal police. The creation of a municipal prevention officer role in charge of coordinating prevention policy and the establishment of a municipal advisory board for the prevention of crime were made compulsory for all cities and municipalities that received financing through security and prevention contracts. But in the broader local security policy, the municipal police force was given the most important role. Following the legislative elections of May 21, 1995 a new coalition brought the Christian democrats and socialists back to power. Johan Vande Lanotte, a Flemish socialist, was reinstated as Minister of the Interior (the position he had filled to replace Louis Tobback at the end of the previous legislature) and he continued the crime preventive policy orientations of his predecessor. The number of security contracts and prevention contracts did not rise.

2 With the constitutional reform of 1988, Belgium was no longer a nation state but was transformed into a federal state with three regions (the Flemish, Brussels and Walloon regions) and with three communities (Flemish, French and German) (Platel, 2004). The Belgian state was now composed of three levels of government. The first is the Federal government, which has the residual powers not assigned to other levels of government (notably national defence, foreign policy, the mint, social security, the justice system and the ministry of the Interior). The second level is the Regions. Their powers are defined territorially and include, among other things, housing, transport, public workers and foreign trade. At the third level of government lies the Communities, the powers of which are linked to the language of the citizens and include education, culture, health and assistance to people (and thus youth assistance).

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In the first half of the 1990s, some forms of drug abuse in public places in Belgian cities became more visible and were associated by large groups of citizens, the media and political parties with insecurity and crime. This drug problem was defined as a public order problem. As a part of a broader governmental drug plan, projects to prevent drug use and medico-social projects for homeless drug addicts were added to the security contracts of 1995. This was also the case with Ministry of Justice projects to implement and support alternative criminal sanctions. In 1996, a section on city guards was integrated in the security contracts. Funding was provided to offer the long-term unemployed work as wardens, whose work involved the exercising of control functions and supervision in streets, squares and public places. Although the Council of Ministers of August 1996 announced the transformation of security contracts into society contracts in order to include an urban renewal section, this was only realised in 1998, due to difficult negotiations between the Minister of the Interior and the regions and communities. 14 cities and municipalities with a security contract added an ‘urban renewal’ section. The objectives of the projects financed under this section were the improvement of the quality of life in the city and its neighbourhoods, greater control by the police, integrated social development and the establishment of the so-called ‘justitieantennes’ (decentralised annexes of the administration of justice). The security contracts were not transformed into society contracts but into security and society contracts. In August 1996, the discovery of the bodies of two murdered young girls sent a shock wave through Belgium. The subsequent public concern for what became known as the ‘Dutroux Scandal’ strengthened the position of the Minister of Justice, the Flemish Christian-democrat De Clerck, within the government. He was now able to push through the reform of the justice system. These events meant that the Minister of the Interior was well aware that the total financial support for his prevention and security policy would no longer continue to increase, as it had been the case since 1992. The financial, administrative and scientific evaluation of the security and prevention contracts now became a priority for the Minister of the Interior (Depovere & Ponsaers, 1998; Mary, 2003). The results of this evaluation made it possible to exclude some unsuccessful projects from a contract and to start some new innovative projects. Latterly, the Ministry of the Interior was less interested in the evaluation by academic research groups of socio-preventive projects within the security contracts (Strebelle, 2003).

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The escape of Dutroux from a police station in April 1998 led to the resignation of the Ministers of Justice and the Interior. The Flemish socialist Luc Vanden Bossche became the new Minister of the Interior. In the run-up to the 1999 elections, the ‘get tough’ approach to crime, advocated by the extreme right ‘Vlaams Blok’, captured the public imagination. In the attempt to break the right-wing monopoly of this election theme, the Flemish liberal party positioned itself as the advocate of a more authoritarian repressive approach to crime. In this electoral climate, in which the social component of prevention policy was sidelined and the still existing social prevention projects had a more overt security dimension, the Minister of Interior, Luc Vanden Bossche, took the political initiative to introduce a new bill to provide local authorities with greater powers to advance a repressive fight against public disorder and nuisance (Hubert, 2003). Under certain conditions, the municipal council was able to determine whether criminal or administrative sanctions should be imposed upon disorderly behaviours. On the May 13, 1999, immediately prior to the elections, this new law came into effect.

The ‘purple-green’ and ‘purple’ governments (1999-2007) and the Christian-democratic-socialist-liberal governments (2007-2011): crime prevention policy as part of an integral federal security policy (1999-2011) The security and prevention contracts (2002-2006) The ‘purple-green’ government Verhofstadt I, a coalition of liberal, socialist and green parties was formed in June 1999. For the first time, federal and local prevention policies explicitly became part of a much broader integrated federal approach to security and criminal policy (Hebberecht, 2000). This new integral security policy sought to ensure greater coordination and efficiency between all segments of the criminal justice system, from prevention to repression and sanctions. It also sought to integrate governmental interventions from a local to a national level, under the authority of the Minister of Justice, the Flemish liberal Verwilghen. His Federal Integral Security Plan (2000) prioritised a tougher fight against street crime and organised crime, the decriminalisation of white collar crime, the implementation of management techniques, the privatisation of several police and justice functions and the development of possibilities for greater private-public partnerships.

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Prevention policy became a less important part of integral security policy between 1999-2003 (Goris, 2003). The restructuring of Belgian police services into a federal and local police force in 2002 led to the loss of the section concerning the communal police in the security and society contracts. Hence, the former distinction between security and society contracts (29 cities and municipalities) and prevention contracts (46 municipalities) no longer existed. From 2002, these contracts were called security and prevention contracts and were fi xed with 73 cities and municipalities by the liberal Minister of the Interior, the French-speaking Antoine Duquesne (Smeets, 2003; Van de Vloet & Jamotte, 2003). In these contracts, the local prevention structure, built up by socialists during the 1990s, was strengthened with a steering committee of the local advisory prevention council, composed of the Mayor or a contract manager, the chief of the local police, the prevention coordinator and two new actors, an internal evaluator and an administrative and financial coordinator. The local population had to be better informed about local prevention policy. The content of the security and prevention contracts was now oriented towards the new priorities formulated in the Federal Integral Security Plan (2000), namely situational and technological prevention of property crime and vandalism, functional surveillance by city wardens, projects to improve the security and quality of life in neighbourhoods, and was no longer restricted to young people and to disadvantaged, multicultural neighbourhoods. The socially oriented crime prevention projects from the former security and society contracts and prevention contracts, which according to the Minister of the Interior did not correspond with his responsibility, were taken over by the Brussels and Walloon Regions. This reorientation did not take place within the Flemish Region, because since 1992, they had no longer financed federal contracts. Projects within Flemish contracts that did not fit within the Minister’s crime prevention priorities were removed, reformulated or were now financed by the municipality. According to the government’s 2001 drug policy note, projects to prevent public nuisance caused by drug use were included in the contracts. In these new security and prevention contracts there was less space for social crime prevention projects oriented towards marginalised and excluded young people. During the parliamentary elections of 2003, the Flemish liberal party did not achieve the electoral success they had hoped for. On the contrary, the Flemish and to an even greater extent, the French-speaking socialists strengthened

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their position. The new ‘purple’ government Verhofstadt II (2003-2007) was a coalition of liberal and socialist parties. In this coalition, the liberal party retained Minister of the Interior position, filled by the Flemish liberal Patrick Dewael, but had to give up the Minister of Justice position in favour of the French-speaking socialists. Even more than in 1999, the new Federal Integral Security Plan (2004) was a compromise between on the one hand, a neo-liberal but also a moral conservative and authoritarian vision of the Flemish Liberals on criminal policy, and, on the other hand, the more social and humanistic vision of the French-speaking socialists (Hebberecht, 2004). The existing security and prevention contracts were renewed for the period 2005 and 2006.

Federal urban policy and crime prevention (1999-2007) A federal ‘Urban Policy’ was set up in 1999 by the ‘purple-green’ government Verhofstadt I. Its aim was to pay particular attention to the specific problems of large cities and also to insecurity. By funding ‘City Contracts’ with the five largest Belgian cities (Antwerp, Ghent, Liège, Charleroi and the Brussels metropolitan area), its aim was to implement an urban policy with five strategic objectives, namely integrated neighbourhood development, employment, social cohesion, health and housing. Because security is a vital element in the quality of urban life, the ‘City Contracts’ had also to improve the city’s security and to reduce the feeling of urban insecurity by setting up strategies not only suited to the reality of each environment, but also focused on citizen participation and prevention. The ‘City Contracts’ also financed projects to implement municipal administrative sanctions against different types of ‘anti-social behaviour’ and public nuisance, made possible by the law of May 13, 1999. This law reserved an important role for mediation, a procedure obligatory when dealing with minors from 16 to 18 years old and optional for adults. Since 2006, the federal ‘Urban Policy’ is subsidising one mediator in each of the 27 judicial districts/police zones.

Strategic security and prevention plans (2007-2011) On December 7, 2006 a new Royal Decree from the Minister of Interior Patrick Dewael of the ‘purple’ government Verhofstadt II re-oriented the structure, style and content of the security and prevention contracts. The new strategic security and prevention plans, as they have been called since

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2007, were structured according to the priorities and guidelines of the Ministry of the Interior, by the types of crimes the city or municipality intended to prevent in the first place on the basis of local crime diagnostics. The criminal phenomena that the federal government wishes to prevent as a matter of priority include property crimes, crimes against the person, juvenile delinquency and truancy, drug addiction, public nuisance related to drug use and social nuisance. Priority must be given to certain vulnerable groups, such as the elderly and some risk professions (e.g. certain liberal and independent professions), who must be protected by prevention measures. On the basis of local crime diagnostics, a city or municipality had to select the crime phenomena that they would include in their strategic security and prevention plan. For each selected crime phenomenon the city or municipality had to formulate the general, strategic and operational objectives of the proposed project(s). According to the ministerial guidelines, the general objectives of a project are prevention, visibility and reduction of a criminal phenomenon and /or the feelings of insecurity related to this phenomenon. For each proposed project, the city or municipality has to make a selection amongst the strategic objectives mentioned by the ministerial guidelines: the reduction of risky behaviour, an intervention into criminogenic circumstances and environments, the deterrence of potential offenders, an improvement in the re-socialisation of drug users, an improvement in the re-socialisation of youngsters confronted with problems, the promotion of an integral and integrated approach, the improvement of social control and the diminution of the negative effects of victimisation. Some of these strategic objectives allow the use of methods typical for social crime prevention. In the context of a strategic objective, the city or municipality had to formulate operational objectives and related indicators and evaluation targets. It was no longer necessary (as had been required under the previous security and prevention contracts) to mention the actions, methods and financial means to reach the operational objectives for every prioritised crime phenomenon. Rather, a global subsidy was given by the federal government to realise the strategic security and prevention plan over a period of four years (20072010). However, if the objectives were not realised, the city or municipality could be sanctioned financially. The conceptualisation and first phase of implementation of the strategic security and prevention plans in 101 cities and municipalities in 2006 and

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2007 were realised under the ‘purple’ government Verhofstadt II. Since the parliamentary elections of June 2007, Belgium has been confronted with deep political conflicts between Flemish and French-speaking political parties about a new reform of the constitution. Because of the difficulties of forming a new federal government, the ‘purple’ government Verhofstadt II continued to handle current affairs until the end of 2007. A new government was constituted on December 21, 2007 with five parties, the Flemish and French-speaking Liberals and Christian Democrats and the French-speaking socialists. During this governmental period 2007-2010 the Minister of the Interior was a Flemish liberal. Since 2002, the federal prevention policy was implemented by the ‘General Direction of Security and Prevention’ of the Ministry of the Interior, and more specifically by the ‘Service Integral Security Policy’ and the ‘Local Service of Integral Security’. Since 2002, most of the projects devised and implemented by the ‘Service Integral Security Policy’ had the improvement of the techno- and situational prevention of certain types of theft and the security of certain categories of professional groups (jewellers, pharmacists, etc.) as their objective. Also, since 2009, the coordination of networks of neighbourhood watches became an important task of this ‘Integral Service of Security Policy’. In the margins, they also further elaborated social crime preventive projects concerning the social efficacy of youngsters and the prevention of their radicalisation. The ‘Local Service of Integral Security’ sustained the local prevention policy of 101 cities and municipalities in Belgium by means of strategic security and prevention plans 2007-2010. They set up a manual to perform local diagnostics of insecurity and crime at a city or municipality level. They are in charge of the evaluation of these security and prevention plans. In this context they organise observance and evaluation meetings with the involved partners of a municipality or city (Mayor, prevention coordinator, internal evaluator, etc.). On June 13, 2010 parliamentary elections were held in Belgium. The Flemish nationalist ‘New Flemish Alliance’ won the elections on the Flemish side and the socialists on the French-speaking side. The political crisis is even deeper now than it was in 2007. Political parties could not reach an agreement to form a new government. As in 2007, they could not agree on a new constitutional reform. The government Leterme II has been handling current affairs since April 26, 2010. This political situation at a federal level

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also has implications for the strategic security and prevention plans that ended in 2010. But the government Leterme II has no authority to devise a security and prevention policy for the coming years. For this reason, the 2007-2010 strategic security and prevention plans have been prolonged until December 31, 2011.

Social Crime Prevention and Local Crime Prevention Policy in the City of Ghent Due to a lack of information, documents, evaluations and scientific analyses it is impossible to provide an overall view of social crime prevention policies in all cities and municipalities in Belgium. To illustrate the way in which cities and municipalities have translated federal crime prevention programmes and especially social crime prevention incentives into a local (social) crime prevention policy that corresponds to local crime and security problems, we will take a closer look at the situation in the city of Ghent. Ghent is one of the five largest cities in Belgium and is the second major city in Flanders. According to the figures of 31/12/2008 the city has about 240 000 inhabitants. 90  % of the inhabitants have Belgian nationality (Stad Gent, 2009). Of this number, 6.21  % are not Belgian by birth but have obtained Belgian nationality. 10 % of the population of Ghent is of foreign nationality. There is a significant Turkish community. At the economic level, the city of Ghent has an important function as a port, with much industrial activity to the north of the city. There are important industrial sites all around the city near the main roads (E40, E17, R4). To the south of the city, there are also high-technology businesses, with links to the university and the colleges of higher education. In the city itself, there are many small businesses. Ghent is also known for its agricultural and horticultural activities. However, the unemployment rate is quite high and, in any case, much higher than the average of 7  % for the Flemish region. Ghent is also a centre for services, commerce and education. Ghent is characterised by its flourishing cultural life. At a political level, Ghent has been governed since 1988 by a coalition of the socialist and liberal parties. Since 1988, the Mayor has been a member of the Flemish socialist party. At the last municipal elections in October 2006, the socialist party (SP.a) obtained 31.6 % of the votes and the liberal party (VLD)

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21  %. In the opposition, the extreme right-wing party (Vlaams Belang) obtained 18 %, the Christian democrat party (CD&V) 15.8 % and the greens (Groen) 12.1 %. In the 1980s, the Ghent communal police played an innovative role in the elaboration of a new police prevention policy (Carlier, 1988, 1990). In collaboration with the local police, the first neighbourhood watch in Belgium was set up in a middle class neighbourhood of Ghent. Freddy Carlier, the municipal police’s prevention officer of Ghent at that time, participated in the drafting of the Royal Decree of 6 August 1985 and became a member of the Provincial Council of the Prevention of Delinquency in East Flanders in 1985 and of the Higher Council of the Prevention of Delinquency in 1988. Due to the dominance of the communal police in crime prevention matters in Ghent, it is not surprising that contrary to the new local, integrated and administrative crime prevention policy orientation of the socialist Minister of the Interior Tobback, a police project concerning the prevention of drug use was subsidised in 1991 and 1992. According to the security and prevention policy of the new federal government, a security contract for the second half of 1992 and for 1993 was negotiated between the Ministry of the Interior and the city of Ghent. The security contract contained a section concerning community policing and a section covering prevention. Contrary to many other cities and municipalities where the Ministry of the Interior negotiated the contract with the Mayor and the chief of police, in Ghent the alderman for City Social Affairs (who was also a member of the socialist party) participated in the negotiation of the prevention section of the security contract. Convinced of the importance of social crime prevention, she introduced two social crime prevention projects into the security contract, a city coaching project and a neighbourhood prevention project. The city coaching project was set up by the city’s Youth Service to reach groups of marginalised youngsters, 12 to 18 years of age, who were confronted with problems at school and in their free time and who caused nuisances and committed delinquent acts in different places within the city, by means of street corner workers (Hebberecht & Tuteleers, 1997). The neighbourhood prevention project consisted of establishing contact committees in multiethnic working class neighbourhoods to improve the communication between local politicians, the administrative services of the city and the

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inhabitants of a neighbourhood (Hebberecht & Tuteleers, 1997). By means of these activities, different kinds of community problems and conflicts could be prevented and solved. Both projects were rooted in the city’s social services function, which since the 1980s had also tried to find methods to cope with social problems (youth problems, deprivation, community and ethnic conflicts) in Ghent’s working class neighbourhoods. Both projects were in the first place socially oriented but also had the secondary objective of preventing delinquency and nuisance and reducing feelings of insecurity. In 1995, as a consequence of a new federal drug plan, some drug projects such as the creation of a medico-social crisis centre for marginalised drug users, were included in Ghent’s security contract (Hebberecht & Tuteleers, 1997). Street corner workers were funded to make contact with these drug users and to refer them to this crisis centre. The section urban renewal of the security and society contract of Ghent for the period 1998-1999 reinforced the interventions of community work, youth work and social and cultural integration work in some working class neighbourhoods (Colle, 2003). The dynamic from a prevention contract (1991-1992) to a security contract (1992-1997) to a security and society contract (1998-1999), introduced by the socialist Ministers of the Interior, was obliterated by the new prevention policy of the ‘purple-green’ federal government (1999-2003). In 2000, the urban renewal section of the security and society contract was replaced by some projects financed by the new ‘Federal urban policy’ of this ‘purple-green’ government. In Ghent, this programme invested in the first place in the socio-economic revival of disadvantaged neighbourhoods and also in the recruitment of 60 assistant police officers to enforce the activities of the local neighbourhood police. In the context of this programme, social preventive projects were set up in Ghent for some groups defined as problematic, such as asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants. Another project aimed at improving the health of intravenous drug users was set up, as well as a street corner work project for prostitutes. After the municipal elections of October 2000, the same political coalition of socialists and liberals continued to govern the city of Ghent. Due to a lack of a political consensus about prevention policy at a federal level, and a lesser functioning of the Permanent Secretariat for Crime Prevention and

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the General State Police of the ministry of the Interior, which were being reorganised at that time, the city of Ghent revisited its own prevention and security policy on a more autonomous basis (Colle, 2003). As ‘urban renewal’ projects could be taken over by the new ‘Federal urban policy’ in 2000, some social preventive projects from the former security and society contract could be integrated in the section ‘A better integration of specific target groups’ of the new security and prevention contract (2002-2006). Moreover, some innovative projects in the field of social crime prevention, reacting to problems of living quality in working class neighbourhoods, were included in the security and prevention contract. Easily accessible sports infrastructure was built. Youth workers and street corner workers were charged with motivating young people to make use of and take responsibility for this infrastructure. Community workers made efforts to improve the willingness of neighbourhood residents to tolerate these free time activities for young people. Other projects tried to improve the quality of life in some neighbourhoods by struggling against and by preventing traffic noise and nuisances as well as aggression in traffic. Because of a greater diversity (according to age, ethnic origin and material wealth) of the inhabitants of working class neighbourhoods, youth workers and street corner workers tried to stimulate communication between inhabitants. These efforts culminated in the organisation of neighbourhood parties. After the municipal elections of October 2006, the same political coalition of socialists and liberals continued to govern the city of Ghent. An elected socialist member of the municipal council, Daniel Termont, became the new Mayor. For the priorities of the strategic security and prevention plan (20072011) Ghent selected six criminal phenomena: burglary, domestic violence, violence on public transport, juvenile delinquency, school absenteeism and social nuisance. The strategic objectives formulated by the Ministry of the Interior concerning the prevention of the latter three phenomena, namely ‘an integrated and integral approach’ and ‘a reduction of risk behaviour’ allowed the use of some social crime prevention methods (youth work, youth assistance and drug assistance) in order to realise those objectives. The strategic objective of reducing risk behaviours among young people was put into action by means of activities organised by youth counsellors from the Social Cell of the police, by the organisation of path guidance by

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social work for young people, and with life skills training, early intervention and preventive actions for young people at risk. The strategic objective of promoting an integrated and integral approach was put into action by police youth councillors and by path counsellors from the ‘Jong’ (‘Young’) organisation within the ‘Integral Youth Assistance’ network. This objective was also achieved by their contribution to the dialogue between young people welfare and security policymakers. Some organisations were subsidised to play an important social preventive role in the prevention of juvenile delinquency and school absenteeism. The functioning of two organisations is illustrative of a more individualised social crime prevention intervention. The youth welfare association ‘JONG’ (‘YOUNG’) organizes the project ‘Path guidance’ for youngsters between 12 and 18 year old, living in marginalised neighbourhoods. Paths within the youth welfare services are set up by the counsellors of this organisation to tackle the problems mentioned by the youngsters themselves. The team, three counsellors and a coordinator, uses the model ‘strengths-based case management’ whereby the counsellor and the youngster look for the strengths and opportunities in cooperation with youth welfare services. The ‘life space crisis intervention’, a therapeutic verbal strategy to help youngsters in case of a crisis is used in a complementary way. This strategy uses the reaction to a stressful event to change behaviour, improve self-esteem, reduce fear and increase comprehension and insight into someone’s own behaviour and into the behaviour of others. Although financed by Ghent’s strategic security and prevention plan, the prevention or reduction of juvenile delinquency is not an explicit objective mentioned by this youth welfare association. The association CAT (Centre for the Study, Treatment and Prevention of Alcoholism and Other Toxicomania) organizes the Programme ‘MACHTIG’ (‘POWERFUL’), a life skills training course for youngsters at risk. This programme aims to inspire youngsters using the FERMe –approach (Physical, Emotional, Rational and Motivating), a less verbal method. Challenging martial arts exercises enable the participants experience what emotions like anger, fear and stress can do to a person and teaches them how to handle them. By taking a non-moralising but confrontational approach, the programme tries to keep the youngsters emotionally involved. By providing insights into the functioning of the human brain in general and in risk situations in particular, the programme tries to stimulate selfconsciousness and to improve the possibilities of self-reliance. The assertive

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style of the counsellor, the funny side of the programme and the activities around personal goals, self-motivation and self-reliance help to motivate the young people. The objective of the programme ‘Machtig’ is to give young peoples more ‘power’ over their own behaviour in risk situations, for example when they have the opportunity to take drugs. The strategic security and prevention plan tries to prevent social nuisance in some disadvantaged neighbourhoods of Ghent, not only with situational projects which enforce social control, but also with projects with a social preventive dimension as community work, the project ‘living together in diversity’, street corner work and initiatives to activate marginal young people. The prevention of social nuisance is mainly achieved by the co-financing of 18 street corner workers in different Ghent neighbourhoods by the strategic security and prevention plan. Each street corner worker has a demarcated location in the city where he/she tries to come in contact with people with personal problems or problems concerning their living conditions and/or the society. Street corner workers listen to the problems in different domains with which they are confronted and try to find the appropriate person or organisation who can help the person in trouble and try to strengthen the bonds of the person in trouble with his/her environment and with the existing social services. The strategic security and prevention plan also finances interventions of the Service Community Work and of the Ghent Integration Service to solve social and ethnic-cultural conflicts and to strengthen social cohesion at a neighbourhood level. Four times a year, they promote positive networks amongst inhabitants in public spaces. Moreover, they have developed a methodology to turn a nuisance into an encounter at neighbourhood level. The city of Ghent is a good example of a Belgian city that gives a prominent place to social crime prevention in the context of the federal crime prevention policy. But with this characteristic of its prevention policy, Ghent is certainly not representative of all Belgian cities and municipalities. The importance of social crime prevention in Ghent’s local prevention policy is made possible by: the dominance of the socialist party in local (welfare and security) politics since 1988; a well developed social welfare policy; the professional view of local prevention policy coordinators in favour of social crime prevention; and the long experience of different types of welfare professionals. The main components of this social crime prevention policy in working class neighbourhoods are the prevention of delinquency and social

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nuisance committed by young people, and community crime prevention oriented towards age, ethnic and lifestyle differences and conflicts between inhabitants. These social crime prevention projects try to maximise the crime and insecurity-reducing effects of local social welfare policy (youth work, community work, integration work, etc.). A certain evolution in the social crime prevention of juvenile delinquency is observable in the period 1992-2011. In the 1990s, marginalised young people were brought in contact with local social welfare providers. Social crime prevention tackled, in the first place, the problem of social marginalisation and exclusion of these groups of young people. It was only in a secondary way that the projects were oriented towards the reduction of crime and insecurity. Since 2000, the problem of delinquency has been extended to the problem of social nuisance. Problems to do with the social exclusion of groups were given lower priority. Particularly since 2006, a more individualised form of social crime prevention with a more authoritarian dimension towards young members of those groups has been devised. The problems of crime and insecurity are now given a higher priority. Also, the nature of community crime prevention has changed under the influence of new migration movements and the problems of asylum seekers and refugees reinforcing the ethnic diversity of these neighbourhoods. These social crime prevention projects try to manage the new problems in the neighbourhood in a pragmatic way, rather than to offer structural solutions.

Conclusion In this overview of the social crime prevention policies at a federal and local level since 1985, we can distinguish two important dates, namely 1992 (with a first start in 1990) and 2002. In the new economic and political context of the 1980s, a situational ‘preventive turn’ took place in Belgium in 1985, oriented by the police forces towards the (middle class) victims of property crimes and vandalism. This ‘preventive turn’ was instigated by police forces and officialised by the Minister of the Interior and was based on the administrative competences of the police. When the socialists re-entered the government after seven years in opposition, they were determined to conduct a social policy that mitigated

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the marginalising and social excluding effects of neo-liberal politics (Meynen, 2000). In so doing, they engaged in defending the social security system and commenced a fight against poverty and social exclusion. They wanted to shape an immigration policy that would contribute to the fight against discrimination and racism. As a part of this broader social policy, they wanted to develop a social crime prevention policy that would tackle the effects of the neo-liberal transformations wrought during the 1980s on crime and insecurity. The socialist leaders were also pressured by many socialist Mayors of Belgian cities, who were confronted daily with problems of crime and insecurity, but lacked the funds to tackle these problems. The political means to reach their objectives were limited by the neo-liberal restructuring of the state and the economy, to which they had had to consent as a condition of being part of the new government with the Christian democrats in 1988. Also, with the reform of the Belgian state from a national to a federal state, many responsibilities to develop social policies were transferred from the national level to the regions and communities. One of the possible political strategies was to adapt the national crime prevention policy of the Minister of the Interior with a local, administrative social crime prevention dimension. This illustrates how important the institutional context is in shaping of a social crime prevention policy (Hebberecht, 2009). In this sense the ‘social crime preventive turn’ is also influenced by the neo-liberal logic of situational prevention (Poulet, 2003) and by a vision in which social problems are criminalised, which in their turn affect crime and insecurity. The first step in the direction of local, administrative social crime prevention was taken in 1990 by the circulars of the socialist minister of the Interior Tobback. In this initial form, social crime prevention projects had to be devised under the authority of the Mayor, supervised by a prevention coordinator and advised by a local council. But under pressure of the electoral success of the Flemish extreme-right ‘Vlaams Blok’ these social crime prevention projects were situated under the section ‘prevention’ of a security contract or in a prevention contract by the new government in 1992. The local police once again had a dominant position in local security and prevention policy. From 1994 until 1999, in the context of their federal security and prevention policy, the socialist Ministers of the Interior had taken responsibilities from other federal departments (employment, traffic, urban renewal, etc.) and from the regions (urban renewal, the fight against poverty, etc.) and communities (drug use and drug addicts, etc.) to finance new types of

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(social) crime prevention projects in local security contracts. In this sense, at the level of discourse, we can speak of a criminalisation of social and urban policies (Hebberecht, 1997). This was not automatically the case at a local level. A criminalisation of the local social and urban policy at the level of discourse or practice happened because of a political and politicalideological dominance of conservatives, a lack of autonomy and a police vision on social problems of the prevention coordinators and a lack of social welfare policy towards marginalised groups and neighbourhoods. This illustrates how important political and professional ideologies are in shaping a social crime prevention policy (Hebberecht, 2009). In the context of the same federal security and prevention policy, other cities and municipalities, like Ghent, avoided, not always successfully, the criminalisation of social and urban policies, without being able to socialise the police and the criminal justice system (Van Outrive, 2000). Social crime prevention projects were designed in line with local social welfare policies. Even in the cities and municipalities where a social crime prevention policy had a chance to be fully developed, this happened less in the area of local, more structural economic, employment, urban and housing policies. 2002 was a second important date in the development of a social crime prevention policy at federal and local level in Belgium after 1985. The crime prevention policy of the new liberal Minister of the Interior was an illustration of the lack of consensus within the government about security and prevention policy. His own situational preventive initiatives at a federal level were taken on the basis of his traditional responsibilities (Willekens, 2006). In this sense we can no longer speak of a criminalisation of social and urban policy by the liberal Ministers of the Interior, because they no longer took social and urban policy initiatives. The social crime preventive initiatives taken by the former socialist Ministers of the Interior on the basis of other combined responsibilities were left out or taken over by the responsible authorities at different levels or by the ‘Federal Urban Policy’ that was established in 1999. Local authorities could continue to include social crime prevention projects in their security and prevention contracts (20022006) and strategic security and prevention plans (2007-2011). Because since 2002 the police section was no longer included in the contracts and plans, the pressure of the local police on social crime prevention projects became less direct. This illustrates how important the organisation of police forces is in of shaping a social crime prevention policy (Hebberecht, 2009).

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The neo-liberal economic globalisation and the related crisis of the Belgian nation state are the underlying background to the institutional context, the political – ideological power relationships and the organisation of the police forces and their effects on social crime prevention (Hebberecht, 2009; Lea, 2002). The formation of a new federal government and the municipal elections of October 2012 will probably become the third crucial date since 1985 for social crime prevention in Belgium, as were 1992 and 2002. If the Frenchspeaking socialist party becomes a member of a centre-right or centre-left federal government, then the current trends in social crime prevention will continue to exist in the context of new strategic security and prevention plans. A more individualised form of social crime prevention and a more moral conservative and authoritarian community crime prevention approach will be implemented, with measures against anti-social behaviour and public nuisance. In a more outspoken right wing government the strategic security and prevention plans will not be prolonged and federal urban policy will no longer finance social crime prevention projects. In this political scenario, many social crime prevention projects will be terminated. Only the cities that are politically and ideologically convinced of the importance of social crime prevention will (perhaps in a lesser way) continue to finance this kind of projects with their own means.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Carlier, F. (1990). De buurtobservatieactie: een politioneel preventieve reactie op de elitaire technopreventie te Gent [The Neighbourhood-ObservationAction: a Police Prevention Reaction Against an Elitist Techno-Prevention in Ghent]. In C. Eliaerts, E. Enhus & R. Senden (eds.), Politie in beweging. Bijdrage tot de discussie over de politie van morgen (pp. 89-110). Antwerp/ Arnhem: Kluwer/Gouda Quint. Cartuyvels, Y., & Hebberecht, P. (2002). The Belgian Federal Security and Crime Prevention Policy in the 1990s. In P. Hebberecht & D. Duprez (eds.), The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe (pp. 15-50). Brussels: VUBPRESS. Colle, P. (2003). Foto’s van een stedelijk preventielandschap. Kanttekeningen bij enkele federale impulsen voor een lokaal preventiebeleid tussen 1999 en 2003 [Pictures of an Urban Prevention Landscape. Comments on Federal Impulses for a Local Prevention Policy between 1999 and 2003]. In P. Goris & D. Kaminski (eds.), Preventie en het paars-groene veiligheidsbeleid (pp. 137-150). Brussels: Interuniversitair Netwerk Criminaliteitspreventie. De Witte, L. (ed.). (1988). Veiligheid en kleine criminaliteit. [Security and Petty Crime]. Brussels: SEVI-publicatie. Depovere, K., & Ponsaers, P. (1998). Evaluatie preventiecontracten. Vijf jaar preventiecontracten in Vlaanderen (’93-’98) [Evaluation of the Prevention Contracts. Five years of Prevention Contracts in Flanders (’93-’98)]. Ghent: Onderzoeksgroep Criminologie en Rechtssociologie. Ferri, E. (1914). La sociologie criminelle [Criminal Sociology] (2nd ed.). Paris: Félix Alcan. Franssen, A. (2003). Dispositifs sécuritaires et émancipateurs: fausses ruptures et vraies continuités [Security and Emancipatory Initiatives: False Ruptures and Real Continuities]. In P. Mary (ed.), Dix ans de contrats de sécurité. Evaluation et actualité (pp. 159-173). Brussels: Bruylant. Goris, P. (2003). Integrale veiligheid als paradepaard van het paars-groene veiligheidsbeleid. Op weg naar een meer duale of democratische samenleving? [Integral Security as a Showpiece of a Purple-Green Security Policy. A Way to a More Dual or Democratic Society ?] In P. Goris & D. Kaminski (eds.), Preventie en het paars-groene veiligheidsbeleid (pp. 51-59). Brussels: Interuniversitair Netwerk Criminaliteitspreventie. Hebberecht, P. (1988). Kritische kanttekeningen bij het Belgisch beleid ter preventie van criminaliteit [Critical Comments on the Belgian Crime Prevention Policy]. Panopticon, 9(5), 449-456. Hebberecht, P. (1990). Het Belgisch politioneel preventiebeleid [The Belgian Police Prevention Policy]. In C. Eliaerts, E. Enhus & R. Senden (eds.), Politie in beweging. Bijdrage tot de discussie over de politie van morgen (pp. 81-88). Antwerp/Arnhem: Kluwer/Gouda Quint. Hebberecht, P. (1997). Van preventiecontract tot veiligheids- en samenlevingscontract … of de logica van de veiligheidsstaat [From Prevention Contract to Security and Society Contract…or the Logic of a Security State]. Panopticon, 18(2), 101-110.

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Belgian Crime Prevention Policy since the 1980s Hebberecht, P. (2000). Het federaal veiligheidsplan versterkt de ongelijkheid inzake veiligheid [The Federal Security Plan Reinforces the Inequality Concerning Insecurity]. Panopticon, 21(2), 101-112. Hebberecht, P. (2004). De kadernota Integrale Veiligheid van de paarse regering Verhofstadt II en het Belgisch preventiebeleid [The Enabling Integral Security Note of the ‘Purple’ Verhofstadt Government and Belgian Prevention Policy]. Panopticon, 25(5), 1-8. Hebberecht, P. (2009). De ‘verpaarsing’ van de criminaliteitsbestrijding in België. Kritische opstellen over misdaad en misdaadcontrole in de laatmoderniteit [The ‘Purple-isation’ of Criminal Policy in Belgium. Critical Thoughts on Crime and Crime Control in Late Modernity]. Brussels: VUBPRESS. Hebberecht, P., & Tuteleers, P. (1997). Een intern evaluatiemodel voor projecten uit het Veiligheidscontract van de Stad Gent (deel 1) [An Internal Evaluation Model for Projects of the Security Contract of the City of Ghent (part 1)]. Ghent: Onderzoeksgroep Criminologie en Rechtssociologie. Hubert, H.-O. (2003). Les contrats de sécurité et les incivilités comme contentieux entre adultes et jeunes d’origine immigrée [Security Contracts and Incivilities as a Dispute between Adults and Youngsters with Immigrant Backgrounds]. In P. Mary (ed.), Dix ans de contrats de sécurité. Evaluation et actualité (pp. 197-207). Brussels: Bruylant. Lea, J. (2002). Crime & Modernity. London: Sage. Mary, P. (2003). Dix ans de contrats de sécurité: l’intérêt d’un bilan [Ten Years of Security Contracts: the Importance of an Evaluation]. In P. Mary (ed.), Dix ans de contrats de sécurité. Evaluation et actualité (pp. 1-9). Brussels: Bruylant. Meynen, A. (2000). Economic and Social Policy since the 1950s. In E. Witte, J. Craeybeckx & A. Meynen (eds.), Political History of Belgium. From 1830 onwards (pp. 201-237). Brussels: VUBPRESS. Platel, M. (2004). Communautaire geschiedenis van België van 1830 tot vandaag [The Community History of Belgium from 1830 until Today]. Leuven: Davidsfonds. Poulet, I. (1995). Les nouvelles politiques de prévention. Une nouvelle forme d’action publique? [The New Prevention Policies. A New Form of Public Action?]. Brussels: Services fédéraux des Affaires Scientifiques, Techniques et Culturelles. Poulet, I. (2003). Les conceptions de la personne et de la prévention en politique comparée [The Concepts of the Person and Prevention in Comparative Policy]. In P. Goris & D. Kaminski (eds.), Prévention et politique de sécurité arc-en-ciel (pp. 74-93). Brussels: Réseau Interuniversitaire sur la Prévention. Smeets, S. (2003). Les contrats de sécurité et de prévention en questions [A Questioning of the Security and Prevention Contracts]. In P. Mary (ed.), Dix ans de contrats de sécurité. Evaluation et actualité (Vol. 69-84). Brussels: Bruylant.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Stad Gent. (2009). Het indicatorenrapport. Met meer cijfers bouwen aan een beleid tegen armoede [The Report on Indicators. Building an Anti-Poverty Policy with More Figures] (pp. 86). Ghent: Stad Gent. Strebelle, C. (2003). Les contrats de sécurité: une évaluation indépendante [The Security Contracts: an Independent Evaluation]. In P. Mary (ed.), Dix ans de contrats de sécurité. Evaluation et actualité (pp. 13-37). Brussels: Bruylant. Synergie. (1995). La prévention intégrée au niveau local [Integrated Prevention at a Local Level]. Brussels: Politeia. Van De Vloet, Y., & Jamotte, L. (2003). Des contrats de sécurité aux contrats de sécurité et de prévention: évolution et perspectives [From Security Contracts to Security and Prevention Contracts: Evolution and Perspectives]. In P. Mary (ed.), Dix ans de contrats de sécurité. Evaluation et actualité (pp. 39-67). Brussels: Bruylant. Van Outrive, L. (2000). Pénalisation du social et non-socialisation du pénal: évaluation et alternatives politiques [Criminalisation of the Social and Non-Socialisation of the Criminal Justice System: Evaluation and Political Alternatives]. In L. Van Campenhoudt, Y. Cartuyvels, F. Digneffe, D. Kaminski, P. Mary & A. Rea (eds.), Réponses à l’insécurité. Des discours aux pratiques (pp. 443-466). Brussels: Editions Labor. Willekens, P. (2006). “Beter één vogel in de hand dan tien in de lucht”: integrale veiligheid [“Better one Bird in the Hand than Ten in the Sky”: Integral Security]. Orde van de dag. Criminaliteit en samenleving, 35, 9-16.

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La prévention de la délinquance chez les Anglais: From Community-based Strategies to Early Interventions with Young People Adam Crawford and Peter Traynor

The prevailing view of crime prevention in the UK – in England and Wales in particular – since the 1980s has been that it has been dominated by situational approaches at the expense of more socially oriented ones. Michael King (1989), in an important essay written at the end of the 1980s, reflected this view when he characterised the British approach as ‘social crime prevention à la Thatcher’. In his essay, he argued that crime prevention in Britain, rather like the ‘crime problem’ and crime control more generally, had become constructed in ways that promoted and sustained the political objectives of the government of the time and reflected the governing party’s own ideological inclinations. As such, the turn towards preventive adaptations as a response to the challenges of crime control and the ‘crisis of penal modernism’ (see Garland, 1996) that began to take form in the 1980s (see Crawford, 1997a), was deemed to constitute a powerful vehicle for putting a Thatcherite ideological vision into practice (King, 1989). There were close echoes here with Pat O’Malley’s (1992: 265) forceful portrayal of situational crime prevention as reflecting a neo-liberal understanding of human behaviour, in which ‘not only is the knowledge of the criminal disarticulated from a critique of society, but in turn, both of these may be disarticulated from the reaction to the offender’. For O’Malley, the triumph of situational, over social, crime prevention, in Anglophone countries signified ‘the displacement of socialised risk management with privatised prudentialism’ (1992: 263). Furthermore, for him this needed to be understood as being connected to, and an extension of, the neo-liberal political programmes with which it was aligned in those jurisdictions – most notably in the UK but also in Australia (O’Malley 2001). Moreover, King (1988; 1989) contrasted the situation-oriented approach prevalent in the UK

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with the more inclusive, welfarist and socially-oriented approach to crime prevention policies adopted in France at the time (see also Pitts & Hope, 1997). In many senses and somewhat erroneously (see Crawford, 2000a), the two contrasting approaches in England and France came to be seen as divergent, mutually exclusive and antithetical policy pathways (Crawford, 2009a). Hence, by the mid-1990s New Zealand policy-makers, interestingly, chose to follow – at least at a rhetorical level – the French policy path set out in the Bonnemaison Report (1982) in their Crime Prevention Strategy (New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 1994) rather than pursue the more culturally proximate model of the English (see Crawford, 1997b; Bradley & Walters, 2002). Whilst in many senses, this caricature is highly salient, as it both reflects important aspects of the prevailing logics within the two countries (Hope, 2009; Wyvekens, 2009) and preventive approaches more generally (Hebberecht & Duprez, 2002), it does not tell the whole story. Furthermore, some 20 to 30 years on, the comparative fortunes of crime prevention in England and France arguably share as many similarities as they do differences – despite important prevailing socio-legal divergences (see Crawford, 2000b; 2002). Or at least, it is harder to characterise one as wholly reflecting a situational approach and the other a social approach to crime prevention (Crawford, 2009a). Whilst France has seen a revival of interest in situational approaches to crime prevention in public spaces (Wyvekens, 2009), England and Wales have witnessed important developments under the auspices of social crime prevention in the past two decades. Yet, in the literature, the English approach to social crime prevention remains a largely neglected subject. In this paper, we intend to address this lacuna and outline the dominant trends in the evolution of social crime prevention in England and Wales and the manner in which these have been shaped by wider institutional, political and intellectual influences. Given the prevailing interpretation elaborated above, we shall begin with a conceptual discussion of what we take social crime prevention to mean and its place within wider debates about the recent historic preventive turn in public policy. The paper goes on to provide an overview of (national) policy developments in the field of community safety and the elaboration of the anti-social behaviour agenda, both of which have advanced a particular variant of social crime prevention, rooted in a distinct normative understanding of the social causes of crime and the role of the state, communities, families and individual citizens in its prevention. We will then present an illustration of the prevailing trends, fault-lines and enduring themes that converge around the practice of social

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crime prevention in England through a number of case studies. Finally, we will conclude with some speculative thoughts on the potential future direction of developments in England and, to a lesser extent, Wales.

Social Crime Prevention Social crime prevention primarily centres on interventions that seek to affect and target social processes and collective relationships. In contrast to situational prevention, which involves the ‘management, design or manipulation of the immediate physical environment’ so as to reduce the opportunities for specific crimes (Hough et al., 1980: 1), social prevention is concerned with ‘measures aimed at tackling the root causes of crime and the dispositions of individuals to offend’ (Graham & Bennett, 1995). For the purpose of this paper, we take social crime prevention to include both social influences on individuals and the manner in which social groups foster crimogenic factors and, conversely, generate preventive dimensions of social control. Thus, social crime prevention incorporates interventions aimed at: (i) reducing individual motivations to offend via their social influences and institutions of socialisation; and (ii) altering social relationships and/ or the social environment, through a collective focus on communities, neighbourhoods or social networks. Elsewhere in the literature (Tonry & Farrington, 1995), the former is often referred to as ‘developmental’ (Tremblay & Craig, 1995) or ‘risk-focused’ prevention (Farrington, 2002) and the latter frequently assumes the moniker of ‘community crime prevention’ or ‘community safety’ (Hope, 1995; Crawford, 2007a). Developmental approaches entail intervention early in personal pathways that may result in criminal behaviours and other social problems to prevent the development of criminal potential in individuals. It is based on the idea that offending is determined by behavioural and attitudinal patterns learned and produced throughout the course of an individual’s life. It proceeds from the basis that risk factors exist at different ages and that life events affect the course of development. Consequently, developmental prevention concerns the manipulation of multiple risk and protective factors at crucial transition points across a lifetime. Hence, it focuses largely on childhood development and the opportunities present at critical junctures during the life-course, to prevent the onset of offending in the early years. These developmental stages offer opportunities to target prevention resources at those most at risk of offending, where long-term benefits might accrue. This is what van Dijk and

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de Waard (2009: 137-8) term ‘secondary offender-oriented crime prevention’, namely early intervention programmes targeted at children and young people (and their parents) identified as ‘at risk’ of offending. Whilst it is not restricted to interventions with young people, much of the policy focus has been targeted at childhood risk factors (Farrington, 2007). Community crime prevention, by contrast, refers to interventions designed to change or alter the social conditions, institutions and relationships that influence offending among social groups and residential communities. In so doing, it seeks to increase the crime preventive capacity, and often the informal social control, of communities and social groupings; it concerns communal inter-personal relations, values and norms rather than questions of individual propensities and motivations. Nevertheless, the conceptual boundaries between developmental and community crime prevention are porous. Whilst developmental approaches have largely focused on individual level risk factors, including those expressed in the interactions that individuals have with others – be they in families, kinship relationships, peer groups and school settings – community level factors have also been drawn into these analyses. Some community-based interventions, such as the ‘Communities That Care’ programmes (Crow et al., 2004), have adopted a risk-focused approach that largely conceptualises communities as aggregates of individual risk profiles. Furthermore, (as we shall see) other community approaches assume a developmental logic that underpins both the factors that render certain communities high crime areas and those that foster the crime preventive capacities of certain communities. Such approaches are influenced heavily by Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) ‘broken windows’ thesis, which posits a causal (developmental) connection between, on the one hand, incivilities, disorder and anti-social behaviour, given the fears, anxieties and perceptions of insecurity that these promote and, on the other hand, subsequent crime. Hence, interventions to halt communities from ‘spiralling into crime’ necessitate a focus on low-level disorderly ‘pre-crimes’ (Zedner, 2007). Early intervention, pre-emption and governing possible futures are therefore all unifying themes within both individual and community-level prevention strategies. Furthermore, both developmental and community-based crime prevention strategies can operate across all three levels of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention (Brantingham & Faust, 1976). They can: be directed at general populations aimed at addressing potentially crimogenic factors

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before the onset of the problem (primary prevention); involve work with people who have been identified as ‘at risk’ because of some pre-dispositional factor (secondary prevention); and be targeted at known offenders in order to reduce further crimes or the harms associated with them (tertiary prevention). In Britain, we shall argue (and seek to illustrate) that developmental and community-based approaches to crime prevention, to a certain degree, have increasingly merged around a political agenda focused on ‘anti-social behaviour’ (Burney, 2009; Crawford, 2009b), which has prioritised forms of ‘secondary’ prevention targeted at individuals, families and neighbourhoods. In this, pre-emption and precaution have become increasingly prominent logics in prevention policy and practice (Zedner, 2009; Crawford, 2010), licensing earlier intervention, both at an earlier age in the lives of young people and earlier in the (presumed) developmental evolution of identified risk factors.

Social Crime Prevention within Community Safety If the Bonnemaison report set the tone for social crime prevention developments in France, then its nearest equivalent in England was the Morgan Report. Published in 1991, the report had been commissioned by the then Conservative government to review crime prevention developments since the publication of interdepartmental circular 8/84, which first elaborated the new philosophy at the heart of government, declaring that ‘preventing crime is a task for the whole community’. The Morgan Report fostered a significant shift in the emerging discourse. The two most important propositions were conceptual and institutional. Conceptually, it argued that the term ‘community safety’ is to be preferred to ‘crime prevention’. The latter was seen as too narrowly construed in a situational guise and too closely associated with the view that crime prevention is solely the responsibility of the police. Community safety, by contrast, was promoted as an umbrella term, under which situational and social approaches could be combined rather than juxtaposed. In the view of the Morgan Committee, ‘the social aspects of crime prevention, which seek to reduce those influences which lead to offending behaviour, and the fear of crime, need to receive attention at least equal to that given to the situational aspects of crime prevention’ (Morgan, 1991, 13). Allied to this, community safety was perceived to be open to wider interpretation, which could encourage a genuine partnership approach through ‘greater participation from all sections of the community in the fight against crime’ (ibid., 13). Institutionally, the Morgan Report

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recommended that local authorities should be given ‘statutory responsibility’, working with the police, for the development and promotion of community safety strategies and partnerships. The reasoning given by the Committee for this pivotal recommendation included: firstly, the fact that local authorities control important local services and resources necessary for a multi-agency strategy; secondly, the belief that this would foster wider acceptance of responsibility among potential partners (and discourage any assumption that the police can and should be primarily responsible); thirdly, the view that it enables permanency, continuity and a clear focus for the involvement of the business and voluntary sectors; and fourthly, that it crucially provides for the legitimate involvement of locally elected representatives (ibid., 29). Largely for ideological reasons, the Conservative government at the time refused to implement the Report’s central recommendations. The government was not keen to give local authorities new or greater powers (it had spent much of the 1980s reducing local authority powers). Moreover, the broader social approach to prevention advocated by the Morgan Committee sat awkwardly with the notion of individual responsibility that defined the Thatcherite mantra: ‘There’s no such thing as society!’ As a consequence, social crime prevention receded into the shadows of central government policy. Despite this, local organisations in the voluntary sector, such as NACRO, the Safe Neighbourhoods Unit and some large metropolitan authorities, continued to develop innovative projects, often in relation to socially deprived housing estates (Power & Tunstall, 1995). During much of the 1990s, the crime prevention ideas emanating out of Whitehall were largely restricted to promoting active citizenship through the special constabulary and neighbourhood watch, whilst sponsoring the expansion of CCTV technologies across the UK. It is estimated that in the mid-1990s in England, some 78 % of the Home Office’s crime prevention budget was being spent on CCTV systems alone (Koch, 1998); in essence, resources were being devoted to the flagship of situational prevention. It was only with the election of the New Labour government in 1997 that the fortunes of social crime prevention policy improved in England. In the run-up to the election, the Labour opposition had sought to seize the initiative on law and order – a subject for which the traditional ‘soft on crime’ perception had come to constitute a political ‘hostage to fortune’ (notably since 1979) for Labour politicians (Downes & Morgan, 1994). This political repositioning was captured most clearly in Tony Blair’s infamous catchphrase ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ (first articulated

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in 1993). In realigning itself and attacking the Conservative government, the Labour leadership drew heavily on both the Morgan Report and a scathing critique of youth justice that had been published in late 1996 by the Audit Commission (1996), entitled Misspent Youth. The report concluded that about £1 billion a year was being spent on a youth justice system that was both inefficient and ineffective. It concluded that youth justice was preoccupied with processing and administering young offenders, rather than working to address offending behaviour, and that little was being done to prevent young people from offending in the first place. This set the tone for one of the central legislative planks of the initial New Labour government, namely the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. At its core, the Act combined a focus on community safety with significant reforms to the youth justice system – initially elaborated in a provocatively titled No More Excuses consultation paper (Home Office, 1997). Informing both was a strong theme of crime prevention as well as personal responsibility. In relation to community safety, the 1998 Act created the institutional framework for implementing a partnership approach. It diverged from the Morgan Report proposals in that it placed a joint duty on local councils and the police to work together with a wide range of other agencies from the public, private, voluntary and community sectors to develop and implement strategies to reduce crime and disorder. The Act gives partners the power to disclose information for the purposes of the Act (s. 115), to foster interagency coordination and evade some of the constraints of data protection. With regard to youth crime, the 1998 Act gave the youth justice system an overarching aim to ‘prevent offending’ by young people (s. 37) and imposed a duty on all youth justice agencies take this into account. The Act also paid considerable attention to reforming the youth justice infrastructure by introducing the Youth Justice Board to oversee the changes at a national level, and at a local level the legislation established multi-disciplinary Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) to implement and deliver the ‘new’ youth justice. Hence, a further unifying theme in the new institutional architecture was a partnership approach to prevention through multi-agency collaborative working. At least at the level of rhetoric, ‘joined-up policy’ became a defining attribute. From this perspective, it was presumed that prevention demanded a novel corporate approach that would transcend the competencies of specific professional groups and cut across disciplinary boundaries. In theory, if not in practice, this new approach – recognised that the levers and causes of crime lie far from the traditional reach of the criminal justice system; acknowledged that there was no single agency solution to crime and

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disorder; accepted the need for social responses to crime that reflected the nature of the phenomenon itself and its multiple aetiology; allowed for an holistic approach to crime, community safety and associated issues which was ‘problem-focused’ rather than ‘bureaucracy-premised’; and allowed for the potential co-ordination and pooling of knowledge, capacity and resources. A further theme elaborated in the 1998 Act was a focus on ‘disorder’ – reflected in the title of the legislation – as a distinct concept of policy focus that was conceived (albeit ill-definedly) as a ‘precursor to crime’ (Crawford, 2009b: 816). Here, the ideological category ‘disorder’ – or ‘anti-social behaviour’ as it subsequently became known in UK policy debates – is identified as the first step in a developmental trajectory, for both individuals and communities, which leads to more serious offending. Thus conceived, ‘disorder’/‘anti-social behaviour’ flags up the need for early intervention; to ‘nip in the bud’ future criminality and the onset of individual ‘criminal careers’ or to avert a ‘tipping point’ in relation to spirals of community decline. Disorder/anti-social behaviour becomes a precursor in a sequential nexus of disorder, fear and crime. In support of this prevailing philosophy, references to Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) ‘broken windows’ thesis litter British policy documentation on urban governance. If intervention is delayed beyond a certain threshold, it is assumed that it becomes more problematic and less successful. As such, responding to disorder and antisocial behaviour is intrinsically concerned with governing possible futures and averting potential outcomes. It fits squarely within the preoccupation with risk prediction, crime prevention and early intervention. The most notable example of this was the introduction of the ‘anti-social behaviour order’ (ASBO) – s. 1 of the 1998 Act – as a civil preventive order designed to provide a response to low-level repetitive acts of incivility which have disproportionate and cumulative adverse consequences for perceptions of security and community wellbeing. Yet, the empirical evidence providing support for such a developmental nexus between disorder, fear and crime is at best weak. By contrast, there is significant countervailing evidence (Taylor, 2000; Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004; Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006). In 2004, James Q Wilson, himself, observed that: ‘I still to this day do not know if improving order will or will not reduce crime ... People have not understood that this was a speculation’ (cited in Hurley, 2004: 3). Nevertheless, in British policy circles the ‘broken windows’ thesis has become widely accepted official wisdom (Innes & Jones, 2006), routinely invoked as unchallenged orthodoxy.

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The cross-departmental approach to policy and the influence of Wilson and Kelling’s seminal thesis were both evident in the work of the Social Exclusion Unit, which had been set up in 1998 to consider cross-governmental challenges to ‘narrow the gap’ between the most socially deprived estates and the rest of Britain. In its first two years of work the Social Exclusion Unit spawned 18 cross-departmental policy action teams, one of which was explicitly dedicated to address problems of ‘anti-social behaviour’. The eventual report specifically argued that anti-social behaviour matters because ‘if left unchecked, it can lead to neighbourhood decline, with people moving away and tenants abandoning housing’ (Home Office, 2000, 7). In an extract that draws heavily on the original ‘broken windows’ thesis and articulates its developmental logic, the report asserted: ‘Combating anti-social behaviour is central to regenerating deprived areas and preventing serious crime. Minor anti-social behaviour such as litter and graffiti can produce a breakdown in community control through a spiralling process that leads to serious crime. When houses are left untended and become dilapidated, children feel they can be noisy, litter will accumulate, young people will congregate within an area, and public drinking will become routine. People avoid moving into the area and those who can move out. This results in more serious crime, which in turn increases fear. A vicious circle of neighbourhood decline has begun.’ (ibid., 32-3)

The policy focus on ‘community’ as the appropriate level at which to target crime prevention and as a key dynamic in fostering informal social control also reflected the wider influence of a communitarian philosophy (Etzioni, 1993; Crawford, 1996) and debates about the preventive forces of ‘social capital’ (Putnam, 2000). Reviving ‘social capital’ – the social norms, networks and bonds of trustworthiness that enable people to act collectively – came to be understood ‘as a means to the end of social inclusion and as a way of tackling social exclusion’ (Kearns, 2003: 39) and significantly influenced New Labour policies on community cohesion and safety (Crawford, 2006a). This was further elaborated in the government’s White Paper Respect and Responsibility, which preceded the 2003 Anti-Social Behaviour Act and called on communities to ‘take a stand’, arguing that ‘everyone must play their part in setting and enforcing standards of behaviour’ (Home Office, 2003: 17). In the foreword, the Home Secretary at the time, David Blunkett, elaborated the government’s vision:

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‘Our aim is a “something for something” society where we treat one another with respect and where we all share responsibility for taking a stand against what is unacceptable… We must be much tougher about forcing people not to behave anti-socially. When people break the rules, there must be consequences for them ... Unless laws are enforced, the signal is clear – if those in a position to act do not do so, then others will not join in. Those who have both the power and the responsibility to act must do so.’ (Home Office, 2003, 3-4)

Social Crime Prevention and the Anti-Social Behaviour Agenda By introducing both the term ‘anti-social behaviour’ and the institutional infrastructure for delivering community safety – crime and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) – the 1998 Act and the work of the Social Exclusion Unit prepared the ground for the subsequent anti-social behaviour agenda. The legislation defined ‘anti-social behaviour’ as ‘behaviour which causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more people who are not in the same household as the perpetrator’ (s. 1). Its meaning derives less from what it is than from what its consequences are or might be. This definition’s distinctive features are: firstly, that it focuses on the importance of public space and sensitivities about local social order; secondly, that it highlights the cumulative effects of persistent behaviour; and thirdly, that it accentuates the differential interpretation and meaning of certain local social problems – such as groups of loitering youths, graffiti and vandalism – and offers an explanation for why perceptions of such problems have a disproportionate impact on people’s sense of (in)security (see Innes, 2004). As such, it emphasises the dimension of ‘public perception’ with regard to issues of wrongdoing and local safety governance. In part, the anti-social behaviour agenda was a response to what became known, in policy circles, as the ‘reassurance paradox’ (Crawford, 2007b). As measured by the British Crime Survey (BCS), aggregate crime rates had been declining from a high point in the mid-1990s, to the extent that the (average) risk of crime by 2004 was lower than it had been at any time since 1981 when the first BCS was conducted. Yet public perceptions remained trapped in the belief that crime and anti-social behaviour were inexorably on the rise. For instance, the percentage of people who identified youths hanging about in the street in their locality as ‘a big problem’ was not only significant but also growing. In the decade between 1992 and 2002 the figure increased by

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nearly two-thirds, from 20 to 33 per cent. Consequently, public anxieties and community wellbeing have become prominent policy concerns in their own right. By 2002, there was a growing view that the national legislation and powers that had been put in place (notably by the 1998 Act) were not being used as they had been intended. Most notably, the ASBO was little used and the power for local authorities to apply for curfew orders for children under 10 in specified areas (s. 14) was not used at all, much to the frustration of senior Labour politicians. Jack Straw, the first New Labour Home Secretary, blamed an inherent ‘conservatism’ among local authorities and the police for the failure to implement the new laws (House of Commons, 2001: 40). During the second Blair administration there was a shift in government focus towards ensuring not only the availability of new powers (which continued to proliferate) but also the delivery of policy initiatives and the local implementation of all available tools. This was reflected in the establishment of the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit at the heart of central government in 2001. A key philosophy behind the shift was that ‘numbers are important but not enough: citizens have to see and feel the difference’ (Barber, 2007: 370). As the Prime Minister’s self-styled ‘enforcer’, Sir Michael Barber (head of the Delivery Unit) played a vital role in relentlessly pursuing policy delivery and implementing what he describes in his memoirs as ‘deliverology’; the ‘science’ of marshalling prime ministerial power to deliver significant measurable improvements in public services’ (ibid., 79). Hence, delivering irreversible change that citizens might notice and appreciate became a major policy driver. Towards the end of his period in office, Tony Blair reflected upon the importance of effecting policy changes that impact on public perceptions, in declaring: ‘the other thing I have learnt in over 8 years of being Prime Minister is that you can argue about statistics until the cows come home and there is usually a very great credibility gap between whatever statistics are put out and whatever people actually think is happening, but the real point is not about statistics, it is about how people feel… because the fear of crime is as important in some respects as crime itself.’

These lessons were clearly felt in the experience of the Street Crime Initiative, which illustrated the work of the Delivery Unit. The initiative was a shortterm ‘national emergency’ response to a perceived rise in street robbery, personally launched by Tony Blair in March 2002. It targeted considerable

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resources (an additional £ 67 million) at ten police force areas, which were challenged with meeting short-term crime reduction targets in collaboration with partner agencies. The initiative was overseen by a high-level crossdepartmental group (the Street Crime Action Group) chaired by the Prime Minister, which included nearly half the Cabinet, as well as representatives of statutory and voluntary agencies. As an exercise in policy delivery on a significant and symbolic scale, the message that the initiative sought to reinforce was that crime is not just the responsibility of the police or the criminal justice system, but of a wide range of agencies and individuals. A subsequent joint thematic inspection found that significant reductions in street crime and street robbery were achieved over a 6 month period and local partnership working in the targeted areas ‘was revitalised and energised with a renewed emphasis on delivery’ (HMIC et al., 2003). The importance of the initiative was more extensive than its specific subject matter or duration might imply. The thematic inspection report concluded that not only was the initiative an example of ‘“joined-up” government in action’, but it also ‘provided an ideal case study within which to identify the friction points and barriers inherent within the criminal justice system and to make significant improvements that will benefit the longer-term criminal justice reform’ (ibid., 7). In his biography Blair Unbound, Seldon (2007: 74) suggests that Blair learnt two fundamental lessons from the Street Crime Initiative: ‘not to trust the Home Office, and that the whole criminal justice system was in need of fundamental change’. The initiative became much more than simply a means of reducing street robbery. It provided ‘a way into more radical reforms’ of criminal justice and left a legacy for the delivery of change through challenging performance and providing appropriate incentives (Barber, 2007: 156). It reinforced the growing governmental belief that criminal justice processes and principles were an intrinsic part of the problem, rather than the solution to crime and anti-social behaviour. As Blair asserted: ‘it is the culture of political and legal decision-making that has to change, to take account of the way the world has changed ... It is a complete change of mindset, an avowed, articulated determination to make protection of the law-abiding public the priority and to measure that not by the theory of the textbook but by the reality of the street and community in which real people live real lives.’ (Blair, 2006)

In order to prevent crime and respond appropriately to contemporary problems of anti-social behaviour, it was necessary to rebalance and, where

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needed, to circumvent the criminal justice system. ‘Rebalancing’ in this context means shifting the emphasis away from a rights-based discourse towards one that emphasises social responsibilities, conditionality and community wellbeing (Home Office, 2006). For influential ‘New Labour’ policy commentators like Frank Field, at the vanguard of promoting institutional change, the type of anti-social behaviour that blights neighbourhoods and social relations is distinctively novel. Hence, it demands new modes of response: ‘because it is new, effective means of dealing with it have generally still to be devised’ (2003: 44). For Field, the distinguishing mark of anti-social behaviour is that each incident, by itself, does not warrant a legal response, but it is in its regularity and repetitiveness that anti-social behaviour ‘wields its destructive force’ (ibid., 45). The challenge presented by the collapse of social virtues and common decency, for him, is the foremost issue facing government. Politics, he contends, needs to reconnect with questions about ‘the kinds of people we want as citizens’. For Field, the ‘politics of behaviour’ has replaced the historic ‘politics of class’ that structured traditional political divisions and was instrumental in moulding respectability and decency in Britain during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 formally extended the legal responsibility of CDRPs to ‘anti-social behaviour’ (in addition to ‘crime and disorder’) and introduced a swathe of new powers designed to assist local practitioners in the fight against antisocial behaviour, including ‘parenting contracts’ (as more informal and quasi-voluntary modes of intervention than the little used ‘parenting order’), fi xed penalty notices for disorder and the ‘dispersal order’, which gave police powers (s. 30) to disperse groups in designated areas (Crawford, 2008). Allied to this, the Street Crime Initiative model was replicated through the establishment of the Anti-Social Behaviour Unit (and the subsequent Respect Taskforce in 2005) at the centre of government, supplemented by local Anti-Social Behaviour units within CDRPs across the country, who could be held responsible for the delivery of the agenda. Moreover, the central Unit/Taskforce was to use a variety of delivery techniques to cajole local practitioners into using the new legislative tools and powers available, including rewarding ‘good’ performance (by conferring additional resources such as those provided to the 40 Respect areas identified in early 2007) and publicly shaming ‘poor’ performance. The effectiveness of this strategy – particularly in the years in which Louise Casey was head of the ASB Unit and Respect Taskforce (between 2003-2007) – was evidenced in the prime

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(albeit very crude) indicator used by government of the time; namely the number of ASBOs issued per year (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: The number of ASBOs issued at all courts in England & Wales (up to end 2009, by year)

However, the very need for a Delivery Unit style body at the heart of government to enforce the new regime of powers implies a certain degree of local practitioner resistance to their use. From the outset of the anti-social behaviour agenda, local practitioners – to varying degrees and with local variations – recognised the limitations of the enforcement-led approach promoted by the government. This generated a patchwork take-up and use of the powers, reflecting significantly different local approaches, cultures and practices (Burney, 2009; Cooper et al., 2009). In 2007, the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2007) was highly critical of the Home Office’s approach to anti-social behaviour, condemning it for its lack of evaluation and ‘published data on the effectiveness of different measures’, its limited knowledge about ‘the extent to which socioeconomic, geographic, ethnic, and age factors influence the outcomes achieved’ and its over-emphasis on enforcement. It concluded that decisions about which interventions to use in particular circumstances ‘are based on local preferences and the familiarity of those in authority with the different types of measures, rather than an objective assessment of what works with different types of perpetrators’ (ibid., 5).

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In the later years of the New Labour administration – notably in the postBlair era under the leadership of Gordon Brown (2007-10) – there was a slight softening of the enforcement-led approach and a greater emphasis on combining enforcement with support packages in the name of prevention. Similarly, the fervour with which the ASBO was promoted as a panacea and mark of ‘good performance’ waned, as reflected in the declining use of ASBOs; albeit as figure 1 shows, this downward trend began before Brown took over as Prime Minister and was probably more a reflection of practitioners’ frustrations and preferences for other forms of intervention than simply a change in message from the centre. In early 2006, the emphasis on prevention through support – rather than enforcement alone – saw the promotion of systematic support networks for the most anti-social families through the development of Family Intervention Projects (FIP), which drew inspiration from the successful Dundee Families project (Dilane et al., 2001). These projects targeted families at risk of eviction on grounds of anti-social behaviour and provided them with intensive surveillance, intervention and support programmes, sometimes located in dedicated housing units. In addition, Individual Support Orders (ISOs) were introduce by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (s. 322) and promoted by government as the supportfocused ancillary to ASBOs for juveniles. Tony Blair elaborated on the need to focus on families and parenting as simultaneously the root causes of social problems and the potential crucible for their prevention when, in August 2006, he declared: ‘I think we need to… intervene at a very early stage… If we are not prepared to predict and intervene far more early, children are going to grow up in families that we know perfectly well are completely dysfunctional  ... The kids a few years down the line are going to be a menace to society.’

The Youth Taskforce Action Plan (Department of Children, Schools and Families, 2008) continued this trend. The Plan outlined a ‘triple track’ approach based around ‘tough enforcement’ to tackle problems, ‘nonnegotiable support’ to address the underlying causes of poor behaviour and ‘early intervention and prevention’ to tackle problems before they escalate. The parenting theme had been a central one throughout New Labour’s years in government, as reflected by the introduction of the ‘parenting order’ under the 1998 Act. But like some of the other powers introduced by that legislation, it remained little used and was seen by many practitioners as overly stigmatising and punitive (Burney & Gelsthorpe, 2008).

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To summarise, as an umbrella term, anti-social behaviour has come to demarcate a distinct policy field that blurs traditional distinctions between crime and disorder. It refigures the use of civil and criminal, as well as formal and informal, regulatory responses. Above all else, the anti-social behaviour agenda reflects a preoccupation with the question of governing ‘young people’. It constitutes a policy terrain that transcends crime, interconnecting its governance with a matrix of wider social problems and prompting linked responses. Echoing Jonathan Simon’s (2007) ‘governing through crime’ thesis, anti-social behaviour has come to constitute an organising concept central to the exercise of contemporary authority. Just as ‘we can expect people to deploy the category of crime to legitimate interventions that have other motivations’ (Simon, 2007, 4), so too anti-social behaviour now serves similar purposes. As a relatively ‘new’ conceptual category, it is able to incorporate and absorb the governmental activities of much wider institutions and organisations, from housing to schools via health, urban planning and commerce. It has a much more capacious quality that extends far beyond the limited purview of ‘crime’, incorporating perceptions of insecurity, incivilities, manners and quality-of-life concerns. As such, it affords a more all-encompassing lens through which to redefine the ambitions of government and the responsibilities of citizens. The antisocial behaviour agenda, thus, became bound up not only with a particular variant of social crime prevention – with its developmental and riskfocused approach as well as communitarian concerns – but also with a toxic combination of state-centred dirigisme, a rejection of assumptions about the impact of social complexity and structural forces, an individualisation of responsibility and a belief in the conditionality of behaviour as a prerequisite for accessing public provisions and welfare. With its preventive orientations, the anti-social behaviour agenda presented a fundamental challenge to principles of criminal justice and introduced new, often authoritarian and discretionary, powers that circumvent established principles of due process, proportionality and protections afforded to juveniles (Crawford, 2009b). In Tonry’s estimation, ‘Labour’s criminal justice policies were the most repressive of any western country’s since the Second World War’, with the consequence that the ‘Labour government’s policies and rhetoric have weakened support within the British public and within British culture for the rule of law and for fundamental beliefs about relations between the citizen and the State’ (2010, 388-9). A damning indictment indeed!

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Case Studies Against this national policy background, we now turn to consider a number of case studies that illustrate some of the diversity of social crime prevention developments that have emerged over the past decade or so in parts of England, although these are not supposed to be representative of all developments or trends across the country. We hope to use the case studies to highlight some recurring themes, sites of conflict and tensions that are to be found replicated more generally across the field of social crime prevention, policy and practice. These include: • The tensions that exist between national policy agendas and local practice delivery and innovations. • The challenges present in realising coordinated local inter-organisational preventive partnerships against a wider policy framework, which both remains departmental and disciplinary-based and is structured by intraorganisational performance measurement and regulatory regimes – such that service delivery remains simultaneously ‘joined-up but fragmented’ (Crawford, 2001). • The ambiguous relationship between (rationalistic) risk reduction and risk-focused prevention, on the one hand, and assuaging (affective and subjective) public perceptions of insecurity and promoting public confidence, on the other hand. • The tense relationship between informal and formal, as well as between civil and criminal, responses to problematic behaviour and the associated dangers of ‘net-widening’ (Cohen, 1985) that attend to strategies that seek to combine or blur boundaries between them. • The limits of ‘community’ as an organising concept and vehicle of governance, and the differential capacity of communities to prevent crime. • The ambiguities in the extent to which social crime prevention blurs with social policy, in such a way that crime control may come to refigure (criminalise) social policy. • The ethical and social problems associated with targeting ‘at risk’ groups – particularly young people – for special policy attention and resourcing, notably labelling children, stigmatising localities and generally lowering the threshold of intervention; i.e. ‘defining deviancy up’ (Krauthammer, 1993). • The dangers of fostering a precautionary approach to early intervention whereby risk assessment confronts limitations of (‘scientific’) knowledge and is thereby influenced by uncertainty.

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• The difficulties surrounding investments in future crime prevention and long-term solutions as against timely and tangible actions (often enforcement based) that produce short-term results. Allied to this are tensions between reactive, enforcement-led approaches and proactive prevention through early interventions.

Youth Inclusion Projects The Youth Inclusion Programme was established in 2000 by the Youth Justice Board as part of its Youth Crime Strategy. The initiative formed part of a broader response to the Audit Commission’s Misspent Youth report (Audit Commission, 1996), which had advocated greater investment in targeted preventive services. Youth Inclusion Projects (YIPs) target 13-16 year olds in some of the most deprived areas, with a special focus on identifying the ‘top 50’ most ‘at risk’ young people, specifically those at risk of offending, engaging in anti-social behaviour or exclusion from school. The idea was extended in 2003, when Junior YIPs were established to complement existing provision and target 8-12 year olds, thereby providing a consistent and continuous service that spans the whole ‘transition age’ (Ives & Wyvill, 2007: 5). Junior YIPs are supported by Youth Inclusion Support Panels in many areas, which have responsibility for referral and signposting to services and are comprised of staff from various agencies. The programmes are a locally grounded means to engage with marginalised young people and change patterns of behaviour before they become entrenched. In doing so, the aim is to facilitate movement back into mainstream services and prevent or reduce offending. Interventions occur not just at the individual level but also with communities and families. This can involve helping service users with their homework, assisting excluded young people to find alternative educational arrangements or simply providing them with a safe environment (Selman, 2006). There are some 110 YIPs/Junior YIPs operating across the country. Estimates made in 2008 suggest that at that time some 48 000 young people had engaged with the YIPs (excluding Junior YIPs), at the relatively modest cost of £ 1,641 per child over a three-year period (Mackie et al., 2008: 12). The Youth Justice Board provides an annual grant to support their work. Many also work in partnership with locally based voluntary organisations and charities such as NACRO. As a result, the services provided can vary considerably. This can be a benefit, in that it allows projects to respond to the particular needs of

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the communities in which they work, and this fluidity and flexibility of the projects is seen as an important strength (Ives & Wyvill, 2007: 9). However, there are also negative implications. There are some concerns that the most effective YIPs are those that operate in a clearly defined and coherent geographical area – something that only a small proportion of the projects do in practice (Mackie et al., 2008: 10). There were also questions raised about the commitment to working with the top 50 at risk young people, based on an analysis of the data which suggests that engagement rates with this group vary between areas (Selman, 2006), and similarly, concerns that service users more broadly were receiving a lower level of ‘dosage’ in some areas than was deemed necessary for securing long term change (Mackie et al., 2008: 20). Nonetheless, national evaluations of the YIPs have been broadly positive, with some caveats. Research into Phase 1 (2000-2003) found that the programme could be ‘judged as a success on several counts’ including reductions in arrests and exclusions for the ‘top 50’ but that there was considerable variation in different areas in terms of the engagement of this group (Morgan Harris Burrows, 2003: 15). Likewise, in Phase 2 (20032006) the programme had ‘easily’ met its target of engaging the most at risk group, but had failed to maintain regular contact or adequately engage them in education, training or employment (Mackie et al., 2008: 10). The experiences of YIPs highlight a number of problems including: staff shortages, lack of capacity for referral to other agencies and lack of appropriate agencies for referral (Clarke et al., 2008). Whilst participation in these schemes is voluntary, the evaluation of the first phase of the project noted that a ‘significant proportion of cases’ had been ‘unwilling to participate’ on this basis (Morgan Harris Burrows, 2003: 7). Initial findings from our own Nuffield Foundation project (Crawford et al., forthcoming) suggest that some young people might be entering YIPs as a requirement of signing an Acceptable Behaviour Contract, which may be experienced as less than voluntary. This raises questions about the role of coercion and possible sanctions in the process, particularly if young people are reluctant to take part. The projects utilise various risk assessment tools (such as Onset and Asset) for identifying relevant young people. At risk individuals are thereby targeted using a complex matrix of information, gathered from various sources. Aside from broader concerns about the efficacy of using risk factor analysis in targeting services, there is some suggestion that the ability of staff members to work effectively is compromised by, among other things, time spent on

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record keeping and administrative duties, and that there was, initially at least, some resistance to the use of the various risk assessment tools and the ‘stringent recording requirements’ (Morgan Harris Burrows, 2003: 4; Ives & Wyvill, 2007). One study also found ‘unsatisfactory’ relations between a quarter of all YIPs and the local Youth Offending Team, as well as data protection issues which hampered the sharing of appropriate information between these services (Mackie et al., 2008).

Family Intervention Projects Family Intervention Projects (FIPs) started life as six experimental Intensive Family Support Projects (IFSPs) rolled out in Yorkshire and the North West of England in 2003. The projects were designed to assist and support families who were either homeless or threatened with eviction as a result of complaints of anti-social behaviour towards them, principally towards children and young people in the families (Nixon et al., 2008). The projects were modelled on the pioneering Dundee Families Project in Scotland (Dillane et al., 2001) and involved up to two years of intensive outreach and residential support from a team of professionals from a range of backgrounds. The IFSPs were considered sufficiently successful that in 2006, a national network (now called Family Intervention Projects) was launched as part of the Government’s Respect Action Plan. FIPs combine an ‘assertive’ and ‘persistent’ style, offering both challenge and support to, as well as surveillance of, families (White et al., 2008). This is placed within a twin track approach that works to address the ‘underlying causes’ of problematic behaviour, whilst using sanctions to encourage participation and gain compliance and behavioural change. Initially, these projects were aimed at supporting vulnerable families, placing behavioural problems within wider policy concerns of homelessness and child protection (Parr & Nixon, 2009). Broadly, there are three distinct levels of interventions that are used: outreach services; services provided in units managed by the family intervention project but dispersed in the community; and (at the most intensive level), families provided with 24 hour supervision and support in a core residential unit. Where families are the targets of an intervention project’s core housing units or else housed in dispersed tenancies, family intervention tenancies provide an additional coercive lever with which to induce compliance. Family intervention tenancies combine reduced security of tenure with an identified behaviour support agreement;

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a type of ‘contract’ drawn up between the family and key worker which sets out the changes that are expected, the support that will be provided in order to facilitate behavioural change and the consequences of non-compliance. Termination of the tenancy is linked to wilful refusal to accept support. As such, FIPs provide a continuum of support, from visiting families in their homes to intensive residential care. Teams take a holistic approach, described as ‘grip’ (Respect Taskforce, 2006) towards the families, most of whom experience a complex of problems and problematic behaviours including drug and alcohol use, domestic or inter-generational violence, mental health issues and behavioural and learning difficulties. Referrals come through a range of agencies and FIPS work closely with other stakeholders including social housing providers, the Police, Anti-Social Behaviour Teams and Schools. Though a national programme, FIPs are grounded in local contexts and in practice, the ways of working are quite varied, sometimes involving, for instance, work to support mothers in the home who are struggling to provide appropriate care or boundaries for their children, and taking children out to events and activities. A number of assessments have concluded that on the whole, the projects have been successful and worthwhile, based on a range of criteria including reductions in anti-social behaviour, improvements in outcomes for young people and a stabilisation or improvement in the housing situations for a significant proportion of families (White et al., 2008; Nixon et al., 2008; Department for Education, 2010). However, this does not appear to be evident for all participants, and for around one third of families, principally those with the most deeprooted problems, there had been little improvement and their lives remained ‘dominated by’ complaints about behaviour, the threat of eviction and family breakdown (Nixon et al., 2008: 8). Criticisms have focused on a number of concerns. Firstly, questions have been raised about the validity of the evaluations, and that they are not only methodologically flawed but that their somewhat nuanced conclusions have been ignored by the Government in favour of overly positive headlines (Gregg, 2011). As a consequence, it has been suggested that FIPs have not been as successful as has been claimed and could even have been counterproductive in some cases. There are a number of reasons put forward for this: that the schemes target the wrong people and the wrong behaviours, punishing some of the most vulnerable people, whilst simultaneously failing to provide any appropriate or genuinely useful help or support (Gregg, 2011). Secondly, it has been suggested that the use of sanctions, particularly

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the threat of the loss of housing, represents part of a broader ‘coercive shift’ (Flint, 2009: 247) reflected by the anti-social behaviour agenda in England, in stark contrast to the model in Scotland, which makes no mention of sanctions and instead emphasise the importance of negotiation when working with reluctant or recalcitrant families (Nixon et al., 2010). Other commentators, however, argue that these criticisms miss the point, and that FIPs were set up primarily to help families avoid, or overcome, loss of housing, rather than to hasten eviction, and incorporate strong inclusionary as well as exclusionary elements (Flint, 2009). It is also argued that the national rhetoric on sanctions has been exaggerated, in part at least, to assuage a media dominated by a populist punitive ‘not in my back yard’ mentality (Nixon et al., 2010; 2008), and that in the gap between national and local implementation there exists a number of ‘sites of resistance’ in which local practitioners are able to adapt or ignore central dictates (Parr & Nixon, 2009). There is some evidence to suggest that practitioners deliberately under-emphasise the use of sanctions (White et al., 2008) in their work, which allows them to create a distance between themselves and other agencies working with families, particularly those with more of an enforcement function. As a result, FIP workers are able to establish more trusting relationships with the families. Others, however, suggest that the use of sanctions, at least in the English context, has been central to the success of the projects (White et al., 2008).

Tackling Knife Crime and Gangs Knife carrying and use are increasingly a concern for politicians, the media and the general public, despite overall reductions in violent crime. Researchers and policymakers are still grappling with the extent and nature of the phenomena, and its relationship with other forms of ‘problematic’ behaviour among young people, such as gang membership, gun use and drug use. Most agree, however, that there is substantial overlap between these and knife-related crime, that they tend to cluster together in areas of severe deprivation and marginalisation, and that those most likely to engage in such behaviours are socially excluded young people, who are themselves often victims of crime (Bannister, 2010; Marfleet, 2008). Official responses to youth violence are ostensibly enforcement-focused (Squires, 2009: 144) and much of the rhetoric emphasises detection and punishment. However, within this, there is also space for a range of developmental initiatives, targeted both at those most at risk of joining gangs and using weapons, and

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the wider neighbourhoods and social environments in which knife-carrying youths reside. The Tackling Knives Action Programme was launched in 2008 and was initially aimed at young people aged 13-19 in ten police force areas. There was a deliberate focus on those areas and neighbourhoods that were known to have the greatest problems of knife carrying and crime. This was later extended in a second phase to cover other areas and young people up to 24, and was renamed the Tackling Knives and Serious Youth Violence Action Programme (Ward et al., 2011). The programme combined enforcement, prevention and reassurance measures. This included more intense enforcement of laws relating to knife carrying, through proactive stop and search police activities, knife amnesties, and the use of metal detectors in schools and other public places, as well as longer custodial sentences for possession. The second phase of the programme supported a variety of preventive measures, with a focus on diversion, rehabilitation and education. Some £1.5 million a year over three years was provided to local community projects through the Home Office Community Fund. These projects targeted young people who were at risk of offending and there was an emphasis on outreach street work, mentoring and innovative youth schemes, including schemes for new migrant communities, which aimed at improving social skills and changing attitudes towards weapons and violence. Funds were also invested in the existing Positive Activities for Young People programme and provided additional recreational activities for some 26,000 young people on Friday and Saturday nights in early 2009. Rehabilitation was principally addressed through the establishment of the Knife Crime Prevention Programme, a partnership between central government and local Youth Offending Teams that continues to work with young people convicted of knife offences. Local community safety partnerships have also been active in generating and supporting prevention schemes, particularly the provision of educational packages and ‘social marketing campaigns’ designed to raise awareness of the risks of carrying weapons (Silvestri et al., 2009). In Leeds, for instance, this included a programme run by the Royal Armouries Museum, entitled ‘No to Knives’. This sends trained volunteers into schools, youth clubs and community centres around the city to deliver weapons awareness sessions, in order to influence cultural attitudes to knife carrying amongst youths.

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There have been limited assessments of these programmes, but those that have been conducted suggest that such initiatives may reduce violent offending, including knife carrying (Silvestri et al., 2009). However, an evaluation of the second phase of the Tackling Knives Action Programme was inconclusive (Ward et al., 2011). Whilst there had been reductions in serious youth violence over the course of the programme, these reductions had occurred in both targeted and non-targeted areas. Critics have broadly welcomed the commitment to social crime prevention, but question the coherence of the overall strategy and the sustainability of relatively shortterm schemes (Booth et al., 2008). There have also been problems with the take-up of some schemes. For instance, in a recent review of local anti-knife projects, Kinsella (2011) found that many schools were unwilling to engage with knife awareness programmes, even when these were offered free of charge, because of concerns about potential damage to a school’s reputation. This tension between enforcement and preventative elements manifests itself in other ways. It has been known for some time that intensive stop and search can alienate those young people and communities who most need support (Eades et al., 2007), but Kinsella (2011: 4) found that poor relations between police and young people still represented a ‘significant barrier’ to effective knife crime prevention. Given the emotive nature of knife crime and the often-visceral impact it has on families, communities and the wider public, there has been considerable support for concerted government action, especially within the most affected communities. Indeed, as noted by the Street Weapons Commission: ‘Any strategy to combat the dangers of knife and gun crime must be firmly rooted in the locality it is targeting. The socio-economic and demographic character of the community suffering from such violence will dictate the specific interventions that will be most effective. Where initiatives have been successful they have involved a wide range of local partners, with a clear analysis and understanding of their local situation and co-ordinated plan of action.’ (Booth et al., 2008: 89-90)

Other initiatives and funding streams have contributed to efforts to reduce youth violence. The Tackling Gangs Action Programme, for instance, has funded a number of community and neighbourhood schemes. One innovative example is the Merseyside Young Transformers programme, launched by the Community Foundation for Merseyside in 2007. This brings together Liverpool and Knowsley Councils, Merseyside Police and a range of

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charitable and community groups to provide funds and local work targeted at young people most at risk of involvement in knife and gun crime and gang membership. In addition to short-term diversionary activities and longerterm development work focusing on training and skills, the programme incorporates group and family-based activities such as first aid courses, outdoor and sporting activities and skills training; for example, mechanical skills and web design (Booth et al., 2008: 91). The organisers have placed a special emphasis on building relationships with frontline and senior police officers, and engaging officers in project work. As a result, there has been a marked improvement in relations between police and young people using the services since the project began (Institute for Voluntary Action Research, 2009). Recently, the Coalition Government affirmed its commitment to social crime prevention with the announcement of a number of ambitious initiatives. The ‘Communities Against Guns, Gangs and Knives’ Fund will provide funding for around 200 organisations to work intensively with young people engaged in violent crime or at risk of becoming violent offenders in England and Wales. The scheme prioritises projects that provide mentoring, outreach or educational work with young people and their families and schemes that work specifically with girls and young women. An additional £18 million in funding over two years will be provided to the police, local authorities and voluntary agencies to tackle ‘teenage knife, gun and gang violence’ through prevention and enforcement in ‘hotspot’ areas. There are marked similarities between these initiatives and the previous Government’s approach. It remains to be seen how successful they will be.

Sure Start and Children’s Centres One of New Labour’s most ambitious early intervention programmes was the Sure Start initiative, which aimed to support young children and their families by integrating early education, childcare, healthcare and family support services in disadvantaged areas. Sure Start Children’s Centres were first established in 2004 and were preceded by several distinct earlyyears initiatives: Early Excellence Centres, the Neighbourhood Nurseries Initiative and Sure Start Local Programmes. Sure Start Children’s Centres are designed to offer children under five years of age and their families access to local, integrated early childhood services. They were based on the concept that providing integrated education, care, family support, health services

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and employment support are key factors in determining good outcomes for children. Children’s Centres were given a statutory basis under the Childcare Act 2006, which set out a range of ‘core’ services that all Children’s Centres must provide. Children’s Centres serving the 30  % most deprived communities must in addition offer integrated early education and childcare places for a minimum of 5 days a week, 10 hours a day, 48 weeks a year. The Labour Government set a deadline of March 2010, to have in place 3500 Sure Start Children’s Centres, catering for every community in England. Sure Start was influenced inter alia by the research evidence that emerged from the High/Scope Perry Pre-School Programme in the US. Established on an experimental basis in 1962, the Perry Pre-School Project sought early intervention for children at risk of impaired cognitive development and early failure in school through a special childcare programme for children aged between 3 and 5 years old, and who had been identified as ‘at risk’ of entering into criminality because of the situation of their parents. It involved the establishment of a highly structured pre-school educational programme, which gave children more chance to choose their own activities (BerruetaClement et al., 1984). The evaluation compared the long-term results of the group in the programme against the control group, following the children through to the age of 27. Adults who had been on the programme had significantly fewer arrests by the time they were 27. About 7  % had been arrested five times or more, a fift h of the rate of the control group (Schweinhart et al., 1993: 16). The evaluation also pointed to reductions in illiteracy, failure to finish school and reliance on welfare. Furthermore, it identified significantly greater earning and home ownership among the programme group. The US senate estimated a saving of $ 5 in welfare and criminal justice costs for every $ 1 invested into the programme. Inspired by these findings, the Sure Start initiative sought to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty, school failure, social exclusion and delinquency. However, the national evaluation of Sure Start has produced equivocal and so-far unimpressive findings with regard to the impact of Children’s Centres (Belsky et al., 2007). Nevertheless, in 2010 the House of Commons Children, Schools and Families Committee (2010: 17) concluded: ‘The Sure Start programme as a whole is one of the most innovative and ambitious Government initiatives of the past two decades. We have heard almost no negative comment about its intentions and principles; it has been solidly based on evidence that the early years are when the greatest difference

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can be made to a child’s life chances, and in many areas it has successfully cut through the silos that so often bedevil public service delivery. Children’s Centres are a substantial investment with a sound rationale, and it is vital that this investment is allowed to bear fruit over the long term.’

The Sure Start initiative highlights the porous boundaries between social crime prevention and social policy more generally. Unlike the US Perry Pre-school project, which was conceptualised – at least by government and officials in the late 1980s and 1990s – in large part as a crime prevention programme (see Sherman et al., 1997), Sure Start has tended not to be targeted at (or justified in terms of) crime prevention goals but rather is conceived in terms of wider social, educational and developmental benefits. As such, it has tended not to fall foul of the pitfalls of the criminalisation of social policy, whereby state provided social services increasingly come to be seen and justified in relation to their (potential) consequences for crime and disorder rather than as social goods in their own right. One further characteristic that distinguished Sure Start from many other early intervention programmes was that it was area based, with all children under five years of age and their families living in a prescribed area serving as the ‘targets’ of intervention. This was seen as having the advantage that services within a Sure Start local programme area would be universally available, thereby limiting any stigma that may accrue from individuals being targeted. As such, within the designated localities, Sure Start constitutes a form of primary, rather than secondary, prevention initiative. However, the new Coalition government, whilst committed to retaining Sure Start, in the face of widespread funding cuts, has also suggested that it will target ‘the neediest families’, investigate ways of paying providers by results and ‘take Sure Start back to its original purpose of early intervention’ (HM Government, 2010, 19). This may signal a subtle shift towards secondary ‘risk-focused’ prevention.

Concluding Questions New Government, New Policies? There is little evidence that the present Coalition government elected in May 2010 is likely to depart dramatically from the general direction of developments set out by previous governments in terms of the content of policy with regard to developmental crime prevention and responses to antisocial behaviour. The focus on young people and families is set to continue,

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as is the preoccupation with anti-social behaviour. Whilst the Coalition government has proposed abolishing the ASBO, it intends to replace this with two new powers – the Criminal Behaviour Order and the Crime Prevention Injunction (the former is a criminal and the latter a civil power), both of which share many similarities with variants of the ASBO. Interestingly, the proposed new Crime Prevention Injunction, according to the government, is intended to ‘bring together restrictions on future behaviour and support to address underlying problems… that can quickly stop anti-social behaviour before it escalates’ (Home Office, 2011: 5), echoing the arguments outlined earlier. In many senses, the new orders represent a ‘rebranding’ of past tools rather than a change in trajectory or of substance. Early intervention with young people and families at risk has secured a prominent place in the new government’s strategies (Allen, 2011; Clegg, 2011). However, there remains something of an ideological tension within the Coalition (and within Conservative politics more generally) which plays itself out in the field of anti-social behaviour interventions, between the civil libertarians with their emphasis on a liberal rights discourse, on the one hand, and the more moral authoritarian conservatives with their appeal to a populist and popular punitiveness reflecting a ‘responsibilisation’ rhetoric, on the other hand. This ambiguity has expressed itself in uncertain and hesitant critiques of the use of ASBOs, and other powers introduced under New Labour administrations, and is evident in the tentative nature of the proposed reforms. Nevertheless, there are at least three dimensions in relation to which we might see future shifts in the organisation and mode of delivery of social crime prevention in England. Firstly, the new government has promoted its ‘localism’ agenda, in which it claims it will depart from the perceived failure of centralised state authority associated with New Labour: ‘centralisation and top-down control have proved a failure’ (HM Government, 2010: 7). There is a commitment to lessen the culture of performance measurement and reduce the national targets that have constrained the discretion of local practitioners for years. However, the extent to which this will be realised in practice is yet to be seen. Secondly, fuelled by the financial and banking crisis, we are witnessing a considerable tightening of the public purse with swingeing 20  % cuts in funding across much of the public sector, including the police and local authorities. According to the new government: ‘the days of big government are over’ (HM Government, 2010: 7). Reductions in public resources are likely to impact on the capacity of front-line agencies to deliver social crime

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prevention and work through partnerships. There is a genuine concern that the fiscal restrictions will cause key public sector organisations to focus on their primary tasks (at the expense of secondary functions) and look to meet their own internal goals rather than partnership goals that link their activities with other services providers, such as community safety and the prevention of crime and anti-social behaviour. It is also unclear what the impact of reductions to police numbers will be on public perceptions of security and confidence in policing authorities. The projected decline will come as a stark volte-face against the background of a long and sustained period in which police numbers increased significantly, especially with the introduction of new front-line patrol personnel in the form of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) (Crawford, 2007b). Thirdly, in place of state provision there is now an appeal to social entrepreneurs in the private and voluntary sectors, as well as to active citizens, to take over responsibility for providing social goods, in what the Prime Minister David Cameron has described as the ‘Big Society’ (Cabinet Office, 2010): ‘You can call it liberalism. You can call it empowerment. You can call it freedom. You can call it responsibility. I call it the Big Society. The Big Society is about a huge culture change… where people, in their everyday lives, in their homes, in their neighbourhoods, in their workplace… don’t always turn to officials, local authorities or central government for answers to the problems they face… but instead feel both free and powerful enough to help themselves and their own communities.’ (Cameron, 2010)

The small state/big society vision chimes well with the wider critique of the over-interventionist, ‘nanny state’ of the New Labour era, but leaves unanswered crucial questions about how it will be achieved, especially in a climate of fiscal stringencies. Furthermore, the extent to which the ‘big society’ will be capable of filling the spaces left by the withdrawal of local public services remains a subject of much debate, particularly in areas of high social deprivation, where crime and anti-social behaviour thrive. More broadly, this approach – in line with the appeal to localism – implies a critique of the ambitious state-centred, command-and-control style interventionism and social engineering that came to represent the New Labour political legacy (Crawford, 2006b). Regardless of the genuine nature of the government’s desire to draw back and adopt a ‘hands off ’ approach to allow ‘local solutions to local problems’, it is likely to take only a few high

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profile cases – like the tragic Pilkington case in 2007 – to ignite demands for the government to intervene more and ensure standardised policy delivery. For governments, the British government in particular, ‘“hands off ” is the hardest lesson of all to learn’ (Rhodes, 2000: 361).

Future Directions? Given the previous discussion, we might well ask: what are the current prospects for social crime prevention in England and what future trends are discernible? One possible scenario is that social crime prevention becomes increasingly lost within more conditional, restrictive and coercive social, family and urban policies (White, 2005). Here, the possibilities of Americanstyle ‘governing through crime’ (Simon, 2007) could potentially mean an expansion of the ‘penal state’ (and a concomitant decline in the ‘welfare state’), where mass incarceration and exclusionary modes of prevention are seen as mutually supportive rather than as conflicting developments. A second, dystopian scenario is that urban communities become increasingly constructed around preventive endeavours and perceptions of insecurity that serve to consolidate and harden lines of difference, to such an extent that security differentials become markers of affluence, wealth and social identity. Here, the capacity of communities to organise and tap into resources for the prevention of crime and anti-social behaviour becomes a defining issue. Nevertheless, it is possibly in the field of developmental crime prevention that we may be witnessing the emergence of a new orthodoxy (Farrington & Welsh, 2007). As we have sought to show, risk assessment and classification and actuarial profiling have become increasingly influential aspects of contemporary criminal (notably youth) justice systems. Despite the possible preventive benefits and cost savings of targeting resources at ‘high risk’ groups, such early intervention schemes raise crucial normative concerns. Gatti notes the right of children and young people not to be classified as future delinquents, whether they go on to become delinquents or not, as representing ‘one of the greatest ethical problems raised by early prevention programmes’ (1998: 120). Furthermore, the inaccuracy of predictive knowledge prompts caution. In the conclusion to a major report for the British government on working with young people and their families to reduce risks of crime, Utting sagely warned:

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‘[A]ny notion that better screening can enable policy makers to identify young children destined to join the 5 per cent of offenders responsible for 50-60 per cent of crime is fanciful. Even if there were no ethical objections to putting “potential delinquent” labels round the necks of young children, there would continue to be statistical barriers … [Research] shows substantial flows out of as well as in to the pool of children who develop chronic conduct problems. As such [there are] dangers of assuming that anti-social five-year olds are the criminals or drug abusers of tomorrow, as well as the undoubted opportunities that exist for prevention. Since the experience of service providers suggests that labelling children would also [be] counter-productive to gaining the trust and participation of parents, there must be a strong presumption in favour of preventive services presenting and justifying themselves in terms of children’s existing needs and problems, rather than future risks of criminality.’ (Utting, 2004: 99).

Consequently, many practitioners prefer universal programmes to targeted ones, despite their obvious resource implications. Early intervention has parallels outside of life-course and developmental criminology in forms of preventive detention and preventive exclusion, as well as a more general lowering of the threshold of intervention to incivilities, anti-social behaviour, ‘quality of life’ concerns and other forms of ‘pre-crime’ (Zedner, 2007). Allied to this is the greater use of data pools, the storing of DNA records and risk profiling. Anticipating, forestalling or eliminating potential threats and risks before they present themselves is an increasing focus of concern. Yet, in governing the future, uncertainty prevails. As Utting implies, the scientific knowledge base for prevention and pre-emption remains too ambiguous to be reliable. The limitations of knowledge serve to magnify uncertainty. Under conditions of uncertainty, a pre-emptive and preventive logic implies a precautionary principle (Sunstein, 2005). Consequently, people are increasingly judged in terms of what they might do. Anticipating and forestalling potential harm in a riskaverse culture of insecurity implies erring on the side of precaution (Ericson, 2007). In such circumstances, the question ‘what if?’ prompts action; ‘just in case’. Furthermore, as Zedner highlights, ‘precaution places uncertainty – not knowledge – centre stage’ (2009: 37), with significant implications for traditional criminal justice principles of due process protections and proportionality. It is perhaps, here, in the context of uncertainty, and in the face of our lack of knowledge about future risks and harms, that the prospects for social crime prevention lie, in justifying interventions as a

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precaution within a wider logic of (limited) predictive governance. What is clear is that the shape of, and space for, social crime prevention in all its guises, in England as elsewhere, will be influenced by unfolding debates about the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the state, communities, families and individual citizens in the regulation and politics of behaviour. So too, will it be informed by the ways in which practitioners and ordinary citizens give life to, sometimes resist, and enact, the various policies and strategies prompted by governments.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Crawford, A. (2007b). Reassurance Policing: Feeling is Believing. In A. Henry & D.J. Smith (eds.), Transformations of Policing (pp. 143-168). Aldershot: Ashgate. Crawford, A. (2008). Perceptions of Crime and Insecurity: Urban Policies in an Era of Hyperactivity and Ambiguity. In A. Groenemeyer & X. Rousseaux (eds.), Assessing Deviance Crime and Prevention in Europe. Report of the First General Conference of CRIMPREV, 8-10 February 2007 (pp. 66-80). Guyancourt: GERN. Crawford, A. (2009a). Situating Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective. In A. Crawford (ed.), Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective (pp. 1-37). Cullompton: Willan. Crawford, A. (2009b). Governing through Anti-Social Behaviour: Regulatory Challenges to Criminal Justice. British Journal of Criminology, 49(6), 810831. Crawford, A. (2010). Regulating Civility, Governing Security and Policing (dis)order under Conditions of Uncertainty. In J. Blad, M. Hildebrandt, K. Rozemond, M. Schuilenburg & P. Van Calster (eds.), Governing Security under the Rule of Law (pp. 9-35). The Hague: Eleven International Publishing. Crawford, A., Lewis, S., & Traynor, P. (forthcoming). Anti-Social Behaviour Interventions with Young People: Pathways into, through and away from Youth Justice. Leeds: CCJS Press. Crow, I., France, A., Hacking, S., & Hart, M. (2004). Does Communities that Care Work? An Evaluation of a Community-based Risk Prevention Programme in Three Neighbourhoods. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. Department for Children, Schools and Families. (2008). Youth Taskforce Action Plan. London: DCSF. Department for Education. (2010). Monitoring and Evaluation of Family Intervention Projects to March 2010. London: DfE. Dilane, J., Hill, M., Bannister, J., & Scott, S. (2001). Evaluation of the Dundee Families Project. Edinburgh: The Stationery Office. Downes, D., & Morgan, R. (1994). ‘Hostages to Fortune?’ The Politics of Law and Order in Post-War Britain. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (1st ed., pp. 183-232). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eades, C., Grimshaw, R., Silvestri, A., & Solomon, E. (2007). Knife Crime: a Review of Evidence and Policy (2nd ed.). London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies. Edwards, A., & Hughes, G. (2009). The Preventive Turn and the Promotion of Safer Communities in England and Wales. In A. Crawford (ed.), Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective (pp. 62-85). Cullompton: Willan. Ericson, R. (2007). Crime in an Insecure World. Cambridge: Polity. Etzioni, A. (1993). The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities and the Communitarian Agenda. New York: Simon & Schuster.

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La prévention de la délinquance chez les Anglais Farrington, D.P. (2002). Developmental Criminology and Risk-Focused Prevention. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (3rd ed., pp. 657-701). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Farrington, D.P. (2007). Childhood Risk Factors and Risk-Focused Prevention. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (4th ed., pp. 602-640). Oxford: Oxford: Oxford University Press. Farrington, D.P., & Welsh, B.C. (2007). Saving Children from a Life of Crime: Early Risk Factors and Effective Intervention. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Field, F. (2003). Neighbours from Hell: The Politics of Behaviour. London: Politico’s Publishing. Flint, J. (2009). Governing Marginalised Populations: Coercion, Support and Agency. European Journal of Homelessness, 3, 247-260. Garland, D. (1996). The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society. British Journal of Criminology, 36(4), 445-471. Gatti, U. (1998). Ethical Issues Raised when Early Intervention is Used to Prevent Crime. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 6, 113-132. Golding, B., McClory, J., & Lockhart, D. (2008). Getting to the Point. Reducing Gun and Knife Crime in Britain: Lessons from Abroad. London: Policy Exchange. Graham, J., & Bennett, T. (1995). Crime Prevention Strategies in Europe and North America. Helsinki: HEUNI. Gregg, D. (2011). Family Intervention Projects: a Classic Case of Policy-Based Evidence Retrieved May 18, 2011, from http://www.crimeandjustice.org.uk/ opus1786/Family_intervention_projects.pdf Harcourt, B.E., & Ludwig, J. (2006). Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five City Social Experiment. University of Chicago Law Review, 73, 271-320. Hebberecht, P., & Duprez, D. (eds.). (2002). The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe. Brussels: VUBPRESS. Henry, A. (2009). The Development of Community Safety in Scotland: A Different Path? In A. Crawford (ed.), Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective (pp. 38-61). Cullompton: Willan. HM Government. (2010). The Coalition: Our Programme for Government. London: Cabinet Office. HM Inspectorate of Constabulary. (2003). Streets Ahead: A Joint Thematic Inspection of the Street Crime Initiative. London: Home Office. Home Office. (1997). No More Excuses. London: Home Office. Home Office. (2000). Anti-Social Behaviour. Report of Policy Action Team 8, National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (pp. 121). London: Home Office. Home Office. (2003). Respect and Responsibility – Taking a Stand Against AntiSocial Behaviour, Cm 5778. London: Home Office.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Home Office. (2006). Rebalancing the criminal justice system in favour of the lawabiding majority. London: Home Office. Home Office. (2011). More Effective Responses to Anti-Social Behaviour. London: Home Office. Hope, T. (1995). Community Crime Prevention. Crime and Justice, 19, 31-89. Hope, T. (2009). The Political Evolution of Situational Crime Prevention in England and Wales. In A. Crawford (ed.), Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective (pp. 86-109). Cullompton: Willan. Hough, J.M., Clarke, R.V.G. & Mayhew, P.M. (1980). Introduction. In R.V.G. Clarke & P.M. Mayhew (eds.), The Development of Children’s Centres. Fifth Report of Session 2009–10 (HC 130-I). Designing out Crime. London: HMSO. House of Commons. (2001). The Criminal Justice and Police Bill: Bill 31 of 20002001 (Research Paper). London: House of Commons. House of Commons Children, Schools and Families Committee. (2010). The Development of Children’s Centres. Fift h Report of Session 2009-10 (HC 130-I). London: the Stationery Office. House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts. (2007). Tackling AntiSocial Behaviour, Forty-fourth report of Session 2006-7 (p. 53). London: Stationery Office. Hurley, D. (2004). On Crime as Science (a Neighbor at a Time) Retrieved May 18, 2011, from www.ctdatahaven.org/know/images/6/6c/On_Crime_As_ Science.pdf Innes, M. (2004). Reinventing Tradition? Reassurance, Neighbourhood Security and Policing. Criminal Justice, 4(2), 151-171. Innes, M., & Jones, V. (2006). Neighbourhood Security and Urban Change. York: JRF. Institute for Voluntary Action Research. (2009). Merseyside Young Transformers: A Case Study. Liverpool: Community Foundation for Merseyside Retrieved May 18, 2011, from http://www.cfmerseyside.org.uk/index.php?p=70 Ives, R., & Wyvill, B. (2007). Evaluation of the Junior Youth Inclusion Programme. London: Camden Children’s Fund. Kearns, A. (2003). Social Capital, Regeneration and Urban Policy. In R. Imrie & R. Raco (eds.), Urban Renaissance? New Labour, Community and Urban Policy (pp. 37-60). Bristol: Policy Press. King, M. (1988). How to Make Social Crime Prevention Work: The French Experience. London: NACRO. King, M. (1989). Social Crime Prevention à la Thatcher. Howard Journal, 28(4), 291-312. Kinsella, B. (2011). Tackling Knife Crime Together – A review of Local AntiKnife Crime Projects Retrieved June 13, 2011, from http://www.homeoffice. gov.uk/publications/crime/tackling-knife-crime-together/tackling-knifecrime-report Koch, B. (1998). The Politics of Crime Prevention. Aldershot: Ashgate. Krauthammer, C. (1993). Defining Deviancy Up. The New Republic, 22 (November), 20-25.

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La prévention de la délinquance chez les Anglais Lemos, G. (2004). Fear and Fashion: The Use of Knives and Other Weapons by Young People. London: Lemos & Crane. Mackie, A., Hubbard, R., & Burrows, J. (2008). Evaluation of the Youth Inclusion Programme – End of Phase 2 Report. London: Youth Justice Board. Marfleet, N. (2008). Why Carry a Weapon? A Study of Knife Crime amongst 15 – 17 year old Males in London. London: Howard League for Penal Reform. McAra, L. (2005). Modelling Penal Transformation. Punishment and Society, 7, 277-302. Morgan Harris Burrows. (2003). Evaluation of the Youth Inclusion Programme End of Phase 1 Report (pp. 138). London: Youth Justice Board. Morgan, J. (1991). Safer Communities: The Local Delivery of Crime Prevention Through the Partnership Approach. London: Home Office. New Zealand Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. (1994). The New Zealand Crime Prevention Strategy. Wellington: Crime Prevention Unit. Nixon, J., Parr, S., Hunter, C., Sanderson, D., & Whittle, S. (2008). The Longer Term Outcomes for Families Who Had Worked with Intensive Family Support Projects Retrieved May 18, 2011, from www.communities.gov.uk/ documents/housing/doc/familysupportprojects.doc Nixon, J., Pawson, H., & Sosenko, F. (2010). Rolling Out Anti-social Behaviour Families Projects in England and Scotland: Analysing the Rhetoric and Practice of Policy Transfer. Social Policy & Administration, 44(3), 305-325. O’Malley, P. (1992). Risk, Power and Crime Prevention. Economy and Society, 21(3), 252-275. O’Malley, P. (2001). Risk, Crime and Prudentialism Revisited. In K. Stenson & R.R. Sullivan (eds.), Crime, Risk and Justice (pp. 89-103). Cullompton: Willan. Parr, S., & Nixon, J. (2009). Family Intervention Projects – Sites of Subversion and Resilience. In M. Barnes & D. Prior (eds.), Subversive Citizens: Power, Agency and Resistance in Public Services (pp. 101-117). Bristol: Policy Press. Pitts, J., & Hope, T. (1997). The Local Politics of Inclusion: The State and Community Safety. Social Policy and Administration, 31(5), 37-58. Power, A., & Tunstall, R. (1995). Swimming against the Tide. York: JRF. Putnam, R. (2000). Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. Respect Taskforce. (2006). Respect Action Plan. London: Home Office. Rhodes, R.A.W. (2000). The Governance Narrative: Key Findings and Lessons from the ESRC’s Whitehall Programme. Public Administration, 78(2), 345363. Sampson, R.J., & Raudenbush, S.W. (2004). Seeing Disorder: Neighbourhood Stigma and the Social Construction of ‘Broken Windows’. Social Psychology Quarterly, 67(4), 319-342. Schweinhart, L.J., Barnes, H.V., & Weikart, D.P. (1993). Significant Benefits: the High/Scope Perry Preschool Study Through Age 27. Ypsilanti, Michigan: High/ Scope.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Seldon, A., with Snowdon, P., & Collings, D. (2007). Blair Unbound. London: Simon & Schuster. Selman, J.E. (2006). New Deal for Communities Youth Inclusion Programme: Early Outcomes in West Ham & Plaistow. London: Centre for Institutional Studies, University of East London. Sherman, L., Gottfredson, D., MacKenzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P., & Bushway, S. (1997). Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising. Washington DC: NIJ. Silvestri, A., Oldfield, M., Squires, P., & Grimshaw, R. (2009). Young People, Knives and Guns. A Comprehensive Review, Analysis and Critique of Gun and Knife Crime Strategies. London: Centre for Crime and Justice Studies. Simon, J. (2007). Governing Through Crime. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Squires, P. (2009). The Knife Crime ‘Epidemic’ and British Politics. British Politics, 4(1), 127-157. Sunstein, C. (2007). Worst-Case Scenarios. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Taylor, R. (2000). Breaking Away from Broken Windows. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Tonry, M. (2010). The Costly Consequences of Populist Posturing: ASBOs, Victims, ‘Rebalancing’ and Diminution in Support for Civil Liberties. Punishment and Society, 12(4), 387-413. Tonry, M., & Farrington, D. (1995). Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention. Crime and Justice, 19, 1-20. Tremblay, R., & Craig, W. (1995). Developmental Crime Prevention. Crime and Justice, 19, 151-237. Utting, D. (2004). Overview and Conclusion. In C. Sutton, D. Utting & D. Farrington (eds.), Support from the Start: Working with Young Children and their Families to Reduce the Risks of Crime and Anti-Social Behaviour (pp. 89-100). London: Department for Education and Skills. Van Dijk, J., & de Waard, J. (2009). Forty Years of Crime Prevention in the Dutch Polder. In A. Crawford (ed.), Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective (pp. 130-152). Cullompton: Willan. Ward, L., & Diamond, A. (2009). Tackling Knives Action Programme (TKAP) Phase 1: Overview of Key Trends from a Monitoring Programme. London: Home Office. Ward, L., Nicholas, S., & Willoughby, M. (2011). An assessment of the Tackling Knives and Serious Youth Violence Action Programme (TKAP) – Phase ll. Home Office Research Report 53 (p. 67). London: Home Office. White, C., Warrener, M., Reeves, A., & La Valle, I. (2008). Family Intervention Projects: An Evaluation of Their Design, Setup and Early Outcomes (p. 191). London: DCSF. White, S. (2005). Is Conditionality Illiberal? In L. Mead & C. Beem (Eds.), Welfare Reform and Political Theory (pp. 82-109). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

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La prévention de la délinquance chez les Anglais Wilson, J.Q., & Kelling, G. (1982). Broken Windows: The Police and Neighbourhood Safety. The Atlantic Monthly, 3, 29-37. Wyvekens, A. (2009). The Evolving Story of Crime Prevention in France. In A. Crawford (ed.), Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective (pp. 110-129). Cullompton: Willan. Zedner, L. (2007). Pre-Crime and Post-Criminology. Theoretical Criminology, 11(2), 261-281. Zedner, L. (2009). Fixing the Future? The Pre-Emptive Turn in Criminal Justice. In B. McSherry, A. Norrie & S. Bronitt (Eds.), Regulating Deviance: The Redirection of Criminalisation and the Futures of Criminal Law (pp. 35-58). Oxford: Hart Publishing.

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Social Prevention in France. Erasure, Permanence, Regeneration? Jacques de Maillard and Séverine Germain

Introduction France is a country traditionally associated with social prevention,1 since the Bonnemaison techniques devised in the 1980s and the advent of what has been called the ‘politique de la ville’ (an integrated policy targeted at deprived urban areas). It is usually presented in this way in international classifications (Hebberecht & Sack, 1997). The United Kingdom is seen as the key location for the development of situational crime prevention, with the introduction of CCTV cameras, new shutters and alarms, improvements in lighƟng or the development of an urbanism that creates a sense of ownership, whilst France is an archetypical example of the strategy followed by southern European countries, who have developed approaches based on partnerships between different institutions, taken measures to promote urban renewal, stimulated community life and revitalised the economy or encouraged mediation in neighbourhoods.

1 Social prevention acts on the ‘predisposition’ to commit offenses (Cusson, 2010: 17). It aims to address a lack of affection and operates within the social environment of the individual (neighbourhood, family). Cusson distinguishes between two types of social prevention. ‘At one end are programmes whose target is the individual and his family, which we describe as developmental prevention. These aim to address the factors that would lead to the catastrophic development of a child if nothing is done. At the other end of the spectrum are interventions within a neighbourhood, or a city itself: “community prevention”. In this case, we want the community to stimulate individuals to act’ (2010: 89). In France, it is the second of these which constitutes the bulk of the measures carried out. There are only very few measures undertaken on developmental prevention, despite the fact that in recent years, measures have been developed that focus more strongly on individuals and their families.

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However, France has changed recently, especially with the rise of video surveillance, strongly supported by central government,2 with the growth of a new kind of urbanism or with the spread of gated communities throughout the country. These developments are supported by the publication of the 2007 law on the prevention of delinquency, which established the Interministerial Fund for Delinquency Prevention (Fonds Interministériel de Prévention de la Délinquance, FIPD), whose funds are mainly used to finance local video surveillance equipment for public roads. This has led to many commentators pointing to a loss of French individuality: while England has been moving away from focussing only on situational prevention programmes, engaging in urban renewal and the social care of young people at risk of delinquency, France has been strengthening its situational prevention devices, moving away from its 1980s approach (Robert, 2009). France abandoned the model of social crime prevention in favour of an urban crime deterrence model (Donzelot, 2010). Some commentators are rather pessimistic, pointing out that the concept of prevention has ceased to have any meaning in today’s France (Bailleau, 2007). Others more optimistically suggest that – despite recent changes – social prevention continues to make sense to many players (Baillergeau, 2007). Our paper aims to contribute to this field of enquiry. We will suggest that the devices and practices related to social prevention continue to play a role in French policies, despite a shift of discourse and political orientation towards situational prevention. Even without political backing, social prevention – whose contours are at best undefined – is backed by the classical structures of the welfare state, at both local and national level. This diagnosis does not mean that French policies have not changed; we will see that the establishment of social prevention devices is accompanied by a progressive focus on vulnerable groups, that cities are developing hybrid policies in which the distinction between traditional forms of prevention (social and situational) is anything but easy. After having presented the situation at a national level, we will attempt to analyse the prevention mechanisms implemented at a local level.

2 Grants to fund CCTV systems use up an increasingly large share of the interministerial Fund for Delinquency Prevention – namely 30 % in 2007 and 2008, 46.5 % in 2009 and about 60 % in 2010 (Geoff roy, 2010: 21)

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1. Prevention Devices Promoted at a Central Level: Towards Targeted Prevention In this section, we will be focussing on prevention devices promoted at a central level. These devices exist locally, but our focus here will be on how they are defined centrally. We will show that programmes related to social prevention are far from disappearing and cover a wide spectrum of measures, even if there is a shift with regard to the public. This plurality of intervention types will lead us to argue that there continues to be a lack of clarity surrounding the category of social prevention, which is as much an analytical concept as a category of political debate.

1.1. A variety of preventive repertoires What are the measures traditionally associated with social prevention? If the traditional distinction between three levels of prevention, ‘primary’ (social action aimed at the general public), ‘secondary’ (measures targeted towards people at risk of delinquency) and ‘tertiary’ (measures directed primarily at offenders) can be legitimately criticised because of the difficulty in distinguishing between these three different levels,3 it is still helpful to distinguish between the types of measures typical of each level. These three types of prevention focus on predisposition and social causes. Let us see what types of measures are carried out, according to the type of audience selected. (i) The first category of preventive measures is part of what might be called primary social prevention. Firstly, there are measures designed to support parenthood. These measures help strengthen the role of parents, either by putting structures in place to listen to them, or by enhancing their role in institutions or their expertise. More specifically, since 1999, networks have been established to listen to, support and guide parents (réseaux d’écoute, d’appui et d’accompagnement des parents, REAAP), and to help strengthen

3 Of course, some preventive measures are at odds with this triptych. This is clear in relation to the prevention of intra-family violence (including violence against women). The 2008-2011 plan to combat violence against women has four priority areas including prevention (measure, prevent, protect and co-ordinate). Prevention activities funded within this framework, often carried out by victims’ associations, range from IO-awareness for professionals (which leans more towards primary prevention) to the psychological care of victims or perpetrators (which instead fall within tertiary prevention).

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parents’ educational skills. These networks group together a wide range of structures in relation to parenthood (Parents’ Listening Points, Family Information Points, but more broadly crèches, nurseries, etc.). Discussion groups, conferences and activity groups in relation to parenting are among the main activities conducted within REEAP (Bousquet & Lenoir, 2009: 54). Also relevant are the measures to prevent risky behaviour (initially focused on issues of drug addiction, then expanded to include other risky behaviours, such as suicide or running away). Preventive measures may consist of sequences of training in schools conducted by the education committees on health and citizenship (comités d’éducation à la santé et à la citoyenneté, CESC). These measures target a wide audience, not necessarily directly related to delinquency. Preventing the risk of delinquency associated with family instability or addictive practices is one reason to set them up, but they are part of a broader social policy (e.g. family support or public health). (ii) A second category of social prevention is secondary prevention (meaning delivery to an audience at risk of delinquency). The first examples of these measures are the activities run during school holidays (Ville-vie-vacances, VVV). This is a relatively old device, created in 1982 under the title ‘AntiHot Summer Activities’ (‘opérations anti-été chaud’) in a small number of cities. Gradually, it has been extended to all school holidays and to all parts of the country. According to the ACSE (agence pour la cohésion sociale et l’égalité des chances), now responsible for steering the measures, these provide an ‘integrated system of crime prevention aimed at young people whose living conditions produce danger to themselves and who can be in conflict with their environment’.4 The measures are chiefly aimed at the most deprived neighbourhoods affected by the Contracts of Urban Social Cohesion (contrats urbains de cohésion sociale, CUCS). In the fight against school dropout (defined as abandoning a course before completing it) or absenteeism, many measures have been initiated at the intersection between education support and delinquency prevention. Although this pattern is not necessarily explicitly highlighted in the measures, many of them are directed at young people at risk of delinquency. This framework included the creation, in 2009, of 5000 ‘mediators of academic success’ (médiateurs de réussite scolaire) roles. The jobs involve 4 Visit l’Acsé’s website: http://www.lacse.fr/dispatch.do?sid=site/prevention_de_

la_delinquance/actions/ville_vie_vacances

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responsibility for participation and for the identification of absences, as well as establishing a link between families and their personal, educational, social and medical provision. (iii) In the third category (tertiary prevention), the link with delinquency is more obvious as it is focused on offenders. Firstly, there are operations conducted in the field of prevention of recidivism. Of particular note are the measures undertaken in preparation for release from prison (literacy programmes, vocational training activities relating to access rights or to maintaining relationships with families), or the support of released prisoners (in particular through partnerships with specialised integration and accommodation structures). These measures can be viewed as part of social prevention when they are the social causes of recidivism. Since 2006, Contracts for Insertion in Social Life (Contrats d’insertion dans la vie sociale, CIVIS) were signed with young people aged from 16 to 25, based on a partnership with integration structures and providing employment support for young wards of court. Between 2007 and 2008, around 3800 young people took part in this programme (Bousquet & Lenoir, 2009: 206-207). The multiplicity of measures carried out demonstrates that social prevention devices are being maintained. Although the Interministerial Fund for Prevention of Delinquency funding shows a slow shift towards situational prevention (see note 2), this does not mean that measures anchored in the logic of social prevention disappear altogether. The line of funding for crime prevention in the CUCS illustrates that there is ongoing funding of social prevention measures. Many of these measures, conducted by voluntary organisations, depend on cross-subsidisation: a combination of national resources (with respect to the ACSE, which distributes funds traditionally spent on prevention in the context of urban policies, the FIPD, or sources such as the Interministerial Mission for the fight against drugs and drug addiction, etc..) and local resources (local authorities, tenants, etc.). Despite these elements of stability, we are seeing a double shift in terms of social prevention. Firstly, there are a growing number of measures that combine different modes of action, social prevention cohabiting with a repressive logic. Measures of parenting support are a first example of the hybridisation of modes of action, as traditional social prevention and judicial restraint are combined. Thus, since the law on delinquency prevention was passed in 2007, courses for parents can be set up as part of an alternative to prosecution, then as an additional penalty (Bousquet & Lenoir, 2009: 54-55).

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Similarly, Contracts for Parental Responsibility, established in 2006, and Councils for the Rights and Duties of Families (Conseils pour les droits et devoirs des familles, CDDF), created by the 2007 Act, both feature a mix of support and social control (see Bousquet & Lenoir, 2009: 84-87). Another element of change is also apparent: new measures increasingly involve targeting the young person and his family rather than the general context. Whether we are looking at the prevention of recidivism (with CIVIS), the prevention of violence against women or dropout prevention, these measures are all promoted at a central level and targeted at individuals or potential offenders. In this sense, the distinction between types of prevention, if it must be tempered, allows us to identify a trend towards more targeted preventive measures within the field of social prevention.

1.2. Prevention as a blurred category It should be noted that the use of the term ‘social prevention’ in France is quite generic and often used to describe anything that is not repressive. Note, for example, that governments almost always present measures in favour of victims and access to rights (‘accès aux droits’) as preventive measures, although the ‘preventive’ dimension of these two activities is indirect at best. In other words, categorising ‘access to rights’ or ‘victim support’ as social prevention action is a particularly important enlargement of this category. Social prevention is often on the boundary between different fields of action, and it is not necessarily easy to discern to what extent measures labelled ‘social prevention’ are properly preventive. Depending on how you look at it, social prevention is either linked to, or diluted by, two other areas: (i) Between entertainment (leisure activities for young people) and prevention: operations such as Ville-vie-vacances have been created, based on a principle that combines a commitment to providing recreational activities for disadvantaged young people and a desire to avoid delinquent activities during holidays (Lapeyronnie, 2003). VVV operations present a range of leisure activities, linked only by the fact that they are aimed at young people, most of whom live in inner cities. A 2008 inter-ministerial circular recalled the need to give these operations an educational tint and to strengthen the participation of young people at risk of delinquency. (i) Between prevention and treatment: with regard to two areas of recent measures, the fight against truancy and school dropout, and the fight against

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violence against women, it can be difficult to see how measures can be truly preventive. Thus, among the 342 preventive measures financed under the FIPD concerning violence against women in 2008 (Bousquet & Lenoir, 2009: 68), many of them actually involve care. Boundaries of social prevention are constantly blurred. Social prevention either tends to involve recreational activities directed towards a disadvantaged audience, or may include a wider process of treatment. In the end, it is difficult to dissociate prevention from two other traditional fields: social assistance and entertainment (Astier, 2010). Contemporary trends are somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, the Central State promotes measures that undoubtedly emphasise control and surveillance (whether CCTV or forms of treatment supported under the 2007 crime prevention law). On the other hand, the state did not abandon traditional social prevention devices, although they enjoy little political support. However, it is wrong to believe that initiatives taken at a national level have a direct impact at a local level: local actors have multiple ways to ignore or bypass nationally designed devices. Research conducted into the implementation of the 2007 law concludes that city councils have only implemented it in part (CNV, 2009). It is precisely this dimension that we will examine now.

2. Local Crime Prevention Policies: Local Policy Mixes Social prevention is no longer the only way to measure municipal action in the field of crime prevention. Not only do municipalities combine social and situational crime prevention, they also develop measures that go beyond the traditional distinction between these two types of prevention. These substantial changes to public policy tend to blur the standards of action of an organisation that has historically been the most involved in the field of crime prevention in France: specialised education.

2.1. Mixed standards of prevention City councils, urged to reinvest their power in the field of security (Germain, 2008; Le Goff, 2008), developed ‘policy mixes’ in the course of the nineties (De Maillard, 2005a & b; Robert, 2009), i.e. programmes of pragmatic measures combining social and situational crime prevention. The cases of

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Grenoble and Lyon, two cities run by left-wing coalitions (since 1995 and 2001 respectively), illustrate the variety of possible combinations.5 The comparison of the measures financed by the budget allocated for urban policies confirms the breadth of the range of measures labelled under the term prevention.6 Whereas in Grenoble the ‘youth-oriented measures’ and the ‘measures for preventing repeat offending’ are the most significant items of crime prevention expenditure in 1999 and 2000 (75 % of the budget), in Lyon, the local Crime Prevention Council (CCPD) has been allocating a growing part of its budget to victim assistance, access to law and measures for preventing repeat offending7 (see tables 1, 2 and 3). Item

Types of measure

Development of mediation

Neighbourhood party based on the theme of citizenship

1999

2000

3049

0

2.7

0

- Educational programmes for young people under 20 under judicial control - Follow-up of young drug addicts in jail: individual visits and collective writing workshops

39 637

39 637

37.2

37.2

- Homework assistance - Boxing club: activities for young people during holidays

38 722

50 003

36.3

46.9

Adult-oriented measures % of total budget

- Coaching and training of the ‘régie de quartier’ staff * - Advice centre for residents and parents

12 272

14 102

11.4

13.1

Citizenshiporiented measures

- Theatre play based on the theme « the Others» - Day devoted to exchanges about violence as part of social programme

13 416

2956

% of total budget Prevention of repeat offending

% of total budget Youth-oriented measures % of total budget

% of total budget Total budget

12.4

2.8

106 700

106 700

Table 1: CCPD budget breakdown in Grenoble for 1999 and 2000 (in Euros) * This is a kind of community agency in charge of urban monitoring, which brings together local government and local authority housing representatives and neighbourhood residents. 5 However, as municipalities do not systematically have specific budgets for crime prevention, it is very hard to create an exhaustive list of these policy mixes. In Lyon, for instance, the Holiday Prevention Activities (activities for young people during the summer primarily called ‘anti-hot-summer programmes’) are financed by the Education Department of the Cities-State-Region (urban policy) contract (‘city contract’), and not by the Prevention one. Conversely, some measures financed by the Crime Prevention Department seem to cross other budget lines, such as sport and social entertainment. 6 All the following data come from S. Germain’s doctoral research (2008). 7 It is worthwhile to add that these issues are ruled and financed at the inter-municipal level in Grenoble, which is not the case in Lyon. 110

Social Prevention in France

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

Access to law

29 728

24 392

24 392

28 356

35 097

40 000

40 000

40 000

% of total budget

17.3

13.4

11.9

16.6

20.2

21.6

20.3

23.2

Victim assistance

29 886

25 916

9299

29 727

38 112

44 500

45 000

40 000

70 000

% of total budget

17.4

15.1

5.1

14.5

22.3

25.6

24.3

20.3

40.6

12 196

12 196

18 599

18 294

21 342

27 746

35 145

32 271

33 271

7.1

7.1

10.2

8.9

12.5

16

19

16.4

19.3

24.5

39.5

29.8

35.2

51.4

61.8

64.9

56.4

83.1

Prevention of repeat offending % of total budget Cumulative % of total budget Total budget

172 000 171 800 191 800 205 600 170 600 173 700 185 000 197 000 172 400

Table 2: Evolution of the three most significant budget items of the CCPD in Lyon between 1998 and 2006 (in Euros)

Whereas the municipality of Grenoble devotes the majority of its CCPD budget to youth-oriented actions and measures targeting the adults in charge of their education, these issues seem much more residual in Lyon, where these items represented only 20 % of the budget for 2004.8 On the other hand, Lyon City Council invests heavily in situational crime prevention. In 1998, the city council began the rollout of open-street CCTV monitoring, which has been continuously extended from then on.9 This represents a 12 million Euro global investment. However, in Grenoble, the first municipal CCTV project only dates back to 2004. The CCTV project was a moderate bench test (4 cameras), set up as part of a prevention plan that was, for the first time, based almost entirely on situational crime prevention (see table 3 below).

8 The measures in question are the following: three educational programmes, a VVV educational programme, measures for preventing school dropout, educational boxing and measures to assist parents in their educational function. 9 In January 2001, the city council was operating a total of 238 cameras.

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Item

Measures

Securing buildings

Continuation of the mediation service ‘Night correspondents’

35 500

131 303

Securing spaces

- Lighting

60 000

150 000

163 000

408 000

- Programmes (cellars, pits)

Public facilities and local services

Municipal funding

Total cost

- CCTV bench test

15 750

31 500

- Open enjoyable recreational spaces in the evening

40 000

100 000

- Welcoming and counselling of delivery drivers

50 000

130 000

- Rehabilitation of building facades and commercial premises

75 000

150 000

- House of Justice and Law (MJD)

Unknown

Unknown

Relationship between schools and the police

Partnership

Unknown

Unknown

Measures for preventing school dropout and truancy

Setting-up a specific device

5000

Unknown

Civic behaviour at school

- Increasing school students awareness of anti-social behaviour and school bullying

6000

10 482

- Prevention of school bullying: intervention of professionals in schools

9600

19 76

- Training of parents’ representatives

1000

4000

- Support service for children and parents in difficulty

4240

23 490

- Support administrative process service for residents

7500

54 591

Prevention of addictive behaviours

Youth-oriented measures (12-25 years old)

3000

19 500

Victim assistance

Being on duty at the police station and in the premises of the Victim Assistance Association

1416

9463

Operations VVV and CLJ*

- Sport and culture activities at the National police leisure centre

Unknown

52 718

- Local educational activities during school holidays

Unknown

Unknown

465 971

1 304 319

Support for parental action

Total budget

Table 3: Plan for preventing violence and crime in the neighbourhood of Villeneuve and Village Olympique, 2004 * The CLJ is a leisure centre run by the police. 112

Social Prevention in France

Finally, the two city councils have developed innovative measures that cannot easily be categorised as social or situational crime prevention. Social mediation is probably the example that best illustrates the mixing of prevention and control strategies. In 1998, Grenoble City Council set up ‘Night Correspondents’, a night mediation service run in the sensitive neighbourhood of Villeneuve. This service, primarily encouraged by the Régie de quartier (the community agency bringing together residents, local housing authorities and local government representatives), was then made permanent by the local government. In Lyon, however, it wasn’t until 2004 that a similar programme was set up in a sensitive neighbourhood called La Duchère: l’ALTM (Lyon Association for Mediation and Public Peace). So, the combinations of interventions considered by city councils vary from one site to another. In both cases, policy mixes are based on similar measures, but each city council has its own policy style: in Grenoble, the city council ensured a certain continuity with the traditional prevention policy implemented at inter-municipal level, whereas Lyon City Council is known for having made a huge policy U-turn. This statement refers to a range of different political factors, which depend on crime levels, the strength of public opinion, and local policymakers’ strategies to promote certain political issues (De Maillard, 2005a; Le Goff, 2008). Comparative work is needed to analyse the development of this particular mix of similarities (the rise of open street CCTV, a growing political focus on security issues, the spread of partnerships) and differences (diverse combinations of these logics) in local security policies.

2.2. The reconstruction of professions The substantial changes to municipal public policy described above also impact on professionals working in the socio-educational field. Specialised educators have not disappeared but the hybridisation of prevention and control objectives has been increasingly constraining their professional practices. Born in the 1960’s, during the rise of the blousons noirs (black jackets) phenomenon,10 specialised education was defined as a socio-educational 10 Which is about gangs of young people influenced by the American culture of the sixties who became synonymous with young delinquents.

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intervention targeted at disadvantaged young people in an open environment (see in particular Peyre & Tétard, 1985; 2006). Specialised education intervention has historically been based on three principals: no warrant of names,11 free public adherence to and respect for users’ anonymity. These specific interventions are grounded in street-based programmes, which chiefly means educators intervening in places usually occupied by young people (the entrance halls of buildings, cafés, etc.). Specialised education is organised according to a double register of measures: with the psychosocial side aimed at caring for disadvantaged young people and the socio-cultural side aimed at changing habits within the social group (Petitclerc, 2002). Attached to child social assistance since 1983, specialised educators are sworn to professional confidentiality, which not only relates to secrets gathered, but also to information of which the social worker may have been advised in the course of his work (Bousquet & Lenoir, 2009: 185). Nowadays, there are 350 specialised education associations, employing about 3,000 people, of whom half have a degree in specialised education. Specialised education has had to cope with a number of considerations in the course of the last thirty years (Berlioz, 2002; Peyre & Têtard, 2006). First, with the long-standing economic crisis that has been taking place in France since the Seventies, it is more difficult for the specialised educators to accomplish their mission of supporting young people until they get a job. In 1981, urban riots made the public believe that educators were unable to control the young people of whom they were in charge. Secondly, decentralisation – which made local elected officials responsible for specialised education – and the partnership imperative that the new crime prevention policy imposed on specialised educators, unsettled them, as they were accustomed to working within an ‘closed institutional environment’ (Ion, 2005: 93-95).12 Finally, the emergence of security issues within the field of social intervention in the 1990s meant that the purpose of specialised education was brought into question. On the one hand, some common acts engaged in by disadvantaged young people – such as gathering at the base of buildings or occupying lift shafts – which had formerly been monitored by social workers, henceforth fell under the jurisdiction of the police (Bailleau, 2007). On the other hand, putting security issues on the agenda resulted in the promotion of a reactive 11 This means that the specialized educator does not need any administrative warrant to proceed. 12 Employing institutions often being associations whose board of directors was composed of peers or ‘associate notables’; specialised education was previously protected from external (political) pressure.

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situational response aimed at immediate results, i.e. a response that is opposed in all respects to the precepts of socio-educational work. Specialised education has therefore been forced to redefine its position within the new ‘social-security nebula’ (Baillergeau, 2007) that emerged in the course of the nineties. To participate in the new multi-agency partnership, the main purpose of which is achieving security, specialised education needs to modify some of its professional practices. This is particularly true of information circulation. Specialised educators, as they are sworn to professional confidentiality, have agreed to divulge personal information to institutional partners, provided that the data is used for protection purposes and not for repression. This has led them to fear that educational action comes second to the demands of security. From this point onwards, their participation in multi-agency partnerships has been regarded as a ‘complex problem that puts the philosophy of their work, their code of ethics and the requests they have to tackle under pressure’ (Bordet et al., 2004: 24).13 The tensions caused by these contradictory professional and partnership imperatives are solved differently from one site to another. Some administrative players (middle-ranking executives, board directors), who are not sworn to professional confidentiality, participate in partnership meetings as educators (CTPS, 2001). For example, this is particularly the case in Lyon (Germain, 2008) or Maxéville (Nécol, 2004), where the director of the specialised prevention team personally participates in the GLTD (Local Group for Treating Delinquency). So, specialised education discreetly uses information exchanges within the framework of particular local arrangements, which are specific to each site. Thus, when the government bill about crime prevention proposed the official legalisation of information exchanges for socio-education professionals,14 some of them felt they were put in a tricky situation concerning their code of ethics.15 Furthermore, social workers were afraid of being placed under the responsibility of the

13 This is one the conclusions of a piece of action-research sponsored by the CTPS (Technical Council of Specialised Education Clubs, which dealt with the participation of specialised education to local security contracts (CLS) on 8 sites. 14 This allowed professionals sworn by professional confidentiality to exchange information without facing judicial proceedings. 15 Some childhood unions and professional associations joined together in a united national action group (CNU) to denounce the draft bill about crime prevention in March 2004. For further information, see the website: http://antidelation.lautre.net.

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mayor,16 which would result in their being even more subject to the security imperative (CNV, 2009). Specialised education was so worried that in 2009, the Prime Minister asked his services to work on an ‘Ethics Charter for Sharing Information within CLSPD’17 that was supposed to be approved by the High Council of Social Work (CSTS). However, as the CSTS has not been renewed since the end of the previous team’s mandate in June 2009, ethics charter project has not been subjected to any official consultation and has also been sparking concerns.18 Destabilised by partnership imperatives, specialised education is also being challenged by mediation-related jobs. Social mediation was born in the eighties as a result of local initiatives such as the Boutique du droit (‘Law shop’) in Lyon and especially developed in the form of night correspondents in Rouen and Rennes at the beginning of the nineties. Mediation services then spread, thanks to the Government policy for supported employment, particularly with regard to youth jobs, implemented by the Jospin Government (1997-2002). Thus, in 2000, nearly 20  000 youth jobs were in the field of mediation, whether or not this was really their main activity. However, in 2003, when the youth jobs policy ended, there were only 12 000 left, including 4000 Local Social Mediation Assistants (ALMS) (Gautier-Étié & Lenoir, 2004). In addition to ALMS, an ‘Intermediary Adults’ plan was initiated. The plan consisted of three years’ State funding for mediationrelated jobs, guaranteeing up to 80 % of the guaranteed minimum wage. In 2004, there were about 3300 intermediary adults, overwhelmingly employed by associations.19 Specialised education has complex relations with social mediation-related jobs. Mediators ‘operate on their turf while being careful not to compete with them’ (Astier, 2007: 84). Like specialised education, mediation professions were formed within a specific framework. But their frame of reference 16 Indeed, the government bill made provision for the Département to transfer social action power to the city council. 17 In 2002, CCPD were replaced by CLSPD (Local crime prevention and security councils). 18 The National Association of Social Workers (ANAS) (2010) is especially worried about the distinction made in the chart between ‘confidential information’ and ‘secret information’, which, instead of clarifying the legal framework for information sharing, tends to cause confusion. 19 According to the 2002 report, 88  % of intermediary adults’ employers were associations, 8  % were local governments, 2  % social housing authorities, and 2  % public transport authorities.

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has also been shaped by their employers’ requests. So, in many respects, mediators are much more susceptible to political and social demands than specialised educators. Thus, their missions often vacillate between urban monitoring, social observation and personal assistance,20 and can therefore combine control and prevention purposes in varied proportions, according to their employers’ priorities.

Concluding Remarks Social prevention today is still a set of practices linked to the Welfare State, financed by the French politique de la ville. Above all, social prevention still makes sense for a certain number of players who give priority to educational measures and not to repressive ones, as shown by the professional resistance to systematic information sharing for security-related purposes. Under the pressure of contradictory injunctions, social prevention continues to function by selectively adapting professional practices, without necessarily giving up core educational principles. There is something of a paradox in this: despite the fact that elected officials no longer promote social prevention at a political level, as they are more concerned with getting immediate answers to local population demands, social prevention plans still continue to exist, because professionals continue to believe in them. It is nonetheless true that social crime prevention is hindered nowadays by the rise of new policy demands (a hybrid series of measures, the rise of new mediation-related jobs, the partnership imperative) that make the boundaries between prevention and control even more blurred. Thus, French social prevention seems all the more in jeopardy as it is already a blurred intervention category, threatened with dilution within the larger field of social intervention. So, it seems clear that the future of crime prevention policies lies in a good policy mix. However, the absence of a systematic evaluation of crime prevention innovations in France is regrettable.

20 A research carried out for the Ministry for Housing and Urban Policy and based on the study of 5 mediation services (Duclos & Grésy, 2008) listed no fewer than 8 types of activity: active proximity presence, conflict management (in real or delayed time), social watch, consultation with residents and institutions, putting people and partners in touch, technical watch, project management, raising awareness measures and/or training.

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Social Prevention in France Prevention Policies. Synthesis and Analysis of CLSPD/CISPD Managers’ Recommendations] (p. 17). Paris: CNV. CTPS (Technical Council of Specialised Education Clubs). (2001). Prévention spécialisée, pratiques éducatives et politiques de sécurité [Specialised Education, Educational Practices and Security Policies] (pp. 102). Paris  : Ministère des Affaires sociales, du travail et de la solidarité. Cusson, M. (2010). Prévenir la délinquance. Les méthodes efficaces [Preventing Crime. Efficient Methods]. Paris: PUF. De Maillard, J. (2005a). The Governance of Safety in France. Is there Anybody in Charge? Theoretical Criminology, 9(3), 325-343. De Maillard, J. (2005b). Les politiques de sécurité. Réorientations politiques et différenciations locales [Security Policies. Political Reorientations and Local Differentiations]. Sciences de la société, 65, 105-122. Donzelot, J. (2010). La nouvelle prévention de la délinquance [New Crime Prevention]. In M. Boucher (ed.), Penser les questions sociales et culturelles contemporaines. Quels enjeux pour l’intervention sociale? [Reflecting on Contemporary Social and Cultural Issues. What is at Stake for Social Intervention?] (pp. 59-76). Paris: L’Harmattan. Dubouchet, L. (2003). OPE et VVV, la galaxie de la prévention [OPE and VVV, the Galaxy of Prevention]. In D. Lapeyronnie (ed.), Quartiers en vacances: des opérations Prévention Eté à ville vie vacances 1982-2000 [Neighbourhoods on Holiday: from Operations Prevention Holidays to City Life Holidays 19822000] (pp. 39-74). Saint-Denis: Editions de la DIV. Duclos, H., & Grésy, J.-É. (2008). Evaluation de l’utilité sociale de cinq structures de médiation sociale. Rapport final [Assessement of the Social Utility of Five Social Mediation Services. Final Report] (pp. 115). Paris: Ministère du logement et de la ville. Gautier-Etie, F., & Lenoir, E. (2004). La médiation sociale. Une démarche de proximité au service de la cohésion sociale et la tranquillité publique [Social Mediation. A Proximity Procedure Supporting Social Cohesion and Public Peace] (pp. 289). Paris: Délégation Interministérielle à la Ville & Centre National de la Fonction Publique Territoriale. Geoffroy, G. (2010). Rapport d’information sur la contribution de l’État au développement de la vidéoprotection [Information Report about the State Contribution to the Development of Video-Protection] (pp. 33). Paris: Assemblée nationale. Germain, S. (2008). Les politiques locales de sécurité en France et en Italie. Une comparaison des villes de Lyon, Grenoble, Bologne et Modène [Local Security Policies in France and Italy. A Comparison between Lyon, Grenoble, Bologna and Modena]. Thèse pour le doctorat de science politique (Ph.D. dissertation in Political Science), Grenoble: Université Grenoble. Hebberecht, P. & Sack, F. (eds.). (1997). La prévention de la délinquance en Europe. Nouvelles stratégies [The Prevention of Delinquency in Europe. New Strategies]. Paris: L’Harmattan.

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Social Crime Prevention in Germany. Balancing Social Policy and Crime Policy? Axel Groenemeyer and Holger Schmidt

1. Does Social Crime Prevention Exist in Germany? Ambiguity and use of concepts Writing about social crime prevention in Germany is a difficult task for a number of different reasons. The first difficulty is general in character and stems from problems of definition. Nearly no discussion about crime prevention fails to mention that ‘crime prevention’ is an ill-defined concept that leaves room for a certain ambiguity (Bennett, 1989; Crawford, 1998, 2007; Gilling, 2009; Pease, 1997). Social crime prevention strategies are often opposed to situational crime prevention and to dissuasion or repression by the criminal justice system, as in the definition by Young (2001: 272): ‘Measures to prevent crime which are aimed at the social causes of crime rather than those concerned with the mechanical reduction of opportunities (situational crime prevention) or with deterrence (the criminal justice system).’ Even the task of crime prevention is not clear and subject to dispute. Sometimes, crime prevention is classified as a form of crime reduction. In other cases, victim protection or reducing fear of crime or feelings of insecurity fall under the mantel of crime prevention, and it is not at all clear what these different prevention objectives have in common. This ambiguity is reflected in exercises to classify different strategies of crime prevention. Very often, a classification of prevention strategies developed in the field of public health has been adapted to crime prevention. With reference to Brantingham and Faust (1976), primary prevention addresses the general population and focuses on the social and environmental factors seen as potentially crimogenic, which include social causes as well as situational factors; secondary prevention is addressed to risk groups, or risk factors of criminal behaviour; and tertiary prevention focuses on known offenders,

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aiming to reduce the risk of further crime or the development of a criminal career (see Bennett, 1998: 371; Crawford, 1998: 14). With the same reference, Gilling (2009) identifies primary prevention more as situational crime prevention and secondary prevention as social prevention. In differentiating the public health classification further between social and situational crime prevention, Crawford (1998: 9) arrives at a six-field table, whereas van Dijk and de Waard (2009), in subdividing the targets of crime prevention – victim-oriented, situation-oriented, offender-oriented –, produce a ninefold categorisation. Without reference to the public health tradition, Tonry and Farrington (1995) establish a typology of four forms of prevention, namely law enforcement, developmental, communal, and situational prevention. But these categorisations are of limited use, if we take into consideration that crime prevention projects may span a number of different categories, which can result in the same project being classified in different categories by different authors. In English discussions on crime prevention, the categorisation of social vs. situational crime prevention is often linked to specific political ideologies. Situational crime prevention and repression tends to be based on a more conservative or right-wing political ideology, whereas social prevention is usually identified with left-wing or social democratic ideologies in crime policy (Young, 2001). This distinction is no longer valid in Germany, as crime prevention is not seen as a political alternative to repression but more as a complement to it. Furthermore, there is currently a consensus amongst all political parties that crime prevention is necessary, without making any distinction between situational and social prevention strategies. If we adopt a comparative perspective, the ambiguities become more complicated. In the same national context, we might discuss the differences of definition and classification based on common meanings and shared social, cultural and political contexts. However if we try to discuss the issue in a comparative perspective we are confronted with different meanings of the same word, and run the considerable risk of being ‘lost in translation’ (Crawford, 2009: 12). The connection to medical and public health sciences has also been highlighted in German discussions on crime prevention, but has been defined differently. In official or quasi-official sources, primary prevention refers to the social and individual causes of crime and fear of crime in the general population, whereas secondary prevention addresses specific risk groups (Arbeitsstelle Kinder- und Jugendkriminalitätsprävention, 1998).

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In this context, primary prevention (but also most forms of secondary prevention apart from law enforcement) is identified with a broad definition of prevention and refers to social, youth, family, economic, traffic and cultural policy (Bundesministerium des Inneren/Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2001: 457; Steinert, 1995: 26). Franz von Liszt is often cited in this context, with his famous remark that ‘the best criminal policy is social policy’ (1898).1 The term ‘social crime prevention’ is almost never explicitly used in crime prevention programmes and only seldom appears in scientific reports. When it does appear, it is usually a direct translation from English, used to describe crime prevention targeted at the criminal motivations of (potential) individual offenders; social crime prevention is thus identified as prevention by educational means. In this sense, the term is directly linked to social work and education, whereas the term ‘social prevention’ is widely used in a broader sense, but without the explicit link to crime and security. As well as its general orientation towards educational measures, social work has been focused on local communities since the end of the 1960s, developing interventions aimed at fostering social capital in specific marginalised urban areas. Even if these areas frequently show higher rates of young offenders, prevention and intervention objectives by means of social work are usually formulated within the social policy discourse of social justice and empowerment, and only seldom as measures of crime prevention (Albrecht & Otto, 1991; Wohlgemuth, 2009).

Blurring the boundaries between social policy and crime policy? The second difficulty of writing about social crime prevention in Germany stems from the fact that social crime prevention measures often overlap with programmes and interventions in the field of social policy. Programmes 1 Franz von Liszt (1851-1919) was a famous professor of criminal law in Berlin and a Member of Parliament. He was a proponent of the modern school of law and is cited as the father of special preventive punishment and rehabilitative measures for offenders, as well as one of the founders of special criminal law with educational measures for young offenders. There is an ongoing tradition in the German philosophy of law of stressing the same idea. Gustav Radbruch (1887-1949), minister of justice in 1920s Germany and responsible for the law governing young offenders from 1923 with a strong educational orientation, may be cited: it is ‘a questionable task of criminal law to … make up against the offender what has been missed for him by social policy (Radbruch, 1929: 105, own translation).

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and ‘social prevention’ measures, as used in discussions on social policy and social work, may have preventive effects on crime or criminality, but are normally associated with other tasks, like social justice, social security or welfare, and are seldom explicitly aimed at the prevention of crime in Germany. The relation between crime prevention and social policy has been discussed with the idea of blurring boundaries between these different policy fields, and crime prevention programmes have been criticised for a ‘criminalisation of social policy’ (Crawford, 1997: 228). Crime prevention and especially social crime prevention must then be interpreted as a form of ‘governing through crime and insecurity’ (Simon, 2007), in which social policy is legitimised only by its preventive effects on crime, or in which crime policy even replaces inclusive social policy measures (Wacquant, 2009): ‘The danger here is that crime becomes the organising principle and vehicle for allocating and distributing social goods’ (Crawford, 2009: 31). But this is nothing particularly new, as the provision of social services and social work has always been linked to political discourses and public fears about the risk of dangerous and criminal young people, dangerous classes and dangerous places (Garland, 1985). Even if the rhetoric of social services stresses the idea of inclusion and empowerment, crime and deviance have frequently been the central criteria for identifying clients and areas at risk. The question could also be put the other way around: ‘does the rise of community safety, then, represent the re-emergence of a welfarist discourse into the business of crime control, as if by the back door?’ (Gilling, 2001: 382). Even if some projects and measures in the field of social policy and social work in Germany are aimed directly at the social causes of crime and are labelled as crime prevention in their programmatic formulations, very often these are no more than a rhetorical and strategically motivated effort to gain financial support from political boards for measures that have been justified otherwise by other aims. Whether this strategy of justifying social work projects by labelling them as ‘crime prevention’ is convincing or not depends on the public and political formulation of crime as a major public issue. Talking about social crime prevention is uniquely fraught with the difficultly of distinguishing between ‘talk’ and ‘action’, between rhetorical and symbolic adaptations of programmes traditionally developed under the idea of welfare, social security or social justice and real new forms of prevention policies. Social prevention and social policy measures may, and probably do have crime preventive effects, even if the programmes do not mention the goal of crime reduction. Even if a programme aims explicitly at

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the reduction of crime and fear of crime, it may have a real inclusive effect on marginalised social groups and areas without effectively reducing crime. For example, the now widespread programmes of harm reduction and the prescription of methadone (or Heroin) in the field of drug problems could have been developed as discourses on crime prevention and insecurity in Germany. But even if public drug scenes are a safety issue in public places, these measures have been developed and legitimised in Germany more as a public health problem than as a crime prevention problem (see Groenemeyer, 2012). For Germany, it is difficult to estimate whether there is or has been a tendency to formulate social policy or social work programmes in terms of crime prevention. There is no empirical research or database available on this question, but it seems that, especially in the 1990s, there has actually been a tendency to use the goal of crime reduction as a strategic resource for legitimising social work projects, especially at a local level.2 On the other hand, we find large-scale national social policy programmes, which were also started in the 1990s, which in other countries may be aiming explicitly at crime prevention (e.g. housing projects or social renewal of city districts). In Germany, these programmes were mainly formulated as social policy programmes and crime prevention only plays a very minor role in them (see 4.3).

Political and public discourses on safety and crime prevention The third problem, when analysing social crime prevention, is estimating the role and consequences of the public and political discourse on policy change and policy measures. One problem is the public construction of crime and insecurity. Whether a social problem is defined as a crime problem, as a social exclusion problem or as a public health problem (or whatever) depends on the development of changing public and political discourses. There is no evidence in itself that some forms of behaviour are problematised 2 ‘Ever since crime prevention began attracting widespread interest three or four years ago, many organisations have used this method to »prove« that they have successful track record in the prevention field. Suddenly, virtually everyone engaged in youth work, whether in the form of activity provision or of specialist associations, notably those devoted to sport or to political and cultural education, discovered that they were being offered a new and promising market for the services they had been providing all along’ (Lüders, 2004: 26).

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as crime problems and as crime prevention targets. Talking about ‘crime prevention’ and especially about ‘social crime prevention’ means focussing on discourses about ‘normal’ or ‘street crime’ or about what in Britain is called ‘antisocial behaviour’, about violent young people or youth drug and alcohol consumption. Discourses on other forms of crime, like economic or organised crime, are largely ignored in discussions about ‘public security’. However, there are many programmes that explicitly address ‘violence’ without applying the criminal justice definition of crime in this context. Their theme is thus ‘prevention of violence’ and not ‘crime prevention’, and the fields of activities are ‘school violence’, ‘abuse or neglect of and violence against children’, ‘violence in private relationships and against women’ or ‘violence against minorities’ (see 4.2). The relationship between public and political discourses and policy is rather complex. But there does at least seem to be consent that political and dramatised media discourses on crime and security enhance fear of crime and are very often accompanied by demands to strengthen law enforcement. The idea of ‘governing through crime’ is often interpreted in this sense as a strategy employed by political parties that uses fear as a means of winning elections, with as a consequence, political parties vying with one another to be ‘tough on crime’. For some years now in Germany, there has been no major public or political discourse on ‘the crime problem’ or on public security that addresses ‘street crime’. Each year since 2005, in presenting national police statistics, different Home Office ministers in Germany have never failed to repeat that Germany is one of the safest countries in Europe (or sometimes ‘in the world’). Crime rates are decreasing, as are fear of crime rates. After reunification in the 1990s, and at the beginning of the new century, crime and security issues played a prominent role in national election campaigns. It’s safe to assume that conservative or right-wing political parties are the driving force behind the dramatisation of crime and security in political discourses to enhance law and order and police repression. On a general level, this is also true of Germany, but there is no extreme right-wing political party at a national level to strengthen the vicious circle of condoning repression. In fact, it was the social-democratic party that copied Tony Blair’s notion of ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’ in the 1990s, and that also tried to introduce ideas of ‘zero tolerance’ into the political debate. Furthermore, it was the social-democratic Home Office minister who, from 1998, continued his conservative predecessor’s programmes of strengthening repressive

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sanctions, blurring the programmatic boundaries between Germany’s two largest political parties (see Aden, 2002: 139). In elections within the federal states, the situation is different, and a public and political problematisation of crime and security (in connection with migrants) has often followed the idea of ‘governing through crime and insecurity’. In the 2001 election in Hamburg, a local right-wing party obtained about 20 per cent of the votes with a political programme consisting entirely of crime reduction, with other parties falling over one another to be the ‘toughest on crime’. In the 2005 elections in North Rhine Westphalia, the conservative Christian Democratic Party won with a populist campaign in which crime, security and migration played an important role. But in subsequent federal state elections, political party strategies of whipping up fear and racism during election campaigns have prominently failed or have not been important for the result (f. e. in Hessen 2008, Hamburg 2010).3 Public discourses on crime and insecurity have changed in the past few years, and other issues have gained more prominence in the public agenda. There have been discourses on the risk of terrorist attacks and, already in the 1990s, on organised crime. It is clear that these security issues were never linked to social crime prevention, but to police measures of data collection, as well as telecommunications and internet surveillance. The same is true of recent debates on the problem of controlling long-term convicted violent offenders who are regarded as posing a risk to the public. There have been effective public and political discourses on violence against children in families and institutions over the past few years. In order to specifically tackle the issues of child neglect and abuse, expanded surveillance measures were developed by building data exchange schemes between different institutions (schools, paediatricians and local youth authorities) and by establishing new measures making child medical examinations compulsory. These problems have rarely been regarded as crime issues, but more as educational or social policy problems. New surveillance schemes were not approved in order to allow repressive police or justice interventions, but in order to identify ways

3 Elections in the federal states are always subject to specific regional developments in Germany. For example, the latest elections in Hamburg 2010 were very much marked by local problems with education system reform and by local problems with city developments that overlapped the issue of crime and insecurity. However, crime still played an important role in the election campaigns of all relevant parties in the city of Hamburg, which is sometimes described in the media as Germany’s ‘crime capital’.

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in which local youth authorities could respond to the needs of families and children. Since the mid 2000s, ‘low level crime’ or ‘street crime’ has no longer been a major public issue (at least for the moment). Even though highly mediatised violent events can provoke lengthy public discussions, these are seldom accompanied by political discourses and the strengthening of repression. The major social problems in today’s Germany are educational problems, young people’s qualifications, educational justice and discrimination, or issues surrounding the integration of migrants and migration control. ‘Binge drinking’ problems can be seen as a new example of what in Britain is called ‘antisocial behaviour’. There are different prevention schemes targeted at this problem, especially in the form of public communication through TV and cinema advertisements or posters, but once again, this issue is regarded more as a public health problem than as a crime and security problem. The latest issue of the Eurobarometer (72, Feb. 2010: 1001) reported that crime figures were one of the two most important personal concerns for just 4 % of German respondents, one of the lowest rates in Europe. Furthermore, only 13 % of Germans sees crime as one of the two most important political issues for the country. To put this in an international perspective, the highest rates are reported for Denmark (39 %), for the UK (36 %) and for Bulgaria (33 %). The results for Germany are confirmed by national opinion polls on important political problems and personal concerns. After reunification at the beginning of the 1990s, crime and security always ranked among the most pressing political issues (but never in first place). Since 2000, the issue has continuously decreased in importance, mirrored by a parallel reduction in fear of crime. These days, the highest-ranking political problems and personal concerns are issues such as social security, exclusion and social justice, health policy and problems in the school or educational system. Nowadays, crime and security in general rank very low as political issues and personal concerns. This also explains why there is ‘less need’ to legitimise social prevention as crime prevention in order to gain political and public support, and why political strategies in election campaigns need more differentials than simply being based on crime and security issues.

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How crime prevention in Germany has been institutionalised and made routine This does not mean that there is no crime prevention in Germany. On the contrary, there are thousands of crime prevention projects, initiatives and programmes; there are several national organisations, umbrella organisations and some national programmes; each federal state and nearly every region has its own institutional boards for crime prevention and crime prevention policy and nearly every town has its own local crime prevention council. Crime prevention nowadays is a routine activity carried out by public or semi-public organisations at all levels of the political structure. So, the fourth difficulty in analysing social crime prevention in Germany is the identification of crime prevention actors and projects. By definition, social crime prevention is located outside the criminal justice system.4 Crime prevention in Germany is a highly fragmented enterprise. There is no national plan that we can rely on to identify a common strategic orientation or a dominant development in crime prevention. The difficulty in giving a convincing overall picture of crime prevention and its development in Germany stems from the specific political structure within which crime prevention, criminal policy and social policy is organised.5 Apart from the police, who have created their own national and local organisations and institutions for crime prevention, and local administrations, who have established local crime prevention councils in the form of policy networks in nearly every town, most crime prevention is organised in the form of specifically targeted and time-limited projects by welfare associations, which are the most important bodies in organising

4 This is also true of social preventive schemes in a larger sense that have direct links to the criminal justice system. Diversion schemes have been implemented both in young offenders’ law and in criminal law for adult offender-victim-mediations, but these are organised entirely by social work associations. 5 It could well be argued that this is not very unique, since even if there were to be a national crime prevention plan, the process of universal implementation at a local level would create fragmentation and local developments that do not fit into the national picture (see for Britain Gilling, 2001: 388  ff ). This argument should avoid overgeneralisation in analysing national trends that may be just programmatic without any visible consequences at local policy level. However, it is clear that in national states with a federal political structure and political autonomy at local administrative level, a fragmentation and inconsistency of local policies with the national policy plan will be greater than in centralised states of a Jacobin type.

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social policy and social work in Germany.6 Independent national umbrella welfare organisations, as well as their local and regional member welfare associations, enjoy considerable influence on shaping policy at each level. Because they strictly adhere to social values of inclusion and social justice, this may explain the relatively low significance of crime prevention rhetoric in German social policy. But crime prevention is also undertaken by private enterprises and shopping centres, by public transport organisations and by media campaigns, as well as by schools. Whereas crime prevention undertaken by private or semiprivate enterprises mostly falls under the category of ‘situational crime prevention’ and surveillance, crime prevention in schools and youth centres is mostly educational or ‘developmental’, but could also contain elements of social crime prevention in the more restricted sense given by Young (2001). Despite the highly fragmented structure of crime prevention in Germany, the first thing to report from a more general perspective on crime prevention developments is the spread of city security councils within local town administrations. In international discussions, these are often identified with crime prevention in Germany (4.1). Secondly, there are several national programmes that aim at specific crime prevention targets (4.2). Thirdly, there are social policy programmes that in other countries would be labelled as crime prevention (4.3), even if crime prevention as an explicit target only plays a minor role in these programmes in Germany.

2. Between Rhetoric, Discourse and Action: The Development of Crime Prevention Policies in Germany Despite the difficulties of limiting the meaning of crime prevention outside law enforcement, prevention has been a stated goal of criminal justice and prosecution as far back as the 19th century. The notions of general and special

6 It should be noted that in Germany, social policy and especially the organisation of social services strictly follows the idea of ‘subsidiarity’, which means that the state (national, regional and even local) abstains from organising social services directly when civil society associations are available. There are traditionally 6 nationally organised independent and non-profit umbrella welfare associations, that together form the biggest private employer worldwide, with about 1.3 million employees (plus about 1.5 million voluntary workers) in Germany and a total annual budget of about 55 billion euros.

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prevention and discourses on the preventive duties of the police were already established in the 1920s; and after the Second World War, in 1964, a television series was created (whose format remained unchanged until 2001) to warn citizens about fraud and to give advice on protecting homes against burglary. These early crime prevention discourses and institutions, which offered information and practical advice to make citizens aware of crime risks and to take responsibility for them, was the only form of crime prevention until the end of the 1980s. In the 1970s, the federal police institutionalised this approach when they promoted and established information centres in every town, accompanied by national public relations and information campaigns (Jasch, 2009: 196). These crime awareness campaigns are still widespread and one of the central police activities under the label of crime prevention. Since 1997, these forms of crime prevention by the police are coordinated and supported by a central national agency (Polizeiliche Kriminalprävention der Länder und des Bundes (http://www.polizei-beratung.de). Many activities of the Local Crime Prevention Councils also follow this approach (see 4.1). Crime prevention did not become a dominant public and political discourse in Germany until the 1990s (Aden, 2002; Jasch, 2009).7 In the 1990s, insecurity became a major political issue for different reasons. One reason can be found in the increase in fear of crime. Public opinion polls on major personal concerns show that between 1970 and the end of the 1980s, crime and insecurity were neither an important issue for the public nor on the political agenda. On the contrary, fear of crime and personal concerns about crime decreased considerably until the end of the 1980s (Dittmann, 2005, 2009). They started rising at the end of the 1980s and reached a peak in the middle of the 1990s, but since then, fear of crime, as well as public concern about crime, have been constantly decreasing. The rise of insecurity in the 1990s can partly be explained as an effect of reunification, because the citizens of the Ex-GDR, with their much higher rate of fear and concern about crime, were introduced into the opinion polls at the beginning of the 1990s; furthermore, unification itself also created fears and insecurity in the western part of the country, manifested as a fear of criminal migrants from Eastern Europe. Whether media dramatisation of crime and political 7 Aden (2002) and Jasch (2009) offer concise and well-judged analyses of the development of crime prevention in Germany from different perspectives. Whereas Jasch emphasises the developments of ideas and institutions, Aden focuses more on discourses within law and criminal justice. To avoid too much repetition, this chapter is limited to the development of central discourses that shaped the ideas and institutions of crime prevention in Germany.

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discourses on insecurity also played a role cannot be said with any certainty, but even if we find populist political demand for harsher punishment, it is remarkable that the attitude of the population towards punishment and rehabilitation of offenders in general has remained more or less the same since the 1980s (Kury et al., 2009; Reuband, 2010).8 Less clear are other developments in public discourses on security. Since the 1970s, awareness of all kinds of violence seems to be increasing, resulting in waves of public and media problematisations of school violence, violence against women and violence against or neglect of children. This creates the public perception that violence is a permanently growing social problem, even if the crime statistics show the contrary. A second reason for the problematisation of crime and insecurity in the 1990s was the increased visibility of deviance and disorder, linked to public drug scenes in city centres and the spread of youth cultures like the punk and graffiti cultures. Shop owners, local administrations and police were directly confronted with these new problem groups, which were a major local law and order issue in city centres. For the 1990s, the police statistics show a very sharp increase in drug offences and a previously unheard-of peak in drug related deaths. Since the early 2000s, rates have decreased again and, as a result of preventive efforts to establish local harm reduction centres for drug users and ‘street children’, the visibility of deviance in the city centres has also decreased since then. Another important point for crime prevention was the sharp increase in violence against migrants and in right wing violence against marginal groups. Even if this problem was mainly concentrated within the new federal states in eastern Germany, the violence also spread to the western part of the country in the 1990s. This problem of insecurity has been directly linked to political populist discourses. Media dramatisation and populist and nationalist political party strategies based on discussions about reforming the migration and asylum act established in the 1990s, led to a general political climate where migrants were seen as a problem and as a scapegoat for many of the social problems associated with unemployment and social insecurity (see Heitmeyer, 1994). Even if these populist discourses did not 8 However, there are differences between offences. Reactions to violent sexual offenses, whose public and political problematisation took the form of a moral panic, meant that they were subject to different changes in criminal law. Following an orientation towards harsher punishment for these sort of offences, the use of soft drugs is seen nowadays more as a public health problem than as a criminal offence.

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become dominant in political strategies, they nevertheless had an effect in the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s on the political climate and on criminal policy in general; they were very often directly linked to demands for harsher punishment and repression through criminal justice and law enforcement. There have been two other dominant frameworks for interpreting these indicators of social crises and for developing political strategies in Germany, which have shaped the idea of crime prevention. The first of these stresses the idea of economic crises as a source of social disorder and insecurity. In the 1980s, unemployment rates had already started rising, and these rose sharply from about 7 per cent at the beginning of the 1990s to nearly 13 per cent at the end. Youth unemployment rates in particular became a major political issue. Even though the youth unemployment rate has always been one of the lowest in Europe, due to a dual system of professional training in enterprises and in professional schools, in the mid 1990s it became clear that a growing number of young people could not be integrated into the system. Supported by the social democratic party, at that time in opposition to the conservative-liberal national government, by the welfare associations and by the green party, the issue of poverty, growing social inequality and social exclusion formed a political discourse against the conservative orientation of the government at that time. In this context, the interpretation of crime and insecurity was shaped as a consequence of youth problems, labour market exclusion and growing social inequality. The second discourse stresses the ideas of communitarianism. This framework was not limited to conservative political elites and parties but also shaped a significant part of the German left. The way that social problems were interpreted was based on the diagnosis of a loss of common values, solidarity and community as a consequence of individualisation, and amongst young people, the failure of education and the consumption of media violence. Crime and vandalism in city districts, as well as drug use, are regarded as a consequence of a widespread social ignorance, carelessness and the loss of informal social control in families and neighbourhoods. These two discourses combine to suggest educational deficits in children and young people. In political programmes and governmental discourses, crime problems are often discussed as educational matters. Tackling the ‘root causes of crime’ demands pedagogical intervention, to support families, schools and social workers in fulfilling their educational tasks.

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Even if there are some differences between the important political parties in Germany, a typical statement about crime and crime policy stresses the idea that individualisation and pluralisation weaken the integration and education of children and young people. Educational problems are seldom directly referred to as crime prevention but as social policy, employment policy or as social renewal of city districts (Deutscher Bundestag, 1997: 1). This orientation explains why most of the projects and programmes under the label of crime prevention focus on young people and on educational measures, whereas most of the programmes that aim to get involved with social conditions or with the social organisation of city districts are not labelled as crime prevention. The indicators of social crises in the 1990s resulted in the political perception that something must be done in order to guarantee safety and security in cities. And the aforementioned political discourses and frameworks led to different types of promising political strategies. From the Anglo-Saxon scene, the ideas of ‘zero tolerance’ found support in political discussions, as did the ideas of ‘fi xing broken windows’ and ‘community policing’, but these were also a subject of controversy. Crime prevention could be seen as the lowest common denominator, since the idea is also open to very different interpretations and political strategies. The central unifying idea, expressed in nearly all programmes, official papers and reports on crime prevention, is that crime prevention and security is not only the duty of the police but of the whole of society. However, this idea of responsibilisation as a symbolic activation strategy is very much limited by patterns of resource allocation as well as by political and legislative responsibilities. In the German federal political system, where the responsibility for criminal justice legislation and punishment as well as the general regulation of social policy are concentrated at a national level, the responsibility for police organisation is situated at a federal state level, and the organisation of social services is coordinated by relatively autonomous local administrations and welfare associations, we can expect to find a wide variety of crime prevention programmes and strategies. As a consequence, crime prevention in Germany is highly fragmented and comprises measures and projects that follow ideas of education and training, projects aiming to improve feelings of security by forms of situational or architectural crime prevention. On a programmatic level, at least, many projects try to enhance social capital, identification and social integration in local neighbourhoods in order to strengthen informal social control. Some of them could also be classified as ‘social

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crime prevention’ in the strict sense used in this book. Some of the federal states developed schemes of dividing responsibility for crime prevention that were far reaching, insofar as they tried to establish highly contested forms of ‘neighbourhood watch’ (Hitzler, 1996) or to hire social welfare recipients as ‘city guards’ (Eick, 2003), but such strategies are now the exception rather than the rule, often didn’t last for very long, and have not been adopted by other federal states or cities. The most common approach to crime prevention is what could be labelled ‘local crime prevention’. It would be misleading to label it ‘community prevention’ since in Germany, community does not refer to a kind of socially or culturally defined unit but to the urban administration and local government. Since the 1990s, in nearly all cities in Germany, local crime security councils that organise and coordinate very different programmes and projects of crime prevention were established at a local level (see 4.1). Since crime prevention is in the federal states’ legislation, there is only one national programme that addresses right wing extremism; a programme for ‘Tolerance and Democracy’. In this programme, prevention of violence is one of the key topics and it can be treated as crime prevention (see 4.2), but its main focus is on education and the change of individual orientations. The strongest link to social crime prevention can be found in a joint national and federal state programme on the ‘Socially Integrated City’, but in the discourses of this programme, crime prevention is rarely an explicit point of reference (see 4.3).

3. The Organisation of Crime Prevention in Germany 3.1 Local crime prevention in city councils Since the beginning of the 1990s, all over Germany, federal states and cities have started to establish crime prevention institutions in the form of roundtables, networks, security partnerships or working groups. They have different names and both their organisational structures and their level of activities vary enormously. The common idea behind these institutions is that their task is always formulated in terms of coordinating, initiating and supporting local crime prevention activities. Very often, these institutions have taken the form of local crime prevention city councils. It has been reported that between 1990 and 2001, about 1800 local crime prevention initiatives were institutionalized, and in 2006, their number was estimated at

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about 2000 (Bundesministerien, 2006: 672). In 2000, 75 % of cities with more than 50 000 inhabitants were already reported to be engaged in some form of local crime prevention, and about 60 % of them have established permanent crime prevention institutions (Obergfell-Fuchs, 2001). However, it is not possible to describe them as uniform institutions with unique activities. Even if in some federal states, the establishment of crime prevention councils has been strongly encouraged or even decreed, the membership of these institutions is very variable. Very often, they were initiated by the police and established by the city council. In most of them, the policy and local administrations have members. Other members are welfare and social work associations, occasionally local journalists and representatives of local shop owners, but only very seldom other ‘ordinary’ citizens from outside administrations or associations. The activities frequently depend on the initiative and the engagement of only a few people. Normally they do not have any budget for the implementation of their own projects or measures, but they are often able to mobilise resources from member institutions or the city council for specific projects (ObergfellFuchs, 2001; Steffen, 2004). There is no overall evaluation, but some limited analyses on a local or regional level show that the main fields of activities are youth violence, drug use, right wing extremism, vandalism and graffiti. For the period until 2000, it has been reported that 78 per cent of the activities and projects concern projects of primary prevention in a wide sense (Bundesministerien, 2001: 469), which means that they aim at the general population. These projects are very often limited to information campaigns for civil engagement or to projects publicising the risks of crime, drugs and violence in schools. One central problem of these institutions is that they have neither sufficient resources, nor any capacity to intervene or administrative power, and there is no strategic common programme or even definition of what crime prevention at a local level or community crime exactly means. The only common perspective is that they promote community safety and that they are preventive (and not repressive). The city security councils are most often concerned with different forms of social and visible disorder, by ‘low level crime’ and by the so-called incivilities below the level of penal law. This very quickly gave rise to criticisms about a ‘net widening-effect’ and about the stigmatising effects on young people and marginalised areas of crime prevention (Lehne, 1998; Steffen, 2004).

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City crime prevention councils are based on general ideas of what community safety is and of who is responsible for community safety; both are based on a normative idea of a ‘good community’. Programmes always stress that community safety consists of an ‘objective element’ (crime) and a ‘subjective element’ (fear of crime), and there seems to be a consensus that both are not always directly linked. However, community crime prevention should always focus on both (Berner & Groenemeyer, 2000). The idea that crime prevention is a matter for local administration is legitimised by the argument that the causes of crime (especially education and socialisation) are local and that 70 per cent of the criminal offenses occur in the neighbourhood or near to the home of the offender (Bundesministerien, 2001: 459). These discourses always stress the idea of the limits of law enforcement and repression. A common slogan for the establishment of local crime prevention institutions, which can be found in nearly every political programme, is ‘Crime prevention is not only the matter for the police, but for the whole of society’ (Berner & Groenemeyer, 2001; Crawford, 1997; Gilling, 2001: 384). This argument has also been used to mobilise citizens for local crime issues, which in some rare cases have led to the foundation of ‘neighbourhood watch’ or ‘community defence’ schemes, mostly in richer neighbourhoods with low crime rates, often criticised by the police for reporting too many low level public order disturbances, or even for behaving violently against suspicious persons (Hitzler, 1996). Following the perspective of local causes of crime and fear of crime, the idea of informal neighbourhood control, the strengthening of local integration and the identification and the promotion of good educational and learning contexts for children and young people form the normative basis of a good community: ‘Community safety constructs a vision of a good, wellordered society. The foundation of this positive vision is the community itself, envisaged as comprising a horizontally integrated set of family and kinship ties, providing ‘natural’ insulation for its members against crime by establishing an equilibrium between collective rights and obligations, between freedom and security’ (Gilling, 2001: 384; see also Berner & Groenemeyer, 2001; Kreissl, 1987; Steinert, 1995). But in fact, local crime prevention councils and security partnerships always suffer, not only from a lack of resources and administrative power, but also from the fact that they act within pre-existing institutional networks of social policy and the police, which make it difficult for them to define projects that are not already the duty of some other administrative body and that are not repressive. As a consequence, the booming movement of community crime prevention

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councils of the 1990s has now cooled down considerably. It has become a routine administrative activity that often only fulfils ‘symbolic policy’ functions (Berner & Groenemeyer, 2001; Lehne, 1996).

3.2. National programmes preventing political extremism, racism and anti-Semitism As a reaction to a growing right wing extremist movement in the 1990s, especially in the new (eastern) federal states of Germany, which resulted in violent attacks against migrants and in the burning of asylum seekers’ homes, the national government funded an initial programme entitled ‘Against Aggression and Violence’9 (1992-1996). The programme funded specific, limited projects in the new federal states, most of them with an educational orientation. Starting in 2001, different national programmes for all federal states in Germany were established with funding at least up to 2013, with a total budget of about 800 million Euros. It is important to note that all programmes and the budget are governed by the Ministry of Family and Youth Affairs, and not by the Home Office. It was mostly social welfare associations who implemented the projects, sometimes with the support of local administrations. There are very few projects within these programmes that have been integrated with the police; the programmes are not established under the umbrella of crime prevention and only fall indirectly within the discourses on insecurity, particularly with regard to their focus on the insecurity of migrants within the new federal states. Reporting about these programmes is problematic because of their confused structure and goals. Under the umbrella of the programme ‘Youth for Tolerance and Democracy – Against Right Wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Ant-Semitism’,10 three different programmes with slightly different goals and funding structures started in 2001 (ENTIMON, XENOS and CIVITAS), and ran until 2006. Another programme, from 2007-2010, ‘Diversity is Good.

9 Aktionsprogramm gegen Aggression und Gewalt (1992-1996) with a budget of about 45 million euros. 10 Jugend für Toleranz und Demokratie – gegen Rechtsextremismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus (2001-2006) with a national budget of 200 million euros plus about 75 million euros from the European Social Fond (see Bundesministerium für Familie, Senioren, Frauen und Jugend, 2007; Klingelhöfer et al., 2007).

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Youth for Diversity, Tolerance and Democracy’11, has funded projects with a budget of about 140 million euros. Whereas these projects are designed to combat right wing political orientation and right wing violence, in 2010, a new programme was established called ‘Strengthening Democracy’,12 which focuses on all ‘anti-democratic movements’ from right over left wing extremism to Islamism. As a main objective, these programmes are aimed at the prevention of antidemocratic political movements and racism, as well as violence resulting from these movements, especially in relation to young people. Each programme differs in further specific goals and fields of activity. None of the programmes has a uniform nationwide methodology or activity. For example, within the programme Youth for Diversity, Tolerance and Democracy, more than 5000 different single projects were initiated and funded between 2007 and 2010. These projects were usually financed for a maximum of three years. Violence prevention programmes are nearly always organised in projects funded for specific activities, which means that successful projects are often stopped due to lack of resources and that most projects have to spend a lot of their resources and time on administration. The official reports of the programmes’ funding schemes, as well as the programme evaluations, do not usually classify the programmes as criminal prevention at all, but as prevention against political extremism, racism, antiSemitism and violence. Within this framework, most of the projects within this programme have been educational in character and mention the tasks of ‘education towards tolerance and democracy’, ‘strengthening intercultural and inter-religious competences’, ‘anti-racist education’, ‘social integration’ and ‘creation of networks against right wing extremism and racism’ (Regiestelle Vielfalt, 2011: 53). Also, most projects target either young people or a group known as ‘multiplicators’ (teachers, social and youth workers and other professionals). Over time, both titles and programmatic formulations have shifted, both within and between different programmes. In the 1990s, programmes began with negative connotations of prevention of the various –isms’ mentioned above, but

11 Vielfalt tut gut. Jugend für Vielfalt, Toleranz und Demokratie (2007-2010) since then until 2013 integrated with another programme for strengthening democratic political orientations in young people (see Regiestelle Vielfalt, 2011). 12 Demokratie stärken (2011-2013) with a budget of 5 million euros.

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today the emphasis has shifted to informing, educating and activating citizens and civil society. This shift to the positive seems to be a general tendency when formulating policy programmes for social problems. Unlike during the 1990’s, when policies focused on avoidance and redress of deficiencies, nowadays, programmes are often formulated in terms of empowerment. Policy rhetoric of ‘war on x’ has never been applied with very much success in Germany. This may also partly explain why many of the programmes mentioned in this report do not make use of the concept of crime prevention, and instead stress the idea of strengthening education and social cohesion. Nevertheless, in the programmes against political extremism and pro-democracy, the prevention of violence is always mentioned as one of the goals.

3.3. Federal and regional programme for city districts with special rehabilitation needs (Socially Integrated City) Analyses of social segregation, social inequality and social exclusion have dominated discourses about the development of cities all over Europe since at least the 1990s. Many national governments as well as the European Commission started special programmes to react to this problem, mostly within a social policy perspective based on definitions of city quarters or communities as being in difficulty, problematic or ‘sensitive’. In France, a programme was established in 1994 as Contrat de Ville and in Great Britain in 1991, the Single Regeneration Budget, the New Deal for Communities (1998) and the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (2001) were created. The European Commission started similar fund programmes 1994-1999 (URBAN Community Initiative), followed 2000-2006 by URBAN II. The main objective of these programmes is not crime prevention but architectural renovation and social mobilisation of marginalised neighbourhoods, city districts or communities. These programmes are hardly ever mentioned in academic discussions on crime prevention. Furthermore, in academic discussions about city renewal programmes and local social policy insecurity issues, crime and crime prevention are only very seldom analysed. Nevertheless, feelings of insecurity, crime, violence and vandalism, as well as the bad reputation of a city district, are important criteria for participating in the ‘socially integrative cities’ programme in Germany, and security is also mentioned as goal of the programme, but not as the most important one.13 13 The program is well documented on the internet [http://www.sozialestadt.de/], including reports in English and French. 140

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Up to 2009, about 2.7 billion euros have been invested in this programme, complemented by similar European Social Fund programmes in 570 areas in 355 cities and communities defined as marginalised city districts. The central goal of the programme has always been the architectural renewal of cities and investment in social housing projects, but always in combination with investments in social and cultural infrastructure. The declared goals stress in particular the creation of local offices of social district management and the support of civil society initiatives, the building of social capital within local districts and the funding and strengthening of local economies, as well as possibilities for professional training for young people, measures for ecological development and public health in city districts, measures for integrating populations with a migrant background, and safety measures (Verwaltungsvereinbarung Städtebauförderung, 2010: 8). The central idea of the programme is the creation of a new governance arrangement between the local administration, social welfare associations, local initiatives and other civil society actors at neighbourhood level. The programme follows a double logic: on the one hand it tries to foster a vertical dimension of social inclusion, which means the relation between local structures of administration and power. The central goal of participation and the central role of a local management office are always stressed in the projects. On the other hand, the projects try to strengthen social identification and social capital among the population within a local area, the horizontal dimension of social integration. This model fits well into models of activating social policy by the mobilisation of citizens and by the creation of networks between citizens as well as between institutions. It is worth noting that the police are not mentioned as a network actor, neither in the programme, nor in the reports (see Zimmermann, 2011). An evaluation of the programme in 2008 shows that projects focussing on architectural and environmental renewal and on social infrastructure and social integration are the most important, the goal of security and crime prevention only ranks in 14th place (from a total of 20 fields of activity) (see Bundestransferstelle Soziale Stadt et al., 2008). Nevertheless, concerning the goal of a ‘safe city’, some projects within the programme are explicitly formulated as ‘crime prevention’, whereas the measures are always a mix of ‘situational crime prevention’ (avoidance of constructing spaces that create feelings of fear, amelioration of physical environment for decreasing fear, establishment of concierge services within buildings, etc.) with measures of ‘social crime prevention’ (mediating of conflicts by the social neighbourhood

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office, integrative activities to mobilise citizens for the neighbourhood, creation of leisure activities for young people, etc.) (see Schubert et al., 2009).14 If crime and insecurity are mentioned in the reports and descriptions of projects, they are always linked to problems of exclusion, youth unemployment and poverty. The fostering of social integration and identification, the creation of informal social control within the neighbourhood and the mediating of conflicts by social work through the neighbourhood office, as well as the creation of professional training possibilities and leisure activities for young people, are described as the central measures of crime prevention in the projects, whereas architectural renewal, neighbourhood identification and integration are described as the central measures for reducing feelings of insecurity. But it is important to note that these measures are most often mentioned under the goal of social integration and social inclusion, without explicit relation to discourses on crime and security. To conclude, we can say that all of these programmes contain elements that could be defined as social or community crime prevention (see f. e. Gilling, 2001; Hope, 1995; Hope & Karstedt, 2003), but without having crime prevention as their goal. Problems of crime, vandalism, conflicts and the interpretation of social (and visual) disorder in specific local districts are a reason for mobilising political resources and for identifying these areas as problematic, but political goals are formulated in terms of social integration and social inclusion or even as measures against social inequality or the social make-up of society.

4. Perspectives on Social Crime Prevention in Germany Crime prevention spread all over the country in the 1990s, especially with the creation of local crime prevention councils. This policy developed as a reaction to tendencies towards social crises, which manifested themselves in a dramatic increase in crime and illegal drug offenses in police statistics, an increase in fear of crime and personal concerns about insecurity in the 14 This article does not set out to evaluate the effects of the programme, but simply to describe the dominant discourses produced by the programme, and by the projects within the programme, in relation to the idea of social crime prevention. All available evaluations of the programme or of projects are limited to formal variables (what has been done) or to indicators of satisfaction within the population.

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cities, but also in increasing rates of unemployment and especially youth unemployment. In the shadow of reunification and as a consequence of political strategies against migration and asylum seekers, right wing extremism and violence became a central public and political issue. Political reactions to this public problematisation of security were not limited to the idea of crime prevention. Social policy measures, especially for marginalised city districts and unemployed young people, have been developed, but they only very seldom directly address crime and insecurity. The same is true of the problem of racist violence, which has been addressed mostly by educational projects. Crime prevention at a local level is highly fragmented but is guided by concepts of ‘community crime prevention’, with its normative assumptions about ‘good’ communities. The promotion of social capital, informal social control and social integration functions in these programmes as a kind of natural insulation against crime. In this context, the idea of encouraging a feeling of responsibility found its place and the programmes do not fail to stress the concept that citizens are responsible for crime and safety in their neighbourhood. However, local crime prevention has in fact been institutionalised, in the form of a network between different local administration organisations, welfare associations and the police, and has often failed to mobilise ‘ordinary’ citizens. Discourses on the social crises of the 1990s were very much informed by these ideas of ‘community’, insofar as the causes of social problems have been attributed to the breakdown of traditional social ties and solidarities, to individualisation and pluralisation of modern societies. The strategies that followed from this perspective could have promoted measures of social crime prevention, but in fact, local crime prevention councils have been equipped neither with the resources, nor with the administrative power to develop strategies and to implement projects that address the social causes of crime and insecurity. Most of the programmes ‘in action’ reinterpreted the idea of social crime prevention as an educational challenge for children and young people. Local crime prevention then uses the notion of community only as a variable for identifying marginalised local districts and areas with deficiencies in educational and social capacities, and then deploys the idea of community in order to reach individuals or households (Crawford, 2007: 884). There has been a tendency, especially in the 1990s, to formulate social work programmes and projects as crime prevention, and in this sense, there has been a tendency to ‘criminalise social policy’. However, due to a lack of clear strategic ideas about what crime prevention could be, this ‘criminalisation of social policy’

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normally rested only on a rhetorical level of programme formulation and had no influence on the kind of social work implemented. Programmes aimed at marginalised city districts followed a social policy orientation without being legitimised by crime and insecurity discourses. Crime and insecurity remain central indicators for problematic city districts, but the programmes address social cohesion and identification as well as quality of life as goals in their own right. Nevertheless, ideas of situational crime prevention and ‘defensible space’ sometimes found their way into programmes of city renewal. Policies against right wing violence and racism have always been formulated as educational problems, but even if they fit into a programme of crime prevention, they stress the idea of violence prevention as the problem of instilling democratic values through education. Crime prevention is a highly fragmented enterprise with thousands of projects, initiatives and different forms of organisation, depending on the creativity and the personal engagement of the participating members in the crime prevention organisations. The wave of institutionalisation has died down and crime prevention councils go on operating in a more or less routine way, developing projects and initiating information campaigns on various youth problems. And the created institutional networks often fulfil informal coordinating and information exchange functions between different welfare organisations, the police and local administrations under the umbrella of crime prevention, but their impact on local policy remains marginal. Whether social problems are formulated within a framework of crime and safety, or within a framework of social justice and social integration, depends on the development of public and political discourses. After the 1990s, crime and insecurity, as well as discourses on crime prevention, lost a great deal of prominence in public and political discourses. Crime and fear of crime are decreasing and political party strategies of governing through fear and crime have failed in some recent elections. Nowadays, other social problems and insecurities, like organised crime and terrorism, but also unemployment, exclusion and social justice, as well as problems with the educational system and with migrant integration, are framing public and political discourses in Germany. At the moment, there seem to be no indicators signalling social crises like in the 1990s, but racist discourses on migrant integration or specific violent events, dramatised by the media and strategically instrumentalised by political parties could change the political climate any time and very rapidly.

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But even in the golden age of the foundation of crime prevention initiatives and projects, they were mostly orientated towards the individual (potential) offender by educational means. Social crime prevention in Germany in practise is more or less educational prevention,15 even if the programmes sometimes stress the ideas of community. Many social policies and social work programmes and projects tackle the social ‘root causes of crime’, but as ‘social prevention’, they are only very seldom labelled ‘crime prevention’. Up to now, there seems to have been only a very limited tendency to ‘blur the boundaries’ between crime policy and social policy using the idea of social crime prevention.

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15 The term ‘educational prevention’ seems more appropriate than the sometimesused category of ‘developmental prevention’. It refers to the means and pedagogical techniques by which prevention goals should be achieved. Whereas ‘developmental prevention’ is associated with the idea of early intervention in childhood to prevent the development of a ‘criminal career’, ‘educational crime prevention’ is neither limited to a specific age group nor does it bring crime prevention into a discourse on criminal careers.

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Social Crime Prevention in Greece Sofia Vidali

1. Introduction This chapter presents an analysis of the main policy directions and explanations of social crime prevention in Greece. It analyses social crime prevention, in particular, and how it relates to social causes of crime. Social crime prevention is connected to wider social protection systems and it is developed by extra-penal strategies with a view to changing social environments and the motivations of possible offenders (such as interventions in education, employment possibilities, family relationships, housing and health care, etc.). Taking into consideration the expanding effects of the structural economic crisis in Greece, a discourse on social crime prevention is presented as rather problematic. However, this analysis will attempt to explain the tendency of crime policies to be influenced by the free-market during late modernity in Greece. In addition, it will examine the impact of its effects on social crime prevention policies. It is extremely important to explain the way these effects are nowadays ‘integrated’ into government policies during the Greek crisis, whilst further weakening social crime prevention policies. Additionally, it should be noted that this analysis will show the need to reflect further on a possible extension of the reach of social crime prevention, in order to include other social groups and other types of criminality, beyond the ordinary crimes of the common ‘dangerous classes’, young people, and petty criminals. This analysis will be structured in seven parts and will attempt to explore the typologies, the features and policies, the specific influential factors and the problems that have arisen in regard to social crime prevention in Greece, and to make some proposals concerning social crime prevention. The main thesis presented in this text is that the crimes of the powerful should explicitly be included in the debate on crime prevention, especially regarding that on social crime prevention.

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2. Crime Prevention and Social Crime Prevention in Greece An analysis of social crime prevention is connected primarily to crime prevention concepts. The concept of crime prevention includes a variety of policies with different theoretical and ideological backgrounds (Pease, 1997: 661), each of which corresponds to different ‘answers’ regarding crime problems, and different perceptions of crime, according to whether it is described as an outside threat/offence to civil society, or not (Currie, cited in Crawford, 2007). The same concept is also considered as a vague and controversial concept (Knepper, 2007: 140), “a chameleon concept which cannot be neatly or unproblematically defined” (Hughes, 2007: 63). It is, additionally, considered an issue far from critical social theory and of limited theoretical value and it is further considered an area more often of technical and pragmatic work (Walkate, 1996: 307; Hughes, 1998: 3).

2.1. Theories and features of crime prevention During the development of crime prevention approaches, four main theories of crime prevention have been formed. The first is that of Brantingham and Faust (1976), the theory of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention, aimed firstly at preventing crime before it occurs, by reducing opportunities for crime and changing specific groups of people at ‘risk’ from following a criminal career (because of certain predetermined factors), and lastly, to avoid recidivism, by intervening in the treatment of known offenders (Pease, 1997: 660; Crawford, 2007: 870). The second theory refers to that of Farrington and Tonry, who identify four types of crime prevention (Hughes, 1998: 21): 1: Law enforcement (general prevention); 2: Developmental (prevention of development of criminal potential in individuals); 3: Communal (changing social conditions in residential communities); 4: Situational (reducing opportunities to commit crime, including environmental design approaches and increasing risks). The third theory is based on the theory of Bottoms and Wiles on defensive strategies (locks, alarms, policing neighbourhood watches, etc.), guardianship and monitoring (target policing, CCTV etc), new forms of social order (multi-agency, public-private partnerships, etc), criminality prevention (pre-school programmes, etc) (Hughes, 1998: 22). The fourth theory is proposed by Walkate, who classifies community based crime prevention in offender-centred strategies, victim-centred strategies and environment-centred strategies (Walklate, 2001: 307-308). Critical, for

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the purposes of this chapter, is the differentiation regarding the types of crime prevention, which focuses on ‘the nature of the initial processes or mechanisms to be altered in anticipation of producing a preventive effect’ (Crawford, 2007: 872): situational and social crime prevention policies are placed at the centre of this differentiation. It should be noted that situational and social crime prevention are not classified as having absolute policies, and display common features (Young, 2001). However, beyond the concepts of crime prevention, or its associations with a certain theory, it would be more appropriate to highlight some of the distinctive features, which could help theorising on this issue and contribute to a future discourse on political economy as regards crime prevention. In particular, considering the relevant literature, there are five types of allegations that arise: 1. Crime prevention does not constitute an ideologically neutral issue. It is not ‘a technical and practical problem, needing an administrative and apolitical solution’ as the technicist orientation claims (Hughes, 1998: 4, 18), and it cannot be understood or explored outside a concrete socio-political and economic context. Crime prevention is differently understood and developed according to its relationship with penal or social policies. As the history and the sociology of crime prevention prove (Hughes, 1998: 4, 18), its shifts toward penal or extra-penal policies were always dependent on wider socio-political and economic processes, and models (Taylor, 1999). Such policies are linked to the prevailing ideas of the time, connected to crime, social control projects and processes, and, furthermore, to levels of social tolerance, and the law’s intervention limits, and they are associated with variations in social structure in different countries (Vidali, 2007 b). 2. The re-emergence of prevention debates during late modernity (those of situational and social crime prevention) do not constitute new approaches (Gilling, 1997: 2; Crawford, 2007: 867-870); as Hughes comments: ‘... what is new is the governments’ current uses of the term “crime prevention” for their promotion of multiagency, situational and social strategies and partnerships against crime that is an agenda for crime prevention beyond a police-driven agenda...’ (Hughes, 1998: 3, see also Crawford, 2007: 869) Crime prevention approaches are often linked and integrated with other forms of public policies (Gilling, 1997: 2) such as penal policies, security policies or social policy systems. Furthermore, crime policies and crime prevention have never been characterised as solely ‘national questions’; the internationalisation of

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crime policy strategies has been common in the history of crime control in European states, since the 19th century (Vidali, 2007a). 3. Crime prevention policies are adapted during the process of transition from one type of economy to another (such as from consumerist to financial capitalism), and therefore, the aforementioned constitute the ‘responses’ to structural changes in social and economic life (indicatively see Crawford, 2008). From this point of view, situational and social crime prevention have emerged as ‘solutions’, responding to the crises that emerged during transitions in the course of the late 20th century (Taylor, 1999). In this context, state sovereignty and the concept of rehabilitation have transformed the focus and the goals of crime prevention policies, which have now shifted to a question of criminality control and management (Garland, 2001: 16-17; Crawford, 2008). 4. Nevertheless, the new trend in crime prevention discourse is focused on protecting human rights and victims of crime. Paradoxically, the question about the impact of power relations on crime prevention policies and on social crime prevention is absent from these main policy agendas, even if crime prevention during late modernity became a ‘must’ in the governmental agendas of western societies (see below in the next sections). Having clarified some typical features and trends of crime prevention policies, social crime prevention is placed in the centre of this analysis, as it has emerged in late modernity, despite the fact that it has assumed different meanings throughout the history of crime prevention.

2.2. Social Crime Prevention In particular, the social crime prevention initiative constitutes a project to avoid the coercive intervention of state institutions. It became a significant issue for public policies from the 1970s (Crawford, 2008). According to its proposals, ‘...  the most effective way to prevent crime is to invest in social development programmes that strengthen individuals, families and communities  ...’ (Knepper, 2007: 140). Social crime prevention concerns measures that are intended to prevent crime, which focus on the social causes of crime, rather than on those related to the mechanical reduction of opportunities (situational crime prevention) or deterrence (the criminal justice system) (Young, 2001: 272).

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Young clarifies that ‘the emphasis on social causes, relates social crime prevention to any causal theory of crime... in common with crime prevention strategies in general, it is aimed at intervention before the offence has occurred rather than after ...’ Therefore, initiatives beyond the criminal justice system, on the level of multi-agency crime prevention, are considered indispensable. Social crime prevention goes beyond police and community interactions (Young, 1991: 157). It could be developed in relation to different levels of social policies and social protection systems, which tend to regulate and reduce poverty, social inequalities, and therefore social and economic exclusion (Knepper, 2007; Young, 1991: 157) without however criminalising social policy (Knepper, 2007; Crawford, 2007: 871). As Crawford remarks ‘social crime prevention is subdivided into those that target individual motivations and those that seek to change communal interactions or collective processes of control. These are often referred to as developmental and community crime prevention respectively’ (Crawford, 2007: 882). This focus differs from the point of view in this text, because it seems that it does not place social crime prevention in the context of broader social processes. Social crime prevention is not a static feature. As mentioned in the Greek case, in late modernity, the development of social crime prevention is further linked to broader economic changes and specifically to free-market expansion and its effects on society.

2.2.1. Social crime prevention and market society The approach of E. Currie to market society is of significant importance for this discourse. Based on his approach, ‘market’ does not mean ‘market economy’ but a spread of a civilization (Currie, 1997: 151-152): market society ‘... is a society in which the pursuit of private gain increasingly becomes the organising principle for all areas of social life, not simply a mechanism which we use to accomplish certain circumscribed economic ends’ (Currie, 1996: 343). Free market economy is part of the ideology of market society (Currie, 1997: 152). According to this author (1996: 344) there are five mechanisms by which market society is promoting crime: 1. ‘The increasing inequality and concentrated economic deprivation; 2. The weakening of local communities’ capacity for ‘informal’ support, mutual provision, and socialisation and supervision of the young;

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3. The stressing and fragmenting of the family; 4. The withdrawal of public provision of basic services for those it has already stripped of livelihoods, economic security and ‘informal’ communal support; 5. The magnifying of the culture of Darwinian competition for status and dwindling resources, and by urging a level of consumption that it cannot fulfil for everyone through legitimate channels.’ Currie claims (1996: 348-349, 351-352) that the long-term vision should be the replacement of the ‘market society’ by a ‘sustaining society’ and proposes some key strategies for a social crime prevention approach (three macro and three micro), which are especially critical in order to face the global transformations that a free market society has brought about. • At a macro level, Currie suggests the development of a supportive labour market policy (active labour market policy), the long-term development of an unapologetic strategy to reduce extremes of social and economic inequality, and an international effort to promote an active and childsupportive family policy directed at resolving and reducing conflicts between family and work. • At a micro level he suggests the development of creative programmes related to a) child and family support programmes, b) a youth intervention strategy for the expansion of tangible opportunities and the end of the ‘deficiency model’ of delinquency c) a user-friendly approach to the prevention and treatment of drug abuse.

2.2.2. Market society: The Greek version Market society civilisation has been increasingly spreading in Greece during late modernity, although as a collateral effect of the ‘free market economy’ expansion. Despite the fact that it has activated an important number of the mechanisms previously mentioned by Currie, none of them has been absolutely and strictly integrated in Greek social life (especially in extended rural and small urban areas) until the outbreak of the economic crisis (2008). In particular, a pre-existing (to neo-liberalism and to the economic crisis) extra-institutional system of social protection and social support, based on personal and local communities, family interest and traditional social relationships, and developed in various forms of social networks associated with the clienteles of political parties, has always been an informal substitute for the weakness of the welfare state. These social aggregations,

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reproduced due to the ‘Greek capitalism model’ (see below), have partly conditioned power relationships. These relationships have demonstrated an extraordinary ability to adapt to any type of social and economic change throughout the years. To be precise, the increasing inequality and concentrated economic deprivation that Currie mentions have been partly counterbalanced by: the informal economy and political clienteles system; the weakening of both informal support and the role of local communities in socialising young people; and the fragmenting of the family, (see Currie above). Nevertheless in Greece, these relationships have been, to a large extent, continued by the survival of strong family bonds, neighbours and the role of localised social networks in social protection, employment and social mobility (Vidali, 2011a). However, these mechanisms contributed to the reproduction of social conservatism; they blocked social emancipation and obscured the effects created by the structural changes in the Greek economy (the free market expansion). Actually, they influenced the effectiveness of the system of social transactions and as a result, they created social inequalities. As it is noted “...Greece is one of the most representative countries of the ‘welfare regime of Southern Europe’...” (Papatheodorou et al., 2008: 20); this regime is characterised “...by delayed development of the social state, the limited universality of the benefits and large gaps in the social protection system, which are replenished by the family and related networks. Also it is distinguished by the fragmentation and high polarisation of the social security system, as well as the role of patronage in sharing resources and providing social protection...” (Papatheodorou et al., 2008: 15). Consequently, people could not rationalise and understand the impact of ‘the public provision of basic services exploitation’ (see Currie above), which favours the interests of the powerful (what Currie calls ‘withdrawal’) in the context of the market economy. Likewise, people were not aware of the shift towards a market society (typical is the Zoniana case, revealed in 2008, where local community members were transformed into an organised crime network, see Vidali, 2011a). Therefore, the effects of growth and the magnification of a Darwinian ‘competition culture’ as well as the connection of consumerism to illegitimate means (see Currie above) are still unexplored as latent side effects of free market expansion, by the majority of Greek citizens. This is also because large areas of the social strata (and political leaders) are still attached to traditional visions of social and power relationships, at the core of which political patronage is critical (see below). These issues are also connected to particular trends regarding the rise and fall of social crime prevention policies in the context of free market expansion during the last 20 years.

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3. The Market Society, Social Crime Prevention and the Welfare State In Greece, crime prevention polices during the 19th and 20th century had been identified as security policies rather than social crime prevention policies within a long-term process of national integration, the structure of economic development and social relations. Also, the role of the ruling classes in the development of political systems (including the Cold War period) influenced features concerning crime questioning and prevention policies. Until the end of the 70s, crime prevention was of limited interest in Greece, while welfare state policies were quite poor. This is not, however, a paradox. Apart from the low crime rates, the limited effect of rehabilitative ideas in Greece could be explained, if one takes into consideration some concrete reasons: the crime question and crime control policies and institutions (such as prisons) have never been connected to the integration of labour forces with industrial production processes, or to industrial labour market needs (Vidali, 2007a). The reason for this can be detected in a series of typical characteristics of Greek capitalism development, added to the aforementioned regime of social inequalities reproduction, such as self-employment, small and medium-scale crafts and family enterprises, and re-sale schemes of economy. The Social Democrats’ rise to power in 1981 liberalised social mobility processes and contributed to a massive social rearrangement, by abrogating Cold War restrictions regarding middle-class participation in public and economic life. Since the mid 80s, the change in the type of economic development from state controlled to market economy, also coupled with changes to the aforementioned social and extra-institutional networks, determined the de-industrialisation of the country, the privatisation processes, and market expansion to old and new sectors of social life. The economic change resulted in greatly expanding consumerism, income redistribution, social rearrangement and mobility. There was an ‘explosion’ in the illegal and black economies, as well as in the unofficial labour force; the massive migration flows toward Greece had further favoured these sectors (Vidali, 2007a). The expansion of the ‘market society’ had influenced specific aspects of the Greek institutional system and accelerated social transformation. The increasing privatisation of health and social protection systems, the intensification and disintegration of labour market rules, the black labour market ‘explosion’ and the unofficial ‘normalisation’ of the economy, constitute some typical ‘social

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features’ that contributed to the increase in social inequalities (see below). However, combined with the typical ineffectiveness of Greek capitalism on social transactions – namely their limited impact on inequality reduction (Papatheodorou et al., 2008: 20) – this process resulted in traditional perceptions of crime prevention policies in Greece and undermined any attempt to implement social crime prevention. In this context, institutional and social relationship changes, income redistribution and welfare (in the 80s) and then (in the 90s and 2000s) an increase in the crime rate, led to increased interest in improving crime prevention in Greece. Adaptations to international and EU polices also played an important role in crime prevention policies. However, these trends were not framed by specific policies relating to the development of social crime prevention; since crime prevention continued to be considered by policymakers as a criminal justice system issue that was completely different from social policy and welfare state development, and was restricted to policies depending on the cultivation of a relationship of trust between the police and the community.

4. State Policies, Trends and Academic Discourse on Crime Prevention This was the social context that had framed the crime problem until the outburst of the world economic crisis in 2007. Since the mid 1990s, the criminality issue has become a government priority. It was linked, initially, to street and property crimes, immigrants, youth deviance and drug abuse, and later to the trafficking of human beings, organised crime and terrorism. The re-emergence of the idea of prevention was for the first time linked to ‘community involvement’ in crime prevention, which was cultivated during that period. Community involvement in crime prevention was linked to local authorities, public agencies and NGOs’ crime control plans, and also, to police reforms and the multiplication of its forces, proximity policing and the formation of victim-oriented protection systems. In spite of this, until the 1980s, a crime prevention discourse was developed regarding the dichotomy between penal and extra-penal crime prevention. At that time, extra-penal prevention was normally identified (and still is) as social crime prevention (Spinellis, 1982: 67), despite being theorised in its developmental version. According to Spinellis, “‘penal prevention’ is considered to be both general and specific prevention, (individual proactive prevention), as well as a deterrent; and ‘extra-penal’ or ‘social crime

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prevention’ is considered to be ‘micro-social’, consisting of: psychological interventions and counselling as ‘environmental’ prevention (regarding the natural and the social environment), as well as ‘mechanical’ or ‘technical’ prevention, which includes policing, environmental design, reducing opportunities to crime, etc.” (Spinellis, 1982: 64-65) Also Farsedakis, some years later, theorised that social prevention is based on a psycho-social background that transmits the burden of solving social problems to society and in particular to other social systems of control, not necessarily punitive, but rather less stigmatising ones (Farsedakis, 1991: 194). By the end of the 90s, the issue of prevention monopolised crime policy features, public policies and academic discourse (see also, Panousis, 1993). In particular, in the 1990s, when the question of street crime, fear of crime and immigrants arose in Greece, the idea of the declining role of the state and that of community involvement in crime prevention was transplanted in Greece (Vidali, 2007b) and was widely recognised by academics (Papatheodorou, 2005)1 and government without any further reflection on differences or comparisons between the Greek social structure and those of the USA and Western European countries. Consequently, despite their innovative character, the aforementioned attitudes seemed extraneous for the Greek institutional system in reality. Some reasons for the failure of community involvement in crime prevention could be traced to the ideological, organisational and legal traditions of the Greek criminal justice system (mainly regarding the development of the police, the historical failures of this kind of communitarianism in Greece related to an ‘eternal’ conflict between state institutions and local political ruling groups and networks. Also, this failure is related to the fact that the so-called structural changes have been developed in a very short time, without the possibility of their being socially rationalised, consolidated and elaborated by social processes. Besides this, crime has always been considered a question for the state; local authorities could not take it ‘seriously’, as it was considered only as a state responsibility. Additionally, the project of community involvement in crime prevention was a short-term one (as explained below) and it had not been supported by political, state and local authority regulations. Furthermore, community involvement in crime prevention could not be integrated with wider social policy projects. These trends changed in 2004 when the neo-liberals came 1 In that context the institution of Crime Prevention Local Councils (CPLC) has been set up, created to enforce municipal government to prevent criminality at a local level (see further in next pages).

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into government and officially launched situational crime prevention policy. Since then, crime prevention discourse has ‘disappeared’ from the official governmental agenda and also from the prevalent academic discourse: the securitarian turn in crime policy turned the attention of criminologists and penologists towards crime control and towards the dilemma between ‘security enforcement’ and ‘security of rights’, with great emphasis on antiterrorism legislation, and security in the city, instead of social or community crime prevention (Manoledakis, 2005; Curakis, 2007). Moreover, police became a first site agency of crime and social disease control (Vidali, 2007a). Recently, the interest of criminologists towards prevention has been partly renewed, taking into consideration two recent publications by some of the leading criminologists in Greece, emeritus professors, C.D. Spinellis, and S. Alexiadis. Their core discourse nowadays concerns human rights and individual freedoms. It is not clear if this trend is related to the escalation of repression in recent years. The discourse on Human Rights in crime policy has been developed in Greece since the end of the 90s (Tsitsoura, 1997). It was linked to decriminalisation and depenalisation processes and to minimising penal intervention, to avoid further victimisation and to protect victims’ human rights. Spinellis focuses here on classifications of prevention, mainly of liberal constitutional guarantees (Spinellis, 2011). She classifies the prevention strategies in five models: penal prevention, the targeted model of population prevention, the specialised or concrete types of crime prevention, social prevention and situational prevention: Without defining situational prevention, she considers it an effective way to control crime because it is focused on heightening the awareness of future victims, and not on future offenders (Spinellis, 2011: 1616-1618). However, Spinellis considers that some situational prevention projects and policies are not compatible with fundamental rights and individual liberties. As she comments, the fact that individual rights are adapted to the needs of an effective crime policy is unacceptable. Furthermore, she considers that social crime prevention ‘...  even if it is not absolutely effective  ...’ raises questions about poverty, unemployment and education, stating that the policies that have developed regarding them are ‘... naturally positive policies ...’ (Spinellis, 2011: 1622). Alexiadis, in his last edition of ‘Criminology’, considers social crime prevention policy as a strategy that is developed before crime is committed (‘ante delictum’ measures against crime). In particular, it is developed outside the penal system and beyond any type of penal measures, and, in his words, ‘... it does not presuppose the commission of crime ...’ (Alexiadis,

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2011: 313). Alexiadis does not refer explicitly to social crime prevention as a part of possible prevention models, but rather he considers it an alternative (to a penal) model of crime policy, which he describes as ‘social crime policy’. From his point of view, social crime policy is based on the hypothesis that crime, due to social causes, is committed under certain social conditions; as he comments, the theoretical background of this approach is the Marxist theory and a majority of the other sociological theories of crime. Alexiadis considers, as social crime policy, everything that is not included in the penal system. He understands the penal system from a narrow perspective (the justice system), and social prevention measures against crime are considered in a technical sense. Therefore, he does not include police in the criminal justice system. He (2011: 354) classifies as social crime prevention measures (for example) the cases of body searches, behaviour control during electronic traffic control etc., during which citizens are subjected to obligatory controls. According to Alexiadis (2011: 314, 321), social crime policy is structured by social prevention measures, community involvement, and police preventative measures. The social prevention measures are categorised in relation to the Greek legislative practice in: i) primary measures of social policy linked directly or indirectly to the quality of life; ii) general measures of social policy related to social problems which have an effect on shifts in criminality (e.g. measures against alcoholism, begging, protection of adolescents); iii) specific measures applied to individuals at risk of committing crime, to ‘dangerous’ – quotation marks in original text – mentally ill people or to adolescents at ‘moral’ risk, drug addicts etc. Alexiadis recognises individual freedoms as a limitation of crime policy and notes that general social crime prevention measures could not violate these freedoms; when applied to real people, protection of the freedom of the individual should be taken into account.

5. Criminality and Crime Prevention in Context Increased crime in Greece is almost an argument in itself. The average age of criminality is one of the lowest in Europe, while extremely violent crimes have not been common until recently. Even now, they could mainly be explained by interpersonal relations; serial killing is extremely rare, assaults in the streets are specific to certain inner city areas of big cities, especially in Athens and Thessaloniki, whilst physical injuries were, until the end of the 1990s, linked mainly to domestic violence, an area mainly ignored by

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the public at large. Drug trafficking, thefts and burglaries were, however, a constant feature of criminality, while criminal aggregation, in the form of organised crime, emerged during the 1990s (after a normative change) and began to be statistically reported by 2001. Apart from the development effects of the market society in the 1990s, the arrival of immigrants and refugees contributed to criminality (Karydis, 2011) and partly to significant changes in social relationships (Τriandafyllidou, 2000). Undocumented migrants and refugees were offered the ‘opportunity’ to create and expand an extremely profitable transnational illegal market, including trafficking of human beings, illegal prostitution networks, document falsifications and illegal legalisations, etc. The majority of these people were also involved in street criminality, unofficial labour, etc. (Vidali, 2011b) and became a target of the police as well as of violent racist groups (Antonopoulos, 2006). In that same period, and on the back of moral panic about immigrants, youth rioting, the expansion of drug retail markets and increased drug abuse rates, the lower social strata and Greek young people became increasingly involved in crime (Vidali, 2007a: 847-849). Criminality data changed dramatically during 2000-2011, mostly on a qualitative rather than a quantitative level (see table 1 as example). Reported street crime (drug trafficking, thefts and robberies) increased in certain urban areas where structural changes effected changes in the population, and the composition of the labour force and the markets. Organised crime, illegal night-time activities, white collar crimes, state crimes and abusive policing, unofficial labour and sexual exploitation became constant criminality features in Greece, despite their underreporting and panic about petty street crimes and some forms of violent and serious crimes.2

2 Murder ratio per 100 000 inhabitants is relatively low in Greece. It was 190 in 2009, 120 in 2005 and 133 in 2000. For the same period however property crime ratios were noticeably changed: the fraud ratio per 100  000 inhabitants was 1240, 866 and 700; that of begging was 1143, 406 and 466; that of thefts and burglaries was 66 269, 40 222 and 42 168; that of robberies was 4294, 1901 and 1442; and that of drugs was 11 261, 8934 and 7034. The changes in some crime statistics are very significant, indicative of organised forms of criminal offences: the gun law violation ratio was 3194 in 2009, 1966 in 2005 and 1669 in 2000. The forgery ratio per 100 ,000 inhabitants was 6948, 3646 and 1629 respectively for the years 2009, 2005 and 2000, and all of them had registered increasing trends with no critical fluctuations during the whole period 2000-2009. Data source: Ministry of Citizen Protection (2011), http://www.astynomia. gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=91&Itemid=4.

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During the same period, in the 1990s and 2000s, the white-collar and statecorporate crimes became a normal practice in the relationship between the State, the political parties and the private sector, as it is now evidenced by the revelations of big financial and economic cases and scandals regarding fraud, corruption, organised and financial crimes related to public works contracts (as in the Siemens case), stock exchange market frauds, and illegal speculations over social insurance funds’ investments in high risk structured bonds. Shadowy deals with big financial institutions such as JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs obscured the real figures of a country’s debt and deficit in exchange for the country’s wealth resources. Most of these companies are now under inquiry by specific parliamentary commissions and the Criminal Justice system.3 Among others, these trends, in combination with the prevalence of a Darwinian competition culture, have stimulated the cultivation of social cynicism4 among politicians and policymakers as a key way of resolving social problems.

CRIMINALITY CHANGES GREECE 100000

FIRE ARMS

39 90 9

THEFTS - BURGLARIES MOTORVECHILE THEFTS ROBBERIES

90000

58 72 6

70000

00 67 8

60000

72 58 4

03 49 4

50000

00 44 1

97 42 3

17552

17478

52 49 3

65 48 3

18629

17801

89 45 6

33 46 2

19025

18941

23550

22516

20216

0

2010

2009

23 84

2008

18 62

2007

20 84

32 93 29 68

24 63

35 02

28 23

36 26

47 08

10000

60 97

20000

21 33

2006

18 30

2005

19 94

2004

21 08

2003

21 13

2002

15 81

26711

17 35

27608

20 83

30000

19 92

40000

23 39

AMMOUNT OF CRIMNALITY

80000

18 30

2001

2000

Table 1: Source Hellenic Police, Elaboration S. Vidali

3 For Parliamentary Commissions reports online (in Greek) see www.hellenic parliament.gr 4 I use the term ‘cynicism’ here as a metaphor for the word ‘cynicism’ as is used in the modern Greek language, that is, a behaviour characterised by a complete lack of emotional or moral sensitivity, which expresses thoughts, feelings or intentions without any effort to mitigate dissatisfaction that can result in complete contempt and indifference to the commonly accepted rules of decency or morality. See http://www. greeklanguage.gr/greekLang/modern_greek/tools/lexica/triantafyllides/index.html

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Changes to criminality and, in particular, to some forms of it, are framed by the increase in unemployment rates over the last few years, which is related to the austerity measures adopted in an attempt to confront the economic crisis5 (see also section below). Possible links between crime and increased unemployment in the context of the crisis have not yet been explored. However, this will depend on various coefficients. For the moment, this link cannot be explored. There is also a ‘technical reason’ for this: the lack of official criminality statistics from the public scene, firstly through the revision of criminality data published by police (they are restricted in events and types of events registration), and secondly, through the reform of the national statistical service (which actually further hindered the production of crime statistics and easy public access). Nevertheless, the increased disintegration of the labour market, in combination with the deterioration of the social protection system, the increase in poverty rates and social inequalities, and the ‘flexibility’ in work, contributes, even if only indirectly, to the disjointed nature of any social crime prevention perspective. The disjointed nature of any social crime perspective is also evident during the last five years, when we examine the everyday crime control policies entrenched and identified, in the public discourse, as ‘prevention’. Actually, crime prevention policies in Greece could be classified as secondary and tertiary crime prevention strategies and these are developed inside the criminal justice system. Specifically, secondary crime prevention was always targeted at people belonging to specific social groups susceptible to deviance and criminality, especially adolescents; as social problems and the economic crisis become more intense, these groups are now growing in number and include social protesters such as students, labourers and other groups of activists, drug addicts, Roma, immigrants, victims of trafficking, etc., all of them associated with problems that are specifically found in urban areas. These policies are primarily focused on crime control as a way of controlling the dangers associated with specific groups’ social dangerousness, independently from any criminal act commission. Furthermore, a ‘dogma’ concerning collaborations of protesters and activists, and even terrorist groups, to organised crime, was also recently launched, institutionalising the further penalisation of other groups (beyond terrorists), such as young

5 In 2006 the unemployment rate in Greece fell to 8.9 % from 9.8 % in 2005; the number of unemployed people was just over 427  000. In 2006, Greece registered the second highest unemployment rate of the 15 EU Member States. The unemployment rate in Greece exceeded the EU15 average for the first time in 1998 (EIRO, 2007).

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protesters and activists, to which law provisions have been applied by the Courts. In particular, policing intensification, police raids (Eleft herotypia 27.4.2011, 7.5.2011; tvxs, 21.7.2009; Ministry of Citizen Protection, 2011), penalisation of some forms of rioting, such as the face mask or hood during rioting (l. 3772/2009) and the politics of fear and moral panic enforced by the media are typical state reactions to acute social problems. However, this type of policy should be evaluated in combination with a tension, less discussed in Greece, ascertained by official inspections of the Greek Ombudsman. As noted, among policemen, there is a well-established belief that the justification of a police action has ‘... no need to be related to the behaviour of the person arrested or to individualised suspicions of committing a criminal offence as the law explicitly requires. They believe that the abstract reference to subjective assessments of each police officer in charge as to the risks to public order and safety is enough ...’ (Greek Ombudsman, 2009: 48). In this context, social crime prevention becomes more and more problematic. In the next section, there will be an analysis of the main social crime prevention policies and measures in Greece, such as extra-penal prevention and social policy measures, which constitute the mainly victim-oriented prevention and with a positivist approach, secondary crime prevention.

6. Social Crime Prevention and Social Policy at the Turn of the 21st Century During their last governments (2000-2004, 2009 until now), the Social Democrats (PASOK) legislated various institutions regarding social crime prevention, especially regarding victim support (in particular victims of trafficking),6 juvenile delinquency prevention and offenders’ treatment,7 and ex-prisoners’ support.8 Neo-liberals (ND) officially adopted (2004-2009) 6 For the protection of victims of trafficking (l. 3386/2005, l. 3274/2004.) 7 ‘Ratification and implementation of the Convention of the Council of Europe to protect children against sexual exploitation and abuse, measures to improve the living and the decongestion of detention and other provisions.’ (L. 3860/2010) ‘Improvements to the criminal law for juvenile offenders, prevent and tackle crime and victimisation of minors.’(L. 111/12.7.2010) 8 By the p.d. 300/2003 institution of ‘Epanodos’ (return), which has as primary objective the ex-offenders’ social re-integration, the financial support and implementation of

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the situational crime prevention model in order to control crime, and they also legitimised a set of measures related to family, motherhood and child protection, elimination of gender and other types of discrimination, child trafficking and pornography, sexual exploitation and abuse.9 Therefore, both political parties enforced the creation of victim support substructures, in the context of wider social policy initiatives to support socially vulnerable groups, at a national and municipal level. At a national level, the National Centre for Social Solidarity (in Greek EKKA, l. 3106/03 and 3402/05), supervised by the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity, coordinates the network of social services in the country and provides social and psychological support to individuals, families and vulnerable groups in crisis or in emergency cases (children, adolescents, women, victims of abuse, neglect, abandonment, exploitation or trafficking, domestic violence, adolescents who leave home, single women with children in crisis and economic weakness, adults and old people in need of immediate social assistance, people in crisis and in a state of emergency with psychosocial and emotional needs, victims of discrimination and social exclusion). The network is developed through Social Support Centres (K.K.S.), Host Hostels-Host Protected Shelters, Immediate Social Intervention Services, crisis management and special treatment-counselling programmes for the implementation of penal mediation. Drug abuse control is a matter of public policy in Greece. Since the 80s, the most serious effort to develop a planned policy of social crime prevention was the institution of Organisation Against Drugs (in Greek, O.K.A.NA.) under the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity. OKANA implemented the nationwide network of 71 Prevention Centres, which collaborate with local authorities, the Ministry of Education, as well as other governmental and non-governmental drug-specialised or health services (such as ‘KETHEA’, ‘18 Ano’, Public Psychiatric Hospitals’ clinics, etc.). Drug use and addiction prevention polices are not specifically directed towards crime prevention. The treatment programmes for prisoners, drug users, and ex-prisoners, the financial support of prisoners after release, care for juvenile prisoners and the organisation of special educational programmes, etc. 9 In particular, a framework has been legislated for the child, motherhood and family protection (l. 3655/2008, l. 3719/2008, 3727/2008) for the protection and support of victims of violence in the context of combating discrimination, and in particular, family violence (l. 3500/2006) ratification and implementation of the protocol for child rights related to child trafficking and child pornography (l.3625/2007, l. 3727/2008).

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dominance of the medical model in the prevention of drug use contributed to the focus on police prevention, to the control of drug demand and to the reduction of drug addiction, by interventions among those of the population at risk or the population in general (Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity, 2008). However, this was also the prevalent policy at an international level for years. The development of healthcare and therapeutic programmes for active drug addicts is at the core of these policies. It should be noted that social prevention is also developed by interventions in schools and public awareness campaigns. As well as other significant interventions, the development of personal and social skills and the knowledge and changing attitudes towards drugs, constitute important parts of the programmes rolled out in secondary education (http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/country-overviews/ el#prev). Interventions regarding the supply of drugs and the retail markets for illegal drugs are under the jurisdiction of the police. Crime prevention has been developed as victim protection rather than as ‘neutralisation of offenders and their motives.’ As is evident from the above description, the victim support policy, even if it constitutes a really positive feature in public policies, aims at reducing the effects of victimisation. Therefore, the infiltration of developments in illegal crime markets is not hindered by these strategies. A very recent initiative of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, also concerns the institution of the Central Scientific Council for Prevention and Coping to Criminality and Victimisation (called KESATHEA-in Greek), a social prevention agency, whose role is to prevent juvenile delinquency and research victimisation, policy plans and proposals and preventative initiatives and projects (l. 3680/2010). The results from its function cannot yet be evaluated. At a municipal level, social crime prevention development was firstly linked to the aforementioned community’s involvement in crime prevention. In that context, Crime Prevention Local Councils (CPLC) were set up. These were composed of exponents of local communities at municipal level. The idea was that local communities and municipal authorities would participate in the development of crime policy plans and in public awareness. Despite the fact that their involvement in local crime policies remained largely theoretical, they were mainly encouraged to organise conferences targeting

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citizens’ awareness. The CPLC are operating in the context of municipal administration. Despite the fact that 53 CPLCs have been actually instituted in various city councils in Greece, their impact on crime prevention remains unknown. Their development depends on the specific development conditions of the local community, on social or particular political groups or other people’s involvement, governmental changes (and crime policy changes). The aforementioned councils were not supported by municipal authorities, and later on their function was actually underestimated and devaluated (Vidali, 2011b). Their impact on crime prevention is as yet unexplored and rather marginal. The absence of a rational plan on crime prevention, which should go beyond police operational raids, even at a municipal level in Greece, determined the future of these Councils. During the period 2004-2009, the CPLC’s name changed in order to include not only crime prevention but deviance prevention. During the same period, the development of Municipal Police took place (instituted by l. 2503/1997), which enforced crime control. Apart from crime control, municipal level policies concerning poor, as well as homeless people were developed in Athens (mentioned as an example because Athens constitutes a Metropolitan Municipality and over 35  % of the total population lives permanently in the region). These policies are mentioned here because even if there is no causal link between crime, poverty and homeless people, all of them are actually living below poverty limits; they are exposed to different social harms, between groups (e.g. conflicts between homeless and drug addicts) and within groups (e.g. conflicts within homeless people’s groups) and victimisation. They are also exposed to petty criminality because of their precarious living conditions. However, the most important point is that this group of people is increasing rapidly in Greece (by around 20  000) and now consists (in Athens) by people who are characterised by psychic diseases (which officially include: alcoholism, gambling, drug addiction), lack of housing, and those on very low or no income. Another group is made up of immigrants who have lost their jobs and are unemployed and without any home for a long period of time (over six months) and a third group consists of people who remain homeless because of the economic crisis (Klimaka, 2011). In the Municipality of Athens, the ‘Centre of Reception and Solidarity of the City of Athens’ (in Greek K.Y.A.D.A.) was founded in 1999 (PD 289/1999; PD 25/2010). K.Y.A.D.A. develops activities addressed to actual everyday problem solving, regarding homeless people or families. In particular, it

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collects and distributes first aid (including food), manages three host hostels, a Social Grocery, and a Social Pharmacy (2009) which aims to provide primary health-care, medicines and pharmaceuticals to people living below the poverty line. It also runs the ‘Athenian Agora’ (operating since 2009) which provides clothing, shoes, appliances and utensils etc. to poor destitute families, large families, and single parents with minors or adult children and lonely people. In conclusion to this section, it should be noted that behind the different types of difficulties for the development of social crime prevention, such as the traditional crime policies, and legal culture, (Knepper, 2007: 140), social crime prevention initiatives in Greece were undermined by the securitarian turn of crime policies, which framed the recent phase of market society expansion.

6.1. The securitarian turn and the dislocation of social crime prevention The proposals of situational crime prevention (Clark, 1997: 2-43) applied in Greece were limited, almost exclusively, to problem-oriented policing, in the form of police interventions, controls, stop and search and abusive policing against immigrants, young people, students, drug addicts etc. Therefore, the social dimensions of such a model (e.g. environmental design) were not promoted and only its securitarian aspects were developed. Ill treatment, police brutality and degrading treatment, formal and informal controls primacy, coerciveness and intolerance especially towards immigrants, and racist policing against the poor and ‘dangerous’ groups became constant attitudes of the police forces (NCHR, 2007, 2010; Greek Ombudsman, 2004, 2009; MCCA, 2008). Prevention concepts became focused on effectiveness, aimed at coercively controlling particular, yet always the same, groups of people and types of criminality. Policies related to the social integration of immigrants and the settlements of illegal immigrants could also be characterised as extremely problematic (CPT, 2011). It is asserted, from many parts of society, that these policies – mostly repressive, exclusionary and contradictory to human rights – are increasing rather than preventing crime. Typical of the state’s reaction to the increase in criminality rates has also been the legislative modernisation and authoritarian turn of criminal justice (Manoledakis, 2010).

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7. Problematising Social Crime Prevention Reflecting on actual contemporary crime problems, one could claim that the very concept of social crime prevention should be magnified and redefined. It should be deconstructed, reconstructed and put under problematisation.

7.1 Crime prevention and social crime prevention: what about the powerful? Prevention programmes are directed by ‘tradition’ to certain population groups such as young people, old people, women and children and even towards whole areas of urban spaces. Social crime prevention is on the same course: the objects of prevention are groups of people with no full rights (such as adolescents, illegal immigrants etc) or those in crisis because of their social status. They are people who are socially excluded or in the course of being excluded from civil society. Most of them are officially and legally not included either in the production process or the labour force. Reconsidering the relevant literature and research on prevention and social crime prevention policies, one could easily assume that there are projects directed towards interventions for certain types of criminality. They are related to offenders and victims according to classifications of age, sex or social status. They are targeted to certain types of crimes, mostly to ordinary forms of crimes, such as property, violent crimes, street crimes and conventional forms of low level economic crimes etc (Walklate, 2001: 307). According to police classification lists, the most dangerous crimes are identified within the above types of crimes, in which the fear of crime is also associated. The whole discourse on crime prevention and social crime prevention is restricted to the aforementioned types of crimes. Even the discourse on corruption and organised crime is often restricted to underworld features, and of course to personal attitudes. Therefore, the public discourse on criminality, crime causation, prevention, community safety and the connected topics of threat assessment and risk management are also focused on these types of crimes. The concept of social crime prevention is almost exclusively focused on crimes committed by lower social class males, young people, drug addicts and beggars, mostly committed on the streets or in public places and open urban areas. In addition, the very concept of threat is related to specific,

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mainly violent crimes. Social crime prevention is regularly connected to individual dispositions and motivations, social and environmental conditions, and community processes of control. Questions related to the development of possible social crime prevention policies regarding other types of criminality, beyond conventional crimes, are mostly excluded from the relevant discourses, especially from those concerning community safety. Therefore, white-collar crimes, corporate crimes and state crimes are excluded from ordinary crime prevention discourses and prevention projects. Walklate comments on ‘crimes of the streets’, ‘crimes of the suites’, and ‘crimes behind closed doors’, in order to criticise the simplistic approach of ‘what works?’ Hughes also adds state crimes in the distinctions that should be taken into consideration (Walklate, 2001: 307; Hughes, 1998: 13). As he explains, the exclusion of such crimes (he cites business crimes) from preventative agendas, is related to USA and UK prevention policies, “targeted primarily at predatory street crimes, rather than the full gamut of crimes and social harms in society”.

7.2 The social landscape of social crime prevention application: the ‘community’ Usually the concept of community is taken for granted, without any further reflection or problematisation (see critics, Walklate, 2001: 336; Hughes, 2007: 12-14, 25; Crawford, 2007: 887). Nevertheless, social integration and the social inclusion process poses questions regarding the limits of ‘community’: the social status of people, the recognition of their civil, social and political rights, assurance and access to social protection and opportunities of participation to the labour market are, among other things, the factors that determine the limits of community. Notwithstanding, in contemporary European societies, and particularly in Greece, behind the increasing numbers of socially excluded people (illegal immigrants, undocumented migrants, the unemployed, young people, homeless people) there are groups of people who are not in a position to claim or protect their rights, or solve their problems beyond the legal system order (Vidali, 2007b), such as illegal and unofficial labourers, victims of illegal migration and trafficking, gypsies, young, old age pensioners, etc. All these groups, the number of which is continually increasing, are not participating in either the various aspects of community life, or in solving

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problems within the community (see also Hughes, 2007: 65). They are citizens ‘under pre-conditions’; the social protection and legal system is not ‘expanded’ towards them (Vidali, 2007b). At the same time, the number of citizens who have the right to, but choose not to, either participate in civil and political society or to exercise their own rights, is increasing. There are also some other groups of people well known to criminologists, who function beyond the law, and are included in the so-called ‘underworld’. Taking into account ‘... that relations of exploitation and intimidation between different categories of criminal actors become more important than relations between criminals and the public ...’ (Lea, 1999: 320) the ‘omerta’ strategies used on these situations can be understandable. Accordingly, there is a growing grey zone of social spaces in Greece, in which the population is living according to rules formed ‘de facto’ out of the ideal of community and often outside any legal rule that could protect it (criminals, underclass, drug addicts, victims of trafficking, unofficial labourers, etc). From this point of view, while ‘civil’ community deteriorates, a whole world that by ‘nature’ could not be included either within social or community prevention ideas or within any type of crime prevention policy, is increasing, for the simple reason that law does not ‘reach’ there.

7.3 Economic crisis, social tensions and crime prevention Therefore in Greece, the effort to deal with the social causes of crime actually concerns a rhetorical and academic issue. Additionally, any discourse on social crime prevention in Greece should take into consideration the effects of the economic crisis, the collapse of the Greek economy, and its specific causal nexus to white-collar crime and to state corporate crime. Regarding ‘economic crisis management’, it seems quite certain that the politics of austerity will disintegrate further any perspective of social crime prevention policy in the coming years. Specifically, the contract related to the supervision of the Greek fiscal system by the IMF and EU is framed by plans and measures concerning extended privatisations of public services in healthcare, education, public transport, telecommunications and energy production, and public sector employment reduction. To give an example, the first wave of measures was introduced in 2010: the tax system reform, the restructuring of the public sector wages system, and relative reforms in employment rights in the private sector were legislated. Up to now, these reforms resulted in a cut in yearly salaries (equivalent to 1 or 2 months’ wages), plus monthly salary cuts for employees in the public sector, cuts in wages in the private sector and

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massive institutionalisation of flexible labour work, further monthly pension cuts, etc. (l. 3845/2010). According to the Labour Force Survey (Hellenic Statistical Authority (GSA), 2011) the unemployment rate in Greece for the first trimester of 2011 was 15.9 % (in 2010 it was 11.7 %), while the number of unemployed people rose 35.1  % compared to the rate during the same months in 2010. Unemployment rates for young people from 15-29 years of age have risen to 30.9 %.10 Unemployment figures are more than 792 601 and the long-term unemployed are at 46.6 %, while recession is at 3.9. Thus, the economic restructuring programme is now further disintegrating the labour market in the public and private sectors, professional employment in care services, and in the general trade and consumer market (Living in Greece, 2010).

7.4 A new target group for social crime prevention In this context, crime prevention shifts to crime and social disease control through street and riot policing, which increasingly becomes more abusive and violent towards immigrants and rioters; the latter are not only students or the exponents of extra-parliamentary groups, but also middle class professionals who have lost their jobs, unemployed and often high skilled young people, etc. Accordingly, the ‘conventional’ target groups of crime prevention and social crime prevention are growing, however, without it being possible to develop an effective policy related to intervention on the causes of crime. Therefore, if the free market economy and market society have disarticulated public policies in regard to community and crime prevention, by privatising them, it seems that the economic crisis has destroyed, in general, any possibility of prevention, interventions before crimes are committed, or deterrence. However, this is just one aspect of the prevention issue. The other is that which regards white-collar and state corporate crimes as crimes committed by the powerful. Even if they had been confirmed as some of the principal causes of the withdrawal of public wealth in Greece, the governmental reactions are limited to the reorganisation of the fiscal control system and the expansion of the jurisdiction of penal law. Any attempt to sanction responsibilities to political and government exponents through the successive parliamentary committees’ constitution has largely failed, blocking further penal justice inquiries. Moreover, even in cases of criminal justice intervention in similar types of affairs, the results 10 Euro stat [online] Unemployment statistics.

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were poor and limited to crucial but low level parts of these criminal, state corporate networks. Therefore, the causes and effects of the Greek crisis, as well as the causes, effects and development of the world economic crisis lay before us a ‘new’ consideration; that at least our societies and the late modern social order are ‘at risk’, not because of ordinary criminality, but because of the crimes of the powerful; and while ordinary criminality is associated with ‘fears’ and a breakdown in social relations, such crimes of the powerful are associated with something more: with violent social rearrangements, similar to war in regard to their effects on public fears and ontological insecurities. From this point of view, the present crisis obliges us to reconsider the range of crime prevention concepts; especially the discourse about social groups, which should reconsider the primary concerns of crime prevention. Furthermore, the types of crimes that crime prevention includes should be reviewed, either through the so-called ‘risk assessment’ perspective or through the theories of crime prevention and social crime prevention.

8. Conclusions Community and social crime prevention in Greece seems to be a rhetorical scheme, despite the limited efforts in the past years to develop it. The social and political differences which determined the Greek version of capitalism blocked any real participation from communities in tackling crime prevention and the development of wider social policies. Any attempt was fragmented and short term. Critical at this level was the role of the oftenmentioned extra-institutional social networks, the future of which, in the course of crisis, is as yet unclear. Nevertheless, from our analysis it is evident that the discourse on ideological and cultural presupposition for the implementation of social crime prevention policies should be reconsidered. In particular, there should be elaboration regarding the effects of the world economic crisis in the deregulation of social crime prevention models (where they still exist), the relationship between social structures and crime in the context of financial economy, and the main social subjects of crime prevention. Social crime prevention should be reconsidered beyond explanations of personal criminal motives to crime, in regards to young people, the poor, women etc. It is important to elaborate on understandings about how social structure is linked to the virtual-casino-economy and the social impact of this link.

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A social crime prevention policy, in order to be reproduced and secured, should analyse the impact of privatisations on social solidarity, social relations and social care, the control of social inequalities and wealth redistribution. It should survey all forms of crimes, including those of the ruling classes and groups of power crimes and deviances. The global and local (national) effects of the world economic crisis, in combination with the Greek debt and the effects of the deficit crisis on social lives in Greece, lead us to reconsider the critical and conflicting ‘classics’ of criminology schools’, and to explore further the interaction and co-existence between the law and crimes of the powerful (Chambliss, 2004: 243) – organised crime, white collar crime, state and state corporate crimes – and from this point of view, to conduct research on a theoretical scheme of communicating vessels relationship, that seems to be formed between the ‘war on crimes’, ‘zero tolerance’ politics and increased tolerance towards various types of crimes of the powerful. Furthermore, it is necessary to reflect upon an eventual development of theory and policy on the prevention of criminality for the ruling classes. Any effort to prevent these types of crimes (crimes of the powerful) should not be limited by high sophisticated technical resolution of issues, but should be considered as an issue of high socio-political value, orientated to deconstruct the prevailing attitude of considering these crimes a priori as a ‘bad apple’ in a barrel full of good ones. Also, it is of great significance that the structural conditions that favour these crimes, which are rarely taken into consideration by mainstream theorists and even less by policy makers, should be analysed and researched (especially on the consecutive effects of these processes). J. Lea referred to ‘... Not only legal activities come to depend on illegal ones, but exclusion from legal capitalist relations forces the poor into the hands of the unregulated financial institutions ... where they became prey to the criminal financial sector ...’ (Lea, 1999: 321) Therefore, it is important, that the legal technicist contradiction of ruling these types of crimes as civil and not penal cases, is resolved, and a systematic discussion about their impact on the rates of so-called common crimes, and their effect as specific amplifiers of crime needs to be developed. At the end of the day, the actual social cost of these types of crimes and their impact on social inequalities and poverty is the thing that increases. It is to be expected that the relationship between the subcultures of the powerful and the subcultures of crime will be critical considering the Greek

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case, if crime is also a question of subculture or lived experience. The crimes of the powerful and state crimes need to be studied from the point of view of the criminal cultures of power; cultures which relate to the market society, as Currie determines it, ‘as a form of civilianisation’ (Currie, 1997: 151-152). Furthermore, there is strong need for a new discourse about power relations to begin in the context of the current financial economy. Last, but not least, a crime prevention model, which could be really social, should focus on structural, extra penal and extrajudicial factors of increased criminality, such as (see also Currie, 1996) changes in the ideology of the ruling and labour classes, etc. Actually, the economic crisis draws a new line between past and present, on which we must reflect further. The present is a new, different and somewhat unpleasant world to be explored, in all likelihood using new points of view, concepts and research tools (that are still to be discovered), since the crisis seems to have defined the end of late modernity.

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‘Grandpa’s Fashion in the New Year’ – Innovative Theoretical Thoughts vs. Simplistic Crime Prevention Practices in Hungary Klára Kerezsi

Introduction This chapter outlines the situation in Hungary, in order to explore the mutual impacts of the problem of crime and a number of other issues, such as poverty, racial discrimination and the future of younger generations. These problems relate to human safety, human rights and the sustainability of the transition process. The Hungarian situation can be described as one that has been in constant flux and social turbulence over the past two decades. After 1989, it seemed for a while that everybody (at least the majority) would benefit from the political changes. Instead, the transition had at least three types of consequences: (1) totally unexpected effects, (2) actions expected to influence progress for a shorter period, and (3) forces expected to be positive but which instead had negative consequences. The ‘waiting for a miracle’ effect was a general attitude of the public towards the promise of the years ahead. People were enthusiastic about the possibility of a new beginning. They desired a new moral system, political freedom and a market economy that would solve the inconveniences of the previous ‘shortage economy’, without the disadvantages of an unrestricted market. They cherished the hope that the responsibilities of the ‘premature welfare state’ would remain untouched. But this seemed to be an illusion. No one could have predicted the ‘human costs’ of this process. Nobody warned the public that the transitional period would have ‘nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat’1 at first. It would 1 On May 13 1940, Churchill warned the House of Commons and the nation: ‘I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat.’ 181

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bring social problems, unemployment, rising crime rates, increasing social inequality, etc. Most people in Hungary lost their welfare safety net (a core value of the socialist system), without gaining the benefits of the capitalist system. According to the officially registered data, in 2003, 3  % of Hungary’s population was affected by crime. According to the victim survey (N=10,020) carried out by the National Institute of Criminology in the same year, as many as 12  % of the adult population became victims of crime in 2002, but only half of them reported the crime to the police (Barabás, 2004). The victimisation rate shows a higher territorial concentration.2 Urban citizens in Hungary become victims, with a 25-30  % higher probability than the inhabitants of other regions.3 One half of the Hungarian population lives in an urban environment, but three quarters of reported crimes are committed in cities. In 1988, 32-33 % of Hungarian citizens lived in areas where 45 % of reported crimes were committed. The lack of security also played its part, in that by 2001, the population of these areas decreased by 2-3  %, and it is now a mere 30 % of the population that lives in the settlements that are strongly affected by criminality (Erdősi, 2002). The quality of the lives of urban citizens is affected not only by crime rates, but also by violations of the law and unsettled legal issues experienced in public areas, such as graffiti, prohibited or unlicensed trading, infringements relating to the cleanliness of public places, begging, the appearance of homeless people in the streets, and the disintegration of traffic rules. 26.9 % of the inhabitants of Budapest cited the environment spoilt by litter, 18.8 % the poor quality of public roads, and 16 % a lack of public safety, as the most disturbing factors of urban life. The security of urban living is also adversely affected by long-term urban unemployment, child poverty in cities, social exclusion, and the permanent compulsion to consume. Thus, the security of modern cities is not confined to the threats caused by crime. Loneliness, health concerns, the tension arising from the lack of a secure livelihood, and fear of crime, are mental processes that mutually strengthen one another. The lack of security and anxiety are, in turn, complex socio-psychological problems. 2 According to United Kingdom police data, two thirds of reported robberies occurred in 10 % of areas, but 22 % of the population lives in these communities. See: Smith & Allen (2004). 3 Crawford mentions a similar peculiarity: “More than half of all the crimes committed against property, and more than one third of the victims of all the crimes committed against property are probably located in one fift h of the communities of England and Wales” (Crawford, 1999).

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Historical Overview In Hungary, a professional and political environment that clearly supported the idea of systematic crime prevention had emerged by the 1980s.4 The internal crisis of socialism, rising crime rates and changes to the structure of criminality strengthened the recognition of criminology as a discipline, transformed the approach to criminology and expanded the scope of its research (Lévay, 2006). At this time, confrontation with the deficiencies in society, and the needs of the population arising from these at a political level had become inevitable. In the mid-1980s, the findings of the research conducted within the framework of the Main Research Course of Social Integration Problems at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences made it clear that the various forms of deviant behaviour arise from similar social and domestic problems. These research findings also signalled some new types of deviance that had appeared and exposed the deficiencies of the handling system. By the late 1980s, as a result of the findings of Hungarian criminological research, the view became accepted that crime control can only be operated as a complex system, and that crime prevention is a multilayered and complex social task that goes beyond the scope of criminal law. Although crime had noticeably increased since the early Eighties, the boom that took place in the early 1990s still found society and the criminal justice system unprepared for it. In the years that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the change in the political regime, those who tried to shape criminal policy found themselves facing a double challenge: (1) the growth of crime was coupled with a decreased feeling of security within communities, and (2) the liberalisation of the institutions of criminal law was progressing in parallel. The latter, for instance, meant the elimination of such legal institutions as the death penalty or close confinement. Those institutions set up to prevent crime in the early years after the change in the political system, proved to be weak in their handling of crime related problems. This also explains the inconsistencies in criminal policy and more precisely, those in the goals and tools of prevention in the two decades that have passed since the end of socialism (Borbíró, 2011). Several researchers (Kerezsi, 2009; Lévay, 2009; Domokos, 2008; Kerezsi, 2010) have pointed out that ever since the Berlin Wall came down, the individual phases and turning points of 4 In the historical overview of the Hungarian crime prevention system, I used chapter 6 of Andrea Borbíró’s doctoral thesis entitled ‘Criminal Policy and Crime Prevention in Late Modernity’ (2011).

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criminal policy have been strongly tied to government cycles. This indicates that in the past twenty years, no long-term, coherent and conceptual approach that overarches the individual cycles could be enforced in criminal policy, although this would have been badly needed in the post-socialist institutional and social transformation (Borbíró, 2011). The processes of the Eighties, during which several proposals aimed at the prevention-oriented transformation of crime control were made, were interrupted by the change in the political regime, so the idea of a complex crime prevention system was taken off the agenda after 1989, up until the mid-nineties. ‘Which is better – to pay the policeman or the schoolmaster – prison or school?’ The question is as relevant to crime prevention policy today as it was more than a hundred years ago (Collins, 1994). The Hungarian governments have given different answers to this question over the past 20 years. The first freely elected government (1990-1994), a Conservative one, followed a rational and humane criminal justice policy at a time of increasing crime rates, but did not focus on crime prevention issues. Paragraph (1), Section 8 of the Local Government Act assigned the performance of local public security tasks to local government, but failed to explain how these tasks should be performed and provided no financial support for the acquisition of the necessary physical assets. Thus, the police came to be the primary players in crime prevention; indeed they had already been active in the area of crime prevention before the shift in the political regime. However, no comprehensive concept was evolved for the clarification of crime prevention tasks delegated to the police. Chapter III of the Police Act contains lengthy paragraphs on the relationship between city councils and the police, but in fact, independent local authorities have only had a very slight impact on the activities of the police. Crime prevention and public security committees could be set up to perform the local tasks related to public security, but in several areas of the country, these forums were not established (Nyíri, 2000). Over the past two decades, the relationship between councils and the police has been very one-sided, and this lack of connection has been caused by a lack of police resources. Councils provided financial support to local police headquarters by procuring motor vehicles and IT devices for them, by contributing to the bonuses given to the police and by creating financial conditions for the employment of police staff on leave, but besides giving the message of ‘more police to the streets’, they could not formulate their needs, i.e. what kind of ‘extra services’ they would need, or what forms

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of co-operation they would suggest establishing in order to enhance the security of local communities. In the years that followed 1989, the citizens responded to the deficiencies of the state’s security institutions by organising civilian self-defence movements. The most significant of these was the civil guard movement, which, in a few years, became a critical player in the Hungarian crime prevention system, along with the Neighbours for Each Other Campaign (Hungarian acronym: SZEM), which was organised based on the example of the Neighbourhood Watch programmes. Supported by the German Weisser Ring, the first NGO involved in victim support, the White Ring Association, came into existence in 1990. In the early Nineties, the number of security companies also grew significantly, which meant considerable market resources flowing into the crime prevention system. The first turning point in the institutionalisation of the multi-layered crime prevention system was represented by the activities of the Socialist-Liberal coalition government (1994-1998). In 1995, the National Crime Prevention Board (OBmT)5 was established as the government’s professional organ for crime prevention, by which the government declared its commitment towards a long-term, complex crime prevention strategy. They went no further than this declaration, as they failed to make any financial resources available to OBmT. It was thanks to the joint efforts of OBmT and the National Institute of Criminology (OKRI) that the first coherent Hungarian crime prevention programme of the post-socialist era was prepared in 1997 (National Crime Prevention Programme, OBP).6 The preparation of the OBP involved significant scientific effort, but the utilisation of the proposals was not even mentioned. The programme delegated crime prevention tasks to national and local governments, and it did not regard the implementation of prevention as only the responsibility of the police. The OBP thought that criminal policy was primarily responsible for the implementation of crime prevention, and it did not clearly distinguish between the criminal policy and social policy aspects of crime prevention. This made it difficult to work out what tools should be used to realise individual goals, or at which points the two areas were connected. Emphasising the principle of co-operation and the requirement of harmonised strategic planning, 5 Government decree No. 1040/1995 (V. 17.) 6 http://bunmegelozes.bm.hu/data/hatteranyagok/orszagos_bunmegelozesi_program. doc

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the strong involvement of local authorities, the definition of key crime prevention target groups, as well as an increased stress on socio-political considerations, were already signs of the state’s intention to actively and systematically take part in crime prevention, says Andrea Borbíró (2011). 1998 saw a shift in criminal policy. This was the first election year in which public security became a key issue (Kerezsi, 2010). The winning Conservative Party’s rhetoric of ‘law and order’ was clearly reflected both in its new priorities of criminal policy and of crime prevention. According to the ideas of the central right government (1998-2002), a ‘get tough’ criminal policy could adequately replace crime prevention policy. The election promises of ‘law and order’ were followed by the legal introduction of a definitive life sentence, the concept of ‘visible police’ and a prison-building programme. The responsibilities of OBmT were transformed, and some new priorities such as victim support, drug prevention and combating corruption were included. Thus, from 1999 onwards, the state became actively involved in victim support, a task that had previously almost exclusively been performed in an NGO form. Based on all this, by the end of the millennium, a rather contradictory view of crime prevention had evolved. Whether local governments should take on the role of performing local public security tasks was still an unsettled issue, and local governments continued to lack the necessary physical and professional support. The majority of the 1997 OBP proposals remained on paper, thus the development of an efficient institutional system of crime prevention did not become a political priority. The establishment of a victim support system was undoubtedly an important step but its direct impact in the area of crime prevention was not tangible (Borbíró, 2011). In 2002, when the Socialist-Liberal government won the election again (2002-2006 and 2006-2010), it became obvious that the notion of social crime prevention could be part of crime control policy. The measures taken by the Socialist-Liberal coalition government were aimed at the enforcement of a so-called two-track criminal policy. In the area of crime prevention, this cycle brought about the independence of crime prevention policy and related to this, the reform of crime prevention institutions, especially of those criminal justice ‘satellite’ organs (e.g. probation service, victim support, etc.) that are especially relevant to prevention. The development of the reform was supported by the targeted improvement and utilisation of criminological knowledge: in 2002, Hungary’s crime map was prepared by the Ministry of

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the Interior, while in 2003, the first nationwide research into victimology and citizens’ attitudes was conducted, under the leadership of the National Institute of Criminology (Irk, 2004). For the first time since the beginning of the transition, criminal policy showed an interest in ‘good old-fashioned’ crime. In 2003, a National Strategy for Social Crime Prevention was prepared. Government decree No. 1002/2003 (I. 8.) appointed the National Crime Prevention Council (OBmB) as the legal successor of OBmT. The permanent membership of the Council was increased to 19 and it consisted of a total 30 people, including members invited by the government (representatives of scholarly domains, experts, etc.). The current conservative government does not pay too much attention to social crime prevention. Their attitude towards the usefulness of social crime prevention has completely changed: tertiary crime prevention is now the core of crime prevention, and the primary focus is on deterrence. In 2010, the system of crime prevention was reorganised again. OBmB was succeeded by the National Crime Prevention Board, whose activities were built on the mid-level managers at the Ministry (18 people). However, civil guards and NGOs operating in the area of victim support are also free to appoint board members. The repeated change in Hungarian criminal policy has a number of visible signs. In August 2010, the package of measures related to public security (Act LXXXVI of 2010) extended the scope of infringements punishable by confinement and allowed the confinement of juveniles. The justification of this law makes it clear that the measures are aimed at meeting the assumed expectations of the population. However, the fact is that this increased rigour is justified neither by the current criminal situation, nor by the expected legal application and criminological impacts of these aggravations. The number of reported crimes and particularly the number of violent crimes affecting the ‘three strikes’ target group have considerably decreased since the early 2000s (Borbíró, 2009; Hack, 2010). In April 2011, the government eliminated the National Crime Prevention Board and established the National Crime Prevention Council. Since the government decree also plans the approval of a new crime prevention strategy, a new concept will shortly replace the 2003 National Strategy for Social Crime Prevention. Exactly which form this will take remains to be seen, thus we do not yet know which crime prevention priorities and which forms of intervention the new strategy will emphasise.

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Criminal Policy and Crime Prevention in the Post-Socialist Societies Apart from economic, historical and cultural characteristics, Borbíró suggests we consider two key points when evaluating modern-day crime prevention priorities: (1) ‘the interrupted nature of the political and professional discussion of criminality and its control, and (2) the unique pattern of citizens’ attitudes which has characterised post-socialist societies, especially Hungary after 1989’ (Borbíró, 2011). After the Second World War, objective scientific research into social processes was hindered in the socialist bloc countries, including Hungary. The ideological approach to the discussion of social problems, including criminality, resulted in the interruption of political and professional discussions. Socialist societies regarded crime as a remnant of earlier capitalistic conditions, which could exclusively be put down to reasons arising from the individual’s character, the first of which was the absence of social responsibility, which would thus disappear as ideological knowledge grows (Korinek, 2006). The view of crime automatically disappearing as the new social order is established made it unnecessary for the political powers to deal with the characteristic features and correlations of criminality and to develop the institutions that would affect the evolution of criminality (Borbíró, 2011). From the 1960s, ‘the ice started to melt’ and a scientific approach started to replace the ideological interpretation of crime. As one of the signs of this tendency, the system of criminal statistics was developed that is still used to this day (Vavró, 1976). This period of Hungarian criminology was characterised by the dominance of research into the so-called specific level, i.e. oriented towards a certain type of crime or group of perpetrators (Lévay, 2006). Post-socialist societies were thus torn away from the development course, and professional discussions in Western European countries were confronted with the phenomenon of abruptly increasing crime rates without any transition, at the time of the change in the political system. In the welfare states, the discussions on handling crime, and the organic experience gained as crime rates gradually grew, encouraged the development of an ambivalent attitude towards criminal activities and the management of perpetrators. Hungary was naturally left out of these professional disputes, which analysed the correlation between the welfare state and criminal activities, and both politicians and citizens felt helpless in the face of a sharp rise in

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criminal activity. In Borbíró’s interpretation, this also explains ‘why the contents and approaches were often not transformed hand in hand with the democratic transformation of the institutions destined to handle social tensions’ (Borbíró, 2011). The correlations relating to the Central-Eastern European processes of criminal policy and crime prevention are influenced by the unique structure of attitudes which are characterised by 1) anxiety and a lack of security, 2) contradictory values related to responsibility, and 3) a low level of trust in institutions (Fleck, 2008). The presence of this special post-socialist value pattern is also evidenced by the findings of the World Value Survey (WVS). The societies of the Eastern European region are characterised by ‘strong anti-market and anti-competition sentiments, paternalistic adjustment, and anti-state attitudes’.7 All this has been coupled with increasing scepticism about democracy from the nineties onwards (Borbíró, 2011). The support of democracy has considerably decreased in the countries of the region since the shift in the political regime. In Hungary today, for example, only just over half the population regards the introduction of the multi-party system as a positive change, as compared to 74 % in 1991 (Fleck, 2010). The rate of general and institutional confidence is noticeable in the post-socialist countries: with regard to institutional confidence, the countries with the lowest scores all come from the ex-socialist bloc. Hungary is known for an especially low level of trust in institutions, even within the bloc (Tóth, 2009).

European Features of Crime Prevention The two main values of the European social model are solidarity and social cohesion; the quality of a society is measured by the extent to which its citizens are able to take part in the social and economic lives of their respective communities, with conditions that improve their well-being and individual opportunities (Ferge, 2002). According to the findings of the surveys, EU citizens probably agree that criminal activities performed by citizens under legal age can be explained by some social or other kind of deprivation: three out of four agree that juvenile crime is the result of poverty and unemployment (81 %) and fewer crimes would be committed if young people were more strongly disciplined (78 %). Two out of three (67 %) respondents agree that better education may deter youngsters from criminal

7 Medián’s late 2010 survey is quoted by Borbíró (2011)

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activities.8 The research conducted by Ulla Bondeson indicates that even in the Scandinavian states, which are the most developed countries from the aspect of welfare supply, almost half of the population thinks that the gap between the social classes is too wide (Bondeson, 2003). Based on the above, we may conclude that a European attitude that rejects extreme social inequalities, and is supportive of the losers in society, can be classified as a European value that is still valid today.9 What we regard as right and worth preserving in the region can be described by using the value-filled concept of being “European”’: qualities such as sensitivity, the acknowledgement of human rights and the ‘ultima ratio’ type of criminal law, which not only excludes autocracy, but also sets limits for itself (Bárd, 2003: 4). It is these humanist traditions that shape the frames of interpretation within which European countries’ criminal policies evolve. The value density of the concept of being ‘European’ is also strongly apparent in other areas of social policy. The welfare systems that evolved in Europe after the Second World War provided the primary tool for the integration of citizens. These systems also reached out to those who were in marginal situations and ensured at least the minimum economic conditions for ‘social membership’. Social integration meant secure employment and provided opportunities for integration into a culturally (more) homogenous local community. This approach was not questioned until the late 1980s and early 1990s but since then, there is the increasingly common view that the welfare state creates a culture of dependence on supplies. Despite this, the majority of the citizens does not favour the breaking down of the welfare state. Ferge says that ‘however many reforms are in progress, some of which are necessary and some of which are forced by vested interests, protection of welfare achievements as a whole has been successful, for the time being’ (Ferge, 2002). At European Union level, the increase in employment, the fight against exclusion, as well as the strengthening of social cohesion, have become accepted central goals. It may of course be brought up as a counter-argument that present-day discussions of social acceptance refer to acceptance into a world that is disappearing at an ever-faster pace. It is indisputable that the past few decades have seen a change in the European world as well: the opportunities for employment have decreased, the structure of the family, along with the nature of 8 Analysis of Public Attitudes to Insecurity, Fear of Crime and Crime Prevention. Results of Eurobarometer 58.0 (Autumn 2002), European Commission Directorate-General Press and Communication. Communication Media and Services, Opinion Polls, Press Reviews, Europe Direct. DG PRESS B/1/UTM D(2003) 9 See also: Junger-Tas (2002)

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local communities, has changed. I still believe that, for the time being, European local communities can be defined as communities ‘frightened’ of social changes rather than ones that are ‘intimidated’ and/or ‘fortress’ communities. This means that, when interpreting crime prevention, it should be taken into account that a socio-political change in paradigms is currently taking place in the world: the social policy of the 20th century modern welfare state is being/has been replaced by the neo-liberal social policy of the postmodern age. What happened was that by the 1980-1990s, the concept of the welfare state built on joint social responsibility, whose depositary is the state and where the social goal supported by state interventions is to reduce social inequalities, underwent a crisis. Along with this, the view of society that can be characterised by integration, cohesion and secure livelihoods, also faded (Ferge, 1996). Instead, the view of society represented by postmodern social policy tends towards the unlimited acceptance of inequalities, and individual responsibility takes the place of joint responsibility for the whole of social reproduction. Nonetheless, by the last decade of the twentieth century, it came to be accepted by experts and international organisations that the main characteristic of crime prevention concepts is a long-term, comprehensive strategic approach, which strongly relies on the co-operation of crime prevention players, the state and local democracy organisations, the participation of the civil sector, as well as the role played by communities, and last but not least, by citizens.10

The Concept of Social Crime Prevention The idea of community crime prevention may just as well be regarded as a philosophy (i.e. a way of thinking) and an organisational strategy (i.e. a way in which a philosophy is realised). As a philosophy, it relies on the assumption that citizens support crime prevention initiatives and if they are called upon to act, they will also be willing to take part in the process. It is built on the idea that proactive tools should be used to alleviate citizens’ concerns about criminal activity, instead of simply responding to a criminal 10 Borbíró, A. (s.d.). Crime Prevention, Social Crime Prevention Strategy and the Relevant International Requirements. Retrieved 15/07/2011 from http://bunmegelozes.bm.hu/ data/hatteranyagok/borbiro.pdf.

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act or committed crime. This way of thinking allows the enforcement of organisational strategy: the government, local authority, community, business and civil sectors can co-operate to prevent criminal activity, stop people from becoming criminals, solve the drug problem, remove fear of crime and reduce uncivilized forms of behaviour that disturb citizens (from graffiti to alcohol abuse): in short, they can improve the community’s quality of life. The practical enforcement of the way of thinking and organisational strategy described above is hindered by the decreased solidarity of society towards these groups in unfavourable situations. A Hungarian survey has indicated that 85 % of the respondents would favour tighter control on who receives state aid, and alcoholics and criminals are regarded as unworthy of these forms of support. (Mankó, 1999). Discrimination against the Roma population also appears in the attitudes of the authorities, although very little Hungarian data is available in relation to this. The Helsinki Committee examined discrimination by the police by looking at identity check practices. The research findings give a clear indication of police forces’ bias against the Roma population. According to the data, 22 % of the total identity checks affected the Romany, while Roma inhabitants make up a mere 6-8  % of the entire population. However, although the Romany were checked on more occasions, further measures against them were taken in the same proportion as against nonRoma citizens (e.g. detention took place in just 1  % of the cases) (Kádár, Körner, Moldova & Tóth, 2008). However, policemen still stopped and checked Roma citizens more frequently.

National Strategy for Social Crime Prevention The ‘two-pillar’ interpretation of crime control, one pillar being crime prevention, the other being criminal justice, was formulated in the National Strategy for Social Crime Prevention as late as 2003. Previous to this, the handling of the shock caused by the shift in political regimes, as well as the hectic events of the political transition, diverted attention from the definition of government tasks related to crime prevention. If the past twenty years are examined chronologically, we first encountered the definition of crime prevention in 1993. The researchers of the National Institute of Criminology prepared their discussion material entitled ‘Criminal Policy Concept’, with the open goal of starting a dispute on the various forms of crime management. There are two fundamental ways to

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fight crime, they said: one is the detection of crimes that have already been committed and calling perpetrators to account: the other is the disclosure of the factors that have contributed to the committing of the crimes and the creation of such social (economic, social, moral, etc.) conditions as may act against these factors (Finszter, Hajas, Irk, Kerezsi, Kiss & Márki, 1999). A few years later, the Government stipulated, in its government decree No. 1027/1998 (III. 13.) that the Hungarian Republic’s mid-term law enforcement and criminal policy concept should be prepared. In the wording of the document, ‘criminal policy is a part of crime prevention, especially of crime prevention policy. When the new system is established, the tools that may become feasible in the area of crime prevention, as well as those beyond the scope of criminal law, and even beyond the scope of law, should be taken into account as part of a system of uniform solidity.’ The National Strategy for Social Crime Prevention, approved in 2003, considered security as just such a ‘common property’ of the community, from which everybody is entitled to have their share. Social crime prevention was defined as a professional and grassroots movement with social involvement, built thanks to co-operation between the various players in society (central and local government organs, local community governments, NGOs, other non-profit and for-profit organisations, economic players, citizens and their communities, churches, etc.).11 The strategy12 regards social co-operation as the sum total of such measures or interventions, the goal of which is to reduce crime rates and to improve citizens’ feeling of security. The strategy enforced such a concept, by interpreting crime prevention as a part of social policy. This went beyond the boundaries of criminal policy and aimed at ‘the creation of a public security that improves quality of life, and reduces crime’ using a systemic approach. The strategy wished to achieve this goal by improving the security of society, integrating crime prevention into social policy, and developing partnership-type co-operation between the players in the prevention process. In order to realise this, a system of crime prevention was established, divided both horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, it was expected that the government would harmonise crime prevention policies from all different sectors and vertically, the joint

11 http://www.bunmegelozes.hu/index.html?pid=446 12 National Assembly decree No. 115/2003 (X.28.) on the National Strategy for Social Crime Prevention was adopted by the Hungarian Parliament on October 20th, 2003.

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participation of governmental, municipal, community and civilian players was expected. The strategy enforces a three pillared principle, i.e. it assigns roles to: (1) touching on the processes that generate the roots of criminal activity: (2) the prevention of victimisation, and: (3) the reduction of opportunities for criminal activity. The fundamental principles of the strategy are in line with international organisations’ crime prevention approach, primarily that of the Council of Europe. Fundamental rights, as well as social priorities (the prohibition of exclusion, the prohibition of discrimination, the protection of a system of guarantees) form the starting point for the crime prevention interventions defined in the strategy at any time. The strategy also adjusts to international trends, in that it interprets crime prevention as a complex, multi-pillar system in which elements both within and outside criminal justice operate in a complementary way. It gives equal weight to the moderation of the processes that generate the roots of crime and those that create opportunities for committing crime, the prevention of victimisation and the reduction of repeat crimes. Its tools primarily include the development of institutional and signalling systems, as well as proposals for specialised programmes. However, it also assigns a moderate role to punitive or obviously control-based techniques. OBMB, which was responsible for the social crime prevention strategy and the execution of its annual action plans, organised a professional roundtable on the uniform interpretation of the concept of social reintegration in October 2004.13 The experts agreed that social reintegration was a complex concept, the goal of which was to ensure that people who have been left out of the mainstream of society become fully-fledged members of their community again. Those who work in public healthcare emphasised that the two sides of social integration are that (1) system integration is of an ‘impersonal kind’ and (2) that personal, partner type social integration and socialisation is the basic mechanism of the latter. The problem is caused by the weakening of the integration power field at an individual or collective level, as well as by a decrease in the cohesion of integration. The experts that approached social reintegration from an employment angle stressed that labour market (re)integration means, from a social point of view, that the individual gets back into the labour market. This process can be 13 The interpretation of the concept of social re-integration. Online: http://www. bunmegelozes.hu

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promoted by providing employment and training support, labour market services and programmes. Sociologists pointed out that an inability to integrate is the result of a social situation in which the individual does not have sufficient (symbolic, material, or connection) capital to enable them to function acceptably in society (and, as the case may be, even by themselves). Reintegration was interpreted as the improvement of an unfavourable existential situation, which can be remedied by taking measures like changing social policy, creating opportunities, improving housing, entering employment and pursuing studies. Those involved in criminal execution listed all such activities and measures under the banner of social reintegration, which succeeds in either (1) reducing the psychological and existential damage caused by confinement, or (2) enabling individuals to live in a way acceptable to society after their release from confinement. Those who work in the area of drug treatment interpreted social reintegration as a concept that results in the reintegration of a ‘cured drug addict or one that is in the process of healing’ into society through their newly acquired, or existing but strengthened social skills and roles, as well as the gradual winning and confirmation of their ‘new’ social status (‘as a useful member of society’). Successful social integration, as has been underlined by these experts, does not only require individual, but also collective responsibility and role-playing. The Hungarian Strategy for Social Crime Prevention is ‘a good example of the process in which crime prevention is institutionalised as a system that is expanded both vertically and horizontally, and as a system that overarches a number of new areas of social life (Borbíró, 2011). However, the question always remains as to how this expanded intervention framework should be filled up by criminal policy, especially with regard to where it draws the line, or whether it draws a line at all, to define its own area of responsibility. The most valuable and internationally exemplary feature of the Hungarian strategy lies in this very characteristic’, says Borbíró (2011) and she continues ‘[T]he situation is that a strong, fundamental law approach gives clear priority to guaranteeing elements of both criminal justice and the broadest possible protection of liberties against the interests of crime prevention. The aspiration for social fairness is of similar significance […], as part of which the strategy identifies the potential threats of crime prevention interventions, such as stigmatisation, discrimination, exclusion and the risk of increasing prejudice, and she defines the aspiration to avoid these as the starting point of crime prevention at any time’ (Borbíró, 2011).

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Social Security as the Basis for a Feeling of Security The lack of a feeling of security and the vulnerability of social security are related symptoms. Although they may have no causal link to criminality, they are linked in other ways. In Hungary, it was the research conducted by Gönczöl that proved that the highest risk of deviance was within the social groups on the margins of society, but she also pointed out that the elements of a disadvantaged situation are not crime-generating factors in themselves. Poverty does not only mean a limited ability to satisfy fundamental needs, but is also a form of existence that conserves a lack of success and passes it down through several generations (Gönczöl, 1991). Ferge also found a close correlation between the number of perpetrators and the rate of unemployment, as well as the various indicators of being active (Ferge, 2000). Also examining the links between criminality and disadvantaged situations, Tauber concluded that the social structural features of being deprived, disadvantaged, or poor, in their sociological sense, make people more inclined to commit crimes, mostly against property. Based on the criminal statistical surveys conducted between 1989 and 2000, Tauber concluded that 50  % of the perpetrators have multiple disadvantages and they are in the lowest 10 % of the social hierarchy. He thinks that it is highly probable that a further 20-25 % of reported perpetrators also belong to the disadvantaged population close to the previous group (Tauber, 2000). Thus, Hungarian research findings confirm, from several different points of view, that the various dimensions of a disadvantaged situation may enhance the evolution of criminality. The most disadvantaged regions from a social and economic point of view (primarily the North-East of the country) are the ones that emerge as the primary regional sources of crime, where the ratio of reported offenders is higher. These areas have lower than average GDP per capita, whereas the unemployment rate among young people is higher, and child poverty is also more pronounced than in other parts of the country. By contrast, the capital city (Budapest) and the mid and western Hungarian counties can be regarded as the primary targets of crime. These areas experience a higher number of reported crimes than justified by the size of their populations, and as the amount of accumulated wealth is larger than average here, more opportunities exist for crime. In Hungary, the uneven distribution of those lacking proper education, or the distribution of unemployed people, or the territorial distribution of the

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Roma population, practically correspond with each other. The Roma have faced deepening poverty as a result of the economic impact of transition, but the everyday discrimination that they face makes it harder for them to seize the opportunities created by transition. ‘This discrimination includes deadly physical assault. The burning of Roma homes and physical attacks, especially on children, has been documented in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Serbia, and many Roma are fleeing the region. This violence has received more attention than the persistent discrimination and exclusion experienced by the Roma in education and health and the fact that their children account for a disproportionate number of those in residential care and special education facilities’ (UNDP, 2003). The employment level of the Romany population is outstandingly low: their unemployment rate is three to five times as high as that of the non-Roma population, while the number of dependents for one earner is three times as many as that of the non-Roma population. It is a critical factor in the low employment level of the Roma that they are considerably lower qualified than the average population, and their majority lives in economically backward counties and small villages. The proportion of those who break off from the labour market (those who are permanently unemployed and young people who are not at school any more but are not yet working) is far higher in the Roma population in each age group than in the average of the age group in question, with the exception of the oldest citizens. A family whose third consecutive generation is growing up without having the opportunity to work may experience tragic and unforeseeable consequences. According to the findings of a survey conducted in 2002, 15 % of Roma children do not continue their studies after graduating from primary school, while 57 % of those who do continue attend technical schools, and only 20 % go to secondary schools. A mere 2 % of the young Roma population studies at institutes of higher education. According to some estimates, in 1999, 11  % of those who were statutorily obliged to attend school were Roma and by now, this rate is close to 20 %.14 We know that leaving school early is one of the key problems of the disadvantaged strata of society. A few years ago, in order to prevent this, the age limit for compulsory education was raised to 18 years of age, to prevent early dropout. Based on the new public education concept disclosed this spring, the current government is planning to lower the age limit for compulsory education to 15 (or perhaps 16) years. 14 Report on the Review of Roma Subsidies between 2002 and 2010. Retrieved 14/07/2011 from http://www.romnet.hu/hirek/2011/06/06/jelentes_a_2002_es_2010_kozotti_ roma_tamogatasok_felulvizsgalatarol

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Hungarian surveys constantly show that there is an unusually big difference between the poverty rate of the total population and that of children: in 2009, 15 % of the total population, and 28 % of those living in families with children, lived under the above-mentioned threshold of income poverty. There is a strong tendency between living in ghettos and being ethnically excluded. In 2008, the deprivation rate15 was between 2 and 15 % in the richer countries with better systems of social policy, while it was 26 % in Hungary. Amongst EU member states, it was only in Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania that rates worse than this were measured (Ferge, 2011). Another symptom of poverty is the share of household expenditure devoted to food purchase. Only in the Czech Republic is this share below 50 % of households’ total expenditure. In other countries, it ranges between 52 % in Hungary and 69 % in Bulgaria (UNDP, 2003). Distribution of total household income between upper/middle/lower income groups, 2009 Monthly income per capita, 2009, HUF

From the total income, to the group in question, percent

From the total income, to the group in question, HUF bn

Upper 30 %

122 430

49.8

4380

Middle 40 %

66 300

36.0

3170

Lower 30 %

35 000

14.2

1250

Social exclusion affects all Western-European societies and is widely discussed; however, no one seems to agree on a shared definition. This expectation seems to be seen differently in the CEE countries. A simultaneous course of action can be seen here: inclusion parlance and exclusion practices can co-exist. In 2000, 55  % of the adult population, increasing to 62  % in 2005, agreed with the statement that ‘criminal inclinations are in the Roma blood’. ‘In the period that has elapsed since then, the fact that the JOBBIK party, which represents the country’s worst side, has become a central party, indicates that the social consensus on legitimate public speech and behaviour 15 Those families are considered deprived where 4 or more deficiencies exist at the same time from among the properties and services that are regarded as “important” (e.g. whether there is sufficient money for meat meals at least every second day, for overhead costs, for the adequate heating of the apartment, for an annual one-week holiday, or whether there is a toilet, washing machine, colour TV set and phone in the apartment).

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has almost entirely disintegrated. In other words, it is not even necessary to avoid the appearance of racism’ (Radó, 2011).

The Measures and Practices of Social Crime Prevention In Hungary, the tools for, and the practices of, social crime prevention have been provided by a combination of the strategy and the action plan. The role of strategy, to use a medical analogy, is to identify the symptoms, diagnose what is wrong and define the direction that change should take in the longterm. The treatment of the ‘symptoms’ is, in turn, provided by the execution of the sectoral tasks specified in the action plan, the implementation of which is the government’s responsibility and competence. ‘Formulating the strategy and defining the action plan at least partially remedied the long-standing problem of unclear crime prevention roles, and supported the development of crime prevention programmes. The tasks were outlined in general and also, according to individual priorities, gave clear guidance to potential crime prevention players, by clarifying how they could contribute to the implementation of the objectives set out in the strategy within their own profi le of activities. In this respect, the strategy followed an especially complex approach, as it wished to mobilise all possible criminal justice players, sectoral policies and communities. Indeed, one of the goals of the strategy was to make the affected players conscious of different aspects of crime prevention, and to help enforce these coherently, by relying on more active co-operation. This was also supported by a strong local approach, since the Strategy views crime prevention as a system coordinated and supported by the government, but one that is basically a co-operation that reacts to local problems at a local level’ (Borbíró, 2011). Local crime prevention initiatives are supported in a tender system established for the implementation of the objectives set out in the strategy, on a different subject each year. It is a fundamental requirement of crime prevention tenders that these should be executed by organisations co-operating in consortia. The vast majority, almost 90  % of the programmes implemented between 2004 and 2007 regarded local experts as their direct target group. 34 % of the programmes addressed more than 30 local experts. The critical majority of the implemented programmes (76 %) regarded young people aged between 15 and 22 years of age as their direct target group. Nearly two thirds of the projects were aimed at children between the ages of 5 and 14 years. 60  % of the organisations supported

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by OBMB (also) organised programmes for the victims of crime or those belonging to key potential victim groups. In 54 % of the programmes, the direct target group was made up of those who had just been released from prison or those who were on probation.16 The programme financing system was partially built on internal, and partially on external – mainly EU – resources. OBMB supported the operation of the crime prevention model programmes through tendering, from its own funds, for which applications could be submitted in a consortia form. OBMB classified the programmes in two categories : micro- or macro-programmes, according to the groups of reasons they intended to influence, and according to the number of players who would participate in the future co-operation. OBMB took the objectives and priorities of the National Development Plan (NFT) into account, based on which the Operational Programmes were developed. The Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement may schedule the use of some 8.6 bn HUF between 2007 and 2013, as the independent responsible entity for action No. 6 of the 5th priority (‘Strengthening of Social Cohesion with Crime Prevention and Re-integration Programmes’) in TÁMOP (the Social Renewal Operational Programme). Action No. 6 focuses on three areas: (1) the protection of children and young adults living in moral danger zones; (2) the development of victim protection and support; and (3) the re-integration of those convicted. The general over-simplicity of Hungarian crime prevention projects might best be demonstrated by the fact that the government announced ‘second chance grants’ on December 21st, 2010, with a competition deadline of January 20th, 2011. The implementation period of the proposed projects was between March 1st and May 15th, 2011. This means that the grant applicants had just one month to finalise and submit their proposals and just two and a half months for the project implementation. The main aims of this year’s grant proposal were: • Encouraging the crime prevention cooperation of a settlement and its surrounding area. Identifying those signals that are significantly influencing the fear of crime of the local community. Developing methods useful for solving the problems in connection with the negative factors of the local fear of crime; 16 Evaluation of the tendering activities of the National Crime Prevention Council, retrieved 14/07/2011 from http://www.bunmegelozes.hu/index.html?pid=1778

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• Crime prevention based on social and cultural integration in the most deprived areas of the country; • Developing and implementing a complex model programme for combating child and juvenile victimisation with the cooperation of police, school and NGOs; • Shooting nationally-distributed short films on school crime prevention, developing a curriculum on the basis of the film. Trainers should be trained for this purpose, broadcasting time should be negotiated, and the royalties of the film’s music must be legally agreed. However the aims are correct, none of them are implementable in two and a half months’ time. The only reason why this practice recurs each year is that the budget year ends on May 15th and the governments want to spend all available money that has yet to be allocated within the same budget year. We can conclude that the crime prevention phraseology is well-learned and used as a discussion platform between the call-publisher, the grant distributor and the project implementer. Thus, discussions are conducted using sophisticated professional language, but the actual project implementation is taking place on an extremely basic level. According to evaluation of the practice of calls to tender between 20042008, more than 50 % of the grant proposals did not even take into account the calls’ aims, but planned to implement something absolutely different from these (Gyökös & Ivány, 2009). However, I would like to underline that the Hungarian non-profit sector is divided according to left and right-wing political orientation, just like the economic and state sector. The aforementioned trend can be observed independently of the political orientation of the changing governments. This example gives clear evidence of an impossible situation that is based on marginal principles of financing crime prevention. And above all, it should be noted that this grant is the only ‹small grant› in Hungary for supporting crime prevention projects. The calls to tender during other parts of the year do not differ much from this. Even ministerial self-evaluation identifies dissatisfaction with: • Co-operation among the project implementers; • The involvement of various ministries in crime prevention activity; • The over-representation of state institutions; and • The under-representation of educational and cultural NGOs and organisations among grant applicants.

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They pointed out a lack of evidence-based planning, a lack of projects’ success indicators, as well as a lack of methodology for measuring the effectiveness of the projects. Financial evaluation is missing from practically all projects (Gyökös & Ivány, 2009). According to Borbiros’s views, all these factors are deeply determined by public opinion on crime prevention. The general public believes that the only actor in crime prevention should be criminal policy. And even if other crime prevention tools are mentioned, it is exclusively in their policing and situational crime prevention forms (Borbíró, 2011). This means that progressive crime prevention practices may only be able to play a secondary role. In 2003, the following five priorities were selected by the Strategy with regard to the current criminality situation and international requirements: (1) the prevention of crimes committed by children and young adults; (2) the improvement of urban security; (3) the prevention of domestic violence; (4) the prevention of victimisation; and (5) the prevention of recidivism. By this point, it was also mentioned in technical literature that priorities should be reconsidered. However, three priority areas should still be emphasized. Youth criminality, urban public security and the prevention of recidivism are all areas that deserve permanent special attention. The priority related to victimisation, however, has partly lost its meaning, after the expansion of the Victim Support Act, and it would seem to make more sense to give independent strategic treatment to domestic violence, taking into account the complexity of the phenomenon and the necessary management system (similarly to the drug issue) (Bobíró, 2011). Besides, there are two more new areas that would deserve priority in a comprehensive crime prevention strategy: (1) the treatment of lower weight crimes against property; and (2) the formulation of the problem of violence in schools (Bobíró, 2011). Although the strategy was less successful in launching institutional reforms, it proved to be rather successful in the initiation of crime prevention model programmes. However, there is very little information on what actual effects have been achieved by crime prevention programmes on local public security and on a feeling of security amongst local inhabitants.

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Conclusion In summary, we can conclude that thanks to the National Strategy for Social Crime Prevention, crime prevention policy has also become independent in Hungary. A sub-system of criminal policy came to exist that provides transferability between criminal policy and the other specialised policies affected by crime prevention, in accordance with a clearly defined goal (Bobíró, 2011). The current government is unlikely to (fully) change direction, so it can be hoped that the complex crime prevention approach will not be removed from the criteria of criminal policy. The situation of social crime prevention is plausible in Hungary. In the past twenty years, it seemed on several occasions as though social crime prevention had been officially defined in this country as well. However, it always turned out subsequently that the formulated definition was just a very short-lived figure of speech, and the importance of crime prevention was overwritten by newly-formulated political intentions. In the interpretation of crime prevention, the correlation between poverty and criminality was easily interpreted in a simplified way, i.e. as a local problem of public security. Over the past 3-5 years, public prevention strategies have been reoriented towards crime reduction. As compared to the former decade, there is a shift from a social preventive approach to a more repressive, situational approach to crime prevention. The ‘privatisation of security’ is an ongoing process in Hungary, and a dramatic rise in the number of private security personnel can be seen as a consequence of new anxieties concerning personal and property safety. Private security firms employ more people than the Police Forces. The Urbaneye program compared the attitudes towards CCTV surveillance in seven countries including Hungary, Austria, Great Britain, Denmark, Germany, Norway and Spain (Hempel & Töpfer, 2004). The findings have shown that the main supporters of CCTV were politicians and the police. It gives food for thought that the vast majority of city councils still regard the application of situational tools as the essence of crime prevention. They give motor vehicles to police forces, pay the overtime costs of policemen on leave, etc. and by doing this, they get their public security-related tasks ‘over with’. However, limitless information has also been accumulated in relation to local security at Hungarian local government level. Research experience suggests that city council departments have an unbelievable amount of knowledge of and an in-depth awareness of the problems in their own areas, but only in the sector in which the department or unit is involved. These pieces of

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information do not ‘meet’, they are not assessed for several different criteria, and there is no attempt to use them jointly for the improvement of public security in the local community. In addition, there is no transferability between these departments and the committees, in order to utilise this knowledge and information in long-term planning (Kerezsi, Finszter, Kó & Gosztonyi, 2003). We may also say that the municipality thinks in terms of ‘geographical objects’ when it comes to planning. It can accurately say how many kilometres of road surfaces will be repaired by the end of the term, how many kilometres of new drainpipes will be built, or what size of district heating network will be renewed, etc. But, for example, if we were to ask a candidate running for local mayor how the social structural distribution of the area will evolve ten years from now, how the situation of children will change, how many families will still be living in poverty, and how many will belong to the middle class, well, there is no guarantee that our questions would be answered. Crime prevention and especially its long-term tools, whose aim is the development of society, needs exactly this sort of long-term thinking in terms of people.

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1. Introduction: Definition of Social Crime Prevention in Italy According to the most common definition, social crime prevention includes measures that seek to eliminate or reduce structural crime factors, acting on possible causes of crime through general social programmes (Robert, 1991: 16). Alternatively, according to a similar definition, it seeks to influence or modify the reasons that bring people to commit offences due to conditions of social disadvantage (Gilling, 1997: 5). Unlike situational prevention, this strategy puts the focus on the potential offender and his or her inclination to commit crime, considered not so much as the result of individual pathology, but rather as a deficit deriving from personal and socio-structural conditions. According to some scholars, social prevention is not only a specific prevention modality, but also a global policy for social wellbeing that crosses all administrative policy sectors (Peyre, 1986). Other authors focus on social development, considered as the basis for these policies. Their purpose would be to study the origin and reproduction of inequalities responsible for ‘disadvantaged contexts’ in order to overcome them (Hastings, 1998:117). Fields of intervention for social prevention, according to the authors of a broad review of crime prevention programmes (Graham & Bennet, 1995) are: urban policy, health policies, family policies, education policies, labour market policies and, finally, social integration policies in general. These definitions are mostly consistent with the one offered as a guiding principle in this volume: “Measures to prevent crime which are aimed at the social causes of crime rather than those concerned with mechanical reduction of opportunities (situational crime prevention) or with deterrence (the criminal justice system)” (Young, 2001: 227).

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In Italy, there is neither an official definition of social crime prevention nor is there substantial scientific literature or research on the issue. Most scientific works on the subject adopt a definition borrowed from other contexts and often include social crime prevention in the context of ‘urban safety’. For instance, Massimo Pavarini, in the first half of the 1990s, published many articles on the issues surrounding the so-called ‘new prevention’, as part of a more general plan for the development of local safety policies. In one of his first articles, Pavarini (1994a) defines the concept of social crime prevention as “those actions that are part of general social programmes and which are addressed not to individuals, but to the general public” (1994: 19). More recently, in a whole book dedicated to crime prevention, Tamar Pitch (2006: 128) offers a definition of ‘social-community crime prevention’, as follows: “Social-community prevention (…) is based on traditional etiological theories of crime, both social and individual. Therefore, it intervenes in those social and cultural conditions where the risk of crime and incivility is higher (…)”. She also makes a distinction between social crime prevention and general social policies, arguing that the former is more focused on specific groups or individuals, on specific areas and also on victims of crime and not only on offenders. In all the aforementioned works, the authors borrow their definitions from the international literature with few adjustments. In one of the other few books on the matter, Barbagli and Gatti (2005: 39) define social crime prevention as an approach that, starting from a deterministic view of crime, seeks “to modify the social conditions of a community, a neighbourhood, a school environment”. As examples of social crime prevention, the authors focus mainly on some North-American projects (like the well-known Chicago Area project and Mobilization for Youth), as well as other European experiences.1 This lack of original or more detailed definitions does not imply, of course, that social crime prevention was put into practice in different ways, as we’ll see later on in this paper. Many projects and programmes aimed at reducing crime and addressing its social causes have been developed over the years, at both a national and a local level; however, social crime prevention never gained much relevance within the institutional or scientific discourse on crime prevention, (except for a decade, as we’ll see later on, and in the context of the so-called ‘urban safety policies’) and very little data or 1 The only Italian experience of social crime prevention quoted in this book is the so-called “Progetto Città sicure” (Safe Cities project) of the regional government of Emilia – Romagna. See the following chapters for more information.

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research on the topic is available. In the following pages, I will describe the development of social crime prevention projects over several decades, considering those programmes that have crime or disorder reduction, or fear of crime reduction, as their main goals. Given the fragmentation of the Italian experience of crime prevention in general, I will analyse social crime prevention both at a local level and at a national level. Finally, I will offer some remarks about the recent decline – and the increasing ‘invisibility’ – of social crime prevention in both public discourse and in institutional practices, and the most important changes that are affecting its implementation.

2. Social Crime Prevention from World War II to the 1980s The development of social crime prevention policies and practices in Italy probably occurred later than in other European contexts and was strictly related to the general modernisation of the country after World War II and to the ‘Italian economic miracle’ of the 1960s and 1970s. In less than a couple of decades, Italy experienced a shift from being mostly a backward, rural and very poor country – especially in Southern areas – to being an urban and industrialised economy, with one of the highest GDPs in Europe. This shift took place along with one more crucial transition within Italian society, from being strongly divided along class and political lines (or at least perceived and described in this way by its members) to a society in which the major sections of the working class became incorporated into the established system of governance (Melossi & Selmini, 2000: 149). Even though the conservative Christian Democrat Party ruled the country for decades, the Italian Communist Party – increasingly less aligned with the Soviet Union – and the strong workers’ unions of the 1960s and the 1970s were able to fight successfully for important modernisations in different fields of social life and to improve civil rights. New laws on abortion, family, divorce and women’s rights in the workplace, just to mention some of the more important changes – were passed in the Italian Parliament and enjoyed strong public support. In the more developed, richer and industrialised Northern regions, between the 1960s and the 1970s, a new infrastructure of local healthcare and social welfare services developed, especially in regions like Emilia – Romagna, Tuscany, Marche and Piemonte, where left-wing parties were ruling the local (regional and municipal) governments. In those same areas, with few exceptions, the urban renewal of cities and the building of new neighbourhoods – also necessary to host the immigrant workers of

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the Southern regions who come to the industrialised North to work – rarely followed a segregational pattern. Public housing estates were built close to working and middle class areas and the cities of the North absorbed and smoothly incorporated huge numbers of ‘newcomers’ workers from the South. All these general trends had an influence, of course, on ideas about social prevention and crime. We cannot find any official talk about social crime prevention until the mid 1990s, but this does not mean that many different social policies aimed also (or only) at reducing crime were not enforced during the 1970s and the 1980s. Simply, in official public discourse, social policies were not directly related to preventive effects on crime: they were merely necessary for the goal of transforming a rural and backward country into a modern democracy based on a welfare state model. Preventing crime was just one of the potential goals of these policies, neither the most important nor the most mentioned one in public and scientific discourse. There are several explanations for this point. The first is that neither sociology nor criminology was well developed in the Italian academic world, and research was not strongly related to policy. The push for social policies was mostly part of a political discourse led by left-wing parties and unions in pursuit of the general wellbeing of citizens, and research on crime was not influential. Italian criminology, until the beginning of the nineties, was mostly based on a forensic-psychiatric approach and mostly concerned with an understanding of crime as individual pathology, rather than a social problem (Selmini, 2007: 8-9). One more important reason for the lack of connection between social policy and crime was that until the beginning of the 1990s, the crime discourse focused mostly on the Mafia and organised crime, and the Mafia was considered at that time to be a phenomenon that needed a criminal justice approach rather than a social preventive one. One important step in the development of social crime prevention was the constitutional reform of local government competencies in 1977, which increased the powers of local governments and of local social and health agencies in the field of social problems. A subsequent reform in 2001 further broadened these local powers, as we’ll see later on.

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Among the local services established in Italy during the 1970s and the 1980s, the following could be considered as related to crime prevention:2 • General services for families and young people, called ‘consultori familiari’, in which different health and social services were delivered: from counselling for young people and families considered ‘at risk’ of crime, to medical services for low-income workers, and different kinds of services for women. • Services that we could define as ‘primary social prevention’, like the so– called ‘centri giovanili’ (centres for young people) in which young people could find a structured offering of educational and leisure activities. It is important to remark that, even if the ‘centri giovanili’ were mostly established in those neighbourhoods considered by politicians and urban managers as most disadvantaged, (and, in this case, aimed at young people considered ‘at risk’ of involvement in crime) the focus on crime prevention and the stigmatising feature of the definition ‘at risk’ were never very strong. • Specialised services for drug addicts – the so-called S.ert (Servizi per il trattamento delle tossicodipendenze) were established to address the huge problem of heroin addiction between the 1970s and the 1980s, and these have recently been transformed into multiple-services agencies, working not only on harm reduction or other drug and alcohol addiction related measures, but also on emergency assistance for homeless people and immigrants. • These same local agencies, in co-operation with the Minister of Justice, also run programmes for the prevention of recidivism – something that we could define as ‘tertiary social crime prevention!’ – for both young and adult offenders, delivering help with job search, professional training, support in finding transitional housing after release, etc.

2 However, we can rarely find a clear and direct connection between the establishment of these services and the aim of crime prevention. Official documents by proponents (both politicians and social workers) talk about ‘primary prevention’ in a very general way, while it is in the analysis of sociologists and criminologists that these measures are sometimes re-defined as crime prevention. The theoretical challenge of the definition of some measures as ‘social crime prevention’ and how they differ from other crime prevention measures is raised – without offering an answer – by De Leo (1993) in a thoughtful article and more recently, by Pitch (2006).

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In short, social crime prevention between the 1960s and the mid 1990s was characterised by the following main features: • A leading role of local governments (municipalities and local health agencies) which, despite relying upon national funds, still had a strong autonomy in defining priorities and strategies for developing social crime prevention at different levels. • A focus on preventing young people from offending or re-offending, despite the fact that young peoples’ crime rates were – and still are – much lower than in other European countries (Killias, 2002). This is consistent with the general principles of ‘leniency’ that characterised – and still does – the Italian criminal justice system for young people, mostly based on prevention and on alternative measures to punishment. • A strong concern about prevention of drug addiction, given that the S.ert were the most widespread and funded initiatives in the country. • A low involvement of disciplines like sociology or criminology, none of them well developed, at least concerning research into the causes of crime, and none engaged in the development of crime prevention projects.

3. The Turn of the Nineties At the beginning of the 1990s and up until the end of the decade, important changes affected both the broad picture I have just described, as well as the concept and practices of social crime prevention. I will shortly describe some of the most important social changes and phenomena that affected the Italian approach to crime prevention in general, and to social crime prevention in particular, starting from the following points: the increase in crime rates and the emergence of fear of crime; the increasing relevance of ‘urban disorder’ and incivilities as a relevant concern for local governments; the remarkable immigration flows from North Africa and Eastern Europe; and the decline of social cohesion and informal social control. At the beginning of the 1990s in Italy, as in many other European countries, a new concern about crime and fear of crime appeared and both issues gradually became important aspects of the political agenda and a reason for concern in public opinion.

Italy, at that time, experienced a remarkable increase in crime rates. Increases, mostly in property crime, and particularly in burglary, had started

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many decades earlier – without giving rise to any strong public reaction on the issue – and had continued for nearly 40 years. Some violent crimes, especially robberies, (but not murder) also increased. After 1991 the linear increase shifted to a more variable trend, with some ups and some downs, but in 2007 a second peak was reached – even higher than in 1991. Italy’s unexpectedly strong economic performance qualified it to join the club of high-crime societies (Garland, 2001).3 Urban disorder began to parallel crime in citizens’ – and institutional – concerns and it became part of a new discourse about local safety, where the border between the two phenomena – crime on the one hand, disorder on the other – began to vanish. At the end of the 1990s, the challenge to the ‘urban aesthetic’ (Millie, 2008) posed by incidents of incivility, defined as a sort of a ‘minor crime’ and as a violation of civic rules, represented some of the most important reasons for citizens’ concerns (Nardi, 2003; Chiesi, 2004). The increasing arrival of immigrants from both Northern Africa and Eastern Europe is another important feature of the 1990s. The first official count of foreign citizens regularly living in Italy dates back to 1992. At that time, residents with foreign documents represented only 1.5 % of the population, and only about 500  000 of these were work permits, but within a decade, both the percentages of foreign residents and of permits to stay increased remarkably. The first percentage reached almost 5 % at the end of the 1990s, and it is now around 11 %. The numbers of work permits varied according to the kind of policies adopted in order to enlarge (or restrict) the possibility to work in the country, but they also generally increased during the last two decades. (Ministero dell’Interno, 2007). During the 1990s, it was clear that the presence of foreign workers and of undocumented immigrants was becoming a permanent feature of Italian society, and that the immigration process was shifting from the old pattern of a single male immigrant (whose goal was just to work hard and then return to his country) to a contemporary model of stable permanence in the worker’s new country and – possibly – of his or her family. Migration policies tried – with limited success – to adjust the Italian system to this new experience (Ambrosini, 2001), which also represented a huge cultural

3 The drop in crime rates that other European countries experienced years ago is a much more recent phenomenon in Italy, and we could date it at 2007. On this see Selmini and Arcidiacono (2010).

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challenge in a country whose self-image was one of an emigration – and not an immigration – country. Many laws aimed at regulating entry, permanent residency and work permits have been passed at a national level from the end of the 1980s to the present. Regional laws also started to regulate a wide range of ‘integration policies’, mostly aimed at facing the challenge of cultural and social discrimination and fostering integration opportunities. None of these laws ever mentioned the goal of preventing – through these social measures – the risk of immigrants’ involvement in crime as a result of a maladjustment in integration in the guest society. However, the idea that cultural conflicts, the status of undocumented immigrants and a lack of opportunities to work regularly represented strong criminogenic factors was widespread in public discourse, in the media and in the academic context. Without entering here into the complex debate about immigrants’ involvement in crime and its causes,4 we nonetheless need to remark on how these important social changes resulted in widespread public fear of crime in relation to the presence of immigrants and a debate – among scientist and policy makers – about proper measures necessary to prevent this involvement. The fast and profound change in the social and economic structure of some cities and districts, the de-industrialisation of those same areas, a ‘work ethic’ crisis and a crisis of work as a means to promote social progress and personal dignity, the disappearance of traditional urban social networks – often related to political participation – and the consequent fragmentation of social identities, combined to create a context in which new images of disorder, often related to the presence of immigrants in public space, tended to emerge (Melossi & Selmini, 2000: 160). At the same time, those same phenomena implied a reduction in communities’ collective efficacy in managing social and criminal problems, a weakening of social bonds and informal social control, an increase in a defensive, complaining culture – when there was no strong community reaction (Belluati, 2004) – especially directed towards immigrants and the difficulty of a common life (Melossi, 1999). Both left and right-wing political parties began to use fear of crime and feelings of insecurity as a leit motif in their electoral campaigns and to rely upon these issues as strong emotional resources for gaining public consent.

4 See the opposite positions by Melossi (1999) and Barbagli (1998).

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4. Social Crime Prevention in the Context of Local Safety Policies To face these changes and phenomena, both in Italy and elsewhere in Europe, there arose a new level of concern about crime prevention, with an emphasis on measures different from those taken by the criminal justice system. The ‘new’ crime prevention, as defined by Robert (1991) became the core of both academic interest and of the so called ‘local safety programmes’, mostly led by local governments. Indeed, in the early 1990s, many cities and regional administrations established programmes for crime prevention and policy-related research, usually under the label of ‘local safety plans’. These projects were concerned with taking crime and fear of crime seriously, giving more attention to (much neglected) victims of crime, and efforts to mobilise communities, mostly addressed to support Ngo’s and other active citizens’ groups and associations. The Emilia –Romagna regional government5 pioneered this process with the ‘Safe Cities Programme’, established in 1994 and defined as a ‘social prevention of crime and deviance initiative’ (Barbagli & Gatti, 2005: 51-52). At the very beginning, the project was characterised by an effort to reduce both the social causes of crime and the social causes of fear of crime. Given that in Italy, local governments do not have any competency in the criminal justice field, the development of this programme looked promising for an enhancement of social crime prevention, and raised many expectations on the part of social crime prevention advocates (Pavarini, 1994b). Some of them (Pitch, 2001; 2006) also raised an important point: whether local safety plans were the correct framework within which to include social crime prevention measures, or if this choice might result in a change of the intrinsic nature of social crime prevention (see chapter 7). The new infrastructure of crime prevention developed in the country at the beginning of the 1990s is articulated in many city-level projects, often co-ordinated by regional governments, which deliver funding and, in some cases, technical support. Regional laws about local safety are a truly Italian peculiarity in delivering crime prevention measures. From the 1990s until a few years ago, regional governments in Italy usually behaved in a manner akin to the way national governments did in other European contexts, 5 An Italian Region that has traditionally been characterised by its progressive political and social orientation (Putnam, 1993).

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offering a general framework for the development of local crime prevention projects.6 Briefly, we could say that the Italian attitude to a ‘new’ crime prevention approach was mostly based on the efforts of municipalities and regional government to support programmes, while, at least until the end of the 2000s, the national government played a minor role. From a content point of view, the model is characterised by a mix between traditional social measures, new measures for public reassurance (victim support, community mobilisation) and situational crime prevention (surveillance, administrative control and environmental design with defensive aims). A national study carried out between 1994 and 1999 in the 103 main cities in Italy (Selmini, 2000; 2003) showed that at least 70 of them had developed local crime prevention policies and that at this first stage, social crime prevention measures were a relevant part – if not the most relevant part7 – of the general ‘local safety plans’. The people interviewed in the study (politicians and practitioners in charge of the implementation of local safety projects) defined the following measures as ‘social crime prevention’: Social prevention tackling specific areas • Harm reduction for drug addicts and prostitution • General social help for homeless and marginalised individuals • Services for the integration of immigrants • Services to crime victims Social prevention for the physical environment and the community • Mediation of conflicts among social groups • Animation of public spaces (through cultural activities and similar initiatives) • Urban renewal

6 In the past few years, eleven of the twenty regions enacted laws whose aim was to support, in different ways, municipalities and local police forces under the label of ‘local safety policies’. For an overview of Italian regional legislations on this matter, see Braghero and Izzi (2004). 7 451 preventive measures have been recorded in five years. Social crime prevention measures, as defined in the text, represented 40% of crime prevention measures, and 60% was related to situational crime prevention. The following studies on the matter are based only on regional areas, but mostly show similar results (Giovannetti & Maluccelli, 2001).

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The instruments used to implement these measures were partly traditional ones and partly some new administrative tools. In addition to traditional social work, they include urban renewal, street repairs, administrative orders and the ever more frequent likelihood of non-specialised operators also adopting preventive measures, such as the participation of ordinary citizens in crime prevention programmes. In the Italian context, community crime prevention has been reintepreted, by those in charge of implemention, as part of a social prevention strategy. It is based mainly on measures to foster community cohesion and ameliorate the physical environment, in order to improve quality of life and reduce conflicts and fear of crime in some areas. Recalling the Chicago School’s main assumptions, the basic idea is that crime, deviance and disorder are the result of the decline of community, conflicts between heterogeneous social groups, the abandonment of public space, and the deterioration of community relations. Consequently, these programmes must address these phenomena, using different strategies that we could collectively define as ‘community crime prevention’. The most important feature is that these local programmes tried to combine both social and situational crime prevention in what we could call a “mix” or “integrated/coordinated response”. This also means that the goals of these new local crime prevention policies were ambiguous from the very beginning, because they were based on a very demanding challenge: to try and fine-tune social inclusion and exclusion, as well as tackle causes of crime while, at the same time, managing crime symptoms and making them compatible with ordinary urban life, through situational measures.8 However, if ‘integrated crime prevention’ was a rather successful political slogan, this does not mean that ‘integration’ would really allow local governments to entirely pursue social crime prevention goals, for reasons that I will better describe later on. Consequently, after almost fifteen years of local crime prevention scheme implementation, in the second half of 2000 we witnessed a failure of the primary idea, based on the development of a new model of local governance 8 For a discussion about the compatibility of a ‘situational rationality’ with a ‘social justice’ and the spreading of articulated models of crime prevention see O’Malley (1992).

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of crime able to tackle the ‘causes’ of crime, whilst at the same time proving effective in managing crime symptoms. In the last decade, and above all in the most recent years, this process is even clearer and more obvious. Situational crime prevention has become, with few – but remarkable – exceptions, the most important crime prevention practice and the most relevant issue in public discourse on crime. In Italy, as everywhere, the success of situational crime prevention9 lies in its capacity to offer pragmatic and fast political responses to manage crime and disorder problems for those who are responsible for governing ordinary urban life, i.e. the mayors and other politicians, and it is consistent with the widespread adoption of a more punitive and control-based approach to crime, that is nowadays common to many European contexts. The development of local crime prevention programmes I have just described, implied that some of the social crime prevention initiatives that were traditional in the Italian context had already been transplanted to local safety policies during the 1970s and 1980s, becoming part of the so-called ‘coordinated approach’ to crime prevention, while many other social crime prevention programmes remained outside this more general policy, and continued to follow their traditional style. Projects that were often integrated into local safety plans are: mediation schemes (especially conflict mediation in public spaces), measures aimed at reducing bullying and violence among young people, and the integration of immigrants. Drug addiction treatment and social services for prostitutes are sometimes included in local safety plans, but sometimes remain in the domain of social policies. Finally, traditional street work in neighbourhoods at risk of crime is rarely included in local safety plans. The choice of whether to include these projects in a local safety plan or not takes into account many different factors, but is mostly a matter of political sensibility and also of the distribution of resources among the different sectors of public bodies.10 This represents a sort of dichotomy 9 What is remarkable is the fact that in Italy this approach to crime prevention has been accepted enthusiastically without any diff usion of the kind of criminological knowledge upon which it depends, namely opportunity theory and the routine activity approach. Whilst these have become a part of the recent interest of some academics (Barbagli, 1995; Savona, 2004), they are largely unknown and unfamiliar to our scientific discourse on crime and crime prevention. This fact in itself suggests interesting reflections on the sources of criminal policy change. 10 As a consequence of regional laws about local safety governance, regional governments provided significant funds to support local safety plans, and it therefore became more convenient for local politicians in search of resources to include social crime prevention in these plans. 220

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in the Italian experience of social crime prevention, and a fragmentation of initiatives that the different national governments have not been able to manage.

5. Social Crime Prevention in National Policies In Italy, the national government has never developed structured programmes for social crime prevention, and has rarely used this official definition to describe the goals of its programmes. A national law passed in 2000 (Law 328/2000) reaffirmed the general competency of the State in defining the basic standard needs that regional governments should respect when developing their social policies, leaving the implementation of the measures to local governments. At the same time, some new laws concerning specific sectors of the welfare system – and generically related to social crime prevention – were passed in those years, to support programmes for the integration of immigrants (language facilities, professional training and similar measures). At a national level, only one general programme directly addressed the risk of crime among a specific group (young people). Law 216/91, aimed at supporting projects ‘for minors at risk of involvement in criminal behaviours’, funded some initiatives carried out at a local level by the Prefectures,11 like: • Out of home care projects for young people at risk; • Support for families; • Support for measures at neighbourhood level (centri giovanili); • Projects to reduce the ‘dropout’ rate in schools, and other projects to support the educational system. Some more specific national programmes about prevention of bullying and of pedophilia, drug addiction, and measures for the integration of young immigrants, were supported by the national government – both by the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Social Policies – during the 2000s. Once again, the specific goal of ‘social crime prevention’ is never mentioned, but all these programmes clearly show an approach to the crime 11 This programme was part of the Minister of the Interior’s crime prevention projects, and this is why the implementation was the responsibility of Prefects, and not of local governments.

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phenomena as the result of social problems and, consistently, the proposed interventions are addressed to the social causes from which they originate. Finally, on an annual basis, the national government provides funds for social policies, through a financing that does not indicate priorities. It is therefore the responsibility of the regional and local governments – whose competency in the matter was even enlarged after a further constitutional reform in 2001 – to decide about the priorities in spending the funds. Given this fragmentation, it is very difficult to have a clear framework of how relevant social crime prevention is and which kind of measures the local governments decide to run. Together with the traditional social crime prevention measures that I described in the first chapter, we can single out, between the 1990s and the 2000s, these further interventions: • Measures to support the educational system (as examples: projects to prevent dropping out in Southern schools, anti-bullying projects and programmes to promote the so-called ‘cultura della legalità’ (culture of legality) among young generations in order to prevent their involvment in crime and illegal behaviours);12 • Actions against trafficking and smuggling of women and children; • Transitional and permanent camps for gypsy groups; • Social housing for people at risk of extreme marginality; • Programmes for the prevention of child abuse. These programmes,13 even though regulated in general by a national law, were implemented in many cases – once again – by local governments. Many of them became part of ‘local safety plans’, others were run separately, according to the fragmentation and dichotomy I just mentioned.

12 It is here worth noting that ‘educazione alla legalità’ is a general category of school programmes aimed chiefly at reinforcing the cultural resistance among young generations towards the attempts of the Mafia –and similar organised crime groupsto ‘infi ltrate’ or to establish a cultural hegemony, especially in the Southern regions. These programmes clearly show that ‘social crime prevention’ is now seen as an instrument to fight the mafia and organized crime, that must necessarily go side by side with the traditional criminal justice response to these kinds of criminal problems. 13 These programmes’ crime prevention goal is usually directly recalled in the official documents that support them and in their description, but this goal is rarely clearly defined in the programme titles. For a general overview over the years, see the website of the Minister of the Interior (http:// www.mininterno.it ).

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6. Social Crime Prevention Disappearing? At the end of the 2000s, some radical changes in crime prevention and local safety policies occurred, with remarkable consequences for the concept and practice of social crime prevention. The recent period is characterised by the following points: 1) the development, for the first time in Italian history, of a national strategy for local safety policies and crime prevention; 2) the definitive criminalisation of social problems; 3) an increasing cutback of public expenditure on traditional social crime prevention, that also, for the first time, directly affected local governments. By means of some legislative tools, the national government increasingly reduced – from 2008 till now – local governments’ powers in the field of social crime prevention and, more generally, of local safety policies, opening a new era of national protagonism for the Minister of the Interior. The consequence of this new national strategy is a remarkable change that occurred in the whole infrastructure of local crime prevention, now mostly ruled by a national law (Law 15/2009 ‘Disposizioni in materia di sicurezza pubblica’) and by some subsequent decrees of the Minister of the Interior that impose strict guiding principles for local authorities when running crime and urban disorder programmes. Within this new framework, the national government has also clearly displayed a turn toward a ‘tough’ approach to crime (Mosconi, 2010) mostly based on an increase in control measures, on the criminalisation of behaviours, including those behaviours that were once considered expression of social deprivation and marginality, and not of a predisposition to crime and, finally on increasing punishment for street crime and other violent behaviours. This change has important consequences for the idea and practices of social crime prevention. Firstly, a national programme for urban safety was launched in 2009,14 with the aim of supporting those local projects, mostly based on CCTV and other situational measures in urban design, 14 See the art. 61, comma 18, Law 6 August 2008 n. 133: “Fondo per la realizzazione di iniziative urgenti per il potenziamento della sicurezza urbana e la tutela dell’ordine pubblico”. Once again, the label used is the one of “urban safety” instead of “crime prevention”, where urban safety is now interpreted as a part of “public safety” and therefore a task for the national government.

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diverting funds towards these crime prevention measures. Secondly, the national government strongly enforced the instruments of ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’ with local governments – a pre-existing form of partnership for implementation of local safety plans that was never very successful – stressing however the leading role of the local prefectures in defining priorities and measures. Social crime prevention plays a minor role in these new ‘protocols for local safety’, whereas police patrolling and CCTV are once again strengthened. Regional laws and local municipal projects have been remarkably affected by this new national strategy, and their role – together with the socialinclusionary rationality that underlined them – has been devalued in public discourse and practices. Social crime prevention as part of the former infrastructure of crime prevention has been devalued as well. The most important change that the government proposed to control minor crime and disorder is, however, the so called ‘ordinanze amministrative’ (administrative orders). This instrument was already used by mayors to keep some forms of disorder and incivility under control, but with some important restrictions in time, space and content. A Minister of the Interior decree in 2008 cancelled these restrictions and defined these administrative orders in detail, making them closer to criminal measures and in some ways similar – even though their legal nature is different – to the antisocial behaviour orders implemented by the New Labour governments in the UK during the 2000s. These orders are aimed at controlling routinely – and not just on the grounds of urgency – ‘behaviours’ and ‘situations’ related to crime or disorder, in different ways. They can impose new obligations on citizens, especially on some citizens, new prohibitions that sometime overlap with criminal offences, sometimes anticipate new criminal offences, or that make a current criminal offence more specific and easier to enforce. Mayors – in their new role as government officers – can issue an administrative act ‘in order to prevent and to eliminate serious dangers that pose a threat to public safety and to urban safety’,15 in the following cases and to deal with these problems: 15 It is worth noting that this is the first legal definition of “urban safety” at a national level, as: “A public good to protect and defend, inside local communities, through the improvement of civic rules, and with the aim of making the conditions of life in

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•

•

• •

“Urban decline and similar conditions that represent a good environment for the development of crime phenomena, like drug dealing, exploitation of prostitution, begging involving children or disabled persons, and violence related to alcohol abuse.” “Situations that favour the insurgence of behaviours like damage to public or private properties or that impede the use of those properties and that provoke a general urban decay”. “Situations which impair the mobility of people or that alter urban life, especially the illegal selling of goods and illegal occupation of public spaces”. “Those behaviours (like prostitution and aggressive begging) that represent an offence to public decency, or that seriously impair the free use of public spaces, or that make that use more dangerous”.

If the orders – that are based on administrative powers as a first step – are breached, the consequence is a – minor – criminal violation, punishable with a fine. It is evident that these orders are mostly addressed to those problems once considered a ‘social problem’ and they attempt to re-criminalise behaviours once decriminalised, like street prostitution and vagrancy. The use of these orders is, in Italy as in some other contexts,16 part of a developing penal culture that stresses the shift from social crime prevention to situational prevention, of fear of crime and the role of victims and a strong concern about disorder and incivility. They are also welcomed by a widespread punitive popular crime culture and strongly supported by governments and political cultures that – using Simons’ (2007) words – are ‘governing through crime’. In Italy as in the UK, or Spanish or NorthAmerican experiences, politicians promoting the new legislation wanted to reassure the public that the kinds of behaviour troubling them would now be addressed in a faster and more efficient way.

urban centres better and also to strengthen social cohesion” (Ministerial Decree 5 August 2008). 16 Among the wealth of British literature on ASBOs, see Burney (2005) and, for the USA, Beckett and Herbert (2010). It is in any case worth noting that the newly elected British government in February 2011 announced its intention to abolish ASBOs and to replace them with “criminal orders”, whose features are not yet clear. A few months later, in April 2011, the Italian Constitutional Court declared the Mayors Administrative Orders partially unconstitutional, but – apparently – they will be reintroduced soon through a new legislative act by the government.

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Many social problems and social groups have been affected by these new municipal regulations: street prostitution, homelessness, young people drinking in public spaces – or simply loitering – , gypsies. The orders also proved useful in reinforcing the stigmatisation and control of immigrants.17 Administrative orders and criminal laws reinforce each other in a complicated game of interactions: criminalising behaviours once decriminalised (vagrancy, begging18 and prostitution are the best examples); the number of behaviours that are under a double regime (both administrative and criminal, like prostitution related crime) is increasing; using selective enforcement of administrative orders to circumvent the absence of a criminal offence – like in the case of the Roma people mentioned in note.18 Finally, it is important to note in this context that the enforcement of administrative/criminal orders is partially replacing the social crime or disorder preventive measures. Many mayors, who could once have addressed the same problems through a social measure (street workers, shelters, social support etc.), now find it simpler, less expensive and more symbolically productive for increasing their political appeal among citizens, to issue and administrative order.

7. Recent Changes and Further Developments While in the last twenty years, situational crime prevention in most European countries became the most widespread category of crime prevention, social approaches to crime are now seen as obsolete, extremely expensive, impossible to evaluate, or considered ineffective on crime trends. 17 The most interesting case is the selective enforcement of orders concerning begging. Roma people, after Romania became part of the European Union, cannot be considered illegal immigrants. Since they represent the highest percentage of beggars in Italian public space, the administrative orders against beggars are actually mostly anti-Roma measures, which get round the state’s inability to criminalise Roma on the grounds of an undocumented immigrant status. 18 Begging was decriminalised in Italy by a sentence of the Constitutional Court, and later “aggressive begging” – still prohibited till 1998 – was decriminalised by a law. Currently, begging is one of the most common forbidden behaviors in Italian administrative orders. Moreover, the aforementioned Law 15/2009 – that represented a shift to a tough “zero tolerance” approach toward minor crimes – created the new crime of “using young people in begging”, that is also one of the behaviors potentially deserving of an administrative order. Without re-introducing the crime of vagrancy, the same law also included new rules that remarkably affect the living conditions of homeless people, especially when they are also beggars. 226

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This shift is also occurring in Italy, even though it is never officially declared, and even if there is no evidence, based on some kind of scientific evaluation, of this assumption.19 It is a matter of fact, anyway, that social crime prevention measures are on the one hand, less common in local safety plans and, on the other, less and less supported by national governments. A shift in the understanding of social problems has also occurred, especially in the sphere of public opinion. Crime and disorder, or simply behaviours that once were confined to the realm of social maladjustment and viewed – and treated as – social problems, moved slowly but surely during the 1990s to the sphere of individual responsibility and criminalisation.20 In the context I have just described, social prevention, when integral to local safety policies, is changing its nature and features in everyday practice in several different ways. Firstly, the prevailing situational rationality also began to permeate also those measures that we once used to call ‘social’: the short-termism that now characterises many ‘social’ measures is an example of this change. Secondly, social interventions are more and more used as auxiliary measures to situational intervention. Good examples of this dynamic are programmes addressing street prostitution. At the beginning of the 1990s, most of these programmes were based on an idea of prostitutes as victims of trafficking and exploitation (especially because most of them were actually trafficked immigrant women from central Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe) and on an idea of prostitution as a social problem that could have been reduced through education, communication campaigns, social and health services for prostitutes and helping them to change their lives. In many areas of the country, street workers – also enforcing a national programme against trafficking – were approaching prostitutes offering help and support, housing

19 Evaluation of the impact of social crime prevention in Italy is very uncommon. Only a few big programmes run in Northern Italy, mostly based on urban renewal, have been evaluated by an external independent evaluator, and even in these cases the evaluation concerns almost exclusively the process and not the impact of the programme. This is due to the general lack of a culture of evaluation in Italy, of an expertise in this field of research, and in the weak availability and reliability of data. 20 A dynamic which has been defined also as “criminalisation of social problems” and already analysed in different European contexts (Hebberecht & Duprez, 2001; Pitch, 2006).

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them in shelters when necessary and finding them jobs. Over the years, however, local and national police also approached the problem in a more repressive way, through administrative forms of banishment and through traditional repressive tools. The two approaches soon became incompatible and the effort to ‘coordinate’ them was increasingly unsuccessful. In some cases a social workers’ minibus just started to offer some health services, a sort of humanitarian assistance where changing people lives was no longer the main goal. Important cutbacks in the support of social policies in general resulted in social programmes concerning prostitution being reduced, while control and repression were increased. The creation of administrative orders banishing street prostitution – mentioned earlier – definitively weakened the social approach to the problem. One more change affecting social crime prevention concerns the recipients of the measures: these are no longer only potential offenders, but also potential victims, and their perception of insecurity. The development of local safety policies, with their broad aims of preventing both crime and a feeling of insecurity, support practices that are oriented towards potential victims of crime as vulnerable subjects, whose protection needs to be balanced with the efforts to help potential offenders. Social reassurance – a broad concept under which we can find different measures aimed at preventing fear of crime and feeling unsafe, or conflicts within neighbourhoods and among different social groups – is now increasingly used to define a new way to put social crime prevention into practice (Baillergeau, 2007). Finally, social crime prevention is more and more losing its general aim of modifying the structural context that favoured crime, and is often becoming articulated in less ambitious practices. More precisely, social crime prevention measures, especially those adopted in local safety projects, clearly show a shift from aiming to intervene radically in the causes of crime through social reform, to simply offering ‘humanitarian’, but often shortterm solutions, for some disadvantaged groups. This ‘loss of focus’ of social crime prevention, above all when these measures are mixed with situational ones in the context of local safety policies, is now documented in many different contexts,21 and it has been explained as the 21 Gilling (2001) points out this change in the context of some British mixed crime prevention programmes, where social reassurance measures also embrace CCTV and formal street surveillance. The broadness of this change in social crime prevention is also testified to by Sutton and Cherney (2002) with reference to Australia. 228

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result of its contemporary “informational and conceptual ambiguity (that) opens the doors to multiple and contradictory political interests, and at the end of the day, makes it vulnerable to co-option by conventional crime control agendas” (Knepper, 2007: 140).22 Together with these changes in the content and features of social crime prevention, a further issue that is worth noting is the recent emergence of developmental crime prevention, or, better, risk-focused crime prevention, as an alternative to traditional social prevention, or as a different way to conceptualise it. In the opinion of the supporters of this approach to crime prevention (Savona, 2004), crime and antisocial behaviours are the result of individual or family social maladjustment and/or of an individual predisposition rather than of social inequalities and structural factors. The combination of risk-focused crime prevention and situational crime prevention are considered by these scholars to be a new alliance that could provide a promising way of reducing crime. This view – or re-interpretation – of social crime prevention is, however, still uncommon in the Italian context, and very few programmes based on this assumption have been enforced, both because of a lack of resources to implement expensive and long early prevention programmes, and because of the lack of scientific knowledge and expertise on this approach, which is quite far removed from the Italian culture of crime prevention.

8. Some Conclusive Remarks As a consequence of the processes and changes I have described in these pages, the role, and above all the visibility, of social crime prevention in Italy is nowadays even weaker than it was ten years ago. Despite the ambiguities I mentioned earlier in this paper, the local safety projects of the mid 1990s were able to give a conceptual and practical basis – or just a different label – for the development of social crime prevention measures. Even though they were often combined with situational approaches, and even though – as I mentioned before – they were at risk of losing their traditional features, many social crime prevention initiatives were substantiated in Italy for more than a decade. 22 Very few scientific works are now seeking to put social crime prevention back on the stage, trying also to make it compatible with the new needs of the risk society and the new shape of safety policies (Baillergeau, 2007; Knepper, 2007).

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Once the national government replaced the pre-existing infrastructure of crime prevention created by local governments – under the label of ‘local safety plans’ – with the new approach to crime and disorder that I have described earlier in this paper, social crime prevention seems to be disappearing. This is not, anyway, entirely true. We could talk, instead, of a ‘disappearance’, of an increasing ‘invisibility’ of social crime prevention from the public, political and scientific discourse on crime and disorder. Even if its role is weaker, its traditional features are changing, and the resources are reduced, it is also true that social crime prevention measures23 still survive as part of local culture and crime prevention practices. Many relevant projects in Italian cities are still ongoing, for instance some large projects aimed at revitalising public housing estates or deprived neighbourhoods, providing social support for residents and urban renewal, as well as many of the more traditional and smaller scale projects that I have described in these pages. What is unknown, and almost impossible to foresee, is how long these projects will go on and if the pervasive punitive culture and practices that are now so widespread in Italy will end up being so strong that they make social crime prevention not just ‘invisible’, but a minor and totally irrelevant part of our crime prevention strategies and practices.

Bibliography Ambrosini, M. (2001). La fatica di integrarsi [The Challenge of Integration]. Bologna: Il Mulino. Baillergeau, E. (2007). Intervention sociale, prévention et contrôle social: la prévention sociale d’hier à aujourd’hui [Social Intervention, Prevention and Social Control: Social Prevention Then and Now]. Deviance et société, 32(1), 3-20. Barbagli, M. (1995). L’occasione e l’uomo ladro. Furti e rapine in Italia [Opportunity Makes the Thief. Thefts and Robberies in Italy]. Bologna: Il Mulino.

23 Most of these projects are concentrated in the region Emilia – Romagna, but see also, at the national level, FISU (2008), in which an overview of a hundred self-selected projects is described. The majority of them, even though never clearly described as ‘social crime prevention’, but, according to the usual Italian language, as ‘urban safety projects’, belong to the category of social crime prevention.

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Social Crime Prevention in Italy Barbagli, M. (1998). Immigrati e criminalità in Italia [Immigrants and Crime in Italy]. Bologna: Il Mulino. Barbagli, M., & Gatti, U. (2005). Prevenire la criminalità. Cosa si può fare per la nostra sicurezza [Preventing Crime. What We Can Do to Protect Our Safety]. Bologna: Il Mulino. Beckett, K., & Herbert, S. (2010). Banished. The New Social Control in Urban America. New York: Oxford University Press. Belluati, M. (2004). L’in/sicurezza dei quartieri. Media, territorio e percezioni d’insicurezza [The In/Security in the Neighbourhoods. Media, Territory and Feelings of Insecurity]. Milano: Franco Angeli. Braghero, M., & Izzi, L. (2004). Le legislazioni regionali [Regional Laws]. In R. Selmini (Ed.), La sicurezza urbana [Urban Safety] (pp. 245-257). Bologna: Il Mulino. Burney, E. (2005). Making People Behave. Antisocial Behaviour, Politics and Policy. Collumpton: Willan Publishing. Chiesi, L. (2004). Le inciviltà: degrado urbano e insicurezza [Incivilities: Urban Decay and Insecurity]. In R. Selmini (Ed.), La sicurezza urbana [Urban Safety] (pp. 129-140). Bologna: Il Mulino. De Leo, G. (1993). Complessità sociale e prevenzione della criminalità [Social Complexity and Crime Prevention]. Sicurezza e territorio, 12, 15-20. Fisu. (2008). Cento idee per la sicurezza [One Hundred Ideas About Safety]. Bologna: Fisu. Garland, D. (2001). The Culture of Control. Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gilling, D. (1997). Crime Prevention. Theory, Policy and Politics. London: UCL. Gilling, D. (2001). Community Safety and Social Policy. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 9, 381-400. Giovannett, I. M., & Maluccelli, L. (2001). Politiche di sicurezza e azioni di prevenzione nei comuni e nelle province della regione Marche [Safety Policies and Crime Prevention Actions in the Municipalities and Districts of the Marche Region]. Unpublished research report. Graham, J., & Bennet, T. (1995). Crime Prevention Strategies in Europe and North America. Helsinki: HEUNI. Hastings, R. (1998). La prévention du crime par le développement social: une stratégie à la recherche d’une synthèse [Crime Prevention Through Social Development : A Strategy in Search for a Synthesis]. Criminologie, 1(XXXI), 109-123. Hebberecht, P., & Duprez, D. (2001). Sur les politiques de prévention et de sécurité en Europe: réflexions introductives sur un tournant [Prevention and Security Policies in Europe: Introductory Reflections on the Turns]. Déviance et société, 25(4), 371-376. Killias, M. (2002). La criminalità in Italia. Uno sguardo dall’estero [Crime in Italy. A glance from outside]. In M. Barbagli & U. Gatti (Eds.), La criminalità in Italia [Crime in Italy] (pp. 269-278). Bologna: Il Mulino. Knepper, P. (2007). Criminology and Social Policy. London: Sage.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Melossi, D. (1999). Multiculturalismo e sicurezza in Emilia-Romagna: prima parte [Multiculturalism and Safety in Emilia – Romagna: Part One]. Quaderni di Cittasicure, 15. Melossi, D., & Selmini, R. (2000). Social Conflict and the Microphysics of Crime. The Experience of the Emilia – Romagna Città Sicure Project. In T. Hope & R. Sparks (Eds.), Crime, Risk and Insecurity: Law and Order in Everyday Life and Political Discourse (pp. 146-165). London: Routledge. Millie, A. (2008). Anti-social Behaviour, Behavioural Expectations and an Urban Aesthetic. British Journal of Criminology, 48, 379-394. Ministerio dell’ Interno (2007). Primo rapporto sugli immigrati in Italia [First report on immigration in Italy]. Retrieved July 14, 2011, from http://www. interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/15/0673_Rapporto_ immigrazione_BARBAGLI.pdf. Mosconi, G. (2010). La sicurezza dell’insicurezza. Retoriche e torsioni della legislazione italiana [Security of Insecurity. Rethoric and Ambiguities in Italian Laws]. Studi sulla questione criminale, V(2), 75-99. Nardi, L. (2003). Il senso di insicurezza [The Feeling of Insecurity]. In M. Barbagli (Ed.), Rapporto sulla criminalità in Italia [Report on Crime in Italy] (pp. 525-554). Bologna: Il Mulino. O’Malley, P. (1992). Risk, Power and Crime Prevention. Economy and Society, 21(3), 252-275. Pavarini, M. (1994a). Produrre le condizioni materiali della sicurezza [Producing Effective Conditions for Security]. Sicurezza e Territorio, 13, 15-22. Pavarini, M. (1994b). Bisogni di sicurezza e questione criminale [Demands for Security and the Crime Problem]. Rassegna italiana di criminologia, 4, 436462. Peyre, V. (1986). Introduction. Eléments d’un débat sur la prévention de la délinquance [Introduction. Elements of a Debate on Prevention of Delinquency]. Annales de Vaucresson, 1(24), 9-13. Pitch, T. (2001). Sono possibili politiche democratiche di sicurezza? [Are Democratic Safety Policies Possible?]. Rassegna italiana di sociologia, XLII(1), 137-157. Pitch, T. (2006). La società della prevenzione [The Society of Prevention]. Roma: Carocci. Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Robert, P. (1991). Les chercheurs face aux politiques de prévention [Researchers Coping with Prevention Policies]. In P. Robert (Ed.), Les politiques de prévention de la délinquance à l’aune de la recherche. Un bilan international (pp. 13-27). Paris: L’Harmattan. Savona, E. U. (2004). Ipotesi per uno scenario della prevenzione [Some Hypotheses for a Scenario on Prevention]. In R. Selmini (Ed.), La sicurezza urbana [Urban Safety] (pp. 273-283). Bologna: Il Mulino. Selmini, R. (2000). Le misure di prevenzione adottate nelle città italiane [Crime Prevention Measures in Italian Cities]. Quaderni di Cittasicure, 20b, 53-78.

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Social Crime Prevention in Italy Selmini, R. (2003). Le politiche di sicurezza: origini, sviluppo e prospettive [Safety Policies: Origins, Development and Perspectives]. In M. Barbagli (Ed.), Rapporto sulla criminalità in Italia [Report on Crime in Italy] (pp. 611648). Selmini, R. (2007). Criminology in Italy. Paper presented at the European Society of Criminology, Bologna. http://www.esc-eurocrim. org/newsletter/ April07ESCnewsletter.pdf Selmini, R., & Arcidiacono, E. (2010). Are Crime Rates Falling in Italy? Paper presented at the European Society of Criminology, Liège. http://www.esceurocrim.org/newsletter/Apr10ESCnewsletter.pdf Simon, J. (2007). Governing through Crime. How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear. New York: Oxford University Press. Sutton, A., & Cherney, A. (2002). Prevention Without Policy? The Cyclical Progress of Crime Prevention in an Australian State. Criminal Justice, 2, 325344. Young, J. (2001). Social Crime Prevention. In E. McLaughlin & J. Muncie (Eds.), The Sage Dictionary of Criminology (pp. 272). London: Sage.

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Social Crime Prevention in the Netherlands in the 2000s. A Marginalised but Enduring Line in Crime Reduction Evelyne Baillergeau

1. Introduction Assessing social crime prevention in the Netherlands is quite a challenge, since it is not a clear-cut issue in that country. Just as in some other parts of Europe, many initiatives, measures and projects may fall within the scope of social crime prevention, but few have ever actually borne a ‘social crime prevention’ label in the Netherlands. Furthermore, there is no official definition of social crime prevention among Dutch governmental bodies and the term ‘social crime prevention’ is hardly in use in Dutch academic literature. Instead, scholars refer to bestuurlijke preventie (administrative prevention, standing for extra-judicial prevention – Van Swaaningen, 2002; 2005), structurele preventie (structural prevention: Willem de Haan, 1989; 2001; Van Swaaningen, 2002) or offender-oriented prevention (Van Dijk & De Waard, 1991; 2009). A notable exception is the volume by Dirk J. Korf and colleagues (2007), where social crime prevention is understood as opposed to techno-prevention. Such a wide definition recalls a definition of social crime prevention that has been in common use in British literature about crime reduction over the past decade: social crime prevention as opposed to situational crime prevention. While the latter focuses on reducing opportunities to commit crime – through surveillance and/or target hardening – the former addresses ‘criminal motivations’ (‘an array of ideas and interventions oriented towards the prevention of criminality’ – Gilling, 2007: 187; Tonry & Farrington, 1995) or ‘criminal predispositions’ (Crawford, 1998: 101). Such a broad definition is valuable because it invites questions and causes exploration of alternatives to

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techno-prevention, which has been praised by many but has also generated criticism to a large extent (Gilling, 2007: 187; Hebberecht & Duprez, 2002). However, this understanding of social crime prevention could cover various perspectives of crime prevention, hence it does not give us much guidance in our plan to assess how the ‘social causes of crime’ are interpreted and turned into measures and practice.1 What are the possible interpretations of the social causes of crime considered in crime prevention? In Jock Young’s view, the social causes of crime lie in relative deprivation (Young, 1999). This relative deprivation can be reversed, by enhancing opportunities for potential criminals to achieve social status and economic expectations in a legitimate way. This brings to mind what Gilling called ‘distant causes’ (social inequalities), as opposed to ‘proximate causes’ (parenting, poor community infrastructure) (Gilling, 2007: 187). Proximate causes are indeed diverse and possibly connected to different interpretations of crime causation. According to Pease (2002), crime prevention may target (besides situations) either structures – ‘through economic and social change, especially by reducing inequality or levels of social exclusion’ – or psyche, when crime is seen as a ‘product of the human psyche’, which is to be ‘reformed’. Such nuances are worth considering since the rise of ‘developmental crime prevention’ (Tremblay & Graig, 1995; Loeber & Farrington, 1998). Over the last few years, in a number of Western countries, crime prevention policies have increasingly reflected a shift away from sociological interpretations and towards psychological/behavioural interpretations of the causes of crime. How about the Netherlands? Does social crime prevention now equal developmental crime prevention, as in some other countries? It makes sense to wonder, because the label ‘social crime prevention’, as well as the label ‘structural prevention’, was absent in recent policy evaluation work (Van Noije & Wittebrood, 2008). Furthermore, there is an obvious focus on individual behaviour in an increasing number of governmental crime reduction programmes, such as in the Dutch version of ‘Communities That Care’ (Steketee et al., 2006). However I would like to argue, that although social crime prevention has never been given prominence in crime prevention at a policy level in the Netherlands, unlike in France or Norway, it has been implemented in a great variety of long-lasting measures and practices, some

1 The definition provided by Jock Young for social crime prevention is as follows: ‘Measures to prevent crime which are aimed at the social causes of crime rather than those concerned with the mechanical reduction of opportunities (situational crime prevention) or with deterrence (the criminal justice system)’ (Young, 2001: 272).

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of which are still in operation. Despite its enduring character, Dutch social crime prevention has been severely marginalised over the past decade. Therefore, this chapter will focus on the fate of crime prevention policy and measures, based on a sociological interpretation of the social causes of crime (which I will call social crime prevention), and question the balance between the latter and merely behaviour-based prevention policy and measures, and also, of course, situational crime prevention. In doing so, I will show that the Dutch ‘structural’ crime prevention view embodies the relative deprivation perspective to a large extent, since the point is to enhance opportunities for potential criminals to achieve social status and economic expectations in a legitimate way. This is achieved by fostering the professional skills and employability of young people and providing them with work experience programmes, as well as by dragging early dropouts towards appropriate education. However, according to the Dutch understanding, enhancing social status can also be achieved by addressing the feeling of relative deprivation through strengthening self-esteem among marginalised groups and fighting negative discrimination. This implies complementary, but slightly different measures and practices, relying on other theoretical underpinnings, namely the social control theory (Hirschi, 1969). A common methodological problem in the study of social crime prevention derives from the fact that it is applicable to measures and practices which do not bear any direct crime prevention label (some were born in another context such as urban regeneration and some do not even lay claim to a prevention label) (Gilling, 2009). However, social policy and crime reduction have been slightly intertwined for more than a decade in the Netherlands and a wide diversity of measures have been subjected to evaluation with regard to their contribution to crime reduction. Therefore, I will consider all the policies and measures that Dutch criminologists regard as crime prevention outside the judicial field2 and/or that have been subjected to official evaluation with regard to crime reduction. In so doing, I will not only consider crime prevention projects that qualified for (quasi) experimental

2 This implies not considering measures such as werkstraffen (work penalties) applying to first time offenders (Nabben et al., 2010). Given the ongoing trend towards the penalisation of minor youth crime, the profile of first offenders involved in work penalties is possibly not strongly different from those of some young people labelled ‘at risk’ and involved in extra-judicial measures. However, including all judicial preventative measures would induce, in the Dutch case, a significant enlargement of the scope of this chapter and possibly be misleading.

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evaluation design (Van Noije & Wittebrood, 2008) but also those that were evaluated according to a mixed design (Korf et al., 2007). I will therefore refer to a wide range of contrasting literature. Some authors, such as Van Dijk and De Waard (2009), stress continuity and consensus in Dutch crime prevention policy since the 1980s, while Van Swaaningen (2002) and Rood-Pijpers (1995) stress conflict and domination dynamics since the early days of the central government’s commitment to crime prevention in 1983. In spite of such contrasts, all the authors clearly include social crime prevention (‘structural’ prevention in their words) within the field of crime prevention. In Van Dijk & De Waard’s typology of crime prevention (2009), ‘offender-oriented preventive measures’ are to be considered both at the level of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. In 1995, Fijnaut argued that Sociale vernieuwing (Social Renewal, pitched as a national programme for urban regeneration) aimed at fighting criminality, which he regarded as closely connected to other important social problems such as employment, housing and education, and which could only be tackled together with these other social problems (Rood-Pijpers et al., 1995). De Haan’s understanding of structural crime prevention also includes social programmes of this kind (1989; 2001). As a matter of fact, a wide array of Dutch social programmes has been aimed at crime reduction over the last two decades, as we shall see below, leading to a broad scope for crime prevention, probably larger than in neighbouring countries such as Germany. Regarding the recent period, the review is substantially limited by the marginalisation of independent evaluation in the matter of crime reduction in the Netherlands over the past decade (Van Noije & Wittebrood, 2008).

2. Brief Historical Outline of Crime Prevention Policy in the Netherlands According to Van Swaaningen (2002), the Dutch criminal legal system has fulfilled a preventive function towards (sentenced) offenders, but also towards other potential criminals (deterrence) since the 1880s, in the context of what Garland (1985) called a penal welfare complex. Just as in other Western countries, there was a significant shift in the 1970s, leading to the prominence of two different systems of crime control: (1) the classical criminal justice system (Rule of law and welfare rationale) with punitive, retributive aspects stressed more than before (hyper-incarceration) and (2) penal welfare continued though in a new pragmatic rationale of risk-

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management (before the fact approach). In the 1970s, extra-judicial crime prevention originated in police circles as a result of the growth of recorded crime and the fall of the response rate. In order to deal with a significant increase in the policing workload, Dutch police started providing the general public with preventive information (in Amsterdam as from 1974 – Van Swaaningen, 2002; Rood-Pijpers et al., 1995). The Dutch situational crime prevention approach was born, primarily based on technological measures but explicitly aiming at changing ‘mentalities’ and behaviours (governmental plan Politie in verandering, 1977). So-called ‘administrative prevention’ first consisted of police intervention, but soon explicitly called for the involvement of other professionals. For instance, as far as vandalism prevention was concerned, surveillance schemes such as neighbourhood watch were launched in 1979 under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, with the purpose of reinforcing both objective and subjective security (Van Dijk & De Waard, 2009). During the first few years, Dutch crime prevention was primarily of a situational kind. However, crime reduction soon gradually became entwined with social policy, The Netherlands having generated one of the most farreaching Welfare States in Europe, incorporating both corporatist and Nordic models (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Several authors use the Halt project as an illustration of this trend. Halt was launched in Rotterdam in 1981 and consisted of community-based work as an alternative sanction for first time minor offenders. Halt’s evaluation was highly positive (Van Dijk & De Waard, 2009: 140; Rood-Pijpers et al., 1995) and it is still in operation. However Halt cannot be regarded as a social crime prevention programme, but rather as an illustration of an early collaboration between long-lasting actors from the judicial field and social workers (Van Swaaningen, 2002). During the 1980s, while youth criminality became a prominent issue in the Netherlands, there was an intense political fight, pitting two opposing views against one other, with, on the one hand, a risk-management and control perspective, fostering situational crime prevention and, on the other, a ‘structural’ perspective, addressing the social causes of crime such as low job prospects and lack of social ‘inclusion’ among a significant share of young people (De Haan, 2001). However the former – which was supported by the right-wing parties – remained prevalent (Van Swaaningen, 2002). The two perspectives are reflected in the works of the Roethof Commission, appointed by the Parliament in 1983 in order to set the basis for a national crime prevention policy. Although the report of the Roethof Commission provided

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significant ground for structural prevention, the resulting policy document carried out by the central government3 – Samenleving en Criminaliteit (Society and Criminality Plan) – gave national crime prevention policy a risk-management tone from 1985 onwards, (Van Swaaningen, 2002; Fijnaut, 1995) as well as a focus on reinforcing informal social control (Van Dijk & De Waard, 2009). Nonetheless, certain measures/practices implemented in the field4 are instead oriented towards structural prevention, such as housing and neighbourhood renewal programmes, as a contribution to the improvement of living conditions in deprived neighbourhoods (De Haan, 2001). In 1990, a significant shift occurred at the level of policy intentions, thanks to the start of the Social Renewal Programme – launched by the Ministry of Home Affairs once the social democrats got back into the governmental coalition in 1988 – which had a strong emphasis on structural prevention. While facing persistent poverty, in spite of economic recovery, and a concentration of deprived households in certain areas, the point was to bridge the efforts of various policy fields in order to develop a global perspective on social problems in so-called deprived areas, crime included. In the social renewal programme, crime prevention was an official goal. Generally speaking, there was a shift from risk-group targeting towards risk-factor targeting, where the point was to offer ‘protective factors’ (RoodPijpers et al., 1995: 119, 123) such as strengthening self-esteem; offering opportunities to young people; developing educational skills; strengthening networks and positive role models; and improving professional skills and experience among young people. This new focus clearly reflects some inspiration inherited from both the relative deprivation theory and the social control theory. Actually Hirschi (1969) has been rather influential in the Netherlands (Junger-Tas, 1997). Yet, such a broad agenda was implemented through a rather wide set of measures, most of which fit within the social economic mainstream (job training; job creation) reflecting a strong imprint of the structural perspective in Dutch crime prevention policy. Overall, there was a strong emphasis on inclusion at policy level, even though situational 3 The Parliament and the central government are indeed key-players in Dutch crime prevention. However, the role of the mayors of the large cities should not be overlooked, since they took part in both raising petty crime (in the 1980s) and fear of crime (in the 1990s) as prominent public issues and they launched pilot projects in order to address these issues at a local level, involving non-judicial actors such as social workers. 4 From 1986 till 1990, 200 projects were funded for about 25 million euros, granted by central governmental measures, on the top of which some local funds were also involved (Van Dijk & De Waard, 2009, 136).

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crime prevention never moved to the background. This was soon confirmed by the rise of public safety as a mainstay of central governmental policy throughout the 1990s.

3. The Main Lines of Contemporary Crime Reduction Policy In 1993, public safety (veiligheid) emerged as a new policy topic, quickly coming to the fore (Boutellier & Van Stokkom, 1995) while the focus on crime was somehow lagging behind (Van Swaaningen, 2005). Fear of crime became a recurrent matter for investigation and measurement as well as a key ingredient in government policy, under the so-called purple coalitions (1994-2002). As an umbrella for Dutch crime reduction policy, the proponents of Integraal Veiligheidsbeleid (Integral Safety Policy, launched in 1993) strove to combine situational crime prevention and the Social Renewal Programme, later called the Big City Policy (Grotestedenbeleid as from 1994). While in England and Wales, the surveillance agenda primarily relied on CCTV, the Dutch surveillance programme consisted of human surveillance (Van Dijk & De Waard, 2009). In practice, some jobs were created in the non-profit sector, with both surveillance and assistance tasks. Moreover, jobs such as ticket inspectors on public transport and caretakers in public housing estates supposedly offered some professional experience to the long-term unemployed, while improving the quality of life of fellow citizens. By providing more control (possibly ending up with more exclusion for suspected criminals) as well as chances to improve job prospects (possibly ending up with more inclusion for those holding the surveillance jobs), the Integral Safety Policy contributed to a blurring of the boundaries of situational and social crime prevention. However, there were also more clear-cut social crime prevention measures such as buurtbemiddeling (neighbour conflict mediation schemes), through which there were not only chances to discuss fear of crime and tensions, possibly unfolding from more serious incidents, but also chances to question images, clichés and stereotypes related to the various and possibly conflicting lifestyles, co-existing in urban areas (Peper et al., 1999). By promoting the concept throughout their estates, a number of non-profit housing associations became key-players in Dutch social crime prevention. The 1990s also witnessed the first pilot projects in truancy prevention (Van der Steeg & Webbink, 2006). In a significant share of governmental programmes,

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social cohesion was a consistent driver, as well as the inclusion of so-called vulnerable young people (Schuyt, 1995). From 1997 there was an increasing focus on the inclusion of young people of extra-European descent, with the launch of a specific programme with young people from ethnic minorities as an explicit focus (CRIEM-Nota). Two more major developments are to be credited to the mid-1990s, both unfolding from the focus on risk profiling. Firstly, the concerns for early risks gave rise to a long lasting developmental trend in Dutch crime prevention (Commissie Jeugdcriminaliteit, 1994; Junger-Tas, 1997). This was partly fostered by the increasing power allocated to councils regarding design and implementation of crime prevention policies from the mid-1990s onwards (Van Dijk & De Waard, 2009: 147); including greater financial and human investment in the development of inter-departmental databases (Schinkel, 2009). Secondly – not without a connection to the first point – the antisocial behaviour theme emerged in 1993 as part of the Integral Safety Policy. Anti-social behaviour became increasingly popular throughout the 1990s (especially since 1998) and gathered even more momentum by the beginning of the 2000s, both in the mass media and in nationwide political arenas (Koemans, 2010).5 Actually, in the Netherlands, the emphasis is not put on the term ‘anti-social behaviour’, as it is in England, but rather on ‘nuisance’ (overlast), which is as unstable and vague a term as anti-social behaviour is in England and Wales (Millie, 2008; Crawford, 2008) but is used mostly in the same way. The point is to raise awareness of ‘behaviour that is not penalised in itself but because of cumulative effects may generate a climate of tension and insecurity’ (CEC definition quoted by Koemans, 2010: 202).6 From 2002, a paradoxical era dawned, in which perceived nuisance declined in the Netherlands but tough approaches have been increasingly promoted by governmental bodies – under the leadership of the Christian-democrats (since 2002) – and praised by civil society (Van Swaaningen, 2008), especially when it comes to nuisance caused by young people of ‘Non-Western’ descent (according to the official understanding). While nuisance is often the first ‘chance’ for young people to come into contact with police forces, there is a strong belief in the assumption that nuisances lead to more serious forms of crime – especially when combined with other factors that are commonly 5 However anti-social behaviour was not a new issue in the Netherlands, since it was already topical at times during the earlier decades of the 20th century (Deben, 1988; 1989). 6 In the Dutch context, some of the acts involved in anti-nuisance measures can indeed be penalised as a result of certain local by-laws.

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interpreted as risk factors for a criminal career (such as having a sibling or friend engaged in a criminal career). This development recalls both the recent influence of the Broken Window theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982) in the Netherlands (Van Stokkom, 2005) and an old local tradition of reforming the deviant behaviour of ‘asocial’ people throughout the 1950s in a confident and positivist way (De Regt, 1984). While the social crime prevention line clearly vanished during the first three coalitions led by Christian democrat Jan Peter Balkenende (2002-2007), as suggested by Van Swaaningen (2005), there was a certain revival of social crime prevention in the period 20072010 (during the fourth coalition led by the Christian democrats), yet with a rather new (authoritarian) perspective.

4. Contemporary Social Crime Prevention: Between Policy and Practice Regarding the second half of the 2000s, Van Dijk & De Waard (2009) suggest a marginalisation of the structural perspective at governmental policy level, in relation to how it was viewed before. According to their analysis of the governmental policy document Veiligheid begint bij voorkomen (Safety Begins with Prevention, the 5th of the central governmental policy intentions for the 2007-2010 term), there was a shift towards more coercive forms of early intervention in at-risk families based in ‘socially problematic neighbourhoods’ and more coercive forms of approach in offender-oriented preventive measures, blurring the boundaries between offender-oriented crime prevention and probation (Van Dijk & De Waard, 2009: 145). In Van Noije & Wittebrood’s evaluation of safety and crime prevention policies in the Netherlands (2008), situational crime prevention is not in opposition to social crime prevention but, rather, to developmental crime prevention. Nonetheless, among the 250 projects carried out by 38 local communities across the Netherlands that were considered in the official evaluation of the ‘prevention policy 2001-2004’7 (Veenma et al., 2006), many could qualify as social crime prevention along the relative deprivation line (work experience programmes; help in finding work; school dropout prevention and more). However, there is also a clear focus on early intervention, targeting young children and parenting. Therefore, it seems that social crime prevention is still alive, but obviously it has to play in a busy and crowded arena. Throughout the 2000s, major cities – Rotterdam (since 2002) and Amsterdam (since 7 37 millions euros

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2008) – developed revanchist and exclusive agendas towards undesirable groups. However Uitermark and Duyvendak found out that in spite of their revanchist policy discourse, the Municipality of Rotterdam kept on promoting inclusive practices, such as promoting positive contacts among neighbours in public housing estates based in deprived areas and so forth (Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008). Does this mean that the exclusive line is purely rhetorical, or does it entail that target groups have to cope with conflicting drives, consisting of both exclusive and inclusive incentives? In order to get a better grip on current conditions in Dutch crime prevention, let us have a look at a long-lasting field of social crime prevention, namely street work. Since the 1950s, street work has been dealing with young people on the street, some of whom are involved, or supposedly involved, in criminal activity.8 Although street workers do not all claim participation in crime reduction, criminologists have regarded street work as an important drive in crime prevention (in particular in community crime prevention, but not exclusively) (McIver, 1966; Szabo, 1968; Robert & Lascoumes, 1974). Our recent qualitative research data about street work dealing with marginalised youth, labelled as ‘young people at risk’ – risicojongeren – in Amsterdam (2008-2009),9 confirms the importance of crime matters in current street work. In spite of a broad assignment (reaching out to ‘young people on the street’ in order to offer them the opportunity to enrol in additional training, work experience programmes or recreational activities), we could not help but notice that crime reduction and anti-social behaviour were very common issues in day-to-day interactions between street workers and young people. What has street work been doing about crime over the last few years in the

8 In American literature street work is also known as ‘curbstone counseling’ (Kobrin, 1962; Shaw & McKay, 1969). Street work possibly involves professional detached social workers and/or peer workers. 9 Or better: mobile youth work (ambulante jongerenwerk in Dutch). The point of the research was to explore the attempts made by professionals at reaching out to marginalised groups who are not applying for social assistance provided by governmental or semi-governmental bodies although they are entitled to and although they are widely regarded as facing social problems. The research consisted in analysing the rationales of such attempts and how they are embodied; how they are legitimised and what are the outcomes according to the frontline professionals and the target groups. The research was carried out in three Western metropolitan areas: Amsterdam, Montreal (Canada) and Barcelona (Spain). The Dutch part of the research focused on street work towards ‘young people on the street’ provided by four local welfare organisations (Baillergeau & Hoijtink, 2010; Baillergeau et al., 2009).

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Netherlands? To what extent does it fall under the scope of social crime prevention and what kind of social crime prevention is it about? ‘Young people at risk’ has been a popular topic in Dutch politics and policy over the last decade (Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, 2008; Rovers & Kooijmans, 2008). Since roughly 2000, youth workers have been increasingly urged to deal with young people at risk (Veenbaas & Noorda, 2005). In most cases, it is unclear which risks are involved and these are possibly various: young people at risk of early school dropout (and in turn at risk of early unemployment, since the Dutch labour market requires a high level of professional skills) but also at risk of crime or ‘nuisance’. Debts and drug addiction are also possible risks. Nuisance prevention or reduction is indeed a common topic for the street work practice under investigation. Either there is an explicit assignment for the street workers to take part in dealing with some reported ‘nuisance’, either by approaching the suspected young people and looking for solutions or where young people spontaneously report that they have been involved in criminal activities while interacting with a street worker. The challenge for the street worker is to provide them with alternatives, which will partly function as diversion or recurrence prevention. In both cases, the role played by street workers is firstly to understand the causes of nuisance and to provide alternatives to ‘pointless hanging around’ (get them off the street). There are several options for that: (1) get them enrolled in regular activities provided by neighbourhood centres (sport, music and so on); (2) when applicable provide them with guidance towards relevant agencies such as debt clearance support, work experience programmes and so on; and (3) get them enrolled in some specific projects through which young people will ‘discover talents’ and gain new skills. Let us look more closely at the last option, which appears to be very common in Amsterdam – indeed most of the street workers involved in the research were carrying out projects such as organising a kickboxing gala, organising a music festival and so on. These were also very successful, according to the (targeted/participating) young people who took part in the research. The involvement of the young people occurs at all levels: project definition; fundraising; applications for authorisations; publicity; approaching guestartists and/or –athletes for performance scheduling; practicalities; project evaluation. A major achievement frequently mentioned with regard to such projects – both by street workers and target groups – is that involvement in them provides young people with new skills that are regarded as valuable for their CVs and for job applications. As key players in such projects, Dutch

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street workers are fully in line with government policy guidelines on the need to enhance the employability of young people through the development of individual skills, the reinforcement of self-esteem and so on, while in other countries such as Canada, street workers and target groups prefer to stress the struggle amongst marginalised groups/identities for social recognition. But Dutch street work is also in line with most fields of practice involved in crime prevention, which does not focus on the ‘problems’ caused by young people but rather emphasises their ‘talents’, which need to be discovered and fostered (Korf et al., 2007). However, the prevalence of the focus on work does not imply the total disappearance of a collective perspective within crime prevention, as suggested by Robert (2009) with regard to the French case. Rather, the involvement of young people in project development provides them with a chance to collaborate with peers as a group and, later on, beyond their circle of peers, to approach policymakers or social housing estate managers. Moreover, the projects – when they are completed – can also play a role in reversing negative images of young people on the street amongst ‘ordinary citizens’ and visa versa. This is an important challenge, especially for young people of Moroccan descent, who have been heavily stigmatised in the Netherlands (De Jong, 2007). In so doing, these projects are in line with the relative deprivation perspective along a rather wide understanding, as they both directly improve job prospects and indirectly help boost self esteem and the ability to set up and to get involved in networks at a microlevel. These projects are also of an inclusive kind, recalling some practice inspired by the social control theory. Nonetheless, the research also clearly shows that this way of dealing with ‘young people at risk’ has obviously been challenged and further marginalised over the past decade. This is firstly due to cuts to governmental budgets for neighbourhood centres and youth work, but also to the development of conflicting orders/assignments and competition from new forms of outreach work directed at young people at risk in big cities. Indeed some street workers have to deal with conflicting assignments. On the one hand, since the focus of street work is on ‘hard to reach’ groups, the point is not only to approach and circulate leaflets but also to approach and investigate the tense relationship between these young people and mainstream society and, in turn, to provide ground for mutual trust and understanding as a prerequisite for further inclusion programmes. On the other hand, street workers are increasingly urged to take part in partnerships with other actors involved in community safety (local government and police included) and to provide information about young people who are suspected of crime and/or nuisance. In the

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present context, the wellbeing of the young people is no longer the primary concern it used to be in partnerships involving social work and police in the Netherlands (Baillergeau & Schaut, 2001; Korf et al., 2007). Assignments like providing information about young people, are definitely not compatible, since they jeopardise professional secrecy and the street workers’ chances of building ground for mutual trust and understanding with young people. In practice, these conflicting demands lead street workers either to resign or to resist the partnership orders – as is the case in the United Kingdom, although to a greater extent. Furthermore, street workers also have to deal with the increasing role of more coercive forms of outreach work towards young people at risk, such as the ‘street coaches’, sponsored by Amsterdam City Council since 2008 (Baillergeau & Hoijtink, 2010), consigning street work to little more than a control mechanism. Korf and colleagues (2007) provide a broader picture of Dutch social crime prevention, since their evaluation report is based on 41 projects carried out in 12 cities across the Netherlands, involving a great diversity of actors, such as the local police and social workers of many kinds. Their perspective is also broader, since the research relies on a broader understanding of social crime prevention (everything but techno-prevention), including some projects inspired by a developmental perspective (based on an individual or family approach, strongly behaviour-oriented). However Korf and colleagues confirm the continuity of prevention projects based on the assumption that criminality and/or nuisance can be reversed by addressing its social causes through projects aiming at preventing early school dropout or promoting guidance towards legal, paid work. For instance, regarding the young people suspected of or involved in causing nuisance in public places, some projects aim to compensate for the absence of a place for young people with a low income and small houses to socialise in their spare time, by providing them with either a place or projects through which they are challenged and/or invited to develop new skills as a team. The latter clearly recalls the projects carried out by the street workers in Amsterdam. Besides testifying to the continuity of social crime prevention, both researches also show the ongoing marginalisation of such drives in crime prevention within institutional circles. Korf and colleagues show that there is a gap between policy and practice, as a result of little knowledge among local policymakers and commissioners about what can possibly be achieved at the level of practice. Sadly, unrealistic goals can potentially lead to failure and, in turn, budget cuts, without the core problem having been addressed

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(2007: 174). This gap is often experienced as mistrust by frontline staff such as youth workers and street workers. Further on, both pieces of research show that social crime prevention is currently practiced in vulnerable working conditions. Many projects are carried out on the basis of short-term contracts, resulting in high turnover among frontline workers; problematic when continuity should be a must, as the point is to reverse multi-problematic marginalisation processes involving hard-to-reach and highly vulnerable cases. This confirms the marginalisation within institutional settings of professionals who have gained expertise in supporting marginalised groups’ talents to blossom, which was recently outlined in research by Van Lieshout and colleagues (2007).

5. Conclusion Starting in the 1980s, a strong thread running through early Dutch crime prevention policy has been the aim of strengthening the link between the young generation and mainstream society (De Haan, 2001). This may be achieved through a wide array of measures, some of which are directly accountable to fighting relative deprivation (such as enhancing job prospects on the labour market), some indirectly (such as housing and neighbourhood renewal programmes, as a contribution to the improvement of living conditions in deprived neighbourhoods – De Haan, 2001), while some measures could be accountable to other interpretations of crime causation, such as the social control theory (providing young people with alternative forms of socialisation and strengthening ‘social cohesion’ at a local level). A tradition of Dutch crime prevention policy is the combination of the various perspectives. Obviously there is a long-lasting interest in Dutch crime prevention for the sociological understanding of crime causation; first of all with deprived young people as a central focus (1980s) and increasingly young people of non-Western descent (since the 1990s). This is partly entwined with a longlasting focus on inclusive measures at policy level, at least where the focus on low prospects for low-skilled young people is concerned.10 Social cohesion is still a popular topic, although Dutch people seem to feel little hope about the 10 Yet it is not clear at this stage whether the cultural/ethnic understanding of crime causation result in specific actions such as anti-discriminatory measures among Dutch employers.

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chances of it succeeding through governmental policies (Van Swaaningen, 2008). However, the inclusive line in crime reduction has gradually shifted towards more coercive forms of inclusion such as mandatory guidance towards work or education for unemployed people, possibly linked with loss of social benefits. The non-coercive perspective still exists, although it is increasingly embodied by local small-scale projects focusing on individuals and their immediate living environment, from a social economic perspective. Some projects also have social cultural undertones, while working on the detrimental consequences of negative discrimination through specific targeted practices, but they seem rather modest when compared to the ongoing stigmatisation of Non-Western young men on the labour market. Although crime rates have dropped over the past few years, crime and fear of crime are still issues for young people living in so-called deprived neighbourhoods. The frequent-used label ‘young people at risk’ may apply to many risks, such as early school dropout or unemployment, but crime is also part of the picture in many cases. That these young people could be ‘dangerous’ is a long-lasting belief in Dutch society and paths towards inclusion in mainstream society often cross crime prevention, even if the risks at stake are increasingly unknown. While Van Dijk and De Waard indicate less focus on ‘vandalism and burglary or other petty crime’ and a move towards more serious forms of crime at policy level since 2007 (2009: 145), ‘petty crime’ is clearly still a label attached to young people on the street. Whether anti-social behaviour is resulting in more serious forms of crime or not, the management of ‘nuisance’ contributes to the marginalisation of young people of Non-Western descent in Dutch society. While consumption of expensive goods continues to nurture the expectations and the hopes of most Dutch young people (Guadeloupe, 2010), in spite of the persistence of lower job prospects among youth of Non-Western descent, it seems that the ‘discontent’ of these young people, which Jock Young regarded as a product of relative deprivation and a major root cause of crime, has hardly been addressed as a social problem of central importance in the Netherlands during the 2000s. Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Dirk J. Korf for his constructive and helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

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Social Crime Prevention in the Netherlands in the 2000s international de criminologie tenu à Montréal en 1967 (pp. 273-311). Montréal: Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal. Tonry, M., & Farrington, D.P. (eds.). (1995). Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (Vol. 19). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Tremblay, R.E., & Craig, W.M. (1995). Developmental Crime Prevention. Crime and Justice, 19, 151-236. Uitermark, J., & Duyvendak, J.W. (2008). Civilising the City: Populism and Revanchist Urbanism in Rotterdam. Urban Studies, 45(7), 1485-1503. Uitermark, J., Duyvendak, J.W., & Kleinhans, R. (2007). Gentrification as a Governmental Strategy: Social Control and Social Cohesion in Hoogvliet. Environment and Planning A, 39(1), 125-141. Van der Steeg, M., & Webbink, D. (2006). Voortijdig schoolverlaten in Nederland; Omvang, beleid en resultaten [Early School Leaving in the Netherlands. Magnitude, Policy and Results]. Den Haag: Centraal Planbureau. Van Dijk, J., & De Waard, J. (1991). A Two-Dimensional Typology of Crime Prevention Projects; with a Bibliography. Criminal Justice Abstracts, September 1991, 483-503. Van Dijk, J., & De Waard, J. (2009). Forty Years of Crime Prevention in the Dutch Polder. In A. Crawford (ed.), Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective (pp. 130-152). Collumpton: Willan Publishing. Van Lieshout, P.A.G., Van der Meij, M.S.S., & De Pree, J.C.I. (eds.). (2007). Bouwstenen voor betrokken jeugdbeleid [Bricks for Concerned Youth Policy]. ‘s-Gravenhage: Amsterdam University Press. Van Noije, L., & Wittebrood, K. (2008). Sociale veiligheid ontsleuteld. Veronderstelde en werkelijke effecten van veiligheidsbeleid [Social Safety Unlocked. Presumed and Actual Effects of Safety Policy]. Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau. Van Stokkom, B.A.M. (2005). Zero tolerance in de praktijk. Handhaving van de ‘kleine norm’ door politie of boa’s? [Zero Tolerance in Practice; Maintaining the ‘Minor Norms’ by the Police or Special Enforcement Teams?]. Justitiele verkenningen, 31(6), 44-59. Van Swaaningen, R. (2002). Towards a Replacement Discourse on Community Safety. Lessons from the Netherlands. In G. Hughes, E. McLaughlin & J. Muncie (eds.), Crime Prevention and Community Safety. New directions (pp. 260-278). London – Thousands Oaks – New Delhi: Sage. Van Swaaningen, R. (2005). Public Safety and the Management of Fear. Theoretical Criminology, 9(3), 289-305. Van Swaaningen, R. (2008). Sweeping the Street: Civil Society and Community Safety in Rotterdam. In J. Shapland (ed.), Justice, Community and Civil Society. A Contestes Terrain (pp. 87-106). Collumpton: Willan Publishing. Veenbaas, R., & Noorda, J. (2005). Het jongerenwerk bronnen 4, schoolboek voor mbostudenten [Youth Work Sources 4. School Book for MBO Students]. Bussum: EigenWijs.

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Social Crime Prevention in Norway Marit Egge and Helene I. Gundhus

1. Defining Social Crime Prevention in Norway 1.1. Introduction Historically crime prevention strategies have long traditions in Norway. Over the last 30 years, several different crime prevention measures have been applied, but social crime prevention has always had a significant following. This may be related to the Norwegian political system. Norway is a welfare state with low crime rates, and the preventive strategies – as well as the crime prevention strategies – are influenced by its social structures. In the field of crime prevention, several governmental bodies were established during the 1970s, which still exist and are recognisable today. However, different target groups have been identified, especially in the last ten years. In this chapter we present these changes, explore the understanding of social crime prevention in policy documents and contemporary practices, and look at general conditions and challenges for the future of social crime prevention in Norway. The Norwegian scientific literature that discusses social crime prevention (Bjørgo & Carlsson, 1999; Egge et al., 2008; Erstad, 1997; Knutsson & Søvik, 2005: 15; Lie, 2011) is grounded in established international definitions of situational and social crime prevention (Crawford, 1998; Hughes, 2007; Young, 2001). Social crime prevention is understood here, as opposed to situational crime prevention, in relation to changing the root causes of an individual’s potential crime, drawing on sociological, psychological and even physiological insights. In this chapter, we narrow this definition of social crime prevention. As a general background, we understand crime as socially constructed and exclude psychological and physiological causes. The

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main objective is to avoid social exclusion and marginalisation by improving inclusive aims through relationship building and community mobilisation.

1.2. Policy discourses on social crime prevention Social crime prevention is a term seldom used in Norwegian policy documents about crime prevention. The closest we come to an official definition is in two strategy plans drawn up by the Police Department at the Ministry of Justice (1997) and the Norwegian Police Directorate (2002: 16). Here, social crime prevention is defined as targeting individuals at risk of committing crime, and is referred to as person-oriented. It presupposes a traditional understanding of crime causations, including social, environmental, familial and individual causes of crime. One way to understand the limited use of the social crime prevention concept in Norway may be to see social crime prevention efforts as integrated parts of the Nordic model. The Nordic model is a concept where the state plays a key role in the protection and promotion of the economic and social wellbeing of its citizens. It is based on the principles of equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth, and public responsibility for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life. Many scholars have come to single out the four Nordic countries as a special type of welfare state that has been labelled ‘the universal welfare state’. This means that there is a broad range of social services and benefits that are intended to cover the entire population throughout the different stages of life, and that the benefits are delivered on the basis of uniform rules for eligibility. A typical example would be universal childcare or universal child allowances that are distributed without any form of means testing. Universal healthcare and health insurance are other examples. This type of welfare state model is distinguished from welfare states with selective welfare programmes that are intended to assist only those who cannot manage economically on their own. In a selective programme, the specific needs and the economic situation of each person seeking assistance must be scrutinised by an administrative process (Rothstein, 2010). The Nordic welfare model is often understood as including a political welfare perspective on crime prevention. By facilitating the inclusion of people in community life, through work, education and housing, the foundation for crime prevention efforts is laid. Crime reduction is not the main objective

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of these efforts, but much of what is done in a welfare perspective is crime prevention. In the Strategic Plan for Prevention (Ministry of Justice, 2009b), developed and harmonised by all ministries, the government aims to promote these aspects of general welfare measures in several areas. These general welfare measures are developed as crime preventive efforts in the action plan ‘Good Efforts’, an action plan particularly dominated by what we define as social crime prevention measures. Since there is no official definition of social crime prevention, we have developed three criteria which we use to determine whether a measure qualifies as social crime prevention or not. The criteria are: 1) preventing exclusion and promoting integration; 2) solving conflicts with emphasis on reconciliation and growth; and 3) counteracting isolation and stimulating participation.

1.3. Mapping the historical and institutional context The Minister of Justice, Inger Louise Valle, (Minister of Justice from 1973 to 1976) represented a break in Norwegian crime policy. She prepared White Paper 104 (1977-1978), which established a new perspective on Criminal Justice. The paper aimed at a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between crime and the existing social conditions and culture; and emphasised social crime prevention measures. It stimulated a broad debate about society and crime, and evaluated interventions other than imprisonment in response to crimes. The fight against crime was expanded from being a matter solely for judicial authorities to include all ministries with fields that affect the area of justice. The report called for administrative co-operation at all levels, from the Ministry to municipal agencies. There were several concrete results of the White Paper. Among the most important ones were the efforts to strengthen co-operation between different levels of governmental (including the police and criminal justice system) and non-governmental institutions that manage crime and disorder. Similarly, a project related to raising the age of criminal responsibility from 14 to 15 years had a major influence in the field of prevention through the National Mediation Service project, and The Norwegian National Crime Prevention Council (Det kriminalitetsforebyggende råd – KRÅD) was established. These two bodies still constitute crime prevention in Norway. Social crime prevention in contemporary Norway is unthinkable without these bodies.

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1.3.1. National Council (KRÅD): from situational to social crime prevention? KRÅD is central as a guiding principle for social crime prevention, but it has not always been so. When KRÅD was established (1980), the objective was to discuss systematically how public and private agencies could contribute to crime prevention. Through co-ordination, KRÅD should facilitate the above-mentioned co-operation between all levels of governmental bodies from the Ministry to municipal agencies. KRÅD was established using a similar model to the crime prevention Councils in Denmark (in 1971) and Sweden (1974) (Brå, 2001; Takala, 2005). All members are appointed by the Government.1 Originally, KRÅD was engaged in the work of preventing crimes against property, and was mainly oriented towards situational crime prevention. Central activities were physical planning in local areas, shaping housing environments, neighbourhood watch schemes and technical security measures for businesses and private individuals. Apart from some exceptions, few interventions were evaluated (Unstad, 1995). Since the 1990s, the efforts of KRÅD have been primarily focused on children and young people; their theoretical presuppositions are experience and research that show clear connections between social structure and social development, and between the influences of a person’s childhood and crime. KRÅD’s guiding principle is therefore to focus on various social institutions and authorities at a local and national level, and on the individual’s potential for change. But what we see is that these principles often lead to programmes that can be more accurately sorted under developmental crime prevention. This will be discussed in part 3.

1.3.2. The Mediation and Reconciliation Service In 1976, Nils Christie (1977) wrote a seminal article redefining conflicts as property. This alternative to the accepted understanding of crime interpreted a conflict as ‘owned’ by those directly involved in it and affected by the conflict, namely, the victim and the offender. They primarily – not the state 1 Today, the Crime Prevention Council has 11 members. According to its mandate, the Crime Prevention Council’s task is to collect and pass on knowledge about developments in crime and crime prevention measures. It does not have an affi liated research unit. The Council’s administration is attached to the Ministry of Justice, but is professionally independent, and the Council’s secretariat has six employees.

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– had a conflict that required resolution. Together with the government’s Report on Criminal Justice from 1978, the article pointed towards the desirability of alternatives to incarceration for juveniles. The Mediation and Reconciliation Service was established on the foundation of this understanding. For example, it is also part of the idea that mediation is less stigmatising than traditional criminal justice (Egge, 2004; 2007; Pabsdorff, 2010). At the beginning, the offender was the focus of the mediation processes, but gradually this has changed, and today there is much greater focus on the victim’s situation and the social preventive aspects of mediation.

1.4. Government politics and public spending Is there any difference in crime prevention policies when it comes to different political parties? Minister of Justice Valle represented the Labour Party. At that time, it was less likely that a right-wing party could have introduced such policy changes. Since 1997, three different coalition governments have produced three different crime prevention action plans (Ministry of Justice, 2005; Ministry of Justice, 2009a; White Paper 17 (1999–2000)).2 Despite differences in politics, we observe continuity rather than fracture in crime prevention discourses. Both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party share a belief in social prevention as a vision and value. However, compared with the first two plans from a majority of conservatives, the latest action plan, drawn up by a majority of the Labour Party, is more focused on understanding the social causes of crime. The Conservative Party coalition is focusing more on responsibilisation strategies that strengthen the moral choices of highrisk individuals to prevent them from committing crime. However, all three action plans emphasise an appeal to communities and partnerships to conduct effective crime prevention strategies, particularly in regard to

2 White Paper 17 (1999-2000) was written by a coalition between the Christian Democratic Party, the Centre Party and the Liberal Party (Bondevik’s first government). The action plan ‘Together against Children and Juvenile Crime’ (2005-2008) was a product of a coalition between the Conservative Party, the Christian Democratic Party and the Liberal Party (Bondevik’s second government) (Ministry of Justice, 2005). The last action plan ‘Good Efforts – Crime Prevention Action Plan; 35 Efforts for Increased Safety’ was written by a coalition between the Labour Party, the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party (Stoltenberg’s second government) (Ministry of Justice, 2009a).

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collaboration between the police and the municipalities. They also emphasise that the current involvement of the business and voluntary sectors is too small, and want more participation from these bodies. The greatest political difference is on punishment and prison, where conservatives are more critical of alternatives to prison than the Labour Party. In Norway, the budget for public spending on crime prevention comes from several ministries that share the cost of facilitating crime prevention interventions in communities. The activities are therefore integrated in municipalities and local communities’ budgets. For that reason, it is impossible to construct an overview of the total costs of these activities. Since the public sector has been so strongly developed, the efforts of local residents have traditionally been engaged in other enterprises. However, in recent years, considerable efforts have been made in the area of crime prevention by various humanitarian and religious organisations, such as Church City Mission, Red Cross and Save the Children, in line with the policy aims described above. Nevertheless, even voluntary organisations are eager applicants for municipal funding in the area of crime prevention.

2. Social Crime Prevention as a Field of Practice The rate of success when it comes to social prevention will depend on the possibilities the individual has to be included socially. The essence of social prevention – including social crime prevention – presupposes that society has a certain responsibility to open up for integration, reconciliation and participation.

2.1. Basic ideals for preventive practices in Norway All preventive practices, whether related to health, drugs or crime, are based upon several common pillars. One of these is collaboration. It has long been recognised that collaboration and co-operation is vital for prevention work. For example, co-operation is reflected at the highest level of governance.3 The 3 For example, if we look at the recent action plan ‘Good Efforts’ (Ministry of Justice, 2009a), we find that different ministries (Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, Ministry of Health and Care Services, Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry of Local Government and Regional Government) are responsible for different interventions, as well as collaborating in different formations.

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main objective is to facilitate local crime prevention efforts and initiatives through co-ordination. It is argued that proximity to problems is important to target crime appropriately and effectively; those who know the local conditions usually know best what is needed. In this respect, crime prevention is more advanced in the establishment of successful collaborating structures, and we will reflect more on the local crime prevention collaboration model (Samordning av Lokale Kriminalitetsforebyggende Tiltak – SLT) in part 3. Another pillar is early intervention. Early intervention was long understood as measures taken early in a child’s life. For example, police officers would visit the kindergarten, often bringing a teddy bear dressed like a police officer, and this was labelled crime prevention. Eventually, there was a demand for more analytical practices. The introduction of problem-oriented policing (POP) gave the efforts a different character. Early intervention was no longer tied to the child’s age, but to a risk and symptom assessment. As a result of a more focused and analytical approach to crime prevention, young people with a history of crime were also included as targets in social crime prevention strategies. The Norwegian criminologist Paul Larsson described this change ‘from Teddy Police to POP stars’ (Larsson, 2005). The third pillar is knowledge. Because of the complexity of social crime prevention as a phenomenon, it is important that several aspects of knowledge are preserved. Since practices within the field are based on personal and intuitive knowledge, it is essential to develop and exchange knowledge within the field of practice and in academic forms.

2.2. Preconceptions about the label ‘social crime prevention’ As we have already pointed out, there is a strong belief in Norway that the causes of crime are related to the social environment. There has been a similar trust in the welfare state being sufficient to prevent crime. The social pedagogic approach has had a strong bearing on these ideas. For example, it has long been believed that youth clubs have a crime prevention effect, even though there has been little analysis available to confirm that these measures lead to crime control or reduction, or reduction of fear. Through experience, it has been discovered that youth clubs and similar enterprises do not result in any preventive effect, and we notice an increase in programmes better related to personal behaviour. A noticeable result of this development is the establishment of The Norwegian Centre for Child Behavioural Development (see part 3).

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Our understanding of social crime prevention (avoiding social exclusion and strengthening reintegration processes to prevent future offending) brings it close to radical left communitarianism (Hughes, 1998: 104129). In contrast to conservative moral authoritarian communitarianism, radical left communitarianism recognises the crucial role of the state and economic policy in effecting greater social justice by support for institution building. Crime problems cannot be solved through self-help efforts and empowerment, nor through targeting the dangerous ‘other’ (Braithwaite, 1989). Despite the absence of precise definitions connected to social crime prevention in policy documents, we find descriptions of practices that, based on certain criteria, we will classify as social crime prevention. Our main criterion for a practice to be included will be that it represents a reciprocal attitude to the social reasons explaining crime. These practices have to be able to prevent marginalisation and provide for inclusion, reconciliation and participation. Hence, it is not the problem area per se that will decide whether a measure can be defined as social crime prevention or not; rather, the focus is on the extent to which this practice will oppose marginalisation. As an illustration, efforts to oppose bullying in schools can be a social crime prevention measurement if the approaches are: 1) addressing processes that provoke crime; and 2) can be directed to include all involved parties. On the other hand, anti-bullying programmes can lead to stigmatisation, whereby individual schoolchildren can be frozen out and excluded. Since 2008, three policy documents that describe crime prevention strategies and measurements have appeared (Ministry of Justice, 2009a; Ministry of Justice, 2010; Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, 2008). These include situational, developmental and social crime prevention. The strategies and measurements can be aimed at individuals, focus on parents, or consider changes in institutions as the main goal. Whatever the case, to be defined as crime prevention, they need to be focused towards structures, relationships or situations that cause crime, victimise or create insecurity. Next, we will focus on social crime prevention measures. The following measures are selected from the three most recent policy documents, and according to our definition we divide these into three main categories according to whether they: 1) prevent exclusion and promote integration; and/or 2) solve conflicts and emphasise reconciliation and growth; and/or 3) counteract isolation and stimulate participation.

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2.2.1. Measures to prevent exclusion and promote integration Marginalised young people may have many qualifications and develop many skills and strategies for coping. Sandberg and Pedersen (2011) conceptualise these skills, competence and knowledge, which are of value on the street as ‘street capital’. These qualifications are important for survival on the street, but often work poorly as inroads into the larger community. This group rarely finds that they possess the attributes and skills that society seeks. Therefore, a main strategy for integration is to ensure that they receive an education and develop the professional skills required for a job. Concrete measures aim to reduce the dropout rate from upper secondary school, and to increase the co-operation between educational establishments and parents. Co-operation between home and school is not a new strategy; what is new is the emphasis on it at this level of education. The job market is another main arena for inclusion, with job training programmes also being a central feature of social crime prevention. The job market for youths in Norway is better than in most other countries, but the level of unemployment is higher among young people than for the rest of the population, and marginalised youngsters are particularly excluded. Along with education and jobs, access to the housing market is the third important arena for integration. The housing market in Norway is characterised by a majority of homeowners. Without sufficient capital to buy a home, the alternative is a poor and expensive rental market. This often leads to poor housing conditions combined with high costs. The provision of the necessary capital through affordable, subsidised loans has been presented as a measure for crime prevention. It is a challenge to reach young people who do not actively seek help. Social work that actively reaches out to this group is a measure that, in particular, seeks to prevent exclusion and stigmatisation among marginalised youths. Henningsen and Gotaas (2008) describe outreach youth work as informal and as an activity that takes place in various arenas. Their study identifies three objectives that form the basis of outreach work: first, building relationships of trust between field-workers and marginalised young people; second, acquiring knowledge about the living conditions of marginalised young people; and third, providing assistance from responsible adults to young people in the target population of the outreach services. Other researchers are less optimistic, and point out that even if the objective of outreach youth

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work is to prevent exclusion, practical experience shows that field-workers do not always succeed, and sometimes even reinforce their status as a client (Sandberg & Pedersen, 2011). Many young people who are not included in educational programmes or in the job market experience a strong sense of failure. Increasing their experience of accomplishment in general is likely to have a positive effect on the process of integration. Measures aimed at qualifying for education, as mentioned earlier, constitute one category; other examples are social training, anger-management programmes, and programmes aimed at empowering girls by building self-confidence to reduce the risk of being exploited for criminal purposes (Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, 2008).

2.2.2. Measures to solve conflicts and emphasise reconciliation and growth Children and young people involved in conflict often have weak or broken relationships in general. Weak ties make them vulnerable to exclusion mechanisms. Practices aimed at building relationships are therefore of great importance within social crime prevention, for example, through ‘mentor support’ and building social groups, in projects where the main goal is to ‘chase friendship’. Restoring the social balance can also been seen as a strategy for inclusion and a necessary step towards integration. As for crime prevention, one should not underestimate the value of making amends. Lately, this aspect has been emphasised in crime prevention, and it has become a main strategy in alternative conflict resolution. The most significant measure tested within this area of crime prevention is the so-called ‘follow-up team’, which is a new way to use mediation in the work against youth crime. The target group is young offenders, especially the most violent and active criminals below the age of 18. Children growing up in homes where the parents are incapable of fulfilling their roles as carers, where the needs of the parents are prioritised before the needs of the children, or where children are exposed to or witness violence and abuse, are most vulnerable to relationship damage. Social crime prevention interventions are especially targeted at domestic violence. The argument is that those who grow up in a home marked by violence are at

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greater risk of developing violent behaviour. The target group is children who are exposed to various forms of violence, abuse or neglect. In the recent action plan ‘Good Efforts’ (Ministry of Justice, 2009a), crime is strongly connected to drugs and drug abuse. Mental health and crime are also connected, but the causation is seen as weaker. Child welfare authorities are the main intervention bodies for small children with unacceptable living environments in their homes. In Norway, the most commonly used procedure for children who cannot live in their homes is a foster home. When the children are older, institutions become more common. However, in recent years local projects that involve young people staying in their community have been initiated, and major resources have been employed to build relationships and trust. Relationship building is conditioned by long-term, close and stable follow-up, and is one of the most demanding tasks in social work (Carlsson, 2005; Egge & Barland, 2009).

2.2.3. Measures to counteract isolation and stimulate participation The third strategy for preventing marginalisation is to counter the formation of isolated groups parallel to society, and to stimulate participation instead. A vital ingredient for success is the sense of belonging and trust, which is strongly connected to whether the individual feels that he or she has a clearly identifiable position in the family, the local community, educational institutions or working life. Furthermore, it is crucial for the individual to have faith in the set of values that society is based on, and to have belief in the main institutions of society. There is often the experience of double mistrust. School dropouts usually have little faith in the educational system; on the other hand, the school might have limited confidence in the pupil’s capacity for change. It is most important for the school system – as the professional entity – to develop practices that build confidence. This mutual mistrust is most evident in the relationship between the police and juvenile gangs. Little or no faith will reinforce the experience of marginalisation with already marginalised young people. In recent years, this effect has come to the attention of the Norwegian police, and efforts have been made to increase faith amongst young people. This has mainly focused on improving communication and in particular on making contact in ‘times of peace’. A strategy document for a five-year plan

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emphasises the responsibility of the police in preventing marginalisation by building trust with all groups of the population, with a special focus on new sections of the population (Norwegian Police Directorate, 2010). Training courses to gain knowledge about Norwegian society and democracy have been established for newly arrived immigrants, and meeting places for dialogue between NGOs and public authorities have been allocated. The police have put considerable effort into working to establish a better dialogue and freedom of speech. This has legitimacy and value far beyond crime prevention, but taken together with other measures, it aims to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism.

2.3. Participants involved As a consequence of the Norwegian social system, the people involved in social crime prevention measures are mostly employed in the public sector. The practitioners are professionals employed as social workers, police officers and educational staff, working at different levels within the municipality, the national police or the province. In recent years, considerable efforts have also been made in the area of social crime prevention by various humanitarian and religious organizations. Social crime prevention policies are influenced to a minor degree by commercial interests or the private sector. An exception is the insurance company Tryg, which supports a measure called Night Owls (Natteravner) that is aimed at making public spaces safer for young people. In general, however, co-operation between local police and the private sector is quite limited, which means that there is an absence of commercialism in the crime prevention field.

3. Social Crime Prevention in Context 3.1. Situational crime prevention as an adjunct The Ministry of Justice’s (2009a) action plan on crime prevention focuses mainly on social and developmental crime prevention, with the latter understood as early intervention and risk profi ling. Situational crime prevention only occurs as a concept in action plans drawn up by the police,

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where problem-oriented policing is presented as the main police strategy (Ministry of Justice, 1998; National Police Directorate, 2002). Here, it is argued that only situational crime prevention has relevance for the police. Because it is not part of the role of the police to change individuals, it is considered that other professionals should perform social crime prevention (Balchen, 2004: 8).4 However, the implementation of situational crime reduction initiatives in Norway is rather limited (Gundhus, 2011). In general, crime prevention has been downgraded within the police (Larsson, 2005). Public police practices are characterised by a traditional occupational culture, and adaptation strategies such as the pragmatic use of situational crime prevention receive marginal attention in everyday police work (Gundhus, 2011). Situational crime prevention is often introduced by dedicated police officers in the form of bottom-up initiatives with support in police action plans. However, there has been some important co-operation between researchers at the Norwegian Police University College and special police districts in projects concerning situational crime prevention (Knutsson, 1997; 2003; Knutsson & Søvik, 2005; Knutsson & Clarke, 2006). In government crime prevention action plans, elements from situational crime prevention have also been suggested as ways to reduce opportunities for crime; for example, the seizure of knives from youths, which may prevent violence, and the application of reduced opening hours for bars and restaurants (Ministry of Justice, 2009a: 47). Research on situational crime prevention interventions such as closed circuit television (CCTV) in Norway concludes that such technologies are mainly used in the private sector (Lomell, 2004, 2007). Only the police in Oslo have adopted CCTV in a certain area and have used it as a crime prevention method, without connecting it to POP and situational crime prevention. Lomell’s (2007) study also shows that the police in Oslo use CCTV to a large extent to identify under-aged drug abusers, and to share the information with child welfare agencies in a social crime prevention package.

4 As Balchen (2004: 9) explains in the National Police Directorate’s guidelines for the introduction to POP: when it comes to influencing ‘mechanisms on the personal level, there are other professionals than the police who have the greatest responsibility and authority to do something about the situation. The reason for this is that the police do not have formal qualifications to conduct person-change work.’

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3.2. Responsibilisation strategies – individualising social problems In Norwegian discourses, and even in the literature, social and developmental crime prevention is often treated as being the same concept. Social problems are socially constructed, to be solved through different types of programmes that do not go through an overall evaluation (Carlsson, 2002). Yet, managing the complexities of social problems by means of different types of programmes has many unintended consequences or side effects, since it addresses symptoms rather than social causes of crime. For example, programmes are often isolated interventions, and when one person is the target in several programmes at once, these programmes may undermine each other’s effect. Also, programmes most often aim to control the crime, rather than attempt to understand its causes and do something with the roots of crime. Social explanations of crime are marginalised, particularly those emphasising socio-economic factors, and it is difficult to separate cause from effect (Crawford, 1998: 111). Another problem with such responsibilisation strategies is that social problems are individualised. If families or communities ‘fail’, stringent and intrusive penalties are warranted (Garland, 2001; Muncie, 2002: 156). Although some programmes intend to improve individuals’ social relationships, some of the cognitive and behavioural interventions bypass the social context (Muncie, 2002: 149). There is a clear contradiction between ‘what works’ strategies, which aim to measure and therefore standardise the interventions in programmes, and tailor-made efforts, which are not so concerned about effect evaluation, but draw attention towards process evaluation. Audits and effect evaluations have a tendency to promote onesize-fits-all programmes. To measure quality by ‘what works’ strategies is, for example, a problem for outreach drug work (Barton, 2006). With its focus on early intervention and parental training, developmental crime prevention is a growing trend in Norway, especially connected to The Norwegian Centre for Child Behavioural Development (2011). ‘Governing through early intervention’ has become the buzz-phrase in crime prevention policies (also meaning early identification in criminal courses), and it is often unclear whether it is crime or general behavioural problems that it is preventing. Interventions comprise different cognitive programmes that target children and young people, including their parents, who are identified as being ‘at risk’ of offending. Often, genetic explanations of deviances are combined with psychological and social causes of deviance (Ministry of Justice, 2009a: 52–53). However, applying early interventions to people at risk of offending will, in any case, raise crucial normative concerns. As

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Crawford (2009: 31) explains: ‘The inaccuracy of predictive knowledge prompts caution.’

3.3. Collaboration and prevention of crime In 1989, KRÅD took the initiative to establish a model for co-ordination of local crime prevention enterprises (Samordning av Lokale Kriminalitetsforebyggende Tiltak - SLT). Implementation of the model was voluntary. Of the 435 Norwegian municipalities, the SLT model is represented in about 190. The idea is that juvenile delinquency is best prevented in the community by multi-agency partnerships consisting of the police, municipality agencies such as schools and child welfare, leisure, cultural and health facilities, and volunteers. The aim is to create interprofessional collaboration, co-ordinated by an SLT co-ordinator. The evaluation of the SLT model in 2008 showed that it is strongly anchored in the municipality (Gundhus et al., 2008). The police, schools, health services and social care services have the strongest representation. These four sectors represent different kinds of competence, and the findings strongly indicate that the social care outlook has precedence. The voluntary and private sectors are absent from the working committees. Despite the fact that the police are strongly represented, police methods are more or less absent in different types of SLT-interventions (Gundhus et al., 2008). This is in contrast to findings from the UK, where the police dominate the multi-agency partnerships, and in that way, have criminalised social problems (Newburn, 2002).5 In Norway the police can be described as a guest in a municipality model. They forward information to the participating parties to identify crime and pre-crime, and there is little emphasis placed on interventions taken to assist social crime prevention after a crime has been committed. SLT work is directed equally towards social development, prevention and crime prevention measures. There does seem to be a tendency to ignore efforts directed towards crime prevention. The SLT model has a vague criminal policy profile, which demonstrates some confusion concerning the level of prevention. It is also the case that alternative penal 5 As Gilling (2005: 744) indicates, the shift towards crime reduction put the police in charge of the local agenda, with the key to resources, in terms of knowledge, skills and capital.

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reactions which in many cases involve prosecuting attorneys, do not appear to have been developed to any degree within the SLT system. The objective – to prevent crime – is understood so broadly that practitioners working in municipalities talk about ‘prevention’, not ‘crime prevention’. The definition of the concept is so wide that it satisfies all the collaborating parties and avoids excluding participants, without crime as their core focus. Crime prevention has also been used as an argument to release funds and initiatives, which have had consequences for the seriousness of the field. The role of the SLT co-ordinator, who is seldom recruited from the criminal justice system, reinforces this tendency. The co-ordinator is supposed to initiate cross-sector measures. However, the co-ordinator also needs to rationalise pre-existing measures so that the effects from ongoing measures are increased. The co-ordinator’s work depends on the general priority of crime prevention in the municipality, which is dominated by general developmental prevention programmes. A limitation of the social care field is that it is problem-focused and individual-oriented. This is reinforced by the fact that SLT work is not managed by objectives or performance indicators. The participating units’ core tasks are increasingly governed by the New Public Management (NPM). Financial incentives, auditing structures and socio-political changes may explain why SLT work is so close to developmental crime prevention. Practitioners participating in SLT work are under stronger pressure to create success stories and to prioritise interventions that produce short-term quantifiable results. The NPM demands more bureaucratic structures for managing outcomes, and collaborating parties focus on top-down performance indicators designed to measure their core business, not the interests of the wider partnership. This makes interprofessional collaboration more difficult (Gilling, 2005: 744). As Hughes (2007: 64) observes, hierarchical intervention as national targets, the monitoring of performance and tight time scales ‘may often have the unintended consequences of undermining local trust formation, upon which effective partnership working depends.’ These are challenges faced by the units participating in SLT activities. For example, the police adopt a dual role, characterised by a sense of responsibility to the local community and a requirement that they should govern top-down, and that these results should be measured by the National Police Directorate (Gundhus, 2005; 2009: 240). Such a conflicting role can be an obstacle to building trust with local partners. The evaluation of SLT indicates that if the aim is to make a clearer social crime preventive profile, presuming that accomplishing processes of

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change is the foundation for social crime prevention, there will be much to gain from including approaches more strongly related to mastering, qualifying and rectifying (Gundhus et al., 2008). In 2007, another model of collaboration, the Police Council, was established by the Labour Government. The Police Council was not meant to replace SLT, but in many municipalities SLT and the Police Council are integrated. However, this Council has a broader aim than SLT, namely to contribute to increased community safety and crime prevention through co-operation between the police, the community, the private sector and politicians. This partnership has only recently been implemented, and it remains to be seen to what extent it increases or decreases social inclusion of citizens in the community, and how it manages the demands from urban renewal, regeneration and gentrification.

4. Conclusion There is no official definition of social crime prevention in Norway. But as we have seen in part 2 of this chapter, we stress that social integration is an important part of social crime prevention. When it comes to practice there are a lot of measures with a clear social crime preventive approach. Situational crime prevention has not been dominating at the expense of social crime prevention, as it has been argued elsewhere in Europe (Crawford, 2009). We conclude this chapter by summing up some of the obstacles we have pointed out concerning social crime prevention in Norway. The universal welfare model is to a large degree consistent with the logic in social crime prevention. The efforts and way of thinking are then in line with prevailing political recommendations. Since the welfare state in Norway has strong support, independent of the government’s political colour, there have not been clear breaches in prevention policy in connection with alternating governments. In relation to social crime prevention it has been strongly believed that general welfare arrangements were adequate for preventing crime. A more knowledge-based approach has not been developed until the last decade. Gradually, we have seen an alteration in crime prevention discourses – from crime prevention as an integrated part of social policy, where, for example, youth clubs were seen as crime prevention interventions, to the introduction

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of more targeted interventions, including those aimed at known offenders. Restorative justice, mediation and re-integrative shaming have also become more visible within the field of crime prevention. Social crime prevention assumes an inclusive society. It is therefore important not to underestimate the value of neighbourhoods, schools, and other social institutions, experiencing that young people who have created insecurity and caused damage make amends or reparations. This is why reconciliation is an important element of social crime prevention strategies. But even in the Norwegian welfare state, there are challenges with including new groups in the existing prevention strategies, in particular in relation to new groups of unaccompanied child asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. Although social crime prevention can be described as the main crime prevention model in Norway, it is challenged by an increased focus on developmental crime prevention interventions characterised by early intervention programmes. The establishment of the Norwegian Centre for Child Behavioural Developments in 2000 illustrates this. However, the fields of intervention in Norway are still closest to what Graham & Bennett (1995, see also Melossi & Selmini, 2009: 167) describe as urban policy, health policies, family policies, education, labour market and social integration policies. In this chapter the long tradition of collaboration in the field is emphasised, and the widely used model for co-operation is described. In our opinion, co-operation is a prerequisite to effective social crime prevention because the field is complex and requires knowledge and insights from different disciplines and practices. One challenge with social crime prevention is that its effects are often too unclear, especially compared with interventions within the field of developmental crime prevention. There is much qualitative research (interviews and observations) that clearly proves that social prevention strategies create positive change. However, drawing qualified conclusions about the directly measurable effects of individual measures is problematic. There are many factors that come into play, and it is difficult to isolate individual factors and quantify the effect. Lack of accurate measurement of social crime prevention is considered by many to be a weakness, and gives the strategy low status and support in certain circles. This is in contrast to programmes that can be tested over a limited

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time and with a verifiable method. However, at society level, the effects of social crime prevention become visible – there is less crime in countries with smaller social differences, good integration, equal opportunity and equality. Policy-documents, strategies and efforts are exclusively developed by professionals. Within such work, dialogue with users, user orientation and participation is an area that has been long neglected in Norway. There is also a lack of good methods to prevent drug abuse. Reducing harm has had less emphasis as a solution, and criminalisation has been flagged as the answer (Christie & Bruun, 1985). Research has pointed to a high death rate in Norway caused by drugs (EMCDD, 2010), and this can be interpreted as a consequence of criminalisation. Drug addiction is an area where the police have been free to manoeuvre, and it is still dominated by law and order, moral authoritarianism, responsibilisation strategies and social exclusion. In the shadow of the Nordic welfare model, the losers are the drug addicts. The growing emphasis on performance management and national targets in reducing crime and disorder can also drain the remaining reserves of informal social control in communities and civil society (Christie, 2000; Hope, 2005: 380). It is an open question whether the expanded family of agencies preventing crime will push these agencies deeper into the ‘criminalisation’ of social policy, or encourage the ‘socialisation’ of crime control. Hughes (2007: 75) observes that both tendencies are unfolding. It appears that, also in Norway, social policy is justified to a higher degree in terms of its crime prevention potential, and ‘social life is increasingly governed through crime and insecurity’ (Crawford, 2009: 30). However, in the 1970s and 1980s, social crime prevention was also pursued through social reform and social policy, and announced as crime prevention, so this is not new in the Norwegian context. In the Norwegian discourse about crime prevention, there have traditionally been some voices arguing that integration has a value per se – regardless of the crime-reducing effect.6 In an era where evidence-based interventions and programmes are growing in importance, this is increasingly a difficult position to defend politically. Nevertheless, these voices contribute to creating resistance against the one-sided belief that only strictly quantifiable measures have value. 6 See, for example, the work of Nils Christie (e.g., 1977, 2000), Thomas Mathiesen (e.g., 1990) and Paul Leer-Salvesen (e.g., 1998).

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(Social) Crime Prevention in Portugal Josefina Castro, Carla S. Cardoso and Cândido da Agra

Definition of Social Crime Prevention In Portugal, the concept of social crime prevention is not found in either academic literature, official documentation or in political discourse. One of the possible explanations for this could be related to the lack of a systematic debate, mainly at an academic level, about the models of crime prevention. In Portugal, the study of crime and safety issues is relatively recent and fragmented, and there is no consistent theoretical or empirical research in this area. Therefore, because of the absence of this term in a Portuguese context, we start by analysing terminology and types of social crime prevention, as defined by international literature in this field. The definition of social crime prevention in academic terms, as clearly pointed out by Crawford (1998: 120), is an ‘elastic’ concept: ‘In some instances, it is taken to mean any activity or intervention into the social world which may improve people’s quality of life or which may have some beneficial impact on the intended subjects, so that they may be less inclined to commit crime.’ A broader definition could also cover the measures and practices that aim to reduce fear of crime or the risk of victimisation. In addition, the definition of ‘putative social risk factors’ in relation to crime, is also a matter of debate within the scientific community. Theoretical research in this field has shown the complexity of the phenomenon as well as the interactive and/or correlative nature of those potential social risk factors. The complexity of analysis resides not only in the levels of analysis (individual, local, national or transnational), but also in terms of the timing of the intervention (primary, secondary and tertiary), as well as the targets of the intervention (potential offender, offender, potential victim, victim, community, age-groups, etc). To ‘complexify’ this complex picture, it is also important to dissect the policies, interventions, practices and the context

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of crime prevention strategies that go beyond academic discussion and definitions. What can we learn from our country-based analysis and comparison of social crime prevention? Based on the historical outline of prevention and security policies in Portugal defined by Agra et al. (2002), we describe for each period the nature of social crime prevention and its place in the broader configuration of social crime control, as well as its political and social context. From this analysis, two distinct periods emerge in the development of Portuguese social crime prevention. When comparing the government programme for the first half of the 1990s with that of the following period, a major shift in the handling of criminality and insecurity issues is clearly visible: progression from a strategy which centred on strengthening conventional actions and means of preventing and controlling crime (from 1974 to the mid-1990s), to a much more multi-pronged approach that pointed towards a management model, in which similarities with what had previously happened in other countries were identifiable: publicprivate partnerships; central-local partnerships; community policing; the introduction of new technological means of crime prevention and detection; and the implementation of social and specific programmes oriented to the prevention of crime, fear of crime and victimisation. A more detailed and exhaustive analysis of policies and practices will be presented to deal with this last period.

(Social) Crime Prevention in the Context of the Restructuring and Development of the Criminal Justice System From the revolution of April 25th 1974 until the early 1990s, the policies and practices in terms of crime prevention were a product of the intersection of two models: the social-penal model and the social-protection model. On the one hand, there were the traditional forms of crime prevention within the judicial system (police, courts and corrections) and, on the other hand, the idea that crime prevention could also be based on the improvement of living conditions for the general population. In fact, during this period, crime prevention was conceived in a rather narrow way, within the boundaries of the formal criminal justice agencies, according to the traditional functions of police, courts and correctional institutions. After a period of almost fifty years of dictatorship (1926-1974), the conceptualisation and development

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of crime prevention policies and interventions were inseparable from the re-organisation of the judicial system. In the context of severe political instability and deep economic crisis, the construction of a democratic society and the start of major structural reforms in various fields were imposed as a matter of urgency. The primary concern for provisional governments was to ensure conditions for economic reconstruction and political legitimacy through the stabilisation of the regime. It was, therefore, necessary to implement the changes by restructuring these services in order to adapt them to the principles enshrined in the democratic constitution of 1976, and to the social and political transformations demanded by Portuguese society. During this period, the political discourse about crime prevention was essentially directed towards two types of problems: 1) a hybrid configuration between petty crimes and disorders, which were seen as major threats and offences against the Democratic State (from popular protests to terrorism); and, 2) from the late 1970s, the trafficking and use of drugs. These priorities were perceived to be problems that stemmed from the opening of Portuguese society to external influences and the tense process of democratisation. In that context, political discourse regarding preventive measures constituted a counterpoint to the previous approach of repressive and authoritarian dictatorship. Crime prevention was, therefore, conceived as a key element in achieving a balance between, first, the humanisation, tolerance and respect for human rights and liberties and, second, the need to control disorders which were seen as real threats to the State and the construction of democratic order. In relation to the police, the measures were principally addressed towards strengthening human and material resources as well as improving their professional qualifications. In order to promote closer co-operation between these state agents and citizens, another key element of crime prevention was to change the public image of the police. This was considered to be fundamental in order to overcome a perceived lack of trust inherited from the previous political regime. However, at a police level, for many years, the prevention of crime was primarily treated as a matter of deterrence, addressed through the amount of policing and police visibility, often not involving any substantial change in the original concept of the functions and traditional ways of conducting police work. In terms of the preventive action of the courts and correctional services, the transformations introduced to penal law in the light of the democratic Constitution of 1976 were crucial. Oriented towards the construction of a

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democratic and social state (artº1º and 2º), the new Constitution established major rights and guarantees for offenders and their reintegration into society. This was one of the major aims of crime policy. Under this constitutional framework, the new Penal Code (1982) determined that penal sanctions and security measures should aim to socially reintegrate offenders. This was in contrast to the previous penal code, which was essentially understood as repressive in nature. In addition to the reduction of penal sanctions, the new law established that custodial sentences should only be used in exceptional circumstances, and placed the emphasis on alternative penalties to imprisonment. In pursuit of the principles of a ‘positive conception’ of special crime prevention, oriented towards the promotion of social reintegration of offenders, the following milestones can be highlighted as particularly important when considering the future direction of Portuguese crime policy: a) The creation of the National Probation Service in 1983 and its extension since 1995 to juvenile justice; b) The new prison law (Decree –law n. 265/79, August 1st) that re-structured prison services according to the principles recommended by international bodies (a regime that was intended to be more humane, more flexible and focused on offender reintegration); c) The juvenile justice reform (Decree-Law n. 314/78, October 27, 1978) accentuated the main features of the protection model (created in 1911) and is seen as a maximalist example of the protection model in Europe. The tutelary measures (‘protection, assistance, and education measures’) were applied indiscriminately to children who were simply in need of protection, as well as to deviant or delinquent young people. All circumstances were conceived as symptoms of maladjustment, and this criterion dictated the nature and the (indeterminate) length of the measure applied. This model emphasised individualised sentencing (systematic consideration of the minor’s living conditions and personality), reliance on childcare experts and youth workers, and informal handling of cases. Due to the exclusively protective function of intervention within this scheme, neither the means of defence nor procedural guarantees were ensured. The reforms that took place in the 1970s and 1980s reflected the transposition within the criminal justice system that paralleled the implementation of a welfare state, which was a top priority for successive governments. Moreover,

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the actual construction of the welfare state itself was understood to be a part of crime prevention, given the explicit recognition within political discourse that social causes of crime lay beyond the narrow action of the criminal justice system and should be tackled through general social policies addressed towards the improvement of life conditions (education, training, employment, housing, social protection), and directed, in particular, towards the most vulnerable groups (children, young people, women and the elderly). Essentially, it was believed that an increase in social welfare would both facilitate the reduction of crime and promote social cohesion.

Drugs and Crime Prevention The increasing emphasis on crime prevention and the beginning of a process of change in policies and practices began at the end of the 1970s with the emergence of a specific problem in Portuguese society: the drug phenomenon. Within the framework of political stability and economic development, reinforced by Portugal’s entry into the European Community, safety concerns focused on the prevention and reduction of illicit drug trafficking and drug abuse. In spite of being present well before the April Revolution, its causes are now read in the light of the new political and social conditions: i) the return, after the end of the colonial war, of approximately half a million Portuguese people from colonies in Africa (Angola, Guinea, Cape Verde, Mozambique), as well as the return of some 80 000 soldiers from the colonial wars; and, ii) the political and cultural transformations which impacted on attitudes and lifestyles within Portuguese society. Indeed, since the late 1970s, the association between drug abuse, trafficking and petty crime has been recognised as the main cause of increased petty crime, juvenile delinquency and social insecurities in political and media discourse. The criminalisation of drug use (Law n. 6.368/1976) and the ratification of international conventions marked the beginning of a specific policy towards drug-control, focused on the conceptualisation and implementation of a new dispositive in the fight against drugs. In 1975, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers (Decree-Law No. 745/75 of 31 December), created the Centre for Youth Studies (Centro de Estudos da Juventude- CEJ), with a more preventive

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intervention and socio-health treatment, as well as the Judicial Research Centre for Drugs (Centro de Investigação Judiciária da Droga- CIJD) with interventions in the area of drug-control and schemes to reduce illicit drug trafficking. In the next year a campaign against marijuana was implemented and a new body was created, under the direct tutelage of the Prime Minister – the Office for the Co-ordination and Fight Against Drugs (Gabinete Coordenador do Combate à Droga). This new agency replicated the combined structure of the first dispositive: on the one hand, the Centre for Studies and Prevention of Drugs, and on the other hand, the Specialist Police Centre for Combating Drugs. The first dealt with treatment, prevention and research (techniques, methods, and intervention programmes), the second with the reduction of drug trafficking. The whole socio-health apparatus was headed by a Commander. According to a report by the parliamentary commission (Provisional Commission – Assembly of the Republic, 1998), this was a pioneering system in southern Europe, designed by United Nations experts (Agra, 2009). The activities of this body started in 1977. At the level of primary prevention, the intervention was specifically directed towards young people and their families, and at school situations. In spite of the emphasis on ‘physical, psychological and social eco-systems’, the primary preventive practices were noticeably informative by nature, focusing on the harmful effects of drugs and strategies to pre-empt and prevent drug taking. The 1980s saw a consolidation of the polarised crime debate and insecurity about the drug problem. This became a clear concern for the public and had a strong impact on the functions of the judicial system, and, in particular, the prison system. At that time, as in other European countries, the problem of heroin use in Portugal had spread massively across all social classes. The rigid systems of control had become obsolete, due to significant changes in the extension and structures of the drug phenomenon. It was in this context that in 1987 the National Plan to Combat Drugs1 (Resolution of the Council of Ministers n. 23/87, April 21) was initiated under the presidency of the Council of Ministers. The ‘Projecto Vida’ sought to be an integrated and multi-modal approach to the drug problem, comprising the reduction of drug trafficking as well as prevention, treatment and reintegration strategies.

1 In Portuguese termed Plano Nacional de Combate à Droga (Resolução de Conselho de Ministros nº 23/87)

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This Project emerged in a context that was characterised by two synchronised movements: (i) Concerning the creation and the enforcement of law, there appears to be what could be called a contraction of criminal law. Regarding the implementation of the 1970 legislation by courts, judges rarely sent a drug user to prison simply for consumption. Magistrates decided that this was contrary to the spirit of the law: the young drug user was not a delinquent. This understanding was accentuated in the subsequent legislation on drugs: ‘symbolic sentencing’ for the user (a sick person), heavy sentencing for the trafficker (a dangerous criminal). The teleology of the ‘symbolic sentence’ for consumers was treatment and rehabilitation through the criminal law system. According to this understanding, the laws from 1983 and 1993 focused on encouraging discussion and communication between the judiciary and health professionals. (ii) Concerning socio-health issues, there was the progressive extension of a network of treatment facilities, measures and programmes aimed to rehabilitate and socially reintegrate drug addicts in order to avoid stigmatisation and social rejection, as well as the gradual dissemination of the risk reduction policy. Although the evaluation made in 1998-1999 of the ‘Projecto Vida’ was very critical, this project was the first example of a specific integrated and multimodal prevention strategy to address criminal and social problems, bringing together criminal justice responses and socio-health interventions. The emphasis on cooperation between public and private agencies and concern about communication at a central and at a local level made this programme a prototype for new ways of devising crime prevention programmes that emerged in the mid-1990s. The National Strategy for the Fight against Drugs is largely a consequence of the proposals contained in the final report by the experts nominated in 1998, and constitutes the framework for the decriminalisation of drug consumption.2 This Strategy condenses the policies of prevention and control that are still maintained now. We can say that in a period in which the number of new heroin users decreased significantly, the new strategy 2 For further details about Portuguese decriminalisation of drugs, see Agra, 2009; Greenwald, 2009.

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pursued the objective of an integrated intervention that aimed at prevention, deterrence, risk and harm reduction, treatment and rehabilitation. The more recent developments of the Strategy place an emphasis on cost reduction and better co-ordination and efficiency (‘doing more with less’). Harm reduction is an increasingly important area of focus, along with the territorialisation of interventions and their specialisation.

The ‘Golden Age’ of Social Policy and Crime Prevention As referred to previously, until the mid-1990s, crime prevention was considered to be located within the restructuring and development of the criminal justice system, both in terms of its guiding principles and in terms of the functioning of its various services. (Agra et al., 2002). The shift in crime prevention policies and their progressive differentiation occurred at a time when public discourse about crime and urban safety had intensified. It was actually in the 1995 election campaign that the focus of political discourse emphasised social policies around crime and insecurity. In this period, an increase in social policies about issues that mobilised the attention of public opinion and the mass media began to emerge, namely regarding immigration, social exclusion, deprived neighbourhoods on the periphery of Lisbon and Porto and the association between these problems and the increase in crime and insecurity in urban areas. From that moment on, these issues were given unprecedented media coverage and attention in political debates. Although the issue of drugs remained present in this configuration, its importance receded in the face of other phenomena that are commonly associated with it, in particular juvenile delinquency, violence and organised crime. Several factors may explain the emergence of this new configuration, both in terms of social and political contexts, in general, and in terms of crime and safety, in particular. This period was marked by an optimism and confidence in socio-economic prosperity and the increased wellbeing of citizens. This is illustrated by several points: (i) Portugal met the Maastricht convergence criteria, with the consequent admittance to the euro – ‘a good student within the EU’; (ii) increased levels of consumption and an approach to European living standards; and (iii) increased investment in social protection measures to prevent social exclusion and inequality. During this period, several social protection measures and programmes were implemented that aimed to reduce poverty, prevent social exclusion and promote inclusion. The targets

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were the ‘most vulnerable groups’ (the elderly, children and young people from deprived areas, immigrants, and ethnic minorities). An illustrative example is the Programme ‘Rede Social’ (in English, Social Network). This programme was created in 1997 under the slogan ‘a new generation of social policies based on the social responsibility and mobilisation of society as a whole and each individual in particular’. It sought to eradicate poverty and to fight against social exclusion by promoting cooperation between municipalities and the public and private sectors that intervened in the same territory. Another measure which had a major impact on public opinion and political debate was the Guaranteed Minimum Income (formerly called Social Integration Income, 2003)3 created by Law No. 19-A/96 of June 29, following a recommendation from the Council of Ministers of the European Union, which urged all member states to recognise ‘the fundamental right of individuals to resources and social assistance to live in accordance with human dignity …’ This social benefit was directed towards situations involving poverty and exclusion, in order to ensure the minimum conditions for survival and integration into working life. During the parliamentary debate, a relationship between this social benefit and the prevention of crime and delinquency was directly established. This subsidy was perceived as a possible extension of social protection mechanisms for population groups that were not covered by others benefits. It was seen as a tool to prevent crime and other anti-social behaviour (e.g. juvenile exclusion from the education system, prostitution, drug abuse, etc.). Despite this association, crime is rarely taken as an explicit argument to support social policies and when it occurs, it keeps a discrete and secondary place, unless the emergence of measures or programmes constitutes a direct response to specific situations that generate social alarm. Therefore, it cannot be stated that in Portugal, crime and safety issues are major arguments for the legitimation of social policies, even in recent years when the economic crisis has called the welfare state into question. At the same time, and related to crime and safety policies, we highlight the following relevant points: increasing levels of crime in the context of a weakening of formal and informal controls that arose from the democratic transition; the opening up of Portuguese society and the changes in urban lifestyles; the recognition that formal and state agencies are not capable of 3 In Portuguese called Rendimento Social de Inserção, and formerly Rendimento Mínimo Garantido.

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dealing with security issues and increased media pressure on their own (especially following the creation of the first private television stations that have recognised crime as an important lure for audiences); and, finally, the influence of policies implemented by other countries that were transferred to Portugal. The policies, measures and programmes that emerge in this period can be organised into two main categories: 1. The first orientation is defined as situational crime prevention, characterised by the implementation of several community policing programmes at a national level, the growing use of technological devices such as CCTV in private spaces, along with the growth of the private security sector, and its alliance with police in the surveillance of public and semi-public spaces. The idea that police proximity and visibility are a major answer to crime prevention and the fear of crime is not new. In fact, it corresponds with recurrent political debate about the need to increase the number of police officers and/or the need for a more rational distribution between those completing administrative work and those on street patrol. Nevertheless, community programmes, as they were conceived, convey the idea of problem-oriented roles that could have a major impact on public opinion. In general, these programmes are targeted at different contexts and sectors of activity (e.g. schools, commercial areas, tourist places) providing confidence that specific problems are a matter of major political concern. In addition to police patrols, these programmes provide information to potential victims about victim reduction strategies and how to adopt protection measures. Nonetheless, the public image of the community policing often exceeds the roles described above: the police officer was portrayed as someone who not only deals with safety issues but who also assumes the role of ‘social worker’, providing support in situations that go far beyond crime prevention. This represents a shift in the inherited image of the police, both in the collective imagery and in the culture of formal control agencies. The evaluation of these programmes, currently implemented all over the country, misses the analysis concerning their role and impact on the internal organisation and functions within police forces, their relative costs and their impact on crime prevention. 2. The second orientation corresponds broadly to what can be defined as social crime prevention, since it explicitly identifies its objectives as preventing crime, victimisation, or the feelings of insecurity, through interventions that address the social causes of these phenomena, and

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not simply by changing the circumstances associated with situational opportunities. Before proceeding to an accurate explanation of the models found in this general category (social crime prevention), we describe the main features of the rationale that runs through this configuration and that, somehow, reflects common elements of the different measures and strategies implemented: a) The assumption that the ‘criminal issue’ is complex and multidimensional and therefore needs the integration of crime prevention policies and strategies. Somehow, the concepts of ‘safety’ and its correlative, ‘safety policies’, express the decentralisation and expansion of the concept of crime, which is traditionally locked within the boundaries of the formal control system, and, in particular, the criminal justice system. In this sense, the vector ‘crime-safety’ is a total social fact. As stated in Agra (2004), ‘it is an object that refers rather to the ways of living than to individuality, more to risk than to dangerousness.’ In other words, in this definition the spatio-temporal coordinates prevail over the psycho-social ones. This assumption can explain the emphasis on local areas, territories and contexts. b) The erosion of the boundaries between the criminal justice system and social system in two ways: firstly, the adoption by the formal system of directions and practices that, up to that point, were extraneous; and secondly, extension beyond the system of formal logics and practices. c) The emergence of a culture of partnership that is conducted at several levels: between the central and local, public and private sectors supported by inter-institutional cooperation and networking. This trend is inseparable from the appeal to ‘the community’ and co-responsibility, in alliance with the progressive recognition of the state’s incapacity to handle these problems, per se. d) The proliferation of measures and programmes that combine mixed preventive strategies, social and situational, and are often directed to different objectives (prevention of crime and victimisation, prevention of exclusion and marginalisation, reduction of the feelings of insecurity, promotion of confidence in the police and institutions, social cohesion, promotion of informal social control, etc.) and also to different targets, directly or indirectly related to crime and insecurity, namely offenders and potential offenders, victims and potential victims, social groups, and specific contexts such as vulnerable or ‘at risk’ fields (schools, social housing, critical urban areas, etc.).

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e) The multiplication of institutions and agents involved in cooperative roles concerning crime prevention and safety. f) Adopting a managerial approach, at least at a rhetorical level. The organisation of multiple interventions into programmes, with a welldefined beginning and end, accompanied by individualised and systematic action plans which include evaluation processes. This chapter does not aim to make an exhaustive inventory of policies and practices of social crime prevention in Portugal but to present what, in our view, constitute the most emblematic and illustrative examples. As referred to above, although the concept of social crime prevention is absent, the nature and objectives of those interventions fall more or less explicitly within previously defined boundaries of the concept. In this context, the interventions, strategies and policies will be organised into two main categories: 1. Social crime prevention strategies specifically directed towards offenders or potential offenders, combining individual and group approaches, in order to produce behavioural changes. These changes can be pursued through direct interventions with individuals and/or their life conditions and contexts (family, school, leisure time). In the literature (e.g. Crawford, 2009; Farrington & Welsh, 2007; Tremblay & Craig, 1995; Homel, 2005), this model is commonly defined as developmental crime prevention. However, in this current analysis, we do not adopt this definition because it could be misleading about the nature and scope of the practices and measures that have been implemented in Portugal. As will be described in the next sections, specific practices do not follow the inherent logic in this area of knowledge, and are closer to a non-specific psycho-social intervention model. The main activities are based on common-sense ideas about what might reduce crime and victimisation, such as leisure time occupations, group dynamics, and citizenship education. These programmes are not based upon a rigorous and systematic empiricallysupported knowledge about risk and/or protection factors and the processes involved in the development of deviant or criminal behaviour. 2. Community prevention programmes. This category generally encompasses a range of strategies that are more illustrative of the new preventive measures, directed towards urban areas and particularly at low-income neighbourhoods that are associated with social exclusion, poverty, unemployment and low education levels. Within this category, we also refer to the more general or specific preventive measures which

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may include an awareness of the risks of being victimised, information campaigns, police-victim communication, psycho-social interventions and victim assistance. Frequently, the victim-oriented strategies are included in community crime prevention programmes.

(Potential) Offender Oriented Social Crime Prevention As previously discussed, until the early 1990s, intervention with offenders or potential offenders, either through individual or group programmes, was mostly done within the juvenile justice and penal systems by the probation or penitentiary services aiming towards ‘social reintegration or rehabilitation’. In contrast to other countries, the rehabilitation of offenders in Portugal never involved ‘treatment’ programmes. Instead, it was conceived rather with a social meaning, addressed at promoting basic conditions for successful social integration (e.g. education, professional training, family integration, employment). In recent years, however, this logic has evolved: the concept of criminal behaviour is now less centred on the offenders’ living conditions and more on their criminal behaviour and the individual variables that are associated with it. This trend can be observed in specific programmes implemented by the probation and prison systems that aim to produce behavioural changes in juveniles and adult offenders. Those pilot experiments are associated with: an increased standardisation of procedures, in the handling of situations and in resources and management; the presence, at least in institutional guidelines, of a ‘risk vs. needs’ and ‘what works’ language; as well as the adoption, notably in supervision, of instruments based on cognitive behavioural theories. At the same time, the emergence of crime prevention policies outside the formal traditional system has been evident. These policies were translated into programmes that have autonomy in relation to the criminal justice system, although they can still have shared involvement (e.g. with the police). Whilst directed towards offenders, or those at risk of offending, these programmes can also be characterised by the integration of different levels of involvement, and strategies that go far beyond individual interventions or casework. In fact, the territorial scope of some of these programmes may make them overlap with community programmes. The majority of these programmes and practices are oriented towards the prevention of juvenile delinquency and the anti-social behaviour of young people. The ‘Programa Escolhas’ (translated by the authors as Choices Programme) clearly illustrates this category of interventions. This programme was created in rather specific circumstances

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that put juvenile delinquency at the centre of public concern. During the late 1990s, juvenile delinquency acquired increased visibility and a new status, more independent from other issues with which it was usually associated (see Agra & Castro, 2007). Formerly linked to petty offences against property and offences associated with drug use, juvenile delinquency started to be identified with acts of vandalism and violence allegedly committed by ‘gangs’ from low-income neighbourhoods in Lisbon and Porto. Despite their irregular occurrence, these events, which took place in public and semipublic areas (e.g. public transport, schools, and commercial areas) had a significant effect on public opinion and created the idea that the behaviour of young delinquents was getting more violent. The increased media coverage and dramatisation of these kind of events, namely those that occurred in the summer of 2000, contributed greatly to the pressure that surrounded the implementation of the 1999 Juvenile Justice Reform (Agra & Castro, 2007). Despite the reduced public visibility of juvenile justice, critics of the protection model made by magistrates and academics were not new, and in 1996 the Socialist government announced its plan to reform the system. The arguments revolved around the difficulties within the reigning protection model, in terms of justice and effectiveness (Castro, 2011): a) The criminalisation of poverty since the juvenile justice system took charge of situations of basic social deprivation, through greater reliance on placements within criminal justice facilities; the main reason being a lack of resources in the social protection system; b) The juvenile courts’ discretionary powers and the absence of rights and guarantees for minors within such proceedings; c) With regard to the lack of effectiveness, two major factors were highlighted, namely, the alleged (i.e. not supported by empirical evidence) rise in delinquency recorded for juveniles under 16 years of age, and the apparent ‘leniency’ of the protection model. The new rationality, instituted by the laws of 19994 which concerns juvenile delinquents from 12 to 15 years of age, was built around the following ideas: the shift from the ideal of child protection to that of promoting the rights of children and young people; and the representation of young 4 The Protection of Children and Young People Act (Lei de Protecção de Crianças e Jovens em Perigo - Law 147/99 of 1st September 1999) and the Educational Tutelary Act (Lei Tutelar Educativa - Law 166/99 of 14th September 1999).

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people as active subjects. The most salient feature of the reform is the ‘principle of differentiation’, instituted by the two laws that organised the separation between the protective regime for children in danger and the educational tutelary regime concerning juvenile offenders (Castro, 2011). This regime claims to offer a third way (Gersão, 1994: 254; Rodrigues, 1997: 373) between criminal law and the protection model, attempting to offer a compromise between the strengths of both models: a) from criminal law, the Educational Tutelary Act takes the concept of the minor as a subject with rights and the assertion of the minor’s responsibility; b) from the protection model it takes the need to safeguard the minor’s interest, the rejection of a punitive-retributive regime, and a main educational purpose (Explanatory Memorandum) (Castro, 2011). In the summer of 2000, during the vacatium legis period, the occurrence of the events already mentioned forced the government to announce an emergency plan in order to prevent juvenile delinquency: the reinforcement of surveillance in certain public areas and spaces frequented by young people; urgent measures in order to create the conditions to implement the new law, specifically custody measures; and finally, a prevention programme called ‘Programa Escolhas’. Inspired by the French experience, it was announced as a programme that aimed to prevent juvenile delinquency and to promote social integration for youngsters from the most vulnerable neighbourhoods of districts in Porto, Lisbon and Setúbal, with a high concentration of ethnic minorities, mostly from African or gipsy origin. The ‘Programa Escolhas’ aimed to intervene with young people, through the implementation of measures addressed to personal, academic and professional skills, and activities that revolve around leisure, community participation and social mediation. It is based on cooperation between public agencies at a local level (including the police, justice, social security, health, education, local authorities and private organisations), constituted of multidisciplinary teams that include social workers and psychologists engaged (temporarily) by the programme and a mediator (a young neighbourhood resident). Each police station should nominate a police officer to connect with the programme, flagging up events and making links with schools through participation in the community policing programme, ‘Escola Segura’ (Safe School). Presented as ‘inclusive and global’, this programme relies, to some extent, on the programmatic lines that structure the new juvenile justice system: i) Recognition of young people as social participants; ii) The combined focus on safety and education-protection areas;

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iii) An intervention that is intended to be as close as possible to life contexts, seeking to re-establish connections between young people and normative responses in order to regulate their conduct (mediation, responsibility, development and control); iv) The implementation of an inter-institutional and interdisciplinary intervention between public and private, central and local agencies – building a culture of partnership between the various stakeholders and community participation. After the end of the first phase, in 2003, some important changes were introduced in the programme: • The aim is no longer the prevention of criminality but the promotion of ‘social inclusion’, although the targets of intervention are still the same (young people living in vulnerable and deprived contexts). Recently the programme emphasised the participation of immigrants and ethnic minorities. • The centralised model adopted in the beginning has been replaced by a consortium model between the state and local institutions (public or private). The latter has to conceive and submit projects in order to be financed by the central administration. The evaluation is made locally and the results are then the object of a global analysis made by an academic team at a central level. • In public discourse, interventions and activities became progressively more centred on the improvement of school performance, professional qualifications and employment. Indeed, the evolution of this programme is a good example of the oscillation between crime prevention and social protection, as well as an indicator of how this political balance is dependent on the impact certain events have on public opinion. The alarm generated around juvenile delinquency in 2000 generated a dual response: the emphasis on the ‘tough’ face of new juvenile justice, and at the same time differentiated social funding that targets the early detection and prevention of delinquency. However, this investment focus has been given a back seat in the other reform wing – the juvenile protection system based upon the work of the committees for the protection of minors.5 Although, since the beginning, the need to provide 5 Created in 1991 under the de-judiciarisation principle, these commissions are responsible for socio-administrative intervention in situations of vulnerability for

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young people with professional support on a full-time basis was clear; only in the past few years has staffing been improved with the employment of full-time professionals. Once again, this measure was taken in response to tragic cases of violent abuse of children, which had a powerful impact on public opinion. In fact, the shift that occurred in the second generation of ‘Programa Escolhas’ took place at a stage when the unprecedented alarm about youth delinquency had taken a much more discreet tone (Castro, 2011). Other aspects of juvenile behaviour – the abuse of children and young people, truancy and the school dropout rate – overlap with public questions about crime and highlight the shortcomings of the protection system and the chronic problems of an education system which is unable to retain students until they have reached nine years of compulsory education, with obvious consequences in terms of qualifications and their integration into the labour market. Indeed, in recent years, schools have become the main context for the discourse about juvenile behaviour. School failure and truancy, indiscipline, violence and bullying have recently merited special attention from public authorities, resulting in an investment in prevention programmes in schools. It is worth noting the programme TEIP6 (Educational Territories for Priority Intervention) that was created by the Ministry of Education in 1996. The main objectives of this Programme are to provide universal basic quality education and to promote educational success for all students and, in particular, children and young people that are identified as those who are at risk of social and school exclusion. Schools that take priority are those in socially and economically disadvantaged areas or those undergoing socioeconomic transformation, as well as those who have students of different ethnic backgrounds or immigrants. The Programme is specifically oriented towards the prevention of educational failure, truancy and dropout, by diversifying and improving the quality of training offered, and also by promoting links between schools and the labour market. Echoing public concern about school safety, the second generation of the programme, launched in 2008, added to this the aims of preventing school violence and indiscipline. The interventions include educational and cultural activities, sports and leisure, community mediation, tutorial guidance, etc. The school and the community are used as mutual agents for development, through children and young people up to 18 years and in deviant or delinquent behaviours committed by minors aged less than 12 years. These committees are made up of local representatives of state services, the municipality, and private institutions and associations. 6 In Portuguese called Territórios Educacionais de Intervenção Prioritária (TEIP)

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an integrated network within the school community (students, parents associations, and teachers) and local community agents in the pursuit of an educational plan.

Community-Oriented Crime Prevention One of the key elements of the ‘new logic’ of crime prevention is the emphasis on a local approach and the co-responsibility of municipalities concerning what was traditionally seen as the exclusive jurisdiction of central government. This decentralisation becomes more evident with the creation of the municipal police, who operate in conjunction with the security forces, under the direction of the municipal authorities. The creation of municipal police occurred two years after their being legitimised by constitutional revisions in 1997. As well as administrative areas (supervision of municipal regulations, traffic, environment, etc.) the municipal police also have responsibility for the maintenance of public order and protection of local communities. At the same time, the Municipal Safety Councils were created, with consultative purposes, in all municipalities across the country (Law No. 33/98 of July 18). The objectives of the boards are: a) to contribute to a deeper understanding of the safety situation at a local level, through the consultation of all parties involved; b) to formulate proposals for solving marginalisation and safety problems and to participate in prevention activities; c) to promote discussion about measures against crime and social exclusion in cities; d) to evaluate requests directly related to security issues and social inclusion; e) to monitor and support actions directed, in particular, at drug prevention and other social problems. Despite these new structures, we can say that neither the police, nor the municipal safety councils, albeit for different reasons, had a major impact on public opinion. Indeed, in the latter case, public awareness of their involvement is very low; although various community programmes created since have referred to the councils as one of the organisations involved, their role has not been highlighted. In the case of the municipal police, public recognition is mainly due to other activities, including those relating to the regulation of urban traffic. It was, effectively, with the creation of ‘Local Safety Contracts’ in 2008, that local crime prevention made a greater impact on public opinion. It is important to note that in the late 1990s a pilot project in Porto city had already been implemented (Oporto City Contract) involving a closer liaison between central and local governments. This programme was created

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in 1996 between the central government (Ministries of Interior, Justice, Education and Health) and the Porto municipality with the participation of private agencies. The main objective of the ‘City Contract’ was to develop an integrated programme promoting urban safety with a multiagency approach, aimed at confronting emerging problems at a city level (e.g. drug addiction, prostitution, victims of domestic violence). At the core of this programme, the Permanent Safety Observatory was created with the following objectives: (i) to evaluate the interventions implemented within the ‘City Contract’; and (ii) to produce scientific knowledge about crime and (in)security phenomena (using surveys, official crime statistics, clinical interviews and ethnomethodology). The Observatory is a scientific project of the University of Porto with scientific, administrative and financial autonomy. These evaluative studies, applying experimental methodology, have become more systematic since 2001, after the restructuring of the local safety programme by the new municipal executive. This restructuring, rather than covering various different issues, was mainly focused on drug use and on related behaviours perceived as socially deviant (e.g. homelessness; car offences). The programme included the following lines of individual intervention: physical health and psychological treatment, social and professional reintegration (accommodation, professional training and employment). These interventions were monitored and evaluated by a team that worked on links between action and scientific research at the University of Porto. The second phase (2001-2006) was funded centrally by the Institute on Drugs and Drug Addiction (in Portuguese called Instituto da Droga e Toxicodepêndencia, IDT, I.P.) and the Oporto Municipality. The programme ended in 2006. In 2008, the Minister of Internal Administration promoted the creation of Local Safety Contracts with municipalities at a national level. This programme integrates different strategies and different bodies, namely the police, public services and private agencies at a local level. The municipality and the representatives of central government at a district level are responsible for the diagnostics, to conceive, coordinate and evaluate the interventions. Despite the often-vague formulation of objectives and activities, these contracts add different strategies: situational prevention, community policing, physical rehabilitation, social interventions and strategies that intend to enhance the mechanisms of informal social control (e.g. activities that involve the participation of residents). At present, Portugal has 33 Local Safety Contracts.

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Simultaneously, another community programme was created, aiming at the ‘improvement and rehabilitation of critical neighbourhoods’ (Iniciativa Operações de Qualificação e Reinserção Urbana de Bairros Críticos) with overlapping actions and objectives. The underlying context of the implementation of this Programme was based on the recognition of social vulnerability (e.g. low education, unemployment, welfare dependency, informal work, immigration) of the people that lived in particular urban areas (‘Critical Neighbourhoods’). The social stigma, the vulnerability of particular groups to different types of discrimination, and reduced opportunities, were the main factors that led to the implementation of this Programme in order to promote citizenship and social cohesion. The areas where interventions are being targeted are known to be unstable, with high levels of crime. This programme started in three urban areas (one in Porto and two in Lisbon). The Programme is characterised by a multisectoral partnership between several ministries and local organisations and institutions. The intervention’s aims, in general terms, are: to improve the quality of life for residents, including the regeneration of housing and public space conditions; to create new job opportunities; and the social integration of children, juveniles and other socially excluded people (such as ethnic minorities) through education, opportunities, culture, sport and leisure activities. Finally, one major goal of this intervention is to increase the sense of belonging in these neighbourhoods and the socio-economic integration of their residents.

Victim-Oriented Programmes Under the community policing programmes, in 1999, the government created the INOVAR Programme that has the main objectives of enhancing police competence when supporting victims of crime, and preventing victimisation. Therefore, the focus is on training police officers and creating victim support services within police stations, as well as on information campaigns targeted at different sectors of society, especially at those groups considered most vulnerable (children, young people, women and the elderly). At this time, the prevention of domestic violence emerged as a priority, and it was progressively integrated into community prevention programmes (e.g. local safety contracts). Under the national plan of Domestic Violence (approved by the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 55/99, June 15), a series of measures were taken that included public awareness campaigns and the creation of conditions for the care and support of victims. These measures

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comprised: police training; the creation of temporary shelter; and access to social housing for women in need. Further examples of this were measures directed towards foreign prostitutes (education, training programmes and support for entering into the labour market). Their results support programmes and partnerships between governmental structures and NGOs. In general, these programmes are implemented in a partnership between the central state and private institutions in this field.

Conclusion By observing the actual Portuguese field of crime prevention and, in particular, social crime prevention, one gets an impression of a multiple and fragmented landscape. Indeed, the programmes that we noted are merely the most visible points of a sparse network with elastic and blurred boundaries, with a multitude of agents and institutions whose actions and relations are not necessarily harmonious and consistent. The recent developments in crime prevention correspond with the shift from the perception of crime as an atypical phenomenon, resulting from political and social changes in Portuguese society, to a new configuration integrated in ‘normal’ urban life. However, the perception persists that crimes, fear of crime and victimisation are not distributed uniformly in society, along with the recognition of the existence of social groups, areas and specific contexts where crime is especially concentrated (generally associated with other social vulnerabilities). After the optimism of the initial period, the gradual recognition of the government’s inability to deal, by itself, with the specific and different dimensions of the phenomenon emerges, along with the increased security pressure and the politicisation of criminal issues. In general, the answers can be characterised by the increasing differentiation of intervention strategies, broadening their scope beyond the criminal justice system, and the direct action of central government. This movement is, in fact, common to the development of social policies in the same period. We can say that crime prevention and social policies somehow develop a common trajectory: (i) the blurring between crime prevention and social policy does not result, in the Portuguese experience, in the criminalisation of the latter; and (ii) initially formed under a monolithic conception of the welfare state, evolving into a network model, marked by shared responsibility and by public-private

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partnerships, the ‘community’ emerges not only as a locus of intervention, but also as a true agent of intervention and participation. However, despite this decentralising effort, the state maintains a prominent role by triggering and financing action. In most programmes, it is responsible for co-ordination and intervention through local public services. This unfolding model of coordination and integration of various participants at different levels is not exempt from difficulties that can result from different factors, including the co-existence of diverse interests, the distribution of resources, responsibilities and roles. The inadequacies in terms of strategy, planning and co-ordination are often reflected in the quality of interventions that turn out to be fragmented, and sometimes redundant. These aspects are reinforced by the concentration of interventions in the same areas or neighbourhoods. In many cases, diagnosing the problems is insufficient. This hinders the process of outlining and devising strategies with clear objectives. This is similar to non-specific intervention strategies, not clearly defined and without consistent theoretical and scientific support. Somehow, the ‘umbrella programmes’, such as ‘local security contracts’, emphasise this issue, merging several strategies and practices that were previously implemented, although, in some cases, their relationship to crime or to security issues is not clear. Devices that meet the criteria of scientific evaluation and that measure the impact of interventions (and their outcomes), namely the reduction of crime and associated factors, are rarely found. In spite of an increased demand for participation from researchers and academics, in most cases the evaluation does not go beyond a performance evaluation, focusing more on the presence or absence of conditions and resources allocated to the programme, rather than on the effectiveness of their activities. Although central government maintains its position as overseer, when it comes to defining and managing crime prevention programmes, a concerted global policy that establishes clear priorities and strategies to guide the design, implementation and integration of programmes and interventions, is still not apparent. It results in fragmentation, overlapping and, in some cases, excessive intervention. The lack of hard knowledge about the following areas is persistent: (i) the impact of the programmes, interventions and measures; (ii) the study of integration processes between relevant bodies and agencies, and between the various measures and programmes implemented that ultimately address the same targets; and (iii) the impact of these initiatives on the normal functioning of institutions, i.e. on their missions.

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For all these reasons, we can conclude by saying that in spite of the best efforts in a short period of time, aiming to bring Portuguese policies into line with other European countries on many levels, and particularly as regards crime prevention policies and practices, at present we do not find an integrated crime prevention system. In a moment of profound economic crisis, the future of social crime prevention will depend on structural reforms in order ‘to do better with less’, as well as on the development of scientific knowledge about the causes of crime and the models of crime prevention. Although a lot has been done in a small amount of time, these are the general conditions needed in order to accomplish what seems to be a ‘preventive turn’ in the Portuguese experience.

Bibliography Agra, C. (2004). La révolution scientifique de la criminologie contemporaine. Victime et sécurité: deux analyseurs épistémiques [The Scientific Revolution of Contemporary Criminology. Victim and Security: Two Epistemic Analyzers]. In B. Brägger, N. Capus, S. Cimichella, R. Maag, N. Queloz & G. Schmid (eds.), Kriminologie – Wissenschaftliche und praktische Entwicklungen: gestern, heute, morgen / La criminologie – Évolutions scientifiques et pratiques: hier, aujourd’hui et demain (pp. 137-154). Chur/ Zurich: Rüegger Verlag. Agra, C. (2009). Requiem pour la guerre à la drogue. L’expérimentation portugaise de décriminalisation [Requiem for the War on Drugs. The Portuguese Experiment of Decriminalisation]. Déviance et Société, 33(1), 27-49. Agra, C., & Castro, J. (2007). La justice des mineurs au Portugal: Risque, responsabilité et réseau [Juvenile Justice in Portugal: Risk, Responsibility and Network]. In F. Bailleau & Y. Cartuyvels (eds.), La justice pénale des mineurs en Europe. Entre modèle welfare et inflexions néoliberales (pp. 229246). Paris: L’Harmattan. Agra, C., Quintas, J., & Fonseca, E. (2002). From Democratic Security to a Securitarian Democracy: the Portuguese Example. In P. Hebberecht & D. Duprez (eds.), The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe (pp. 187-208). Brussels: VUBPRESS. Castro, C. (2011). ‘The Punitive Turn ‘ – Are There Any Points of Resistance? An Answer from the Portuguese Experience. In F. Bailleau & Y. Cartuyvels (eds.), The Criminalisation of Youth. Juvenile Justice in Europe, Turkey and Canada (pp. 111-134). Brussels: VUBPRESS.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Crawford, A. (1998). Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Politics, Policies and Practices. Harlow: Longman. Crawford, A. (2009). Governing through Anti-Social Behaviour: Regulatory Challenges to Criminal Justice. British Journal of Criminology, 49(6), 810-831. Farrington, D.P., & Welsh, B.C. (2007). Saving Children From a Life of Crime: Early Risk Factors and Effective Intervention. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gersão, E. (1994). Menores agentes de infracções – interrogações acerca de velhas e novas respostas [Juvenile Delinquents – Questions about Old and New Reactions]. Revista Portuguesa de Ciência Criminal, 4(2), 241-259. Greenwald, G. (2009). Drug Decriminalisation in Portugal: Lessons for Creating Fair and Successful Drug Policies. Washington: CATO Institute. Homel, R. (2005). Developmental Crime Prevention. In N. Tilley (Ed.), Handbook of Crime Prevention and Community Safety (pp. 71-106). Collumpton: Willan Publishing. Rodrigues, A. (1997). Repensar o direito de menores em Portugal utopia ou realidade [Rethinking a Juvenile Justice in Portugal: Utopia or Reality]. Revista Portuguesa de Ciência Criminal, 7(3), 355-386. Tonry, M., & Farrington, D.P. (1995). Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention. In M. Tonry & D.P. Farrington (eds.), Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (pp. 1-20). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Tremblay, R.E., & Craig, W.M. (1995). Developmental Crime Prevention. Crime and Justice: a Review of Research. In M. Tonry & D.P. Farrington (eds.), Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (pp. 151236). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

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Social Crime Prevention in Slovenia – Recent Developments Gorazd Meško, Zoran Kanduč and Maja Jere

Introductory Remarks This paper is an attempt at an analysis – although just a brief (and hopefully a critical) one – of social crime prevention concepts in Slovenia, along with the historical background of criminological perspectives on crime prevention development, and current endeavours in the field of social preventative practices. Generally speaking, regarding crime prevention (or crime control), Slovenian society has become harsher (less tolerant and more punitive), which could be interpreted as a withdrawal from the past orientation in crime prevention practice in general (Flander & Meško, 2011). Along with this trend, a new phenomenon appeared; namely public opinion-led policy making, highly supported (and often manipulated or at least orchestrated) by the media, and leading to the progressive exclusion of criminological expertise in crucial crime prevention issues (Meško, 2009). These developments could be described, as Šelih (2004) has warned, as some sort of ‘deviation’ from the implementation of the ideals of human rights, social justice and humanity in crime prevention policy (and, as a matter of fact, from social crime prevention as it was implemented in the 1950s, 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s, when, at its peak of development, this approach was somehow integrated into social welfare programmes and activities). Social crime prevention was still a part of policies and crime response practices in the 1980s, although it almost disappeared in the last decade of the twentieth century with the introduction of more ‘promising’ ideas about crime prevention, and ideas about ‘quick fi xes’ concerning crime problems. After the 1990s, social prevention remained a constant in criminological literature, while in practice it kept on losing its importance, as the public, as well as politicians, required effective and efficient responses to everyday crimes, mainly committed by working

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class men – at least those which were reported to, or detected by, the police, and which subsequently led to convictions in criminal courts. To begin with, what is ‘social crime prevention’? Strategies to do with social crime prevention aim to change social environments and, consequently, influence offenders’ motivations, preferably with planned and co-ordinated multi-agency approaches. Social crime prevention initiatives include organising socially acceptable leisure activities for young people (potential delinquents), and strengthening the socialisation agents, such as informal control (family, peers, school), education, employment, and support schemes for ex-convicts (Meško, 2000). Social crime prevention is based on the assumption that real changes regarding diminishing crime rates can be achieved mainly through solving numerous social problems, such as social inequality, a low education rate, structural unemployment, poor employment opportunities, discrimination, poverty and social exclusion (Meško, 2002). The developments in Slovenian criminology and crime policy, as well as social crime prevention in practice, are further elaborated below. In the conclusion, authors’ remarks concerning the concept and practices of social crime prevention are presented.

Historical Overview The development of Slovenian criminology in relation to crime policymaking has evolved in several stages (Meško, 2009). The first stage, between 1954 and 1970, could be called ‘criminological positivism and seeking for truths about crime, deviance and criminality’ (Meško, 2009: 34). The second stage (1970s) was characterised by criminological experimentation, theoretical contributions to re-socialisation/rehabilitation practices and the functioning of penal institutions, and critical reflections about the role of the police in society. It could be stated that criminological research contributed to the decrease of punitiveness within the criminal justice system and tried to ‘civilise’ professionals and lay people in their understanding and responses to deviance and crime. The appearance of research projects and theories about domestic violence, introducing children’s and human rights in criminological practices, along with the study of violence in schools and prisons, defined the third stage of development. At that time, Slovenia began to function as a somewhat ‘transitional’ cultural space between Western Europe and the rest of the former Yugoslavia, which was, among other

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things, occupying the most favourable geographical position for getting familiar with – and for importing – Western criminology (Meško, Frangež & Dvoršek, 2008). The third stage, after the formal establishment of political independence of the Slovenian national state (in 1991), could be called ‘a retreat from empirical research and critical criminology’. This was mainly due to the fast and deep socio-economic transformations in Slovenian society, namely privatisation/denationalisation (Meško, 2009). In addition, the interest of Slovenian criminologists in Western crime prevention increased. At first it was focused on theoretical knowledge and later on crime prevention practices (Meško, Frangež & Dvoršek, 2008). The fourth stage was marked by significant social, economic and political changes – e.g. by joining NATO and the EU in 2004, and adoption of the Euro (but also by an increase in so called economic or ‘white-collar’ crime) – which defined this period as a stage of ‘internationalisation, multiplication (and growing diversification) of criminology and exclusion of criminologists from official policy-making’ (Meško, 2009). In the past decade ideas on crime prevention have been changing, and have become a part of a professional, media and political rhetoric. Along with state responses to crime and the institutionalisation of crime prevention, non-governmental organisations began to play an important role in preventive and educational activities (Meško, Frangež & Dvoršek, 2008). In a small Slovenian society, researchers are confronted with the task of choosing to study a variety of crime problems and present their results to the state agencies – in the hope of being understood, and of seeing preventive activities applied in everyday practice (Šelih & Meško, 2010). This idealistic hope often remains unfulfilled.

Social Crime Prevention and the Official Ideas of Crime Policy In spring 2007, the Slovenian Parliament adopted a Resolution of the National Plan on Preventing and Combatting Crime (Resolucija o nacionalnem programu preprečevanja in zatiranja kriminalitete za obdobje 2007-2011, 2007), and along with it the Commission for Crime Prevention and Control was appointed to exercise oversight over implementation of the Resolution. The document itself represents the policy guidelines, which are in compliance with article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (Ustava Republike Slovenije, 1991), stating that Slovenia is a social

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state. Social crime prevention is not specifically defined in the Resolution or in any other analysed document, but it can be recognised as a guiding principle, supported by various bodies and their activities. The Resolution stresses the importance of systematic and co-ordinated implementation of all those activities performed by governmental institutions, civil society and citizens, that can in any way contribute to crime prevention and control. Since crime is a complex phenomenon, its prevention depends on dealing with many more or less criminogenic factors, requiring a comprehensive social approach, based on co-operation and partnership. According to the Resolution, the most important crime related problems in our society are: urban and property crime; organised crime; abuse of illegal drugs; youth and family violence; environmental crime; fear of crime; the rates of unreported crime; help for the victims of crime; and inter-institutional co-operation and sentencing policy. In the Resolution it is emphasised that modern society, also characterised as a ‘risk society’, involves significant changes in the structural and cultural positioning of its, apparently, increasingly atomised members. This recent – ‘post-modern’ or (post) transitional – historical trend runs against the deep-rooted – although more often than not, neglected – collectivist Slovenian tradition of survival strategies, based upon its strong, informal mutual support networks. Individuals are now less integrated in solid formal social structures, particularly in the domain of wage work or economic activities. Moreover, people are exposed to constant changes in the normative and value systems, which can lead to a sense of disorientation or confusion. Needless to say, crime prevention efforts at a local level should also include civil society. Public participation in local democracy is a twoway process that allows local self-government to respond to citizens’ needs or demands and to improve its services. With public participation, mutual trust could be developed and general quality of life could be increased. Also, local self-government should strive to achieve maximum public involvement, as well as involving specialised non-governmental organisations in the planning and implementation of crime prevention strategies. The Resolution on the National Plan for Preventing and Combatting Crime (2007) defines as crime prevention strategies: social work programmes to prevent crime in urban areas; programmes of non-violent culture and social equality in urban areas; property crime suppression strategies; rehabilitation programmes for drug abusers; education and training programmes for parents to identify violence and non-violent conflict resolution; integration of educational content and activities that contribute to pro-social behaviour of children and adolescents in the curricula of primary and

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secondary schools for non-violent problem and conflict resolution; leisure time activity programmes for young people; effective help for families affected by violence; protection for victims of family violence and active efforts to change the perpetrators’ behaviours; programmes to reduce the consumption of alcoholic beverages; strategies to reduce the fear of crime; media presentations of possible ways to reduce the risk of becoming a victim of crime; improving the information flow between the investigation, prosecution and judicial authorities. In practice, co-operation between different local self-government entities is already present. The Police Act (Zakon o policiji, 1998) recommends police co-operation with local communities in the areas related to crime prevention and other local security issues. Consequently, around one hundred and fift y-three local safety councils were established within local municipalities in Slovenia at the end of 2005. In most cases mayors followed an initiative by local and regional police chiefs whose responsibility it is to provide citizens with safety and security services. Besides representatives of local municipalities, local police, representatives of schools, social services, companies, private security agencies, civil society associations, non-governmental organisations and other responsible citizens participate in activities designed by local safety councils (Meško and Lobnikar, 2005; Meško, Nalla, & Sotlar, 2006). Meško and Lobnikar (2005) conducted research into the contribution of local safety councils towards local responsibility in crime prevention and safety provision. Respondents were representatives of local authorities, the police force, local community groups and non-governmental organisations from several Slovenian cities. Among other findings, social crime prevention measures1 were recognised as necessary priorities in local crime prevention. Respondents perceived crime and disorder problems as activities of young and neglected citizens, individuals alienated from their communities and ‘problem’ children at schools. However, social crime prevention activities, 1 In this research, factor analysis showed that respondents believed that the following social crime prevention measures should be applied in everyday practice: training for parenthood; work with parents; organised youth activities; solving social problems; pupil/student friendly school climate; development of the sense of affi liation to the community; leisure activities; competent school teachers; and anti unemployment strategies. This research also showed that the main pressure is put on the police while other institutions were not so eager to respond to crime and incivility problems in local communities. As local safety councils are just a consultative body of a local government, not all agreed priorities are implemented in the agreed time.

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although highly ranked by the respondents as appropriate preventive activity, are only paid lip service. Situational crime prevention and ‘fire brigade interventions’ are still preferred when solving everyday local crime and safety problems. In 2008 the Slovenian government adopted The National Report on Strategies for Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2008-2010 (Nacionalno poročilo o strategijah socialne zaščite in socialnega vključevanja za obdobje 20082010, 2008). It was prepared by the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs within the framework of the new cycle of the European Union’s open method of co-ordination, and was forwarded to the European Commission. Among other risk factors in the area of social protection and social inclusion, the Report identifies the slow, and poorly co-ordinated, modernisation of key areas in the field of social protection (such as a lack of accessibility and responsiveness), the importance of intergenerational solidarity (making housing accessible and providing help in the family), the importance of strengthening one’s own responsibility and an awareness of the need for constant personal development, education and training. Social crime prevention is not actually explicitly mentioned in the report. Key challenges in the area of social protection, therefore, contribute to the greater social inclusion of individuals and the cohesion of Slovenian society, improvements in the accessibility and quality of social services, and improvements in the efficiency and adequacy of social transfers by modernising social protection systems. Vulnerable groups of the population, regarded as being at a higher degree of risk of social exclusion, are people with a very low income, often depending on benefits: the unemployed; single-parent households; single elderly people; children, whose physical, mental and social development is threatened by poverty or social exclusion; elderly people; people with disabilities, and those with mental and physical development disorders; people with severe learning difficulties; homeless people; addicts; Roma people and victims of violence. Another set of important guidelines is included in the Resolution on the 2009–2014 National Programme on Prevention of Family Violence (Resolucija o nacionalnem programu preprečevanja nasilja v družini 20092014, 2009), which presents various strategies for the prevention of family violence. Since the end of the 1980s, victims of domestic violence and victims of violence in general were primarily the concern of non-governmental

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organisations,2 which were the first to develop and offer specific professional assistance for victims. Until the mid-1990s, domestic violence prevention was not an important focus for social institutions. The government started funding these programmes through public calls for tender in the field of social security and is now funding them, using the budget agreed in the Resolution on the National Social Assistance Programme 2006-2010 (Resolucija o nacionalnem programu socialnega varstva za obdobje 20062010, 2006). The Ministry of Education and Sport is responsible for Preventive Actions in Education and Schooling Strategy. Implementation strategy for preventive campaigns for life in society without violence is operated by the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Culture and Government Office for Equal Opportunities. The Ministry of Culture, along with the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs implements the Strategy for the Promotion of the Constructive Role of Media in Decreasing Family Violence, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour. Family and Social Affairs are in charge of Risky and Harmful Alcohol and Illegal Drug Abuse Reduction Strategy. Action Plan for Family Violence Prevention (Akcijski načrt za preprečevanje nasilja v družini 2010-2011, 2010) defines additional strategies in the field of preventing family violence. The Ministry of Culture organises schools for parents and provides education for responsible and quality partnerships. The Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Police) organise education and training for professionals dealing with family violence. As well as these strategies, Action Plan contains goals, activities, funds and indicators to assess the key goal – reduction of family violence.

2 Non-governmental organisations, dealing with victims of domestic violence and violence in general are among others: Association SOS Help Line for Women and Children - Victims of Violence [SOS telefon za ženske in otroke – žrtve nasilja] (http://www.drustvo-sos.si/index.php?page_id=3), Association For Non-violent Communication [Društvo za nenasilno komunikacijo] (http://www.drustvo-dnk. si/), Institution Emma – Professional psychosocial support in cases of violence [Zavod Emma – Strokovna psihosocialna pomoč v primerih nasilja] (http://www.zavodemma.si/), Women Counselling Service [Ženska svetovalnica], Society Ključ – centre for fight against trafficking of human beings [Društvo Ključ - center za boj proti trgovini z ljudmi] (http://drustvo-kljuc.si/), Institution Papilot [Zavod Papilot] (http:// www.papilot.si/).

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Although it was stated in the Programme for Children and Young People in 2006–2016 (Program za otroke in mladino, 2006) that the Slovenian Government is aware of the fact that without taking care of its children, the state has no future, the Programme is the first document, after the Resolution on the Grounds for the Formation of Family Policy (Resolucija o temeljih oblikovanja družinske politike v Republiki Sloveniji, 1993), that fills the gap in the area of integration of children, young people and the family as a whole. Slovenia failed to draft such a national development programme in the 1990s, as the period coincided with the country struggling to assert its independence, meaning that other development areas and subjects took priority. Programming areas concerning children and young people are: health policy; family policy; education policy; social policy; special social care policy; protection from neglect policy; violence and abuse policy; illegal drugs protection policy; free time activities policy; spatial policy; and cultural policy. One of the objectives in the area of health policy is to carry out measures in dealing with violence against children, with strategies such as changing the social climate at school and introducing health-related subjects into the school curricula, as well as training and education for medical personnel in discovering injuries caused by violent behaviour. One of the three education policy objectives is to guarantee quality education for mutual tolerance, reduction of inequalities in society, and respect for diversity and human rights. In the area of social policy, the objectives are to reduce poverty and social exclusion of children and families, to reduce the dropout rate in secondary schools, and to improve the inclusiveness of young unemployed people in vocational, educational and other programmes. In the area of special social care, one chapter is dedicated to children and young people belonging to a particular ethnic group – in our case the Roma people. The basic objective is to achieve an improvement in their social position and to ensure their social inclusion. Basic objectives in the area of protection from neglect, violence and abuse are to prevent all forms of violence against children and to make victim protection one of the state’s priority tasks, improving legal care and protecting children, as well as providing specialist training for all experts working with children who have experienced violence. In Slovenia, the concept of developmental crime prevention is included within social crime prevention and is aimed towards at-risk young people. Equal opportunities for women and men, and the related social attention to women, who are still in a position of inequality, are the main concern of

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the Office for Equal Opportunities. In order to improve the status of women and ensure sustainable development in the realisation of gender equality, pursuant to Article 15 of the Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men (Zakon o enakih možnostih žensk in moških, 2002), the Resolution on the National Programme for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men was adopted in 2005 (Resolucija o nacionalnem programu za enake možnosti žensk in moških, 2005-2013, 2005). The fifth chapter of the Resolution deals with violence against women and encompasses objectives and measures for preventive action. The entire system for the prevention of violence against women should be based on zero tolerance towards all kinds of violence. In addition, the system of values in Slovenian society should be developed in the direction where violence is recognised as an inadmissible violation of fundamental human rights. In order to bring about the practical implementation of the aforementioned documents, individual ministries are obliged to draft action plans, in which they have to: assign the bodies tasked with the plans’ implementation; determine the ways and means of carrying out individual tasks; assess what funds are necessary for implementation; and report on how the plans have been carried out.

Some Final Critical Remarks (Instead of Conclusion Stricto Sensu) The term ‘social crime prevention’ is quite rarely (if ever) used in parapolitical, media, academic, managerial or professional discourses. Although, undoubtedly, there are measures, practices and programmes that could be described by this vague, and consequently rather controversial, ‘concept’, these are always accompanied by hesitation, serious mental reservations or theoretical acrobatics. Such phenomena can be observed, particularly at local community (or authority) level, or in relation to specific issues, such as domestic/family violence, mobbing, bullying, hate crimes and (ab) use of drugs. However, in these specific fields, many preventive activities are basically ‘cultural’ in their orientation, e.g. in the sense that they aim primarily at challenging and changing: ‘socially undesirable’ values or unacceptable hedonistic strategies; happy-go-lucky approaches to health and other risks; deep-rooted aggressive behaviour patterns; die-hard ‘patriarchal’ gender roles; too-narrow concepts of ‘violence’, and accordingly, toobroad a tolerance of its appearance in intimate or workplace relationships.

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Unfortunately, ‘social prevention’ programme schemes are, more often than not, unachievable, quickly forgotten or only partly realised, often because of the shortage of human or material resources (or because of the chronic or acute lack of political will) (Meško, 2003). This should not come as a big surprise. Namely, that in the (post)transitional Slovenian society, characterised by the victorious counter-revolutionary restoration of (now fundamentally ‘consumer’) capitalism, the otherwise innocent adjective ‘social’ has become somewhat obsolete or, in extremis, even an ideologically strictly prohibited signifier, since it is associated with ‘socialism’ (or, even worse, with ‘communism’). And, what is more, nowadays, ‘totalitarian’ social formation has to be understood, evaluated and treated as some sort of ‘absolute evil’3 or ‘crime of all crimes’, that is to say, as an extreme danger (especially in political and economic terms) that has to be prevented at all costs. As is to be expected, in this (basically neo-liberal and neo-conservative) context, the social or ‘welfare’ state, and of course its various entitlements and programmes, (overlapping, in many important areas with what mainstream criminology conceives and recommends as ‘social prevention of crime’), has also come under almost continual attack. This is mainly because this institutionalised and bureaucratic concession to the demands of the working class is nowadays presented by the ruling, national and trans-national, ‘elites’ as a huge, or even the principal, obstacle or problem par excellence for economic agents and companies, exposed to increasingly brutal pressures or ‘categorical imperatives’ of international competition. On the other hand, the theory and practice of ‘prevention’ (packaged, needless to say, preferably without the annoying label ‘social’) are increasingly invading all aspects of individual lives and regular family functions. Increasingly atomised members of Slovenian post-modern society and its (quite often relatively unstable) family ‘cells’ (progressively resembling dustbins, filled by all kinds of structurally-generated problems and contradictions) are expected to prevent, indeed even to ‘fight against’ the growing multitude of various ‘risks’, including of course criminal ones: wrinkles, cellulite and numerous other shameful signs of (too early) ageing, health problems, illness and – what is probably even more important – insufficient fitness (having no upper limit), un- or under-employment, ‘new’ (even if generally ‘just’ relative) poverty, low personal worth or status 3 As far as the ideological treatment of the ‘Big Evil’ (connected to modernity’s failed ‘utopian’ political projects) in the Western societies is concerned, see excellent, mindopening analysis provided by Hall, Winlow and Ancrum (2008: 198-200).

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in the social hierarchy, or even social insignificance, often equated with the involuntary inclusion into an anonymous ‘herd’, composed of ‘nobodies’ and ‘despicable losers’ of all kinds. Consequently, prevention of crime becomes primarily the ‘civil’ duty (or responsibility) of private individuals (hardly described as ‘citizens’ or ‘public figures’) and organisations. Such prevention – conceived and performed mainly in personal, familiarised, privatised and commercialised (commoditised) arrangements – can be rather easily subsumed under a well-known criminological concept. Yes, we are dealing here with so-called situational prevention, probably the central paradigm in treating – increasingly ‘normalised’4 (or rather trivialised) – crime risks in the turbulent period (‘dark age’) following the glorious establishment of the ‘sovereign’ Slovenian state (although, its political independence has quickly evaporated in obscure labyrinths of EU and NATO structures). However, there is an additional (and in no way negligible) reason explaining the gradual rise of manifold forms of ‘situational prevention’, the complex phenomenon that could be perhaps more adequately conceptualised as individual, familiar or organisational self-defence, operating on the horizon of ‘civil’ society; this is the progressive crises of the criminal justice system and also of many other agencies of formal (state or government managed) control. Let us pose a final, supposedly ‘big’ question. Is an apparent eclipse of ‘social crime prevention’ deplorable, at least if understood in terms of the defi nition kindly suggested by the editors of this book? That is to say, as it is thought of as a concept containing measures, practices and other interventions which explicitly focus on ‘social causes of crime’, such as, relative deprivation, exclusion, restriction of opportunities and chances, conflict situations and supposedly many others. The answer is, not really. There are, of course, many arguments for such an answer. To begin with, it is most unlikely, or, at least, extremely naïve to hope, that the Slovenian (finally and proudly) ‘democratic’ state (or, any post-modern government functioning more or less strictly in the obedient service of domestic and international capital) would – first and foremost in the name of ‘crime prevention’ – enact and enforce political measures aimed at the radical reduction of huge inequalities in material wealth, in incomes (rents included) or in other valuable resources (inequalities that, obviously enough, cannot be justified either morally or economically) and abolish the terribly archaic (anachronistic) right of 4 For a precise description (and theoretical interpretation) of various forms of the ‘normalisation of crime’ in post-modern society, see Lea 2002: 134-160.

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inheritance. Yet, these eye-opening (or, maybe, eye-closing) inequalities (along with accompanying political, cultural, ideological and ‘symbolic’ power differentials) are primarily problematic, as such or in themselves, although not because of their actual, potential or supposed crimegenerating effects or repercussions. To put it more precisely, they could, and should, be interpreted as aspects of ‘structural violence’, also including many other harmful phenomena, such as: involuntary unemployment; socially unnecessary overwork of ‘happily’ employed ‘liberal wage slaves’; humiliation, alienation and reification of the bearers/sellers of ‘labourpower’; ramified ecological damage; almost omni-present and, moreover, awfully vulgar/demagogic economic propaganda, performed mainly by the advertising and marketing ‘industry’; systematic cultivation of the ‘spirit of stupidity etc. Needless to say, those various phenomena are quite a normal, or, at least for many of those that are caught up in the dominant ideology, even a ‘natural’ dimension of ‘living’, or rather, for most of the time, working and consuming, in a post-modern capitalist ‘social’ formation. What is more, capitalist structural violence should not only be interpreted (described and evaluated) as such. It has to be fought against – not merely ‘socially’, but politically and economically. Unfortunately, it is exactly this category of struggle (i.e. a class struggle led by a politically organised, premodern, modern and post-modern proletariat, knowing what it is fighting for, and against) that is most categorically prohibited or ‘socially prevented’ in Slovenian and other similar social formations (capitalist modes of production, exploitation and accumulation). Besides, the vanishing concept of ‘social crime prevention’ has many other deficiencies, of varying degrees of seriousness. First of all, the real, or at least, scientifically presupposed ‘social causes’ (or should we say ‘roots’ or ‘root causes’) of crime, are more often than not conceptualised in quite an abstract, ambiguous or vague manner. Can we imagine some members of society who don’t have feelings of ‘relative deprivation’, not necessarily referring to money or any other material resource, but related to, for example, physical appearance, beauty, sex-appeal, health, intelligence, creativity or some other human potential or characteristic, defining or determining one’s social position, ‘status’, popularity, prestige, influence, respect and other erotic or thymotic ‘goods’?5 No. Can we imagine some sort of society without ‘social conflicts’, where the members of society live in perfect peace and harmony? 5 As far as the competition for thymotic goods/values is concerned, see Sloterdijk 2009: 62-64.

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No. What could be said of ‘restrictions of opportunities and chances to make choices,’ understood as the social causes of crime? Well, what really matters is the following question: opportunities and chances for what? For wage slavery, for miserably paid, alienating, boring, stupidity-generating, mentally or physically health-damaging, humiliating, annoying, excessively time and energy consuming (or rather stealing), idiotic work? For as quick, and as effortless enrichment as possible, according to the motto, ‘catch as much cash as you can,’ some way or other, preferably legally, or at least without encountering serious sanctions? For bettering one’s position in a fierce, and essentially endless, competition known as the ‘rat race’ for ‘social distinction’, membership of the elite, (super- or just ‘normally’) rich, successful, famous, beautiful and, generally generously overpaid individuals, so far removed from the majority of people in a fragmented and polarised society? Finally, it is no secret that crime that is to be ‘socially prevented’ consists largely (or even exclusively) of ‘good old’ conventional ‘street’ crime, perpetrated mostly by people inhabiting the lower echelons of the hierarchical social pyramid. Yet, even a quick and superficial look at Slovenian (post) transitional society clearly shows that it was, and still is, ‘unconventional’ crime, also labelled as ‘corruption’, ‘white-collar crime’, ‘economic crime’ or ‘crimes of the powerful’, that is much more dangerous and harmful than its conventional ‘brother in illegality’ (or, perhaps better expressed as a ‘colleague in predatory, fraudulent, aggressive, exploitative, humiliating, plundering or deceptive activities’) (Meško, Sotlar and Winterdyk, 2011). Obviously, protagonists of ‘unconventional crime’ (illegal, in-civil, a- or antisocial economic activities) are, generally, not deprived, poor, uneducated, professionally unsuccessful, unemployed, socially excluded or marginalised, mentally deficient, seriously restricted in their opportunities and chances to make choices (either free or determined ones). On the contrary, they are usually quite (or even enviably) well-off, respectable and successful, at least according to the prevailing cultural standards that are in use for ‘measurement’ of personal achievements. In other words, they have plenty of choices (referring to potential actions), resources, opportunities and various forms of ‘capital’, not only economic or financial, but also social, human, cultural, political and symbolic ones.6 6 As Ruggiero has shown social inequalities determine varied degrees of personal freedom, choices and potential actions that can be carried out: ‘Each degree of freedom offers an ability to act, to choose the objectives of one’s action, and the means to make realistic choices. The greater the degree of freedom enjoyed, the wider the range of choices available, along with the potential decisions to be made and the possibility of realistically predicting their outcomes’ (Ruggiero, 2001: 179). 315

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How would ‘social crime prevention’ look like in this particular case? Unfortunately, as far as really ‘big crime’ is concerned, it seems that ‘situational crime prevention’ and deterrence provided by the criminal ‘justice’ system are also ineffective preventive (or repressive) mechanisms of social control. At first (and somehow naïve) sight, the notorious failure of the criminal sanctioning apparatus comes as a paradox, for it is precisely ‘white-collar crime’ that seems the most appropriate target of the (threat of) punishment-based prevention. ‘White-collar criminals’ possess huge amounts of legally or illegally accumulated wealth that could be quite easily confiscated in terms of sanctioning. However, as to whether riches are legally or illegally obtained is often a blurred, uncertain, flexible and fluid area, influenced by ideology and propaganda. Unsurprisingly, sanctions are rarely used, given the enormous immunity in relation to formal and informal social control activities. Consequently, greatly enlarged normative freedoms of action are granted, and happily and peacefully enjoyed, by the ‘whitecollar criminal’ (e.g. politicians, state officials, members of parliament, para-political party leaders and followers, managers, businessmen and businesswomen, entrepreneurs, lawyers, church functionaries, bankers, ‘financial magicians’ and speculators, academics, medical doctors). Of course, this systematic impunity of (post)transitional ‘white-collar crime & corruption’ (usually referred to as ‘scandals’ or ‘affairs’) has not passed unnoticed, mainly because of media coverage and ‘hearsay’ information, but the only – or at least – predominant repercussion of this public knowledge has been extensive and intensive expansion of ‘reactive’ emotions, e.g. frustration, dissatisfaction, indignation, anger, envy, resentment, hatred or simply aggressive feelings (waiting and looking for appropriate targets). However, regardless of conventional and unconventional crime in Slovenian (post)modern society, it could be stated that the more or less legal processes – e.g. denationalisation and privatisation (‘theft of the century’) – have done, qualitatively and quantitatively, even more social damage than ‘crime’ (lato sensu and stricto sensu). So, we can end this shorthand analysis not with an answer, but with the following question: what kind of ‘social prevention’ would be required in order to significantly reduce the manifold damage caused by counter-revolutionary restoration of capitalist social formation? To conclude our essay on Slovenian social prevention in theory and practice, prevention ideas stated in the above-mentioned governmental documents have had very little impact (or sometimes a perverse effect) on the crime situation in the country. Social crime prevention used to be a significant part of social welfare programmes and social practices in the second part of the

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previous century, although it lost its central position after new economic and political elites decided to follow (or simply had to join mainstream) neoliberal and/or neo-conservative mainstream and market economies in the 1990s. Contemporary crime prevention has been mainly characterised by situational crime prevention, deterrence, and law enforcement, as the police are seen as the main formal crime prevention and crime control agents by the public and politicians, even in areas beyond their powers. The social elite are nowadays more interested in incapacitating troublesome individuals (mainly from the lowest social strata) than in dealing with the root causes of the most frequently detected crimes and antisocial behaviours, and investing in social preventative programmes. To conclude, Slovenia has been facing increasing crime and imprisonment figures since the mid 1990s (Flander & Meško, 2011). Nevertheless, crime indicators still show that Slovenia, despite a more punitive orientation, overcrowded prisons and fewer social preventative measures, is catching up with the crime and imprisonment rates in Scandinavian countries.

Bibliography Flander, B., & Meško, G. (2011). ‘Punitiveness’ and Penal Trends in Slovenia: on The ‘Shady Side of the Alps?’. In H. Kury & E. Shea (eds.), Punitivity – International Developments (pp. 227-249). Bochum: Universitätsverlag Brockmeyer. Hall, S., Winlow, S., & Ancrum, C. (2008). Criminal Identities and Consumer Culture: Crime Exclusion and The New Culture of Narcissism. Uffculme: Willan Publishing. Kazenski Zakonik [The Penal Code]. (2008). Uradni list RS, št. 55/2008, št. 66/2008. Lea, J. (2002). Crime and Modernity: Continuities in Left Realist Criminology. London: Sage. Meško, G. (2000). Pogledi na preprečevanje kriminalitete v poznomodernih družbah [Aspects of Crime Prevention in the Late Modern Societies]. In M. Pagon (ed.), Prvi slovenski Dnevi varstvoslovja (pp. 295-306). Ljubljana: Visoka policijsko-varnostna šola. Meško, G. (2002). Osnove Preprečevanja Kriminalitete [Basics of Crime Prevention]. Ljubljana: Visoka policijsko-varnostna šola. Meško, G. (2003). Socialna kriminalna prevencija – vizija ali utopija [Social Crime Prevention – Vision or Utopia]. Socialno delo, 42(6), 347-353.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Meško, G. (2009). Transfer of Crime Control Ideas – Introductory Reflections. In G. Meško & H. Kury (eds.), Crime Policy, Crime Control and Crime Prevention – Slovenian Perspectives (pp. 19-41). Ljubljana: Tipografija. Meško, G., Frangež, D., & Dvoršek, A. (2008). Status Report Slovenia – Current Endeavours in Crime Prevention Training in Slovenia. In M. Coester, E. Marks & A. Meyer (eds.), Qualification in Crime Prevention. Status Reports from Various European Countries (pp. 17-41). Mönchengladbach: Forum Verlag Godesberg GmbH. Meško, G., & Kury, H. (eds.). (2009). Crime Policy, Crime Control and Crime Prevention – Slovenian Perspectives. Ljubljana: Tipografija. Meško, G., & Lobnikar, B. (2005). The Contribution of Local Safety Councils to Local Responsibility in Crime Prevention and Provision of Safety. Policing, 28(2), 353-373. Meško, G., Nalla, M., & Sotlar, A. (2006). Co-operation of Police and Private Security Officers in Crime Prevention in Slovenia. In E. Marks, A. Meyer & R. Linssen (eds.), Quality in Crime Prevention (pp. 133-143). Norderstedt: Books on Demand. Meško, G., Sotlar, A., & Winterdyk, J. (eds.). (2011). Policing in Central and Eastern Europe – Social Control of Unconventional Deviance. Ljubljana: Tipografija. Ministrstvo za delo, družino in socialne zadeve [Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs]. (2006). Program za otroke in mladino 2006–2016 [Programme for Children and Youth 2006-2016] Retrieved October 28, 2010, from http://www.mddsz.gov.si/fi leadmin/mddsz.gov.si/pageuploads/ dokumenti__pdf/pom2006_2016_en.pdf Ministrstvo za delo, družino in socialne zadeve [Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs]. (2008). Nacionalno poročilo o strategijah socialne zaščite in socialnega vključevanja za obdobje 2008–2010 [National report on strategies for social protection and social inclusion 2008–2010] Retrieved October 27, 2010, from http://www.mddsz.gov.si/fi leadmin/mddsz.gov.si/pageuploads/ dokumenti__pdf/npsszsv08_10_en.pdf Resolucija o nacionalnem programu preprečevanja in zatiranja kriminalitete za obdobje 2007–2011 [Resolution on National Plan on the Prevention and Combatting of Crime]. (2007). Uradni list RS, št. 40/2007. Resolucija o nacionalnem programu preprečevanja nasilja v družini 2009-2014 [Resolution on the 2009–2014 National Programme on Prevention of Family Violence]. (2009). Uradni list RS, št. 16/2008. Resolucija o nacionalnem programu socialnega varstva za obdobje 2006-2010 [Resolution on the National Social Assistance Programme 2006-2010]. (2006). Uradni list RS, št. 39/2006. Resolucija o nacionalnem programu za enake možnosti žensk in moških, 2005– 2013 [Resolution on the National Programme for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men]. (2005). Uradni list RS, št. 100/2005.

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Social Crime Prevention in Slovenia Resolucija o temeljih oblikovanja družinske politike v Republiki Sloveniji [Resolution on the Grounds for the Formation of Family Policy]. (1993). Uradni list RS, št. 40/1993. Ruggiero, V. (2001). Crime and Markets: Essays in Anti-Criminology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Šelih, A. (2004). Preprečevanje kriminalitete – razvoj in dileme [Crime prevention – development and dilemmas]. In G. Meško (ed.), Preprečevanje kriminalitete – teorija, praksa in dileme [Crime Prevention – Theory, Practice and Dilemmas] (pp. 19-30). Ljubljana: Inštitut za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti. Šelih, A., & Meško, G. (2010). Slovenian Criminology – A Brief Overview of Research on Unconventional Deviance. In G. Meško, A. Sotlar & B. Tominc (eds.), Social Control of Unconventional Deviance / The Eighth Biennial International Conference Policing in Central and Eastern Europe (pp. 126127). Ljubljana: Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security. Sloterdijk, P. (2009). Srd in čas. Ljubljana: Študentska založba. Ustava Republike Slovenije [Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia]. (1991). Uradni list RS, (33). Zakon o enakih možnostih žensk in moških [Act on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men]. (2002). Uradni list Republike Slovenije, (59). Zakon o Policiji [Police Act]. (1998). Uradni list Republike Slovenije, (49).

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Social Crime Prevention Policies in Spain from 2000-2010 Amadeu Recasens i Brunet

1. Introduction This paper tries to describe the basic aspects of the development of social crime prevention policies in Spain during the last decade, or better, tries to analyse why these polices have never been implemented in a systematic way. The root causes can be found in the transition from a dictatorship to a democratic regime, and in a current situation deeply affected by tensions between the different levels of administration. Each aspect is analysed focusing on social crime prevention policies, on the agencies involved, on the issues tackled and on the resolutions adopted. Since this text is part of a collective and comparative work, it is mostly descriptive, in order to allow readers from other countries to understand facts and realities that are peculiar to each country. In different contexts things happen in their own way, especially in the field of crime prevention (Crawford, 2009: 19). For a good comparison, one of the key elements is to identify a common concept, but the concept of crime prevention raises a number of problems. Its definition is probably a major obstacle, which has yet to be overcome. The question is even more complex when we try to define the term ‘social crime prevention’, because some specific limits and boundaries are blurred by sharing common areas with other disciplines and methods, which can be more or less related to criminological domains. Therefore, the problem is not a lack of, but an excess of definitions that are not always consistent with one another. Even among criminologists, there is no consensus on the definition of the term.1 1 See among others: Crawford, 2009; Hughes, Mc Lauglin & Muncie, 2002; Hughes, 2010; Ekblom & Wyvekens; ICPC, 2008; Hebberecht & Sack, 1997; Baillergeau, 2008; Tilley, 2009; Hebberecht & Duprez, 2002; Commission of the European Communities, 2004. 321

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The more we apply the concept to the reality, the more the confusion increases: the term appears with different and changeable names, and becomes the subject of several disciplines and specialties (criminological, psychological, sociological, epidemiological, etc.). Moreover, each of these disciplines and specialities focuses on the question from a different perspective (the offender, the victim, the context, etc.). The search for the lowest common denominator leads us to adopt Young’s (2010: 396) generic, simple and clear definition,2 but we must be aware that this definition does not solve the bigger problem of the concept, and of which kind of policies must or can be considered social crime prevention. This definition also does not solve other questions (such as whether or not the attempt to reduce fear of crime falls into the category of social crime prevention), nor does it clearly define the conceptual boundaries with other fields (such as community safety). One consequence of the above assumption is the difficulty of including certain policies in the field of crime prevention (Crawford, 2009: 3). In order to speak properly of social crime prevention policies it is necessary, at least, that these policies are explicitly oriented or directed at the problems of crime and violence as their main priority. The opposite would be an improper extension of the term crime prevention. Due to their conceptual vagueness, there is a risk of confusion or dilution of social crime prevention policies in wider, more general policies, developed under different key priorities. Furthermore, to over-extend the scope of the social crime prevention approach risks placing social policies under the banner of criminality (Gilling, 2009: 30). Even accepting that social crime prevention leads to (or is a consequence of) redistributive policies and social justice, this is not yet the core of the problem. As noted by Dubet (2010), there are at least two conceptions of social justice, often intertwined in contemporary democratic societies. The former is aimed at reducing inequalities (income, security, living conditions, etc.) whereas the latter (the most relevant among enforced policies) tackles discrimination on the basis of fair competition (merit, individual responsibility, free enterprise). Following one of Dubet’s examples, the choice is between reducing the gap in living conditions between workers and executives and promising the worker’s children the same opportunities as 2 ‘Measures to prevent crime which are aimed at the social causes of crime rather than those concerned with the mechanical reduction of opportunities (situational crime prevention) or with deterrence (the criminal justice system)’

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executive’s children to become executives. To give priority to one solution or the other is a bet that can be decisive with regard to social crime prevention. As we will see, these elements are aggravated, in the Spanish context, by a lack of discussion, studies and policies.

2. Crime Prevention Policies in Spain until the End of the Century The model of the current Spanish State is the result of a compromise between different national and social wills and the political trends inherited from the Nineteenth Century.3 This reality raises dichotomies mainly focused on two axes: the dilemma between centralism and federalism and the choice between democracy and dictatorship. The policies of security and crime prevention in the Spanish XXI century are a direct result of the problems of the transition from Franco’s totalitarian regime to a democratic one (which took place during the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s) as well as of the social, economic and territorial conflicts of the 1990s (Recasens, 2002). Spain was late in reaching modernity. It did so abruptly, in the second half of the 1970s, when Europe was beginning to suffer a ‘welfare’ crisis, which also implied a loss of belief in the preventive role of social spending as a tool to keep crime under control, reducing inequality and poverty. In this context, there was neither the time nor the opportunity for the growth of a social state model in the Iberian countries.4 Moreover, throughout Europe the idea of a return to the police as the most efficient and less costly instrument spread. This idea fitted well in the context of Spain’s transition from dictatorship, during which no relevant changes to the politically powerful police organisations were made. Thus, we can argue that the shift from the welfare 3 The enormous burden of the state, marked by its Bourbon origin and the constant dictatorships of the XIX and XX centuries, as well as by the inability of the bourgeoisie to realise its industrial revolution (except in Catalonia and the Basque country) and to create a market or a modern state, gave primacy to highly centralised and authoritarian structures (López Garrido, 1982). 4 The Spanish economic model was heavily dependent on external factors, and the oil crisis of 73-74 seriously affected the country at a moment of political transition (in 1975 the country experienced the lowest growth rate since 1960).

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state to a social democratic state of security that occurred in other European countries after World War II (Hebberecht & Sack, 1997) never developed well in Spain. The country saw an immediate shift from dictatorship to a weak social security state, pointing towards a liberal democracy and even towards a securitarianism that reduced the state’s responsibilities; all these factors were situated within a context of European crisis. The two main areas of tension in democratic Spain are the clashes between ‘francoists’ and democrats (later changed into a left-right axis) and the confrontation between Spanish nationalism and the so-called ‘peripheral’ nationalisms (with the Basque Country and Catalonia heading the process). The constitutional structure tried to radically change the ‘francoist’ model, but itself became the victim of the blockade resulting from the struggle for power between the heirs of dictatorial regime and democratic forces. All this led to a long and tortuous process of transition. The Spanish Constitution (1978) established three virtually independent levels of administration: the central state, the autonomies and the municipalities.5 This situation can only work in a threefold dimension and can lead to an overlapping of powers. Among the institutions that can exercise power in the field of social crime prevention, we can single out: several Ministries of the central State (Interior Home Office, Justice, Social welfare and Health); different CCAA Ministries, especially in Catalonia and the Basque Country (Interior Home Office, Justice, Social Welfare and Health); and in the largest cities, the municipal councillors in charge of the police, welfare and other areas (municipal casuistry can be very long, as can the number and functions of its organs and instruments). At each level, policies are not always consistent, and they are even less consistent between the different levels. Other autonomies can also exercise powers according to the dispositions of their respective Statutes of Autonomy.6 Smaller and medium sized towns and cities can also have certain responsibilities, according to their own 5 In the Constitution, regions are divided into nationalities (like Catalonia or the Basque Country) and autonomous communities (CCAA). Municipalities and local institutions are not exactly the same (for example, the Diputaciones are instruments of local cooperation in a supra municipal level, but still in the same local sphere. For the purposes of simplicity, this piece will only consider autonomies -including nationalities- (as CCAA) and local-municipal as synonyms (as City Councils). 6 Home rules

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possibilities and policies. The overall result leads to a highly asymmetric model, impossible to describe briefly. The distribution of powers among the three levels means that policies are defined only along very general lines, and implemented through a system of transfer (whether by act or omission) from higher to lower administrative level (cascade system), and are then enforced by different institutions. The lower level responds to the same logic, which ends up producing a high rate of transfer of responsibilities – but not of budget – and at the same time gives high rates of autonomy to all levels of administration. Often, this mechanism places the actual implementation of policies at a local level. To understand the current crime prevention policies in Spain, we must take into account the tensions that occurred at each of the three political-administrative levels, between police-type security policies and social ones. There had been little experience of sharing responsibilities between different levels of governments and administrations. This allowed crime prevention policy programmes, and actors, to become multiple and fragmented, and also implied an endemic lack of coordination. In this context, also influenced by periodical crises of rule and by the new European tendencies on crime prevention and security, it is not surprising that security policies have been mostly developed in the area of the police,7 far more than in the area of social prevention. As a result, the gap between security and preventive policies allows the former to develop more than the latter. Moreover, the primacy of police-security approaches also implies a budgetary and political supremacy that allows them to influence the set of policies and even to assume some prevention roles (e.g. in mediation matters). Prevention, which is more fragmented and dependent on security policies, is effective at a micro-social and micro-political level, but does not have the necessary strength to enforce its policies at a macro-political level.

7 The state, following the old Napoleonic structure has two large police forces: Cuerpo Nacional de Policía (civilian nature) and Guardia Civil (military nature). There are 5 autonomous police forces (under the orders of their CCAA governments) in the Basque Country, Catalonia and Navarra (with full administrative, judiciary and security powers in its territories) and in Galicia (the law of the police exist but it has never been developed), Andalusia and Canary Islands (with limited functions by Organic Law 2 / 1986 of the Security Forces). In addition, more than 1700 local police are led by Mayors. There isn’t any organic or functional dependency among the three levels, and this implies lack of coordination and overlapping of functions (Recasens, 1992).

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Consequently, the tensions of the 1990s were gradually solved in favour of the predominance of policing strategies with respect to social policies. Factors like a higher organisational capacity, the burden of corporations or a more efficient problem-solving approach, helped give police forces a dominant role. Despite their fragmentation between different administrations, they have a similar status and similar practices that make them more cohesive with respect to other actors and to the security policies they can enforce. This prevalence means that the ‘Interior environment’ has managed to impose its own understanding/interpretation of social conflict, therefore acquiring a leading role in prevention policies. Moreover, the phenomenon of terrorism in the Basque Country by the ETA group meant that security was high up on the Spanish political agenda. It is possible to argue that the biased view of the Spanish Interior Ministry on security matters (focused on national security rather than on citizens’ security) has provoked a perverse effect (Robert, 1999) and has largely dissociated institutional perception from everyday reality. The actors in the fields of security and prevention policies are diverse and plural. The police, due to their corporate characteristics and the common criteria coming from European police co-operation, show greater consistency than the justice system, which is ill placed for prevention policies. In the case of social workers, they are too scattered, may have a different professional status and their practices may diverge significantly. During the 1980s and 1990s, new actors, especially the NGOs involved in social work, tended to secularise (as opposed to the primacy of religious organisations in the 1960s and 1970s) and they also increased. In addition, they become more and more professional, specialised, bureaucratic, and dependent on governments or European Union grants and funds.8 Broadly speaking, we can note that the actors in social policies appear to have become increasingly fragmented, whilst actors within the police are engaged in a vast process of reorganisation. The absence, in Spain, of a real welfare state undermined a social approach to crime prevention. Moreover, we must take into account the role and the strength of the police during the 8 The number of NGOs has significantly increased in Spain during the period. 57  % were created between 1986 and 1995 and of these, 42.4  % had social action as their main objective (Gómez, 2005). Their aims, often broad and diff use, make difficult to distinguish between those dealing (as a priority) with social policies (including security) and those that did this as a secondary action.

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transition process, which clearly established their primacy over other crime prevention policy actors. The overall consequence is that in the 1980s and 1990s, the police presented themselves as an ‘expert group’ (Torrente, 1999: 92) in crime and crime prevention. That is why security and crime prevention can be considered inseparable in Spain. Police tend to cover all areas of security, sometimes adopting sometimes a profile that seems to point towards a new preventive profession different from the classic one (Recasens, 2007: 100-106). At the same time, however, this implies a sort of schizophrenia between the police’s ‘new’ preventive, proactive soul (which requires greater autonomy and discretionary power), and the police’s ‘classic’ repressive soul. (Torrente, 1999: 92). This situation gives raise to tensions and requires deep changes in the forms of control and the conditions for its enforcement, as well as in its mentality, organisation and philosophy (Bayley, 1994: 102-120). This is particularly visible in the local (municipal) police and community policing, which have influenced Spain since the 1980s. The Spanish police do not adopt such changes regularly and uniformly. They differ from force to force, and even in the internal workings of each police force. We can say that these policies have been adopted in a partial and unbalanced way. In political terms, the decade was clearly divided into two halves; the first one was marked by the decline of socialism, governing since 1982. Between 1982 and 1992 we cannot clearly identify crime prevention policies in Spain. The key priorities were firstly the obsessive fight against terrorism and then, the problems of drugs and illegal immigration. In November 1994 the Council of Ministers approved the ‘Plan de libertad y seguridad ciudadana’ (Programme for freedom and urban security) to prevent crime in 11 big Spanish cities. For the first time, the Ministry of the Interior tried to develop security policies that embraced social aspects. In April 1995 the Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana (National Public Security Council, characterised by a social and plural membership) was established, which could be considered as an appropriate framework for social crime prevention. Unfortunately, results were scarce due to the shortness of the legislature. During the second half of the decade (1996-2000), the Popular Party (PP) was ruling the country. The priorities in crime matters were focused – once again – on the fight against terrorism, the reaction to the alleged increase in

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crime,9 the strengthening of the National Drug Plan and the development of a European police landscape.

3. Security Crime Prevention Policies in Spain from 2000-2010 3.1. Socio-political context Social crime prevention policies require a certain context, as well as values and an ethical environment and sensibility. This context did not exist in Spain during the decade 2000-2010 for several reasons. Firstly, the inertia of previous decades was still going on, and as we have seen, this did not favour the development of social crime prevention policies. Secondly, during the first half of the decade (Seventh Parliamentary term 2000-2004) the PP ruled the country with an absolute majority. This was clearly a neo-liberal period, and in crime and safety matters, the PP displayed all its preoccupations: an almost pathological obsession with terrorism, and the idea to fight crime independently from its causes. PP was fully aligned with the neoconservative U.S. administrations, also hostile to social crime prevention. Thirdly, during the second half of the decade (Eighth Parliamentary term 2004-2008), when the Socialist Party (PSOE) was in charge, even if their policies became a little bit more socially sensitive, we cannot find social crime prevention policies. PSOE was not brave in social matters, and since 2008, the IX Parliamentary term (08/03/2009 - ...) the government has been fully occupied with the global crisis, leaving little room for social crime prevention policies. Nevertheless, during the second half of the decade we experienced a growing interest in victims (as a consequence of the PP’s use of the victims of terrorism), domestic violence and young people (especially concerning bullying) and human trafficking.

9 This priority would deserve a deeper interpretation given the statistics of the Cuerpo Nacional de Policia and the Guardia Civil, which do not detect this growth. Rates of crime from these sources were as follows: 990,301 offences in 1991; 934. 070 in 1992; 938,612 in 1993; 801,696 in 1994; 808,264 in 1995; 930,780 in 1996; 924,393 in 1997; 917,311 in 1998.

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3.2. The role of social crime prevention in major state prevention policies During the VII Legislature, the PP tried to develop an agenda for crime prevention, (known as Plan Policía 2000), always within a police framework. With the support of private companies for monitoring and evaluation, the plan had three main strategic objectives: a) to improve the quality of services; b) to increase the degree of satisfaction of citizens and police and; c) to reduce crime. The central idea was to regain the trust of citizens, with an emphasis on a proactive, decentralised model, and to try to meet demands for greater public safety.10 The Police Plan 2000, in spite of a lack of social crime prevention elements, had – at least – some traces of crime prevention. Anyway, the plan resulted in a failure that was never explicitly admitted. The violent rise of terrorism in the second half of 2000 cast the priorities of the plan into the shadows, and it was gradually abandoned. In 2002, the PP government changed course and presented, on 12th September, a Plan de lucha contra la delincuencia (plan to combat crime) with a special emphasis on strengthening public safety, mostly through the police and a reactive/repressive approach. This brings us back to the essential idea of neo-liberalism that characterised the governments of the PP, which prioritised the effects of crime instead of its root causes. New laws on the matter included: expansion of crime offences in the penal code; an increase in penalties and detention; the improvement of victim support; and tougher rules on illegal immigration. In addition, operational programs were developed to improve feelings of personal safety by increasing the police presence on the streets and in the form of victim protection. According to the government, the plan to combat crime brought about a decrease in crime rates, which had experienced a rise of 10 % during the first years of the decade. Other important policies were, as we will see later on, the second antidomestic violence plan of 2001-2004, the development of a National Plan

10 See: Comparecencia del Director General de la Policia. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados. Comisiones VI Legislatura, Sesión nº 62 25 de febrero 1999 pp. 18288-18300. http://www.congreso.es/public_oficiales/L6/CONG/DS/CO/ CO_630.PDF (accessed 3-03-2011)

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on Drugs (created in 1985) and European cooperation against cross-border organised crime. In short, a PP government with an absolute majority and therefore considerable scope, showed no interest in developing social crime prevention policies. The one exception to this can be found in the important but very circumscribed area of domestic violence. The Al Qaeda terrorist attacks of March 2004 in Madrid marked the end of one parliamentary term and the beginning of the next one, this time with a socialist government. In the 2004 elections, the victory of the PSOE without an absolute majority opened a new political era. However, few changes affected the main security and prevention guidelines, except for a new interest in young people and school problems and changes to domestic violence policies and the treatment of illegal immigration. Concerning young people and school, a Plan Director de convivencia y mejora de la seguridad escolar (Plan for improvement of safety in school and in communal life) was agreed in February 2007. Its main goals were: 1) To offer a coordinated and effective response to providing security for children and young people in schools and in their living environment, by strengthening police co-operation with educational authorities in their effort to improve security in schools and in communal life. 2) To promote the development of lectures and conferences in schools addressed to students and taught by police experts. 3) To improve police surveillance in the schools’ surroundings. 4) To promote the establishment of mechanisms for co-operation between police experts and the educational authorities, the educational community, parent and student associations other organisations. As part of this Plan, a sector programme was established: the Plan contigo (Plan with you). This is an initiative in Tuenti, which addresses internet safety, bullying, cyber bullying, drugs, social integration and equality (Rodriguez & Salarich, 2009). On February 20, 2007 the Ministry of Interior and the Federación Española de Municipios y Provincias (Spanish federation of councils and provinces) signed an agreement to co-operate in the problems concerning young people and safety. The agreement focused not only on the fight against youth violence but also on prevention and social integration of young people,

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on the reintegration of young offenders and the care of victims of youth violence. To pursue this goal, the protocol included measures to strengthen coordination and co-operation between the police forces in the specific areas of public safety issues related to youth, such as youth gangs, street vandalism, violence in sport, harassment or ‘bullying’ in schools, drug and alcohol use, xenophobic behaviour or cyber crime. However, looking at the main goals of the agreement, it is clear that the measures are clearly oriented to improve police efficacy, information gathering and presence. There are no clear social crime prevention measures. A national strategic plan for childhood and adolescence for 2006-2009 (Plan estratégico nacional de la infancia y la adolescencia) was approved by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs as a common scheme of comprehensive planning, which is defined by consensus on broad strategic guidelines for the development of policies for children and adolescents. It draws upon aspects like health care, or child abuse prevention, but it does not say anything about crime prevention policies. Concerning the combat of human trafficking and sexual exploitation, the PSOE government draws upon a Plan Integral de lucha contra la trata de seres humanos con fines de explotación sexual (Comprehensive plan to combat human trafficking for sexual exploitation) (2006-2009/2009-2012). Approved in December 2005, the plan aims to be the first instrument of planning in the fight against human trafficking for sexual exploitation in Spain. The plan had several editions and the last one covers the years 2009 to 2012. The plan is complemented by measures to combat trafficking of children, included in the Second Plan of Action against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children and Adolescents 2006-2009. The main coordinators of the plan are the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Equality. The participation of other ministries, CCAA, municipalities and NGOs is not excluded. In the 62 measures and actions planned, we have been unable to find clear social crime prevention activities, except for some poorly developed measures on education and social awareness. The emphasis is clearly placed on the assistance and protection of victims, the investigation of crimes, legal reforms, and police co-operation. The current Legislature opened in March 2008, with the global crisis as a backdrop. This will mean a radical change of vision and drastic economical cuts. Nevertheless, some Plans were implemented in 2009. Among others, we

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can stress: Plan Policía Mayor (Police elderly) which responds to the needs identified by the gradual and increasing aging of the Spanish population (16 % older than 65 years, which means about 7,400,000 people in 2009). Far from implementing a social crime prevention policy, the programme tries to provide adequate information on how to prevent crimes, both at home and out in public spaces, and to offer technical mechanisms that allow quick reporting of incidents and the receipt of prompt police, social or medical assistance. An increase in ‘first delinquency’ has been detected, with people committing their first crime as a result of a lack of means to survive. Social crime prevention seems even more urgent than before. However, there are no plans or policies of this kind on the horizon. The economic cuts are affecting social crime prevention policies proportionately more than police ones. Social policies seem to be transferred to charity and charitable NGOs (like Caritas and others).

3.3. A transversal case: the fight against domestic violence This is one of the few areas where some social policies for crime prevention have been enforced, mixed with other measures, at all levels (Sate, CCAA and councils) and by all Governments. Two main plans were developed (1998-2000 and 2000-2004) and laws were promulgated in 2003 and 2004: The First Action Plan to protect victims of domestic violence (19982000) created services to assist and protect victimised women, including specialised care services provided by the Police (SAM) and the Guardia Civil (EMUME), women’s shelters (dependent on the CCAA, City Councils or NGOs), Information Centres and offices for victim assistance in courts and prosecutors’ offices. Legislative changes were made (introducing the new crime of physical violence, and making some protective measures, like the mandatory banishment of the aggressor from the victim). A specific register was created for specific cases of family violence, and the police issued instructions on how to act in these cases. The Plan also included public and victim awareness objectives.

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The Second Action Plan to protect victims of domestic violence (2000-2004) focused on four areas: a) Preventive measures and improvement of victim awareness, training and coordination for both, delivered to both the public and the professionals, like teachers and students, the police, the courts, the healthcare system, etc. b) Legislative and procedural measures: preventive measures to protect potential victims, punitive measures against the aggressors and procedural measures to speed up the judicial process. c) Welfare measures and social intervention: Creating resources to meet the needs of victims, making the complaints procedure easier, or providing other medical, economic, occupational and psychological care. d) Research: In order to obtain reliable and complete data on domestic violence, from the acceptance that the triggers can be multiple and of a diverse nature (social, family and personal). A law containing aspects of domestic violence was passed in 2003. In 2004 the Organic Law 1 / 2004 de medidas de protección integral contra la violencia de género (integrated protection measures against gender violence) was enacted. The Act concerns awareness, prevention and detection of domestic violence, social and legal assistance, and institutional and judicial protection, exacerbating criminal offences and making punishment harsher. Moreover, the Law also takes into consideration psychological and economic issues. In Title I we can find some elements of social crime prevention in the context of a Plan Nacional de Sensibilización y Prevención de la Violencia de Género (National Plan on awareness and prevention of violence against women), which divides the field in two areas: a) Prevention: concerning resources and instruments of socialisation and helping female victims of domestic violence re-plan their lives. b) Awareness: providing society with the necessary knowledge to recognise when a process of domestic violence starts or is in progress and to identify the roles played by women and men as victims and aggressors. In 2003 a work was published under the auspices of the Ministry of Health, which examines the issue from another point of view, virtually ignoring the police perspective. It focuses on prevention, recognising the scarcity of studies and the fragmentation of social assistance.

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The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, with its own edition of the National Plan, has also been actively involved in criminal domestic violence. This proliferation of actors and editions of the plan has not however been helpful for the coordination of such policies.

4. Crime Prevention Policies in the Autonomous Communities (CCAA) Since the 1980s there has been an asymmetrical transfer of powers from the state to the CCAA. Not all home rules contain the same distribution of powers with the state. CCAAs with greater autonomy, as the Basque Country and Catalonia, have powers over police and security, wellbeing, justice or labour, while other CCAAs do not have these powers (especially police and justice) or they are not well developed. Co-operation between regional governments, and between them and the state, was never fluid, which means a real risk of overlapping or omissions (thinking that a function is ‘someone else’s’ responsibility). There are neither comparative studies on crime prevention (and even less about social crime prevention) in the CCAA, nor studies for any single CCAA. It is therefore impossible to make a social crime prevention analysis applied to this political-administrative level. Broadly speaking, it is possible to argue that social crime prevention has not been, in general terms, an element of these different policies because: a) The more lightweight CCAAs with no great political will to self-govern, did not actually develop any real crime prevention policy, and especially not any social crime prevention policy, due to a lack of general interest, a lack of interested policymakers and a lack of structures. b) Those CCAAs with some political relevance did not work much in the field, and left the matter in the central State’s hands and in its policies, probably because, due to a lack of experience and political interest in these fields, they did not establish the necessary infrastructure to carry out these policies. c) The CCAAs with greater political relevance (like the Basque Country or Catalonia) and with the experience and professional skills to develop these policies, tended however to replicate the State pattern, leaving the burden of preventive activities to the municipalities. Therefore, in order to find crime prevention policies, it is necessary to look at the municipalities

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In the case of Catalonia, which can be considered one of the most important examples, and after an analysis of the Conselleries (Ministries) of Interior, Well-being, Justice and Labour, the situation is as follows: a) There are no structured social crime prevention policies in the Interior Conselleria, except for some aspects of a plan to fight gender violence. b) The Conselleria of welfare, which includes among its competences: inclusion and social cohesion, citizenship, youth, senior citizens, etc. also lacks any explicit programme including social crime prevention. One might think that on issues of social inclusion or youth, there are some activities that may include aspects of crime prevention as a desired or eventually foreseeable effect, but there is no clear or explicit evidence of this. c) The Conselleria of justice, through its Youth Justice Plan (2004-2007) includes vague references to preventive intervention and environmental implication on the theme of children or young people (p. 16) and prevention (p. 20) (Departament de Justicia, 2004). d) The Conselleria of labour also has no provision in this regard. A lack of research impedes an in-depth analysis of these fields. At least in the case of Catalonia, it is worth noting that: a) We cannot speak of social crime prevention in the strict sense. If it is true that some measures of this kind have been developed, they are not a part of structured policies, but just actions embedded in wider policies whose purposes are more general and not directly connected to social crime prevention. b) The lack of social crime prevention policies at the Catalan level shifts the responsibility and the problem to the political and administrative underlying structure, namely the City Councils.

5. Local social crime prevention policies 5.1. Spanish situation It is very difficult to establish common elements throughout the local areas, due to the wide dispersal of cases. However, there is one common denominator: the high level of indebtedness.11 But what is more serious is 11 In Spain there are 8118 municipalities, of which 85 % have less than 5000 inhabitants, and of these, 40 % have fewer than 500 inhabitants. According to the Bank of Spain,

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that the indebtedness is not only due to ‘own expense’. In fact, 30 % of the costs that are ‘unfit’ are derived from the provision of services for which, in theory, the municipalities are not responsible. These costs correspond to other governments (central or CCAA), but mayors are obliged to estimate them, in the absence of anyone else. Among these costs, there is a significant part of crime prevention and security resources. The ‘cascade effect’ is clearly noticeable. Municipalities, with limited resources, are compelled to enforce many of the policies on crime prevention and safety. But it is very difficult to develop this argument, because of the lack of empirical studies on the subject. Local autonomy and dispersion are too large and a case-by-case analysis is impossible. On the other hand, there are no large-scale studies. A first approach could be based on the analysis of social crime prevention policies developed by the City Council members of the Spanish Forum for Urban Safety and Prevention (FEPSU). Actually, these City Councils are apparently the most interested in the matter, given their adherence to a forum that, as defined by its statutes, is an association of Spanish municipalities for the defence and promotion of prevention and public safety policies. Its aims are the promotion and defence of security and prevention strategies in public policy and the promotion of studies on problems and issues related to these matters. A brief analysis of some of the affi liated municipalities allows us to understand the lack of implementation of security policies and especially the near absence of social crime prevention. In general terms, it is possible to say that large and medium cities have programmes or actions concerning domestic violence (Valencia, Zaragoza, Badalona, Calafell, Teruel, etc.) and social integration (Zaragoza, Badalona). There are measures concerning the use of public spaces (Calafell) and against drug addiction (Badalona). In some cases, there are mediation and conflict resolution areas (like in A Coruña). Even smaller municipalities show a certain sensitivity (El Carpio has actions for young people). the ‘live’ debt of local corporations during the third quarter of 2010 was 36  227 million Euroseuros, equivalent to 3.4  % of Spanish GDP (gross domestic product) and a 4.62 % increase compared to the same period a year earlier. Of this debt, 29 127 million correspond to the municipalities, and of this number, 14 689 million belong to the provincial capitals. And experts estimate that much of this debt is still hidden. Several municipalities have reached their maximum borrowing capacity (110  % of their current incomes and have had to ask permission to borrow even more (up to 125 %) while the margin for resources are exhausted. 336

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In short, FEPSU members develop generic welfare and security policies on gender, youth, the elderly, minorities or drug abuse. In many cases these policies show a preventive will, but no explicit and specific activity in social crime prevention is apparent, even though some of these actions can indirectly lead in that direction.

5.2. The case of Barcelona Barcelona’s experience cannot be regarded as an expression of the evolution of Spanish municipalities. It is a one-off experience and can be considered paradigmatic. The starting point of crime prevention and security policies in Barcelona can be located in the early 1980s and has continued until today. In 1983 the first city victimisation survey was carried out. The results showed a high feeling of insecurity among the population, which is not consistent with the low crime rates as shown by the only quantitative available information (police and judicial statistics on crime). At that time, the feeling of insecurity was high and the survey shows high rates of victimisation (25 % in 1983). These values remained the same until 1987 (Sabaté, 2005).12 To address this situation, in December 1983 a Technical Committee on Urban Safety was created by the City Council. The Committee wrote a report with several proposals to improve the situation. Its working guidelines were its knowledge of the current situation, inter-institutional co-operation and the coordination of public policies. As a result of this work, in June 1984 the Consell de Seguretat Urbana (Urban Security Council) of Barcelona was created. It was structured on several levels: political, police, judiciary, prosecutors, trade unions, neighbourhood associations, professionals, mass media, etc. The aim was to establish relationships and coordination between the institutions concerned with security matters. (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1994: 10).13

12 The results of the survey are published in the web of the Catalan Department of Interior: www20.gencat.cat/portal/interior/) 13 Many of these works have been published by the City Council in the collection Estudis I Recerques: Protecció Ciutadana. The findings of the Technical Commission of Urban Safety were published there (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1986).

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That was the beginning of the so-called ‘Barcelona model of participated security’ (Lahosa, 1999). The four great principles were: prevention, repression, solidarity and community participation (Lahosa & Molinas, 2003: 17) and the working areas were the knowledge of the current situation, institutional cooperation and solidarity, coordination of policies and the development by programmes. Community participation in defining policies was considered the main element and so, organs of representation and debate were established (Security or Prevention Councils). In 1988, the Mayor of Barcelona created the Consell Municipal Social Benestar (Municipal Council of Social welfare) as an instrument of participation. The Council tried to propose non-police security policies, on the basis of promoting a culture of wellbeing in the city, developing social crime policies and co-operation between actors and institutions.14 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the City Council created Councils of Security and Prevention in every district of the city. They became an essential instrument of the proximity and participation policies. Since 1988 and during the first half of the following decade, the victimisation rate fell to about 18 %. In 1993, due to the effect of the maximum security alert for the Olympic Games, the rate dropped to 13.6 %. In the second half of the decade, the victimisation rate was about 14 %. The 1980s were a relatively quiet decade in terms of security, and the ‘Barcelona model’ seemed to be fruitful, but things would change in the next decade. The 1990s saw the first serious crisis of the Consell Seguretat Urbana and the Consell de Benestar Social, for several reasons. On the one hand, the 1992 Olympic Games gave priority to the ‘hard’ security aspects, and secondly, the ‘securitarian exhaustion’ after the Olympics led municipal policies to other public and social goals (City Planning, Tourism, etc.).15 The Councils themselves, designed to face the problems of the 1980s, had to face their own limitations and a ‘generational’ change of their members. The result was a growing paralysis.

14 The Council’s work was also published in the collection Estudis I Recerques: Serveis Socials, and in special annual reports. 15 The report of the Social Services area of City Council (1988-92) and its new proposals for the period 1992-95 constitute a clear demonstration of this changes (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 1993).

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But the main crisis happened during the last months of 1999 and the first of 2000. The feeling of insecurity grew again, linked to an increase in petty crime, a serious deterioration of some neighbourhoods (like the old town, the Ciutat Vella) and a very poor image of the local police. Urban problems of security returned to the forefront, but from a totally different perspective: confrontation of actors, low consideration of social aspects and a strong commitment to a model of reactive security. The Mayor was very clear: the model of the Consell de Seguretat Urbana was over, and other measures were necessary: ‘We will review the policy of prevention and security. We will create a new Commission for prevention and security; we’ll monitor the situation and we will adopt proper measures’ (La Vanguardia, 12/02/2000). But the situation did not improve (La Vanguardia, 17/10/2000; La Vanguardia, 10/11/2000; El Periodico, 17/12/2000). The decade 2000-2010 started with an increase in conventional crime and incivilities, and the victimisation rates corroborate the situation. Stable at around 25  % between 1983 and 1987, they dropped to 18  % between 1988 and 1995, and to 14  % between 1995 and 2000. But during the 2000s, the victimisation rates were at the levels of the 1980s (21 % in 2006; 25.6 % in 2009) and it must be noticed that the survey does not consider the continuous growth of tourism and the connected high victimisation rate of tourists: an omission that is misleading for a true understanding of the problem. There is also a rise in conflicts between social groups related to a high growth of immigration (between 2001 and 2009, the foreign population increased from 6.3 % to 175 %, and to 40 % in some neighbourhoods of the inner city). Different cultural patterns among different social groups in private and public spaces are a common reason for conflict. On the other hand, some phenomena (for example the presence of Latino gangs) were highly emphasised by the media and increased the social perception of an association between migration and conflict. During the second half of the decade, anti-social behaviour became one of the central themes. The victimisation survey, which included antisocial behaviour questions since 2004, shows a remarkable increase in the perception of incivilities among the respondents. In terms of institutional policies on antisocial behaviour, in early 2004 the City Council launched the

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Pla per a la promoció del civisme (Plan for the promotion of civility). The plan was primarily based on awareness campaigns. In these years, the question of incivilities became a relevant topic for the media and was included in political agendas and electoral campaigns. Some conflicts between police and noisy groups of youths, late at night after parties, enhanced public perception that insecurity was growing again. On October 14, 2005, in the City Plenary Council, the socialist Mayor of the city announced a new phase of the security system in Barcelona, based on more police presence and coordination. The Mayor called for greater efficiency to ensure compliance with the bylaws. The Mayor also announced the approval of a bylaw on anti-social behaviour. The Ordinance, entitled Mesures per fomentar i garantir la convivència ciutadana en l’espai públic de Barcelona (Measures to promote and ensure the communal life of citizens in public spaces in Barcelona), was approved on December 23, 2005. It is a catalogue of prohibitions, from social and physical incivilities (urinating in the street, noise, graffiti, etc.) to life in common in the public space (skates, street parties, etc.), including issues of public order (prohibitions of camping in public spaces or non-regulated propaganda of a radical group’s activism). It also includes the control of marginal groups in public spaces (beggars, prostitutes and street vendors). This mix has been criticised by some academics and politicians. While the City Council has tried to save some assistance measures for marginal groups, the trend of the data about complaints for violations of municipal rules shows a clear increase in policing strategies in public space (the complaints increased by over 100 % between 2005 and 2009, raising from 59,684 to 122,028). Similarly, the strategy of public security management is characterised by enhanced physical control of public space, both by the increase of police presence and by surveillance devices. As for the police intervention model, we can detect a combination of community policing, carried out mainly by the local police, with a situational prevention approach in districts with higher crime rates, and the consolidation of special security measures for troubled areas or events. Between 2007 and 2010, the Guardia Urbana implemented a model of community policing in all districts (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2009; 2010) and the city centre, the main centre for tourism and consumption, was the subject of a stronger presence of Mossos d’Esquadra (CCAA police) for

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crime prevention (deterrence of pickpockets, drug sellers, etc.) and public order security measures on weekend nights. As for video surveillance, in December 2010, 22 cameras had been installed in the streets and public spaces (not including cameras for street traffic control). There is no evidence of the effectiveness of these measures in preventing crime in Barcelona, while they had been apparently more successful in reassuring citizens, given that video surveillance is one of the most requested measures by local residents. In short, Barcelona’s model of participatory security (which is probably the most successful social crime prevention policy in Spain) had its best moment during the 1980s; but after the crisis at the beginning of the 2000s, the model can be considered to be in decline, overlapped by repressive and policeoriented policies.

5.3. Increase of formal control through administrative tools: the case of anti social behaviour As mentioned, constitutional law links the sanctioning power to a series of legal safeguards that, in fact, reduce the potential for municipalities to use such authority. The Spanish Constitution establishes a principle of legality in crime and punishment matters (art.25.1 CE), which forbids taking punitive measures if they are not previously established in a State or autonomic Law. Until the beginning of the millennium, the courts applied a narrow interpretation of the principle of legality and cancelled any penalty imposed under a municipal ordinance, when the offence was not part of a pre-existing Law. A Sentence of the Constitutional Court (Sentence132/2001 of 8 of June), however, opened the door to the validity of municipal ordinances, establishing a flexible and wider interpretation of ‚principle of legality’, understanding it in terms of a ‚minimum set of guiding criteria’. Thus, each municipality can set its administrative sanctions on the basis of this broad legal authorisation. The State Law 57/2003 of December 16, De reforma de la ley de bases del régimen local (amending the basic law of local government) relies upon the Constitutional Court’s decision (Pemán, 2010). The Law sets ‹minimum standards of unlawfulness under which each municipality can set the types of offences.› Th is reform enables the adoption of ordinances, which

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have become the municipal response to lack of jurisdiction to impose penalties. Since the middle of the decade, and especially after the adoption of the ordinance of civility in the city of Barcelona (after some resistance), ordinances proliferate in municipalities throughout the country (Galais, 2010; Ortuño, 2010). Some laws from the CCAA have also legitimised the new offences created by the ordinances (e.g. laws against botellón, etc.). However, some of the offences and issues raised by these local rules still lack sufficient legal authorisation, and have exceeded their competences.16

6. Conclusions In Spain, for historical, social and political reasons, crime has usually been associated with police, and crime prevention with police work. Even in the concept of social crime prevention, the word ‘crime’ has prevailed over the idea of ‘social’. This situation did not even change during the democratic era that began in the mid 1970s and still survives today. Several ministries, the CCAA and municipalities took into consideration concepts like marginality or prevention, but the idea of crime prevention remains related to the police and to the other actors in charge of the police. In general, social policies have been developed, but with no specific crime reduction focus. In them, crime reduction can, at most, be considered a secondary or collateral purpose. That is why there are no explicitly formulated social crime prevention policies on issues such as health or welfare. But if crime prevention was left almost exclusively to the police, this does not mean that the police embraced these policies. Police have other goals, which never included the ‘social’ as one of their strengths. Thus, social crime prevention represented a sort of no man’s land.

16 For instance concerning general parental responsibility (repealed by courts and legally only admitted in some minor driving offences); providing documents to facilitate the residence for foreigners who report offences or to oblige the pre-payment of the fines for offenders who do not live in Spain.

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Transversal and interdisciplinary cases were rare. Actually, there is no culture of co-operative work in this area, while conflicts among different actors involved in this area (educators, social workers, police and other social actors) are common. When some degree of co-operation was achieved, this only happened for specific plans and on specific topics (drugs, minors, etc.). Contacts between the police and non-police structures to develop social crime prevention policies were scarce. Actually, the policies were almost non-existent. Some examples can be found on the topic of drugs, but for the aforementioned reasons these policies date back to the 1990s, rather than to the 2000s. Other specific plans addressed at vulnerable groups (the elderly, women or children) suffered the burden of policing and have resulted in crime prevention policies, but not in social crime prevention. As for the CCAA, their powers are disparate but they generally reproduce the central state scheme. Therefore it is necessary to look on the side of the municipalities but in this field, dispersion and local autonomy are too large and we cannot establish large sets. We need to consider the cases separately and there is still not enough field research. However, the fact that there are no policies does not mean that there are no actions. The key is the concept of policy that we adopt. To talk about policies we need to have a set of interactions within an institutional framework between public, parapublic and private actors, seeking to solve a collective problem through a particular action. If we adapt a definition theoretically oriented to the solution of social problems (Subirats, Knoepfel, Larrue & Varonne, 2010: 40),17 we see that in the case of crime: a) The institutional framework is essential, because the definition of crime has a legal nature and its prevention primarily concerns the public authorities.18 17 Subirats, Knoepfel, Larrue and Varonne (2010: 38) define public policy as ‘a series of intentionally coherent decisions or actions taken by different actors, public and sometimes non-public, – whose resources, institutional linkages and interests are variable – to solve in a timely manner a problem politically defi ned as collective. This set of decisions and actions leading to formal events with a variable degree of obligation, seeking to modify the behaviour of social groups that are supposed to raise the collective problem to solve (target groups), in the interest of social groups that suffer the negative effects of the problem at hand (final beneficiaries) 18 Art. 9.2 of the Spanish Constitution states: ‘It is the responsibility of the public authorities to promote conditions ensuring that freedom and equality of individuals and of the groups to which they belong are real and effective, to remove the obstacles

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b) The collective problem is relatively easy to identify, but the target group is not. It is not possible to define the offenders as a social group, given the legal nature of the definition and the huge variety of offences. For the same reason, there is no specific behaviour to change, since the criminal typology is composed of a large number of behaviours. So, in trying to implement public policies in function of real resolution of these problems, we can only define subgroups of criminal behaviour (often in heavily delineated areas or environments) or abusively suspect everyone, making them potential members of the ‘target group’, as is the case with the placing of video cameras in public spaces. c) Among those who suffer from the problem, are some citizens who can invoke the public interest, while others are private actors, with private interests (traders, entrepreneurs, etc.). d) There are also private interests at stake (private security companies, producers of security products, etc.). For those actors, the adoption of one or another decision/action has an impact on their profits. Thus, resources allocated to crime prevention policies are dependent on institutional/governmental priorities, their agenda and the ‘sensitivity’ of institutions to private interests and priorities. We cannot define social crime prevention actions in Spain as true policies. This is important because it raises the question of why social crime prevention is not a priority and why it is not on the agenda. In addition to the historical, social and political factors already mentioned, another possible answer, in economic terms, is that neo-liberal policies have promoted the privatisation of security, and only that which makes a profit is privatised. In prevention and safety matters, situational prevention or law enforcement are much more profitable than social crime prevention. On the other hand, we must determine whether the isolated actions must be considered as policies by the mere fact of being institutional, or not. In general terms, it is possible to respond that not all institutional action is already public policy. When an institution, or a part of it, makes and

preventing or hindering their full enjoyment, and to facilitate the participation of all citizens in political, economic, cultural and social life’. For his part, art 104.1 states: ‘The Security Forces and Corps serving under the Government shall have the duty to protect the free exercise of rights and freedoms and to guarantee the safety of citizens’.

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promotes isolated low-profile decisions, we cannot speak of public policy, but of products (Subirats et al., 2010: 41). Spain has become aware of the problem of crime, which now has a place on the political agenda (however, crime is often presented disproportionately, compared to official crime rates). Nevertheless, various access controls have operated in social crime prevention policies, not allowing them to prosper at any level of administration or government. Once the problem was discovered, social crime prevention was not considered one of the possible solutions, because: a) In the process of privatisation of security, companies have not considered it profitable to invest in social crime prevention. b) When allocating public resources, other solutions – apparently more immediate – were preferred, avoiding questioning the causes of the problem and implementing emergency solutions (for ideological, electoral or social pressure, or other reasons). c) The scarce social crime prevention actions established at the municipal level must be considered as products derived from isolated low-profi le decisions, except in the case of Barcelona, where for a while, some social crime prevention policies were drawn up.

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Social Control. Social Prevention from Yesterday to Nowadays]. Déviance et Société, 32(1), 3-30. Bayley, D.H. (1994). Police for the future. New York: Oxford University Press. Bergalli, R. (1993). La forma-estado social y el sistema penal. Experiencias municipales en Barcelona a través de sus servicios socials [The Social Stateform and the Penal System. Municipal Experiences in Barcelona through their Social Services]. In R. Bergalli (ed.), Sistema penal e intervenciones sociales (pp. 219-286). Barcelona: Hacer. Borja, J. (2006). Miedos urbanos y demandas de seguridad: la represión preventiva [Urban Fears and Security Demand: the Preventive Repression]. Revista Catalana de Seguretat Pública, 16, 83-90. Commission of the European Communities. (2004). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Crime Prevention in the European Union. Brussels: CEC. Crawford, A. (2009). Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective. Collumpton: Willan. Departament de Justícia. (2004). Pla Director de justícia juvenil. Línies estratègiques, objectius i actuacions 2004-2007 [Master Plan on Juvenile Justice. Strategic Guidelines, Aims and Actions] Retrieved March 7, 2011, from www20.gencat.cat/docs/Justicia/Documents/ARXIUS/doc_93922505_ 1pdf Dubet, F. (2010). Les places et les chances. Repenser la justice sociale [Places and Chances. Rethinking Social Justice] Paris: Eds. du Seuil. Ekblom, P., & Wyvekens, A. (2004). A Partnership Approach to Crime Prevention. Strasbourg: Council of Europe publishing. Feixa, C. (ed.). (2006). Jóvenes ‘latinos’ en Barcelona. Espacio público y cultura urbana [Young ‘Latins’ in Barcelona. Public Space and Urban Culture] Barcelona: Anthropos. Galais, C. (2010). Les polítiques locals de civisme a Espanya [Civic Local Policies in Spain]. Barcelona: Diputació de Barcelona. Gilling, D. (2009). Crime Prevention. In A. Hucklesby & A. Wahidin (eds.), Criminal Justice (pp. 11-36). New York: Oxford University Press. Gomez Gil, C. (2005). Las ONG en España. De la apariencia a la realidad [NGO’s in Spain. From Appearence to Reality]. Madrid: Libros de la Catarata. Hebberecht, P., & Duprez, D. (eds.). (2002). The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe. Brussels: VUBPRESS. Hebberecht, P., & Sack, F. (eds.). (1997). La prévention de la délinquance en Europe. Nouvelles stratégies [Crime prevention in Europe. New strategies]. Paris: L’Harmattan. Hughes, G. (2010). Crime Prevention. In E. Mc Laughlin & J. Muncie (eds.), The Sage Dictionary of Criminology (pp. 85-87). London: Sage. Hughes, G., Mc Laughlin, E., & Muncie, J. (2002). Crime Prevention and Community Safety. New Directions. London: Sage. ICPC (2010). Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Trends and Perspectives Report presented at the 12th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Subirats, J., Knoepfel, P., Larrue, C., & Varonne, F. (2010). Análisis y gestión de políticas públicas [Public Policies Analysis and Management]. Barcelona: Ariel. Tilley, N. (2009). Crime Prevention. Collumpton: Willan. Torrente, D. (1999). Prevención del delito y futuro de la policía [Crime Prevention and Police Future]. Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 85(99), 85-94. Young, J. (2001). Social Crime Prevention. In E. McLaughlin & J. Muncie (eds.), The Sage Dictionary of Criminology (p. 272). London: Sage. Young, J. (2010). Social Crime Prevention. In E. McLaughlin & J. Muncie (eds.), The Sage Dictionary of Criminology (p. 396). London: Sage.

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Cândido da Agra is Full Professor and Director of the School of Criminology and Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Porto in Portugal. He is an Invited Member of the International Centre for Comparative Criminology (CICC) at the University of Montreal in Canada. His main research interests are the epistemology of human sciences, the philosophy of law, clinical criminology and drugs and crime. His publications include From Democratic Security to a Securitarian Democracy: the Portuguese Example (2002, co-author), La révolution scientifique de la criminologie contemporaine. Victime et sécurité: deux analyseurs épistémiques [The Scientific Revolution of Contemporary Criminology. Victim and Security: Two Epistemic Analyzers] (2004) and Requiem Pour la Guerre à la Drogue. L’Expérimentation Portugaise de Décriminalisation [Requiem for the War on Drugs. The Portuguese Experiment of Decriminalization] (in Déviance et Société, 2009). Evelyne Baillergeau is Senior Research Fellow at CREMIS (Montreal, Canada) and Associate Research Fellow at the University of Amsterdam (Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research) in the Netherlands. She has carried out contract research in various policy areas involving marginalised groups: public housing; crime prevention; social welfare; urban regeneration in so-called deprived areas; migrants’ participation; educational and professional training among marginalised youth, most of which in an international comparative perspective. Her recent publications include a volume about the changes in social intervention over the last decades in Canada and Europe, considering both the level of policy making and the level of implementation at the grassroots’ level (2007, co-editor, Presses de l’Université du Québec) and one about social ties building in public housing estates in an international comparative perspective (2008, co-editor, Presses de l’Université du Québec). Carla Sofia Cardoso is responsible for the Laboratory of the School of Criminology since 2007 and Invited Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Porto in Portugal since 2008. She is also a researcher at the Local Security Observatory of Porto. She contributed as co-author a chapter

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on Portugal to the collection Crime and Punishment Around the World. Vol. IV. Europe (2010). Josefina Castro is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law and Joint Director of the School of Criminology of the University of Porto in Portugal. She is also the Scientific Co-Coordinator of the Observatory for Juvenile Delinquency (2008-2011). Her recent publications include La Justice des Mineurs au Portugal: Risque, Responsabilité et Réseau [Juvenile Justice in Portugal: Risk, Responsibility and Network] (in Déviance et Société, 2007, co-author), Violence, Leisure and Actors. An Empirical Study in Porto (2007, co-author) and ‘The Punitive Turn’ – Are There Any Points of Resistance? An Answer from the Portuguese Experience (2010). Adam Crawford is Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice in the Centre for Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Leeds in Great Britain. His recent book, for which he editor, is International and Comparative Criminal Justice and Urban Governance (2011, Cambridge University Press). He is also editor of Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective (2009, Willan) and author of The Local Governance of Crime (1997, Oxford University Press) and Crime Prevention and Community Safety (1998, Longman). He is editor-in-chief of the journal Criminology and Criminal Justice. In 2012, his latest co-edited book (with Anthea Hucklesby) Legitimacy and Compliance in Criminal Justice will be published by Routledge. Marit Egge is Associate Professor at the Norwegian Police University College. Her research interests include crime prevention and police culture. Her most recent work is a study on how the Norwegian police work to build relationships of trust with minority youths. Séverine Germain is Contract Lecturer at the University of Rouen, and Associate Researcher at Pacte-Institute of Political Studies in Grenoble (France). Since her PhD she has mostly been working on local public policy in the field of crime prevention. Her recent publications include Répondre aux mobilisations sociales. Le modèle policier italien en transition [Reacting on Social Mobilisations. The Italian Police Model in Transition] (in Revue Française de Science Politique, 2009, co-author), Une petite entreprise qui ne connaît pas la crise. Le succès de la vidéosurveillance au regard de la littérature internationale [A Small Enterprise not Confronted with the Crisis. The Success of CCTV Within International Literature] (in Champ Pénal, 2010, co-author)

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and The Legitimisation of CCTV as a Policy Tool: Genesis and Stabilisation of a Socio-Technical Device in Three French Cities (in The British Journal of Criminology, 2011). Axel Groenemeyer is Professor of Theory and Research on Social Work and Social Services at the Faculty of Educational Science and Sociology at the Technical University of Dortmund in Germany. He is the Director of the ISEP (Institute of Social Work and Education in Early Childhood) and President of the Section ‘Social Problems and Social Control’ within the German Society of Sociology. His research themes are: sociology of deviance and social control, urban violence and security, social services and evaluation of public policies, constructions of social problems and public discourses on security, discrimination and ethnic conflicts, intercultural and international social work, crime and local crime prevention, exclusion and poverty, drug and alcohol research, deviant life-courses and careers, risk and risk behaviour. His recent publications include Crime Control in Germany, Too Serious to Leave it to the People. The Great Exception? (2007, Willan), La normativité à l’épreuve. Changement social, transformation institutionnelle et discussions sur la mort de la déviance. [Questioning Normativity. Social Change, Institutional Transformations and Discussions about the Death of Deviance] (in Déviance et Société, 2007), Institutionen der Normativität [Institutions of Normativity] (2008), Doing Social Problems. Mikroanalysen der Bearbeitung und Konstruktion sozialer Probleme und sozialer Kontrolle in institutionellen Kontexten [Doing Social Problems. Microsociological Analysis of Social Problems and Social Control] (2010, editor) and Handbuch Soziale Probleme [Handbook Social Problems] (2012, co-editor) Helene I. Gundhus is Associate Professor at the Norwegian Police University College. She graduated and obtained Doctorate in criminology at the Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law at the University of Oslo. Her research interests include policing, security, crime prevention and community safety. Patrick Hebberecht is Professor of Criminology and Sociology of Law and Director of the Research Group of Criminology and Sociology of Law at the University of Ghent in Belgium. He is doing research on the sociology of criminal law, ethnic minorities, victims of crime, feelings of insecurity and security and prevention policies in Belgium and Europe. He co-directed with Fritz Sack La prévention de la délinquance en Europe: Nouvelles stratégies [The

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Prevention of Delinquency in Europe: New Strategies] (1997, L’Harmattan) and with Dominique Duprez The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe (2002, VUBPRESS). His recent publications include Crime Prevention at the Belgian Federal Level: From a Social Democratic Policy to a Neo-liberal and Authoritarian Policy in a Social Democratic Context (2009, Willan). His latest boek is De ‘verpaarsing’ van de criminaliteitsbestrijding in België: Kritische opstellen over misdaad en misdaadcontrole in de laatmoderniteit [The ‘Purple-isation’ of Criminal Policy in Belgium: Critical Thoughts on Crime and Crime Control in Late Modernity] (2008, VUBPRESS). Maja Jere is a Junior Research Fellow and a PhD student at the Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security of the University of Maribor in Slovenia. Her research interests include crime prevention and provision of safety and security in local communities. Her recent publications include articles on mobbing, community policing and crime prevention. Zoran Kanduč is Associate Professor of Criminology and Scientific Counsellor at the Institute of Criminology at the Faculty of Law of the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia. His research embraces theoretical criminological issues, structural violence and social or class control. His publications include Beyond Crime and Punishment (2003) and Subjects and Objects of (In)Formal Social Control in the Context of Post-modern Transitions (2007). Klára Kerezsi is an Associate Professor in Criminology at the Department of Criminology at ELTE University Faculty of Law since 2000 in Hungary. She has been working in different positions at the National Institute of Criminology (OKRI) since 1981, where she is currently the Deputy Director and the Head of the Crime Research Department. She has been a member of the Scientific Board of the International Society of Criminology since 2006. Klára Kerezsi is the vice-president of the Hungarian Society of Criminology. She acts as a scientific contact point in EU Crime Prevention Network. In 1996 she was engaged to elaborate the first national crime prevention concept, and in 2002 she helped to work out a crime prevention strategy which was approved by the Parliament as the National Strategy for Social Crime Prevention. Her research focuses on different forms of legal punishments: imprisonment and alternative sanctions as labour in the public interest. She is interested in issues of transitional societies and crime policy and the change of crime

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policy. Furthermore her interest lies on juvenile criminality, juveniles in the criminal justice system, crime prevention and restorative justice. Jacques de Maillard is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin and researcher at the CESDIP in France. He works on the local governance of public security, the Europeanisation of internal security policies, and police reform. His recent publications include Réformes des polices dans les pays occidentaux. Une perspective comparée [Police Reforms in Western Countries. A Comparative Perspective] (in Revue française de science politique, 2009) and Crisis in Policing: the French Rioting of 2005 (in Policing, 2009, co-author). Gorazd Meško is Professor of Criminology and Dean at the Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security of the University of Maribor in Slovenia. He did his post doctoral research on crime prevention at the Institute of Criminology in Cambridge in 2001. His publications include Basics of Crime Prevention (2002, in Slovene) and Crime Prevention – Theory, Practice and Dilemmas (2004, in Slovene), Crime, Media and Fear of Crime (2009, co-editor) and Crime Policy, Crime Control and Crime Prevention – Slovenian Perspectives (2009, co-editor). Amadeu Recasens I Brunet is Associate Professor of Criminal Law at the Faculty of Law of the University of Barcelona and Guest Professor at the School of Criminology of the University of Porto. He was Director (19962004) of the Police School of Catalonia, Commissioner (2004-2007) for the Research Centre on Public Security of the Catalan Government and General Director (2007-2010) for the Modernisation of the Administration of the Catalan Government. His main research interests are public policies, penal law, criminology and security and police policies. His publications include La seguridad y sus politicas [Security Policies] (2007), Espagne, Portugal et Italie: un développement de la recherche au coeur des démocraties latines fragiles [Spain, Portugal and Italy: the Development of Research within Fragile Latin Democracies] (2009) and La seguridad en tiempos de crisis [Security in Times of Crisis] (2010). Holger Schmidt is Social Worker and a member of the scientific staff at the ISEP (Institute of Social Work and Education in Early Childhood) at the Faculty of Educational Science and Sociology of the Technical University of Dortmund in Germany. His research themes are youth crime and deviance; development of social norms; crime and violence prevention in social work

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and youth work; nationalism, racism and right wing attitudes in youth and ethnic minorities; participation in youth work; school and social work cooperation. His recent publications include Gewalt im Kontext der Offenen Kinder- und Jugendarbeit [Violence in Context of Open Youth Work] (in Neue Praxis, 2009), Präventionsansätze für Kinder und Jugendliche im non-formellen und informellen Bildungsbereich [Prevention for Children and Adolescents in Fields of Non-formal and Informal Education] (2010) and Empirie der Offenen Kinder- und Jugendarbeit [Empirical Studies in Open Youth Work] (2011, Editor). Rossella Selmini is Visiting Professor of Sociology of Law, Deviance and Social Change at the Faculty of Law, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy. While working at an academic level, Rossella Selmini has also served as the director of a research centre for the government of Regione Emilia-Romagna. Her recent publications include Experiences of Crime Prevention in Europe (in International Handbook of Penology and Criminal Justice, 2010) and Modernisation of Institutions of Social and Penal Control in Italy/Europe: the ‘New’ Crime Prevention (2009, co-author). Peter Traynor worked as a research officer for nearly ten years before starting a PhD in October 2010 in the Centre for Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Leeds in Great Britain. Most recently, Peter Traynor worked on a Nuffield Foundation funded study of the impact of anti-social behaviour interventions on young people and local communities. He has previously worked on studies of alcohol policy and the policing of problem drug users, and has taught on community safety, policing and research methods modules. His PhD thesis focuses on young people’s pathways into knife-related crime. Sofia Vidali is Associate Professor in Criminology and Crime Policy at the Democritus University of Thrace in Greece. She collaborated as chief scientific coordinator in research and policy projects conducted by the National Organisation Against Drugs (OKANA), by the Ministry of Public Order and by various NGOs in Greece and related to drug addicts social support, to drug retail markets, to police, to prison policy, to crime policy and drugs, to juveniles social protection, to immigrants, to human rights and criminal justice personnel education systems in Europe. Her recent publications include Crime Control and State Police: Ruptures and Continuities in Crime Policy. Vol. I and II (2007, in Greek), Counselling and

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Prison (2008, co-editor, in Greek), Nightlife and Crime in Greece (2009), Social Reaction to Crime and its Limits: Drugs and Organised Crime (2011, in Greek) and Crime measurement and crime policy (2011, in Greek), Police and policing (2011), Greece: for ‘sale’. Casino economy and state corporate crime (forthcoming).

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Index A Action Contracts, France 27 Action Plan against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children and Adolescents 331 Action Plan for Family Violence Prevention, Slovenia 309 Administrative crime prevention 40-55, 235, 239 Agent of social development, France 28 Anti-Hot Summer Activities, France 106 Anti-social behaviour 9, 29, 33, 47, 59, 66, 70-78, 80, 82, 83, 89-93, 112, 242, 244, 249, 287, 291. 339, 340 Anti-Social Behaviour Act 71-72, 75 Anti-social behaviour agenda 64, 67, 72, 76, 78, 84 Anti-social behaviour intervention 90, 94 Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBOs) 70, 73, 76-77, 90 Anti-Social Behaviour Team 83 Anti-Social Behaviour Unit 75 Architectural crime prevention 134 At risk 67, 122, 127, 152, 229, 242, 289, 290, 291, 311, 322 At risk areas 124 At risk family 31, 77, 90, 243 At risk group 79, 81, 121, 122, 152, 240 At risk individual 81, 162 At risk municipality 42 At risk of deviance 196 At risk of exclusion 295, 308 At risk of offending 66, 80, 84, 85, 87, 88, 105, 106, 108, 121, 122, 127, 131, 210, 213, 216, 220, 221, 245, 256, 264, 268, 279, 291, 309, 312 At risk of unemployment 245 At risk people 222 At risk population 168 At risk social order 175 At risk young people 54, 80, 81, 88, 90, 104, 162, 221, 244, 245, 246, 247, 249, 259, 310

At risk victimization 124, 136, 264, 279, 291, 307 Authoritarian 33, 45, 47, 56, 59, 78, 90, 170, 243, 261, 273, 281, 323 Autonomous Communities, Spain 334-335

B Barcelona 337-341 Belgium Christian democratic and liberal policy 39-40 Christian democratic and socialist policy 40-44 Christian democratic, liberal and socialist policy 47-50 Institutional context 56-58 Liberal and socialist policy 45-47 Police prevention 39-40, 51, 53-54 Prevention contracts 43 Security and prevention contracts 45, 52-53 Security contracts 42-44, 51-52, (Social) crime prevention, local policy Ghent 50-56 Strategic security and prevention plans 47-50, 53-56 Urban policy 47, 52-53 Big City Policy, The Netherlands 241 Big Society 91 Bonnemaison Report, France 27, 64, 67, 103 British model of crime prevention 28-30, 63-65 Broken windows 66, 70-71, 134, 243

C CCTV (closed-circuit television) France 103-104, 109, 111-113 Greece 152 Hungary 203 Italy 223-224, 228 Netherlands 241

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Norway 267 Portugal 288 UK 68 Centralised state 129 Central state 109, 299, 324, 334 Centre for Child Behavioural Development, Norway 261, 268 Chicago Area Project 210 Christian-democratic and liberal crime prevention policy, Belgium 39-40 Christian-democratic and socialist crime prevention policy, Belgium 40-45 Citizen security 42, 326 City coaching project 51 Commission for Crime Prevention and Control, Slovenia 305 Communal crime prevention 122, 152 Communitarianism 71, 78, 133, 262 Communities Against Guns, Gangs and Knifes 87 Community 172-173 Community crime prevention Authoritarianism 59 Concept 66, 103, 135, 137, 142, 172173, 191, 219, 290-291, 296-299 Developmental prevention 30, 66 Migration 56 Primary prevention 66-67 Secondary prevention 66-67 Social 210 Social causes of Crime 31-32 Social crime prevention 21, 23, 25, 3032, 65, 296-299 Tertiary prevention 66-67 Community Foundation for Merseyside 86 Community safety Concept 7, 67, 137, 271 Developmental crime prevention 30 Morgan Commission 28 Social crime prevention 9, 21, 30, 64, 65, 67-72, 85, 91, 171-172, 246, 322 Community That Care – programmes 66 Community work 26, 55, Contracts for Insertion in Social Life (CIVIS), France 107 Contracts of Urban Social Cohesion (CUCS), France 106 Contractualisation 27

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Council of Europe 194 Councils for the Rights an Duties of Families (CDDF), France 108 Crime and Disorder Act (CDA) (1998) 69-73 Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) 72, 75 Crime prevention Academic debate 21 Academic discourse 159-162 Administrative 40-55, 235, 239 Architectural 134 Autonomous Communities, Spain 334-335 British model 63-65 Christian-democratic and liberal 39-40 Christian-democratic and socialist 40-45 Communal 122, 152 Contractualisation 27 Crimes of the powerful 171-172 Crime trends 162-166, 182 Definitions 235-238 Development of policies 130-135, 238241 Economic crisis 173-174 Environmental 160 European features 189-191 Evaluation 44, 49, 236, 238 Exclusion 92, 289 Extra-judicial 235 Extra-penal 159, 166 French model 63-64 General 130-131,152 History 257-260 Inclusion 31-32 Institutionalisation 129-130, 257-259, 305 Integrated 40-50, 219-220 Local councils 131, 135-138 Local policy 40-56, 56-59, 79-89, 109117, 135-138 Mechanical 160 Multi-agency 155 National policy 39-50, 56-59, 67-78, 103-108, 130-135, 159-162, 183189, 238-248, 280-286, 323-339 Neo-liberal 23 New 210, 217, 218

Index Offender-oriented 66, 122, 152, 235, 238, 243 Partnership 27-28, 41, 69-70, 155, 269271, 260-261 Penal 159, 161, 316 Policy mixes 109-117 Political and public discourses 125-128 Post-socialist societies 188-189 Primary 67, 105,121-122, 136, 152, 238, 279, 284 Proactive 80, 159 Risk-focused 65, 89, 229 Safety 243 Secondary 66, 67, 105, 121-122, 152, 165, 166, 238, 279 Situation-oriented 63, 122, 152 Social policy 123-125, 286-291 Social tensions 173-174 Special 130-131, 282 Structural 32, 235, 236, 238, 239, 240 Territorialisation 27 Tertiary 67, 105, 121, 152, 187, 238, 279 Theories 37, 152-154 Turn 185 Urban policy 47 Victim-oriented 122, 152, 166 World congresses 24 Crime Prevention Injunction 90 Crime Prevention Strategy, New Zealand 64 Crime prevention turn 25-30, 57-59, 170, 185, 214-216 Crime reduction 237, 239, 244-245, 256, 267 Crimes of the powerful 171-172 Crime trends 162-166, 182, 214-215 Criminal Behaviour Order 90 Criminalisation of social policy 79, 143 Crisis of penal modernism 63 Curfew orders for children 73

D Decentralisation 28 Democratic state 280, 282, 313, 324 Detached youth work 26 Developmental crime prevention Community crime prevention 30, 66 Concept 7, 31, 34, 65-66, 103, 130, 152,

236, 290, 310 Future Direction 92 Government Cameron 89 Inclusion 31 Primary prevention 66-67 Secondary prevention 66-67 Social crime prevention 30-31, 32, 78 Tertiary prevention 66-67 Developmental criminology 29 Disorder 29, 66, 69, 70, 75, 78, 89, 136, 211, 214, 215, 216, 219, 220, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 230, 257, 273, 281 Disorderly behaviour 45 Drug prevention 44, 51-52, 54-55,167-168, 283-286 Dundee Families Project 77, 82

E Early intervention 77, 92 Economic security 156 Educational Territories for Priority Intervention (TEIP), Portugal 295 Education Committees on Health and Citizenship, France 106 England and Wales Anti-Social Behaviour agenda and social crime prevention 72-78 Community crime prevention 66 Community safety and social crime prevention 67-72 Concept social crime prevention 65 Developmental crime prevention 65 Family Intervention Projects 82-84 Future directions 92-94 Sure Start and Children’s Centres 87-89 Tackling Knives and Serious Youth Violence Action Programme 84-87 Youth Inclusion Projects 80-82 Environmental crime prevention 160 EU member states 198, 287 European Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN) 29 European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS) 24 Evaluation of crime prevention 32, 44, 49, 236, 238 Excellence Centres 87 Exclusion 92, 289

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Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Extra-judicial crime prevention 235 Extra-penal crime prevention 159, 166

F Family Intervention Projects (FIPs) 77, 82-84, Fear of crime 9 Federal state 57, 134, 135, 136, 138 Fonds Interministériel de Prévention de la Délinquance (FIPD) 104 Forum for Urban Safety France 24 France Concept social crime prevention 103109 Future directions 117-118 Governmental crime prevention policy 103-109 Local crime prevention policies 109117 French model of crime prevention 24, 2528, 63-64, 103-104

G General crime prevention 130-131, 152 General Direction of Security and Prevention, Belgium 49 Germany Concepts 121-123 Crime prevention policies 130-135 Federal and regional programme for city districts 140-142 Institutionalization of crime prevention 129-130 Organisation of crime prevention 135142 Perspectives on social crime prevention 142-145 Political and public discourses on safety and crime prevention 125128 Social crime prevention and social policy 123-125 GERN (European Group for the study of norms) 10 Ghent 50-56 Greece Community crime prevention 172-173

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Concept of social crime prevention 152-157 Crime trends 162-166 Economic crisis, social tensions and crime prevention 173-174 Future directions 175-177 Market society, social crime prevention and the welfare state 158-159 New target group for social crime prevention 174-175 Prevention of the crimes of the powerful 171-172 Social crime prevention and social policy 166-170 State policies, trends and academic discourse on crime prevention 159-162 Grenoble 110-111

H HALT project, The Netherlands 239 High/Scope Perry Pre-School Programme 88 Home Office Community Fund 85 House of Commons Children, Schools and Families Committee 88 Human safety 181 Hungary Crime control policy 183-188 Crime prevention 183-188 Future directions 203-204 Social crime prevention concept 191-192 measurers and practices 199-202 social security 196-199 strategy 192-195

I Incivilities 9, 33, 66, 70, 78, 93, 136, 214, 215, 224-226, 307, 339, 340 Individual Support Orders ( ISOs) 77 Insecurity 31, 42, 44, 47, 49, 56, 57, 66, 72, 78, 79, 82, 92, 93, 121, 127, 189, 242, 262, 271, 273, 281, 284, 286, 288, 289, 296, 337, 339, 340 Insecurity reduction 56 Institutionalisation of crime prevention

Index 129-130, 257-259, 305 Integral 331, 333 Integral Safety Policy, The Netherlands 241-242 Integral Security Plan, Belgium, 45, 46, 47 Integral security policy 29, 45, 46, 49 Integral Youth Assistance Network 54 Integrated 44, 45, 52, 54, 88, 103, 107, 133, 139, 151, 156, 256, 260, 271, 284, 285, 296, 297, 298, 299, 303, 306, 333 Integrated crime prevention 28, 40-50, 42, 51, 153, 160, 219-220, 285, 301 Integrated neighbourhood development 47 Intensive Family Support Projects (IFSPs) 82 Internet safety 330 Italy Definition of (social) crime prevention 209-211 Future directions 229-230 History of social crime prevention 211-216 Local safety policies 217-221 National policies 221-226

J Johnson’s War on Poverty 23

K Keynesian welfare state 39 Knife Crime Prevention Programme 85

L Local crime prevention policy 33, 40-56, 56-59, 79-89, 109-117, 135-138, 217221, 223-226, 260-266 Local safety contracts, Portugal 296-298 Local safety policies 72, 215-221, 223-226 Local Service of Integral Security, Belgium 49 Lyon 111-113

M Market society 155-159 Mayor 27, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 49, 50, 51, 53, 57, 204, 225, 240, 307, 336, 338-340 Mechanical crime prevention 160 Merseyside Young Transformers programme 86 Misspent Youth report 69 Mixed model of crime prevention 9, 3032, 57, 107-117, 219-221, 223-226, 241, 266-267, 268-269 Mobilisation for Youth Project New York 23, 210 Moral conservative 47, 59, 261 Morgan Report 28, 67-69, Multi-agency approach 115, 152, 155, 269, 304 Multi-agency crime prevention 155 Municipal Council of Social Welfare Barcelona 338 Municipal safety councils 296

N NACRO (National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders) 28, 68, 80 Nanny state 91 National Commission for the Social Development of Neighbourhoods (CNDSQ), France 27 National Crime Prevention Board, Hungary 187 National Crime Prevention Council (KRAD), Norway 257-258, 269 National Crime Prevention Council (OBmB), Hungary 187, 194, 200 National crime prevention policy 3950, 56-59, 67-78, 103-108, 130-135, 159- 162, 183-189, 192-195, 211-216, 221-226, 238-248, 256-260, 280-286, 305-311, 323-339 National Crime Prevention Programme (OBP), Hungary 185 National Institute of Criminology (OKRI), Hungary 182, 185, 187, 192 National Mediation and Reconciliation Service, Norway 257-259

361

Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe National Plan on Awareness and Prevention of Violence against Women, Spain 333 National Plan on Drugs, Spain 329 National Plan on Preventing and Combatting Crime, Slovenia 305 National Programme for Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, Slovenia 311 National Programme on Prevention of Family Violence 308 National Public Security Council, Spain 327 National Report on Strategies for Social Protection and Social Inclusion, Slovenia 308 National Social Assistance Programme, Slovenia 309 National state 129, 305, 323 National Strategic Plan for Childhood and Adolescence, Spain 331 National Strategy for Social Crime Prevention, Hungary 187, 192-195 Neighbour Conflict Mediation Schemes 241 Neighbourhood clubs 25 Neighbourhood Nurseries Initiative 87 Neighbourhood prevention project 51 Neighbourhood Renewal Fund 140 Neighbours for Each Other Campaign (SZEM), 185 Neo-liberal crime prevention 23, 57 Neo-liberal security logic 29 Netherlands Crime Reduction Policy 241-243 Definition of (social) crime prevention 235-238 Future directions 248-249 History crime prevention 238-241 Social crime prevention 243-24 New crime prevention 210, 217, 218 New Deal for Communities 140 Nordic model 24 Norway Crime prevention partnerships 269271 Definition social crime prevention 255-257 Future directions 271-273

362

History of (social) crime prevention policy 257-260 Policy mix social and individualised crime prevention 268-269 Policy mix social and situational crime prevention 266-267 Practices of social crime prevention 260-266 Nuffield Foundation Project 81 Nuisance 9, 51, 55, 242-248

O Offender-oriented crime prevention 66, 122, 152, 235, 238, 243, 290, 291-295 Office for Equal Opportunities, Slovenia 311 Outreach work 26

P Participatory security 338, 341 Partnership 27-28, 40-41, 67, 69-70, 72, 74, 79, 80, 85, 91, 103, 107, 112, 113, 114, 115, 135, 154, 155, 193, 247, 252, 260-261, 269-271, 289, 294, 298, 299, 306, 309 Penal crime prevention 159, 161, 316 Penal state 92 Permanent Safety Observatory, Portugal 197 Personal safety 203, 329 Pilot prevention projects 41 Plan for Improvement of Safety in School and in Communal Life, Spain 330 Plan for the Promotion of Civility, Spain 340 Plan to Combat Crime, Spain 329 Plan to Combat Human Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation, Spain 331 Police crime prevention 23, 38, 39-40, 41, 51, 67, 131, 168, 184, 342 Political discourses on safety 125-128 Political-ideological relations 33 Portugal Community oriented crime prevention 296-299 Definition of social crime prevention 279-280

Index Development of criminal justice system 280-282 Drugs and crime prevention 283-286 Future directions 299-230 Offender oriented social crime prevention 291-296 (social) crime prevention and social policy 286-291 Positive Activities for Young People Programme 85 Post-socialist societies 188-189 Prevention clubs 25 Prevention contract 42-43 Prevention coordinator 46, 49, 57-58 Prevention council Local 41, 43, 46, 57, 129, 130, 131, 135138, 168-169, 336, 337-341 National 51, 185, 187, 257-258 Provincial 51 Prevention of anti-Semitism 138-140 Prevention of anti-social behaviour 291 Prevention of bullying 221 Prevention of child abuse 222, 331 Prevention of crimes of the powerful 171172 Prevention of domestic violence 202, 298, 308-309, 332-334 Prevention of drug addiction 214, 221, 283-286, 291 Prevention of juvenile delinquency 54, 56, 80-89, 202 Prevention of knife crime 84-87 Prevention of nuisance 245 Prevention of pedophilia 221 Prevention of political extremism 138-140 Prevention of racism 138-140 Prevention of radicalisation 49 Prevention of recidivism 107-108, 202, 213 Prevention of school drop out 243 Prevention of truancy 241 Prevention of vandalism 239 Prevention of victimisation 194, 202, 289 Prevention of violence 126, 135 Prevention of violence against women 108, 311, 333 Preventive Actions in Education and Schooling Strategy, Slovenia 309 Preventive turn 7, 25-26, 38, 40, 56-59

Primary crime prevention 66-67, 105-106, 213, 121-122, 136, 152, 238, 279, 284 Priority Zones of Education (ZEP), France 28 Private security 203, 288, 307, 344 Privatisation of security 203, 344-345 Proactive crime prevention 80, 159 Problem-oriented policing 261 Programme for Children and Young People, Slovenia 310 Programme for Freedom and Urban Security, Spain 327 Programme Social Network, Portugal 287 Property safety 203 Public discourses on safety 125-128 Public disorder 45 Public nuisance 29, 33, 45-48, 59 Public-private partnerships 45, 152, 280, 300 Public safety 182, 224, 241, 329, 330 Public security 184, 186, 187, 193, 202, 203

Q R Radbruch,Gustav 123 Reactive security 339 Reassurance paradox 72 Respect Action Plan 82 Respect and Responsibility, White Paper 71 Risk assessment 175, 261 Risk behaviour 48, 53, 106 Risk factor 65, 240, 242, 243, 308 Risk-focused crime prevention 65, 78, 89, 229 Risk management 171, 238, 239, 240 Risk of prejudice 195 Risk professions 48 Risk profi ling 266 Risk reduction 285, 286 Risk situations 54 Risk society 229, 306 Risk structural bond 163 Risky and Harmful Alcohol and Illegal Drug Abuse Reduction Strategy, Slovenia 309

363

Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Roethof Commission, The Netherlands 239 Roma population 192, 197

S Safe Cities programme 217 Safety 125-128, 166, 243, 279, 283, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 293, 296, 328, 330, 336, 344 Safety begins with Prevention, The Netherlands 243 Safety contract 296-298 Safety council 296, 307 Safety plan 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 224, 227, 230 Safety policy 29, 210, 217, 220, 223, 227, 228, 243, 287, 289, 336 Safety problem 296, 307 Safety programme 217, 297 Safety project 218, 228, 229 School safety 295, 330 Secondary crime prevention 66-67, 89, 105, 106-107, 121-122, 152, 165, 166, 238, 279 Security 40, 45, 46, 47, 49, 70, 72, 91, 92, 109, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 181, 183, 193, 199, 202, 204, 239, 258, 282, 288, 296, 299, 300, 307, 322, 325, 326, 327, 330, 334, 336, 337, 338, 344 Security and Liberty, France 26 Security and prevention contract, Belgium 45-47, 53, 58 Security and society contract, Belgium 44, 46, 47, 52, 53 Security companies 185 Security contract, Belgium 42-44, 51-52, 57, 58, 300 Security enforcement 161 Security institutions 185 Security management 340 Security of communities 185 Security of rights 161 Security plan 40, 45, 46, 47 Security policy 29, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 51, 53, 57, 58, 113, 114, 153, 158, 184, 186, 203, 280, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341 Security policymakers 54

364

Security politics 55 Security problems 50, 339 Situational crime prevention Anglophone model 25 Concept 8, 26, 46, 65, 130, 141, 161, 219-241, 243, 255, 262, 266-267, 288, 313, 316 Critical remarks 311-316 Exclusion 31 Ideology 63, 122, 152 Measures 103 Projects 109-117 Social crime prevention 30, 41, 220, 303-311 Situation-oriented crime prevention 63, 122, 152 Social causes of crime 8, 31-32, 236-238 Social crime prevention Anti-social behaviour 9, 72-78 Authoritarianism 56 Barcelona 337-341 British model 28-30 Comparative 7-10 Concept 8-9, 21, 22-25, 65, 103-109, 121-123, 141, 151-152, 154-159, 191-192, 209-211, 209-211, 235238, 255- 257, 261-262, 279- 280, 303-305, 321-323 Communitarian concern 78 Community 172-173 Community crime prevention 21, 23, 25, 65, 30-32, 296-299 Community safety 9, 21, 30, 65, 67-72 Contractualisation 27 Crime policy 305-311 Crimes of the powerful 171-172 Crime theories 22-25 Decentralisation 28 Developmental crime prevention 30, 78 Early intervention 77, 92 Educational 145 Entertainment 108 Evaluation 32 Fear of crime 9 Feelings of insecurity 9 Feelings of security 196-199 French model 24, 25-28, 103-104 Future directions 22, 32-34, 59, 92-94,

Index 117, 142-145, 175-177, 203-204, 229-230, 248- 249, 271-273, 299311, 342-345 Ghent 50-56 History 211-216, 257-260 Hybridisation 107-117 Incivilities 9 Local policies 33, 41-44, 46-47, 51-56, 79-89, 217-221, 223-226, 260-266, 335-342 Local safety policies 217-221, 223-226 Market society 155-159 Measures 105-108, 191-202, 218-219 Mix with developmental crime prevention 268-269 Mix with other prevention models 30-32 Mix with situational crime prevention 9, 57, 109-113, 219-221, 223-226, 241, 266-267 Morgan report 67-69 National policy 39-50, 67-78, 103-108, 192-195, 211-216, 221-226, 243248, 256-260, 305-311, 329-334 Neo-liberal logic 57 New target group 174-175 Nordic model 24 Nuisance 9, 55, 245 Offender-oriented 290, 291-295 Partnership 27-28, 269-271 Policy 21 Policy discourses 256-257 Political and public discourses on safety 125-128 Political-ideological relations 33 Practice 21, 199-202, 260-266 Primary social prevention 105-106, 213 Repressive logic 107 Risk-focused approach 78, 229 Secondary social prevention 106-107 Social defence theory 22, 37-38 Social policy 8, 79, 89, 123-125, 166170, 286-291 Social safety 21 Social security 196-199 Strategy 192-195 Structural prevention 32-33 Territorialisation 27-28 Tertiary social prevention 107, 213

Theory 22-25, 37-38 Transfer 22, 25-30 Treatment 108-109 Turns 25-30, 57-59, 170, 214-216 Welfare state, 158-159 Youth delinquency 80-89 Social Exclusion Unit 71-72 Social nuisance 48, 53, 55, 56 Social policy 8, 79, 89, 123-125, 166-170, 286-291 Social Renewal, The Netherlands 238, 240-241 Social safety 21 Social security 157, 196-199, 293, 309 Social-security nebula 115 Social security system 57 Social state 282, 305, 306, 312, 323, 324 Social welfare state 26, 33 Society and Criminality Plan, The Netherlands 240 Sovereign state 313 Special Crime Prevention 130-131, 282 Specialised educators, France 25, 113-116 State 64, 78, 89, 90, 91, 94, 116, 129, 158, 159, 160, 163, 166, 170, 184, 186, 190, 191, 201, 221, 226, 256, 258, 262, 281, 287, 289, 294, 300, 305, 310, 313, 316, 324, 329, 334, 341 Strategic Plan for Prevention, Norway 257 Strategic security and prevention plan, Belgium 47-50, 53-56, 58-59 Strategy for the Promotion of the Constructive Role of Media in Decreasing Family Violence, Slovenia 309 Street corner work 52, 244-248 Street Crime Action Group 74 Street Crime Initiative 73 Street Weapons Commission 86 Structural crime prevention 32-33, 52, 235-241, 243 Sure Start Children’s Centres 87 Sure Start initiative 87 Sure Start Local Programmes 87

T Tackling Knives Action Programme 85 Tackling Knives and Serious Youth

365

Social Crime Prevention in Late Modern Europe Violence Action Programme 85 Theories of crime prevention 22-25, 37-38, 152-153 Techno-prevention 41, 46, 49, 235, 236, 247 Territorialisation 27-28 Tertiary crime prevention 66-67, 105, 107, 121, 152, 187, 213, 238, 279 Transfer of crime prevention policy 22, 25-30

Urban social cohesion 106 Urban social dimension 41 Urban social problems 41 Urban sprawl 26 Urban traffic 296 Urban unemployment 182

V Victim-oriented crime prevention 122, 152, 166

U W Unitary state 40 Urban areas 103, 123, 156, 163, 165, 171, 241, 286, 289, 290, 298, 306 Urban centre 225 Urban citizens 181, 182 Urban community 92 Urban crime 306 Urban crime deterrence model 104 Urban environment 181 Urban governance 70 Urban insecurity 47, 339 Urban life 47, 182, 299 Urban lifestyle 287 Urban planning 78 Urban policy 27, 28, 37, 47, 52, 53, 58, 59, 92, 107, 110, 272 Urban processes of marginalisation and exclusion 24 Urban regeneration 237, 238 Urban renewal 44, 52, 53, 57, 103, 104, 227, 271 Urban riots 114 Urban safety 24, 29, 210, 223, 224, 230, 286, 296, 297, 336, 337 Urban security 202, 327, 337

366

Welfare safety 181 Welfare state 8, 24, 25, 37, 38, 92, 104, 117, 158, 159, 181, 188, 190, 191, 212, 239, 255, 256, 261, 271, 272, 282, 287, 299, 312, 323, 324, 327

X Y Youth delinquency 80-89 Youth for Tolerance and Democracy, Germany 138-139 Youth Inclusion Projects (YIPs) 80-82 Youth Justice Board 69 Youth Justice Plan, Spain 335 Youth Offending Teams 69, 82 Youth Taskforce Action Plan 77 Youth welfare 54

Z Zero tolerance 127,134, 176, 226, 311