Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective 9781843927259, 184392725X, 9781843924128

Table of contents :
Content: Cover
Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Figures and tables
Acknowledgements
Notes on contributors
Introduction: The preventive turn in Europe
1 Situating crime prevention policies in comparative perspective: policy travels, transfer and translation
2 The political evolution of situational crime prevention in England and Wales
3 The preventive turn and the promotion of safer communities in England and Wales: political inventiveness and governmental instabilities. 4 The development of community safety in Scotland: a different path?5 The evolving story of crime prevention in France
6 Forty years of crime prevention in the Dutch polder
7 'Modernisation' of institutions of social and penal control in Italy/Europe: the 'new' crime prevention
8 Crime prevention at the Belgian federal level: from a social democratic policy to a neo-liberal and authoritarian policy in a social democratic context
9 Going around in circles? Reflections on crime prevention strategies in Germany. 10 Crime prevention in Hungary: why is it so hard to argue for the necessity of a community approach?11 International models of crime prevention
Index.

Citation preview

Crime Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective Edited by

Adam Crawford

W ILLA N PUBLISHING

C r im e P re v e n tio n Policies in C o m p a r a tiv e P ersp ec tiv e

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

E d ited by A d a m C ra w fo rd

Published by

Willan Publishing Culmcott House Mill Street, Uffculme Cullompton, Devon EX15 3AT, UK Tel: +44(0)1884 840337 Fax: +44(0)1884 840251 e-mail: [email protected] Website: www.willanpublishing.co.uk Published simultaneously in the USA and Canada by Willan Publishing c /o ISBS, 920 NE 58th Ave, Suite 300, Portland, Oregon 97213-3786, USA Tel: +001(0)503 287 3093 Fax: +001(0)503 280 8832 e-mail: info@ isbs.com Website: www.isbs.com © The editor and contributors 2009 All rights reserved; no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the Publishers or a licence permitting copying in the UK issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC IN 8TS. First published 2009 ISBN 978-1-84392-412-8 paperback 978-1-84392-413-5 hardback British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

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Project management by Deer Park Productions, Tavistock, Devon Typeset by TW Typesetting, Plymouth, Devon Printed and bound by T J International Ltd, Trecerus Industrial Estate, Padstow, Cornwall

C o n te n ts

Figures and tables

vii

A cknow ledgem en ts

ix

N otes on contributors

xi

In tro d u ctio n : T h e p rev en tiv e turn in Europe A dam Craw ford 1

2

3

4

S itu a tin g crim e p re v e n tio n p o lic ie s in com p arativ e p ersp ectiv e: p o licy trav els, tra n sfe r and tran slatio n A dam Crazvford T h e p o litic a l ev o lu tio n o f s itu a tio n a l crim e p rev en tio n in E nglan d and W ales Tim H ope T h e p rev en tiv e turn and th e p ro m o tion o f sa fe r com m u n itie s in E n g lan d and W ales: p o litica l in v e n tiv e n e ss and g o v ern m en tal in s ta b ilitie s A dam Edw ards and G ordon H ughes T h e d ev elo p m en t o f com m u n ity sa fety in S co tlan d : a d iffe re n t path? A listair H enry

xv

1

38

62

86

5

T h e ev o lv in g story o f crim e p rev en tio n in France A n ne W yvekens

110

6

Fo rty years o f crim e p re v e n tio n in the D u tch p o ld er Jan J.M . Van D ijk and Jaap De W aard

130

7

'M o d e rn isa tio n ' o f in stitu tio n s o f so cial and p en al con trol in Italy /E u rop e: the 'n e w ' crim e p rev en tio n D ario M elossi and R ossella Selm ini

8

C rim e p rev en tio n at the B elg ia n fe d e ral lev el: fro m a social d em ocratic p o licy to a n e o -lib e ra l and au th o ritarian p o licy in a so cial d em o cratic con text P atrick H ebberecht

153

177

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

9

10

11

vi

G o in g arou nd in circles? R e fle ctio n s o n crim e p rev en tio n strateg ies in G erm an y M ichael Jasch

196

C rim e p rev en tio n in H ungary: w hy is it so hard to argue fo r the n e ce ssity o f a com m u n ity approach? K lara K erezsi

214

In te rn a tio n a l m od els o f crim e p rev en tio n M argaret Shaw

234

Index

255

Figures and tables

Figures 1.1 1.2 2.1 6.1 6.2 7.1 9.1 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 11.1 11.2

D om estic burglary recorded by the police (in thousands) Theft of a m otor vehicle recorded by the police (in thousands) H ousehold crim e and the polarisation of tenure, 1981-2007 Recorded crim e and clearance rates in the N etherlands, 1950-2007 Self-reported victim isation am ong the population aged 15 years and older, 1980-2008 N um ber of crim es (delitti) per 100,000 inhabitants in Italy, 1881-2004 Fear of crim e in East and W est G erm any, 1992-2002 'Zigzags' in crim e control policy, 1990-2010 The developm ent of crim e prevention in H ungary G D P per capita, and crim e rates per capita by counties in H ungary The subsystem s of com m unity crim e prevention The com m unity crim e prevention strategy's system of objectives H om icides in Brazil: num ber and rate per 100,000 population, 1980-2003 Bogota, Colom bia: rate of hom icides per 100,000 inhabitants, 1985-2004

25 25 47 132 133 159

200 215 217

222 223 225 237 245

T ables 1.1 1.2

Political econom y and im prisonm ent rates per 100,000 population Im prisonm ent rates across Europe per 100,000 population (EU plus EFTA countries)

6 7 vii

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

1.3 6.1 6.2 10.1

viii

Public reception of situational crim e prevention technologies M atrix of types of preventative m easures Security precautions in percentage of the total num ber of households in the N etherlands, 1993-2008 Key distinctive features of the crim e prevention strategy

9 137 145 229

A ck n o w le d g e m e n ts

This boo k arose out o f an international colloquium held at the U niversity o f L eed s on 7 -8 Ju n e 2007. It w as organised u n d er the fram ew ork o f the C R IM P R E V co-ordination action project entitled 'A ssessing C rim e, D evi­ ance and P reven tion' and funded by the European C om m ission (C ontract No. 028300). The project is co-ordinated by the French Centre N ational de la R echerche Scientifique (C N RS). Fu rther inform ation about C R IM P R E V is av ailable from the p roject w ebsite: w w w .crim p rev .eu . A ll the contributors to this v olu m e presented initial papers and argum ents at the L eed s colloqu iu m in Ju n e 2007. T he resultant final v ersions o f all the chapters benefited from the lively d iscu ssions and d ebates d uring the tw o-d ay m eeting. W e w ould like to acknow led ge all those w ho attended and con tributed to the colloquium d eliberations inclu ding (in alphabetical order): A dam C raw ford, Jim D ignan, Jan Van D ijk, A dam E dw ards, P atrick H ebberecht, A listair H enry, Tim H ope, G ordon H ughes, M ichael Jasch , Klara K erezsi, H ugues L agrange, Rene Levy, Stu art Lister, Livia Lucianetti, M ichel M arcus, D ario M elossi, G orazd M esko, M argaret Shaw , Peter Traynor, Jaap D e W aard and A nne W yvekens. As ever, m any thanks to Brian W illan and his team for their support and en couragem ent in bringin g this collection to fruition.

Notes on contributors

Adam Craw ford is Professor of C rim inology and C rim inal Justice and director of the Centre for Crim inal Justice Studies at the U niversity of Leeds. His publications include The Local G overnance o f Crim e (1997), Crime Prevention and Com m unity Safety (1998), Crim e and Insecurity (2002) and Plural Policing (2005). He w as the recipient of a Leverhulm e Trust M ajor Research Fellow ship w hich inform ed his forthcom ing book Governing the Future: The Contractual Governance o f Anti-Social Behaviour. In the past he has worked for the N ew Zealand governm ent and N orthern Ireland Office on m atters of crim e prevention and com m unity safety and is a m em ber of the Safer Leeds Partnership Board. Jaap D e W aard is Senior Policy A dvisor at the N etherlands M inistry of Justice. He is the form er secretary of the European Crim e Prevention Netw ork. He has published w idely on crim e prevention m odels, interna­ tional trends in the private security industry, and international benchm ark studies in the field of crim e control. H e is a m em ber of the European Union Crim e Experts Group, European Com m ission, Directorate-G eneral for Justice, Freedom and Security. He is research fellow at the Interna­ tional Victim ology Institute (IN TERVICT), Tilburg University. Adam Edw ards is Lecturer in crim inology in the School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University. His publications include Crim e Control and Comm unity (with Gordon H ughes, 2002). He is director of the European Governance of Public Safety Research N etw ork, w hich is a w orking group of the European Society of Crim inology that prom otes com parative research into the politics of crim e prevention in Europe. P atrick H eb berech t is Professor of Crim inology and Sociology of Law and director of the Research Group of C rim inology and Sociology of Law at the U niversity of Ghent. He is doing research on prevention policies in Belgium and Europe. He co-directed w ith Fritz Sack La Prevention de xi

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

D elinquance en Europe: Nouvelles Strategies (1997) and w ith Dom inique Duprez The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe (2002). H is latest book is D e 'verpaarsing' van de crim inaliteitsbestrijding in Belgie: Kritische opstellen over misdaad en m isdaadcontrole in de laatm oderniteit ('The "P u rp le-isatio n " of Crim inal Policy in Belgium : Critical Thoughts on Crim e and Crim e Control in Late M odernity'). A listair H enry is a lecturer in crim inology at the U niversity of Edinburgh. He recently com pleted his doctoral research on com m unity safety partnerships in Scotland and is currently em barking upon a know ledge transfer project on com m unity policing funded by the A rts and H um an­ ities Research Council. H is recent publications include Transform ations o f Policing (edited w ith David J. Sm ith, 2007). He is associated with both the Scottish Institute for Policing Research and the Scottish Centre for Crim e and Justice Research. T im H ope is Professor of Crim inology at K eele U niversity and Senior Visiting Research Fellow , Scottish Centre for Crim e and Justice Research, U niversity of Edinburgh. He has held positions at the universities of M anchester and M issouri-St Louis, and the H om e Office Research and Planning U nit (1974-91). He was director of the Econom ic and Social Research Council's Crim e and Social O rder research program m e. His research into crim e prevention, com m unity safety and victim ology is published in the USA, Canada, France, G erm any, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic and Portugal. G ordon H ughes is Professor of Crim inology at the School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University. H is current research interests include com ­ parative trends in crim e prevention, the politics of com m unity safety, strategic problem -solving and the changing m odes of the local governance of crim e, disorder and security. Recent funded research has involved a study of the changing role and w ork of com m unity safety teams and an evaluation of youth crim e prevention schem es in W ales funded by the W elsh A ssem bly G overnm ent. His most recent m onograph is The Politics o f Crim e and Com m unity (2007). He is currently w riting a book for Sage entitled Sociology and Crime. M ich ael Jasch is a lecturer and research assistant at the Goethe-U niversity Frankfu rt/M ain. H is recent publications include 'The Crisis of Com m u­ nity Crim e Prevention' (in M onatsschrift fiir Krim inologie und Strafrechtsreform , 2003), a paper on 'C rim inal Law and Security' (in Krim inologisches, 2007) and an em pirical study on the crim e situation in the city of Rostock (2000). H e has worked with law faculties and research institutions in G erm any and with the Centre for Crim inological Research at Oxford xii

N otes on contributors

U niversity. Betw een 1996 and 2001, he w as a m em ber o f the local crim e prevention cou ncil in Rostock. K lara K e re z si is D epu ty D irector o f the N ational Institute o f C rim in ology and associate p rofessor at E otvos U niversity, H ungary. She is a m em ber o f the Scientific C om m ittee of the International Society o f C rim in ology and v ice-presid ent o f the H ungarian Society o f C rim inology. H er research interests are crim e prevention, crim e control policies and com m unity sanctions. H er books inclu de Crim e Prevention in Three D istricts o f Budapest (2003, co-au thor) and C ontrol or Support: The D ilem m a o f A lternative Sanctions (2006). She con tributed a chap ter to the collection Probation in Europe (2008). In 1996 she w as com m issioned to elaborate the first H u n garian national crim e p revention con cept and in 2002 she contributed to the elaboration o f the N ational C rim e Preven tion S trategy w hich w as approved by the parliam ent. D ario M e lo s si is P rofessor o f C rim in ology in the School of Law at the U niversity o f Bologna, to w here he has returned after m an y years on various cam p u ses o f the U niversity of California. H is pu blications include The Prison and the Factory (w ith M assim o Pavarini, 1981), The State o f Social C ontrol (1990) and, m ost recently, Controlling Crim e, C ontrolling Society: Thinking A bou t Crim e in Europe and A m erica (2008). H e is curren tly w orking on issues o f m igration and d eviance, esp ecially you th d eviance, in the Italian region o f E m ilia-R om agna. H e is also very m u ch interested in the issue of m igration in relation to the process o f E uropean unification. H e has been a m em ber o f the Safe C ities project o f the regional governm ent o f Em ilia-R om agna. R o sse lla S e lm in i is D irector of the D epartm ent for U rban Safety and Local P olice o f the Italian region o f E m ilia-R om agna and P rofessor of C rim in ology and Sociology o f Preven tion at the U niversity o f M acerata. In the past she has been a research er at the E uropean U niversity Institute, and then responsible for the research unit on crim e and prevention in E m ilia-R om agna. She has also been a con su ltan t of local and national governm ents. H er recent pu blications inclu d e La Sicurezza U rbana (2004) and m any articles on the local governan ce o f crim e, crim e prevention and victim isation studies. M arg aret S h aw is D irector o f A nalysis and E xchange at the International C en tre for the Preven tion o f C rim e (IC PC ), based in M ontreal, C anada. Sin ce she joined IC PC in 1999 she has w ritten and published extensively on crim e prevention issues, and p articipated in m an y con ferences and sem in ars internationally. She has w orked as a con su ltan t for U N O D C , U N -H A BIT A T and the Inter-A m erican D evelopm ent Bank on issues of prevention and com m u nity safety. She p rev iously taught at C oncord ia x iii

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

U niversity, M ontreal, and w as a long-tim e m em ber o f the H om e O ffice R esearch and P lan ning U nit before m oving to C anada. W ith Tim H ope she edited a first U K text on C om m unities and Crim e R eduction published in 1988. She is a board m em ber o f W om en in C ities International. Ja n J.M . V an D ijk holds the P ieter V an V ollen hov en C h air in V ictim ­ o logy, H um an Secu rity and Safety at the U niversity o f Tilbu rg in the N etherlands. H is form er posts inclu de d irector of crim e prevention at the D utch M inistry o f Ju stice and officer in charge o f the U nited N ations crim e p rev ention program m e in V ienna. H is latest book is The W orld o f Crim e: Breaking the Silence on Issues o f Security, Justice and D evelopm ent (2008). In 2003 he received the H ans von H en tig A w ard from the W orld Society of V ictim ology and in 2008 the Sellin-G lueck A w ard from the A m erican Society o f C rim inology. A nne W y v ek en s is R esearch er at the French N ational C en tre for Scientific R esearch (C N R S /C E R S A U niversite Paris 2) and A ssociate R esearch er at the Facultes U niversitaires Sain t-L ou is Brussels. H er books inclu d e Espace Public et Securite (2006) and La M agistrature Sociale (w ith Jacqu es D onzelot, 2004). She w orked as a scientific expert for the C ou ncil o f E urope's C om m ittee on Partnerships in the P revention o f C rim e and con tributed to its su bsequ ent p u blication A Partnership A pproach to C rim e P revention (2004). She w as d irector o f research at the M inistry o f the Interior funded Institut des H autes E tu d es d e la S e cu rite In te rieu re . S h e is a m e m b e r of the scien tific com m ittee o f the In tern atio n al C e n tre fo r the P rev en tio n o f C rim e and w o rk s w ith th e F re n ch F o ru m fo r U rb a n S afety .

x iv

Introduction

The preventive turn in Europe A d a m C r a w fo r d

For the past quarter of a century or so the grow th of public policies and im plem entation strategies advanced across diverse jurisdictions in the nam e of crim e prevention and com m unity safety has constituted one of the m ajor innovations in crim e control, with significant im plications for the m anner in which crim e and safety are governed. The ensuing 'preventive turn' has been variously described as representing a 'm ajor shift in paradigm ' (Tuck 1988), an 'epistem ological break' w ith the past (Garland 2000: 1) and 'a long-overdue recognition that the levers and causes of crim e lie far from the traditional reach of the crim inal justice system . . . afford[ing] the potential to encourage a stronger and more participatory civil society and challenge m any of the m odernist assum p­ tions about professional expertise, specialisation, state paternalism and m onopoly' (Crawford 1998: 4). Others have proclaim ed it as confirm ing the rise of 'risk' as an overarching governm ental narrative (O 'M alley 1992) or as ushering, and evidencing, a new era of 'netw orked governance' (Johnston and Shearing 2003). Despite these claim s, conceptions of preventive governance are by no m eans new. In Britain, Patrick Colquhoun (1797) and Edw in C hadw ick (1829), am ong others, advocated form s of crim e prevention through policing aimed at reducing opportun­ ities and tem ptations that resonate strikingly with contem porary trends. M ore broadly, classical liberal thought in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries prom oted the governance of future life choices on the basis of rational calculations of the relative balance betw een risk and reward that closely echoes the logic of m odern crim e prevention thinking, m ost notably its situational variant (Clarke 1995, 2000). N evertheless, 'preventive partnerships' have becom e a defining at­ tribute of contem porary crim e control and its interface with w ider social and urban policies in a w ay that is both novel and dem ands critical xv

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

contextual scrutiny. As Garland noted in his assessm ent of shifts in contem porary crim e control: O ver the past tw o decades . . . a w hole new infrastructure has been assem bled at the local level that addresses crim e and disorder in a quite different m anner . . . The new infrastructure is strongly oriented towards a set of objectives and priorities - prevention, security, harm -reduction, loss-reduction, fear-reduction - that are quite differ­ ent from the traditional goals of prosecution, punishm ent and 'crim inal justice'. (2001: 16-17) W hile Garland w as w riting exclusively about developm ents in the UK and USA, w hat is interesting (especially for the purposes of this book) is that novel infrastructures, technologies, m entalities and practices began to em erge, unfold and to be fashioned across different European countries from the late 1970s and early 1980s onwards. Saliently, as the contribu­ tions to this volum e testify, these developm ents took (and continue to take) different directions, trajectories and nuances, as they w ere influenced by divergent political contexts and socio-cultural traditions. W hile crim e prevention policies and practices have stim ulated a w ealth of com m entary and analysis (too extensive to elaborate here), there have been few system atic attem pts to reflect back on the varied journeys taken, the reasons that have inform ed particular developm ental pathw ays and their im plications, as well as possible future directions. Furtherm ore, while there have been som e valuable exceptions (Graham 1993; Graham and Bennett 1995; Craw ford 1998, 2002; Duprez and H ebberecht 2002; Hughes et al. 2002), m uch of the literature has tended to leave less space for analyses of the com parative differences and sim ilarities betw een diverse m odels of prevention and the different routes to im plem entation. By contrast to current policy deliberations, the early years o f the 'preventive turn' in the 1980s w ere m arked by a relatively stark debate concerning the m erits and attractions of contrasting European m odels of crim e prevention, its m anagem ent and delivery. From the outset these m odels w ere heavily influenced by political ideology and reflected different assum ptions about crim e, behavioural m otivations and appropri­ ate ways of organising regulatory responses. Sim ply put, while the British m odel becam e coupled with a situational approach that sought directly to involve the private sector (King 1991; Hope, see Chapter 2), the French m odel, exem plified by the Bonnem aison com m ission report published in 1982, cam e to be seen as the archetype of a social crim e prevention approach, w ith its em phasis on social inclusion and w elfare-based interventions. Betw een these polarities lay the more pragm atic approach of the D utch (and to a degree som e Scandinavian countries, notably Sw eden), who w ere recognised for their em phasis on the evaluation of new preventive interventions and a coherent strategic national focus.1 This xvi

The preventive turn in Europe

book traces the variable fortunes of these different m odels and reflects upon their im pact and the lessons learnt through im plem entation over the subsequent years. The m anner in w hich different m odels have been adopted and adapted in other European jurisdictions is a recurring theme. Collectively, the chapters in this book attem pt to take stock of, and interrogate, the nature, form and scope of contem porary crim e prevention policies in a com parative perspective. In other words, they seek to chart the m anner in which the general notion of a 'preventive turn' has found expression in, and been prom oted through, policy developm ents and practice within a num ber of different European jurisdictions. In so doing, the m etaphor of a journey, as yet incom plete, is deployed as a way of thinking about the developm ental trajectories and divergent paths taken. The book seeks to explore and address a num ber of allied questions: ITow has the 'preventive turn' in crim e control policies been im plem ented in various different countries, w ith w hat effects and w ith w hat im plications? To w hat extent has crim e prevention secured a prom inent place w ithin the governance of crim e and disorder? W hat are the m ajor trends influencing the direction of developm ent? W hat have been the relationships betw een, on the one hand, crim e prevention and com m unity safety and, on the other, crim inal justice and punitive responses, as against w ider social and urban policies? To w hat extent has prevention reoriented the focus of crim inal justice a n d /o r influenced the direction of social policy? In so doing, contributors to the book explore and assess the different m odels adopted and the shifting em phasis accorded to differing strategies over time. There are, how ever, inevitable lim itations in the approach adopted in this collection and reflected in the m anner in w hich the book is organised. By asking contributors to address a num ber of questions and them es with regard to a specific jurisdiction, there is an essential bias tow ards the nation-state and defined polities as the unit of analysis. W hile providing a rich understanding of national developm ents and experiences, as well as the role of politics and central governm ent policy initiatives therein, by necessity less space is accorded to consideration of local differences, the role of non-state actors and the nature of sub-national com parisons. C onsequently, given the approach assum ed here, there is an im plicit tendency to highlight and give greater priority to contrasts and com pari­ sons betw een nations and to governm ental program m es, legislation and policy statem ents. As highlighted in this collection (notably Chapter 3), national policies m ust them selves be im plem ented and enacted. In the process, they are frequently shaped, interpreted and translated in diverse ways, influenced often by local cultures and traditions as well as by political alliances and struggles. N ational policies are regularly reinterpreted, resisted and revised at the local level. As a result, the expectations of central governm ent in London, Paris or Brussels are m odified and given positive and concrete form in different local contexts. This reinforces xvii

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

the significance of not assum ing the effectiveness of central governm ent intentions or am bitions, notably those set dow n in legislation. In federal constitutions, such as Belgium and Germ any (Chapters 8 and 9), w here legislative authority is devolved to regional structures, this disjuncture is particularly evident. H ow ever, it is also apparent in other countries, notably those w ith traditions of strong regional (Italy, see Chapter 7) or local governm ent. As the British case exem plifies, the question of what constitutes a nation-state - especially in the light of the different m odels of devolved governm ent in Scotland, W ales (Chapters 3 and 4) and Northern Ireland - is itself a m oot subject. The constitutional arrangem ents, com bined with the role and am bitions of the central state in organising social life and providing public safety, m anifestly inform the com parative experiences of crim e prevention policies and infrastructures, particularly w ith regard to the relations betw een central and local political authorities. It is im portant not to ignore that m uch policy innovation em anates from local or regional levels, som e, but not all, of w hich m ay filter 'upw ards' or get appropriated by central governm ents. In addition, given the pivotal role of cities, towns and localities in the delivery and developm ent of crim e prevention and com m unity safety practices, it would be wrong to discount the significance of cross-national city-to-city and region-to-region netw orks, policy connections and lesson-learning. The w ork of the European Forum for U rban Safety is a good exam ple of city-to-city netw orks that transcend national boundaries and have been pivotal in the transfer and diffusion of policies across Europe. A further lim itation of the dom inant focus on national experiences is an understandable prioritisation of governm ental action in its diverse forms. W hat this tends to sideline, how ever, is not only the role of civil society institutions (which M argaret Shaw highlights in her contribution, see C hapter 11) but also the key role played by com m ercial interests and private businesses. This general overem phasis on governm ent action is a prevalent feature of the w ider crim inological literature. However, H ope in his contribution (Chapter 2) provides an im portant corrective to this, highlighting the interplay betw een governm ent action and the role of m arkets, the security industry and the citizenry. In this vein, a recent sum m ary of the preventive turn in the U K concludes: The story of the contem porary genesis and grow th of crim e preven­ tion is often written as if it was som ething imposed by governm ents upon the citizenry through program m es of 'responsibilisation' em anating outw ards from the centre - and evidenced by key policy initiatives. Yet, m uch of the credit should properly be attributed to sm all-scale, local and pragm atic developm ents w ithin civil society and the business sector. In reality, both crim inology and governm ent policy w ere relative late-com ers to a preventive w ay of thinking. (Crawford 2007: 900-1) x viii

The preventive turn in Europe

For exam ple, research has highlighted the role o f the insuran ce industry as 'ag en ts o f p rev ention' and its part in helping to spread actuarial logics and tech nologies o f p red iction as w ell as fostering netw orks w ith state agen cies that have been instrum en tal in the ascend ancy o f crim e preven­ tion (E ricson et al. 2003). In m any senses, it w as only follow ing the ad vent o f m ass con su m erism and the associated grow th in interest in securing property com bined w ith the steep rise in crim e risks (from the 1960s) that insurers w ere prom pted to narrow their risk pools and foster a preventive m en tality on the part o f insurers. T his goes som e w ay to explaining the relativ ely late d ev elop m ent o f prevention in relation to crim e risks as con trasted , for exam ple, w ith the field o f fire prevention (O 'M alley and H utchinson 2007). N everth eless, w hile the insuran ce ind ustry m ay have been relativ ely slow to recognise and use its potential pow er to influence beh av iou r w ith regard to crim e risks (Litton 1982), its su bsequ ent sw ay in stim ulatin g a 'p reventive m en tality' is undoubted. In the ensuing years, the insuran ce ind ustry has played a significant part in fostering p rev en­ tive thinking and action sim ultaneously through netw orks w ith the police and governm ent agen cies and via d iv erse form s o f insuran ce cov er w hich have served to p rom ote the spread and u se of certain situational m easures, notably form s o f target-hard ening. O ne o f the im plicit aim s o f this collection is to highlight and explore the extent to w hich there has been an internationalisation a n d /o r convergence o f key ideas, strategies, tech nologies and practices o f crim e prevention and com m u nity safety. In other w ord s, to w hat extent have policy ideas and practices travelled betw een different cou ntries? M oreover, have ideas developed in one place been replicated or em ulated in others? A nd, w here this is evid ent, to w hat extent and in w hat w ays have policies been ad apted, transform ed and given expression in the process o f policy transfer? W here transnational diffusion has occurred, how can w e explain the receptiveness w ithin particu lar polities (at specific m om ents in tim e) tow ards given ideas, m od els and technologies? To ad dress these question s, the book brings to gether a collection of leading international com m entators, m ost o f w hom have been intim ately involved in crim e p revention policy a n d /o r research in g crim e prevention practices ov er the past tw o decades. A con sid erable nu m ber have w orked eith er w ithin governm ent d ep artm ents or governm ent-based research institutes, inclu d ing Jaap D e W aard and Jan Van D ijk at the D utch M inistry o f Ju stice (the form er also subsequ ently w orked as head of the Secretariat o f the E uropean C rim e Preven tion N etw ork, w hile the latter w orked at the U nited N ations C en tre for International C rim e P revention); Tim H ope and M argaret Shaw at the H om e O ffice R esearch and P lanning U nit, as it w as kn ow n in the 1980s (and the latter subsequ ently at the International C entre for the P reven tion o f C rim e in M ontreal); K lara K erezsi at H u n gary 's N ational Institute o f C rim in ology; and A nne W yveken s at the French M inistry o f the In terior's Institut des H autes x ix

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Etudes de la Securite Interieure. O thers have established track records of researching and com m enting on the unfolding landscape of crim e prevention and com m unity safety. As such, they are all em inently well placed to reflect upon the nuances of jurisdiction-specific developm ental trajectories and the direction of change over the last quarter of a century, as well as to draw out the underlying influences that have shaped events and movem ents. The structure of the book is as follows. In the first chapter, Adam Crawford outlines a com parative fram e of analysis for thinking about jurisdiction-specific developm ents in Europe, by considering a num ber of cross-cutting them es, issues and dynam ics of change. In so doing, he highlights som e challenges and insights offered by a com parative analysis, as well as draw ing out areas of continuity and divergence in different national experiences. Particular attention is given to consider­ ation of the extent to w hich convergence and departure are evident and to explanations for these. The chapter seeks to highlight the influence of policy transfer and the diffusion of ideas and strategies w ithin and betw een nations. It questions the extent to which a com m on m odel or general direction of travel can be discerned and reflects upon future prospects. The subsequent nine chapters present country-specific accounts of crim e prevention policies and their developm ent in a num ber of selected E uropean jurisdictions. In each of these chapters, in addition to providing a descriptive overview of key events, initiatives and ideas, the authors specifically seek to explain and assess the paths taken and the factors influencing developm ents (both conceptual and institutional) as well as the infrastructures constructed for delivering crim e prevention policies. Im plicitly each chapter seeks to address a num ber of interrelated questions: W hat are the distinctive features of specific approaches to crim e prevention policies across Europe? How have these changed over time and w hat are the dom inant trajectories of developm ent? To w hat extent have crim e prevention policies been shaped by differences in institutional infrastructures, con stitu tional/leg al arrangem ents, political ideologies, econom ic perform ance, traditions of w elfare a n d /o r cultural sensibilities? H as policy diffusion influenced developm ent, and if so, how have policies been transform ed or reshaped in the process of transfer from one context to another? W hat lessons have been learnt over the years and w hat are the possible future directions within particular countries? This jurisdiction-specific section begins with three chapters that focus on different aspects of the British experience. In Chapter 2, Tim Hope explores the evolution of situational prevention as a 'particularly English' contribution to crim e prevention technologies and practices. In so doing, he provides a situated understanding of how and w hy situational prevention, since the late 1970s, found a particularly favourable reception in parts of Britain. In assessing the im pact of situational crim e prevention xx

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in relation to the significant reduction in the num ber of property offences com m itted since the mid 1990s, H ope highlights the different m odes of regulation and w ays by w hich governm ental strategies have worked through, and been constrained by, local authorities, the private sector (notably car m anufacturers and the security industry) and private citizens. Im portantly, he highlights both the lim itations of the direct role of central governm ent and local authorities and the pivotal influence of shifts in housing tenure (through the expansion of ow ner occupation), develop­ m ents in the security m arket and the built environm ent, as well as the increased privatised dem and for personal security. H ope's analysis underscores the im portant role of the m arket, as well as private and collective initiatives. As such, it serves as a corrective to the usual (dom inant) focus on public policy delivered directly through central governm ent. W hile situational prevention appears to have had a signifi­ cant im pact on levels of property crim e, it also has served to exacerbate inequalities of security provision and potentially heighten dem ands for personal, dom estic and parochial security. As such, the 'peculiarly British' (or should that be English?) experience, in which situational approaches have dom inated im plem entation, m ay either (or both) offer a w arning to, or act as a source of inspiration for, other European countries. It is clear from subsequent chapters (see particularly Chapters 5 and 8) that parts of mainland Europe have keenly felt the influence of the British approach to situational crim e prevention. By contrast, in Chapter 3 G ordon H ughes and A dam Edw ards focus on the fortunes of developm ents elsew here in the crim e prevention field, nam ely the evolving contours of 'com m unity safety' as a capacious referent for diverse preventive approaches and in the nam e of which an elaborate infrastructure of local partnerships has been constructed. They outline the m anner in which com m unity safety emerged in England and W ales as an alternative to the police-dom inated, technologically-driven and situationally-oriented approaches that prevailed throughout m uch of the 1980s and 1990s in Britain. They go on to assess critically five different narratives of com m unity safety, notably w ith regard to its relation with w ider social and crim inal justice policies and institutional practices. They advance a 'pow er-dependence' fram ew ork that is sensitive to the uneven distribution of resources, the contested nature of political pow er and the im portance of local traditions and cultures - w hat they refer to as local 'geo-historical contexts'. From this perspective, they highlight a plurality of outcom es and (constrained) spaces for ways of governing crim e under the um brella of com m unity safety that are not tram m elled by the prevailing neo-liberal or m oral authoritarian dogm a, so evident in much central governm ent policy in England and (to a lesser degree according to their analysis) W ales. They underscore the local and regional differences that prevail both w ithin and betw een England and W ales. Significantly, they alert us to the im portance of com parative studies w ithin national xxi

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ju risd iction s in ord er to h igh ligh t the contested natu re o f im plem entation and the scope for political struggles over the d irection and substance of gov ernm ental program m es. This them e o f differences and sim ilarities w ithin parts o f the U K is further explored in C h apter 4. H ere, A listair H enry consid ers the p articular experiences of, and paths taken by, Scotland in the im plem en­ tation o f crim e prevention and com m u nity safety in both the preand post-d evolu tion periods. H e con trasts d irectly the Scottish experience w ith the prev ailing ap proach in England and W ales. In this respect, the Scottish tale is one o f con vergence and divergen ce, both at different tim es and in d ifferent policy d om ains that im press upon crim e prevention and com m u nity safety. W hereas in the 1980s and 1990s Scotland sou ght to d ifferentiate its polity, as far as possible w ithin the con stitutional fram ew ork available, from the neo-liberal influences of T hatcherism , the last d ecad e or so u n d er a N ew L abou r governm ent saw significant policy em u lation and harm onisation d espite the establish m ent of an ind ependent Scottish P arliam ent in 1999 w ith full com p etency for crim inal ju stice and p olicing m atters. O ne exam ple o f this im portation o f ideas and policies from England and W ales has been in regard to the anti-social b ehaviou r agenda, although its im plem entation and action on the ground has taken a m uch m ore m uted form (Tisdall 2006). In other areas, such as youth ju stice, the d istin ctiv en ess o f the Scottish ap p roach - as com pared w ith that south o f the bord er - has rem ained m arked , although perv ersely the p ost-d evolu tionary period also saw con sid erable con vergence in this dom ain. A s H enry d em onstrates, due to com plex historical, con stitutional and cultural reasons, Scotland shares certain sim ilarities w ith continental E uropean approaches to youth and urban policies, w here a legacy of w elfarism and social inclusion are evident. H ence, as elsew here in m ainland Europe, crim e prevention and com m u nity safety have oscillated in an aw kw ard space betw een crim inal ju stice and s o c ia l/u rb a n policy, but one w hich, as d istin ct from the English experience, has seen com m u nity safety m ore com fortably em bed ded w ithin a w ider patchw ork o f social ju stice strategies rather than as an ap p end age to crim e control. C ollectively, the three U K -focused chapters highlight the extent to w hich a p articular m odel o f crim e prevention has beco m e associated , particularly in the early years, w ith a situ ationally-oriented ap proach in Britain, albeit w ith a caution as to the un even im plem entation and reception of situational practices and the d angers o f overgeneralisations from that prem ise. C h apter 5, by A nne W yveken s, provides an accoun t o f the ev olv ing ebb and flow o f French d evelopm ents, from its confid ent B onnem aison origins to its p resent-d ay hesitan cy and uncertain future. The social prevention m odel advanced by B onnem aison, as W yveken s show s, w as rooted in the left-w ing politics o f the then Socialist governm ent. It establish ed a m odel o f prevention organised around its defining con cepts o f 'solid arity ', x x ii

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'integratio n ' and 'lo cality ', w hich foreground ed the role o f the m ayor and local m u nicipality and in w hich the police and ju d iciary rem ained m arginal. This w as part o f its appeal, but as W yv eken s high ligh ts it also lim ited its im pact, as it becam e dissipated w ithin w ider urban policy over the years and the ju diciary initiated their ow n interventions. M oreover, she notes the parad ox that, having establish ed city-level partnership structures to d eliv er prevention locally, the centralised n atu re o f the French state served repeated ly to un d erm ine their realisation by u n d er­ scoring the lack o f shared com petences betw een state and m u nicipality. W yvekens high ligh ts the m an ner in w hich political fortun es have fostered a greater appetite for situ ational ap proaches, w hich had developed in m ore recent years, as w ell as m ore pu nitive responses. Yet, d espite the close association betw een social p revention and the p olitical Left, the prevention land scape in France has becom e m ore m ixed: both social and situ ational approaches coexist w ithin program m es and local practices m anaged b y Left and Right ad m inistrations. C h apter 6 p rovides an in sid er's account o f D utch d evelopm ents. Jan V an D ijk and Jaap D e W aard outline the p articularly pragm atic and eclectic approach taken by the D utch in their com bination o f situational and social prevention, as w ell as technological and hum an (people-based) interventions. This ap p roach w as initially expressed in the w ork o f the R oethof C om m ittee and the resultant Society and Crim e w hite paper pu blished in 1985. A central them e w ithin the su bsequ ent new w ave of crim e prevention in itiatives focused on strength en in g sem i-form al social con trol and hu m an surv eillance in public and sem i-p ublic urban spaces. The best kn ow n exam ple has been the 'city gu ard s' (Stadsw achten) initiative, w hich su bsequ ently influenced d evelopm ents in o ther countries inclu d ing the UK (Craw ford 2006). As well as an em ph asis on offenderoriented projects, the D utch also im plem ented significant victim -focu sed schem es. In ad dition to high-profile social p revention and youth diversion schem es such as H A LT, the D u tch pu t significant energies into p u b licprivate partnerships betw een governm ent d ep artm ents and the business sector, often w ith a short-term situ ational focus. O ver tim e, the initial, cen tral top-d ow n strategy has been replaced b y greater auton om y on the part o f local m unicipalities. V an D ijk and D e W aard note that the strategy for im plem enting crim e p revention in the N eth erlan ds is relatively un iqu e in its relian ce on non-statutory collaboration structures. The effectiveness o f the local p artn ersh ips has been facilitated by a corporatist tradition of reg u lar co-ordination m eetings b etw een key local partners, notably m ayors, chiefs of police and ch ief prosecu tors. T h e bu siness sector has been d raw n into this fram ew ork w ith reasonable ease. V an D ijk and De W aard situ ate this exp erience in the D utch cu ltural trad ition o f the P older (as expressed in the title of their chapter), w hich allu des to a practice of pragm atic con sensu s d ecision-m aking in econom ic and public life. R ather than reflecting 'to leran ce', they contest, the D utch approach is m arked by x x iii

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a pragm atism that is rooted m ore in id entifying and evalu atin g 'w hat w orks' and d raw ing on an eclectic array o f p reventive techniques, than in startin g from any fixed ideological prem ise. This, they conclud e, has p rovided the b asis not only for significant exp erim en tation and lessonlearning, but also facilitated a con sid erable d egree o f successfu l im p le­ m entation o f crim e prevention strategies and partn ersh ip infrastructures. H ow ever, given that the D u tch experience is rooted in a particu lar cultural tradition, they w arn that its best p ractice lessons m ay be less easily transferred to other countries. In C h apter 7, D ario M elossi and R ossella Selm ini offer an accoun t of d ev elopm ents in Italy w hich they situ ate w ithin a broad er canvas o f the em ergence and d evelopm ent o f the 'n ew ' crim e p revention in Europe m ore generally. T h ey trace the gen esis o f a p reoccu pation w ith extra-p en al and local crim e prevention to the transform ations w rou ght b y the onset o f w hat C. W right M ills term ed 'm ass society'. A s a result o f the spread o f consu m erism , they argue, the w orking classes, the new -found ow ners o f com m od ities, becam e m ore anxiou s and insecure d ue to their potential to be victim s o f (property) crim e. P revention becam e another w ay of reconstitu ting a sym bolic com m u nity in con trast to the d ev iant 'oth er', w ho becam e less the political antagonist and m ore the m arginalised but 'com m on ' pred atory offender. It also reflected a n arrow in g o f discou rse from p olitical relations o f citizens w ith the nation state to the m icro ­ m an agem en t o f local, m u nd ane, ev eryd ay life and rou tine aspects of 'o rd inary ' street crim e. The chap ter locates the regional focu s o f d ev elop ­ m ents in Italy in the con text of the d om inant p revailing m od els o f crim e prevention w ithin Europe. It high ligh ts the influence that French and British m od els o f crim e prevention v ariou sly exerted on Italian d ev elo p ­ m ents, p rod ucing a m ixed m odel. D raw ing on Italian research findings into the im plem entation o f crim e prevention strategies, M elossi and Selm ini d iscern a m u tation in traditional social crim e prevention. They o utline a shift aw ay from the focu s o f social prevention on ad dressing structural factors that m ight influence offender m otivation and tow ards quality of life and environm en tal concerns, v ictim protection and public reassu rance, as w ell as social prevention increasing ly serving as an au xiliary to situ ational crim e prevention. T h ey also highlight the em erging alliance betw een situ ational and d evelopm ental approaches. They con­ clu de that the Italian exp erience reflects a w ider them e of convergence across Europe w ith regard to crim e prevention policies. T his is esp ecially n otable in the light o f recent national reform s that have underm ined the d istin ctly regional focus o f Italian d ev elopm ents by cen tralisin g greater authority. This them e - the m an ner in w hich specific ju risd iction s are influenced b y prevailing m od els o f crim e prevention in other E uropean cou ntries is also evid ent in P atrick H ebb erech t's analysis o f B elgian crim e p rev en­ tion policy. C h apter 8 presents a fascinating case o f a federal cou ntry x x iv

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(since 1988) in which crim e prevention policies have been shaped both by the political m ake-up of governing alliances betw een the established parties and the linguistic and cultural traditions of the different regions notably the French-speaking W alloon and Brussels regions on the one hand, and on the other the Flem ish region - w hich together constitute Belgium . The rather unusual constitutional fram ew ork w hereby alm ost all political institutions are split into two independent Flem ish and Frenchspeaking versions of the sam e, has provided interesting conduits for policy transfer and em ulation. In essence, Belgium has seen various waves of policy influence in ways that have som etim es belied traditional political associations with policies betw een the political Left and Right (as outlined in the French experience, for exam ple, see Chapter 5). W hile the A nglo-Saxon m odel of situational prevention exerted an influence and served as a model for em ulation via Dutch developm ents in Flem ish­ speaking parts of the country, the French-speaking regions m ore readily drew on ideas, policies and practices advanced by their French cousins. Consequently, the local im plem entation of national strategies has taken on very different expressions and form s in different parts of the country. Despite this uneven im plem entation, H ebberecht detects a significant drift over tim e towards m ore authoritarian and neo-liberal influenced policies as investm ents in w elfare and social inclusion have waned. In Chapter 9 M ichael Jasch presents an overview of the experiences from G erm any, a federal jurisdiction which like Belgium has a 'patchy picture' o f crim e prevention policies. The Germ an story has certain very specific factors that have propelled and shaped developm ents. Reunifica­ tion, for exam ple, significantly affected perceptions of insecurity within G erm any and subsequent crim e prevention strategies. D espite the un­ evenness of practices across G erm any, Jasch draw s out som e of the dom inant trends over the last 30 years, including a m ove towards localisation and the reallocation of responsibilities, neither of which seem s to have been fully realised. He highlights the m anner in w hich prevention policy appears to have travelled in a full circle: from a repressive approach to crim e through technical and situational prevention in the 1970s to a notion of social prevention in the 1980s, com m unity strategies in the 1990s and back to a predom inance of repressive techniques in recent years. Like H ebberecht, Jasch detects a decline in the role of social policies as a vehicle for prevention and suggests that much prevention policy has suffered from w eak im plem entation, often due to lack of resources. It is largely in the fields of policing and surveillance that prevention has been most effectively developed, notably through form s of preventive detention and personal data collection. H ow ever, Jasch also points to the em erging influence of early intervention program m es targeting 'at risk' fam ilies and young people. A different and m ore recent 'preventive turn' is highlighted by the experience of H ungary as outlined by Klara Kerezsi in Chapter 10. In xxv

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com m on w ith other form er Soviet-bloc countries, crim e prevention policies have been closely tied with the process of political transition. The com bined challenges of rising crim e rates, falling perceptions of public safety and the need to transform the crim inal justice system in a more dem ocratic and open society have shaped the H ungarian experience. As K erezsi dem onstrates, the early process and direction of crim inal justice reform w ere dom inated by the requirem ents of so-called 'Europeanisa­ tion'. D espite m uch governm ental activity and the establishm ent of a N ational Council of Crim e Prevention and the subsequent publication of a national strategy, the continuously changing organisational structure left little clarity in terms of crim e prevention definitions and responsibilities. The objectives of crim e prevention practice appear to have been in a constant state of flux. Tensions betw een the roles of the M inistry of Justice and M inistry of the Interior served to exacerbate this. Furtherm ore, despite the appeals to m ore localised provision the strategy has predom i­ nantly been a top-dow n approach. Kerezsi highlights the fact that although the crim e prevention strategy was oriented around the interface betw een crim inal and social policies, in practice H ungary has seen an apparent proliferation of situational crim e prevention m ethods. Despite the seem ing lack of progress in, and resources dedicated to, em bedding form s of prevention that address the social causes of crim e and vulner­ ability and prom ote social cohesion, Kerezsi concludes that the aim s of crim e prevention rem ain both laudable and vital. In the final chapter, M argaret Shaw offers a view from outside Europe. She considers the im plications and relevance of European m odels of crim e prevention and com m unity safety for developing and third world countries, in w hich poverty and crim e are endem ic. From the favelas of Rio and the tow nships of the Cape Flats, the param eters o f and resources associated with crim e prevention take on very different m eanings and possibilities. In situations w here the state is weak, absent a n d /o r unw elcom e, safety and security are differently conceived. Local know l­ edge, capacity and resources take on a greater salience. So too, the role of institutions w ithin civil society becom es crucial in realising genuinely bottom -up problem -solving that engages w ith key actors and agencies. In this light, Shaw highlights the central im portance of context in thinking about, im agining and doing crim e prevention. She advances a broad concept of crim e prevention that engages with urban safety via diverse routes of com m unity organisation, public health, urban regeneration and inclusive notions of hum an security. O ne advantage of such an approach may be to rem ove crim e from the political agenda, to restrain the focus on policing and to de-centre crim inology's narrow preoccupations. Collectively, the chapters highlight patterns of convergence and diver­ gence in the developm ent of crim e prevention policies and practices across (and within) different countries. They illustrate differing routes of travel, lesson-learning and institution-building in the nam e of crim e xxvi

T h e preven tive tu rn in E uro p e

p re v e n tio n an d c o m m u n ity sa fe ty . In s o m e se n se s , th e v a rio u s in itia tiv e s in p o lic y fo rm a tio n an d im p le m e n ta tio n o u tlin e d h a v e d ra m a tic a lly re o rie n te d th e la n d sc a p e a c ro ss w h ic h c rim e is g o v e rn e d w ith in lo ca litie s, a n d th e m a n n e r in w h ic h th is is d o n e , as w e ll a s re fig u re d re la tio n s b e tw e e n lo ca l a u th o ritie s a n d n a tio n a l g o v e rn m e n ts an d b e tw e e n c itiz e n s a n d th e sta te . In o th e r w a y s, h o w e v e r, th e d iv e rs e re fo rm p ro g ra m m e s h a v e fa lle n s h o rt o f th e lo fty a m b itio n s th a t m a n y c o m m e n ta to rs held o u t fo r th e m o d e rn 'p r e v e n tiv e ' tu rn . In s u m , th is c o lle ctio n a llo w s a tim e ly re fle ctio n on p ro g re ss m a d e and p ro s p e c ts fo r th e fu tu re , an d , in so d o in g , e v o k e s a jo u r n e y as y e t in c o m p le te .

N o te 1 N otably, Sweden was the first country to establish a National Crim e Prevention Council in 1974 to prom ote and co-ordinate crim e prevention initiatives.

R e fe re n c e s Chadwick, E. (1829) 'A Preventive Police', The London Review, 1: 252-308. Clarke, R. V. (1995) 'Situational Crim e Prevention', Crime and Justice, 19: 91-150. Clarke, R. V. (2000) 'Situational Prevention, Crim inology and Social Values', in A. Von Hirsch, D. Garland and A. W akefield (eds) Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 97-112. Colquhoun, P. (1797) A Treatise on the Police o f the M etropolis. London: H. Fry. Crawford, A. (1998) 'Com m unity Safety Partnerships', Criminal Justice M atters, 33: 4 -5. Crawford, A. (ed.) (2002) Crime and Insecurity: The Governance o f Safety in Europe. Cullompton: W illan Publishing. Crawford, A. (2006) 'Fixing Broken Promises?: Neighbourhood W ardens and Social Capital', Urban Studies, 4 3(5/6): 957-76. Crawford, A. (2007) 'Crim e Prevention and Com m unity Safety', in M. M aguire, R. M organ and R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook o f Criminology, 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 866-909. Duprez, D. and H ebberecht, P. (eds) (2002) The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe. Brussels: VUB Press. Ericson, R., Doyle, A. and Barry, D. (2003) Insurance as Governance. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Garland, D. (2000) 'Ideas, Institutions and Situational Crim e Prevention', in A. Von Hirsch, D. Garland and A. W akefield (eds) Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 1-16. Garland, D. (2001) The Culture o f Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Graham, J. (1993) 'Crim e Prevention Policies in Europe', European Journal o f Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 1(2): 126-42. Graham, J. and Bennett, T. (1995) Crime Prevention Strategies in Europe and North America. Helsinki: HEUNI. x x v ii

C r im e P re v e n tio n Policie s in C o m p a ra tiv e P ersp ective

Hughes, G., M cLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (eds) (2002) Crim e Prevention and Community Safety: New Directions. London: Sage. Johnston, L. and Shearing, C. (2003) Governing Security. London: Routledge. King, M. (1991) 'The Political Construction of Crim e Prevention', in K. Stenson and D. Cowell (eds) The Politics o f Crime Control. London: Sage, pp. 87-108. Litton, R. A. (1982) 'Crim e Prevention and Insurance', Hozvard Journal, 21: 6-22. O'M alley, P. (1992) 'Risk, Power and Crim e Prevention', Economy and Society, 21(3): 252-75. O'M alley, P. and Hutchinson, S. (2007) 'Reinventing Prevention: W hy did "C rim e Prevention" Develop so Late?', British Journal o f Criminology, 47: 373-89. Tisdall, E. K. M. (2006) 'Anti-Social Behaviour Legislation meets Children's Services: Challenging Perspectives on Children, Parents and State', Critical Social Policy, 26(1): 101-20. Tuck, M. (1988) Crime Prevention: A Shift in Concept, Home Office Research and Planning Unit Research Bulletin, No. 24. London: Home Office.

x x v iii

C h a p te r I

Situating crim e prevention policies in com parative perspective: policy travels, transfer and translation Adam Craivford

The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, it is intended to raise certain com parative questions and highlight challenges of com parison in order to inform and fram e the subsequent country-specific accounts and trajecto­ ries of developm ent that follow in later chapters. It poses the question, how m ight we understand com parative differences and sim ilarities betw een jurisdictions? In this light, connections will be m ade with the em erging literature on com parative penal policies. Second, the chapter explores the conceptual param eters of policy convergence and divergence with regard to crim e prevention. Im plicitly, it poses and responds to the question, is there a com m on European direction of travel evidenced by the jurisdiction-specific journeys? In so doing, it explores the extent to which particular crim e prevention-related policy 'ideas' m ay have been the subject of diffusion across Europe in recent years. Finally, it considers the extent to w hich the different experiences of the countries outlined in this collection corroborate or counter a num ber of dom inant assertions that abound within the literature about the origins, nature and im plications of the 'preventive turn'. Throughout, in reference to crim e prevention policies, the focus deliberately seeks to include both strategies and structures: the content of policies and the m echanism s elaborated for their delivery.

I

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

C o m p a rin g c rim e p re v e n tio n policies W hat becom es clear from the collection of chapters in this volum e is that som e notion of crim e prevention (re-)em erged in the last third of the twentieth century in diverse European countries, albeit at different m om ents in time, in direct response to specific stim uli and events, and follow ing som ew hat contrasting trajectories. H ow ever, at the evident risk of overgeneralisation, w e can highlight the confluence of a num ber of sim ilar factors and im pulses that inter alia propelled and inform ed developm ents. These include: • Public concerns over increased crim e and the fear of crim e, prom pted by greater ow nership of com m odities vulnerable to theft and propertyderived incentives to security. • Grow ing acknow ledgem ent of the lim ited capacity of form al institu­ tions of crim inal justice adequately to reduce crim e and effect change in crim inal behaviour, spurred by a recognition that the levers of crim e lie beyond the reach of form al institutions of control. • Concern that m any of the traditional bonds of inform al social control that operate through fam ilies, kinship ties, com m unities, voluntary associations and other social netw orks - m ay be fragm enting and weakening. • A decline in the attachm ents by liberal elites to social welfare-based responses to offending as captured in the 'rehabilitative ideal' and the concom itant rise in im portance attributed to the role of victim s of crim e within public policy. • A political desire to explore alternative m eans of m anaging crim e that avoid the econom ic, social and human costs associated with over­ reliance on traditional punitive - 'law and order' - responses. The turn to prevention, therefore, can be seen as having em erged as an adaptation to both perceived changes in social conditions - m ass consum erism , grow ing individualisation, high crim e rates as 'a norm al social fact' (Garland 2001), a culture of insecurity and the politicisation of d isorder - and the acknowledged failings of the form al apparatus of crim inal and penal justice, given its m arginal role in regulating crim inal acts (m ost of w hich never com e to official attention) and its shaky assum ptions about offenders and changing offending behaviour. Brantingham and Faust's (1976) conceptual distinction, draw n from the healthcare analogy, betw een prim ary, secondary and tertiary prevention is useful in highlighting the broad shifts in contem porary understandings of prevention over recent times. They differentiate betw een prim ary 2

Situating crime prevention policies in comparative perspective

prevention, directed at general populations to address potentially crim ogenic factors before the onset of problem s; secondary prevention, targeted at potential offenders who express or are identified by some predispositional risk factor; and tertiary prevention strategies that respond to know n offenders in order to reduce further crim es or the harm associated w ith them. Van Dijk and De W aard (1991; and see Chapter 6) add a second dim ension to this typology by differentiating betw een three targets of preventive interventions - offenders, victim s and situations - to produce a ninefold categorisation. The assum ption is that different types of m easures will produce distinct benefits w here aimed separately at preventing people from offending (often referred to as social prevention) or preventing victim isation (frequently conceived as safety advice or victim assistance), as against preventing crim e opportunities in particular places (often referred to as situational prevention) and that these m ay be directed at the general population, at risk groups or places and those known offenders, victim s and crim e hot spots. These categorisations rem ind us that prevention was not invented in the late twentieth century; rather it has been reconfigured and reconcep­ tualised, previously having been disaggregated and contained within certain dom ains. Thus, prim ary prevention, w here it existed, had been the stuff of social policy, but was rarely articulated or nam ed as such. State-provided education, health, social housing and w elfare, for exam ple, for the most part w ere not justified in terms of their potential crim e prevention effects, but rather in term s of their m ore direct and prim ary goals of an educated and productive citizenry, a healthy population, affordable housing and social security. It is only latterly that these have com e to be view ed, and in som e instances justified, by their ancillary crim e preventive im plications. Secondary prevention tended to be sidelined, given the dom inant em phasis on universal social provisions. W here program m es were targeted (via m eans testing, m ore often than not) these tended to see crim ogenic ends subsum ed within w elfarist notions of poverty prevention and alleviation. Tertiary prevention, by contrast, was the stuff of crim inal justice, constituting an elaborate infrastructure designed to respond to crim e (after the event) w ith only a lim ited w ider prim ary prevention role by w ay o f its residual deterrent effects. Thus, institutional and state bureaucratic structures tended to determ ine the language and location of w hat w e now have com e to define as crim e prevention and com m unity safety. A large part of the story about the 'preventive turn' is a tale of institutional reconfiguration w ithin and betw een policy dom ains and am ong relations betw een (and responsibili­ ties of) the state, m arket and citizenry. As a distinct policy dom ain, crim e prevention and its siblings, 'com m u­ nity safety' and 'urban security', em erged in an awkw ard policy void betw een crim inal justice on the one hand, and social and urban policy on the other. In continental Europe, 'prevention' is com m only contrasted 3

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

w ith 'rep ression '. It therefore m ight be instructive, in con sid erin g com ­ parative crim e prevention, first to assess the insights offered by contrasts in penal policies. Before d oing so, it is w orth noting that ju st as crim inal ju stice policies have changed and been red raw n in the last 30 years, so too social p olicy has been transform ed . In d ifferent w ays and to a greater or lesser extent in different cou ntries, w e have seen m ore targeting of resources (on the basis o f som e notion o f identified need or risk) and increased conditionality. O ne thing that changed w ith the arrival o f the p rev ailing w ind s of n eo-liberalism - propelled by the gu lf-stream o f globalisation - w as that social w elfarism itself becam e increasingly discredited as the o rganising g ov ernm ental narrative and raison d'etre fo r social policy. N ot only w as red istributive social w elfare costly to large section s o f the p opu lation in m any cou ntries, w ho saw little d irect benefits and w arm ed to the politics o f tax cuts, it also cam e to be seen as un d u ly p aternalistic, overly interventionist, dom inated b y self-serving professional elites and p rem ­ ised on m isplaced assu m ptions about hum an m otivation and agen cy (Le G rand 2003). M arqu an d 's ev ocative caricature o f Fabian social policy captures well this shifting logic: C ivil society w as seen, all too often, not as an agen t but as a patient: an inert body, lying on an operating table, u n d ergoin g social d em ocratic surgery. The surgeons acted for the best, o f course, but they acted on the patient from w ithout; the patient m erely received their m inistrations. But in reality, o f course, gov ernm ents cannot b eh av e like surgeons. H ere, at any rate, H ayek w as right. It is not p ossible to re-m ak e society in accord ance w ith a grand d esign, since no con ceivable grand design can do ju stice to the com plexity and reflexivity o f hum an behaviou r. N or is civil society m u ch like a p a tie n t. . . Instead o f lying p assively on the operating table, it insisted on arguing w ith the surgeon, or at least trying to do so. (1999: 17) W hat is m ore, policies of social w elfare w ere argued to be, them selves, crim ogenic in fostering a 'culture o f d ep en d en cy ' and loosening bond s of m oral restraint (M urray 1990). From this perspective, social w elfarism is envisaged as the antithesis o f enterprise, auton om y, responsibility and freedom . For som e, social p olicy cam e to be seen as part o f the problem o f crim e and d isord er rather than as con tribu ting to the preventive solution.

C o m p a r a tiv e p en al policies A nalysin g the com p arativ e fortunes o f penal policies in variou s ju risd ic­ tions m ight tell us som ething about both (i) the relative place o f crim e 4

Situating crime prevention policies in comparative perspective

prevention w ithin different polities and (ii) how to draw com parisons sim ilarities and differences - betw een the experiences of assorted Euro­ pean countries. Cavadino and D ignan's (2006a, 2006b) recent analysis of im prisonm ent rates, youth justice arrangem ents and privatisation policies in 12 w estern jurisdictions provides a useful reference point. Drawing upon the w ork of Esping-A ndersen (1990), they outline a fourfold typology of crim inal justice system s, situated w ithin different kinds of political econom y: the neo-liberal, conservative corporatist, oriental corporatist and social dem ocratic. These four 'fam ily groups' are differentiated with regard to a range of criteria including their form of econom ic and w elfare state organisation, extent of incom e and status differentials, degree of protection afforded to social rights, political orientation, and scale of social inclusivity. For the purpose of a European analysis, only three of these typologies are relevant, as the oriental corporatist model seeks to explain the case of Japan (and hence will not detain us here). W hile neo-liberal political econom ies (including England and W ales) are m arked by the free m arket and m inim al w elfare state provisions, as well as extrem e incom e differentials, conserva­ tive corporatist societies (including the N etherlands, France, Germ any and Italy) feature com prehensive, m oderately generous, but non-egalitarian w elfare states, w hich reflect pronounced, but not extrem e incom e differen­ tials (Cavadino and Dignan 2006b: 441). By contrast, social dem ocratic regim es (notably Sw eden and Finland) are m arked by m ore universalistic, generous w elfare system s and exhibit relatively lim ited incom e differen­ tials. These 'fam ily traits', they suggest, appear to be associated w ith som e striking and enduring differences in term s of penal policies, notably rates of im prisonm ent (see Table 1.1). A ccording to Table 1.1, with only one exception (the N etherlands), all the neo-liberal countries have higher rates of incarceration than all the conservative corporatist regim es. M ost strikingly, the N ordic social dem ocracies, with the addition of the single oriental corporatist country (Japan), have the low est im prisonm ent rate of all. Furtherm ore, the social dem ocratic system s of the N ordic countries have succeeded in sustaining relatively hum ane and m oderate penal policies in the period during which som e of the neo-liberal countries - notably the United States and to a lesser extent Britain - have been m oving in the direction of punitive and exclusionary policies of m ass incarceration. Furtherm ore, C avadino and Dignan suggest that as a society m oves in the direction of neo-liberalism , its punishm ent tends to becom e harsher. The m ost dram atic exam ple of this is the N etherlands, w here the im prisonm ent rate rose exponentially betw een 1975 and 2006, from 17 to 128 prisoners per 100,000 population. This is a useful starting point, for our purposes, as it alerts us to the im portance of differences, despite globalising pressures, in the form of variations of political econom y, and also highlights sites of continuity, nam ely the connection betw een neo-liberal influences and apparent punitiveness. 5

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

Table 1.1

Political economy and im prisonm ent rates per 100,000 population

Political economy

Imprisonment rate 2005/06

Neo-liberal USA South Africa N ew Zealand

736 335 186

England and Wales

148

Australia

126

Conservative corporatist Netherlands Italy Germany France

128 104 95 85

Social democratic Sw eden Finland

82 75

Oriental corporatist Japan

62

Source: Walmsley (2007) cited in Dignan and Cavadino (2007: 53) Note: Countries in bold are represented in this volume.

H ow ever, the schem a provided b y C avad in o and D ignan offers less by w ay of explanation as to precisely how the variables they identify coalesce to produce particular fam ily resem blances at the level o f punishm ent. It takes a rather narrow interpretation of penal severity, by focusing on 'im prisonm ent rates', and affords less space for shifts over tim e as well as the role of historic institutional, constitutional and cultural factors. For our purposes, given our focus on Europe, the typology m asks extensive in-group differences, som e of w hich are con sid erably greater than those betw een groups. T h e m ost obviou s o f these is evid ent w ithin the neo-liberal fam ily, w here the con trasts in im p risonm ent rates betw een the U SA and England, for exam ple, are rad ically different, m u ch m ore so than betw een England and the N etherlands. In m any sen ses, A m erican exception alism represents som ething o f an ou tlier w ith im p risonm ent rates on a fundam entally d ifferent scale from other 'n eo -liberal' cou ntries, such as England and A ustralia, w hich are m u ch closer to 'conservativ e corp oratist' cou ntries in this regard. T his w ide variation in ind icators o f penal severity raises questions abou t the exp lanatory v alu e o f 'n eo -liberalism ' as a coherent o verarching reg im e type. Fu rtherm ore, if w e stick w ith im prisonm ent rates for a m om ent and focus on a b road er pool o f E uropean cou ntries, a m ore m u d died pictu re em erges. 6

Situating c rim e p rev en tio n policies in co m p arative p ersp ective

Table 1.2 Imprisonment rates across Europe per 100,000 population (EU plus EFT A countries) Country Latvia Estonia Lithuania Poland Czech Republic Spain Luxembourg Scotland England and Wales Hungary Slovakia Romania Greece Portugal Netherlands Austria Malta Belgium Germany Northern Ireland France Italy Cyrus Ireland Switzerland Sweden Norway Slovenia Denmark Finland Iceland

Im prisonm ent rate 2007/08 288 259 234 222 182 159 155 155 153 149 148 124 109 103 100 95 95 93 89 87 85 83 83 76 76 74 69 66 63 63 44

Source: International Centre for Prison Studies World Prison Brief 2008 Note: Countries in bold are represented in this volume.

T h e A n g lo -S a x o n ju ris d ic tio n s o f th e B ritis h Isle s - g iv e n th e ir a s so c i­ a tio n w ith n e o -lib e ra lism and th e ir a ffin ity w ith A m e rica n -in flu e n ce d p e n a l p o lic y - n o lo n g e r stan d o u t a s s ig n ific a n tly d iffe re n t fro m o th e r E u ro p e a n c o u n trie s (a lb e it still w ith s o m e o f th e h ig h e st ra te s in E u ro p e ). A c c o rd in g to m o re re c e n t d ata fro m th e In te rn a tio n a l C e n tr e fo r P riso n S tu d ie s (see T a b le 1.2), E n g la n d an d W a le s im p ris o n fe w e r p e o p le p e r 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 th a n a n u m b e r o f fo rm e r S o v ie t-b lo c E a ste rn E u ro p e a n co u n trie s, in c lu d in g th e B a ltic n a tio n s , P o la n d an d th e C z e c h R e p u b lic , an d sits in 7

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

am ong a group that incorporates Spain, Luxem bourg and Hungary. Scotland with its w elfarist traditions and distinct legal culture (see C hapter 4), has sim ilar rates of im prisonm ent to England and Wales. N orthern Ireland, with its evident sim ilarities to m ainland UK, neverthe­ less has im prisonm ent rates that parallel those of Belgium , Germ any, France and Italy. That said, the social dem ocratic Scandinavian countries still stand out for their low levels of im prisonm ent. N icola Lacey (2008) has argued that C avadino and D ignan's typology accords less appreciation to the role of the labour m arket and the econom y in both shaping penal and exclusionary responses and fostering social inclusion. In an attem pt to put further explanatory flesh on their fram ew ork, Lacey distinguishes betw een 'liberal' and 'co­ ordinated' m arket econom ies and argues that m acro political-econom ic forces are conditioned by both cultural filters and econom ic, political and social institutions. In so doing, she draw s attention, am ong other things, to the potential salience of the dynam ics of different electoral system s (and the im pact of electoral cycles at local as well as national levels); the nature of political decentralisation; and the relevance of education and training to a society's capacity for integration. All of these have relevance beyond the analysis of punishm ent and considerable im plica­ tions for influencing the shape and direction of crim e prevention policies. Differences betw een federal and non-federal constitutions, the strength of regional identities and the nature of relations between national and local governm ent, are all strikingly evident in the accounts provided in this book.

C o m p a ra tiv e c rim e p rev en tio n There are im portant differences betw een form s of punishm ent and penal policies on the one hand, and crim e prevention strategies and com m unity safety policies on the other. W hile the form er is self-evidently coercive and m ore often than not exclusionary - notably w here im prisonm ent is involved - the latter fits less unam biguously into a sim ple or dichotom ous exclu sio n/inclu sion binary. Crim e prevention and com m unity safety can be sim ultaneously exclusionary and inclusionary, as well as both instru­ m ental and moral. For exam ple, developm ental crim e prevention, by targeting those 'at risk' for special attention, can be inclusionary, but also m ay inadvertently or otherw ise stigm atise those targeted and engender form s o f social exclusion. Com m unity-based crim e prevention likew ise can be at the sam e tim e inclusive for som e and exclusive for others. The exclusionary dynam ics of the theories of 'defensible space' (N ew man 1972) and 'broken w indow s' (W ilson and Kelling 1982) have been long recognised (Currie 1988), but this is also true of other instances w here safety is a 'club good'. Tim H ope (2000) has docum ented the exclusive 8

Situating crim e prevention policies in comparative perspective

'clu b bing effects' o f neighbou rhood w atch and situ ational target-hard ening efforts against burglary. But these and other com m u nity-level crim e p rev ention intervention s can also foster social netw orks and form s of collective efficacy (Sam pson et al. 1999). D efensive exclu siv ity can prom ote form s o f bonding social capital b etw een shared interest groups w hile u n derm ining types o f bridging social capital betw een different social groups (Putnam 2000; C raw ford 2006). N everth eless, such con ceptu al m od elling provides som e useful insights w hen thinking about sim ilarities and d ifferences in crim e prevention p olicies across Europe. W hat, then, are the potential im plications for a com p arativ e analysis o f the grow th and reception o f crim e prevention policies? G iven the difficulties o f qu an tifyin g and m easurin g prevention, w e are not able to assess the d egree o f reception o f certain types of prevention in the w ay that penal scholars can read ily com pare rough ind icators o f penal 'sev erity' throu gh im prisonm ent rates. T able 1.3 presents one very lim ited attem pt to do so using data from the E uropean C rim e and Safety Su rv ey 2005 (Van D ijk et al. 2006: 116-17). It focuses not on state policies but on the reception o f prevention on b eh alf o f the public - by w ay o f the p ercentage o f hou sehold s w ith a bu rglar alarm and special d oor locks. W here the d ata are available, they show an increase in Table 1.3

Public reception of situational crim e prevention technologies

Countries

Households with a burglar alarm (%)

Households with special door locks (%)

United Kingdom

36

61

Ireland

30

55

Italy Belgium

20 15

59 49

Luxem bourg Portugal

14 13

52 56

Germany

12

63

Austria

12

58

Hungary France Netherlands

12 11 10 9 9

55 38 78

Spain Sw eden Finland Estonia Greece Denmark Poland

7 7 6 6 3

48 46 43 40 46 32 18

Source: Van Dijk et al. (2006: 116-7) Note: Countries in bold are represented in this volume. 9

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

hou sehold s w ith a burglar alarm in recent decades. In the UK, the percentage o f respond ents saying that their household w as fitted w ith a bu rglar alarm rose from 22 p er cen t in 1992 to 36 per cent in 2005. Sm aller increases w ere evid ent in Belgiu m w here the figures grew from 12 per cent to 15 per cent and in the N eth erlan ds from 8 per cent to 10 per cent. It is im portan t to acknow led ge the lim itations o f these data and the m ethods o f their collection, as w ell as the m an ner in w hich the identified kinds o f prev entive actions are influenced by differences in resid ence type, security and design w hich find different expression s in various European countries. H ow ever, as a starting point for com p arativ e analysis one m ight infer that countries w here the p roportion o f hou sehold s that have burglar alarm s is high have m ore read ily em braced the logics o f situ ational crim e p revention, w hether this is throu gh insuran ce-based incentives, gov ern­ m ent cajoling or auton om ous action on the part o f citizens. It is notable that the U K and Ireland are som e w ay ahead o f other cou ntries in this regard and Scan d inav ian societies appear less attuned to the reception of these technologies. A further ind icator o f the reception o f situ ational crim e prevention m igh t be ascertained in the installation o f C C TV cam eras. H ere the UK is a global leader, w ith an estim ated 20 per cent of the w o rld 's C C T V s (but only less than 1 per cent o f the w o rld 's population). A ccord in g to the B ritish Secu rity Indu stry A ssociation, by 2004 there w ere over 4.25 m illion C C T V cam eras installed in the U K .2 T his com pares m arked ly w ith F ran ce's estim ated 340,000. R esearch confirm s a higher level o f public acceptance o f C C T V in the U K as contrasted w ith other parts o f Europe. T he m ost sceptical attitu d es w ere found in A ustria and G erm any (H em pel and T opfer 2004). H ow ever, the expansion o f C C T V has been strongly influenced by the very d ifferent regulatory regim es found across Europe (G ras 2004), w here m ore robu st reg u latory system s have served to restrain the expansion o f C C T V in pu blic space. H ence, in Paris, for instance, w hile the m etro and rail netw orks operate around 9,500 CC TV devices, there are o nly som e 330 in o peration in pu blic spaces. H ow ever, P resid en t N icolas S arkozy recently annou nced a plan to em u late L o n d o n 's im plem entation o f C C TV cam eras w ith the program m e 'A T hou sand C am eras for P aris', at the launch of w hich he w as quoted as saying: 'I am v ery im pressed by the efficiency of the B ritish police thanks to this netw ork o f cam eras' (Sam uel 2008). In review ing the global grow th o f C C TV , N orris and colleagues have identified a four-stage diffusion of C C TV that represents a 'general trend am id the m essy com plexity o f d ifferent cou ntries' exp eriences' (200 4 :1 1 9 ). T his follow s a sequ ential path o f (i) private diffusion; (ii) institutional diffusion in the pu blic realm ; (iii) lim ited diffusion in pu blic space; and (iv) a final stage that they ch aracterise as 'tow ard s u biqu ity' w hich 'h erald s the creation o f m u ch larger system s, w ith hu nd reds o f cam eras providing blanket coverage o f w hole areas o f a city' (2004: 119). If this is 10

Situating crime prevention policies in comparative perspective

the case, then perhaps other European countries are less far along this path than the UK. But this suggests a rather unidirectional process of change w ith little sense that saturation m ay prom pt further adaptation and questioning of the enterprise itself. N orris et al. are aw are of the potentially determ inistic nature of such a sequential path and assert that the extent to w hich a particular country or region will progress from one stage to another will depend on the com plex interplay betw een socio­ econom ic, legal, fiscal and political factors. If neo-liberal regim es tend to exclude both those who fail in the course of econom ic relations in the m arketplace and those who fail to abide by behavioural codes in line with their highly individualistic social ethos, how m ight this express itself in crim e prevention? M ight it suggest more exclusionary preventive strategies, such as those traditionally associated w ith 'defensible space', 'broken w indow s' and situational crim e preven­ tion? O 'M alley (1992, 2001) has persuasively highlighted the political and ideological connections betw een situational approaches to crim e preven­ tion and neo-liberal assum ptions about hum an behaviour, the lim itations and perverse effects o f governm ent am bitions to provide social goods and the appropriate role of the m arket (H ayek 1979). Rational choice theories that inform situational prevention (Clarke 1995) resonate strongly with neo-liberal political program m es. M ore generally, the rise of prevention has been closely allied w ith the dism antling of system s of state-sponsored w elfare provision that socialised risk. In their place a preventive m entality prom otes individual autonom y and responsibility. U ndoubtedly, situa­ tional prevention (re-)em erged at a favourable political m om ent and was enhanced by its connections with a neo-classical, utilitarian philosophy. Its language of econom ic reasoning, personal choice, responsibility and rationality fitted very well with the grow ing neo-liberal consensus within the British governm ent. Its appeal to the responsibilities of people and organisations throughout civil society m eshed well with the growing political will to dow nsize and roll back the state, in order to free up entrepreneurial initiative. In this context, situational prevention offered the prom ise of short-term and cost-effective, albeit sm all-scale, im pacts, in stark contrast to the 'nothing w orks' pessim ism connected with the grand-scale social engineering projects circulating w ithin crim inal justice and penal w elfarism . A situational m entality speaks the language of the m arket, of supply and dem and, risk and reward, opportunities and costs, w hile appealing to regulation beyond the state through private and quasi-private auspices. It focuses as m uch on potential victim s as on potential offenders. Yet, while the period of Thatcherism and Reaganism clearly coincided w ith the considerable expansion of situational technologies - especially in the U K - it would be an overstatem ent to assert that situational prevention w as sim ply a vehicle through w hich a Thatcherite ideology about crim e w as im plem ented (King 1991). To do so would be to ignore the w ider

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

econ om ic and cultural factors at play. Fu rtherm ore, it w ould pay insufficient attention to the tensions betw een n eo-liberalism and neo­ con servative valu es expressed w ithin T hatcherism , as w ell as betw een the ad m inistrativ e urge to m anage (and norm alise) the crim e problem on the one hand, and on the other hand the expressiv e and m orally toned inclination to con dem n and exclu d e offenders as 'other'. T he instrum en tal logic of m u ch situ ational crim e prevention tends to red uce hum an beh av iou r to an econ om ic rationale o f calcu lativ e actions prem ised on choice and self-interest, w ith little or no regard for m oral or cultural values. N eo-conserv ativ e influences w ithin m u ch recent crim e control policy, w ith its em ph asis on expressiv e pu nitiveness, by con trast have an av ow ed ly norm ative agenda. They assert a notion o f responsible agency that is con ceived in high ly m oralistic tones em bod ying valu es and virtues. H ere, rather than d isappearing into the background and leaving the in visible hand o f the m arket to prevail, the state's role is not m erely to free au ton om y but to shape it. As C ruikshank notes: 'To restore civil society b ack to a state o f natural liberty and self-reprod uction, neo-con servatives argue that it is necessary to in culcate civic v irtue in the citizenry, if necessary, by force' (cited in Rose 1999: 185). It is perhaps this am bigu ous accom m odation o f conflicting ideologies and political forces w ithin crim inal ju stice policies that explains, at least in part, the m an ner in w hich C C T V tech nologies w ere so read ily and extensively em braced in the U K (and possibly elsew here). As a m easure o f situ ational crim e prevention, C C T V also appeals to, and con nects w ith, an expressive and affective d im ension, reflecting a d eeper cultural attraction. C C T V cam eras not only evoke sym bols o f secu rity by ap p ear­ ing to p erform p reventive tasks, bu t also facilitate the acting out o f m ore trad itional expressive and pu nitiv e sen tim ents provoked by the footage d erived from C C TV cam eras w here crim inal acts and d isord er are captured on film . In this m anner, CC TV stradd les both a p reventive logic and a pu nitive one (N orris and M cC ahill 2006). It enables both a g o v ernan ce o f the present and futu re throu gh surveillance and deterrence and a norm ative reord ering o f the past by w itnessing and recording even ts and respond ing to them . N ot only are C C TV cam eras tangible rem ind ers that som ething is bein g d one to secure personal safety; they also serve to prom pt m oral ind ignation at the acts they portray.

A E u ro p e a n m odel? In thinking abou t com p arativ e crim e prevention across Europe (and beyond ), one question prom pted by the collection o f essays in this book is to w hat extent the variou s cou ntry-sp ecific experiences suggest a con vergence o f policies or the em ergence o f a com m on E uropean m odel. O r if not, w hat lines o f differentiation m ark divergences? A s w e have seen, 12

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the con tem porary gen esis o f crim e p revention as a focus o f p u blic policy first em erged in E urope in the 1970s, as evid enced in early governm ent reports and enqu iries notably in France, Sw eden, B ritain and the N eth er­ lands. This w as follow ed in the 1980s by the beginn ings o f the institu­ tion alisation o f new infrastructures. W hat m arked this period of d evelopm ent w as the em ergence o f a nu m ber of d ifferent m od els of delivery. A s M elossi and Selm ini argue in their con tribution to this collection (see C h apter 7) the tw o d om inant m od els tended to associate the British w ith a situational ap proach and the French w ith a social approach. W hile som ething o f a caricature, the follow ing becam e asso­ ciated w ith different ju risd iction s, d uring that period: • T h e Sw edish m od el inclu ded a national strategy w hich sou gh t to integrate relevant policy d om ains w ith a focus on planning, im plem en­ tation and resources. • T h e French m odel, inform ed by the B onnem aison Report (1982), em phasised social crim e prevention notably throu gh inclu sionary strategies targeted at alienated and m arginalised you ng people. • T h e British m odel, initially reflected in the Safer C ities projects, becam e closely associated w ith a situ ational and police-led approach to the m an agem en t and m od ification o f the physical env ironm en t to reduce op portu nities for crim e. • T h e D utch m odel w as seen as a m ore p ragm atic blend o f strategies inv olv ing hu m an agents and tech nology and w ith an em ph asis on a rigorou s research ev id ence base, reflected in the policy that 10 per cent o f p revention fun ding should be allocated to evaluation. • T h e N ordic m odel reflected an inclu sive and non-p unitive approach, w ith less relian ce on technology and greater em ph asis on hum an agents. O ver tim e o ther hybrid m od els em erged, inclu d ing the regional focus of d ev elopm ents in Italy - notably the region o f E m ilia-R om agna (see C h apter 7) - and city-level d ev elopm ents often given practical expression throu gh involvem ent in transnational netw orks and city -to-city alliances such as the E uropean Forum for U rban Safety. In o ther ju risd iction s, such as Belgium (see C h apter 8), the influence o f m od els d eveloped w ithin n eigh bou ring cou ntries (in the N etherland and France) prod uced a com plex m ixtu re o f approaches in d ifferent regions, reflecting different cultural trad itions - notably in the sep arate Flem ish and French -speakin g parts o f the cou ntry - and on accoun t o f the sw ay o f d ifferent political parties. In form er Soviet-bloc cou ntries, such as H u n gary (see C h apter 10) and Slovenia, the d evelopm ent o f crim e p rev ention strategies and an infrastructure to d eliv er them has been closely associated w ith the processes of transition. These cou ntries have often seen the rapid 13

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

d ev elop m ent o f policies at a national level w ith less em p h asis on robust local d elivery m echanism s. M ore recent years have w itnessed con sid erable internationalisation of crim e prevention throu gh the d evelopm ent of transnational and su p ran a­ tional netw orks. T hese institutions, policy com m u nities and form s o f elite n etw orkin g have generated significant flow s o f policy ideas across countries. This p olicy transfer has confused and confound ed the sim ple association o f particu lar ju risd iction s w ith specific m od els or approaches. A nu m ber o f key institutions have been instrum ental in the transfer and diffusion of crim e prevention ideas and practices. In so doing, they have added to the m ore com plex pictu re o f m ixed m odels, as strategies devised in one cou ntry have been approp riated and ad apted to other contexts. T hey inclu de the E uropean Forum for U rban Safety (EFU S); the U nited N ations C en tre for International C rim e P reven tion (U N Office fo r D rug C on trol and C rim e P revention); the E uropean Institute for C rim e P reven­ tion and C on trol, affiliated w ith the U nited N ations (H EU N I); the International C en tre for the P reven tion of C rim e (IC PC ); U N -H A B IT A T Safer C ities program m e; and the European C rim e P revention N etw ork (ECPN ). A s w ell as forging professional netw orks, these organisations d issem in ate m od els o f good p ractice and seek to encourage their ad option (see IC PC 2008). The establish m ent o f the EC PN by a d ecision o f the E uropean C ouncil in M ay 2001 (2 0 0 1 /4 2 7 /JH A ) signalled a significant institutional attem pt at E u ropean -level co-ordination, lesson-learning and, b y im plication, h arm onisation. It w orks to prom ote crim e p revention activity in m em ber states across the E uropean U nion, notably 'to prov id e a m eans through w hich v alu able good p ractice in p reventing crim e, m ainly "tra d itio n a l" crim e, could be sh ared '.3 From the outset, its focus of attention w as largely restricted to 'the fields o f ju venile, urban and d rug-related crim e' (Art. 3(1)) and it w as charged w ith favouring 'a m u ltid iscip linary approach' (Art. 4(a)). A central aspect o f the w ork of the ECPN is concerned w ith lesson-learning and the diffusion o f apparen tly successfu l interventions. Flence, one o f the criteria for the annual E uropean C rim e Preven tion A w ard that the EC PN runs is that the projects should be 'capable of replication by organisations and groups in other M em ber S tates'.4 O ver the years, h ow ever, the E C P N 's w ork has becom e m ired in political difficulties, as it is required to w ork through governm ent authorities. It has also been hindered by perception s that it favours the prom otion of p articular approaches to crim e p revention, notably those associated w ith situ ational and technological m easures. In part, this perception has been fuelled by the key roles played by the D utch and the British in running and resourcin g the netw ork. By contrast, the E uropean Forum for U rban Safety is a good exam ple of a city -to-city netw ork influenced by a d ifferent p hilosoph y o f crim e prevention and com m u nity safety, notably one that em ph asises the role 14

Situating crim e prevention policies in comparative perspective

played by m u nicipal authorities. Established in 1987 in Barcelona, EFU S now con stitutes a n etw ork o f som e 300 local auth orities across Europe. M oreover, given its original con nection w ith the w ork o f G ilbert Bonnem aison - w ho, as w ell as w riting the report that shaped F ran ce's m odel o f social crim e prevention (B onnem aison 1982) also helped initiate the foun d ing o f the Forum - it has been associated w ith a p articular social ap proach to prevention. It is perh aps becau se o f this that E FU S has struggled to establish any significant presence in the U K , w ith only tw o British cities form ally allied to it (Liverpool and Luton) and rem ains d om inated by sou thern European cities and regions (notably in France, Italy and Spain). As M elossi and Selm ini (C hapter 7) argue, the Forum played a crucial role in the diffusion o f strategies allied to the 'French m od el' o f social crim e p revention w ithin Italy and elsew here. Th e apparen t d istin ctiven ess o f earlier m odels, and their association w ith particular cou ntries and specific p olitical affiliations over tim e, has given w ay to m ore m ixed and varied approaches. If there is such a thing as a E uropean m odel o f crim e prevention it w ould appear to coalesce around the follow ing clu ster o f central them es: • Strategies that inclu de but extend beyond technical opportu nity red u c­ tion and target-hard ening. • An em ph asis upon w ider social problem s, in clu ding pu blic perceptions and fear o f crim e, q uality o f life, broad ly defined harm s, in civilities and disorder. • A focus upon m od es o f inform al social control and local norm ative o rders, as w ell as the m an ner in w hich they relate to, and con nect w ith, form al system s o f control. • Im p lem entation throu gh d ecentralised , local arrangem en ts - evoking the aphorism 'local problem s requ ire local solu tions'. • D elivery throu gh co-ordinated partnership structures that d raw together a v ariety o f organisations and stakeholders from the public, volu ntary and private sectors. • Policies that recognise the need for social responses that reflect the m u ltiple aetiology o f crim e and are aim ed at prod ucing holistic or 'jo in ed -u p ' solutions. • Strategies that are 'problem -orien ted ' rather than defined accord ing to the bu reau cratic m eans or organisations m ost read ily av ailable to respond to them . C on ceptu ally, the broad ening out o f crim e p revention aw ay from a narrow focus on crim e and crim inal op p ortu nities has been reflected in the w ider d iscu rsiv e fram e in w hich it is frequ en tly located. In a nu m ber 15

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

of countries, the language of crim e prevention has been replaced by alternative term s that reflect this shift - such as 'com m unity safety', 'local safety', 'urban security', 'local governance'. A key them e in the institu­ tionalisation and delivery of such policies has been the idea of local - city or regional - safety partnerships or security netw orks. These variously involve the co-ordination of diverse local organisations, actors and interests in m ultidisciplinary and interorganisational working relations. These partnerships - w hich m ight incorporate representatives from public, private and voluntary sectors - potentially m ark a fundam ental shift in the governance of crim e and social problem s. It acknow ledges that there is no single agency solution to crim e - it is m ultifaceted in both its causes and effects. In so doing, local safety partnerships challenge m any bureaucratic assum ptions about professional expertise, specialisation and disciplinary boundaries. In theory, it offers a de-differentiated response that is not segm ented or com partm entalised but affords a generalised, non-specialist activity, built into the routines and consciousness of all citizens and organisations. H ow ever, the experiences o f all European jurisdictions show that delivering partnerships presents a considerable challenge. O ften key agencies have been unw illing to get involved, w hile others have dom inated the agenda. Tensions betw een central governm ent control and local dem ands and interests have often stym ied developm ent such that in som e countries the focus of partnerships has been com pliance with national agendas or perform ance indicators, notw ithstanding the require­ ment upon them to identify and pursue local priorities. D espite the rhetoric of localism and decentralisation, m any national governm ents appear to have been unable and unw illing to adopt a m ore 'hands off' approach to local safety partnerships. H ow ever, w here robust system s of devolution and federalism exist, the scope for local autonom y appears to have been m ore vibrant. The politics of law and order has also played a significant part in underm ining, or at least curtailing, the fortunes of crim e prevention policies. A recurring them e from the chapters that follow is the m anner in w hich crim e prevention policies have been conditioned and influenced by w ider political struggles and the alliance of particular strategies with specific political program m es. The political will and leap of faith necess­ ary to ensure a dram atic shift in resources tow ards prevention have yet to transpire to the degree that m ost proponents would like. Given other m ore salient or new sw orthy political dem ands, the focus on delivering and em bedding prevention has waxed and waned. The enduring sw ay of 'punitive populism ' and the preoccupation of politicians and the m edia w ith 'talking tough on crim e', even against a background of declining aggregate crim e rates (in m any countries), have not provided a particular­ ly productive environm ent in w hich to institutionalise preventive thinking in the public state sector. 16

Situating crime prevention policies in comparative perspective

Lost in translation? Before going further, we need to sound a brief note of caution about the implied process of translation and the lim itations of the com parative m ethod. In so doing, it is valuable to differentiate two m eanings of translation. The first and m ost obvious entails translation from one language to another. In a European context, given the rich diversity of language, this presents particularly acute challenges. Linguistic conver­ sion im plies that the sam e term carries the sam e m eaning in each language. This is often a dangerous assum ption. N ot only do practices and institutions differ considerably but the sam e term can have very different meanings. O ne m uch debated exam ple is the frequent m istrans­ lation of 'com m unity', a concept that has very different connotations in an Anglo-Saxon context as com pared, for exam ple, to France and Germ any. The French concept of com m unaute has a very distinct and different sense (Garapon 1995; Craw ford 2000; W yvekens, Chapter 4 this volum e), while 'com m unity' in G erm any has distinct authoritarian connotations (Zedner 1995). In a different but related vein, there is no French equivalent term for 'policy7, w hich translates sim ply as la politique, the sam e word used for 'politics'. Baum an (1999: 5) highlights how the G erm an term unsicherheit conflates experiences and sentim ents conveyed by three distinct English terms: 'uncertainty', 'insecurity' and 'unsafety'. This leaves concepts such as 'com m unity safety' and 'urban security' subject to varied interpreta­ tions, particularly w here we seek to understand specific practices through such conceptual lenses. Learning not to translate both literally and figuratively, therefore, is an im portant aspect of com parative research. Rather, there is a need to excavate and understand the culturally specific essence of key terms and locate them w ithin the context of w ider horizons of interpretation. N evertheless, w e need also to recognise that words them selves are not static but the subject of change in w hich they take on new m eaning, som etim es in the interplay betw een different languages. N otably, the term inology associated w ith key policy ideas m ay have salience and appeal that transcends linguistic traditions. The second m eaning of translation is the process by which an idea, practice or activity is translated from one place to another. This process of contextual relocation assum es that the sam e practices carry the same m eanings in different social and cultural contexts. There is all too often a danger w ithin com parative crim inology (as in the social sciences more generally) of analysing developm ents in the style of a butterfly-collector, where the exhibits are plucked from the very environm ents that they inhabit and through which their lives m ake sense (Crawford 2002). W e need to understand m ore, rather than less, about the differences and sim ilarities in connections betw een responses to crim e and cultures, as well as the m anner in which such strategies derive their sense and

17

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m eaning from their cultural ties. T h e lim its to the transferability o f crim e control m echanism s or policies that ad vocates claim to be un iversal often d eriv e from p recisely such cultural and in stitutional connections. For this reason, as far as possible, con tributors to this volu m e have sou gh t to relate experiences to, and situ ate crim e prevention policies w ithin, the political and social con ditions w ithin each country. C om parativists need to be sen sitive to the pitfalls o f both linguistic con version and contextual relocation. As various con tributors note, context m atters. This is p ossibly the m ost v alu able insig ht provided by situ ational perspectives. Situ ation al crim e prev ention theory d em and s not m erely that intervention s are targeted at approp riate places rooted in an u n d erstand ing o f their specific crim e problem s but also that these should be regularly review ed and renew ed or ad apted in an interactive and iterative process. A s situ ational interven­ tions are intend ed to change behaviou r, they need to be continuously checked, for their ongoing effectiveness w ill be d ep endent upon how crim e patterns ad apt and change over tim e. This acknow ledges that crim e patterns - like the social, cultural and technological w orld s - are not static. From w ithin a situ ational fram e o f reference, new crim inal opportu nities are b ein g created all the tim e, notably through innovations. C rim e op portu nities are highly specific, are concentrated in tim e and space, depend on everyd ay m ovem ents o f activity and are intercon nected such that one crim e m ay prod uce op portu nities for another (Felson and C larke 1998). A s som e opportu nities m ay be closed or restricted con sequ ent to situ ational end eavou rs, others m ay be opened. C rucially, how ever, as E kblom notes, con tin ual ad aptation and evolution 'm akes kn ow led ge of w hat w orks in crim e prevention a w astin g asset' (2005: 230). In essence, situational prevention p rivileges a p articu lar kind o f kn ow led ge that is practical, em pirical and reflexive. H ow ever, the im portan ce o f con text is not restricted to situational approaches. In fact, it is likely to be m ore salient aw ay from technological m easures and outsid e o f intervention s into the p hysical and built en vironm en t, in the m essy w orld o f hum an affairs, social relations and interp ersonal d ynam ics w here 'p eop le m atter'. This point is forcefu lly m ade by M argaret Shaw (C hapter 11), w ho looks beyond the confines of E urope to the very d ifferent m eanings and practices o f crim e prevention in im poverished parts o f the d evelopin g world. Th e con text specificity and tem poral im p erm anence o f crim e prevention question the gen eralisin g claim s m ad e by m any propon ents o f 'crim e scien ce' and 'international crim e p rev ention'. It also challenges the transferability and replication o f apparen tly successfu l prevention schem es from one cou ntry, city or locality to another. For som e, the possibilities o f international crim e prevention offer a 'scientific' approach to the qu estion o f 'w h at w orks?' (Farrington 2000). For others, the gen eralisations im plicit in such an approach o v ersim p lify the interactive 18

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and constitutive relationship between crim e, preventive m echanism s and the contexts in w hich they operate.

C o n verg e n c e o r divergence? There are considerable dangers in com parative analysis in either focusing on the richness of difference and diversity of practices or - m ore often in crim inology - rushing to hasty and misguided assum ptions about the flattening o f difference through policy convergence and transfer. Further­ more, transnational sim ilarity should not autom atically infer that a transnational explanation is at work. It m ay reflect a sim ilar response to related structural problem s. To draw a sim ple analogy, the w heel m ay w ell have been invented by a num ber of people in different places at sim ilar times. W e cannot necessarily assum e the w idespread use of the w heel to overcom e com m on problem s of transport was the result of diffusion from one original source. Likew ise, sim ilar policy developm ents m ay have diverse local origins in responding to sim ilar problem s. This highlights the essential dangers of functional determ inism in convergence theories w hich often assum e intentionality. Sim ilarities m ay be the product of unintentionally convergent developm ents, w hereas diffusion is an intentional and purposive activity. W ith this in m ind, Dolow itz and M arsh define policy transfer as 'the process by w hich know ledge of policies, adm inistrative arrangem ents, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the developm ent of policies, adm inistrative arrangem ents, institutions and ideas in another political system ' (2000: 5). Here, convergence m ay be understood as not m erely a response to structural forces but as a product of w hat we m ight call 'contagious diffusion' (Levi-Faur 2005: 22). Bennett (1991: 218) distinguishes five form s of policy convergence: (i) at the level of policy goals w here there is a sim ilarity of intention to deal with com m on policy problem s; (ii) in relation to a convergence of policy content, represented through form al expressions of governm ent policy; (iii) by way of a com ing together of policy instrum ents, nam ely the institutional tools available to adm inister policy; (iv) there m ay be a convergence on policy outcomes and im pacts with regard to the consequences of policy im ple­ m entation; (v) convergence m ay express itself in relation to policy style, by which he refers to a more diffuse notion of 'the process by which policy responses are form ulated'. By im plication, we m ay find exam ples of policy convergence in som e aspects of policy coexisting with divergence on others. In a related vein, Pollitt (2001) identifies four distinct levels of policy that allow us to differentiate betw een different levels of policy transfer and convergence: policy ideas inform or provide legitim acy for policy 'rhetoric' and 'talk'; policy instrum ents are the 'decisions' and specific program m es 19

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

that con stitute form al statem ents o f policy and legislation; policy im plem en­ tation refers to the actions o f people (professionals, p ractitioners and 'street-lev el bu reau crats') given the task o f im plem enting p olicy decisions on the ground in everyd ay practice; and policy outcom es represent the social con sequ ences and im pacts of policy im plem entation. Both B en n ett's and P ollitt's con cep tu alisations are useful as they allow us to explore not only the d ynam ics w ithin each level or form o f policy bu t also the interactions betw een them . N either typology envisages im pervious d evelopm ental stages, but rather their coexistence in a m ore fluid and con stitutiv e relationship. T here is, for exam ple, an im portant intercon nected ness b etw een policy form ation and policy im plem entation, w hich belies the idea o f d iscrete sequ ential stages. A s A nd erson notes, 'p o licy is m ad e as it is b ein g ad m inistered and ad m inistered as it is b ein g m ad e' (1975: 79). The differentiation betw een 'talk ' and 'd ecisio n s', as w ell as 'actio n ', high ligh ts the im portan t role that ideas can play as rhetorical devices for the pu rposes o f sym bolism and legitim acy. Jones and N ew burn (2007a: 25) note how the im portan t sym bolic d im ension o f m uch crim inal ju stice p olicy often prod uces a significant d isson ance betw een 'talk ' and 'actio n ', rh etoric and actions. C laim s abou t con vergence m ay be m ore a m atter o f 'talk ' and sym bolism than o f everyd ay practices. In their stud y o f the transfer of U S-style p olicing policies and practices into the UK, Jon es and N ew bu rn (2007b) found little evid ence o f w holesale im portation. R ather they identified elem ents o f 'soft' policy transfer in the form o f ideas, principles, sym bols and rh etoric rather than 'h ard ' policy transfer o f specific 'd ecisio n s' and 'actio n s'. T heir research also serves as a rem ind er to be w ary o f the d angers in o v er-ration alisin g p olicy as both a process and a set o f levels o f analysis. P olicy trajectories m ay unfold influenced as m uch by opportu nistic and non-rational factors or affective sen tim ents as inform ed by rational d eliberation. This is particularly ev id ent in relation to m atters o f crim e and safety, w here the role of em otions can be pow erfu l factors and w here public sen sibilities are volatile. A s a w arning against o v er-in terpreting p olicy as a m echanical process w ith discrete stages, B en nett highlights the 'shiftin g and interactive processes o f feedback that shape policy con ten t' (1991: 218). P olicy con v ergence need s to be con ceptu alised in d ynam ic term s. T h e key dim ension is tim e rather than space. In this sense, policy is in a continual process o f evolu tion and change. To push the m etaph or o f travel slightly further, it is a jou rney w ith no final destination. Van M annen (1995: 138) aptly d escribes policy as a 'w orld o f con tin ual flux, a w orld that is alw ays beco m in g'. In a sim ilar vein, Bennett suggests that p olicy con vergence is 'a process o f "b e c o m in g " rather than a con d ition o f " b e in g " m ore alike' (1991: 219). From this perspective, lookin g back ov er 25 years or so of d ev elopm ents in crim e prevention allow s a d egree of reflection on different trajectories ov er tim e; it affords consid eration o f patterns of 20

Situating crim e prevention policies in comparative perspective

d evelopm ent, evolu tion and change. It begs the question , to w hat extent is there m ov em ent over tim e tow ards som e identified com m on position? To answ er this qu estion w e need to clarify further the potential causes of convergence. As suggested above, con vergence m ay be the p rod uct of b o th intentional and pu rposive activ ity and the u n in ten tion al by-p rod u ct o f ind igenous ad aptations to policy d ilem m as and social problem s. Bennett (1991: 2 2 0 -9 ) helpfully identifies four processes throu gh w hich d eliberate policy con vergence m ight occur: em u lation, elite netw orking, harm onisation, and penetration. Em ulation refers to the d eliberate borrow ing o f ideas and policies from elsew here. It con stitutes a form o f im itation although this m ay entail ad ap tin g p olicy innovations in a w ay that m ay not be characterised as strict replication. E m u lation m ay occur at different stages o f the policy process and m ay serve different purposes. Elite netw orking and policy com m unities can play an im portan t role as con du its in the transfer of p olicy innovations. E lite netw orkin g refers to the circu lation o f ideas w ithin relatively coherent and stable netw orks o f elites w orkin g w ithin the sam e policy dom ain that engage in transnational interactions. It will often take the form of shared exp erience and lesson-draw in g about a com m on problem . In the con text o f crim e p revention, the E uropean Forum for U rban Safety is a good exam ple of elite netw orkin g that has significantly influenced the travel o f crim e p rev ention policies and p ractices across Europe. Elite n etw orkin g high­ lights the role that people play (esp ecially professional groups and associations) throu gh interactions and exchanges o f ideas. It also flags the influential role played b y key 'p o licy entrep ren eu rs' (K ingdon 1984) in p rom oting and ad vancing certain p olicy ideas, approaches and instru ­ m en ts.5 H arm onisation d em and s the existen ce o f institutions and structures designed to co-ordinate, synchron ise and stand ard ise policy d ev elo p ­ m ents across d ifferent m ilieux. U nlike the inform al collaboration provided throu gh elite netw orking, harm onisation requ ires the form al existen ce of som e overarching regim e. B ennett (1991: 225) suggests that the recognition o f interd ep en d en ce w ill often provide a central raison d'etre and driving force inform ing harm onisation. In the con text o f betw een-state policy transfer, this relates to the role played b y intergovernm ental and su p ra­ national organisations, such as the institutions o f the E uropean U nion or the U nited N ations (see U N 2002). H arm on isation is p articularly evident w ith regard to transnational crim e and insecurity problem s w here intergovernm ental co-operation is prom inent. In this sense, the w ork of the E uropean C rim e Preven tion N etw ork, given its institutional position w ithin the E uropean C om m ission , is m ore akin to harm onisation than elite netw orkin g, although it p robably encom passes both. By con trast, penetration evokes a process w here policy change arises on the basis of con form ity im posed by extern al actors or interests. In the 21

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

European context, the econom ic and political conditions - generally know n as the Copenhagen criteria (after the C openhagen sum m it in June 1993) - required before accession states can join the European Union constitute a good exam ple of penetration. M ore generally, the negotiations associated w ith accession m ay im pose policy prerequisites. W hile Bennett suggests (1991: 227) that, in contrast to the seem ingly co-operative relations evident in harm onisation, penetration entails coercion or force, he also recognises that certain efforts at harm onisation can have coercive effects. At their boundaries the two shade into each other, dependent upon degrees of co-operation or coercion and perceptions about the reception of externally generated policy ideas w ithin a given policy com m unity. H ence, European directives and 'soft law ' m ay be both a product of harm onisation and experienced as a form of penetration. A good exam ple of this is the extent to w hich Eastern European countries and other accession states incorporated certain policy developm ents including dom inant ideas about crim e prevention - because they per­ ceived these as desirable and potentially necessary attributes associated with m em bership. The European Com m ission (2004) has actively prom o­ ted a preferred m ethodology for im plem enting crim e prevention projects6 - the so-called 5 Is - as well as 'essential conditions' for the prevention of crim e that should prevail in all m em ber states.7 As Klara Kerezsi dem onstrates in Chapter 10, H ungarian reform s were heavily influenced by the (perceived) requirem ents of so-called 'E uro­ peanisation'. In H ungary, diffusion via harm onisation and penetration appears to have significantly influenced the direction of developm ent and institutionalisation of crim e prevention. Given the place that prevention had secured on the European C om m ission's agenda, a dom inant m odel of prevention becam e associated with H ungary's accession to the European Union. This appears to have occurred both as part of negotiations and as a perception that in order to join the W estern European 'club' certain policy ideas needed to be form ally incorporated into the dom estic policy fram ew ork, with perhaps less em phasis given to how these ideas m ight be institutionalised and im plem ented in practice. From this perspective, convergence becom es som ething of a ritual rite of passage, im posed by an external supranational authority (in this instance the European Union), w hether or not this is intentional. In the light of this blurring of self-obligation and external coercion or unw elcom ed harm onisation, Dolow itz and M arsh (2000: 13) conceptualise policy transfer as lying along a continuum that runs from lesson-draw ing to the direct im position of a policy program m e or institutional arrangem ent on one political system by another. The detailed study of the processes through w hich policy transfer occurs requires the exploration of a num ber of allied questions. W hat are the key institutions through w hich policies are transferred? W ho are the central actors engaged in policy transfer? W hich policy ideas, decisions 22

Situating crim e prevention policies in comparative perspective

and instrum ents are transferred ? From w here are lessons learned? W hat facilitates or con strains transfer? H ow are ideas, d ecisions, instrum ents and practices transferred from one con text rew orked and reshaped in the p rocess o f transfer, reform ulation and im plem entation? V ariou s chapters in this collection high ligh t elem ents o f policy transfer betw een E uropean countries. In C h apter 8, for exam ple, P atrick H ebberecht illustrates the m anner in w hich in Belgiu m experienced con flicting w aves o f policy transfer d raw n from different cou ntries associated w ith various m od els of crim e prevention policy. Policy em u lation follow ed both ideological p ositions as w ell as d ifferent cultural and linguistic traditions. W hile Flem ish-sp eakin g regions w ere m ore influenced by D utch and British d evelopm ents, the French -speakin g regions d rew on French policy d ev el­ o pm en ts for inspiration.

Assessing p rogress Reflecting on the past qu arter o f a cen tury, there is a sense in w hich, to som e significant degree, the prev entive turn has not been fully realised and the initial o ptim istic aspirations have becom e increasingly m uted. D espite the ap p aren t proliferation o f situ ational crim e prevention in som e cou ntries, rather than celebrate its institutional successes propon ents frequ en tly bem oan the lack o f influence o f situ ational ideas and the ind ifference w ith w hich they have been received by m any crim inologists and p oliticians (C larke 2000). The prom ise o f joined-u p local partnerships d eliverin g co-ordinated prevention strategies in response to local needs rem ains a d istant aspiration. C on sequen tly, one question that m ight be asked is, w hy has crim e prevention not taken greater hold? O ne response m igh t be that the initial claim s o f a ru pture w ith the p ast w ere exaggerated . A further assessm en t m igh t highlight the obdu racy of d o m inant state bureaucracies, ill-equipped at gen uine problem -solving and p reventive planning. A nother appraisal m ight identify the persistence o f the p rev ailing logic o f penal sanctioning. D espite the governm ent resources allocated to prevention, this pales in the shad e of the vast am ou nts o f m on ey that are con su m ed b y the trad itional crim inal justice estate. To take one con crete exam ple from England and W ales, the perceived failu re to fully im plem ent a m ajor plank o f the C rim e and D isord er A ct 1998 is an illu strative case in point. Section 17 im poses a duty on local auth orities, in exercising their various functions, to con sid er the crim e and d isord er im plications and the need to do all that they reasonably can to prevent crim e and d isord er in their area. This statu tory d uty w as lobbied fo r and w elcom ed by local au th ority associations. A ccord in g to the H om e O ffice, the pu rpose of the d uty w as to 'giv e the vital w ork o f preventing crim e a new focu s across a v ery w id e range o f local services . . . putting 23

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

crim e and d isord er con sid erations at the very heart o f d ecision m aking, w here they have alw ays belon ged ' (1997: para. 33). M oss and P ease notably suggested that 'Sectio n 17 is arguably the m ost rad ical part o f the A ct . . . B ecau se [the] "crim e d riv e rs" pervad e every sphere o f local auth ority responsibility, it is difficult to conceive o f any d ecision w hich w ill rem ain untouched by s.17 con sid eratio ns' (1999: 15-16). They questioned w hether Section 17 m ight con stitu te 'the w o lf in sh eep 's clothing' w ithin the 1998 A ct w hich itself sou ght to do m u ch to ad van ce and institu tionalise crim e p revention and com m u nity safety. Yet, the im plem entation o f Section 17 has fallen con sid erably b elow expectations. O ne area w here it m igh t have had d irect and im m ed iate im plications is the realm o f p lanning applica­ tions, w here police architectu ral liaison officers and crim e prevention d esign ad visors m ight have used it as a lever into planning decisions. A s it transpired , a significant nu m ber o f test cases revolved around applications fo r licensed prem ises associated w ith the expan sion o f the night-tim e econom y. D espite the w ell-d ocu m ented attend ant crim e and d isord er im plications o f large nu m bers o f alcohol outlets in city centres (H adfield 2006), the P lanning Insp ectorate has been largely u n w illin g to uphold d ecisions to reject applications on the ground s o f Section 17 w here these had been m ad e by local auth orities (M oss 2006). A s a branch o f central g o v ernm ent rather than the local council, the P lanning Insp ectorate h as not felt itself bound by the legislation, w hich applies to local auth orities alone. This illustration o f im plem entation failu re also reflects m ore general tensions b etw een resp onsibilities o f cen tral and local governm ent, evid ent in a nu m ber o f E uropean jurisdictions. In England in late 2004, so displeased at the rate o f progress w as the g o v ernm ent that it announced a m ajor rev iew o f com m u nity safety p artn ersh ip structures (see H om e O ffice 2006), acknow led g in g that 'a significant nu m ber of p artn ersh ips stru g gle to m aintain a full contribution from key agencies and even successfu l ones are not sufficiently visible, nor w e think accountable, to the pu blic as they should be' (H om e O ffice 2004: 123).8 M any partnerships have stalled due to the reluctance o f som e agencies to participate, the d om inance o f certain agendas, often policing, an u n w illin gness to share inform ation, conflicting interests, priorities and cultural assu m ptions on the part o f som e partners, a lack o f interorganisational trust, a d esire to protect bud gets and a lack o f cap acity and expertise. T h e d om inance o f hierarchical state bu reau cracies has proved obdurate. C o n sequen tly, there w as a d istin ct trace o f deja vu in the British gov ern m en t's latest strategy prom ises that 'p artnership w orking will be strength en ed ' and 'G overn m ent w ill be m ore enabling, and less d irective' (H om e O ffice 2007: 5). This rather p essim istic accoun t o f unfulfilled prom ises is reflected in m any, although not all, con tribution s to this book. Yet m any E uropean countries have w itnessed sig nificant red uctions in aggregate crim e rates d uring this sam e period - m ost m arked in the period since the m id 1990s. 24

Situating crim e prevention policies in comparative perspective

T hese d eclin es have been p articularly ev id ent in relation to d om estic burglary and auto theft. Figure 1.1 presents figures on the red uctions in d om estic burglary w here recorded by the p olice across all the countries represented in this collection. Figure 1.2 show s sim ilar data in relation to theft of a m otor vehicle.

Source: Tavares and Thomas (2008: 6)

Figure 1.1

Dom estic burglary recorded by the police (in thousands)

Source: Tavares and Thomas (2008: 7)

Figure 1.2

Theft of a m otor vehicle recorded by the police (in thousands)

It m igh t be expected that d om estic b u rglary and vehicle theft w ould be the m ost susceptible to red uctions due to the installation o f prevention 25

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

technologies, notably target-h ard en in g d evices such as bu rglar alarm s, d oor and w ind ow locks regarding d om estic burglary, and steering colu m n locks and im m obilisers in relation to theft o f vehicles. The figures reveal significant red uctions in police-recorded data in the various cou ntries for bo th offence types. In England and W ales the annual nu m ber o f d om estic burglaries declined by 55 per cent in the 11 years betw een 1995 and 2006. O ver the sam e period theft o f m otor cars fell by 62 per cent. France saw red uction s o f 25 per cent and 46 per cent respectively; G erm any w itnessed d eclin es o f 50 per cent and 66 p er cent; Italy saw red uction s o f 32 per cent and 8 per cent; and the N eth erlan ds experienced falls o f 23 per cent and 52 per cent. A cross Europe generally (w here the d ata are available) there has been an annu al 5.3 per cent d ecline in m otor v ehicle theft betw een 1995 and 2006. Su bstantial red uction s in a v ariety of com m on crim es - such as burglaries, thefts, robberies and assau lts - are also evid enced in the find ings o f the E uropean C rim e and Safety Survey, w hich show s significant decreases everyw h ere in the E uropean U nion (w ith the possible exceptions of Belgiu m and Ireland) d uring the period from 1995 to 2004 (Van D ijk et al. 2006). M ight not the shift tow ards greater em ph asis on p revention be part of an explanation for this crim e drop? T h ere is increasing ev id ence that changes in the level and quality o f security m ay have inform ed this m om entous turnarou nd in the historic rise in crim e rates. U sing British C rim e Survey data, Farrell and colleagues (2008) have put som e em pirical flesh on this 'secu ritisatio n ' hy p othesis b y lin king the d ecline in the nu m ber o f vehicles w ithout im m obilisers and steering colu m n locks in England and W ales to the d ecline in car thefts w here the entry m ethod w as the forcing o f d oor locks. They surm ise that this is con sisten t w ith central locking as the cause o f the d ecline 'becau se better locks w ould red u ce d oor-forcing m ore than w ind ow -breaking ' (Farrell et al. 2008: 18) w ith little apparen t evid ence o f tactical d isplacem ent. Fu rtherm ore, they show how the bulk o f the d eclin e has been in relation to recovered v ehicles, m ore likely to have been used for opportu nistic pu rposes of joy-rid ing and transportation, as opposed to un recovered vehicles w hich are m ore likely to have been stolen b y professional thieves for the purpose o f resale or parts (w hich also declined but less steeply). They suggest that this points to the conclusion that opportu nistic and am ateu r car thieves h ave been 'd riven out o f the m arket by better locks and im m obilisers' (2008: 18). W hile there are w id er issues at play, com plicating any sim ple cause and effect relationship, and it is not clear w hether this evid ence is replicated in other E uropean cou ntries,10 n evertheless it p rovides som e evid ence that increased security m ay have con tributed to the overall crim e d rop in ad dition to red uctions in specific crim e types. T his begs the question , w hy has p revention not been given greater credit for this apparen tly significant developm ent? O ne answ er m ight be that it does not accord w ith the 26

Situating crim e prevention policies in comparative perspective

p rev ailing politics o f 'law and ord er' in m any E uropean cou ntries w hich con tin ues to em p h asise the expressiv e and pu nitive 'crim inolog y o f the o ther' at the expen se o f the m ore instru m en tal and pragm atic 'crim inology o f the self' (G arland 2001: 137), w ith w hich prevention is m ore intim ately aligned. This reflects a preoccu pation in w hich the am bitions o f governing and statecraft have been resighted in the face o f u n con trollable flow s of capital, goods, people and risks. Being seen to assert sovereign auth ority through bou ts o f p u nitive sen tim ents to assu age pu blic perception s of insecurity has becom e an increasingly prom in ent governm ental raison d'etre. T his fits less com fortably w ith the m ore ad m inistrative and m u nd ane approach to target-h ard en in g and heightened securitisation throu gh the actions and interventions of the private secto r and ord in ary citizens prom pted by com m ercial im peratives and m arket-based incen­ tives. A further reason for the m uted response to any association betw een the p reventive turn and the historic crim e drop lies in difficulties of m easurin g success. As it entails a 'n on -ev en t', crim e p rev ention is intrinsically problem atic to m easure. T here are com plex issu es of tem ­ poral, spatial, tactical and crim e-type d isplacem en t to accoun t for. T here m ay also be social costs to the hardening o f secu rity around cars and d om estic prem ises, w hich leaves people as the m ost vulnerable links in the chain o f crim e opportu nities. C on sequen tly, p rev ention does not cap tu re the kind o f sim ple narrative that a m ed ia-saturated w orld dem and s. W e are u n likely ever to see head lines read ing 'm urd er, rape or bu rglary prevented by early child hood p rog ram m e'. Prevented crim es do not leave obviou s traces and as such con stitute w hat T aleb refers to as 'silen t ev id en ce', w hereby the v alu e o f w hat w e d o n 't know - ou r 'know n un kn ow n s' - is d ow ngraded : 'ev erybod y know s that you need m ore prevention than treatm ent, bu t few rew ard acts o f p rev ention' (Taleb 2007: xx iv ).11 T his m easurem ent difficulty and cultural salience of prevention is com pounded by the problem o f tem poral effects. W hile situational prevention m ay prod uce im m ed iate and tangible pay-offs, m u ch social crim e prevention only has effects over the long term . Fu rtherm ore, the long-term investm en t needed for som e form s o f prevention is frequ ently underm ined b y short political tim e horizons. G ov ern ing political alliances are m ore interested in effecting change that is m easurable d uring their period of office. In her chapter, M argaret Shaw cites H o m el's analogy o f crim e p rev en­ tion as 'a sw an sw im m in g in the su rf', m oving in and out o f sight, and hence prom inence, as it floats on the un d u lating w aves. T h e point being m ad e here is that the pu blic salience and political fortunes o f crim e prevention m ay fluctuate, but it rem ains a good idea that is here to stay. The im plication is that in the long-ru n crim e p revention w ill rem ain an im portant feature o f the land scape, unaffected by the sw ell o f the choppy seas below . From the chapters in this collection, there is certain ly an 27

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

evid ent that in w hich in various ju risd ictio n s crim e prevention has m oved in and out o f favour, m irrorin g the sw an in the surf, and it has been buffeted by changin g p olitical circu m stan ces. Yet there is also a sense in w hich crim e prevention and com m u nity safety are intim ately bound up w ith, and an expression of, the w id er political and cu ltural clim ate. U ltim ately, crim e prevention is a m atter o f politics, albeit not red ucible to the d ecisions o f national and local governm ents. It is about priorities, resource allocation , d ecision-m aking and authority. W hile bein g aw are o f the d angers in ov erstretching an analogy, one story (and there are m u ltiple stories to tell, as this volu m e testifies) o f the recent experiences of state-sponsored crim e prevention m igh t be ch arac­ terised as the 'u psid e-d ow n sw an '. The sw an is w ell know n for its grace and poise above the w ater w hile its legs w o rk busily and efficiently underneath. T h e u p side-d ow n sw an, by contrast, inverts this logic: w hat b ecom es v isible is a con sid erable am ou nt o f activ ity - energy bu t w ith little to show for it by w ay o f results. Fu rtherm ore, the frantic energy exerted is not only ineffective but can be interpreted as an end in itself as it is seen to be d oing som ething in response to pu blic anxieties and d em and s for security. The significance o f governm ental actions m ay d eriv e as m uch from the sym bolic m essages and com m u nicativ e p rop er­ ties they express as from their instrum en tal capacity to control or prevent crim e.

C o n c lu d in g re fle c tio n s Responsibilisation strategies?

A d om inant interpretation and explanation o f the renaissan ce o f crim e p rev ention and con struction o f com m u nity safety p artn ersh ips is that they con stitute the em bod im ent of 'resp onsib ilisation strateg ies', w hereby state auth orities seek to enlist o ther agencies and ind ividu als to form chains of co-ordinated action, p rom p tin g crim e control end eavou rs on the part of 'resp o nsibilised ' actors (O 'M alley 1992; G arland 1996). A s G arland re­ m arks: 'T his involves the central governm ent seekin g to act up on crim e not in a d irect fashion through state agen cies (police, cou rts, prisons, social w ork) but instead by acting in d irectly, seeking to activate action on the part o f non-state agen cies and o rg anisations' (1996: 452). Through these processes o f 'g overn m ent at a d istan ce', state pow er is extended and enhanced. In the light of the evid ence presented in this book, can w e understand the rise o f crim e p revention and com m u nity safety as the p rod uct o f a strategy on the part o f central go v ernm ent auth orities to d ivest them selves o f direct social control roles and shift m ore o f the bu rd en for personal and collective safety on to ind iv id u als and groups? A t one level, there is no 28

Situating crim e prevention policies in comparative perspective

d ou b t that citizens, com m u nities and organisations are being encouraged to take on greater responsibility in m atters of their ow n and o thers' safety and security. Fu rtherm ore, partn ersh ip structures have created a veneer o f m ore co-operative and co-ordinated relations betw een diverse public secto r org anisations and betw een state and non-state, as w ell as som e private sector, agencies. Yet, the natu re and extent o f that responsibility rem ains high ly circu m spect and am bigu ous. T he d egree to w hich partner­ ships have been su ccessfu lly im plem ented and to w hich responsibility has been em braced rem ains both un even and tentative. Som e 20 years (or m ore) on from its incep tion, the partn ersh ip approach rem ains poorly im plem ented across Europe, w here internecin e 'tu rf w arfare' betw een organisations and d ep artm entalism rem ain rife, often expressed in con­ flicts betw een M inistries o f the Interior and M inistries of Ju stice in con tin ental Europe. T he intervening years have show n that realising p reventive p artn ersh ips has proved stubbornly illusive. P artnerships rem ain d om inated by public sector bod ies (notably m u nicipal auth orities and the p olice), w hile the role o f the v olu ntary secto r largely has been m arginalised. T his is true in the U K , w here the inv olv em ent o f businesses w as a key them e o f early d evelopm ents, notably through the Safer Cities p rog ram m e in the 1980s and 1990s. D espite this, com m ercial engagem ent has been patchy and often un co-ord inated. In m any crim e-related end eavou rs pu blic and private activ ities 'p ass like ships in the night' (C raw ford et al. 2005), as businesses frequ en tly p refer 'to do their ow n thing' and m an age their ow n affairs. There rem ains a d eep reluctance on the part o f m an y com m ercial enterprises to take on responsibilities for w hat they perceive as m ore ap p rop riately governm ent business. W hile shops, leisure o utlets and licensed venues are keen to control and m anage the p olicing and crim e prevention activities w ithin the confines o f their prem ises, they are frequ en tly less w illing to con tribu te to the regulation o f pu blic spaces beyond. Fu rtherm ore, the ev er-p resen t sp ectre o f v igilantism and private justice, as w ell as con cern s about 'h ave-a-go h eroes' ov erstepping the bounds of acceptability, invariably con strain d irect pu blic inv olv em ent in crim e control. M ore fun dam entally, the very foun dation of the m od ern state is intim ately bound up w ith quests to m on op olise the legitim ate use o f force and violence. A s such, attem pts to o utsource crim e control - to corp o r­ ations as w ell as ind ividu als - and enlist their activ e assistan ce raise vexed question s not ju st about the com petency o f the state but also about its essential project for gov ernan ce as the prim e p rotector of pu blic order. P roblem atically, the notion o f 'resp o nsibilisation ' im plies a process that em an ates outw ards and d ow nw ard s from central governm ent: one that is evid enced by key p olicy initiativ es and strategies. W hile the chapters that follow provide corroborative evid ence o f and high ligh t such strategies, this is by no m eans the sole picture, nor n ecessarily the d om inant one in all dom ains. The responsibilisation thesis largely d ow nplays the crucial 29

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role that institutions - in civil society and the m arket place - have played and con tin ue to play as agents o f social control and prevention in the regulation o f both d eviant and con form ist behaviou r. It accepts too read ily the idea o f the d om inant sovereign state; perversely, it seeks to highlight the m ythical status o f state sovereignty. It fails to connect sufficiently w ith w id er d evelopm ents and shifts in inform al control, prevention and regulation outsid e the narrow field o f crim e (cf. O 'M alley and H utchinson 2007). Im portantly, B raith w aite (2003) rem ind s us that there is a very d ifferent history o f p olicing and prevention to be derived from the business regulatory field as d istin ct from the 'p o lice-p rison s' arena. O ne o f the principal historical lessons d raw n from the d iverse body of regulatory agen cies established in the n ineteenth cen tury is the m an ner in w hich they prioritised non-p u nitive m od es o f enforcem ent, preferring strategies rooted in persuasion through m arket-based d isciplines and m entalities w ith a m ore explicit preventive orientation. Crim e and social policy

O ne o f the recurrin g tensions evid ent in the accounts o f experiences in a n u m ber o f European nations con cern s the porou s bou n d aries and con ceptu al confusion betw een social crim e prevention and social or urban policy m ore generally. There is a sense in w hich innovation s in com m u ­ nity safety and social crim e p revention have been subsum ed w ithin, and have sim ultaneously refigured, social and urban policy. A s a con sequ ence o f this bleed ing betw een crim e and social policy, social life is increasingly 'govern ed throu gh crim e and insecu rity' w hile social policies are justified in term s o f their crim e red uctive potential. This 'crim inalisation o f social p olicy' alerts us to the m an ner in w hich crim e and insecurity have becom e pivotal to the exercise o f auth ority and central organising fram ew orks that legitim ate intervention s that have other m otivations (C raw ford 1997: 228). T he shift to p revention has accorded to crim e an elevated place in the con stru ction o f social order, such that fundam ental public issues m ay becom e m arginalised, except in so far as they are defined in term s o f their crim e preventive qualities. W here social policies are justified in term s of their crim e preventive potential there are real risks that the services provided w ill com e to take on stigm atising connotations. As the chapters in this volu m e testify, there certain ly has been a d egree o f blu rrin g o f social policy and crim inal ju stice goals, as w ell as m echanism s for d eliverin g them . In their con tribution , Van D ijk and De W aard w arn that the integration o f social crim e p revention w ithin w ider p olicy agendas, such as urban renew al, carries evid ent risks: 'Fund s allocated to such ''crim e prevention in d isg u ise " can easily leak aw ay to activities w ith little potential to red uce crim e' (see page 149). H ow ever, this m ight also be con ceptu alised as the socialisation o f crim inal justice, w hereby crim e prom pts social responses that target need. In the process, 30

Situating crim e prevention policies in comparative perspective

both social p olicy and crim inal ju stice have been transform ed . Social policy has becom e m ore con ditional - less un iversal - and behaviou r has becom e one o f the key con d itions attached to w elfare. The danger here is that crim e becom es the organising p rinciple and vehicle for allocatin g and d istributing social goods. W h a t o f the future?

A s befits a reflection on the jou rn ey travelled ov er a quarter of a century, w e are left w ith qu estion s over the futu re d irection o f crim e prevention policies. G iven the prev ious d iscu ssion, one possible scenario is that social crim e prevention beco m es increasing ly lost w ithin a m ore conditional, restrictive and coercive social and urban policy. H ere, the d ystop ian logic o f 'g overn in g through crim e' (Sim on 2007) p otentially sees an expansion o f the 'penal state' (and a con com itan t d eclin e in the 'w elfare state'), sim u ltaneou sly through m ass incarceration and exclu sionary m od es of p revention as m u tually sup p ortiv e rather than oppositional d ev elo p ­ m ents. A nother scenario sees situ ational crim e p revention slip into the background as part o f tech nology, d esign and the rou tine activities of businesses and o rd in ary citizens as they adapt to ev eryd ay life. It becom es part o f the architectu re, in w hich the social incon ven iences, erosion o f civil liberties and ad verse cultural im plications are all sid elined as the price w orth paying for m an aging insecurities in w hat B outellier (2004) charac­ terises as the 'safety u topia'. N evertheless, it is possibly in the field o f d ev elopm ental crim e prev ention that w e m ay be w itnessing the em ergence o f a new orthodoxy (Farrington 2007; Farrington and W elsh 2007). A nu m ber o f chapters testify to the grow ing im p ortan ce o f w hat V an D ijk and De W aard term 'secon d ary offend er-oriented crim e p rev en tio n ', nam ely early intervention program m es targeted at child ren and you ng people (and their parents) identified as 'at risk' o f offending. R isk assessm en t and classification and actu arial profiling have becom e increasingly influential aspects o f con tem ­ porary crim inal (notably youth) ju stice system s. D espite the possible prev entive benefits and cost savings throu gh targeting resources at 'h ig h -risk ' groups, such early intervention schem es raise crucial n orm a­ tive concerns. G atti notes the right o f child ren and you ng people not to be classified as futu re d elinqu ents, w hether they go on to becom e d elin ­ quen ts or not, as representing 'one o f the greatest ethical problem s raised by early p revention pro g ram m es' (1998: 120). Fu rtherm ore, the inaccu racy o f p red ictive kn ow led ge prom pts caution. In the conclusion to a m ajor report fo r the B ritish governm ent on w orkin g w ith you ng people and their fam ilies to red uce risks o f crim e, U tting sagely w arns: [A ]ny notion that better screening can enable policy m akers to id entify you ng child ren d estined to join the 5 per cent o f offenders 31

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

responsible for 50 -6 0 per cent of crim e is fanciful. Even if there were no ethical objections to putting 'potential delinquent' labels round the necks of young children, there would continue to be statistical barriers . . . [Research] show s substantial flows out o f as well as in to the pool o f children w ho develop chronic conduct problem s. As such [there are] dangers of assum ing that anti-social five-year olds are the crim inals or drug abusers of tom orrow , as well as the undoubted opportunities that exist for prevention. Since the experience of service providers suggests that labelling children would also [be] counter­ productive to gaining the trust and participation of parents, there m ust be a strong presum ption in favour of preventive services presenting and justifying them selves in term s of children's existing needs and problem s, rather than future risks of crim inality. (Utting 2004: 99) C onsequently, m any practitioners prefer universal program m es over targeted ones, despite their obvious resource im plications. Early intervention has parallels outside o f life-course and developm en­ tal crim inology in form s of preventive detention and preventive exclusion, as well as a m ore general low ering o f the threshold of intervention to incivilities, anti-social behaviour, 'quality of life' concerns and other forms of 'pre-crim e' (Zedner 2007). A llied to this is the greater use of data pools, the storing of DN A records and risk profiling. A nticipating, forestalling or elim inating potential threats and risks before they present them selves is an increasing focus of concern. Yet, in governing the future, uncertainty prevails. As U tting im plies, the scientific know ledge-base for prevention and pre-em ption rem ains too am biguous to be reliable. The lim itations of know ledge serve to m agnify uncertainty. U nder conditions of uncertainty a pre-em ptive and preventive logic im plies a precautionary principle (Sunstein 2005). People are judged in terms of w hat they m ight do. A nticipating and forestalling potential harm in a risk-averse culture of insecurity im plies erring on the side of precaution (Ericson 2007). In such circum stances, the question 'w hat if?' prom pts action, 'just in case'. Furtherm ore, as Zedner highlights, 'precaution places uncertainty - not know ledge - centre stage' (2008: 37), with significant im plications for traditional crim inal justice principles of due process protections and proportionality. It is perhaps here, in the context of uncertainty and in the face of our lack of know ledge about future risks and harm s, that the prospects for crim e prevention lie, in justifying interventions as a precaution w ithin a w ider logic of (lim ited) predictive governance. W hile the future is uncertain, w hat is clear is that the outlook for crim e prevention and com m unity safety across Europe will be the com plex outcom e of local and national political and social struggles about m eaning and direction, in w hich cultural traditions and sensibilities w ill inform and infuse the future routes of travel and destinations. 32

Situating c rim e p rev en tio n policies in co m p arative p ersp ective

N o te s 1 w w w .k cl.ac.u k /d ep sta/law /re search /icp s/w o rld b rie f/ (accessed 18 Decem ­ ber 2008). 2 See w w w .bsia.co.uk/ 3 See w w w .eucpn.org/ 4 See w w w .eucpn.org/eu cp-aw ard/ 5 The Home Office Research and Planning Unit of the early 1980s, notably while Ron Clarke was at its helm, played an im portant role in the prom otion of situational crim e prevention ideas and practices, as did Alice Colem an with regard to 'defensible space' ideas in Britain (Coleman 1985). 6 The methodology comprises: (i) Intelligence-, gathering and analysing inform a­ tion; (ii) Intervention: blocking, disrupting or weakening the causes of crime; (iii) Implementation: converting the intervention principles into practical m ethods; (iv) Involvement: mobilising other agencies, com panies and individ­ uals to play their part in im plem enting the intervention or acting in partnership; and (v) Impact and process evaluation. 7 These include the requirem ents to: (i) place local authorities as primarily responsible for crime prevention; (ii) prom ote national crim e prevention policies to volume crim e through formal declarations of com m itm ent; and (iii) follow internationally agreed standards such as those set out in the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Crim e (UN 2002). 8 The British governm ent had previously responded to the perceived unwilling­ ness of some agencies to engage with statutory com m unity safety partnerships sim ply by expanding the list of organisations under a legal duty to participate - a classic com m and-and-control solution to a com plex interorganisational problem. 9 Com parable data are not available for Belgium in 1995. 10 Although Van Dijk and colleagues suggest that a sim ilar pattern to the British experience in relation to auto theft is evident across Europe, resulting in fewer cars stolen 'thanks to improved security' (2006: 19). 11 To drive home this point, Taleb gives the hypothetical exam ple of the courageous legislator who enacts a law that all airplane cockpits have locked, bullet-proof doors, w hich is put into universal effect in August 2001, thus preventing the attacks on the World Trade Center. The legislator is unlikely to be given credit for the prevented attacks and would more likely be the subject of public scorn because of the cost and the disruption to pilots and crew.

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Farrington, D. P, and W elsh, B. C. (2007) Saving Children from a Life o f Crime: Early Risk Factors and Effective Intervention. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Felson, M. and Clarke, R. V. (1998) Opportunity M akes the Thief: Practical Theory for Crime Prevention. London: Home Office. Garapon, A. (1995) 'French Legal Culture and the Shock of Globalisation', Social & Legal Studies, 4: 493-506. Garland, D. (1996) 'The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crim e Control in Contem porary Society', British Journal o f Criminology, 36(4): 445-71. Garland, D. (2001) The Culture o f Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gatti, U. (1998) 'Ethical Issues Raised W hen Early Intervention is Used to Prevent Crim e', European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 6: 113-32. Gras, M. L. (2004) 'The Legal Regulation of CCTV in Europe', Surveillance & Society, 2 (2 /3 ): 216-29. Hadfield, P. (2006) Bar Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hayek, F. A. (1979) Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol. Ill: The Political Order o f a Free People. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Hempel, L. and Topfer, E. (2004) CCTV in Europe: Final Report, Urban Eye W orking Paper No. 15. Berlin: Centre for Technology and Society. Online at: w w w .urbaneye.net/results/ue_wrp l5.p d f Home Officc (1997) Getting to Grips with Crime: A New Framezvork for Local Action. London: Home Office. H ome Office (2004) Building Communities, Beating Crime. London: H ome Office. H ome Office (2006) Review o f Partnership Provisions o f the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Report o f Findings. London: Home Office. H ome Office (2007) Cutting Crime: A New Partnership, 2008-11. London: Home Office. Hope, T. (2000) 'Inequality and the Clubbing of Private Security', in T. Hope and R. Sparks (eds) Crime, Risk and Insecurity. London: Routledge, pp. 83-106. International Centre for the Prevention of Crim e (2008) International Repiort on Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Trends and Perspectives. Montreal: ICPC. Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (2002) 'Policy Convergence and Crim e Control in the USA and UK: Stream s of Influence and Levels of Im pact', Criminal Justice, 2: 173-203. Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (2007a) Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice. Open University Press. Jones, T. and N ew bum , T. (2007b) 'Sym bolizing Crim e Control: Reflections on Zero Tolerance', Theoretical Criminology, 11(2): 221-43. King, M. (1991) 'The Political Construction of Crim e Prevention', in K. Stenson and D. Cowell (eds) The Politics o f Crime Control. London: Sage, pp. 87-108. Kingdon, J. (1984) Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Boston: Little, Brown. Lacey, N. (2008) The Prisoner's Dilemma. Cam bridge: Cam bridge University Press. Le Grand, J. (2003) M otivation, Agency and Public Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Levi-Faur, D. (2005) 'The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism ', Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social Science, 598: 12-32. M arquand, D. (1999) 'Prem ature Obsequies: Social Dem ocracy Com es in from the Cold', Political Quarterly, 70(1): 10-18. M oss, K. (2006) 'Crim e Prevention as Law', in K. Moss and M. Stephens (eds) Crime Reduction and the Law. London: Routledge, pp. 1-13. 35

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W ilson, J. Q. and Kelling, G. (1982) 'Broken W indow s: T he Police and N eighbour­ hood Safety', A tlantic M onthly, M arch: 29 -3 7 . Z cdner, L. (1995) 'In Pursuit o f the Vernacular: C om paring Law and O rder D iscourse in Britain and G erm any ', Social & Legal Studies, 4: 517-34. Zedner, L. (2007) 'P re-C rim e and P ost-C rim inology', Theoretical Crim inology, 11(2): 261-81. Zedner, L. (2008) 'Fixing the Future? The P re-em ptive Turn in Crim inal Justice', in B. M cSherry, A. N orrie and S. Bronitt (eds) Regulating D eviance: The Redirection o f C rim inalisation and the Futures o f Crim inal Law. O xford: H art Publishing, pp. 35-58.

37

C h a p te r 2

The political evolution of situational crim e prevention in England and W ales Tim Hope

How do we account for a country's crim e prevention practice to an international audience; and w hy should particular institutional form s and agency practices appear to be m ore successful or popular at certain times and places, both w ithin and betw een jurisdictions, than at others? The intention of this book is to take these questions forw ard; the purpose of this chapter is to provide an account of a particularly English experience - the grow th of situational crim e prevention as a governm ental crim e prevention program m e - in a way that provides som e points of contact with other country's experience (H ope and Sparks 2000). The United Kingdom , particularly the jurisdiction of England and W ales, has seen tw o m ajor transform ations in the governance of crim e control since the 1970s (see Chapter 4 in relation to the Scottish experience). The first has been the em ergence of 'new ' techniques of crim e prevention (H ope and Karstedt 2003) and the second has been an apparent transform ation in the m ode of governance of crim e. W ith regard to the latter, it has becom e som ething of a doxa am ong com m entators to see the signs of such transform ation as archetypical o f a globally pervasive neo-liberalism. In turn, this neo-liberalism in crim inology is defined idealistically; its institutional and practical m anifestations are seen as sym ptom atic of a pervasive culture of crim e control (Garland 2001), or an ideological stratagem of governm ent (Sim on 2007), that som ehow speak to the deep-rooted anxieties of late-m odernity (Young 2007). In this general view , both institutional form and agency practice appear largely as echt exem plars of this culture, with m ore than a hint of historicism 38

The political evolution of situational crime prevention in England and W ales

about their provenance (H ope and Sparks 2000). Crim e prevention practices, such as 'situational crim e prevention' (SCP) are distinguished as a 'new crim inology of everyday life', brought into being as a collective sentim ent by the preoccupations, fears and anxieties of high-crim e society, coterm inous w ith a 'new crim inology of the other', again reflecting social anxiety. Both are held to be functionally equivalent phenom ena of the sam e 'punitive turn' (Garland 2001). Finally, the econom ic transform ­ ations of neo-liberalism are also seen as prim arily cultural in their consequences (Lash and Urry 1994), producing new needs for social discipline that drive em ergent governance strategies of crim e control (Rose 1999). Yet com pelling as these kinds of explanations are (apparently), purely cultural interpretations of the crim e control patterns of late-m odernity tend, in the m ain, towards attenuated explanation of specific institutional form s and m anifestations (cf. Baum an 2000). As Rose rem arks: 'There appears to be no overarching "p ost-d iscip linary " logic, but rather a m ultiplication of possibilities and strategies deployed around different problem atisations [sic] in different sites and with different objectives' (1999: 240). W hile this does not seem to cause too m any problem s for his account of a new governm entality (signalling the end of grand narratives generally), som ething nevertheless seem s to be m issing as an explanation of crim e prevention in its specific institutional m anifestations and agency practices, especially the rise of SCP in late tw entieth-century Britain. W hat has not been m uch discussed is: The apparent disparity in the degree to w hich SCP has penetrated the language and practice of crim e prevention in distinct national settings . . . W hat then explains the apparent enthusiasm - or at least preparedness - of actors in som e settings to follow the situational route as com pared say, with the hesitancy, lack of interest, scepticism or outright hostility of others? If SCP is the characteristic crim e control apparatus of late m odernity, w hy has it taken root m ore deeply in certain (political, institutional) contexts and not others? W hy also does it seem to sit alongside other crim e control approaches, in m ore or less coherent m ixes of governm ental styles and interventions? (H ope and Sparks 2000: 178, original em phasis) N either has the dom inance of SCP been ju st a peculiarity of the English or, rather, the A nglo-Saxons (sic) as w e are know n on the C ontinent since that would m erely revert to another, even less palatable, cultural explanation. Rather, part of the reason lies in the w ay in which the nature of governance in Britain over the period - its specific conjuncture of constitution, politics, social structure, culture and econom y - has placed 39

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

crim e control generally, and SCP specifically, w ithin a contest betw een the Keynesian and the regulatory modes of state governance (Braithw aite 2000a). N ot only has SC P been the progeny of this contest, it has also been itself subject to its contending im pulses; rather than a unitary practice, SCP has experienced the contentions and contradictions of the two m odes within itself. N or has this been sim ply an ideological struggle, since neither have Keynesian m odes been vanquished, nor regulatory m odes vin­ dicated from within the crim e control ideology o f each contending party in British politics - represented on the one hand by the Conservatives, w ho held office during the first period of SC P's ascendancy (1979-97) and on the other by 'N ew ' Labour, w hich has governed national politics since 1997. Instead, the form s and practices of SCP exem plify a contradiction and confusion in m any respects sim ilar to that w hich Rose (1999) sees m ore generally. Even so, a prima facie case can be put forward that governm ent action m ay have been responsible, at least in part, for a dram atic drop in volum e property crime. Since 1995, the British Crim e Survey has reported a 59 per cent reduction in dom estic burglary and a tw o-thirds reduction in vehicle-related theft in England and W ales (Kershaw et al. 2008). Since these are the kinds of crim e m ost am enable to situational (or opportunityreducing) crim e prevention m easures, while not necessarily seeing these m easures as the sole cause of the reduction, it seem s plausible that governm ental action of this kind m ay have had som e effect on these volum e crim e rates. But this begs an im portant question: if w e are to make such a case, we need to ask not only what it is that governm ent thinks it has done but also how it thinks it m ight have done it. Regrettably, over the past years, British governm ent m inisters have been m ore vociferous in their claim s than in the justification of them (H ope 2008a, 2008b). Be that as it m ay, a case will be m ade that w hile SCP as the preferred m ode of governm ent action over the period has had som e success in reducing volum e property crim e, it has been m uch more successful when practised in its regulatory than in its K eynesian form.

T h e Keynesian and th e re g u la to ry m odes o f g o v e rn m e n t in England and W a le s In his essay 'The N ew Regulatory State and the Transform ation of C rim inology', John Braithw aite (2000a) describes the m entality of the 'K eynesian' state as consisting of: a general belief that the state could do the job, including the job of policing . . . under the ideology of the Keynesian state, the response to every outbreak of disorder w as to increase central state policing resources. Social w orkers, probation officers and other welfare 40

The political evolution of situational crime prevention in England and W ales

w orkers em ployed by the state also acquired ever m ore resources and pow ers under the sam e Keynesian disposition. (Braithw aite 2000a: 224) Yet in general econom ic and social policy, U K Conservative governm ents led by M argaret Thatcher set about 'rolling back the state' during the 1980s through a large-scale privatisation of national econom ic enterprises, w elfare institutions and public utilities. Braithw aite (2000a) seizes on these political developm ents as heralding the em ergence of a 'new regulatory state': The new regulatory state is qualitatively different . . . in its reliance on self-regulatory organisations, enforced self-regulation and other responsive regulatory techniques that substitute for direct command and control. Responsive regulation also flow s into strategies for regulating already private institutions through com pliance system s, codes of practice and other self-regulatory strategies. (Braithw aite 2000a: 224) The challenge, as his title presupposes, is to apply this m odel to crim e and justice. N evertheless, Braithw aite is perhaps too am bitious in his enthusiasm , at least w hen applied specifically to the policies of crim e control actually practised during this era and subsequently. In the first place, while 'Thatcherism ' pursued deregulation, it was chiefly for the purpose of econom ic liberalisation and the reduction of public expenditure; in m atters of social discipline, the ideology and governm ental practice was distinctly authoritarian, if not necessarily alw ays state-centric (Gam ble 1988). Second, as he acknow ledges elsew here (Braithw aite 2000b), an adequately responsive regulatory state presupposes not a liberal, m ini­ m alist state but one based upon 'republican' principles, notably an assum ption that civil society and local com m onw ealth are constitutive entities in their own right, a priori of the institutions of 'the sovereign State' (pace Garland 2001). Yet this republican assum ption never has applied with much force to the constitution of the British state, nor features greatly in recent British constitutional theory (Loader and W alker 2007). W hile regulatory governance m ight operate in the UK in the m anner envisaged by Braithw aite with regard to the 'private sector' essentially to ensure the 'self-policing' of private institutions in the com m on interest (Braithw aite and Drahos 2000) - the w ay in w hich the regulatory state has developed in Britain with regard to the 'public sector', particularly local governm ent and the police service, has been quite different, m ore akin to Rose's conception of 'governing-at-a-distance' (Rose 1999). But, pace Rose, this has com e about arguably less because of 41

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

a new 'governm entality' than as a consequence of a m uch more established constitutionality. There are three constitutional principles of local governm ent in England and W ales that not only define the state but also provide an im portant contextualisation for the current construction of crim e prevention in Britain (Hope 2002). The first is the relative lack o f autonom y of local governm ent vis-a-vis the (central) state. The constitutional convention in Britain, upheld by the courts, is that local governm ent can only take actions that are perm itted or justifiable by legal statute or statutory instrum ent by virtue of Acts of Parliam ent. If local authorities do som ething that is not perm itted or justifiable by reference to a specific statute they m ay be held to be acting ultra vires' Thus, the fram ew ork of statutory law is the essential, perm issive precondition for local governm ent - constituted as a system of adm inistration - and specific laws (e.g. Section 17 of the Crim e and D isorder Act 1998, referred to later) need to be enacted to enable, as m uch as to com pel, local governm ent to perform particular functions. A rguably a consequence of this principle is that local governm ent is effectively the adm inistrator of public policy. From the central governm ent perspective, local governm ent in Britain exists to adm inister national policy locally. W hile elected officials have leeway to interpret national policy or allocate local revenue in w ays appropriate to their constituencies, they can neither raise additional revenue nor dispose of central revenues outside the fram ew ork that is determ ined centrally. W hile they m ay innovate w ith practice, over m uch of their recent history, local authorities rarely have had the confideiice or legitim acy to innovate with policy. The second, relevant principle is that of the fiduciary duty of local authorities - that is, that they m ust be able to dem onstrate that they have discharged their financial responsibilities in the public interest. This principle is the prim ary constitutional justification for local governm ent accountability in the UK and provides the justification also for the external, public auditing of local governm ent operations, carried out by statutory audit bodies (such as the A udit Com m ission). The third, relevant constitutional principle (follow ing the other two) is that of central governm ent control over local governm ent revenue and expenditure. M uch of the political history of cen tral-local governm ent relations over the past three decades has been a struggle for the control of public expenditure m uch of it in the form of public sendees adm inistered by local authorities (for exam ple in delivering education, housing, personal social services, recreational and environm ental services, and also of crim inal justice). Now adays, less than a quarter of local governm ent incom e required to finance these services is raised through local taxation and charges (Chandler 2001). N ot only does central governm ent control the am ount of tax revenue that is allocated each year to local governm ent for service provision, but also successive Conservative governm ents of the period 1979-97 passed legislation (preserved by their successors) enabling central 42

The political evolution of situational crime prevention in England and W ales

governm ent to 'cap' local governm ent expenditure by im posing lim its on the am ount that individual local authorities could raise through local taxation.2 A corollary of the fiduciary duty and the paucity of local revenue is that central governm ents have needed to institute regim es of expenditure control on local governm ent if public sector spending and borrow ing is not to unbalance central econom ic m anagem ent. And, in the wake of such financial controls, governm ent has been able to institute perform ance accountability regimes, not only to m ake public services accountable to their 'custom ers' but also to m ake them m ore efficient in the delivery of their services. W here governm ents have differed is not so m uch in having such regim es but in their purposes: for past Conservative governm ents, such regim es w ould provide a transparent basis for consum er choice and 'quasi-m arket' com petition; for Labour, their purpose has been more that of providing the electorate w ith feedback (validated by general elections) that the 'challenges' and 'targets' the governm ent has set for local governm ent perform ance on the public's behalf have been achieved. The significance of these constitutional issues is that they dem onstrate the basis for the powers of control and influence that central governm ent (the sovereign state) is able to wield over the local adm inistration of public services in Britain, including policing services and local governm ent com m unity safety practice.3 In other words, even though the state w ithin the UK m ay now increasingly govern at a distance, it retains m ost of the levers for ensuring com pliance w ithin the public sector through top-dow n policy, and to that extent, rem ains sovereign over public m atters of crim e control. In contrast, no such central control operates over the private enterprise and civil society sectors of British society. The w idespread denationalisa­ tion of form erly publicly owned services and utilities initiated by the Thatcher governm ents occasioned a need to replace the direct governance of public expenditure with a new m ode of regulation than that which had been practised hitherto within the public sector. Since the substitution of direct, central governm ent intervention by at-a-distance regulation was part of a m ore general reaction (literally) to Keynesian econom ic m anage­ m ent, it is hardly surprisingly that there has been som e convergence in the m ode of governance applied generally to all sectors - public, private and voluntary. In this respect, Braithw aite's (2000a) 'new , regulatory state', incorporates m uch of O sborne and G aebler's (1992) 'new public m anagem ent' w hich itself incorporates orthodoxies of private sector m anagem ent. Sim ilarly, as the C onservatives' privatising im pulses ext­ ended to local w elfare policy, to be delivered m ore by the 'voluntary' or charitable sector and less by local governm ent, so these civil society agencies too have com e under sim ilar financial and contractual regim es. The strategy of central governm ent has been to use regulatory in­ strum ents to engineer voluntary com pliance with public policy objectives w ithin the distribution of constituted pow er.4 So, although a new 43

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

governm entality m ay underlie the em ergence of the idea of a regulatory state, an unchanged constitutionality concerning state-local governm ent relations has preserved m any of the institutions and governm ent practices of the Keynesian w elfare state w ithin the public sector in Britain. The ideological im pulse of the Thatcher governm ents was to look for w ays of circum venting local governm ent in order to reach citizens directly, using perform ance regim es (such as the publication of state schools' exam in­ ation results) as a w ay of providing m arket inform ation to enable citizens to exercise consum er choice (such as deciding which school their children should attend). In contrast, New Labour governm ents post 1997 have been much m ore inclined to w ork with the grain of local governm ent institutions. Yet the expenditure of public revenue still provides the decisive tool of governance for the sovereign state. To a m uch greater degree than their predecessors, N ew Labour governm ents have sought to use perform ance criteria as a m eans of engineering the im plem entation o f centrally determ ined public policy m easures - a process it has called 'delivery' - via a regim e of target setting and auditing. And central governm ent has further imposed such targets upon itself as declared 'contracts' with the electorate in the form of public service agreem ents. These differences have lead to a bifurcation in regulatory practice as it has affected the im plem entation of crim e prevention policy. On the one hand, the privatising and liberalising tendencies of past Conservative governm ents have created capacities and opportunities for regulatory governance applicable to the private sector and civil society at large. In contrast, local governm ent, including the police, w ere effectively bypassed as the principal agencies of crim e prevention, which was seen to lie in the hands of private and civil bodies. As noted below , in terms of crim e prevention, these have been relatively successful, though their collateral effects m ay have been less so overall. On the other hand, New Labour governm ents have placed local governm ent and the police in a more central role as agents of crim e prevention. W ithin existing constitutional arrangem ents, they have instituted new adm inistrative m achinery notably crim e and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) betw een local governm ent and the police (set up by the Crim e and Disorder A ct 1998) - and used perform ance regim es to ensure com pliance to national objectives.5 In effect, these latter reform s have revived Keynesian m odes of the governance of crim e; though they have also replicated som e of the endem ic failures associated with them.

Police failu re and th e e m e rg e n c e o f ‘p a rtn e rs h ip ’ During the 1970s, the central governm ent of the British state was faced w ith a crescendo of system ic difficulties in the adm inistration of crim inal justice (W indlesham 1987). The bottom -line cost to the state - grow th in 44

The political evolution of situational crime prevention in England and W ales

the size of the prison population - seem ed inexorable, relatively unrelated to short-term changes in crim e rates, and easier to increase by legislation and sentencing practice than to reduce by policing, crim e prevention or alternatives to custody. M oreover, the rate of crim e recorded by the police, already grow ing, was show ing signs of increasing dram atically (which it did during the 1980s). N ot least of these system ic failures had been that of the police service - evidently failing to m eet public expectations in reducing the crim e rate, detecting offenders or reassuring the public. Echoing public disquiet about rising crim e, research had failed to find m uch in the way of conclusive evidence of police operational effectiveness (Bow ling and Foster 2002). Further, the period saw increasing conflict over the governance of policing, particularly a set o f political struggles involving local authorities, m ainly representing inner-city and large m etropolitan areas and controlled by a 'm unicipal left' w ithin the Labour Party. Follow ing defeat of this m ove for a local governm ent of policing (largely achieved by the Thatcher governm ent's abolition of the big city m etropolitan county councils, w here the m ovem ent had been most vociferous), central governm ent turned to the idea of partnership as the preferred m ode for delivering safety from crim e (Crawford 1997; M cLaughlin 2002). The partnership idea germ inated during an expert-led H om e Office W orking Party on Crim e Prevention (Gladstone 1980), initiated under the last Labour adm inistration of the 1970s (Crawford 1998). This early form ulation, reflecting that governm ent's 'corporatist' outlook, was to be applied prim arily to local governm ent: a better m anagem ent of crim e could be obtained by co-ordinating the efforts of public bodies particularly using operational m eans to circum vent the constitutional division betw een the police and local governm ent - and im proving their consultative links with the com m unity (Crawford 1997). This went hand in hand with an em phasis on technical expertise to inform practice (rather than political ideology or police professionalism ), with the newly em erg­ ing 'situational crim e prevention' prom ising to provide a m ore behaviourally sophisticated 'third w ay' betw een the crude polarity of 'physical' and 'social' crim e prevention (Craw ford 1998). The concept of partnership as it em erged w as prim arily one of ensuring governm ental efficiency: it was believed that co-ordination of agencies' efforts would bring the expertise of relevant parties to the table, to focus on crim e 'in the round', identifying com petences and gaps in provision. The sub-text was that not only would this produce better local outcom es but also start to w rest the ow nership of dealing with the crim e problem aw ay from the m onopoly of the public police.6 By the tim e the W orking Party had com pleted its deliberations, the C onservatives under M argaret Thatcher had gained power. For them, the partnership ideal w as a useful and expedient w ay of solving the politico-adm inistrative dilem m a of crim e control (W indlesham 1987). The 45

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

C onservatives' concept o f partnership rested upon a notion of voluntary association of individual bodies, each with its own interests - in this case, protecting their ow n private security. It followed that no single body could have anything approaching a m onopoly over the aggregate of security, least of all state agencies. And since the public good of security was thought to be produced as the sum of individual private security, then if sufficient num bers of individual agents could be brought together in m utual associations, inefficiencies and gaps in production of security could be rem oved. Thus, the essence of the C onservatives' approach to the partnership idea was less that of a technical, m anagerial blueprint for a corporatist state, as the Hom e Office W orking Party had thought (Craw ­ ford 1998), than that of creating an infrastructure for a new, regulatory governance of crim e control. Em phasis w as to be placed oil developing voluntary, co-operative agreem ents am ong partners based upon a com ­ mon appraisal of need (Home Office 1984, 1990). The issue of constitutionality also shaped the N ew Labour govern­ m ent's approach to crim e prevention. Som e while earlier, the M organ Com m ittee (H om e Office 1991) had argued that local authorities should have 'clear statutory responsibility' for delivering the m ulti-agency approach (para. 6.9); som ething the Conservatives had refused to coun­ tenance, given their antipathy to local authorities as political institutions. N otw ithstanding Labour's sentim ental attachm ent to m unicipalism (which had inspired hopes that principal statutory responsibility for crim e prevention m ight be vested in m unicipalities), the Crim e and Disorder Act (CDA) 1998 im posed a joint duty falling equally upon local authorities and the police. O ther than providing statutory obligation to the main partners to act as such, all other institutional arrangem ents and operating practices, especially for the police service, rem ained as they were under the Conservatives (H om e Office 1998). In practice, that m eant preserving the operational independence of the chief officers of police.7 N evertheless, the constitutional com prom ise of the CDA offered a novel means for central governm ent to shed irksom e responsibilities of direct state m anagem ent of crim e control w hile also acceding to the profes­ sionally autonom ous police service. Through the allocation of police resources and a legislative (steering) role in crim inal justice policy­ making, central governm ent retained the possibility of taking credit for crim e reduction. The CDA appeased the police by keeping their oper­ ational independence intact and headed off another bruising confrontation betw een Labour and the chief constables. At the sam e time, its statutory perform ance regim e tied the police service into a rudim entary accounting to their local com m unities (H ope 2006). W hile it gave local governm ent a share of the responsibility for crim e control, it also w idened accountabil­ ity, not least creating a convenient focus (or scapegoat), if needed, for public concern. From the police perspective, the CDA offered a 'w in-w in' solution to their difficulties in local crim e control: it w ould bring local 46

T he political evolution o f situational crim e prevention in England and W ales

auth orities, and their resources, on to the police side in the 'b attle against crim e'; it w ould im prove not only police effectiveness but also their im age w ithin the com m u nity; it appeared to be an easy con cession to com m u nity accou n tability w hile avoid ing d irect accoun tability; and, o f course, it offered som e o ther b od y to take, or share, the blam e, w hile reserving to itself the credit for crim e reduction.

P a rtn e rs h ip w ith p riv a te c itizen s A guiding v ision o f the C on serv atives d uring the 1980s had been the creation o f a 'p rop erty-ow ning d em ocracy '. As M argaret T hatcher said in an interview w ith T im e m agazine (22 Ju n e 1987), 'F ar m ore p eople ow n their ow n hom es now . W e are nearly up to the U nited States - not yet quite - but now one in five o f ou r people ow ns com pany shares. Far m any m ore people have savings accounts. T h at's all extend ing opportu nity ever m ore w id ely.' A m ong the m easures for d oing this w ere the freeing up of m ortgage finance and the transfer o f ow nership o f social housing to existing tenants via preferential pu rch ase schem es (Forrest and M urie 1988). A s a con sequ ence, b etw een 1981 and 2007 the p roportion o f d w ellings in o w ner-occu pation increased by a fifth, w ith around three-qu arters o f all d w ellings m oving into o w ner-occu pation .8 C oincid ing w ith the grow th of portable, relativ ely h igh -value con su m er goods, the grow th o f private property ow nership constituted a pow erful d river both of opportu nities for crim e and citizen dem and for security, w ith household property crim e rates grow in g com m ensu rately (see Figure 2.1).

Source: British Crime Survey/National Statistics (England and Wales)

Figure 2.1

Household crime and the polarisation of tenure, 1981-2007 47

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

The 'm oral vision' of situational crim e prevention was in tune with the Thatcher revolution (Kleinig 2000); based upon self-interest, the ethos of situational crim e prevention chim ed well w ith the kind of property-ow ning, liberal dem ocracy, inscribing the values of freedom , personal liberty and individual responsibility, to w hich Thatcher aspired (Duff and M arshall 2000). H itherto, governm ent efforts to prom ote crim e prevention to private citizens had been in the form of 'public inform a­ tion' publicity backed up with free security advice, on request, from local police crim e prevention officers. Rem iniscent of the 'H om e Front' during W orld W ar Tw o, this public service approach - w hereby the state acts to exhort citizens to participate in publicly beneficial activities (such as 'digging for victory', picking up litter, crossing the road safely, sneezing into a handkerchief) - cam e under increasing stress in the face of private property ow ners' escalating dem ands for private security, that is, the protection of their persons and property, w hich the public police service appeared unable to meet. A H om e Office survey in an affluent suburban area found that 93 per cent of dw ellings had levels of hom e security that fell below the standard being recom m ended by the then police Crim e Prevention Officer (CPO) service, w hile less than a half of 1 per cent of all households in the area were likely to receive a CPO survey each year (W inchester and Jackson 1982). Clearly, the public provision of private security, via the CPO s, w as not only inim ical to C onservative ideology but apparently failed to address the needs of their constituents. W hat w as needed w as to privatise private security by em pow ering the consum er. In order to wean ordinary citizens aw ay from their sentim ental attachm ent to the Keynesian state and persuade them to take greater responsibility for their own security, it was necessary to convert their sense o f public duty into the virtues of self-help; hence M argaret Thatcher's fam ous aphorism: I think w e've been through a period w here too m any people have been given to understand that if they have a problem , it's the governm ent's job to cope w ith it . . . And, you know , there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and w om en, and there are families. And no governm ent can do anything except through people, and people m ust look to them selves first. It's our duty to look after ourselves and then also to look after our neighbour . . . there's no such thing as entitlem ent, unless som eone has first m et an obligation. (M argaret Thatcher, in an interview with Woman's Own m agazine, 31 O ctober 1987, em phasis added) The concept of 'neighbourhood w atch' (NW) was extrem ely useful in effecting this transition since it encouraged individual self-help while sim ultaneously reinforcing the virtues of both neighbourly reciprocity and 48

The political evolution of situational crime prevention in England and W ales

support of the police. During the mid 1980s, the governm ent launched a cam paign to establish N W , with local police services acting as its agents: An advertising cam paign was run at that tim e that suggested that the public needed to support the police in the 'fight against crim e', and a series of television and new spaper cam paigns w ere run with supporting m aterial for distribution through police forces and other crim e prevention groups, w hich encouraged the public to act as the 'eyes and ears of the police'. (Laycock and Tilley 1995: 550) If N W encouraged residents to report issues to the police, im plicitly the police w ould reciprocate by offering their protection to these 'active citizens'. M em bership of N W grew, peaking in England and Wales around 1992 (H ope and Trickett 2004), coinciding with the peaking of the property crim e rate (Figure 2.1). A n analysis of British Crim e Survey data from that period suggested that N W required both fertile social conditions (in the form of social capital based upon a sense of com m unity reciprocity) and a strong and ever-present threat o f crim e in the m inds of residents (H ope and Trickett 2004). In this respect, worry about the grow th of crim e galvanised the property-ow ning m iddle classes into 'doing som ething' (albeit in a relatively mild way) about their ow n risk of crim e in their residential locality. The general effect of the cam paign to m arket N W was to reinforce a 'taste' for private security am ong the propertied m iddle classes (H ope and Trickett 2004). A nalysis of data from the 1994 British Crim e Survey found a distinct cluster of crim e prevention activities associated with NW m em bership, including security m arking of household property, asking neighbours to watch the hom e when away, and having household contents insurance (H ope and Lab 2001). These activities reinforced the private (target-hardening) security of ow ner-occupiers with additional reassurance, form ing a set of 'club-goods' that could be associated with N W m em bership, and that added benefit to individual private security, chiefly by retaining the externality costs of individual private security activities w ithin the 'residential club' (H ope 2000). In return, by support­ ing N W via netw orks of local voluntary co-ordinators, the police w ere able to establish a conduit for inculcating a security consciousness among the m ass of private property owners. Yet consistent with Conservative ideology it was not to be the role of the police, as a public body, to supply m ore security to private citizens. W hile there was a grow th in private policing and security suppliers d uring this period, it was also necessary to increase the dem and for private security am ong private citizens, and to diversify the range of security 'products', so that they would not look to the public police and their traditional services for protection; in other w ords, to divert the public aw ay from its habitual dem and for 'm ore bobbies on the beat'. 49

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

C on veniently, the grow th o f private security con sciou sn ess am on g property-ow n ers fostered by N eighbourh ood W atch gave a w elcom e op p o r­ tunity to the British insuran ce ind ustry, w hich began to offer discounted p rem iu m s to N W m em bers (L aycock and T illey 1995). It is hard now to d iscern the extent to w hich this m ove reflected d irect governm ent en couragem ent rather than a response b y the insuran ce ind ustry to burgeoning m arket opportu nities. In any event, the p rofitability o f the d om estic contents insuran ce m arket, w hich had been relatively sm all before the 1970s, depended less on the accu rate targeting o f risk than on m arket grow th and penetration (Litton 1997). In this respect, NW m em bersh ip flagged up a profitable m arket for hom e insuran ce products. B ecau se the N W 'm essage' to its su bscribers coupled their anxieties about their p rop erty to a generalised 'fear o f crim e', they becam e an ideal m arket for insurers; that is, high ly risk-averse con su m ers able and w illing to pay h igh insuran ce prem iu m s against a low actuarial risk. M oreover, the w illingn ess o f the public police to accept insuran ce and secu rity industry sponsorsh ip gave the sponsors d irect access to their target m arkets, thereby greatly red ucin g their m arketing costs. A ccord in g to the British C rim e Survey, by 1994 som e 83 per cent of hou sehold s w ere regularly insuring their hou sehold contents against theft (H ope 2000). In the w ake o f the insurers has follow ed w idespread con su m p tion o f private security products, con sequ ential up on the in­ su rers' interests in loss ad justm ent (H ope 2006). T hu s, the m arket for private secu rity grew extensively, w ith an alm ost fivefold increase in the turnover o f B ritish secu rity equipm ent m an ufacturers betw een 1983 and 2 003.9 A ccord in g to the BCS, by 1994 around 70 per cent o f household s had som e form o f secu rity device in their d w ellings, and about a fifth had an intru d er alarm installed (H ope and Lab 2001). In sum , the m uchvaunted strategy o f 'resp onsib ilisation ' w as achieved not so m uch by state d irection as by its opposite: ind irect action to stim ulate a 'taste' for private security, that w ould then be satisfied by private enterprise. W hether or not this has b een the only thing that led to the d ecline in household property crim e after 1995 is high ly arguable; but the coincidence o f the trends in Figu re 2.1 suggests that, w hatev er the o verall set of reasons, the grow th o f d om estic private secu rity has played a part in the 'm arket correction' necessary to ad just better-off private property-ow ners to their crim e risks, w ithout the need for direct state intervention and at som e profit to the private sector. As such, the role o f the regulatory state in crim e prevention has been to 'm ake the m arket' for priv ate security.

P a rtn e rs h ip w ith p riv a te in d u stry If the con su m ption o f d om estic secu rity by priv ate citizens has con trib ­ uted to the red uction of v olu m e property crim e in England and W ales, it 50

T he political evolution o f situational crim e prevention in England and W ales

has not d one so w ithout som e change to the supply o f property itself, particularly the supply o f new m otor vehicles and d om estic dw ellings, the m ajor classes o f citizens' private property. Significant changes in vehicle security, resultin g in com m ensu rate red uctions in v ehicle crim e, have com e about as a result of tw o pieces o f regulatory action (W ebb 2005). The first w as the pu blication b y the H om e O ffice in 1992 o f a detailed C ar T heft Index - a league table o f the risk o f theft by m ake and m odel. H itherto, m an ufacturers had b een reticent about incorporating security into their m od els, but: Th e C ar Theft Index changed all that, and m ade security a m arketing issue. By exp osing those m akes and m od els o f car m ost at risk, custom ers w ere em pow ered to m ake inform ed d ecisions about their choice o f vehicle. C ou pled w ith the great deal o f pu blicity generated . . . the m an ufacturers b egan to d esign m ore sop histicated d evices such as d ead locks and engine im m obilizers into the m ore nu m erou s econ om y vehicles. (W ebb 2005: 468) Second, this change in m an ufacture w as reinforced by E uropean U nion legislation requ iring all new cars to be fitted w ith electronic im m obilisers from 1998 onw ards. By 1999, the Labour go v ernm ent had established a V ehicle C rim e R ed uction A ction T eam com prising not only experts and civil servan ts but also representatives o f the m otor industry. It encouraged changes and procedu res across the board , inclu d ing the con tin uation of the C ar Theft Index, u n d er the gu ise o f the N ew C ar Secu rity Rating Schem e, operated by the M otor Insu rance R epair R esearch C en tre, w hich is ow ned by the British insu ran ce ind ustry. Su bsequ ent im p rov em en ts to v ehicle security 'are likely to be one o f the m ain reasons for the reduction in thefts of v ehicles' (N ational A ud it O ffice 2005). N everth eless, it is im p ortan t to note that m echanism s like the C ar T heft Index do not operate as a d irect pu blic service to the pu blic (as they w ould in a p u rely K eynesian m ode), particu larly as it seem s d oubtful that m ost con su m ers w ould con su lt it before choosing a new car. R ather, the goal of crim e red uction am ong the con su m ers o f m otor vehicles has been d elivered by providing a public subsid y to facilitate a private transaction w ith an influential third party - that is, betw een the con su m ers' interest in risk assu rance, and the insuran ce in d u stry 's interest in loss reduction (H ope 2006). T h e com plian ce o f m otor m an ufacturers has been achieved not by direct state intervention but by affecting the natu re o f the co n su m er-in su rer transaction, shaped by con su m ers' interest in avoid ing the otherw ise higher theft prem iu m costs that the insurers could now feel ju stified in passing on to them by virtue o f the au th ority of the C ar Theft Index (w hich they now ow n and operate). Still, w hat rem ains un know n is w hether this has resulted in net profit or loss to the m otor m anufacturers. W e should su spect the form er if the greater dem and for secu rity has 51

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

added a prem ium to the price charged to the consum er. A rguably, this may be another success for the responsibilisation strategy, contributing in its ow n sm all w ay to British industrial production.10 A second w ay in w hich regulatory policy m ay have had an im pact on dom estic property crim e is through intervention into the built environ­ m ent planning and developm ent process. A concern w ith 'crim e preven­ tion through environm ental design' em erged during the 1970s (Poyner and W ebb 1991; Crawford 1998), leading eventually to the governm ent circulating advice about 'planning out crim e' to be considered by parties to the local statutory planning process (DoE 1994). DoE C ircular 5 /9 4 was not a statutory requirem ent; rather, its significance lay in indirectly creating an opportunity for 'crim e prevention' to be inserted into the planning system in the follow ing ways: • Giving 'Police A rchitectural Liaison Officers' (ALOs) a form al status in the planning system as expert advisors on crim e risk. • A rticulating 'crim e prevention' as a purpose of urban planning, and arguing for a partnership approach to com plem entary activities. • W idening the concept of crim e prevention, from physical security devices to environm ental design. (Schneider and Kitchen 2002: 202) The governm ent has continued this approach by publishing guidance and advice for local planning com m ittees, w hich are adm inistered by local governm ent autonom ously from central governm ent (ODPM 2004). On the police side, the A ssociation of C hief Police Officers (ACPO) established the 'Secured by Design' schem e: 'a police initiative to encourage the building industry to adopt crim e prevention m easures in the design of developm ents to assist in reducing the opportunity for crim e and the fear of crim e, creating a safer and m ore secure environm ent'.11 W hile Secured by Design is offered as a standard 'kite-m ark' to the building industry, its significance is that it legitim ises the advice given by police A LO s within the planning process (Schneider and Kitchen 2002). Yet even though governm ent advice offers a broad planning perspective, and the Secured by Design standards cover a range of design principles, in its early stages at least research found that the m ajority of police ALOs em phasised target-hardening and one particular form of estate layout (based around culs-de-sac linked by m ain feeder roads) (2002: 197). A general issue identified by Schneider and Kitchen is that the Secured by Design process, in practice, has reflected an interplay betw een police expertise in target-hardening and the com m ercial considerations o f the big house­ building developers of the British construction industry that has resulted in a bias tow ards a particular kind o f suburban, low -density, private estate (2002: 230). Still, in as m uch as these new developm ents have reinforced 52

T he political evolution o f situational crim e prevention in England and W ales

further the 'clu bb in g' o f private security in 'exclu siv e' d evelopm ents, w hile also m akin g them affordable to m id dle-in com e hou sehold s (H ope 2000), they m ay w ell have contributed not only to the red uction of burglary bu t also to a grow th o f inequ ality in risk betw een the better and the v ery w orse off m em bers o f society (H ope 2001).

K eynesian c r im e re d u c tio n H aving m oved sw iftly to enact the C D A , the L abou r go v ernm ent then need ed to 'task' the statu tory C D R Ps w ith things to do that w ould 'd eliv er' its prom ise o f crim e reduction, setting out its stall in the Crim e R eduction Strategy (H om e O ffice 1999). Tw o actions w ere prom inent: investm en t in pu blic 'closed -circu it television' (CC TV) system s; and a m ode o f governan ce that em ph asised the d eliv ery of crim e prevention via specific 'p ro jects'. CCTV In m any w ays, the d evelopm ent of open-street, p u blicly funded CC TV su rv eillance system s represents perh aps the m ost 'K eyn esian' o f all crim e prevention inv estm en t in Britain, resem blin g as som e have called it the 'fifth u tility' (G raham 1999). P aradoxically, it w as the C on servatives w ho initiated the investm ent: b etw een 1994 and 1997, 78 p er cent o f the H om e Office crim e p rev ention bu d get w ent on C C TV , w ith over £250 m illion of pu blic m on ey spent on C C TV betw een 1992 and 2002 (w hich inclu des the 'N ew L abour' governm ent), m akin g Britain one o f the m o st highly C C TV -su rveilled societies in the w orld (M cC ahill and N orris 2002). W hether C C TV has achieved a greater level of security seem s unlikely (G ill and Spriggs 2005) and perh aps even im m aterial, since the idea dovetailed neatly w ith . . . ideological dem and s for privatisation of the public sector. T h e private sector w ould be fully involved in b u ilding, equipping and m aintaining the system s . . . private security firm s w ere responsible for m on itoring the screens in the control room s and, as bu siness had contributed to the setting up o f the system s, it w ould have a say in the shape o f the system s and how they w ere run. (M cC ahill and N orris 2002: I I ) N ew Labour has continued this investm en t in pu blic good s infrastructure via financial 'partn ersh ip ' w ith the private sector, though it has left local auth orities w ith the o ngoing bu rd en o f financing the schem es, w hich m u st com e out o f their hard -pressed rev enu e accoun ts and w hich, if anything, h as left them even m ore in hock (via the fidu ciary duty) to central governm ent. 53

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

Crime reduction via ‘projects’

The question of w hat the CD RPs ought to do to prevent crim e has been answ ered by governm ent in the form of their undertaking tim e-lim ited, ad hoc 'projects'.12 The local C D R P's job is to initiate targeted crim e prevention projects and initiatives, reflecting an analysis (audit) of crim e patterns and priorities in their local area (H om e Office 1999; Audit Com m ission 1999). As a consequence of the introduction of the 'new public m anagem ent' into local public adm inistration, the perform ance of partnerships is to be publicly auditable, conform ing to 'targets' imposed centrally as a condition o f future funding. The com m on denom inator is a belief in, and a com m itm ent to, the principle of rational public action. The m ode in w hich prevention projects are enjoined to operate conform s, in m ost respects, to a m odel of rational strategic planning by 'identifying and analysing the problem , devising solutions, assessing the likely im pact of solutions, review ing progress, refining approaches and evaluating success (sic)' (Tilley et al. 1999: 28). Know ledge of a particular crim e problem is to be ascertained in advance of trying to im plem ent action, and the selection of services and m easures to be delivered is then tailored to the key features of crim e m anifest in the specific target area or group. The ideal m odel is of an influential and credible governm ent, guided by expert know ledge, 'dem onstrating' by practical exam ple that certain pro­ gram m es 'w ork' and thereby persuading others to adopt them .13 Laycock (2001), for exam ple, describes the research and im plem entation pro­ gram m es involved in the British governm ent's developm ent and dissem i­ nation of a policy aim ing to prevent repeat victim isation. The form of adoption is also a continuation of the project-based dem onstration. Thus, once persuaded, those with the authority to act are enjoined further to establish and evaluate their own 'projects' so that they too can dem on­ strate benefits, both to their constituents, as the recipients o f prevention, and to the public purse, that value for m oney has been achieved. U nfortunately, the governm ent's ow n effort at dem onstration-by-project - the £250 m illion Crim e Reduction Programm e, w hich ran from 1999 to 2002 - failed rather m iserably to fulfil its prom ise, encountering m assive im plem entation failure across the board and m eagre results (Homel et al. 2004; Bullock and Tilley 2003; M aguire 2004; H ope et al. 2004). Irrespective of w ho was to blam e - w hether governm ent m inisters, central program m e m anagers, local projects, HM Treasury, or even the independent evalu­ ators (Homel et al. 2004) - the ensuing silence from governm ent, along with its behind-the-scenes efforts to stifle and suppress critical evaluation evidence (H ope 2008b, 2008c), is perhaps testim ony enough to the collapse of the project ideal, and the Keynesian assum ption of rational public action that underpins it.

54

The political evolution of situational crime prevention in England and W ales

G o v ern in g th ro u g h insecurity The incom ing N ew Labour governm ent m ade the control of 'anti-social behaviour' its chief aim of crim e control, a residue from its m uncipalism during the preceding years, com bined with a sedulously fostered, election-w inning populism (Burney 1999). Yet the focus on local disorder and anti-social people m ay have heightened public anxiety - paradoxi­ cally w here such people and events are not experienced directly. Far from reducing dem and upon the state, the crim e prevention strategy pursued by the Conservatives and bequeathed to Labour m ay have stoked up citizens' dem ands for security and contributed to inequality in its provision, w ithout any alleviation of the burden upon the state and its agencies: 'by m aking antisocial behaviour into a m ajor social policy problem , and giving it sustained high-visibility attention, Labour has m ade a small problem larger, thereby m aking people m ore aw are of it and less satisfied w ith their lives and their governm ent' (Tonry 2004: 57). Perhaps to avoid the buck being passed by m inisters, the police service, led by ACPO, have set about responding to an apparent 'reassurance gap' - that is, the inconsistency betw een public anxiety about crim e and the reduction in the volum e crim e - by directing police activity towards those crim es and disorders that (they think) give ordinary citizens most cause for concern and anxiety in their localities.14 If these local sources of anxiety in local com m unities can be addressed, and the police are seen to be giving priority to local concerns, then not only will the public's sense of security increase but so will their confidence in the police as an effective service organisation. Yet there are som e policy risks in this conception. First, this extension of policing into the com m unity m ay increase dissatisfaction and discon­ tent, either if it serves to heighten and dram atise local insecurities, or if, in practice, the police prove unable to deliver on their prom ise of efficacious action. Second, as with m any other 'com m unity policing' initiatives, there is the widespread assum ption that it is specific police action - albeit in collaboration with com m unity partners - that is the most efficacious m eans of preventing disorder. Indeed, in this respect, it seem s there has been little change from the ethos of NW , except that in this case efforts at responsibilisation m ay be even m ore likely to backfire into public resentment. Third, the approach tends to dow nplay the role o f other social factors and conditions in the creation of disorder, w hich m ay be m ore influenced by social policy - such as neighbourhood renew al or urban regeneration - than by crim inal justice actions. And finally, action is still predicated on intelligence (although now m ore focused on disorder than crim e), and that this intelligence should determ ine police operational policy. In this sense, it continues the perform ance-based ethos of the Crim e Reduction Strategy,

55

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

nam ely that the delivery of com m unity safety is to com e from intelligencebased policing rather than, say, from the directly expressed voice of citizens in the governance of their ow n com m unity safety.

Conclusion Despite the apparent 'success' of regulatory approaches in bringing down volum e property crim e, the governm ent rem ains saddled with the dilem m a of public provision. N otw ithstanding the responsibilisation that appears to have taken place, since the financial and social capital available to citizens to consum e private security of all kinds is inequitably distributed (H ope and Lab 2001), the less w ell-off m em bers of society face not only higher risks (H ope 2007) but also a private security deficit that still falls, if anyw here, upon the state to redress. D espite the privatisation of 'm ass private property' (Kempa et al. 2004), there still rem ains a public space that falls to public bodies to secure. Yet, the penalty of inequality in private security is that it underm ines public good provision. Citizens who are required to spend m ore of their private resources on public goods, such as health services, education and in this case their own and their neighbourhood's security, tend to have little incentive to contribute to the general public good over and above w hat appears to them to m eet their ow n needs, m aking them less likely to support additional contributions to the cost of public policing or the crim inal justice system , particularly if they see no benefit to their ow n im m ediate security. In a strategy of private action, those who have the capital to devote to security are m ore likely to w ant to spend it upon them selves than donate it tow ards am eliorating the social and econom ic conditions of those most at risk of crim e (as victim s and offenders), who are m ore likely to be the poorer and m arginalised sectors of society (H ope 2000), even if this would be an optim um 'w elfare' strategy for reducing crim e from the point of view of society as a whole. A lthough such a strategy of risk reduction m ight appear socially prudent, w ithout som e agreed and ultim ately enforceable conception of 'the social', that would underpin com pliance and redistribution, market failure is likely to prevail, at least for the 'K eynesian' ideal of providing security as a universal public good (Hope and K arstedt 2003). The success in reducing volum e property crim e has com e at consider­ able cost, notably in underm ining the public (or com m on) good elem ent of crim e control. As a tool of governance practised by central governm ent, it m ay contain the seeds of its own destruction: w hile the incentives produced by m arket interventions have brought about a responsibilisation of self-interest, they have underm ined responsibility for the public interest, since the crim e rate, how ever m uch reduced on average, still falls inequitably upon the poor and propertyless, w ho are unable to m eet their 56

T he political evolution o f situational crim e prevention in England and W ales

ow n secu rity interests through private action. It has been the greater am en ability o f British politics to regulatory go v ernan ce ov er the period (as d istin ct from m u ch o f Europe) com bined w ith a con stitutional pred isp osi­ tion to centralised state pow er (as d istin ct from N orth A m erica and A ustralasia) that has m ad e this a un iqu ely B ritish experience. But in as m uch as the com petition b etw een the regulatory and the K eynesian m od es o f governan ce is becom in g a com m on experience in m an y polities o f the E uropean U nion, then the B ritish experience o f im plem enting SC P as its prim ary m od e o f crim e prevention articu lates a d ilem m a (if not a w arning) for Europe as a w hole.

N o te s 1 An ultra vires act is one that is outside the specified and /or implied constitutional objects and powers of the body in question. It is 'beyond the powers' and therefore illegal. 2 The principles of ultra vires and fiduciary duty also constitute the powers of enforcement of central government's financial control. Local elected represen­ tatives, for instance, can be individually surcharged at penurious levels and barred from holding office for defying such regulations in the setting of local taxation levels. 3 Although, since devolution, the UK government has had less direct control over the Scottish government (see Chapter 4 in this volume), the latter's powers vis-a-vis Scottish local authorities are much the same constitutionally as are the former's for England and Wales. 4 A good example of this are the local area agreements recently established for the local strategic partnerships (comprising relevant public and other bodies in local authority areas). See www.idea.gov.uk/idk/core/page.do7pageId = 1174195. 5 Again, differences have emerged within the UK post-devolution: statutory CDRPs exist only in England and Wales (compare with Chapter 4 in this volume). 6 This is not to say that government espoused such views publicly. Indeed, the Conservative governments in particular faced a quandary - of needing to give ideological support to the police in public, while despairing in private of the police service's lack of concern for its cost-effectiveness and efficiency. 7 Essentially, the battles of the previous decade had been around precisely this issue - the operational autonomy of chief officers. 8 As the proportion of dwellings in private rental has remained constant over the period at around 10 to 11 per cent, the growth of the owner-occupier sector since the late 1970s has been in proportion to the decline in the social renting sector. 9 Information available from the British Security Industry Association, see www.bsia.co.uk/ 10 So, we might infer that it is the consumer who has been required to pay for the reduction in risk, either in higher insurance premiums (accompanied by higher deductibles) or in higher retail prices. 57

C r im e P re v e n tio n Policie s in C o m p a ra tiv e P ersp ective

11 See vvww.securedbydesign.com 12 See www.crim ereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk 13 For example, 'legislative mandates and publicity exhortation can be used, but the dem onstration to those with authority to act that [crime prevention] measures result in cost savings may be more effective' (Laycock and Tilley 1995: 535). 14 See w w w .neighbourhoodpolicing.co.uk

R e fe re n c e s Audit Com m ission (1999) Safety in Numbers. London: Audit Commission. Bauman, Z. (2000) Liquid M odernity. Cam bridge: Polity. Bowling, B. and Foster, J. (2002) 'Policing and the Police', in M. M aguire, R. M organ and R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook o f Criminology, 3rd edn. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 980-1033. Braithwaite, J. (2000a) 'The New Regulatory State and the Transform ation of C rim inology', British Journal o f Criminology, 40: 222-38. Braithwaite, J. (2000b) 'Republican Theory and Crim e Control', in S. Karstedt and K. Bussm an (eds) Social Dynamics o f Crime and Control: N ew Theories for a World in Transition. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 85-103. Braithwaite, J. and Drahos, P. (2000) Global Business Regulation. M elbourne: Cam bridge University Press. Bullock, K. and Tilley, N. (eds) (2003) Crime Reduction and Problem-oriented Policing. Cullompton: W illan Publishing. Burney, E. (1999) Crime and Banishment: Nuisance and Exclusion in Social Housing. W inchester: W aterside Press. Chandler, J. A. (2001) Local Government Today, 3rd edn. M anchester: M anchester University Press. Crawford, A. (1997) The Local Governance o f Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Crawford, A. (1998) Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Politics, Policies and Practices. London: Longman. Departm ent of the Environm ent (1994) Planning Out Crime, DoE Circular 5 /9 4 . London: HMSO. Duff, R. A. and M arshall, S. E. (2000) 'Benefits, Burdens and Responsibilities: Some Ethical Dimensions of Situational Crim e Prevention', in A. von Hirsch, D. Garland and A. Wakefield (eds) Ethical and Social Perspectives on Situational Crime Prevention. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 17-35. Forrest, R. and M urie, A. (1988) Selling the Welfare State: The Privatisation o f Public H ousing. London: Routledge. Gam ble, A. (1988) The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics o f Thatcherism. Basingstoke: M acm illan Education. Garland, D. (2001) The Culture o f Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gill, M. and Spriggs, A. (2005) A ssessing the Impact o f CCTV, H ome Office Research Study 292. London: Home Office. Gladstone, F. J. (1980) Co-ordinating Crime Prevention Efforts, Home Office Research Study 62. London: HMSO. 58

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G raham , S. (1999) T h e Eyes H ave It: C C TV as the “Fifth U tility "', E nvironm ent and P lanning B: Planning and D esign, 26: 639-42. H om e Office (1984) Crim e Prevention, H om e O ffice C ircular 8 /8 4 . London: H om e Office. H om e O ffice (1990) Crim e Prevention: The Success o f the Partnership A pproach, H om e Office C ircular 4 4 /9 0 . London: H om e Office. H om e Office (1991) Safer Com m unities: The Local D elivery o f Crim e Prevention Through the Partnership A pproach (M organ Report). London: H om e Office. H om e O ffice (1998) The Crim e and D isorder Act Introductory Guide. Local Strategies fo r R educing Crim e and D isorder. London: H om e Office. H om e O ffice (1999) The Governm ent's Crim e Reduction Strategy. London: H om e Office. H om el, P., N utley, S., W ebb, B. and Tilley, N. (2004) Investing to D eliver: R eview ing the Im plem entation o f the UK C rim e Reduction Program m e, H om e O ffice Research Stud y 281. London: H om e Office. H ope, T. (2000) 'Inequality and the clubbing of private secu rity ', in T. H ope and R. Sparks (eds) Crim e, Risk and Insecurity. London: R outledge, pp. 83-106. H ope, T. (2001) 'C rim e V ictim isation and Inequality in Risk So ciety', in R. M atthew s and J. Pitts (eds) Crim e Prevention, D isorder and Com m unity Safety. London: R outledge, pp. 193-218. H ope, T. (2002) 'La rid uzione della crim inalita, la sicurezza locale e la nuova filosofia del m anagem ent p u bblico', Dei D elitti e della Pene, IX, n. 1-2-3: 207-329. H ope T. (2006) 'M ass C onsum ption, M ass Predation - Private V ersus Public A ction?: T he C ase O f D om estic Burglary in England And W ales', in R. Levy, L. M ucchielli and R. Zau berm ann (eds) Crim e et Insecurite: Un D em i-siecle de Bouleversem ents - M elanges pour et avec P hilippe Robert. Paris: Editions l'H arm attan, pp. 45-61. H ope, T. (2007) 'T he D istribution of H ousehold Property C rim e V ictim ization: Insights from the British C rim e Survey', in M. H ough and M. M axfield (eds) Surveying Crim e in the 21st Century, C rim e Prevention Studies Vol. 22. M onsey, N Y: Crim inal Justice Press, pp. 91-124. H ope, T. (2008a) 'D od gy Evidence - Fallacies and Facts of C rim e R ed uction', Safer Com m unities, 7(3): 35-8. H ope, T. (2008b) T h e First C asualty: E vid ence and G overnance in a W ar A gainst C rim e', in P. C arlen (ed.) Im aginary Penalities. Cullom pton: W illan Publishing. H ope, T. (2008c) 'A Firing Squad to Shoot the M essenger: H om e O ffice Peer Review of R esearch', in W. M acM ahon (ed.) Critical Thinking about the Uses o f Research. London: C entre for C rim e and Justice Studies, pp. 27-44. H ope, T. and K arstedt, S. (2003) T o w a rd s a N ew Social C rim e P reven tion', in H. Kury and J. O bergfell-Fuchs (eds) Crim e Prevention: Neiv A pproaches. M ainz: W eisse Ring V erlag-G m bH , pp. 461-89. H ope, T. and Lab, S. P. (2001) 'V ariation in C rim e Prevention Participation: Evidence from the British C rim e Survey', C rim e Prevention and Com m unity Safety, 3: 7-21. H ope, T. and Sparks, R. (2000) 'For a Sociological Theory of Situations (Or How U seful is Pragm atic C rim in ology?)', in A. von H irsch, D. G arland and A. W akefield (eds) Situational Crim e Prevention: Ethics and Social Context. O xford: H art Publishing, pp. 175-91. 59

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H ope, T. and Trickett, A. (2004) 'A ngst Essen Seele A u f . . . But it K eeps A w ay the Burglars! Private Security, N eighbourhood W atch and the Social Reaction to C rim e', Kolner Z eitschrift fiir Soziologie m id Sozialpsychologie, 43: 441-68. H ope, T., Bryan, J., C raw ley, E., C raw ley, P., Russell, N. and Trickett, A. (2004) Strategic D evelopm ent Projects in the Y orkshire and the H um ber, East M idlands and Eastern Regions, H om e O ffice O nline R eport 41 /0 4 . London: H om e Office. H ough, M. and Mayhew', P. (1983) The British Crim e Survey: First Report, H om e Office R esearch Stud y 76. London: HM SO. H oughton, G. (1992) Car Theft in England and Wales: The H om e Office Car Theft Index. London: H om e Office. K em pa, M ., Stenning, P. and W ood, J. (2004) 'P olicing C om m unal Spaces - A Reconfiguration o f the "M a ss Private P rop erty'' H ypothesis', British Journal o f Crim inology, 44(4): 562-81. K ershaw , C., N icholas, S. and W alker, A. (2008) Crim e in England and Wales 2007/08: Findings from the British C rim e Survey and Police Recorded Crim e. London: H om e Office. K leinig, J. (2000) 'T he Burdens of Situational C rim e Prevention: An Ethical C om m entary', in A. von H irsch, D. G arland and A. W akefield (eds) Situational Crim e Prevention: Ethics and Social Context. O xford: H art Publishing, pp. 37-58. Lash, S. and Urry, J. (1994) Econom ies o f Signs and Space. London: Sage. Laycock, G. (2001) 'H ypothesis-based Research: T he Repeat V ictim isation Story', Crim inal Justice, 1: 59-82. Laycock, G. and Tilley, N. (1995) 'Im plem enting C rim e P reven tion', in M. Tonry and D. P. Farrington (eds) Building a Safer Society: Strategic A pproaches to Crim e Prevention. Chicago: U niversity of Chicago Press, pp. 535-84. Litton, R. A. (1997) 'C rim e Prevention and the Insurance Indu stry', in M . Felson and R. V. Clarke (eds) Business and Crim e Prevention. M onsey, N Y: C rim inal Justice Press, pp. 151-96. Loader, I. and W alker, N. (2007) Civilising Security. Cam bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. M cC ahill, M. and N orris, C. (2002) C C T V in Britain, W orking Paper N o. 3. O nline at: w w w .urbaneye.net M cLaughlin, E. (2002) 'T he C risis o f the Social and the Political M aterialization of C om m unity Safety ', in G. H ughes, E. M cLaughlin and J. M uncie (eds) Crim e Prevention and Com m unity Safety: N ew D irections. London: Sage, pp. 77-99. M aguire, M. (2004) 'The C rim e R eduction Program m e in England and W ales: R eflections on the V ision and the R eality', Crim inology and Crim inal Justice, 4(3): 213-37. N ational A udit O ffice (2005) H om e Office: Reducing V ehicle Crim e, Report by the C om ptroller and A uditor G eneral, H C 183 Session 2004-2005, 28 Janu ary 2005. London: The Stationery Office. Office o f the D eputy Prim e M inister (2004) Safer Places: The Planning System and Crim e Prevention, London: H M SO . O nline at: w w w .co m m u n ities.go v .u k/d ocu m e n ts/p la n n in g a n d b u ild in g /p d f/1 4 7 6 2 7 .p d f O sborne, D. and G aebler, T. (1992) R einventing G overnm ent: Hozv the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transform ing the Public Sector. Reading, M A: A ddison-W esley. Poyner, B. and W ebb, B. (1991) Crim e-Free H ousing. London: A rchitectural A ssociation. Rose, N. (1999) Pow ers o f Freedom . Cam bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. 60

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Schneider, R. H. and Kitchen, T. (2002) Planning fo r Crime Prevention: A Transatlan­ tic Perspective. London: Routledge. Sim on, J. (2007) Governing Through Crime: Hozv the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture o f Fear. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tilley, N., Pease, K., Hough, M. and Brown, R. (1999) Burglary Prevention: Early Lessons from the Crime Reduction Programme, Policing and Reducing Crim e Unit, Crim e Reduction Research Series Paper 1. London: Home Office. Tonry, M. (2004) Punishment and Politics: Evidence and Emulation in the M aking o f English Crim e Control Policy. Cullompton: W illan Publishing. W alker, A., Kershaw, C. and Nicholas, S. (eds) (2006) Crime in England and Wales 2005/06, Home Office Statistical Bulletin 12/06. London: Home Office. W ebb, B. (2005) 'Preventing Vehicle Crim e', in N. Tilley (ed.) H andbook o f Crime Prevention and Community Safety. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, pp. 458-85. W inchester, S. and Jackson, H. (1982) Residential Burglary. London: HMSO. W indlesham , Lord (1987) Responses to Crime. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Young, J. (2007) The Vertigo o f Late M odernity. London: Sage.

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C h a p te r 3

The preventive turn and the prom otion o f safer com m unities in England and W ales: political inventiveness and governm ental instabilities Adam Edwards and Gordon Hughes

In tro d u c tio n The preventive turn in England and W ales and across its diverse localities has had a longer institutional history and been the subject of m ore em pirical research and conceptual social scientific debate than is the case for m ost European countries. Furtherm ore, and m ore contentiously, the preventive turn and its institutionalisation as com m unity safety partner­ ships (in W ales) and crim e and disorder reduction partnerships (in England), is at a m ore 'advanced' stage than the relative latecom ers over the Channel in much of m ainland Europe. Such developm ents in England and W ales in the past three decades point to both intense (even frenzied) bouts of 'political inventiveness' and consequences w hich m ay be termed 'governm ental instabilities' (Clarke 2004; H ughes 2007). This relative m aturity in terms of m ulti-agency partnership w ork in com m unity safety across every local governm ent locality in England and W ales m ay, of course, be a source of 'A nglo-Saxon' stigm a (forgetting for the m om ent the significant Celtic nations o f the UK) to som e European com m entators. This is especially the case w hen the 'British' national m odel of crim e prevention is interpreted by som e European com m enta­ tors as a m etaphorical launching pad or in m ilitaristic terms, an 'aircraft carrier' floating om inously off m ainland Europe for the im portation of 62

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US-inspired neo-liberal and neo-conservative governm ental practices into the seem ingly more social dem ocratic polities across Europe in the international policy transfer trade. W hatever the veracity or otherw ise of this thesis, there is no denying that the English and W elsh experience is 'particular' if not 'peculiar' w hen com pared to m uch o f m ainland Europe. A ccordingly, this chapter aim s in part to unravel and unveil the institutional realities and uneven developm ent of the preventive turn across England and W ales in the recent decades. There is already a volum inous body of published w ork on the recent history of crim e prevention and com m unity safety in Britain, stretching back to the early 1990s (see, for exam ple, Craw ford 1997, 2007; Gilling 1997, 2007; H ughes and Edwards 2002, 2005; H ughes 1998, 2007; Hughes et al. 2002; Stenson and Edw ards 2004). Readers are encouraged to refer to this body o f literature for detailed descriptions of the legislative powers, national policy developm ents, and form al local structures and strategies that have been im plem ented in England and W ales over recent years. The chapter is organised as follows. Follow ing a brief chronicling of the career of com m unity safety, past and present, the chapter concentrates on unravelling the com peting interpretations and different histories of current trends in this policy field which, as A dam Craw ford (2007: 900) has noted, has been characterised by 'hyper innovation' and 'hyper­ politicisation' alongside, w e w ould add, a lack of any settled verdict not just on the success or failure of the policy experim ent but w ith regard to the nature of the beast itself from social scientific com m entary and research. Any 'history of the present' in a society with a w ell-developed crim inological research base, both in governm ent departm ents and universities, necessitates a critical discussion o f the com peting intellectual translations of 'com m unity safety' as a floating signifier. In other words, the telling of the com peting stories of com m unity safety is not ju st about describing institutional developm ents m anufactured 'out there' by the state but is also about the relationship of this preventive turn to various proponents of the contem porary crim inological im agination. A ccordingly w e need to consider the w ays in w hich crim inologists as academ ic social scientists and governm ental experts have conceptualised, mapped and advised 'expertly' on the w ork done on the ground under the signifier of com m unity safety. In particular, in this section o f this chapter we argue that social scientists - including ourselves of course - have necessarily been engaged in both representational accounts (reflecting and capturing what has happened) and perform ative narratives (which help constitute and reconstitute the phenom ena under study) (see Edw ards and Hughes 2008a). It is im portant in m aking sense of the institution-building in the com m unity safety sector in England and W ales that such intellectual attem pts at fram ing and problem atising both the 'plum bing' of the new 63

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institutional architecture and its 'products' receive consideration. The five non-exhaustive narratives about community safety discussed in this section suggest that it is specious to identify a single history other than an institutionally descriptive account of key laws, policy statements and agencies. Instead, when attempts are made to interpret the consequences of such institutional developments the stories becom e more contested, leading us to an investigation of the politics of the history of community safety as well as the contested politics of community safety. Accordingly, in this part of the chapter a reflexive interpretation of these narratives is provided. Finally, the chapter draws on illustrative examples from the authors' own realist conceptual framework and ongoing empirical research pro­ gramme on the local politics of community safety. First, this highlights the polyvalence of the concept of com munity safety, pointing to its qualities as a floating signifier with no fixed referent but a multiplicity of significations, capable of being aligned with a spectrum of political positions on safety. Second, this final section also highlights some of the challenges for researching the preventive turn when the national frame is unsettled and other geo-historical contexts are acknowledged.

C o m m u n ity safety: ca re er of a floating signifier The last two decades in England and Wales have seen a dramatic shift in the local governance of crime and the politics of insecurity. More fundamentally, these developments reflect a re-articulation of powers and responsibilities in and between the state, private interests and civil society. It represents simultaneously a dramatic narrowing of the horizons of state 'sovereignty' and an attempt to reassert a form of control. (Crawford 2002: 14) [TJhis network of partnership arrangements and inter-agency work­ ing agreements is designed to foster crime prevention and to enhance community safety, primarily through the cultivation of community involvement and the dissemination of crime prevention ideas and practices. (Garland 2001: 16) Our discussion begins with a brief resume of the 'talk' and policy pronouncements regarding the 'preventive turn' and associated changes in governance of crime and insecurity across localities since the 1980s (highlighted in Crawford's and Garland's claims above). We then focus on the question of where we are at the different level of competing interpretations regarding the nature and consequences of policy imple­ mentation and actual practices associated with the policy mix of commu­ nity safety, iieighbourhood policing and local crime and disorder reduction, and the provocations that arise from these processes on the 64

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ground today. In con tem porary international policy d iscou rses on crim e control and prevention, there is m u ch sim ilar langu age used, and con v ergent p olitical rallying calls m ade, across 'A n g lop h on e' cou ntries for p olicy change and innovation, w hether it be 'p olicin g ' rather than the police, and 'safer com m u nities together' (rather than crim e prevention in the narrow er sense o f the w ord). T his is captured neatly in both G arlan d 's and C raw fo rd 's above d iagnoses o f the 'd ram atic shift' in the governance o f crim e and insecurity in late-m odern societies. A t the sam e tim e, it needs to be acknow ledged that the often bland translations and appeals for a com m on lingua fran ca around prevention and safety in p olicy d iscou rses are less easily accom p lished in n on-A ng lop hone cou ntries across Europe (E dw ards and H ughes 2005a). Let us exam ine in b rief the p articular career o f com m u nity safety in England and W ales sin ce the 1980s based on the 'talk' and 'd ecisions' dim ensions o f the policy process, as d istin gu ished by P ollitt (2001). This brief account w ill also d raw on C raw fo rd 's (2002) overview o f d ev elop ­ m ents in the tw o d ecad es up to 2000 w hich, like this chapter, w as w ritten w ith an eye to points o f both con vergence and d ivergen ce across E uropean countries. Indeed, C raw fo rd 's interpretation o f d evelopm ents, and in particu lar his em ph asis on the con trad iction s around the govern­ m ental logics o f (i) m an agerialism , (ii) governan ce throu gh partnership, and (iii) n ostalgic com m u nitarianism , bears sim ilarities to m u ch o f the analytical fram ew ork em ployed by the present auth ors in charting these d ev elopm ents since the 1990s and throu gh ou t the 2000s across the UK (see, for exam ple, H ughes and E dw ards 2005). The origins o f com m u nity safety in the 1980s are su ggestive of the m ixed paren tage o f this signifier. W e should note, for exam ple, the initial ap p rop riations by, variously, 'rad ical' M etropolitan Police A uthorities, w ho form ulated local com m u nity safety p lans as a cou nterw eigh t to police-d riv en notions o f pu blic safety, the charity N A C R O (N ational A ssociation for the C are and R ehabilitation o f O ffenders) and its 'bottom up' projects in m arginalised local com m u nities, alongsid e central gov ern­ m ent circu lars and initiatives elaboratin g a new ap p roach to crim e prevention in this decade. H ow ever, the real d iscu rsive turning point at the national d im ension in this d ecad e w as the H om e O ffice C ircu lar 8 /8 4 : this 'key sym bolic lan d m ark ' (C raw ford 2002: 16) bein g the first explicit official recognition o f the lim its to 'go-it-alo n e' p olicing and the capacity of con stabu laries to effectively p revent problem s o f crim e w ithout d raw ing on the resources (including expertise) o f other key statu tory partn ers and the w ider public. The next key d iscu rsive m om ent in this career w as the 1991 M organ Report, D elivering Safer C om m unities (H om e Office 1991), w ith its social d em ocratic am bition to con ceptu alise and m anage h olistically crim e and d isord er and their d eeper roots through creative, d em ocratically sensitive partn ersh ip arrangem en ts led by local authorities rather than the police. 65

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This report reflected an em ergent consensus am ong academ ics and policy-m akers that the ideal approach to prevention com bines a package of both precipitating factors and predisposing influences (Craw ford 2002: 21). Equally im portantly, it gave the new approach a nationally recognis­ able 'brand nam e': com m unity safety. Craw ford (2002: 23) suggests that the period 1991-97 w hich followed the M organ Report was a period of 'stagnation and am bivalence'. This is true when viewed from 'on high', from the national governm ent policy dim ension. H ow ever, it is not so valid when attention is paid to the local contexts in which com m unity safety w ork was institutionalised and put into practice. Indeed, Craw ford (2002: 23) adm its as m uch by noting that, unlike the 1980s w hen 'the' governm ent had done so m uch to stim ulate enthusiasm in crim e prevention, 'activity and innovation had clearly shifted to the local realm of local organisations in the 1990s' (see also H ughes 1998; H ughes and Edw ards 2002). Follow ing the M organ agenda, w hich w as widely and influentially, if unevenly, taken up locally, the third key discursive m om ent was the Crim e and D isorder Act (CDA) in 1998. In retrospect the CDA helped inaugurate the New Labour 'm odernisation' project associated with the three appeals to m anagerialism , governance through partnership and com m unitiarianism . The effects of this central governm ent project have continued to resonate into the late 2000s. This period w itnessed both linguistic turns and policy decisions to shift the focus from 'com m unity safety' to 'crim e and (eventually) disorder reduction' m ade tangible as calculable, centrally defined, targeted perform ance m easures. Again, Crawford (2002: 25) characterised the first three years of this period (1997-2000) as that of 'rebirth and renew al focused around D isorder'. This focus w as further consolidated in subsequent years by the m uch pub­ licised flood of further crim e and anti-social behaviour legislation, alongside a com m unitarian-inspired crusade around 'Respect' and the drive for m oral authoritarian interventions against anti-social behaviour (see H ughes 2007: 119-25). The broad verdict am ong m any influential com m entators on the possible consequences o f the post-CDA agenda was that of a guarded optim ism , as expressed by Crawford: recent developm ents potentially allow a fundam ental shift in the way that crim e and its prevention are governed. They represent a m aturing of com m unity safety and its m ovem ent into m ainstream consciousness and service delivery . . . The CDA begins a longoverdue recognition that the levers and causes of crim e lie far from the traditional reach of the crim inal justice system . . . the new politics offers more plural understandings of and social responses to crim e, draw ing together a variety of organisations and stakeholders, in the public, voluntary and private sectors as well as from am ong relevant 66

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com m unity groups in w ays which are problem -focused rather than defined according to the m eans m ost readily available for their solution. (Crawford 2002: 31-2) Such optim ism at the beginning of the 2000s w as w idely shared across much of the crim inological academ y. H ow ever, w e also need to note C raw ford's own recognition of com m unity safety as 'sites of contradic­ tion, am biguity and am bivalence', w hich we also shared at the time (M cLaughlin et al. 2001; Hughes 1998, 2002; Edwards and Hughes 2002). M uch of the subsequent career of com m unity safety has confirm ed the w isdom of this recognition of the contradictory and am bivalent tendencies associated w ith local partnership w orking and their narrow ly targeted focus on m easurable crim e and disorder reduction (see H ughes 2007; G illing 2007).

C r im e c o n tro l o r social policy? C o m m u n ity safety as a ‘h y b rid ’ policy C om m unity safety as a policy approach sits at the intersection of attem pts by the state to deliver w elfare and security, and policing and control in local com m unities. W e noted earlier that com m unity safety emerged in the 1980s as a local governm ent strategy that sought to m ove beyond the traditionally police-driven agenda of crim e prevention. A part from seeking to involve other 'social' agencies in crim e prevention and in turn m oving from single to m ulti-agency activities, com m unity safety has also been associated w ith m ore aspirational claims. O ne particular claim has been to generate greater participation and leadership from residential com m unities in prom oting 'quality of life', not just tackling those social harm s classified as crim es. As a long-term outcom e, com m unity safety is often linked to the com m unitarian am bition of replacing fragile, atom ised, fearful and insecure com m unities with ones confident enough to take responsibility for their ow n safety. At the sam e tim e, in the national politics of the 1990s and 2000s, 'creating safer com m unities' has been a crucial com ponent of the Labour adm inistration's prom otion of policies that could be 'tough on crim e, tough on the causes o f crim e'. In this sense, com m unity safety straddles the fault line of repressive crim e control (tough on crim e) and m ore preventive, w elfare-oriented, interventions (tough on the causes of crime). In the discussion that follow s the m ain features of the institutional infrastructure of com m unity safety are sketched in brief. As will be evident from the earlier discussion, it is difficult to deny that there has been a highly prescriptive and directive central governm ent shaping of the contem porary preventive infrastructure in England and W ales. This is indicative of a sovereign state strategy, w hich stresses greater central 67

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control ('steering') alongside the diffusion of responsibility for the delivery of crim e control and the prom otion of safer com m unities ('row ing') to a wide array of agencies and groups, both public and private, voluntary and statutory in character. For com m entators like Rose (1999), these developm ents are part of a broader neo-liberal m ovem ent towards enlisting com m unities as the new and preferred sites of governance. The em ergence of com m unity safety as a policy discourse is most usefully viewed as feeding off two interconnected features of governm ent thinking, nam ely a political discourse of civic com m unitarianism and a 'm odernising' public m anagem ent project. To give one exam ple, as a result o f the CDA in England and W ales the aim to tackle disorder and anti-social behaviour through the establishm ent of exclusion orders w as a central feature of this fused com m unitarian and public m anagem ent project. It is im portant to note how moral or social transgressions as well as law -breaking cam e under the scope of the com m unitarian-inspired pow ers vested in local crim e and disorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs), or com m unity safety partnerships (CSPs) as they are know n in W ales. Such developm ents are illustrative of the entanglem ents and possible contradictions associated with control and w elfare in the field of com m unity safety. Betw een 1998 and 2008 all 376 statutory partnerships in England and W ales w ere legally obliged and em pow ered to: • Carry out audits of local crim e and disorder problem s. • Consult w ith all sections of the local com m unity. • Publish three-year crim e and disorder reduction strategies based on the findings of the audits. • Identify targets and perform ance indicators for each part of the strategy, with specified timescales. • Publish the audit, strategy and the targets. • Report annually on progress against the targets. M ost CDRPs and CSPs have been characterised by very sim ilar formal organisational structures. For exam ple, there is a form al strateg ic/ operational division; there are usually specific them atic or geographically based 'action' teams; the key statutory partners or 'responsible' authorities are m ade up of public agencies ranging from the local authority, police, probation, fire, police authority and health, alongside co-opted agencies from both the statutory and the voluntary sector. The 'com m unity' is usually presented in the local strategies as a spatial and moral concept, em phasising locality, belonging and unity (albeit across consensual 68

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d iversity). H ow ever, there is also a com m on tend ency to place certain groups outsid e the com m u nity d ue to their 'an ti-social' activities, pointing to the key role o f boun dary and exclu sion in representation s o f com m u ­ nity. In turn, the com m u nity is usually 'passiv ely ' present in term s of b ein g 'con su lted ' rather than an active participan t in the p lanning and deliv ery o f com m u nity safety (H ughes 2009). There con tin ue to be ongoing reform s o f C D R P s /C S P s as the vehicles for com m u nity safety at the tim e o f w riting w hich have the stated aim to im prov e their p erform ance at the local level. H ow ever, such partnership w ork rem ains substantively d eterm ined by the evolving central gov ern­ m ent agenda o f targeted, evid ence-based and m easu rable crim e and d isord er red uction, linked to specific negotiated local priorities. Th e priorities listed below are taken from the pu blished strategies o f the 22 C SPs in W ales for 20 0 5 -0 8 , but they also reflect the typical priorities shared across partnerships across England and W ales. R esearch show s that those highlighted in bold w ere con sisten tly the top priorities in local C SP strategies (Edw ards and H ughes 2008c).

• Anti-social behaviour • A rson • Burglary • D om estic abuse

• Fear of crime • H ate crim e • H om e safety • Prolific and persistent offenders • P ro p e rty /b u sin e ss crim e • Road safety • Rural crim e

• Substance abuse • V ehicle crim e • V iolence

• Youth offending T he prim ary focus o f com m u nity safety partn ersh ips in term s o f their stated priorities sin ce the C D A has thus been on crim e and d isord er reduction. O n the surface this suggests that they are p rim arily engaged in local crim e control rather than in social p olicy w ork. H ow ever, the actual o utcom es o f such control w ork m ay be preventive in character rather than pu rely repressive and en forcem ent-oriented , w hen exam ined in term s of 69

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problem -solving orientation and when studied em pirically 'on the ground' (Edw ards and H ughes 2008b). The centrally propelled and Hom e O ffice-directed drive tow ards the institutionalisation of com m unity safety rem ains strikingly apparent across every local governm ent authority in England and W ales. Such processes have seen an ever-increasing num ber of m ulti-agency com m u­ nity safety teams - m anagers, officers, project w orkers, police secondees, drug actio n /su b stan ce m isuse team s, anti-social behaviour units, for exam ple - which now form an increasingly salient, if still fragile, part of local governm ent structures and processes. As a relatively novel set of institutions and experts, com m unity safety w ork is set to rem ain a key feature of the local governance of crime, d isorder and security in England and W ales. H ow ever, there are m ajor challenges that lie in wait, not least those associated with innovations in the local policing of the terror threat and 'radicalisation'; additionally, tensions exist both about the nature and form of neighbourhood policing and the uneasy and unstable relations betw een such 'police-ing' initiatives and local com m unity safety policy (see Hughes and Rowe 2007).

N a rra tiv e s o f c o m m u n ity safety In this section we undertake som e initial steps tow ards a sociology of know ledge production, nam ely an exploration of how exponents of the crim inological im agination have contributed to the developm ent, fram ing and problem atisation of com m unity safety as a field of policy and practice. In w hat follow s, w e distinguish and critique four com pelling narratives or histories of com m unity safety (and their perceived conse­ quences) before concluding with our preferred mode of conceptualising and researching built around the 'necessary' relations of pow er depend­ ence in the policy field and practices of com m unity safety. Com munity safety as a progressive third way?

W e begin with the uses to w hich the notion of com m unity safety has been put by a range of actors w ho m ay be grouped collectively as adm inistra­ tive or policy crim inologists: the array of central and local governm ental advisors, policy-m akers, practitioners and research officers and consul­ tants. The terms 'adm inistrative' and 'policy' are not used in a pejorative sense here (see Hughes 2007: 2 0 1 -7 on the different form s of crim inologi­ cal labour). W e would include in this im portant intellectual grouping such w riters as Lea, M atthew s and Young, often collectively know n as the 'left realists', and the w ork of such H om e Office social scientists as Tim Hope and M argaret Shaw in the 1980s, and architects of the post-1998 crim e reduction guidance, N ick Tilley and M ike Hough. 70

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A longside the w ork of policy crim inologists noted above, the authors of the M organ Report (H om e Office 1991 and see pp. 65 above) used the concept of com m unity safety to retrieve the gam ut of dispositional theories of crim e causation that constitute the principal sociological and psychological contributions to governm ental crim inology. These had been eschew ed during the previous decade by a national Conservative adm in­ istration critical of the social determ ination of crim e and concerned to prom ote neo-classical principles of deterrent penal regim es for rational offenders and situational crim e prevention techniques. The unsurprising rejection of the M organ Report's recom m endations for com m unity safety by this adm inistration provided the Labour Party, then in opposition in W estm inster, w ith a basis for reform ulating its approach to law and order, specifically through Tony Blair's now renow ned concept of being tough on crim e and tough on the causes of crime. The influence of the M organ Report and its translation into Labour Party 'third w ay' thinking can also be seen in the appeal m ade to 'joined-up' and holistic governance and the technique of partnership w orking, also pioneered by the social dem ocratic-oriented 'left realist' crim inologists. This partnership approach sought to unsettle and decentre the dom inant assum ption of a single­ agency solution to crime. The political im portance o f Blair's reform ulation of crim e control policy, during his tenure as opposition spokesperson on Hom e Affairs, both for his personal political career and for the subsequent electoral fortunes of the Labour Party, has been the subject of m uch analysis and com m entary (Downes and M organ 2002; M atthew s and Young 2003; Tonry 2004). The key point about this narrative is that the concept of com m unity safety enabled the Labour Party, at both national and m unicipal levels, to reassert the social dem ocratic association of crim e control and social policy while accom m odating m ore im m ediate, palliative m easures for reducing crim e and addressing the needs of victims. It therefore provided a m eans of loosening the 'hostages to fortune' that had characterised the Labour Party's depiction, by its political opponents, of being soft on crim e, tolerant of civil disorders and m ore concerned with the w elfare of offenders than the rights of victim s (Dow nes and M organ 1994; G illing 2007). From its origins in the political dynam ics of national and local governm ent in Britain, the very im precision of com m unity safety as a concept proved useful in instantiating the problem o f crim e as a com posite of social causes, to be addressed through m ulti-agency policies on fam ily support, em ploym ent and training, education and youth work, situational opportunities, support for victim s and so on. In these terms, the intellectual coherence and internal consistency of the concept is less im portant and less interesting than its capacity to outflank and out-think m ore reductionist narratives about crim e control through either enforce­ m ent of the crim inal law and punitive deterrence or social policy interventions. 71

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Community safety as a repressive state apparatus?

C ounterpoised to the adm ixture of crim inological ideas found in official and policy-oriented narratives on com m unity safety, som e com m entators w orking w ithin the tradition of critical crim inology have offered an altogether 'sm oother' interpretation of this concept and w hat it signifies. Draw ing inspiration from M arxist analyses of an earlier generation of critical crim inologists, these com m entators identify com m unity safety as a set of particular practices that form part of a repressive state apparatus w hose function is to regulate the conditions for capital accum ulation via a strategy o f '"lo ck d o w n " leading inexorably and inevitably to differential policing, discrim inatory targeting, universal surveillance, crim inalisation and escalation in the prison population' (Scraton 2003: 31; see also Colem an et al. 2002; Colem an 2004, 2005). In this narrative com m unity safety is im agined as a set of repressive, 'revanchist' policing practices aim ed at retaking public space (from the 'anti-social', for exam ple) for the purposes of capital accum ulation while obviating alternative conceptions of safety, such as youth w ork within disadvantaged neighbourhoods. M oreover, the narrow conception of com m unity safety am ong urban elites is viewed as closing off action on other threats to public health, such as toxic w aste disposal and allied corporate crim es that are excluded from the vision and horizon of com m unity safety work. A ccordingly, Colem an et al. (2002: 96) observe that 'these inclusionary and exclusionary practices can be understood as part of a w ider social ordering strategy w hich is legitim ated by the m oral and intellectual project of social and econom ic regeneration'. Interest in capturing the concept of com m unity safety and using it to signal the need for public protection against a variety of harm ful activities perpetrated by corporations against vulnerable working-class com m uni­ ties has increased am ong critical crim inologists (Tom bs et al. 2007). Again, this dem onstrates both the polyvalence of the concept and its focus for political contestation over the definition of 'safety' for different com m uni­ ties of interest. H ow ever, our particular concern here is in the relationship betw een the perform ative and representational aspects of this critical narrative. In problem atising com m unity safety as an exercise in securing the conditions for capital accum ulation strategies (such as the regener­ ation of post-industrial cities around retail consum ption during the day and alcohol consum ption at night), this narrative fram es com m unity safety as a repressive apparatus and channels the vision of the social researcher on to those policing practices that fit this initial problem atisation. To w hat extent this im agination also provides an accurate a n d /o r exhaustive representation of com m unity safety in the case study area in question (Liverpool) as well as further afield is a m oot point. In our view, it is questionable because of the m essy, capacious and often disorganised 72

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conceptions of com m unity safety revealed through em pirical research into the dispositions of com m unity safety w orkers them selves (Edwards and H ughes 2008b; H ughes and G illing 2004) and into the practice of partnerships in other localities in England and W ales (H allsw orth 2002; Stenson 2002; Foster 2002; H ughes 2007). Community safety as a neo-liberal political rationality?

W hereas critical crim inology was, at one time, synonym ous with the kind of M arxist political econom y advocated by Colem an and colleagues, it now accom m odates the w ork of those influenced by a very different intellectual tradition associated w ith Foucault's study of power, particu­ larly his concept of governm entality. The latter concept exam ines the role of political rationalities in defining objects of control and prescribing how these objects so defined should be interpreted and acted upon (Foucault 1991; Garland 2001; Sm andych 1999). In Britain argum ents about the m eaning of crim e prevention and com m unity safety have provided a focal point for this tradition of thought, particularly as a result of David G arland's thesis about the contradictory political rationalities at play in late-m odern strategies of control. Specifically, the episodic bouts of punitive display by sovereign states anxious to legitim ate their authority through various 'w ars' on crim e, drugs or terror exist in tension with the sotto voce adm ission that state authorities lack the effective capacity to govern crim e and disorder alone. This lim it to the sovereign state and in turn the norm ality of high crim e rates provides the real world conditions to w hich governing strategies m ust adapt by 'responsibilising' citizens and other private actors m ore actively and m ore prudentially to participate in their own governance. Central to this adaptation is the prom otion of m easures for identifying and reducing the opportunities for crim e and disorder generated through the everyday routines of citizens (Garland 2001; see also Craw ford 2006; Johnston and Shearing 2003). In these term s, com m unity safety is counterpoised to various form s of punitive display, such as zero tolerance policing, A SBO s, parenting orders, and is allied to a new logic of prevention and risk m anagem ent that 'instead of pursuing, prosecuting and punishing individuals . . . aims to reduce the supply of crim inal events by m inim ising crim inal opportun­ ities, enhancing situational controls, and channelling conduct aw ay from crim inogenic situations' (Garland 2001: 171). Here, as Garland goes on to note, com m unity safety 'becom es the chief consideration and law enforce­ m ent becom es m erely a m eans to this end' (2001: 171). Com m unity safety is consequently allied to a certain neo-liberal political rationality in w hich state intervention, even in the core com petence of order m aintenance, is rolled back as private citizens are required to act as individualised, responsibilised and prudential actors, better insuring 73

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them selves against future risks of crim inal victim isation. W hat, for Garland, is eclipsed in this interplay betw een punitive 'crim inologies of the other' and adaptive 'crim inologies of the self', is the social dem ocratic crim inology that had prevailed in the mid tw entieth century and which privileged collective risk m anagem ent and w elfare state interventions, particularly those aim ed at the education, training, em ploym ent and recreation of young people. As noted above, how ever, em pirical research studies suggest that com m unity safety has been regarded, notably by com m unity safety w orkers them selves, as a m eans of resuscitating a m ore social dem ocratic vision of control (H ughes and G illing 2004). The sm ooth elision of com m unity safety with neo-liberal politics has also been challenged for obscuring the increasing accom m odation of punitive strategies w ithin com m unity safety work, most notably through the pressure put on m ulti-agency partnerships to use exclusion orders, such as A SBO s, which w as present at the outset of the local statutory partnerships in 1999 and further intensified follow ing the passage of the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003. An arboreal vision o f control?

The fourth narrative on com m unity safety is arguably the most provoca­ tive and destabilising exercise in the crim inological im agination of all those considered here. It draws its inspiration from the w ork of the post­ structuralist philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987), whose broader critique of w estern philosophical traditions challenges the com ­ mon preoccupation with producing 'arboreal' know ledge, as exem plified by the historical device of genealogical or fam ily trees. For Deleuze and G uattari this is a specious exercise which m isconceives the m ore inchoate, protean, m ulti-directional and unpredictable qualities of social relation­ ships, which are better envisaged in terms of the botanical m etaphor of the 'rhizom e'. This m etaphor captures the heterogeneous m utation of social relationships and their osm osis into one another, creating in turn further m utations, for exam ple in the assem blage, breakdow n and reassem blage of non-nuclear fam ilies. The point of the m etaphor is that it expresses the kind of thinking that is needed to apprehend the dynam ic qualities of social relationships and how this thinking has been debilitated by the rigid conceptual hierarchies and categorisation associated with, for exam ple, m odern, positivist social science. This opposition betw een arboreal and rhizom atic thinking has been imported into crim inological thought by those interested in innovations in the control of crim e and disorder often associated w ith com m unity safety (see H aggerty and Ericson 2000; H allsw orth 2002, 2008). A ccording to H allsw orth's research in London on street crim e and its (attem pted) control, there is a dissonance betw een the rational problem -solving 74

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activities w hich com m u nity safety w orkers are asked to undertake, in o rd er to rend er problem s o f street crim e and d isord er intelligible and m easu rable for the pu rposes o f their su bsequ ent rem ed iation, and the protean qu alities o f these problem s, w hich escape precise d efinition and calibration. A rboreal visions o f control are subverted by the rhizom atic q u alities of bo th control itself and the street crim e and d isord er that are the focus o f m uch control. This narrative suggests a basic con trad iction in com m u nity safety w ork, nam ely the struggle to d elim it the lim itless. A ccord ing to this narrative, the problem s o f m irror im aging - by w hich p u blic au th orities p roject their ow n w ays o f thinking on to their subjects o f control - can be d iscerned throu gh ou t the intelligence-led , p roblem ­ solv ing ap p roaches that com m u nity safety officers and police crim e analysts in p articular are required to undertake by the statu tory d uty to return annual strategic assessm en ts o f their w ork. D espite the persistence o f extant trad itions o f social d em ocratic and sociological thought am ong com m u nity safety practitioners, as noted earlier, the pred om inant intellec­ tual trad itions u n derp in ning the rou tine analysis o f crim e patterns in these strategic assessm en ts are those o f rational choice, rou tine activities theory and situ ational crim e prevention. In turn, these d elim it street crim e in term s o f d iscrete 'ev en ts' that can be enu m erated and m ap ped to reveal their con centration in tim e and place (C larke and E ck 2003). In d oing so, the anteced ent con d itions and 'u p stream ' causes of these events are forgotten and the m ean in g o f street violence, for its 'ration al' p rotagonists, is bracketed off. If the hot-spot, situ ational analysis o f crim e patterns im poses an arboreal vision o f control upon inheren tly rh izom atic p rocesses o f crim e and d isord er, as H allsw orth contends, it follow s that other intellectu al traditions are required for the cultivation o f a rh izom atic im agination. To this end, H allsw orth identifies the p rom ise o f the phen om enological m ethods of 'cultural crim inology' (2008: 13). In p lace o f 'v ood oo statistics' (Y oung 2004), qu alitative research m eth od s are required that rend er intelligible the 'ecologies' o f street crim e and the rules o f violence as understood by protagonists them selves. (H allsw orth 2008: 8ff.). D eleu zian crim inolog y as translated in ou r fourth narrative is essential­ ly p erform ative, preoccupied as it is w ith d econstructing the o v er­ rationalised, patterned and structured im agery o f crim e and d isord er and its control found in official and in m u ch critical social science as a m eans o f prom oting an alternative rh izom atic vision o f control. It is clear, how ever, that H allsw o rth's 'v iolen ce ecologies' are also offered as superior representations of crim e, d isord er and control; superior, that is, to the official and critical crim inolog ies they have first d econstructed and d ism issed as arboreal. In our view , it is q u estion able if it is possible to ever escape arboreal representation s o f social life. D oes a non-arboreal repre­ sen tation o f the 'inheren t con tin gent am orphous v olatility o f street life' or the 'rh izom atic expansion of su rv eillance' (H aggerty and E ricson 2000) 75

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im ply an inherently contingent am orphous and volatile or rhizom atic m ethod of inquiry and argum entation? H ow can the m utable, open-ended quality of the social relations signified by the idea of com m unity safety be represented in w ays that avoid the structuring devices of social science, including, ironically, those of post-structuralist thinkers? Power-dependence

The final narrative of com m unity safety considered here is that associated with our own research into the unfinished politics and necessarily unstable outcom es of the struggle for security and safety (Edw ards and H ughes 2005b). Central to this research is the concept of 'pow erdependence', developed by political scientists to build theory about changes and continuities in governance (Rhodes 1997). The concept of pow er-dependence identifies a central paradox of political power: those w ho possess the potential to govern are not pow erful w hen they are not actually governing, but neither are they when they seek to govern because they are dependent on others to carry out their com m ands. The difference betw een the potential to govern and actually governing is alw ays the actions of others. It follow s that 'w ould-be sovereigns' are necessarily in a relationship of pow er-dependence w ith those through w hom they m ust govern and with w hom they must enter into exchange relationships to win and m aintain a governing coalition. This dependence is w hat necessitates political com ­ petition and the consequent gaps betw een talk, decisions and action in any particular policy field as som e actors resist recruitm ent a n d /o r are interested by com peting coalitions. The content of this com petition, however, is contingent on the political vision, acum en and resources of the com petitors, which we expect to differ am ong particular centres of pow er (national adm inistrations, local governm ents, supranational or­ ganisations such as the European Union, and so on). W hether the substantive content of security politics, or any other governing project, actually differs am ong different centres of pow er is also a question for em pirical research. W e suggest, on the basis of case study research reported on security politics in various localities in W estern Europe (H ughes and Edw ards 2002; Edw ards and H ughes 2005b), that this proposition has yet to be falsified, although this case study research was cross-sectional and so prospective convergence in security politics cannot be ruled out. Com plete convergence in actions as well as decisions and talk would, how ever, be rem arkable, indicating the total collapse of political com petition and capacities for resistance w hich, certainly in liberal dem ocracies, and other 'differentiated polities' (Rhodes 1997), we suggest, is highly unlikely. The resources associated w ith relations of pow er-dependence are unevenly distributed but no single actor is ever com pletely resource-less. 76

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For exam ple, even poverty-stricken voluntary organisations at the subna­ tional level have the capacity for political representation to governors anxious to 'engage' them; w hether this capacity is actually realised is a contingent consequence of other factors, particularly acum en in cam ­ paigning. As a consequence, the political com petition to translate talk into decisions and then decisions into action is structured by asym m etrical (rather than zero-sum ) relations of pow er-dependence. Rhodes (1997) suggests five dim ensions of pow er-dependence, which we have found useful as a basis for building theory about the uneven outcom es of secu rity /safety politics in different centres of power: constitutional-legal, financial, inform ational, organisational, and political. W hen w e apply this conceptual fram ew ork to the words, decisions and actions associated w ith the politics of com m unity safety in England and W ales, we are able to discern better the real terrain of (delim ited) political contestation and action, (constrained) plurality of outcom es and (bounded) spaces for contingency, that has characterised the history of our floating signifier. W e now consider som e of the key em ergent challenges facing the hybrid policy field of com m unity safety raised in our ongoing empirical research, alongside the opening up of potentially new research agendas when the national fram e of reference is unsettled and the uneven local distribution of various asym m etric governing resources is centred in sociological and political analysis o f this still evolving policy terrain.

U n s e ttlin g th e ‘B ritish n a tio n ’ as a u n it o f analysis (i) Researching community safety in the partially devolved polity o f W ales

M ost research studies, as well as nationw ide surveys of and com m entaries on the preventive turn in British crim inology, have tended to take the 'B ritish /E n g lish ' national m odel of crim e prevention and com m unity safety as their taken-for-granted fram e o f reference even w hen discussing 'U K ' developm ents. A listair H enry breaks with this tradition in part by discussing the specific characteristics of the preventive turn in Scotland (see Chapter 4, this volum e). It is also evident that things are different in N orthern Ireland, although w e lack a firm em pirical research base for draw ing any subtle or firm conclusions both about the recent em ergence and future direction of com m unity safety strategies in this province. It is also often assum ed that the term 'England' subsum es W ales and there has been a tradition for the 'and W ales' part of the descriptor to be ignored. This w as unsatisfactory in the past, but it is now seriously flawed to presum e that processes of change and adaptation in the localities across W ales, in this case with regard to com m unity safety and crim e prevention, w ill sim ply reflect the tendencies of its larger neighbour (England) given 77

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the partial devolution of pow ers since 2000 to the W elsh A ssem bly Governm ent. Since 2000 the W elsh A ssem bly G overnm ent (W AG) has had a range of statutory pow ers relating to the policy and practice of com m unity safety, including local governm ent, health and social services, and education. This is one exam ple at the national and local levels in W ales of what we term the constitutional-legal dim ension of pow er-dependence. At present, its pow ers do not extend to policing and crim inal justice per se (unlike Scotland) but issues of crim e prevention - for exam ple, through tackling substance m isuse, youth crim e and annoyance, and prom oting 'youth inclusion' - do fall within the A ssem bly's constitutional-legal and financial remit. Considered as a distinct policy area, com m unity safety was until 2007 a responsibility of the A ssem bly governm ent's Departm ent of Social Justice and Regeneration,1 em phasising at the level of political rhetoric the A ssem bly governm ent's interest in locating issues of 'crim e and disorder' prevention w ithin a problem atic of social rather than crim inal justice. That local partnerships in W ales have retained the prefix 'com m unity safety' rather than the officially designated 'crim e and disorder reduction' partnerships in England is, in the light of recent research findings (Edw ards and H ughes 2008b), also m ore than a sem antic difference. The distinction betw een CSPs in W ales and CD RPs in England has perform ed an im portant sym bolic political function in (as one of our research respondents put it) 'dragonising'2 the policy area as w ell as further em phasising - at least at the level of 'talk' and 'decision' if not as yet proven 'action' - the social policy orientation of responses to crim e and disorder in W ales as distinct from the intended central governm ent direction for CDRPs in England. W hether such sym bolic differences in the nam ing of the organisations tasked with delivering com m unity safety in W ales (i.e. the organisational dim ension of pow er-dependence) translate into radically different practices of control and outcom es for com m unities betw een England and W ales rem ains a m oot point for the kind of com parative research that we would advocate (Edw ards and Hughes 2005b) but w hich, to our know ledge, has yet to be undertaken system ati­ cally and com paratively. Pow erful pressures for convergence across English CDRPs and W elsh CSPs (associated with financial, inform ational and organisational dim en­ sions of pow er-dependence) clearly include the role of the H om e Office in establishing certain perform ance targets for CDRPs and CSPs and linking the two m ain funding budgets hitherto dedicated to partnership w ork and dispensed from W hitehall (the Basic Com m and Unit Fund and the Building Safer Com m unities Fund) to success or failure in m eeting these targets. The new inform ational technologies from central governm ent depart­ m ents associated, for exam ple, with the police-driven N ational Intelli­ gence M odel (NIM ), annual strategic assessm ents and the establishm ent of annual police and com m unity safety statem ents and 34 national 78

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outcom e and indicator sets for com m unity safety in 2008 are suggestive of further penetrative processes o f convergence and conform ity across CSPs and CDRPs in England and W ales. That noted, findings from our survey of all 22 CSPs in W ales (Edw ards and H ughes 2008c) suggest, how ever, that the A ssem bly governm ent provides the overw helm ing proportion of funding received by the W elsh partnerships, accounting for betw een 60 -8 0 per cent of their annual budgets. In turn this funding is allied to a very particular post-devolutionary politics in W ales that is suggestive of a potentially im portant break with the direction of crim e and disorder reduction in England since 1998. The WAG Safer Com m unities Fund established in 2004, for exam ple, is dedicated to reducing problem s of youth exclusion and prom oting youth inclusion through social crim e prevention and diversionary interventions. These are objectives of an 'old' social dem ocratic im pulse to engineer social integration through more intensive w elfare state interventions sitting som ew hat uneasily alongside the risk factor prevention paradigm of the England and W ales Youth Justice Board (H ughes et al. forthcom ing). Indeed, broader com m entaries on post-devolution governm ent in W ales have em phasised the political goal of reasserting the im portance of social dem ocracy and creating a 'high-trust' polity in which disillusioned citizens are reconnected to m ore accountable and responsive public authorities through the dem ocratisation rather than com m ercialisation of public services. The Beecham Inquiry into public service delivery in W ales noted the com m ercial conception of citizens in England (as consum ers of services delivered through quasi-m arket com petition) could not be replicated in W ales, both because of political opposition to the very idea of com m ercialising public services and because of its im practicality given the problem s of sustaining alternative com petitors in a country with a highly dispersed dem ography, particularly in the rural and valleys areas (Beecham 2006: para. 2.13). This broader political context is significant for a discussion of any putative British 'A SBO nation' (Squires 2008) because A SBO s have been regarded by som e key elite decision-m akers in the W elsh polity as the epitom e o f low -trust state-citizen relations, inim ical to the post-devolutionary project of building a m ore inclusive society and thus to be used only as a last resort (Edw ards and H ughes 2008b). (ii) Researching local negotiations and contestations o f anti-social behaviour control

Let us exem plify such local struggles with the exam ple of the resistance we found am ong lead com m unity safety officers in m ost of the 22 localities across W ales to any uncritical im plem entation of the anti-social behaviour agenda prom ulgated from the H om e Office in the mid 2000s (see Edwards and H ughes 2008b). This discussion alerts us to the im portance of the 'subnational' as brought to life in specific geo-historical contexts and local practices and politics in situ. 79

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It becam e clear from this com parative, translocal research on W elsh C SPs that the occu p ation o f com m u nity safety m an ager w as often a tortuous process o f barg ain in g betw een im placable partners, esp ecially w ith regard to the political and culturally em otive issue of governing you ng peop le's use o f pu blic space. In occu p ying this position, com m u­ nity safety m anagers w ere not in a position to act as som e sim ple interlocu tor for the H om e O ffice's 'R esp ect' agenda, or fo ot-soldier for the gov ern m en t's R espect unit, if they w anted to retain the involvem ent of those partn ers prim arily concerned w ith the w elfare o f child ren and young people. As noted earlier, there has been substantial inv estm en t of resources, financial as w ell as political (and sym bolic), in a m ore social dem ocratic, w elfare-orien ted approach to crim e and d isord er in W ales, allied to the rhetoric o f a citizen-centred m od el o f p u blic service, for w hich the prolific use o f 'low -tru st' m easures such as A SB O s is anathem a. A s a consequ ence, this b road er p o st-d evolu tionary project places a con sid er­ able pressu re on com m u nity safety m anagers, reinforced by funding stream s from the W A G that account for the overw helm ing share o f their annual bud gets, to cou nterbalance the 'M an ch ester tend ency' (the local auth ority area w ith by far the highest nu m ber o f A SBO s in recent years) w ith strategies that place a prem iu m on the social inclu sion o f you ng people. H ow ever, there is also evid ence of v ariation in local C SP s' ad herence across W ales to this social d em ocratic project, w ith som e notable ad vocates of A SB O s as an econ om ic and high ly effective m eans of restoring order. Su ch uneven con testation em ph asises the local political agen cy of com m u nity safety m anagers and the partn ersh ips they co-ordinate, the con sequ ences o f w hich cannot be articu lated w ithin the sm ooth narratives o f d isord er that have pred om inated in both official and academ ic discourses. T h e con ception and go v ernan ce o f anti-social b ehav iou r is a com plex and un even ly developed p ractice both in its 'd o in g' by p racti­ tioners and in its ap p reh ension by social researchers. T he greater concerns o f com m u nity safety m anagers across m any lo calities in W ales are focused on efforts to p rev ent or at best to m anage d isord er and local feelings of fear and insecurity. M uch of this w ork is profou nd ly influenced by a social d em ocratic ethos that belies sed u ctive but sim plistic official narra­ tives o f A SB O s as a p rogressive p alliative for 'feral' populations. W hat w e have term ed the 'resilient Fabianism ' (or social d em ocratic and socialist ideological orientation) o f local com m u nity safety m an agers' accounts o f their ow n w ork also d isturbs n arrativ es o f social control in critical social science, w hich are in d anger o f believ in g the hype o f the very political projects they seek to challenge. The d istin ction betw een the neo-liberal and n eo-con serv ative im pu lses con stitu ting the 'free econom y, strong state' project o f N ew R ight politics has anim ated critical com m en­ tary on British governm ent for too long, obfuscating the com plex interd ep en den cies betw een state and civil society that both necessitate 80

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political agency and enable local resistance. The incorporation of this distinction into crim inological research, notably through the w ork of David Garland (1996, 2001) and N ikolas Rose (1999, 2000), has further obscured an understanding of social control as an em ergent, necessarily contingent, product of the struggle for sovereignty over territories and populations. As such, grand narrative them es, such as the eclipse, even death, of social dem ocratic 'crim inologies of everyday life', underestim ate the com plex interplay betw een local priorities and extant political traditions over social order and those em anating from both W hitehall and the WAG. In this way, our research suggests that it is both conceptually flawed and em pirically m isleading to speak of a unitary 'British m odel' or 'A SBO nation' that governs populations through sanctioning anti-social behav­ iour, particularly w hen the im pact of the devolved polities of the U K on policy responses to crim e and disorder is recognised. A larger challenge for research and policy in this field is to explore both the broader conditions of social integration, w hich explain the generation of these new form s of disordering, and their anti-social consequences, as lived experiences for the populations m ost ravaged by the loss of old stabilities around previous divisions of labour at the w orkplace and in the home. To paraphrase Paul W illis (1977), w hat does it mean, especially for young men, to 'learn not to labour', given their actual and prospective ejection from stable, full-tim e em ploym ent?

Conclusion Throughout the discussion in this chapter it has been argued that any adequate social scientific interpretation of both the broad trends and specific realisations of com m unity safety m ust centre on the follow ing issues: • The distinction betw een security and safety talk, decisions and actions: specifically, the gap betw een intended governm ental projects and their actual outcomes. • The role of relations of pow er-dependence betw een (would-be) sover­ eign actors in causing gaps betw een talk, decisions and actions. • The consequent political struggles over safety and security and their uneven outcom es in particular places and m om ents or geo-historical contexts. O ur discussion of current tendencies and consequences, and their interpretation, suggests that the field of com m unity safety is m arked by contradictory and unstable forces. A cross England and W ales we 81

C r im e P re v e n tio n Policie s in C o m p a ra tiv e P ersp ective

c u rre n tly la ck a s y s te m a tic c o m p a ra tiv e re s e a rch p ro g ra m m e in to th e kind o f s e c u rity p o litic s p ro d u c e d b y c o m m u n ity s a fe ty w o rk , a t b o th n a tio n a l a n d su b n a tio n a l le v e ls, a n d e s p e c ia lly a c ro ss E n g lish lo ca litie s. T h a t n o te d , th e re d is c o v e ry o f p o litic a l a g e n c y im p lie d b y th e c o n c e p t o f g e o -h is to r ic a l c o n te x t m a k e s v is ib le an d s a lie n t th e o n g o in g s tru g g le s to g o v e rn . T h e o u tc o m e s o f th e s e s tru g g le s d e riv e fro m th e d iv e rs e as w e ll a s c o m p a ra b le p o litic a l, e c o n o m ic an d c u ltu ra l tra je c to rie s fo u n d in 'B ritis h ' lo ca litie s.

N o te s 1 Following the Assem bly election in M ay 2007 the departm ent was restructured and renamed the Departm ent of Social Justice and Local Government. Com m u­ nity safety rem ains within this department. The em phasis on social rather than criminal justice approaches to reducing crim e and disorder is, if anything, likely to be further enhanced following the agreem ent, in July 2007, betw een the Labour Party and Plaid Cymru (the nationalist party of W ales that adopts a relatively left-wing stance on social policy issues including those of crime and disorder) to form a coalition governm ent. 2 A reference to Y Ddraig Goch or the Red Dragon that is the national symbol of Wales.

R e fe re n c e s Beecham, J. (2006) Beyond Boundaries: A Review o f Service Delivery (Beecham Report). Cardiff: W elsh Assem bly Government. Clarke, J. (2004) Changing Welfare, Changing States. London: Sage. Clarke, R. V. and Eck, J. (2003) Become a Problem-Solving Crime Analyst in 55 Small Steps. London: Jill Dando Institute, University College London. Coleman, R. (2004) Reclaiming the Streets: Surveillance, Social Control and the City. Cullompton: W illan Publishing. Coleman, R. (2005) 'Surveillance in the City: Prim ary Definition and Urban Spatial O rder', Crime, M edia and Culture, 1(2): 131—48. Colem an, R., Sim, J. and W hyte, D. (2002) 'Power, Politics and Partnerships: The State of Crim e Prevention on M erseyside', in G. H ughes and A. Edwards (eds) Crime Control and Community: The Neiv Politics o f Public Safety. Cullompton: W illan Publishing, pp. 86-108. Crawford, A. (1997) The Local Governance o f Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Crawford, A. (2002) T h e Governance of Crim e and Insecurity in an Anxious Age: The Trans-European and the Local', in A. Crawford (ed.) Crime and Insecurity. Cullompton: W illian Publishing, pp. 27-51. Crawford, A. (2006) 'N etworked Governance and the Post-Regulatory State?', Theoretical Criminology, 10(4): 449-79. 82

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Crawford, A. (2007) 'Crim e Prevention and Com m unity Safety', in M. M aguire, R. M organ and R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook o f Criminology, 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 866-909. Deleuze, G. and Guattari, F. (1987) A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizopherenia. M innesota: University of M innesota Press. Downes, D. and M organ, R. (1994) "'H ostag es to Fortune"? The Politics of Law and Order in Post-W ar Britain', in M. M aguire, R. M organ and R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook o f Criminology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 183-232. Downes, D. and Morgan, R. (2002) 'The Skeletons in the Cupboard: The Politics of Law and O rder at the Turn of the M illennium ', in M. M aguire, R. M organ and R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook o f Criminology, 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 286-321. Edwards, A. and Hughes, G. (2002) 'Introduction: The N ew Com m unity Govern­ ance of Crim e Control', in G. H ughes and A. Edwards (eds) Crime Control and Community: The Neiv Politics o f Public Safety. Cullompton: W illan Publishing, pp. 1-19. Edwards, A. and Hughes, G. (2005a) 'Editorial', Theoretical Criminology, 9(3): 259-63. Edwards, A. and Hughes, G. (2005b) 'Com paring the Governance of Safety in Europe: A Geo-historical Approach', Theoretical Criminology, 9(3): 345-63. Edwards, A. and Hughes, G. (2008a) 'Inventing Com m unity Safety', in P. Carlen (ed.) Imaginary Penalities. Cullompton: W illan Publishing. Edwards, A. and Hughes, G. (2008b) 'Resilient Fabians? Anti-social Behaviour and Com m unity Safety W ork in W ales', in P. Squires (ed.) ASBO Nation. Bristol, Policy Press, pp. 57-72. Edwards, A. and Hughes, G. (2008c) The Changing Role o f the Community Safety Officer in Wales. Cardiff: W A C SO /C ardiff University. Foster, J. (2002) "'P e o p le Pieces'': The Neglected but Essential Elem ents of Com m unity Crim e Prevention', in G. Hughes, and A. Edwards (eds) Crime Control and Community: The Neiv Politics o f Public Safety. Cullompton: W illan Publishing, pp. 167-97. Foucault, M. (1991) 'On Governm entality', in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. M iller (eds) The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Hemel H empstead: H ar­ vester W heatsheaf, pp. 87-104. Garland, D. (1996) 'The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crim e Control in Contem porary Society', British Journal o f Criminology, 35(4): 445-71. Garland, D. (2001) The Culture o f Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gilling, D. (1997) Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy and Politics. London: UCL Press. Gilling, D. (2007) Crim e Reduction and Community Safety: Labour and the Politics o f Local Crime Control. Cullompton: Willan Publishing. Haggerty, K. and Ericson, R. (2000) 'The Surveillant Assem blage', British Journal o f Sociology, 51(4): 605-22. Hallsworth, S. (2002) 'Representations and Realities in Local Crim e Prevention: Som e Lessons from London and Lessons for Crim inology', in G. Hughes and A. Edwards (eds) Crim e Control and Community: The Neiv Politics o f Public Safety. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, pp. 197-215. Hallsworth, S. (2008) 'Interpreting Violent Street W orlds', Inaugural lecture, Departm ent of Applied Social Sciences, London M etropolitan University, 27th February. 83

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Home Office (1991) Safer Communities: The Local Delivery o f Crime Prevention Through the Partnership Approach (M organ Report). London: Home Office. Hughes, G. (1998) Understanding Crime Prevention. Buckingham: Open University Press. Hughes, G. (2002) 'Plotting the Rise of Com m unity Safety: Critical Reflections on Research, Theory and Practice', in G. Hughes and A. Edwards (eds) Crime Control and Community: The Neiv Politics o f Public Safety. Cullompton: W illan Publishing, pp. 20-45. Hughes, G. (2007) The Politics o f Crime and Community. London: Palgrave. Hughes, G. (2009) 'Com m unity Safety and the Governance of Problem Popula­ tions', in G. M ooney and S. Neal (eds) Community. M aidenhead: M cGraw Hill, pp. 99-134. H ughes, G. and Edwards, A. (eds) (2002) Crime Control and Community: The New Politics o f Public Safety. Cullompton: W illan Publishing. Hughes, G. and Edwards, A. (2005) 'Crim e Prevention in Context', in N. Tilley (ed.) Handbook o f Crime Prevention and Community Safety. Cullompton: W illan Publishing, pp. 14-34. Hughes, G. and Gilling, D. (2004) "'M issio n Im possible"': The H abitus of the Com m unity Safety M anager', Criminal Justice, 4(2): 129-49. Hughes, G. and Rowe, M. (2007) 'Neighbourhood Policing and Com m unity Safety: Researching the Instabilities of the Local Governance of Crime, Disorder and Safety in Contem porary U K ', Criminology and Criminal Justice, 7(4): 315-46. Hughes, G., M cLaughlin, E. and M uncie, J. (eds) (2002) Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Neiv Directions, London: Sage. Hughes, G. et al. (forthcoming) Youth Crime Prevention in Wales: A National Evaluation o f the Safer Communities Fund. Cardiff: Welsh Assem bly Government. Johnston, L. and Shearing, C. (2003) The Governance o f Security. London: Routledge. M cLaughlin, E., Muncie, J. and Hughes, G. (2001) 'The Permanent Revolution', Criminal Justice, 1(3): 301-18. M atthews, R. and Young, J. (eds) (2003) The New Politics o f Crime and Punishment. Cullompton: W illan Publishing. Pollitt, C. (2001) 'Convergence: A Useful M yth', Public Administration, 79(4): 933-47. Rhodes, R. (1997) Understanding Governance. Buckingham: Open University Press. Rose, N. (1999) Powers o f Freedom: Refraining Political Thought. Cambridge: Cam bridge University Press. Rose, N. (2000) 'G overnm ent and Control', British Journal o f Criminology, 40: 321-39. Scraton, P. (2003) 'Defining Pow er and Changing "K now led ge": Critical Analysis as Resistance in the U K ', in K. Carrington and R. H ogg (eds) Critical Criminology. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, pp. 15-40. Sm andych, R. (ed.) (1999) Governable Places: Readings on Governmentality and Crime Control. Dartmouth: Ashgate. Squires, P. (2008) ASBO Nation. Bristol: Policy Press. Stenson, K. (2002) 'Com m unity Safety in M iddle England: The Local Politics of Crim e Control', in G. H ughes and A. Edwards (eds) Crime Control and Community: The Neiv Politics o f Public Safety. Cullompton: W illan Publishing, pp. 109-39. Stenson, K. and Edwards, A. (2004) 'Policy Transfer in Local Crim e Control: Beyond Naive Em ulation', in T. N ewburn and R. Sparks (eds) Criminal Justice 84

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and Political Cultures: N ational and International D im ensions o f Crim e Control. C ullom pton: W illan Publishing, pp. 2 0 9-33. Tom bs, S., Croall, H. and W hyte, D. (2007) Safety Crim es. Cullom pton: W illan Publishing. Tonry, M. (2004) Punishm ent and Politics: Evidence and Emulation in the M aking o f English C rim e Control Policy. Cullom pton: W illan Publishing. W illis, P. (1977) Learning to Labour. Farnborough: Saxon H ouse. Young, J. (2004) 'V oodoo C rim inology and the N um bers G am e', in J. Ferrell, K. H ayw ard., W. M orrison and M. Presdee (eds) C ultural C rim inology U nleashed. London: G lasshouse.

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C h a p te r 4

T h e developm ent o f com m unity safety in Scotland: a different path? Alistair H enry

In tro d u c tio n T he various con tribution s to this collection ably d em onstrate the differen­ ces and the sim ilarities in the w ays in w hich com m u nity safety has d eveloped throu gh ou t Europe. It m ay be surprising to som e to see a sep arate chapter on Scotland , how ever. As a con stitu ent part o f the U nited K ingdom it m ight be expected that d ev elopm ents in Scotland w ould sim ply m im ic those o f its larger, and m ore thorou ghly researched, neighbour. O ne o f the aim s o f this chapter is to show that such an assu m p tion should be treated w ith a d egree o f caution. D espite the fact that form al con stitutional arrangem en ts m eant that Scotland w as gov ern­ ed by a W estm in ster P arliam ent follow ing the 1707 A cts o f U nion, the practice o f governm ent w as, to an im portan t degree, retained w ithin Scotland. T he absen ce o f a Scottish parliam ent betw een 1707 and 1999 has thus often m asked the fact that Scotland retained a substantial am ount of au ton om y w ithin the U nion, and w ith this auton om y cam e the potential that Scotland cou ld, and w ould, do som e things differently from its neighbour. H ow ever, on e should be w ary of o v erstating the differences that em erged b etw een the tw o countries. If one looks at the d ev elop m ent of com m u nity safety in Scotland sin ce the 1980s, for exam ple, one sees m uch that w ill be fam iliar to those aw are o f d evelopm ents in England and W ales ov er the sam e period. Indeed, w ider d ev elopm ents in the field of crim inal ju stice inclu ding, but not restricted to, com m u nity safety show 86

The developm ent of com m unity safety in Scotland: a different path?

strong sim ilarities w ith d ev elopm ents in England and W ales, and else­ w here in E urope, over this period. T hat said, the d ev elop m ent of com m u nity safety has not follow ed an identical trajectory in Scotland. The sections o f the C rim e and D isord er A ct 1998 that establish ed the statu tory infrastructure o f com m u nity safety in England and W ales w ere not im plem ented north o f the bord er, and so m arked a clear point of d iv erg en ce betw een the system s. A lth ou gh the statu tory infrastructure that has su bsequ ently evolved in Scotland does send out som e con trad ic­ tory m essages it will be argued that, for the m om ent at least, it can be seen as giving som e em ph asis to a fairly broad social ju stice, rath er than an u n necessarily narrow crim inal ju stice, agenda. The chapter con clud es by offering som e specu lations on the likely n ear-fu ture d ev elop m ent of com m u nity safety in Scotland.

T h e a u to n o m y o f sm all n atio n s in E u ro p e : th e case o f S co tlan d Scotland has been the anom aly that has m ad e an osten sibly u n itary state, an archetyp e o f 'nation state' in certain p olitical-theoretical term s, function internally in a m arked ly federal w ay. T h is has been hitherto a federalism o f political m an agem en t and ju dicial separation rather than a federalism o f con stitutional form . (M acC orm ick 1999: 60) In M ay 1999 a new ly elected Scottish P arliam en t sat in E d inbu rgh fo r the first tim e sin ce the 1707 A cts o f U nion had establish ed G reat Britain, w ith its single p arliam ent based at W estm in ster. T h e setting up o f a parliam ent in Scotland had been a m anifesto pledge o f the incom ing N ew Labour ad m inistration that took pow er in 1997. T h e su bsequ ent referend um show ed strong support for this form al d evolution o f governm ent to S cotland , su pport that had been grow ing since the 1960s at least, and seem ed to have strength en ed throu ghou t the T h atch er and M ajor ad m in ­ istrations b etw een 1979 and 1997 (H irst 1989; P aterson 1994; M cC rone 2001). N ationalist sen tim ent and calls for 'h om e rule' w ere not, how ever, new to this period and can be spotted sporadically, albeit w ith different levels o f support, throu ghou t the period o f the U nion (D onald son 1969; M cC rone 1992). W hat w as new w as the resound ing support for form al constitutional recognition o f S co tlan d 's status as a nation w ith the capacity to govern itself - d em and s that have been articu lated in other nations w ithin nation states (such as Q u ebec in C anada and C atalonia in Spain) over rou ghly the sam e period (Tierney 2005; M aclnn es and M cC rone 2001). H ow ever, the re-establish m ent o f a Scottish P arliam en t should not m ask the fact that Scotland retained an im portan t d egree o f auton om y as a cou ntry prior to this recent con stitutional settlem ent. A lth ou gh the U nited K ingd om m ay have been v iew ed as an archetype exam ple o f the 87

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hom ogeneous, u n itary nation-state this w as, in fact, som ething o f a m yth (M id w inter et al. 1991; M cC rone 1992; M acC orm ick 1999). The p u rpose of this section o f the chapter is to provide a b rief account of Sco tland 's long-term auton om y, as it is w ith this in m ind that the potential for d ev elopm ents in com m u nity safety to have been d istinctive from those in E ngland and W ales can be understood. Sco tlan d 's au ton om y w as enshrined w ithin the A cts of U nion from the outset. The U nion w as intended to b e 'an incorporating bu t not an assim ilating u n ion ' (M id w inter et al. 1991: 3). It w as incorp orating both in the sense that it form ally d issolved the old Scottish and English parlia­ m ents and created the unitary sovereign P arliam en t o f G reat Britain (arguably an incorp oration o f the Scottish parliam ent into the ongoing E nglish p arliam ent) (M id w inter et al. 1991: 2; M acC orm ick 1999: 5 7 -8 ) and in that it freed up econom ic exchange betw een the tw o nations, creating a sin gle B ritish m arket w ith a single cu rren cy (M acC orm ick 1999: 52). H ow ever, although the T reaty did create this new B ritish state architec­ ture it also explicitly retained im portant aspects o f Scottish civil society, 'those institutions w hich o p erate in the pu blic dom ain bu t are not part of g ov ernm ent' and w hich 'in clu d e econom ic institutions, p rofessions and o ther self-governing institu tions' (M id w inter et al. 1991: 3). T hree d om ains o f civil society are given p articular p rom in ence in analyses o f post-union Scottish auton om y, identity and politics: the legal system , the church and edu cation (see M id w inter et al. 1991: 9 -1 4 ; M cC ro ne 1992, 2001; Paterson 1994; Young 1996). W here it is true that all o f these institutions w ould com e un der criticism for bein g A nglicised at various points, it rem ains the case that their organisational and institutional d evelopm ent, and the social and professional w orlds inhabited by the people w ithin them , rem ained, to varying degrees, sep arate from those o f their cou nterparts in England and W ales. T his institutional sep aration, w hich also applied to other spheres o f central and local go v ernm ent and ad m inistration, w ould allow for the survival o f d istin ctive Scottish values and trad itions am ong those w ho w ere, to an im portan t degree, gov erning the nation (M cC rone 1992: 23; P aterson 1994: 131). If w e ask w hy Scotland can still be recognised as d istin ct at the end o f the tw entieth century, the answ er is m u ch the sam e as w ould be given for any sm all European country: the character o f a society is conditioned m ore by the daily interactions o f hum an beings, d raw ing on a com m on history, than by the broad sw eep o f enablin g legisla­ tion. If the state does have an influence in this respect, it is through the d irect con tact w hich people have w ith it - throu gh its p rofessional staff such as teach ers or social w orkers or bu reaucrats . . . in Scotland, these professionals operated accord ing to Scottish trad itions and rules. (P aterson 1994: 130-1)

88

The developm ent of com m unity safety in Scotland: a different path?

Thus, Scotland retained a capacity for d istin ctiven ess becau se it m ain ­ tained a d istin ctive institutional apparatus w ithin w hich cadres of p rofessionals and bu reaucrats w orked acco rd ing to Scottish trad itions and w ays o f d oing things (Paterson 1994: chapter 3; P hillipson 1976). M cC rone h as gone so far as to argue that, particularly follow ing the m ove o f the Scottish O ffice to E dinbu rgh in 1939, Scotland had increm entally evolved its ow n d istin ctive w elfare state structures and that by the 1970s it could be characterised as a 'sem i-state w ith pow erfu l ad m inistrativ e apparatus' (1992: 22). T he architectu re o f go v ernm ent that had evolved w as only scrutinized by P arliam ent at W estm in ster to a lim ited d egree (M id w inter et al. 1991: chapter 4) as m u ch o f its w ork w as p olicy im plem entation rather than d evelopm ent. G ov ern m ent in Scotland had becom e a 'tech n oc­ racy' ru n by Scottish Office civil servan ts and officials, interest groups and policy netw orks populated by m em bers o f S co tlan d 's sep arate civil society in stitutions, and the grow ing bod y o f public sector p rofessionals created by the w elfare state, inclu ding d octors, teachers and social w orkers (Paterson 1994: 103). T his did not m ean that p olicy in Scotland w ould necessarily be m uch d ifferent from that in England and W ales, it m erely created a possibility that it could be. K eatin g's argum en t that W estm in­ ster's sovereign ty o v er setting the 'g o als' o f governm ent w as fundam ental, becau se Scottish auton om y in choosing the 'm ean s' through w hich policy w ould be im plem ented w ould u ltim ately be lim ited by the p aram eters of these goals (2001: 9 7 -8 ), is a rem ind er that Scottish autonom y, though real, should not be overstated and w as not w ithout constraints. Indeed, one of the striking features o f m u ch o f the tw entieth cen tury w as that there w as a high d egree o f agreem ent about the fun dam ental objectives of gov ern­ m en t am ong p oliticians and bu reaucrats in both Scotland and England and W ales. T h e d evelopm ent o f the w elfare state w as an end eavou r based upon con sid erable political con sensu s about the role o f the state in m aintaining a healthy and active popu lation, full em p loym ent and political em an cipation and entitlem en ts (Paterson 1994: 104-6). T here are exam ples o f d ifferent approaches to p olicy im plem entation bein g taken, even in this period o f relativ e consensu s over governm ental goals (such as in relation to econom ic d evelopm ent, p lanning and hou sing policy, see P aterson 1994: 1 1 7-23), and stud ies have provided ev id ence o f Scottish d istin ctiven ess in relation to several im portan t social d im ensions, inclu d ­ ing national identity, voting patterns, party political affiliation, health and edu cation (M cC rone 1992, 2001); how ever, the w elfare project un d erp in ­ ned sim ilarities that w ould characterise Scotland and England and W ales for m u ch o f the last century. A lth ou gh difference is not a necessary outcom e o f au ton om y it can p rovide evid ence o f it. It is o f p articular relevan ce to the present d iscu ssion that the Scottish legal system rem ained in stitutionally separate from the system in England and W ales, and that it retained and developed its ow n d istin gu ishing features, som e o f w hich are sum m arised below : 89

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• C rim inal courts. T he structure and organisation o f the cou rts differs m arked ly in Scotland from England and W ales (Y oung 1997). A lthou gh the H ouse o f Lords acts as a court o f final appeal in Scottish civil cases, it has no such ju risd iction in relation to crim inal m atters w here the H igh C ou rt o f Ju sticiary acts in this cap acity (H im sw orth 2007: 35). The C on stitu tion R eform A ct 2005 established a Su p rem e C ou rt o f the U nited K ingd om as a court o f last resort on constitutional m atters. The consu ltation that preceded the A ct w as con tentiou s as there w ere con cern s that a Su p rem e C ou rt could threaten the autonom y o f Scots law in general, and the H igh C o u rt o f Ju sticiary in p articu lar (H im ­ sw orth and Paterson 2004), but the long-term im pact that it w ill have on the three ind ep en den t legal system s in the U K (England and W ales, N orthern Ireland and Scotland ) rem ains to be seen (H im sw orth 2007: 37-4 0 ). • C rim inal court procedure. D espite crim inal cou rt procedu re b ein g form al­ ly ad versarial, as it is in England and W ales (G ane 1999), it also contains features, such as the interm ed iate diet w here the ju d g e plays an active role in assessing preparedness o f cou ncil to proceed, that som e com m entators have consid ered to be m ore inquisitorial in nature (Young 1996; M cC allu m and Duff 2000). • Prosecution. Scotland has long had a system o f pu blic prosecu tion throu gh the ind ep en den t office o f the P rocu rator Fiscal w hich, even follow ing the establish m ent o f the C row n P rosecu tion Serv ice in England and W ales, has arguably m ore in com m on w ith system s of prosecu tion on the C on tinen t (D uff 1999). • C rim inal ju stice social work. The Social W ork (Scotland) A ct 1968 con trov ersially closed d ow n the specialist Scottish P robation Serv ice in fav ou r o f having crim inal ju stice social w ork provided throu gh m ore gen eric social w ork services (M clv o r and W illiam s 1999:199-200; Schaffer 1980:40). A lth ou gh there is evid ence that crim inal ju stice social w ork has becom e increasing ly specialised w ithin Social W ork D epartm ents (and so personnel m ay have rath er less gen eric social w o rk exp erience than w ould have been envisaged ) it rem ains the case that personnel w ho un d ertake crim inal ju stice social w ork services identify them selves as social w orkers, and gen erally esp ou se the outlook and penal w elfare valu es of social w orkers (even in the face of alternative d iscou rses, such as public protection, see M cN eil and W hyte 2007: 21-30). • Children's H earings and youth justice. The C h ild ren 's H earing system is arguably the m ost d istin ctive feature o f Scottish crim inal ju stice process. Set up un der the Social W ork (Scotland) A ct 1968, C h ild ren 's H earings w ere based on the un derstand ing that there w as no d ifference betw een you ng people w ho offended and those w ho w ere in need o f social support a n d /o r intervention. A ccord in g to the report o f the K ilbran don 90

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C om m ittee (w hich inform ed m uch of the 1968 A ct) offending w as sim ply a con sequ ence or m an ifestation o f w ider social problem s in the y ou ng p erso n 's env ironm en t and so ad d ressing these problem s w as central to ad d ressing offending behaviou r. Therefore, w hen youth cou rts w ere abolished and the C h ild ren 's H earings system established in 1971, Scotland had essentially ad opted an explicitly w elfarist ap proach to youth ju stice at precisely the m om ent that such approaches w ere com ing u n d er d irect attack south of the b ord er (M cA ra 2004: 27 -3 2 ; W hyte 2003). T he d istin ctive features of Scottish crim inal ju stice serve to illustrate the potential for d ifference betw een Scotland and England and W ales. It has further been argued that the period betw een the K ilbran don Report (the 1960s) and the m id 1990s can be characterised as one in w hich divergence b etw een the crim inal ju stice system s o f Scotland and England and W ales becam e p articularly acute, the form er retaining a m uch stronger com m it­ m ent to the values o f penal w elfarism than the latter (M cA ra 2004, 2005). This w as a period in w hich political sen tim ent in Scotland w as noticeably out o f kilter w ith the rest o f the U K - the T hatcher and M ajor ad m inistrations nev er enjoyed a political m an d ate in Scotland (see M cC rone 2001: chapter 5) - resu ltin g in Scottish elites ad optin g an 'other than E ngland ' position w hen it cam e to policy d evelopm ent and im p le­ m entation (M cA ra 2007). T his period of d iv erg en ce w as not to last, how ever, and w ould sw iftly b e follow ed by a period in w hich there w ould be evid ence o f con sid erable con vergence o f crim inal ju stice policy. The d evelopm ent o f com m u nity safety in Scotland , and this com plex and contrad ictory policy env ironm en t in w hich it occurred, will now be exam ined.

T h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f c o m m u n ity safety and p a rtn e rs h ip s in S co tlan d : a fa m ilia r tale? The story of the d evelopm ent o f com m u nity safety in Scotland sin ce the 1980s is one that w ill be v ery fam iliar to those w ho have observed England and W ales over the sam e period. A lthou gh the chapter w ill m ove on to id entify and exam ine som e features o f the organisation and structure o f com m u nity safety and partn ersh ip w orkin g in Scotland that are d istin ctive from how things have evolved south of the bord er, it is the sim ilarities betw een the ju risd ictio n s that w ill be m ad e apparen t in this section. In fact, the story in Scotland also has striking sim ilarities w ith d ev elopm ents throu gh ou t Europe. T h e 'clu ster o f cen tral them es' that C raw ford sees as characterising p olicy responses to in security throughout E urope (see C h apter 1, this volu m e) are all visible w ithin the Scottish context. 91

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Recent accounts of the developm ent of crim e prevention and com m u­ nity safety w ithin the Scottish police often take the setting up of Juvenile Liaison Schem es in the 1950s as their starting point (Schaffer 1980; M onaghan 1997; Fyfe 2005). The first Scottish schem e w as set up in G reenock in 1956 (it had been tried som e years earlier in Liverpool), a force that quickly developed a reputation for innovative com m unity policing (Schaffer 1980: 68-72; Fyfe 2005: 109-10). Further schem es were later set up in the towns of Coatbridge, Kilm arnock, Paisley and Perth (as well as in Stirling and Clackm annan police districts) (see M ack 1963: 361) and they would soon form part of the w ork of all Scottish police forces. The Juvenile Liaison Schem e was undoubtedly interesting as it involved police officers w orking closely with a range of other local social services and com m unity m em bers (including schools, probation officers, m inisters, local businesses and fam ilies them selves) in order to supervise and monitor young people w ho had been identified as being engaged in what would probably be described as 'anti-social behaviour' in m odern parlance - problem atic and disruptive behaviour that m ight be a m inor offence in itself, or could be viewed as evidence that the young person was out of family control and 'at risk' of engaging in future offending (Schaffer 1980: 30 -1 ; M onaghan 1997: 25). As such, the Juvenile Liaison Schem e was both an early attem pt to highlight the im portance of m ulti-agency co-operation and an articulated recognition that the police alone did not necessarily control all of the m eans through w hich to prevent crime. It was also 'part of a w ider project of crim e and delinquency prevention' that, at this point, was particularly focused on the im pact of urban decay on young people and crim e rates (M ack 1963: 367; M onaghan 1997: 27), an area of concern that would continue to shape developm ents in the future. The approach of the Juvenile Liaison Schem es would not, however, receive universal support w ithin the Scottish police, m irroring debates about the role of the police and the m eaning of 'crim e prevention' that have also been docum ented in England and W ales (Craw ford 1997). One of the aim s of the Juvenile Liaison Schem e had been to keep young people out of form al crim inal justice process (in this w ay it sat quite com fortably w ith the K ilbrandon philosophy discussed earlier), and there is evidence that it w as quite successful in this respect (M ack 1963: 367-8). The Royal Com m ission on Police in Scotland (which reported in 1962) would also give som e thought as to w hat the nature of, and priority to be given to, crim e prevention ought to be - was it to be achieved through effective detection and prosecution of crim es, through better com m unity involve­ ment and liaison, or with reference to proactive physical and social crim e prevention m easures (M onaghan 1997: 27)? Basically, the Com m ission w eighed up the relative value of proactive m easures (such as juvenile liaison and com m unity involvem ent) against reactive policing (law enforcem ent and prosecution). M onaghan observed that the Com m ission did not com e to any clear conclusions on this m atter and defined the 92

The development of community safety in Scotland: a different path?

functions of the Scottish police in broad terms that w ere interpretable either way (1997: 27).1 The point is that in large part the police them selves continued to give em phasis to the reactive role of police as crim e-fighters, and considered proactive and com m unity-based w ork as being 'social w ork' and certainly not 'real' police w ork (Schaffer 1980: 26). Culturally this m eant that the Scottish police (like their English colleagues) gave priority and status to work that produced 'results' (in the form of arrests a n d /o r convictions) and would com e to think o f crim e prevention in such terms. The generally low num bers of police officers involved in specialist crim e prevention work, despite it becom ing a focus of policy, continued into the 1990s, and it was found to be a relatively m arginal activity within the organisation by Her M ajesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary as late as 1995 (M onaghan 1997: 31). D espite this internal resistance w ithin the police there would continue to be im portant developm ents that w ould give em phasis to more proactive and m ulti-agency form s of crim e prevention. For exam ple, the Scottish H om e and H ealth D epartm ent's 1971 circular (4 /7 1 ) sought to develop com m unity relations w ork through the recom m endation that specialist com m unity involvem ent branches be established (Schaffer 1980: 47-8). A fter the 1975 rationalisation of the Scottish police there w ere found to be com m unity involvem ent branches in all eight of the newly established forces (there had previously been 22) (M onaghan 1997: 29). It rem ains unclear how active all of these com m unity involvem ent branches actually w ere in practice, but there is evidence that som e of them w ere active and took the role seriously. For exam ple, the new ly established Strathclyde police force set up a working party to develop the com m unity involvem ent role (Schaffer 1980: 48). It understood 'crim e prevention' in much broader terms than just 'law enforcem ent', distinguishing between physical m easures (from target-hardening to being involved in architec­ tural design), social m easures (with a particular focus on working with young people and the C hildren's H earing system , but also including w orking w ith schools and in deprived urban neighbourhoods) and com m unity relations (which it described as being about m aintaining good contacts w ith various local services and local governm ent, noting, interestingly, that 'race relations present no problem in Strathclyde') (Schaffer 1980: 47-8). Sim ilar them es w ere also found within the often quite contem porary sounding report of the Scottish Council on Crim e from 1975. It was possible to argue that the report rather played down the potential role of opportunity reduction and physical crim e prevention to act as anything other than a short-term solution, but it was nonetheless interesting that such m easures, coupled w ith the idea that they needed to be im plem ented by com m unities them selves (citizens, businesses and so on) w ere already w ell in evidence (see Scottish Council on Crim e 1975). It w as also interesting that the report gave som e em phasis to the im portance of 93

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'so cial' causes o f crim e (defined as poverty, bad housing, fam ily u p b rin g­ ing and unem ploym en t) as key to long-term crim e prevention, even if it did so w ith a caveat that rising crim e could not easily be attributed to social factors alone (1975: 2 2 -3 ). T aking such an approach again m eant that the C ou ncil w as inclined to con clud e that crim e prevention w ould u ltim ately requ ire the co-operation o f a w ide ran ge o f social services, governm ent bodies, com m u nity rep resentatives and local people them ­ selves - it w as not a task for any sin gle agen cy (1975: 22). Even though the report did m ove on to give som e consid eration to the potential role of p enal sanctions and treatm en t-based disposals in crim e prevention (doing so w ith quite a critical eye as to the efficacy o f the latter, chim ing w ith the em ergin g 'n oth in g w ork s' cynicism o f this period; see para. 53 o f the report), it did not take too police-centred a v iew o f crim e prevention, seeing the police as bu t one elem ent o f a larger netw ork o f governm ental and inform al social control, a v iew that has becom e m u ch m ore w idely accepted in recent years (Loader 2000). By the early 1980s it w ould appear that there w as quite a lot of m u lti-agen cy w ork going on in Scotland that saw the police w orking w ith schools, social w orkers, local businesses, churches, architects, town p lanners, local gov ernm ent and a d evelopin g netw o rk o f local crim e p rev ention panels (w hich w ere them selves populated by local interested parties) (Schaffer 1980). Som e of the problem s inherent in m u lti-agency w orking, such as the difficulty in getting local people involved and taking o w nership o f projects, and the related p roblem o f the sam e faces turning up to get involved every tim e, w ere alread y recognised (Schaffer 1980: 74). H ow ever, d espite som e focused strategies in the 1980s that w ould con tin u e to em ph asise partn ersh ip w orking (w hich w ill b e outlined shortly), it rem ained uncertain as to how m uch, if at all, partnership w orking or crim e prevention initiatives w ere having an im pact on the ground. T h e C en tral R esearch U nit's D irectory o f C rim e P revention Initiat­ ives in Scotland (V alentin 1995) show ed that there w as a lot o f w ork out there, but that it w as d evelopin g sporadically, un der d ifferent auspices (som e w ere police-led initiatives, others w ere led by crim e prevention panels, others appeared to be run by som e form o f partnership), and w ith d ifferent visions o f 'crim e p rev ention' (there w as a m ix o f situ ational and social projects). V ery little o f it appeared to have been evalu ated and so it is difficult to m ake anything bu t quite cautiou s claim s about the extent to w hich crim e prevention and com m u nity safety in p ractice in Scotland was d ifferent, if at all, from that in England and W ales. T he co-ord ination of these piecem eal d ev elopm ents w ould becom e all the m ore im portan t over the 1990s as a p otentially ov erlap p in g set of partnership structures evolved. N ot only did the S cottish H om e and H ealth D epartm ent circu lar 6 /8 4 , m u ch like its cou nterpart in England and W ales issued six m onths earlier, reiterate a com m itm ent to the shared responsibility for crim e prevention 94

The developm ent of com m unity safety in Scotland: a different path?

and the need, therefore, for a m u lti-agen cy response to it, it also indicated som ething o f a shift in thinking abou t crim e prevention tow ards the situ ational (Bottom s 1990). By this tim e the influence o f the H om e O ffice R esearch U nit, and the pow erfu l research that it w as p rod ucing (C larke and M ayh ew 1980), w as clearly b ein g felt in Scotland. For M onagh an this represented an exam ple of anti-w elfarist sentim ent hav ing an im pact upon Scottish p olicy (1997: 35). T hat said, the con ception o f crim e p rev ention that continued to be articu lated in Scotland throu ghou t the 1980s also gave em ph asis to the perceived link betw een the socio ­ econ om ic d ecline o f urban centres and hou sing estates ('im p ossib le com m u n ities'), the rising crim e problem , and w ider con cern s about problem you ng people (Schaffer 1980: 78-8 0 ). The Safer N eighbourhood schem es organised by SA C R O in 1986, although sim ilar to earlier w ork condu cted in England and W ales by N A C R O (Bottom s 1990: 5, 9 -1 0 ) reflected this, as did 1988's N ew Life fo r Urban Scotland, a partnershipbased initiative w hich activ ely sou gh t to involve local com m u nities and the p rivate sector in urban red evelopm ent. A t this point in late 1980s Scotland 'crim e p rev ention . . . w as set w ithin the w ider con text o f urban reg en eration ' (M onaghan 1997: 35). T h e next series o f m u lti-agency initiatives, in the form o f the Safer C ities projects, w ould con tin u e w ith this tendency to nest crim e prevention w ithin b road er policy concerns, and w ould also see com m u nity safety em erge as a m ore w idely used term . T h e Scottish O ffice ann ou nced its Safer C ities program m e in 1989, again follow ing the lead o f the H om e O ffice w hich had annou nced its program m e the previous year. Fou r Scottish projects w ere initially set up, in C en tral E dinbu rgh , C astlem ilk (G lasgow ), G reater E asterh ou se (G las­ gow ) and N orth East D undee, w ith a fifth project bein g added in A berdeen in 1992 (see C arnie 1996). All o f the projects continued to be situated w ithin the logic o f urban regen eration to the extent that one of their objectives w as to 'create safer cities in w hich econom ic enterprise and com m u nity life could flou rish ' (C arnie 1999: 76). H ow ever, the Safer C ities program m es, on both sides o f the bord er, w ere also m ore explicitly focused on crim e and fear o f crim e issues than previous initiatives, and had, from the o utset at least, an orientation that favoured the use of situ ational crim e prevention m easures ov er m ore social (or w elfare-based ) m easures (Pease 1997; C arnie 1999). This orientation, d espite being favoured by gov ernm ent officials and m any H om e Office research ers at the tim e (Ekblom 1995), w ould not be accepted u n reserved ly by the local p ractitioners w ho w ould end up ru nning the projects. For exam ple, C arnie found that the C astlem ilk Safer C ities project had been able to negotiate a broad com m u nity safety agen da that understood crim e p rev ention in social w elfare term s (1999: 7 7 -8 ). It had been able to do this becau se the m u lti-agen cy group that w ould d evelop the agenda pre-existed its Safer C ities status and w as alread y w orkin g w ith this b road er perspective. This w as not the case w ith the o ther projects, but even there situational 95

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m easures would be balanced with social initiatives (Carnie 1999: 79-82). Indeed, analyses of projects throughout Scotland and England and Wales found that there tended to be a m ovem ent tow ards social m easures and aw ay from purely situational m easures throughout the lives of projects (Pease 1997: 982). The reason for this seem ed to be that local practitioners, in both jurisdictions, favoured w hat they saw as more 'holistic' and 'long-term ' solutions to crim e prevention (i.e. social m easures), and rem ained unconvinced that situational m easures would produce much else other than displacem ent (Pease 1997; G illing 1997). This was despite the fact that there was evidence that working with the less clearly defined social m easures was often the source of disagreem ent and conflict within partnerships, w hereas situational m easures w ere m ore clearly defined, their effects also being m ore readily m easurable (Gilling 1994). The Safer C ities projects certainly suggested that 'com m unity safety' seem ed to be a more politically attractive rallying call than 'crim e prevention', despite its shortcom ings (Gilling 1997; C arnie 1999). In any case the evaluations would prove to be sufficiently positive to ensure that the com m itm ent to m ulti-agency w ork would not only continue, but would gather m om en­ tum. The Scottish Office's strategy docum ent Preventing Crim e Together in Scotland: A Strategy fo r the 1990s (1992) em erged ju st as internal develop­ ments w ithin central governm ent (including the setting up of a Crim e Prevention U nit w ithin the Scottish Office in the sam e year) w ere serving to underline the increasing im portance being given to crim e prevention (see M onaghan 1997: 34-9). The docum ent continued to extol the virtues of the partnership approach to problem -solving that would be taken up, or would develop, in a range of social policy areas by the end of the decade. Interestingly, the docum ent was quite clear about the im portance of local governm ent to the developm ent of 'holistic' crim e prevention strategies, in contrast to w hat M onaghan had seen as active attem pts to exclude it throughout the preceding decade, and in the Safer Cities experim ents specifically w here appointed co-ordinators cam e from the Scottish Office or organisations such as Crim e Concern, but not from local governm ent (1997: 39; C arnie 1996, 1999). It w as also clear that the intention was that the resources to develop crim e prevention partnership work w ould have to com e from the reallocation of existing local governm ent funds, rather than from additional stream s of funding. This was just prior to a substantial reorganisation of local governm ent structures in both Scotland and in England and W ales (M cCrone 2001), so it is perhaps not surprising that developm ents in partnership w ork seem to have been piecem eal at best in this period of uncertainty (Craig and M anthorpe 1999). Partnerships would continue to receive core support through resource reallocation and 'in kind' (i.e. through local authority and police com m itm ents to provide designated com m unity safety officers to develop strategies) for around another decade, although additional pots 96

The development of community safety in Scotland: a different path?

of Challenge Fund m onies would also be available through com petitive tender com petitions for specific initiatives (such as CCTV). M ore sustain­ able core annual funding for com m unity safety partnerships was only introduced in 2002 (Scottish Executive 2002, 2003, 2005), but since the election of a new adm inistration to H olyrood (the Scottish N ational Party) in M ay 2007 future funding arrangem ents for com m unity safety have again becom e uncertain. The turning point in England and W ales occurred w hen local authori­ ties and the police were given statutory duties to develop local crim e and d isorder reduction partnerships (CDRPs) under the Crim e and Disorder A ct 1998, thus creating the form al 'infrastructure' within w hich com m u­ nity safety would develop over the follow ing decade (see Craw ford 2007: 893-5). These sections of the A ct did not apply to Scotland, possibly because devolution was in the air and it was felt that the creation of such responsibilities should lie w ith a future Scottish Parliam ent. This is not to say, how ever, that the position in Scotland w as necessarily so different in practice. The im portance, and possible benefits, of working in partnership would be em phasised in a num ber of high-profile docum ents produced in the late 1990s. Com m unity Safety: A Key Council Strategy (1997) is of particular interest in that it was published by the Convention of Scottish Local A uthorities (CoSLA - a body that represents the interests of local governm ent in Scotland), articulated a broad view of com m unity safety partnership w ork (ranging from CC TV to youth cafes to intergenerational problem s to fire and road safety), and, am ong others, gave the new adm inistration's m anifesto com m itm ent to com m unity safety and its affinity with the 'Best V alue' agenda as key reasons for local authorities to engage with com m unity safety. CoSLA would also, along with the Association of C hief Police Officers Scotland (A CPOS), contribute to the Scottish Executive's Safer Comm unities in Scotland (1999), designed to play a not dissim ilar role to the guidance m aterial for new CDRPs issued by the H om e Office, in that it was about giving advice to the police and local authorities about how they should go about setting up partnership structures (it included sections on conducting com m unity safety audits, m onitoring program m es and evaluating initiatives). So even though partnership rem ained non-statutory north of the border the level of encouragem ent to develop such strategies was such that it is questionable w hether it actually rem ained genuinely 'voluntary'. Certainly by the end of the decade all 32 of the Scottish local authorities were involved in som e kind of com m unity safety-related m ulti-agency work, even though much of it rem ained, disappointingly, 'at a very early stage of developm ent' (A ccounts Com m ission 2000a: 2; 2000b; H ew itt et al. 2000). It should also be noted at this point that partnership w orking in Scotland (and England and W ales too) was being extolled as a virtue in a wide range of other, often related, policy fields. O ne of the first things that Donald Dew ar, the incom ing Secretary of State for Scotland, did upon the 97

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election of the N ew Labour adm inistration in 1997 was issue a consulta­ tion paper on the problem of social exclusion in Scotland (Scottish Office 1998). Social exclusion was defined to incorporate a wide social w elfare agenda that m ade explicit reference to com m unity safety, but also identified poor housing and urban decay, unem ploym ent and low levels of m arketable skills, the lack of resources for children and young people, ill health and inequitable access to transport, as m eans through which citizens w ere effectively prevented from fully participating in public life. As with urban regeneration before it, crim e prevention and com m unity safety w ere being nested w ithin a broader social w elfare agenda. Social Inclusion Partnerships (SIPs) em erged throughout the U K in the late 1990s and a substantial am ount of w ork continues to be done under its rubric (Scottish Executive 2007), including the developm ent of com m unity-based interventions that m ay im pact on offending (see Bannister and Dillane 2005). W ithout entering into a larger discussion of w hat is a substantial area of social policy in its own right, the central point to be m ade here is that by the end of the twentieth century there w as a plethora of partnership structures in Scotland (for exam ple, com m unity safety, social inclusion, partnerships for parenting, lifelong learning partnerships), many of w hich could potentially overlap in various ways. If one took a broad enough view of 'crim e prevention' all of these partnerships could be deem ed to have a role to play. The desire to co-ordinate the work of this patchw ork of partnerships, and avoid overlap and duplication of effort, would find expression in com m unity planning, the developm ent of w hich has played an im portant role in shaping the infrastructure of com m unity safety in Scotland (see below ). The developm ent of com m unity safety in Scotland can thus be seen as having followed a very sim ilar, but not identical, trajectory to that of England and W ales. There are argum ents to be m ade that the size of the jurisdiction, the rural character of m uch of it, and the history of officials and com m unity m em bers working in partnership in other fields (such as econom ic developm ent, see Paterson 1994: 117—23) gave developm ents som ething of a m ore consensual and social w elfare-oriented edge than w as the case south of the border, but in the absence of rigorous evaluation and research throughout m uch of this period such claim s ought to be m ade with som e degree of caution. A picture of sim ilarity also em erges if one looks at broader developm ents in crim inal justice since the mid 1990s - the period when, according to M cAra (2004, 2005), Scottish and English d ivergence cam e to an end, and convergence becam e m ore apparent. By the early years of the new century both jurisdictions could be character­ ised as articulating a com plicated, and very often contradictory, set of rationales and values ('punitive, preventative, restorative, actuarial'), all of which w ere further justified on the grounds of, and underpinned by, a com m itm ent to 'scientific rationalism ' and the value of evidence-led policy (M cAra 2004: 39-40). Realising that all of the follow ing can be 98

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thou ght o f as features o f the recent crim inal ju stice land scape in Scotland gives som e sen se o f this confusion, and the con trad ictory tend encies that ch aracterise the system (see G arland 1996; Fyfe 2005; M cA ra 2004; W hyte 2003): • Z ero-tolerance policing • A nti-social behav iou r ord ers and paren ting orders • C u rfew s on you ng people • N eighbourhood w atch • C h ild ren 's H earings • Y outh courts • D rugs courts • R isk-assessm en t and risk -m an agem ent regim es • M unicipal policing • C om m u nity W ard ens Schem es • R estorative ju stice program m es • A grow ing prison population • Electronic tagging • W idespread use o f C C T V in pu blic and sem i-p u blic spaces • G row th o f the private secu rity sector • M ulti-agency you th team s H ow ever, d espite these very apparen t sim ilarities the d evelopm ent of com m u nity safety in Scotland has not been identical to that in England and W ales. This is best illustrated throu gh reference to the statutory in frastructures that have em erged in both cou ntries, and it is to this that I now turn.

C u r r e n t d e v e lo p m e n ts in th e in fra s tru c tu re o f c o m m u n ity safety in S co tlan d : a c o n tra d ic to ry ta le The sections o f the C rim e and D isord er A ct 1998 that placed a statu tory du ty up on local auth orities and the p olice to set up and co-ordinate C D R Ps w ere not im plem ented in Scotland. It is alread y clear that this did not m ean that calls for partn ersh ip w orking and m u lti-agen cy co ­ operation did not p reoccu py Scottish p olicy-m akers throu ghou t the 1990s. H ow ever, it did m ean that the infrastructure w ithin w hich com m unity safety developed rem ained less form al for longer than it did in England and W ales. Indeed , it is only in the last few years that w hat m igh t be view ed as a statu tory in frastructure for com m u nity safety has been 99

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erected. There are three m ain pieces of legislation that are of great im portance to the current and future developm ent of com m unity safety in Scotland. Taken together they create the infrastructure w ithin which com m unity safety is nested. W hether this infrastructure reflects a distinc­ tive set of value com m itm ents w ithin crim inal justice and social policy in Scotland is an altogether more vexed question, upon w hich I will conclude. The discussion will be organised around the three statutory obligations that have a bearing on the location and future developm ent of com m unity safety in Scotland: com m unity planning, anti-social behaviour and com m unity justice authorities. Community planning

C om m unity planning was first mooted in Labour Party policy docum ents on local governm ent in the mid 1990s. The concept was closely linked with current thinking on the Best Value agenda, and the im portance of im proving local governm ent efficiencies and perform ance through it. In Scotland five local authorities (Edinburgh, H ighland, Perth and Kinross, South Lanarkshire and Stirling) voluntarily becam e Pathfinder projects in 1998 and developed and published their own Com m unity Plans by D ecem ber of that year. The Pathfinders w ere review ed, in generally favourable terms, by a team from the U niversity of Birm ingham that identified four core com ponents underlying the concept of com m unity planning (see Rogers et al. 2000: 6-7): 1. Strategic vision. Com m unity planning was to be very m uch about em phasising 'holistic' approaches to social policy. It saw that m any of the needs of local com m unities w ere interlinked and, as w e will see, would also com e to be a m odel through w hich the existing patchw ork of som etim es overlapping partnerships (including com m unity safety and social inclusion as but two exam ples) could be subjected to increased oversight and co-ordination. 2. Commiinitij consultation ami involvement. The view s of the com m unity itself and of local public, private and voluntary agencies w ere to be sought and, m ore im portantly, they w ere to be actively involved in the process. 3. Partnership. Both planning and im plem entation were, unsurprisingly, to be done in partnership. 4. Com m unity leadership. It was interesting that, despite the em phasis on partnership working, there was nonetheless a view that local govern­ m ent had an especially im portant role to take in term s of initiating and 'leading' the com m unity planning process. Rogers et al. argue that this idea cam e from the fact that local authorities tapped into local dem ocracy through their elected m em bership and that they also had 100

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responsibility for the broadest range of social services, and so w ere best placed to take the lead (2000: 7). The Birm ingham team found that there w as 'no basic dispute about the fundam ental value of com m unity planning' (Rogers et al. 2000: 9) and that there were high levels of goodw ill towards the approach from w ithin local governm ent and am ong partners. M ore specifically the team found that there was strong support w ithin local governm ent for com m unity planning to be given statutory backing in a m anner that would underline the com m itm ent to be given to strategic planning (2000: 19-20). It is interesting to note that local governm ent in England and W ales had been vocal som e years earlier (follow ing the influential M organ Report in 1991) about the need for a statutory duty to underscore partnership com m itm ents (Craw ford 1997; H ughes and Edw ards 2002), but in Scotland the pressure cam e in relation to broad and strategic partnership working and w ithout m uch specific reference to crim e prevention or com m unity safety at all (am ong the Pathfinders only Stirling had com m unity safety as a priority of the com m unity plan; see Rogers et al. 2000: 15). Com m unity planning was given statutory force in the Local G overn­ m ent (Scotland) A ct 2003. The Act does articulate the com m unity leadership role of local governm ent through placing the duty to 'initiate' com m unity planning on it (Section 15), although it also places a specific duty on a broad range of other agencies (including health boards, joint police boards, chief constables of the police, joint fire boards, and Scottish Enterprise) to 'participate in com m unity planning' (Section 16). Since the A ct, com m unity safety has been placed w ithin the fram ew ork of C om m u­ nity Planning as a strategic priority for m any of the partners. It sits, therefore, nested am ong other partnership-based strategic priorities that vary in different com m unity plans, but include social inclusion, partner­ ships for parenting, healthy com m unities, social justice, lifelong learning, econom ic developm ent and sustainability, and environm ental planning. It is, of course, the case that CDRPs in England and W ales also developed from and alongside other partnership structures that included urban regeneration and social inclusion (H ughes 2002: 31), but in Scotland the statutory duty itself has given em phasis to the m ore holistic com m unity planning over the potentially more crim e-focused com m unity safety. Antisocial behaviour

The Antisocial Behaviour (Scotland) A ct 2004 largely followed the lead of its English counterpart enacted around a year earlier. There is nothing in this Act that gave a nod to any residual com m itm ent to w elfare values. The Act extended the use of anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) to 101

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young people betw een the ages of 12 and 16, gave the police increased pow ers to disperse groups of young people, created com m unity repar­ ation orders, extended the use of electronic m onitoring in the com m unity and created parenting orders for parents who w ere viewed as 'failing' their problem atic children (see M cA ra 2004: 34, 3 8 -9 ; W alters and W oodw ard 2007). Recent research has suggested that there was som e resistance to the use of som e of the orders provided for by the Act. A lthough use of ASBOs in Scotland has been on the increase since the Act, the extent to which they were actually being used for under 16s, for exam ple, rem ained unclear, possibly because local authorities were view ing them as a 'last resort' for this group, and continued to favour the C hildren's H earings system w here possible (Zuleeg et al. 2007). W alters and W oodw ard's (2007) study of local practitioners' attitudes towards parenting orders also found there to be resistance to w hat was perceived as the 'punitive' language of the A ct and its central governm ent sponsors. Returning to the preoccupations of the present discussion, the 2004 Act contributed to the com m unity safety infrastructure in Scotland by placing a statutory duty on local authorities and chief constables to develop and publish an antisocial behaviour strategy for their areas (Section 1(1)). H ow ever, in practice it was assum ed from the outset that such strategies would be written using existing com m unity planning structures, most likely their com m unity safety partnerships or m em bers thereof (Scottish Executive 2004a: 6-7). In effect, the duty to draft anti-social behaviour strategies had becom e a m eans through w hich com m unity safety and com m unity planning could be required to focus on m ore explicitly crim e-related issues (although it m ust be noted that m uch anti-social behaviour is not itself a crim e, even though breach of an A SBO is). There have long been tensions betw een the Scottish Executive and com m unity safety partnerships about the degree to which broad social justice agendas should form the focus of their work, the form er, unsurprisingly, show ing a preference for the deploym ent of m ore m easurable and 'scientific' situational m easures (Shiel et al. 2005). It is uncertain w hether the focus on anti-social behaviour will generate a m ore 'punitive' focus of partner­ ships in the long term but the current series of strategies that have been published suggest that there is an ongoing resistance to placing reliance upon such rhetoric. For exam ple, the Strategic Plan for 2005-2008 for H ighlands and Islands observes:

[W jhile the C ouncil's perform ance survey show ed that respondents noted som e concern about high spirits am ong young people, this was outw eighed by a stronger feeling that young people are the lifeblood of our com m unity and should not be blam ed for social problems. (H ighland W ellbeing A lliance 2005)

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Community justice authorities

Since devolution there have been a num ber of long-overdue review s of different aspects of Scottish crim inal justice (see Bonom y 2002; N orm and 2003; M clnnes 2004) and an attem pt to articulate a more co-ordinated and m anagerial approach to the problem of crim e through, for exam ple, publication of a crim inal justice plan (Scottish Executive 2004b). The plan gave particular focus to the vexed issue of recidivism rates and would open up discussion about the m anagem ent of offenders in the com m unity. There was considerable activity over the next couple of years, including the publication of a N ational Strategy for the M anagem ent of Offenders (Scottish Executive 2006) and the passing of the M anagem ent of Offenders (Scotland) A ct 2005. This A ct established eight Com m unity Justice A uthorities (CJAs) around the country (M cN eil and W hyte 2007: 8-10). In a sense CJAs represented som ething of a clim bdow n for the previous adm inistration because it had actually been the intention of the Scottish L abour Party to create a single-agency correctional service for Scotland instead (M cNeil and W hyte 2007: 8). The clim bdow n is im portant because the creation of such an agency would have had the effect of rem oving crim inal justice social w ork from generic social w ork practice. This connection betw een crim inal justice and generic social w ork rem ains a distinctive characteristic of the Scottish system and so its survival is im portant. H ow ever, the com prom ise that followed consultation on the m atter CJAs - becam e operational in A pril 2007. CJAs w ere designed to provide a co-ordinated and strategic approach to the m anagem ent and planning of services that were available to offenders in the com m unity and were also required to co-ordinate the w ork of the Scottish Prison Service and local auth ority/com m u nity providers to ensure continuity betw een them, the belief being that better co-ordination of services would serve to reduce re-offending. A ccording to M cN eil and W hyte, both the list o f partners ('the police, courts, prosecution, prisons, Victim Support Scotland, H ealth Boards and relevant voluntary agencies') and the range of offender groups to be focused upon ('less seriou s/first-tim e offenders; offenders with m ental health problem s; offenders w ith substance m isuse problems; persistent offenders, including young offenders com ing through from the youth system ; prisoners needing resettlem ent and rehabilitation services; violent, serious and sex offenders; and women offenders') are broad (2007: 9). The creation of CJA s reflects ongoing tendencies felt around the world for there to be increased co-ordination, m anagem ent and m onitor­ ing of crim inal justice services (Crawford 1997: 86-92; N orm and 2003). It is rather less clear how they will fit, if at all, next to Com m unity Planning. There are undoubted differences betw een the objectives of the two partnership structures that are readily illustrated by reference 103

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to Brantingham and Faust's classic typology of crim e prevention ap­ proaches. CJA s focus upon people who have already been identified as offenders and try to stop them re-offending (tertiary crim e prevention). On the other hand, Com m unity Planning is a much more proactive enterprise that focuses on the social w elfare of the population at large (prim ary crim e prevention) and, potentially, on needy groups w ithin the population who might be viewed as being at risk of becom ing offenders (secondary crim e prevention) (Brantingham and Faust 1976). The distinctive objectives of the two structures m ay keep them separate, in theory at least, but partner agencies m ay ultim ately be placed in the position of balancing resources for one off against the other and it is possible in a political environm ent, w here anxieties about crim e are politically potent, that reactive, m easur­ able and m ore explicitly crim e-focused partnership w ork will prevail. Such balancing of objectives is, of course, not a new problem for local governm ent, or for m any of the partner agencies involved, but is nonetheless likely to be im portant for the future of both CJA s and C om m unity Planning and the relative em phasis in practice given to them.

Discussion This chapter has show n that developm ents in com m unity safety in Scotland have taken a sim ilar, though not identical, trajectory to those in England and W ales over the sam e period. On the one hand, this should not be surprising given the long history of Scottish autonom y that belied the constitutional settlem ent that established the United Kingdom . On the other hand, it m ight be asked w hether greater differences should have been expected, given M cA ra's analysis of policy divergence betw een Scotland and England and W ales over precisely the period in which contem porary thinking about crim e prevention was developing (the 1970s to the mid 1990s). M ore specifically, it m ight be asked if crim e prevention and com m unity safety in Scotland, like its youth justice system , bore a stronger im print of social w elfare values than did developm ents in England and Wales. A pplying Paterson's analysis of autonom y to the first question, it is clear that the relative sim ilarity of developm ents in crim e prevention and com m unity safety on both sides of the border does not underm ine either the belief in Scottish autonom y or M cA ra's analysis o f policy divergence in specific areas of crim inal justice, notably youth justice. A utonom y does not necessitate difference and in the case of the 'preventative turn' in thinking about crim e (Garland 1996; H ughes 2002) there is no evidence to suggest that officials and practitioners did not agree on the basic idea that prevention would be a good idea (i.e. the 'goals' of policy). There were, of course, debates in both jurisdictions about the relative m erits of different approaches to crim e prevention (Craw ford 1997; Carnie 1999) 104

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(the 'm eans' of im plem entation) but the open-textured nature of the concepts concerned allowed them to engender broad political appeal, ensuring that 'crim e prevention' did not becom e the site of 'other than E ngland' politics that youth justice had. Situational crim e prevention can, for exam ple, be viewed as holding appeal for those on the political right because it assum es that individuals are rational actors (thus em phasising personal responsibility), diffuses responsibility for crim e prevention to individuals rather than the state, and underplays the im portance of broader 'social' causes of crime. However, it also has appeal to those on the left, albeit for different reasons - it is a pragm atic approach that can be used to quickly give help to com m unities that need to see that action is being taken, and can also be readily targeted at those vulnerable com m unities and individuals suffering the corrosive effects of repeat victim isation (Gilling 1997). In any case, local im plem entation also gave practitioners a degree of discretion in term s of the approach to be taken, evidenced by the drift towards being m ore offender-oriented over situational m easures (Pease 1997: 982) despite H om e Office and Scottish Office exhortations to focus on the latter. In short, the terms 'crim e prevention' and 'com m unity safety' w ere too politically vague and open to interpretation for them to be perceived as challenges to traditional Scottish w ays of doing things - in the sam e way that challenges to social w ork and C hildren's H earings were. If anything, the preventive turn that w as given such im petus by H om e Office research in the 1970s and 1980s found very fertile ground in Scotland w here com m unity involvem ent (Schaffer 1980), a belief in m ulti-agency co-operation (Paterson 1994) and a none too police-centred understanding of social control (Scottish Council on Crim e 1975) had long histories. Far from being a challenge to Scottish sensibilities, developm ents in crim e prevention and com m unity safety fitted with them. Indeed, it should also be rem em bered that these developm ents w ere perceived as providing an alternative to the seem ing rise of punitive, m anagerial and actuarial rhetoric w ithin crim inal justice policy in England and W ales: their potential to prom ote social justice as well as technical crim e prevention was understood in both jurisdictions. This begs the second question: does com m unity safety in Scotland bear a stronger im print of com m itm ent to social justice or penal w elfare values than it does in England and W ales? There are certainly concerns that work in England and W ales, despite com ing from a sim ilar background in urban regeneration, becam e too narrow ly focused on crim e-control issues throughout the 1990s (Crawford 2007; H ughes 2002), quite probably because of central governm ent attem pts to m icro-m anage com m unity safety through detailed perform ance m easurem ent regim es (Edwards and H ughes 2002). For the m om ent com m unity safety partnerships in Scotland continue to articulate a broader com m itm ent to social justice and welfare, despite Scottish Executive attem pts to narrow the focus. The fact that the statutory duty for partnership working was tied to Com m unity Planning 105

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in Scotland also reinforces the im pression that this b road er vision has a stronger foothold. A lthough the future o f com m unity safety in Scotland, and its social w elfare character, are by no m eans certain, there are reasons to be cautiou sly optim istic. The election o f the SN P to H olyrood in 2007 reconfigured the political land scape that had form ed the backd rop to the period o f policy con vergence in the U K (N ew L abou r held office in both H olyrood and W estm inster). The 'other than England' orientation of Scottish p olicy-m akers is likely to becom e m ore tenable again now that the elected political elites in Scotland are once m ore of a different (and m ore leftist) political hue from their colleagues in the south. This m ay well provide fertile ground for future d ivergen ce and the long-term en trenchm ent o f social w elfare valu es into com m u nity safety and partnership w orking in Scotland.

N o te 1 The functions of the Scottish Police were defined as the prevention of crime, the protection of life and property and the detection and bringing to justice of offenders and were subsequently enshrined in the Police Scotland Act 1967.

R e fere n ces Accounts Commission (2000a) Safe and Sound: A Study of Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland. Edinburgh: Audit Scotland. Accounts Commission (2000b) How Are We Doing? Measuring the Performance of Community Safety Partnerships. Edinburgh: Audit Scotland. Bannister, J. and Dillane, J. (2005) Communities that Care: An Evaluation of the Scottish Pilot Programme, Crime and Criminal Justice Research Findings, No. 79. Edinburgh: HMSO. Bonomy (2002) Improving Practice: 2002 Review of the Practices and Procedure of the High Court of Justiciary. Edinburgh: HMSO. Bottoms, A. E. (1990) 'Crime Prevention Facing the 1990s', Policing and Society, 1: 3-22. Brantingham, P. J. and Faust, L. (1976) 'A Conceptual Model of Crime Prevention', Crime and Delinquency, 22: 284-96. Carnie, J. (1996) The Safer Cities Programme in Scotland: Overvieiv Report. Edinburgh: Scottish Office Central Research Unit. Carnie, J. (1999) T h e Politics of Crime Prevention: The Safer Cities Experiment in Scotland', in P. Duff and N. Hutton (eds) Criminal Justice in Scotland. Dartmouth: Ashgate, pp. 74-93. Clarke, R. V. and Mayhew, P. (1980) Designing Out Crime. London: HMSO. Council of Scottish Local Authorities (1998) Community Safety: A Key Council Strategy. Edinburgh: CoSLA. Craig, G. and Manthorpe, J. (1999) 'Unequal Partners? Local Government Reorganization and the Voluntary Sector', Social Policy and Administration, 33(1): 55-72. 106

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Crawford, A. (1997) The Local Governance o f Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Crawford, A. (2002) Crime and Insecurity: The Governance o f Safety in Europe. Cullompton: W illan Publishing. Crawford, A. (2007) 'Crim e Prevention and Com munity Safety', in M. M aguire, R. M organ, and R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook o f Criminology, 4th edn. O xford: Oxford University Press, pp. 866-909. Donaldson, D. (1969) 'Scottish Devolution: The H istorical Background', in J. N. W olf (ed.) Government and Nationalism in Scotland: An Enquiry by M embers o f the University o f Edinburgh. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 4-16. Duff, P. (1999) 'The Prosecution Service: Independence and A ccountability', in P. Duff and N. H utton (eds) Criminal Justice in Scotland. Dartmouth: Ashgate, pp. 115-130. Edwards, A. and Hughes, G. (2002) 'Introduction: The Com m unity Governance of Crim e Control', in G. H ughes and A. Edwards (eds) Crime Control and Community: The Neiv Politics o f Public Safety. Cullompton: W illan Publishing. Ekblom, P. (1995) 'Less Crim e By Design', The Annals AAPSS, 539: 112-29. Fyfe, N. (2005) 'Policing Crim e and Disorder in Scotland', in D. Donnelly and K. Scott (eds) Policing Scotland. Cullompton: W illan Publishing, pp. 109-29. Gane, C. (1999) 'Classifying Scottish Crim inal Procedure', in P. Duff and N. Hutton (eds) Criminal Justice in Scotland. Dartmouth: Ashgate, pp. 56-73. Garland, D. (1996) 'The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crim e Control in Contem porary Society', British Journal o f Criminology, 36(4): 445-71. Gilling, D. (1994) 'M ulti-agency Crim e Prevention in Britain: The Problem of Com bining Situational and Social Strategies', Crime Prevention Studies, 3: 231-48. Gilling, D. (1997) Crime Prevention: Theory, Policy and Politics. London: UCL Press. Hewitt, J., Cryle, G. and Ballintyne, S. (2000) Threads o f Success: A Study o f Community Safety Partnerships in Scotland. Edinburgh: HMSO. Highland W ellbeing Alliance (2005) Highland Wellbeing Alliance: Antisocial Behav­ iour Strategy 2005-2008. Inverness: Highland W ellbeing Alliance. Himsworth, C. M. G. (2007) 'Devolution and its Jurisdictional A sym m etries', M odern Law Review, 70(1): 31-58. Him sw orth, C. and Paterson, A. (2004) 'A Suprem e Court for the United Kingdom: Views from the N orthern Kingdom ', Legal Studies, 2 4(1/2): 99-118. Hirst, P. (1989) After Thatcher. London: Collins. Hughes, G. (2002) 'Plotting the Rise of Com m unity Safety: Critical Reflections on Research, Theory and Politics', in G. H ughes and A. Edwards (eds) Crime Control and Community: The N ew Politics o f Public Safety. Cullompton: W illan Publishing, pp. 20-45. Hughes, G. and Edwards, A. (eds) (2002) Crime Control and Community: The Neiv Politics o f Public Safety. Cullompton: W illan Publishing. Keating, M. (2001) 'Scottish Autonom y: N ow and Then', in J. M aclnnes and D. M cCrone (eds) Stateless Nations in the 21st Century: Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec. Edinburgh: Unit for the Study of Governm ent in Scotland, University of Edinburgh, pp. 91-103. Loader, I. (2000) 'Plural Policing and Dem ocratic Governance', Social and Legal Studies, 9(3): 323-45. M acCormick, N. (1999) Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 107

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M aclnnes, J. and M cCrone, D. (2001) Stateless Nations in the 21st Century: Scotland, Catalonia and Quebec. Edinburgh: Unit for the Study of Governm ent in Scotland, University of Edinburgh. McAra, L. (2004) T h e Cultural and Institutional Dynamics of Transform ation: Youth Justice in Scotland and England and W ales', Cambrian Law Review, 35, 23-54. M cAra, L. (2005) 'M odelling Penal Transform ation', Punishment and Society, 7: 277-302. McAra, L. (2007) 'W elfarism in Crisis: Crim e Control and Penal Practice in Post-devolution Scotland', in M. Keating (ed.) Scottish Social Democracy: Progress­ ive Ideals for Public Policy. Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, pp. 115-58. M cCallum, F. and Duff, P. (2000) Intermediate Diets, First Diets and Agreem ent o f Evidence in Criminal Cases: An Evaluation, Central Research Unit Papers. Edinburgh: HMSO. M cCrone, D. (1992) Understanding Scotland: The Sociology o f a Stateless Nation. London: Routledge. M cCrone, D. (2001) Understanding Scotland: The Sociology o f a Nation, 2nd edn. London: Routledge. M clnnes, J. (2004) The Summary Justice Review Committee: Report to M inisters. Edinburgh: HMSO. M clvor, G. and W illiams, B. (1999) 'Com m unity-based Disposals', in P. Duff and N. Hutton (eds) Criminal Justice in Scotland. Dartm outh: Ashgate, pp. 198-227. M cNeil, F. and W hyte, B. (2007) Reducing Re-offending: Social Work and Community Justice in Scotland. Cullompton: W illan Publishing. Mack, J. A. (1963) 'Police Juvenile Liaison Schem es', British Journal o f Criminology, 3(4): 361-75. M idwinter, A., Keating, M. and M itchell, J. (1991) Politics and Public Policy in Scotland. London: Palgrave Macmillan. M onaghan, B. (1997) 'Crim e Prevention in Scotland', International Journal o f the Sociology o f Law, 25: 21-44. Normand, A. (2003) Proposals for the Integration o f Aims, Objectives and Targets in the Scottish Criminal Justice System. Edinburgh: HMSO. Paterson, L. (1994) The Autonomy o f M odern Scotland. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Pease, K. (1997) 'Crim e Reduction', in M. M aguire, R. M organ and R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford H andbook o f Criminology, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 963-95. Phillipson, N. T. (1976) 'Lawyers, Landow ners and the Civic Leadership of Post-Union Scotland: An Essay on the Social Role of the Faculty of Advocates 1661-1830 in 18th Century Scottish Society', in N. M acCorm ick (ed.) Lawyers in their Social Setting. Edinburgh: W. Green and Sons, pp. 171-94. Rogers, S., Smith, M., Sullivan, H. and Clarke, M. (2000) Community Planning in Scotland: An Evaluation o f the Pathfinder Projects Commissioned by CoSLA. Edinburgh: CoSLA and The Scottish Executive. Schaffer, E. B. (1980) Community Policing. London: Croom Helm. Scottish Council on Crim e (1975) Crime and the Prevention o f Crime: A M emorandum by the Scottish Council on Crime. Edinburgh: HMSO. Scottish Executive (1999) Safer Communities in Scotland: Guidance for Community Safety Partnerships. Edinburgh: HMSO. 108

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Scottish Executive (2002) Comm unity Safety Award Programme: Application Guidance for Community Safety Partnerships, 2003-2004. Edinburgh: HMSO. Scottish Executive (2003) Comm unity Safety Award Programme: Application Guidance for Community Safety Partnerships, 2004-2005. Edinburgh: HMSO. Scottish Executive (2004a) Guidance on Antisocial Behaviour Strategies. Edinburgh: HMSO. Scottish Executive (2004b) Supporting Safer, Stronger Communities: Scotland's Crim i­ nal Justice Plan. Edinburgh: HMSO. Scottish Executive (2005) Community Safety Partnership Award Programm e 20052008. Edinburgh: HMSO. Scottish Executive (2006) Reducing Reoffending: National Strategy for the M anagement o f Offenders. Edinburgh: HMSO. Scottish Executive (2007) Social Inclusion Research Bulletin, No. 16. Edinburgh: HMSO. Scottish Office (1992) Preventing Crime Together in Scotland: A Strategy for the 1990s. Edinburgh: HMSO. Scottish Office (1998) Social Exclusion in Scotland: A Consultation Paper. Edinburgh: HMSO. Shiel, L., Clark, I. and Richards, F. (2005) Approaches to Community Safety and Anti-Social Behaviour in the Better N eighbourhood Services Programme. Edinburgh: HMSO. Tierney, S. (2005) 'Refram ing Sovereignty? Sub-state National Societies and Contem porary Challenges to N ation-state', International and Comparative Laiv Quarterly, 54(1): 161-83. Valentin, C. (1995) Directory o f Crime Prevention Initiatives in Scotland. Edinburgh: HMSO. Walters, R. and W oodward, R. (2007) 'Punishing Poor Parents: “R espect", "R esponsibility" and Parenting Orders in Scotland', Youth Justice, 7(1): 5-20. Whyte, B. (2003) 'Young and Persistent: Recent Developm ents in Youth Justice Policy and Practice in Scotland', Youth Justice, 3: 74-85. Young, P. (1996) 'The Peculiarities of the Scots', Criminal Justice M atters, 26: 22-3. Young, P. (1997) Crim e and Criminal Justice in Scotland. Edinburgh: HMSO. Zuleeg, F., Boyle, J., Lees, F., Patterson, K., Pawson, H. and Davidson, E. (2007) Use o f Antisocial Behaviour Orders in Scotland. Edinburgh: HMSO.

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C h a p te r 5

T h e evolving sto ry o f crim e prevention in France A n n e Wyvekens

W hat can be said about crim e p revention in France today? It can be consid ered from various angles. This chap ter first gives an overview , tracing the ev olu tion o f crim e prevention w ithin the b road er context of o ther policies such as law enforcem ent and urban policies. T hen, in a m ore 'p ro sp ectiv e' view , the question of w hether or not the recent em ergence o f situ ational p rev ention con stitutes one illustration, am ong others, o f a break w ith the past or a new p arad igm is discussed.

F ro m B o n n e m a is o n to S a rk o z y T he history o f crim e prevention in France can be seen as the history of an aw kw ard relationship betw een 'p rev ention' and 'rep ressio n ', the latter b ein g the term used in French as a synonym for 'law en fo rce m e n t'.1 From this perspective, three m ain con tem porary historical periods can be identified and are d iscussed to begin w ith. In the su bsequ ent section consid eration is given to the nu anced im pact o f political changes and their lim itations. Prevention versus repression

The 1980s: renew ing crim e prevention In France, like elsew here in E urope, crim e p revention policy arose in response to the lim its of the trad itional penal approach. In the late 1970s, figures began to show a significant rise in recorded crim e,

The evolving sto ry o f crim e prevention in France

esp ecially petty offences. M uch o f the blam e for this situ ation fell at the feet o f the police and the judiciary. Fear o f crim e began to infuse the p olitical debate: p olarising R igh t versus Left and repression versus p revention. T hen, in 1981 urban riots erupted in disadvan taged urban areas, m ost notably in Les M in guettes in V enissieux, a suburb of Lyon. T h e L eft had recently com e into pow er, in M ay 1981. It sw iftly im plem ented the 'n ew crim e prevention p o licy', based on a report prepared by a com m ission o f city m ayors led by G ilbert Bonnem aison (C om m ission des m aires su r la securite 1982). T he p u rpose w as to be p rag m atic and break from the sterile ideological d ebate on either prevention or repression. R ather they w ere to be seen as m u tually su p p ortiv e in a w ay that con stituted a 'ren ew al of crim e p rev ention'. The new policy w as to be local, involving various agen cies un der the auth ority o f the city m ayor, and w as quickly to becom e articu lated w ith a m ore o verarching policy relating to d eprived neigh bou rhood s: the v ery basis for urban policy (politique de la ville). O riginally, French crim e prevention w as p rim arily social prevention. In this w ay it contrasted significantly w ith A nglo-A m erican trends. The p olice played only a m inor role in the im plem entation o f the policy and the ju d iciary largely rem ained in the background . M oreover, the m ethod o f fu n d ing - follow ing w hich the con tribution of the national level w as equ al to the am ou nt decided by the city in the fram ew ork o f its local priorities - encouraged the tend ency to fav ou r program m es w ith a w ider social and cultural em phasis, easier technically and p olitically to im p le­ m ent than specific crim e prevention strategies. The 1990s: rehabilitating safety T he follow ing d ecad e w as defined by the con cern to correct this lack of corresp on d en ce and con nection betw een social m easures and law enforce­ m ent. H ence, it can be characterised as 'reh abilitating safety '. In policy d iscou rse, the w ord 'p rev ention' w as replaced by the w ord 'safety' as exem plified in the creation o f local safety contracts (contrats locaux de securite (CLS)) in 1997. T hese contracts w ere signed by the local m ayor, the prefet (the state's representative w ithin a d ep artm ent)2 and the prosecutor. Th ey w ere still based on the principle o f a local partnership, but they entailed a stronger involvem ent o f the p olice and the judiciary. Fu rther­ m ore, the partn ersh ip w as broad ened to inclu de new actors, those w ho w ere m ore com fortable w ith the concept o f safety than that of prevention, nam ely those from the priv ate sector or sem i-p rivate institutions (like pu blic hou sing and transp ort com panies). In the m ean tim e, the ju d iciary developed its ow n partn ersh ips under the rubric o f 'alternativ es to p rosecu tion ' and 'p roxim ity ju stice' (justice de proxim ite) (W yvekens 2001, 2007a). In tand em w ith these d evelopm ents, the police de proxim ite reform w as launched. T his w as not exactly

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

com m unity policing, but a French way of trying to get the police closer to the population (M onjardet 1999). Since 2002: a repression nam ed prevention? A third period began in 2002, w hen the political Right returned to office. The first im portant changes did not concern local safety policy. A lthough in 2002 local councils of safety and crim e prevention (conseils locaux de securite et de prevention de la delincjuance (CLSPD)) w ere indeed created, the prim ary objective was a rationalisation of the structures rather than a fundam ental change in policy direction. The first im portant change concerned the police, w hen the reform that had created the police de proxim ite was dram atically brought to a halt (Roche 2005). A ccording to the M inister of the Interior: T h e role of the police is not to play football with young people, it is to catch crim inals.' At the sam e time, betw een 2002 and 2004, four laws w ere passed on safety issues - two at the initiative of the M inister of the Interior,3 and two introduced by the M inister of Justice.4 All w ere understood as 'repressive'. Beyond the m easures that extended the pow ers of the police to carry out investigations justified by the fight against terrorism , one could also find various offences in connection with the occupation and use of public space, targeted at gypsies, prostitutes, beggars or young people in the lobbies of public housing estates. O ther special offences appeared that could be called 'opportunistic', in the sense that they w ere introduced in response to a specific problem that captured public debate, such as the new offence of insulting the national anthem . Law s relating to the judiciary contained new m easures towards m inors, such as the creation of 'closed educational centres' and 'educational sanctions', in particular for children under 13 years. N ew kinds o f sim plified proceedings were created in the French crim inal procedure, nam ed 'appearance on prelim i­ nary recognition of culpability' and inspired by A nglo-A m erican crim inal procedure and intended to accelerate the course of justice. In parallel, the debate on juvenile justice grew sharper, fuelled by the then M inister of the Interior (and future president) N icolas Sarkozy who argued strongly for the w eakening, and even the disappearance, of som e specific legal protections for young offenders, such as reducing the age of crim inal responsibility, lim iting the scope of specialised jurisdiction, and abolish­ ing the traditional priority w ithin the youth justice system for education over repression. A bove all, over a five-year period a special 'law relating to crim e prevention' was in preparation under the control of the M inistry of the Interior. This fed the debate on safety issues. It was prom ulgated in M arch 2007.5 Its content goes far beyond m ere crim e prevention. O ne could say that this law covers everything but crim e prevention. Thus, this period in France could be called 'a repression nam ed prevention'. First of all, the law provides no definition of crim e prevention. It contains tw o m ain series

The evolving story o f crime prevention in France

of m easures. First, the central role of the m ayor in the local safety policies is recognised officially, w ith a set of m easures intended to em bed this role, especially as regards inform ation-sharing. In addition, m ayors have also been given new com petences. For instance, the m ayor is entitled to create a 'council of the rights and duties of fam ilies' or to propose parental support (accom pagnem ent parental)6 in relation to the parents of unruly youths. Second, a set of m easures reform ing juvenile justice in the direction evoked above have been introduced. Furtherm ore, the law contains a set of new offences, including m ore m easures related to public space, as well as som e new opportunistic offences such as those relating to am bushing or 'happy-slapping'. The em phasis on repression is conveyed by two m ore laws that w ere passed very soon after N icolas Sarkozy w as elected president in M ay 2007. The first one reflected an electoral prom ise relating to repeat offenders.7 It instituted m inim um sentences (peines planchers) for both juveniles and adults. It also sought to abolish the so-called 'm inority excuse' (excuse de m inorite) for young people aged betw een 16 and 18, w hich m eans that juveniles could only be sentenced to penalties not in excess of half of those applicable to adults for the sam e offence. Due to international and constitutional provisions, how ever, the m inority excuse could only be bypassed in a limited num ber of cases. The second law is called the 'law related to security detention' (.retention de siirete).8 Security detention is aimed at offenders 'for whom , follow ing a review of their situation at the end of their sentence, it is assessed that they represent a particular danger characterised by an extrem ely high likelihood of re-offending because they suffer from serious personality disorders', as well as at perpetrators of particularly serious offences: 'Security detention entails placing the person concerned in a secure judicial-m edical-social centre w here h e /s h e will be offered perm anent medical, social and psychological treatm ent aim ed at bringing to an end the need for d etention'.9 The m easure can be renew ed for as long as the person rem ains 'dangerous'. Left versus Right?

France is well know n for having a relatively polarised debate on safety issues. Prevention can be said to be a left-w ing issue while law enforcem ent and 'repression' have tended to be a right-w ing concern. Therefore, can we understand this intense legislative activity (outlined above) sim ply as a result of political change? Political shifts do have effects, but these effects are only relative. First of all, several counter-exam ples can be observed. For instance, the new crim e prevention policy, created by a left-w ing governm ent, focusing on social and urban aspects, has often been and is still implem ented by right-w ing m unicipalities. In other words, we m ust m ake a distinction betw een

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

n ational and local levels o f politics. C on versely, reg ard ing ju venile justice, the idea o f w eaken ing its special protections and sep arate philosophy alread y began to appear un der a left-w ing ad m inistration, prior to 2002. T he sam e is true as regards the d etention o f juveniles. The 'reinforced ed u cational cen tres' w ere not actu ally invented by the Right, w hich m erely renam ed a structure created u n d er a previous left-w ing gov ern­ m ent. So 'the L eft', or part of the Left, years ago had already realised the need to ad dress safety issues not only from a social prevention p erspec­ tive. A second elem ent that need s to be taken into accoun t is the grow ing gap betw een ivords and practice. In France there are m ore and m ore exam ples o f a p hen om enon that could be called 'o n e problem , one law '. This w as the case w ith the public d ebate about the Islam ic veil, for instance. The sam e can be observed w ith regard to local safety issues. It w as also the case w ith the law s initiated b etw een 2002 and 2004 by the M inistries o f the Interior and Ju stice. T h e preparation of the law s, and the d ebate around them , have had at least as m u ch im pact as has their su bsequ ent im plem entation. M oreover, several im plem enting d ecrees have eith er n ev er been taken or have only been initiated after som e con sid erable delay. Som e m easures are - in p ractice - inapplicable or sim ply not applied , like the new offence o f loitering in groups in com m on parts o f ap artm ent buildings. The sam e has happ ened w ith the law relatin g to repeat offenders: there is a n oticeable difference b etw een w hat w as annou nced d uring the cam paign and the even tual term s o f the law. T he law related to security d eten tion gave the P resid ent the opportu nity to go even further. D espite the fact that the C o n stitutional C ou rt (Conseil constitutionnel) ruled against the article that provided for retroactive im plem entation, the P resid en t announced that he w ould nonetheless retain the pow er, thus con testing the d ecision o f the highest constitutional au th ority in France. A ll o f this raises a central question that dem and s m ore in-d ep th con sid eration, nam ely con cern in g the vexed relationship b etw een safety policies and pu blic opinion. A nother feature o f French p olitical culture leads to a specific question w hich appears to be com m on to bo th left- and righ t-w in g governm ents: to w hat extent is it possible to im p lem ent a real and genuine local policy in the context o f such a centralised state apparatus as exists in France? Im portantly, the new crim e p revention p olicy began w ith a 'com m ission o f city m ayors'. T oday, the law on crim e prevention in stitutionalises the core role of the m ayor in local safety policies. A nd yet w hat can be observed o f d ev elop m ents in the field? N ot only are not all m ayors ready to assum e this role, b u t they are far from having the m ean s to assu m e it, eith er financially or in term s o f inform ation tools and m eth od olog y of im plem entation. So w e face the parad ox o f a state w hich on the one hand 'inv ents' or encourages local partn ersh ips and on the other hand m ain­ tains a form o f cen tralisation , w hich is incom patible w ith the idea of

The evolving sto ry o f crim e prevention in France

sharing com petences (M arcus 2006). In o ther w ords, in France, safety rem ains a state business; or m ore precisely a police business. Initiatives that are intend ed to involve the police in partnerships, esp ecially in the nam e o f prevention, invariably end up d isqu alifying police w ork. Sim ply con sid er how France is unable - or d o esn 't w ant - to reform its police (M onjard et 2004; R oche 2005). T he situ ation is not any better w hen w e con sid er the judiciary. W ith the exception of a few 'atypical' prosecu tors, the ju d iciary does not appear to be ready to share either inform ation or even less its com p etences w ith local representatives. Thus, even if the m ay or is keen to cham pion local safety issues, h e /s h e rem ains quite p ow erless: m issing inform ation, m issing funding, m issing m ethodology. A nd it cannot be certain that the situ ation w ill im prove w ith the new law. Finally, question s con cern in g the im pact o f p olitical changes should also be seen from a b road er point o f view , in the w ay safety policies are linked w ith urban policies. T he safety issue is indeed closely related to urban segregation (and social (d is)integration). H ence the point is not only to con sid er w hether there is m ore or less p u nishm ent or to w orry about a 'pen alisation o f the social' (M ary 2003), w e should also b ear in m ind the need to link safety policies w ith urban, em p loym ent and integration policies. Sin ce the Right cam e back into pow er in 2002 the real change m ay have occurred less in the extent to w hich law enforcem ent has increased, than in the question o f how inv estm en t in urban p olicy has decreased and evolved. Sin ce 2002 the fun ding allocated to urban policy has d ecreased significantly. M any N G O s w orking in the suburbs are facing acute financial difficulties. In this regard, the politique de la ville has evolved both in its con tents and its organisation. A law dated 1 A ugust 2003, relating to urban renew al,10 set up the N ational A gency for U rban Renovation (A N RU ). T he A N R U is responsible for im plem enting a national p ro­ gram m e of urban renew al that 'aim s to prom ote the objective o f social diversity (m ixite sociale) and su stainable d evelopm ent, to restructure neigh bou rhood s classified as sen sitive urban areas (zones urbaines sensibles (Z U S))'. It inclu des 'op erations for urban p lanning, renovation, resid entialisation, d em olition and con struction o f hou sing, the creation, renova­ tion and d em olition o f public and collective structures, or any other investm en t consistent w ith urban re n e w a l.'11 W ithin the period 2 0 0 4 -0 8 the quan titative objective o f the program m e is to build 200,000 new public housing units, to renovate 200,000 o f them and to d em olish 200,000 others. T h e 'so cial' approach that w as prevalent in urban policy has tended to be replaced or even ousted by a m ore 'u rb an istic' approach, focused on places m ore than people (D onzelot et al. 2003). O nly after new urban riots had occurred, in N ovem ber 2005, did attention return to the social d im ension o f urban policy throu gh the creation, in Jan u ary 2006, o f the N ational A gency for Social C oh esion and Equal O p portu nities (A cse). The A gency is in charge o f fun ding for integration issues as w ell as crim e

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

prevention. Currently, som e 30 per cent of this budget is devoted to CCTV. U rban policy has not been the new President's first concern. The first m easures his governm ent took w ere in the areas of taxation and em ploym ent. Low ering taxes for upper m iddle classes and 'w orking more to earn m ore' was given priority and only much later, in February 2008, w as a plan entitled Espoir banlieues (banlieues' hope)12 presented, whose concrete m easures w ere detailed later in June 2008. W ithout entering into a detailed analysis of the plan, we can sim ply observe that its develop­ m ent has lagged considerably and the m eans of financing it rem ain to be clarified. The m easures announced w ere aimed at fostering desegregation and enhancing 'm obility' - through schooling, training, im proved job opportunities for the young or better public transport to m ake neighbour­ hoods more accessible. In the m eantim e, however, A N RU is continuing its work and the CCTV system is expanding. W e should also note - and once again the rem ark applies to both the Left and the Right - that nothing in actual fact seem s to point to a shift in the tendency to treat the banlieues as anything other than com pletely isolated territories.

B rea k w ith th e past? N e w model? M aybe a better w ay to fram e the question of a break w ith the past is to talk about the effects of neo-liberalism on safety policies. W hat are the m ain shifts that can be observed in French policies? To w hat extent can w e identify a new m odel of crim e prevention? Let us first draw a quick parallel betw een past and present safety and crim e prevention policies. There are indeed several signs of a possible break. O ver the past few years, we have witnessed intense legislative activity in relation to crim inal issues, with a double trend. On the one hand, particularly (but not only) for serious offences, m ore severe m easures have been introduced: new categories of crim e (particularly regarding im proper occupation of public areas), longer prison sentences, increased punitiveness for young delin­ quents, strong concerns about im prisonm ent of m inors, the institution of m inim um sentences for repeat offenders, and so on. On the other hand, the developm ent of alternatives to prosecution for petty crim e suggests an increasing em phasis on responsibility. The offender has to provide concrete com pensation for the harm h e /s h e has caused. The sam e trends are at work with regard to juvenile justice. W hereas traditionally the young person, even if h e /s h e w as dangerous, used to be prim arily considered as 'in danger', today we are w itnessing a clear desire to treat d elinquent youths like adults, or at least as autonom ous, responsible individuals, able to understand the m eaning of w hat they do. Protection or education tends to be replaced by educational sanctions. These are also used as a w ay of punishing even very young children. Likewise,

The evolving sto ry o f crim e prevention in France

accord ing to the 2007 law relating to prevention, parents are to be m ade responsible for their ch ild ren 's behaviour. In ad dition, a form o f prevention not p rev iously w idespread in France - situ ational prevention - is grow ing, w ith m ore and m ore C C TV and greater interest in action throu gh environm en tal d esign and urban p lanning in relation to safety concerns. Th e final shift lies in the kind o f agencies in charge o f im plem enting safety policies. In the past, the state w as the m ain actor, the p olice and the ju d iciary h olding alm ost exclu sive com petences to ad dress safety issues, interv ening gen erally in isolation from w ider social and edu cational agencies. T h e state now appears to be losing its m on op olistic position - at least partly. Local partn ersh ips inv olv e a broad ran ge o f actors - local auth orities, the private sector, N G O s, the civil society - so that the state tends to 'steer' m ore than it 'ro w s' in quests to 'govern at a d istance'. M eanw hile it has d eveloped new m an agerial logics and technologies, albeit less than in the U nited K ingdom . P erform an ce m on itoring and assessm en t have b een introd uced in the police. In the ju diciary, 'real tim e' processing is m oving along the sam e lines. O n this basis, tw o kinds o f interpretation or analysis m ay be possible. O ne is to say that w e have finally ad opted a new parad igm , and w e have d efinitely entered a 'culture o f con trol' as described by G arland (2001); that neo-liberalism has finally w on o u t.13 A n ev en darker picture in this respect has b een painted in the early stages o f N icolas Sarko zy 's presid ency. A no th er interpretation is to adopt a longer-term view , at som e d istance from the frenzied atm osphere o f French elections, to go beyond the w ord 'b reak ', aim ed to reassu re the m id dle class - but hid ing the continuities betw een policies, beyond the R ig h t-L e ft opposition. W e should also bear in m ind the con trad ictory tend encies already evoked, such as the d iscrepancy betw een w ords and p ractice, and betw een the national and local levels; the various w ays policies can be im plem ented from one place to another, by one actor or another; the end uring sig nificant rem nants o f w elfarism ; and above all the d ynam ism o f civil society and the con cern - hard going but real - to involve citizens in safety (co-)production. P ossibly w e are w itnessing m ore a shift or transition rather than a com p lete break or ru pture w ith the past. T his could be illustrated throu gh the issue of safety in public spaces, w ith som e exam ples o f the grow th o f situ ational prevention in France.

The French m odel o f crime prevention

T he French m odel o f crim e prevention, the so-called B onnem aison m odel, w hich w as d esigned in the early 1980s and im plem ented sin ce then, has for years focused on social prevention. The pu rpose is to have an indirect o r d irect 'influence on the p ersonality and living con ditions o f ind ividu als to avoid spaw ning d eviant behav iou r and to red uce the social factors that

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

encourage d ev iance' (D IV 2004). The French m od el focu ses o n the root causes of crim e: poverty, lack o f education, bad jobs and poo r housing conditions. A cting on these causes is supposed to m ove people aw ay from crim e. In this view , French crim e prevention has alw ays been linked w ith the politique de la ville, targeting disadvan taged urban areas, w ith a tw ofold approach: actions o f a social natu re on the one hand, and u rbanism , urban renew al on the other. It is interesting to note that the B onnem aison Report focused on safety issues, w as prepared in the sam e con text as tw o other reports: the D u bed out R eport (1983), on social d evelopm ent o f neigh bou r­ hoods, and the Sch w artz Report (1981) on p rofessional integration of youth. A fter the p rev iously m entioned d rift tow ard s a 'g en eralist' kind of p revention, there w as som e con cern about a repressiv e turn follow ing the introd uction o f the w ord 'safety' as w ell as the reinforcem ent o f the police and the ju d iciary 's role in the local safety con tracts (CLS) (Ferret and M ouhanna 2005). N everth eless, social p revention rem ained im portant, w ith a nu m ber o f actions or program m es con tin uing those im plem ented in earlier prevention action con tracts (contrats d'action de prevention). But C L Ss can be analysed prim arily as aim ing to 'restore social bon d s' m uch m ore than im proving law enforcem ent. P olice de proxim ite, ju stice de proxim ite, hiring you ng people to m ake public spaces safer, all these m easures are d escribed as m eans o f tacklin g a 'feelin g o f aband onm en t' that w ould be characteristic o f people living in disadvan taged urban areas. P roxim ity is thus view ed not only as a goal in itself, b u t also as a w ay to im plem ent a kind o f 'ed u cation ', teaching people their duties as w ell as their rights (D onzelot and W yveken s 2004). In other w ord s, CLSs h ave not pu t an end to French social prevention, rather they have given it a new tone, em ph asising the aspect o f 'resp onsibility '. In that context, French prevention contrasted w ith w hat w e call the A nglo-A m erican m odel, w hich is m u ch m ore focused on situational prevention. W hereas the French m odel aim s to act on offenders, to prevent them from com m ittin g crim es by im proving their living conditions, the A nglo-A m erican m odel aim s to act on the targets o f crim e - eith er persons o r goods - b y protecting them . It does not d eal first w ith root causes of crim e but rather w ith im m ed iate or 'p roxim al' ones. O riented tow ards the crim inal act, situ ational prevention designates m easures that aim to suppress or lim it the o p portu nities to com m it an infraction by m od ifying the circu m stan ces in w hich they can be com m itted. The intention is to m ake crim es harder, risk ier and less p rofitable by d issu asion and p rotectin g potential victim s, w hether they are people o r goods. (D IV 2004) F or a very long tim e France has had a quite narrow view o f situ ational prevention, w hich has rem ained m arginal in practice. N ot only w as it not

The evolving sto ry o f crim e prevention in France

p art o f the French cu lture o f prevention, it w as even associated w ith repressive m ethod s o f d ealing w ith crim e. In practice, situ ational p rev en­ tion w as con sid ered as synony m ou s w ith CC TV . A nd the d ebate on CC TV focused on the threat it represented for civil liberties. O n one side, C C TV w as blam ed and opposed becau se o f that threat; on the other sid e, its use w as justified as a m eans to achieve public safety. O n both sides the public d ebate on C C T V w as id eological, not practical; the question w as not: does it w ork to prevent crim e? Fu rtherm ore, for a long tim e there w as no em pirical research to answ er that qu estion (O cqueteau 2004: 130). M oreover, the first stud y relied only on British d ata (H eilm ann and M ornet 2003). A t the sam e tim e another stud y, although entitled The Im pact o f C C T V on Security in P ublic Space and P rivate D om ains with P ublic A ccess (Pecaud 2002),14 w as devoted m ore to the notion o f control than to the im pact o f C C T V devices. The ideal pursu ed by the B onnem aison Report - to com bine prevention, repression and solidarity, and overall to end the o pposition betw een p revention and rep ression - rem ained som ew hat o f a utopia. The sam e m istrust can be observed from a theoretical point o f view , w hen w e con sid er the w ay France received som e A m erican reflections on the relation sh ip betw een places and safety, such as 'broken w ind ow s' or 'd efen sible sp ace' theories, w hich d eveloped a b road er notion of situa­ tional prevention. Both are 'broad er' becau se they m ake a link betw een the quality of space and its safety. The objective is still to d issuad e offenders by intervening on the physical, urban environm en t, in ord er to m ake it harder and riskier to com m it a crim e. But instead o f im plem enting solely technical solutions, like C C T V , alarm s, protection o f entran ces and anti-theft m arking o f goods, they inclu d e som ething m ore com plex. The pu rpose is to facilitate a social control of places through a d esign that m akes it possible for their users to m on itor them. Jan e Jacob s (1961), in The Death and Life o f G reat A m erican Cities, and after her O scar N ew m an (1972), w ith his 'd efen sible sp ace', explain how the street or pu blic space can be designed so that people enjoy being in these areas and are then m onitored in a w ay that d issu ad es potential offenders. In their turn, W ilson and K elling (1982) pointed out that an aband oned space (i.e. d irty and neglected ) looks like it is out of control, thus a suitable place to com m it crim e or disorders. O n the one hand, urban studies theorists w orried abou t safety, w hile on the other hand crim inologists w ere taking space into account. Both reached the sam e conclusion: space belon gs to its users, and they have to take care o f it and are able to prevent d isord ers or crim es that happen there. The only area in w hich they differ is in relation to the role o f the police. For the urban theorists, residents replace the police, w hereas in crim inolog ists' view the police have to rely on the resid ents to do their job. Both theories received a less than enthu siastic w elcom e in France. Both w ere reduced to notions o f control, exclu sion and d enunciation. N ew ­ m an 's w ork provoked polem ical view s m ore th an real evalu ations

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

(M osser 2007). Defensible space was criticised as advocating a 'safety urbanism ', leading to 'the city as a fortress' (Lem onier 1998). Broken w indow s theory was reduced to zero tolerance: being tough on any slight offence or incivility would be the only w ay to keep people from em barking on a crim inal career. In both cases, the idea that citizens could take care of their neighbourhood was com pletely ignored, because it would m ean controlling each other or inform ing the police, and that is definitely unthinkable for a French m entality that shuns 'social control' and does not really trust the police. The emergence o f situational prevention: ‘safety urbanism ’ or quality o f public space?

O ver the past few years, it can be said that France has 'discovered' situational prevention, at the sam e tim e as it has discovered public space. Public space is not new - it has alw ays existed, but w ithout being a subject of either discourses or policy. For a long time, urbanists ignored public space. In the functional city o f the A thens C harter public space was little m ore than an area for traffic, binding together various places with various functions. It had none of the social, civic or festive attributes that we are rediscovering today (Claval 2001). Derelict public spaces, often uncared for and ignored by urban planners, increasingly have attracted private sector investm ent (G horra-G obin 2001). Businesses have invented 'private spaces open to the public', w hat has been termed 'private m ass property' (Shearing and Stenning 1983). A public space is public through its uses m uch m ore than through its legal status. Som e spaces are private but open to the public, like shopping m alls; other ones are public but abandoned and left to the strongest in som e disadvantaged neighbourhoods; others that w ere previously public have becom e privatised, like gated com m uni­ ties. Public space has becom e hybrid, hesitating betw een opening and closure, betw een com m unity and individuality (Burgel 2006). As regards safety, public space m ay be threatened by m isuse or disturbing uses. A nti-social behaviour and the som etim es disturbing control of public space by groups represent im portant issues for local safety policies. A fter the im plem entation of various program m es intended to foster increased 'hum an presence' in public spaces in the fram ew ork of local safety contracts, situational prevention is now developing under various forms, institutionalised or not, in the field of urban practices. First of all, CCTV, which has for long been m arginal, has steadily grown over the past few years. The French railw ay com pany is about to launch an am bitious installation program m e in its stations. The Conservative candidate for the m unicipal election in Paris in 2008 intended to set up 3,000 cam eras in the city. U nder the M arch 2007 law related to crim e prevention, priority is now given to CC TV funding. In 2007 central governm ent funded 315 projects for a total am ount o f 13.4 m illion euro. 120

The evolving story o f crime prevention in France

Furtherm ore, in the sam e year the private sector requested 10,000 authorisations to allow the installation of CC TV cam eras, com pared to only 4,000 in 2006.15 This increase is being facilitated by a law of 23 January 2006 related to the fight against terrorism . The law allow s private com panies that are 'exposed to risks of terrorist attacks' to install cam eras near their buildings w ithout having to w ait for the prior authorisation from the videosurveillance com m ission of the departm ent (Commission departem entale de videosurveillance) (Ocqueteau 2007). The French data protection authority (Commission nationale de I'informaticjue et des libertes, CN IL) expressed concern about this proliferation of CCTV cam eras in its 2006 annual report (CN IL 2007). O ne chapter of the report is entitled 'W arning about the surveillance society' (A lerte a la societe de surveillance). The com m ission sought to raise public aw areness about the risks of system atic com puterisation and called for m ore resources to help the com m ission play its role as a protector of freedom s. In 2007, CCTV rem ained 'under CN IL's w atchful eye' (CN IL 2008). At the sam e tim e, it is striking to observe that, except for the CN IL, there are no other prevalent voices expressing deep concerns about possible threats to civil liberties. Public opinion, even on the Left, now views the developm ent of CCTV w ithout any particular em otion. For instance, pupils w ere inter­ viewed for a recent poll about CC TV in high schools in the region Ile-de-France: according to the research findings, CCTV does not seem to represent any significant problem for them (Le Goff et al. 2007). Situational prevention is also developing in disadvantaged urban areas. The new N ational A gency for U rban Renovation (ANRU) funds and m anages urban renewal program m es, including w hat in France w e call residentialisation. Even if the word is used in m any senses, it can be defined as a way to rearrange the landscape of these disadvantaged neighbour­ hoods so that they appear m ore like typical residential neighbourhoods especially in the clear distinction betw een public and private spaces w hich is thought to foster am ong the inhabitants a greater sense of security (Billard et al. 2005). A nother form of situational prevention takes place in a decree related to urban planning actions dated 3 A ugust 2007 and nicknam ed the 'decree on situational prevention'.1'’ It is the outcom e of a lengthy process, in that it provides the im plem entation clauses of a law initially passed in 1995,17 m aking public safety audits com pulsory before conducting certain urban renew al w orks or constructing buildings that will be open to the public.18 In the event, nothing happened before 2007, when the law related to crim e prevention was passed which reiterated this obligation. Finally, the decree of 3 A ugust 2007 detailed w hat kinds of program m es w ere targeted, how the studies would be conducted and w hat their effects would be. This long delay (12 years) can be explained by the resistance of urban planners and architects to an approach they considered as unacceptable because of what they called an intrusion of the police in the design of buildings. 121

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

If France seem s to be con verting to situ ational prevention, all these 'official' and visible form s have prom pted em otion or raised criticism . C C T V rem ains the object o f scepticism at least about its real effectiveness. For exam ple, w ill there be a hum an eye behind each cam era? (A nache 2004; H eilm an n 2008). Residentialisation has its d etractors w ho point to risks o f exclu sion w hen certain places are privatised (Tabet 1999). As regards pu blic safety audits, it is too early to know w hat their im plem en­ tation will be and how they w ill be received. Towards a ‘successful’ public space

W e w ould now like to point out other, less spectacular, exam ples o f care for public sp ace and try to analyse them . R ecen t research d escribes v arious form s o f 'prod u ction o f safety o r civ ility' that recall A m erican com m u nity prevention: the w ay that inhabitants or users, along w ith other agencies, can take care o f the places w here they live or visit. T his set of research is condu cted on the initiative of bu sinesses that are w orried about the increase o f d isord er and in civilities on their prem ises: in post offices, railw ay stations, shopping m alls - all pu blic places or places open to the pu blic w here tranqu illity o r safety are threatened by behaviou rs that are not seriou s bu t sufficiently w orrisom e and cum u lativ e to require som e response. A ll these businesses face the problem in the sam e way: w ith pragm atism . T h ey do not care about d iscu ssions on prevention versu s repression. For a m em ber of staff o f the French national railw ay com pany, d isord er and d elinqu en cy threaten both the clients' trust and the efficiency o f the com pany (A nd re 2005). In that w ay, they are a 'bu siness pro blem ', part o f its activity, w hich has to be ad dressed from w ithin its resources. T h e research conducted on this issue points in the sam e direction. The basic idea is to invert the w ay d isord ers - 'in civ ilities' - are considered. W hat one no longer sees w hen trying to rem ove d ev iant b ehaviou r is the o ther sid e o f the coin: civility. In other w ords, w e forget that in m any public places a w hole set o f situ ations eith er do not cause any problem or are solved w ithout the intervention o f any authority, thanks sim ply to successfu l interactions betw een the users o f the place. C iv ility, just like in civility, is the result o f interactions. C ivility con stitutes 'th o se innu m er­ able tiny acts w hich often avert con flicts' (V id al-N aquet and Tiev ant 2006). W e m erely have to w atch the su bw ay at rush hour: people w alk past each o ther w ithout collid ing, ju st becau se they spontaneously find the w ay to w alk p ast each other. A nother exam ple can be observed at the p ost office, in the queue: w hereas people could quickly be irritated, m any incidents are avoid ed thanks to a look, a w ord, or silence. This is w hat is called 'civ ic skills'. 'C iv ility' is a polite w ay o f using pu blic space. W hen one replaces a substantialist approach to in civilities - nam ely one that view s inciv ility as a beh av iou r that is p roblem atic in and o f itself - w ith an 122

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interactionist view - that sees incivility as the p rod uct o f an interaction this highlights the civic skills o f the users and their ability to prod uce civility. Th e sam e has been observed , on a larger scale, in a large pu blic park located just o utsid e Paris, the Parc de la V illette (Tievant 2006). T his park is open 24 hou rs a day and frequ en ted b y a w ide v ariety o f people: fam ilies w ith young children, tourists, you ng people com ing from the n earby banlieue, know n as 'bobos'. A ll the people com e there for com pletely d ifferent pu rposes, not necessarily com p atible w ith one another, like p laying m usic, sleeping on the grass, playing football, w alking babies, etc. N everth eless, thanks to the w ay the p lace is d esigned and the w ay it is m anaged everyone can use it p eacefu lly and in safety. H ow is this p ossible? T he park is m anaged based on the idea o f d efining and im plem enting rules for its use that can be respected by all users, thus d efined with the users. So not only are the need s o f the users taken into account, but also their civic skills: they are trusted as people w ho are able to define, possibly negotiate, and then enforce rules for the use o f the place they enjoy visiting. T ogeth er they build an 'ord er o f the p lace'. T h e result is that several different uses o f the p ark take place together and contribute to the quality o f that space, in w hich safety is only one aspect am ong others. A nother bod y o f research , condu cted for the N ational Institute for A dvanced Secu rity Stud ies (Institut national des hautes etudes de securite (IN H E S)), dem onstrates the sam e point startin g from the opposite d irection (R eussir l'esp ace public 2006). To restore safety in a space requ ires first con sid erin g its uses, its users, and their skills. Indeed, safety is one elem ent, am ong m any others, o f the quality o f a pu blic space. The p u rpose o f this set o f stud ies w as to show , on several sites in France and abroad , how the situ ation in different places w here safety had d ram ati­ cally deteriorated subsequ ently could be turned around. T h e places studied included a public school and its surrou nd in gs; a railw ay station (the G are de Lyon in P aris); a shopping m all (La P art-D ieu in Lyon); a bus line in Toulouse; an A frican neighbou rhood in B russels (M atonge); Broad S treet in B irm ingham ; and the P iazza V ittorio E m m an uele in Rom e. In all cases, the action w as based on problem -solving: in other w ords, dealing w ith the problem in a pragm atic w ay by involving the people m ore d irectly con cern ed, taking their interests into account instead of legalistic answ ers com ing from institutional points o f view , w ith their interests b ein g related to the w ay they use the places. So, from the p erspective of situ ational p revention, in every case, environm en tal m an agem en t or physical im provem en ts w ere com bined w ith m easures taken as a con se­ quen ce o f o bserving the w ay places w ere used by their various users. In m ost cases, in one w ay or another, involving the users in caring for the space, using their civic skills w as a key elem ent in the success o f the operation. 123

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Th e situ ation in the shopping m all w as im proved by physical m easures like m od ifying the lighting or organising the m ovem ent o f people, but also by find ing a w ay to com bine safety and business im peratives. Young people som etim es can cause trou ble but they are also custom ers, w hich the m all m an agers take into account. T h ey are concerned w ith safety but also w ith their profits. T his leads to build ing an 'ord er o f the place' in w hich ev eryone has a share o f responsibility. Th e railw ay station w as disturbed by the p resence of hom eless people and drug dealers. T h e solution succeeded in com binin g safety requ ire­ m ents and solidarity in such a w ay that the station w as no longer unsafe but still rem ained hospitable, for the hom eless people as well w ho w ere invited to stay in som e places and not in others, and not to have disturbing behaviou rs. O nce again, creatin g an 'ord er o f the p lace', in w hich safety is only one elem ent o f the quality o f space, w as the d om inant approach. Fu rtherm ore, this high ligh ts the m an ner in w hich situ ational prevention does not necessarily m ean placing cam eras everyw here. A nother research condu cted in post offices (W yvekens et al. 2003), show ed that d isord ers decreased w hen a 'qu eu e gu id e' is installed, in ord er to organise the queue and m ake the w aiting quieter. But disorders and conflicts also d ecreased natu rally, sim ply becau se custom ers as w ell as em ployees have regulatin g skills, not necessarily con sciou sly recog­ nised as such, but effective nevertheless. People are nev er asked to 'collabo rate' w ith auth orities, w ith the police. T h ey are ju st asked about w hat is im portant fo r them in the w ay they use the space, and also m ad e to feel that they can be trusted as bein g able to participate in prod ucing an 'ord er o f the place'. A final, som ew hat different, exam ple also appears to b e interesting: it is the w ork d one by a police service called Prevention et secu rite urbaine (U rban P revention and Safety) in the d ep artm ent o f Sein e-Saint-D enis. A group called Safety o f the E conom ic Secto r had been created in ord er to ad vise sen ior com pany executives how to fight property crim e and street crim e in a d ev elop in g econom ic and ind ustrial area o f this 'p roblem atic' departm ent. Public services then asked for safety audits. T he scop e o f the group becam e broad er, targeting public bu ild ing s like schools, city halls and hospitals. L ater public hou sing com panies con du cting renovation and residentialisation program m es w ere incorporated. In 2005, the service w as renam ed U rban P revention and Safety Service, and its activities becam e focused on pu blic spaces, im plem enting situ ational prevention. In an interview , one o f the serv ice's d irectors explains the approach: Y ou can alm ost im m ed iately tell if a space is safe or unsafe, m an ageable or unm anageable: paint, in other w ords, cleanliness, pleasantness, lighting, green areas. T he sam e can be said for private spaces: a m etro station fo r exam ple. So w e had the idea to reverse [the situ ation], to influence this area through recom m en d ations on various 124

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issues. In the realm of coveillance, this m eans having as many witnesses, observers, as possible: so large w indow s, openings, views, louvred fences instead of palisades, or hedges that are not too high, taking w hat pollutes or w hat's useless off the public thorough way, m aking public furnishing m ore transparent, installing billboards on the sides of buildings instead of perpendicular . . . W e try to put into practice the idea of positive occupation of space: so that the space protects itself . . . W hen a space is offered to everyone they protect it. Do things so that, w ithout police presence, the people feel safe in a public space - that's situational prevention.

Conclusion D oes such a com plex form of situational crim e prevention announce a renew al of crim e prevention in France? The answ er is even more significant in the present context w here social prevention is said to be ineffective and w here law enforcem ent seem s to be a priority. In other w ords, if w e consider the reality on the ground, do local agents and agencies just blindly follow national trends and discourses? Even though Am erican theories have been criticised, som e approaches like those I have described are along the lines of the 'broken w indow s' or 'defensible space' approaches. As in 'broken w indow s', w e find the idea that local safety is linked to the m aterial quality of space as m uch as to the absence of deviant behaviour. And as in 'defensible space', we can observe attem pts to create a space that would be shared, thus better controlled. O f course this is a long step from A nglo-A m erican com m unity prevention. A fter all, the French abhor the concept of com m unity! But in these times when everyone deplores the lack of resident participation (Estebe 2002; Bacque et al. 2005; Donzelot and Epstein 2006), w hat seem s prom ising is a bottom -up approach to problem s and a concern with m aking people responsible for the places they use. Safety production becom es less specialised: everyone has a role to play in it. It is an interesting w ay to m ove from the French trend to expect everything from the state. It looks like a new form of social control (W yvekens 2007b), w here citizens are considered as capable of being co-responsible for the public space, not as a 'club good' (H ope 2000), but as a 'com m on good'. The 'overly social' French m odel would leave som e room , but not all, to a situational logic, taking into account the notion of risk and the concern for efficiency: to address problem s at a level w here som ething can be done, while relying on civil skills. This could rem edy the w eakness of French crim e prevention, w ithout either elim inating it or reducing it to a m onitoring of people and places.

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N o te s 1 As the weight of this term is im portant in understanding the French context, it will be used in this text. 2 A French departement is an adm inistrative unit roughly analogous with a county in the British context. The 100 French departm ents are grouped into 22 metropolitan and four overseas regions. The prefet is the state's representative in the department. 3 Law 2002-1094 of 29 August 2002 on the direction and operation o f domestic security (d’orientation et de programmation pour la securite interieure). Law 2003-239 of 18 M arch 2003 for domestic security (pour la securite interieure). 4 Law 2002-1138 of 9 Septem ber 2002 on the direction and operation of the justice system (d‘orientation et de programmation pour la justice). Law 2004-204 of 9 M arch 2004 on adapting the justice system to developm ents in crim e (portant adaptation de la justice aux evolutions de la criminalite). 5 Law 2007-297 of 5 March 2007 relating to the prevention of crime (relative a la prevention de la delinquance). 6 Where local order, security and public tranquillity are threatened by lack of parental surveillance and control or parental failure to assist in their child's education, the m ayor can propose parental support, consisting of an individ­ ualised programm e com bining counselling and educational work. The pro­ gram m e of support aims to help parents in parenting, but does so within a context of control and constraint as parents must have good reason to refuse the support offered. 7 Law 2007-1198 of 10 August 2007 reinforcing the fight against recidivism among adults and minors (renforqant la lutte contre la recidive des majeurs et des mineurs). 8 Law 2008-174 of 25 February 2008 on security detention and criminal irresponsibility due to mental disorder (relative a la retention de surete et a la declaration d'irresponsabilite penale pour cause de trouble mental). 9 Article 706-53-13 of the 2008-174 law. 10 Law 2003-710 of 1 August 2003 on the direction and operation of city and urban renewal (d'orientation et de programmation pour la ville et la renovation urbaine). 11 Article 6 of the 2003-710 law. 12 The banlieues are high-density peripheral housing estates around French cities in which low -incom e and disadvantaged populations tend to be concentrated, often in social housing. 13 On this question, it is useful to warn against the confusion som etim es made betw een close notions, such as neo-liberalism , neo-conservatism and the Am ericanisation of public policies (Crawford and Lewis 2007). 14 L'impact de la videosurveillance sur la securite dans les espaces publics et les etablissements privts recevant du public. 15 Speech by Michele Alliot-M arie, Interior Minister, at a meeting held on 20 May 2008, at the Interior M inistry, between the National Com mission on videosur­ veillance, the chairs of the departm ent level com m issions and the prefets or their representative, M aire Info, 21 M ay 2008. 16 Its official title is actually the 'decree taken for the im plem entation of article L 111-3-1 of the code of urbanism and related to public safety studies'.

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17 Law 95-73 o f 21 Janu ary 1995 on the direction and operation for security (d'orientation et de program niation relative a la se'curite'). 18 Extract from art. 11 of the law: 'P relim inary studies prior to urban renew al, collective infrastructure and building projects, undertaken by a collectivity or requiring an adm inistrative authorisation and w hich, becau se of their scope, location or characteristics m ay have an im pact on protection o f people or goods against threats and aggressions, are subject to a public safety stud y to assess the consequences.'

R e fe r e n c e s A nache, M . (ed.) (2004) Evaluation de I impact de la videosurveillance s u r la securisation des transports en com m un en Region Ile-de-France. IAU RIF. A ndre, P. (2005) 'C on cilier service et surete. U ne nouvelle exigence pour la SN C F', Les Cahiers de la securite, 57(2): 85-113. Bacque, M .-H ., Rey, H. and Sintom er, Y. (eds) (2005) G estion de proxim ite et dem ocratic participative. Une perspective com parative. Paris: La D ecouverte. Billard, G., C hevalier, J. and M adore, F. (2005) V ille ferm ee, ville surveillee. La securisation des espaces residentiels en France et en A m erique du N ord. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes. Burgel, G. (2006) La revanche des villes. Paris: H achette Litteratures. C laval, P. (2001) 'C listhene, H aberm as, Raw ls et la privatisation de la v ille', in C. G h orra-G obin (ed.) R einventer le sens de la ville, les espaces publics a I'heure globale. Paris: L 'H arm attan, pp. 23-32. Com m ission des m aires su r la securite (1982) Face a la dilin qu an ce: prevention, repression, solidarite. Paris: La D ocum entation Franchise. Com m ission nationale inform atiqu e et libertes (CN IL) (2007) 27e rapport d'activite 2006. Paris: La D ocum entation Franchise. Com m ission nationale inform atiqu e et libertes (CN IL) (2008) 28e rapport d'activite 2007. Paris: La D ocum entation Franchise. Craw ford, A. and Lew is, S. (2007) 'E volu tions m ondiales, orientations nationales et justice locale: Les effets du neo-liberalism e sur la justice des m ineurs en A ngleterre et au Pays de G alles', in F. Bailleau and Y. C artuyvels (eds) Les evolutions de la ju stice penale des m ineurs en Europe. Entre m odele w elfare et inflexions neo-liber ales. Paris: L'H arm attan, pp. 23-43. D elegation interm inisterielle a la ville (DIV) (2004) P olitique de la ville et prevention de la dilinquance. Recueil d ‘actions locales. Paris: Editions de la DIV, coll. «Reperes». D onzelot, J. and Epstein, R. (2006) 'D em ocratic et participation: 1'exem ple d e la renovation urbaine', Esprit, July: 5-34. D onzelot, J. and W yvekens, A. (2004) La m agistrature sociale. Enquetes sur les politiques locales de securite. Paris: La D ocum entation Franqaise. D onzelot, J., M evel, C. and W yvekens, A. (2003) Faire societe. La politique de la ville au x Etats-U nis et en France. Paris: Seuil. D ubedout, H. (1983) E nsem ble, refaire la ville. Paris: La D ocum entation Franchise. Estebe, P. (2002) 'L 'habitant, ou le cher disparu. D isparitions, apparitions et resurgences de l'habitant eom m e figure de la participation politique en France', Les Cahiers de la securite interieure, 49: 151-71. 127

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Ferret, J. and M ouhanna, Ch. (eds) (2005) P ears su r les villes. Vers un populism e p u n itif a la franqaise? Paris: PUF. G arland, D. (2001) Culture o f Control: Crim e and Social O rder in Contem porary Society. O xford: O xford U niversity Press. G horra-G obin, C. (2001) 'R einv estir la dim ension sym bolique des espaces publics', in C. G horra-G obin (ed.) R einventer le sens de la ville, les espaces publics a I'heure globale. Paris: L 'H arm attan, pp. 5-15. H eilm ann, E. (2008) 'La videosurveillance, un m irage technologique et politique', in L. M ucchielli (ed.) La fren esie securitaire. R etour a Vordre et nouveau contrdle social. Paris: La D ecouverte, pp. 113-24. H eilm ann, E. and M ornet, M .-N . (2003) V ideosurveillance et prevention de la crim inalite. L'im pact des dispositifs dans les espaces urbains en G rande-Bretagne. IH ESI, coll. Etudes et Recherches. H ope, T. (2000) 'Inequality and the Clubbing of Private Secu rity ', in T. H ope and R. Sparks (eds) C rim e, Risk and Insecurity. London: R outledge, pp. 83-106. Jacobs, J. (1961) The Death and Life o f G reat Am erican Cities. N ew York: Random H ouse. Le Goff, T., Loudier-M algouyres, C., Lavocat, Ch. and D autheville, M. (2007) Ln videosurveillance dans les lycees en Ile-de-France. Usages et impacts. IAU RIF. Lem onier, M. (1998) 'D e l'esp ace d efendable a la prevention situ ationnelle', D iagonal, 129. M arcus, M . (2006) 'L e role du m aire dans les politiques locales de p rev en tio n / securite', Les Cahiers de la securite, 61: 131-42. M ary, P. (2003) Insecurity et penalisation du social. Bruxelles: Labor, coll. Q uartier libre. M onjardet, D. (1999) 'La police de proxim ite: ce qu 'elle n'est pas', R evue franqaise d ‘adm inistration publique, 91: 519-25. M onjardet, D. (2004) 'L 'inform ation, l'urgence et la reform e, reflexions sur le fonctionnem ent de la D irection centrale de la securite pu b liqu e', in S. Roche (ed.) R eform er la police et In securite. Paris: O dile Jacob, pp. 128-42. M osser, S. (2007) 'E clairage et securite en ville: l'etat des savoirs', D eviance et Societe, 31(1): 77-100. N ew m an, O. (1971) D efensible Space. People and D esign in the V iolent City. London: A rchitectural Press. O cqueteau, F. (2004), P olices en tre Etat et m arche. Paris, Presses de Sciences Po. O cqueteau, F. (2007) 'La «securite globale», une reponse a la m enace terroriste?', Regards sur I'actualite, 328: 49-60. Pecaud, D. (2002) L'im pact de la videosurveillance sur la securite dans les espaces publics et les etablissem ents prives recevant du public. IH ESI, coll. Etudes et recherches. Reussir l'esp ace public (2006) Q ualite globale de Vespace et securite. Paris: Rapport d 'etu d es pour l'ln stitu t national des hautes etudes de securite. Roche, S. (2005) Police de proxim ite. N os politiques de securite. Paris: Seuil. Schw artz, B. (1981) L'insertion professionnelle et sociale des jeunes. Paris: La D ocum entation Franchise. Shearing, C. and Stenning, P. (1983) 'Private Security: Im plications for Social C o n trol', Social Problem s, 30(5): 493-506. Tabet, J. (1999) 'La residentialisation du logem ent social a P aris', A nnales de la recherche urbaine, 83-84: 155-63. Tievant, S. (2006) 'L e pare de la Villette, Hot de civilite', Les Cahiers de la securite, 57(2): 131-52. 128

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Vidal-Naquet, P. A. and Tievant, S. (2006) 'Incivilites et travail de civilite', Les Cahiers de la securite, 57(2): 13-31. Wilson, J. Q. and Kelling, G. (1982) 'Broken Windows', The Atlantic Monthly, March: 29-37. Wyvekens, A. (2001) 'La justice de proximite en France. Politique judiciaire de la ville et interrogations sur la fonction de justice', in A. Wyvekens and J. Faget (eds) La justice de proximite en Europe: Pratiques et enjeux. Toulouse: Eres, pp. 17-36. Wyvekens, A. (2007a) 'Proximity Justice in France: Anything but "Justice and Community"?', in J. Shapland (ed.) Justice, Community and Civil Society. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, pp. 30-46. Wyvekens, A. (2007b) 'Espace public et civilite: reinventer un controle social? Perspectives pour la "Fran ce"', Lien social et politiques, 57: 35-45. Wyvekens, A., Donzelot, J., Mevel, C., Oblet, T. and Villechaise-Dupont, A. (2003) Les incivilites a la Poste. CEPS/La Poste.

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C h a p te r 6

F o rty years o f crim e prevention in the D utch p o ld e r Jan J. M . Van Dijk and Jaap D e W aard 1

In tro d u c tio n In 1992 a d elegation o f D utch crim e prevention practitioners, headed by the ju n io r M inister o f Ju stice, attend ed a m ajor con ference in Paris o rganised by the E uropean Forum on C rim e P reven tion (later called E uropean Forum fo r U rban Safety). A t the end o f the first d ay the anchorm an of the con ference ann ou nced a special p resentation on a project to prevent b icy cle theft in G roningen, the N etherlands. H e added that this w ould be follow ed by a p resentation from A ix en Proven ce on the prevention o f theft o f jeu d e boules balls. His asid e caused great m errim ent am ong the largely French aud ience but annoyed the D utch d elegates. They sensed that their carefully designed and proven project, w here unem ployed you ngsters assisted bike ow ners in installin g security locks and id entification tags on their bikes, w as out o f place. T his clearly w as a high-level con ference w here m ayors and other d ignitaries spoke eloqu ently about social solidarity rather than a foru m for practitioners to exchang e success stories about reducing crim e b y m u nd ane, non-p unitive m eans. In this ch ap ter w e d escribe d ev elopm ents in crim e prevention policies in the N eth erlan ds over the past 40 years. In m an y respects crim e p rev ention in the Low C ou ntries resem bles that in o ther w estern countries. Its focus on surv eillance and sem i-social control could, for exam ple, be understood as m an ifestations o f an international trend tow ards expanded state con trol (C ohen 1985). Its pragm atic approach of crim e problem s has been critiqued as a form of risk m an agem en t against the background o f neo-liberalism (H ebberecht 1997). Its later, m ore 130

Forty years o f crim e prevention in the Dutch polder

pu nitiv e m an ifestations could perh aps be interpreted as yet another expression o f the com m on trend o f penal popu lism in the w estern w orld (G arland 2001). C learly the D u tch experience of crim e p rev ention can be interpreted from an international theoretical perspective. For this chapter, h ow ever, w e have opted for another theoretical ap p roach by focu sing not on com m onalities w ith trend s elsew here but on special, possibly unique features o f D utch crim e prevention. W e try to bring out con tin uities in the natu re and organisation o f D utch policies that seem to stand out from an international perspective. In the final section w e argue that som e ch aracteristics of D utch crim e prevention can be interpreted as a prod uct o f the D utch P old er m od el, a m etaph or for the D u tch trad ition of con sensu s policies in the p ragm atic pu rsu it o f the com m on good.

C r im e tre n d s and v ic tim is a tio n surveys T rend s in anti-crim e policies m ust, of course, be understood in relation to the pu blic d ebate on crim e. This pu blic d ebate is at least in part a response to inform ation on trends in crim e as com m u nicated b y the m edia. In m any cou ntries such inform ation is trad itionally un der the control o f the police ad m inistration. T h e N eth erlan d s has been the first E uropean cou ntry to invest in the execution o f reg u lar victim isation surveys am ong the general p u blic as a sou rce o f inform ation on crim e, ind ep en den t of police ad m inistrations. T h e first large-scale victim isation survey w as launched by the R esearch and D ocum entation C en tre o f the M inistry o f Ju stice in 1973 (V an D ijk and Steinm etz 1979). In the first reports on the survey the p oint w as m ad e that the d ark figure o f crim e w as huge but consisted m ainly o f relatively m inor crim es. T his conclusion w as reflected in the rep o rt's subtitle: Results o f a Study into the V olum e and Trends in P etty Crim e. In later years, the survey results show ed that various types of petty crim e w ere increasing. In the N eth erlan ds, reports on the results o f the N ational V ictim isation Surv eys have sensitised pu blic opinion to the need to tackle types o f volu m e crim e such as vand alism and shoplifting (around 1980), household burglary and car-related thefts (around 1985), robberies (around 1990), street violence (around 2000) and d om estic violence (around 2003).

C r im e tre n d s in th e N e th e rla n d s : 1 9 5 0 -2 0 0 7 Figure 6.1 show s the d ev elop m ent o f aggregate crim e, as recorded by the police, since the 1950s. The increase in crim e w as m ost m arked in the p eriod 1970-85. W hile until then the N eth erlan d s w as a lo w -crim e society com pared to su rrou nd in g countries, crim e rates caught up quickly. The 131

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Key: Black line represents the volume of recorded crimes (in thousands). Grey line represents the clearance rate as a percentage of recorded crimes.

Figure 6.1

Recorded crime and clearance rates in the Netherlands, 1950-2007

increase w as partly a result of grow in g anonym ity of society and the ab u n d an ce o f good s su scep tible to theft, and partly due to social problem s such as d ru g ad diction and unem ploym ent. W ith hind sight it can be argued that D utch society and go v ernm ent w ere overtaken by events. L o ng-stand in g attitu d es o f tolerance and anti-auth oritarianism fuelled a p erm issive society. In the 1980s attitu d es started to change and the pressure on governm ent to act against crim e increased rapidly. T he result w as a fast catch-u p o f policies to red uce crim e (Society and C rim e 1985). S in ce 1985 the sharp annual rises in the incid ence o f recorded crim e have tailed off. O ver the last years, a sharp d ow nw ard trend in crim e can be observed , w hile clearan ce rates show an upw ard trend. T h e dow nw ard trend in crim e is confirm ed by the results from the D utch N ational V ictim isation Surveys. Figu re 6.2 show s the d evelopm ent in self-reported victim isation am ong the popu lation aged 15 years and older. O n the basis of victim surveys w e see a gradu al stabilisation of crim e. W hen w e com pare the outcom es from 2007 w ith 2002, a m ajor crim e drop can be observed. The o verall levels of v ictim isation have declined by 23 p er cent; violence is dow n by 33 per cent (B erghu is and De W aard 2008). W hen lookin g at property crim e, m ost n otably household bu rglaries, car-related thefts and b icycle thefts show the b iggest red uction s in this category. T hese d ev elopm ents are not u n iqu e for the N eth erlan ds alone. A s in the U nited States o f A m erica and A ustralia, in m an y E uropean cou ntries there are ind icators o f a d ow n ­ w ard trend in the total level of crim e. A lso the results of the various crim e victim surveys am ong the popu lation ind icate a d ow nw ard trend of the gen eral level of crim e. The d ecline in crim e can be observed in m any 132

Forty years o f crim e prevention in the Dutch polder

Key: Black line represents the overall victimisation rate in percentage. Grey dotted line represents victimisation rate of violence in percentage.

Figure 6.2 Self-reported victimisation among the population aged 15 years and older, 1980-2008

countries. Startin g in the U SA in 1992, other cou ntries follow ed in the years thereafter (Van D ijk 2008). A com bination o f three m ajor factors can be given to explain the D utch d rop in crim e. First, d rug-related crim e has fallen sharp ly due to the d ecreasin g nu m ber of heroin ad dicts (active heroin cohorts have partly dried up). Second , sin ce 1993 crim e p rev entative b ehav iou r am on g the p opu lation at large and bu sinesses is boom ing. Third , the crim inal ju stice system is respond in g m ore seriou sly and in a stricter m an ner to crim inal and d elinqu en t behaviour. The p erm issive society o f the N eth erlan d s has com e to an end.

C r im e p re v e n tio n as an a lte r n a tiv e s tra te g y C rim e prevention in the N eth erlan d s is, as elsew here, a relativ ely new p henom enon. In the late 1960s police forces started w ith inform ation cam paign s am on g the pu blic about the im portan ce o f precautionary m easu res to p rev ent victim isation by petty crim e. In 1979 a N ational Bureau for C rim e P revention w as set up at the D utch M inistry o f Ju stice to prom ote p olice-based crim e prevention. T his national bureau m ainly prom oted different form s o f technical crim e prevention (target-hardening). In the late 1970s it also supported p olice-based program m es such as 133

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

p rop erty -m arking and neighbou rhood w atch. P olice-based crim e p rev en­ tion w as seen as a new tech nique of p o licing that did not attract m uch p olitical attention. A t the tim e only p olitical parties at the righ t end o f the p olitical sp ectru m expressed con cern s about rising crim e rates, typically interpreted as the con sequ ence of ov erly soft policing and sentencing. In leftist p olitical circles the so-called crim e problem w as gen erally regarded as a social con struction o f con servative political parties, fuelled by the m edia (e.g. Van D ijk 1979). In the early 1980s the stead y increase in petty crim e accord ing to both p olice statistics and victim isation surveys gave rise to heated political d ebates. In 1983 the cen tre-right go v ernm ent con sisting o f the C h ristian d em ocratic (CD A ) and liberal con servative (VV D ) parties established an A d v isory C om m ittee on P etty C rim e (A dviescom m issie K leine Crim inaliteit). This com m ittee w as requ ested to com e up w ith a set o f recom m endations to ad dress the rise in volu m e crim e. It w as chaired by H ein Roethof, a form er M em ber o f P arliam ent o f the L abou r P arty w ith a repu tation for liberal ideas abou t crim e control. M em bers included experts from differ­ ent political parties, inclu ding the future threefold M inister o f Ju stice Ernst H irsch Ballin and Jan Van Dijk, at the tim e head o f the Research C en tre o f the M inistry o f Justice. In the w inter o f 1984 the com m ittee in its first report ad vised that volu m e crim e had indeed becom e a serious social problem for large segm ents o f the p opu lation but should be tackled p rim arily w ith p reventive m eans. This recognition heralded a new con sensu s am ong the m ain political parties, inclu ding the L abou r Party, about both d iagnosis and cure. W hile acknow ledgin g the seriou sn ess of the crim e problem , the report categorically rejected proposals for a m ere expan sion o f the crim inal ju stice system . It also questioned a further expansion o f technical crim e prevention m easures as a v iable response to the problem o f v olu m e crim e. Its key m essage w as that volu m e crim e had grow n from a w eaken ing o f inform al social controls in an urbanised , con su m erist society and should prim arily be tackled by reintrod ucin g m od ern versions o f inform al social control. Its m ain recom m en dations w ere a strength en in g o f the national go v ern m en t's com m itm ent to crim e prevention, the involvem ent o f interm ed iary structures (such as schools and sports clu bs) and bu sinesses to that end and inter-agen cy co ­ o peration at the central and local levels o f gov ernm ent (Van D ijk and Ju n ger-T as 1988). The rep ort specifically recom m en ded the involvem ent o f interm ed iary structures such as schools, sports clubs and churches as well as pu blic transport com panies, shopping m alls and o ther businesses to increase natural surv eillance in their sem i-p u blic d om ains. T he report also m ade the recom m en d ation to m ake crim inal ju stice m ore victim centred and to offer state fun ding for specialised su pport for crim e v ictim s as a m eans to prevent their alienation from society. The reco m ­ m en dations o f the com m ittee w ere fav ourably received b y all m ain political parties and soon cam e to con stitute the cornerstone o f the 134

Forty years o f crim e prevention in the Dutch polder

g ov ern m en t's anti-crim e policies as form ulated in the w hite p ap er Society and C rim e in 1985.

C o n c e p tu a lis in g th e n ew c r im e p re v e n tio n C rim e prevention in both the R oethof Report and in the Society and Crim e w hite paper w as conceptu alised as a set o f m easures d istin ct from law enforcem ent that w ould supplem ent con v en tional crim inal policies. In this vein, V an D ijk and D e W aard , both involved in the d esign o f the D utch crim e prevention policies betw een 1985 and 1995, d efined crim e preven­ tion as: 'the total o f all private initiatives and state policies, other than the enforcem ent o f crim inal law , aim ed at the red uction o f d am age caused by acts defined as crim inal by the state' (1991: 483). D utch crim e prevention has been from the outset eclectic in its orientation. A ccord in g to a typology developed by Van D ijk and De W aard (1991), crim e prevention m easures can be d istin gu ished by lookin g at the natu re o f the target (either the offenders, the victim s or the physical environm en t) and the reach o f the m easures d irected at the cou ntry or pu blic at large, focu sing on at-risk areas or groups or tackling alread y existing problem s. T he first d istin ction looks at the target o f the m easures: • M easu res aim ed at p reventing (potential) offenders from com m itting crim es or re-offending; know n as offender-oriented or social prevention. • M easu res that attem pt to red uce the opportu nities to com m it crim e, either by changin g the behav iou r o f potential victim s (victim -oriented prevention) or by intervention in situ ations w ith inherent risks (situa­ tional prevention). O ffend er-oriented m easures can be seen as practical applications of con v en tional crim inological theories on the causes o f crim e such as H irsch i's (1969) theory o f social control. V ictim ological stud ies on v ulner­ abilities for crim inal victim isation and v ictim -precip itation have laid the foundation for victim -oriented crim e prevention. Recent interest in repeat victim isation un derlines the relevan ce of this type o f m easures. The new brand o f crim inological theories regarding rou tine activities and crim inal o p portu nities has inform ed situ ational crim e p revention (C larke 1995; Felson 1994; V an D ijk and Steinm etz 1979). T h e second d im ension, w hich is w ell kn ow n in the literatu re on drugs prevention, m akes a d istin ction betw een the stages o f d evelopm ent of problem s d eterm ining the reach of the m easures. It distinguishes: • P rim ary prevention. This relates to general p reventative activities, aim ed at the public or the cou ntry at large. 135

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

• Secondary prevention. T his relates to m easures aim ed at specific risk factors (on the victim or offend er side) and on vulnerable n eigh bou r­ hoods. • T ertiary prevention. This form o f p revention is aim ed at people and situ ations actually affected by crim e. E xam p les are rehabilitation of offenders, victim su pport to p revent repeat victim isation or alienation, and intensive surv eillance at so-called 'h ot sp ots' in urban env iron­ m ents. If w e set the tw o d im ensions alongsid e each other, nine form s of crim e prevention can be d istin gu ished . In T able 6.1 w e present the m atrix w ith som e exam ples o f each type o f prevention. Th e typ ology reflects the broad D utch con ception o f crim e prevention policies, encom passing both social crim e prevention, p revailing in France and Sw eden, and environm en tal or situ ational prevention, m ore prevalent in England and W ales (Sutton et al. 2008). In the R oethof Report and the ensu ing Society and Crim e w hite paper, em ph asis w as put on second ary situ ational crim e p revention con sisting not of tech nologies but o f sem iform al su rveillance, on second ary offend er-oriented prevention (e.g. truancy prevention by schools) and on tertiary v ictim -oriented prevention (victim support). From the outset D utch crim e prevention has been m u ltid im ensional and inform ed by academ ic research about 'w h at w orks' in red ucing types o f crim e, deem ed w orrying by the popu lation (Van N oije and W ittebrood 2008).

Im p le m e n tin g th e n ew c rim e p re v e n tio n To im plem ent the new ly annou nced policies, an Interdep artm ental C om m ittee for C rim e P reven tion w as set up in 1985 com prising high-level rep resentatives o f the m inistries o f Ju stice and the Interior and several other key m inistries, u n d er the chairm an ship of the secretary general of the P rim e M in ister's office. It ad m inistered a fund o f 25 m illion euro to perm it local auth orities to m ou nt crim e prevention p rogram m es in the period 1986-1990. A lm ost all larger tow ns appointed crim e prevention co-ordinators to d raft proposals for projects and oversee their im p lem en­ tation. D uring the period 1986-1990 som e 200 local projects w ere subsid ised . C en tral funds w ere supplem ented w ith m on ey raised locally. Ten per cent o f the total bud get w as earm arked for ind ep endent ev alu ation b y the R esearch C en tre of the M inistry of Ju stice or un iversitybased institutes. The secretariat o f the new policies in 1990 w as upgraded to a fully fledged d irectorate at the M inistry o f Ju stice, w ith separate d ep artm ents for offender-based and situ ational prevention. It set up a d atabase w ith current projects and their first results, and launched a

136

Table 6.1

Matrix of types of preventative measures T ertiary offender-oriented prevention

Academ ic enrichm ent Advertising After-school activities (latchkey children) Deterrence Education in the law Information cam paigns (vandalism , tax evasion) N orm ative training Parent education and training Police talks in school Recreation and social activities School discipline code Family support services Health care access Literacy Nutrition services Substance abuse education Intervening in biological and psychological developm ent

Apprenticeships B ootcam ps/w ilderness cam ps Com m unication skills Education projects Em ploym ent skill-building Foster parenting Inner city em pow erm ent O ut-of-hom e placements Scared straight program m es Social developm ent Truancy patrols (police) College scholarships Job creation /p lacem en t M ental health screenings Parental involvement Sum m er jobs for youth Cognitive-behavioural techniques

Alternative sanctions Child care Com m unity-based corrections Curfew Diversion Electronic monitoring Intensive supervision probation Restitution Training courses for drunk drivers Victim -offender mediation Vocational training/C urriculum Conflict resolution Gang intervention M entoring Periodic drug testing A nger m anagem ent therapy Pharm acological m anaging of behaviour

Prim ary situational-oriented prevention

Secondary situational-oriented prevention T ertiary situational-oriented prevention

Architectural design Building safety and security Checklists for criminologically sound designs Crim e im pact statements Defensible space

A ccess control (entry phones) Burglar alarm s Business w atch /secu rity Caretakers (concierges) Clean-ups Closure of access points

Behavioural geography and criminal behaviour C rim e an aly sis/crim e m apping Closing crim inogenic places Focused or saturation policing H ot sp o ts/crim e locations

in the Dutch polder

Secondary offender-oriented prevention

Forty years of crime prevention

Prim ary offender-oriented prevention

i

Table 6.1

Continued

Primary offender-oriented prevention

Secondary offender-oriented prevention

Tertiary offender-oriented prevention

Facility site selection Housing design/renovation Housing programmes Improving domestic door and window locks Insurance Law as situational measure Improved visibility Opportunity reducing techniques Security inspections/surveys Steering column locks Target-hardening Safe passages/corridors Zoning

Community policing Employee screening Extra ticket inspection staff Fencing Improved visibility Increased staffing of facilities Landscaping Private security guards Rapid repair Surveillance by employees (formal) Reducing weapon lethality

Increased police patrols Licensing policies M icro-environments of violence Offender mobility Police crackdowns Problem-oriented policing styles Reduce amount of cash in tills Target removal Trouble spot clustering Video control/CCTV Public/private partnerships Disruption tactics for illegal markets

Primary victim-oriented prevention

Secondary victim-oriented prevention

Tertiary victim-oriented prevention

A w aren ess o f v ictim isatio n risks C rim e stop p ers prog ram m es L eaflettin g M ass-m ed ia c a m p a ig n s/p u b lic ity P rop erty m a rk in g /o p e ra tio n iden tificatio n P u b lic ed u cation / info rm atio n Pu blic m eetin gs Pu blic sp eak in g presen tatio n s Sp ecial in fo rm atio n cam p aig n s (elderly, violence) S elf-d efen ce training Site su rv eys

Block p aren t pro g ram m es C itizen p atrols D oorstep cam p aign s E m erg en cy ph o n e lines Escort services G u ard ian A ngels M u n icip al bylaw chang es N eig h b ou rh o od w atch Safe hou ses fo r child ren Serv ices to the e ld e rly /is o la te d V IP -p rotection

C ivil pro tectio n o rd ers C risis cou n sellin g P olice referral sch em es P o lice -v ictim co m m u n icatio n P ost-trau m a cou n sellin g R ap e C risis cen tres R ep eat v ictim isation p rev ention S elf-h elp groups V ictim assistan ce (projects) V ictim im p act statem en t V ictim notification

Forty years o f crim e prevention in the Dutch polder

journal on crim e prevention w ith a d istribution am ong 20,000 practioners. It also introduced an annual aw ard for the m ost successfu l project, the R oethof A w ard , w hich w as later extend ed to inclu de B elgian and British p rojects and ev en tu ally inspired the current Preven tion A w ard o f the E uropean U nion. In 1992, the d irectorate w as also m ad e responsible for the screening o f com panies w ith lim ited liability as a m eans to prevent infiltration o f the legitim ate econ om y by (associates of) organised crim e groups. T o this end a d atabase w as set up o f all D utch lim ited com panies, listin g their board m em bers and ow ners as well as record s o f past b ankru p tcies and crim inal con viction s (called V ennoot) (T.M .C. A sser Instituu t 2006). A s m entioned earlier, a m ain focus of the new w ave o f crim e prevention w as the strength en in g of sem i-form al social control or surv eillance in the public and sem i-p ublic dom ain. For historical reasons, the con tribution of v olu ntary groups o f citizens to patrolling or o ther form s o f surveillance w as relativ ely sm all in the N etherlands. N eighbourhood w atch, for exam ple, brings back associations o f spying on beh alf of the governm ent d uring the G erm an occup ation in the N azi period. A ttem pts by police forces to prom ote such schem es w ere n ev er very successfu l. O ne o f the m ore interesting D utch exam ples o f crim e prevention and arguably the D utch alternative o f neighbou rhood w atch are the 'city gu ard s' (Stadszvachten). Stadsw achten are m u nicipal secu rity gu ard s w ho patrol the inner cities and give assistan ce to passers-by. T h ey are unarm ed and have no special authority. In the event that they w itness the com m ission o f a crim e they are bound to im m ed iately alert the police. T h ey are largely recruited from the long-term unem ployed and are financed b y the M inistry o f E m ploym ent. E valuation stud ies have show n that the p res­ ence o f stadsw achten is greatly appreciated by shop keep ers and p assers-by and red uces feelings o f un safety and possibly (m inor) crim e (H ofstra and Shapland 1997). T he UK took this m odel as an inspiration w hen im plem enting their N eighbourh ood W ard en S ch em e in 2000. O ther exam ples o f this type of crim e p revention inclu de the ap p o in t­ m ent o f extra inspectors in pu blic transport and the use o f caretakers in crim e-ridd en h igh -rise apartm ent bu ild ing s (H esseling 1995). A n essential elem ent in these projects is the joint tackling o f three social problem s: un em ploym en t, volu m e crim e, and resultin g feelings o f in security in the pu blic dom ain (W illem se 1996). W hen u n em p loym en t rates plum m eted in the N eth erlan ds after 1995, the funding o f the schem es becam e less generous. The policies have, how ever, proved their w orth and could easily be revitalised w hen needed (Van N oije and W ittebrood 2008). Th e new crim e prevention o f the 1980s w as m ainly d irected at red ucin g the op portu nities fo r crim e. In ad dition, a nationw id e netw ork o f victim support schem es cam e into being, assisting over 100,000 crim e victim s per year. A sizeable m inority o f the funded projects can be categorised as offender-oriented. Pilot projects focused on red ucing 139

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

truancy and im proving academ ic achievem ent in secondary schools through im proved record system s and early contacting of parents. Results at the experim ental site w ere com pared system atically w ith a control school of sim ilar size and student com position. A final, modified program m e was then im plem ented on a national basis (Van Dijk and Junger-Tas 1988). A rguably one of the m ost successful innovations was the introduction of com m unity service as a diversionary option for m inors (the so-called H ALT option). Young people arrested for m inor crim es for the first time are referred to special agencies, which arrange for them to carry out an unpaid job on a free Saturday, e.g. cleaning the floor of the departm ent store w here they com m itted shoplifting or cleaning graffiti from buses. If the youth com plies w ith the appointm ent no report is sent to the prosecutor and no record will be kept of the arrest. Form ally, the com m unity service is a condition for discontinuing the prosecution, m andated by the prosecutor to the police. Evaluation studies showed favourable reductions in recidivism rates for form er clients of the LIALT bureaus (Van Hees 1998). Later studies, how ever, have show n fewer or no effects on recidivism , probably because the young people are currently m ore deeply involved in crim inality at their first arrest than was the case ten years ago. It has also been observed that options such as H ALT have little im pact upon clients from ethnic m inorities (Ferw erda et al. 2006). Van Sw aaningen and Uit Beijerse (2006) point at the failure of Dutch crim e prevention policies to m ake a significant contribution to the social integration of (m arginalised) youth. In their view the policies insufficiently addressed root causes of crim e and expected m unicipalities to solve deeply rooted social problem s with m inim al additional financial support. W ith hindsight the new crim e prevention for m any years has ignored the grow ing involvem ent in form s of serious delinquency at a very young age of youths from ethnic m inority groups, notably M oroccans and A ntilleans (Van Gem ert et al. 2008).

P u b lic -p riv a te p artn ersh ips O ne special feature of the Dutch approach in preventing crim e is the collaboration betw een governm ent and the business world. In 1992 the governm ent agreed to set up the N ational Platform of C rim e Control. In this body, under the presidency of the M inister of Justice and the Chair of the Dutch Em ployers Federation, public institutions such as the police and prosecutors as well as the business com m unity are represented at the highest level (for instance, board m em bers of the largest Dutch corpor­ ations such as AM RO , ING, A H O LD and U nilever). Security and crim inal justice experts are brought together in task forces under its supervision. The N ational Platform for C rim e Control prom otes the co-operation betw een the M inistries of Justice, the Interior, Econom ic Affairs, Trans­ 140

Forty years o f crim e prevention in the Dutch polder

port, Finance and the bu siness com m u nity (insu rance com panies, banking retail and so on). To inform the policy agenda o f the Platform , the D irectorate for C rim e P reven tion com m issioned the International C rim es against B u sin esses Su rv ey (Van D ijk and T erlouw 1996). The funding arrangem en t o f con crete actions foresees an equally shared (50 per cent each) d ivision o f costs b etw een the governm ent and the bu siness sector. This co-operation has resulted in several successfu l joint initiativ es against specific types o f crim e. The nu m ber o f com m ercial robberies and auto thefts, for exam ple, declined in the late 1990s as a result o f initiativ es of the N ational Platform on C rim e C ontrol (Van Dijk 1997a). The p ro­ gram m es funded are a m ixtu re o f situ ational m easures (such as im proved secu rity in banks and im m obilisers in cars) and extra efforts o f police forces and p rosecu tors to target crim es against the bu siness sector. Th e introd uction o f the D utch version o f Secured by D esign has involved close co-ord ination betw een the M inistries of ju stice , the Interior and H ousin g and P lan ning w ith a v iew to influencing planners and architects to inclu d e crim e prevention as one o f their concerns in designs for new hom es and renov ating existing ones. T he evaluation o f projects u n dertaken has led to the id entification and d issem in ation o f best practice throu gh ou t the cou ntry on such issues as resid ential burglary, vand alism and security on pu blic transport (D e W aard 1996). The con cep t of certification for safety asp ects w as later extend ed to businesses in general and bars and d iscos specifically. T h e Safe E nterprises program m e focuses on the safety o f businesses, their custom ers and the physical environm en t in w hich businesses operate. In recent years, a w ide ran ge of initiatives for im proving safety in the bu sin ess com m u nity has been d eveloped on the basis of p u b lic-p riv ate partnerships. At this m om ent the Safe E nterprises Q uality M ark, the U rgent S trategy for B usiness L ocations, and the Safe Enterprises A ction Plans are im plem ented n ationw ide.2 Th e N ational Platform on C rim e C ontrol has proved to be one of the m ost stable co-operation stru ctu res in the field o f crim e prevention in the N eth erlan ds and is still in full sw in g in 2008. In the late 1990s a dozen or so larger cities set up local P latform s for C rim e C ontrol w ith a sim ilar com position and su pport from the N ational Platform . To prom ote public and private partnerships in the field o f crim e p revention a N ational C en tre for C rim e Preven tion and Safety w as set up on 1 Ju ly 2004. It w as established as a priv ate foundation and co-funded by the business sector and the m inistries o f Ju stice and the Interior. Its key tasks are gathering inform ation and d issem in ation o f best p ractices on tackling crim e p ro b ­ lem s at local level and in specific areas o f the business sector. T h e C entre prom otes the quality m ark for safe en trepren eurship and the certification m arks for going out safely, tackling com m ercial robberies and tackling v iolence in the leisure industry. It also supports existing netw orks, such as in the areas o f integrity at the w orkplace and the prevention of em ployee theft. 141

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

F u r th e r d e v e lo p m e n ts In 1994 D utch central gov ernm ent initiated a public safety and security p olicy as part o f its Larger T ow ns policy (1995-98). T h e Larger Tow ns policy sou gh t to ad dress problem s o f urban d ecay through the prom otion o f local, integrated program m es for neigh bou rhood s w ith high con centra­ tions o f social problem s, inclu ding crim e. Its secu rity com p onent stood for the co-ord ination o f all parties involved in crim e prevention: m inistries, local and regional governm ent and various kinds o f non-governm ental o rg anisations. A ccord in g to the plan, strength en in g o f p u nitive action should go hand in hand w ith m ore targeted and specialised crim e prevention. It w as argued that only such com prehen siv e crim inal policies could lead to a structurally im proved control o f the various form s of crim e. In this fram ew ork con sid erable funds w ere placed at the d isposal o f the m u nicipal auth orities in the largest cities to tackle d rug abuse and youth crim e. This new policy resulted in action program m es for the preventive and repressiv e approach to yo u th crim e, and the form ulation o f n eigh ­ bourhood secu rity plans. C ovenants w ere signed w ith 15 cities in relation to, am on g o ther things, youth and crim e and hard-core persistent offenders. Extra funds have also been m ad e av ailable for the police to tackle these issues. In con trast to the previous funding arrangem en ts, m u n icipalities w ere given con sid erable freed om in spend ing the funds and ov ersigh t from central gov ernm ent w as d eliberately reduced. In this p olitical context, it w as also decided to d ow nsize the D irectorate o f C rim e P reven tion at the M inistry o f Ju stice and to transfer som e of its resp onsibilities to the M inistry o f the Interior, w hich has resp o nsibility for the L arger T ow n Policies. R esponsibilities for project d esign and in n o v a­ tion in situ ational crim e prevention w ere later partly handed ov er to the p rev iou sly m entioned N ational C en tre for C rim e P revention and Safety. This centre has also taken over the p rod uction o f the journal on crim e p rev ention and the organisation o f the annual R oethof A w ard for the m ost successfu l local project. In the cou rse o f the 1990s new types o f crim e began to d om inate public debate. O ne new trend in the d iscou rse on crim e and crim e prevention w as the attention accorded to so-called 'h ard-core ju venile d elinqu en ts'. This hard core o f you ng offenders are supposed to com m it chronically a v ariety o f seriou s crim es in clu ding v iolent offences. A s confirm ed by research (Leuw 1997; Van G em ert et al. 2008), ad olescents from certain ethnic m inorities are over-represented am ong these groups (for exam ple, M oroccans and A ntilleans). In response to this, crim e prevention u n d er­ w ent a gradu al change. In several tow ns experim en ts w ere initiated w ith intensive p robation supervision. For exam ple, you ng offenders detained in a pre-trial d etention cen tre are placed in an intensive vocational training and w ork experience program m e as a condition for their release. 142

Forty years o f crime prevention in the Dutch polder

In the case of a relapse or non-com pliance with the rules they are re-arrested and tried. Young people who com plete the program m e are offered jobs under the m unicipal em ploym ent schem es. The best-know n project in A m sterdam , called N ew Perspectives, processes several hun­ dred young offenders per year and seem s to have achieved good results. In a sim ilar project in Rotterdam drug addicts highly active in crim e are given vocational training and w ork experience during a tw o-year pro­ gram m e as an alternative to a prison sentence of a few months. In all these projects, offenders are approached with both a 'carrot' and a 'stick'. O ther recent initiatives w orth m entioning are experim ents w ith parental support in the fram ew ork of integrated com m unity program m es for difficult neighbourhoods (along the lines of 'com m unities that care') and the establishm ent of offices of the public prosecutor in difficult neighbour­ hoods (Justitie in de Buurt, w hich translates as 'Justice N earby'). Prosecu­ tors working in these offices deal with m inor crim es on the spot through adm inistrative fines, conditional discontinuance of prosecutions or m edi­ ation.3 M ore serious cases are brought before the court in special sessions. In som e offices other justice agencies such as probation, victim support and H ALT are also represented. The central concept behind these front offices is that crim inal justice interventions are m ore effective if applied 'in context', ensuring due know ledge about and consideration of the unique local circum stances of the incidents at issue. M ore recently, several larger cities have established integrated centres that bring together police, prosecutors and m unicipal agencies responsible for youth w ork, social w ork and health. These centres are called Safety H ouses (Veiligheidshuizen). At the time of w riting (N ovem ber 2008) 25 Safety H ouses are active. They are the shared responsibility of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the m unicipalities. The M inistry of Justice contributes to their funding. These initiatives clearly signal the re-em ergence of offender-oriented prevention in the N etherlands. Know ledge about the crucial influence of responsible parenting on the developm ent o f self-control has also led to the prom otion and subsequent adoption of early intervention pro­ gram m es that w ould have been a political anathem a only a few years ago. Prim ary prevention targeted at fam ilies in difficult neighbourhoods is seen as a prom ising approach by the M inistry of Justice (Junger-Tas 1997). At both central and local level there is a grow ing interest in tertiary offender-oriented prevention. Topical program m es for young offenders and drug addicts com bine punitive or coercive elem ents with m easures aimed at reintegration through training and em ploym ent. The presence of prosecutors in Safety H ouses adds a coercive edge to existing com m unitybased crim e prevention and com m unity-based policing in difficult neigh­ bourhoods. M ayors of the largest cities have requested new authority to im pose coercive m easures on fam ilies with children w ho are routinely in conflict with the law, under the threat of the w ithdraw al of social benefits (M inistries of Justice and Interior 2007). 143

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

S afety begins w ith p rev en tio n In 2007, the new coalition governm ent consisting of Christian dem ocrats and Labour issued a new program m e called Safety Begins with Preven­ tion. In an introductory statem ent the new M inister of Justice Ernst Hirsch Ballin w rites that crim e control no longer can be regarded as the sole responsibility of police and justice and that m any other governm ent agencies at all levels have im portant roles to play. The program m e bears the signatures of six other m inisters and its overarching objective is a reduction of overall victim isation rates by 25 per cent in 2010. The program m e has set targets in six different areas: violence in public places and fam ily violence; crim es against businesses; bicycle theft; reduction of recidivism by 10 per cent through better aftercare; organised crim e; and cyber crim es. It also foresees a strong em phasis on safety aspects in a new program m e to upgrade a selection of run-dow n neighbourhoods in the largest towns. Prim ary responsibility for the program m e's im plem entation lies with a special directorate at the M inistry of Justice. For its im plem entation the program m e will rely on an extended netw ork of integrated Safety Centres under the national supervision of the M inister of Justice. Special centres in larger cities have also been set up to co-ordinate m easures against fam ily violence including tem porary bans for abusing partners. Projects to prevent violence in public spaces, bicycle theft and crim es against businesses will be executed in co-operation with the N ational Platform for Crim e Control and affiliated entities such as the Centre for Crim e Prevention and Safety (CCV). Renewed attention is given to the screening of com panies that seek (renewals of) m unicipal licences or public contracts for links w ith organised crim e groups. To facilitate this preventive screening, legislation was passed in 2002 and 2006 offering public bodies access to crim inal records and investigative inform ation (Law to Facilitate Integrity Checks by Public Bodies of 2002, last am ended 2006).4 These new instrum ents are, for exam ple, actively and successfully used by the city of Am sterdam (H uism an and N elen 2007; K leem ans 2007) in its drive to clean up the red light district in the inner city.

T h e changing agenda o f c rim e p rev en tio n As in the United Kingdom and the United States of A m erica, there are clear indicators of a downward trend in the overall level o f crime. A ccording to reports from Statistics N etherlands, crim e recorded by the police has declined since 1997. Also the results of the annual Crim e Victim Survey am ong the population indicate a dow nw ard trend in the general level of crim e (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2). As in other countries, the level of 144

Forty years o f crim e prevention in the Dutch polder

Table 6.2 Security precautions in percentage of the total number of households in the Netherlands, 1993-2008 Year

1993

1995

1997

1999

2002

2004

2006

2008 Change

Burglar alarm Special door locks Secured by design Extra lighting

6.2 67.6 n.a. 51.4

6.9 71.8 n.a. 64.2

7.7 74.4 n.a. 66.6

8.3 74.2 n.a. 68.6

8.8 77.0 n.a. 70.1

9.5 77.4 n.a. 70.7

10.9 82.6 15.3 77.7

12.2 83.6 16.4 80.8

97% 24% 57%

self-protection against property crim e has risen significantly over the past ten years (V an D ijk et al. 2008). The recent d eclin e in the overall crim e rates - car-related thefts and hou sehold burglaries in p articular - m ight in part be the effect o f this im proved self-p rotection (see T able 6.2). In the N eth erlan ds, this has been activ ely prom oted by the g o v ern m en t's crim e prevention policies (Van D ijk 2008). D utch hou sehold s are am ong the best secured against crim e in the w estern w orld (V an D ijk et al. 2008). C om pared to the situ ation 30 years ago, the extent o f sem i-form al su rveillance, for instan ce in pu blic transport, has also been greatly im proved. Statistics ind icate a rise in certain form s of v iolent crim e, in p articular am on g ad olescents. D utch society has been d eeply affected by the political assassination o f the righ t-w in g politician Pim Fortu yn and the su bsequ ent bru tal m u rd er o f film -m aker Theo V an G ogh in 2004 by a M uslim fundam entalist. O v er the past ten years, the crim e discou rse in the N eth erlan d s has focused less on vand alism and burglary or other petty crim es and m ore on v iolent youth crim e and organised crim inality (K leem ans 2007). A rgu ably, crim es have indeed becom e m ore seriou s and less opportu nistic in nature. C u rrent crim e problem s seem to be m ore clearly related to problem s o f inhabitants of socially p roblem atic n eigh ­ bourhoods. Parallel to this shift, the focus o f crim e prevention has gradu ally m oved tow ards 'seco n d ary offend er-oriented approaches' tar­ geted at early invention w ith 'at-risk' fam ilies. A s said, m ayors are propagating coercive form s of early in terv ention in at-risk fam ilies, m any o f M oroccan descent. O ne o f the m ost outspoken protagonists o f such approaches is a form er ju nior m in ister o f social affairs o f M oroccan descen t w ho w as recently elected as M ayor o f Rotterdam . An acclaim ed in n o v atio n o f the 1980s w as the com m u nity service as diversion ary option for m inors (H A LT). T he new est offender-oriented prev entive m easures are m ore coercive in nature. T h e bou n d aries betw een offend er-oriented crim e prevention and p robation have been blurred. C o m m u nity service is one o f the m ost frequ en tly im posed penalties. For you ng offenders too there is the p ossibility o f com m u nity service, but they can also be sentenced to follow a training cou rse (V an der Laan 1993, 2006). M any o f the new offend er-oriented preventive projects, d escribed 145

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

above, rely heavily on crim inal ju stice based coercion. O n the plus side, the w idespread substitu tion o f com m u nity service for short-term prison sen tences seem s to pay off in few er prison sentences. The nu m bers of prisoners per 100,000 have started to fall. Sin ce 2006, the total nu m ber of prisoners in the N eth erlan ds has declined by alm ost 20 per cent. If this d ow nw ard trend persists, the cou ntry m ight once again becom e one o f the less pu nitiv e cou ntries in Europe.

Discussion L ooking back at 40 years o f crim e prevention in the N eth erlan d s the follow ing observations can be m ade. In con ju n ction w ith the types of crim e d om inatin g d ebate, the m easures prom oted have undergone im portan t transform ations. Situ ation al crim e prevention dom inated the first w ave o f projects. It has proven its efficacy and is now w idely im plem ented to prevent crim es against hou sehold s and bu sinesses and to increase safety in pu blic spaces. E valuation stud ies have contributed to the social acceptance o f these m easures and also to the international literatu re on crim e prevention. O ffend er-oriented projects, especially p aren t-ch ild interaction therapy, are now w idely regarded to be prom is­ ing responses to cu rren t problem s of violent crim e (Junger et al. 2007). Sim u lation m odels, relying m ainly on findings from A m erican research (G reenw ood et al. 1996; Sherm an et al. 1997), have show n the superior cost-effectiveness o f both situ ational and offend er-oriented prevention com pared to con v en tional crim inal ju stice m easures (V an D ijk 1997b). D espite these transform ations in D utch crim e prevention policies over the years, certain ch aracteristics seem to have prevailed. P olicies have first o f all been planned and m onitored using results o f national and local m ajor victim isation surveys. In the N eth erlan ds, as in England and W ales, national victim isation surveys have later been supplem ented by local surveys focu sing on police perform ance and the im pact o f crim e p rev en­ tion m easures. P rogram m es and projects have been inform ed by crim i­ nological kn ow led ge and m an y have b een in d ep en den tly evalu ated (De W aard 2004). In this respect, D u tch crim e prevention policies resem ble the British 'w hat w ork s' approach to crim e prevention (Sutton et al. 2008). In lin e w ith 'w h at w ork s', D utch crim e prevention has initially been m ore oriented tow ards proven situ ational m easures, though w ith a distinct preference for people-based surv eillance ov er technical m easures such as CC TV . In this respect, D utch crim e prevention can be characterised as bein g p ragm atic and people-centred in its orientation. The 'ration alist' ap p roach favours a top-d ow n im plem entation strategy. E vid en ce-based program m es are typ ically d esigned at the level o f central gov ernm ent and local agen cies are held accoun table in relation to previously agreed outcom es. In the U nited K ingd om this centralist 146

Forty years o f crim e prevention in the Dutch polder

tend ency, prevailing d u ring the crim e red uction program m e in the late 1990s, has been criticised for its lack o f flexibility in im plem entation (H om el et al. 2004). In the N eth erlan ds, a sim ilar top-d ow n im p lem en ta­ tion strategy w as practised by the p olice-based C rim e P revention Bureau, the Interm inisterial S teerin g C om m ittee and the D irectorate for C rim e P reven tion at the M inistry o f Justice. Sin ce the m id 1990s m u n icipalities have gained greater au ton om y in both d esign and im plem entation o f their crim e prevention policies. Several m u n icipalities have launched w ellfunded and closely m onitored safety p rogram m es o f their ow n. O n the d ow nsid e, p rojects are less often ind ep en d en tly evaluated and outcom es are less system atically recorded and shared w ith others at the national level than before (V an N oije and W ittebrood 2008). M ost w estern cou ntries have introd uced special legislation m andating existing ad m inistrativ e structures or stand-alone structures such as crim e prevention cou ncils to carry out crim e prevention policies. D utch crim e prevention seem s to be fairly un iqu e in its reliance on non-statutory collaboration structures. D esign, funding and im plem entation have re­ m ained the responsibility o f joined -u p m inistries and m u nicipal agencies w ithout a special statu tory footing. C ollaboration w ith local p olice forces and the p rosecu tors has been facilitated at the local level by the existing trad ition o f reg u lar co-ordination m eetings, called triangle m eetings, b etw een m ayors, chiefs o f police and ch ief prosecutors. The collaborative ap p roach has been perm anently adjusted to new situ ations, m ost notably b y inclu d ing the bu siness sector w ith the establish m ent o f the N ational P latform on C rim e C on trol in 1992 and subsequ ent local platform s and the N ational C en tre for C rim e Preven tion and Safety. In its com paratively loose and flexible form o f organisation, D utch crim e prevention can also be characterised as b ein g pragm atic. The pragm atic natu re o f D utch crim e prevention and its organisational form seem s to have been m u tually reinforcing. For exam ple, the successful inv olv em ent o f the business sector is predicated on the 'w h at w orks' approach, inclu d ing a keen interest in im p lem enting situ ational m easures. D u tch crim e control policies have been characterised as tolerant and non-p u nitive by foreign observers (D ow nes 1988; C raw ford 1989) but should in its m ore recent m an ifestations perh aps better be described as pragm atic. T his raises the question as to the historical or cultural roots of such p ragm atism in the face o f collective problem s such as the crim e threat. O ne o f the p rotagonists of the N ational P latform on C rim e C ontrol, a form er C E O o f the British-D utch m u ltinational U nilever, once confessed to the first auth or that in the U nited K ingd om the h an d s-on collaboration b etw een the m inisters o f ju stice, a p rosecu tor-general, a ch ief o f p olice and board m em bers o f key D u tch com panies w ould not be feasible. Such pragm atic co-operation at the high est level o f governm ent and the bu siness w orld w as, in his view , only possible d ue to the D utch tradition 147

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

of the Polder. The so-called Polder m odel stands for a tradition of pragm atic consensus decision-m aking in econom ics and other public dom ains (The Economist, 22 M ay 2002). As is w idely known, large parts of the N etherlands have been reclaimed from the sea through w ater drainage. Ever since the M iddle Ages, com peting or even w arring cities in the sam e polder w ere forced to set aside their differences to m aintain the polders, lest they both be flooded.5 The com m on fight against the sea is seen as the root cause of the Dutch tradition of pragm atism and consensual policies (Rom ein and Rom ein-V erschoor 1934). Regardless of whether or not these instances of collaboration are indeed rooted in the cultural heritage of the polder, coalition-building across religious d enom i­ nations and parties have undeniably been a characteristic of Dutch politics for a long tim e (Lijphart 1975). In som e respects, the experience of Dutch crim e prevention over the past 30 years seem s to have been com paratively successful. Considering the lack of stable institutional arrangem ents for crim e prevention in Europe, A ustralia and elsew here, it would seem of great practical relevance to collect best practices in the governance of crim e prevention. To the extent that Dutch crim e prevention is predicated upon specific cultural traditions, the Dutch experience, however, cannot be transferred as a best practice to other countries. A ttem pts to copy elem ents of the Dutch approach in Belgium under M inister of the Interior Louis Tobback in the early 1990s have indeed been short-lived (see Chapter 8, this volum e). Pioneering efforts from the Perm anent Secretariat for Crim e Prevention in Brussels to collaborate w ith Belgian com panies in the funding of crim e prevention projects resulted in allegations of corruption and ultim ately to the resignation of the responsible adm inistrator. In our view the Dutch experience of crim e prevention confirm s som e of the recom m endations for sustainable crim e prevention m ade by Adam Sutton, form er director of crim e prevention in South A ustralia, and his colleagues (Sutton et al. 2008). To be sustainable, besides political leadership, crim e prevention requires a solid partnership betw een central and local governm ent to execute a com prehensive program m e o f both short-term (e.g. situational) and long-term (e.g. social) prevention m easures. The still w eak, evolving know ledge base, and dynam ic nature of crim e problem s call for strong research and developm ent efforts at the central (national or European) level. W e also agree with Sutton et al. that social crim e prevention should not necessarily be im plem ented under the banner of crim e prevention due to its stigm atising connotations. The integration o f crim e prevention in larger policy agendas such as urban renewal, how ever, is not w ithout risks. Funds allocated to such 'crim e prevention in disguise' can easily leak aw ay to activities w ith little potential to reduce crime. This is not, as Sutton et al. seem to believe, just a question of lack of expertise that can be rem edied by the deploym ent of m ore crim e prevention experts. The leakage results from the inherent 148

Forty years o f crim e prevention in the Dutch polder

tend ency o f both bu reau cratic and com m ercial agen cies to focus activities on client groups that look prom ising and rew ard ing to w ork w ith. E ffective crim e p rev ention requ ires an u n w averin g com m itm ent to invest in fam ilies and you ng persons that offer no prospects for easy gains. Such com m itm ent can be assured only un der a system o f rigorou s m onitoring from a cen tre w hose u ltim ate objective is to red u ce levels o f crim e. A ccord ing to article 1.1 o f the U nited N ations G uidelines fo r the P revention o f C rim e, ad opted on 24 Ju ly 2002 by the E conom ic and Social C ouncil: 'C rim e prevention offers o p portu nities for a hu m ane and m ore cost-effective ap proach to the problem s of crim e.' To m ake full use of these opportu nities, cou ntries m u st succeed in creating organisational con ditions fo r crim e prevention that fit their specific national setting. In m an y cou ntries such best-fit arrangem en ts for crim e p revention can be found only after extensive trial and error. C ou ntries that flinch from this d ifficult search are d oom ed to continue con d u cting crim e control policies that are u n necessarily costly in both econ om ic and h u m anitarian term s.

N o te s 1 We dedicate this chapter to our friend and former colleague at the Directorate of Crime Prevention at the Ministry of Justice, Hans Willemse. His intellectual merit and commitment has been important to continue 'flying the flag for crime prevention' in The Netherlands. 2 For an overview of these initiatives see www.theccv.eu/ 3 There are strong similarities between the ]ustitie in de Buurt and the Maistm de Justice et du Droit that was developed in France during the late 1980s and early 1990s and was a source of inspiration for the Dutch Ministry of justice (Wyvekens 1997). 4 Wet Bevordering Integriteit Beoordeling door het Opembaar Bestuur van 20 Juni, 2002, laatstelijk gewijzigd op 04.08.2006. 5 A polder is a low-lying tract of land enclosed by embankments known as dikes, usually drained and reclaimed marshland, and a common feature of the Netherlands.

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De W aard, J. (ed.) (1996) 'Crim e Prevention in the Netherlands: Policies, Research, and Practice, Part 2', Security Journal, 7(3): 155-234. De Waard, J. (2004) Innovations for Crime Prevention: An Exploration Towards M ore Effective Crime Prevention Policies in the Netherlands. The Hague: M inistry of Justice. Online at: w w w .theccv.eu /dossiers/crim e-red u ction/crim eprevention.html Downes, D. (1988) Contrasts in Tolerance: Post War Penal Policy in The Netherlands and England and Wales. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Felson, M. (1994) Crime and Everyday Life: Insight and Im plications for Society. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. Ferwerda, H., Van Leiden, I. M. G. G., Arts, N. A. M. and Hauber, A. R. (2006) Halt, het alternatief?: De effecten van Halt beschreven. Arnhem: Boom Juridische uitgevers. Garland, D. (2001) The Culture o f Control: Crime and Social Control in Contemporary Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Greenwood, P. W., Model, K. E., Rydell, C. P. and Chiesa, J. (1996) Diverting Children from a Life o f Crime: M easuring Costs and Benefits. Santa Monica: RAND. Hebberecht, P. (1997) La prevention de la delinquance en Europe. Paris: L'H armattan. Hesseling, R. (1995) 'Functional surveillance in the Netherlands: Exemplary Projects', Security Journal, 6(1): 21-5. Hirschi, T. (1969) Causes o f Delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hofstra, B. and Shapland, J. (1997) 'W ho is in Control?', Policing and Society, 6(4): 265-81. Homel, P., N utley, S. and W ebb, B. (2004) Investing to Deliver: Reviewing the Implementation o f the UK Crime Reduction Programme, Home Office Research Study 281. London: H ome Office. H uism an, W. and Nelen, H. (2007) 'Gotham unbound Dutch style: The A dm inis­ trative Approach to Organized Crim e in A m sterdam '. Crim e Law and Social Change, 48: 87-103. Junger, M., Feder, L., Clay, J., Cote, S. M., Farrington, D. P., Freiberg, K., Genoves, V. G., Homel, R., Losel, F., Manning, M., M azerolle, P., Santos, R., Schmuckler, M., Sullivan, C., Sutton, C., Van Yperen, T. and Tremblay, R. E. (2007) 'Preventing Violence in Seven Countries: Global Convergence in Policies', European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 13: 327-56. Junger-Tas, J. (1997) Jeugd en gezin II: Naar een effectief preventiebeleid. The Hague: M inisterie van Justitie, Directoraat Generaal Preventie, Jeugd en Sancties. Kleem ans, E. (2007) 'O rganized crime, transit crime, and racketeering', in M. Tonry and C. Bijleveld (eds) Crime and Justice: A review o f research, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 163-215. Leuw, E. (1997) Criminaliteit en etnische minderheden: Een criminologische analyse. The Hague: WODC. Lijphart, A. (1975) The Politics o f Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands, 2nd edn. Berkeley: University of California Press. M ayhew, P. and Van Dijk, J. J. M. (1997) Criminal Victimisation in Eleven Industrialized Countries: Key Findings from the 1996 International Victms Surveys. The Hague: M inistry of Justice, Research and Documentation Centre. M inistries of Justice and Interior (2007) Safety Begins with Prevention: Continuing Building a Safer Society. The Hague: Ministry of Justice. Romein, J. and Rom ein-Verschoor, A. (1934) De Lage Landen bij de Zee: een geillustreerde geschiedenis van het N ederlandse Volk. Utrecht: de Haan. 150

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Sherm an, L., G ottfredson, D., M aeK enzie, D., Eck, J., Reuter, P. and Bushw ay, S. (1997) P reventing Crim e: What W orks, What D oesn't, What's Prom ising. W ashington DC: N ational Institute o f Justice. Society and C rim e (1985) A Policy Plan for The N etherlands. The H ague: M inistry of Justice. Sutton, A., C herney, A. and W hite, R. (2008) C rim e Prevention: Principles, Perspectives and Practices. C am bridge: C am bridge U niversity Press. T. M. C. A sser Instituut (2006) P revention o f O rganised Crim e: The Registration o f Legal Persons and their D irectors and the International Exchange o f Inform ation. The H ague: T. M. C. A sser Instituut. Van der Laan, P. H. (1993) A lternative Sanctions fo r Juveniles in the N etherlands. T he H ague: M inistry o f Justice, Research and D ocum entation Centre. V an der Laan, P. H. (2006) 'Just D esert and W elfare: Juvenile Justice in the N eth erlan ds', in J. Junger-Tas and S. H. D ecker (eds) International H andbook o f Juvenile Justice, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 145-70. Van Dijk, J. J. M. (1979) 'T he Extent o f Public Inform ation and the N ature of Public A ttitudes Tow ards C rim e', in Public O pinion on Crim e and Crim inal Justice: Reports Presented to the Thirteenth C rim inological Research Conference (1978). Strasbourg: C ou ncil of Europe, pp. 7 - i2 . Van Dijk, J. J. M . (1997a) 'Tow ards Effective Public Private Partnerships in C rim e Control: Experiences in the N etherlands', in R. V. C larke and M. Felson (eds) Business and Crim e Prevention. M onsey, N Y: Crim inal Justice Press, pp. 97-124. Van D ijk, J. J. M. (1997b) 'T ow ard s a Research-Based Crim e R eduction Policy: C rim e Prevention as a C ost-effective Policy O ption', European Journal on Crim inal P olicy and Research, 5(3): 13-27. Van Dijk, J. J. M. (2008) The World o f Crim e: Breaking the Silence on Problem s o f Security, Justice and D evelopm ent A cross the World. Thousand O aks, Sage. Van Dijk, J. J. M. and Jun ger-T as, J. (1988) 'Trends in C rim e Prevention in The N etherlands', in T. H ope and M. Shaw (eds) C om m unities and Crim e Reduction. London: H M SO , pp. 260-77. V an Dijk, J. J. M. and De W aard, J. (1991) 'A Tw o-dim ensional T yp ology of C rim e P revention Projects: W ith a Bibliography', Crim inal Justice A bstracts, 23(3): 483-503. Van D ijk, J. J. M . and Steinm etz, C. H. D. (1979) The Research and D ocum entation Centre V ictim isation Surveys, 1974-1977: Results o f a Study into the V olum e and Trends in P etty Crim e. The H ague: M inistry of Justice, R esearch and D ocum en­ tation Centre. Van Dijk, J. J. M. and T erlouw , G .-J. (1996) 'A n International Perspective o f the Business C om m unity as V ictim s o f Fraud and C rim e', Security Journal, 7 :1 5 7 -6 7 . Van D ijk, J. J. M ., K esteren, J. N. and Sm it, P. (2008) Crim inal V ictim isation in International Perspective: Key Findings from the 2004-2005 IC V S and EU ICS. The H ague: Boom Legal Publishers. Van G em ert, F., Petersen, D. and Lien, I.-L. (eds) (2008) Street Gangs, M igration and Ethnicity. Cullom pton: W illan Publishing. Van H ees, A. (1998) 'D e ontw ikkeling van H alt in cijfers', Kw artaalbericht R echtsbescherm ing en VeUigheid, 11(2): 48 -5 0 . V an N oije, L. and W ittebrood, K. (2008) Sociale veiligheid ontsleuteld: V eronderstelde en w erkelijke effecten van veiligheidsbeleid. The H ague: Sociaal en C ultureel Planbureau. 151

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Van Sw aaningen, R. and U it Beijerse, J. (2006) 'The N etherlands: Penal W elfarism and Risk M anagem ent', in J. M uncie and B. G old son (eds) Com parative Youth justice. London: Sage, pp. 65-78. W illem se, H. M. (1996) 'O verlooking C rim e Prevention: Ten Years o f C rim e Prevention in the N eth erlan ds', Security Journal, 7(3): 177-84. W yvekens, A. (1997) 'M ed iation and P roxim ity', European Journal on C rim inal Policy and Research, 5(4): 27-42.

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C h a p te r 7

‘M o d e rn isa tio n ’ o f institutions o f social and penal co n tro l in Italy/Europe: the ‘n ew ’ crim e p re v e n tio n 1 Dario M elossi and Rossella Selmini

The first part o f this chapter, m ainly authored by D ario M elossi, looks at the gen ealogy o f the em ergence o f a p reoccu pation w ith extra-p enal and local crim e prevention in E urope and m ore specifically in Italy. The second part, m ainly authored by R ossella Selm ini, looks at the current situ ation o f 'n ew ' crim e prevention policies in E urope and m ore specifi­ cally in Italy.

T h e d ia le c tic o f th e c rim in a l and th e p o litic a l: changes in th e re p re s e n ta tio n o f c rim e and in s e c u rity In this first part, w e w ould like to retrace and reconstruct d evelopm ents in the field o f crim e prevention from an early period, after W orld W ar Tw o, to the current state o f affairs, m oving from a b road er context tow ards the specificity o f the Italian situation. In m any E uropean cou ntries and also in N orth A m erica there w as a m ajor o verhaul having to do w ith issues o f crim e and crim e prevention that coincided w ith the ad ven t o f w hat w e could call, for w ant o f a b etter term , 'm ass society' (going back to the already quite old bu t never enough acclaim ed land m ark by C. W righ t M ills (1956), The P ow er Elite). By 'm ass society ' w e do not sim ply m ean - as C. W righ t M ills did not sim ply m ean - the kind o f society w here the 'm ass m edia o f com m u nication' has becom e so crucially im portant! W e rather m ean the society w here the 'm ass' of the 153

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p eople becam e less and less o f an op positional, poor and easily rad icalisable 'w o rk in g class', and m ore and m ore o f a con su m erist, o pportu nistic and m od erate lo w e r m id dle class' - the m ass m ed ia bein g nothing b u t a very strategic articu lation w ithin this m ore general change. This transition now h ere happ ened v ery sud denly and w as now here ev er com plete. It happened at different tim es in different places. In the U SA , R oo sev elt's 'N ew D eal' w as crucial bu t its effects w ere not really felt until the 1950s. In N orthern Europe, this transition w as connected w ith the com ing to pow er o f social d em ocracies. In G erm any, France and Italy it happened w ith the post-w ar 'eco n om ic m iracle', betw een the 1950s and the 1960s. In Spain, G reece and Portugal, it occurred after the d em ise of those cou ntries' d ictatorsh ip s in the 1970s. E veryw here it w as connected to som e form s o f the w elfare state.2 Th e d efinition by D avid G arland of 'penal w elfarism ' (2001), applied to the m an agem en t o f penal issues d uring this period, is therefore v ery a propos (even if w e m ay not com pletely agree on tim e lags and chrono lo­ gies). A class p erspective, such as the one adopted here, tends to em ph asise in fact a few elem ents related to such pivotal transition. M ass em ploym ent in Fordist factories, starting in the 1920s but n ev er really taking off until after W orld W ar Tw o, m ean t the p ossibility for the w orking class of saving m oney and con su m ing on a m ass scale, and having for the first tim e in history a vested econom ic interest in the conservation o f the social system (the harsh struggles that cu lm inated in the recognition o f trad e unioiis' and therefore w orkers' rights - betw een the 1930s and the 1970s - con tributed m assiv ely to such new w orkingclass w elfare). T his vested interest also m eant hom e ow nership A m erican s' fam ed post-w ar 'little b o xes' - and the p ossibility o f pu rch as­ ing the gad gets o f d aily lives. For the first tim e in history, therefore, at least on a 'm ass' scale, w orkers becam e potential victim s o f crim e. A t the sam e tim e and even m ore crucially, how ever, w hat in the early 1970s in France, Italy, G erm any or Spain w e still used to call the 'rep ressiv e state apparatuses' becam e less involved w ith class oppression, and w ith keeping the streets free o f w orkers' and unions' rallies (often in crucial connection w ith the international necessities of the C old W ar, given that in m any cou ntries the leading w ork ers' parties had been forged in a strategic alliance w ith the Soviet U nion). These repressiv e state appar­ atuses becam e increasingly involved w ith d efen ding the m aterial interests o f hom e- and gad get-ow ners w ho w ere now the m ajority o f the popu la­ tion. T he 'tw o-third s and one-third ' society w as born. As m entioned earlier, the true explosion o f the m ass m edia, from the cinem a and radio in the 1920s and 1930s to television in the 1950s and 1960s, w as certain ly a crucial aspect of all this, to w hich corresp onded an 'an th ropological m u tation' that cannot be expressed better than in M ills' ow n w ords:

154

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[T]he m an in the m ass does not gain a transcen ding view from these m ed ia; instead he gets his exp erience stereotyped, and then he gets sunk further by that experience. H e cannot d etach him self in ord er to observe, m uch less to evaluate, w hat he is experiencing, m uch less w hat he is not experiencing. R ather than that internal d iscu ssion w e call reflection, he is accom p anied through his life-exp erience w ith a sort o f un con sciou s, ech oin g m onologue. H e has no p rojects o f his ow n: he fulfils the rou tines that exist. H e does not transcend w hatever he is at any m om ent, b ecau se he does not, he cannot, transcend his d aily m ilieu. H e is not truly aw are o f his ow n daily exp erience and o f its actual standards: he drifts, he fulfils habits, his behaviou r a result o f a planless m ixtu re o f the confused standards and the uncriticized expectation s that he has taken over from others w hom he no longer really know s or trusts, if indeed he ever really did . . . H e d oes not form ulate his desires; they are insinu ated into him . A nd, in the m ass, he loses the self-con fid ence o f the hu m an b ein g - if indeed he has ever had it. For life in a society o f m asses im plants insecurity and further im potence; it m akes m en un easy and v agu ely anxious. (M ills 1956: 3 2 2 -3 )3 If to such feelings o f vagu e insecurity and anxiety one w ere to add that in the follow ing period the crim e rate - esp ecially crim e against property - increased m anifold everyw h ere, even if w ith som e tim e lag betw een cou ntries (in the U SA and the U K starting d u ring the 1960s, in Italy in the 1970s), the w hole p ictu re becom es a bit clearer. So, this period o f 'high crim e societies' (G arland 2001) is essentially at the turning point betw een the clim ax o f d evelopm ent of w elfarism and the beginn ing of the crisis in penal w elfarism . And this becau se the increase in the crim e rate - d ue to the increase in the general w ealth - w as interpreted as a sym p tom o f the m alaise o f penal w elfarism and the w elfare state in general, so that it becam e a very pow erfu l argum en t in the construction not only o f the w hole discou rse that G arland calls the 'cu ltu re o f con trol' (that w e m ay also w ant to call 'pen al liberalism ' in opposition to 'pen al w elfarism ') but also of neo-liberal id eology m ore generally. The dialectics o f ‘the political’ and 'the crim inal’

From another land m ark w ork b y C. W right M ills, The Sociological Im agination (1959), can b e derived ano ther central im age, having to do w ith a sort o f d ialectic betw een 'p riv ate trou bles' and 'p u blic p roblem s'. Indeed, if 'an om ie' is connected to periods o f d islocation and transform ­ ation, w hen society becom es unable to support, so to speak, ind ividu al m orality (D urkheim 1893), then periods o f rationalisation are prim e targets for anom ie - and the sectors o f the w orkin g class hardest hit by these processes are the ones destined to becom e m ost anom ic. W hereas 155

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the 'o ld ' sectors o f the w orkin g class v ent their m oral ind ignation against the im m oral habits o f the 'n ew ' w orking class, the latter is certain ly m ore likely to engage in, or anyw ay be perceived as engaging in, behaviou r that is crim inalised or defined as characterised by a lack o f 'civ ility'. For the new w orking class (often the product of processes o f social d isorgan isa­ tion o f previous social groupings, such as ru ral w orkers), the transform ­ ation crisis in fact brings about the im p ossibility both o f a decent livelihood and o f u n derstand ing on eself as a dignified hu m an being. In o ther w ords, the d evalorisation o f labour goes hand in hand with crim inalisation , in the tw o senses o f the term - an increasing involvem ent o f som e sectors o f the 'n ew ' w orking class in crim inal b ehav iou r and an increasing v isibility o f those sam e sectors by agencies o f form al control. Th e conflicts in w hich a new , em ergin g w orkin g class is involved are at first defined as 'crim in al', and rightly so. It is only w hen, in turn, this 'n ew ' w orking class becom es cen tral to prod uction, o rganised and socially recognised , that the root conflicts w ithin w hich it d w ells can be redefined as 'political' and ev en tu ally incorporated w ithin the new structure o f pow er. T o a large d egree such processes o f d ecrim inalisation and p o liticisation are d ue to the increasing im portan ce o f the new w orking class, w hich, through organising, becom es able to affirm its hum an and p olitical dignity. O n the contrary, the ability o f the ru ling class to define the m ain social conflicts as 'crim in al' rather than 'political' - as 'private trou bles' rather than as 'p u blic issu es' - is a sure sign o f its hegem ony; a hegem ony, how ever, that is not only con structed ideologically through persuasion but is also d eeply rooted in the 'reality' o f social relationships. Paradoxically, the victory of the w orkin g class w ithin the N ew Deal and in all the other 'n ew d eals' that follow ed in m an y other countries betw een the 1930s and the 1970s - m eant that w hat up to that point had been understood as a form o f 'p u blic issu e', the m isery and d esperation o f m arginalisation bein g the experience o f a w hole social class, could becom e now again 'p riv ate trou bles', once that exp erience w as the exp erience of a m inority, even if a substantial m inority, o f the population. It w as around the tim e o f the N ew D eal in the U SA that a rh etoric o f the 'pu blic enem y ' em erged; d uring the period, that is, that m arked the first pioneering entry o f organised labou r into the establishm ent. In a sim ilar w ay, it is only recently, w ith the com ing to m atu rity o f a 'resp ectable' and non 'an ti-system ' L eft in Italy and other European and Latin A m erican cou ntries, that the spectre o f 'crim e' (as opposed to that of 'political v iolen ce', w hether from governm ental or non-g overnm ental agencies) is ap p earing in these societies for the first tim e as a m atter o f pu blic concern. It is this con nection b etw een political p acification and m arginalisation of a m inority that w e see in the con nection betw een m ass m edia and m oral panic. W e see the m ass m edia and m oral panic as child ren of a society w here that kind o f 'n ew d eal' w as reached - a new d eal that w as also fed, at the representational level, by the con struction o f that im agery. 156

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First in N orth A m erican societies, and later in Europe, this process has unfolded together w ith the m atu ration o f a d em ocratic form o f gov ern­ m ent that has pu t an end to very d eep d ivisions in civil society and has em phasised at the sam e tim e the need for social unification. 'C rim e' becam e then the rallying cry for the reu nification o f society, as D avid M atza ind icated in Becom ing D eviant (1969). The 'o u tsid ers' are not really any longer those 'an tag on ists' to p o w er b u t a fragm ented reality of m arginalised, excluded outcasts, 'd ev ian t', 'pred ato rs' or 'su itab le ene­ m ies', as N ils C h ristie (1986) has called them . T his story w as first told by H erbert M arcuse,4 one that, w e have to adm it, at the tim e from w ithin C on tinen tal E urope w e could not com prehend, becau se w e w ere not fam iliar w ith w hat w as going on alread y in Southern C alifornia, w hich w as the focu s o f M arcu se's perspective. In this sense, w hether the rh etorical appeal is to pu nishm ent or to social prevention, these are sim ply (not indifferent) variations on the sam e m otif, nam ely the reconstitu tion o f a sym bolic com m u nity. T his is p articularly the case in E urope, w here the root causes o f crisis have been m ultifarious: from the d eep transform ations in state sovereign ty (Garland 1996) to the crisis o f the w elfare state; from the em ergence o f a E uropean society to w hat Etienne B alibar (1991) has called 'identity p anic', and the con sequ ent rise and em ergence o f 'lo calities', 'region s' and 'stateless nations' (Jauregui B ereciartu 1994; M elossi 1990, 2005). In other w ord s, p arad oxically, the v ery process o f d em ocratisation of E uropean societies, in con jun ction w ith the end o f the C old W ar, has facilitated the em ergence of a com m on internal enem y. W e w ill see the case o f Italy in greater detail below . S im ilar reconstructions have, how ever, been presented for d ev elopm ents o f the police in France (M onjard et 1999; L aurent 1999), on the transform ations follow ing Fran co's death in Spain (Cid and Larrauri 1998), on Turkey (G reen 2000) and on N orthern Ireland (M ulcahy 1999).

The turn o f the 1970s: the Italian case

B oth auth ors of this chapter have contributed to the pioneering years of the initiative term ed Citta sicure, a project o f social prevention o f crim e and d ev iance created in 1994 by the regional go v ernm ent o f Em iliaR om agna, an Italian region that has trad itionally been characterised b y its p rog ressive political and social orientation (Putnam 1993). This project is best characterised for bein g situated at the ju n ctu re point o f tw o axes, or d im ensions. O n the one hand, the project d eveloped, and w as in part also a response to, the em ergence o f 'crim e' in Italy as a m ajor feature o f public d iscourse. O n the other, it unfolded w ithin a d eep turm oil iii the structure o f the Italian p olitical landscape, m arked by the requ est o f local pow ers (esp ecially regions and cities) to play a m u ch m ore d ecisive role in crim e prevention vis-a-vis the central governm ent.5 W e believ e that these tw o 157

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aspects are closely related, becau se the level at w hich the issue o f crim e em erged w as that o f d ay-to-day local life. Th e em ergence o f 'crim e' in recent Italian history as a cen tral question o f pu blic d ebate took place to gether w ith a crucial transition o f Italian society from bein g strongly divided along class and p olitical lines (or anyw ay so perceived and d escribed by its m em bers) to a society w here the central sections o f the w orking class becam e incorporated insid e the establish ed system o f governance. T h e old 'straight from the Cold W ar' cen trist C h ristian d em ocratic governm ents w ent ad rift on the bloodshed o f the w orkers w ho fell in Reggio Em ilia in Ju ly 1960. A crucial protracted transition follow ed. A fter 1962, w ith the cen tre-left coalitions, the role of the police slow ly started changing, from bein g a pu blic ord er force engaged in the control and rep ression o f the Left and the w orkin g class, to a force that w as m ore and m ore supposed to deal w ith 'o rd inary ' crim e (D ella Porta and R eiter 1994; D ella Porta 1996; R eiter 1996).6 A fter several years of social peace and reform , arou nd 1967 the m u sic once again started to change. N ow a m ore pow erful social and political m ovem ent, less aligned w ith the Soviet U nion, posed a m assiv e threat to the con servative status quo. It w as not possib le to oppose it openly in the streets becau se this w ould have m ean t a blood bath and the end of d em ocracy (even if at the tim e there w ere, in Italy, those w ho w ere in favour o f this, 'like in G reece, in A rgen tina and in C h ile'). Instead, a m ixtu re o f instrum en ts w ere used, partly straightforw ard righ t-w in g terrorism , partly the stupid ity o f left-w ing terrorists, but especially, and increasingly, the m ass-m ediatisation o f Italian society, on the N orth A m erican exam ple. Terrorism s of all colours, d irections and sources cam e to occup y centre stage and in a sen se 'rep laced ' direct conflicts w ith the police as a sou rce o f p olitically m otivated violence. T h e estim ated nu m ber o f victim s o f political violence betw een 1969 and 1988 w as 428. L ater on, after the fall o f the Berlin w all and the end o f the C old W ar, the political forces that had m anaged the transition, the C h ristian d em ocrats and the socialists, w ere d isposed of, buried under an avalan ch e o f investigations for corrup tion and for collusion w ith o rganised crim e. N ow the old w orking class, w hich had alw ays been in the opposition, could be invited into g o v ern m en t/ O nly at this point, the crim inal enem y w as not a p olitical enem y any m ore but the enem y o f all, a 'com m on ' crim inal, often (starting in the 1980s) a foreign com m on crim inal. W hat happened to 'ord inary crim e' in the m eanw hile? C rim e, at least crim e as represented in official statistics, increased d ram atically, esp ecially property crim e, as show n in Figure 7.1. In Italy there have in fact been tw o periods show ing strong increases in the recorded crim e rate: the first w as the 1970s and the second the early 1990s (see Figu re 7.1). A rise in fear of crim e and social alarm developed, how ever, only around the second of these. Indeed, interpretations such as those provided by a 'rou tin e activity approach' w ould seem rather useful in ord er to ad dress all of this, becau se 158

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it is quite difficult to sep arate the increase in crim e rates from the various 'econom ic m iracles'.8 U ntil after the fall o f the Berlin w all and the co-optation o f the L eft am on g the 'resp ectable' gov ernm ent m em bers, the p henom ena o f fear and 'm oral panic' had not been p articularly relevant in the pu blic field and in p olitical agenda. In the second half o f the 1970s and in the 1980s, elected institutions, public opinion and political parties had d irected their attention tow ards the M afia - and other related form s o f organised crim e - and esp ecially tow ards political terrorism . In both cases, there is no doubt that Italy experienced the o utbreak o f a w idespread m oral panic and a law and ord er cam paign em erged, accom p anied by strong law enforcem ent tend encies in crim inal policy. In a few cases, how ever, M afia and p olitical terrorism gave rise to a com m u nity-based reaction, except for the m ost politicised sectors of the pu blic opinion, esp ecially w ithin the Left. Even then, pu blic opinion did not dem and m ore pu nishm ent, the d eath p enalty and so on. T he alarm su rrou nd in g even ts o f M afia and terrorism n either extend ed to other less seriou s form s o f crim e, nor gav e rise to a w idespread feeling of lack of safety, such as has b een experienced m ore recently. If one analyses the articles that appeared in the journal that m arked the appearan ce o f a 'critical crim inology' in Italy, La Q uestione C rim inale (1975-81), one finds that topics o f Taw and ord er' w ere very present. T hey w ere, how ever, never coupled w ith so-called 'com m on ' crim e b u t alw ays w ith 'p olitical repression'. T his fact has often been interpreted as an instan ce o f a certain Italian backw ard ness, w hich m eant that concern about terrorism and organised crim e held centre stage w hereas the cam paign s for law and ord er about street crim e, of w hich the 'new 159

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crim inolog ists' w ere w riting and w hose papers w ere being translated in La Q uestione Crim inate, did not really com e to exist. A s w e m entioned earlier, how ever, w e did not realise that also in the U K they w ere rather recent d evelopm ents (see the pioneering w ork by Stanley C oh en (1972), F olk D evils and M oral Panics) and that even in the U SA they had been just 'd isco vered ' b y labellin g theorists or theorists o f the 'social reaction' (Becker, Lem ert, G usfield and others).9 O ne m ay certain ly hypothesise that the m u rd ers linked to organised crim e and terrorism m ay have b rou ght about a substantial social reaction. H ow ever, these m u rd ers w ere those o f 'excellen t cad av ers', as Sicilians called them (Stille 1995) and, corresp on dingly, the follow ing social reaction w as m u ch m ore one from the political and ju d icial elites than from the general public.

M icrophysics o f crime

T he fast and d eep change in the social and econ om ic stru ctu re o f som e cities and d istricts, the d eind u strialisation o f those sam e areas, the crisis o f a 'w ork ethic' and o f w ork as a m eans to prom ote social progress and personal dignity, the d isap p earan ce o f traditional urban social netw orks often related to political p articipation - and the con sequ ent fragm entation o f social identities: all o f this has created a con text in w hich new im ages o f d isord er tended to em erge, often related to the presence o f im m igrants and, m ore rarely, o f groups o f hom eless yo u th (w ho, rather than for com m ittin g crim e, are consid ered responsible for a social d isord er in the city, o f the kind d escribed m ost fam ou sly in W ilson and K elling (1982) or Skogan (1990), a d isord er perceived as o p posite to the valu es and ideals o f the form er w orkin g class).10 In a 1997 speech in B ologna, Prim e M inister R om ano Prodi stated that 'the problem o f the safety o f the cou ntry seem s to be no longer one of external safety, but an internal one: the safety o f citizens in their everyd ay life' (Prodi 1997). In the new post-C old W ar era, the issue o f safety w as no longer ju st a question o f external security - or, at m ost, o f a con cept of 'p u blic o rd er', w hich w as nothing m ore than a d om estic reflection of international d ivisions, as it had been in fact until the 1980s. C rim e, and crim inals, w ere now our com m on enem y - even better if they could be described as prod ucts o f a com m on new 'extern al' enem y, a 'fifth colu m n' in ou r m idst, the u n desirable, u n docum ented, clan d estine im m igrants. Im m igrant sections o f the popu lation are already in m any cou ntries the core o f a new w orkin g class. In the m ost developed cities o f Em iliaRom agna, this is already the case in m any factories. T h e 'to u g h ' jobs that Italians are u n w illin g to d evote them selves to, m ake it such that in som e factories of the city o f R eggio Em ilia, for instan ce, nine o ut o f ten w orkers are not born in Italy. In such cities, the offspring o f im m igrant and m ixed m arriages are alread y m ore than oiie in ten, in a cou ntry w here only about 5 per cent o f the p opu lation are foreign. It is not difficult to foresee that 160

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here too, very soon, the 'fo reign ' w ork force w ill rep resent a very substantial section o f the 'Italian' w orking class, exactly in the sam e way in w hich this happened to Italians, am on g others, in the U nited States, B elgiu m or G erm any. This com plex change obv iou sly shifted the centre o f gravity of control from the national state to localities. T h e loss o f control as a political function in a class-d ivid ed society in favour instead o f a concept o f police as the protection o f the m id dle-class m ajority o f the popu lation from street crim e, essentially m oved the p ivot o f p olicing from the national state to p laces closer to citizens, their hom es and their goods. (This also accounts, in our opinion, for the am bigu ity, m alaise and difficulties in w hich police forces find them selves still now every tim e the problem o f control shifts back to a p o litic a l/n a tio n a l/c o lle ctiv e form at: the issues o f terrorism and o rganised crim e in Spain or Italy; 'difficult n eigh bou rhood s' in France and o ther C en tral E uropean cou ntries; soccer hooliganism in Italy; political radical groups all over, and so on.) T his train o f events created the con ditions for the creation o f a con cern w ith crim e expressed in the con cepts o f 'crim e p rev ention' and 'secu rity ' or 'safety'. In this context new d iscou rses and p olicies about crim e prevention, and safety policies, em erged. T h e old centralised 'state' system w as one geared to struggle against form s o f organised crim e, w hether crim inal or p olitical - a type of 'crim e', or sim ply o f opposition, that as such had to be cou ntered at the national level becau se it w as d irected against the v ery 'core' o f the state, w ithin a b itterly divided polity. The current situ ation is v ery different. S o-called m icrocrim inalita - as Italian m edia used to call street crim e, m aybe u n w ittingly echoing M ichel Fo u cau lt's 'm icrophysics o f p o w e r'" cannot care less about the 'grand n arrativ e' of the state. It has to do instead w ith the very local, m u nd ane, everyd ay life: rou tine series o f petty thefts, m u ggings, burglaries, d rug-dealin g, street-w alking, that take place sid e by side w ith the places w here 'resp ectable' citizens live and work. The instrum en ts to cou nter m icrocrim inalita can hardly be, then, the m ajestic ones o f the state, even if governm ents - as w ell as national police forces - have a hard tim e in com ing to deal w ith such undesired red uction o f their 'au ra'. W hy have things not really w orked out that w ay? W hy has the pioneering exp erience of Citta sicu re been alm ost ignored at the national, political level? W e w ould subm it that the 'm od ern isation ' process im plied in the Citta sicure initiative has gone the usual w ay things go w hen w e talk o f 'm od ern isatio n ' in the sp here o f crim e, d ev iance and security. It is one thing to be concerned w ith citizens' security. It is a totally d ifferent thing to go after the 'p olitical capital' represented by citizens' fear (Sim on 2007). A 'ratio n al' ap p roach m ay sev erely end anger that capital, a capital that p oliticians and p olitical cam paign ers m ay instead be eager to exploit to their advantage.

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T h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f c r im e p re v e n tio n policies in E u ro p e and Ita ly Italy, Europe, and some open questions about crim e prevention

If the general social and political con text o f Italy is as d escribed above, we now focus on the strategies, d iscou rses and practices o f crim e prevention d eveloped in Italy in the last 15 years. These strategies and practices are - and w ere - d eeply influenced and shaped also by the E uropean context and by the changes that occurred in the field o f crim e prevention in the past d ecad es in m an y other European countries. This is the reason w hy w e begin ou r analysis focu sing first on som e general issues abou t crim e p rev ention that are part o f a E uropean d iscou rse and have already been analysed in other com p arativ e studies. W e then enter m ore d irectly in the reconstru ction of som e d istinctive features of Italian experience and d ebates about crim e prevention, and d escribe som e recent changes and tend encies occurred in recent years in this country. M any E uropean cou ntries in the past d ecad es focused on the d ev elo p ­ m en t o f d iscou rses and practices that show clearly the 'need to shift resources and focus tow ards crim e p revention, rather than focusing on m ore reactive and coercive form s o f p olicing and crim inal ju stice' (Stenson and Edw ards 2004: 209). This em ph asis and attention tow ards crim e prevention still rem ains an open question, because, d espite the great am ou nt o f scientific literatu re and efforts in explaining it, its d efinition is b ecom in g increasing ly v agu e and confused. U nd er the label o f 'crim e prevention' policies, in fact, w e find a w ide range o f practices and m easures that share the attem pt to avoid the d evelopm ent o f crim inal b ehav iou rs or v ictim isation, or the o ccu rrence o f crim inal events, or that try to red u ce the recurren ce o f crim e. T h e extension and, con sequ ently, increasing v agu eness of the con cep t o f crim e prevention has been the o bject o f thoughtful analyses in socio-crim inological literatu re in the past d ecad es, w hich has stressed its novelty as a 'd isp arate set o f practices that m ay be contrasted w ith those m ore trad itional approaches to crim e con tro l' (G illing 1997: xi).12 Som e of the m ost d istin ctive features o f the changing con cept o f crim e prevention are: • The expansion o f the nu m ber of actors entitled to act legitim ately in crim e prevention, as is w ell expressed by the increasing pow ers and responsibility o f local governm ents in m any E uropean countries. • A s a con sequ ence o f such expan sion, the fragm entation o f d ecisio n ­ m akin g processes and the follow ing increasing conflicts am ong different actors in this field .13 • A further, im portan t change is the attem p t at incorporating social and com m u nity org anisations in the p olicy-m aking process or in its im p le­ m en tation, or in both (H ughes and E dw ards 2002). 162

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• T h e em ergence o f European policies, also in the field o f crim e control. S om e further topics that are still open question s are: H ow can these changes in the con cep t and p ractices o f crim e prevention be explained? W hat is the increasing role o f new actors at a local level in this field? C an the new local d im ension o f crim e prevention represent a chance for true change in the d irection o f the balancing of pow er betw een national and local governm ents and of the d evelopm ent o f social ju stice and citizens' rights, w hile increasing prevention and protection? In the great am ou nt of literatu re on the issue, tw o m ain and general approaches can be d istin gu ished in trying to deal w ith these points. The first focu ses on the shift from the 'w elfare reg u latory' state to the n eo-liberal one and on how such shift affected cultures, polices and practices o f social ord er and crim e control (O 'M alley 1992; G arland 2001; L and reville 2005). The social control policies o f the post-w ar period w ere, in m ost E uropean cou ntries, led by the national state and by national agencies, and w ere based on an idea o f crim e as a social or individual d eficit. C rim e p revention, con sequ ently, w as to be pursued through social reform s and social policies, w hile penal policies w ere to d evelop through rehabilitativ e strategies. T he shift tow ards a new cu lture and new policies o f crim e control, w hich occurred in d ifferent periods in the last decades in m ost E uropean cou ntries, on the con trary focu sed on individual responsibility, on the role o f the v ictim and on different preventive strategies and p u nishm ent policies. A ccord in g to som e, rehabilitation and social inclu sion w ere replaced b y so-called 'actu arial penal strategies' (Feeley and Sim on 1994), the attention tow ards crim inals by the new role p layed by the victim s, and the attention tow ard s causes of crim e by the attem pts at con trolling crim e in a m an ner that w ould m ake it com patible w ith ord in ary urban life (G arland 1997). The em ergence o f new attem pts to intervene in crim e control policies has been understood also in a d ifferent perspective, w here - w ithout d en ying the d ynam ic p rev iously d escribed - so-called 'n ew ' prevention and the local nature of safety policies are seen as the favoured approach fo r d evelopin g an alternative m od el o f social order. Local policies and cities are con sid ered, respectively, the best instrum en t and the best site for intervening on crim e and d ev iance issues. In this context, so-called 'n ew ' p rev ention is offered as the answ er for governm ents (both national and local) in search o f a strategy to face both 'high crim e societies' (Garland 2001) and the con cu rrent d ecentralisation o f m echanism s o f control from national states to local governm ents. O n both of these points, as w e shall see later, Italy represents an interesting case study.

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The 'two European models’ o f crime prevention, their overlapping and their change over time

During the 1980s, com parative studies about prevention policies showed the em ergence of tw o different m odels of crim e prevention, w hich are also partially related to the two m ain approaches to changes in crim e control described above.14 The U nited K ingdom and France are usually referred to as the two different European contexts w here these m odels developed first and m ost clearly. A ccording to this distinction, the crim e prevention policies that developed in the UK, were m ainly based on these principles: • The prevalence of situational crim e prevention over social crim e prevention. • The leading role of the police and, more generally, a predom inance of a 'technical level' over the political one. • The em phasis on individual responsibility and on the victim 's role. • The involvem ent of local com m unities in crim e control and in surveil­ lance tasks, as in the w ell-know n 'neighbourhood w atch' program m es. • The focus on pragm atism , im plem entation, m anagem ent and evalu­ ation. • A strategy of responsibilisation from the national state towards other actors (Garland 1996) but with the central state, how ever (and precisely the H om e Office), keeping the leading role for w hat concerns priorities, resources, evaluations, and so on. The theoretical fram ew ork of this model is to be found in theories of opportunity and also related com m on-sense approaches, such as the well-know n and politically successful 'broken w indow s' theory for w hat concerns urban disorder. W hile being essentially 'British', this model largely influenced, at an early stage, som e European countries, such as the N etherlands and Belgium (see Chapters 6 and 8, this volum e), and later on also som e other continental contexts. Com parative literature on crim e prevention policies has very often opposed this m odel in favour o f a French - or 'C ontinental' - one, whose main features differ from those in the follow ing ways. • The prevalence of social prevention over situational prevention. • The attem pt to give elected bodies, especially at a local level, a central role.15 • A n idea of crim e as the result of social deprivation, m arginality, lack of opportunities, urban decay, and so on. 164

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• A lim ited responsibilisation o f ind iv id u als and com m u nities, and an attem p t to involve collective organisations, social services, and other institutional actors. T hose original m od els w ere not, in fact, that d istin ct from each other. They shared , alread y in those v ery first years, m ore than w hat appears from their red uction to 'm o d els' and, during the past decade, they have moved closer and closer, so that the features they share are probably m ore than those that sep arate them (D up rez and H ebberecht 2001). W hile m aintain­ ing som e o f its original features, for instan ce, the British m odel cam e to inclu d e - at least for a period - an inv olv em ent o f local auth orities in crim e prevention policies and fostered the idea of com m u nity safety as a key con cept to balance the p o lice's lead ing role. T h e sam e occurred in the F rench m od el, w here m ore coercive m easures, o r situ ational strategies, w ere often included in crim e p rev ention policies (R oche 2004; W yvekens, C h apter 5 this volum e). A s a result, m ost crim e prevention policies are n ow ad ays a m ix o f situ ational and social m easures, althou g h the situ ational approach p rev ails.16 The developm ent o f the Italian model, between the search for integration and the absence o f the state

Italy is an interesting case fo r a better u n d erstand ing o f this 'm ixed ' m odel o f crim e prevention. The new infrastructure o f crim e prevention d ev elo p ­ ed in the cou n try at the beginn ing o f the 1990s is articu lated in m any city-level projects, often co-ordinated by regional gov ernm ents, w hich d eliv er funding and in som e cases technical support. R egional law s about local safety are the true Italian p eculiarity in d eliverin g crim e prevention m easures. From the 1990s until a few years ago, regional governm ents in Italy usually behaved in a m anner akin to that o f national governm ents in other E uropean contexts, offering a general fram ew ork for the d ev elo p ­ m ent o f local crim e prevention projects. E leven o f the 20 regions enacted law s, in the past years, the aim of w hich w as to support, in different w ays, m u nicipalities and local police forces un der the label o f 'local safety policies'. H ence, a new infrastructure o f local gov ernan ce o f crim e prevention has been established in the absen ce o f the nation state. This p eculiarity reflects the institutional conflict b etw een different levels o f governm ent and how the stru ggle o f local au th orities to acquire new com petencies and resp onsibilities in m any different sectors o f public policies has been influential in shaping the Italian m odel o f crim e prevention. In this respect, the Italian con text also show s clearly how con tem p orary crim e control practices and p olitics are at the core of a com plex and not yet solved - as w e shall see b etter later on - process of red istribution o f responsibilities am ong the state, the local governm ent and the civil society (Selm ini 2005: 319). 165

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From the po in t o f view o f its content, the m o d el17 is characterised by a m ix betw een traditional social m easures, new m easures for public reassu rance (victim support, com m u nity m obilisation) and situ ational crim e p revention (surveillance, ad m inistrativ e control and environm ental d esign w ith d efen sive aim s).18 Situ ation al crim e prevention m easures, w hich represented a true novelty, w ere enthu siastically adopted in m any cities, and in som e areas they now prevail ov er social prevention. G iven the fact that local au th orities have no com petencies in penal law enforcem ent or in crim e repression, bu t w ere n o neth eless w illing to extend their sphere o f intervention further, cid es have been in search of new instrum en ts for con trolling people and behaviours. T hese in stru ­ m ents have been found in the intensification o f su rveillance, m ainly perform ed by the m u nicipal police,19 in the use o f ad m inistrative orders and in environm en tal design. T he ad m inistrative ord ers ('m ayo ral o rd in ances') are ground ed in ad m inistrative pow ers rather than in crim inal law pow ers. They are the p rerogative o f m ayors w ho, for reasons o f public hygiene or other generic risks to the w ell-being of citizens, have the p o w er to enact such ord ers to face 'em ergen cies' and also to keep u n d er rou tine control m any different activities and groups in public spaces. By m eans of these ad m inistrative orders, we have w itnessed substantial intervention s o f local police esp ecially against street prostitu tion, d isord er, incivilities, and nu isances related to un docum ented im m igrants. A com bination o f the abov e m easures allow ed local auth orities to d evelop w hat can be called an 'integrated approach'. This m eans that local crim e prevention program m es try to fine-tune social inclu sion and exclu sion, as w ell as to tackle causes o f crim e, w hile at the sam e tim e m anaging crim e sym p tom s. H ow ever, if 'integrated crim e p rev ention' is a rather successful political slogan, this does not m ean that 'integration ' w ould really allow local governm ents to follow these tw o different approaches. In fact, the kind o f social m easures that they can im plem ent rem ain at the level o f a w elfarist p hilosophy, given that intervention on structural causes o f crim e requ ires a w hole range o f com petencies in the field o f im m igration, labour m arket and general w elfare that are not fully available to local governm ents. C o n sequen tly, after alm ost 15 years o f im plem entation o f local crim e prevention schem es, w e are now w itnessing a failu re o f the prim ary idea based on the d evelopm ent o f a new m odel o f local go v ernan ce o f crim e able to tackle 'cau ses' o f crim e w hile at the sam e tim e proving effective in m an aging crim e sym p tom s. A n analysis o f m ore recent general p ro­ gram m es on local crim e prevention (Selm ini 2009) high ligh ts the extent to w hich these program m es are m ore and m ore characterised by a situ a­ tional ap p roach and an increasing w eakn ess o f their p rim ary socialinclu sionary rationality.

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Social crim e prevention: decline or change?

A ccord in g to the m ost com m on definition, social crim e prevention inclu des m easures that seek to elim in ate or red uce structural crim e factors, act on possible causes o f crim e throu gh general social p ro­ gram m es (Robert 1991: 16), or, accord ing to a sim ilar definition, influence o r m odify the reasons that brin g people to com m it offences due to con ditions o f social d isadvan tage (G illing 1997: 5). U nlike situational p revention, this strategy puts the focus back on the p otential offend er and h e r /h is inclination to com m it crim e, considered not so m u ch as the result o f an individual p athology but rather as a d eficit d eriving from personal and socio-stru ctu ral conditions. A ccord in g to som e scholars, social p re­ v ention is not ju st a specific prevention m od ality, b u t rather a global p olicy for social w ell-being that crosses all sectors o f ad m inistrative policies (W algrave and de C au ter 1986; P eyre 1986). O ther authors focus on social d evelopm ent, con sid ered as the basis o f these policies. Their pu rpose w ould be to stu d y the origin and reprod uction o f inequalities responsible for 'd isad van taged con texts' in ord er to overcom e them (H astings 1998: 117). T he fields o f in terv ention o f social prevention, accord ing to the authors o f a broad review o f crim e prevention p ro­ gram m es (G raham and Bennett 1995), are urban policy, health policies, fam ily policies, edu cation policies, labour m arket policies and, finally, social integration policies gen erally speaking. O u r stud ies o f the Italian context, based on a classification o f social crim e p rev ention m easures derived from relevan t local practitioners and responsible auth orities, show s som e interesting differences from the aforem en tioned d efinitions o f social crim e prevention, as w ell as som e ad dition al features: • A 'collective d im ension' and the rejection o f an ind ividu alistic approach - social crim e p revention is seen as ad dressed to social groups and not to individuals. • A m ong those social groups, there are not only those at risk o f becom in g crim inals or deviant, bu t also those at risk o f bein g victim ised - or those w ho have already been victim ised - by crim e; the 'potential crim inal' and the 'v u lnerab le citizen' are both subjects o f social crim e m easures. • A change in the final aim s, w hich are no longer focused on preventing crim e through the am elioration o f social d isdvan tages, bu t on a m ore lim ited p u rpose to support, through d ifferent form s o f assistance, som e groups 'at risk'. N o longer are gen eral crim e p revention aim s prioritised; m ore frequ en tly the priority is a type o f a 'social pacifi­ cation' am on g different groups, through different form s o f social m ediation. 167

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Interviewed about their practices of social crim e prevention program m es, local politicians and officers in charge of local crim e prevention pro­ gram m es listed the follow ing measures: Social prevention addressed to subjects H arm reduction for drug addicts and prostitution General social help for hom eless and m arginalised individuals (shelters, etc.) Services for the integration of im m igrants Services to crim e victims Social prevention fo r the physical environm ent and the comm unity M ediation of conflicts am ong social groups A nim ation of public spaces (through entertainm ent, etc.) U rban renewal The instrum ents to im plem ent these m easures are also different. In addition to traditional social work, they include urban renew al, street repairs, adm inistrative orders and the ever m ore frequent possibility that non-specialised operators adopt preventive m easures too, such as the participation of com m on citizens in crim e prevention program m es. In the Italian context, com m unity crim e prevention has been reinterpreted by those in charge of im plem ention as part of a social prevention strategy, based m ainly on m easures to foster com m unity cohesion and am eliorate the physical environm ent, in order to im prove the quality of life and reduce conflicts and fear of crim e in som e areas. Recalling the Chicago School's main assum ptions, the basic idea is that crim e, deviance and disorder are the result o f the decline of com m unity, conflicts between heterogeneous social groups, the abandonm ent of public space, and the deterioration of com m unity relations. Consequently, interventions must act on these phenom ena, using different strategies that collectively we m ight define as 'com m unity crim e prevention'. In the context we described above, social prevention, w hile still a well-established concept, is changing radically its nature in the everyday practice of safety policies. Furtherm ore, it is increasingly at risk of losing its traditional features.20 M ore precisely, m easures of social prevention clearly show a shift of focus, from intervening radically on the causes of crim e through social reform to sim ply offering 'hum anitarian' and often short-term solutions for som e social em ergencies. On the one hand, situational rationality seem s to perm eate also those m easures that were once called 'social'; on the other hand, social interventions are increasingly being used as auxiliary to situational interventions. W e are also w itnessing a change in the object of social crim e prevention, which is no longer seeking to deal w ith social groups at risk of becom ing crim inals, but rather is concerned to protect real and potential victim s 168

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from both victim isation and feelings of insecurity. Public reassurance - a broad and vague definition that em braces different practices aim ed at preventing fear of crim e and unsafety or conflicts in neighbourhoods and betw een different social groups - is increasingly replacing traditional social crim e prevention (Baillergeau 2007; Selm ini 2003). This lo s s of focus' of social crim e prevention - above all, when these m easures are mixed with the situational ones in the local safety policies - is docum ented in m any different contexts (Gilling 2001). It has been related to the 'conceptual am biguity' of social crim e prevention in itself that 'opens the doors to m ultiple and contradictory political interests, and at the end of the day, m akes it vulnerable to co-optation by conventional crim e control agendas' (Knepper 2007: 140). Together with such changes in social crim e prevention, a further issue, w orth noting is the recent em ergence - at least in Italy - of developm ental crim e prevention, as an alternative to traditional social prevention. D evelopm ental and situational crim e prevention are now presented as the new alliance able to tackle crim e in its different dim ensions: The solution (for the future) is an integrated prevention w here, beside a selective penal prevention, other preventive m easures are develop­ ed: the situational and the psycho-social . . . Given the fact that crim e behaviour is the result of predisposition and opportunities, w e need to intervene on predisposition until it is possible, and then m odify opportunities. (Savona 2004: 277) W ith the replacem ent of the social crim e prevention w ith the early (or developm ental, or risk-focused) crim e prevention,21 the process o f align­ m ent of Italian tendencies to the general European ones about crim e prevention was alm ost com pleted. Recent changes and further developments

In these last few pages, w e have described the developm ent of crim e prevention policies in Italy, and how these policies w ere deeply rooted in the context of a peculiar form of local governance of crime. W e have rem arked on som e local peculiarities, external influences, and finally recent convergences that are m aking the Italian experiences not so different from others in the European context. The situational and the social approaches m eet the needs and interests of local politicians in different ways. This is not at all different from w hat occurred, and is occurring, in other contexts. The success of situational crim e prevention lies in its capacity to offer pragm atic and fast political responses to m anage crim e and disorder problem s for those w ho are responsible of the governm ent of ordinary urban life; that is, for the 169

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m ayors and other politicians.22 W hat is rem arkable is the fact that in Italy this approach to crim e prevention has been accepted enthusiastically w ithout any diffusion of the kind of crim inological know ledge on which it depends, nam ely opportunity theory and the routine activity ap­ proach. W hile these are part of the recent interest of som e academ ics (Barbagli 1995; Savona 2004), they are largely unknow n and unfam iliar to our scientific discourse on crim e and crim e prevention. This fact in itself suggests interesting reflections on the sources of crim inal policy change! A further Italian peculiarity was that the national state, during the past decade, has continued pursuing its traditional law enforcem ent strategies w ithout paying m uch attention to the infrastructure of crim e prevention that was taking shape at a local level. The w hole apparatus of local governance of crim e prevention has been developing for m any years w ithout any kind of form alisation, in the absence o f any nation legal fram ew ork and w ithout any support or resources from central govern­ ment. Even though the developm ent of a partnership strategy is apparently - a com plicated m atter in m any different European contexts (Aden 2002; H ope 2002; Le Goff 2004), in Italy we witnessed a rem arkable absence of the national governm ent in the search for institutional co-operation and in the involvem ent in these new practices of crim e prevention. This was the result of a cultural, professional and political inadequacy of Italian national political and professional elites. It w as also a consequence of the traditional backw ardness and w eakness of the central Italian state apparatus and of the culture and organisation of our national police forces, traditionally ill equipped to w ork within a preventive approach. H ow ever, the fram ew ork described in this chapter has deeply changed because of new legislation passed by the conservative governm ent that w on the election in April 2008, although it should be noted that m any of these changes were already part of a crim e prevention reform on local safety issues elaborated by the previous centre-left governm ent. Change, therefore, does not com e only from the political ideology of those leading the governm ent, but also from the office of crim e control strategy within the M inistry of the Interior, w hose needs and interests aligned them selves w ith those of the new governm ent, strongly com m itted to developing a 'tough on crim e' strategy on m any different levels. A new law w as passed in the sum m er of 2008. Its general strategy is to reduce local governm ents' pow ers and strengthen the role of m ayors as representatives of the national governm ent at a local level, deeply reform ing the whole infrastructure of crim e prevention, and underm ining all efforts at deliver­ ing a strategy based on integration of different m easures. The m ain results of this reform - the consequences of w hich in the everyday practice of crim e prevention and its overlap with regional laws are not yet easy to foresee - are: 170

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• T h e re -e sta b lish m e n t o f n atio n al so v e re ig n ty a b o u t o rd in ary , m u n d an e crim e at a sy m b o lic level. • T h e resp o n sib ilisatio n o f o f the In terio r and o f stro n g e r p o w ers in the e v ery d ay crim e in u rb an

m ay o rs as 'e x e cu tiv e officers' o f the M in istry the p refects, w h ile ap p aren tly g iv in g them u se o f a d m in istrativ e o rd ers in m an ag in g con texts.

• T h e ex p an sio n in the u se o f a d m in istrativ e in stru m en ts fo r the p u rp o se o f co n tro llin g b e h av io u rs and situ atio n s. • T h e re sp o n sib ilisa tio n o f lo cal p o lice in the field o f crim e p rev en tio n , b u t m ain ly at the o rd e rs o f n atio n al re p rese n ta tiv e s o f the state. • T h e stro n g e r re le v a n ce o f in civ ilities, 'u rb an d iso rd er' and an ti-so cial b e h a v io u rs in the d isco u rses ab o u t crim e p rev en tion . In co n clu sio n , in Italy , as p ro b ab ly else w h e re , th e w h o le fram ew o rk o f crim e p re v e n tio n seem s n o w to b e trav ersed b y con trad icto ry , fra g m e n ­ tary and ch an g in g ten d en cies. It is, h o w ev er, cle ar th at the stru g g le o f lo cal g o v e rn m e n ts in o rd er to find th e ir p lace in the field o f crim e p rev en tio n h as b a sic a lly failed . In its p lace, n atio n al a d m in istra tiv e con tro l o f b e h a v io u rs and situ a tio n s h as d efin ite ly b e co m e the m ain so u rce o f d isco u rse and p ractice a b o u t crim e p rev en tio n .

N o te s 1 This is a revised version of papers presented by Dario Melossi and Rossella Selmini at the CRIMPREV First General Conference (Brussels, 8-10 February 2007) and by Dario Melossi at the CRIMPREV Meeting at the University of Leeds (Leeds, 7-8 June 2007). 2 It may be useful to mention Gosta Esping-Andersen's classification of the welfare state in three types: a 'Social Democratic' one, typical of Northern European countries; a 'Conservative/Corporatist' one, typical of Continental Europe; and a 'Liberal' one, typical of the US (Esping-Andersen 1987). 3 One should compare these reflections by Mills to some of the more sociological writings by Italian poet, novelist and film-maker Pier Paolo Pasolini on the mutation of the Italian working class in the 1970s - keeping also in mind, probably, the circulation of these ideas, coming from American social sciences, among Italian intellectuals of the 1960s. 4 See especially the conclusion to One-Dimensional Man (Marcuse 1964: 247-57). 5 Attempts at revising Article 117 of the Italian Constitution, which defines the respective roles and competencies of the central state and the regions, have until now failed. In the early 1990s this issue was muddled by the emergence of a political force, the 'Northern League', that demanded independence for Northern Italy from the rest of the country. 6 Between 1946 and 1962, 126 citizens and 12 police officers were killed in street clashes (D'Orsi 1972). This is not counting the peasants killed by landowners' 171

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7

8

9 10

11

organised gangs in the South in the period im m ediately after the end of the war: in Sicily in particular a consp iracy of M afia gangsters, local (and national) reactionary forces, and 'A llied' secret services, tried to play a separatist card for the island, succeeding, how ever, 'only' in d estroying the peasant radical m ovem ent and opening the follow ing de facto governm ent betw een central pow ers and the mafia. Socio-econom ic change brou ght 'to pow er' the organised w orking class but also at the sam e tim e its nem esis, 'post-Ford ism ' (decline of the factory, decline o f w ork ethics, etc.). A general process o f class fragm entation ensued that m arked both a deep decline in the self-understanding o f large sectors o f the population as 'w orking class', and increasing sym ptom s of social d isorganisa­ tion especially am ong w orking-class youth (such as the sudden and huge creation of a drug culture and m arket after the m id 1970s). Even if it is not as useful in ord er to understand the decline in the 1990s; furtherm ore there is an im portant dem ographic argum ent. See also K atherine B eckett's argum ents in her criticism s o f G arland (Beckett 2001). See, contra, K ing (2003). In response, 'citizen com m ittees' w ere spontaneously created, often in areas that had traditionally seen a strong presence o f the traditional Left parties (Sclm ini 1997). For exam ple, in M ilena C h iod i's (1999: 24 1 -5 ) research on the specific case o f a M odena neighbourhood, clearly im m igrants are visible, they are perceived as not used to the rule o f d em ocratic participation, and they tend to concentrate in those areas of the city that are m ore vulnerable, and w here com m unities are in search o f new identities. Such 'new identities' m ay be found, how ever, as in the case studied b y Chiodi, in organising the neighbou r­ hood against the im m igrants. In the w ords of the citizens Chiodi interview ed, they have been able to build a 'renew ed unity' in their struggle to 'clean' their neighbourhood o f the unw anted guests. Erickson or M atza could not have expressed the m atter m ore clearly: the social cohesion of the 'C rocetta' neighbourhood in M odena w as at least tem porarily strengthened by the unity o f intents and actions against 'N orth A frican drug d ealers'. T his episode is revealing of the contradictions and am biguities o f the processes and feelings involved. A sen se of d em ocratic participation m ixes with one o f parochialism , the old faith in 'the unity o f the w orking class' w ith outright exclusion and racism . The traditional Left institutions and values seem to be unable to orient and direct the course o f events and, in som e respects, even the pioneering role o f initiatives such as Citta sicure m ay appear as having played m ore the role of 'sorcerer's apprentice' than that o f the Leninist vanguard o f the w orking class! And in fact, in som e cases, w hen citizen and com m unity organisations' claim s have not been catered to, the backlash for this lack o f attention has been significant, as in the clam orous electoral d efeat of the Left in Bologna in 1999, a city that it had adm inistered uninterruptedly since the end o f the war. Such is the title o f a collection o f M ichel Fou cau lt's essays in Italian, referring to Fou cau lt's concept o f 'm icro-pow er' (Foucault 1977). Indeed, one could venture to suggest that Fou cau lt's polem ic against a state-centred concept of pow er w as the w ay in w hich European culture started to question itself about the obsolescence o f the old nineteenth-century European nation-states as w ell as the introduction o f the notion o f political pluralism (M elossi 1990, 2005).

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12 The concept of 'new ' prevention and its main features have been promoted and fully analysed, in the European context, especially by Philippe Robert (1991). 13 A dynam ic that has been thoughtfully studied in the perspective of 'govern­ ance' (Crawford 1997; Garland 2001; Loader and W alker 2007). 14 On these changes in crim e prevention policies in Europe and the em ergence of the two models, see Robert (1991). A more recent analysis of the same issues is to be found in Duprez and H ebberecht (2001). 15 However, this em phasis on local governm ent was, in France, more rhetoric than real, given the strong centralist nature of the French institutional fram ew ork (see Chapter 5, this volume), while it worked better in those countries with a weaker state structure, as the case of Italy. 16 The com patibility of a 'situational rationality' with a 'social justice' one and the spread of articulated m odels of crime prevention were analysed by O 'M alley (1992). 17 This description of the Italian way to 'new ' prevention is based on national research about crim e prevention policies in 103 Italian cities during the last five years of the 1990s, on sim ilar studies concerning some Italian regions (Regione Toscana 2002; Giovannetti and M aluccelli 2001), and on a partial updating of the first national research (Selmini 2003). 18 The com bination of these measures represents the contem porary content of Italian security policies. Their features are a further exam ple of the circulation of practices, which is part of the 'travelling process' in the field of criminal justice (M elossi et al. 2009). Originally, in fact, the concepts and practices of social and situational prevention arrived through academ ic relationships both with British 'Left Realism' and with som e French sociologists and crim inol­ ogists. The network of cities affiliated to the European Forum for Urban Safety also played an important role in this process of transferring policies. The relationship of Italian local governm ents with this association stressed the connections with the French-speaking world and other continental countries, partially balancing the Anglo-Am erican influence and giving the Italian projects the aforementioned 'm ixed' character (Selmini 2005). 19 Municipal police, which depend on the mayor, have an exclusive com petency in the general field of adm inistrative police, but also the status of a public security force. Apart from the norm ative definition of their com petencies, their role in crime prevention has increased enorm ously in the past ten years. 20 A dynam ic that has been defined also as the 'crim inalisation of social policies', already analysed in different European context (Cartuyvels 1996; Pitch 2006). 21 About the sim ilarities and differences among these definitions, all of them conceptually included in the main category of developm ental crim e preven­ tion, see Homel (2005: 71-3) and also Farrington and W elsh (2007). 22 Am ong the many w ho have reflected upon the practical and political appeal of situational crim e prevention, see above all H ope and Sparks (2000).

R e fe re n c e s Aden, H. (2002) 'Le possibility di riforma di un sistem a sem i(de)centralizzato', Dei delitti e delle pene, 1-2-3: 145-57.

di

polizia

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Peyre, V. (1986) 'Introduction: Elem ents d 'u n debat su r la prevention de la d elinqu ance', A nnales de Vaucresson, 24(1): 9 -13. Pitch, T. (2006) La societa della prevenzione. Rom a: Carocci. Prodi, R. (1997) U npublished speech to the sem inar 'La sicurezza in Em ilia R om agna', Bologna, 5 April. Putnam , R. D. (1993) M aking D em ocracy Work: Civic Traditions in M odern Italy. Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press. Regione Toscana (2002) R elazione generate sullo stato della sicurezza in Toscana e sull'attuazione della legge regionale 16 A ugust 2001, n. 38. Firenze: Regione Toscana. Reiter, H. (1996) 'L e forze di polizia e l'o rd in e pubblico in Italia', Polis, 10: 337-60. Robert, P. (1991) 'L es chercheurs face aux politiques de prevention', in P. Robert (ed.) Les politiques de prevention de la delinquance a I'aune de la recherche. Un bilan international. Paris: L'H arm attan, pp. 13-27. Roche, S. (2004) 'R eform es dans la police et form es de gou vernem ent', in S. Roche (ed.) Reform er la police et la securite. Les nouvelles tendances en Europe et aux Etats-U nits. Paris: O d ile Jacobs, pp. 7-37. Savona, E. U. (2004) 'Ipotesi per uno scenario della prevenzione', in R. Selm ini (ed.) La sicurezza urbana. Bologna: II M ulino, pp. 273-84. Selm ini, R. (1997) 'II punto di vista dei com itati di cittad ini'. Q uaderni di Citta sicure, 11(a): 77-94. Selm ini, R. (2003) 'L e politiche di sicurezza: origini, sviluppo e prospettive', in M. Barbagli (ed.) Rapporto sulla crim inalita in Italia. Bologna: II M ulino, pp. 611-48. Selm ini, R. (2005) 'Tow ard s Citta sicure? Political action and institutional conflict in contem porary preventive and safety policies in Italy', Theoretical Crim inology, 9(3): 307-23. Selm ini, R. (2009) 'Introd uzione', in R apporto A nnuale sulla sicurezza in E m iliaRom agna, Q uaderni di Citta sicure, 33: 1-10. Sim on, J. (2007) G overning through Crim e: Hoiv the War on Crim e Transform ed A m erican D em ocracy and Created a Culture o f Fear. N ew York: O xford U niversity Press. Skogan, W. G. (1990) D isorder and D ecline: Crim e and the Spiral o f D ecay in Am erican N eighborhoods. Berkeley: U niversity of California Press. Stenson, K. and Edw ards, A. (2004) 'Policy Transfer in Local C rim e Control: Beyond N aive E m u lation', in T. N ew burn and R. Sparks (eds) Crim inal Justice and Political Cultures: N ational and International D im ensions o f Crim e Control. C ullom pton: W illan Publishing, pp. 209-33. Stille, A. (1995) Excellent Cadavers. London: Vintage. W algrave, L. and de Cauter, F. (1986) 'U ne tentative de clarification de la notion de "p re v e n tio n "', A nnales de V aucresson, 24(1): 31-51. W ilson, J. Q. and K elling G. L. (1982) 'B roken W indow s: The Police and N eighborhood Safety ', The A tlantic M onthly, M arch: 29 -3 8 .

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C h a p te r 8

C rim e prevention at the Belgian federal level: from a social dem ocratic policy to a neo-liberal and authoritarian policy in a social dem ocratic con text Patrick Hebberecht

In tro d u c tio n In this contribution I analyse the developm ent of Belgian crim e prevention policy at the national and later at the federal level, and its im plem entation at the local level from 1985 until 2007. For a good understanding of the evolution of crim e prevention policy during this tim e, it will be sub­ divided into three periods according to the coalition of political parties governing at the nation al/fed eral level. Follow ing this criterion, a d istinction is m ade betw een three periods: first, 1985 to 1988, during w hich a coalition of Christian dem ocratic and liberal parties governed; second, 1988 to 1999, w hen a coalition of Christian dem ocratic and socialist parties w ere in pow er; and third, the period 1999 to 2007, which witnessed a coalition of liberal and socialist parties (and from 1999 until 2003 also of green parties). It is im portant to note that since the 1970s, due to the regional conflicts of interest w ithin Belgium alm ost all political form ations are split, w ith both a Flem ish and French-speaking political party, w hich are totally independent from each other. In the subsequent discussion of the evolution of crim e prevention policy in Belgium , the political-ideological orientation of the different phases of 177

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the crim e prevention policy w ill be specified, as will the specific types of crim e, the prevention m ethods and the target groups privileged in these different phases. In so doing, close attention is given to the relation betw een the nation al/fed eral level and the local level. A fter the initial descriptive overview the chapter will analyse further som e specific topics in the evolution of the prevention policy during the period from 1985 until 2007. These will include the effects of the changing institutional context and organisation of the police forces on crim e prevention policy; the influence of political ideologies on the place of crim e prevention policy w ithin broader crim inal policy; and the changing priorities of crim e prevention policy. The influence of prevention stra­ tegies and m odels draw n from other European countries on the evolution of Belgian prevention policy will also be discussed. In the final section, the evolution of crim e prevention policy will be placed in the context of neo-liberal econom ic globalisation and the crisis of the nation state. U ntil 1985 the Belgian governm ent had not developed a specific national prevention policy. The prevention of crim inality was believed to derive from the general preventive effects of the police and crim inal justice system as well as by way of the special preventive effects of individual crim inal sanctions oriented towards the social reintegration of offenders. The prevention of juvenile delinquency was developed by the juvenile protection system . In the context of a new neo-liberal econom ic and political context of the mid 1980s, the Belgian governm ent subse­ quently took the first initiative to set up a national prevention policy. Before considering this, first let us reconstruct the crim e prevention policy elaborated by the Christian dem ocratic and liberal governm ents during the period from 1985 until 1988, before going on to consider the Christian dem ocratic and socialist governm ents during the period from 1988 until 1999 and finally the liberal-socialist-green governm ent (1999-2003) and the liberal-socialist governm ent (2003-07).

T h e C h ristian d e m o c ra tic and lib eral p re v e n tio n policy ( I 9 8 5 -8 8 ): a new n atio n al p re v e n tio n policy and s tru c tu re The m arginalising social and cultural effects of the econom ic crisis in the 1970s, com bined with the processes of econom ic restructuring and its im pact on specific social groups, led to an increase in property crim es and vandalism as well as an increase in feelings of insecurity. Because of the increase in problem s of crim e and insecurity, but also due to the reduction in detection rates, a new police prevention policy was developed by the gendarm erie and som e local police forces, m ost notably in Flanders (H ebberecht 1990). Potential victim s w ere encouraged by police services to take techno-preventive m easures and to adopt avoidance and security behaviours. In collaboration with other partners (such as school head 178

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teachers, parents' associations, and leaders of youth centres) preventive projects were developed by the gendarm erie at district levels (com parable with the judicial districts) in order to avoid deviant and delinquent behaviour of (m ainly m iddle-class) youth (Berkm oes 1990). Som e m unici­ pal police forces, Ghent for exam ple, set up som e form s of neighbourhood watch schem es (Carlier 1990). From 1981 the governm ent, a coalition o f Christian dem ocratic and liberal parties, tried to restructure the Belgian Keynesian w elfare state according to neo-liberal prescriptions. Only when the legitim acy of the governm ent was heavily threatened by a com bination of the unsolved killings by the so-called 'G ang of N ijvel', acts of terrorism of the 'Cellules Com m unistes Com battantes' and the dram atic events of the football gam e betw een Juventus and Liverpool in the Brussels H eysel stadium in 1985, did the governm ent begin to outline a security and prevention policy towards several types of crime. By m eans of his security plan (note that the word 'security' was used for the first tim e in a governm ent plan), the M inister o f Justice, the French-speaking liberal Gol, sought to strengthen and im prove collaboration betw een the gendarm erie, the com m unal police and the judicial police in their fight against banditry and terrorism. To fight property crim e and vandalism , the M inister of the Interior, the French-speaking Christian dem ocrat N othom b, created a new national prevention structure and policy. The new police prevention policy w as the inspiration for the new national prevention policy. At that time, the institutions of the Belgian unitary state m arked the structure of the prevention policy, the elaboration and im plem entation of w hich was centralised at national and provincial level. At that tim e Belgium had nine provinces and the provincial governors acted under the authority of the M inister of the Interior. The gendarm erie and the com m unal police forces of the larger cities w ere the m ain actors in the Belgian prevention policy at the national and provincial level. Consequently, during the period 1985 until 1988 the local adm inistration, the m ayor and w elfare services were not involved in Belgian prevention policy. Betw een 1985 and 1988, a neo-liberal com ponent was developed in Belgian prevention policy. A ccording to this neo-liberal com ponent, property crim e and vandalism cam e to be seen as the product of leaving properties unprotected and inadequate supervision (Clarke 1980). Belgian prevention policy focused on reducing opportunities to com m it crim es and increasing inform al, functional and formal control in (sem i-)public places (H auber 1999). Citizens w ere to be viewed as prim arily and especially responsible for their own security. They were to be regarded as responsible for protecting them selves and their possessions as well as taking increased control for their surroundings. The state's role, by contrast, was to support the citizens by fulfilling its responsibilities, including the provision of security advice, support for victim s and increased police surveillance on the streets. 179

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C h ristian d e m o c ra tic and socialist p re v e n tio n policy (1 9 8 8 -9 9 ): fro m p re v e n tio n to security The elaboration o f a social democratic component in Belgian prevention policy

(1 9 8 8 -9 2 ) A fter years of opposition, Flem ish and French-speaking socialists entered a coalition with Flem ish and French-speaking Christian dem ocratic parties. In different governm ental constitutions this political coalition existed until 1999. During this period, Flemish socialists held the position of M inister of the Interior. U nder their authority, the Belgian prevention policy was further developed (Cartuyvels and H ebberecht 2002). In 1988 the socialists no longer opposed the neo-liberal inspired econom ic and political restructuring w hich the Christian dem ocratic and liberal govern­ ments had put into practice in the 1980s. The socialist parties w ere determ ined to conduct a social policy that m itigated the m arginalising and social excluding effects of these neo-liberal processes of change (M eynen 2000). In so doing, they engaged in defending the social security system and com m enced a fight against poverty and social exclusion. An im m igration policy was shaped in the fight against discrim ination and racism . As a part of this broader social policy, the prevention policy was oriented towards the effects on crim e and insecurity of the neo-liberal transform ations w rought during the 1980s. Several types of theft and vandalism increased significantly according to police records. Rates of vandalism in and around schools and football stadium s also kept rising. In m iddle-class urban neighbourhoods and suburbs perceptions of insecurity increased. Especially under the influ­ ence o f French sociological analyses of social exclusion these problem s of crim e and insecurity were seen as a consequence of the deterioration and disintegration of several urban neighbourhoods (Dubet 1987; Delarue 1991; Delebarre 1993). W ithin the fram ew ork of w hat becam e know n as the W hit Sunday Plan of 5 June 1990, a governm ent plan to reform the police and justice system , the M inister of the Interior, the Flem ish socialist Louis Tobback, reoriented the national prevention policy tow ards a local, adm inistrative and integrated approach. Tobback privileged the local m unicipality, the city and som e deteriorated neighbourhoods, bypassing the provincial level. The m ayor was given key responsibility for the developm ent, integration and execution of a prevention policy at the local level. The role of the police services and thus of their privileged situational and techno­ prevention moved som ew hat into the background. The governm ent reorganised the com m unal police in a front-line police force and the gendarm erie in a secondary role. A ccording to this new division of police tasks only the m unicipal police had a lim ited role to play in the local prevention policy. A fter all, the m unicipal police exercise their adm inis­ 180

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trative com petencies u n d er the au th ority o f the m ayor. Social and w elfare organisations w ere given an im portan t task in p reventing crim es com m it­ ted by vulnerable and m arginalised you th as w ell as in the red u ction of fear o f crim e am on g vulnerable social groups. In the opinion o f the M inister o f the Interior the local ad m inistrative prevention p olicy had to integrate both situ ational and social approaches and a (potential) victim and (potential) p erpetrator orientation. The m ayor had to ensure that the v arious actors in the field o f prevention w orked together in partnership. To im p lem ent this new vision the M inister o f the Interior financed 27 pilot p rev ention projects. To stim ulate public, political and ad m inistrative su pport for the integrated local prevention policy, the M inister distributed to all m ayors a m inisterial circu lar O O P I8 (3 0 /0 1 /1 9 9 2 ) con tain in g a m od el regulation for setting up a com m u nal ad visory board on p rev en­ tion. From the public pron ou ncem ents and policy d ocu m ents o f the M inister o f the Interior, Tobback, w e can d ed u ce that a social dem ocratic com p onent in B elgian p revention p olicy w as elaborated. T obback devel­ oped a local prevention p olicy w ith a m ore structural, social and urban d im ension (D e H aan 1999). A ccord in g to this social d em ocratic com p o ­ nent, crim e and insecurity problem s are connected w ith unequal Iifechances, social d ep rivation and d iscrim ination. The social question here is p articularly seen as an urban issue. C rim e problem s and subjective feelings of un safety are to be prevented in the first place by social prevention for the benefit o f v u lnerable social groups (Poulet 1995; S ynergie 1995).

The transform ation o f the social dem ocratic com ponent o f Belgian prevention policy in a social liberal direction (1 9 9 2 -9 5 )

D uring the parliam entary election s o f 24 N ovem ber 1991, the Flem ish extrem e righ t political party (V laam s Blok) had an electoral breakthrough in Flanders. It had con du cted a cam p aign against im m igrants and in fav ou r of a repressiv e and tough crim e control policy. D espite the fact that the previous coalition o f C h ristian d em ocrats and socialists lost alm ost 10 per cent of their votes, they still form ed the new governm ent. M oreover, the Flem ish socialist T ob back rem ained at the M inistry o f the Interior. Th e C ouncil o f M inisters approved the 'Secu rity o f the C itizen ' g u id elin e drafted by the Interior and Ju stice M inistries on 19 Ju n e 1992 (C artu yvels and H ebberecht 2002). The princip le o f an integrated ap ­ p roach to local prevention w as confirm ed in the shape o f the security and p rev ention con tracts that w ere set up. H ow ever, the d esire m anifested in 1990 to aim prevention w ork first and forem ost at socially vulnerable ind iv id u als and d eal w ith the processes o f econom ic, social and political m arginalisation that threatened them had d isappeared . C om m u nal police services w ere again given the m ost im portan t role. C itizen s w ere 181

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responsible for their own security, just as was the case in the 1980s. Situational control perspectives resurfaced, since the best way of preven­ ting crim e was considered to be reducing the opportunities to com m it crim e. So, the priority em phasis was put on various types of technical prevention m easures, such as police surveillance, delegation of security tasks to private security services, housekeepers, shop personnel, transport w orkers. If social prevention was not forgotten, this was because acting upon the social causes of crim e (through outreach youth work, for exam ple) could help prevent crime. These new orientations in the prevention policy were now framed w ithin a broader security policy o f the m ayor and police and from the end of 1992 supported by the negotiation of security and prevention contracts w ith cities and m unicipalities. A security contract consisted of a section concerning com m unity policing and a section covering prevention. About 75 per cent of the financing of a security contract was channelled into projects that sought to im prove the quality of com m unal policing and w ere designed to bring police closer to citizens. In the section concerning prevention, projects w ere chosen that reflected the new preventive philosophy of the governm ent. By the sum m er of 1992, security contracts had already been signed with five large Belgian towns and seven at-risk municipalities o f the Brussels Region for the period covering the winter of 1992 and all of 1993. Prevention contracts consisted exclusively of preventive projects. The creation of the role of a m unicipal prevention officer in charge of co-ordinating prevention policy, and the establishm ent of a m unicipal advisory board for the prevention of crim e, w ere both m ade com pulsory for all cities and m unicipalities that received financing through security and prevention contracts. Betw een the end of 1992 and 1995 the num ber of security contracts increased to 29 cities and m unicipalities. In 1995 another 29 cities and m unicipalities agreed prevention contracts. The royal d ecree of 12 M arch 1993 m arked the birth of a Perm anent Secretariat for Prevention Policy, w hich w as directly accountable to the M inister of the Interior. This Secretariat w as given a num ber of tasks that included supporting local prevention initiatives, and co-ordinating and evaluating the federal prevention policy. The continuing transformation o f Belgian prevention policy in a social liberal direction and the beginnings o f an authoritarian, m oral conservative component

(1 9 9 5 -9 9 ) Follow ing the legislative elections of 21 M ay 1995 a new coalition brought the Christian dem ocrats and socialists back to power. Johan Vande Lanotte, a Flem ish socialist, was reinstated as M inister o f the Interior (the position he had filled to replace Louis Tobback at the end of the previous legislature). The existing policing and prevention sections of the security 182

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con tracts w ere expanded to incorporate a focus on drugs, ju stice and city guards. T h e section con cern in g drugs financed projects aim ed at the p rev ention o f drug use, and m ed ical social projects esp ecially targeted at hom eless drug addicts. The section on ju stice provided financial support fo r the im plem entation and su pport of alternative m easures. T h e section on city gu ard s provided fun ding for long-term unem ployed people w ith w ork as w ard ens in the exercise o f control functions and supervision in streets, squares and pu blic places. In 1996 the M inister o f the Interior planned also the integration o f projects o f urban regen eration w ithin the security contracts. For this reason, from 1998 secu rity con tracts w ere reform ulated into security and society contracts. In the second half o f the 1990s inhabitants o f ru ral areas and outer areas o f sm all cities increasing ly becam e victim s of burglary. In Fland ers this led to several citizen initiatives that organised surv eillance in their ow n neigh bou rhood s. Fearing that the extrem e righ t-w in g party V laam s Blok w ould benefit from the resultin g d iscontent tow ards central and local g overnm ent, both the gen darm erie and the m u nicipal p olice established N eighbourhood W atch N etw orks, together w ith the inhabitants of certain neigh bou rhood s. In doing so, inform ation about suspicious situ ations and persons w as d istributed to all inhabitants o f these areas m ore quickly, so that they could take necessary p reventive m easures. A dd itionally, these initiatives facilitated a b etter flow o f inform ation from citizens to the police about suspicious persons and situations. T hese citizen initiatives w ere regulated throu gh a m inisterial circu lar o f the M inister o f the Interior, V ande Lanotte. The initiatives w ere ad opted w id ely in Fland ers; by con trast, they w ere unsu ccessful in the B russels and W alloon Regions. Th e d iscovery, in A ugust 1996, o f the bodies o f tw o m urd ered young girls hit B elgium like a shock w ave. T h e su bsequ ent pu blic concern for w hat becam e know n as the D utroux Scandal strengthened the position w ithin the gov ernm ent o f the M inister o f Ju stice, the Flem ish C h ristian d em ocrat D eclercq. H e w as now able to push throu gh reform o f the ju stice system . T hese events m eant that the M inister o f the Interior w as w ell aw are that the total financial su pport for his prevention and security policy w ould no longer con tin ue to increase, as had been the case since 1992. T he financial, ad m inistrative and scientific evalu ation of the security and p revention con tracts now becam e a priority for the M inister of the Interior (D epovere and P onsaers 1998; M ary 2003). T he results o f this evalu ation m ad e it possible to drop som e u nsu ccessful p rojects from a con tract and to start w ith som e new innov ativ e projects. Th e escape of D utroux from a police office in A pril 1998 led to the resignation o f the M inisters o f Ju stice and the Interior. T h e Flem ish socialist L uc V an d en B ossche becam e the new M inister o f the Interior. In the ru n-up to the election s o f 1999, the 'get tough' approach on crim e, ad vocated b y the extrem e righ t V laam s Blok, captured a lot o f public attention. In the attem pt to break the righ t-w in g m on op oly o f this election 183

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them e, the Flem ish liberal party positioned itself as the cham pion of a m ore authoritarian repressive approach to crim e. In this electoral climate, in w hich the social d em o cratic/so cial liberal m odel of prevention was sidelined, the M inister of Interior, Luc Vanden Bossche, took the political initiative and introduced a new bill to provide local authorities w ith greater pow ers to advance a repressive fight against public disorder. U nder certain conditions the m unicipal council was to be able to determ ine w hether crim inal or adm inistrative sanctions should be used against disorderly behaviours. On 13 M ay 1999, im m ediately prior to the elections, this new law cam e into effect.

T h e fe d e ra l p rev en tio n policy o f th e ‘p u r p le -g re e n ’ g o v e rn m e n t V e rh o fs ta d t I ( I 9 9 9 -2 0 0 3 ) and ‘p u rp le ’ g o v e rn m e n t V e rh o fs ta d t II (2 0 0 3 -0 7 ): p re v e n tio n policy in te g ra te d in a secu rity policy The federal prevention policy o f the ‘purple-green’ government Verhofstadt I

(1 9 9 9 -2 0 0 3 ) Despite the prevention and security policies adopted as well as the tougher approach to law and order taken by the Justice Departm ent, problem s of crim e and insecurity did not becom e less serious tow ards the end of the tw entieth century. The percentage of victim s of various types of property crim es and vandalism rem ained high. The num ber of burglaries increased. Street crim es w ere increasingly com m itted w ith aggression. In the afterm ath of the Dutroux case, sexual offences rem ained a preoccupation w ithin public opinion. In addition, several types of organised crim e w ere given widespread attention by the m edia. The population in general was m ore concerned about crim e, as reflected in the continuing electoral success of the extrem e right party Vlaam s Blok. W ith the 'p u rp le-green' governm ent Verhofstadt I, a coalition of liberal, socialist and green parties was form ed in June 1999. For the first time, the federal and local prevention policies explicitly becam e part of a m uch broader integrated federal approach to security and crim inal policy (H ebberecht 2000). This new security policy sought to ensure greater co-ordination and efficiency betw een all segm ents in the crim inal justice system , from prevention to repression and sanction. It also sought to integrate governm ental interventions from the local level to the interna­ tional level. The M inister of Justice, the Flemish liberal Verw ilghen, had responsibility for elaborating a federal integrated security plan. The M inister aimed to strengthen the neo-liberal com ponent of the security policy by prioritising the fight against street crim e and organised crime, the decrim inalisation of w hite collar crim e, the im plem entation of m anagem ent techniques, the privatisation of several police and justice functions and the developm ent of possibilities for greater private-public 184

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p artnerships. T h e political w ill to build in a m ore au th oritarian and m oral con servative com p onent w ithin the integrated security policy is evidenced by the tougher ap proach tow ard s street crim e and ju venile d elinqu en cy ad opted by the police and ju stice system . This new norm ative orientation also could be seen reflected in changes to penal law and penal procedu re that allow ed possibilities for m ore severe pu nishm ents and gave police g reater pow ers to com bat crim e. Th e prevention policy role w ithin the integrated security policy becam e less im portan t in the period 1999-2003. The restru ctu ring o f the Belgian p olice services into a federal and local p olice force in 2002 led to the loss o f the section con cern in g the m u nicipal p olice in the security and society contracts. H ence, the form er d istin ction betw een secu rity and society con tracts and p revention con tracts no longer rem ained. From 2002, these con tracts w ere called security and prevention con tracts and w ere fixed w ith 73 cities and m u nicipalities. T h e local prevention structure, w hich w as bu ilt up by socialists d uring the 1990s, w as retained by the liberal M inister of the Interior, the French -speakin g A ntoine D uquesne. The con tent o f the security and prevention con tracts w as now oriented tow ards the new p riorities form ulated in the federal security plan, nam ely situ ational and technological prevention o f property crim e, street violence and d isord er caused by drug use and drug trafficking. N o space w as left in the federal prevention p olicy for a m ore social, stru ctu ral and urban d im ension. C on sequen tly, the social d em o cra tic/so cia l liberal com ponent d im inished . In 2002 a general reform of the federal d ep artm ents w as im plem ented . T h e tasks o f the P erm anent Secretariat fo r P reven tion P olicy w ere taken over by the 'L ocal Integrated Secu rity P olicy' service o f the 'G eneral D irection o f the Secu rity and P revention P olicy' o f the Federal D epartm ent o f the Interior. The federal prevention policy o f the ‘p u rp le ’ governm ent Verhofstadt II (2003- 07)

D u ring the parliam entary elections in 2003, the Flem ish liberal party did not achieve the electoral success it hoped for. O n the contrary, the Flem ish - and m ore so the French -speakin g socialists - strengthened their position. The new 'p u rp le' go v ernm ent V erh ofstad t II w as a coalition o f liberal and socialist parties. In this coalition, the liberal party w as less able to force its neo-liberal, auth oritarian and m oral con serv ativ e v ision on security and prevention policy. The party retained the position o f the M inister o f the Interior, the Flem ish liberal P atrick D ew ael, but had to give up the position o f the M inister of Ju stice in favour of the French -speakin g socialists. Even m ore than in 1999 the new federal security plan in 2004 w as a com prom ise betw een, on the one hand, a neo-liberal b u t also a m oral con serv ativ e and au th oritarian v ision o f the Flem ish liberals, and, on the other hand, the m ore social and hu m anistic vision of the French -speakin g socialists (H ebberecht 2004). 185

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The existing security and prevention contracts w ere renewed for the period 2005 and 2006 and on 7 D ecem ber 2006 a new Royal Decree reoriented the structure, style and content of the security and prevention contracts. The new 'strategic security and prevention plans', as they w ere now called, w ere structured by the types of crim es the city or m unicipality intended to prevent in the first place and by the priorities of the federal governm ent. These last priorities w ere outlined in the Royal Decree and included property crim es, crim es against the person, public disorder, drug addiction and the security of certain vulnerable groups, such as the elderly and certain professionals. General and strategic objectives were form ulated for the prevention of these crim es. Each city or m unicipality had to select from som e of the general and strategic objectives outlined and to form ulate operational objectives and related indicators and evaluation targets. The priorities of the city or m unicipality had to be based on a local diagnosis of the insecurity problem s. Priorities had also to be in line w ith the zonal security plan of the local police. For these crim es general, strategic and operational objectives had to be form ulated. It w as no longer necessary (as had been required under the previous security and prevention contracts) to m ention for every prioritised crim e the actions, m ethods and financial m eans to reach the operational objectives. Rather, a global subsidy was given by the federal governm ent to realise the strategic security and prevention plan over a period of four years (2007-10). H ow ever, if the objectives are not realised the city or m unicipality could be financially sanctioned. Since the m id 1990s different types of w ardens and w atchers were created to im prove the security on the streets, in social housing, on public transport, at the football stadium . The Royal D ecree of 15 M ay 2007 created a uniform legal fram ew ork for all the security and prevention functions not belonging to the public and private police. The new function of gem eenschapsw acht (com m unity w arden) was created. A fter the parliam entary elections of Jun e 2007 Belgium was confronted w ith a deep political crisis at the federal level. Because of the difficulties in form ing a new federal governm ent, the 'purple' governm ent Verhofstadt II continued to handle the current affairs until the end of 2007. In expectation of a political com prom ise about a new constitutional reform a new governm ent was constituted with five parties, the Flem ish and French-speaking liberals and Christian dem ocrats and the French-speaking socialists. Until 21 M arch 2008 this governm ent was provisionally led by the Flemish liberal Verhofstadt. Since then the Christian dem ocrat Yves Leterm e becam e the Prim e M inister. All that tim e the Flem ish liberal Patrick Dew ael stayed at the Departm ent of the Interior. Since the elections of 2007 no new initiatives at the level of the prevention policy have been undertaken.

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T h e ro le o f th e in s titu tio n a l c o n te x t, o rg a n is a tio n o f th e police and p o litic a l ideolo gy The institutional con text o f B elgiu m , the organisation o f the police forces and the neo-liberal, social d em ocratic and social liberal political ideologies played a d eterm ining role in the d evelopm ent o f Belgian prevention policy. T h e first governm ental crim e p rev ention policy w as structured in 1985 by the institutional con text o f the national B elgian state. T he M inister o f the Interior w as the com petent au th ority for the elaboration of prevention policy. This neo-liberal oriented policy, characterised by a top-d ow n approach, w as developed in d ep en den tly from the crim inal ju stice policy. T he governors o f the provinces w ere responsible for the elaboration and im plem entation o f the national prevention policy. The m ain actors in the crim e prevention stru ctu re w ere the gen darm erie and the com m u nal police forces, w hich for the p u rpose o f their ad m inistrative com petencies w ere d ep en d en t up on the M inister o f the Interior. N ational prevention policy in the 1980s w as aim ed at ind ividu al m id dle-class citizens and m id dle-class neigh bou rhood s situated around Belgium cities. These constituted the core electorate o f the gov erning C h ristian d em o­ cratic and liberal parties. P rim arily prevention p olicy w as targeted at preventing victim isation am on g these groups. H ence, tech nological and situ ational prevention m ethod s w ere privileged , herald in g a neo-liberal com p onent w ithin prevention policy. W hen crim e prevention policy w as reoriented at the end o f 1990, B elgium w as no longer a nation state but w as transform ed in a federal state w ith three regions (the Flem ish, Brussels and W alloon regions) and w ith three com m u nities (Flem ish, French and G erm an) by the con stitu ­ tional reform o f 1988 (Platel 2004). The B elgian state w as now com posed o f three levels o f governm ent. T he first is the Fed eral governm ent, w hich has the resid ual pow ers not assigned to other levels o f governm ent (notably national d efen ce, foreign policy, the m int, social security, the ju stice system and the M inistry o f the Interior). T he second level is the Regions. T heir pow ers are defined territorially and inclu de, am ong other things, hou sing, transport, pu blic w orkers and foreign trade. A t the third level of go v ernm ent lies the C om m u nities, the p ow ers o f w hich are linked to the langu age of the citizens and inclu de edu cation, culture, health and assistan ce to people (and thus you th assistance). Th e reorientation o f the p revention p olicy un der the C h ristian dem ocratic-socialist governm ents (1988-99) w as first inspired b y a social d em ocratic v ision w hich from the m id 1990s w as transform ed in a social liberal one. In the first h alf o f the 1990s inhabitants of w orkin g-class neigh bou rhood s w ithin the cities becam e the privileged group o f a social d em ocratic inspired prevention policy. T h eir victim isation and insecurity by crim e w ere taken seriously. M ore social prevention projects w ere set

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up, aim ed at crim e afflicting those areas. A s such, crim e prevention policy becam e part o f a b road er social policy against poverty, social exclusion, d iscrim in ation and racism . A m ore robu st social d em ocratic com ponent in crim e prevention policy w as constituted . In the second half o f the 1990s m ore attention also w ent to the secu rity d em and s em an ating from the m id dle-class neigh bou rhood inhabitants in suburban and ru ral areas. The social prevention projects w ere now aim ed less at changin g the structural econ om ic and social position o f m arginalised groups, and becam e part of a b road er security policy of the m ayor and police. T he objective of p rev ention p rojects w as no longer the im provem en t of the econ om ic and social con ditions o f exclu d ed persons bu t a d ecrease o f crim e and insecurity. T h e social d em ocratic com p onent in crim e prevention policy w as gradu ally transform ed into a social liberal one. Th e local level o f the city or com m u ne w as privileged for the elaboration o f prevention policy. P reven tion policy w as no longer shaped b y a top-d ow n relationship betw een the federal and local level. G iven the form alisation o f p revention p olicy through con tracts, local ad m inistrative au th orities obtained an increasing ly im portan t p artn ersh ip role in co ­ d eterm ining the policy content. For p o litical-ideological reasons p rev en­ tion policy becam e m ore im p ortan t w ithin b road er crim inal policy due to the inclu sion o f w ider policies u n d er the au sp ice o f prevention (such as d ru g policy, d iv ersion ary policies, em p loym ent policy and urban policy). S in ce 1992, the B russels and W alloon regions and the French com m u nity sustained the secu rity and prevention con tracts o f the M inister of the Interior by financing som e social crim e prevention projects. P olitically they w anted to support the social d em ocratic crim e prevention p olicy of the socialist M inisters o f the Interior. H ow ever, for political reasons this w as not the case for the gov ernm ent o f the Flem ish com m u nity, w here C h ristian d em ocrats held a m ajority. T h e Flem ish go v ernm ent w anted to d istance itself from the federal go v ernm ent that took initiatives by m eans o f a security and prevention policy d ep loyin g com petencies that in fact belonged to the au th ority o f the com m u nities and the regions. From the end o f 1990 to the end of 1992 the com m u nal police played o nly a second ary role in local prevention policy. From the end o f 1992 until 1999, prevention policy b ecam e part o f a w id er secu rity agenda of the police. The role o f the com m unal police in local prevention p olicy w as reinforced. The p rofessional identity crisis of w elfare w orkers em ployed in the fram e of the security and prevention con tracts w as experienced d ifferently in both parts o f Belgium . In Brussels and the W alloon Region there w as greater resistance than in Flanders to the fact that w elfare and social w ork w as placed in the con text o f p revention and secu rity policy of the police. C on sequen tly, social and w elfare w orkers in the Frenchspeaking part o f B elgiu m have succeed ed m ore than in the Flem ish part to d evelop w elfare d ynam ics from w ithin the fram ew ork o f the security and prevention policy in a w ay that is ind ep endent o f p olice interventions 188

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towards the sam e problem s (Goris 2000; Van Cam penhoudt et al. 2000; M ary 2003). The dom inant role of the com m unal police in local prevention policy w as term inated by the liberal M inisters of the Interior during the governm ents V erhofstadt I and II (1999-2007). In 2002 the three Belgian police forces - the gendarm erie, the com m unal police and the judiciary police - w ere reorganised into a federal and a zonal police. As a result of this reorganisation, the execution of preventive tasks of the zonal police becam e m ore independent from local prevention policy. Police prevention projects had to be incorporated into the zonal security plan rather than the security and prevention contracts. Consequently, the zonal police have becom e less interested in crim e prevention. M any preventive tasks are now perform ed by civilians working in zonal police forces, such as giving inform ation about technological preventive m easures. As was already the case since 1990 for the gendarm erie, the federal police had no preventive com petency to fulfil. U nder the governm ents V erhofstadt I and II prevention policy becam e a part of a federal integrated security plan elaborated by the M inister of Justice under the 'p u rp le-green' governm ent (1999-2003) and by the Prim e M inister him self under the 'purple' governm ent (2003-07). The prevention elem ent w ithin this security and crim inal policy dim inished in im portance from 1999 until 2007, largely because for neo-liberal politicalideological reasons parts of other policies that w ere included in preven­ tion policy during the period 1992-98 w ere now system atically excluded (W illekens 2006). The regions and com m unities becam e less involved in the prevention policy. W hile the prevention policy and security policy of the m ayor and police developed by the governm ents Verhofstadt I and II becam e m ore integrated in a broader crim inal policy, at the sam e time prevention policy becam e less integrated. As in the 1980s, the M inisters of the Interior limited their com petencies to specific situational and techno­ logical prevention. Since 1999, preventive initiatives have been especially oriented tow ards the (com m ercial) m iddle class, the professions and sm all and m edium -sized businesses. The neo-liberal com ponent in crim e prevention policy was reinforced and for the first tim e a new moral conservative, authoritarian dynam ic emerged.

Belgian c rim e p re v e n tio n policy and m o d els o f c rim e p rev en tio n in th e E u ro pean U n io n Since the federalisation of Belgium in the 1980s politicians and policy­ m akers in the Flem ish part have been influenced by A nglo-Saxon and Dutch developm ents w hile those in the French-speaking part by evol­ utions in France. From this perspective the developm ent of the federal Belgian prevention policy is an interesting case of the transfer o f policies 189

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from England and W ales, the N etherlands and France (Stenson and Edw ards 2004). A com parative study of the crim e prevention models in those countries is necessary for a good understanding of the prevention policy developm ents in Belgium (H ebberecht and Sack 1997; H ebberecht 2002; H ughes 2007; Craw ford 2007). The new police prevention strategy developed in the first half of the 1980s was strongly influenced by the prevention policies elaborated by the British police from the end of the 1970s (Johnston and Shapland 1997; Crawford 1997, 2002b). M any of these new British police initiatives were known to Belgian police forces via the Dutch police, who had introduced them in the N etherlands (de Savornin-Lohm an 1997). Also the Belgian national prevention policy developed after 1985 was strongly influenced by both British and Dutch prevention policies, although unlike in the N etherlands, the m ayor and local adm inistration played no significant role in the Belgian prevention policy of the 1980s. By contrast, the reorientation of the federal prevention policy at the end of 1990 tow ards a local, adm inistrative and integrated prevention policy w as strongly influenced by the social prevention policies elaborated since the beginning of the 1980s in France (Body-G endrot and Duprez 2002). The im portant role of the m ayor in the elaboration of an integrated local prevention policy was em ulated from the French exam ple, as w as the institution of the local advisory prevention council. As in England and W ales, the N etherlands and France, prevention policy took the form of a contractualisation of relations betw een central governm ent and localities, notably since the end of 1990. Local prevention projects w ere only financed if they w ere consistent w ith the governm ent prevention philosophy. In England and W ales, France and the N ether­ lands a new adm inistrative organisation at the national level was set up to elaborate, co-ordinate and im plem ent the national prevention policy. In Belgium this w as also evident in 1993 with the establishm ent o f a Perm anent Secretariat for prevention policy. The security and prevention contracts negotiated betw een the M inister of the Interior and the local authorities of som e cities and m unicipalities were a typical Belgian policy initiative w hich influenced the further evolution of prevention policy in France in the 1990s (De M aillard 2005). The initiative to em ploy long-term unem ployed w orkers as city guards, a key elem ent o f the security contracts, was heavily inspired by the project of the Dutch city guards (Van Dijk 1990; Van Sw aaningen 2002). So too, the integration of the prevention policy in a broader integrated security policy over recent years was influenced by the Dutch integrated security plans (Van Sw aaningen 2005). Contrary to the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, w hen the situational and technological prevention m odel of England and W ales and the N etherlands com peted w ith a m ore social preventive m odel of France and Barcelona in Spain, the m ore recent integration of both m odels by the 190

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N ew Labour governm ent in Britain since 1997 has dom inated European developm ents (Crawford 2002a; H ughes 2007). This is evident in other W estern European countries and in the new m em ber states of the E uropean U nion since 2004. In Belgium w e can characterise the preven­ tion policy of recent years as a neo-liberal and authoritarian policy adapted to a social dem ocratic context in w hich this external influence has been present (H ebberecht 2008).

F ed era l c rim e p re v e n tio n policy, n e o -lib e ra l globalisation and th e crisis o f th e n ation state C hanges in the federal crim e prevention policy w ere not only an indirect reaction to new developm ents in crim e and insecurity; they w ere also the product of political choices m ade by a reorganised federal state in a neo-liberal global context (H ughes 1998; Taylor 1999). Since the end of the 1980s neo-liberal econom ic globalisation led in the first place to urban social fragm entation, polarisation, inequality and cultural diversification (Lea 2002). By these processes certain neighbourhoods w ere confronted with social problem s and problem s of crim e and insecurity. The authori­ ties had less success in realising social integration, cohesion and cultural hom ogeneity while sim ultaneously m eeting the dem ands of com panies and enterprises. A uthorities w ere increasingly confronted w ith contradic­ tory dem ands for security. O n the one side, (global) enterprises are less dependent on governm ent by w ay of their greater m obility. Social integration and stability, realised by a social and w elfare policy, are less im portant for them. Those (global) enterprises are also less willing to contribute financially to such a policy. N ow adays they dem and m ore security and control of 'risk' populations that m ight disturb and threaten the econom ic process. The federal governm ents tried to m eet those dem ands by enforcing a neo-liberal com ponent in their crim e prevention policy and since the end of the 1990s also by developing a more authoritarian and m oral conservative approach. On the other side, the governm ent is still confronted, although to a lesser extent, w ith a dem and from sections of the population to deal with problem s of crim e and insecurity by developing a social and w elfare policy. By not m eeting these dem ands, governm ent can lose their legitim acy am ong those groups of the population. For this reason, a social d em ocratic/social liberal com ponent in the governm ent crim e prevention policy was elaborated in the 1990s and still exists in the local prevention policy of som e cities. In line with G arland's (2001) analysis, the federal governm ents have developed in their security policy a double strategy, nam ely a pragm atic strategy of preventive partnership and since the end of the 1990s also a strategy of a m ore authoritarian and punitive segregation of certain 'risk' 191

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populations. A pragm atic strategy o f preventive partnership was developed in ord er to o v ercom e the lim itations o f the fun ctioning o f the crim inal justice system in the fight against property crim es. The authorities displaced responsibility for the p rotection o f all kinds of p ossessions to n eigh bou r­ hood w atch, to the (potential) victim s and to the private sector. This strategy con centrated attention on the effects o f crim e (the victim s and fear o f crim e) and less on the causes o f crim e. N um erous partn ersh ips betw een the priv ate and pu blic sector, set up by the governm ents V erh ofstad t I and II, have also to be understood in the con text o f this strategy. For the first tim e in the crim e prevention policy o f the last few d ecad es a m ore au th oritarian strategy of segregation o f certain risk p opu lations has been elaborated. T he target groups o f this strategy have been you ng p eople from ethnic m inorities, illegal persons, prostitu tes, beggars and d rug addicts. T his strategy o f segregation w as esp ecially elaborated in the fight against public d isorder. T his political strategy o f segregation w as prom oted in a radical form by the extrem e right-w ing V laam s B lo k / V laam s B elang and in a m ild er form b y the Flem ish con servative liberals and C h ristian dem ocrats. Sin ce the parliam entary election s o f Ju n e 2007 Belgium has been confronted w ith a deep political crisis. O n the Flem ish side, the C h ristian d em ocratic party, a d em ocratic Flem ish nationalist party and the extrem e right party V laam s B elang are d em and in g a m ore far-reaching federalisation o f Belgiu m w ith m ore com petencies for the Flem ish region. By contrast, all the French -speakin g parties are opposed to this proposal. At the end of 2007 a gov ernm ent w as form ed w ith the C h ristian d em ocratic and liberal party on the Flem ish side and the C h ristian dem ocratic, liberal and socialist party on the French -speakin g part. U ntil 21 M arch 2008 this g o v ernm ent w as provisionally led by the Flem ish liberal V erhofstadt. S in ce then this coalition o f p arties has been led by the Flem ish C h ristian d em ocrat Y ves Leterm e. Th e federal crim e prevention policy w as reoriented in 2007 by the form er 'p u rp le' gov ernm ent V erh ofstad t II. N ew strategic secu rity and prevention p lans w ere contracted w ith cities and m u nicipalities for a period o f fou r years (2007-10). This new prevention policy is now im plem ented b y the actual governm ent. T h e strategic secu rity and prevention plans w ere structured by the types o f crim es the city or m u nicip ality intended to p revent in the first place and by the priorities of the federal governm ent. The priorities o f the new gov ernm ent are also oriented tow ard s the situ ational and tech no-prevention o f property crim es and the auth oritarian approach o f pu blic disorders. In cities and m u n ici­ palities w here the local political pow er relations are in fav ou r o f the liberal o r C h ristian d em ocratic party these federal priorities are also reinforced by local neo-liberal and auth oritarian and m oral con servative inspired priorities. This trend is m ore present in the Flem ish part o f Belgium . In o ther cities and m u nicipalities, w here the socialist party is politically 192

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d o m in a n t s o c ia l lib e ra l in sp ire d p rio ritie s a re still in c lu d e d in th e s tra te g ic se c u rity a n d p re v e n tio n p la n s. U n d o u b te d ly , th e re s u lts o f th e n e x t fe d e ra l p a rlia m e n ta ry e le c tio n s (2 0 1 1 ) a n d m u n ic ip a l e le c tio n s (2 0 1 2 ) w ill b e im p o rta n t fo r th e fu r th e r d e v e lo p m e n t o f p re v e n tio n p o lic y in B elg iu m .

R e fe re n c e s Berkm oes, H. (1990) T o litionele preventie: een halte naar bestuurlijke preventie?', in C. Eliaerts, E. Enhus and R. Senden (eds) Politie in beweging. Bijdrage tot de discussie over de politie van morgen. A ntw erp/A rnhem : K luw er/G oud a Quint, pp. 111-18. Body-Gendrot, S. and Duprez, D. (2002) 'Security and Prevention Policies in France in the 1990s', in P. H ebberecht and D. Duprez (eds) The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe. Brussels: VUB Press, pp. 95-132. Carlier, F. (1990) 'De buurtobservatieactie: een politioneel preventieve reactie op de elitaire technopreventie te Gent', in C. Eliaerts, E. Enhus and R. Senden (eds) Politie in beweging. Bijdrage tot de discussie over de politie van morgen. A ntw erp/ Arnhem : K luw er/G oud a Quint, pp. 89-110. Cartuyvels, Y. and Hebberecht P. (2002) T h e Belgian Federal Security and Crime Prevention Policy in the 1990s', in P. Hebberecht and D. Duprez (eds) The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe, Brussels: VUB Press, pp. 15-50. Clarke, R. (1980) 'Situational Crime Prevention: Theory and Practice', British Journal o f Criminology, 20(2): 136-47. Crawford, A. (1997) The Local Governance o f Crime: Appeals to Community and Partnerships. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Crawford, A. (2002a) 'The Growth of Crim e Prevention in France as Contrasted with the English Experience: Som e Thoughts on the Politics of Insecurity', in G. Hughes, E. M cLaughlin and J. M uncie (eds) Crime Prevention and Community Safety: New Directions. London: Sage, pp. 214-39. Crawford, A. (2002b) T h e Politics of Com m unity Safety and Crim e Prevention in England and Wales: New' Strategies and Developm ents', in P. H ebberecht and D. Duprez (eds) The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe. Brussels: VUB Press, pp. 51-94. Crawford, A. (2007) 'Crim e Prevention and Com m unity Safety', in M. M aguire, R. M organ and R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford H andbook o f Criminology, 4th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 866-909. Delarue, J.-M . (1991) La relegation. Paris: La Documentation Frangaise. Delebarre, M. (1993) Le temps des villes. Paris : Seuil. De M aillard, J. (2005) 'The Governance of Safety in France: Is There Anyone in Charge?', Theoretical Criminology, 9(3): 325-44. Depovere, K. and Ponsaers, P. (1998) Evaluatie preventiecontracten. V ijf jaar preventiecontracten in Vlaanderen ('9 3 -9 8 ). Ghent: O nderzoeksgroep Criminologie en Rechtssociologie. Dubet, F. (1987) La galere: jeunes en survie. Paris: Fayard. Garland, D. (2001) The Culture o f Control. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Goris, P. (2000) Op zoek naar de krijtlijnen van een sociaal rechtvaardige veiligheidszorg. A nalyse van relaties tussen professionele actoren in het kader van een geuitegreerde 193

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preventieve aanpak van veiligheidsproblemen in achtergestelde woonbuurten. Leuven: KULeuven. De Haan, W. (1999) 'Sociaal beleid als structurele crim inaliteitspreventie', in E. Lissenberg, S. van Ruller and R. Van Swaaningen (eds) Tegen de regels III. Een inleiding in de criminologie. Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri, pp. 243-57. Hauber, A. (1999) 'Situationele en individuele preventie', in E. Lissenberg, S. van Ruller and R. Van Swaaningen (eds) Tegen de regels III. Een inleiding in de criminologie. Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri, pp. 258-73. Hebberecht, P. (1990) 'H et Belgisch politioneel preventiebeleid', in C. Eliaerts, E. Enhus and R. Senden (eds) Politie in beweging. Bijdrage tot de discussie over de politie van morgen. A ntw erp/A rnhem : K luw er/G oud a Quint, pp. 81-8. H ebberecht, P. (2000) 'H et Federaal veiligheidsplan versterkt de ongelijkheid inzake veiligheid', Panopticon, 21(2): 101-112. Hebberecht, P. (2002) 'O n Prevention and Security Policy in Europe', in P. H ebberecht and D. Duprez (eds) (2002) The Prevention and Security Policies in Europe, Brussels: VUB Press, pp. 7-14. H ebberecht, P. (2004) 'De kadernota Integrale Veiligheid van de paarse regering Verhofstadt II en het Belgisch preventiebeleid', Panopticon, 25(5): 1-8. Hebberecht, P. (2008) D e 'verpaarsing van de criminaliteitsbestrijding in Belgie. Kritische opstellen over de misdaad en misdaadcontrole in de laatmoderniteit. Brussels: VUB Press. H ebberecht, P. and Sack, F. (1997) 'N ew Forms of Prevention in Europe', in P. Hebberecht and F. Sack (eds) La Prevention de la Delinquance en Europe: Nouvelles Strategies. Paris: L'H arm attan, pp. 21-32. Hughes, G. (1998) Understanding Crime Prevention: Social Control, Risk and Late M odernity. Buckingham: Open University Press. Hughes, G. (2007) The Politics o f Crime and Community. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Johnston, V. and Shapland, J. (1997) T h e United Kingdom and the New Prevention', in P. Hebberecht and F. Sack (eds) La Prevention de la Delinquance en Europe: Nouvelles Strategies. Paris: L'H arm attan, pp. 33-59. Lea, J. (2002) Crime and M odernity. London: Sage. Mary, P. (ed.) (2003) Di:x arts de contrats de securite: Evaluation et actualite. Brussels: Bruylant. M eynen, A. (2000) 'Econom ic and Social Policy since the 1950s', in E. W itte, J. Craeybeckx and A. Meynen (eds) Political History o f Belgium: From 1830 Onwards. A ntw erp/Brussels: Standaard U itgeverij/V U B University Press, pp. 201-37. Platel, M. (2004) Communautaire geschiedenis van Belgie van 1830 tot vandaag. Leuven: Davidsfonds. Poulet, I. (1995) Les nouvelles politiques de prevention. Une nouvelle form e d'action publique? Brussels: Services federaux des affaires scientifiques. de Savornin-Lohm an, J. (1997) 'N ew Forms of Crim e Prevention: The Dutch Experience', in P. H ebberecht and F. Sack (eds) La Prevention de la Delinquance en Europe: Nouvelles Strategies. Paris: L'H arm attan, pp. 83-100. Stenson, K. and Edwards, A. (2004) 'Policy Transfer in Local Crim e Control: Beyond N aive Em ulation', in T. N ewburn and R. Sparks (eds) Criminal Justice and Political Cultures: National and International Dimensions o f Crime Control. Cullompton: Willan Publishing, pp. 209-33. Synergie (1995) La prevention integree an niveau local. Brussels: Politeia. Taylor, I. (1999) Crime in Context: A Critical Criminology o f M arket Societies. Cam bridge: Polity Press. 194

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Van Cam penhoudt, L., Cartuyvels, Y., Digneffe, F., Kaminski, D., M ary, Ph. and Rea, A. (eds) (2000) Reponses a I'insecurite: Des discours aux pratiques. Brussels: Labor. Van Dijk, J. (1990) 'Crim e Prevention Policy: Current State and Prospects', in G. Kaiser and H.-J. Albrecht (eds) Crime and Criminal Policy in Europe. Freiburg: Max Planck Institute, pp. 205-20. Van Sw aaningen, R. (2002) 'Tow ards a Replacem ent Discourse on Com munity Safety: Lessons from the N etherlands', in G. Hughes, E. McLaughlin and J. M uncie (eds) Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Neiv Directions. London: Sage, pp. 260-78. Van Sw aaningen, R. (2005) 'Public Safety and the M anagem ent of Fear', Theoretical Criminology, 9(3): 289-307. Willekens, P. (2006) 'Beter een vogel in de hand dan tien in de lucht: integrale veiligheid', Orde van de Dag. Criminaliteit en sam enleving, 35, 9-16.

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C h a p te r 9

G oing around in circles? Reflections on crim e prevention strategies in G erm any Michael Jasch

Crim e prevention has m any different faces. This applies to Germ any in particular because of the federal structure of the country. The Germ an constitution provides a highly differentiated separation of pow ers within the w ide field of crim inal justice: the central governm ent retains the legislative com petence for crim inal law and crim inal procedure, w hereas police laws and strategies are a m atter for the 16 federal states. M oreover, the sm allest adm inistrative unit in G erm any, the local com m unity, is entitled to pass a broad range of regulations concerning public order and social policy that can be very influential for the im plem entation or developm ent of local prevention policies. H ence, it is not surprising that such a federal structure leads to a rather patchy picture of crim e prevention policies. N evertheless, there have been and there are today som e com m on trends and developm ents in Germ any as a whole. The aim o f this chapter is first to give a brief account of crim e prevention strategies applied from the 1970s until the 1990s, before looking at recent policies since the turn of the m illennium . Finally, there is a critical sum m ary of the m ajor developm ents in Germ an crim e prevention policies during the past decades.

A b rie f history o f p rev en tio n strategies Exploring the context: crim inal justice and prevention in Germany

In G erm any, crim e prevention is a relatively new item on the agenda of politicians, crim inologists and the police. During the first decade after 196

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W orld W ar Tw o, research ers as w ell as p ractitioners w ere strongly focused on question s con cern in g the d etection and repression o f specific groups of offenders and offences. C rim in ology as an ind ep en den t aca­ d em ic d iscipline w as alm ost non-existent in those years, and crim e prevention w as m erely a subject for b ooks on the penal law , bu t not dealt w ith as a social p h en o m en o n .1 In the second h alf o f the 1960s, public attention w as d irected to the stud ent protests and riots - a rather new and irritating exp erience for the young d em ocracy that w as celebrating its 'econom ic m iracle' at the sam e time. A s a legacy o f the stud en t m ovem ent o f the 1960s, G erm any w as confronted w ith the ap p earan ce o f the Red A rm y Faction (RA F), a group o f left-w ing terrorists w ho totally dom inated the national d iscou rse on crim inal ju stice and caused a kind o f public hysteria until the end o f the 1970s. D uring the follow ing decade, a civil protest m ov em ent took the centre stage o f public and political d ebates on crim e and pu blic d isord er again: the rise o f the peace m ovem ent and the ecological m ovem ent led to perm anent - and som etim es v iolent - m ass protests against the d ep loym ent o f nu clear m issiles in W est G erm any, against nu clear pow er stations and environm en tal pollution. A fter tw o police officers w ere killed in the cou rse o f v iolent protests against the expansion o f Frankfu rt airport, d ebates abou t these civil un rests becam e a general d iscou rse about pu blic order, crim e and the pow er of the state. C om pared to these 'big issues' and several sp ectacu lar cases, everyd ay crim e and its p revention played a rather m inim al role in pu blic d ebates d uring all these years. N everth eless, d ifferent approaches to crim e p revention that have been applied in G erm any in the d ecad es before 1990 can be identified.

Technical prevention in the 1970s

A lm ost 40 years ago, crim e prevention becam e v isible as a distinguished subject o f crim inal ju stice policy and d iscou rses for the first tim e in post-w ar G erm any. In the 1970s, police started to praise prevention as 'the noblest task fo r the police' and prom oted the establish m ent o f police inform ation centres in all cities and regions arou nd the country. A lthou gh the first inform ation centre had alread y been establish ed in 1921 in Berlin, there w as no co-ordinated netw ork o f such offices in all federal states before. T o the present day, it rem ains the p rim ary pu rpose o f these centres to ad vise citizens how they can p rotect them selves from becom in g a victim of crim e by m eans o f technical provisions and correct behaviour. T he w ork o f the p olice inform ation centres has been accom p anied by a nationw ide pu blic relations p rog ram m e (K rim inalpolizeiliches V orbeugungsprogram m , see W einberger 1984), responsible for d evelopin g inform ation cam paign s on various crim e p revention tech niques in every day life, esp ecially the preventioii o f burglary, theft and fraud. T hu s, crim e prevention w as understood as form o f 'tech n ical prevention' in the first 197

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place, w ith police as security con su ltan ts for citizens w ho w ere regarded as responsible for the security o f their ow n prem ises and vehicles. A t the institutional level, tw o things are notew orthy about these early prevention activities: first, it w as in the 1970s that police d iscovered prevention w ork as a subject that need ed to be ad dressed system atically. T h e G erm an federal police, the B undeskrim inalam t (BK A ), organised an initial con fer­ ence entitled 'P olice and P reven tion' in those years (B und eskrim inalam t 1976). Second, the d evelopm ent of technical prevention program m es w as essentially a top-dow n m ov em ent, initiated by the central governm ent and the auth orities o f the federal states, and subsequ ently ad m inistered by the police. A lread y som e years later, prevention p rogram m es no longer relied m erely on tech nical provisions. In the first half o f the 1980s, G erm any experienced an econ om ic recession w ith an increase in the unem ploym ent rate b y m ore than 100 per cent betw een 1980 and 1983. E specially in big cities, difficult econom ic con ditions w ere a m ajor cause for the establish­ m en t o f various social initiativ es and youth p rojects by charities, local au th orities and state institutions - and presum ably for a shift in p revention strategies as w ell. Social prevention, defined as m easures aim ed at tackling the root causes o f crim e and the d isposition of ind ividu als to offend (G raham and B ennett 1997: 11), becam e the com m an d ing notion of crim e prevention in the 1980s. Edw in K ube, a form er ch ief o f the BK A , w rote in 1987: It has to be the task for (practical and scientific) crim e prevention to d eterm ine the individual and social circu m stan ces o f d elinqu ent b ehav iou r and to d evelop, to realise and to evalu ate practicable m eth od s o f p reventing crim inality . . . P revention is a com plex task, becau se it can only becom e successfu l if it influences social policies too. (K ube 1987: 7f.) In practice, the p reventive aspects o f the w ork o f schools, you th centres and social w orkers w ere sud denly recognised. A typical exam ple o f the new ap proach w as the pilot project 'P reven tion P rogram m e P o lice /S o cia l W o rk ers', set up in the federal state o f L ow er S axony in ord er to com bine m an p ow er and w orking skills o f police officers and social w orkers (Schw ind et al. 1980). Inevitably, the b o u n d ­ aries betw een p olice w ork and social services w ere b lurrin g in the course o f such projects. This by-p rod u ct o f the new inter-agen cy approach provoked seriou s critiqu e w ith regard to potential n et-w iden in g effects. Several scholars argued that p revention m igh t be a 'p roblem atic objective fo r the crim inal ju stice system ' (A lbrecht 1989) becau se the new co ­ operation betw een social services and the police w ould in fact am ou nt to a con cealm ent o f the professional interests o f the crim inal ju stice agencies, still oriented tow ards repression and control (see the d ebates in K reuzer 198

Going around in circles? Reflections on crim e prevention strategies in Germ any

1981). A t the institutional level, the new focus on social w ork au tom ati­ cally resulted in a partial inclu sion o f non-state organisations in the field o f crim e p rev ention w ork. C om pared to the 1970s, the new trend also represented a change in relation to the m ain target o f p revention efforts: from a notion o f 'technical self-p rotection' to a 'strategy o f proactive interv en tio n ', focused on convicted or potential offenders. B y the end of the 1980s, the notion of prevention had gained ground in G erm any. The p hen om enon of crim e, trad itionally regarded as a m atter to be d ealt w ith rep ressiv ely by state institutions, has increasingly com e to be regarded as a field for p revention initiatives. N evertheless, d uring both d ecad es the p rev ention o f crim e w as rather an im p licit task to be accom p lished - never at the top o f the agenda, n either o f p o liticians nor am on g G erm an crim inologists. The rise o f prevention in the 1990s

It w as not until the early 1990s that crim e prevention becam e a priority issue in d iscu ssions on the crim inal ju stice system in G erm any (M eier 2007: 268). T h e political con text o f the rise o f a p rev entative ideology is o bvious. The break d ow n o f the form er E astern bloc, the reu nification of the tw o G erm an states, the globalisation o f the econom ic system and a large and sud den im m igration from the East to W estern E urope a d evelopm ent that esp ecially affected G erm any - had d ram atically reshaped the social and econom ic circu m stan ces in C entral Europe. Feelings o f social in security w ere probably the d riving force behind extrem ely high rates o f fear o f crim e, esp ecially in the E astern federal states (Jasch and H efendehl 2001; see Figu re 9.1). Th e results o f surveys w hen people had been asked abou t their general assessm en t o f pu blic secu rity w ere even m ore frightening. In the m id dle o f the 1990s, 86 p er cent o f E ast G erm ans and about 70 per cent o f the ad ult p opu lation in the W est thou ght that security in public spaces w ould be at risk. A ccord in g to em pirical stud ies in 1993, nearly every second ad ult w as afraid o f beco m in g a v ictim o f a robbery, theft or b u rglary (Frevel 1999: 59). In those years, w e can observe tw o m ajor tend encies in G erm an prevention strategies: first, an attem pt to reallocate the resp onsi­ bility for the challenge o f crim e prevention; and second , a trend tow ards localisation - or perh aps better d escribed as a m u nicipalisation - o f crim e prevention. B oth these features are intercon nected and form w hat has becom e kn ow n as the G erm an ap p roach to com m u nity crim e prevention (K om m unale Krim inalpravention). Localisation and institutionalisation In the first half o f the 1990s, a new slogan becam e extrem ely fashion able am on g policy-m akers and police officers. C rim e prevention, they claim ed, h as to be a task for the w hole society and , at the organisational level, for 199

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

Note: Question: 'Do you feel threatened by crime in our country?' Shown: percentage of 'Yes'. No separate data for East/W est were available for the years from 1996 to 1998. 'East Germany' refers to the five federal states on the territory of the former GDR and Berlin.

Figure 9.1

F e a r o f c rim e in E ast an d W e st G erm a n y , 1992-2002

the local com m u nity (e.g. B aier and Feltes 1994: 697; B u nd esm inisterien 2006: 692). This axiom con tain s tw o elem ents that had been rather u n fam iliar for G erm ans w ho w ere used to regarding crim e exclu siv ely as a problem for the state and not for p rivate citizens. Fu rtherm ore, the constitutional idea of 'th e state' com prises the central go v ernm ent and the federal states, but does not inclu d e local auth orities, w hich are con cep ­ tualised as a self-ad m inistration of the local com m u nity (A rt. 28 Grundgesetz). C on sequen tly, the new ap proach heralded a tw ofold shift of responsibility for crim e prevention. The state institutions trad itionally concerned w ith crim e - the governm ent and the police - attem pted to share their responsibility w ith the citizens and local authorities. Sound ju stification for the local focus derived from the established crim inological finding that about 80 p er cent o f offences are com m itted by persons w ho live in the city w here the offence takes place (Steffen 2006: 1145), bu t it is likely, that sharing the costs and the risk o f failure o f prevention activities w ere also strong m otiv es for reallocatin g the task o f crim e prevention. Th e cornerstone o f this p olicy has been the establish m ent o f local crim e prevention cou ncils all ov er G erm any. In m ost federal states, the H om e O ffices strongly encouraged - if not to say initiated - the establish m ent of prevention cou ncils at the local level. At the sam e tim e, sim ilar o rg anisa­ tions w ere set up at the federal state level to co-ordinate and support the 200

Going around in circles? Reflections on crim e prevention strategies in Germ any

local prevention councils. Finally, organisations w ere established in ord er to co-ordinate and su p p ort the new p revention-oriented policy at the national level. In 1993, the G erm an Fou nd ation for C rim e P reven tion and the R ehabilitation o f O ffenders w as founded by a group con sisting of academ ics, the M inister o f Ju stice and a form er D irector of the Public P rosecution Service, and started to organise national D ays o f P revention (D eutscher P raventionstag)3, a con ference w here p ractitioners from preven­ tion projects m eet annually. In ad dition, the G erm an Forum for C rim e Prevention, set up by the H om e Secretaries o f the federal states in 1997, should 'initiate and co-ordinate national crim e prevention strategies . . . of governm ental and private institu tions' (B und esm in isterien 2001: 467). The establish m ent of these organisations has been geared to sim ilar bodies in D enm ark, Belgiu m and England. T hu s, there is now an organisational stru ctu re in existen ce at all three ad m inistrativ e levels for the exchange of inform ation and experiences w ith prevention projects. G erm any m ight thus be clearly consid ered as a cou ntry w ith a process-focu sed approach, w hich aim s - in contrast to schem e-focused strategies - at creating structures and ad m inistrativ e arrangem en ts in o rd er to d eliv er prevention efforts over the long term (Craw ford 1998). It is noticeable, how ever, that the initiative for the establish m ent o f the entire in frastructure cam e from the official sid e - the governm ent, local auth orities, and at the local level from the police. B earin g in m ind the fact that the local p olice forces in G erm any are not ind ep en den t but un der the d irection o f the federal state governm ent, police can be regarded as a long arm o f the crim inal justice strategy in each federal-state. In the state of N orth R h ine-W estphalia, for exam ple, the H om e S ecretary form ally com m itted all p olice au th orities to stim ulate the institu tionalisation of local prevention cou ncils (Frehsee 1998: 744). A t the federal state level, it w as each gov ernm ent that set up the prevention cou ncils, although som e academ ics and representatives of churches and private institutions had been invited to participate. A central p u rpose o f the new com m u nity cou ncils has been to establish an inter-agen cy approach to crim e prevention: not only the p olice and the ju stice agen cies, but also social services, local auth orities, sports clubs, shop ow ners, churches, trade unions and neigh bou rhood s should be concerned w ith crim e. In m an y cases, these cou ncils have achieved the netw ork in g goal w here sen ior rep resentatives o f d ifferent auth orities get to know each o ther and talk to each other on a reg u lar basis. H ow ever, this kind o f com m u nity prevention has failed to involve a broad ran ge of 'ord inary citizens' and has not becom e w ell know n in m ost local com m u nities. Preven tion cou ncils 'G erm an style' have been o rganised too m u ch in a top-d ow n w ay by the p olice and state auth orities - and so, the state has rem ained the d om inatin g and d riving force b ehind these cou ncils up to now . Yet, there are N G O s involved in prevention w ork and in som e exceptional cases, the initiative cam e from private citizens (for 201

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exam ple, in the city of GieGen; Schneider and Stock 1996). But in m ost cases, the people and organisations involved are professionally con­ cerned w ith crim e anyw ay and ju st reflect the local structure of power, the m ajority culture of the local com m unity. W ith regard to the role of the state, not m uch has changed significantly in com parison w ith the im plem entation of prevention strategies in previous decades (see above). Thus, an inter-agency structure for police and local authorities has been im plem ented successfully, but the local citizens have tended to stay aw ay from local prevention councils. It is o f no surprise then that such com m ittees raise critical questions as to the potential net-w idening effects of social control w ithin a local com m unity (Frehsee 1998; Kreissl 1987). In general, the topics dealt w ith by the local councils could be as extensive as suggested by the local situations and public perceptions of problems. In practice, how ever, the vast m ajority of councils have focused on setting up working groups on youth delinquency, graffiti and the prevention o f violence. Also, inter-agency groups on the prevention of xenophobic attacks and com m ittees concerned with drug crim es and the prevention of substance abuse are very popular am ong councils.4 It has been criticised, correctly, that the council's focus on young people, who are perceived and sim ultaneously construed as a risk for society, may have stigm atising effects for particular parts of the com m unity (Steffen 2004: 6; O stendorf 2005: 8). It is notew orthy that, according to a nationw ide survey (Bundesm inisterien 2001: 471), about 80 per cent of the local projects applied a social approach to crim e prevention (primary prevention) w hereas just 9 per cent reported activities in the field of situational crim e prevention. H ow ever, we have to take into account the fact that the options for local authorities to im prove the living conditions of particular groups are rather restricted because problem s like school funding, unem ploym ent, social benefits or im m igration policies are beyond the responsibility o f local authorities. Reallocation o f responsibility As noted above, there has been a strong tendency on the part of traditional crim inal justice agencies and the state to share the responsibility for crim e prevention w ork with local com m unities. Som e official statem ents made it very clear that the state could not, or did not w ant to, cope w ith the problem of crim e exclusively any more. In 1995, the then H om e Secretary of the federal state Baden-W urttem berg argued at the opening of a conference on com m unity prevention that 'now adays, security can not be provided by the authorities of the state or the local governm ent alone' (Birzle 1995: 9).5 Today, the internet hom epage of the police in Bavaria states that 'internal security requires joint responsibility, the engagem ent and assistance of the citizens'.6 In this context, sharing the task of crim e prevention has not been just a 202

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theoretical concept. A distinctive feature of com m unity crim e prevention policies has been the active involvem ent of private citizens in the w ork of the police. In som e federal states, different m odels of private policing citizens w ho support the police in an organised form - w ere set up (Putter and Kant 2000). The security guards project (Sicherheitszvacht) in Bavaria, established in 1994, was the first policing initiative in the context of com m unity prevention;7 other federal states, like H essen (Freiwilliger Polizeidienst), Brandenburg (Sicherheitspartner) and Sachsen followed the Bavarian exam ple.8 In m ost cases, these volunteers do not have the same pow ers as police officers. In particular, they are not arm ed (with the exception of Baden-W iirttem berg) and they are not entitled to use direct force except in cases of em ergency or self defence. It is intended that their job is to 'have an eye open' on the streets, to call the police if necessary, to support the professional police and to be a contact partner for the com m unity. On the beat, the volunteers are supposed to help prevent 'vandalism and street crim e' and their presence is intended to 'im prove security and the feeling of security of citizens'.9 From very different perspectives, this kind o f private policing has always been a source of dispute. Som e politicians and the police have argued that these voluntary citizens are not sufficiently qualified for the tasks they perform . The police unions in particular have articulated this argum ent, and it is obvious and plausible that police have a considerable interest in protecting their jo b s10 or even seeking to increase the num ber of officers rather than see som e aspects of their w ork transferred to a group of inexpensive but superficially trained volunteers. Sim ilar prob­ lem s occur in the relationship betw een police and private security com panies. H ow ever, this turned out not to be a m ajor issue in Germ any - probably because there are not yet so m any 'quasi-public' areas in private ow nership in Germ an cities and conditions for the establishm ent of security firms and the training of personnel have been put on a statutory basis.11 Such an atm osphere of com petition betw een different groups of the 'extended police fam ily' is well know n from other European countries and m ay be an obstacle for the deliverance of local security (Crawford et al. 2005: 83). In fact, there is evidence in Germ any that som e volunteers are not very skilled in de-escalating situations. In April 2007 a citizen patrolm an in H essen w as seriously attacked after he had stopped a car driver who was not w earing his seat belt. This incident triggered a w ide public debate on the question of w hether it is responsible for the state to send sem i-professionals out on to the streets for the sake of public order. O n the other hand, from a liberal point of view, there are claim s that we sim ply do not need even m ore control of deviance and more surveillance. Especially in Germ any, the involvem ent of ordinary citizens in police w ork raises aw kw ard m em ories for a section of the population because of the fascist legacy from before and during W orld W ar Tw o and - m ore recently, in a different w ay and w ith other consequences - the 203

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totalitarian regim e of the GDR. Both used m odels of private policing in order to keep the people under control. M oreover, there are indications that citizen patrols are ineffective w ith regard to crim e rates. A ccording to an early study on the Sicherheitswacht, conducted by a group of sociologists based at M unich U niversity, the most significant actions the guards engaged in was to tell off m en urinating in public and to reproach youngsters listening to loud m usic at night on the streets (H itzler 1996). Since significant reductions o f crim e rates could not really be expected from citizen patrols, it m ay well be that tackling fear of crim e was a m uch stronger m otive for the establishm ent of such projects from the outset.12 In essence, the establishm ent of citizen patrols has been a way to show the people that som eone cares about crim e and public order. Furtherm ore, in som e regions w ith specific problem s, involving citizens in the course of com m unity prevention has been used as an attem pt to keep the crim inal justice activities of the public under the control of the state and to prevent vigilantism . That becom es apparent from the official statem ent of the prevention council in the eastern federal state of Brandenburg, describing its prevention concept of Security Partnerships (Sicherheitspartnerschaft). The establishm ent of local Partnership Pro­ gram m es, the council w rites, was 'triggered by citizens' reactions to a series of burglaries, especially com m itted by gangs from Eastern Europe. Because of grow ing feelings of insecurity, vigilante groups turned up in several com m unities in order to protect them selves.'13 The uncertain future o f com m unity prevention Localisation and the reallocation of responsibility for crim e prevention by im plem enting an inter-agency approach have been the m ain characteris­ tics of com m unity prevention in Germ any. Beyond these features, however, quite different prevention policies have been established under the elastic um brella term of 'com m unity prevention' (Schreiber 2007; Lehne 2006). W hereas som e states and cities have used rather traditional m eans of control and patrolling that rem inds us of the so-called 'zero tolerance policing' in the USA, others have focused on strategies of prim ary prevention in the field of youth crim e. A fter m ore than 15 years of com m unity prevention, the experiences are assessed quite differently. The m ajority of practitioners and crim inologists praise the fact that prevention has becom e an issue for local com m unities and regard the com m unity approach as an adequate starting point for long-term preven­ tion policies based on em pirical and practical experiences (Feltes 2006: 835; Schw ind 2008: §18; Heinz 1998: 47). M oreover, there is a broad consensus that m uch more evaluation research on preventive approaches and projects is urgently required (W alter 2002: 7; Bundesm inisterien 2006: 684). O n the other hand, it has beeii argued that local prevention councils are rather sym bolic m eans of crim inal policy that have little if any positive 204

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effects on crim e or the fear o f crim e (Jasch 2003; H ornbostel 1998). A s one research stud y sum m arised the reality o f the cou ncils w ork in 2004: T h e m ain result [of p rev ention councils] has been to prod uce concepts, papers and d iscu ssions instead o f effective projects. Fu rtherm ore, m ost com m it­ tees are lacking in m an pow er and necessary financial resources, they are not legitim ised d em ocratically and their resolu tions and recom m en d a­ tions entail little com m itm ent' (Steffen 2004: 2). H ence, the futu re o f com m u nity prevention in G erm an cities w ith regard to their org anisational form as w ell as their activities seem s to be uncertain. It is u n likely that p articular cou ncils are going to be abolished by local auth orities, but there is a risk that they m igh t sim ply go to sleep - in p articular becau se now ad ays everyd ay crim e is not the m ajor issue fo r the p opu lation any m ore as it w as in the 1990s. Som e academ ics recom m end the d evelopm ent o f a 'collaborative crim e p rev ention' ap ­ proach based on a consensu s b etw een all groups o f society w ithout stigm atising p articular sections o f the population on the basis o f the existing com m u nity approach in G erm any (Feltes 2006: 835). O thers suggest that prevention cou ncils should secure d em ocratic legitim acy and ensu re su itable financial resources in ord er to establish a long-term security strategy at the local level (Steffen 2006: 10). Still others argue that p rev ention initiatives should becom e less bu reau cratic and m ore p lu ral­ istic (Jasch 2003: 417) and that the fun ding o f prevention activities should be d ep en d en t on research results and evalu ations (W alter 2002: 7). In this context, it m ight turn out to be useful that crim e prevention has been based on a process-focu sed approach w ith org anisational structures at the national, regional and local level becau se this institutional fram ew ork could ensure that the issue o f crim e prevention is kept alive.

T h e n ew m ille n n iu m T he v ast m ajority o f com m u nity projects o f the 1990s are still in operation today, even thou gh they are not m akin g the head lines o f crim inal ju stice d iscou rse any m ore. In G erm any, as in m ost other E uropean cou ntries, the prevention o f everyd ay crim e has been superseded by the threat of international terrorism in the afterm ath o f 11 Sep tem ber 2001, the attacks in L ond on (in 2005) and M adrid (in 2004) and som e arrests of suspected terrorists in G erm an cities. In the cou rse of cou nter-terrorism efforts, the face o f the crim inal ju stice system has changed also in G erm any and the threat o f terror is d om inatin g pu blic d ebates on crim inal policy. Legisla­ tion and p olicing policies in the first d ecad e of the tw enty-first century h ave b een characterised by a trend tow ard s m ore pu nitiv e and repressive m easures. Sim u ltaneou sly, the percep tion o f crim e prevention has changed tow ard s a red iscov ery o f 'p rev ention by m eans o f repression'. In past d ecad es, prevention strategies consisted o f m easures that intend ed to 205

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convince people not to com m it a crim e. N ow adays, prevention has com e more and m ore to m ean incapacitating people from com m itting offences. However, I do not believe that 9 /1 1 can be regarded as the decisive and unique turning point in Germ an crim inal policy. In fact, there w as a punitive trend in existence already before Septem ber 2001 (see also H assem er 2007). This pre-existing trend w as m arked by a perm anent extension of police pow ers, especially techniques of control, an increase in the use of preventive detention and the introduction of som e new crim inal offences. This has sim ply been accelerated since 2001, and it is by no m eans only directed at terrorism , but also at ordinary street crim es and at people who are presum ed to be 'dangerous'. The recent tendency of the crim inal justice policy can be illustrated briefly by m eans of four exam ples. (i) Justified with the goal of crim e prevention, the pow ers available to police and prosecutors to com pel people to render a DN A sam ple have been expanded. Som e years ago, the prosecution service w as entitled to gather DNA data only from offenders convicted of serious violent or sexual offences under the condition that further offences com mitted by him or her w ere likely. Since a reform of §81 g StPO 14 in 2005, it is available for all types o f offenders, not ju st serious offenders but also for graffiti-sprayers, shoplifters and fare dodgers. O nly two conditions must be met to com pel a m inor offender to undergo a DNA test and to record the data obtained for the purpose of future, anticipated proceedings. First, the individual m ust be regarded as a persistent offender. Second, there m ust be 'reason to believe' that he or she m ight com m it further sim ilar offences in the future. Such a law is problem atic because crim inologists have not yet discovered reliable indicators that enable us to identify persons who will continue to offend persistently or who will becom e a multiple or serious offender in the future (e.g. Sam pson and Laub 2006). (ii) O ne of the most striking developm ents in Germ an crim inal law is the extension of preventive detention (Sicherungsverwahrung, §§66ff. StG B1"’), im prisonm ent on the grounds that a convicted offender is regarded as dangerous to the public. Usually, offenders receive a prison sentence that reflects his or her personal guilt, according to the principle of personal responsibility that governs Germ an crim inal law. In recent years, judges w ere given extended statutory powers to im pose further preventive detention on the grounds of the prognosis that the offender m ay be a danger to the public in the future. The instrum ent of preventive detention is prim arily used for sex and serious violent offenders; how ever, it is also used to detain persistent burglars and defrauders. Since 2004, preventive detention in cases of serious violent crim es can also be im posed years after the crim inal trial if the assum ed dangerousness of the offender em erges only during the offender's time in prison (§66b StGB; for details see A lbrecht 2006). A s a consequence of various extensions to the law, the num ber of persons in preventive detention has m ore than 206

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d oubled betw een 1996 and 2006.16 This is perh aps the m ost rad ical m ode o f prevention by m eans o f repression one can think of. (iii) C C T V has been expan ded enorm ously. In pu blic places, cam eras are frequ en tly used in o rd er to restrain drug trafficking and vandalism . A lth ou gh w e know that d ealers sim ply change sites fo r their bu siness and the effect on crim e rates is rather lim ited (G ill and Spriggs 2005), the cam eras rem ain and provide su rv eillance o f m an y city areas. In particular, C C T V has been expanded in pu blic transport. C am eras have becom e a com m on elem ent insid e trains and buses o f pu blic transport as well as in tube and railw ay stations. E ver since C C TV played a crucial role in the arrest o f tw o m en w ith an Islam ist background , w ho planted bom bs in pu blic trains in C ologne in 2006, police and p oliticians use the incid ent to argue in fav ou r o f surveillance cam eras, although it w as in fact rather an exam ple o f the lim ited preventive effects o f C C T V .17 U p to now , there are no system s o f 'intelligent scene analysis' in operation in G erm any becau se w e are quite sceptical w hether such an extension o f surveillance com plies w ith data protection law s and the constitution. H ow ever, there is already one railw ay station w here a cam era system that should recognise ind ividu al faces by analysing bio m etric data is currently ru nning on a trial basis. (iv) Fu rtherm ore, w e can observe a d ev elop m ent that represents the natu re o f prevention strategies although it does not take place in the con text o f crim inal or pu blic ord er law . It has becom e very attractive for the state to collect as m u ch d ata on citizens as possible. For instan ce, since 2005 the social services and tax au th orities are entitled to gath er d ata from the bank accoun ts of all citizens in ord er to d etect tax offences and frau du lent applications for social security benefits or stud en t grants. The police and in telligence service - usually strictly separated for historical reasons - becam e entitled to exchange data gathered on ind ividuals. In com plian ce w ith E uropean law ,18 all G erm an p assports in the future w ill contain biom etrical d ata as w ell as tw o com puterised fingerprints. A lso due to a recent E uropean gu id elin e,19 a new law has introd uced the storage o f all telecom m u nication d ata (calls by teleph one and m obiles, em ails, SM S and b row sin g the internet) o f the citizens for at least six m onths.

F o u r decades o f p re v e n tio n : going a ro u n d in circles? D u ring the past 30 years, w e have w itnessed d ev elopm ents that look som ew hat like going around in circles. From a m erely repressive ap proach to crim e o v er technical and situ ational prevention to a notion of social p revention in the 1980s and com m u nity strategies in the 1990s, w e h ave returned full circle back to a d om inance of repressiv e tech niques in recent years. H ow ever, if w e com pare the reality o f crim e prevention 207

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today with the situation in the 1970s, it becom es obvious that the num ber of institutions, com m ittees and councils concerned with prim ary preven­ tion in G erm any has increased enorm ously. A lm ost every federal state and the m ajority of large Germ an cities have introduced prevention com m ittees in order to establish an inter-agency approach to crime. Today, the central governm ent leaves no doubt on its com m itm ent to a process-oriented approach to crim e prevention when stating that 'perm a­ nent structures are necessary' for a successful crim e prevention policy (Bundesm inisterien 2006: 692). However, it rem ains an open question w hether a high num ber of prevention com m ittees really constitutes a high priority given to a preventive approach to crim e in crim inal justice policy. A lthough there has been a certain rise of prevention policies at central and regional level in Germ any, most academ ics and practitioners are rather unsatisfied with the outcom es. W iebke Steffen, a leading sociologist w ith the Bavarian police, recently concluded that neither the practice of com m unity preven­ tion nor the police prevention schem es m ay be called a track record as such: 'A t the local level, the insight that crim e prevention has to be a task for the entire society and an overall responsibility instead of a by-product of politics is still not prevailing' (Steffen 2006: 1153). The official rhetoric relies on a twofold approach, with repressive crim inal sanctions and the extension of control strategies as well as proactive and com m unityoriented prevention projects: 'The antagonism betw een prevention and repression has to be regarded as antiquated, at least since also the crim inal law has chosen crim e prevention as its objective', the governm ent declared in its latest report on security (Bundesm inisterien 2006: 684). Such a statem ent show s that there is a need for future research to clarify the precise relationship betw een the concepts of 'prevention' and 'repres­ sion'. The question rem ains, how ever, w hether one of the two concepts will prevail in the practice of crim inal policy. W hereas local com m unity initiatives suffer from a lack of m anpow er, m oney and practical projects (see above), the expansion of police powers, preventive detention, data pools w ith personal data of citizens and other m easures w hich are highly relevant for civil rights m ight be more sustainable. In practice, there is a highly visible tendency aw ay from social prevention that aim s at the social circum stances of persons at risk, as well as aw ay from the presumed causes of crim e and towards prevention by m eans of repression and surveillance. The old and w ell-know n saying by Franz von Liszt, that the best crim inal policy would be a good social policy, has today becom e alm ost out of fashion. Yet, w e have to take note of one exception to this developm ent. U nder the heading of 'Early Prevention' a new area of prevention w ork is em erging in academ ic and public discussions. A n increasing num ber of politicians,20 social w orkers and crim inologists put forward the view that 208

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w e should intervene at a very early stage o f p eop le's lives in ord er to prevent d eviancy and future crim e. C rim e prevention, they claim , has to start in fam ilies w ith paren ts w ho are strained w ith the u p bringing o f their child ren (G alm 2005), in kind ergartens and p rim ary schools; even the prenatal period of child d evelopm ent has been d iscussed as a potential field for p reventive m easures (A nd ers-H oepgen 2006; B eelm an n et al. 2006; for a critical view see O sten d o rf 2005). This seem s to be a striking exam ple for a general trend o f m odern states to aband on 'restraint tow ards intervention in p eop le's priv ate affairs' and to apply a p olicy of 'behav io u r m od ification ' (Furedi 2005: 146f.). A lthou gh there is no doubt that strained fam ilies do need and d eserve help, it is question able w hether w e really need 'crim e p rev ention' as an objective to ju stify social w ork. W e have to bear in m ind that early p rev ention strategies m ight result in an early screening o f m arginalised and p otentially 'd an g ero u s' fam ilies and in a sort o f 'social eng in eering ' o f futu re generations. Sooner or later, early prevention m easures m ight resort to coercive intervention s in the p riv ate life o f fam ilies if the assistan ce offered b y the state is refused. The new ap proach rem ind s us that crim e prevention is an am bivalen t and p otentially d angerou s gu iding principle. W ith the intensity and realm of p revention, the extent o f control, regulations and intervention s in a society w ill grow . A lread y 20 years ago there w ere w arnings in G erm any that the society w ould be slow ly transform ed from a 'constitu tional state' into a 'p rev ention state' (D enn inger 1989). Today, the critics have gone one step further and claim that the statutes of the 'p rev ention state' have turned into a 'p ost-p rev entiv e secu rity law ' (A lbrecht 2007: 6) w hich puts security first and nou rishes the 'safety u top ia' (B ou tellier 2004) o f m odern societies. W e do not yet have m uch reliable kn ow led ge abou t the political reasons for this shift o f crim inal policy. H ow ever, it appears p lausible that at least three factors are at w ork. First, peop le's w illingness to accept risks as an im m an ent con d ition o f hum an life has d im inished radically. T hu s, we tend to regard crim inals and d eviants p rim arily as futu re risks, and less as fellow citizens. Second , in m odern and pluralistic societies, crim e has becom e one o f the last com m on 'en em ies', and the fight against crim e carries a strong p otential for m oral and norm ative guidance. T hird , a tough ap proach to crim e m igh t be a com fortable w ay for the state to prove its capacity to act. W hereas the im pact o f national governm ents on econ om ic and environm ental d ev elopm ents is rath er lim ited in a glo ­ balised w orld w ith m u ltinational con cern s, crim e appears to be a subject that can be tackled by politicians. M oreover, in con trast to social w ork for youths, the unskilled and the rising nu m ber o f poor people in a society that sep arates m ore and m ore betw een 'w in n ers' and 'lo sers', repressive m eans are supposed to be the tough ap proach to crim e. In the long term , it w ould be m ore prom ising to return to a policy o f social prevention, w hich takes the p articu larities o f local com m u nities into account. 209

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N o te s 1 The only exception to this narrow, merely juridical, perception of crim e was Heinrich M engs' book on the Prophylaxis o f Crime (1948). It remained the only academ ic publication on crim e prevention in a broader sense until the end of the 1960s. 2 The federal governm ent of Schleswig-H olstein played a leading role in developing the organisational fram ew ork of com m unity prevention and established the first German Prevention Council at federal state level in 1990, followed by the first local council in the city of Liibeck, a high-crim e area in the same state. Up to now, eight sim ilar councils at the federal state level and about 2,000 at the local level have been established (Schreiber 2007). Moreover, som e federal states have set up perm anent offices or co-ordination bureaus, w hich are com parable to prevention councils. 3 For more information see w ww.praeventionstag.de 4 A com prehensive register of local prevention projects is available on the internet hom epage o f the Federal Police B undeskrim im lam t: h t t p :// infodok.bka.de (for a recent analysis of the structure of prevention councils see Schreiber 2007). 5 Sim ilar to the statem ent by K u b e/S ch n eid er/S tock (1996: 16): 'For police and . .. the criminal justice system , the options for prevention activities are rather lim ited.' 6 vvww.polizei.bayern.de/vvir/sicherheitswacht/index.html (accessed April 2008). 7 Independent of the new com m unity approach, there is a voluntary police service (about 1,200 citizens in 20 cities) w hich has been in operation in the federal state of Baden-W iirttem berg since the 1960s. In Berlin, on the other hand, a coalition of social dem ocrats and socialists abolished the voluntary police service in the capital in 2002, arguing that it would be a relict from the Cold W ar Period, unsuitable for contem porary security challenges. 8 In 2007, the voluntary police in H essen consisted of 700 citizens in 90 cities and towns. In Sachsen about 600 citizens have joined this service and the Bavarian Sicherheitswacht counted 530 volunteers in 58 cities. 9 Quotes from the information leaflet on the Bavarian Sicherheitswacht. 10 A ccording to the police union, the German states reduced the number of jobs for police officers by 10,000 and for civil em ployees by 7,000 between 2000 and 2006 (w w w .gdp.de, accessed April 2008). 11 §34a, Trade and Com m erce Regulation Act (Gewerbeordm ing). 12 Today, the central governm ent declares clearly that 'crim e prevention must also strengthen the population's feelings of security' (Bundesm inisterien 2006: 691). 13 vvvvvv.brandenburg.de/sixcm s/detail.php/59444 (accessed April 2008). 14 German Crim inal Procedure Code (Strafprozessordnung). 15 German Penal Code (Strafgesetzhuch). 16 375 offenders were detained in preventive detention in 2006 (31 March), com pared to 176 persons in 1996 (source: Statistisches Bundesam t W iesbaden 2006). 17 The bombs w ere placed successfully by the offenders but did not explode because they w ere badly constructed.

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18 Decree (EU) No. 2252/2004 of the European Council, 13 Decem ber 2004. 19 Guideline No. 2 0 0 6 /2 4 /E G of the European Parliam ent and the Council, 15 M arch 2006. 20 In January 2008, the Green Party in the German Parliam ent suggested 'early prevention, education and w ork with parents' as a program m e for the reduction of youth crim e (h ttp ://w w w .gru en e-bu n d estag.d e/cm s/ju g en d lich e /d o k /2 1 5 /2 1 5 3 7 9 . handeln_statt_einfach_sitzen_lassen.pdf). One year before, the Liberal Democrats asked for 'early prevention measures in order to identify families at risk before a child is born and to supervise them' in order to prevent child abuse (3UFVh ttp ://d ip 2 1 .b u n d e sta g .d e /d ip 2 1 /b td /1 6 /0 4 4 / 1604415.pdf).

R e fe re n c e s Albrecht, H.-J. (2006) 'A ntw orten auf Gefahrlichkeit - Sicherungsverwahrung und unbestim m ter Freiheitsentzug', in T. Feltes, C. Pfeiffer and G. Steinhilper (eds) Krim inalpolitik and ihre wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen. Festschrift fiir Schwind. Heidelberg: Muller, pp. 191-210. Albrecht, P.-A. (1989) 'Prevention as a Problem atic Objective in the Crim inal Justice System ', in P.-A. Albrecht and O. Backes (eds) Crime Prevention and Intervention: Legal and Ethical Problems. Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 47-72. Albrecht, P.-A. (2007) 'Das nach-praventive Strafrecht: Abschied vom Recht', in Institut fur Krim inalwissenschaften Frankfurt a.M. (ed.) Jenseits des rechtsstaatlichen Strafrechts. Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, pp. 3-26. Anders-Hoepgen, E.-J. (2006) A u f Geivalt geschaltet. Zusammenhange zivischen pranatalen, perinatalen und friihkindlichen Erfahrungen und spdterer Gewalttatigkeit und M oglichkeiten der Friihprdvention. M arburg: Tectum. Baier, R. and Feltes, T. (1994) 'Kom m unale K rim inalpravention', Kriminalistik, 48(10): 693-7. Beelmann, A., Jaursch, S., Losel, F. and Stemmier, M. (2006) 'Friihe universclle Prevention von dissozialen Entwicklungsproblemen: Implementation und Wirksam keit eines verhaltensorientierten Elterntrainings', Praxis der Rechtspsychologie, 16(1/2): 120-43. Birzle, F. (1995) 'Kom m unale Krim inalpravention in Baden-W iirttemberg. Von der Idee zur Um setzung', in T. Feltes (ed.) Kommunale Kriminalpravention in Baden-W iirtemberg. Holzkirchen: Felix, pp. 3-9. Boutellier, H. (2004) The Safety Utopia: Contemporary Discontent and Desire as to Crime and Punishment. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Bundeskrim inalam t (ed.) (1976) Polizei und Pravention. W iesbaden: Eigenverlag. Bundesm inisterien der Justiz und des Inneren (eds) (2001) 1. Periodischer Sicherheitsbericht der Bundesregierung. Berlin: Eigenverlag. Bundesm inisterien der Justiz und des Inneren (eds) (2006) 2. Periodischer Sicherheitsbericht der Bundesregierung. Berlin: Eigenverlag. Crawford, A. (1998) Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Politics, Policies and Practices. London: Pearson Longman. Crawford, A., Lister, S., Blackburn, S. and Burnett, J. (2005) Plural Policing: The Mixed Economy o f Visible Patrols in England and Wales. Bristol: Policy Press.

C r im e P re v e n tio n Policie s in C o m p a ra tiv e P ersp ective

Denninger, E. (1989) 'Der Praventionsstaat', Kritische Justiz, 21(1): 1-15. Feltes, T. (2006) 'K onununale Krim inalpravention gegen weltweiten Terrorismus?', in T. Feltes, C. Pfeiffer and G. Steinhilper (eds) Krim inalpolitik und ihre wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen. Festschrift fiir Schwind. Heidelberg: Muller, pp. 825-39. Frehsee, D. (1998) 'Politische Funktionen Kom m unaler Krim inalpravention', in H. J. Albrecht, F. Dtinkel, F. and H.-J. Kerner (eds) Internationale Perspektiven in Krim inologie und Strafrecht. Festschrift fiir Kaiser. Berlin: Duncker & H um blot, pp. 739-63. Frevel, B. (1999) Kriminalitat - Gefahrdung fur die Innere Sicherheit? Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Furedi, F. (2005) Politics o f Fear: Beyond Left and Right. London: Continuum. Galm, B. (2005) 'Friihpravention von Gew alt gegen Kinder in psychosozial belasteten Familien. Friiherkennung - Friihe H ilfen', Deutsches JugendinstitutBulletin, No. 72: 4-5. Gill, M. and Spriggs, A. (2005) A ssessing the Impact o f CCTV, H ome Office Research Study 292. London: H ome Office. Graham, J. and Bennett, T. (1997) Strategien der Kriminalpravention in Europa und Nordamerika. Godesberg: Forum. Hassemer, W. (2007) 'Sicherheit durch Strafrecht', in Institut fiir Krim inalwissenschaften Frankfurt a.M. (ed.) Jenseits des rechtsstaatlichen Strafrechts. Frankfurt a.M.: Lang, pp. 99-137. Heinz, W. (1998) 'Krim inalpravention - A nmerkungen zu einer iiberfalligen Kurskorrektur der Krim inalpolitik', in H.-J. Kerner, J.-M. Jehle and E. Marks (eds) Entwicklung der Kriminalpravention in Deutschland. Godesberg: Forum, pp. 17-59. Hitzler, R. (1996) 'Der in die Polizeiarbeit eingebundene Burger. Zur symbolischen Politik m it der bayerischen Sicherheitsw acht', in J. Reichertz and N. Schroer (eds) Qualitaten polizeilichen Handelns. Studien zu einer verstehenden Polizeiforschung. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, pp. 30-47. Hornbostel, S. (1998) 'Die Konstruktion von Unsicherheitslagen durch kom munale Praventionsrate', in R. Hitzler and H. Peters (eds) Inszenierung. Innere Sicherheit - Daten und Diskurse. Opladen: Leske & Budrich, pp. 93-112. Jasch, M. (2003) 'Kom m unale Kriminalpravention in der Krise?', M onatsschrift fiir Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform, pp. 411-20. Jasch, M. and H efendehl, R. (2001) 'Krim inalgeografie und Furcht in ostdeutschen Stadtcn - odcr von der Notw endigkeit, auf schnelle Veranderungen forschungstechnisch zu reagieren oder diese zu ignorieren', M onatsschrift fiir Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform, pp. 67-81. Kreissl, R. (1987) 'Die Sim ulation sozialer Ordnung. Gem eindenahe Kriminalitatsbekam pfung', Kriminologisches Journal, pp. 269-84. Kreuzer, A. (ed.) (1981) Polizei und Sozialarbeit: Bestandsaufnahm e theoretischer Aspekte und praktischer Erfahrungen; Tagungsbericht der Expertentagung 'Polizei und Sozialarbeit'. W iesbaden: Akadem ische Verlagsgesellschaft. Kube, E. (1987) Systematische Kriminalpravention. Wiesbaden: Bundeskriminalamt. Kube, E., Schneider, H. and Stock, J. (eds) (1996) Vereint gegen kriminalitdt. Wege der kommunalen Kriminalpravention in Deutschland. Liibeck: Schmidt-Romhild. Lehne, W. (2006) 'Praventionsrate, Stadtteilforen, Sicherheitspartnerschaften. Die Reorganisation des Politikfeldes "In nere S ich erh eit"', in T. v. Trotha (ed.) 212

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Politischer Wandel, Gesellschaft und Kriminalitatsdiskurse. Festschrift fiir F. Sack. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 299-319. Meier, B.-D. (2007): Kriminologie. M iinchen: Beck-Verlag. O stendorf, H. (2005) 'Prevention um jeden Preis? Eine kritische Analyse kriminalpraventiven H andelns', in lnternet-D okumentation der DVJJ. Hannover: DVJJ. Online at: w w w .dvjj.de/dow nload.php7id = 334 Putter, N. and Kant, M. (2000) 'Ehrenam tliche Polizeihelferlnnen. Polizeidienste, Sicherheitsw achten und Sicherheitspartner', Biirgerrechte & Polizei (CILIP) 66(2): 16-30. Sampson, R. and Laub, J. (2006) Developmental Criminology and its Discontents: Trajectories o f Crime from Childhood to Old Age. London: Sage. Schneider, H. and Stock, J. (1996) 'Krim inalpravention GieBen e.V. Initiativfunktion von Seiten privater Gruppen', in E. Kube, H. Schneider and J. Stock (eds) Vereint gegen Kriminalitat. Wege der kommunalen Kriminalpravention in Deutschland. Liibeck: Schmidt-Romhild. Schreiber, V. (2007) Lokale Praventionsgremien in Deutschland. Institut fur H umangeographie der J.W .Goethe-Universitat, Frankfurt a.M.: Eigenverlag. Schwind, H.-D. (2008) Kriminologie, 18. Aufl. Heidelberg: Kriminalistik-Verlag. Schwind, H.-D., Steinhilper, G. and Wilhelm-Reiss, M. (1980) 'Prevention Programme P olice/Social W orkers (PI’S): A M odelproject in the Lower Saxony Departm ent of Justice, Hannover, Federal Republic of Germ any', Police Studies, 3(2): 15-20. Steffen, W. (2004) 'Grem ien Kom m unaler Kriminalpravention - Bestandsaufnahme und Perspektive', in H.-J. Kerner and E. M arks (eds) Deutscher Praventionstag: Hannover. Online at: w w w .praeventionstag.d e/htm l/G etDokum entation.cm s?XID = 81 Steffen, W. (2006) 'Krim inalpravention in Deutschland: Eine Erfolgsgeschichte? Erzahlt an den Beispielen Komm unale Kriminalpravention und Polizeiliche K rim inalpravention', in T. Feltes, C. Pfeiffer and G. Steinhilper (eds) Kriminalpolitik und ihre wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen. Festschrift fu r Schwind. Heidelberg: C. F. Muller, pp. 1141-54. Walter, M. (2002) 'Kom m unale Krim inalpravention - wozu wird sie fiihren?', forum kriminalpravention, 2(4): 6-7. Weinberger, R.-P. (1984) Polizeiliche Prevention durch Offentlichkeitsarbeit: dargestellt am kriminalpolizeilichen Vorbeugungsprogramm in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. M tinchen: Florentz.

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C h a p t e r 10

C rim e prevention in Hungary: w h y is it so hard to argue fo r the necessity o f a com m unity approach? Klara Kerezsi

H u n gary 's history in the tw entieth century - sim ilar to that o f other Eastern European cou ntries - has been characterised by constant change, w hich has often m eant fundam ental transform ations in its political, social and econ om ic system . The free parliam entary elections in the spring o f 1990 ended 40 years o f socialist rule in H ungary. This had an enorm ous im pact on all aspects o f the social, political and econ om ic life o f the cou ntry, and thus on crim e and crim e control policies. T h is ch ap ter d iscu sses the follow ing issues: first, the history o f crim e prevention, trends in crim e, and the m ain features of H ungarian crim e control policy; second, the 'stillbirth', birth, and th en revival o f the idea o f crim e prevention; and the circu m stances influencin g crim e prevention p olicy over the past 18 years; and third, harm ony and d iscord ance in the H ungarian approach to crim e prevention and the m ain featu res o f the C om m u nity C rim e P reven tion Strategy.

‘Z ig z a g s ’ in c r im e c o n tro l policy C rim e in H ungary becam e an acu te political question in the early years o f the transition after 1990. T h e first few years of this period had been chaotic, w ith a m assive increase in social d isord er and in the rate of recorded crim e. The rise in the nu m ber o f d etections lagged far behind the increase in the nu m ber o f reported offences. T he inv olv em ent o f you ng people in crim e also increased to a w orrying extent. 214

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□ Nunber of r e v e r e d offences ■ Number of registered offenders

Figure 10.1

'Z igzags' in crim e control policy, 1990-2010

A fter the change o f regim e, sim ilar to the other p o st-C om m unist countries o f E astern E urope, H un garian p olicy-m akers faced a dual challenge o f the rising crim e and the parallel d eclin e in perceptions of public safety com bined w ith the n ecessity o f a d em ocratic transform ation in the crim inal ju stice system , accentu ated by the needs o f an increasingly open society. Figure 10.1 sum m arises the shifting political land scap e in H ungary since 1990. D uring the first period o f the transition, legal reform s w ere dom inated by the requ irem ents o f so-called 'E u rop ean isation '. A s a result, the increase in crim e had p ractically no influence on crim e control policy. Betw een 1990 and 1994 the first freely elected C on serv ative governm ent follow ed a con sisten t rationale and a hu m ane ap p roach in its crim inal ju stice p olicy d espite a rapid ly increasing crim e rate. The 1993 am en dm en t o f the C rim in al C ode, am ong other things, d ecrim inalised prostitu tion, reduced the m in im u m term o f im prisonm ent from three m onths to one day, expanded the application o f non-custodial sanctions, increased flexibility in sentencing, and for the first tim e in H ungarian crim inal law , introduced the option o f treatm ent instead o f pu nishm ent for petty drug offenders. The su bsequ ent Socialist L iberal gov ernm ent (betw een 1994 and 1998) initiated a d ebate on how to d esign a m ore effective crim inal ju stice system , and declared its com m itm ent to continued crim inal justice reform s. U nfortun ately, the d esired crim inal policy d irection becam e 215

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

blurred , and the gov ernm ent sen t m ixed m essages to the pu blic and to p rofessionals about the aim s o f its policy. Th e general election cam paign in 1998 d em onstrated that pu blic safety and fighting crim e could be construed as salient issues, and the em phasis shifted from the lim its o f crim inal law to the issue o f efficiency. The Young D em ocrats' P arty (FID ESZ) w on the election w ith a 'law and ord er' program m e, prom ising to introd uce m an d atory life sentences w ithout p arole and gen erally tou g her pu nishm ents. The con cept o f the 'v isible and strong police' w as aim ed at d eterrin g street crim e. The pu blic was p rom ised a 'tough on crim e' stance, as w ell as a d eterrence-oriented reform o f the Penal Code. T h e sen tencing system becam e stricter, and the crim inal law w as given an increased role in the social control o f drug m isuse. T h e new cen tre right governm ent did not w aste tim e in starting a prison con stru ction program m e. A fter w inning the election in 2002, the Socialist L iberal governm ent introduced a new penal reform based on a tw in-track crim inal policy sim ilar to those in m ost E uropean countries. This governm ent considered crim e prevention to be part o f its crim e control policy, and for the first tim e sin ce the transition, crim inal policy show ed an interest again in d ealing w ith 'o ld -fash ion ed ' crim e. A com p rehen siv e reform o f the Penal C od e w as undertaken in 2003. Sin ce this point, therefore, crim e control policy has had tw o pillars in H ungary: crim inal ju stice policy and the system o f crim e prevention. A fter w inning the election again in 2006, the Socialist L iberal gov ern­ m ent reinforced the d irection it had taken in its crim inal ju stice policy by establish ing the legal and organisational fram ew ork for m ed iation, setting up a state-fu nd ed legal aid program m e, and introd ucin g the concept of the restrainin g ord er to support the fight against fam ily violence. In the cou rse o f its law enforcem ent and crim inal ju stice m od ernisation p rogram m e, the gov ernm ent aim ed to red uce the w orkload o f crim inal ju stice agencies, cu t law enforcem ent costs, as w ell as help and com pensate victim s o f crim e and 'offend ed-again st' com m u nities. The M in ister of Ju stice declared that com m u nity crim e p revention w as to be an integral part o f social policy, and a core elem ent o f a coh erent crim inal policy. T his recent ap proach to crim e control policy is w ell illustrated by a qu otation from an opening ad dress by D r Jo zsef P etretei, the form er M inister of Justice: Social d em ocracy as a social p hilosoph y concept aim s for full social integration. C rim in al policy based on this con cept is fundam entally different from the con trol-oriented approaches in that it is looking for m eans other than locks, bars and surv eillance system s in an attem pt to solve social problem s. (Petretei 2005) A rem arkable feature o f the d ev elop m ents in con tem p orary H un garian crim e control p olicy is that even though the first d ebates con cern in g police 216

Crim e prevention in Hungary

Crim e prevention activities

Crim e prevention initiatives

by the police

by other state bodies -N

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i c a

S

s

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i ?

i

i §

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Figure 10.2

Research programmes on crime prevention

The development of crime prevention in Hungary

reform date back as far as 1988-90, the dilem m as raised in these debates on issues of decentralisation, dem ilitarisation and the functions, m anage­ m ent and training of the police, inter alia, have still not been satisfactorily resolved. The new governm ental structure does not include a M inistry of the Interior w here the police had traditionally belonged. It is currently the M inistry of Justice and Law Enforcem ent that oversees its work. The experience of the past few decades show s that alternating Socialist Liberal and Conservative governm ents have chosen different crim e control principles to define directions and tools for law enforcem ent (see Figure 10.2). In this regard, different political directions m ay apply varying approaches to crim e prevention too, and offer more or less restricted resources for the delivery of crim e prevention program m es through setting different objectives for crim inal policy.

L ooking back: a sh o rt and tro u b le d h istory o f th e p rev en tio n o f c rim e in H u n g a ry The notion of crim e prevention first appeared in H ungary nearly 30 years ago. The governm ent funded a pioneering research program m e on form s of deviance, from 1980 to 1985. In addition, leading crim in­ ologists and police officials initiated a proposal for a Crim e Prevention A ct in 1982. A lthough this initiative failed, crim e prevention ideas gradually cam e to life. The H ungarian Society for C rim inology was 217

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

establish ed in 1983, and the first them e in its p u blication series w as the prevention o f crim e. Th e p olice had trad itionally been controlled by the M inistry o f the Interior, w hich w as also responsible for the fun ctioning o f m unicipalities. T he H un garian police forces are en tirely central governm ent-ru n, w hile the d istricts and m u nicipalities also have som e responsibilities for tasks in m aintaining pu blic order. The problem is that n either the p olice nor local auth orities have resources dedicated for the prevention o f crim e. Para (1) A rticle 8 o f the Local G ov ern m ents A ct (A ct LXV, 1990) states that local gov ernm ents have a nu m ber o f tasks related to local pu blic safety. In spite o f the provision laid d ow n in the A ct, m ost local auth orities did not set up public safety and crim e prevention com m ittees in ord er to im prove co-op eration w ith the police. T heir attitu d e con cern in g local pu blic safety boiled d ow n to the slogan 'the m ore police the safer'. Therefore, the relation ship betw een local governm ents and the police w as confined to the form er providing financial support for police patrols, or bu y in g cars for local police stations. D uring the first half o f the 1990s the police launched a nu m ber o f crim e prevention initiatives. 'C om m u nity p olicing' w as a new inspiration com ing from abroad. This idea appealed to the police, b ecau se through this it could present itself as a civil organisation serving the public, and free itself o f its form er im age o f the C om m u nist era. B esides this, local p olice forces opened 'crim e p revention ad vice cen tres' to provide situ a­ tional crim e prevention ad vice on hom e secu rity to the public. The police also launched 'D A D A ' program m es in schools in som e o f the cities and villages. T his special safety program m e for you ngsters w as based on the A m erican D A RE p ro g ram m e,1 ad apted to H ungarian circu m stances. H ow ever, this w as also the tim e w hen m any police officers left the service to find jobs in the private security ind ustry. At the turn o f the 1990s, as a con sequ ence o f rising crim e rates and citizens' perception s o f their lack of safety, a grow ing nu m ber o f 'civil gu ard ' organisations w ere also set up as citizens' initiatives.

The N a tio n al Council o f Crim e Prevention (NCoCP)

A new era o f crim e prevention began in 1995 w hen the N ational C ouncil o f C rim e Preven tion (N CoCP) w as set up to assist the go v ernm ent in its efforts to red uce crim e. H ow ever, establish ing this organisation did not m ean that governm ental efforts on crim e prevention becam e m ainstream . T he first chair o f the N C oC P w as the d irector o f the N ational Institute of C rim in ology w ith an o u tstand in g professional achievem en t, but the C ou ncil itself did not have a budget. H ow ever, this special personal circu m stan ce m ad e it possible for the C ou ncil to d evelop the first N ational C rim e P reven tion P rogram m e w ith the help o f research ers in 1997. It becam e the first com prehen siv e governm ental crim e prevention p ro­ 218

Crim e prevention in Hungary

gram m e, stating for the first tim e that the effectiveness of crim e prevention should be ensured by im plem enting a com plex set o f com m unity action points. Inasm uch as the Council lacked resources and co-operation from other bodies, the situation can be described as a 'Potem kin village'.2 The lip-service to crim e prevention continued with a Governm ental Decree [1075/1999] broadening the scope of N C oC P's activities with new areas of responsibility including the prevention of corruption; the co­ ordination o f preventative m easures concerning victim s; and drug preven­ tion. In spite of these being evidently im portant questions, the lack of clarity in the assignm ent of pow ers rem ained a basic feature that characterised the N CoCP over the ensuing decade: neither its organisa­ tional form nor the expectations concerning its role w ere clarified. In practice, it was doubtful w hose expectations the N CoCP should fulfil: the governm ent's (which established it), or those of the M inistry of the Interior (which determ ined the conditions for its operation). Additionally, its tasks w ere not set out precisely. Som e of its co-ordinating tasks clashed with those of the Victim Protection Bureau of the M inistry of the Interior, and the prevention of corruption com peted with the activities of the M inistry of Justice in relation to fighting corruption. Likew ise, the prevention of drugs problem s in internal affairs com peted with the drug prevention program m e of the M inistry of Youth and Sports. In sum m ary, by the turn of the century it w as not only im possible for the governm ent to fulfil its responsibilities in the area of crim e prevention, the adm inistration of crim e prevention activities also becam e confused. Public funds for crime prevention

Hungarian crim e prevention activities w ere akin to a badly organised beehive betw een 1995 and 2002. New organisations w ere established and old organisations w ere given new responsibilities, developing a certain am ount of duplication in the tasks and activities. The Public Fund for a Safer H ungary was set up in 1999, with som e resources to support crim e prevention program m es. The m em bers of its board consisted of crim inal justice professionals, researchers, academ ics and higher-ranking police officers. This public funding body w as also tasked w ith providing financial com pensation for victim s of serious violent crim es in 2001. W ithin the legal lim its, the Board of Trustees decided on the level of com pensation. In the sam e year another public fund was established. O ne person was able to convince politicians about the necessity of setting up a fund in order to provide financial support to the newly established N eighbour­ hood W atch program m es, im ported from Canada, and this person also helped launch som e of the schem es in Hungary. Respect for M r Kopacsi dated back to the H ungarian Revolution of 1956 when, as the Budapest chief of police, he changed sides and began to support the rebels. A fter 219

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

serving a long prison sentence, he em igrated to Canada, and returned to H ungary after the change o f regim es. W ith his help, this crim e prevention initiative directly affected H ungarian practice. This public fund was also given responsibility for subsidising disaster prevention. The two public funds w ere subsequently am algam ated.

N a tio n a l strate g y fo r c o m m u n ity c rim e p rev en tio n In O ctober 2003 the Parliam ent adopted a resolution to approve the N ational Crim e Prevention Strategy (M inistry of Justice 2003). A new N ational Crim e Prevention Board (NCPB) was established under the auspices of the M inistry of Justice. The Board had shared chairing arrangem ents, w ith an expert chair and two co-chairs: the M inister of the Interior and the M inister of Justice. A new N ational Crim e Prevention Centre was also set up in the M inistry of the Interior, with responsibility for the m anagem ent and adm inistrative tasks. By setting up this centre, the M inister of the Interior ensured the continuity of im plem enting crim e prevention guidelines at m inistry level. The N ational Crim e Prevention Strategy envisages crim e prevention as a particular type of social policy that entails both professional and civic activities, and som ething that m ust be governed by state authorities. The C om m unity Crim e Prevention Strategy is designed to be accom plished through a partnership w ith crim inal justice and law enforcem ent agencies. Com m unity crim e prevention involves sets of objectives to curb the effect of the underlying causes of crim e, reduce the risk of becom ing a victim , increase the safety of the com m unity as a whole, and thus im prove the quality of life and the fulfilm ent of individual hum an rights. U ltim ately, the Com m unity Crim e Prevention Strategy contributes to econom ic developm ent, the secure operation of the m arket and the reduction of m oral and m aterial dam age caused by crim e. Expenditure on crim e prevention m easures m ust be regarded as an investm ent, with returns in the perceptible im provem ent of public safety. During the preparation phase, a SW O T analysis3 was used to highlight how the strategy w ould contribute to achieving different (and potentially conflicting) objectives and priorities. The analysis w as perform ed in different subcategories (e.g. resources, structure, value and level of professionalism ). It helped to determ ine crim e prevention priority areas, to establish goals pertaining to these areas, and to put an action plan in place to achieve these goals. Based on the findings, a num ber of strengths could also be identified. These included, for instance, existing possibilities for m itigating the dam age suffered by victim s of violent crim e; the Victim Protection Bureau, established in the M inistry of the Interior; the existence of the N ational Crim e Prevention Council since 1995; the grow ing num ber of 'civil guard' organisations; and the efforts of the police to dissem inate 220

C rim e prevention in Hungary

inform ation on situ ational crim e prevention. O n the other hand, the analysis also revealed som e sig nificant w eaknesses. T hese included, am on g m an y others, the shortage o f finance; the lack o f specialised victim services; and the u n derd eveloped system for m easurin g latent crim e. The lack o f an ad equ ate sen se o f responsibility for local pu blic safety b y local governm ents w as also consid ered to be a w eakness. An analysis o f the external environm en t o f the system w as also perform ed from a p olitical, econ om ic, social and technical point o f view . It revealed new op portu nities for crim e prevention, and first am on g these w as the g ov ern m en t's com m itm ent to crim e prevention, w hich is essential for launching any kind o f new initiative. The existen ce o f a nationw ide ch ild ren 's w elfare and child protection system , and the new d ru g strategy and its action plan w ere also consid ered as strength s, as w as the o p p ortu nity to join the E uropean U nion C rim e P reven tion N etw ork, w hich m ad e it possible to adopt blu ep rin t m od el program m es in crim e prevention. It w as obviou s that any changes in the external environm en t m igh t present threats to the system o f crim e prevention and jeop ard ise the fulfilm ent o f its goals. For instan ce, d ifferent org anisational cultures m ight in p ractice override crim e prevention objectives, or the fear o f crim e am on g m em bers of the public m igh t not correspond w ith the real risk of v ictim isation, and new inform ation m ight only exacerbate this subjective fear.

The strategy’s background

T he rise o f crim e and anti-social behav iou r w as a m ajor blot on the political land scape of C entral E astern E uropean cou ntries undergoing transition. In the period betw een 1970 and 1995, the nu m ber o f reported crim es increased fourfold in H ungary. O ver a span o f ju st three years, betw een 1989 and 1992, H ungarians faced a boom in crim e that W estern E uropean cou ntries had experienced over a lengthier period o f tw o d ecades. The pu blic w as shocked by the speed of the rise in crim e. H ow ever, this phen om enon w as not specific to H ungary, as sim ilar trends could be observed in all o f the form er socialist bloc countries. The hum an costs o f transition in H u n gary turned out to be far higher than anticipated. T he loss o f secu rity and the grow th in the fear o f crim e w ere closely connected w ith un em ploym en t, social exclu sion and the loss o f a personal o u tlook for som e age coh orts and social strata. Som e social groups (for exam ple fam ilies w ith child ren, the elderly on a low incom e, the unskilled and un em ployed , and the Rom a) paid a higher than av erage price for the transition. A t the b eginn ing o f the new cen tury a com parison o f regional (county) crim e rates and G D P per capita show ed that w here G D P w as higher, the nu m ber o f reported crim es w as also h igh er (M in istry o f Ju stice 2 0 0 3 :1 7 ). Sin ce then, this trend has becom e som ew hat blurred. O n the one hand, the H un garian crim e rate has stabilised ov er the last four to five 221

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

7000

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6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 -

I ---------------------------------------------------------------------r v n i l i l j j 1 I I 1111I I

1000 0 4- ■ i

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GDP per capita (2006) (Thousand HUF) -------LineAris (GDP per capita (2006) (Thousand HUF))

Source: HCSO (2008) and Office of the Prosecutor General (2008)

Figure 10.3

G DP per capita, and crim e rates per capita by counties in Hungary

years. O n the other hand, as Figure 10.3 show s, in the poorer counties w here G D P per capita is low - esp ecially in the north-eastern parts o f the cou ntry - the crim e rate per capita can be as high as in the m ore developed counties. It is notew orthy that in the p oorer cou nties, the com position of crim e show s m u ch higher levels o f v iolent crim inality (such as hoolig an­ ism , bodily harm , v and alism ) than before. The socially and econ om ically m ost d isad v an taged regions (prim arily the north -east o f the country) are the ones that em erge as the prim ary regional sou rces o f crim e, w here the ratio o f reported offenders is higher. These areas have low er than av erage G D P per capita, w hereas the un em ploym en t rate am ong you ng people is higher, and child poverty is also m ore pronou nced than in other parts o f the country. By contrast, the capital city (B ud apest) and the m id and w estern counties can be regarded as the prim ary targets o f crim e. T hese areas exp erience a higher nu m ber o f reported crim es than the size o f their p opu lation w ould ju stify, and as the am ou nt o f accu m ulated w ealth here is larger than average, m ore op p ortu nities exist for crim e.

The scope and lim itations o f the Com m unity Crim e Prevention Strategy

The N ational C om m u nity C rim e P revention S trategy aim ed to undertake a com prehen siv e task, w hile also attem p ting to take the lim itations of com m u nity crim e prevention into con sid eration. It recognised that com ­ m u nity crim e prevention could not encom pass all activity types aim ed at red ucin g crim e. C om m u nity crim e prevention is above all d irected at red ucing crim e that d irectly harm s or puts citizens and their com m u nities at risk. In ad dition, in a lim ited w ay, it inclu des a nu m ber o f activities against specific form s o f crim e that fall into the category o f organised crim e; and against certain typ es o f crim e, related to international 222

C rim e prevention in Hungary

TH E COM M UNITY CR IM E PREVEN TIO N SY S T E M System of drug and alcohol prevention

Public collections and cultural institutions

Environmental protection, sport

&T a s k s o f p o lice ' an d crim inal justice

S e c to ra l co o pe ra tio n

I

j

C o m m u n ity crim e prevention

Source: Ministry of Justice (2003: 42)

Figure 10.4

The subsystem s of com m unity crim e prevention

m igration, that can d irectly affect ind ividu als, com m u nities, N G O s and churches. T hu s, com m u nity-based crim e prevention is m ostly effective against 'ev eryd ay' crim es that influence the p u blic's sen se o f security. In a com prehen siv e system o f com m u nity crim e prevention (see Figure 10.4), three m ajor strands can be distinguished: 1. T he various organisations that curren tly deal w ith crim e p revention ex officio, in clu ding trad itional police and crim inal ju stice functions con­ cerned w ith crim e reduction. 2. C lose sectoral co-operation am on g au th orities to rem ov e the causes of crim e, red uce the nu m ber o f o p portu nities for crim e and the risk of b ecom in g a v ictim of crim e. A ll functions are inclu ded here that can be im plem ented via partn ersh ips betw een sectors, and b etw een go v ern­ m en t d ep artm ents, as w ell as through necessary co-operation am ong the latter on an equal basis. 3. T he com m u nity crim e prevention system is com p lete w ith local and w ider com m u nities also assu m ing their responsibilities; that is, if action for attaining goals is forthcom ing from people and organisations w ho are able and w illing to im prove com m u nities' capabilities o f d efending them selves. 223

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

O ne of the key principles that guide effective crim e prevention is that of 'sim ultaneous com petency'. This m eans that the strategy can only deliver lasting results if m easures to reduce the effects of the social causes of crim e, victim isation and opportunities for crim e are applied sim ulta­ neously. Crim e prevention w ork at the local level is voluntary. The state adm inistration prepares plans, different m inistries draw up strategies, but their delivery at the local level is not m andatory. The H ungarian crim e prevention strategy therefore lacks legal teeth. Constitutional principles in crime prevention

C om m unity crim e prevention itself is a system of checks and balances that incorporates, on the one hand, the im plem entation of social control m easures for increasing public safety, and on the other hand, the preservation of individual autonom y and respect for human rights. In this context, the N ational Strategy states: Com bating crim e is a socially accepted objective. H ow ever, m easures taken to pursue this objective, and to reduce the fear of crim e, have the possible side-effects of excluding certain groups and raising prejudices against juvenile delinquents, ex-prisoners, drug addicts, hom eless people, poor people and Gypsies. The social crim e preven­ tion system is based on the principle of social justice. It m ust therefore endeavour both to avoid social exclusion and prejudice and to uphold rights of security. (M inistry of Justice 2003: 34) In selecting the mode of prevention, the intervention m ust follow the principle of proportionality, and a balance m ust be struck betw een the autonom y of the individual and the exercise of com m unity control. In pursuance of the requirem ents of security and the protection of hum an rights, the traditional system of crim inal justice, with its m any guarantees, must be safeguarded in such a way that it does not becom e subordinated to specific considerations o f com m unity crim e prevention. The Strategy’s objectives and priorities

The Com m unity Crim e Prevention Strategy intends to im prove the quality of life by ensuring public safety and reducing crim e. It defines a system of linked objectives on different levels. In general, the strategy covers a w ide range of areas, and opens the door for a large num ber of m easures (see Figure 10.5). The objectives form the m ain directions o f the strategy. They define a vertical approach to the Com m unity Crim e Prevention Strategy in three m ajor target areas: (i) the everyday life of the public; (ii) the arena of social policy concerned w ith crim e prevention; and (iii) local and m ulti-sector players involved in crim e prevention. This three-w ay division is intended 224

C rim e prevention in Hungary

Strategic o b jectiv es

High level o b je ctiv e s

S p e c ific o b jectives

Source: Ministry of Justice (2003: 41)

Figure 10.5

The com m unity crim e prevention strategy's system of objectives

to m ake the goals clear both to the pu blic and to the organisations responsible for im plem enting the Strategy. Five p riority areas are id enti­ fied: (i) the prevention and red uction o f ju venile d elinqu en cy; (ii) the im p rovem en t o f urban safety; (iii) the p revention o f violence w ithin the fam ily; (iv) the p revention o f victim isation and p roper m eans to help victim s o f crim e; and (v) the prevention o f re-offending.

The m anagem ent o f com m unity crim e prevention in Hungary

C o m m u nity crim e p rev ention as an integral part of social policy can only be p roperly m anaged through joined-u p go v ernan ce by cen tral go v ern­ m en t and m inistries, joined -u p public tend ering for local and p rofessional partn ers, as w ell as joined-u p training for professionals (G onczol and K erezsi 2004). It is the go v ern m en t's task to pu t the fundam ental legislative, organisational and technical prerequ isites in p lace for crim e prevention. This requ ires responsible co-operation am on g m inistries on an equ al basis. It is crucial that continuous co-operation is m aintained inside cen tral governm ent, am on g m inistries and professional institutions, and betw een governm ental and non-governm ental organisations. 225

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

The H ungarian N ational Crim e Prevention Board undertakes the co-ordination of com m unity prevention on behalf of the governm ent, and is responsible for im plem enting the strategy. The pow ers of the N ational Crim e Prevention Board are: • To establish long-term partnerships and fora for dialogue among partners both at horizontal and vertical levels. • To set up such an organisation a n d /o r partnership that w hich is capable of m onitoring and evaluating inform ation and recent findings from research on crim e, victim s and crim inal justice. • To m anage regulatory and deregulatory activities defined by law. • To periodically revise and update the action plan according to strategic goals and priorities. • To revise and m aintain a public com m unications strategy and an internal one for partners. The N ational Crim e Prevention Board is chaired by a crim e prevention expert, appointed by the Prim e M inister. The Secretariat of the Board is based in the M inistry of Justice and Law Enforcem ent. This m odel attem pts to utilise the strengths and traditions of the earlier, more police-oriented, system of crim e prevention, but also to involve new parties in the crim e prevention partnership. Effective com m unity crim e prevention m eans interdisciplinary co­ operation in horizontal (across several m inisterial departm ents), and vertical (between m unicipal and county-level local governm ent) partner­ ships. It m eans that crim e prevention is an integrated part of local public affairs, and the local action plan is an adequate response to local crim e and local fear of crim e. Therefore, the existence of a local partnership is an essential condition for action. G overnm ent support and public funding is granted for joint local training program m es, local surveys, program m es and m onitoring. Annual action plans

Since the initiation of the first N ational Crim e Prevention Strategy in 2003, annual crim e prevention action plans, as well as annual reports for Parliam ent on the im plem entation of the Strategy, have been prepared. The governm ent's action plans, drawn up in accordance with the Strategy, specify tasks for the relevant m inistries, national bodies and data providers, and require continuous co-operation betw een the relevant partners. The action plans have stim ulated various new program m es each year. By w ay of overview , the N ational Crim e Prevention Board has a duty to subm it a biennial report to Parliam ent on the im plem entation of 226

Crim e prevention in Hungary

the Strategy. The N ational Crim e Prevention Board also provides a conduit through which governm ent funding for crim e prevention activ­ ities is channelled. The Board announces invitations to tender every year for program m es in two categories, for 'm acro' and 'm icro' projects. For instance, one m acro project was set up to create a com pact for the protection of children in M orahalom through a w ide partnership, and another to establish a probation centre as an experim ental project. Exam ples of funded m icro projects include a dem onstration project for graffiti rem oval through com m unity w ork and a project providing peer-assisted training for juveniles. H ow ever, the com m unity crim e prevention strategy and the governm ent action plan can only becom e an integrated part of local social policy with the involvem ent of the local authorities. M unicipalities m ust, in partnership w ith local police, play an active and leading role in producing plans for local com m unity safety. The local governm ent, as the provider of most local services and the controller of local public adm inistration as well as the forum for local political debate, should serve to lead, stim ulate and co-ordinate local crim e prevention.

Conclusion Even though the idea of crim e prevention had been in existence in H ungarian crim inology since the 1980s, it had no significant effect on legislation or public attitudes until the beginning of the tw enty-first century. The police w ere active in practical crim e prevention, having borrow ed several ideas ranging from the com m unity policing model to the zero tolerance approach, but local governm ents undertook hardly any tasks and responsibilities in this area. D espite the continuous efforts of national law enforcem ent and crim inal justice agencies, perceptions of public safety have show n a deteriorating trend. During the last 20 years, H ungarian crim inal policy has faced the dual challenge of, first, a threefold increase in the national crim e rate and declining public safety, and second, the need for a dem ocratic transform ation in the crim inal justice system , led by the dem ands of an increasingly open society. In the first period of the transition, legal changes focused on m eeting the standards of a 'European crim inal law '. As a result of this, the increase in crim e had practically no influence on crim e control policy during this time. M eanw hile, crim inal policy with every new parliam entary cycle shifted either to becom e tougher or to take a social integration approach. Furtherm ore, the continuously changing organisational structure of the crim e prevention system did not help to clarify crim e prevention definitions and tasks. A lthough a high level of inequality and m ultiple structural strains appeared in the course of the transition process, the political clim ate 227

C rim e Prevention Policies in Comparative Perspective

needed alm ost one and a half decades to elapse before the im portance of com m unity crim e prevention becam e accepted. Since then, H ungarian crim e control policy has been based on the tw o pillars of crim inal justice policy and the system of crim e prevention (Kerezsi and Levay 2008). By the end of the last century 'com m unity' had becom e a central organising concept of crim inal justice in the developed world. N otions of com m unity policing, com m unity prosecution, com m unity justice and com m unity corrections show that the concept of com m unity has a strong association with crim inal justice. These associations also dem onstrate that close relationships have been established am ong the stakeholders in crim e control that would have been unim aginable in previous decades. The 'reallocation' of som e of the sentencing pow ers of the courts in the form of diversion significantly increases the role and pow er of prosecutors in the crim inal procedure (Kerezsi 2006). H owever, this is only one sign of the shifting balance am ong the actors of crim inal justice. In other ways, the sentencing guidelines (which m ay also be view ed as a 'straitjacket' for the courts), the obligatory m inim um sanctions, the 'three strikes' laws and the subsequently w ithdrawn rule of a m inim um prison sentences also reduce the sentencing pow ers of the courts. In crim inological thought the governance of safety has becom e asso­ ciated with the preventive turn in crim e control strategies in Europe that acknow ledge the lim its of crim inal justice, invoke the direct participation of statutory as well as com m ercial and voluntary sector actors and, in so doing, generate new objects and places of control signified by notions of safety and security (Edwards and H ughes 2005). The zero tolerance principle applied to acts that 'spoil the quality of life' blurs the threshold betw een disorderly behaviour and less serious crim inal offences. As Carson notes, social policy in m any developed societies has generally taken on an 'increasingly com m unalist hue in recent years, ideas of com m unity and social capital having com e to occupy a central position in a wide variety of policy areas far beyond the purview of crim inology' (2004: 193). In H ungarian crim e prevention practice too, confusingly, the term 'prevention' seem s to be applied to a w ide array of contradictory activities (Sansfagon et al. 2002). The H ungarian com m unity crim e prevention strategy's m ain goal was to establish a sensitive balance betw een m aintaining strong law enforcem ent and prom oting the broader interests of society by ensuring political freedom and econom ic developm ent. It is not easy to get this balance right. Too little security and the state fails to satisfy its core obligations. Too m uch security and it intrudes unduly and unjustly on citizens' liberties. W hite (1996) elaborated three abstract crim e prevention m odels: first, the conservative model, based on crim e control and opportunity reduc­ tion; second, the liberal m odel, based on social problem s and opportunity enhancem ent; and third, the radical m odel, based on social justice and 228

Crime prevention in Hungary Table 10.1

Key distinctive features of the crime prevention strategy

Key concept

Social problem Social justice

Main strategy

O pportunity enhancem ent

Main crime focus

Conventional 'street' crime

Concept of criminality

M arginalisation Social alienation M arket com petition

Crime response

Im prove opportunities Reduce inequality Enhance personal responsibility

Role of community

Auxiliary to police Com m unity developm ent

Limitations

Based on limited resources Narrow definition of crim e

Source: Adapted from White (1996: 100)

political struggle. T he H un garian crim e p rev ention m od el fits W h ite's liberal m odel w ell, based on crim e focused on social problem s and op p ortu nity enhan cem en t (see T able 10.1). Th e H ungarian N ational C rim e Preven tion Strategy con sid ers the p rev ention o f crim e to be a p articu lar type o f social policy that entails both p rofessional and civic activities, and som ething that m u st be governed by state authorities. A s such, it ad opts a top-d ow n approach. A lthou gh the crim e prevention strategy has been bu ilt on the interface betw een crim inal and social policies, in p ractice there has been an ap p aren t p roliferation of situ ational crim e p rev ention m ethods. Fu rtherm ore, the laud able aim s of the strategy have been ham pered by nu m erou s setbacks in the last tw o d ecades. First, d uring large-scale and rapid social changes, there is alw ays a d anger that w hen ev er the crim e rate increases, the auth orities are blam ed for their inability to secure pu blic safety. O rganisational changes across all levels o f governm ent, and sim ilarly in the structure o f crim e prevention, have been too nu m erou s and too frequent. Before 2003, the d riving force behind crim e p rev ention w as the M inistry o f the Interior, w hich w as responsible for the police force; after 2003 it w as the M inistry of Justice. S in ce 2006, the M inistry o f Ju stice and L aw E nforcem ent has been responsible for the police - thanks to another fun dam ental reorganisation o f the structure o f governance. 229

C rim e Prevention Policies in Com parative Perspective

Second, in H ungary safety rem ains essentially state business, m ostly police business. A lth ou gh citizens do not trust the gov ernm ent and the police, they are w illing to give up their rights in the hope o f better safety (CC TV, for exam ple), and keep relying on the state to provide this. The introd uction o f the ru le of law is - and m u st be - the m ost fundam ental achievem en t o f the new d em ocracies in C en tral and Eastern Europe. The state m ay still be intervening everyw h ere, yet at the sam e tim e it is w eak in the sen se that it is not able to gu arantee that the ru le o f law w ill be observed. The state is also w eak becau se it is no longer auth oritarian , but public trust has not (yet) em erged. This holds true for both the trust of citizens in the state and the tru st o f p olitical actors in citizens. In p eo p le's perception, and in reality, d em ocracy is not (yet) w o rkin g w ell. A s a result, law lessn ess and crim e are w idespread . O ne im portan t m an ifesta­ tion o f this is the con sid erable 'shad ow ' o r undergrou nd econom y. Third , n otw ithstand ing the existen ce o f at least four crim e prevention m od els around the w orld - nam ely s o cia l/co m m u n ity crim e prevention, d evelopm ental crim e prevention, situ atio n al/en v iro n m en tal crim e pre­ vention, and crim inal ju stice system -based crim e prevention - in practice only tw o m od els w ere recognised in H ungary d u ring the 1990s. M oreover, there w as an ongoing tug-of-w ar betw een situ ational and com m u nitybased crim e prevention. The form er w as supported by the police, and the latter w as held up as a m od el by the N ational C rim e P reven tion Board. D espite the fact that crim e p rev ention could be interpreted in m an y w ays, w hat w as never w ell conceptu alised or com m u nicated w as the intersec­ tion betw een the different types o f prevention, and the priority crim es that the strategy should focus on. C rim e prevention responsibilities w ere often placed on police services that could not sufficiently respond by them ­ selves, yet few m u n icipalities w ere p roactively involved. R ecognition of the im portan ce o f com m u nity crim e prevention am on g local m u nicip ali­ ties w as ran dom and slow . Fourth, d uring the last tw o d ecad es m ore and m ore new phenom ena and d em and in g p roblem s occurred that dem and ed solutions. H ence, the new requ irem ents placed upon, and as a result the role, dom ain and m easures of, crim e prevention w ere con tin u ally changin g (fam ily v io l­ ence, child victim s, football hooliganism , and so on). T herefore the objectives o f crim e prevention p ractice w ere in a constant state o f flux, w hile financial resources b ecam e restricted. Fifth, the p articular w eaknesses o f the curren t system are the inad ­ equate d istribution o f resources, the absen ce o f evalu ation, the lack of co-operation betw een stakeholders, and the scarcity o f training and research activities. Sixth, w hile p rev ention program m es supported by the N ational C rim e Preven tion Board have m atu red in the last few years, the ev alu ations of these program m es have lagged behind , ev en though the need for an evid ence-base and such ev alu ations has never been greater. 230

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Seventh, the H un garian m odel o f crim e prevention has a strong affiliation w ith areas outsid e the ju stice system and strikes a balance b etw een com m u nity and situ ational crim e prevention. H ow ever, it lacks su itable training capacity, either in the form o f sep arate h igh er edu cation courses o r as part o f crim inology courses. A lth ou gh an introd uctory cou rse has been run by the police ('C rim e Preven tion A cad em y '), there is a need for m u nicipal crim e prevention m anagers (if they exist at all) and other field w orkers to be provided w ith m any m ore practical skills. Th e IN SEC research4 surveyed fear o f crim e and d efen siv e practices am ong citizens, as w ell as local p olitical efforts to increase pu blic safety, in tw o d istricts o f five European cities (A m sterdam , H am burg, V ienna, K rakow and B udapest). O ne o f the outcom es o f the high est international relevance w as the difference in the types o f concerns raised by W estern and E astern E uropean citizens: w hile the form er felt d istressed by the con sequ ences o f m ass im m igration, the latter suffered the u n certainty of living con ditions brou ght on b y transition (B arabas et al. 2005). H ow do new crim inal p olicy trends affect the practical application of crim e prevention m ethods in a social env ironm en t sim u ltaneou sly ex­ posed to the processes of 'global inclu sion' and 'local exclu sio n '? Tw o m ain processes con tribute to social exclusion: first, high u n em p loym en t (esp ecially long-term unem ploym en t) and job insecurity for people w ho w ere previously fully integrated into m ainstream society, and second, difficulty, particu larly for you ng people, in entering the labour m arket and enjoyin g both the incom e and the social n etw ork associated w ith it. The stren gth o f the links b etw een the em ploym ent situ ation and other d im ensions o f life (such as fam ily, incom e, hou sing, health, social netw orks) suggests that those people w ho are trapped in the low er segm ents o f the labou r m arket, or are excluded from it, suffer the risk of b ecom in g excluded from society altog ether (C ouncil o f Europe 2001: 14). T he p roblem of crim e affects the quality o f life throu ghou t the world. T he lack o f public safety and w ays to red uce crim e has becom e a central issue in m ost countries. A lth ou gh w e know since D u rkh eim that som e form and level o f crim e w ill alw ays be w ith us, w hich requ ires crim inal ju stice system s to operate, it is a com m u nity m atter to decide how m uch m on ey should be spent on them , and how effective their activities are in protecting the public. It is now w idely recognised that trad itional crim inal ju stice responses are insufficient d eterrents against acts that threaten com m u nity safety. D iverse crim e red uction m easures w ere tried, but the prevention o f crim e is the only kind that offers a long-lasting effect on com m u nity safety, and can help raise living standards and help people becom e contented. In H ungary, safety and security as a cen tral d ilem m a appears som ew hat d ifferent from con cern s in W estern Europe. The un favou rable socio ­ econom ic con ditions, low living standards and the lack o f a clear value system m ay com bine to set a person on a trajectory that m ay result in 231

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crim e, violence and problem s with alcohol and drugs. Therefore, all possible prevention policies should include the reduction of risk factors and the developm ent of protective factors. The tw o basic features that all crim e prevention program m es m ust address are social developm ent and opportunity reduction. In this context, the prom otion of social cohesion m ost likely to be effective will take the form of conflict resolution, reconciliation and the rebuilding of the 'social fabric' through the prom otion of institutions that are sources of 'social capital'.

N o te s 1 Founded in the early 1980s, Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) is an education-based programm e that seeks to prevent the use of illegal drugs, mem bership in gangs and violent behaviour. 2 The expression 'Potem kin village' refers to som ething that appears elaborate and im pressive but in actual fact lacks substance or hides an undesirable fact or condition. 3 Identifying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. 4 Insecurities in European Cities, 'Crim e Related Fears Within the Context of New Anxieties and Com munity-based Crim e Prevention'. The research project was funded under the European Com m ission's Fifth Framework Program me (19982002).

R e fe re n c e s Barabas, T., Irk, F. and Kovacs, R. (2005) Felelem, bttttozes es biinmegelozes Eurdpa ot nagyvarosdban. Budapest: OKRI. Carson, W. G. (2004) 'Is Com munalism Dead? Reflections on the Present and Future Practice of Crim e Prevention: Part Tw o', Australian and New Zealand Journal o f Criminology, 37(2): 192-210. Council of Europe (2001) Promoting the Policy Debate on Social Exclusion from a Comparative Perspective: Trends in Social Cohesion, No. 1. Germany: Council of Europe. Online at: h ttp ://w w w .co e .in t/t/d g 3/so cialp o licie s/so cialco h e sio n d ev /so u rce/T ren d s/T ren d s-01_en .p d f Edwards, A. and Hughes, G. (2005) 'Com paring the Governance of Safety in Europe: A Geo-historical Approach', Theoretical Criminology, 9(3): 345-63. Gonczol, K. and Kerezsi, K. (2004) 'The Basic Principles and the Social Background for the Hungarian Com m unity Crim e Prevention Strategy', in Tribute to Kalman Gyorgyi [Gyorgyi Kdlmdn iinnepi kotet] (ed. B. Geller) Bibliotheca luridica, ELTE AjK, Libri Amicorum II, pp. 265-78. Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) (2008) A GDP teriileti kiilonbsegei M agyarorszdgon, 2006, Statisztikai tiikor. II. evf. 90. szam, H ungarian Central Statistical Office, Budapest (Hungarian). Online at: h ttp ://p o rta l.k sh .h u /p ls/ k sh /d o cs/h u n /x ftp /sta ttu k o r/te rg d p 0 6 .p d f 232

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Kerezsi, K. (2006) Control or Support: The Dilemma o f Alternative Sanctions. Budapest: C om plex Kiadoi Kft. English summ ary, pp. 287-303. Online at: h t t p :// en.okri.hu/content / view / 95 / 9 / Kerezsi, K. and Levay, M. (2008) 'Crim inology, Crim e and Crim inal Justice in H ungary', European Journal o f Criminology, 5: 239-60. M inistry of Justice (2003) The National Strategy for Community Crime Prevention. Budapest: M inistry of Justice. Online at: http ://bu n m egelozes.easy hosting .hu / dok/nationaLstrat_crim e_prevention.pdf Office of the Prosecutor General (2008) Disclosure on Criminality, 2007. Budapest: M inistry of Justice and Law Enforcem ent and the Office of the Prosecutor General. Petretei, J. (2005) Speech at the 'Crim e Prevention - A Strategic Approach' Conference, 20-21 September, UK Presidency programme. Online at: w w w .bunm egelozes.hu/index.htm l7pid = 106&lang = cn Sansfa