Simply philosophy : Guided Readings 9780748617395, 0748617396, 9780748618231, 0748618236
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Table of contents :
Contents
Introduction
1. SCIENCE
Aristotle - on scientific knowledge
Francis Bacon - on scientific method
David Hume - on the concept of a cause
Karl Popper - on induction
Hilary Putnam - against Popper
Paul Feyerabend - on scientific method
2. MIND
BF Skinner - on behaviourism
CS Peirce - on reality and truth
Bertrand Russell - on sense-data
Rudolf Carnap - on the argument from analogy
AJ Ayer - on other minds
Norman Malcolm - on other minds
Colin McGinn - on the mind/body problem
William James - on the reality of the mind
Paul Churchland - on the unreality of thoughts
3. FREEDOM
Peter Strawson - on determinism
Norman Malcolm - on determinism
Daniel Dennett - on determinism
Max Black - on causality
Frederick Dretske - on the reality of meaning
Thomas Hobbes - on human nature
Immanuel Kant - on duty
Jeremy Bentham - on utilitarianism
Thomas Nagel - against utilitarianism
GEM Anscombe - on 'ought' and 'should'
4. KNOWLEDGE
Galileo Galilei - on perception
Rene Descartes - on doubt
John Locke - on knowledge
Hilary Putnam/Noam Chomsky - on innate ideas
George Berkeley - on Idealism
Thomas Reid - against scepticism
Immanuel Kant - on causality
David Hume - on miracles
Bertrand Russell - on knowledge
L Jonathan Cohen - on empiricism
5. LANGUAGE
John Locke - on language
Gilbert Ryle - on Mill's theory of names
Ludwig Wittgenstein - on naming
Saul Kripke - on naming
Hilary Putnam - on language
WV Quine - on language
Plato - on universals
John Searle - on computer 'understanding'
6. OBJECTIVITY
Roderick Chisholm - on perception
AJ Ayer - on perception
Gilbert Ryle - on perception
Thomas Reid - on ideas
JB Watson - on behaviourism
Thomas Nagel - on qualia
JJC Smart - on mind/brain identity
Hilary Putnam - on functionalism
FH Bradley - on truth
Michael Dummett - on anti-realism
7. GOD
Norman Malcolm - on the ontological argument
Thomas Aquinas - on the existence of God
Anthony Kenny - on teleology and design
Anthony Flew - on religious belief
Ludwig Wittgenstein - on religious belief
Soren Kierkegaard - on the 'absurdity' of belief
WH Newton-Smith - on metaphysics in cosmology
Further Reading
Copyright Acknowledgements
Glossary
Index.
Citation preview
Simply Philosophy Guided Readings BRENDAN WILSON
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Simply Philosophy: Guided Readings
Edited by Brendan Wilson
Edinburgh University Press
Editorial concept, selection,
Other
arrangement and commentary
©
Brendan Wilson, 2003.
texts copyright the authors.
Edinburgh University Press Ltd 22 George Square, Edinburgh
Typeset in Minion and Gill Sans Light
by Pioneer Associates, Perthshire, and printed and Scotprint,
A CIP ISBN
bound
in
Great Britain by
Haddington
record for this
book
is
available
7486 1823 6 (paperback)
from the
British Library
For Makiyo
Contents Introduction
Area
1:
ix
Science on
knowledge
1.
Aristotle ...
2.
Francis Bacon
3.
David
4.
Karl Popper ... on induction
5.
Hilary
6.
Paul Feyerabend
Hume
scientific
on
...
method
6
on the concept of a cause
...
Putnam
scientific
1
.
12
against Popper
.
.
on
...
scientific
16
method
Overview
Area
2:
Mind Skinner
on behaviourism
B.
8.
C. S. Peirce ... on reality
9.
Bertrand Russell
F.
...
...
25
and truth
26
on sense-data
28
10.
Rudolf Carnap
11.
A.
12.
13.
Norman Malcolm ... on other minds Colin McGinn ... on the mind/body problem
14.
William James
15.
Paul Churchland
J.
Ayer
...
on the argument from analogy
...
on other minds
...
on the
...
31
34
reality
of the
mind
on the unreality of thoughts
35 39 43
45
47
Overview
3:
20 22
7.
Area
8
Freedom
16.
Peter Strawson ... on determinism
49
17.
Norman Malcolm
52
18.
Daniel Dennett
19.
Max Black
20.
Frederick Dretske
21
Thomas Hobbes
22.
Immanuel Kant
23.
Jeremy Bentham
...
...
...
on
on determinism
on determinism
55 58
causality ...
reality
of meaning
60
on human nature
63
on duty
66
... ...
on the
...
on
utilitarianism
VI
68
24. 25.
Area
against utilitarianism Thomas Nagel G. E. M. Anscombe ... on 'ought' and 'should'
70
Overview
79
.
4:
.
.
Knowledge
26.
Galileo Galilei ... on perception
27.
Rene Descartes
28.
John Locke
29.
Hilary
30.
George Berkeley
31. 32.
Thomas Reid ... against scepticism Immanuel Kant ... on causality
33.
David
34.
Bertrand Russell
35.
L.
...
...
on doubt
82
on knowledge
Putnam/Noam Chomsky
Hume
81
...
...
84 ...
on innate
93
98 99
on miracles
103
on knowledge
...
Jonathan Cohen
5:
89
ideas
on Idealism
...
108
on empiricism
Overview
Area
75
110 114
Language on language
36.
John Locke
37.
Gilbert Ryle ... on Mill's theory of names
119
38.
Ludwig Wittgenstein
123
39.
Saul Kripke ... on naming
40.
Hilary
41.
W. V. Quine
42.
Plato ... on universals
43.
John Searle
...
Putnam
...
...
1
on proper names
126
on language
128
on language
...
131
134
on computer 'understanding'
...
Overview
Area
6:
17
138 141
Objectivity
44.
Roderick Chisholm
45.
A.
46.
Gilbert Ryle ... on perception
148
47.
Thomas Reid
150
48.
J.
49.
Thomas Nagel
J.
B.
Ayer
...
Watson
...
on perception
on perception
...
...
on
146
ideas
on behaviourism ...
143
152
on qualia
153
VII
C. Smart ... on mind/brain identity
50.
J. J.
51.
Hilary
52.
F.
53.
Michael
Putnam
H. Bradley
...
...
155
on functionalism
157
on truth
Dummett
...
160
on anti-realism
163
Overview
Area
7:
1
66
God
55.
Norman Malcolm ... on the ontological argument Thomas Aquinas ... on the existence of God
170
56.
Anthony Kenny
1
57.
Anthony Flew
58.
Ludwig Wittgenstein
59.
Soren Kierkegaard
60.
W. H. Newton-Smith
54.
...
...
on
on
teleology
and design
religious belief ...
...
on
...
175
'absurdity' of belief
on metaphysics
72
174
religious belief
on the
169
in
cosmology
1
78
179
Overview
186
Further Reading
188
Glossary
190
Copyright Acknowledgements
1
Index
203
VIII
99
Introduction Compilers of anthologies are guilty
men - and if they're women, women too. Even those who texts, perfect
contains only a tiny part of what there
guilty
is
whole
deal in
and unabridged,
feel
I
hope not
entirely
bad
aside. And those who not only and comment too,
How to Use this Book
about the things they put (like the
- though
unrepresentative.
present author)
abridge but interpolate feel guiltiest
of
all. It's
Simply Philosophy: Guided Readings
understandable,
source
book focussing on
therefore, that introductions to
problems of Western philosophy,
anthologies should brim with good advice
problems occur
about going back to the original
texts. It differs
reading
it
whole and
in
its
text,
context
-
all
first,
that sort of thing.
But
take
I
it
my
go back to the originals. This
is
hack
his ancestors to pieces
spread within, and overlap between, the
have
different Areas. Philosophy
of
discipline,
volume
about physical objects existing
'without the mind'.
What he means word
the present
word make of
I
know what
purists will
and I'm very much afraid they're Most of all, there is the danger that
to this
set for it. The companion one - Simply Philosophy
unsettling behaviour,
book follow the same general it would be silly to
respects the nature of the subject
a short introduction,
the symbol [...], but the difference
aim has been
It
and
... is
Each of the
going
sixty readings
is
preceded by
and followed by a section. The
'Comments and Questions'
to let the reader get into the
original text as quickly as possible, but to
easy to overlook.
bears saying, therefore, that this
is
to be neat.
make philosophical progress seem easier and more linear than it really is. Longer omissions are marked by this
in
pretend that any organisation which
right.
selective editing will
between
and the readings
framework. But
'outside' (in square brackets) for the
this,
an unruly
(Wilson, 2002) - reveals one pattern in this
is
and where appropriate,
I've substituted the
is
which constantly oversteps the
boundaries we
the English. Locke, for example, regularly
'without'.
appear
and second, by guiding the
issues
and dance
And this is not my worst offence. I made efforts to modernise some
I'm afraid
more
and problems. The readings are divided into seven Areas' - a term intended to suggest both
the
also
outside the mind,
texts
or setting, but towards the underlying
on the remains.
talks
as those
primary
reader, not to a text's historical significance
pious hope which permits the anthologist to
clearly,
a
from thicker anthologies,
by editing the primary
more
reader already
knows all that. I prefer to think that readers of a good anthology will genuinely want to
in a selection of
stringently, so that the central ideas
that
is
the central
book
provide an opportunity, after reading, to
IX
think over
main
its
each group of readings there 'Overview',
which
end of
ideas. At the is
it
-
a text-based
way
•
Philosophy's canonical texts are, for
difficult. Yet
many
seems to
me - is
The readings
texts are
in this
problems
clearly.
The 'text-first' approach of the anthology complements the 'theme-first' approach of Simply Philosophy. Let
1
sets
me
up the
McGinn, James and Churchland on dualism).
Bacon, and
1,
and
Hume)
3
set
2
and
And is it
to theory?
(from Aristotle, out three seminal
3 take
up
scientific progress in
the
hope,
mutual advantage.
The use of short chapters
SP and short readings in GR, should make both books flexible and 'teacher-friendly' in classroom use. Most of all, I hope both in
books reconcile a fundamentally problem-based approach with good
first
texts.
I
am
grateful to the following friends
colleagues
who
the book:
Angus
have read Collins,
and
earlier drafts J.
of
Patrick Barron,
Richard Francks, Brian Harrison, Colin Lyas, Paul Rossiter,
George Weir, Martin
Wilson.
Hume
and
the problem of induction, then Popper
and
I
scientific
answers to these questions.
SP Chapters
GR and
track each other,
Acknowledgements
is
what kind of process 2
SP
basic problems
by which we move from data Readings
isn't.
out different
Readings 10-15 provide a range of
illustrate.
data-led or theory-driven?
data-led,
and what
set
5
exposure to the original
of the philosophy of science:
method
GR
to their
anthology have been selected and edited
SP Chapter
real
and 6 explain some of the problems which arise (dualism and the
SP Chapters
discussion of
to
understand what problems the
to display these
is
and 9
In general, the readings of
is
problem-based. The crucial thing for a
trying to solve.
8
my opinion, the best
into this wonderful material
it
7,
Ayer and Malcolm on other minds;
has to present philosophy's Great Books
beginner -
Readings
responses to these problems (Carnap,
even an introductory course
(and Articles). In
GR
other minds problem).
beginning readers, bewildering and
•
decisions in the
mind.
into the
•
GR
how
to relate science to the reality of the
To the Teacher
•
4 shows
attempts (by Skinner, Peirce, and Russell)
heartland of Western philosophy.
if it's
SP Chapter
questions of what •
combination with Simply Philosophy or
•
and 6 deal with
4, 5
philosophy of science affect wider
The book presents some of the best work in the main areas of Western philosophy, and provides - either in
way
Readings
method, including Popper and Kuhn. •
whole.
without
GR
contemporary theories of scientific
an
relates the readings to
each other, and characterises the 'Area' as a
•
more
detail.
I
am
also very
much
indebted to
my
colleagues at the University of Tokyo, for
making
possible the period of sabbatical
leave during
together,
which
and
to
this
book was put
my receiving
Finally,
institution,
to
I
am happy to
have
thank Jackie and the team
who
this at
chance
Edinburgh
have put so
much
the University of Strathclyde, for being the
University Press,
perfect hosts.
enthusiasm and hard work into both books.
XI
syllogism form, this might be represented
AREA
as:
1
1.
Science 2.
The reading
selections in this
Area deal with our ongoing attempts to understand what
makes good
science.
is
by good or successful is,
what
science,
and
take drugs are (or
become) losers. You are not (or do not want to become) a loser. Therefore you should not take drugs. is
not to
cumbersome - its be snappy but to make the certainly
example,
there a
it
if
there
and becoming them), and
it
a loser as a result of taking
a
list
which lead
of the syllogism
from
reliably
premisses to conclusion and noted the structures which don't. If
syllogism structure which
scientific
'valid',
and
if
conclusion
Analytics
is
is
we
new
assertion
true,
made
Aristotle
more or
is
a
particularly to represent those processes
which lead from existing knowledge to new knowledge, and to represent them in a
form which point
is
to
is
as explicit as possible.
make
it
really
The
easy to see whether the
attempted derivation of
many
different types of thinking. In the following
less
way of representing our thought processes more clearly. It aims invented,
we can in the
also true.
Logic can be applied to clarify
which
some of
use a
reliable or
our premisses are
be sure that the
knowledge - from Posterior
Logic,
For
clear.
reveals unstated assumptions.
made
Aristotle
structures
on
is
brings out an ambiguity
is it?
Aristotle (384-22 bc)
role
(between being a loser before taking drugs
method followed
distinctive
This
who
underlying thought processes
They focus on the question:
3.
All those
new knowledge
works. For Aristotle, this meant
chunk of thinking in the form of a syllogism, a three-line argument leading from two premisses to a setting out a
what
extracts, Aristotle tries to explain
distinctive
about
saying what
is
scientific
is
thinking by
special about a scientific
syllogism. Stylistically, Aristotle
tends to be a bit
closely-reasoned (which explains the larger-than-usual
number of explanatory
comments). The reading which follows
this
one, by Francis Bacon, rejects not only the Aristotelian concept of science, but also the
densely-packed
style, in
favour of
something more relaxed.
conclusion.
We suppose ourselves to
For example, suppose you're trying to
persuade someone not to take drugs. 'Only losers take drugs!'
you
say. Set
out in
Cfl thing, as
unqualified scientific
possess
knowledge of
opposed to knowing
it
in
[an]
a
.
way
accidental
know
.
.
.
when we
.
.
we
think that
the cause on which the fact depends,
[given the cause]
.
.
.What
now
I
we do know
assert
mean
I
is
that at
about the nature of
knowledge
my
If
primary, immediate, better
them
.
]
of any attribute's
is
accidental unless
.
.
.
]
hard to be sure whether one knows
It is
or not; for
we
it
is
hard to be sure whether is
based on the basic truths
.We think knowledge if we have
.
.
.
have
scientific
.
.
reasoned from true and primary premisses.
true,
But that
not
is
so:
the conclusion must be
homogeneous with the
further
as effect to cause
is
appropriate to each attribute
known than and
prior to the conclusion, which
[
one's knowledge
scientific
demonstrated knowledge must be
related to
.
[the reason the thing has that
property]
correct, the premisses of
is
we know
a syllogism productive
which constitutes such knowledge. thesis
events
all
knowledge, a syllogism grasp of
scientific
.
connection with a subject
.
by demonstration. By
demonstration of
.
[
in
those truths cannot be
truths,
Our knowledge
the fact could not be other than
further, that it is
immediate
demonstrated)
as the cause specifically of that fact, and,
must end
regress [of demonstrations]
basic facts of the
science [...]'
It's
possible to have a syllogism without these conditions, but such a syllogism
productive of
Now syllogism
.
.
is
.
Here, Aristotle seems to allow that the
not be
will
knowledge
of a particular conclusion with the
.
about whether we
the possession of such a
[and] since the primary
.
basic truths
premisses are the cause of our knowledge ...
it
that
we know them
follows that is,
are
better
knowledge of the
latter
is
Some
our
the effect of our
knowlege of the premisses
.
is,
but that
truths are demonstrable.
all
Neither doctrine necessary
[
.
.
Our own knowledge
is
knowledge. Others think there
scientific
.
is
is
that not
.We
clearly
is
independent of demonstration. (The necessity of this
is
obvious; for since
draw
that
scientific
act of perception ... for
perception must be of a particular whereas
knowledge
involves recognition of
the appropriate universal. So
if
we were on
the moon, and saw the earth shutting out
the sun's
light,
we we
should not
know
the cause
should perceive the
fact at
universal.
drawn, and since the
I
is
do
all,
since the act of
not of the appropriate not, of course,
deny that by
watching the frequent recurrence of this event
we must
the prior premisses from which the is
to
cannot obtain
knowledge by the
perception
all
demonstrative: on the contrary,
demonstration
.
reasoned
]
is
from which
have found the
present fact of the eclipse but not the
knowledge of the immediate premisses
know
'.
of the eclipse:
either true or
doctrine
really
conclusion.
scientific
.
hold that, owing to the necessity
of knowing the primary premisses, there
no
of
-
more convinced of them - than
their consequences, precisely because
'fit'
rest
theory might influence our judgement
ground of our knowledge
since the
of a fact
...
scientific
we
might, after tracking the
appropriate universal, possess a
demonstration, for the universal
from the several groups of
is
elicited
singulars.'
.
What does
mean by
Aristotle
any particular
one particular
we
case,
is
that
perceive only
For scientific
fact.
many particular
- by
rational intuition
which is
precious because
clear the cause; so that like
...
these which have a cause other than
precious than sense-perception clear that
is
.
.
.
originative
knowledge - nor of
scientific
more Hence
is
is
in
if
a
the
is
.
.
the grasping of a premiss
fact
immediate but not [understood to
be] necessary
the case of facts
in
themselves, universal knowledge
is
makes
it
mean an
I
grasping of the immediate premiss
opinion
'The universal
.
are they any concern of rational intuition
indemonstrable knowledge, which
cases.
.
Nor
source of
knowledge, we need a more general concept which covers
.
knowledge clearly does not concern them
the
'appropriate universal'? His point in
.
[
man
.
.
.
]
grasps truths that cannot be
other than they
are,
in
the
way
in
which he
grasps the definitions through which it
knowledge of things
demonstrations take place, he opinion but knowledge:
if
will
on the other hand
demonstrable cannot be acquired by
he apprehends these attributes
perception [...]'
their subjects, not
in
have not
as inhering in
virtue of the subjects'
substance and essential nature, he possesses Aristotle does not
deny the importance of
perception - on the contrary, he says the universal
- but
reading of
a superficial
Knowledge
the apprehension
is
.
.
of, e.g.,
the
attribute 'animal' as incapable of being
from' a series of
is 'elicited
perceptions
opinion and not genuine knowledge
otherwise, opinion the apprehension of
of being otherwise -
the above remarks can easily give the
'animal' as capable
impression that he underrates perception.
the apprehension that 'animal'
is
an element
man
is
knowledge;
in
'Scientific
knowledge and
its
object differ
from opinion and the object of opinion
in
that scientific knowledge involves universal
the essential nature of
e.g.
the apprehension of 'animal' as predicable of
man
but not as an element
nature
is
in
man's essential
opinion [...]'
and proceeds by necessary connections Aristotle claims, in short, that scientific Aristotle's point here, to
terms,
is
that scientific
put
in
it
knowledge
modern
sees into the essential natures
of things: knowing a mere 'accidental'
knowledge
about a thing should not qualify as
involves laws. To notice that a particular
fact
animal has red blood
real scientific
matter of opinion call a
mere
'factoid'.
is,
it's
for Aristotle, a
what we might
To understand that
blood has to be red because
haemoglobin genuinely
it
its
and
is
'. .
.
in all
these examples
and yet can be otherwise,
it
is
clear that the
nature of the thing and the reason of the
knowledge.
though there are things which are true real
goes on
reason for existing.
fact are identical:
'So
He now
uses
to transport oxygen,
scientific
knowledge.
to identify a thing's essential nature with
scientific
the question 'What
lunar] eclipse?'
and
of the moon's
light
its
answer 'The
is
[a
privation
by the interposition of
.
'
the earth'
'What the
the question
identical with
is
the reason of eclipse?' or
is
moon
suffer eclipse?'
we
Thus, as nature
about
know a thing's reason why it is ...
the
all
other natural
a given way; but this
in
is
come
never true of
the products of chance or spontaneity.
out [...]'
it
impossible that this should be the
is
things either invariably or normally
through the
do not
maintain, to
know
to
is
light
it
true view. For teeth and
and the reply
'Because of the failure of earth's shutting
...
'Why does
ascribe to chance or
coincidence the frequency of rain but frequent rain
in
We
mere winter,
in
summer we do
.
.
when
.
Aristotle regards this 'giving the reason
an event takes place always or for the most
why' as the most fundamental kind of
part,
The
explanation.
basic scientific
move
then,
is
to explain 'that for the sake of which' a
thing exists or Physics,
the
is
way
he argues for
view of science,
it is.
it
is
not accidental or by chance
is
agreed that things are either the
it
...
If,
of coincidence or for an end, and
result
these cannot be the result of coincidence or
In the
spontaneity,
this teleological
an end
as follows:
.
it
follows that they
must be for
.
Further where a series has a completion, 'A difficulty presents
why
itself:
should not
nor because rains,
not
in
is
it
better so, but just as the sky
What
is
nature
being that the corn grows
necessity
- the
tearing, the
grinding
.
.
then
'
.
.
.
animals,
in
in
this persistence
no knowledge
.
.
since they did not
was merely
.Wherever
all
come about
perceiving,
which
the parts
would have done
a
for an end, such
fitting
it
innate
in all
others
does
it
not.
So animals
the
soul:
in
does not occur have
at
all
outside the act of
or no knowledge of objects of persists; animals in
does occur have perception and can
continue to retain the sense-impression
if
things survived, being organized in
persist, in
which no impression
a
is
some the sense-perception comes
either
as they
terms to
later
in both.'
though sense-perception
which
coincidental result
in
to the Posterior Analytics:
front teeth sharp, fitted for
it
so
of this
result
.Why
molars broad and useful for
spontaneously
the same
to
arise for this end, but
they had
is
our teeth should come up of
down the food -
came about
.The relation of the
Back now
not be the same with the parts
it
.
intelligent action,
in
drawn up must
become water and descend, the
nature, e.g. that
.
surely as
the earlier
and what has been cooled must
should
Now
that.
order to make the corn grow,
but of necessity? cool,
the preceding steps are for the sake of
all
nature work, not for the sake of something,
and when such persistence
in
is
frequently repeated a further distinction at
way; whereas
once
arises
between those which
those which grew otherwise perished and
a
continue to perish
and those which do
power of
perception
.
.
.
develop
systematizing [sense-impressions] not.
So out of sense-
comes to be what we
call
Against this pre-echo of Darwinian
memory, and out of frequently repeated
natural selection, Aristotle argues as
memories of the same
follows:
experience; for a
4
—
thing develops
number of memories
.
From
constitute a single experience.
experience again
.
.
develop the
.
cause of something), then the premisses
skill
man
craftsman and the knowledge of the science
We
many
conclusion. In
in
cases, these
story (Aristotle believes). Eventually,
other higher states of knowledge, but from
there
sense-perception [...]'
based on other syllogisms, but on
must be premisses which
something he
knowledge
is
none of our
recollection of a previous existence.
and
Thus
vital role in science as Aristotle sees of, for
he asserts here that
teeth,
knowledge evolves, both
is
clear that
we must
get to
know
since scientific
it
follows that there
be
will
knowledge of the primary
scientific
premisses, and since except intuition nothing
can be truer than
be
intuition that
premisses
...
If,
scientific
it
knowledge,
is
it
source of
intuition will
scientific
the only other
be the originative
knowledge.
And
to ask
-
is
scientists
have different
what then? For
intuitions about something,
A and B
both
observe various things moving. A's is
a very natural one)
that objects naturally slow their natural state
is rest.
the other hand,
that
is
down and
stop
B's intuition,
it is
is
-
on
as natural for a
object to remain in
motion
as for
will
kind of true thinking except scientific
knowledge,
Suppose two
moving
apprehends the primary
therefore,
how - we want
intuition (which
knowledge must be
demonstrative]
no
[However,
inductive.
the whole structure of syllogisms
based. But
example, suppose scientists
method by which even sense-perception is
is
intuition to be justified?
the primary premisses by induction; for the
implants the universal
it.
Intuition grasps the fundamental premisses
on which
at the individual
at the species-to-species level.
it
Comments and questions This notion of 'intuition' obviously plays a
an
rejects evolution as
explanation of the apparent design
example
or
innate - a fundamental
and a reaction against theory that knowledge is really
Though he
calls 'induction'
are not
'intuition'.
empiricist tenet Plato's
whole
syllogisms, but this cannot be the
a
determinate form, nor developed from
Aristotle here says that
the
premisses will be derived from other
conclude that these stages of
knowledge are neither innate
known than
indeed must be better
of
.
.
known -
of such a syllogism must also be
of the
the
an object
at rest to
remain
at rest.
Must we
wait for both systems of kinetics to
which
is
more
economical overall? Or
is
there any
develop,
and
see
fruitful or
way
that the intuition itself can be assessed?
originative source of science grasps the original basic
That
is, if
premiss
scientific
knowledge which
knowledge
results
from
is
a syllogism
of a certain sort (one which moves
through
the essential nature or final
Aristotle argues: 1
.
Everything that happens does so either
by chance or
for
some purpose.
2.
It's
obvious that
natural world
many
events in the
do not happen by
has observed
chance, since chance events are 'one-
off and
(for
through 3.
is
example) teeth coming
if
is,
because they are directed
towards some end if
anything,
is
he neither
this [
.
.
.
]
from the senses and particulars to the
most general axioms, and from these the truth of which
principles,
state.
wrong with
this
one
searching into and discovering truth.The flies
settled
What,
thought of the
in
knows nor can do anything
not 'one-off'.
these events
end, that
or
in fact
course of nature: beyond
There are and can be only two ways of
do not happen by chance they must happen for some So
understand so much and so much only as he
it
takes for
and immovable, proceeds to
judgment
.
.
And
.
this
is
the
way now
argument? [= the early seventeeth century]
The other and
particulars, rising
unbroken helpful to represent scientific
arrives at the
it
last
of
true way, but as yet untried
thinking in terms of syllogistic logic?
fashion.
by a gradual and
ascent, so that
most general axioms Is it
in
derives axioms from the senses
all.
[
.
.
This .
is
the
]
Both ways set out from the senses and particulars,
and
For the one
infinite.
the highest
in
but the difference between
generalities; is
rest
just glances at
experiment and particulars
in
other dwells duly and orderly
The
them
passing, the
among them.
one, again, begins at once by establishing
certain abstract and useless generalities, the
other
Francis Bacon (1561-1626) scientific
method - from
on
known
prior and better
Selected
Aphorisms: Routledge, 1905 (eds Spedding, Ellis and Heath)
nature
Bacon
[
.
.
.
in
the order of
]
argumentation should
new
greater
avail
for the discovery
works; since the subtlety of nature
many times over than the
argument. But axioms duly and orderly
approach to science, which jumps
formed from
prematurely from a few familiar examples
way of new
method which
and
a
more painstaking
uses experiment to test
its
do and
[
.
.
.
]
The axioms now
enough to
made fit
use, having
in
particulars of the
occurrence, are large
and thus render
particulars,
sciences active
few 'Man, being the servant and interpreter of Nature, can
particulars easily discover the
suggested by a scanty
generalisations.
is
subtlety of
distinguishes between an Aristotelian
to generalisations,
is
cannot be that axioms established by
It
of In the following remarks,
by gradual steps to that which
rises
.
.
.
been
experience and a
most general for the
most part
and take these
in:
just
and
.
therefore
it
no wonder
is
And
if
.
they do not lead
some opposite instance, not observed or known before, chance to come in the way, the axiom is rescued and preserved by some frivolous
new
to
particulars.
conclusions of
ordinarily applied
in
itself [
.
.
.
or methodical process,
I
call
facts
call
I
by a
just
Interpretations of
For the winning of assent, indeed,
interpretations;
few
difficulties ...
I
experiments itself,
is
far greater
and
artificially
I
purpose of determining the point
weight; but
I
.
do not
I
.
.
in
much
give
contrive that the office of the
experiment, and the experiment
shall
as are
perception of
sense
of familiar occurrence, they straightway touch
mean,
devised for the express
and those for the most part
fill
as
than that of the
instruments; such experiments, skilfully
the sense therefore
more powerful than
the understanding and
.
even when assisted by exquisite
because being collected from
instances,
.
endeavour
much by instruments
question. To the immediate
anticipations are far
much to be
not
upon. For the testimony and
To meet these
sense
Nature [...]
a
is
by experiments. For the subtlety of
or premature). That
from
apprehension
to accomplish not so as
matters of nature,
elicited
is
the sense does apprehend a
always to man, not to the universe
]
human reason
(as a thing rash
reason which
when
information of the sense has reference
for the sake of distinction Anticipations of
Nature
its
relied
distinction; whereas the truer course would
The
again
thing
if
be to correct the axiom
And
be only to judge of the
be the judge of the
itself shall
thing.'
the imagination;
whereas interpretations on the other hand,
Comments and questions
being gathered here and there from very various and widely dispersed
suddenly
strike
One method us;
which
is
According to Bacon, the difference between
cannot
facts,
the understanding
[
.
.
.
]
of delivery alone remains to
simply
this:
we must
men
lead
to
the particulars themselves, and their series
men on
and order; while
must
their side
Aristotelian science
and genuinely
empirical science
really a
matter of
among particulars. Well, how shall we know when we have dwelt long enough among
force themselves for a while to lay their
particulars, or
notions by and begin to familiarize
with
themselves with
is
degree: true science dwells longer
become
familiar
enough
facts?
facts'
In the following extract,
Bacon
emphasises the importance of experiment (as
opposed
to
mere observation).
How important
is
the distinction
between observation and experiment? And
The
sense
gives
no information, sometimes
fails in
information. For
two
first,
ways. Sometimes it
there are very
things which escape the sense, even
best disposed and no
it
gives false
many when
way obstructed
.
.
how
should the distinction be drawn?
endeavour
section, to
in this
fix, if
possible,
the precise meaning of these terms, and
David Hume
(1711-76) on the concept of a cause - from Enquiry Concerning Human Understandings section VII: 1748
some part of that much complained of in
thereby remove
obscurity,
which
this
is
so
species of philosophy. It
seems
a proposition,
which
admit of much dispute, that
all
will
not
our ideas are
nothing but copies of our impressions, or In the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume greatly shortened
other words, that any
think of
antecedently
discussion of causality from his youthful
internal senses.
Human
Nature.
The
expressed
argument.
that
if
we
my
application of
it
very
briefly,
Hume's point
when
have not
our external or
have endeavoured to
hopes, that, by a proper it,
men may
clearness and precision
is
are serious about empiricism,
then we cannot say that
I
we
either by
explain and prove this proposition, and have
extract
below presents the main steps of the To put
felt,
in
impossible for us to
which
thing,
and simplified the ground-breaking Treatise of
it is
been able to
Complex ideas may, known by definition, which
attain.
event, such as a push, causes another
perhaps, be well
particular event, such as a stumble, the
is
we
reach a greater philosophical
what they have hitherto
reasonings, than
a particular
in
nothing but an enumeration of those parts
stumble' in terms of a history of push-like
or simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas, and find still some
things and stumble-like things, or in terms
ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are
of a mental habit of expectation resulting
we then possessed of? By what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render
push makes the stumble happen. In
fact,
can only understand 'That push caused that
from
that history. But both the history
and
the expectation are things which are external to the relationship
particular
our
push and that particular
stumble, taken by
itself.
concept of causality
no
impressions are
strong and sensible. They
all
admit not of ambiguity. They are not only
a consistent empiricist,
Hume begins only
have clear meaning to the extent that they
on experience
view? Produce the
impressions or original sentiments, from
at all.
by claiming that concepts (or are based
altogether precise and determinate to
intellectual
which the ideas are copied. These
Taking that
relationship strictly alone allows
As
them
between that
'ideas')
a
full
light
themselves, but
throw
light
on
their
correspondent
which
lie in
placed
in
we may
(or 'impressions').
obscurity.
And by this means, new microscope
perhaps, attain a
or species of optics, by which,
There
are
no
metaphysics,
ideas,
which occur
sciences [that
in
more obscure and
or necessary connexion
.
.
.We
shall,
is,
in
enlarged as to
—
fall
readily
8
may be
so
under our
apprehension, and be equally
therefore,
the moral
psychology] the most
minute, and most simple ideas
uncertain, than those of power, force, energy
may ideas,
known with
.
.
moment conscious of internal power; we feel, that, by the simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our
the grossest and most sensible ideas, that can
every
be the object of our enquiry.'
while
This
is
about
radical empiricism as could be for.
body, or direct the faculties of our mind
statement of
as clear a
We
wished
Trace back our concepts to their
sources in experience, will fully
and
clearly
Hume
and we
says,
proceed to examine
shall
pretension; and
understand what
first
.
this
with regard to the
influence of volition over the organs of the
body. This influence,
they mean.
.
fact,
which,
like all
we may
observe,
is
a
other natural events, can
be known only by experience, and can never
To be
power or necessary connexion,
examine
impression; and
its
in
may
it
possibly
When we
find
let
us
the sources, from which
it
we
effect,
and renders the one an
connexion; any
in
a single instance,
one does
effect
we
Of this we
are every
follow
diligent
...
is
it
there any principle
with body; by which a supposed
is
substance acquires such an influence over a
inward impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, there
is
not,
in
any
of cause and
we empowered,
by a secret wish, to
effect,
orbit; this
comprehension. But
.
.
]
Since, therefore, external objects as they
appear to the senses, give us no idea of
power or necessary connexion, by
their
particular instances, let us see,
be derived from
reflection
on the operations of our own minds, and be
may
copied from any internal impression.
It
be
we
said,
by Locke] that
are
in
Were
move their
extensive authority would not be
power or necessary connexion
.
refined thought
mountains, or control the planets
more
[
most
spiritual
able to actuate the grossest matter?
any thing which can suggest the idea of
was
soul
is
is
said [and
nature
in all
billiard-ball
material one, that the
this idea
.
the second. This
no sentiment or
single, particular instance
.
more mysterious than the union of
senses. The
feels
is
will
must for ever escape our
enquiry
the whole that appears to the outward
mind
which the
are so far from being immediately
conscious, that
most
actually, in fact,
in
will.
performs so extraordinary an operation; of this
which binds the
quality,
attended with motion
in
infallible
command of moment
our body follows upon the
consequence of the other We only
operation
with
consequence of the other The motion of
effected; the energy, by
power or necessary
the other The impulse of one
whether
it
conscious. But the means, by which this
are never able,
that the
the cause, which connects
look about us towards external
to the cause, and renders the one an infallible
the
in
our
to discover any
find,
power
be derived.
and consider the operation of
objects,
causes,
in all
us
let
order to
the impression with greater certainty, search for
be foreseen from any apparent energy or
acquainted, therefore, with the
fully
idea of
extraordinary, nor if
more beyond our
by consciousness
we
power or energy in the will, we must know this power; we must know its connexion with the effect; we must know perceived any
the secret union of soul and body, and the nature of both these substances; by which
the one
is
instances,
We
able to operate,
upon the other
learn
[
so
in .
.
.
many
]
from anatomy, that the
immediate object of power motion,
number of
voluntary
in
member
not the
is
which
itself
moved, but certain muscles, and nerves, and animal
[nerve impulses] and, perhaps,
spirits
something
more minute and more
still
unknown, through which the motion
is
reaches the
successively propagated, before
it
member
the immediate
itself
whose motion
is
Can there be
object of volition.
a
more
certain proof that the power, by which
whole operation being directly
is
and
to the
is,
far,
upon the appearance of one its
believe, that
in order to
First,
he argued
understand the idea of
where
our experience the idea comes
in
to get clear about
(a typical empiricist
feel in
the mind,
this
transition of the imagination
usual attendant,
its
from
the
is
we
the case.
in
is
all
sides;
any other origin of that
find
you
will
idea. This
the sole difference between one instance,
from which
by which
we
can never receive the idea of
number of
similar instances,
suggested. The
is
it
time a
first
man
saw the communication of motion by
move). Then
impulse, as by the shock of
two
billiard-balls,
he argued that the idea does not come
he could not pronounce that the one event
from our experience of any
single case of
was connected: but only
A causing
he has been
with the other After he has observed several
B.
Most
recently,
idea of force or
power comes from our own power to make our
awareness of our bodies move.
He
is
that
them to be
was
to claim that the idea
conjoined
pronounces
connected. What alteration has
happened to
new idea of he now feels
give rise to this
connexion? Nothing but that
now about
it
instances of this nature, he then
arguing against the suggestion that the
these events to be connected
in his
can only come from repeated experiences
imagination, and can readily foretell the
of As causing Bs - which means that
existence of one from the appearance of the
power or
other.
force
is
not a component of any
single situation in
which an
A
causes a B.
When we
object
is
only, that It
we
connexion, and a
we need
connexion,
will exist. This
form the idea of power or necessary
is
that,
causality,
from
it
therefore, which
and to
usual attendant,
Contemplate the subject on
there have been three steps in
is
carried by habit,
never
So
mind
event, to expect
connexion. Nothing farther
last
degree, mysterious and unintelligible [...]'
Hume's argument.
supposed to be
sentiment or impression, from which
known by an inward
sentiment or consciousness,
is
repetition of similar instances, the
one object to
performed, so far from
fully
which
exactly similar; except only, that after a
customary this
from every
instances, different
single instance,
is
appears, then, that this idea of a necessary
connexion among events
number of
arises
similar instances,
from
therefore, that
one
we mean
they have acquired a connexion
our thought, and give by which they
a
which occur of
say,
connected with another
rise
become
other's existence:
A
to
proofs of each
conclusion, which
the constant conjunction of these events; nor
somewhat
can that idea ever be suggested by any one
founded on sufficient evidence.
of these instances, surveyed
evidence be weakened by any general
lights
and
in all
positions. But there
is
possible
nothing
in
a
in
this inference,
extraordinary; but which
Nor
is
seems will its
diffidence of the understanding, or sceptical
suspicion concerning every conclusion, which is
new and
No
extraordinary.
conclusions can
be more agreeable to scepticism than such
make
as
discoveries concerning the
and narrow
limits
weakness
produced of the
and
surprising ignorance
this
surely,
among objects, which it imports to us to know perfectly, is that of cause and effect. founded
all
concerning matter of
means of
alone
it
we
We can
or existence. By
fact
attain
immediate
to teach
is
us,
utility
how
of
2.
every
are, therefore,
this relation:Yet
it
is
we
when we
desire to know,
at a
conception of
it'
we may
in syllogism
Hume's
form:
Concepts which are not based on
We
never experience one thing (a central a
So our ordinary concept of a cause defective
and needs
to
is
be changed.
If
you disagree with Hume's conclusion
it.
have experience. Suitably
to this experience, therefore,
usefully represent
drawn
is
Similar objects are always conjoined with
Of this we
a
cause). 3.
from something extraneous and foreign to
similar
it
have no idea of
element in our ordinary concept of
so
impossible to give any
of cause, except what
just definition
We
making another happen
we form
imperfect are the ideas which that
effect.
rejected.
to control and
thoughts and enquiries
it,
its
experience are meaningless and to be
all
Our
moment, employed about
1.
memory and
regulate future events by their causes.
concerning
is
argument
any assurance
the present testimony of our
sciences,
the cause, which gives
our reasonings
concerning objects, which are removed from
senses. The only
perfect
Comments and questions
it
this are
it
endeavour
if there be any relation
more
this
connexion; nor even any distinct notion
what
weakness of the understanding, than the present? For
in
connexion with
stronger instance can be
cannot remedy
which may point out that
circumstance
And what
we
inconvenience, or attain any definition,
capacity.
On
be drawn from circumstances
definitions
foreign to the cause,
human reason and
of
thought to that other. But though both these
3,
where do you think
his
argument goes
wrong?
define
a cause to be an object, followed by another,
and where
all
the objects, similar to the
first,
are followed by objects similar to the second.
Or,
in
other words, where,
had not been,
if
the
the second never
The appearance of
first
had
object
existed.
a cause always conveys
the mind, by a customary transition, to the idea of the effect.
experience. this
We
Of this
also
we
have
may, therefore, suitably to
experience, form another definition of
cause; and
call
it,
an object followed by another,
and whose appearance always conveys
the
Hume is right and we have to the idea of A making B happen.
Suppose give
up
How serious
a loss
would
this be?
If,
for
we have to give up the idea of some kind of transmission (of energy or power or something) from A to B, can we example,
still
cope with everyday
life?
If
the idea of transmission
is
genuinely
the statement, 'That cheetah just killed
useful in science (in simplifying theory for
that zebra'?
example), should empiricism rule
call
because we don't detect
it
or instruments? Couldn't
theory give
it
it
out
to
a 'cheetah'
-
to use any inherently general word - has implications beyond what you've just
with our senses its
Popper thinks not, because
one of the things involved
role in the
meaning?
experienced.
Then can any number of similar experiences justify the claim 'Cheetahs zebras'? Again,
the claim
is
so general as to go beyond
implies that unseen
Hume's second definition of a cause depends on our 'customary transition' in thought from cause to effect. When we see
existing experience.
clouds, the thought of rain pops into our
future cheetahs will go
heads. But
this
is
thought of rain
implies that,
from causes
is
no
a rational
What do you
think?
opposed
On
own
on
It
also
devices,
killing future
one
to, say,
'Cheetahs
Popper's account, the
idea that cheetahs
kill
zebras pops into
someone's head - by some process which
Popper hands over to psychology to
from Popper). Is it
zebras, (as
kiss zebras')?
development of this shocking claim follows, in the reading
to their
So why should we believe that cheetahs kill
rational inference
to effects (and
left
zebras.
argued, in another famous
passage, that there
It
cheetahs have killed unseen zebras.
inference, or just a conditioned reflex?
Hume
kill
Popper thinks not, because
explain.
really reasonable
The important point for scientific method is
understanding
to expect the effect, having witnessed the
idea,
cause?
however produced,
is
then tested (by
savannah-gazing, asking experts survives these tests,
proceed with
that the
we can
etc). If
it
scientifically
it.
Popper claims two advantages for
this
model of science {SP p.l8f). makes science out to be rational,
theory-first
©
First,
and
it
it
does
thinking
Karl Popper (1902-94) on induction - from The Logic of Scientific Discovery:
so,
using only the deductive
we understand comparatively
well. In this sense,
it
stands with
Hutchinson,
from pseudo-science and metaphysics. In the case of genuine science, are,
conjectures
and aural (and fortunately not
things which
Can
we make
considerable efforts to prove our
gazing out over the
savannah. You have certain dramatic visual
experiences.
it
allows us to distinguish genuine science
1959 So there you
common
sense against scepticism. Secondly,
tactile)
these experiences justify
to be false.
12
false.
We actively look for
would show our hypothesis
.
The theory
CJ
to be developed
opposed to
a
[
.
.
The question of how
]
scientific
asserts
-
far
kind of test
is
to
the
demands of
stand up to the
whether
raised by purely scientific
be deductive. With the
help of other statements, previously
we
it
'predictions'
call
-
deduced from the
are
theory; especially predictions that are easily
theory - may be of great
testable or applicable.
From these
statements, those are selected which are
is
it
too, the procedure of
accepted, certain singular statements - which
conflict,
interest to empirical psychology; but
Here
applications.
testing turns out to
be susceptible
be a musical theme, a dramatic or a
or
neither to
man - whether
idea occurs to a
last
new consequences of theory whatever may be new in what
practice,
happens that
it
how
out
experiments, or by practical technological
me
seems to
for logical analysis nor to
new
.
stage, the act of conceiving
initial
it
- and then only
has been advanced
it
inventing a theory,
it.
the
or as the view that a hypothesis can
The call
find
be
it.
The purpose of this
might be described
It
only be empirically tested
of
derived from
theory of the deductive method of
testing,
after
applications of the conclusions which can
the
attempts to operate with the
all
ideas of inductive logic. as the
in
following pages stands directly
irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific
not derivable from the current theory, and
knowledge
more
[
.
.
.
Accordingly
]
between the process of conceiving a new and the methods and
idea,
examining
it
logically.
of knowledge
logic
results
As to the
...
investigating the
methods employed
consists solely
systematic tests to which every
must be subjected entertained .
.
.
[
.
.
.
if it
is
experiments. that
in
new
in
not yet are
a
new
idea,
any way
justified in
.
.
.
logical
this decision
positive,
is
verified,
then the theory
the time being, passed
is
negative, or
the conclusions have been
testing theories,
their falsification also
results
It
in
its
test: it.
But
then
logically
deduced.
should be noticed that a positive
conclusions
decision can only temporarily support the
deduction.
theory, for subsequent negative decisions
may always overthrow
one another and with other relevant
theory withstands detailed and severe
what
tests
logical
and
relations (such as equivalence, derivability,
theory
compatibility or incompatibility) exist
we may
between them
or that
.
of the theory by
.
.
finally,
way of
there
if
the theory
These conclusions are then compared with statements, so as to find
we
other words,
falsified,
falsifies
from which they were
put up tentatively, and
drawn by means of
If
and
have found no reason to discard
]
critically
them with the
the singular conclusions turn out to
the decision
the method of
From
if
has, for
of tests, always proceeds on the following lines.
is
be acceptable, or
those
idea
to be seriously
and selecting them according to the
seek a decision
results of practical applications
proceed on the
shall
I
statements by comparing
of
it
we
as regards these (and other) derived
task of the
assumption that
which the current
theory contradicts. Next
sharply
shall distinguish
I
especially those
is
the testing
in
is
is
experience
empirical
3
So long
as a
not superseded by another
the course of
say that it
it.
it
has 'proved
'corroborated' .
.
scientific progress, its
by past
mettle'
if
.
...
.
no conclusive disproof of
ever be produced; for
it
is
.
theory can
a
these laws,
or that the discrepancies which are
will
and
in
similar
arguments abound
proof (or sciences,
disproof)
strict
you
you
If
the
in
on
insist
are
[
.
.
.
strict
in .
how
it
.
is
appears
logic I
.
in
.to which
their place
proposal to adopt
criterion for deciding
falsifiability
[
.
scientific, .
.
my at
.
For the conventionalist, theoretical natural science
is
According to
.
will
sense
all
The
may have
[
.
.
.
my
]
criterion of
falsifiability
theories into genuinely
and pseudo-scientific or
its
it
.
is
.
.
is
impossible to
it is
form, whether
logical
a conventional
implicit definitions,
a system which
possible to ask
or
empirical
is
Only with reference
in
to the is
only
way to
avoid conventionalism
methods. We decide that
point of
we
if
threatened
of conventionalist stratagem
determine what an observation and, more instrument
is.
It
I
14
will
is
our system
never save
propose the following
theory
is
—
it
whether we are dealing
observation: for they are needed to
scientific
arisen;
is
taking a decision: the decision not to apply
.
this conventionalist
what a
away the
explain
view, laws of nature are not falsifiable by
especially,
point of view,
with a conventionalist or an empirical theory.
not a picture of nature but merely
a logical construction
my
methods applied to a theoretical system
are influenced by the school of .
He
system of irrefutable
whether
who
new
appear unshaken to the
will
a system of statements
example, by
thought known as 'conventionalism'
.Yet
.
system of the day
'classical'
decide, by analysing
science. They will
those
.
quite unacceptable
metaphysical ones]. Indeed,
]
whether or not a raised, for
it
according to
admit that
theoretical system belongs to empirical
be
find
I
.Whenever the
classification [of
our
as
this
all
does not lead to an unambiguous
Objections are bound to be raised against
my
self-contained and defensible
threatened by the results of
I
can be eliminated
new ones
without creating
is
spite of
of the system
or even as merely 'probable'. Those .
the axioms of
perhaps by blaming our inadequate mastery
conclusions, theories can be established as
rise,
if
have decided to
inconsistencies which I
never assume that by force of 'verified'
inductive logic gives
only
.
conventionalist.
can argue from the truth of
[epidemiological] problems
'rigid'
regard conventionalism as a system
the system
never
singular statements to the truth of theories.
'true',
called
is
experiments which might be interpreted as
]
Nothing resembling inductive
we
which
of
field
.
I
falsifications
the procedure here outlined.
assume that
...
the empirical
in
experience, and never learn from
wrong you in
adopt
never benefit from
will
our so-called
clock
satisfy
we
mechanics which
support of Newtonian mechanics,
the social sciences.)
A
and a measuring rod
these instruments
the struggle against
(In
both these arguments were often
Einstein,
used
'accurate'
disappear with the advance of
our understanding.
which form the
us,
the movements measured with the help of
and the theory are only apparent and
that they
measuring rods.
'rigid'
asserted to exist between the experimental results
by
clocks and the correction of
say that the experimental results are not reliable,
down
laid
indispensable basis for the regulation of our
always possible to
[
.
it
.
.
by its
is
by any kind
]
definition.
to be called 'empirical' or
A
'falsifiable'
.
if it
divides the class of
possible basic
all
some
statements unambiguously into the two
nonempty
following
of
all
subclasses.
First,
the class
those basic statements with which
inconsistent (or which
we
prohibits):
the class of those basic statements which
does not contradict (or which
We
can put
theory
is
falsifiers
We
more
this
falsifiable
is
if
introduced
.
.
.
test
we between
We
falsification.
As to
regarded as
We
is
only
we
not
it.
This condition
is
a
a
few
to reject falsified
effect
it
as falsified.
only
if
we
will
We
take
we
a low-level empirical hypothesis
describes such an effect
We the
have
I
.
.
.
is
which
if
which
proposed and
event
The which
have called basic statements. But what kind
.
.
agreement
would amount to
this
done
after science has
we
.
.
its
work of
stop at basic
easily testable. .
will
.
not
suitable to serve as statements at
we
stop
[
.
.
.
]
is
occurring
in
.
.
a certain individual
and
[
basic statements at
we
.
.
.
.
.
Every test of a theory, whether resulting
we
stop,
decide to accept as satisfactory,
as sufficiently tested, have admittedly the
]
may
in
arguments (or by further
15
]
which
character of dogmas, but only [
.
'Babel of Tongues': scientific discovery
region of space and time
of singular statements are these basic falsified?
we
statements asserting that an observable
the question of
can they be
that
agreement
Basic statements are therefore
of theories to that of the
How
new
be very
other
of those singular statements which
statements?
we
whose
are clearly not of this kind; thus they
]
now reduced
falsifiability
falsifiability
[
In
means
it
this
is
Statements about personal experiences
as
only accept the falsification
shall
corroborated
it
in
should no longer be possible
statements which are
discover a reproducible
which refutes the theory.
words,
it
deduction or explanation,
hardly induce us shall
arrive
procedure according to which
some day
... so,
stray basic statements
contradicting a theory
we
would be reduced to absurdity
occurrences are of no significance to science.
Thus
at a
about basic statements
necessary but
non-reproducible single
sufficient; for
.This
the time being.
easy to see that
for scientific observers to reach
have accepted basic statements which contradict
satisfied, for fairly
investigators are likely to reach
if
.
the
acceptance or rejection the various
to be
If
falsified
is
.
if
point or other and say
are stopping at statements about
falsified.
say that a theory
some
especially easy to test. For
determine
will
under what conditions a system
turn be subjected to tests
stop only at a kind of statement that
falsification, special rules
must be introduced which
is
logical
any basic statement can
.
to lead us anywhere, nothing remains
are
way
have
the empirical character of a system of statements.
is
It
solely as a criterion for
falsifiability
.
but to stop at
potential
]
distinguish clearly
and
falsifiability
[
its
in its
.
have
will
procedure has no natural end. Thus
by saying: a
the class of
not empty
must
briefly
again
it
permits').
it
we come to any some basic
and do not accept
point of view
at
not
nowhere. But considered from a
led
and secondly,
potential falsifiers of the theory;
.
or other which
we do
statement or other then the test
the class of the
this
call
decision,
is
it
If
.
must stop
falsification,
basic statement
decide to accept.
or
rules out,
it
corroboration or
its
.
desist
from
justifying
in
so far as
them by tests).
we
further
But
this kind
of dogmatism
need
is
innocuous
tested further
admit that
I
the chain of deduction But
since,
should the
these statements can easily be
arise,
in
this
of 'infinite regress
this kind
innocuous since
in
too makes
principle infinite. is
also
our theory there
n Why are _
or
,
question of trying to prove any statements
by means of I
it.
And
finally,
.
,
no
is
no
.,
.
non-reproducible occurrences r
._
'.
significance to science? °
as to psychologism:
admit, again, that the decision to accept a
basic statement, causally
with
satisfied
it,
is
connected with our experiences -
especially with
But
and to be
we do
our perceptual experiences.
not attempt to
£% ^^
justify basic
statements by these experiences.
Experiences can motivate a decisively,
decision,
perhaps
and hence an acceptance or
rejection of a statement, but a basic
statement cannot be
justified
more than by thumping the
by them - no
Putnam
Hilary
(b.
Popper - from 'The "Corroboration" of Theories' in The Philosophy of Karl Popper.
table.'
Open
Court, 1974
Comments and questions
(ed. P. A. Schilpp)
Thumping
In this reading, Hilary
a table motivates without
justifying because
it's
not connected with
the thumper's claim being true. But
perceptual experiences as of a cheetah
connected - except for dreams and so on - with what makes the
killing a zebra are
claim true.
Is
Popper right to say that
perceptual experiences, such as seeing
something with your
own
eyes,
cannot
rationally justify a statement like 'The
house
is
on
1926) against
attacks
alternative.
M
'Popper himself uses the term 'induction' to refer to
for verifying or showing to
any method
be true (or even
probable) general laws on the basis of observational or experimental data (what he calls 'basic
can
statements'). His views are
Humean: no such method exists or A principle of induction would have
radically
fire'?
Putnam
Popper's view of science, and offers an
exist.
to be either [innate] (a possibility Popper
Is it
-
as
always unscientific to protect claims
Popper
says conventionalists
falsification?
do - from
rejects)
or
But the
latter
justified
by a higher-level
principle.
course necessarily leads to an
infinite regress.
What
is
novel
is
that
Popper concludes
neither that empirical science
nor that empirical science
is
rests
impossible
upon
.
.
principles that are themselves incapable of
Rather
justification.
his position
does not
empirical science
really rely
and
it
would be
unimportant for the purpose of
upon
understanding, since on Popper's view,
a
principle of induction!
never
scientists
Popper does not deny that
.
practical purposes;
that
is
.
scientists state
is
us that any law or theory
tell
true or even probable. Knowing that
general laws, nor that they test these general
certain 'conjectures' (according to
laws against observational data. What he says
scientific
is
that
when
general
law, that scientist
does not thereby
'I
degree' only
means
'
to severe tests and laws are
Scientific
this
Since the application of scientific laws does
this
Popper
law
has withstood them'.
not
falsifiable,
laws,
but only to
falsify
is
induction
not
right in maintaining that
unnecessary. Even
is
them, Hume's
laws
arise for empirical
inductions'
hardly reasonable advice to give
is
men
A Brief Criticism of Popper's View
Kuhn's View of Science
.When
a scientist accepts a law,
he
.
number of philosophers have
Recently a
is
.
begun to put forward a rather new view of
recommending to other men that they rely on it - rely on often, in practical contexts.
scientific activity
Only by wrenching science altogether out of
sharpest expression
it,
the context
context of
in
which
men
it
really arises
- the
on induction
peculiar view If
is
'this
law
is
scientifically
merely meant tests'
.
errors; but
his
like
- and there were no suggestion
likely
to withstand further
tests involved
application,
in
at
tests,
examining
It
because
would be scientists
any law or theory
practically
but
is
tell
safe to rely
.
reaches
its
Louis Althusser.
I
I
believe
commit tendency
also represent, for
needed corrective to the
a
we
have been
.
Kuhn's account
is
the notion
some
unclarities
the use of this notion; but
in
paradigm
is
inconsistencies and
simply a
scientific
.
.
theory
together with an example of a successful and striking application.
us that
upon
.
criticized for
a
unimportant,
would never
.
of a paradigm. Kuhn has been legitimately
such as the
right:
is
The heart of
all
an application or attempted
then Popper would be
.
the writings of
[Popperian] deductivism
then science would be a wholly unimportant activity.
in
also believe that the
I
that matter)
locutions
that a law which has withstood severe tests is
.The view
they represent (and that
.
law has withstood severe
'this
.
that both of these philosophers
highly corroborated', 'this law
accepted', and
.
Thomas Kuhn and
trying to change and control
the world - can Popper even put forward
do
men who apply scientific and theories do so. And 'don't make
these
.
scientists
course, they do),
scientists.
.
if
not inductively anticipate the future (and, of
verifiable.
Since scientists are not even trying to verify
problem does not
not
involve the anticipation of future successes,
law to a high
have subjected
I
it
is
understanding anything.
assert that law to be true or even probable.
have corroborated
all
laws are 'provisional conjectures')
have not yet been refuted
a scientist 'corroborates' a
Popper
application
some
for
17
fact,
-
say,
It
is
important that the
a successful explanation of
or a successful and novel
.
- be
prediction
striking.
that the success
-
scientists
is
sufficiently
especially
career -
choosing a
What
young
means
this
impressive that
opinion): data,
in
the usual sense,
cannot establish the superiority of one
paradigm over another because data
scientists
are led to try to emulate
that success by seeking further explanations,
themselves are perceived through the spectacles of
or whatever on the same model.
predictions,
my
so, in
is
For example, once U.G. [universal gravitation]
one paradigm or another
Changing from one paradigm to another requires a'Gestalt switch'. The history and
had been put forward and one had the
methodology of science get rewritten when
example of Newton's derivation of
there are major paradigm changes; so there
Kepler's
laws together with the example of the derivation
of, say,
are no 'neutral' historical and methodological
canons to which to appeal. Kuhn also holds
a planetary orbit or two,
then one had a paradigm. The most
views on meaning and truth which are
important paradigms are the ones that
relativistic
generate
scientific fields:
the
do not wish to
generated
field
by the Newtonian paradigm was,
the
in
and,
on my
discuss these here
instance, the entire field of celestial
substantial differences
Popper on the
.
Kuhn maintains that the paradigm that structures a falsification
field
-
sense, this physics
highly
particular
in
overthrown by
is
a
new
immune it
paradigm,
if
in
a drastic
is
theory
in
.
.
.What
in
in
the absence of
its
.
.
in
activity
is
the
field
falsify
(e.g.
deductions), a theory which
is
in
the
paradigmatic
solving' is
I
[
.
.
.
'normal science']
because and when a better theory
and seek further
[
.
is
.
.
Once
a
scientific
calls
'normal
of scientists during such
]
fixed,
.
.
have suggested that [during periods of
not given up because of observational and
.
it
described by Kuhn as 'puzzle
is
experimental results by themselves, but
available
is,
grown around that paradigm, we
an interval
a mistake
[that
neither an activity of
get an interval of what Kuhn
the data
scientific
one's paradigm nor as an
of trying to confirm
has
in
stresses
qua non of a
paradigm has been set up, and a
turning out
way
the quiet periods between shifts] as
trying to
stresses the
whereas Popper
as the sine
science'. The activity
was
]
between Kuhn and
Kuhn
something 'phony' about them faked, or there
.
theory may be immune
that the paradigmatic successes had
were
.
Kuhn sees normal science
.
in
paradigm a
the absence of such
and unprecedented change
world, and
new
the absence of a
that
falsification,
science
the world had started to act
believe,
scientific
falsifiability
an exaggeration: Newtonian
is
markedly non-Newtonian way I
from
one
would probably have been
abandoned, even
true,
In
.
issue of the falsifiability of
scientific theories.
which a
to
can only be
paradigm.
[
I
As might be expected, there are
first
mechanics
.
view, incorrect; but
...
we
take a theory as
take the facts to be explained as fixed, facts
-
frequently
contingent facts about the particular system
]
Kuhn's most controversial assertions have
to do with the process whereby a
new
- which
will
enable us to
paradigm supplants an older paradigm. Here
of the theory.
he tends to be
point of view
radically subjectivistic (overly
fill
out the
explanation of the particular fact on the basis I
suggest that adopting this
will
enable us better to
appreciate both the relative
Newton's theory of universal gravitation
of
unfalsifiability
theories which have attained paradigm status,
and the
fact that
known beforehand
[
facts
.
.
.
which were
the earth's shape which were tested
confirmed
]
how U.G. came to be Newton first derived Kepler's
accepted.
from U.G
.
.
.
was not
this
a
could account for the tides
the gravitational
was not
a
pull
'test', in
and
hitherto mysterious
it
also gave a
known but phenomenon of change
'precession' (the slow
were already
sense, because Kepler's laws
to be true. Then he
laws
Popper's
'test' in
in 1733,
Putnam
axis of rotation).
showed that U.G. on the basis of
of the moon: this also
fully unfalsifiable
normal
Popper's sense, because
also accepted that
science'
during periods of
is
overstating the case.
- and properly Popper demands.
many
- not
years showing that small perturbations
this
time the whole
civilized
as falsifiable as
What do you
the orbits of
the planets could be accounted for by U.G.
By
He
continued to believe, however, that scientific theories are often
in
in the earth's
to describe even paradigm-level theories as
the tides were already known. Then he spent
(which were already known)
and
precise explanation of the
us see
... let
known
Newton's theory made predictions about
the 'predictions' of physical
theory are frequently
was more complex than he had suggested.
think?
Is it
always
unscientific to protect a theory
world had
from
falsification?
accepted - and, indeed, acclaimed - U.G.; but it
had not been 'corroborated' at
all
in
Popper's sense! If
we
look for a Popperian
one risky to background knowledge - we do
a derivation of a relative
new
not get one
until
spheres] of after the
1
797, roughly a hundred years
sum, a theory
is
only accepted
non-ad
substantial,
if
.
.
.
]
in
accordance
with Popper; unfortunately,
it
is
in
better accordance with the
'inductivist'
accounts that Popper
even
rejects, since
it
classical
induction from past to future
it
does,
doesn't, then there's
to use scientific laws or theories
in real
(which
life
Popper respond
these
Comments and questions In discussions after reading an earlier
Putnam conceded
that the history of the acceptance of
-
if it
no reason
stress support rather than falsification'.
version of this article,
doesn't. If
eliminating). But
hoc,
is
we have
ones, or
(which Popper was committed to
the
explanatory successes. This
dilemma for Popper: makes it likely
that a law or theory will survive future
two
[
a
either surviving past tests
the Cavendish experiment
theory had been introduced
theory has
Putnam proposes
prediction,
[measuring the attraction between
In
-
of U.G.
'test'
19-
is
absurd).
to this
How should
dilemma?
o
method
Paul Feyerabend (1924-94) on scientific
ideas
whenever one tries to more definite one finds
that they are
false.
Was
.
.
Secondly,
.
of normal science
method - from 'How to
Defend Society against
make Kuhn's
No
Science':
- and
in
there ever a period
the history of thought?
challenge anyone to prove the
I
contrary.
Radical Philosophy , vol. 2, 1975
Lakatos
immeasurably more
is
sophisticated than Kuhn. Instead of theories
Feyerabend here claims, against Popper,
he considers research programmes which
that real scientific theories are not
are sequences of theories connected by
falsifiable in the
way he
part of his larger distinctive
m a
requires. This
argument
that there
method belonging
methods of
is
is
no
modification, so-called heuristics.
Each theory
to science.
faults.
It
may be
'. .
.
no new and revolutionary
scientific
manner
theory
beset by anomalies,
that permits us to say under
we must
regard
tendency exhibited by the sequence. We
in
what
judge historical developments, achievements
over a period of time, rather than the
as
it
endangered: many revolutionary theories
do
are unfalsifiable. Falsifiable versions
but they are hardly ever
in
situation at a particular time. History
methodology are combined
exist,
agreement with
accepted basic statements: every
moderately interesting theory
is
Moreover theories have formal
A
progress
the sequence of theories leads to
if
research
novel predictions.
falsified.
flaws,
many
is
It
discovered without feature of Lakatos'
criteria it
evaluations are
methodological rules which
this
they are
much too vague to
anything but lots of hot
air
If
Scientists
that such
tell
the
scientist
stick
succeed
but, alas,
its
rivals
in
to a
may even
making the programme overtake
and they therefore proceed
whatever they are doing
rationally with
you don't
(provided they continue
calling
degenerating
programmes degenerating and progressive
Never
programmes
before has the literature on the philosophy of science been invaded by so
is
tied to
may
give rise to
believe me, look at the literature.
many creeps
progressive). This
Lakatos offers words
means
which sound
like
that
the
and incompetents. Kuhn encourages people
elements of a methodology; he does not
who
offer a methodology. There
have no idea
ground to
talk
why
a stone
falls
to the
with assurance about
if it
decisive
degenerating programme, they
has been realised
Kuhn and Lakatos among
them. Kuhn's ideas are interesting
A
to
to either retain or abandon a research
programme.
the past decade
help.
methodology
no longer
said
have been
facts that
by
to science.
by various thinkers,
its
is
to degenerate
said
would
anything comparable. They are useless as an
In
is
programme
reduced to absorbing
of them contain contradictions, ad hoc
eliminate science without replacing
and
into a single
enterprise.
adjustments, and so on and so forth.
Applied resolutely, Popperian
is
not the shape of the single theories, but the
ever formulated
is
of
full
contradictions, ambiguities. What counts
circumstances
aid
may be
the sequence
in
is
no method
according to the most advanced and
scientific
20
sophisticated
methodology
in
up
existence
no
Comments and questions says that scientific progress
is
more
be hoped for from improvements in
method than improvements in instruments. In particular, good
distinctively scientific
mean the
to
planned experiments.
Feyerabend, however, suggests that there
today
Bacon
carefully
science sets
-21
-
the same thing word 'method'?
as
is
method. Does he
Bacon meant by
Overview of Area
gathered in these ways.
1
It
therefore
clear that these rules of induction
The
central concern of this 'Area' has
to say
what
a
been
thinking and acting which makes
become accepted
For Aristotle the fundamental point
When
thinking.
the belief that
For example, the syllogism:
legitimately All ungulates have multiple stomachs.
2.
Cows
3.
So cows have multiple stomachs.
Hume
can we
this that
A makes B
call this belief a
opposed
to a
kind of
conditioned response (see SP, ch. 2)?
Hume's questions
if
still
await
good
answers, and in the Reading from Popper,
A genuinely scientific something more
even
B: (a)
can we
(b)
rational belief, as
scientific syllogism,
for
experience leads us to form
A causes
mean by
happen? and
are ungulates.
would not be a it was all true.
way
to raise questions about 'inductive'
that the premisses in a scientific syllogism
1.
paradigms of good
as the
reasoning. This opened the
is
contain information about a thing's essence d'etre.
logic or
Euclidean geometry, though these had
them
scientific.
or raison
kind of thinking which was very different
from the deductive thinking of
about certain kinds of
it is
became
governed
syllogism
we saw
would be
one, radical, response to them.
Popper agrees with
like:
Hume that we
must
answer 'No' to both questions, and argues 4.
Multiple stomachs exist to digest
that since scientific thinking
grass.
must be distinguished by
5.
Cows
6.
So cows have multiple stomachs.
eat grass.
The conclusion
is
its
multiple stomachs: 1-3 does not.
can rationally be accepted,
This - together with Aristotle's notion of 'intuition' - eventually led people to think
temporarily, as scientific.
that scientists could simply 'intuit' the real
criticisms of Popper's view
basis of everyday
from Bacon, we
scientists
see the
mediaeval view. Bacon
beyond
insists that
Our
we need
familiar experience in
we need
two
to incorporate
at
wrote
down
final
Reading, from Feyerabend,
some problems with the Kuhnian approach and prefers the model of scientific progress
due
to Lakatos.
On
this
model, however, Feyerabend thinks we have to say that, after
designed to answer specific questions. also
do not allow their theories to be Popper suggests.
sketches
more and perhaps unfamiliar phenomena, and we need consciously to set up experiments, Bacon
real
falsified as readily as
seventeeth-century rejection of that
to go
at least
method. According to Putnam,
In the extract
set
The Reading from Putnam offered some and suggested instead a Kuhnian approach to scientific
experience.
ways:
attempt to
it
up explanatory hypotheses or conjectures as falsifiable as we can make them. Those conjectures which survive our determined attempts to prove them false
the same, but 4-6 goes
on the
rational,
which are
through the purpose or final cause of
essences of things,
is
scientific
rules for arriving
all,
there
is
no distinctively
method.
There are other important questions
conclusions from a body of evidence
22
in
the philosophy of science.
We haven't
Readings of Area
1
have
at least
introduced
looked, for example, at the instrumentalism
what
debate (about the extent to which scientific
philosophical thinking about science.
theories can, or should, be regarded as
In Area 2
and
difficult
example, that space-time
is real.
will see
how
in
taking our
way or another) impinges on our common-sense belief that our minds and
questions in the
philosophy of physics - whether to
we
problems
concept of reality from science (in one
useful fictions). There are also lots of
fascinating
are probably the central
say, for
But the
their contents are real.
23
to
AREA 2
move about
describes,
predicts.
it
It
deals not only with
Nor
the past but with the future.
Mind
prediction the
not only
capriciously. Science
last
is
word: to the extent that
relevant conditions can be altered, or
otherwise controlled, the future can be controlled.
The reading selections in this area ask what it means to say a thing is real, and whether minds and their contents
science
we
the
in
determined.
human
of
field
We
methods of
are to use the
assume that behaviour
that
should be considered
If
affairs,
we must
and
lawful
is
must expect to discover
what a man does
the result of
is
real.
specifiable conditions
and that once these
conditions have been discovered,
we
can
and to some extent determine
anticipate
his
actions.
This possibility
people.
is
It
is
Skinner (1904-90) on behaviourism - from Science and Human Behaviour: Macmillan, 1953
whose behaviour
F.
approach to
human
as a free agent,
the product, not of
antecedent conditions, but of
specifiable
spontaneous inner changes of course.
In this extract, Skinner argues that a scientific
is
tradition of long
man
standing which regards
B.
many
offensive to
opposed to a
Prevailing philosophies of
human
recognize an internal
which has the
power of
behaviour
'will'
nature
interfering with causal relationships
conflicts with the traditional belief that
and which makes the prediction and control
human beings act freely and spontaneously. He goes on to suggest that the scientific,
of behavior impossible
deterministic view will bring large benefits
that
in social
how much we
more than the mere
without a struggle.
description of events as they occur is
an attempt to discover order; to
certain events stand
other events.
No
in
until
possible
end product;
it
show
is
start.
We
about man and flattering.
not only a
is
simply
a
do not want
It
.
.
.
unknown
in
Primitive beliefs
his place in
nature are usually
has been the unfortunate
more The Copernican theory of system displaced man from his
realistic pictures.
at
the solar
the
cannot apply the methods of
science to a subject matter which
We
is
can do so
responsibility of science to paint
a working
assumption which must be adopted very
who
civilization
the history of science
technology can be
is
the proper subject
Conflicts of this sort are not
that
such relations have
been discovered. But order
is
such a science.
It
lawful relations to
practical
based upon science
Regardless of
.
stand to gain from supposing
human behavior
product of Western is
.
matter of a science, no one
and international planning.
'Science
.
pre-eminent position at the centre of things.
Today
assumed
25
we
accept
this
theory without
.
emotion, but
.
originally
met with enormous
it
Darwin challenged a practice of
resistance.
segregation
which man set himself
in
firmly
struggle
which arose
place,
he did not deny him a possible
problems
position as master Special faculties or a special capacity for
in
new
Our
threat arises
current practices
confused. At times
of
we
.
.
[
.
.
is
.
At other times
are thoroughly
.
is
we
.
.We
not
almost
solving these
adopt a consistent point
.
fact,
we
what other people are going
the time,
to
do
and mostly with considerable utters the words,
good sign that he or she is about to leave and go to work. What is the real basis of
as the
Skinner's feeling that the 'traditional
reserve
philosophy of human nature'
men for .We want to believe that right-minded men are moved by valid principles even though we are willing to regard wrong-minded men as victims of erroneous propaganda Though we
is
unscientific?
.
.
If
no
science could deal with
.
observe that Moslem children
'spontaneous inner changes' (such as acts of
general
in
become Moslems while Christian in general become Christians, we
will),
does that imply that they aren't
real?
children
are not
to accept an accident of birth as a
basis for belief All this
We
we
shall
in
'I'm off to work', that's usually a pretty
the right to give credit to great
willing
until
success. When someone
not always
is
environment; yet
their achievements
.We
implies 'unpredictable'. But in
all
.
.
common man we
regard the his
.
view.'
predict
recognize
at least
complete, that the individual to be held to account .
.
Skinner seems to assume that 'spontaneous'
]
appear to regard a
that inner determination
product of
are intimately
now
man's behavior as spontaneous and responsible.
peaceful assembly
Comments and questions
the process
of evolution. When that distinction questioned, a
battlefield,
in
spontaneous, creative
emerged
action might have
and on the
principal issues in dispute
both
certainly remain ineffective
biological
in his
nations,
freedom and control
not yet ended. But
is
between
concerned with the problem of human
apart from the animals, and the bitter
though Darwin put man
our vacillation.The
.
.
suggests that
we
are
in
transition.
o
have not wholly abandoned the
traditional philosophy of
we
the same time scientific
human
nature; at
are far from adopting a
S. Peirce (1839-1914) on reality and truth - from 'How to Make our
C.
point of view without
reservation
[
Confusion
.
.
in
.
Ideas Clear': Popular Science Monthly
]
theory means confusion
practice. The present
the world
may
in
in
12,
1878
unhappy condition of
large
measure be traced to
In this paper, Peirce states his 'ideal limit'
— 26 —
.
theory of truth, and derives from of
idea'
For Peirce, reality
reality.
a 'clear
it,
defined
is
which things partaking of
[this
another version of empiricism].
The
minds of ideal
in terms of beliefs in the
is
it
only effect which real things have
cause
investigators.
produce
effects
for
belief,
is
the sensations which
all
they excite emerge into consciousness '. .
.
wouid probably puzzle most
it
the form of
men, even among those of a reflective turn of mind,
to give an abstract
definition of the real. Yet
opposite,
fiction.
A
figment
somebody's imagination; characters as
his
it
is
and
reality
its
a product of
how you own
or
think
is
an external
minds, dependent
which are that
I
however phenomena
are,
we
at
it.
really think
characters
not depend on what
we
existence as a mental
phenomenon,
so,
it;
independent of
On
all
its
if
peculiarities
than that
it
retains
by virtue of no other fact
was dreamt to possess them. real as that
his
whose
what anybody them to be. But however satisfactory such a definition may be found, it would be a great mistake to
where we
are carried, not
destiny.
taken,
No
no
like
selection of other facts for study,
mind even, can enable
other
According to them, quality, consists in
reality, like
our
embodied
great law
is
truth and
reality.
in
the conception of
The opinion which
investigate,
is
all
real
But
it
.
— 27
fated
this
truth,
opinion
is
.
may be
opposed to the
said that this
answer to
this
is
view
is
directly
abstract definition which
reality,
ultimately thought
the peculiar sensible
in
is
who
what we mean by the
inasmuch as
characters of the real to
every
a
to escape the predestinate opinion. This
have given of
reality
wish, but to a
the operation of
modification of the point of view
natural bent of
man
is
the
perfectly clear Here, then, let us apply
set out with
them by a force of themselves to one and the same
to be ultimately agreed by
think
rules.
.They may at
of investigation carries
may
makes our idea of
.
processes, the
may
and the object represented
it
.
scientific
all
characters are independent of
suppose that
will
together toward a
steadily
research. Different minds
no
opinion on the subject.
Thus we may define the
method and
move
results will
foreordained goal,
completely
it
only pushed far enough,
conclusion. This activity of thought, by which
the other hand, considering, not the fact
of dreaming, but the thing dreamt,
if
obtain different results, but, as each
first
we
does not depend on what is
fully
certain solution to every question
to which they can be applied
outside
a real
that he
anybody thinks was dreamt, but
real)
the most antagonistic views, but the process
they do
think those
dream has
has really dreamt
dreamt so and
think,
the
false belief (or belief in
destined centre. So with
the sense
them. But though their
depend on how we
characters to be. Thus, a
somebody
real in
one
perfects his
reality.
within our
upon our thought,
the same time
from
in
the followers of science are
... all
give
That whose characters are independent of
There
The question therefore
persuaded that the processes of investigation,
has such
thought impresses upon
beliefs.
true belief (or belief
is
in
fiction) [...]
considering the
between
how
distinguished
such a definition
may perhaps be reached by points of difference
is,
to
it
depend on what
about them. But the
that,
we
makes the
on the one hand,
is
reality
independent, not necessarily of
is
thought
or any it;
and
general, but only of
in
number of men may
finite
that,
that opinion
opinion;
it
yet
what that opinion I
or any
is
does
man
perversity and that of others
Peirce notices an apparent conflict
may
between (as
might even conceivably cause an
arbitrary proposition to
be
and
if,
(as
he propose to escape
whatever an
think).
this
How does
seeming
contradiction? Does his escape plan work?
sufficiently
our
after the extinction of
another should
it
would
which alone could be
belief,
the result of investigation carried far;
his 'clear idea' of
ideal investigator
Yet even that would not change the
nature of the
his 'abstract definition' of reality
independence of what anyone thinks),
and
universally
accepted as long as the human race should last.
Is
think about
postpone the settlement of
indefinitely
produce'.
opinion depends on what
final is,
not depend on what you or
Our
it
this true?
I
on the other hand, though the
object of the
thinks.
which things partaking of
what you or
race,
with faculties and
rise
disposition for investigation, that true opinion
o
must be the one which they would ultimately
come
to.
again,'
and the opinion which would
result
from
Truth crushed to earth
investigation
how anybody may reality
the
if
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) on sense-data - from 'The Relation of
actually think. But the
of that which
lead, at last,
finally
does not depend on
is
real
Sense-data to Physics', in Mysticism and Logic. Longmans, 1918
does depend on
real fact that investigation
belief in
shall rise
is
destined to
continued long enough, to a In this seminal article, Russell argues that
it'
the claims of
Comments and questions
objects,
common
sense about material
and the claims of physics
too, are
ultimately verified by sensory impressions. Peirce says that a
dream
phenomenon because independent of Is it
all
is
it is
a real
A claim
mental
an oscilloscope on the
bench' might be verified by visual
'completely
opinion on the
like 'There's
impressions of a box-like object with a
subject'.
completely independent of the
screen, tactile sensations of
something
heavy and metallic, and so on.
dreamer's opinion?
Now we normally regard referred to
some
by
common
further thing
an object
sense or physics as
whose presence
is
by the sensory impressions we But there are two problems with
signalled
Peirce also says that 'every
.
.
.
quality,
receive.
consists in the peculiar sensible effects
this. First, it
28
seems
less
economical than
)
.
making do with impressions
And
namely the sensible term,
just the sensory
we can manage to do so. it seems to commit us to a
other term seems essentially incapable of
if
second,
being found. Therefore,
impressions in the
mind
common
physics
for ever unverifiable.
- and
(
If this is
1
We
may
say that
empirical verification,
Russell tries in this
the definition would would have the double advantages of economy and resistance to scepticism.
go -
said to
science, based
is
upon observation
verifiable,
i.e.
need of
e.g.
that our sense-data
is
.
.
.
but insofar
adopted physics ceases to
be empirical or based upon experiment and
be an empirical
observation alone. Therefore
be avoided
supposed to be
we know some
by inference from their effects
and experiment. It
this result.
something can be known about these causes
as [this strategy] is
capable
(2)
We
much
as
this
way
may succeed
in
actually defining
the objects of physics as functions of
subsequently confirmed by observation and
sense-data
Thus
experiment.
we
can
[
.
.
.
]
physics
is
to be verifiable
we
are
faced with the following problem: Physics
and
learn by observation
if
to
is
as possible.
of calculating beforehand results
What
and
utterly
have causes other than themselves, and that
it
'Physics
itself
is
principle a prion, without the
how
paper to sketch
verified,
There are two ways of avoiding
sense and physics in
terms of sensory impressions. really possible
was to be
to external things directly). Better,
therefore, to define the 'external things'
presumed by
would seem, the
it
correlation with objects of sense, by which
very problematic inference (from
which we never perceive
ever found, the
is
experiment?
exhibits sense-data as functions of physical
Nothing, so far as physics
is
concerned,
objects [that
is,
tells
us that
we
such-and-such
if
except immediate data of sense: certain
an object
patches of colour; sound, tastes, smells,
such-and-such sense-data], but verification
etc.,
with certain spatio-temporal relations.
The supposed contents of the world are prima
facie
these: molecules have
no
If
be
such objects are to be
solely
taste
.
data are
know it
must
I
through their relation to sense-data:
they must have
some
all
that
we
directly
in fact,
to
me
i.e.
causal
ascertained?
the correlation
A
itself
objects being constantly found together But
these
one term of the
and primitively [
.
.
.
]
...
for
arguments seem
nerves, and brain. The appearance which a
correlation can only be
case, only
]
dependence on the sense-organs,
thing presents to us
our
.
only to prove physiological subjectivity,
ascertained empirically by the correlated
in
.
are
matter of physics.There are arguments
through their correlation alone. is
.
part of the actual subject
their subjectivity, but these
how
[
regard sense-data as not mental, and as
being,
kind of correlation
is
be
when they
of the external world
with sense-data, and must be verifiable
But
probably get
physical objects can
Sense-data at the times
.
verified,
if
will
exhibited as functions of sense-data
physical
no colour atoms make no
present
only possible
very different from
noise, electrons have
is
.
.
.
is
causally
but continuity makes
dependent on it
not
unreasonable to suppose that they present
correlation,
29
—
some appearance Since the
object
[
.
.
'thing' [for
.
moves on
]
one of
be
thought of as something
distinct
from
intrinsically just the
of
all
Occam's razor
as
same
status as
any
others, but differ as regards their
them and underlying them. But by the principle of
then
constructed out of sense-data which 'have
any
came to be
it
He
and dreams
that, explains illusions
identified with
appearances,
its
'sensibilia'.
to the construction of enduring
material objects, and having completed
example, a physical
a table] cannot, without
like
indefensible partiality, single
constructed from
at [other presently
unoccupied] places
correlations or causal connections with
other "sensibilia" and with "things".'
[requiring
theories to minimise the entities they postulate],
if
the class of appearances
fulfill
was invented by the
thing
'I
economy demands
that
we
appearances.
It
physical world,
is
should
this
it
from asserting .
.
The
unnecessary entity
this
which
inferred entities
myself are of
two
other people,
in
kinds: (a)
I
[
.
.
.
is
other than
my own
in
of physics
...
'sensibilia'
'thing'
to eke out
its
momentary
appearance.'
Comments and questions
favour of minds
[see SP pp. 40-4]; (b) the
Russell begins is
verified
by pointing out that physics
by observation, usually in the
they are actually present to any mind] which
context of an experiment.
would appear from places where there
think, as Russell does, that in an
happen to be no minds, and which
observation, an individual receives
to be data
...
It
would
satisfaction to
and thus basis;
me
give
establish physics
-
in
whom
I
the
'immediate data of sense'?
we
the greatest
upon
up the
affections are
logical
no doubt, not share my desire
not,
economy [...]'
Russell proceeds to argue that the unified
space and time of
common
If
correct to
it is,
should
immediate data of
correlated with physical objects, or to
a solipsistic
human
also accept that these
Is it
sense are sufficiently 'thing-like' to be
[(a)],
fear they are the
stronger than the desire for will,
suppose
be able to dispense with
but those - and
majority
I
although they are no one's
real
I
the
[sense-data regardless of whether
'sensibilia'
verifiability
the inferences derivable from
evidence of testimony, resting ultimately upon the analogical argument
the only one which accounts for
invoking the history of a
]
the sense-data of
favour of which there
on the other hand,
could be indefinitely diminished, probably by
allow
shall
that,
the part played by unperceived
merely expedient to abstain
is
is
and
should hope that, with further elaboration,
substance or substratum underlying these appearances;
view
the empirical
its
not necessary to deny a
is
view which regards sense-data
as part of the actual substance of the
sense
identify the thing with the class of
conclude, therefore, that no valid objection
exists to the
prehistoric
whom common
metaphysicians to due,
will
the purposes for the sake of which the
sense can be
30
—
make
'actual substance of the world'? If
why
not?
ordinary inference by analogy.
see a box of
I
a certain shape, size and colour that
Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) on the argument from analogy from 'Psychology in the Language
it
contains steel nibs.
box of the same appearance. analogy that
Now
nibs.
of Physics': Erkenntnis y vol.2, 1931
proposed
mentioned
'the
by
infer
I
probably also contains steel
the [argument] maintains that the
about matters
analogical inference
pertaining to another psyche logical
In our last reading, Russell
it
establish
I
discover another
I
form.
If
were the
this
would be
of the same
is
case, the
legitimate. But
it
analogical argument', which concludes that
the case. The concluding sentence
is
other people have a mental
meaningless, a
life like
because they show behaviour
Carnap
its
conclusion
and therefore devoid of (This depends
on
is
mine.
mental
verified large,
life
present example
in
The someone has
in experience if true).
and so cannot
really
make
statement about any matter of
principle
box' and
at
a
same
fact.
is
also experience,
I
am
angry behaviour the feeling of anger When
observe angry behaviour I
may, therefore,
least
if
in
in
steel nibs in
can
analogous
the
first
the second
The
two sentences
other person first
not the case
is
is
angry'.
'I
am
We
angry'
consider
sentence makes sense while the
second sentence (when the
I
sense
interpretation
is
ruled out)
physical
makes no
another person
not with certainty then at
with probability,
The two
.
It
the second box
I
addition to the
in
There are
with regard to the
angry
unverifiable.
is
verified that .
the fact that
in
type. Therefore, the analogical inference
that the
when
be
in
.The difference to our
precisely
legitimate here. But this
and
case,
.
is
it
box' are logically and epistemologically of the
argument:
my own
.
not
is
physically
sentences There are steel nibs
Carnap begins by presenting the
'"In
lies
also contains steel nibs
directly
by the language community
about matters
the concluding sentence
it
not
is
mere pseudo-sentence. For
a sentence
principle unverifiable
meaning of a
- cannot possibly be
is
supposed to be interpreted
yet another version of
argument's conclusion - that
it
pertaining to another psyche, which
unverifiable
statement consists in the difference
a
since
factual content.
the empiricist claim that the
would make
mine,
argument on the
attacks the
grounds that
like
inference
make the
Carnap goes on
analogical
to consider the following
reply:
inference that he too has a feeling of anger
(which does not in
mean
a physical condition),
"'. .
addition to the angry behaviour". Rebuttal:
inferences
While
it
is
true that analogical
do not provide
no doubt permissible probability. Let us
certainty,
.
[the fact that]
a feeling of anger
A is
is
actually experiencing
something that
He
establish simply by asking him.
they are
testify that
as inferences conferring
consider an example of an
-31
he experienced a
I
can
will
feeling
then
of anger
Having known him as a credible person and a
-
good observer; why should
I
not consider
.
.
statement as true, or
his
at least as
probably
Rebuttal: Before
should accept
As
can decide whether
I
statement as true,
probably true, indeed before consider
this question,
the statement;
me. And .
.
is
If
.
must have
it
only
it
first
.
if
.
and
it
of
possibility
I
my
verifying
no
fellow
is
in
there exists at most a difference of
it
being contributes to our
knowledge and what a barometer
contributes [...]'
meaningless for me. The question whether should accept
But,
it
will
be
or
as true
it
true cannot even arise said,
[
.
.
.
say
]
men
physics,
become
if
This
is
I
had
true. But there
difference
observed
is
(for
a fundamental
of A about
past,
anger yesterday.
his
can
I
But
cannot even
I
in
in
if,
about
not
is
verifiable
ruled out
...
.
.
basis of
on the Punch
a sentence that
the speech of our fellow
in
I
else.
and so
Nobody
meant when
said
I
'I
my
state
of
mind
condition -
is
its
tell
learned.
on
behaviour, 'You're angry',
basis of is
is
the child-learner,
Mr
the
or,
Punch's behaviour, 'Mr
angry':
and therefore meaningless
cannot deliver us anything not
unverifiable
my own
my physical
Other people
become
meaningful through such an utterance. .
would be
remember how language
.
accordance
without the utterance of A, cannot
.
non-
would
confirmed (Carnap thinks) when we
with the [argument], the physical interpretation
a
if it
have to be interpreted as statements
principle verify the
statement about the anger
it
statements about
type
through [my own] perception sentences
on
This surprising result - that
in
first
I
be
feel angry'.
and a statement
principle verify statements of the
also
meaningless for everybody
between a statement of A about a event of the
me),
would know what
myself!
geographical condition of China, or about a historical
must
be verifiable (by me) and so meaningful
poor
myself to the
restrict
directly
when
to argue that even
angry', this
interpreted physically, since
geography and history
had to
I
events that
How
7 feel
physical interpretation, even
order to
in
construct intersubjective science?
would
Carnap goes on
or probably
false
do we not need the
statements of our fellow
is
call
as especially important. But,
human
scientific
Consequently,
it.
we
which
degree between what the statement of a
principle,
in
them
principle,
intuitive
[argument] rejects the physical interpretation is,
as indications of further physical
especially high. Therefore, science rightly
treats
impressions [of mine]. But since the
of the statement, there
that they can
in
'statements of fellow men', this degree
it
sentences about
.
true that
is
It
are not of
from any
occurrences to varying degrees. For those physical occurrences
can verify
I
physical occurrences differ
be used
understand
physically interpreted,
is
through
or
meaning for
a
makes sense
the statement
verifiable
other physical occurrences.
I
false
can even
I
must
I
particular perceptions
is
men
the statements of our fellow
a fundamentally different type
true?'
principle acquire
in
.
.
.
men we
that
.
It
follows that the child
uttering
is
taught the habit of
under certain conditions a sentence
expressing the physical state
.
could
a different way. For
observed (or inferred from by another person. Hence
— 32 —
in
himself as
signs
if
observed)
the child
.
produces the same sounds
may be
inferred
of the child
in
is
from
this
again,
.
no more
no answer from him: there
than that the body
the same physical
that case
state.
we would deny
of using the word.
Summary
are
no
empirical signs of teaviness, he says. In
uses the
word
If
the legitimacy
the person
says that,
the same,
all
there are things which are teavy So-called psychological sentences are always translatable into the language of physics,
they
be
pertaining to another psyche, about matters
own
pertaining to one's
psyche
in
about matters pertaining to one's psyche
in
the
past,
[such as 'Absence
own
psychology
is
sentence refers .
finite
remains for
which things are teavy and
which are not, we
empty
it
mind of man an
shall regard this as
Now perhaps he
verbiage.
insists
mean something by From this, however, we
the
word
'teavy'.
only learn the psychological fact that he
makes the heart grow
to physical processes of the body
weak and
and
that he really does
the present, or general sentences
fonder']. Every psychological
the
eternal secret
sentences about matters
specific
things which are not, but
who
and
associates images
feelings with the
word. The word does not acquire a
.
meaning through associations of this no criterion of application is
a branch of physics.'
kind. If
stipulated, then
Comments and questions
nothing
sentences in which the
Few philosophers now
is
asserted
word
they are only pseudo-statements
accept a
by
appears; .
.
because of the shocking conclusions which
The (pseudo)statements of metaphysics do not describe existing states of affairs They express the
seem
general attitude of a person towards
verificationism as sharp-edged as Carnap's
- but perhaps
that
to follow
is
from
it. It's
remember how very verificationism
Here's
was
important to
plausible this
.
.
.
.
.
statements like 'John
this point
(from
article called
life.
Well, the 'criterion of application' for
(is).
Carnap on
another Erkenntnis
at least in part
.
is
homesick' involves
only John's verbal and other behaviour.
'The
Is it
true, then, that psychological statements
Elimination of Metaphysics through
about other people, when reduced to their
Logical Analysis of Language'
essential factual content, are only
Let us suppose,
):
overt behaviour?
by way of illustration,
someone invented the word 'teavy' and claimed that there are things which that
are teavy
and things which are not
In order to learn the
word, we ask him about application: real case
how
teavy.
meaning of this its
criterion of
does one ascertain in a
whether a thing
is
teavy or not?
Let us suppose to begin with that
we
get
— 33
about
.
.
o
So long
.
.
we
as
hold
we
conceivable that
to be theoretically
it
should be
the
in
privileged situation [of having the best
A. J. Ayer (1910-89) on other minds - from 'One's Knowledge of Other
conceivable evidence], the fact that
not
We
utter ignorance.
Martin's Press/Macmillan, 1954
that the evidence for nothing at
positivism, Language, Truth
in
and Logic
that other people have thoughts feelings like
mine, from the
behave the way unverifiable
fact that
and therefore
they
factually
analogy.
He
it
minds with
serious. For here ... to
to be the other person. Only he
is
knows what he
the other cases which
occupy
The
is
know what
In
best
So,
if
my
said,
it
becomes,
a necessary fact that
know
as
I
one cannot
past. In
the same way, going on
is
space. This
in
we
we
know
really
in
question.
If
of
possibility
we
cannot
does not
follow,
however
that
we
reduced to scepticism [about other
it,
.
are
.
we
...
it
it
else
is
for
are
.
.
my
feels,
.
is
it
34
in
.
feelings
not merely
us,
to occupy the relatively
we
do, but
plausible but [
.
.
.
I
do not
]
necessarily true that, being the
And really
then
is
sound
is
it
I
am, if
I
this
am is
not also
made
someone
the requirement
knowing what he thinks or is
something that
places].
.
are respectively the persons that
person that
.
else?
.
think that
visiting
visit
we happen
This reasoning
part of
for a practical and not a logical reason It
because
really
situation's
could a change
make me someone
unfavourable position that
seems a smaller deprivation than
the other because of the the place
cannot
some other
how
could be
it
by the
least in theory,
seems that the thoughts and
because have
the truth of any statement about the
what
it
we
one was
space and time; and
of others are inaccessible to
to be equated with having the best
evidence conceivable,
in
situation
Thus
not
knowing
really
fact that
was the outcome of one's
being changed. But
look
is
...
is
the position that one happened to
remedied, at
the past [the sceptic
the best conceivable
it
what here seems to
exactly
be required.
underprivileged
in
feels ...
should both
I
is
situation,
we cannot go back and evidence we can now obtain
and
thinks
be
myself: yet this
space.
happened
very
first sight,
much more
have considered, the
because
and
not,
comes, however, to the case of
scepticism about events distant in time or
claims],
is
remain myself and be someone other than
begins by comparing
really
good
is
.
plainly a contradiction that
the argument from
'We cannot
because
just
it
privileged really
In this later, less positivistic article, he
scepticism about other
can obtain
underprivileged appears, at
meaningless conclusion.
tries to rehabilitate
we
other minds, the fact of our being
and
do) ended in an
I
.
When
argument from analogy (arguing
that the
all
are not inclined to say
the circumstances cannot be, the best
possible
(1936), Ayer had maintained, like Carnap,
are
not regarded as condemning us to
is
Minds', in Philosophical Essays: St
In his splendid early manifesto for logical
we
necessarily true that this I
can never
really
know.
is
On
the other hand, with regard to any given property, which
may or may not myself
I
seems to be no
fact possess, there
why
reason
of scepticism.
cannot
in
reasonable to say that
Is it
know X,
really
we
if
are unable to
get the 'best conceivable evidence' for
logical
we
X?
should not test the degree of
I
some other properties: and what am asserting when ascribe an experience to some other person is just that its
connection with
I
I
the property of having
it
[occurs together]
with certain others. The inference
my
from
experience as such to
is
©
not
his
experience as such but from the fact that certain properties have
conjoined
in
will
a further context the
in
still
hold. This
is
type of inductive argument; and it
that
however
in
I
cannot see
any degree invalidated by the fact
that
is
Philosophy LV, 1958
normal
a
far
positive analogy,
one
it
is
(1911-90) on
other minds - from 'Knowledge of Other Minds': The Journal of
certain contexts to the
conclusion that
conjunction
Norman Malcolm
been found to be
Malcolm
In this article,
first
argues that
attempts to resuscitate the argument from
able to extend the
analogy lead nowhere.
always remains within the
compass of one's own experience.'
explain,
from
then goes on to
a Wittgensteinian point of
why this must be
view,
He so.
Comments and questions There have been various attempts to repair the argument from analogy.
In essence, Ayer puts this question to the sceptic:
why should I assume
difference
between myself and others
relevant difference,
Mr
that the
when I'm
a
is
and
in
sometimes
infer that
my
proof onto the sceptic - always a good
inferential
But the obvious answer have,
and
it
is
that
I
my own. This marked
have to
and possible
in actual
access
is
inference can be
I
am
have
I
feeling giddy direct,
knowledge, says Hampshire, of
feelings.
So
I
can check inferences
against the facts, checking
inference .
.
[
.
.
.
]
Hampshire has apparently forgotten
.
the purpose of the argument from analogy,
surely just
make me
which
is
to provide
some
probability that 'the
suspicious about generalising from myself
walking and speaking figures which
to others.
hear,
Is this
correct? If
it is
correct,
it
from
non-
thereby the accuracy of the methods of
difference
the kind of thing which ought to
Now
made about me
never
seems, never could have, the
kind of access to others' experiences which I
behaviour
my own
move.
its
the following way: others
established
behaviour? This throws the burden of
strategic
method of
validity as a
building up
correlations between inner experiences
Stuart Hampshire has argued that
have sensations and thoughts'
the reasoning that he
throws us
back on Ayer's interesting characterisation
see and
I
(Mill).
assumption that other people do have
35
For
describes involves the
.
.
thoughts and to
make
feelings: for
inferences
my
observations of
other minds
other
they are assumed
which these informative sounds proceed
me
need not be a human body. 'If the
from
the leaves of an oak formed
behaviour. But the
problem of the existence of
philosophical
human
about
figures
make
things,
bushes
among
other than oneself do,
animated by an intelligence
Although
and assertions'
that Hampshire's
I
question against the sceptic. The sceptic
'How do
I
know
like
know by
is still
are 'symbols
mine?'
.
.
from the
analogical
form:
in
when certain come from me they
introspection that
combinations of sounds
that other people
have thoughts and feelings
should have
I
argument, the reasoning
presented by Price
version of the argument begs the
asks
words
gorse
if
my own'
like
differing sharply
classical analogical is
in
acts of
spontaneous
thinking';
therefore similar combinations of sounds,
Hampshire's reply (according to
not produced by me, 'probably function as
Malcolm)
instruments to an act of spontaneous
is, 'I
can check that other
my states
people's inferences about
mind
are accurate,
the analogical
and so confirm
use
it
of
well.
I
amount of
as
is
myself with confidence.' But this
intelligible
any probability that thoughts
takes for
Since
.
it
it
has sensations or
has nothing
like
the
dispute.
an electronic computer; that
it
makes no sense to
be-proved happens so frequently in
Therefore
philosophy (and elsewhere) that
that
to itself
- begging
has a
He
is
more
is
How
idea
is
that
if
one understands,
like
There's the
new
some evidence like
one's
own
and
.
.
.
say
above
the tests that a child
is
put
them
.
.
informative sentences and valuable
emanate from a gorse scientific
problem, but
gorse bush has a mind. Better no explanation than nonsense
if
.
.
.
[
.
.
.
]
the most fundamental error of the
argument from analogy
that the foreign is
.
the explanation could never be that the
His
information, this
body which uttered the noises by a mind
bus',
fail
bush might be a grave
another body gives forth noises
these noises give one 'provides
...
.
would make no sense to
predictions could
derived primarily
from the understanding of language'
looking or
is
through. They cannot even take
interesting.
suggests that 'one's evidence for the
existence of other minds
it
face or
words. Trees and computers cannot either
the question.
version of analogical reasoning offered
by Professor H. H. Price
it
did or did not understand the
it
pass or
The
human
say of a tree, or
pointing at or fetching something
This taking-for-granted-the-thing-to-
all
.
.
body
name
.
sounds coming from
granted the very thing which was in
it
my own'
not
an oak tree or kitchen table could create
can therefore
it
case
in this
wish to argue against Price that no
I
presupposes that other people do think
and reason. In other words,
which
thinking,
that
method of inference,
used by them, works
.
evidence that the oak or the gorse bush was
observations, inferences,
Malcolm's point
.
rustling of
intelligible
new information, and made intelligible gestures,
conveying
the problem of whether
is
.
whether the argument
animated
'The body from
(the analogy
36
is
present
the
classical
... is
one
between my body and other
.
.
from
bodies) or Price's version (the analogy
between my language and the noises and produced by other
signs
things).
It
is
own case what
when he
introspection
what
acts of thinking
.
perceiving are
.
.
'
indeed seems at possibility. Yet
that
it
leads
nonsense.
.
.
first
shall
how
possible .
I
Wittgenstein has
case'
make and
soul.
that
results
one inwardly
whenever
it
[
.
.
.
he
soul;
in his
it
criteria that are available
presents
position
statements.
right.
how
It
identifications
no
identification,
appearance of sense.
its
collapse brings
down both
argument from
analogy.
.
.
A
of
all
he
phenomena troubles him
is
if
is
how
to
the former
criticism,
in difficulties
like
it
all;
would have to
'My head aches'
is
or'l
do not express
is'
do they do? What
my
declaration that
fact that
my head
is
my
aches,
not a report of an
The
perplexity about the
turned into a perplexity about the
oneself.
At our
'His
problem; but
now
...
we
starting point
it
37
—
was
the sentence 'My head
is
[
.
.
.
]
must conceive of first-person
psychological sentences
transition
it
head aches' that posed a
the sentence
aches' that puzzles us
What
make the
verification at
meaning of one's own psychological sentences
solipsism and the
case'.
is
existence of other minds has, as the result of
Its
about
own
sentences
observation?
acquainted with mental
'from his
if
head aches and the
about other minds because he assumes that first
no
they had a verification
the relation between .
the latter
philosopher feels himself
first
the second
kinds of psychological
observations then what
application to the
notion loses
many
wonder where she
see that the ideas of correct and
supposed inner
.
.
if
But
being under the impression that he does,
incorrect have
The
be by self-observation.
He
and
(See Philosophical Investigations #258-9)
all.
are forced to conclude that
follows that they have
for
is
to distinguish between
making correct
We
to
unintelligible;
(or hardly ever) verified by self-observation.
Indeed he has could mean.
case' philosophy
first-person psychological statements are not
identifies correctly
right
becomes
false for at least
but feeling sure
no idea of what being
When we
own
'one's
observation would be by means of outward
has nothing to say
feels sure that
does not know
make the common assumption
others; according to behaviorism the self-
]
picks
But the question to be
no guarantee of being
actually
a sense
According to the
'private' identifications
He
in
own
statements are verified by self-observation.
us see
Does one make correct identifications? The proponent of these here.
and behaviorism, though
opposites,
is,
the occurrence
thinking or
is
that first-person, present-tense psychological
out something as thinking or pain and
the
out that one
the self-observation cannot be checked by
thereafter identifies
pressed
find
to solipsism and then to
one supposes
itself in
circumstances, behavior, and utterances
try to state as briefly as
produces those
it
.
danger of flying to the opposite
angry. The philosophy of 'from one's
and
made
in
one can
to be the only
first
is
own
the most natural
is
It
assumption for a philosopher to
.
believing that through observation of one's
know from
says:'l
case to the case of others
extreme of behaviorism, which errs by
thinking, feeling,
sensation are. Price gives expression to this
assumption
own
But [having accepted Wittgenstein's point]
he
the
mistaken assumption that one learns from one's
his
in
some
entirely
different
light.
Wittgenstein presents us with
the suggestion
.
.
that first-person sentences
.
way of checking that we have recognised the new candidate right. If believe I've I
are to be thought of as similar to the natural
identified a rare species of butterfly,
nonverbal, behavioral expressions of
important that
psychological states. 'My leg hurts,' for
books, or
example,
is
to be
is
way of checking
a
bewildering comparison and one's
thought
be more can is
that
is
unlike.
make
true
two
or
By saying
a statement;
None
exactly,
one's
it
one
or
lies
the
te//s
how
So
resemblance?
...
I
be explored. For
'How does one know
this will
the
in
light
'How does one know when to
or hold one's
how
of
the utterance of a first-person
leg?';
second,
it
cry,
can have importance for
analogy
it
will
what seem
for
in
us,
the
on
really
We
the
And
it
follows too,
be reports (T have
a
my stomach', was just my childhood' and so on) 'I
be reports in the ordinary
have to understand them more
model of expressions,
like a
groan of
apprehension, or a nostalgic sigh.
But
false:
Malcolm
as
also points out, a
groaning or limping cannot be true
or false (though they can be genuine or
although not as light
cannot
case.
to
sentence like 'My leg hurts' can be true or
explains
psychological sentence by another person
-
from our own
sense.
be as nonsensical as the
limp,
an identification
are
thinking about
breaks the hold on
it
makes no
Malcolm, that we
follows, according to
sinking feeling in
two
to say 'My leg hurts?' for
question
It
think this analogy ought to
first,
thought about
idea of checking
that
us of the question
the analogy
The
a
is
don't learn what thoughts and sensations
of these things,
has at least
is
sense here.
can there be any
it
important merits:
occurrence really butterflies.
it
can be said of crying, limping, holding
leg.
when
the sentence one
has a contradictory;
it
saying
false; in
and so on.
truth;
sorts of things could not
no
fact, there's
that this sensation really
of lemon, or that that mental
a taste
first
judgement of
at least against the
other lepidopterists. But in
assimilated to crying,
limping, holding one's leg. This
can check
I
it's
this against the
of the
that's
have the same importance as
And
pretended).
if
'My
leg hurts'
presumably because
(but see
SP
it
is
true,
reports a fact
pp. 170-2, against the
the natural behavior which serves as our
correspondence theory of truth). So 'My leg
preverbal criterion of the psychological states
hurts'
of others.'
(inner) fact.
detect
Comments and questions
must and
where we
is
that if
we
And
be a report of an
if I
identify
started.
out of this
Malcolm's central claim
after all
it
report
it, I
have to
- and we're
right
back
Where should we break
circle?
are
supposed to know what thoughts and sensations are from our
own
case (from
and on later occasions, same sort of thing in our
introspection),
recognise the
mind
as
Hume
another thought or another
sensation, then there
would have
says (in the Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion) that
to be a
from the
— 38
sky, or
if
we heard
if legible
a voice
and coherent
books were produced not by authors but by
one case
some spontaneous
going to justify the confidence we actually
process,
be
it'd
reasonable to think that there was an intelligence responsible. In the
me
seems to
attach to the 'hypothesis' that other people
same way,
have thoughts and
it
(though Malcolm says
otherwise) that
if
a kitchen table
The
spoke
wooden ours,
it,
'body' roughly as
we
feel
consciousness in
it
as intelligent.
feelings.
seems to be that language
some
providing evidence of
Malcolm
about
and so on, we would and should
begin to regard
alternative
ability actually constitutes self-aware
showed awareness of seemed to feel about its
intelligently to us,
events around
to five billion different cases isn't
says,
is
way, rather than just it.
But
this, as
very close to
behaviourism.
Of course
What do you
we'd look for trickery, and we might well
think?
argument
Is Price's
good?
suspect hallucination too. But after a certain
amount of investigation, we might
reasonably rule those possibilities out.
Does
Price's
language-based version of
the argument from analogy
do the
trick,
©
then? Well, there's a difference between
being 'animated by an intelligence' and
having thoughts and playing computer intelligence (the
remove), but
it
is
feelings.
doesn't think or
it
We
conversation with us.
at
one
feel.
much more
out decent chess moves:
I
But
than
of Consciousness Studies no. 3, 1995
spit
sustains a proper
might
become inhabited or
suppose we would in
Here
and
feelings associated
And
if
somehow with
is
anomalous
the
it
nor entirely out of
We
with normally functioning
figures
we
Yet
if
is,
A
my case: A occurs B occurs
is
nonsense.
correlated
in other cases:
in other cases too,'
feeling
example, SP
p. 42).
We
'in there' in
it
seems to be subject to a powerful objection (see, for
human
fully spatial. Yet the idea
is 'in'
is
do say
39
of
is
same sense
it's
not
that the brain
in there.
This anomalous spatial status,
Induction from
bodies,
that a thought or
someone's head, but
the
it.
associate consciousness
putting consciousness in a bottle
the argument
so probably
do of course
which are
see
around us? with B in
McGinn
relation to the idea of space,
neither entirely in
so,
reason to believe in thoughts and feelings
human
pessimism
argues that consciousness stands in an
wouldn't the same argument give us good
associated with the
conclusion
a reasoned
about making sense of the mind.
fact take the
we'd be right to do
(to balance the optimistic
of SP, Chapter 21)
spirit,
language ability as evidence of thoughts
table.
2, vol. 12,
insist that
possessed by a thinking and feeling
but
Colin McGinn (b. 1950) on the mind/body problem - from 'Consciousness and Space': Journal
animated by an
programmer's,
the kitchen table does
the table has
A chess-
McGinn
.
.
from
believes, disqualifies consciousness
.
Cartesian intuition of unextendedness
scientific treatment, unless our
firm part of
understanding of space changes very
mental
radically.
But this kind of change
really feasible,
McGinn
profound dependence
not
is
If
argues, given the
our thinking
all
the
shows on the idea of space, and on analogies derived from
.
.
our ordinary conception of the
.
how
then
' •
there
though
misleading about the popular
phenomena have the
suggestion that mental
same
is,
postulated to
Apart from the obvious point that
also
know about our mental
inside',
there
is
of the mental case. While
we
in spatial
more
puzzling
how
we
physical case,
we
...
unclear
in
how
supposed to
it
is
area
How do
cause physical changes philosophy has
in
.
.
.
idea of mental causation, but this
much more mysterious than
is
have
.
.
.
is
Recent
consciousness does not, on
smoothly into the ordinary
spatial
.
existence
its
in
.
.
that
inherently non-spatial.
We
ordinarily conceive of
but [perhaps
which
.
this
common
is]
.
.
.
it
in
yet another
sense misconceives
conscious
reality. In fact,
they are brain states
classical materialism, is
.
.
Thus we
the thesis that
nothing over and above the
we
and processes
observe
the brain. Since these admit of
in
by
identity,
do conscious
materialist insists that the
states
.
.
.
the
appearance of
non-spatiality that consciousness presents is
.
its
or owes
straightforward spatial characterisation, so,
the
generally
acknowledged
mind has an
...
we
cellular structures
appreciated, once the non-spatial character
of consciousness
is
grant that
consciousness
actually
is
mind sprang
that
.
second response questions
states, since
conscious events
the body?
.
states are just as spatially constituted as brain
quite
become accustomed to
of
of mind. Perhaps mind
is
the true nature of
these causal paradigms are apply.
.
existence, as independent of
this way,
have notions of contact
the mental case
lines
Instead,
may
causation and gravitational force acting across space, but
response denies
consciousness
It
the
... In
two mam
autonomous
A
atomic events to the macroscopic
behaviour of material bodies
]
are, historically,
to a direct act of God.
the
is
.There
.
has always existed
they relate to
behaviour; especially causally, than relation of
way
.
from matter
think of the mental
states that explain behaviour in this
.
matter as matter
space
relation to the things
do observe, we do not thus far
One
think of the in
.
[
supposed to be exclusive and exhaustive.
character
unobservables of physics as existing
is
we
states 'from the
sui generis
not
is
response to the problem, commonly
a crucial disanalogy here,
which underscores the
and hence
.
best sense of the
data.
physical, since,
non-spatial, the abstract
material
that both are unobservables
make the
this
supposed to have emerged from the
sort of status as the posits of physical
science: that
origin
its
the relation
parallel in
between the abstract and the
something highly
is
have had
it
can you derive the unextended
problem has no jPY^Hl
could
world?
spatial
How
not constitutionally
is
from the extended? Note too that
it.
a
.
consciousness
spatial,
in
.
is
a kind of illusion
Now
face, slot
world. The
it
is
not
.
my
.
intention here to
rehearse any of the usual criticisms of these
40
—
.
two venerable
beyond noting that
positions,
both have deeply unattractive features
we
These are positions
phenomena
theoretically satisfying way.
option
identify a third
material
.
can achieve any such conception, even principle.
.
driven to, rather
feel
than ones that save the
.
place
is
to
naturalistic spirit, with
counted
to preserve
...
emergence while not denying the
consciousness
anomaly like all
.
.
.
Consciousness
we
for
calls
it
am now
in
we
a
new
conceptual breakthrough
medium
about the exist,
and hence
in
in
We
need
the
way we
we
when we
refer to
has a nature that
we
is
it
non-spatial (as
is
use the
it
.
.
.
.
.
ontologically
is
how
conceive
in
is
not
conceptual revolution .
.
.And here the
[
.
.
bitter
be
we need
conception of space
.
.
.This
our practices of
in
is
matter.
between
.
F.
particular
that the
is
and
universal,
.
idea,
or experience, of
.Without that
spatial
is
spatial
resource
should not be able to frame the single
and hence
location.
based upon a conception of space
It
At
our entire structure of thought in
is
which
objects are severally arrayed; though once this structure
refine
it
is
in
place
we
can extend and
by means of analogy and relations of
conceptual dependence.
new
not to imply that
a line
identification
.The guiding Strawsonian thesis
root, then,
beneath the
a radically
is
the underpinning of
core
focuses particularly on the
spatial separation,
sweet coating begins to seep through. For to suggest that
to
its
in
property. This implies that the very notion of
]
pill
is
a proposition presupposes the notion of
pretty
a merely local .
itself,
conception of multiple instances of a
will
come from
we need
who
distinctness
and such an affront to our
that
spatial
founded on the
order to sustain the assumption
likely
.
distinction
so singular
that consciousness can
.
and hence between subject and predicate,
in
some hidden
remarkable properties of matter
needed
.
role of space .
it)
some
is
Strawson,
to be; so different,
standard spatial notions, that
.
of thinking powerfully advocated by R
'space'
we
Consciousness
namely,
word
from
is
way we represent space to our entire conceptual scheme
general. Experience
aspect or principle. .
far:
thought,
consciousness. Things
they harbour
specific
providing the skeleton of our thought
space can generate consciousness only
because
more
shot through with spatial notions, these
think
capable of 'containing' the
we now
phenomenon of
.
think something
I
.That which
quite different
standardly conceive
indeed, that
.
is.
But
ourselves
a
our conception of
material objects themselves
.
features of the
which material objects
in
.
every other
just as
consciousness arise from certain deep-seated
need, at a minimum,
conception of space.
that
is
that our troubles over space and
main
order to solve the
in
mind-body problem
species
overwhelming probability
suggested by our discussion so
[current theory].
a position to state the
thesis of this paper:
.
human
are subject to definite limits on our
species
some more or
.
a properly
in
the
powers of understanding,
an
our present world view and,
in
anomalies,
less drastic rectification in I
is
.
one evolved species among
as just
others, the
ordinary non-spatial conception of
to point to a
incurably ignorant
Viewing the matter
a
in
My purpose
may be merely
It
where we are
in
[But] how,
we
if
the Strawsonian thesis
do we contrive to
41
is
right,
think about consciousness
.
at
all?
It
ought to be impossible. The answer
those analogies and dependencies
lies in
We
mentioned.
go
metaphors and, to the body
we
exploit relations
making sense of numerically
but similar conscious episodes
distinct is
in
for spatialismg
in
centrally,
.
.this
nature
.
.
.We
represent the mental by
upon our
relying
because that theory
at
lies
being able to represent at
the mental
itself
mode
such a
of the
it
But
if (as
is
appears from the inside, it
to
change our
in itself
is
go
let
skeleton of our thought. But,
it
could have
- including a strange nonspatiality - which the brain event
aspects, can have very different
go of the very notion of a
proposition, leaving us nothing to think is
no
as
achieving a spatially nonderivative style of
thought about consciousness this lies
.
.
.
No
we
stare
of incomprehension I
[
.
.
agape .
in
focus.
No
doubt
two of the
it
is
- could play
its full
its
difficulty.
causal role
Would
is
this solve
McGinn's problem?
vacuum
a
lack of
difficult
familiar [consciousness
and even
appears from the outside - spatially
plagued with
.
.
knowledge
hard even to get into
things with
different
]
marks the place of a deep is
it
aspect under which
our
have been arguing that consciousness
about space, which
under
causal role, in spite of having another
attempts to fathom the nature of consciousness;
thing, seen
respectable of course
doubt
behind the sense of total
theoretical blankness that attends
it
incompatible properties. So the brain event
prospect of our
real
as
appears from the outside doesn't share.
The same
So there
it
properties
would be to
with.
much
a brain event as
according to the Strawsonian thesis, that let
is
SP, Chapter 21 suggested) a
conscious experience
of representation.
were - we would need to
spatial
we need
easier said than done.
has a nature that craves
as
could
to their
he also
spatial nature. Since
material events,
- not because
To represent consciousness neat, as
anomalous
longer anomalous. This, however,
the root of our all
due
understanding of space so that they are no
theory of space
folk
McGinn emphasises the difficulty of understanding how conscious events
thinks they certainly do causally relate to
alien to their intrinsic
is
questions
causally relate to material ones,
to impose upon conscious events a
conceptual grid that
-
.
Comments and
just
which
to accept that
we
are
most
illusion.
and space] might
an
harbour such intractable obscurities. Irony being a mark of truth, however;
we
should
take seriously the possibility that what
McGinn
we
tend to think completely transparent should turn out to transcend altogether our powers
of comprehension.'
— 42
considers the view that the non-
spatiality of consciousness
is
a kind of
Could consciousness
illusion?
as a
whole be
©
philosophy
William James (1842-1910) on the reality of the mind - from 'Does "Consciousness" Exist?': Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, vol. 1,1904 In this extract, James tries to
and
as matter
another. This 'neutral
me
overcome the
some mean
I
both consist of an
it
and
will
it,
for
.
.
.
I
in
It
is
attenuates
in
itself
nothing can be
mere echo, the
faint
the disappearing
to
it
in
.
is
that
or material
relation itself
.
one of
upon the
in
if
principles
for that
we is
start with the
one primal
only
the world, a stuff of
composed, and
is
if
we
call
in its
terms becomes the subject or
its
is
[this
not a substantive Self
but just the 'passing thought'], the other
own
when once
may enter The
a part of pure experience;
is
'knower' for James
to a
becomes the object known ...
we
[
.
.
.
]
are supposed by almost every
one
to have an immediate consciousness of
it
consciousness
itself.
When
the world of
outer fact ceases to be materially present,
and it,
we
merely
flowing
of
says]
43
recall
the consciousness
and to be
behind by air
first
bearer of the knowledge, the knower
the
said.
left
of
list
portions of pure experience
the future .
out the notion of
of relation towards one another into which
are clinging to a
rumour
'soul'
blots
can easily be explained as a particular sort
name of a nonentity, and place among first principles.
will cling
thesis
which everything
the
has no right to a
Those who
fact that
that stuff 'pure experience', then knowing
on the point of disappearing
is
provide
still
My
her explanations of
believe that 'consciousness',
altogether
is
function's being carried on.
has evaporated to this estate of pure diaphaneity,
knowing. 'Consciousness'
supposition that there
[something] of which
right absolutely
.That
.
some way
do
thoroughly ghostly condition, being only a
name
.
his
[various neo-Kantian] writers
spiritual principle
most emphatically
must
and may be expected to vary
... In
stands
consciousness from
tries to
always find contrasted
the past
farther
word
monism'
other Philosophy, reflecting on the contrast, in
is
known. Whoever
always practically oppose to each
has varied
me no
follow
things not only are, but get reported, are
sorts of object, which will
It
to
when placed in one when placed in
"Thoughts" and "things" are names
sense
will
supposed necessary to explain the
stuff
common
readers
only to deny that the
does stand for a function
function
properties of dualism.
m
it
universally discarded.
for an entity, but to insist
that
convictions, without committing us to the
two
...
ripe for
is
I
fear
apparently unscientific entities or
for
that the hour
seems so absurd on the face of it undeniably 'thoughts' do exist - that
for
our common-sense dualist
justice to
have
I
exists
underlying 'pure experience' which can be
context,
For twenty years
To deny plumply that 'consciousness'
sense dualism of thoughts and
seen as consciousness
.
be openly and
...
things, suggesting that
.
distrusted 'consciousness' as an entity
seems to
common
.
'.
.
.
.
felt .
it
is
in
memory, or fancy
believed to stand out
as a kind of impalpable inner
[James quotes G.
.When we
E.
Moore,
who
try to introspect the
.
sensation of blue,
the other element Yet
we
all
as
is
can see
the blue;
is
we
if
the reader's sense of
and know that there
something to look
for'
.
.
.
.
the
from which,
.
if
the content, the consciousness revealed to
Now my of
own
its
contention
Experience,
this.
eye
The
remain
will
in
puzzle of
two
has no such inner
two
lines.
how
places
can,
It
just as
exist.
how one
intersection;
undivided portion of
bottom
at
is
be situated
similarly,
if
the
just
can be on
identical point
if it
and
at their
the 'pure
room were a place two processes, which
intersection of
room
the one identical
experience' of the
one context of
in
seems to see
the book immediately
puzzle of
can be
exactly the reverse
is
room and
they physically
is
you abstract
.
believe,
I
duplicity ... a given
experience, taken
.
which knows no
life,
intervening mental image but
is
supposes that the consciousness
.This
one element
paradox, but on the other hand they violate
look
attentively enough,
of
associates, play[s] the part of a knower, of a
connected
state of mind, of 'consciousness'; while
a
associates respectively,
of
twice over, as belonging to either group
different context the
same undivided
in
bit
experience plays the part of a thing known, of an objective 'content'.
group
And, since
as a thing.
speak of at
.
.
.
we
one
in
have every
dualism,
say,
I
As
If
and concrete
verifiable
the reader
take his
will
experiences, he
will
[
.
.
I
'really'
in
the
what
it
which
his
it
.
as being
is
is
.
.
Now
room
'the
represented.
it is
is
represented
realized only
of
when
it
we must
pure state
.
.
in
the
the
there
.
into consciousness 'of.
is
Its
its
two
and
subjectivity
the experience
considered along with at
is
dualism of being
se. In its
self-splitting
in in
say that the experience
and objectivity are functional attributes
be, namely, a .
no
.
]
we
what the consciousness
and
commonsense way seems to
.
it is
.
your 'field
enters both contexts
represents and what
experience per
complex
collection of physical things
same time
]
.
.
another
is
it
represented and representing resides
mean. Let him .
.
it
remember that no
it
this
him for the present treat
[
'subjective'
What
own
see what
begin with a perceptual experience
object
.
in
and
represents; as 'objective'
in
could be counted
it
here numerically the same; but
instead of being mysterious and elusive,
becomes
sit',
wholeness
its
right to
preserved
still
is
with different groups of
one of these contexts
which you
both
in
it
of consciousness';
another group
account, but reinterpreted, so that,
this
let
... In
both subjective and objective
as
it
in
can figure
it
groups simultaneously
once
a word,
In
figures as a thought,
it
.
theories of perception avoid the logical
were diaphanous.
if it
can be distinguished,
it
.
is
.
solely,
.
differing
contexts
just those self-same things
mind, as
we
say,
Comments and questions
perceives; and the
whole philosophy of perception from Democritus's time downwards has been just
Given that we don't know anything about
one long wrangle over the paradox
'pure experience' except that
what
is
evidently
one
reality
two
places at once, both
and
in
in
that
should be
it
sometimes
appears to us as things, sometimes as
in
thoughts, and sometimes as both at once,
[external] space
might seem that
a person's mind. 'Representative'
44
—
little
has been gained by
it
supposing to use
it
to exist.
However, James hopes
just
to explain, not only the
it
also the 'directness' of perception.
when we
conscious of the chair
we
itself
the chair
and not
for
all
we know about
'fairy dust'.
and so on are not
They form
we might
explanatory
a 'radically false
explanation of will
- of
is it
sufficiently well-defined
to be identified with anything scientific.
fundamental substance
And how
this, see extract
claims that thoughts, sensations, decisions
a
experience'. it,
identical with the
In the following Reading, Churchland
and our consciousness of it are
as well call this
we
6/49 and SP, pp. 160-2).
feel,
chair, because
two aspects of the same 'pure Still,
We
is
more on
brain event? (For
are directly
mental representation of the
neural activity in that area? Can't
say that the sensation
relationship between mind and body, but
see a chair, that
is
and misleading'
human behaviour, which when a good brain-
simply be junked
based account comes along.
the directness of perception or anything else
-
The
to bring 'fairy dust' into the
Is this
reply to
a serious objection or can it
identity
doubt [by
equation?
Reading 6/5
James
and SP
1
theory was called into
functionalists
pp.
1
- see
62-8] not because
the prospects for a materialistic account of
convincingly?
our mental capacities were thought to be
poor but because arrival
seemed
it
unlikely that the
of an adequate materialistic theory
would bring with
it
the nice one-to-one
match-ups, between the concepts of folk
o
psychology and the concepts of theoretical neuroscience, that intertheoretic reduction
requires.The reason for that doubt was the
Paul Churchland (b. 1942) on the unreality of thoughts - from Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction
Mind:
systems that could instantiate the required functional organization. Eliminative materialism
Philosophy of
to the
MIT Press,
great variety of quite different physical
also
1988
doubts that the correct neuroscientific
account
will
produce a neat reduction of our
common-sense framework, but here the
One
widely-held view
decisions, sensations will
is
that thoughts,
doubts
and what-have-you
be found to be identical to
states
and
from a quite
arise
As the
different source.
eliminative materialists see
one-to-one match-ups
it,
the
not be found, and
will
processes in the brain. Brain surgeons have
our
common
found, for example, that stimulating a
will
not enjoy an intertheoretic reduction,
particular area of the brain leads the
because our common-sense psychological
patient to report a colour flash, while
framework
stimulating another area leads the patient
conception of the causes of human behavior
to report a
memory. So
doesn't
it
look as
and
if
the experience of seeing the colour flash
is
a
sense psychological framework
false
and
the nature of cognitive
view, folk psychology
45
radically misleading
is
activity.
not
just
On
an
this
.
incomplete representation of our inner natures;
our
it
is
think?
an outright m/s-representation of
internal states
and
activities ...
expect that the older framework
we
will
must
location,
powers
simply
be eliminated, rather than reduced, by
A pre-modern astronomer
misdescribe a comet's
it
and might attribute
to
or causal
illusion.
It
really did pass across
the night sky.
Churchland's claim, however,
Churchland goes on
it
might
does not possess. But the comet
was not an
a
matured neuroscience.'
size, colour,
is
that
conscious decision to buy a camera
to argue that the
is
your
not
concepts of folk psychology - concepts
only subject to misdescription (as 'firm' or
such as
sensation,
'sudden' for example), and not only falsely
go the way of
supposed
'belief, desire, fear,
pain, joy
and so on' -
concepts
like 'phlogiston' (a 'heat-
will
to have causal
possess (to lead you
for example). His claim
eighteenth century, to be given off during
the future might
Our
psychological concepts
is
will just
just as
we now
framework which provides superior
Could
nothing
really
'decision' at
all,
say that nothing
corresponded to the word
disappear, replaced by a conceptual
does not
that a person of
realise that
corresponded to the word
currently familiar
it
to go to a certain shop,
substance' wrongly supposed, in the
combustion).
powers
this possibly
'phlogiston'.
be true?
prediction and control.
Comments and questions Churchland says that the 'magnitude of the conceptual revolution here suggested
would be enormous'. He
says, for
.
.
.
and
.
example,
that 'our private introspection will
transformed
.
If
is
be
will
much
Is this
theory'.
'night sky' analogy fair,
do you
46
own
others' behaviour in terms of
we
still
states'
and so on,
be able to regard any of our
actions as free
enhanced by the detailed knowledge of
modern astronomical
switch to explaining our
'neuropharmacological
just as the astronomer's
perception of the night sky
we do
and responsible?
Overview of Area 2 The Readings
person's body. What's more, statements
Area 2 present
in
a
number
of answers to the question 'Are minds
and show where these answers might For Skinner, mental
phenomena
history.
real?',
is
same way, or others would not be
if
are
public and
and
To say that
X
is
to
believe in
in
heads against
economical, and
less
He
is
not
better to
this brick wall,
knock our
McGinn
real.
to the sensations of
possible exit
more
vulnerable to
offers a
from the problem. According
to James, neither the sensation
external thing
terms of these sensations. Russell
the
is
ultimately
nor the
'real':
they are
same underlying 'pure experience' as it occurs in different contexts. Thoughts and
realises
that he should really limit himself strictly
own
it's
The Reading from William James
scepticism, to define external things in
to his
boggle the limited
thinks, than try to say that consciousness
argues that any observation or experiment
therefore
totally
human mind. But
about observers, but for very different
It's
our concept of space, indeed a change
which may
Russell too constructs reality out of facts
the observer.
that they are not real, he believes
science will require a revolutionary change
is
it.
reasons and in a very different way.
show
that our current science must be imperfect. Accommodating consciousness within
according to Peirce, means that an
comes down eventually
argument from
against, versions of the
current science. But rather than taking this
say, for
example, that a sequence of behaviour
would
even
The Reading from Colin McGinn accepts phenomena do not fit into
real is to say that at
people would believe in X. So to
ideal investigator
reality,
sensations.
that mental
the end of an ideal process of investigation,
real,
own
analogy.
real.
on the other hand, argues that the very concept of reality depends on an apparently mental phenomenon, namely Peirce,
belief.
concept of
limited to Russell's
The Readings which follow - from Ayer and Malcolm - pursue the question of other minds. They argue respectively for,
and so can be accepted within
science as genuinely
in the
psyche must be interpreted
Russell's subjective
lead.
for the dustbin of
Overt behaviour
observable,
my own
able to understand them. This rules out
capricious, therefore unsuitable for science,
and therefore destined
about
things are 'functional attributes' of
sensations, but he allows himself
-
to posit the sensations of other observers
something which
too. This raises the question of the reality
something which, though
of other people's sensations, and in general,
both as the thing known and as the process
the problem of other minds.
of knowing, would
Carnap states - the main argument (the
appear as
In our fourth selection,
and
rejects
argument from analogy)
Our
is
essentially neither
still
be
it
can appear
real if
it
didn't
either.
last
Reading, from Paul Churchland,
agrees with Skinner that the traditional
in favour of the
another's psyche must, he believes, be
framework for explaining human behaviour - in terms of beliefs, desires,
interpreted as saying something about that
decisions
existence of other minds. Statements about
47
and so on -
is
deeply unscientific
and
sooner or
will
expects
it
scientific
He
knowledge and language
by a
given us a
later disappear.
to be replaced, however,
which we
theory based on brain processes,
not one based on behaviour. (In Reading 5/41, we'll see
Quine suggest
the mental to behaviour
way
to full reduction to
he interprets,
like
that reducing
freedom.
a stage
Churchland,
as a
it
way of
mind
to say that a thing
is
6, in
of course
accept Plato's concept of
to follow that
causal nexus,
p. 31),
is
real if
then
it
mental events such as
and so
as fully
determined as
any other causal process, or non-existent.
it
Having considered some ways of saying
realV We'll
that they don't exist,
connection with objectivity, and it's
we
decisions are either fully involved in the
confront the enigma of mentality again in
Area
If
has a causal role, (see SP,
seems
in
connection with the question 'What does
mean
Area 2 has
at
according to which a thing
reality,
repudiating mentalistic theorising.) Overall, Area 2 looked at the
will
too.
some of the options explore in more depth later. look
Area 2 also introduces the problem of
on the physiology - which is
first
Area
involved in the problems of
3,
as fully causal.
48
we now
consider, in
the consequences of regarding
them
punishment and moral condemnation imply
AREA 3
moral
Freedom
freedom and freedom
guilt
and
and moral responsibility implies
responsibility
The Reading this area ask
selections in
whether we
in
implies the falsity of
to this the optimists are
turn that
is
it
true that
these practices require freedom
in
and the existence of freedom
this
'freedom'
and debate what
makes an action
reply
one of the
have sufficient freedom to act morally,
And
determinism.
wont to
moral
guilt implies
facts as
we know
means here
is
in
a sense,
sense
is
them. But what
nothing but the
absence of certain conditions the presence
right or
of which would
wrong.
make moral condemnation
or punishment inappropriate
'Optimists' or compatibilists argue
(roughly) that the freedom