Saladin: Empire and Holy War 9781463233235

Table of contents :
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF MAPS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER ONE. THE MIDDLE EAST IN SALADIN’S TIME
CHAPTER TWO. THE EARLY YEARS: 1138–1164
CHAPTER THREE. CONQUEST OF EGYPT: 1164–1170
CHAPTER FOUR. CONSOLIDATION OF POWER IN EGYPT: 1170–1174
CHAPTER FIVE. INDEPENDENT EMPIRE: 1174–1176
CHAPTER SIX. EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION FROM EGYPT TO IRAQ: 1176–1182
CHAPTER SEVEN. EASTERN AND NORTHERN EMPIRE COMPLETED: 1182–1186
CHAPTER EIGHT. BATTLE OF HATTIN: 1187
CHAPTER NINE. JERUSALEM RECAPTURED: 1187
CHAPTER TEN. DEFEAT AND CONQUESTS: 1187–1189
CHAPTER ELEVEN. THE CRUSADERS RESPOND: 1189–1191
CHAPTER TWELVE. KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD AND THE FALL OF ACRE: 1190–1191
CHAPTER THIRTEEN. STALEMATE: 1191–1192
CHAPTER FOURTEEN. BACK TO DAMASCUS: 1192–1193
CHAPTER FIFTEEN. SALADIN: AN ASSESSMENT
MAPS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX OF AUTHORS
INDEX OF PEOPLE
INDEX OF PLACES

Citation preview

Saladin

Saladin

Empire and Holy War

Peter Gubser



 2010

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright © 2010 by Gorgias Press LLC All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. 2010

‫ܝܐ‬



ISBN 978-1-61143-670-9

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gubser, Peter. Saladin, empire, and holy war / by Peter Gubser. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. Summary: Saladin, the great twelfth century Middle East leader, not only created an empire, but also reduced the Crusader presence in the Holy Land. In a comprehensive manner and clear prose, Peter Gubser describes how Saladin rose to power, conquered lands, governed peoples, and raised armies. In addition, he clearly addresses Saladin's imperial motives, a combination of ambition and the devotion to the ideal of the unity of Islam. 1.

Saladin, Sultan of Egypt and Syria, 1137-1193. 2.

Islamic Empire--Biography. 3. Empire--Biography. 4.

Soldiers--Islamic

Crusades.

I. Title.

DS38.4.S2G83 2010 956'.014092--dc22 [B] 2010016053

Printed in the United States of America

For Annie

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents...................................................................................vii List of Maps..............................................................................................xi Acknowledgments .................................................................................xiii Introduction ..............................................................................................1 Saladin and His Times ....................................................................1 Notes on Early Arabic Sources .....................................................2 Notes on Transliteration and Translation ...................................4 Chapter One The Middle East in Saladin’s Time ..............................5 The Spread of Islam........................................................................7 Sunni and Shia Islam.......................................................................9 The Shia Moment in Medieval Times ........................................15 Turkish Ascendancy in the Middle East ....................................17 State and Society............................................................................19 Ethnic and Religious Groupings.................................................24 Islam and Christian Europe.........................................................27 The Crusades..................................................................................30 Chapter Two The Early Years: 1138–1164........................................37 Chapter Three Conquest of Egypt: 1164–1170.................................45 First Military Expedition to Egypt: 1160–1164........................47 Second Military Expedition to Egypt: 1166–1167 ...................51 Third Military Expedition to Egypt: 1168–1169 ......................59 Saladin’s Rise to Power: 1169......................................................64 Saladin, the Man ............................................................................68 Saladin’s First Year in Power: 1169–1170 .................................74 Chapter Four Consolidation of Power in Egypt: 1170–1174 ........81 Saladin’s Armed Forces ................................................................81 1170–1172.......................................................................................88 Economy and Society ...................................................................98 1173–1174.....................................................................................104

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Chapter Five Independent Empire: 1174–1176 ..............................119 Chapter Six Expansion and Consolidation from Egypt to Iraq: 1176–1182.....................................................................................137 Egypt: 1176–1178........................................................................137 Syria, Palestine, and the Upper Euphrates: 1178–1180........144 Upper Euphrates and Iraq: 1180 ..............................................153 Egypt: 1181–1182........................................................................155 Chapter Seven Eastern and Northern Empire Completed: 1182–1186.....................................................................................163 Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon: 1182 .........................................163 Iraq, Upper Euphrates, and Syria: 1182–1183........................167 Palestine, Transjordan, and Damascus: 1183–1185...............182 Mosul: 1185–1186 .......................................................................195 Syria: 1186.....................................................................................203 Chapter Eight Battle of Hattin: 1187 ................................................207 Crusader Politics..........................................................................207 Road to Hattin .............................................................................210 Battle of Hattin ............................................................................222 Aftermath......................................................................................229 Chapter Nine Jerusalem Recaptured: 1187 ......................................237 Jerusalem.......................................................................................237 Muslim Reaction to the Conquests...........................................247 Chapter Ten Defeat and Conquests: 1187–1189 ............................255 Failed Siege of Tyre: 1187 ..........................................................255 Crusaders Reorganize in Europe: 1187–1189.........................258 More Frankish Fortresses and Towns Fall: 1188–1189 ........263 Chapter Eleven The Crusaders Respond: 1189–1191....................283 Acre Besieged: 1189–1190 .........................................................283 Emperor Frederick Barbarossa: 1189–1190............................300 Acre Besieged: 1190–1191 .........................................................304 Chapter Twelve Kings Philip and Richard and the Fall of Acre: 1190–1191.....................................................................................323 Kings Philip and Richard: 1190–1191......................................324 Acre Recaptured: 1191 ...............................................................329 Massacre of the Acre Garrison: 1191.......................................340 Chapter Thirteen Stalemate: 1191–1192...........................................345 Combat and Diplomacy on the Coastal Plain: 1191..............345

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Richard’s Advance on and Retreat from Jerusalem: 1191–1192............................................................................363 Politics and Negotiations: 1192.................................................366 Jerusalem Again: 1192 ................................................................375 Diplomacy, Battle, and Agreement: 1192................................382 Chapter Fourteen Back to Damascus: 1192–1193..........................399 Jerusalem, Beirut, and Damascus: 1192–1193 ........................399 The Ayyubids after Saladin ........................................................404 Chapter Fifteen Saladin: An Assessment..........................................407 Maps .......................................................................................................421 Bibliography ..........................................................................................427 Medieval Sources .........................................................................427 Others............................................................................................428 Index of Authors ..................................................................................433 Index of People.....................................................................................437 Index of Places......................................................................................447

LIST OF MAPS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

The Middle East Egypt Palestine and Transjordan Lebanon, Northern Syria, and Southern Anatolia Eastern Anatolia, Iraq, and Jazira.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many outstanding scholars helped me learn about the people, history, politics, religions, and economics of the Middle East. At the American University of Beirut, I was fortunate to work with Nabih Faris, Malcolm Kerr (on sabbatical from the University of California, Los Angeles), Yusif Ibish, Nicola Ziadeh, and Mahmoud Zayid. At Oxford University, I was able to delve broadly into Middle East issues with Albert Hourani, Roger Owen, E. E. EvansPritchard, and Peter Lienhardt. In addition, as a student and later with the University of Manchester (UK), the Ford Foundation, and American Near East Refugee Aid (ANERA), I lived and traveled extensively in the region. During these years, I visited most of the lands that Saladin brought under his rule. I especially wish to thank my colleagues who took the time and effort to read the manuscript at various stages of its development: Max Gross, Ted Gorton, Edmund Ghareeb, and Jenab Tutunji. Their comments, suggestions, and insights contributed positively to the final version of my biography of Saladin. Paula McNicholas provided invaluable editorial advice, which I utilized to improve the text. Naturally, I take sole responsibility for the manuscript. I also wish to express my gratitude to George Kiraz and his colleagues at Gorgias Press for their help in the preparation and publication of the book. They were always thoughtful, professional, and efficient. Similarly, I acknowledge David Herbick for his skillful preparation of the excellent maps that are essential to and accompany the text. Lastly, I am deeply grateful to Annie, my wife, for her continual support. She has indulged my life-long interest in the Middle East and always encouraged me as I researched and wrote about Saladin’s life and times. xiii

INTRODUCTION SALADIN AND HIS TIMES Saladin, a great Muslim leader of medieval times, intrigued scholars and observers in the twelfth century and still intrigues them in current times. The literature from the two periods is rich, though not always satisfactory in detail and, at times, partisan and contradictory. Utilizing these occasionally problematic sources, I seek to develop an understanding of Saladin’s career and its impact on the Middle East and on Muslim-European relations by addressing four interrelated questions, two of which are essentially political, one military, and the other economic. First, was Saladin a preeminent defender of Islam, or just another ambitious leader? Medieval and modern historians and biographers come down on both sides of the question—and each usually writes about Saladin through his or her chosen lens. Thus, some extol his character, his devotion to Islam and holy war, and, consequently, his ability to motivate men despite adversity. Others see him as a pretentious prince who manipulated Muslim symbols for his own ends and, at times, lost control of his army. In this book, we heed these studied views, but seek an interpretation based on what is known about Saladin from the historical record and modern scholarship. Second, how did Saladin manage his unwieldy empire that stretched from Egypt, Yemen, and Libya to northern Iraq, southern Anatolia, Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon? As he expanded his empire, Saladin used power and resources in various ways. In some provinces, he exerted direct control, notably in Egypt and Syria. In other broad regions, he brought lords and their lands under his suzerainty, but imposed only limited obligations on them, namely, to provide men and resources in time of war. However, to wage war against the Crusaders from 1187 through 1192, he had to constantly recall his coalition army despite its centrifugal tendencies 1

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and, at times, manifest tensions between Kurdish and Turkish amirs and soldiers. Thus, a subsidiary question is how did he maintain command and control, but also accommodate, when necessary, the fractious nature of his army? Third, how successful was Saladin at creating and directing an army that had to fight different kinds of military battles for decidedly dissimilar aims? Also, how and how effectively did he mix diplomatic and economic tools with the use of force? Against Muslim foes, his battles were in the field, on urban streets, and sieges. In these confrontations, for the most part, Saladin planned to bring his opponents into his realm, thus he usually wanted to limit casualties for political reasons. Facing Crusaders with their unfamiliar technologies and tactics, sieges and field battles were the rule. Saladin’s objective against the Crusaders, though, was total defeat to drive them from the Holy Land. Saladin’s military successes and failures must be analyzed and judged within the appropriate context of each, a principal goal of this study. Fourth, how did Saladin secure resources to wage war and build an empire and how well did he manage them? While economic data is sparse in the literature, material on tax farms, trade policy, benefits from imperial acquisitions, and Egyptian resources are available. Accordingly, this study describes and evaluates how Saladin contributed to the economic process, but also how he exploited—some say overexploited—his medieval economy, especially during times of war. In the pages that follow, I trace Saladin’s life and career from his early years in Syria in the 1140s and 1150s, the creation of his empire and the struggle against the Crusaders from the 1160s through the early 11190s, and his return to Damascus where he died in 1193. The portrait that emerges is that of a complex, humane but hardly sentimental warrior-king with both great talents and inherent flaws, one whose rightful place in history may be closer to conquerors who also built, like Alexander the Great or Napoleon Bonaparte, than to those like Genghis Khan, who merely conquered.

NOTES ON EARLY ARABIC SOURCES Students of Saladin’s life and career are fortunate to have a relatively rich, but still not complete, literature on which to base their biographies and histories. This body of material is varied in

INTRODUCTION

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quality and presents distinctively different perspectives on the nature of Saladin’s rule, which, in turn, is problematic, challenging, and valuable for historians, but also leads to conflicting interpretations of Saladin’s career. Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, Saladin’s long-time secretary, left two chronicles: Al-Barq al-Shami [Lightning of Syria] of which only part has survived and Al-Fath al-Qussi fi al-Fath al-Qudsi [The Eloquent Exposition on the Holy Conquest]. Together, they cover most of Saladin’s life and are both marked by Imad al-Din’s florid and verbose style. Baha al-Din Ibn Shaddad joined Saladin’s service as secretary and military judge (qadi) in 1188. Thus, though his chronicle briefly surveys Saladin’s early years, it is much more detailed and complete for the 1188–1193 period. Both Imad al-Din and Ibn Shaddad provide us with important information and insights on the life of Saladin, but by dint of their service with him, their volumes are recognizably sympathetic to their leader. Abu Ali Abd al-Rahim al-Fadil, known in most of the literature as Qadi al-Fadil, was a senior secretary and advisor to Saladin. While he did not write a chronicle, he did leave a rich correspondence. Many of the letters were drafted for Saladin, but others were personal. They are found in narrative histories written after Saladin’s death in 1193 and in various archives. Given his position as a senior aide and counselor, Qadi al-Fadil’s writings offer us unique material on the way Saladin was able to expand his empire and his relationship with the various key parties within it and the caliph in Baghdad. Ibn Abi Tayy, a Shia resident of Aleppo, wrote a chronicle that included rare information on Saladin’s early life. His tome did not survive. However, Shihab al-Din Abu Shama in his Al-Rawdatain fi Akhbar al-Dawlatain [The Two Gardens in the History of the Two Countries], written after 1193, preserved many noteworthy passages from the works of both Ibn Abi Tayy and Qadi al-Fadil. Another view is offered by Izz al-Din Ibn al-Athir, a famous historian of the Middle East, in his Al-Kamil al-Tarikh [The Perfect History], which covers the period from the creation through 1231. He was a partisan of the Zangid family of Mosul, which resented Saladin’s rise to power. While Ibn al-Athir presents us with important and valuable historical detail, his narrative, at times, reflects his political leanings, mixed with occasional grudging respect for Saladin’s accomplishments. Similar to Abu Shama,

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Jamal al-Din Ibn Wasil wrote his chronicle, Mufarrij al-Kurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyoub [The Relief of Anxieties Concerning the History of the Ayyubids], after Saladin had died. He repeats much of what Ibn al-Athir recorded about the life of Saladin, with a similar political orientation. In sum, the chroniclers and secretaries of the day preserved many details about and opinions on the way Saladin conducted his career and his achievements. This variety of viewpoints gives rise to controversy about the nature of Saladin’s rule, but makes it richer for the student of this medieval period.

NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION In the text and footnotes, I have used a simplified standard transliteration system without diacritical marks for Arabic names, places, and words. For common words, such as Beirut, Saladin, and Syria, I utilize the modern English spelling. Unless otherwise indicated, I translated the Arabic and French quotes and citations.

CHAPTER ONE THE MIDDLE EAST IN SALADIN’S TIME Islam, the third Abrahamic religion, emerged in Arabia in the seventh century, five centuries before Saladin was born. During this period, the religion gained believers and expanded first in the Middle East and Egypt, and then to the north and east in Anatolia, Central Asia, and India and to the west in North Africa, the Iberian Peninsula, enclaves in Mediterranean Europe, and West Africa. Parallel with this geographic spread of Islam was the movement of various ethnic groups. The Arabs, who disseminated the religion in the Middle East and North Africa, also brought their language and, over the years, the region gradually adopted and adapted the Arab culture. Neighboring ethnic groups, especially Turks and Persians who had converted to Islam, ruled large areas of the Middle East during the two centuries before Saladin started to form his empire. Ruling dynasties, too, rose and fell. Umayyad caliphs governed the Middle East and North Africa from Damascus for 100 years. The Abbasids, who subsequently took over the caliphate, ruled the same region from Baghdad for two centuries. Following the decline of the Abbasid Empire, various smaller dynasties such as the Buyids (Buwayhids), Hamdanids, Fatimids, Seljuk Turks, and Zangids gained control over more limited geographic areas. Saladin’s larger empire survived him for a few decades, but eventually fell to the Mamlukes and others. Effective central authority over most of the region was not restored until the Ottoman Turks established their empire from North Africa to Iraq and to the Balkans in the middle of the fifteenth century. The competition between Sunni and Shia Islam was another prominent feature of this dynamic historical period. The Umayyids 5

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and the Abbasids were Sunnis, but they were followed by the rise of the Shia dynasties: the Buyids who were the rulers of major parts of Persia (Iran) and Iraq, the Hamdanids who controlled most of northern Syria and Iraq, and the Fatimids who reigned in Egypt, North Africa, and, at times, parts of Syria. The Seljuk Turks, adherents of Sunni Islam, replaced the Buyids and the Hamdanids in the middle of the eleventh century and pushed the Fatimids out of most of Syria later in the same century. Saladin eliminated the latter’s Egyptian and North African empire in the twelfth century. The Christian Crusaders were still another new dimension of the Middle East mosaic of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Indigenous Christians had always been part of Middle East society. In addition, the Christian Byzantine Empire and Armenian states had long been neighbors with whom the various Muslim dynasties had both friendly and combative relationships. Unlike the Eastern Christians, the Crusaders came from western and northern Europe. In the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, they conquered an area that included parts of southern Anatolia, western Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan. Expanding on this brief historical summary, in the balance of this chapter we bring together in a little more detail the major religious, political, ethnic, and societal forces, norms, and practices that were current in the medieval Middle East. Hence, the focus is on: the spread of Islam; Sunni and Shia Islam; Shia rule in medieval times; Turkish ascendancy in the Middle East; state and society; ethnic and religious groupings; relations between Islam and Christian Europe; and the Crusades The literature on the history of the Middle East and medieval Islam from the seventh century through the twelfth centuries is very rich1 as is the material on the Crusader venture.2 This concise overview is based on these classical sources.

The bibliography at the end of the book lists extensive materials on the Middle East and medieval Islam. Of these, the most outstanding are: Hodgson, Venture of Islam; Lapidus, History of Islamic Societies; Hourani, History of the Arab Peoples; Fletcher, Cross and the Crescent; Lewis, Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople; Gibb, Mohammedanism; 1

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THE SPREAD OF ISLAM Islam spread geographically as its early adherents—the Muslim Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula—conquered neighboring lands and as the conquered peoples gradually or, at times, precipitously adopted the new religion. Muslim traders and religious clerics also traveled to distant lands, especially Asia and Africa, where they preached Islam, converting individuals, tribes, and whole nations. During his life, the Prophet Muhammad along with his close followers preached Islam throughout Arabia, converting most of its leaders and tribes. Emanating from the Hijaz where Mecca and Medina (Map 1) are located, they reached Yemen, Oman, and the Persian Gulf and even made forays into the Byzantine Empire to the north. Following Muhammad’s death in 632, the leadership of both the religion and the growing temporal authority devolved onto the Companions of the Prophet: Abu Bakr (632–634), Umar ibn al-Khattab (634–644), Uthman ibn Affan (644–656), and Ali ibn Abi Talib (656–661) who was also the paternal cousin and sonin-law of the Prophet. The four Companions of the Prophet were early converts to Islam as well as strong and close supporters. On the passing of the Prophet, following broad deliberations involving numerous tribes and geographic regions, the leaders of the growing Muslim community successively chose them as its caliphs, successors of the Prophet Muhammad. During the three decades after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, the world witnessed a major geopolitical transformation as a result of the forces unleashed by the message of Islam. Under the guidance of these four caliphs, Muslim armies captured Syria, parts of southern Anatolia, and Egypt from the Gibb, Civilization of Islam; Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives; Philip Hitti, History of the Arabs. 2 There are numerous tomes on the Crusades. Very helpful studies are: Runciman, History of the Crusades; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades; Tyerman, God’s War; Richard, Crusades; Riley-Smith, History of the Crusades; Mayer, Crusades; Maalouf, Crusades through Arab Eyes; Gabrieli, Arab Historians of the Crusades; Stevenson, Crusaders in the East; Holt, Age of the Crusades; Fletcher; Cross and the Crescent; Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives.

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Christian Byzantine Empire as well as Persia and the lands between the Black and Caspian Seas from the Zoroastrian Sasanian Empire. After the death of Caliph Ali in 661, the caliphate and the political and military authority passed successively to two great Arab Muslim dynasties, the Umayyads (661–750) and the Abbasids (749–1258). During the 90 years of Umayyad rule, based in Damascus, the Muslims extended their sway over additional territories in Egypt and Anatolia. To the East, the expansion was even greater. Muslim influence and rule reached lands in India up to the Indus River and far into Central Asia to the east of the Caspian Sea, including the historical trading cities of Samarkand and Bukhara on the Silk Road. As a caliphate dynasty, the Baghdad based Abbasids lasted from 749 to 1258. However, its political and military power largely disappeared by 945. Even though the family retained the religious authority of the caliphate, other families, tribes, and groups seized and exercised governing power and authority. During the Abbasids’ first 200 years, Islam continued to expand its religious and temporal reach, but not in the name of the Abbasids. Lesser families established their rule in North African lands to the west of Egypt: Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. In addition, the Umayyad dynasty that had ruled the expanding Muslim Empire from Damascus, only to be replaced by the Abbasids, established itself in Spain in 756 where it and successor families ruled for several centuries. Christian forces eventually prevailed over Muslim rulers in the Iberian Peninsula, but it took 400 years before they finally expelled them in the fifteenth century. Even though the Christians began to push the Muslims back in Spain at the beginning of the second millennium, Islam continued to gain converts and lands in other continents. West African leaders and tribes started to adopt the religion in the eleventh century. In the 990s, the Seljuk Turks of Central Asia adopted Islam. Their influence on the direction of the Muslim religion was profound as they fought their way to power in the Middle East in the eleventh century. How and why did people from Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe adopt this new, expansive religion? During Prophet Muhammad’s life, he did not attempt to convert the Christians and Jews of the Arabian Peninsula. Rather, he considered them “Peoples of the Book” who practiced respected religions that were

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precursors to Islam. For Muhammad, the Companions of the Prophet, and his other followers, the proselytizing goal of Islam was to bring the animist tribes of Arabia to the true faith. In like manner, as the Muslim Empire expanded, the caliphs extended “People of the Book” status to the Christians and Jews of the former Byzantine Empire in Syria, Egypt, and Anatolia and to the Zoroastrians who were prevalent in Persia and parts of Iraq. Over time, though, many—perhaps most—of the people in Muslim-controlled lands converted to Islam. Some did so out of religious conviction. To them, Islam was the new successor religion to Judaism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism. It appeared to be the new revelation from God and had immediate and spiritual meaning for them. Others converted, at least partially, for material advantage. Muslims were subject to less taxation and had access to more jobs in the governmental, military, and religious structures. Thus, adopting the new religion was of direct benefit to them and their families. As time passed, a family’s former religion was forgotten or, at the least, lost meaning. Still others followed the actions of their tribal or national leader: if he converted, the whole tribe or nation converted. The leader himself may have converted for his own political reasons, out of spiritual conviction, or some combination of both. Despite this centuries-long process of conversion, large Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian communities retained a major presence and role within the Muslim Empire.

SUNNI AND SHIA ISLAM The divergence between Sunni and Shia Islam began to develop in the early decades of the new religion. Initially, the issue between the two groups was largely political. Over a couple of centuries, however, the division grew in terms of theology, worldview, and ritual. This cleavage, though, should not be overemphasized. While there are certainly differences, there are also numerous fundamental similarities in belief and practices, namely: x Muslims submit to the will of God (Allah in Arabic). The very meaning of the word “Islam” is submission, and, as is clear in the Holy Quran (also Koran and Qur’an), the submission is to the will of God.

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The Holy Quran, the word of God, was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by the archangel Gabriel. Its 114 suras were and are the source of Islamic law and religion. The Holy Quran is thus fundamental for all believers. x All Muslims are required to adhere to and practice the five “Pillars of Islam.” They are obligations for all believers. First is the paramount testimony (shahada) of faith: “There is no god but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God.” Second is the requirement to pray, using certain ritualistic phrases and postures of the body. Third is donating a portion of one’s income for public benefit, the giving of alms. Fourth is fasting from sunrise to sunset during the holy month of Ramadan. Fifth is to perform, once during a person’s lifetime, the pilgrimage to Mecca. x Another similarity shared by Sunnis and Shia is their reliance on the sunna—the authoritative example of the Prophet Muhammad—as a source for religious practice, law, and societal behavior. The life of the Prophet, by dint of his communication with God through the archangel Gabriel, is considered exemplary. His actions, examples, and words thus became a source for law and the ideal norms for Muslim society and governance. Even though the word Sunni, which is derived from the Arabic word sunna, is used to describe the Sunni community, the sunna is common to both Sunni and Shia Muslims. In summary, both Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims accept common religious attributes. Thus, when discussing Islam and Muslim society, it is incumbent to remember that the religious groups do share many fundamental similarities. Throughout history, tribal, ethnic, religious, and national groups have focused on their particular historical narratives. A group’s historical experience, as it understands it, helps structure the way that group sees itself as a community, but also how it sees itself in the larger society. Accordingly, Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims have their own histories that define who and what they are. The historical narrative in the previous section on the “Spread of Islam” is largely a Sunni narrative. The Umayyads and Abbasids

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were Sunni dynasties. Thus, Sunni Islam was dominant, with some exceptions, during the first half-millennium after the revelation of the Quran to the Saladin era. During this period, Sunni Muslims developed practices, laws, and institutions that became part of the identity of the ruling Sunnis. The institution of the caliph was unique to them. The first four caliphs, the Companions of the Prophet, were considered legitimate and “rightly guided” in the religious sense of the words. The Umayyad caliphs were accepted as legitimate rulers, but the term “rightly guided” was reserved just for the Companions of the Prophet. It should be noted that while Muawiya, the first Umayyad caliph, was Caliph Uthman ibn Affan’s close relative, he was not a descendant of the Prophet’s immediate family, an important distinction in the Shia narrative below. Uthman and Muawiya were, though, from the Quraysh tribe, the tribe of the Prophet. Despite this issue of family origin, Sunni Muslims in their desire for unity and peace within the Muslim community, recognized Muawiya and his caliphate dynasty as legitimate rulers of the Muslim Empire. With the establishment of the dynasty of Abbasid caliphs, also considered legitimate by Sunni Muslims, we witness a reversion to descendants of the Prophet’s family and the meaning that entailed. The Abbasid caliphs, the first being Abdul-Jabbar al-Saffah, were descendants of al-Abbas, the brother of the Prophet’s father, Abdallah. Another important institution for Sunni Muslims was and is the Islamic body of law, the sharia. Muslim learned men developed four schools of law: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali. Named after legal scholars who first wrote for them, they include codification and interpretation. Initially there were strains and conflicts between and among the schools, but, over time, they were all recognized as legitimate Muslim institutions. Sharia goes well beyond what people in the West consider to be religious law. Rather, in addition to what Westerners may consider religious precepts, it includes laws on how believing Muslims are to conduct their lives and relate to each other in their community. In Western terms, sharia includes not only religious norms, but also civil, commercial, and criminal conduct and how infractions are to be treated. To interpret and apply the sharia, Islamic society developed a special group of trained individuals, the ulama (learned men).

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Ulama were taught sharia and how to apply the laws in special schools called madrasas. They were deeply steeped in all aspects of Islam: the Quran, the life of the Prophet, the sunna, the sayings (hadith) of the Prophet, and the schools of law. From the ulama were chosen the qadis (judges) who administered the sharia in Islamic courts. The ulama kept the traditions and learning and passed them on to the next generation, whether the public, the judges, the religious personnel in the mosques, or younger men who were studying to be ulama. They were lawyers, scholars, clergymen, and professors—all part of one profession. Some ulama were also the tutors of the men who would be caliphs. Upon their accession to the caliphate, they were not only caliphs, but, in a sense, senior qadis. Along with these legal and structural trends in Islam, Sunni leaders, including the ulama and the caliphs, also accepted the Sufi (or esoteric) movements found in Muslim lands and integrated them into their overall thinking about religion. They too became part of the intellectual and popular traditions of Sunni Islam. Unity of Islam in a state of peace was the ideal, the goal of the community. However, this concept of unity certainly allowed for different approaches as it incorporated the four schools of law as well as Sufi thinking and traditions into the arena of what is legitimate and acceptable in Islamic society. The Shia Muslim historical narrative differs considerably from that of the Sunnis. The Shia unique experience, traditions, rituals, theology, and world outlook that are associated with their distinct history, defined the Shia Muslims as a distinct group, a distinctiveness that was important in medieval times. Upon the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Ali ibn Abi Talib, one his Companions, asserted that he, by right, should be the caliph. His claim was based on his being from the family of the Prophet, and that only descendants from the Prophet’s family were “rightly guided” to lead the Muslim community and interpret or explain Islam to the people. However, the larger Muslim community did not choose him; it chose Abu Bakr. After the death of the third caliph, all of whom were Companions of the Prophet, Ali was chosen as caliph. His caliphate was not without challenges, especially from Muawiya ibn Sufyan, a relative of an earlier caliph, Uthman. Muawiya, governor of Damascus at the time, initially did not accept Ali’s accession to the caliphate. After some

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confrontation and negotiation, though, he did. However, upon Ali’s assassination at the hand of a disillusioned supporter, Muawiya claimed the caliphate, and as noted above, established the Umayyad dynasty. Hussein, one of Ali’s sons, with a group of kinsmen and supporters, sought to travel to Kufa in southern Iraq, where Ali had lived and eventually died. They wanted to assert their claim that only descendants of the Prophet’s family had the right, in a religious sense, to lead the Muslim community and expound on the meaning of the Quran. Yazid, the son of Muawiya and the second Umayyad caliph, dispatched an armed force that intercepted Hussein and his followers in Karbala in Iraq. In the ensuing battle on October 10, 680, Hussein and all of his supporters were killed. Over the years, Hussein assumed the role of martyr for Shia Muslims and Karbala became an important shrine and place of pilgrimage. Perhaps minor at the time, the battle of Karbala and the martyrdom of Hussein would become a watershed in Shia history. The historical narrative of the Shia Muslims became distinct. Rather than accept the legitimacy of the Sunni caliphs, they established their own successive religious and community leaders, the imams. In their version of history, Ali was the first imam. (The Shia reject the legitimacy of the other early caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman. From a practical viewpoint, this stance may have been minor in substance, but it is major in symbolism.) The second imam is Hussein’s older brother, Hassan. The third is Hussein. The imam in Shia Islam was considered to be the sole authority who could interpret the Quran and Islam and, in this role, he was deemed infallible, that is he was incapable of error in matters of faith. He acquired these special attributes by dint of his being a direct descendant of the Prophet. In addition, the Shia did not accept the Sunni schools of law. Rather, they looked to the teaching of the imams in all matters relating to religion, society, commerce, treatment of criminals, and relationships among people. The Shia dynasty of imams lasted for about 100 or 200 years, depending on which imamate line a Shia follows. On the one hand, the sixth imam, Jafar al-Sadiq, had two sons: Ismail, the eldest, and Musa al-Kazim. Even though Ismail predeceased his father, his followers considered the son of Ismail, Muhammad al-Mahdi, to be

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the true imam. Eventually, the followers of the descendants of Ismail would be known as Ismailis and have a major role in Middle East history. On the other hand, a larger number of Shia followed Musa alKazim and considered him and his descendants to be the true imams. The twelfth imam in this line, Muhammad al-Muntazar, disappeared in 874. His disappearance is considered an occultation, namely, the imam did not die and is hidden from view. Following this occultation, the Shia ulama accommodated the lack of an imam living with the community. Basing their writings on the words of the imams who lived before them, they developed a body of theological literature. A major tenant of this thinking was chiliastic. The hidden twelfth imam would return; life, as we know it, would end; and the imam, to be known as the Mahdi (the expected messiah), would establish the kingdom of God on earth, the ideal society. The Shia who looked to the twelfth imam, Muhammad alMuntazar, would become known as the “Twelver” (or “Imami”) Shia. A unique Shia institution was and is the commemoration, called the ashura, of the battle of Karbala and the martyrdom of Hussein in 680. In that it marks the historical event that is central in Shia history, the symbolism of this celebration is substantial. On this annual occasion, Shia Muslims wear special mourning clothes, imams give sermons marking the battle and Hussein’s death in the mosques, and the story is re-enacted in dramatic fashion in ceremonies on the streets. For them, at Hussein’s martyrdom, the course of history strayed from what God had intended. As discussed, Sunni and Shia Islam share many religious attributes. Nevertheless, shortly after the death of Ali, their paths diverged. The Sunnis had caliphs with both a temporal and religious role. Shia had imams, infallible religious leaders with no state power. The Sunnis developed their schools of law; the Shia looked to the imams for their body of law. Early Sunni history is centered on the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties; the Shia focused on the martyrdom of Hussein at Karbala and the religious role of the imams. While the profession of faith, prayer, alms giving, pilgrimage, and fasting during the month of Ramadan are common to both groups, the Shia added the ashura, a major ritual with great popular participation. In addition, the chiliastic view of the future world is unique to Shia thinking. While certainly of the same broad

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faith, the two groups took different paths in their traditions, history, and worldview.

THE SHIA MOMENT IN MEDIEVAL TIMES Unique in the history of Islam, three Shia dynasties gained temporal control over large areas of the Middle East and North Africa in the tenth century. Heretofore, the Shia had not exercised state power and authority. Rather they had looked to their imams for religious guidance. Perhaps because they did not participate in government, they were considered to be in opposition to the establishment. Marginal societal groups, minorities, and some of those who opposed the Abbasids turned to them. Somewhat by chance, this political and religious process coalesced in the tenth century and three Shia families claimed governmental power. The weakest dynasty, the Hamdanids of northern Iraq and Syria, emerged first. In about 905, this Shia family rallied a number of bedouin tribes. These tribes joined the Hamdanids partly for religious reasons and partly for the benefits state power would give them. The Hamdanids held sway in the region, including the major provincial towns of Mosul and Aleppo, until about 1000. The second group was the Shia Buyid military family. Originating from around the Caspian Sea, they gained control of Persia by 934 and Iraq, including Baghdad, by 945. The Buyid dynasty did not try to replace the Abbasid caliph with its own Shia equivalent. Recognizing the new reality after the Buyids entered Baghdad, the Abbasid caliph formally acknowledged their temporal authority. The caliph, though, retained his religious role and he also received substantial income, which the Buyids authorized. During the Buyid stewardship, which lasted until 1040 in Persia and 1055 in Iraq, the regime did support Shia institutions: the Shia ulama, schools, and mosques. It essentially allowed the Shia intellectuals more support than they had enjoyed heretofore. Interestingly, the Buyids allowed, actually encouraged, intellectuals in general to explore new ideas, to speculate in new ways of thinking. From the standpoint of philosophical, legal, and religious thinking, it was a period of intellectual openness and positive ferment. It is important to emphasize that neither the Hamdanids nor the Buyids sought to eliminate or replace the Sunni Muslim caliphate. They saw themselves as commanders of the state. While

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they protected and assisted Shia religious activities, they did not seek to create a Shia state in the sense that the Umayyads and the Abbasids had created a Sunni Muslim state. The Ismailis, the group of Shia Muslims who claimed descent from Ismail, the son of Jafar al-Sadiq, the sixth imam, were decidedly different. They were noted for being aggressive proselytizers, but they yearned for state power as well. One group, the Carmathians, rose up and created their own small state in eastern Arabia (about 890–1050). Another group of Ismailis, calling themselves Fatimids, would eventually control a large part of Muslim lands. One of the earliest Ismaili Fatimid leaders was Ubaydullah—a man who claimed descent, and thus legitimacy, from Caliph Ali and Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad—who became ruler of Tunisia in 910. Using this base on the Mediterranean Sea, the Fatimids extended their control to Morocco and, by 969, they established themselves in Egypt. Eventually Western Arabia (Mecca, Medina, and Yemen) would fall under their suzerainty and, at times, they ruled parts of Syria. Centered in Egypt, they retained power and authority until Saladin removed them in 1171. Unlike the Buyids and Hamdanids, the Fatimids created a Shia state. Their leaders claimed the titles of both caliph and imam. Accordingly, they took both religious and administrative authority. This posture was a direct affront and challenge to the Sunni Muslim caliphate. It was not only an assertion of a different, competing, religious authority, but also a manifest division in the desired unity of Islam. This challenge gave rise to generations of struggle as the Sunnis attempted to eliminate Fatimid rule in the heart of the Muslim world. Control of Egypt was exceptionally important for the Fatimids. Egypt was rich in people, agriculture, and industry. It offered great wealth and opportunity to the leaders who commanded it and gave them resources to embark on adventures in Muslim lands and beyond. Interestingly, while the Ismaili version of Shia Islam became the state religion of the Fatimid Empire, the state authorities did not try to convert the population. Sunnis, Christians, and Jews were free to practice their religions. Remarkably for a Muslim state, several Christians became vizier (chief minister), including an Armenian Christian, Bahram, who

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initially headed the Fatimid military and was later appointed vizier by the Fatimid caliph. The Shia had their moment in medieval history. In Iraq, Syria, and Persia, Shia rule lasted 100–150 years. In Egypt and neighboring territories, it lasted over 200 years. After the demise of the Fatimid Empire, Shia Muslims would not rule a state until the Safavids, under Shah Ismail, took control of Persia in the sixteenth century.

TURKISH ASCENDANCY IN THE MIDDLE EAST For centuries, Asian nomads—Huns, Turks, and Mongols— emerged from Central Asia. At times, they possessed the power and skill to conquer and subdue neighboring lands: Europe, China, South Asia, and the Middle East. The most famous of these nomad leaders were Attila who led the Huns across Asia and into Central Europe in the fifth century and Genghis Khan who, with his Mongol hordes, captured Central Asia, China, and some European lands in the thirteenth century. Upon Genghis Khan’s orders, his grandson, Hulagu, invaded the Muslim Middle East, taking Persia and Iraq. In 1258, he captured and razed Baghdad and eliminated the Abbasid caliphate. Turkish nomadic tribes from north of Lake Balkhash in present day Kazakhstan began appearing on the borders of Muslim lands in the ninth century. The Turks and related Turkish groups known as Turkomans (also Turcomans and Turkmen) were animal herders; they followed their flocks and frequently sought new pasturage. Abbasid caliphs and later the Buyids and Hamdanids recruited them into their military service. Splendid equestrians, they were rugged and effective soldiers, as both cavalry and mounted archers. Some were inducted as mamlukes, slave soldiers who served an amir, atabeg, or sultan and who, at times, were manumitted, but remained in the service of their former owner. The majority of the Turkish peoples, though, maintained their pastoral life for centuries. In the tenth century, the Seljuk family ascended to the leadership of the Oghuz (also called Ghuzz in the historical literature) peoples, a large grouping of Turkish tribes. By the 990s, the Seljuks adopted Islam. During the eleventh century, the Seljuk Turks carried the banner of Sunni Islam to all corners of the

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Middle East, uniting major portions of the Muslim domain once again. In the third and fourth decades of the eleventh century, the Seljuk Turks defeated the Ghazanids of central Persia (Khurasan) who then came under their suzerainty. In 1055, Tughril Beg, the preeminent Seljuk leader, entered Baghdad and supplanted the weakening Buyid Shia dynasty. Caliph al-Qaim welcomed him almost as a liberator. Under Tughril—and the successor sultans, Alp-Arslan and Malik-Shah—the Seljuk Turks extended their rule to Syria where they confronted the Shia Fatamid dynasty, still based in Egypt. They also took the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the Hijaz and Yemen from the Fatimids. The frontiers of Islam were also extended. In mid eleventh century, Turkish pastoralists pushed into Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Anatolia, then under the Byzantine Empire. In 1071, the Seljuk Turks defeated the Byzantine army at Malazgirt (Manzikert) where they captured the Byzantine emperor and shortly thereafter magnanimously released him. This Seljuk victory was a disaster for the Byzantine Empire. It opened up large territories in Anatolia to migrating Turkish nomadic tribesmen. As they arrived, the Byzantine peasants left, withdrawing to regions around relatively secure towns. In broad sections of Anatolian lands, settled agriculture gave way to Turkish pastoralism. Based in Nicaea (today Iznik) and later Iconium (today Konya), they ruled what came to be known as the Sultanate of the Seljuks of Rum (derived from the Arabic word for Roman territory) for 200 years. The arrival of the Seljuk Turks constituted a sea change in the history of Islam. Sunni rule replaced Shia dominance in vast areas. The Buyid and the Hamdanid dynasties were eliminated and the Fatimids were pushed back. The stature of the Sunni Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad grew again. Retaining and asserting his religious role, the caliph welcomed the return of Sunnis to state rule. The caliph even bestowed on Toghril the title of Sultan of Dar al-Islam, the house (or lands) of Islam. Thus, the caliph bestowed legitimacy on the newly arrived Sunni Seljuk Turks, but also asserted his own role as the source of legitimacy. Lastly, as noted, an ideal in Islam had always been unity and peace in Muslim lands. As such, the caliph, the ulama, and many Muslims in general looked favorably on the Seljuks for the restoration of this ideal.

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The unity was not to last. The nomadic nature of the Turkish tribes was inherently contradictory to central order. They moved frequently and looked to leaders they could see. At the death of Malik-Shah in 1092, the great Seljuk Empire split into three territories: Persia under Sultan Barkyaruq, the son of Malik-Shah; the Seljuks of Rum; and the sons—who were deemed atabegs (Turkish provincial and regional rulers), not sultans—of Tutish, another son of Malik-Shah who did not live to rule, in Aleppo and Damascus. In addition to these major Seljuk successors, a number of minor rulers established themselves in Muslim territories from Armenia and Diyar Bakr to Damascus and Azerbaijan. Of particular interest to the history of Saladin, is the family of Imad alDin Zangi Aq-Sinqor. Zangi, as he is commonly known, was the son of a Turkish military slave in Seljuk service. Successful and able as an officer, the Seljuks appointed him atabeg of Mosul in 1127 and he extended his territory to Aleppo in 1128. A religious man, he was popular with the ulama. In addition, he was the first Muslim leader to forcefully confront the Crusaders. In 1144, he captured Edessa, the most vulnerable of the four Crusader states. Upon his death, his sons divided his territories. Nur al-Din took Aleppo and Saif al-Din took Mosul. This minor dynasty became known as the Zangids. As we shall find, Nur al-Din played a major role vis-à-vis the Crusaders and it was in Nur al-Din’s service that Saladin rose to power.

STATE AND SOCIETY From the foregoing historical narrative, it is clear that, in the first centuries of Islam, the state took on different forms. At times, the state extended its power and authority far and wide. Also at times, such as during the first two centuries of Abbasid rule, the caliph was the senior leader in both the civil and religious sense. At times, though, the power of the strong, unified state deteriorated. In its place, several sultans as well as amirs and atabegs ruled separate realms. Although some amirs and atabegs were effectively independent, others answered to a more powerful sultan. This decidedly mixed and somewhat fluid system was the rule when Saladin was a young man. The basis for an amir’s or atabeg’s power was his standing military, his praetorian guard. He owned the monopoly of armed

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force. With this power, the overall society expected him to defend the territory from external enemies and maintain internal order. Another of his functions was judicial. If the regular qadis who hailed from the ulama could not resolve an issue that disturbed the society, people turned to the sultan, amir, or atebeg for a judgment and a resolution to the problem, a court of last resort if you will. Families and individuals who lived in the near vicinity of the ruler availed themselves of his judicial judgments if they could gain access to him. The ruler recruited military personnel in a variety of ways. One was to buy or capture mamlukes and place them in his guard. The term mamluke cannot be equated with the institution of slavery, “the peculiar institution,” that was found in the United States before the Civil War. Mamlukes were indeed purchased or captured and could be sold. However, they held a variety of positions in service of the ruler: foot soldier, cavalryman, officer, general, and some were even elevated to the position of minister in the ruler’s court. A freed mamluke usually stayed in the citadel or court of his former owner. Another source of recruits was freemen who were paid to serve in the standing military. In times of conflict or threat of conflict, the ruler brought in more men. Through his subordinates or allies, he enrolled tribal horsemen and fighters who would expect either wages and/or booty in payment for their service. In medieval times, another unique and important institution that was both a resource for military men and revenue, was the iqta. The iqta is essentially the right to collect taxes or revenues, usually from productive land. The ruler granted iqtas to military (mamluke and free) officers, governors, amirs, and other individuals. They in turn collected taxes directly from peasants working the land or indirectly from agents who were managing the agricultural process. The person who received the iqta grant had two obligations: to provide soldiers to the ruler, on either a temporary or a permanent basis, and to provide a portion of the collected revenues to the ruler. Rulers typically did not give out iqtas on all of the lands they controlled. Namely, they reserved some of the lands and taxes therefrom for themselves. Some scholars equate the iqta system with the European feudal institution of medieval times. This is not the case. The grant of an iqta did not create mutual obligations between lord and

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peasant as in Europe. Furthermore, a ruler granted an iqta and he could revoke it. Iqtas could not be bought and sold, and were not heritable. In essence, the iqta was a mechanism through which the central power in the capital collected revenues and recruits from rural areas. It was both a fiscal and military tool, which drew resources from the villages to the benefit of the urban areas, including the ruling court, the ulama, merchants, Sufi leaders, and notable families. On occasion, especially in border regions of a ruler’s territories, iqta grants were abused. Fathers passed them to their sons and iqta holders sometimes treated the peasants as their personal serfs. This, however, was the exception, not the rule. While the primary role of the sultan, amir, or atabeg was to provide external and internal security, he did have other limited relationships with the people, especially in urban areas. For example, he used some of his revenues to build or repair mosques, schools, and special markets called khans as well as to endow religious foundations. Through such acts, he gained stature in the eyes of the ulama, merchants, and other urban groups. This role though was limited. The sultan was a political and military man. Other aspects of society—civil, economy, legal, and religion—were in the hands of others. The caliphate in Baghdad, until 1258 when Genghis Khan’s grandson Hugalu destroyed it, was another central institution in Muslim society. By the latter half of the tenth century, it had lost most of its political power. During the next 300 years, its role was primarily religious, but religious in a special sense that reflected the role of Islam in the overall society. The people and the ulama considered the Abbasid caliphs to be successors to the caliphs who were the “rightly guided” Companions of the Prophet. While not enjoying the “rightly guided” status, they did possess a religious aura. It was to them that the society turned for religious leadership and legitimacy. Only the caliph could bestow legitimacy on the temporal ruler. In the minds of the people, the sultan did not have authority on his own right. Rather, the caliph delegated the authority to the sultan. And the latter could only maintain it by upholding Islamic law. The caliph had a special duty to uphold the sharia, the fundamental rules by which Muslims live. He was integral to its interpretation and implementation in society. In this mission, some

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were regarded as the senior qadi and respected as being from and part of the ulama. In Baghdad where he lived, the caliph was responsible for building mosques, schools, and khans, as well as funding religious endowments. Indeed, all leaders—caliphs, sultans, ulama, merchants, Sufi masters, and noted families—contributed to such public facilities and institutions. These individuals, their relatives, and their religious groups acquired prestige in the eyes of the society when they contributed to the public good. Family and tribe are fundamental social and political institutions in the Middle East. In medieval times, their roles and functions constantly touched everyday life. The family was not only a social unit that produced and nurtured children, but also it was an economic unit. Father, sons, often uncles, and cousins worked the same land or joined to practice the same craft in urban areas. The larger family was also a political unit. As a collective, it had a say in a village or a province. This solidarity was utilized vis-à-vis or in cooperation with other families to address and resolve problems—social, economic, and criminal. Equally as salient, a political leader looked primarily to his sons, brothers, uncles, and nephews as he sought allies, engaged in military expeditions, and ruled his territories. As we will see, Saladin certainly inherited this practice. His relatives were his first military lieutenants and governors as he established and expanded his empire. When his sons came of age, they too were assigned key leadership positions. The tribe is a larger unit than the family—indeed tribal membership reaches thousands or even hundreds of thousands— that claims, albeit the claim is in reality most likely fictive, that all members of the tribe are descendants of one man many generations ago. This claim gives the tribe a sense of mutual identity and solidarity. During the medieval era, members often worked together for certain ends that may at times have been political. They also defended each other in times of strife. Tribes, as noted earlier, moved together in search of new pastures for their flocks. They acted together, sometimes with strong leadership, but also sometimes solely out of a sense of common goals. While we usually think of tribes as nomadic, such as the Oghuz led by the Seljuk Turks or the great bedouin tribes of the Syrian and Arabian

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deserts, tribes do settle and retain their tribal identity. Over time, their identity may dissipate, but the process may take centuries. Economy in the medieval Middle East was based on agriculture, urban crafts and manufacturing, mining, and trade. Agriculture as elsewhere is dependent on the availability of water and the fertility of the soil. Parts of the Middle East are blessed in agricultural terms, others are not. The famous Fertile Crescent—arcing from Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria next to or close to the Mediterranean littoral across Anatolia and northern Iraq, and descending along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers— deserves its name. The region usually receives sufficient rain for peasants to grow wheat, barley, and other crops. Where the rainfall diminishes in southern Iraq, irrigation water is available from its two great rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates. Egypt is the Nile River. Before the advent of major dams in the twentieth century, the annual flood brought silt and moisture, making the country a rich source of food, industrial crops, and revenue for its overlords. In these lands, peasants tilled the crops, often in financial and technical arrangements with urban merchants. The sultan (or other heads of government) taxed the land either directly or through the iqta system. Raising animals was always very important in an overall and balanced agricultural system. Peasants certainly kept some small domestic animals, foul, and sheep. Nomads, bedouin, and hill tribes, however, dominated animal husbandry. Not only did they produce sheep, goats, and camels for human consumption, but also camels and horses for trade and warfare. The tribes raised their animals in the more marginal areas, the lands and deserts that receive less moisture than the Fertile Crescent. Periodically they brought their sheep, goats, horses and camels to the suqs of Cairo, Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, Baghdad, and other inland and coastal towns where they exchanged them for other necessities: grains, coffee, weapons, saddles, tools, and cloth. The relationship between desert and hill tribes, on the one hand, and peasants and urban dwellers, on the other, was based on commerce and was normally peaceful, a symbiotic consociation. At times, when one group tried to dominate the other, strife occurred. From another perspective, Middle East leaders relied on the tribes for troops, often mounted, in times of warfare. Given their occupation and familiarity with horses and camels, they excelled as cavalry and

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mounted archers. This skilled human resource was crucial for Saladin as he built his empire and confronted the Crusaders. Urban economy drew on resources from rural areas, crafts and manufacturing, and trade. Men of commerce were of the same class as the ulama. The latter staffed the religious schools attended by merchants’ children and led religious institutions. The families of the two groups intermarried. They both looked to the sultan or atebeg to maintain external and internal security. However, for the most part, they along with Sufi leaders and noted families managed urban affairs and business. Due to its location at the junction of three great continents (Asia, Europe, and Africa), the Middle East was a major crossroads. Trade routes flowed along the coasts—the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, both of which are linked to the Indian Ocean, and the Mediterranean Sea—and up and down the major rivers: the Nile, Tigris, and Euphrates. Merchants and sailors utilized the riverine and sea routes for both domestic and international trade. Traders also followed land routes. The noble camel, the ship of the desert, moved goods to and from Central Asia and China along the famous Silk Road. Internally, land routes linked Iraq, Syria, Arabia, and Egypt, and yet, where possible, merchants transported bulk goods by boat on the seas or rivers. Trading patterns shifted upon occasion, usually due to security issues and fortunes of war. For example, as the Seljuk Turk Empire declined, unrest threatened trading caravans. In response, traders and merchants shifted the routes for their merchandise. Similarly, prior to the arrival of the Crusaders, the Fatimid navy and traders were ascendant in Mediterranean waters. As the Crusaders gained control over the Holy Land, the navies and merchants from Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and other Italian towns claimed the upper hand in the Mediterranean Sea. This new geopolitical reality disrupted traditional land and sea trade routes. Arrangements for Muslims to cross Crusader-held lands for the purposes of trade were frequently negotiated, but not always honored.

ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPINGS Due to its geographical location and long history, a great variety of people in both the ethnic and religious sense inhabits the Middle East. By the twelfth century, people who resided in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and North Africa had become Arab or were in the process

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of being Arabized. They spoke Arabic, a Semitic language, in their daily affairs: commerce, learning, government. There were naturally differences among various Arab groups depending on geography, class, and life style. In addition, the Muslims looked to the common belief in the Quran and sharia, while Christians and Jews retained their distinctive holy books and communities. The people of Persia, on the other hand, retained their language, Farsi, and their rich culture. Islam as the religion of Persia gradually replaced Zoroastrianism and the ulama of Persia were proficient in classical Arabic, the language of the Quran. However, the language of the court and commerce was Farsi. Unlike Arabic, Farsi is an Indo-European language, a member of the same broad family as Latin, Greek, English, and French. Turkish peoples who migrated into the region brought still another tongue, but this time from the Turkic family of languages. During their first centuries in the Middle East, they were largely nomadic. Indeed, Turkish pastoralism replaced Byzantine settled agriculture in Anatolia. They also established great empires, that of the Seljuk Turks starting in the tenth century and that of the Ottomans founded in the thirteenth century. Turkish peoples lived and continue to live in Anatolia, northern Iraq, Azerbaijan, and northwestern Iran. Kurds are mountain people who lived and still live in eastern Anatolia, northern Iraq, and northwest Iran. Their language is closely related to Farsi and we know that they lived and fought in those mountains over two thousand years ago. Xenophon, the famous Greek general of the fourth century B.C.E., encountered them. Saladin’s family was of Kurdish heritage. During Fatimid times, the generals incorporated both mamluke and free Negroes and Berbers into their military corps. The Negroes came from the Sudan, notably Nubia (and thus are frequently termed Nubians in the literature), and the Berbers from North Africa. Over time, many adopted Islam and were freed. Some, especially the Nubians from the Sudan, not only became Muslims, but also were Arabized. Berbers followed two patterns: some adopted Arabic, but others kept using the Berber language in their communities. Christians lived throughout the Middle East. Many were Eastern Orthodox or Copts who had resided in the Christian Byzantine Empire in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt; others adhered to

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ancient Christian sects that took their identities from some of the famous Christian schisms. In Egypt, the Coptic Church with its own pope, not related to Rome, oversaw the religion of the land when the Muslim Arabs arrived. Initially, most Egyptians retained and continued to speak the Coptic language. During the first centuries of Muslim rule, even though most Copts adopted Arabic, they kept their religion and Coptic liturgy. In the ninth century, Copts revolted against the Muslim overlords, were repressed, and many adopted Islam en masse. Significant Copt communities remained in the eastern delta and Upper Egypt. The Fatimids, the Ismaili Shia dynasty, did not make an effort to convert the Christians and, indeed, welcomed them as merchants, government servants, and peasants. To the south, the Nubian blacks also maintained their own Coptic religion for centuries. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, they began to convert to Islam in large numbers as they increasingly married into Arab bedouin tribes. In Syria and Iraq, large Christian communities, a legacy of Byzantine and even earlier times, enjoyed a significant presence in the towns and countryside. They were active in commerce, crafts, manufacturing, and agriculture, and occasionally they performed technical government functions. Most Christians were Eastern Orthodox; they adopted Arabic for daily life and commerce, but retained Greek in their religious services. Over the centuries, Christians, both as individuals and families, converted to Islam. During the twelfth century, Eastern Orthodox constituted certainly less than half of the population, and perhaps only 25 percent. Smaller Christian groups also lived in scattered locations. Syrian Orthodox communities resided in Iraq and Syria; Nestorian Christians, for the most part, lived in Iraq, especially Baghdad where they had a strong position in commerce and manufacturing. These groups spoke Arabic in the larger society, but utilized their ancient languages, Aramaic and Syriac, in their liturgies. Some spoke these languages in their villages. Still another group, the Maronites, lived mostly in the mountains of Lebanon. They practiced an Eastern rite, but during Crusader times, their church turned to Rome and accepted the authority of the pope. In the twelfth century, the Armenians lived in the regions around Lake Van in Eastern Anatolia and between the Black and

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Caspian Seas as well as in south central Anatolia on the Mediterranean Sea. The latter is called “Little” or “Lesser” Armenia. Their existence as a people goes back perhaps 3,000 years. Alexander the Great interacted with them. In 301, they accepted Christianity as their state religion, the first nation to do so. Armenian communities also lived in Egypt and Jerusalem during Saladin’s time. This ancient community has its own Armenian Orthodox Church and the liturgical language is Armenian. In mediaeval society, they were active in agriculture, commerce, crafts and manufacturing, finance, and occasionally government. Jews are also an ancient people of the Middle East. In the medieval period, they lived in most of the region’s cities, especially Baghdad, Damascus, Jerusalem, Beirut, Cairo, and Alexandria. Many adopted Arabic as their language of society and commerce, but they kept Hebrew in their religious ceremonies and learned books. They, like the Christians, were active in trade, crafts, manufacturing, finance as well as medicine.

ISLAM AND CHRISTIAN EUROPE When people think about Christian-Muslim relations in Europe in the first five centuries of Islam, the focus is usually on confrontation and war. The dominant themes are the Muslims attacking and the Christians defending in Spain, France, Anatolia, and the Mediterranean Sea. As one probes the historical record in more depth, the unidimensional depiction gives way to a multidimensional picture. Indeed, there were many battles and the Muslims expanded their empire at the expense of the Christians, but also they had positive relationships and interacted in a number of fields: diplomacy, pilgrimage, technology and ideas, and trade. Muslims challenged Christian Europe in Asia Minor, Andalusia, France, and along the Mediterranean littoral. The first confrontation was with the Byzantine Empire, which, from its capital in Constantinople, controlled extensive territories stretching from European lands in Italy, the Balkans, and Greece to Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt. In the 670s and again in the 710s, the Muslims took their battle to the capital, which they besieged for years, but failed to capture. Even though Byzantine rulers realized some success against the Muslims in the following centuries, in 1071 the Seljuk Turks defeated them decisively at Malazgrit and opened the door to Turkish nomad migration. Within decades, the Byzantine

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emperors felt so threatened that they petitioned Western European Christians for assistance. (This call led to the Crusades, the subject of the next section of this chapter.) In the seventh and eighth centuries, the Muslims also directly pressed Christians in the West. By 718, Spain was in the hands of Muslim forces whence they crossed the Pyrenees and began to attack Frankish forces. However, in 732, Charles Martel, the great leader of the Franks, checked them at Poitiers after which they retired to the Iberian Peninsula. During subsequent centuries, Muslims gained occasional footholds in and around Italy. In addition, in the 900s, Muslim pirates and brigands frequently marauded the French and Italian coasts. Only in the eleventh century, were European leaders able to suppress these raids. Diplomatic exchanges and relationships also developed between the two sides. Famously, in 801, the great Abbasid Caliph Harun al-Rashid sent Charlemagne an elephant, apparently in honor of Charlemagne’s coronation as emperor a year earlier. Europeans and Muslims frequently negotiated with each other for the return of prisoners of war and other hostages. However, there is no record of permanent ambassadors. Travelers at the behest of rulers served as diplomats of the day. Pilgrimage, while common to the two religions, was one-sided in terms of Muslim-Christian relations. Muslims undertook the hajj to Mecca, a religious journey solely within Muslim lands. On the other hand, Christians who wanted to travel to Jerusalem for religious worship, had to travel through Muslim territories to the Muslim held city until the Crusaders took it in 1099. To reach Jerusalem, pilgrims had to secure permission from the Muslim leaders who controlled the ports and travel routes. Indeed, local leaders gained a lucrative income from selling safe-conducts. In most years, pilgrimage was frequent and not fraught with difficulty. There are numerous European accounts of these religious trips, and the pilgrims’ adventures along the way. Over the generations and centuries, Muslims and European Christians also exchanged technology and ideas. Many of the works of antiquity, particularly Greek, were translated into Arabic. Muslim scholars, such as al-Kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn Sina (Avicenna), and Ibn Rush Averros, commented on these works and made their own significant additions in the fields of mathematics, logic, astronomy, medicine and pharmacology, and chemistry. In later years,

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European thinkers and schools became familiar with this body of Muslim scholarship and utilized it as they gave birth to their Renaissance. In technology, the two societies also learned from each other and exchanged skills. Muslim caliphs and sultans imported Christian artisans and architects to help build and decorate grand buildings in Isfahan, Baghdad, Damascus, and Jerusalem. Muslims and Christians from all sides of the Mediterranean shared agricultural techniques and Muslims introduced improved papermaking methods to the Europeans. Technology of war always seems to cross borders with alacrity. Greek fire, an incendiary device used in naval and siege warfare, was known in ancient times, but fell out of favor as a weapon of choice in subsequent centuries. The Byzantines, however, rediscovered the weapon and used it with success against Muslim navies in the seventh and eighth centuries. A few decades later, Muslims acquired the technology from them. Both sides used Greek fire during the Crusader wars. Between the seventh and twelfth centuries, trade between the Muslims and European Christians grew, especially in the latter half of this period. In the earlier centuries, Europe was still retreating from the collapse of the Roman Empire. Economy, trade, and learning were all in decline. The more vibrant and growing Muslim Empire was interacting with a Europe that was at a historical nadir. Trade existed, but it was not flourishing. With the beginning of the tenth century and even more so in the eleventh, however, this pattern changed. Trade started to grow. Italian merchants in coastal cities—initially Amalfi, Naples, and Venice, followed by Pisa and Genoa—took the lead. Their counterparts were traders from Alexandria and Damietta in Egypt and the ports of Sidon, Acre, Ascalon, Tripoli, and Beirut on the eastern Mediterranean coast. Italian and Arab merchants landed goods at each other’s ports and returned with cargos desired at the other end of their journeys. Spices, ivory, cloth, and small implements were sold to Europeans in exchange for slaves, furs, timber, and occasionally, mercenary soldiers. Gold and silver were also always a part of the mercantile exchange. In aggregate, the relationship around the Mediterranean between Muslims and Christian Europeans was both conflictual and peaceful. Battles, conquering, and defending were the

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complements of pilgrimage, diplomacy, trade, and exchange of technology and ideas.

THE CRUSADES Between 1098 and 1291, Christian Europeans established and maintained military, commercial, and religious colonies in the Middle East. Their geographic extent varied, depending on the fortunes of war. At their height, they controlled vast territories from southern Anatolia to the Red Sea, including Palestine, Lebanon, western Syria, Jerusalem, and lands east of the Dead Sea. Saladin spent part of his professional life confronting the Crusaders, eventually wresting ninety percent of their domain, including Jerusalem. That narrative is for subsequent chapters. Here we will explore the long-debated historical question: Why did the Europeans undertake the Crusades? Pilgrimage to Jerusalem and holy war against non-Christians were not uncommon during the millennium before the Crusaders conquered the eastern Mediterranean. The historical record tells us that Franks and Italians visited the holy city for religious purposes as far back as the fourth century. By the tenth and eleventh centuries, the numbers had grown. Not only parties of two or three individuals, but also groups of tens, hundreds, and occasionally thousands undertook this arduous journey. The record shows that they visited the Holy Sepulcher and other Christian religious sites. Their motivation was penitence; they were seeking forgiveness of sin. Moreover, because Jerusalem had assumed a numinous aura in the minds of commoner and noble alike, it was the unique and required destination for the pilgrims. For the most part, Muslims welcomed them. As discussed in previous sections of this chapter, Muslims considered Christians to be People of the Book and Christians, albeit Eastern Christians, and Muslims shared cities, towns, and villages in the Middle East. For Muslims, pilgrimage was also a source of revenue. Leaders sold safe-passages and merchants vended food, clothing, and animals. The Caliph Harun al-Rashid even invited Charlemagne to invest in Jerusalem, to enhance the Holy Sepulcher shrine. The pilgrims, despite the difficult journey, returned to their European homes with a renewed spirit gained from the visit to the holy city. A few pilgrims elected to remain and eventually die there.

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This peaceful and religious exercise was severely disrupted in 1009 when the Fatimid Caliph al-Hakim, who was known for his strange behavior, destroyed the Holy Sepulcher. Within a short period, Christians rebuilt it. Pilgrimage, while temporarily slowed by this event, rebounded and even increased in magnitude. Indeed, pilgrims were visiting Jerusalem in ever-larger numbers during the very decade of the Crusades. Many Europeans who joined a Crusade simply viewed it as a large pilgrimage. Holy war was a familiar concept to Europeans and the papacy. In the ninth century, the earliest example we know, Pope Leo IV and Pope John VIII promised eternal life for fighters who died battling Muslims and Vikings. In the 1060s, 30 years before the Crusades, Pope Alexander II offered indulgences for those who fought Muslims in Spain. Frankish knights crossed the Pyrenees to join the battles. Their prizes were religious—forgiveness of sin— but also material, land and booty. In addition to the holy war in Spain as Christians sought to reconquer lands lost to Muslims in the eighth century, popes also encouraged Pisans to attack Tunisia in 1087 and Roger the Norman to invade Sicily in 1061, which was then under Muslim control. Holy war, in the eleventh century, was a known and acceptable practice, encouraged and blessed by the Church. It also had other attractive features, namely, political and material benefits. Political, economic, and social conditions in Christendom, both East and West, also laid the groundwork for the Crusades. As recounted, in 1071 the Byzantine Empire suffered a major defeat at Malazgrit. As nomadic Turks migrated into Anatolia, the Byzantine emperors lost their eastern hinterland. To fight their wars and guard long frontiers, the Byzantines had frequently recruited mercenaries. From the West, Franks, Normans, Englishmen, and Belgians joined the army. From the East, Byzantine generals recruited people from the Steppes as well as peasants from Anatolia. Thinking he might be able to rebuild his army and reconquer lost territories, Byzantine Emperor Alexius appealed to European leaders for additional mercenary troops. Inter alia, he sent emissaries to the Council of Piacenzce, called by Pope Urban II in March 1095, to present his case for additional men. Favorably received, they addressed the council. It must be underlined that the emperor was asking for mercenaries, that is, organized bodies of soldiers whom he would control, not an

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independent Crusader army and rabble that had their own agendas. Urban II, though, adapted the Byzantine request to his own purposes. Western Europeans were restive in the tenth century. They had resources and energy for which they needed outlets. Feudal lords, especially Franks, frequently fought each other to gain land, people, and position. As populations grew, new lands in Europe were opened and settled. At times, the pope helped direct this energy toward Spain to battle Muslims rather than themselves, a papal motivation that would continue as the various popes called for the Crusades. Italian port cities were also expansive. Their reach and wealth were growing as they sought and gained new markets. The feudal lords and Italian merchants complemented each other with their respective political and mercantile interests. Due to the growth in population, feudal society in the tenth and eleventh centuries had to adapt. Observing that lordly lands were being divided into ever-smaller parcels, undermining their economic and political value, medieval nobility and other large landholders introduced the institution of primogeniture, which, by 1000, became quite common. This new system of inheritance worked, but it had consequences. The eldest son inherited his father’s land. Second sons, without resources, joined the clergy, others the military. As military units grew in size and number, they became increasingly aggressive. Knights and their soldiers and retainers wanted to exercise their profession, and reap the rewards. All of these eleventh century conditions—centuries of pilgrimage, a tradition of church sanctioned holy war, Byzantine demand for soldiers, restless feudal lords, ambitious merchants, and young men looking for battles—helped create a political, economic, and religious environment that was open to a new and dramatic call to duty. On November 27, 1095, Pope Urban II issued this call at the Council of Clermont in France. The speech, although not published, has come down to us in several versions. In compelling words and delivery, it contained a number of themes: an appeal for a holy war to free Eastern Christians from Muslim rule and depredation with special reference, albeit altered to his own purposes, to Emperor Alexius’ request for troops for his own struggle with the Muslims; the sacred need to retake Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulcher; and the religious requirement to liberate the

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Eastern Church and bring it back to a united Christendom under the authority of the pope. Very importantly, the pope and the council made it very clear that those who volunteered for this noble cause would receive indulgences for their sins or, in other words, they would be freed of all church imposed penances for transgressions of divine law. The various elements of the speech were not new, but they were combined in a whole and powerful message and presented with the authority of the pope, in this instance Pope Urban II. Combining holy war, the spiritual meaning of Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulcher, the threat to Christendom (depending on the listener, this could mean the need to liberate the church from its East-West division or from supposed ravaging by the Muslims), and the pilgrimage with its inherent relief from penance, constituted a compelling call to all classes in the society. The message was well received at the Council of Clermont and even more so as preachers delivered it broadly to the people. Nobles and commoners alike responded in large numbers. Did the average medieval man understand the subtleties and theological nuances in the pope’s words? Probably not. Indeed, many elements of the pope’s speech were certainly lost as the preachers talked about the necessity to reach Jerusalem. Did the peasants understand that they were to travel to the city of Jerusalem or the New Jerusalem that would relieve them of their misery? On reaching the numinous city, they may have thought that they would be in the presence of God and their lot in this world, or the next, would improve. From another perspective, Pope Urban’s call for a Crusade gave some people a religious justification for doing something they wanted to do for other reasons, whether they were political, economic, or social, or some combination thereof. For the Crusades to succeed for as long as they did, it can be argued, they required a combination of motives. Spirituality drove some people as they sought to better their lives in the eyes of God. Others sought booty, land, and profit. Drawing all of this together, the Crusaders began the long trek to Jerusalem. In the first of many waves, perhaps 100,000 knights, soldiers, retainers, and rabble, the latter led by Peter the Hermit, traveled overland through the Balkans and Anatolia to the Holy Land. During what became known as the First Crusade, 1097–1100, the

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Crusaders captured extensive territories where they set up four loosely confederated governments: x The Principality of Antioch composed of lands in both Anatolia and western Syria; x The County of Edessa in Anatolia which included the headwaters of the Euphrates River; x The County of Tripoli which included the coastal plain, part of Mount Lebanon, the Biqa Valley and the famous Crac des Chevaliers; x The crown jewel of the project, the Kingdom of Jerusalem, which stretched from Beirut to Gaza and Jerusalem and down to the Red Sea. Headquartered in the Holy City, which the Crusaders had captured in a bloody massacre, its first king, Baldwin I, established the Crusader institutions that would last for decades. Initially, Muslim reaction to the Crusades was tepid. The Seljuk Turk Empire was in disarray and the Abbasid caliph, even if he had wanted to, could do little. Not until the middle of twelfth century did Muslim leaders actively confront the Crusaders. Zangi, the Turkish atabeg, recaptured Edessa in 1144 and, later in the century, his son, Nur al-Din, battled them in Syria and Egypt. Great success, though, awaited Saladin’s appearance on the historical scene. Looking at the Crusades from still another perspective, we must note that Europeans projected force towards the East on a number of fronts during this period. Prior to Pope Urban’s call, we know that Europeans were bold and forceful in political and mercantile terms. This aggressiveness assumed a military mien at the end of the eleventh century that lasted for hundreds of years. Frankish lords and Italian merchant states, at times working alone and at other times working together, took and held land on at least five occasions and locations: the Kingdom of Jerusalem and its federated states from 1098 to 1291, Cyprus from 1191 to 1571, Constantinople from 1204 to 1261, Athens from 1205 to 1458, and Peloponnesus from 1206 to 1420. In addition, the Kingdom of Jerusalem with its allies and, separately, the Normans of Sicily assaulted Egypt by sea or by land at least ten times during the twelfth century alone. The Crusades to the Holy Land, the first of the adventures, wedded economic and political motivations with

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spirituality, penance, and indulgences. With respect to the other ventures, while some leaders asserted that bringing the Eastern Church back to the true Church based in Rome was paramount, in reality ambitious men were focused on economic and political gain. They were looking for land, trade, and revenues. Some would describe these men as the new European imperialists, the first rebirth of this spirit since the collapse of the Roman Empire.

CHAPTER TWO THE EARLY YEARS: 1138–1164 Salah al-Din (referred to as Saladin in the West) Yusif bin Ayyub entered the world in 1138 in Takrit (Map 1), a town on the Tigris River north of Baghdad. His family, of Kurdish heritage, was from Dvin near Tiflis (now Tbilisi). At the time, that territory was part of Armenia. Some Kurds lived there, but larger numbers inhabited lands just to the south. The population in the entire area was in flux because Turkish nomadic tribes had started migrating into Anatolia, especially Eastern Anatolia where Armenia was, after the Seljuk success and Byzantine loss at the battle of Malazgrit in 1071. Saladin’s father, Najm al-Din Ayyub (Ayyub in the literature), and his younger brother, Asad al-Din Shirkuh (Shirkuh in the literature), joined the Seljuk government in 1130. Appointed by Sultan Muhammad ibn Malik-Shah, they actually answered to Bihruz, a powerful Seljuk official in Baghdad. Ayyub served as governor—an administrative and military position—of Takrit, an important crossing point on the Tigris River. Shirkuh also had a post in Takrit, but under his brother’s authority. Ayyub and Shirkuh were influential role models for Saladin. Ayyub’s strengths were diplomacy and administration, but also he was politically astute and knew how to look after his family’s interests in a tumultuous time. Furthermore, Ayyub was personally devout throughout his life, an attribute that Saladin would inherit. While Ayyub certainly had military talent, Shirkuh excelled in them. He could think tactically and strategically and he reportedly had great personal courage and martial skills, both of which he displayed in battle. Ayyub and Shirkuh were obviously ambitious, the former perhaps in a more calculating way, while the latter was at times more impetuous and willing to take greater risk. Saladin, who was close to both men at different stages in his life, learned 37

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from them by example and by being included in their activities in the diwan, the hunt, and the battlefield. To the west of Takrit, Zangi, an atebeg in Seljuk service and the first Muslim leader to confront the Crusaders, climbed to power in Mosul and Aleppo in 1127 and 1128. In 1132, this aggressive leader, thinking he could take advantage of the declining Seljuk Empire, led his troops to the outskirts of Baghdad where he intended to influence events in his favor. He failed. His military force defeated, he retreated towards Mosul. At Takrit, Zangi asked Ayyub for permission to cross the Tigris. For Ayyub, the request was problematic. His superior, Bihruz, had just defeated Zangi outside Baghdad and would not expect Ayyub to treat Zangi kindly. Nevertheless, Ayyub saw it in his interest to allow the ambitious Zangi to reach the other side of the river and proceed to his base in Mosul. Bihruz, not pleased with Ayyub’s action, did express his disapproval, but did not relieve him of his governorship. In 1138, however, the brothers’ fortune changed. Shirkuh killed a man, reportedly a Christian, in a private dispute. Bihruz, well known as a friend of the Christians, immediately dismissed Ayyub and Shirkuh and expelled them from Takrit. Remembering the favor they rendered to Zangi, they took their families, including the newly born Saladin, to Mosul where Zangi took them into his service. In 1139, Zangi, always seeking new lands, captured Baalbek (Map 4), then under the rule of the Burids, a Turkish dynasty based in Damascus. He appointed Ayyub governor of the town and the surrounding lands, a prosperous region in the fertile Biqa Valley between the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountain ranges. The valley was famous for its plentiful production of wheat, barley, vegetables, fruits, and grapes. Saladin spent his early years, one to eight, in Baalbek. There is no record of his rearing in this period. His father, being a senior public official, no doubt afforded him the best education of the day. Like many sons of well-to-do families, he would have studied the Quran, Arabic grammar and writing, numbers, and rhetoric. Baalbek was sufficiently large and prosperous to have a small cadre of teachers for the children of the leading military, merchant, administrative, and religious families. At home, Saladin most likely spoke Kurdish, but Arabic was the language of his schooling and his friends in Baalbek.

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In 1146, when Saladin was eight, his family moved to Damascus for political reasons. In that year, Zangi was assassinated. His two sons, Saif al-Din and the younger Nur al-Din took Mosul and Aleppo respectfully. Given his concern for his older brother’s possible ambitions, Nur al-Din concentrated his attentions on securing his rule in Aleppo with the help of its military leader, Shirkuh, who had held the post in Zangi’s time. The Burid leader Mujir al-Din Abaq of Damascus took advantage of the opportunity to reclaim Baalbek. Ayyub, rather than enter a fight he knew he would lose, negotiated the town’s peaceful surrender in exchange for an iqta of ten villages around Damascus, a large house, and a position in service of the Burid government. Once again, we see Ayyub use his political skills for his and his family’s benefit. Within a short period, Mujir al-Din’s atabeg appointed Ayyub military commander in Damascus. For Saladin, Damascus must have been a very big change, affording broader opportunities than Baalbek. One of the grand cities of the Middle East, it was full of merchants, artisans, manufacturers, and well-educated ulama. Traders from around the world, Samarkand to Muslim Spain, traveled to the great oasis city. Bedouin from the Syrian and Arabian deserts came to trade and renew their supplies. Damascus was also a major starting point for the hajj to Mecca. One of the noted Arab travelers, Ibn Jubayr, records seeing many mosques, 20 madrasas, Eastern Orthodox churches, and thriving Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities. After six years in Damascus, Ayyub sent Saladin to Aleppo where his uncle, Shirkuh, resided. At this young age—he was 14 years old in 1152—Nur al-din awarded him his own iqta to cover his expenses. In one sense, this move seems curious. The Burids of Damascus were the enemies of Nur al-Din in Aleppo. However, in this case, it appears that family ties were more important than political differences and, as events will show, these ties proved to be politically very useful. During these years, according to noted Arab chroniclers, Saladin acquired in depth knowledge of Arab culture and history. He studied the biographies and genealogies of Arab leaders as well as their successes in battle. He also reportedly memorized the Hamasa by Abu Tammam. The Hamasa is a large compilation of famous Arab poems, collected in ten books. Not only are the poems beautiful, but also they present values, behavior, and modes

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of thinking valued by society, especially the bedouin tribes of ancient Arabia. Saladin fully participated in the hunt and sport. Hunting and playing polo gave him equestrian skills he would use for life. Also, during these formative years, like others of his family’s status, he started to learn the art of war and battle. Joining Shirkuh in Aleppo during his mid teens gave him ample opportunity to master military skills, tactics, and strategy. Later in his life, Saladin wrote that he rode and fought with Ayyub and Shirkuh early in his career. In his very late teens, Saladin became an aide to Nur al-Din. Working closely with him as his liaison officer to the military, Saladin acquired a third role model. Nur al-Din was known for his religiosity (like Ayyub), his devotion to the struggle against the Crusaders, his ambition to increase his political domain, his rigor in planning and execution of state and military decisions, his courage, his fairness, and his constancy to his word. Saladin recounted that in those years he was never far from Nur al-Din’s side “on the march or at court.” Nur al-Din loved to ride horses and would often join Saladin and his colleagues on the polo field. Hunting, hawking, and military exercises were part of the life when they were not on campaigns or at home. By the time he was about 30, Saladin married. His first son, alAfdal, was born in 1170. In all, Saladin eventually had a large family, including several wives and 16 sons. There is no record of his daughters. Like Muslim barons of the time, it was paramount for Saladin to have a large family. As a rule, medieval leaders relied on their sons as well as their brothers and uncles to fill high positions in their administrations. Loyal and able kinsmen were crucial to their rule. That being said, sultans, amirs, and atabegs always had to be wary of their relatives’ separate agendas and ambitions.1 Resources on Saladin’s early years are sparse. The most relevant are: Gibb, Life of Saladin, 4–5; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 25–33; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 2–6; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 65–76; (Lane-Poole’s material for most of this period is conjecture.) Also see the great Arab historians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 17; Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij al-Kurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyoub, vol. 1, 1–10, 125–37; Ibn al1

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*** As Saladin was growing up and reaching maturity, the Middle East experienced momentous events. x In 1144, Zangi defeated the Crusader Count Joscelin de Courtenay and captured Edessa (also known as al-Ruha), one of the Crusader states. x In 1145, Pope Eugenius III called for a new crusade, the Second Crusade, to recapture Edessa, an ancient Christian city. x In 1146, Zangi was assassinated. Saif al-Din Ghazi, the eldest Zangi son, inherited Mosul. Nur al-Din, the younger son, hurriedly went to Aleppo. Shirkuh, the city’s military commander under Zangi, welcomed him and declared him Zangi’s successor. x In 1146, the Burids of Damascus retook Baalbek. x In 1146, Count Joscelin attempted to recapture Edessa, but Nur al-Din defeated him and drove him out of the region. x In 1147, King Conrad III of Germany and King Louis VII, initiating the Second Crusade, lead two large armies to the Holy Land, once again through Anatolia. x In 1147, the Seljuk Turks decisively defeated King Conrad and the German Crusaders near Dorylaeum in Anatolia. With only a small body of troops, Conrad reached Jerusalem later in the year. x In 1147, Nur al-Din, with the help of Shirkuh, conquered more land for his realm. x In 1148, King Louis and his substantial Crusader army joined King Baldwin III of Jerusalem and King Conrad for an attack on Damascus. Ostensibly, the purpose of the Second Crusade had been to regain Edessa. The Frankish leaders, though, turned their attention to their material interests, which, in this case, was Damascus, a city rich in Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 89–298 passim; Abu Shama, AlRawdatain, pt. 1, 83–152 passim, esp. 84, 89, 100; Ibn Jubayr, Travels of Ibn Jubayr, 271–312.

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x

x

trade, manufacturing, and fertile land. While King Louis was noted for his piety, he did lend his formidable army to this imperial adventure. The Burids of Damascus called on their enemy, Nur al-Din, for military help, which he sent. However, through trickery, cunning, and bribery, the Damascenes defeated the Crusaders on their own, inflicting considerable casualties around Damascus and as the Frankish armies retreated to Jerusalem. Even though Nur al-Din’s forces did not engage, their evident military potential contributed to the Crusaders’ decision to retire. Saladin, living in the city, was ten years old at the time. In 1154, Nur al-Din took over Damascus, realizing one of Zangi’s great dreams. Atabeg Unur, the regent for the Burid lord but also the city’s de facto leader, had died, leaving a void. Shirkuh led Nur al-Din’s troops to Damascus where he met his brother, Ayyub, who held a high position in the Burid administration at the time. Ayyub and Shirkuh began negotiating the future of the city and its hinterland. After a few days, the Damascenes realized that a viable defense was impossible. They abandoned the Burid dynasty and accepted Nur al-Din’s rule. Ayyub profited greatly. He was appointed governor of the city and given special honors at Nur al-Din’s court. Once again, his political dexterity benefited him and his family, but also the grand oasis city was spared bloodshed. Saladin, then living in Aleppo, was 16 years old at the time. In 1162, once again utilizing his military skills and acumen, Shirkuh helped Nur al-Din increase the size of his realm.2 ***

For Crusader developments and wars during this period, see: Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 214–88, 325–67; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 53–435; Richard, Crusades, 146–81; Tyerman, God’s War, 268–346. 2

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In sum, during his first 25 years, Saladin had numerous and varied learning opportunities of which he took full advantage. Working with successful leaders such as Ayyub, Shirkuh, and the indomitable Nur al-Din, he acquired religious values and military skills, developed negotiating and administrative abilities, and honed his understanding of statecraft and international relations. He also became aware of the value of sharia and fairness in solving disputes and rendering decisions and, importantly, learned that an effective leader had to be ambitious. He observed his father’s ability to shift alliances as needed, his uncle’s military prowess and energy, and Nur al-Din’s willingness to expand his empire at the expense of both Frankish and Muslim neighbors. Zangi had led the way in initiating the Muslim response to the Crusades, but Nur al-Din made it real on the ground.

CHAPTER THREE CONQUEST OF EGYPT: 1164–1170 The Shia Fatimid Empire controlled vast and rich lands. Its base was in Egypt, which it conquered in 969. Its territories, at varying times, included large sections of North Africa and southern Syria as well as the Hijaz (including Mecca and Medina) and Yemen in Arabia. By the middle of the twelfth century, even though Fatimid Egypt was still very wealthy, its political and military institutions had decayed. Noting Egypt’s weakness, its adventurous and covetous neighbors attempted to capture the country or, at the least, exact large tribute payments. Central to Egypt’s wealth was the Nile River and its annual floods. Each year, its waters covered broad areas of the Nile Delta north of Cairo and stretches of land along the river’s banks south of the city. In a country with very little rain, the flood brought valuable moisture and silt, enabling Egypt to be agriculturally rich and productive. Its population was quite substantial, both in urban and rural areas. Aside from making agriculture possible, the Nile was also the most important Egyptian transportation artery. Manufacturers, of which there were many, and merchants exported and imported raw materials, goods, and produce. Fatimid Egypt was also a noted maritime country. The government built and sent out large naval fleets and traders competed favorably throughout the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, and further a field. In medieval times, Muslim empires usually did not last for long periods; the Fatimid Empire was no exception. In Syria, it lost lands to the Crusaders in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In 1153, the Franks led by King Baldwin III of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem besieged and conquered the last Fatimid city, Ascalon (Ashqelon or Ashkelon today), on the eastern Mediterranean coast. 45

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Similarly, local leaders along the North African coast began displacing Fatimid rule. Internally, Fatimid institutions were in decline. In earlier periods, Fatimid caliphs exercised great political and military power. By the middle of the twelfth century, however, the caliph was largely a figurehead, albeit with considerable income, opulent palaces, and strong palace guards. In reality, though, the government and military were in the hands of the vizier (chief minister). Viziers gained power by military force. To claim the vizierate, an aspirant would usually kill or capture the incumbent, using either violence or just a show of force. Recognizing the new reality, the caliph of the time appointed him vizier. The vizier, in turn, controlled and exploited state revenues. They were at his disposal for public works, building religious schools and mosques, maintaining and expanding armies and navies, and international relations. With respect to the latter, viziers frequently used substantial payments to persuade, or attempt to persuade, foreign powers to do their bidding. From a regional perspective, Egypt came to be seen as a prize that external powers coveted for themselves, but also wanted to deny to others. Thus, Baldwin III, after he captured Ascalon on the Mediterranean coast close to Egypt, expressed interest in controlling Egypt in order to exploit its considerable resources and keep them out of the hands of Nur al-Din and the Byzantine emperor. Nur al-Din, the Crusaders’ primary rival, looked at Egypt as a potential and valuable addition to his growing empire. Like Baldwin, he calculated that if he secured it for his empire, he would shut out his rivals. In addition, as a devout Sunni Muslim, he wanted to reintegrate Egypt into the Sunni community. Like other Muslim leaders, he looked to the Sunni Caliph in Baghdad, then alMustanjid, for his own legitimacy. Bringing Egypt back to the Sunni fold would contribute to the unity of the Islamic community, please the caliph in Baghdad, and enhance his prestige, stature, and recognition in Muslim lands. While the Byzantine Empire was far from Egypt, its emperors also recognized Egypt’s great resources. Despite their enmity towards the Crusaders, on occasion they could and did lend their large navy to joint military campaigns against Egypt. Lastly, although Egypt was viewed as the prize, it was also a player. Its viziers learned how to manipulate the other regional powers, or at least to attempt to do so. This overall pattern

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was destroyed when the forces of Nur al-Din, led by the able general Shirkuh and accompanied by his youthful lieutenant, Saladin, conquered Egypt and eliminated the Fatimid Empire.

FIRST MILITARY EXPEDITION TO EGYPT: 1160–1164 While the chronology of caliphs and viziers in Egypt is long and convoluted, for our purposes here, we will take up the narrative in 1160. In that year, Caliph al-Faiz, who acceded to the office at the age of five in 1154, died. His cousin, al-Adid, who was 11 at the time, succeeded him. Ibn Ruzzik, the governor of Upper Egypt, through palace intrigue and by means of force, had become vizier in 1154. He lasted until 1161 when he was killed at the behest of the caliph’s aunt who, in turn, was killed by the dying Ibn Ruzzik. His son, al-Adil, succeeded him, but was killed and replaced by Shawar, then the governor of Upper Egypt, in early 1163. Dirgham, who held a palace position (Warden of the Gate or Chamberlain) that commanded troops, though, deposed him, in the late summer of the same year. To ward off perceived and real threats to his new position, Dirgham invited approximately 70 generals and other officers to a grand banquet where his men slaughtered them to a man, thus denuding the military of experienced and capable leadership. Shawar, however, managed to escape Cairo and fled to the court of Nur al-Din in Damascus. During these intrigues and changes in power, the Crusaders were active. In 1160, Baldwin III threatened to invade Egypt, but Ibn Ruzzik, in exchange for a promise of an annual payment of 160,000 dinars, persuaded him not to move his troops to the Nile. Baldwin died in 1162; his younger brother, Amalric, then 25, succeeded him. Egypt was still the prize, but it was not paying the tribute. Using this as pretext, in September 1163, Amalric invaded Egypt, attacking Dirgham’s forces near Bilbais (Map 2), north of Cairo. The vizier’s army, depleted of its senior leadership, was roundly defeated. Dirgham, though, did not bow to the powerful Crusaders. Taking advantage of the Nile’s annual flood at that time of the year, he breeched some dykes, flooding the fields where Amalric was camped, forcing him to withdraw back to Jerusalem. Taking advantage of the Crusaders’ attention to Egypt, Nur al-Din undertook an expedition in the north, in the County of Tripoli, where he besieged the famous Crac des Chevaliers (Hisn al-Akrad). Whether intended or not, this assault engaged Crusader regiments

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that otherwise could have joined Amalric in the invasion of Egypt. Eventually the superior Crusader army forced him to withdraw in disarray. The Franks followed him to Homs, intending to engage his weakened army again. However, after he regrouped and recruited new troops, the Franks broke off their pursuit. Shawar meanwhile repaired to Damascus where he requested Nur al-Din’s help to regain the vizierate in Cairo. In return, he promised an annual tribute of one third of the state’s grain revenues, a very considerable sum, as well as the campaign’s expenses. Nur al-Din weighed his options. The best route from Damascus to Egypt was along the Mediterranean coast, but it was under Crusader control. The second option was through Transjordan, even though this passage was always under threat from Frankish fortresses at Karak, Shawbak, and Aqaba (Map 2). As he was deciding, Dirgham sent emissaries who asked Nur alDin not to undertake such an expedition and offered financial inducements. By spring 1164, Nur al-Din had made his determination. Rather than give Shawar command of the military force, which Shawar had expected, he assigned it to Shirkuh, one of his successful generals. As an Arab chronicler wrote, Shirkuh “… had courage … and a personality that showed no heed to danger.”1 Shirkuh selected Saladin, then 26 years old, to accompany the expedition as his aide-de-camp. Shirkuh led his mounted regiments, made up of Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab troops, through Transjordan and reached the Nile in May 1164. His army defeated Dirgham’s advance guard under command of his brother, Mulham, near Tell Basta and later at Ard al-Tabba, north of Cairo. Meanwhile, Nur al-Din attacked Banyas (Map 3), a Crusader held-town southwest of Damascus, to divert the Crusaders’ attention from Shirkuh’s campaign. Shawar then took the initiative. He led Egyptian troops, who had rallied to him upon his return to the country, to Fustat, the ancient Egyptian capital to the south of Cairo, which he captured in short order. Shawar then met Dirgham’s diminished army outside Cairo where he easily prevailed. Dirgham’s appeal to the caliph for fresh forces went unanswered. During their attempt to escape, both Dirgham 1

Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 305.

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and Mulham were killed on May 24, 1164. The following day, the caliph reinstated Shawar as vizier. Now that he had regained power, Shawar wanted Shirkuh to quit Egypt. As an inducement, Shawar offered to pay Shirkuh 30,000 dinars, a fraction of the sum he had promised Nur al-Din. Shirkuh rejected the offer and prepared to remain in Egypt until the agreed upon terms were met. Aware of the major threat presented by Shirkuh and his army, Shawar called on King Amalric for help. He proposed to pay him 1,000 dinars per day for the 27-day march to the Nile Delta. Amalric, for reasons that were likely both pecuniary and strategic, accepted the proposal. Hearing these developments, Shirkuh prepared to meet both Shawar’s and Amalric’s forces. He ordered Saladin to take a small force to Bilbais and prepare for a siege. Saladin stockpiled sufficient food, fodder, and defensive materials for the three-month period during which Crusaders and Egyptians besieged Shirkuh’s forces. The siege began in late July, but neither side attempted a major attack. There were skirmishes, but they checked each other. On the diplomatic front, they did attempt to play each other off on the other. Shawar even offered Shirkuh and his officers payments or even iqtas in his attempt to entice the Syrian force to vacate Egypt. To the north, to draw off Crusader forces, Nur al-Din attacked a large Frankish contingent led by Prince Bohemond of Antioch near Harim (Map 4) in the County of Tripoli. To augment his forces, Nur al-Din had called for a holy war against the Crusaders to which his nephew, Saif al-Din of Mosul, and others responded. In August, Nur al-Din and his enhanced army defeated a large body of Frankish knights, killing most of them and capturing Bohemond. In still another diversion, Nur al-Din attacked Banyas again in October 1164, this time capturing it. At the time, its ruler, Humphrey II of Toron, was in Egypt with Amalric. After three months of siege in and around Bilbais, all sides grew tired of the conflict. Of the three groups, Shirkuh’s men were perhaps in the greatest danger in that they faced a force superior in numbers to theirs. Amalric, though, needed to withdraw to attend to Crusader business in the north, especially freeing the captured Prince Bohemond. Negotiations ensued. Shirkuh accepted a 30,000-dinar payment and safe-passage for his army back to Damascus. Chroniclers report that the tough old Shirkuh was the

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last to vacate Bilbais, proudly carrying his mace. The Franks also marched north, but to Jerusalem. For a time, both armies marched along parallel routes. King Amalric eventually made his way further north where, after negotiations with Nur al-Din, he secured the release of Bohemond. From these series of events, patterns become clearer. The Crusaders, even though they possessed formidable military power, were vulnerable. Nur al-Din was able to pressure them in the north to help Shirkuh in Egypt, as the latter successfully executed his mission of reinstating Shawar and then extricating his troops from the siege by the duplicitous Shawar and the Crusaders. The Crusaders, under talented leadership in these years, found that they could not simultaneously attack and/or defend on many fronts. Shawar seemingly profited from the events of 1164. He regained the vizierate and successfully persuaded the foreign forces to leave. The very need to call on them for assistance, though, underlined the acute political and military weakness of Egypt. He had to call on both the Syrians under Nur al-Din and the Crusaders to secure his position. Shirkuh, having seen the material wealth of Egypt, but also the frailty of its essential institutions, wanted to return to claim the prize. He spent the next two years preparing for that venture and persuading Nur al-Din of its potential benefit to his growing empire. Saladin gained stature and experience. He had helped his uncle in substantive ways during the campaign, earning recognition for his growing abilities. Within months of his return, Nur al-Din made him shihna (police chief, a responsible position) of the city of Damascus. Having grown up in city, Saladin was particularly fond of its vibrant life as well as the opportunity to discuss religious issues with the ulama. While there is no written record, it is certain that he returned to the hunt and polo with his contemporaries and Nur al-Din himself.2 Sources for the first Egyptian expedition are: Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij alKurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyoub, vol. 1, 137–48; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 41–42; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 298–99, 305–307; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 129–33; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 6–19; 2

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SECOND MILITARY EXPEDITION TO EGYPT: 1166–1167 Shirkuh secured Nur al-Din’s permission for a second Egyptian expedition in 1166. The arguments for and against the project were similar to those of 1164. Egypt was vulnerable, but with great wealth. Nur al-Din would like to add Egypt to his empire, and deny it to the Crusaders. As always, though, he did not want to spread himself too thin. The Franks could always attack him in a number of places in the north. To press his case, Shirkuh, the crusty and wily general, added another element to the decision making. He circulated a statement by the Sunni caliph in Baghdad to the effect that the expedition was warranted because the Shia Fatimids were apostates and, thus, bringing Egypt back into the fold of true Islam was desirable. It appears that although Nur al-Din certainly focused on the realpolitick considerations, his decision was influenced by this religious declaration. The second expedition was a grander exercise than the first. The numbers are not certain, but it seems that Shirkuh led a force of about 10,000 mounted men, the bulk of whom were armed fighters, the balance archers. Shirkuh recruited most of them; Nur al-Din also contributed a regiment, reportedly another 2,000 men under his amirs. Shirkuh also selected Saladin to be part of his command, but this time at an elevated rank. Arab chroniclers report that he was reluctant to go to Egypt once again.3 This may have been the case, but also it may be after the fact propaganda, attempting to show Saladin’s modesty and humility. Shirkuh and his cavalry marched in early January 1167. Shawar, in Egypt, heard of the Syrian plan in 1166. Knowing that his military could not defend the country, especially since he was facing rebellious bedouin and Berber tribes south of Cairo, he once again called on the Crusaders, specifically King Amalric, for assistance. Amalric, in consultation with Frankish lords, decided to

Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 367–69; Gibb, Life of Saladin, p. 5; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 6–9; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 35–39; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 77–85. 3 For example, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 42.

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undertake the enterprise, again for monetary promises and strategic calculations. Amalric hoped to meet Shirkuh east of the Nile, but the Syrian forces reached Itfih (also Atfih) 40 miles south of Cairo (Map 2) and crossed the Nile at the end of January 1167 before the Crusaders arrived. Amalric camped between Fustat and Cairo. Meanwhile, Shirkuh and his men marched north along the opposite bank and camped in Giza. With the river between them, there was a temporary stalemate. The Franks were growing frustrated. Amalric threatened to return to Jerusalem. Shawar, still facing bedouin revolts, received a message from Shirkuh, suggesting an Egyptian-Syrian alliance against the Crusaders. Shawar and his family considered the proposal, but rejected it, presumably for fear of Shirkuh’s ambition to control the country. Shawar then returned to Amalric and they negotiated a lucrative agreement: 400,000 gold pieces (dinars) for the Crusaders, 200,000 up front and 200,000 at the successful completion of the mission. The mission was simply to destroy Shirkuh’s forces or expel them from the country. Knowing Shawar’s unreliability and wanting to ensure that the payments would actually be made, Amalric requested an audience with Caliph al-Adid to confirm the agreement. What ensued is one of the more colorful moments in the interaction between East and West. William of Tyre, a bishop and one of the most famous Crusader chroniclers, recorded the story in intricate detail. Amalric sent Hugh, Lord of Caesaria (a fortified port on the Mediterranean) and Geoffrey, a Templar knight, presumably with Arabic skills. The Crusader mission was … accompanied by Shawar. A large troop, armed with broadswords, marched in front of them with considerable fanfare. They were guided along a straight covered passage; at each doorway, they were received by a company of armed Ethiopians who saluted the Crusaders and the vizier. After passing the first and second guard, they were introduced into a vast space where the sun shined [a large courtyard]. They walked along a gallery of marble columns embossed with gold and sculpted designs. The floor was mosaic. Everything in the gallery displayed royal power. The elegance of the material and artisanship involuntarily drew the gaze of those who passed…

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One found marble basins of limpid water, gazelles of many varieties, and birds unknown to [the West]… Still further, guided by the chief eunuch, they found buildings still more elegant than the ones they had passed…. They saw an astonishing variety of quadrupeds, the like of which could only be imagined in dreams or poetry…. The West does not have anything to equal these sights. After passing many torturous corridors… they finally arrived at the palace itself where the greatest number of armed men were present… proclaiming the incomparable glory of the caliph…. Shawar then prostrated himself three times and presented the sword suspended from his neck. At once, with great rapidity, a curtain woven in gold and decorated with precious stone was drawn. There, the caliph, exposing his face to all, appeared, seated on a gold throne, dressed in robes more magnificent than those of [European] kings and surrounded by his personal eunuchs and domestic servants.4

Shawar then approached the caliph, explained the purpose of the visit, and gave details of the already negotiated EgyptianCrusader agreement. The caliph readily gave his agreement. Hugh asked that the alliance be confirmed by a handshake. The caliph’s entourage reacted “…with horror, as if the request was unimaginable in all the centuries.” After persuasion, especially on the part of the vizier, the caliph, with great repugnance, extended his gloved hand. Hugh responded that unless he shook the caliph’s bare hand, he “‘… would have to think that you [the caliph] had other thoughts, and less sincerity than I need.’” The caliph extended his bare hand to Hugh. The caliph then reaffirmed the agreement, saying the accords would be honored, “in good faith, and without fraud, nor bad intention.”5 (Italics in the original.) Thus ended the unique encounter. The Franks were duly impressed, as per Egyptian design, with the Fatimid palace, the opulence, and the multitude of personnel serving the caliph.

4 5

Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 33–37. Ibid., 37.

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Moreover, Shawar and al-Adid received the support that, they thought, was absolutely necessary to keep them in power. Shirkuh, at the same time, was contemplating his strategy. Thinking of future steps, he sent envoys to the port city of Alexandria to ascertain if its leaders were amenable to joining him in his confrontation with Shawar, especially in light of his alliance with the Crusaders. Alexandrians, many of whom were disgruntled with Shawar’s government, responded positively. Back in Giza, Shirkuh hoped and intended that the presence of his forces with their banners in the wind would have an impact on the Cairene population and undermine support for Shawar. While the Egyptians certainly took note of the Syrian force, it did not give them sufficient cause to rise up against the vizier. Thus, we have to ask: was Shirkuh in a tenable position? Had he overreached in Egypt where Shawar and Amalric had joined forces against him? We do not know what the inner thinking of his command was, but we can follow the ever-aggressive general’s actions. Immediately after the Egyptian-Crusader agreement was finalized, the Franks started building a bridge across the Nile. They reached an island in the middle of the river, but did not complete it. Why is not clear. Presumably, the Franks realized that troops could go both ways across a bridge. During the same period, additional Crusader barons and their knights reached Cairo and reinforced the Frankish army, allowing Amalric to conduct military maneuvers on both sides of the Nile. Shirkuh, realizing the threat presented by the Crusaders’ newly augmented forces, precipitously assembled his baggage, men, and horses and headed south on the west side of the Nile. The Franks and Egyptians then faced a challenge. They had considerable territory to guard and they were not able to match Shirkuh’s mobility. The allies left Hugh of Ibelin and Shawar’s son, al-Kamil, to secure the unfinished bridge, now an albatross. A joint Crusader-Egyptian force-marched up the east side of the river, to prevent the Syrians from crossing. Amalric and Shawar pursued Shirkuh along the west side of the river. To keep up with Shirkuh, they left their foot soldiers (including many archers) behind and increased their speed astride horses and camels. Shirkuh stopped at Dilga (also Dilja), 185 miles south of Cairo, in mid March 1167. His men sacked the town and revictualled. Shirkuh then made the decision to turn and fight,

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specifically at a location called Babain. The Arabic word means two gates, which, in this case, refers to two specific hills with a limited and precipitous expanse between them. The various Arabic and Crusader accounts of the ensuing battle conflict with, or at least, do not fully corroborate, each other. Nevertheless, it appears that Shirkuh assigned the center to Saladin and one of the flanks to himself. Their forces were composed of Turkish and Kurdish cavalry as well as Arabs and bedouin on horses and camels. Shirkuh instructed Saladin to withdraw up the slope between the hills when the allies charged, to allow him to attack from the flank. In this plan, we should remember that Shirkuh (and Saladin) had numerous mounted archers. Amalric and Shawar had only mounted troops, some mailed, some lightly armored. His foot soldiers and most of the archers were 150 miles to the north. On March 19, the sides engaged. The Frankish knights and horsemen charged the center, their preferred battle tactic. As per plan, Saladin pulled his men back beyond the two hills. Charging up the sandy rise, the attackers found the footing difficult for their large steeds. Shirkuh assaulted the allies from the right, especially where the less capable Egyptians formations were. As the Frankish charge up the hill dissipated, Saladin turned his men around and advanced on the allies. The battle, as are many battles during the fog of war, was confused and both sides suffered losses. A balanced comment comes from a contemporary report by Sawirus ibn alMuqaffa: “… many people of [Shirkuh’s] army lay slain and a great multitude of the Franks and the Muslims [Egyptians] also were slain and each of them captured from the other prisoners.”6 In sum, it appears that Shirkuh came out on top despite losing men, horses, and supplies. Saladin, in his first major battle, acquitted himself well. Using classic Turkish tactics, his cavalry executed the feigned retreat according to design, allowing Shirkuh to inflict great damage on the allies. After his maneuver, Saladin rejoined the confusing battle. Amalric suffered the loss of many knights and one of his commanders, Hugh of Caesaria, who had

6

Cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 16.

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earlier visited Caliph al-Adid, was captured.7 Despite their respective losses, both sides were still in the field and would fight again. Amalric and Shawar headed back to Cairo. Shirkuh marched directly to Alexandria, arriving in late March or early April. Responding to Shirkuh’s earlier approach, Alexandrian leaders, including senior members of Shawar’s government, welcomed him. They gave him funds and arms from government coffers and stores; his troops and horses freshened themselves for the next stage of the war. Surprised, the allies responded. Amalric brought in more knights, soldiers, and supplies. Shawar and Amalric blockaded Alexandria by land, river, and sea, calculating that the city could not hold out without supplies. Within a month of his arrival in the port city, Shirkuh took a bold, if not audacious and risky, decision: he split his expeditionary force. He left the young, but increasingly proven Saladin with 1,000 men to defend Alexandria. Shirkuh marched south with a much larger force. He eventually reached Qus, 425 miles from Cairo, where he exacted funds, but more importantly recruited local bedouin mounted men from the tribes that had earlier risen against Shawar. In May 1167, the allies, escalating the confrontation at Alexandria, initiated a major siege. Particularly energized, Shawar wanted to take vengeance against the Egyptian city and the officials who had betrayed him. The allies quickly assembled catapults (also called mangonels) with which they bombarded the increasingly terrified city. They also built a tall battle tower from which they could rain arrows on the Alexandrians. The pressure continued for almost three months. Refugees escaped and orchards were destroyed. Interestingly, the chroniclers do not describe a direct assault that might have breached the city walls. To the north in the County of Tripoli, Nur al-Din led raids, once again to draw the attention of the Franks, but with little effect.

The descriptions of this battle vary greatly. My reading agrees with Steven Runciman, one of the foremost historians of the Crusades. Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 74–76. 7

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The pressure against Alexandria increased sufficiently that Saladin felt compelled to send a missive to Shirkuh, asking for relief. In response, Shirkuh led his reinforced army to the vicinity of Cairo, which, with the allies concentrated against Alexandria, he could have attacked. However, he chose the diplomatic course. He sent a message to Shawar and Amalric, proposing that all forces stand down—and the Syrians would return to Damascus. He initially asked Hugh of Caesaria, his captive, to deliver the proposal, but he declined fearing his side would consider this action selfserving. Another Crusader, Arnulf of Turbessel, undertook the task. In mid August, the terms offered and accepted were: the Syrians would be allowed safe-passage home and Shirkuh would be given a 50,000-dinar payment. The Franks would leave Egypt with their payment. This tripartite accord, in turn, meant that Shawar would again be rid of foreign forces. Saladin made two requests to which all sides agreed. His injured men would be given transport by Frankish ships to the Mediterranean coast, allowing them to avoid the arduous overland journey. Once landed, they would be permitted to return to their homes. In addition, the citizens of Alexandria would receive amnesty for their actions during the war. Neither agreement was initially honored. The injured Syrian soldiers were indeed transported to Crusader ports, but they were forced to join labor crews on Frankish farms until Nur al-Din secured their release. Shawar did exact vengeance on the Alexandrians. Saladin appealed to Amalric, asking him to bring pressure on Shawar to cease this retribution. Saladin’s intervention proved to be successful. As the siege wound down and negotiations were taking place, Saladin spent time in the Frankish camp, some say as an honored hostage. Whatever the case, he interacted with the Crusaders, shared meals with them, learned more about their weapons, and reportedly made friends, especially with Humphrey of Toron. Despite the terms of the agreement Amalric had just signed with Shawar, Amalric wanted more from the Egyptians. Knowing the Franks had decidedly superior force, the vizier acceded to the new demands. He promised Amalric a 100,000-dinar annual tribute, gave him the right to leave a small garrison in Cairo, and agreed that his knights would guard the city’s principal gate. This military presence would help insure that the annual tribute was paid.

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Each protagonist for his own reasons decided on peace, albeit, a temporary peace. Shirkuh calculated that he could not win at this time, but he could return and fight another day. In addition, having exacted revenue from some towns and having received another payment from Shawar, the expedition was not a financial burden on the Syrians. Shawar was pleased to rid himself of the Syrians, but also the Franks whom he did not want to remain in Egypt. Amalric may have wanted to pursue the fight, but certainly realized that he could not do so if Shawar was ready to lay down arms and perhaps even join Shirkuh if the Crusaders refused to accept the terms. Developments in his kingdom that required his presence also contributed to his decision to withdraw. As is evident, though, he profited greatly from the venture. Back in Damascus on September 5, 1167, Shirkuh and Saladin resumed their lives. Nur al-Din posted Shirkuh to Homs, an important frontier town where he held iqtas. However, he was still close enough to Damascus and Aleppo so that he could weigh in on policy discussions. It was obvious that Shirkuh still wanted to return to Egypt, but Nur al-Din remained unconvinced. While he must have been pleased that Shirkuh denied Egypt to the Crusaders once again, he certainly worried that if Shirkuh had totally succeeded in the country, he would have had resources that rivaled his own. Thus, sending Shirkuh to Homs from which he could lead battles against the Crusaders in the north would absorb his attention and energies, at least for a temporary period.8 As for Saladin, Nur al-Din awarded him two iqtas in and around Aleppo. At the age of 29, he had many accomplishments; he had participated in two military expeditions and exercised highlevel troop command. At Babain, his combat performance was crucial to the victory. Alexandria had been an even greater challenge. While his uncle led a large force in the Egyptian desert, Sources for the second Egyptian expedition are: Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij al-Kurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyoub, vol. 1, 149–52; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 42–43; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 327–28; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 28–65; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 371–76; Gibb, Life of Saladin, p. 5; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 10–19; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 39–45; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 85–91; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 45–46. 8

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with only 1,000 men he successfully held out against the combined forces of Amalric and Shawar. On the diplomatic front, he negotiated and associated with his adversaries, the Crusaders. Back home, chroniclers tell us that he settled down, enjoyed life in Damascus, including religious discussions with qadis and ulama, and had no desire to join in another foray.9

THIRD MILITARY EXPEDITION TO EGYPT: 1168–1169 Shirkuh’s third expeditionary force to Egypt under the flag of Nur al-Din was initiated, in the immediate sense, in response to one more Crusader invasion of Egypt. Other basic strategic and mercantile factors, though, were still very much in play, namely, Egyptian political and military weakness and Nur al-Din’s desire to command Egyptian wealth, enlarge his empire, and deny the Egyptian prize to the Franks. While the two previous confrontations between Shirkuh and Amalric had not been decisive in their conclusion, the third would result in a sea change in Egypt and eventually and ultimately in the Middle East as well as in the Franks’ fortunes in the region. During the summer of 1168, Amalric received a delegation from the Byzantine Emperor Manuel. These envoys informed the Crusader king that Manuel had concluded that Egypt had fallen in stature and its leaders were weak men. Thus, it was incumbent on the Byzantines and the Crusaders to keep Egypt out of their adversaries’ hands. Hence, he proposed a joint invasion that, he thought, would not take great effort and, after its success, a division of Egypt and its resources between them. Amalric sent William of Tyre, the future great historian of the Crusades, to Constantinople to negotiate an agreement to that end. In the meantime, the ever-impetuous Amalric discussed the idea of a new attack on Egypt with his colleagues. Count William IV of Nevers and his strong body of knights had just arrived in the Holy Land from France. As was frequently the case, the newcomers argued vociferously for the project. The Hospitalers, an order of fighting monks based in Jerusalem, also strongly agreed. The Templars, 9

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 42.

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another religious order of knights, weighed in against the proposal. Apparently, their substantial interests in Italian-Egyptian trade were more important to them than Amalric’s imperial designs. In any event, long before William of Tyre returned from Constantinople with a negotiated agreement, the Franks took the decision to invade Egypt once again, most likely with the intent of staying for the long term. They started making their preparations in late September or early October, and marched from Ascalon on October 20, 1168, arriving in front of Bilbais, the scene of past battles, in early November. Not anticipating the Frankish invasion, Shawar only became aware of it when the knights left Ascalon. He seemingly was counting on the 1167 agreement with Amalric by which Shawar was to pay the king an annual tribute in exchange for protection of Egypt. He sent embassies to the marching Amalric, asking him to withdraw and restating Egypt’s intent to honor its end of the accord. The response from Amalric was equivocal. Realizing that the year-old agreement was no longer valid, Shawar decided to make a stand at Bilbais. The Crusaders attacked on November 4 and the city fell the following day. The Franks then ran amok. They indiscriminately slaughtered men, women, and children and captured thousands, reportedly 10,000, whom they enslaved and later sold in the markets around Jerusalem. Many of the victims and captives were from the large Coptic Christian community who lived along side their Muslim neighbors in Bilbais. Amalric also captured Tayy, Shawar’s son, who had been leading the defense of the city. He would be ransomed in the coming weeks. Lastly, there were rumors that the Crusaders planned to expel the region’s population and bring farmers from the Crusader states to settle in the fertile lands. Feeding this thinking and fear, a Frankish fleet came up the Nile, burning towns—Tanis (also Tinnis), Ashmun, and Minat Amr—and taking prisoners and slaves. Over the years, the Egyptians had lost no love for Shawar and his rule and, conceivably, they might have accepted Amalric as an alternative. However, due to the population’s revulsion at the bloody massacre in Bilbais and the fear these actions invoked, Shawar was able to rally the Egyptians who then prepared to defend Cairo. Amalric took a few days in Bilbais to reorganize his raucous troops after which he led them towards Cairo, camping at Birkat al-

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Habash between the city and Fustat on November 13. Shawar, remembering how easily he captured Fustat in 1164 in his struggle with Dirgham, decided to deny it to the Franks by destroying it. On November 12, his men, using 20,000 flasks of naphtha and 10,000 torches, burned the city. The town’s citizens fled to Cairo, making the already populous Egyptian capital very crowded. Shawar indeed succeeded in preventing the Crusaders from taking Fustat, but at the price of incinerating its citizens’ homes and businesses. For the next four weeks, Amalric maneuvered, shifted the site of his main camp a number of times, and negotiated with Shawar. Back in Syria, Nur al-Din’s men informed him in mid October 1168 that Amalric was gathering his forces to march on Egypt. He immediately ordered Shirkuh to assemble a third mounted expeditionary army.10 In the next six weeks, Shirkuh recruited a force of about 5,000 horsemen and Nur al-Din contributed another 2,000 commanded by amirs loyal to him. The actual numbers may have been different, but they do show us their order of magnitude. Nur al-Din had earlier given Shirkuh 200,000 dinars to help finance the expedition. As the army prepared to ride to Egypt, Nur al-Din gave each mounted trooper a 20-dinar bonus, a show of his legendary generosity. As part of his organization, Shirkuh again selected his nephew Saladin, this time as his deputy. Some Arab chroniclers report that Saladin was unwilling to go. He, after the fact, told Ibn Shaddad: “‘I was the most unwilling of men to leave [for Egypt] on this occasion. It was not my choice that I left with my uncle.’”11 Again, this reporting may be a reflection of his friends and admirers desire to project Saladin’s aura of modesty and humility, not ambition. Be that as it may, this claim reminds one of the famous Shakespeare Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 23–24. Of all the modern historians who have written about Saladin, Lyons and Jackson are the only ones who make this observation. Their conclusion is drawn from their reading of both Western and Eastern texts. Other historians write that Nur al-Din did not prepare to send a force to Egypt until after he received appeals from Shawar and al-Adid. 11 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 43. 10

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line in Hamlet: “Methinks [he] doth protest too much.” Saladin enjoyed two iqtas bestowed on him by Nur al-Din and for which he owed him military service. As a young, but accomplished officer, it would be difficult to imagine him questioning or rejecting Nur alDin’s orders. Nur al-Din, on the other hand, had additional calculations. He certainly admired Shirkuh’s military sagacity, but he wanted this talent complemented by executive and political skills that Nur al-Din recognized in Saladin. In this third expedition, while a written record does not exist, it is likely that Nur al-Din’s intention was for the Syrian forces to remain in Egypt, denying it to the Franks and allowing Nur al-Din to bring it and its wealth into his empire. Concern that Shirkuh might strike out on his own must have been on his mind, but this consideration apparently held less weight than the threat of the Amalric taking and owning Egypt. Interestingly, Nur al-Din was looking in all directions. To the east at Qalat al-Jabar on the Euphrates River, he was facing a challenge from some bedouin tribes, but also an opportunity made possible by the death of Zain al-Din, a leader who controlled towns and fortresses. In late October, while Shirkuh and Saladin gathered men, horses, camels, arms, and other supplies, he led his own troops to Qalat al-Jabar, arriving on October 24. His campaign in the East may have given the Franks a false sense of security as they prepared to advance on Egypt, to wit, the Syrians were occupied elsewhere. As the Syrians were executing their own agendas, Vizier Shawar and Caliph al-Adid, independently of each other, wrote to Nur alDin during November, appealing for help. In exchange for the requested military assistance, the caliph committed one third of the revenues from Egyptian lands and iqtas for Nur al-Din’s amirs and generals. The chroniclers did not record Shawar’s offer. The fact that the entreaties were separate arises from the very different motivations of the two men. Shawar simply wanted to save his office. Al-Adid, on the other hand, focused on securing his palace and Fatimid rule in Egypt. The Fatimids had appointed Sunni Muslim viziers in the past and al-Adid, to save his position, would certainly do so again. Both the vizier and the caliph did agree that they wanted the Franks to quit the country. In early December, Nur al-Din returned from his foray to Qalat al-Jabar and immediately

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visited Shirkuh, Saladin, and their army at Ras al-Ma, south of Damascus. On December 14, 1168, Shirkuh marched to Egypt. In the interim, Amalric remained on the move in the Cairo region. He left Birkat al-Habash, perhaps because of the smoke from Fustat or, perhaps, to pose a more direct threat to the capital from Bab al-Barqiya, east of Cairo. In the third week of November, he moved to al-Matariya, seven miles north of Cairo. In late November, he shifted his camp again, this time to Saryaqus on the road to Bilbais, 20 miles from the capital. During these moves, Shawar and Amalric negotiated terms of withdrawal. The payment was to be substantial: figures vary from 400,000 to 2,000,000 dinars. Regardless of what the actual amount was, Shawar did pay Amalric 100,000 dinars for the release of his son, Tayy, and said he would need more time to gather the larger sum. In early December, Amalric heard that Shirkuh with a great Turkish army was readying itself to push into Egypt. Amalric fell back from Saryaqus to Bilbais, which he refortified. In the fourth week of December, Amalric led his knights in search of Shirkuh, but he failed to intercept him. In the first week of January 1169, the ever-mobile Shirkuh reached Cairo, unimpeded. He camped at alLuq. Shawar, despite his supposed agreement with Amalric, approached him and proposed a joint Egyptian-Syrian attack on the Crusaders. Shirkuh rejected the mercurial vizier’s proposal, noting that Amalric now had a direct line of retreat to his home base. Amalric, realizing he was not in a position to win or gain additional spoils, began his withdrawal to Jerusalem on or about January 2, 1169, but not without the 12,000 slaves and prisoners his knights had captured in Bilbais and other small towns. On January 8, 1169, after waiting a few days to make certain the Franks were truly vacating Egypt, Shirkuh entered Cairo. The Cairenes and displaced Fustatians received him as a savior with great fanfare. On January 10, Shirkuh had an audience with Caliph al-Adid where he was presented with sumptuous gifts and recognized for his great service to the independence of Muslim Egypt.12 Sources for the third Egyptian expedition are: Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij alKurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyoub, vol. 1, 155–60; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 43–44; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 337–42; Abu 12

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SALADIN’S RISE TO POWER: 1169 Shawar’s career was fraught with challenges. He claimed the vizierate by killing his predecessor in 1163, only to be replaced in another bloody coup. Nur al-Din and Shirkuh helped him reclaim the post in 1164, but he turned on his rescuers in alliance with the Franks in the same year. After less than two years of relative quiet, Shirkuh’s 1167 invasion challenged him. Once again, he allied with Amalric. His erstwhile allies, the Franks, though turned on him and invaded in 1168. Shawar shifted alliances again. He called on Nur al-Din for assistance, only to find his former Frankish allies fleeing the country and Shirkuh, with a large and able army, firmly within it. Shirkuh’s visit with al-Adid must have troubled him, but he maintained appearances. With high vizierial fanfare, he visited Shirkuh each day at his camp in al-Luq. This colorful show could not hide the reality of his military weakness. Although the number of men under his command was greater than those at Shirkuh’s disposal, the Egyptian army was poorly led and inadequately trained and organized. While Egyptian soldiers did serve in his military, the backbone in and around Cairo was made up of Armenian archers and Nubian regiments. In addition, it should be recalled that only four years earlier the then Vizier Dirgham slaughtered most of Egypt’s senior officers. Thus, given this imbalance of forces, the weak Shawar was certainly concerned about his future. In his ornate and sumptuous palace, al-Adid approached the presence of Shirkuh from an entirely different perspective. He and his entourage were tired of Shawar’s endless wars and their drain on Egyptian treasure. Although he may have contemplated accepting a major Crusader presence in the country, albeit one that, he hoped, was not intending to dethrone him, he was certainly more comfortable with a Muslim as vizier. Preferring an Egyptian and a Shia, he was ready to accept a Sunni Muslim. Part of his Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 154–55; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 74–82; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 380–83; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 5–6; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 20–25; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 45–54; LanePoole, Saladin, 92–96; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 46.

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calculations was that he enjoyed the wealth of Egypt, which he could bring to bear in a political bargain. Iqtas and revenues in the hands of the Syrians, he thought, would make them self-interested in the new status quo and be prepared to defend it. Shawar was expendable. The security of the Fatimid throne was paramount. In the middle of January 1169, the Syrians planned their next move. In these days, Shirkuh’s only legitimate reason for still being in Egypt was al-Adid’s and Shawar’s request for assistance against the Franks. In his own mind, Shirkuh may have been willing to remain in Egypt as military commander of all forces in the country and leave Shawar in his post. The record is not clear on the point. However, it is clear that his senior officers, including Saladin, made other calculations. They realized that the Syrians had no true authority as long as Shawar was vizier. Accordingly, Saladin, Izz alDin Jurdik—a high-ranking officer from Nur al-Din’s army who had joined Shirkuh’s expedition at Nur al-Din’s behest—and others took the decision to eliminate Shawar and so informed Shirkuh.13 On January 18, 1169 Vizier Shawar, as was his daily practice, rode to Shirkuh’s encampment. A Syrian troop led by Saladin isolated him from his guard, unhorsed him, and imprisoned the hapless vizier in a tent to await Shirkuh’s return. Ibn Shaddad claims that “… only the Sultan [Saladin] himself was bold enough to seize him from amongst his retinue.” Others record that he and Izz al-Din Jurdik did so together.14 Learning of Shawar’s capture, the caliph’s men immediately visited the camp and demanded Shawar’s head. The palace eunuch even produced a warrant demanding his execution. Before Shirkuh could behold Shawar in Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 157. Abu Shama is clear on this point. Ibn Shaddad does not definitively state that Shirkuh knew of the plot, but he does write: “While Shawar survived, they knew that there was no way they could take over the land. Therefore they concerted their plan to seize him if he visited them.” Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 44. Yaacov Lev argues that Shirkuh was not informed. Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 46–47. As noted above, the usually reliable Abu Shama states otherwise and I accept his account. 14 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 44; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 157; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 25. 13

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the tent jail, the Egyptians obtained what they wanted. His severed head, as Fatimid tradition required, was dispatched to the caliph’s palace. The caliph, following the practice of the last few decades, bestowed the vizierial robe on Shirkuh and gave him the titles of vizier and victorious king, the very rubric accorded his predecessors. At once, Shirkuh’s and the Syrians’ roles in Egypt were transformed. Shirkuh, no longer head of an expeditionary force, was the legitimate ruler of Egypt and commander of its army. However, he did have two masters: the Fatimid caliph in Cairo and Nur al-Din in Aleppo. On a practical level, he immediately took actions. In order to divert the attention of a potentially angry mob, he allowed the Cairenes to ransack the vizier’s palace. He also gave iqtas to Syrian amirs, officers, and soldiers, but took care to honor the iqtas of still serving Egyptian officers. In his new office, he left day-to-day affairs to his deputy, Saladin. He personally looked after the welfare of the refugees from Fustat, providing resources for them to repair or rebuild their homes and businesses. He seemed to enjoy his frequent visits with al-Adid. Otherwise, he relaxed and savored the luxuries of Cairo. Saladin, on the other hand, busied himself with running the business of state. Seemingly, Nur al-Din had intended this division of labor: Shirkuh as the warrior and Saladin as the executive. Shirkuh was comfortable with the arrangement, assured of Saladin’s competency and loyalty. Nur al-Din, on hearing of the great Syrian feat, spread the news throughout his realm; towns were decorated in celebration. Some early observers write that he was not pleased by the turn of events, that he did not want Shirkuh to assume the high post. Perhaps, but Nur al-Din certainly preferred the new configuration to Frankish control of Egypt or the Crusaders’ seemingly constant forays into the country. Also, the record shows that Izz al-Din Jurdik, a Nur al-Din loyalist, along with Saladin and others made the determination to relieve Shawar of the vizierate and allow Shirkuh to be elevated to that position. If Izz al-Din thought this was not what Nur al-Din wanted or intended, he would certainly not have participated in the decision, nor taken the actions he did. As a last note, Caliph al-Adid informed Nur al-Din that now that Shirkuh was vizier, Shirkuh was responsible for Egypt’s wartime

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financial commitments to Nur al-Din. With Shirkuh’s elevation, he, the caliph, was relieved of that responsibility. Shirkuh was known for his love of food, especially great quantities of rich meat. On occasion, his gluttonous appetite made him ill. On March 23, 1169, he did not survive a hearty banquet. In the event of his demise, he had bequeathed the Asadiya (the Asad regiment, the name of which is derived from his given name, Asad al-Din) of 500 armed and mounted mamlukes, his camels and horses, and his considerable treasure to his successor, whoever he might be. The passing of this short, ruddy, burly, and crusty military man left a major void in Nur al-Din’s leadership cadre and equally in Egypt, which once more lost its vizier. Abruptly, the Syrian force in Egypt was leaderless. The amirs and officers, knowing they could not wait for Nur al-Din to appoint a new head of the force, decided to elect one of their own. A number of candidates rose to the top: Shihab al-Din al-Harimi, the maternal uncle of Saladin and a Kurd; Ain al-Daula, a Nur alDin loyalist with perhaps the largest number of men, but not the majority of the soldiers, and a Turk; Saif al-Din al-Mashtub and Qutb al-Din Khusrau, both Kurds; and Saladin himself. In addition, Shirkuh’s elite Asadiya cannot be forgotten in this overall equation. Its 500 mamlukes focused on selecting a leader who would look after their interests. There is no record of the inner deliberations. Apparently, Shihab al-Din and Ain al-Daula balanced each other. The two other Kurds, if they could not grab the baton, certainly favored another Kurd. Thus, the group turned to Saladin, perhaps a compromise candidate, but more importantly an aspirant who brought accomplishments and proven talents in military leadership and political shrewdness. Moreover, as his uncle was enjoying the good life in Cairo, Saladin had been the de facto vizier for the past two months. As noted earlier, blood relationships always played a very important role with respect to loyalty as well as in the selection of leaders. In this regard, Saladin, as the son of Shirkuh’s brother, was Shirkuh’s closest relative in Cairo. Some say Shirkuh had designated Saladin as his successor, which, if true, would have had weight in the deliberations, but it would not have been decisive by itself. In any event, the Syrians, at the end of the process, chose Saladin as their new military leader on March 26, 1169. Ain al-Daula was not pleased with the decision. Declaring he would not serve Saladin, he and his regiment left for Damascus.

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In theory, Caliph al-Adid appointed his vizier. The reality though was that the superior army, the Syrian forces, had made its decision. The caliph accepted this on the same day and invested Saladin with the title of vizier and victorious king, just as he had on Shirkuh. He also presented him the vizierial regalia “… a white turban stitched with gold, a robe with a scarlet-lined tunic, a jewelencrusted sword, a chestnut mare with a saddle and bridle adorned with engraved gold and encrusted pearls, and many precious objects.”15 Qadi al-Fadil, a friend and advisor to Saladin, but at the instruction of al-Adid, composed the diploma of investiture: “As for the jihad, thou art the nursling of its milk and the child of its bosom. Gird up therefore the shanks of spears to meet it and to plunge on its service into the sea of swordpoints; … until God give the victory which the Commander of the Faithful hopeth to be laid up for thy days and to be witness for thee when thou shalt stand in His presence.”16 The diploma’s focus on holy war against the Crusaders is notable and a harbinger of how Saladin’s leadership would unfold. At the age of 31, Saladin was the master of Egypt. However, like Shirkuh, he similarly served two masters: Nur al-Din and alAdid.17

SALADIN, THE MAN With his rise to power, more becomes known about Saladin, the man, his thinking, his worldview, his leadership style, and his personal characteristics. Earlier, we reviewed his role models: his father, the successful executive with diplomatic skills; his uncle, the Maalouf, Crusades through Arab Eyes, 170. A number of chroniclers record this diploma. See: Gibb, Life of Saladin, 6–7. 17 The sources for Saladin’s rise to power are: Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij alKurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyoub, vol. 1, 160–74; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 44–45; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 337–45; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 156–74; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 82–84; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 383–84; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 6–7; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 25–29; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 54–59; LanePoole, Saladin, 96–99; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 46–49. 15 16

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warrior; and Nur al-Din, the empire builder and proponent of holy war against the Crusaders. In addition, we learned about his first achievements as a battle tested officer and leader of men, as shihna in Damascus, and as deputy to his uncle in Cairo. With respect to the latter, according to one of the Arab chroniclers, “… he dealt with and settled daily affairs, since the responsibility for ordering and forbidding was entrusted to him because of the level of his competence, his knowledge and his good judgment and governance…”18 Saladin had a worldview. As a religious man with deep faith in Islam, the unity of the Muslim world, centered on the legitimate direction of and submission to the caliph in Baghdad, was paramount. The divided and fractious nature of the Islamic states had greatly weakened the Muslim people. Aside from violating an ideal in Islam, this condition had allowed the Crusaders to conquer Muslim lands, including Jerusalem, and establish their states. Consistent with this view of the conditions in the Middle East as well as his ideals, Saladin frequently restated his goals in his dispatches to Baghdad. “‘These three aims—jihad on the path to God, the restraining of actions hurtful to the servants of God, and the submission to the caliph of God—are the sole desire of this servitor from the territories in his occupation and his sole gain from the worldly power granted to him. God is his witness that … he has no desire beyond these things and no aim beyond this aim.’”19 Disconcerting to Saladin was the skepticism, at times, with which his message was received. The Baghdad court, while cooperating with Saladin as he expanded his realm was, at least in part, wary of his ambition. Throughout Saladin’s career, we repeatedly observe these themes: holy war against the Franks; a focus on fair governance as he always admonished his deputies to suppress abuse and be “not hurtful”; and submission to the caliph. With respect to the latter, Saladin sought a diploma from the caliph before he took a major action, or, on occasion, very soon thereafter. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 44. Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 48. The translation of the quote is from: Gibb, Civilization of Islam, 100. 18 19

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Another Saladin principle was his “sincerity and absolute loyalty to his word.”20 He honored his word and expected others to honor theirs. In his treaties with Crusaders, he always respected their terms. When Franks blatantly broke agreements, as did Reynald of Châtillon, the Crusader lord of Karak in Transjordan, he dealt harshly with them. As will become apparent, he was loyal to his suzerain, Nur al-Din, but that loyalty would be tested. To realize all of these principles, Saladin employed a highly developed strategic sense of how to approach and deal with his growing empire and its neighbors. He constantly had to weigh and balance the political, military, economic, and social forces at play, first in Egypt, but later throughout his realm in the Middle East and North Africa. Was Saladin ambitious? Arab writers of the time do not address this question. They preferred to emphasize his modesty, humility, and humanity. Society, it appears, did not look favorably on ambition or, at the least, it did not publicly say so. Accordingly, his friends portrayed him in adulatory terms that were current in the medieval Muslim world. While it is conceivable that his sense of duty to family required him to join Shirkuh on three expeditions to Egypt, he certainly did not have to stand for vizier of Egypt. Moreover, when selected, he energetically took up rule. Likewise, his aims of holy war, good governance, and loyalty to the caliph in Baghdad are not contradicted by being ambitious. Indeed, to fulfill them required ambition. Saladin could be both magnanimous and ruthless. He treated defeated but honorable opponents generously as was famously demonstrated after he captured Jerusalem. However, when rebels threatened his regime or adversaries were ignoble, he did not hesitate to have them dispatched. In managing the affairs of state, Saladin readily relied on others. He appointed his father, brothers, and uncles to high positions such as treasurer, governor, and general, awarding them lucrative iqtas. This practice was common to Middle East leaders in medieval times and Saladin was no exception. He relied on his military to expand his lands. In addition, officials in his court, such 20

Gibb, Civilization of Islam, 101.

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as Baha al-Din Ibn Shaddad, Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, and Qadi alFadil, helped him manage his administration and his everimportant communications with the caliph in Baghdad, amirs and governors in the lands under his suzerainty, as well as external powers, both friends and enemies. Unlike most of the leaders in the Middle East at the time, Saladin was not Turkish. He was a Kurd. Accordingly, Kurdish amirs and tribal leaders were accorded more positions and benefits than they had enjoyed under Turkish leaders. Some Turkish amirs and officers, especially those loyal to the house of Nur al-Din, were critical of this advancing Kurd, considering him a bounder. While Saladin certainly did not deny his ethnicity, his identity was much more as a Muslim as is apparent from his worldview and his fundamental aims. Three of his close associates recorded in their chronicles what they consider to be Saladin’s attributes. The men were perhaps excessively plauditory, but it is worth recording their observations to give a perspective on the ideals valued by society at the time as well as a perspective on what Saladin was like as a person.21 x Piety. He assiduously followed the five pillars of Islam. Planning to perform the hajj to Mecca, he died before he could make the journey. x Justice. Each Monday and Thursday in the presence of qadis and ulama, he meted out justice to those who appeared before him, reportedly, in fairness. x Generosity. In demonstration of this attribute, the Arab chroniclers all site the fact that when de died, he did not have any personal treasure or property. To be accurate, though, he did have the resources of a vast empire while he lived. x Courage and steadfastness. Throughout his life, by his actions and deeds, he consistently focused on “…his vindication of Islam against both its enemies and its

This listing may be found in a number of works. Here I rely on: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 17–38; Gibb, Civilization of Islam, 99. 21

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x

x

22

professed adherents.”22 He demonstrated this both in battle and in negotiation. Zeal in holy war. Some complained that in his first years he incorrectly focused on expanding his empire in Muslim lands. However, as he started to fulfill his vision of a more united Islam, he turned his attention and energy to holy war, which, his friends claimed, vindicated him. With additional assets gained from an enlarged realm, a unity under his command, he was to challenge successfully the Crusaders. Forbearance and clemency. An exemplary and colorful anecdote reads as follows: After a long day on horseback, “[a]n old mamluke, much respected by [Saladin], approached and presented him with a petition on behalf of one of the warriors. Saladin said, ‘I am tired now. Keep it for awhile.’ Taking no notice, he thrust the petition close to Saladin’s dear face and opened it so he could read it. His eye fell on the name written at the head of the petition and recognized it. ‘A worthy man,’ he said. The mamluke said, ‘Will the lord endorse his petition?’ to which the sultan [Saladin] answered, ‘I do not have my pen-box to hand at the moment.’ Saladin was sitting at the entrance of his tent, so placed that no-one could enter. The pen-box was by the back wall of the tent, which was a big one. The man who had addressed him said, ‘There is the pen-box at the back of the tent.’ This could mean nothing but ‘Fetch it.’ Saladin turned around, saw the pen-box and said, ‘By God, he’s right.’ Then leaning back on his left arm, he stretched out his right and reached it. He endorsed the petition, and I [Ibn Shaddad] said, ‘God Almighty said concerning the Prophet, “Verily you are of noble character.” I can only think that our lord [Saladin] shares the same characteristics with him.’ He replied, ‘We were not put out in any way. We settled his business— and the reward [in Heaven] is ours.’ Had some persons and certain individuals had this happen to them, they

Gibb, Civilization of Islam, 99.

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would have been furious. Who could address his superior in such a way! This is the ultimate in kindness and forbearance, and God does not neglect to reward those that do good.”23 x Chivalrous behavior. To this attribute, one of his secretaries cites the following story. “One day I was on horseback in attendance on him [Saladin] face to face with the Franks when one of the forward pickets arrived with a woman in great distress, bitterly weeping and continually beating her breast. The man said, ‘This woman has come out of the Frankish lines and asked to be brought to you, so I have done so.’ The sultan ordered the dragoman to question her about her business. She said, ‘Muslim thieves entered my tent yesterday and stole my daughter. I spent all night until this morning pleading for help. I was told, “their prince is a merciful man. We shall send you out to him to ask him for your daughter.”’ The sultan took pity on her. His tears flowed and, prompted by his chivalry, he ordered someone to go to the army market to ask who had bought the little girl, to repay what had been given for her and bring her back, having heard something about her early that day. Hardly an hour passed before the horseman arrived with the little girl over his shoulder. The moment the woman’s eye lighted on her, she fell to the ground besmirching her face with earth, while all around wept for what she had suffered. She was lifting her eyes to heaven, although we did not know what she was saying. Her daughter was handed to her, then she was taken off and restored to their camp.”24 Interestingly, some of his colleagues who are usually praiseful of Saladin write that on his accession to the vizierate, he gave up drink and frivolous activities; he adopted simple dress and adhered to the rules of Islam. While we do not have details of this earlier

23 24

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 33. Ibid., 37.

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behavior, if true, history does tell us that from 1169 until his death, he was true to the Muslim path. We know little about his immediate family. Children started arriving in 1170. Thus, he must have married while he was in Egypt or perhaps before the start of the third expedition in Damascus. He had 16 sons; we do not know how many daughters. Apparently, he was not a tall man, similar in stature to Ayyub, his father, and Shirkuh. A few coins struck during his lifetime and one picture, which may or may not depict his true likeness, show him sitting, tailor-like, on a low dais or possibly a throne, with a beard and mustache. The pose, it should be noted, is similar to renderings of other Muslim leaders in medieval times. Given his life in the saddle, he must have been a superb equestrian. Traveling for endless miles and leading battles, he was certainly tough in mind and body. In later years, he did suffer illnesses that almost cut his life shorter than it was. In sum, Saladin was a man with a vision and sufficient ambition and ability to realize much of it.

SALADIN’S FIRST YEAR IN POWER: 1169–1170 On March 26, 1169, Saladin took up his new role as Caliph alAdid’s vizier, but, more importantly, he was commander of the Syrian expeditionary force that hailed from Nur al-Din’s empire. His first task was to consolidate and build up his control, all the while answering to a distant and, at times, suspicious suzerain. In addition, Egypt was, as always, a major source of wealth. Still coveting this giant plum and noting the death of Shirkuh and the political change in Cairo, Amalric, emboldened by an alliance with the Byzantine Emperor Manuel, would mount one more attack on the country. During his first four months, Saladin quietly organized and enhanced his forces and planned his next steps. On the surface, he maintained good relations with the caliph, visiting him frequently and occasionally walking in religious processions with him. Utilizing the treasure from Shirkuh’s brief rule, he looked after the welfare of the Cairenes. They reportedly reacted positively to this largess, a practice not seen in previous viziers. Knowing he was ultimately dependant on his superior military force, he took steps to build its capacity and capability. Some units had left with Ain al-Daula, the amir who disapproved of Saladin’s

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selection as commander, but substantial forces remained. Saladin had inherited the loyal Asadiya (500 mounted mamlukes) from Shirkuh and quickly built up a complementary personal guard called the Salahiya (derived from his Arabic name, Salah al-Din) commanded by Husam al-Din Abu al-Haija. While numbers are not precise, it seems he had at least 5,000 additional well-trained troops made up of Kurdish units commanded by their tribal amirs and an equal number of Turks under the loyal Baha al-Din Qaraqush. To pay for these, he utilized iqtas inherent in his vizierate office, but also he started taking iqtas from Egyptian officers, causing resentment. During its height, the Fatimid Empire had enjoyed a formidable navy, but it had declined, as had other Egyptian institutions. Saladin reversed this trend, built some ships, and sent them on patrol in the eastern Mediterranean. To strengthen his military command and control, he asked Nur al-Din to send his brothers and family to Cairo. The Fatimid regime also had military forces in Egypt, superior in numbers to Saladin’s regiments, but greatly inferior in quality. Again, numbers are not certain. Presumably with the exception of those units paid directly by the caliph’s palace (mounted men, foot soldiers, and Armenian archers), the bulk of the Egyptian army was answerable to and paid by the vizier. In this evolving and precarious situation, Saladin seriously doubted their loyalty. Three groups were notably present in and around Cairo: additional Armenian archers, 30,000 to 40,000 Nubian25 infantry who were infamous for their unruly behavior on the streets, and Egyptian troops, some mounted and some infantry, who, in comparison to the second group, were better organized and led. During his first four months, as he built up his forces, Saladin started moving some Egyptian units out of and away from Cairo. In addition, as noted, he took some Egyptian officers’ iqtas for his own purposes. Saladin’s relations with Nur al-Din were both problematic and positive. On the one hand, Nur al-Din was suspicious of Saladin’s ambitions. Arab chroniclers write that he questioned how Saladin “dared” to accept the vizierate. He complained that Saladin The Nubian soldiers are also referred to as Negroes and Blacks in the literature. 25

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expended significant funds without consulting him. In his letters to Cairo, he addressed them to “Amir Salah al-Din [Saladin], commander-in-chief, and to other amirs,” demonstrating that he did not recognize the vizier title. Nur al-Din also took Shirkuh’s iqtas in Homs from his son, Nasir al-Din. This action can be interpreted as a slap at the Ayyub family, but also it may have been simply a reflection of policy. First, iqtas were not heritable. Second, Nur al-Din needed to bestow them on the new governor of Homs. On the other hand, Saladin had Nur al-Din’s name and title read in the official khutba, the public Friday prayer, along with al-Adid’s name and title. This, in and of itself, is curious: the names of both Sunni and Shia leaders were being recited in the same prayer at the mosques in Egypt. Importantly, Nur al-Din honored Saladin’s request to send his family to Cairo. Lastly, Nur al-Din knew that Amalric was mustering his forces for another assault on Egypt. Accordingly, he sent his own military units to assist in battle. By mid summer, Saladin’s relatives and their families had a strong presence in Egypt. Shihab al-Din, his able and loyal maternal uncle, had come with Shirkuh. Taqi al-Din, a paternal nephew, arrived sometime in the first half of 1169. (Taqi al-Din is also referred to as al-Muzaffar Taqi al-Din Umar in the literature.) Saladin’s brother, Turan-Shah, reached Cairo on July 29, and two other brothers, Tughtakin and al-Adil as well as a nephew, FarrukhShah, presented themselves shortly thereafter, but the actual dates are not clear. As the various relatives arrived, Saladin awarded them iqtas to finance their stay in Egypt and their provision of troops for Saladin’s army. With the build up of his regiments and the presence of his loyal and capable relatives, Saladin was prepared to act forcefully. Saladin’s first major action to eliminate competing military units was sparked by a plot—which may be apocryphal but is cited by the Arab chroniclers—that is worthy of Scheherazade. Caliph alAdid’s palace was ripe with intrigue. The accepted tale is that the eunuch Mutamin al-Khilafa, a powerful palace official, and a few Egyptian amirs and officers, disgruntled that Saladin appropriated their iqtas, designed a grand plan to defeat Saladin and drive him out of Egypt. Their scheme was to invite the Crusaders to attack Egypt. Saladin then would be forced to meet the invaders in the field. Meanwhile, the plotters would destroy the Syrians’ garrisons and attack Saladin from the rear as he engaged the Franks. One of

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Saladin’s men in Bilbais conveniently noticed a man in rags, but new sandals. They apprehended him and found a note from the plotters to the Crusaders, describing the scheme and inviting the Franks to join it. Under pressure, the ragged man led Saladin’s men to a Jewish scribe who had written the message. Under interrogation, the scribe converted to Islam and told Saladin’s men who was involved in the plot, namely, Mutamin al-Khilafa and perhaps al-Adid himself. Realizing his plan was revealed, Mutamin hid in the palace. Saladin bided his time. Mutamin, thinking Saladin’s attention was finally elsewhere, visited his estate outside Cairo on August 20, 1169. Saladin sent a small Syrian force to his estate and had him executed. Saladin certainly knew that the execution of such a prominent personage would precipitate a crisis and, it appears, he had prepared well for it. The following day, the 30,000–40,000 strong Nubian regiments in Cairo revolted. Joined by some discontented Egyptian officers and soldiers, they fought for two days. Saladin hesitated to act aggressively, waiting to learn where al-Adid stood in the revolt. Even though Saladin well knew that his army was strong and well disciplined, he did not want to fight simultaneously the palace guards and the Nubian regiments. Turan-Shah, his at times impetuous brother, had wanted to respond robustly on the first day. On day two of the rising, most likely with the encouragement of al-Adid, Armenian archers in the caliph’s palace started shooting arrows at the Syrians. Saladin immediately ordered a catapult crew to load burning naphtha missiles and fire them at the palace, specifically at the Armenian archers and the caliph’s personal quarters. Al-Adid, realizing his very life was in jeopardy, forthwith sent a message to Turan-Shah: Drive the Nubians out. He changed sides, or at the least, took a side. The Nubian infantry had commanded a large square in the center of Cairo, close to the palaces. Turan-Shah now drove them down Cairo’s central street, Qasabat al-Qahira. The Syrians, by earlier design, manned all of the side streets. Bloodied, the Nubians finally reached the city’s locked southern gate, Bab Zuwaila. Meanwhile, the Syrians burned the quarters in which they and their families lived and attacked the Armenian archers’ quarters as well. Demoralized and defeated, the Nubians petitioned for safe-passage out of Cairo, which was granted. They then crossed the Nile and

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started to camp at Giza. Turan-Shah, however, also crossed the river with a strong force and, despite the safe-passage agreement, decimated the Nubians. Those few who survived, fled to Upper Egypt. The largest Egyptian military force was no more. In addition, the Syrians had greatly reduced the Armenian archers’ numbers and efficacy. Al-Adid, with just a small palace guard, now had to rely solely on Saladin. Importantly, from another perspective, Saladin as vizier no longer had to pay for the upkeep and the salaries of the now destroyed Egyptian regiments. This relieved him of a major fiscal burden and freed up resources for other projects. Almost immediately, Saladin faced another major challenge. Amalric and his Frankish army and Manuel with his Byzantine navy, numbering a formidable 200 ships, agreed to attack the rich port of Damietta where a major branch of the Nile meets the Mediterranean. While the allies had reached agreement by early summer, they took their time in preparation. Andronicus Contostephanus, the Byzantine fleet commander, set sail from the Hellespont on July 10, 1169. Meeting a small Egyptian contingent close to Cyprus, he captured two ships, but the four others returned to Egypt and informed Saladin of the impending assault. Amalric, after the fiasco of 1168, took time to reform his army. Despite urging from his Byzantine Greek allies, he did not march until October 16, reaching the northern walls of Damietta on October 27. While Saladin knew the allies were coming, not until late October did he know their destination. Damietta was only lightly defended. This was soon rectified. A continual stream of reinforcements and supplies arrived throughout the 45-day siege. Taqi al-Din, Saladin’s nephew, and his uncle, Shihab al-Din, led the Syrian defense made up of Turks, Kurds, and Arabs. They immediately strengthened the city’s walls and other static defenses. Of exceptional importance, they placed a rugged chain across the river. This prevented the Greek fleet from sailing up the Nile to attack the Syrians, but also allowed the latter to resupply the city at will. As Saladin built up his forces, they stoutly defended the Damietta’s walls and frequently conducted operations outside of the city. Utilizing their cavalry, the commanders mounted effective hit-and-run forays, a typical tactic utilized by Nur al-Din, Shirkuh, and now Saladin, against the allies’ army formations and ships.

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Saladin stayed in Cairo where he protected the only recently challenged home base. The extant Egyptian army forces, that is, those regiments left in tact after the elimination of the Nubian and Armenian units, supported Saladin’s defense of the country. They did not try to take advantage of the Syrians’ march to Damietta to challenge Saladin’s rule in Cairo. On his request, the Caliph al-Adid gave 1,000,000 dinars for the defense of Egypt for which Saladin publicly praised him. Saladin also called on Nur al-Din to send reinforcements, which, in short order, he did. The allies noted their arrival with consternation. Rumors of even more horsemen on their way further demoralized the attackers. The Greeks and the Crusaders disagreed on how to conduct the siege. Andronicus had embarked with only three months supply of food for his sailors and soldiers and by mid fall, his stores were almost depleted. He urged an immediate attack using scaling ladders to overcome the city’s walls. On the other hand, Damietta’s fortifications impressed Amalric. He settled down to bombarding the walls with mangonels and building a tall siege tower. Each side blamed the other for the failing tactics. Andronicus asserted that the Franks were to slow. Amalric said the Byzantine navy should have brought more food for the troops. Meanwhile the Greeks were hungry; their fighting ability was undermined. An Egyptian fireboat managed to infiltrate the Greek fleet, causing considerable damage. Rains came early, turning the allies’ camp into a quagmire. Andronicus and Amalric eventually initiated negotiations with Shihab al-Din. While the terms are not recorded, it is clear that the allies were given safe-passage to retreat. The allies burned their siege engines and the Crusaders and Muslims visited each other’s camps, freely buying and selling. Alexandrian merchants arrived with still more wares to peddle. On December 13, the allies quit Damietta. On its return, the Greek fleet encountered tremendous storms; it lost many ships and numerous sailors. Once again, Saladin met the Crusaders— this time, reinforced by the Byzantine navy—and prevailed. At about this time, al-Adid wrote Nur al-Din, asking him to recall the Syrian forces, leaving only Saladin and his immediate

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entourage. Nur al-Din, according to the Arab writers of the time, replied: No! “… the arrows of the Turks are the only answer to the lances of the Franks.” The Syrians were Egypt’s saviors.26 In spring 1170, Ayyub, Saladin’s father, asked Nur al-Din for permission to join his son in Cairo. Nur al-Din readily agreed, perhaps thinking that his close friend would favorably influence his son. Nur al-Din rode with him to Ras al-Ma where Shirkuh had encamped before his third expedition to Egypt. Arriving at Cairo on April 16, 1170, Caliph al-Adid gave him the unheard of honor of meeting him outside the city walls near the Gate of Victories. Saladin welcomed his father and immediately offered to relinquish the vizierate to him. Ayyub responded: “My son, God had not chosen thee for this great position hadst though not been fitted for it; it is not well to play with one’s luck.”27 Saladin then offered the position of treasurer to his father, which he accepted, and assigned him remunerative iqtas: Alexandria, Damietta, and al-Buhaira. In 13 months, Saladin had met major hurdles—plots, a largescale revolt, and a forceful invasion—but he survived them all, increased his strength in Egypt, and laid the foundation for future growth. In addition, the arrival of his family fortified him greatly with their loyalty, energy, and talent.28

For example, Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 181. The translation is from: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 38. 27 Lane-Poole, Saladin, 100. 28 For this section, “Saladin’s First Year in Power,” the following works are particularly helpful: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 180–84; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 45–47; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 345–47, 350–51; Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij al-Kurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyoub, vol. 1, 174–88; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 383–89; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 86–96; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 31–39; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 6–7; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 98–105; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 69–82; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 49–84 passim. 26

CHAPTER FOUR CONSOLIDATION OF POWER IN EGYPT: 1170–1174 In his first year as vizier of Egypt and commander of Nur al-Din’s expeditionary force, Saladin overcame threats to his rule and started solidifying his power and authority. In the next four years, he took additional steps to strengthen his regime, eliminated the Fatimid caliphate, built institutions, and initiated military forays against the Crusaders, but also extended his burgeoning empire to other Muslim lands: Yemen and Libya. To examine these years, this chapter is divided into four sections: a discussion of Saladin’s allimportant military institutions; the events of 1170–1172; a brief description of Egypt’s economy and society and how Saladin’s regime affected them; and the events of 1172–1174.

SALADIN’S ARMED FORCES In the period immediately following Shirkuh’s death, Saladin had about 6,000 mounted men in his core army, termed askar in Arabic.1 Some of these soldiers were in his personal guard, which consisted of 500 mamlukes in the Asadiya unit and a similar In the literature, a number of Arabic and Turkish military terms are used. At times, the various authors present common definitions of the words, but at other times, they do not. In this work, we rely on three respected authors: Gibb, Civilization of Islam, 76 nn. 31, 32, 76–77, 87; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 143–44; Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 66. The relevant terms are: askar, Arabic for army or troops; tulb, Turkish for a small army unit of 70–200 men; tawashi, Arabic for the highest quality mounted army soldiers; and qaraghulam, Arabic for lower-quality mounted army soldiers. 1

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number in the newly created Salahiya brigade. In addition, Saladin fielded 5,000 cavalrymen who were superbly trained and outfitted with high-quality arms and armor. They were largely Turks and Kurds who came with Shirkuh’s original army in 1168. By the end of 1169, his core army numbered 8–9,000. New Turkish and Kurdish horsemen from Syria, the Upper Euphrates, and Iraq came to Egypt in small units or as individual mercenaries, seeking to join Saladin’s military. The success of the Syrian expedition into Egypt was, apparently, a magnet for new recruits. Saladin also integrated a few units from the old Egyptian army into his forces. In the early 1170s, the army continued to grow. Fortunately, Qadi al-Fadil, one of Saladin’s close advisors, provided a brief, but comprehensive description of the army in Egypt. On September 11, 1171, in a major show of force to impress the Cairenes and some visiting Byzantine and Crusader envoys, Saladin marched 14,000 mounted men through the streets of the capital. They were divided into 147 units (tulbs). “‘A tulb, in the language of the Ghuzz [Turkish], is (a unit consisting of) an officer in command, who had a standard fixed on a lance and a trumpet which is sounded, with a number of horsemen ranging from 200 to 100 or 70.’ The total number of these horsemen was approximately 14,000, the majority being tawashis and the rest qaraghulams.”2 Tawashis were superior and well-armed troops. Qaraghulams were inferior, less well-armed soldiers who functioned largely as archers. In this show of force, Saladin certainly paraded his core army, but he also included other units from the pre-1169 Egyptian military and some bedouin auxiliary troops. Despite the ambiguity of the numbers, it is apparent that the military had grown considerably and, as noted below, at a fiscal cost. By the mid and late 1170s, Saladin shrank his core Egyptian army. Some units were sent to North Africa and Yemen where they helped expand and maintain his empire, but also, because they were then paid from local resources, their absence from Egypt relieved The primary source for this quote is the Arab historian, Ahmad alMaqrizi, who lived in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The quote is cited in: Gibb, Civilization of Islam, 76; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 143. 2

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some of the financial burden on his treasury. The size of Saladin’s Egyptian army, not counting his personal guard, stabilized at around 8,000 first-line soldiers. At any one time, half of the army remained in the country to guard the Egyptian coast and borders against Crusader attack as well as to maintain internal security during campaigns, while the balance joined Saladin in his forays against the Crusaders and in Muslim lands. As Saladin expanded his empire in Syria, Iraq, and Anatolia, more highly trained and well-equipped troops were added to his core army. In the mid 1180s, his provincial lords maintained forces totaling approximately 9,000 of whom 1,000 were in Damascus, 1,000 in Homs and Hama, 1,000 in Aleppo, 4,000 in Jazira and Diyar Bakr, and 2,000 in Mosul. During a campaign, similar to the practice in Egypt, a portion of the provincial forces stayed at home for security duties, the other military units being available to Saladin. For example, in March 1187, Saladin mustered his army at Ras al-Ma in Syria in preparation for what would be the grand battle of Hattin. This army, all cavalry, was composed of: x 1,000 Saladin’s guard x 4,000 Egyptian army x 1,000 Damascus x 1,000 Aleppo and northern Syria x 5,000 Mosul, Jazira, and Diyar Bakr Saladin’s army of 12,000 was the largest he had ever assembled. In addition to these core brigades, a large number of auxiliary troops—perhaps 6,000 in total—of questionable value joined the campaign. In comparison, the Crusaders mustered about 20,000 men of whom 1,200 were fully armored knights, 4,000 more lightly armed cavalry, and the remaining soldiers were infantry, including archers, crossbowmen, and men with miscellaneous and lesser skills.3 The numbers come from: David Nicolle, Hattin 1187. Oxford, 1993, 40–41; David Nicolle, Saladin and the Saracens. Oxford, 1986, 19–20; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 143–44, 148; Nicholson and Nicolle, God’s Warriors, 58–59; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 489–90. The numbers in the various sources are not always consistent and must be considered approximate. 3

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Maintaining troops and funding campaigns consumed, by far, the largest share of state revenues. Saladin generated funds through the time-honored iqta system that had been utilized in Muslim society for about two centuries. In addition, soldiers were allowed to plunder a defeated enemy. Thus, war booty was another way to compensate soldiers. The iqta system was a vast, yet simple way for a ruler to fund his military and to garner additional state revenues. Saladin awarded iqtas throughout his empire to his relatives, amirs, officers, officials, and, at times, individual soldiers. The iqta holder, in turn, was required to train and equip a certain number of cavalrymen for state service and pay a portion of the iqta’s revenue to the state treasury. The size of iqtas varied. Records show that some supported 250 cavalrymen, others 120 or 70, and still other more marginal iqtas supported only Turkish, Kurdish, and bedouin auxiliary troops.4 In essence, the iqta—a kind of tax farm—was a mechanism used to fund the government and supply it with trained and equipped troops. Under direction of lords, amirs, and officers, these soldiers maintained internal security, guarded borders, and joined major and minor campaigns. With respect to an individual soldier’s remuneration, more than one pattern obtained. In some regions, the amirs paid the soldiers in cash and kind. In others, the soldiers were part of the iqta. They farmed the land and shared the production with the iqta holder. In still other areas, both systems operated simultaneously. Because the iqta system was usually based on agricultural productivity, there was always tension between providing soldiers, on the one hand, and the desire to go home and tend the farm, on the other. Thus, the amirs and officers as well as the soldiers who were also farmers always wanted to return home in the late fall in order to sow winter crops. On more than one occasion, Saladin had to wind down a campaign when he could not persuade his amirs and soldiers to stay in service throughout the winter. Saladin’s military forces were divided into various categories, each with unique functions. The tawashi, the elite soldier mentioned above, was “‘… a trooper whose pay ranges from 700 to 1,000 or 4

Nicolle, Hattin, 26–27.

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1,200 [dinars], and who has a baggage train of ten or less animals, [cavalry] horses, pack horses, mules and camels, and a squire to carry his armor.’”5 Three-quarters of Saladin’s core army were of this category. The balance was qaraghulams who were more lightly armed and, it seems, mostly archers. Both groups were mounted and accomplished cavalrymen. From an ethnic standpoint, a majority of the soldiers was Turk and Kurd, but also Arabs from Syria and Egyptians were part of the overall mix. In addition to his skilled cavalry, Saladin did employ a number of specialized infantry soldiers. Their skills related to sieges: men who operated the catapults, some of whom were expert in hurling naphtha; sappers who dug underneath city and citadel walls in an attempt to cause them to collapse; and soldiers who built and manned the siege towers from which they rained arrows and other objects on the opposing soldiers and the citizenry of a besieged city. Auxiliary forces were recruited from the Turkish, Kurdish, and bedouin tribes. Upon Saladin’s call, tribal chiefs brought the requested number of men, mounted on horses and camels. The Turks and Kurds were primarily archers, while the bedouin utilized lances, swords, and clubs. For the most part, they were not armored and their pay varied. Some tribal chiefs enjoyed iqtas from which they were able to provide modest pay for the men in their service. In addition, they were allowed to pillage a vanquished foe, an exercise that could be quite lucrative. As a group, they were not as well trained or disciplined as the soldiers in the core army. Saladin used them for quick raids to disrupt an enemy force and deprive it of its baggage. They were also dispatched to lightly guarded regions where they would sack and burn villages and towns and return with booty and prisoners. During major battles, the archers’ main task was to rain arrows on the opponent, a tactic that often disrupted an enemy’s ability to fight in a coherent and organized manner. Saladin floated a small navy, but it was no match to the Crusader flotillas. The latter were superior in numbers and quality. During sieges of coastal cities, Saladin’s ships occasionally played effective and dramatic roles. A sailor was paid about three-quarters 5

Ahmad al-Maqrizi, Khitat, cited in: Gibb, Civilization of Islam, 87 n. 31.

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of what a soldier was paid, which reflected the navy’s lower stature in Saladin’s overall military calculations. Known for their sailing skills, Saladin’s officers frequently recruited men for the navy from the western part of North Africa.6 The Crusaders, as compared to their Muslim opponents, approached battles and warfare in a markedly different manner. The Franks were famous for their heavily armored and armed knights on large steeds. The quality of their armament as well as their discipline in battle was very high. They were especially known for massive charges whereby the knights attempted to break the enemy’s center, killing many opponents and undermining the cohesion of its forces. The more lightly armed horsemen and infantry would then enter the fray to dispatch soldiers still on the field. In contrast, Saladin’s army—and the armies of his predecessors: Nur al-Din and Zangi as well as Seljuk sultans and atabegs—had different assets and their tactics were matched to those assets, all of which continually troubled the Crusaders.7 Saladin’s army of tawashis and qaraghulams wore lighter armor and carried lighter weapons, which, in comparison to the Frankish knights, gave them more mobility, a significant asset. This mobility was utilized in four ways. First, the Muslim cavalry did not provide a static target for the Crusader knights’ massive charges. The mounted units, the tulbs, could approach and retreat, all the while shooting arrows at the knights, other cavalry, and their horses. The relatively small units, each under the command of an amir or officer, gave the army flexibility. It was not dependent on the cohesion of a large front or flank. Second, Saladin used the feigned retreat, an example of which was recounted in the battle of Babain in 1166. The intention was to break up the enemy’s formation and draw their soldiers into For this section on the various military units, the most relevant sources are: Gibb, Civilization of Islam, 74–90; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 140–84; Smail, Crusading Warfare, 64–87; Nicolle, Hattin, 21–52; Nicolle, Saladin, 6– 21; Nicholson and Nicolle, God’s Warriors, 58–59. 7 Smail is particularly helpful on Saladin’s tactics. Smail, Crusading Warfare, 64–87. See also: John Keegan, History of Warfare, 293–95. 6

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strange territory away from their baggage where they could be harassed and engaged. Third, mobility allowed the Muslims to attack the Crusaders’ flanks and rear, again with the intent of disrupting their opponents’ formations and coherence. Fourth, the fast moving troops could attack a marching army. In this case, it was likely that the enemy would not be wearing full armor and would not be able to organize in normal order of battle.8 Lastly, it is worth noting that, as a rule, neither the Franks nor the Muslims marched in full armor. Rather, their armor and some weapons were carried in baggage trains. Thus, it was all-important to protect the baggage train so that the knights, cavalry, and other soldiers would be able to don armor and secure a complement of weapons before engaging in full battle. The exception to this rule was when a commander expected to be attacked on the march. In this case, he ordered his men to don armor and arranged them in marching battle order. The second major tactic that plagued the Crusaders was the heavy use of archery, especially mounted archers. Saladin’s army was highly proficient in these specialized skills. A couple of examples of such training were recorded in a manual on military equipment and tactics written for Saladin. When shooting at a horseman who is armored or otherwise untouchable, shoot at his horse to dismount him. When shooting at a horseman who is not moving, aim at the saddlebow and thus hit the man if (the arrow flies) too high and the horse if too low. If his back is turned, aim at the spot between his shoulders. If he charges with a sword shoot at him, but not from too far off for if you miss he might hit you with his sword. Never shoot blindly! If you wish to shoot and have a sword, drop the sword from your right hand, seize the wrist loop and slide it up the right forearm. Hold the bow and three arrows in your left hand. If you are on horseback and are also armed with a lance, push the lance beneath the right thigh. If you have a sword as well, put the lance beneath the left thigh. If a group of enemy 8

Smail, Crusading Warfare, 78–80.

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As is clear, not only was the archer aiming at the combatant, but also his horse. An unhorsed knight lacked the ability to move freely and was thus deprived of some of his efficacy. Mobility and archery were certainly formidable weapons. Employing them, Saladin’s military units could wear down the enemy and, if possible, eventually afford them the opportunity to close on the Crusader formations. However, as one of the scholars on medieval warfare wrote, “[b]y such means they weakened the enemy, but his final defeat on the battlefield could be achieved only by the fight at close quarters with lance, sword, and club.”10 In this case, if the Frankish force had not been sufficiently weakened, its superior armor and weapons gave it an advantage, resulting in victory or, frequently, in stalemate.

1170–1172 As Saladin entered his second year as the effective leader of Egypt, he was in a position to focus on his own vision and start taking actions to realize it. Perhaps most important for him was the fundamental principle that legitimacy for his rule was derived from the approval of the caliph in Baghdad. The Sunni caliph—alMustanjid before December 20, 1170 and al-Mustadi after that date—pursued two agendas: holy war against the Crusaders and bringing Egypt back into the Sunni Muslim community. Saladin, as noted, strongly concurred with both—and they accorded with his ambitions. The real issue was: How precipitous should his actions be? On more than one occasion, he wrote the caliph that he was pursuing these objectives, but he argued that he must take slow, studied steps so that he would be successful. Nur al-Din, Saladin’s suzerain, echoed the caliph’s words. He too pushed Saladin to act

Murda al-Tarsusi, “Book of Military Equipment and Tactics written for Saladin,” cited in Nicholson and Nicolle, God’s Warriors, 102–3. 10 Smail, Crusading Warfare, 82. 9

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and, as he increased the pressure in the second half of 1171, their relations became tense. During 1170–1172, Saladin used his army to prosecute the international agenda, holy war, and to secure the borders of Egypt. As vizier of Egypt, his first foreign adventure was a brief raid into southern Palestine in the fall of 1170. With a large force under his command, he advanced toward Frankish territory in late November, arriving at Darum (also Daron), nine miles south of Gaza City, on December 8 (Map 3). Darum, the southern most Crusader outpost in Palestine, had only a modest fortress with a small settlement outside its walls. Saladin took the town on the first day and immediately assaulted the citadel’s walls and towers. King Amalric, hearing of Saladin’s march, led a small contingent of knights to Darum, arriving in the area on December 11. The Muslims harassed the column of knights, but it continued toward the beleaguered fort in a defensive formation. Saladin broke off the engagement, rode nine miles north to Gaza City where his men seized horses, other animals, and goods and freed Muslim prisoners. The same day he returned to Darum, finding that Amalric had already entered the fortress. Sensing that the Franks could not be lured into a major confrontation—Amalric was, it seems, very impressed by the size of Saladin’s army—Saladin broke the siege on December 13 and returned to Egypt. In this brief episode, Saladin proved that holy war was part of his agenda, but also his men were able to seize some booty. From a military standpoint, however, he did not dent the Crusader force. In December, Saladin also sent a cavalry brigade to Eilat (also referred to as Aila and Ailah) at the north end of the Gulf of Aqaba. Without a fight, the Frankish guards who manned its fortress asked for quarter and surrendered to Saladin’s troops. The capture of this post helped ease the passage from Damascus via Transjordan and the Sinai to Cairo. However, the stronger Crusader fortresses at Shawbak and Karak still stood in Transjordan (known to the Crusaders as Oultrejordain).11 For the Gaza and Eilat attacks, see: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 42– 43; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 390–91. Ehrenkreutz records a different version of what happened and why. Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 83–84. 11

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On a more mundane level, Saladin used his army to secure borders, but also to garner more resources and expand his empire. In early 1171, bedouin started raiding villages and small towns in Upper Egypt. In response, Saladin sent Turan-Shah, his brother, to bring the bedouin under some semblance of control, an exercise that took close to three months, ending in mid May 1171. In the middle of 1172, troubles erupted again in Upper Egypt. Nubian soldiers, joined by some disgruntled Armenian troops, were pillaging the Aswan region. The governor, one Kanz al-Daula who was also the amir of the Rabia bedouin tribe, asked Saladin for help. Saladin sent some troops who subdued the marauding, but did not totally put an end to it. Consequently, in late 1172 Saladin sent Turan-Shah with a larger cavalry contingent. He advanced as far as Ibrim in Nubia, which he captured, and then proceeded to raid the countryside. The Nubian king in Danqla sued for peace. Turan-Shah, however, kept Ibrim and gave it as an iqta to one of his Kurdish amirs who, with some unemployed Kurdish troops, settled there. Saladin’s brother, at once, quelled a troubled border area, expanded the empire, and employed some of his soldiers. Saladin did not attempt to expand further in the region. The Arab chroniclers of the twelfth century all report that the poverty of the region was striking, making it of little value for exploitation. While Turan-Shah was in the south, Saladin and his family were planning expansion to the west. Once again, they were concerned that they had too many troops and insufficient revenues to pay for them. At a conference in 1172 in Alexandria, the assembled family members decided to invade North Africa, specifically Libya, claiming, as a pretense, that the bedouin were robbing travelers and disrupting commerce. They actually sent letters to the bedouin leaders telling them to cease and desist. The actual invasion, assigned to Taqi al-Din, Saladin’s nephew, was delayed due to the events in Nubia. However, in 1173, on Taqi alDin’s orders, his amir Sharaf al-Din Qaraqush who was of Armenian stock12 conquered Tripoli with a mixed force of Turkish Lyons and Jackson as well as Runciman, given their sources, seem more credible. 12 Gibb, Life of Saladin, 20.

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troops and bedouin. The invasion was lucrative. They reaped booty for Saladin’s government and cavalrymen and employed a contingent of soldiers at no cost to Cairo. Through subsequent raids in 1175 and 1187, Saladin further expanded his North African realm, but also put himself in conflict with the Almohades who ruled the western part of the region. By this expansion, Saladin controlled a greater expanse of the North African coast and helped facilitate Egypt’s trade in the area. Saladin did launch one other military expedition in 1171 against the Crusaders, this time in Transjordan. Because the event is central to and reflective of Saladin’s relations with Nur al-Din, it is presented below. *** Turning to the domestic front, Nur al-Din was pressing Saladin to act more rapidly and robustly against the Fatimid establishment in Egypt. Saladin, on the ground, elected a more cautious approach. He realized that, although he had dismantled the primary Fatimid military force, there were still many potential enemies in the country. For reasons having nothing to do with Egypt, however, Nur al-Din stopped pushing for more anti-Fatimid steps from June 1170 through May 1171. First, on June 29, 1170, there was a massive earthquake in the region. In Nur al-Din’s realm, his capital of Aleppo was severely damaged, as were Homs and Hama. The citadel of Baalbek was undermined to the point of collapse, but Damascus was spared. In affected towns, multitudes were killed and people set up tents for the refugees in the ruins or on the outskirts of the urban areas. Crusader towns also sustained severe damage, especially Tripoli, Jubail, and Antioch. Nur al-Din immediately directed his attention to rebuilding. The second event that diverted Nur al-Din was the death of his brother, Qutb al-Din Maudud on September 6, 1170. Qutb alDin had been the independent ruler of Mosul. Without delay, Nur al-Din marched to Mosul where his forces took some small towns. In the fall, with a show of force, Mosul itself fell to him. Qutb alDin had appointed his eldest son, Imad al-Din Zangi, to be his successor in Mosul. However, due to familial intrigue, he had subsequently replaced him with the younger Saif al-Din Ghazi. The latter was to be the independent ruler of Mosul. Nur al-Din,

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however, had other ideas. With Nur al-Din’s army dominant in the region, Saif al-Din fell under the suzerainty of his uncle. Nur al-Din left him in charge of the grand city and assigned the elder Imad alDin Zangi, who was also Nur al-Din’s son-in-law, to be governor of a smaller and decidedly less important town, Sinjar. These decisions of father and uncle fueled enmity between the two brothers, a reality that would benefit Saladin in the future. Nur alDin did not leave Mosul until February. He first went to Aleppo, still recovering from the earthquake, and eventually traveled to Damascus in May 1171. Meanwhile back in Cairo, Saladin started taking steps to reestablish Sunni Islam in Egypt and disestablish Shia Islam. During its time, the Fatimid Empire had built grand mosques in Cairo, notably al-Azhar in 972, to which Shia educational institutions were attached. Alexandria, though, was the site of a number of Sunni Muslim law colleges, a legacy of Sunni rule before the advent of the Fatimids. In Cairo, a newer city, there were none. Saladin, in a very public manner, proceeded to rectify this situation in the first months of his rule. In September 1170, he demolished a notorious prison in Fustat and replaced it with a law college of the Shafii school. In October, he initiated construction of a second law college, this time of the Maliki school. Both received generous endowments. In later years, more institutions were added. In early 1171, Taqi al-Din built a Shafii law college in Cairo and generously endowed it. In 1173 and 1177 respectively, Saladin built a Sufi hostel in Cairo and constructed another Shafii law college, both of which he endowed. In subsequent years, a number of Saladin’s amirs and civil servants established and funded additional law schools and public buildings. Saladin also caused other measures, both symbolic and substantive, to be put in place to bolster the role of Sunni Islam. First, in the Friday khutba, some Shia phraseology was eliminated, but very importantly, the names of the first three caliphs, Prophet Muhammad’s companions, were inserted ahead of Ali’s name. Second, in 1170 and 1171, Saladin appointed his own men, Sunni Muslims of the Shafii school, as senior judges in Cairo and Fustat. These men, in turn, replaced lower Shia judges with men from the Sunni ulama. In spheres other than religious, Saladin took additional decisive steps to secure his authority. Egyptian civil servants were

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crucial for the welfare of the country. They ran the tax system and disbursed funds, but of highest consequence was their management of the Nile water system of canals, dikes, and levees. For the country to prosper, the cadre of Egyptian bureaucrats had to function properly. Consequently, Saladin and his inner circle paid close attention to this key group. From its own standpoint, this cadre was ready to embrace the new regime. Its members, looking back to Dirgham who ruled by terror and Shawar who brought war and disasters, could hope that the Syrians, who were successful in military matters, would be equally so in running the country. In addition, a significant number of the senior civil servants were Sunni Muslims, thus making them even more attuned to a Sunni leader. An exemplary member of this group was Abu Ali Abd alRahim, commonly known as Qadi al-Fadil and previously referred to in this narrative. A Sunni Muslim from Palestine, he had served in senior positions in Fatimid governments. In March 1171, the chief of the Fatimid chancery died. Having observed his performance over the previous two years, Saladin elevated Qadi alFadil to the position. The chancery, at the time, was officially the executive office of the Fatimid palace. That being said, it had increasingly fallen under the authority of the Egyptian vizier, the very office awarded to Saladin in 1169. Qadi al-Fadil energetically and intelligently executed the duties of the office and, over a short time, became one of Saladin’s close advisors. Saladin’s men continued to arrest former Egyptian officers and, frequently, take their property. On one occasion, Fatimid Caliph al-Adid complained about their treatment. He was informed, disingenuously, that the officers were plotting against him. As recounted, Saladin had also taken many iqtas heretofore in the possession of Egyptian military officers and other officials and distributed them to his relatives, amirs, and officers.13

For details on these domestic changes, see: Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 76– 79, 83, 124–28; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 44–45; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 87–89. Ibn Jubayr, a Muslim traveler from Andalusia, reports in 1183 that he saw numerous colleges, hospitals, and hostels in Alexandria and Cairo 13

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In May 1171, Nur al-Din had returned to Damascus from his extended journey to Mosul and Aleppo. During the following month, he renewed the pressure on Saladin to deal with the Fatimid caliphate. From the contemporary sources, it is not clear if Nur al-Din was aware of the steps Saladin had already taken to bring Egyptian institutions and resources under Syrian control. Nevertheless, under pressure from the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, he wrote to Saladin numerous times, making the case for expediting the matter. For his part, Saladin consulted his family. They were not of one mind. Some were still cautious, not certain what the public reaction to the elimination of the Fatimid caliphate would be; others were in favor of completing the process that they had already started. At the end, Saladin and his colleagues recognized that they had no choice but to “obey Nur al-Din’s orders.”14 By August 1171, determined to end the Fatimid caliphate, Saladin decided to take action. Fortuitously or purposefully, we do not know, Caliph al-Adid fell seriously ill during the last days of the month. As part of the overall plan, Saladin brought the bulk of his army to the Cairo area. On September 10, at Saladin’s request, his father, Ayyub, went to the principal mosque in Fustat and ordered the preacher, on pain of death, to insert the name and title of the Abbasid Caliph al-Mustadi in place of al-Adid’s name in the Friday khutba. The preacher did omit al-Adid’s name and recited the names of the “rightly guided” caliphs, but he did not mention alMustadi’s name. When interrogated on that point, he simply said he did not know all of the caliph’s names and titles. He promised to insert them on the following Friday and did so. On the streets, there was no popular reaction at all to this change. The people of Fustat either did not notice or did not care that the Fatimid caliph’s name was not included in the khutba. Saladin, nevertheless, wanted to make certain that the street would not react negatively in the future. On September 11, 1171, he paraded 14,000 mounted troops through the streets of the capital. that Saladin had established and funded. Ibn Jubayr, Travels of Ibn Jubayr, 33, 42–45. 14 Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 193–94.

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The Cairenes, in face of such a massive and organized display of power, must have been impressed. On September 13, Caliph al-Adid died. In earlier years, upon the death of a caliph, the vizier would very shortly announce his successor. Saladin made no such announcement. Rather, on September 17, the preachers in all of the mosques in Cairo and Fustat inserted the names and titles of the Sunni caliph in the khutba. Again, there was no public reaction. Saladin had altered the political and religious environment, and then planned the transition and executed it with precision and success. While there are many versions of this story in the records of the early chroniclers, one of the more pointed accounts was recorded by Ibn Abi Tayy. When Saladin learned of al-Adid’s death, he expressed grief, saying: “Had I known that he was going to die in the course of this week, I would not have crushed him with the removal of his name from the khutba.” His trusted advisor Qadi al-Fadil responded: “Had he known that you would not have removed his name from the khutba, he would not have died.” Ibn Abi Tayy editorialized: “By that he meant that al-Adid had killed himself.”15 There were many rumors about al-Adid’s death: he was truly ill; he was poisoned; he poisoned himself; one of Saladin’s brothers killed him; he killed himself upon hearing that Saladin’s brother was looking for him.16 Saladin, though still under the suzerainty of Nur al-Din in Damascus, was now supreme in Egypt. In order to make sure the Fatimids did not re-emerge in the future, Saladin could have executed all of the family members. He did not. Instead, he assigned them small quarters in the palace, but separated males from females so there would be no more issue. Indeed, when Saladin died in 1193, some elderly Fatimids were still living in Cairo. The Syrians had hoped that the opulent Fatimid palace would reveal enormous treasure that they could exploit. While they did find some valuable jewels, art objects, and luxuriant cloth, the Ibn Abi Tayy in Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 193–94. Also cited in: Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 94. 16 For the end of the Fatimid caliphate, see: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 45–46; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 82–83; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 89–96. 15

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expected enormous cache of dinars did not exist. Some said the payments to the Crusaders depleted the treasury, but also it should be remembered that in 1170 al-Adid gave Saladin 1,000,000 dinars to prosecute the war against the Byzantines and Franks at Damietta. From another perspective, though, with the elimination of the Fatimid caliphate, the Egyptian treasury and other resources no longer had to pay for the palace’s high costs. Consequently, although the rumored treasure was not found, future state revenues were less encumbered, freeing up funds for other projects. The elimination of the Shia Fatimid caliphate satisfied the caliph in Baghdad. Saladin had met his obligation to Sunni Islam’s highest religious authority. However, although his highest temporal authority—Nur al-Din—was undoubtedly pleased that Saladin had obeyed his orders and eradicated the Fatimids, tensions remained. They were centered on the two leaders’ different views on the role of Egypt, Saladin’s ambitions, and Nur al-Din’s concern about those ambitions. For Nur al-Din, Egypt was just a part, albeit a significant part, of his empire, which should be subordinate to the needs of his empire. Its resources should be dedicated to pursuing holy war against the Franks under his direction as well as utilized as needed to enlarge his empire in Muslim lands. Nur al-Din certainly saw the necessity of ensuring the security of Egypt, especially against Crusader attacks, of which there had been many. Nevertheless, his major focus was his larger empire and its needs. On the other hand, Saladin, while recognizing the call for holy war, focused much more on making Egypt secure under his control. He knew there had been and would be threats against Syrian control of the country on the part of internal enemies as well as the Crusaders. All of this consumed his efforts and revenues, making less available for his suzerain in Aleppo. The two different viewpoints gave rise to uneasy relations, but also the matter of ambition inexorably exacerbated the strain. Before al-Adid’s death, Nur al-Din and Saladin had coordinated a joint expedition to address the Franks’ strategic strongholds in Transjordan. They were to meet near Karak, the Crusader fortress and town that is located east of the Dead Sea. In September, Saladin waited a few days in Cairo to make certain that the change of the khutba in favor of the Abbasid caliphate did not stimulate unfavorable reactions on the street. As noted, he had marched his troops through Cairo earlier in September, thus his

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army was already mustered. On September 25, 1171, he left for Transjordan via Bilbais. The size of his expeditionary force is not recorded. He arrived in the vicinity of Shawbak (called Montreal by the Crusaders) where he lost some horses, camels, and baggage at the hand of the bedouin. It is unclear if he ever laid siege to the town’s fortress, but whatever the case, after only a couple of weeks in the field, he returned to Egypt. He wrote to Nur al-Din saying that Fatimid plots required his return, but Nur al-Din did not accept the excuse. Nur al-Din had traveled south from Damascus. Given that they were both in the field, even if a few days ride from each other, it is curious that they did not meet. The various chroniclers and historians speculate about what occurred. Ibn al-Athir, a writer of the time who favored Nur al-Din and his family, records that there was an Ayyubid conference focused on what the family should do if Nur al-Din invaded Egypt. Some spoke up for resistance, but Ayyub, Saladin’s father, more soberly stated that the family was in Egypt as Nur al-Din’s servants and thus should obey him. He later told Saladin that the family members should be careful not to anger Nur al-Din and guard against actions that might give rise to his ire.17 Whether this meeting was actual or exaggerated, we do not know, but the fact that the two men did not meet in Transjordan caused Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, the sober servant and friend of both leaders—Nur alDin and Saladin—to say: “something happened,” but he quickly added that Saladin had suffered military losses, as noted above.18 Despite the tensions between the two leaders, both camps celebrated the demise of Fatimid Egypt and the re-establishment of Sunni Islam in Egypt. Upon learning of the 1171 events, Nur alDin dispatched a messenger with the news to Baghdad. The Abbasid caliph awarded both leaders robes of honor in the Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 368. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 48. Some contemporary observers speculated that if the two leaders had met, Nur al-Din may have ordered Saladin not to return to Egypt. This scenario is doubtful. Nur al-Din would not want to leave a void in Egypt that the Crusaders or irredentist Fatimids might fill. Nonetheless, as Imad al-Din wrote, “something happened.” We just do not know what. 17 18

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traditional black color of the caliphate. Saladin received his robe on March 9, 1172. The next day, he donned it and rode across Cairo in the celebratory regalia. Already in the fall of 1171, he had ordered the Egyptian mint to strike coins with the name of Caliph alMustadi on one side and Nur al-Din on the reverse. Furthermore, Saladin started sending funds to Nur al-Din. In the spring of 1172, he dispatched 100,000 dinars along with valuable objects from the Fatimid palace. In spring 1173, he sent 60,000 dinars, again accompanied by precious stone and objects from the palace. Nur al-Din, while he accepted the payments and gifts, did not express his approval. Instead of the occasional subvention, it seems, he wanted an agreed upon steady tribute. Saladin, for his part, appeared to be following his father’s advice concerning Ayyubid relations with Nur al-Din. Striking coins, sending funds, including Nur al-Din’s name in the khutba, and promising to join in future campaigns against the Franks were all designed to assuage Nur al-Din’s concerns. Nevertheless, the tension between the two remained.19

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY Wars and change of overlord certainly impacted the Egyptian economy, both negatively and positively, but nevertheless it retained its resilience and productivity. For Saladin, it was a rich resource upon which he could build his rule in the 1169–1174 period and his empire thereafter. His colleagues—his relatives, mamlukes, amirs, officers, officials, and others—also found Egypt to be a plenteous place to live, work, and invest. Wars, battles, and sieges left their physical mark on the country. The various armies—Crusader, Shirkuh’s expeditionary force, and the Egyptians themselves—lived off the land, taking crops, stores of food and fodder, animals, and funds from villages For Saladin’s relations with the Sunni caliphate and Nur al-Din during this period, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 368; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 193–94; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 95–101; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 47–49, 59–61; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 94–97; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 9. 19

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and towns. During the siege of 1167, Alexandria sustained material damage and its orchards were burned; in 1168 the Crusaders depopulated and destroyed parts of Bilbais; in the same year, they devastated Tanis, Ashmun, and Minat Amr on the Nile river; in 1168 Shawar burned Fustat; in 1169, when Saladin’s cavalry defeated the Nubians and the Armenian archers, his soldiers burned their residential quarters; and in 1169, the CrusaderByzantine siege of Damietta left buildings in ruins. The economic and social consequences of war were also severe. Some quarters around Cairo never recovered. Either they became wasteland or new owners converted them to agricultural use. Some damaged towns did not regain the economic role they once enjoyed. In addition, the vibrant economies of both Alexandria and Bilbais were harmed. The former was a major trading city through which Egypt received vital imports, exported its own products, and handled transit trade. During the siege, this function ceased, but did return as both the Europeans and Saladin’s Egypt wished to resume their important trading relationship. Bilbais, once a center for milling grain, which supplied Egypt as well as Mecca and the pilgrims, was slower to regain its earlier role in that it had lost much of its population to the Crusader slave markets and many of the mills were destroyed. In some instances, the rulers responded vigorously to the needs created by the ravages of war. Shirkuh and subsequently Saladin helped the people of Fustat and the remaining people of Bilbais rebuild their homes and businesses, pumping funds into the economy and creating jobs. Similarly, anticipating more Crusader assaults on Alexandria, Saladin embarked on a large program to rebuild and strengthen the city’s walls, an exercise that demanded considerable labor. As recounted, Saladin built up his army over the years and continued to do so as he forged his empire. The expenditures for weapons, armor, siege engines, other military equipment, horses, and camels acted as another economic stimulant. Saladin also rebuilt the navy. Starting with virtually no warships in 1169, by 1179 his navy boasted 60 galleys and 20 freighters.20 While certainly 20

Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 102.

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contributing to his military strength, this major project created a demand for skilled labor. In addition, due to the very presence of his strong navy, Egyptian based merchants were freer to embark on Mediterranean trade, albeit limited in comparison to the very active Italian merchants and their fleets. The Fatimid government had owned a number of buildings in Cairo, Fustat, Alexandria, and other cities and towns. Officials serving the Fatimid caliph or vizier had often exploited them for their private benefit. Saladin reformed the system and redirected their use to service as hospitals, covered markets, jails, law colleges, and Sufi hostels. This change had the effect of stimulating commerce, providing welfare for the people, and creating jobs. Similarly, some of Saladin’s relatives, amirs, and officials, who had recently arrived in Egypt, invested in the country, primarily in bathhouses, urban caravansaries, and housing. Governments always need funds. Revenue from some iqtas went directly to the state treasury, as did rents from state-owned buildings. Moreover, as discussed, most iqta holders paid a portion of what they earned from their iqtas to the state. From the records, it is clear that Saladin paid very close attention to iqtas. During the first years of his Egyptian rule, he seized virtually all iqtas held by Fatimid officials and institutions and assigned them to his supporters as well as government offices and other institutions serving the public good. This resulted in a massive transfer of wealth and income streams. It was a true revolution, not in the sense of class relationships, but in the relationship between the ancien and new regimes. Another source of revenue in Egypt was a tax called mukus, a levy on service providers and on traders and merchants who were buying and selling. Under Islamic law, the mukus was not a legal tax. Legal taxes in the Muslim world were restricted to revenues from individuals’ wealth and property. Aware of the way Islamic law was honored in Syria and Iraq under Nur al-Din, Saladin and his advisors wanted to correct this extracanonical practice. Thus, while he was on the expedition in Transjordan in the fall of 1171, Saladin abolished the mukus tax, a highly popular measure, which merchants, traders, artisans, and manufacturers in the cities and ports applauded. Although officially eliminated, travelers did report that some local officials still enforced it, most likely without the central government’s knowledge.

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Saladin’s government, however, still needed income in addition to that derived from iqtas and buildings. Consequently, he turned to the zakat. Zakat, a form of alms giving for public benefit, is one of the five Pillars of Islam. Reinstituting a practice of both the Umayyads and the Abbasids, Saladin imposed zakat as a state tax, collected it, and utilized it for the public welfare as well as for other state purposes. Interestingly, even though Saladin was imposing major changes with respect to iqtas and taxes, in the rural area they had little meaning. The peasants were still peasants and an important source of the wealth for Egypt. Peasants not affected directly by the ravages of war, noticed little difference in their daily lives and economic situation as Saladin rewrote the rules. Notably, grain and commodity prices remained remarkably stable during this whole period. With respect to trade, Saladin had a defined policy. He was a protectionist in the sense that he wanted internal trade in Muslim lands to be in Muslim hands. However, he encouraged international trade between Muslims and Europeans as well as between Muslims and the Orient. In a letter written in the late 1170s or early 1180s to the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, “… he pointed out the danger to Islamic trade should the Franks succeed in seizing some point on the Red Sea, in addition to the foothold in Syria. This would threaten not only the pilgrim route to Mecca and Medina but also the activities of merchants in Yemen, and especially of the Karimis in Aden. Saladin, however, added in the same letter that trade with western Christians was in many ways advantageous to Islam, not least through the supply of strategic goods. If, however, the expulsion of the Franks from Syria were jihad, then preventing them from reaching the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean was also a sacred duty.”21 Following these principles, as Saladin gained control of the Egyptian government, he forbade European traders from reaching Cairo, a practice common in Fatimid times. However, he did encourage them to trade at Alexandria and allowed them to set up Subhi Labib, “Egyptian Commercial Policy in the Middle Ages,” in Cook, Economic History of the Middle East, 66. 21

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their own establishments, including commercial offices, housing, a bathhouse, and a church. By the mid 1170s, Saladin and others observed that there were many Italian ships in the Alexandria port. In 1187, it was reported, 38 ships from Pisa, Venice, Genoa and other Italian cities wintered in the Egyptian port. Trade was crucial to the Egyptian economy. From Europe, the country received strategic goods: weapons, lumber, iron, pitch, oakum, and slaves. Lumber, iron, and pitch were especially important for Saladin’s shipbuilding project. To Europe, they sent alum, natron, flax, fabrics, indigo, and small manufactured objects. Egypt was also the route for transit trade from the Orient, primarily spices, aromatics, dyes, and cloth. Controlling this exchange across Muslim lands, including Egypt, was lucrative for the traders and the government alike. While Mediterranean trade had declined in the twelfth century due to disruption caused by the presence of the Crusaders, it started to improve as Saladin’s government expanded its role. The expansion of his empire in North Africa encouraged trade along land and coastal routes to the west; the new regulations on internal trade left more funds in Egyptian hands; and the new stability and increased demand fostered more commercial activity and trade in Alexandria and Damietta. With respect to trade to the East, Saladin’s presence in Egypt and Nur al-Din’s in Damascus helped make the Transjordan overland caravans more secure. Their military men regularly traveled between the two cities and merchants joined them.22 *** For this section on economic conditions, the most relevant sources are: Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 108–15 and 132–35; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 49–51 and 53–57; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 73–75, 81–83, 101–5; Subhi Labib, “Egyptian Commercial Policy in the Middle Ages,” in Cook, Economic History of the Middle East, 63–77; Goiten, S.D. “Mediterranean Trade in the Eleventh Century.” In Cook, Economic History of the Middle East, 51–62; “The Old French Continuation of William of Tyre, 1184– 1197,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 66; Ibn Jubayr, Travels of Ibn Jubayr, 33, 42–45. 22

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During Fatimid times, Christians and Jews were allowed to gain more senior level government positions than was common in other parts of the Muslim world. The normal practice in the region was for them to hold technical positions in the bureaucracy. In Egypt, though, they frequently rose to be directors of whole departments and major offices. A few even rose to be head of the Fatimid army and vizier. The most famous was Bahram, an Armenian Christian, who acceded to the command of the army and later, in 1137, became vizier. Holding these positions, he was able to bring in a large number of Armenians from Anatolia who would later serve in the army and bureaucracy while others entered business as merchants and artisans. Bahram soon fell from power, but his legacy was a large Armenian community in Egypt. Upon gaining power, Saladin’s government installed rules then prevalent in Syria and Iraq with respect to Christians and Jews. They were made subject to the ghiyar regulations, namely, they were forbidden to ride horses and mules and were required to remove religious symbols from the external facades of their places of worship. During Saladin’s years, there were two waves of restrictions on religious minorities, one in 1172 and another in 1182. That there was a second wave indicates that enforcement had become lax in the interim, and would be lax once again. Under the new rules, the minorities were no longer allowed to head major offices, but the government still depended on a large cadre from both communities to staff vital government offices: war, taxation, disbursement, and management of the Nile. While minorities had lost some privileges, they still filled essential roles, which Saladin well recognized. Government prohibitions did not extend to private affairs. Saladin, his relatives, and his amirs retained many Christians and Jews to manage their private estates and businesses as well as serve as physicians in their courts. Maimonides, the famous Jewish physician, who prospered during these years, benefited from the patronage of Qadi al-Fadil, Saladin’s close advisor. Among the minorities, the Coptic Christians and the Jews fared the best, the Armenians the worst. As Saladin took control of Egypt, the former two groups looked on and then worked for those who prevailed. The Armenian archers sided with the losers and, in subsequent years, lost properties and position. The government took some Armenian private and church lands for its

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own purposes, but restored some holdings to the Coptic Church from which they had been expropriated by the Fatimids. The Armenian Patriarch, having lost his monastery, left Cairo for Jerusalem in 1172. The Coptic Church, a venerable and rich Egyptian institution, lost some lands, monasteries, and churches, but it did not suffer to the extent the Armenians did. Some Coptic families, for example the Muhadhdhabs, converted to Islam in order to retain their high-level posts in the Saladin administration.23

1173–1174 The 1173–1174 period was marked by events and themes that were similar to the previous two years: military expeditions across all of Egypt’s borders; challenges to Saladin’s rule inside Egypt; continued strain between Nur al-Din and Saladin; and a maritime assault on Alexandria, this time by the Norman kingdom based in Sicily. However, in May 1174, Nur al-Din—Saladin’s suzerain, role model, and nemesis—died. The passing of this historical figure, especially since his only son was just 11 years old, provided Saladin with a new opportunity, which he seized. In April 1173, Saladin mustered his cavalry and rode to Transjordan. His first order of business was to escort the 60,000-dinar payment and a number of valuable items from the Fatimid palace to Nur al-Din. Once the convoy safely passed the Crusader fortress at Karak, he turned back. Learning that Saladin was in Crusader territory, King Amalric assembled a small Frankish force and rode to the region of Hebron, on the west side of the Dead Sea. If Saladin had attacked Karak or Shawbak, Amalric was ready to cross the Wadi al-Araba and join in its defense. Saladin’s intentions were otherwise. His target was the bedouin who bloodied him in 1171. Bedouin who lived in Frankish-controlled lands frequently sold their services to the Crusaders as guides and auxiliary troops. Saladin’s plan was to punish the bedouin, push them out of the area, and thus help insure the safe-passage of For this section, the most relevant sources are: Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 185–93; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 55–56; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 14, 71; Goiten, “Mediterranean Trade in the Eleventh Century,” 51–62. 23

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convoys. Accordingly, he attacked their camps, destroyed their crops, and seized their animals. This was Saladin’s third expedition aimed at securing the route between Cairo and Damascus via Transjordan. Nur al-Din received the tribute from Egypt in early July 1173 when he was on a military campaign north of Aleppo in the region of Marash in Anatolia. Though he thanked Saladin for the funds and gifts, he was not pleased. Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, his loyal secretary who would later serve Saladin, wrote “‘…since the time when Egypt was taken Nur al-Din had wanted an agreed sum of money to be contributed which would help him meet his expenses of the Holy War… He was waiting for Saladin to suggest this on his own account and did not ask him for it.’”24 In this context, even though he was focused on Muslim political issues to his north, he decided to audit Saladin’s accounts in Egypt. This order would not be executed until early in 1174, but it is one more indication of the Nur al-Din–Saladin problematic relationship. On July 31, 1173, Ayyub suffered a riding accident and died on August 9. Saladin cut short his Transjordan campaign and returned to Cairo where he mourned his father, settled his estate, and redistributed the iqtas he had held. Military ventures were not restricted to Transjordan in 1173. As recounted, Taqi al-Din’s amir led an armed brigade into Libya where he captured Tripoli. Similarly, Turan-Shah, Saladin’s older brother, was also restless. Saladin decided to send him to Yemen. The ostensible reason for this mounted expedition was that some Yemenis retained Fatimid loyalties. In addition, Saladin’s aides claimed that Abd al-Nabi ibn Mahdi, the ruler of Zabid, a town in northwest Yemen, was both power hungry and a heretic who should be eliminated. More to the point, Abd al-Nabi “… had his own name … proclaimed in the Friday khutba. He was claiming that his rule would spread throughout the whole earth and that his cause would prosper.”25 In actuality, there was a combination of family, imperial, and commercial interests at play. Turan-Shah, who had successfully subdued antagonistic forces in Upper Egypt and 24 25

Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 62. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 48–49.

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Nubia, was an energetic and generous man. Even though he was assigned lucrative iqtas, he spent and gave away funds beyond his means. Thus, by sending Turan-Shah on an expedition to Yemen, Saladin would redirect his energies and, if successful, relieve the Egyptian treasury of a financial burden. For the same reasons Saladin had extended his reach to the West and the South, there was an equal logic to expand in Arabia. The venture would employ and, eventually, fund some of his army regiments and he would enlarge his realm in another direction. Aden on the southern coast of Yemen was one of the important ports in the Indian Ocean. Bringing it under his sway would encourage and facilitate trade with the Orient and Africa to the benefit of the merchants of his empire and the overall economy. Intriguingly, Turan-Shah’s focus on Yemen was sparked by a Yemeni poet, Umara al-Yamani, who, even though sympathetic to the Fatimids, frequented Turan-Shah’s court. He wrote poetry encouraging him to create his own realm in Yemen and promised him the support of one Hashim ibn Ghanim, the leader of the Sulaiman tribe, who was powerful in central Yemen. To fund and man the venture, Saladin assigned one year’s revenue from the region of Qus in Upper Egypt and provided some troops in addition to those Turan-Shah brought from his own iqtas. As preparations were being made, Saladin wrote Nur alDin, requesting permission for the project, which was promptly given. Turan-Shah marched on February 5, 1174 and arrived at Yanbu, the port of Mecca, on March 9. On May 13, he reached Zabid and eliminated Abd al-Nabi after which he gained control of the great Yemeni cities of Sana and Aden.26 Turning again to the relationship between Nur al-Din and Saladin, the tensions characterized as “‘[o]ur differences of opinion’” by Saladin27 continued in 1174. During the winter, Nur al-Din dispatched al-Muwaffaq ibn al-Qaisarani, one of his leading The best sources for the Yemeni expedition are: Ibn al-Athir, AlKamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 388–90; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 48–49; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 216–17; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 110–12; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 97–98; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 65–66. 27 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 49. 26

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officials, to audit the accounts in Cairo. Saladin, albeit unhappy about the attention to Egypt’s finances, did open his books to al-Muwaffaq, showing him detailed troop rosters, costs of maintaining the army, and the assignment of iqtas. He explained that the large country required considerable revenues for its administration and, more importantly, its security, a reality made manifestly clear by the frequent uprisings and Crusader assaults. AlMuwaffaq completed his investigation by the middle of May and left for Damascus. Saladin sent his own version of the accounts with Diya al-Din Isa who accompanied al-Muwaffaq on the journey. Diya al-Din also carried gifts and funds for Nur al-Din. Rumors were rife about a potential rupture between the two leaders. There were reports that both Nur al-Din and Saladin had mustered troops in the late spring or early summer, the former preparing to invade Egypt and the latter preparing to defend his rule in the country. No definitive archives exist that tell us why each leader was assembling cavalry units, only conjectures. Over the previous 2–3 years, both Nur al-Din and Saladin had gathered troops for various purposes: forays in Anatolia, Yemen, and North Africa; suppression of rebellions; police actions in Transjordan; and defense against Crusader attacks. Any one of these could have been the reason the two leaders mobilized. From another perspective, one or both may have been posturing, that is, showing each other they had military might.28 Saladin later told his biographer, Ibn Shaddad, “‘[w]e had heard that Nur alDin would perhaps attack us in Egypt. Several of our comrades advised that he should be openly resisted and his authority rejected and that his army should be met in battle to repel it if his hostile move became reality. I alone disagreed with him, urging that it was not right to say anything of that sort.’”29 It is equally important to note that Saladin had just sent a large force to Yemen and, in May, he wrote Turan-Shah, offering him more troops if they were needed. Thus, it is doubtful that Saladin feared an attack; otherwise, he would not have thinned out his This issue is discussed by: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 68–69; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 115–16; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 94–97. 29 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 49. 28

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own troops. With respect to the audit, Nur al-Din had not yet received it at the time he mustered his soldiers. Presumably, Nur al-Din had asked for the audit in order to lay the grounds for his demand for a regular tribute. Such a request had not yet been made and thus Saladin’s response had not yet been formulated. During the spring of 1174, another pro-Fatimid plot was hatched and thwarted. The conspirators included former Fatimid officials, Nubians, Armenians, and religious personalities. Notable among them were: Umara al-Yamani, the pro-Fatimid poet who frequented Turan-Shah’s court; Ibn Abd al-Qawi, a senior Shia cleric; Shubruma, a former civil servant from the Fatimid palace; and Abd al-Samad, a former Fatimid military officer. The plotters had enrolled, or at least they thought so, the support of King Amalric in Jerusalem and had even contacted Sinan, the leader of the Assassins (a singular Ismaili sect based in Syria and Persia). According to this version of the plot, Amalric and his knights were to attack Egypt in coordination with a Norman Sicilian maritime assault on Alexandria. As Saladin’s troops left Cairo and hurried to the defense of Egypt, the plotters planned to rise up and take the capital. The record is confused on this point. On the one hand, the conspiracy was supposed to role out during the spring harvest when many of the troops would be away from their garrisons, working their iqtas. On the other hand, the Sicilian fleet was not due to arrive until late July. In any event, Saladin’s men discovered the plot in mid March, probably before it was completely formulated. The conspirators were tried before a special court and then crucified, a particularly public and humiliating form of execution, on April 6, 1174. A few others were rounded up, tried, and put to death in the following weeks. The timing of these events was convenient for, if not planned by, Saladin. He had been warned that a Norman maritime fleet was coming. Thus, as with the plot of 1169, Saladin was able to use the plot of 1174 to clear away opposition so that he could meet external threats. Al-Muwaffaq was completing his audit at the time. Thus, the sight of a number of executed conspirators at key public places around the capital would certainly have been dramatic evidence for him that Egypt was not entirely tamed. In addition,

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Turan-Shah, Umara’s friend, was conveniently far away in Yemen and thus not able to intervene on behalf of the poet.30 *** Ending a major chapter in the history of the Middle East, Nur alDin died on May 15, 1174. On May 5, he had attended celebrations for his only son’s circumcision in Damascus. On May 6, while playing polo, he fell ill and succumbed nine days later. William of Tyre, the Christian chronicler of the Crusades wrote that Nur alDin “… was the greatest enemy of the Christian faith and the name of Christ, but also a prince who was skillful, perceptive, wise, and religious, at least according to the traditions adopted by his people.”31 Nur al-Din had followed in the footsteps of his father, Zangi, as he expanded his empire at the expense of both Muslim and Christian leaders. Unlike Zangi, he developed the concept of holy war as the justification for many of his actions, which both the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad and the civilian and religious elite in his own realm accepted and applauded. Saladin, as recounted, adopted the same strategy and themes. For Saladin, the passing of Nur al-Din opened a new chapter in his quest for empire and eventually his pursuit of holy war. Upon hearing of Nur al-Din’s death, he immediately expressed his condolences to his 11-year-old son, al-Salih Ismail, and confirmed his loyalty to his new suzerain. Al-Salih’s name was included in the khutba in Egyptian mosques. While Saladin had business to conclude in Egypt, most importantly its defense against the expected Norman invasion, by the fall of 1174, he would march on Damascus to realize his Ayyubid ambitions. The death of the great leader left a major void in the Syrian and Iraqi lands he had controlled. Unlike Saladin, Saif al-Din, the atabeg of Mosul, did not acknowledge the suzerainty of Nur alDin’s son, al-Salih. He took advantage of the new situation, For more details on this plot, see: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 67– 68; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 390–93; Abu Shama, AlRawdatain, pt. 1, 219–24; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 86–94; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 112–15. 31 Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 127. 30

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expanded his boundaries from Mosul on the Tigris to the eastern bank of the Euphrates, the Jazira region, and allowed wine drinking in public, an act that was anathema to the religiously strict Nur alDin. Saif al-Din’s elder brother, Imad al-Din Zangi, the atabeg of Sinjar also threw off the suzerainty of his uncle’s family. It should be noted that Saif al-Din and Imad al-Din were sons of an independent atabeg, Nur al-Din’s brother, Qutb al-Din Maudud. Thus, they could claim the right to be independent atabegs on their own. Saladin, however, was from a family of senior servants to the atabegs and did not enjoy such a claim. Neither Saif al-Din nor Imad al-Din had the resources to project power all the way to Damascus and Aleppo, and they certainly would not have done so in combination for they were uncompromising rivals. In addition, even though they were the closest blood relatives to al-Salih and thus appropriate regent(s), this was not to be. Nur al-Din had stipulated, according to Saladin, that the eunuch Sad al-Din Gumushtekin, one of Nur al-Din’s senior aides, should act as regent for al-Salih if he died before his son attained the age and wisdom to rule. In the western part of Nur al-Din’s realm—Damascus and Aleppo—rival groups vied for power. At the great leader’s death, al-Salih was physically in Damascus, not in Aleppo, his father’s capital. Senior officials of Damascus loosely banded together and attempted to assert control. The key members of this group were: Jamal al-Daula Raihan and Ibn Isa al-Jarrah, senior civil servants; the vizier al-Adl ibn al-Ajami; and the treasurer Ismail al-Khazan. The members of the group swore loyalty to each other and together appointed Shams al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam to be commander of the local military force after which they placed alSalih under his tutelage. In Aleppo, the pre-eminent Banu al-Daya family attempted to fill the leadership void. Ali, a famous amir from the strong town of Shaizar, was the most senior of the brothers. The others, Uthman of Qalat Jabar and Tell Bashir and Hasan of Harim rallied to the side of Ali. Together, they brought significant resources. They, in supposed cooperation with Gumushtekin, developed plans to bring al-Salih back to Aleppo. Aleppo, however, was wrought by strains between the Sunni Muslims and the Shia community. Under the leadership of Ibn al-Khashshab, the Shia, freed of Nur al-Din’s

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strict controls, tried to wrest a greater degree of freedom for their community, a direct challenge to the established Sunnis. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the unsettled conditions, in June Amalric marched on Banyas, which Nur al-Din had seized from the Crusaders in 1164. He besieged the town, but after two weeks Ibn al-Muqaddam, the commander of the Damascus garrison, approached him with an offer: a substantial payment and the release of Frankish prisoners held in Damascus in exchange for abandoning the siege. Amalric, whose health had declined, accepted the proffer. He marched back via Tiberias and Nablus. His health deteriorated further and on July 11, 1174, at the age of 38, he died. Amalric, though at times impetuous and acquisitive, had been an effective and aggressive leader of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Generations of lesser individuals followed him. Steven Runciman, the great historian of the Crusades, wrote: “Amalric was the last king of Christian Jerusalem worthy of his throne.”32 In the middle of the summer, the Aleppans and Damascenes played out their plots and intrigues. The Banu al-Daya brothers thought they had an agreement with Gumushtekin and one of the Damascus leaders, al-Adl, whereby al-Salih would be brought to Aleppo where he would be under the joint regency of Gumushtekin and Ali al-Daya. Ali sent a delegation made up of his brother Uthman and Gumushtekin to Damascus in mid July where they presented the case that Gumushtekin should be the regent, which according to Saladin was Nur al-Din’s wish. The disorganized and leaderless group in Damascus acquiesced to the request and Ibn al-Muqaddam relinquished his tutelage of al-Salih. Al-Salih left Damascus on July 25, 1174 with the delegation, arriving at the gates of Aleppo a few days later. At this point, the plot unfolded. Gumushtekin, al-Adl, and the warden of the Aleppo citadel, al-Nuri Shadhbakht, had secretly agreed to seize power. As Uthman approached the citadel, Hasan, his brother, met him. The conspirators apprehended them and their elder brother, Ali, and threw them into a dungeon. Their other potential challenger, the Shia leader Ibn al-Khashshab, was also captured and promptly killed. The ambitious Gumushtekin, who was now the most senior 32

Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 399.

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official in the citadel and al-Salih’s recognized regent, emerged as the strongman of what remained of Nur al-Din’s lands. Saladin observed developments in Syria and northern Iraq from afar. On June 6, as noted, he wrote a condolence letter to alSalih, expressing his loyalty. In late June and early July, he wrote to Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, a senior advisor to the late Nur al-Din, and separately, to Qadi ibn Abi Arsun, another senior official, then in Damascus, complaining about the Banyas agreement with Amalric. He asserted that this agreement freed the Franks to attack in other regions and gave them the resources to do so. He claimed that he had started his own march in defense of Banyas, but stopped upon hearing of the agreement. In another letter at this time, he wrote that if Gumushtekin were not an acceptable regent in the eyes of the Syrians, he himself would serve in that capacity. The various Syrian parties all knew that Saladin was the strongest among all of the servants of Nur al-Din. Some respected his strength, but harshly criticized him as an upstart who was trying to climb above his station in life. In still another exchange, Saladin wrote to Ibn alMuqaddam, complaining of the way the Banu al-Daya were treated, especially in light of their many years of strong support for Nur alDin. In another letter, written perhaps in August 1174, Saladin laid out his approach to the messy Syrian events. “In the interests of Islam and its people we put first and foremost whatever will combine their forces and unite them in one purpose; in the interests of the House of Atabeg [Nur al-Din] we put first and foremost whatever will safeguard its root and its branch. Loyalty can only be the consequence of loyalty. We are in one valley and those who think ill of us are in another.”33 In this letter, it was clear to the Damascenes that Saladin asserted his own right, in the interest of the unity of Islam, to intervene in Syria and, he added, as world leaders frequently do in times of war: “You are either with us or against us.” While Saladin was formulating his plans for Syria and Iraq, he did have to look after two more challenges in Egypt. William II, the Norman King of Sicily, had earlier coordinated a joint attack with 33

text.

Gibb, Life of Saladin, 12. Many historians of the period cite the same

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King Amalric on the coast of Egypt. The two princes also counted on the pro-Fatimid plot to divert some of Saladin’s attentions and forces. William sent an armada of 200 galleys and 80 freight ships filled with soldiers, animals, provisions, and siege engines under the command of Tancred, Count of Lecce. The Normans—unaware that Amalric had died and thus the Crusaders had not marched and that the pro-Fatimid plot had been nipped in the bud—appeared off the Alexandrian coast on July 28, 1174. The Byzantine Emperor Manuel had alerted Saladin that a Norman assault was coming, but he did not know against which port. Forewarned, the Alexandrians sank their own ships to block the Normans’ ability to maneuver in the waterways. Nevertheless, on July 29, Tancred landed soldiers— reportedly 30,000 men, but probably an exaggeration—supplies, and catapults. In face of the magnitude of the attacking force, the Muslims retreated behind the city’s fortified walls. On July 30, the Normans started battering the walls with the catapults. On the same day, Saladin who was in Faqus 120 miles to the west of Alexandria was informed of the landing by pigeon post. Uncertain that this was the major assault, he immediately dispatched reinforcements to both Damietta and Alexandria. On July 31, the Alexandrian defenders stormed the Norman forces operating the catapults and managed to burn the equipment. On the same day, both the Normans and the Alexandrians received news that Saladin was only 20 miles from the city and, even though the report was erroneous, it had an effect. The Muslims made a bold night attack during which they surrounded 300 knights, all of whom they either killed or captured. The Normans, having suffered on the field and fearing Saladin’s imminent arrival, hastily boarded their ships and sailed home. In Upper Egypt, a serious uprising broke out in the summer in the region of Qus and Aswan. The rebels were essentially a hodgepodge of Nubians, bedouin, peasants, and pro-Fatimid elements. Their leader was Kanz al-Daula, amir of the Rabia bedouin and a former official in the Fatimid administration. Upon attaining power, Saladin had appointed him governor of Aswan and he had cooperated with Turan-Shah when the latter invaded Nubia in late 1172. Now, for his own reasons, Kanz al-Daula began marauding Upper Egypt. While certainly not regime threatening, Saladin was determined to terminate forcefully the revolt. Accordingly, “… he dispatched against him a large army

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bristling with weapons, made up of those who had tasted sweetness of ruling the land of Egypt and feared to lose it. He put in command of them his brother, al-Adil Saif al-Din, who led them forward until they came upon the enemy and met them in open battle, breaking them, killing a great number of them and thus removing their threat and suppressing their revolt. That was on September 7, 1174.”34 Thus ended what proved to be the last proFatimid revolt in Egypt. Al-Adil returned to Cairo at the end of September. With the defeat of the Normans and the Upper Egypt rebels, Saladin was now free to turn his total attention to Syria. He appointed the successful al-Adil as his deputy to manage Egyptian affairs in his absence. As the correspondence cited above shows, Saladin was determined to advance on Damascus and claim Syria for his growing empire. He wanted his move, though, to be perceived as legitimate and by invitation. He did not want his critics to be able to claim that he was just one more rapacious military leader. Accordingly, at his behest, Qadi al-Fadil wrote a long letter35 to alMustadi, the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, most likely in late September or early October 1174. In it, he recorded many details about Saladin’s feats in Egypt, Yemen, and North Africa and about his elimination of Fatimid Shia rule and reinstatement of Sunni Islam in Egypt. Foremost, he emphasized Saladin’s role in the holy war against the Crusaders and his aspiration to free Jerusalem and bring it back under Muslim authority. Throughout the long epistle, Qadi al-Fadil presented the successes as the result of Ayyubid policies and initiatives. He omitted Nur al-Din’s central role. Portrayed in these terms, especially Saladin’s focus on holy war and his desire to regain Jerusalem, Qadi al-Fadil concluded by asking for a diploma entitling Saladin to rule Egypt, Yemen, and North Africa, but also Syria and other lands that had been part of Nur alDin’s domain. In essence, Qadi al-Fadil asserted, in light of Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 49–50. The text of the letter may be found in: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 241–44. Lev also discusses the letter in some detail. Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 101–7. 34 35

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Saladin’s legitimate goals on the one hand and the avaricious power play in Aleppo on the other, that Saladin should be the recognized holder of all of these lands. (As recounted in the next chapter, alMustadi did not respond until May 1175, well after Saladin had successfully secured control over parts of Syria.) The leaders of Damascus were initially unaware of the coup de force in Aleppo. As they learned of the events, they began to survey the challenges facing them. Saif al-Din in Mosul, Gumushtekin in Aleppo, Saladin in Egypt, and certainly the Crusaders coveted the great commercial city and its rich oasis gardens and orchards. The Damascenes were especially troubled by how the blatantly ambitious Gumushtekin had thrown the respected Aleppo amirs, the Banu al-Daya brothers, into a dungeon. Fearful of meeting a similar fate, they invited Saif al-Din of Mosul, Nur al-Din’s nephew, to become suzerain of Damascus. Knowing he lacked the resources to assume this burden, he declined. Surveying the political and military environment, they turned to Saladin for protection. Ibn al-Muqaddam, one of the more powerful amirs and commander of the Damascus garrison, was the first personality to invite Saladin to the city. His letter was accompanied by a similar letter from Shams al-Din Sadiq, an amir of lesser stature who ruled over Busra, some 70 miles south of Damascus. Having arranged matters in Egypt and in receipt of the invitations, Saladin marched. He left Bilbais on October 12 and reached Busra on October 23, a very rapid journey. As he departed Egypt, he brought only 700 cavalry, a relatively small force. He anticipated that many men would join the expedition—and this proved to correct. He wrote his nephew, Farrukh-Shah, that he was joined by “‘amirs, soldiers, Turks, Kurds, and bedouin’”36 in what turned out to be a triumphal procession. Among the amirs joining his men were: Sad al-Din ibn Anar whose father had held Damascus in the service of the Burids, Shams al-Din Sadiq, and Nasir al-Din Muhammad, the son of Shirkuh. The Crusaders at Jerusalem did not send any troops to oppose his progress even though he was riding through territory they ostensibly controlled. 36

Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 81.

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Aleppo was too far away and probably did not know where he was, although they surely anticipated that he would advance on Damascus. On October 27, Saladin halted at Jisr al-Khashab, 10 miles from Damascus, where a large number of soldiers joined him. On the following day, he reached the city gates. Elements of the garrison made a show of resistance, but they quickly asked for quarter and Saladin re-entered the city of his youth. Saladin quickly took a number of steps to secure his position and smooth ruffled feelings. He occupied his father’s old house in the city, using this as a symbol of continuity and hospitality. He liberally distributed guarantees of immunity to amirs and other officials who might have feared the new ruler. He distributed “huge sums of money,”37 some of which he brought from Cairo, but the bulk came from the Damascus treasury over which he now had control. He reopened the city’s market, which merchants had closed due to the uncertainty inherent in the recent events. As in Cairo, he cancelled the mukus taxes, a popular move among the commercial and artisan classes. One of the officials, Jamal al-Daula Raihan, who figured in the group that loosely ruled Damascus at the death of Nur al-Din, had shut himself in the city’s citadel. Saif al-Islam Tughtakin, one of Saladin’s brothers, surrounded the building with heavily armed cavalry, but Raihan came to terms and acquiesced without bloodshed. Now installed in the grand city, Saladin continued to insist that he had come in the service of Nur al-Din’s family. Ibn Shaddad, one of the Arab chroniclers, wrote that Saladin “… arrived in Syria demanding that he himself should take on al-Salih’s guardianship, direct his affairs and set straight what had gone awry.”38 During these heady days, such a message had a calming effect: It was a sign of continuity in a difficult time. Saladin was asserting that he was the better regent and he wished to preserve the legitimate rule of Nur al-Din’s minor son. However, such a statement is in apparent contradiction to the very message Qadi al-Fadil sent to the Abbasid caliph whereby Saladin was asking for a diploma of investiture for himself, which would mean 37 38

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 51. Ibid.

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that allegiance to his suzerain would end. During those early weeks, city leaders only heard his public statements. The missive addressed to Baghdad was not, at this time, shared with them. Saladin was now in Damascus. Using skills he honed in Cairo, he shortly established effective control and would soon reach out beyond Damascus.39 Interestingly, at about this time, some of Saladin’s amirs, officers, and other supporters started calling him “sultan.” Saladin’s official title was still “al-malik,” which in Arabic, means king. He never officially enjoyed the title of sultan. In the literature, he is variously referred to as sultan, al-malik, Salah al-Din, or just plain Saladin.

The most salient sources for the period covering Nur al-Din’s death to Saladin’s establishment in Damascus are: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 227–37; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 393–405; Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij al-Kurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyoub, vol. 1, 258–62; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 49–51; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 126–28; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 69–84, 97–98; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 117–28; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 95–96, 101–7; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 398–404. 39

CHAPTER FIVE INDEPENDENT EMPIRE: 1174–1176 Saladin’s move to Damascus opened a completely new chapter in his career. Some key events, conditions in the Middle East, his own thinking, and ideas that appealed to his central supporters helped develop the direction he would follow. First, the death of prominent leaders had presented opportunities. In 1169, Saladin inherited Egypt from Shirkuh and he quickly added Yemen and parts of North Africa to his realm, though under the suzerainty of Nur al-Din. The demise of Nur al-Din in 1174, leaving only a young son, opened the door to Damascus. Following Amalric’s death in the same year, the Crusaders were certainly still a threat, but they suffered from weak and fractious leadership. Second, disunity in the lands of Islam provided both challenges and opportunities. Saladin ruled Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Damascus. Al-Salih, Nur al-Din’s young son under the guardianship of Gumushtekin, was suzerain of only remnants of his father’s domain, Aleppo and a few surrounding towns. Saif al-Din, grandson of Zangi—as was al-Salih—commanded Mosul and its hinterland, including the Jazira. Imad al-Din Zangi, another Zangi grandson, was the lord of Sinjar, west of Mosul. There were other leaders, descendants of the Seljuk Turks for the most part, to the north of Aleppo and Mosul. Still other Muslim dynasties ruled further to the east in Persia and Central Asia and others to the west in North Africa and Spain. Disunity thus was the rule. Many states were small with commensurately weak military forces. Accordingly, no state was strong enough to challenge the Crusaders. This endemic condition was also an opportunity: A strong and resolute leader, through diplomacy, propaganda, and force, could potentially bring some weak states under his suzerainty. Third, Saladin’s own contemporaries as well as scholars have debated at length Saladin’s motivation for building an empire and 119

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fighting the holy war. Some conclude that he was little different from other leaders who only wanted to expand their realms for personal and familial benefit. Others contend that he was different, that he truly believed in the unity of Islam and the centrality of the holy war to regain Jerusalem and the rest of western Syria, including Palestine and Lebanon, for the Muslims.1 At Saladin’s instruction, Qadi al-Fadil wrote a letter in the fall of 1174, cited above, to the Abbasid caliph, requesting a diploma of investiture for all of the lands Nur al-Din had held, even though Saladin did not control any of Nur al-Din’s Syrian, Iraqi, or Anatolian lands at the time the letter was written. Equally, for the most part, he appointed his brothers, relatives, and, later, his sons as lords of the lands under his rule. In addition, during the first 12 years after Nur al-Din’s death, he spent much more time and energy acquiring territories for his realm in Muslim-held lands than from the Crusader states. This pattern points to personal and family ambition. On the other hand, in letters to the caliph and many others, Saladin always couched his actions and intended actions in terms of the unity of Islam and holy war. He argued that to address successfully the Crusader presence, he had to have a large empire behind him. The men-at-arms from Egypt and Damascus were not sufficient; he needed to double the force—and those men could only come from Aleppo, Mosul, Jazira, and Diyar Bakr (Map 5). Equally important, from a tactical perspective, whenever he moved against an opponent, he had to protect his flank. Thus, if he were to fight the Crusaders, he wanted the Muslim cities to the north and to the east to be on his side or at least be neutral. The corollary to this thinking was that when he campaigned to the north or east, Among the early Arab historians, Ibn al-Athir asserts that Saladin was motivated by ambition. Ibn Shaddad, Imad al-Din, and Abu Shama contend that he was motivated by the need for the unity of Islam and holy war. Among writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Ehrenkreutz is close to the former, while Gibb and Lane-Poole are part of the latter group. Lyons and Jackson as well as Lev are in the middle, saying that both sets of motivations were operative. Hillenbrand offers an excellent discussion of this subject. Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 193–95. 1

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he sought truces with the Franks in order to protect his western flank. After he gathered the lands of the late Nur al-Din under his suzerainty, he turned his full attention to the Crusader presence. These actions point to holy war and religion as a major element in his thinking. In sum, it appears that Saladin acted out of both ambition and religious conviction; the two motivations coexisted throughout his empire years. Fourth, throughout these years, Saladin and his secretaries continually wrote letters to the Abbasid caliph and his officials, leaders across his domain, and others in neighboring lands, making the case for the unity of Islam, his fidelity to the Abbasid caliph, and his devotion to holy war. These messages were read and discussed in diwans, mosques, and other public fora. Some contended that they were simply propaganda, an attempt to persuade people that his motives and actions were moral and in service of religion. The audiences for these messages, aside from the caliph and his officials, were his supporters and potential supporters: his military, including amirs, officers, mamlukes, and soldiers; the religious class and senior civil servants; and the people at large, especially in the cities and towns. While some of his followers were primarily interested in power, wealth, iqtas, and the good life, many others were moved by religion. Islam, its unity, and holy war were central for them. In the twelfth century as today, perception is important. Thus for many, it was crucial that Saladin be perceived as a moral and just ruler. His propaganda machine, as well as his actions, helped maintain this image. Consequently, his supporters retained their loyalty and, for the most part, waited patiently for Saladin to complete his empire and turn to holy war.2 *** It is worth reiterating that Nur al-Din was perceived as moral and just. Also, he was the first Muslim in this era to utilize the concept of holy war. While his father, Zangi, successfully fought the Crusaders, he did not couch the campaign in term of holy war. In addition, Nur al-Din, despite his claim to be primarily motivated by holy war, spent considerable effort and wealth building his domain in Muslim lands, a pattern Saladin followed. 2

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Having consolidated his rule in Damascus, Saladin turned his attention to northern Syria, especially Aleppo, al-Salih’s capital. He wrote the 11-year-old boy: “‘I have come from Egypt in service to you, to fulfill an obligation out of respect for my deceased overlord [Nur al-Din]. I plead with you not to heed people [Gumushtekin and others] around you, for they undermine your status and corrupt your authority. As to my aim, I strive only for the unity of Islam against the Franks.’”3 Gumushtekin and other Aleppo leaders reacted angrily. They sent a delegation to Damascus headed by Qutb al-Din Inal, one of Nur al-Din’s amirs who decamped Cairo when Saladin was elevated in 1169. A known opponent of Saladin, he minced no words in Damascus. Pointing to his sword, he said Nur al-Din’s weapons gave him Egypt and, if need be, would drive him back to Cairo. Qutb al-Din added that Saladin, who coveted his late master’s lands, was only one of Nur al-Din’s boys and he should remember his place. Saladin gave his standard response: He had come to secure the unity of Islam for holy war and he was there “‘… to emancipate the boy from the control of you and of your associates, for you are the cause of the collapse of his kingdom.’”4 Saladin’s assertion in these two statements was disingenuous. On the one hand, he was claiming he was there to serve al-Salih, son of Nur alDin. On the other, Qadi al-Fadil, on Saladin’s behalf, had recently asked Baghdad for a diploma covering all of the lands Nur al-Din held at his death. This contradiction would continue until Saladin freed himself from the suzerainty of the house of Nur al-Din in the spring of 1175. The two sides stated their positions, but it was Saladin who was prepared to act. Leaving his brother Tughtakin in charge of Damascus, he left the city in early December 1174 and arrived outside Homs (Map 4), half way between his base and Aleppo, on the eighth. His campaign was demonstrably popular. He had left Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi, Mirat al-Zaman, 328. Also cited in: Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 128. Ehrenkreutz translation, with my inserts. Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi is an Arab historian of the thirteenth century. 4 Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi, Mirat al-Zaman, 328. Also cited in: Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 129. Ehrenkreutz translation. 3

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Damascus with a modest force, but many volunteers, reaching 7,000 mounted men by the time he reached Homs, augmented it. Because Homs did not immediately capitulate, he attacked on December 10 and captured the town—but not its citadel—without difficulty. Leaving a small force to contain the fortress, he marched 30 miles north to Hama. Izz al-Din Jurdik, Saladin’s old colleague who helped him seize the Egyptian Vizier Shawar in 1169, held the city. Izz al-Din joined Saladin at Rastan outside the town where they negotiated through the night. At the conclusion, Izz al-Din turned the town over to Saladin, but left its citadel in the care of his brother. Izz alDin traveled at once to Aleppo to negotiate a general agreement among all parties. For unknown reasons, however, the Aleppo leaders arrested him and threw him into a dungeon with the Banu al-Daya brothers. On his advance north, Saladin learned of the arrest, immediately returned to Hama and informed Izz al-Din’s brother who then gave the citadel to Saladin and joined his march to Aleppo. On December 30, 1174, Saladin reached Aleppo, a large city with strong walls and a formidable citadel that has foundations dating to biblical times. Saladin may have hoped his arrival would spark a popular groundswell as had occurred in Damascus. While some Aleppo soldiers did join his force, the majority stayed with Gumushtekin and his amirs. To rally the city, they asked the young al-Salih to address the general population. Breaking into tears, he appealed for their help. To strengthen the call, Gumushtekin rescinded some of the harsh measures that had recently been put into place against the city’s Shia population. With this popular support, the Aleppo leaders stood defiantly against Saladin. Lacking sufficient military power to challenge Saladin directly, the Aleppans approached dangerous allies. In their hope to remove Saladin permanently, they contacted Rashid al-Din Sinan, the Ismaili leader of the so-called Assassins who was known as the “Old Man of the Mountain.” Presumably, the agreement involved the assassination of Saladin in exchange for a payment and perhaps some territory. The Ismailis, who lived in the Nusairi Mountains in western Syria as well as in mountainous redoubts in Persia, were opposed to the Fatimid Ismailis of Egypt for their own doctrinal reasons. Sinan’s team successfully penetrated Saladin’s camp, but Khumartekin, amir of Bu Qabais which neighbors the Ismaili

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region, recognized one of the assassins and was able to warn Saladin and his men. In the ensuing fight, the assassination squad killed Khumartekin. One Assassin reached Saladin, but his amirs and mamlukes decapitated him. Saladin’s men eventually killed all members of the team, but not without their own losses. Saladin, however, would hear from Sinan again. The Crusaders entered the next phase of the struggle. Upon Amalric’s death in the summer of 1174, his nephew, Baldwin IV who suffered from leprosy, acceded to the throne. After several months of squabbling, the Frankish lords finally appointed Count Raymond III of Tripoli as regent for Baldwin who was still a minor. Raymond knew the Muslims very well, for he had spent many years in Nur al-Din’s prison where he learned Arabic and many local customs. Raymond and his fellow barons concluded that to check the ambitious Saladin, the Crusaders should support al-Salih. On their own or, according to some Arab historians, in agreement with the Aleppans, Raymond led a Frankish attack on Homs. Saladin, because he called himself the champion of holy war, felt compelled to abandon his show of force before Aleppo’s walls and make a forced march in relief of Homs. Rather than confront Saladin, the Franks withdrew to the grand fortress of Crac des Chevaliers. Saladin then besieged the Homs’ citadel. On March 17, 1175, after his sappers undermined its walls and his catapults knocked holes in them for a month, its garrison surrendered. Twelve days later, Baalbek, his boyhood home, capitulated as he arrived at its gates. With these conquests, southern and central Syria was in Saladin’s hands. Meanwhile, the Aleppans, thankful or in payment for the Crusaders’ help, released Reynald of Châtillon, who would become the lord of Karak and a particular nemesis of Saladin, as well as Joscelin of Courtenay, the titular Count of Edessa.5 Both had been held in Nur al-Din’s dungeons for years. During the next two weeks, Saladin engaged in a flurry of negotiations, diplomacy, and military preparations. Al-Salih at the direction of Gumushtekin had requested that the lord of Mosul, his Some historians date this release in 1175, others in 1176. Whichever was the case, the release was a quid pro quo for the Franks’ help for alSalih and Aleppo. 5

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cousin Saif al-Din, come to his assistance with a military force. Saif al-Din, however, was busy besieging his brother, Imad al-Din Zangi, in Sinjar (Map 5) with the intent of bringing him under his suzerainty. Aware of the bitter sibling rivalry, Saladin had been in contact with Imad al-Din in the summer of 1174. Through their correspondence, they agreed to provide each other assistance. Honoring this understanding, Saladin later sent a small cavalry contingent to aid Imad al-Din. Even though he was otherwise engaged with his recalcitrant brother, Saif al-Din did dispatch a large cavalry force under the command of his younger brother, Izz al-Din Masud. Joined by a contingent from Aleppo, he arrived in the Hama region in early April. Saladin immediately left Baalbek and marched to Hama. Initially, they negotiated, Saladin on one side and Gumushtekin and al-Adl ibn al-Ajami on the other. During this period, Saladin’s military presence gave the allies the impression that he only had a modest force—one they could likely defeat in battle—which encouraged the Aleppo-Mosul allies to escalate their demands. Meanwhile, Saladin was making his own preparations. To protect his flank against a Frankish assault, his diplomats, unbeknownst to the allies, concluded a truce with the Crusaders, taking them out of the equation. In exchange for the truce, Saladin released Crusader prisoners. Weeks earlier, he had communicated with Egypt, asking for reinforcements. His talented and loyal relatives responded. Farrukh-Shah and Taqi al-Din, his nephews, and Shihab al-Din al-Harimi, his maternal uncle, all of whom had provided crucial assistance in Egypt, brought a number of regiments, considerably increasing Saladin’s military force. Thus, the two weeks of negotiations that Saladin knew would be futile, gave him the window to neutralize the Franks and augment his army while giving the allies the impression that he was undermanned.6 Saladin and the allies met at the Horns of Hama, north of the town of Hama, on April 13, 1175. Each side fielded about 10,000 Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 90–93. Lyons and Jackson sort out this complex series of events very clearly and point out Saladin’s tactical and strategic acumen. 6

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riders. Saladin commanded his center and the two Egyptian units covered the left and right flanks. After hours of furious battle, Saladin’s cavalry prevailed. The Aleppo-Mosul brigades were driven back and then broke and retreated in an unorganized rout, abandoning their baggage and many horses. It was rumored that Saladin’s agents had bribed some of the allies’ amirs and officers, undermining the morale of a number their units. Saladin allowed his soldiers to seize all of the available booty, baggage, and animals, but forbade them from following the defeated army. Some allied soldiers and officers had been captured, but Saladin quickly released them and allowed them to return to their homes. From a strategic standpoint, Saladin wanted no more killing. His vision was for these very cities to accede to his suzerainty and provide him men and means to pursue holy war in the future. At the conclusion of the battle, Saladin rode to Aleppo in victory. While vanquished on the battlefield, the city was not defeated and was certainly not willing to open its gates to Saladin. Al-Salih along with Saif al-Din of Mosul wanted to preserve their lands for the house of Zangi. They were not willing to give themselves in vassalage to the Kurd Saladin, who had been in service to Zangi’s son, Nur al-Din. Indeed, this ethnic identity and dynastic rivalry was to play a role throughout the next several years. Saladin, however, did negotiate an agreement with the leaders of Aleppo. His possession of Homs and Hama was recognized and augmented by Maarrat and Kafr Tab, north of Hama. Prisoners held by Aleppo, notably the Banu al-Daya brothers and Izz al-Din Jurdik, were released. The Aleppans agreed to join Saladin in future confrontations with the Crusaders, a pledge in which Saladin had little confidence. Very importantly, in this overall context of a new relationship and Aleppo’s recognition of his Syrian domain, Saladin declared he was no longer under the suzerainty of the heirs to Nur al-Din. After both parties reached the new understanding, Saladin quit Aleppo for Hama. Shihab al-Din Bashir, the Abbasid caliph’s envoy met him there with al-Mustadi’s reply to Qadi al-Fadil’s letter of fall 1174 in which he had requested a broad diploma of investiture. The caliph’s diploma recognized reality. It covered all the lands Saladin currently held, but explicitly excluded Aleppo, Mosul, and their hinterlands. As part of this recognition, the envoy presented Saladin with robes of honor from the caliph, but he had

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also sent robes of honor to al-Salih, underlining his neutrality. In his message, the caliph reminded Saladin of the need to prosecute true holy war, not just raids into Frankish lands. While certainly not pleased by the limits of the diploma, Saladin accepted it. For Saladin’s supporters, the caliphal recognition was an important sign of legitimacy. It had resonance among the amirs and soldiers, religious personnel and civil servants, as well as the general population. By late spring, Saladin’s name was struck on coins and recited in the Friday khutba in mosques throughout his realm. The rulers of Mosul and Aleppo, the heirs of the Turkish atebeg Zangi, though, were furious that the upstart Kurd had been so elevated. Before turning south, Saladin sent a military contingent to the Nusairi Mountains, home of the Ismailis. There his soldiers pillaged villages in response to the Assassins’ attempt on his life. In late May, he returned to Damascus.7 *** In the city of his youth, Saladin turned to more mundane tasks. Having acquired territory, he allocated it to his relatives. The iqta of Homs was given to Nasir al-Din Muhammad, Shirkuh’s son; Shirkuh had held that iqta in Nur al-Din’s time. Shihab al-Din alHarimi, who had come from Egypt to assist in the campaign, was given the iqta of Hama. Taqi al-Din, also from Egypt, was made governor of Damascus in place of Tughtakin. Thinking that al-Adil in Egypt needed additional support, he sent his trusted advisor Qadi al-Fadil to Cairo. Farrukh-Shah returned to Egypt with the qadi, taking up duties in defense of Damietta and later in the eastern desert against Crusader incursions. Many of the Egyptian based regiments and their amirs were allowed to return home. Imad al-Din al-Isfahani became Saladin’s secretary, but as deputy to Qadi al-Fadil, even though the latter was then in Egypt. The most salient sources for the period, late fall 1174 to late spring 1175, are: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 84–98; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 12–16; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 128–40; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 51–54; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 405–10; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 137–49; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 406–11; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 234–52; Richard, Crusades, 192. 7

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In late July 1175, a Crusader delegation visited Saladin outside Damascus to negotiate an armistice. Humphrey of Toron who befriended Saladin in Alexandria was a key member of the group. The two sides agreed to refrain from hostilities. The Franks also promised not to interfere in Saladin’s problems with Aleppo and, in exchange, Saladin released Frankish prisoners held in the Homs citadel. There was also a special codicil whereby if a great Crusader prince arrived from Europe, the agreement would be suspended and the local Franks could assist him in military matters against Saladin’s forces. Upon the departure of the prince, the armistice would be renewed.8 Such an agreement certainly contradicted the terms of Saladin’s diploma, namely to pursue the holy war, but it was obviously in accord with Saladin’s longer vision: Secure Aleppo and Mosul so they would provide men and wealth for the successful conduct of the holy war. The Normans of Sicily were not constrained by the armistice. Before Saladin’s regiments returned to Egypt in 1175, they made a probing attack against Tanis, an industrial city at one of the Nile outlets to the Mediterranean Sea. Saladin’s far-flung empire with troops marching to battle in various localities, it seems, invited adventurous attacks. The Normans repeated this venture in 1177 when they captured, sacked, and burned the town. Less successfully, a small Crusader naval unit attacked Tanis in 1180, but the Egyptian defenders drove off the fleet. Meanwhile, Saif al-Din of Mosul took the initiative to ally with Aleppo with the intent of attacking Saladin and driving him out of Syria. In the fall of 1175, his envoy negotiated a written understanding with Gumushtekin in Aleppo. The envoy then traveled to Damascus where he met Saladin. His instructions were to inform him that Saif al-Din wanted to expand the 1175 Aleppo accord, namely, Mosul was prepared to join in the peace agreement with him. However, due to either intrigue or ineptitude, the envoy mistakenly gave Saladin a copy of the just concluded agreement to

This codicil is mentioned in: Gibb, H.A.R. “The Rise of Saladin.” In Baldwin, History of the Crusades, 571. Also referred to in: Gibb, Life of Saladin, 22. 8

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attack him. At that, Saladin realized that the earlier Aleppo accord had lost its validity. Saladin immediately wrote to Egypt, asking his colleagues to send forces for an early spring confrontation. He also wrote to the caliph, informing him of this duplicity, which, in turn, would require Saladin to take forceful action. Saif al-Din, for his part, mustered troops from his city as well as Diyar Bakr and Jazira. Imad al-Din Zangi, his estranged brother, did not participate in the venture. After preparing a large and well-equipped army, Saif alDin marched to Aleppo where he negotiated at length with Gumushtekin, presumably about how they would divide territories and spoils of war after the anticipated successful battle. At the conclusion, al-Salih came to Saif al-Din’s camp for an emotional meeting after which several of the Aleppo amirs and their troops joined the expedition. The allies then rode to Tell Sultan, 25 miles to the south, where they camped. Not only had Saif al-Din brought the implements and men of war, but also dancing girls, wine, musical instruments, and treasure. His amirs and soldiers enjoyed themselves as they waited for Saladin. Saladin set out from Damascus around the first of April 1176. Farrukh-Shah, with his Egyptian brigades, had returned to Syria upon Saladin’s call and joined his uncle. In addition, Shams al-Din Sadiq of Busra, one of the two amirs who invited Saladin to come to Damascus in the summer of 1174, brought his troops. TuranShah, Saladin’s brother who went to Yemen in the spring of 1174, had decided to quit that country. He arrived in Damascus in mid April from which he sent a cavalry contingent to join Saladin. In all, Saladin had about 6,000 riders and Saif al-Din had a similar number.9 Saladin was 50 miles south of Tell Sultan on April 19 when his agents told him where Saif al-Din had camped. He sent his heavy baggage back to Hama and covered the distance in two days. On April 22, 1176, both sides drew up their armies in classical battle formation. Saladin commanded his center, Shams al-Din was Some of the early historians cite different numbers, both higher and lower. The data used by the more objective historians, however, do not point to a significant discrepancy in force sizes. 9

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in charge of the left wing and Farrukh-Shah probably led the right wing. A hill obscured Saladin’s reserves. Saif al-Din captained the allies’ center even though he was not an experienced commander. Senior officers led his left and right wings. As the battle commenced, the left wings of both armies encountered setbacks and Saladin lost two amirs. Saif al-Din decided to charge Saladin’s center, but did so in a disorganized manner, causing his formation to lose cohesion. Saladin led the countercharge against the opposing cavalrymen and utterly defeated them. They left the field in ignominy, mounted if they still had horses or on foot if they did not. The historical sources do not mention significant casualties. Thus, it appears that Saladin won, but not at a great human price. Emulating the pattern at the Horns of Hama, he did not let his cavalry pursue the defeated soldiers because his intent was still to bring Aleppo and Mosul into his empire. He did, however, let his soldiers pillage Saif al-Din’s abandoned, but well-stocked camp. Animals, weapons, treasure, and other booty were theirs. In the camp, Saladin’s men also liberated a number of caged birds: nightingales, doves, and parrots. Saladin forwarded these to Saif al-Din in Mosul with a note disparagingly saying he should focus on ornithology in the future, not military battles. Qadi al-Fadil wrote of the battle: “‘The trees of Saladin’s spears bear fruit, while those of the enemy cast no shadow.’”10 Saladin certainly won the day at Tell Sultan. However, Aleppo and Mosul still stood. After a few days rest, Saladin marched in force towards Aleppo, but without the intent of investing the recalcitrant city where both Sunnis and Shia had rallied in support of al-Salih. Rather, Saladin directed his attention to Buzaa, 25 miles east of Aleppo, which surrendered to him on May 4. Next, he invested Manbij, still further east of Aleppo, which was ruled by Saladin’s old enemy, Qutb al-Din Inal. Saladin was surprised when the tough old warrior capitulated without a fight. Saladin offered to give him Manbij’s considerable treasure if he would join his growing empire. Still intransigent, he decamped for Mosul and service to Saif al-Din. Qadi al-Fadil, British Museum Archives, cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 104. 10

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Saladin kept the treasure to finance the long campaign. Now that Saladin held the two towns, Buzaa and Manbij, he effectively blocked the road between Mosul and Aleppo. In the middle of May 1176, he also besieged Azaz, a well-fortified center to the north of Aleppo and the last point before the Frankish border and halfway between Edessa and Antioch. On May 22, the Assassins once again attempted to kill Saladin, perhaps in revenge for Saladin ravaging their villages in May 1175 or perhaps because Gumushtekin paid Sinan, “The Old Man of the Mountain,” to kill the Ayyubid leader. The assassination team, intent on regicide, was well prepared; some had even enrolled in Saladin’s personal guard. During the attack, one Assassin reached Saladin and cut his cheek. But for his body armor, the dagger might have inflicted greater bodily harm. Saladin grabbed the man’s dagger hand and Saif al-Din Yazkuj, one of the late Shirkuh’s mamlukes, dispatched him. Nasir al-Din Muhammad killed another. By then, the camp was aroused in defense of Saladin. All the Assassins were killed as was one of Saladin’s men. Dead Assassins and wounded guards were scattered around his tent. As would be expected, Saladin subsequently increased his personal security greatly, excluding people he did not know from his presence. On June 21, Azaz fell. Gumushtekin thought Saladin’s next target would be Harim, his iqta. Taking Harim, due west of Aleppo, would have completed the city’s encirclement. Accordingly, Gumushtekin rushed to defend his lands. Saladin, however, rode directly to Aleppo, arriving in late June 1176. Once again, there was a stalemate. Saladin could easily blockade the city, but, given its strong fortification and united population, it would have been difficult to capture it. Gumushtekin, realizing he had to return to the city to dominate the Aleppo side of negotiations, gained permission to cross Saladin’s lines in exchange for the release of some prisoners. The long and convoluted discussions dragged on to July 29. At the conclusion, the allies—Aleppo, Mosul, and Diyar Bakr—recognized Saladin’s control of Syria from Hama to the south as well as Buzaa and Manbij. Saladin recognized the house of Zangi as the rulers of Mosul and Aleppo and their respective territories and dropped his claim to be the rightful guardian of alSalih. As in 1175, the leaders of Mosul and Aleppo pledged to support Saladin in the holy war, again a promise that Saladin did

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not give credence. As to Azaz, it seems that Saladin gave it back to al-Salih. The town was distant from the core of his realm and would have been difficult to defend against either the Crusaders or the Aleppans. Historians, though, circulated a more romantic story about why Saladin returned Azaz: When the treaty was concluded, there came to Saladin a young girl, the little sister of es-Salih [al-Salih]. He received her with honour, and asked her “What is thy wish?” “The castle of Azaz,” she said. So he restored the castle to its old owners, loaded the princess with presents, and escorted her back to the gate of Aleppo at the head of his staff.11

On July 31, rather than return to Damascus, Saladin led his army to the Nusairi Mountains and invested Masyaf, the isolated but well-fortified headquarters of Sinan, the Ismaili leader. Seeking revenge for the attempt on his life, he ordered his troops to plunder the Assassins’ villages even though they were very poor. Strangely, after only a week’s siege, Saladin struck camp and rode to Damascus. Why? A number of explanations have been posited. The most likely is that Sinan sent a message to Shihab al-Din alHarimi, lord of Hama, which included severe threats and incentives. One version asserted that Sinan threatened the life of Saladin, his relatives, and his amirs.12 A more bizarre story is that Sinan himself entered Saladin’s tent as he slept. “The Old Man of the Mountain” left hot breads of a kind only Ismailis baked and a sheet of paper with a threatening verse pinned to the table with a poisoned dagger. Saladin awoke just as Sinan was leaving the tent and called his guard at once, but he also ordered his aides to secure a safe-passage from Sinan so he could leave the Nusairi Mountains.13 An equally exotic story was recorded by another Arab historian of the time:

Lane-Poole, Saladin, 146. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 108–9. 13 Lane-Poole, Saladin, 150–51. 11 12

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Sinan sent a messenger to Saladin and ordered him to deliver his message only in private. Saladin (God have mercy on him) had him searched, and when they found nothing dangerous on him he dismissed the assembly for him, leaving only a few people, and asked him to deliver the message. But he said: “My master ordered me not to deliver the message [unless in private].” Saladin then emptied the assembly save two Mamluks [mamlukes], and then said: “Give your message.” He replied: “I have been ordered only to deliver it in private.” Saladin said: “These two do not leave me. If you wish, deliver your message, and if not, return.” He said: “Why do you not send away these two as you sent away the others?” Saladin replied: “I regard these as my own sons, and they and I are as one.” Then the messenger turned to the two Mamluks and said: “If I ordered you in the name of my master to kill this Sultan, would you do so?” They answered yes, and drew their swords, saying: “Command us as you wish.” Sultan Saladin (God have mercy on him) was astounded, and the messenger left, taking them with him. And thereupon Saladin (God have mercy on him) inclined to make peace with him and enter into friendly relations with him.14

Whatever actually occurred, Sinan and Saladin came to some kind of understanding. Neither attacked the other for the rest of their lives. The Crusaders had observed for some months that Saladin’s army was far to the north. Breaking the armistice of the previous year, King Baldwin of Jerusalem and Count Raymond of Tripoli marched on the Biqa valley in July 1176. Ibn al-Muqaddam, the governor of Baalbek, acquitted himself well and drove off the Franks. However, later in the month, the Franks clashed with Turan-Shah’s regiment near Ain al-Jarr (today, Anjar) on the Damascus-Beirut road. Turan-Shah was roundly defeated, losing many soldiers. The remnants of his force scattered to the hills.

Lewis, Assassins, 116–17. The text is translated from the works of Kamal al-Dib Ibn al-Adim, a twelfth century Arab historian. 14

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Turan-Shah, though, proceeded to Hama where he greeted Saladin for the first time since 1174. Saladin arrived back in Damascus on August 25, 1176. He appointed Turan-Shah governor of Damascus, replacing Taqi alDin. The senior Damascus qadi had recently passed away. In his place, he appointed Ibn Abi Arsun who had recently left Aleppo to join Saladin’s court. Saladin’s envoy to Baghdad, Shams al-Din ibn Abi al-Mada, a man who presented well, both with the caliph’s officials and the men of literature, also died. Lastly, Saladin married Ismat al-Din Khatun, the widow of Nur al-Din and the sister of Sad al-Din Masud ibn Anar, a Damascus notable who had joined him on his march to the city. This obviously political marriage contributed to his status in the eyes of his supporters. After only two weeks in Damascus, he left for Cairo, arriving in triumph on September 22, 1176.15 A week earlier on September 17, 1176, far to the north in Anatolia, Emperor Manuel fielded a very large army, which met an equally large Seljuk army under Qilij-Arslan, Sultan of Rum, at Myriocephalum. After a day of fierce combat, Manuel’s force was destroyed, leaving very few survivors. The emperor escaped just with his vanguard. This defeat changed the military equation in the Middle East for decades. Heretofore, the Crusaders, despite mutual distrust, had relied on the Byzantine Empire for protection in the north. Now, they could no longer count on any support, leaving them without regional allies. Equally, in his calculations, Saladin did not have to take the Greeks into consideration as he planned future campaigns. *** The most salient sources for the period from spring 1175 to summer 1176 are: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 99–112; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 16–20; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 139–54; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 52–54; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 408–10; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 146–52; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 415–22; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 252–62; Lewis, Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople, 112–17; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 142–53. 15

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Putting his two years in Syria in perspective, Saladin had to be both pleased and displeased. On the positive side, he established dominance over much of Muslim Syria and both the Abbasid caliph and his adversaries in Aleppo and Mosul recognized his achievements. In addition, he twice survived assassination attempts and, apparently, reached a permanent accommodation with the Ismaili leader, Sinan. On the negative side, his vision of including Mosul and Aleppo in his realm was not realized. The Crusaders were still a major challenge as was demonstrated at Homs in 1175 and in the Biqa in 1176. Lastly, Saladin’s vaunted desire to engage in holy war was not very evident in the 1174–1176 period. He had put that goal on the shelf as he pursued his aim of creating the Ayyubid Empire from the lands of the late Nur al-Din.

CHAPTER SIX EXPANSION AND CONSOLIDATION FROM EGYPT TO IRAQ: 1176–1182 EGYPT: 1176–1178 Saladin’s first 12 months in Cairo were relatively calm. While he certainly focused on military preparedness, he did not muster his troops or embark on a campaign. His amirs, officers, and soldiers returned to their iqtas and families, a welcome relief from the expeditions of the previous two years. While Syria had been suffering from a serious drought, conditions in Egypt were much more positive. Utilizing the waters of the Nile, the industrious Egyptian peasants continued to produce rich harvests, providing food and industrial crops for the country and for export. In this context, Saladin reported to Baghdad that al-Adil’s government in Egypt was sound. It provided a just and proper judicial system and legal framework for the affairs of merchants, artisans, and civil servants. The people, treated fairly by the regime, were at ease and the roads and frontiers were secure, allowing for peaceful commercial, religious, and personal travel.1 Saladin’s portrayal of conditions in Egypt may have been over-generous; nevertheless, it did reflect the relatively peaceful environment the people were enjoying. During this period, Saladin initiated a number of large civil and military projects. Heretofore, Cairo and Fustat were two distinct cities, each with its own defense systems. He ordered his government to build a wall encompassing both urban areas and the Dispatch to the vizier at the court of the Abbasid caliph. British Museum Archives cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 113. 1

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construction of a massive citadel on a high hill between the two. Reflecting the obvious need for defense against Sicilian, Byzantine, and Frankish attacks, he also commanded the governors of Alexandria, Damietta, and Tanis to reinforce their walls. To fund this construction, Saladin dedicated the revenues of several iqtas. Some labor costs, which were extensive, were offset by the use of captured Frankish soldiers. In addition, Saladin, his relatives, amirs, and other officers and civil servants funded law colleges, hospitals, schools as well as markets and residential apartments.2 On the military front, Saladin reoutfitted his army, replacing weapons, armor, siege machines, and animals as needed. His navy needed more attention. He had started rebuilding the fleet prior to 1174. On his return to Egypt, he redoubled the program. His agents bought timber, iron, and pitch from Italian ports despite papal injunctions not to sell products that could be used for military purposes to the Muslims. He ensured that skilled shipwrights were available in the shipyards. Equally important, he gave the commanding admiral sufficient funds to recruit and keep sailors, an unpopular and nonprestigious career in Egypt. As noted, by 1179, his fully functional fleet counted 60 galleys and 20 freighters. In a letter to the Baghdad court in 1177, he wrote that he was developing both his army and navy to “‘grind the unbelievers as with a file from both sides’, land and sea.”3 In the spring of 1177, Saladin visited the Mediterranean coast with two of his sons, al-Afdal Ali and al-Aziz Uthman,4 seven and five respectively, where he inspected the fortified walls and shipbuilding. In Alexandria, he spent three days at one of the law colleges where he and his sons listened to traditions of the Prophet

In 1183, Ibn Jubayr reports that he saw the Cairene walls and citadel under construction and observes that a large number of Frankish slaves were working on the projects. Ibn Jubayr, Travels of Ibn Jubayr, 43. 3 Dispatch to the vizier at the court of the Abbasid caliph. British Museum Archives cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 113. 4 Al-Afdal Ali is usually referred to as al-Afdal in the literature. Al-Aziz Uthman is referred to as al-Aziz or Uthman, depending on the historian or chronicler. I use Uthman. 2

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Muhammad and engaged in theological conversations, one of his favorite pastimes. Saladin also increased the presence of his empire in the Hijaz ports where pilgrims landed on their way to Mecca. In the early 1170s, he had asserted his military presence in the region. In 1177, he abolished the tax on pilgrims, which local leaders had used to fund their administrations, but made up the lost revenues from state iqtas and other sources. This was popular with the pilgrims who, on their return home, spread positive stories about the just and beneficent new leader, enhancing his religious image. It also had the effect of relieving a fiscal burden on pilgrims, which in turn helped increase pilgrimage to Mecca, an economic benefit to Saladin’s realm.5 During the summer of 1177, there were rumors that the Crusaders and the Byzantines were going to mount a major attack on Muslim lands. Philip, Count of Flanders, landed at Acre with a large retinue of men in September. King Baldwin, very ill with malaria at the time, met him and offered him the regency if he would lead an invasion of Egypt. Even though Emperor Manuel’s army no longer existed, the Byzantines still had a formidable naval fleet. He dispatched 70 ships to Acre along with a delegation of notables who, they told Philip and Baldwin, were willing to finance the expedition. Philip hesitated and ultimately balked, fearful of the well-known strength of the Muslim army. The Byzantine navy returned home in disgust at the Franks’ unwillingness to undertake the campaign against the Muslims. In mid fall, Philip did join Raymond of Tripoli and a 100-knight unit from King Baldwin’s army in an attack on Homs. They pillaged the surrounding villages and extracted some booty, but soon lost it to a Muslim ambush. This attack and Saladin’s subsequent response did not violate the terms of the 1175 truce between Saladin and the Crusaders because of the presence of Philip of Flanders. Namely, as noted in the previous chapter, the armistice contained a special codicil whereby if a great prince In 1183, Ibn Jubayr records that Saladin had cancelled the tax on pilgrims and comments on the great popularity of the change in the law. Ibn Jubayr, Travels of Ibn Jubayr, 47–48, 72, 92–93. 5

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arrived from Europe, the agreement would be suspended, and the local Franks could assist him in military matters against Saladin’s forces. On November 14, 1177, the Crusaders besieged Hama. Shihab al-Din al-Harimi, Saladin’s uncle, held the town, but, due to his severe illness, he was not in a condition to put up a lively defense. However, Saif al-Din Ali al-Mashtub, a Kurdish amir who was by chance in the neighborhood, applied pressure on the Franks. After four days, they raised the siege and marched north. On December 5, 1177, Shihab al-Din, an effective military leader who had provided Saladin with valuable help and loyalty throughout his career, died.6 The Franks then moved up to Harim, a city in al-Salih’s realm to the west of Aleppo. Harim had been Gumushtekin’s iqta, but he and the young al-Salih had quarreled and al-Salih had him tortured and put to death. Initially Gumushtekin’s men in Harim revolted against al-Salih, but as the Franks approached in December, they lifted their mutiny. The Crusaders invested the town, but not vigorously. Apparently, the knights were enjoying themselves in nearby Antioch. In early spring 1178, al-Salih sent a message to Philip, Raymond, and Prince Bohemond of Antioch who had joined the group, that Saladin was back in Syria and he was the true enemy of the Franks and al-Salih. At that, they lifted the siege. Thus, despite months in the field, the Franks’ campaign did not have any positive results: no victory, no booty, no land. Philip traveled to Jerusalem for Easter after which he left the Holy Land in late spring 1178. In October 1177, Saladin learned that Philip of Flanders and the Byzantines would not join Baldwin in an attack on Egypt. He also heard that the Franks were mustering for the campaign in the north. He did not know if their aim was his territory, namely, Homs and Hama, or al-Salih’s land, possibly Harim. Nevertheless, as the proclaimed defender of the Muslims against the Crusaders and to take advantage of the supposed weakness of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in their southern territories as some of its men For the Crusader campaign in the north, see: Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 158; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 126–27. 6

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campaigned in the north, Saladin elected to lead his men to Palestine. He left Cairo on October 28, prepared his regiments in Bilbais, and crossed the frontier with a large force, 8–10,000 riders, into Crusader lands on November 18. Hearing that Saladin was coming, Baldwin hastily assembled about 500 knights and rode in defense of Ascalon. Observing that the Muslims bypassed Gaza, Baldwin called on the Templar knights, who were resident there, to join him. On November 23, the two sides skirmished outside the walls of Ascalon, but thinking he was overwhelmed by numbers, Baldwin withdrew behind the city walls. At this juncture, Saladin made a major error. Presumably, he calculated that Baldwin and his knights would not venture out and meet him in battle. Accordingly, he allowed many of his men to pillage the countryside, which they did as far as Ramla, Lydda, and even Qalqilya at the foot of the Samarian hills. Concerned that the Muslims were freely ravaging his lands, Baldwin decided to attack. Joined by the full Templar contingent from Gaza, he rode out of Ascalon on November 25, 1177. The two sides met, most likely at Tell al-Safiya (Map 3), about 15 miles northeast of Ascalon and a similar distance south of Ramla. (Some chroniclers place the ensuing battle at Ramla, others at Mons Gisardi or Montgisard.)7 Saladin had a brief warning that the Crusaders were coming in force, but he could not gather all of his disbursed troops. He ordered his entourage to sound trumpets and beat drums to alert those soldiers within earshot, but they could not assemble in a timely and orderly manner. Even as the battle was commencing, some of his cavalry were attempting to don their armor and find their weapons. Saladin’s men were still organizing their battle order as the Crusaders were readying their charge. Saladin later told Ibn Shaddad that

The various historians give different locations for this battle: Imad al-Din at Tell al-Safiya; Ibn Shaddad at Ramla; Guillaume de Tyr at Mons Gisardi (Montgisard, close to Ramla). Lyons and Jackson as well as Ehrenkreutz agree with Imad al-Din that the battle was at Tell al-Safiya. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 123; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 158. 7

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SALADIN. EMPIRE AND HOLY WAR [t]he Muslims had drawn up for battle and when the enemy approached, some of our men [Saladin’s amirs] decided that the right wing should cross to the left and the left should cross towards the center, in order that when battle was joined they might have at their back a hill known as Ramla Land. While they were occupied in this maneuver, the Franks charged them and God decreed their defeat.8

In the typical set piece battle, the Frankish heavily armored knights arranged themselves in a very close formation and then charged their opponent. The usual Muslim response was for the center to give way and then the flanks would attack from both sides. Saladin was taken by surprise. As Ibn Shaddad indicates, he was still putting his men in battle order and one of the wings was in the front of the center. Thus, as the Franks charged, the center was also occupied by a wing, and consequently the overall center was not in a position to give way. Fighting was heavy. Typically, Taqi alDin performed well. At his orders, his son Ahmad with some riders successfully charged the Franks. On a second charge, though, he was killed. Despite their valor, Saladin’s undermanned and illorganized cavalry was defeated by the knightly charges. Saladin’s men who were still standing, escaped to the south, some on horses, but many on foot. Frankish pursuers cut some down and others were captured and sold in slave markets. All of the Muslims’ light baggage was lost as were most of their riding and pack animals. Three Crusader knights attempted to capture or kill Saladin near the battlefield, but his mamluke guard was able to rescue him. When Qadi al-Fadil, who had remained in al-Arish on the northern Sinai coast, heard of the disaster by pigeon post, he hired bedouin and rode into the Sinai desert to find Saladin and his immediate party. Many Muslim soldiers suffered from lack of water and marauding bedouin as they crossed the dry sands on their retreat to Cairo. The victorious Crusaders, led by Baldwin, retired to Ascalon to celebrate their success at arms against Saladin. With the king were Balian and Baldwin of Ibelin and Hugh and William of 8

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 54.

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Galilee. Local lore said that even Saint George had fought with the knights.9 Within four days, all of Baldwin’s knights and soldiers had returned to the city. “One saw them arriving loaded with their spoils, trailing after them prisoners, herds of camels and horses, tents, and drunk with joy at their great victory.”10 Baldwin, however, did not pursue Saladin into Egypt. He knew his and his modest army’s limits. Rather, he focused on strengthening his borders against the Muslims. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Crusaders could simultaneously field armies in the north, at Homs and Harim, and the south, a sign of residual strength, despite the lack of large numbers their leaders could call to arms. Saladin took immediate steps to repair the damage. On the propaganda level, he sent letters to leaders throughout the empire, giving a whitewashed version of events, exaggerating Crusader losses, and minimizing his own. He obviously felt the need to broadcast a positive image to garner support as he intended to continue to build his empire. On the military front, many of his men eventually returned to the barracks. Citing their unorganized and disruptive behavior, he punished some Kurdish soldiers by denying them salaries. He recruited and trained new men to replace the fallen and captured. Egyptian workshops were busy manufacturing new armor and weapons. Even though Saladin suffered a major defeat in battle at Tell al-Safiya, his vision to grow his empire was unabated.11

Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 417. Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 171. 11 For the most important sources for this period, 1176–1178, in Egypt and southern Palestine, see: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 1, 264– 84; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 164–73; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 54; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 428–34; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 416–18; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 121–26; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 155–59 and 162–63 Gibb, Life of Saladin, 21–22; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 153–56; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 650–64. Imad alDin, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 3, 23–55, (16a–26a). The reference numbers for Al-Barq al-Shami are found beside the text and are included in the notes for this work. 9

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SYRIA, PALESTINE, AND THE UPPER EUPHRATES: 1178–1180 Four months after Tell al-Safiya, Saladin mustered his Egyptian army and rode to Damascus, arriving April 15, 1178. For the next 12 months, he occupied himself with issues near at hand and did not mount major military activities. Syria was still suffering from a severe drought. Consequently, because his iqta holders were realizing very small harvests, he could not prevail on them to join him in a major campaign. He wrote to the caliph in Baghdad optimistically saying that with a good harvest next year, he would march on Jerusalem. Saladin did have to deal with complicated family and administrative problems. During his absence in Egypt, his brother Turan-Shah neglected his duties as governor of Damascus, pursuing his own pleasures and, seemingly, drawing close to alSalih of Aleppo as he had to Fatimid supporters in Cairo. Saladin immediately replaced him with Farrukh-Shah who had proved his competence in both Egypt and Syria. Thinking that he was owed a significant iqta, Turan-Shah demanded Baalbek, the boyhood home he had shared with Saladin. Given his past service and the fraternal relationship, Saladin accommodated his demand. There was, however, a major problem. Ibn al-Muqaddam, the very amir who first invited Saladin to come to Damascus in 1174, held the Baalbek iqta. In its place, Saladin offered him a larger iqta in the north, but he refused, resulting in a prolonged standoff. In the summer of 1178, Saladin marched with a small force and camped outside Homs. At the time, a small contingent of Crusaders was raiding in the vicinity of Hama in violation of the truce of 1175. Philip of Flanders had left the Holy Land in late spring 1178 and thus the truce was once again in force. The commander of Hama, Nasir al-Din ibn Khumartigin who had temporarily replaced the late Shihab al-Din al-Harimi, met them in a major skirmish, killed their leader and several other raiders. He also took a number of prisoners whom he delivered to Saladin’s camp. Noting that the Frankish raiders were in violation of the armistice, Saladin ordered their execution by “men of piety.” Some say that his bitterness arising from the 1177 defeat at Tell al-Safiya played a role in his order. Not everyone enjoyed the spectacle. Qadi

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al-Fadil commented: “‘Men’s souls must always be naturally inclined to find it disgusting.’”12 In the fall, Saladin rode to the Biqa valley and camped outside Baalbek, effectively blockading the town. He reached out to Ibn alMuqaddam, sending him friendly and flattering messages. The tough old amir stuck to his position. After his fill of winter hunting, Saladin left for Damascus in January 1179, leaving a blocking force. By mid spring, Ibn al-Muqaddam’s garrison had suffered enough: food was running short. As he left Baalbek, he accepted the iqtas of Barin, Kafr Tab, and Maarrat, a plenteous exchange that insured that Ibn al-Muqaddam would remain an Ayyubid loyalist for the rest of his years.13 Before he turned his attention to Crusaders’ activities in 1179, Saladin had to address two matters. Sultan Qilij-Arslan, feeling strength after his great victory at Myriocephalum, attempted to project power to the south, into territories Saladin claimed as his rightful heritage from Nur al-Din’s lands. Specifically, Qilij-Arslan coveted Raban and Kabsun, to the north of Aleppo and Azaz in the Upper Euphrates region. He asserted that while Nur al-Din had taken them in 1173, now Nur al-Din’s son al-Salih was willing to cede them to Qilij-Arslan. Saladin objected to this attempt to grab these lands, which he wanted for his own empire, saying that, if needed, he would send forces to protect the towns. Indeed, even though Saladin needed troops to battle the Franks, in spring 1179 he dispatched Taqi al-Din with 1,000 horsemen to break QilijArslan’s siege of Raban. Taqi al-Din, an aggressive and capable military leader, met a much larger force and defeated it. Qilij-Arslan withdrew and refrained from challenging Saladin a second time. This victory also helped strengthen Saladin’s relations with the leaders of the Diyar Bakr region, specifically with Nur al-Din

Quoted in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 132. For the Ibn al-Muqaddam affair, see: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 2–5; Imad al-Din, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 3, 134–37 (102b–103b); Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 132–33; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 23–24; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 160–61. 12 13

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Muhammad of Hisn Kaifa who had written Saladin asking for help against Qilij-Arslan’s desire to take land in the region.14 Additionally in the spring of 1179, Saladin made some command changes. He ordered Turan-Shah, after a brief stay in Baalbek, to go to Alexandria, which he assigned to him as an iqta. On May 3, Turan-Shah left Damascus accompanied by 1,500 Egyptian-based troops that Saladin asked al-Adil to replace with fresh cavalry. Numerous merchants and other civilians accompanied him in sure knowledge that with such a large force they would not be subject to Crusader taxes or marauding. Saladin entrusted Hama to Taqi al-Din, replacing the recently deceased Shihab al-Din al-Harimi. It was from Hama that Taqi al-Din marched in defense of Raban and Kabsun. Nasir al-Din Muhammad ibn Shirkuh remained in Homs and Saladin presented Baalbek to Farrukh-Shah as an iqta. *** In 1178, perhaps flush with their success against Saladin at Tell alSafiya, the Crusaders started taking aggressive actions against the Muslims in violation of the 1175 armistice. The raids around Hama in the summer were noted above. In October, they started building a fortress at Jacob’s Ford (Bait al-Ahzan or House of Sorrows) on the Jordan River between Lake Huleh and the Sea of Galilee and to the south of Banyas, which Nur al-Din had captured, from the Crusaders in 1164. Situated just a short ride from Damascus, Jacob’s Ford held strategic importance for both Saladin and the Crusaders. Because the operative armistice forbade fortifications in the area, King Baldwin did not want to build there. However, the ever-aggressive Templars overruled him. The local Muslim peasants, some living under the authority of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and others under Saladin, objected to the presence of the fortress because it impeded their ordinary economic and social interchange, and they so informed Saladin. Even though Saladin was focused on the Ibn al-Muqaddam dispute at the time, he well For the Qilij-Arslan issues in 1179, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Barq alShami, vol. 3, 157–58, 172–74 (123a, 137b–138a); Gibb, Life of Saladin, 28– 29; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 161; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 137–38. 14

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recognized the new Crusader challenge. His first effort to resolve it was to offer Baldwin 100,000 gold pieces to terminate the project, but the overture was not accepted. Saladin then concluded that the treaty of 1175 was defunct and he vowed to destroy the structure. In the spring of 1179, Saladin’s agents reported that the Crusaders were planning to raid his territory. He sent Farrukh-Shah with about 1,000 cavalry to the Golan Heights, somewhere in the vicinity of Banyas or Qunaitra (Map 3). His orders were to locate the Crusader military contingent and inform Saladin by pigeon post whereupon he would immediately bring his cavalry brigades to engage the Franks. To Farrukh-Shah’ surprise, Baldwin scaled the Golan Heights at night and then let some of his men disperse to capture booty, primarily shepherds’ flocks. Baldwin then stumbled across Farrukh-Shah’s advance guard. Fighting as it retreated in the direction of the Muslims’ main force near Banyas, the Crusader cavalry rashly pursued it. Manning higher ground, Farrukh-Shah’s archers rained arrows on the Crusaders and their horses, killing and wounding many and completely disorganizing the Frankish force. Baldwin escaped only with the help of Humphrey of Toron’s own personal guard. During the fight, Humphrey was mortally wounded, dying shortly thereafter at his fort in Hunin (ChateauNeuf). Travelers in the vicinity informed Farrukh-Shah that they saw the retreating Franks and reported that all of the knights were wounded. Only then did Farrukh-Shah realize the extent of the almost fortuitous feat of his modest force. Saladin arrived with his men only to celebrate the victory. After this battle, Turan-Shah left for Egypt.15 In late spring 1179, in retaliation for the Frankish raid into his lands, Saladin sent units of regular troops and auxiliary bedouin to the vicinity of Sidon and Beirut to pillage the countryside. The drought was still negatively impacting the farmers and animal herders throughout the region. Consequently, aside from responding to the Crusader attacks, he wanted his men to return References for the Golan Heights battle are: Imad al-Din, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 3, 151–52 (118b); Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 419; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 136; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 667–70. 15

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with food and fodder to augment the scarce supplies in his Syrian territories. In April and May, he reconnoitered the land around Jacob’s Ford. On the first occasion, a representative of the caliph was with him. Having seen the Frankish threat to the Muslim realm, he left to make his report to the court in Baghdad. On May 16, Saladin briefly invested the fortress, but after five days, he raised the siege, returning to his camp at Tell al-Qadi near Banyas. One uncorroborated Crusader source reports that he withdrew because the Frankish defenders killed an amir.16 In late May and early June, Saladin was still in the field. On his orders, Farrukh-Shah was scouting in Frankish territories to the north and west of the Litani River. In this region, now southern Lebanon, the river runs due south, but at Beaufort (at times referred to as Belfort and known as Shaqif Arnun among the Arabs), a large Crusader fortress, the river makes an abrupt turn to the west. Beaufort, thus, is just to the west and north of the Litani. For his part, King Baldwin accompanied by Raymond of Tripoli, Baldwin of Ibelin, Hugh of Galilee, and Odo of Saint-Amand, the Grand Master of the Templars, fielded a very large Crusader army. Rather than march directly to Jacob’s Ford, they rode through Safad and Tibnin and arrived at Marj Uyun (currently Marjayoun), just to the east of the Litani. Saladin, informed on June 10 by herdsmen that a Frankish force was in the region, sent his heavy baggage to Banyas and placed his men in battle formation. On the same day, Farrukh-Shah sent part of his contingent across the Litani, which is fordable in the summer, but it was surprised by the Franks, suffered casualties, and lost all of its baggage. Farrukh-Shah with only a small number of men, observed the loss. Nevertheless, he rallied his remaining horsemen and forded the river. Observing his bold move in face of a potential Frankish charge, his men—some of whom may have been hanging back—quickly joined him from both sides of the Litani so that he was able to face the Crusaders at full force, minus the losses his army had already suffered. Meanwhile, Saladin with his well-armed cavalry was approaching from the southeast. The Franks, perhaps 16

Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 181.

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thinking they had already won the battle, split their force. The infantry was busy pillaging Farrukh-Shah’s supplies next to the Litani. Raymond and Odo, with a group of knights, climbed a hill to observe troop movements. To their shock, the Muslims attacked from two directions. Lacking time, they were not able to organize a heavily armored knightly charge. Instead, Saladin and Farrukh-Shah charged twice, destroying the Crusader army. Many were killed and hundreds captured of whom, according to Imad al-Din al-Isfahani who recorded their names at Saladin’s camp, 270 were considered important prisoners. Others escaped to Beaufort or ran all the way to the coast. After the great victory, Saladin realized monetary rewards. Hugh of Galilee was ransomed for 55,000 dinars and Baldwin of Ibelin for 150,000. In addition, in exchange for other prisoners, the Crusaders released over 1,000 Muslim prisoners, some taken at the time of the loss at Tell al-Safiya. Saladin offered to exchange Odo for an amir, but the Grand Master of the Templars, “a haughty, arrogant man, with the breath of fury in his nostrils, who feared not God nor respected man” according to William of Tyre, responded: “‘A Templar can give for his ransom but his belt and dagger.’”17 Odo died in a Damascus prison.18 At this time, Saladin did not follow up with more attacks in Palestine. A large body of knights from Europe, led by Henry II of Champagne, Peter of Courtenay, and Bishop Philip of Beauvais, had recently landed in the Holy Land. Thus, Saladin focused on building his strength by adding tribal Turkish and Arab bedouin units to his force. On August 18, he struck camp at Tell al-Qadi and marched to Jacob’s Ford, arriving on August 23, 1179. En route, his men pillaged Crusader orchards and vineyards. His sappers in the assault on the fortress would soon use the wood from these trees and vines. By this time, Saladin’s army was further Lane-Poole, Saladin, 158–59. References for this battle are: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 439–41; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 181–85; Imad al-Din, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 3, 162–72 (128a–136b); Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 139–41; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 419–21; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 162; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 670–78. 17 18

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reinforced by the arrival of the new Egyptian contingent that replaced the troops Turan-Shah took to Egypt, and Taqi al-Din and his cavalry who had just returned from the Upper Euphrates. Furthermore, Nasir al-Din Muhammad of Homs joined the Muslims investing the fortress at Jacob’s Ford. On the first day, Saladin’s men assaulted the village next to the Crusader fort. The Templars quickly abandoned it to the Muslims and withdrew into the fortress. Fearing an advance on the gate, the Crusaders built a fire behind it to prevent Saladin’s army from entering. Saladin’s sappers then quickly went to work. The first attempt on August 27 failed, but they enlarged the tunnel and refired the saps the following day, causing the wall to collapse. On August 29, the Templars asked for quarter, but were refused. Saladin’s men stormed the stronghold, capturing 700 prisoners and killing an equal number. Saladin then ordered his men to destroy the structure and make the location uninhabitable. The soldiers threw bodies and dead animals into the fort’s oversized well and then heaped earth and lime on top of them. By September 2, 1179, Saladin left Jacob’s Ford and his men raided the lands of Tiberias, Tyre, and Beirut. The visiting French knights did not make an effort to help the local Franks either at Jacob’s Ford or in the countryside. They soon left the Holy Land, making no impact despite their numbers. Saladin returned to Damascus on September 13. There he experienced his greatest loss. Having contracted fevers from the fetid conditions at Jacob’s Ford, ten amirs and many soldiers died. Both Nasir al-Din Muhammad and Taqi al-Din fell ill, but recovered.19 During this period of intense conflict with the Crusaders, Saladin’s navy was also active. Due to his diligent building program, by 1179 the navy consisted of 80 ships of which 60 were galleys and 20 freight ships. To protect Egyptian ports, 50 ships were References for the Jacob’s Ford battle are: Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 186; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 11–13; Imad al-Din, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 3, 175–83 (139b–147a); Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 141–43; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 421; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 163; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 678–80. 19

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always kept at or near the coast. The balance engaged in two successful forays against Frankish ports in 1179. In May, the Egyptian navy raided several Crusader coastal towns, capturing booty and damaging facilities. On June 10, it captured two Frankish ships, including considerable cargo and a large number of men. On its return to Alexandria with the spoils and prisoners, the people renamed the fleet “Victorious.” As Saladin was celebrating his own victory at Marj Uyun, he heard of his navy’s achievement. In mid October, the Egyptian navy, in an audacious move, captured the port of Acre and held it for two days. The marines on the ships kept the Franks at bay by raining volleys of arrows on them. Meanwhile, they sank numerous ships, destroyed port facilities, and captured booty. During the spring of 1180, Farrukh-Shah and Saladin made separate raids on Safad and Tiberias. The purpose of these seems to have been to encourage the Kingdom of Jerusalem to finalize a two-year armistice, which was signed in early summer 1180. Shortly thereafter, under threat of an Egyptian naval attack and another threat by Saladin’s men near Crac des Chevaliers, Count Raymond of Tripoli, the strong Frankish leader, agreed to a similar two-year truce. With his western flank secured, at least temporarily, Saladin turned his attention to the north.20 *** The 1177–1180 period was punctuated by numerous clashes between the forces of Saladin and those of the Franks. The first at Tell al-Safiya in 1177 was a disaster for the Muslims, but Saladin rearmed and retrained his army and floated a capable navy. The rest of the battles were his: Hama (summer 1178), Golan Heights (spring 1179), Marj Uyun (June 1179), Jacob’s Ford (August 1179); numerous raids against the lands of Beirut, Sidon, Safad, and

For reference to the naval battles and the 1180 attacks and armistice, see: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 13–14; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 190–93; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 421; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 169; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 145–47; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 162–65; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 681. 20

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Tiberias (spring 1179–spring 1180); and naval attacks on the Mediterranean coast (late spring 1179 and October 1179). Saladin’s accomplishments in 1179 and 1180 were beneficial to his cause in a number of ways. First, he proved that his men-atarms were a formidable threat that the Crusaders had to respect. He overcame the aura of the 1177 defeat and demonstrated that his cavalry had mastery of the needed skills and tactics to defeat the heavily armored knights. His specialized units, the sappers and sailors, also proved their ability to take on their opponents’ fortresses, ports, and ships. By the summer, each for their own reasons—the Crusaders to organize their internal affairs and Saladin to focus on his competitors to the north and east—the two parties signed a two-year armistice. Second, by dint of his victories, Saladin gained stature throughout the Muslim world. His army and navy had not won just one big battle, but many over an extended period. The common man, though untutored in military matters, unquestionably respected his prowess and success in battle. Third, because Saladin had effectively challenged and defeated the Crusaders, people—especially the religious cadres, civil servants, and amirs and other officers—came to respect Saladin at a different level. He was not just a military man building an empire, but a leader who would truly take on the European Christians who had captured Jerusalem 90 years earlier. In other words, he proved his holy war credentials. This plus his facilitation of the pilgrimage to Mecca enhanced his prestige among the devout and common men alike. Fourth, the holy war accomplishments certainly raised his stature. In Baghdad, he could now legitimately claim leadership of this noble cause. During this period, there were two camps in the Abbasid court. One group of partisans favored the descendants of Zangi and the other Saladin. The vizier, Zahir al-Din ibn al-Attar, was a powerful friend of Saladin. With the passing of al-Mustadi and the accession of al-Nasir li-Din Allah as caliph on March 11, 1180, Saladin’s star rose a little higher, but until he died in 1193, he always had his detractors. Saladin did write a letter to the new caliph, congratulating him on his new post, reiterating his loyalty and obeisance to the Abbasid caliphate, and requesting a reaffirmation of the diploma of investiture bestowed on him by alMustadi in 1175.

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Fifth, despite his successes, Saladin’s grand strategy was still to include Aleppo, Mosul, Diyar Bakr, and other lands that Nur alDin had commanded in his empire. The unity of Islam demanded this, but also he, at once, needed access to more soldiers who could only come from these territories and the assurance that his northern and eastern flanks were secure and quiet as he took on the Crusaders in a decisive manner.

UPPER EUPHRATES AND IRAQ: 1180 At the conclusion of his armistices with the Crusaders, Saladin and his cavalry rode north to the Upper Euphrates. In early June 1180, he set up camp near the Gok Su River (also Blue or Sanja River), a tributary of the Euphrates, close to the border of Sultan QilijArslan’s territories. The ostensible reason for this journey was that an Ortoqid ruler, Nur al-Din Muhammad of Hisn Kaifa, had appealed for his help in a domestic dispute with Qilij-Arslan. He based his petition on the 1176 agreement among Saladin, Mosul, and Aleppo. This appeal was curious because ostensibly the Ortoqid rulers of the region were under the suzerainty of Mosul. The Ortoqids, a leadership clan in the Diyar Bakr region, were descendants of a Turkish general, Artuq, who had been in the service of Seljuk Turkish leaders. Saladin, on his part, wanted to gain allies in the Upper Euphrates region and deny them to Mosul. Even though he arrived with his imposing army, his intent was to reach agreements with a show of force, not military action. Saladin did help resolve the domestic problem, which involved Nur al-Din Muhammad favoring a singing girl, one of his wives, over another wife, the daughter of Sultan Qilij-Arslan, a proud Seljuk princess. Saladin also hosted the Ortoqid brothers, Nur al-Din Muhammad and Abu Bakr, at a lavish reception and presented them with expensive gifts, thereby demonstrating to the leaders of the region the benefits of an alliance with him. After considerable wrangling and a demonstration of the capability of the Ayyubid cavalry, Saladin and Qilij-Arslan also reached a broad agreement. Qilij-Arslan agreed to stay in his recognized land and not reach into territories under the control of Mosul, Aleppo, or Saladin. Apparently, they also agreed that Saladin would make a demonstration of Muslim power against Prince Roupen III of Little Armenia in response to the latter’s harsh treatment of Turkish pastoralists who were pasturing their

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herds on his lands at his invitation. Saladin’s cavalry made the suitable impression after which a far-reaching accord was reached. On October 2, 1180 Saladin, Qilij-Arslan, Roupen, the amir of Mosul, and the Ortoqid amirs of the Diyar Bakr region, signed a two-year nonaggression pact.21 In a few short months, Saladin asserted himself into a new geographic area. At the end, he succeeded in neutralizing QilijArslan’s ambitions and brought some Upper Euphrates leaders into his circle. They were not yet subordinate to him, but they certainly recognized that they were indebted to him. On June 29, 1180 as Saladin was establishing his camp at Gok Su, Saif al-Din Ghazi, the leader of Mosul, died of natural causes. Fearing Saladin’s intervention in Mosuli affairs, the leaders forthwith declared Izz al-Din Masud, his brother, as the new leader, ignoring Saif al-Din’s wish that his 12-year-old son, SanjarShah, succeed him. Izz al-Din, whom Saladin defeated in 1175, wrote Saladin a letter asking for recognition of his suzerainty over the Mesopotamian towns that Saif al-Din had seized on Nur alDin’s death in 1174. Saladin refused outright. He contended that the caliph had only given these towns to Saif al-Din on a temporary basis and in exchange for providing Mesopotamian and Jazira troops for the holy war effort. He, in turn, immediately wrote the caliph, making the same arguments he had forwarded previously and emphasized his need for additional men-at-arms to prosecute the war against the Franks. In addition, while in the Upper Euphrates region, Saladin learned that his at times troublesome brother, Turan-Shah, had died in Alexandria in June 1180. Turan-Shah was known for his generosity—Saladin had to cover his 200,000-dinar debt—and his love for frivolous pleasures. He was indeed helpful to Saladin’s initiatives and conflicts in Egypt and Yemen, but he utterly failed as governor of Damascus in 1176–1178.

References for Saladin in the Upper Euphrates are: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 55; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 447–49; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 164–66; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 28–30; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 148–49. 21

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Saladin left the Upper Euphrates in October and rode with his cavalry back to Damascus. Arriving in the great city, he was met by a high-level delegation from the Abbasid caliph, led by Shihab alDin Bashir and the Shaikh al-Shuyukh (shaikh of the shaikhs) Sadr al-Din. They presented him with robes of honor and reconfirmed the diploma of investiture initially issued by Caliph al-Mustadi. By this recognition, Caliph al-Nasir signaled his approval of Saladin’s rule in the lands under his authority. Sadr al-Din then accompanied Saladin to Egypt after which he went to Mecca for the pilgrimage. Since the Fatimids gained control of the country 200 years earlier, this was the first time a high level Sunni caliphal official went on the pilgrimage via Egypt, one more significant Baghdadi sign of approval. The group left Damascus on December 8 and arrived in Cairo on January 2, 1181. Saladin left Farrukh-Shah in charge of Damascus.22 Far to the north, Emperor Manuel of the Byzantine Empire died on September 24, 1180. He had been a friend to the Crusaders. He frequently cooperated with them in their battles with the Muslims as long as such actions did not violate Byzantine interests. Upon his death, the Franks lost a regional ally. By the middle of the decade, Emperor Andronicus would sign a treaty with Saladin that in effect took the Byzantine Empire out of the Muslim-Crusader conflict.

EGYPT: 1181–1182 Despite occasional raids by the Normans of Sicily, the Crusaders, and the Byzantines, Egypt had settled down under Saladin’s rule. No longer did it suffer from the constant political maneuvering, major Christian invasions, and devastation of its cities and countryside. Rather it was able to sustain its economic productivity in conditions of relative peace. From time to time, the Nile flood came late, harmed agricultural production, and stimulated References for Mosul and Damascus in 1180 are: Gibb, Life of Saladin, 30; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 55; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 9, 451; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 149–53; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 164–66. 22

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temporary increases in the price of grain and animals. Nevertheless, as a rule, Egypt was a solid and reliable economic engine that usually produced a surplus to the great benefit of Saladin’s imperial ambitions. Yemeni traders, known as Karimi merchants, increased crossEgyptian trade in conjunction with their counterparts in Cairo, Alexandria, and Damietta. Egypt also sustained its export of alum, natron, cloth, and small craft items to Europe, especially to Italy. Saladin maintained a state monopoly on mining and exporting alum and natron so that his shipbuilding industry could bring in needed European materials without a great outflow of gold coins. To help realize and facilitate trade between Egypt and Italy, Saladin sought out written agreements with key trading cities. As far back as 1173, he signed a treaty with Pisa and renewed it by letter in 1176, 1179, and 1180. He had similar agreements with Genoa and Venice. To give an idea of the magnitude of the trade, as recounted, 38 ships spent the winter of 1187 in the port of Alexandria. Not only did these facilities and trade relations help assure Egypt’s access to strategic material from Europe, but they also helped assure Saladin’s empire that these energetic traders would not join the Crusaders in the struggle for the Holy Land.23 As he had in the past, Saladin directed the Egyptian administration to use the economic surplus for public works, fortifications, and the supply of soldiers and ships for service in the holy war and expanding his realm. In Cairo, Fustat, and Alexandria, he opened or reopened hospitals and arranged for their required operating revenues. Bridges over the Nile and its branches in the delta were built. Moreover, in support of the Sunni Muslim establishment, he opened law colleges and provided sufficient funding for their students.24 Saladin had earlier ordered the construction of new walls around Cairo and the strengthening of those at Alexandria, Damietta, and Tanis. In early 1182, he took time to inspect the Gibb, Life of Saladin, 50. In his 1183 travels in Cairo and Alexandria, Ibn Jubayr reports about the colleges, hospitals, and hostels that Saladin established and supported. Ibn Jubayr, Travels of Ibn Jubayr, 33, 42–45. 23 24

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fortifications in two of the coastal cities. As was his habit, he discussed theological matters with the ulama at the law colleges in Alexandria. Also in the more relaxed Egyptian atmosphere, he played polo and went hunting. During his years in Egypt, he built up the shipbuilding industry in Cairo, rather than Alexandria. Realizing the benefits of a strong navy, as demonstrated by its rewarding forays along the Crusader coast in 1179, he insisted on decent pay for his sailors and made funds available for their salaries. In subsequent years, in acknowledgement of Muslim naval strength, Frankish attacks along the Egyptian coast diminished. Saladin also changed the administration of the fleet. Heretofore, revenues that had gone to the Fatimid caliph had funded it. In 1180, Saladin regularized it by setting up a naval ministry and dedicating certain iqta revenues for construction and operational expenses.25 Cavalry was the backbone of Saladin’s military. Skilled and well-armed fighters on horseback allowed him to project power that he used to defeat enemies in combat or impress adversaries so that they would either back down and/or join the Ayyubid Empire. For most of his years in the field, the Egyptian economy supported the cavalry, whether the troops were ethnically Kurd, Turk, Egyptian, or Armenian. The number of first-line horseman provided by Egypt was most likely between 9,000 and 12,000, inclusive of 110 or more amirs as well as other officers. As noted, each cavalryman had a helper or helpers and a train of pack animals. In addition to highly skilled cavalry, depending on the place and the time, bedouin, Nubian, and Egyptian units were incorporated into his overall army. The majority of these men, either through their amirs or directly, were paid from specially assigned iqtas in Egypt or occasionally by the Egyptian treasury. They also shared in the booty after battles or pillaging forays. When Saladin marched out of Egypt in the spring of 1182, he took

References for the economy and the naval build up in 1181–1182 are: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 19–21 and 24–28; Ibn al-Athir, AlKamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 453; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 141–84 passim; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 156–65; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 167–72. 25

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with him his private guard of 1,000 and 4,000 regular cavalry, plus appendages.26 Upon the departure of Turan-Shah in 1174, Saladin’s most distant territorial possession, Yemen, started to present administrative problems. Local governors quarreled; centralized authority languished. Moreover, Yemen was not producing revenues as hoped. Indeed, it required new expenditures to bring it back under Ayyubid control. Initially, Saladin sent auditors to examine financial matters in Zabid and Aden. Having determined that this step was not sufficient, most likely in 1181 he sent a former governor of Cairo, Sarim al-Din Khutluba, to re-establish order. In the summer of 1182, Saladin sent his own brother, Tughtakin, as governor. His and his Ayyubid successors’ rule in Yemen lasted for decades. During this period, the Ayyubid family continued to grow. By 1178, Saladin had celebrated the birth of 12 sons: five were born before he left Egypt for Syria in 1174. Al-Adil, his brother who was usually Saladin’s deputy in Egypt, also had at least nine sons; Tughtakin had two sons; and Taqi al-Din, Saladin’s nephew, had three sons. To solidify the dynasty, in late March 1182 before Saladin left Egypt, he arranged marriage contracts for four of his sons with four of al-Adil’s daughters. These children and their children would rule broad Middle East territories well into the thirteenth century.27 *** Reynald of Châtillon came to the Holy Land with the Second Crusade. Made prince of Antioch in 1153, he ruled the city for seven years. However, in 1160, he was captured during a raid on Syrian and Armenian farmers and thrown into a dungeon in Aleppo until his release in 1175. During his imprisonment, his wife died. After gaining his freedom, he married Stephanie, the widow of both Humphrey III of Toron and Miles of Plancy, but The numbers in the sources vary considerably. Lev sorts through all of the references in a very helpful exercise. Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 148–49. 27 See: Lane-Poole, Saladin, Table II, “The Family of Saladin,” following 416; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 134, 164. 26

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importantly the heiress of Transjordan, which included the massive fortresses at Karak and Shawbak. Reynald was famous, indeed infamous, for his aggressive Frankish stances, his impetuosity, and his disrespect of central authority, for what it was, in Jerusalem. In 1181, the old warrior defied Jerusalem, effectively initiating another round of Muslim-Crusader fighting. Despite the 1180 treaty between Saladin and the Crusaders, he coveted the rich Muslim caravans crossing his territory. As the fall grass began to appear in the desert and with the assistance of some greedy bedouin, he undertook a reconnaissance mission in force far into the desert. In October or November, he came upon a train of merchants and camels laden with goods near Tabuk in northern Arabia. As per the armistice agreement, they were peacefully traveling through Transjordan from Damascus to Mecca. Putting his interests above those of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, he captured the entire caravan. Furthermore, it appears, he may have been intent on proceeding south and attacking Medina. Saladin reacted. He ordered Farrukh-Shah in Damascus to march to Transjordan. Fearing that the Muslim troops would block his return to Karak, Reynald precipitously returned to the security of his fortress. Saladin also protested to Baldwin in Jerusalem who agreed with the complaint, but despite his orders, Reynald refused to release the caravan. Baldwin let the matter drop, but Saladin did not. In April 1182, stormy weather forced a large Christian pilgrim ship to land at Damietta. Saladin placed the men and women in chains and once more contacted Baldwin, offering to exchange the prisoners for the captured caravan. Baldwin approached Reynald once again, but, underlining the king’s weakness, was refused a second time. In 1180, Saladin and Baldwin had negotiated a two-year truce; given the interests of both leaders, it is possible that the two parties would have extended it. However, due to the recalcitrance of Reynald and impotence of Baldwin, the agreement was not enforced, setting the stage for another armed confrontation. In the middle of November 1181, al-Salih, the son of Nur alDin and the ruler of Aleppo, fell ill at the young age of 19. Recognizing the seriousness of his deteriorating condition, he gathered the Aleppo amirs and commanded them to swear loyalty to his cousin Izz al-Din Masud of Mosul whom they should invite to assume authority over Aleppo on his death. Al-Salih and his key advisors were fearful that Saladin, whom they justly considered to

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be aggressive, would attempt to take Aleppo and Izz al-Din was the only leader capable of checking his ambitions. On December 4, the young man died. It was commonly said that al-Salih was “the handsomest of men,” that he had great potential to be a leader in the image of his father, and that “… his death greatly affected the hearts of his people.”28 For Saladin, the death of al-Salih changed the equation in the lands around Aleppo and Mosul. Had the young man lived and fathered children, Saladin would have had little justification for demanding that Aleppo and Mosul join his empire. According to the honored traditions of the day, filial inheritance—father to son—was highly respected and difficult to challenge. Thus, the children and grandchildren of the Nur al-Din would have had the right to his territories, including even Damascus, which Saladin took in 1174 on the death of the great leader. With the passing of al-Salih, only collateral relatives—Izz al-Din Masud and his brother Imad al-Din Zangi of Sinjar—remained. While the Zangi clan—the brothers were grandchildren of Zangi—would continue to claim Nur al-Din’s lands, their standing did not equal that of the late alSalih. Al-Salih’s amirs were true to their oaths and invited Izz al-Din to Aleppo. He accepted at once. His own amirs reached the city on December 12 whereupon they received the oaths of the Aleppan amirs. “On 29 December Izz al-Din came to Aleppo and went up into the citadel, whose stores and treasure he took possession of, and he married al-Salih’s mother on February 11, 1182,”29 a mirror image of Saladin’s marriage in 1176 to Ismat al-Din Khatun, another widow of Nur al-Din. Upon hearing of al-Salih’s illness and subsequent death, Saladin attempted to take advantage of the opportunity. He ordered Farrukh-Shah to join Taqi al-Din in Hama and ride north, ostensibly to assist his supporters in Diyar Bakr, but actually to put Aleppo under pressure. Farrukh-Shah, however, was engaged in Transjordan as he attempted to contain Reynald of Châtillon. 28

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 55; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 159–

160. 29

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 56.

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Realizing that military pressure was not available, Saladin activated his propaganda machine and began writing letters to Baghdad, asserting his claim to Aleppo. Inter alia, he argued that Caliph alMustadi, in his diploma of investiture, had included all of Nur alDin’s territories, a position that is contradicted by the wordage of the 1175 diploma, cited above.30 More to the point, he wrote that his own forces, namely Farrukh-Shah and his cavalry, were actively engaging the Franks, while rival Muslim amirs—a reference to Izz al-Din Masud in Aleppo—were grabbing territory in the north. Moreover, these petty squabbles among Muslim princes undermined Islamic unity and diminished the ability of Muslims to challenge the true adversaries in Jerusalem. Saladin, in his letters, also asserted, with no apparent proof, that the leaders of Mosul and Aleppo had approached the Assassins and the Crusaders to line up allies to oppose him. In a state of pique, he went so far as to write: “‘if the Exalted Commands should ordain that the prince of Mosul be invested with the government of Aleppo, then it was better to invest him with all Syria and Egypt as well.’”31 For his part, Izz alDin was apparently writing to Baghdad as well, making his case for taking Aleppo, but that correspondence is not preserved. During late 1181 and early 1182, this war of words did not turn into a war at arms. In early fall 1180, as recounted, Saladin had led the negotiations that resulted in a two year nonbeligerency agreement to which Mosul was a party. Even though some of Izz al-Din’s allies urged him to advance on Damascus, he prudently pointed to the 1180 agreement and presumably the even earlier 1176 nonbeligerency agreement and said he would honor his oath. Saladin also kept his oath. Indeed, he was still in Egypt and had some Crusader issues in front of him. Thus, both sides held back, at least for the first few months after al-Salih’s death. Izz al-Din Masud was not having an easy time in Aleppo. The city’s amirs did not want his administrator, Mujahid al-Din Qaimaz, to be in charge of Aleppo’s administration. See Chapter Five. Correspondence recorded by Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 22. Also cited in: Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 171–72; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 31. Gibb translation. 30 31

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A complication from another direction solved the problem. Izz alDin’s estranged brother, Imad al-Din Zangi who was based in Sinjar, craved Aleppo, a larger and much more important city than Sinjar. Since 1174, Imad al-Din Zangi had been an ally of Saladin, but not under his suzerainty. In January or February 1182, Imad alDin informed Izz al-Din that unless Aleppo was given to him, he would give Sinjar to Saladin. Izz al-Din met him at al-Raqqa on the Euphrates. By the end of February, they struck a deal. Imad al-Din would give Sinjar to Izz al-Din and, in exchange, receive Aleppo and Imad al-Din would drop his alliance with Saladin. Imad al-Din then sent his son to Aleppo to claim the prize and he followed with his family, arriving on May 18, 1182. Meanwhile, despite the Frankish and Aleppo-Mosul issues, Saladin did not hastily march north from Egypt. Instead, he inspected the walls and fortifications of Alexandria and Damietta. In March, he moved to Birkat al-Jubb, ten miles east of Cairo. Not until May 11 did he and his cavalry start the journey to Damascus. Al-Adil stayed in Egypt as his deputy. Realizing that Saladin’s return to Damascus was a momentous event, amirs, officers and senior civil servants of Cairo came to bid him farewell. On a jarring and disagreeable note, citing a classic Arab poem, a voice called out: Enjoy the perfume of the ox-eyes of Nejd: After to-night, there will be no more ox-eyes.32

This was taken as an omen, an ill omen, that Saladin would not enjoy ox-eyes in Egypt again, that he would not return.33

Cited in Lane-Poole, Saladin, 167. Other historians also cite the same verse. 33 For events of the second half of 1181 and the first half of 1182, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 55–57; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 202–3; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 454–58; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 21–24, 27–29; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 431; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 167–72; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 157–65; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 30–31, 43. 32

CHAPTER SEVEN EASTERN AND NORTHERN EMPIRE COMPLETED: 1182–1186 SYRIA, PALESTINE, AND LEBANON: 1182 Saladin started his ride to Damascus in the second week of May 1182. In order to take advantage of the security provided by his powerful cavalry, a large party of merchants and other civilians joined the Ayyubid leader on the journey. In his letters to Baghdad, Saladin boasted of his grand tail of individuals, baggage, provisions, and animals. Proceeding at a modest pace, he arrived in the region between Eilat and Shawbak in five days. While in southern Transjordan, he heard that Baldwin and a great number of knights had joined Reynald of Châtillon at Karak. Apparently, Reynald and his close colleagues had persuaded the king to march to the fortress despite his advisors’ objections that such a move would deprive parts of the Holy Land of knightly protection. The intent of the congregation at Karak was not clear: protection of Crusader interests in Transjordan, especially Reynald’s position at Karak; a show of force; or an attack on Saladin. Most likely, each Frankish leader had a different motive for undertaking the expedition. Saladin, for his part, took the desert route to the east of Karak and peacefully reached Qasr al-Azraq, 50 miles east of Amman. Qasr al-Azraq, the site of an ancient Umayyad desert palace, is an oasis with an abundant supply of fresh water and many birds and wild boar. In the meantime, Farrukh-Shah indeed took advantage of the knights’ absence from some of their lands. First, with riders from Busra, Baalbek, and Homs, he raided Daburiya near Nazareth. Using saps, he destroyed its fort and captured 500 Franks. His men then spread out and pillaged the countryside, almost as far as Acre. They returned with another 500 Frankish prisoners and 20,000 head 163

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of cattle. He also attacked and captured Habis Jaldak, a fortification carved out of rock in a wadi north of the Yarmuk River and east of the Sea of Galilee. His men actually dug a tunnel of their own and then surprised and overwhelmed the defenders, local Christian guards with no great loyalty to their Crusader overlords. FarrukhShah placed his own garrison at Habis Jaldak to help ensure that Damascus would receive a share of the grain and revenues from this rich region, the Hauran. In mid June, Farrukh-Shah rode to Busra, north of Qasr alAzraq, where he met Saladin. On June 22, 1182, the army and caravan arrived at Damascus where the city leaders and notables welcomed Saladin’s return and the people celebrated the success of Farrukh-Shah’s raids.1 Saladin did not relax in the capital. After only a three-week stay, he and his cavalry returned to the field. Combining his Egyptian and Syrian troops, Saladin mustered an imposing force. William of Tyre estimated it at 20,000,2 but this number is most likely an exaggeration. Saladin brought with him 5,000 first-line horseman from Egypt. Farrukh-Shah added another 2,000 riders. In addition, the march included an unknown number of archers and auxiliary troops. They most likely numbered between 3,000 and 7,000, not the 13,000 recorded by William of Tyre. In the typical arrangement, the Muslim army was divided into three major divisions: Taqi al-Din on the right, Farrukh-Shah on the left, and Saladin commanded the center. Saladin’s army rode south and camped on the southern shore of the Sea of Galilee close to the Jordan River. From there, his very presence intimidated Tiberius on the west coast of the sea. Count Raymond of Tripoli, who had married the princess and heiress of Galilee, Eschiva of Bures, resided in Tiberius. At the time, he was quite ill, but realizing the threat, he called in reinforcements from Safad to the north and the Hospitaler fortress at Belvoir (known as For the Transjordan trip and the Crusader foray, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 458; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 215–9; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 68; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 432; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 165–67; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 174. 2 Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 221. 1

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Kaukab or Kawkab to the Arabs). On July 13, Saladin attempted to provoke a battle, but the Crusader knights did not respond. Rather than advance towards the town, he decided to ride south to attempt to draw them out. The Franks did follow and on the night of July 14, they camped on the hills near Baisan overlooking the Jordan Valley and its river. The Frankish army included 700 fully armored knights and an unrecorded number of infantry soldiers.3 On July 15, the Franks found the Muslims in battle order. Taqi al-Din’s contingent was located on the west where it blocked the Harod Valley leading to the coast; Farrukh-Shah blocked the wadi that dropped down to the Jordan River; and Saladin was in the center. In classical fashion, the knights charged. Saladin attempted to surround the Crusaders, but after a very hard fight, most of them were able to ascend some nearby hills and reach the castle of Forbelet to the west of Belvoir. Even though both sides claimed victory, the battle was essentially a draw. The extreme heat of the July noonday sun claimed as many lives as did the clashes. While few knights were among the casualties, both sides lost hundreds if not thousands of soldiers. Neither side tried to pursue the other.4 In early August, Saladin demonstrated once again that his army could go anywhere it desired, but again he did not show that it could, as of yet, win decisive battles. From the Sea of Galilee, his cavalry marched via the Golan Heights to the Biqa Valley in Lebanon. Exactly what his plans were, we do not know. At the most, his intent was a well-coordinated demonstration of power. At the worst, from Saladin’s standpoint, it was a grand attack that did not succeed. From the south, al-Adil attacked Gaza, Ascalon, and Darum. From the sea, 30 Egyptian ships arrived off the coast of Beirut. Alerted that the navy had arrived, Saladin besieged the city, raining arrows on it for days. He attempted to mine the city’s walls, but was thwarted by Bishop Odo, who, awaiting help, Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 221. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 460–61; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 220–23; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 68; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 31; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 432; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 168–69. 3 4

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conducted his own vigorous defense, including digging mines to counter those of Saladin. Despite all of this tunneling activity, it is interesting to note that Saladin had not brought the typical array of heavy siege equipment, which indicates that the exercise was actually just a major show of force. Baldwin, notified of the investment of Beirut by land and by sea and the attacks on the south, was in a quandary about how he could defend both ends of his kingdom at the same time. Shortly he made his decision to save Beirut and let the southern towns fend for themselves. He mustered a contingent of knights and hastily assembled his own fleet of equal size from ships at Acre and Tyre. Arriving behind Saladin’s line, Baldwin’s force initiated energetic and effective attacks on the Muslim positions around Beirut. After three days of this military pressure, Saladin lifted the siege, pillaged the countryside for a day, and then rode towards the Biqa. The Egyptian ships sailed home and al-Adil returned to Cairo, laden with booty. The Crusader knights, for their part, proved they were capable of defending their realm, despite the pillage. On the other hand, interpreting the record from the standpoint of the Muslims, the record is muddled. It seems obvious that if Saladin had captured Beirut, he would not have been able to retain it. His supply line to Damascus would have been very vulnerable to Crusader attack. To capture and hold coastal cities, he had to gain dominance throughout Palestine and Lebanon. This was not the time for that campaign. This interpretation would argue that Saladin intended just to show his military capabilities and allow his men to capture some booty. It is clear that Saladin was still focused on Aleppo and Mosul. To the latter point, while in front of Beirut’s walls, he received an urgent and opportune invitation to involve himself once again in the Upper Euphrates, an invitation that constituted one more reason for breaking the siege of Beirut. However, others argue that Saladin failed in his attempt to capture and hold Beirut and thus showed weakness.5 For the Beirut and coastal campaign, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 57; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 29; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 9, 461–62; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 170–71; Runciman, 5

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IRAQ, UPPER EUPHRATES, AND SYRIA: 1182–1183 When Saladin left Egypt in May 1182, everyone knew that he was not focused solely on the Crusader presence in the Middle East. His ambition to expand his empire to encompass all of the lands of Nur al-Din was palpable. Al-Salih, the only widely recognized legitimate claimant to that realm was gone, giving Saladin the right, at least in his and his supporters’ minds, to assert vigorously his own claim. In addition, with al-Salih’s departure, Aleppo and the region were passing through difficult times. In such a period of leadership instability, there might be opportunities for Saladin to affect that change in his favor. In that context, we should recall that, as recently as 1180, Saladin had spent months in the Upper Euphrates region and, during this period, had cultivated potential allies for the future. Furthermore, in the summer and fall of 1182, he wrote many letters to the Abbasid court, asserting and reasserting his claim to the territorial legacy of Nur al-Din. Now that al-Salih was gone, he added the argument that other than a direct male descendant, kings and princes did not have the right to their relatives’ lands. In this contention, he was advancing the proposition that Izz al-Din Masud in Mosul and Imad al-Din Zangi newly in Aleppo, as only collateral relatives of Nur al-Din, did not have a right to Nur al-Din’s territories. Rather, he, Saladin, should be awarded a diploma for Nur al-Din’s entire realm because he was uniting Islam and actively opposing the Franks. To underline the latter context, Saladin wrote to Baghdad saying that Mosul had an agreement with the Crusaders whereby the Franks would attack in the Damascus region. In exchange, Mosul would pay the Franks 10,000 dinars per year; give them back Banyas, which Nur al-din had captured in 1164, and Habis Jaldak, which Farrukh-Shah had captured in 1182; and free Crusader prisoners who came into their possession. Not only was this a powerful addition to Saladin’s overall argument, but also, from the

History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 432–33; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 223–29; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 174–75.

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historical record, it appears to be a correct rendition of the facts.6 All of the letters, or at least the essential messages contained within them, were broadcast in the Middle East by Saladin’s effective propaganda service. Lastly, the two-year truce signed at the Gok Su in October 1180 was due to expire, freeing Saladin to pursue his imperial ambitions in the region to the north of his realm. He seems to have conveniently forgotten the 1176 nonbeligerency agreement signed with the late Saif al-Din of Mosul and the late alSalih of Aleppo. To Saladin, the demise of the two signatories to the agreement may have rendered it no longer valid. The successors to the two late leaders certainly did not agree with this interpretation. Given this background, it was no surprise to Muslim observers in Damascus and Cairo and the Franks in Jerusalem that Saladin shifted his attention from the Crusaders in Beirut to the Muslim region to the north. While he was besieging Beirut, Saladin welcomed a message from Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi inviting him to ride north, cross the Euphrates, and claim suzerainty of the towns and lands in the Jazira and Upper Euphrates regions.7 Muzaffar al-Din was a man with an interesting history and would become an effective if problematic ally. Son of Zain al-Din Ali Kuchuk, a former administrator of Mosul, he commanded the Mosul-Aleppo left wing in the 1176 battle of Tell Sultan at which Saladin vanquished Saif al-Din. In early 1182, he was commander of the forces in the city of Aleppo. He had been a loyal al-Salih amir, but, for unknown reasons, estranged from Izz al-Din. After al-Salih’s death, he failed in an attempt to capture Aleppo’s citadel in the unsettled period before the arrival of Izz al-Din’s brother, Imad al-Din Zangi. Despite the rebellion and in need of allies, Izz al-Din awarded him the town and citadel of Harran to the north and east of Aleppo in the Upper Euphrates region. Muzaffar al-Din, though, was not content. He approached the Ortoqid lords Nur al-Din Muhammad of Hisn Kaifa and Shihab al-Din Mahmud of al-Bira, both of whom Saladin knew from his 1180 stay at Gok Su. Even though in For this agreement, see: Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 434; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 175. 7 Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 462. 6

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principle they held iqtas from Mosul, as did Muzaffar al-Din, they agreed to change sides and join Saladin. Muzaffar al-Din’s invitation was exactly what Saladin required. With this request from a substantial individual with important allies, he rode north. As he left Beirut, he ordered Farrukh-Shah to return to Damascus and guard the borders and Taqi al-Din and Nasir al-Din Muhammad to arrange for the security of Hama and Homs. Farrukh-Shah stayed behind in southern Syria where the Frankish threat was greater, especially in light of the CrusaderMosul agreement, but the latter two leaders and their regiments joined Saladin. The Ayyubid leader traveled slowly towards Aleppo, gathering new riders who were joining his expedition in large numbers. With this sizable force, part of which was battle tested, he was prepared to use many tools to increase the size of his empire: show of force, use of force, diplomacy, and money and gifts. With respect to the latter, on more than one occasion, he wrote Damascus and Cairo, asking them to send funds so that he could bring additional cities and towns into his realm. In mid September 1182, Saladin met Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi in person. The latter argued persuasively that Saladin would be welcomed east of the Euphrates for he was genuinely esteemed for his just leadership and his holy war aspirations. He also stated that by moving east, Aleppo, a well-fortified and vigorously defended city, would be increasingly isolated as he grew his empire. These arguments accorded with Saladin’s thinking. Before crossing the frontier, though, he did visit the outskirts of Aleppo from September 19 through 22. His men camped to the east of the city while he forwarded a proposition to Imad al-Din Zangi. To his old ally, but now the partner of his formerly estranged brother Izz alDin Masud of Mosul, he suggested that Imad al-Din should return to Sinjar, which Saladin would give to him, in exchange for Aleppo where Imad al-Din was not entirely happy because of the constant demands from the city’s strong amirs. The proposal was audacious. In September 1182, Saladin was not actually in a position to present Sinjar to Imad al-Din because the town was not yet under his control. After this exchange, Saladin departed Aleppo, but left the proposed exchange on the table. As Saladin marched east, he issued a proclamation inviting the leaders of the region to join him. He pledged that “‘those who would surrender their cities to his authority would be allowed to

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remain in control of their places, provided that they join the army of the sultan [Saladin], to follow him and assist him in the war against the Infidels [Crusaders].’”8 Thinking that Saladin represented the future, as will be seen, many leaders accepted his invitation. Saladin’s first stop was at al-Bira (Map 5), to the east and north of Aleppo, on the east side of the Euphrates. Shihab al-Din Mahmud, the ruling amir and Muzaffar al-Din’s colleague in inviting the Ayyubid leader to the Jazira region, met Saladin at the city gates. The amir gave him the keys to al-Bira’s citadel, which Saladin immediately returned. As per Saladin’s promise, Shihab alDin was “allowed to remain in control of [his] place” and some of his men joined Saladin in his triumphal journey. The second stop was at Edessa (also al-Ruha) to the north and east of al-Bira, which was held by Fakhr al-Din Masud, a commander in the late Nur al-Din’s army. From Mosul, Izz al-Din Masud sent troops towards the city to help in its defense, but they did not arrive in time to challenge Saladin. After a brief show of force, Fakhr al-Din turned the city over to Saladin and joined his army. Perhaps with the help of bribery, the citadel’s commander also surrendered without a fight. As Izz al-Din’s cavalrymen sought to return to Mosul, the Ayyubid army upon Saladin’s orders did not hinder them. Following the Balikh River, a tributary of the Euphrates, to the south, Saladin passed Harran. Since Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi of Harran was already part of the expedition and a major ally, he did not need to visit this Jazira city. His next destination was alRaqqa where the Balikh flows into the Euphrates. Qutb al-Din Inal, Saladin’s long-time foe, held the city. In 1174, it was Qutb alDin, then a leading Aleppo amir, who challenged Saladin, saying to his face that the swords of Nur al-Din’s soldiers would drive him back to Egypt. In 1182, despite a generous monetary offer, the amir declined to align himself with Saladin. Surveying the

Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij al-Kurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyoub, vol. 2, 117. Ehrenkreutz also cites the proclamation. Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 176. Ehrenkreutz translation. 8

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formidable Ayyubid army, though, the normally pugnacious Qutb al-Din Inal surrendered without a fight. The cities and towns, which Saladin brought into his empire in the first weeks of his campaign, all enjoyed economic importance in their respective regions. Moreover, they all had citadels, which testified to their strong political and military roles. In the next weeks, Saladin peacefully gathered in a series of smaller towns: alFudain, al-Husain, Maksin, Duran, Araban on the al-Khabur River, and al-Khabur also on the river of the same name. At the end of this phase of the expedition in November 1182, he stopped at Nisibin, a small dusty town with a citadel, but also just a short ride from the great city of Mosul. Following the common pattern, the amirs of Nisibin did not resist and quickly enrolled in Saladin’s enterprise and provided riders for his army. As the news of Saladin’s string of acquisitions and growing empire spread, regional leaders and fighting men flowed to Saladin’s Nisibin camp. His old ally from his 1180 trip to the Upper Euphrates, Nur al-Din Muhammad of Hisn Kaifa, brought a large cavalry contingent. Greeting his friend, Saladin promised that Diyar Bakr would be his, once it was captured. Additionally, many Kurdish and Turkish cavalrymen, then in the service of Mosul, crossed over and volunteered to join Saladin’s army.9 In November, Saladin learned that his nephew and deputy in Damascus died. Farrukh-Shah had been leading a short foray against the Franks when he fell ill. He returned to Damascus where he succumbed. Over the years, Saladin had relied heavily on his loyalty and skills to grow the Ayyubid Empire. An Arab historian of the time, Ibn al-Athir, records that Saladin counted on FarrukhShah more than any other of his family members or amirs. He added that he was brave, kind, generous, and a literary man who not only appreciated the written word but authored poetry as For the campaign starting from Beirut, to Aleppo, Jazira, and Nisibin during the August to November 1182 period, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 57; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 461–63; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 30–32; Imad al-Din, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 5, 17–30 (2a–18a); Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 433; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 32–33; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 171–77; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 175–76. 9

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well.10 Saladin appointed the able amir, Ibn al-Muqaddam, as his replacement in early 1183. In the late fall of 1182, southern Syria was subject to Crusader assaults and, more seriously, Reynald of Châtillon mounted a serious naval attack in the Red Sea. These developments are discussed in the next section of this chapter. At Nisibin, Saladin paused to assemble his relatives, allies, and amirs in a general council. The discussion focused on the next phase of the campaign and its rationale. Saladin told the leadership conclave that he thought they had three options: Mosul, Sinjar, or Jazirat ibn Umar. Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi strongly presented the case for attacking Mosul. He speculated that its leader, Izz al-Din Masud, upon seeing Saladin’s vast army, would run away to a smaller, more distant fortress. Nasir al-Din Muhammad, Saladin’s cousin, agreed that Mosul should be their next target. Apparently, in return for a payment, he was hopeful that Saladin would award him the iqta of Mosul. In light of the Crusader attacks around Damascus, a few amirs contended that Iraq should be abandoned and the army should return to its base. In response to the latter proposal, Saladin with his broader imperial vision, said: “‘Let them [attack]. While they knock down villages, we are taking cities.’”11 Assessing the recommendations of the assembly and undoubtedly expressing his own ambitions, Saladin decided to advance on Mosul. Izz al-Din heard of the decision well before the Ayyubid forces arrived in front of Mosul’s walls. He dispatched Ibn Shaddad, who was then in Mosuli service, but would join Saladin’s service in 1188, to Baghdad to seek the intervention of the caliph. Ibn Shaddad reported: “I traveled in haste to seek their aid. The only thing we got from them was that they sent to the Shaykh alShuyukh, who was already with the sultan [Saladin] as an envoy on their behalf, ordering him to speak with him and to settle the matter diplomatically.”12 In sum, the caliph did not take Mosul’s Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 469. Also see: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 33–34. 11 Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 177. Also, see: Gibb, Life of Saladin, 45. 12 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 57. 10

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side, but only gave instructions to a mediator, albeit, one of considerable stature. Ibn Shaddad added that: “An envoy was also sent from Mosul to Pahlawan [also al-Pahlawan, a Seljuk atabeg who ruled northern Persia] asking for support, but all that resulted from that direction was a demand which, if accepted, would be more dangerous than war with the sultan.”13 Presumably, because the caliph and al-Pahlawan were severely estranged, the demand related to joining an alliance against Baghdad. Thus, bereft of powerful allies, Izz al-Din had to look to his resources, which were still formidable. On November 12, 1182, Saladin and his army appeared at Mosul on the Tigris River. Saladin and his amirs saw a grand city with stout walls, a well-defended citadel, and a large population. Saladin’s secretary, Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, boastfully observed that upon their arrival, “…we watered our horses, in the months of one year, at the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris,”14 no small feat in the days of animal transport. Rather than a true investment with siege engines and mining, Saladin appears to have only established a blockade around the city. He assigned the north-west wall to his brother, Taj al-Muluk Abu Said Buri. Saladin and Nur al-Din Muhammad covered the west and south sides. Taqi al-Din crossed the Tigris and guarded the eastern approaches. Emissaries traveled between the two camps, but the two rulers did not alter their positions. Saladin laid down his usual demand that Mosul should join his empire and participate with men and treasure in the holy war as an integral part of a unified Islam. Izz al-Din Masud, in strength behind his walls, told Saladin to return to Syria. Heavy fighting did not break out, but there were a number of skirmishes. It seems that Saladin ruled out the use of catapults against the city and its population. He still wanted Mosul to be part of his realm, to come under his suzerainty; he did not want to punish it. The Shaykh al-Shuyukh continued his role as intermediary. Once, to his displeasure, the enthusiastic Buri and Taqi al-Din were attacking the walls as he was delivering his message. At his request, 13 14

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 57. Imad al-Din, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 5, 33 (6a).

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they backed off after which Saladin moved his camp some distance from the city. At one point, when envoys from al-Pahlawan and Shah-Arman15 (also known as Nasir al-Din Suqman II) of Khilat (also Akhlat) were present in the Ayyubid camp, there were rumors that Saladin and Izz al-Din were going to reach a peaceful solution. This worried some of Izz al-Din’s erstwhile allies who had only recently joined Saladin, especially the Kurdish and Turkish soldiers. Looking to their own welfare or at least as they understood it, they changed sides again and rejoined Izz al-Din. As some had predicted, Mosul did not readily fall. Saladin must have been unhappy at this lack of success. One Arab historian recorded that Saladin blamed Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi and Nasir al-Din Muhammad for their ill-conceived advice.16 More likely, Saladin recognized reality, but he also knew that he needed more successes in order to retain the support of some of his new allies and sustain his positive momentum. In the middle of December, he decided to turn his attention to Sinjar, an important city, just a three-day ride to the west of Mosul.17 Sensing Saladin’s plans, Izz al-Din Masud sent a cavalry contingent to Sinjar, which was held as an iqta by his brother, Sharaf al-Din. Advancing ahead of the main Ayyubid column, Taqi al-Din intercepted it, seized its horses and camels, and sent the men back to Mosul on foot. Accompanied by the caliph’s envoys, Saladin arrived at Sinjar in mid December. He attempted to persuade Sharaf al-Din and the city’s amirs to surrender peacefully, but to no avail. His men invested Sinjar and attacked the outer walls with catapults and saps. After a few days, they breached them, but the citadel held out. In his desire to inflict as little damage as Shah-Arman means King of the Armenians. Shah-Arman was a Muslim Turk. He was the ruler, though, in a region that had a large Armenian population. 16 Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 464. 17 For the November-December period around Mosul, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 57–58; Imad al-Din, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 5, 32–45 (9b–20b); Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 32–33; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 33–34; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 176–78; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 177–81. 15

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possible and due to the miserable weather, Saladin delayed a frontal attack. In late December 1182 or early January 1183, either through bribery or because the fortress’s guards fell asleep, his men entered it and without a fight captured a number of Sinjari amirs. Accepting defeat, Sharaf al-Din asked for quarter, which was granted. With Saladin’s permission, he then rode to Mosul with his personal entourage. During the two weeks at Sinjar, Saladin’s own soldiers behaved honorably vis-à-vis the defeated Muslim soldiers and the town’s citizenry. For Saladin, they were potential allies in the future. However, some Kurdish and Turkish soldiers from the north did not refrain from ill behavior. During the siege, they cut down orchards and, at its conclusion, they ran amuck through the city until Saladin’s men brought them under control. Sinjar’s notables welcomed Saladin and especially appreciated his repair of the battle damage. He gave the town to Taqi al-Din as an iqta and assigned the citadel to his brother-in-law, Sad al-Din ibn Anar. Saladin now held 12 cities and towns between the Euphrates and Tigris, six of which had citadels: al-Bira, Edessa, Harran, alRaqqa, Nisibin, and now Sinjar. This constituted an imposing presence in this broad territorial expanse. In his dispatches to Baghdad, he informed the court that he lifted the siege of Mosul in deference to the wishes of the Shaykh al-Shuyukh, but had now attached Sinjar to his realm, adding that the Sinjaris had received him well, as had others throughout Jazira. He also reiterated his request for a diploma covering Mosul and the other Upper Euphrates cities and towns he had not yet taken.18 During the last two months of 1182, Imad al-Din Zangi supported his beleaguered brother in Mosul. He raided a number of small towns in the Aleppo neighborhood, damaging citadels and city fortifications. It is worth noting that, at the end of the year, because Saladin now held Sinjar, his earlier proposal to Imad al-Din to exchange Aleppo for Sinjar took on a new reality. Saladin, in a letter to one of Imad al-Din’s key supporters in Aleppo, made this very point. As he renewed the offer, he pointedly wrote that he

Paris and Mosul Archives cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 182–83. 18

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would overlook the damage Imad al-Din had visited on towns under his rule.19 After conquering Sinjar, Saladin settled down in winter quarters, which seemingly were in both Nisibin and Harran. He allowed many of his amirs and their men to return to their lands and iqtas. Taqi al-Din and Nasir al-Din Muhammad rode to their homes in Hama and Homs, as did his northern allies and amirs to their towns in the Upper Euphrates region. In late winter, in a curious episode, Mosul put together a large show of force that proved to be impotent. At the request of Izz alDin Masud, Shah-Arman brought a strong force from his capital at Khilat close to Lake Van. He camped at Harzam, a largely Armenian town close to Mardin, north-west of Mosul. Izz al-Din, with only light baggage, “… set out on February 21, 1183 and joined forces with him and also the lord of Mardin [Qutb al-Din IlGhazi of the Ortoqid leadership clan]. A detachment of the army of Aleppo also arrived, all with the intent of confronting the sultan [Saladin].”20 Learning of the large muster, Saladin recalled Taqi alDin and Nasir al-Din Muhammad. The Mosuli allies bided their time throughout the month of March. Shah-Arman did send his amir, Saif al-Din Bektimur “… to discuss peace through the mediation of the Shaykh al-Shuyukh, but no settlement was arranged.” Even though Saladin’s military force was smaller than that of the Mosuli allies—especially with the addition of Shah-Arman’s cavalry—the Ayyubid commander directed his regiments, including Taqi al-Din’s horsemen who had just joined him, to advance towards Harzam in early April. Upon hearing of Saladin’s move, Shah-Arman “… turned tail and returned to his own lands. Izz al-Din also returned and all dispersed.”21 The allies apparently had calculated that a muster in force would cause Saladin with his smaller winter army to retreat to Syria. They obviously underestimated the aggressiveness of Saladin and his amirs. When they actually started to advance, Shah-Arman and Izz al-Din must have realized that they would be facing a Top Kapu Archives cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 184. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 58. 21 Ibid. 19 20

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highly skilled and experienced army in the open field without massive walls to protect them and their men. Their own forces, while numerous, had little battle experience. Qutb al-Din Il-Ghazi, after returning home, wrote Saladin that he should not have joined the venture and was now interested in peace with the new master of Jazira. Saladin camped at Harzam where he and his colleagues discussed the spring 1183 phase of their campaign. At about this time, Baghdad sent a response to one of Saladin’s many letters by which the caliph gave him a diploma for Diyar Bakr. Mosul was not mentioned.22 Diyar Bakr (also referred to as Amid and Amida)23 was a substantial city with two strong walls and a massive citadel, widely considered to be impregnable. Diyar Bakr not only boasted a large population, but also a library with over one million books. In return for his help, Saladin had promised it as an iqta to Nur al-Din Muhammad of Hisn Kaifa. Some thought Saladin was making a false promise, namely, that he would not be able to capture the city and bestow it on him. The doubters failed to recognize the military skills’ of the Ayyubid army or his opponent’s incompetence and lack of popularity. Basha al-Din ibn Nisan, the elderly amir in charge of the city and its fortress, was certainly past his prime and infamous for his narrow-minded stinginess. Saladin reached the city walls on April 13, negotiated for three days, and then set up catapults and put his sappers to work. Within three days, his men broke through the outer wall and turned their attention to the main fortification. Meanwhile, Ibn Nisan, even though he had a sizable citadel guard, did not inspire confidence because of his reputation for meanness. During Saladin’s attack, he did not supply the people of Diyar Bakr with food or money. On the fourth day, fearing that one or more of his own amirs might turn on him, he asked for quarter. Saladin gave him three days to Imad al-Din, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 5, 84 (50a). Diyar Bakr was the name of the city as well as the region in the twelfth century. Some writers refer to the city as only Amid or Amida and the region as Diyar Bakr. I have elected to use Diyar Bakr for both the city and the region. 22 23

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move out his own property. Because his servants had deserted him, he took but little. At the end of April, Saladin ascended the citadel and presented it to Nur al-Din Muhammad, keeping his word despite the naysayers. The Ortoqid lord kept his promise and always provided a well-outfitted cavalry regiment and resources for the holy war. Saladin was finally realizing what he always said he needed in his letters to Baghdad: more men and wherewithal to fight the Crusaders. After the fall of Diyar Bakr, Il-Ghazi of Mardin grasped the future, shifted his allegiance to Saladin’s empire, and brought with him his cavalry units. For Shah-Arman of Khilat, this was a disturbing blow because Il-Ghazi was his nephew. For Izz al-Din Masud, the realignment of the three cities— Sinjar, Diyar Bakr, and Mardin—and the loss of the other cities and towns to the Ayyubids in 1182 were major blows. These shifts left him with very little territory outside the environs of Mosul and Aleppo, undermining his ability to defend his diminished realm against challenges from Saladin or others who might wish to encroach on his lands. He had to come to grips with the reality that Saladin had truly changed the pieces on the chessboard during his seven months in the Upper Euphrates region.24 After another flurry of letters to Baghdad, again making his case for a diploma for Mosul, Saladin turned his attention to Aleppo. This Syrian city was now isolated. Only a few small towns were still under its sway and it was virtually cut off from Mosul by dint of Saladin’s conquest of the Jazira. En route to Aleppo, Saladin and his cavalry paused at Tell Khalid on May 17, 1183. His brother, Buri, had preceded him with an advance guard and had set up siege machines. The demonstration of power was sufficient. The town and citadel surrendered without a fight. He then rode to Ain Tab (today For the section Sinjar to Diyar Bakr, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Barq alShami, vol. 5, 40–56 (13a–30a); Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 38; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 58; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 466–67, 470–71; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 185, 188–91; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 434; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 34–36; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 178–79, 180–81. 24

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Gaziantep). Its leader, Muhammad ibn Khumartekin, readily changed sides and entered Saladin’s service. As he marched, Saladin called in other regional amirs and their men so that he would have an imposing army to impress the Aleppans. On May 21, 1183, he presented himself in front of the city. The people of Aleppo and Imad al-Din Zangi’s soldiers vigorously defended the city walls as Saladin’s army set up the siege, including catapults. At a certain point, in order to apply a different kind of pressure, Saladin moved his personal camp to Jawshan on a hill next to Aleppo. There his construction crews started building a fortress with a look of permanence. Moreover, he began distributing Aleppo’s iqtas to his supporters, in essence taking them away from their current holders in the city. As the fighting and pressure played out, Imad al-Din Zangi was secretly negotiating with Saladin. Imad al-Din’s emissaries were two amirs: Izz al-Din Jurdik—Saladin’s former colleague in Egypt who since 1170 had been in the service of Nur al-Din and his successors— and Zain al-Din Yaruqi, also in Imad al-Din’s service. The basic bargain that Saladin offered and, Imad al-Din, recognizing his nonviable position, agreed to, was the same as Saladin had presented in September 1182: Aleppo for Sinjar, but Saladin sweetened the offer by adding al-Khabur, Nisibin, al-Raqqa, and Saruj. Additionally, Imad al-Din Zangi would provide troops and funding for the holy war against the Crusaders. The deal was finalized on June 11, 1183. As the secret negotiations proceeded, fighting had continued during which Buri was wounded. He died on June 13. When the secret agreement became public, the people of Aleppo and its army were surprised and deeply concerned. Not only had they energetically defended the city’s walls, but also they had a long history of loyalty to Nur al-Din and his family and enmity for the Ayyubids. They wanted affirmation that the soldiers and people would be well treated. On the night of June 11, after a long discussion with the same Izz al-Din Jurdik and Zain al-Din Yaruqi, Saladin swore an oath to that effect. After these assurances were given and accepted, Saladin received Aleppo’s notables and military officers on whom “[h]e bestowed robes of honor and

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eased their minds.”25 On June 13, the day of his brother’s death, he welcomed Imad al-Din Zangi to his camp, “… giving him a splendid gift and some handsome horses. He gave robes of honor to several of his men.”26 In return, Imad al-Din Zangi pledged to join him in war against the Franks. As he left the city, Saladin generously allowed him to take his treasure and supplies. As he rode out of town, though, the citizenry mocked the unpopular atabeg, both for the secret deal and its substance. How could he exchange Aleppo for Sinjar! “A popular song was sung with the words: ‘this Zangi is mad’, and the people shouted a catch-phrase about the donkey who sold Aleppo for Sinjar (fresh for sour milk).”27 On the opposite side of the ledger, Saladin was very pleased with the agreement. According to the historian Abu Shama, he said: “In reality, we took the dinar and we gave dirhams.”28 That is, we received a large coin and gave small change. On June 21, to complete the conquest of northern Syria, Saladin’s men compelled Surkhak al-Nuri, a minor mamluke who held Harim to the west of Aleppo, to surrender the town and its citadel. Saladin remained at Aleppo until mid August, but he did give leave to many of the amirs and their troops to return to their homes. He settled a number of administrative matters concerning his new territories, especially the allocation of iqtas in the many cities, towns, and villages. As in other regions he conquered, he cancelled the extracanonical mukus taxes, much to the gratitude of merchants, traders, and artisans. To the west, he negotiated a truce with Prince Bohemond, the Frankish leader of Antioch, who in turn freed Muslim prisoners under his control. Before he left Aleppo, he decreed that al-Zahir Ghazi, his ten-year-old fourth son, would be the ruler. Actual authority over the citadel was given to Saif al-Din Yazkuj, a former Shirkuh mamluke. On August 14, Saladin took his leave from Aleppo. Riding south to Damascus, he Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 59. Ibid., 60. 27 Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 200. Also, see: Ibn Wasil, Mufarrij alKurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyoub, vol. 2, 143. 28 Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 43. 25 26

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took his own guard and Egyptian army units as well as troops from Aleppo and Jazira whom he had recalled from their home bases and some Turkish tribal auxiliaries. He arrived in Damascus on August 24, 1183. During the summer, he kept up his correspondence with the court in Baghdad, repeating his request for a diploma for the territories now under his rule, but also Mosul, which still eluded him. In Damascus, most likely in September 1183, he received a response to his liking. The new caliphal diploma “… covered all territories that Saladin could take from those who disobeyed the Caliph’s orders.” Saladin thanked the caliph, writing: “to the foot of the Caliph the Muslims says: ‘would that I were a clod of earth.’” Almost as important, Saladin turned on his propaganda machine. Far and wide, he circulated the diploma with the addition of his own gloss. He maintained that it covered lands under the control of those “‘whose actions in their lands are not sound and the balance of whose loyalty does not incline to Baghdad.’”29 In sum, the Ayyubid leader finally had Baghdad’s writ to subdue its foes as well as those who simply did not obey Baghdad’s edicts. After paying attention to the Crusader threat for the next 18 months, under this new license, Saladin would once again focus on Mosul.30 The events of June 1183 were the culmination of a remarkable ten-month campaign. Saladin took control of vast territories from the borders of Cilicia to the Tigris River in the Upper Euphrates, Jazira, and northern Syria. With the exception of Mosul and its environs, which Saladin greatly resented and regretted, Nur al-Din’s entire realm was now his. This massive shift changed the calculation of all his neighbors. Qilij-Arslan in Iconium and ShahArman in Khilat to the north knew his power and, consequently, Qadi al-Fadil, Paris Archives, cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 204. It is curious that other historians do not mention this diploma, which Saladin certainly used to his advantage. 30 For the May-August period at Aleppo, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 59–60; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 471–75; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 41–49; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 36–39; Imad alDin, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 5, 107–25 (71a–87a); Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 195–204; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 181–82. 29

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would not challenge him again. Izz al-Din in Mosul was very isolated. He had lost most of his territories and iqtas to Saladin’s army, but he still held out in the great city. He could now only look for allies in the East, such as al-Pahlawan or Sultan Arslan-Shah Tughril, both of whom were enemies of the caliph in Baghdad. Baghdad itself was no longer in a position to balance Saladin against the successors of Zangi and Nur al-Din. Imad al-Din Zangi had shifted allegiance to the Ayyubid camp and Izz al-Din was weak, hardly a force against which to counterpoise a behemoth as powerful as Saladin. Despite Saladin’s continuous declarations of fidelity to the Abbasid caliph, Baghdad must have been concerned by his burgeoning military strength and stature. The Crusaders, for their part, saw a rapidly growing threat, especially in light of the death of Emperor Manuel in Constantinople and the marked weakness of his successors as well as the unsettled political and familial conditions in the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

PALESTINE, TRANSJORDAN, AND DAMASCUS: 1183–1185 While Saladin was executing his northern campaign, the Crusaders were not quiescent. They calculated that in the absence of a large number of Muslim troops in southern Syria, they had an easy opportunity to pillage and perhaps gain territory. William of Tyre observed that another motive to raid Saladin’s lands was that the Franks were “… indignant that Saladin showed his contempt for us by going there to conquer other countries, without concluding either a truce or a treaty with the King [Baldwin].”31 During October 1182, Baldwin and a body of knights raided the Hauran and Damascus neighborhoods. Count Raymond of Tripoli assaulted Habis Jaldak, which Farrukh-Shah had captured only six months earlier. The 70 soldiers in the garrison asked for quarter and were allowed to return to their homes. In December, Raymond and Baldwin undertook new attacks, reaching Busra and Darayya respectively. From all of the forays, their men returned laden with booty: animals, harvested crops, weapons, and other valuable items. As recounted, when Saladin’s camp at Nisibin heard of the 31

Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 231.

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raids, some amirs counseled Saladin to return to southern Syria, but he rejected the idea in favor of his expedition to build his empire in the north. During January-February 1183, the ever-active and bold Reynald of Châtillon undertook a much more spectacular expedition, a naval sortie in the Red Sea. Over a two-year period, he had built a number of ships utilizing trees harvested from the hills around Karak. In January, bedouin camels transported them to Eilat at the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. He captured the town from the Muslim guard and, with two ships, blocked the fortress on an offshore island. He remained behind in Eilat as his flotilla sailed down the coast of the Red Sea, raiding small coastal towns and sinking 16 Muslim ships. At Aidhab, a large Nubian port, his sailors captured merchant ships from Aden and the Indian Ocean as well a rich merchant camel caravan. The Crusader ships then moved to the east coast and attacked al-Hawra, Yanbu, and Rabigh. It was rumored in both Muslim and Frankish circles that Reynald’s men intended to attack Mecca itself. Crusader penetration of what heretofore had been a Muslim sea was shocking and disturbing to Muslims from Central Asia to Morocco. Saladin’s masterful response, though, raised his stature in the Muslim world even more. Once al-Adil in Cairo heard of the naval attacks, he immediately ordered the Armenian admiral of the Egyptian fleet, Husam al-Din Lulu, to respond forcefully. Fortunately, the incursion took place in the winter when the Egyptian fleet was at port. As a first step, Lulu transported his own ships to the Red Sea from Fustat and Alexandria. He then drove the Franks out of Eilat—Reynald had already left the town—and relieved the blockade around the island fortress. Frankish ships were sunk and the local bedouin, who would work for anyone who would pay them, helped his men capture the Frankish garrison soldiers who had scattered into the desert. Subsequently, Lulu sailed to Aidhab, but the Franks had already left. Crossing the sea to the east, he caught the Crusader fleet near al-Hawra where he forced its ships onto the beach and burned them. Bedouin helped the Frankish sailors escape into the desert. The admiral’s men pursued them with “… purses full of silver fixed to their lances to

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buy back the bedouins’ loyalty.”32 After a five-day chase, the Muslim sailors ran the Franks to ground. Some were killed, but 170 asked for quarter. Lulu sent them to Cairo where Ibn Jubayr records that, in a show of disdain, they were forcibly mounted backwards on camels and paraded through the streets with great fanfare.33 Al-Adil obviously wanted to show the people that Saladin controlled the Red Sea and that the raiders, who invaded the waters and ports next to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, would be severely punished. The harshness of their ultimate punishment led to some controversy. Ordinarily, soldiers who ask for quarter were not killed. Al-Adil had assumed this tradition would be honored, but Saladin ordered their decapitation. He wrote to al-Adil: “‘if in these circumstances faith is kept with the unbelievers it will cause a rent [amongst the believers] that can never be mended.’”34 In sum, in Saladin’s mind, for political and religious reasons, the violation of the Muslim holy land trumped the tradition of clemency when quarter was requested and granted.35 In early 1183, the kingdom of Jerusalem was suffering a leadership crisis. King Baldwin IV, after the winter raids around Damascus, came down with a high fever. Convalescing in Nazareth, he rose from his sick bed, but the fever had severely aggravated his leprosy, which he had contracted as an adolescent. He was virtually blind and crippled. His legs, which had begun to decay, could not support him.36 Recognizing the severity of his condition, he reluctantly appointed Guy of Lusignan, the husband of his sister, Sibylla, as his regent. The Crusader lords, while Ahmad al-Maqrizi, Khitat, cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 186. Ibn Jubayr, Travels of Ibn Jubayr, 51–53. 34 Correspondence in the Top Kapu Archives cited by: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 187. 35 For the raids in southern Syria and the Red Sea, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 5, 69–75 (38b–42a); Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 35–37; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 468–69; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 177–78, 185–87; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 434, 436–67; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 177, 179–80; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 732–36. 36 Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 245, 245–48 passim. 32 33

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certainly not satisfied with Guy’s leadership qualities or his knowledge of the region for he had only recently arrived in the Holy Land from Europe, charily accepted the decision. The Frankish lords also held a council to decide what course to take with respect of Saladin. Reynald of Châtillon was not there because he was attending to his raids in the Red Sea. William of Tyre reports that the barons speculated about what Saladin would do on his return from Aleppo. Some thought he would focus on Beirut again. Others looked to fortresses around Tyre as his next target. Still others calculated that he would seek to remove Reynald from Karak and Shawbak. The optimists thought he would return to Egypt and rest his troops.37 At the conclusion of their deliberations, they made preparations for potential conflict with the full Ayyubid army. They imposed a new tax to pay for the defense of the kingdom. And as Saladin approached Damascus, they mustered their army at Sepphoris (also Saffuriya and Sephoria), north of Nazareth.38 The Crusaders would soon find out what Saladin’s intentions were. After only three weeks in Damascus, he rode to Jisr alKhashab, arriving on September 17, 1183. He gathered his forces, the largest body of soldiers he had commanded. In addition to his core Egyptian brigade and private guard, he had cavalry from Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and the Jazira as well as auxiliary troops. The total number is not recorded, but both the Frankish and Muslim sources state that his forces were much larger than the Crusader army was, even though Guy of Lusignan had put together the largest locally raised force the Franks had put in the field. Most of the Crusader barons were present: Raymond of Tripoli, Reynald of Châtillon, Walter of Caesarea, the Hospitaler grand master, and the Ibelin brothers. They were joined by two visiting Crusader princes from Europe and a group of merchants from Pisa, Lombardy, Venice, and Genoa who happened to be in the Holy Land ports at the time. In total, Guy had at his disposal about

Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 244. Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 244–48; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 436; Tyerman, God’s War, 210–11, 362. 37 38

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1,300 armored knights, 15,000 infantry, and a few thousand auxiliaries, all of whom constituted a daunting army. Before he left Jisr al-Khashab, Saladin wrote the caliph that he was marching in force against the Franks to engage in holy war. On September 29, he crossed the Jordan River below the Sea of Galilee. The people of nearby Baisan, hearing he was coming, fled to Tiberius. His troops sacked and burned the vacated town as well as villages in the vicinity. Saladin sent out an advance guard under the command of Izz al-Din Jurdik and Izz al-Din Jawuli, one of Shirkuh’s mamlukes. It came upon Humphrey IV of Toron, the stepson of Reynald of Châtillon, and his battalion, near the road to Nablus as they were marching from Transjordan. In the ensuing battle, the advance guard defeated the Frankish contingent, killing a number of horsemen and capturing 100 at the loss of only one Muslim rider. On October 1, Saladin reached the region around al-Fula to the south of Nazareth. The Crusaders, learning of his movements, marched to Goliath Springs (also Ain Jalut). Saladin’s strategy, it seems, was to try to lure the Franks into a classic battle and then defeat the Crusaders by dint of his overwhelming numbers and the consummate skills of his battle-tested cavalry. Reynald of Châtillon and the European knights wanted to rise to the challenge, but Raymond and the Ibelin brothers cautioned that Saladin’s troops were superior and the results would be disastrous. Guy, the regent, fell into indecision and failed to provide leadership at the height of the stand off, which was almost a siege, to the great consternation of many of the Franks. To complicate Guy’s position, food was running short and the amateur Italian volunteers complained of hunger and inaction. Saladin sent out advanced guards to draw out the Crusaders, but time and again they did not take the bait. Whenever the Muslims advanced, the Frankish infantry surrounded the knights, protecting them and their horses from the arrow barrages. Saladin, perhaps unaware that his numerous mounted thrusts and the blockade had put effective pressure on the Crusaders at Goliath Springs, decamped after a week, especially after his amirs started reporting that their supplies were running low. Even though the Franks broke camp after he left, he did not pursue them. He returned to the Hauran and dismissed his troops so they could

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return to their homes to the north and northeast. He arrived back in Damascus to joyous festivities on October 13, 1183. Guy de Lusignan suffered the most from this October affair. Back in Jerusalem, the Frankish lords and soldiers complained vociferously about his military skills, or lack thereof, and his courage. Confronting him, Baldwin stripped him of the regency. Guy retired to Ascalon and cut his ties with the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Baldwin, despite his severe infirmity, resumed the throne and its duties. Even though Saladin had dismissed many of the military units that hailed from the north, he only stopped in his capital for ten days. On October 21, he marched south towards Karak with his Egyptian brigade. Earlier, he had ordered al-Adil to meet him in Transjordan with the other half of the Egyptian army where they would exchange one set of troops for the other. In addition, he made a command change, the first in four years. Taqi al-Din was assigned to Egypt and al-Adil to Aleppo. For the former, Egypt was compensation for the Sinjar iqta that Saladin had reassigned to Imad al-Din Zangi. Al-Adil, his brother and able deputy in Cairo, envisioning the expansion of the Ayyubid Empire further to the north and northeast, certainly thought there would be opportunities for him in this dynamic situation. When he arrived in Aleppo, Saladin gave him the city and Manbij as iqtas. Al-Adil had asked his brother to deed Aleppo to him whereupon Saladin testily responded: “‘do you think that [these] places can be sold and do you not know that they belong to the people who are stationed in them? ... We are the treasurers of the Muslims.’”39 Reaching al-Rabba, an old Roman town to the east of the Dead Sea and six miles north of Karak, Saladin waited a few days for al-Adil and Taqi al-Din. The fortress at Karak was huge with many floors and stout walls. Moreover, due to the topography, it was relatively easy to defend and difficult to attack. Three sides of the hill on which it sits, drop precipitously to valleys far below. The fourth side is separated from the sizeable town of Karak by a wide moat. Before al-Adil arrived, Saladin’s men stormed the town and almost entered the fortress. Only at the last minute did Reynald 39

Ibn Abi Tayy quoted in Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 209.

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and his men escape over the bridge that spanned the fosse, burning it after them. Saladin set up catapults and started hailing rocks on the wall. On November 22, al-Adil arrived with the Egyptian relief brigade, accompanied by a large party of merchants and other civilians. Because of the constant threat of Crusader attacks, merchant caravans through Transjordan always sought military protection, a major reason for Saladin’s actions against Karak. Arriving shortly after al-Adil, Taqi al-Din and his men joined the attack. At its height, they were operating nine mangonels. Meanwhile, the Crusaders were having a party. Reynald’s stepson, 17-year-old Humphrey of Toron, was to be married to 11-year-old Princess Isabella, the daughter of Queen Maria Comnena and half-sister to King Baldwin. This was the same Humphrey who had lost his men to Izz al-Din Jurdik only a couple of months earlier. Many Crusader grandees were in Karak for the festivities along with dancers, jugglers, and musicians. Undeterred by the incessant attack, the Muslims could hear the singing and music. In a show of chivalry, “… [t]he Lady Stephanie, mother of the bridegroom, herself prepared dishes from the bridal feast which she sent out to Saladin. He in return asked in which tower the young pair were housed and gave orders that it should not be bombarded.”40 Despite his bravura, Reynald recognized the seriousness of his situation. He appealed to Baldwin for assistance. Under the leadership of Raymond of Tripoli, a relief column of knights marched toward Karak, passing by Mt. Nebo. Upon hearing of the enemy muster, even though his men were filling the moat with rocks and debris, Saladin lifted his siege on December 4. Taqi alDin rode to Egypt with the Egyptian army contingent that had been with Saladin in the north. Lacking overwhelming numbers because he had dismissed his northern units months earlier, Saladin chose not to challenge the Crusaders. The Frankish mounted units arrived with great fanfare at Karak, especially since the king had accompanied the force, albeit on a litter. Saladin and al-Adil with the replacement Egyptian brigade arrived back in Damascus on December 12, 1183. From Saladin’s standpoint, he was satisfied 40

Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 441.

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with the November-December events. He had made the command change and received fresh troops. While he did vigorously assault Reynald’s fortress, most likely he did not expect to capture it in 1183. Back in Damascus, his thoughts returned to Muslim lands to the north.41 On December 19, al-Adil left for Aleppo, his new home and base, and arrived on January 8, 1184. Al-Zahir Ghazi, Saladin’s son and al-Adil’s nephew, had held the town. Reportedly, he was upset that his father had taken it from him and given it to his uncle. Nevertheless, he returned to Damascus “… and remained at the service of his father, showing nothing but obedience and compliance, despite his inner disappointment which did not escape his father’s notice.”42 In Aleppo, al-Adil settled in, but the everobstreperous Aleppans were quick to find something about which to complain. Apparently, al-Adil’s chancellor, al-Sania, was a Christian who had adopted Islam to marry a Muslim lady. He appointed some Christians to his administration, sparking a sardonic street poem: “‘the religion of the Messiah has the upper hand over all others in the reign of al-Adil. There is a Christian emir [amir], a Christian vizier, a Christian governor and a Christian overseer of the diwan.’”43 During February and March 1184, Saladin was involved in Mosuli affairs. He still wanted to bring the region into his empire, but peacefully if possible. A major complication, though, presented itself in late winter. Sanjar-Shah, the lord of Jazirat ibn Umar and the nephew of Izz al-Din Masud of Mosul, and Zain al-Din Yusuf, For the 1183 Goliath Springs and Karak events, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 60–63; Imad al-Din, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 5, 143–54 (104b–115a), Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 477–78; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 50–54; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 436– 441; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 183; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 205–11; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 722–31, 736–40; Guillaume de Tyr, Histoire, 244–61. Sadly, this is the end of Guillaume de Tyr’s book. His observations and record are an invaluable resource for the history of this period. 42 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 63. 43 Cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 211. 41

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the ruler of Irbil and also the younger brother of Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi of Harran, sent envoys to Saladin. The delegation reported that the two leaders wanted to be relieved of Izz al-Din’s control and that they were ready to join the Ayyubid Empire if Saladin would extend his protection to them. Both towns were in the Upper Tigris region and had, in recent years, been under Mosul’s suzerainty. Thus, if Saladin were to accommodate the request, it would be a major affront to Izz al-Din. The towns were some distance from Saladin’s lands, complicating their security under the auspices of his realm. Earlier, in the summer of 1183, the governors of Hadith on the Euphrates and Takrit on the Tigris had sent similar envoys, saying they too wished to switch sides. At the time, Saladin replied that, because these two towns were close, less than a week’s ride, to Baghdad, he would accommodate their request, but only with explicit permission of the Caliph. In the end, though, it seems that Saladin judged that all of these towns came under his general caliphal diploma because, as he interpreted it, Izz al-Din Masud was in noncompliance with the caliph’s orders. After Izz al-Din’s loss of the Jazira, Diyar Bakr, Aleppo, and all of northern Syria, members of the political class in the remnants of his territories were very uncertain and worried about their future. Adding to the general sense of unease, Izz al-Din, for unclear reasons, arrested his long-time chief administrator, Mujahid al-Din Qaimaz. In the absence of this strongman, the dissidents were attempting to improve their situations and secure viable options. In response to this growing tension and unease, Mosul and Baghdad sent high-level delegations to Damascus. Shaikh alShuyukh Sadr al-Din Abd al-Rahim on behalf of the caliph and Qadi Muhi al-Din al-Shahrazuri on behalf of Izz al-Din arrived on February 27, 1184. They negotiated with Saladin for about a month, but eventually left without an agreement. Saladin did offer a compromise: Let Sanjar-Shah and Zain al-Din Yusuf chose between Saladin and Izz al-Din. Muhi al-Din rejected the proposal, saying: “‘their position must be clear in the text.’”44 Saladin knew what their position was—as did Muhi al-Din—thus the Ayyubid 44

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 64.

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offer was safe from his standpoint and obviously unacceptable to Mosul. The unhappy delegations left on March 22. In a show of confidence and perhaps arrogance, Saladin gave a diploma to Zain al-Din Yusuf for Irbil and the neighboring Great Zab, lands not yet appended to his realm. Negotiations had failed. Izz al-Din, in retaliation, prepared to attack Irbil. He released Mujahid al-Din Qaimaz and sent him to alPahlawan of northern Persia and his brother Qyzyl-Arslan, Lord of Azerbaijan, both opponents of Caliph al-Nasir, asking for military assistance. The latter provided 3,000 horsemen who proved to be ill-disciplined and unruly. Rather than assault Irbil, they looted the surrounding villages. Hearing of the pillage, Zain al-Din Yusuf and his cavalry rode out to attack the Azerbaijanis. Meeting them in the field, they routed the disorderly contingent and rescued the villagers’ goods and harvested crops. Mosuli matters still simmered, but Saladin waited until 1185 to address them forcefully.45 During the summer of 1184, Saladin once again engaged the Crusaders. He called up troops from most of his realm: Egypt, Damascus, Aleppo, Jazira, Sinjar, Hisn Kaifa, Mardin, and Diyar Bakr. Ibn Shaddad, the historian, emphasizes how honorably the Ayyubid overlord treated Nur al-Din Muhammad, the iqta holder of Diyar Bakr. As a symbol of respect for his new and powerful ally, Saladin rode from Damascus to the Biqa where he met him on June 20, as he traveled with al-Adil from Aleppo. During July, with a large body of soldiers, Saladin advanced on al-Rabba. He left the less experienced Nur al-Din Muhammad in the region around Hisban, which is north of the Arnon River (Wadi al-Mujib), the route through which a Frankish relief force might march. Meanwhile, from Egypt, Taqi al-Din advanced on Karak, bringing Qadi al-Fadil and the balance of al-Adil’s household goods with him.

For the negotiations and the events around Mosul in the first half of 1185, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 5, 163–69 (123b–128b); Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 480–81; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 56–57; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 39; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 205, 212–16; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 63–66. 45

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By August 22, 1184, Saladin and Taqi al-Din along with other contingents from the north invested Karak. They set up catapults and pummeled the fortress’s walls, degrading them considerably. Their men once again started filling the moat and sappers, under the cover of wooden shields, dug their tunnels. Having prepared the approaches, Saladin called in the reserves, who arrived August 26. Ibn Shaddad observes that the “… armies of Egypt and Syria and also those of al-Jazira under [Nur al-Din Muhammad] Ibn Qara Arslan had now met,”46 a true expression of the scope of Saladin’s empire. Saladin’s men set up more mangonels and continued to prosecute the siege. At the end of August, however, Saladin learned that the Franks had crossed the Jordan River. At once, he abandoned Karak and rode to Hisban. The Franks camped at alWala, not far from Hisban. (Al-Wala is also identified as El-Al, Elealeh, and Ain Awaleh.)47 Neither side chose battle. The Crusaders eventually rode on to Karak where they celebrated Saladin’s withdrawal from the area. Some of Saladin’s contingents crossed the Jordan River where they sacked Nablus, Jenin, and some villages, capturing a large number of prisoners and collecting all the booty they could carry. Saladin returned to Damascus on September 15, 1184. At the capital, the Shaykh al-Shuyukh met him, bringing robes of honor from the caliph for Saladin, al-Adil, and Nasir al-Din Muhammad. Recognizing the important role of Nur al-Din Muhammad, Saladin gave his robe to him and then told the other leaders from the north that they could return to their towns and villages. In late September, emissaries from Zain al-Din Yusuf arrived, informed Saladin of Qyzyl-Arslan’s attack at the instance of Izz al-Din, and asked for protection, setting the stage for another Mosul expedition. Some opposed the campaign. Qadi Zain al-Din ibn Naja who had worked with Shirkuh in the 1160s, complained in a letter to Saladin that his presence in Egypt was needed and that his presumed preference for Syria was noted. He Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 65. Lyons and Jackson sort out most of these names. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 218. 46 47

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was fearful that neglect of Egypt would be harmful to the country and that the expansionist policies would undermine Ayyubid strength. In addition, his long-time friend and advisor, Qadi alFadil, objected to the Mosul venture. He worried that Saladin would become entangled in Eastern politics and not refocus on what was important: the holy war. Their relationship suffered some strain due to this difference of opinion. Saladin, though, had his own agenda. He doubtlessly felt the necessity to come to the aid of his new allies in Irbil and Jazirat ibn Umar. The fact that Izz al-Din was reaching out to Qyzyl-Arslan and al-Pahlawan, known foes of the caliph as well as Saladin himself, strengthened his resolve to attain a satisfactory resolution to Izz al-Din’s refusal to join the Ayyubid project. Moreover, Saladin wanted to incorporate the last element of Zangi’s and Nur al-Din’s territories into his empire. He wanted to establish firmly that the Ayyubids were the successors to the house of Zangi. In line with his imperial plans, Saladin started relegating key provinces to his sons. In November 1184, he assigned Egypt to his second son, Uthman, but to be administered as heretofore by Taqi al-Din. Al-Adil continued to administer Aleppo, but now on behalf of al-Afdal, Saladin’s eldest son. Despite this assignment, it seems that al-Afdal continued to live in Cairo.48 For 18 months, Saladin had largely focused on the Crusaders’ presence in the Holy Land. At the end of this period, on the surface, very little had changed. The Franks still held their borders, including the troublesome Karak fortress that impeded trade between Egypt and Syria. How do we assess this period? First, Saladin showed the caliph and the Muslims that, despite his months in the north, he was still devoted to the holy war. Three times, he moved his troops against the Crusaders. On all occasions, remembering their major defeat at Marj Uyun, they refused to meet For the second half of 1185 at Karak and Damascus, see: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 57–60; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 64–66; Imad al-Din, Al-Barq al-Shami, vol. 5, 172–77 (131b–135b); Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 9, 481–82; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 216–20, 223–24; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 442; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 40; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 184–86. 48

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him on the battlefield. Could Saladin have successfully prosecuted the siege of Karak? Such sieges are not easy and they often entail heavy casualties. In any event, both investments were vigorously executed and only lifted as the Frankish knights and infantry approached. Thus, Saladin had pursued the Franks and engaged in holy war, but he was not yet ready for momentous encounters. That would have to wait for another two years. Saladin was still in the raiding, ghazu in Arabic, mode. The Arab historians of the time describe these attacks on the Franks as raids, not battles to the finish. Second, related to the raid concept, he gave his men an opportunity to capture booty and damage Crusader assets. For some soldiers, this was a substantial part of their pay and thus important for maintaining the army. Third, he took the opportunity to exchange his battle-weary troops for fresh cavalrymen from Egypt. At the same time, he made a major command change whereby al-Adil was assigned to Aleppo and Taqi al-Din to Egypt. Fourth, during these months Saladin twice asked his new provinces as well as the old ones to provide troops and resources for holy war. Accordingly, he solidified his suzerainty over his whole empire and proved to all observers, friend and foe alike, that his brigades, in great numbers, would indeed show up for war. Fifth, at the beginning of this period, Saladin had received the broad diploma from Baghdad. By not taking military action against Mosul for this extended period, he demonstrated to the caliph and other Muslim leaders that he was willing to let diplomacy work. Some questioned his focus on Mosul, but most accepted his overall strategy, especially if it was clear that he made great efforts to reach a negotiated solution when it came to Muslim lands. *** In early 1185, the political crisis in the Kingdom of Jerusalem became more acute. Knowing that he was dying, Baldwin published his will. His seven-year old nephew, Baldwin V, son of his sister Sibylla and William of Montferrat, would be crowned. However, the disgraced and rebellious current husband of Sibylla, Guy of Lusignan, would not be regent. Rather, Baldwin tapped Count Raymond of Tripoli. Raymond accepted the post, but not the guardianship of the boy, which was given to Joscelin of Courtenay. Raymond did not want to be blamed if anything happened to the sickly youth. The king died in March. Raymond called a council of

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lords to formulate Frankish policy, especially vis-à-vis the Ayyubid Empire. In light of the weakness of the kingdom and the current drought, they elected to negotiate a four-year truce with Saladin that was signed by both parties shortly thereafter. As a note of intrigue, at about this time, Sibylla, the wife of Bohemond III of Antioch, began sending Saladin, for payment, information on Frankish troop concentrations and movements, a practice that lasted at least until 1189. In late 1184 or 1185, Emperor Andronicus of the Byzantine Empire, fearing attacks from Europeans as well as Seljuk Turks, signed a truce with Saladin. Reversing Emperor Manuel’s policy, he gave Saladin a carte blanche with respect to the Crusaders and, in return, Saladin was to help him in his relations with the Turks. Lastly, Saladin signed a truce with the Armenian prince of Cilicia, which included a clause that he free some Turkish prisoners as a favor to Sultan Qilij-Arslan with whom Saladin already had a peace treaty. Thus, in a few short months, the Ayyubid leader secured his western and northwestern flanks. Consequently, he was in a more secure position to turn towards his eastern goal: Mosul.49

MOSUL: 1185–1186 In April 1185, Saladin established his camp near Hama where he received delegations from his holdings in the region and from the north and east. In late May, he camped outside Harran, east of the Euphrates and due west of Mosul. Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi, a For the Crusader developments, see: Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 428–30, 443–45; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 222, 289; idem, “The Old French Continuation of William of Tyre, 1184–97.” In Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 11–18. This work is hereafter cited as “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem. Edbury translated the “Morgan edition” of this work, which is found in the Bibliotheque Municipale in Lyon. It covers the period 1184–1197. It is likely that Ernoul, a squire in the service of Balian of Ibelin, wrote the 1186–1187 part of the text and was an eyewitness to events. It is likely that the balance of the manuscript was written by other eyewitnesses or close observers at the time. See: “Introduction,” Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 3–8. 49

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senior member of the Ayyubid Empire, held the town and neighboring Edessa as iqtas. In a curious set of events, after enjoying a polo game together, Saladin placed Muzaffar al-Din under arrest and took his iqtas from him. He had been one of the strongest proponents of Saladin’s expedition to Mosul, for which he promised 50,000 dinars. Only recently, he had helped persuade his brother Zain al-Din Yusuf of Irbil to shift his allegiance from Izz al-Din Masud to Saladin. Apparently, though, Muzaffar al-Din was overly bold. He asked for too much. He wanted to be his brother’s overlord in Irbil, a demand Saladin refused for he fully intended to keep Zain al-Din directly under his suzerainty. Upon his frustration, Muzaffar al-Din failed to pay the promised funds for the march. Saladin’s response was severe but brief, even though some of his aides wanted even harsher treatment because it seems they believed the rumors that Muzaffar al-Din was changing sides. A few days after the arrest, Saladin relented, released him from prison, restored his citadels and towns, and re-elevated him to an honorable status in the Ayyubid court. While there is no record, presumably Muzaffar al-Din turned over the 50,000 dinars to Saladin’s coffers. For the rest of his life, he remained a loyal and active senior member of Saladin’s empire.50 In June, Saladin advanced towards Mosul in what would be an exercise in demonstrating strength, isolating Izz al-Din, taking much of the Mosul lord’s hinterland, as he was not in a position to defend it, and ultimately receiving his capitulation. While en route, Sultan Qilij-Arslan, for whom he had only recently rendered a favor, sent an envoy to inform Saladin that “all of the kings of the East” had allied together and vowed to fight him if he did not withdraw. Saladin ignored the threat. He stopped at Dunaisir between Mardin and Nisibin where Nur al-Din Muhammad’s brother, Abu Bakr, joined him with a sizable cavalry. Within a few days, though, he excused himself to return to Diyar Bakr where, after a short illness, Nur al-Din Muhammad had died, leaving only two young sons. Abu Bakr, as was typical of the time, planned to assert control over Nur al-Din’s iqtas: Diyar Bakr, Hisn Of all the historians, Lyons and Jackson best sort out this murky episode. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 224–27. 50

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Kaifa, and Khartpirt. Saladin then traveled to Nisibin, skirting Mardin, which had shifted to the suzerainty of Shah-Arman upon the death in 1184 of Qutb al-Din Il-Ghazi who had joined Saladin in 1183. Sanjar-Shah of Jazirat ibn Umar—the nephew of Izz alDin Masud who had recently rejected his uncle’s suzerainty and received Saladin’s protection—joined him in Nisibin. From there, the expeditionary force reached Balad on the Tigris north of Mosul on July 1, 1185. Saladin took the opportunity to write the caliph, again making his case for Mosul, largely by arguing that Izz al-Din Masud was acting against the caliph’s orders and interests. Specifically, he asserted that Izz al-Din had included the name of the Seljuk Sultan Arslan-Shah Tughril in the Friday khutba and had it stamped on coins, even though Tughril of Persia and the caliph were deeply estranged; was allied with al-Pahlawan, atabeg of northern Persian, who was also at odds with the caliph; and was collecting illegal taxes and dealing with the Franks. Saladin omitted any reference to his own agreements with the Crusaders. Furthermore, he complained of Izz al-Din’s past treatment of his new allies, Sanjar-Shah and Zain al-Din Yusuf and, as usual, maintained that he was camped near Mosul to seek unity of Islam and bring the grand city back under the authority of the caliph.51 While Saladin was in Balad, Izz al-Din Masud sent a delegation of women composed of his mother, a daughter of Nur al-Din, and other ladies and notables. They spoke about Izz alDin’s willingness to send troops whenever he requested them. Though Saladin honorably received the delegation, it appears that a definitive and acceptable proposal was not yet on the table. Saladin’s forces now surrounded the city, Saladin on the west side and Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi and his brother on the east. Even though there were some light skirmishes, Saladin did not besiege the town and attack it. His forces just blocked ingress and egress. Meanwhile, he proceeded, in a very public way, to give out Mosuli territories as iqtas to his supporters. He allotted some lands in traditionally Kurdish areas to his Kurdish amirs; other senior aides and officers received iqtas in neighboring villages; and Imad

51

Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 227–28.

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al-Din al-Isfahani, his scribe, was given a valuable property in the city.52 During this period, Saladin received numerous delegations from leaders through out the region. Notably, Shah-Arman and alPahlawan, both of whom were not on good terms with Ayyubids and were long-time Izz al-Din supporters, sent senior emissaries. They met Saladin and presented him with expensive gifts. Thus, as his stature and presence was growing, Izz al-Din Masud was becoming increasingly more isolated. Moreover, Saladin was giving away his lands. Saladin and his aides also debated a proposal to divert the Tigris and thus deprive Mosul of water. Such a project would have been enormous and very difficult to execute successfully. Nevertheless, it received serious attention, but was abandoned as new imperial opportunities rose to the north.53 This general pattern of light siege, negotiations, receiving delegations, and doling out iqtas was temporarily broken when in mid July 1185, Shah-Arman of Khilat died, leaving no children. The demise of this important leader as well as others left a significant void in the general region of Diyar Bakr. As noted, Nur al-Din Muhammad, the iqta holder of Diyar Bakr city and its citadel had recently passed, leaving only young sons. Similarly, Qutb alDin Il-Ghazi of Mardin had died a couple of years earlier, also leaving only young sons. Additionally, Daulat-Shah of Bitlis had suffered a debilitating stroke and was no longer a functioning leader. At Khilat, Shah-Arman’s mamluke and long-time senior administrator, Saif al-Din Bektimur, had assumed control. On the popular level, he was considered a benevolent ruler, partly because of his Sufi roots. As is normal in many parts of the world, such a void invited intervention. Al-Pahlawan mustered his forces and advanced on Khilat. Bektimur, fearing al-Pahlawan’s posture, sent emissaries to Saladin, offering to join the Ayyubid Empire in exchange for protection. Saladin, always alert to opportunities, Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 300. For the Kukburi through Mosul blockade period, see: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 60–63; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 66–67; Ibn alAthir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 5–9; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 41; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 223–29; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 188–90. 52 53

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lifted the blockade of Mosul and rode north. He ordered Nasir alDin Muhammad and Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi to lead an advance guard to Khilat to negotiate directly with Bektimur. Saladin, with the main force, stopped at Mayyafarqin, mid way between Diyar Bakr and Khilat in the Diyar Bakr-Lake Van region. The town had been under the patrimony of Shah-Arman, but under the command of one Asad al-Din Yurun-Qush, an amir from Mardin, which was also under Shah-Arman. Facing a vigorous defense, Saladin besieged Mayyafarqin, but eventually turned to diplomacy. On August 28, 1185, an arrangement was agreed upon whereby: Assad al-Din was assigned a valuable iqta and would join Saladin’s service; the late Qutb al-Din’s widow who had been living in the town would be allied with Saladin through marriage, namely, her daughter was betrothed to Saladin’s young son, al-Muizz Ishaq, and the widow would be given the fortress at al-Hattakh. This imperial acquisition was far to the north of Nur al-Din’s holdings. Saladin’s desire to include it and Khilat, even further north, in his realm caused some to raise questions. Was he reaching too far? Was he losing sight of the essential mission: holy war against the Franks? While Saladin was engaged at Mayyafarqin, events at Khilat took another turn. As the Ayyubid advance guard approached the city, Bektimur was in negotiation with al-Pahlawan. Initially, the latter appeared intent on capturing Khilat and extending his empire by force in the Lake Van region. Bektimur’s envoy approached alPahlawan’s aides and threatened them with Saladin whose cavalry was in the region. Surveying the new reality, al-Pahlawan shifted to diplomacy. He “… sought to make peace and gave him [Bektimur] his daughter in marriage, recognized his authority there and restored the city to him. Bektimur made his excuses to the sultan’s envoys, who returned ‘without the cream.’”54 Thus, while Saladin was spending time at Mayyafarqin, the opportunity to take Khilat passed. Certainly, if Saladin had advanced directly to the city, his very presence along with his able army, would have likely dictated a different outcome. During September, Saladin returned to the Mosul region, stopping at Nisibin for a short time and then camping at Kafr 54

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 67.

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Zammar, west of Izz al-Din Masud’s stronghold in October and November 1185. Mosul put up barricades, but Saladin did not lay siege to the city. Rather he received delegation after delegation from Mosul, seeking peace and saying they would take steps to meet Saladin’s terms. Saladin also focused on arrangements for the territories around the city, giving out more iqtas and solidifying his relationships with numerous local leaders. He pointedly reached out to Irbil and the lands between the Great and Little Zab Rivers, eastern tributaries of the Tigris. All of these steps put pressure on and further isolated Izz al-Din. On December 3, 1185, Saladin became ill with a severe fever that would not fully lift until early March 1186. In mid December, he asked Imad al-Din Zangi to intercede and negotiate a final agreement with Izz al-Din. However, his health declining even more, he left Kafr Zammar on December 16, rode to Nisibin where he left many units of his core army and then continued on to Harran to wait out the debilitating fever. He dismissed many of the amirs and their men from the northern region and Syria and they rode to their homes. People throughout the empire despaired at his serious illness. They were worried about the health of their great leader whom they admired, but also fearful for their own futures at his possible demise. Many rumors spread from the Tigris to Yemen, but especially in Aleppo, Damascus, and Cairo. Who would inherit what? As the fever lingered, Saladin required his key lieutenants to swear oaths that they would honor his will whereby his sons would inherit the Ayyubid Empire. By mid February, al-Adil brought Syrian doctors to help the ailing leader and took the opportunity to persuade his brother to let him return to Egypt where he had spent many years. One of Saladin’s sons, Uthman, had arrived at his father’s bedside during the same period. In like fashion, one of his wives brought their two youngest sons, Turan-Shah and MalikShah, to Harran from Damascus. On a more conspiratorial note, there were rumors that Nasir al-Din Muhammad, who had returned to Homs, was in contact with personalities in Aleppo and Damascus for nefarious purposes. Calculating that the promise, at least perceived, that he would be assigned Mosul as an iqta would not be kept and, conceivably, still bitter that he had not inherited more at the death of his father, Shirkuh, he now sought to take over the empire on Saladin’s death.

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In an irony of history, or perhaps not so ironic turn of events, he died on March 4, 1185 at the very time Saladin was realizing his ambitions at Mosul. The public word was that he had overindulged in wine, just as his father had before his death, but there were also rumors that he was poisoned. During this period, Mosuli issues remained on the table. In the late fall or early winter of 1185/1186, Izz al-Din Masud reached out in two directions—al-Pahlawan and the caliph—but he did not receive encouragement from either party. Ibn Shaddad records what happened: “The treaty came about because the Atabeg Izz alDin, lord of Mosul, sent me to the caliph to seek his support, but no ‘cream’ was forthcoming from that direction, so he sent to the Persian princes, but again no benefit resulted. When I arrived back from Baghdad and delivered the reply to the mission, he despaired of any aid.” Finding no allies for his now isolated city, in February Izz al-Din ordered Ibn Shaddad and Baha al-Din al-Rabib, another senior aide, to travel to Harran and “‘Ratify whatever your joint efforts and abilities can manage.’”55 The eventual agreement, to which both Saladin and al-Adil swore an oath, met Saladin’s demands: Izz al-Din would swear an oath of allegiance; he would provide troops upon demand and under his personal command; Saladin’s name would be added to the khutba and the names of Sultan Arslan-Shah Tughril and al-Pahlawan would be dropped; and Izz al-Din would abandon all claim to Irbil and Jazirat ibn Umar as well as Shahrazur, Haditha, Takrit, and Ana.56 In return, Mosul would live in peace and Izz al-Din would receive, as iqtas, lands east of Nisibin, which Saladin took from Sanjar-Shah. The agreement was finalized on March 3, 1186. By this date, Saladin was finally recovering from his long illness. In light of his serious fever and recognition that he had fulfilled his mission in the East, it was said that Saladin swore that

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 68. Qadi al-Fadil, Munich Archives, cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 238–39. 55 56

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he would turn his entire attention, energy, and resources to holy war, a promise he would keep.57 For Saladin, this expedition was both positive and negative. He secured Mosul, one of the great cities of Islam. In this sense, his eastern and northern empire was now complete. On the other side of the ledger, he failed to extend his reach further north. He took Mayyafarqin, but was unsuccessful at Khilat. A positive aspect of adding Mayyafarqin, though, was that he secured control over a vast and rich region north of the Tigris and Diyar Bakr, approaching the waters of Lake Van. He had expanded his empire. His neighbors to the north and east were now al-Pahlawan and Arslan-Shah Tughril. However, there were significant weaknesses in his evolving imperial structure. Many of the arrangements were personalistic. When a local leader died or was killed, a new intervention often became necessary. Thus, Saladin lost Mardin on the death of Qutb al-Din Il-Ghazi and his suzerainty over certain lands was called into question upon the demise of others. His march to the far north and his capture of Mayyafarqin had helped resolidify his rule, but the endemic weakness still obtained. In addition, despite all of these personal and imperial arrangements, the countryside was not always calm. For obscure reasons, but most likely due to disputes over land and pasturage—not over a marriage as reported— Kurdish and Turkish tribes fought each other in the fall of 1185 and again in the spring of 1186. Many lost their lives in this rural conflict. While his rule in Cairo, Damascus, and Aleppo and their hinterlands seemed relatively secure, Saladin’s hold in the Upper Euphrates and the Upper Tigris, though real, was certainly more tenuous. Somewhat ironically, al-Pahlawan died on March 23, 1186. If Saladin had intended to expand his realm north and east of the Tigris River, al-Pahlawan’s lands would have been his next target. However, because Saladin was not physically present in the For the period October 1185 to early March 1186, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 67–68; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 8–11; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 63–66; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 235–41; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 41–3; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 190–93. 57

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region—he was in Harran close to the Euphrates—he was not in a position to exploit the unexpected opening. Predictably, the death of this powerful leader led to tumultuousness and unsettled conditions in the vast region that had been under his rule.

SYRIA: 1186 Having completed his business at Harran at the end of March, Saladin and the Ayyubid army returned to Syria. The 13-year-old son of the late Nasir al-Din Muhammad, Shirkuh ibn Nasir al-Din, met him at the Euphrates crossing. Saladin gave him a diploma for his father’s iqtas, Homs, al-Rahba, and Tadmur (also Palmyra). At Aleppo, the victorious Ayyubid leader was received with great accolades. The citizenry’s celebrations were that much greater because Saladin had recovered from a disease that many had feared would be fatal. Saladin then visited Hama and Homs. At the latter, he made certain that Nasir al-Din Muhammad’s widow, who was also Saladin’s sister, and their children received the proper share of the inheritance according to Islamic law. The estate was quite large: about one million dinars according to some accounts. In the course of the day, Saladin asked the young Shirkuh how far he had advanced in the study of the Quran. Shirkuh responded with sura 4.10: “Those who consume the orphans’ properties unjustly, eat fire into their bellies, and will suffer in Hell.”58 Saladin let the impertinence pass. After Homs, Saladin returned to Damascus, arriving June 2, 1186, again to an enthusiastic popular welcome. On a sad note, though, he learned that Ismat al-Din Khatun, one of his senior wives, had died on January 26, 1186, news that had been concealed from him during his illness. Once he settled down again in Damascus at his family home, he focused on regaining his physical Quran, sura 4.10. Translation by Dr. Rashad Khalifa. This quotation is cited by a number of historians, including: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 10, 11, Lane-Poole, Saladin, 194; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 243; and Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 193. Ibn al-Athir claims that Saladin took some horses, weapons, and money. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 10–11. However, Imad al-Din, clearly records what is found in the text in this book. Also, see: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 243. 58

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strength and family matters. Al-Adil wanted to return to Egypt, an appeal he made to his brother on more than one occasion in Harran. Accommodating his wishes, he assigned al-Adil to Cairo, but to rule in the name of Uthman. His son al-Zahir, who had been deprived of Aleppo only a few years earlier, was reassigned to the city, to be assisted by Husam al-Din Bishara as garrison commander and Isa ibn Balashu as governor. Al-Afdal, his 16-yearold eldest son, who had been in Cairo with Taqi al-Din, was called to join his father in Damascus. Saladin ordered these changes in August 1186. Family changes, though, frequently give rise to friction. When Taqi al-Din heard he was going to be replaced, he was so angry that, according to Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, he jumped over the Nile to Giza.59 In 1185, he had proposed a military expedition to western North Africa against the Almohades, the rulers of the region at the time, only to be dissuaded by Saladin. Now he openly talked about marching west, but without Saladin’s blessing. His aides assumed the Egyptian army would readily accompany him because he was very popular in the ranks due to his generosity. Some Cairene notables reasoned with him or as Ibn Shaddad harshly put it: “Several of the great men of state disapproved of his plan and they told him that his uncle, the sultan, would disown him immediately and God knows what would happen to him afterwards. God opened his eyes to perceive what was right and he answered with ‘I hear and obey.’”60 In early November, Saladin met him at Marj al-Suffar where he reconfirmed all of his Syrian iqtas, including Hama. Tellingly, though, he added Mayyafariqin on the frontier of the Ayyubid Empire. Giving it to the aggressive and headstrong Taqi al-Din may have been an indication of Saladin’s future plans. Further solidifying family ties, Saladin arranged the marriage of al-Zahir to Ghaziya Khatun, one of al-Adil’s daughters as well as

59 60

Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 245. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 71.

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the marriage of al-Afdal to Nasir al-Din Muhammad’s daughter, Safra Khatun. The nuptials took place in December 1186.61 By early 1187, Saladin had arranged family matters. He spent leisure time discussing the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad and theological matters with members of the ulama and participating in sports, primarily polo, with his sons and colleagues. The year 1187, though peaceful in the early months, would turn out to be a true watershed for Saladin, the Crusaders, and the Middle East.

For the April-December 1186, Aleppo to Damascus, period, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 10–11; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 65–66; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 69–71; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 243–46; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 192–93; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 49. 61

CHAPTER EIGHT BATTLE OF HATTIN: 1187 The year 1187 was truly momentous for the Ayyubid Empire, and a watershed in the relations between the Muslims and the Crusaders. In July, Saladin’s forces met the full Frankish army in battle and destroyed it. In the following months, he and his men spread out in Palestine and Lebanon where they captured scores of towns and fortresses, a process that would continue through 1189 and extend to northwest Syria. In early October 1187, the holy city of Jerusalem surrendered to Saladin. Not only had he fulfilled his oftstated pledge to his numerous supporters and the Abbasid caliph, but also he changed the course of history, as had the Crusaders in 1099. Difficulties and setbacks, however, accompanied the epochal victories. His successes in the Holy Land as well as those in Syria, Iraq, and Anatolia filled some leaders with trepidation. How great was his ambition? Would he be satisfied with the empire as it stood in 1187, or would he reach to Morocco and Spain, to Persia, to Baghdad itself? His feats in the Holy Land, as Saladin well knew, would stimulate a massive European reaction. By 1189, the new invasion, the Third Crusade, began to arrive. Although this military effort did not roll back Saladin’s conquests, the Franks did extend their presence in limited areas on the Mediterranean littoral. On the domestic front, Saladin had problems with his army. Keeping an iqta-based army in the field for long periods had always been difficult and, predictably, this proved to be a constant challenge for Saladin in the post-Hattin months and years.

CRUSADER POLITICS In early spring 1185, a grand assembly of Crusader barons swore to abide by the will of the ailing King Baldwin IV. The testament 207

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stipulated that Count Raymond of Tripoli would be regent until Baldwin V, then seven, reached the age to rule, or, if the young prince were to die, Count Raymond would retain the regency until “…the four great rulers of the West, the Pope, the Western Emperor [Frederick Barbarossa] and the Kings of France and England, should arbitrate between the claims of Princesses Sibylla and Isabella.”1 As recounted, Baldwin IV died in March 1185; Raymond assumed the regency; and Joscelin of Courtenay became the boy’s guardian. Baldwin V, a sickly youth, died at Acre in late August 1186 with both Raymond and Joscelin in attendance. Thereafter followed a ruse that involved breaking solemn oaths, an incipient civil war, and treason. After the boy’s death, Joscelin persuaded Raymond to retire to Tiberias where he could assemble the Frankish lords and implement the terms of the late king’s will. Joscelin, however, pursued a different course. After he dispatched the little body to Jerusalem with the Templars, he urged Sibylla and her husband Guy of Lusignan, Reynald of Châtillon, and William III of Montferrat to hurry to the holy city with the intent of crowning Sibylla before the other Crusader barons learned of their intent. In Jerusalem, they joined Patriarch Heraclius and the Grand Master Gerard of the Templars, both of whom were close to Sibylla and at odds with Count Raymond. To obtain the royal insignia that rested in the royal coffer, the plotters needed three keys. Heraclius and the Gerard held two of them. The Hospitaler Grand Master held the third. Faithful to his oath, the Hospitaler refused to produce it, but after the Jerusalem grandees placed considerable pressure on him, he begrudgingly threw the key from the monastery window. After burying the boy king, but in clear violation of the royal will, the patriarch crowned Sibylla. Knowing that Guy was decidedly unpopular, he gave a second crown to the queen and said enthrone whom you will to rule the Kingdom of Jerusalem. She promptly placed it on her husband’s head. Raymond quickly heard of the treachery. He called his own conclave in Nablus, which was attended by Balian of Ibelin and his wife Queen Maria, Humphrey of Toron and his wife Isabella, 1

Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 443.

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Baldwin of Ibelin (Lord of Ramla), Walter of Caesarea, Reynald of Sidon, and other Crusader barons. Sibylla sent them an invitation to the coronation. Two lowly monks conveyed the assembled lords’ response, which reminded the Jerusalem group of its collective oath and objected to any action until they finished their deliberations. In their practical wisdom, the Nablus barons well realized that Sibylla, Guy, and their coconspirators held considerable military power and that Sibylla, as sister of the late Baldwin IV, had her own hereditary rights to the throne. In addition, she was popular in Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the Nablus assembly proposed that Princess Isabella and Humphrey of Toron, who had married at Karak in 1183, be crowned and taken to Jerusalem. Obviously, this meant civil war. Humphrey, though, would have no part of the challenge. He rode to Jerusalem and offered his obedience to Sibylla, which she accepted. At that, the Nablus grandees gave up. Raymond absolved them of their oath to Baldwin’s will after which most of them traveled to Jerusalem and swore allegiance, however reluctantly, to Guy of Lusignan. Count Raymond did not visit Sibylla and Guy’s court in the holy city. After the conclusion of the royal coup, he retired to Tripoli where he was in contact with Taqi al-Din in November. Fearing an attack from Jerusalem, he concluded a personal agreement with Saladin via Taqi al-Din for the protection of his county, Tripoli, and his wife’s principality of Galilee. Then, traveling through Muslim territory with Saladin’s permission, he rejoined Eschiva in Tiberias. Reportedly, as part of the arrangement, Saladin stationed a cavalry unit in the city for the protection of the Frankish couple. This accord with Saladin, though perhaps necessary for Raymond’s very survival, was considered treasonous in Frankish halls and would haunt him during the remaining months of his life.2 For Crusader politics in 1186, see: “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 24–29. Ernoul, the probable author of “The Continuation,” gives an extended description of the whole affair. Also, see: Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 443–44, 446–47; Tyerman, God’s War, 364–66; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 247–48; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 764–75; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 51–52. Interestingly, the 2

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ROAD TO HATTIN Saladin had returned to Damascus in May 1186. Aside from settling familial and administrative matters, he spent the next few months recuperating from his long illness. At least into the fall of that year, he suffered pain and other symptoms. In the evenings, he and his advisors would sit in the diwan and discuss the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad and other theological matters. In the early fall, Qadi al-Fadil, perhaps in an attempt to divert him from his personal condition or perhaps to influence decision making, persuaded him to swear that he would forego future forays against Muslims, and instead focus his attention on the Franks, with an explicit vow to dispatch Raymond of Tripoli and Reynald of Châtillon. By dint of their private agreement in November, though, the pledge with respect to Raymond became moot. By the winter of 1186–1187, Saladin had recovered from his illness, or, at least, the Arab chroniclers no longer mention it. Surveying the environment in the Holy Land and Syria, Saladin had to weigh the various political and military factors at play. The 1185 truce with the Crusaders was still in effect. Negotiated with the regent of the time, Count Raymond, it was scheduled to last until the spring of 1189. Nevertheless, his ambition to eliminate the Crusader occupation of Jerusalem and the Holy Land—which would embellish his image in Baghdad as well as among his supporters in the military and religious classes and in the population at large, especially after his long campaigns in Muslim lands—pushed him to renew the war against the Franks. Indeed, during a grand council in June 1187 to discuss the next steps for the Ayyubid army, one of Saladin’s amirs said “… the people of the East are cursing us; they are saying we have stopped fighting the unbelievers [the Franks] and just want to fight Muslims. In my opinion we should act decisively [against the Crusaders] and check their tongues.”3 The fact that Saladin could Arab chroniclers also present some details about Frankish politics in 1186. See: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 17–18; Abu Shama, AlRawdatain, pt. 2, 74–75; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 53–54. 3 Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 23.

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now draw soldiers and material support from his vast empire, made him more confident that he could prevail on the battlefield. Moreover, the Crusader camp was divided and in disarray. He knew that the coronation of King Guy caused major dissension. Baldwin of Ibelin, one of the strongest knights, had decamped to Antioch and Raymond by November 1186 had a private cooperative arrangement with Saladin. Prince Bohemond of Antioch, some distance from Jerusalem, could be contained by either a small show of force or a truce. In sum, the realities on the ground called for decisive action against the Crusaders, but the truce to which he had sworn an oath, still stood. At the end of 1186 or in early 1187, the rapacious Lord of Karak, Reynald of Châtillon, presented Saladin with a casus belli.4 He seized a very large caravan traveling from Egypt to Damascus, accompanied by a cavalry unit. Reynald threw the soldiers and the civilians, including their families, into his dungeons and took possession of a great array of goods and coffers of dinars. Saladin reacted immediately. He sent a delegation to demand the release of the caravan, but Reynald refused to receive it. Saladin’s envoys then proceeded to Jerusalem where Guy heard them out after which he ordered Reynald to release the caravan. Ernoul, the author of parts of “The Continuation,” records that “… [h]e replied that he would not do so, for he was lord of his land, just as Guy was lord of his, and he had no truces with the Saracens [Muslims].” Guy, well aware that Reynald’s support was crucial for his throne, did not press the matter. Ernoul, in an interpretive comment, concludes that “… [t]he pretext for the loss of the kingdom of Jerusalem was the seizure of this caravan…”5 At the conclusion of the unsuccessful attempt to resolve the matter through diplomacy, Saladin adjudged that the truce was now

Runciman records 1186 as the year of the capture of the caravan. Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 450. Ehrenkreutz records that it was in early 1187. Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 199. Grousset states that it was either one year or the other. Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 776. The other historians do not record a precise date. 5 “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 29. 4

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void. He declared a new holy war and called for his troops from throughout his empire.6 On March 13, 1187, as his brigades began to arrive, Saladin moved to Ras al-Ma. Earlier, he had ordered Taqi al-Din, based in Hama, to advance on Antioch and the Armenian kingdom to keep them in check. By early April, he was in Harim from which he raided Antioch and Darbsak to its north. He negotiated a truce with Prince Bohemond in early June, thus securing Saladin’s northern flank after which he rode south to join his uncle. Meanwhile, ever the diplomat, Saladin exchanged letters with the Byzantine Emperor Isaac Angelus. He congratulated him for his recent military successes in Europe and hinted that the emperor would enjoy Muslim support if the Greeks attacked the Franks. For his part, Isaac asked Saladin to help secure the release of his brother, Alexius Angelus, whom Raymond held in Tripoli. Saladin helped negotiate his release for ransom, but Raymond later reneged on the deal after he reconciled with King Guy. After arranging the camp at Ras al-Ma, Saladin left for Busra in the Hauran, leaving his eldest son al-Afdal to organize the muster as the military contingents arrived. As he marched south, Saladin had three missions: to secure safe passage for the pilgrimage caravan from Mecca which included his sister, the widow of the late Nasir al-Din Muhammad, and her son by a previous marriage, Husam al-Din Muhammad; to meet the Egyptian brigade, which were due in mid spring; and to punish the Crusaders in Transjordan for their seizure of the caravan 3–4 months earlier. Due to Saladin’s presence in the neighborhood, the pilgrims’ journey was uneventful. In late April, he attacked the town of Karak, but broke off the engagement to greet al-Adil and the Egyptian troops in early May. Meanwhile, Turkoman tribal irregulars under Saladin’s command ravaged the land from Shawbak to Karak, denuding the hills of trees and vineyards and taking crops from village stores. Most of the Muslim peasants fled For the caravan episode, see: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 248; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 450; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 10, 18–19; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, 85; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 776–78. 6

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to territory under Ayyubid control. With his focus on his larger ambitions in the Holy Land, Saladin decided not to renew his assault on Karak. Thus, in late May, Saladin, al-Adil, and the fresh troops rode north to rejoin al-Afdal. Before he marched south to Transjordan, Saladin had told his son that he could undertake raids along the Damascus frontier with the Crusader kingdom. Such raids would serve as a training exercise in joint maneuvers for his arriving Ayyubid army. In addition, they would give the cavalrymen the opportunity to pillage the countryside and seize booty and prisoners. In late April, al-Afdal moved the force to al-Qahwani (also Cavan) at the southern end of the Sea of Galilee. On April 30, he sent a note to Count Raymond, then allied with Saladin, asking for permission to make a reconnaissance-in-force through his Galilee territories. Although it was certainly embarrassing to him, Raymond had no choice but to give permission. He did stipulate that the Muslim brigades should enter and leave on the same day, May 1, 1187. He also sent messengers to all the Galilee villages, ordering them to coral their livestock and avoid traveling through the countryside for the entire day. Fortuitously, a Frankish delegation was on its way to visit Count Raymond to try to persuade him to rejoin the Kingdom of Jerusalem and reconcile with King Guy. Balian of Ibelin had formulated the initiative and was joined by the Grand Masters of the Templars and the Hospitalers. When they heard on April 30 that an Ayyubid military force was going to be in the region the following day, they summoned all available men: 80 Templar knights, 10 Hospitaler knights, 40 secular knights, and 300–400 soldiers. At dawn on May 1, the Muslim cavalry, quite large at 7,000 men, marched by Tiberias. Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi was in command of the men from Jazira, Sarim al-Qaimaz of the Damascus units, and Badr al-Din Dildirim of the Aleppo regiments. The question for the Franks was: Should they avoid battle or engage? Observing the impressive Muslim force as its soldiers watered their horses at the Springs of Cresson,7 the Master of the The Crusader sources record that they were the Springs of Cresson, but the Arabic sources refer to them as the Springs of Sepphoris. 7

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Hospitalers and the Marshall of the Templars, James of Mailly, counseled caution. Gerard of Ridfort, the Templar Master, responded with an acerbic taunt. He “… scoffed at [James] and told him he was speaking like someone who wanted to flee. The marshal replied that he would not flee the battle but would remain on the field like a man, but he [Gerard] would flee like an evil coward.”8 Taking the challenge, the Crusaders charged the Muslims. Utilizing their mobility, the Ayyubid brigades rallied quickly, surrounded the Crusaders, and massacred them. All but three of the religious knights were slaughtered; Gerard and two Templars escaped. Curiously, the secular knights survived. Either they elected not to fight or the Muslims made the religious knights their special target. Muzaffar al-Din captured the remaining knights and soldiers. His men also seized some villagers whom Gerard had earlier encouraged to pillage the battlefield once the battle was won. Rather than enjoy the spoils of war, they were taken to the slave markets in Damascus and Aleppo or held until they were exchanged for ransom or Muslim prisoners held by the Franks. From Tiberias, Raymond saw the Muslims return triumphantly to their camp with their prisoners. Balian of Ibelin had delayed in Nablus and, thus, was not at the battle. Indeed, had he been present, his more sober counsel may have prevailed. Upon hearing of the great loss, he rode to Tiberias where he found Raymond aghast at what happened, especially because his policy had allowed it to occur. He quickly accepted Balian’s reconciliation proposal as did Guy who, in a sign of respect, met him dismounted outside of Jerusalem to receive his homage. Knowing that Saladin was gathering a grand army, Guy knew that he needed a united front and a large body of men-atarms. The episode at the Springs of Cresson is strange. The Crusaders undoubtedly knew of Saladin’s muster. Nevertheless, giving way to the hubris of Master Gerard, the Franks lost fully ten percent of their knightly force on the eve of a major battle that was certain to come. This was surely a high price to pay for what seems like a schoolyard taunt. However, from another perspective, while 8

“The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 32.

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the Crusaders suffered a defeat and lost men to either the sword or Saladin’s prisons, one of the consequences of the fiasco was unity of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.9 Saladin returned to the Hauran on May 27 where he met alAfdal and the Ayyubid army at Tell Ashtara, an old Nur la-Din encampment about 20 miles north of Deraa. His first line cavalry numbered 12,000, a very large gathering of military might. In addition, he mustered another 6,000 archers and auxiliaries, for a total fighting force of about 18,000. The various amirs, officers, and army units also employed the services of about 12,000 squires, servants, and retainers. Saladin’s men, now that northern Muslim lands were part of his empire, hailed from the vast regions under his control, including Egypt, Damascus, Aleppo, Harran, Mardin, Sinjar, Nisibin, Mosul, Diyar Bakr, and Irbil. As was his normal practice, Saladin called a grand council of his relatives, amirs, and officers to debate next steps, tactics, and strategy. Some amirs suggested that more negotiations to release prisoners were called for, while others advocated traditional Muslim raiding tactics. Ibn al-Athir, a historian often critical of Saladin, records a more forceful exchange. One amir, cited earlier in this chapter, said they should provoke a battle. “‘My opinion is that we should look around their country, and we should plunder, and destroy, and take prisoners, and if any Frankish force stands before us, we shall meet it…’” At the conclusion of the council’s deliberations, Saladin summed up his strategy. “The affairs [of man] do not accord with human desire. We do not know the remainder of our lives. It would be wrong to disperse the gathering [of troops] until after serious holy war.”10 Well before the council met, for political, military, and imperial reasons, Saladin had obviously made up his mind to seek a For the first months of the road to Hattin, March to early May, 1187, see: Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 450–54; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 29–35; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 248– 51; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 51–53; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 71; Ibn alAthir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 18–21; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 75–76; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 776–87. 10 Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 23. 9

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major confrontation with the Crusaders. Calling up 30,000 men was no small decision. Leaders in medieval days and today do not lightly tap massive political, human, and material capital unless they intend to use the resources. Moreover, as recounted, over the years, Saladin had asserted his desire to pursue holy war. The pressure to fulfill his pledge in June 1187, as indicated by the amir’s pointed statement about opinion in the East, must have been substantial. Looking at the issue from another perspective, Saladin had to design a plan to bring the Franks to the battlefield. He did not want to repeat the 1183 exercise at Goliath Springs where the Franks simply remained in a defensive posture even though his cavalry, using hit and run tactics, continually attempted to provoke combat. Similarly, he did not want another stalemate as occurred in July 1182 south of the Sea of Galilee. With all of this in mind, Saladin organized his march to cross the Jordan River once again. After the disastrous fight at Cresson Springs, King Guy ordered the Crusader barons to assemble their troops to defend the Holy Land against Saladin. They readily responded. The recently defeated Templar and Hospitaler Grand Masters11 brought in knights and soldiers from their fortresses throughout the Crusader kingdom. Reynald of Châtillon came from Transjordan and the newly reconciled Count Raymond brought men from Tripoli and the Tiberias. Balian of Ibelin came from Nablus and even Prince Bohemond of Antioch sent a contingent of knights under the command of his son, Raymond. Guy brought his troops from Jerusalem and the coastal cities. Patriarch Heraclius assigned the Prior of the Holy Sepulcher to bring the True Cross (also known as the Holy Cross)12 to urge on the Frankish ranks. All told, the Crusaders mustered 1,200 fully armored knights, 4,000 lightly The Hospitalers had replaced their Grand Master whom the Muslims killed at the May 1, 1187 Cresson Springs battle. 12 In 1099, the Crusaders unearthed a supposed piece of the “True Cross” in Jerusalem. “The discovery of the Jerusalem relic of the True Cross brought physical symbolism to the fulfillment of the journey of the bearers of the cross. It was to play a central role in the religious ceremonial, military display and political iconography of the new Christian kingdom of Jerusalem.” Tyerman, God’s War, 160. 11

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armored cavalry, and 15,000 infantry, including archers, crossbowmen, and soldiers with miscellaneous and lesser skills. With respect to the cavalry, some were Europeans, but others were Turcopoles: Syrian Christian light cavalrymen plus some Muslim horsemen.13 The king and his lords had not yet determined their strategy and tactics. At Acre, Guy held a council to discuss military options. Raymond of Tripoli argued for a defensive posture. He noted that it was very hot and that the Ayyubid leader could not hold his army indefinitely. Thus, if the Crusaders would just staunchly defend their force in an appropriate encampment, the Muslim threat would eventually disappear. The aggressive Gerard of the Templars called Raymond a coward and pointed to his recent treacherous alliance with Saladin. Guy did not make a conclusive decision. However, as the Muslims prepared to cross the Jordan, he ordered his army to quit Acre and advance to the Springs of Sepphoris, a position at once much closer to Saladin’s forces, but also very defensible. All of his men were in place by June 27 or 28, 1187.14 Meanwhile, Saladin had remained at Tell Ashtara for a month meticulously organizing his command for the coming confrontation. On June 24, he reviewed his entire troop, unit by unit, at Tel Tasil six miles north of Tell Ashtara.15 Although his

Some sources indicate that there were 1,200 knights and 18,000 other soldiers. See: Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 489–90; Nicole, Hattin, 59–61; Nicholson and Nicolle, Saladin and the Saracens, 59. 14 For Saladin’s decision to cross the Jordan River to the Crusader response up to June 28, 1187, see: Gibb, Life of Saladin, 52–52; Gibb, Civilization of Islam, 76; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 454–55, 489–90; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 80; Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 143–44, 148; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 252–53, 256; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 10, 23; Nicolle, Hattin, 40–41; Nicolle, Saladin and the Saracens, 19–20; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 36–37. 15 Imad al-Din describes, in two full pages, how Saladin personally organized the army. He gives details on how Saladin distributed duties to the amirs, assigned posts to specialized soldiers, told his troops to expect ambushes, and encouraged his men to fight the true fight. Imad al-Din, 13

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army was larger than he had commanded heretofore, he assembled it in his proven manner: Taqi al-Din took the right wing, Kukburi the left, and Saladin as usual was in charge of the center. Assured supplies were equally as important. Knowing that his men might easily use up their personal allocation of arrows during each day of fighting, he was prepared to refill their quivers each evening. To meet this requirement, his logistics team positioned 70 camels loaded with the munitions within easy reach of the assembled soldiers. Readily acknowledging the heat of the summer, Saladin’s supply team commanded a caravan of camels that would continually transport skins full of water to fill camp reservoirs for all of the army units. On June 26, Saladin commenced his march down the east side of the Jordan Valley where he camped at Khisfin. Over the next couple of days, he crossed the river at the southern end of the Sea of Galilee, near a village called Sannabra, just as he had in 1182 and 1183. His amirs had earlier sent skirmishers to ravage the Galilee countryside. Both sides were in their respective camps by June 28 after which they played a waiting game. On June 28 and 29, with the exception of the Muslim pillagers, neither side moved. On June 30, leaving his heavy baggage behind, Saladin relocated his main force to Kafr Sabt. Situated “on top of a mountain” according to Ibn Shaddad,16 the new camp was about nine miles east of Sepphoris Springs and a similar distance south of Tiberias city as well as the plain of Hattin (Map 3), the site of the forthcoming battle. On July 1, Saladin with his personal guard and a handful of other units, advanced on the Frankish camp at Sepphoris. His mission, it seems, was to entice them out and spark a battle, but the Crusaders stayed in their defensive position. He also surveyed the plains of Lubiya as a potential battle sight, but retired to Kafr Sabt at sunset. On the following day, July 2, Saladin again rode out with his guard and a mixed regiment, but this time to the city of Tiberias. Using siege machines and saps, his men quickly breached the walls, Al-Fath, 54–55. Abu Shama also presents organizational details. Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt, 2, 80–81. 16 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 73.

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seizing everything that was movable, including a large herd of cattle. His army must have eaten well that night. Countess Eschiva, the wife of Count Raymond, and her sons fled to the protection of her fortress from which she sent an urgent message to Guy de Lusignan, appealing for help. With this coup at Tiberias, Saladin had put the bait in the trap: the lady and her children in the besieged fortress. As Ibn al-Athir wrote, Saladin’s “… only reason for laying siege to Tiberias was to provoke the Franks to leave their camp and offer battle.”17 And the tactic worked. Hearing of the attack on Tiberias and later receiving the appeal from Countess Eschiva, Guy once again called a grand council to advise him. Recognizing that Raymond was the strongest of all his lords and that the count’s wife was the fief holder of Tiberias, Guy invited him to speak first. Raymond repeated the same argument he delivered at Acre, namely, an appeal to remain in a defensive stance close to the Crusaders’ fortresses and wait until Saladin’s superior forces tired of the field and returned to their homes in the East. This classic Frankish strategy had proved successful for decades. Ernoul in “The Continuation,” albeit perhaps not exact, recorded his words: “‘Sire, you should know that Tiberias is mine, and any damage done there falls on me and no one else. For the lady of Tiberias, my wife, and her children are in the castle, and the last thing I would want is for any harm to come to them.’” “The count of Tripoli [then] counseled the king not to move from the springs but to stay put and keep his camp there, for Saladin had too great an army and the king did not have enough men to oppose him and drive him from Tiberias: if Saladin destroyed Tiberias he [Raymond] would bear the full cost.”18 In response, Reynald of Châtillon and the Templar Grand Master once more declared that such counsel was cowardly and Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 24. “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 38–39. Ernoul’s account of what Raymond argued conforms with what most Crusader and Muslim chroniclers of the time recorded and is commonly accepted by modern historians. However, Imad al-Din states just the opposite, namely, that Raymond urged Guy to lead the Crusaders to Tiberias to rescue his wife and step children. Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 57. 17 18

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reminded Guy of Raymond’s recent treasonous actions. At the conclusion of the evening, the “… king and the barons who were present were happy to take the count’s advice and stay where they were.”19 They reconfirmed traditional strategy. The debate, however, did not end there. After everyone retired, Gerard came to the king’s tent where, according to Ernoul and confirmed by others, he intensely argued the case for an immediate offensive: Sire, do not trust the advice of the count for he is a traitor, and you well know that he has no love for you and wants you to be put to shame and lose the kingdom. I advise you to move off immediately together with the rest of us, and let us go and defeat Saladin. This is the first crisis that you have encountered since you became king. If you do not leave this camp, Saladin will come to attack you, and if you withdraw at his attack the shame and reproach will be all the greater for you.20

This time, Gerard won over Guy who ordered his army to march to Tiberias the following morning. Why did Guy reject proven Crusader strategy and decide to confront the Ayyubid army? In hindsight, it appears that four interrelated factors weighed more in his calculations than did Raymond’s articulate appeal. First, following the advice of Raymond and others in 1183, he remained in a defensive position at Goliath Springs. Afterwards, due to this posture and his vacillation, he came under severe criticism, especially on the part of those who wanted to aggressively attack Saladin. After the standoff, Baldwin IV relieved him from the regency of the kingdom and he retired to Ascalon in ignominy. Second, in July 1187, he had been king less than one year. In his insecurity of rule and his desire not to receive harsh vitriol once again, he felt pushed to follow the more bellicose advice. Third, unlike 1182, in 1187 the issue in front of him was not just engaging the Muslims in battle, but the rescue of Countess Eschiva, Saladin’s bait in the trap. To this point, R.C. Smail, a historian of crusading warfare, points out that “… [t]he oldest surviving version of the Laws of Jerusalem states in 19 20

“The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 39. Ibid., 39–40.

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strong terms the lord’s overriding obligation to aid a vassal attacked by the Muslims; rulers with stronger character and authority than Guy had been obliged to answer such appeals.”21 Fourth, while Saladin’s numbers were greater than Guy’s, if one discounts the efficacy of his Turcopoles, nevertheless the Crusader host was sizable, the largest ever assembled from the local Frankish population and resources, and it included 1,200 virtually invincible knights. The next question is: Why did Guy and his advisors adopt a flawed plan to advance on Tiberias? As the crow flies, the distance from Sepphoris to the city is 15 miles or at least 20 miles by the roads and paths of the day. Without opposition, the goal may have been attainable for the knights, cavalry, and foot soldiers, even though the forced march would have been arduous and fatiguing. The alternative, especially in the face of strong archer and cavalry attacks, which could only be expected, would be a slower march with a defensive camp midway along the route. We do not know if Guy expected to reach Tiberias in one or two days. We do know that under a bright Middle East sun in early July, the weather was very hot. Also, his barons, who were intimately familiar with the territory, knew that there was very little water available except at Turan springs and the village of Hittin. The former is relatively close to their starting point at Sepphoris and the latter was beyond the limits of a day’s march under military harassment. Given these realties, the real question is: If the decision to march was truly firm, why did the Franks not bring their water with them? As noted, Saladin’s team hauled water for the Ayyubid cavalrymen and their horses. Guy likewise could have transported water on camels, horses, and donkeys from Sepphoris and Turan. There is no record that he did so, at least in quantity. The lack of adequate logistical preparation would prove to be disastrous during the next two days.22 Smail, Crusading Warfare, 194–95. For the period when Saladin started his march on June 26 through July 2, including the movements of both parties and the deliberations of the Crusaders, see: “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 37–40; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 54–58; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 72– 21 22

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BATTLE OF HATTIN Before dawn on July 3, 1187, Guy organized the advance on Tiberias. Count Raymond commanded the vanguard, a right that was his because the Frankish army was to march through his land, the Galilee. With him were Raymond, son of the Prince of Antioch, and four of Countess Eschiva’s sons, Hugh, William, Ralph, and Oste. Guy was in charge of the center division. Balian of Ibelin led the rearguard, accompanied by Count Joscelin, Reynald of Châtillon, and the Grand Masters of the religious orders. At sunrise, the great Crusader army marched. By mid morning, Guy reached Turan, about six miles east of Sepphoris. Because Guy quickly ordered the advance to continue, it is doubtful that all the men and animals drank from the village springs. From a strategic perspective, Turan was a true crossroads. Guy could have elected to remain there and see if Saladin would attack his troops in the protected and watered position. One of his alternatives, if he were to go forward, was to march directly to Tiberias, along a southern route. This road, though, would have taken him by Saladin’s camp at Kafr Sabt and it was too long to cover in the heat of the day and under Muslim attack. The other alternative was to take the northern route through the plains of Hattin to the village of Hittin where plentiful water was available. The distance to Hittin was about seven miles, still a considerable distance for thirsty men and horses facing enemy pressure. Guy chose not to stay in Turan, but continue via the northern route. The Franks restarted their journey by noon. Saladin’s spies alerted him to the Crusaders’ movement shortly after dawn. Leaving a small blocking force at Tiberias, he and his men immediately rode to Kafr Sabt. Taqi al-Din and Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi had organized the troops in battle formation, but they awaited Saladin’s arrival. The grand Ayyubid 73; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 80; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 22–24; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 256–58; Smail, Crusading Warfare, 189–95; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 455–56; Tyerman, God’s War, 368–69; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 787– 793.

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cavalry started its advance towards the Frankish army, but Saladin went slowly until he learned that Guy had committed to the northern route. Saladin then took two crucial decisions. First, he ordered a large number of skirmishers to harass in force the marching Crusaders. They rained arrows on the men and animals, but always retreated before the Franks could engage. This tactic had the effect of slowing Guy’s march, especially because, as the day wore on, his men increasingly suffered from the heat and thirst. Second, he ordered Kukburi to close the Crusaders’ rear and Taqi al-Din to position his men in front of the column. Saladin and his cavalry division guarded the southern and eastern flank. In this manner, his forces blocked a retreat to Turan or an advance to Hittin, both of which had ample water. By mid or late afternoon, the Templars in the rearguard complained to Guy that their men were extremely tired, hot, and thirsty and said they could not continue. The king sent a message to Raymond in the advance guard, asking for advice. His response was: Camp where you are, in the middle of the Hattin plain, but with the soldiers’ backs against a ridge. Even though some barons pleaded with Guy to reject the advice, he saw the fatigue and thirst in the body of his men and ordered the army to halt and make camp. During the night of July 3/4, the Franks were as despondent as the Muslims were elated. While the evening hours were cooler than midday, the soldiers and animals, camped in a barren area, increasingly suffered from the lack of water. Aware of their plight, one of Saladin’s units, in the severest of taunts, brought camels laden with skins of water in view of the Frankish camp and poured them on the ground. In their camp, the Ayyubid soldiers were joyous, encouraging each other to fully join the battle that they knew would come when the sun rose. Throughout the night, the logistics teams resupplied the soldiers with quivers full of arrows and they held still more in reserves. In addition, water caravans made certain the men and horses had adequate supplies. Saladin was reportedly quite pleased with his army’s situation. His plan, so far, had worked. For once, he had the Crusaders in a nonfortified position where his vaunted mobility would give him an advantage—and he knew the enemy was demoralized. In his elegant way, Imad al-Din al-Isfahani summed up the Muslim position that evening. “Night separated the two sides and the

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cavalry blocked the two roads. Islam was face to face with the unbelievers; monotheism was fighting with Trinitarianism; the correct way was observing those straying from the truth; faith was fighting polytheism.”23 The next day, July 4, 1187, started inauspiciously for the besieged Crusaders. During the night, Saladin’s auxiliaries had gathered piles of brush, which they placed along the northern and western Frankish flanks. After they were set on fire, the dense smoke drifted over the Crusader camp, augmenting their discomfort due to thirst. As the battle began, the Frankish infantry and knights fought as a coherent force. The Franks and Muslims charged each other many times, but as the hours passed the Crusader army weakened. At each charge, it lost men. In addition, the Muslims sent barrages of arrows that not only killed and wounded soldiers, but also crippled the ability of many of the knights’ horses to function and eventually killed most of them. Apparently, while the knights’ armor was very effective, horse armor was not common. Towards late morning, Guy’s army as an overall organized body started to crumble. One small contingent of six knights escaped to Saladin’s line and, to the consternation of the Franks, renounced Christianity and adopted Islam. Ernoul even reports that when they reached Saladin, they said: “‘Sir, what are you waiting for? Go and take the Christians for they are all defeated.’”24 At a certain point, the Crusader infantry, or at least most of it, retired from the field. The soldiers climbed a small hill and refused to persevere. Knowing that his fortune was rapidly deteriorating, Guy asked Raymond to attempt to break through the Ayyubid lines in the direction of the village of Hittin. Taking Raymond of Antioch and the sons of his wife, he charged the Muslim front. Taqi al-Din, who held that sector, opened his line and let the knights through after which he closed it again. Calculating that Tiberias’ fortress would fall shortly, Count Raymond, with the 10–12 knights who survived

23 24

Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 58. “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 46.

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the charge, rode in the direction of Tyre and then to his home base, Tripoli, where he died of pleurisy before the end of the year. Meanwhile, Balian of Ibelin, Reynald of Sidon, and remnants of the rearguard escaped; they would fight another day. A large body of surviving knights joined Guy and established a new position at the base of what is called the Horns of Hattin, two modest hills joined by a ridge. There they pitched the king’s distinctive red tent. While his ranks were severely diminished, his immediate knightly force still had the energy to fight. Until mid afternoon, both sides charged and countercharged each other. AlAfdal vividly described the event. I was at my father Saladin’s side during the battle, the first that I saw with my own eyes. The Frankish King had retreated to the hill with his band, and from there he led a furious charge against the Muslims facing him, forcing them back upon my father. I saw that he was alarmed and distraught, and tugged at his beard as he went forward crying: “Away with the Devil’s lie!” The Muslims turned to the counterattack and drove the Franks back up the hill. When I saw the Franks retreating before the Muslim onslaught I cried out for joy: “We have conquered them!” But they returned to the charge with undiminished ardor and drove our army back toward my father. His response was the same as before, and the Muslims counterattacked and drove the Franks back to the hill. Again I cried: “We have beaten them!” but my father turned to me and said: “Be quiet; we shall not have beaten them until that tent falls!” As he spoke the tent fell, and the Sultan dismounted and prostrated himself in thanks to God, weeping for joy.25

After the tent fell, the Muslim soldiers found the king and his knights sitting or lying on the ground, exhausted. They hardly had

Al-Afdal’s story is quoted by Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 25–26. This translation is from: Gabrieli, Arab Historians of the Crusades, 122–23. Most historians incorporate this al-Afdal quote in their books, for example, Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 263; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 459–60; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 201. 25

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the strength to give their swords to the victors. Among the fallen knights, the Muslim soldiers found the True Cross. In sum, the glory belonged to Saladin. Indeed, in the course of two days, but primarily on July 4, the Ayyubid army annihilated the Crusader military, a momentous event for the Muslims, a disastrous one for the Franks, and a historic turning point for both. The 90-year European project was irreparably damaged. It would be another 100 years before the remnants of the Crusader presence were totally eliminated in the Holy Land, but the aura of success was forever gone. As the dust settled, Saladin’s men erected the commander’s tent to which his amirs and mamlukes brought the captured notables: King Guy, his brother Constable Amalric, Reynald of Châtillon, his stepson Humphrey of Toron, Master Gerard of Ridfort of the Templars, and a few lesser barons. Then Saladin “… summoned King Guy, his brother and Prince Reynald. He handed the king a drink of iced julep, from which he drank, being dreadfully thirsty, and he then passed some of it to Prince Reynald. The sultan said to the interpreter, ‘Tell the King, You are the one giving him a drink. I have not given him any drink.’ According to the fine custom … if a prisoner took food or a drink of water from whoever captured him, his life was safe.”26 The clear signal was that Reynald had yet to pay for his past actions. While the rest of the story has been presented in many variations, the common gist is that Saladin offered Reynald Islam, which he unequivocally and unreservedly rejected. Saladin then said that twice he had sworn to kill Reynald, once when he attempted to attack Mecca and Medina and the second time when he violated the truce and seized the rich caravan in the winter of 1186–1187. Upon those words, he drew his sword and severed Reynald’s shoulder. The mamlukes attending Saladin then finished the job. “His body was taken and thrown down at the door of the tent. The king, when he saw him brought out in this manner, was convinced that he would be next. The sultan called him in and reassured him, saying, ‘It has not been

26

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 75.

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customary for princes to kill princes, but this man transgressed his limits, so he has suffered what he suffered.’”27 After the grand triumph, Saladin and his amirs had many details to wrap up. First, on July 5, the Ayyubid leader rode to Tiberias where Countess Eschiva surrendered at once. He readily gave her permission to move with her entourage and possessions to her husband’s city of Tripoli. Second, under the command of one of his amirs, he dispatched the elite prisoners to Damascus where they were later exchanged for ransom or in diplomatic bargains. Along with the train of notable Franks, a qadi carried the True Cross strapped upside down on a pike. Third, the Muslim army had captured an additional 3,000 Franks on the battlefield. Amirs, officers, and soldiers took them to the slave markets in Syria. Observers saw individual soldiers trudging through the countryside with 15–40 Crusader prisoners tethered by tent ropes trailing behind them. Suddenly, supply exceeded demand, depressing the price for slaves to as little as three dinars. Fourth, because the Ayyubids considered the Templars and Hospitalers to be the fiercest and most fanatical Crusaders, Saladin had them rounded up, about 230 in total. He first gave them the opportunity to accept Islam, which a handful did. Reportedly, one rose through the ranks and became commander to the Damascus garrison.28 As in Hama in 1178, he gave the others to “men of piety,” in this case largely Sufis, for execution. Before he left the scene of his greatest military feat, Saladin wrote detailed reports for the caliph in Baghdad, describing the nature of the battle, the totality of the victory, and the disposition of the captives. Before closing, he also stressed that the historic meeting of the two armies at the plains of Hattin justified his many requests for diplomas of investiture that, in turn, enabled him to raise men and material to pursue holy war.

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 75. Most chroniclers of the time tell the same story. A couple record that it was Saladin who decapitated Reynald. 28 Nicolle, Hattin, 79. 27

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The number of Crusaders who died at the plains of Hattin is not precisely known. Of the whole army, aside from the notables, 3,000 were captured and between 200 and 3,000 escaped. The rest of the army, the retainers, and most of their horses were killed in battle. In graphic terms, Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, who was with Saladin, takes two full pages to describe the carnage.29 Ibn al-Athir visited the fields one year after the battle. He writes that he “… saw the earth full of their bones which could be seen even from a distance, and they were piled on top of each other while others were scattered. And this is [what was still visible] despite the fact that some had been carried away by storms or by the wild beasts of these hills and valleys.”30 This tremendous feat at arms, however, was only the beginning for Saladin. The Crusader kingdom stretched from Gaza and Ascalon to Antioch, 350 miles from south to north and, variously, 40 to 75 miles to the east, for a land area of approximately 15,000 square miles. The Franks had about 90 fortresses and fortified cities. To make his success at Hattin complete, he needed to bring these defensive positions under his command. Because of the July 4 defeat, only skeletal forces or no forces at all guarded many, but Tripoli and Antioch were still strong. Saladin knew that he had to capture the strongholds quickly because he fully anticipated that the Europeans would send another crusade to the Holy Land. As usual, he wanted his flanks safely under his control as he faced a new Frankish invasion.31

Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 60–61. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 27. 31 The sources on the famous battle of Hattin are numerous. Those consulted are: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 58–62; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 10, 23–27; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 81–85; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 73–75; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 45–48; De Expugatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum, in Brundage, Crusades: A Documentary Survey, 153–59; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 259–66; Smail, Crusading Warfare, 195–97; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 207–16; Nicolle, Hattin, 61–79; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 29 30

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AFTERMATH On July 7, Saladin moved his army from the battlefield back to the camp at Kafr Sabt, but he did not stay there and savor his success. On the following day, unlike his normal practice of concentrating his troops to meet an opponent, he split his cavalry into separate units. They were each assigned different geographic sectors in Palestine and Lebanon with orders to capture Crusader positions. Saladin led his personal guard, accompanied by a cavalry brigade and specialized units, to Acre, a fortified port and rich trading entrepot. On the eve of his arrival, the men of the city, mostly merchants, made a show of resistance. At dawn on July 9, Saladin drew up his men in battle formation, but Acre’s leader, Joscelin of Courtenay, sent a delegation headed by Peter Brice to meet the Ayyubid commander and ask for terms. Even though Saladin invited the businessmen to remain in Acre under his rule, they feared for their future and elected to abandon the city. As per the negotiated terms, they left, mostly for Tyre, with possessions they could easily transport. Saladin took charge of the city on July 10 and immediately freed 4,000 prisoners held in its dungeons. He also seized vast material wealth and divided it among his relatives and amirs. To his son al-Afdal, he gave the city of Acre and its surrounding land. Diya al-Din Isa received the riches of the Templar religious order. Saladin assigned the sugar refinery to his energetic nephew Taqi alDin. Saladin had the option of retaining these great assets for his treasury as some chroniclers observed,32 but such was not his habit. He always gave captured wealth to his lieutenants who, in turn, usually passed it on to their men. Meanwhile, Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi, as assigned, was subduing the inland region between Tiberias and Acre. Fortresses and towns readily fell. Within weeks, Nazareth and its citadel, the Crusader camp at Sepphoris still full of stores, Daburiya, Tabor, 456–60; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 793–99; Tyerman, God’s War, 369–72. 32 Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 267.

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and Zarin were in his hands. Because they had no knights or soldiers, none offered resistance. Somewhat ironically, at al-Fula, one of the strongholds of the bellicose Templars, only a delegation of servants appeared to ask for terms. Muzaffar al-Din agreed and let them go to Tyre or Tripoli. Saladin ordered Husam al-Din Muhammad, his sister’s son, to mop up northern Samaria. Initially, he captured Sebaste (also Sabastiya), the site of a shrine to John the Baptist who is honored by both Christians and Muslims, and personally took possession of the local church treasures. He then rode to Nablus where the Muslim peasants, in the euphoria of Saladin’s victory, were rising against the Nablus castle from which Balian of Ibelin had ruled his fiefs. After holding out for a brief period, the Nablus garrison surrendered to Husam al-Din on terms. Saladin assigned the district south of Acre to Badr al-Din Dildirim, an early ally from the Aleppo region. He quickly subdued three fortified towns. Haifa and Arsuf asked for terms as he arrived, but Caesarea did not and his men energetically attacked and subdued it after which they enjoyed the pillage. At Saladin’s summons, al-Adil had brought cavalry units from Egypt. They rapidly took control of southern Palestine. Majd alYaba, an inland town, surrendered at once to al-Adil, but the large port of Jaffa did not. Even though al-Adil offered terms, Jaffa’s leaders refused to capitulate. Consequently, in the face of stiff resistance, the Ayyubid army stormed the city and eventually defeated the fighters and pillaged the shops, palaces, and residential neighborhoods.33 At Jaffa, according to Ibn al-Athir, al-Adil acted in a brutal manner that was uncharacteristic of Saladin’s army. He enslaved men and women in great numbers and his soldiers treated the city’s citizenry harshly “… as no others had been in this country.” He continues with a personal story. “When I was in Aleppo, I owned a refugee woman from Jaffa who had a one year old child. The child fell from her grasp and its face was scratched. For these mopping-up operations, see: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 267–69; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 75–76; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 10, 27–29; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 62–68. 33

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The woman cried profusely. I calmed her and learned that she was not crying for the child. She said: ‘It is not for that I am crying, but I am crying for what happened to us. I had six brothers and they were all killed and I do not know what happened to my husband and two sisters.’”34 After Acre fell, Saladin remained in the city for a week, arranging its administration. He did send Taqi al-Din north to capture Tibnin, inland from Tyre. It resisted stoutly and Taqi alDin asked Saladin for reinforcements. Saladin left Acre on July 17 and joined his nephew for the final attack on the fort on July 19.35 Saladin allowed the survivors to take their possessions, excluding weapons and horses, as they trekked to the sanctuary of Tyre. Saladin then reconnoitered Tyre. Ernoul of “The Continuation” reports that: “… Saladin had gone to besiege the city of Tyre. But when he got there he found it was too well provided with men and knights who had escaped the battle and who were now forming the garrison. He saw that there was nothing to be gained there and moved on to take Sidon.”36 It is worth noting in this context that, aside from its garrison, Tyre’s defenses were formidable. Only a low sandbar connected the city, built on a peninsula, to the mainland. At the junction, the Crusaders had built a strong wall to protect its only land access. While Saladin may have overestimated the Tyre’s defense, he did not test it. Rather, he rode north to Sidon, which immediately surrendered. By July 29, he camped outside of Beirut. Even though Saladin applied pressure with catapults and sappers, the men of Beirut defended their city for a week. To thwart the sappers, Frankish soldiers came outside the wall to engage the Muslims. When Saladin’s men pushed them back, citizens inside the city fled to the port to attempt to escape by sea. The Beiruti leaders realized that all was lost and approached Saladin who once again gave the vanquished terms.

Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 29. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 76. 36 “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 50. 34 35

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Further north, Saladin’s men brought Hugh Embriaco, one of the noble prisoners captured at Hattin, to Jubail. In the ensuing negotiation, he was granted freedom in exchange for the capitulation of the port, a ransom of sorts. Saladin advanced no further in Lebanon, but reversed direction to give attention to the southern coastal towns still in Frankish hands: Tyre, Ascalon, Gaza, and Darum. In mid July, Saladin had bypassed Tyre, but according to Frankish records, he was in contact with Reynald of Sidon, the senior Crusader lord in the city. Reportedly, Reynald despaired of saving Tyre and was in negotiation with Saladin’s lieutenants for terms. They even gave him Ayyubid banners to display when Saladin returned from Sidon and Beirut. However, almost serendipitously, Tyre’s fortunes changed. Conrad of Montferrat, who had delayed for the last couple of years in Constantinople because of his involvement in a murder, decided to make the pilgrimage, with Emperor Isaac Angelus’ leave, to Jerusalem. He and his knights sailed to Acre. Not hearing the usual welcoming harbor bell, he sent the ship’s skiff to the entrance of the port known as the Tower of Flies. His sailors “… asked who the city belonged to. The people in the tower told them that it belonged to Saladin and that they could land safely [thinking they were from a merchant ship] relying on Saladin’s safe-conduct… When the people in the boat heard this, they returned to the ship and told the marquis the news. The marquis was most distressed, and had them sail away and so they came to Tyre.”37 The people of the city welcomed Conrad and his men as saviors. Adding to their good fortune, soon thereafter, “… three Pisan ships full of provisions and men arrived at Tyre, and so the people of the city had greater security.”38 When Saladin again camped in front of Tyre’s wall in mid August, he learned that Reynald of Sidon had fled to Tripoli and that Conrad was now in charge. Conrad, in a demonstration of his own hubris, threw the Ayyubid banners over the city wall. After failing to exchange Conrad’s father, Marquis William of Montferrat 37 38

“The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 52–53. Ibid., 53.

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who was a captive in Damascus, for Tyre, Saladin abandoned the siege and rode south.39 During the summer of 1187, Tyre was a dilemma for Saladin. The key question was: Did he want to expend time and effort to besiege and capture it while he had other pressing tasks? In July, he may have miscalculated the difficulty of assaulting the city, but whatever the case, he quickly passed it and focused on Beirut, Sidon, and Jubail, ports that were also important. On his return in August, he may have counted on Tyre’s surrender by dint of his negotiations with Reynald of Sidon, but he met a new reality in the presence of Conrad of Montferrat. Ibn Shaddad presents part of his calculations: “… after he camped before Tyre and made a trial assault at this time, he determined not to occupy himself with it because his troops had scattered throughout the coast. Every man had gone to take something for himself, tired of fighting and constant campaigning.” “The forces [were] …satisfying their desire for plunder and pillage.” In addition, “[e]very Frankish survivor on the coast had flocked to Tyre. Thus he decided to attack Ascalon because it was an easier objective.”40 In sum, he was not in a position to muster a large force as his men had spread throughout Palestine, as ordered, to bring the country under Ayyubid control. In this post-Hattin phase of the campaign, a major objective was to deny all of the hinterland and as much of the coast as possible to the Franks, especially because he was certain the Europeans would once again reappear in force. Moreover, Tyre was not the only port about which he was concerned. Ascalon stood in the south, while Tripoli, Latakia, and al-Suwaidiya (St. Symeon) to the north were still in Crusader hands. Al-Suwaidiya served as the port for the great city of Antioch.

Resources on Tyre and the brief siege, are: Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 471–72; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 220–23; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 50–54. The Arabic sources hardly mention Saladin’s time in front of Tyre. 40 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 76, 77. 39

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Leaving Tyre, Saladin arrived before Ascalon on August 23 and laid siege two days later. He brought King Guy and Grand Master Gerard of the Templars with him. Guy pleaded with the leaders of the port city to capitulate to Saladin for he was promised his freedom if the Ascalon fell peacefully. The townspeople jeered the king and rejected the offer. Saladin then brought up his catapults and his sappers dug under the walls. Fighting was fierce. An Ayyubid amir of Kurdish origin was killed, but Saladin gained the upper hand. Once again, Guy talked to the leaders, pointing out their precarious situation. They decided to ask for quarter and terms. On September 5, under escort, they left for Alexandria with their personal possessions where they were housed until Italian ships could take them to Europe. Saladin eventually freed Guy, but he had to languish in custody in Nablus and later Damascus until summer 1188. In September 1187, Master Gerard ordered his knights to surrender Gaza, a Templar post, which they did. Similarly, members of his order in Latrun also laid down their arms. Even though Gerard cooperated with his captors in September 1187, he was only released with Guy in 1188. During late August and September, Ramla and Yubna in the coastal plain and Hebron, Bethlehem, and Bait Jibrin in Judea fell to Saladin’s amirs. Except for a few fortresses—Beaufort, Safad, Belvoir, Karak, and Shawbak—and Jerusalem and the port of Tyre, the Muslims had successfully gained control of the Kingdom of Jerusalem south of Tripoli. Before Saladin left for Jerusalem in September, he welcomed the Egyptian fleet under command of Admiral Lulu. This Ayyubid flotilla would guard the coast against a Frankish landing and free Saladin to march with the bulk of his troops to the encounter at the Holy City. Throughout this rapid mopping-up campaign, one of Saladin’s most successful tactics was his generous treatment of the people who had lived in the captured Frankish strongholds. Usually he permitted the leaders and their military units to take their possessions, but not their arms, and leave for Crusader territory or Europe. In addition, the Ayyubids allowed ordinary people and merchants to stay and some chose to do so. As the Franks witnessed this magnanimity, they were increasingly willing to capitulate in expectation of similar treatment. A number of captured towns and cities had substantial Muslim populations. They, for the most part, remained and

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celebrated the leadership change. In addition, as in Acre, Saladin’s men freed numerous Muslim prisoners who had been held for months or years in Frankish dungeons across Palestine and Lebanon.41

For this section on the aftermath of the Battle of Hattin, see: Ibn alAthir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 27–33; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 75–77; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 62–78; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 49–54; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 266–73; LanePoole, Saladin, 218–23. 41

CHAPTER NINE JERUSALEM RECAPTURED: 1187 JERUSALEM As Saladin was arranging the new administration and defense of Ascalon, he was also focusing on broader issues. All the towns and fortresses with the exception of a few isolated Crusader strongholds had fallen to his amirs. The question was: Should he first capture Jerusalem, one of his life-long goals and the focus of his devout followers, or should he try to conquer Tyre, the only remaining Frankish port south of Tripoli and thus of significant military importance? The choice of Jerusalem would satisfy many of his amirs, the religious classes, and other pious folk. Saladin’s stature in the Muslim world, which was already elevated due to his defense of Mecca and his triumph at Hattin, would soar to new heights. In addition, his brother al-Adil added extra pressure for the Jerusalem option when he reminded Saladin that he had almost died in the previous year and thus, in view of his obvious mortality, he should not shift his focus from the Holy City. However, Jerusalem was not of military importance. It could easily be isolated and its leaders would eventually capitulate as the population ran out of food. Tyre, on the other hand, was a door for the Crusaders to re-enter the heart of the Holy Land. Capturing it would deny them a central Palestinian foothold, even though they still held two other major cities: Tripoli and Antioch. In the end, Saladin postponed the strategic choice, turned to the political and religious option, and ordered his scattered troops to converge on Jerusalem.1 The wisdom of Saladin’s choice, Tyre or Jerusalem, is debated in the historical literature. Gibb accepts Saladin’s selection as the correct one, 1

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Due to the loss at Hattin, the Franks had very few assets in Jerusalem. Patriarch Heraclius, well aware that Saladin might appear before the city’s walls, was attempting to arrange a modicum of defense, but to little effect. In this context, Balian of Ibelin suddenly appeared. When his castle in Nablus fell to the Muslims, his wife Queen Maria, who had been in the city, fled with her entourage to Jerusalem. Balian wrote Saladin, asking for permission to travel from Tyre to the Holy City so that he could escort her back to the port. Saladin readily gave him leave to do so, but asked him to swear on the Christian Bible that he would stay only one night in Jerusalem, terms that Balian accepted. When he arrived, the patriarch and other city leaders immediately importuned him to stay and be the leader of their defense. Balian pointed to his sworn oath, but Heraclius promptly absolved him of it. The noble knight then sent Saladin another letter in which he explained the new situation, apologized, and asked Saladin to relieve him of his vow. Ever chivalrous, Saladin also absolved him of his word and provided an honorable escort for Queen Maria to Tyre. Later, after Saladin had invested the city, Balian asked for another favor. Noting that Thomas, the young son of his brother Baldwin of Ibelin, and William, son of Raymond of Jubail, were in Jerusalem, the lord asked if they could join his wife in Tyre. “When Saladin heard this request he was happy to do what he could to comply…. When the children came before Saladin, he received them honorably as the children of free men, and had them taken

pointing out that it was incumbent on Saladin to secure his hinterland, including the large city of Jerusalem, before the Europeans launched a new invasion. Ehrenkreutz as well as Lyons and Jackson question the decision, contending that the coastal port was much more important and that it was a strategic mistake not to capture it in the summer or fall of 1187. Lyons and Jackson do note that Saladin took the “cohesion” choice, thus recognizing the political importance of Jerusalem for Saladin’s constituencies. Lane-Poole essentially says that Saladin should have devoted more resource to fight for Tyre. Gibb, Life of Saladin, 57–59; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 271; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 239–44; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 206–8.

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off and given robes and jewels and offered them something to eat,”2 after which an Ayyubid cavalry unit escorted them to Tyre. While he was still in Ascalon, in an effort to gain the peaceful transfer of Jerusalem to his control, Saladin summoned a delegation of its citizens to discuss surrender under terms. The Jerusalem envoys, however, replied “… they would never surrender that city where God had shed His blood for them…”3 Back in Jerusalem, Balian was organizing his meager military. To increase the number of knights—he had only found two— he knighted sons of noble families over 16 years of age and about 30 men from the merchant classes. He also enlisted Frankish priests and brothers as soldiers. After some rapid training, he was in a position to make an honorable defense of the city. Saladin and his brigades arrived before Jerusalem on September 20. For the first five days, he camped in front of the Towers of David and Tancred along the northwest walls of the city. With their siege engines, both sides catapulted stones at each other. On a daily basis, Balian’s hastily assembled defenders met Saladin’s skirmishers in front of the wall, acquitting themselves well. Saladin judged the northwest walls, made of hewn stone, to be too strong for his catapults. After surveying other approaches to the city, he ordered his men to dismantle the camp on September 25. The Franks exalted their defenders, commenting that the great warrior Saladin had abandoned the assault. On the next day, however, the Muslims reappeared northeast of the city between St. Stephan’s Gate and the East Gate. They camped on the Mount of Olives, brought up their siege engines—11 in total—and proceeded to hurl rocks and Greek fire against the wall between the two gates. The archers’ arrow barrages were so dense that the defenders did not dare show their faces above the walls. One Crusader chronicler claims that Saladin had 10,000 archers, 10,000 cavalry, and other soldiers manning the catapults and sapping teams.4 These numbers are clearly exaggerated. Saladin had only “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 57. Ibid., 55. 4 Chronicon Terrae Sanctae, 89. The data are also cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 273. 2 3

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18,000 men-at-arms at Hattin. In front of Jerusalem, the number of troops was certainly less, most likely between 10,000 and 15,000. As the battle progressed on the first day, even though Balian’s men resisted, the Muslims filled in the moat and crossed it. As the days of bombardment and the rain of arrows continued, the Franks suffered considerable attrition. One Frankish chronicler observed: The Christians were failing so by this time that scarcely twenty or thirty men appeared to defend the city walls. No man could be found in the whole city who was brave enough to dare keep watch at the defenses for a night, even for a fee of a hundred besants [dinars]. With my own ears I heard the voice of a public crier between the great wall and the outer works proclaiming (on behalf of the lord Patriarch and the other great men of the city) that if fifty strong and brave sergeants could be found who would take up arms voluntarily and keep guard during the night…, they would receive five thousand besants. They could not be found.5

On September 29, Saladin’s men effected a breach in the wall. Realizing defeat was eminent, a group of Frankish Christians took council together and then approached the patriarch and Balian, saying “… they wanted to sally forth at night and attack the Saracen host, for they would rather die honorably in battle than be captured shamefully in the city.”6 Having no desire to be a martyr, Patriarch Heraclius rejected the appeal. He pointed out that if all the men were killed, the surviving women and children would be enslaved in Eastern cities. Balian agreed and the citizens returned to their posts. Over the years, one of Saladin’s advisors on relations with European Christians was an Orthodox scholar named Joseph Betit. Saladin asked him to approach the Jerusalem Eastern Orthodox community, which may have been larger than the Frankish Latin population, with the proposition that they open the city gates. They

De Expugatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum, in Brundage, Crusades: A Documentary Survey, 161–62. 6 “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 58. 5

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promised to do so and even said they would attack the Franks.7 Before this plan could be put into effect, if indeed it could be, Saladin’s military success made it irrelevant. On September 30, the Muslims clamored over the breach and ascended to the ramparts where they raised the Ayyubid banners. That day, Balian appeared personally before Saladin and asked for terms. Saladin reminded him of the bloody massacre when the Crusaders seized the Holy City in 10998 and said his people, who were still very angry, would only accept total surrender. Meanwhile, both sides continued to fight and suddenly the Franks were able to throw the banners to the ground after which the two leaders broke off the talks for the night. On October 1, the Muslims widened the gap in the wall and once again started clamoring up the ramparts. Balian reappeared. Again, he proposed terms, which Saladin rejected. Balian responded that if no terms were given, the Franks would return to the fight. They would kill the 3,000–5,000 Muslim prisoners they held and he would order his men to destroy the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque, the two most holy Muslim sites in Jerusalem.9 Balian’s ploy worked. After consulting his amirs, Saladin returned with terms, which the two sides finalized on October 2, 1187. The Franks could free themselves at the rate of ten dinars per man, five per woman, and one per child. Individuals and families had 40 days to pay the ransom; otherwise, they would be taken as slaves. Saladin invited and encouraged the Eastern Christians and Jews to remain in the city under Ayyubid rule, an invitation that both communities accepted. In contrast to 1099 when the Crusaders led by Godfrey of Bouillon conquered Jerusalem and wantonly killed Muslims, Eastern Christians, and Jews, looted their homes, and pillaged public buildings, Saladin maintained order. The Crusader chronicler in “The Continuation” states: “He placed two knights [officers] and Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 811–12. This is in both the Arabic and Latin sources. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 141; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 58. 9 Lane-Poole, Saladin, 228–29; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 274. 7 8

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ten sergeants in each street to guard the city, and they guarded it so well that I never heard of any wrong done to a Christian.”10 Thus, order was kept and the Franks prepared to quit the city. A large proportion of the Frankish population had trouble securing the required ransom. Balian reminded Saladin that there were 20,000 poor people in Jerusalem. Saladin responded that for 100,000 dinars, he would free all of them. Balian scoured his treasury and begged the rich Templars and Hospitalers for funds, but could raise only 30,000 dinars with which he freed 7,000 Franks. Steven Runciman, the noted Crusader scholar, comments: “… many thousands could have been spared slavery if only the Orders and the Church had been more generous.”11 Muslims as well as Eastern Christians and Jews who remained in the city purchased goods and houses from the vanquished Franks. Given the surfeit of property for sale, prices were very depressed. Saladin organized the collection of ransom, but the rules were frequently violated. He posted guards at every gate and Franks could only leave upon presentation of a receipt. Egyptian and Syrian agents were assigned to collect the payments and write out discharge chits, but due to the lack of an effective audit system, the agents often pocketed money that was due to the treasury. Many Franks found more ingenious ways to escape the city. Some were lowered over the walls by ropes while others disguised themselves as Muslim soldiers and walked out. Those who could pay, did so and joined the assembling Franks outside the wall, as did the Patriarch Heraclius with carts filled with church treasures. When Saladin’s aides complained that the church leader paid only ten dinars despite his great wealth, Saladin reminded them that the rules were agreed upon and would be obeyed. Even though Balian ransomed some poor families, many more remained. Taking pity on them, Saladin’s brother al-Adil asked Saladin to free 1,000 Franks, which Saladin promptly did. This act sparked a series of similar requests. Balian and the patriarch each asked for 1,000 men and women, requests that Saladin honored. Saladin himself followed suit and freed all elderly 10 11

“The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 62. Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 466.

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Franks. Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi secured the freedom of 1,000 Armenians from Edessa, his iqta, who were in Jerusalem for religious reasons. Seeing this, Shihab al-Din of al-Bira pointed out 500 Armenians who hailed from his iqta and obtained their freedom. Other amirs were also able to set free some of their people. A few disreputable Muslims took advantage of the frenzy. They persuaded Saladin to free some selected Franks, but then made them pay their own private ransom. In addition, even though the Eastern Orthodox and Jewish communities of Jerusalem were officially required to pay the ransom, Saladin excused the poorer folk among them. While the administration of the ransom process was problematic, it did generate revenues, about 220,000 dinars according to Ibn Shaddad. Saladin though dispersed the funds to his lieutenants and eventually left the city without a balance in the treasury.12 While the future of the Franks of Jerusalem was being sorted out, Saladin enhanced his reputation for chivalry. Queen Sibylla, the wife of King Guy then held in Nablus, was allowed to join her husband, taking her personal entourage and possessions with her. Saladin gave a safe-conduct to the widow of King Amalric I, who was living in Jerusalem as a nun, to quit the city with her household. On still another occasion, a delegation of ladies whose husbands were either killed or captured at Hattin appeared before Saladin. They explained that they had paid their ransoms, but did not know what to do in the absence of their men of whom many were knights. Saladin immediately freed their husbands held in Damascus. To those who were widowed, he bestowed gifts from the Ayyubid treasury. Stephanie, the widow of Reynald of Châtillon and mother of Humphrey of Toran, asked Saladin to free her son. Saladin agreed on condition that she would persuade the garrisons at the Karak and Shawbak to surrender. She indeed appealed to them, but they refused whereupon she returned Humphrey to Saladin. Noting that she truly attempted to honor her word, Saladin again freed her son.

12

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 78.

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Some of Saladin’s advisors had proposed demolishing the Church of the Holy Sepulcher to punish the Franks for seizing Jerusalem 88 years earlier and to diminish their interest in the Holy City. Saladin rejected the advice, pointing out that the Christians would still want to visit because, according to their religion, Jerusalem is where Christ was crucified. He added that, under his rule, he wanted to encourage, not discourage, Christian pilgrimage. To wit, only three days after he took the city, he ordered the church to be reopened and invited pilgrims to come and venerate the site upon payment of a fee. In a political and religious affront to the Crusaders, Byzantine Emperor Isaac Angelus extended his congratulations to Saladin and asked that the role of the Orthodox Church in the administration of the Christian holy places be restored, to which, after a delay, Saladin gave his concurrence. As the Franks paid their ransoms or otherwise secured their freedom, they assembled outside the walls in a camp “… less than a bow-shot away from the Saracen host. Saladin had his troops guard the Christians [Franks] day and night so that no one could do them any harm and no robbers could fall on them.”13 On the day of their departure, due to their great number—between 50,000 and 75,000—they were divided into three groups, one led by the Templars, another by the Hospitalers, and the third by the patriarch. Saladin assigned 50 cavalrymen to each group, half as a vanguard and the balance as a rearguard. Due to crowding at Tyre, only men of fighting age were admitted. Also complaining of overcrowding, Tripoli refused access to the refugees, but some families remained in the area and eventually gained entry. The balance of the Jerusalemites reached Antioch, where Prince Bohemond opened its gates. Along the road in Frankish territory and after the Muslim guard had retired, some local lords robbed the refugees, especially in the area of Botrun, near Tripoli. Some of the refugees were escorted to Alexandria where Saladin’s local officials hosted them until they could be repatriated upon the resumption of the sailing season in March 1188. At first, the Italian ship captains refused to board the Franks because they could not pay passage. The local governor withheld the ships’ 13

“The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 62.

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steering oars until they accepted the passengers. Once they agreed, according to “The Continuation,” he gave the captains bread and water for the refugees, but also he made them swear to treat the poor people well and said “‘… be sure to convey them to the same place as you take the rich people and do not do them any evil or harm. If I find out at some time that you have treated them badly or shamefully, I shall seize the merchants of your land who come to this country.’ And so it was that the Christians who had spent the winter in Alexandria went in safety from the land of Egypt.”14 Franks who were not freed were taken into slavery. According to Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, the group was composed of 7,000 men and 8,000 women and children.15 As the more fortunate refugees descended the hills towards the coast, this party of poor Franks was led east to the already depressed slave markets in Damascus and Aleppo. As Saladin was establishing Ayyubid order in Jerusalem, he was also in correspondence with the caliph in Baghdad. In a series of letters, he described in detail the conquest of the Holy City; once again explained how his actions justified his frequent requests for diplomas over Muslim lands; and argued that the realization of his goal in Jerusalem, which was also the goal of Islam and the Abbasid caliph, proved that the words of those who had criticized him in the past were unjustified. On Saladin’s behalf, Imad al-Din turned on the Ayyubid propaganda machine. He wrote 70 letters to leaders, civil and religious, throughout the empire with essentially the same message. Saladin also pointedly warned the caliph of future dangers. “It was certain, he wrote, that the Franks would not draw back their hands from their former lands until these hands were cut off.”16 As Saladin was marching up and down the Mediterranean coast during July, August, and September, devout people throughout his lands heard of his great feats—and they assumed that he would soon conquer Jerusalem. Wanting to be part of history, “a vast crowd of men of religion, Sufis and mystics” joined 14“The

Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 66. Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 89. 16 Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 276–77. 15

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Saladin. Of great importance to them was the surrender date, October 2, which was “… the eve of the [date of the] Prophetic Ascension which is written about in the Noble Koran.” One of the chroniclers continues: “Observe this remarkable coincidence, how God facilitated [Jerusalem’s] restoration to Muslim hands on the anniversary of their Prophet’s Night-Journey.”17 This refers to the Quranic Sura 17, which mentions Prophet Muhammad’s journey from Mecca to Jerusalem astride, according to tradition, the winged horse al-Burak after which he ascended to heaven where he spoke to God as well as holy men of the Old and New Testaments of the Bible. Under the direction of Saladin and assisted by religious men, army units reclaimed the Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque. The Templars had appropriated the structures, using them as living quarters, storerooms, and latrines. The Dome of he Rock had been turned into a church with a great gilded cross. Saladin’s men dismantled all of the Templar facilities and restored the buildings to their original state. Saladin’s sister brought rose water from Damascus that was used in a purifying ceremony. On Friday October 9, one week after the conquest, Saladin and a great host of Muslims prayed at al-Aqsa Mosque.18 Trusting his amirs to finalize the exodus of the Franks and set up the administration of the Holy City, Saladin rode to the coast on October 30 before the 40-day grace period for the ransom payments expired. He was responding to the call of Saif al-Din alMashtub—a Kurdish amir who had been with Saladin in Egypt in 1169—who was in charge of Sidon and Beirut. Saif al-Din was urging him to attack Tyre, the last Crusader bastion where “‘every day there is an opportunity which cannot be grasped once it is gone.’”19 After months of seemingly endless successes, Saladin and

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 77. Some of the panegyric oration is presented and discussed in the next section of this chapter. 19 Imad al-Din, Sana al-Barq, cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 277. 17 18

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his army were entering a new period marked by a mixture of conquests and difficulties.20

MUSLIM REACTION TO THE CONQUESTS As Saladin successfully met the Crusaders at Hattin and subsequently took Jerusalem, the Muslim world reacted both positively and negatively. Many of his fellow Muslims from the Upper Euphrates to Egypt and Syria were in awe of his accomplishments and expressed themselves with adulation. Others—especially those in the caliph’s circles in Baghdad, some in Aleppo and Mosul, and groups of Shia—were fearful and jealous of the Ayyubid project. Just as Jerusalem is a city of the first order for Christianity and Judaism, so too is it for Islam. Being one of the great monotheistic religions, its holy book, the Quran, incorporates significant personalities and locations of the Old and New Testaments. In the early years, the Prophet Muhammad instructed Muslims to pray facing Jerusalem. Only in later years, did he redirect them to face Mecca. Jerusalem as the site of the “far mosque” joins Mecca and Medina as one of the three most holy sanctuaries of Islam. Moreover, Muhammad’s Night Journey to Jerusalem is recorded in Sura 17 of the Quran. When the second caliph, Umar ibn alKhattab, took the city in 638, he respected the sanctity of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher and told his men to build on the Haram al-Sharif (the Noble Sanctuary) where they erected the Dome of the Rock to commemorate the Prophet’s visit and alAqsa Mosque adjacent to it. Sources on the conquest of Jerusalem are numerous. Those consulted are: “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 54– 67; De Expugatione Terrae Sanctae per Saladinum, in Brundage, Crusades: A Documentary Survey, 159–63; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 77–78; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 78–97; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 33–38; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 93–101; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 54–58; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 272–77; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 462–68; Lane-Pole, Saladin, 224–34; Nicolle, Hattin, 82–86; Nicholson & Nicolle, God’s Warriors, 75–81; Tyerman, God’s War, 372–74; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 2, 809–22. 20

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Over the years, the ulama commonly discussed the centrality of Jerusalem to Islam and they read exegeses on the subject in public fora. Most of this literature is found in a body of eleventh and twelfth century writings called “The Merits of Jerusalem,” although antecedents date back to the early tenth century. Works by al-Rabai in this genre as well as others extolling holy war were read out in mosques, city squares, and diwans during the spring and summer of 1187 as Saladin was preparing to march against the Franks.21 After Saladin’s overwhelming victory at Hattin and as Crusader cities and castles were falling to his army, contemporary poets wrote adulatory panegyrics that religious and literary men recited at community gatherings. They reflected not only Saladin’s holy war triumphs, but also his new heroic stature. Ibn Sana alMulk penned a vivid example: You took possession of Paradises palace by palace, when you conquered Syria fortress by fortress. Indeed, the religion of Islam has spread its blessings over created beings. But it is you who have glorified it… You have risen up in the darkness of the battle like the moon when it climbs slowly in the night… Syria is not the only object of the congratulations addressed to you, but it is also every region and country. You have possessed the lands from east and west. You have embraced the horizons, plain and steppe.22

While extolling Saladin’s military successes and stressing that he honored Islam and brought light where there was darkness, the poet also pointedly indicates that his realm extended to “east and west” and encompassed “the horizons,” thus celebrating the reality of Saladin’s imperial reach, a reach that, as discussed below, his critics loathed and feared. The praise for and recognition of the Ayyubid leader rose to new heights after his conquest of the Holy City. To celebrate the 21 22

Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 162–65, 175. Ibid., 179–80.

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reopening of al-Aqsa Mosque on October 9, 1187, Saladin invited the esteemed qadi of Aleppo, Mahi al-Din Muhammad ibn al-Zaki, to give the principal sermon. In heady language, the qadi compared Saladin’s holy war to the Prophet Muhammad’s military successes and the early Muslim conquests. Ibn al-Zaki continued: And prolong, O Almighty God, the reign of thy servant, humbly reverent, for thy favor thankful, grateful for thy gifts, thy sharp sword and shining torch, the champion of thy faith and defender of thy Holy Land, the firmly resisting, the great, the victorious King, the strengthener of the true religion, the vanquisher of the worshippers of the Cross, the Honor of the World and the Faith, Sultan of Islam and of the Muslims, purifier of the holy temple, Salah al-Din Yusif bin Ayyub, reviver of the empire of the Commander of the Faithful. Grant, O God, that his empire may spread over all of the earth, and that the angels may ever surround his standards; preserve him for the good of Islam; protect his realm for the profit of the Faith; and extend his dominion over the regions of the East and the West… Save him, O God, and his children after him; may they rule the land till the end of time…23

Qadi Ibn al-Zaki calls Saladin the Sultan of Islam. While the term “sultan” usually relates to a temporal role, connecting it with “Islam” adds another dimension, another aura to the accolades bestowed on Saladin. Purifying “the holy temple” again evokes the centrality of Jerusalem, which Saladin had just restored to its proper state of sanctity in the eyes of the Muslims. Notably, the qadi echoes Ibn Sana and expresses the hope that the Ayyubid will “extend his dominion over the regions of the East and the West.” The biographers and chroniclers also contributed their laudatory words. Ibn Shaddad, as recounted, writes about a great host of religious men attending the opening of the Holy City, “so much so that no-one of any note failed to be present,” a high honor for Saladin and a solemn rejoicing that khutbas would once again be delivered at al-Aqsa Mosque. Holy war was realized and it Ibn Khallikan, Ibn Khallikan’s Biographical Dictionary, vol. 2. 634–41. Also cited in: Lane-Poole, Saladin, 237–38. 23

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resulted in success of the highest order.24 Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, eloquent as usual, writes about Saladin receiving pious courtiers, about how his face glowed and appeared to be encompassed by a lunar halo. He records that the people said: “‘… noble this victory of al-Nasir [a name bestowed on Saladin, which means “the victorious”], this stock of Islam, this profession of Abbasid loyalty, this Ayyubid kingdom, Saladin’s dynasty! Is there anywhere in Islam an assembly more noble than this that God, by His help, has done the honor of allowing to obey Him in this way?’”25 The oftencritical Ibn al-Athir also praises Saladin’s conquest, but in near acerbic tones: “Thus Islam was restored there in its new freshness. And this noble act of conquering the Holy City, as did Umar ibn alKhattab, may God be pleased with him, was realized by no other than Saladin, may God have mercy on him, and that is sufficient glory and honor.”26 In a similar vein, but three years before Saladin recaptured Jerusalem, Ibn Jubayr, a visitor to Syria and Palestine from Spain, adds his own reflections based on his conversations with people he encountered as well as his own thoughts. For him, Saladin stood for justice and the “defense of Islamic lands” and he should be remembered for “his memorable deeds in the affairs of the world and religion, and his zeal in urging holy war against the enemies of God.”27 As befitting a great leader and conqueror, a gold coin was struck in his name in 1187. The calligraphy celebrates the victories at Hattin and Jerusalem and once again terms Saladin “The Sultan of Islam and the Muslims.”28 Furthermore, Saladin’s name and attributes bestowed on him are “… enshrined in a monumental inscription dated 1191 in his name on the Dome of the Rock on the Haram [al-Sharif] esplanade: ‘the victorious king, the probity of this world and of [true] religion, the Sultan of Islam and of the Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 77–78. Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 85–86, 89–92. The translation is from: Gabrieli, Arab Historians of the Crusades, 166. 26 Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 38. 27 Ibn Jubayr, Travels of Ibn Jubayr, 35, 311. Also cited and commented upon by: Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 182–83. 28 Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 180. 24 25

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Muslims, the servant of the two noble sanctuaries and of Jerusalem.’”29 This accolade is still prominently displayed in the Dome of the Rock in the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem. At Saladin’s death, one of his contemporaries from the scholarly class, Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi (also known as Muwaffaq al-Din Abu Muhammad), summed up the common feeling in a brief eulogy: “Men grieved for him as they grieve for prophets. I have seen no other ruler for whose death the people mourned, for he was loved by good and bad, Muslim and unbeliever alike.”30 In this context, Carole Hillenbrand, a modern scholar and historian, perceptively comments that Saladin evolved into “a charismatic and highly successful” holy war leader. “[H]is fellow military commanders, his personal advisers and the religious classes” saw his charisma and responded to it.31 In sum, by dint of Hattin and Jerusalem as well as the manner in which he conducted and exercised his leadership, the Ayyubid leader enjoyed a positive, distinctive, and pervasive reputation that lasted until his death, and, for some, beyond. *** In the late twelfth century, this praise and respect gave way to concern, fear, and jealousy in certain parts of the Muslim world. After his victories from July through October, Saladin wrote to Caliph al-Nasir, giving him the details of the conquests. In December, he received the caliph’s response in the form of a letter from his office, carried by Taj al-Din al-Isfahani, the brother of Imad al-Din. While it did not explicitly deal with Saladin’s expansionist ambitions—ambitions that some in al-Nasir’s court thought included the caliphate itself—concern about them was certainly implicit in the message. There were no words of congratulation, just criticisms, including disapproval of: “sectarian Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 191. Lewis, Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople, vol. 1, 67. Also cited in: Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 186; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 76. Gibb’s translation is slightly different, but the feeling is essentially the same. 31 Hillenbrand, Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 186. 29 30

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disputes in Syria”; the toleration of the presence of “men exiled from Iraq ‘for whatever reason’”; Tughtakin’s (Saladin’s brother) alleged support for troublesome people and heresies in the Hijaz; Saladin’s usurpation of the “Caliph’s laqab (title), al-Nasir (the victorious)”; and Saladin’s supposed correspondence “with Turkmans and Kurds on the borders of the Caliph’s own territories, ‘causing their feet to slip and blunting their resolution…. They should know [only] that they are Iraqi subjects.’” The tone and substance of the letter greatly disappointed Saladin, but he responded diplomatically and then only to the charge of claiming the al-Nasir title, correctly pointing out that the caliph’s predecessor, Al-Mustadi, had bestowed the title on him when he was still in Egypt. Saladin concluded by writing “… his purpose was ‘to complete the conquests of the Commander of the Faithful [the Abbasid Caliph].’”32 How far did Saladin’s ambitions extend? Equally important, how justified were Abbasid apprehensions concerning these ambitions? In 1183, as Saladin was campaigning in the north, he wrote Caliph al-Nasir a long letter about his progress and intentions in that immediate area. He concluded it with expansionist musings. He posited that once he took Jerusalem, he could turn in many other directions. Always couched in terms whereby the Abbasid writ would reach to new realms, he wrote about extending his empire to Constantinople, then controlled by the Byzantine emperor, to Morocco and Spain where the Almohades held sway, to smaller places like Khuzistan in south Iraq and Oman in the Arabian Peninsula where local barons ruled.33 In 1185, Taqi al-Din planned to march on the Almohades’ territories, only to be dissuaded by Saladin, but he proposed to undertake the project again in 1186. In October 1187, Saladin’s messenger to Baghdad, a rather uncouth envoy who had the temerity to meet the caliph’s men while inebriated, gave them the impression that Saladin “… believes that he can overthrow the

Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 280–81. Also, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 116–20. 33 Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 194. 32

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[Abbasid] state.”34 Moreover, in 1191, while Saladin was fighting the Crusaders, the headstrong Taqi al-Din attempted to expand his lands north of his assigned iqtas in Anatolia, provoking pointed criticism from Caliph al-Nasir. Lastly, in 1193 after Saladin had settled matters with the Crusaders, Ibn al-Athir records a family conversation at which Saladin, his son al-Afdal, and his brother alAdil were present. Noting the conclusion of the Frankish business, they ruminated on what their next horizons should be: Khilat in the north next to Lake Van; the lands of Rum in Anatolia now in the hands of the sons of Qilij-Arslan, which would furnish many soldiers and block a Frankish invasion route; Azarbaijan after which “… we will arrive at the land of Persia, and there is no one who can stop us.”35 In sum, Saladin and his Ayyubid relatives unquestionably speculated about further expansion and we know from Saladin’s history that he was capable of acting on such aspirations. It would be difficult to argue that they were not real. Did he have designs on Baghdad? There is nothing in the record that so indicates. However, the volatility of history and the fact that Saladin’s admirers gave him the name “Sultan of Islam and the Muslims” and inscribed it on at least one coin and the Dome of the Rock, would only naturally give rise to concern, if not fear, at the caliph’s court. This resentment—and perhaps some rivalry—spilled into the streets of Mecca. In 1188, Ibn al-Muqaddam, Saladin’s longtime supporter, led a party of Syrians on the pilgrimage. One of the caliph’s amirs named Tashtakin Mujir al-Din headed the Iraqi delegation, which considered him Amir of the Pilgrimage (Hajj). There are different versions of what caused a clash between the two groups: one involved Ibn al-Muqaddam’s men beating drums and cymbals to the Iraqis’ annoyance and disapproval and another focused on the Syrians’ raising Saladin’s banners, only to have the Iraqis tear them down. Following the altercation, Iraqi toughs ransacked the Syrian camp. During the melee, Ibn al-Muqaddam received a wound to his eye. Tashtakin, obviously embarrassed that 34

Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 117. Also, see: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin,

280. 35

Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 118.

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the Syrian amir was hurt, immediately led him to his own tent where he succumbed to the injury.36 This affair shows that while Saladin savored broad popularity and esteem, there were limits, especially among Muslims in rival camps. In some instances, jealousy joined with envy as friction between Saladin and some of his compatriots played out. Ibn alAthir observed a case in point in 1192 when the Ayyubids were defending Jerusalem against a potential Frankish attack led by King Richard the Lionheart. As a Mosuli amir assisted Saladin as he was getting on his horse, another Mosuli amir was heard to say: “Be careful, oh son of Ayyub, of what death you may meet, as a Seljuk prince and descendant of the Atabeg Zangi helps you mount.”37 This statement reflects two types of tension. The Mosuli, certainly of Turkish stock, showed disapproval of a Seljuk Turkish lord assisting the Kurd Saladin to sit his horse, a comment that reflects ethnic friction, a problem Saladin frequently encountered. The speaker was also jealous that a Seljuk of the Zangi atabeg family was attending Saladin, who he undoubtedly thought had jumped above his station in life, hailing as he did from the class of military servants to the atabegs. Thus, the Mosuli amir confounded ethnic, class, and tribal jealousy and friction in one observation. Leaders throughout the world, especially those who are active and forceful, have always been subject to praise and criticism, to words of adulation and fear, to awe and resentment. Saladin was no exception as he built his empire in Muslim lands—and the positive and negative reactions and views came to a climax after his great successes at Hattin and Jerusalem.

Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 43–44; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 80; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 210; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 284. 37 Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 104. 36

CHAPTER TEN DEFEAT AND CONQUESTS: 1187–1189 FAILED SIEGE OF TYRE: 1187 From Jerusalem, Saladin took the better part of a month to reach Tyre. Initially, he visited Acre for a week after which he marched north on November 8. He camped in sight of the port on November 13 where he waited for men and equipment. After the battles of Hattin and Jerusalem and the mopping-up exercises throughout Palestine, his leaders and men were dispersed. Ibn alMuqaddam was on the pilgrimage to Mecca. Saladin’s sons had retired to their cities: al-Zahir to Aleppo, al-Afdal to Acre, and Uthman to Cairo. Al-Adil was in Jerusalem and many amirs were in possession of Crusader fortresses or blocking those few the Franks still held. This was the third time Saladin had arrived at Tyre. In July, he elected not to invest the city and, in August, he thought he had an agreement for its capitulation, only to find that Conrad of Montferrat had taken command of the port and informed him that he would vigorously defend it. During September and October, Conrad had enhanced Tyre’s defenses. He strengthened its walls and increased their height. Equally important, he dug a moat the entire width of the peninsula on which the city stood, making the approach to the walls difficult, especially since the spit was narrow enough—about 600 yards wide—that an archer could shoot an arrow over its entire breadth. During the two-month respite, Conrad was also able to acquire more supplies and weapons as well as a small flotilla. Saladin’s soldiers initiated some light skirmishes in mid November, but serious fighting was delayed for days. On November 26, Saladin moved his camp to Tell Mashuq, about one mile from the city’s moat. On that date, al-Zahir joined his father 255

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with his regiment. Al-Afdal and Taqi al-Din arrived within a few days and al-Adil on December 8. In mid November, Saladin lacked his normal complement of catapults and siege machines, but by early December, he had sufficiently rearmed to prosecute the battle. The Muslim muster was complete, but the fighting dragged on for weeks. The limited width of the peninsula and thus the front, constrained Ayyubid tactics, in particular the ability of the cavalry and foot soldiers to maneuver. In contrast, the Franks on the city walls could focus their arrows and missiles on small concentrations of soldiers. Conrad also took advantage of his naval assets. “The Continuation” reports that he “… had boats covered with hides with windows made in them and put crossbowmen in them. They were so light that they could keep close to the land, and crossbowmen did great damage to the Saracens…”1 Ibn al-Athir confirms that the Franks attacked Saladin’s flanks from the sea and his vanguard from the walls.2 To suppress the fire from the sea, Saladin summoned ten galleys from Acre that compelled the Frankish ships to take refuge in the guarded harbor. While this change afforded the Muslim soldiers a measure of protection, the opponents checked each other for most of December. Despite the seriousness of the conflict, the Franks did provide a diversion that the Muslims appreciated and honored. On many days, their knights sallied outside the walls. “They were led by a knight from Spain who was in the city of Tyre named Sancho Martin. He bore arms vert. When the knight issued forth, the Saracens all rushed up, more to see his fine bearing than anything else. The Turks called him the Green Knight. He bore antlers of a stag on his helmet and this greatly benefited him.”3 The Green Knight would surface again in 1188 in Tripoli. During the night of December 29/30, as was their usual practice, five of Saladin’s ships under the command of Faris al-Din Badran were blockading the Tyrian harbor. At dawn, thinking the threat had abated, the sailors let down their guard. As they slept, “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 68. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 40–41. 3 “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 68. 1 2

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marines from Frankish ships—about 17 galleys—stealthily boarded and captured all five. Observing the defeat, Saladin immediately commanded his other ships to sail to Beirut. The Frankish flotilla gave chase. Fearing capture and death, the captain beached the remaining galleys to escape. Hearing of the second maritime defeat, Saladin ordered his men to break up the craft to deny them to the Crusaders. At about this time, Saladin held a war council. He was well aware that many of his amirs and soldiers wanted to return to their cities, villages, and farms as was typical of medieval Muslim iqta armies. He had even offered a bounty to attract more soldiers, but found few volunteers. In addition, it was wet and cold, making the camp less than comfortable. Among his military leaders, many voted to quit the field with their ample booty and muster again in the spring. A few, led by Saladin’s steadfast amirs—Izz al-Din Jurdik, Diya al-Din al-Isa, and Husam al-Din Tuman—wanted to continue the siege as did Saladin. Knowing the limits of his men and bowing to the majority, he decided to lift the siege after one more assault. On December 30 or 31, his cavalrymen and foot soldiers attacked in wave after wave, but the Franks from the walls and in front of them, successfully resisted. Both sides suffered casualties, but the battle for Tyre was over. The Franks celebrated their auspicious defense, while the Muslims absorbed their first defeat in 1187. In late December 1187, the Ayyubids captured Hunin (Chateau-Neuf), a major fortress strategically located in the hills to the west of the Jordan River and north of the Sea of Galilee. The occupation of Hunin at the end of the fighting season closed a long string of historical successes in Palestine and Lebanon, marred only by the stalemate at Tyre. On January 1, 1188, Saladin retired to Acre with his personal bodyguard and his commanders dispersed. Taqi al-Din marched with the regiments from Diyar Bakr, Mosul, Mardin, and Sinjar in the Jazira and Upper Tigris region. He wanted to visit Mayyafariqin, the strategic and valuable iqta in the northern reaches of Saladin’s empire, which Saladin had recently assigned to him. AlAdil rode to Egypt, al-Zahir returned to Aleppo, and al-Afdal was at Acre with his father. Saladin gave command of the city to Izz alDin Jurdik, a reward for his long service.

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Saladin never captured Tyre. He may have had the opportunity to do so earlier in 1187, but elected to concentrate on securing many fortresses throughout Palestine. He successfully prosecuted this strategy and secured his flanks against future battles with the Crusaders. In addition, at the end of this momentous year, he not only faced Franks ably led by Conrad of Montferrat in Tyre, but also “the fissiparous tendencies and the instability of the feudal armies,”4 as H.A.R. Gibb describes the Muslim military of the day. His army wanted to go home and tend to their families and fields. Saladin had little choice but to let them do so. From another standpoint, as a tactical matter, Saladin did not like to invest fortresses or cities for long periods. He preferred to win their surrender either by negotiating terms or by assault in relatively short order. Otherwise, he bypassed them, usually leaving a small blocking unit. In most cases, because his soldiers deprived them of food and supplies, he eventually forced their capitulation. For him, this system worked well in the hinterland, but not on the coast. Tyre, though, was strategically important, but not uniquely so. Under Frankish command, it was a beachhead for a new crusade. However, even if he had taken the city, Tripoli and Antioch were still under Frankish control. While they were some distance from Palestine and Jerusalem, they were major fortified positions that the Crusaders could exploit for the same purpose.5

CRUSADERS REORGANIZE IN EUROPE: 1187–1189 Upon hearing of the defeats at Hattin and Jerusalem, the fall of many cities, towns, and fortresses, and the loss of the True Cross, Europeans—kings and barons, the pope and clerics, and ordinary folk—were shocked. The Kingdom of Jerusalem had existed for 88 years. It had earned a place in their view of themselves and was Gibb, Life of Saladin, 59. For battle for Tyre, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 40– 41; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 67–70; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 78–79; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 99–109; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 119–20; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 1–8; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 239–43; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 279–83; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 472; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 55. 4 5

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seemingly a part of the architecture of Europe. Moreover, the Holy City and the True Cross enjoyed a very special aura in religious thinking and worship. How could all of this disappear? That was one question that spread across Italy, France, England, and Germany. Equally important, both lay and religious leaders focused on the second question: How do we regain what Saladin has conquered? Quite rapidly, the lords of the Church and kingdoms accepted the idea of what became known in the annals of history as the Third Crusade. Even though they forcefully and vigorously adopted the concept of a new Christian project, it was a full four years before the kings landed troops and supplies in quantity on the coast of the Holy Land, that is, before they projected massive force. During this period, they raised resources, recruited men, spread the word through preaching, slowly put their local wars in abeyance, and did send some crucial early assistance to Tyre, Tripoli, and Antioch. Sea traders had brought rumors of Hattin, but Archbishop Josias of Tyre presented the definitive details. In late summer, before the loss of Jerusalem, he had an audience with King William II of Sicily who was so struck that he dressed in sackcloth for four days. After he re-emerged in society, he was decisive and expeditious. He ordered his able admiral, Margaritus of Brindisi, to leave Cypriote waters where he was conducting military operations in support of a rebel lord, Isaac Comnenus, and against the Byzantine Empire. William and Emperor Isaac Angelus put their small war on the shelf, allowing William to initiate the first actions of the new crusade. After the admiral refitted his fleet, he embarked with 200 or 300 knights for northern Syria as the 1188 sailing season started. They substantially reinforced the defenses of Tripoli and Antioch and were prepared to assist Tyre, if needed. William also wrote the kings of Europe, informing them of the disaster and calling for a crusade. Josias next traveled to the Papal Court. The news greatly upset the elderly Pope Urban III, contributing to his death on October 20, 1187. Having heard of the defeat from Genoese seamen, his successor, Gregory VIII, had been preparing a papal bull in which he called for another crusade. In it, he asked kings, lords, knights, clerics, and commoners to take up the cross, to commit themselves to the holy expedition. Those who did would receive broad indulgences and their property in Europe would be

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under the protection of the papacy. Aside from spelling out the reasons and necessity for the project, he also outlined sacrifices others would make, including fasting and prayers. Pointing to secular reality, the bull also called for the princes of Europe to forgo their internecine wars and refocus their military energies on regaining the Holy Land and the True Cross. Gregory died on December 17 and thus did not witness the fruits of his call. Clement III replaced him two days later. On the popular level, Europeans responded. Their “… reactions to the call to arms were conditioned by considerations of material and political advantage, as one contemporary [Roger of Howden], observed, ‘for the love of God, remission of sins and the respect of kings,’” but also “… there can be no doubt the message produced strong psychological and religious responses.”6 In disseminating the call to join the Crusade among the common folk, of highest importance was the loss of Jerusalem and the True Cross, images of which were familiar in “scriptures, liturgy, songs, popular stories, sculpture, stained glass, relics and travelers’ tales of returning pilgrims.”7 Religious symbols influenced kings as well, but they also made their own political and dynastic calculations. To affect these deliberations, Archbishop Josias embarked on a trip to France to meet the English and French kings. Pope Clement, likewise, sent an urgent message to Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, urging him to take the cross, and, given his vast resources, lead a grand army to take on Saladin. In January 1188, Josias found King Henry II and King Philip Augustus at Gisors, northwest of Paris. The two men had been fighting a desultory war for years, but in response to the news from the Holy Land and the eloquence of the archbishop, they immediately decided to terminate their conflict and take up the cross. Count Richard of Poitou, Henry’s eldest surviving son who would become King Richard the Lionheart, had already vowed to join the new Crusade in November 1187, without consulting his father, the king. Philip, the Count of Flanders who led his own 6 7

Tyerman, God’s War, 378–79. Ibid., 379.

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ineffective Crusade in 1177–1178, also took the cross, as did numerous English and French barons. To finance the great project, both kings decided on a special Crusade tax that became known as the “Saladin Tithe” at the popular level. Passed by King Henry’s Royal Council held at Le Mans in late January and the Paris assembly in March, the tax, ten percent of net revenue, fell on lay citizens as well as clerical lands. If an individual joined the Crusade, however, he was exempt, making the tax a powerful recruitment tool. The provision that targeted ecclesiastical lands violated the traditional separation of religious matters from secular state affairs and, expectably, caused considerable consternation and resentment among the clerical classes. It seems that both Philip and Henry were able to collect the Saladin Tithe from throughout their respective kingdoms, albeit, there were exceptions such as the Scottish King William the Lion, Henry’s vassal, who could not cajole his thrifty barons to contribute to the holy fund.8 The special tax generated considerable revenue, especially because the governments continued to collect it despite the delay in starting the crusade. Henry and Philip started making arrangements to raise armies and provide for governance in their absence, but their deleterious wars delayed their preparations. In the summer of 1188, the kings, Count Richard, and their vassals engaged in a complex conflict around Poitou, Toulouse, and Berry, involving revolts and invasions. By January 1189, the confrontation took an even stranger turn when Richard joined the French king in an attack on Richard’s father. Richard and Philip prevailed with the latter wresting control of Tours from Henry. In early July, Henry accepted a humiliating defeat, but he died on July 6, which made one of his foes, his son Richard, the new English king. Richard the Lionheart was formally crowned at Westminster on September 3, 1189.

Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 6–8; Tyerman, God’s War, 381–90. Runciman writes that the tax was only on lay subjects, but Tyerman more authoritatively shows that it was also on net income from Church lands, which sparked harsh complaints. 8

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With the passing of King Henry II, the wars in France ceased. In the fall of 1189, Philip informed Richard that he was ready to start the crusade and would like to meet Richard at Vezelay, southeast of Paris, on the first of April 1190 to which Richard agreed. However, due to the death of the Queen of France, Isabella of Hainault, in March, the rendezvous was postponed. On July 4, they met with their respective armies to set about the much-delayed Crusade and take the measure of Saladin. In Germany, Emperor Frederick was dreaming of repeating, but successfully this time, the Second Crusade (1147–1149) on which he had accompanied his father, King Conrad III, and acted as his chief deputy. Frederick was moved by the loss of Jerusalem to Saladin, but proud of Conrad of Montferrat’s stern defense of Tyre. Furthermore, with the death of Pope Urban III, he was able to put aside his long-term altercation with the papacy over ecclesiastical matters in Germany. On March 27, 1188, he pledged to take up the cross in the presence of the Cardinal of Albano. While he did not commence his march until the spring of 1189, he did start making military and diplomatic preparations. He recruited an army said to be variously 85,000, 100,000, and 150,000 men. Taking just the middle number, the breakdown was 20,000 knights and 80,000 infantry.9 In comparison to the Crusader army at Hattin of 1,200 knights and about 19,000 infantry and cavalry, this was truly a massive military force. By letter, Frederick requested permission from the king of Hungry, Emperor Isaac of the Byzantine Empire, and Qilij-Arslan, Seljuk Sultan of Rum in Anatolia, to pass through their respective territories. Frederick also wrote Saladin, demanding the return of the Holy Land to Western Christian control and inviting him to battle on the fields of Zoan10 in November 1189.11 Saladin politely, but firmly replied that the Latin Church could reclaim its abbeys, but that was the limit of his Tyerman, God’s War, 418. Emperor Frederick may have been making an allegorical reference to two biblical passages from: Psalms 78:12, 43. “In the sight of others, he wrought marvels in the land of Egypt, in the fields of Zoan.” “When he wrought his signs in Egypt, and his miracles in the fields of Zoan.” 11 Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 11. 9

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generosity. If the emperor arrived with his army, there would be war.12

MORE FRANKISH FORTRESSES AND TOWNS FALL: 1188–1189 After lifting the siege of Tyre and sending his troops home, Saladin moved south to Acre where he remained until mid March 1188. With his son al-Afdal, to whom he had given Acre, and Izz al-Din Jurdik, the city’s commander, he improved its administration and institutions. He converted a former Hospitaler monastery into a hostel for Muslim religious personnel and the bishop’s palace into a hospital, both of which he endowed with the spoils of the last few months. Saladin also discussed the future of Acre with his court, or more specifically, its walls and defenses. Fearing that the Crusaders might recapture it and use it as a fortified harbor in the next stage of the conflict, he and his colleagues weighed the option of destroying the port city and building an inland fortress to protect the region. However, the argument that Acre was crucial for the control of both sea and land won the day. Saladin adopted this policy and ordered Baha al-Din Qaraqush, who had been in charge of building Cairene defenses, to come to Acre and improve its walls and fortifications.13 During the early days of 1188, serious contacts between Saladin and Emperor Isaac Angelus were renewed. On January 6, 1188, Saladin received an embassy from Constantinople, congratulating him on his victories and thanking Saladin for freeing For this section, “Crusaders Reorganize in Europe: 1187–1189,” see: Tyerman, God’s War, 375–403, 417–421; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 3–12; Richard, Crusades, 217–21; Riley-Smith, History of the Crusades, 137–40; Mayer, Crusades, 137–40, 144–45; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 8–10. Christopher Tyerman, the noted Crusader historian, discusses the call for the Third Crusade and its message as well as the way soldiers were recruited and the manner in which the project was financed, in a thoroughly researched and perceptive manner. Tyerman, God’s War, 375–99. 13 Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 132–33; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 285; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 244. 12

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the emperor’s brother who had been held by the Crusaders. In 1188 or 1189, it is not clear, the two empires reached a formal agreement. Isaac was to help Saladin vis-à-vis the expected European incursion and Saladin was to help Isaac in his disputes with Qilij-Arslan, the Seljuk Sultan. Orthodox control over Jerusalem’s Christian religious sites was formalized and Saladin was given the honor of being responsible for activities and personnel of the mosque in the Byzantine capital, making the Ayyubids the protector of Constantinople’s Muslims. The two sides regularly exchanged diplomatic delegations and during the course of 1188, Saladin learned from the Greek envoys that the Europeans were making plans for a new Crusade, which confirmed what he had written to Caliph al-Nasir after the fall of Jerusalem. The military aspect of the agreement was of little consequence because the two empires were not contiguous and Isaac Angelus was very weak. Nevertheless, the accord did constitute major recognition on an international scale of Ayyubid accomplishments.14 In mid March 1188, Saladin left Acre with a small force composed of his personal guard and a cavalry regiment. He wanted to resume his campaign to reduce the remaining Crusader fortresses: Belvoir and Safad in Palestine, Beaufort in southern Lebanon, and Karak and Shawbak in Transjordan. His amirs with small military contingents had been watching them since late summer 1187. They sought to prevent the Crusaders forts from acquiring new provisions, but with mixed success. In March, Saladin arrived before the Hospitalers’ Belvoir stronghold, located in the hills west of the Jordan River and south of the Sea of Galilee. For a month, he laid siege and his men carried out attacks. By the end of April, however, he determined that his limited force could not succeed in a reasonable time in face of an experienced garrison made up of dedicated soldiers. Lifting the investment but leaving a blocking unit, he marched to Damascus where he arrived on May 5, 1188. He had not visited his capital for 16 months. Nonetheless, upon hearing that the Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 10–11; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 211–12; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 12; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 121. 14

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Mosul regiments under the command of Imad al-Din Zangi and an Upper Euphrates force led by Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi were arriving south of Homs, he left five days later and rode north. At Qadas, Saladin met Imad al-Din. To underline mutual respect and indicate equality, they both dismounted and embraced. The army stayed at Qadas for some time, enjoying the fresh apricots, a local specialty that was in season. The Crusaders were stirring. On May 10, the day he left Damascus, Saladin heard of an attack on Jubail, a Muslim-held port north of Beirut, but the Franks withdrew when they heard that Saladin was marching north, even though he was headed for Homs, not Jubail. By this time in 1188, small-armed bands of Franks did ride along the coast between Antioch, Tripoli, and Tyre. Avoiding Muslim strong points, they could successfully maintain communications between the cities, especially because Saladin was concentrating his forces in the hinterland. In addition, at about this time, King William’s knights arrived from Sicily. Conrad of Montferrat, the commander of Tyre, directed Admiral Margaritus to take the 200–300 armed and armored men to Tripoli where Frankish defenses needed to be strengthened more than did Tyre. Accompanying the admiral was the Green Knight.15 After a couple of pleasant weeks in the Homs region, Saladin marched west towards Crusader positions. His full army was not present. On his orders, Taqi al-Din and al-Zahir were in the north opposite Antioch to contain potential Frankish military activity. AlAdil was in Egypt, al-Afdal was still in Acre, and several amirs led blocking forces around Crusader fortresses in Palestine and Transjordan. On May 30, Saladin’s brigades camped near Crac des Chevaliers, a massive, well-defended castle overlooking a large plain. While Saladin did reconnoiter the terrain and make a probe, he decided not to besiege it. Leaving his heavy baggage, his cavalry rode to the vicinity of newly reinforced Tripoli. His men conducted For the period mid March to mid May, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 78–81; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 74, 76; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 47; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 135–39; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 124; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 285; Tyerman, God’s War, 405; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 245. 15

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a few raids, specifically against Crusader fortresses at Yahmur, alUraima, and Chastel Blanc (Safitha). His intention at this time, though, was not to lay siege and take strongholds, but to “… cause damage, to find out what forces it had and to strengthen his troops with booty.”16 During June, his men seized large numbers of sheep and goats, newly fattened on the spring grass, to feed his army. On a colorful note, Saladin took the opportunity to interview the Green Knight, whom he had enjoyed observing from afar during his siege of Tyre in 1187. According to “The Continuation,” Saladin … sent word to him begging him to come to visit him under the guarantee of his safe-conduct. He went, and Saladin had him presented with a horse and with gold and silver and made a great fuss of him, but he had no thought of seizing him; he told him that if he decided to remain he would give him extensive lands. He replied that he had not come to live with the Saracens but to do his best to destroy them and harm them as much as he could. He took his leave and went off to Tripoli.17

Of more serious consequence, Saladin let King Guy out of prison during the early summer. Queen Sibylla had written Saladin many times, asking him to release Guy, as he had promised, for the surrender of Ascalon. In September 1187, the grandees of the port city rejected the king’s call to capitulate and Saladin eventually took it by storm. Thus, Saladin did not feel compelled to free Guy because he had not been able to deliver on his promise. For unclear reasons, Saladin decided to release Guy and several other barons captured at Hattin while he was camped near Crac des Chevaliers and ordered his officials in Damascus to dispatch them to his camp. The group included Guy, his brother Constable Amalric of Lusignan, the Templar Grand Master Gerard of Ridfort, the elderly Marquis of Montferrat, and six others. Saladin may have thought that when he freed these men, the ever-bickering Crusader leaders would bicker even more. His intelligence service would 16 17

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 81. “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 77.

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undoubtedly have known of the personal and dynastic rivalry between Conrad of Montferrat, then in possession of Tyre, and King Guy of Lusignan who would assuredly want to reclaim his throne. When the noble prisoners appeared before him in front of Tartus (also Tortosa, Antartus), “The Continuation” records that “… Saladin had the king and all the barons that had been freed swear that they would never bear arms against him, and then he let them go.”18 Ibn Shaddad similarly states that the “… Sultan stipulated that the king should not draw a sword against him ever again and that he would be his servant, mamluke and freedman for ever.”19 After seeking and receiving absolution from a priest, the Frankish lords promptly broke their sworn word. Guy joined his wife in Tripoli and started gathering his relatives and supporters. Gerard led the defense of the Templar fort at Tartus and the Marquis of Montferrat joined his son, Conrad, at Tyre.20 As the Frankish leaders celebrated their newfound freedom, Saladin initiated what would become a very successful campaign in northwest Syria. Rather than commit his army to a long siege of a major port city, Saladin decided to target a series of smaller cities, ports, and fortresses, which, after he captured them, would deny Antioch and, to a degree, Tripoli, their hinterland. The strategy also would allow his soldiers many opportunities to pillage and capture booty and prisoners. Saladin left the neighborhood of Tripoli on July 1 and arrived at Tartus (Map 4), a port city north of Tripoli, on July 3. Imad alDin Zangi led the vanguard or left wing of the army, Saladin took the center, and Muzaffar al-Din commanded the rearguard or right wing. By this time, bedouin and Turkish tribesmen had joined his march and augmented his numbers. Before his tents were pitched, “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 77. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 91. 20 For the mid May to early July period, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 136–46; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 47–48; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 91; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 77; Tyerman, God’s War, 404–5; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 19; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 285–86, Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 125–26. 18 19

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he ordered his troops to storm the walls. Taking the defenders by surprise, the city quickly fell. The soldiers, joined by servants who had been setting up the camp, ran through the streets of Tartus, grabbing money, supplies, and prisoners. The victory, though, was not complete. Two fortified towers remained. Muzaffar al-Din’s men effectively stormed one, captured its garrison, and then dismantled the structure. The second tower, a Templar bastion, was made of dressed stone and surrounded by a moat. Despite energetic assaults, it withstood the Ayyubid army. Indeed, the Templar crossbowmen inflicted many casualties. Saladin ordered the Muslims to stand down and then directed his men to destroy the town’s walls. Because of the sustained Templar resistance, he commanded his men to burn the town’s palaces, markets, and homes. The remaining tower had little left to guard.21 On July 11, 1188, Saladin resumed his march north and alZahir and his troops joined the campaign at his father’s orders. Saladin decided to bypass the Hospitaler fortress at Marqab (Margat), but bowmen aboard the Sicilian fleet under Admiral Margaritus harassed his men as they traveled on a narrow seaside road below it. In response, the Muslim archers filled the air with arrows, forcing the ships to distance themselves from the shore and the army safely marched on. While Saladin was in the Tripoli region in June, the qadi of Jabala, a town 75 miles north of the city, visited him. The cleric urged Saladin to ride to the largely Muslim town where he promised it would be his without a fight. On July 15, he peacefully delivered it to the Ayyubids. The Frankish citadel resisted, but after a symbolic assault on July 16, the garrison asked for quarter. The soldiers and their families were allowed to leave, but without their stores, arms, or horses. Because Jabala had surrendered as promised, it was not pillaged. In the middle of July, an Ayyubid regiment approached the fortress of Bikisrail. Its governor had

For the capture of Tartus, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 48; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 126–27; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 82–83; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 287; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 246. 21

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heard the news from Jabala and asked for and was granted the same terms. Saladin’s next target was Latakia, 15 miles north of Jabala. The pleasant town with a handsome port did not have a wall, but even though Saladin’s men erected a camp in front of it on July 21, it did not readily capitulate. Accordingly, his troops continuously assaulted the town during the remainder of the day, finally taking it before nightfall. Two forts remained. On July 22, after sappers mined their walls, the two sides directly engaged and even hurled stones at one another. The Frankish garrison recognized its desperate situation and asked the Jabala qadi to arrange terms, which he did on July 23. The Crusaders were allowed to leave with their wives and children and their personal possessions. The Muslims took their grain stores, weapons, and horses. Due to the stout resistance, Saladin let his soldiers pillage the town, much to the regret of Imad al-Din al-Isfahani who admired its quality marble, and excellent palaces and houses, many of which had splendid gardens. After the port fell, the Sicilian fleet arrived. Realizing he could not do anything militarily, the admiral sought an interview with Saladin. He asked him to spare the Franks, but also informed him that if he did not, the kings of Europe would advance on him. This was not the first time Saladin had heard of a potential new Crusade. Embassies from Constantinople had brought such news in 1188 and his spy in Antioch may have sent him similar intelligence. In addition, his sources in Egypt and Morocco sent him dispatches in early 1189 with the same message, although the Crusaders’ target, Egypt or the Holy Land, was unclear. In the context of his conversation with the admiral, he played the role of the superior leader and dismissed the warning.22

For the operations around Marqab, Jabala, Bikisrail, and Latakia, see: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 127–29; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 146– 151; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 83–84; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 10, 48–51; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 287–88, 293; LanePoole, Saladin, 246. 22

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During the last week of July and the month of August, Saladin vigorously prosecuted his campaign in northwestern Syria. He left Latakia on July 24, 1188. Two days later, his men presented themselves before the Sahyun fortress. On the following day, he invested it from all sides and activated six catapults. Ibn Shaddad, an eyewitness to the battle, reports: [Sahyun] is a well-fortified and strong castle on the spur of a hill. Awful, wide and deep valleys serve as moats and on one side only does it have an excavated moat… dug out of rock. It has three walls, a wall around its bailey, a wall round the castle and the wall of the keep… From all sides the [Muslim] assault was fierce and the trebuchet of his son, al-Zahir, the lord of Aleppo, hurled its missiles against the castle… [Al-Zahir] set up a trebuchet to attack Sahyun opposite an angle of its wall across the valley. The stones were on target and he kept up the blows until he had demolished a large section of the wall, through which it was possible for those scaling the wall to gain access… On July 29, the sultan decided on a general assault… Within an hour the Muslims had scaled the walls of the bailey. The fight was hard, the struggle great and the Muslims broke into the bailey… I was watching our men seize the cooking pots, in which food had just been prepared, and eat while battling against the castle… Our soldiers surrounded the castle walls and the enemy, when they stared destruction in the face, sought relief by asking for terms.23

Saladin allowed them to leave with their personal possessions, but made them pay ransom as he had in Jerusalem. At the conclusion of the Sahyun conquest, Saladin dispatched some units to capture minor satellite forts in the vicinity. They found Balatunus devoid of Franks and placed it under Ayyubid control. Aidho (Idhu) and Jamahariya were also quickly secured. Of the three fortresses, Balatunus was geographically important. In the hands of Saladin, the road it commanded facilitated communications within his newly acquired territories. Saladin had to be careful, however, because a portion of the road was adjacent 23

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 84–85.

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to Assassins’ lands and close to their fortress at Masyaf. The Ayyubid leader doubtlessly did not want to accidentally create another front with a difficult foe who had attempted to assassinate him on more than one occasion. On August 2, he moved to the twin castles of Bakas (Bukas) and al-Shughr on the Orontes River. He found Bakas evacuated and secured it.24 Saladin set up his catapults to break down the walls of al-Shughr, a fort that was considered very strong and difficult to capture. Prepared for a long siege, the Ayyubids were surprised when, after a brief assault with mangonels, the garrison suddenly asked for quarter on August 9. The Franks requested a three-day truce so they could contact their superiors in Antioch. Permission to surrender was received and Saladin’s men raised his banner over the walls on August 12, 1188. The following day, Saladin sent al-Zahir to Sarmaniya (Sarmin), some seven miles from al-Shughr. After a five-day battle, he captured the fortress for his father on August 19. The chroniclers note with reverence and pride that Saladin had conquered the Frankish strongholds, from Jabala to Sarmaniya, on Fridays. This was a positive sign that prayers were answered, that the Ayyubid commander enjoyed good fortune, and that “… God enabled him to achieve these victories on the day during which the reward of good deeds is multiplied. These are rare victories on successive Fridays, unparalleled in history.”25 Saladin’s next destination, Burzey (Barzuya), next to Afamiya on the Orontes River, was famous in both Muslim and Crusader lore. Located atop a mountain with very steep slopes, it was considered impregnable. Saladin’s men established their camp on August 20 and the following day he commenced his attack with catapults from all directions. The defenders had their own trebuchets. Under the command of a woman officer, a relatively rare phenomenon, they were aimed so accurately that Saladin decided to abandon the battering and attempt a direct assault on Ibn Shaddad states that Saladin had to fight for Bakas, but other chroniclers say the Franks had left the stronghold. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 85. 25 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 85–86. 24

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August 23. To exert continuous pressure, he divided his men into three groups that attacked in wave after wave, one unit replacing the other to allow his troopers to rest. Imad al-Din Zangi led the first wave, Saladin the second, and an unnamed commander, most likely Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi, the third. Outnumbered, the Frankish garrison asked for quarter, but only after the Muslims had secured Burzey’s walls and captured the garrison as well as many families who had taken refuge in the much-vaunted fortress. Saladin’s men reveled in the rich plunder and enslaved many soldiers and civilians. After the battle, the governor, a Frankish baron, was brought to Saladin, who freed him and his family— 17 people—and had them escorted to Antioch. This release of the selected Franks, though, involved a more complex relationship, because the Lady of Burzey, the wife of the governor, was the sister of Princess Sibylla, the wife of Prince Bohemond III of Antioch, who was supplying Saladin with intelligence on Frankish troop movements.26 After Burzey, Saladin rode north to the vicinity of Antioch. He stopped at the Iron Bridge, about 17 miles from its walls to let his men rest and take the measure of the great city. He surveyed its strong defenses, but also calculated the pluses and minuses of the different options before him. Capturing Antioch would eliminate the major Frankish presence in northern Syria and help block the land route to the Holy Land via Anatolia. However, such a military endeavor would most probably entail a long siege. He knew his iqta army, which was already replete with booty, wanted to go home and, consequently, would be reluctant to remain in the campaign. His alternative was to capture the remaining Crusader fortresses to the north of Antioch, whereby he would deny the city its hinterland and block the pass that links Anatolia to Syria. Saladin chose the second option. He advanced on Darbsak, arriving in front of it on September 2, 1188. This Templar fortress guarded the Beylan For the campaign from Sahyun to Burzey, see: Ibn al-Athir, AlKamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 51–56; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 151–59; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 84–86; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 129– 132; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 288–89; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 246–47. 26

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Pass, the gate to Anatolia. The Templars stoutly defended their fort. Once Saladin opened a hole in its walls with his catapults, their fighters blocked it. “They defended it with fighting men, who stood in the breach to hold it against those who tried to climb through it. I [Ibn Shaddad] saw them myself. Whenever one was killed, another took his place. They stood like a replacement wall, with no cover.”27 Eventually, Saladin’s large force overwhelmed the garrison and, on September 16, the commander asked for quarter. Saladin allowed them to take their personal baggage, but not their grain supplies, weapons, and horses. The Templars were famous for their substantial repositories full of gold and coins. Despite their reluctance to part with their treasure, Saladin forced them to transfer their rich coffers to his command. The Muslim army then moved to Baghras, which also guarded the Beylan Pass, but was in sight of Antioch’s fortifications. After a vigorous fight on both sides, this fortress also fell and the garrison requested and received terms. The Muslim soldiers raised the Ayyubid banner on September 26. Bohemond of Antioch saw his outposts fall, one after the other. After Baghras, Saladin’s next logical objective would be his city. As the soldiers were pillaging and celebrating their victory, Saladin received a message from the prince stating that he wanted to negotiate. Knowing that many of the Ayyubid troops were anxious to depart, especially those under Imad al-Din Zangi who was quite manifest in his desire to return to Sinjar, Saladin accepted the proposed treaty. Under the agreement, Bohemond would release all Muslim prisoners he held, a clause that was popular among Saladin’s men. Furthermore, another clause stated that if no reinforcements arrived in Antioch during the ensuing seven months, the city would capitulate to the Muslims. There is doubt about how serious this provision was. If Saladin wanted to secure Antioch, he most likely would have had to fight for it. The accord took effect on October 1, 1188. During the three-month campaign, Saladin had severely reduced Frankish presence in northern Syria. He had captured 14 forts, leaving only Marqab, one tower at Tartus, and Antioch. 27

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 87.

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Further south, Tripoli and its ancillary strongholds as well as Crac des Chevaliers still stood. As was his general strategy, he denied the countryside to the Franks and secured one more flank in full knowledge his newly acquired territories would help him when the European Crusaders came anew. Conceivably, he could have taken the opposite strategy and attempted to capture Antioch and Tripoli, but that choice would have left him exposed to a strong Frankish presence in the interior. He had made his own strategic decision, but not without disappointment on the part of some of his advisors who had pushed for an extended military effort irrespective of the reality of restive amirs and troops who wanted to return to their homes. During the course of the campaign and his journey back to Damascus, Saladin assigned his conquests as iqtas to his military leaders. Interestingly, of these, he only gave two places—Jabala and Latakia—to one of his relatives, Taqi al-Din. The others were distributed to his second tier supporters, which undoubtedly help solidify Saladin’s base. He gave Bikisrail to Sabiq al-Din Uthman of the Banu al-Daya of Aleppo; Sahyun to Mankurus ibn Khumartekin of the Bu Qubais from northern Syria; al-Shughr and Bakas to Gharas al-Din Qilij, one of Shirkuh’s men; Burzey to the son of the late Ibn al-Muqaddam, Saladin’s loyal partisan from Damascus; and Darbsak and Baghras to Alam al-Din Ibrahim Sulaiman ibn Jandar of the Aleppo region. With the exception of Izz al-Din Ibrahim, Ibn al-Muqaddam’s son, all were from the northern Syria region.28 When the army arrived at Aleppo, al-Zahir feted Saladin, the amirs, and many soldiers. Aside from the excellent Aleppan cuisine, he gave everyone generous presents, to the extent that Saladin worried that his son was being too generous. After staying three days, Saladin rode south on October 8. Imad al-Din Zangi led his men east. At Hama, Taqi al-Din met Saladin on the road and

For the distribution of iqtas, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 87, 88; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 291. 28

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insisted that he enjoy one more feast, this time in his city. The Ayyubid commander finally arrived in Damascus on October 24.29 Ramadan started on October 28 in 1188. Typically, families celebrate the holy month together. Saladin, however, wanted to continue prosecuting the holy war; specifically he focused on eliminating the last Frankish strong points in the Palestine and Transjordan countryside. Thus, a few days after the beginning of the month, he rode to the Galilee to address Safad, Belvoir, and Beaufort. With him were his personal guard and specialized catapult and sapper units. Despite the cold and rain, he invested the Safad fortress, well defended because of its location on a hill surrounded by steep ravines, and set up mangonels in early November. Safad was already short of food and supplies because Saladin had left a blocking force in the spring of 1188. His men hurled missiles at Safad until November 30 when the garrison commander realized he would eventually have to capitulate. He sent his Muslim prisoners to ask for terms, which Saladin granted. On December 6, Saladin received the fort and his cavalry escorted the Franks to Tyre. Saladin then turned to Belvoir, which also was blocked and short of supplies. Despite the miserable weather conditions, he prosecuted the siege with mangonels and sappers. Although the Frankish soldiers put up a spirited defense and killed a number of Muslims who at times were exposed below Belvoir’s walls, they too ultimately concluded that defeat was inevitable. The tipping point came when Saladin’s sappers succeeded in digging a tunnel underneath Belvoir’s walls upon which the governor asked for terms. Saladin raised his banner over the fortress on January 5, 1189 as the Franks rode to Tyre under guard. Al-Adil had placed a blocking force around Karak in the fall of 1187, but the Frankish garrison proved as truculent and fanatical as its late leader, Reynald of Châtillon. Despite near starvation, the soldiers held out into late 1188. In an act of great dishonor, they For the campaign in the Antioch region, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 159–64; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 132–34; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 87–88; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 56–59; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 289–91; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 247–48. 29

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even sold their women-folk to the bedouin to buy food. After they had eaten all of their horses, they surrendered to al-Adil in late November 1188. When Saladin heard of the plight of the Frankish women, he ordered his men to find them in the bedouin camps, repurchase them, and return them to their defeated men. Once reunited, the group was escorted to Tyre. In southern Transjordan, al-Adil had maintained a loose block around the distant and isolated Shawbak. It fell in May 1189.30 With the capture of Safad, Belvoir, and Karak, Saladin capped his successful campaign in the summer and fall of 1188. In the interior of the Holy Land, only Beaufort just to the northwest of the Litani River, some minor strongpoints around Tripoli, and Crac des Chevaliers in northern Syria held out. Otherwise, Frankish presence was narrowly restricted along the coast. Even though he had not reduced the large Crusader ports, he had secured strategic depth and denied it to the Franks. After the fall of Belvoir, Saladin relaxed for almost four months. During January, al-Adil joined him in the Jordan Valley, pleasantly warm after weeks of cold, wet weather in the Galilee. After discussing matters of state and family and giving his troops permission to go home, the two men rode to Jerusalem. They arrived on January 27, performed the Friday prayers, and then on January 30 traveled to Ascalon. Al-Adil took his leave to go to Egypt, but not before his brother gave him Karak as an iqta in place of Ascalon. Saladin rode slowly up the coast, inspecting the various towns and ports. At Acre, he joined his son al-Afdal during February and March. After an Egyptian regiment arrived to guard Acre, Saladin rode to Damascus, arriving on March 21. He stayed at home for a month, enjoying his family as well as discussions in the mosques and law colleges. While he was in the city, he received For the details on the capture of Karak, see: Lane-Poole, Saladin, 249; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 2, 469–70; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 77–78; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 59. For the capture of Safad and Belvoir, see: Ibn al-Athir, AlKamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 59–61; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 166–70; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 135–37; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 291–93; LanePoole, Saladin, 248–50. 30

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a letter from Caliph al-Nasir ordering him to add the name of his son, Uda al-Din, to the khutba, which Saladin did.31 *** Almost two years of war in the Holy Land adversely impacted people’s lives. Heretofore, as Ibn Jubayr reported, commerce between Muslims and Franks was well regulated and common. Saladin’s government imposed a tax on Frankish merchants, as did the Crusader kingdom on Muslim traders—and commerce flowed. In addition, as long as rains were sufficient, peasants of the Holy Land produced ample grain, fruit, and livestock for their consumption and that of the cities.32 War disrupted this pattern. It is noteworthy that the casus belli that led to the battle of Hattin was Reynald of Châtillon’s seizure of a merchant caravan in violation of a Muslim-Crusader treaty, which inter alia regulated travel and trade. After the war started, travel within the Holy Land and to Egypt was not always safe. Upon occasion, traders and travelers lost their goods and money to brigands. Disruption, which frequently follows war, had not yet given way to a new stability under Ayyubid rule—indeed, a rule that should be termed military occupation in some areas. Likewise, roving armed groups pillaged villages, severely harming or, at times, devastating their local economies. On a different level, keeping large numbers of soldiers in the field for extended periods taxed the treasuries of Egypt, Damascus, Aleppo, and Mosul. Chroniclers reported shortages where there were usually adequate funds. In 1188, an old adversary raised its head in Cairo. Twelve men marched through the streets, shouting Fatimid slogans. The authorities promptly arrested and incarcerated them. Even though this event was singular and not repeated, it showed that old loyalties and enmities still existed. Al-Adil’s strong and steady hand usually kept such tendencies in check, but he had been with Saladin in the Holy Land for many months during 1187–1188. After capturing Karak and conferring with Saladin, he returned to Cairo For spring 1189, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 181–83; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 89–90; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 292–93. 32 Ibn Jubayr, Travels of Ibn Jubayr, 300–1, 313. 31

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in early 1189. To provide an extra pair of experienced eyes, Qadi alFadil, who had also been with Saladin for the past several months, returned with him.33 *** Saladin stayed in Damascus for a month. After ordering a very limited muster, on April 21, 1189 he rode in the direction of Banyas to await the arrival of his troops. Earlier in the spring, he had indicated in a letter to Caliph al-Nasir that he intended to address the large Frankish cities in the north, Tripoli and Antioch. However, because he gathered his men south of Damascus, it became obvious that his concern was with Tyre as well as the grand fortress of Beaufort, the last remaining inland Crusader fortress south of Tripoli and Crac des Chevaliers. In the spring, Saladin had received intelligence about new reinforcements in Tyre and reports that Guy of Lusignan and Conrad of Montferrat had reached an understanding.34 Thus, rather than focus on the north, he decided to remain in northern Palestine and south Lebanon where a new threat might arise. By early May, his cavalry and siege units had joined him whereupon he moved to Marj Uyun, just a short distance from Beaufort and accessible to the hills overlooking Tyre and the road from Tyre at Acre. As he reached Marj Uyun, Reynald of Sidon, the lord of Beaufort who had escaped capture at Hattin, appeared before Saladin’s tent and requested an audience. In his conversation with the Ayyubid leader and his colleagues, he impressed them with his fluent Arabic and knowledge of Arab customs and Islam. After the standard introductory niceties, he made a proposition. He would be pleased to surrender his castle to Saladin, move to Damascus, and attend the Ayyubid court. He asked for a suitable house and an iqta to maintain his family. His only stipulation was that this would For the economic problems, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 62; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 292–94. 34 Although Saladin had received intelligence about a Conrad-Guy reconciliation, the information was incorrect. They did reach an understanding of sorts in the spring of 1190, but it fell apart within six months. 33

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occur after three months so that he could arrange to bring his family from Tyre and collect revenues from his agricultural land. This suited Saladin and the proposal was accepted, provided Reynald undertook no new construction at Beaufort. Handover would occur on August 13, 1189. In the ensuing weeks, Reynald frequented Saladin’s camp and engaged him in theological discussions, which both men enjoyed. During the three-month period, the Franks began probing Muslim positions. On July 3, a band of Crusaders crossed the Litani River in the direction of Sidon. Muslim pickets stationed in the area met the soldiers and drove them back, but not without the loss of one of their amirs. Saladin and his cavalry immediately rode to the area. Bedouin irregulars and other volunteers attached themselves to his force. Two days later, Saladin rode towards the Litani to reconnoiter the Frankish position. The irregulars, who lacked the discipline and experience of Saladin’s regiments, thought he was going to attack. Without orders, they charged across the river. Before Saladin’s men could recall them, the Franks, who had superior numbers and skill, met them. After a sharp but disorganized battle, the Crusaders prevailed. About 180 irregulars died. The Franks suffered minor losses, but the number is unknown. On July 13, Saladin marched in force across the Litani, but found the camp abandoned. After the Litani battles, Saladin traveled to Acre to survey its defenses and ordered his men to complete unfinished construction. He was concerned about the increasing enemy strength and their intentions. In mid July, Saladin’s pickets reported that Franks were gathering firewood under army protection near Tibnin, east of Tyre. Saladin devised a plan to take on the guard. On July 24, he ordered his men in Tibnin to advance on the Frankish unit and then retreat in the direction of Saladin’s much larger force, giving Saladin the opportunity to attack and defeat the Frankish battalion. Saladin’s men at Tibnin, however, disobeyed the order. When they saw the Frankish soldiers, they galloped towards them and engaged. Because he did not see the Franks pursuing his men from Tibnin in a timely manner, Saladin sent his men forward. When they heard the cavalry coming over the hills, the Franks retreated to Tyre. In comparison to other battles, casualties were not great. The

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Franks lost ten men and the Muslims six of whom four were bedouin. After these confused, ill-directed, and ill-disciplined engagements, Saladin returned to Marj Uyun on July 26. The threemonth period would lapse shortly and he wanted to take possession of Beaufort. Two days later, he moved to a field near the fortress. As usual, he received Reynald of Sidon, but was surprised and troubled when he requested a nine-month extension to deliver his fortress. Suspecting perfidy, “Saladin charged him directly, saying ‘You have plotted treachery, completed new construction in the place and brought stores.’ [Reynald] denied this.”35 He then confined him to the camp. On the day of the transfer, a large delegation of Saladin’s men accompanied Reynald to Beaufort. At the gate, he told the Muslims he was asking for the surrender, but speaking in his own language he ordered his men to resist, which they did. Saladin’s men also saw that the Franks had strengthened the fort’s gate. Saladin was furious at Reynald’s breach of his word. He placed the Frankish baron in chains and had him taken to a dungeon in Banyas. On August 20, he was brought again, threatened, but once more Beaufort’s garrison did not yield.36 Saladin then dispatched Reynald to prison in Damascus where he held other Crusader grandees. He would not see freedom until April 1190, when, after a diplomatic exchange, Saladin traded him for Beaufort. Reynald then joined the Crusaders on the coast and the Muslims gained the great fortress and manned its walls. On August 22, 1189, Saladin moved to a hill near Beaufort and ordered his men to initiate a full siege. On this day, though, he heard that Frankish troops were moving in the direction of Acre. On August 26, he received a full report that they were marching in force. He immediately wrote to all of his lieutenants throughout the empire, calling for a general muster. On the following day, he lifted the Beaufort siege, but left a blocking unit. Riding to Acre, he knew Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 95. The author of “The Continuation” claims that Reynald was tortured, a claim that is confirmed by Ibn Shaddad. See: “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 72; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 97, 108. 35 36

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that the predicted new Crusade had begun and that he faced an extremely difficult challenge. For Saladin, the first half of 1189 was not fruitful. After resting in the early months, his attempt to take Beaufort failed and the skirmishes close to the coast were not glorious. This was in great contrast to 1188 when he reduced many Frankish strongholds in the north and the grand castles at Safad, Belvoir, and Karak. And now in the second half of the year, due to Frankish resurgence, he would be forced to engage in a defensive war, a type of war that his coalition army did not like to fight, because it would not bring new territory or booty.37

For the April-August 1189 period, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 176– 181; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 65–68; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 90–97; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 139–42; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 70–73; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 60; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 22–23; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 295–99; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 254–57; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 20–21. 37

CHAPTER ELEVEN THE CRUSADERS RESPOND: 1189–1191 For the two years following the Battle of Hattin, the Crusaders sought to retain their presence along the Mediterranean littoral, but they also started preparing to move forcefully against Saladin. In the summer of 1189, King Guy and his supporters took action. He gathered troops and laid siege to Acre. During the next two years, wave after wave of men and supplies came from Europe, strengthening Guy’s meager force. In like manner, Saladin summoned his regiments from his far-flung empire. The result was a two-year stalemate, punctuated by frequent skirmishes and occasional major battles with high casualties, especially on the Frankish side. The besieged Muslims in Acre suffered from severe shortages, as did the Crusader army, which Saladin had in turn blocked with his army. The Ayyubid also had to devote considerable energy and political capital to keep his coalition army in the field. This pattern was not broken until Kings Philip and Richard arrived in the spring and summer of 1191.

ACRE BESIEGED: 1189–1190 After Saladin released King Guy of Lusignan in early July 1188, he joined his wife Queen Sibylla in Tripoli. Guy’s first order of business was to re-establish his leadership position among his relatives and supporters in both Tripoli and Antioch. His brother Geoffrey of Lusignan, one of King Richard’s senior vassals who had recently arrived in the Holy Land, joined him in this effort. In early fall, the king, Sibylla, and some companions rode to Tyre to reclaim the last remnant of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Conrad of Montserrat, the strong Tyrian leader, closed the city gate in his face. In Conrad’s mind and politics, the absent Guy had forfeited the throne. Conrad claimed that he held the city in trust until the 283

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European kings arrived and determined its disposition. Feudal and consanguine ties also came into play. The Lusignans were in the English king’s circle, while the Montserrats were cousins and friends of Emperor Frederick and King Philip. The rejected Guy retreated to Tripoli, but in early spring 1189, he returned to Tyre with a military force. With him were Queen Sibylla, his brother Geoffrey, the Templar Master Gerard of Ridfort, and other barons. Once again, he presented himself, but the gate remained shut. Conrad rejected him as he had in 1188. Political and military considerations, though, had evolved. In 1188, Guy had only a few followers, but by spring 1189, he had been able to assemble a military force and it continued to attract adherents. On April 16, a Pisan fleet of 52 ships arrived under the command of Archbishop Ubaldo. Ubaldo and Conrad quickly fell into a raucous disagreement about Pisans’ rights to their traditional quarter in Tyre after which the archbishop placed his military assets at the king’s disposal. Guy also persuaded King William of Sicily’s knights, who had had a falling out with Conrad, to join his project. The Templar knights under Gerard were already in his camp, but, as usual, the Hospitalers supported the other side. During the spring and summer, couriers and diplomats were bringing news that Frankish military parties planned to sail in 1189 well before the kings would arrive with their armies. Thus, another major factor in Guy’s calculations was the sure knowledge that substantial reinforcements from Europe would arrive shortly. The question before Guy, then, was: What should he do next? While friction with Conrad was acute, he was not contemplating civil war, or at least there is no public record of such thinking. Should he try to capture Acre, the major port city the Muslims took in 1187? Guy and his entourage knew that it was stoutly defended with a capable garrison and strengthened walls. He also clearly knew that once he attacked, Saladin, who was in the neighborhood in front of Beaufort, would muster his battalions from his great empire. Nevertheless, his war council advised him to take action. “Geoffrey, his brother, told him that the emperor of Germany and the kings of France and England and plenty of other barons had taken the cross and would soon be arriving. ‘It is much better that they should find

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that you have besieged a city than that you have been idle.’”1 To this end, the assembled lords pledged to support him.2 Muslim pickets saw Guy’s army marching south on August 22, 1189. They immediately informed Saladin. Initially, he was not certain of the Franks’ intentions: to capture Acre or a feint to draw him away from Beaufort. He and his amirs debated the options: Ride at once and attack as Guy moved south; wait for confirmation of the Crusaders’ target; or, catch up with the Franks at Acre so the Muslims could attack from both the city walls and the hills, forcing the enemy to fight a two-front war. Chroniclers record that Saladin favored the first option, but, at the urging of his amirs, he accepted the second and third options. On August 26, his men confirmed that Guy had almost reached Acre. Rather than cross the hills and then essentially follow the Crusaders, Saladin led his men via the easier route. He rode by Huleh and the Sea of Galilee after which he passed the Hattin battlefield. He arrived outside Acre on August 29 and camped at al-Kharruba, close to the town of Shafaram (also, Shefa Amer), from which he could easily observe Acre. King Guy reached Acre on August 28 and established his fortified camp at Tell Toron (also referred to as Tell al-Musallabin and Tell al-Fukhkhar). At this time, his army was modest in size, likely just a few hundred knights and a few thousand foot soldiers.3 “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 80. Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 18–19; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 20–22; Tyerman, God’s War, 406–09. 3 From the sources, the size of Guy’s army in late August is unclear. “The Continuation” implies that it was relatively small: “… so few dared to undertake so great a deed as laying siege to Acre…” However, this chronicler also states that Guy had 600 knights in his service when he was still in front of Tyre. “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 80–81. Tyerman records that “…Guy had amassed the core of a useful fighting force of a few hundred knights, some thousands of infantry and the Pisan fleet.” Tyerman, God’s War, 409. Lyons and Jackson state that Guy had 400 knights and 7,000 infantry. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 298. Lyons and Jackson’s numbers are from a German translation of “The Continuation.” William of Tyre: Die Lateinische Fortsetzung Wilhelms von Tyrus, 113. 1 2

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Knowing that Saladin was approaching, Guy decided that his artillery units would not have sufficient time to weaken Acre’s stone walls with catapults. Thus, in a bold move, he ordered his men to immediately assault the port city. According to Frankish sources, the attack was achieving success, but once the soldiers heard that Saladin would arrive later that day, they retreated to the protection of their camp. For the next two weeks, the Franks fortified their tent city, building ramparts and digging ditches. In addition, significant reinforcements joined them. In early September, Frisians and Danes in 50 cogs, large ships capable of transporting 100 men plus supplies, under the command of Danish lords arrived. In the middle of the month, an even larger fleet from Germany landed and offloaded its military units, war materials, and foodstuffs. They had traveled in 60 ships, including some very large busses that could transport 150 men. En route to the Holy Land, the naval force pillaged the Muslim port of Albuferia in Algarve, a region in southwestern Iberia, after which a few ships, sated with booty, returned to their home port of Cologne. The second half of September proved to be even more bountiful. James of Avesnes led a Flemish and northern French flotilla that brought knights, foot soldiers, animals, and supplies. A colleague and friend of the French and English kings and considered to be a wise and strong leader, James quickly assumed command of the western Franks facing Acre. Guy also welcomed numerous barons, knights, and common soldiers from France, Italy, and Sicily. Among the nobles was Louis III of Thuringia at the head of a battalion from Germany and Italy. Louis first stopped at Tyre where he persuaded Conrad of Montferrat to bring his knights to Acre with the stipulation that he would function outside of Guy’s authority. Louis joined James as coleader of the Crusaders newly arrived from Europe.4 Ibn Shaddad estimates that in September, the Frankish host totaled 2,000 mounted men or knights and 30,000-foot For the details on the reinforcements, Tyerman is especially helpful. Tyerman, God’s War, 411–13. Also see: Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 24–25; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 23–24; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 81–82. 4

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soldiers.5 A Crusader source states that 12,000 men arrived from Europe in the fall of 1189.6 Added to the few thousand Guy had in August and the substantial force that Conrad eventually brought from Tyre, Ibn Shaddad’s estimate is credible, or just modestly exaggerated. After he arrived at al-Kharruba, Saladin promptly established land contact with Acre by which he was able to send men and supplies to the besieged city. During the following fortnight, the lords of his empire began arriving. Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi from Harran and Taqi al-Din from Homs rode in first with their battalions; units from Mosul, Sinjar, and Diyar Bakr shortly joined them. Many of these men had been with Saladin in northern Syria as well as at Hattin and Jerusalem. The Ayyubid army in September, however, was not yet a full muster. Some Egyptian and Syrian regiments were not present. While formidable, Saladin’s numbers were not equal to those of the Franks. As his army grew, Saladin moved his lines closer to the expanding Crusader encampment. As usual, he took charge of the center, at this time at Tell Kaisan; the right wing was at Tell alAyyadiya under Taqi al-Din, and the left wing stretched to the River Naman (also Belus and Sweet—Naman means sweet in Arabic), most likely under Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi. The Ayyubid force was about 2–3 miles from the Crusader army. Having grown in strength, the Franks tightened their siege of the city and blocked Muslim access to it. Saladin had hoped the Franks would emerge from their tents and appear before him so he could lead another battle in open fields. Guy, James, and Louis avoided that option, remained in their camp, and concentrated of Acre’s walls. After meeting with his war council, Saladin decided on a general assault on the enemy position. On the first day of the battle, September 15, 1189, despite violent forays on the part of both parties, neither side gained an advantage. On the following day, the intense attacks continued, some of which were on foot in front of the Crusader embattlements. In the early hours, Saladin dispatched Taqi al-Din to the north of Acre and to the west of Tell 5 6

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 97. Chronicle of the Third Crusade, 74.

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al-Ayyadiya. There, Taqi al-Din found only a light Crusader guard and was able to re-establish direct contact with Acre through St. Anthony’s Gate. Saladin took the opportunity to visit the city and view the Crusader camp from the city walls. Under the protection of Muslim guards, merchants and city folk were able to come and go, bolstering the spirits of the beleaguered Acrians. Having successfully opened the route to Acre, the Muslim troops took their rest and watered their horses. After the sustained clashes, they complained of fatigue and openly said they did not want to re-engage the enemy that day. Also, the units that had been ordered to fight on foot, were grumbling. They were proud cavalrymen who greatly preferred shooting arrows and wielding sword and mace from the back of agile horses to slogging back and forth in boots. Even though Saladin was ill and under the care of his doctors, he directed his men to continue exerting pressure against the Franks, but in more limited engagements to accommodate the complaints. For the next eight days, in daylight and at night, soldiers engaged in heavy skirmishes. On September 22, the Crusaders made a broad sally on horse and foot. They advanced on the hills and came close to the Ayyubid tents. Aware of the approach, the Muslims rallied and drove them back to the safety of their own camp, inflicting significant casualties. On September 24, Saladin shifted his lines forward, but returned to his earlier bivouac at Tell al-Ayyadiya at the end of the month. Despite the heavy fighting, some opposing soldiers “… got to know one another, in that both sides would converse and leave off fighting. At times some people would sing and others dance, so familiar had they become over time, and then after a while they would revert to fighting.”7 The fanatics on both sides, not understanding the fraternization or countenancing it, denounced it in harsh terms. During this period of sustained clashes, European Franks continued to pour in men and materials. Imad al-Din al-Isfahani writes that their numbers reached 100,000. This is surely an exaggeration and does not accord with Ibn Shaddad’s estimate of

7

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 100–01.

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32,000. Nevertheless, they had gained strength and were preparing new military operations for October.8 Having gained reinforcements, but also feeling very pressed by Saladin’s close siege, the Crusader command decided on a major assault against Saladin’s front. Notably, according to “The Continuation,” Saladin’s constant pressure prevented adequate Frankish resupply, “… with the result that their food ran out. Hunger so afflicted the common people in the army that they could no longer bear the suffering.”9 On October 3, 1189, the lords organized the battalions with the Templar Master Gerard in charge of the left wing or vanguard and Count Andrew of Brienne of the right wing or rearguard. King Guy was in the center, while his brother commanded the garrison that remained in the encampment. Once Saladin and his officers saw that the Frankish army was preparing to advance, the Ayyubid army rapidly spread out to meet it. Saladin, his sons al-Afdal and al-Zahir, and noted amirs directed the center. Taqi al-Din was on the far right, overlooking the sea. Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi, the Kurd amir Saif al-Din al-Mashtub, and other amirs held the left wing. The Muslim lines opposing the Crusaders stretched over five miles. The first move was by the Frankish left, which outnumbered Taqi al-Din’s Muslim right. Hoping to draw the enemy away from the larger Frankish force, Taqi al-Din sent skirmishers forward after which they were directed to withdraw. The feint did not work. The Franks did not pursue his retreating men. However, perhaps because of the distance and unclear signals, Saladin thought Taqi al-Din’s battalions were in trouble. Accordingly, he detached some of his units and dispatched them to the Muslim right wing, weakening his center. Observing the thinned out Muslim center, the Franks attacked with success. Fortunately for the Crusaders, For the period from mid August through September 1189, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 69–72; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 142–44; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 183–90; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 96–101; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 80– 82; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 257–61; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 220–25; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 20–24. 9 “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 82. 8

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they faced inexperienced cavalry battalions from Diyar Bakr under the command of Qutb al-Din Suqman, the 15-year old leader of the historic city. They along with neighboring units quickly broke and fled the field. Many rode as far as Tiberius or even Damascus to escape the battle. Some eventually returned to the Ayyubid camp, but others deserted and disappeared. At this hour, the Franks prevailed in the center. Andrew of Brienne even reached Saladin’s tent on Tell al-Ayyadiya where his men killed three aides. Andrew, though, finally realized that he had advanced well beyond other Frankish units. His men could clearly see that the Muslim left was fully in tact. Thus, they quickly reversed direction and started riding back to the Frankish lines. Saladin, meanwhile, salvaged the center. Only the Diyar Bakris and a few other cavalry groups had fled. At the foot of the tell, he reorganized his men. As the Franks started to gallop around them, his men wanted to charge at once, but Saladin held them back until they passed. Using their fleet steeds, they attacked the retreating Franks, knocking several from their mounts. The men in the main Crusader line saw their retreating brothers. Thinking they were witnessing a major rout, the Frankish lines collapsed and the soldiers ran towards their camp in confusion. Now his right and left wings joined Saladin’s center. Taqi al-Din along with Husam alDin, the grandson of the Shirkuh and commander of Nablus, fully joined the battle, as did Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi and al-Mashtub. Ibn Shaddad describes the feel and drama of what followed. “God gave the lie to the Devil and brought victory to the faith. On and on went the killing, the overthrowing, striking and wounding until the fugitives that survived reached the enemy camp.”10 Geoffrey of Lusignan performed a double service for his brother Guy. As the army marched against Saladin early that day, the Muslim garrison at Acre emerged from the city gates and assaulted the enemy camp. Geoffrey stoutly defended the ramparts, forcing the Muslims back to the city. Later, as the Muslim forces pursuing the routed Franks reached the camp, Geoffrey and his reserves stood firmly on the breastworks and in front of them. The Muslims, tired after a long day of battle, decided to wait until the 10

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 103.

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following morning to confront them. With a note of irony, King Guy personally saved the life of Conrad, his nemesis from Tyre. The carnage was great. Depending on the source, the Crusaders lost 7,000 or 10,000 men.11 After the fighting, Saladin ordered his crews to load the bodies on carts and throw them in the local river, a form of biological warfare. “The Continuation” records that the “Saracens killed so many that the river ran with blood.”12 Among the dead were the Templar Gerard of Ridfort and Count Andrew of Brienne, the very lord who reached Saladin’s tent, and many knights. The Muslims also captured numerous prisoners including three women in full armor. The Ayyubid army suffered casualties, but seemingly in the hundreds or perhaps a thousand, both line cavalrymen and a few amirs. It lost more men to desertion than to Frankish swords. At the end of the battle, the Muslims rode back to their encampment only to find their baggage missing, especially the possessions of troops who had manned the center. Earlier, when the pages and grooms saw the flight of the cavalry regiments, they wrongly concluded that the army was defeated. They joined the camp followers, grabbed the baggage as if it were their booty, and proceeded to take it away on pack animals. That evening, having discovered the theft, Saladin forthwith sent men in all directions to recoup it. He ordered the misappropriated goods—carpets, loaded bags, blankets, clothes, baskets, weapons and armor—to be stacked in front of his tent. The pile was so high that seated soldiers could not see their colleagues on the other side. Saladin then asked all the pillaged to come and claim their possessions. The soldiers were so busy securing their effects the next day that Saladin could not organize another attack on the severely wounded Franks. However, because they were in the relative safety of their fortified tent city, direct assaults most likely would not have been efficacious and the Muslims assuredly would not have been able to entice the Crusaders into the open field.

Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 73; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 104. 12 “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 83. 11

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Saladin and the amirs wanted to draw away from the foul air surrounding the battlefield. In addition, Saladin was afflicted with colic again and his men persuaded him that a fresher environment would be better for his all-important health. On October 12, nine days after the battle, he ordered his logistics units to move the camp to al-Kharruba where he had briefly stayed in August. On the following day, while still at Tell al-Ayyadiya, he held a grand council with his relatives, amirs, and officers. The discussion echoed previous debates after a long stint of fighting. Saladin argued for sustained assaults and military pressure. He noted that the Frankish army was damaged. “‘He is left in small numbers and we must exert our efforts to root him out.’”13 In addition, he pointed out that only al-Adil’s battalions would augment the army and they were expected in a month. Afterwards, no more reinforcements were available. And in the spring, he said, the shipping season would start again and many additional Frankish flotillas would arrive. The amirs, though, had different viewpoints. They observed that their men had been fighting for 50 days; they were tired and their horses were saddle sore. They should withdraw to a healthier camp, restock supplies, and regroup the deserters. Once al-Adil arrived, Saladin and his barons should meet again and discuss the fundamental questions. Knowing the strains on his many soldiers and wanting to avoid discontent, Saladin accepted his council’s advice. He arranged for more supplies for Acre and ordered his men to firmly close the city gates and vigilantly patrol the walls. Saladin rode to al-Kharruba that evening and the army followed on October 16, leaving advanced pickets. The Franks, ever aggressive, filled the void with military activity. They strengthened their breastworks, deepened the moat around the camp, put in place mantelets to protect their soldiers from missiles from Acre’s walls or skirmishing Muslim cavalry, and constructed catapults. Moreover, they extended their lines to the sea, making Muslim access to the city very difficult. In November, they did lose the service of the 200–300 Sicilian knights because,

13

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 105.

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after the death of King William II in the fall, the Sicilian court recalled them to be at the ready as succession issues were settled.14 On October 14, 1189, while his army was moving to alKharruba, Saladin received a letter from his son al-Zahir in Aleppo. He reported that Emperor Frederick Barbarossa was marching towards Constantinople with an army of 200,000. The actual number, as recounted, was probably half that size, but still at least five times larger than the number Saladin could muster. Al-Zahir’s dispatch confirmed intelligence Saladin had received from Emperor Isaac in August 1189. The Ayyubid commander was very concerned. He foresaw that he would have to divide his army so that he could simultaneously defend Acre and oppose Frederick. To gather additional regiments for the two-front holy war, in late October he sent his secretary Ibn Shaddad to the East to impress on the lords the need for more cavalry with senior leadership. On his return to Palestine in April 1190, Ibn Shaddad reported to Saladin that the temporal leaders of the Ayyubid empire had said “‘To hear is to obey.’” And they indeed honored their promises. “Imad al-Din Zangi, lord of Sinjar, set out [in 1190] with his standing troops and his levies, as did his nephew Sanjar-Shah, lord of Jazirat Ibn Umar, leading his troops. The lord of Mosul, Izz alDin, sent his son, Ala al-Din Khurramshah, with most of his troops. The lord of Irbil marched in person with his army.”15 Ibn Shaddad’s mission to Baghdad was not successful. He received promises, but in the spring Caliph al-Nasir sent only loads of Greek fire and a promissory note for some modest funds. Saladin accepted the Greek fire and the five artificers, technicians who were expert in the use of the weapon, but declined the money order, which he may have considered to be an insult. He recalled For the October 3, 1189 battle and its aftermath, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 190–201; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 101–6; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 82–84; Ibn al-Athir, AlKamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 72–75; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 144–48; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 302–6; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 25–26; Tyerman, God’s War, 411; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 61–62; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 261–64; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 24–27. 15 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 106. 14

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that the Fatimid caliph had given him one million dinars as he prepared to defend Damietta against a Crusader assault.16 In late November, al-Adil arrived with a substantial force, including some Nubian units. In his baggage train, he brought a large supply of siege engines, spears, shields, and bows and arrows from Egyptian factories and workshops. Once again, the substantial Egyptian market and economy supported Saladin’s holy war. During October and November, Saladin had also augmented his forces with men and equipments from throughout Syria. He was now in a position to let troops who had been with him since August and September return to their homes. Accordingly, he gave leave to large units from Mosul, Sinjar, Diyar Bakr, and Harran. Saladin, al-Adil, al-Afdal, and Taqi al-Din stayed at al-Kharruba during the winter, despite the cold and rain. On December 26, even though the sailing season had closed, Admiral Lulu arrived with a fleet of 50 ships. Outside the harbor, he captured a Frankish ship and seized rich plunder to the delight of the people of Acre. Aside from the naval power, he brought military personnel: amirs and soldiers for the garrison and his sailors manned catapults and Greek fire operations. The Franks likewise received additional reinforcements and material by sea during the fall. During the winter and early spring of 1189–1190, the Franks and Muslims spent the days and weeks, sieged and besieged. Skirmishes were frequent, but as warriors came to know each other, so too was fraternization. Each side was trying to determine how to win or, at times, just survive. The Franks were counting on new flotillas that would bring knights, foot soldiers, animals, war supplies, and food. They especially needed the latter as hunger grew in the camp. Moreover, they awaited the three preeminent kings: Richard, Philip, and Frederick. For Saladin, the great challenge was how to secure sufficient resources to fight the expanding holy war. Not only had he sent Ibn Shaddad to the East to ask his senior vassals for more battalions, but also he wrote his brother Tughtakin in Yemen as well as Qyzyl-Arslan, the Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 306, 310; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 106, 110. 16

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independent and strong ruler of Azerbaijan, asking for troops for the war against the Crusaders. Eventually he would plead with the Almohades of North Africa, against whom Taqi al-Din sent small expeditionary forces in earlier years, for naval help. These distant Muslims—one a bother and the other potential or actual rivals or adversaries of the Ayyubids—did not respond with military help.17 *** In the spring, the sailing season restarted. The first arrival was a combined flotilla of 35 ships from Germany, Flanders, and England. They had departed their homeports in April and May of 1189 and rendezvoused at Lisbon where they contracted with the Portuguese king to capture the Muslim port of Silves in southwest Iberia. The defense was stout, but after seven weeks of hard fighting, the Crusaders overcame the Muslim garrison. This project delayed their voyage to the Holy Land. Rather then proceed to Acre, they set sail for the eastern Mediterranean where the mixed fleet wintered, most likely, at Marseilles. In the spring of 1190, the ships finally landed at Acre with 3,500 men, food, animals, and war material.18 At about the same time, despite a sharp clash with Saladin’s Acre based fleet, Conrad of Montferrat returned from his resupply voyage, further replenishing depleted Frankish stores. In March, the lord of Tyre had finally realized the strength of the new Crusade and King Guy’s role in its leadership. Accordingly, he and the king reached an understanding whereby Tyre would remain under his rule and when the Franks recaptured Beirut and Sidon, they would be assigned to him. For the period mid October 1189 through mid spring 1190, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 217–17; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 150–51; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 106, 108, 109; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 10, 74–77; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 121–22; Tyerman, God’s War, 414–15; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 306–8; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 26–27; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 28–32. 18 Runciman has the fleet arriving in fall 1189, but Tyerman with greater assuredness, states that it more likely reached Acre in spring 1190. Tyerman, God’s War, 413–14; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 26. 17

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In mid spring, still another fleet landed and, inter alia, delivered 300 prostitutes for the active brothel in the Crusader camp. Despite disapproval among some classes on both sides of the conflict, Muslim amirs and soldiers availed themselves of the services of the ladies. Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, in his verbose style, devotes two full pages of baroque prose to describe the activities in these special Frankish quarters.19 With the approach of spring, the fighting season started. One day in late March 1190, the Crusader command learned that Saladin had gone hunting far from his camp at al-Kharruba. Unbeknownst to the Muslims, they organized a major attack on the left wing of the Ayyubid blocking force. In the melee, both sides suffered casualties and the Muslims lost ground. When he heard of the attack, Saladin rode quickly to his front lines only to find the battle had ended. During April, Saladin took a number of steps to organize his men and empire for the broader war. He wrote to his lords and barons, urging them to accelerate their musters and join him in Palestine. He also shifted his camp from al-Kharruba to Tell Kaisan in mid April. On April 22, 1190, Beaufort finally fell, freeing up troops. On the following day, as recounted, the caliph’s envoy arrived with the supply of Greek fire and artificers. In the middle of the same month, Syrian cavalrymen from Homs and Shaizar marched into his camp along with bedouin and Turkoman irregulars. As was his usual practice, he assigned Taqi al-Din to the right wing, al-Adil to the left, and he directed the center. His sons, al-Afdal and al-Zafir, were in charge of battalions on his immediate left and right flanks. During the winter, it was possible for individuals to travel back and forth to Acre. With the coming of spring, however, the Ayyubid communications team anticipated that the Crusaders would cut the Muslims’ land access. To maintain contact, they set up a pigeon post system that was fully utilized. Young swimmers who would brave the waters from the beach south of the city to the

Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 212–14. For an English translation, see: Gabrieli, Arab Historians of the Crusades, 204–7. 19

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harbor supplemented this. Some died in the exercise, but those who succeeded were rewarded handsomely. As Saladin arranged for the two-front war in military terms, he took extraordinary economic decisions as well. He directed officials in northern Syrian towns to speed up their grain harvests and to store rather than sell the crop so they would be better prepared to withstand Emperor Frederick’s onslaught. Fearing upheaval as far as Mosul, Ibn al-Athir reports that his brother, an agent for a local amir, was ordered to stockpile the grain harvest. In explanation, the amir said he thought that with the arrival of the Germans, “‘there would be no place for us in Syria.’”20 Back at Acre, the Crusaders were building three huge siege towers, a proven military technology for attacking walled cities. Made from special European hardwood and iron, they stood five stories tall and were equipped with wheels. Each could accommodate hundreds of soldiers—mostly crossbowmen and archers—as well as a catapult. The appearance of these great machines sparked concern and fear in the city, especially when the Franks started filling in the city’s moat so the soldiers would have a level path to push them to the walls. As they were being readied, Saladin moved his forces closer to Acre and reoccupied his old camp at Tell al-Ayyadiya on April 28. In order to pressure the enemy, Saladin instructed his men to skirmish in force on a daily basis. Diverting some of their soldiers from the city walls, the Frankish officers defended their camp against the Muslim cavalrymen, but the three towers still loomed over the walls and the soldiers rained arrows and stones on the Acrians. The defenders had tried to burn the towers with Greek fire, but the Crusaders covered them with skins soaked in vinegar, thwarting the Muslims’ efforts. Saladin consulted with his fire experts, but they could not offer any new or innovative options for destroying the towers. It so happened that a young coppersmith from Damascus was in the camp. Despite ridicule from his friends, his hobby was collecting pyrotechnic devices and ingredients. Earlier he had offered his advice to Saladin’s command, but was rejected. Eventually, he gained access to Saladin and told him that if he could gather his 20

Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 83.

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special ingredients and enter Acre, he could burn the three towers. Despite grumbling from his expert artificers, Saladin agreed. Once in Acre, the young man saw that the people were extremely fearful of the Crusader towers and anticipated the fall of the city. Acre’s governor, Qaraqush, initially rejected the young man’s services, asking how could he prevail where his Greek fire experts had failed. But his aides persuaded him to give the Damascene a chance. They said: “‘Perhaps God has put salvation in this man’s hands.’”21 Qaraqush ordered his artillery team to obey him. On May 5, at his orders, the catapult crew fired their standard ordnance at the towers without effect. Once the young man saw that the crew had perfected the range, he placed his singular burning concoction, contained in an earthenware pot, on the catapult’s firing arm. The projectile hit the first siege tower and the flames it produced rapidly consumed the structure. Most of the Franks on the various tower floors died in the conflagration. The governor and his aides were delighted with the efficacy of the improved technology. The Damascene then directed the fire at the two other siege towers. They too burned to the ground, but not before the Frankish soldiers had fled in fear. With the new weapon, the Muslims burned other siege engines and mangonels. Acre was saved. Saladin was extremely pleased and he offered the young coppersmith rewards, but he reportedly refused, saying: “‘I did this for the sublime God and I do not want a reward except from him.’”22 Saladin’s army was elated. The amirs and soldiers “… were seized with such joy and delight that staid and stern men were as excited as flighty girls.”23 Saladin’s secretaries wrote to Baghdad and the great cities of the Ayyubid Empire, extolling their military feat. Also, to rub the victory in the Crusaders’ faces, his men mounted up—right, left, and center—and rode as a body to the

Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 80. Ibid. 23 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 111. 21 22

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enemy camp. Remaining behind their fortifications, though, the Franks did not emerge to meet them.24 As the challenge of the siege towers was being met, Saladin’s grand coalition started to arrive. Imad al-Din Mahmud of Dara and his troops joined him on April 27. Saladin received him in style and told him where to erect his tents. On May 4, the day before the towers burned, Saladin’s son al-Zahir marched in and greeted his father. On the following day at dawn, he “… put on a show of finery. [His cavalrymen] donned breastplates, unfurled flags and standards, beat drums and blew trumpets. They passed in review before the sultan, who had ridden out to meet them on the plain, and were led to take their position opposite the enemy, who saw in these soldiers of God such as to cause them alarm and anxiety.”25 As each unit arrived, Saladin attended their parades, all designed to build the morale of the army and undermine that of the enemy. Shortly after al-Zahir, Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi led his battalions into the Ayyubid camp, to be followed by numerous cavalry units in the middle of the month. On May 29, 1190, the preeminent leader of Sinjar, Imad al-Din Zangi, rode in with a great troop. Saladin drew up battalions to honor and greet him. SanjarShah of Jazirat ibn Umar marched in on June 13. He was followed by Ala al-Din, son of the lord of Mosul, with his cavalry. Saladin welcomed the youth warmly and gave him the honor of camping between his sons al-Afdal and al-Zahir. Recognizing the stature of his father, the Ayyubid leaders continually offered him hospitality. The last to arrive, in late June, was Zain al-Din Yusuf of Irbil. Assistance also arrived by sea. Saladin had earlier instructed his Egyptian shipyards to build another fleet. On June 14, the galleys appeared on the horizon. Knowing that the Franks would attack not only with their own fleet, but also from land as the ships approached the harbor, he had his men launch a broad assault on the Crusader fortified encampment to relieve the anticipated pressure. The two fleets did clash. Depending on the source, each For the three towers’ battle, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 78–80; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 110–11, Imad al-Din, AlFath, 223–25; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 311; Tyerman, God’s War, 415. 25 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 110. 24

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side lost a ship, or the Muslims lost two and the Franks one. Once the flotilla entered the harbor, the Egyptian ships offloaded muchneeded military equipment, foodstuffs, and men. With the destruction of the three towers and the arrival of the navy, the crisis at Acre passed. Qaraqush and his aides, while certainly still vigilant, were able to return to their normal military duties.26

EMPEROR FREDERICK BARBAROSSA: 1189–1190 On May 11, 1189, Emperor Frederick finally began his march from Germany to the Holy Land. His younger son Frederick, the Duke of Swabia, was his second in command and the army numbered perhaps 100,000 men. Initially, he boated down the Danube as the bulk of the troops walked along the shore. King Bela of Hungary welcomed him with sumptuous hospitality and the markets were open to the German force. The environment changed when he reached Bulgaria and Serbia. Ostensibly, a part of the Byzantium Empire, rebels controlled much of the countryside and they harassed the troops, forcing them into a defensive posture as they marched south and east. Frederick held an amicable meeting with the Serbian Prince Stephen Nemanya to the annoyance of Constantinople. The German Emperor dispatched an ambassadorial delegation to Emperor Isaac Angelus to finalize terms under which he would cross Byzantine Thrace and Anatolia. The erratic Isaac threw the ambassadors in prison and, reportedly, gave their horses to Saladin’s diplomatic delegation that happened to be in the capital. He also shared information on Frederick’s march with the Ayyubid leader. In retaliation for Isaac’s actions, the Germans occupied Thrace and freely seized food and supplies. Adding to the pressure, he ordered his eldest son, Henry VI, to bring a war fleet For spring through June 1190, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 78–80; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 152–54; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 108–13; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 216–32; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 309–14; Tyerman, God’s War, 414–15; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 27–28; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 32–34; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 268–70. 26

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so that together they would occupy Constantinople. Whether this was just a threat or an actual plan, is not known, but Isaac Angelus did back down. He agreed to the Frederick’s request whereby he would provide ships for crossing the Dardanelles and open his markets to the German army. Because winter was approaching, Frederick Barbarossa decided to winter at Arianople. Between March 22 and 28, 1190, he crossed at the Hellespont. The force marched across Greek Anatolia relatively easily. While not friendly and reluctant to sell their grain to the soldiers, the local population did not harass the men, as had the Serbians and Bulgarians. The experience in the land of the Seljuk Turks was radically different. Uncontrolled Turkish tribesmen constantly assailed outriders and stragglers and attempted to loot baggage trains. Recognizing the overwhelming power of the massive and heavily armed German force, Sultan Qilij-Arslan’s policy was to let the army pass with only minor interference. His son, Qutb al-Din— who had escaped parental control and was married to Saladin’s daughter—had other ideas. He actively confronted the Germans. In April, either his men or a local force clashed with the grand army. In the melee, Frederick of Swabia lost some teeth to a Turkish stone. Marching in the direction of Iconium, the Seljuk capital, the Germans passed the site of the Battle of Myriocephalum where Qilij-Arslan had decimated Emperor Manuel’s army in 1176. Bones of the slaughtered Greeks were still visible. As Frederick approached Iconium, he split his army. On May 18, 1190, one wing met Qutb al-Din’s full force and defeated him. The other wing fought its way into the capital where the sultan personally participated in its defense. At the end of the day, the Germans prevailed and proceeded to pillage and seize booty. They also took some hostages to ensure safety for their troops, an exercise that met with only modest success. After six days of rest, the Germans resumed the road, but newly victualed. Qilij-Arslan seized command from the headstrong Qutb al-Din and made certain there were no more major German-Turkish clashes, even though minor raids were still the rule. Saladin’s intelligence about the events in Seljuk Anatolia was faulty. Informed that Qilij-Arslan was actively assisting the Germans, he wrote the caliph a letter in which he complained that all Muslims should be helping the Ayyubid-led holy war and asserted that, in loyalty to Islam, they

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certainly should not aid the Crusaders as they were preparing to invade the Holy Land. By May 30, the German vanguard reached Cilicia, an Armenian region. Emperor Frederick sent for Prince Leon of the Armenians who reluctantly agreed to travel to meet him. However, prior to the appointed rendezvous, history took another turn. On June 10, 1190, the emperor and his advance guard reached the river Calycadnus (also referred to as Saleph). In midstream, Frederick Barbarossa leapt from his steed or was unhorsed and drowned. What actually happened is unclear. He may have dismounted to enjoy the cool water, but the current was too strong for him. Or his horse slipped and the weight of his armor pulled him under. Or the shock of the cold water caused him to have a heart attack and he succumbed in the river.27 Whatever the case, the empire lost its long-time emperor and the German army lost its powerful leader, but the troops were still in Cilicia. Shortly after the emperor’s death, Duke Frederick of Swabia, who was now the titular head of the army, rode along the ranks with the son of the Armenian prince. In a letter to Saladin, the Armenian Catholicos Gregory IV, stated that the son of Leon “… reviewed [the] army, which consisted of 42,000 mailed men and foot-soldiers beyond numbering. They are of varied races and strange ways. Their cause is a great one and they are serious in their enterprise and of prodigious discipline…”28 The German army’s coherence and motivation did not endure. Lacking the stature of his father, Duke Frederick could not Quite ironically, “The Continuation” reports that in a conversation with his court astronomer, Frederick asked: “…what death would he die.” The astronomer replied: “‘Sire, it will come about that you will die in water.’ The emperor took the word to heart and never forgot it. When he took the cross he remembered the words of the astronomer, and so he avoided the sea and came by land.” “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 89. The story may or may not be true, but it is obvious that it would have been near impossible for Frederick to move his army be sea. At 100 soldiers per ship, it would have required a flotilla of 1,000 ships for the men plus other vessels for supplies. 28 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 115. 27

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keep the assemblage together. Some princes took their battalions and retraced the route north through Anatolia. Others marched to the Cilician port of Tarsus from which, for the most part, they sailed home. A few went to Tyre. Some disappeared into the countryside, never to be heard of again. A regiment traveled south to Baghras, which its commander had assumed was still a Templar bastion. There the local commander, Alam al-Din Sulaiman, and some Aleppan cavalry captured many Frankish soldiers and glutted the slave markets. Other Muslim units from Aleppo and elsewhere rounded up hundreds of Germans who were also sent to the saturated markets. Reportedly, more Germans died than were captured.29 “The Continuation” impolitely sums up the dispersal of the great army: “The troops scattered in different directions like sheep without a shepherd.”30 Some German soldiers, who were intent on joining the Crusade as soon as possible, reached Antioch on June 21. They were followed by Frederick of Swabia who had lingered in Cilicia due to illness. By this time, the army was essentially a rabble, numbering somewhere between 5,000 and 15,000. The Armenian catholicos wrote that the men had been reduced to riding donkeys, walking and carrying sticks, and very few “had any shield or spear.”31 They recouped and refitted in Bohemond’s capital where the prince was very solicitous of the German duke. Reportedly, Bohemond tried to persuade Frederick to stay and reconquer northern Syria. Even though he contemplated the proposal, the duke ultimately decided to continue south. Observing that they would lose their protection, the people of Antioch considered his departure as a betrayal. They also asserted that the German presence in northern Syria better served the Crusader cause since it would force Saladin to divide his troops and fight a two-front war. While most of the soldiers stayed with the duke during the summer, some died of overindulgence in Antioch and others just For these northern Syrian events, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 10, 82; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 117; Imad al-Din, AlFath, 238–89; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 315. 30 “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 89. 31 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 117. 29

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deserted. The Germans left for Tripoli in late August, but the trek down the coast was not easy. They were constantly harassed and Taqi al-Din, who was now in the area, assaulted them. When the troop eventually arrived at Tripoli on September 11, it was reduced by half.32 Frederick and the soldiers rested for a few days in Tripoli where many contracted a severe illness that was rampant, further diminishing their numbers and strength. They resumed the Crusade, by either sea or land,33 and arrived at Acre on October 7, 1190. By this date, they were only 1,000 strong,34 a faint shadow of the great German army that had commenced its journey in the spring of 1189. As a last curious note, when Emperor Frederick died, his aides pickled his body in vinegar, hoping to bury him in Jerusalem. On their arrival in Antioch, they saw that their experiment was not working and decided to inter him in the city’s St. Peter’s Cathedral. Before the Germans finally laid him to rest, they extracted some of his bones, destined once more for the Holy City. Ultimately, however, they ended their journey at a church in Tyre.35

ACRE BESIEGED: 1190–1191 Even though Emperor Frederick died on June 10, 1190, Saladin did not know that the German army was rapidly disintegrating. Indeed, Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 239. The sources are not consistent on the last leg of the Germans journey to Acre. Tyerman writes that they traveled by land. Tyerman, God’s War, 428. Imad al-Din and Ibn Shaddad both say they went by sea. Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, p.239; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 128. 34 Two of the Arab chroniclers state that the force was a meager 1,000 men when it finally arrived at Acre. Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 82; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 239. Grousset, Runciman, and Tyerman do not posit a number. 35 For the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa saga, see: Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 11–17; Tyerman, God’s War, 418–28; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 10–18; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 84–91; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 312–16; Imad alDin, Al-Fath, 234–39; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 106, 113–17, 125– 126, 128–39, 143; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 81–83. 32 33

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the letter from the Armenian catholicos reported that the son of Leon had seen soldiers in the tens of thousands, an observation confirmed by others. Thus, once the muster was complete, Saladin started dispatching regiments and battalions to northern Syria to block the expected German advance. He particularly focused on relatives and amirs who had iqtas in the region. Thus, he sent the son of Taqi al-Din, Nasir al-Din Muhammad, who held Manbij; Izz al-Din ibn Muqaddam, the lord of Kafr Tab and Barin; BahramShah of Baalbek; Sabiq al-Din Uthman, the baron of Shaizar; and Saladin’s son al-Zahir of Aleppo with his own brigade and some Turkoman units. Finally, on June 14, Taqi al-Din rode north with his very able battalions. This large group of leaders and their men would not return until the fall. Meanwhile, Saladin had to rearrange his lines in front of Acre. Al-Adil replaced Taqi al-Din on the right wing. Imad al-Din Zangi commanded the left wing and Saladin held the center.36 From a strategic perspective, though at a tremendous human price, the German Crusade impacted the war. Its anticipated arrival forced Saladin to thin out his troops in front of Acre whereby he could not launch a major frontal attack and attempt to drive the Crusaders from Acre during the summer of 1190. And he and some of his opponents well knew that when the troops returned from the north, as typical of an iqta army, they would want to return to their homes. Though the Muslim force was depleted, the siege and countersiege continued. Saladin mounted numerous forays to assess the Franks’ readiness and capacities. The common soldiers in the Crusader encampment chaffed at their inaction. On July 25, St. James’s day,37 a large group of soldiers, but no knights, For troop movements in June and July 1190, see: Ibn al-Athir, AlKamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 83; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 313; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 116. 37 The Crusaders may have chosen St. James’s day because of its special meaning in the centuries-long struggle against the Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula. By Spanish tradition, St. James, one of Christ’s apostles, was buried at Santiago de Compostela in northwestern Spain. Popular paintings and statuary depict him fighting the Muslims from horseback, 1,000 years after his death! 36

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advanced on the Muslim right wing under al-Adil’s command. Some Christian sources state that the assault was unorganized and leaderless, but Muslim sources partially disagree. The armed troop aimed at the weakest wing, in terms of number of cavalrymen available, and it marched forward in battle formation with right and left wings. Once al-Adil saw the advancing Franks, he applied classical Ayyubid tactics. With support from regiments on his left led by Sarim al-Din Qaimaz and Izz al-Din Jurdik, he withdrew. At the same time, he signaled Saladin with drummers and messengers of the developing Crusader attack. Once the Franks reached alAdil’s camp, they forgot their military discipline and began pillaging and looting the market and tents, grabbing valuables as well as fruits and other foodstuffs. At this point, al-Adil responded forcefully. Cavalry from the center of the Muslim lines, including men from Saladin’s personal guard and others led by Mosul’s Ala al-Din and Egypt’s Sunqur al-Halabi, joined him. Saladin remained with part of his personal retinue and some other battalions to guard against a Frankish assault on his army’s center. The next phase of the battle was a bloody rout. Four to five thousand Crusaders lost their lives to ten on the Muslim side.38 Bodies were strewn on the field between the two camps. The dead included at least two women in armor. In addition, among the few prisoners taken, two were women. The Muslim soldiers had wanted to enter the enemy camp and pillage. Afraid that the Frankish battalions behind the fortifications would attack and overcome his men, al-Adil recalled them. Thus, while the Muslims could celebrate a devastating victory, they could not reap material rewards. At the Frankish retreat, only an English archdeacon, Ralph of Alta Ripa, emerged from the camp to help the defeated Crusaders and he lost his life in the effort. Imad al-Din Zangi, who was four or five miles from the field of battle on the Muslim left, did not learn of al-Adil’s resounding achievement until the evening. Most Muslim and Western sources agree on this range of casualties, but “The Continuation” claims 16,000 soldiers perished and only 100 of the sallying party escaped. “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 95. The smaller counts are more likely to be closer to the actual number. 38

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The Muslim triumph was great, but Saladin did not follow up on the next day. It is possible that he could have made gains against the weakened enemy, but the Franks were still behind their extensive breastworks, which were difficult for the Muslims to cross. On that day, a camel rider from Aleppo reached the camp. He reported that the German army was falling apart and that Saladin’s men had captured hundreds of soldiers and killed even more. The Ayyubid encampment at Acre beat drums, blew horns, and celebrated that night. Furthermore, the Crusaders dispatched a messenger, inviting Saladin to send an envoy to discuss peace. While Saladin’s soldiers were reveling in their accomplishments and the news of the Germans to the north, a new challenge appeared. On July 28, 1190, Count Henry of Champagne landed with a substantial fleet. Henry had taken the cross with Kings Philip and Henry at Gisors in January 1188. He was also the nephew of Kings Philip and Richard and personally very wealthy. As the advance guard for the French king, he brought vast material and supplies, including high quality siege machines. As expected of a man of such high stature, he was accompanied by other notables including: Tibald of Blois, Stephen of Sancerre, Jean of Pontigny, and Alan of Saint-Valery. The two leaders of the Western Crusaders at Acre, James of Avesnes and Louis of Thuringia, turned the command over to the count. The Franks promptly assembled the new catapults and tried them out against Acre’s walls. After assessing the major reinforcement and wanting to avoid disease from the rotting corpses, Saladin moved his tents back to al-Kharruba on August 1, 1190. While he would welcome an open field battle against the Franks, he had to await the return of his men from the north. He did leave a masking force of 1,000 cavalrymen to block the Crusader camp and signal the enemy that his army was still present.39 For the last few days of July 1190, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 10, 83–85; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 242–44; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 118–21; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 94–95; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 28–29; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 34–36; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 314–15; Tyerman, God’s War, 415–16; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 269–70. 39

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*** During the August 1190 – March 1191 period, the AyyubidCrusader confrontation was essentially a stalemate, marked by daily low-level combat, sporadic sharp clashes, and the introduction of and defense against innovative technologies. The Franks also had to deal with acute rivalries among and between the French, English, and German units as well as disease and hunger. Resupply efforts presented a challenge for both sides and, as in the past, there was occasional fraternization. On most days, the Crusader mangonels crews hurled stones and, at times, Greek fire against Acre. Skirmishers from both sides made sallies against their opponents’ lines. While violent, usually the foot soldiers and cavalrymen did not suffer severe casualties, but the possibility of death or injury was always present. During August, the Europeans continued to send men, war machines, and supplies by sea. As the collection of catapults increased, the crews were able to mount assaults from many different angles. As the barrages increased, Acre’s governor, Baha al-Din Qaraqush, and the garrison commander, Husam al-Din Abu al-Haija the Fat, developed a major counterattack. Emerging from a city gate in large numbers, the Muslims surprised and overwhelmed the mangonel positions and burned them with Greek fire. They also killed 70 Franks and captured others. Later in the month, another raid from the city reached a very large catapult for which Henry of Champagne had reputedly paid 1,500 dinars, and destroyed it with Greek fire. Utilizing another technology, the Muslims fired ballistas—large crossbows that could be loaded with burning arrows—from the city walls and burned other siege engines, thereby reducing the artillery threat against Acre. Acre’s resupply in the summer and fall was always problematic due to the Frankish naval presence. To address the dwindling foodstuffs, Saladin resorted to a picturesque ruse. From Beirut, he dispatched a buss, a large freight ship, disguised as a Crusader merchant vessel. The sailors wore European clothing and shaved their beards. On deck were pigpens and from the mast a large flag embellished with a cross whipped in the wind. As the buss passed the enemy ships, one of the Crusader captains asked why he sailed towards Acre’s harbor. The disguised spokesman responded by asking if they had taken the city yet, to which the Frank replied in the negative. The Muslim then said, in that case, he would tack, but

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the Crusader captain should warn the Frankish ship behind him. As the captain turned his ship, the Muslims raised more sail and hurriedly entered the harbor. With great fanfare, the people of Acre welcomed the supplies: about 90 tons of wheat, cheese, onions, sheep, and other victuals.40 On September 25, the Crusaders attempted a naval attack against the Tower of Flies that guarded the entrance to Acre’s harbor. Acknowledging its crucial importance, Saladin had manned it with crossbowmen, Greek fire artificers, and archers and provisioned them with the required weapons and supplies. In an ambitious scheme, the Franks floated three specially constructed busses. One had a high turret filled with a great quantity of combustible materials destined, they planned, to burn the tower. Another was loaded with Greek fire and the officers directed it to mingle with Muslim ships in the harbor and burn them. The third was covered with a canopy of animal skins to protect troops hidden underneath until they could storm the tower. Although bold and ingenious, the plan did not work. The first ship approached the Tower of Flies, was ignited, but an adverse wind suddenly arose and blew it in the opposite direction. All was lost as it burned in the open water. The second ship was set alight, but Muslim sailors overcame its crew and brought it into the harbor under their control. The third ship, perhaps because of a dispute among its men, lost its stability and capsized. Unable to escape the confined space, the storm troopers drowned. Not to be thwarted by failure, Crusaders from Pisa prepared another ship to burn the tower. On October 17, Muslim galleys reached it and set it ablaze with Greek fire. After this second attempt, there was a lull in the maritime attacks on the Tower of Flies.41 Frederick of Swabia had arrived with the remnants of the German army on October 7, 1190. To prove his worth and mettle, For the buss incident, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 249–50; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 123–24; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 316; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 38. 41 For the Tower of Flies incidents, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 10, 84–85; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 127–28, 131; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 317; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 38. 40

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he immediately led a probe against Saladin’s lines at Tell alAyyadiya that turned out to be a total failure. The Muslims lost two soldiers to scores of German dead and wounded. Imad al-Din alIsfahani cites a Frankish source who belittled Frederick’s efforts, saying his presence was not helpful and it would have been better if he had not come.42 On October 14, accompanied by leading amirs and their cavalry, Saladin’s son al-Zahir rejoined the camp after four months in northern Syria. Their return overlapped with another battle involving Frankish technological innovation, but ultimate Muslim victory. Henry of Champagne and the Archbishop of Besancon had brought two enormous battering rams from France. Designed to break down the city walls, one had a blunt head and the other sported a sharper edge like a ploughshare. The former was nicknamed “Crawler” and the latter “Cat.” Both featured a large canopy to protect the men who provide the kinetic energy. On the day they were introduced, the Franks filled in the moat in front of Acre and carried their weapons forward. The Muslim defenders fired burning missiles from baristas, arrow barrages, and stones from catapults, but to little effect. They then streamed through the city gate and surprised the Franks in the moat. Overpowered by numbers, the soldiers fled to their encampment. The Muslims immediately ran to the “Crawler” and burned it with Greek fire. The flames spread to the “Cat” and it too was destroyed. The defenders then attached chains to the two rams and dragged them into the city, denying them to the enemy. During October, at about the time of the battle of the rams, the English advanced party arrived, headed by Baldwin, the Archbishop of Canterbury. His flotilla offloaded men, siege engines, foodstuffs, and other materials and supplies. In late October, Saladin learned by pigeon post that Prince Bohemond had led a large raiding force from his capital at Antioch to pillage Muslim territory. Al-Zahir’s amirs who were still in the region learned of the impending foray from their spies. They ambushed the party, killing 75 and capturing a larger number. The

42

Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 252–53.

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prince escaped the slaughter and returned to his capital with the remnants of his cavalry unit.43 In late October, Saladin’s agents learned that the Crusaders were preparing for another battle. Hoping to draw them into the field, he moved his camp to Shafaram where he had stayed in 1189. At this time, he was suffering from his periodic bouts of colic and fevers. The anticipated Crusader advance did not occur until November 11, 1190. On that day under the leadership of Henry of Champagne, the troops left their camp and marched in the direction of the Muslim wells at Tell al-Ayyadiya, east of Acre. In a show of their colors, the force was accompanied by a mule-drawn cart on which was mounted a high mast flying a large flag emblazoned with a cross. The mounted knights surrounded the cart and they in turn were encircled by foot soldiers carrying mantelets to protect them from Muslim arrows. Not knowing their ultimate target, Saladin ordered his men to move the baggage to Nazareth and Qaimun. His army, fully reinforced by the return of the battalions from the north— including Taqi al-Din who arrived in early November—was arranged in battle order: right wing, center, and left wing.44 Because Saladin was quite ill, he did not command the center, as was his usual practice. Though mounted, he stayed at al-Kharruba from which he could observe troop movements. On the second day, the Crusaders, who only had a four-day supply of food, turned south in the direction of Haifa. They skirted around the headwaters of the River Naman. At this point, Saladin’s cavalry essentially surrounded them, the Muslim left stretching to the sea and the right wing reaching to al-Kharruba. Both sides sustained casualties in the heavy skirmishing. The Franks buried their dead where they fell, but carted the wounded back to their base camp. At the end of the day, Henry’s men made a field camp, but the Muslims maintained their lines around them. With only two For the Antioch incident of October 1190, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 132; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 317. 44 For a full list of all the commanders, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 146. 43

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days’ provisions remaining, the Franks reversed their march and headed back towards Acre. Reportedly, they had hoped to capture new food supplies during their foray. Haifa had such stocks, but Henry ultimately took the prudent decision to return to his base rather than risk going forward with insufficient supplies for his soldiers. On the third day, November 13, the Crusaders walked and rode towards the Dauq Bridge across the Naman. The Muslims sent unit after unit to attack them on their defensive march, depleting their reserve forces as the day wore on. Interestingly, one of the amirs reported that he and his colleagues saw one knight, a commander, “mounted on a large horse, clothed in mail down to its hooves,”45 a rare example of horse armor in the twelfth century. As they arrived at the bridge, the Franks drove off the light Muslim guard and, once they had crossed it, they destroyed it to blunt the Muslim pursuit. Again, they buried their dead as they marched. Henry camped close to the river, and resumed his trek on the fourth day. Saladin, meanwhile, attempted to order the Acre garrison to attack the Frankish base camp, which Frederick of Swabia was guarding. In the confusion of battle, his message did not reach Acre’s governor, Qaraqush, or the garrison commander, Abu al-Haija. During the morning of the fourth day, Muslim units on their fleet steeds forded the river or rode around its headwaters. They harassed the marchers, but not with the intensity of the previous two days. As the Crusaders approached their camp, some of Frederick’s men charged and chased them off. The contemporary chroniclers do not give casualty estimates, but it must have been in the hundreds on both sides. The battle on the march was intense and many fell. Saladin was likely pleased that the Franks did not capture a valuable prize, but disappointed that he did not inflict greater damage on his enemy. From the Crusaders’ standpoint, even though resupply was most probably one motive for the four-day march, Henry did know that Saladin was ill and he wanted to challenge the Ayyubid army in the absence

45

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 138.

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of its great leader. The challenge, though, was expensive. The Crusaders lost men, horses, and munitions and gained nothing.46 As a follow up, Saladin organized a classic ambush, similar to one Taqi al-Din conducted in 1189. During the evening of November 23, 1190, a band of selected men hid behind a hill. The next morning, a small party rode towards the Frankish encampment, brandishing arms. Ever aggressive, 200 knights charged the Muslims who withdrew to join the main body of Muslims who promptly gave battle. Cavalrymen unhorsed a number of Franks. They killed some and captured others, including Guy of Senslis, the Butler of France. Saladin invited Guy and the other noble prisoners to join him for a meal and he gave them fur coats against the cold. The next day, he sent them to Damascus where they would remain until exchanged or ransomed. With this brief but successful battle, the fighting season ended. In 1190, both sides lost military personnel—amirs and knights, and foot soldiers and cavalry—as well as horses, equipment, and war munitions. But during this violent stalemate, neither side gained. Saladin, though, was worried about the coming year. Although Emperor Frederick was no longer a threat, he knew that Kings Philip and Richard would land during the next sailing season. In preparation, Saladin gave the radical order to destroy and leave Jaffa, Arsuf, and Caesarea and demolish the walls of Sidon, Jubail, and Tiberias. He felt compelled to deny these positions to the Crusaders in the event they should reach them, but his orders were not without critics. His loyal secretary Qadi al-Fadil wrote: “‘the destruction of towns at this difficult time must undoubtedly strengthen the spirit of the enemy and weaken that of the Muslims… We are saving the enemy the expense of destroying places that he would otherwise have to besiege.’”47 In a diplomatic effort to gain additional military assets, on October 14, 1190 Saladin had sent an ambassador, Abd al-Rahman For the November 11–14 battle, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil alTarikh, vol. 10, 85–86; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 261–64; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 135–39; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 320–22; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 273–75; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 39–40. 47 Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 317–18. 46

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ibn Munqidh, to Morocco to meet the Almohades lord, Yaqub ibn Yusuf ibn Abd al-Mumin. Following instructions, he asked the Moroccan leader to send a fleet to block the Franks’ access to Acre. The Moroccans, once again remembering the attacks ordered by Taqi al-Din and undertaken by Sharaf al-Din Qaraqush, sent the envoy home empty handed.48 *** Replenishing supplies constantly occupied the attention and energies of military commanders and logistics teams on both sides of the war. From spring through fall, the Crusaders’ dominance of the sea allowed them to bring in numerous heavily laden ships, but seemingly never sufficient for their substantial army. On the Muslim side, Saladin struggled to resupply the Acre garrison, but his field army had full access to the vast Ayyubid Empire for food and materials. In the winter, as the Franks concentrated on surviving the cold and rain, the Muslims were able to reach the beleaguered city. In late August, as recounted, the Muslims sailed a disguised buss through the Crusader fleet. Supplies ran short again and Governor Qaraqush, perhaps in exaggeration, wrote Saladin that shortly his men would run out of food. Saladin had ordered three busses from Egypt, laden with wheat, cheese, onions, and other foodstuffs. They appeared before Acre on September 17 where they ran the gauntlet of the enemy galleys and safely sailed past the Tower of Flies to the elation of the garrison. In mid October, the two sides exchanged losses. A Muslim bark, a small ship, fell to the Crusader fleet, but a few days later, the Muslims captured two enemy busses with men, women, and children as well as a rich shipment of grains and flocks of sheep and goats. On December 31, For the ambassadorial mission, see: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 170–76; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 318. For military developments from August through December 1190, see: Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 36–40; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 64–67; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 315–23; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 270–78; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 122– 125, 127–32, 135–40; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 83–87; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 248–65. 48

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1190, seven more Egyptian ships entered Acre’s harbor. One was lost on a rock outcropping. As the Acrians attempted to secure the others, the Franks started scaling the city walls. The combined weight of the climbing soldiers broke the ladders, causing considerable loss of life. Meanwhile, the winds had shifted and drove the remaining Egyptian ships on the rocks, where they broke up and sank. Five days after these events, a segment of the wall collapsed, most likely due to the efficacy of the Frankish catapults. The Crusaders rushed to the opening, but the Muslim garrison stoutly defended the town. Qaraqush drafted all the city’s stonemasons and common laborers who rebuilt the wall in a matter of days. During January and February 1191, Saladin was able to transport supplies to the city by land. On February 13, he rotated Acre’s troops. Husam al-Din Abu al-Haija and his men marched out as the Kurdish amir Saif al-Din al-Mashtub and his troop marched in. Because recruiting for the post was difficult, among amirs and soldiers alike, al-Mashtub’s replacement garrison was smaller than the one it replaced. Baha al-Din Qaraqush elected to remain in the city.49 Crusader fleets arrived throughout the summer and fall, bringing men and supplies. While the barons and highborn always had food, the common soldiers did not. When ships arrived, they usually had adequate bread and meat, but when supplies ran out, they were reduced to eating grass, gnawing on bones, and chewing leather. In a rare compliment, an Arab chronicler commented that this adversity “only added to the [Franks’] endurance, doggedness and stubbornness.”50 Even though most Franks retained their fortitude, the Muslims frequently welcomed disgruntled deserters from whom they learned the newest plans. This pattern grew more acute in the late fall and winter when food became scarcer and the weather less clement. In a curious event, a small group of Frankish deserters asked Saladin for a boat with which they could raid Crusader shipping For Muslim resupply, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 123–24, 127–28, 132, 141–42; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 314–23; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 270–78; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 66. 50 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 135. 49

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near Acre. He gave them a bark and they put to sea on January 11, 1191. In their first sally, they intercepted a European merchant ship, captured sailors, and seized silver goods and bullion. On their return, they presented the prisoners and an elaborate silver table to the Ayyubid commander. He congratulated them on their good fortune and returned all of the gifts for their own use. In addition, fetid conditions added to the Crusaders’ misery. Sickness, including the plague, ran through the ranks and occasionally struck the leadership. Arab historians report that 100– 200 Franks died per day during the most difficult periods.51 Among the lords who succumbed to disease were Tibald of Blois and Stephen of Sancerre in the fall. Duke Frederick of Swabia passed away on January 20, 1191 and Henry of Champagne was quite ill for weeks. Most serious for the Kingdom of Jerusalem, Queen Sibylla and her two daughters died in October 1190. These deaths at once called into question King Guy’s claim to the throne because his crown rested solely on his wife’s right by inheritance. Seizing the opportunity, Balian of Ibelin, Guy’s long-time opponent, promoted Isabella, the daughter of his wife Queen Maria Comnena. The proposal was for Isabella to marry Conrad of Montferrat. The problem was that both parties were already married, Conrad to a woman in Constantinople and perhaps another in Sicily. Isabella was wed to Humphrey of Toron. She reputedly did not want to terminate her vows taken at Karak in 1183, but her mother prevailed. Balian’s faction exerted great pressure, including threat of physical harm, on Humphrey to agree to the annulment. The fact that the purportedly effeminate Humphrey and Isabella had no children made the messy affair more palatable for some. But it further divided the Frankish camp. The Lusignans were vassals of and favored by King Richard, while Conrad was cousin to both Emperor Frederick and King Philip II. The Archbishop of Canterbury objected throughout and excommunicated many, but he died suddenly on November 19, For conditions of Crusader camp life, see: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 323; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 142–43; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 94; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 33. 51

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1190. The Bishop of Beauvais, a cousin to Philip II, performed the nuptials. The tough and obdurate Conrad took his bride to Tyre where in a year they produced a daughter. Guy remained in Acre and did not relinquish the crown.52 The Muslims were not immune to disease or rough politics. Even though Imad al-Din Zangi’s troops fully participated in the November 11–14, 1190 battle, due to illness he stayed with the baggage train. More seriously, Zain al-Din Yusuf of Irbil fell ill in mid October. He asked permission to return to his home base, which was denied. Saladin, however, did allow him to go to Nazareth to recuperate. While still in the Ayyubid camp, he refused the ministrations of Saladin’s doctors allegedly because he imagined that some in Saladin’s circle might administer poison. He likely remembered the rumors associated with the death of Nasir al-Din Muhammad ibn Shirkuh in 1186 and the Fatimid Caliph al-Adid in 1171. Whatever the case, he died in the last week of October. Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi, his older brother, immediately seized his possessions and strong-armed his amirs who held iqtas and fortresses to bring them under his authority. He then turned to Saladin and asked for Irbil, heretofore Zain al-Din’s iqta. Saladin granted the request, but only in exchange for Harran, Edessa, and Sumaisat, which Muzaffar al-Din held. Saladin granted him leave to ride to Irbil once Taqi al-Din returned from northern Syria on November 3. Taqi al-Din and his regiments replaced Muzaffar alDin Kukburi and his troops in the Ayyubid front line. November 3, 1190 was the last time Muzaffar al-Din saw Saladin or Palestine and Syria. An elderly man at this time, he settled down in his new iqta, Irbil, and spent the rest of his years there.53 In November, Saladin faced insubordination and desertion. Sanjar-Shah ibn Saif al-Din Ghazi, a great grandson of Zangi, had been asking Saladin for leave to return to Jazirat ibn Umar on the Tyerman, God’s War, 429; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 30–33. 53 For the illness, death, and iqta issues of October and November 1190, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 87–88; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 132–33; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 67; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 318–19. 52

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Tigris north of Mosul. He had been at the camp for five months and he thought he had met his iqta obligation. Saladin, who wanted to keep his army together until the end of the fighting season, denied his requests. On Id al-Fitr, November first of that year, Sanjar-Shah appeared personally before the Ayyubid leader and was again refused. He returned to his tents, told his men to abandon the food they were cooking, and leave the camp with him. Saladin was mightily upset for he had helped the young man secure his iqta and resolve a serious dispute with his uncle. In his letter to him, after a pointed preamble, he stated: “‘Look to yourself, see whom you may attach yourself other than me and guard yourself against whomever may attack you. I have no longer any concern for your welfare.’”54 Saladin’s messenger delivered the written threat near Tiberias, but Sanjar-Shah continued his desertion. To the north at the defile of Fiq, he met Taqi al-Din who was riding towards Acre. Once Taqi al-Din realized the import of the moment, he warned Sanjar-Shah that he should return. Upon his refusal, the tough Taqi al-Din told him he would return whether he wanted to or not. Recognizing that he would be arrested, Sanjar-Shah backed down. Upon their arrival at the Ayyubid camp, the two men visited Saladin. Sanjar-Shah presented his apology, which Saladin accepted. Sanjar-Shah, though, stayed physically close to Taqi al-Din, in essence seeking his protection, until Saladin gave him leave to ride to Iraq in late November. Saladin reportedly said of this perfidy: “‘Normally, when I hear something negative about someone, it is always decidedly less than what was asserted, except in the case of Sanjar-Shah.’”55 In the same period, Saladin also had a test of wills with Imad al-Din Zangi, Sanjar-Shah’s uncle. He too had been in front of Acre for five months. He complained that he did not have winter tents and thus should return to Sinjar. Ibn Shaddad, acting as the go-between, despaired of a resolution between the two who Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 134. The quote is from: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 92–93. For the Sanjar-Shah desertion, see: Ibid., 91–93; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 320; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 214; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 133–34. 54 55

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stubbornly adhered to their positions. It all ended, though, when Imad al-Din Zangi wrote a trenchant note in both plaintive and threatening tones. On the reverse, Saladin wrote in poetic style: “Whoever loses such as me, Would that I knew what gain had he!”56 The implied threat from the Ayyubid leader had its effect: Imad-al Din stayed with the army until Saladin gave him permission to leave in late November 1190.57 Towards the end of November, the weather deteriorated and the fighting season ended. Hence, Saladin started giving his military leaders permission to return to their cities and villages. Imad al-Din left for Sinjar on November 26 followed by Sinjar-Shah for Jazirat ibn Umar on the following day. Ala al-Din, son of Izz al-Din, rode to Mosul on December 30. Al-Zahir led his battalion to Aleppo on February 6, 1191. Taqi al-Din coveted the former iqtas of Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi, which, in recognition of his services, Saladin assigned to him early in 1191. As Taqi al-Din left for the northern regions on March 2, 1191, Saladin well realized that as a senior member of the family, he too wanted to assemble his own realm under the Ayyubid flag. Saladin accepted this, but cautioned him to honor current relations with iqta holders, especially in the Diyar Bakr and Mardin regions. Saladin also likely accepted the notion that Taqi al-Din wanted to extend the empire’s borders beyond Mayyafariqin, close to Lake Van, which Taqi al-Din held as an iqta.58 For Saladin, the centrifugal tendencies of his army were always a challenge. In 1190, these pressures gathered more force because his men had been in the field for many months and because, due to the changed nature of the fighting, there had been little or no opportunity to pillage and acquire booty. Moreover, many of the leaders and soldiers wanted to return to their farms from which they derived income. Sanjar-Shah’s actions were simply desertion. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 135. Also cited in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 320. 57 Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 320; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 135; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 214. 58 See: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 267–69, 288–89; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 67; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 140; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 322–25. 56

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While Saladin ostensibly forgave him in November 1190, in the spring of 1191, he gave Sanjar-Shah’s other uncle, Izz al-Din Masud of Mosul, permission to attack Jazirat ibn Umar. Even though he was not able to capture the city in a four-month siege, he did force Sanjar-Shah to forfeit some iqtas to him.59 The strains with Imad al-Din Zangi were also serious because of his seniority and his ability to provide a large number of skilled soldiers and resources. Saladin needed all of these barons’ military assets to prosecute the holy war—indeed, any war for that matter—and he had to use guile, diplomacy, and threats to persuade the various leaders to stay in the field. This pattern would recur and become more acute in the next two years. *** As in 1189, the war in 1190 was telling on the economy. Qadi alFadil, while perhaps exaggerating, writes about disrupted communications, the loss of jobs, and depressed markets and trade. Even though the economy had taken on a war orientation, production could not keep up with demand, especially with respect to the manufacture of spears and presumably arrows. Gold was scarce in Egypt because traders had used the reserves to purchase war materials from Europe.60 In spring 1191, Saladin resumed his correspondence with the caliph. He described the difficulties with his coalition army and the constant need for resources to prosecute the holy war. He also informed the caliph that he had learned from Sultan Qilij-Arslan that Crusader armies were massing in Sicily, en route to the Holy Land. In sum, he argued that the facts and realities included in his report made it even more necessary to defend the conquests he had made on behalf of the Abbasid caliphate. As in the past, Saladin always couched his arguments in terms of the need for the unity of Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 91–92; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 325. 60 Qadi al-Fadil’s observations are recorded in: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 318, 323. Also, for a brief discussion of the effects of the 1189–92 war with the Crusaders on the Egyptian economy, see: Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 222-23. 59

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Islam and the pursuit of holy war, as well as his and his empire’s loyalty to the caliph. In the early spring, military clashes between the Muslims and Franks were few. Shirkuh ibn Nasir al-Din Muhammad, Shirkuh’s grandson, raided the Tripoli region and seized 400 horses and 100 cattle for no loss on his side. The Acre garrison raided the Frankish camp on March 29, 1191, taking a number of prisoners including 12 women. On April 17, the Ayyubid unit based in Beirut brought 45 recently captured prisoners to Saladin’s tent. Wanting to play war, his young sons asked for permission to kill one of the captives. He refused and offered the following explanation: “‘So that they will not, as youngsters, grow accustomed to shed blood and make light of it, when they as yet do not distinguish between Muslim and infidel.’”61 In a more pleasant vein, one of the captives was a toothless old man. The Ayyubid asked him why he was in Beirut. He responded that he wanted to make the pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulcher. In an act of chivalry, Saladin freed him and had his men escort him on horseback to the enemy camp. In the same month, some elements of his army started to return. Bahram-Shah of Baalbek, Alam al-Din Sulaiman of Aleppo, and Badr al-Din Maudud of Damascus rode in with their cavalrymen. In the Frankish camp, the winter had been exceedingly difficult. Food ran short; the common soldier rarely ate adequately. Desertions continued. In March, a fully laden freight ship landed at the beach and filled the market with grain and other foodstuffs. Equally important, its officers brought the welcome news that the kings were finally in eastern Mediterranean waters and would arrive shortly. Saladin’s efficient spies soon learned the details and forwarded them to him, confirming what he had heard from QilijArslan the previous month. With this certain news, Saladin knew that a momentous phase in the Muslim-Crusader struggle was about to begin.62 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 145. For the first four months of 1191, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 267– 269, 279–80, 288–90; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 91–93; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 143–45; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 276–78; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 323–26; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 33. 61 62

CHAPTER TWELVE KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD AND THE FALL OF ACRE: 1190–1191 Western Europeans started planning and preparing for the Third Crusade in 1187. Emperor Frederick began his march in 1189 and met his demise in 1190. Kings Philip and Richard delayed their departure until 1190 and did not arrive at Acre until 1191. Given the broad European dedication and sacrifice for this religious and temporal project, Christopher Tyerman comments that this dilatory response—on the part of Richard and Philip—was “one of the scandals of the age.”1 Steven Runciman adds that for Richard, the supposedly more eager Crusader of the two, to “have made so little haste shows a lack of purpose and responsibility.”2 Despite questions about their commitment to the cause, when they finally landed at Acre, they did make a difference, but not to the extent they, or at least Richard, had projected. While successful at Acre and along the coast to its south, ultimately the English king was not able to realize the Third Crusade’s objective of restoring all territory lost in the Holy Land, including the capital at Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulcher. The Third Crusade did prolong Western Christian presence in the region, but the Ayyubid conquests of 1187–1189, with the exception of a narrow band on the Palestinian littoral, remained. The heart of the Third Crusade, 1191–1192, though, was an epical struggle between two of the century’s foremost leaders—Saladin and Richard—and their grand armies.

1 2

Tyerman, God’s War, 431. Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 34.

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KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD: 1190–1191 As agreed, King Richard the Lionheart and King Philip Augustus met at Vezelay and started their march together on July 4, 1190. At Lyons, they parted ways to meet at Messina in Sicily. Richard led his men to Marseilles where he had arranged to join his fleet that had left England via Lisbon months earlier. Philip rode with his army to Genoa where his aides had hired ships for the voyage to Acre. The two kings were very different. At 25 years old, Philip was the younger by eight years, but he had already held the throne for ten. An unimposing man who did not enjoy personal combat, he was in 1190 a practiced, calculating monarch who always looked after his own interests. His sole reason for joining the Crusade was public expectation, but, knowing his armed force was weaker than Richard’s army was, he waited to make certain that his dynastic rival embarked for the Holy Land before he set out. With his 650 knights, 1,300 squires, and many siege engines, he arrived at Messina on September 14. It is important to note that although the force that marched with Philip was modest, France had already sent thousands of knights and soldiers led by his highborn vassals. As his ships landed at the Sicilian harbor, even though he favored simplicity, the new Sicilian king, Tancred of Lecce, received him with honors and housed him in a royal palace. Richard, 33 years of age, had held his throne for only a year. An impressive man who liked ostentatious costumes and handsome armor and mail, took pride in his martial skills, both in combat and in command. Energetic, self-willed, and opportunistic, Richard was, at times, tempestuous and intemperate. Financial gain was frequently part of his agenda. In contrast to Philip, Richard marched to his Mediterranean port with a substantial army of around 8,000 knights, soldiers, and his guard and servants. In addition, Archbishop Baldwin of Canterbury brought his own battalion and equipment. The English fleet had not yet reached Marseilles when Richard arrived in early August. Unwilling to wait, he and his immediate party traveled separately along the Italian coast towards Sicily. The English flotilla reached Marseille on

KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD AND THE FALL OF ACRE 325 August 22, refitted, and sailed. Archbishop Baldwin went directly to Acre, but the bulk of the force—Richard’s land army and other brigades numbering 8,750, including soldiers and sailors—headed directly to the rendezvous at Messina.3 Richard enjoyed the trip down the boot of Italy, partly by ship and partly on horseback, passing through Genoa, where he visited King Philip, and Pisa, Ostia, and Salerno. As they approached Sicily, he sent his party to Messina to prepare for his arrival. With one escort, he rode through the southern Italian hills. At Mileto in Calabria, he fancied a hawk he saw in a peasant’s home. When he tried to steal it, the villagers reacted violently, almost killing him.4 Finally, on September 23, he entered the Sicilian capital with flags, horns, and showy heraldry. Sicilian leadership had gone through convulsions after the death of William II in the fall of 1189. He had been married to Joanna, Richard’s sister. Because they had no issue, William’s aunt Constance was the rightful heir. Constance, though, was married to Henry of Hohenstaufen, Frederick Barbarossa’s eldest son who would shortly be crowned emperor. The people of Sicily recoiled at the idea of German rule and Pope Clement III equally so. Combining their wiles, they placed the late king’s bastard cousin Tancred, Count of Lecce, on the throne. Fearful of Joanna’s continued influence, he confined her to her residence and held her dower as well as a bequest from William II to her father, the late King Henry II, which was now Richard’s due. Richard’s strong presence altered the various noble rivalries. Tancred, clearly intimidated by the English king, housed him in a palace outside the city walls. Upon Richard’s demand, Joanna was delivered to his court with a royal escort. Philip offered his good offices to smooth the visibly ruffled relations. The recently widowed king was so gracious to the dowager queen that courtiers speculated about a royal marriage. The improved atmosphere degenerated when the local population noisily objected to the behavior of English soldiers. Tyerman, God’s War, 435, 437. Tyerman is particularly helpful with respect to the sizes of the various forces. 4 Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 38. 3

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Perceiving an affront, Richard ordered his men to seize the city. He then had his engineers build a great wooden palace, which he named Mategrifon, meaning death to the locals or Greeks. This pointed insult to Sicily’s population—a rich mixture of Italians, Greeks, Normans, and Muslims—proved to be typical behavior on the part of the English king. Tancred made his own calculations. He decided that the German threat was more serious than Richard’s transient truculence and decided to side with him. The Sicilian king paid 20,000 ounces of gold to Joanna in place of her dowry and the same amount to Richard, which settled the inheritance due to Richard’s late father. To strengthen the alliance, Richard betrothed his nephew and heir, Arthur Duke of Brittany, to one of Tancred’s daughters. In all of this maneuvering, Philip lost. He had offered to help Tancred, but the Sicilian snubbed this proposal and turned to Richard. Moreover, Richard spurned Philip’s sister, Alice, whom his father Henry II had chosen for him, but reputedly favored himself. To add insult, the supposedly confirmed bachelor Richard asked his mother, Queen Eleanor, to bring a daughter of the King of Navarre, Princess Berengaria, whom he accepted as his betrothed. Despite these abrasive developments, Richard and Philip agreed on the terms of the crusade. Soldiers’ debts, gambling, and price control were addressed, but also they agreed to divide by half all territory they conquered. In October, the sailing season was ending. Accordingly, the joint Crusade remained in Sicily for the winter and the kings enjoyed courtly life. In Rome, Pope Clement died to be replaced by Pope Celestine III. Henry of Hohenstaufen and his wife, Constance, happened to be in the city and they pressured the new pope to crown the emperor and empress. In the spring, the kings were finally ready to sail to Acre. All assembled, they had 219 ships of various sizes and around 17,000 men, a formidable armada.5 Philip started on March 30 with six large cargo ships and an assorted array of galleys and cogs. Without incident, he landed at Acre on April 20, 1191 where his 5

Tyerman, God’s War, 436, 443.

KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD AND THE FALL OF ACRE 327 cousin Conrad welcomed him with appropriate ceremony. Philip directed his men to assemble catapults and build siege towers, and then he put constant pressure on Acre’s walls and the besieged city. He delayed an attempt to scale the walls for Richard’s arrival. Queen Eleanor and Princess Berengaria landed as Philip left. Richard welcomed them, saw to the last fitting of his ships, and then instructed his captain to lift anchor on April 10, 1191. Richard’s sister, Joanna, accompanied his prospective queen on the voyage to the Holy Land and his mother returned to England. The passage to the eastern Mediterranean faced tempestuous weather. Richard finally arrived at Crete, but left the next day for Rhodes where he spent ten days recuperating from seasickness. Meanwhile, on May 1, his sister and Berengaria reached Cyprus where two of their ships broke up on the rocky shore near Limassol. Isaac Ducas Comnenus, a rebel leader who had severed ties with Constantinople, promptly captured the English sailors and commandeered their goods. He invited Joanna to the city, but she refused, preferring to wait safely aboard her ship for her brother’s arrival. In a decidedly nonchivalrous gesture, Isaac rejected her request for a supply of fresh water. After one more storm, Richard landed on Cyprus on May 8, 1191. He promptly captured Limassol and the mercurial Isaac Comnenus. In recent years, the Cypriote overlord had struck deals with Sicily, Armenia, and the Ayyubids, but now he allied with the English king. However, once he left Richard’s camp, he unwisely denounced the agreement and ordered the king off the island. On May 11, 1191, a large Crusader contingent from Palestine landed at Limassol to welcome Richard and assure his support against the Philip-Conrad alliance in Acre. Among the delegation were: King Guy of Lusignan, his brother Geoffrey, Prince Bohemond of Antioch, Templar officials, and other lords. On the following day in front of an august assemblage gathered at the Chapel of St. George, Richard married Berengaria with great ceremony. The next day additional English ships carrying knights and soldiers made land. Though Richard may not have needed encouragement, Guy and his colleagues argued that Cyprus should be secured for strategic reasons. They envisaged it as a reliable staging post to supply the Crusaders in the Holy Land and, knowing that Isaac had been negotiating with the Damascus, they wanted to deny the island’s ports to Saladin’s active navy. At the same time, Philip was

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sending messages urging Richard’s prompt presence at Acre, but he testily replied that it was first necessary to finish his business in Cyprus. Accordingly, even though Richard stayed in Famagusta, resting and recuperating from a bout of illness, his men captured the island. Towards the end of the fighting, King Guy led elements of the English army against Kyrenia and captured Isaac’s wife, an Armenian princess, and their daughter, after which the Cypriote leader capitulated. Guy put Isaac in silver chains and delivered him to Richard. The English king established an occupation government under which he replaced all of the Greek functionaries with Latin Christians from his realm, much to the displeasure of the local Greeks. This new possession was exceedingly lucrative for Richard. Isaac’s immense treasure derived from harsh taxes was now his. His government imposed its own taxation regime on the Greek population and it proved to be profitable for the Latin rulers. After Richard moved his army to Palestine, he tired of governing the island, partly because the Greeks resisted his rule. He sold it to the Templars for 100,000 dinars. They gave it back to Richard in 1192. Richard turned around and sold it to Guy of Lusignan, who had lost the Jerusalem throne by that time, for 60,000 gold dinars. Guy’s brother, Amaury, inherited it upon his death in 1194. He became king of Cyprus two years later and his line held the throne until the late fifteenth century.6 In one of the ironies of history, only because of the vagaries of a storm did Richard reach and capture the island of Cyprus. Moreover, this Crusader enterprise proved to be the most enduring in the eastern Mediterranean, outlasting the Frankish presence in the Holy Land by a full two centuries. Richard left Famagusta on June 5, 1191. He first made landfall at Marqab (Margat), still under Hospitaler control, then sailed down the coast past Tartus, Jubail, and Beirut. On the evening of June 6, he anchored near Tyre, but by order of Philip and Conrad of

Tyerman, God’s War, 445–46; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 112–14. 6

KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD AND THE FALL OF ACRE 329 Montferrat, the commander denied him entry. On June 8, 1191, he reached Acre and disembarked to great fanfare.7

ACRE RECAPTURED: 1191 The kingly rivalry that had been in stark evidence in Messina resurfaced in front of Acre. On the day Richard arrived, Philip pressed him to initiate direct assaults on the city walls. Richard rejected the proposal. He wanted to assemble his siege engines and wait for all of his men to join the camp. Frequently, the two kings did not co-ordinate their plans for the disposition of troops or attacks, all of which undermined the efficacy of their campaign. In addition, they undertook negotiations with Ayyubids along separate tracks without consulting with each other.8 Ultimately, the very magnitude of their armies assured their success, but perhaps at a pace that was slower than necessary. Not only were the two monarchs at odds, but also the Frankish camp was fractioned. Many of the barons who had arrived in the past 18 months were loyal to the king of France as was Conrad and his circle. On the other hand, Richard brought many more soldiers and equipment in 1191 and he enjoyed the constancy of Guy of Lusignan and his men as well as Archbishop Baldwin who had arrived in the fall of 1190. These divisions would last until the end of the Third Crusade in the fall of 1192. In the battle for Acre, both sides utilized the classical array of weapons and tactics, but at a very high level of intensity. The Crusaders deployed large and small catapults, towering siege engines, sappers to compromise Acre’s walls, and scaling ladders to surmount them. The Muslims in the city responded with Greek fire launched from catapults and ballistas, missiles from mangonels, and counter sappers. In the field, Saladin’s cavalry attacked the For the voyage from France to Acre, see: Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 34–47; Tyerman, God’s War, 431–46; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 45–49; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 92–94, 97–98, 99–104; Richard, Crusades, 223–24; Ambroise, Estoire de la Guerre Sainte, 74–108. 8 Tyerman, God’s War, 450. 7

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Crusaders’ camp, especially when the Franks were mounting assaults against Acre’s walls. During April and May, the two sides vied for control of the sea, but by June, the Frankish navy dominated the coast, thwarting Saladin’s efforts to resupply the besieged city. The Crusaders fielded more men than did the Muslims. The kings had left Messina with 17,000 knights and soldiers in 219 ships. Accounting for some loss en route and a small occupation force in Cyprus, perhaps 16,000 landed in waves between April 20 and mid June. They joined about 9,000 Crusaders who had arrived in 1190 or who were long-time residents of the Holy Land, for a total of about 25,000.9 In contrast, in late April, Saladin’s force numbered one quarter to one third of the Franks’ muster. At Shafaram, he had his personal guard, al-Adil’s battalions from Egypt, and units from Damascus, Aleppo, and Baalbek. To face the growing Crusader force, Saladin summoned barons, amirs, and men from throughout his realm. In late June, they started to rejoin the Ayyubid army. Between June 24 and 26, regiments from Sinjar, Egypt, and Mosul marched into Saladin’s camp, followed by another Egyptian force on June 28 as well as companies from scattered parts of his empire. On July 5, Izz al-Din Jurdik rode in from northern Syria. In the middle of July, after the battle was largely lost, Shirkuh ibn Nasir alDin from Homs and Sabiq al-Din from Shaizar arrived. In late spring, Saladin had ordered Badr al-Din Dildirim to recruit a large number of Turkoman irregulars and provided gold to pay for them. They reached Acre on July 15, 1191. Even though most of Saladin’s provinces responded to his call to join the holy war, some did not, thereby harming the Ayyubid response to the Crusader threat. In addition, Saladin had encouraged Izz al-Din of Mosul to besiege Sanjar-Shah at Jazirat ibn Umar, thus drawing some troops away from the Holy Land. In addition, Saladin gave leave to Taqi al-Din in early March to ride to Anatolia to arrange his new iqtas. Given the distance, Saladin must have known that Taqi al-Din The total number of knights and soldiers, 25,000, comes from Tyerman, God’s War, 449. The components of the number are my calculation. 9

KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD AND THE FALL OF ACRE 331 could not return until late summer. Nevertheless, the absence of his proven military talents was a blow to Ayyubid capabilities. Moreover, due to Taqi al-Din’s aggressive presence in southern Anatolia, the lords of the Diyar Bakr region stayed home to protect their iqtas. When Saladin learned that his nephew’s actions delayed the Diyar Bakri troops joining the holy war, he reportedly said: “‘This is Satan’s work.’”10 The size of the Ayyubid muster by mid summer is not known, but given the magnitude of previous musters, a reasonable estimate is 15,000 men.11 Both sides mixed diplomacy with their military efforts. Doubtlessly, each camp preferred to realize all of its objectives, militarily or politically, and go home victorious. This seemed to be the posture in the first few months. As the war dragged on after the fall of Acre, though, the two sides began to realize that some compromise would be necessary. This trend was not evident in the first few weeks as the Crusaders and the Muslims respectively tested each other militarily, even though they also probed each other diplomatically. However, after the fall of Acre and King Philip’s departure to France, Saladin and Richard used both sets of tools as they took each other’s measure on the field and in negotiation. *** Shortly after he organized his men and equipment at Acre in late April 1191, Philip had initiated relentless bombardment of Acre. Assaults awaited Richard’s presence, but Philip’s catapults rained stones on the walls, slowly degrading them. In preparation for direct attacks with grappling ladders, the Franks started filling in the moat with any material available, including human and animal bodies. This macabre activity commenced about May 30. In response, Acre’s commander divided his men into four teams. One descended into the fosse and cut up the bodies. A second hauled Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 186. For the arrival and make up of the Ayyubid army, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 154–55, 159, 160; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 188; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 291–92, 293–94, 300; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 326, 330. 10 11

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the parts out and threw them in the sea. A third provided protection for the grisly trench work and a fourth patrolled the walls, hurling stones, arrows, and Greek fire on the Crusaders. Saladin’s main force was at Shafaram, 14 miles from the city. On June 5, 1191, as the fighting escalated, he relocated to Tell alAyyadiya. In early June, a representative of King Philip approached Saladin’s lines and asked for a Muslim emissary with whom he could have a discussion. Saladin’s response was succinct: “‘If you have anything to propose, let one of you come and speak with us. We have nothing to discuss with you.’”12 In May, the Franks had not yet dominated the waters. Consequently, Muslim naval ships from Beirut patrolled the coast and purportedly captured six Crusader vessels and delivered their captives and goods, including siege engines, to Saladin. This changed, though, with the arrival of Richard on June 8. He enjoyed watching his galleys overtake a large Muslim buss carrying soldiers and war materials. Despite the loss of one of their ships, the Franks prevailed and sank the buss. All aboard were lost.13 Within days, Richard had assembled his siege machines and put them into operation. The combined French and English armies fielded a formidable compliment of weaponry. Many units had one or more catapults. The Duke of Burgundy, Philip’s second in command, had one, as did the Pisans. The religious orders—the Hospitalers and the Templars—each had one. Philip, Count of Flanders, operated two mangonels. King Philip had several, the largest of which he named the “Evil Neighbor”. He also built a sophisticated grappling ladder, nicknamed the “Cat” because it The quote is from Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 150. Also, see: Tyerman, God’s War, 452. For the period April 20–June 5, 1191, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 149–50; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 95; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 284–85, Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 326. 13 For naval operations including the buss incident, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 287; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 327; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 147, 151. The sources state that 750 men were lost, but this figure seems high. The ships of the day were usually not large enough to hold that many men. 12

KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD AND THE FALL OF ACRE 333 could stick to the city walls with claws. For his part, Richard built two catapults but also assumed control over Count Philip’s mangonels for he had died on June 1, 1191. Local Crusaders had their own machine, built with the proceeds of a common fund, called “God’s Own Sling.” Both Richard and Philip constructed imposing siege towers. The various crews worked the stonethrowing machines incessantly, slowly but effectively reducing Acre’s walls. The Muslims mounted defenses, burning Philip’s “Cat” and his siege tower. In addition, they succeeded in damaging the “Evil Neighbor” a number of times, but the French crews repaired it and returned it to action.14 On June 14 and June 18, the Crusaders assaulted the city. Each time, responding to Acre’s signal drums, Saladin launched counterattacks on the Frankish encampment. On one occasion, his men entered the enemy’s tents and seized booty. Once the Franks learned that the Muslims were pushing at them from the other direction, they broke off the attack on the walls and drove them back. On June 23 and again on June 24, the Crusaders probed first the Muslims right by the sea and then the left flank close to the River Naman. Each time, Saladin’s cavalrymen countered the probe and the Franks returned to their camp. The June 18 attack appears to have been a French initiative without English co-operation. Richard, who was ill at the time, did not want to witness a victory from which he could not reap the spoils.15 As the bombardment continued night and day, Richard sought a personal meeting with Saladin. On June 17, he sent an official envoy who first met al-Adil and then Saladin. Saladin’s oftquoted response was: Kings do not meet unless an agreement has been reached. It is not good for them to fight after meeting and eating together. If he wants this, an agreement must be settled before it can happen. We must have an interpreter we can trust between us, who can make each of us understand what the other says. Let For the siege weaponry, see: Tyerman, God’s War, 448–50; LanePoole, Saladin, 289–90; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 47–48. 15 Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 49. 14

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SALADIN. EMPIRE AND HOLY WAR the envoy be our mutual interpreter. If we come to an agreement, the meeting can happen later, God willing.16

Saladin’s words clearly left the door open for more dialogue, more negotiations, but Richard’s sudden illness interrupted the contacts. On June 18, both kings were afflicted with a disease called “Arnaldia” that caused their hair and nails to fall out. Philip bounced back more rapidly, but both men suffered from its symptoms for the rest of their lives. The Frankish camp was understandably very concerned about their kings’ illnesses. Who would survive? Who would gain and who would lose? What would happen to the armies and kingdoms if one or both should die? While they were ill, according to local lore, Richard visited Philip when the French king was suffering from a fever. After inquiring about his health, “… King Richard said to him, ‘As for Louis your son, how are you to be comforted?’ The king of France asked him, ‘What about Louis my son that I should be comforted?’ “It is for this,” said the king of England, ‘that I have come to comfort you, for he is dead.’” Leaving Philip with this telling news, Richard departed. Philip immediately called for the Duke of Burgundy and William of Barres who under oath assured Philip that no such news had arrived from overseas.17 Even though the tale may not be true, the fact that it circulated broadly shows the palpable enmity between the ostensible allies and the depths to which some thought Richard would go to hurt his fellow king. On a more immediate level, the rivalry between the English and French Crusaders continued to play out. On June 25, the strains became sufficiently intense that Conrad, who still claimed to be the rightful king of Jerusalem, fled to Tyre in fear that English knights might arrest him. During the first days of the royal illnesses, the Franks refrained from direct attacks on the walls, but they maintained the relentless bombardment. By June 28, 1191, they had knocked six

16 17

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 153. “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 109.

KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD AND THE FALL OF ACRE 335 feet off the top of the walls, opened fissures in places, and undermined their integrity with sappers’ tunnels. At the June 18 meeting, Saladin had indicated to Richard’s ambassador that more meetings would be welcome. Accordingly, a few days later, one of Richard’s men approached the Muslim lines and arranged for another session. In late June, the English ambassador sat with al-Adil and Saladin’s son al-Afdal in a temporary bivouac in the middle of the plain between the two camps. In introduction, the envoy discounted rumors that fellow Crusaders had pressured Richard not to meet with Saladin’s men. He said the delay was solely due to his disease and underlined the king’s very words: “‘The reins of power are entrusted in me. I rule and nobody rules me.’”18 He added that, as kings like to do, Richard wanted to present Saladin with suitable gifts, in this case some handsome falcons and hunting dogs. Al-Adil replied that this was suitable and Saladin would reciprocate with his own presents for the English king. The Frankish ambassador then stated that the animals had suffered on the voyage and he would like to have some chicken to bring them back to health. Chuckling, al-Adil responded: “‘So the king needs chickens and fowls and wishes to get them from us on this pretext.’”19 On July 1, the ambassador appeared again, this time with a Moroccan whom the Franks had captured years previously and presented him to Saladin. The Ayyubid set the man free and gave the Frank gifts for Richard. The purpose of the visits and exchanges, at least partially, was to assess the strength and morale of Saladin’s army. For his part, Saladin was pleased to exhibit the ability and resolve of his men.20 The next two days witnessed heavy fighting. The hail of stones continued and, according to local observers, made the walls

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 155. Ibid., 156. 20 For these encounters, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 96–98; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 294–95; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 155– 156; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 328; Tyerman, God’s War, 452; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 48. 18 19

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totter. On July 2,21 the small Acre garrison met the Franks in front of the moat as they threatened to enter the city. Saladin launched a broad counterattack with his army that had, by this date, grown in size. This action relieved the pressure on Acre, but the Muslim camp worried for its survival. That day, Acre’s command sent a desperate message: “‘We have been so utterly reduced to incapacity that there is nothing left but surrender. Tomorrow, if you do not do something for us, we will seek terms and surrender the city and purchase our necks at least.’” In response, Saladin renewed his attack on July 3, but the Franks in their great numbers held firm with crossbows, arrows, and spears. Select Ayyubid units attacked their flanks, but to no avail. On both sides, many died on that day. Energized by their progress, the Crusader catapult crews and sappers weakened the walls even more and increased the number of gaps the Muslims had to defend. During this period, though still not well, Richard ordered his men to carry him on a silken litter to the front line where he sat in his resplendent armor. He urged his men to dismantle the wall, offering first two, then three and four gold coins for each stone. To amuse himself and show his prowess, he made sport of shooting heavy arrows with his own ballista at the Ayyubid soldiers atop the wall.22 On July 4, Saif al-Din al-Mashtub, Acre’s commander, walked through one of the city’s gates and personally visited King Philip. He asked about surrendering the city on terms. Specifically, he wanted to know if his men would be allowed to travel freely to their lands, as was customary. In a haughty manner, Philip replied: “‘These princes of ours whom you captured and you too are my

The sources disagree on the date. Ibn Shaddad records July 2, 1191. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 157. Lyons and Jackson record July 3, 1191. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 328. In any event, the time line I use corresponds to the time line in most of the sources, but, according to the source, the dates may differ slightly. 22 For Richard’s intervention, see: Tyerman, God’s War, 452; Itinerarium Peregrinorum, in Brundage, Crusades: A Documentary Survey, 175–81; Ambroise Estoire de la Guerre Sainte, 207–8. 21

KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD AND THE FALL OF ACRE 337 servants and my slaves. I shall consider what to do with you.’”23 For al-Mashtub, this was a breach of the rules of war. In angry response, he said the men of Acre would fight to the death. Apparently Richard had rejected any deal between the garrison and Philip, but on his own he sent an envoy to Saladin, saying that on the following day the English king would send a delegation to ask for ice and fruit and to discuss a truce. After many days of conflict, the Ayyubid regiments were becoming weary of the continual fighting. On July 4, Saladin prepared one more surprise assault, but his men held back. Thinking the result would only be more death and no gain, soldiers reportedly said: “‘We shall put Islam at risk. There is no advantage in that.’”24 In accommodation of his men’s morale, he put off the major attack. That day, the Muslims and Franks skirmished in front of the city walls and the Crusader camp, but neither side launched a sustained offensive. On the night of July 4/5, a group of amirs, abandoning their military duties, escaped by sea from Acre. One made his way to Saladin and apologized. The Ayyubid forgave him on condition he return to duty in the city. For the others who hid in the camp, he cancelled their iqtas and his men arrested those they could find. On the same night, Saladin and the commander in Acre arranged an attempted break from the city. He and his amirs knew men would be lost, but they wanted to save as many lives as possible. It is not known if Saladin endorsed this plan before or after he learned of al-Mashtub’s interview with Philip. In any case, spies learned of the scheme and the Crusaders thwarted its execution before the garrison could cut its way out of the city. On July 5, Saladin’s officials received Richard’s delegation. His men escorted some of the Franks through the military market where they saw thousands of shops and hundreds of baths operated by enterprising Moroccans.25 Al-Adil met part of the

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 158. Ibid., 159. 25 Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 329. The observation comes from Ahmad al-Maqrizi, Kitab al-Suluk, a fourteenth or fifteenth century 23 24

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delegation for an hour, but neither side offered what the other wanted. Once again, the Muslims and Richard’s men were testing each other. On July 6, Frankish officials and a delegation from Acre discussed terms at the city walls. The Muslims said they were prepared to surrender the city and its stores for freedom for the garrison’s soldiers. The Franks made excessive demands, after which the two sides broke off the talks.26 On July 7, a swimmer from Acre delivered a message of despair. The command had concluded that the cause was lost; nevertheless, the officers and men had pledged to fight to the end.27 Saladin and his amirs could easily see the city’s desperate straights. The Franks’ effective catapult crews had opened numerous beaches in the walls. It was just a matter of time before they launched a massive assault, seized the city, and most likely slaughtered the garrison. It was in this context that al-Mashtub was attempting to negotiate with the Crusaders. While it is not clear from the historical records, Saladin had to know of the discussions. Indeed, Ibn Shaddad who was frequently with him records the terms al-Mashtub offered, presumably on July 7 or possibly one or two days later. In these talks, he proposed once again to exchange the city and its stores for the freedom of the Muslim soldiers. At manuscript. This source states that there were 7,000 shops and 1,000 baths, undoubtedly an exaggeration. 26 For the period July 2–July 6, 1191 period, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol., 10, 96; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 187; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 156–60; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 328–29; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 49–50; Tyerman, God’s War, 452, Imad alDin, Al-Fath, 295–98. 27 Ibn Shaddad, speculating on the potential impact of the loss of Acre, states that the city “… held all the armaments of the Coast Lands, Jerusalem, Damascus, Aleppo, and Egypt…” Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 157. While the spirit of the lament assuredly reflects the emotions of the Muslim camp, the assertion cannot be factually correct. Otherwise, Saladin would not have dispatched numerous ships with armaments to the beleaguered city. In war, such material and equipment are expended. Two years of war at Acre certainly depleted its stores.

KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD AND THE FALL OF ACRE 339 the Franks’ refusal, he added that Saladin would turn over one Frankish prisoner for each member of the garrison and, as a sweetener, said Saladin would return the True Cross captured at Hattin. The Frankish negotiators rejected the enhanced proposal, holding out for restoration of all of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and freedom for all prisoners the Muslims held. Al-Mashtub could not and would not accede to such demands and thus the parties broke off the talks.28 On July 12, 1191, the defense of Acre collapsed. Conrad, who had returned to the Crusader camp from Tyre, was the chief negotiator for the two kings and al-Mashtub served in that role for the Acre garrison. The final deal went well beyond Acre’s capitulation. In return for freedom for the garrison and the soldiers’ families, Saladin was required to pay a 200,000-dinar ransom and relinquish the True Cross to the Crusader kings. In addition, al-Mashtub surrendered the 70-galley fleet in the harbor; all stores still in the city; and, very importantly, 100 elite Crusader prisoners in Damascus dungeons whom the Franks were to name plus 1,500 “common” prisoners. The kings awarded Conrad a generous 10,000-dinar negotiating fee and his aides 4,000 dinars. Al-Mashtub sent a swimmer to deliver the terms to Saladin. Saladin’s reaction to the agreement was decidedly negative. He called a meeting of his leadership council. His amirs and officers presented conflicting advice, but Saladin resolved to send a swimmer that night to order al-Mashtub to renegotiate. However, at noon, the Crusader investment ended. The Franks climbed the walls, raised their flags with the cross, and seized the entire city. Seeing the enemy banners atop the ramparts, Saladin, however reluctantly and emotionally, accepted the terms that had been imposed on al-Mashtub. Later in the day, the Muslim garrison marched out of Acre under guard. The Franks, proud of their ultimate feat, were moved to see their stalwart foe in defeat, for, as one Crusader chronicler observes, they “… admired them especially as soldiers… Their For details of the negotiations, see: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 187; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 160; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 329–30. 28

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appearance, as they emerged almost empty-handed from the city was … amazing in its gracefulness and dignity… in their spirited appearance they seemed victorious.”29 Acre was lost to the Ayyubids. For Saladin, this was a defeat, but more symbolic than strategic. The Crusaders gained a battered city and proved that they could prevail against the great Muslim leader, which was important in the eyes and minds of the Franks and Muslims alike. However, Saladin’s formidable army still stood. In 1187, Saladin took Acre in one day; the Crusaders required two years to recapture it. Moreover, they paid a very high price. Upwards of 50,000 Franks lost their lives in battle and to disease over the two years.30 Such a loss undoubtedly blunted their capabilities. While Richard gained more coastal lands in the next 15 months, he did not realize his objective of recapturing Jerusalem and restoring all of the lands of the Crusader kingdom. On Saladin’s domestic front, he had to contend with criticism from some of his fellow Kurds who felt they sacrificed more than had other groups, especially because the mainstay of Acre’s garrison was Kurdish under the command of the Kurdish amir, Saif al-Din al-Mashtub.31

MASSACRE OF THE ACRE GARRISON: 1191 One day after Acre’s surrender, Saladin ordered his logistics team to move the baggage to Shafaram and he followed it on July 14, 1191. Now that Acre was lost, his close proximity to the Crusader Itinerarium Peregrinorum, in Brundage, Crusades: A Documentary Survey, 180–81. Runciman reflects similar sentiment. Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 51. 30 Letter written by Qadi al-Fadil on Saladin’s behalf and cited in: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 188. Also, see: Gibb, Life of Saladin, 69. 31 For the period July 7–12, see: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 187– 188; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 96–97; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 160–62; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 293–97, 300–2; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 68–69; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 50–51; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 330; Tyerman, God’s War, 452–53; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 297–99; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 53–56; Itinerarium Peregrinorum, in Brundage, Crusades: A Documentary Survey, 175–81. 29

KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD AND THE FALL OF ACRE 341 army was no longer necessary. As he prepared to meet the terms alMashtub negotiated, he would watch the two kings’ military movements and plan his response. As was his normal practice, he sent gifts to Richard and Philip, partly out of protocol, but also the exercise gave his men the opportunity to observe the enemy’s actions, preparations, and morale. The two sides also exchanged messages and envoys with respect to the technical aspects of the terms. Saladin proposed monthly installments, but the matter of how to guarantee each party’s performance was not discussed or, at least, not mutually agreed. Internally at his camp, Saladin and his colleagues reflected on the reason for the defeat at Acre. He laid the blame with Taqi al-Din who was still in Anatolia, attempting to expand the realm to include Khilat at the expense of Saif al-Din Bektimur. Even though Taqi al-Din’s military abilities were legend, it is doubtful that his presence would have made the difference in face of 25,000 well-entrenched and disciplined Crusaders led by Philip and especially Richard. After they captured the Muslim garrison, the Crusaders claimed Acre. As per the Messina agreement, Philip and Richard divided it between them. Duke Leopold of Austria, the German army commander, made his own claim on behalf of the third great European king, Henry VI, and placed his banner next to those of the French and English kings. The English soldiers promptly threw it into the moat, an act that angered Leopold for the rest of his life. Philip wanted to return to France to settle questions of fiefs, vassalage, and land raised by the death of Duke Philip of Flanders on June I, 1191. Initially, he concealed his intentions, but to loud condemnation, he made the decision public on July 22. Many considered his abandonment of the Third Crusade to be “cowardly and traitorous desertion.”32 Shortly thereafter, Richard and Philip negotiated the future of Guy of Lusignan and Conrad of Montferrat and their respective monarchial claims to the Kingdom of Jerusalem. On July 28, they announced their compromise whereby Guy would retain the crown until his death upon which it would pass to Conrad and Isabella and their progeny. Conrad and Guy would divide royal revenue, but very importantly Philip and 32

Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 52.

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Richard recognized Conrad’s claim to Tyre and any lands liberated to its north. Moreover, he was deemed autonomous of Guy’s authority. On July 29, Philip publicly promised not to encroach on Richard’s lands in France while Richard was leading the Crusade and he appointed Duke Hugh of Burgundy as commander of his troops, the bulk of whom he would leave in the Holy Land. On July 31, Philip marched to Tyre with half of the Muslim prisoners as well as Governor Qaraqush. Before he sailed on August 3, he deeded his half of Acre to Conrad and gave him the prisoners, presumably entitling Conrad to half of the ransom. King Philip reigned over France until his death in 1223 during which time he greatly expanded royal authority, somewhat making up for his less than honorable behavior after the fall of Acre. Meanwhile, Saladin was still preparing to free imprisoned Franks. The Crusaders were to select 100 elite prisoners. Under escort, a small delegation visited Damascus and returned to Acre with a list on July 24. On August 2, two of Richard’s envoys visited Shafaram. Upon request, Saladin’s aides allowed them to view the True Cross whereon they expressed their reverence. In conversation, they told Saladin of Philip’s decision and travel to Tyre with Conrad and Qaraqush. Saladin promptly sent an ambassador to Tyre with gifts for Philip with instructions to return with whatever intelligence he could gather. The matter of the prisoners held by both parties now took on greater urgency. Both sides asserted that the other was not meeting the terms, namely, the Ayyubids said the Franks had not presented a full list of elite prisoners they wished to receive, while the Franks said Saladin was finding excuses to delay the exchange. On August 11, the two parties reached an impasse. On that day, two of Richard’s envoys met Saladin who informed them that the first tranche of the ransom was ready as were the 1,500 “common” prisoners and most of the noble prisoners. He added that the Crusaders had not yet presented a complete list of the latter and his officials had not yet found all of those who had been designated. Ibn Shaddad then records the following exchange. The Sultan said to them, “Either you send our men to us and you receive what has been specified for this term, while we give you hostages for the rest which you will get in the remaining terms or you give us hostages for what we hand

KINGS PHILIP AND RICHARD AND THE FALL OF ACRE 343 over to you until you send our men to us.” They replied, “We shall do none of that, but you deliver to us what this term demands and be satisfied with our word, until we hand over your men to you.”33

The Crusaders thus rejected the concept of guarantees and arrogantly said their word should be trusted. From Saladin’s standpoint, his demand for one side or the other to hold hostages was a common requirement in such confrontational relationships and, given his experience with Frankish perfidy, this was especially relevant at Acre. Three days later on August 14, Richard led a large military contingent beyond the ramparts of the Crusader camp where the soldiers pitched tents in easy view of Saladin’s pickets. By this time, he had control of all of the Muslim prisoners, including those Philip gave to Conrad. On August 20, 1191, the Frankish soldiers led the prisoners—about 2,600 men—in front of the tents. Bound by ropes, they heard King Richard the Lionheart order their slaughter. The Frankish soldiers completed the grisly task with knives, swords, maces, and spears. Richard held back some notable Muslims, including al-Mashtub and Qaraqush, as well as a few selected men the Crusaders slated for slavery. As the English king clearly intended, Saladin’s pickets observed the killing field. They skirmished with the Franks, but no serious fighting ensued. Why did Richard order the massacre? Two Muslim sources suggest that he never intended to honor the terms of the surrender. One states that Saladin asked the Templars, whom he disliked intensely but trusted, to guarantee the terms, but they declined for they thought Richard would break them. Another, Ibn Shaddad, writes that Franks told him that Richard had always planned to kill them, but only after he took possession of the ransom. In a judgmental conclusion, this same observer notes that once the soldiers had surrendered on terms, the king should not have killed them. If Saladin did not meet the terms, Richard had the right to

33

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 164.

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enslave them, not slaughter them.34 In a letter dated October 1, 1191, Richard artlessly writes: “‘But the time limit expired, and, as the pact which he had agreed was entirely made void, we quite properly had the Saracens we had in custody—about 2,600 of them—put to death.’”35 State policy is not so simple. The public executions raised the stakes, forcing Saladin to consider the fates of other garrisons along the coast, but it would also mean that Richard had passed a death sentence on Franks captured in the future. Another reason posited for Richard’s actions was that the king did not want to relinquish 2,600 fighters who had proven their valor. Some Western apologists of the time contend that “without the agreement with Saladin, the lives of the defeated garrison were forfeit jure belli, ‘under the rights of war,’”36 which is a very different standard from the one cited by Ibn Shaddad. On another level, an overarching consideration is the deep mistrust the two leaders and armies had for each other. This is evident from the nature and tone of the negotiations, especially Saladin’s demand for corporeal guarantees and the Crusaders’ rejection of them. On March 25, Richard, now the supreme and sole commander of the Crusader forces, commenced his march south.37

Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 54 n. 1; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 164–65. 35 For Richard’s letter to the Abbot of Clairvaux, Garnier of Rochefort, see: “Richard the Lionheart in the Holy Land (1191–1192),” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 180. 36 Tyerman, God’s War, 456–57. The quote is from Chronicle of the Third Crusade, 218–19. 37 For the period July 13–August 20, 1191, see: Abu Shama, AlRawdatain, pt. 2, 188–90; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 302–10; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 161–65; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 97–98; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 106–9; Itinerarium Peregrinorum, in Brundage, Crusades: A Documentary Survey, 183–84; Tyerman, God’s War, 453–57; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 330–33; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 50–54; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 208– 307; Gibb, The Life of Saladin, 68–70; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 56–62. 34

CHAPTER THIRTEEN STALEMATE: 1191–1192 After the Acre massacre, King Richard led the Crusaders south, ostensibly to recapture Jerusalem and reclaim all of the lands of the Kingdom of Jerusalem lost to the Ayyubids. In response, Saladin’s strategy was to use his mobile troops to stay the enemy march, protect Jerusalem, and cause the Crusaders to return to Europe. Even though both sides fielded effective and capable forces, neither was able to best the other, ultimately resulting in stalemate. Each side also had to deal with fissiparous tendencies in their medieval armies. Maintaining large numbers of men at the ready for long periods constantly created problems for Saladin and Richard as did frictions among various parts of their respective coalitions. Not being able to realize their goals through military means, the two princes turned to negotiation and, at the end, they both compromised. Saladin accepted, though only on a temporary basis, Frankish presence on part of the Mediterranean littoral. Richard terminated the Third Crusade without retaking the Holy City and most of the other lost lands. Moreover, he reluctantly abandoned Ascalon, the strategic gate to Egypt, and most of the surviving European Crusaders returned to their homes in the West, as did Richard. The Ayyubids continued to rule most of Lebanon and Palestine, including Jerusalem.

COMBAT AND DIPLOMACY ON THE COASTAL PLAIN: 1191 On August 23 and 24, Richard organized his men for an armed march. Many military units readily joined him, but others hung back. Some of the soldiers were enjoying Acre where food was plentiful and wine and women were readily accessible. The Duke of Burgundy, King Philip’s appointed replacement, only 345

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grudgingly joined the muster. Conrad and some other local barons stayed behind in Acre or retired to Tyre. The Crusader flotilla commanded the sea and Richard ordered his ships to sail parallel to his land route to resupply his men. Other vessels were assigned to bring fresh soldiers at different stages of the Crusaders’ trek south. Even though Richard undoubtedly expected some resistance from Saladin’s cavalry, it was much greater than anticipated, partly due to faulty intelligence. When the king was still at Acre, two bedouin agents had told him the “Muslim army was few in numbers and depleted.” After he lost soldiers and horses in great numbers a few days later, he summoned the two men and ordered their decapitation.1 On August 25, 1191, the grand army commenced its move to the south. Richard assigned the Templars to the vanguard and the Hospitalers were in charge of the rear. In between, the brigades were organized in four separate divisions: the Bretons and the men from Anjou; Guy of Lusignan with his followers and the soldiers from the Poitier region; Richard’s English and Norman troops; and the French under Duke Hugh of Burgundy and Count Henry of Champagne. English knights were in charge of the Crusader standard atop a cart-drawn tower in the center of the force. Even though the distance to the first destination, Jaffa, was only 60 miles, the pace was slow due to the difficult terrain. The men had to ford eight rivers and walk through areas with high grass, some dense trees and shrubs, and occasional expanses of sand and bogs. The summer heat sapped energy, especially since the soldiers were girded for war. The army marched in three parallel columns. To the west along the sea, men assigned to logistic units carried the baggage, a task that was especially grueling because the Crusaders had few pack animals. In the center were the mounted knights in full armor. Walking soldiers filled the eastern column. Their military attire consisted of long mail under which they wore a gambeson, a heavy stuffed quilted garment.2 By early afternoon of Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 172. Lane-Poole, Saladin, 310. In this instance, I am using Lane-Poole’s translation of Ibn Shaddad. Richards, however, translates Ibn Shaddad 1 2

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each day of the march, men in the eastern line suffered greatly from the intense heat, some falling by the wayside from exhaustion and sunstroke. As the Franks mustered, Saladin prepared his retort. After consulting with his leadership council, he sent a couple of amirs to survey the land south of Acre. They reported that the first few miles were dominated by dunes, terrain that was not suitable to cavalry maneuvering and attacks, but further south around Caesaria, there were some large open areas with firm ground. To impede the enemy’s progress, Saladin’s men implemented a scorched earth policy. Consequently, the Crusaders were not able to forage for food and fodder, making them very dependent on the naval supply operation. In addition, to defend against the Crusade, especially the anticipated advance of the great German army in 1190, Saladin had ordered his stonemasons and sappers to destroy Caesaria, Jaffa, and Arsuf. He maintained Haifa intact for the Acre war effort, but in the summer of 1191, he also leveled that city’s fortifications, this time to defend against the challenge from Richard and Philip. On August 25, after it was clear that Richard was taking his army towards Jaffa, Saladin struck camp. He directed his logistics team to move the baggage to Tell Qaimun, south and east of Haifa in the hills overlooking the Mediterranean. With his main body of troops, Saladin rode through the low hills where he could clearly see the Crusaders strung out in their long formation. His son alAfdal took the rearguard and soon engaged the Franks in a fierce battle. During the fray, he sent a note to Saladin, requesting reinforcements so he could annihilate the embattled Crusader formation. Saladin dispatched a force and followed it. As he reached the sand dunes, he met al-Adil who informed him that the straggling Frankish battalions succeeded in rejoining the main force and the battle broke off. Four days later, a captured knight told Saladin that the Crusaders lost 400 horses and many men on that day. differently. In his version, he states that the marching soldiers wore solid iron corselets as well as full-length mail. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 170.

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At dusk, Richard camped near the ruins of Haifa. Saladin continued to watch his progress from the hills to the east. Al-Adil rode ahead to reconnoiter the land to the south, the Plain of Sharon that lies along the coast between Caesaria and Arsuf. Two amirs, Alam al-Din Sulaiman and Husam al-Din Bishara, guarded the baggage and Izz al-Din Jurdik kept a watchful eye on the Crusader camp. During this day and the next, Saladin’s men captured a number of Frankish laggards. Each time, he interrogated them about the army’s movements, the cost of food, and reinforcements. Just as in the Muslim camp, the price of dried biscuits and barley was increasing and bread was not available. Asked about the slow march, the Franks said they awaited the ships to bring supplies. On each occasion, once Saladin gleaned information from the prisoners, he ordered their execution. He was still very angry about the treatment of the Acre garrison. Saladin also took the time to disperse funds to soldiers who lost horses or supplies. He wanted to ensure their ability to fight and bolster their morale. Many had left their personal baggage at Shafaram near Acre because they had accumulated clothing, bedding, and equipment during the long siege and did not have sufficient pack animals to transport all of their supplies. Many camp followers also lost possessions. On August 28, the Franks only marched a short distance. Ayyubid cavalrymen harassed the column and captured stragglers who were dispatched after questioning. Others died from sunstroke. On the following day, the Franks stayed in their camp. Fighting escalated on August 30 and was sustained for over a week. On this day, Saladin sent wave after wave against Richard’s marching foot soldiers and knights. He was attempting to disrupt the Frankish formation and provoke an unorganized knightly charge, which Saladin hoped to surround and decimate. The ranks, though, maintained their discipline and strode on in their protected columns. According to a European chronicler, the Duke of Burgundy and his French division lagged behind the main force. A Muslim brigade caught up with it at a narrow passage between the sea and the hills and captured men and baggage. Saladin’s cavalry was closing in on the duke and his guard when, alerted to the impending disaster, Richard rode into the fray, dispatched a few Muslim soldiers, and chased off the others. The commander

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himself, in a great show of arms and bravado, averted what could have been a major loss.3 On the following day, Richard rested his men near the ruined city of Caesaria. From the hills, Saladin looked down at the plain and the camp after which he consulted al-Adil and Alam al-Din Sulaiman about the suitability of the topography for the cavalry. Settling on a plan of a battle for the next day, he turned to the prisoners his men had produced. Thirteen Franks appeared before him. One was the daughter of a knight with a Muslim woman attendant. Saladin freed the latter, but ordered the execution of all of the Franks. During the morning of September 1, Saladin organized his army for combat. He directed the kitchens to prepare adequate food and sat with his amirs to discuss battle plans. Once his pickets informed him that the Crusaders had broken camp, he had his signal corps beat drums and his men mounted for action. The Franks were in their classic formation: marching soldiers clad in full mail and gambesons to the east with mounted knights in the middle. The baggage train was seaward. The Muslim cavalry charged the marchers throughout the day, raining arrows on the soldiers. The Arab chroniclers report that they saw soldiers with ten arrows sticking out of their backs, resembling hedgehogs. However, their armor protected them and they fought as they walked. The Franks, armed with crossbows, shot arrows and darts at the charging Muslims, effectively blunting but not stopping the assault. Horses and men fell to Frankish arms, as did Crusaders to cavalrymen’s arrows and swords. The knights held their formations and rarely charged and then only when commanded to do so. The Crusader officers frequently rotated the marching troops, pulling companies out and replacing them with companies that had been handling baggage. Thus, Saladin’s men constantly faced fresh soldiers.4 On the following day, the same pattern prevailed. At times, Saladin joined the skirmishers and urged them on as arrows were Lane-Poole, Saladin, 311–12. For the pattern of fighting on the march, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 170–71; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 312–16. 3 4

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flying around. Once again, Richard’s army maintained discipline and, at the end of the day, he camped near the River of Reeds. In the fighting, one of Saladin’s mamlukes, Ayaz the Tall, was killed— a man so effective with his heavy lance that Crusaders avoided him when possible. He was buried on a hill near the confluence of several streams called al-Birka. There is no historical record of Muslim or Crusader casualties during the August 30–September 2 period, but one Arab historian does note that the Franks lost 1,000 horses during these four days of fighting on the march.5 The Franks spent the following two days in camp. The navy landed eight large busses and delivered substantial reinforcements, material, and foodstuffs. Saladin again surveyed the terrain, especially to the east of the destroyed town of Arsuf. The hills above the plain were heavily afforested and his men, scattered among the trees, enjoyed shade and respite from bitter fighting. Light skirmishing claimed very few soldiers on both sides. On September 4, Richard decided to re-establish his dialogue with Saladin. His officers approached Alam al-Din Sulaiman who was in charge of the Muslim front lines that day and asked if al-Adil could meet him the following day. The message was passed to Saladin and al-Adil. Saladin wrote his brother, instructing him to meet Richard and, if possible, draw out the conversation to allow the Turkoman irregulars, who were still in the hills near Acre, to rejoin the army. On the following day, al-Adil met the king with Humphrey of Toron acting as interpreter. Richard started talking about the benefits of peace for both parties. Al-Adil interrupted and said: “‘You desire peace but you do not mention your demands that I might mediate your differences with the sultan.’ The king of England replied, ‘The basic condition is that you should restore all the lands to us and return to your own countries.’ Al-Adil gave a harsh answer and a quarrel followed….”6 The Crusader demands had not changed and al-Adil, with his rough response, was not able to extend the negotiations.

5 6

Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 191. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 173–74.

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After the failed talks, the Franks marched. Saladin ordered his men to mount prepared for battle and sent his baggage train ahead. Later in the day, Saladin recalled the light baggage. It arrived back at the camp after sunset amidst some logistical confusion. The Crusaders remained encamped on September 6 and Saladin sorted out his army. He also conferred privately with al-Adil about what Richard had said. Realizing negotiations would not be fruitful at this time, they drew up battle plans for the next day.7 On September 7, 1191, Saladin was determined to provoke a major engagement. It is not clear if Richard planned the same on that day or just intended to continue towards Jaffa. In the morning, the Crusaders broke camp and marched through the fields near Arsuf. To the east were some low hills and behind them the forest of the same name. In mid morning, Saladin sent out a major skirmishing force of 2,000 cavalrymen. They rained arrows on the marchers for hours. The pressure forced the Crusaders to halt near the orchards of Arsuf and reform in their traditional order with the Templars to the south and the Hospitalers to the north. Richard with the English and Norman contingents was in the center. By late morning, Saladin commanded his main cavalry to attack. Even though the Muslim horsemen penetrated the line of armed soldiers, the knights and overall Crusader force stood firm. The mounted knights wanted to charge, but Richard withheld the order, waiting for the Muslims’ horses to tire. Saladin’s men were gaining ground to the north, killing some of the Hospitalers’ mounts. The knights requested permission to charge, but were repeatedly denied. As Richard was organizing his men to move against Saladin’s army, the Hospitalers thought they could no longer absorb the losses. Two men, the Marshal of the Order and Baldwin Carew, initiated their own charge and other Hospitaler knights quickly followed. Grasping the new reality, Richard ordered the knights along the For the August 23–September 6, 1191 period, namely the fighting march, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 311–17; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 98–99; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 165–74; Abu Shama, AlRawdatain, pt. 2, 190–91; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 307–13; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 54–56; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 333–36; Tyerman, God’s War, 457–58; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 62–67. 7

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entire line to charge. Initially, there was some confusion as the officers had not given orders to the foot soldiers to make way for the charging knights, but once the men heard Richard’s command, the mounted men with their lances at the ready gave one vociferous yell. The infantry opened its ranks for them as they rode through. Along the entire front—left, right, and center—the knights stormed forward in a very organized and disciplined formation. Shortly, elements of Saladin’s battalions at the center and left and right flanks gave way and started fleeing from the field. However, other units—Saladin’s personal guard, the battalion under al-Adil, al-Afdal’s men, and companies led by the mamluke Sarim al-Din Qaimaz—held firm. The Frankish knights, now some distance from the main lines, paused. Saladin started to rally his fleeing men; his drummers kept up a steady beat to bring them to his standard. Re-energized, they generated some resistance until the knights reformed their lines and charged a second time. Once again, the Muslims fled, but again the knights paused, fearing an ambush. Saladin rallied his cavalry once more and the knights charged a third time. The Muslims fought as they retired to the low hills with the knights in pursuit. Again, the latter halted. At this point, the Crusaders dominated the field, but Saladin’s army, even though wounded and not victorious, still stood. The mounted knights returned to the main body of soldiers and the Crusaders resumed their march to the leveled town of Arsuf where they made camp. Lyons and Jackson comment that “… the Muslim rout was, in fact, little more than an undignified and expensive version of their usual tactics.”8 Namely, the Ayyubid cavalry, by long practice, utilized the attack and retreat tactic. In this instance, though, Saladin did not break the disciplined Crusader formation and, unlike at Hattin, he did not prevail. When Ibn Shaddad tried to extend consoling words, Saladin rejected them out of hand. He knew he had not won the day. Richard had. At Hattin, Saladin surrounded and cut off an army that had failed to bring adequate water under a summer sun. At Arsuf, Richard’s well-regimented knights and infantry had superior armor. Furthermore, given the Crusaders’ route next to the sea, encircling 8

Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 338.

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the enemy brigades was nigh impossible. In addition, the sea provided the Franks with strategic depth via which they could renew their supplies and rotate troops. The chroniclers of the day—both Muslim and Christian—do not record numbers of troops, nor casualties for either side.9 Ibn Shaddad does state with respect to the Arsuf battle that “many foot-soldiers were killed and a lot on both sides were wounded.”10 Among the nobles, one prominent knight, James of Avesnes, died on the field, as did the Kurdish amir Musak. With respect to Frankish horses, a bedouin counted 100 killed on the field,11 which, added to the 1,400 already lost on the twoweek march, shows a very high attrition rate. There are no records for equine losses on the Muslim side. Even if they were equal to one another, the loss was more difficult for the Franks because their mounts were largely imported from Europe, especially after Saladin captured most of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187–1189. The Ayyubids, on the other hand, were able to replace stallions and mares from throughout his empire, although at a cost. On the following day, September 8, Saladin mounted his cavalry, rode to the Crusader camp, and offered battle. Richard, though, ordered his men to stay in their defensive posture. The next day, Saladin assembled his men again. This time they met a marching army. The Ayyubid skirmishers shot many arrows, as did the Crusaders, but Saladin could not goad the knights into another charge. In ordered ranks, they strode to the al-Auja River where Lane-Poole does quote some numbers for August and September 1191, but they are unquestionably exaggerated. For example, he writes that Saladin had 300,000 men and Richard had 100,000. Lane-Poole, Saladin, 313. These totals cannot be correct. The numbers found at Acre, cited previously, would be closer to those in the field at Arsuf and on the march. That would mean that each side had 10,000 to 15,000 troops. Citing a Christian chronicler, Lane-Poole goes on to record that 7,000 Muslims died in the Arsuf battle to 700 or 70 Crusader mortalities. Lane-Poole, Saladin, 313. These numbers are also undoubtedly greatly overstated. 10 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 176. 11 Ibid., 177. 9

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they set up their camp. On September 10, Saladin moved his army inland to Ramla as the Franks reached Jaffa.12 On a strategic level, the Crusader advance of August 25 – September 10, including the battle of Arsuf, had troubling lessons for both princes. Saladin determined he could not defeat Richard in the open field close to the sea. Failing a rapid victory, he learned he would have to wait until Richard tired of the Holy Land war and returned to Europe. Such a waiting strategy, though, was difficult for Saladin and his coalition army. The latter wanted booty and its leaders coveted new iqtas and monetary rewards. Forced into a defensive stance, Saladin was not able to provide these spoils of war; hence, his military units from his far-flung empire would shortly show disgruntlement. Richard, on the other hand, had just won the field at Arsuf, but not the war. On August 25, he may have thought his disciplined men with their superior armor would not only win battles, but also the war. On his march, he lost perhaps 1,600 horses and “many men,” but only gained the ruined city of Jaffa. And Saladin still had a large and effective standing army, which continued to challenge him. To this point, in his letter of October 1, 1191 to the Abbot of Clairvaux, Richard records his success at Arsuf, but does not claim victory in the war with Saladin.13 For the next 12 months of his stay in Palestine, the king would have to wrestle with that reality, his fractious coalition army, and his desire to return to Europe to look after his new kingdom. *** After they made camp at Ramla on September 10, Saladin and his senior advisors met to discuss territorial strategy. They were concerned about their capacity to defend Jerusalem and Ascalon at For the battle of Arsuf, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 99–100; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 174–77; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 317–19; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 191–92; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 337–39; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 55–57; Tyerman, God’s War, 458–60; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 313–23; Ambroise, Estoire de la Guerre Sainte, 249–73; Chronicle of the Third Crusade, 247–61. 13 “Richard the Lionheart in the Holy Land (1191–1192),” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 180. 12

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the same time. The amirs assumed Jerusalem was the highest priority. Ascalon—an important port and, in a sense, the door to Egypt—was strategically important, but they opined that the Ayyubid army could not defend both at the same time because 20,000 men would be required for each position. In addition, noting the experience of the Acre garrison, the soldiers and amirs were reluctant to man the port’s walls and citadel. Even though two captured Franks had, earlier in the day, told Saladin that Richard was busy rebuilding Jaffa, the councilors nevertheless feared that the king would send a sizable force and capture Ascalon. At the conclusion of the deliberations, Saladin decided to demolish Ascalon’s fortifications and vacate the city. Saladin ordered al-Adil to stay at Ramla with ten amirs and their troops to watch the Franks at Jaffa. With his cavalry, he rode to Ascalon at dawn the next day and made camp outside the city. On the following day, he ordered the destruction. Aside from losing a beautiful city, the decision caused great hardship for the population. The residents tried to sell what they could not carry, but prices immediately plummeted. As they sought transportation to Egypt and Syria, fees soared. Some poor citizens could only afford to walk. On September 13, Saladin distributed all the foodstuffs held in the government granaries. Meanwhile, his stonemasons were dismantling walls and buildings. Two towers were so strong that the engineers decided to burn them to precipitate their collapse. Even though Saladin intellectually accepted the strategic need to destroy Ascalon, he lamented its necessity. He is quoted as saying: “‘By God, I would prefer to lose all my sons rather than demolish a single stone of it. Yet, if God decrees it and prescribes it as a way of preserving the best interests of the Muslims, what else can I do?’”14 In order to speed up the sad work, he even enjoined his son al-Afdal to lend his cavalry battalion to the effort. On September 12, al-Adil sent a message to Saladin informing him that Humphrey of Toron had approached his camp, asking for talks. The jilted lord said Richard wanted to discuss the coastal lands. Saladin readily agreed. He wrote al-Adil that he should use 14

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 178.

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his skills and negotiate as he saw fit. He also told him to protract the parley as long as possible. Saladin was fearful that the Franks might try to capture Ascalon before the destruction was complete. Later in the day, al-Adil sent another message, informing Saladin that the Crusaders did not know the Muslim objectives in Ascalon. Nonetheless, Saladin vigorously pursued the work, knowing that the energetic Franks could refocus their attention. Saladin was still demolishing walls and burning towers on September 22 when Izz al-Din Jurdik rode into his camp to tell him that Franks had started sending out raiding parties from Jaffa. He recommended that Saladin return and perhaps capture a Crusader company. Leaving the masons with a cavalry guard to complete the work, Saladin rode to Yubna on September 23 where he visited al-Adil in the evening. On the following day, he arrived back at Ramla.15 Saladin was correct to worry about the English king’s ambitions in the south of Palestine. When Richard left Acre in August 1191, among his objectives was to capture Ascalon. For him, this would impede Saladin’s access to Egypt from which the Ayyubids drew men, weapons, supplies, and funds. A base that included Jaffa and Ascalon, and perhaps even Egypt or parts of it, would enable him to recapture Jerusalem. After he set up camp at Jaffa on September 10, he dispatched Guy of Lusignan by ship to ascertain what Saladin was doing there. He also attempted to persuade his army leadership to advance on the southern port. He failed. The barons were now in Jaffa, enjoying summer fruits, wine, and women imported from Acre. Moreover, their ambition—the mission of the Third Crusade—was to regain Jerusalem. They did not appreciate Richard’s view that a substantial and strong base was necessary to launch an assault on an inland city, in this instance the Holy City. Meanwhile, Saladin was rearranging the terrain in the middle of Palestine. He instructed his engineers and stonemasons to For the Ascalon episode, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 321–23; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 177–81; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 100; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 339–41; Abu Shama, AlRawdatain, pt. 2, 192–93. 15

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dismantle the fortress at Ramla and distributed the contents of the town’s public granaries to the people. In Lydda to the north of Ramla, he told the workers to destroy the fortress-like church of St. George and again opened the stores to the people. At the end of the month, Saladin made a three-day trip to Jerusalem to inspect reported deteriorating conditions. For the past two years, he had focused on the Crusader siege of Acre, neglecting the Holy City’s needs. It was now apparent that the garrison and stores were depleted and the walls needed attention, especially in light of the expected Frankish siege and assault. Saladin charged the governor, Sarim al-Din Qaimaz, with restoring defenses and readiness. At about the same time, Sarim al-Din’s men arrested two Eastern Christians who had copies of his letters to the Ayyubid commander, describing the conditions in Jerusalem. At Saladin’s order, they were promptly executed. Saladin arrived back at the main army camp between Ramla and Lydda on September 30. The day before, a company of his soldiers had nearly captured King Richard. One of the stories about the event was that the English king had gone to the assistance of some Frankish foragers who had come under attack. Depending on the version, a Muslim was about to lance him when a Frank stepped in front of Richard and received the fatal blow. An alternative version is that the Muslims had Richard in their grasp when a senior aide, William of Pratelles, yelled out in Arabic that he was the king. The soldiers seized William and delivered him to Saladin. On October 5, Saladin moved some army battalions from the vicinity of Ramla and Lydda to Latrun at the base of the hills leading to Jerusalem. At this location, his cavalrymen could pasture their horses without constant heavy guard. The advance units remained in the center of the plain. In the middle of this great struggle, occasionally other imperial issues arose. An example was the visit of one of Qilij-Arslan’s sons, Muizz al-Din Qaisar-Shah. Upon his arrival at the Ayyubid camp, he requested assistance against his father and brothers who were attempting to seize his land. Al-Adil and al-Afdal had received him with honors, as did Saladin on November 1, but he had little to offer him. On the Crusader front, Richard was still arranging his army and dealing with politics. At his behest, Lord Humphrey had

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carried on negotiations on the basis that the entire coast should revert to the Crusaders, an unacceptable demand for Saladin. The king was also trying to reinforce his dwindling army. He sent Guy to Acre to encourage troops to return to Jaffa, with no result. On October 8, Richard traveled by ship to Acre to muster the soldiers—the Muslims thought he sailed because King Philip had died—and on October 13, he returned with substantial reinforcements. Now the English king was prepared to engage in either robust diplomacy or battle.16 *** During October and November 1191, soldiers from both sides were in constant low-level contact, occasionally punctuated by harsh clashes in which scores were killed, wounded, or captured. On the diplomatic front, Saladin was negotiating with two Crusader factions, the main group headed by Richard and a dissident set of lords led by Conrad of Montferrat from his base at Tyre. While Saladin was in Ascalon, he had authorized al-Adil to discuss peace issues with the English king, but both sides maintained their respective positions and the negotiations came to naught. Richard renewed contact on October 18 when he gave a note to al-Adil’s senior aide, al-Sania, which was sent on to Saladin. In the preface to his bargaining position, the king asserted: “‘The Muslims and Franks are done for. The land is ruined, ruined utterly at the hands of both sides.’” He then demanded Jerusalem, “‘the center of our worship,’” all the land west of the Jordan River, and the Holy Cross. Saladin, after consulting his council of advisors, responded that Jerusalem is important to the Muslims because “‘it is where our Prophet came on his Night Journey,’” that the land Richard demands was originally Muslim territory from which Muslims “‘feed on the produce and draw our benefit,’” and that the

For the attention to Ramla, Lydda, Jerusalem, and Richard’s movements in October 1191, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 180–83; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 341, 343; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 57–59. 16

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transfer of the Holy Cross awaits a benefit that might “‘accrue to Islam.’”17 Three days later, Richard offered a very different solution. He proposed that his sister, Queen Joanna, the widow of King William of Sicily, marry al-Adil. Richard would give Crusader lands in Palestine to Joanna as a dowry and Saladin would give his lands west of the Jordan to al-Adil. The wedded couple would live in Jerusalem and rule the joint kingdom under Saladin’s suzerainty. Western priests and monks could return to Jerusalem and the religious orders could take possession of the villages they once held, but not the fortresses, which would belong to the state. All Muslim and Frankish prisoners would be released and the True Cross returned to the Western Christians. With this arrangement, the two sides would declare a peace settlement and Richard would sail home. These terms were presented to al-Adil. Discussing them with his council of advisors, he took the position that he would accept the proposal if Saladin approved it. At Al-Adil’s direction, the council then sat with Saladin who, after the concept was presented, judged that the terms were “intended to mock and deceive him.” Nevertheless, Saladin accepted Richard’s proposal. Ibn Shaddad, the spokesman for the council, asked him three times if he approved it. Three times, Saladin responded that he did. Ibn Shaddad gives two interpretations of this unique event. First, Saladin thought he was being taunted, but, second, in the same paragraph, he writes that “these terms were settled.”18 On October 23, al-Sania returned to Richard’s camp with Saladin’s acceptance only to be told that Joanna in great anger rejected the prospect of marrying a Muslim. The king’s immediate solution was for al-Adil to become a Christian. This proposal went nowhere, but the door for more discussions was explicitly left open.19 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 186. Ibid., 188. 19 For this October negotiation, see: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 324–25; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 187–88; Tyerman, God’s War, 461; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 59; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 32–43. 17 18

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On November 8, Richard and al-Adil spent the day together during which they exchanged presents, enjoyed a long banquet, and shared each other’s food. Through al-Adil, Richard sent a message asking for a meeting. Saladin responded as in the past: once a comprehensive agreement is concluded, it will be appropriate for the two kings to meet, not before. Richard accepted this position and, on the next day, sent another conciliatory message, delivered by Lord Humphrey of Toron to show respect and sincerity. Saladin dispatched a small delegation to see if the matter of the exchange of prisoners could be arranged. The Franks replied that this would only be part of the larger peace accords. In early October, via an envoy, Conrad of Montferrat proposed a separate peace. In exchange for Beirut and Sidon, he said he would besiege and capture Acre from the Western Franks and conclude a general peace with the Muslims. The proposal, extended behind the back of Richard, was a blatant betrayal of the mission of the Third Crusade. Not averse to fueling the divisions among his enemy, Saladin responded that he was favorably disposed to Conrad’s construct, but as a condition to the conclusion of such an agreement, Conrad would first have to seize Acre and free the prisoners who were spared in the August 1191 massacre. In November, these discussions resumed at a higher level. Reynald of Sidon, the former lord of Beaufort and a fluent Arabic speaker, arrived at Saladin’s camp on the fifth of the month. Saladin instructed his aides to treat him with high honor. On November 9, Saladin held a long session with Reynald, essentially with the same message imparted in October. During these days, the two men enjoyed riding together. On occasion, they rode to the ridge from which they could view Richard’s camp, an exercise that Richard’s men clearly observed and reported to the king. During these weeks, Saladin’s amirs saw the various envoys coming and going. On November 11, he held a general council and laid out the two proposals that had been presented. The amirs strongly preferred an accord with Richard. They commented that “a sincere friendship of the [local] Franks towards the Muslims, such as they could mix together, was a remote possibility and an

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association not safe from treachery.”20 Additionally, the fact that Richard planned to leave the Holy Land was positive. An enemy at a great distance was less of a challenge. In addition, they would be able to stand down the iqta army. During the next few days, more envoys brought messages. Once again, Richard discussed the possibility of an al-Adil-Joanna marriage. For this to occur, the king would have to seek the pope’s concurrence, which would take three months. If this was not forthcoming, Richard would offer his niece. Saladin repeated that the peace arrangement involving Richard’s sister Joanna was still acceptable, but he rejected the niece, saying Joanna had already been discussed and the Muslim side was unwilling to alter that part of the agreement. The negotiations with Richard had now extended over two months. No conclusion had been reached and Saladin was skeptical that one could be with an adversary who does not always keep his word. Looking at the relationship with the Franks from another perspective, Saladin privately said to Ibn Shaddad: “‘If death should happen to strike me down, these forces are hardly likely to assemble again and the Franks will grow strong. Our best course is to keep on with the Jihad until we expel them from the coast or die ourselves.’”21 In this statement, we see Saladin’s belief in his singular importance and his desire to prosecute the holy war. One can question the statement, though, and perhaps consider it Ibn Shaddad’s contribution to the Ayyubid propaganda effort.22 On the military front, Muslims and Franks remained in contact. In early October, Saladin’s amirs organized a bedouin unit of about 300 men to cross Frankish lines and infiltrate their camps. For the next two months, they would go out at night and return with captured men, horses, and mules. Regular cavalry units were Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 195. Ibid. 22 For the diplomacy of October and November 1191, see: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 193–94, Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 182–97; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 324–28; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 342–43; Tyerman, God’s War, 460–61; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 59–60; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 326–31; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 72. 20 21

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also active. On October 14, Saladin’s pickets saw a large number of soldiers spread out from Acre. The mounted Muslims charged and captured 21 Crusaders whom they delivered to Saladin two days later. At about the same time, Prince Bohemond of Antioch led a raiding party against Jabala and Latakia, but an Ayyubid brigade responded effectively. Many Franks fell on the road as they retreated to the capital. In mid October, Saladin moved his headquarters and additional elements of his army to Latrun so his men could pasture their horses under light guard. Late in the month, he received intelligence that the Franks were planning to advance on Ramla whereupon he returned in battle order to his old camp near that town. The Franks by that time were near Yazur, half way between Jaffa and Ramla. On October 29, Saladin ordered al-Adil’s advance troops to raid the Crusader camp. Eager to participate in battle, a number of irregulars from Anatolia followed the guard. After the Muslims made contact, the Frankish knights mounted one of their famous charges. While the regular cavalry escaped the field, the irregulars suffered losses, both wounded and killed. On November 6, there was a similar clash, but with a positive conclusion for the Ayyubid army. Saladin organized a classic ambush. Bedouin skirmishers were ordered to attack some foragers. The noise of the fight signaled the Frankish camp of the threat and a mounted force rode towards the bedouin who withdrew to a hidden Muslim cavalry battalion. The mounted men yelled in unison, charged the Franks, and a significant battle ensued. A larger mounted force then raced from the Frankish camp to rescue their beleaguered compatriots. Saladin had anticipated the response. He now directed a senior amir, Saif al-Din Yazkuj, to bring his cavalry regiment, which had been in ready reserve, to the field. At the sight of the substantial force, the Crusaders returned rapidly to the protection of their camp. At the end of the day, 60 Franks lay dead on the field, but also several Muslims were killed and wounded. Saladin’s men captured two knights and two others with their horses and armor deserted to Ayyubid camp.23 23

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 192–93.

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On November 17, knowing the weather would soon deteriorate, Saladin retired to Latrun where he remained for a month. Richard moved to Ramla and started rebuilding fortresses.24 On the Muslim front, Saladin learned of the loss of Taqi alDin on November 1, 1191. After his failed siege of Khilat, Saif alDin Bektimur’s capital, he was returning to his Mayyafariqin iqta when he died of natural causes. Saladin called his closest advisors: al-Adil, Alam al-Din Sulaiman ibn Jandar, Sabiq al-Din ibn al-Daya of Aleppo, Izz al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam, and Ibn Shaddad. In front of them, he shed tears for his nephew who had effectively led Ayyubid troops on numerous occasions and had engaged in many successful battles. On the following day, Saladin received a letter from the caliphal diwan in Baghdad strongly criticizing Taqi alDin’s actions in Anatolia, specifically his assault on Bektimur’s Khilat and the arrest of one Hasan ibn Qifjaq, a rapacious prince with lands east of the Tigris. Saladin responded that he had sent Taqi al-Din to the region to gather troops for the holy war, but his nephew had exceeded his orders. However, he defended the detention of Hasan ibn Qifjaq, saying Taqi al-Din was to bring him to Damascus where he would be settled on an iqta, with the implication that the troublesome leader would be removed from the upper reaches of the Tigris.25

RICHARD’S ADVANCE ON AND RETREAT FROM JERUSALEM: 1191–1192 During the month Saladin spent in Latrun, he kept continual pressure on Richard’s brigades. Patrols rode out to challenge the Franks and the bedouin continued to capture animals and For the fighting in October and November, see: Imad al-Din, AlFath, 324–28; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 193–94; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 184–92; Tyerman, God’s War, 460–63; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 59–60; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 342–46; LanePoole, Saladin, 326–31. 25 Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 343, Gibb, Life of Saladin, 67; Imad alDin, Al-Fath, 330–33; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 184, 190. 24

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occasionally prisoners. The king directed his men to rebuild castles in the region of Ramla. He enjoyed riding to survey the land, all new to him. On one occasion, while inspecting the Blanchegarde fortress, which is situated between Ramla and Latrun at Tell Gezer, one of Saladin’s companies nearly captured him. On a separate occasion, a patrol apprehended the Earl of Leicester, a very senior member of the king’s council, but the ever-chivalrous Saladin released him. In December, the weather deteriorated. On the twelfth, Saladin moved the army to Jerusalem, but left an advance guard at Beit Nuba. As planned, a large elite force under the command of Husam al-Din Abu al-Haija the Fat—a very senior and respected amir who, in 1190, had commanded the troops in besieged Acre— marched into the Muslim camp on December 22, 1191. Saladin deployed part of his army within the city and instructed his engineers to continue repairing the walls. He also stationed major battalions outside in the hills. Others that had been in service for months were released to return to their homes in the north and east with instructions to return in mid spring.26 Saladin made this decision despite the approach of the Crusaders. Rain, sleet, and mud created very difficult conditions for a marching army. Thus, even though Richard was close to Jerusalem, Saladin did not expect a full siege and assault during the winter.27 The inclement weather did not halt military maneuvering and skirmishing. After Saladin left Latrun, Richard relocated his army to the abandoned camp and celebrated Christmas there. This move effectively doubled the distance his logistics’ units had to cover to bring material and foodstuffs from Jaffa. Ayyubid units took advantage of the Franks’ new posture. On a number of occasions, they succeeded in cutting the supply road and plundering Frankish caravans. On December 28, the Crusaders left Latrun and slowly marched to Beit Nuba, only 12 miles from Jerusalem, where they established their camp on January 3, 1192. The location commands a beautiful view of the Plain of Sharon, but the road from there to Jerusalem is uphill. Saladin’s pickets had withdrawn from the 26 27

Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 102. Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 329–30; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 345.

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region, but his amirs sustained their attacks on the Franks. On December 29, Sabiq al-Din Uthman harassed Richard’s guards and on January 3, Saif al-Din Yazkuj and Alam al-Din Qaisar raided and pillaged the Ramla region. Richard and his coalition army was now only a short march from the Holy City, but the weather was atrocious. Chroniclers write of heavy rain and sleet and deep mud. Winds caused tents to collapse and water often penetrated Frankish stores, fouling the army’s staple fare—hard biscuits and bacon. After the Franks settled in at Beit Nuba, Richard called a grand council on January 6, 1192, which met for a week to decide if the Crusaders would continue to Jerusalem or return to the coast. The barons, knights, and soldiers from Europe strongly favored completing their mission. They wanted to take the Holy Sepulcher, perform the pilgrimage, and secure the Holy Cross. Then return home. Even the miserable weather and bad food did not mute their aspirations and dreams. Levantine Crusaders—the Hospitalers, Templars, and local barons—posited the contrary position. In their view, it would be militarily very difficult to lay siege to the city in the sloppy winter conditions. They also noted that substantial Muslim forces bivouacked outside the city and were prepared to assault the Franks’ flanks and rear. A second line of argument was that if the Crusaders captured Jerusalem, they would not be able to hold it. The European Franks, after performing pilgrimage rites, would sail home. The local Crusaders were not numerous. Thus, once again, Saladin would be able to take the Holy City. They likewise contended that the army should take and rebuild Ascalon to secure a more substantial coastal presence. Richard’s original intentions are not known, but the fact that he took over two months to reach Beit Nuba suggests he was less than enthusiastic about the project. Ibn al-Athir even writes that in the council Richard focused on the tactical reasons, namely the geographical difficulties of such a siege in January, for not attacking Jerusalem. He also quotes Richard as saying that as long as Saladin is alive and the Muslims are united, it would not be possible to take the Holy City.28 Another concern had to be the supply line to Jaffa. It was 28

Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 102–3.

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vincible when his large army was in the field. After the European contingents left for their homes, it would be much more vulnerable to Saladin’s raiders. On January 13, 1192, Richard was convinced. Despite strenuous objections, he ordered a general retreat. The morale of the army disintegrated. Individuals, companies, and battalions left for Jaffa and Acre. Some even went as far as Tyre where the breakaway Conrad of Montferrat ruled. Duke Hugh of Burgundy was among the lords who left, but Richard’s nephew, Count Henry of Champagne, remained with him and the remnants of the army at Ramla. The episode on the road to Jerusalem also had lessons for Saladin. It showed him that grand European armies of the day were as fragile as large Muslim armies were. Furthermore, it demonstrated that the European Crusaders, coming from afar, did not want to remain in the region and, consequently, that the Franks who remained in the Holy Land would lack sufficient manpower to challenge the Ayyubid Empire in Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon. As the Franks withdrew, Saladin dismissed additional brigades with orders to return in late spring. His own guard, al-Adil’s battalion, the Jerusalem garrison, and the Egyptian brigades under Abu al-Haija remained in the camps in and around the city.29

POLITICS AND NEGOTIATIONS: 1192 At Ramla, Richard had to think about his next steps in the Holy Land. Many of the barons and men who were with him and those who had dispersed to the north wanted to devote their attention and energies to the mission of the Third Crusade. In contrast, Richard’s broader view was to secure the entire Palestinian littoral and then consider either Jerusalem or possibly Egypt, the latter of For mid November 1191 to mid January 1192, see: Ambroise, Estoire de la Guerre Sainte, 303–07; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 102–3; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 328–30; Tyerman, God’s War, 46–65; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vo. 3, 75–83; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 61–62; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 332–34; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 345–46. 29

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which he had proposed to the Genoese, as a joint venture, in the fall of 1191. On January 20, he held a council at Ramla, which accepted his project to march to Ascalon and rebuild the fortress that Saladin had recently destroyed. By the end of the month, his reduced army camped in the ruins and his engineers directed the reconstruction. Richard persuaded some French barons with their companies to join him, but their will to stay did not last. Soon the Duke of Burgundy traveled north. Richard summoned Conrad in Tyre, but he haughtily declined despite royal threats. Meanwhile, his stolid English soldiers worked on the citadel despite the foul weather and erratic food supplies. Saladin spent the winter and early spring months resting his army and preparing for the next Crusader attack. He dispersed many battalions to strongpoints along the road to Egypt and to the Jordan Valley. Because the valley is below sea level, it is warm in the winter and thus the troops were comfortable and enjoyed local fresh fruits and vegetables. In Jerusalem, Saladin repaired city walls, constructed new towers, and deepened moats. He utilized 2,000 captured Franks as forced labor as well as 50 stonemasons Izz alDin of Mosul had dispatched to aid in the holy war. Saladin’s men observed the Crusaders energetically rebuilding Ascalon. Fearing that Egypt might be the next target, Saladin instructed his authorities to evacuate women and children from Tanis and Damietta on the coast. He also had the latter’s moat repaired and directed work crews to clear the local forest so the Crusaders would not have wood for siege engines. Despite the cold and rain, both sides conducted military raids in force. On January 28, February 18, and March 1, Saladin’s amirs successively attacked Yubna, Ascalon, and Jaffa. For his part, Richard raided an Ayyubid camp near Ascalon that was under the command of Saif al-Din Yazkuj and Alam al-Din Qaisar, two of Saladin’s senior officers.30

Tyerman, God’s War, 461, 465; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 62; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 85–86; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 346–47; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 329–30. 30

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*** To the north, Crusader fractious politics deteriorated into open rebellion and violence involving rival Pisan and Genoese factions in alliance with various French and English lords and barons. The Pisans, ostensibly with Guy of Lusignan’s blessing, seized Acre. The Genoese supported by Hugh of Burgundy and Conrad of Montferrat violently objected, forcing the Pisans to call their ally Richard for assistance. The king sailed to Acre on February 20, calmed the parties, and patched up the coalition. His interview with Conrad, though, did not result in reconciliation and thus enmity between the two camps persisted. During the first months of the year, Saladin and Conrad maintained their contacts through senior barons sent by the Tyrian leader. Saladin’s position was the same as in the fall. He would allow Conrad to include Beirut and Sidon in his minor state and sign a peace accord, but only after Conrad engaged in hostilities against the Crusaders in Acre. Richard was frustrated with petty Frankish politics and anxious to return to his kingdom. In this context, he reached out to Saladin once again. While still in Acre in late February or early March 1192, he sent Stephen of Turnham to Jerusalem, requesting Saladin to send al-Adil for another round of negotiations. Stephen was startled to see Reynald of Sidon and Balian of Ibelin leaving the Holy City as he arrived. It was common knowledge that Saladin had a good rapport with both men. In the fall of 1191, he and Reynald rode together in the hills around the city. In 1187, Saladin had Balian’s wife Queen Maria royally escorted from Jerusalem to Tyre before the siege and he personally negotiated with Balian after the city’s fall. Their very presence was one more pressure on Richard to reach a settlement. After consulting with al-Adil and his amirs, Saladin decided to send his brother to meet with Richard’s ambassador, Humphrey of Toron. His instructions to al-Adil were complex. He was to initiate the discussion by saying: “‘On many occasions there have been talks between us which have yielded no useful result. If this time is to be like those others, there is no need for more talk, but if the aim is to settle some arrangement, then buckle down to business.’” Saladin additionally said that if his brother could truly negotiate peace, he should do so. Al-Adil asked for a written memorandum outlining what principles were acceptable, which was duly

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prepared. As before, the condominium concept was mentioned and considered unobjectionable. Besides, it noted that if Richard pressed for Beirut, the city would be given to him, but the citadel would be dismantled and could not be rebuilt. Saladin would restore the Holy Cross to the Crusaders and they would be allowed to make the pilgrimage, unarmed, to Jerusalem where they could post their priests at the Holy Sepulcher. However, no notable Frank would reside in the city.31 The records do not mention Ascalon at this stage, but given later statements concerning the port, Saladin certainly required the Franks to abandon the city after which he would demolish it again. Al-Adil took the paper to Baisan in the Jordan Valley, not far from Acre. Humphrey of Toron and al-Adil’s chamberlain, Abu Bakr, sallied back and forth between the Ayyubid and Richard. The king responded with his own requirements. Although initially he said that the Franks should have all of Jerusalem, the demand was temporized whereby the Muslims would possess the Haram al-Sharif esplanade upon which the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque are situated and the citadel known as David’s Tower. The rest of the city would be shared, as would the villages nearby. (Some references state that Richard’s offer was less generous, namely, the Muslims would only have the Haram alSharif and the citadel and the Franks would posses the rest of the Holy City.) He accepted that Crusader barons of stature would not reside in the Holy City. As to other lands, Richard proposed that each prince keep what he holds, but allowed for some give-andtake so that each side would hold similar amounts. In the course of the discussions, Richard hosted Abu Bakr’s delegation at a banquet during which he personally honored alAdil’s son by bestowing on him a belt of knighthood.32 On April 1, 1192, al-Adil rode to Jerusalem to discuss the state of negotiations with Saladin. Many details were still to be finalized, but it appeared that both sides felt there was progress.33 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 197. Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 63; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 338. 33 For the February–March 1192, see: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 347; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 197–98; Runciman, History of the Crusades, 31 32

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Richard returned to Ascalon in early April only to face rough politics once again. His viceroy in England, Bishop William Longchamp of Ely, arrived to tell him that Richard’s brother John was grasping authority and importuned the king to return to London. Meanwhile, Hugh of Burgundy called all French still in the southern port to join him in Acre. Richard convened a grand council of his barons and knights. He told them he would shortly have to return to Europe. Further, he asked to whom he should bestow the Jerusalem crown, Guy of Lusignan or Conrad of Montferrat. To his surprise and anger, the council chose Conrad; no one voted for Guy. Richard accepted the decision and sent Henry of Champagne on April 20 to Tyre to inform Conrad. During this period, contacts between Saladin and Conrad persisted. Diplomats went back and forth. Saladin maintained his earlier terms, but added and clarified them. Most importantly, prisoners held by Conrad were to be turned over to Saladin. Envisaging a possible joint assault on European Franks, all land conquered in concert would be equally divided. A new clause was that any Saladin-Conrad agreement would have to conform to a Saladin-Richard peace treaty, if achieved. This is the clearest note in the records that Saladin guardedly expected that he and Richard could reach an accord. Saladin clearly put forth that Ascalon would not be part of any agreement with Conrad. It was not on the table. On April 21, Conrad’s negotiator arrived with developing news. “‘Some sort of understanding had been reached between him and the [local] Franks. If a settlement is achieved in the next few days, the French will depart by sea. If it is delayed, peace negotiations with the marquis [Conrad] will be completely futile.’”34 This somewhat confusing message prompted Saladin to send his own envoy, al-Adl—not to be confused with Saladin’s brother, alAdil—to Tyre to conclude an agreement with Conrad along the terms described above.35

vol. 3, 63; Tyerman, God’s War, 466–67; Grousset, Histoire des Croisade, vol. 3, 88. 34 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 200. 35 Ibid., 199–200.

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Richard’s reluctant acceptance of Conrad’s election to head the Kingdom of Jerusalem and Saladin’s potential concord with Conrad, were undone on April 28, 1192. After visiting the Bishop of Beauvais, Conrad was walking home when two men accosted and stabbed him to death. One of the assassins was killed immediately, but the second lived to confess that the two were loyal agents of Sinan, the “Old Man of the Mountain,” the leader of the Assassins. Rumors quickly circulated as to why Sinan wanted Conrad dead. The most likely motive was that some of Conrad’s men had captured a richly laden Assassin ship. Sinan demanded the return of the goods, men, and ship, but Conrad refused. In fact, all the sailors had drowned. Furthermore, Sinan may have been fearful that Conrad’s ambitions in Lebanon would eventually encroach on his territory. Two other stories were in the air. Saladin had hired Sinan to kill both Richard and Conrad, but Sinan decided to kill only Conrad for fear that Saladin’s power in the absence of Richard would threaten his base at Masyaf. The other rumor asserted that Richard arranged the murder, a conspiracy that has no basis in the records, but was believed by some of the French and Austrians. Suddenly, the Jerusalem crown was again at play. Henry of Champagne hurried to Tyre where the young Queen Isabella, twice widowed and only 21 years old, had sequestered herself in the palace. Popularly acclaimed and accepted, Isabella gave the keys to Henry. Two days after the assassination, they were betrothed. Richard appeared and advised Henry to accept the throne. On May 5, 1192, they travelled to Acre and married. The queen’s widowhood had lasted only one week.36 In the midst of the dramatic politics, Saif al-Din al-Mashtub, the Kurdish amir who was commander of Acre, gained freedom from a Frankish prison, most likely because a sizable ransom was paid. He visited Saladin in Jerusalem on April 16, 1192. Even For the negotiations et al of April and May 1192, see: Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 64–66; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 89–96; Tyerman, God’s War, 465–66; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 348–49; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 200–1; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 344–45; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 105–6; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 114–16. 36

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though he had met Richard, he was not able to offer any insights about the peace negotiations.37 After the Conrad assassination, Saladin and Richard maintained contacts from afar. The king was still asking for an equal division of the lands. Saladin countered by demanding that the Franks abandon Ascalon and Jaffa. In return, they could keep all other territories they currently held.38 In essence, the two men were not yet ready to compromise and come to an agreement. Saladin’s fellow leader to the very far north, Emperor Isaac of Byzantium, sent a senior envoy who, on the emperor’s behalf, proposed a formal agreement giving Constantinople’s Eastern Christianity a favorable place in Jerusalem. Specifically, he asked Saladin to give his priests control over the Holy Sepulcher and other Jerusalem churches and he requested the Holy Cross. In a strange mixture of issues, he also called on Saladin to join an attack on Cyprus to restore it to the Byzantium Empire and eliminate Crusader control. On May 17, Saladin received the envoy with ceremony to show his respect and friendship for the emperor, but he politely turned down all of the proposals. He was acutely aware that Isaac’s problem was with Richard and the Crusaders and that the weak forces of Constantinople could not help him. There were also rumors that Saladin was talking with Guy of Lusignan, the deposed king, about his ambition to take Cyprus. This is curious, because by late May, Richard had sold the island, as noted, to Guy. It is possible, though, that Guy and Saladin may have discussed the island in the period after Guy was deposed and before Richard turned it over to him.39 Just as Richard was experiencing family problems in Europe, Saladin too had to deal with the potentially rebellious son of Taqi al-Din, Nasir al-Din Muhammad (also referred to as al-Mansur Muhammad ibn al-Muzaffar Taqi al-Din) who, at the young age of 20, was seeking to inherit his father’s iqtas, especially those east of the Euphrates. Nasir al-Din was fearful that Saladin would not Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 334; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 199. Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 345; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 349. 39 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 201–2; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 349. 37 38

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favor these ambitions and reportedly approached Saif al-Din Bektimur, the leader of Khilat—known as Shah-Arman as was the previous Khilat leader—whom Taqi al-Din had unsuccessfully besieged in the previous year. Such an alliance, if concluded, would have threatened other alliances Saladin enjoyed in the region. At another level, Saladin was reluctant to entrust the young man with such a large legacy in a sensitive area. Nasir al-Din would have also known that iqtas were not patrimony. Saladin had assigned and reassigned many during his rule, including those bestowed on Taqi al-Din. To deal with this matter, Saladin dispatched his son al-Afdal. He left Jerusalem with great ceremony, accompanied by his battalion. At Aleppo, he visited his brother al-Zahir. On April 16, Saladin instructed al-Afdal to cross the Euphrates and take the iqtas that Nasir al-Din coveted. Additionally, he told al-Zahir to give alAfdal any help he needed. Saladin was particularly distressed at Nasir al-Din’s behavior. Ibn Shaddad, who was at Saladin’s camp, writes that this “… annoyed the sultan and made him very angry against al-Mansur [Nasir al-Din] for having caused trouble in the family. No-one in the family had ever feared him before or demanded an oath from him.”40 As the crisis progressed, Nasir alDin realized that he had stimulated a reaction that he could not handle by himself. He appealed to al-Adil to intervene with Saladin on his behalf. In response to al-Adil’s intercession and input from his senior amirs, Saladin made some erratic decisions. Initially, he accepted al-Adil’s proposals with respect to the young man, but on May 14, he reversed his decision and tore up the draft agreement and oath al-Adil had prepared for him. His close advisors and amirs talked with him, saying a choice must be made between conflicts with Muslims in the East and the prosecution of the holy war, arguments that were similar to those made before him prior to 1187. Saladin relented. He decided to assign some iqtas west of the Euphrates to Nasir al-Din. Al-Adil promptly requested Taqi alDin’s iqtas east of the Euphrates. Saladin assigned these to him, but relieved him of some northern iqtas he currently held, and allowed him to retain his iqtas in Transjordan: Karak, Shawbak, Salt, and 40

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 200.

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the Balqa. Documents attesting to these arrangements were drafted and Saladin enjoined al-Adil to travel to the Euphrates and settle the matters with Nasir al-Din. He left with his regiment on May 22, 1191. Al-Afdal was not pleased with the new developments. Ordered back to Syria, he stayed in Damascus until eventually his father instructed him to join the army in Jerusalem.41 Just as Saladin had substantial intelligence about political and military issues in the Crusader cities and camps, Richard knew about developments at Saladin’s headquarters. He was aware of Ayyubid family problems in the North and East and the consequent thinning of Saladin’s army, namely, that both al-Afdal and al-Adil had taken their battle-tested cavalry units to the Euphrates region and that Saladin’s troops had not yet returned from their winter-spring rest in Anatolia, Syria, Sinjar, Diyar Bakr, and Mosul. With this knowledge, Richard decided to attack Darum, a walled town and citadel south of Ascalon. He summoned the French and others in Acre to join him, but the impatient Richard decided to attack as they slowly made their way south. On May 23, he assaulted the town with cavalry and foot soldiers, but he also employed 50 Aleppan sappers he hired away from the Ayyubids. In hours, they drove their tunnels under the walls and the Franks entered the town. The garrison asked for permission to contact Saladin, but none was given. It too fell quickly and the Muslim soldiers were either killed or enslaved. Alam al-Din Qaisar, who was in charge of Darum’s defense, was camped outside of the town in fear of a massacre as at Acre. Judging that it would be futile to counterattack, he watched as the last Ayyubid outpost before Egypt fell. From a strategic standpoint, this Frankish success threatened commerce with the economic engine of the empire. As long as the Franks held their positions at Ascalon and Darum, the army would have to provide trading caravans with heavy cavalry escorts. The military success emboldened the Franks. Having tasted victory This series of incidents and decisions is covered extensively in the sources. See: Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 348–49; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 199–202, 209; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 347–48; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 73; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 109; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 218. 41

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again, the combative Crusaders would want more and, in the minds of many, Jerusalem was still central to their mission in military and religious terms.42

JERUSALEM AGAIN: 1192 After the victory at Darum, the Third Crusade leadership traveled in celebration to Ascalon. Henry of Champagne, married for only three weeks, arrived and Richard gave him the newly captured stronghold. Duke Hugh of Burgundy and his French colleagues joined the assemblage, as did Richard’s vassals and men from England, Poitou, and Normandy. The French and English leaders, in the absence of Richard, met and decided to march on Jerusalem. Before informing him, they leaked the decision to the army to force his acquisition. In January 1192, Richard in consultation with the Crusader grand council had decided to abandon the Jerusalem project for reasons that had not changed. Nevertheless, the popular decision was taken. Richard, in depression or anger, took to his bed only to be revived by a priestly speech, extolling his knightly reputation, duty, and bravery. With reluctance, the revived king led the army to Beit Nuba.43 The trek began on June 6 and, on the first evening, the army camped at Tell al-Safiya. Saladin learned of the new threat the same day when an army messenger reported “… that the enemy had set out with horse and foot [soldiers] and a huge mass of camp followers.”44 By the end of May 1192, substantial military units had joined Saladin. In mid April, Shirkuh ibn Nasir al-Din of Homs arrived with his vanguard, soon followed by other cavalry units. On May Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 203; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 349; Tyerman, God’s War, 467; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 67; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 245–47; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 107–9. 43 For this decision, see especially: Tyerman, God’s War, 467. Also see: Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 67; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 97–98; Ambroise, Estoire de la Guerre Sainte, 355–64; Chronicle of the Third Crusade, 321–26. 44 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 204. 42

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31, Badr al-Din Dildirim with his large force of Turkomans marched into Jerusalem and on the same day Izz al-Din ibn alMuqaddam rode in “with a fine troop and battalions.”45 Al-Afdal sulked in Damascus, but on his father’s order, he and al-Zahir joined the army on July 2, 1192. As the Crusaders were mustering, Saladin’s men conducted raids in force against them, notably near the Majd al-Yaba fortress in the southern hills leading to Hebron, in the neighborhood of Tyre, and east of Ascalon at Wadi al-Hasi. The harassing attacks continued as the enemy marched. The Franks arrived at Beit Nuba on June 11. Aside from skirmishing around their camp, the Muslims also focused on their supply lines. On or about June 12, Dildirim and his Turkoman battalions successfully attacked a caravan, killed 30 Frankish soldiers, captured others, and seized booty, a substantial raid that undermined Crusader morale. A carefully planned ambush on June 16 similarly disrupted Frankish logistics. A bedouin company attacked a Crusader caravan guard and retreated towards a Turkish cavalry unit. In the ensuing clash, a number of Franks were killed and wounded, but the Turks also suffered losses.46 During this sustained violence, the two sides maintained their dialogue. Low-level envoys came and went, but with little result. On June 10, a Crusader envoy accompanied by one of al-Mashtub’s mamlukes visited Saladin’s headquarters to discuss a ransom deal for the release of Baha al-Din Qaraqush, the imprisoned former governor of Acre, but he was also enjoined to explore Saladin’s requirements for peace and measure the morale of the Muslim camp.47 On June 10, 1192, Saladin met with his amirs and officers. They decided on a strategy on how to defend Jerusalem. The bulk of the army would remain outside of the city and act as a mobile striking force. In addition, selected amirs and their men were assigned specific sections of the city’s walls to defend if the Franks Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 204. Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 346–47; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 203, 205–6. 47 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 205. 45 46

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undertook a siege. Saladin told them, though, that if needed, he would call on them to fight outside the Holy City.48 Richard, in his usual manner, personally surveyed the terrain close to Jerusalem. In the second week of June, he rode up to Qaluniya (or Montjoie or Emmaus, depending on the source) about five miles from Jerusalem.49 The difficulty of the terrain, scarcity of water sources in the hard rock of the mountains, and the presence of many Ayyubid cavalry battalions outside the city walls surely impressed him. In the Crusader camp, although the decision to advance on Jerusalem had been made, the nobles continued to debate the wisdom of an attack on the city. As in January, the local Franks were against the project. The French argued for an assault. The English and their allies, though, were of two minds. The king was still “dubious, if not overtly hostile” to the idea and, reportedly, he and some of the barons were still weighing the option of invading Egypt.50 Meanwhile, the army awaited the return of Henry of Champagne whom Richard had sent to Acre and Tyre to bring men who had not yet joined the muster. The new body of fresh knights and soldiers arrived at the end of the month. Richard learned through his spies that a large Egyptian camel train was assembling in Bilbais. As a major diversion that eventually bode well for the Crusaders, he decided to plunder it. By June 20, the intelligence was confirmed and on June 22, the English king mounted a large raiding force—700 knights, 1,000 Turcopoles, and 1,000-foot soldiers who rode mules or doubled up behind the Turcopoles.51 The Ayyubids did not know where Richard was going, but Saladin was concerned about the great prize. He dispatched Shams al-Din Aslam with a cavalry force to warn the Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 346; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 205. Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 350; Tyerman, God’s War, 468; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol., 3, 61. 50 Tyerman, God’s War, 467. 51 Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 347. Ibn Shaddad records a smaller force made up of 1,000 knights and 1,000 soldiers. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 206. Abu Shama repeats Ibn Shaddad’s numbers. Abu Shama, AlRawdatain, pt. 2, 198. 48 49

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Egyptian guard, commanded by Falak al-Din Sulaiman, to march at night and speedily quit the Wadi al-Hasi—half way between Gaza City and Ascalon. Falak al-Din, al-Adil’s half-brother on his mother’s side, reconnoitered the valley and found it free of Franks. Fearing that some units of the strung-out caravan would lose their way in the dark, he ordered them to make camp there on June 23. Richard was perfectly positioned. He was just outside the area surveyed by the Muslim scouts. At dawn on June 24, his knights struck as the men were loading the camels. The mounted knights pursued the Egyptian guard, a much smaller force than Richard’s, as the soldiers secured the enormous booty: 500 prisoners, 3,000 camels, a herd of horses, cloth, weapons, and coffers full of coins. Richard forced the camel drivers to lead the caravan to Beit Nuba where he arrived on June 29. Small parties escaped to the desert and Egypt. One man found himself as far as Karak on the other side of the Dead Sea. Aslam’s cavalry interfered with the Frankish raiders on the edges, but his force was not large enough to be effective.52 The Crusaders were elated at their success and many now clamored for Jerusalem. Saladin feared the Franks’ next move, on either the Holy City or possibly Egypt. To thwart the first option, he instructed his engineers to destroy or poison wells and cisterns around Jerusalem. If the enemy chose Egypt, he was prepared to pursue them with a great force because many of his Egyptian brigades were either at Jerusalem or with al-Adil. His younger son Uthman, still in Cairo, was inexperienced in war and would need help from the main Ayyubid army if the Crusaders marched to the Nile. On July 2, the day al-Afdal arrived at Jerusalem with his battalion, Saladin held another war council. Ibn Shaddad, at Saladin’s request, gave a pep talk, urging the assembled men to pursue holy war and defend Jerusalem. All of the amirs “held their Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 347–48; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 108–09; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 198; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 206–09; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 118– 119; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 350; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 68; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 102–6. 52

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peace and hardly dared to move—as though there were birds on their heads.”53 Saladin broke the silence by saying that they were the protection for “the blood of the Muslims, their property and their offspring” and that “public treasury monies” had been expended on them for that purpose. Thus, they had a duty to holy war. Speaking for the assemblage, Saif al-Din al-Mashtub gave Saladin total support. It was also decided that for the safety of the Ayyubid Empire, Saladin, despite his personal reluctance, should join the army outside the city walls. After the meeting, Husam al-Din Abu al-Haija—the very senior commander from Egypt—sent Saladin a note with two messages. He pointed out that many of the amirs and mamlukes, remembering Acre, wanted to fight in the field where, if they bested the Franks, they could take the coast. If they lost a battle, they would perhaps lose Jerusalem, but it could be taken again. In essence, they were basically supporting the strategy outlined on June 10, but without committing substantial military assets to defend the Holy City and risk a massacre. In addition, Abu al-Haija bluntly noted that there was considerable friction between the Kurds and Turks, to the point that they would not accept orders from one another. Thus, a member of Saladin’s family had to stay in Jerusalem to command the garrison. Saladin acknowledged the reality by appointing Majd al-Din, the son of his brother FarrukhShah, to remain in the city. On the next day, Friday July 3, 1192, Saladin prayed at the alAqsa Mosque where Ibn Shaddad reports “his tears were falling on his prayer rug” after which he left Jerusalem.54 Thus, Saladin’s faithful secretary continued to extol his sultan’s religious feeling and fervor. In the first days of July, the Crusaders continued their debate: Jerusalem or Egypt. It was both vociferous and acrimonious, and reported in detail to Saladin. Hugh of Burgundy, speaking for the French, insisted on assaulting the Holy City. This was what his men Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 209, and n. 3. For the decision of July 2–3, 1192, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 209–11; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 352–53; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 341; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 74. 53 54

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desired and it was the purpose of the Third Crusade. Richard observed that Saladin had polluted the water sources. Thus, a besieging army would have to break ranks to secure supplies, making the troops acutely vulnerable to Ayyubid cavalrymen. He also repeated the earlier argument that the Franks would not have sufficient soldiers to hold the city over time. As the rancorous discussion became more and more bitter, Izz al-Din Jurdik reported that on July 3, the Franks mounted their horses, stood in the field, and then returned to the camp, a curious exercise that likely reflected the indecision and division at the camp. The next day, Richard, as supreme commander, appointed five Templars, five Hospitalers, five local Franks, five French, but no English to sit on a committee to make a hard recommendation. By this selection, he protected himself and his allies from at least one kind of criticism, but he had purposely put a majority on the body who were known to want to return to the coast. After debate, the committee gave Richard the option he wanted and, on July 4, 1192, he ordered a general retreat. The army disintegrated once again. The French ran to Acre and Tyre as Richard and his followers marched to Ramla. Each side hurled verbal blows and more at the other. From Jerusalem’s hills, Saladin and his troops observed the Crusaders’ humiliating return to the coast. It was “a day of delight and rejoicing,” but Saladin realized the stalemate endured.55 Richard’s second experience in the hills below Jerusalem was replete with frustration, anger, division, and lack of success. Unlike in 1099, his great European army did not make a dent on the Holy City. In his attempt to offer Egypt as an alternative goal, he knew he was being disingenuous. He did not have sufficient military assets to invade, capture, and hold the country’s ports, the delta, and possibly Cairo. In addition, the pressure to return home to England was great. Not only did this call undermine the Egyptian option, but also it meant that he had to reach an accord with Saladin through which he could recoup some honor and perhaps For the Crusader decision, see: Tyerman, God’s War, 468–69; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 69; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 353; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 106–10; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 341–42; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 211–12. 55

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improve the prospects of the local Crusaders as he sailed home. In this context, he surely recognized that he would be negotiating from a position of weakness, given the fractured condition of his thoroughly disgruntled coalition army. The Crusader withdrawal from Beit Nuba was not a victory for Saladin. The two armies had not met in battle. Both were still in Palestine, each with its singular weaknesses. Components of Richard’s coalition army had started going their separate ways, while the Ayyubid brigades were tired and overtaxed. Six years of continual warfare had taken its toll on the Ayyubid military. In 1187, 1188, and half of 1189, his army was able to capture towns and fortresses and thus enjoy booty and new iqtas. From August 1189 to mid 1192, Saladin’s men only lost territory and enjoyed few opportunities to pillage Frankish assets. Thus, the troops were tired and, at times, reluctant to fight. Continuous wars were expensive for amirs and soldiers alike since they were expending funds in Saladin’s service instead of tilling their fields at home. And the friction between Kurdish and Turkish units—a factor that was always present, but usually quiescent when new lands were conquered—raised its head as the army prepared to defend Jerusalem. Saladin’s family problems nagged him and undermined the readiness of his army, or at least some of it battalions. Nasir al-Din, although undoubtedly ambitious, could not replace his fabled father, Taqi al-Din. Settling the reassignment of Taqi al-Din’s iqtas created tensions, as Saladin first enjoined al-Afdal to take them and then cancelled the decision and turned them over to al-Adil. Consequently, al-Afdal grumbled in Damascus with his battalion until ordered to Jerusalem just before the Frankish retreat. While Saladin was still the undoubted commander of the Ayyubid army, he was, at times, experiencing difficulty controlling the entirety of his coalition force, once again, underlining one of the weaknesses of twelfth century medieval armies. Aside from military issues, constant war was straining the economies of Egypt, Syria, and the Upper Euphrates and Tigris. Saladin was mining resources, factories, and wealth for military ends, taking away from normal civilian needs. In addition, no new territory was being added to the empire, depriving the state coffers as well as Saladin’s relatives and amirs of additional income and revenue sources. These combined

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factors added to the pressure on Saladin to resolve the conflict with Richard, either on the field or in negotiation.

DIPLOMACY, BATTLE, AND AGREEMENT: 1192 The two princes resumed their discussions with a flurry of envoys relaying positions and proposals. On July 5, Saladin received Henry of Champagne’s agent who, quoting Henry, said: “‘The king of England has bestowed on me the lands of the coastal plain, which are now mine. Restore to me my lands so that I may make peace with you and be one of yours sons.’”56 Saladin reacted angrily at what he deemed to be arrogance and duplicity and threw the diplomat out of his tent. The next day, though, he recalled the agent whom he told, as with Conrad of Montferrat, he was prepared to discuss Acre and Tyre, but no other territory. For his part, Richard tried to set a new tone. On July 6 and again on July 9, he sent a message to Saladin via his own envoy and Hajji Yusuf, al-Mashtub’s aide. The king asserted that both sides were “ruined,” or will be “ruined” by this war. But also, he warned that Saladin should not consider his return to Ramla as a sign of weakness. He reminded the Ayyubid that the “ram backs away to charge.”57 Returning to reconciliation, he asked Saladin to consider Henry as a son and even said that if requested, Henry would fight with Saladin in the East, an offer Saladin did not take seriously. More importantly, Richard was no longer demanding Jerusalem. His request had now shrunk to just the Holy Sepulcher church with a reminder that Saladin had given churches to other Christian men of the cloth. On receipt of the new proposal, Saladin consulted his council of advisors. They were at one in their recommendation to accept Richard’s new demarche, noting that their troops were tired and indebted, that an end to the conflict with the Franks would relieve them of a major burden. Accordingly, he responded positively. His message to the king was: the Holy Sepulcher would be given to Henry of Champagne who would be treated as his son; coastal 56 57

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 212. Ibid., 213.

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lands in the hands of the Franks would remain so; the Ayyubids would keep the mountain fortresses; and the lands in between would be a condominium. Ascalon and the towns and structures to the south must be dismantled and that territory would revert to Ayyubid control. The parley from afar continued. Richard escalated his requirements, demanding that 20-armed Franks be posted in Jerusalem’s citadel, but the king’s ambassador hinted that this was not serious. Richard only wanted unencumbered pilgrimage access. On July 13, Saladin agreed that visiting worshipers would “have nothing to pay.” While the envoy was pleased with this response, he did say that the king objected to giving up Ascalon where he had “spent vast sums on the walls,” but Saladin held to his position. On July 16, the English envoy and Hajji Yusuf returned, saying the king still demanded Ascalon. Saladin’s response was to give Lydda to Richard to compensate him for the expenditures at Ascalon. The diplomat and Hajji Yusuf delivered the offer on July 17, but on July 18, only the Hajji returned with a message from Richard in his own words: “‘It is impossible for us to demolish one stone of Ascalon… The boundaries are well known and there is no dispute about them.’”58 With those clear words, Saladin broke off negotiations. The two leaders understood that they had reached an impasse, that the dialogue would now take a different form.59 During July, the Ayyubid army reached full strength as many major battalions from the north and east arrived at Damascus and Jerusalem. Al-Afdal joined Saladin, as noted, on July 2. In the next two weeks while Saladin was negotiating with Richard, Ala al-Din of Mosul, Qutb al-Din Suqman of Diyar Bakr, and Mujahid al-Din Yurun-Qush of Sinjar all rode in with their cavalry battalions. Saladin’s son al-Zahir brought his force on July 18 and Saladin rode

All quotes in the paragraph are from Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 215–16. 59 For the negotiations from July 5 through July 8, 1192, see: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 354; Tyerman, God’s War, 469–70; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 69; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 110–12; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 212–16. 58

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out to Bethany (Azariya) to welcome him to the Holy City. On July 23, Al-Adil returned to Jerusalem with his brigades.60 Richard’s intelligence sources undoubtedly informed him about the renewed presence of a large number of Muslim troops. Nevertheless, he led a new aggressive initiative to the north. He and his barons left Jaffa for Acre before the break in the negotiations. Reportedly, the king planned a surprise attack on Beirut further to the north. After capturing it, he and the European Crusaders intended to sail home. The king was still concerned about the threats to his throne in England on the part of his brother John and to his French territories on the part of Philip II despite the latter’s promise not to interfere with Richard’s lands as long as he was still on crusade. The seasons also drove his timing. Richard wanted to embark before the fall storms halted maritime travel. Aware that Richard had left Jaffa and the Frankish troops had traveled with him, Saladin started reconnoitering the terrain in preparation for an attack on the fortified port city.61 He left Jerusalem on July 22 and on July 23 called his troops, including alAdil and his men who had just arrived from the East. Because Crusaders were assembling in Acre, Saladin sent al-Afdal accompanied by Ala al-Din to Marj Uyun and instructed the battalions still in Damascus to join him. The following day, Saladin moved his army to a camp between Ramla and Lydda. From there he rode to Yazur and Bait Dajan to survey the city and terrain after which he returned to his camp. After all his troops joined him, Saladin moved to Jaffa where he arranged the army in the classic manner. Al-Adil commanded the left wing, Saladin the center, and

Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 354–55; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 109–10; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 216. 61 Ibn Shaddad is the best source for this stage of the contest. He was there. Dates in the sources vary, usually by only one day. I have rely on the dates in Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, which conform to the dates in Tyerman, God’s War. The dates in Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, and Runciman, History of the Crusades, are different, but usually, as noted, by only one day. The narrative is the same; only the dates differ. 60

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al-Zahir the right wing. The two flanks stretched from the sea to Saladin’s position. Many of the Muslims thought they would be able capture Jaffa with modest effort, but quickly discovered otherwise. On July 29, Saladin ordered the assault. Catapults were put into action and sappers started digging a tunnel under the walls. At his command, the soldiers and amirs attempted to scale the walls, but met stout resistance. Moreover, the Franks dug counter tunnels, causing the Muslim saps to collapse. Some soldiers grumbled at the unexpected difficulties and the sappers ran from the damaged tunnels. Nevertheless, Saladin ordered them to dig another sap. The battle continued on the next day, July 30. Saladin drew up two more mangonels and put them into action. Some of the soldiers were reluctant to fight, wanting to await the effects of the bombardment. Saladin, upset, commanded them to attack, which they energetically did. The Crusaders weakened, but, with arrows and darts from their crossbows, they still managed to wound a number of Ayyubid troops, including a few amirs and mamlukes. Recognizing their losses, the Crusaders sent two envoys, a local Christian and a Frank, to ask for terms. Saladin offered the terms that were imposed in Jerusalem. They agreed, but asked that these be extended to August 1. If no help arrived in the interim, they would surrender on terms; if help arrived, the fight would continue. Saladin rejected the proposal. The Franks walked back to their commander, but soon returned and represented the previous proposal. Saladin again rejected it. Meanwhile, the Muslim soldiers, seeing the envoys coming and going, relaxed and diminished their efforts. Despite their attitudes, Saladin ordered his sappers to fire the new tunnel. It worked effectively and caused a section of the wall to collapse. Not to be daunted, the energetic Franks filled the gap with logs and brush and set them ablaze. With new energy, Saladin’s men pressed the Franks, but they resisted effectively until nightfall. Ibn Shaddad, recognizing their courage and skill, praised the Crusaders’ ability. “My God, what fighting men they are! How strong they are and how great their courage! Despite everything, they had not closed any gate of the town and they continued to fight outside the

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gates.”62 At this show of valor and fortitude, Saladin wished he had accepted the terms they had offered. On July 31, Saladin increased the number of catapults to five. His logistics unit, having exhausted the supply of local stone, went far afield to bring more from streams and fields. In a major effort, the three-army wings attacked in unison. More tunnels were dug and fired, causing more sections of the wall to collapse. Once the dust cleared, though, the soldiers saw that “spear-points had replaced the walls and lances blocked the breach.”63 Once again, Ibn Shaddad extolled the Franks for their “steadfastness” and the “soundness of their operations.” At this stage of the battle, two more envoys arrived and asked for terms. Saladin responded: “‘A horseman for a horseman, a turcopole for his equivalent and a foot-soldier for a foot soldier. For any who cannot manage this the Jerusalem tariff applies’”64 Seeing the openings in the wall, the emissaries agreed, but asked Saladin to stop the fighting. Saladin, however, said he could not do so because his men were now devoted to pillage. He did tell the Franks to withdraw all of their men to the citadel where he could assure their safety, which they did. On the same day, Sarim al-Din Qaimaz, who was watching Acre, informed Saladin that Richard had abandoned his Beirut project and was returning to Jaffa with a force. Saladin’s men were either tending to their wounds or searching for booty. Thus, even though Saladin may have wanted to secure the citadel on July 31, he gave up the effort. His men, who had not had the opportunity to pillage a city since 1189, were now devoted to finding “crops, household furnishings and the remnants of the goods that [the Franks had] plundered from the Egyptian caravan.”65 On the following day, August 1, the Muslim camp heard Frankish trumpets, signaling that the relief brigades were about to arrive. Enlisting Ibn Shaddad, Saladin ordered him to go tell alZahir to guard the south gate, then go to the citadel and bring out Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 219. Ibid. 64 Ibid., 220. 65 Ibid. 62 63

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the Franks and seize all monies and weapons. Ibn Shaddad found al-Zahir asleep in his brigandine, a kind of body armor. Arising “with sleep still in his eyes,” he led his men to the assigned gate. Ibn Shaddad gathered Izz al-Din Jurdik, Alam al-Din Qaisar, and Dirbas Mihrani to accompany him to the citadel. The Frankish garrison, seeing only a handful of relief ships, accepted Ibn Shaddad’s orders. Izz al-Din, however, delayed their march out because he was afraid the unruly pillagers would grab some of the men for private ransom. He and his troop started manhandling his fellow Muslim soldiers, ordering them to leave the city. But they were dispersed and near impossible to assemble. Ibn Shaddad feared that too much time was being wasted and confronted Izz alDin with Saladin’s orders. Izz al-Din agreed and they promptly delivered 47 men and their horses to al-Zahir’s camp. More Franks, though, remained in the citadel and when they saw the relief flotilla increase to 35 ships, their spirits were raised. They mounted their horses, rode out of the fortress, and charged the plunderers. When Saladin heard of this action, he sounded his own drums. His relaxing men immediately joined their companies, rode into the city, and drove the Crusaders back to the citadel. Even though the flotilla had now increased to 55 ships, no one had landed. Because of the many Ayyubid flags, the Franks off the coast thought Saladin had the city and its fortress. Consequently, the citadel commander once again dispatched two envoys to accept Saladin’s terms. However, a Frankish messenger jumped from the wall onto the beach and swam out to Richard’s red galley. Informed of the conditions on the ground, the English king landed with bravado and costume. Ibn Shaddad, an eyewitness, describes the scene. “The first galley to deliver its men on land was his. He was red-haired, his tunic was red and his banner was red, as was his device [his Danish ax or perhaps a crossbow].”66 He and his body of men—80 knights, 400 archers, and around 2,000 Italian sailors—and a handful of horses quickly cleared the beach and then drove the unruly soldiers from the city. Leaving most of the booty Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 222–23. The Crusader sources give similar descriptions of the landing. For example, see: “The Continuation,” in Brundage, Crusades: A Documentary Survey, 117. 66

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in front of the city, the Muslims galloped to Saladin’s camp where he was on the verge of signing the agreed terms with the Frankish envoys. Ibn Shaddad immediately informed him of the change in fortune whereupon he ordered the baggage train and army to retreat to Yazur.67 *** In the aftermath of Richard’s rapid recapture of Jaffa, the two sides engaged in lighthearted banter and bargaining. The king gathered his men, who according to Ibn Shaddad were now quite numerous, in front of the city walls. Some of the mamlukes who were at the front joined them and Richard invited some senior amirs such as Sunqur al-Mashtub and Aibak al-Azizi whom he knew from previous parleys. Amid rounds of joking and merriment, Chamberlain Abu Bakr al-Adili—one of Saladin’s senior envoys— arrived. The king mocked and praised the Ayyubid leader. He asked why he vacated the theater so quickly, saying, “‘By God, I had not put on my breastplate and was not ready for anything. On my feet I only had sea boots.’” Then he added, “‘By God, I did not imagine that he could take Jaffa in two months. How did he take it in two days?’”68 On a more serious vein, the king asked Abu Bakr to greet Saladin, once again spoke of ruined lands, and asked Saladin to “‘grant me what I ask for to make peace.’”69 After consulting his senior advisors, Saladin repeated his standard offer. Jaffa is ruined. You can have the coast from Caesarea to Tyre and we will keep Ascalon. Richard immediately made a counterproposal: Saladin For the battle for Jaffa, see: Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 355–57; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 69–71; Tyerman, God’s War, 470– 471; Gibb, Life of Saladin, 74–75; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 344–49; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 216–23; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 110–11; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 349–51; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 201; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 113–14; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 116–17; Ambroise, Estoire de la Guerre Sainte, 399–426; Chronicle of the Third Crusade, 349–69. 68 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 223. 69 Ibid. 67

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should give him Jaffa and Ascalon and he, Richard, would be his “vassal and servant” and the troops of these towns will be at Saladin’s service and Richard would come “whenever you need me.” Both sides knew that such an arrangement could not be serious in that Richard would be back in Europe fighting his own wars. However, the negotiations did not stop. Saladin countered by saying that he accepted this approach, namely the towns should be divided into two parcels, Jaffa for the Franks and Ascalon for the Ayyubids. On the following day, August 2, Abu Bakr and a senior Frankish envoy brought the king’s response: He still must have Ascalon. He added that if this demand is not ceded, he would remain throughout the winter. Saladin’s response was at once both philosophical and pointed. He calmly observed that if the king leaves, these lands will be seized and even if he does not leave, they may be seized. He then compared their stages in life. The king is a “‘young man in the flower of his youth and at a time when he seeks his pleasures…’” and thus he wondered why he wanted to be “‘far from his family and his homeland.’” On the other hand, he observed that it was easy “‘for me to spend a winter, a summer, then a winter and another summer in the middle of my own lands, surrounded by my sons and my family… I am an old man and do not desire worldly pleasures. I have had my fill of them and have renounced them.’” At the end, pointing to a distinct advantage, he noted that his army rotates; the troops of the summer are replaced by the troops of the winter, thus they are always fresh and ready. This may have been an exaggeration after six years of fighting, but the import of the comment would not have been lost on Richard.70 On August 3, Saladin’s pickets reported that Henry of Champagne was leading a relief column from Acre to reinforce the Crusaders at Jaffa. Following the consensus of his amirs, Saladin decided to attempt to engage the battalion in the open field. If his cavalrymen could defeat it, they would weaken the enemy. If they could not prevail, they could withdraw to the hills in their traditional fashion. This strategy was preferable to simply watching For the negotiations following the Jaffa battle, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 223–24, Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 202; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 357–58. 70

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this Frankish strength grow and retiring to the highlands. Saladin ordered the logistics units to move the baggage to the hills and on the next day, he rode with the army to the north. At the al-Auja River, he halted. There, his pickets informed him that Henry had moved to Caesaria and made camp. Saladin did not want to attack the relief column there because Richard might come to its rescue and the English king and Henry might trap the Muslims between the two Frankish forces. Then he heard that Richard was encamped in front of Jaffa’s walls with only a small army— according to Western Crusader sources, Richard had 54 knights, 15 horses, and 2,000 soldiers. Arab sources report a smaller force: 9–17 knights and 300–1,000 soldiers.71 Utilizing bedouin guides, Saladin marched all night to Jaffa, arriving in the early hours of August 5. The sources differ with respect to the nature and magnitude of the battle. According to Frankish chroniclers, a Genoese was wandering around in the early morning hours when he heard the sound of horses and the glint of steel. He immediately informed the king who readied his men in an ordered formation. The Muslim cavalry charged the Franks numerous times until the afternoon, but Richard’s men held firm with rows of lances and shields. Eventually, as the cavalry horses tired, Richard’s archers rained arrows on them and drove them off. In the course of the battle, the king lost his horse. In a chivalrous gesture, Saladin sent him two Arab steeds, which Richard accepted, promptly mounting one.72 The Muslim sources tell a different story. Much to the annoyance of Saladin, his troops just surrounded the Franks and looked in awe at their strength and discipline. Saladin attempted to rally his men, but only al-Zahir came forward. Seeing that no one else responded, he recalled his son. Ibn Shaddad heard that “… al-Janah, al-Mashtub’s brother, said to the sultan. ‘Your mamlukes who beat people the day Jaffa fell and took their booty from them, tell them to charge.’”73 Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 71; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 225, Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 202. 72 Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 71–72: Lane-Poole, Saladin, 353. 73 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 225, 71

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The soldiers were angry that Saladin had allowed Jaffa to surrender on terms, depriving them of an opportunity to enjoy the booty they had grabbed. (This is a different version of what may have actually happened, but for the soldiers, the result was the same.) Reportedly, to accentuate the Muslims’ unwillingness to fight, Richard rode with his lance in front of the entire Muslim front, and no one challenged him. Greatly angered at his loss of face, Saladin ordered his men to withdraw to Yazur, abandoned any pretense of fighting the Franks that day, but kept his men at the ready in case Richard attempted to follow up his success with a knightly charge.74 Holding his ire, Saladin did not discipline the army that refused to fight, but he did know that shortly he would be welcoming fresh troops who would fight and that Richard would be aware of their arrival. He also understood that neither leader could prevail, that many of his men and army units were tired, that many of Richard’s men had left or were leaving the field for France. Consequently, both he and the English king needed to find a way to attain peace. Peace, however, had to wait. The next day, August 6, Saladin moved his army to Latrun, putting some distance between his forces and those of Richard. On the following day, he consulted with alAdil about military and diplomatic matters. On August 8, the two leaders briefly resumed diplomatic contact. Chamberlain Abu Bakr, at the request of the king, traveled to Jaffa with the Frankish envoy and met Richard outside the walls. His message was simple: “‘How many times must I throw myself at the sultan’s feet, while he still refuses me! … All talks between us are at an end.’”75 *** During the middle of August, major troop reinforcements arrived. On August 8, Ala al-Din who had been at Marj Uyun rode in with his Mosuli battalions. On August 20, elite Egyptian cavalrymen under the command of Majd al-Din Khuldiri, Saif al-Din Yazkuj, and some Asadiya amirs marched in with flags and banners. Saladin welcomed the Mosuli and Egyptian troops with great ceremony Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 202; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 225–26; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 358. 75 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 226. 74

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and a banquet. On August 22, Nasir al-Din, the son of Taqi al-Din who was rebellious in the spring, brought his battalions. He first visited al-Adil who then brought him to Saladin who, in turn, welcomed him back into the Ayyubid fold.76 After Saladin’s humiliating performance at Jaffa on August 5, Richard had the advantage. However, with the arrival of the fresh battalions from Iraq, Syria, and Egypt—major provinces of the Ayyubid Empire—the advantage began to shift. Not only was the Muslim army growing, the Frankish forces were shrinking as barons and soldiers alike sailed home—and the political pressure to return to his lands continued to haunt the king. Moreover, Richard fell very ill during this period. He asked for fruits and ice, which Saladin dispatched to him on a regular basis. Between August 8 and August 27, there were no negotiations between the two sides, but they were in constant contact at lower levels. Saladin’s men, who were delivering pears and plums to feverish Richard, saw that the Franks were not repairing Jaffa’s walls, that Henry of Champagne was visiting Acre frequently to attempt to persuade French Crusaders to stay, and that the force at Jaffa was not large, 200 to 300 knights with an undetermined number of soldiers. On August 26 or 27, Saladin met with his senior military men. He proposed that they march on Jaffa. If an attack with the fresh troops was advisable, they would undertake an assault. However, if the Frankish defenses were too strong, they would ride to Ascalon and capture it before Richard could send reinforcements. His amirs agreed and on August 27, the army rode to Ramla. At the same time, Saladin sent Izz al-Din Jurdik and others amirs to Jaffa to try to determine Frankish strength. Due to the new military pressure and/or for his own reasons, Richard sent a revised negotiating position. On the day Saladin rode to Ramla, the king asked Abu Bakr to join his envoy for a “private talk.” Directing his words through al-Adil, “my brother,” he asked for Ascalon, but then said, “‘If the sultan will not cede Ascalon, then let al-Adil take something from him to recompense Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 202–03; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 359; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 227. 76

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me for the expense of rebuilding the wall.’”77 Saladin immediately sent his position to al-Adil, “‘If they give up Ascalon, make peace with them, for the army is tired of constant campaigning and their resources are exhausted.’”78 On the following day, August 28, the message was delivered after which senior envoys—including Badr al-Din Dildirim who had become friends with Richard—traveled between the two camps, delivering offers and counteroffers. Twice Saladin made quite clear that he would not put up with procrastination and wanted assurances that he could trust the English king. Judging that the two parties had made sufficient progress, Saladin forwarded a written proposal on August 29. Richard would have the land from Jaffa to Tyre, but he removed the port cities’ natural hinterland of Ramla, Lydda, Yubna, Majd alYaba, Nazareth, and Sepphoris. There was confusion with respect to compensation. Badr al-Din understood that Richard had dropped that demand, but Richard asked for it again. Saladin compromised and agreed that the revenues from Ramla and Lydda would be shared in a sort of condominium. Other terms included: the demolition of Ascalon’s walls; freedom for Muslims and Christians to travel in each others’ territories; and unencumbered and untaxed pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulcher. The treaty, to last for three years, included Tripoli and Antioch and, oddly, the Ismaili lands of Sinan. Curiously, the Holy Cross was not mentioned, perhaps overlooked, in the document. The issue of ransoming and releasing respective prisoners was left for later settlement. Saladin’s envoy, al-Adl, was dispatched with the draft, instructed once more to emphasize that the deal had to be finalized immediately. Saladin did not want any more delays, for whatever reason. At the Crusader camp, the Ayyubid envoy had an audience with King Richard who, ill in his bed, said he did not have the energy to read the document, but offered his hand in agreement. Al-Adl presented the details to Henry of Champagne and other Frankish officials. They all agreed the Crusaders would swear their oaths the next day, September 2, 1192, after which the Ayyubids would give their oaths. At the appointed time, Henry, Balian of 77 78

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 228. Ibid.

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Ibelin, and the grand masters of the Hospitalers and the Templars swore for the king who asserted that kings do not swear oaths. On September 3, the delegations appeared before Saladin who shook hands with the Franks and gave his oath, as did al-Afdal, al-Adil, alZahir, Saif al-Din al-Mashtub, Badr al-Din Dildirim, and Nasir alDin. The historic truce was final. After the oaths, Saladin ordered a public proclamation of the peace accords. He specifically noted that Franks and Muslims could now travel and visit each other’s territories unmolested.79 In a private conversation with Ibn Shaddad, Saladin commented on and analyzed the just concluded agreement. He did not prefer the peace settlement because he was unsure of his personal fate, presumably meaning that his leadership was crucial in the struggle with the Crusaders and that, given the nature of Muslim empires, it would be difficult for another person to truly replace him and assume his mantle. In a complementary thought, he feared that the Franks would be able to use their territorial base to expand, gain hilltops, and hold them. Nevertheless, he also observed that at this time, peace was necessary for his army because it had grown weary and showed signs of disaffection. Human frailty, uncertainty of the future, continuing enemy challenges, and the morale of his amirs and soldiers were all central to his thinking.80 In the midst of these seminal negotiations, Saladin was dealing with significant issues in other parts of his realm. On September 1, For the negotiation and terms of the treaty, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 227–31; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 203; Ibn alAthir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 111–12; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 354–57; Itinerarium Peregrinorum, in Brundage, Crusades: A Documentary Survey, 185– 186; “The Continuation,” in Edbury, Conquest of Jerusalem, 120–21; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 359–60; Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 72– 73; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 354–57; Tyerman, God’s War, 471; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 116–17. The sources disagree as to the duration of the treaty. Ibn Shaddad records that it was for three years. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 229. Ibn al-Athir writes that it was for three years and eight months. Ibn al Athir, Al-Rawdatain, vol. 10, 111. 80 Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 232–33. 79

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he received an ambassador from Saif al-Din Bektimur of Khilat. The envoy informed Saladin that Saif al-Din hereby declared loyalty and said he would send troops as requested. This is the very Bektimur who Saladin had intended to bring under his suzerainty in 1185 and who Taqi al-Din had assaulted in 1191. Al-Adil’s trip to the East where he dealt with Khilat as well as other issues clearly added to Ayyubid strength. The King of Georgia also sent an ambassador to discuss the restoration of his kingdom’s religious properties in Jerusalem, a decision that Saladin left for further study and discussion. The third ambassador to arrive that day was from Erzerum (Erzurum) in northeast Anatolia who offered his lord’s loyalty and service to the Ayyubids.81 On September 5, Saladin sent Alam al-Din Qaisar to Ascalon with a large party of sappers and stonemasons, accompanied by a Frankish delegation. At first, on September 6, the garrison refused to lay down its arms, saying the soldiers had not been paid. Shortly the king’s agent rode in and ordered them to stand down, which they did. On September 7, Alam al-Din started demolishing the town’s walls. Six days after Saladin accepted the truce, he moved to Latrun. Soldiers and officers from both camps joined in celebration of the new relationship. Many Muslims went to Jaffa to look for bargains in the markets. Shortly, a number of Crusaders rode up to Jerusalem for the pilgrimage. Saladin provided escorts to prevent unseemly events. Richard tried to stop the French from going to worship at the Holy Sepulcher, claiming they should have his personal pass, but Saladin ignored the stipulation. He wanted the Crusaders—French and English—to make their devotions and then leave the Eastern Mediterranean for their homes. In his evergracious way, he received many of the noble pilgrims in Jerusalem, offered food, and engaged them in conversation. One of the highranking pilgrims was Hubert Walter, the Bishop of Salisbury. During a wide-ranging discourse, the two men respectively analyzed Richard’s character. Hubert said the knights thought the king had “every good character.” Saladin, though, offered that while certainly brave, Richard lacked “wisdom and moderation,” 81

Gibb, Life of Saladin, 75; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 230.

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which, for a king, is preferable to “boldness and immoderation.” Saladin also asked the bishop what present he might desire. Hubert responded that he would like to have permission for two Latin priests and two deacons to serve at the Holy Sepulcher along side the Eastern priests and he asked for the same arrangement in Bethlehem and Nazareth. Saladin granted the requests.82 On September 9, Richard left Jaffa for Acre. The following day, Saladin released his coalition army. The Irbil troops left the same day and on September 11, the cavalry battalions from Mosul, Sinjar, and Hisn Kaifa rode home and others followed suit during the next two weeks. In Acre, Richard arranged his affairs, paid his debts, and attempted to collect amounts owed to him. On September 29, Queen Berengaria and his sister Queen Joanna sailed for France. Ten days later, Richard sailed. Ever beleaguered by bad weather, his ship wrecked near Venice from which he rode north to Austria where Duke Leopold, whom he had insulted in Acre by throwing his banners in the moat, arrested him on December 11. Leopold was one of those who thought that Richard had arranged for the assassination of Conrad of Montferrat. Three months later, Leopold turned the king over to Emperor Henry VI of Germany. For dynastic and alliance reasons, the two princes did not enjoy amity. One year later, upon payment of a kingly ransom, Richard was freed, but only after the emperor humiliated him by requiring him to swear a vassal’s oath. He returned to his lands in France and resecured his throne, but in the course of a battle in March 1199 near the castle of Limousin, he was struck by an arrow and died.83 Steven Runciman offers a pithy judgment of Richard’s life. “He was a bad son, a bad husband and a bad king, but a gallant and splendid soldier.”84 Judgment of Richard’s expedition as well as that of Philip II and the Third Crusade as a whole must be critical. With the loss of a very large number of lives and tremendous Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 73; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 361–63. 83 Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 74–75; Tyerman, God’s War, 472. 84 Runciman, History of the Crusades, vol. 3, 75. 82

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expenditure of wealth and time, the Crusaders gained less than one hundred miles of the littoral, from Tyre to Jaffa, and very little hinterland. Others may argue that the Third Crusade preserved the strategic toeholds at Tripoli and Antioch and, most likely, they are correct. On more than one occasion, Saladin expressly stated that he wanted to bring these great cities into his empire and deny them to the Crusaders. From a larger perspective, the Third Crusade failed in its mission to regain the Holy Sepulcher, the Holy Cross, Jerusalem, and the Holy Land. In sum, the project’s secular mission was only minimally realized, but its religious mission was not realized at all. After Saladin captured Jerusalem in 1187, Christians from the West and East could make the pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulcher on payment of a modest fee. After September 3, 1192, the fee no long applied. Crusader presence in the Holy Land would last another hundred years, but the Frankish footprint was much diminished from its heyday from 1099 through 1187. Saladin had wanted a Holy Land without a Crusader presence. From 1187 through 1192, he attempted to achieve this goal, but failed. He established that his army with the tactics and armor he put in the field could not prevail over Crusader tactics and armor, but he also determined that if he could stay in the field, he could force a stalemate and eventually the European elements of the Frankish force would withdraw. Saladin also found that his army had limits. Years and years in the field drained its strength, ability, and even loyalty. His brigades chaffed at the lack of opportunity to pillage newly conquered cities, towns, and lands. The iqta duties of serving under the Ayyubid commander in the field always conflicted with the desire of the amirs and cavalrymen to return to their farms, villages, and cities. And when friction appeared, ethnic strain occasionally emerged. It was Saladin’s job, with the help of key relatives and amirs, to manage all of these disparate forces and bring them together as a coherent force, while he was also weighing the strength of his enemies and his allies.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN BACK TO DAMASCUS: 1192–1193 JERUSALEM, BEIRUT, AND DAMASCUS: 1192–1193 Saladin traveled to Jerusalem on September 13, 1192. Al-Adil, who had been ill, met him on the road where he respectfully greeted the supreme Ayyubid leader. In the afternoon, the two brothers, after their long struggle with the Crusaders, rode to Jerusalem in peace. In the Holy City, aside from providing hospitality to visiting Frankish barons, Saladin busied himself with issues of empire. Wanting to recognize and reward essential contributions of some of his amirs, he assigned them iqtas in the regions where they lived. In Jerusalem, he initiated projects to improve living conditions and intellectual and religious life. He built and provided funding for a hospital and a Shafii school of law to which he appointed his secretary, Ibn Shaddad. He also named Izz al-Din Jurdik as governor of the city and district in recognition of his long service as a senior amir. During this period, he started to develop plans for the immediate future. High on his agenda was a pilgrimage to Mecca, which he could join in December/January 1192–1193. He also planned to visit Egypt, which he had not seen for ten years. He sent instruction to his brother Tughtakin in Yemen to provide transport, presumably from Eilat. Saladin’s senior advisors, including the influential Qadi al-Fadil, objected to the proposed travel. They pointed out that if he wanted to go to Mecca, he should first inform and obtain the concurrence of the caliph in Baghdad. As apparent from the communications between the religious and temporal courts, there were distinct tensions and Saladin’s aides did not want them to be exacerbated. Another argument for not leaving Syria and Palestine was the state of the economy, which, they contended, needed serious attention. War 399

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had drained resources—and taxes to fund the long conflict were heavy. In addition, it was necessary for the central administration to secure stable revenues in a time of peace to fund normal government functions. Qadi al-Fadil, in somewhat histrionic terms, asserted that Syrian peasants were experiencing unacceptable difficulties and that iqta holders were so oppressive “one wonders whether the rain still falls.”1 Lastly, some of the amirs pointed out that the Crusaders were still on the coast and their desire for Jerusalem, despite the treaty, was unabated. It is not clear from the record when the plan to travel to Mecca and Egypt was dropped, but it is not mentioned after October 10, 1192 in the chronicles. As various plans were being discussed, a senior Baghdad envoy visited al-Adil’s camp on October 3. After receiving the caliphal message, al-Adil delivered it to Saladin. Al-Nasir’s diwan wanted to re-establish high-level communications with the Ayyubids and did not withhold its criticism of Saladin for “delaying his diplomatic contacts with the Noble Threshold.” The missive concluded by asking Saladin to send Qadi al-Fadil to Baghdad “to establish terms of agreement” between the courts.2 After considerable discussion, Saladin decided to dispatch Diya al-Din alShahrazuri, his official delegate to the caliphate’s court in 1189, to Baghdad to address the issues that concerned both parties. Diya alDin left on his mission on October 6. Al-Adil had departed for Karak, one of his iqtas, the previous day. Turning to family matters, Saladin gave al-Zahir, who was readying for his return to Aleppo, an emotional farewell. Ibn Shaddad has him conferring fatherly advice. Whether the words are truly recorded, partially true, or simply Ayyubid propaganda is not known. Nevertheless, they do give us the feel of the time. “‘I [Saladin] warn you [al-Zahir] against shedding blood, indulging in it and making a habit of it, for blood never sleeps. I charge you to care for the hearts of your subjects and to examine their affairs… I charge you to care for the hearts of the amirs and men of state and the magnates. I have only achieved what I have by

1 2

Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 205. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 234.

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coaxing people. Hold no grudge against anyone, for death spares nobody. Take care in your relations with people…’”3 In contrast, relations between Saladin and al-Afdal were still strained. They had degenerated to the point that the two only communicated through Ibn Shaddad. On October 14, Saladin gave al-Afdal leave to return to Damascus, which he did “in bad odor.”4 Saladin left the next day to inspect inland and coastal fortifications.5 In late October, Saladin traveled first to Nablus where he found the people protesting the rule of the Kurdish amir Saif alDin al-Mashtub who had been commander in besieged Acre when it fell in 1191. After Saladin dealt with the matter, al-Mashtub returned to Jerusalem where, three weeks later, he died. Saladin next rode to the great fortress of Kaukab (Belvoir) where he spent a few days. While there, Baha al-Din Qaraqush, who had just been released on payment of ransom from a Frankish dungeon, presented himself. Saladin welcomed the former governor of Acre with high honors for his years of service and valor after which he joined the tour of Palestine and Lebanon. Upon reaching Damascus, Qaraqush arranged the release of his colleagues still in Crusader prisons, presumably on payment of ransom provided by the Ayyubid treasury, and then returned to his home in Egypt.6 On October 30, 1192, Bohemond III of Antioch with an entourage of 14 barons visited Saladin in Beirut. The Ayyubid treated the prince with ceremony and invited him to a banquet commensurate with his title and status. Both men acknowledged the terms of the Jaffa treaty and Saladin bestowed lands around

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 235. Ibid., 236. 5 For the Jerusalem period, September 13–October 14, 1192, see: Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 204–6; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 357–58; Ibn alAthir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 111–12; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 233–36; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 361–62; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 225– 227. 6 Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 207. Also, see: Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 336. 3 4

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Antioch on the Frankish leader that boasted 15,000 or 20,000 dinars of annual production.7 On November 4, to huge fanfare, Saladin returned to Damascus, which he had not seen since April 1189. There he found al-Zahir who had not yet left for Aleppo and Al-Afdal who resided in the city. The latter seized the occasion to hold a sumptuous banquet to which secular and religious notables were invited. More importantly, Saladin attended and the occasion was seen as reconciliation between father and son. Later in the month, al-Adil arrived. The two brothers went hunting on two occasions for a total of 15–20 days. Aside from the pleasure of the chase in the Syrian fields, they undoubtedly discussed affairs of empire. As recounted, on another occasion that winter, Saladin, al-Adil, and Afdal talked about potential future imperial acquisitions, including Khilat northwest of Lake Van, the lands of Rum in Anatolia under Seljuk Turkish rule, and Azerbaijan or even Persia. For each of the men, these territories were attractive. Al-Adil had been assigned iqtas in the East and thus would want to expand in the region. Al-Afdal, the eldest of Saladin’s sons and thus the presumptive heir on his father’s passing, was ambitious to expand the empire. Such projects would occupy him until he inherited his father’s mantle and afford him stature in the eyes of the family and amirs. Saladin had spent his entire life building the Ayyubid Empire, thus to think about extending his realm to new lands was only natural. During February 1193, Saladin’s health began to deteriorate. Ibn Shaddad whom he had summoned from Jerusalem, records that on February 17, Saladin declined to attend court where alAfdal and a few amirs and notables awaited him. On February 19, despite his unease, he rode with al-Afdal to meet the pilgrim caravan returning from Mecca. Ibn Shaddad observed with alarm that he was not wearing his brigandine, which he normally did when riding. Aside from providing protection, the garment would

Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 207; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 320–21; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 237; Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, vol. 3, 119–20. 7

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also ward off the cold. The secretary personally led his sultan by a shortcut back to the citadel. On the following day, Saladin came down with a fatal fever. His doctors treated him with the known technologies of the day, but his condition continued to decline. His senior aides kept the news from the public, but on March 1, rumors of his illness were widespread. Ordinary people were fearful and merchants removed their goods from the market. Al-Afdal concluded that his father’s days were at an end. Accordingly, he called in amirs and notables and asked them to affirm allegiance. “He said to people in explanation that it was because of the sultan’s serious illness and ‘we do not know what may happen and we are only doing this as a precautionary measure according to the custom of princes.’”8 Some gave their oaths without reservations. Two amirs qualified their words by saying “‘We swear with a stipulation that we will never draw a sword in the face of your brothers, but I will give my head to protect your lands.’”9 Others swore on condition that al-Afdal assign them iqtas. Egyptian amirs did not attend the daylong session and were not pressured to offer fealty. On the twelfth day of his disease, March 3 or 4, 1193— depending on the source—Saladin died. The people expressed great sorrow and extolled their preeminent leader. He was fiftyfive. His family gave him a simple burial in the citadel garden. About two years later, one of his sons placed his body in a sarcophagus in an oratory of the grand Damascene Umayyad Mosque where it remains today.10

Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 242. Ibid. 10 For the Damascus period, November 4, 1192–March 4, 1193, see: Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 118–20; Abu Shama, AlRawdatain, pt. 2, 207–8; Imad al-Din, Al-Fath, 362–64; Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 237–45; Lane-Poole, Saladin, 364–67; Lyons and Jackson, Saladin, 362–63; Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 228–31. 8 9

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THE AYYUBIDS AFTER SALADIN Upon Saladin’s death, al-Afdal was in principle the suzerain of the entire realm, but his brothers, uncle, and cousins held lands they had enjoyed under his father. Thus, al-Afdal was in Damascus, Uthman in Egypt, and al-Zahir in Aleppo. Al-Adil had extensive lands in Anatolia and Transjordan, while cousins held Homs, Hama, and Baalbek. Al-Afdal’s superior position did not last. After a series of struggles, including invasions, a new hierarchy emerged. Uthman with his base in Egypt, always a major source of Ayyubid power, was recognized as the suzerain in 1196, a status he attained with al-Adil’s crucial support and assistance. Displacing al-Afdal, alAdil ruled in Damascus. Uthman died in a hunting accident in 1198. Once more, a struggle ensued, but by 1201, al-Adil emerged as the supreme leader and was proclaimed “sultan,” unlike his brother Saladin. He ruled Egypt, Damascus, and Anatolia. His sons—respectively alKamil, al-Muazzam, and al-Ashraf—served as governors of the three provinces. Al-Zahir retained Aleppo, but Al-Afdal was isolated in the far north at Mayyafariqin. Under this new set of relationships, al-Adil again brought unity to the Ayyubid Empire. Al-Adil died in 1218 and, after another intrafamilial struggle, his son al-Kamil with his base in Egypt was able to claim his father’s position and sultan title. He ruled until his passing in 1238. Ayyubid relations with Western Europe shifted in the decades after Saladin’s death. The new rulers focused on remunerative trade with Italy and France, but also they had to defend Egypt from the combative Crusaders who invaded in 1197, 1217, 1229, and 1249. With their major focus on Egypt, the Ayyubids paid less heed to Palestine. In 1229, to divert Frankish military ambitions from Egypt, al-Kamil negotiated a treaty with Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, the leader of the Fifth Crusade, by which he ceded Jerusalem to Crusader rule on condition it remain unfortified and the Haram al-Sharif continue under Muslim control with normal free access for Muslims. To maintain the empire, the Ayyubids imported Kurdish and Turkish mamlukes to man the army. In 1250, a group of mamlukes killed the Egyptian based Ayyubid ruler, Sultan Turan-Shah, and established Mamluke rule. Mongols drove the Ayyubids from Syria, but the Mamlukes defeated them at Goliath Springs (Ain Jalut) in 1260 and then assumed control of the region. Minor local Ayyubid

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dynasties remained in place, notably in Hama, for another seven decades. In 1291, the Mamlukes eliminated all Crusader presence in the Holy Land, but in 1517, the Ottomans defeated and supplanted them in Egypt, Syria, the Holy Land, Anatolia, and Iraq.11

For the Ayyubids after Saladin, see: Lapidus, History of Islamic Societies, 291–92; Hourani, History of the Arab Peoples, 84–85; Hodgson, Venture of Islam of Islam, vol. 2, 267–68. 11

CHAPTER FIFTEEN SALADIN: AN ASSESSMENT During his life, Saladin generated far-reaching change in the Middle East by profoundly altering the region’s landscape in political, geographic, religious, and ethnic terms. In the West, he is famous for sharply curtailing the Crusader presence in the region, but also for the chivalrous and honorable way he dealt with adversaries and neighbors. In Muslim lands, he is well known—even lionized by some—for his success vis-à-vis the Crusaders. His achievements in other spheres also notably influenced the course of Middle East history. First, Saladin built a new empire from Egypt, North Africa, and Yemen to Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, northern Iraq, and parts of Anatolia. Second, by eliminating Fatimid rule in Egypt as he built his Ayyubid Empire, he deracinated Shia Islam from that strategic country. Third, the Seljuk Turks and their Turkish successors had ruled large sections of the Middle East. With the ascendancy of Saladin, a man of Kurdish heritage, the role of the Seljuk Turks declined, to be replaced by a more varied group— Kurds, Turks, Arabs, and others—but with a unifying Muslim identity. To accomplish these various aspects of his career, Saladin used many assets and tools. He learned leadership and military skills from his suzerain Nur al-Din as well as his father Ayyub and his uncle Shirkuh. As his empire expanded, he quickly turned to family members—father, uncles, brothers, sons, and nephews—for support and relied upon them to administer his provinces and help lead his army. In a broad sense, to fund his military, the crucial institution for extending his realm, he depended on the Egyptian economic engine. In addition, as he established suzerainty over new territories, he acquired additional resources, men, and material, for further expansion in both Muslim lands and against the Crusaders. To gain the loyalty of certain key groups—his military, 407

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including amirs, officers, mamlukes, and soldiers; the religious classes and senior civil servants; and the people at large, especially in the cities and towns—he employed inspiring religious concepts, namely, the appeal for the unity of Islam, the need to prosecute holy war to regain Jerusalem for the Muslims, and loyalty to the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad. *** In his imperial quest, was Saladin primarily a defender of Islam or simply an ambitious military leader who wanted to build a legacy for himself and his family? The historical record strongly indicates that both motives were central to Saladin’s thinking throughout his adult life. Certainly, as he captured lands, he turned to close relatives to govern them. Even before his sons reached maturity, he assigned key provinces to them, albeit, with a senior relative or amir to administer them. In 1186, when he was severely ill, he required his brothers, cousins, and amirs to swear that they would honor his will that his sons inherit the Ayyubid Empire. As alAfdal, al-Zahir, and Uthman matured, he gave Damascus, Aleppo, and Egypt to them, assignments they held on his death in 1193. His brothers, other sons, nephews, and cousins also held important iqtas at the time. From another perspective, in the 1180s and 1190s, he and his relatives occasionally contemplated additional imperial expansion in Muslim lands, such as in 1193 when he, al-Adil, and al-Afdal talked about potential new campaigns to the north in Anatolia and to the east against Persia. Indeed, princely ambition drove Saladin in some aspects of his career. With respect to Saladin’s focus on the defense of Islam, the historical record evolves. During the earlier 1174–1186 period, Saladin continually asserted that his primary aim was to realize Muslim unity and to reclaim the Holy Land, including Jerusalem, for Islam. However, during those years, he expended more time, energy, and treasure on bringing Muslim lands into his realm. Battles against Crusaders—both successes and standoffs—were less frequent and not sustained. Accordingly, his opponents and detractors could contend that he was just manipulating religious symbols for his personal ends. Saladin and his supporters, though, argued that the new lands were needed to provide sufficient men and treasure to successfully confront the Franks. Also, he wanted to cover his flanks; he did not want to be under threat from the

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north or east when he was battling the Crusader project in the Holy Land. Saladin’s successes at Hattin and Jerusalem in 1187 and throughout Palestine and Lebanon in 1187–1189, reassured his supporters and won over some doubters and critics, though by no means all of them. In a dramatic manner with singular results, he dedicated time, men, and considerable resources to expel the Franks and restore land for Islam when he could have used the same assets against more vulnerable and weaker opponents in Anatolia, Persia, and North Africa. It can be argued that Saladin’s campaign against the Crusaders in 1187–1188 made imperial sense because he was adding lands to his realm. However, his defense of Acre lacked that logic. He was defending a city that was becoming progressively less defensible, expending resources for no potential gain. In the first year of the siege, he may have thought he could win, but as time passed, he well knew that the Franks, as during the First and Second Crusades, would arrive in great numbers with formidable military assets. Saladin could have withdrawn from besieged Acre, retreated to the hills, and forced the Franks to come to him—inter alia, extending their supply lines so that they would be vulnerable to Muslim attacks—to attempt to retake Jerusalem. Furthermore, in his defense of Acre, he consciously stretched his army almost to the breaking point, thereby weakening his empire. Hence, from the historical record, Saladin’s actions and behavior in conformance with his oft-stated religious goals indicate that he saw himself as a defender of Islam who willingly put his empire at risk in pursuit of this ideal.1 In sum, Saladin was a leader of his day, in pursuit of empire and legacy for himself and his family, but also a man who was committed to the idea of holy war for Islam. With respect to this conclusion, Lev offers an excellent discussion of Saladin and holy war. Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 196–97. Specifically, his thoughts on defensive war, included in my discussion, are very pertinent. “Wars of defense [in medieval warfare] made sense only when the core territories of the kingdom, on which its very existence depended, were threatened by an enemy. Within these parameters Saladin’s battle for Acre made no sense at all.” Lev, Saladin in Egypt, 196. 1

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*** To administer his broad realm, Saladin used two different systems with tools and institutions common to both. In Egypt, most of Syria, and Yemen, his relatives, acting as his deputies or governors, maintained direct Ayyubid control. At times in Egypt, Saladin’s deputies were assisted by the able Qadi al-Fadil. These administrators were responsible for raising and maintaining military forces as well as for other normal functions of government of the day: public order, infrastructure, courts and Islamic institutions, trade regulation, and public welfare. To generate revenue, they utilized the iqtas Saladin assigned to them, canonical zakat taxes, and rents derived from governmental properties. To maintain his own ultimate authority, Saladin occasionally reassigned provinces and iqtas, which, at times, upset the extant governor or iqta holder such as when he moved al-Adil from Aleppo to Egypt, at al-Adil’s urging, and removed Taqi al-Din who briefly threatened rebellion. While certainly pointing to a weakness in his control system, such familial problems were rare during Saladin’s lifetime. Thus, even though Saladin periodically complained that petty issues were too frequently brought to his attention, he was able to rely on his direct governing system and focus on broader issues: imperial expansion and confrontation with the Crusaders. There were infrequent challenges to Saladin’s new regime such as Fatimid remnants demonstrating on Cairene streets or the break down in authority and probity in Yemen. In each instance, his system responded. The Fatimid adherents were contained and, in Yemen, Saladin ultimately sent his brother, Tughtakin, to reestablish Ayyubid order. In parts of northern Syria, Jazira, northern Iraq, and Anatolia, Saladin exercised indirect control. As new lands fell under Ayyubid suzerainty, their leaders—notably Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi of Harran, Imad al-Din Zangi of Sinjar, Izz al-Din Masud of Mosul, Nur al-Din Muhammad and Abu Bakr of Diyar Bakr, and SinjarShah of Jazirat ibn Umar—swore fealty to Saladin with the obligation to provide soldiers and treasure in time of war.

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When Saladin put out a call to muster troops, major and minor lords readily dispatched cavalry regiments and battalions, depending on their resources.2 Even though they were expending funds in this exercise, they expected to reap the fruits of war: opportunities for plunder and new lands and iqtas. The expansionist nature of Saladin’s medieval empire fed this expectation. At once, it helped motivate the leaders and their troops, but also it proved to be a weakness when troops did not have the opportunity to pillage and new lands were not captured. From another perspective, after the provincial lords had been in the field for an extended period, they, their amirs, and troops wanted to go home to their families and fields. For example, in the fall of 1190, Sanjar-Shah and his battalion deserted Saladin’s lines in front of Acre, after which Saladin allowed Izz al-Din of Mosul to assault Sanjar-Shah’s capital Umar ibn Jazirat. In the same period, Imad al-Din Zangi exerted great pressure on Saladin to release him and his troops from service before Saladin was ready to let his army disperse. As the tone of the communication became harsher, Saladin’s implicit threat—“Whoever loses such as me, Would that I knew what gain had he!”—caused Imad al-Din to back down. During the long stalemate in the battle with Richard the Lionheart in 1191–1192, this centrifugal impetus became severe, presenting a major challenge for Saladin. The lack of opportunity for booty exacerbated this tension, undermining army morale as was illustrated at the Jaffa battle in 1192 and the long defense of Jerusalem. In addition, this frustration at times led to ethnic tensions between Kurdish and Turkish soldiers. A particularly acute example occurred during the 1192 defense of Jerusalem when Saladin’s senior amir Abu al-Haija bluntly noted that there was

With respect to this pattern, it is worth recalling that when Taqi alDin rode to the Diyar Bakr region in 1191 to claim iqtas Saladin had assigned to him and to attempt to expand on them, he upset the indirect rule system in that part of the Ayyubid Empire. In reaction, the local Diyar Bakri lords did not respond in a timely manner to Saladin’s call for troops to defend Acre because they felt it necessary to remain at home to protect their towns against Taqi al-Din’s ambitions. 2

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sharp friction between the Kurds and Turks, to the point that they would not accept orders from one another. Despite these shortcomings, Saladin had assets that countered them. One was the depth of his empire. As troops tired, he could call for fresh battalions from Egypt and other provinces to reinvigorate his army. Another was his record of success. Even though times might be difficult, many of his amirs and soldiers recognized that in the end he would most likely prevail. For many, the cause, holy war, was foremost and, thus, Saladin’s identification as the defender of Islam was of particular importance. Another asset was the force of his personality and his stamina. He was an engaged leader who simultaneously looked after the welfare of his men, the tactical needs of his army, and grand strategy—and he stayed in the field, available to the common soldier and amir. *** The Ayyubid army was central to Saladin’s ability to create an empire and battle the Crusaders. Saladin’s military system was not new. It was based on cavalry, operating in small mobile units under the direction of amirs, coordinated by senior amirs, and ultimately commanded by Saladin in the center with key relatives or lords on each flank. For sieges, Saladin fielded sapper, artillery, and siege tower companies. The structure and organization of his army replicated the system of the Seljuk Turk sultans of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and their successors, such as Zangi and Nur alDin of Aleppo and Mosul in the twelfth century. Unlike the Seljuks, Saladin floated an able navy, though not equal to the Frankish flotillas. The Ayyubid military was sufficiently flexible and competent that Saladin could employ it in decidedly different ways, depending on the goal of the engagement or campaign: creation and defense of the empire in the early years; expansion in Muslim lands; raids against the Franks; and all-out holy war on the Crusader project. While combat is invariably serious business for soldier and commander alike, Saladin’s battles in the late 1160s were especially critical because they involved the very establishment of the Ayyubid Empire. Thus, in 1167, the battle of Babain and the defense of Alexandria were very violent and intense affairs. In each, neither side won, but under the command of Shirkuh at Babain, the Syrian cavalry acquitted itself well. Although it sustained

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casualties, it killed, wounded, and captured many Frankish and Egyptian soldiers. Even more crucial was the 1169 battle against the Nubian battalions of the Egyptian army. Saladin’s cavalry bested them in the streets of Cairo and, even though he had given the defeated Nubians safe-passage to cross the Nile, his brother Turan-Shah also crossed the river with a large force and slaughtered them as they made camp in Giza. This brutal deed was a pivotal point in Saladin’s assumption of control in Egypt because it eliminated the core of the Fatimid army, leaving Saladin to act as he pleased. The 1169 defense of Damietta against a joint CrusaderByzantine assault and the 1174 defense of Alexandria against a Norman maritime attack were also critical. Alexandria and Damietta were Egypt’s two most important ports and the Ayyubids could not afford to lose them. While certainly not his favorite or chosen form of warfare, Saladin’s men broke the sieges, inflicting significant casualties in both cases. In sum, from 1167 through 1174, Shirkuh and Saladin’s cavalrymen performed effectively and powerfully in the Egyptian desert and the Cairene streets and at the crucial port cities. The empire was established and defended. In his campaign to acquire Muslim territories, in addition to his army, Saladin utilized intelligence, diplomacy, and economic incentives and punishments. With the exception of the battles at the Horns of Hama in 1175 and Tell Sultan in 1176, he mustered and presented his formidable cavalry largely for its demonstration effect. And, even at the Horns of Hama and Tell Sultan, while the fighting was indeed intense, he did not let his men pursue the defeated opponents for he wished to eventually incorporate them into the Ayyubid Empire. In his campaigns from 1174 through 1186, as he approached a city he intended to capture, whether Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, or the towns of Jazira, he ordered his agents to gather intelligence on what was possible and who might defect to his side. On the diplomatic front, he conducted negotiations, at times for short periods as at Hama in 1174 or for months as at Mosul and Aleppo. Once he secured a city, he took steps to assuage its leaders and citizens who might otherwise have been fearful of their new suzerain. Saladin also used economic tools. Payments to new supporters, before or after he took over a city, were common. In addition, he utilized the iqta system. For example, in a show of power, he assigned iqtas to amirs and other leaders who accepted his suzerainty in the Mosul and Aleppo

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provinces. By these assignments, Saladin, on the one hand, awarded men who had joined the Ayyubids and, on the other, he deprived the recalcitrant lords of Aleppo and Mosul of iqtas they had heretofore enjoyed. Using this schema of military capacity and capability combined with effective intelligence, political diplomacy, and economic rewards and punishments, Saladin successfully extended his empire from Damascus and Aleppo to Mosul, Jazira, and Diyar Bakr. To claim legitimacy for his empire building, he always couched his actions and intentions in terms of the unity of Islam and the need to assemble sufficient manpower and resources for holy war. He continually asserted these arguments broadly throughout the Middle East. He also frequently addressed special letters to the caliph in Baghdad in which he reiterated the same points and thereupon requested diplomas for his territorial goals. While some of his contemporaries certainly resented this expansion, others bought into it whether for ideological reasons or for the opportunity to join the pillage and gain more iqtas. During the 1170–1186 period, Saladin’s forays against the Crusaders, while certainly serious and sometimes dangerous, were essentially raids. Although he doubtlessly wanted to inflict damage on their forces, it is apparent that he was not prepared during this period to undertake a long campaign or campaigns to drive the Franks out of the eastern Mediterranean. Thus, in 1170, he raided Gaza with a sizable cavalry contingent and gave his men the opportunity to seize booty. In 1177, Saladin raided Palestine with a large force. While some of Saladin’s horsemen were plundering as far as Ramla and Qalqilya, King Baldwin surprised him and roundly defeated the Ayyubids at Tell al-Safiya. Embarrassed, Saladin rebuilt his army and, two years later, defeated the Franks in three engagements—Golan Heights, Marj Uyun, and Jacob’s Ford. In each, Saladin wished to prevail, but the engagements were not designed to totally defeat the Franks. Similarly, in the Jordan Valley near Baisan in 1182, though the battle engaged many in furious combat with losses on both sides, Saladin did not take the opportunity to pursue the Crusaders. In 1183, at Goliath Springs, he besieged the Franks in their camp, but within days, he led his cavalry back to Damascus. Ayyubid naval attacks of 1179 were also just raids. Saladin’s admiral was not trying to capture and secure a

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port; he was simply demonstrating his maritime reach and capturing ample and valuable booty. These raids served a number of purposes. Saladin’s men were able to pillage. After the Marj Uyun battle, Saladin collected lucrative ransoms for his treasury. He wrought damage on the Frankish military establishment. Recognizing his capability and the harm he could inflict, the Crusaders readily signed treaties that Saladin needed in order to secure his western flank as he pursued his ambitions to the east. In addition, these raids and battles underscored his holy war credentials for his supporters and Baghdad, albeit, he still had some detractors. From the 1160s through 1186, Saladin’s battalions served him well in Egypt, in Muslim lands, and in raids against the Franks. During 1187 and the subsequent five years, his army was tested at another level. From mid 1187 through mid 1189, the Ayyubid cavalry dramatically demonstrated its prowess. During the summer and fall of 1187, due to his tactical and organizational skills, but also due to fundamental Crusader mistakes, Saladin totally defeated King Guy of Lusignan’s sizable army at Hattin and the Frankish defense of Jerusalem. Deploying his men broadly, he captured the bulk of Palestine, Lebanon, and northwestern Syria. Once more, Saladin had led his Ayyubid forces to victory. In the course of this string of conquests, Saladin mixed diplomacy with warfare. He readily granted quarter to Frankish defenders in city after city and fortress after fortress, letting the soldiers and their families march to Tyre. This very public magnanimity in the early stages of the campaign undoubtedly encouraged others, though not all, to surrender after little or no fighting. Some of his contemporaries complained about his generous treatment of enemy personnel because, as the months passed, the Crusaders were able to build a significant military presence at Tyre and Tripoli. However, Saladin well knew that without this policy, the Franks would have tenaciously held fortresses and towns in the hinterland that would have presented a danger to his rear and flanks as he faced the new waves of Crusaders from Europe.

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Saladin’s decision not to assault Tyre during the summer and fall of 1187 was the subject of similar criticism. Some contemporaries and historians3 blame Saladin for poor judgment when he decided to skirt the port city and wrap up Caesarea, Jaffa, Haifa, Ascalon, Sidon, and Beirut. Again, it was a question of priorities and availability of resources, especially because many of his amirs and soldiers were mopping up towns, cities, and castles in other parts of Palestine and Lebanon. As he faced the Third Crusade, Saladin’s army suffered from two major weaknesses. He could not defeat the well-led, armed, and armored Frankish army in the field, especially because the Frankish navy assured its resupply by sea. The 1191 Arsuf battle, which Saladin sought, showed that Crusaders could stay in the field and, with their disciplined charges, bloody Saladin’s cavalry. As recounted, Saladin’s army suffered casualties, but in essence, the daylong encounter was a major, but expensive raid on the part of the Muslims. On the following day, Saladin tried to provoke another battle, but King Richard did not accept the offer. After this nondecisive battle at Arsuf, Saladin and Richard found themselves in a stalemate. Saladin explicitly told the English king that he was in his homeland and could wait until the European Crusaders tired and returned to their homes. This strategy, which ultimately proved to be successful, pointed to a second weakness in Saladin’s army— after a long period in the field, especially with little opportunity to plunder and acquire new lands, his officers and soldiers wanted to Ibn al-Athir is frequently critical of Saladin’s decision-making. Ibn alAthir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 27–41. Ibn Shaddad gives his interpretation of why Saladin did not assault Tyre during the summer and fall; this discussion is, itself, an indirect acknowledgement of criticism directed at Saladin. Ibn Shaddad, History of Saladin, 76. Lane-Poole, who is usually very positive about Saladin, is critical of his decision not to assault Tyre during the fall of 1187. He is even more negative in his discussion of Saladin’s decision to break off the winter siege of Tyre at the end of December 1187. Lane-Poole, Saladin, 220, 241. Ehrenkreutz, who is frequently critical of Saladin, calls his decision at Tyre “a strategic blunder.” Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 203–4. 3

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disperse and go home, at times to the point of rebellion. Some observers in the twelfth century and historians of the twentieth are critical of Saladin for this military shortcoming.4 Even though this view is understandable, it is shallow and does not recognize medieval realities. In forming and leading his army, Saladin was not a revolutionary. He used the time-honored system based on iqta obligations and coalitions of provincial leaders. His ability to motivate, lead, and think strategically may have been unique, but the nature and makeup of his armed forces were not. Thus, he had to face and cope with the fissiparous tendencies inherent in the nature of his empire. In this broad context, a common observation of military historians is appropriate and to the point: “We make war as we can, rather than as we should.” *** The economy of empire is always complex and the Ayyubid Empire was no exception. During Saladin’s rule from 1169 to 1193, his actions and decisions contributed to the improvement of trade and commerce, manufacturing and construction, agriculture, and public welfare. However, at times, the frequent wars and campaigns, especially in 1187–1192, severely strained the system to the detriment of the ordinary citizen as well as some in the middle classes. Before the Ayyubids took over Egypt, the country suffered from disruption and destruction of war in Cairo, along the Nile’s branches, and at the ports. Under Saladin’s rule, public order was re-established and Norman and Crusader threats were limited to the coast. Saladin’s government also made certain the judicial system operated properly to the benefit of traders, merchants, iqta holders, and manufacturers and he paid attention to the security of the roads and transportation. In a complementary fashion, the government and Saladin’s relatives and senior officials built markets and khans in Cairo and other cities and looked to the security of the ports. Furthermore, Saladin sought to regulate trade to the benefit of Egyptian and Muslim merchants and the Ayyubid Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil al-Tarikh, vol. 10, 40–41, 95–109. Ehrenkreutz, Saladin, 233–38. 4

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economy in general. Canceling a practice common under the Fatimids, foreigners were not allowed to trade in the Egyptian interior. However, he encouraged trade with Europe. At Alexandria, he built and improved special facilities and infrastructure for Italian merchants and even allowed them to build a church. He also signed trade agreements with key Italian merchant cities to help guarantee access to strategic materials and provide markets for Egyptian exports and transit trade. With respect to commerce between Muslim and Frankish merchants in the Holy Land, Saladin’s truces with the Crusaders included provisions for their respective traders to cross borders with their goods. During tense times, Saladin’s cavalry provided protection for merchant caravans and, in 1183, his navy defended the Red Sea against Reynald of Châtillon’s surprise attack. Aside from trade related infrastructure, the government and senior officials built or improved numerous other facilities—law colleges, mosques, hospitals, Sufi hostels, and apartment buildings—investments that helped stimulate the economy. In like manner, for the defense of the Cairo, Saladin ordered the construction of a new wall around the capital and Fustat and a formidable citadel between them. He also strengthened the walls of Alexandria, Damietta, and Tanis. In addition, Saladin’s administration rigorously managed and maintained Egypt’s crucial irrigation system fed by the Nile. While Saladin’s government invested in Damascus and Aleppo, Syria did not require the level of attention Egypt needed. Ruled peacefully by Nur al-Din in previous years, the cities had not been attacked and had not suffered from mismanagement. For revenue, Saladin relied on the iqta system, zakat taxes, rents from government owned facilities, sale of Frankish slaves, ransom for Crusader notables captured in battle, and occasional payments by provincial lords. Saladin’s wartime economy was both a benefit and a burden on his people. On the one hand, commerce, manufacturing, and agriculture were stimulated by the demand of his war machine for weapons and armor, horses and camels, ships, and food and fodder. Government payments for these resources flowed to the coffers of the middle classes. On the other, these expenditures were a cost to the society. Saladin’s administration took some of the revenues ordinarily used for the normal functions of government and applied them to the prosecution of war.

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Similarly, under their obligations to Saladin, provincial nobles utilized iqta income to support their troops in the field rather than on public welfare. At another level, many soldiers were also farmers. When they were riding with Saladin’s cavalry, they were not at home tending their fields. In addition, in his campaigns against the Crusaders, Saladin frequently instructed his officers to recruit irregular Turkoman tribesmen and bedouin, men who usually had to be paid in gold for their military service. In the course of wars and campaigns, especially in the 1189– 1192 period, Saladin’s colleagues reported deteriorating economic conditions: the lack of gold in the big cities because Ayyubid controlled supplies had been depleted to buy war materials in Italy; overexploitation of peasants in Palestine and Syria; and the lack of sufficient funds for normal government functions. In sum, from the earliest days of his rule, Saladin had the vision to build for the people, to expend funds for public order and security, and to provide for the public welfare. Nevertheless, Saladin also spent freely to grow his empire. He frequently demanded funds from Egypt and Syria as he pushed into the Jazira, and this pattern escalated during the Holy Land wars starting in 1187. Qadi al-Fadil, Saladin’s senior aide, succinctly described the process: Saladin “… spent revenues of Egypt to gain Syria, and he spent revenues of Syria to take over Jazira, and he spent the revenues of all to conquer the [Mediterranean] coast.”5 In this observation, likely written in 1189, Qadi al-Fadil described an important facet of Saladin’s warfare economy. He also, though, implicitly complained in this passage and elsewhere6 about the extraordinary expenses for empire and war and underlined the need to pay attention to the conditions of the people and public need. From the historical record, Saladin obviously focused on the economic and social welfare of his subjects from Egypt to Mosul, but it is likewise evident from his career that he sacrificed domestic needs and priorities to pursue empire and holy war. *** 5 6

Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 177. See Chapter Fourteen; Abu Shama, Al-Rawdatain, pt. 2, 205.

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In summary, looking at Saladin’s life from multiple perspectives, it is clear that he was driven by personal and familial ambition and by the imperative of holy war in defense of Islam, at times to the point of jeopardizing the welfare of the very empire he had created. To maintain control over his unwieldy realm, he ruled both directly through his relatives and senior amirs and indirectly through provincial lords. In times of peace, the two systems were relatively efficacious, but as Saladin entered into sustained combat against the Crusaders, extended periods of war strained the bonds of fealty the provincial nobles owed him. Saladin’s mobile, experienced, and skilled cavalry was central to establishing and expanding his empire. He successfully took risks at Babain, in the Cairo streets, and at the Horns of Hama and Tell Sultan, but later augmented his military capabilities with diplomatic and economic tools. Against the Crusaders with their unfamiliar armor and tactics, he was successful at Hattin due both to his competent generalship and logistics and to fundamental Frankish mistakes. However, against King Richard, an accomplished and headstrong soldier, he could only attain a stalemate, partially due to the centrifugal tendencies of his own army, which he faced with the strength of his personality and his tenacity. Lastly, at the economic level, he will long be known for building edifices and institutions, but also for exploiting—perhaps overexploiting—his medieval economy to expand his realm and undertake holy war against the Crusaders. During his life, Saladin made a difference. He was a warriorking who could and did create a broad empire and confront the Franks, yet also built for the benefit of the Ayyubids and the many classes who supported him. While he had critics, many more mourned his passing. Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi summed up the common feeling in a brief eulogy: “Men grieved for him as they grieve for prophets. I have seen no other ruler for whose death the people mourned, for he was loved by good and bad, Muslim and unbeliever alike.”7

Lewis, Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople, vol. 1, 67. 7

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Map 1. The Middle East

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Map 2. Egypt

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Map 3. Palestine and Transjordan

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Map 4. Lebanon, Northern Syria, and Southern Anatolia

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Map 5. Eastern Anatolia, Iraq, and Jazira

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BIBLIOGRAPHY MEDIEVAL SOURCES Abu Shama, Shihab al-Din Abd al-Rahman. Al-Rawdatain fi Akhbar al-Dawlatain [The Two Gardens in the History of the Two Countries]. Edited by M. H. M. Ahmad and M. M. Ziyada. 1 vol., 2 pts. Cairo: n.p., 1956 and 1962. Reprinted in Beirut: Dar al-Jil, n.d. The Beirut printing is cited in the text of this book. Ambroise. Estoire de la Guerre Sainte. Translated by M. J. Hubert and J. L. Lamonte as The Crusade of Richard the Lion-Heart. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1976. Brundage, James. The Crusades: A Documentary Survey. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 1962. The Chronicle of the Third Crusade: Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi. Translated by H. Nicholson. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001. Chronicon Terrae Sanctae seu libellus de expugnatione. Edited by H. Prutz. Danzig: n.p., 1876. Edbury, Peter W. The Conquest of Jerusalem and the Third Crusade: Sources in Translation. London: Ashgate, 1998. Gabrieli, Francesco. Arab Historians of the Crusades. Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1969. Ibn al-Athir, Izz al-Din. Al-Kamil al-Tarikh [The Perfect History]. Edited by Umar Abd al-Salam Tadmuri. 14 vols. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 2004. Ibn Jubayr, Muhammad. The Travels of Ibn Jubayr. Translated by R. J. C. Broadhurst. London: Jonathan Cape, 1952. Ibn Khallikan, Shams al-Din. Ibn Khallikan’s Biographical Dictionary. Translated by Baron MacGuckin de Slane. 4 vols. Paris and London: Printed for the Oriental Translation Fund of Great Britain and Ireland, 1843–1871. 427

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Ibn-Munqidh, Usamah. An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusade. Translated by Philip K. Hitti. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. Ibn al-Qalansi. The Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades. Translated by H. A. R. Gibb. London: Courier Dover Publications, 2003. Ibn Shaddad, Baha al-Din. The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin or al-Nawadir al-Sultaniyya wa’l-Mahasin al-Yusufiyya. Translated by D. S. Richards. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001. Ibn Wasil, Jamal al-Din. Mufarrij al-Kurub fi Akhbar Bani Ayyoub [The Relief of Anxieties Concerning the History of the Ayyubids]. Edited by Jamal al-Din al-Shiyal. 3 vols. Cairo: n.p., 1953. Imad al-Din al-Isfahani. Al-Barq al-Shami [Lightning of Syria]. Edited by Mustafa al-Hiyari. Vols. 3 and 5. Amman: Abd alHamid Shuman Foundation, 1978. ———. Al-Fath al-Qussi fi al-Fath al-Qudsi [The Eloquent Exposition on the Holy Conquest]. Edited by Muhammad Mahmud Subh. Cairo: Al-Dar al-Qawmiyah lil-Tҕibaah wa alNashr, 1965. Reprinted as Harub Salah al-Din wa Fath Bait alMuqadis, wa Huwa al-Kitab Musamman: Al-Fath al-Qussi fi al-Fath al-Qudsi [Wars of Saladin and Conquest of the Holy City, Book Named: The Eloquent Exposition on the Holy Conquest]. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Alamiya, 2003. The Beirut edition is cited in the text of this book. Guillaume de Tyr. Histoire des Régions D’Outre-Mer depuis L’Avènement de Mahomet, 1163–1184. Translated by Francois Guizot. Vol. 5. Paris: Paleo, 2006. Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi. Mirat al-Zaman [Mirror of Time]. Hyderabad: n.p., 1951. William of Tyre. A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Seas. Translated by E. A. Babcock and A. C. Krey, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1943. ———. Die Lateinische Fortsetzung Wilhelms von Tyrus. Edited by M. Salloch, Leipzig: n.p., 1934.

OTHERS Akkari, Hatem, ed. La Méditerranée médiévale. Tunis: Alif, Les Editions de la Méditerranée, 2002. al-Amin, Hassan. Salah al-Din al-Ayyoubi bain al-Abassiyin wa al-Fatamid wa al- Salabiyin [Saladin the Ayyoubi between the Abbasids and the Fatimids and the Crusaders]. Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1996.

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Gibb, H. A. R. Studies on the Civilization of Islam. Edited by Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1962. ———. Mohammedanism. London: Oxford University Press, 1969. ———. The Life of Saladin. London: Oxford University Press, 1973. Grousset, René. Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume Franc de Jérusalem. 3 vols. Paris: Perrin, 1934. ———. Les Croisades. Paris: Quadridge/Presses Universitaires de France, 1944. ———. The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia. Translated by Naomi Walford. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005. Grunebaum, G. E. von. Medieval Islam. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1953. Heer, Friedrich. The Medieval World. New York, NY: Anchor Books, 2001. Heyd, W. von. Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen Age. Leipzig: n.p., 1923. Hillenbrand, Carole. The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge, 2000. Hitti, Philip. History of the Arabs. Houndmills, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Hodgson, Marshall. The Order of the Assassins. The Hague: Mouton, 1955. ———. The Venture of Islam of Islam. 3 vols. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1974. Holt, P. M. The Age of the Crusades. London: Longman, 1986. Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. Humphreys, R. S. From Saladin to the Mongols. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1977. Jordan, William. Europe in the High Middle Ages. London: Penguin Books, 2002. Kedar, B. Z., ed. Jerusalem. Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1979. Keegan, John. A History of Warfare. New York, NY: Vintage Books, Random House, 1994. Lambton, A. K. S. State and Government in Medieval Islam. New York, NY: Routledge, 1981.

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Lane-Poole, Stanley. Saladin and the Fall of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, LTD., 1898. ———. A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages. London: Methuen & Co., 1901. Lapidus, Ira. A History of Islamic Societies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Lev, Yaacov. Saladin in Egypt. Leiden: Brill, 1999. Lewis, Bernard. The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam. New York, NY: Octagon Books, 1980. ———. Islam from the Prophet Muhammad to the Capture of Constantinople. 2 vols. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1974 ———. The World of Islam: Faith, People and Culture. London: Thames & Hudson, 1991. Lyons, Malcolm and D. E. P. Jackson. Saladin, The Politics of the Holy War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Maalouf, Amin. The Crusades through Arab Eyes. London: Al Saqi Books, 1984. Mayer, Hans Eberhard. The Crusades. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972. Mohring, H. Saladin und der dritte Kreuzzug. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1980. Momen, M. An Introduction to Shi’i Islam. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985. Mouton, Jean-Michel. Saladin: Le Sultan chevalier. Paris: Institut du Monde Arabe, 2001. Nicholson, Helen and David Nicolle. God’s Warriors. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2005. Nicolle, David. Arms and Armor of the Crusading Era, 1050–1350. London: Greenhill Books, 1999. ———. Hattin 1187. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1993. ———. Saladin and the Saracens. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1986. Nowich, J. J. Byzantium. 3 vols. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986–1996. O’Shea, Stephen. Sea of Faith: Islam and Christianity in the Medieval Mediterranean World. New York, NY: Walker & Co., 2006. Oldenberg, Zoé. The Crusades. New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1966. Philips, J. R. S. The Medieval Expansion of Europe. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

432

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Qalaji, Qadri. Salah al-Din al-Ayyoubi [Saladin al-Ayyoubi]. Beirut: Sharika al-Matbuat lil-Tawzia wa al-Nashr, 1997. al-Rabii, Ismail Nuri. Nabla wa Darawish: Tarikh al-Harub al-Salabiyin, 1095–1291 [Nobles and Dervishes: History of the Crusader Wars, 1095–1291]. Amman: al-Ahliya, 2003. Read, Piers Paul. The Templars. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2001. Reston, James, Jr. Warriors of God. New York, NY: Doubleday, 2001. Richard, Jean. The Crusades, c. 1071–c. 1291. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Riley-Smith, Jonathan. A History of the Crusades. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987. Roseblaut, Charles. Saladin, Prince of Chivalry. New York, NY: Robert M. McBride & Company, 1930. Runciman, Steven. A History of the Crusades. 3 vols. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1951. Schact, J. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983. Setton, K. M., ed. A History of the Crusades. 6 vols. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969–1989. Shatzmiller, M., ed. Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria. Leiden: Brill, 1993. Sivan, E. L’Islam et la Croisade. Paris: Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient, 1968. Smail, R. C. Crusading Warfare, 1097–1193. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1956. Stevenson, W. B. The Crusaders in the East. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1907. Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War: A New History of the Crusades. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006. Watt, W. M. Muhammad at Mecca. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953. ———. Muhammad at Medina. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956. Wheatcroft, Andrew. Infidels: A History of the Conflict between Christendom and Islam. New York, NY: Random House, 2003. Wise, Terrence. Armies of the Crusades. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1978.

INDEX OF AUTHORS Bulliet, R. W., 429 Cahen, C., 429 Cantor, Norman, 429 Champdor, Albert, 429 Chauvel, Geneviève, 429 Cook, M. A., 101, 102, 429 Daftary, Farhad, 429 Durand, Robert, 429 Edbury, Peter W., 102, 195, 209, 211, 214, 215, 217, 219, 220, 221, 224, 228, 231, 232, 233, 235, 239, 240, 241, 242, 244, 245, 247, 256, 258, 265, 266, 267, 276, 280, 281, 285, 286, 289, 291, 293, 295, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307, 316, 328, 329, 334, 344, 354, 371, 378, 388, 394, 427 Ehrenkreutz, Andrew, 40, 51, 58, 64, 68, 80, 89, 93, 95, 98, 99, 102, 104, 106, 107, 109, 117, 120, 122, 127, 134, 140, 141, 143, 145, 146, 149, 150, 151, 154, 155, 157, 161, 162, 164, 167, 170, 171, 172, 174, 178, 181, 184, 189, 193, 198, 202, 203, 205, 211, 225, 238, 254, 264, 318, 319, 320, 374, 401, 403, 416, 417, 429 Eickelman, D., 429 Elbeheiry, S., 429

Abu Shama, Shihab al-Din, 3, 41, 50, 64, 65, 68, 69, 80, 94, 95, 98, 106, 109, 114, 117, 120, 127, 134, 143, 145, 150, 151, 157, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 171, 172, 174, 178, 180, 181, 184, 189, 191, 193, 198, 202, 205, 210, 212, 215, 217, 218, 222, 228, 247, 258, 265, 267, 268, 269, 272, 275, 276, 281, 289, 293, 295, 300, 314, 331, 338, 339, 340, 344, 350, 351, 354, 356, 361, 363, 377, 378, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 394, 400, 401, 402, 403, 419, 427 Ahmad, M. H. M., 427 Akkari, Hatem, 428 Ambroise, 329, 336, 354, 366, 375, 388, 427 al-Amin, Hassan, 428 Angold, Michael, 429 Armstrong, Karen, 429 Arnold, T. W., 429 Ashtor, E. A., 429 Babcock, E. A., 428 Baldwin, Marshall W., 429 Bloch, M., 429 Broadhurst, R. J. C., 427 Brundage, James, 228, 240, 247, 336, 340, 344, 387, 394, 427

433

434

SALADIN. EMPIRE AND HOLY WAR

Elisseef, N., 429 Ernoul, see Edbury, Peter W. Fletcher, Richard, 6, 7, 429 Gabrieli, Francesco, 7, 225, 250, 296, 427 Gibb, H. A. R., 6, 40, 51, 58, 64, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 90, 98, 112, 120, 127, 128, 134, 143, 145, 146, 154, 155, 156, 161, 162, 165, 171, 172, 174, 178, 181, 191, 193, 198, 202, 205, 209, 215, 217, 237, 247, 251, 258, 281, 293, 314, 315, 317, 319, 340, 344, 361, 363, 374, 379, 388, 395, 428, 430 Grousset, René, 7, 42, 143, 147, 149, 150, 151, 184, 189, 209, 211, 212, 215, 222, 229, 241, 247, 258, 263, 264, 281, 285, 286, 289, 293, 295, 300, 304, 307, 309, 313, 314, 329, 340, 344, 351, 366, 367, 370, 371, 375, 378, 380, 383, 388, 394, 402, 430 Grunebaum, G. E. von, 430 Guillaume de Tyr, see William of Tyre Guizot, Francois, 428 Heer, Friedrich, 430 Heyd, W. von, 430 Hillenbrand, Carole, 7, 120, 248, 250, 251, 430 Hitti, Philip K., 428, 430 Hodgson, Marshall, 6, 405, 430 Holt, P. M., 7, 430 Hourani, Albert, 6, 405, 430 Hubert, M. J., 427 Humphreys, R. S., 430 Ibn Abi Tayy, 3, 95, 187

Ibn al-Athir, Izz al-Din, 3, 41, 48, 50, 58, 63, 68, 80, 97, 98, 106, 109, 117, 120, 127, 134, 143, 149, 154, 155, 157, 162, 164, 165, 166, 168, 171, 172, 174, 178, 181, 184, 189, 191, 193, 198, 202, 203, 205, 210, 212, 215, 217, 219, 222, 225, 228, 230, 231, 235, 241, 247, 250, 253, 254, 256, 258, 265, 267, 268, 269, 272, 275, 276, 278, 281, 289, 291, 293, 295, 297, 298, 299, 300, 303, 304, 305, 307, 309, 313, 314, 317, 318, 320, 321, 332, 335, 338, 340, 344, 351, 354, 356, 364, 365, 366, 371, 374, 375, 378, 384, 388, 394, 401, 403, 416, 417, 427 Ibn al-Qalansi, 428 Ibn Jubayr, Muhammad, 39, 41, 93, 102, 138, 139, 156, 184, 250, 277, 427 Ibn Khallikan, Shams al-Din, 249, 427 Ibn Shaddad, Baha al-Din, 3, 40, 50, 51, 58, 59, 61, 63, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 80, 105, 106, 107, 114, 116, 117, 120, 127, 134, 141, 142, 143, 154, 155, 160, 162, 166, 171, 172, 173, 174, 176, 178, 180, 181, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 198, 199, 201, 202, 204, 205, 215, 218, 221, 226, 227, 228, 230, 231, 233, 235, 243, 246, 247, 249, 250, 254, 258, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 277, 280, 281, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290,

INDEX OF AUTHORS 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 298, 299, 300, 302, 303, 304, 305, 307, 309, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 321, 331, 332, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 342, 343, 344, 346, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 358, 359, 361, 362, 363, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 416, 428 Ibn Wasil, Jamal al-Din, 4, 40, 50, 58, 63, 68, 80, 117, 170, 180, 428 Ibn-Munqidh, Usamah, 428 Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, 3, 71, 97, 105, 112, 127, 149, 173, 198, 204, 223, 228, 245, 250, 269, 288, 296, 310, 428 Jackson, D. E. P., see Lyons, Malcolm and D. E. P. Jackson Jamal al-Din al-Shiyal, 428 Jordan, William, 217, 430 Kedar, B. Z., 430 Keegan, John, 86, 430 Krey, A. C., 428 Lambton, A. K. S., 430 Lamonte, J. L., 427 Lane-Poole, Stanley, 40, 51, 58, 64, 68, 80, 120, 132, 134, 143, 149, 158, 162, 203, 228, 233, 235, 238, 241, 249, 258, 263, 265, 268, 269, 272, 275, 276, 281, 293, 300, 307, 313, 314, 315, 321, 333, 340, 344, 346, 349, 351, 353, 354, 361,

435

363, 366, 369, 379, 380, 388, 390, 394, 396, 403, 416, 431 Lapidus, Ira, 6, 405, 431 Lev, Yaacov, 58, 64, 65, 68, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 93, 95, 98, 102, 104, 106, 107, 109, 114, 117, 120, 151, 157, 158, 217, 409, 431 Lewis, Bernard, 6, 133, 134, 251, 420, 431 Lyons, Malcom and D. E. P. Jackson, 40, 51, 55, 58, 61, 64, 65, 68, 80, 89, 93, 95, 97, 98, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 115, 117, 120, 125, 127, 130, 132, 134, 137, 138, 140, 141, 143, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 154, 155, 157, 158, 160, 162, 164, 165, 166, 168, 171, 174, 175, 176, 178, 180, 181, 184, 187, 189, 191, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 209, 212, 215, 217, 222, 225, 228, 229, 230, 235, 238, 239, 241, 245, 246, 247, 252, 253, 254, 258, 263, 265, 267, 268, 269, 272, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 281, 285, 289, 293, 294, 295, 299, 300, 303, 304, 305, 307, 309, 311, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 331, 332, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 344, 351, 352, 354, 356, 358, 359, 361, 363, 364, 366, 367, 369, 371, 372, 374, 375, 377, 378, 379, 380, 383, 384, 388, 389, 391, 392, 394, 401, 403, 431 Maalouf, Amin, 7, 68, 431

436

SALADIN. EMPIRE AND HOLY WAR

MacGuckin de Slane, Baron, 427 Mahmud Subh, Muhammad, 428 Mayer, Hans Eberhard, 7, 263, 431 Mohring, H., 431 Momen, M., 431 Mouton, Jean-Michel, 430, 431 Mustafa al-Hiyari, 428 Nicholson, Helen, 83, 86, 88, 217, 247, 427, 431 Nicolle, David, 83, 84, 86, 88, 217, 227, 228, 247, 431 Nowich, J. J., 431 O’Shea, Stephen, 431 Oldenberg, Zoé, 431 Qadi al-Fadil, see Index of People Philips, J. R. S., 431 Prutz, H., 427 Qalaji, Qadri, 432 al-Rabii, Ismail Nuri, 432 Read, Piers Paul, 432 Reston, James, Jr., 432 Richard, Jean, 7, 42, 127, 263, 329, 336, 344, 353, 354, 358, 369, 382, 432 Richards, D. S., 428 Riley-Smith, Jonathan, 7, 263, 432 Roseblaut, Charles, 432 Runciman, Steven, 7, 42, 51, 56, 58, 64, 68, 80, 83, 89, 111, 117, 127, 134, 143, 147, 149, 150, 151, 162, 164, 165, 166, 168, 171, 178, 184, 185, 188, 189, 193, 195, 208, 209, 211, 212, 215, 217, 222, 225, 228, 233, 242, 247, 258, 261, 262,

263, 264, 267, 276, 281, 285, 286, 289, 293, 295, 300, 304, 307, 316, 317, 321, 323, 325, 329, 333, 335, 338, 340, 341, 344, 351, 354, 358, 359, 361, 363, 366, 367, 369, 371, 375, 377, 378, 380, 383, 384, 388, 390, 394, 396, 432 Salloch, M., 428 Schact, J., 432 Setton, K. M., 432 Shatzmiller, M., 432 Sibt Ibn al-Jawzi, 122, 428 Sivan, E., 432 Smail, R. C., 81, 86, 87, 88, 220, 221, 222, 228, 432 Stevenson, W. B., 7, 432 Tyerman, Christopher, 7, 42, 185, 209, 216, 222, 229, 247, 260, 261, 262, 263, 265, 267, 285, 286, 293, 295, 299, 300, 304, 307, 317, 323, 325, 326, 328, 329, 330, 332, 333, 335, 336, 338, 340, 344, 351, 354, 359, 361, 363, 366, 367, 370, 371, 375, 377, 380, 383, 384, 388, 394, 396, 432 Umar Abd al-Salam Tadmuri, 427 Watt, W. M., 432 Wheatcroft, Andrew, 432 William of Tyre, 50, 52, 53, 58, 59, 60, 64, 68, 80, 102, 109, 117, 127, 134, 141, 143, 148, 149, 150, 151, 162, 164, 165, 167, 182, 184, 185, 189, 195, 285, 428 Wise, Terrence, 432 Ziyada, M. M., 427

INDEX OF PEOPLE 292, 294, 296, 306, 330, 333, 335, 347, 349, 350, 351, 352, 355, 356, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 366, 368, 369, 370, 373, 374, 378, 381, 384, 388, 391, 392, 394, 400, 402, 404, 408, 410 al-Adl (Damascus leader), 111 al-Adl (Saladin's envoy), 370, 393 al-Adl ibn al-Ajami, 110, 125 al-Afdal Ali (Saladin’ son), 40, 138, 193, 205, 212, 213, 215, 225, 229, 253, 255, 257, 263, 265, 276, 289, 294, 296, 299, 335, 347, 352, 355, 357, 373, 374, 378, 381, 384, 394, 401, 402, 403, 404, 408 Aibak al-Azizi, 388 Ain al-Daula, 67, 74 Ala al-Din Khurramshah ibn Izz al-Din Masud, 293, 299, 306, 319, 383, 384, 391 Alam al-Din Qaisar, 365, 367, 374, 387, 395 Alam al-Din Sulaiman ibn Jandar, 274, 303, 321, 348, 349, 350, 363 Alan of Saint-Valery, 307 Alexander II (Pope), 31

Abbasids, 5, 6, 8, 10, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 28, 34, 94, 96, 97, 101, 117, 120, 121, 126, 136, 152, 155, 167, 182, 207, 245, 250, 252, 253, 320, 408 Abd al-Nabi ibn Mahdi, 105, 106 Abd al-Samad, 108 Abdul-Jabbar al-Saffah (Abbasid Caliph), 11 Abu al-Haija, Husam al-Din, 75, 308, 312, 315, 364, 366, 379, 411 Abu Ali Abd al-Rahim al-Fadil, see Qadi al-Fadil Abu Bakr (Caliph), 7, 12, 13 Abu Bakr al-Adili, 369, 388, 389, 391, 392 Abu Bakr ibn Qara-Arslan, 153, 196, 410, al-Adid, Abu Muhammad Abd Allah, (Fatimid Caliph), 47, 52, 54, 56, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 74, 76, 77, 79, 80, 93, 94, 95, 96, 317 al-Adil (Saladin’s brother), 76, 114, 127, 137, 146, 158, 165, 183, 184, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 200, 201, 204, 212, 230, 237, 242, 253, 256, 276,

437

438

SALADIN. EMPIRE AND HOLY WAR

Alexius I (Byzantine Emperor), 31, 32, 212 Ali ibn Abi Talib (Caliph), 7, 8, 12, 16 Almohades, 91, 204, 252, 295, 314 Amalric I (King of Jerusalem), 47, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 74, 76, 78, 79, 89, 104, 108, 111, 112, 113, 119, 124, 243 Amalric of Lusignan (Constable), 226, 266 Amaury of Lusignan, 328 Andrew of Brienne (Count), 289, 290, 291 Andronicus Contostephanus, 78, 79 Andronicus I (Byzantine Emperor), 155, 195 Armenians, 6, 16, 18, 19, 26, 37, 64, 75, 77, 78, 79, 90, 99, 103, 108, 153, 157, 158, 174, 176, 183, 195, 212, 243, 302, 303, 305, 327, 328 Arslan-Shah Tughril (Seljuk Sultan), 182, 197, 201, 202 Arthur (Duke of Brittany), 326 Asad al-Din Yurun-Qush, 199 al-Ashraf (al-Adil’s son), 404 Assassins, 108, 123, 127, 131, 132, 133, 161, 271, 371, 430 Ayyub, Najm al-Din (Saladin’s father), 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 74, 80, 94, 97, 105, 407 al-Aziz Uthman, see Uthman, al-Azizi Badr al-Din Dildirim, 213, 230, 330, 375, 393, 394 Badr al-Din Maudud, 321

Baha al-Din al-Rabib, 201 Baha al-Din Qaraqush, 75, 263, 298, 300, 308, 312, 314, 315, 315, 342, 343, 376, 401 Bahram, 16, 103, 305, 321 Bahram-Shah, 305, 321 Baldwin I (King of Jerusalem), 34 Baldwin III (King of Jerusalem), 41, 45, 46, 47 Baldwin IV (King of Jerusalem), 124, 128, 133, 139, 140, 141, 142, 146, 147, 148, 159, 163, 166, 182, 184, 187, 188, 194, 207, 208, 209, 211, 220, 414 Baldwin V (son of Queen Sibylla and William of Montferrat), 194, 208 Baldwin of Ibelin, 142, 148, 149, 209, 211, 238 Baldwin (Archbishop of Canterbury), 310, 324, 325, 329 Baldwin of Ibelin, 142, 148, 149, 209, 211, 238 Balian of Ibelin, 142, 195, 208, 213, 214, 216, 222, 225, 230, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 316, 368, 393 Banu al-Daya (of the Aleppo region), 110, 111, 112, 115, 123, 126, 274, 363 Basha al-Din ibn Nisan, 177 Berbers, 25, 51 Berengaria Navarre (Queen of England), 326, 327, 396 Bihruz, 37, 38 Blacks, see Nubians Bohemond III (Prince of Antioch), 49, 140, 180, 195,

INDEX OF PEOPLE 211, 212, 216, 244, 272, 273, 303, 310, 327, 362, 401 Buri, Taj al-Muluk Abu Said (Saladin’s brother), 173, 178, 179 Burids, 38, 39, 41, 42, 115 Buyids, 5, 6, 15, 16, 17 Celestine III (Pope), 326 Charlemagne (Emperor), 28, 30 Clement III (Pope), 260, 325, 326 Conrad III (King of Germany), 41, 262 Conrad of Montferrat, 41, 232, 233, 255, 256, 258, 262, 265, 267, 278, 283, 284, 286, 291, 295, 316, 327, 329, 334, 339, 341, 342, 343, 346, 358, 360, 366, 367, 368, 370, 371, 372, 382, 396 Constance (wife of Emperor Henry VI of Hohenstaufen), 325, 326 Copts, 25, 26, 60, 103, 104 Daulat-Shah, 198 al-Daya, see Banu al-Daya Dirbas Mihrani, 387 Dirgham, 47, 48, 61, 64, 93 Diya al-Din al-Shahrazuri, 400 Diya al-Din Isa, 107, 229, 257 Eastern Orthodox Christians, 25, 26, 27, 39, 240, 243 Eleanor (Queen of England), 326, 327 Eschiva of Tiberias (wife of Raymond III of Tripoli), 164, 209, 219, 220, 222, 227 Eugenius III (Pope), 41 Fakhr al-Din Masud, 170 Falak al-Din Sulaiman, 378

439

Faris al-Din Badran, 256 Farrukh-Shah, Izz al-Din Daud, 76, 115, 125, 127, 129, 130, 144, 146, 147, 148, 151, 155, 159, 160, 163, 164, 165, 167, 169, 171, 182, 379 Fatima (Prophet Muhammad’s daughter), 16 Fatimids, 5, 6, 16, 18, 26, 45, 46, 47, 51, 53, 62, 65, 66, 75, 81, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 113, 114, 123, 144, 155, 157, 277, 294, 317, 407, 410, 413, 418 Frederick (Duke of Swabia), 300, 301, 302, 302, 303, 304, 309, 310, 312, 316 Frederick Barbarossa (Emperor of Germany), 208, 260, 262, 284, 293, 294, 297, 300, 301, 302, 304, 313, 316, 323, 325 Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (Emperor of Germany), 404 Genghis Khan, 2, 17, 21 Geoffrey of Lusignan, 52, 283, 284, 290, 327 Gerard of Ridfort (Grand Master of the Templars), 208, 214, 217, 220, 226, 234, 266, 284, 289, 291 Gharas al-Din Qilij, 274 Ghazanids, 18 Ghaziya Khatun (al-Adil’s daughter), 204 Godfrey of Bouillon, 241 Green Knight, see Sancho Martin Gregory IV (Armenian Catholicos), 302, 303, 305

440

SALADIN. EMPIRE AND HOLY WAR

Gregory VIII (Pope), 259, 260 Gumushtekin, Sad al-Din, 110, 111, 112, 115, 119, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128, 129, 131, 140 Guy of Lusignan, 184, 185, 186, 187, 194, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 234, 243, 266, 278, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, 290, 295, 313, 316, 327, 328, 329, 341, 346, 356, 358, 368, 370, 372, 415 Hajji Yusuf, 382, 383 al-Hakim (Fatimid Caliph), 31 Hamdanids, 5, 6, 15, 16, 17 Harun al-Rashid (Abbasid Caliph), 28, 30 Hasan ibn Qifjaq, 363 Hashim ibn Ghanim, 106 Hassan ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib (Imam), 13, Henry II (King of England), 260, 261, 262, 307, 325, 326 Henry II (Count of Champagne), 149, 307, 308, 310, 311, 312, 316, 346, 366, 370, 371, 375, 377, 382, 389, 390, 392, 393 Henry VI of Hohenstaufen (Emperor of Germany), 300, 325, 326, 341, 396 Heraclius (Patriarch), 208, 216, 238, 240, 242 Hospitalers, 59, 213, 214, 216, 227, 242, 244, 264, 284, 332, 346, 351, 365, 380, 394 Hubert Walter (Bishop of Salisbury), 395, 427 Hugalu, 21

Hugh (Duke of Burgundy), 332, 334, 342, 345, 346, 348, 366, 367, 368, 370, 375, 379 Hugh Embriaco, 232 Hugh of Caesaria, 52, 53, 55, 57 Hugh of Galilee, 142, 148, 149 Hugh of Ibelin, 54 Humphrey II of Toron, 49, 57, 128, 147 Hmphrey IV of Toron, 186, 188, 208, 209, 226, 243, 316, 350, 355, 357, 360, 368 Huasam al-Din (Shirkuh's grandson), 290 Husam al-Din Abu al-Haija, see Abu al-Haija, Husam al-Din Husam al-Din Bishara, 204, 348 Husam al-Din Lulu, see Lulu, Husam al-Din Husam al-Din Muhammad, 212, 230 Husam al-Din Tuman, 257 Hussein ibn Ali ibn Abi Talib (Imam), 13, 14 Ibn Abd al-Qawi, 108 Ibn Abi Arsun, 112, 134 Ibn al-Khashshab, 110, 111 Ibn al-Muqaddam, Shams alDin, 110, 111, 112, 115, 133, 144, 145, 146, 172, 253, 255, 274, 363, 376 Ibn Isa al-Jarrah, 110 Ibn Ruzzik, 47 Ibn Shaddad, Baha al-Din, see Index of Authors Il-Ghazi, Qutb al-Din, 176, 177, 178, 197, 198, 202 Imad al-Din al-Isfahani, see Index of Authors Imad al-Din Mahmud, 299

INDEX OF PEOPLE Imad al-Din Zangi ibn Qutb alDin Maudud, 19, 91, 110, 119, 125, 129, 160, 162, 167, 168, 169, 175, 179, 180, 182, 187, 200, 265, 267, 272, 273, 274, 293, 299, 305, 306, 317, 318, 320, 410, 411 Isa ibn Balashu, 204 Isaac Angelus (Byzantine Emperor), 212, 232, 244, 259, 262, 263, 293, 300, 327, 328, 372 Isaac Ducas Comnenus, 212, 232, 244, 259, 262, 263, 264, 293, 300, 301, 327, 372 Isabella, 188, 208, 262, 316, 341, 371 Ismail al-Khazan, 110 Ismail ibn Jafar al-Sadiq (Imam), 13, 14, 16 Ismailis, 14, 16, 26, 108, 123, 124, 127, 132, 135, 393 Ismat al-Din Khatun, 134, 160, 203 Izz al-Din Ibrahim ibn Shams al-Din ibn al-Muqaddam, 274, 305, 363, 376 Izz al-Din Jawuli, 186 Izz al-Din Jurdik, 65, 66, 123, 126, 179, 186, 188, 257, 263, 306, 330, 348, 356, 380, 387, 392, 399 Izz al-Din Masud ibn Qutb alDin Maudud, 125, 154, 159, 160, 161, 162, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 176, 178, 182, 189, 190, 191, 193, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 293, 319, 320, 330, 367, 411, 410 Jafar al-Sadiq (Imam), 13, 16

441

James of Avesnes, 286, 307, 353 Jean of Pontigny, 307 Jews, 8, 9, 16, 25, 27, 39, 77, 103, 241, 242, 243 Joanna (King Richard’s sister), 325, 326, 327, 359, 361, 396 John VIII (Pope), 31 Joscelin of Courtenay, 41, 124, 194, 208, 222, 229 Josias of Tyre (Archbishop), 259, 260 Joseph Betit, 240 al-Kamil (al-Adil’s son), 404 al-Kamil ibn Shawar, 54 Kanz al-Daula, 90, 113 Karimis, 101 Khumartekin, 123, 124 Kukburi, Muzaffar al-Din, 168, 169, 170, 172, 174, 190, 195, 197, 199, 213, 214, 222, 229, 243, 265, 267, 272, 287, 289, 290, 299, 317, 319, 410 Kurds, 25, 37, 38, 48, 55, 67, 71, 75, 78, 82, 84, 85, 90, 115, 126, 140, 143, 158, 171, 174, 197, 202, 234, 246, 252, 254, 315, 340, 353, 371, 379, 381, 401, 404, 407, 411, 412 Leo IV (Pope), 31 Leon (Prince of Little Armenia), 302, 305 Leopold (Duke of Austria), 341, 396 Louis III of Thuringia, 286, 287, 307 Louis VII (King of France), 41, 42 Lulu, Husam al-Din, 183, 234, 294

442

SALADIN. EMPIRE AND HOLY WAR

Mahi al-Din Muhammad ibn alZaki, 249 Maimonides, 103 Majd al-Din (Farrukh-Shah’s son), 379 Majd al-Din Khuldiri, 391 Malik-Shah (Saladin's son), 200 Malik-Shah (Seljuk Sultan), 18, 19 Mamlukes, 5, 404, 405 Mankurus ibn Khumartekin, 274 Manuel I (Byzantine Emperor), 59, 74, 78, 113, 134, 139, 155, 182, 195, 301 Margaritus, 259, 265, 268 Maria Comnena, 188, 208, 238, 316, 368 al-Mashtub, see Saif al-Din alMashtub Muawiya ibn Sufyan (Umayyad Caliph), 11, 12, 13 al-Muazzam (al-Adil’s son), 404 Muhadhdhabs, 104 Muhammad al-Mahdi ibn Ismail (Imam), 13 Muhammad al-Muntazar (Imam), 14 Muhammad ibn Khumartekin, 179 Muhammad ibn Malik-Shah (Seljuk Sultan), 37 Muhammad, Prophet, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 92, 134, 139, 205, 210, 246, 247, 249, 251 Muhi al-Din al-Shahrazuri, 190 Muizz al-Din Qaisar-Shah, 357 al-Muizz Ishaq (Saladin’s son), 199

Mujahid al-Din Qaimaz, 161, 190, 191 Mujahid al-Din Yurun-Qush, 383 Mujir al-Din Abaq, 39 Musa al-Kazim ibn Jafar alSadiq (Imam), 13, 14 al-Mustadi ibn al-Mustanjid (Abbasid Caliph), 88, 94, 98, 114, 126, 152, 155, 161 al-Mustanjid ibn al-Muqtafi (Abbasid Caliph), 46, 88 Mutamin al-Khilafa, 76 al-Muwaffaq ibn al-Qaisarani, 106, 107, 108 Muzaffar al-Din Kukburi, see Kukburi Nasir al-Din ibn Khumartigin, 144 Nasir al-Din Muhammad ibn Taqi al-Din, 305, 372, 373, 374, 381, 392, 394 Nasir al-Din Muhammad ibn Shirkuh, 76, 115, 127, 131, 146, 150, 169, 172, 174, 176, 192, 199, 200, 203, 205, 212, 317 Nasir al-Din Suqman II, see Shah-Arman, Nasir al-Din Suqman II al-Nasir li-Din Allah (Abbasid Caliph), 152, 155, 191, 251, 252, 264, 277, 278, 293 Negroes, see Nubians Normans, 31, 34, 113, 114, 128, 155, 326 Nubians, 25, 26, 64, 75, 77, 79, 90, 99, 108, 113, 157, 183, 294, 413

INDEX OF PEOPLE Nur al-Din Mahmud ibn Zangi, 19, 34, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 86, 88, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 126, 127, 134, 135, 153, 159, 160, 167, 170, 179, 181, 407, 412, 418, Nur al-Din Muhammad ibn Qara-Arslan, 146, 153, 168, 171, 173, 177, 178, 191, 192, 196, 198, 410 al-Nuri Shadhbakht, 111 Odo (Bishop), 165 Odo of Saint-Amand, 148, 149 Ortoqids, 153 al-Pahlawan, 173, 174, 182, 191, 193, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202 Peter the Hermit, 33 Philip (Count of Flanders), 139, 140, 144, 260, 332, 333, 341 Philip II, Augustus (King of France), 260, 261, 262, 283, 284, 294, 307, 313, 316, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 331, 332, 333, 334, 336, 337, 341, 342, 343, 345, 347, 358, 384, 396 Qadi al-Fadil, 3, 68, 71, 82, 93, 95, 103, 114, 116, 120, 122, 126, 127, 130, 142, 145, 181, 191, 193, 201, 210, 278, 313, 320, 340, 399, 400, 410, 419 Qilij-Arslan (Sultan of Rum), 134, 145, 146, 153, 154, 181,

443

195, 196, 253, 262, 264, 301, 320, 321, 357 Qutb al-Din ibn Qilij-Arslan, 301 Qutb al-Din Il-Ghazi, 176, 177, 178, 197, 198, 199, 202 Qutb al-Din Inal, 122, 130, 170, 171 Qutb al-Din Khusrau, 67 Qutb al-Din Maudud ibn Zangi, 91, 110 Qutb al-Din Suqman, 290, 383 Qyzyl-Arslan, 191, 192, 294 Raihan, Jamal al-Daula, 110, 116 Ralph of Alta Ripa, 306 Rashid al-Din Sinan, 108, 123, 131, 132, 133, 135, 371, 393 Raymond (son of Prince Bohemond III of Antioch), 222, 224 Raymond III (Count of Tripoli), 124, 133, 139, 140, 148, 149, 151, 164, 182, 185, 186, 188, 194, 208, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224 Reynald of Châtillon, 70, 124, 158, 159, 160, 163, 172, 183, 185, 186, 187, 188, 208, 210, 211, 216, 219, 222, 243, 275, 277, 418 Reynald of Sidon, 209, 225, 232, 233, 278, 279, 280, 360, 368 Richard I (King of England), 7, 42, 127, 254, 260, 261, 262, 263, 283, 294, 307, 313, 316, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349,

444

SALADIN. EMPIRE AND HOLY WAR

350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 374, 375, 377, 378, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 386, 387, 388, 390, 391, 392, 393, 395, 396, 411, 416 Roupen III (Prince of Little Armenia), 153 Sabiq al-Din Uthman ibn alDaya (of the Banu al-Daya of the Aleppo region), 274, 305, 330, 363, 365 Sad al-Din ibn Anar, 115, 175 Sadr al-Din (Shaikh alShuyukh), 155, 172, 173, 175, 176, 190, 192 Safra Khatun (Nasir al-Din Muhammad’ daughter), 205 Saif al-Din al-Mashtub, 67, 140, 246, 289, 290, 315, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 343, 371, 376, 379, 382, 394, 401 Saif al-Din Bektimur, 176, 198, 199, 341, 363, 373, 395 Saif al-Din Ghazi ibn Qutub alDin Maudud ibn Zangi, 49, 91, 92, 109, 110, 115, 119, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 317 Saif al-Din Yazkuj, 131, 180, 362, 365, 367, 391 al-Salih Ismail ibn Nur al-Din, 109, 110, 111, 112, 116, 119, 122, 123, 124, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 140, 144, 145, 159, 160, 167, 168 Sancho Martin, 256, 265, 266 al-Sania, 189, 358, 359 Sanjar-Shah ibn Saif al-Din Ghazi, 154, 189, 190, 197,

201, 293, 299, 317, 318, 319, 330, 411 Sarim al-Din al-Qaimaz, 161, 190, 191, 213, 306, 352, 357, 386 Sarim al-Din Khutluba, 158 Shah-Arman, Nasir al-Din Suqman II, 174, 176, 178, 181, 197, 198 Shaikh al-Shuyukh, see Sadr alDin Shams al-Din Aslam, 377 Shams al-Din ibn Abi al-Mada, 134 Shams al-Din Sadiq, 115, 129 Sharaf al-Din Maudud ibn Qutb al-Din Maudud, 174, 175, Sharaf al-Din Qaraqush, 90, 314 Shawar, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 93, 99, 123 Shihab al-Din al-Harimi, 67, 76, 78, 79, 125, 127, 132, 140, 144, 146 Shihab al-Din Bashir, 126, 155 Shihab al-Din Mahmud, 168, 170, 243 Shirkuh ibn Nasir al-Din Muhammad ibn Shirkuh, 203, 321, 330, 375 Shirkuh, Asad al-Din, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 81, 98, 99, 115, 119, 127, 131, 146, 180, 186, 192, 200, 407, 412, 413 Shubruma, 108

INDEX OF PEOPLE Sibylla (Princess of Antioch), 195, 272 Sibylla (Queen of Jerusalem), 184, 194, 208, 209, 243, 266, 283, 284, 316 Sinan, see Rashid al-Din Sinan Stephanie (wife of Reynald of Châtillon), 158, 188, 243 Stephen of Sancerre, 307, 316 Stephen of Turnham, 368 Sunqur al-Halabi, 306 Sunqur al-Mashtub, 388, 390 Surkhak al-Nuri, 180 Taj al-Din al-Isfahani, 251 Taj al-Muluk Abu Said Buri, see Buri, Taj al-Muluk Abu Said Tancred (Count of Lecce), 113, 239, 324, 325, 326 Taqi al-Din, al-Muzaffar, 76, 78, 90, 92, 105, 125, 127, 134, 142, 145, 146, 150, 158, 160, 164, 165, 169, 173, 174, 175, 176, 187, 188, 191, 192, 193, 194, 204, 209, 212, 218, 222, 223, 224, 229, 231, 252, 256, 257, 265, 274, 287, 289, 290, 294, 295, 296, 304, 305, 311, 313, 314, 317, 318, 319, 330, 341, 363, 372, 373, 381, 392, 395, 410, 411 Tashtakin Mujir al-Din, 253 Tayy (Shawar's son) 63 Templars, 52, 59, 141, 146, 148, 149, 150, 208, 213, 214, 216, 217, 219, 223, 226, 227, 229, 230, 234, 242, 244, 246, 266, 268, 272, 284, 289, 291, 303, 327, 328, 332, 343, 346, 351, 365, 380, 394 Tibald of Blois, 307, 316

445

Tughril Beg (Seljuk Sultan), 18 Tughtakin (Saladin’s brother), 76, 116, 122, 127, 158, 252, 294, 399, 410 Turan-Shah (Saladin’s brother), 76, 77, 90, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 113, 129, 133, 134, 144, 146, 147, 150, 154, 158, 413 Turan-Shah (Saladin's son), 200 Turcopoles, 217, 221, 377 Turkomans, 17, 212, 296, 305, 330, 350, 375, 376, 419 Turks, 5, 6, 17, 18, 19, 25, 27, 31, 36, 38, 49, 55, 63, 67, 70, 74, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 90, 115, 149, 153, 157, 171, 174, 175, 181, 195, 202, 254, 267, 301, 376, 379, 381, 404, 407, 411, 412 Turks, Oghuz, 17, 22 Turks, Ottoman, 5 Turks, Seljuk, 5, 6, 8, 17, 18, 22, 24, 25, 27, 34, 41, 119, 195, 301, 407 Tutish, 19 Ubaldo, Archbishop, 284 Umar ibn al-Khattab (Caliph), 7, 247, 250 Umara al-Yamani, 106, 108 Umayyads, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 101, 164, 403 Urban II (Pope), 31, 32, 33, 259, 262 Urban III (Pope), 259, 262 Uthman, al-Aziz (Saladin’s son), 138, 193, 200, 204, 255, 378, 404, 408 Uthman ibn Affan (Caliph), 7, 11, 13

446

SALADIN. EMPIRE AND HOLY WAR

Vikings, 31 Walter of Caesarea, 185, 209 William II (King of Sicily), 112, 113, 259, 265, 284, 293, 325, 359 William IV (Count of Nevers), 59 William of Galilee, 143 William of Montferrat, 194, 208, 232, 266, 267 William of Tyre, see Index of Authors Yaqub ibn Yusuf ibn Abd alMumin, 314 Yazid ibn Muawiya ibn Sufyan (Umayyad Caliph), 13 Zahir al-Din ibn al-Attar, 152

al-Zahir Ghazi (Saladin’ son), 180, 189, 204, 255, 257, 265, 268, 270, 271, 274, 289, 293, 299, 305, 310, 319, 373, 376, 383, 385, 386, 387, 390, 394, 400, 402, 404, 408 Zain al-Din Ali Kuchuk, 168 Zain al-Din ibn Naja, 192 Zain al-Din Yaruqi, 179 Zain al-Din Yusuf, 189, 190, 191, 192, 196, 197, 317 Zangi, Imad al-Din, 19, 34, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 86, 92, 119, 121, 126, 127, 131, 152, 160, 182, 193, 254, 317, 412 Zangids, 5, 19 Zoroastrians, 9

INDEX OF PLACES 214, 215, 230, 245, 247, 249, 255, 257, 270, 274, 277, 293, 303, 305, 307, 319, 321, 330, 338, 363, 373, 400, 402, 404, 408, 410, 412, 413, 414, 418 Alexandria, 27, 29, 54, 56, 57, 58, 80, 90, 92, 93, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 108, 113, 128, 138, 146, 151, 154, 156, 157, 162, 183, 234, 244, 412, 418 Amalfi, 29 Amid, see Diyar Bakr Amman, 163, 428, 432 Ana, 201 Antioch, 34, 49, 91, 131, 140, 158, 180, 195, 211, 212, 216, 222, 224, 228, 233, 237, 244, 258, 259, 265, 267, 269, 271, 272, 273, 275, 278, 283, 303, 304, 310, 311, 327, 362, 393, 397, 401 Aqaba, 48, 89, 183 Araban, 171 Ard al-Tabba, 48 al-Arish, 142 Arnon (Wadi al-Mujib), 191 Arsuf, 230, 313, 347, 348, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 416 Ascalon, 29, 45, 46, 60, 141, 142, 165, 187, 220, 228, 232, 233, 234, 237, 239, 266, 276, 345, 354, 355, 356, 358, 365, 367, 369, 370, 372, 374, 375,

Acre, 29, 139, 151, 163, 166, 208, 217, 219, 229, 230, 231, 232, 235, 255, 256, 257, 263, 264, 265, 276, 278, 279, 280, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 290, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 300, 304, 305, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 314, 316, 317, 318, 321,
323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 329, 330, 331, 333, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 345, 346, 347, 348, 350, 353, 355, 356, 357, 358, 360, 362, 364, 366, 368, 369, 370, 371, 374, 376, 377, 379, 380, 382, 384, 386, 389, 392, 396, 401, 409, 411 Aden, 101, 106, 158, 183 Afamiya, 271 Aidhab, 183 Aidho (Idhu), 270 Ain al-Jarr, 133 Ain Tab, 178 Aleppo, 3, 15, 19, 23, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 58, 66, 83, 91, 92, 94, 96, 105, 110, 111, 115, 116, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 140, 144, 145, 153, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 185, 187, 189, 190, 191, 193, 194, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 213,

447

448

SALADIN. EMPIRE AND HOLY WAR

376, 378, 383, 388, 392, 395, 416 Ashmun, 60, 99 Aswan, 90, 113 Athens, 34 al-Auja, 353, 390 Azaz, 131, 132, 145 Baalbek, 38, 39, 41, 91, 124, 125, 133, 144, 145, 146, 163, 305, 321, 330, 404 Bab al-Barqiya, 63 Babain, 55, 58, 86, 412, 420 Baghdad, 3, 5, 8, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, 37, 38, 46, 51, 69, 70, 71, 88, 94, 96, 97, 101, 109, 114, 117, 122, 134, 137, 138, 144, 148, 152, 161, 163, 167, 172, 175, 177, 178, 181, 182, 190, 194, 201, 207, 210, 227, 245, 247, 252, 293, 298, 363, 399, 400, 408, 414, 415 Baghras, 273, 274, 303 Baisan, 165, 186, 369, 414 Bait Dajan, 384 Bait Jibrin, 234 Bakas (Bukas), 271, 274 Balad, 197 Balatunus, 270 Balikh, 170 Balqa, 373 Banyas, 48, 49, 111, 112, 146, 147, 148, 167, 278, 280 Barin, 145, 305 Beaufort (Shaqif Arnun), 148, 149, 234, 264, 275, 276, 278, 280, 281, 284, 285, 296, 360 Beirut, 4, 27, 29, 34, 133, 147, 150, 151, 165, 166, 168, 169, 171, 185, 231, 232, 233, 246,

257, 265, 295, 308, 321, 328, 332, 360, 368, 369, 384, 386, 399, 401, 416 Beit Nuba, 364, 365, 375, 376, 378, 381 Belvoir (Kaukab), 164, 165, 234, 264, 275, 276, 281, 401 Bethany (Azariya), 384 Bethlehem, 234, 396 Beylan Pass, 273 Bikisrail, 268, 269, 274 Bilbais, 47, 49, 60, 63, 77, 97, 99, 115, 141, 377 Biqa, 34, 38, 133, 135, 145, 165, 191 al-Bira, 168, 170, 175, 243 al-Birka, 350 Birkat al-Habash, 61, 63 Birkat al-Jubb, 162 Bitlis, 198 Blanchegarde, 364 Botrun, 244 al-Buhaira, 80 Bu Qabais, 123 Burzey (Barzuya), 271, 272, 274 Busra, 115, 129, 163, 164, 182, 212 Buzaa, 130, 131 Caesaria, 52, 55, 57, 347, 348, 349, 390 Cairo, 23, 27, 45, 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 56, 57, 60, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104, 105, 107, 108, 114, 116, 117, 122, 127, 134, 137, 141, 142, 144, 155, 156, 157, 158, 162, 166, 168, 169, 183, 187, 193, 200, 202, 204,

INDEX OF PLACES 255, 277, 378, 380, 413, 417, 418, 420 Calycadnus (Saleph), 302 Chastel Blanc (Safitha), 266 Cilicia, 181, 195, 302, 303 Constantinople, 6, 27, 34, 59, 60, 134, 182, 232, 251, 252, 263, 269, 293, 300, 301, 316, 327, 372, 420 Crac des Chevaliers (Hisn alAkrad), 34, 47, 124, 151, 265, 266, 274, 276, 278 Cresson, 213, 214, 216 Cyprus, 34, 78, 327, 328, 330, 372 Daburiya, 163, 229 Damascus, 2, 5, 8, 12, 19, 23, 27, 29, 38, 39, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49, 50, 57, 58, 59, 63, 67, 69, 74, 83, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97, 102, 105, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 127, 128, 129, 132, 133, 134, 144, 145, 146, 149, 150, 154, 155, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 169, 171, 172, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 200, 202, 203, 205, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 227, 233, 234, 243, 245, 246, 264, 265, 266, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 280, 290, 297, 313, 321, 327, 330, 338, 339, 342, 363, 374, 376, 381, 383, 384, 399, 401, 402, 403, 404, 408, 413, 414, 418 Damietta, 29, 78, 79, 80, 96, 99, 102, 113, 127, 138, 156, 159, 162, 294, 367, 413, 418

449

Danqla, 90 Dara, 299 Darayya, 182 Darbsak, 212, 272, 274 Darum (Daron), 89, 165, 232, 374, 375 Dauq, 312 Dilga (Dilja), 54 Diyar Bakr (Amid), 19, 83, 120, 129, 131, 145, 153, 154, 160, 171, 177, 178, 190, 191, 196, 198, 202, 215, 257, 287, 290, 294, 319, 331, 374, 383, 410, 411, 414 Dorylaeum, 41 Duran, 171 Dvin, 37 Edessa (al-Ruha), 19, 34, 41, 124, 131, 170, 175, 196, 243, 317 Eilat (Aila, Ailah), 89, 163, 183, 399 Erzerum, 395 Famagusta, 328 Forbelet, 165 al-Fudain, 171 al-Fula, 186, 230 Fustat, 48, 52, 61, 63, 66, 92, 94, 95, 99, 100, 137, 156, 183, 418 Galilee, Sea of, 146, 164, 165, 186, 213, 216, 218, 257, 264, 285 Gaza, 34, 89, 141, 165, 228, 232, 234, 378, 414 Genoa, 24, 29, 102, 156, 185, 324, 325 Gisors, 260, 307 Giza, 52, 54, 78, 204, 413 Gok Su, 153, 154, 168

450

SALADIN. EMPIRE AND HOLY WAR

Golan Heights, 147, 151, 165, 414 Goliath Springs (Ain Jalut), 186, 189, 216, 220, 404, 414 Habis Jaldak, 164, 167, 182 Haditha, 201 Haifa, 230, 311, 347, 348, 416 Hama, 83, 91, 123, 125, 126, 127, 129, 131, 132, 134, 140, 144, 146, 151, 160, 169, 176, 185, 195, 203, 204, 212, 227, 274, 404, 405, 413 Harim, 49, 110, 131, 140, 143, 180, 212 Harod Valley, 165 Harran, 168, 170, 175, 176, 190, 195, 200, 201, 203, 204, 215, 287, 294, 317, 410 Harzam, 176, 177 al-Hattakh, 199 Hattin, 83, 84, 86, 207, 210, 215, 217, 218, 222, 223, 227, 228, 232, 233, 235, 237, 238, 240, 243, 247, 248, 250, 251, 254, 255, 258, 259, 262, 266, 277, 278, 283, 285, 287, 339, 352, 409, 415, 420 Hattin, Horns of, 225 Hauran, 164, 182, 186, 212, 215 al-Hawra, 183 Hebron, 104, 234, 376 Hijaz, 7, 18, 45, 139, 252 Hisban, 191, 192 Hisn al-Akrad, see Crac des Chavaliers Hisn Kaifa, 146, 153, 168, 171, 177, 191, 197, 396 Hittin, 221, 222, 223, 224 Homs, 48, 58, 76, 83, 91, 122, 124, 126, 127, 128, 135, 139,

140, 143, 144, 146, 150, 163, 169, 176, 185, 200, 203, 265, 287, 296, 330, 375, 404 Horns of Hama, 125, 130, 413, 420 Huleh, 146, 285 Hunin (Chateau-Neuf), 147, 257 al-Husain, 171 Ibrim, 90 Iconium, 18, 181, 301 Irbil, 190, 191, 193, 196, 200, 201, 215, 293, 299, 317, 396 Itfih (Atfih), 52 Jabala, 268, 269, 271, 274, 362 Jaffa, 230, 313, 346, 347, 351, 354, 355, 356, 358, 362, 364, 365, 366, 367, 372, 384, 385, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 395, 396, 397, 401, 411, 416 Jamahariya, 270 Jawshan, 179 Jazira, 83, 110, 119, 120, 129, 154, 168, 170, 171, 175, 177, 178, 181, 185, 190, 191, 192, 213, 257, 410, 413, 414, 419 Jazirat ibn Umar, 172, 189, 193, 197, 201, 299, 317, 319, 320, 330, 410 Jenin, 192 Jerusalem, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 41, 45, 47, 50, 52, 59, 60, 63, 69, 70, 102, 104, 108, 111, 114, 115, 120, 133, 140, 144, 146, 151, 152, 159, 161, 168, 182, 184, 187, 194, 195, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 224, 228, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 237, 238, 239, 240,

INDEX OF PLACES 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, 262, 264, 265, 266, 267, 270, 276, 280, 281, 283, 285, 286, 287, 289, 291, 293, 295, 302, 303, 304, 306, 307, 316, 323, 328, 329, 334, 338, 339, 340, 341, 344, 345, 353, 354, 356, 357, 358, 359, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 388, 394, 395, 397, 399, 400, 401, 402, 404, 408, 409, 411, 415 Jisr al-Khashab, 116, 185, 186 Jubail, 91, 232, 233, 238, 265, 313, 328 Kabsun, 145, 146 Kafr Sabt, 218, 222, 229 Kafr Tab, 126, 145, 305 Kafr Zammar, 200 Karak (Kerak, al-Karak), 48, 70, 89, 96, 104, 124, 159, 163, 183, 185, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 209, 211, 212, 234, 243, 264, 275, 276, 277, 281, 316, 373, 378, 400 Karbala, 13, 14 al-Khabur, 171, 179 al-Kharruba, 285, 287, 292, 293, 294, 296, 307, 311 Khartpirt, 197 Khisfin, 218 Kufa, 13 Kyrenia, 328 Latakia, 233, 269, 270, 274, 362 Latrun, 234, 357, 362, 363, 364, 391, 395

451

Limassol, 327 Litani, 148, 276, 279 Lombardy, 185 Lubiya, 218 al-Luq, 63, 64 Lydda, 141, 357, 358, 383, 384, 393 Maarrat, 126, 145 Majd al-Yaba, 230, 376, 393 Maksin, 171 Malazgirt (Manzikert), 18 Manbij, 130, 131, 187, 305 Mardin, 176, 178, 191, 196, 198, 202, 215, 257, 319 Marj al-Suffar, 204 Marj Uyun, 148, 151, 193, 278, 280, 384, 391, 414, 415 Marqab (Margat), 268, 269, 273, 328 Marseilles, 295, 324 Masyaf, 132, 271, 371 al-Matariya, 63 Mayyafarqin, 199, 202 Mecca, 7, 10, 16, 18, 28, 39, 45, 71, 99, 101, 106, 139, 152, 155, 159, 183, 184, 212, 226, 237, 246, 247, 253, 255, 399, 402 Medina, 7, 16, 18, 45, 101, 159, 184, 226, 247 Messina, 324, 325, 329, 330, 341 Minat Amr, 60, 99 Mosul, 3, 15, 19, 23, 38, 39, 41, 49, 83, 91, 94, 109, 115, 119, 120, 124, 125, 126, 128, 130, 131, 135, 153, 154, 155, 159, 160, 161, 162, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 181, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196,

452

SALADIN. EMPIRE AND HOLY WAR

197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 215, 247, 257, 265, 277, 287, 293, 294, 297, 299, 306, 318, 319, 320, 330, 367, 374, 383, 396, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 419 Myriocephalum, 134, 145, 301 Nablus, 111, 186, 192, 208, 214, 216, 230, 234, 238, 243, 290, 401 Naman (Belus), 287, 311, 312, 333 Naples, 29 Nazareth, 163, 184, 186, 229, 311, 317, 393, 396 Nebo, 188 Nicaea, 18 Nisibin, 171, 172, 175, 176, 179, 182, 196, 199, 200, 201, 215 Nusairi Mountains, 123, 127, 132 Orontes, 271 Pisa, 24, 29, 31, 102, 156, 185, 284, 309, 325, 368 Poitiers, 28 Qadas, 265 Palmyra, see Tadmur al-Qahwani (Cavan), 213 Qaimun, 311, 347 Qalat al-Jabar, 62 Qalat Jabar, 110 Qalqilya, 141, 414 Qaluniya, 377 Qasr al-Azraq, 163, 164 Qunaitra, 147 Qus, 56, 106, 113 Raban, 145, 146 al-Rabba, 187, 191 Rabigh, 183 al-Rahba, 203

Ramla, 141, 142, 209, 234, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 380, 382, 384, 392, 414 al-Raqqa, 162, 170, 175, 179 Ras al-Ma, 63, 80, 83, 212 Rastan, 123 al-Ruha, see Edessa Safad, 148, 151, 164, 234, 264, 275, 276, 281 Sahyun, 270, 272, 274 Salt, 373 Sana, 106, 246, 248, 249 Sannabra, 218 Sarmaniya (Sarmin), 271 Saruj, 179 Saryaqus, 63 Sebaste (Sabastiya), 230 Sepphoris (Saffuriya, Sephoria), 185, 213, 217, 218, 221, 222, 229, 393 Shafaram, 285, 311, 330, 332, 340, 342, 348 Shahrazur, 201 Shaizar, 110, 296, 305, 330 Sharon, 348, 364 Shawbak (Montreal), 48, 89, 97, 104, 159, 163, 185, 212, 234, 243, 264, 276, 373 al-Shughr, 271, 274 Sidon, 29, 147, 151, 231, 232, 233, 246, 279, 295, 313, 360, 368, 416 Sinjar, 92, 110, 119, 125, 160, 162, 169, 172, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 187, 191, 215, 257, 273, 287, 293, 294, 299, 318, 319, 330, 374, 383, 396, 410 Sumaisat, 317

INDEX OF PLACES al-Suwaidiya (St. Symeon), 233 Tabor, 229 Tabuk, 159 Tadmur (Palmyra), 203 Takrit, 37, 38, 190, 201 Tanis (Tinnis), 60, 99, 128, 138, 156, 367, 418 Tartus (Tortosa, Antartus), 267, 268, 273, 328 Tell al-Ayyadiya, 287, 288, 290, 292, 297, 310, 311, 332 Tell al-Qadi, 148, 149 Tell al-Safiya, 141, 143, 144, 146, 149, 151, 375, 414 Tell Ashtara, 215, 217 Tell Bashir, 110 Tell Basta, 48 Tell Gezer, 364 Tell Kaisan, 287, 296 Tell Khalid, 178 Tell Mashuq, 255 Tell Sultan, 129, 130, 168, 413, 420 Tell Toron, 285 Tiberias, 111, 150, 151, 152, 208, 209, 213, 214, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 227, 229, 313, 318 Tibnin, 148, 231, 279 Tiflis, 37 Tripoli, Lebanon, 29, 34, 47, 49, 56, 91, 105, 124, 133, 139, 148, 151, 164, 182, 185, 188, 194, 208, 209, 210, 212, 216, 217, 219, 225, 227, 228, 230, 232, 233, 234, 237, 244, 256,

453

258, 259, 265, 266, 267, 268, 274, 276, 278, 283, 284, 304, 321, 393, 397, 415 Tripoli, Libya, 90 Turan, 76, 77, 90, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 113, 129, 133, 134, 144, 146, 147, 150, 154, 158, 200, 221, 222, 223, 404, 413 Tyre, 52, 59, 60, 102, 109, 149, 150, 164, 166, 182, 185, 195, 225, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 244, 246, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 262, 263, 265, 266, 267, 275, 276, 278, 279, 283, 284, 285, 286, 291, 295, 303, 304, 317, 328, 334, 339, 342, 346, 358, 366, 367, 368, 370, 371, 376, 377, 380, 382, 388, 393, 397, 415, 416 al-Uraima, 266 Van, 26, 176, 199, 202, 253, 319, 402 Venice, 24, 29, 102, 156, 185, 396 Vezelay, 262, 324 Wadi al-Hasi, 376, 378 al-Wala, 192 Yahmur, 266 Yanbu, 106, 183 Yarmuk, 164 Yazur, 362, 384, 388, 391 Yubna, 234, 356, 367, 393 Zab, Great and Little, 190, 191, 200 Zabid, 105, 106, 158 Zarin, 230