Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education: Tensions between Political Socialization and Academic Autonomy [1st ed.] 9789811582998, 9789811583001

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xvi
Introduction: Chinese Higher Education and Its Political Task (Xiaoxin Du)....Pages 1-9
Theoretical Perspectives: Political Socialization and Higher Education (Xiaoxin Du)....Pages 11-27
Historical Review on JU (1903–2013): A Wrestle Between Political Restriction and University Autonomy in Chinese Higher Education (Xiaoxin Du)....Pages 29-53
Different Players’ Deduction on Political Task (Xiaoxin Du)....Pages 55-64
The University’s Practices to Ensure the Complement of Political Task (Xiaoxin Du)....Pages 65-85
Practices to Seek for Academic Freedom and Critical Thinking Under Political Restriction (Xiaoxin Du)....Pages 87-106
Practices to Look for Flexibility and Alternative Space Under Political Restriction (Xiaoxin Du)....Pages 107-130
Political Socialization in Chinese Higher Education: Role Differentiation as a Strategy (Xiaoxin Du)....Pages 131-146
Back Matter ....Pages 147-178

Citation preview

Governance and Citizenship in Asia

Xiaoxin Du

Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education Tensions between Political Socialization and Academic Autonomy

Governance and Citizenship in Asia Series Editors Kerry J. Kennedy, The Education University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China Sonny Shiu Hing Lo, School of Professional and Continuing Education, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Aims and Scope This series explores how citizenship is shaped by social, political, cultural and historical contexts and how it may be moulded to serve the nation state in the age of globalization. In these publications we see how governance relates to all aspects of civic life, including politics, public policy, administration, civil society and the economy, as well as the core values of society. Titles cover themes including public trust and trust building, the role of civil society, citizens’ rights and obligations, citizenship identities including those related to gender, class and ethnicities. Authors explore how young people are shaped by democratic and traditional value systems and the importance of citizenship challenges in the Asia Pacific region. Research collaborations in this interdisciplinary series probe questions such as: What are the links between ‘good governance’ and new forms of citizenship? What is the role of citizenship education as a tool in state formation and the development of active citizenship cultures? How do we explain the distinctive features of governance and citizenship in Asian societies? Through these publications we see that citizenship is an integral part of ‘good governance’ and that such governance ultimately enriches citizenship. Scholarly investigation and academic dialogue in this series describe the interdependence and mutuality of governance and citizenship.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/11911

Xiaoxin Du

Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education Tensions between Political Socialization and Academic Autonomy

Xiaoxin Du Fudan Development Institute Fudan University Shanghai, China

ISSN 2365-6255 ISSN 2365-6263 (electronic) Governance and Citizenship in Asia ISBN 978-981-15-8299-8 ISBN 978-981-15-8300-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8300-1 © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Foreword

This book opens up profound insights into the sensitive theme of the tension between political socialization and academic freedom in the case of an influential Chinese university located in a major east coast metropolis of China. The book began its life as a doctoral thesis carried out at the University of Hong Kong, but it has now been re-crafted into a highly readable scholarly text that elucidates and elaborates on the concept of role differentiation between political indoctrination and open-ended critical academic inquiry. If the Western mind finds it difficult to grasp how these opposite roles can coexist harmoniously, that may reflect a form of logic that assumes the need for a synthesis in the dialectical move between thesis and antithesis. The strength of classical Chinese epistemology, by contrast, is the ability to hold opposites permanently in tension, in a dialectic that does not require a synthesis. Thus, Confucianism and Daoism, with their opposite philosophical orientations, have provided a kind of balance and flexibility in China’s development over the country’s long history. And author Du Xiaoxin demonstrates in this book how the strategy of role differentiation has served to balance the dual tasks of political socialization and academic inquiry in such a way that they are able to coexist at the same time without diametrical opposition. Her research methods make possible a rich and fine-grained picture of a leading Chinese university. Readers are able to hear the voices of students, through interviews as well as a survey that received nearly 800 responses. Interviews with faculty members, both those teaching academic subjects and those responsible for political education, also with student counsellors, and senior leaders, expose the reader to a range of voices expressing diverse and sometimes opposite viewpoints. In her preface, she has used the lively image of the parade of masks in The Phantom of the Opera to give a vivid depiction of the dance that keeps everyone moving! She also draws on substantive documentary, historical and archival sources to fill out her depiction of this remarkable institution. The chapter on the university’s 115-year history is particularly significant. It shows the intense efforts by early leaders to mold

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a modern university that would carry forward China’s own rich traditions of higher education while remaining open to influences that came from France; from the United States, especially Yale, where a long-serving early president had graduated; and later from the Soviet Union. At certain periods, its students and faculty were active in a range of democratic movements and also in some of the radical action of the Cultural Revolution period. The issue of university autonomy and how it should be defined in a Chinese context is central to the analysis. Du Xiaoxin discusses the term used in Pan Suyan’s well-known book on another illustrious Chinese university—semi-independence. She concludes that it fit JU fairly well, even though JU did not have quite the same degree of influence. The term regulated autonomy used by Yang Rui, another wellknown scholar of Chinese higher education, is also discussed as a way of understanding JU’s standing. This term is used effectively throughout the book in the discussion of the activity patterns of faculty and students. In reflecting on the application of the term autonomy to universities in a Chinese context, I have noted that two distinctive Chinese terms are used. One is zizhi (自治) or self-rule, which is close to the English term and its Greek roots. The other is zizhu (自主), which might be translated as self-mastery. This term may be more appropriate in depicting the standing of Chinese universities at the current time. Du Xiaoxin described how the JU president has spoken out on academic freedom and encouraged faculty to foster critical thinking, thus demonstrating a spirit of independent thought which is essential to nurturing academic excellence. At the same time, the degree of legal protection the university enjoys through its charter is limited under Communist Party supervision. Because of the strength of China’s own academic tradition and the respect in which the scholar has been held throughout the country’s long history, the forms of indoctrination that are part of political socialization within the “Presidential responsibility system under the leadership of the Communist Party Committee” do not necessarily undermine the academic quality of the institution. Chapters 6 and 7 give considerable detail on all the ways academic faculty members diversify the contents of the courses they teach and open up space for students to explore a wide range of perspectives on what they read and study. Students, for their part, are involved in a plethora of activities outside of their classes as well. These include musical performances; a range of social service opportunities, both under Communist Party guidance and in affiliation with various NGOs; and all kinds of athletic events. Organizations such as the Communist Youth League arrange lectures, salons, and debates to attract student interest, rather than focusing only on the political dimension. Internationalization is another way in which the campus is opened up to diverse perspectives with as many as 50 formal teaching staff from 20 countries giving courses, and a large number of international students on campus. Also, many local students and faculty are able to enjoy study-abroad experiences and so are quite cosmopolitan in their outlook and their exposure to global trends.

Foreword

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In conclusion, let me say that this book has many strengths. It is based on thorough and meticulous research combining both qualitative and quantitative elements. It is forthright and open in dealing with issues that are often seen as highly sensitive and presents a genuine and nuanced portrait of a leading Chinese university. There is much here that will challenge the misguided stereotypes of Chinese universities that have arisen in some circles within the global community. Department of Leadership, Higher and Adult Education (LHAE), O.I.S.E, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

Ruth Hayhoe

Preface

This book explains the tension between the state’s demand for political socialization as a restriction on university autonomy and the university’s promotion of academic development through promoting academic freedom and fostering critical thinkers in Chinese higher education, using Jour University (JU) in PRC, as a case study. The research problem focuses on the dynamics and complexity of the interplay among the state, university, faculty, staff, and students in the process of socialization through political education and academic activities. Theories on political socialization and higher education were used to guide this study. As universities’ sociopolitical task of imbuing students with a certain type of ideology coexists with their role of promoting university autonomy to fulfill their conventional task of knowledge creation through academic freedom for research and teaching, examining China’s higher education system can provide important insights as different players’ interaction constitutes a dynamic picture of role differentiation as a strategy to cope with a politically restricted autonomy. In 2012, after 4 years of being a student counselor in a Chinese university and finishing my master’s degree, I started my Ph.D. program in the University of Hong Kong. As a student, who used to major in a very special discipline in China— ideological and political socialization, I always wondered what exactly this discipline serves for. In addition, I did have a very rough idea of telling the story of my university education in an academic way. Starting to live a life in Hong Kong strengthened my impulse in venting it all out, since this city, the Ph.D. program, and the people I met have all given me a comparative perspective to look back on these experiences. Through the progress of my Ph.D. study, I found a research gap as little research has been done on the detailed interaction among different players in the university around how they deal with the political task given by the state. After a thorough review of the literature about political socialization and Chinese higher education, I started my fieldwork to collect data in 2014 with a research design focused on a single case university, where questionnaires were collected from 709 participants;

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41 nonparticipatory observations of classes, meetings, and activities were carried out; and semi-structured interviews were done with 39 informants, including administrators, teachers, and students, as well as two focus groups with staff and alumni. After analyzing all the data, a concept of role differentiation emerged as the strategy used by all players to deal with the tensions they experienced under a politically restricted autonomy. This book is based on this research which was also the Ph.D. thesis I completed in 2016. I started to work in another Chinese university after graduation, in which the experiences inspired me a lot as I reflected on turning the thesis into a book. Parts of the thesis were adapted for a journal article and published in the international journal Higher Education (Du 2018). The article and the book share some of the same data, but the flow of discussion and the theme are different. This book is structured more based on themes, as it contributes to the literature on political socialization and Chinese higher education, particularly the complexity and the dynamics when implementing the political task and dealing with tensions in Chinese higher education. I intend to help people who have an interest in Chinese higher education to see a vivid picture of what is actually happening in the system, and have access to an academic interpretation of the issues. It was not an easy journey to revise the manuscript as I worked in a think tank where a lot of consulting reports submitted to related government organs were produced. The writing style had to be adjusted by me, and the working environment was different from an ordinary academic institution. But it broadened my horizons on Chinese higher education, and deepened the understanding of a lot of the relations interwoven in this system, leading to a lot of revision of some inaccurate terms and expressions, and also of some simple or even naïve claims. In the 3 years of revision, a song from the Phantom of Opera called Masquerade was always replaying in my head, and gave me a lot of “Ah-ha” moments: Masquerade! Paper faces on parade Masquerade! Hide your face, so the world will never find you! Masquerade! Every face a different shade Masquerade! Look around—there’s another mask behind you! Flash of mauve, Splash of puce Fool and king, Ghoul and goose Green and black, Queen and priest Trace of rouge, Face of beast Faces Take your turn, take a ride on the merry-go-round in an inhuman race Eye of gold, Thigh of blue True is false, Who is who Curl of lip, Swirl of gown Ace of hearts, Face of clown Faces Drink it in, drink it up, till you’ve drowned in the light, in the sound Masquerade! Grinning yellows, spinning reds. Masquerade! Take your fill—let the spectacle astound you! Masquerade! Burning glances, turning heads

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Masquerade! Stop and stare at the sea of smiles around you! Masquerade! Seething shadows breathing lies Masquerade! You can fool any friend who ever knew you! Masquerade! Leering satyrs, peering eyes Masquerade! Run and hide—but a face will still pursue you!

This is exactly what I pictured as a role split strategy in Chinese higher education, and instead of only one mask in the masquerade for each dancer, the players have several masks like face-changing techniques in traditional Sichuan opera in China. Sometimes this conceptualization provided me an explanation that drew upon things other than the higher education systems. I am grateful that a lot of people’s contributions finally made the publication of this book possible. My deepest gratitude goes, undoubtedly, to my supervisor, Professor Wing-wah Law, of the Faculty of Education, the University of Hong Kong, for always providing careful instruction on academic issues, encouraging me to reach various achievements, and always being an example of how to be a mentor by guiding me to investigate things and to demonstrate integrity. I would also give my thanks to all the participants from the case university who facilitated my data collection, including all the teachers, students, and alumni whose names I cannot mention due to ethical considerations. I would also thank all the editors, reviewers, and examiners of this study for their valuable and constructive suggestions. My special thanks go to Professor Ruth Hayhoe from the Department of Leadership, Higher and Adult Education (LHAE), O.I.S.E., University of Toronto, for accepting my invitation to write the foreword of this book. Lastly, I want to express my gratitude to all my family members who supported me unconditionally in the writing process of this book. I would like to dedicate this book to my little girl, Hana, as an encouragement to always be herself in front of me. Du, X. (2018). Role split phenomenon of academic staff in Chinese higher education: a case study of Fudan University. Higher Education, 75(6), 997-1013. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-017-0180-7. Shanghai, China

Xiaoxin Du

Contents

1

Introduction: Chinese Higher Education and Its Political Task . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Theoretical Perspectives: Political Socialization and Higher Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Political Socialization and Educational Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Higher Education and Its Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Political Socialization in China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interactions of Different Players in Chinese Higher Education . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Historical Review on JU (1903–2013): A Wrestle Between Political Restriction and University Autonomy in Chinese Higher Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Changing Political Regimes and Struggling for Independence (1903–1949) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JU in the Late Qing Dynasty (1903–1911): A Struggle for Independence from Religious Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JU in the ROC Under Sun’s Leadership (1911–1927): Enjoyment of Freedom from Government Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JU in the ROC Under Chiang’s Leadership (1927–1949): Struggle Between Toleration of and Resistance to Political Control . . . . . . . . Centralized Political Socialization and Restricted University Autonomy (1949–1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JU in Socialist China Under Mao’s Leadership (1949–1966): Fulfilling Red and Expert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JU in the Cultural Revolution (1966–1977): Suffering from Political Chaos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reinforced Political Socialization and Regulated University Autonomy (1977–2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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JU in Socialist China Under Deng’s Leadership (1977–1989): Switching to Modernization and Liberalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . JU in Socialist China in Post-Deng Era (1989–2013): Orientated Towards Political Stability Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Different Players’ Deduction on Political Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . State’s Consistent Expectation on Red as Premise of Expert . . . . . . . . The University’s Response on Political Requirements from the State . . Faculty Members’ Understanding on Political Bottom Line . . . . . . . . . Students’ Inertia on the Political Task Assigned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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The University’s Practices to Ensure the Complement of Political Task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The University’s Administrative Mechanism to Ensure Political Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The University’s Academic Mechanisms to Implement Political Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Providing Mandatory Political Education Courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Supervising Political Sensitivity in Non-PEC Courses . . . . . . . . . . . Influencing upon Faculty Members’ Self-Censorship . . . . . . . . . . . The University’s Organizational Mechanisms to Reinforce Political Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SAO System and Its Student Counselors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Student Counselors Managing CPC Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SAO Resuming Situation and Policy Course . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Student Counselors Filtering Students’ Political Expressions and Behaviors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The University’s Extracurricular Activity Mechanisms to Facilitate Political Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CYL’s Control over the Students’ Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CYL’s Restriction on Students’ Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CYL’s Supervision on Students’ Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CYL’s Monopoly in Important Event Organizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Practices to Seek for Academic Freedom and Critical Thinking Under Political Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The University’s Initiatives in Search for Academic Freedom and Critical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The University’s Maintenance on Public Image of Academic Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

The University’s Tolerance on the Diversity and Openness of PECs . The University’s Provision on General Education Courses to Promote Critical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Faculty Members Ploughing for Critical Thinking in Teaching . . . . . . . . Faculty Members’ Diversification on Teaching Contents . . . . . . . . . . Faculty Members’ Encouragement on Discussion and Debate . . . . . . Students Seeking for Critical Thinking in and out of Classroom . . . . . . . Students’ Expectation on Critical Thinking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Students’ Resistance Towards PECs Based on Academic Judgments . . . Students’ Strive for Independent and Critical Expression . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

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Practices to Look for Flexibility and Alternative Space Under Political Restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Depoliticizing of Students’ Affairs and Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Student Counselors’ Diluting of Political Contents in Students’ Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Students’ Redefinition on Political Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Diversification on Students’ Affairs and Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Student Counselors and CYL’s Democratization of Student Affairs . . . CYL’s Provision of Enriched Forms of Student Activities . . . . . . . . . Internationalization in and out of Classroom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The University’s Pluralization in Crew on Campus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The University’s Promotion on International Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . Pragmatizing to Pave the Way for Personal Development . . . . . . . . . . . Students Gaining Political Capital Through Participation . . . . . . . . . . Students’ Mixed Motivation to Join the CPC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Students’ Preparation for Future Career Development . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Political Socialization in Chinese Higher Education: Role Differentiation as a Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Meaning of Political Socialization in the Context of JU . . . . . . . . . Role Differentiation as a Strategy in Chinese Higher Education . . . . . . . Role Differentiation as a Strategy to Balance Dual Tasks . . . . . . . . . Role Differentiation as a Strategy to Realize Coexistence of Restriction and Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Role Differentiation as a Strategy to Cope with Political Dynamics . . . . Theoretical Implications of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revisiting Theories on Political Socialization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revisiting Theories on Chinese Higher Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Limitations and Further Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Appendix A: Methodological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Preliminary Methodological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Data Collection Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Document Collection and Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Validity, Reliability, and Triangulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Validity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reliability and Triangulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Appendix B: Political Education Courses List (1905–2015) . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Appendix C: List of Reviewed Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 Appendix D: List of Interviewees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Appendix E: Outline of Online Course: Ideological and Moral Cultivation and Basic Knowledge of Laws . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Appendix F: List of Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Chapter 1

Introduction: Chinese Higher Education and Its Political Task

The political control on Chinese higher education had long been an impression for a lot of people working in the field of higher education. Some might think universities in China lack university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking, as they are controlled politically by the party-state in various ways; for example, 10% of students’ total credits must come from political education courses, academic staff need to be cautious about what they say, and discussing certain historical events in class is taboo. However, these and other mechanisms of political control might not necessarily eliminate all efforts at seeking for university autonomy and academic freedom. The state, in an effort to improve the global reputation of Chinese higher education, has encouraged Chinese universities to be innovative, and to promote the critical thinking required of world-class universities. However, this may largely counter the effectiveness of the political indoctrination the CPC (Communist Party of China) wishes to implement in China’s higher education system. This book focused the research problem on the dynamics and complexity of the interplay among the state, university, faculty, staff, and students in the process of socialization through political education and academic affairs. Theories on political socialization and higher education will be used to guide this study. Extant theoretical studies on political socialization (Dawson and Prewitt 1969; Jennings 2007; Niemi and Sobieszek 1977; Torney-Purta 2004)—including the three major approaches in political socialization study (partisanship (Jennings and Markus 1984), moral development (Wilson 1981), and political system theory (Easton and Hess 1961a)—explain political socialization in a Western context and focus on how students become social members of a given polity by gradually becoming attached to a political party, learning morality, and providing support to the political system. A considerable number of studies have examined the role of such different agents as family, media, peer groups, and educational institutions in one’s ongoing political socialization (Dawson and Prewitt 1969; Easton and Hess 1961b; Giddens 1993; Dowse and Hughes 1971); however, many of these studies have focused on childhood as an important age period, and have ignored higher education’s influence. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Du, Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8300-1_1

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Higher education institutions are crucial agents in political socialization and should be studied as such; theories on higher education could shed light on which university tasks are related to political socialization. Theories and studies on institutional autonomy and academic freedom have noted the contradiction inherent in educating students as critical thinkers and preparing them to have a certain type of ideology. Universities, traditionally institutions of knowledge creation that promote academic autonomy for both staff and students and encourage critical thinking (Barnett 1990), are also associated with economic modernization tasks (Delanty 2002); as such, a degree of coordination has emerged among the state, the university, and the market (Clark 1986). However, since the late twentieth century, the forces of globalization have increasingly urged universities to imbue students with a set of particular values to help them develop a global outlook (Davies et al. 2005); this is seen as a form of political socialization, and thus contradictory to the promotion of critical thinking. In China, the CPC has, since 1949, seen education institutions as a state instrument for the implementation of the political task so as to make future socialist conformists. It is a political task assigned by the one-party state that students be educated to become both future socialist conformists and constructors of China’s economic and social modernization. The slogan, Red and Expert, was introduced in the 1950s to reflect the state’s requirement that students be, first and foremost, politically and ideologically reliable, while still being given the knowledge needed to further China’s economic development (Spring 2006); after 1978, however, greater emphasis was placed on modernization than on political reliability. It is thus the responsibility of education to socialize the citizenry, to unify the country ideologically, and to prepare high-caliber leaders capable of reconciling communist precepts with market economics in China (Postiglione 2011). The CPC has made policies and established mechanisms in educational institutions to facilitate the implementation. The fulfillment of the political task of educational institutions has been enshrined in law to ensure enforcement on the policy level. The Education Law of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that education shall serve the construction of socialist modernization, be combined with production and labor, and shall produce students with the necessary morality, intelligence, and physique to be constructors of and successors to the socialist cause (National People’s Congress 1995). Education in China is thus a state agent controlled by the CPC for the reproduction of socialist citizens (Mok 2000), and the transformation and indoctrination of socialist ideology into the mainstream political culture (Ma 2001). Higher education is no exception; the Higher Education Law stipulates that higher education is to be conducted in the service of socialist modernization and the socialist cause (National People’s Congress 1999). As noted in Law’s (1996) study, higher education is an agent of both political socialization and economic modernization, and its graduates are expected to be professionals with “ideological reliability.” Education institutions’ foremost political task is to socialize students politically as socialist successors who will serve the needs of modernization.

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Mechanisms within education institutions have been established to facilitate the political task fulfillment. Since 1949, an enduring mechanism has existed in educational institutions in China at all levels, which has been confirmed in the new century through the systematic mandatory inclusion, from primary schooling through to university, of political education courses on Marxism, Mao’s thoughts, and Deng’s theories (Zhang 2007). At the higher education level, ideological and political education courses, which account for 10–16 of the approximately 150 credits needed to graduate, stick to the original goal of cultivating socialist successors, and rely heavily on delivering communist values and developing a sense of service to socialist modernization (Document 04) (Yang 2002). In addition, student counselors and moral education teachers help students adapt to university campus life and offer assistance with psychological problems and career planning; their overarching responsibility, however, is to oversee students’ ideological and political education, in and out of class (Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China 2006). In addition, the Chinese Youth League Committee (Zheng 2012) and Students’ Affairs Office (Yan 2014) in educational institutions also affect students’ life in a political way. These mechanisms in educational institutions are generally and traditionally situated in studies on ideological and political education (Dong 2005), which ensure that education remains a state instrument for political socialization and the basis of socialist construction (Spring 2006). It is the state-assigned political task of all levels of educational institutions in China; however, universities are unique among educational institutions, given their features in institutional autonomy and academic freedom, and merit specific discussion. The Chinese higher education system has long served as an instrument for political education, and provides useful insights into the study of political socialization. Its close relationship with the state—through the state’s administrative supervision and the dual-leadership system—has ensured that political socialization, rather than critical thinking, has been the focus of Chinese higher education (Hayhoe 1987, 2011; Zha 2011a, b; Yang et al. 2007; Li 2012). Extant studies do not fully portray the situation in which universities now find themselves—i.e., having to satisfy a political task while simultaneously facing the challenges of marketization (Mok 2000), globalization (Lo and Zhang 2007), and technological development (Zheng 2011). There is also a tension between equipping students to be critical thinkers while still socializing them to be a certain type of citizen in a context combining limited autonomy with globalization. Though there are studies discussing the relationships between state and university (Pan 2009), university and faculty (Hu 2005; Liu 2012), and university and students (Fairbrother 2003), the interplay between political socialization and academic pursuit among university, faculty, staff, and students is still under-researched, and informs the research problem of this study. To understand this issue, this book tries to understand the complexity with the tension between state’s demand for political task and university’s promotion on the academic development with different types of interactions by different players within the university using Jour University (JU, a pseudonym for the case university) in a coastal metropolis, PRC, as a case study. As universities’ sociopolitical task of imbuing students with a certain type of ideology coexists with their role to fulfill

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their conventional task of knowledge creation through academic freedom for research and teaching under the political restriction, examining China’s higher education system could provide important insights. Different groups of people are involved in the research including faculty members, staff (nonacademic staff including administrative staff, student counselors and Communist Youth League cadres), and students, Specifically, several questions should be asked to understand the issue: • What is the political task given by the state to the university? • What are the mechanisms used by the state to control the university’s implementation of political socialization? • How does the university interpret this political task? Why does the university respond as it does? • What are the perceptions of (a) the university, (b) faculty and staff, and (c) students on political socialization’s influence on university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking? Why do they perceive things as they do? • What are the strategies of (a) the university, (b) faculty and staff, and (c) students for managing both the political task and academic development? What patterns can be seen in the interplay among the university, staff, and students? Why and how do these patterns exist? This book examines JU as a case study to explore the roles and behaviors of different stakeholders (university, faculty, staff, and students) in the face of the implementation of political task and different players’ practices under the politically regulated autonomy in the university. It demonstrates the complex interplay among different players involved in the fulfillment of both political task and academic task in China’s higher education system; the university, faculty, staff, and students interacted with each other in response to the tension between socializing students with certain values and creating critical thinkers; the complexity of that interaction is the focus of this study. University selection for this case study was based on some specific criteria. The selected university is one of the elite universities in China, which have long histories, have been influential in Chinese higher education, and are focused on becoming world-class universities (Xi’an Jiaotong University 2009). The elite universities pursue institutional autonomy and seek further development outside of the framework of state leadership (Xiong 2008). The selected university is comparatively more balanced in its disciplines, with considerable number of faculties in the social sciences and humanities that might provide insights into their relations with the political task assigned by the state. And it is a university located in a major city in China, as in a large, preferably cosmopolitan city, one in which students can be exposed to multiple values, based on mobility from and between different parts and levels of the city, the country, and the world. The selected university has a long history of integrating Western and traditional Chinese values, and has contributed to the modernization process in China. According to Pan (2009), it fits the feature of an intertwining of academia and officialdom with university autonomy, and their relationships with the state are not based simply on control; rather, it gains freedom for their own development as a reward for their “good” political performance. In

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addition, it aims to become world-class universities, with students from all over China and a considerable number of international students. Students in the selected university are comparatively active in student activities, especially political ones. The students in the selected university participated actively in the May Fourth Movement and the development of CPC (Document 50) (Hayhoe 1987; Chen 2000; Xiao 2005). During the reeducation of university students that followed the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident, students from this university were required to complete military training, which lasted for a long time (Rosen 1993; Zhao 1998; Dreyer 2004), indicating that the state paid considerable attention to students’ political socialization at this university in an effort to build trust between students and the party, and to cultivate it among future generations of students (Rosen 1992). Thus, compared to other universities, JU was a more appropriate subject for this research, and as a case to focus on a holistic description and explanation (particularistic, descriptive, and heuristic) (Merriam 1998) of the related research questions. A 3-month fieldwork period was conducted in JU beginning in March, 2014, involving a pilot questionnaire and draft interview questions; the questions were modified based on the results of the pilot survey. In November, 2014, a second round of data collection, lasting 1 month, was conducted in JU; consistent follow-up interviews were conducted through email and online instant messaging from 2015 to 2018. This case study does not intend to generalize its result statistically, but to investigate the research problem so as to develop a deep understanding thereof. Pseudonyms and codes were used in this study including the university name, people’s names, and publication name. Based on the analysis of the interplay of different players, this study suggests that role differentiation is a strategy in Chinese higher education through which different players with different specific roles form strategies to cope with tensions; and players undertake complex interactions with each other while dealing with those tensions. In such interactions, players take on different roles (with different expectations and responsibilities), adopt different strategies, and exhibit different or even contrasting behaviors on different occasions. These behaviors could range from obediently observing the bottom lines and boundaries set by the state, particularly as regards political affairs to challenging the state by attempting to expand the scope of academic autonomy and freedom, even in areas it might deem politically sensitive. This framework also facilitates our understanding of political socialization, university autonomy, academic freedom, and especially players’ interactions in Chinese higher education. It supplements the conventional understanding of educational institutions as agents of political socialization by looking into the interactions within a specific educational institution. It explores additional mechanisms of political socialization in higher education institutions by not focusing solely on political education courses. It also supplements the extant literatures on political socialization in China and the role of ideological and political education in making obedient citizens by paying attention to possible disobedience by playing the role to embrace political socialization and the complexity of political socialization implementation. This book highlights the tension between political control and pursuit of

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university autonomy and academic freedom in a socialist country by observing how higher education covers both its sociopolitical task and its conventional knowledge creation task, using the case of a Chinese university to explore the status of autonomy and academic freedom in China’s higher education system. It also illustrates the interaction among the players within Chinese higher education as they deal with the tensions resulting from competing expectations and responsibilities. University, staff, and students were involved in the analysis, which saw them strategically adopting different roles in different circumstances. Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical concepts and theoretical framework of the study. It reviews studies of political socialization and its important agent—educational institutions. It presents higher education as an agent of political socialization with distinctive tasks, and then follows up by presenting studies on university autonomy and academic freedom. Theories on political socialization in China depict the country’s higher education system as being party-state controlled and having regulated autonomy; however, although universities’ primary political socialization task is to reproduce socialist conformity in China, they can still face challenges. Lastly, it highlights the research questions and the significance of the study, as it has emerged in the theory presentation. Chapter 3 explains the tension that has existed, throughout the history of JU, between political socialization as a means of political control and the university’s promotion of its autonomy to ensure knowledge creation, with attention being paid to continuity and changes from 1903 to 2013. It also illustrates the tension in JU along with a sketch on the modern history of Chinese higher education. This chapter argues that JU has continuously struggled to attain university autonomy in the face of changing levels and types of political intervention and control; specifically, it describes seven major stages in the development of the struggle between political control over JU and the university’s pursuit of independence. With the general social changes in China, the university has experienced different levels of political intervention and has sought increased autonomy. Chapters 4 through 7 present and discuss the major findings of this study. Chapter 4 presents different player deductions on the political task on what they could not do and what they could do or would do. Chapter 5 explains in details practices the university implements to fulfill the political task with different types of mechanisms including administrative, academic, organizational, and extracurricular, to ensure the political leadership supervision on political socialization process. Chapter 6 presents the pursuit on academic freedom and critical thinking under the political restriction with efforts from the university, faculty members, and students. Chapter 7 illustrates the practices to look for flexibility and alternative spaces under the political restriction, listing out four types of scenarios including depoliticizing, diversification, internationalization, and pragmatizing on different issues. Chapter 8 concludes this book by pointing out the role differentiation as a strategy in political socialization in Chinese higher education. It begins by reviewing the meaning of political socialization in the context of JU, as under the setup that political task is the priority which composed a political restriction in the university, while different players have their deductions on the task. Secondly, it describes the

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concept of role differentiation to explain the dynamics and complexities in Chinese higher education, with the characteristics as a strategy to balance both political and academic tasks, to make possible the coexistence of restriction and flexibility, and to cope with political dynamics. Thirdly, it revisits theories of political socialization, and studies on Chinese higher education, so as to discuss the theoretical contributions, implications, and limitation of this study.

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Chapter 2

Theoretical Perspectives: Political Socialization and Higher Education

As a Western concept, political socialization examines the relationship between the state and the individual, as well as their roles in the formation of political ideas and behaviors through certain agents. Educational institutions, including both schools and universities, are important agents in the political socialization process. Higher education institutions with the mission of knowledge creation, which should enjoy academic freedom and foster critical thinking, could be in tension with political socialization. This chapter discusses the issue through a theoretical perspective.

Political Socialization and Educational Institutions People are taught to be members of society through socialization, a lifelong process whereby infants gradually become self-aware, knowledgeable persons, and skilled in the ways of the culture into which they are born (Giddens 1993). With immigration and other merging social issues happening nowadays (Giddens 2007), this process shifting making people members in a community into adapting an alternative principle of world order (Held 2010) broadens the scope for socialization. A series of societal elements, including technology, cultural lore, and social relationships, are introduced to children at an early age, as contents of their socialization (Dawson and Prewitt 1969). Socialization theories explain how people become members of their society and how their actions and practices are those of people who do what they have been brought up to do (Nash 1990). Socialization is a process whereby one learns to live in a society, by learning, throughout one’s life course, about social norms, beliefs, and behaviors. People of different classes, ethnicities, sexes, and different linguistic, geographic, or religious-based groups experience different types of socialization (Sawyer 2005). Cultural and linguistic socialization appears early in one’s life, while explorations related to sexual, religious, and political affiliation occur later (Giddens 1993; Brim and Wheeler 1967). Cultural and linguistic socialization, gender and sex © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Du, Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8300-1_2

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socialization, religious socialization, and political socialization are just some of the different types of socialization. Political socialization is a process through which one acquires political knowledge, skills, and values; develops the political views, attitudes, and behaviors that inform one’s perceptions of the political world; and forms one’s political self (Dawson and Prewitt 1969); it can also be defined as a process through which regimes attempt to justify the ruling and motivate people to support national goals (Fairbrother 2003b), through which people form their political orientations, values, and behaviors, and their attitudes towards the nation (Fairbrother 2003a). In this study, political socialization is defined as a process where people acquire political knowledge, form political attitude, and involve in political participation so as to live in a community. Three major approaches have been used in the study of political socialization: partisanship study; theory of moral development and social learning; and political system theory (Brauen and Harmon 1977; Jennings 2007). The first focuses on generational partisanship, and the passing on of party identifications, electoral choices, and their formation, continuity, and change. Studies on civic engagement, especially voting behaviors, are based on this type of research (Jennings and Markus 1984). The theory of moral development and social learning, on the other hand, argues that one’s political behaviors are related to one’s moral orientations, and that the learning process helps develop feelings of membership in specific political communities (Wilson 1981; Campbell 1979). This type of research sheds light on the relationship between politics and morality, and its appliance in political socialization. Finally, the political system theory approach, advocated by David Easton, regards political socialization as a method of creating support within a political system, and a vital means of preserving that system (Brauen and Harmon 1977). Examinations of political efficacy among adults, as diffuse support, have implied that regime persistence depends heavily on the creation of supportive beliefs in children during their formative years, and should be retained to adulthood (Wright 1975); such support depends on political socialization. All three approaches, regardless of their respective focuses and emphases, agree that political socialization influences how one learns political knowledge, acquires political attitudes, and practices political participation. These approaches also reveal that political socialization is a dynamic process involving multiple agents at different stages of one’s life. For instance, partisanship studies have revealed that certain idiosyncratic and personal events, including college experiences, geographic mobility, and marriage (Jennings and Markus 1984), inform one’s party orientation, thus showing the influence of family and education; for its part, the social learning approach often stresses moral virtue as a form of citizenship education in schools (Wilson 1981), while political system theory studies have shown that political efficacy is comparatively high among college-educated individuals, as they have greater political will and more resources to influence the political process (Wright 1975). All three approaches have shown

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that certain stages of one’s life are crucial to one’s political socialization, and that family, peers, media, and schools might be important agents thereof. However, partisanship can only explain political party competition, social learning emphasizes individual efforts rather than integrating the state’s power over society, and political system theory sees political socialization in terms of its utility as a political tool, ignoring individual contributions. The role of the different actors in the process of political socialization deserves further study. A variety of agents, including parents and family, peer groups, media, and education institutions (Dawson and Prewitt 1969; Niemi and Sobieszek 1977), facilitate political socialization efforts (Fairbrother 2003b). Family is the first and foremost agent in one’s life, and the premier group to which one has access in life. Parental influences are strong, enduring, and stable, especially in terms of partisanship and ideology (Jennings 2007; Jennings and Markus 1984; Dowse and Hughes 1971); however, when one leaves one’s family, the latter’s influence is weakened. As children grow up and go to school, they are drawn farther from family influence, as they begin to spend much more time in school or with peers than at home. Peers provide them with knowledge specific to their social life and motivate them to conform to attitudes and behaviors accepted by the group or the wider society, while various media act as transmitters of political cues, exposing individuals to political information and reinforcing existing political orientations (Dawson and Prewitt 1969). In addition to family, peers, and media, education is a powerful and long-lasting agent of political socialization. Families are based on blood relationships, while friendships are forged through free choice; one’s participation in school, however, just as is one’s participation in society writ large, is based on neither nature nor free will (Ballantine and Spade 2011). White (1997) argued that it is the function of educational systems at all schooling levels to shape young people’s minds, characters, thoughts, and behaviors through socialization. Education, as Friedland (2009) contended, produces power relations by authorizing practices that constitute subjects and objects through which authoritative relationships are organized. Education has a significant, strong influence, especially in regard to political socialization. Educational institutions, as agents of reproduction oriented towards order and importance of education, can be viewed as “indispensable to social integration and social control” (Morrow and Torres 1995), as “political socialization efforts carried out by agents of socialization are dependent upon the state for the content of the messages conveyed to younger generations” (Fairbrother 2003b). The educational system is thus inevitably a powerful agent of political socialization. Educational institutions can establish political socialization mechanisms through which socialization, political values, attitudes, and behaviors are perpetuated (Harker 1984). According to Durkheim (2011), the function of education in society, no matter the formal curricula or extracurricular activities, is to provide discipline for socializing children to be good citizens. The education system is a powerful tool that encourages people to follow a given social order (Deer 2003; Friedland 2009; Bourdieu 1985; Morrow and Torres 1995), and which uses curriculum, collective life, and environment as mechanisms for socializing students into citizens

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(Durkheim 2011; Parsons 2011). Thus, educating future citizens is an important component of political socialization. Educational institutions, as agents of political socialization, are the main arena in which the contents of citizenship education are implemented. However, unlike primary and secondary schools, universities are not compulsory, and enjoy a certain degree of autonomy; moreover, they are also knowledge creation sites and crucial agents of modernization (Delanty 2002). Higher education, as one type of educational institution, has its distinctive functions, aims, missions, and tasks. Universities were created to be seats of critical thinking, not merely job training and economic development centers, and to offer civic training related to citizenship, society, and politics (Giroux 2009, 2010); modern universities are agents of modernization, and politics is a feature of the campus (Delanty 2002). Higher education may bear several types of tasks, and be crucial to one’s political socialization.

Higher Education and Its Tasks The idea of higher education is closely connected to knowledge creation. Universities, as the major type of higher education institution, are places in which one develops both one’s critical thinking abilities and knowledge for its own sake (Barnett 1999; White 1997; University Grants Committee 2010). A university is ideally a place free from intervention by government, business, and religion (Pan 2009), and one in which knowledge creation is the central task. Usually, university has three major missions, teaching, research, and social responsibilities (Liu 2012). As mission focused more from the university’s construction perspective, the discussion on university’s task involved the university more with the social context with a comparatively interactive sense. The first task of a university is knowledge creation, with emphasis on fostering critical thinkers. It is the fundamental academic aim of universities to develop individual students’ minds, enhance their reasoning abilities, inspire their critical thinking (Barnett 1990), and help them to acquire the skills needed for reasoning, skepticism, and reflection (Fairbrother 2003b). The principle functions of this task are to transmit culture, create knowledge, and pursue truth, through teaching, research, and study (Clark 1986). A university should maintain a certain distance from the state government and the market to avoid interruption of these tasks. However, universities cannot realistically avoid all external pressures, as higher education must also fulfill a second task, which is the economic task. Over time, a sense of the university as a servant of society and economic development has emerged (Barnett 1994; Delanty 2002). As Clark (1986) argued, academic oligarchy supplements a unitary and unified state/market linkage, forming a triangular coordination pattern among the state authority, market, and senior professors. Universities are linked to market needs, due to the emergence of knowledge-based economies highly reliant on technology and science (Delanty 2002). Universities shoulder the responsibility of motivating society’s economic development by contributing

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research results that can trigger such development. In short, the tasks of higher education have been expanded to include economic tasks, and universities must, through curriculum and extracurricular activities, equip students to meet the expectations of society and employers alike (Arthur and Bohlin 2005). This economic task urges universities to aid in the modernization of society and embrace the needs and demands of the market. Moreover, the state can assign a third task to universities—the sociopolitical task. The sociopolitical task is to educate students as citizens capable of taking social responsibility and serving the community (Arthur and Bohlin 2005). Modern universities are regarded by many researchers as civic actors whose major institutional aim, nature, and bearing are to nurture citizenship (Li 2009), including encouraging students to embrace a global citizenship, as a result of globalization’s influence on and internationalization of higher education (Li 2011; Lo and Zhang 2007; Mok 2005; Bartell 2003; Altbach 2004). Global consciousness has become a motto in the education of future citizens, and international university exchange projects have been promoted to help students think differently about and interact with people from outside of their original culture (Ichilov 1998; Davies et al. 2005). Both globalization, a market-induced process resulting from international market integration towards a multipolar economic world (Held 2010), and internationalization, the reciprocal exchange of people, ideas, goals, and services between two or more nations or cultures, are now entailed in higher education (Yang 2003, 2004). The new emphasis of political socialization in higher education is to equip students with a global outlook that will allow them to compete in response to the challenges of globalization and internationalization. Other than a value imbuing function of the sociopolitical task, the social responsibility of higher education in seen more and more important as a supplement to the research and teaching functions of university, as a way to strengthen civic commitment and active citizenship, using volunteering as an approach to serve the local community or to support sustainable development (Shaari et al. 2018). Some scholars defined university social responsibility (USR) by modifying the definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR), showing a trend of “corporatization of university” (Vasilescu et al. 2010), though generally the focus of university’s social responsibility has been put on projects to make future good citizens. However, scholars have been skeptic about USR as a real responsibility. In his study, Yan (2002) pointed out that these USR initiatives in universities could only be categorized as social responsiveness according to Robbins and Coulter (2017). A real responsibility of university should be based on a spontaneous judgement free from seduction and hegemony of any kind. With only the responsiveness to the society based on a contract, the basic idea of higher education would be endangered, making higher education institutions into manufacture organs to produce what consumers need with standardized principles. He admitted that there are still debates between university’s responsibility of searching for truth and the good and its undeniable attachment with the society or even the polity in reality. As a result, to what extent higher education is influenced by the state and market has become the core of the dilemma between the university’s conventional task, and its economic and

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sociopolitical tasks. University’s responsiveness to the market and the state could sometimes influence the university autonomy and academic freedom. In addition, the idea of socializing students into a particular set of values in the context of globalization could contradict higher education’s conventional task of creating knowledge and fostering critical thinkers, as it involves a certain type of ideology being implanted in the university through external intervention. In addition, through the impact of globalization and what it has brought to education, the ideology of human capital and consumerism has become dominant in both general and higher education (Spring 2012); it is seen as an economic good by both individuals and society writ large (Barnett 1994), and undermines the emancipatory conception of higher education, which rests on a belief in reason and critical thinking (Barnett 1990). As a result, though higher education institutions are expected to be innovative and to generate new knowledge, they must increasingly emphasize productivity in the global economy (Ballantine and Spade 2011); thus, instead of encouraging individual intellectual development among students, higher education has tried to socialize students within a tightly bounded albeit global outlook (Barnett 1990), in contrast to its conventional task. Institutional autonomy and academic freedom have been the fundamental means by which higher education has guarded its pursuit of knowledge creation, innovation, and truth, and are necessary conditions for creating knowledge and fostering critical thinking. Institutional autonomy at the university level refers to a status of self-governance in deciding academic work standards, management, and related activities without intimidation or negative consequences from external intervention (Vrielink et al. 2011; Andren and Johansson-Dahre 1993). Institutional autonomy is seen as essential if universities are to exist and develop free from outside control (Pan 2009), especially when that control comes from the state. Academic freedom in universities entails freedom of thought and expression in teaching and research, and even civic freedom in speaking and writing (Enders 2007; Moor 1993; Turk 2014). Academic freedom ensures teaching and researching quality, and that individuals continue to contribute knowledge to the world (Akerlind and Kayrooz 2003). Institutional autonomy is a prerequisite to preserving and promoting academic freedom (Andren and Johansson-Dahre 1993; Vrielink et al. 2011); however, both institutional autonomy and academic freedom can be threatened, politically and economically. The first threat comes from political authorities, such as the state, local government, and political parties (Jin 2003; Zhou 2002; Pan 2009). Political authorities seek to involve higher education in issues concerning societal intentions (Zhou 2002), societal development (Jin 2003; Yang 2014), and social and political development (Zhong 1997). Political and ideological pressure affects research directions and selection of faculty and students, resulting in academics losing both the right to make their own judgments according to intellectual virtue and the ability to act as social critics (Pan 2009). Professors can be influenced by sociopolitical intervention to make adjustments to curricula, syllabi, research topics, and publications, thus threatening the collective rights of academic staff (Turk 2014). Political intervention

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from the state and government can endanger freedom in teaching and research, and even freedom in learning. The second threat to institutional autonomy and academic freedom comes from economic development and the market. Economic intervention in universities is a result of market competition and commercialization of higher education (Enders et al. 2013; Tierney and Lanford 2014); external bodies begin to sponsor specific research projects, making universities more market-like and economically strategic (Enders et al. 2013). Market influences could threat institutional autonomy and academic freedom internally. Knowledge is no longer sufficient as “its own end” (Newman 1996), and universities are now constructed as institutions with graduate schools of arts and sciences, professional schools, and specific research institutions (Kerr 2001), in recognition of the need to serve societal and economic needs. Decisions on university internal affairs could be influenced by this orientation, including such criteria of institutional autonomy as staff appointments, student enrollment, curriculum content, and fund dispersal (Jin 2003; Du 1992); through fears of punishment or dismissal (Enders et al. 2013), academic freedom could be sacrificed to service the needs of society and the market. However, the extent to which intervention threatens university autonomy and academic freedom is debatable, especially when the intervention is by the state. Political and economic intervention does not necessarily threaten university autonomy and damage academic freedom. Between the models of absolute university autonomy and absolute state control lies the state supervising model, which features a limited degree of state intervention (Pan 2009); the model can result from two changes—from a highly centralized system to one of loose central control, or from loose central control to increased state intervention (Pan 2009). The latter happens more often in democratic Western countries, in which sociopolitical tasks are increasingly given to universities (Ballantine and Spade 2011). Whether the relationship between state control and university autonomy and academic freedom is a balance or a tension depends on their interaction. Although studies in this field have touched upon the concern, the influence of the state and the market on higher education’s traditional task of knowledge creation and fostering critical thinkers remains under-examined. Since there still could be a spectrum of relationships between the state, market, and university under the state supervising model—given differentiated degrees of political control by the state, economic influence by the market, and autonomous space for the university—research on institutional autonomy in higher education should be contextual, with variations in different political and educational cultures (Marginson 2014) not covered in the general literatures on university autonomy and academic freedom. Discussion of the various restrictions on teaching and research due to specific political systems (Enders 2007) would be supplementary to the extant literature. In this research, Chinese universities’ relationship with the state is different from that seen in Western countries, making it necessary to review literatures concerning the specific context of China. Political socialization in China has its own emphases that are tightly related to the party-state, and Chinese educational institutions, including higher education

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institutions, act as instruments of political socialization as presented in Chap. 1. Higher education in China is supervised by the party-state and enjoys a level of regulated autonomy, yet the universities’ political tasks face challenges. There is a tension between the state’s assignment of political tasks and universities’ conventional academic task. With university, faculty, staff, and students as players, the scenario might be more complicated which deserves further study with empirical date.

Political Socialization in China Political socialization and political contents in educational institutions have followed their own trajectory in China. Before the beginning of China’s modern era (i.e., pre-1911), the major function of political socialization was to educate obedient people with Confucian-oriented values. Nowadays, political socialization projects in China—which features a centralized, one-party-state political system with socialism as its mainstream ideology (Li 2009)—have experienced challenges and been forced to evolve. Looking back in history first, Confucianism, as a tradition, has been an important element of political socialization for a very long period of China’s history. It has been argued by Ip (1996) that rights and equality have historically been prominently lacking in this system, resulting in the underdevelopment of the civic person in China. The major functions of Confucian sociopolitical values were aimed at rationalizing the emperor’s dominance, reinforcing state-society relations, and maintaining social and political stability (Law 2011). Cultivating, among the polity, the sense of being chenmin (ruler’s subject) was a tool for upholding state orthodoxy (Goldman and Perry 2002; Tan 2010). Political participation has seldom been a commoner’s right or responsibility in China (Yu 2002); rather, the main responsibilities of citizens in traditional Chinese society have generally been to respect authority and to obey those put in place above them. Plus, in Chinese society, citizenship is different from the Western conception, as it denotes less of a contractual relationship between the individual and society, and more of a heritance of an identity bound to nationality and loyalty (Lo and Man 1996), which reflected the mechanisms for political socialization. Chinese ideas of legal, civil, and political citizenship have traditionally focused much more strongly on the responsibility to remain loyal and obedient to the Chinese state than on the legal, civil, and political rights of the individual, while the state intertwined with society rather than separate from it (Fong and Murphy 2005). The practice of rites (Cai 1987) and the recognition of a common identity composed the contents of political socialization as support for the governor. This traditional political culture has impacted political socialization in China in modern times through its function of consolidating a specific regime’s rule with unified political ideology, even though the CPC replaced Confucianism with socialism at the beginning of its rule.

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There are two main models found in studies of political socialization in modern China. The state control model views political socialization as a state project for passing mainstream ideology to individuals and reproducing socialist successors, and a key means of maintaining social stability. China’s mainstream ideology is based on Marxism, supplemented by Mao Zedong’s thoughts, Deng Xiaoping’s theories, the Three Representations, and Socialist Core Values (Zhao and Li 2011; Zhao 2001; Ma 2001). After China’s reform and opening up in 1978, however, pure Marxist ideology has transformed into a more practical ideology focusing on modernization (Chen 2012), which has mandated a slight adjustment in the political socialization process; specifically, political socialization now focuses on the reproduction of socialist constructors for modernization (Spring 2006). Moreover, political socialization has been remade as a powerful tool for maintaining China’s political system and political stability (Ma 2001), especially given the diversification of societal values following China’s social transition, with political education courses being used as the main mechanism of political socialization (Zhao 2001). Other mechanisms of political socialization are not clearly identified in this model. According to the state control model, political socialization is allied closely to the state’s efforts at perpetuating socialist ideology as an important source of legitimacy for the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s leadership (Law 2011), in order to ensure social and political stability. The state control model also streamlines the agents of political socialization found in the general literature, and tries to interpret historical events surrounding ideological and political work within the army and party organization related to the development of the CPC, with the framework of political socialization (Zhao 2001; Zhao and Li 2011). However, the model fails to see political socialization as a process participated by parties other than the state, ignoring the efforts of such individuals as political guidance counselors, parents, teachers, and students in political socialization. While the state control model emphasizes the powerful indoctrination of ideology into political education courses, the social mutual construction system sees political socialization as a process involving both state and individual efforts (Wu et al. 2013), with family, peer groups, educational institutions, mass media, party, and government all acting as agents. Through these political socialization agents, political ideas construct individuals’ cognition and behavior, while individuals’ cognition and behavior have a reciprocal constructive impact on the agents and other participants (Wu et al. 2013); individuals’ political beliefs and trust in the government, the party, and the political system are results of political socialization. The social mutual construction system points out that multiple actors participate in the state’s political socialization process, and that different actors’ contributions have a significant impact on the political socialization process. The model can be applied in a university context, according to the research by Dong (2005), in that such extracurricular activities as social practices and services can be mechanisms of political socialization involving teachers and students. Dong argued that the political socialization one experiences in early adulthood involves strong elements of self-consciousness and self-choice, and that individual students make constructive efforts at political

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socialization; as such, the impact of political socialization does not always mirror the state’s mainstream ideology. Dong’s study suggested the possibility of students’ resisting political socialization in universities, and is a more sophisticated model than the state control model. The model explains political socialization as a process participated in and constructed by multiple actors within Chinese higher education. Although the social mutual construction model points out students as players in the political socialization process, it does not identify other players in the context of a university. Plus, though mentioning extracurricular activities as supplementary to political education, the model still ignores many other activities, such as party groups and students’ associations, which should be seen as related to political socialization (Du 2012), especially in educational institutions, as their activities can be viewed as mechanisms of political socialization. Neither model satisfactorily explains the complexity of political socialization in educational institutions in China.

Interactions of Different Players in Chinese Higher Education As demonstrated in Chap. 1, Chinese universities have a close relationship with the state through the mechanisms for political socialization, though this political task has been challenged by social changes. The state, universities, faculty, staff, and students are players within the higher education system, and it is important to acknowledge the interaction among these players in the political socialization process. The relationship between the state and universities in Chinese higher education can be characterized as semi-independent. Pan (2009) defined the university’s status in China as semi-independent, in that the university has the power to protect itself from external intervention in certain areas, and can act upon its own initiative to respond to social needs within the framework of government’s policies. Pan’s (2009) study took Tsinghua University, one of the top universities in China, as a case, and concluded that government can have political influence over universities, but that universities could exert influence on government policy decision-making as well. Tsinghua employed that balance to introduce measures to preserve its leading political role in Chinese higher education, by promoting political activities and programs in exchange for more resources and opportunities for development. The study was a thorough review of the relationship between the state government and elite universities in China, highlighting higher education role in reproducing socialist successors for the state and how universities’ semi-independent status has changed with social changes, and emphasizing that universities have their own development goals to pursue and autonomy to preserve (Fig. 2.1). Given the tension between the state’s political socialization demands and universities’ pursuit of fostering critical thinkers, university staff are key actors in this tension. Hu (2005) focused on staff’s role in balancing academic and political affairs

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Fig. 2.1 The university-state relation expressed by the concept of autonomy as semi-independence (source: Pan (2009))

in universities by looking into the interplay among the state, society, and universities to identify teachers’ multiple roles on campus, and found that they could act as representatives of the state by fulfilling their obligations to the CPC regime, could criticize and rebel, or could marginalize themselves by eschewing politics. Hu pointed out that, in China, no matter what role staff play, they cannot rid themselves of state control; as such, Hu questioned whether it was possible for staff to maintain both their academic ethics and their social criticism abilities, making this research problem unsolved at the staff level. In regard to faculty member’s role under a regulated autonomy, Liu (2012) studied Chinese university scholar’s personality in regard to academic independence. She pointed out that the practical or pragmatic use of the knowledge which was enduring in Chinese culture is different from the Western tradition, as in the West, scholars take individual as the center while Chinese regard the issue of liberty with a consideration on the boundary between the group and the individual. She quoted Xu Jilin’s categorization on Chinese scholars to illustrate the five types of intellectuals as independent (sticking to one’s own judgement and principles), strategical (a balanced type), active attached (to authority), passive attached (to authority), and floating clouds (self-entertaining type that stays away from the politics) to understand the possibility of independent personality under certain game rules. Based on her analysis, there are two possibilities when one scholar’s thinking and action contradict the given rules: one is the scholar insisting his/her own judgments and sticking to the plan of changing the world into a better place, and the other is the scholar losing his/her dignity in academic thinking during the change

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the world made on him/her. As a conclusion of her study, Liu still saw a possibility of flexibility under a powerful state intervention in Chinese higher education. Students are actors in managing the tension, too. Fairbrother (2003b) examined the influences of political education in higher education on students and the role of students in political socialization by comparing resistance to patriotism education among Hong Kong and Mainland China students. Political socialization, as a way of promoting the state’s point of view, faces challenges when students enter university, as students’ critical thinking skills are enhanced and they have increased exposure to various information and opinions that can inform their resistance. Resistance is a process of perception, reaction, and result. While students can exercise their autonomy to resist the state’s indoctrinated political values, Fairbrother (2003b) concluded that such resistance might not have a negative effect, and that student empowerment and constructive attitude students attained through the process could benefit society. His study focused on the relationship between students and their educational institution, emphasizing the importance of individual students in the process of political socialization. The studies by Pan, Hu, and Fairbrother identified the relationship between the state and universities, the conflicting roles staff play, and the relationship between students and universities under political control, all of which are useful for explaining the tensions inherent between actors when implementing political tasks. However, they fail to explain the specific interactions among these four actors, especially as regards the tensions between political socialization and university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking. These types of tensions have not emerged from their study and have been carefully explained with empirical data. Universities have their own development agenda, which includes educating critical thinkers, and lots of university departments involved in and conducting political socialization programs also have detailed strategies for promoting academic freedom. These have not been thoroughly presented in existing studies.

Summary This chapter has introduced theories on political socialization and higher education with special focus on its tasks with a deeper discussion on the situation in Chinese higher education, examined their usefulness and inadequacies for understating the single case study, and proposed a theoretical framework to illustrate the complexities and dynamics of political socialization in Chinese higher education, with a highlight on the interaction between different players in the process of political socialization. Theories on political socialization including the three major approaches including partisanship, moral development, and political system theory generally explained political socialization in a Western context and focused on how students become social members of a given polity. A considerable number of studies have examined the role of such different agents, as schools being one of them, and higher education institutions are crucial agents. Theories on higher education shed light on

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university’s different tasks, including conventional, economic, and sociopolitical. Theories and studies on institutional autonomy and academic freedom have noted the contradiction inherent in educating students as critical thinkers and preparing them to have a certain type of ideology. Since in the late twentieth century, the forces of globalization have increasingly urged university to imbue students with a set of particular values as a response to the expectation of the society. Through a review on studies of political socialization in China, it could be seen that the political task has long been an important task in higher education. The state tightly controls educational institutions at all levels, using them as instruments of political socialization to foster students’ socialist values and produce graduates who are Red and Expert through ideological and political education mechanisms. However, extant studies have focused mostly on primary and secondary school education, rather than on higher education. In addition, neither the state control model nor the social mutual construction system theories of political socialization can explain China’s specific situation, as neither reflects the multitude of players involved in and the complexity of political socialization in Chinese higher education which would be explored in the following chapters.

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Pan, S.-Y. (2009). University autonomy, the state, and social change in China. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Parsons, T. (2011). The school class as a social system. In J. H. Ballantine & J. Z. Spade (Eds.), Schools and society: A sociological approach to education (pp. 35–39). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Inc. Robbins, S. P., & Coulter, M. A. (2017). Management (14th ed.). London: Pearson. Sawyer, P. R. (2005). Socialization to civil society: A life-history study of community leaders. Albany: SUNY Press. Shaari, R., Sarip, A., & Rajab, A. (2018). The impact of university social responsibility towards producing good citizenship: Evidence from Malaysia. International Journal of Organizational Leadership, 7(4). Spring, J. (2006). Pedagogies of globalization: The rise of the educational security state. Mahway: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Spring, J. (2012). Globalization of education. International Journal of Chinese Education, 1, 139–176. Tan, C. (2010). Lun “Gongmin” Gainian de Teshuxing yu Pubianxing—Jianlun Gongmin Jiaoyu de Jiben Neihan (On the particularity and universality of the concept of citizen—also on the basic connotation of the concept of citizenship education). Educational Research, (5), 17–22. Tierney, W. G., & Lanford, M. (2014). The question of academic freedom: Universal right or relative term. Frontiers of Education in China, 9(1), 4–23. Turk, L. J. (2014). Introduction. In L. J. Turk (Ed.), Academic freedom in conflict: The struggle over free speech rights in the university (pp. 7–10). Toronto: James Lorimer & Company Ltd.. University Grants Committee. (2010). Aspirations for the higher education system in Hong Kong: Report of the University Grants Committee. Hong Kong: University Grants Committee. Vasilescu, R., Barna, C., Epure, M., & Baicu, C. (2010). Developing university social responsibility: A model for the challenges of the new civil society. Procedia—Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2, 4177–4182. Vrielink, J., Lemmens, P., & Parmentier, S. (2011). Academic freedom as a fundamental right. Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences, 13, 117–141. White, J. (1997). Philosophy and the aims of higher education. Studies in Higher Education, 22(1), 7–17. Wilson, R. W. (1981). Political socialization and moral development. World Politics, 33(2), 153–177. Wright, J. D. (1975). Political socialization research: The “primacy” principle. Social Forces, 54(1), 243–255. Wu, L., Yang, Q., Liu, H., Shen, Y., Jian, Z., Wang, J., et al. (2013). Daxuesheng Zhengzhi Shehuihua de Jieguo Yanjiu—Yi “Shehui Hugoulun” Wei Lilun Shijiao (The research on the consequences of political socialization of undergraduates—social mutual construction theory as framework). Beijing: Social Science Academic Press. Yan, G. (2002). Shidu Daxu: Zuzhi Wenhua de Shijiao (Understanding university: From a organizational culture perspective). Beijing: Education Science Press. Yang, R. (2003). Internationalised while provincialised? A case study of South China Normal University. Compare, 33(3), 287–300. Yang, R. (2004). Openness and reform as dynamics for development: A case study of internationalisation at South China University of Technology. Higher Education, 47(4), 473–500. https://doi.org/10.2307/4151513. Yang, F. (2014). Boya Jiaoyu (Liberal arts education). Shanghai: Fudan University Press. Yu, X. (2002). Citizenship, ideology and the PRC constitution. In M. Goldman & E. J. Perry (Eds.), Changing meanings of citizenship in modern China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Zhao, W. (2001). Zhuanxingqi de Zhongguo Zhengzhi Shehuihua Yanjiu (Study on China’s political socialization in social transition). Shanghai: Fudan University Press. Zhao, W., & Li, Y. (2011). Woguo Qingnian Zhengzhi Shehuihua Jixu Shiyi Yu Yangcheng—Lun Woguo Zhengzhi Shehuihua de Fazhan Ji Chuangxin (Political socialization for youth in China

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Chapter 3

Historical Review on JU (1903–2013): A Wrestle Between Political Restriction and University Autonomy in Chinese Higher Education

This chapter serves as a historical review on the tensions between political restriction and university autonomy in Chinese higher education and especially the case university, and provides background information on the evolution of Chinese higher education with the change in Chinese society as a background. It argues, based on data collected from documents and interviews, that JU has continuously struggled for university autonomy in the face of changing degrees of political intervention and control. Each historical stage of the struggle has had its own characteristics, reflecting the different political regimes, extent of political intervention, and social background in different historical stages; the chapter covers seven major stages in history till 2013, as the year Xi Jinping took the leadership and the next year when data collection started.

Changing Political Regimes and Struggling for Independence (1903–1949) The history of modern Chinese higher education started in Late Qing period. Before that, the major form of higher learning in China is based on academies, Shuyuan system, and with a system of meritocracy through national examination (Keju) aiming for civil servants’ recruiting. During late Qing’s warfare-dominated period of time since the Opium War in 1840, with both external force from foreign countries and internal rebellions from different social groups, political reforms were launched which also brought education reforms (Hayhoe 1999). In the last decade of Qing Dynasty, the political reforms in 1898 (Bairiweixin) actually opened the window for modern higher education system to be established in China; the civil service examination and the academies continued but lost viability. Though the reform did not prevent the collapse of Qing Dynasty, it paved way for the modern higher education system to be established with a republicanism spirit (Xun 2004). © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Du, Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8300-1_3

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However, only four institutions could be called modern universities till Qing Dynasty came to its end due to the Wuchang Uprising in 1911, which is Imperial University (Jingshi Daxuetang), Peiyang University, Nanyang Gongxue University Department, and Shanxi University. Compared with these institutions, JU, established in 1950 as Jour College, was only an institution providing preparatory course for universities at that time (Jin 2000). JU experienced different types and extents of external and internal intervention and struggled for autonomy in this period. While the internal intervention came from the religious body related to its foundation and sponsorship, the external intervention came from the lingering Dynasty. Duanfang, as a late Qing official who had great reputation in supporting modern education, once sponsored JU’s founder in its development with financial and governmental support, but also implemented political control over JU (Document 63). After the revolution of 1911 (Xinhai Geming), JU enjoyed a period of autonomy and minimal state intervention in university affairs due to the overthrown old political system and the unsteadiness of the new social order. However, the emergence of the ROC saw the ruling Nationalist Party attempt, from 1927 to 1949, to implement a unified model of political education at the university level, placing JU under increased political control and struggling to find a means for remaining autonomous. The unstable political system in China resulted in unstable autonomy in JU.

JU in the Late Qing Dynasty (1903–1911): A Struggle for Independence from Religious Control The promulgation of the School Regulations of 1904 (zouding xuetang zhangcheng) led to the 1905 abolition of China’s civil service examination and increased tolerance for modern educational system (Pan 2009); as a result, diverse forms of modern higher institutions, including government schools, missionary colleges, and private universities (Hayhoe 1999), began to be built in China. Since the Qing government was shaken by the impact of modernization on China in its last years, there was room for higher education institutions to experiment with and explore the field of education. Furthermore, the tradition of scholars enjoying the research freedom in Shuyuan set up the tone for the university spirit in early republican years in China (Xun 2004). A higher education institution called Jour College was established with this background, in an effort at balancing both traditional Chinese and Western learning in an autonomous institution. In 1903, the predecessor of JU, College Soleil, was founded by a famous Chinese education pioneer, scholar, and thinker, Mr. Yang Zhide with sponsorship of a Western religious organization (Document 54), with the intention of combining traditional Chinese education with Western religious and Western cultural influences, to ensure that the college had high teaching and moral standards (Document 23). However, tensions emerged as it became apparent that Yang Zhide and the

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religious body had different ideas about College Soleil and its autonomy. Mr. Yang’s idea was to insist all students to have a solid grounding in Chinese classical studies supplemented by Western learning in a coherent and holistic way (Hayhoe 1999) that combined the best of what China and the Occident had to offer in education (Document 23, Document 54). However, the religious body involvement in education brought about intervention in teaching methods and materials, aims of the college, and student affairs (Document 50). First, academically, although Yang Zhide intended to use the college and its curriculum to preserve Chinese traditional culture, the Western partner wanted to make it into a university equal to a real European higher education institution; to that end, all teaching materials and instruction were in French, making the college remote to China’s political situation and Chinese culture (Document 23). Second, in terms of administration, the religious party was against Yang Zhide’s preferred student governance model, which tolerated political activism and involved student officers in the selection of students (Document 23). Third, regarding student affairs, the religious party forbad all students from participating in political movements in society, like a lot of foreign-sponsored universities in China at that time, despite Yang Zhide’s strong support for students’ doing so (Document 04); Yang Zhide even protected and enrolled students whose arrest was sought by the Qing government due to their participation in political movements (Document 23). Within 2 years, the disagreement led to an open break between Yang Zhide and the religious body, and the establishment of Jour College. After a clergy attempted, in 1905, Yang Zhide led most of the College Soleil students (about 130 people) in a protest against religious interference in college administration (Document 23, Document 54). The relationship between Yang Zhide and the religious body finally collapsed. As a means of establishing academic independence and preserving institutional autonomy, Yang Zhide and the students opened a new college, as Jour College, despite financial problems and difficulty finding a site for the fledgling institution (Document 09). After JU’s 1905 founding, the college enjoyed a relatively high degree of autonomy, since the government’s control over the education system was steadily weakening. JU was autonomous in terms of curriculum setting, student enrollment, staff recruitment, and administration. Firstly, JU’s curriculum adapted Zhang Zhidong’s concept of Chinese learning as the essence and Western learning for its usefulness (zhongti xiyong) (Hayhoe 1999), combining Confucian studies and Western practical knowledge, all set up by the academic committee (Document 04). Secondly, JU established, in 1905, a college charter regulating student enrollment, teacher recruitment, and college’s administration body. The first cohort of students was directly selected by Yang Zhide for enrollment, the college’s academic affairs committee decided academic issues, and the students’ union was engaged in university decision-making (Document 08). JU was able to get rid of religious control and earn its autonomy by reinventing itself as an independent institution and gaining a foothold in Chinese higher education.

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JU in the ROC Under Sun’s Leadership (1911–1927): Enjoyment of Freedom from Government Intervention The second stage of JU’s development spanned the period from the beginning of Sun Yat-sen’s 1911 Revolution to the consolidation of the ROC under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership, in the late 1920s. Immediately following the 1911 revolution, China was effectively Balkanized and under the rule of various warlords and armies. Though Sun stepped down and gave way to Yuan Shikai after the ROC was established, his spiritual leadership continued to motivate vigorous experimentation at all levels of education, while China was without a strong central government. In 1912, the Ministry of Education promulgated Law of University to ensure that the universities are with the mission of teaching academic contents, making great talents, and fulfilling the state’s needs (Xun 2004), though the implementation of the law lacked a strong supporting mechanism. In 1919, as a consequence of Treaty of Versailles, May Fourth Movement broke out in China, with students protesting against the Chinese Government’s weak response to the Treaty as allowing Japan to retain territory in Shandong. This provided opportunities for cultural and social movements and political reforms. Accompanied by the New Cultural Movement, May Fourth Movement was carried out with values of appreciating science and democracy, which brought the community of intellectuals and education per se new elements to promote in modernized forms of schools and higher learning institutions (Wang 2015). It was not until the Northern Expedition and the establishment of the Nationalist government, in 1927, that education once again found itself under central government administration (Hayhoe 1999). JU thus experimented with its educational style in this period. Unlike from the previous period, when JU’s major challenge was to establish its independence, the tension between political control and institutional autonomy decreased following the change in political regime in 1911. The social environment for education provided JU general autonomy from 1911 to 1927, in terms of finance, curriculum, staff recruiting, academic freedom, and student affairs, without too much political intervention. Political turbulence afforded JU more autonomous space and academic freedom, and, in 1917, Jour College’s university board upgraded the institution and renamed it as Jour University (Document 09). In terms of financial autonomy, funding was decided by an administrative body called the college of administration, which was composed of JU staff and students. The JU archives show that, from 1917 to 1924, the college of administration discussed and passed resolutions on such expenses as staff salary, library construction, and student subsidies in its meetings, as well as a constitution on accounting (Document 08). JU’s fiscal autonomy was greatly enhanced by the fact that a considerable amount of its financial support came from donations, rather than the central government, as the government had insufficient money supply to finance higher education (Hayhoe 1999); moreover, the Beiyang Government led by Yuan Shikai would not allow JU to be registered as a university until 1928, which spared

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JU from direct political intervention, despite forcing it to shoulder a heavy fiscal burden (Document 34). Regarding curriculum design and disciplinary standards, JU had the freedom to integrate traditional Chinese culture and modern Western technology (Document 08). It could experiment with providing students both Chinese and Western learning, and deciding the arrangement and development of academic disciplines. JU’s curriculum promoted both preserving national identity and constitutionalism (Document 04), with reference to Yale University’s curriculum, and the use of English as the language for teaching and learning (Document 34). It included English literature and philosophy, logic, and geometry and argumentation from Western tradition; at the same time, students had courses in Chinese literature and culture throughout their 4 years of study (Document 50). JU had freedom in university academic development, and the college of administration decided how JU’s academic disciplines were to be set up; adding or canceling a discipline did not need approval from the central government (Document 08). Speaking of academic freedom, JU enjoyed autonomy in encouraging academic freedom among its staff, and chose staff with diverse backgrounds and teaching contents. In 1918, the then President Dr. Lee identified independent thinking as JU’s main education goal (Document 04), and purposely recruited staff from different backgrounds to teach at JU, no matter whether they were graduates of the Imperial Examination or Chinese returnees from overseas universities (Document 57). Teachers with foreign citizenship were also recruited to teach law, parliamentary debate, English, politics, and other subjects (Document 08). A considerable number of JU professors returning from Europe and the United States were constitutionalists (Document 04), while there were others who were communist supporters (Document 08) (Yeh 2000); neither, however, had their teaching contents restrained, and were encouraged to share diverse ideas with students. When looked at student affairs, especially political participation, JU involved students in university affairs and encouraged their engagement in social movements. It motivated students to set up their own council, in 1915, to support the spirit of autonomy in the university (Document 34, Document 50). Since Chinese society at that time was not politically stable, social movements promoting nationalism arose frequently; JU was tolerant of faculty, staff, and students’ participation in such movements as manifestation of the central government’s weak political control. Mr. Yang Zhide even advised students to go to public places and talk to people about the situation the country was through at that moment (Document 09). Students in JU were active in the May Fourth Movement in its located coastal metropolis and other revolutionary activities. JU accepted talented students expelled from missionary universities and government-funded schools and universities (Document 23), and served as a shelter for progressive revolutionists, who had actively participated in the 1911 revolution and other political movements (Document 08) (Yeh 2000), showing JU’s political tolerance towards its faculty and students by inviting people with a wide range of political beliefs to become a part of the university (Document 93). The political, economic, social, and ideological fragmentation of government had an impact on higher education (Law 2011) that there were no strong political

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socialization mechanisms at that time in JU, making it a remarkably free political atmosphere. However, with Sun Yat-sen’s promotion, in Guangzhou University in 1924, of his Three Principles of the People in nationalism, democracy, and livelihood (Zhang 2011), the general autonomy JU enjoyed was close to an end.

JU in the ROC Under Chiang’s Leadership (1927–1949): Struggle Between Toleration of and Resistance to Political Control After the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kai-shek completed the pro forma unification of the country. Due to the consistent social changes, the policies on education of the Nationalist government were also unsettled. In this period of time, the quantity of higher education institutions was considerably increased, and the modern higher education system also significantly improved (Zheng 1994); 210 institutions were publicly or privately funded with 155,000 students by 1948 (Wu and Morgan 2016). However, the outbreak of World War II and its influence on China in 1930s left the country in a situation with unprecedented international and domestic turbulence (Law 2011). The higher education system had a very difficult development with an unstable social context. In this period of time, educational reform and experiment had been undertaken in Chinese higher education that had influence on university autonomy. For instance, to prevent corruption in education and intervention to universities, the then Minister of Education, Cai Yuanpei, launched reform in the education-related administration system in 1927, to include research-related affairs in the Ministry of Education of Nationalist government. It also aimed at facilitating the autonomy of universities especially in finance, with granted independence in legislative and decision-making right in education area. This reforming attempt failed within 2 years, thanks to strong objection due to its damage to the bureaucratic system at the moment. It also attempted to isolate education with politics in reality, which was totally on the opposite direction of what the Nationalist government wanted (Jin 2000). The faction forces within the government spared universities in China some spaces for possible disobedience to the authority. The general situation of the society had an influence on JU as well. Regarding the university administration, in 1927, when the Nanking government of the Nationalist Party was established, the Registration Regulations for Private University and Specialized Schools were promulgated to further confirm that private universities must register under the government or their graduates could not enjoy same treatment as those which are registered (Jin 2000). As a further step, in 1929, the implementation of Law of University Organization further legitimized government’s control on universities. Universities should register under the Ministry of Education (MoE) of Republic of China and set up their faculties according to the government’s

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instruction (Jin 2000). The Nationalist government had an obvious intension to implement control on higher education, from the 1920s on by interfering in university registration, financial support, and leadership. As government approval was needed for recognition of a university’s legal status and receipt of government financial aid, threatening to withhold that recognition was a major way of exerting political control over JU. The state government used subsidies to financially control universities, at a time when financial support was critical to their ongoing wartime development (Wang 2007). JU applied for central government subsidies (Document 08), but accepting financial support meant also accepting supervision by the MoE. In 1928, JU was registered with the MoE, placing its administration under state supervision; following a subsequent MoE inspection visit, JU was pressured to modify its curriculum (Document 08). On the university leadership, the Nationalist Party appointed party members to be university presidents, and required some existing public university presidents to join the Nationalist Party (Wang 2007; Yeh 2000). The MoE appointed JU’s university president and other leaders, such as the head of JU’s Moral and Discipline department (Song 2003); appointees had to be politically reliable to qualify for the positions, placing the university’s administration firmly under political control. As a result, in 1931, JU is approved as a private university registered by the MoE (Xun 2004). The political education had been infiltrated in the universities to strengthen the legitimacy of the Nationalist Party’s ruling. In 1932, missionary universities, no matter registered or not, were investigated by province-level education bureaus to see whether they have firmly implemented partification education (Jin 2000). Before the Anti-Japanese War, Nationalist Party rarely developed its political organization on university campus. It was not until 1938 the Party branches had started to be set up in universities (Sang 2010). The political control on universities was loosened during war time. When moved to inner land of China in 1930s during wartime, 30% of JU students received subsidy or student loans from the university which was actually provided by the government. It was a period of time that both professors and students had confusion in different types of ideologies. Though university professors felt totally disappointed at the Nationalist Party, they did not really understand the CPC either (Sang 2010). When the World War II ended, warfare went on in Mainland China. Roughly 4 years of conflict between the Nationalist Party and the CPC finally ended with the Nationalist government forced by the CPC to move its seat to Taiwan in 1949 (Law 2011). MoE of the Nationalist government wanted to move JU to Taiwan before 1949; however its then president refused to move and chose to stay (Jin 2000). The political task finally made its way to JU. JU’s enjoyable autonomy ended slightly predating the 1927 establishment of Nationalist Party-dominated ROC in Nanjing and continuing to the end of Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership in Mainland China (Dreyer 2004); this period also featured both the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945) and the Civil War (1945–1949). Chang Kai-shek had promoted Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People (TPP) to legitimate his leadership; however, Nationalist Party political orthodox became important education contents, and academic freedom was constrained through political control (Yeh 2012).

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Autonomous spaces were preserved by JU staff and students during wartime in various ways, including taking advantage of the Nationalist government’s weak supervision to lessen the influence of political indoctrination and introduce alternative ideologies. The tension between political control and university autonomy was upgraded following the government’s implementing of unified political education in universities, as a means of asserting political control and indoctrinating students with an ideology countering that of the Communist Party. The ROC’s one-party dictatorship was replicated in China’s universities (Pan 2003) through Ministry of Education standards for required courses, guidelines for elective courses (Hayhoe 1999), and TPP education, all of which were specifically designed with the clear purpose of and contents for indoctrinating students with the Nationalist Party’s political ideology. Following the 1927 celebration of the May Fourth Movement, Chiang Kai-shek launched the “partification education” (dangyi jiaoyu) initiative, which focused on education about the Nationalist Party. At the First National Education Conference in May, 1928, partification education was officially conceptualized as TPP education (Junbing Zhang 2011). In 1929, the Nationalist government issued The Educational Aim of Nationalist China, which declared that all education in the ROC should penetrate the TPP teaching into the entirety of students’ curricular and extracurricular activities at all education levels, where the Party Principles (dangyi) course and military training became compulsory. In September, 1931, the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party passed Principles for the Implementation of the TPP Education, which specified that the principles for teaching TPP should be (1) clarifying Sun Yat-sen’s legacy, party policies, and important declarations; (2) proving the TPP as the one and only revolutionary theory for completing the national revolution and achieving world peace; and (3) criticizing other ideologies (i.e., socialism) contrary to the TPP (Gong et al. 2003). This strengthened the Nationalist government’s control over university autonomy (Document 04) (Yeh 2000), setting in place patterns that would ensure ideological conformity to TPP education as a kind of nationalist credo (Hayhoe 1999). Compared to the previous period, during which JU enjoyed a high degree of autonomy, the university was now very much under the supervision of the state and forced to tolerate its political restriction. JU followed the Nationalist government’s instructions regarding educational system design. In terms of curriculum, Party Principles and military training were included in TPP education as compulsory, no-credit courses (Document 08). The political education system in wartime served as part of a massive effort to preserve national identity. In 1938 and 1939, respectively, the state issued Outline for Youth Moral Teaching (qingnian xunyu dagang) and Moral Teaching Principles (xunyu gangyao) (Junbing Zhang 2011; Hayhoe 1999), which strictly enforced political orthodox in all universities; by 1941, JU students were required to take TPP courses on Chiang Kai-shek’s works, including China’s Destiny (zhongguo zhi mingyun) and Ideals and Reality (lixiang yu xianshi) (Zhang 2011), and to attend the Party Principles course held every week throughout their 4 years of university.

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JU also set up specific department responsible for TPP education and students’ military training, as mandated by the government’s Moral and Discipline Education department (xunyuchu), which was in charge of implementing TPP education within universities (Song 2003; Zhang 2011). Some private universities, especially those with a missionary background, refused to follow the instruction, seeing it as damaging university autonomy (Song 2003; Ren 2003). However, those universities without foreign sponsors were unwilling to risk their future development in hopes of retaining their current autonomy, and most followed the state’s orders. Though against all odds, JU had found a way to resist that control and seek autonomous space. Due to the majority of JU’s funding being raised by the then President Dr. Lee (who served in JU from 1913 to 1936) due to the Japanese occupation of the city and the Nationalist government’s tightened control, and due to Lee’s promotion of American-style pragmatism to protect intellectual freedom, JU enjoyed greater freedom than did China’s public universities (Document 34, Document 93). Firstly, though JU established a Moral and Discipline Education department in 1929, this department was given responsibility for issues ranging from scholarship provision to prohibitions on students’ gambling (Document 08), thus diluting its political effect; the department existed in form only, and never really implemented its mission of political education. Following the wartime migration of universities to the relative safety of China’s interior after 1937 (Document 51), JU settled in a city in inner land of China (Document 34), and political education was even more loosely supervised. The mechanism existed, but the implementation of TPP education was not tightly controlled in JU, which slightly deviated from its expected conduct to reject the government’s political control. About political organization on campus, JU was tolerant of the alternative ideology provided by the CPC. When the CPC’s city branch was established in November, 1921, the head of Chinese Language department was the party secretary who later became the president of JU following the establishment of the PRC, and was a translator of the Chinese version of Marx’s works (Document 08) (Yeh 2000). In 1945, radio broadcasts from Yan’an containing CPC-related contents were detected at JU, catching Chiang Kai-shek’s attention and causing him to urge the university to deal with the issue (Document 08). However, progressive revolutionaries continued giving lectures espousing different political views at JU, and its students held heated debates on social and political issues on campus, without intervention from the university administration (Yeh 2012). JU had preserved part of its autonomy by loosening control over ideology. Throughout this period, the Nationalist party and its government sought to promote political indoctrination in JU by enforcing administrative control and TPP education; JU implemented the political task, but simultaneously looked for ways to avoid total state control by diluting political education and opening its campus to other ideologies.

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Centralized Political Socialization and Restricted University Autonomy (1949–1977) After the CPC came to power in 1949, Jour University became an institution serving the state’s development and modernization needs. There were two major changes in universities in China. The first was that the university education system was turned into a “Soviet Union model” to serve for the national planned economy under the direction of the CPC (Wu and Morgan 2016), with highly centralized administration, specialized talent cultivation, and unified curriculum (Liu 2012). Universities were reorganized to be specialized institution with only a few left as comprehensive ones. The second change was related to the highly centralized system as it required all faculty members and students to be loyal to the CPC and (Wu and Morgan 2016) to its ideology. Especially for the faculty members as part of the intellectual group, they had to go through a process of self-reflection, which was called “take a shower” (Xizao) (Liu 2012), as a social movement of requiring all intellectuals to reflect and self-criticize the thoughts related to capitalism in their mind, which did humiliate a lot of intellectuals in universities and made them cautious about expressing their political stands in public occasions from then on. Specifically in higher education, the eighth meeting of Central People’s Government Council passed the resolution on university leader appointment and dismissal regulation that the university presidents and vice presidents would be appointed and dismissed by the central government (Yu 1994). In addition, the CPC’s restructuring of the PRC’s higher education system and the establishment of political socialization mechanisms in 1950s meant that the university lost its autonomy and operated under strict state supervision. Political education became the priority in JU, and students were molded into socialist conformists. In 1960, emerging political movements overthrew academic activities in JU, and the university fell into political chaos, which lasted for roughly one decade.

JU in Socialist China Under Mao’s Leadership (1949–1966): Fulfilling Red and Expert When the CPC took over the regime, the political orthodox had been set up to follow a Marxism ideology. The first national meeting on education in 1949 promoted the admission of workers and peasant students into universities. And a university, Renmin University of China, aiming at cultivating future CPC cadres was established, to learn from the Soviet Union and enhance the study on Marxism theories (Yu 1994). Soon the model was promoted to the whole country. In 1951, after the central government of CPC took over the control on universities, all TPP education courses set up by the Nationalist Party were abolished, substituted by political education courses about Marxism and Leninism (Yu 1994), so as to ensure that the ideology the CPC promoted is an orthodoxy one. In 1961, the Ministry of

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Education drafted Temporary Working Regulations for MoE Supervised Universities (University 60 Rules for short) to inform all cadres, teachers, and students in universities what they should do and should not do in politics to ensure the implementation of the CPC’s educational guiding principles (Yu 1994), which set up the boundary for academic freedom in universities. Political control over education was maintained in much the same way as it was during the ROC; however, the political ideology into which students were indoctrinated was different. The CPC eliminated TPP education in universities, replacing it with education on socialist ideas. The party-state implemented its political control over universities in two ways: by reconstructing the higher education system to make the university serve the state’s development and modernization needs, and by installing political socialization mechanisms to implement ideological control over students and make them politically reliable socialist constructors serving the PRC’s development. The new socialist regime not only took charge of the country, but also implemented sweeping education reforms, with the reorganization and restructuring of higher education completed in 1952 which served as a structural change to prepare for the consequent control. The CPC-led state reorganized and restructured universities in China according to the Soviet Union model, making them institutions specializing in disciplines instead of comprehensive institutions (Hayhoe 1999); this served the twin purposes of establishing the state’s political control over the universities, and furthering China’s reconstruction. From 1950 to 1952, MoE made plans for reforming and rules for overseeing education in the PRC (Dong 2005). Firstly, the state took control of all universities’ administration. Universities with missionary background and with private origin were merged with other universities such that all universities became public institutions under the CPC supervision, thus ensuring government control over higher education. Financial support and disbursements, student enrollment, and curricula were also gradually centralized by the state, from 1952 onward (Document 08). Secondly, universities’ disciplines and specialties were redesigned, through adjustments to departments and faculties, to serve the strategic development of the whole country. In total, departments from 19 universities were reorganized into the new comprehensive JU (Document 50). Although JU lost all of its applied and most of its professional programs in the process, and was limited to teaching basic arts and sciences (Hayhoe 1999), the restructuring made JU a top university in East China, and an example for other universities in the region. However, despite its lofty status, its university autonomy was largely restrained. In the 1960s, the new concept—Red and Expert—was promoted (Dreyer 2004) that asked university students to become both politically reliable (Red) and intellectually excellent (Expert). Red and Expert university graduates were expected to have very high levels of intellectual proficiency, master modern science and technology, and serve the people with their entire heart and soul (Ministry of Education of the Central Government 1950). The state set up mechanisms for political socialization to educate talented students who were loyal to the CPC and also could further China’s modernization.

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The political socialization mechanisms cast JU as a university serving the needs of socialist modernization and molding students into socialist conformists. The first step was to eliminate the teaching of alternative ideologies, especially the political education system formed by the Nationalist government, to ensure that Communism and Socialism were university’s political orthodoxy. JU canceled the TPP teaching contents in August, 1949, even before the Decision on the Implementation of Higher Education Curriculum Reform, issued by the state in 1950, called for universities to stop teaching “reactionary” courses and to begin political education for the New Democratism Revolution (Dreyer 2004). Throughout the reorganization, capitalist and Western ideologies were abolished by universities, and Communist values, including patriotism, love for labor, and love for science (Hayhoe 1999), came to dominate higher education. Unlike the ROC period, in which some private universities could resist state political requirements (Yeh 2000), the new socialist regime ensured that this was no longer possible. The second step was to establish the political socialization goal of ensuring that students became and remained loyal to the new political regime. In response to the state’s Red and Expert requirements, the then JU President and Party Secretary announced that it was JU’s task to equip students with Communist values, help them overcome individualism, and make them Red and Expert working-class intellectuals (Document 09). To serve and respond to the state’s Great Leap Forward movement, intended to enable the PRC to “surpass the United Kingdom and the United States” (ganying chaomei), JU established such disciplines as computational mathematics, mechanics, and nuclear physics, among others, in an effort to catch up with Western countries in the field of science (Document 10). In terms of graduate cultivation, JU followed the state’s instructions on modernization. The third step was to implement a range of political socialization mechanisms in universities, including political education, political activities, and political guidance. In accordance with the 1952 Instruction of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thoughts Courses in Higher Education Nationwide (Gong et al. 2003; Dong 2005), universities were obliged to teach classes on New Democratism Theory, Theories on Political Economics and Dialectical Materialism, and Historical Materialism; between 1950 and 1954, teaching groups for all these political courses were established in JU (Document 50). JU also took a leading role in the city and Eastern China, in the 1950s, by holding training and exchange programs for teachers from other universities on how to teach political education courses (Document 09). In 1959, the mandatory political education courses expanded to include (Marxism) Philosophy, Theories on Political Economics, Scientific Socialism, and History of Communist Party of China (Gong et al. 2003); in the 1960s, a course on Mao’s Thoughts was added to the national political education curriculum, and JU abided by that policy (Document 09) (Duan 2004; Gong et al. 2003). In a report from JU to the MoE on the implementation of “University 60 Rules,” a document issued in 1961 to all 26 universities supervised by the MoE on how to set examples for other universities in terms of talent cultivation and higher education development, JU claimed to have reinforced political education about Marxism-Leninism and Mao’s work (Gong et al. 2003), in accordance with state policy. JU actively played the role

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to implement political socialization to set up the image of a well-performed university in this period. Political organizations were established to promote political socialization in JU. The first such organ created (in September, 1949) was the Chinese New Democratism Youth League Committee (later renamed the Chinese Communist Youth League), which recruited 288 members who assisted in establishing, in 1952, the second and most significant political organ on campus, JU’s CPC Committee (Document 08). Though at the time higher education operated under a president-responsible leadership system in which the president had all the power over administration, the president still had to report to the party and the state (Liu 2008), and the CPC university committee secretaries’ decision-making authority was equal to that of university presidents. The Youth League Committee helped the CPC Committee orient political socialization with political movements, for example, the promotion of participation in the army during the Korean War, of learning from Lei Feng (a young devoting soldier who loved to help people, but died in his 20s), and so on (Document 50). The political organizations helped to promote CPC ideas on campus. JU’s Department of Political Guidance was established, in 1952, to master students’ ideological and political study, and to evaluate students’ performance in preparation for their job assignments (Document 50). Political counselors were established to supervise and help students in their political studies and political activities (Dong 2005). Students were organized and dormitories assigned according to classes (Document 08), with students of the same cohort in the same discipline forming a class. Each class would be assigned a political counselor and a class teacher, respectively, responsible for students’ political beliefs and studies, and academic studies, according to a 1964 document specifying their duties; despite being focused on students’ academic studies, the class teacher was also expected to have a record of good political performance (Document 50) and to show loyalty to the ruling party and the state. In this way, all students were organized and motivated politically through the political guidance system on campus. Compared to the Nationalist government, the CPC had a totally different ideology, and operated stronger supervision over the implementation of political socialization; the autonomous space for the university was largely limited.

JU in the Cultural Revolution (1966–1977): Suffering from Political Chaos The fifth stage of JU’s development came during the Cultural Revolution, when education was disturbed nationwide by political chaos. 17 years after 1949, the intellectuals in China had experienced several “tightening-loosening-tightening” rounds of political restrictions on them (Liu 2012), while this finally led to a

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suspension on knowledge creation of higher education institutions in China as the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution. In this period, the heated fight in education was between open access for peasants and workers to equal opportunity in higher education and the need for expertise to serve socialist construction (Dreyer 2004; Hayhoe 1987), and it resulted in several rounds of political movements that led to political chaos in universities. Staff in universities had to criticize themselves and be criticized by students as a means of politically remolding their academic thoughts as they related to Western ideologies or traditional Chinese culture, which were regarded as capitalist or feudalist ideas that ran contrary to the precepts of socialism (Xingwumiezi Dousipixiu) (Pan 2009). Faculty were even required to spend time at May Seventh Cadre Schools (Wuqi Ganxiao) in rural areas for years to undergo political retraining and manual labor (Hayhoe 1999). The prioritization of political correctness damaged university autonomy and academic freedom in this period. In JU, all humanity students’ discipline courses were cut. For example, for Chinese literature students, the history of ancient Chinese literature course was abandoned; for history students, history of ancient China course was composed of only several lectures; more than ten discipline courses for international politics students were cut and only one lecture on international issues remained. Students had very narrow academic exposure, and students did not have basic knowledge about their major (Yu 1994). Similar to the previous stage, political socialization contents were still oriented to Mao’s socialism; however, higher education was subjected to further political intervention. Although the mechanisms of political socialization were suspended during the Cultural Revolution, university autonomy was greatly damaged by the array of political movements, especially in terms of student enrollment, university leadership, and curriculum design. The political movements were ad hoc in nature, and led to even more serious political restriction; it left universities with only little autonomous space in academic areas. JU had to follow the state’s instruction on enrollment, which established political performance as the prioritized criterion. From 1968 on, the universities enrolled students not based on exam results, but on political performance (Dreyer 2004). In 1970, JU began to admit workers, peasants, and soldiers recommended by their work units (Document 09), many of whom aimed to “get into university, take over university and reform the university with Mao’s thoughts” (Li 2015), instead of pursuing academic learning. Before the Cultural Revolution, enrollment was uniform and governed by national examinations; during the Cultural Revolution, however, JU had to enroll students whose only qualification was political reliability, which influenced its academic development. JU’s leadership was taken over by political activists. In 1968, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, and the Central Cultural Revolution Group issued Notice on Sending Workers’ Propaganda’s Team (Gong Xuan Dui) to Schools; since then, teams promoting Mao’s ideas had roamed schools and universities, focusing on “criticizing and struggling” (pidou) (Gong et al. 2003) and supplanting the university leadership.

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JU’s presidents and CPC secretaries had repeatedly been criticized politically and overthrown (Li 2015). The forms of pidou could vary in different places ranging from making faculty members reading out loud their self-reflection reports to insults that could lead to severe physical and psychological harms. The movement was continuously upgraded that one who pidou other people 1 day could be pidou by others the very next day. The university did not have autonomy in leadership in this political environment, and was severely interfered with politically. Course curricula were redesigned to contain more political elements. The major activities on campus were no longer academic learning, teaching, and research, but political activities (Document 58). Numerous professors were criticized and treated violently, since they were seen as reactionary academic authorities ( fandong xueshu quanwei) or as pro-capitalist rightists (zouzipai) (Li 2015), left with no room for academic freedom. For registered students, special teaching groups were established in the end of 1971 (Document 09), aimed at educating students so as to prevent and combat revisionism, and cultivate communist successors. In JU, students were expected to participate in various types of political movements to gain political capital and craft a trustworthy political identity (Li 2015). Since the learning contents were heavily ideological (Hayhoe 1999), students’ critical thinking was not encouraged. JU was a leading university in terms of political movements during Cultural Revolution, as well as an important force in the city; as the saying went at the time, “If JU gets a cold, the city will cough” (Li 2015). With its close links to the Gang of Four and its influential journal, Study and Criticism, JU was seen as a model university during the Cultural Revolution (Hayhoe 1999), and from 1970 was assigned the task of educating workers, peasants, and soldiers with classes on (Marxism) Philosophy, Political Economics, History of Communist Party of China, and History of International Communism Movements in off-campus settings (Document 50). Political education courses were suspended for registered students in all universities, as a wider scope of people began participating in political movements (Gong et al. 2003). The only autonomous space JU retained was preservation on the academic standards in areas that do not overlap with politics. JU still preserved part of its educational function on campus despite the severe environment of political criticism and struggle. As one alumnus described in a memoir, I was a soldier sent to JU to study by my unit. In JU, I felt differently. The whole society was obsessed with political movements, but on campus, people are still reading and learning (Document 58).

Some JU staff and students still had academic ambitions and were allowed to continue aspects of their pursuit. One worker-peasant-soldier student, former JU President Prof. Young, went on to become a member of the Chinese Academy of Science, a scientist, and an expert in high polymer chemistry (Document 17), showing that it was still possible for students and staff to make academic achievements and to be inspired academically in a politically charged environment, though this possibility could be limited to certain disciplines.

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Reinforced Political Socialization and Regulated University Autonomy (1977–2015) The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC was seen as the signal of China’s reform and opening up in 1978, with more openness and less political movements as the basic tone. Higher education institutions were reopened and developed since Deng Xiaoping promoted the strategy in economic reform and politics for opening China to the world (Liu 2012), leading to a series of changes in universities, as scientific knowledge innovation and application were regarded again as high value of the universities. The university curricula were depoliticized and international exchanges were encouraged, though as a political mission in the first place. The universities started to enjoy a bit autonomy in the introduction of tuition fee and student recruitment. In this period of time, a reflection on Cultural Revolution and its damage to the knowledge community led the university faculty members to open to various types of thoughts from all over the world. The then government was tolerant and cooperative on academic discussions which loosened the atmosphere in politics in 1980s (Document 30). Political socialization was restored and set as a regular part of Chinese higher education after 1977, still serving the PRC’s development needs, but with a comparatively open and market-oriented manner. University autonomy was promoted in this period to facilitate academic development, so as to benefit modernization. The outbreak of the incident in 1989 made the government start to be cautious on the influence that would be made by the openness in the universities; the academic freedom which was just granted roughly a decade ago was taken back again. Universities carefully obeyed the requirements from the state since then in fear of cut in the financial support from the state while the autonomy issue was put aside for a long time after 1989 (Liu 2012). Despite experimenting with increasing university autonomy, the state reinforced political control after 1989. The tension between political socialization and university autonomy emerged in this period as the state encouraged innovation, but still resisted alternative ideologies. While after Deng’s speech in Southern China in 1992 the market extended its hand into the universities, the academic production was also molded into an industry, so that the productivity decides one’s future in the academic area as well (Liu 2012). This together with a caution in politics had instructed the faculty members as well as students to focus more on individual development and interests; the universities in China tended to become training centers which Qian Liqun called “cunning egoists.”

JU in Socialist China Under Deng’s Leadership (1977–1989): Switching to Modernization and Liberalization The sixth stage of JU’s development began with the end of the Cultural Revolution and the reinstatement of the national college entrance examination (gaokao) in

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China. Deng Xiaoping was back at a leadership position, and prioritized economic modernization, beginning with 1978’s Open Door Policy (Deng 1983). The educational system started to support China’s economic development, leading to lessened political emphasis (Dreyer 2004). Mao’s version of socialism was substituted by Deng’s version, which emphasized opening China to the world and to market forces, both domestic and global. JU recovered control of its student enrollment and teaching as well. Unlike the previous stage’s emphasis on political struggle and lack of tolerance for ideologies other than socialism, in this period, political socialization contents integrated with thoughts on modernization and Western liberalized ideas. After the reform and opening up began in 1978, university autonomy increased, with permission from the state, as society had started to open up gradually and the economy was beginning to feel the effects of marketization. The universities still functioned to serve for the state’s development needs, but multiple values from the outside world were allowed on campus to trigger students’ innovation. However, students’ liberalized ideas led to political instability by the end of 1980s, setting up the political bottom line of universities’ next stage. When looking at JU’s development, a major adjustment was in terms of course contents. Political education, as a mechanism of political socialization, was restored in universities and adjusted to reflect the reforms in Chinese society. The basic feature of university education remained to be learning for serving the state, and JU’s political task was still to develop students’ talents for reform and modernization while still imbuing them with a solid belief in socialism (Document 50). JU followed government instructions by “demonstrating a difference between socialist universities and capitalist universities by delivering political education courses” (Document 09) that followed closely the policy of the state. Political education courses were reinstated to maintain stability and order (Hayhoe 1993), and once again reinforce the socialist political orthodoxy through education. In 1980, JU formed its own Marxism Teaching Section, which developed, in 1987, into a department of teaching groups focused on political education courses. In 1980, the document Opinions on Strengthening Ideological and Political Works in Higher Education and Proposed Regulation on Improving and Reinforcing Marxism-Leninism Courses in Higher Education was published, reemphasizing the importance of political education (Duan 2004; Dong 2005), and that all political education courses in all higher education institutions should be compulsory, not selective. The change in political education courses in this stage can mainly be seen in the inclusion of contents on the market economy and opening up to the world, and the integration of Deng Xiaoping’s works into political education course packages at JU. In 1982, JU’s Moral Education course was merged into the full package, followed, in 1986 and 1987, respectively, by Basic Knowledge on Laws and Situation and Policy (Dong 2005) as supplementary courses. These provided students with fundamental knowledge of current CPC policy and the idea that the rule of law was the basis of China’s new market economy. The political leaders’ important speeches and ideas on Chinese political development were integrated

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and updated in political education textbooks (Dong 2005). JU followed the trend by offering a new course on Deng’s Theory and establishing a student club for studying Deng’s works (Document 50). Through the adjustment of political education, the state indoctrinated university students into new development directions. The student management system was restored in JU, albeit with some adjustments to its function, especially as regards depoliticization. In 1980, the universitylevel CPC Committee returned in a leadership capacity, but had been reconstituted as the Student Affairs Office (SAO), so as to be less politically oriented, and with one vice secretary of JU CPC Committee specifically responsible for student affairs (Gong et al. 2003). In 1984, JU made its SAO responsible for students’ ideological and political works, and other student affairs (Document 08). Political counselors were gradually renamed student counselors, showing that their work was less overtly politically orientated; however, JU still supervised students’ political performance through class meetings and student counselors (Document 30). If they wanted to sign out library books by Xu Zhimo and Yu Dafu, writers representing capitalism, JU students had to ask their counselors to write a note and get approval from their faculty’s CPC secretary (Zhang et al. 2014). Student counselors played an important gatekeeper role in students’ political performance. In the late 1980s, the state started to use a new plan for student job assignments, due to its marketization strategy (Zhao 2001; Deng 1983). Before the previous job assignment system was canceled, whether one could get a satisfactory job depended greatly on political counselors’ evaluation of one’s political performance. JU stopped its graduates’ job assignment in 1988 (Document 50). After that, JU students relied heavily on themselves to find a job after graduation; as such, they were less concerned about performing well on nonacademic courses to impress their counselors, as that no longer influenced their job attainment (Zhang et al. 2014). Some JU students even started their own businesses and made money while still being university students (Document 25). In response, the SAO enlarged its function in other student affairs, such as scholarship awarding, financial subsidy application for students from underprivileged social group, student services, and career planning guidance (Document 50), thus further depoliticizing its functions. Marketization had loosened the state’s ideological grasp on students, as political performance might not be seen as essential to students’ future career (Mok 2000), thus further changing the function of the student guidance department. The loosening of political control over JU encouraged the promotion of university autonomy, in terms of university leadership, curriculum, and student publications. Regarding university leadership, in 1985, a reform initiative in Chinese higher education promised a certain degree of increased autonomy by giving university presidents final decision-making power in all nonpolitical areas (Hayhoe 1999). In terms of curriculum, although the teaching methods generally consisted of lecturing without much discussion or debate, JU provided students with critical thinking elements, diversified information, and international exposure. An alumnus now working in an academic area at Harvard University (Document 30) wrote, in her online memoire about JU, that Western philosophy lectures held by JU’s Department of Philosophy were popular among students and even influential in the city. JU also

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featured a class in Department of World Economy that used all English textbooks and was taught entirely by international teachers (Document 30); it was sponsored by a famous US foundation, and offered selected postgraduate students Americanstyle education. English language learning was also popular among students and was promoted by the university. We got to buy a pair of earphones. We could sit in a specialized classroom after lunch, the English teachers would provide us English dialogues, American country music and British classical pops for us to listen. This aimed to promote our ability in listening (Document 30).

JU students were keen on ballroom dancing, as well, and these activities were even participated by foreign students (Document 25). Liberalization of ideas occurred in numerous Chinese universities in the late 1980s, and JU was no exception (Document 30) (Zhang et al. 2014), with students getting access to and having more faith in Western political ideas that stressed the democratization of political systems and were somewhat antisocialist (Lee 1996). In that period of time, students were also given freedom in publication, as an indicator of relaxed media control on campus. Students from JU’s Faculty of Journalism published and printed the newspaper Du Jour, which, according to Document 30, published students’ articles, including chores like junior students’ criticisms of senior students’ noise at night to criticisms towards the university administration. A magazine was also published, in the 1980s, called Le vent du Jour, also very critical on university affairs; when the then JU President Prof. Tse asked the students why the magazine’s cover was black, they said that it showed the magazine was bold and special (Document 25). Tse supported students’ ideas in this magazine; it could be seen that freedom to publish was a key student focus at that time, and that the university supported students’ innovations in this area. As another alumnus described in a newspaper report, “We got support on whatever we did (Document 25).” This also echoed the first indicator of the degree of autonomy in leadership that the president could apply his/her autonomy in university affairs. However, these changes in JU autonomy led to students’ fluctuating faith in socialism, which led to JU students’ active participation in the 1989 Students’ Movement. Though the political socialization system was well established and had been adjusted to keep up with social developments, students seemed to have lost interest in political education (Dong 2005), but were attracted to Western liberalism and democratic ideas. Liberalization, according to an article published in the CPC’s People’s Daily, indicated “denying Socialism and affirming the Capitalist system” (1987). One interviewee (Alumni 01), who graduated from JU in 1987, reported, “We just did other things in political education class by ourselves, like I always wrote my chemistry experiment report. No one was really listening.” As a result, JU students took active part in the pro-democracy students’ movement, including staging a sit-in in the city’s biggest square and demanding to meet with the then Mayor (Saich 2004). After this 1986 incident, JU was criticized by the central government and MoE as being active in promoting capitalist liberalization, and some of its lectures were deemed to pollute students’ thoughts (Document 30). The independent thinking atmosphere on campus faded away for a while.

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Consequently, a belief crisis emerged in the late 1980s as JU students began to lose faith in the CPC (Dong 2005), culminating in public demonstrations in the spring of 1989. In the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, student calls for democracy and expressions of disappointment in the CPC finally ended with a military crackdown (Zhao 2001). The basic requirements of the students are implementation on democracy, freedom of media, freedom of speech, freedom of association, and rule of law; they also wanted the government to recognize the demonstration as a patriotic student movement (Wang 2015). JU students were active in the city, echoing the actions of students in Beijing, and making the political elites realize that the students had ideological differences with them (Zhao 2001). The relaxation of political education was identified by Deng Xiaoping as a major cause of these student political movements (Deng 1989a), and his conclusions led to the reinforcement of political socialization, especially for stability maintenance. The incident actually established the political bottom line in Chinese higher education: the university could have autonomy in academic areas, but the state would not tolerate any attempt to overturn the CPC’s authority. These student demonstrations were the end result of the liberalization in ideas in universities in the late 1980s, and the reconfiguration of political socialization mechanisms to emphasize marketization, rather than socialist ideologies (Lee 1996).

JU in Socialist China in Post-Deng Era (1989–2013): Orientated Towards Political Stability Maintenance After the end of the student political movements and the beginning of the post-Deng era (roughly after Deng’s 1992 Southern tour (Yan 2014)), the aftermath of Tiananmen witnessed the tightening of state political control, with CPC secretaries once again in the superior leadership position in universities (Zhao 2011). Documents were issued defining student political movements as disturbances (Deng 1989b), and making reestablishing university students’ political stability a major task for higher education (Hayhoe 1993), especially in China’s top universities, whose students were politically active. In the 1990s, when Jiang Zemin took over the CPC leadership, innovation became a key concept in steering China’s economic development (Jiang 1999), and critical thinking that stimulated innovation was (to some extent) encouraged in universities, giving universities the chance to be more open to the outside world (Pan 2009). Unlike the previous stage, in which opening up political socialization contents led to unwanted CPC influence, liberal course contents were minimized to maintain students’ political stability. After 1989, JU returned to the status quo by asserting political restriction, and JU freshmen needed to undergo a long time of military training as a special form of political education (Rosen 1993), where a group of elite university students were also punished in similar ways (Dreyer 2004). Three cohorts of freshmen, from 1990 to 1992, were sent to military forces and academies, where

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they took the political education course, Chinese Revolutionary History (Document 09). Reeducation in military academies, as an ad hoc form of political education, aimed at indoctrinating students about political orthodoxy, and also warned other universities and students of the costs of political protests against the CPC. The students in JU in the early 1990s were deeply influenced by military training that, in a way, influenced their access to critical thinking. It was reported by some alumni that the 1990 cohort did not know they would spend such a long time in military academy until they received their admission letter; what they did all day was military practice, intermixed with English and political education courses (Document 58). One interviewee who experienced this 1-year military training reported: We were actually too tired to question about the contents we should learn and even the whole issue of military training itself, while the very hard physical training, very rare food and even the very little chance to see the opposite gender had made us take full use of their leisure time just to sleep (Alumni 02).

The military training made these freshmen more obedient to authorities. Officially, Vice Premier at that time pointed to the one of JU’s classes’ political reeducation as a nationwide example of this generation of university students’ increased obedience, due to military training (Document 09). The remaining JU students in other cohorts underwent reflection meetings on the 1989 incident to ensure that they expressed their support for the CPC Central Committee’s judgment of and decisions on the incident (Document 30). Faculty, staff, and students showed good political performance to the state so as to preserve the university’s position as a top university. Restoring and maintaining political stability became a priority political task assigned by the state. JU’s university autonomy was also restrained by leadership arrangements and reinforcement of political socialization mechanisms. In terms of leadership, placing the presidential responsibility system under the leadership of university-level CPC Committees has been promoted after the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee, in late June, 1989, and enacted in 1998’s Higher Education Law (Zhao 2011; National People’s Congress 1999) to ensure CPC leadership in universities. University affairs were to be approved by the CPC Committee under this leadership framework, thus limiting university autonomy. In 1990, the State Education Committee assigned a new CPC secretary to JU and urged JU to place moral and ideological education ahead of all other work at the university (Document 08), to help maintain political stability now that the CPC was in charge of university affairs. Political education was also reaffirmed as the preferred process for inculcating Marxist-Leninist teaching into students in the 1990s, rather than the more dialoguebased teaching methods of the mid-1980s (Hayhoe 1993). The political education course system was reconstructed further to serve the needs of reform and opening up in the new century. The document, Some Opinions on Strengthening and Improving of Marxism Theory Education in Higher Education, issued in 1991, mentioned teaching-hour increments and teaching method improvements in political education courses (Duan 2004). Political education courses were reemphasized as “a basic feature of socialist universities,” the major path for ideological and political

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education, and “an important battlefield.” JU was given the task of making “socialist constructors and successors” (Dong 2005), and was the first university to introduce, in 1995, Deng’s Theory course as a formal selective (Document 04, Document 09), a textbook which was later widely used in the city, and had been edited by professors from JU’s Department of Political Science (Dong 2005). In 1998, JU adapted to the new political education system by consolidating five courses: Marxism Philosophy Theory; Marxism Political Economics; Mao’s Thoughts; Deng’s Theory; and Moral Education (Gong et al. 2003). In 2002, regarding teaching content, JU integrated Jiang Zemin’s Three Representations as political education contents, in accordance with state requirements that these contents be placed “into classrooms, into teaching materials and into university students’ heads” (Document 04). The arrangement on political education courses further developed the system of political stability maintenance by related staff. JU also modified its student affairs system to ensure the political stability of its students. Students were organized in classes as they had been in the 1950s, but with student counselors supervising their campus lives and party branches reporting their situations (Yan 2014). This way of managing students was to prevent students from taking to the streets for political protest that threatened the political stability and control of the CPC. The functions of the SAO were expanded to include students’ loan provision, students’ on-campus part-time job management, psychological counseling, and students’ career planning (Document 53), to facilitate stability by reassuring students that their future was being taken care of, so they would not be dissatisfied and take political action. These efforts helped distract students’ attention from civic participation. JU reformed student counselor recruitment in 1994, establishing a team closer to the students in age to manage and help students in the above functions. The team consisted of student counselors, rather than political guidance counselors, and addressed more nonpolitical issues as they supervised students in both direct and indirect ways (Yan 2014). They held class meetings and managed party branches to accomplish ideological and political education, but also provided students with aid on university’s financial support and psychological guidance (Document 53). In this way, the JU SAO stabilized students despite paying less attention to political demonstrations; JU’s innovations in student affairs were also a way of showing good political performance, so as to regain the trust of the central government. Aside from political stability maintenance, JU encouraged reforms in curriculum to stimulate innovation in the 1990s as a way to promote both “Red” and “Expert.” The general education system had been changed several times to meet the state’s demand for talented graduates, such as by adding courses in foreign languages and computer science (Document 04). In 2005, JU launched another round of reforms in its undergraduate education with the aim of forming graduates with humanistic caring, scientific spirit, a global outlook, and high professional quality (Document 11). Faculty members considered themselves generally free to decide the contents they taught in classes (Document 58). Traditionally, JU students have sat in courses taught by different faculties to broaden their horizons (Document 64). These could be seen as efforts by the university, faculty members, staff, and students to seek

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academic freedom and foster critical thinking, within the boundary of political stability maintenance. The theme of political socialization in this period was without a doubt political stability maintenance. The incidents at the end of previous period determined the bottom line in both political and academic issues, such that the university could have autonomy over academic issues, but the CPC would not tolerate any attempt to threaten political stability in general, or its leadership in particular. However, the definition of “attempt” could be interpreted in different ways, which left room for the CPC to tighten and loosen political control on JU at any time it wished (Pan 2009). In this sense, the autonomy granted by the state to JU was somewhat illusory.

Summary This chapter covers seven major stages of the struggle between state political restriction of JU and the university’s pursuit of autonomy with history of higher education in China as a background. The first stage is from 1903 to 1911, the Late Qing period, when JU was established as an independent institution due to the reduction of religious intervention in education in China. During the second stage (1911–1927, roughly the Beiyang Government period) JU enjoyed a high level of autonomy. The third stage (1927–1949, the Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist government period) saw JU struggling under one-party political indoctrination, and strong political control of the university. The fourth stage is the pre-Cultural Revolution period (1949–1966), a period when the state, under Mao, exercised very strong political control and granted little autonomy to the university. The fifth stage (1966–1977) was the Cultural Revolution period, a massive political movement and time of educational chaos; although the mechanisms of political socialization were interrupted, the university was filled with political movements, and academic development was strongly restricted. During the sixth stage, which started with the beginning of the post-Mao era in 1977, and continued through the Deng era of reform and opening up to the West until the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, JU experienced limited autonomy and some tolerance of liberalized ideas, which led to students’ political movements. The seventh and last stage (1989–2013, the postDeng era) saw the reinforcement of political socialization in the university and the emergence of a regulated type of autonomy.

References Deng, X. (1983). We are building a socialist society with both high material standard and high cultural and ethical standards. In The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx Engels Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Ed.), Selected works of Deng Xiaoping (Vol. 3, pp. 37–38). Beijing: Foreign Language Press.

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Deng, X. (1989a). Address to officers at the rank of General and above in command of the troops enforcing martial Law in Beijing. In The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx Engels Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Ed.), Selected works of Deng Xiaoping (Vol. 3, pp. 294–299). Beijing: Foreign Language Press. Deng, X. (1989b). We must adhere to socialism and prevent peaceful evolution towards capitalism. In The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx Engels Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Ed.), Selected works of Deng Xiaoping (Vol. 3, pp. 333–334). Beijing: Foreign Language Press. Dong, Y. (2005). Zhishi Xinyang Xiandaihua: Zhongguo Zhengzhi Shehuihua Zhong de Gaodeng Jiaoyu (Knowledge, belief and modernization: Higher education in China’s political socialization). Shanghai: Fudan University Press. Dreyer, J. T. (2004). China’s political system: Modernization and tradition (4th ed.). Boston: Pearson/Longman. Duan, Z. (Ed.). (2004). Jianguo Yilai Putong Gaoxiao Makesi Zhuyi Lilunke he Sixiang Pinde Kecheng Sheizhi ji Jiaoxue Neirong Lishi Yange Ziliao Huibian (Collection of document on curriculum setting and historical development of teaching contents on Marxism theory and moral education courses in higher education since 1949). Beijing: Higher Education Press. Gong, H., Zhang, J., & Zhang, Y. (Eds.). (2003). 20 Shiji de Zhongguo Gaodeng Jiaoyu—Deyu Pian (Chinese higher education in 20th century—moral education volume). Beijing: Higher Education Press. Hayhoe, R. (1987). China’s higher curricular reform in historical perspective. China Quarterly, 110, 196–230. Hayhoe, R. (1993). Political texts in Chinese universities before and after Tiananmen. Pacific Affairs, 66, 21–43. Hayhoe, R. (1999). China’s universities, 1895–1995: A century of cultural conflict. Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong. Jiang, Z. (1999). Jiaqiang Jishu Chuangxin (Enhancing technology innovation). In Editorial Committee on CPC Literature of the Central Committee (Ed.), Selected works of Jiang Zeming (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House. Jin, Y. (2000). Jindai Zhongguo Daxue Yanjiu (Study on university in modern china). Beijing: Central Party Literature Press. Law, W.-W. (2011). Citizenship and citizenship education in a global age: Politics, policies, and practices in China (Global studies in education, Vol. 2). New York: P. Lang. Lee, W. O. (1996). Moral education policy: Developments since 1978: Guest editor’s introduction. In W. O. Lee (Ed.), Chinese Education and Society (July–August 1996) (July–August 1996 ed., Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 5–12). Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, University of Hong Kong. Li, X. (2015). Geming Zaofan Niandai: Shanghai Wenge Yundong Shigao (Revolutionary rebillion age: Draft history of cultural revolution movements in Shanghai) (Vol. 1). Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Liu, B. (2008). Zhongguo Dalu Gaodeng Jiaoyu Zhi Xuexiao Lingdao Tizhi de Fazhan yu Xingsi (Reflection on system of leadership of higher education institutions in mainland China). Bulletin of National Institute of Educational Resources and Research, 39(3), 47–66. Liu, X. (2012). Lun Daxue Xuezhe de Duli Renge: Cong Ren de Duli Dao Xue de Duli (On university scholar’s personality: From man’s independence to academic independence). Hunan: Hunan Normal University. Ministry of Education of the Central Government. (1950). Guanyu Shishi Gaodeng Xuexiao Kecheng Gaige de Jueding (Decision on the Implementation of Curriculum Reform in Higher Education). In M. o. E. o. t. C. Government (Ed.). Mok, K. H. (2000). Marketizing higher education in post-Mao China. International Journal of Educational Development, 20(2), 109–126. National People’s Congress. (1999). Higher education law of the People’s Republic of China: Order No. 7 of the President of People’s Republic of China.

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Pan, S.-Y. (2003). How higher educational institutions cope with social changes: The case of Tsinghua University, China. Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong. Pan, S.-Y. (2009). University autonomy, the state, and social change in China. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Qizhi Xianming de Fandui Zichan Jieji Ziyouhua (Opposing to capitalist liberalization with clear determination). (1987). People’s Daily, p. 1. Ren, H. (2003). Zai Lun Danghua Jiaoyu: Da Fan Yunlong Xiansheng (On partification education again: To answer Mr Fan Yunlong). In D. Yang (Ed.), Daxue Jingshen (The spirit of university) (pp. 96–99). Shanghai: Wenhui Press. Rosen, S. (1993). The effect of Post-4 June re-education campaigns on Chinese students. China Quarterly, 134, 310–334. Saich, T. (2004). Governance and politics of China (2nd ed.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Sang, B. (2010). Guomindang Zai Daxue Xiaoyuan de Paixi Zhengdou (Nationalist Party’s Factionners in universities). Shixue Yuekan (Journal of History Science), (12), 57–71. Song, Q. (2003). Jindai Zhongguo Sili Daxue Yanjiu (Study on private universities in modern China). Tianjin: Tianjin People's Press. Wang, R. (2007). Bainianlai Zhongguo Xiandai Gaodeng Jiaoyu: Guojia Xueshu Shichang zhi Sanjiao Yanbian (Chinese modern higher education in a hundred years: The triangular coordination among state, academic and market). Taipei: National Chengchi University (Centre for China Studies). Wang, H. (2015). Duan Ershi Shiji (Short 20th century). Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Wu, B., & Morgan, W. J. (2016). Introduction: Chinese higher education reform and social justice. In B. Wu & W. J. Morgan (Eds.), Chinese higher education reform and social justice (pp. 1–13). New York: Routledge. Xun, Y. (2004). Cong Chuantong Dao Xiandai: Jindai Zhongguo de Gaodeng Jiaoyu (From tradition to modern: Chinese higher education in modern times). Gansu Ethnic Publishing House. Yan, X. (2014). Engineering stability: Authoritarian political control over university students in post-Deng China. China Quarterly, 218, 493–513. Yeh, W.-H. (2000). The alienated academy: Culture and politics in Republican China, 1919–1937 (Vol. 148). Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center. Yeh, W.-H. (2012). Minguo Shiqi Daxue Xiaoyuan Wenhua (1919–1937) (The alienated academy: Culture and politics in Republican China, 1919–1937). Beijing: China Renmin University Press. Yu, L. (Ed.). (1994). Zhongguo Gaodeng Jiaoyu Shi (History of Chinese higher education) (Vol. II). Shanghai: East China Normal University Press. Zhang, J. (2011). Guomin Zhengfu Daxue Xunyu (1927–1949) (Moral teaching in colleges of national government 1927–1949). Beijing: Guangming Daily Newspaper Publishing House. Zhang, A., Yang, Z., & Ren, J. (Eds.). (2014). 1980 Women Zheyijie (1980 our cohort). Beijing: Tuanjie Press. Zhao, D. (2001). Guojia Sheuhui Yu Bajiu Beijing Xueyun (The state, the society and 1989 Beijing students’ movement). Hong Kong: Chinese University Press. Zhao, Y. (2011). Jianchi he Wanshan Putong Dangwei Lingdaoxia de Xiaozhang Fuzezhi (Upholding and improving structure of president responsibility system under leadership of committee of CPC). Qiu Shi, (3), 51–52. Zheng, D. (Ed.). (1994). Zhongguo Gaodeng Jiaoyu Shi (History of Chinese higher education) (Vol. I). Shanghai: East China Normal University Press.

Chapter 4

Different Players’ Deduction on Political Task

As a state-supervised university, JU undoubtedly had to fulfill both the political and academic tasks required by the state. The party state had expectations on JU’s political performance and academic development. The expectation of making future socialist conformists and constructors was passed on to university level while within the university, faculty members, administrators, and students would have their own interpretation on the political task and their deduction on what should be done to fulfill their task. From 2013, the atmosphere of the tension actually changed a bit, with a possible introduction on a new term of Xi era (which would be discussed in Chap. 7). With Xi Jinping taking over the CPC leadership, the social and political control was tightened in Chinese higher education, reemphasizing the importance of political ideology as the core task for the CPC (2013). In a speech delivered to students of Peking University in 2014, Xi (2014) established the core political task for young university students as holding tightly to socialist values. The then Minister of Education Yuan Guiren also emphasized the importance of ideological and political education in universities, and the need to stick to socialist and Marxism values (Xinhua Net 2015). During a 2012–2016 special inspection tour of Jour University by the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the CPC, the first problem pointed out was that JU’s staff’s and students’ ideological and political thoughts should be enhanced and bound more tightly to the CPC (Document 94). JU’s strategies for dealing with these state demands will be the focus in the following chapters.

State’s Consistent Expectation on Red as Premise of Expert Red and Expert, the 1950s’ slogan on university students’ education goals, has continuously identified the state’s expectations of Chinese universities, even to this day. Thus not surprisingly, when JU celebrated its centennial it received a letter © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Du, Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8300-1_4

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of congratulation from the then CPC Central Committee General Secretary Hu Jintao, which read, in part, I hope JU using Deng Xiaoping’s Theories and Important Thoughts of Three Representations, to implement Scientific Outlook on Development, making effort in strategy of developing the country through science and technologies and talents making, carrying forward the fine traditions, keeping on innovation, trying your best to make Jour University as a worldclass, socialist, comprehensive university (Document 55).

There were two layers of meaning worth noticing in Hu’s letter that revealed CPC’s expectation on JU with dual tasks on both politics and academics. As shown in Hu’s remarks, Deng Xiaoping’s Theories, the Three Representations, and Scientific Outlook on Development are three CPC leaders’ political thoughts (Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, respectively) and represent the CPC’s ideological orthodoxy. These political ideologies, according to Hu, should be prioritized as important elements in JU’s development, as JU’s defining feature is that it is a socialist university, and its students are expected to be socialized politically into “high quality talents who serve the socialist construction” (Document 55). At the same time, Hu Jintao also wished JU to become a world-class university with the ability to innovate. These two requirements were the tasks assigned to JU by the party-state for being politically reliable, loyal to the CPC, and academically outstanding. Sticking to the political principle set up by the CPC is put on top of the list, while all innovation and academic development should be conducted within the framework of a socialist university. When baton changed into JU’s hand, the system to ensure the implementation became important. This expectation of putting Red as the premise of Expert had been continued after Xi took over the position as General Secretary of the CPC in 2013. Xi made a speech mentioning universities of JU’s kind in 2014 when he talked to students in Peking University, urging youngsters to contribute to the socialist construction in new times. He also gave out his own definition on world-class universities, as they should be socialist universities with Chinese characteristics. In this world there is only one Harvard University, University of Oxford, Stanford University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and University of Cambridge; likewise, there is only one Peking University, Tsinghua University, Zhejiang University, Fudan University and Nanjing University in China. We should draw on the world’s best experience in running institutions of higher learning, follow the rules of education, and establish more excellent colleges and universities on Chinese soil (Xi 2014).

In the very same speech, Xi said that it is important to give guidance to students as they need to establish their values as they are the future of the society. He made a metaphor as buttoning up coat, “we may inadvertently put the first button in the wrong button hole, and that will result in all the other buttons being put in the wrong holes” (Xi 2014). Xi’s emphasis on ideological and political education of university students was then clear, and reaffirmed in other occasions like the ideological and political conference in 2016, and political education teacher congress in 2019. According to Xi, universities must be transformed into “strongholds that adhere to party leadership” (Phillips 2016). As JU fell in the same type of university as PKU

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and one of JU’s political education teachers were invited to the 2019 congress, Xi’s expectations on Chinese higher education would also provide explanation on his expectation on JU. Though “being Red” is the foremost requirement from the state to the university, it is also important for “being Expert.” To realize “being Expert,” the state issued a number of policy documents to stimulate scientific research while providing windows for the universities to promote university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking. Regarding university autonomy, the state has been promoting an acclaimed decentralization since mid-1990s; especially in 2014, a document named Opinions on Further Implementing and Enlarging Autonomy of Universities and Improving Universities’ Internal Governance Structure was issued, emphasizing that more autonomy should be given to universities in areas including enrolling students, adjusting disciplines, teaching, recruiting faculty members, researching, fund using, and promoting international collaboration (Xun and Liu 2018). This signals on further power delegation for universities in certain areas which has been a dynamic process since 1995, with the detail of autonomy being gradually clarified during the process. The use of policy as an instrument showed the transforming from an interventionist to evaluative governance with more employment of indirect instruments (Han and Ye 2017). Scholars argued that other than ideological and political imprints in university curriculum and culture, and the appointment of presidents and party secretaries, the universities in China do enjoy a certain degree of autonomy as though guidelines on categorization of subjects, disciplines, and academic degrees remained in hands of the MoE and the Academic Degree Committee of the State Council, the determination of teaching contents and procedures is actually in hands of universities and individual faculty members (Han and Xu 2019). This gives the universities and their faculty members space in practicing a regulated autonomy. Academic freedom is not a closed deal either. Hu Jintao once mentioned in a talk to students and teachers in Peking University that academic freedom should be respected and tolerated environment should be built to encourage the making of world-class research achievements (Xinhua Net 2008). According to Xi, to make Chinese higher education great, it is important to balance academic freedom and academic regulation; by regulation, he does not mean academic ethics, but the regulation for setting up the political bottom line and sticking to it. He thought that the university should maintain the atmosphere to research on the new and the unknown, should encourage academic debate and innovation, and should seek after truth (National Center for Education Development Research 2017; Xi 2014). With these comments, universities had his words in justifying some of the practices they apply in reality in a negotiable context in order to resist political influence and seek for academic freedom. Critical thinking could find its source of legitimacy in policy documents and political leaders’ public speeches as well. Innovation had been a topic that has been encouraged ever since Jiang’s administration till now (Jiang 1999). The Xi JinpingLi Keqiang administration also emphasized a lot on innovation, as Xi even had a

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published brochure discussing about scientific innovation (People’s Daily 2016). Xi expressed in different occasions that higher education represented a country’s development level and potential (National Center for Education Development Research 2017). As innovation has a tight relation with critical thinking, since only skepticism on the old could lead to creation of the new (Fairbrother 2003), the encouragement on critical thinking could be done in the name of the encouragement of innovation. With these umbrella policies, the detailed conducts of universities could vary, thus leaving them a status of regulated autonomy to grow space for academic freedom and critical thinking.

The University’s Response on Political Requirements from the State JU responded to the state-mandated political task, by emphasizing the role faculty members take, urging them to be gatekeepers on political issues. Firstly, JU counted on its faculty members to implement political socialization projects and deliver the party-state’s message to the students; related state policies and regulations set the tune for JU staff on political issues. In recent years, the CPC Central Committee has introduced new rules and guidelines for universities to follow regarding political education. In 2013, CPC Secretary General Xi Jinping, in a speech to the National Conference on Propaganda Work, reaffirmed Marxist ideology’s important position in universities (Xi 2013), and the Vice Director of the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC confirmed faculty members’ role in doing ideological and political education to make qualified constructors and reliable successors for socialism (Document 49). In January, 2015, the then Education Minster Yuan Guiren, in a meeting with a group of university administrators, implied that the CPC would by no means allow into university classrooms material propagating Western values or defaming the CPC (Xinhua Net 2015). According to Xi in his speech on 2016 ideological and political education conference, university teachers needed to be both “disseminators of advanced ideology and “staunch supporters of [party] governance” and they have the responsibility to make political education “more appealing” (Phillips 2016). For the CPC, university faculty members are important figures in political socialization. In response to Xi’s speech, the top universities in China stated, in 2014, that they had their own ways of improving their ideological work (Cai 2014). JU responded to the state’s concerns about political socialization by focusing on teacher training, especially for those faculty members under 45, to prevent the use of possible politically incorrect contents in classes. It promised to “strengthen training for the teachers and that the evaluation system for them would be reformed” (Document 29) to improve their political standing, in case the staff had an “incorrect understanding” regarding the state and the CPC. An outstanding example of political education

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teacher from JU, Dr. Katy was invited to the 2019 congress Xi Jinping held intending to have a talk with political education teachers in Beijing. On the congress he said that the key to strengthening ideological and political education was teachers, and that they should shoulder responsibility in spreading party-approved ideology (Wong 2019). The recognition from Xi indicated JU’s strategy on setting example for teachers who got the CPC central’s notice. The faculty members thus shoulder the responsibility of fulfilling the political assigned to JU through academic mechanisms. Secondly, JU’s preliminary requirement for administrative staff, especially student affairs officers like student counselors and CYL cadres who faced students directly, is that they must be politically reliable, with a “firm belief in Marxism” (Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China 2006; Communist Party of China Central Committee and State Council 2004). JU made policy documents, in accordance with CPC Central Committee and MoE strictures, focusing on enhancing the political quality of student counselors, and made being a CPC member a criterion in student counselor and CYL cadre selection (Document 37). Both would also have to undergo political training before and during their service in JU, to ensure that they knew the CPC’s most current political information and received political instructions from JU’s CPC Committee (SAS 03). SAS 01 said in an interview, I spent 2 weeks (before starting to work as a student counselor) on training provided by SAO on what political messages should be delivered to the students and how to deal with urgent issues happened to students and so forth. (SAS 01)

Political loyalty to the CPC and an ability to implement political correctness according to CPC standards were thus deemed important in administrative staff recruiting. That is to say, SAO and CYL helped JU to fulfill the political task via organizational mechanisms and oversee students in their extracurricular campus life.

Faculty Members’ Understanding on Political Bottom Line Faulty members in JU have developed a system to avoid the violation of political bottom line as a way to fulfill the political task assigned by the state and passed on by the university. The idea of political bottom line is actually related to all topics with the “attempt to undermine its [CPC’s] leadership or to drive the country in the direction of Western-style democratic system” (Heilmann 2018). The primary component of the political bottom line is recognition of the CPC’s leadership in China; no matter what topic faculty members are discussing in their classes, the legitimacy of the CPC generally cannot be challenged. Teacher 08, a PEC teacher, said that contents cannot contradict the CPC’s Four Cardinal Principles (upholding the socialist path, people’s democratic dictatorship, leadership of CPC, and Mao’s Thoughts and Marxism-Leninism) for instructing all Chinese people. The most important of these principles is the recognition of the CPC’s leadership in China. Faculty members must pay attention to this bottom line in their teaching, and are

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reminded of this on becoming a faculty member in JU. Teacher 03 earned his PhD in the United States and learned of the restrictions on teaching materials in Chinese universities only later; he commented, When I first came to JU to teach in a social science department, I asked the senior professor timidly about whether there were things that I could not talk in class here in mainland China, the professor told me: “As long as you do not say ‘Bring down CPC’, you would be perfectly fine.” (Teacher 03)

The second area of political bottom line concerns specific historical events and incidents that might challenge the CPC’s leadership. These topics are politically sensitive in the Chinese context which are actually domestic security crises with nationwide impact, for example, urban protest movement of 1989, Falun Gong1 movement in 1999, protests in Tibet in 2008, Xinjiang unrest in 2009, and terrorist attacks in Beijing and Kunming in 2013–2014 (Heilmann 2018). Thus, the state would not like students to know anything more about them than has been reported in the mainstream media. Some interviewees (Teacher 01, Teacher 03, Teacher 07) mentioned topics they felt they would have concerns when talking about them in class, such as the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 and the Falun Gong. If they do have to mention these sensitive issues, they have to have arguments that aligned with the CPC’s official conclusion on related incidents and historical events. These events or topics are controversial and regarded by the CPC as challenging the legitimacy of its rule. What the faculty members have to do to help fulfill the political task is to avoid violating these rules mentioned above. Their roles to deliver political messages to students would be introduced in the next section as university’s detailed practice.

Students’ Inertia on the Political Task Assigned JU students generally follow the mandatory routine of political requirements: they attend the PECs to meet graduation requirements and participate in class meetings organized by student counselors, and many sign up for patriotic education activities held by the CYL. Students would connect their personal development to the state’s modernization. They participate actively in social serving, by taking up positions in all types of organizations, including political ones. The students’ endorsement on the CPC’s view on stability as the most important condition for the country’s growth while upholding CPC’s leadership would be the key to maintain stability (Li and Lowe 2016). Most of them generally behave obediently, as if they were future socialist constructors. They are used to this system of ideological and political education as this system accompanied them ever since they entered the school system.

1

A religious organization banned by the government as an anti-CPC political movement.

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JU students regard political socialization as a part of their university education, since they have to complete credits in PEC and are organized in home classes. Some students even think that political education is necessary for university education and actively participate in patriotic activities. Firstly, some JU students think that political education is important to university students, as it establishes students’ values about life and the world. They accept the existence of political socialization because they have received political education about CPC ideas since elementary school. In the interviews, some students identified PECs as essential to their university study; Student 09 reported, “I think PECs are necessary for university students, though I had little interest in them.” Student 04 thought that PECs established students’ basic values, and that “they are important for university students, they serve to set up students’ world outlook, views on life and values.” Though they have reservations about the quality of political education, they see the necessity of including PECs in the curriculum, and accept PECs as a component of their education. As Students 01 reported, PECs have been a constant and influential part of students’ journey to higher education; “I think political education from elementary school to high school had great influence on me.” Students actually know how to behave as appear to be recognizing the party orthodox. Teacher 05 defined this type of behaviors as “acting”: In recent years, more and more people from the government organs would appear in universities to sit in classroom and investigate on political education courses. If I got notice ahead of the class, I would arrive earlier in the classroom than usual and tell the students that there would be people from outside of the campus to listen to my class today. Students would know exactly what to do. They would give answers in class that sound supportive to the CPC, unlike in usual classes, some of the students would have some comments across the line. I could tell the difference (Teacher 05).

Despite a willingness to cooperate in classroom, students also voluntarily participated in the National Flag Raising Ceremony every year on University Foundation Day to experience the “solemnity and dignity (of the national symbol)” (from students’ online blog). Some JU students actively participated in extracurricular political activities though they not aiming purposely to fulfill the political task of being socialized politically, in accordance with CPC instructions. At least in public, the majority of students showed the willingness to comply and adopt a position of political apathy and conformity (Li and Lowe 2016), which could result from the state entitled the political indoctrination tightly with students’ sense of social responsibility. JU students see themselves as having responsibility for the development of society and the country, according to the survey data and interviews. Since the Chinese ideas of legal, civil, and political citizenship have historically been much more strongly focused on one’s responsibility to remain loyal and obedient to the Chinese state, than on the legal, civil, and political rights of the individual (Yu 2002), as no exception, JU students’ sense of citizenship is associated with a sense of social responsibility. For them it is an ambiguous mixture of the understanding of social responsibilities that integrate concepts on behavioral citizen. In an observed party branch meeting (M08), students were discussing how they planned to become

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Students’ Percepon on Social Responsibility 4

3

2

1 University students should have sense of social responsibility. N=697 SD=0.57

JU teaches students to have sense of social responsibility.

N=691 SD=0.64

1=Strongly Agree; 4=Strongly Disagree Fig. 4.1 Students’ perception on social responsibility. 1 ¼ strongly agree; 4 ¼ strongly disagree

qualified CPC members when they graduated, and framed the word “citizen” as meaning someone with a strong connection with the state and community, and linked their personal development closely to the prosperity of the country. Student 01 reported, “I know I should be a good citizen and serve the country and the society.” In the survey (Fig. 4.1), students generally agreed that students should have a sense of responsibility (mean ¼ 1.34), with 1 ¼ strongly agree and 4 ¼ strongly disagree. JU students have a sense of serving society, and regard JU as a place for enhancing this sense, with mean at 1.67 on related question. In an observed commencement ceremony in 2014 (M10), JU students expressed their sense of responsibility in their speeches and in videos, a concept that has been a theme in commencement ceremonies every year. As one student said in the 2013 commencement video: JU students should not only see our city as the only venue for personal development, but to see the whole China. So I choose to go to work in village in Gansu Province. I believe the country would benefit the ones who choose to serve the country (Document 14).

Students who choose to serve in rural areas and to teach in underdeveloped villages are held up as role models at commencement, and are proud to announce their society-serving heart in public. These JU students have a sense of social responsibility, and see the construction and betterment of the state as university students’ tasks. These could help the university to fulfill the political task as these

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actions are also serving the political requirements from the state that aligned with the CPC and its leaders’ expectations on university students. Through the deduction on the political task, different players are clear about what can be tolerated within the from framework: those that were not expressed clearly in the policy documents (e.g., seeking for the truth), those concepts the state presented in the policy document without a clear definition that left space for interpretation (e.g., the idea of innovation, more autonomy delegated to the universities), and those ideas that the state may not prefer but did not indicate in detail that what cannot be done (e.g., academic freedom) which left players in the university with spaces to differentiate practices in reality.

Summary This chapter illustrated different players’ deduction on the political task assigned from the state. It first explained the state consistent expectation on the political task as a premise of the academic task with a revision on related state policies and political leaders’ speeches, finding the spaces left for universities to implement their understanding as a response. It then presented the university’s response to the state’s requirements before it went on to illustrate the faculty members’ and students’ understanding on what they have to obey and especially on what they could not do and say. This chapter provided background information for the readers to better understand Chaps. 5–7.

References Cai, C. (Ed.). (2014). Xinde Lishi Tiaojian Xia Ruhe Zuohao Gaoxiao Yishi Xingtai Gongzuo. (How to do better the ideological work in universities with new historical condition) (Vol. 17). Qiushi. Communist Party of China Central Committee, & State Council (2004). Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang He Gaijin Daxuesheng Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu de Yijian (The opinions on further strengthening and improving the ideological and political education for undergraduates). In S. C. Communist Party of China Central Committee (Ed.). Fairbrother, G. P. (2003). Toward critical patriotism: Student resistance to political education in Hong Kong and China. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Han, S., & Xu, X. (2019). How far has the state ‘stepped back’: An exploratory study of the changing governance of higher education in China (1978–2018). Higher Education, 78, 931. Han, S., & Ye, F. (2017). China’s education policy-making: A policy network perspective. Journal of Education Policy, 32(4), 389–413. Heilmann, S. (2018). Red Swan: How unorthodox policy making facilitated China’s rise. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Jiang, Z. (1999). Jiaqiang Jishu Chuangxin (Enhancing technology innovation). In Editorial Committee on CPC Literature of the Central Committee (Ed.), Selected works of Jiang Zeming (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House.

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Li, Z., & Lowe, J. (2016). Chinese higher education and social justice: What can the capabilities approach offer? In B. Wu & W. J. Mogan (Eds.), Chinese higher education reform and social justice (pp. 14–32). New York: Routledge. Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China (2006). Putong Gaodeng Xuexiao Fudaoyuan Duiwu Jianshe Guiding (Regulations on team building of students’ counselors in regular institutions of higher education). In M. o. Education (Ed.). National Center for Education Development Research (2017). Jiaoyu Fazhan Zhongxin Dangzhibu Kaizhan Dangke Xuexi (Party Branch Education for National Center for Education Development Research). Retrieved from http://www.ncedr.edu.cn/djgz/201801/t20180109_29739. html2019. People’s Daily (2016). Xi Jinping Guanyu Keji Chuangxin Lunshu Zhaibian (Edited work on Xi Jinping’s discussion about scientific innovation). Retrieved from http://theory.people.com.cn/ GB/68294/402884/index.html2019. Phillips, T. (2016). China universities must become communist party ‘strongholds’, says Xi Jinping. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/09/china-universi ties-must-become-communist-party-strongholds-says-xi-jinping Wong, C. (2019). Xi Jinping tells Chinese teachers to help ‘nurture support’ for communist party rule. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/ article/3002243/xi-jinping-tells-chinese-teachers-help-nurture-support-communist Xi, J. (2013). Yishi Xingtai Gongzuo Shi Dangde Yixiang Jiduan Zhongyao Gongzuo (Ideological work is an extremely important work for the CPC). Beijing: Xinhua Net. Xi, J. (2014). The governance of China. Beijing: Foreign Language Press. Xinhua Net. (2008). Hu Jintao Zai Beijing Daxue Shisheng Daibiao Zuotanhui Shang de Jianghua (Hu Jintao’ speech at conference with teachers and students of Peking University). Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2008-05/04/content_960544.htm2019. Xinhua Net. (2015). Yuan Guiren: Gaoxiao Jiaoshi Bixu Shouhao Zhengzhi Falv Daode Santiao Dixian (Yuan Guiren: University teachers should upholding three bottome lines on politics, laws and morality). Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2015-01/29/c_1114183715. htm. Xun, Y., & Liu, X. (2018). Cong Gaodu Jizhong Dao Fangguan Jiehe: Gaodeng Jiaoyu Biange Zhilu (From highly centralization to a combination of power delegation and tightened oversight) (China’s path to education modernization). Shanghai: East China Normal University Press. Yu, X. (2002). Citizenship, ideology and the PRC constitution. In M. Goldman & E. J. Perry (Eds.), Changing meanings of citizenship in modern China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Chapter 5

The University’s Practices to Ensure the Complement of Political Task

As different levels of players would have different deduction on the political task assigned by the state, JU’s detailed practice to ensure the complement of political task is through its administrative and leadership structure, with the assistance from the academic mechanisms, organizational mechanisms, and extracurricular activity mechanisms to implement political education, ensure political reinforcement, and facilitate political control.

The University’s Administrative Mechanism to Ensure Political Leadership To assist the implementation of both tasks, a dual-leadership structure has been developed in JU with party’s leadership on both political and academic affairs, like most of the other universities in China, though called a structure of president’s leadership under the CPC supervision (Document 12). JU’s university charter, made in 2014, clarifies the dual-leadership system and its political and administrative roles, as shown in Fig. 5.1. On the right side is the president’s scale of leadership, while on the left is that of the secretary of JU’s CPC Committee. Generally, the president took the responsibility in administration for issues related to academic and university development, and the CPC secretary for political issues. However, the CPC Committee has branches in all JU departments and faculties to ensure CPC supervision at all levels and in all kinds of organizations at JU. According to JU’s charter, the CPC Committee is the leadership core, and is responsible for the overall leadership of the university, while the president, who is also a member in the CPC Committee, is accountable to the Committee (Document 15). One function of the Committee is to discuss and decide important items concerning teaching, research, and administration, including staff appointments and dismissals. The president has the © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Du, Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8300-1_5

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Fig. 5.1 JU’s dual-leadership structure (source: translated from Charter of Jour University (Document 15))

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responsibility and power to draft and implement plans for important issues, but not the power to decide them, which makes the CPC Committee the most important decision-making organ in JU. In December 2019, however, it was revealed that the 2014 version of Jour University Charter has removed the wording of institutional autonomy, academic freedom, and freedom of thought, and strengthened the wording of party control, leaving the situation unpredictable since then. The appointment of president and party secretary is in the hands of the MoE. In 2016, JU had a new party secretary appointed who got most working experiences in government organs at the municipal level, unlike the previous two secretaries who spent most of their career in higher education systems (Document 98). Another top university of China in the same city was also appointed a secretary from the civil servant system, showing a reemphasis on political issues in university in recent years.

The University’s Academic Mechanisms to Implement Political Education In the post-Deng era, JU generally formed its own political education mechanisms to provide students with political learning experiences and orient their attitude to align with socialist values and CPC ideologies. In recent years, its target for political socialization was revised and redefined through policy documents and official media; currently, the aim of JU’s political socialization is to make constructors and successors for socialism with Chinese characteristics (Xinhua Net 2014). JU has tried to realize this goal by employing specific mechanisms on campus to implement state requirements regarding students’ practical conduct, including compulsory political education courses, supervising of non-PEC courses’ political correctness, and influence on faculty members’ self-censorship.

Providing Mandatory Political Education Courses JU’s first mechanism for conducting political education is the provision of its compulsory political education course (PEC). Since political and social awareness could be the last thing the party-state wants, the compulsory PEC helped to tightly regulate any politicization through education (Li and Lowe 2016). JU set up its own department for teaching PECs, in accordance with state policies and requirements, and made political education a mandatory curriculum subject for all Chinese students. To ensure proper provision of PECs, JU’s PEC implementation is under the supervision of two state government departments—the CPC Publicity Department and the MoE. JU is obliged to implement documents issued by these departments in

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2005, specifying that PECs should be “instructing students to stick firm on their belief in Marxism [and] their faith in socialism, increasing their confidence in reform and opening-up and modernization, and also their trust of the Party and the government” (Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee and Ministry of Education of the Central Government 2005), which serves the aims of PECs in higher education. In order to make sure that PECs follow the political orthodoxy, teaching methods and contents were designed according to central government policy documents. JU implemented the policy of the Three Intos (“San Jin”—into textbooks, into classrooms, and into students’ heads) to show its determination in delivering PECs (Document 83). JU adjusted its PEC structure according to the Opinions on Further Strengthening and Improving Ideological and Political Education Courses in Universities, in 2005, by introducing four new courses: Basic Theories of Marxism (hereafter the Marxism class); Mao’s Thoughts, Deng’s Theory, and the Three Representations (later as Mao’s Thoughts and Theories on a System of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, hereafter the Socialism class); Outline of Chinese Modern and Contemporary History (hereafter the History class); and Moral Education and Basic Knowledge of Laws (hereafter the ME class) (Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee and Ministry of Education of the Central Government 2005). The CPC Committee in JU strongly supported the reinforcement of PECs; the then party secretary, Prof. Piggott (Document 82), and the head of the College of Marxism, Prof. Kao (Document 81), reassured a Marxism research conference (held at JU in 2012) of the importance of PECs, stating that they should provide students with perspectives from which to observe the world and Chinese society. JU started to provide students with selective PEC related to Xi’s political thoughts in 2017 (Document 97). Recently, Prof. Kao (2015) reemphasized that PECs should help university students grow confidence in socialism with Chinese characteristics, so as to make them qualified constructors and reliable successors. The first measure for ensuring the provision on PECs was building the team for teaching PECs. With accordance to state policy, JU set up a specialized team of politically qualified staff to teach PECs; the team was overseen by the Department of Social Science (different from the Department of Sociology), since it has been upgraded and renamed the College of Marxism in 2014, to raise its status and improve PEC teaching (Document 06, Document 80). The College of Marxism has its unique position in the university. It is under the leadership of the CPC Committee and operates under the instruction of the Office of Academic Affairs. It is responsible for all PEC teaching on campus, including at both the undergraduate and postgraduate levels, and for conducting Marxism theory research. Reforming the former department as a college shows how seriously JU takes PEC teaching, and affords it greater status and resources. With dual-task implementation system, the PEC teaching team was built by strictly selecting teachers with both good academic qualifications and political reliability (Document 22). According to interviewees (Teacher 05, SAS 08), all faculty members in the College of Marxism possess a PhD degree, and some have overseas educational background. Every PEC teacher must be a CPC member

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(Teacher 05), and must, theoretically, uphold the political positions and policies of the CPC (Document 79), to ensure that the CPC’s political orthodoxy is delivered to students. As one interviewee noted, “PEC is an important battlefield of ideologies (Teacher 08).” The second measure JU took was to consolidate the formal undergraduate curriculum structure—including the university’s credit system (since 2001), assessments, and GPA calculations—to ensure that all students completed their PEC. This is the same for most Chinese universities; PECs are compulsory for all Mainland Chinese students attending JU (Document 88) (Duan 2004). A certain proportion of the credits students need for graduation is tied to PECs. Since 2002, of the 150 credits required for graduation from JU, a minimum amount of credits must be earned in PECs (Document 04); in 2014, the amount was 14 credits, including 12 from the 4 required courses (Marxism class, Socialism class, History class, and ME class) and 2 from any of 10 PEC selectives in the course calendar. According to interviewed faculty members (Teacher 05), students must not only take PEC classes, but also complete the teacher-defined class assessments to earn credits and grades. The assessment results are calculated into students’ GPA, just as in other courses; as such, completing the PECs influences students’ graduation. PECs ensure students’ spending a certain amount of time on political learning, with a focus on CPC orthodoxy. The specialized team for and systematic implementation of PECs show that JU has followed state policy regarding this indoctrination mechanism.

Supervising Political Sensitivity in Non-PEC Courses As JU is an open campus, theoretically anyone may attend its classroom lectures; as such, external agencies, including China’s National Security Department and local police cultural protection units (wenbao fenju), make random checks of classroom teaching content and receive reports from on-campus informers (SAS 05), while such internal agencies as JU’s Security Department maintain contact with faculty CPC cadres to ensure that faculty members’ conduct does not cross the political bottom line, especially in PECs and social science courses. Externally, the National Security Department and its related local organs oversee teaching contents through participatory or indirect in-class observation; when problems occur, they either refer the matter to the JU Security Department or other relevant university department (SAS 05), or direct the faculty CPC secretary to talk with the people involved. In an interview, SAS 05 reported that informers on campus report faculty members’ in-class words to security departments if they go too far in criticizing the government. More interviewees confirmed that they could feel the existence of these student informers and they believed that the member of this group is growing (Teacher 05, Teacher 06). When a teacher is reported on an issue, he/she might be “invited for coffee” by the security department, a euphemism for an

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informal interrogation and lecture to reinforce what cannot be said in class (Teacher 07); however, faculty members are rarely dismissed or given serious penalties (SAS 05), at least in current stage. Once external agents learn of politically incorrect teaching practices, they come to the university, make sure that the faculty members involved realize their misconduct, and make them promise never to do it again (Alumni 03, Teacher 07). For example, Teacher 07 recounted his experience regarding his teaching contents on the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. He talked about the event in class and uploaded some related video clips to his file transfer protocol (FTP) site for students to download. However, JU’s on-campus local area network (LAN) is monitored by the National Security Department; officers went to Teacher 07’s department head, who ordered him to remove the clips from the site and to write a report confessing that his actions were inappropriate. JU helps the National Security Department implement their supervision of all faculty members. Internally, faculty members are under the supervision of university departments, as well. JU departments facilitate the censorship of teaching and other academic activities, so as to prevent faculty members from overreaching and being investigated by external agencies. For example, academic lecture topics are censored, even at the faculty level. Teacher 03 implied that all international scholars are expected to “report their topics to the university [based on] a regulation issued by the MoE,” while Chinese teachers’ topics are examined by the university and the relevant faculty. The Department of Publicity at JU is also involved in the censorship of faculty members’ classes (SAS 05), with special attention to social science faculties and their comments in the mass media (Teacher 11), as the latter could “influence JU’s reputation and image.” In recent follow-up interviews, academic faculty members reported that new systems had been applied on campus to supervise teaching contents in classrooms, including microphone and monitoring camera installed that could not be turned off (Teacher 12). These two means of supervision facilitate political censorship in JU classrooms; in response, faculty members have developed their own strategies to deal with the situation, as will be illustrated in the following section.

Influencing upon Faculty Members’ Self-Censorship The mechanism of internal and external investigation made faculty members aware of the consequences they might have if they cross the bottom line or linger around it. As Xi spoke in the 2016 ideological and political education conference, “all academic problems could be researched on, but there should be rules to its application and to its use in classrooms” (National Center for Education Development Research 2017). In this way, he urged teachers to “guide the students to be confident about socialism with Chinese characteristics” and “to take the initiative to instil patriotism in the nation’s youth and reject ‘wrong ideas and ideology’” (Wong 2019). These “wrong ideas” are ideas that were below the bottom line. JU’s faculty members are expected to follow the established political bottom line with

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supervision from both external and internal department and through self-restraint. Political control mandates the use of censorship to ensure that classes and academic activities are politically correct—i.e., do not challenge CPC authority as presented previously. Academic staff have developed their own self-censorship strategies in response to this control. The JU academic staff have developed self-censorship strategies based on their experiences, taking responsibility for checking their own teaching contents by filtering some contents, particularly those that are politically sensitive, to avoid causing (or experiencing) trouble. At the same time, however, faculty members used those strategies to maintain some degree of academic freedom. The first self-censorship strategy involves the plentiful use of metaphors in class to avoid sensitive words, especially those that criticize the CPC or the government. In an observed political science class (C06), when the teacher mentioned nation-state building and democracy, he gave an example “a minority in a country would like to be independent . . .” and drew a map on the blackboard; the map made it clear to students that he was talking about the Uygur ethnic group in China’s Xinjiang province, but the teacher spoke as if he were commenting on Ukraine, since Xinjiang issues are politically sensitive in Mainland China, due to the Uygur’s conflict with the majority Han. In the same class, he used the term “mou dang” (some party) to subtly indicate the CPC when criticizing CPC policies. Faculty members are cautious about the words they use in classes, and are reluctant to speak out publicly. Teacher 06 said, When I ‘fake’ my point of view, I give them signals on that. I meant when I was ironically echoing the mainstream political view, I would give students a facial expression as a hint to let them know I did not actually agree with the CPC in this specific issue. I also used cases from history to substitute for current situations to make an analogy, when I felt like criticizing the government and the Party. (Teacher 06)

Faculty members’ wariness about explicitly criticizing the government and party is a form of self-censorship, but one that is used so as to keep their contents within tolerances and still strive for academic freedom, as will be illustrated further later in next chapter. Faculty members’ second self-censorship strategy is to avoid talking about or commenting on Chinese politics in classes. The faculty members generally focus on academic analysis rather than positions, or filter political contents. Teacher 02, who teaches economics, reported that he only talks about academic research, and is not keen on commenting on political or social issues in class. I would talk about the Party state political system, the promotion system of CPC cadres, the internal administrative organization and structure of the government and the relationship between the Party and the government, all of which are academic research results with supports of evidences and data, instead of providing students with my own values. (Teacher 02)

The faculty members would eliminate sensitive elements about Chinese politics when they prepare their syllabi, and use their own systems to choose “politically

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correct” teaching contents; Teacher 09, as a history faculty, for example, focused mainly on European rather than Chinese issues, to be “academically safe.” Even PEC teachers would use this strategy in their classes. In PEC classes, teachers are supposed to indoctrinate students with socialist core values, which the 18th CPC National Congress, in 2013, distilled into 12 concepts: prosperity, democracy, civilization, harmony, liberty, equality, justice, rule of law, patriotism, dedication, integrity, and camaraderie (Xinhua Net 2013). However seldom would PEC teachers make it clear that these values were socialist ones, nor did they often use the words “socialist core values” in the observed PEC classes (C10, C13, C14, C15, C17, C18, C19, C20, C21). From the researcher’s observation of classes and online course videos (Document 42), most ME teachers dealt with topics related to university life, such as relationship problems and time management (see Appendix V). For example, Dr. Katy, a popular PEC teacher both on campus and in public, and a fashionable PEC teacher icon, posted one ME class video online about loneliness and another about romance that received over a million combined views. Her online videos have nothing to do with politics or socialist core values; she just shares her experiences with and understanding of very general topics and gives students positive encouragements. As commented by Teacher 07, “Dr Katy’s contents are like a bowl of chicken soup for the spirit,” suggesting that it is fine for both PEC and non-PEC faculty members not to talk about political topics at all. The third self-censorship strategy involves faculty members compromising their personal political views, mainly in their research so as not to offend the party-state and ensure that they get published. The teacher of observed class C09 said, in the class, that his research on the relationship between the CPC and the KMT1 covered only from 1927 to 1937, instead of from 1927 to 1949, since he knew that a lot of what occurred between 1937 and 1949 was “unprintable” (C09). The combined censorship from JU and the state gave faculty members a sense of what sorts of research contents would not be published. Student 01 also reported that he heard his social science faculty members talking about their research on China’s political development: They know what could not be said in the article if they want it to be published. So they write under this framework. (Student 01)

The faculty members would examine and self-censor their articles to be sure that they had not written anything politically offensive to the CPC’s leadership, especially if they sought to be published in Chinese journals. During research fund and grant application processes, book publication proposal submissions, and newspaper article writings, faculty members would receive kind reminders from reviewers, peers, and editors to be cautious on specific contents and topics in their writings and materials that could be politically sensitive (Teacher 12), and they would suggest eliminating “problematic” expressions or even changing the topic of research.

1

Chinese Nationalist Party.

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There is a difference in censorship among academic disciplines, with science and engineering faculty members experiencing less censorship of their research and teaching than humanity and social science faculty members (Teacher 10); as one teacher commented, “there is almost no restriction on what I teach and research as a science teacher” (Teacher 11). However, they too knew not to talk about topics like the 1989 Tiananmen Incident in class (Teacher 10), suggesting that the political bottom line and related censorship issues were clear to all JU faculty members. Faculty members also act as censors by screening students’ research topics. Student 01 reported that his faculty members in political science would not allow research on some topics as course assignment or as student research projects. Graduate students, especially in the social sciences, would be advised by their supervisor as to which parts of their study might be politically problematic (Alumni 03, Student 04). Faculty members act like gatekeepers in students’ academic issues; when students are out of classroom, the job on political education is handed over to student counselors.

The University’s Organizational Mechanisms to Reinforce Political Stability JU’s mechanism for conducting political socialization outside classroom involves the SAO, which is under the leadership of JU’s CPC Committee. The SAO’s team of young student counselors (Fudaoyuan) are responsible for students’ political and ideological education, maintaining stability to avoid political disturbances, and managing the university’s various CPC branches (Dangzhibu). The SAO has formed an organizational and ideological framework, including compulsory courses about China and Chinese society, to maintain its involvement in students’ daily lives and ensure that JU carries out its state-mandated political task as a form of reinforcing what students had been taught politically in classroom.

SAO System and Its Student Counselors JU followed closely the MoE’s instructions on student affairs. University SAOs, since the 1990s, have been responsible for student management and students’ political and ideological education; student counselors are supposed to be students’ mentors and friends (Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China 2006), and are selected, recruited, and trained by SAOs. JU’s SAO functions in multiple areas, and is composed of three offices: the Office of Ideological and Political Education (OIPE), the Office of General Students’ Management (OGSM), and the Office of Students’ Campus Life (OSCL). These offices supervise students’ political activities and provide or manage student

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services, including financial subsidies, scholarships, student legal services, dormitory and living space assignment, and so on (Document 38). However, in addition to their daily work (according to MoE Instruction No. 24, issued in July, 2006), student counselors’ primary work efforts should be directed at students’ moral and ideological education (Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China 2006; Yan 2014). Unlike “guidance counselors” in school systems in the Western context, who generally provide psychological, university admission, and career advices within schools, these student counselors act as a combination of class teachers, mentors, and senior peers to provide political instructions as well as to assist students in adapting university life. Student counselors work as a team to take daily care of student affairs, based on classes. In JU, student counselors are under the supervision, training, and evaluation of the SAO, which holds “weekly meetings at the university level and at the faculty level for student counselors and CPC cadres to attend to be assigned works” (SAS 05). The SAO reported on JU’s student affairs and, especially, ideological and political education-related issues to one of JU’s CPC Committee vice secretaries (PAS 02), who in turn reported to the MoE. Selected student counselors are required to perform well academically, and must be deemed politically trustworthy by JU’s CPC Committee. JU student counselors are mainly politically reliable young graduates of JU, who know the campus and university affairs well. In 2002, 57.0% of student counselors were part-time staff selected from JU graduate students; by 2010, that percentage had increased to 69.4% (Document 36, Document 40). These part-time student counselors are selected from academically and politically qualified year four students—i.e., CPC members with good grades. Prospective student counselors undergo a series of written and interview examinations that test their political knowledge and how they would deal with student issues (Document 37); each year, 30 graduate students are selected by the SAO to be student counselors. Student counselors use the following three measures to exercise ideological and political education. Each home class at JU is assigned a student counselor who helps maintain students’ political stability on campus, and conducts ideological and political education through class meetings. Student counselors’ primary task in the post-Deng period is political stability maintenance. Students are organized according to their discipline and cohort (Yan 2014); in JU’s context, this is called their home class. One student counselor is assigned by the SAO to each home class to conduct political education, and to oversee the home class on behalf of the SAO. Student counselors ensure that students do not participate in activities that are deemed anti-government or against the socialist regime. Since 1990, it has become very important that universities keep their students under a certain degree of control, to prevent the outbreak of large-scale student demonstrations, as occurred in 1989 (Yan 2014). This was referred to as stability maintenance by the interviewed student counselors, who noted that the university required them to stand by in their office on special occasions such as possible demonstrations, so as to be prepared to follow any students who went into the streets, care for their safety, and persuade them to return to JU (SAS 01, SAS 03).

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Class meetings are the main way in which student counselors conduct political education. According to SAO requirements, student counselors have to organize class meetings every 2 weeks to talk about socialist values and to provide moral guidance to students. Sometimes, the SAO would distribute printed materials to the counselors during weekly meeting to guide them as they set up the topics for subsequent class meetings. For example, in 2008, the theme of the year for political and ideological education was the reform and opening up policy’s 30th anniversary, and all student counselors were given a manual detailing a series of class meetings they were to organize on that theme (PAS 01, Alumni 03 and Document 68). In addition to managing their home class, student counselors also managed class-based CPC branches.

Student Counselors Managing CPC Membership One major way of conducting ideological and political education is to deliver political information through its various on-campus CPC branches. Usually, student counselors are also the secretaries of their party branch group (SAS 07), and one of their major functions is to recruit and develop new CPC student members, and to socialize these students according to CPC ideology. A student counselor moderates a student’s CPC membership applications, and uses the process to implement additional political education—e.g., through the applicant attending a CPC education program (Dangxiao) and undergoing examination by other student party members regarding the charter, history, and recent policies of the CPC. According to the interviewed staff (SAS 01, SAS 05), the strict procedure through which JU students become CPC members includes checking their parents’ political background, collecting classmates’ opinions, and having applicants orally defend their motives for joining the CPC (SAS 03). Perhaps partly as a result of this exhaustive procedure, only 12% JU undergraduate students are CPC members (SAS 07), including those who joined the CPC in senior high school. As a CPC branch secretary, a student counselor moderates the entire student application procedure, from applying for a branch member quota from the faculty CPC committee to conducting political checks and scheduling meetings for the oral defense (SAS 05). Student counselors are students’ direct instructors on how to join the CPC. The CPC biweekly meeting is another means of political education for student counselors, who moderate the biweekly branch meetings student CPC members are required to attend to study political leader’s speeches or policy documents (SAS 01, Alumni 03). Student CPC members are expected to deliver positive information about the CPC to nonmember students, so as to confirm their confidence in the current regime, including how correct the CPC’s decision was on a certain issue or how only the CPC can make China better. As student counselor SAS 01 reported, As a CPC member, one should not make negative comments on social events or about the CPC, since one’s classmates would take one’s opinion as the CPC’s opinion. (SAS 01)

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Student counselors, as branch secretaries, remind student CPC members continuously of their duty as party members to aid in implementing the political education task.

SAO Resuming Situation and Policy Course A special course called Situation and Policy (SPC) (Document 04) was added in students’ timetable, which has been resumed since 2008 in JU, and introduces topics about government policy and social issues. The course is another channel through which the SAO provides students with additional political education outside of class time, so as to further socialize them and strengthen their belief in the CPC’s policies. SPC is an additional course especially designed for political education purposes. Although described in students’ curriculum structure as a required course, it is not taught by PEC teachers, but SAO staff—usually an experienced student counselor, such as the head of the faculty student counselor team. All Chinese students at JU are required to take SPC for four semesters (worth two credits in total), and must be in class for this course at least twice per semester. After an in-class lecture, students are obliged to form groups and conduct a social investigation related to the topic the SAO staff delivered in class, which is later reviewed by their student counselors (SAS 04, Alumni 03). This is used as a means to inform students of the latest CPC policies. The SPC contents are generally supportive of the CPC and its topics share its ideology. The SAO staff may choose topics in which they are interested in, are familiar with, and think students should know more about—usually recent social issues of concern to students, presented and analyzed from the CPC’s perspective— but they must be approved by senior SAO staff, such as the appointed SPC teaching team leader (SAS 04). In observed classes, the topics ranged from the “18th NPC Congress Reports by Western Media” to “Medical Insurance Reform in China” (observed classes C01 and C02). According to one SAO staff member who teaches SPC (SAS 04), these courses provide students with deeper understanding of social problems in contemporary China. Though touching upon some social problems or dark sides in class, the SAO staff’s interpretation ensures uniformity of ideas on certain issues, as topics usually conclude with staff giving remarks such as “the problems have been noted by the CPC . . . the CPC will improve the situation . . . the CPC is concerned about people’s troubles and serves the people . . .” (observed class C01 and C02) to enhance the CPC’s positive image.

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Student Counselors Filtering Students’ Political Expressions and Behaviors Student counselors shoulder the responsibility of collecting information about students and advising students when their activities have crossed the political bottom line, and instructing them on how to prevent future violations. JU’s University General Office, CPC Committee, and SAO pay attention to and collect students’ opinions on state policy and CPC documents, and report them to the state, be it to the MoE, other government agencies, or higher level CPC departments. Administrative staff from the SAO contribute to the information collection and reporting, as they have direct access to students. The SAO has office that investigates young students’ views on current issues—such as Liu Xiaobo receiving the Nobel Prize for Peace and being lauded by Western media for his efforts at advancing democracy reform in China, despite being seen by the CPC as a traitor—and changes in their political attitude after having spent a semester studying in a foreign country (PAS 01), to see how students had been influenced by Western ideas in various ways, and whether mainstream students kept rank with the CPC. Findings are published in such internal reference reports as the SAO’s Weekly Report (meizhou yibao), which is distributed to all CPC cadres on campus, to help maintain the censorship system by acknowledging students’ basic political views (SAS 05). If the findings merited reporting to central authorities, the university would first polish them before doing so (PAS 01), so students would not encounter serious negative consequences for their politically incorrect feelings; according to Alumni 03, a former students’ counselor, It was a holistic information gathering rather than a test on students. The report handed to SAO or other departments would serve as reference to instruct work in the next period . . . I could choose not to report some of my students’ comments if they are too brutal on the CPC . . . If I punish my students who told me what they think, who would answer my question next time (when I need to collect information on some incidents). (Alumni 03)

Nonetheless, this system of information collecting and reporting made students cautious about posting political opinions on social networks, since their student counselors “could see that” (Student 01). Though no negative consequences followed, the mechanism still served to censor opinions, as it sometimes led students to hide their true political opinions. In addition, these bodies in JU practice their own form of self-censorship, as they generally only report students’ positive comments on issues related to the CPC (PAS 01); for example, students’ opinions on the 18th CPC National Congress, or Uygur students’ view on the 2014 attack in Kunming2, would be reported to faculty and collected by the General Office, which would then decide whether to report them to a higher level (Alumni 03, PAS 01). Students’ views on major CPC events and social

2 In the evening of 1st March, 2014, a terrorist attack occurred in Kunming Railway Station in Yunnan Province, China. The official media believed that it was initiated by Xinjiang separatists.

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problems are watched more closely, so the university can gauge specific students’ support for the CPC. These mechanisms, in a way, informed students about where the bottom line is; furthermore, student counselors would consistently tell them through various ways to stay away from politically sensitive issues. The first area of politically sensitive activity students are counseled to avoid is participating in political movements against the CPC or that spread negative information about the CPC (SAS 01), or in political demonstrations. Alumna 03 recalled an incident in her undergraduate years in which the class FTP was found to contain a video on the 1989 Tiananmen Incident: The class representative was asked to have a talk with the National Security Department and the vice-secretary of the faculty CPC committee, since he hosted the server, though it was not him who uploaded the video. The student counselor of our class also had a talk with the representative and discussed with him how to avoid this type of incident in the future. The student counselor took this chance to educate all students in our class to be cautious on the contents we uploaded online and we spread. (Alumni 03)

Alumni 03 regarded this incident as a lesson on how to avoid political troubles, and on how political issues could be used as opportunities for political education. The second area the student counselors paid attention to was ethnic minority students’ political performance, particularly students from Xinjiang and Tibet, to gauge whether they politically supported regional independence movements, which are politically taboo to the CPC. Student counselors are also responsible for communicating with their students on sensitive ethnic issues, as Alumni 03 reported: When I was a student counselor, one of the Uygur students in my classes posted something politically sensitive on the JU BBS3, something about the independence of Uygur people. The university security department checked the student’s IP address and ID, informed the SAO and the SAO informed me to talk to the student. So I had to ask the student over and ask him why he posted such things on the BBS. This is part of an SC’s job. (Alumni 03)

However, the incident resulted in only a talk, without other punishment, although Alumni 03 was urged to pay attention to the student in the future. As ethnic students’ stability on campus is important to national solidarity, student counselors pay extra attention to them. According to SAS 03, faculty-based student counselor teams would invite ethic minority students for meals on their ethnic festivals, as a part of their job, to show that they cared for them and respect their culture traditions, and remind them to behave well while at JU, thus facilitating political socialization in this gentle and nice way.

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Bulletin Board System.

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The University’s Extracurricular Activity Mechanisms to Facilitate Political Control The CYL is seen as the reserve force of the CPC (Communist Party of China Central Committee 2012), and being a CYL member is a precursor to applying for full CPC membership. The CYL, as an organization for young people who would like to be closer to the CPC, is regarded by the CPC Central Committee as an important unifying force (Xinhua Net 2016), and the cradle for recruiting and training future CPC leaders at different levels of the CPC hierarchy. For example, former general secretary of the CPC Hu Jintao served in the CYL Central Committee from 1982 to 1985 (Xinhua Net 2011). JU’s CYL Committee is under the instruction of the CYL’s Central Committee, and under the direct leadership of JU’s CPC Committee. In most years, CYL membership in JU is about 95% of the total student population (SAS 02), making it a factor that CYL covers almost all students in JU. The CYL in JU aims at leading students in their political thinking, serving their growth, and enriching university culture (Document 92). It comprises numerous departments, including the Secretariat Department, Organization Department, Publicity Department, Research Department, Social Practice Department, Volunteer Office, and the JU Youth newspaper editorial office, among others. Unlike in the SAO, the CYL’s departments are intended to diversify cultural life on campus in a manner consistent with the CPC’s political agenda (PAS 02) and that leaves students with a favorable impression of the CPC while at the same time constraining students’ activities and making sure that they do not cross the political bottom line. Thus the CYL at JU serves as an adjunct organization assisting the CPC at JU.

CYL’s Control over the Students’ Union CYL’s political control over students’ union (SU) is accomplished in three ways— by having its role clearly declared in the SU charter, by intervening in SU meetings, and by appointing the SU cabinet. Firstly, CYL control of the SU is state mandated; the SU charter states that the SU is a self-governed student organization under the leadership of the JU CPC Committee and the instruction of the JU CYL (Document 46) by SAS 02. The SU chairman presents its annual working report to the vice secretary of JU’s CPC Committee (Document 44). Secondly, CYL cadres intervene in SU meetings to “give instructions.” Interviewee SAS 02, a CYL cadre, indicated that he would attend important SU meetings to offer his opinions. Another interviewee (Student 05), who used to work in the SU, mentioned JU’s CYL vice secretary’s intervention in SU decisions—“He was trying hard to persuade us to accept his opinions. We could not just ignore him.” Students

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see CYL cadres as faculty members whom they should respect and listen to, and so tend to agree when a CYL cadre state his/her position. Thirdly, the SU cabinet is not decided through election only, but along with CYL input. In addition, JU’s CYL Committee, and even its CPC Committee, must approve the SU cabinet, despite their having been elected by students; for example, it is preferred that the SU chairman be a CPC member (SAS 02). These subtle interventions in the SU cabinet are realized through CYL cadres, who instruct the SU by talking with SU members and adjusting elections (Student 05). JU SU is different from a lot of student unions’ role in universities in other regions. For example, the student union of the University of Hong Kong (HKUSU) declared its aims on the website; among them, two aims are “to promote the welfare of the student body” and “to act as a bridge between the student body and the University authority in furthering the interests of the students and the University as a whole” (HKUSU 2018). In reality, the university authority was frequently challenged by HKUSU. Like SU in other Chinese universities, JU’s SU should stand firmly with the university authority though they also claimed to serve as a bridge between the university administration and the students; SU is generally supportive to the university leadership and administration.

CYL’s Restriction on Students’ Associations The second way in which the CYL conducts its political control over students is through its restriction on JU’s students’ associations (SA, Shetuan). SAs are student organizations, including interest clubs and societies that cover a variety of areas, such as academics, sports, arts, and social service. The CYL restricts SAs through their registration and financing, and supervises activity topics to filter out problematic ones. All SAs must be registered under the SU. Students who wish to establish a new SA must submit an application detailing what the association or club would be and do, and how it differs from existing SAs (Document 45). As illustrated by CYL cadre interviewee SAS 02, applicants are interviewed by a committee composed of SU department heads, student representatives, and SA representatives. The CYL vice secretary responsible for the SU and SAs keeps an eye on the application process, and has the final say regarding SA approval. Secondly, the CYL controls SAs by supervising the SU department responsible for their financing. Moreover, since the venue distribution system and related facility management system are also controlled by the SU and the CYL, SAs must follow systematic application procedures to locate an activity venue and financial support. As a result, CL could intervene SAs’ conduct on their activities. Thirdly, CYL controls and checks the topics and themes of SAs’ activities. Through the financial aid and facility application procedure, the CYL gets to know the SAs’ activity topics and the guests they might invite. With this advance knowledge, the CYL can disapprove any SA application that might cause difficulties; for

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example, if an SA’s “activity or lecture is about voluntary service, but the guest they invited might be problematic” (SAS 02), the CYL might be concerned that the guest speaker could intend making politically sensitive statements, such as “the government is not doing their job so the voluntary service stepped out to help” (Document 77). Such activities thus might be canceled, for JU’s CYL. In follow-up interviews, SAS 09 reported that a secret document was distributed to universities to further control SAs in universities; this document required universities to control the number of SAs, to require faculty members to be instructors of SAs, to affiliate SAs to faculties, and to select CPC members as SA leaders. The rule on affiliating the SAs with faculties helped to reduce the number of SAs as it would increase the faculties’ workload, and the faculties are not willing to put extra efforts in students’ affairs other than academic affairs. Now they (the government department who delivered the secret document) only ask us to select CPC members as heads of political theory related SAs, such as Research Association of Deng Xiaoping Theory. But it is suggested that they prefer all heads be CPC members (SAS 09).

According to SAS 09, the CYL has multiple ways to “kill softly” SAs they deem politically sensitive.

CYL’s Supervision on Students’ Events The second means of implementing censorship of students involves supervising their activities and publications, and is mainly done by CYL cadres. Firstly, CYL cadres supervise students’ activities to make sure that they do not cross the political bottom line. Unlike student counselors, who supervise activities within their own, single class (SAS 01, SAS 05), the CYL’s workload is heavier, as its mandate encompasses most student activities. SAS 02, a CYL cadre4, went through every student activity application to ensure that nothing too sensitive was involved. Some students’ organizations and associations with foreign background or supported by foreign foundation would urge us to be extra cautious. . .if there is an activity which is against Four Cardinal Principles, no matter how the activity has been proceeding, I have to stop it, it would be either me or the “related department” asks me to stop it. Usually the “related departments” are CPC JU Committee and University General Office, the Publicity Department and the Security Department in JU. (SAS 02)

He mentioned being told that specific types of activities were best avoided, such as those that dealt with the idea of civil society or some scandals at JU, to name just a few. Secondly, the JU Security Department and CYL jointly supervise students’ publications to avoid “politically incorrect” comments being published. As CYL

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A young university staffer managing CYL organization.

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cadres, SAS 02 and SAS 06 were responsible for censoring student media publications and replacing all politically inappropriate contents: [On one CYL newspaper,] those reports on students’ activities for fun and new policies on students’ associations would be totally fine. But anything related to ideology, stability and basic infrastructure, we have to be cautious . . . For example, we had a report related to campus security since a student brought stage used gun to campus causing panic among students. However, the night we had it published on our WeChat account5, although we had the JU Security Department vice director went through the report before publishing it and the contents were quite supportive to them, they called me to withdraw the report. They still do not want to see it in public I guess with reasons I don’t understand. (SAS 06)

In the end, the report was still published, since the online article could not be taken back and the newspaper had already been printed. However, the CYL and the CYL publication editing team always communicate with such JU departments as the Department of Publicity, Department of Infrastructure, and University General Office to examine their reports and articles. Although some contents that could damage JU’s image (like the example mentioned) slip through, political correctness is still strictly checked, first by CYL cadres (SAS 02), and then by related JU departments, if the CYL or these departments think it is necessary.

CYL’s Monopoly in Important Event Organizing The CYL’s political control is further facilitated by its monopoly on students’ access to and participation in official events; sponsored social services, investigation projects, and voluntary service at major international events are only available to students through CYL channels. The CYL’s annual Social Practice Projects (shehui shijian xiangmu), encouraged by the MoE, aim to help students know more about society by encouraging them to form teams for volunteer work and social investigation, and provide students with financial support for traveling and other project necessities (Document 07). Unlike SA activities, which are only initiated by or participated by SA members, all JU students can apply to these projects. However, the CYL has the right to examine and approve the projects, and reimburses project participants when it is done (Document 07). Off-campus enterprises or organizations that wish to cooperate with students in establishing a social practice program cannot contact SAs or groups of students directly, but must cooperate with the CYL Social Practice Department to get official university support (SAS 02). According to Alumni 05, who worked in a big company that wished to provide internship and social practice opportunities to students in JU, it is actually hard to get such support: It is hard to communicate with CYL and other administrative departments in JU. They are reluctant and cautious on resources offered by institutions they are not familiar with. They

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Smartphone subscription connected with Instant Messenger.

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would not bother to spend more time and efforts to provide students with more chances as they might go through a lot of paperwork and communication with different departments to achieve that (Alumni 05).

The CYL also monopolizes volunteer recruitment for international events. When the country is hosting an international event, the CYL is responsible for volunteer recruiting, following a “top-down” model (Document 69). For example, students who wished to participate in a grand international event around 2009, which was held in the city, had to apply through the CYL system at JU, rather than directly to the Event Committee. Other big events followed the same route, to ensure that teams were politically reliable. According to one interviewee, As a faculty CYL cadre, I followed the instructions from CYL JU to do volunteer interview and training; CYL JU was following the instructions from CYL Central. That’s why the CYL Central secretary paid a visit to volunteers in some pavilion during our service in the event . . . Students were trained to recognize the flag the Tibet independence and so on before service to be politically cautious in their service. I think that’s why they recruit students through CYL instead of facing to the whole society, to ensure volunteers’ political reliability. (Alumni 03)

The CYL also enjoys a monopoly over patriotic education on campus. When the CYL stages patriotism education events to further publicize the CPC’s ideas, it mobilizes all on-campus resources, and other activities organized by students have to give way to the big events held by the CYL in terms of financing and venue booking. For example, the CYL organizes a patriotic choir contest (129 Singing Gala) every year to commemorate the 1935 Beijing students’ movement, in which students took to the streets in a mass protest demanding the government resist Japanese aggression. This is a comment event held in universities all over China. In JU, the best venues and human resources available to the SU and faculties are used in this event, and SAs are encouraged to participate (SAS 06). Every year, this event costs between 200,000 and 300,000 RMB (SAS 06), which is a considerable portion of the financial support provided by the university for students’ activities. In the 2014 contest, held in JU’s fanciest stadium, the very first performance was a recitation of The Communist Manifesto by the Drama Club, to reaffirm the glorious image of the CPC (Observed activity A06). A lot of resources are allotted to patriotic activities.

Summary This chapter presented the detailed practices of the university to ensure the implementation of the political task. There are four mechanisms for the university to implement the political task: the administrative to ensure the leadership; the academic mechanism to implement political education with provision on PECs, non-PEC supervision, and influence on faculty’s self-censorship; the organizational mechanisms to reinforce the political stability with SAO and student counselors as the assistant; and the extracurricular mechanisms to facilitate political control

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assisted by the CYL. However the academic mechanism, organizational mechanism, and extracurricular mechanisms actually supervised the whole process of political socialization on political knowledge attaining, political knowledge formation, and political participation. This has formed a politically regulated autonomy in the university that might lead to different practices as the reactions to this situation, which would be presented in the following two chapters.

References Communist Party of China Central Committee. (2012). Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhangcheng (Charter of Communist Party of China). Retrieved from http://www.12371.cn/special/zggcdzc/ 2016. Duan, Z. (Ed.). (2004). Jianguo Yilai Putong Gaoxiao Makesi Zhuyi Lilunke he Sixiang Pinde Kecheng Sheizhi ji Jiaoxue Neirong Lishi Yange Ziliao Huibian (Collection of document on curriculum setting and historical development of teaching contents on Marxism theory and moral education courses in higher education since 1949). Beijing: Higher Education Press. HKUSU. (2018). About us. Retrieved from http://www.hkusu.org/en/about/2019. Li, Z., & Lowe, J. (2016). Chinese higher education and social justice: What can the capabilities approach offer? In B. Wu & W. J. Mogan (Eds.), Chinese higher education reform and social justice (pp. 14–32). New York: Routledge. Mingque Gongneng Dingwei Chengqing Renshi Wuqu Sixiang Zhengzhi Lilun Ke Xu Jiaqiang (Clarifying function and distinguishing errors to enhance political education courses). (2015). People’s Daily, p. 7. Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China. (2006). Putong Gaodeng Xuexiao Fudaoyuan Duiwu Jianshe Guiding (Regulations on team building of students’ counselors in regular institutions of higher education). In M. o. Education (Ed.). National Center for Education Development Research. (2017). Jiaoyu Fazhan Zhongxin Dangzhibu Kaizhan Dangke Xuexi (Party Branch Education for National Center for Education Development Research). Retrieved from http://www.ncedr.edu.cn/djgz/201801/t20180109_29739. html2019. Phillips, T. (2016). China universities must become communist party ‘strongholds’, says Xi Jinping. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/09/china-universi ties-must-become-communist-party-strongholds-says-xi-jinping Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, & Ministry of Education of the Central Government. (2005). Guanyu Jinyibu Jiaqiang he Gaijin Gaodeng Xuexiao Sixiang Zhengzhi Lilunke de Yijian (Opinions on further strengthening and improving ideological and political education courses in universities). Wong, C. (2019). Xi Jinping tells Chinese teachers to help ‘nurture support’ for communist party rule. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/ article/3002243/xi-jinping-tells-chinese-teachers-help-nurture-support-communist Xinhua Net. (2011). Hu Jintao Jianli (Resume of Hu Jintao). Retrieved from http://news3. xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2002-01/16/content_240483.htm2016. Xinhua Net. (2013). Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting Yinfa “Guanyu Peiyu he Jianxing Shehui Zhuyi Hexin Jiazhiguan de Yijian” (General Office of the CPC Central Committee Distributed “Opinions on Cultivating and Practicing Socialism Core Values”). Retrieved from http://news. xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-12/23/c_118674689.htm2014. Xinhua Net. (2014). Xi Jinping: Jianchi Lide Shuren Sixiang Yinling Jiaqiang Gaoxiao Dangjian Gongzuo (Xi Jinping: Sticking to take moral guidance and talents making as an instruction,

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strengthening and improving CPC building in universities). Retrieved from http://news. xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-12/29/c_1113818177.htm. Xinhua Net. (2016). Xi Jinping: Zai Zhishi Fenzi Laodong Mofan Qingnian Daibiao Zuotanhui Shang de Jianghua (Xi Jinping’s speech in meeting with intellectuals, model workers and youth representatives). Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-04/30/c_ 1118776008.htm2016. Yan, X. (2014). Engineering stability: Authoritarian political control over university students in post-Deng China. China Quarterly, 218, 493–513.

Chapter 6

Practices to Seek for Academic Freedom and Critical Thinking Under Political Restriction

Universities in China enjoyed a status of semi-independence (Pan 2009) in regard to university autonomy, within which some conducts in search for academic freedom and critical thinking would be tolerated by the state. With the university’s interpretation on related policies, how far they will go to seek for academic freedom and critical thinking depends on a joint effort by the university, faculty members, and students.

The University’s Initiatives in Search for Academic Freedom and Critical Thinking The university made different types of efforts in trying to search for academic freedom and critical thinking within a regulated autonomy; it maintains its public image on academic independence as a tradition, tolerates faculty member diversification and openness on PECs, and provides students with courses encouraging critical thinking.

The University’s Maintenance on Public Image of Academic Independence For JU’s administrative leaders, faculty members, and students, it is seen as a pride and a symbol to have the image of being academic independent for JU leaders. JU’s perspectives on academic independence can be seen in the speeches of recent JU presidents, regarding the university’s responsibility for seeking the truth, remaining academically independent, and preserving its staff’s and students’ freedom of thought. © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Du, Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8300-1_6

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As a mostly loved president in recent years, Prof. Young was especially keen to talk about academic independence on public occasions. In his commencement ceremony speeches, he often talked about making students into critical thinkers and giving staff space for unhindered academic researches (Document 60, Document 61, Document 62). He also spoke about what a university is: We have to constantly ask ourselves: what is the real aim for us to have this university? Do we always stick to the ideal of academics? Do we always fight for the truth? (Document 60)

He urged faculty members and students to reflect on whether they always held on to the truth and pursued freedom. In another speech, delivered at a freshmen convocation ceremony, he required faculty members to encourage students’ critical thinking in classes, and reminded students to reflect on the things they learnt and to continue to innovate (Document 95). President Prof. Young constantly mentioned maintaining students’ independent thinking ability and critical minds as the most important task of JU (Document 60, Document 61). He also famously said, of JU graduates, that they should strive to be “free and of no use” (Document 58): Free means your thoughts, your academics, even your value of life have got to travel in time and space without restrain; no use means you must intentionally distance yourself from realistic utilitarianism (Document 60).

JU perceives faculty members, as having the right to academic freedom and the responsibility of preserving it in teaching and research, as noted in its charter, which declares that staff should “love students and stick to academic research ethics” (Document 15). Furthermore, former president Prof. Young emphasized faculty members’ moral obligation to offer students a good example by pursuing academic truths and stimulating students’ critical thinking ability (Document 59); of one young JU teacher, he said, This young teacher said in the commencement ceremony in a faculty, “We JU faculty members are afraid of nothing, not the authority, not the political leaders, not publication, but our students.” Could all of our faculty members be like him to take students’ evaluation on us as the standard for always pursuing excellence in research and work? (Document 59)

He hoped that all faculty members in JU could set examples to their students by seeking the truth in academic learning and research through critical thinking. Thus, JU also regarded academic performance and influence over students as important elements of faculty members’ responsibility. A video clip celebrating ten undergraduate student-selected top teachers, produced by the JU SAO and played during the class of 2010’s commencement ceremony (Document 39), made no mention of political criteria, but focused instead on the faculty members’ care for students, devotion to research, pursuit of truth and freedom, and support of students’ independent thinking. For students, President Prof. Young also encouraged them to serve the whole of society and the progress of all human beings, “with the world in mind” (Document 59, Document 95). The university’s expectation of students is that they should care for human society more than specific political beliefs.

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Fig. 6.1 Academic affairs’ decision-making structure in JU (source: translated from Charter of Jour University (Document 15))

From presidents and CPC secretaries’ speeches, it could be seen that JU has the attempt to separate academic affairs with political issues. In the recent convocation ceremonies, the president usually only talked about academic requirements and responsibilities students should meet as new JUers; for example, Prof. Hui urged the students to respect academic researches and to stay curious about the unknown. No political requirements were mentioned in the speech (Document 99). While all students would assemble and listen to the lecture given by the CPC secretary in the freshmen orientation, with topic specifically on ideological and political education. This separation was written in JU’s charter drafted in 2014, with JU declaring its image of independence in academic, which states: The university mission is to maintain the academic independency and freedom in thinking, and to emphasize the truth pursuing and civilization guarding; universities are the light of the society; they are communities taking academics as the core (Document 15).

The charter also states that faculty members in JU are to enjoy academic freedom, and students autonomy of learning (Document 15). According to the charter, as long as it is not against the law, all types of research can be conducted at JU. JU’s governance structure illustrates the decision-making system for academic affairs in a separate chart, shown here in Fig. 6.1. While the CPC Committee had the actual power to decide, the university still perceived itself as having academic independence, by claiming that the CPC secretary could not be a member of the Academic Affairs Committee (Document 26). However, when the fulfillment of political task contradicts the fulfillment of academic task, the statement on Academic Affairs Committee having the final say on related issues could stay questionable.

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Although the state requires JU to educate its students as socialist conformists and on some occasions JU has mentioned making students into firm believers in Marxism (Document 20), JU’s charter does not mention cultivating political beliefs as a student responsibility; according to the charter, students have a: Duty of defending the interest of the university; duty of taking academic learning as priority, pursuing excellent academic level; duty of respecting teachers and loving peers, practicing moral cultivation and social involvement; duty of obeying research ethics and regulations (Document 15).

From a charter perspective, JU highlights students’ concerns on social issues and state development, but does not specify which (if any) political body or system of beliefs they ought to serve. In a speech about general education, former CPC JU Committee Secretary Prof. Tsin mentioned: We hope JU could make our students with personality integration [. . .] We JU educate talents, who serve for the progress of the society, with comprehensive knowledge. Even we have to make specialists according to the need of the state, they have to have a comprehensive general education as their base of knowledge (Document 35).

JU also maintained a mechanism of belief in JU’s academic freedom through the university’s anthem and other image-building measures. JU has two versions of its university anthem. The official version, reaffirmed at the university’s centennial celebration (Alumni 03), is famous for the line Independent scholarship, liberal thoughts, no stranglehold of either religion or politics (Document 08, Document 93). However, in 1988, JU once started to use a new anthem that more strongly linked students’ future to the development of the party-state through such lines as We have the same new dream; the rise of the nation and prosperity of people, the historical task of making the future is on our shoulders (Document 21). However, this new version was regarded as banal, and excluding JU’s features (Document 24). In 2005, with students and faculty members expressing their view that the 1925 version represented better the spirit of JU, the university administrative level replaced the 1988 version with the 1925 version (SAS 05), thus reconfirming the university’s spirit and its tradition of seeking academic independency and freedom. Not only does JU’s administration project an image of academic freedom, so too do its faculty members, students, and alumni. Interviewed faculty members felt that JU is generally a free environment for teaching and research (Teacher 01, Teacher 04, Teacher 05, Teacher 06, Teacher 07), and 89% of surveyed students agreed that “JU always stick to academic freedom as its priority.”

The University’s Tolerance on the Diversity and Openness of PECs Though PECs should indoctrinate students with orthodoxy CPC views on politics, critical thinking is still encouraged in PECs in JU. The university tolerated the

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diversity and openness. Firstly, JU built up the academic image of PEC teachers as being academically well established, open minded, and encouraging of critical thinking, and recommended high-quality PEC teachers to their peers as examples to increase PEC’s academic reputation (Document 22, Document 27); this has been perceived by the JU authority as the uniqueness of JU PEC delivering. JU also publicly lauded outstanding examples of PEC teaching to counter the stereotype of PECs being political, rather than academic. For example, a newspaper report on Dr. Lynn, a young teacher teaching Socialism class in JU, demonstrated how she made critical thinking a part of PEC classes: I have encountered students asking me, is PEC a type of brainwashing? I felt like, when people start to talk to each other, they start to persuade each other; for us in PEC, it all depends on whether my rationality persuaded yours, or the other way around . . . I think the only way to prevent being brainwashed is to keep independent thinking . . . but how to know one’s own argument? It should be done through reading, reflection and challenging the authority . . . one should develop his or her own point of view through academic methodology . . . that is critical thinking (Document 27).

In the report, though the theme of the course was settled—socialism and Marxism in China—Dr. Lynn answered students’ questions with academic analyses, provided different perspectives, and encouraged students’ independent thinking about the course content she delivered. Dr. Lynn’s class was set up as an example in JU, indicating JU’s value on PECs’ academic foundation. This emphasis encouraged critical thinking elements in PECs. Secondly, teachers could set up their own teaching plan without much political intervention from JU’s CPC Committee. Teachers reported that they did not have to participate in collective course preparation meetings, in which all teachers’ course plans were harmonized to talk only about CPC ideologies. Teacher 06 reported, JU is comparatively free (in teaching), especially compared to other universities. That was the reason I chose to work here. (Teacher 06)

In a follow-up interview with Teacher 06, when asked about the collective course preparation that was repromoted nation-wide in recent years, he replied, It has all been just pro forma and what has been presented to the supervising department on the surface. We could report to the MoE or other investigation teams from different government organs that we have that (collective course preparation system), but actually those meetings could be just weekly meet-ups on discussing chores. We still prepare for our own teaching materials (Teacher 06).

Teacher 05 reported that JU had to be open in its PEC contents, “or students would not listen to what teachers talk about,” while Teacher 07 said, JU is tolerant of PEC teachers’ performances. JU has very fashionable teachers talking about love and relationships in Moral Education courses, and JU has PEC teachers who have only been lecturers for more than 15 years and no one ask him “to publish or to perish” . . . I do not really see constraints in course contents. JU just would not do that (type of political control on teachers). (Teacher 07)

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All interviewed faculty members including PEC teachers would imply that JU has relatively free atmosphere and tradition on independence compared to other universities and they basically have the freedom to decide teaching contents and materials. Thirdly, in PECs, JU also encouraged discussion and debate to show openmindedness in political education. In a report to the MoE, students’ interaction with teachers in PECs was a key point used to show JU’s advancement in PEC teaching (Document 33). The head of the College of Marxism positioned PEC as a means of providing students with a perspective from which to view Chinese society and the world; JU’s focus in PEC teaching was interaction with students (Document 81). One JU CPC secretary also encouraged heuristic, research-based, involving, interactive, and case study methods in PEC teaching, to stimulate students’ curiosity in class (Document 82). While incremental improvements had been made to PEC’s academic image through teaching methods, students’ thoughts and teachers’ talk did not always align with CPC ideology in class, and thus could be seen as de facto resistance by JU to state-mandated PECs. Though the original purpose of PECs was to indoctrinate students with CPC ideas only, these three ways of providing PEC gave teachers freedom in their academic judgments.

The University’s Provision on General Education Courses to Promote Critical Thinking JU developed a system of general education common core (GECC) courses to train students’ critical thinking, with students needing to complete 12 GECC credits before the graduation. This reform in general education started in 2006 (Document 04) and was kept till now. GECC courses in JU combine Western and traditional Chinese studies in courses featuring reading both classics and science (Document 04). GECC courses were expected to help students develop their critical thinking abilities through the following measures. Firstly, in terms of curriculum, JU set up goals for GECC to develop students’ independent thinking habits and ability to innovate. Although the type of course was regulated, students could select lecturers and specific courses that most interested them. One of the six GECC modules specifically addressed critical thinking, as shown in Table 6.1 (Document 02). Table 6.1 JU GECC course types Classics in Literature and History and Heritage of Culture Core Courses Philosophy and Critical Thinking Core Courses Intercultural Conversation and Global Vision Core Courses Scientific Progress and Spirit Core Courses Ecological Environment and Care for Life Core Courses Artistic Creation and Appreciation Experience Core Courses

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The structure of the six modules reflected the GECC’s goal of cultivating students’ abilities in “independent thinking, criticism, making choices and taking responsibility for their personal choices through general education common cores” (Document 03). One interviewee, a senior administrative leader at the university, implied: General education focuses more on personality and values, compared to electives. We hoped we would stimulate students’ deep thinking through these courses. The common cores are not only about knowledge, but the construction of knowledge. (PAS 03)

This perspective on GECC’s function and goal echoes JU’s definition of common cores as leading students along the road towards independent, critical, and original thinking (Document 04). Based on the common core syllabi collected, more than half of GECC teachers listed the cultivation of critical thinking as a course objective, some through reading and reflecting on classical works. The syllabus for a course about Tocqueville noted: Reading carefully great thinkers’ works is not only a fascinating intellectual challenge, but also a spiritual exercise of observing thoroughly human affairs and situations. (Document 65)

Another course, about Song Dynasty poetry, indicated that its objective was to help students grow understanding of, appreciation for, and creativity in life and society (Document 66), as these are the foundation of critical thinking. In addition to the contents, the modular design itself was expected to help students develop their capacity in critical thinking. Specifically, the module on Philosophy and Critical Thinking aimed to encourage students’ critical thinking through reading philosophical and religious studies based on Western and Chinese classics, such as the works of Aristotle, Kant, Marcuse, Confucius, and Lao-tzu. A course called Logic and Critical Thinking, using Western and Chinese classics, led students to think about and reflect on current related situations in China. In collected syllabus, Document 96 included such topics as gender issues, judicial review systems, and freedom of speech. In the syllabus, the teacher wrote that the aim of the course was . . . to help students know about the constitutional and political system in the United State, think about Western political traditions and the spirit within, and broaden students’ horizon in political science studies. This course aims to provide students with insights and inspiration in reflection on contemporary China. (Document 96)

The syllabus shows that the teacher aimed to provide students with knowledge of other political systems and alternative ideologies from a comparative perspective. The faculty member who designed the course is a GECC working committee member (Document 02). This type of course design and delivery is encouraged in JU. JU took GECC as a means of measuring students’ capacity for critical and independent thinking (Document 56). Pursuing students’ development, in terms of autonomy, independence, and initiative (Document 04), is a part of JU’s strategy for talent cultivation and fulfilling its academic task.

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Faculty Members Ploughing for Critical Thinking in Teaching Though the teaching subjects could be set, teaching contents could still be tuned. JU faculty members pursued their autonomy by selecting teaching materials based on their academic judgment, and encouraging students’ critical thinking in classes. Some JU faculty members made use of this autonomous space to search for academic freedom. Aside from the university, faculty members have expectations of students as well, specifically that they become independent thinkers and seek truth. In a video, the undergraduate student-elected most popular JU teachers of 2010 expressed their hopes about what kind of people JU graduates would become: I hope you could all be giants in thoughts, and grassroots in life. If people do not have anything in mind but driving a BMW, it’s a pathetic thing. I’d rather you (JU students) could ride on you bicycles thinking about wormhole or time travel (Prof. Lu) [. . .] I hope JU students could think with their own brain (Prof. Guo) [. . .] I wish 1 day I saw you on streets, I could see JU, see university, see the light of pursuing truth and freedom on you (Prof. Xu) [. . .] (Document 39)

JU faculty members’ expectations of their students—i.e., a thirst for knowledge, independent thinking, and pursuit of truth—are generally related to academic freedom and critical thinking, rather than political socialization. And in an occasion of commencement where the mentioned video was publicly broadcasted, these values seem like a consensus of all staff and students about the specific expectation on students. Depending on these values, they have developed two tactics to search for academic freedom and encourage critical thinking.

Faculty Members’ Diversification on Teaching Contents JU’s faculty members used their granted academic freedom from the university in deciding and tuning their teaching contents. They were generally free to talk about Western values, criticize the CPC in class, and reject official textbooks, according to their academic judgment. Taking the creation and passing on of knowledge as their main responsibilities to students, some JU faculty members took advantage of this freedom to select more diversified teaching materials, in order to broaden their students’ horizons and provide balanced views in certain issues. Firstly, Western values are not eliminated from classroom. Western values, as defined by the CPC (Theory Bureau of Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee 2009), include ideas about constitutional democracy, liberty, human rights, capitalism, liberalism, civil society, freedom of the press, and so on. The CPC opposes the spread of such ideas, fearing that they may unify people’s thoughts around the “wrong values” (Theory Bureau of Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee 2009). This idea has been reemphasized in recent years

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(Xi 2014*) and the ideological control towards spreading Western values was further tightened (Phillips 2016; Wong 2019*). In JU, all interviewed faculty members said that they had not been told officially what things could not be discussed in class. Even after former Minister of Education Yuan Guiren’s (Xinhua Net 2015) talk on preventing the infiltration of Western ideas into Chinese universities, JU faculty members did not change their teaching contents or style (PAS 01); if JU faculty members wished to select Western ideas as teaching contents, they were still free to do so. According to the fieldwork, there are two main types of Western values discussed in JU classrooms. The first is the discussion on advantage of Western political systems. In observed classes, lecturers spoke freely about such concepts as democracy (C09), civil society (C18), and constitutionalism (C05 and C14), and their advantages. For example, in Teacher 04’s class about Ancient Greek and Roman Classics, the origin of politics and political systems was discussed with references to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. He implied, in his interview, that it was impossible to avoid talking about the idea of democracy in his class; CPC restraints on Western ideas in university classroom could not be fully implemented in his or similar courses in JU as the faculty members tacitly approve that they are not supposed to censor away the Western values at all and praise only the superiority of socialism with their academic consciousness. The second type of Western values concerned social and political value discussion. In observed class C08, a philosophy class, the teacher focused on the book, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, by Max Weber. He also talked about religion and social welfare in Western countries, and numerous other Western values in an introductory and explanatory way. The teacher also made comparisons between social welfare systems in China and in Germany, indicating their differences in rationality based on religion. Even when related instructions were released from the central government, course contents were not changed. Faculty members used their granted space by JU to preserve their academic freedom to include Western values (if necessary in academic sense) in their class contents. In addition, JU faculty members could sometimes introduce contents challenging the legitimacy of the CPC in classes by using various technical strategies (e.g., using metaphors, as mentioned previously in Chap. 5) while remaining cognizant of the political bottom line. In an interview, social science year 2 Student 01 reported that he was initially surprised that JU’s classes were open to discussion and to different opinions, since his faculty members were “criticizing pretty hard on the CPC’s political censorship in some classes.” In observed non-PEC classes C04 and C05, faculty members presented criticisms on the People’s Commune and Three Years of Natural Disasters, indicating that they had led to death of over ten million people in China, and had never been studied or admitted as a mistake by the Chinese Government. PEC teachers, despite being mandated to spread pro-CPC values, also presented criticisms in classes on occasion. One teacher reported, This is a country constructed on lies and violence. This regime does not want its citizens to know that they are actual taxpayers. I told my students not to be too grateful to the country. (Teacher 06)

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This teacher regarded his History class as a reversed form of brainwashing to counter orthodox indoctrination, to help students break down their knowledge about the CPC and construct a new system of values and belief. He did not show support for the CPC in his classes, meaning faculty members critical of CPC could still serve as PEC teachers in JU, showing the level of freedom faculty members enjoyed when teaching in JU. In non-PECs, considerable number of faculty members from humanity and social science are deemed “dare to say” by the university staff (PAS 01, SAS 03, Teacher 04, etc.) and the students (in the questionnaire, the 62nd question is about how much do students agree on the statement “JU teachers dare to criticize on social problems” with Likert scale 1–4, and the mean is 1.53). Teacher 05, who also taught History class, believed that only praising the CPC in class would not really set up a “great, glorious, and correct” image of the CPC, so her class did not avoid criticism, either. JU faculty members did not feel restrained in terms of teaching contents, even when those contents were based on criticism of the CPC. Faculty members could also exercise their professional and academic judgment in selecting teaching materials, like officially approved textbooks. Generally, PEC teachers should mostly follow the official textbook; in JU, however, they had more latitude in teaching content selection. For example, two History class teachers (and they are not exclusive) selected ten lecture topics they considered most important in Chinese modern and contemporary history without using the official textbooks (Teachers 05 and 06), based on their evaluation on the book and their understanding of PEC’s political task. Teacher 05 reported: Those books have too strong a sense of preaching, emphasizing again and again the legitimacy of the Party and how great it is. But the truth is, the Party made mistakes too. I never denied that in my class. My students would know from my teaching that the Party struggled all the way to realize better governance, with its ups and downs, with all tests and experiments. (Teacher 05)

Teacher 05 regarded the textbooks as being too doctrinal and one sided, as well as being not sufficiently well organized in terms of teaching practices to attract students. Similarly, Teacher 06 believed that the contents in the History class textbooks were written to prove the CPC’s greatness, at the expense of historical accuracy, and that letting students believe that everything the textbooks presented represented “Universal Truth” would be ridiculous. Students in his class were encouraged to criticize the arguments and historical facts in the official textbooks in an academic way. “I teach them real history,” Teacher 06 said with pride. Taking the Boxer Rebellion (a historical event mentioned in the textbook and a topic of Teacher 06’s lecture) as an example, he argued: The textbook said this movement was encouraged by missionaries and stimulated by foreigners’ invasion. But the missionary force was far more active in Guangdong than in Shandong. Why it was not happening in Guangdong? It (the content in official textbook) doesn’t make sense at all. This movement was always captioned as anti-imperialist patriotic movement. I think it was total nationalist terrorism. (Teacher 06)

Teacher 06 did not agree with the officially approved textbook himself, so he decided to deliver the class in his own way, providing students with more academical

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interpretations of historical events as references and telling them where they could find books to support his arguments. He also questioned the purpose of the arguments in the textbooks, pointing out that they contradicted the current government’s attitude in international relations. On one hand, we are now talking about being a player in international affairs in mainstream media; on the other hand, we are educating students to hate foreigners in classes . . . it made students feel humiliated with all that expression of Sangquan Ruguo (loss of power and humiliation of the country), without a reflection on our own problems. This is really twisted. (Teacher 06)

The faculty members exercised their academic judgment in teaching content selection in their own courses, even if those contents did not align with the official political orthodoxy. The above forms of autonomous conduct in content selection show faculty members’ flexibility in teaching and respect for academic issues. Not all JU faculty members practiced these conducts, but all academic staff could do so if they so chose.

Faculty Members’ Encouragement on Discussion and Debate A lot of JU faculty members encouraged critical thinking about academic issues and problems in social science courses, despite political censorship. JU established its Center for Faculty Development (Document 19) to promote teaching quality, in 2012. One of its tasks was to promote discussion-based teaching in general education (Document 11). In reality, discussion and debate were promoted in classes to stimulate critical thinking, even in PEC classes. Faculty members would hold meetings within discipline, to discuss course delivery and teaching methods (Teacher 04) to better encourage students’ thinking from different perspectives (Document 04). Faculty members were encouraged to implement JU’s emphasis on students’ involvement in classes; six of nine observed PECs (C13, C14, C15, C17, C18, C19) involved student discussion, student presentations (with other students posing questions), student comments on teachers’ lecturing, and debates with the teacher and other students; the other three classes held discussions before or after class, or online. Among the syllabi collected in this research, faculty members mentioned such activities as group discussion (Document 67), face-to-face tutorials before presentations (Document 65), and E-learning online discussions after class (Document 66). All the collected syllabi mentioned discussion and question posing in classes, showing that faculty members welcomed debates and different opinions. In some collected general education examination papers, the most common question form was essay questions probing students’ understanding of the readings and related academic issues, which allowed students to voice their opinions on topics and issues,

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instead of regurgitating uniform answers. This shows that faculty members encouraged students’ creative and personal perceptions. JU faculty members encouraged students to look for different information sources to enable them to approach academic discussions with a more open mind. These faculty members would ask students to reflect on what they have learnt in the past, especially in high school, and to avoid using textbooks alone to form their arguments in oral presentations and written essays. One PEC History class, for instance, demonstrated the ways in which teachers in JU encouraged critical thinking. In this observed Teacher 05 class, several students made oral presentations on The Treaty of Nanking, most of which regarded the opening up of the five seaports to trade as a passive move that shamed China. Teacher 05 pointed out that most of the historical materials students cited had strong ideological orientations, and were mainly drawn from senior high school textbooks that presented only one type of argument; students were using such terms as yangren (foreigners) and lieqiang (foreign powers), which she characterized as “CCTV-style” speech, that students claimed to hate but still used; most students had presented similar arguments, while she thought that they should have shown more independent thinking. In this way, Teacher 05 deconstructed the knowledge system of history her students attained in high school. The next step Teacher 05 took was to construct a way of doing research using diversified resources, and to encourage students to find multiple sources of historical data to support their arguments. From this class observation, it can be seen that what she actually instilled in her students was a healthy skepticism of official textbooks and historical accounts. The teacher further encouraged using multiple sources by posing several questions inspiring students to think in nontraditional ways and learn from multiple sources of information. This was common in JU, according to both interviewees and observation data. Faculty members promoted discussion and debate in class to stimulate critical thinking. In addition to lecturing on alternative interpretations of China’s problems, JU faculty members involved students in inquiry about China’s current problems (observed courses C06 and C11), such as netizens’ criticisms of the CPC (Teacher 01) and the government’s firewall blocking of the Internet (Teacher 03). Teacher 03’s class used several high-tech touchscreens and intranet to realize students’ immediate discussion of his lecture and other students’ presentation. In addition, all the interviewed social science faculty members and most PEC teachers made essay questions a major form of examination, instead of relying on test papers calling for rote answers. Teacher 07 reported, “I value students’ depth of thinking. If a student really read and think, you can tell from his essay.” None of the interviewees said that students’ answers and discussions in exams or essays had to stick to CPC ideology or be politically correct. JU faculty members also encouraged students to question and even disagree with the teacher. As Teacher 03 said: I encourage students to question my point of view. It is good that they think differently even totally in opposite with me. And I would tell them I like that. (Teacher 03)

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In Teacher 03’s observed class, students had a heated interaction with their teacher, whom they questioned about concepts, and about whose answers they seemed skeptical; they were not afraid of posing questions. Teacher 03 also gave them encouraging words when they posed questions, such as “You’ve got a very good point,” “I haven’t even thought about that,” “Anyone else would like to comment on this,” and so on. In observed social science classes C10 and C11, faculty members also encouraged students’ participation and questions; in their teaching, they tended to remind students to maintain their independent thinking at all times, and were always ready to answer students’ questions. Many faculty members encouraged students’ critical thinking in this way. In these ways, JU’s academic staff searched for academic freedom within the boundaries of the political bottom line by encouraging critical thinking and providing students with balanced views from multiple academic resources.

Students Seeking for Critical Thinking in and out of Classroom Although the political socialization mechanism in JU includes students as participants in political education and related activities, some JU students still look for opportunities to broaden their own horizons through critical thinking and independent expressions. They switch from being a political socializee to being an autonomous learner on different occasions, and different students behave differently when playing out their different roles.

Students’ Expectation on Critical Thinking A lot of JU students see critical thinking as an important part of their university education. Students have relative autonomy in course selection (i.e., they may choose between different faculty members teaching the same course, or choose different courses within a certain type) and practice this autonomy according to a certain standard. For many students, the degree to which a course requires or teaches critical thinking is a selection criterion. In the survey, JU students generally agreed that university students should have a spirit of critical thinking, and that JU could provide them with critical thinking elements on campus (see Fig. 6.2). In the interview, students expressed their expectations about critical thinking in classes, even in political learning; they wished to experience more than just political indoctrination, and to be exposed to education with balanced views. Student 04 stated:

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Students’ Percepon on Crical Thinking 4

3

2

1 University students should have spirit of crical thinking. N=697 SD=0.53

JU culvates students’ crical thinking.

N=695 SD=0.70

1=Strongly Agree; 4=Strongly Disagree Fig. 6.2 Students’ perception on critical thinking. 1 ¼ strongly agree; 4 ¼ strongly disagree

Faculty members should provide students with different perspectives, not simple indoctrination of the CPC orthodox. Students have the ability to do independent thinking and be rational with all the information they get. (Student 04)

Student 04, a political science major, felt that encouraging critical thinking in political learning and providing different perspectives did not necessarily create skepticism about the CPC; rather, it made students more rational in their judgments. A considerable proportion of JU students perceived critical thinking as an important element of university education.

Students’ Resistance Towards PECs Based on Academic Judgments Although some of PEC teachers, such as Teachers 05 and 06, tried to encourage critical thinking in their PECs, JU students do not see that as sufficient, as there were also PEC teachers who do not act as Teacher 05 and Teacher 06 but give boring lectures like Teacher 08. Interviewed students who had attended Teacher 06’s class confirmed his encouragement of discussion and debate, but also pointed out that not every PEC teacher was like him. JU students expect PECs to provide them with more critical thinking elements, commenting that a lot of PECs are boring, or of low academic quality. Though some PEC classes could provide students with balanced

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How much do students like PECs 5

4

3

2

1 Marxist Basic Theories

N=625 SD=1.02

Mao’s Thoughts Moral Educaon Outlines of Group B Selecve Courses and Socialism and Law Basics Modern History With Chinese Characters N=606 SD=1.05

N=652

N=678

N=553

SD=1.11

SD=1.10

S=1.06

1=Like it very much; 2=Like it; 3=So so/No opinion; 4=Dislike it; 5=Dislike it very much Fig. 6.3 How much do students like PECs. 1 ¼ Like it very much; 2 ¼ like it; 3 ¼ so so/no opinion; 4 ¼ dislike it; 5 ¼ dislike it very much

views, as presented in the previous section, JU students expected more to be like that. Student 03 reported: I expected contents about KMT in History classes instead of only contents about how great CPC is and I expected my teacher to convince me with solid data and spectrum of views. (Student 03)

This shows students’ expectations about understanding historical events from more than just a single (CPC) perspective. Speaking of being boring, based on the survey questionnaires collected in JU in 2014, students showed a lack of interest in most PECs, except for History class, which earned a mean score between 2 and 3, whereas other PECs were mostly between 3 and 4 (1 ¼ like it very much; 2 ¼ like it; 3 ¼ so so/no opinion; 4 ¼ dislike it; 5 ¼ dislike it very much). As to whether these courses helped their political learning, JU students also gave higher scores to GECC courses than PECs. The data can be seen in Figs. 6.3 and 6.4, with comparison in Figs. 6.5 and 6.6. Based on the data in Figs. 6.3 and 6.5, it can be seen that students liked other courses better than PECs, with other courses’ mean scores generally falling between 2 and 3 (1 ¼ like it very much; 2 ¼ like it; 3 ¼ so so/no opinion; 4 ¼ dislike it; 5 ¼ dislike it very much) and one type of course even between 1 and 2, and regarded GECC courses as having helped them more in terms of attaining political

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How much do students think PECs have influenced them in attaining political knowledge, forming political attitude and learning political participation 4 3 2 1 Marxist Basic Theories

Mao’s Thoughts Moral Education Outlines of Group B Selective and Law Basics Modern History Courses and Socialism With Chinese Characters

N=683

N=676

N=686

N=694

SD=0.74

SD=0.77

SD=0.79

SD=0.79

N=652 SD=0.75

1=Very positive help; 2=Not much; 3=Not at all; 4=Very negative influence

Fig. 6.4 How much do students think that PECs have influenced them in attaining political knowledge, forming political attitude, and learning political participation. 1 ¼ Very positive help; 2 ¼ not much; 3 ¼ not at all; 4 ¼ very negative influence

How much do students like other courses 5

4

3

2

1 Courses based Classics in Philosophy and Intercultural on disciplines Literature and Critical Thinking Conversation History and Core Courses and Global Heritage of Vision Core Culture Core Courses Courses

Scientific Ecological Artistic Creation Progress and Environment and Spirit Core and Care for life Appreciation Courses Core Courses Experience Core Courses

N=681

N=631

N=614

N=647

N=675

N=659

N=656

SD=0.90

SD=0.94

SD=1.02

SD=0.95

SD=1.01

SD=1.00

SD=0.95

1=Like it very much; 2=Like it; 3=So so/No opinion; 4=Dislike it; 5=Dislike it very much

Fig. 6.5 How much do students like other courses. 1 ¼ Like it very much; 2 ¼ like it; 3 ¼ so so/no opinion; 4 ¼ dislike it; 5 ¼ dislike it very much

knowledge, forming political attitudes, and learning political participation, with means (in Fig. 6.4) mostly below 2.0, compared to mostly above 2.0 (in Fig. 6.6). In collected documents and interviews, students revealed why they did not like PECs, the most common reason being that PECs did not provide them with enough

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How much do students think other courses have influenced them in aaining polical knowledge, forming polical atude and learning polical parcipaon 4

3

2

1 Courses based Classics in Philosophy and Intercultural on disciplines Literature and Crical Thinking Conversaon History and Core Courses and Global Heritage of Vision Core Culture Core Courses Courses N=679 SD=0.86

Scienfic Ecological Arsc Creaon Progress and Environment and Spirit Core and Care for life Appreciaon Courses Core Courses Experience Core Courses

N=669

N=665

N=676

N=684

N=681

N=679

SD=0.79

SD=0.79

SD=0.77

SD=0.79

SD=0.79

SD=0.86

1=Very positive help; 2=Not much; 3=Not at all; 4=Very negative influence

Fig. 6.6 How much do students think that other courses have influenced them in attaining political knowledge, forming political attitude, and learning political participation. 1 ¼ Very positive help; 2 ¼ not much; 3 ¼ not at all; 4 ¼ very negative influence

opportunities for critical thinking. In a nonofficial student publication, one student wrote an article about PECs that read, in part, PECs are mostly boring . . . I do not think they include critical thinking. But the training in critical thinking and freedom in expression through discussion should have been the major educational function of universities. And this is what PECs lack of (Document 78).

This voices students’ dissatisfaction with PECs’ limited critical inspiration. More than half of the interviewed students reported that they had little interest in PECs because they found them “dull and dry (Student 01),” “boring (Student 03, Student 05, Student 06),” and “uninteresting (Student 07).” Some students were reluctant to take PECs, despite their being compulsory. Although some teachers made efforts at bringing critical thinking into the PEC classroom like some interviewed teachers mentioned previously, students’ general perception of PECs was still unfavorable. As a response, students resisted having to attend courses they did not like by paying as little attention as possible in class. In the interview, students stated that they would “ditch class (Student 01),” “do their own stuff (Student 02),” or “sleep it off (Student 06).” If the students thought that the course was not worth listening and the contents were not useful to them, they would sit in class with an absent mind. Although some teachers and their classes were popular among students (e.g., Teacher 06, a History class teacher) and students in some observed classes (e.g., C13, C14, C18) were attentive, in most observed PEC classes, students did not seem interested or engaged. In an observed Marxism class, almost no students were

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listening to the teacher’s lecture; instead, most were sleeping or browsing web pages on their own computer; one student was even wearing a gaming helmet headset and looking at his laptop (C15). Some students preferred putting in minimum effort in PECs; Student 06 said that he would not take the MOOCs for the ME class, “[If I took the MOOC,] I would have to do all those exercises for online courses. In faceto-face classes, if I don’t want to listen, I can just sleep.” In other words, students did not put any effort into PECs, because they did not think that they could learn in these courses; however, if teachers encouraged critical thinking, students would be more interested in the contents.

Students’ Strive for Independent and Critical Expression Outside of the class, JU students also seek spaces to express themselves politically (without too much intervention from official ideological authorities) as a way of seeking critical thinking opportunities. They play their role to pursue for freedom of expression through political participation and independent publication. It is not uncommon that some JU students do not always follow officially promoted political participation as a way of showing their independence in political issues, and of expressing their own opinions to show their autonomy and individuality. One example is the local NPC (National People’s Congress) election, in 2011. Some JU students thought that the candidate nomination process was not sufficiently transparent, and some students thought that they have no political impact at all within the current political system, so they were reluctant to participate in the election by refusing to vote or writing in names that were not on the official list of nominees. Ten percent of the votes in JU’s electoral district went to “Hao Zhuangyan”1, “Edison Chen” 2, or other celebrities or made-up names (Qiang 2012). Students also complained on the Internet about the candidates not knowing what they should do as representatives and what they could do for JU (Document 52). Students even criticized the election in a student publication, saying that it was just a show (Document 74). This showed some of the students’ rebellion against pro forma political participation, and their resistance to political indoctrination. In a similar vein, some JU students used independent students’ publications to express critical thinking on university affairs and their student lives. Such publications usually act as alternative voices on campus, since there is a monopoly on media (as mentioned in Chap. 5). Despite this monopoly, some JU students still set up their own publications, encouraging their peers to think from a more open and critical perspective that is different from the official media. La Vague and 211 degree were two major independent magazines in JU during the data collection period, in 2014.

1

An adjective in Chinese meaning very dignified, used here to mock the election. A Hong Kong Canadian actor, rapper, singer/songwriter producer, entrepreneur, artist, and fashion designer. 2

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Students from JU’s Journalism School established 211 degree, which aimed at addressing JU students’ quality of life in university issues and daily chores, by being vigorous, sincere, rational, and temperate (Document 01). They provided students with different perspectives on campus issues, sometimes with articles criticizing the university administrative authority. Another magazine, called La Vague, was published from 2009 to 2014, when it stopped due to personnel issues. Printed version of the magazines was distributed among students by its student editors. There were also issues placed on shelves of campus nearby coffee shops. The digital version of the magazines was uploaded on ISSUU3, and shared through other popularly used SNSs among students. The magazines’ goal was to be critical and independent when making their publication and recruiting editing members (Document 75): What we fight for is to inspire students’ thinking and observing on campus and social issues, even only a little bit; if our comments could yell out university students’ minds, speak out the truth, no matter how weak that is, we think we have done what worth the efforts (Document 76).

In these irregularly published magazines, articles were very blunt in their criticism of, for example, CYL bureaucracy, the insignificance of student military training, or even the government and the party (Document 71). Despite having its ups and downs, La Vague demonstrated students’ interest in expressing themselves in public affairs. Independent publication is another way for students to pursue critical thinking, one that lies outside of traditional academic learning, showing some students’ willingness to fight against political indoctrination.

Summary This chapter had illustrated the practices in search for academic freedom and critical thinking in the university although there is a politically restricted autonomy. The university itself had some initiations in promoting academic freedom and critical thinking by its maintenance on public image of academic independence, its tolerance on diversity and openness of the PECs, and its provision on general education courses with critical thinking elements. The faculty member tried to insert critical thinking elements in class by selecting teaching contents and reference book with balanced views and encourage student discussion and debate in class. The students had expectation on critical thinking and showed the resistance towards PECs based on academic judgements; they also strove for independent and critical expression through political election and independent publications. These practices showed the tension between the implementation on the political task and the academic task, with

3

An online publishing house, where people can host documents and read those submitted by others, with various kinds of magazines and PDFs uploaded by individuals and professional organizations alike.

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the university, faculty members, and students bearing academic freedom and critical thinking in mind and carrying it out in action. But there is another situation in response to the political restriction, which would be presented in the next chapter.

References Pan, S.-Y. (2009). University autonomy, the state, and social change in China. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Phillips, T. (2016). China universities must become communist party ‘strongholds’, says Xi Jinping. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/09/china-universi ties-must-become-communist-party-strongholds-says-xi-jinping Qiang, G. (2012). Jiceng Renda Xuanju Zhong de Zhengzhi Lengmo Yu Liyi Queshi (The political indifference and lack of interest of the national people’s congress election on basic level). People’s Congress Studying, (10), 9–11. Theory Bureau of Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee. (2009). Liuge Weishenme: Dui Jige Zhongda Wenti de Huida (Six whys: Answers to several important questions). Beijing: Xuexi Publishing House. Wong, C. (2019). Xi Jinping tells Chinese teachers to help ‘nurture support’ for communist party rule. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/ article/3002243/xi-jinping-tells-chinese-teachers-help-nurture-support-communist Xi, J. (2014). Qingnian Yao Zijue Jianxing Shehui Zhuyi Hexin Jiazhiguan (Young people should conscientiously practice socialist core values). Retrieved from http://www.moe.gov.cn/ publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_176/201405/167911.html Xinhua Net. (2015). Yuan Guiren: Gaoxiao Jiaoshi Bixu Shouhao Zhengzhi Falv Daode Santiao Dixian (Yuan Guiren: University teachers should upholding three bottom lines on politics, laws and morality). Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2015-01/29/c_1114183715.htm.

Chapter 7

Practices to Look for Flexibility and Alternative Space Under Political Restriction

The state built a system into universities to maintain its control over politics, and though its mechanisms have been well implemented, there remains some buffer space between state requirements and student expectations. Students’ counselors’, CYL cadres’, and students’ role therein is subtle; on the one hand, their interactions with students dilute their efforts at political indoctrination and increase their openness in party activities; on the other hand, students can find autonomous spaces in university—e.g., joining a political organization to benefit their job hunting, or even leaving the campus physically to be exposed to other cultures and ideologies. This scenario is also different from the promotion of academic freedom and critical thinking which composed a third situation in the complex process.

Depoliticizing of Students’ Affairs and Activities Although the mechanism of political socialization had been implemented through courses, organizations, and extracurricular activities in JU, a phenomenon of depoliticizing students’ affairs and activities could be observed on campus, which includes student counselors’ diluting of political contents in their job and students’ redefinition of political activities.

Student Counselors’ Diluting of Political Contents in Students’ Affairs Although, as presented in the previous chapter, student counselors’ major work focus is ideological and political education, they have flexibility when deciding the form and content of that education. They can choose to dilute the ideological and © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Du, Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8300-1_7

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political information conveyed to depoliticize the process, meaning they exert less political and ideological control over students, and emphasize instead providing such services as scholarships, subsidies, career and psychological advising, and so on (Document 48). Since these services still count as political stability maintenance, student counselors enjoy autonomy in deciding how much actual political information they will deliver. As a first scenario, though the CPC’s students’ branches serve as a political socialization arena for students, not all contents talked about in CPC branch meetings are political. Even at the most political class events, like CPC branch meetings, student counselors are not really always delivering explicitly ideological and political contents to student CPC members. According to the interview data, one reason for this is that student counselors think that as long as students are concerned about society, the purpose of the party meeting has been realized. SAS 01, who has been a student counselor for more than 2 years in a science faculty, said, Sometimes we even played board games in branch meeting and entitled this type of activities team building. I think what we science students could do as CPC members is only helping urge other students to pay attention to social problems and current national events. Only the faculty CPC vice secretary would give us student counselors some instructions on the branch meeting organizing. I have pretty much autonomy on the contents. (SAS 01)

The second reason for party meetings to not be strictly politics related is that student counselors do not have sufficient training in political education, and are not confident enough to talk about politics in front of students. In the two observed party meetings (M08, M09), student CPC members were generally commenting on CPC members’ responsibilities at the university and at work, or on the Kunming Railway Station Attack of April, 2014, with some general remarks similar to official newspaper reports; the branch secretary did not really have a thorough plan, clear meeting contents, or ways of discussion, showing their lack of superior political understanding of the issues to other branch members. JU did not provide student counselors with strict training in politics though there claims to be some, or have specific expectations of them, thus leaving the student counselors space for flexible conducts at party meetings. Second scenario is in class meetings, which, although supposed to facilitate political education as mentioned previously, are now mainly nonpolitical, in terms of contents. The student counselors talk more about students’ authentic needs, rather than indoctrinate them with the political ideals of the party state: In class meetings, I usually would tell my students to stay positive in life and not to cheat in exams. These are the things I think worth being a reminder. (SAS 01)

The student counselors’ comments in their interviews revealed that class meetings generally dealt with such issues as to how to realize one’s career dreams, and that some were purely for fun, as also seen in SAO year books (Document 37); only

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one concerned Socialist Honors and Shames1. This shows SAO’s tolerance in selecting class meeting topics. An interview (SAS 01) and some observed class meetings (M14, M15) revealed that class meeting contents were about CV preparation for internships, expressing gratitude to parents and teachers, enhancing communication among students in the home class, and so on—mostly topics closer to students’ needs in daily life than to their political life. According to Focus Group 2, the SAO would not interfere in how student counselors conducted their class meetings, as long as the class meeting topics remained healthy and positive and seemed to be serving to the stability of campus. Thirdly, though student counselors’ major job is supposed to be ideological and political education, in reality, their job is mainly oriented to students’ daily life. This part of the job assigned to JU SAO is more similar to the guidance counselors and student service in the Western context. Even senior administrative staff acknowledged that student counselors could not talk about communism all day, and that “they just accommodate university students’ personal growth” (PAS 02). As mentioned by several faculty members in the interview, student counselors now pay more attention to career planning, psychological advice, and other daily student affairs (SAS 03, SAS 04, SAS 05), and the SAO does not really control their conduct on the job; political instruction is required, but not enforced (Document 37). As student counselors shared in Focus Group 02, the “head of the SAO once told us that all things related to students’ growth are parts of our job”; another continued, “If you talk politics all day, students will not listen and they will turn their back on you.” As a result, most student counselors chose to please students by providing them with life guidance, rather than too strong a sense of political guidance. From the scenario presented above, student counselors adjusted their work focus according to the practical needs of students. Since the student counselors are now no longer political counselors to the same extent they used to be (Dong 2005), there is no system to check on their implementation of political indoctrination; they have autonomy to dilute political contents.

Students’ Redefinition on Political Activities A lot of activities which supposed to be politically related had been redefined by students as related to social responsibilities when they chose to participate. JU students would link the state’s development with their own personal development. To realize their concerns about the country, students participated in various forms of social investigation and service, including social practice programs and voluntary work. The voluntary work and social practice programs could be counted into political socialization projects as a way to accomplishment of the political task.

1 A political concept proposed by former CPC General Secretary Hu Jintao for constructing a harmonious society in China.

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How much do students like CYL acvies 5

4

3

2

1 Voluntary Work N=617 SD=0.88

Social Pracce Programs in Vacaon N=532 SD=

1=Like it very much; 2=Like it; 3=So so/No opinion; 4=Dislike it; 5=Dislike it very much Fig. 7.1 How much do students like CYL activities. 1 ¼ Like it very much; 2 ¼ like it; 3 ¼ so so/no opinion; 4 ¼ dislike it; 5 ¼ dislike it very much

These projects could also be illustrated in social services that help students develop transferrable skills, so they would be welcomed and participated by most students. Students could redefine these activities with their own understanding. In questionnaire survey (Figs. 7.1 and 7.2), they showed their preferences for voluntary work (mean ¼ 1.89, 1 ¼ like it very much; 5 ¼ dislike it very much) and social practice programs (mean ¼ 2.07). These activities are mostly organized and controlled by CYL as presented in Chap. 5. An observed meeting organized by the CYL (A04) to promote and introduce social practice projects and to sign up project members filled a 100-student classroom to capacity with attentive students who closely questioned the project managers, showing their passion for involvement in such activities. In the summer of 2008, for example, according to a JU report to the MoE, over 250 student social practice projects were carried out in 29 provinces of China, involving over 2300 participants (Document 31), or roughly 17.9% of the university’s entire undergraduate population (Document 12). Voluntary work is another way for some JU students to show their concern for society. Different from social practice programs, in which students can do investigations as part of a related academic project, voluntary work is more about service during events, mostly state events. For example, over 4280 JU students served as volunteers at a grand international event in China (Document 32), accounting for 14.9% of JU total student population (Document 12). Some JU students showed

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How much do students think CYL activities have influenced them in attaining political knowledge, forming political attitude and learning political participation 4

3

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1 Voluntary Works

Social Practice Programs in Vacation

N=663

N=651

SD=0.78

SD=0.84

1=Very positive help; 2=Not much; 3=Not at all; 4=Very negative influence Fig. 7.2 How much do students think that CYL activities have influenced them in attaining political knowledge, forming political attitude, and learning political participation. 1 ¼ Very positive help; 2 ¼ not much; 3 ¼ not at all; 4 ¼ very negative influence

enthusiasm for participating in such activities as a way of serving society and the country. Alumni 03 was a student counselor and volunteer group leader at that time: A TV program came to us and made a documentary about JU student event volunteers. One of my students said in the program that when people started to know the grand international event was going take place in the city, she calculated she was about to be a university student by that time. So she planned to be a volunteer almost 10 years before it really happened. (Alumni 03)

Aside from state-level events, other types and levels of voluntary work were also popular among students. Almost every class and every CPC branch feature a social service project, such as helping in the City Library (Student 01), teaching local army soldiers English (Student 02), and serving as subway guiding assistants (Alumni 03). The students learnt how to provide service through the process of volunteer work. In addition, some JU students participate actively in political and patriotic activities, as they consider such collective activities to be positive and helpful, but they do not necessarily link the activities with the political meanings behind. For example, group interview data shows that students consider the 129 patriotic singing contest, held every year around December 9th to commemorate the 1935 students’ patriotic movement, as a “JUers must-do” (Focus Group 01). This big chorus competition is designed to teach students, through the singing of revolutionary

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songs, to care about and love the country, and students actively vie for positions on the competing teams. One year four singing contest activist reported: In our faculty, over 100 students would come to audition and 70 would be selected. Attending the singing contest is usually the task assigned to Year 2 students, but some Year 4 students would participate as well. That might be their fourth time participating. They just love singing and the contest. (Student 02)

In Student 02’s faculty, the cohort population was 150, including international students; thus, the majority of students auditioned for the contest, most because they found it “fun and meaningful” (Student 02). According to Student 02, there was even a student from Macau on their team, despite not being a conventional target of political socialization. According to the interview data, students joined organizations like CYL and SU, because they thought that they could make the university a better place through their participation in university affairs. Student 05, a year four engineering student, reported in the interview: I joined the Student Council because I would like to make a change. We acted like senators to communicate university affairs with the administrative departments, making students’ voices heard by the university. (Student 05)

These students also believed that their participation in these organizations would make the university understand better students’ needs surrounding basic infrastructure, catering, and other university affairs, showing their belief in the democratic instrument provided to them by the JU administration. Students 03, a year 4 science student and a class executive member, reported that his and his roommate’s efforts made the university set up a traffic light at the crossroad outside the dorm area: I saw traffic accident happening there, my roommate is a students’ representative in the Student Council. So we wrote a report together. And 1 year later, the traffic light was built up. I think that’s the thing we did to serve and help more fellow students. (Student 03)

This highlights one of the reasons the interviewed students took positions in political organizations—to serve their community. Their good intentions and trust in the university’s political system as a means of fulfilling their social responsibility led them to participate in activities that could realize their willingness to serve. Students saw the connection between personal development and state prosperity. Their intention of serving society was encouraged by and could be realized through a series of activities which are seen by the SAO and CYL as political education programs. However, as students redefine them as just positive activities and programs to show their social responsibility, the aim and effectiveness of political education behind the activities would be weakened.

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Diversification on Students’ Affairs and Activities The diversification in students’ affairs and activities is another way to show a flexibility in the regulated autonomy in JU. Student counselors and CYL cadres practice this flexibility by democratizing students’ affairs so as to promote students’ involvement and care for students’ needs, and also by providing enriched forms of student activities to broaden students’ horizon and enhance their autonomy. Though these conducts could be seen as stability maintenance in a political perspective, it actually achieved a certain degree of diversification on campus.

Student Counselors and CYL’s Democratization of Student Affairs Student counselors and CYL cadres encourage students’ involvement and participation in class and university affairs within the political bounds. They promoted democratization, meaning giving students the right to make decisions for themselves in student affairs, affording them freedom in JU when out of class. JU student counselors encourage students to practice democracy in home class affairs. Student counselors’ involvement in student affairs is limited to organizing home class cabinet election and discussing important issues with that cabinet. In a researcher-conducted online focus group involving eight student counselors (Focus Group 02), the student counselors reported that they encouraged students to make their own rules for scholarship evaluation within their home class; the rules should be approved and voted on by all class members. Alumni 03, who had been a student counselor for 4 years, reported, I do not think I have any power over students. All awards, scholarships and other interest related issues in class should be decided democratically, publicly and fairly. (Alumni 03)

As Alumni 03 said, it is common among JU student counselors to give students space for decision-making, or JU students would vent or even riot on unsatisfied treatments (Nao, as taking complaints to university departments or on the Internet, or boycott on certain issues). Student counselors do not have absolute power over students, since students do not count on their evaluation to graduate from JU. The student counselors have to become popular among students to fulfill their political tasks; allowing students to decide things in their home class is one strategy for doing so. For CYL cadres, they encourage more student participation in student affair issues in the students’ union and other organizations, instead of giving orders to students. As these cadres often meet with students, they often hear students’ questions and concerns about issues on campus, as SAS 02 expressed: For example, should students be charged while they use a projector in classrooms to hold activities? Should traffic lights be set up at the crossroads outside the dormitory area?

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Students’ Council makes proposals for improvements to these issues. . . . So part of my job is to establish ways for university departments to know students’ needs, like holding the department-level student meetings and university status reporting meetings for students (SAS 02).

SAS 02 actually agreed with students’ concerns on these issues and thought it right to encourage more student involvement. He noted some of the issues bothering students: Another example. Mainland Chinese students were getting a discount for train tickets purchased to go home for vacation; students from Hong Kong and Macau thought it is unfair to them, as they might have to buy train tickets too, to get back to Shenzhen or Zhuhai first. So we held a meeting with several departments in JU and had a resolution that all Hong Kong and Macau students could get the magnetic stripe on their student ID to enjoy the discount (SAS 02).

Since the students were claiming their rights in JU, SAS 02 also regarded this as an important issue, and exercised his initiative to promote students’ involvement within an area of his responsibility. JU student counselors and CYL cadres democratize students’ involvement in student affairs by giving students spaces for participation, as an outgrowth of the flexibility they enjoy in searching for administrative freedom.

CYL’s Provision of Enriched Forms of Student Activities CYL cadres have to deal with, on the one hand, fulfilling the state-defined, university-assigned political task, and, on the other, increasing the CPC’s popularity among young university students (Document 92). Sometimes, the latter contradicts the former, since students are not interested in politics most of the time. Therefore, CYL cadres often prioritize popularity as their focus (within the bounds of the political bottom line), and make efforts at promoting academic diversity to that end. CYL cadres are concerned about the unattractiveness of their activities due to their political contents, and so have to think of other ways to interest students in the activities they organize. As CYL cadre SAS 06 reported in the interview: I often question myself, why should I do this job (ideological and political education related activities)? And how this should be done? We are an organization that supposed to build up cohesion among students, let them follow us, and we should follow CPC. But the activities purely related to ideology are so not popular. (SAS 06)

As a result, SAS 06 put considerable effort in initiating other types of activities, such as pop singing contests and model contests. CYL cadres also made efforts at making political activities more attractive to students. Even 2014’s biggest patriotic education event, the 129 singing contest (observed activity A06), allowed English songs to be sung, whereas previous editions in the early 2000s had exclusively featured Chinese revolutionary and patriotic songs (SAS 03). This patriotic education event was merged with non-singing elements, such as

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Table 7.1 Starry forum lecture title list in 2014 Title The world is flat 4.0: Education’s function in globalization Revisiting the silk road Medical reform in China in deep zone and its policy direction Magic and beauty of math in mathematical analysis Talking Japan with perspectives in ancient and modern times Life education: Ego, ethics, and death What if enlightenment movement The development on DPRK’s nuclear problem and its influence on Southeast Asia Chinese diplomacy as a globalized big country Daily Outfit’s differentiated expression: Cantonese People’s “revolution” on collars Observation and thinking on 18th CPC National Congress’s situation supervision through media Key words for Chinese economy 2013 interpretation What could feminism critique do

movie making, to attract student participants. The choir competition per se has been evolved into a professional competition instead of a patriotism education event (Alumni 03, Student 02). As faculties in JU provide considerable amount of financial support for the choir training, the judges and trainers were from professional musician associations and some awarded teams were invited to perform in professional choir concert at the municipal level. Thus the political meaning of 129 contest has clearly weakened, but popularity among students is elevated. The adjustments CYL cadres made to serious, unattractive ideological and political education-related activities blurred the line whether their goal was to attract students for political socialization, or promote diversity and freedom, using the activity as a cover. However, what is clear is that they had the autonomy to make political education events more entertaining, when they realized that political education per se was not attractive enough. CYL cadres also attempted to attract students by providing academic activities that were diverse in nature and promoted critical thinking. A CYL-edited booklet on the activities the SU academic department organized in 2013 (Document 47) recorded 13 lectures, 2 salons, and 2 debates (see Table 7.1). The lectures included two non-Chinese lecturers, and numerous topics related to sociology, economics, and different cultures; one salon was about the societal basis for political civilization. All topics were discussed in an academic way, so as to attract students. In an observed salon held in 2014 (A02), the topic was Politics, Academics, and Life; teachers debated and discussed, with each other and students, on topics related to Chinese politics, university students’ responsibilities, and academic independence. During the activity (A02), a teacher mentioned: If academia serves politics, provides explanations for politicians, then it’s fake academia, stupid academia. (A02)

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This line could be problematic with the possibility of violating the political bottom line, in a classroom full of students. CYL cadre SAS 02 was at the activity, but had no intention of stopping the teachers and students from interacting, and was generally satisfied with the whole activity. According to SAS 02’s interview, students in SU academic departments proposed these activities’ topics and speakers; he felt that JU would allow this extent of academic diversity and a possible challenge to the political authority, so he encouraged students to organize the activity. The CYL had sacrificed political education in activity organizing to attract more students, and it is unclear whether these activities were strategies to attract students’ attention for political socialization, or acts promoting academic freedom; from the interview, SAS 02 and SAS 06 claimed that their motive was to contribute to the free atmosphere in JU, as they thought that JU should be tolerant enough to welcome diverse information and opinions.

Internationalization in and out of Classroom Since the state had granted the promotion on internationalization so as to make world-class universities in recent years (Xi 2014), in pursuit of academic achievement, JU encourages academic collaboration, research, and international exchanges to further JU’s academic development. Though initiated as a political task, these exchanges did contribute to the diversity on opinions on campus, and opened up alternative spaces for staff and students. Through international exchanges, the staff and students came to know more about the outside world, gained a comparative perspective on university education, and developed an understanding differed from the ideological orthodox promoted by the CPC. With this pluralism in opinions, political socialization became tougher to implement, as the increased autonomy granted by the state in the post-Deng era encouraged tolerance of Western culture and international exchanges (Pan 2003).

The University’s Pluralization in Crew on Campus JU pluralized its university population by recruiting more and more faculty members, with overseas educational backgrounds, and foreign faculty and admitting international students. Even some PEC teachers and administrative staff have an overseas educational background. Diversified ideas were brought in by these people who had international experiences. JU recruited Chinese graduates with an overseas educational background as teachers to enhance the diversity of academics; in addition, it offered other teachers plenty of chances to visit other countries. As of 2015, of JU’s 2527 formal teaching staff, 750 had overseas education experience (Document 18), which, while a large number, still falls short of JU’s goal, stated in 2008, of over 70% of its staff having

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an international education background (Document 13). Of 12 interviewed teachers, 5 got their PhD degree in overseas universities (Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada), including 1 PEC teacher; of the remaining 7 who earned their PhD in China (5 of those from JU), 3 had overseas visiting experience (the United State, Austria, and Hong Kong). Thus, 7 of the 12 interviewed teachers had access to more varied sources of information and a more open-minded approach to teaching and academics (Teacher 02, Teacher 03). In the interview, these teachers expressed that they would bring to their classes some political ideas they had learnt in the countries or regions where they had visited or they got their degrees (Teacher 03). JU also recruited foreign faculty members who provide students with more balanced views in classes; in 2015, over 50 formal teaching staff from 20 countries were teaching in JU (Document 18). These teachers’ recruitment is also decided on the faculty level (Teacher 03), and then reported to the university. In some social science departments, international professors are recruited to further the faculty’s academic internationalization (Document 41, Document 43) by bringing new ideas to teaching and research. Hiring faculty members from diverse backgrounds and promoting internationalization of the student population bring alternative values to campus, which triggers students’ critical thinking and opens new horizon. JU admitted a considerable population of international students whose daily lives integrated with those of local students. Through course taking and student organizations, international students brought diversity to JU in academic and political issues. JU has the largest population of international students of any Chinese university in 2014 (Document 16). According to interviewee Student 08, who was from Singapore, international students and Chinese students had classes together most of the times, except that international students need to take Chinese language courses instead of English courses and they do not need to take PECs. International students, together with students from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, do not need to take PECs (Document 02). Although international students live separately from Chinese students, they have communication with each other in class, and debate issues on which they do not have a consensus. In a focus group of 2012 graduates from JU (Focus Group 01), one student said that, in a class about global governance (taught by an Irish professor and with half the class being international students), in-class discussions often revealed different opinions on political issues, such as Taiwan’s sovereignty; the PECs taught Chinese students that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, but international students could see the matter differently (Focus Group 01). In that class, Chinese students faced skepticism about and criticisms of the Chinese Government and the CPC from international students. Students in the focus group said that these experiences made them reflect on the political education they had been receiving. International faculty members and students actually enjoyed a more tolerated political environment.

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The University’s Promotion on International Exchanges JU promoted international exchanges for students with the assistance of various departments so as to let students embrace a global vision. However, the ideas and openness students experienced could challenge the university’s mechanisms of political socialization. JU is promoting students’ becoming more open to the wider world at the risk of degrading the effect of its political socialization efforts. In one observed report meeting, the director of JU’s Foreign Affairs Office (FAO) showed data on undergraduate students’ international exchanges, noting that the proportion of students who had been exchanged overseas increased from about 20% in 2008 to 40% in 2013 (Observed meeting M11). International exchange programs could be initiated at the faculty level, so most faculties have a secretary responsible for international affairs (SAS 03). Former president Prof. Young stated in a speech that the aim of international exchanges should be to cultivate students’ concerns about humanity, scientific spirit, professional quality, and global vision: [To be societal elites with global vision,] you should have basic knowledge of other cultures; you should have a deeper understanding on several specific cultures and religions; you should be tolerant to people and their cultures; you should learn how to communicate and coordinate with people from different cultural background (Document 85).

The former president was encouraging students to be open minded to other cultures during their exchanges. In reality, students who went on international exchanges encountered many different opinions, including political ones. In the focus group of 2012 graduates, one shared her experience: One professor kept on asking me “weird” questions when I was in Paris. She asked: do Chinese people discriminate Tibetans? I think she’s got an attitude against China (Focus Group 01).

Students who went for exchanges faced a lot of questions from foreign professors and students about China, and about things they took for granted at home, such as the possibility of some ethnic minority group’s independence or some political figures whom the CPC regarded as threats to its rule. These students would have to think about these problems and the answers to these questions, while accessing information and opinions they could not access in China. A lot of ideas they regarded as “correct” according to the CPC’s indoctrination were seriously challenged and reflected on when they went abroad (Focus Group 01). Therefore, the promotion of international exchanges also acted as a force challenging ideological and political education. Learning off-campus provides JU students with alternative learning space free from CPC political indoctrination; in particular, learning abroad allows students to get information from their international peers as a way of autonomous learning outside the realm of political socialization. Certain JU students, mostly Mainland Chinese students, participate in on-campus and off-campus international exchange programs to broaden their horizons. As shown in Table 7.2, over 30% of students had on-campus international experiences,

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Table 7.2 Students’ international exchange situation Abroad Times of international exchanges 0 1 2 3 4 5 and above Total

Frequency 564 100 19 2 4 4 693

On campus Valid percentage 81.4 14.4 2.7 0.3 0.6 0.6 100.0

Frequency 363 99 45 13 2 16 538

Valid percentage 67.5 18.4 8.4 2.4 0.4 3.0 100.0

Students’ Percepon on Globalizaon and Internaonalizaon 4

3

2

1 Universies University JU is an JU makes should be students should internaonalized students see a internaonalized. have global university. bigger world. vision.

N=695

N=696

N=697

N=691

SD=0.62

SD=0.57

SD=0.72

SD=0.63

I have a lot of interacon with internaonal students on campus. N=695 SD=0.

1=Strongly Agree; 4=Strongly Disagree Fig. 7.3 Students’ perception on globalization and internationalization. 1 ¼ Strongly agree; 4 ¼ strongly disagree

and over 18% went on international exchanges to other countries. Among the interviewed students, half had international exchange experiences. In Focus Group 01, of the 96 participants, 35 had such experiences, mostly students from humanities and social sciences (Table 7.2). Students in JU also think that it is necessary to have international exchange experience so as to know better about the world and China. As seen in Fig. 7.3, the mean value for the item “university students should have global vision” is 1.36, but the mean for students’ agreement that they have interactions with international students is at 2.62, indicating insufficient communication between Chinese and

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international students within JU (Document 72), but showing students’ will to participate in exchanges as a way to supplement the insufficiency. Interviewed students, especially from the humanities and social sciences (Student 01, Student 02, Student 04, Student 07), all expressed their desire to participate in international exchanges, or felt that they have gained a lot from their international exchanges. In international exchange activities, students have access to information they have not had access to before, including political information. They could thus experience an alternative space for learning in two ways. In international exchanges, students may take courses in foreign universities, experience different teaching styles, and be exposed to more discussion and debate in class. Interviewed students reported that their understanding and academic learning were enhanced through international exchanges. Student 01 reported that he really would like to go on international exchange programs: I could see the outside world, have different perceptions and experience in a different style of teaching, with more discussion, less lecturing. (Student 01)

Students wrote in university newspapers that exchanges really made them reflect on what kind of country China is, what kind of image Chinese people have in the world (Document 87), and even what Chinese higher education should be like (Document 86). These ideas could stimulate students’ curiosity about and reflections on things they learnt in their political education. In Focus Group 01, students also said that they took international exchanges as a way to learn from other perspectives than the ideological orthodoxy in JU, and to experience a freer atmosphere in their discussions: There would be professors asking your opinions on Tibet and Xinjiang, Students talking freely on the CPC policies and China’s development. Not like in JU, some professors are really cautious about what they talk in class and what students talk in class. (Focus Group 01)

Students on international exchanges can also read and buy books that are officially banned in China, such as How Did the Sun Rise over Yan’an: A History of the Rectification Movement by Gao Hua, which talks about the model and origin of the CPC’s ideological remolding (Focus Group 01). Their academic experiences in foreign countries help them to reflect on contents they learnt in JU. These students’ communication with their global peers also helped them develop a broader understanding of political issues. In the process of some international exchange activities, different political opinions held by students from all over the world come to surface, so the JU students participating would be exposed to and get the chance to understand different perspectives. In an interview, Student 02 reported that she had attended an activity participated by students from Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, in which she learnt that Taiwan students were taught that the Republic of China (ROC) should be the country name with territory including Mainland China and Taiwan, unlike what she had been taught—that Taiwan is never a sovereign state, but a rebellious province of the PRC. Student 02 further reported,

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We tried not to ‘correct’ each other’s cognition on this issue and we JU students avoid calling them supporters of Taiwan Independence supporters (Taidu), because we knew we were just educated differently. (Student 02)

The exchange activity helped Student 02 and her groupmates gain an alternative understanding of the Taiwan issue from their Taiwanese peers’ perspective, which differed from what they had learnt in their textbooks. Through international exchanges, some JU students get the chance to evaluate the possibility of further study abroad as another step in their quest for alternative learning spaces. Alumni 03, who used to be a counselor from a social science department, reported that among her 130 Chinese students, 37 pursued graduate studies outside of Mainland China, the majority of whom had international exchange experience in their undergraduate years. International exchanges provided them with opportunities to see other possibilities after graduation. JU students use international exchanges as a form of autonomous learning to broaden their horizons and to learn different perspectives from diversified backgrounds. In this way, they are getting information they could not get from political socialization. In areas not under political control, students used strategies for going off the JU campus to see a world with different political views. Different JU students could behave differently according to their understanding of the necessity of political socialization and their own demands for future development.

Pragmatizing to Pave the Way for Personal Development Some JU students participated in political activities to earn political capital and gain an advantage when applying for employment or internships in the future, particularly for government-related jobs and work in state-owned enterprises. The more they participated in political socialization events, the more they could increase their political capital. Some JU students therefore served in SU and CYL positions or became a CPC member to gain experience and qualifications that would prepare them for the future. The pragmatizing of their political and nonpolitical participation on campus is also another alternative space students find to stay a bit away from political indoctrination.

Students Gaining Political Capital Through Participation JU students also took up positions in political organizations to participate in the collective life. JU students willingly became members of students’ organizations, from the class level up to the faculty and university levels. Most such organizations were supervised by student counselors and the CYL. As seen in Fig. 7.4, of 709 surveyed students, a sizable proportion was interested in participating as

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Student Organizaon Parcipaon Class Commiee/Youth League Group Students’ Union and Youth League Commiee of the faculty College Self-governance Commiee

Students’ Union/Youth League Commiee 0 Percentage

50

100

150

200

250

Frequency

Fig. 7.4 Student organization participation

executive members in the CYL and SU; some might even take up several positions on different levels, showing students’ close attachment to political organizations on campus. Some students took part in political activities or took up positions in political organizations to show their concern for social issues as mentioned in previous section, but some did so for the pragmatic reason of gaining political capital. Participation in these activities showed students’ activeness in campus life, which would earn them credits when applying for internships, foreign exchanges, and other programs. Student 03 reported that, when students apply for an internship or job, companies look into their CVs for information about their organization affiliations, to see whether they were team workers, communicative, and sociable in their university life, as these characteristics are of value to employers. Student 02 also admitted that some students participated in patriotic singing contest to earn credits when they applied for scholarships. Student counselors can be important witnesses of students’ on-campus political performance, making them valuable references on students’ program applications. As a result, some students participate in political activities just to impress their student counselors, so they would make a favorable report to future governmental employers (if they wished to become a civil servant or to work in a state-owned enterprise) regarding their behavior in political activities. Alumni 03 reported in the interview, Several of my students passed the national or regional examination for recruiting civil servants. When they passed the written test, they had to pass the interview. And when they were about to be hired, the unit they applied to would come to JU for political qualification check (zhengshen) . . . Usually they talk with student counselors and the vice CPC secretary of the faculty about how the students behave politically [. . .] like: Has he/she participated in Falungong? Is he/she an active and devoting CPC member? It used to have a

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question about students’ participation in 1989 Tiananmen Incident, but nowadays students are too young to participate in that incident some of them were not even born. (Alumni 03)

Student applicants’ political correctness during important political events would be looked into by potential employers, as would their activeness, making political performance matter to some students, though not all. Taking active part in such political activities as patriotic singing, class meetings, and important ceremonies, or taking up a position in the class cabinet or CYL committee, made students appear loyal to the CPC and active in public affairs, which would be beneficial in politically influenced jobs, such as those in the civil service, state-owned enterprises, public schools, public hospitals, and so forth. These behaviors would also lead to more chances to show even better political performance, by, for example, working as an SAO assistant or for the JU official media (SAS 01, PAS 01), which might directly lead to job opportunities in government or related institutions.

Students’ Mixed Motivation to Join the CPC JU students could choose to join the CPC during their undergraduate studies, but could have mixed motives for doing so. Some students believe that the CPC will help the country develop further, but also see being a CPC member as a type of qualification that will afford them more opportunities after graduation. Different students have different motivations; they hide them or show them according to the occasion when talking to different people. The first motivation for joining the CPC is the belief that only the CPC can make China a better and stronger country. Students with this motivation join the CPC to link their personal development with that of the whole country and society. For example, Student 09, a year six medical student, reported that she had joined the CPC because she wanted her studies to benefit China and its development, as all university students have a social responsibility to make China a better place (Student 09). In observed biweekly CPC branch meetings, students presented similar opinions, saying that their destiny is “tightly connected with the country’s destiny” (M08, M09), suggesting the strength of their belief in the CPC’s governance capabilities. The second motivation is the belief that joining the CPC is an honor, and membership marks one as a part of the elite. Student 09 also reported having this motivation, as she believed that joining the party would make her “improve herself” (Student 09). Student 02 reported that she felt as if her fellow classmates who are CPC members were outstanding, while Student 06 stated that joining the party meant accepting more responsibility for helping others and having strict requirements of one’s self. The survey confirmed that impression; Fig. 7.5 shows that a certain proportion of students regarded their peers who are CPC members as having a heightened sense of responsibility, and as being elite students. Some students also saw joining the CPC as a type of honor, since only 12% of JU students could be approved as members (SAS 07).

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Students’ Percepon on CPC members in JU 4

3

2

1 All my CPC member schoolmates could carry All my CPC member schoolmates are elites. out the responsibility as a member. N=693

N=693

SD=0.82

SD=0.83

1=Strongly Agree; 4=Strongly Disagree Fig. 7.5 Students’ perception on CPC members in JU. 1 ¼ Strongly agree; 4 ¼ strongly disagree

The third type of motivation involves joining the CPC as a result of family influence. Some JU students’ family members might be exemplary CPC members who might want the students to follow in their footsteps, or who might pressure them to join for other reasons. Student 06, for example, said that her grandfather encouraged her to join the CPC because doing so showed one’s desire to improve. Alumni 03 reported, The most frequently mentioned reason in the oral defense of CPC member application procedure, no matter when I was a undergraduate student or when I served as a student counselor, is students saying “my grandpa was a CPC member and an honorable one,” “my father is a civil servant and a CPC member, he served the people heart and soul” . . . things like that. (Alumni 03)

However, some students’ families wanted them to join the party, not only because they saw it as an honorable move, but also out of realistic consideration for their children’s future development—which is the fourth motivation. The fourth motive for joining the CPC concerns students’ intentions of getting a job in China’s public sector, such as government and state-owned enterprises. Usually, students do not express this motive in public, since it seems too straightforward and pragmatic. Moreover, this motivation is regarded “incorrect” in official textbooks on CPC application training (dangxiao). An official textbook for training would be delivered to students. Such textbooks identify five types of motivation: faith firming motivation (a firm belief in communism); progressiveness motivation

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(intention of self-improvement); emotional motivation (family members’ encouragement); honor-gaining motivation (top students’ mentality); and benefiting motivation (obtaining political capital) (Wang 2008). The last two are criticized in the book as “incorrect”; as a result, students avoid mentioning this type of motivation in their application, although they could still have this hidden motive for becoming a CPC member. However, some students do join the party for this pragmatic purpose, as they mention on other occasions. There are even students who are secret religious converts applying to be a CPC member, as doing so opens up more possibilities for a future with no harm. One student who joined the party and was a Christian at the same time wrote an article in the La Vague magazine that read, in part, When I participated in the Party branch’s political life and activities, firstly of all, it is because of faith and belief. Secondly, another assignable reason is the realistic consideration: it is easier to join the CPC in university than later in work; there is no loss for joining, I might even get some bonus in some perspectives. One thing I could not deny is that, behind the political ideal, I also weighed my interests in it (Document 73).

This student hid his religious faith and joined the political organization because he thought both sides were good for him. He thought that the CPC could help China to be a greater country and was willing to contribute to that process; on the other hand, he did not want to give up the religion that had helped him when he felt lost and needed the comfort he found in the divine. It is possible that some students would have similar hidden motives for joining the CPC. Most students have a mixture of the above motivations when they apply to join the CPC, but it is hard to know to what extent students may have the fourth type. It is almost impossible to tell whether students’ motivation in joining CPC is purely political or is mixed with other types of motivations (SAS 03), so the administrative staff responsible for member recruiting accept that students’ political motives are generally mixed with their personal development needs. Students with mixed motivations participate in political activities to gain political capital for their future development. They show loyalty to the CPC in branch meetings to gain credits, knowing very well what to say and how to look to appear concerned about the CPC and the state. As Student 01 reported, I wish Party meeting could be like in those movies about establishing years of the CPC, someone stands up and says a lot of words, then someone else stands and debates with the former one . . . but it is not like that. The reality is, everybody in the meeting is acting according to form. (Student 01)

Acting according to form, as Student 01 describes it, shows that the branch fulfills its formal requirements for teaching from political and policy documents, but does not follow up by checking student CPC members’ learning outcomes or feedback. As a result, students in branch meetings generally make positive comments about the CPC, and avoid negative comments to show their support and good performance. Student 03, a year four engineering student, said that he had experienced different types of branch meetings; some were not educational at all, and just accomplished the task given by the JU CPC Committee by rote:

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Like those themes as Chinese Dreams (assigned by the Central Committee of the CPC as a political movement to participate), we student CPC members just wrote several lines of nice words about the China and a good future and handed over, the secretary of our branch collected those words and made a poster of the words and showed it in the faculty corridor. (Student 03)

In Student 04’s branch, students know how to participate in CPC-related activities and perform well; the poster is a type of achievement. As Student 04 commented, Those students need the identity to find job in state-owned enterprise or to be a civil servant, so what they say need to fit the mainstream CPC ideology. (Student 04)

Performing well in branch meetings could give a student’s branch secretary, usually a student counselor, a good impression on his/her general political performance, thus creating political capital that could benefit him/her when applying for civil service or CPC-related positions in enterprises, as their future potential work unit would contact JU as part of a political reliability check (Alumni 03), and the branch secretary would be the one to reply. These students know how to perform in CPC branch activities, and how to change their role-play to suit the occasion. Students in JU play the role to embrace political socialization by showing a desire to serve the country obediently to fulfill their political task; at the same time they gain political capital and learn how to perform best in politics so as to pave the way for their future development.

Students’ Preparation for Future Career Development Some JU students were pragmatic about their university education, seeing it as a way to find better employment in the future. As a result, they set aside academic and political learning, and instead studied to improve their competitiveness in the job market, and made efforts at long-range career planning. This pragmatic attitude and students’ resulting behavior were informed by several reasons. As a first reason they did not think what they experienced in political socialization would benefit them in their future career. JU students’ pragmatism became stronger with every year they spent in university; in the survey, when responding to the statement, “I think knowing more about politics is of no help to my future career,” year one and year two students had significantly higher means than year three and year four students (see Table 7.3), showing the longer they stayed in university, the more they agreed that political knowledge was useless to their future career. This was echoed in the student interviews. Student 03 described the changes in JU students from their freshmen to senior years, as they developed more realistic goals about their graduation: When we firstly entered the university, we were passionate, we talked about the country and we worried about the people. In year 2 we started to focus more on academics, the topics we

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Table 7.3 Studying year differences in the statement “I think knowing more about politics is of no help to my future career” (I) Year of study Year 1

a

(J) Year of study Year 2 Year 3 Year 4

Difference in means between years (IJ) 0.142 0.230a 0.279a

Standard error 0.074 0.085 0.091

Significance 0.057 0.007 0.002

The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level

talked changed, we talked about the courses, we talked about how those classmates who went for exchange were, we talked about job hunting. Everybody has pressure. (Student 03)

Similarly, Student 01, a year two social science student, seemed to like learning politics greatly, as he talked a lot about the role of the university and how he liked the knowledgeable teachers in his department; however, his peers were different: We university students should be enthusiastic, positive and progressive (in politics). But I found the senior students are minding their own business like job hunting, no one really cares about public affairs. Like Tocqueville described in The Old Regime and the Revolution, it is the lack of noble spirit along with the modern society, everybody only cares about their own stuff. (Student 01)

As students advanced in their university career, they increasingly focused on things they deemed useful (from a business perspective) for gaining a good job, rather than on political knowledge or academic achievement. As a second reason, students were pragmatic due to their parents’ influence. Usually, parents encouraged them to learn more things practical to ensure that they would get better future jobs, and saw attending JU as a good start to getting a good job. As Student 01 said, I feel pressure for my future. I have to earn money finally 1 day. Not everyone in our department would choose to be academic, since the things we learnt are quite ‘useless’ in reality and the income issue. So we have to learn something useful [. . .] because you know how parents raised us up and how they expected us to pay back 1 day. (Student 01)

Parents put pressure on students in terms of their future career planning, and wished them to focus less on things that distracted them from career planning. Student 02 reported, My parents told me not to express too much on political issues. They told me to mind my own business, like my GPA, my intern and my graduate school application. (Student 02)

Parents believed that the purpose of a good university education was to guarantee a good job in the future. Students acted on this received belief by putting their efforts into things likely to benefit them in their future career. As such, some JU students ignored political socialization and found space for autonomous learning by attending career planning or overseas study planning activities. Student 05 reported having several class meetings with senior or graduated students about their experiences in university and at work. In the survey, among the

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How much do students like companies’ campus talks

Like very much

Like

Neutral

Not really

Dislike

Never attended

Missing

Fig. 7.6 How much do students like companies’ campus talks

699 valid respondents to the question on companies’ on-campus talks (Fig. 7.6), only 171 surveyed students (barely 24.1%) never attended such activities. No matter whether students liked such activities, they nonetheless attended to gain information about job hunting and the overall job market. Activities related to applying to graduate school in overseas universities were also hot commodities in JU (SAS 01, Alumni 03, Student 02), with an even higher participation rate (see Fig. 7.7), and only 75 students saying that they had never attended such activities. These activities were usually about graduates or seniors’ graduate school or job application experiences. Students seemed concerned about their development after graduation, and so started to prepare for that during their studies at JU. These activities were neither related to nor covered by political socialization; it was a field in which students could ignore politics. On the other hand, these JU students saw a good GPA as essential to getting a good job or a good graduate school offer, making this a standard of university education. As a result, some of them selected courses and based their interest in a given course on the grade they expected to earn. JU students even developed guides for course selection that made teachers’ grading habits an important criterion. In the JU BBS, one popular board (called “Lessons”) features recommendations from senior students as to which courses they think are worth taking, along with past exam papers. One criterion they often provide is whether the teacher gives good

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How much do students like sharing experiences by seniors and alumni

Like very much

Like

Neutral

Not really

Dislike

Never aended

Missing

Fig. 7.7 How much do students like sharing experiences with seniors and alumni

grades to students. There is even an online, student-written course selection bible to which numerous students refer to ensure that they do not choose professors who grade strictly (Document 64, Document 70). In JU, there are limits on the grades awarded, such that only 30% of students in a given class can receive an A or A. Students consider those teachers who use up their quota of As and give mostly B+ grades to be good graders (Teacher 03). When asked whether they like a specific course and why, in addition to finding the teacher interesting and learning a lot, all interviewees implied that grading is important. As Student 05 reported, My friend does not recommend me to take that course because he said the teacher is a ‘CD writer’.2 (Student 05)

Some interviewed students reported that they liked a course simply because the teacher was generous in his/her grading (Student 05, Student 06). For some students, getting good grades was the only criterion for choosing both PEC and non-PEC courses, not actual course quality. A student-written article in La Vague magazine pointed to this phenomenon of pursuing GPA for pragmatic reasons, noting “students now select courses for good GPA instead of for knowledge” (Document 70). In a classroom survey done by Teacher 05 (involving 3 classes and approximately 250 students), the statement, “For me, grading is more important than getting knowledge,” received an average score of 4.9 (1 ¼ strongly disagree to 10 ¼ strongly agree), suggesting that students think GPA is almost equally important as learning knowledge. Thus, some students set getting a good GPA as a goal and develop

2

An expression popular among students to describe teachers who give a lot of C and D as scores.

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strategies to achieve it, largely ignoring political socialization projects and even sometimes academic achievements.

Summary This chapter had presented the practices other than pursuing academic freedom and critical thinking as a contrast to the politically restricted autonomy, by showing a third scenario of looking for flexibility and alternative space. The depoliticizing of students’ affairs and activities which included student counselors’ diluting of political contents in their daily job and students’ redefinition of political activities happened often on campus. The students’ affairs and activities were also diversified with SAO and CYL’s democratization of students’ affairs and provision of enriched forms of activities. Both the internationalization in faculty members and students and the promotion of international exchanges actually did provide diversified ideas on campus. There are also a group of students who are actually pragmatic in participating events on campus including political ones so as to pave way for personal development in the future. They participate in activities to gain political capital, join the CPC with mixed motivation, and prepare well for their career path. These practices constituted a tension between the political restriction and a desire in flexibility, while different players had their tactics to deal with it.

References Dong, Y. (2005). Zhishi Xinyang Xiandaihua: Zhongguo Zhengzhi Shehuihua Zhong de Gaodeng Jiaoyu (Knowledge, belief and modernization: Higher education in China’s political socialization). Shanghai: Fudan University Press. Pan, S.-Y. (2003). How higher educational institutions cope with social changes: The case of Tsinghua University, China. Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong. Wang, W. (Ed.). (2008). Xinshiqi Gaoxiao Rudang Peixun Jiaocheng (University students’ joining CPC training textbook in the new period. Shanghai: People’s Publishing House. Xi, J. (2014). The governance of China. Beijing: Foreign Language Press.

Chapter 8

Political Socialization in Chinese Higher Education: Role Differentiation as a Strategy

This book used the case of JU to explore the dynamics and complexity of the interplay between the state, university, faculty members, staff, and students in the fulfillment of both political task and academic task in the university. The struggle of JU assisted to look into different actors’ practices regarding the state-assigned political task of making socialist successors and the academic task of preserving university’s academic freedom to educate critical thinkers, and also a flexibility therein to find alternative spaces, revealing a tension between the two tasks and different players’ tactics to deal with the tension. This chapter begins by reviewing the meaning of political socialization in the context of JU. Next, it explains the concept of role differentiation as a strategy used to tackle the tension, so as to explain the dynamics and complexities in political socialization in Chinese higher education. Finally, it will revisit studies on political socialization, Chinese higher education especially in university autonomy, and academic freedom to discuss the theoretical contributions, implications, and further thoughts of this study.

The Meaning of Political Socialization in the Context of JU This section reviews the meaning of political socialization in the context of JU. The process of political socialization in this study is complex and dynamic, and involves fulfilling political task as the priority and different players’ deduction on the task so as to come up with detailed practices within the political restriction. Political socialization means the completion of the political task in the context of JU that set up a politically restricted autonomy. As shown in Chap. 4, though political task is set as the priority, different players have their own deduction on the implementation of the political task. The state has a consistent expectation on universities being Red and Expert, though in different historical stages, the detailed expectation might differ according to Chap. 3. “Being © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Du, Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8300-1_8

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Expert” is actually a task to serve for the socialist construction. Though in recent years the state did give autonomy in various areas through power delegation including faculty recruiting, research grant management, and so on, the political supervision is enhanced. The university has to consistently respond to political requirements from the state to reassure the sate the implementation of the task. The fulfillment of political task would be modified by the university, faculty members, and students, as the faculty members’ major task is to hold on to the political bottom line in teaching and research and students are already used to the system of ideological and political education as they grow up in a school system with this essential part. What set superior to the academic task is the task to make future socialist conformists and constructors. As illustrated in Chap. 5, the political leadership, the system of political education, the maintenance of political stability, and the political control composed the mechanism to fulfill the political task. The administration system, the academic system, the organizational system, and the extracurricular system are infiltrated with political elements to ensure the complement of the political task in making “high quality talents who served for the socialist construction (Document 55).” With the political leadership system to oversee the other three mechanisms, the academic mechanism on political education ensures that the political knowledge students get is orthodoxy, the organizational mechanism on political stability supervises students’ political attitude in daily life, while the extracurricular mechanism on political control manages students’ political participation. These mechanisms composed the process of political socialization in JU. The association of the completion of political task and the process of political socialization constituted a politically restricted autonomy in JU that despite the political area that has a clear boundary, there are still spaces for academic development that do not take politics as an end, and for flexible and alternative conducts that do not follow the political orthodoxy routine, which is the strategy of role differentiation.

Role Differentiation as a Strategy in Chinese Higher Education From the foregoing analysis, this study suggests the concept of role differentiation as a strategy in Chinese higher education, so as to (a) fulfill the dual tasks; (b) to ease the tension in a politically restricted autonomy; and (c) to cope with political dynamics. In such a model, the players concerned take on different roles based on their deduction on political task and exhibit different or even contrasting behaviors on different occasions under the political restriction. These behaviors could range from playing an obedient role by observing the political bottom line set by the state in political matters to playing the role of challengers by attempting to expand the scope of academic freedom even in politically sensitive areas, and from using

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political participation as a path to gain political capital to looking for chances to broaden horizon. One player could differentiate his/her role into two or more with the strategy to deal with different situations. The role differentiation strategy with which background it operated under specified the university autonomy situation in China by defining it as a politically restricted autonomy and making every player count in the interaction with the state’s requirements. It supplements the idea of regulated autonomy (Yang et al. 2007) by pointing out which part was specifically regulated. It illustrates players within one university and their interactions, instead of seeing them as parts of the university, as in Pan’s (2009) study. Pan looked at the semi-independent status of Chinese higher education from a perspective of the influence of Western and Chinese traditions on Tsinghua University, with a focus on the modernization and globalization of Chinese society. Pan also found indicators about staff and students to illustrate the relationship between the state and the university. Different players, according to the different requirements they encountered in their position, found different alternative spaces, illustrating in detail the concepts of “overt obedience but covert violation” and “bravely testing” the government’s tolerance, as Pan (2003) suggested as topics for further study. This study discovered that, though JU did not have as strong an influence as was seen in the case of Tsinghua University, it still experienced struggles and tensions between political control and institutional autonomy, which set up the context for different players to practice the strategy. The concept of role differentiation uses the dual-role perspective in Hu’s (2005) research and the idea of university faculty members’ personality in Liu’s (2012) study as a reference to see players’ strategies for dealing with the tension between their academic and political roles in Chinese higher education. Hu defined academics’ dual tasks as delivering knowledge, and acting as politicians. The university is a cell unit of society, and the state controls the university by providing resources and authoritative political mobilization, such that the politicized academic staff in Chinese higher education cannot get rid of state supervision, as Liu pointed out as a comparatively closed environment. As a result, academic development is largely influenced by politics. This idea of faculty members’ dual role and Dong’s (2005) idea of the university’s dual role were combined and reorganized in this study into the concept of role differentiation. In addition, unlike Hu and Liu’s analyzed examples of academics active in the early ROC years, this study analyzed the current situation in China, and provided more insights into the interactions between the state, university, faculty members, administrative staff, and students, as the tension between the political task and the academic task could be expanded to all levels of interaction. There is also another type of scenario that could happen which is the indifference to the fulfillment of the political task, which made the interaction even more complicated. Role differentiation strategy is also a supplement to the studies on students’ perspectives on political socialization and critical thinking by expanding the deconstruction and reconstruction in political socialization from student group only to all players and by adding a scenario of political indifference. Fairbrother (2003) illustrated students’ skepticism in political education and their reflections on constructive

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University’s Response Political Task as Priority

Different Players’ Deduction

Faculty’s Sense Students’ Inertia

Academic Task Academic Freedom Critical Thinking

Tension

Political Tasks Implementation

Tension Flexibilities

Administrative

Political Leadership

Supervision

Academic Organizational Extra-curricular

Political Education Political Stability Political Control

Mechanisms

Practices

Knowledge Attitude Participation Political Socialization

Role Differentiation: balance

Politically Restricted Autonomy

Alternatives

Role Differentiation: coexistence

Fig. 8.1 Role differentiation strategy

patriotism in Mainland China, where the state has hegemony over higher education, and suggested that qualitative inquiries into students’ political socialization experiences and critical thinking could be directions for further studies, as his study majorly focused on students’ attitudes towards national identity. This research has gone further by showing and explaining how players use role differentiation strategy to be political socializees, critical thinkers, and autonomous learners. This concept of role differentiation strategy resulted from the restricted autonomy, as the political task is set as the priority and the university has a strong system to implement the task as a process of political socialization. As tension arouses between the academic task and political task, the strategy is used to pursue academic freedom and critical thinking, while as a scenario of looking for alternative spaces, the strategy is used to make possible the coexistence of both restriction and flexibility, as shown in the figure below. These different roles could be seen in one individual, or in different people within a single group, and could range from obediently observing the political bottom line for political affairs to acting as a challenger by attempting to expand the scope of autonomy and freedom in academic areas, even those deemed politically sensitive. The following section presents details on the characteristics of role differentiation (Fig. 8.1).

Role Differentiation as a Strategy to Balance Dual Tasks The first characteristic of role differentiation strategy is that it could be practiced to balance both the political task and the academic task. Though the political task of Chinese higher education could be seen as a social service task except for the

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teaching and research tasks of university, its weight in reality is way more than what social service could contain. “Red and Expert” as putting “Red” before “Expert,” and “Expert” serving “Red,” has decided political task sticking on top of the list. There are still some areas which the faculty members and students perceived as being “Expert” did not fit in the service for being “Red.” Since political control put restrictions on university autonomy and academic freedom, the political task could damage the staff’s and students’ academic independence. Role differentiation strategy helped to realize the fulfillment of academic task when it did not also fall in the category of the political task. Different players, based on their deduction on the political task, find out what practices could be tolerated in politically restricted autonomy. In regard to political issues and administrative leadership, the university followed state policies and instructions; on issues relating to the development of the institution, such as academic standards, student quality, and education reputation, it took actions consonant with its autonomy. The practices to implement political socialization are practical in JU, with administrative mechanism to overlook the academic, organizational, and extracurricular mechanisms to ensure that students attain political knowledge, form political attitude, and involve in political participation in favor of a CPC orthodox. The SAO and CYL helped the university set up a bottom line for faculties and students not to cross, and thus outlined the areas of the forbidden, leaving out a space to fulfill the academic task which some faculty members and students deemed important but might not favor the political task. In balancing the political task and the academic task, the tactics of this strategy includes university’s maintenance on its public image of academic independence, its tolerance on diversity and openness of PECs, and its provision on general education courses to promote critical thinking; faculty member diversification on teaching contents and encouragement on classroom discussion; and students’ expectation on critical thinking, resistance towards PECs, and their striving for independent expression. There is a duality status of the tasks in Chinese higher education. The idea of duality, which indicates a state simultaneously having two parts, is different from polarity (Beckham 2014), which is an issue of either-or. The strategy of role differentiation helps to balance the dual tasks that could exist at the same time without diametrical opposition. Exceptional examples of role differentiation strategy can be seen when individuals have not fulfilled their political tasks at all, and have acted against the CPC in China. It happens comparatively more often on faculty members. The 2010 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, Liu Xiaobo, used to work in a university before he was sent to prison, for suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power” (Zang 2011) after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, and again in 2009 after he published documents criticizing the CPC’s “dictatorial monopoly over the dissemination of information” (He 2015). Dismissal can occur when one refuses to differentiation of one’s role of fulfilling both tasks, by challenging authority, resulting in one not only leaving China’s system of higher education, but also losing the opportunity to strive for university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking in a restrained framework.

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Role Differentiation as a Strategy to Realize Coexistence of Restriction and Flexibility As a second characteristic, the role differentiation strategy helps to ease the tensions under the political restriction to make coexistence possible. The flexibility and alternative space could also contradict to the original purpose of the political task implementation. The university, faculty members, administrative staff, and students coped with the tension between expectations and responsibilities by exhibiting different behaviors in different situations. On many occasions, the expectations on and responsibilities of the university, faculty members, staff, and students might be competing or even contradictory. Though student counselors should implement ideological and political education, they also dilute political contents when doing it and democratize procedures in student affairs. Though CYL controlled the students’ organizations on campus, it also enriched the form of student activities according to students’ interests. Though students take part in political activities as an inertia, they also redefine their participation as a responsibility towards the society which detached the party ideology. The internationalization of the university actually promoted pluralism in views. Students’ pragmatic development needs make the effect of ideological indoctrination questionable. The strategy of role differentiation realizes the coexistence of the political task implementation and the flexibility and alternative space. This coexistence of restriction and flexibility would appear more in higher education rather than other educational stages in China. The state built a system into universities to maintain its control over Chinese politics, and though its mechanisms have been well implemented, there remains some buffer space between state requirements and players’ deduction on the political task. The faculty members’, student counselors’, and CYL cadres’ role therein is subtle; on the one hand, their interactions with students could dilute efforts at political indoctrination and increase openness in party activities; on the other hand, students can find autonomous spaces in university—e.g., joining a political organization to benefit their job hunting, or even leaving the campus physically to be exposed to other cultures and ideologies. Only university could enjoy this degree of free choice since most of them are already grown-ups. This shows their perceptions of political socialization, including their complicated motives for pursuing a political life, desire for civic participation, and multidimensional pursuit of content and context in university life. Unlike at the basic education level, where political socialization contents and programs are mainly designed and imposed by authorities in a top-down manner, though school leaders might have a say in the practices to implementation of political socialization (Xu and Law 2015), university students do enjoy bigger autonomous spaces within the higher education system.

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Role Differentiation as a Strategy to Cope with Political Dynamics The third characteristic of role differentiation is that it could help all players to cope with political dynamics through the history and towards the future. Through the historical review it could be seen that there has been continuous resistance to political intervention in academic affairs in JU throughout the years, though these political interventions have come from different political bodies. Role differentiation actually had been settled as a strategy in JU since the political regime stabilized in the hands of the CPC. Though JU’s experience could not be generalized to the whole Chinese education system, the strategy of role differentiation could be seen here and there, more or less in other Chinese universities. Role differentiation would be used as a strategy in the future; as the political climate changes, the strategy would help all players to adjust. After Xi Jinping took over, he made a few big steps to distinguish himself from his predecessor Hu Jintao and to consolidate his power including an initiation in changing the constitution, publishing his own books on ruling the country while he is still in the position (most of the other political leaders publish book when they step down), giving a specific name to his thoughts on particular issues (Xi Jinping Education Thoughts became a hot topic among scholars in educational research in China), and promoting a series reform in legitimizing the rule of the CPC in China. All has shown that he is an ambitious and powerful new generation of political leader. When Xi gave a talk in Peking University in 2014, he commented that young people’s value determined the whole direction of the entire society and it was like tying the buttons on one’s clothes, and if one got the first button wrong, he got the rest wrong as well (Xi 2014a). This talk implied that Xi realized that the future leaders would be from these top universities in China and making these students conformists of socialism is crucial to the rule of the CPC in China. That might explain why he paid a lot of attention on university students’ ideological and political education ever since he seized the power. Specifically, 2013 till recent witnessed an increased tightening of political and social control in China, as mentioned in Chap. 4, that has been echoed in Vice Minister of Education Du Yubo’s (2016) recent emphasis on student counselors’ ideological influence on students; how such an increase in control might affect the relationships among universities, teachers, and students, both internally and with the state, could be topics for further studies. In recent years the government has been making efforts to revive Confucianism and Chinese traditional culture (Ministry of Education of People’s Republic of China 2014; Xi 2014b); whether this promotion of traditional Chinese elements will serve as a mechanism for further political stability maintenance is worthy of careful study. In December 2016, Xi broke new ground in higher education, by including all staff and students in the process of making future socialist conformists in Chinese universities at the National Conference on Ideological and Political work in colleges and universities held in Beijing in December 2016, and specifically commented on the importance of ideological and

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political education in universities, especially PEC teachers’ role therein (Xi 2016). Minister of Education, Chen Baosheng, has since emphasized Xi’s ideas on various occasions (Chen 2016), leading provincial and municipal party branches and universities to take advantage of them in their ideological and political education (Fan 2017; Zhang 2017). The party organization was strengthened. A website named Xuexi Qiangguo (xuexi.cn) was launched in 2018 together with the smartphone application by the CPPCC to urge and help all party members to learn documents and speeches of political leaders. Party members could earn points by reading news, watching video clips, and answering questions on the app; all contents are related to the greatness and development of the CPC. Some party groups would require its members to reach certain amount of points to show their eagerness in learning about the CPC, showing an enhancement in CPC organization construction. In universities, student party members are required to download the application on their phone and study the materials in the application. These changes in Chinese politics would stimulate new tactics from the role differentiation strategy, as this strategy is capable of dealing with dynamics.

Theoretical Implications of the Study This section first revisits the idea of political socialization and its related studies in the context of Chinese higher education. It then reviews studies on Chinese higher education, with special attention to the strategy of preserving university autonomy and academic freedom, and the fostering of critical thinkers.

Revisiting Theories on Political Socialization The first theoretical contribution of this study is to supplement the theory of political socialization and the conventional understanding of educational institutions as agents of political socialization by looking into related interactions within a given educational institution. It further explores the mechanisms of political socialization in higher education institutions, focusing not only on political education courses. It also supplements the extant literatures on political socialization in China beyond the study of ideological and political education in making obedient citizens, with attention to the possible disobedience of playing the role to embrace political socialization. This study provides a perspective on the complexity of universities’ implementation of political socialization. Firstly, as an agent of political socialization, an educational institution is not static, but dynamic, featuring the interaction of the various players within it. As agents, institutions develop and transmit political knowledge, attitudes, and values among their members in a society (Dawson and Prewitt 1969). The players or actors within these agents are participants in the process of political socialization. Four

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main types of agents are deemed most important in facilitating political socialization in the extant literature (Fairbrother 2003): parents and family, peer groups, media, and educational institutions (Dawson and Prewitt 1969; Niemi and Sobieszek 1977). However, within educational institutions, multiple players can be found and be seen to interact with each other; university administrative staff, teachers, and students, together with the demands of the state, frame a dynamic interaction. Although, as Jennings (2007) pointed out, the study of political socialization had been merged with other sub-areas of political science, such as public opinion, electoral behavior, political culture, and political movements, with focus on the interactions of the political socialization process and contextual factors of a specific society, the process of political socialization within educational institutions remained under-researched. Li (2009) considered agents in higher education, such as university campuses and local communities, to be major factors in political socialization, and internal players within the educational institution were neglected. This study sees the university, faculty, staff, and students as players within the higher education institution, and explores the process of political socialization by looking into their interactions. The individual efforts in political socialization count, and the change of the given community within which people are politically socialized also counts. Secondly, the mechanisms of political socialization in higher education are further explored in this study. Political education courses had been regarded as the main form of political socialization in educational institutions in existing literatures. Denver and Hands’ study (1990) confirmed formal political education curricula’s influence on students’ political perceptions, attitudes, and knowledge. Other mechanisms of political socialization were under-researched, however, with only isolated studies discussing social learning (Campbell 1979), moral development (Wilson 1981), and citizenship-making programs (Sperandio et al. 2010). Most studies about political socialization in China, especially in Chinese higher education, have focused on political education courses (Hayhoe 1993; Jin and Yi 2012), student counselors’ role in maintaining political stability (Yan 2014), voluntary work’s socialization of students (Lin and Zhang 2007), and political organizations for uniting young university students (Zheng 2008); this study has streamlined the mechanisms for political socialization in Chinese higher education. In this study, the university had a system of political task implementation as the process of political socialization, with the political leadership of the CPC as the administrative mechanism, the PECs as the academic mechanism, the political stability maintenance managed by the SAO as the organizational mechanism, and the political control on student activities by CYL as the extracurricular mechanism to supervise students’ political knowledge, attitude, and participation. Thirdly, this study had supplemented the study of political socialization in China in two aspects. The extant literatures on political socialization in China have mostly focused on the process as a form of ideological and political education intended to create obedient citizens to serve the socialist state (Dong 2005; Zhao 2001; Xia and Zhang 2006); this research, however, sees the process of political socialization as serving the needs of both the state and the players within. Most studies in this field have been conducted under the umbrella of ideological and political education, or

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student affairs discussing how universities help consolidate students’ socialist beliefs (Zhang 2005; Qiu 2003a). Many studies see higher education in China as a reproduction-based institution for political socialization that is strongly influenced by traditional political culture heritage, and in which students gain social and symbolic capital through the educational process, especially elite students (Liu et al. 2012). Though some studies have pointed out the possible conflict between fostering critical thinkers and making socialist conformists in higher education (Qiu 2003b), the detailed strategy to ease the tension between academic task and political task and make coexistence of restriction and flexibility possible was not analyzed. Though the necessity of fulfilling the political task in Chinese higher education came from the state’s need to consolidate its political orthodoxy, this is only part of the complexity of political socialization in China. This study adopted a different perspective from the extant literature and put the academic task and the flexibility into a tug-of-war with political socialization. In this sense, this study also further supplements Fairbrother’s (2003) study on providers and promoters of critical thinking, and its tension with political socialization. Unlike his study, which identified that schooling, university experience, and critical thinking dispositions have a significant impact on students’ national attitudes, this study focused more on students’ political socialization experiences and critical thinking, and less on their attitudes towards the nation. As different players practice the strategy of role differentiation, Fairbrother’s emphasis on individual’s effort in political socialization was also expanded to other players, the roles of the state, a given social system, a specific institution, and individuals who were observed and provided new theoretical ways to look at all of them in the complex and dynamic process of political socialization. In summary, this study had supplemented studies on political socialization, both general theoretical works and specific researches about China, with special attention being paid to internal players’ roles in political socialization and its detailed mechanisms in higher education. Studies about political socialization in Chinese higher education have also been extended to include different players’ effort in the process.

Revisiting Theories on Chinese Higher Education The second theoretical contribution of this study is to highlight the tension between political task and academic task in a socialist country, by viewing the function of higher education as it relates to both the sociopolitical task and the conventional task of knowledge creation, using the case of a Chinese university to provide insights into institutional autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking in China’s higher education system. Firstly, the conventional university task of creating knowledge is safeguarded by university autonomy and academic freedom. According to Yang et al. (2007), within higher education, both institutional and individual autonomy should be crucial elements in a university, with “the former referring to a university’s autonomy in its context of multiple external relationships, especially with governments, and the

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latter referring to the autonomy of individual academics which is akin to the notion of academic freedom.” It is academic freedom that ensures the creation and production of knowledge without fear of sanction by academic or external authorities (Altbach 2004): “in most countries, academic freedom extends to expression of opinions by members of the academic community on social and political issues as well as within the narrow confines of professional expertise.” China’s higher education provides a case study of political intervention into university affairs and exemplifies what Altbach (2004) called a country that “permits unfettered academic freedom in the nonpolitical hard sciences but places restrictions on it in the more sensitive social sciences and humanities.” This study had confirmed this type of restriction in Chinese higher education with empirical data, and defined the autonomy status of JU as under a politically restricted autonomy. It supplements firstly Pan’s (2009) study, by exploring furthering her definition of university autonomy in China as semi-independent, by expanding this semiindependence to other players, including faculty, staff, and students, to depict the power they have to protect themselves from external intervention in certain areas, and to act upon their own initiative to respond to academic pursuits and autonomous learning needs within the framework of both government and university policies. To realize this status and manage the tensions they face, they strategically differentiate their roles. This study also furthered Pan’s research by examining how written and unwritten rules shape university’s autonomy by illustrating the expectations and responsibilities the university had and its strategies for promoting university autonomy (Pan 2003). In addition, different from Pan’s view of Chinese higher education as semi-independent in terms of university autonomy, this study found the “buffer” to exist within the university, instead of external organizations (Li and Yang 2014), by enriching the meaning of the idea of semi-independent regulated autonomy. Secondly, the political task has been the core of Chinese higher education since 1949, with the CPC in charge of the indoctrination of university students into its political orthodoxy. The political control of Chinese higher education includes both the economic development task and the political socialization task (Law 1996), with the latter specifically aiming to socialize students into “norms, values and ideologies deemed acceptable to and prescribed by the CPC-led state” (Law 2013). Chinese higher education has to balance the two tasks; however, since economic development relies heavily on knowledge creation, some autonomy and freedom were granted to the universities to diversify curricula, institutionalize research, and promote exchanges (Law 1996). This situation has been pointed out again in this study, as the priority of the political task with granted space for academic freedom and critical thinking. However, most studies in this area (i.e., university autonomy and academic freedom in Chinese higher education) have focused on state-granted university autonomy (Zhong 1997; Wang 2010; Ren and Li 2013; Pritchard 1994; Du 1992) or individual staff autonomy (Yang et al. 2007), rather than seeing the university, faculty, staff, or even students as having an active role in looking for academic freedom under a restricted autonomy. In the extant literature, much has been said of the higher education reforms in 1980s, and how decentralization and decreased

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funding turned higher education in China from a state-controlled model to a statesupervised model with more institutional autonomy (Yang et al. 2007; Postiglione 2004) in knowledge structures, teacher salaries, admissions, and university administration, tempered by the imposition of new measures to restraint (Law 1995). There has also been comments about the depoliticizing trend in Chinese higher education (Yan 2014). On the other hand, the image of Chinese scholars as self-mastering and enjoying a high degree of intellectual authority (Zha 2011; Li 2011) emerging from Chinese cultural tradition (Zha 2012) has been emphasized by scholars as a unique form of autonomy in Chinese higher education. With the acknowledgement of the existence and priority of the political tasks of Chinese higher education, studies on university autonomy and academic freedom in China focused generally on the state’s role only in analyzing the situation, with arguments centering on state-regulated autonomy in universities and academics’ bounded freedom (Document 04) (Zhong 1997). This study used the idea of conflicting ideologies within Chinese higher education as a premise and applied it to all players. Chinese higher education nowadays embraces diverse ideologies, from the communist ideas of Marx and Mao to marketbased ideas resulting from the reform and opening up of 1978 (Mok 2000; Law 1996), leading to the possible flexibility in universities, as students can be both pragmatists and materialists, focusing on personal gain and development while absorbing a variety of values and still being positive to China’s development (Yang 2002). Other than a tension between the political task and the academic task, a third scenario based on diversified values was pointed out in this study and the role differentiation strategy helps it to coexist in the higher education system. This study actually provided empirical data to what Yan Guangcai (2002) called value conflict of different groups of people within the higher education institution. While he analyzed different people’s value in the running of a university, with administrative staff focusing on the efficiency and order, while faculty members appreciating the freedom, as for students, no unified values were detected. This phenomenon Yan concluded allied with the condition for role differentiation strategy. In addition to providing a vivid picture of how differentiated the values can be between different players or even among a group of players, this study revealed that the roles could be differentiated according to different circumstances even on one single player. Based on these understandings of Chinese higher education, especially as regards university autonomy and academic freedom, this study further explored the boundaries of autonomy and how flexible it could be, and strategies for fulfilling both the conventional knowledge creation task and the political task of political socialization. Though under a political restricted autonomy, applying the strategy of role differentiation, the restriction per se is dynamic, it is something that could be constructed through the time according to political changes. The contribution of this study is that it provides new perspective of autonomy in Chinese higher education not solely being granted by the state, but also emerging from players’ dynamic interaction. This study has further clarified the state’s political control over universities in China, but with more attention being paid to the tensions between tasks and players’

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initiatives. Additionally, this study has adopted ideas from different studies and further explored the interactions among different players, based on the identification of the different expectations and responsibilities on the university, faculty, staff, and students. This study has illustrated a complex scenario in Chinese higher education with detailed performances by different players within the university, to examine their strategies for handling tension and pursuing institutional autonomy and academic freedom, and promoting critical thinking. Though it has its limitations and flaws, this model of role differentiation could be a useful framework to be used in different levels of education, and even in other social units as it has become a strategy for a lot of Chinese people to live their lives.

Limitations and Further Studies This mixed method study has three main limitations. First, the initial focus of this research was political socialization in Chinese higher education; it was only during the process of data analysis that the concepts of university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking emerged as core issues informing tensions. Though the interview covered the concepts of university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking, posing specific questions earlier in the data collection process could have yielded different results. Second, in this study, the analysis of the state and its requirements on university majorly relied on the policy documents and political leaders’ speeches. There are some senior university administrative leaders included in the interview, but there are also a lot of interactions between the state and the university happening as a lobbying process which could not be easily accessed to so as to be observed. This part of the data is important but missing in this research, which requires insiders’ perspectives and contribution in related further academic studies. Third, as a case study, this study is not representative of other cases, and its findings cannot be generalized beyond one specific university. However, the intent of this study was not generalization, but the provision of an intensive, holistic description and analysis of JU; only theoretical propositions would be generalized. Errors are unavoidable, especially in the process of designing, distributing, administering, and collecting questionnaires and analyzing the resulting quantitative data. However, since the major use of the data was to present descriptive findings, the impact of any errors would be minor. This study suggests possible methodological and theoretical directions for future researches. JU is a MoE-supervised public university with a good reputation, and the tension between political socialization and university autonomy might be different in other types of universities, including private universities and public provincesupervised universities; as such, these institutions are worthy of specific attention. This research had been mainly about the undergraduates in one university; graduate students could also be included in further studies to see the impact of restriction and autonomy on more research-related fields; since the demographics of graduate

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students are different from those of undergraduates, there could be a higher proportion of CPC members among graduate students, and they could have taken their undergraduate work in numerous other universities with differentiated degrees of political control and university autonomy. In addition, faculty members and graduate students might face more problems with and restrictions on their research topics. The university autonomy in recruitment, in staff promotion, and in evaluation on faculty members was not discussed in this study. These could be interesting topics to explore.

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Appendix A: Methodological Considerations

Introduction This appendix outlines the methodology used to facilitate in-depth analysis of the data and addresses this study’s research questions. The first section describes how the original research questions were formulated, and why a case study was selected as the most appropriate method for answering them. It then explains the rationale for selecting JU as a case. The following section introduces issues related to data collection and analysis, describing in particular the documents selected for collection and review, questionnaire design, format of the observation, semi-structured interview procedures, and data triangulation methods. Finally, ethical considerations are presented and discussed.

Preliminary Methodological Considerations This section introduces the research methods adopted. Clarity is important when explaining the background and purpose of certain research steps and methods (Smagorinsky 2008); therefore, the methods used will be introduced in detail in the next section. A case study can be seen as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context to provide an intensive, holistic description and analysis of a single instance, phenomenon, or social unit (Merriam 1998; Yin 2008). In this research, case study helps to develop an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of political socialization, university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking in Chinese higher education in different historical contexts, including the continuity thereof and changes thereto. In addition, case study tightly connects the phenomenon with the context (Merriam 1998), and provides an opportunity to observe the greater picture of ongoing political and social changes in Mainland China. An additional advantage of case study is that it allows © Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 X. Du, Role Differentiation in Chinese Higher Education, Governance and Citizenship in Asia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8300-1

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the use of a variety of data collection tools, including interviews, observation, and document analysis, and can be used to investigate people’s values and interactions, as well as the progress of projects and programs to shed light on the study’s object (Merriam 1998). There are also some limitations to case studies. The first concerns the problem of generalizing results; case studies only attempt to generalize theoretical propositions, and are not generalizable universally or to larger populations (Yin 2008). This researcher does not intend to generalize the results of this study beyond the specific context of JU. The second concern relates to the subjectivity of the research, which can be avoided by the use of multiple data collection methods and data triangulation. A biased understanding of the situation can be avoided when the researcher has direct contact with research objects and knows detailed information about the local context, as this facilitates identifying and better interpreting phenomena (Pan 2003). The advantages presented and the limitation listed above suggest that case study would be an appropriate strategy for the study, as this study intends to gain a deep understanding of the research problem and will use multiple data collection methods. This case study used four methodological tools to collect data: document review, survey questionnaire, observation, and interview. Most of these are qualitative methods, which seek to understand multiple dimensions and layers of reality (Johnson and Christensen 2010); at the same time, however, survey questionnaire, a quantitative method, was used to identify detailed, factual information about the phenomenon and enumerate the “what” of the underlying research problem (Yin 2008) by revealing students’ evaluation of different forms of political socialization and their perceptions of critical thinking. The qualitative techniques used—document analysis, observation, and interview—focused on how and why some phenomena work, and sought an “in-depth” description of certain social phenomena (Yin 2008) to offer multiple means of understanding those phenomena (Merriam 1998). Thus, both exploratory and confirmatory methods were used in the research (Johnson and Christensen 2010). Using these four methods to gather data also ensured that each research question could be answered; detailed data collection methods and their application will be introduced later. Three months of fieldwork were carried out at the case university for the first round of data collection; the second round of data collection included 1 month of fieldwork, emails with followup interviews, group interview, and document collection.

Data Collection Methods The study adopted four major methods for collecting data to answer the research questions. Data on political socialization-related policy documents, university’s implementation of political socialization courses, projects and programs, and staff’s attitudes towards and students’ perceptions of political socialization, university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking needed to be examined.

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Document review, questionnaire, observation, and interview were selected as the most appropriate data collection methods. These four methods triangulated to help answer the research questions after the data analysis stage, and will be explained in detail in the following sections.

Document Collection and Review Document collection and review was the first method employed in this study. Documents are a source of ready-made data that is easily accessible to investigator. The documents in this case comprise a wide range of written, visual, and physical communications materials relevant to the study (Merriam 1998); in particular, policy documents and general information documents on political socialization, university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking at JU were examined. Document review has certain advantages; specifically, the data in documents are easy to access and stable, and can ground an investigation in the context of the problem being investigated. Moreover, documents contain information that would take an enormous amount of time and effort to gather otherwise (Merriam 1998). However, document review also has its limitations, as document selection is based on the researcher’s preferences. The chosen documents might not have been developed for research purposes, so they may be incomplete, may not provide continuity, may include unrepresentative samples, and may include concepts that do not fit the conceptual model of the study. In addition, documents’ authenticity and accuracy can be very hard to determine (Merriam 1998). As this is only one of the data collection techniques used, its shortcomings were mitigated by data triangulation. The first type of document collected was policy documents related to higher education and political socialization, including all topics concerning general education, political education, students’ affairs, and moral education. Policy documents are systematic and cautious, are usually more moderate in their views, and could provide continuity (Lee 1996). The documents were found on the official website of the PRC’s Ministry of Education and those of other governmental departments. Some of these documents (i.e., those issued prior to 1993) had already been translated into English as part of a special journal of translations published by Chinese Education and Society, in 1996. Policy documents from after 1993 were also collected. These policy documents helped answer part of the first research question by explaining the policies on political socialization, and what political socialization means from the state’s perspective; they also illustrated the state’s expectations of higher education. The second type of document collected was JU’s official documents on higher education and political socialization, and mainly included rules and regulations, meeting memos, and edited publications issued or approved by such bodies as the President’s Office, the Party Committee Office, Students’ Affairs Office, the Communist Youth League Committee, etc. Historical documents were also reviewed to understand better the history of JU. Course handbooks and syllabi for related

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courses, including political education courses, were examined. These documents help to show how the university implements political tasks and what it requires of its students, thus helping to answer the second and the third research questions. The mechanism and activities of political socialization on campus can also be seen in these documents. These materials were accessed via the Internet (official websites) and from JU staff, who also participated in other forms of data collection in the research. Public information documents comprised the third group to be collected, and included JU’s Guide for Freshmen, speeches by university leaders, and campusbased print media (newspapers and magazines). These documents speak to students directly, unlike previous document types, and portray JU’s idea of education. In addition, some of the newspapers on campus, like JU Youth (including its online social network accounts), were included for further analysis; JU Youth is a biweekly newspaper issued by JU’s Communist Youth League Committee, and aims to let readers experience knowledge creation and rationality promotion from a newspaper (Document 84); this newspaper and similar on-campus media supplement official political socialization methods. These documents are more student oriented, and provide a different perspective on the university’s tasks and the kind of students the university is cultivating than do the preceding document types. These documents helped to explain JU’s tasks; however, documentary data alone is not sufficient to address how JU implemented these tasks, how its staff responded, nor how its students were socialized. Thus, other methods were employed.

Questionnaire The second data collection method used was a questionnaire, which is a major, selfreported data collection instrument research participants complete as part of a research study. Questionnaires provide information about participants’ thoughts, feelings, attitudes, beliefs, values, and behavioral intentions (Johnson and Christensen 2010). Questionnaires are used to gather data on the “what” of research question (Yin 2008), which can then be gone into in-depth using other forms of data collection. Questionnaires are detailed, rich data sources that describe complex phenomena, but do have certain limitations; in particular, although they describe phenomena, they do not explain them (Johnson et al. 2007). Thus, in this research, questionnaires were only one source of data collection. The questionnaire used mainly consisted of close-ended questions intended to evaluate students’ preferences for and the influence of political socialization, as well as their understanding of the university’s tasks, as referred to in the third and fourth research questions. Some questions revealed students’ preferences for different political socialization programs provided by the university, and their opinions on the effectiveness of these activities in teaching them about society. These questions helped to explain students’ general perspectives on political socialization programs on campus, and provided a base from which the researcher could pursue the reasons

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for these opinions. Other questions addressed students’ views on university tasks and their experiences at JU. These questions helped the researcher better understand students’ opinions on higher education, especially as regards university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking. Different question and response formats were used in the questionnaire, including continuum of response ranking scales (Johnson and Christensen 2010) and Likert scales (Johnson and Christensen 2010; Feng 2012; Popp 2011). Other question formats were used to gather demographic information (e.g., students’ academic discipline and political affiliation). The questionnaire was presented in Chinese to avoid confusion among the informants, and could be completed within 20 min. The study adopted cluster sampling and systematic sampling. Cluster sampling is a form of sampling in which clusters (rather than a single-unit element) are randomly selected, while systematic sampling is obtained by determining the sampling interval, selecting a random starting point between 1 and k, and then selecting every kth element (Johnson and Christensen 2010). In this study, cluster sampling was used first to select the faculties and classes that participated in the survey; for example, in the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, its year three class was selected as a cluster for further samples. Cluster random sampling can help in situations where a sampling frame of all people in the population is not available (Johnson and Christensen 2010). Systematic sampling is more applicable when the researcher has a list, such as of schools or students; the limitation of this technique is that the sample frame might have a cycling pattern that must be avoided (Johnson and Christensen 2010). These two techniques were employed according to students’ university ID number; the questionnaires were distributed by student counselors, who are in charge of student affairs and have student ID number information at their disposal. University ID (UID) numbers are systematic in JU. Counselors from different faculties distributed questionnaires to students in four to five grades, according to their UID numbers. Only the counselors had students’ contact information; the researcher contacted the counselors, gave them the questionnaires, and taught them the simple sampling technique. In this way, students’ privacy could be assured. Survey questionnaires were distributed to 850 students; 763 were collected, of which 709 were effective. Table A.1 lists the sample-covered disciplines and their relative percentage of the discipline-based cohort population in JU. Table A.2 lists the study years covered by the sample. The questionnaire generally covered all types of disciplines and study years in JU. Although a questionnaire can reveal students’ views on political socialization and higher education, it can only provide a general picture of the phenomenon, not the reasons behind it. Qualitative data collection methods, such as observation and interviews, helped make up for this limitation.

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Table A.1 Sample discipline percentage and JU discipline population percentage

Science Economic and management Social science Liberal arts Language Applied science Medical Art and design Total

Sample frequency 196 86

Valid sample percentage 28.0 12.3

Population percentage of disciplinea 17.7 20.8

127 72 27 91 97 4 700b

18.1 10.3 3.9 13.0 13.9 0.6 100.0

16.1 14.8 5.2 20.2 11.8 0.8 100.0

a

The data was calculated according to statistics provided on JU Official Website Among 709 effective questionnaires, 9 informants did not answer the question about their discipline

b

Table A.2 Sample year of study

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 and above Total

Frequency 225 216 132 110 6 689a

Valid percentage 32.7 31.3 19.2 16.0 0.9 100.0

a

Among 709 effective questionnaires, 20 informants did not answer the question about their year of study

Observation The third data collection method used in this study was observation. Observation is used to learn and understand the behavioral patterns of people in a natural field setting (Johnson and Christensen 2010). It is an important technique that can be used “when an activity, event or situation can be observed firsthand, when a fresh perspective is desired, or when participants are not able or willing to discuss the topic under study” (Merriam 1998). Observation data can show how students participate in political socialization programs, as on-site observation often involves informal discussions with participants to discover those who should be interviewed in greater depth (Merriam 1998). In this research, nonparticipatory observation was adopted to avoid subjectivity and intervention (Merriam 1998; Johnson and Christensen 2010; Yin 2008). There were three major types of activities the researcher observed (related to the third, fourth, and fifth research questions) during the first and second rounds of data collection. The first type was the courses JU students took, including political education and other courses. Observing these courses helped the researcher

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understand the learning contents and teaching style of political education courses, and the interaction between students and teachers in classes; the researcher also learnt what teachers of other courses said about political and social issues, and students’ responses to those statements. 21 classes were observed, including 11 political education courses. The second type of activity was meetings of CYL cadres, student counselors, and other university staff. In these meetings, the researcher explored how political socialization activities were organized and conducted, what emphases were placed on specific activities, and whether the staff considered multiple opinions and issues from the state, university, staff, and students. Thirteen meetings were observed. The third activity type was student activities, including those organized by such official university departments as the CYL, Students’ Affairs Office, faculty-level party groups, classes, and student clubs, as well as lectures. These activities helped explain students’ responses to political socialization. Seven activities were observed. The data revealed how staff implemented the academic and political tasks, and students’ reaction to these implementations. Field notes and memos were made after every observation to record on-site information and the researcher’s mental notes (Lofland et al. 2006), a list of observations as Appendix F. The number of members who participated in the activity or course, the event site, the conductors’ flow in organizing the activity, and students’ responses were all observed. Some, but not all, observations were audio recorded; audio recording is an effective means of collecting observation data, but needs the approval of the concerned JU department, which was not forthcoming in all cases. Memos were jotted down after each observation to summarize the researcher’s findings and reflections during the observation (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Merriam 1998). Conceptualization and analysis were done after the notes have been coded. Observation can provide behavioral information regarding on-site activities, but not the initiative driving actions and thoughts; thus, narrative information is also important for data collection.

Interviews Interview was the fourth data collection method used in this study. An interview can be seen as a process of constructing; theories and concepts are constructed by researchers based on participants’ efforts to explain and make sense of their own experiences and stories. Interviews contain a special kind of information, as feelings, thoughts, and intentions cannot be observed (Merriam 1998). The researcher used semi-structured interview as the major type of interview in this study. Semistructured interviews use a list of open-ended questions to direct the conversation, without forcing the interviewee to select from pre-established responses (Lofland et al. 2006). In contrast, an unstructured interview allows the participants to talk about their stories before the interviewer asks questions, while a structured interview requires participants to answer the interviewer’s questions in a predetermined order

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and manner (Corbin and Strauss 2008). The semi-structured interviews in this research were conducted following an outline of questions, but interviewees were given time and freedom to tell their stories from their perspective and in their own way. The main weaknesses of this type of interview are the possibility of omitting important and salient topics in the process, and the risk that its flexibility might cause coding difficulties and reduce response comparability (Johnson and Christensen 2010). However, while conversational and situational, a semi-structured interview is still systematic and comprehensive, when conducted with an outline. Both individual and group interviews were conducted in this research. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 6 groups, totaling 39 interviewees. The first group, involving four interviewees, was comprised of senior and junior university administrative staff, to obtain knowledge on the university’s development, tasks, and aims. The senior staff, generally at the vice president level, provided the university’s perspectives on political socialization and students’ academic cultivation, which related to the first research question. The second group consisted of academic staff that taught courses in faculties; the researcher elicited their views on JU students’ education, and constraints on their teaching topics. The third group consisted of political education teachers; they were interviewed to determine their understanding of their roles in political socialization. Twelve teachers were interviewed in these two groups. The fourth group was comprised of administration staff involved in political socialization—for example, the secretary of the CYL in JU, and student counselors. These participants had primary access to students and, at the same time, served the university’s purpose of education. This group can be seen as a group in the middle, and as well positioned to demonstrate the tension between the university and students. Nine participants were interviewed in this group. The fifth group was composed of nine students, and was supplemented by a sixth group of respondents, consisting of five alumni with a thorough understanding of their own university education experience; the latter were graduated in four different decades, and thus provided historical information. The interviews attempted to discern students’ perspectives on political socialization and university education. They helped answer the research questions related to the university’s tasks and how the university implemented the state’s political socialization requirements, and elicited respondents’ perceptions of the relationships between the state and the university, as well as their interpretations of the university’s documentary and policy responses to the state’s requirements and students’ reactions. General questions addressed all respondents’ perceptions of JU’s role in Chinese higher education and political education, including its relationship with the state and JU’s image and traditions. These general questions provided answers to the first and second research questions. Specific questions for senior administrative staff focused on (a) JU’s implementation of state policies, (b) JU’s conduct of political education, (c) JU’s internationalization goal, and (d) JU’s encouragement of critical thinking. The answers to these questions helped answer the second, third, and fourth research questions. The specific questions for academic staff teaching discipline-based courses mainly focused on the ways in which they would like to develop students’ critical

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thinking skills, and the university’s impact thereon. On the other hand, the specific questions for political education teachers and administrative staff were related to political socialization (for staff in the Students’ Affairs Office and Youth League Secretaries), and their perspectives on and understanding of political socialization (for student counselors). These questions helped answer the third, fourth, and fifth research questions. The specific questions for students and alumni focused on (a) the image of JU, China, and the world in their eyes; (b) their views on academic performance and critical thinking at JU; (c) their views on political socialization; and (d) their ways on learning politics. These questions helped answer the fourth and fifth research questions. In addition, this research also conducted two online group interviews, which brought informants together so several participants in a given social context could be interviewed simultaneously (Frey and Fontana 1991). Group interview has an advantage in discovering how informants think and why they think in that way (Kitzinger 1995), and in providing subculture information, revealing relationships and interactions between informants, and in helping with data triangulation (Frey and Fontana 1991). However, its disadvantages are that some members might be discouraged from speaking; irrelevant data production could be high; and interpersonal conflicts might occur (Frey and Fontana 1991). These disadvantages required the researcher to obtain techniques for dealing with diverse situations and relationships. This research adopted online group interviews to supplement its one-on-one interviews. It sampled two groups of interviewees online, one a natural group of 96 alumni who graduated from JU in 2012, and provided information about general education courses, political education courses, and their opinions on university education; since they were recently graduated, they had sufficient knowledge of and time to reflect on these questions. Another selected group involved eight student counselors, who answered questions about their thoughts on political socialization and how they had or had not implemented it. The online group interviews were done using a smartphone instant messenger application called WeChat, which is a popular text-based communication tool in China, with over 500 million users (WeChat 2016). The advantages of using online tools for group interview is that interviewees can participate in the discussion at their convenience instead of at a fixed time, which could cause the loss of some informants. The chat records were retrieved from the application after interview. Whenever the researcher had follow-up questions, he/she could go back and pose them to the group. As they were in a virtual setting, interviewees feel considerable freedom to express themselves. The disadvantages of WeChat are that the researcher had less control in the virtual setting, and that interviewees might be too casual in answering the questions. However, for this research, it was a suitable method of supplementing the semi-structured interview data, especially after the first round of data collection and preliminary data analysis were complete. The researcher entered an existing alumni group to make it the first group interview site. The researcher established the second group (of student counselors)

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based on the recommendations of interviewees in semi-structured interviews. The researcher obtained consent from these informants, and asked the first few questions to start the discussion; thereafter, the researcher posed only a few questions, and only to have interviewees clarify or explain further what they had said. Little intervention was made during the process. The questions covered what the graduates thought about their general education, their opinions on political education courses, and their views on teachers; student counselors were asked to what degree they implemented political requirements from the university, how their students responded, and how they adjusted their strategies when doing political socialization. In this research, interview was an important method of gaining insights into staff and student views on political socialization programs and higher education. Interviewees were selected based on the diversity of their backgrounds; the researcher made sure that most academic disciplines, graduating positions, years of study, and political affiliation were reflected by the interviewees. A list of interviewees was given as Appendix D. The interviews were conducted on an individual basis in Chinese (to prevent the unavoidable loss of complexity that occurs when an interview is conducted in an unfamiliar language) (Corbin and Strauss 2008); each interview took about 60 min, and all were audio recorded and then transcribed. The informants were located through personal acquaintance and the use of snowballing, which involved interviewees or participants introducing other potential interviewees to the researcher, after some interviews and other forms of data collection (i.e., questionnaire and observation) had been conducted (Johnson and Christensen 2010).

Data Analysis This study employed different types of data analysis strategies to suit the different methods of data collection. For document collection and review, analysis mainly involved simultaneous data collection and analysis, which integrated memo taking with collecting data for on-site analysis. Some analysis was done while reading the policy documents. A small number of memos were written to highlight important ideas found in the documents and to divide different concepts into identifiable types or couch them in common theoretical terms (Corbin and Strauss 2008). Concepts related to political socialization, university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking were all jotted down during document revision for further analysis. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS Version 22) software was used to analyze the questionnaire data. Descriptive statistics, which focus on describing, summarizing, or explaining data (Johnson and Christensen 2010), are mainly presented in later chapters. Descriptive data was provided to identify students’ perceptions on political and academic issues. For observations and interviews, analysis was done from field notes and transcripts, from notes jotted down when reviewing the records and transcriptions, from

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the researcher’s comment column on the field note sheets, and from interview notes (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Merriam 1998). Related theme and concepts were recorded and analyzed. For documents, interview transcripts, and field notes, data classification reflected the historical time line and the types of raw data (Merriam 1998; Lofland et al. 2006). First, in addition to coding, pattern matching and explanation building were performed, and ideas emerging from the raw data were conceptualized. Second, the researcher drafted logic models using diagrams or conceptual charts to explain the phenomenon better (Yin 2008; Lofland et al. 2006). Third, as memos were made at every stage of data collection, the revision of these memos supplemented the coding and conceptualization. This was especially useful for analyzing and linking the context to the phenomenon (Corbin and Strauss 2008). NVivo 10 software was used to help the researcher classify and code the raw data.

Validity, Reliability, and Triangulation Proper research involves developing valid and reliable knowledge in an ethical manner (Merriam 1998). As this research employed both quantitative and qualitative methods, the research guidelines must ensure that the research results are trustworthy. This section will introduce the validity, reliability, and triangulation concerns of this study.

Validity There are three types of validity, according to Yin (2008): construct validity, internal validity, and external validity. Construct validity identifies correct operational measures for the concepts being studied. This study employed two strategies to build construct validity. The first was to use multiple sources of evidence (specifically, questionnaire, document review and analysis, observation, and interview) to explore the same issue; for example, determine how a specific teacher delivered his/her political education course by observing the teachers’ class, reading online comments about the teacher, and asking the opinions of different interviewees. The second strategy was to establish and maintain a clear chain of evidence, such as recording the time, place, and other details of interviews and observations to ensure that all information could be traced back to the raw data. The researcher kept a fieldwork diary, writing down the details of daily research activities, such as time, location, people involved, and so forth. Internal validity deals with how well the research matches reality, and seeks to establish casual relationships (Yin 2008; Merriam 1998). Three strategies were used to enhance internal validity. The first was triangulation of the data to obtain a holistic understanding of and explanation for the phenomenon (Merriam 1998); in this

158

Appendix A: Methodological Considerations

research, this was done in the analysis process. The second was to make constant observations and to repeat some aspects of the data collection over a certain period; specifically, the second round of data collection in this study was made 5 months after the end of the first. The third strategy was peer examination; the researcher asked colleagues to comment on the findings as they emerged (Merriam 1998) through the consistent Internet communication with informants during the analysis process. External validity concerns whether the findings can be generalized beyond the immediate study (Yin 2008). As presented previously, this study has no intention of making statistic generalizations; instead, an analytical generalization, based on a particular set of results, could be made to a broader theory with a deep understanding of political socialization and its tension with university autonomy, academic freedom, and critical thinking in Chinese higher education in the specific case. This study sought to understand the particular in-depth, not to find out what is generally true of the many (Merriam 1998). The case of JU could provide a framework to see the tensions mentioned above, and players’ interactions to manage these tensions.

Reliability and Triangulation Reliability indicates the extent to which the research findings can be replicated (Merriam 1998). The goal of reliability is to minimize errors and biases in the study (Yin 2008). Scholars consider “dependability” and “consistency” as a substitute for reliability, and demand that the data make sense, rather than repeat the exact result (Merriam 1998). The strategies used in this study to enhance reliability included, firstly, clearly stating the researcher’s position and explaining the assumptions and theory underlying the study, especially regarding informant selection (Merriam 1998). The researcher printed out a guideline for the counselors delivering the questionnaires to ensure that the sampling process was followed properly, and that all participants received informed consent forms that explained clearly the purpose of the research. Secondly, the study’s operational steps were illustrated as much as possible to ensure proper supervision by the reviewer of the study (Yin 2008). For the questionnaire, two rounds of pilot studies were done (Fallowfield 1995), with the researcher asking advisors to read the questionnaire, JU alumni to take and evaluate the questionnaire during the first round, and some students in the field to take and comment on the questionnaire in the second round. In addition, the interview questions were reviewed and commented on by JU alumni and some academic staff. The third strategy used was triangulation, or using multiple sources of evidence (Yin 2008). As mentioned above, multiple methods were used to strengthen both the internal validity and triangulation of the data collected (Merriam 1998). Different

Appendix A: Methodological Considerations

159

sources of data are presented in Chaps. 4–7, so as to triangulate the data when presenting the findings.

References Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2008). Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for developing grounded theory (3rd ed.). Los Angeles: Sage Publications, Inc. Fallowfield, L. (1995). Questionnaire design. Archives of Disease in Childhood, 72(1), 76–79. https://doi.org/10.1136/adc.72.1.76. Feng, X. (Ed.). (2012). Shehui Diaocha Fangfa (Methods of social survey) (21Shiji Sixiang Zhengzhi Jiaoyu Zhuanye Xilie Jiaocai). Beijing: Renmin University Press. Frey, J. H., & Fontana, A. (1991). The group interview in social research. The Social Science Journal, 28(2), 175–187. Gong, H., Zhang, J., & Zhang, Y. (Eds.). (2003). 20 Shiji de Zhongguo Gaodeng Jiaoyu–Deyu Pian (Chinese higher education in 20th century–moral education volume). Beijing: Higher Education Press. Johnson, B., & Christensen, L. (2010). Educational research: quantitative, qualitative, and mixed approaches (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage. Johnson, B., Onwuegbuzie, A. J., & Turner, L. A. (2007). Toward a definition of mixed methods research. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1(2), 112–133. Kitzinger, J. (1995). Qualitative research: Introducing focus groups. British Medical Journal, 311 (7000), 299. Lee, W. O. (1996). Moral education policy: Developments since 1978: Guest editor’s introduction. In W. O. Lee (Ed.), Chinese Education and Society (July–August 1996) (July–August 1996 ed., Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 5–12). Hong Kong: Comparative Education Research Centre, University of Hong Kong. Lofland, J., Snow, D., Anderson, L., & Lofland, L. H. (2006). Analyzing social settings: A guide to qualitative observation and analysis (4th ed.). Wadsworth/Thomson Learning: Belmont. Merriam, S. B. (1998). Qualitative research and case study applications in education (2nd ed.). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers. Pan, S.-Y. (2003). How higher educational institutions cope with social changes: The case of Tsinghua University, China. Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong. Popp, J. A. (2011). Research methods in education. Seattle: Amazon Digital Services, Inc. Smagorinsky, P. (2008). The method section as conceptual epicenter in constructing social science research reports. Written Communication, 25(3), 389–411. Wechat. (2016). Home page. Retrieved from https://weixin.qq.com/2016. Yin, R. K. (2008). Case study research: Design and methods (Vol. 5, 4th ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc. Zhang, J. (2011). Guomin Zhengfu Daxue Xunyu (1927-1949) (Moral teaching in Colleges of National Government 1927-1949). Beijing: Guangming Daily Newspaper Publishing House.

Appendix B: Political Education Courses List (1905–2015)

Period 1905– 1927 1927– 1949 1949– 1957

1957– 1959 1959– 1965

1966– 1976 1977– 1985

1986– 1989

1989– 1998

Political education courses (compulsory and selective) Not Unified Confucianism Values/Moral Education Nationalist Party Principles (党义教育): Three People Principles (三民主义) Citizenship Education/Ethnics (公民课/公民训育) Marxism-Leninism Basics Theories on New Democracism/Chinese Revolutionary History (新民主主义理论/ 中国革命史) Marxism Political Economics (Selective) (马克思主义政治经济学) Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism (Selective) (辩证唯物主义及历 史唯物主义) SUSPENDED Socialism and Communism (社会主义与共产主义) History of Communist Party of China (中共党史) Marxism Political Economics (马克思主义政治经济学) Marxism Philosophy (马克思主义哲学) SUSPENDED History of Communist Party of China (中共党史) Marxism Political Economics (马克思主义政治经济学) Marxism Philosophy (马克思主义哲学) International Communism Movements (Selective) (国际共产主义运动) Scientific Socialism (Selective) (科学社会主义) Chinese Revolutionary History (中国革命史) Marxism Theories (马克思主义理论) Basic Questions in Chinese Socialism Construction (中国社会主义建设的基本问 题) World’s Politics and Economics and International Relations (Selective) (世界政治经 济与国际关系) Chinese Revolutionary History/Mao Zedong’s Life and Thoughts (中国革命史/毛 泽东生平与思想) (continued)

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162 Period

1998– 2005

2005– 2015

Appendix B: Political Education Courses List (1905–2015) Political education courses (compulsory and selective) Chinese Socialist Construction (中国社会主义建设) Marxism Philosophy (马克思主义哲学) Marxism Political Economics (马克思主义政治经济学) Deng Xiaoping’s Theories (邓小平理论) World’s Politics and Economics and International Relations (Selective) (世界政治经 济与国际关系) Mao Zedong’s Thoughts/Chinese Revolutionary History (毛泽东思想/中国革命史) Deng Xiaoping’s Theories (邓小平理论) Marxism Philosophy (马克思主义哲学) Marxism Political Economics (马克思主义政治经济学) Ideology and Moral Education (思想道德修养) Basic Theories and Introduction to Marxism Theories (马克思主义基本原理概论) Mao’s Thoughts and Chinese-Characteristics Theories (毛泽东思想和中国特色社 会主义理论体系概论) Moral Education and Legal Basics (思想道德修养与法律基础) Outline of Chinese Modern History (中国近现代史纲要) Situation and Policy (形势与政策) PEC Electives (政治理论选修课)

Summarized from Gong et al. (2003) and Zhang (2011) and Document 04, Document 08, Document 09, Document 50, Document 88

Appendix C: List of Reviewed Documents

Document code Document 01 Document 02 Document 03 Document 04 Document 05 Document 06

Document 07

Document 08 Document 09 Document 10 Document 11

Title/theme/major contents The JU Students’ Publication (Magazine) 211 Degree’s homepage JU’s Teaching and Training Plan for Undergraduates 2013 A book written by one of JU Vice Presidents titled University: For the Students and the Society A Doctoral Thesis about General Education in JU Brief Introduction on the College of Marxism in JU The decision about College of Marxism’s renaming: University Party Committee: Department of Social Science Renamed as College of Marxism CYL Notice: Notice on Launching University Students’ Summer Social Practice Projects in 2014 Centennial Chronicle of JU

Source Renren.com

Retrieved/ published date 2014.09

Official website of Academic Affairs Office of JU JU Press

2014.09

The University of Hong Kong library Official website of College of Marxism in JU Official website of College of Marxism in JU

2013

Official website of CYL JU Committee

2014.09

JU Press

2005

Centennial History of JU

JU Press

2005

Introduction on JU history (Chinese version) Introduction on JU’s undergraduate education

Official website of JU

2014.09

Official website of JU

2014.09

2009

2014.09 2014.09

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164

Document code Document 12 Document 13 Document 14

Document 15 Document 16 Document 17 Document 18 Document 19 Document 20

Document 21 Document 22

Document 23 Document 24 Document 25

Document 26

Appendix C: List of Reviewed Documents

Title/theme/major contents Introduction on JU history (English version) JU’s 3-year action plan on talent introduction A video clip produced by JU SAO on the Internet titled Pursuing Dream in JU: 2014 Undergraduate Commencement Video Charter of JU

Source Official website of JU

Retrieved/ published date 2014.09

Official website of JU

2014.09

Tudou.com

2014.09

Official website of JU

2014.09

Introduction on international student education in JU Introduction on JU’s former president Prof. Young Introduction on JU’s teaching team Introduction on JU’s center for faculty development The Head of College of Marxism in JU wrote an article titled Clarifying Function and Distinguishing Errors to Enhance Political Education Courses A journal titled Talking About the Old and New JU Anthem A journal titled Activating the Classes, Benefiting the Students: Recording Reform on Political Education Courses in JU A journal article about JU history

Official website of JU

2014.09

Official website of JU

2014.09

Official website of JU

2014.09

Official website of JU Center for Faculty Development People’s Daily

2014.09

Democracy and Science

2009

China Higher Education

2015

China Quarterly

1983

A web page introducing the poet who wrote the lyrics of the university anthem A newspaper article titled Memories of 1980s Jour University Students: We Got Support on No Matter What We Did A newspaper article titled Charter of Jour University was Put Online to be Examined by Teachers and Students in the University: The Expression of Constructing World-Class

Official website of the JU’s student union

2014.09

Wenhui Bao

2014

Wenhui Bao

2014

2015

(continued)

Appendix C: List of Reviewed Documents

Document code

Document 27 Document 28

Document 29

Document 30

Document 31 Document 32

Document 33 Document 34 Document 35 Document 36 Document 37 Document 38 Document 39 Document 40 Document 41

Title/theme/major contents University was No Linger in the Draft of the Charter A newspaper article titled Making the Most Difficult Course to Teach a Most Wonderful One A newspaper article titled JU Issued Policy on Two-leveled management System Reform: Power of Finance and Human Recourses Transferred to Faculty Level A newspaper article titled China Universities Vow to Strengthen Ideological Control over Students and Teachers Dr. L’s blog about her years in JU in 1980s, a part of her memoire draft but not included in the final version of the book An article on Summer Practice Projects set up by JU An article on JU’s volunteer work for the grand expo reporting JU set up temporary party branches during the service An article reporting JU taking firm steps in the construction of political education courses A published biography about the second important president of JU, Dr. Lee A JU party secretary’s discussion on its general education reform Student Affairs Office Annuals 2002 Student Affairs Office Annuals 2006 Department Introduction on SAO A video clip titled JU Class of 2010 Elected Top 10 Good Teachers Student Affairs Office Annuals 2010 List of faculty members of school of management of JU

165

Source

Retrieved/ published date

Wenhui Bao

2015

Wenhui Bao

2015

South China Morning Post

2014

Sina

2010

Ministry of Education, PRC official website Ministry of Education, PRC official website

2008

Ministry of Education, PRC official website

2015

JU Press

2005

JU News website

2008

SAO JU Website

2002

SAO JU Website

2006

SAO JU Website

2010

Youtube.com

2010

SAO JU Website

2010

Faculty website

2014

2010

(continued)

166

Document code Document 42 Document 43 Document 44 Document 45 Document 46 Document 47 Document 48 Document 49 Document 50 Document 51 Document 52

Document 53

Document 54 Document 55 Document 56 Document 57 Document 58

Appendix C: List of Reviewed Documents

Title/theme/major contents PEC MOOCs on moral education, the discussion part List of faculty members of department of public administration of JU Annual report on 42nd student union in JU The application procedure for a new students’ association Charter of students’ union of JU A JU CYL-edited journal called Starry Brief introduction on departments of student union A newspaper article titled the CPC Magazine Focused on Ideological Work in Universities The Annual of JU An introduction on JU during wartimes and related presentation on selected historical materials A blog written by a JU student commenting on NPC election on campus titled Why I Abstained: I Did Not See What You Want to Do For JUers An edited book by the then head of SAO titled The Steps in Innovation: A Review on Ideological and Political Education Work of University Students A book about Mr. Yang Zhide as the pioneer of education reform in China A newspaper article on Hu Jintao’s congratulations to JU’s centennial celebration A journal article titled General Education: the Mission and Practice of JU A book titled JU Threads: Anecdotes and So on in 100 years An edited book contributed by a lot of JU alumni on their

Source The city’s online course center

Retrieved/ published date 2015

Faculty website

2009

Official website of the JU’s student union Official website of the JU’s student union Official website of the JU’s student union Official website of the JU’s student union Official website of the JU’s student union The Paper

2014

JU Press

1995

JU history museum

2008

Renren.com

2011

JU Press

2004

CUHK Press

2002

Xinhua Net

2005

University General Education

2007

Shanghai People’s Publishing House JU Press

2005

2014 2014 2014 2014 2013

2005 (continued)

Appendix C: List of Reviewed Documents

Document code

Document 59 Document 60

Document 61

Document 62

Document 63 Document 64 Document 65 Document 66 Document 67 Document 68 Document 69 Document 70 Document 71 Document 72

Title/theme/major contents memories in JU years titled JU Changes Life A newspaper article interviewing JU’s president Prof. Young titled The University in My Dream Prof. Young’s speech on 2011 commencement ceremony for undergraduates titled What on Earth Has JU Given to You: Let Minds and Imagination Spread Wings and Fly Prof. Young’s speech on 2012 opening convocation for undergraduate freshmen titled Revision on the Common Sense of University A newspaper article interviewing Prof. Young titled Comprehending the Quality of JU People A journal article about history on Chinese higher education titled Duanfang and the founding of JU A post on Zhihu (Chinese version of Quora) titled How Does it Feel to Study in JU Syllabus of GECC on political philosophy course Syllabus of GECC on poems in Song Dynasty Syllabus of GECC on science education Meeting memos of student counselors 2007–2014 An article on La Vague titled Learning from Lei Feng and Volunteers An article on La Vague titled General Education is So Good An article on La Vague titled I am in Taiwan and I am Young An article on La Vague titled The Ups and Downs of the Identity to Mainland: A Taiwan Student’s Changing Track of Consciousness

167

Source

Retrieved/ published date

JU New website

2010

JU News website

2011

JU News website

2012

Weihui Bao

2013

Historical Review

2017

Zhihu.com

2015

From JU students

2014.05

From JU students

2014.05

From JU students

2014.05

From JU SAO

2014.05

La Vague online issues

2010

La Vague online issues

2010

La Vague online issues

2011

La Vague online issues

2011

(continued)

168

Document code Document 73 Document 74 Document 75 Document 76 Document 77 Document 78 Document 79

Document 80

Document 81 Document 82

Document 83

Document 84 Document 85 Document 86

Appendix C: List of Reviewed Documents

Title/theme/major contents An article on La Vague titled The Belief Confession of a Wanderer An article on La Vague titled Why No One Knows You An article on La Vague posting recruiting news An article on La Vague titled Foreword for La Vague An article on La Vague titled Students’ Association or University’s Association An article on La Vague titled What Universities Should be Like? An article on JU newspaper written by the CPC Committee of JU titled Leading Young and the Middle-aged Teaching Team to Develop Healthily An article on JU newspaper titled The Second-level Department in Our University Promoting Rectification and Reform Because of the Special Inspection according to Their Own Features An article on JU newspaper titled Making Political Education Courses with JU Characteristics An article on JU newspaper written by the secretary of CPC Committee of JU titled Integrating Powers and Elevating Position to Promote Out University’s Marxism Theory Research and Subject Construction An article on JU newspaper written by A MoE Officer titled Let Marxism College become Splendid in JU’s discipline Construction An introduction on JU Youth newspaper An article titled What Did Prof. Young Say in University Status Report An article titled How Do I Have Class in Oversea Universities

Source La Vague online issues

Retrieved/ published date 2013

La Vague online issues

2011

La Vague online issues

2009

La Vague online issues

2010

La Vague online issues

2010

La Vague online issues

2011

Jour

2014

Jour

2014

Jour

2012

Jour

2012

Jour

2012

JU Youth

2013

JU Youth

2014

JU Youth

2012 (continued)

Appendix C: List of Reviewed Documents

Document code Document 87 Document 88

Document 89 Document 90 Document 91 Document 92 Document 93

Document 94

Document 95

Document 96 Document 97 Document 98 Document 99

169

Source JU Youth

Retrieved/ published date 2012

JUers Weekly

2013

JU Open Information website

2014.09

JU’s administrative positions

JU Official Website

2014.09

JU’s party positions

JU website of party and administrative service Official website of CYL JU Committee Lexington Books

2014.09

The official website of the Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Committee of the CPC Ministry of Education, PRC official website

2014.09

From JU students

2014.05

China Daily

2018.06

Official website of JU

2016.12

Official website of JU

2019.09

Title/theme/major contents An article titled Thoughts on Tension between Capital and Human An article titled I Came Here for Which People: To See JU Political Education Courses from Young Teachers JU Basic Information

Brief introduction on CYL JU Committee A journal article about SinoAmerican educational interaction from microcosm of JU’s early years The central inspection group’s feedback to JU on its conduct

An article written by Prof. Young titled The Mission of University and Youth’s Responsibility Nowadays Syllabus of GECC on constitutional politics in the United States Newspaper article about JU offering course on Xi Jinping Thought Introduction on JU’s party secretaries Prof. Hui’s speech on 2019 opening convocation for undergraduate freshmen

2014.09 2005

2009

Appendix D: List of Interviewees

Interviewee code Teacher 01

Occupation in and/or affiliation to JU Social Science Associate Professor

Gender M

Teacher 02

Economics and Management Assistant Professor

M

Teacher 03

Social Science Associate Professor

M

Teacher 04

Social Science Professor

M

Teacher 05

Political Education Assistant Professor

F

Teacher 06

Political Education Assistant Professor

M

Teacher 07

Political Education Assistant Professor

M

Teacher 08

Political Education Assistant Professor

M

Teacher 09

Liberal Art Assistant Professor

F

Teacher 10

Science Associate Professor

M

Teacher 11

Engineering Associate Professor

M

Teacher 12

Economics and Management Assistant Professor

M

Student 01

Year 2 Social Science Student

M

Student 02

Year 4 Social Science Student

F

Student 03

Year 4 Science Student

M

Interview date 2014-0506 2014-0605 2014-0618 2014-0623 2014-0401 2014-0403 2014-0415 2014-0615 2014-0702 2015-0902 2015-0913 2018-0903 2014-0331 2014-0403 2014-0429 (continued)

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172

Interviewee code Student 04

Appendix D: List of Interviewees

Student 05

Occupation in and/or affiliation to JU Social Science Graduate Student (First Degree also in JU) Year 4 Engineer Student

M

Student 06

Year 3 Science Student

M

Student 07

Year 3 Economics and Management Student

F

Student 08

Year 4 Social Science International Student

F

Student 09

Year 6 Medical Student

F

SAS 01 (Student Affairs Staff) SAS 02

Science Students’ Counselor

F

Youth League Staff

M

SAS 03

Former Senior Student Affairs’ Staff

F

SAS 04

Junior Student Affairs’ Staff

M

SAS 05

Senior Student Affairs’ Staff

M

SAS 06

Youth League Staff

M

SAS 07

Intermediate Student Affairs’ Staff

F

SAS 08

Senior Student Affairs’ Staff, PhD Candidate in College of Marxism Youth League Staff, Former Students’ Counselor

F

SAS 09 Alumni 01 Alumni 02 Alumni 03 Alumni 04 Alumni 05 PAS 01 (Party/ Administrative Staff) PAS 02

Graduated in 1987, science majored, working in a testing institution Graduated in 1997, social science majored, migrating to the United States Graduated in 2008, a former students’ counselor, social science majored, working in a university Graduated in 2012, economic and finance majored, working in an accounting firm Graduated in 2012, social science majored, working in a fund company Junior Administrative Staff

Senior Administrative Staff

Gender F

M F M F M M M

F

Interview date 2014-0507 2014-0515 2014-0620 2014-0702 2014-0715 2014-0712 2014-0415 2014-0428 2014-0509 2014-0609 2014-0616 2014-0617 2014-0630 2014-1205 2019-0603 2014-1220 2014-1221 2014-0318 2014-1203 2018-0904 2014-0410 2014-0707 (continued)

Appendix D: List of Interviewees

173

Interviewee code PAS 03

Occupation in and/or affiliation to JU Senior Administrative Staff

Gender M

PAS 04

Junior Administrative Staff (Academic Affairs)

F

Focus Group 01

WeChat group discussion with 96 alumni from JU graduated in 2012 WeChat group discussion with 8 student counselors

Focus Group 02

Interview date 2014-0626 2014-1212 2014-1115 2014-1030

Appendix E: Outline of Online Course: Ideological and Moral Cultivation and Basic Knowledge of Laws

Introduction: Cherishing University Life, Opening Up New Horizon

Chapter 1: Pursuing Long-Range Ambition, Firming Great Faith

Chapter 2: Inheriting Patriotic Traditions, Promoting Chinese Spirit Chapter 3: Comprehending the Truth of Life, Creating Life Value Chapter 4: Learning Moral Theories, Paying Attention to Moral Practice

•

Getting Used to New Life Phase – University and Life – The Goal of University Education – Curiosity – Critical Thinking • Enhance Moral and Legal Personal Quality – Law and Morality – Core Value • The Significance and Method of Learning Ideological and Moral Cultivation and Basic Knowledge of Laws • Ideal and Faith and University Students’ Growth • Setting Up Reasonable Ideals and Faith • Connecting the Path All the Way to Dreams • Patriotic Tradition of Chinese Nationality • Patriotism in New Age • Be a Loyal Patriot • Setting Up Correct Value Towards Life • Creating Valuable Life • Facing Life Environment Reasonably • Morality and Its Historical Development • Inheriting and Promoting Good Chinese National Moral Traditions • Practicing and Promoting Socialist Morality • Sticking to Citizens’ Basic Rules of Morality • Citizens’ Basic Rules of Morality of Our Country • Setting Up and Practicing Socialist Values of Honor and Shame (continued)

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176

Appendix E: Outline of Online Course: Ideological and. . .

Chapter 5: Understanding the Spirit and System of Law

Chapter 6: Setting Up Ideas on Rule of Law, Maintaining the Authority of Law

Chapter 7: Obeying Rules and Regulations, Forging Noble Character

Chapter 8: Ending Speech Translated from Document 42

• The Concept of Law and Its Historical Development • Socialist Spirit of Law • The Basic Principles of the Right in Our Constitution • Law of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics • Setting up Socialist Idea of Law • Socialist Core Values • Socialist Ideas of Rule of Law • Cultivating Socialist Law Thinking • Maintaining Socialist Authority of Law • Morality and Law in Public Life • Morality and Law in Professional Life • Morality and Law in Marriage and Family Life • Love • Morality of Romance • Family • Morality in Personality Development • Developing in All Round, Living a True, Kind-Hearted, and Beautiful Life

Appendix F: List of Observations

Activities A01: Youth Innovation Competition on Global Governance [2014.07.11] A02: Starry Forum Salon [2014-03-25] A03: Starry Forum Lecture [2014-03-30] A04: Social Practice Project Selection Conference [2014-05-30] A05: Students’ Drama [2014-06-20] A06: 129 Singing Contest [2014-12-09] A07: Students’ Graduation Gala [2014-06-21] Meetings M01: One JU undergraduate college’s Exchange Agreement Signing Ceremony with a Hong Kong university college [2014-07-18] M02: Commencement ceremony of a faculty [2014-06-25] M03: A faculty-organized lecture on party learning [2014-04-16] M04: Students’ Representative Congress [2014-05-25] M05: Faculty-level student affairs meeting [2014-05-08] M06: Faculty administration staff training [2014-04-22] M07: Situation and policy social practice reporting meeting [2014-06-10] M08: CCP branch meeting [2014-04-08] M09: CCP branch meeting [2014-05-13] M10: University commencement [2014-06-27] M11: University status report on internationalization [2014-05-08] M12: University status report on teaching affairs [2014-05-06] M13: University status report on the university charter [2014-05-13] M14: Class meeting of year 3 science-majored students [2014-12-05] M15: Class meeting of year 3 social science-majored students [2014-06-10] (continued)

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178

Appendix F: List of Observations

Classes C01: Situation and policy on medical reform [2014-03-25] C02: Situation and policy on Western media [2014-04-01] C03: History course (discipline based) [2014-04-10] C04: Sociology course (discipline based) [2014-03-31] C05: Law course (GECC) [2014-05-14] C06: Political science course (discipline based) [2014-04-17] C07: Science course (GECC) [2014-05-12] C08: Philosophy course (GECC) [2014-05-14] C09: Political science course (discipline-based) [2014-03-20] C10: Mao’s Thoughts and Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (PEC course) [2014-05-15] C11: Public administration course (discipline based) [2014-04-17] C12: History course (discipline based) [2014-04-21] C13: History course (PEC course) [2014-03-21] C14: History course (PEC course) [2014-04-08] C15: Marxism course (PEC course) [2014-05-08] C16: Public administration course (discipline based) [2014-06-18] C17: Ethic course (PEC selective) [2014-12-11] C18: Law and civil society course (PEC selective) [2014-12-08] C19: Western Marxism and trends of thoughts course (PEC selective) [2014-12-16] C20: Sustainable development course (PEC selective) [2014-12-17] C21: Market economy course (PEC selective) [2014-12-23]