Risky Markets Marine Insurance in Renaissance Florence (Brill's Studies in Maritime History, 8) 2020046140, 9789004399129, 9004399127

Table of contents :
Contents
Foreword to This Edition
Tables and Charts
Abbreviations
Introduction
1 Note on Dates, Names and Currencies
Chapter 1 Institutions: Contracts and Legislation
Chapter 2 Trade and Insurance: Routes
Chapter 3 Trade and Insurance: Goods
Chapter 4 Trade and Insurance: Seacraft
Chapter 5 The Premium: Structural Factors
Chapter 6 The Premium: Contingent Factors
Chapter 7 The Florentine Insurance Market Within the European Context
Chapter 8 The Market and Its Operators: Demand
Chapter 9 The Market and Its Operators: Supply
Chapter 10 The Market and Its Operators: Techniques and Organisational
Chapter 11 The Market and Its Operators: The “Risk Experts”
Chapter 12 Institutions Again: Informal Safeguards
Conclusions
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Risky Markets

Brill’s Studies in Maritime History Series Editor Gelina Harlaftis, Institute for Mediterranean Studies/Foundation of Research and Technology – Hellas (FORTH) and University of Crete, Greece Editorial Board Maria Fusaro, University of Exeter, U.K. Michael Miller, University of Florida, U.S.A. Sarah Palmer, University of Greenwich, U.K. Amelia Polonia, University of Porto, Portugal David Starkey, University of Hull, U.K. Malcolm Tull, Murdoch University, Australia Richard W. Unger, University of British Columbia, Canada

volume 8

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/bsmh

Risky Markets Marine Insurance in Renaissance Florence By

Giovanni Ceccarelli

LEIDEN | BOSTON

The translation of this work has been funded by SEPS Segretariato Europeo per le Pubblicazioni Scientifiche

Via Val d’Aposa 7—40123 Bologna—Italy [email protected]—www.seps.it The author acknowledges the financial support from the Center for Studies in International and European Affairs (CSEIA) of the University of Parma and from the Fondazione Mansutti per la storia dell’assicurazione. Cover illustration: Quaratesi Polyptych: St Nicholas Saves a Storm-tossed Ship, Gentile da Fabriano, 1425, Tempera on panel, 37 × 37 cm, Pinacoteca, Vatican. Downloaded via Wikimedia Commons. The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2020046140

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 2405-4917 ISBN 978-90-04-39912-9 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-44245-0 (e-book) Copyright 2021 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Foreword to This Edition vii List of Tables and Charts xiii Abbreviations xvi Introduction 1 1 Note on Dates, Names and Currencies 9 1

Institutions: Contracts and Legislation 13

2

Trade and Insurance: Routes 32

3

Trade and Insurance: Goods 47

4

Trade and Insurance: Seacraft 60

5

The Premium: Structural Factors 84

6

The Premium: Contingent Factors 103

7

The Florentine Insurance Market Within the European Context 121

8

The Market and Its Operators: Demand 138

9

The Market and Its Operators: Supply 160

10

The Market and Its Operators: Techniques and Organisational 187

11

The Market and Its Operators: The “Risk Experts” 205

12

Institutions Again: Informal Safeguards 222 Conclusions 239 Appendix 1 247 Appendix 2 249 Appendix 3 258 Bibliography 343 Index 356

Foreword to This Edition In the last decade the history of insurance and risk has drawn the attention of a rising number of scholars and academic institutions. A constant flow of books, journal articles and book chapters, along with conferences and research programs, has gradually remodeled our understanding of pre-modern insurance. Such a wealth of information was not at hand when I was writing the Italian version of this book. At that time, just a handful of scholars were interested in a field of studies that had its heyday in the 1970s only to become over time less and less fashionable. Then came the 2008 crisis, with an increasing need to explore which historical elements could explain the financial crash. Studying premium insurance appeared to a growing scholarship like taking the high road. When it came to publishing an English translation of the book, I was puzzled over this new literature and how to relate to it. I was not interested in providing a comprehensive overview—as recently carried out remarkably with reference to early modern Italy (Fusaro 2020) -, but rather in offering a tool that readers could use to establish a conversation between my book and what has followed it. I believe there are in particular five fields of investigation where a fruitful interaction can be envisaged: (1) applying a comparative approach, (2) focusing on institutions and markets, (3) exploring the socio-economic impact of insurance, (4) considering how insurance relates to probability and risk evaluation, (5) including in the picture alternative tools to manage maritime risks. The first visible trend is the comparative shift taken by historical investigation on premium insurance. On the one side, studies devoted to specific markets have greatly increased the spectrum of available information, making it possible to establish comparisons that were earlier unfeasible. On the other, the comparative approach is embedded in several of the works recently published and in many ongoing research projects, becoming a standard working tool in most insurance studies. A diligent archive research has brought to light a multifaceted body of sources: at times massive in number, such as the over 6,000 contracts coming from early modern Majorca, at times uniquely valuable because of their rarity, or the 40 policies that made it possible to reconsider the early stages of the London insurance industry (Quercia 2013 and 2014; Rossi 2016). The geography of markets has increased in scale as it has in diversity, including large insurance hubs of which little was known—for example Antwerp or Cadiz—and minor markets like Ancona (Puttevils and Deloof 2017;

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Bartolomei 2017; Spallacci 2018). Better known locations, like Genoa, Leghorn, Amsterdam, made no exception to this trend opening the way to more indepth historical comparison. Even Florentine sources have been the object of further—though limited in scale—scrutiny (Piccinno 2015; Addobbati 2015; Go 2015, Tognetti 2017). What is emerging is an extremely varied setting that is difficult to capture with a one-size-fits-all approach; the few attempts made to provide a unified picture, indulging too heavily on evolutionary narratives, appear unable to account for such complexity (Spufford 2015). Common traits clearly appear, however, if one puts the emphasis on a specific angle of insurance history, namely that of institutions, legal norms, and informal customs. I like to call this second and extremely vital trend among scholars the “institutionalist turn” that started before the Italian version of this book was completed but has definitively gained momentum since. In a nutshell, the “institutionalist turn” reassessed well-known (and often already studied) sources in the light of transaction costs and property rights. The focus on institutions revealed itself to be extremely useful to reconsider some of the major changes that occurred in pre-industrial insurance (Botticini 2012; Kingston 2014; de ruysscher and Puttevils 2015). For example, how and why do markets shift from informal rules to formalized ones? How did the business expand in scale attracting newcomers formerly not engaged in insurance transactions? How did market governance account for the rise or the failure of insurance centers? A volume contributed in particular to reorient our understanding showing, thanks to the broad array of essays it gathered, that the emergence of a new contract was not a game changer. It confirmed the findings of my book expanding it considerably, revealing that premium insurance as such was not enough to transform merchants accustomed to sharing the risks of sea trade into underwriters who took it in exchange of money. It will be a matter of centuries for unspecialized club-like markets to become dominated by impersonal transactions, and institutional infrastructure had the lion’s share in determining this change (Leonard, 2015). Another interpretative thread scholars developed in the last decade concerns the cultural and socio-economic implications that insurance has triggered. With reference to 19th and 20th centuries, the “new history of capitalism” warned from considering financial innovations such as insurance as socially neutral and pointed out the need to include the cultural background in which they occur (Levy 2012). Under this light is it possible to reframe the spread of marine insurance in early modern Europe? A crucial contribution in this sense came from investigating the narratives that went along with this spread. In-depth enquiries have revealed that premium insurance was a hotbed of

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business stereotypes, capable of conveying into modernity a well-established tradition of socio-economic exclusions based on religious grounds (Trivellato 2018). This background greatly improves our understanding of the power dynamics of the Florentine market described in my book, with some top-players controlling most of the insurance transactions. It confirms what looks like a recurring pattern: when financial innovations appear, some actors take advantage of them to the disadvantage of others. However, further research is needed to clarify if this was widespread or peculiar to Florentine insurance. The fourth line of investigation lies at the crossroads of history of science and economic history, since insurance has become a favorite testing ground to investigate probability and risks. Whether this was coarsely theorized or carried out in everyday business, early attempts of business forecasting by means of a percentage (i.e. insurance premium) have attracted the attention of a multifaceted scholarship. In particular, the difference between structural and contingent risks that insurance prices stress has been a fruitful way to extend the conversation to sociologists, historians and philosophers of science. Theirs contributions provide a richer theoretical scaffolding for the issues addressed in chapters 5 and 6 of this book (Franklin 2015; Cevolini 2016; Doron 2016). Others, by making use of much more sophisticated tools than those I relied on, have tested in other insurance markets the findings I made about Florence, essentially reaching the same results (Puttevils and Deloof 2017). However, we need more sources, more comparative analysis and more interdisciplinary studies to shed light on this point. In this sense, decisive insights might come from an investigation recently launched to create a large historical database of insurance premium (Go 2019). Lastly, scholars have recently stopped considering premium insurance as the ineluctable outcome of an endogenous process in which “modern” solutions to mitigate risks replace traditional ones. I took this assumption for granted when writing the Italian version of my book, ending up disregarding the rich interplay among the broad set of tools and strategies used to cope with navigation risks. Insurance was, on the contrary, just one option on the table those engaged in maritime trade had. They could ship on armed vessels, opt for a sea loan contract, choose risk-sharing business agreements and organizations, sail in convoy, just to name but a few. New investigations – like an ERC research project on general average—reveal how resilient and effective some of these alternatives could be, suggesting a re-examination of insurance history in wider terms (Fusaro 2017). No matter how modern a contract might appear, the context in which it is used might heavily influence its performance. A case in point recently put forward deals with insurance. Greatly efficient as long as

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forecasting was confined to navigation in the Mediterranean Sea and along the Atlantic coastline, insurance revealed all its shortcomings when trade required crossing the Ocean. Pricing maritime risks became difficult to the point that they were internalized by large organizations like chartered companies and insurance was marginalized (Harris 2020). Notwithstanding this considerable amount of scholarly works, our understanding of insurance history is far from reaching a stable state. While I was writing this foreword, I was asked to peer-review two articles on the topic, and three important books have just been published or were about to be, which I was unfortunately unable to include in here (Pons and Pearson 2020; Hellwege and Rossi 2020; Leonard 2020). I owe to Maria Fusaro the idea of an English version of this book so as to reach a larger audience; I am very grateful to her for starting the process, as well as for her continuous proactive conversation with me. The translation started while I was at Princeton University, where I had the privilege to discuss about insurance in Renaissance Florence in a vibrant intellectual environment. All my thanks to Angela Creager, Jack Tannous, and Tony Grafton. They were decisive, together with my co-fellows at the Davis Center—Carl Winnerlind, Caley Horan, Shennette Garrett-Scott, and Vanessa Ogle—in making me realize it was worthwhile sharing my book with a wider public. More fruitful discussions followed in Paris, while I was professeur invité at the EHESS, for which I am much obliged to Jacques Chiffoleau, Mathieu Arnoux, François Gipouloux, and Clément Le Noble. I am eternally grateful to Francesca Trivellato, who has been constantly supportive during the stages that brought this to publication. Further thanks go to my colleagues and friends Sabine Go, Andrea Addobbati, Adrian Leonard, and Guido Rossi. It is a pure pleasure to sharing with you our common passion for insurance history. I am also indebted with Giacomo Todeschini, Joel Kaye, and Alberto Guenzi for the help and precious advice they provided. A special appreciation goes to Stefania and the Cinnamon Teal’s team, who transformed my Italian text into English, as well as to Gemma and Catriona, who helped me in finalizing the translation. My last thanks is for Anna who was always on my side during the whole time.

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References Addobbati, A., Italy 1500–1800: Cooperation and Competition, in Marine Insurance: Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850, ed. by A.B. Leonard, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015, pp. 47–77. Bartolomei, A., Les marchands français de Cadix et la crise de la Carrera de Indias (1778– 1824), Madrid, Casa de Velázquez, 2017. Cevolini, A., Time Construction in Insurance Society, in «Journal of Historical Sociology», 29, 2016, pp. 160–181. de ruysscher, D., Puttevils, J., The Art of Compromise: Legislative Deliberations on Marine Insurance Institutions in Antwerp (c. 1550–c. 1570), in «BMGN-Low Countries Historical Review», 130, 2015, pp. 25–49. Doron, C-O., The Experience of «Risk». Genealogy and transformations, in Routledge Handbook of Risk Studies, ed. by A. Burgess, A. Alemanno, J. Zinn, London, Routledge, pp. 17–26. Franklin, J., The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability Before Pascal, With a New Preface, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015. Fusaro, M., The Burden of Risk: Early Modern Maritime Enterprise and Varieties of Capitalism, in «Business History Review», 94, 2020, pp. 179–200. Go, S., Amsterdam 1585–1790: Emergence, Dominance, and Decline, in Marine Insurance: Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850, ed. by A.B. Leonard, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015, pp. 106–129. Harris, R., Going the Distance: Eurasian Trade and the Rise of the Business Corporation, 1400–1700, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 2020. Hellwege P., Rossi, G. (eds.), Maritime Risk Management: Marine Insurance, General Average, Sea Loan, Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 2021. Kingston, C., Governance and institutional change in marine insurance, 1350–1850, in «European Review of Economic History», 18, 2014, pp. 1–18. Leonard, A.B., London Marine Insurance 1438–1824: Risk, Trade and the Early Modern State, Woodbridge, Boydell & Brewer, 2021. Leonard, A.B., Marine Insurance: Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015. Levy, J., Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 2012. Piccinno, L., Genoa, 1340–1620: Early Development of Marine Insurance, in Marine Insurance: Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850, ed. by A.B. Leonard, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015, pp. 25–45. Pons, J., Pearson, R. (eds.), Risk and the Insurance Business in History, Madrid, Fundación MAPFRE, 2020.

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Puttevils, J., Deloof, M. Marketing and Pricing Risk in Marine Insurance in Sixteenthcentury Antwerp, in «The Journal of Economic History», 77, 2017, pp. 796–837. Quercia, P., La gestione dei rischi marittimi nel Mediterraneo occidentale della seconda metà del XVI secolo attraverso il mercato assicurativo balearico, Cacucci, Bari 2013. Quercia, P., Le Assicurazioni marittime maiorchine a metà Cinquecento: come fattore di socializzazione del rischio, Cacucci, Bari 2014. Rossi, G., Insurance in Elizabethan England. The London Code, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2016. Spallacci, G., Il prestito a cambio marittimo ad Ancona nel XV secolo, in «Storia economica», 21, 2018, pp. 251–275. Spufford, P., From Genoa to London: the Places of Insurance in Europe, in Marine Insurance: Origins and Institutions, 1300–1850, ed. by A.B. Leonard, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015, pp. 270–297. Tognetti, S., L’attività assicurativa di un fiorentino del Quattrocento: dal libro di conti personale di Gherardo di Bartolomeo Gherardi, in «Storia economica», 20, 2017, pp. 5–48. Trivellato F., The Promise and Peril of Credit: What a Forgotten Legend about Jews and Finance Tells us About the Making of Europe’s Commercial Society, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2019.



Research projects

Botticini, M. (P.I.), “Contracts, Institutions, and Markets in Historical Perspective” European Research Council-Advanced Grant (2012). Fusaro, M. (P.I.), “Average, Transaction Costs and Risk Management during the First Globalization (Sixteenth-Eighteenth centuries)” European Research CouncilConsolidator Grant (2017). Go S. (P.I.), “Risky business: pricing, governance, and integration in European insurance markets, c. 1400–1870” Netherlands Organisation for Scientific ResearchInternationalisation in the Humanities (2019).

Tables and Charts 2.1

2.2 4.1

5.1 5.2 7.1

8.1 8.2 8.3

8.4

8.5 9.1 9.2 9.3

Tables Values insured and quotas underwritten in Pisa and Florence by great maritime route routes (1379–1402), according to the Datini Archive’s insurance policies 37 Values insured and quotas underwritten in Florence by great maritime route (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 42 Nationality of crafts mentioned in the insurance contracts stipulated in Pisa and Florence (1379–1402), according to the Datini Archive’s insurance policies 65 Average insurance premiums on the Florentine market by maritime itinerary (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 96 Seasonal variations of insurance premiums for some routes on the Florentine market (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 98 “Geographical” advantage of buying insurance in Florence in relation to the itinerary and the insured value indicated in the contracts (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 129 Class distribution of insurance demand of Francesco di Marco Datini’s firms (1385–1401), according to the policies in the Datini Archives 141 Class distribution of insurance demand in Florence (1524–1526) according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 143 Major insurance buyers and their periods of operations on the Florence market (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà and the Salviati Bank’s accounts 147 Foreign insurance buyers through Bartolomeo Ricoveri in Florence (1520–1527), their provenance and period of operations, according to the Salviati Bank’s accounts 151 Foreigners insured in Florence (1524–1526), by provenance and amount of insurance cover, according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 157 Distribution of co-insurers per contract and quotas underwritten in Florence (1383–1401), according to the policies in the Datini Archives 161 Distribution of co-insurers per contract and quotas underwritten in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 161 Class distribution per value underwritten in Florence (1392–1400), according to the policies in the Datini Archives 163

xiv

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9.4 Class distribution per value underwritten in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 163 9.5 Quotas and their values, underwritten in Florence by the major insurers of the Datini firms (1392–1400), according to the policies in the Datini Archives 166 9.6 Class distribution of amounts underwritten by “underwriting subjects” in the Florentine market (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 175 9.7 Insurers’ duration of operations in the Florentine market, according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 176 9.8 Average number of quotas and their values underwritten by the most important insurers in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 179 9.9 Number of quotas and their values, underwritten by foreign insurers in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 184 10.1 Number of quotas underwritten in Florence and their value by organisational form (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 199 10.2 Insurance operations of the Salviati-Bracci co-insurer “syndicate” in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 202 11.1 Underwritten quotas by the main “leading insurers” in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 217 12.1 Insurance operations as insurance buyer and insurer of “underwriting subjects” active in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 225 12.2 Active and passive transactions by five selected “underwriting subjects” operating in the Florentine insurance market (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 229 12.3 Class distribution of insurance operations in the Florentine market in two selected three-month periods (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà 234

6.1

Charts Trends in insurance rates in Florence for one route of the North Sea— Mediterranean commercial axis (1520–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà and the Salviati Archives. SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r; SALVIATI 735 fols. 128r–137v; SALVIATI 742, fols. 136, 149, 168, 205, 243, 281, 319, 368, 407, 436; SALVIATI 749, fols. 87, 180, 254, 347, 477, 559, 608 109

Tables and Charts

xv

6.2 Trends in insurance rates in Florence for two routes of the Tyrrhenian Sea—Western Mediterranean commercial axis (1520–1527), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà and the Salviati Archives. SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r; SALVIATI 735 fols. 128r–137v; SALVIATI 742, fols. 136, 149, 168, 205, 243, 281, 319, 368, 407, 436; SALVIATI 749, fols. 87, 180, 254, 347, 477, 559, 608 110 6.3 Trends in insurance rates in Florence for one route of the Upper-Mid Tyrrhenian Sea commercial axis (1521–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà and the Salviati Archives. SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r; SALVIATI 735 fols. 128r–137v; SALVIATI 742, fols. 136, 149, 168, 205, 243, 281, 319, 368, 407, 436; SALVIATI 749, fols. 87, 180, 254, 347, 477, 559, 608 111 6.4 Trends in insurance rates in Florence for two routes of the Adriatic-Eastern Mediterranean commercial axis (1520–1527), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà and the Salviati Archives. SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r; SALVIATI 735 fols. 128r–137v; SALVIATI 742, fols. 136, 149, 168, 205, 243, 281, 319, 368, 407, 436; SALVIATI 749, fols. 87, 180, 254, 347, 477, 559, 608 112 7.1 Monetary value of insurance per month in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà. SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r 125

Abbreviations doc./docs document/documents f./ff. folio/folios r. recto (front) v. verso (back) DBI Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani DATINI Prato State Archive, Archivio Datini MEDICI Florence State Archive, Fondo Mediceo avanti il Principato SALVIATI Archives of the Scuola Superiore Normale in Pisa, Archivio Salviati, Series I (Libri di Commercio)

Introduction For more than four years now, we have been suffering from the depressive effects of the economic crisis started in September 2008 with the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment bank. In retrospect, it is evident how illusory our conviction was that some “elegant” mathematical models would allow us to manage, beyond any common sense, more and more complex financial scenarios. This mistaken belief led to the practice of turning the insolvency risk of tens of thousands of Americans—who had bought their homes without providing any real guarantees—into a secure financial tool that could be exchanged in Stock Markets the world over. When the American real estate bubble finally burst, reality showed itself in all its crudeness: the bankruptcy of sub-prime borrowers, in a fully globalised risk market, crash-landed on all of us.1 One element that reduced our capacity to foresee the obvious was a lack of interest in the history of financial crisis and the excessively risky conducts that caused them in the past. Under the banner “This Time is Different”, we have witnessed a process of collective amnesia, convinced to be living in a time in which such problems, thanks to advances in the science of finance, could not repeat themselves.2 We should not be surprised if insurance, the first tool specifically created to manage risks connected to business activities, has also been involved in this process of collective amnesia. After going through an intense twenty-year period, with plenty of investigations, on the history insurance in general, as well as on some of the most important European markets, by the end of the 1980s, the subject was almost completely expunged from historians’ agendas.3 This book hopes to make a contribution to the rekindling of interest in a subject which, 1 P.R. Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, in “The New York Times”, 2 September 2009. 2 C.M. Reinhart, K.S. Rogoff, This Time is Different. Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 2008. 3 Just limiting ourselves to monographs and following a strictly chronological order, we cannot fail to mention: L.A. Boiteux, La fortune de mer: le besoin de securité et les debuts de l’assurance maritime, Paris, S.E.V.P.E.N., 1968; F. Melis, Origini e sviluppi delle assicurazioni in Italia (secoli 14–16), Volume 1: Le fonti, Rome, Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni, 1975; F. Assante, Il mercato delle assicurazioni marittime a Napoli nel Settecento: storia della Real Compagnia, 1751– 1802, Naples, Giannini, 1979; A. García Sanz, M.T. Ferrer Mallol, Assegurances i canvis maritims medievals a Barcelona, Barcelona, Institut d’Estudis Catalans, 1983, 2 voll.; F.C. Spooner, Risk at Sea. Amsterdam Insurance and Maritime Europe, 1766–1780, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983; G. Giacchero, Storia delle assicurazioni marittime. L’esperienza genovese dal Medioevo all’età contemporanea, Genoa, Sagep, 1984; A. Tenenti, B. Tenenti, Il prezzo

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004442450_002

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Introduction

as Lucien Febvre already remarked, is still a pivotal topic for our understanding of the genesis and development of the “esprit capitaliste”.4 Through insurance, commercial capitalism actually realised that trade consisted of a variety of risks (including business, credit, transport, etc.). And, it was by experimenting with insurance that, for the first time, the possibility arose of reducing the risk connected to trade, by creating a specialised market in which the risks of navigation could be transferred from one player to another. The importance of this crucial innovation was well understood by the intellectuals of the time, who, in the midst of the transition from the Middle Ages to the early Modern period, identified a specific legal category of “aleatory” contracts in which to include insurance.5 This book looks at one particular market, that of Florence (even though, at times, our investigation will expand to include the bordering one of Pisa), between the end of the 14th century and the early decades of the 16th century, a period coinciding with the historical zenith of the city: the Renaissance. This choice also aims at filling a gap in scholarship. Indeed, we seem to know a lot about other European insurance centres, such as Genoa, Dubrovnik, Venice, Amsterdam, Barcelona and Majorca. But, for some unclear reason, the Florentine market has never been organically researched. This omission does not depend on the well-known lack of documentation concerning insurance transactions that has often thwarted researchers by limiting their field of action, causing them to favour a particular market instead of another.6 As we shall see, there is no dearth of sources enabling us to shed some light on the Florentine insurance market in at least two key periods of its history—the first decades of activity and one of the moments of its maximum development. However, it is necessary to clarify right from the start that this book does not aim at being a simple description of how insurance was embedded in the city’s economy during the Renaissance, nor does it intend to analyse the insurance business in the light of the operations carried out by one of the many Florentine business firms that dominated the European scene between the 13th and the 16th centuries. The purpose of this research is to understand how del rischio: l’assicurazione mediterranea vista da Ragusa (1563–1591), Rome, Jouvence, 1985; K. Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima a Venezia, Rome, Il Veltro, 1988. 4 L. Febvre, Pour l’histoire d’un sentiment: le besoin de securité, in “Annales: Economies, sociétés, civilisations”, 11, 1956, p. 247. 5 G. Ceccarelli, Il gioco e il peccato. Economia e rischio nel Tardo Medioevo, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2003. 6 The main contractual instruments of the insurance industry (the policies) are especially problematic, because beneficiaries used to dispose of them once the journey had reached its positive conclusion; cfr. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, cit., p.24.

Introduction

3

a “market of risk” functioned in the period between the end of the Middle Ages and the start of the Early Modern period, the economic and social profile of its operators, the institutional framework in which the transactions were carried out and which techniques had been developed to manage the risks of maritime trade. Florence clearly represents the ideal setting for pursuing this objective, given the extensive existing literature that can help us to put in the right perspective the countless variables that gave impulse to the insurance market. It is a considerable advantage to be able to delve into this wealth of information on the trade flows irradiating from the city, on its manufacturing sector, on the businessmen and firms at the heart of its economic upsurge. As a matter of fact, we really do know so much about Florence, including the level of mathematical literacy of its inhabitants, and which ideas of probability were taught in its schools. However, when considering an insurance market, the place in which transactions were carried out loses some of its importance, as the scale of operations was not that of the city but international. The geographical spread of Florentine insurance coverage stretched from the Middle East to the Northern Atlantic. We need only consider the changes affecting maritime trade between 1385 and 1528, the period encompassed by the first and last document used for this research. Looking at the subject of navigation, we span from the socalled “revolution” in shipping tariffs, to the age of merchant galleys, up to the appearance of the mighty, heavily armed galleons. Considering trade, we are witnessing the progressive marginalisation of the Mediterranean and the inexorable advance of the Atlantic economies. In short, the perspective in which to read the insurance sources should be—to use a fashionable term—“glocal”. The book opens and ends with an analysis of the insurance market in relation to the institutions (both formal and informal) charged with regulating it, and this is not by chance. I am convinced that, if we want to add something new to the scholarship of the 1970s and 1980s, we must look at the impulse provided by neo-institutionalist historiography (in particular to the transaction costs theory). The first few chapters are, therefore, devoted to the concrete elements on which the insurance market was based: the routes covered by contracts, the insured commodities and the seacraft transporting them. More generally, we have tried to understand if insurance simply was a “dependent variable” of trade, or whether the sources allow us to postulate a certain degree of independence of the former vis-à-vis maritime commerce. Studying the itineraries, goods and ships, however, is also an indispensable prerequisite for the analysis of insurance costs, which occupies chapters five and six. The process used to calculate the premium is discussed in the light of the distinction between risk factors that in the medium term are foreseeable and those

4

Introduction

which are not. This distinction—albeit not new—has been reinterpreted in the light of the progress made by historians of probability and statistics in the last few decades. The second part of the book explores the Florentine insurance market itself. First, in chapter seven, we try to understand the role of Florence with respect to other European cities. This is a necessary but difficult operation, because, despite the wealth of studies on the subject, the figures concerning the volumes of transactions are fragmented and not easily comparable. Instead, in chapters eight and nine, we attempt to delineate how supply and demand were structured on the market. Even though we will be dwelling on some of the market’s main operators, our interest is not focused on individuals; rather, we have attempted to trace some general categories in which to frame insurance buyers and underwriters, according to the scale and continuity of their activities. The picture is completed, in chapter ten, by the analysis of the insurance “knowhow” available at the time to those operating in the market. This means that we have not only tried to comprehend which tools and organisations were known to the insurance industry, but also attempted to measure how frequently they were used. The documentation reveals that, in addition to legally codified instruments and business institutions (well known to insurance historians), some informal ones also existed, which played an equally important role on the market. In our reconstruction of the Florentine insurance market between the 14th and 16th centuries, we have taken advantage of two distinct bodies of sources: the first dates back to the last two decades of the 14th century, whilst the second relates to the third decade of the 16th century. In both cases, as Federigo Melis had already indicated, we are dealing with some of the most important extant insurance sources of Europe, although for different reasons. The documents dating from the end of the 14th century belongs to the Datini Archives and provides a remarkable picture of the activities of a great business firm. They consist of a significant number, though somewhat patchy, of insurance policies stipulated in Florence by the firms of the renowned merchant of Prato Francesco di Marco Datini. They number about 130, over a period spanning from 1385 to 1401.7 We were also able to add to the Florentine sources a similar number of contracts concluded during the same period in nearby Pisa, as well as some extant accounting entries of insurance brokers operating in the two

7 DATINI, Polizze di Assicurazione 1159, docs 1–137. For a description of the Datini Archives and its characteristics, see Melis, Origini e Sviluppi, cit., pp. 29–31.

Introduction

5

cities.8 Further information has then been gathered by consulting some of the Datini’s account books and the critical editions of the firm’s business letters.9 The information that can be gleaned from the insurance policies dating back to the last two decades of the 14th century is really comprehensive, as they mentioned the insurance buyer’s name, the value and characteristics (including packaging) of the insured goods, the type of seacraft used (with relative owner and shipmaster), the routes followed, the entity of the premiums, the identity of the insurers and the amount each one of them covered. A more accurate examination, however, immediately highlights the source’s intrinsic limits. Firstly, not all extant documents are valid contracts that came into force. Some are only drafts or copies of other policies, others are incomplete and lack some crucial elements (for example, the premium), whilst several appear to have been cancelled shortly after being drawn up.10 The main problem, however, is the quantitative significance of this documentation and how representative it really is of the actual transactions taking place in that market. In other words, to what extent are the extant policies useful to our aim of reconstructing the insurance demand of the Datini firms in Florence? A preliminary analysis, unfortunately, confirms that many contracts have indeed been lost. The presence of damaged or illegible documents provides ample evidence that this body of sources has been suffering from serious conservation problems. The uneven annual distribution of the extant policies 8

For insurance contracts stipulated in Pisa cf. DATINI, Polizze di Assicurazione 1158, docs 1–159; for further information on this documentary source, see again Melis, Origini e Sviluppi, cit., pp. 26–29. Part of the accounts kept by brokers active in Florence has been preserved in DATINI 1159, docs. 143–146, 149–151, and 154–155; cf. C.L. Daveggia, L’intermediazione assicurativa nel Medioevo, in “Assicurazioni”, 52, 1985, pp. 359–363. 9 For commercial letters, see for example G. Nigro, Mercanti in Maiorca. Il Carteggio datiniano dall’isola (1387–1396), Florence, Le Monnier, 2003, 2 voll. We have also used the studies carried out on some Libri mastri, Memoriali and Quaderni di entrata e uscita of the Datini firm in Florence for three years (from 1395 to 1397); cfr. DATINI 558 (Libro Grande rosso segnato F—Large red book marked F), 576 (Memoriale segnato E—Brief marked E), 584 (Libro dell’entrata e uscita segnato E—Ledger of income and expenditures marked E). 10 The following documents have not been taken into consideration, for various reasons: DATINI ASS. 1159, docs. 46, 51, 59, 64, 127, 128. Sometimes the policy is illegible because of deterioration of the written support (docs. 46, 51); occasionally, we are confronted with the draft of a contract bearing no signatures (doc. 59); in other instances the documents lack mention of the insured quotas; these might possibly be deeds of renewal of existing policies, which unfortunately have not been preserved in the Datini Archives (doc. 64). Or else, (ibid., docs. 14, 39, 47, 48, 57, 63, 66, 94, 99, 109, 127, 128) the documents show a snake-line mark in place of or over the signatures, which indicates their cancellation; we might therefore be facing instances in which only some of the insured had withdrawn (in which case the contract remained valid), or cases in which all insured quotas had been annulled, so that the whole policy was no longer valid.

6

Introduction

also points to the same conclusion.11 In our attempt to solve this issue, we have made use of insurance statements of account, i.e., the accounting summaries compiled by brokers for the Datini firms, with the purpose of receiving their fees for the business carried out in their favour. Comparing these sources with the available policies suggests that the documentation up to 1392 is quite incomplete. However, from then on (and especially for the period 1397–1400), the picture is more encouraging, and we get the impression that the extant contracts do reflect, in a significant manner, the insurance operations of the Datini firm agglomerate.12 The slowly emerging scenario recommends that we should take some precautions when using contracts dating from the end of the 14th century as historical evidence. If taken in their entirety from a diachronically static point of view, the papers can still provide an approximate idea of what was actually occurring in the Florentine insurance market. However, by focusing our attention on the period for which the sources seem to be more complete, it is possible to carry out a quantitative investigation. For this reason, we have decided to concentrate our enquiries on the segment of time from 1392 to 1400.13 This choice does not exclude the fact that some policies may be contextually used for a qualitative-type analysis, because the wealth of details they contain, considered in this light, is unparalleled. For example, the contracts provide crucial indications as to the variables that determined the premium, as well as interesting cues to understand the factors influencing the supply side of the insurance market. From this viewpoint, the quality of the Datini documents compensates for their scarce quantity and undeniable chronological discontinuity. Undoubtedly, the 16th century material is of greater significance, both for the mass of information and its continuity, as well as for its remarkable 11

For example, ibid., docs. 46 and 51. The yearly distribution of the insurance contracts preserved in the Datini Archives is as follows: 1385 (1 policy), 1386 (0), 1387 (1), 1388 (1), 1389 (5), 1390 (3), 1391 (3), 1392 (14), 1393 (10), 1394 (10), 1395 (12), 1396 (13), 1397 (8), 1398 (15), 1399 (17), 1400 (11), 1401 (4). 12 Ibid., docs. 143–144 (Michele di Marco’s accounts), 145–146 (Giovanni di Jacopo’s accounts), 149–151 and 154–155 (Cristofano Pantaleoni’s accounts). For the years from 1392 to 1395 the documentation is more incomplete: apparently as many as 17 entries are missing from the extant policies, out of a total of 40 reconstructed by using the entries in the accounts left by brokers Michele di Marco and Giovanni di Jacopo. The situation for the period 1397–1400, when the reference broker was Cristofano Pantaleoni, seems more promising: in his accounts only 17 of the registered contracts (out of a total of 69) cannot be found among the extant ones. 13 The sample is therefore limited to DATINI 1159, docs. 15–133, from which docs. 46, 51, 59, 64, 127, 128 have been excluded (for the reasons mentioned above in note 10).

Introduction

7

qualitative level. In 1524, the Florence authorities, for the purpose of regulating the insurance industry, established the compulsory registration of contracts. All the details of maritime insurance policies stipulated in the city should be transcribed by an officially sworn broker. One of these ledgers, titled Libro di ricordi di sicurtà and compiled by Raggio di Nofri Raggi, has been preserved among the documents of one of the most important Florentine business firm of the time: the Averardo Salviati and partners of Florence. The ledger, the only extant specimen of this type of document, includes relevant details of the policies drawn up by Raggi himself. Information includes the identity of the insurance buyer, the amount of the cover, the insured good, the route followed, the secraft’s name (including owner and shipmaster), the premium, and the details of the insurers including the amounts each had underwritten.14 Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà lists 914 entries relating to insurance policies concluded in Florence from 13 February 1524 to 11 August 1526, corresponding to an insurance value in of almost 686,000 large golden florins ( fiorini larghi d’oro in oro), the Florentine money of account of that time. As will become clear in the course of this study, not all registrations corresponded to actual contracts. Sometimes, we are confronted with mere drafts, whilst other entries refer to policies that were subsequently cancelled. Moreover, some of the transcriptions concern contract variations (called “licences” or “additions”) agreed on by the insurance buyer and underwriters after signing the policy.15 It is impossible to precisely assess the overall impact of these variations, although we can estimate that the number of contracts mentioned in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà which really were concluded was not higher than 700. Furthermore, to increase the homogeneity of our sample, it has been decided not to take into account the entries of the first and last month covered by the ledger, as they appear incomplete. Consequently, the sample object of our investigation consists of 881 valid insurance contracts, registered by Raggi in the 29 months between March 1524 and July 1526.16 The only limitation of this otherwise outstanding source is that it represents only one half of the transactions carried out in the Florentine insurance market, because Raggi competed with another sworn broker, whose register, unfortunately, has not survived.17 However, other sources, which escaped the systematic census carried out by Melis, partially solve this inconvenience by 14 SALVIATI 70: Libro di ricordi di sicurtà di Raggio di Nofri Raggi. For a description of this source, see Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 160–162. 15 This subject will be discussed in detail in chapter 10. 16 For these entries, cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r. 17 Cf. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, cit., p. 160.

8

Introduction

giving us a remarkable glimpse into the transactions not mentioned in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà. These other sources include the account books of the already mentioned Averardo Salviati and partners, one of the most important banking firms in Florence at that time, which list a large number of bank accounts used by some businessmen to conduct their insurance operations. Besides entries regarding bills of exchange, payments for goods, simple cash deposits and withdrawals, we also find others relating to policies stipulated by these account holders as insurance buyers or underwriters. The most useful for our study are the accounts “regarding insurance” (“a tenere sicurtà”) opened by the account holder only to operate in the insurance market.18 Their entries include, albeit in a simplified manner, several details from the original policies, such as the date of stipulation, the identities of the insurance buyer and underwriter, the amount subscribed by this latter, the route and the vessel, the premium and the name of the broker who had drawn up the contract. Among these dedicated accounts, which from now on (and for simplicity’s sake) we are going to call “insurance accounts”, the one opened by Giovanbattista Bracci turned out to be particularly useful. As we shall later discover, Giovanbattista Bracci was the fourth most important insurer of Florence both for number of contracts he subscribed and for values of coverage he provided.19 Though with some interruptions, the bank accounts allow us to trace his activities in the medium term, from July 1521 to March 1528. Above all, crossing Bracci’s “insurance accounts” with Raggi’s records has enabled us to delineate the defining features of the Florentine insurance market exhaustively. The comparison of data reveals two points. First, compulsory contract registration was mainly complied with (an aspect to which we will return in more detail in the next chapter); thus, enhancing the overall reliability of the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà. Second, it allows us to explore the relationship between a top-level insurance operator such as Bracci and the second most important broker active in the city, revealing a large share of the transactions that did not pass through Raggi’s hands. Further scope for investigation is offered by 18 SALVIATI 742 (Quadernetto di cassa terzo segnato B, 1523–1524), SALVIATI 749 (Quaderno di cassa segnato C, 1525–1527). On this type of documents, see S. Tognetti, L’attività di banca locale di una grande compagnia fiorentina del XV secolo, in “Archivio storico italiano” (Italian Historical Archives), 574, 1997, pp. 595–643. For examples of bank accounts used for insurance operations cf. SALVIATI 742, fol. 231 (account in the name of Tanai de’ Nerli) or SALVIATI 749, fol. 51 (account in the name of Leonardo della Torre from Genoa). For accounts exclusively “dedicated” to insurance purposes cf. SALVIATI 742, fol. 113 (in the name of Giovanni Tornabuoni e Giovanmaria Benintendi and co.) and doc. 252 (bearing the name of Luca di Giugno di Bona from Dubrovnik). 19 SALVIATI 742, fols. 136, 149, 168, 205, 243, 281, 319, 368, 407, 436 and SALVIATI 749, fols. 87, 180, 254, 347, 477, 559, 608.

Introduction

9

another account book of the Salviati banking firm (the Quadernuccio di ricordi di sicurtà), in which traces of a large number of insurance contracts, stipulated in Florence between October 1520 and August 1521, can be found. This includes up to 200 insurance subscriptions, relating to 78 policies, provided through the bank by several operators, which allows us to further expand the time frame of our research, to cover most of the third decade of the 16th century.20 The body of information gathered from the 16th-century documentation enabled a study of quantitative nature, allowing us to overcome many of the reservations put forward against the Libro di Ricordi di sicurtà.21 Thanks to these sources, we have information of over 1,300 insurance transactions that have been carried out in Florence between the end of 1520 to the beginning of 1528. And, through an integrated study of the material from the late 14th century and that from the 1520s, it has been possible to trace an all-round picture of this “market of risk” during the Renaissance. 1

Note on Dates, Names and Currencies

It seems appropriate to provide some clarification concerning the dates, names and currencies mentioned in the sources investigated in this book. Dates have all been changed according to modern usage. In Florence and Pisa, the year started on 25 March. However, the two cities adopted different dating systems and, to adjust them to the current calendar, two distinct procedures have been selected. For the Florentine documents, dates until 24 March have been increased by one year, whilst subsequent dates have been left unchanged. On the contrary, the dates on the Pisan documents after 24 March have been increased by one year, whilst the dates before 24 March were left unvaried. To facilitate reading, where the documentation and secondary bibliography ensured certain identification of individuals, the many variants of personal names have been made uniform. For natives of Florence, we have favoured names, patronymics and surnames as used in the Republic’s official documents; foreign names have been adjusted as much as possible according to the style 20 20 SALVIATI 735: Quadernuccio di ricordi di sicurtà (1520–1521); these registrations are in fact included in docs. 128r–137v. Moreover, several studies have investigated the Salviati firm’s accounts and their correspondence: cf. for example SALVIATI 744 (Giornale segnato C., 1524–1526) and SALVIATI 481 (Copie di lettere di la da’ Monti, 1523–1525). 21 The question of how representative this source is, and more in general, of the validity of a quantitative investigation on the insurance market in Florence during the 1520s, has already been posited in particular by Bruno Dini, in his introduction to Melis, Origini e sviluppi, cit., pp. XL–XLII.

10

Introduction

of their mother-tongue, disregarding the countless variations in the Tuscan vernacular used in the sources.22 Place names and geographical locations are also referred to giving preference to the original language and modern usage. However, Dubrovnik, which exceptionally appears as Ragusa (its vernacular denomination) in the Italian edition, is given its better known rendition here. In this volume, with the exception of some very particular instances, values are expressed in the money of account used in Renaissance Florence, the golden florin, which in its turn was subdivided into smaller soldi (1 Fl. = 20 s.) and denari (1 Fl. = 240 den.; 1 s. = 12 den.).23 However, the florin referred in the documents from the end of the 14th century was not the same coin, as used in the 1520s, because the Republic had issued legislation to modify the monetary unit used for accounting purposes twice, in 1471 and 1501. The money of account in the Datini documentation was the fiorino d’oro a oro, which was based on the gold coins circulating at the time: first the gold florin ( fiorino d’oro), then the fiorino di suggello (sealed florin—from 1390).24 The money of 22 Being able to access the online database of the city’s electoral roll (called “tratte”) has proved crucial; cf. Florentine Renaissance Resources, Online Tratte of Office Holders, 1282– 1532, ed. by D. Herlihy et al., Florentine Renaissance Resources/STG, Providence R.I., Brown University, 2000; http://www.stg.brown.edu/projects/tratte/main.html. Limited recourse has been made to the 1427 Land Registry, also available online; cf. Outline Catasto of 1427, Version 3.1, ed. by D. Herlihy et al., Florentine Renaissance Resources/STG, Providence R.I., Brown University, 2002; http://www.stg.brown.edu/projects/catasto/main.php. 23 This subdivision is not to be confused with that adopted by another accounting system, also used in Florence from the 13th through to the 15th centuries, the fiorino d’oro a fiorini (1 f. = 29 s. = 348 d.). However, three Datini policies are an exception to this rule, plus an additional entry in Giovanbattista Bracci’s “conti sicurtà”. Cf. DATINI 1159, docs. 3, where the value is expressed in Venetian gold ducats (ducati d’oro) and 133 (in which values are indicated in “fiorini vecchi di suggello”—florins only sold in sealed bags); DATINI 1158, doc. 132 (in which the currency was the new florin (fiorino nuovo); SALVIATI 749, fol. 87 (registration of a policy stipulated in Ancona, in which ducati di sole were used, i.e. the gold currency used in France). The difference in value between these coins and those normally used for accounting has not been taken into consideration, because the differences are minimal ( few percentage points), and their occurrence rare indeed. A similar position has been taken regarding the Pisan policies of the Datini Archives: even though the money of account of these contracts was always the Florentine fiorino d’oro a oro, its value varied between the two markets, although the difference was so small (less than 0.05%) to render it irrelevant; cf. P. Spufford, Handbook of Medieval Exchange, London, Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1986, p. 46 (and relative graph on p. 41) and Melis, Origini e sviluppi, cit., pp. 75–76 and 174–175. 24 The weight in gold of the currency circulating in Florence remained practically unchanged during the whole course of its history (3.5 grams); however, this does not exclude that, after being issued by the mint, coins could, with time, undergo a natural or deliberate process of deterioration (e.g. the “tosatura” or shaving off the edges of the coin), thus

Introduction

11

account in the 16th-century documentation was the fiorino largo d’oro in oro, based on a new coin introduced in 1422, larger than the old florin, but thinner and of the same weight in gold: the fiorino largo (large florin), precisely. As a consequence, every time florins are referred to, it is understood that we mean the fiorino d’oro a oro for the late 14th century, and the fiorino largo d’oro in oro for the 1520s. To simplify matters, the sub-multiples of the florin of account have not been expressed in the same manner as did the businessmen of the time, that is by using soldi and denari, but only decimals of the florin. Making a distinction between the two types of florin of accounting is not a matter of mere form, but of substance. When the Florentine government imposed some new official currency, it also contextually intervened on its nominal value, thus sanctioning an age-old process of revaluation of the gold florin against the silver coin circulating in the city (counted in soldi di piccioli). If the 1471 regulations fixed the increase of the new money of account nominal value at 20% with respect to the old one, the 1501 provisions established a further 19% rise. By law, the official 1501 florin of account was therefore worth 42.8% more than the one used until 1471. Obviously, this does not solve the question of the real value of these currencies, which remains extremely complex especially if considered in relation to the specificity of the marine insurance market; however, we are afforded a good approximate image of the differences existing between the two periods under scrutiny.25 This book is the fruit of several years of research benefiting from important cultural contributions by many people. Three scholars have, however, been crucial to its development and I am particularly grateful to them. Reinhold Mueller, my dissertation advisor, with whom I first approached the topic of risk in the late Middle Ages; Marco Cattini, who supervised my PhD thesis, where my interest in the insurance market in Florence was first kindled; Antonio Di Vittorio, who has read the typewritten version of this book and whose observations have allowed me to focus more precisely on the problems relating to the early Modern period.

25

losing some of their intrinsic value. It was precisely for this reason that the custom of sealing florins in small leather bags was introduced in 1294; these coins were called fiorini di suggello (sealed florins) and their value was guaranteed by the Ufficio del Maestro del Saggio (Office of the Testing Master). More detailed information on the content of this section of the Note on Dates, etc., can be found in R.A. Goldthwaite, I prezzi del grano a Firenze dal XIV al XVI secolo, in Quaderni Storici”, 10, 1975, pp. 10–12; R.A. Goldthwaite, G. Mandich, Studi sulla moneta fiorentina (secoli XIII–XVI), Florence, Olschki, 1994, pp. 9–73 and 87–102; R.A. Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, Baltimore-London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, pp. 609–614.

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Introduction

I also wish to thank the many colleagues who willingly discussed with me the subjects investigated in this volume and the friends with whom I have shared various national research projects over the years, from which my studies on insurance later developed. I will begin by mentioning Paolo Prodi, who was the group’s reference point, and then Anna Esposito, Paolo Evangelisti, Claudio Marsilio, Giuliano Milani, Maria Giuseppina Muzzarelli, Luciano Palermo and Massimo Vallerani. I am also thankful for Luciana Frangioni and Giampiero Nigro’s precious advice, which helped me navigate the sea of Florentine insurers’ papers. I also wish to express my gratitude to my colleagues Alberto Guenzi and Gian Luca Podestà, who have discussed with me various aspects of this monograph. I have presented some of the topics shared in this book in the course of various seminars and scholarly meetings, both in Italy and abroad. I am grateful to all the colleagues who were willing to discuss the subject with me—both in institutional settings and during the informal chats taking place at the margins. In particular, I wish to thank Mathieu Arnoux, Henri Bresc, Arnaux Bartolomei, Norbert Meusnier, Sylvain Piron, Francesca Trivellato, Biagio Salvemini, Simona Cerutti and Clement Lenoble. I must also give my heartfelt thanks to the staff at the Prato State Archives and the Archive of the Scuola Normale Superiore in Pisa, who assisted me in unearthing and perusing the documents on which this research is based. My special thanks to Giacomo Todeschini, who has helped me over the years to reflect on the cultural models underlying the economic processes. Lastly, my big thanks to Anna for her unflagging support. This book is dedicated to Nora and Anita.

chapter 1

Institutions: Contracts and Legislation Ever since Douglas North showed the strong correlation existing between the functioning of the economy and the institutional framework in which the markets are born and develop, the study of legislation and the juridical institutions regulating it has become a necessary step for historians and economists. Understanding normative changes contributes to our appreciation of economic development as a whole. It also fosters deeper comprehension of the differences existing among markets as for their structure and functioning.1 In this chapter, we are going to sketch a panoramic view of the institutional framework within which the insurance market developed in Florence from the 14th to the late 16th century. We will expand the picture to include what was contextually happening in other European centres, too. For the time being, we will concentrate our attention on what, strictly speaking, we call institutions, that is, certain procedures, entities and organisational forms created by public authorities to discipline the sector. It is necessary, however, to point out right from the start that, in times characterised by the coexistence of a plurality of normative systems, the very concept of “institution” could assume wider and more complex meanings than today. As we shall see, an analysis restricted to the regulations issued by the “official” authorities runs the risk of being reductive. So, we will have to take into consideration a broader range of norms and institutions that may have contributed in regulating the insurance market, in parallel with the official one.2 If we only consider legislation in a strict sense, the case of Florence could seem utterly paradoxical, since the first organic body of laws on the subject was introduced only in 1524. By that time, the use of insurance contracts was already so widespread that a thriving market was already in place, as early as the second half of the 14th century. Normative interventions, on the contrary, had been rare and not at all systematic. Between 1393 and 1524, we can count 1 D.C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990; R. La Porta, et al., Law and Finance, in “Journal of Political Economy”, 106–6, 1998, pp. 1113–1155. 2 Cf. P. Prodi, Una storia della giustizia. Dal pluralismo dei fori al moderno dualismo tra coscienza e diritto, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2000. For an up-to-date and comprehensive definition of “institution” see the methodological discussion in A. Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 35–37.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004442450_003

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only about a dozen legal provisions almost exclusively referring to the possibility of insuring goods transported on foreign vessels.3 A similar situation can be observed in Pisa and Venice. However, in other important markets of the Mediterranean basin, normative intervention was definitely more intense. In Genoa, for example, the authorities had felt the need to intervene with specific laws as early as 1369. In Barcelona, the Consulat de Mar was set up, and an organic system of regulations disciplining the business was established in 1435.4 We can thus find norms aiming at granting contract enforcement, by fixing the procedures to be followed in damage compensations and by establishing which institutions should decide on insurance matters. Sometimes laws were promulgated with the objective of defining how contracts should be drawn up, including the types of risk that could be covered and who was allowed to assume the said risk. Legislation also intervened on the role of brokers operating in the market (by specifying their functions) and on fiscal matters, introducing various forms of taxation on transactions.5 We can also find norms prohibiting bets disguised as insurance.6 Finally, protectionist measures were issued to forbid or limit the possibility of stipulating contracts to cover goods transported by foreign vessels.7 Despite the lack of a legal framework comparable to that put in place in Genoa and the Kingdom of Aragon, the insurance business in Florence managed to develop and prosper just as considerably. Here, as in other major Mediterranean cities (Genoa, Pisa, Venice and Barcelona), between the end 3 An extremely thorough analysis of the normative framework preceding the 1524 laws is found in L. Piattoli, Le leggi fiorentine sull’assicurazione nel Medioevo, in “Archivio storico italiano”, 18, 1932, pp. 205–257. 4 E. Spagnesi, Aspetti dell’assicurazione medievale, in L’assicurazione in Italia fino all’Unità. Saggi storici in onore di Eugenio Artom, ed. by the Associazione Nazionale fra le Imprese Assicuratrici, Milan, Giuffrè, 1975, pp. 88–111; Consolat de Mar, vol. III: Elements complementaris (ordinacions municipalis. Costums de Tortosa). Interpolacions. Notes i glossari, ed. by F. Valls i Taverner, Barcelona, Barcino, 1933, pp. 72–73. 5 In Genoa taxes were introduced by law in early 15th century, while in Florence we must wait until the legislation issued in the 1520s; cf. Spagnesi, Aspetti dell’assicurazione medievale, op.cit. p. 94, and G.S. Pene Vidari, Il contratto d’assicurazione nell’età moderna, in L’assicurazione in Italia fino all’Unità, op.cit., p. 274. 6 Similar prohibitions were also in force in Venice from as early as 1419, while in Genoa they were reiterated during the whole course of the 15th century. Cf. Spagnesi, Aspetti dell’assicurazione medievale, op.cit., pp. 100 and 116–117. 7 Such measures were firstly promulgated, respectively, in Genoa in 1369–1380, in Florence in 1393, in Venice in 1421, in Barcelona in 1435. On these norms in general see ibid., pp. 92, 96–101, 109–110. The subject has been further investigated, for Genoa, by V. Piergiovanni, Bartolomeo Bosco e il divieto genovese di assicurare navi straniere, in “Annali della Facoltà di Giurisprudenza [di Genova]”, 16, 1977, pp. 855–890.

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of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th centuries, hundreds of insurance contracts were negotiated to cover goods and crafts travelling from the Middle East to as far as the Northern Atlantic ports.8 Can this be considered an evident contradiction of all scholars having insisted on a link between institutions and market functioning? More simply, what we are seeing here is just the confirmation that, until well into the early modern era, it is inappropriate to consider “the law” as the only mechanism through which institutions intervened to regulate the economy. Differences between Genoa and Barcelona, on the one hand, and Florence and Pisa on the other, can be explained by observing the two distinct paths followed by insurance in its evolution as a contract. If, in the first two markets, insurance developed as a notarial deed, in the other two, it took the form of an agreement between private individuals. Where the notary’s mediation prevailed, we witness significant normative intervention. On the contrary, where private contracts were drawn up by a broker, normative intervention was minimal. In Florence (and in Pisa), the policy had the function of establishing in written form all the elements regulating the relationship between the contracting parties.9 Insurance buyers and underwriters, therefore, could avail this flexible tool right from the start, making strict legislative intervention superfluous to a large extent. Policies had the advantage of explicitly indicating the relevant details of the agreement, avoiding the typical legal jargon of notary deeds, which could sometimes obscure the terms and the nature of the contract. This solution proved so successful in the medium term that the way of drafting contracts perfected in Florence and Pisa gradually replaced notarial deeds in all the other markets, even in Genoa, where a somewhat abstruse and complex formulation was well established. Here, where notaries drew up insurance agreements as fictitious sale contracts since the 14th century, the more straightforward formulation of the policy will be adopted in the 16th century.10 Florentine contracts were 8

For the origins of the insurance contract, we cannot fail to mention F. Edler de Roover, Early Examples of Marine Insurance, in “The Journal of Economic History”, 5, 1945, pp. 172–200. 9 Spagnesi, Aspetti dell’assicurazione medievale, op.cit., pp. 115–120; C.L. Daveggia, Forme contrattuali dell’assicurazione marittima medievale, in “Assicurazioni”, 51, 1984, pp. 360– 389; A. La Torre, L’assicurazione nella storia delle idee. La risposta giuridica al bisogno di sicurezza economica: ieri e oggi (1995, Rome), Milan, Giuffrè, 2000, pp. 132–138. 10 Spagnesi, Aspetti dell’assicurazione medievale, op.cit., pp. 131–178; Pene Vidari, Il contratto d’assicurazione nell’età moderna, op.cit., pp. 271–85; La Torre, L’assicurazione nella storia delle idee, op.cit., pp. 139–145; may I also refer to G. Ceccarelli, Cambiamento o stasi? La regolamentazione di alcuni mercati assicurativi mediterranei tra tardo Medioevo e prima età Moderna, in Istituzioni e traffici nel Mediterraneo tra età antica e crescita moderna, ed.

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simple and complete to the point that their example will be followed all over Europe, even inspiring the type of contract normally used by Lloyd’s of London at the end of the 18th century.11 We must, therefore, turn to the policy, to understand the extent and nature of regulation of the insurance industry in Florence. As this subject has been widely explored, here, we need only to point out the crucial aspects of the contract, by referring to a document dated July 1396 still extant in the Datini archives.12 It is important to specify that in Florence (and in Pisa), as early as the last decades of the 14th century, the policies followed a standard structure, with a few variations depending on the broker.13 Each policy opened with the date of stipulation, according to the dating system used in the city, followed by a ritual invocation to God, which acted as the premise to the main part of the deed.14 This took the form of a transcription of a verbal agreement concluded beforehand, starting with the sentence: “To whomever will read or hear this writing may it be clear that [...]”. This declaration is followed by the name of the person “who bought insurance”, the amount of the cover and some indications relating to the route and means of transport, such as the departure port, the kind of craft, its name (though not always), the name of its owner and its master. In the first section of the document, we normally find further information about the goods covered by insurance: their approximate estimated value (“valuta”), who is going to load them onto the ship, their owner, and the type by R. Salvemini, Naples, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche-Istituto di Studi sulle Società del Mediterraneo (National Research Council- Institute of Studies on Mediterranean Societies), 2009, pp. 127–130. 11 Cf. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 31–33; E. Kimura, Polizze di assicurazioni marittime toscane nel XIV secolo: l’origine della polizza (S.G.) del Lloyd’s, in “Assicurazioni”, 50, 1983, pp. 41–54. 12 Cf. DATINI 1159, doc. 82, dated 14 July 1396. For an analysis of the formal features of Florentine contracts, with examples of their transcriptions, cf., among others: E. Bensa, Il contratto di assicurazione nel medioevo. Studi e ricerche. Genoa, Tipografia marittima editrice, 1884, pp. 53–74; A. Brunetti, Sull’origine italiana del contratto di assicurazione, in “Assicurazioni”, 3, 1936, pp. 575–585; Spagnesi, Aspetti dell’assicurazione medievale, op.cit., pp. 3–189; C.L. Daveggia, Il primo contratto dell’assicurazione toscana, in “Diritto e pratica nell’assicurazione”, 2, 1967, pp. 566–577; Id., Forme contrattuali dell’assicurazione, op.cit., pp. 360–389. 13 As will be shown in chapter 11 (pp. 208–209), the Datini firms in Pisa and Florence made use of several brokers to draw up their policies and, with few exceptions, they always followed the same model. As concerns the very few contemporary policies extant, not belonging to the Datini archives, see Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 33–35. 14 As concerns the transposition of dates included in the policies into modern style, please refer to the Note on Dates, Names and Currencies in the Introduction.

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of packaging used. We also need to point out that the estimate of the goods’ value was sometimes very thorough and listed every single item, but frequently it was left blank. This was because, in case of insurance claim, the only detail that mattered was the amount individually subscribed by the underwriters. Details of the route normally followed (mentioning both departure and arrival ports), and then the premium. The latter was usually omitted at first, to be inserted only when the broker had reached an agreement with the insurers. This practice is proven by several documents in which the intermediary failed to indicate the amount of the premium, which can only be inferred by looking at the subscriptions. The first section ended with a paragraph regulating, through an instrument later named “storno” (cancellation), those situations in which the contract was annulled because of some impediment in carrying out the planned journey. In these instances—which, as we shall see, were quite frequent—the insurers would be refunded 0.5 % of any underwritten amount: “... abino soldi x a oro per 100” (“... let them have x soldi in gold per 100”). At this point, the broker left a blank space where the complete list of all the underwriters could be added later. With time, however, this space (rarely filled in) was eliminated and only the subscriptions at the end of the contract were deemed valid. The second paragraph of the agreement started by enumerating the dangers for which the underwriters accepted to take the risk. The coverage was rather wide, including damages caused by natural events and those due to deliberate human intervention, as well as risks connected with war and piracy: “[...] acts of God, of sea, of people, of fire, of jettison, seizure by Nobles or other persons, or reprisal, or arrest, or any other case, danger, fortune, impediment or sinister event [...]”. Another typical feature of the Florentine policies was the absence of insurance cover in the case of barratry (“baratteria di padrone”), namely frauds committed by the ship master or crew. The underwriters were liable, as is made clear by the last words of this section, until the moment the goods were “set unloaded ashore in safety” (“posta ischaricha in tera a salvamento”); this extended the coverage also to the unloading operations, which could sometimes be particularly difficult. The third section of the policy set out provisions for the procedure of insurance claim and compensation in case of mishap. The agreement prescribed that the insurers should pay out what was due within two months from the damage report, even though, in the 1390s, some contracts started to allow for longer periods. It is at this point that we find reference to co-insurance. According to it, each underwriter’s liability was limited to the amount actually subscribed: “each the quantity of money by them insured” (“ciascuno la quantità di danari per loro assicurati”). The claim and compensation procedure was then integrated by two clarifications that aimed at attenuating any

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complications arising from scant or slow-coming information. The first established that after ten months from stipulation, in the absence of any news regarding the outcome of the journey, the indemnification process should start anyway, whilst the second prescribed that, if it should become known after compensation had been paid that the goods had indeed reached their destination, the insured person was required to return the money they had received. Starting from 1396, this section of the contract includes the indication of the competent authority charged with settling any controversies between the parties that coincided with the court where mercantile disputes were normally settled in Florence, i.e., the Tribunale della Mercanzia.15 The contract ended with the name of the broker who had manually written it, followed by the subscriptions. Normally the last section also bore the date, the underwriter’s name (or that of any agent or representative signing on behalf of the insurer), the sum covered and the premium received. As already mentioned, the figures almost always were expressed in the money of account used then in Florence, the fiorino d’oro a oro. If the terms of the agreement diverged from those usually contemplated in the policies, such differences were not included in the main section of the contract, which, therefore, continued to follow the traditional formulation. The changes were only added at the end. If the variation did not concern all the parties, the relevant clarification was placed after the individual subscription. If the change was more general, the broker appended one or more additional clauses at the bottom of the contract, which were then countersigned by all the underwriters. Policies dating from the end of the 14th century reveal a wide range of variations that could be introduced: limitations as to the risks covered, further information about the goods transported, renegotiation of the value of the goods insured, and the replacement of the vessel or of its ship master. Documents including such clauses are not numerous; however, the actual possibility of inserting modifications made the policy a very flexible tool, easily adaptable to the needs of the various parties.16

15

Cf. C.L. Daveggia, Forme contrattuali dell’assicurazione, op.cit., pp. 372–373, with relative transcription of this clause included in DATINI 1159, doc. 72 of 4 August 1396: “And when the above listed goods will reach and be safely unloaded in Venice, may then the above mentioned insurers be discharged and free from any obligation from the insurance done through them. And for all said things to be observed the said insurers submit themselves and are obliged to the Office of Merchants and the Corporation of Chalimalla, or in any other place [...]”. On the functions generally performed by the Merchants’ Tribunal, see Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 111–113. 16 Cf. DATINI 1158, docs. 62, 67, 75, 112, 126.

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After the signatures, the broker could add additional information relating to the evolution of the contract. For example, in the case of shipwreck, or seizure by pirates, or of the vessel being blockaded in one of the transit ports, or damage to the goods, a further paragraph was added in which it was stated that the unfortunate result of the journey had been notified to the insurers.17 In exceptional cases, the policy could even become the instrument used to give an account of the procedure adopted following a mishap. In a contract dated September 1397, for example, it is possible to read all the steps taken to recover an impounded cargo. We can, therefore, establish that cargo recovery formally fell on the underwriters, although they usually delegated this task to the insurance buyer.18 By the end of the 14th century, anybody who operated in the Florentine market could take advantage of a contract which was much more than a means for transferring the risks of marine trade. Policies also defined the mechanisms available to terminate or modify the contract, fixed the procedures to follow in case of claim and compensation and even indicated the “supervisory authority” one could appeal to. In the following decades, the role of the insurance contract remained crucial; a slow evolutionary process led to its formal homogenization and fine tuning of its accessory elements. In Florence, we thus witness the success of a specific formulation in which solutions coming from everyday practice are gradually formalised. This process was followed in several other centres and caused the progressive standardisation, on a local basis, of the written documents used in the insurance business. Thus, we encounter different ways of drawing up insurance contracts depending on the market (“the Pisan way” or “the Florence way”, and so on), each with its own peculiarities as regards the formal aspects, the risks covered, and the claims and compensation procedure.19 This uniformity emerges more clearly when we turn to the contracts used in Florence between the end of the 15th and the beginning of the 16th century. Besides looking very similar to one another, they present hardly any new 17

As an example, see ibid., doc. 14 of 19 December 1383, concerning a bale of gauze travelling from Porto Pisano to Barcelona: “Today 6th of January, in front of me Gherardo d’Ormanno, Istoldo di Lorenzo on behalf of the said Franciescho di Prato and Co. reported the disaster to said insurers, that the said bale was taken by the galleys of King Charles, so that the insurers have the obligation to return to said Franciescho and Co. at the end of two months, the amount of florins for which they had insured. Written by hand by me, Gherardo on the said day and year”. 18 Cf. DATINI 1159, doc. 86. 19 C.L. Daveggia, Forme contrattuali dell’assicurazione, op.cit., pp. 360–389. For an overall picture of various insurance markets in Italy, please refer to Pene Vidari, Il contratto d’assicurazione nell’età moderna, op.cit., pp. 271–285.

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elements compared to the Datini policies. Whenever we spot any differences, these largely represent the formalisation of features already present at the end of the 14th century. This is also true for cargo recovery, that was explicitly delegated to the insurance buyer, or for the procedure to be followed in the case of any controversy, with the prescription that litigation should not block the compensation envisaged by the policy: “the insurers must first pay out and then litigate” (“debono gli asichuratori prima pagare […] e poi litigare”). Only as regards the risks run by the underwriters do we find some substantial modification. For example, exclusions from coverage are contemplated in the cases of impounding (named “rischio di doghana”—Customs risk), damage to goods stored in the hold for the whole length of the journey (the so called “rischio di stiva”—hold risk), and barratry on the part of the ship master.20 We must wait until January 1524 before the Florentine authorities, who until then had practically delegated the task of regulating insurance to the policy, formally intervened in the process. This resolution was part of a wider trend towards increased codification of the insurance market occurring at European level. In Burgos (in 1500 and 1538), Dubrovnik (in 1568), Seville (in 1556), Antwerp (1563,1570), Bilbao (in 1560), London (in 1601) and Amsterdam (in 1598), the whole century was characterised by intense promulgation of various ordinances, measures and codes aiming at regulating the sector in an organic manner. Florence, which had suffered from a “legislative delay” compared to many other Mediterranean cities (such as Barcelona and Genoa) until 1524, suddenly took the lead in this process, not only anticipating the general trend but also somehow becoming its reference point.21 The body of norms then issued was so vast that the term “reform” does not seem inappropriate. The provisions affected not only the insurance contract itself, the individuals authorised to draw it up and the public officials charged 20

See for example the two policies, one signed in 1499 and the other in 1513, published by Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 34–35 and 200–204. All other elements remained unchanged: the compensation due to the insurers in case of failure to load was still fixed at 0.5%; the liquidation of damages was still prescribed within two months from notification; the compensation, if there was no news on the fate of the vessel, was again authorised after 10 months from stipulation; the indication of the Merchants’ Tribunal as the competent court in case of dispute was also retained. 21 For a complete summary of the legislation promulgated and of the official bodies created in the various cities, may I refer to G. Ceccarelli, Dalla Compagnia medievale alle Compagnie assicuratrici: famiglie mercantili e mercati assicurativi in una prospettiva europea (sec. XV–XVIII), in La famiglia nell’economia europea secc. XIII–XVIII, ed. by S. Cavaciocchi, Atti della Quarantesima settimana di studi dell’Istituto internazionale di storia economica “F. Datini” in Prato, Florence, Florence University Press, 2009, pp. 399–404.

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with controlling its enforcement, but they also dealt with possible conflicts between the parties and indicated the courts of law responsible for settling the disputes.22 The policy was at the heart of the legislators’ concerns. Two models were established that had to be scrupulously followed, otherwise the contract was considered void. The first standard policy had universal validity, which is why it was called “general insurance” (“sicurtà generale”). The second only pertained to contracts relating to the Adriatic sea, from the gulf of Venice to Valona (“alla Velona”), with particular reference to the connections between Ancona and Dubrovnik, the so called “insurance of the gulf of Ancona” (“sicurtà del golfo di Ancona”).23 In this respect, too, Florence turned out to be quite advanced, starting a trend that would see other markets, especially in the Atlantic, adopting one or more standard policies that all insurance contracts had to follow closely.24 It is, therefore, necessary to thoroughly analyse the two standard policies made compulsory by the 1524 “reform”, to spot any differences from the contracts used at the end of the 14th or at the beginning of the 16th centuries.25 As regards the opening and the first section of the contract—containing the name of the insured person, the objects covered, the itinerary and the vessel— the new formulation did not present any relevant changes, both in the “general” and in the “gulf of Ancona” types. However, in the latter, it was allowed to omit specific details regarding the means of transport and its ship master by making use of a generic indication “on any passage” (“sopra ogni passaggio”), but in the “general” model this possibility was not contemplated.26 The second section, as in the past, described the nature of the risks covered. Here, we find again, the same range of dangers as defined in the 14th century: weatherrelated risk (“any occurrence at sea”), accidental ones (“of fire”), and others due 22 23

Cf. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., p. 176. J.M. Pardessus, Collection de lois maritimes antérieures au XVIIIe siècle, Paris, Imprimerie Royale, 1827, vol. IV, p. 599: “except for insurance in the Gulf of Ancona, and Dubrovnik, Fiumicino, Signaleccio or Velona [...]”. Cf. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 234–235 and Pene Vidari, Il contratto d’assicurazione nell’età moderna, op.cit., pp. 274–275. 24 For an overall view at European level see Boiteux, La fortune de mer, op.cit., p. 142. For individual cases see for instance A. Tenenti, B. Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio, op.cit. p. 92; W.J. Jones, Elizabethan Marine Insurance. The Juridical Undergrowth, in “Business History”, 2, 1960, p. 55 and H. Casado Alonso, Los seguros maritimos de Burgos. Observatorio del comercio internacional portugués en el siglo XVI, in “Historia. Revista de Facultade de Letras do Porto”, ser. III, 4, 2003, p. 215. 25 The two standard models for contracts were included at the bottom of the new regulations and can be seen in Pardessus, Collection de lois maritimes, op.cit., pp. 605–607 (“sicurtà generale”) and pp. 607–609 (“sicurtà del golfo di Ancona”). 26 Ibid., p. 599

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to human agency, like jettison, reprisal and further possible damage linked to military clash, theft by pirates or other individuals. Risk exemptions are explicitly mentioned, making this the only real difference between the two standard contracts. The “general insurance”, similar to what happened at the end of the 15th century, envisages exclusions for damage incurred by the cargo at sea, either in the case of impounding, or for barratry (“baratteria di padrone”). This last instance is included among the risks accepted by the underwriters when stipulating contract according to the “gulf of Ancona” model.27 The last part of the two standard forms regulated the claim and compensation procedure. Co-insurance was by then a well rooted practice, which is why, compared to late 14th century contracts, we do not find any reference to it, as it must have been taken for granted. The duration for providing compensation was fixed at two months from the damage report in both the standard policies. And, after six months from stipulation, if no news had reached them concerning the outcome of the journey, the underwriters were obliged to start the compensation procedure. The principle guiding the process, “first pay up, then litigate” (“prima pagare […] di poi litigare”), already made explicit in the late 14th century, was confirmed by its formal inclusion in both the standard forms.28 Finally, neither the “general” nor the “Gulf of Ancona” model policies explicitly mentioned the official entities charged with monitoring contract enforcement and solving any disputes. This aspect, like others that we shall soon discuss, was disciplined by specific norms included in the 1524 “reform”. For the first time in its history, the Florentine policy did not have to specify all the elements necessary to regulate the insurance sector, which enabled it to become even more flexible. There were essentially three new norms regarding insurance contracts, which aimed at clarifying their content in relation to damage compensation, the payment to underwriters, and cargo recovery in the case of a mishap. The first established that insurance stipulated in favour of a cargo already lost should be considered void. As we shall later explain, the ruse of contracting policies to cover vessels that were rumoured to have already suffered shipwreck or had been captured by pirates was not uncommon. Therefore, with this provision, Florentine authorities attempted to put a stop to a practice that tried to turn insurance into a sort of a wager, behind which could lurk real frauds against the underwriters.29 The second, which was inspired by the laws 27 Ibid., pp. 607 and 609. 28 Compare ibid., pp. 606 with p. 608. 29 Ibid., pp. 600–601; cf. L. Piattoli, Ricerche intorno all’assicurazione nel medioevo VI: Due liti assicurative tra Italiani in Londra del 1464–1465, in “Assicurazioni”, 7, 1940, p. 169.

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issued in Barcelona with the Consulat the Mar in 1435, made it compulsory to settle the premium payment at the moment of stipulation and in cash. In this case, the norm was aimed at protecting the underwriters, by limiting the widespread tendency on the part of the insurance buyers to delay the payment of the agreed sum for as long as possible.30 The last rule put some order in cargo recovery, a procedure needed when insured goods were seized by foreign authorities or held by pirates with the purpose of obtaining a ransom. We have mentioned how, in the late 14th century, it was officially up to the underwriters to take care of cargo recovery. But, in fact, thanks to the power of attorney envisaged by an insurance clause, the owners of the goods had to step in eventually during the process. This practice was later formalised by inserting it directly into the contracts at the end of the 15th century. In 1524, a new element was introduced, as an institution created by the reform, the Insurance officials (Ufficiali alle sicurtà), was entrusted with the task of deciding on cargo recovery and who must bear the expenses of it.31 If we consider the insurance contract and its contents, the “reform” did not really seem to break with the past, since differences between the two standard forms, the policies stipulated by Francesco Datini and those used in the years immediately before 1524 are admittedly rather small. Therefore, legislative intervention did no more than “crystallize” what had been happening in everyday practice for more than a century of insurance business, a process that we could call “institutionalisation of custom”. However, the general framework in which the agreement between the insurance buyer and underwriters was carried out changed substantially by the “reform” as now it was the public authorities, and not the contract, responsible for granting its enforcement. This new scenario was completed by the indication of two subjects charged by the Florentine government with the task of concretising such guarantees: the “Insurance officials” (“Cinque ufficiali sopra le sicurtà deputati” and the sworn brokers. This new specialised institution—the Ufficiali alle sicurtà—was made of five individuals invested with various functions. Firstly, they could authorise (or decide not to) the contracting parties to depart from the model policy, and, therefore, preserving the long-standing flexibility that had been the main strength of the Florentine contract, and which risked being lost with the introduction of a standard formulation. They could also intervene to allow the parties to omit some elements which the law had made compulsory in the 30 Cf. Pardessus, Collection de lois maritimes, op.cit., p. 600 with Consolat de Mar, vol. III: Elements complementaris, op.cit., pp. 43–44. Cf. Spagnesi, Aspetti dell’assicurazione medievale, op.cit., p. 116. 31 Pardessus, Collection de lois maritimes, op. cit., p. 601; DATINI 1159, doc. 86.

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contract (the ship, the route, the goods, etc.), or to include some particular conditions, not mentioned in the model policy.32 Another field of action for the Insurance officials was vigilance over the premium rate which, if deemed above or below normal, could be compulsorily modified. It is easy to infer, from the introduction of such a prerogative, the intention of establishing a stronger deterrent against the tendency to turn insurance into a wager, recognizable from the abnormally high premiums. This power was not exclusive to the Florentine institution; in Dubrovnik, too, the competent officials had been charged with similar supervisory tasks.33 The third aspect that the Insurance officials had to discipline was, as previously mentioned, cargo recovery. Finally, they were charged with a vital function for the working of the whole insurance business: jurisdiction in case of litigation. The Ufficiali alle sicurtà functioned as first instance court, to which the parties, when doubts or controversies arose, had to apply to. In short, they acted like a specialised filter, aiming at reducing the initial tension between insured and insurers. If either of the parties was not satisfied with the Insurance officials, it was also possible to apply to a court of appeals. For this purpose, the reform confirmed that the Mercanzia had jurisdiction on controversial cases, as it had been doing even before 1524.34 In order to be co-opted into the Ufficiali alle sicurtà, the candidate had to possess specialist skills. We need only peruse the names of individuals who belonged to the magistracy, to realise that these men were all active in the insurance market. From Agnolo di Pierozzo del Rosso to Gerolamo Morelli, from Giovanfrancesco Franceschi to Giovanni di Agnolo Carducci to Giovanbattista Bracci, they were all individuals used to deal with clauses, premiums, and compensations.35 If, on the one hand, the Florentine authorities asserted its power on the field by creating an ad-hoc institution to monitor transactions, on the other, it decided to delegate this duty to experts already operating in the business. This, once again, gives us the impression that continuity was favoured over a real change of direction. As a matter of fact, even before the reform, insurance buyers and underwriters were already well inured to deciding controversies on their own, without turning to the formally appointed bodies. A case in point is an arbitration (“concordia”) occurred at the end of the 14th century, relating to a dispute that arose after the shipwreck of a pepper and ginger cargo travelling from 32 Pardessus, Collection de lois maritimes, op. cit., pp. 598–599. 33 Ibid., p. 599. For some Dubrovnik examples cf. Tenenti, Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio, op.cit., pp. 94–95. 34 Pardessus, Collection de lois maritimes, op. cit., pp. 601–602. 35 These names are mentioned in SALVIATI 70, fols. 71v and 77v; SALVIATI 749, fols. 177, 254 and 608.

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Alexandria in Egypt. A compromise was reached by the parties to avoid ending up in court. The individuals involved decided to entrust the question to two impartial and dependable arbiters, whose profile closely resembled that of the future Insurance officials.36 From this example, we get the strong impression that the 1524 laws did nothing else than give a formal encoding to norms already existing in the market since a long time. However, we are also aware of an effort to go beyond the mere “institutionalisation of custom”. A reflection of this can be seen in the presence of some foreigners among the members of the new administrative unit. For example, the two merchants from Burgos, Lopo de Castro and Pedro de Villena.37 As we shall see in the following chapters, the presence of foreigners is a novelty of the Florentine market during the 1520s. Their co-optation among the Insurance officials, besides being a mark of recognition of their importance, seems almost to reaffirm the role of institutional safeguard that the public authorities wanted to assign to the “reform”. Brokers were also deeply affected by the new norms disciplining the insurance industry. They introduced one sworn broker, appointed by the Ufficiali alle sicurtá, who at the discretion of the latter stayed in office for a year or more. To be legally valid, every contract had to be drafted by this intermediary (following the form envisaged by the standard policy), and also registered by him in an appropriate ledger (in Raggi’s case, the “Libro di ricordi di sicurtá”). The broker was also assigned the task of collecting and paying the new tax introduced by the “reform”, on behalf of both, insurance buyers and underwriters. Along with presenting a monthly report containing all the contracts that have been closed, the sworn broker had to deliver to the treasurer (“depositario”) of the Insurance officials a third of all the commissions he earned.38 It has been claimed that, invested with such a strong public role, the Florentine broker lost its previous independence and ceased to be at the centre between supply and demand, turning into a mere registrar.39 On the contrary, at least as concerns the first stage of implementation, our impression is that the “reform”, even in this case, merely exploited the pre-existing features in the market by 36

Cf. L. Piattoli, Ricerche intorno all’assicurazione nel medioevo V: Disconoscimento di rischio e compromesso in arbitri del 1393, in “Assicurazioni”, 7, 1940, pp. 163–164, in which we can read the text of this agreement (“concordia”); the protagonists were all individuals whose names were recurring again and again in contemporary Datini documents: from Matteo Villani and Niccolò da Uzzano (the arbiters), to Cino Rinuccini, Nofri Bischeri and Paolo di Berto Grazzini (the insurers), from Francesco Bardi (the insured) to the Averardo Medici and Partners Bank (who acted as guarantors of the agreement). 37 SALVIATI 70, fols. 71v and 77v. 38 Pardessus, Collection de lois maritimes, op. cit., pp. 599–600. 39 Pene Vidari, Il contratto d’assicurazione nell’età moderna, op.cit., p. 295.

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giving them formal recognition. As a matter of fact, unlike what was initially prescribed, not one but two sworn brokers were authorised to operate in the insurance market. The identity of the first one is known to us because, as we have anticipated, he was none other than Raggio Raggi. The name of the second broker remained a mystery for a long time. However, Giovanbattista Bracci’s “insurance accounts” have enabled us to solve the puzzle and discover his identity: Bartolomeo Ricoveri.40 Beyond this detail, the interesting piece of information is that not only had both brokers been active on the market for a long time but, as we shall see in later chapters, they had been working for years in a de-facto monopoly regime, continuing the trend towards concentration of this function in the hands of few individuals, already perceptible by the end of the 14th century.41 So, the choice to deviate from the norms and to invest both brokers with a public function shows the reform’s true nature as just another adaptation to a pre-existing reality, and not an imposition from above which stripped these professionals of their independence. From this viewpoint, the case of Florence seems peculiar. In other markets where registration of contracts also became compulsory, this duty was not necessarily entrusted to professional brokers but, more frequently, to proper public registrars. This is what happened in Burgos in 1565, in Marseilles around the mid-16th century, in Antwerp in 1559 and in all the Dutch towns from 1570 onwards, and in Dubrovnik in 1568.42 As regards the institutions involved in its enforcement, the 1524 “reform” also appears as the formalisation of well-established business practices. If, on the one hand, the Florentine authorities reaffirmed their power to dictate the rules governing the insurance market, on the other hand, these same rules were not following a top-bottom approach, but integrated the customs developed and tested over the years. The brokers took on a public role without losing their previous professional functions and the Insurance officials, though 40

41 42

Cf. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., p. 160; Melis, on the basis of the Merchants’ Tribunal’s deliberations and being unaware of the insurance accounts (conti sicurtà), had concluded that Ricoveri worked as a self-employed free agent. The Salviati bank’s archives have dispelled any remaining doubts as to the identification of Ricoveri as the second sworn broker operating in Florence; here, may it suffice to anticipate that during the two periods covered by the bank’s ledgers after 29 January 1524, the only two brokers that seemingly prepared insurance contracts in Florence were precisely Ricoveri and Raggi, cf. SALVIATI 742, fols. 281, 319, 368, 407, 436 and SALVIATI 749, fols. 75, 177, 180, 266, 404. The subject will be covered in more depth in chapter 11 (pp. 209–210). Cf. V. Barbour, Marine Risks and Insurance in Seventeenth Century, in “Journal of Economic and Business History”, 1, 1928–1929, pp. 572–573; Boiteux, La fortune de mer, op.cit., pp. 110, 113, 117–118; Tenenti, Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio, op.cit., pp. 94–97; Casado Alonso, Los seguros maritimos de Burgos, op.cit., p. 216.

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becoming the new “supervising body”, were picked from those already operating in the business. Nevertheless, this obviously meant that these new subjects, by virtue of being given an institutional role, were deemed more trustworthy when it came to concretely applying the norms. Beyond a quest for continuity, we can spot the intention of introducing measures to strengthen the already existing safeguards, such as by co-opting foreigners to monitor transactions and by forcing brokers to use well-defined procedures when drawing up and registering insurance policies. In conclusion, there are evident signs of an effort on the part of legislators to reorganise the rules without exerting too much pressure, hoping to facilitate their adoption. It remains unclear to what extent these efforts had effect in practice, that is, whether the 1524 regulations were indeed complied with or if they remained a mere declaration of principles. We can first try and assess how effective the “reform” was by looking at the compulsory registration of contracts. Supposedly, the tax introduced by the new legislation could have had the effect of encouraging insurance buyers and underwriters to avoid (at least partially) declaring they entered into a contract. As a matter of fact, we have some evidence of widespread elusion in other periods or different markets, both to simply dodge taxes, and to protect details about the shipment that, if disclosed, could increase the risk of capture by pirates.43 However, as we have mentioned, if comparing Raggi’s ledger with Giovanbattista Bracci’s “conti sicurtà”, it seems that, at least in this respect, actors complied with the 1524 laws. The coincidence between the two sources is almost absolute: out of the 77 contracts that (according to Bracci’s registrations in the quaderni di cassa of the Salviati bank) were drafted by Raggi in the period covered by his Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, only one is not present in both.44 It could be objected that operators avoided reporting in their “insurance accounts” any activities not compliant with the new norms; on the contrary, we shall see in the course of this study that the Salviati Bank’s accounting books recorded a wide range of operations that were not officially transcribed, some of which are in clear contrast to the provisions introduced by the “reform”. We can find some traces of policies stipulated outside Florence, of quotas 43

An exemplary case in this sense is that of London, where the obligation to register policies during the 16th century was largely flouted and a thriving “parallel” market in marine insurance was created, cf. Barbour, Marine Risks and Insurance in Seventeenth Century, op.cit., pp. 573 and 575. For examples relating to Amsterdam, see F.C. Spooner, Risk at Sea, op.cit., p. 23 and Barbour, Marine Risks and Insurance in Seventeenth Century, op.cit., p. 575n. 44 SALVIATI 742, fol.368; the entry relates to a policy underwritten in favour of the Alfonso Strozzi and partners of Florence on 14 May 1524, insuring a return trip from Genoa to North Africa (the “Barbary Coast”).

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subscribed and then sold to third parties, and even (but significantly only in one case) contracts not registered by a sworn broker.45 It cannot be excluded that others were less compliant with the law, but the fact that an underwriter as important as Bracci did not have much in the way of “hidden” activities lends support to the opposite conclusion. Among the new measures, the norm prescribing that premiums should be paid fully and in cash seem also to have been applied quite systematically. In the months preceding the “reform”, we find many entries in the “insurance accounts” providing evidence that the Salviati bank’s customers used to settle the premium by means of a transfer. After January 1524, this technique continued to be preferred in all cases the new laws allowed it, such as payments for cancellation and compensation. Bracci, himself, had extensively used bank transfers to cash in premiums, cancellation fees, and compensations. Yet, after the introduction of the new norms, no trace of bank transfers concerning premiums can be found: the payment, even when the insurance buyer was a customer of the Salviati bank, was settled in cash.46 The “insurance accounts” also reveal that paying up an underwriter’s claim in full was a deep-seated custom in Florence, well before it became compulsory. Out of all the entries registering credited premiums, there are only two instances (one preceding and one subsequent to January 1524) in which the amount of the compensation does not correspond to the one previously agreed on.47 It is also possible to verify the degree of compliance with the “reform” as regards the specialised institution it created, and the functions attributed to it. In the archives of the Mercanzia court, there is plentiful documentation on the 45 Cf. SALVIATI 749, fol. 75. This detail is found in a bank account in the name of Giovanbattista’s son, Zanobi Bracci; with reference to the January 1526 contract in favour of the Salviati Firm, we read that this was insurance “in faith and without any other writing”. Further elements confirm the suspicion that this may be an unregistered policy: the close business connections between Bracci and the Salviati firm, the absence of any reference to the broker who should have drawn up the contract, and the fact that the premium was cashed in without the usual deduction of the commission due to the broker. 46 For example, among the 86 entries of Bracci’s insurance accounts registered between February and August 1524, there is not one single instance where the premium was not paid in cash at the Salviati Bank; cf. SALVIATI 742, fols. 281, 319, 368, 407 and 436. For some examples of premiums paid by giro, antedating January 1524, ibid., docs. 136, 149, 205 and 243. The practice of paying insurance compensation by giro was much more common; see for example (ibid., c. 319) the entry, registered on 27 April 1524, which confirms the payment of fl. 12 directly onto the account of the Spaniard Lexmes de Astodillo, as partial refund for a fl. 50 subscription taken out by Bracci in 1522. 47 Cf. SALVIATI 735, fol. 136r and SALVIATI 749, fol. 180. In the first case, dating from July 1521, the insured paid five-sixths of the total due, whilst in the second (April 1526) the sum paid corresponded to half the agreed-on premium.

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insurance-related litigations that the Ufficiali alle sicurtà were called to settle.48 However, according to the bank accounts, the Insurance officials did not only intervene when the disputes became so bitter that they had to be submitted to a court of law, but they also carried out some preliminary investigations aimed at assessing the damage suffered by the insured. The Salviati Bank’s quaderni di cassa vaguely mention some “declarations by the officials” that led to only partial (and temporary) compensation on the part of the underwriters.49 Most likely, this was a preliminary estimate formulated by the Insurance officials to soften the harshness of the conflict, upholding the “first pay up, then litigate” principle already followed in late 15th century, but which the “reform” had translated into a rule. Even before 1524, we find evidence of this principle being put into practice by insurers, whenever they harboured doubts on the real status of the damage reported by the policy holder. Normally the subscribers granted the latter a cash advance, reserving the right to pay the remainder only after obtaining further details on the actual damage caused by the mishap.50 On the subject of the Insurance officials and their tasks, a few words on cargo recovery must be said. We have seen that, compared to the previous way of proceeding, the 1524 legislation introduced some significant changes, institutionalising the whole process to a certain extent. Unfortunately, we lack sufficient elements to be able to assess properly whether the new procedures were systematically adhered to or not. However, in Raggi’s register, we do find mention of cargo recoveries which, in compliance with the new norms, were coordinated by the Insurance officials. For example, we can read the copy of a contract dated June 1525, covering a wool cargo that had been seized in Provence and then recovered by the “signorj uficiallj di sichurta”, none other than the Insurance officials.51 The general impression we obtain from the documents is that the changes imposed by the “reform” were, by and large, implemented. Policies were written and registered by the two appointed brokers and premiums were paid in 48 Cf. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 176–177. 49 Examples can be found not only in Giovanbattista Bracci’s “insurance accounts” (SALVIATI 742, fol. 319 and SALVIATI 749, fols. 254, 608) or his son Zanobi’s (ibid., doc. 177), but also in a bank account opened by Antonio Martellini (SALVIATI 742, fol. 106). The payment would normally correspond to 25–30 % of the declared damages. 50 Ibid., docs. 182 and 205. One case that dragged on for almost three years shows how, for the insured party, obtaining the rest of the compensation after the initial advance might have been rather difficult. In December 1525, Giovanbattista Bracci quickly reimbursed the Spaniard Rodrigo Tostado, giving him fl. 16 out of a total of fl. 200 that the latter claimed as his rightful compensation. However, the final settlement kept being postponed year after year and, in March 1528, Bracci still owed the insured fl. 168; cf. SALVIATI 749, fol. 57. 51 SALVIATI 70, fol. 71v; a similar example in ibid., doc. 77v.

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cash. The specially created supervising authority was urged to settle disputes, and the officials intervened to accelerate compensation procedures and also took direct action when cargo recovery was required. However, not everything went as smoothly as hoped. Only two years after the 1524 “reform”, legislators again tried to put some order in the insurance industry, clarifying the objectives of the regulations and introducing new ones. At this stage, a brief look at the normative revision carried out in 1526 is necessary to highlight the problems that had probably arisen in practice. Firstly, the role of sworn brokers came under further scrutiny: they were urged to exercise greater accuracy when writing the monthly reports listing the registered policies. However, most changes clearly aimed at tightening the law against some practices that experience had taught could become the means through which frauds still took place.52 One of the rules, for example, concerned the goods that were the objects of the contract, by demanding that policy holders should provide more extensive details. Whilst previously insurance buyers were allowed to indicate a whole range of products (of which the new norm provides a detailed list) in a generic manner, after 1526 this was no longer possible, under penalty of invalidation of the contract.53 A definite limit was also imposed on the temporal validity of insurance coverage. After a year from stipulation, the policy was considered null, which freed the subscribers from the risk of being involved in never-ending transactions.54 The norms also clarified the “first pay up, then litigate” principle by specifying that, in order to have a compensation, the insurance buyer had to submit the bill of lading to the Insurance officials, or at least provide trustworthy witnesses confirming the extent of the damage.55 Finally, the new legislation made it compulsory to declare the existence of any other contracts covering the same goods, stipulated elsewhere.56 Unfortunately, it is impossible to verify the degree of enforcement that these legislative changes had, since the registrations in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà stopped after only a couple of months from their introduction. Nevertheless, we are left with the impression that the “reform” had only partially met its initial objectives. The measures introduced in 1526, for example, raise the suspicion 52 Pardessus, Collection de lois maritimes, op.cit., p. 605. 53 Ibid., pp. 602–603; these are: “slaves, fruit, horses, grains, wines, cured meats, sulphates, woad, alums, jewellery, oils, iron ore, crockery, gold, silver bars, silver artefacts and coins of any kind”. Mention of precious metals could be omitted if the policy concerned an interAdriatic sea journey. 54 Ibid., p. 603. 55 Ibid., p. 604. 56 Ibid., pp. 604–605.

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that some individuals had taken advantage of the rules intended to speed up the compensation process, in order to obtain claims to which they were not entitled, or that the possibility of insuring the same cargo in different places had encouraged others to concoct some fraud against the underwriters.57 If, however, even a wide-ranging codification had not been able to stamp out such contractual violations, it becomes legitimate to have doubts about its overall effectiveness that the “fine tuning” carried out in 1526 could not really improve. Only if we consider the concept of institution in a wider sense than its rigid identification with the laws enacted by public authorities (as we shall attempt to do in one of the later chapters), it might be possible to clarify the mechanisms which governed the insurance business as a whole. In spite of the criticism mentioned above, there is no doubt that the institutional framework that accompanied the growth of insurance in Florence played a definite role in ensuring the successful functioning of that market. The system was able to continue for a long time, relying on a type of contract that, right from its inception, showed itself capable of offering extensive safeguards to all those operating in the industry. When the trend towards better and more precise codification started at a pan-European level, the city was among the first to go down that path. It did so, however, without removing old practices that had taken root over a long time, by incorporating in its legislation some customs that had long shown their usefulness and flexibility. It also gave juridical legitimisation to the market demanded for, by recognising, for instance, the role of foreigners. This “soft” approach is perhaps the reason behind the apparently outstanding level of compliance with the new norms, which would seem to suggest that the “reform” had been agreed upon by the insurance buyers and underwriters themselves. 57

Examples of fraudulent practices of this sort can still be found in 17th century London, cf. Barbour, Marine Risks and Insurance in Seventeenth Century, op.cit., p. 576.

chapter 2

Trade and Insurance: Routes In 1601, in establishing the London Chamber of Insurance, Queen Elizabeth I highlighted the lasting link between insurance and trade. She argued that “venture” could only spread its wings and contribute to the “generall wealthe of the Realme” once merchants were freed from the risks of navigation. Through these remarks, the Queen inadvertently recalled a literary theme that had emerged in 15th-century Tuscany and addressed some fundamental points, we will investigate over the next chapters. First, the interaction between longdistance trade and the insurance market; second, the close dependence of the insurance business on maritime commerce; third, the degree of independence that an industry born for the needs of merchants can achieve.1 Among the wealth of information provided by the policies, the details relating to the routes travelled are perhaps the most interesting for historical research. The stretches of sea connecting the ports mentioned in the contracts were crucial in determining the premium, a topic we will discuss further on. The itineraries can also help us in understanding the trade flows feeding the insurance market, and they have been successfully exploited in this sense by several scholars.2 It is, therefore, possible to explore the relation between the spatial aspects of trade and insurance, highlighting their strong connections, as well as the possible points of divergence. The two set of sources under analysis are well suited for clarifying this feature, but in different ways. Clearly, the 14th-century contracts cannot measure up to the extensive view of the market that Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà provides. However, if we integrate these policies with those stipulated in Pisa, we can get an idea of how the two competing insurance markets interacted with the geography of trade. 1 Elizabeth’s theses were expressed in her introduction to the Statute of the Chamber of Assurance, an institution conceived as the only place where insurance negotiations could take place in the Kingdom, cf. Barbour, Marine Risks and Insurance in Seventeenth Century, op.cit., pp. 574–575, which includes a large transcription of the text. The first to underline in these terms the relationship between insurance activities and trade was, however, the preacher Bernardino da Siena, in his treaty on contracts; cf. G. Ceccarelli, Risky Business. Theological and Canonical Thought on Insurance from the Thirteenth to the Seventeenth Century, in “The Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies”, 31–3, 2001, pp. 621–622. 2 See, for example, B. Dini, Saggi su una economia-mondo: Firenze e l’Italia tra Mediterraneo e Europa, secc. 13–16, Pisa, Pacini, 1995, pp. 215–270 and Casado Alonso, Los seguros maritimos de Burgos, op.cit., pp. 213–242.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004442450_004

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Contracts concluded in Florence by the Datini firm aggregate allow us to reconstruct more than 120 journeys. If we add the policies stipulated in Pisa, we can reconstruct almost 280 of them.3 Cumulatively, the contracts list slightly less than 40 ports as departure or arrival points. These ports cover a geographical area which stretched between Beirut and Southampton from East to West, and Tunis and Bruges from North to South. With the exception of Bruges, references to places very far from Florence are quite rare. In fact, the ports mentioned in the policies from the end of the 14th century are mainly concentrated in three specific areas of the Mediterranean. Ports situated on the coast of Tuscany are the most common (over half of all the departure points—152 out of 279, and slightly over a quarter of the destinations—67 out of 279). Pisa and Porto Pisano (indicated almost 200 times, both for departure and arrival) are mentioned most often, followed by Leghorn and Motrone, a minor landing site in the Versilia region. Motrone started appearing in the contracts in 1397, becoming an important alternative to Porto Pisano for Florentine business firms due to the gradually deteriorating political relations between Pisa (increasingly controlled by the Visconti) and the Republic of Florence.4 After Tuscany, the two areas with the highest number of ports registered in the policies are the Provençal and Catalan coasts.5 Provençal ports appear 33 times in our sample as the point of departure and 52 times as the destination. Other common locations for departure and arrival were positioned near the mouth or along the course of the Rhone, such as Aigues-Mortes, Port-de-Bouc and, less often, Arles and Avignon. Marseilles is mentioned 12 times. Catalonia is mentioned 57 times, both as departure point and final destination. Several other ports were used along this coastline, with Barcelona appearing as a point of arrival in as many as 27 policies and Valencia mentioned as a departure point in 16 policies. Along the Catalan coast, a number of other ports were used, such 3 The analysis is obviously based on the data provided by our policy sample, cf. DATINI 1159, docs. 1–137 and DATINI 1158, docs. 1–159. 4 Cf. DATINI 1159, docs. 80, 81, 82, 84, 87, 88, 90, 98, 103, 109, 114, 123. However, as shown by a Pisan contract dated 1398, Motrone was used as a port regardless of political contingencies; cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 127. Cf. F. Melis, Elenco descrittivo dei porti dell’Europa in un manoscritto fiorentino della fine del Trecento, (1966, Paris) and Id. Firenze e le sue comunicazioni con il mare nei secoli XIV–XV (1964), both in Id., I trasporti e le comunicazioni nel Medioevo, ed. by L. Frangioni, Florence, Le Monnier, 1984, pp. 72–73 and pp. 132–134, respectively. 5 On the importance of the Avignon and Catalan markets see the classic study by Y. Renouard, Les relations des papes d’Avignon et des compagnies commerciales et bancaires de 1316 à 1378, Paris, de Boccard, 1941 and C. Carrère, Barcelone. Centre économique à l’époque des difficultés (1380–1462), Paris, Mouton, 1967, 2 vols. On Valencia cf. J. Guiral-Hadziiossif, Valencia: puerto mediterráneo en el siglo XV (1410–1525), (1986, Paris), Valencia, Edicions Alfons el Magnànim, 1989, pp. 381–432.

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as Tortosa and Peñìscola, often indicated as alternatives to the larger Dénia and Benidorm. In the Balearic Islands, Majorca seems to have been the real hub of the port system, appearing 21 times in the contracts, both as the point of departure and destination. The references to Minorca or Ibiza are less common. This preliminary survey of the ports mentioned in our sample reflects the geographical reach of the Datini firm aggregate. The hub of this business aggregate can be located in Tuscany, with one business partnership in Pisa and several firms in Florence. To these, we must add the Francesco Datini and partners of Avignon, where the merchant of Prato had initially started his operations, which was connected to the Provençal ports via the Rhone river; the aggregate was completed by Barcelona and Majorca, where a business firm and its relative branch were respectively located to expand Datini’s operations in the Kingdom of Aragon. The other two cities mentioned in the insurance contracts are Genoa, where another Datini partnership was operating, and Venice, where the merchant of Prato could rely on his agent Marco Zanobi di Taddeo Gaddi. Genoa crops up 22 times in the sample as a departure point and 33 times as the final destination. The nearby port of Savona appears mostly as an arrival location, with 13 references to arrival out of a total of 14. Savona was also used as a transit stop on the way to Avignon. Venice appears mostly as a final destination, with 12 mentions as point of arrival out of a total of 17. Although data coming from extant policies maybe distorted, these limited references reasonably confirm the existence of an insurance market comparable to that thriving in Florence also in Genoa and Venice. With reference to the latter it is also necessary to recall that goods loaded onto convoys of armed galleys (“mude”) departing from this port were seldom insured.6 There were several other locations that did not house one of Datini’s firms but are typical of trade flows involving Florence and Pisa, such as Flanders, Sicily, and Rome. Our contracts mention Sluys, the port of Bruges, as the destination of the journey 9 times, but never as a departure location. Similarly, Rome and Sicily mainly appear as arrival points: 16 times out of 16 for Rome and nearby Ostia, 10 out of 12 for Sicily (including Palermo 9 times, and Messina once). The picture is completed by a series of contracts specifying ports in the Levant and North Africa. Alexandria is referred to twice, and Beirut and Tunis once each. Finally, one of the contracts indicates “Antona” as the point of departure, which is a reference to Southampton in England. While the study of the ports mentioned in the 14th-century contracts gives us just a glimpse of the interplay existing between space, trade and the insurance industry, a review of the connections between these port favours 6 Cf. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 56–60.

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more in depth analysis. We will group the itineraries mentioned in the policies into six great maritime routes to rank, summarily but clearly, the business activities of the Datini aggregate. A broad ranking already emerges by counting how many contracts provide coverage to shipments in each great route: Northern Tyrrhenian Sea-Catalonia/Balearic Islands (85), Northern Tyrrhenian-Provence (84), Tuscany-Liguria (44), Tuscany-Central/Southern Italy (30), Venice-Catalonia/Balearic (17), Mediterranean-North Sea (10).7 The geographical outlines of the demand for insurance of the Datini business aggregate, in Florence and Pisa, are even clearer considering the insured value and the number of quotas underwritten (see Table 2.1).8 These figures also enable us to assess the value of the goods travelling along the various routes. By looking at the average amount underwritten, we can get some indication of the perceived risk of each great route. For high-risk ones, it is self-evident that the underwriters tried to reduce the amount for which they assumed the said risk, while the opposite holds for relatively safer connections. Moreover, by decomposing the data relating to the contracts completed in Florence, it is possible to highlight the differences between the demand for insurance generated by the Datini firms in this market and in Pisa. Two great maritime routes linking the Northern Tyrrhenian coast to the ports of Provence and the Kingdom of Aragon stand out sharply from the rest. They not only make up more than 50% of the total contracts (169 out of 273), but also the values covered (fl. 85,000 out of fl. 137,000) and the quotas underwritten (about two-thirds of the total). The analysis of the great routes, therefore, confirms that the demand exerted by the Datini aggregate was merely a by-product of their more general business strategies. The crucial role of the trade flows generated by the firms in Avignon and Barcelona was mirrored in importance by the policies referring to the Tuscany-Provence and Tuscany-Catalonia/Balearic Island great routes. In terms of insured value, the great maritime routes connecting Pisa (and Porto Pisano), Leghorn and Motrone with Aigues-Mortes, Port-de-Bouc, Arles, 7 On the concept of axis or “great route”, as applied to the insurance market, see M. Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani e l’espansione della corona d’Aragona nel secolo XV, Naples, L’arte tipografica, 1972, pp. 2–148; for contemporary maritime trade by Tuscan firms, cf. F. Melis, Firenze e le sue comunicazioni con il mare, op.cit., pp. 121–141. More in general, see J.A. Van Houtte, Les grands itinéraires du commerce (XIIIe–XVIIIe siècle), in Trasporti e sviluppo economico: secoli XIII–XVIII, ed. by A. Vannini Marx, Atti della Quinta settimana di studi dell’Istituto internazionale di storia economica “F. Datini” in Prato, Florence, Le Monnier, 1986, pp. 87–98. 8 The number of contracts bearing full information about itinerary, the sums insured and number of underwritten quotas has dropped to 273, because 6 policies are lacking one or both of the last two details.

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and Marseilles on the one hand, and Barcelona, Valencia, and Majorca on the other, definitely outdid all others (fl. 38,837 out of fl. 44,887 for the former, fl. 34,317 out of 40,822 for the latter). It seems that the alternative provided by the Ligurian ports, with the great routes Genoa-Provence and Genoa-Catalonia/ Balearic, had a secondary role. Savona as well played a small part, appearing in just two contracts on the itinerary to Provence, for a total value of fl. 1,000.9 Moreover, these two great maritime routes, the Northern Tyrrhenian-Provence and the Northern Tyrrhenian-Catalonia/Balearic Islands, seem to have a lot in common. The average value per contract is similar (fl. 534 in the first case, and fl. 480 in the second), and so are the quotas (fl. 138 and fl. 127). The data relating to the average subscriptions stipulated for each policy is even more homogeneous at 3.9 and 3.8, respectively. The similarities also extend to the distribution of demand between the two insurance markets. It appears equally divided between Florence and Pisa, both in terms of the number of contracts and insured values. A far less important role is played by three other great routes: TuscanyLiguria, Tuscany-Central/Southern Italy and Venice-Catalonia/Balearic. The Tuscany-Liguria route is mentioned in 30 cases with total coverage of approximately fl. 17,000. The connections between Porto Pisano and Genoa had a vital role on this great route as compared to the alternative one from Porto Pisano to Savona. Two elements clearly distinguish Tuscany-Liguria great route from the two previously analysed. The average insured value per quota is by far the highest in the whole sample (fl. 194, rising to fl. 254 for Genoa alone). Moreover, almost all the contracts seem to have been completed in Pisa (39 out of 44). Both the “anomalies” can be explained by the nature of the connections for this great route, characterised by frequent short-distance trips by small boats, travelling in conditions of relative safety. This impression can be confirmed by reconstructing the impact floating insurance policies, which granted coverage for unlimited journeys on the same itinerary, had on the market for this great maritime route. The first contract of this kind is among the extant ones of the Datini archive: a policy stipulated in Pisa on 30 May 1391 in favour of

9 Cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 56 of 22 January 1387 mentioning ginger, spices and “other things” travelling from Savona to Aigues-Mortes, insured for fl. 550 and with a 2.75% premium; DATINI 1159, doc. 131 of 10 June 1400, with departure possibly at Aigues-Mortes or Savona and arrival in Porto Pisano, concerning Languedoc cloth insured for fl. 500 and 1% premium. On the role of Savona in the framework of the Datini group’s commercial strategies see L. Frangioni, Milano. Fine Trecento: il carteggio milanese dell’Archivio Datini di Prato, vol. I: Testo e bibliografia, Florence, Opus Libri, 1994, pp. 130–132.

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Trade and Insurance: Routes table 2.1

Values insured, and quotas underwritten in Pisa and Florence by great maritime route (1379–1402), according to the Datini Archive’s insurance policies

Great maritime route

Northern Tyrrhenian Sea—Provence Northern Tyrrhenian Sea—Catalonia/ Balearic Isl. Venice—Catalonia/Balearic Islands Tuscany—Liguria Tuscany—Central/Southern Italy Mediterranean Sea—North Sea Other Total

Value of insurance in florins

Number of quotas insured

71,597 65,835

510 515

24,400 18,181 17,234 8,500 2,250

167 94 137 65 20

207,997

1,508

SOURCE: DATINI 1159, docs. 1–137 and DATINI 1158, docs. 1–159.

Francesco Datini and partners, with the Pisan banker Giovanni Grassolino as the underwriter.10 Next, let us consider the great maritime routes connecting the Tuscan ports with Rome and Southern Italy, in particular with Sicily, Naples and Gaeta. References to these itineraries are found in 30 contracts, which covered goods worth almost fl.15,000, subdivided into a consistent number of subscriptions (188). The average insured quota was, therefore, rather low, especially for journeys to Rome (fl. 93). In all probability, this amount reflects the unsafe conditions in this area, infested heavily by pirates, especially between Corsica and the Tuscan Archipelago.11 In this case, too, we note an uneven distribution of 10 Cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 77; for an in-depth discussion of this policy see C.L. Daveggia, Una nuova forma assicurativa medievale: la polizza in abbonamento nell’assicurazione, in “Diritto e pratica nell’assicurazione”, ser. II, 5, 1963, pp. 228–238. On the Grassolino Firm see F. Melis, Note di storia della banca pisana nel Trecento (1955, Pisa), in Id., La banca pisana e le origini della banca moderna, ed. by M. Spallanzani, Florence, Le Monnier, 1987, pp. 241–242. 11 This detail, as we shall see later, is confirmed by the high premiums applied for this route and by the frequent use of galleys as a means of transport. On this matter see also the references, contained in two policies, reporting the assistance of Spinola’s formidable galley, commanded by the Venetian Giorgio Gritti, cf. DATINI 1158, docs. 75 (of 3 May 1392) and 76 (stipulated five days later). On the presence of pirates in this area during the period in which Datini was in business see F. Melis, Movimento di popoli e motivi economici nel

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policies between those drawn up in Pisa and Florence, which strengthens our impression that the two cities may have somewhat become geographically specialised with time. Although the number of contracts relating to the Venice-Catalonia/Balearic great maritime route is modest (only 17), their monetary value is comparable to that of the two preceding ones. The documented journeys departing from the Venice, with cargoes insured by the Datini firm aggregate, always had Majorca as their final destination. For the shipments arriving in Venice, the departure point varied between the Balearic Islands, Valencia, Barcelona or some minor port on the Catalan coast.12 The demand for insurance services generated by the Datini business aggregate on the great maritime route connecting the Mediterranean to Flanders and England appears more discontinuous. Only 10 policies are preserved, amounting to less than fl. 5,000 in total. This low figure seems to suggest the lack of permanent commercial bases for the Datini firms in the cities of Atlantic Europe, as well as more frequent recourse to galleys, reducing the requirement for insurance.13 The Venice-Catalonia/Balearic and the Mediterranean-North Sea great routes, which stand out among the others for their length, are both mentioned almost exclusively in the policies drawn up in Florence. Another noteworthy observation is the number and value of contracts stipulated for itineraries not having a departure or arrival location in the Tuscan coast. We have counted 52 of these, distributed between 1386 and 1399, worth a significant amount, just over fl. 28,000, subdivided into 200 quotas. These numbers suggest the progressive expansion of Tuscan operators into other markets; they stress as well the attention given to the underwriters’ nationality when choosing the centre in which to buy insurance. An interpretation as such is supported by the fact that these type of transactions became more frequent over time (half the total, in the years 1395–1399) and by the pre-eminence

giubileo del 1400, (1970, Padua), in Id. I trasporti e le comunicazioni nel Medioevo, op.cit., pp. 256–258. 12 On connections from Catalonia to Venice within the framework of the Datini group’s commercial strategies, see F. Melis, Aspetti della vita economica medioevale (Studi nell’Archivio Datini di Prato), vol. I, Siena, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, 1962, pp. 237–279. 13 For trade between Florence and Flanders or England between the second half of the century and the start of the next, cf. Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, pp. 130–131. On the geographical structure of the Datini firm agglomerate, cf. Melis, Aspetti della vita economica medioevale, op.cit., pp. 133–134; on the infrequent recourse to insurance in case of transport on armed vessels, cf. Id., Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 56–60.

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of Florence over Pisa in this specific market segment (33 policies against 19 for Pisa).14 During the 1520s, the scenario, as outlined by Raggi’s registrations, greatly broadened, with many more ports, itineraries, and trading routes where to spread insurance operations. This spatial expansion clearly depends on the nature of our sources, which provide information on the demand generated not just by one—though remarkable—business aggregate, but by most of the Florentine firms and several “foreign” operators as well. However, the geographical enlargement of the insurance industry revealed by our 16th-century documentation was also the by-product of the progressive development of trade in the Atlantic. Before plunging into an analysis of the data, some clarification is necessary regarding the information provided by Raggi’s records. Firstly, we need to signal the presence of a new type of contract—time insurance—which, by its nature, could omit any indication of the departure and arrival ports. However, this trend was still sporadic in the time period included in our sample. Between 1524 and 1526, we found only 5 examples of time insurance, all covering the hull of the boat.15 The situation was made more complicated by contracts that allowed the ship master to opt for one among several final destinations. Most of the times, we encountered small differences, similar to those already observed in the Datini documents. For example, an option between Alicante and Cartagena, or between Marseilles and Aigues-Mortes. But, in a few contracts, we are confronted with rather significant variations, such as that between Venice and Flanders or Ancona and Leghorn.16 The number of locations indicated as departure, arrival or possible stopover points in this period is 106, much higher than the figure derived from our 14th-century documentation. This increase is matched by much wider spatial distribution, whose extremes are Constantinople and Alexandria in the East, Scotland and Zeeland (Arnemuiden, Middelburg) in the North, the Irish coast, 14 The expansionist drive and ability of Tuscan insurance operators is confirmed by their assiduous presence in Barcelona during the second half of the 14th century. As a matter of fact Italians, and especially Florentines, can be considered the real exporters of insurance to Catalonia, cf. Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani, op.cit., pp. 469–476. 15 Cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 22r, 57v, 105v, 135v, 140v. On this type of policy and its diffusion in the 16th century, see Tenenti, Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio, op.cit., pp. 74–80. 16 See for example, SALVIATI 70, fols. 54r–54v (route: Madeira-Venice or Flanders), 69v (route: Grosseto-La Spezia or Gaeta), 102v and 107r, (route: Pera/Constantinople-Ancona or Leghorn). Moreover, probably because of mistakes by the broker, some contracts (9 in all) lack any indication of the route travelled.

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the Canary Islands and Madeira in the West, and in the South, the ports on the Barbary Coast (Oran and Dellys) and the Isle of Djerba. This expansion went along with a supply of insurance that in geographical terms we can only define as extremely capillary. The distance between the ports mentioned in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà is on average just 70–100 km, rarely exceeding 200 km, as in the case of coastline between Egypt and present-day Tunisia, or Lisbon and Santander.17 The Florentine insurance market seemed to have extended its operations to some coastal areas in particular: 9 of these are referred to over 60 times (corresponding to about two references every month). The core of demand— more than 20% of all instances—revolved around the port of Leghorn with its offshoots at Viareggio (29 contracts) and La Spezia (7). Pisa is mentioned in 7 policies only (twice as an alternative to Viareggio and Leghorn). The 16thcentury sources thus testify the decline of Pisa—the most important maritime port in Tuscany in the late 14th century—, for the well-known hydro-geological problems caused by progressive landfilling. With less than half the number of registered policies compared to the Leghorn area, Ancona had become Florence’s Adriatic outlet (it occurs in about 9% of contracts). The two Provençal ports of Aigues-Mortes and Marseilles, indicated separately in 120 and 51 contracts, respectively, and, as alternatives to each other in 39 policies, appear in over 11% of the total contracts considered. As at the end of the 14th century, the Rhone river continued to be most crucial factor behind the lasting success of Provençal ports. Thanks to the fluvial connections, Lyon could be reached with relative ease, and we know that Florentine business was well consolidated in the French city.18 References to cargoes departing from, or arriving at, the other coastal areas are less frequent, except for several Spanish ports distributed along the coastline that from Valencia, through Cartagena and Alicante, reaches Cadiz. These ports appear individually in a reasonable number of policies and represent 10% of our sample when added together. Both Dubrovnik and Constantinople (including Pera) are mentioned as arrival or departure points in about 5% of Raggi’s registrations. Rome and Ripa Romana are a peculiar case because 17 18

The data discussed here refer to Raggio Raggi’s registrations during the 29 months taken into consideration for our sample; see, therefore, SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r. Cf. R. Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siècle: Lyons et ses marchands (environs de 1520–environs de 1580), Paris, S.E.V.P.E.N., 1971; M. Cassandro, I forestieri a Lione nel ’400 e ’500: La nazione fiorentina, in Dentro la città: stranieri e realtà urbane nell’Europa dei secoli XII–XVI, ed. by G. Rossetti, Naples, Liguori, 1989, pp. 151–162; A. Orlandi, Le grand parti. Fiorentini a Lione e il debito pubblico francese nel XVI secolo, Florence, Olschki, 2002.

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they always appear as the final destinations: they are cited more than 70 times (about 4% of the total) in our sample. If we turn to the north-central Atlantic Ocean, English ports (like Southampton, Gravesend—“the mouth of the Thames”—or London) are mentioned more than 60 times, while Flemish cities and the Bordeaux area lag behind. These are followed by the coastal centres of western and southern Sicily, with less than 60 entries; Palermo with 31 references; Naples, with Salerno as an alternative, and some small harbours in Maremma, such as Talamone and the mouth of the river Albegna, cited almost 40 times; and, Civitavecchia, the only centre of this area also indicated as final destination. Finally, right at the bottom of this particular list, there are three crucial ports: Genoa, Venice and Alexandria in Egypt, mentioned in 32, 24 and 30 contracts, respectively. Taking into analysis the great maritime routes on which Florence spread its insurance operations in the 1520s it is possible to establish a close comparison with what emerged from the Datini sources. Most contracts stipulated during the three years between 1524–1526 concerned 7 great routes (see Table 2.2). We have sometimes adopted rather generic criteria for our classification—as is the case for itineraries linking the North Sea ports with the Mediterranean—or more detailed ones, for example when looking at inter-Adriatic trade flows. As was already apparent at the end of the 14th century, the main great route was between Tuscany (including the Gulf of La Spezia) to Provence, both in terms of the number of contracts and insured values. The documents reveal that the demand for insurance was the highest (a rate of almost 2:1) on the itinerary connecting the South of France (Lyon) with the ports on the Tyrrhenian coast. Compared to the earlier period under investigation, the great maritime route linking the Mediterranean with the English Channel had become busier. This includes the ports of Flanders, Zeeland and England, to which we should add some unspecified departure locations on the coasts of Ireland and Scotland. Within this great route it was the flow from North to South that generated the largest share of insurance demand. This included connections between Southampton and Venice, Chios or Constantinople, and between Antwerp and Leghorn. The shift happening at the time in the hierarchies of the European economy is, therefore, well reflected in the geography of the Florentine market. Only a quarter of the total insured values relating to this great maritime route depart from the Mediterranean. Few and specific itineraries fuel the South to North flow, such as that from Civitavecchia (or, alternately, Porto Ercole) to Normandy and Flanders, and involving just raw materials, such as alum, but not manufactured products.

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table 2.2 Values insured and quotas underwritten in Florence by great maritime route (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

Great maritime route

Value of insurance. In fl.

N. of insured quotas

Northern Tyrrhenian Sea – Provence Inter-Tyrrhenian North Sea – Mediterranean Inter – Adriatic Adriatic – East Northern Tyrrhenian – Spain Provence – Spain Inter – Atlantic Provence – Barbary Coast Atlantic Islands – Mediterranean Other routes Time insurance/unspecified Total

91,498.33 86,455.66 82,377.50 66,350.00 58,985.00 58,565.00 57,640.00 23,951.00 20,200.00 17,450.00 89,273.00 8,650.00 661,395.49

1168 1329 1135 526 745 809 733 310 256 215 1180 109 8515

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r.

In terms of insured value, the third most important great route was the “interAdriatic” one, grouping the contracts relating to trips between Ancona and Dubrovnik. In this case, we register a substantial equilibrium between the policies covering goods travelling from west to east, and those for cargoes transported in the opposite direction. This is novel as compared to the late 14th century, and confirms Florence’s growing influence in the Adriatic area, thanks to the role played by Ancona and Dubrovnik. This latter, not only acted as a hub for trade to and from the Balkans, but was also an intermediate, obligatory stop in the “mixed’ itinerary that reached the Middle-East overland.19 Similar observations can be made for the route connecting the Adriatic ports (from Venice to Apulia, from Dubrovnik to Ancona) to those in the Levant (Constantinople, Beirut and Alexandria). Here, most of the insurance 19 Cf. F. Melis, Da un bacino all’altro del Mediterraneo attraverso la penisola italiana (1983, Naples), in Id., I trasporti e le comunicazioni nel Medioevo, op.cit., pp. 173–174. On the increasing importance of this axis during the 16th century, see the essays included in Ragusa e il Mediterraneo. Ruolo e funzioni di una repubblica marinara tra Medioevo ed Età moderna, ed. by A. Di Vittorio, Bari, Cacucci, 1990; on the role played in the Florentine economy, cf. Dini, Saggi su una economia-mondo, op.cit., pp. 215–270.

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demand was concentrated on the routes travelling from the West to the East, both in terms of contracts (a rate of about 2.5:1) and insured values (almost 5:1). These figures confirm the continued and significant flow of goods into Europe from the Middle East, across the Mediterranean, during the 1520s, but also the growing importance of Florentine underwriters in this market, which had been previously under Venetian control. As we have observed, in the late 14th-century policies, Adriatic itineraries were only used by the Datini firms for longer journeys to Catalonia. Returning to the western Mediterranean, as noticed at the end of the 14th century, our data confirms the increasing importance of the great maritime route connecting the Upper-Tyrrhenian and Provençal ports with the Iberian Peninsula. There are, however, some interesting features to note here. The first is the core of insurance demand—previously centred on Barcelona and Valencia—had now shifted westward, towards the coastal centres of Murcia (Alicante and Cartagena), as far as the Atlantic port of Cadiz. This could be partly attributed to the Spanish Reconquista. The second novel feature is that, according to Raggi’s registrations, the market share occupied by Florence almost exclusively concerned the flow of goods travelling from Tuscany and Southern France towards the Iberian Peninsula and not, as witnessed in the late 1300s, in the opposite direction. It is likely that this anomaly is observed by us simply because most Spanish firms did not use Raggio Raggi as their reference broker, but Bartolomeo Ricoveri, as we will see in the following chapters. Another important factor was the increasing competition of the emerging insurance market of Burgos, for the routes departing from the Iberian Peninsula to the Tyrrhenian sea.20 The last great maritime route that, according to our 1524–1526, was relevant for the Florentine insurance market also crossed the Tyrrhenian Sea. For the sake of simplicity we have called it the “inter-Tyrrhenian route”. This great route, already visible in the Datini documents, consists of a composite number of connections among ports located in various Italian regions, such as Liguria, Tuscany, Lazio and Sicily. Both in terms of stipulated contracts and insured value, the itineraries linking the ports of Liguria (including Genoa) and Tuscany to Naples and Palermo (with the respective alternatives of Salerno and Trapani) stand out among the rest. Travel in the opposite direction was only relevant for the relevant sums insured, mainly as insurance cover for cereal cargoes travelling north from Sicilian lading ports to large cities like Genoa 20

For some evidence of insurance activities from Spain to Tuscany, see Casado Alonso, Los seguros maritimos de Burgos, op.cit., p. 232; on the broker Bartolomeo Ricoveri’s clientele see chapter 8 (pp. 149–150 and 158).

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and Florence. Rome mainly appears as a great centre of consumption, as the final destination of goods coming from Upper-Tuscany and Sicily. An important position was occupied, but only in terms of number contracts, by the itineraries that connected the small ports in the Maremma to Leghorn (or, just as frequently, Viareggio and La Spezia). To complete this overview of the Florentine insurance market, we can mention three more great maritime routes where Florentine insurance operators were active during the 1520s. First, what we may call the “inter-Atlantic” great route. This can be split into two itineraries: first, from Bordeaux to the English or Flemish coasts (17 policies); second, from Gascony to the Basque Country (only 4 policies). The Libro di ricordi di sicurtà also includes three rather valuable contracts in terms of insured goods (over 17,000 florins), covering cargoes travelling from the Canary Islands and Madeira in the Atlantic to Leghorn or Genoa: the “Atlantic Islands-Mediterranean” great maritime route. Finally, we have grouped in the “Provence-Barbary Coast” great route several registrations (18 in all, and often for round trips) concerning journeys from Provence to North Africa (Oran, Dellys and more generally, the Barbary Coast). With the exception of the last one, which became more involved after the Spanish military conquests in North Africa, these great routes are new when compared to the picture previously delineated for the end of the 14th century. If, on the one hand, they concretely bear witness to the growing importance of the Atlantic economies, on the other, they show how Florence still managed to drive a wedge into trade gravitating in that sector of the Ocean, as well as offer its insurance services to entrepreneurs operating in the area. Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà contains only one reference to trade between Liguria and Tuscany. This fact is peculiar, but it finds confirmation in the rest of the surviving 16th-century documentation, where there is only one other mention of the Genoa-Pisa route—plus two references to trips between Viareggio and Savona.21 The lack of data cannot be attributed to either the monopoly of Bartolomeo Ricoveri (the other sworn broker) on this route, or to trade being suspended because of the military standoff between Florence and Genoa.22 It is, therefore, likely that Florence was largely unable to i­ntercept 21 This is one of Raggi’s earliest registrations, a policy dated 18 February 1524 in favour of Pere Labia for a wool cargo transported from Genoa to Pisa; cf. SALVIATI 70, fol. 1v. The first of the other contracts with Pere Labia as beneficiary dates back to July 1521, whilst another two were stipulated in April and July 1527, with Dino Miniati and partners and Leonardo Ginori and Giovambattista Pitti’s firm in the role of insured; cf. respectively SALVIATI 735, fol. 136r and SALVIATI 749, fol. 477v. 22 All the contracts just mentioned were indeed drawn up by Raggio Raggi; Florence and Genoa fought on opposite fronts only from May 1521 to May 1522, when the Ligurian city

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insurance demand generated by this itinerary, which confirms what has already emerged from the Datini contracts. It is one of those instances when the insurance market seems to show some autonomy vis-à-vis the geography into which the general flow of maritime trade tended to force it. There are other indications in this sense, deriving from the analysis of the average value of the insurance quotas for the different itineraries (see Table 2.2). As we have already seen for the late 14th-century, these average value can provide some indirect clues about the risk suffered in the different stretches of seas. The data that can be inferred from Raggi’s registrations highlights two routes whose values significantly deviate from the total average (normally about fl. 77 per insured quota): the “inter-Adriatic” great route shows a considerable increase if compared to the rest of the sample (about fl. 126 per quota), revealing the greater risk tolerance of the underwriters investing in these itineraries. There is evident proof of the low level of risk on these connections which, as we shall see, was reflected in the unusually low premium (2%), by far the lowest charged in Florence. The findings could, in general, suggest a more direct relationship between the entity of the premium and the average amounts subscribed by individual insurers: but the picture is actually more complex. Let us consider the other remarkable anomaly among our great maritime routes, i.e., the “interTyrrhenian” one, with its average values ranging from fl. 54 between Maremma and northern Tuscany, to fl. 58 for a journey from northern Tuscany to Rome, to fl. 68 for Sicily-Rome, reaching fl. 70 for routes linking the north Tyrrhenian to the South of Italy. Although on these itineraries we see higher insurance premiums (from 4% to as high as 9%, with an average of 5–6%), they are not comparable to those charged for very long trips, like the 14, 15, 16 and 17% we find in our sample from the North Sea to the central and eastern Mediterranean. In the contracts covering these latter itineraries or other ones with high premiums, the average value of amount underwritten is in line with our sample. Therefore, the fractioning of risk made by the insurers was certainly linked to the threats characterising each route, but its relationship to the premium was not so straightforward. It was probably not a coincidence if insurers in the late 14th century also adopted similar strategies for sea voyages between the Tuscan islands and the coasts of Campania. The study of the locations mentioned in the Florentine policies highlights their close interdependence with the strategies of merchants engaged in longdistance trade. In our contracts from the end of the 14th century, the most capitulated after a long siege, abandoning the alliance with the French to join the imperial forces.

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frequently recurring stretch of sea corresponds to a triangle delineated by Datini’s main commercial hubs: Avignon, Barcelona and Florence. During the 1520s, the transactions recorded by Raggi traced a map that could largely be superimposed on that outlined by the geographic changes occurring at the time in the European economy. Proof of this is the increased volume of goods insured on the axis from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean, which already foreshadowed the beginning of what has been recently renamed “little divergence”.23 The Florentine insurance market’s expansion in the direction of the Adriatic and Aegean Sea is also an indication of the city shifting its commercial interests towards alternative markets of the Levant.24 As we have seen, itineraries were not all the same in the eyes of both the insurance buyers and the underwriters. Although embedded into the general flows of maritime trade, the insurance market also shaped its own independent geography. Risks were assessed and fractioned using a system that cannot be reduced to mere spatial criteria, a clue to the fact that the perceived threats of an itinerary generated strategies which were peculiar to the insurance sector. The geography of trade had moreover to interact with that determined by the different markets where insurance could be bought and sold. The only clear example emerging from our sources, concerning the Pisa-Genoa route, hints at a trend of geographical specialisation of among insurance markets. If, at the end of the 14th century, Florence had a few competitors—Pisa, Venice, Genoa and maybe Barcelona—in the 16th century, the insurance panorama comprised several new players in the field, making this phenomenon even harder to grasp. However, as we shall discuss later, the discrepancies in the geographies of maritime trade and marine insurance can be a shortcut to measure the ability of different markets to intercept the demand for insurance. 23 24

See, for example, J.L. Van Zanden, The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution: the European Economy in a Global Perspective, 1000–1800, Leiden, Brill, 2009, pp. 95–100. Cf. Dini, Saggi su una economia-mondo, op.cit., pp. 215–287.

chapter 3

Trade and Insurance: Goods It may seem paradoxical, but the very object at the centre of insurance transactions, the goods transported by sea, and less frequently, the vessel on which the cargo was loaded, turn out to be the most difficult elements to study. In our 14th-century documentation, it is sometimes possible to find insurance policies meticulously listing the products for which the insurers took the risk. From a Florentine contract dated January 1400, we learn, for example, that it covered “three bales of paper, two bales of cloth, one bale of spun cotton, half a 50-piece bundle of taffeta from Bologna and half of five sacks of Turkish cotton” for a total value of about 1,500 gold florins.1 However, the remaining documents are seldom so precise, especially as concerns the value of individual items. In fact, at times, such information was found to be too generic by the insurers, too. This happened to a policy written in Florence in August 1396, in which the broker was later forced to add a clause clarifying the quantity and the estimated value of the goods covered.2 1 Cf. DATINI 1159, doc. 122 of 6 February 1400: “Let it be manifest to whomever may read, or hear this contract read, concluded on the day year and month said above, that Franciescho di Marcho from Prato and Stoldo di Lorenzo and partners have taken insurance for gold florins […] on three bales of paper, two bales of cloth, one bale of cotton yarn, half a bundle of 50 taffeta pieces from Bologna and half of 5 sacks of Turkish cotton; already loaded or about to be loaded by Mano d’Albizzo in Porto Pisano onto Giamen Interiglio’s ship, by him commanded or with others commanding it on his behalf; and said goods loaded or must be loaded onto the said ship in the name and mark of […]; it is worth gold florins one thousand and fifty or thereabouts”. For an example of contract with precise indications as to the value of individual packages cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 21 of 18 May 1384, covering “a bale of wares from Bologna” and “a bale of Florentine velvet”, respectively valued gold fl. 200 and fl. 475. To identify the goods described in contracts we have made preliminary reference to F. Balducci Pegolotti, La pratica della mercatura, ed. by A. Evans, Cambridge Mass., Medieval Academy of America, 1936, integrated by F. Edler, Glossary of Medieval Terms of Business: Italian Series, 1200–1600, Cambridge Mass., Medieval Academy of America, 1934. 2 DATINI 1159, doc. 72. Initially the insured goods were indicated in a generic manner, as “leather”, but not all insurers were satisfied, so much so that some of them withdrew (Giovanni di Jacopo Orlandini), and others demanded clarification. More than a month later, on 15th September, the broker added a clause to the policy, in which he declared that between the insurers and the beneficiary, the Datini firm of Florence, an agreement had been reached as regards the goods to be covered, now described more precisely: “one-hundred and seventyfive bundles of leather estimated fl. 1,700”., followed by countersignatures on the part of the insurers. See for example a Pisan contract of 20 April 1391, stating only that the insured object consisted of “a certain quantity of wool”, loaded in Tortosa or a Florentine policy of

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The 16th-century documentation is even less detailed. One example is a 1513 contract, which describes the object of insurance as “bordato (cloth) and other merchandise”.3 Such lack of precision is fully reflected in Raggi’s registrations, which seem particularly vague while specifying the goods. There is seldom any information as to the quality and quantity of goods, and the value of each package making up the shipment is completely lacking. The bank accounts are not of much help, either. Here, the goods that formed the object of the contract were considered to be of least importance.4 For 16th-century Florence, this lack of attention can be explained by the habit of making reference, in the case of any mishap, to the ship’s bill of lading. This custom became a legal requirement after the introduction of the 1526 regulations.5 However, it is hard to understand why the contracting parties, as early as the end of the 14th century, were already inclined to underestimate this aspect. Though the underwriters did not assume risk for a concrete object (the merchandise) but for its monetary estimate (the merchandise value), disputes arose for the simplest reasons, such as the name of the ship as given in the policy.6 Bearing in mind these limitations, in this chapter, we will attempt to sketch a panoramic view of the products mentioned in the insurance contracts to identify their most relevant trade flows. In addition to the Datini policies (127 in total) stipulated in Florence, we have also taken details from the Pisan policies (150 in total) to expand our sample.7 We have thus obtained 479 references to goods covered by insurance. In most of the policies (172 policies out of 277), we found the coverage to be related to just one commodity in both Pisa (94 out of 150) and Florence (78 out of 127). About 20% of contracts report two commodities (59 out of 277), and a significant number of policies insured as many as four items at the same time (37 listing 3 or 4). We encountered only a few cases (9 in total) describing higher quantities. The largest was registered in Pisa (a consignment of 9 different wares), followed by a Florentine policy covering 7 items. However, it appears that there was no direct correspondence between

3 4 5 6 7

10 May 1396, in which the only indication is “n. […] bales of goods”; cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 74 and DATINI 1159, doc. 70. See also another similar contract stipulated in Florence on 23 March 1400, ibid., doc. 126. Cf. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., p. 34. For some unique examples, cf. SALVIATI 735, fols. 130v (herring), 134v (wheat); SALVIATI 749, fols. 180v (wheat), 243v (alum, bordati, paper sheets), 254v (wheat), 266v (alum), 347v (wheat). Most of these references concerned cases of mishap and subsequent compensation. Cf. Pardessus, Collection de lois maritimes, op.cit., p. 604. This is shown by the extra-judicial resolution of an insurance controversy in 1393 Florence, already mentioned in Chapter 1 (pp. 24–25); cf. Piattoli, Ricerche intorno all’assicurazione nel medioevo V, op.cit., pp. 160–164. For the following discussion, cf. DATINI 1159, docs. 1–137 and DATINI 1158, docs. 1–159.

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the number of insured items and the policy’s value. In fact, besides some instances in which the higher insurance cover was matched by a large quantity of goods (fl. 2,100 for 9 items, fl. 1,100 for 7, etc.), we find many examples to the contrary. For instance, 6 different items insured for fl. 275. The overall impression is that the habit of covering different merchandise with a single policy did not reflect a precise strategy aimed at some form of insurance rationalisation; it is more likely that the insurance business simply strove to meet the needs of both, trade and transport.8 This suggestion is supported by some contracts confirming that goods covered by different policies could be carried on the same ship, if they had the same destination. A case in point is a series of contracts concluded in Pisa in January 1395, from which we learn that two distinct policies were drawn up in relation to Nicolao Pugialt’s ship bound for Barcelona: one on the 12th of January for a bundle of taffeta, and the other on the following day for two shipments of pepper. Both the cargoes were marked with Francesco Datini’s trading stamp, and in both the contracts, the Pisan firm was the insurance buyer.9 Very rarely a single underwriter only covered one and specific single item. In a contract dated 1389, relating to a journey from Aigues-Mortes to Porto Pisano, some insurers offered their guarantee only for two bales of cloth and others only subscribed for nine bales of leather hides.10 More frequently, we encounter instances when a given commodity was added to the insured lot much later, resulting in additional, ad hoc clauses that needed to be signed again. An example is provided by a Florentine document attesting the shipment of some wool from Majorca to Venice in which, initially, coverage was limited to 60 sacks of “Barbary wool”, but was later extended to an unspecified quantity of wool from Provence.11 8

For the nine contracts attesting coverage of five or more categories of goods, see DATINI 1158, docs. 31 (9 items), 102 (6), 29 and 138 (5) and DATINI 1159, docs. 60 and 122 (7 items), 122 (6), 58 and 93 (5). Cf. U. Tucci, I trasporti terrestri e marittimi nell’Italia dei secoli XIV e XV, in Contributi del convegno di studi: “Aspetti della vita economica medievale” (Firenze-Pisa-Prato), 10–14 marzo 1984, Florence, Tipografia Giuntina, 1985, pp. 363–380. 9 Cf. DATINI 1159, docs. 96 and 97. Note that the two policies were drawn up by the same broker, Niccolò Manovelli. 10 This is a Pisan policy of 16th April 1388; in the subscriptions Francesco Gettalebraccia confirmed that “said insurance is on two bales of fabrics for gold florins one-hundred and thirty”, while Giorgio da Sancasciano explained he was running “the risk for 9 bales of cotton and none for fabric” and Giovanni di maestro Simone clarified that he and Andrea di Bianco, on behalf of whom he was acting, were taking on “the risk for the leather and not the fabrics”, cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 68. 11 Cf. DATINI 1159, doc. 67 of 12 January 1396 with additional clause and new signed subscriptions dated 28 January.

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The types of insured goods included in the late 14th-century documentation reveal outstanding variety, a perfect example of the diversification of trading activities typical of the substantial merchants of the time. These range from luxury goods, like ostrich feathers or coral to mass consumption foodstuffs such as wheat and salt (usually used as ballast to fill the bottom of the craft).12 Incidentally, it is to be noted that in two cases, the object of insurance was the ship itself, which happens to be a very early example of hull insurance that became common in the following decades.13 The variety of products described in the contracts reflects the more general trends of maritime shipping, when the so-called “revolution” in transport tariffs of the second half of the 14th century was significantly expanding the range of traded commodities. Beyond the generic manner in which the insured goods were normally indicated in the policies, a few individual examples provide clear confirmation in this sense. Among the Datini documents, we have found two stipulations lacking any indication as to the goods covered. The first, dated 1396, has already been an object of study: it makes direct reference to new criteria for calculating the costs of transportation, with the formula “sopra noli che leva la nave di […]” (“on the freight carried by the ship of …”). The other, vaguer in its formulation but older (it is dated 1387), although lacking any subscription, points to the same kind of agreement, allowing for the shipment of any commodity.14 12 See the following examples of policies relating to luxury goods, among which some ostrich feathers transported from Majorca to Motrone (ibid., doc.88), a “Church Missal” on the Pisa-Rome route (ibid., 110), some coral travelling from Tuscany to Catalonia (ibid., 112), besides the well-known case of life insurance for “Margarita the slave” (DATINI 1158, doc. 152); cf. L. Piattoli, L’Assicurazione di schiavi imbarcati su navi ed i rischi di morte nel Medioevo, in “Rivista di diritto commerciale”, 32, 1934, pp. 866–874. For policies relating to wheat, ibid., docs. 30, 71 (from Sicily to Porto Pisano) and 69 (from Port-de-Bouc to Porto Pisano); for insurance on salt, ibid., doc. 84 (same itinerary as the previous one); for further examples related to cargoes coming from Sicily, cf. D. Abulafia, Southern Italy and the Florentine Economy, 1265–1270, in “Economic History Review”, 33, 1981, pp. 377–388. On the use of salt as ballast when travelling without a full load, see. J.-Cl. Hocquet, Denaro, Navi e mercanti a Venezia (1200–1600), Rome, Il Veltro, 1999, pp. 73–74. 13 Cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 80 and DATINI 1159, doc. 26. On these policies see C.L. Daveggia, Lo sviluppo dell’assicurazione corpi nel medievo, in “Diritto e pratica nell’assicurazione”, 28, 1986, pp. 53–73; for similar cases in Venice see Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima a Venezia, op.cit., pp. 120–125; on its diffusion in the Modern Era see Tenenti, Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio, op.cit., pp. 65–73. 14 Cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 125 of 25 May 1396 (a trip from Valencia to Sluys with an 8% premium) and doc. 24 of 16 July 1384. In this latter policy, relating to a journey from Arles to Porto Pisano with a 5% premium, the words used are as follows: “for any stuff and commodity or tools of any condition that the commissars or producers or their partners had loaded”. On the subject of maritime transport tariffs in relation to insurance, cf.

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If we try and group the goods covered by insurance according to their nature and the routes they travelled, we obtain a panoramic view of Datini’s rather articulated business activities. At the top position we find metal wares: raw materials, like iron and tin, or partly processed ones, such as tinned iron and steel, but above all, finished products generically denominated “merce” or “merce grossa” (“merchandise” or “gross merchandise”—78 mentions out of 479). The main trading axis for which insurance coverage was provided for such goods was the route connecting Tuscany to Provence. In one direction, we find manufactured metal products reaching Florence from Lombardy or produced at site to be shipped to Avignon. In the opposite direction, policies almost exclusively concerned tin from Cornwall, of which the Provençal city was of one of the most important trading centres.15 Regarding textile products, woollen cloth had the lion’s share (48 mentions). Often, it was indicated in generic terms in the policies, except, occasionally, in the case of Florentine or Languedoc fabrics (4 cases). The most common route referred to in insurance contracts for this type of product was between the northern Tyrrhenian sea and Catalonia (15 out of 17).16 Raw m ­ aterial C.L. Daveggia, L’assicurazione del nolo e la sua prima comparsa nella storia dell’assicurazione, in “Diritto e pratica nell’assicurazione”, ser. II, 26, 1984, pp. 339–357 (with relative transcription of the quoted doc. 125) and, more in general, F. Melis, Werner Sombart e i problemi della navigazione nel Medioevo (1964, Milan), in Id., I trasporti e le comunicazioni nel Medioevo, op.cit., 3–68. 15 As concerns the categories of goods traded by the Datini firms, please refer to Melis, Aspetti della vita economica medievale, op.cit., pp. 107–108. Cf. DATINI 1158, docs. 1, 6, 23, 40, 116, 124, 136; DATINI 1159, docs. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7–12, 19, 24, 37, 39, 46 and 81, all covering goods travelling from Tuscany to ports in Provence. Cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 29 and DATINI 1159, docs. 16, 28, 49 concerning tin and tinned iron from Provence to Tuscany. Less important are the Tuscany-Liguria itineraries (only in this direction and prevalently unspecified “goods”) and Tuscany-Central/Southern Italy, also only in one way, especially for cargoes of steel arriving from Lombardy and forwarded to Rome. With only 4 policies, the route towards Catalonia seems wholly irrelevant. For the Tuscany-Genoa axis, see DATINI 1158, docs. 27, 36, 38, 39, 41, 44, 46–48, and DATINI 1159, doc. 82. For the Tuscany-Rome route we have found four policies covering steel transports, cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 102 and DATINI 1159, docs 44, 110, 121; for Sicily see three policies relating to cargoes of “goods” (DATINI 1158, doc. 31, 44, 42), plus one covering “Florentine armours” (ibid., doc. 61). As regards trade in metal products and armours by the Datini group, cf. Frangioni, Milano. Fine Trecento, op.cit., pp. 299–313. 16 Cf. for Catalonia DATINI 1158, doc. 107 and DATINI 1159, docs. 32, 34, 43, 45, 65, 90, 98, 100, 102, 107, 108, 115, 122, 135 (outbound) and ibid., docs. 8 and 14 (return). Another important insurance route was the one towards Central and Southern Italy, especially the Sicilian markets (9 references out of 14). The Tuscany-Provence and Tuscany-Genoa routes were less significant (both 7 references). For Sicily cf. DATINI 1158, docs. 5, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 42, 49, 64. Cf. H. Hoshino, L’Arte della lana in Firenze nel basso medioevo: il commercio della

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travelled in the opposite direction. According to the policies, the wool used for producing cloth, often without further specifications, reached Tuscany from the ports of Barcelona and Valencia, or from the Balearic Islands (23 references). Sometimes, contracts concerned shipments of wool to Venice. Wool from Provence and directed to Pisa was also insured, but less often, while a single instance refers to a cargo arriving from Southampton.17 Important textile products covered by insurance were manufactured silks from Lucca, and gauze, taffeta and thread (40 references). Several routes are mentioned for these products, all departing from the Tuscan ports, mainly to reach Catalonia (especially taffeta), and Avignon, Genoa and Savona in some cases.18 Pisa and Leghorn are also mentioned as points of departure in many policies covering spices and sugar. The principal route for such goods was the Tuscany-Provence axis, sometimes via Genoa. Occasionally, however, spices were shipped along longer routes. We have evidence of a journey from Beirut to Catalonia, as well as of three cargoes (one of spices, and two of saffron) destined for Flanders.19 Hides and skins travelled in the opposite direction according to our sample. Shipments of these goods are mainly registered as departing from the Catalan and Balearic ports towards Tuscany and Venice

lana e il mercato dei panni fiorentini nei secoli XIII–XV, Florence, Olschki, 1980, and for fustians, M.F. Mazzaoui, The Italian Cotton Industry in the Later Middle Ages (1100–1600), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981. For imports of Catalan and Provençal cloth by the Datini firms in Tuscany see E. Ashtor, Catalan Cloth on the Late Medieval Mediterranean Markets, in “The Journal of European Economic History”, 17–2, 1988, pp. 227–257 and H. Caldéran-Giacchetti, L’exportation de la drapiere languedocienne dans les pays méditerranéens d’après les Archives Datini (1380–1402), in “Annales du Midi”, 58, 1962, pp. 320–343. 17 For the routes from Catalonia/Balearic Islands to Tuscany (or Genoa) see, for example, DATINI 1158, docs. 8, 12, 13, 54, 74, 83, 113 and DATINI 1159, docs. 13–15, 17, 18, 20, 25, 27, 35, 60–62, 64, 105, 134, 137; ibid., docs. 66, 67, 69, 93, 95 and 97, for policies with destination Venice, and doc. 73 for a load coming from Southampton. On wool from Provence cf. DATINI 1158, docs. 78, 81, 104, 105, 120, 142 and DATINI 1159, docs. 16, 21–23, 28, 36, 58, 68 and 112. In general, for wool imports see Hoshino, L’Arte della lana in Firenze, op.cit., pp. 40–65. On English wool cf. E.B. Fryde, Italian Maritime Trade with Medieval England, “Recueils de la Societé Jean Bodin”, 32, 1974, pp. 291–337. 18 On insurance for consignments of raw silk from Catalonia to Tuscany cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 126 and DATINI 1159, doc. 60. For policies covering taffeta, indicated in generic terms or qualified as “from Bologna”, see, for example, DATINI 1158, docs. 97, 107, 122, or DATINI 1159, docs. 83, 102 and 122. 19 For the last items, cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 130 (Beirut-Catalonia), 132 (Alexandria-Sluys), DATINI 1159, docs. 75 and 78 (Catalonia-Sluys). Further examples of policies covering spices can be found in DATINI 1158, docs. 11, 55, 56, 59, 60, 63, 65, 66, 75, 92; ibid., docs. 15, 62, 67, 97, 98, 115, 122, 127, 128, 143 and DATINI 1159, docs. 4–6, 129, for insured sugar.

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(13 cases). Some contracts also referred to journeys originating in Provence (11 references).20 Insured cargoes of industrial dyes and chemical products travelled along several itineraries that closely reflected their production sites. Woad, for example, is common in policies concerning the route from Genoa (or Venice) to Catalonia whilst kermes (cochineal) generally travelled in the opposite direction, from the Iberian Peninsula or Provence to the Tyrrhenian and the Adriatic.21 Similarly, vitriol, turpentine and minium from Pisa recur in policies covering routes between Tuscany and the western Mediterranean. On the contrary, copper sulphate appears in those relating to the routes connecting Provence to Porto Pisano or Savona. Finally, another interesting category is that of “seed and fruit”; particularly rice, cumin and almonds. These commodities, often loaded onto the same ship, followed very specific itineraries, the most important being the route from Catalonia to Flanders (9 examples).22 Though generic and lacking homogeneity, the data presented so far indicates that the insurance market of Florence emerging from the Datini contracts was strongly intertwined with the business strategies of this firm. It was neither independent with reference to the geographical routes along which it expanded, nor in relation to the goods it covered. Instead, it faithfully mirrored the Datini group’s trading flows. Therefore, in its first stage of expansion, marine insurance seems to have fully carried out its function of supporting commercial practices.23 As already anticipated, the 1524–1526 documentation lends itself even less to an exhaustive analysis of this matter. Over 230 registrations in our sample, about a quarter of the total, lack detailed information about the goods. Very often, the insured items are described only vaguely. In over 50 cases, for example, Raggi adopted generic formulations such as “different goods”, “goods of some kind”, “goods and merchandise”. Except for a few exceptions, the value of each package making up the consignment is also absent. We also know little about the items insured by Bartolomeo Ricoveri (the other sworn broker), 20 21 22 23

On cargoes arriving from Catalonia or the Balearic Islands, see DATINI 1158, doc. 60 (for Genoa) and 94; DATINI 1159, docs. 60, 64, 105, 106, 109, 110 (for Tuscany) and 69, 72, 93, 101 and 109 (for Venice). Cf. F. Borlandi, Il commercio del guado nel medioevo, in Storia dell’economia italiana. Saggi di storia economica, ed. by C.M. Cipolla, vol. I, Turin, Edizioni scientifiche Einaudi, 1959, pp. 263–284. For policies covering rice see DATINI 1158, docs. 11, 102 and DATINI 1159, docs. 30, 31, 60, 78. For cumin, cf. DATINI 1158, docs. 102 and 108, DATINI 1159, docs. 30, 31, 60, 75. For almonds see DATINI 1158, doc. 92, DATINI 1159, docs. 31, 56, 75 and 117. Cf. Melis, Aspetti della vita economica medievale, op.cit., pp. 133–134 and the relative Table n. XXIV; Tucci, I trasporti terrestri e marittimi, op.cit., pp. 363–380.

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because the “insurance accounts” through which we are trying to reconstruct his activities tend to omit any indication of the insured objects. Consequently, even with the 16th-century material, we can only roughly outline the product categories appearing in the policies, and then attempt to build up a picture of their commercial flows.24 Over 450 registrations report only one insured product, while two are mentioned in slightly less than 100 policies. Three items are insured in 51 cases, but more than three products are only found in 14 policies, with a maximum of 6 different items listed in a single policy. In total, there are almost 800 references to commodities in our sample, to which we can add 30 more cases—which we shall discuss later—of hull insurance or concerning the coverage of both the hull and the cargo. The most significant category is that of textiles, which constitutes almost half of the sample. In this category, woollen products top the list (147 references), followed by silks (115) and various other types of fabrics and cloth, as well as ciambellotti and barracani (made with goat or camel wool), fustian, rugs and carpets. The raw materials needed for textile production also occupied a prominent place. In this group, we can distinguish between raw wool (42 references), whose provenance was rarely indicated, cotton (mentioned only 9 times), raw silk (9 times), and hemp fibre (once). Connected to the production of fabrics were dyes and mordants—indicated 53 times, particularly woad or pastel, alum and oak gall. Overall, textile products represent up to 60% of our references to goods covered by insurance (478 out of 812). Sometimes, the source is less generic, which allows us to get a glimpse of the kind of business activities that mostly fed the insurance sector. For example, among manufactured wool products, we find traces of some of the most typical Florentine creations, such as Garbo and San Martino cloth, fabrics from southern France (Carcassonne and Languedoc), and products from the new draperies of the Atlantic area (called pannine and “carisee”, or kersey cloth).25 Comparing the data on products and routes, it is possible to guess their commercial flows. Wool cloth, of which Florence was still an important producer, travelled mainly to the Iberian markets (Cádiz and Lisbon, in particular) or to Southern Italy (Palermo and Naples), departing from Leghorn (34 times). When shipped from Ancona (41 references), these products had Constantinople or Syria as their principal destinations, directly 24 Cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r; obviously the following analysis is based only on the information gleaned from the 881 contracts making up our sample. 25 Cf. Hoshino, L’Arte della lana in Firenze, op.cit., pp. 244–282; Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 267–282.

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or via the mixed sea-land itinerary calling at Dubrovnik. The bordato was often sent from Provençal ports to the Spanish centres on the Mediterranean (or to Cádiz), or sometimes to the Barbary Coast. Finally, the new fabrics—be it pannine or carisee, mainly travelled from England (11 cases out of 20) to reach the eastern markets of Constantinople or Chios. Sometimes, they arrived in Tuscany, too. However, as suggested by merely six instances of these products travelling from Ancona to the Middle East, this was most likely a case of Florence trying to get a foot in the re-export business.26 Among the silks, besides luxury Florentine products like fabrics incorporating gold and silver threads, velvet from Bologna is mentioned. Several references to trade in precious yarns, always from Leghorn in the direction of Alicante and Lisbon are also present. Fabrics made of silk, indicated in a generic manner or specifically as “gold and silver cloth”, represented the bulk of silk products insured. The point of departure mentioned in the registrations leaves no doubt as to the Florentine origin of the goods (in 77 instances out of a total of 93, Leghorn was the departure port, thus confirming the role acquired in the city by this industry. The destinations were principally (in 47 cases) Alicante, Cartagena and Cadiz, while Aigues-Mortes and Marseilles (from where the silk cloth was probably sent to Lyon) played a minor role (25 references in all).27 Aigues-Mortes and Marseilles were, in fact, the points of departure for cotton cloth and canvas (59 mentions out of 65) to mainly Spain, and sometimes to Leghorn. The trading flow of ciambellotti and barracani appears to be more complex, according to the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà. These low-cost textile products from the Middle East are listed as departing from Constantinople and Dubrovnik (12 out of 30 times) with Ancona as their prevalent destination, and sometimes, Leghorn, too. Ciambellotti, however, also occurs frequently as items travelling from Leghorn (17 mentions) with the final destination equally distributed between Provence and Spain (and sometimes Lisbon). The most plausible explanation for these trading flows, substantially corroborated by studies on the subject, is that Florence played a major role as a re-export hub for such textile products.28

26 On the importance of the Middle East (and especially Constantinople) as an outlet for Florentine textile products, see Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 183–191; for the “carisee” cf. Dini, Saggi su un’economia-mondo, op.cit., p. 225. 27 Cf. S. Tognetti, Un’industria di lusso al servizio del grande commercio. Il mercato dei drappi serici e della seta nella Firenze del Quattrocento, Florence, Olschki, 2002; Dini, Saggi su un’economia-mondo, op.cit., pp. 87–115; Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 282–296. 28 Cf. Dini, Saggi su un’economia-mondo, op.cit., pp 230 and 264–265.

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While our references to the cotton trade are insufficient to delineate a reliable picture of its movements, those concerning raw wool appear more intelligible. Wool moved mainly from England (24 cases out of 42) to supply firms in Florence (via Leghorn) and Venice. Less valuable wool travelled towards these two destinations, and sometimes Genoa, too, from Spain (10 mentions, mainly from Tortosa and Valencia) or from the South of France (6 references). The trade in dyes developed along well-established routes. Alum, for example, was loaded near its mining facilities of the Tolfa mountains (in Porto Ercole or Civitavecchia), destined to Flanders or Normandy.29 Woad was transported from Aigues-Mortes and Leghorn to Naples, whilst pastel always travelled from Bordeaux to reach the English ports, and occasionally the Basque coast or Flanders. Finally, in all our samples, madder was shipped from Flanders or Zeeland to Leghorn.30 After textiles, foodstuff represents the second most common type of merchandise mentioned in Raggi’s contracts, appearing as many as 124 times. For this category, we need to differentiate between products that fed trade for the Annonary system (represented in our sample by wheat), luxury goods (such as sugar or wine) and foodstuff belonging to an intermediate range (cheese, preserved fish, etc.).31 Wheat—mentioned 36 times—travelled along two determinate itineraries: the first from Maremma to Viareggio and La Spezia (17 cases), whilst the second originated in the Sicilian ports (14 times) to be equally distributed between Genoa, Rome and Spain. As for sugar, which recurs 29 times in our sample, its trading flow started mainly from its production areas in Madeira, the Canary Islands and Sicily (respectively 8, 4 and 8 references), whilst Leghorn, and rarely Cadiz or Naples, were used as re-exporting centres. Sugar’s final destination was often (12 cases) the thriving Rome market, reached directly from Sicily or via Leghorn, which represented another

29 Cf. R. de Roover, Il Banco Medici dalle origini al declino (1397–1494), Florence, La Nuova Italia, 1970, pp. 218–237; Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 131–132. 30 On the Atlantic trade in woad cf. H. Casado Alonso, Le Rôle des Marchands castillans dans la commercialisation internationale du Pastel toulousain (XVè et XVIe siècles), in Woad, Indigo and other Natural Dyes: Past, Present and Future, ed. by D. Cardon, et al.; Arnstadt, Thüringer Chronik-Verlag, 1998, pp. 65–70; H. Casado Alonso, La gestion d’une entreprise de commercialization du pastel toulousain au début du XVI è siècle, in “Annales du Midi, 236, 2001, pp. 457–479. 31 Cf. A. Guenzi, Le magistrature e le istituzioni alimentari, in Gli archivi per la storia dell’alimentazione, Atti del convegno, Potenza-Matera, 5–8 September 1988, vol. II, Rome, Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali—Ufficio centrale per i beni archivistici, 1995, pp. 285–381.

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important arrival point for the luxury (11 cases). Genoa, Flanders and Marseilles are mentioned less frequently. Wine, which appears 14 times, together with raisins (indicated only twice) had two specific outlet markets: England and Flanders (in two-third of the cases) and Rome (5 references). Wine travelled to Rome only from the ports of Campania and Calabria, whilst for England and Flanders the picture was more complex. These markets had two supply channels; on the one hand, Bordeaux with its renowned wines, on the other, Crete and Patras, which additionally provided raisins.32 Cured fish is another important item listed among the objects of insurance in Florence, appearing 22 times. Herring and salted fish always travelled from Flanders to Leghorn, while tonnina and sorra (tuna fish in olive oil) reached Rome from Leghorn. Leghorn was also the destination for Atlantic fish arriving from Lagos in the Algarve and Cadiz. Finally, a product mentioned often enough for us to guess its trading flows is cheese, which reached Rome and Florence (via Leghorn, Pisa or La Spezia) directly from the most famous production areas of the time, i.e., Sicily and Sardinia (respectively 7 and 3 references).33 Among the remaining commodities found in Raggi’s records, but totally absent from the Datini documentation, are precious metals, jewellery and money. This trade essentially took place along a single maritime route from Dubrovnik to Ancona (32 cases out of 49); journeys in the opposite direction are registered only nine times. Excepting few contracts, our sources show that the trade was reserved to a specific group of operators, who supplied the raw material from the Levant to the goldsmiths in Rome and Florence and, at the same time, met the Papal Mint’s demand for the precious metal.34 As regards another segment of the luxury market, i.e., spices, we register a constant movement of goods departing from the Middle Eastern ports (20 cases out of 32) in the direction of Italy, with Genoa, Leghorn and the Provençal ports acting as re-export centres (8 mentions in all). An isolated reference to a contract

32 SALVIATI 70, fols. 43r, 49r, 66r, 67v, 74v–75r, 75r, 132r, 140v; cf. T. Unwin, Wine and the Vine: an Historical Geography of Viticulture and the Wine Trade, (1991, Oxon-New York), Oxon-New York, Routledge, 1996, pp. 185–186, 193–204 and 229; M. Fusaro, Uva passa. Una guerra commerciale tra Venezia e l’Inghilterra (1540–1640), Venice, Il Cardo, 1996. 33 SALVIATI 70, fols. 20v, 40r, 41r–41v, 64r, 96v–97r; cf. M. Giagnacovo, Formaggi in tavola. Commercio e consumo del formaggio nel basso Medioevo. Un contributo dell’Archivio Datini di Prato, Rome, Aracne, 2007. 34 See, for example, A. Bertolotti, Benvenuto Cellini a Roma e gli orefici lombardi ed altri che lavorarono pei papi nella prima metà del XVI secolo, in “Archivio storico lombardo”, 2, 1875, 121–147; Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 415–416.

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covering a cargo of pepper from Cadiz to Leghorn is our only testimony of the spice trade’s new Atlantic dimension.35 Other types of items found in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà are metals (both as raw material and manufactured goods), skins and leather goods, and chemical products. Metal, which at the end of the 14th century seemed to be the most frequently traded product by the Datini firm, rarely appears in the 16thcentury documentation (27 cases in all). The only route clearly indicated by the sources is the one used by raw materials like lead and tin from England to various locations on the Mediterranean coast, especially Leghorn. For other products, such as iron and metal scrap, our data is useless in identifying precise trade flows. Animal hides—prevalently registered under the terms cuoia and cuoiame—tended to converge towards Florence from Ancona and Leghorn (mentioned as arrival point 14 and 24 times, respectively, out of 44) to supply the city’s tanning industry. The registrations relating to the departure (or stopovers) of cargoes of skins and leather insured in Florence highlight three areas of origin: North Sea and Ireland, Constantinople and, less frequently, Sardinia.36 Chemical products such as saltpetre, copper sulphate, tartar, and even blunderbuss powder are included amongst the goods insured in Florence (18 references). Besides sodium bicarbonate and vitriol, travelling mainly from Leghorn to Ripa Romana, the scant data in our possession prevents us from identifying the axis along which this category of products moved. There are other goods, too, for which it has been impossible to investigate thoroughly— for example, paper, pottery, combs, etc.—but we can certainly mention the Ancona-Constantinople route (with the alternative of Beirut) in relation to the trade in soap. Let us conclude our analysis of the 16th-century with 33 hull insurance ­policies.37 Sometimes, only the hull of the craft (“corpo”) was insured (2 cases), but often (7 contracts) the cover was extended, through the formula “corpo e corredi” to its equipment, such as sails, masts, helm, anchor, and other elements considered integral to the craft. Affreightment contracts (“noli”) frequently went along with hull insurance. In such cases, the policies specified that the coverage applied to “corpo e noli”, or “corpo, corredi e noli” (15 and 9 cases, respectively). We have already anticipated the close connection 35 SALVIATI 70, fol. 92v. 36 Cf. Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 132 and 186. 37 In detail: two contracts just concerned the hull of the vessel, seven the hull and equipment, fifteen the hull alone plus the cargo, nine referred to the hull, the equipment and the cargo. Cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 6r, 7r–7v, 20v, 22r, 27r–27v, 28r, 30r, 33v. 39v, 48v, 49v, 51v, 56r, 57v, 68r, 75v, 93r, 95v, 99r, 100r, 105v, 109v, 112v, 121r, 125v, 126r–126v, 128v, 135v, 137r, 138v, 140v.

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apparently existing between hull insurance and time insurance, so much so that every time we encounter this latter type of policy in Florence, the coverage concerned only the hull.38 This coincidence suggests that when hull insurance was involved, the coverage demanded was irrespective of the specific stretches of the sea to be navigated. When we look at the routes listed in hull policies, we are confronted with a rather diversified geographical distribution. The registrations suggest a kind of “vocation” or inclination for hull insurance for ships departing from Aigues-Mortes to Valencia or Barbary Coast (6 cases) and from Bordeaux to England or the Basque Country (5 references). Looking at the crafts mentioned in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, we don’t get the impression that some types of vessels were considered more at risk than the others. In fact, insured crafts reflect the same overall composition that— as we shall see in the next chapter—can be inferred from Raggi’s records: 25 ships, 4 caravels, 1 large carrack and 3 smaller crafts (2 boats and 1 “naviglio”). It is also not surprising to find among the policy beneficiaries those few shipowners and shipmasters who, according to our sample, used the Florentine market to insure their vessels.39 What is striking, however, is the extreme variability of the value of the contracts, from a minimum of fl. 50 to a maximum of fl. 4,000, the average being about fl. 780. The distribution is concentrated on figures like fl. 300–400 (10 times) and fl. 1,400–1,500 (4 cases). Such divergence cannot be explained by different tonnage, because it is also present within the same type of craft. A startling example is that of two similar ships mentioned in the records, one insured for just fl. 150, and the other for ten times as much.40 Apparently, a more important factor to consider is the nature of the coverage, with an average of fl. 625 for hull and equipment, but reaching fl. 850 for contracts including the cargo. However, it was the habit of dividing the ownership of crafts into several shares that may provide the most likely explanation for the extreme variability of figures in relation to hull insurance. The amounts recorded in the policies could, therefore, reflect the minimum share of the vessel (1/32 of the total, for example), or the sum of several of them belonging to the same individual.41 38 Ibid., docs. 22r, 57v, 105v, 135v, 140v. 39 Ibid., docs. 57v and 140v; only three people, all foreigners, are listed, whose names have been preserved for us in Raggi’s registrations, in a “Tuscanised” form: Luigi Ricasens, Piero di Vara and Giovanni di Borgogna (Burgundy). 40 Respectively ibid., doc. 51v and doc. 68r. Similar variations are also found for ships: “corpo e corredi” (body and equipment/furnishings) of the Santa Maria di Grazia seem to have been insured for fl. 2,000 (ibid., doc. 56r), while for the “corpo, corredi e noli” of the Santa Maria di Begonia just fl 200 were paid (ibid., doc. 125v). 41 Cf. M. Tangheroni, Commercio e navigazione nel Medioevo, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 1996, pp. 228–230.

chapter 4

Trade and Insurance: Seacraft Concerning the choice of seacraft made by those engaged in the insurance business, many scholars emphasized the influence had by the intertwining of technical elements and individual skills, well synthesized under the term “vector”. When deciding whom to entrust their goods, merchants took into consideration the means of transport and the reputation of the individual in charge of it. The combination of a specific vessel and its shipmaster—namely the “vector”—would have considerably impacted the market by influencing demand to a certain extent, but above all the premium.1 We will come back to this aspect in the later pages. For now, let us concentrate on the information about maritime trade between the end of the 14th century and the start of the 16th, provided by our two sources. As is well known, towards the end of the 13th century, a series of technological innovations took place in the Mediterranean area, giving remarkable impulse to marine trade. Although the definition of this phenomenon as a “nautical revolution” has recently been put into perspective by several important researchers, it is undeniable that the adoption, at the same time and on a large scale, of a series of new techniques in the art of navigation had significant impact. At the end of the 14th century, the combined use of lateen and square sails and a single rear helm became common (both elements permitting to easily manoeuvre seacraft), the compass was perfected (thus eliminating winter stoppage) and pilot books became more widespread, causing a marked change in navigation compared to earlier centuries.2 1 For the influence of shipmasters’ reputation on determining insurance premiums, see Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 61–63 and the Introduction to the same by B. Dini, pp. XXV– XXVI, also mentioned in Spagnesi, Aspetti dell’assicurazione medievale, op.cit., p. 178. For a careful description of the influence of the technical features of different types of seacrafts on insurance costs, see Del Treppo, who has insisted on the various typologies, and the two Tenentis, who have discussed the state of conservation and the equipment, but also the crew’s expertise. Cf. Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani, op.cit., pp. 440–442; Tenenti, Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio, op.cit., p. 320. 2 Cf. F.C. Lane, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders of the Renaissance (1992, Baltimore), Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1934 and, more in general, R. Lopez and J. Raymond, Medieval Trade and the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents, Translated with Introductions and Notes, London, Oxford University Press, 1955, pp. 121–145, and also D.W. Waters, Navigational Developments in the 13th to 18th centuries, in Trasporti e sviluppo economico: secoli XIII–XVIII, op.cit., pp. 303–310. See also the essays published in Le navire et l’economie maritime du Moyen

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004442450_006

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However, many aspects of 14th-century navigation were closer to Roman times as compared to the early modern era. Mariners still lacked the essential support of astronomical sciences. Therefore, they navigated mainly “by sight”, greatly constrained by adverse weather conditions and depending on the shipmaster’s individual ability. Moreover, we need to remember that a considerable amount of trade was based, as in the previous centuries, on human power. The diffusion of insurance would seem, to a certain extent, a synthesis of this slow evolutionary stage, suspended between the ancient and the modern era. On the one hand, insurance can be included among the innovative, rationalising elements in the nautical sector, but, on the other, it mirrored the sector’s persisting fragility and the dangers faced by seafarers, all of which greatly influenced the costs of transport.3 The Datini documents wholly reflect this “transition phase” between the late 14th and early 15th century. Besides providing information about medium and long range trips, the policies confirm the persistent need to insure goods carried in small boats travelling along the coast. Besides contracts relating to high-tonnage sailing ships, there are also those regarding vessels that made use of “mixed” power or just oars. Out of the 279 policies actually stipulated in Pisa and Florence, as many as 278 give some indication to the means of transport on which the goods were carried. In two cases, as already mentioned, the vessel itself was insured against the risk of shipwreck.4 Almost 300 seacraft are mentioned in our 14th-century policies, and we know the nationality of 240 of them (see Table 4.1).5 This is a very important detail, because it gives us a rough idea of the tonnage of vessels recurring most frequently in the policies, normally described with the rather generic formula “nave” or “legno” (ship).6 References to this type of sailing ship, the most commonly utilised in maritime

Age au XVIIIe siècle, principalement en Méditerranée, ed. by M. Mollat, Paris, S.E.V.P.E.N., 1958. As concerns commercial fleets from Tuscany and Catalonia during the 15th century, see Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani, op.cit., pp. 523–540 and M.E. Mallet, The Florentine Galleys in the Fifteenth Century, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1967. 3 Cf. J.H. Pryor, Geography, Technology and War. Studies in the Maritime History of the Mediterranean, 649–1571, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988; Tucci, I trasporti terrestri e marittimi, op.cit., pp. 363–380. 4 Cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 80 and DATINI 1159, doc. 26. On the types of seacrafts used by the Datini group cf. Melis, Werner Sombart e i problemi della navigazione, op.cit., pp. 9–35. 5 The discrepancy between the number of contracts and that of crafts is due to the fact that a group of policies, which we shall soon discuss, provided insurance to cargoes transported on several vessels, as an alternative or concurrently. 6 On the importance of nationality in determining insurance prices, see especially Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani, op.cit., p. 454.

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trade at the time, are about three times as many as other seacraft: 221 (of which just 8 relate to “legni”). A comparison between Pisan and Florentine contracts highlights the fact that, in Florence, insurance cover nearly always concerned journeys made by ships and “legni” (123 out of 133). Consequently, these were mentioned for most of the routes indicated in the policies, although they were notably more numerous in medium distance travel; for example, in the Tuscany-Catalonia/Balearic and Tuscany-Provence routes, where they appear to have been used almost to the exclusion of any other type of craft. Insurance relating to the connections between Genoa (or Savona) and the Catalan and Provençal ports also concentrated on trips carried out by ships, although there is some trace of smaller tonnages.7 This type of vessel also predominated on longer routes, such as that between Venice and the ports of Barcelona and Majorca (16 cases—with just one exception, a contract covering a journey by three galleys), and that which led to Flanders from Catalonia or North Africa.8 However, the picture changes if we take into consideration policies relating to connections between Tuscany and the ports of Liguria: out of 35 trips to and from Genoa, only 4 indicate the use of ships. The same is true for Savona (1 contract out of 12).9 Smaller crafts were used on this itinerary, as they were more suitable for coastal trade, for example the “saetta” (“lightning”), a smallish, oar-propelled boat whose name betrays its main feature: speed. Among the 13 saetta mentioned in the policies, most were from Savona, but some from Gaeta too (for navigation between Tuscany and Rome). One operated on the 7 For the Tuscany-Catalonia/Balearic Islands route, out of 79 cases the only exceptions were one destriera (another type of vessel used to transport goods) and one “charachare” (probably a carrack); for the route to Provence a galliot is recorded (but this was the first policy drafted in Pisa in 1379) and one boat, against 69 references to ships and 4 to “legni”. Out of 18 references found for the Genoa/Savona-Catalonia route, all related to ships, with another 7 for the route to Provence, including two yachts and a galley. We must also remember cargoes insured for the Tuscany–Sicily route: in 12 cases, the goods travelled on ships, with just one instance of a yacht (DATINI 1158, doc. 32 of 23 November 1384). As concerns destriere and carracks, see Melis, Werner Sombart e i problemi della navigazione, op.cit., pp. 15–16n. 8 For insurance coverage of the Venice-Catalonia/Balearic Islands route on Venetian galleys cf. DATINI 1158, doc. 22. For Flanders 9 mentions out of 10 related to ships, although (very likely) the last also alluded to a craft of similar tonnage. To complete the picture, we need to add five other long-distance journeys on the Tuscany-England, Tunis-Provence, Alexandria in Egypt-Flanders, Catalonia-Alexandria and Beirut-Catalonia routes; cf. respectively DATINI 1159, doc. 53; DATINI 1158, docs. 45 and 32; DATINI 1159, doc. 85; DATINI 1158, doc. 30. The importance and success of the Catalan nau have been discussed by Del Treppo and Jacqueline Guiral-Hadziiossif; cf. Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani, op.cit., pp. 447–458 and Guiral-Hadziiossif, Valencia: puerto mediterráneo, op.cit., pp. 51–53. 9 See DATINI 1158, docs. 92, 93, 103, 159 and DATINI 1159, doc. 104.

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route to Genoa but had a Pisan shipmaster. It would seem that Pisa had become specialised in insuring cargoes carried by this type of vessel, since all the policies listing the saetta that were found in the documentation were stipulated there.10 This could be the consequence of a phenomenon already observed when we analysed the itineraries: Florence did not seem capable of meeting Datini’s demands in relation to this specific market segment. This is confirmed by data concerning the “liuto”, a small sailing boat also used for coasting trade. In this case, too, all the contracts mentioning this kind of vessel were drawn up in Pisa. The Datini documents imply that liuto was mainly used between Porto Pisano and Genoa (9 cases out of 10), with a more diverse nationality compared to the saetta. We find ship masters and/or ship owners from Portovenere, Catalonia and Sicily.11 Under the generic term of “bargia” and “vacchetta”, insurance contracts usually meant low-tonnage crafts (less than 100 barrels), also apt for coastal navigation. These small boats seem to have been especially active between Pisa and Genoa (or Savona), whilst the four bigger ones mentioned in the policies travelled on longer routes: Tuscany-Rome and Tuscany-Provence. There is also one contract for a carriage of olive oil from Majorca to Sluys on the boat of Giovanni Alfonso, a Portuguese master. In this policy, the term bargia probably indicated a higher-tonnage vessel, similar to a ship. It may not be coincidental that, of all the contracts using this denomination, this is the only one which was stipulated in Florence.12 In the Datini sources, we can also find 23 references to armed vessels, such as galleys, galleasses and galliots. Their relatively low number can be explained, as we have already said, by the fact that cargos travelling on these ships were 10 DATINI 1158, docs. 4, 7, 9, 10, 16, 21, 22, 25, 26, 73, 91, 108, 109 concentrated in the years 1383–1384, although stipulations can be found as late as 1395. For the saetta’s technical features see Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani, op.cit., p. 453; J.-Cl. Hocquet, Le sel et la fortune de Venise. 2: Voiliers et commerce en Meditérranée, 1200–1650, Lille, Université de Lille 3, 1979, pp. 135–137; V. Borghesi, Rotte e tempi di percorrenza nel Mediterraneo tra XV e XVI secolo, in Trasporti e sviluppo economico: secoli XIII–XVIII, op.cit., pp. 246–247. 11 DATINI 1158, doc. 18 (Tuscany-Savona), 48, 75, 76, 78, 85–87, 89 (Tuscany-Genoa) for the period from 1384 to 1393. For further details about the liuto see Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani, op.cit., p. 453; Guiral-Hadziiossif, Valencia: puerto mediterráneo, op.cit., pp. 50–51. 12 DATINI 1159, doc. 89 of 27 September 1397. Every other policy relating to boats and small boats comes from Pisa, cf. DATINI 1158, docs. 19, 27, 33, 36, 37–39, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47 (barchette—small boats); 80, 102, 129 (barche—boats). On the difference between Italian low-tonnage barchette and larger Iberian boats, cf. Melis, Werner Sombart e i problemi della navigazione, op.cit., pp. 18–19 with Guiral-Hadziiossif, Valencia: puerto mediterráneo, op.cit., pp. 48–49. See also Borghesi, Rotte e tempi di percorrenza nel Mediterraneo, op.cit., p. 246.

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seldom insured, as they were considered safer because of their defensive weaponry, and the Datini documents themselves offer ample evidence in this sense.13 However, the advantage of the galley—and of its variants—as regards security and speed were offset by its modest load capacity (around 150 barrels for the large “merchant galleys”). The nationality of these crafts was sometimes omitted, but we do have some references to Genoese, Venetian and Provençal galleys, as well as some from Portovenere. The demand for insurance involving armed vessels mainly concerned the two routes connecting the ports of Tuscany to Rome (9 cases) and Genoa (a further 6 cases), respectively.14 From our 14th-century policies, we can also learn something about the relative importance of fleets used by merchants who bought insurance in Pisa and Florence, since it is possible to identify the “nationality” of almost 240 seacraft (see Table 4.1). The major role played by the vessels from the Iberian Peninsula is clear, chiefly from the Kingdom of Aragon (92 references), but also Biscay and Castile. Together, they represent more than 40% of the total and are dominant especially with reference to ships. One out of five mentions concerns crafts from Liguria, variously distributed in different categories. Portovenere seems to have specialised in vacchette, Savona and Novi in saette, whilst Genoa maintained its prominent role for ships and galleys. The Provençal contribution is also remarkable, especially with respect to ships (34 out of 221). In fact, it was probably the only fleet capable of competing for pre-eminence with Catalonia and Aragon. Available data seems to underestimate the importance of Tuscan vessels. From a preliminary, schematic investigation of the names of ship masters and owners of unknown origins, we can conjecture a more conspicuous presence, especially with regards to Pisa. Lastly, Venetians are underrepresented, which is understandable for at least two reasons. First, we need to consider Datini’s scarce interest in buying insurance for the armed merchant galleys that departed in convoys from Venice; second, we must remember that most of our documents relate to the western Mediterranean.

13 See Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 56–60. 14 Cf. DATINI 1158, docs. 1, 15, 56, 106, 117, 122, 128, 134, 135, 148, 156; DATINI 1159, docs. 80, 82, 87, 110, 121, 130, 132. The policies cover the whole period of the sample. We need to underline that between “State” galleys, “commercial” galleys and galliots there was a difference in tonnage, greater for the first, more modest for the second and even lower for the last. On galleys in general, see Lane, Venetian Ships and Shipbuilders, op.cit., pp. 1–34; on differences within this group of vessels cf. Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani, op.cit., pp. 440–447 and 453; Guiral-Hadziiossif, Valencia: puerto mediterráneo, op.cit., pp. 54–57. On Genoese galleys see J. Heers, Types de navires et spécialisation des trafics en Méditerranée à la fin du Moyen age, in Le navire et l’economie maritime, op.cit., pp. 107–118.

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“Nationality” is also useful as it allows, by using the meticulous classifications elaborated by Federigo Melis, to gain some information as to the transport capacity of the common classes of sailing crafts (ships). This, in turn, helps to formulate some preliminary hypotheses on the distribution of insurance demand in relation to tonnage. We know that the tonnage of Genoese and Venetian ships was higher compared to those from Catalonia, Provence, Tuscany, Savona and Sicily. We also know what was the average carrying capacity, both of the smaller vessels (saette, liuti, boats, barques, and brigs), and of crafts equipped with defensive table 4.1 Nationality of crafts mentioned in the insurance contracts stipulated in Pisa and Florence (1379–1402), according to the Datini Archive’s insurance policies

Nationality

N. of references

Biscay Castile Catalonia/Balearic Islands Portugal

11 5 92 1

Provence

37

Florence Leghorn Lucca Pisa

7 1 6 4

Genoa Savona Porto Venere Others (Liguria)

18 11 20 1

Gaeta Sicily Venice

5 3 17

Unspecified Total

51 290

SOURCE: DATINI 1158, docs. 1–159 and DATINI 1159, docs. 1–137.

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weapons (galleys, galleasses, galliots). The impression we get from comparing all the data is that the demand for insurance was highest for cargoes loaded on medium-tonnages. About two thirds of the goods insured in Pisa and Florence by the Datini firm aggregate (worth slightly over fl. 75,000) would seem to involve such vessels, above all from the Iberian Peninsula. In terms of the insured value, available data suggests that the share of the large Genoese and Venetian ships taken together (with about fl. 15,000) and that of smaller crafts suited to coasting trade (just less than fl. 18,000), is fairly balanced. Lastly, armed ships seem to have played a modest role, with less than fl. 4,000 of insurance cover, a figure four times lower than that for low-tonnage boats.15 This information, albeit incomplete, suggests that the insurance markets of Pisa and Florence might had already anticipated, at the end of the 14th century, a trend that would later characterise other cities. As a matter of fact, despite a process towards rationalisation of investments by concentrating them on larger vessels to profit from economies of scale, demand diversification long remained a constant of the market. In 14th-century Barcelona, as well as in

15 The estimates and hypotheses presented here are based on the following criteria: seacrafts without any defensive equipment have been subdivided into three large groups, according to their transport capacity: “high tonnage” (900–600 barrels); “medium tonnage” (200–400 barrels); “low tonnage” ( 500 ≤ 1000 > 1000 ≤ 2000 > 2000 Total

25 41 27 12 3 108

3,625 16,073 19,970 16,000 6,380 62,048

4 5 3 2 2 16

330 2,100 1,950 2,900 4,350 11,630

29 46 30 14 5 124

3,955 18,173 21,920 18,900 10,730 73,678

SOURCE: DATINI 1159, docs. 1–137.

fl. 401–fl. 500 and fl. 701–fl. 800 (fl. 9,140 and fl. 7,150, respectively), but the fl. 2,001–fl. 2,100 subclass (with fl. 6,230) also reaches high levels, so that, in order to calculate 80% of the total insured values, we must include all the policies up to fl. 1,600. Seen from the perspective of demand by the Datini firm agglomerate, the Florentine market seemed able to respond to a multiplicity of needs. Even though many transactions involved relatively modest sums, it was always possible to request and obtain insurance cover for considerably higher values. Quick comparison with the Pisan policies enables us to understand this aspect more clearly. Though demand in Pisa seemed to follow a similar trend, it was apparently concentrated on lower value classes than in Florence. Contracts in favour of the local Datini firm are especially polarised towards the two lowest intervals (up to fl. 200 and fl. 201–fl. 500). Over 72% of contracts fall in these two categories and the same is true for a considerable percentage of the total amount (almost 44%). Consequently, high-value policies (those insuring over fl. 1,000), which made up more than 40% of the total figures in Florence and about 15% of actual contracts, were less frequent in Pisa (little more than 22% and 7%, respectively). In the 16th century, too, demand seems to display some of the typical features of the previous centuries. In Florence, it was possible to stipulate policies

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covering goods worth as low as fl. 50–60, as well as find enough underwriters to insure shipments worth a hundred times those amounts. In Raggi’s registrations, we find an indication of a fl. 40 policy for a shipment of oak gall travelling from Talamone to Leghorn, or fl. 80 for a cargo of cloth destined for a non-luxury market such as Sardinia. However, some contracts reveal the great availability of capital in the city: for example, a fl. 5,300 insurance policy for a transport of jewels and precious stones from Ancona to Dubrovnik, fl. 4,800 for a cargo of alum from Civitavecchia to Cadiz and fl. 5,000 for a load of sugar sent to Leghorn from Madeira. All these policies could involve as many as 40–50 different underwriters.8 Despite the limitations we have often recalled and to which we shall again return, the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà allows an in-depth analysis of the demand for security that the insurance market had to meet during the 16th century. Based on it, it is not only possible to describe the structure of the Florentine market in general terms, but we are also able to investigate individual cases and outline the profiles of several policy buyers. In the previous chapter, we saw that no particular variation in the volume of negotiations was recorded between March 1524 and July 1526, which permits the examination of the source from an essentially static temporal perspective (see Table 8.2). During the 29 months under consideration, the value of the recorded contracts varied from a minimum of fl. 40 to a maximum of fl. 6,300, a proof of the extreme segmentation of demand, which found its point of equilibrium in the average value of fl. 750.73. Top frequency for the number of contracts was recorded for fl. 300, a sum mentioned in as many as 84 registrations (more than 10% of the total), whilst with reference to insured values, it coincides with fl. 1,000 (43 policies worth fl. 43,000). Similar to the customary behaviour observed at the end of the 14th century, the practice of requesting insurance cover for amounts corresponding to multiples of fl. 100 continued. Figures diverging from this practice are found in less than 10% of all the recorded contracts (96 out 881).9 If we consider the insurance activities recorded in each of the three years covered by our sample, and observe their distribution according to the six value classes, both the single intervals and the overall total display very similar trends. The data, also shown as a percentage to easily compare periods of different durations (10, 12 and 7 months respectively), highlights the absence of change in the internal structure of demand (see again Table 8.2).

8 See SALVIATI 70, respectively docs. 114r, 123v, 23v, 84v–85r, 86v–87r. 9 More than half of these “exceptions” consist of amounts corresponding to fl. 50 and fl. 25 submultiples, and there are only 44 really anomalous cases.

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In terms of contracts, the maximum request was for sums lower or equal to fl. 2,000 (over 93% of the total), with the highest frequency in the fl. 201–fl. 500 range, which represented about 37% of the total demand in 1524, 35% in 1525 and 34% in 1526. In terms of values, the largest share appeared in the higher classes (fl. 501–fl. 1,000 and fl. 1,001–fl. 2,000), which, put together, exceeded 50% of the total insured every year: 52.3% in 1524, 53.1% in 1525 and 50.3% in 1526. On the contrary, low-value policies (up to fl. 200) took up a very modest share of negotiations, between 3% and 5% of the total insured values, in the three years under consideration. When we examine the complete 29-month period in the three years from 1524–1526, the internal distribution of demand seems fairly clear, as it was spread rather homogeneously on the median value classes. Contracts included in the four lowest intervals (up to fl. 2,000) made up, albeit with minor differences, almost all the stipulations. In terms of insured values, the four classes from fl. 201 to fl. 4,000, if considered jointly, almost made up 90% of the total. Each class had a somehow comparable share: fl. 113,307, fl. 159,360, fl. 185,924 and fl. 132,675, respectively. In other words, no single interval seemed able to polarise negotiations. On the contrary, values tended to spread according to a very wide multimodal trend, almost representing the entire spectrum between the minimum and maximum figures. This is confirmed by decomposing the data into smaller subclasses (fl. 100) and studying their distribution. As for the number of contracts, among the ten brackets showing the highest frequencies, most are lower than fl. 1,000, but three exceed this threshold, table 8.2 Class distribution of insurance demand in Florence (1524–1526) according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

Contracts

Value

N. ≤ 200 ˃ 200 ≤ 500 > 500 ≤ 1000 > 1000 ≤ 2000 > 2000 ≤ 4000 > 4000 Total

% of the total 176 312 211 125 48 9 881

19.98% 35.41% 23.95% 14.19% 5.45% 1.02% 100.00

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r.

26,154.80 113,307.00 159,360.00 185,923.70 132,675.00 43,975.00 661,395.50

Fl.

% of the total 3.95% 17.13% 24.10% 28.11% 20.06% 6.65% 100.00

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reaching more considerable sums (fl. 1,901–fl. 2,000, in 24 contracts). The same result is obtained with reference to values if we take the ten subclasses with the highest share. However, the weightage of the three intervals exceeding or equalling fl. 1,000 is obviously higher, amounting to over 20% of the total insured value (almost fl. 137,000). If we consider Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, within reasonable limits, to be representative of the entire market in Florence during the third decade of the 16th century, we can say that it traces a very flexible picture of the market. Demand not only fluctuated between distant extremes, but was also distributed very widely in-between, as the market seemed to be able to satisfy the most disparate requests. Under this aspect, the temptation to emphasise the elements of continuity with what we know of the insurance business at the end of the 14th century is very strong, but we need to be careful in suggesting a comparison in which the two terms are not easily commensurable. While the Datini policies provide a good glimpse of demand coming from a single, though large agglomerate, Raggi’s records refer to a plurality of entities which, as we shall soon see, could be characterised by rather diversified investment strategies and profiles. Above all, it is hard to bypass the problem of the value expressed by the two units of account. We have already explained that the fiorino largo d’oro in oro, the official money of account in the 1520s, had a higher nominal value (more than 40%) than the florin used until 1471, and how this fact was a consequence of its re-evaluation in relation to the silver currency circulating in the city.10 Although legal dispositions started to take this factor into consideration in the late 15th century, the process of re-evaluation started long before. If we consider their value expressed in soldi della lira di piccioli, the differential between Datini’s fiorino d’oro in oro and Raggi’s accounting unit was quite substantial, the latter having a greater nominal value than the former by as much as 80%.11 The question is still open as to the actual, concrete value of the two currencies in everyday practice, a problem whose solution has been attempted by employing various series of prices relating to cereals or the salaries of workers in the building industry. Besides their validity in general terms, which is 10

See the Note in the introduction (pp. 9–11). The two changes in the official currency produced the following equivalences: fl. 1 d’oro (before 1471) = fl. 0.70 d’oro (after 1501) and fl. 1 d’oro (after 1501) = fl. 1.43 d’oro (before 1471); cf. Goldthwaite, Mandich, Studi sulla moneta fiorentina, op.cit., p. 59. 11 This calculation is based on a comparison between the price averages in soldi della lira di piccioli of the two accounting units, observed in the Florentine market for the periods 1392–1400 and 1524–1526. The average for the first interval is fl. 1= 76.67 soldi, whilst for the second is fl. 1 = 140 soldi, which would produce the following equivalences: fl. 1 d’oro in oro (1392–1400) = fl. 0.55 larghi d’oro in oro (1524–1526) and fl. 1 largo d’oro in oro (1524– 1526) = fl. 1.83 d’oro in oro (1392–1400). This is based on the “prices” listed in ibid., op.cit., pp. 87–102.

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still doubtful, using such indicators is wholly inadequate to define the object that these money of account were supposed to quantify in insurance contracts: an enormous variety of goods, both as regards their number and typology, the value of which is obviously impossible to compare in the two periods under consideration.12 Having said that, if we consider the average sums insured by the Datini firms (fl. 594) and those recorded for the three years from 1524 to 1526 (about fl. 750), we have the strong impression that the insurance sector in Florence had grown significantly during the 120-year gap separating the two periods. Unlike the Datini contracts, the 16th-century documentation introduces us to a sizeable group of insurance buyers. In the three years under consideration, 115 “insured subjects” are mentioned in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà: they operate either as business partnerships, both in the traditional form or the new limited (in accomandita) one, individually, or in associations made of two insurance buyers. The people involved are a little less than 130, although their number was probably greater, since not every partner appeared in the denomination used by business firms. Not all insurance buyers operated with the same continuity and scale. By taking into consideration the number of policies and the values insured, it is possible to draw up a preliminary list of the most important actors in the business (see Table 8.3). In most contracts, demand was exerted by a single “insured subjects”, which often coincided with a business partnership firm, though it could also refer to operations carried out on by an individual. The entries also highlight the existence of more articulated mechanisms: for example, we can find more than one “insured subject” referring to the same individual appearing, or different operators that can be connected to the same business firm buying insurance. These interrelations—which, as we shall see, were fairly frequent—normally revolved around a single operator or firm agglomerate that we can simply call “the reference”. A good example is provided by Alessandro di Niccolò Antinori, who appears in Raggi’s registrations in three different positions: individually, in partnership with Francesco Antinori and in partnership with Jacopo Bettoni. These “insured subjects” can all be traced back to the business firm founded by Niccolò and Lodovico Antinori, Francesco’s father and uncle, respectively. This firm agglomerate had been doing business in Lyon since the end of the 15th 12 For an attempt to determine the real value of the florin of account in Renaissance Florence, see Goldthwaite, I prezzi del grano a Firenze, op.cit., pp. 5–35 and Id., The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 609–614. Please note that in both cases the value differential between fiorino largo d’oro in oro and fiorino d’oro in oro remained very high; in the former, fl. 1 largo d’oro in oro (1524–1526) = fl. 1.69 d’oro in oro (1385–1402), in the latter, fl. 1 largo d’oro in oro (1525) = fl. 1.87 d’oro in oro (1400).

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century; when Alessandro took over, he entrusted it to a local administrator (Niccolò Ughi).13 If, beyond the single operator or firm, we also take into account the intertwining among “insured subjects”, an even more restricted group (9 insurance buyers in all) appears to have generated most of the demand exerted on the Florentine market. Corresponding to 20 different “insured subjects”, this small circle made up almost 70% of the total value of insurance (fl. 452,637) and appeared in over half of the contracts recorded by Raggi (477 out of 881). These include the wool merchant Marco del Nero; the business firms controlled, respectively, by Averardo Salviati and his brother Piero; Bernardo Gondi and Niccolò Capponi; the Landi brothers; and the partnership between Gherardo Bartolini and Bartolomeo Lanfredini, and that between Francesco Mannelli and Giovanni Cavalcanti. We also meet again two old foreign acquaintances, Père Labia and Gérard Grillet. For all these people, the commitment to buying insurance extended along the entire period covered by the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, and often—we know it from the Salviati Bank’s documentation—dated back to earlier times and carried forward in later years. Their activity was, therefore, quite intense, considerable in financial terms and prolonged in time, translating into 2–3 stipulations a month, for a value that probably remained above fl. 1,000 monthly. These major players, whose aggregate demand reached at least fl. 25,000 in the three-year period under consideration, were followed by another group of 5–6 individuals who received coverage for sums between fl. 10,000 and fl. 20,000. They were certainly top customers, too, who could boast of long-term commitment to the market. However, different strategies and approaches seem to have been at play in this “second tier”. Some, like the Jacopo da Ricasoli and partners or Francesc “Catalan”, requested insurance covers diligently, with an average of about 2 contracts per month, but for relatively modest amounts (around fl. 350). Others turned to the market less frequently, but when they did so, they mobilized substantial amounts: this is the case of Giovanni Popoleschi and Simone Guadagni’s and partners, which appears only intermittently in Raggi’s ledger (16 contracts in all), but with stipulations approaching those of the major operators in value (on average fl. 927).14

13

14

Cf. G. Miani, under Antinori, Alessandro, in DBI, vol. III, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1961, pp. 455–457; Id., under Antinori, Niccolò, in DBI, vol. III, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1961, pp. 463–464. See also the Salviati bank’s account in the name of “Heirs of Lodovico Antinori and Andrea Sartini and partners”, SALVIATI 742, fol. 25. Three others, who requested insurance cover individually, can be included in this “second tier”: a foreigner, Francesc de Miquel (indicated as “Francesco Catalan” in the records) and two Florentines, Paolo da Romena e Dardano Acciaioli.

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The remaining subjects—around 90—make up just over 25% of all the contracts, corresponding to less than 20% in value. However, there are some differences within this last group that allow us to distinguish two types of clients. The first category is made up by those who, though mentioned several times in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, seem to have used the insurance market only occasionally (on average one policy every 2 or 3 months). For example, Alfonso Strozzi’s and partners, Leonardo Mannelli’s and partners or Ilarione Martelli’s individual firm. The first was seemingly active for 22 months out of the 29 under investigation, the second for 23, and the third for 27 months, with an average of fl. 335, fl. 324 and fl. 490 per policy, respectively. table 8.3 Major insurance buyers and their periods of operations on the Florence market (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà and the Salviati Bank’s accounts

“Reference” operator of the “insured subject”

Insured values in florins

Nr. of contracts

Period of stipulations

Time span of activity as insured

Del Nero, Marco and partners Salviati, Averardo

101,709.0

105

1521–28

63,790.0

61

Labia, Père

61,170.0

64

Bartolini,Gherardo and Lanfredini, Bartolomeo Capponi, Niccolò di Piero and partners Mannelli, Francesco and Cavalcanti, Giovanni Miquel de Francesc, “Catalan” Gondi, Bernardo

46,570.0

64

45,553.3

49

39,050.0

47

March 1524– July 1526 March 1524– June 1526 March 1524– July 1526 April 1524– June 1526 March 1524– June 1526 March 1524– July 1526

34,000.0

65

33,865.0

44

Grillet, Gérard

30,530.0

25

Landi, Giovanni and Landi, Vittorio and partners

30,400.0

18

March 1524– July 1526 April 1524– July 1526 March 1524– July 1526 May 1524–Mar 1526

1521–27 1521–27 1521–27 1521–26 1522–27

1520–26 1524–27 1523–26 1524–26

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table 8.3 Major insurance buyers and their periods of operations (cont.)

“Reference” operator of the “insured subject” Ricasoli (da), Jacopo and partners Popoleschi, Giovanni and Guadagni Simone and partners Da Romena, Paolo

Insured values in florins

Nr. of contracts

Period of stipulations

Time span of activity as insured

April 1524– June 1526 May 1524–Jan 1526

1523–27

16,946.5

46

14,825.0

16

10,275.0

13

Acciaioli, Dardano

9,475.0

22

Martelli, Ilarione

6,940.0

14

Antinori, Alessandro

6,500.0

6

Mannelli, heir of Giovanni and partners Di Sommaia, Antonio and da Sommaia, Gerolamo and partners Biliotti, Giovanbattista di Paolo & Co, wool weavers Strozzi, Alfonso and partners in Florence Mannelli, Leonardo and partners Capponi, Jacopo in London Ginori, Carlo and partners Other “insured subjects” Total

5,800.0

8

5,600.0

7

4,800.0

10

June 1524–Aug 1525

4,685.0

14

4,660.0

11

4,400.0

1

March 1524–Dec 1524–25 1525 Sept 1524– 1520–26 July 1526 January 1526 1526

4,200.0

11

75,651.7

160

661,395.5

881

Aug 1524–Dec 1525 April 1524– July 1526 March 1524– May 1526 Oct 1524–Mar 1526 Jan 1525– July 1526 July 1524– June 1526

April 1524– July 1526 March 1524– July 1526

1523–26

1523–26 1524–26 1524–26 1524–26 1525–26 1523–27

1524–25

1520–26

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r; SALVIATI 735, fols. 128r–137v; SALVIATI 742, fols. 136, 149, 168, 205, 243, 281, 319, 368, 407, 436; SALVIATI 749, fols. 87, 180, 254, 347, 477, 559, 608.

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The second category is made of individuals and business firms appearing very rarely in the registrations. These had a different profile: less than five policies (but mostly only 1 or 2) and for relatively modest sums, lower than the total mode of fl. 350 (23 subjects in all). We would actually be tempted to call them “occasional” insurance buyers even if, as we shall shortly see, this is only partly plausible. We can, in all probability, include in this category a small Sicilian merchant, Vito da Trapani, who insured a cargo of wool cloth and ironware to resell in his homeland. The same can be said about Pedro de Vara, a ship owner/master from Biscay who turned to the Florentine market to insure what was very likely his property share of the ship of which he was also the shipmaster.15 For the others we must exercise utmost caution because, as we well know, a large fraction of demand escaped Raggio Raggi’s hands and was dealt with by the other sworn broker. We can partly remedy this limitation by using the Salviati Bank’s archives, so that we may get a glimpse of Bartolomeo Ricoveri’s customers, not mentioned in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà (see Table 8.4). Starting with about a hundred records, it has been possible to reconstruct 92 insurance policies drawn up by this broker in the three periods—1520–1521, 1523–1524 and 1525–1527. The total number of “insured subject” involved is 30, even though, among Ricoveri’s clients, the same phenomenon can be observed of one individual being connected to several business firms, creating a series of different combinations, in which the same names keep cropping up. The list confirms that insurance could be bought in Florence by individual merchants, as well as by business firms or more or less stable partnerships between two traders. It also reveals two important elements: firstly, some subjects rely on Ricoveri’s intermediation frequently and with some continuity in time. Leonardo della Torre, for example, seems to have stipulated 18 contracts between 1521 to 1526; the Carlo Ginori and partners appeared 10 times in 5 years; Domenico Giugni’s banking firm made an appearance in 5 contracts between 1523 and 1527. For others, insurance cover seemed concentrated in shorter periods, like the case of the two Spanish merchants who sometimes carried out business together: Luis de Malvenda apparently needed insurance only in 1524, but as often as 13 times, whilst Lexmes de Astodillo requested 7 insurance policies in two separate instances (in 1521 and in 1523). So, many insurance buyers did not employ Bartolomeo Ricoveri just occasionally. On the contrary, he seems to have been their preferred broker. This is confirmed by the fact that their names never appear in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, or in the policies drawn up by Raggi in the preceding years, which 15 Cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 36v–37v, 57v.

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can be reconstructed using the Salviati Bank’s archives. For example, Leonardo della Torre, Luis de Malvenda, Lexmes de Astodillo and Domenico Giugni, but also Juan Salamanca or the partnership between Thomas Watts and Nicholas Jones. In other instances, a comparison of the sources suggests that some used either broker indifferently. A good example is the Carlo Ginori co., which—as insurance buyer—also appears 11 times in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà. The same can be said for Jacopo Balducci. Lastly, Ricoveri, too, was approached by occasional customers, such as Niccolò Capponi and partners or Gherardo Bartolini & Bartolomeo Lanfredini’s firm. The second element clearly emerging from the analysis of Ricoveri’s clientele is—as already anticipated—its cosmopolitan dimension. At least 13 insured individuals were not from Florence and they appeared as beneficiaries for 59 out of 92 policies: nine Spaniards, two Englishmen, one Genoese and a Dubrovnik-born businessman. We will shortly come back to the “foreign” component of insurance demand in the Florentine market, but our guess is that it must have been much more considerable than what transpires from Raggi’s records. From this point of view, profound differences must have existed between the two brokers. A survey of the policies handled by Bartolomeo Ricoveri suggests that the number of insurers demanding for coverage during the three-year period (1524–1526) must have exceeded the 115 subjects mentioned in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà. However, it is difficult to quantify their number precisely because, as we have seen, the two clienteles were partly overlapping. Following an approximation based on Giovanbattista’s and Zanobi Bracci’s “insurance accounts”, we may suppose that more than 60% of businesses were in the habit of using both the brokers, which would produce a hypothetical total of less than 160 insurance buyers. Having shed some light, as far as it is possible, on Ricoveri’s business activities, let us try to outline some individual profiles among the restricted group of substantial insurance buyers, starting with the Florentines. Three of these businessmen were Raggi’s exclusive customers (Marco di Simone del Nero, Averardo di Alamanno Salviati and the brothers Giovanni and Vittorio Landi), whereas one—Carlo Ginori—seems to have bestowed his custom equally on the two brokers active in Florence. Marco del Nero owned one of the major wool businesses in the city during the 1520s. He was an outstanding example of specialized merchant-entrepreneur, a fact that is fully reflected in the type of insurance coverage that he demanded for his firm.16 Sources allow us to trace both the products supplying his workshops (he insured cargoes of raw wool 16

By crossing the data in our sources we were able to attribute to the Marco del Nero & partners some of Raggi’s registrations in which the insurance buyer is Neri and partners, an

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table 8.4 Foreign insurance buyers through Bartolomeo Ricoveri in Florence (1520–1527), their ­provenance and period of operations, according to the Salviati Bank’s accounts

“Insured subject”

N. of contracts Provenance Interval of operations

Della Torre, Leonardo Ginori, Carlo and partners Malvenda, Luis De Astodillo, Lexmes De Astodillo, Lexmes & Malvenda, Luis Giugni, Domenico and partners Daedo, Juan De Castillo, Sancho Salamanca, Juan Salamanca, Juan & de Villena, Pedro Florence Wool Weavers’ Guild Balducci, Jacopo and partners De Castro, Lopo De Villena, Pedro Bardi, Migiotto De Logroño, Juan Del Pugliese, Niccolò Watts, Thomas & Jones, Nicholas Berti, Piero Barbosa, Francesco Bartolini, Gherardo & Lanfredini, Bartolomeo and partners Bonsignori, Bonsignore Capponi, Niccolò di Piero Del Pugliese, Filippo Gaddi, Giovanni Ginori, Giovanni and partners Giovanni di Tommaso di Giunta and partners Liberi, heir of Carlo and Zati, Francesco and partners Filicaia (da), Niccolò Malvenda, Francisco Total foreigners insured Total

18 10 13 7 1 5 2 2 3 1 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 59 92

Genoa Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain Spain

Spain Spain Spain England

1521; 1523–24; 1526 1521; 1523–24 1524 1521; 1523 1523 1523–24; 1526–27 1524; 1526 1521 1521; 1524 1524 1521; 1524 1526 1521; 1523–24 1523–24 1523 1525–26 1523; 1526 1521 1524 1521 1524

1524 1524 1524 1521 1524 Dubrovnik 1524 1521

Spain

1526 1524

SOURCE: SALVIATI 735, fols. 128r–137v; SALVIATI 742, fols. 136, 149, 168, 205, 243, 281, 319, 368, 407, 436; SALVIATI 749, fols. 87, 180, 254, 347, 477, 559, 608.

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from Spain and England or dyes such as woad and madder) and his firm’s related trade in finished products, which were shipped from Leghorn and Ancona to a variety of destinations.17 This went along with a more general side business, which included reexporting foreign textile products (ciambellotti, bordati, kersey cloth), the sale of silks on the Iberian markets, trade in basic foodstuffs (e.g., wheat from Sicily to Rome) and luxury goods (wine and raisins from Greece to Flanders).18 Policies paid for by Marco del Nero and partners span across the 29 months under consideration, but this firm’s interest in insurance must have been rather prolonged in time, with the earliest contracts dating back to July 1321, until January 1528, the year when Marco di Simone del Niro died.19 According to Raggi’s registrations, the value of goods for which the firm requested insurance varied a lot, from a minimum of fl. 80 to a maximum of fl. 4,400 (twice), averaging slightly less than fl. 1,000 per policy. This must have translated into high monthly demand, around fl. 3,000–4,000.20 Averardo Salviati, perhaps the richest man in Florence at the time, was the prototype of the great international merchant-banker at the centre of a multibranched firm agglomerate. With his younger brother Piero (1504–1564), after their father’s death in 1510, he quickly acquainted himself with the family business, then managed by his uncle Jacopo di Giovanni, Lorenzo de Medicis’ sonin-law. The enterprise was built around a bank in Lyon, but it also included two firms in Florence (a bank and a silk manufacturing partnership) and two in Pisa (a bank and the Magona, a breeding farm). During the 1520s, the two brothers broke free from their uncle’s tutelage, as he had moved to Rome where he was entrusted with top-level appointments at the Papal Court. Averardo gradually abbreviated form of the complete denomination; for a clear example of the interchangeable use of the two “insured subjects”, see SALVIATI 742, fol. 126. 17 Examples of these activities can be found in SALVIATI 70, fols. 5v–6r, 21r, 46v, 96v, 104v– 105r, 117r–117v, 117v–118r, 119v, 134r. 18 Cf. Ibid., docs. 6r, 26r–26v, 53v, 60r, 69r, 138v (for ciambellotti), 15r, 72v (for bordati), 11v, 126v, 129v (for “carisee” cloth), 40v, 53v, 69r, 98r (for silk fabrics), 7r, 10v, 127r, 132r (for foodstuffs). 19 See SALVIATI 735, fol. 136v and SALVIATI 749, fol. 559. 20 For the importance of the Marco del Nero and co. among wool firms in Florence in the first half of the 16th century, see Dini, Saggi su una economia-mondo, op.cit., p. 212 and D. Toccafondi Fantappiè, under Del Nero, Marco, in DBI, vol. XXVIII, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1990, pp. 173–177. A sizeable sample of books of accounts of the Marco del Nero and partners can be found in the Archives of the Ospedale degli Innocenti in Florence; see Archivio dell’Ospedale degli Innocenti di Firenze, Eredità diverse—Estranei, del Nero. Further information can be gleaned from the firm’s accounts at the Salviati bank, see for example SALVIATI 742, fols. 123, 340, 380.

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took over the management of the whole firm agglomerate, taking advantage of his cousin Battista di Jacopo’s death (late 1523). This change is attested by the denomination prevalently appearing in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà (“Averardo Salviati and partners”). There were also additional firms, which were all part of the business agglomerate, for example, the Piero di Alamanno & Salviati and partners of Naples.21 Records listing the Salviati firm as insurance buyer range from transporting alum to the North Sea to shipments of wheat from Sicily to Rome and from Maremma to Leghorn and Viareggio.22 We also possess ample testimony of the firm’s wool cloth exporting and re-exporting activities, concentrated in Florence (and its ports of Leghorn and Ancona) or Lyon (via the Provençal ports).23 There is also some mention of international trade in luxury commodities like wine, pepper and sugar, or Florentine silks sold in Spain.24 Such diversified commercial interests were mirrored in the group’s highly articulated insurance demand, with policies worth fl. 140 to fl. 4,850, and frequencies distributed around very different values ranging from fl. 200, fl. 400 and fl. 2,000. For the three years from 1524 to 1526, the average insured sum exceeded fl.1,000 with more than two policies per month, on average, for over fl. 2,100. Obviously, the Salviati agglomerate must have taken out insurance cover in Florence for a much longer period than the 29 months considered here. Proof of this has been found which dates back to March 1521, whilst their last known policy was signed in December 1527.25 The involvement of the business firms managed by Averardo di Alamanno resembles—for duration, financial volumes and variety—that of various other agglomerates. active on the market at the same time, from Bernardo Gondi’s firm to the Bartolini-Lanfredini bank, or 21 On Averardo di Alamanno Salviati and on the Salviati business conglomerate in the 1520s see P. Hurtubise, Une famille-témoin: les Salviati, Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1985, pp. 198–223; for details of the group’s organisational structure, see especially ibid., pp. 145–147, 198 and 215–216. Hurtubise is not aware, however, of the existence of a Neapolitan branch (probably managed by Bernardo di Ridolfo da Sommaia), mentioned several times in our 16th-century documentation; cf., for example, SALVIATI 70, fol. 120v; SALVIATI 481, fols. 268v–269r. 22 For examples of insurance covering alum departing from Civitavecchia or the Isle of Elba and destined for Flanders, Normandy or Cadiz, see SALVIATI 70, fols. 20v–21r, 23v, 24r, 28r–28v, 84v–85r, 124v, 125r. For trade in grains: ibid., docs. 11v, 20r, 38v–39r, 69v, 120v. See also Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., p. 137. 23 SALVIATI 70, fols. 5r, 20r–20v, 70v, 76r–76v, 78r, 137v, 102v (for wool cloth), 90v, 93r, 127v (for carisee cloth), 74v (for bordati); cf. Dini, Saggi su un’economia-mondo, op.cit., p. 255. 24 Ibid., docs. 67r, 67v (for wine travelling directly from Candia to England), 90v–91r, 92v (for sugar and pepper), 58r–58v, 70v, 105v–106r, 137r–137v (for silks). 25 Cf. SALVIATI 735, fol. 131v and SALVIATI 749, fol. 559.

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the Niccolò Capponi and partners We will touch on all these below, but it is true that the Salviatis represented the Florentine epitome of the multi-specialist merchant bank agglomerate. The brothers Giovanni and Vittorio di Antonio Landi seem instead to have focused their business activities on a very particular market segment—trade in jewels, metals and precious stones. At the time, they were among the top players in the flourishing goldsmith’s sector. The insurance documents testify to a constant flow of jewels, gold and silver along the maritime axis from Dubrovnik to Ancona, only occasionally replaced by textiles. Their specialization in the luxury segment of the market determined a peculiar demand structure, with the maximum insured value reaching fl. 5,400 (for a transport of precious stones in June 1524), a limited number of contracts (18) and the highest average by far with respect to sums covered: fl. 1,689. The time span in which the partnership was active on the market was all concentrated in the three years, 1524–1526, which makes the Landi brothers’ case highly peculiar, and difficult to compare with others.26 Tracing the profile of Carlo Ginori and his business is not as easy, because we only have the Salviati bank’s documentation to rely on. It seems plausible, however, that the number of insurance policies stipulated in favour of the Carlo Ginori and partners was double of that recorded in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà (11 in all), and maybe even higher, making this firm one of the most important buyers of insurance in Florence.27 After all, we know that Carlo belonged to a family that was part of the social and economic élite, and that he was one 26 SALVIATI 70, fols. 23v, 29v, 65r–65v, 82r, 88v, 92r, 92r–92v, 115r (for examples of policies covering precious stones and jewels) and 29v, 39v (for wool cloth). On the Landis’ activities as goldsmiths cf. G. Cecchi, Landi, Antonio, in DBI, vol. LXIII, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2004, pp. 369–371 and, with particular reference to Papal Rome, Bertolotti, Benvenuto Cellini a Roma, op.cit., p. 139; according to Bertolotti, in 1553 Vittorio Landi sold the Pope a diamond-mounted ring (“diamante legato in anello”) for the sum of 3,000 scudi. Cf. also the firm’s bank account in SALVIATI 742, fol. 82, listing exchange and giro operations for extremely high amounts. 27 As we have already mentioned, on the whole the 16th-century documentation suggests that Carlo Ginori’s firm used both Raggi and Ricoveri as insurance brokers, but perhaps the latter was employed more often. Of the registrations that has been possible to reconstruct (between 1521 and 1526), Raggi’s share was definitely higher (15 policies, against Ricoveri’s 10), but the result changes and is even reversed for shorter periods of time. For example, if we refer to the interval between March 1523 and July 1524 (covered by the first of the two cash ledgers at the Salviati bank), Ricoveri negotiated nine contracts, against only one prepared by Raggi; in the Quadernuccio di ricordi di sicurtà (1520–1522) there are two entries by Ricoveri, one by Raggi; lastly, for the periods when the bank’s accounts are overlapping with the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, there are 5 references to policies drawn up by Ricoveri and 3 to those mediated by Raggi. It is therefore plausible that the Carlo Ginori

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of the wealthiest merchants in the city.28 The scant data available concerning the transport of goods and the itineraries covered by policies taken out by his firm, confirm the impression of a medium-large partnership, which operated on an international scale and dealt in a wide range of products such as textiles, foodstuffs (including luxury goods) and leather. The firm must have operated over an extended area, comprising all the typical routes of long-range trade (Leghorn-Provence, Mediterranean—North Sea, Provence—Spain), with a special interest in commerce with Southern Italy (Apulia, Sicily, Naples) and Sardinia.29 After having described the background of some of the most important buyers of insurance in Florence, let us turn once again to the foreigners, to try and understand the scope and characteristics of the demand exerted by this group. The late-14th-century documentation, as we have seen, does not make it clear whether the presence of foreigners was a well-rooted feature of the insurance market. If we exclude a policy in favour of Domenico d’Andrea, who was born in Siena, the only “alien” appearing in the role of insured is no other than Francesco di Marco Datini. The Merchant of Prato, who in 1395 obtained Florentine citizenship after long negotiations, was perceived, and was made to feel, as a stranger in the city for a long time, a “villano rifatto”, as Iris Origo once wrote.30 We also know that the few legislative measures concerning the insurance sector issued in Florence during the 15th century were of a protectionist nature, and tended to exclude the very possibility of foreigners obtaining insurance cover in the Florentine market. However, these interventions were limited in time and starting from 1464, discrimination ceased, reopening the market to foreign businesses.31 The 16th-century panorama appears very different from this point of view, with a decisively significant presence of subjects from abroad. We had a glimpse of this, just by observing the “cosmopolitan” make-up of Bartolomeo Ricoveri’s clientele, but we can attempt to gauge foreign contribution more and co. might have requested insurance cover at least forty times during the 29-month period under consideration. 28 V. Arrighi, Ginori, Carlo, in DBI, vol. LV, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2000, pp. 31–32 and Bullard, Filippo Strozzi and the Medici, op.cit., p. 134n; see also P. Malanima, I Riccardi. Una famiglia e un patrimonio nella Toscana dei Medici, Florence, Olschki, 1977, p. 28. 29 Cf. SALVIATI 735, fols. 128r, 129r; SALVIATI 742, fols. 149, 168, 205, 281, 368, 407, 436; SALVIATI 742, fol. 266; SALVIATI 70, fols. 13r, 18r, 41r–41v, 49v, 61v, 65r, 73v, 89v, 93v, 127v, 141r. The operations carried out through the Salviati bank, where the firm had opened an account, tend to confirm this profile; cf. SALVIATI 742, fol. 111. 30 Origo, Il mercante di Prato, op.cit., pp. 181–189. 31 Piattoli, Le leggi fiorentine sull’assicurazione, op.cit., pp. 255–257.

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precisely by also referring to the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà. As a matter of fact, the source indicates a high presence of non-Florentines. In the 29 months under investigation, about 20% of the insurance demand, both in terms of policies and values, originated from foreign operators (see Table 8.5). This percentage, which proves the force of attraction exerted by this market at an international level, is likely to have been even higher, given that many foreigners seemed to prefer Ricoveri’s intermediation. Therefore, the hypothesis that, for the three years from 1524–1526, at least 30–40% of policies were stipulated by “alien” merchants may not be far-fetched.32 If we look at the provenance of these insurance buyers, most came from the Iberian Peninsula, with a strong presence of Catalans among Raggi’s customers and Castilians among Ricoveri’s. To the first group belonged Bartomeu Paretes, who was actually based in Avignon, Miquel and Francesc de Miquel, father and son, and Père Labia, to whom we will shortly return. Among the latter, most were businessmen attached to important business firms from Burgos: Lope de Castro, the Malvendas (Francisco and Luis), Juan Salamanca and Pedro de Villena.33 There were also a considerable number of merchants from Dubrovnik (for example Luca di Bona, Giovanni and Tommaso di Giunta), who clearly thought it advantageous to obtain insurance in Florence, rather than in their native town.34 Whilst it is appropriate to consider these three groups as “colonies” of merchants that resided in Florence in a fairly stable way, demand could also be more occasional and dependent on individual traders. Cases in point are Gérard Grillet, a Frenchman, the three Englishmen William Watles, Thomas Watts and Nicholas Jones, and Leonardo della Torre from Genoa.35 A different set was made up by Pedro de Vara, “Luigi Ricasens” and “Giovanni from Burgundy” (as they were recorded in Raggi’s book), who represent a special

32

It is well known that this movement of foreign businessmen towards Florence started to become significant in the late 15th century, growing further during the next century; see Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 123–124. 33 On the Spanish community in Florence during the early part of the 16th century, see B. Dini, Manifattura, commercio e banca nella Firenze medievale, Florence, Nardini, 2001, p. 64 and Id., Saggi su una economia-mondo, op.cit., pp. 290–308. 34 Ibid., pp. 236–240, for settlers from Dubrovnik. With reference to mid-16th century, also see Tenenti, Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio, op.cit., pp. 30–32. 35 Both “Guglielmo Votillese” (Florentine transliteration of William Watles) and the partnership between Watts and Jones had opened bank accounts at the Salviati bank, which allowed to discover their nationality; another English customer, John Watson (“Giovanni Uatison” in the bank’s books) seemed uninterested in insurance. Cf. SALVIATI 742, fols. 13, 47 and 60.

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The Market and Its Operators: Demand table 8.5 Foreigners insured in Florence (1524–1526), by provenance and amount of ­insurance cover, according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

“Insured subject”

Provenance

Labia, Pere Grillet, Gérard (on his own) Grillet, Gérard and Capponi, Piero and partners Miquel de Francesc Francesc de Miquel Tostado, Rodrigo Watles, William Luca di Bona De Vallesta, Juan, haberdasher Giovanni di Tommaso &Tommaso di Giunta Paretes, Bartomeu Juan Alfonso Malvenda, Francisco Giovanni of Burgundy Pedro de Vara

Catalonia France France

61,170.00 23,930.00 6,600.00

64 21 4

Catalonia Catalonia Castile England Dubrovnik Castile Dubrovnik

17,050.00 16,950.00 2,625.00 2,200.00 975.00 650.00 600.00

48 17 2 1 1 1 2

550.00 500.00 500.00 300.00 300.00

2 3 2 1 1

300.00 100.00

1 1

135,300.00 661,395.49

172 881

Vito da Trapani Requesens, Louis Total insured foreigners Total

Catalonia Valencia Castile France Basque Country Sicily France/ Flanders

Insured values in fl.

N. Policies

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r.

category of ship owners and shipmasters that turned to the Florentine market to obtain insurance cover for the vessels they partly owned.36 36

For insurance policies stipulated by ship owners/shipmasters, see SALVIATI 70, fols. 57v and 140v. “Luigi Ricasens” is probably identifiable as Louis Requesens, a French (of possibly Flemish) businessman who was also active in the following years in partnership with Averardo Salviati; see Hurtubise, Une famille-témoin: les Salviati, op.cit., p. 216 and SALVIATI, docs. 81, 82, 83 (registers preserving the activities of the enterprise founded by the two).

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Some of the businessmen belonging to this rather heterogeneous group definitely played a role of utmost importance in the insurance market. A foremost example is that of Père Labia, born in Gerona or Barcelona (possibly a converted Jew), who was living in Florence in 1524–1526. The Salviati Bank’s ledgers reveal his complex business network spanning from Avignon, the city where he had originally moved to, before a short stay in Florence and finally settling down in Venice. Père Labia alone demanded insurance for almost 10% of the total recorded in the 29-month period, thus achieving the second place among Raggi’s customers. The registrations show the main areas of investment of his commercial activities, radiating from the South of France: from Marseilles, Aigues-Mortes and Nice he exported his products (especially textiles) to the Spanish cities of Valencia and Alicante, while his silks and ciambellotti converged on the Provençal ports from Leghorn, and spices from the East.37 Among those who preferred Ricoveri as their trusted broker, two foreign businessmen stand out from the rest: Luis Malvenda, a merchant-banker from Burgos and the Genoese Leonardo della Torre. We know that the former had strong business interests in the coastal centres of Gascony and Brittany, where another member of his family (Juan Malvenda) operated in the insurance sector at the time. Malvenda’s brush with the Florentine market seems to have been brief and limited to 1523 (in partnership with Lexmes de Astodillo) and 1524 (on his own).38 Instead, Della Torre had been buying insurance in Florence since 1521. He was one of the major players of long-range commerce from Genoa to the North of Europe, Spain and the East, including the flourishing trade in 37 The Salviati bank’s archives offer a wealth of information not only about the insurance sector, but also on other financial and commercial operations; see, for example, SALVIATI 742, fols. 110, 329, 409. Traces of Labia’s business activities can be found in Dini, Saggi su una economia-mondo, op.cit., p. 229. An important testimony on his and his family’s biographical details can be read in I diarii di Marino Sanuto, vol. XLVII, ed. by F. Stefani, G. Berchet, N. Barozzi, Venice, Stamperia di Visentini, 1897, p. 79. 38 In the case of Luis Malvenda too (and of the other family members working in 1520s Florence), crossed comparison of the documents has resulted in certain identification. The documents contain many variations of his surname (“Malondra”, “Malandra”, “Maluenda”, “Malonda”), all attributable to personal interpretations of whoever was drawing up the insurance policy or writing in the account ledgers. Particularly useful in this sense are the entries in Luis Malvenda’s accounts at the Salviati bank, which not only have enabled us to identify him for certain, but also bear witness to his intense insurance activities. See SALVIATI 742, fol. 346 and SALVIATI 749, fol. 94. Important indications are also found in Giovanbattista Bracci’s “insurance accounts” (“conti sicurtà”), cf. SALVIATI 742, fols. 281 and 319. For Juan Malvenda’s insurance operations see Boiteux, La fortune de mer, op.cit., pp. 96–97. On the Malvendas’ business activities in Florence, cf. Dini, Saggi su una economia-mondo, op.cit., p. 296.

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sugar produced in the Atlantic islands and shipped to the Mediterranean.39 From the account he had opened at the Salviati Bank, which he often used for his insurance activities, we know that he entertained a business relationship with fellow Genoese merchants Bastiano and Luca Spinola.40 Insurance demand in Renaissance Florence appears both diversified and composite. Although there was a trend towards concentration in a rather restricted number of subjects, there was also plenty of room for more occasional customers. The transactions show considerable variety, starting from minimal sums to substantial amounts, even tenfold the lowest ones. The insured businesses’ profiles were also variegated. The market was approached by the most “typical” Florentine firms, as well as ship owners and shipmasters, and a significant (and apparently growing) number of foreigners. Their presence, together with a sharp increment in the values covered by policies, represents an element of novelty characterising the 16th century in comparison with the 14th, and presents a dynamic picture of a thriving insurance market. 39

His role as the insured party in some of the policies can be retraced thanks to those instances when Giovanbattista Bracci acted in his favour; see SALVIATI 735, fols. 129r, 133v, 136r, 137r; SALVIATI 742, fols. 243, 281, 319, 368, 407, 436 and SALVIATI 749, fols. 87 and 347. 40 SALVIATI 742, fols. 112, 378 and SALVIATI 749, fol. 51.

chapter 9

The Market and Its Operators: Supply Merchants who chose Florence to secure insurance for their goods required a varied and flexible approach on the part of underwriters, both in the late 14th century and in the 1520s, because the sums involved could range from a few hundred florins to up to twenty times as much. The Datini contracts show that in order to meet such unpredictable requirements, insurers adopted the strategy of splitting the requested coverage into a variable amount of individual shares (or quotas). This technique, called co-insurance, had been borrowed from a practice followed in maritime transport that subdivided the property of the vessel and the goods loaded on it into several portions (carats). This mechanism, which seems to have been adopted right from the start in insurance contracts, was so well established by the end of the 14th century that it allowed a considerable distribution of risk.1 Among our extant policies, some had clearly attracted a considerable number of underwriters, with the maximum of 19 in April 1400 for a cargo of cotton, turpentine and spices worth over fl. 2,000.2 Normally, however, quotas were shared among a lesser number of individuals, not more than four co-insurers in most instances (see Table 9.1). According to the Datini policies, cases of up to nine co-insurers were quite frequent (36 out of 138), while those involving a larger number of people were rare. A comparison with documents relating to the Pisan market suggests that Florence had a particular propensity for exploiting the technique of co-insurance, since almost 80% of the Datini policies stipulated in Pisa do not mention more than four underwriters, with a maximum of 13.3 This difference was probably due to a phenomenon we have already noticed, i.e., the Pisan market was largely specialised in local trade. If we consider the policies relating to the route from Porto Pisano to Genoa, the predominance of insurance provided by a single underwriter is overwhelming (29 instances out of a total of 44). 1 See C.L. Daveggia, Forme contrattuali dell’assicurazione, op.cit., pp. 365–366. 2 Cf. DATINI 1159, doc. 129 of 22 April 1400, for Raimondo Orimoll’s ship travelling from Porto Pisano to Aigues-Mortes. This, however, was an unexceptional case at the time, because we know from the Datini Archives of policies underwritten by as many as 27 co-insurers; see Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., p. 220. 3 From the extant policies it has been surmised as follows: 119 contracts out of 150 involved less than five underwriters, 25 were subscribed by 5–9 individuals and only 6 policies had 10 or more co-insurers.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004442450_011

161

The Market and Its Operators: Supply table 9.1 Distribution of co-insurers per contract and quotas underwritten in Florence (1383–1401), according to the policies in the Datini Archives

Coinsurers (number of)

N. of policies

N. of underwritten quotas

≤4 ≥ 5 < 10 ≥ 10 < 15 ≥ 15 Total

93 36 5 4 138

206 231 62 66 565

SOURCE: DATINI 1159, docs. 1–137. table 9.2 Distribution of co-insurers per contract and quotas underwritten in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

Co-insurers (number of)

N. Policies

N. Underwritten quotas

≤4 ≥ 5 < 10 ≥ 10 < 15 ≥ 15 < 20 ≥ 20 < 25 ≥ 25 < 30 ≥ 30 < 35 ≥ 35 < 40 ≥ 40 < 45 ≥ 45 Number of co-insurers unknown Total

286 275 132 68 44 29 12 10 10 6 9 881

792 1,819 1,546 1,138 966 776 383 382 421 284 9 8,516

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r.

By the 1520s in Florence, the technique of co-insurance was well tested and established, and it was applied so systematically that risk was spread very widely (see Table 9.2). The number of people that could supply insurance to a single cargo had increased notably, reaching as many as 51 underwriters in one instance, as in a registration dated January 1525, relating to a transport of textiles (“telerie”)

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from Aigues-Mortes to Valencia).4 The practice can be noted, in less exceptional cases too, if we consider that almost 13% of the contracts listed in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà report a higher number of co-insurers compared to the maximum of 19 reached by the Datini policies. However, as in the late 14th century, most insurance transactions involved a lower number of subjects, with over 560 cases of nine or less underwriters. Policies with three, four or five co-insurers were the most common. The value of the individual quotas, which added together covered the whole amount required by each policy, was not fixed in advance; instead, it could vary according to what risk each underwriter was willing to take. The 14th century sources reveal a clear preference for covering risks in multiples of 50 florins, so much so that in the contracts stipulated in Florence, just 35 quotas out of 560 escaped this rule.5 These rare exceptions were hardly ever due to a specific request on the part of the insurer; rather, they were caused by the need to cover the amount fixed by the contract exactly, or to particular circumstances that modified the initial (and customary) subdivision of the quotas.6 If we consider the 109 policies concluded between 1392–1400, for which we possess the least fragmentary documentary evidence, the most frequent amount was fl. 100 (234 subscriptions out of 463), followed by fl. 200 and fl. 50, which appeared, respectively, in 83 and 51 cases. The distribution of insurance operations, organised along value classes for the single quotas, obviously reflects this trend, showing the highest frequency for quotas worth fl. 100 to fl. 199 (see Table 9.3). This last class and that relating to shares equal or higher than fl. 200, in terms of insured values, cover almost the total supply (over fl. 59,500) of insurance bought by the Datini firms. The impression is that, although they could have risked smaller amounts, many underwriters preferred to cover higher sums, which determines an overall average of fl. 135.6 per quota. The picture for 1524–1526 is very different, with a numerically large sample of over 8,500 underwritten quotas listed in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà alone. And yet, the first element we note when observing the figures is the 4 SALVIATI 70, fol. 50v. The trend toward an exponential increase in the number of people involved in a single contract seems a characteristic feature of the 16th century, as suggested by the “record” of a policy stipulated in Dubrovnik in 1575, covered by 150 insurers; see Tenenti, Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio, op.cit., pp. 181–183. 5 Something similar can also be observed in the Pisan policies, with only 61 quotas out of 472 not corresponding to a multiple of fl. 50. 6 Cf. for example, DATINI 1159, doc. 62 of 3 February 1396, in which the four shares, originally worth fl. 100, were reduced by a third, because the value of the cargo turned out to be lower than what initially hypothesised.

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table 9.3 Class distribution per value underwritten in Florence (1392–1400), according to the policies in the Datini Archives

Amount of underwritten quotas in fl. (by value class)

N. of underwritten quotas

Underwritten values in fl.

≤ 49 ≥ 50 < 100 ≥ 100 < 200 ≥ 200 Total

9 57 272 125 463

283.2 2,961.7 28,975.0 30,560.0 62,779.9

SOURCE: DATINI 1159, docs. 15–133. table 9.4 Class distribution per value underwritten in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

Underwritten quotas in fl. (by value class)

N. of underwritten quotas

Underwritten values in fl.

≤ 49 ≥ 50 < 100 ≥ 100 < 200 ≥ 200 Total

242 4,438 3,590 246 8,516

5,934.83 225,266.67 371,485.00 58,700.00 661,395.50

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r.

persistent trend to portion insurance into shares equivalent to multiples and submultiples of fl. 50. This long-standing, informal rule was flouted less than 70 times. Fl. 50 (almost 4,300 quotas) and fl. 100 (over 3,300) were the two most common amounts, whereas higher multiples were definitely less frequent (less than 500 quotas in all). None of the 18 policies featuring exceptionally high quotas (over or equal to fl. 400) diverged from this practice, including the two largest (fl. 500) shares taken out by Bernardo Gondi and Vittorio Landi.7 As at the end of the 14th century, if we distribute insurance operations along value classes, the customary preference for quotas divisible by fl. 50 influenced their 7 Cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 23v, 92v.

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general distribution (see Table 9.4). Compared to the period covered by the Datini policies, supply appears to have shifted towards lower figures, as the fl. 50–fl. 99 class shows the highest frequency, and that from fl. 100 to fl. 199 represents the most significant portion in terms of insured values. This new structure of insurance supply is summarised by what seems a substantial contraction of the average amount per quota (fl. 77.7 in the three-year period). While discussing the demand side of the market, we already highlighted some difficulties in comparing late 14th-century data with that from the 1520s. As concerns the value of the subscribed quotas, problems deriving from the differences in the consistency of the two samples are not insurmountable, since policies from 1392–1400 can, to a certain extent, be considered representative of the Florentine market in general. There remains, however, the issue of the two different moneys of account, with an additional complication due to the habit of supplying insurance prevalently in multiples or submultiples of fl. 50. Because of the last factor, comparing how operations were distributed according to value classes is not of much use, although it enables us to establish a limited parallel in relation to the overall average per underwritten quota. We thus find out that the fl. 135.6 d’oro in oro of 1392–1400 must have corresponded (in purely nominal terms) to fl. 74.6 larghi d’oro in oro of 1524–1526, a figure very close to the fl. 77.7 we obtained from the records in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà. We need to point out that this conversion is only approximate, though helpful to illustrate a general idea; anyway, there is evidence of a substantial similarity between the two periods.8 How many individuals were actually ready to take the financial risks of maritime trade in Florence, and, above all, who were they? To assess this for the late 14th century, we can rely on the limited information available from those who provided insurance to the Datini firm agglomerate. According to the policies from 1392 to 1400, 115 different “underwriting subjects” appeared in the 110 contracts in favour of the Francesco di Marco Datini & partners, the partnership “ai veli” between Datini and Domenico di Cambio, as well as Zanobi Gaddi. Subscriptions were taken out individually, by two insurers who operated together, or by a business firm. This, however, could happen adopting different denominations, in which the same individuals could crop up again and again. Because of these overlaps, the total number of people involved (123) is only slightly higher than that of the “underwriting subjects” who signed the contracts, leading to a web of interrelations that is only partly possible to 8 The conversion is based on the equivalence, discussed in chapter 8 (notes 10 and 11), fl. 1 d’oro in oro (1392–1400) = fl. 0.55 larghi d’oro in oro (1524–1526).

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disentangle.9 As a matter of fact, some of these insurers provided coverage using different denominations but in accordance with strategies that made reference to a specific family household, or a definite firm agglomerate. As concerns the first category, it is necessary to exercise some caution and adopt more restrictive criteria, because in Florence, in the late 14th century, the extended family clan was already undergoing a crisis. Especially in matters of financial management, the smaller, almost mononuclear family unit was acquiring greater importance.10 However, by carefully examining the documentation, it is sometimes possible to overcome this restrictive definition. Let us consider a concrete example. The four members of the Canigiani family of long-standing mercantile tradition, who appear in the Datini policies, belonged to three different branches of their house, and yet they seemed to act according to a common strategy. There are extant policies stipulated individually by Luigi di Piero and by his two brothers, Antonio and Gherardo di Jacopo. This latter, however, was also in the habit of insuring quotas in partnership, both with Carlo di Ristoro and with Luigi di Piero. Finally, the two brothers Antonio and Gherardo, although they never set up an official partnership, almost always underwrote quotas of the same policy.11 Several “underwriting subjects”, though adopting different denominations, really orbited around the same partnership agglomerate, mostly a business firm that functioned as the core of the whole system: a “reference insurer”. This is well exemplified by policies related to the firm agglomerate guided by Giovanni di Jacopo Orlandini, or to the partnership firm created by Gentile 9 Cf. G. Ceccarelli, Tra solvibilità economica e status politico: il mercato delle assicurazioni marittime a Firenze (secc. XIV–XV ), in Politiche del credito, Investimento consumo solidarietà, Atti del Congresso Internazionale (Asti, 20–22 March 2003), ed. by B. Molina and G. Scarcia, Asti, Arti grafiche TSG, 2004, pp. 191–221. 10 See R.A. Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence: a Study of Four Families, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1968, pp. 221–275; an exemplary case is that of the Strozzi lineage: in mid-14th century it already counted 28 interrelated family branches; cf. ibid, p. 33. 11 Cf. DATINI 1159, docs. 30, 37, 58, 66, 71, 72, 74, 79, 84, 95, 97, 100, 102, 117, 130, 131, 132, 136, and also MEDICI, 84, doc. 4. For additional information about the Canigiani family see G.A. Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society: 1343–1378, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 23n, 30, 125. Other examples of groupings based on the criteria of family membership are: Rinuccini, Tornabuoni, Panciatichi, Guasconi, Morelli, Covoni, Ramaglianti and Rinieri. In other cases there are not enough elements for safe attribution to a single family nucleus of insurers who, at first, would seem to belong to the same lineage: Francesco di Jacopo Gori and Giovanni di Niccolò Gori, Nofri di Palla Strozzi and Lorenzo di Carlo Strozzi, Monte di Filippo Vinaccesi and Raffaello di Jacopo Vinaccesi, Nofri di Andrea del Palagio-Lippi and Guido di Tommaso del Palagio-Lippi.

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di Baldassarre Boni, his brother Niccolò di Baldassarre and Lorenzo di Ciore del Buono.12 Insurance coverage provided individually by Francesco Datini, his partners or his employees, can also be included in this framework.13 table 9.5 Quotas and their values, underwritten in Florence by the major insurers of the Datini firms (1392–1400), according to the policies in the Datini Archives

“Reference insurer”

Underwritten N. of underwritten N. of “underwriting values in florins quotas subjects”

Rinuccini, Cino di Messer Francesco Bischeri, Nofri di Giovanni and Guido di Jacopo Guidetti Datini, Francesco di Marco and partners Tornabuoni, Filippo di Messer Simone Orlandini, Giovanni di Jacopo and partners Canigiani, Luigi and Gherardo

12,605.0

48

3

5,795.0

29

3

2,415.0

16

4

2,305.0

14

3

1,975.0

10

2

1,950.0

21

4

12

The commercial system revolving around Giovanni di Jacopo Orlandini consisted of three firms active in Paris (with Antonio Cittadini), London (with Neri Vettori) and Bruges (with Piero Benizzi). See the List of names in Melis, I trasporti e le comunicazioni, op.cit., under “Orlandini”, Id., Aspetti della vita economica medievale, op.cit., pp. 278–279, and de Roover, Il banco Medici, op.cit., pp. 57 and 460. In the Datini policies reference is generally made to “Giovanni Orlandini and partners”, but closer analysis of the documentation has led us to conclude that the group as a whole played the role of insurer; among those physically stipulating policies we find, besides Giovanni, Antonio Cittadini (his partner in Paris) and Lorenzo di Piero Benizzi (the Bruges partner’s son); cf. DATINI ASS, 1159, docs. 61, 66, 71, 72, 81, 95, 100, 117, 123, 129. For Gentile di Baldassarre Boni’s firm, ibid., docs. 72, 88, 93, 97, 101, 108, 122, 130 and Melis, Note di storia della banca pisana, op.cit., p. 253. 13 Besides Francesco di Marco Datini, we find Bartolomeo Cambioni and Piero Zampini among policy underwriters, respectively partner and treasurer of the Compagnia del Banco di Firenze, as well as Stoldo di Lorenzo, partner in the Florence branch; cf. Origo, Il mercante di Prato, op.cit., pp. 120, 190–194 and Melis, Aspetti della vita economica medievale, op.cit., pp. 197–216 with DATINI 1159, docs. 62, 68, 70, 74, 75, 97, 98, 110, 111, 122, 123, 129.

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The Market and Its Operators: Supply table 9.5 Quotas and their values, underwritten in Florence (cont.)

“Reference insurer”

Davizzi, Gherardo di Giovanni Panciatichi, Gabriello di Messer Bartolomeo Antonio di Santi Guasconi Niccolò di Jacopo di Biagio Dati, Manetto Mucini, Arrigo di Ser Piero Petreboni, Bartolomeo and partners Giugni Domenico and Capponi, Niccolò di Bartolomeo Del Ricco Mei, Bartolomeo Vinaccesi, Raffaello di Jacopo Ardinghelli, Francesco and partners Strozzi, Nofri di Palla Covoni, Antonio di Paolo Total Other “underwriting subjects” Overall Total

Underwritten N. of underwritten N. of “underwriting values in florins quotas subjects” 1,845.0

13

1

1,770.0

16

2

1,440.0 1,420.0

10 9

1 2

1,350.0 1,200.0

11 13

1 1

1,100.0

12

2

1,050.0

10

3

990.0

12

1

950.0

5

1

950.0

5

2

900.0 850.0

4 9

1 2

42,860.0 19,919.9

267 196

39 75

62,779.9

463

114

SOURCE: DATINI 1159, docs. 15–133.

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At other times, the details of existing interactions between individuals are less evident, and we have the impression of short-lived, ad hoc relationships: for example, Francesco Ardinghelli’s partnership with Bartolomeo di Zanobi and Piero Bonciani, and the business that Domenico Giugni and Niccolò Capponi carried out together.14 According to the extant policies, the most significant share of demand generated by the Datini firms was met by a rather restricted number of insurance operators. Only 19 “underwriting subjects” managed to cover about 60% of the total insured value in the years 1392–1400.15 Because of overlapping denominations and family and business ties between them, another group made up of 20 “underwriting subjects” may be added, whose activity was closely connected to the first 19. On the whole, these 39 subjects were willing to risk almost fl. 43,000, subdivided into 267 quotas, equivalent to slightly less than 60% of the total number of subscriptions. About twice the number of “underwriting subjects” shared the remaining portion of demand coming from the Datini firm agglomerate, which provides evidence of a seemingly characteristic feature of the entire market: the strong concentration of supply (see Table 9.5). There were two predominant “insurance suppliers”, both for the number of quotas and for covered values: the Rinuccinis and the Bischeris. The former guaranteed over 20% of the total underwritten amounts and revolved around Cino di Francesco. He contracted 43 quotas individually in the course of the 9 years under consideration, and also managed to involve his brothers Jacopo and Simone in his activities.16 Various elements indicate that Cino Rinuccini 14 Ibid., docs. 34, 58, 78, 119, 133; at first Piero Bonciani appeared only as an underwriter on behalf of Francesco Ardinghelli and Bartolomeo di Zanobi, but, when the latter died (1399 ca.), Piero replaced him as insurer. As regards the activities carried out by Domenico Giugni and Niccolò Capponi, individually or in partnership, ibid., docs. 36, 45, 60, 61, 64, 65, 67, 112, 117, 125, 130. 15 Cf. DATINI 1159, docs. 15–133, i.e. the only policies relating to the period for which the Datini documentation on Florence seems to be more continuous. 16 On Rinuccio, known as Cino di Francesco Rinuccini, a man involved in many business ventures, member of the oldest Florentine nobility, and one of the ten richest men in Florence at the time, as well as a sophisticated humanist, see L. Martines, The Social World of the Florentine Humanists: 1390–1460, Princeton N.J., Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 110–112. More in general, about this important Florentine family, see Molho, Marriage Alliance, op.cit., pp. 237–274. That the five policies stipulated by Jacopo di Francesco (3) and Simone di Francesco (2) were part of Cino’s wider insurance activities is suggested by the fact that, for a long time, the Rinuccini brothers held the capital and properties they had inherited from their father undivided, and by the fact that the subscribed quotas were, mostly, related to policies in which Cino also appeared as an insurer; cf. L. Martines, Nuovi documenti su Cino Rinuccini e una nota sulle finanze della famiglia Rinuccini, in “Archivio Storico Italiano” 119, 1961, p. 81 and DATINI 1159, docs. 16, 22, 27, 32.

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may be considered one of the top insurers (if not the most important) in the Florentine market of the time. He did not limit his insurance interests to Florence, since we often find him in policies concluded in Pisa where, between 1387 and 1399, he took out quotas for fl. 2,600.17 In some ways, his profile corresponds to that of a subject specialised in this industry, operating similarly to other businessmen known to have been active in other insurance markets at the end of the Middle Ages.18 The second group of underwriters mentioned in the Datini policies was linked to Nofri di Giovanni di Bartolo Bischeri, and it included his son, Giovanni di Nofri, and his business partner, Guidetto di Jacopo Guidetti. In the period under investigation, these three individuals signed almost 30 contracts using different denominations, covering over 9% of the total insured.19 If we take a look at the remaining insurers, whose overall involvement could not measure up to either Cino Rinuccini’s or Nofri Bischeri’s, we obtain a rather diversified, socio-economic picture. First of all, we encounter several members of the Florentine patriciate, like Nofri di Palla Strozzi, Filippo di Simone Tornabuoni (and his brothers Francesco and Niccolò), Simone Tornaquinci

17 For policies stipulated by Cino Rinuccini see DATINI 1158, docs. 62, 68, 90, 121, 124, 132. The subscribed quotas were generally expensive, from a minimum of fl. 200 to maximum values of fl. 500, fl. 700 and fl. 800. Cino did not directly operate in the market, but always used an agent, most frequently Andrea di Banco. Cino Rinuccini also often appears in the few Florentine policies of the time that do not belong to the Datini archives, for example a policy dated 25 July 1392 in favour of Francesco de’ Bardi (a fl. 800 share on a total of fl. 1,000). In addition, note a court case at the Tribunale della Mercanzia in Florence, in which Cino di Francesco was sentenced to refund fl. 300 in insurance compensation; cf. Piattoli, Ricerche intorno all’assicurazione nel medioevo V, op.cit., pp. 163–164; Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 174–175. Lauro Martines has reported the case of a 1409 petition in which Cino asked for a reduction in taxes because “etiam habet multa debita cum singularibus personis, et quod horum causa est quod in tribus navibus hactenus in mari perditis perdidit ultra florenos decem milia” (“he had many debts with individual people caused by the loss at sea of three ships, for over fl. 10,000”). Very likely these were not ships he owned, as Martines suggests, but the complaint probably referred to some loss related to high insurance quotas Rinuccini had subscribed. Cf. Martines, Nuovi documenti su Cino Rinuccini, op.cit., pp. 77–90. 18 See, for example, the case of Andreu Crexelles, who dominated the supply side of the insurance market in Barcelona during the second half of the 15th century; cf. Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani, op.cit., pp. 479–483. 19 For information on Nofri Bischeri’s business interests, see Hoshino, L’Arte della lana in Firenze, op.cit., pp. 182–183. It is interesting to observe the evolution of the Bischeri family’s insurance activities: at first, only Nofri di Giovanni appeared in the documents (1390– 1391), then he was joined by Guido di Jacopo (1391–1396); finally, when Nofri’s political involvement became particularly intense (1396–1399), his son Giovanni succeeded him.

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and Francesco Ardinghelli.20 Some underwriters were also active in the banking industry: the brothers Gabriello and Giovanni di Bartolomeo Panciatichi, Bartolomeo Petriboni, Piero Bonciani, Bartolomeo del Ricco Mei (or Riccomei) and Guidetto di Jacopo Guidetti.21 Another relevant class consisted of merchants involved in long distance commerce. Among them, some belonged to long-standing merchant families (Davizzi, Guasconi, Canigiani, Covoni and Capponi), but others were just beginning to taste success at a local and international level, such as Giovanni Orlandini.22 Finally, we find businessmen 20

For the Strozzi lineage in general, see P.J. Jones, Florentine Families and Florentine Diaries in the Fourteenth Century, in “Papers of the British School at Rome”, 25, 1956, pp. 187–191, and Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, op.cit., pp. 20–26; for Nofri di Palla’s family branch see, instead, Martines, The Social World, op.cit., pp. 80, 316–318, while an in-depth analysis of the network of relations headed by Filippo Strozzi is found in Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 31–73. On the Tornabuonis, with particular reference to Francesco di Simone, see Martines, The Social World, op.cit., pp. 65, 168, 203. For Simone di Tieri Tornaquinci and, more in general, on this illustrious family, see Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, op.cit., pp. 22–23; Martines, The Social World, op.cit., pp. 338–339. On Francesco di Neri Ardinghelli see J.M. Najemy, Corporatism and Consensus in Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280–1400, Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1982, p. 260. 21 On the Panciatichi family, with particular attention to Bartolomeo di Bandino and his sons Gabriello and Giovanni, see Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, op.cit., pp. 21; Martines, The Social World, op.cit., pp. 63–65, and Melis, Di alcune girate cambiarie dell’inizio del Cinquecento rinvenute a Firenze (1953), in Id., La banca pisana, op.cit., p. 10; about Giovanni Panciatichi’s financial ventures, see R.C. Mueller, The Venetian Money Market: Banks, Panic, and the Public Debt, 1200–1500, Baltimore-London, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, pp. 274, 335. On the Petribonis, a family operating in the banking sector since the mid-14th century, see Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, op.cit., pp. 24n, 126; details of Bartolomeo Petriboni’s activities can be inferred from the Datini accounts; see, for example, DATINI 558, docs. 236v–237r: the same source can yield information about Bartolomeo Riccomei’s business (ibid., docs. 78v–79r). 22 On the Davizzi family’s activities see F. Melis, Industria, commercio e credito, op.cit., p. 140; Id., Aspetti della vita economica medievale, op.cit., pp. 219–220 and Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, op.cit., p. 102. On the Guasconis, cf. Melis, Industria, commercio e credito, op.cit., p. 137; Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, op.cit., pp. 26, 34, 340 (with particular reference to Biagio Guasconi). In general, on the Covoni family, see A. Sapori, Una compagnia della prima metà del Trecento specializzata nelle operazioni di cambio a distanza: i Covoni di Firenze, in Id., Studi di storia economica, vol. III, Florence, Sansoni, 1967, pp. 83–100 and M. Mandich, Per una ricostruzione delle operazioni mercantili e bancarie della compagnia Covoni, in A. Sapori, Libro giallo della compagnia dei Covoni, Milan, Cisalpino, 1970, pp. CI–CCXXIII. Paolo Covoni, father of the insurers Antonio and Jacopo, was one of the most important international merchants in Florence, see Hoshino, L’Arte della lana in Firenze, op.cit., p. 209. For the Capponi commercial conglomerate, see Melis, Werner Sombart e i problemi della navigazione, op.cit., p. 18. On Giovanni Orlandini see Melis, Industria, commercio e credito, op.cit., pp. 151–152; on Gentile di Baldassarre Boni’s

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active in the textile sector: we know, for example, that the Bischeris had a firm based at St. Martin’s convent, which specialised in the production of wool cloth, whilst Arrigo di Ser Piero Mucini was also a wool merchant.23 Therefore, Francesco di Marco Datini could choose among several professionals belonging to different fields, when he wished to protect his goods against the risks of maritime trade. He could rely on a variegated body of insurance operators that included merchants, money-lenders, aristocrats and entrepreneurs from the manufacturing sector. If we compare this picture with that suggested by the Pisan policies, we have the impression that the two markets presented some common traits, but also considerable differences. In Pisa too, although over 180 “underwriting subjects” are mentioned for the period 1383–1401, a small number of operators (only 23) underwrote about half of all contracts; and they were often linked by family relationships or stable business ties. These men were the main representatives of Pisa’s merchant-banking families (Grassolino, Maggiolini, Del Voglia and Sancasciano).24 They were flanked, however, by a smaller group of Florentine insurers such as Niccolò di Pagnozzo Cardinali, Michele di Carlo Strozzi and Cino Rinuccini.25 Here, the two markets sharply diverged. activities, see de Roover, Il banco Medici, op.cit., pp. 57–60. Other international merchants appearing among the top thirty underwriters of Datini policies were Antonio di Santi, Antonio di Francesco Allegri, Inghilese d’Inghilese and Antonio di Lapacino Rimbertini, cf. Melis, Aspetti della vita economica medievale, op.cit., p. 223. 23 On the Bischeri family firm,—actively managed by Nofri di Giovanni, but also by his son Giovanni and his grandson Bartolo—which entertained business relations both with Datini and with another insurer, the merchant Pazzino di Luca Lucalberti, see Hoshino, L’Arte della lana in Firenze, op.cit., pp. 182–183, 222, 228. For information on the activities of Arrigo di Ser Piero Mucini, Chimenti di Stefano and Filippo di Simone, see, for example, DATINI 558, respectively, docs. 315v–316r; 52v–53r and 178v–179r; 39v–40r, 111v–112r, 239v–240r and 319v–320v. 24 Cf. Melis, Note di storia della banca pisana, op.cit., pp. 223–254 and M. Tangheroni, Politica, commercio e agricoltura a Pisa nel Trecento, Pisa, Pacini, 1977, pp. 75–151. 25 On Niccolò di Pagnozzo Cardinali, member of the powerful Tornaquinci family, banker and important associate of the Arte del Cambio (Exchange Guild), cf. Brucker, Florentine Politics and Society, op.cit., pp. 22–23, 156. In 1369, with his brother Gregorio, Niccolò changed his surname and managed to acquire the status of popolano (“commoner”). Michele di Carlo Strozzi, unlike many of his fellow Florentines, seems to have operated locally and not through an attorney or agent; his father, who headed the oligarchic faction, had been exiled to Pisa after the Ciompi uprising; ibid., pp. 382–383. Many other Florentines appear as subscribers of the Datini policies: Ardingo and Cristofano de’ Ricci, Filippo di Simone Tornabuoni, Francesco Ardinghelli and Piero Bonciani, Inghilese d’Inghilese, Nofri di Palla Strozzi, Niccolò Guasconi, Raffaele Vinaccesi, Bartolomeo and Matteo Petreboni, Averardo and Malatesta Medici, Antonio di Paolo Covoni, Nofri Bischeri, Manetto Dati, Ambrogio di Meo Boni, Arrigo di Ser Piero Mucini.

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Unlike the 14th-century documentation, sources from the 16th century provide us with an opportunity to build a wider picture of the supply side of the insurance market. From this point of view, the fact that the data contained in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà are incomplete, is less of a hindrance to our understanding, compared to the problems affecting our investigation of demand. Logically, it was up to the insurance buyer to choose one or the other of the two sworn brokers, whilst underwriters were probably not that bothered which intermediary they had to deal with. Giovanbattista Bracci’s, Averardo Salviati’s and Domenico Naldini’s records, which we were able to reconstruct using their “insurance accounts”, seem to confirm this hypothesis. In short, underwriters worked indifferently with the two brokers active in the Florentine market.26 This is also indirectly demonstrated by the presence of many of Ricoveri’s insurance buyers among those subscribing quotas in policies drawn up by Raggi: for example, Carlo Ginori, Leonardo della Torre, Luis Malvenda, Domenico Giugni, Pedro de Villena and many others.27 Any time our documents allow us to reach a reasonable conclusion on the matter, we can say that no intermediary was preferred over the other by those who provided insurance.28 According to the contracts registered in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, during 1524–1526, there were 320 “underwriting subjects” supplying insurance cover. Behind each of them, as at the end of the 14th century, could hide an articulated array of different entities: individuals, associations between two or more people (sometimes closely related), and business partnerships, both in the traditional form or the new limited (in accomandita) one. We will look at these connections in more detail later, as they involved over 300 individuals who were free to operate in the market using one or more denominations. For the time being, we will focus on the “underwriting subjects” themselves. Establishing how many insurers operated in the city is a complicated task, as there was a rather high degree of overlapping between Raggi’s and Ricoveri’s customers. It was rare that a person whose name frequently appeared on 26

27 28

For example, we have proof of Domenico Naldini’s insurance operations in five policies drafted by Ricoveri, between July and September 1523; cf. SALVIATI 742, docs. 155 and 182. As for Averardo Salviati, between January and March 1521, he underwrote 8 policies prepared by Bartolomeo Ricoveri; cf. SALVIATI 735, fols. 129r, 129v, 130v, 131v, 132v. See the names in Table 8.4. On the whole, out of 31 denominations that used Ricoveri to buy insurance between 1521 and 1527, 19 also appeared as underwriters in the three years 1524–1526. On this matter, see the accounts opened at the Salviati bank by the Carlo Ginori and co., Luis Malvenda and Leonardo della Torre (all of them Ricoveri’s regular customers), from which we can obtain information on refunds given to underwriters of policies in their favour. The recurring names are almost always the same also mentioned in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà; cf., for example, SALVIATI 742, fol. 111 and SALVIATI 749, fols. 51, 94.

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contracts drawn up by the former, was never found in those intermediated by the latter. As for insurers rarely mentioned in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà the situation is somehow different: it is likely that some of them had never dealt with Ricoveri and vice versa.29 Everything points to an insurance supply which, in the three years between1 524–1526, must have rested on 400 (500 at most) “underwriting subjects”. For a city that counted about 70,000 inhabitants at the time, the presence of just a few hundred insurers reflects the somewhat circumscribed nature of the insurance business.30 However, the number of “underwriting subjects” is only partially indicative, because, in order to delineate the structure of insurance supply, it is necessary to understand its internal articulation. Was it sustained by a mass of actors only occasionally engaged in it, or by a few operators who regularly provided insurance, or else, by a greater number of subjects that preferred to dilute their activities over time? As has been justly underlined in relation to the Amsterdam insurance market in the 17th and 18th centuries, the most important variables to consider are “scale” and “continuity”, as these factors can best characterise the profile of the people working on the supply side. By “scale”, we refer to each insurer’s overall commitment (which can be measured on the basis of the number of quotas or the amounts insured), and “continuity” refers to the time span of their insurance activities.31 Let us now discuss the first variable, by exploring how the 320 “underwriting subjects” found in Raggi’s registrations are distributed according to the amounts they insured between March 1524 and July 1526 (see Table 9.6). The first element to emerge is a clear majority of “underwriting subjects” (199 out of 320) who risked sums below fl. 1,000 during the 29 months under consideration. The average amount insured by each of these subjects, about fl. 240, reveals that most of them were only willing to risk relatively modest sums: 164 did not even reach fl. 500 during the three-year period. Therefore, this class represented a marginal share of supply, just over 7% of the total. We could call them “small insurers”, whose weight was irrelevant at an individual level and modest as a group. The situation for the three other classes to which the remaining 121 “underwriting subjects” have been distributed is rather different. If we consider 29

Just to have some idea of how many people could be involved in this mechanism, note that in Raggi’s register there are about 150 underwriters mentioned in less than 5 contracts: 81 appear only once, 28 twice, 22 three times, 15 four times. 30 For an estimate of the population of Florence during the 1520s, see Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., p. 357. 31 Spooner, Risk at Sea, op.cit., pp. 19–21, 29–23.

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the values covered by these three groups, distribution seems quite regular, proving that all of them played a significant role in meeting the insurance demand. There are differences, however, in the number of individuals composing the three classes. The largest group (77 out of 320) was formed by subjects who, in the period under consideration, provided coverage for a total between fl. 1,000 and fl. 5,000; clearly, considering only Raggi’s customers. The average sum underwritten by those included in this group (over fl. 2,750) is far from negligible, so we may well be confronted with “medium-size” insurers. The other two classes consist of 30 and 14 “underwriting subjects”, respectively. Although, put together, they provided over 60% of the total insurance during the three years. These figures yield an important element in our quest to understand the structure of supply in 1520s Florence—that it was largely concentrated in the hands of less than 14% of subjects. These 44 can undoubtedly be referred to as “major” insurers, all capable of taking risks in the short and long term for considerable sums, even though there obviously existed some differences within the group. A very restricted circle stood out clearly from the rest, and alone managed to meet almost 30% of the demand handled by Raggi, further confirming the fact that the market could rely on a solid basis of “great insurers”. The turnover generated by this class can be roughly estimated by looking at Giovanbattista Bracci’s account, one of the businessmen rightfully belonging to the group. In the 12 months from August 1523 to July 1524, he subscribed 140 quotas (relating to policies drawn up by both Raggi and Ricoveri), worth fl. 10,360, whilst cashing in premiums for fl. 720. If we just take into account the records included in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, we realise that a single insurer of Bracci’s stature could equal the whole group of 66 “small insurers”. This simple comparison explains the importance of size in moulding the structure of the supply side of the market: though generally spread over a few hundred operators, was in fact polarised around a minority of 40–50 subjects able to take risks for large amounts of money. Let us turn to analyse the second helpful variable, in order to understand the other characteristic, that is, continuity. Whom could the merchants turn to and trust, when they approached the Florentine insurance market between 1524 and 1526, in order to protect their goods from the risks of navigation? Did they always deal with the same underwriters, or was there a reasonable turnover in insurance supply, perhaps heightened by the political and military instability of those years? Some general indications can be obtained by decomposing Raggi’s records on a monthly basis, and by observing how many “underwriting subjects” operated during very short intervals. The resulting group is obviously more restricted than that measurable for the whole three-year period;

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table 9.6 Class distribution of amounts underwritten by “underwriting subjects” in the Florentine market (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

Value class insured by single “underwriting subject” in fl.

Underwritten N. of “underwriting values in fl. subject”

N. of underwritten quotas

Average amount underwritten in fl.

≥ 500 < 1,000 ≥ 1,000 < 5,000 ≥ 5,000 < 10,000 ≥ 10,000 Total “Underwriting Subject” Not Indicated or Unidentifiable Total

199 77 30 14 320 –

47,796.7 212,159.1 208,399.7 191,290.0 659,645.5 1,750.0

715 2,842 2,769 2,166 8,492 24

240.2 2,755.3 6,946.7 13,663.6 2,061.4

320

661,395.50

8,516

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r.

however, the reduction is greater than could be expected. The number of these subjects peaked in August 1525 (132), but the average was 95 (the lowest was 58, in August 1524). We witness, therefore, a rapid turnover among underwriters in the short term. If, however, we expand our horizon to encompass the whole three-year period, we have the impression that this result might reflect a more general trend. If we look at the time span of the single “underwriting subjects” and their insurance operations, we note that the majority was only active for very short periods, revealing the existence of a significant share of “occasional” insurers (see Table 9.7). The infrequent nature of their engagement on the market is confirmed by the fact that over 60% of them did not underwrite more than two quotas in the almost 900 policies drawn up by Raggi. It is hard to believe that such sporadic presence in one broker’s business was countered by regular involvement in the other’s negotiations. The fact that nearly 180 “underwriting subjects” were mentioned in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà for just five months, and then disappeared in the next two years, shows that turnover among insurers must have been a constant feature of the Florentine market. As a matter of fact, this continuous change finds confirmation in the small number of “underwriting subjects” that were able to survive over time: less than 70 appear to have operated for longer than 17 months, just 34 of them for at least two years, and only 7 during the 29 months considered. It was, however,

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this very class of insurers (whom, for brevity’s sake, we can call “regulars”), that covered the largest share of insurance supply. This discloses another piece of the puzzle in our exploration of the sometimes fuzzy structure of the market. According to Raggi’s registrations, over 70% of demand was met by subjects that operated for rather prolonged periods of time. The remaining 354 “underwriting subjects” covered less than 30%, both of subscribed quotas and insured values. These, however, were not distributed evenly, but in a way closely related to the “continuity” variable. The almost 180 “occasional” insurers intercepted an irrelevant share of business, less than 6% of the total, whilst those operating for slightly longer periods covered 20% of the total supply (around fl. 140,000 in value). This last group consisted of less than 80 subjects that operated for periods varying from 6 to 17 months, and can be described as “intermittent insurers”. This latter class is the most difficult to put in context; its involvement was quite significant (85% are recorded as having stipulated 10 quotas or more), and “intermittent insurers” must have undoubtedly underwritten policies drawn up by Ricoveri as well. Despite these difficulties, the relationship between the temporal extension of the insurance operations of any “underwriting subject” and its capacity to meet demand is fully evident. The longer the former, the greater the latter, which again corroborates the idea that the most considerable share of the table 9.7 Insurers’ duration of operations in the Florentine market (1524–1526) according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

Duration of operations of single “underwriting subject”

N. of “underwriting subject”

Underwritten values in fl.

N. of underwritten quotas

≤ 5 months ≥ 6 < 12 months ≥ 12 < 18 months ≥ 18 < 24 months ≥ 24 months Total “Underwriting Subject” Not Indicated or Unidentifiable Overall Total

178 45 31 32 34 320 –

37,696.7 57,885.0 82,918.3 177,625.5 303,520.0 659,645.50 1,750.0

484 739 1,091 2,105 4,073 8,492 24.0

320

661,395.50

8,516

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, docs 3r–144r.

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market must have been in the hands of a rather restricted group, made up of 60–70 individuals and firms. These “core” insurers were joined by a significant number of “occasional” operators characterised by high turnover, whose weight in the total supply was eventually modest. If we attempt to cross data relating to “size” and “continuity”, we discover a high degree of overlapping between the two variables. This predictable, but not necessarily obvious result, allows us to have some detail about ranking. Numerically-speaking, the most sizeable group consisted of “small”, “occasional” insurers (174 “underwriting subjects” out of 302).32 On the opposite side, we find about 40 subjects, 14 “great” and 29 “major” insurers, which operated “regularly” during the three years.33 Between the two extremes, we can place “medium-size” insurers, who mostly operated only occasionally (50 “underwriting subjects”), and rarely for longer periods of time (24 “underwriting subjects”).34 In terms of covered values, supply was mainly concentrated in the latter class: a little more than 30% was provided by 74 “medium-size” insurers that intervened either “occasionally” or “regularly”, whilst almost 60% was granted by 43 “major” insurers that all operated over time with regularity. Let us try and give a name and a face to the individuals belonging to this smaller circle. We begin with the 35 “underwriting subjects” which, according to the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, had underwritten the largest share of the policies during the 29 months under consideration (see Table 9.8). Before tracing the individual profiles of some of these businessmen, it is necessary to dwell on some general aspects. The data relating to the temporal extension of their activities shows that these 35 “underwriting subjects” belonged to the classes of “major” and “great” insurers, as for “scale”. They also were “regular” insurers as fort the “continuity” variable: all were active in the insurance business for at least 18 months. Some names and surnames recur more than once, highlighting some overlapping between the various denominations adopted by policy subscribers at the highest level, too. One such example is Averardo Salviati, who appears both acting as individual, and as the person in charge of the partnership firm his name. Another one is provided Giovanbattista and Zanobi Bracci, father and son, who normally acted together by participating in the same contract. 32 Twenty-five “underwriting subjects” escape this description: though generally involved for amounts lower than fl. 500, they belonged to the class of “occasional” insurers. 33 A single major insurer, Paolo Dazzi, appears to have operated in the insurance sector for less than one year and a half, the period we have used as a threshold to divide “regular” from “occasional” insurers. 34 Among “medium size” insurers, we have found another four “underwriting subjects” corresponding to the “occasional” insurer’s profile.

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Some of these “underwriting subjects” are already known to us. They coincide with business firms that appeared as the most relevant insurance buyers among Raggio Raggi’s customers (Gherardo Bartolini and Bartolomeo Lanfredini & partners, the Marco del Nero & partners, the Niccolò Capponi & partners, etc.) or Bartolomeo Ricoveri’s ones (the Jacopo Balducci & partners and the Giovanni Gaddi & partners). This is the first clue pointing to the interchangeability between supply and demand, an issue we will later explore in more detail.35 Most of these “underwriting subjects” were from Florence, with the exception of Père Labia and Bartomeu Paretes, another topic that will be addressed in the following pages. It is not the aims of this study to outline a portrait of each of these “top insurers”, even though we will dwell on some specific examples. Anyway, their social and professional profiles were very similar, firmly rooted in long-distance trade, in international finance and banking, as well as in luxury manufacturing, all industries on which Florence had for centuries based its fortunes. A significant part of “underwriting subjects” directly coincided with a partnership firm: 11 out of 33. Another 12 corresponded to persons, who were the principal investor of a business partnership, but operated in the insurance as individuals.36 The size, level of specialisation and organisation of these firms obviously varied. It included large ones that were active in several markets (the Niccolò Capponi & partners is a good example), medium-sized partnerships that functioned only in one specific area (like the Zanobi Saliti & partners, which operated in Germany), large and diversified agglomerates (like the Gondis’ one), as well as specialised firms like the Giovanfrancesco Franceschi & partners that was active in the silk industry.37 The remaining “top insurers” were certainly not outsiders in the business world; some were closely related to a firm’s principal investor (Gherardo di Francesco Taddei and Zanobi Bracci) or to their agents (Agnolo del Rosso and Giovanni di Antonio Gerini). Some others were employees of business partnerships (Giovanbattista Cei and Tanai 35 The subject is discussed in more depth in chapter 12. 36 Their names were: Alessandro Antinori, Giovanbattista Bracci, Matteo Borgianni, Matteo di Simone Botti, Francesco Corbinelli, Lorenzo di Piero Dazzi, Giovanfrancesco Franceschi, Simone Guadagni, Francesco Martellini, Zanobi di Bartolo Saliti, Averardo di Alamanno Salviati e Neri Venturi. These men were identified by using the Salviati bank’s documentation; cf. SALVIATI 742. 37 For Niccolò Capponi and Bernardo Gondi, see Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 213–220 and 170–175; on Zanobi Saliti, see Dini, Saggi su una economia-mondo, op.cit., p. 275. For the activity of the silk works run by Giovanfrancesco Franceschi’s firm, cf. SALVIATI 742, fol. 10; it seems that Agostino Dini too owned a business in this sector, cf. SALVIATI 742, fol. 24.

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table 9.8 Average number of quotas and their values underwritten by the most important insurers in Florence (1524–1526) according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

Insuring “underwriting subject”

Salviati, Averardo di Alamanno and partners Bartolini, Gherardo and Lanfredini Bartolomeo and partners Del Rosso, Agnolo di Pierozzo Salviati, Averardo, on his own Bracci, Giovanbattista di Marco Del Nero, Marco di Simone and partners Taddei, Gherardo di Francesco Venturi, Neri Gaddi, Giovanni and partners Capponi, Niccolò di Piero and partners Bracci, Zanobi di Giovanbattista Dini, Agostino di Francesco and partners Balducci, Jacopo and partners Da Gavina, Gerolamo Dazzi, Lorenzo di Piero Guadagni, Simone Albizzi (degli), Filippo Borgianni, Matteo Corsini, Gherardo and partners Franceschi, Giovanfrancesco Nerli (dei), Tanai Gondi, Bernardo and Antonio and partners Gerini, Giovanni di Antonio Da Gagliano, Giuliano Martellini, Francesco Antinori, Alessandro Canigiani, Zanobi Mannelli, Leonardo and partners

Values underwritten in fl.

Average value per quota in fl.

Period of activity (out of 29 months 1524–1526)

21,875.0

95.1

29

17,600.0

134.4

23

16,618.0 15,575.0 15,325.0 14,622.0 12,843.3 11,755.0 11,075.0 11,035.0 10,966.7 10,875.0

79.5 79.5 70.9 228.5 83.9 85.8 103.5 121.3 58.3 76.0

28 29 29 28 29 28 28 26 29 29

10,875.0 10,250.0 9,555.0 9,375.0 9,322.0 9,200.0 9,135.0 8,815.0 8,400.0 7,875.0

79.4 62.5 75.8 64.7 66.6 79.3 57.8 60.8 77.8 97.2

28 27 27 28 28 27 29 27 28 28

7,633.3 7,558.3 7,451.0 7,300.0 7,225.0 7,055.0

83.0 82.2 48.7 96.1 77.7 92.8

28 28 18 21 27 28

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table 9.8 Average number of quotas and their values underwritten (cont.)

Average value per quota in fl.

Insuring “underwriting subject”

Values underwritten in fl.

Saliti, Zanobi di Bartolo Labia, Pere Botti, Matteo di Simone Ugolini, Vincenzo and partners Paretes, Bartomeu Corbinelli, Francesco Cei, Giovanbattista Total of 35 most important “­underwriting subjects” Other 285 “underwriting subjects” “underwriting subject” not indicated or unidentifiable Overall Total

7,033.3 6,675.0 6,291.7 6,250.0 6,125.0 5,995.0 5,875.0 351,434.6

91.3 79.5 70.7 64.4 69.6 73.1 58.2 80.1

308,210.9 1,750.0

75.1 –

661,395.50

77.7

Period of activity (out of 29 months 1524–1526) 28 26 27 27 26 28 28

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r.

Nerli), and some belonged to well-known families involved in trade, such as Filippo degli Albizi, Zanobi Canigiani and Giuliano da Gagliano.38 We can investigate some of these “top insurers” in more detail, and understand how they articulated their insurance operations, starting with two subjects that we could define as “multi-specialised”, since their involvement in the market, albeit large, represented a mere fraction of their wide-ranging business in many other fields. The profile of Niccolò di Piero di Gino Capponi (1473–1529), who mainly operated through the partnership firm he was principal of and rarely underwrote individually (for almost fl. 2,000), fits perfectly into this mould. Trained in Lyons, in the family banking business headed by his uncle Neri di Gino, Niccolò ran a multi-branched firm agglomerate—in which his younger brother 38

The information comes from SALVIATI 742, fol. 178; SALVIATI 481, fols. 88r–89r and docs. 274v–275r; S. Tognetti, Da Figline a Firenze: ascesa economica e politica della famiglia Serristori (secoli XIV–XVI), Florence, Opus Libri, 2003, pp. 136, 159; Dini, Saggi su una economia-mondo, op.cit., pp. 262–268; M.E. Mallett, under Canigiani, Simone, in DBI, vol. XVIII, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1975, pp. 95–96; Hurtubise, Une famille-témoin: les Salviati, op.cit., pp. 146n and 231.

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and partner Giuliano operated too—engaged in international trade, banking and manufacturing. The insurance industry was only one of the many ones of his businesses, in which he operated both on the supply (for about fl. 11,000) and demand side of the market (obtaining cover for over fl. 45,000), as we saw in the previous chapter.39 Similar, though more diversified features characterised the brothers Bernardo (1482–1539) and Antonio Gondi (1486–1560), who operated in the insurance market as representatives of their Lyon-based partnership firm. Bernardo also underwrote some policies individually (for over fl. 2,500), and together with Francesco Inghirami, his partner in a firm specialized in wool cloth production (for fl. 750). He belonged to a complex business agglomerate which, as we have already mentioned, bought substantial insurance coverage in favour of the business partnerships in Lyon and Florence, as well as the wool firm, though to a lesser extent. This diversification reflected the general organisation of one of the major business agglomerates of the time, inspired by the eldest brother Alessandro (who had died in 1521). The operations were based on two focal points, in France (where Antonio lived) and Tuscany (where Bernardo resided), and had extended branches in the Italian peninsula and the rest of Europe.40 The substantial turnover and considerable personal wealth of people like Niccolò Capponi and Bernardo Gondi allowed them to maintain a higher risk profile as compared to most other insurers, with average financial exposure per underwritten quota as high as fl. 120. Agnolo di Pierozzo del Rosso seems to belong to another class of insurer; he occupied the third position in the ideal “ranking” of subjects covering insurance intermediated by Raggi, both for number of subscriptions and for the values he underwrote. However, Agnolo di Pierozzo never appeared in the role of insurance buyer (either in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà or in the Salviati Bank’s records), nor was he the owner of a firm involved in long-distance trade, giving the impression of being somewhat different from the other “great insurers”. In fact, this small entrepreneur in the silk sector must have possessed remarkable experience in trade, due to his business links with the Serristori family and his 39

40

Cf. Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 209 and 213–227; Dini, Saggi su una economia-mondo, op.cit., p. 81. Piero Capponi was also involved in the firm; the son of Niccolò, he had been active since 1525, especially as a buyer of insurance, in partnership with Gérard Grillet. After his father’s death, he continued to operate in the insurance sector through the Lapi di Siviglia limited partnership, of which Piero and his uncle Giuliano were silent partners; see Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 56–57. Cf. Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 167–180; S. Tabacchi, Gondi, under Guidobaldo, detto Antonio iunior, in DBI, vol. LVII, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2001, pp. 659–662; F. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 69–70.

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brother Bartolomeo di Pierozzo, who was a well-known member of the circle of international merchants. Moreover, he opened an account at the Salviati bank, which provides evidence to his ready-cash availability and to his connections with the major merchant bankers of Florence.41 It is interesting to note that the Del Rosso family’s involvement in the insurance sector dates back to the late 14th century, when Jacopo di Rosso (Agnolo’s great-grandfather) underwrote several policies in favour of the Datini firms. When it came to insurance, Agnolo’s passion for wagering (we already mentioned of) did not push him to take excessive risks, since his average exposure (fl. 79.5) was in line with the general trend.42 The case of Giovanni di Taddeo Gaddi is even more peculiar. He was born into a family that had practised commerce and banking for a long time—his great-grandfather was Zanobi Gaddi, agent of the Datini firms. Since early 16th century, the Gaddis have been gradually shifting their business interests to Rome and the Papal Court. Giovanni himself was a clergyman who, during the period under consideration, had an important administrative and financial role at the Camera Apostolica (the Pope’s Treasury). This did not prevent him from devoting some of his time to insurance in his native city, where he operated through a partnership firm bearing his name, but probably run by his brothers Luigi (who was at the head of banking firm in Rome) and Sinibaldo (who lived in Florence). An account at the Salviati bank, in the name of “Taddeo Gaddi’s Heirs & partners” (“Redi di Taddeo Gaddi e compagni”), shows that the family continued to manage a part of their business activities together. The Giovanni Gaddi & partners is among the ten “underwriting subjects” mentioned most frequently in Raggi’s ledger, with over 100 subscriptions worth just over fl. 11,000; the average exposure per single quota (fl. 103.5) is one of the highest, proof of a rather marked propensity for risk-taking.43 After this overview on some Florentine insurers, we can briefly outline the role played by foreigners, making an interesting comparison between the 41 42 43

Born in 1469, Agnolo del Rosso was no longer a young man in 1524–1526. Cf. Tognetti, Da Figline a Firenze, op.cit., pp. 136, 159 (about Agnolo), and pp. 160, 162 (about his brother). See also SALVIATI 742, fol. 158 and DATINI 1159, docs. 5, 7, 8 and 9. For Jacopo di Rosso’s activities as an insurer, see DATINI 1159, docs. 5, 7, 8 and 9. Moreover, Rosso’s family could boast of close business ties with Francesco di Marco, cf. Melis, Aspetti della vita economica medievale, op.cit., pp. 495–496. For Giovanni Gaddi’s and his brothers’ biographical details, see V. Arrighi, under Gaddi, Giovanni, in DBI, vol. LI, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1998, pp. 156–158; information on the Gaddi bank in Rome can be found in Bullard, Filippo Strozzi and the Medici, op.cit., p. 125. On the family’s activities in the 15th century, see Mueller, R.C., The Venetian Money Market, op.cit., p. 463. For the bank account in the name of Taddeo Gaddi’s heirs, cf. SALVIATI 742, fol. 37.

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late 14th-century situation and the 1520s, as the documentation reveals some profound differences. The information coming from the Datini policies suggested that foreign insurers were very rare in Florence. The six underwriters that appear in some of the contracts between 1392 and 1401, whose nationality has not been possible to ascertain beyond doubt, represent a very modest fraction of the total: just 10 subscriptions worth fl. 1,100. Very likely, the only non-Florentine insurer meeting demand from the Datini firms—if we exclude Francesco di Marco himself—was his partner Bartolomeo Cambioni, a moneychanger, who is also mentioned in only three contracts.44 Insurance supply in Florence must have then been largely dominated by local entrepreneurs.45 In comparison, the Pisan market seems more “cosmopolitan”, with a significant presence of businessmen from the Kingdom of Aragon (like Antoni Granell or Pere Carbonell from Majorca) and Genoa (Percivalle Grisolfi or Ludovico Spinola), as well as of many underwriters from Florence. According to the Datini contracts, almost 30% of the total was covered by these foreigners.46 In the 1520s, the picture had definitely changed. The market, as we observed when analysing the demand side of it, was open to many players from outside the city by this time. In the 29 months under consideration, 32 foreigners appear in Raggi’s record, for a total of 35 “underwriting subjects”. Another six insurers of uncertain origins must also be considered (see Table 9.9).47 If the identification of many of these people is made possible by an indication of their provenance found directly in the contracts (“Spanish”, “from Dubrovnik”, etc.), for the remaining few, a lot of patient research has been necessary to 44

Their names were: Geri di Giovanni Bellincioni, Manno di Manno and partners, Nutino di Jacopo, Piero di Giorgio di Piero, Sandro di Bono and Giovanni di Lippo Tebaldini. For a more detailed discussion of this question, may I refer readers to G. Ceccarelli, Cittadini e forestieri nel mercato assicurativo di Firenze (secc. XIV–XVI), in Identità cittadina e comportamenti socio-economici tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna, ed. by P. Prodi, M.G. Muzzarelli, S. Simonetta, Bologna, 2007, pp. 73–102. For quotas underwritten by Bartolomeo Cambioni totalling fl. 115, cf. DATINI 1159, docs. 122, 123, 129. 45 A somewhat similar situation held in Venice at the end of the 15th century, where, out of over 1,000 insurance quotas accounted for by Karin Nehlsen-von Stryk, only three were underwritten by foreign insurers, all from Florence: Pierantonio Sernigi, Giovanni Frescobaldi and Giovanni Vettori. Cf. Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima a Venezia, op.cit., pp. 500–524, in particular pp. 511, 523 and 524. 46 G. Ceccarelli, Cittadini e forestieri, op.cit., pp. 75–76. 47 Names of insurers whose nationality is uncertain: Bernardo degli Assi, Giovanni Fabrassa, Francesco Bertini, Giovanni Gandi, Jacopo Gomini, Leonardo Malli. The last four, however, might have been known Florentine underwriters, their names having been wrongly transcribed by Raggi: Francesco Bettini, Giovanni Gaddi, Jacopo Gondi, Leonardo Mannelli.

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table 9.9 Number of quotas and their values, underwritten by foreign insurers in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

“Underwriting subject”: provenance

Underwritten N. of under­written N. of “underwriting values in fl. quotas subjects”

Castile 23,155.0 Catalonia 20,825.0 England 4,400.0 Dubrovnik 4,375.0 Genoa 1,100.0 France 550.0 Venice 50.0 France or Flanders 25.0 Total foreign 54,480.0 “­underwriting subjects” “underwriting subjects” 1,350.0 of uncertain origins Florentine “underwriting 603,815.5 subjects” 1,750.0 Unknown or unidentifiable “underwriting subjects” Overall Total 661,395.5

225 284 49 50 11 8 1 1 629

16 7 2 5 1 2 1 1 35

16

6

7,847

279

24

8,516

–

320

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, 3r–144r.

discover their nationality.48 The largest group of foreign underwriters belonged to the Castilian community (more than a dozen individuals), followed by Catalans (six, possibly seven insurers) and five from Dubrovnik. The two 48

Identification has been based mainly on the comparison between references contained in Raggi’s book with data gleaned from the insurance accounts and correspondence from the Salviati firms, but above all by using the Salviati bank’s accounts, where nationality was included more frequently. Thanks to the correspondence, for example, we know that Pierfrancesco Basalù was a Venetian, that “Luigi Pomar” owned a firm in Naples and “Marco da Coreglia” operated in Seville; cf. respectively, SALVIATI 481, fol. 265r, 112v and 269v. The bank’s ledgers have shed light on the nationality of many Castilian and Dubrovnik-born insurers, as well as on Thomas Watts and Leonardo della Torre; for the last two, see SALVIATI 742, fols. 47, 112. As regards Florentines, using the following (already quoted) database has been crucial: Florentine Renaissance Resources, Online Tratte of Office Holders, 1282–1532.

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foreigners who risked the most money in 1524–1526 were from Catalonia: Pere Labia and Bartomeu Paretes, well over fl. 6,000 each. Very close follow two insurers from Burgos, Luis and Francisco Malvenda, probably members of the same family (with fl. 5,650 and fl. 5,365, respectively), and Francesc de Miquel from Catalonia, who underwrote policies for fl. 4,600. What these underwriters shared was the fact that they also used the market to buy insurance, and that they operated with remarkable continuity (at least 26 of the 29 months considered). This latter element is not always easy to detect for some; Thomas Watts, for example, who had a level of exposure similar to the above mentioned foreigner underwriters (fl. 4,400, both individually and in the name of his business firm), disappeared from Raggi’s records in February 1525, after ten months of very intense insurance activities.49 Something similar applies to the two Castilians, Francisco de Villena and Lopo de Castro, the Genoese Leonardo della Torre, and Antonio Sfondati from Dubrovnik. We suspect that many of these foreign businessmen might have resided in Florence for only a part of the year, periodically returning to their city of origin. We do not know if some may have entrusted fellow countrymen, residing in Florence, with the task of carrying on their insurance business, although it seems likely that many foreigners operated within a specific group, often coinciding with a certain family. This is true for the Paretes (besides Bartomeu, there were also a Luis and a Joan with the same surname), for the Malvendas (Luis, Francisco and Juan) and the De Castros (Lopo, Diego and Gabriel) and, in addition, for Giovanni and Tommaso di Giunta from Dubrovnik (probably father and son), and the two “catalans” Francesc and Miquiel. These connections, to which we shall return in the later chapters, often reflected the existence of wider financial networks, whose operations in the Florentine insurance market represented only a fraction of their very large business. On the whole, however, the contribution of foreigners to insurance supply in Florence must have been rather modest. Even if we include the six operators whose provenance cannot be ascertained, the number of non-Florentines “underwriting subjects” remains low (less than 40 out of 320), with an involvement, as regards the quantity of insured quotas and the insured values, fluctuating between 7% and 8% of the total. The role played by this group on the demand side of the market was very different, as we saw in the previous 49

We need to remember that, according to the Salviati bank’s documentary evidence, Watts had been doing business in Florence since 1521, when he appeared as the beneficiary in an insurance contract signed by Giovanbattista Bracci. In the period when he seemed to have operated as an insurer, this English entrepreneur could boast of considerable involvement, with almost 5 stipulations a month worth on average more than fl. 400.

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chapter, since their share exceeded 20% of the policies recorded in Raggi’s ledger alone. This contrast, which was probably even higher because of Ricoveri’s “international” clientele, shows that foreigners considered Florence to be a good place for buying insurance. The market share occupied by non-Florentine underwriters can be described as a rather marginal niche, somewhat similar to that made up of “occasional” and “small-size” insurers. At the end of the 14th-century, as well as during the 1520s, supply was concentrated in the hands of a few large businessmen, all natives of Florence and belonging to the same socio-economic milieu. They were, as witnessed by Raggi’s records, merchants at the head of a business partnerships, or partners or employees of firms operating in long-distance trade, banking or manufacturing, who risked their money regularly and for considerable amounts. Besides this restricted circle which, in the three years between 1524 and 1526, consisted of 30–40 individuals handling about 60% of the transactions, the only other significant group was made up of “mediumsize” insurers who operated in the market more intermittently.

chapter 10

The Market and Its Operators: Techniques and Organisational The Florentine insurance market was not just made by the people operating on the supply or the demand side of it. Its ability to function efficiently and to compete with other markets rested on the interaction of several elements. The legal and institutional framework in which transactions took place was a very important factor, as well as the scope and type of the trade flows fuelling insurance demand. In addition, the availability of information needed to complete a contract and the capacity to translate all this into the premium also had significant impact on its well-functioning. The number and experience of the players involved and the turnover they generated, undoubtedly contributed to strengthening the role the market had and increased its volume of business, but also reflected the interplay of all these relevant ingredients. Of considerable importance were the tools available to insurance buyers and underwriters, as well as the business organisations through which supply and demand operated, we occasionally referred to in the previous chapters. It is now time to turn to this technical and organisational “know-how”, developed within the Florentine insurance industry, to discover if the propensity for innovation it embed was one of the defining traits of this market.1 It has long been recognised that a technical component was intimately connected to the development of the insurance sector, as the genesis of this “industry” coincided with the introduction of a new type of contract: the policy. From the 14th century onward, innovations followed one another, meeting the needs of both supply and demand. The insurance buyers could avail themselves of instruments that permitted access to the market without physical presence at the time or place of stipulation (commission), or which allowed the interested parties to intervene “in progresss” on the terms initially agreed upon, when some unforeseen circumstance made it necessary or advantageous (additional clauses and cancellation). As for underwriters, the techniques developed on the market enabled them to solve two major problems: protecting themselves 1 Among the many studies that have emphasized the role of innovation of organisational techniques as the key to Florentine firms’ success, see, for example, J.F. Padgett, P.D. McLean, Organisational Invention and Elite Transformation: the Birth of Partnership Systems in Renaissance Florence, in “American Journal of Sociology”, 111, 2006, pp. 1539–1543.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004442450_012

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from excessive exposure to risk through co-insurance and reinsurance (and any tool that could be classed as such), and the possibility to carry out their operation from a distance through commission. Foreign merchants without a firm branch in the city had been operating in Florence through local agents since the end of the 14th century. Some of the oldest ever examples of requests to “take insurance” via letters sent to Florentine firms are found in the Datini archive. Sometimes, these “orders” were issued by non-resident operators, but, at other times, the request was elaborated within the same partnership agglomerate and was sent by a sister firm in another city.2 Therefore, ever since its inception, this innovation allowed the merchants to choose the market where to get the best coverage against the risks of navigation. This freedom of action obviously came at a price: additional costs had to be paid, including a 0.25% commission on the amount of the requested insurance. It was also necessary to have solid business connections with the agent who materially signed the policy.3 It is hard to say whether these two elements influenced the diffusion of the instrument, because commission has so far been investigated mainly in order to establish its existence, rather than to understand to what extent it was actually used.4 The sources available for the 1520s allow to draw a more accurate picture. Several documents provide evidence of the repeated recourse to commission. It was used by business partnership based in other cities, for example by the Chigi & partners in Rome. Within the same agglomerate, a firm located in Florence (e g., the Salviati bank) could be used by the others based elsewhere (e. g., the Salviati firms in Lyon and Pisa).5 In Raggi’s registrations, however, there are a few instances in which the insurance buyer acted “per chomessione”, that is, on commission: just five contracts, involving four agents that stipulated policies on behalf of firms and merchants from Naples, London, Pisa and Venice.6 If we compare these rare examples to the almost 900 registrations in 2 Cf. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 74–76. 3 Cf. SALVIATI 744, fol. 118r (registration of October 1528), in which the Salviati bank in Florence debited the Salviati firm in Pisa a 15-soldi commission for a 300-ducat policy. The same percentage was charged by the Alessandro & Bernardo di Antonio Gondi and partners of Florence to the Affaitadi firm from Cremona, in 1517–1519; cf. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., p. 111. 4 See for example Boiteux, La fortune de mer, op.cit., p. 93 and Casado Alonso, Los seguros maritimos de Burgos, op.cit., p. 216, besides Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 74–76. 5 Cf. SALVIATI 742, fols. 150, 215; SALVIATI 744, fols. 112r, 118r. These testimonies concern policies stipulated from 1523 to 1528 by the Salviati and partners banking firm in Florence, which operated as the mandatary agent in all these cases. 6 SALVIATI 70, fols. 90r, 91r–v, 106v–107r and 120v; respectively relating to: the Bernardo & Antonio Gondi and partners, stipulating on behalf of Luigi Olivieri from Pisa, Francesc “Catalan” on behalf of Giannotto Beltramo from Venice, the Marco del Nero firm for Jacopo

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the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, the ratio is about one contract every two-hundred, a negligible proportion that is unlikely to reflect the truth of the matter. Other documents reveal that sometimes, the name of the real insurance buyer was not mentioned in the policy, although it could be later included in the case of claim, compensation or cancellation. So, it appears that, behind the Averardo Salviati & partners mentioned in a May 1525 record, hid the Siena-based firm Niccolò Piccolomini’s Heirs & partners.7 The number of contracts signed on commission must have been higher and if we consider Giovanbattista Bracci’s “insurance accounts”, the percentage of policies of this kind is almost 5% of the total.8 It cannot be excluded that claims and compensations extant in these accounts may conceal other insurance operations on commission. Moreover, it is not certain that the broker always accurately transcribed the denominations as indicated in the policies, perhaps omitting to specify the name of the person who actually bought insurance. As revealed by an entry made in April 1521 in the Quadernuccio di ricordi di sicurtà, sometimes, the identity of the individual signing the contract was almost irrelevant and it was enough to indicate it by using the words “asicuramo a uno amico” (“We are insuring a friend”).9 Although buying insurance on commission was certainly common in the Florentine market, our strong impression is that the recourse to this type of instrument was not systematic at all. If, as we have seen, at least 20% of contracts concerned foreign firms and merchants, the percentage of policies on commission at 5–10% appears modest after all. The possibility that what had been stipulated in the contract would have to be modified later was not infrequent. To meet this need, the operators could use well-known mechanisms such as the total or partial cancellation of the Capponi in London and Guglielmo di Ridolfo da Sommaia for the Salviati firm in Naples; in the last, more complex case, the Antonio & Gerolamo da Sommaia and partners was the insured client, for a cargo that belonged for two thirds to Giovanni di Nicola. 7 Cf. SALVIATI 749, fols. 254, 266 with SALVIATI 70, fol. 69v. In this instance the “capture” of the Santa Maria ship triggered a compensation procedure, causing the name of the actual customer who had bought insurance through the Florentine firm to be disclosed. 8 The calculation is based on the 86 contracts that ended with a compensation, thus revealing the names of the real customers. Besides the case just mentioned above, another three examples have been found of insurance buyers on commission. The first concerned the Strozzi firm in Naples, which apparently used Giovantommaso Gagliardi as its representative, cf. SALVIATI 742, fols. 281 and 319; the second saw the Salviati bank in Florence buying a time insurance in August 1523, on commission for the Salviati firm of Pisa; in the last example, of December 1525, a Neapolitan merchant, Gabriele Seccaricca, used the Salviati bank to obtain insurance cover in Florence, cf. SALVIATI 749, respectively docs. 87, 254 and 254, 266. 9 SALVIATI 735, fol. 133r.

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policy (named “storno”), the inclusion of additional clauses (called “licenze”, licenses, after 1524) and the reopening of subscriptions (called “aggiunte”— additions—in Raggi’s register). As early as the end of the 14th century, policies drawn up in Florence explicitly regulated cancellation, also fixing its costs: the insurer had to reimburse the premium after keeping 0.5% of the insured quota.10 As shown by the standard policy introduced in 1524, the procedure of cancellation and the percentage due to underwriters must have remained unchanged during the 15th century.11 However, both, in the Datini policies and in Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, evidence cancellations are rare, although this circumstance may depend on the nature of our sources.12 As a matter of fact, the bank’s accounts indicate a different picture, with as many as 60 entries concerning the application of this very mechanism. The entries report many cases of full cancellation, when the goods were not shipped at all (“che non charichò”—“they were not laden”), as well as partial

10

Compare a policy drawn up in Florence in March 1404, found in Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., p. 193: “[...] e se lla detta roba non ssi charichasse in sulla detta nave e detta nave seguise il viagio, che gli asichurattori abino s. 10 a oro per 100” (“if the said stuff was not loaded onto the said ship and said ship continued its journey, may the insurers receive s. 10 in gold for 100”) with DATINI 1159, doc. 82 (of 14th July 1396): “[...] e se lla detta roba non si charichase in su la detta ghalea o ghaleotta, che gli asichuratori abino soldi x a oro per 100, si veramente che lla detta ghalea o ghaleotta facia il detto viaggio” (“if the said stuff was not loaded onto the said galley or galliot, may the insurers receive x soldi in gold per 100, if the said galley or galliot carried out its journey”. 11 Pardessus, Collection de lois maritimes, op.cit., pp. 606 and 608; please note the wrong transcription in the first of the two standard policies (“uno e mezzo per cento”) and corrected in the second (“un mezzo per cento”), further confirmed by the contracts dating from before the introduction of the reform; cf. for example a 1513 contract in Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 34–35. 12 The Datini firms, after paying for cancellation, had no interest in preserving contracts that had become null, nor did Raggi get any advantage from recording the event, since cancellation had no impact on his commission or on the tax imposed by law. In the late 14thcentury policies, cancellation is anyway evident when subscriptions were annulled and cancelled with a sinusoidal trait (“a serpicella”—the snake), overwritten with the words “non andò innanzi” (“did not proceed further”) or “non si charichò” (“was not loaded”); cf. DATINI 1159, docs. 127 and 128: “adì 24 daprile si rese indietro […] perche non si charichò la roba” (“today 24 April […] was returned because the goods were not loaded”). In Raggi’s records there is only one such instance, which is revealed by a note in margins in which the broker underlined the fact that his commission had not been paid, by writing: “istornata e non si è avuta la senseria” (“cancelled and we did not receive any commission”); this was a policy of 12 June 1524 in favour of Paolo da Romena, insuring a journey from Bordeaux to Flanders; cf. SALVIATI 70, doc. 23r.

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cancellation, when the value of the cargo turned out to be less than what had been initially established (“e non si charichò tanto”—“they loaded less”).13 We can attempt to estimate the frequency of cancellations that seem quite common at first sight. It is too difficult to retrace the situation in an exhaustive manner for any specific interval of time, since it was frequent for cancellation refunds to be paid after 13 or 14 months after the policy was signed. We can, however, calculate the amount of payments made by Giovanbattista Bracci and compare it with the number of quotas underwritten in the two periods covered by his insurance bank accounts. This calculation is not irrelevant, because it offers some indication as to how underwriters must have perceived the question themselves. In the first period, about 13% of contracts ended up being totally or partially annulled, whilst in the second, the percentage rose to 16%. It is, therefore, reasonable to suspect that a significant share of transactions in Florence were subject to cancellation at a later date, or partially modified.14 As we have already mentioned, using cancellation entailed some costs: 0.5% of the covered value was due to the underwriter, and the registration fee was not reimbursed as well. Moreover, there were expenses to be incurred for the refund procedures, which could sometimes be rather complex.15 It is, therefore, necessary to ponder on the reasons that made insurance buyers underwrite policies for journeys that were not sure to be undertaken. Out of about 40 cancellations included in Bracci’s insurance accounts, only two referred to journeys departing from ports near Florence (Leghorn and Ancona). 16 related to cargoes travelling from the Atlantic or the Levant, and the same number concerned journeys departing from Spain (including ports on the ocean), Southern France and Apulia. This geographical distribution is quite indicative, as it confirms what we have claimed with respect to the additional costs sustained when buying insurance in a foreign market. These figures also allow to advance a more solid hypothesis about the real function of cancellation. The impression is that this tool was used to mitigate the impact of 13

Reference is here being made to all the cancellations indicated in Giovanbattista Bracci’s, his son Zanobi’s and Domenico Naldini’s insurance accounts; cf. SALVIATI 742, fols. 136, 149, 155, 205, 243, 281, 319, 368, 407, 436; SALVIATI 749, fols. 75, 87, 177, 180, 254, 266, 347, 404, 477. Cancellations are also found in other bank accounts opened in the name of individuals or businesses operating in the insurance sector. 14 For the period April 1523–August 1524 we have counted 18 full and 7 partial “storni”, whilst for December 1525–February 1528 11 full and 4 partial cancellations were recorded. 15 See SALVIATI 742, fol. 150 for an example of cancellation in which as many as 34 insurers were involved, resulting in rather complex accounting procedures; a similar case is found in SALVIATI 742, fol. 151.

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incomplete information, a typical feature of maritime trade at the time, in the (mainly successful) attempt to increase the flexibility of the whole Florentine insurance business. Confirmation in this sense also comes from the other techniques that, by making contracts more flexible, played the same positive role: licences and additions (“licenze” and “aggiunte”). Under these headings, Raggi’s registrations recorded two mechanisms that were already well established in Florence: the former, mentioned in the earlier chapters, allowed insurance buyers and underwriters to redefine the terms of the policy by means of one or more additional clauses; the latter allowed subscriptions to be reopened whenever the insured cargo turned out to be more valuable than what was initially estimated.16 We have already argued that, as early as the late 14th century, the habit of modifying policies was rather widespread. In a contract dated January 1396, for example, insurance for a cargo of 60 sacks of wool was extended, thanks to a clause inserted at a later stage, to an undetermined quantity of wool from Provence. Changes did not only concern the goods, but could relate to any aspect of the policy: the vessel, its ship master, the risks taken on by underwriters, etc.17 During the 1520s, licenses essentially had the same function, although we encounter them less frequently: 15 in total, adding the nine included in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà to another six found in the Salviati Bank’s accounts.18 It could even be assumed that the obligation introduced by the 1524 reform, to have such changes approved by the Ufficiali alle Sicurtà, may have caused a reduction in the use of licenses. As a matter of fact, some contracts, right from the first lines, incorporated clauses that allowed the modification of the clauses in the agreement, without having to obtain the Insurance officials’ approval. It was almost as if the operators had “metabolized” the new restrictions, finding alternative mechanisms, in order to continue using insurance according to the flexible ways that had been tried and tested for almost two centuries.19 16 “Aggiunta”—addition—is the term used in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà to register the new subscriptions, sometimes transcribed after some weeks had passed, without having to report the details of the policy in full, but simply referring back to the document in which they were recorded. 17 DATINI 1159, doc. 67 (12 January 1396), with an additional clause dated 28 January 1396. For examples relating to the goods, ibid., doc. 112; for a divided cargo loaded onto several vessels, ibid., docs. 35, 42, 50, 56, 64; for change of shipmaster, ibid., doc. 102; for exemption from certain risks, ibid., docs. 37 and 112. 18 SALVIATI 70, fols. 8r, 21r, 27v–28r, 98r–v, 99r–v, 114v, 130r; SALVIATI 742, fols. 149, 168, 205, 368, 436 (Giovanbattista Bracci’s insurance accounts) and doc. 182 (Domenico Naldini’s insurance account); SALVIATI 749, fols. 266, 347 (Zanobi Bracci’s insurance accounts). 19 There are about twenty contracts in all, which inserted some clauses right from the start with the aim of increasing the flexibility of contractual terms; the additional articles

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A similar result could also be obtained by reopening the subscriptions, a tool often used whenever it became necessary to increase the value of the covered goods. In Raggi’s register, two different definitions are used to describe the custom of postponing the deadline for the closure of the contract: “addition” and “open policy”.20 There are considerable number of records of this type (51 of the former, 45 of the latter), corresponding to about 10% of the total for the 29-month period, which suggests that both the practices were rather common. Additions concern 41 policies, most of which were modified only once; six policies were reopened twice, and two were completed by three supplementary clauses.21 Completion times for contracts seem to have been quite long for the Datini policies, too. For example, quotas for a 1393 policy were underwritten over a period of two and a half months. It also happened that contracts were cancelled only to be resumed after a few months.22 Even though in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, the broker did not transcribe the date on which the underwriters paid their respective quotas, the practice of additions provides some insight into the phenomenon. There are only five instances where the policy was reopened less than a week after its first registration, whereas in over 50% of cases, the delay exceeded 30 days. Only six times, a two-month interval occurred, with exceptional situations reaching as many as 140 days.23 Some interesting indications emerge from looking at the itineraries for which additions seemed to be common: over half regarded transports departing from the Atlantic or Middle-Eastern coasts, compared to only six instances relating to cargoes starting from ports closer to Florence (Leghorn or could concern the destination (SALVIATI 70, fols. 11v, 12v, 114v), the possibility of an intermediate call (ibid., docs. 74v, 83v, 98v, 127v, 129r–v, 130r, 139r, 140v), the vessel (ibid., docs. 17v–18r), but also limit the risks taken on by the insurers (ibid., docs. 48v, 49v, 130v–140r). 20 The first was introduced by the sentence “una agiunta a una ischrita [...]”, the second by the words “per insino addì [...]”. The aggiunte were contracts that had been considered concluded at the time of registration, but which, after some time, were reopened for new subscriptions; in this instance, the broker accurately reported the details of the registration to which the additional quotas referred. In open policies, when their relevant details were transcribed, the possibility was explicitly mentioned of increasing the number of insurers, leaving a blank space for this purpose, to be filled in later. 21 For an example of a contract followed by three additions, cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 117r–v, 117v–118r, 119v, 134r. 22 Cf. DATINI 1159, respectively docs. 37 and 64. The latter, of November 1395, renewed a policy stipulated in July of the same year, because the ship on which the insured goods were travelling had returned to the port of departure (Majorca). Cf. also ibid., 72; the policy, written on 4 August 1396, was subsequently modified and only finalised in midSeptember, so that 42 days had passed between the opening and closing of the contract. 23 For the last example see SALVIATI 70, fols. 103r, 106r, 111v, 129v; the registrations are dated from 18 December 1525 to 5 May of the following year.

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Ancona).24 So, a direct relationship seemed to exist between how frequently this tool was used and the geographical distance from the market in which the transaction took place. This suggests that recourse to additions helped to make up for the lack of information necessary to conclude the agreement. On the whole, policies whose initial terms were subsequently modified constituted a significant share of the contracts handled by Raggi. In fact, if all the cancellations, additions, licences and open policies are added together, it will not be farfetched to conclude that the phenomenon applied to a quarter of all the transactions. This suggests that merchants who decided to buy insurance in Florence could take concrete advantage of the innovations introduced into the market over the years. Perhaps this situation could be attributed to the turbulent climate created by the war sweeping through Europe, but nonetheless, the insurance business seemed able to offer solutions that could at least partly alleviate its effects, still attracting local and foreign demand. Customers were willing to sustain additional costs, in order to benefit from such efficient and versatile tools. The techniques available to underwriters were also very useful for flexible risk management. A well tested device already discussed in some detail was co-insurance, a simple but valid solution to this problem. Here, we wish to underline that co-insurance was deliberately utilised in order to share the risks of navigation. The Libro di ricordi di sicurtà demonstrates a close correlation between the amount of the premium and the number of underwriters that intervened to cover the same contract. On the less expensive routes, such as between the Adriatic ports (normally 2%), there were, on average, six co-insurers. However, in cases where the premium exceeded 10% (such as connections between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic), the average rose to 14 co-insurers per policy. The trend was not new, as it can also be spotted in the Datini contracts: for the relatively safer route from Porto Pisano to Genoa and vice versa, in most instances (37 out of 47), policies were underwritten by a single insurer and co-insurance was hardly ever used. The 16th-century sources show a further evolution of this technique, which we could name “joint coverage” subscription. This meant that sometimes quotas, initially bought by one insurer, were subsequently subdivided among more individuals, so that the risk was spread even more widely. Normally this was 24

See, for example, some registrations of contracts with later additions relating to trips departing from Flanders (ibid., docs. 100v, 100v–101r, 106r), from the Canary Islands (ibid., docs. 38v, 42v), from England (ibid., docs. 107v, 115v), from Constantinople (ibid., docs. 45v, 50v), from Alexandria (ibid., docs. 105r, 116r), from Leghorn (ibid., docs. 66r, 68v) or Ancona (ibid., docs. 17r, 23v, 24r).

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done through informal agreements, which only come to light by looking at the bank accounts, when the payments of premiums were registered. We can thus discover that fl. 25 of the fl. 75 quota taken out “in the name of Giovanbattista Bracci” had in fact been paid by his son Zanobi, or that Domenico Naldini had stipulated a policy, taking on risks for fl. 100, of whichfl. 25were actually covered by Domenico Alamanni.25 There are only a few such available examples, and all relate to people connected through close family or business ties, giving the impression that this technique was employed mainly when those providing “joint coverage” strongly trusted one another.26 Reinsurance had been practised in Florence since the end of the 15th century. It allowed the subscribers to resell the quotas they had formally committed to (for a higher premium than what had been initially charged), enabling them not just to share the risk, but actually transfer it.27 Although testimonies regarding the use of this tool in Florence are not lacking, the 1524–1526 legislation did not regulate it, which is why no examples are found in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà.28 Comparison with the insurance accounts, however, leads us to suspect that at least some quotas might have been sold on; as a matter of fact, evidence of reinsurance emerges only when a claim is involved and compensation required. We learn from his bank account that Giovanbattista Bracci had bought in part a subscription underwritten by Antonio Arnolfi in favour of the Salviati firm. The fact that reinsurance can be spotted only in particular circumstances hinders a true evaluation of its actual frequency, although the impression remains that it was not very common and limited to exchanges within Florence.29 25 SALVIATI 742, fols. 168 and 182. 26 Cf. SALVIATI 749, fols. 94, 75, 266. Among the almost 200 quotas subscribed by Giovanbattista Bracci between May 1523 and August 1524, there are only two cases of “joint” insurance. We need to underline that the phenomenon is only apparent within a restricted group of individuals who, as we shall see later, were linked to the Salviati firm: besides the Braccis (father and son), the informal sharing of quotas concerned only Domenico Naldini, Domenico Alamanni and the Averardo Salviati and partners itself. 27 Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 34 and 236. It is unclear whether the technique was born of the innovative skills of Florentine operators, but the fact remains that all testimonies as to the use of reinsurance in other markets are not as old; cf. Del Treppo, Assicurazioni e commercio internazionale, op.cit., p. 511 and Tenenti, Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio, op.cit., pp. 175–176. 28 A random survey of 1525 contracts, which analysed the amounts and names of those insurers who, after relatively short time, also appeared as insured (a mechanism that could hide an informal kind of reinsurance) has not yielded any significant results. 29 See, for example, Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., p. 87, which reports a case in 1457 concerning the Cambini firm of Florence. For the buying and selling of quotas between Bracci and Arnolfi, cf. SALVIATI 742, fol. 281; for the other examples (four in total) it is necessary

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There is definitely more evidence for the last instrument employed by those operating on the supply side of the market: subscription on commission. In cases as such an underwriter acted on behalf of someone else willing to provide insurance cover on a distant market, but unable to do so in person. The Datini documents frequently bear witness of subscriptions on commission, at least from the end of the 14th century, given that they make up almost a fifth of the insured quotas in the extant Pisan policies. As a matter of fact, this was how the Florentines habitually operated in that market.30 For the 1520s, examples can be cited both from Raggi’s records (e.g., an insurance quota covered by Juan de Mena, a Spaniard, on behalf of his fellow countryman Juan Daedo) and from the Salviati bank’s ledgers. Thus, we learn that Domenico Giugni, Giovanni Gerini, Francesco Pitti and Paolo da Romena sometimes acted as insurers in Ancona, taking advantage, thanks to the Salviati bank, of a local agent whose name was Lorenzo Cecchi.31 The 16th-century documentation, however, also reveals that commission not always has the function of allowing insurers to underwrite policies in different markets from their usual or local one. The Quadernuccio di ricordi di sicurtà of 1520–1521, to which we have often referred, is little more than a list of quotas underwritten in Florence by the Salviati bank “per chonto”, i.e., on behalf of several insurers. With the exception of Marco da Coreglia, who lived in Seville where he had set up a firm, all the individuals involved were Florentines who could have easily signed these policies directly.32 In Giovanbattista Bracci’s “insurance accounts”, we find evidence of other occasions in which the Averardo Salviati & partners operated for him on commission; but this stopped after the reform of 1524.33 to compare SALVIATI 70, fols. 5v–6r, 11r, 15v, 16v with the registrations in SALVIATI 742, fols. 281, 368, 407; in this case too, the underwriters that allegedly sold quotas to Bracci were linked to him by strong business ties, i.e. Domenico Naldini and the Salviati firm. 30 Cino Rinuccini’s operations in Pisa are a good example of this, cf. DATINI 1158, docs. 62, 68, 90, 121, 124, 132. On this point, see the numerous examples, also found in the Datini sources, mentioned by Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 71–74; by analyzing the accounts, Melis was able to calculate the commission due to the mandatary, which amounted to 1% of the underwritten sum. 31 Cf. SALVIATI 70, fol. 80v and SALVIATI 742, fol. 212. The accounts relating to insurance operations on commission carried out in Seville by the Palla Strozzi and partners from Lyon, in the fourth decade of the 16th century, are a clear testimony to the high turnover generated by the diffusion of this particular tool, cf. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 221–230. 32 Cf. SALVIATI 735, fol. 128r and doc. 134r (for a subscription on behalf of da Coreglia). 33 For example, an instance when the Salviati firm paid Bracci through the “giro” system the premium received from the policy beneficiary, Antonio Calavrese; see SALVIATI 742, fol. 281. The 1524 norm imposing payment of the premium in cash very likely created

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As we shall see later in the chapter, it is likely that this type of commission was arranged informally to create something resembling a syndicate grouping several insurers. Anyway, the variety of instruments and their use, as far as we can gather from the 16th-century documents, shows that their features were vague and indistinct, despite our attempts at classifying them. “Joint coverage” subscriptions, which we have likened to co-insurance, were not so unlike informal commission; this latter, when it involved a group of individuals, closely resembled the buying and selling-on of quotas, and was, therefore, similar to reinsurance. The range of available mechanisms to ease the management of risk, as well as the possibility to adapt them to one’s needs, undoubtedly boosted the competitiveness of the Florentine insurance market. Nevertheless, unlike the conclusions we were able to reach in relation to the demand side of the market, it cannot be proven that—with the exception of co-insurance—these tools were employed frequently. This leaves more than one doubt as to their true importance. In order to redistribute the dangers of marine commerce, by increasing the number of people taking part to the transactions, the insurance buyers and underwriters could also take advantage of other solutions, different from those of a mere technical nature. How quotas were actually fractioned could as well depend on the organisational form of the underwriter because, as we have anticipated, insurance supply was provided by subjects, which, in this respect, were not all the same. In 1520s, specialised “partnership among insurers”, such as those who would start to appear shortly after in several Mediterranean centres, were still unknown in Florence. There was nothing comparable to the “Compagnia dei XXI” (“The partnership of the 21”), operating in Venice in the early 16th century, or other specialised partnership firms that would later base their activities on shared capital, some division of managerial functions and well-defined operation rules (for example, in relation to the maximum insurable value).34 Insurance coverage was still provided in the same way as it was in the late 14th century: individually, by two (or more) insurers who operated together, or by a partnership firm. In 1408, Florentine laws introduced a new type of partnership (“in accomandita”), which was different from the already existing one, some difficulties for this type of informal commission, forcing insurers to sign policies in person. 34 Tenenti, Naufrages, corsaires et assurances, op.cit., pp. 62–63. See also G. Stefani, L’assicurazione a Venezia dalle origini alla fine della Serenissima: documenti pubblicati in occasione del 125° annuale della compagnia, Bologna, Poligrafici il Resto del Carlino, 1956, vol. I, pp. 92–93; Boiteux, La fortune de mer, op.cit., p. 163; Giacchero, Storia delle assicurazioni marittime, op.cit., pp. 82–83; Tenenti, Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio, op.cit., pp. 176–179.

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because it limited the liability if a partner (the “accomandante”) simply wanted to deposit its money in it. In the period under investigation it was however still uncommon to find it in everyday business.35 We must not think of a partnership firm, which the Florentines named “compagnia”, as an organization capable of distributing insurance cover among dozens of investors. Florentine firms during the 15th and 16th centuries had relatively few partners on average, normally three-to-four people, one of whom, the principal investor, possessed a majority share of the capital and was often at the head of it. However, we should not forget that many business agglomerates had firms operating in the banking industry; this granted access to considerable sums deposited by their customers, which could be used in insurance activities.36 Because they were able to draw on larger resources than individuals using their personal patrimony, these partnership firms could (at least in theory) afford to operate on a larger scale compared to the rest of underwriters. Finally, given the absence of organizations specifically conceived for operating in the insurance business, they were the only one that could in some way resemble a specialised firm. If it is true that one of the defining features of these partnership agglomerates was sectoral diversification, their constitutive acts rarely forgot to include insurance among their fields of action.37 At least partially, the data relating to 1524–1526 confirms the hypotheses suggested so far. The 43 “underwriting subjects” that (according to their denomination as transcribed by Raggi) operated as partnership firms (traditional or in accomandita) show higher exposure, on average, than the 270 underwriters that provided insurance individually: almost fl. 4,000 against about fl. 1,800. The median value per insured quota is also higher, fl. 90.6 for the former, against fl. 73.7 for “underwriting subjects” operating individually. If, however, we observe the overall distribution of insurance supply, we realise 35

F. Melis, Le società commerciali a Firenze dalla seconda metà del XIV al XVI secolo (1974, Paris), in Id., L’azienda nel Medioevo, ed. by M. Spallanzani, Florence, 1991, pp. 161–180; on the infrequent use of this particular organisational form, which will become widespread in the second half of the 16th century, see Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 466–467 and Dini, Saggi su una economia mondo, op.cit., pp. 207–214. 36 Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 78–79. For examples of numerically larger “corpi” (5–8 partners) see Tognetti, Da Figline a Firenze, op.cit., pp. 125–127 and Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence, op.cit., pp. 208–210. 37 A good example is the charter of the Giovanni Lapi and partners, a partnership in accomandita operating in the 1530s, which specified that the active partner “debba exercitare la sua persona in mercantile, chanbi, chomessioni, sicurtà […]” (“must operate in in trade, exchange, commissions, insurance”). Cf. F. Melis, Il commercio transatlantico di una compagnia fiorentina stabilita a Siviglia, op.cit., p. 62.

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table 10.1 Number of quotas underwritten in Florence and their value by organisational form (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

Insurer (by organisational form)

N. of “under­writing N. of underwritten Underwritten subjects” quotas values in florins

Partnership firm Two insurers operating together Individual operators Unidentifiable “underwriting subjects”—or not indicated Total

43 7 270 –

1,883 33 6,576 24

170,632.0 4,225.0 484,788.5 1,750.0

320

8,516

661,395.5

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r.

that the share of partnership firms, though considerable, did not turned into a market dominance (see Table 10.1). Most quotas appear to have been subscribed by individuals (at least formally), with almost 6,600 operations worth over 73% of the total insured; partnership firms reached 26% of the total (fl. 170,632); cases of two insurers operating jointly are rare, as only 33 instances of this kind are recorded. If we carry out a comparison with what we can infer from our 14th century sources, it would seem that the insurance market of the 1520s gave more space to businesses that had outgrown the mere individual dimension. Among the 115 “underwriting subjects” of the Datini firms, 25 operated as partnership firms, stipulating 77 out of the 463 quotas, covering 18–19% of the total value: fl. 11,683 out of about fl. 63,000. There are clearly limitations intrinsic to this type of comparison, due to different quantitative relevance of the two sources. Nevertheless, we still retain the impression that no radical changes had occurred in between the two periods. The more complex business organizations contributed to redistributing the risks of maritime trade, and they undoubtedly achieved this aim better than the techniques we discussed above, which were certainly in use, but not as widespread. However, the market still depended on coverage mainly provided individually and risks were managed largely through co-insurance, an efficient, but at least two-century-old business tool. If we extend our investigation, overcoming the idea that a business organization, in order to exist, must have a definite legal form and official recognition, we get the feeling that diversified business models were already being

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experimented in the Florentine insurance industry.38 The preferred solution seemingly adopted to increase the scale of operations, without unduly raising the level of risk, took advantage of simple and well-known techniques (individual firm and co-insurance), exploited to the utmost of their potential. When perusing the lists of underwriters transcribed in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, it is remarkable to note that some names always appear in succession, one after the other, almost testifying to a common strategy, deliberate and agreed upon. It is almost as if we were confronted with “syndicates” made by co-insurers that operated in variable ways and forms, but which were probably based on definite, albeit not formalised, agreements. The most outstanding example is the previously mentioned “syndicate” built around the Salviati firm aggregation, whose existence is attested since 1521. Its existence is revealed by an entry which preceded a long series of registrations relating to subscriptions stipulated in Florence through the Averardo & Battista Salviati & partners banking firm. These few lines reveal the nature of the collaboration, as well as its articulation: the Salviati bank subscribed quotas on behalf (i.e., on commission) of Giovanbattista Bracci, Domenico Naldini and several other subjects interested in operating in the insurance business.39 The network of co-insurers had its core in the Salviati banking firm based in Florence and in Bracci. As revealed by the records, the two covered risks for 44% and 33%, respectively, of the total value underwritten by the “syndicate”. They were joined by Zanobi di Giovanbattista Bracci (with 13% of the coverage) and by another six individuals that operated more intermittently: Domenico Naldini, Marco da Coreglia, (individually), Lorenzo di Giovanbattista Bracci, the Salviati firm of Pisa, Averardo Salviati, and Battista di Jacopo Salviati; when underwriting, the latter two, always specified that they did so individually (“in proprio”), to clarify that banking firm bearing their names was not involved. The group’s cohesion derived from family connections (Bracci), business ties

38

Economic historiography on Renaissance Florence has highlighted the instrumental use of legally recognized business forms, whose clearest example is the “corporate” system or group, which saw the light and developed without any formal sanctioning; cf. F. Melis, Le società commerciali a Firenze, op.cit., pp. 165–167. See also Padgett, McLean, Organizational Invention, op.cit., pp. 1474–1485; they suggest an interpretation of commercial enterprises in Renaissance Florence which takes into account the intense overlapping of functions (not necessarily financial) that they were performing. 39 SALVIATI 735, fol. 128r: “qui di sotto si comincerà a tenere per richordo le siqurtà che si piglierano per conto del bancho e di Giovamba[ttista Bracci] e del Naldini e altrj” (“here below we shall start to record the insurance operations carried out on behalf of the bank and of Giovanbattista Bracci and Naldini and others”). The note is dated 4 January 1521.

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(Naldini and da Coreglia) or from both (the Salviati family).40 The Florentine banking firm carried out its operations in a varied manner: sometimes it directly underwrote the policy using its own business denomination; at other times, it apparently operated on commission for a member of the “syndicate”; and sometimes it subscribed as Averardo & Battista Salviati & partners to then resell, in part or in full, the underwritten quotas.41 During the following years, although there is no explicit evidence, the activities of the “syndicate” clearly continued: the sequence of stipulations shows a coordinated strategy at work behind insurance operations carried out by its members (see Table 10.2).42 However, the make-up of the network had probably changed a little: Francesco Martellini and Calandro Calandri had replaced Battista di Jacopo Salviati (who died at the end of 1523) and Domenico Naldini.43 These co-insurers could also intervene in a random way, but they seldom did so, as they underwrote only 120 quotas worth just above fl. 9,000. When the cooperative strategy expanded, the network could truly offer considerable insurance cover. For example, if we consider the instances when four, five or six members of the “cartel” were involved in the same policy, the sum of individual pledges exceeded fl. 45,000. The network was still revolving around the Averardo Salviati & partners and Giovanbattista Bracci, now regularly 40

Let us roughly summarise the connections underpinning the “cartel”, already anticipated in various parts of the book: Domenico was Francesco Naldini’s son, Francesco being the partner and manager of the Salviati firm in Lyon from 1513; Giovanbattista Bracci, Zanobi and Lorenzo’s father, had instead been associated to the Lyon firm since 1520; Averardo and Battista Salviati were cousins, and joint investors of the Florence banking firm; together with Averardo’s younger brother, Piero di Alamanno, they also ran the banking business based in Pisa; Marco da Coreglia was the principal investor of a partnership firm in Seville, with strong business connections with the Salviati group, during the whole of the 1520s; see Hurtubise, Une famille-témoin: les Salviati, op.cit., pp. 142–146, 198 and 215–216. 41 This last mechanism was occasionally adopted by Giovanbattista Bracci too, who stipulated a policy in his name and then sold part of his share to his son Zanobi; see, for example, SALVIATI 735, fol. 133r: “f. 75 doro per Zanobi Bracci/innome di Giovanba[ttista]” (“gold florins 75 for Zanobi Bracci/in the name of Giovanbattista”). 42 The sequential trend follows a non-random pattern. In almost 90% of Raggi’s registrations we find at least two quotas underwritten in succession by these operators; if we consider the contracts in which three or more of the co-insurers operated jointly, there are at least three names one after the other in over 60% of cases. Finally, in almost 50% of the records all “cartel” members appear in succession. 43 The connection between the Salviati family and Francesco Martellini remains obscure; instead, we know from the cash ledgers that Calandro Calandri had been working for the Florentine bank at least since 1523, and was promoted to the rank of partner in November 1528; cf. Hurtubise, Une famille-témoin: les Salviati, op.cit., pp. 207n, 208n.

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supported by his son Zanobi. The three covered quotas in the same contract in over 130 cases, for a value exceeding fl. 40,000. The Salviati firm of Pisa still belonged to the “syndicate”, as well as Averardo who continued operating individually. While for the others co-insurers joint operations always represented more than 85% of their total operations, the latter showed a greater level of independence. As a matter of fact, Averardo Salviati stipulated “just” 3 out of 4 contracts together with at least one of the other members of the informal “syndicate” although.44 Despite the novelties introduced by the 1524 reform, mechanisms used in the past survived within this group. The “insurance accounts” bear witness to the recourse to business tools such as commission and “joint coverage”, as in the examples we mentioned above.45 The strategy applied by these operators must have significantly impacted the Florentine market. Thanks to coordinated action by some of the most important insurers, the “syndicate” was able to meet about 10% of the total demand. Although it had no formally defined structure, the group closely recalls the first specialised “partnership among insurers”, because of the overall exposure table 10.2 Insurance operations of the Salviati-Bracci co-insurer “syndicate” in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

N. of co-insurers belonging to the “syndicate”

N. of subscribed N. of underwritten Values underwritten policies quotas in fl.

2 51 3 55 4 71 5 64 6 2 Total 243 Individual Operations 123 Overall Total 366

102 165 284 320 12 883 123 1,006

8,025.0 11,140.0 20,065.0 24,321.0 1,300.0 64,851.0 9,091.7 73,942.7

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r. 44 45

The prize for loyalty must go to Martellini (with over 93% of policies stipulated under the “cartel”), followed by Giovanbattista Bracci (over 92%), the Florence banking firm (with almost 91%), Zanobi Bracci (87%), the Pisa firm and Calandro Calandri (both with 85%). For the period under consideration, see SALVIATI 749, fols. 75, 94, 266.

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capacity, continuity in time and the number of “partners”. What made it different, besides its flexible and informal nature, was not its size, but rather its relatively modest potential to redistribute risk. As a matter of fact, even when quotas were fractioned through “joint coverage”, none of the co-insurers ever insured for less than fl. 25. There is not enough evidence as to whether the example of the SalviatiBracci “syndicate” was followed by other Florentine insurers, even though the study of registrations in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà suggests that perhaps looser cooperative mechanisms were indeed at work. The connecting factor could vary (kinship ties, or a shared foreign origin), operations were less systematic or had a narrower scope, but traces of common strategies can still be detected. It does not seem a coincidence if Francesco Baldini, on the rare occasions when he operated in the market, always did so as a co-insurer with his brother-in-law, Averardo Salviati. The overlapping subscriptions recorded for Carlo Bellacci and his relatives also do not seem casual as well.46 Something similar is also noted as regards the operations followed by the members of the Spanish “colony”, who showed a marked propensity to act as a group rather than individually.47 Sometimes, the links behind what appear as common strategies escape us completely, as in the case of Agnolo del Rosso, Filippo degli Albizzi, Gherardo Taddei and Gerolamo da Gavina. And yet, these four insurers displayed such synchronicity in their operations as to suggest that they formed another kind of “syndicate”, perhaps on a smaller scale, but similar in many ways to that revolved around the Salviati bank.48 46 Bandini, the husband of Ginevra di Alamanno Salviati (Averardo and Piero’s sister), underwrote 11 quotas in all, and in 7 cases we find Averardo Salviati among the coinsurers; for these operations, all concentrated in the two months of April and May 1524, cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 9v, 11v, 12r, 13r–v, 14r, 15r, 17r–v, 18v, 19r–v, 20v; for family relations see Hurtubise, Une famille-témoin: les Salviati, op.cit., p. 137. Carlo Bellacci normally intervened when another member of his family was also involved in the same contract (Tommaso or Marco), a circumstance that holds true for almost half of the 52 quotas he underwrote, especially in association with Marco, probably his brother. On the Bellacci family, closely linked to the Serristoris, see Tognetti, Da Figline a Firenze, op.cit., pp. 124– 128, 133–134, 143; for Carlo’s insurance activities, cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 2r, 9v, 10r, 16r, 18r, 24r, 25v, 26r, 27v, 28r, 32r–v, 35r–v, 54r, 59r, 63r, 64v, 65r, 67r, 69r–v, 70r–v, 75v, 76v, 77r–v, 78r, 80v, 81r–v, 82v, 87r–v, 89r, 90v, 91r–v, 92v, 96v, 98v, 135v, 136r–v, 137r, 139r, 140r. 47 For the Spaniards, the analysis was carried out on just over 350 subscriptions distributed in about 200 policies. The “colony’s” insurers participated more frequently when at least another fellow countryman was involved: 205 quotas against 133. The number of co-insurers varied from 1 to 6, with the maximum reached when four compatriots were involved jointly (for a value of over fl. 8,000). 48 All four underwrote the same contract together only 20 times; however, if we consider the instances when at least 3 of them acted as co-insurers, we exceed 70 contracts. When

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If we exclude the institutional changes brought about by the 1524 legislation, the insurance industry in Florence was not revolutionised by any great innovation between the early 15th century and the 1520s. The techniques and organisational forms available to the underwriters Raggi intermediated were ultimately the same as already known and used in Francesco Datini’s time. Instead, the clearest trend of this period was the adaptation and diffusion of existing business tools: cancellation, partial or total, and additional clauses, to reduce contractual rigidity, and co-insurance, as well as the involvement of partnership firms, to achieve a more flexible management of risk. A good example of this trend to micro-innovation was the use of commission to coordinate the actions of several underwriters, which resulted in the formation of “syndicates” and promoted, in turn, an increase in scale of organizations providing insurance. These were not real novelties, and no specialised partnership, formally recognised through constitutive acts or legislation, were being created yet, but the outcome was substantially equivalent. It was the consequence of one of Florence’s competitive advantages, that of being one of the oldest insurance markets, thus having had more time to test techniques and organisational forms, exploiting their potential to the full. From this standpoint, it is understandable that the wealth of experience accumulated for over a century and a half by businessmen working in the industry eventually resulted into innovative skills, perhaps not so noticeable but certainly sustained over time, which long continued to characterise the Florentine market. Filippo degli Albizzi took out a quota, in two cases out of three he did so to participate in a policy subscribed by Agnolo del Rosso, and over 30% of times when this occurred, the names of the two appeared in sequence in Raggi’s records. Neither a study of the existing literature, nor the analysis of the Salviati bank’s accounts have revealed the existence of any family or business connection between them.

chapter 11

The Market and Its Operators: The “Risk Experts” The know-how accumulated over time by the Florentine market certainly helped devise the most suitable mechanisms to mitigate the risks of maritime trade and transfer them from the individual insurance buyer to several operators. Specific skills and longstanding experience were also crucial to tackle the intricate array of variables which, as we have seen, influenced the insurance premium. At that time the theoretical and practical instruments used by the modern insurance industry, such as the concept of mathematical probability or statistical measurements, were still unknown; however, the most updated scholarship in the history of probability has shown that formulating reliable hypotheses was not impossible during the Renaissance. For example, a pseudo-frequentist approach could be used: though based on an unsystematic observation of the events, it enabled operators to link forecasts about the future to past experiences. Or, they could avail themselves of unconscious inferences (still widely employed in business forecasting), often adopted when the variables under consideration were too complex to handle, and a subjective judgment, if authoritative, could be reasonably relied upon. The first method was particularly efficient when evaluating the so-called “structural” factors, whilst the latter was the only way to estimate “contingent” risk.1 However, not everyone possessed the necessary competence to apply these forecasting mechanisms to maritime insurance in the appropriate manner. To be able to do so—as Benedetto Cotrugli probably guessed—operators needed up-to-date information on the safety of the sea, and they also had to be knowledgeable about trade routes and ports, ships and shipmasters; in one word, they had to be true specialists. It might not be a coincidence, if part of the process that led to mathematical probability was connected to mercantile culture and, in particular, to the abbaco schools where businessmen of Renaissance Florence completed their education. The first turning point in this process was represented by the theories of Filippo Maria Calandri, one of the most famous teachers working in such a school, and the uncle of Calandro Calandri who later became a partner in the Salviati bank. He also happened

1 See P.L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: the Remarkable Story of Risk, New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1996, pp. 21–22; Franklin, The Science of Conjecture, op.cit., pp. ix, 324–326 and 338.

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to teach two young men destined for a luminous career in business: Bernardo and Antonio Gondi.2 Moreover, not everybody possessed adequate cultural background and the right mental approach to be able to formulate accurate forecasts on the risks of maritime trade, and this factor undoubtedly acted as a filter for the insurance supply provided by the market. This can help us understand why in Florence, in 1524–1526, there were 400–500 active underwriters, while a preponderant share of transactions registered by Raggi did not involve more than 50 “underwriting subjects”. Thanks to their socio-professional background, the wide range of their financial interests and the continuity of their operations in the market, these “major” and “great” insurers found themselves in the best position to synthesize into a percentage the risk from which the insurance buyer wished to be protected. And yet, demand was not wholly met by this restricted circle, but, as we have seen, by many other subjects that did not exactly correspond to the specialist’s profile. Operations were carried out also by insurers that we classed as “occasional”, which made up a rather marginal share of the market, as well as by “medium-size” ones that intervened only in an “intermittent” way. In terms of covered values, these two classes constituted almost 40% of the insurance supply and gave a significant contribution in meeting demand coming from insurance buyers. We ignore how many of the individuals hiding behind the over 250 “underwriting subjects” included in these categories had a chance to attend Filippo Calandri’s classes; perhaps some others already had skills in the industry comparable to that of the “great” insurers that dominated the market. However, alternative solutions did also exist for non-specialists, such as following the judgements of people considered (rightly or wrongly) particularly competent. In the Florentine market, between the 14th and the 16th centuries, two subjects emerged, who could claim to be more suited than

2 On Filippo Calandri’s contribution (but also on Luca Pacioli’s) see E.D. Sylla, Business Ethics, Commercial Mathematics and the Origins of Mathematical Probabilities, in “History of Political Economy”, 35, 2003, pp. 319–322. On the relationship between mercantile mathematical culture, abacus schools and the concept of probability, see I. Schneider, Why Do We Find the Origin of a Calculus of Probabilities in the Seventeenth Century?, in Probabilistic Thinking, Thermodynamics and the Interaction of the History of Philosophy of Science, ed. by J. Jintikka, D. Gruender, A. Agazzi, Proceedings of the 1978 Pisa Conference on the History and Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980, vol. II, pp. 6–7 and A.W. Crosby, The Measure of Reality. Quantification and Western Society. 1250–1600, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 221–222. For the abacus schools in Renaissance Florence, cf. R. Black, Education and Society in Florentine Tuscany. Teachers, Pupils and Schools, c. 1250– 1500, Leiden, Brill, 2007, pp. 327–468, in particular pp. 366–367 and 379 (for references to the two Gondi brothers).

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others at pricing to the risks connected to maritime trade: the specialized broker and the “leading insurer”. Intermediation has been a characteristic trait of insurance ever since this type of contract appeared in the coastal cities of the Mediterranean. In Barcelona, as in Venice, Genoa and Florence, both the insurance buyers and the underwriters made use of the skills offered by brokers, the qualified experts that could help them strike a deal.3 The profession had become common since the mid-14th century, when intermediaries were entrusted with the task of materially drawing up the policies; where this role had remained the notary’s prerogative, their spread had to wait the course of the 15th century.4 Insurance buyers turned to middlemen because they were specialised in finding individuals willing to take on the risks of navigation, thus saving time and reducing the costs derived from carrying out this research.5 However, the range of services offered by brokers, though varying from one place to another, was much wider. Brokers could also act as cashiers, by paying the premiums on behalf of the insurance buyer or settling compensation in the name of the underwriter.6 Intermediaries also performed the function of managing the claim process in case of mishap: from the damage report to the payment of compensation.7 Always a central figure in this complex procedure, the broker’s role became crucial during controversies. The middleman could be involved when the parties attempted to solve the dispute through arbitration, but also when the discord was such as to cause the matter to end up to court.8 Finally, we need to recall that in some of the largest insurance markets (Florence, Pisa, 3 Cf. Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 147–152; Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani, op.cit., pp. 463–464; Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima a Venezia, op.cit., pp. 82–88. 4 On Barcelona, see Del Treppo, I mercanti catalani, op.cit., pp. 458–464; for Genoa, see Giacchero, Storia delle assicurazioni marittime, op.cit., pp. 117–136 and Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 152–159. 5 Cf. A. Rubinstein, A. Wolinsky, Middlemen, in “Quarterly Journal of Economics”, 102, 1987, pp. 581–593; Ph.T. Hoffman, G. Postel-Vinay, J-L. Rosenthal, What do Notaries do? Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751, in “Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics”, 154, 1998, pp. 499–530. 6 This practice was especially common in Venice, but examples can also be found in Genoa and Marseilles; cf. Boiteux, La fortune de mer, op.cit., pp. 137–139 and Pene Vidari, Il contratto d’assicurazione nell’età moderna, op.cit., p. 228. 7 A good example of notification and subsequent procedures is found in a policy stipulated on 27th September 1397 (the broker was Cristofano Pantaleoni), in favour of the Datini firm, cf. DATINI 1159, doc. 86. For documents relating to the calculation of claim and compensation procedures, cf. ibid., docs. 153 and 160. 8 On the role of brokers in case of private settlement of insurance controversies, see Piattoli, Ricerche intorno all’assicurazione nel medioevo V, op.cit., pp. 160–164. Examples of brokers’ testimonies in court are mentioned by Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima

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and Venice), the broker was also the person who physically drew up the policy and in other cities (for example, Genoa) he was responsible for collecting the tax imposed on such contracts.9 The broad array of functions carried out made these professionals absolutely essential component of any insurance market. It is, therefore, not surprising that brokers have been described as the “guardians of reputation”, to whom both the insurance buyer and the underwriter could turn to safeguard the trust relations underpinning the transactions.10 As a matter of fact, a number of mechanisms, both formal and informal, tended to accentuate their role as impartial arbiters between supply and demand. At the customary level, by breaking the link between a broker’s commission fee and the premium rate, the intermediary was discouraged from having an active role in the transaction. On the legal side, starting with Barcelona’s Ordinances of 1435, a series of ad-hoc measures tried to reinforce their role as a third party, vis-à-vis insurance buyers and underwriters.11 The picture illustrated so far describes a professional category of a certain importance, which was likely to enjoy a high degree of credibility; yet it says nothing about brokers’ real skills in estimating risks. To do this, it is necessary to understand their level of specialization and to what extent they were involved in the negotiations, especially at the stage when the premium was fixed. Perhaps the growing expectations concerning intermediaries’ competence determined an early selection process among individuals considered suitable for the task. Initially, insurance was just one of the sectors in which these professionals could operate. Some of the most important insurance brokers in 1380s Pisa, for example, were also active in trade, banking and money changing intermediation.12 Such diversification, however, did not change the fact that professionals charged with drafting policies still made up a rather restricted group. At the end of the 14th century, there were only a few brokers to whom the Datini firms could turn, 10 in Pisa and 7 in Florence, during a period of 24 a Venezia, op.cit., pp. 564–570 and Piattoli, Ricerche intorno all’assicurazione nel medioevo VI, op.cit., pp. 165–176. 9 In Savona and Ancona insurance contracts started to be drawn up by brokers in late 15th century; cf. Spagnesi, Aspetti dell’assicurazione medievale, op.cit., pp. 131–178; Pene Vidari, Il contratto d’assicurazione nell’età moderna, op.cit., p. 271–285; La Torre, L’assicurazione nella storia delle idee, op.cit., pp. 139–145. On the tasks of a fiscal nature assigned to brokers, see Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 152–159. 10 Kingston, Intermediation and Trust, op.cit., pp. 1–37. 11 Decree n. 18 of the “Ordinacions de la Ciutat de Barcelona sobre asegurances maritimes” of 1345; cf. Consolat de Mar, op.cit., p. 43. For later codifications, references may be found in Ceccarelli, Dalla Compagnia medievale alle Compagnie assicuratrici, op.cit., pp. 400–401. 12 Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 147–148.

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and 18 years, respectively. In part, this was due to early associative forms set up among the brokers: in Florence, Michele di Marco availed himself of two clerks; so did Giovanni di Jacopo del Riccio who, through his assistant, was able to work in Pisa, too. Here, a partnership firm made up of two brokers (Matteo di Guccio and Niccolò Manovelli) was also operating.13 If we take into consideration shorter periods of time, we have the impression that many brokers operated in a kind of monopoly regime. Between 1391 and 1396, out of the 57 extant policies stipulated in Florence, 49 were drawn up by Michele di Marco. In the following years, from 1397 to 1400, Cristofano Pantaleoni had apparently become the top broker. As many as 50 out of 53 contracts among the holdings of the Datini archives were mediated by him. Moreover, Pantaleoni prepared the few other extant policies of the time, those stipulated in favour of the Averardo and Malatesta Medici and partners.14 In Pisa too, according to the Datini documentation, the trend was for a single broker to attract the majority of contracts. At the beginning, most policies were drawn up by Gherardo d’Ormanno (between 1383 and 1388), with some later competition from Matteo di Guccio and Niccolo Manovelli, who had set up a partnership (1387–1395). The two were replaced by Antonio Zanobi from Castagnolo (1395–1396) followed by Gherardo di Giovanni from Siena (from 1399 to 1402). Further confirmation, though pertaining to the last decades of the 15th century, comes from Genoa and Venice, where the most significant share of transactions seems to have been dealt with by just two or three intermediaries.15 Back to Florence, but moving on to the 16th century, the process of concentration of brokerage into the hands of a few individuals had notably accelerated. By comparing different sources, we can spot the hegemony exerted by just two mediators, around whom insurance transactions had polarized right from the start of the century. Raggio Raggi’s career was very long indeed: in business since 1506, this broker was seemingly still active in 1528.16 Bartolomeo Ricoveri’s involvement was briefer, although he appeared as the broker in a 13 Cf. Daveggia, L’intermediazione assicurativa, op.cit., p. 330 with DATINI 1158 and 1159. 14 MEDICI, 84, docs. 2–5. 15 On Genoa, see Giacchero, Storia delle assicurazioni marittime, op.cit., pp. 117–136 and Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 152–159, especially p. 156. For Venice reference has been made to Table 2, found in appendix to Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima a Venezia, op.cit., pp. 502–524, from which it emerges that among the over 80 contracts bearing the broker’s name, 55 were drawn up by Zuan Trevisan (for the period 1470–1496), 25 by Alvise Trevisan (1498–1526) and only 3 by two other brokers (Jacomo de Stefani and Francesco Jacomini). 16 For the former see Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., p. 159, for the latter SALVIATI 749, fol. 559.

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policy of 1513 and was still working in 1527.17 The account books of important firm agglomerates of the time, such as the Gondi and Salviati, confirm that whoever wanted to have insurance cover in Florence was to approach either one or the other.18 As concerns Raggi, apparently his activities were not limited to the Florentine market but were also extended to Ancona.19 According to the extant documents, the monopoly regime of the two brokers was interrupted only in 1528, when Niccolò Sterelli supposedly replaced Ricoveri, who had probably quit the profession the previous year.20 So, just by looking at the case of Florence, it seems relatively clear that between the 14th and the 16th centuries, insurance intermediation was becoming more and more concentrated in the hands of a few specialists. Their pivotal role and their skills must have been well known to their customers who likely agreed that brokers had a better standpoint from which to observe the trend of premium rates. It is, therefore, plausible that, though respecting their clients’ decisions, intermediaries enjoyed a certain margin of autonomy, both in the choice of underwriters, and in negotiating the premium. We know, for example, that in early 16th century, the Gondi firm was willing to grant full autonomy and trust to their preferred broker, Raggio Raggi, for stipulating policies on their behalf.21 In general, the patient work of bringing together the negotiating parties, carried out by the intermediaries, also reveals brokers’ involvement in establishing the premium rates. The Datini policies, as we have often remarked, contain many examples of brokers engaged on continually modifying the initially fixed conditions.22 The changes usually impacted on the premium that the insurance buyer had to pay to the underwriters, which sometimes varied in relation to different insurers within the same contract. Even in Raggi’s more schematic registrations, traces can be found of these personal deals, the clear

17 For this policy, see Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., p. 34–35; the last reference to Giovanbattista Bracci’s accounts is found in SALVIATI 749, fol. 347. 18 Here it may suffice to recall that in all the materials examined no mention is found of another insurance broker until 1528. 19 This can be surmised from a registration in SALVIATI 742, fol. 436. 20 SALVIATI 744, fol. 117v; this is the Giornale segnato C (“Journal marked C”) of the Alamanno and Battista di Alamanno Salviati & Partners of the Florence Bank. Sterelli acted as a broker for the Salviati Bank in Florence—which, in its turn, operated under on commission for the Salviati firm of Pisa—for the stipulation of a policy on 16 September 1528 regarding the Flanders-Leghorn route. 21 Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 109–113. 22 Cf. DATINI 1158, docs. 33, 36, 68, 85, 97, 110, 130 and DATINI 1159, docs. 15, 50, 87, 94.

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symptom of a mechanism that kept reproducing itself over time.23 There are also some previously mentioned instances of contracts in which the terms were modified in progress by additional clauses, which resulted in an adjustment of the premium.24 Those cases, where the premium was redefined, allow us to understand, better than other situations, the central role played by the broker when it came to estimating insurance costs. Although the redefinition of the initial conditions was normally requested by the insurance buyer or the underwriters, the intermediary’s function went beyond taking note of their will; rather, it implied an active role aimed at finding a synthesis between the often diverging demands. For middlemen, being in the condition of observing the impact additional clauses had on premium was a “testing ground” where to appreciate the relative weight each factor had in risk evaluation. We must not forget that a single element of the contract was often enough to determine a price variation: the seacraft used, the route to follow, the goods transported, the risks from which the underwriters were excluded, etc. Perhaps without realizing it, brokers were subjected to a type of mental training ideal for stimulating some kind of pseudo-frequentist reasoning. It is hard to measure how often intermediaries had to engage in this sort of exercise, but undoubtedly, out of all the individuals operating in the insurance market, no one else did so more often than these professionals. On the basis of the available data, we previously hypothesized that between 1524 and 1526, Raggio Raggi and Bartolomeo Ricoveri probably mediated about 300 policies a year each, with the frequency approaching one policy a day. Insurance buyers and underwriters, including the most constant ones, could not keep pace with this rhythm: the former dealt, at the most, with one contract every five or six days, whilst there are exceptional cases in the latter of 20 policies a month (Giovanbattista Bracci). The statements that brokers handed to Francesco Datini to receive payments for their services concretely illustrate the strenuous task facing them. These long lists of insurance operations, diligently compiled in chronological order, also included all the crucial information: the goods and their value, the itinerary, the vessel and its ship master, and finally the premium.25 The Libro di ricordi di sicurtà as well is nothing but another example of such a document. Raggi used this ledger to note 23 The examples from the end of the 14th century are all related to policies stipulated in Pisa; cf. DATINI 1158, docs. 64, 119, 147. For 1524–1526, there are 11 instances of this type, cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 27v–28r, 31v, 41v, 46v, 53v, 58r–v, 64v, 78r, 120r, 138v–139r. 24 Ibid., docs. 8r, 21r, 27v–28r, 98v, 99v, 114v, 130r–130v. 25 The transcriptions of these documents can be read in Daveggia, L’intermediazione assicurativa, op.cit., pp. 359–372; Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp 148–151. Further unpublished examples (by the broker Michele di Marco) are in DATINI 1159, docs. 143 and 144.

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down the main elements of the policies he had drawn up, but by doing so he reshaped his operations in a more logical and rationally structured framework.26 It is impossible to tell whether brokers, when mediating between the counterparts, used the data stored in their registers to evaluate the risks, or if the practice of transcribing policies improved their forecasting skills. When we study the transcriptions they made, the impression of being confronted with something as close to statistical measurement as it was possible in a world lacking the concept of mathematical probability is very strong. A far more complex matter is when it comes to cases in which brokers had to rely on subjective evaluation criteria, based on unconscious inference. However, the central role acquired by these experts placed them in an ideal position to express predictions that could be considered both authoritative and trustworthy by other operators. A professional insurance broker such as Raggi, with many years of experience in the field, could surely be relied upon to formulate a valid opinion even in those situations in which the pseudo-frequentist approach was not best suited for forecasting. However, brokers were not the only ones who could boast of outstanding skills at quantifying the risks of maritime trade. They were undoubtedly flanked by all the other major players in the Florentine insurance market. Testimonies dating to the 18th century tell the stories of reputed insurers whose ability at evaluating risks were widely recognized by all the other actors in the business. These were the “leading insurers”, the name scholars give to those underwriters that most frequently accepted to put their signature on a new policy when it was placed on the market. They were credited with great experience and superior access to information, so much so that both the insurance buyers and the brokers tried to obtain their opening signature, since this allowed them to place the remaining quotas of the contract more easily. The cover supplied by the “leading insurers” convinced many “occasional” underwriters to operate in a business of which they might have no specialist knowledge.27 In 18th-century markets, amateur underwriters had an increasing role in providing coverage, so it is understandable that the documents of the time tended to emphasize the authoritativeness of “leading insurers”. For Renaissance Florence, there is no explicit testimony about the role played by these subjects, 26 For a description of this type of material see Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp 159–162. 27 On London, cf. C. Kingston, Marine Insurance in Britain and America, 1720–1844: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, in “The Journal of Economic History”, 67, 2007, p. 386; Id., Intermediation and Trust, op.cit., pp. 30–31; A.H. John, The London Assurance Company and Marine Insurance Market of the Eighteenth Century, in “Economica”, s.n. 25, 1958, p. 127. On Amsterdam, see Boiteux, L’assurance maritime à Paris, op.cit., p. 15 and Spooner, Risk at Sea, op.cit., pp. 19–25.

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nor do studies carried out on other insurance markets in the 14th–16th centuries hint at anybody resembling a “leader” among co-insurers. Moreover, the structure of insurance supply was different from that characterizing the large 18th-century markets of Amsterdam and London, with “occasional” insurers playing in Florence a rather marginal role, as we have often remarked. However, it is not improbable that the class of “intermittent insurers”, who met a significant portion of demand, could be induced to follow the decisions made by well-known operators that were more regular in their involvement. To try and solve the question, we can start by checking the names of those who, both in the Datini policies and in Raggi’s registrations, had the opening position. As concerns the late 14th century, we can only imagine to spot some general trends. In about 130 policies stipulated in favour of the Datini firms, about 40 insurers alternated as “leading insurers”. More than 50% of the contracts, however, were opened by a more restricted group (8 in all), among whom the most frequent ones were Cino Rinuccini and Nofri di Giovanni Bischeri, who opened the subscriptions 25 and 11 times, respectively. We already know that these two operators, for the number of underwritten quotas and their value, met the most considerable share of Datini’s demand. The propensity shown by both to operate as “leading insurer” probably mirrored their high level of involvement in the insurance market. It is much more interesting to find out those who showed a marked tendency to “open” subscriptions in relation to the total number of policies they stipulated. Inghilese d’Inghilese, for example, had the “lead” in seven out of eight policies he underwrote; Niccolò di Jacopo Guasconi in seven cases out of 10; and Leonardo Tigliamoschi in all the three instances in which he provided cover for the Datini firms. Their operating pattern seems to indicate a certain kind of “specialisation” compared to others who, like Rinuccini and Bischeri (but also Arrigo di ser Piero Mucini and Filippo di Simone Tornabuoni), though certainly playing a top role in the market, were more cautious when it came to “opening” a contract.28 For the 1524–1526 period we can draw clearer indications, although some methodological caveat is required for this source as well. A preliminary and summary analysis of the data highlights the presence of individuals that were generally more willing than others to “open” subscriptions for a policy. This

28

Cino Rinuccini was the top signatory in 25 out of 49 instances, Nofri di Giovanni Bischeri in 11 out of 28, Arrigo di ser Piero Mucini in 4 out of 15, Filippo di Simone Tornabuoni in 3 out of 14; cf. DATINI 1159, docs. 1–137.

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task was taken by a very restricted group, made up of about 40 “underwriting subjects”, who alone covered 70% of the 833 contracts under consideration.29 Another intriguing element is provided by the substantial lack of homogeneity between the way the total quotas underwritten by insurers are distributed, and the percentage of those stipulated in the role of “leading insurer” alone. If we compare the group made up of people underwriting more than 75 quotas to that which includes those who “opened” a policy at least six times, both the hierarchy and composition of the two groups are significantly different. Almost half the denominations included in the former group do not appear in the latter (and vice versa); only 20 subjects belong to both.30 Giovanbattista Bracci is a point in case, falling to the 70th position among the “leading insurers”. Francesco Martellini is another: although he subscribed over 150 quotas, he never had the “opening” place. Instead, the Francesco di Piero Pitti & Bartolomeo Lanfredini & partners operated very differently: they have the “lead” in five of the only 16 contracts they ever stipulated. The scant correlation between total coverage provided and the propensity to “open” subscriptions confirms the opinion that some operators were more specialised than others. The profile of these “experts” was definite: they were largely “underwriting subjects” acting through a partnership firm, plus some principal investors or partners of business firms providing coverage individually. We are, thus, looking at a group of people that had better access to the necessary information to authoritatively operate in the industry. In absolute terms, five “underwriting 29

This is based on the logical assumption that Raggi transcribed insurers’ names according to the sequence in the policy he was registering. The Libro di ricordi di sicurtà sometimes reveals those instances when the broker added subscribers at a later date, and without respecting the order followed in the policy; cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 12r, 29r–29v and 33r. In our attempt to identify the “leading insurers” we have not taken into consideration the almost 50 transcriptions which appeared to be “additions” to previously recorded policies. 30 Though figuring among the “leading insurers”, the following were not part of the group of major policy underwriters in terms of overall quotas: Marco di Simone del Nero and partners, Carlo Ginori and partners, Jacopo Ricasoli, Gherardo Bartolini (on his own), Ludovico Capponi, Leonardo Ginori & Giovanbattista Pitti and partners, Mariotto Segni, Leonardo da Filicaia, Giovanmaria Benintendi, Lorenzo Soderini, Leonardo Bartoli, Paolo di Daniele Dazzi, Stefano di Filippo del Benino and partners The following names belong instead to both groups: Averardo di Alamanno Salviati and partners, Agnolo di Pierozzo del Rosso, Gherardo Bartolini & Bartolomeo Lanfredini and partners, Agostino di Francesco Dini and partners, Neri Venturi, Alessandro Antinori, Zanobi Saliti, Averardo Salviati (on his own), Bernardo & Antonio Gondi and partners, Jacopo Balducci and partners, Giovanbattista Bracci, Mariano del Palagio, Matteo Borgianni, Niccolò di Piero Capponi and partners, Gerolamo da Gavina, Giovanfrancesco Franceschi, Pere Labia, Domenico di Niccolò Giugni and partners Bankers, Leonardo Mannelli and partners, Matteo di Simone Botti, Zanobi Canigiani, Lorenzo di Piero Dazzi, Gherardo di Francesco Taddei.

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subjects”—the Salviati banking firm, Agnolo del Rosso, the Bartolini & Lanfredini banking firm, the Agostino Dini & partners and Neri Venturi—stand out sharply from the rest. Out of every ten contracts transcribed by Raggi, 4 were opened by one or the other’s signature.31 Two of them are well known to us (the Averardo Salviati & partners, and Agnolo del Rosso), and we will come back shortly to Agostino Dini and Neri Venturi. However, it is interesting to note that for the Salviati bank, its role as “leading insurer” seemed a direct consequence of its participation to the “syndicate” which we saw was a distinctive trait of how this firm operated on the market. It is no coincidence if some members of the “syndicate” seldom (Giovanbattista and Zanobi Bracci) or never (Francesco Martellini) were in the “opening” position of a contract. Probably the strategy of the “syndicate” destined this function to the firm headed by Averardo Salviati. An important insight on these “experts” is provided by the business Bartolomeo Lanfredini and Gherardo Bartolini carried out jointly. Their relationship had resulted in the creation of an important bank that enjoyed enormous prestige at the Papal Court, as well as in a firm for the manufacturing of gold thread and beaten gold, the “Gherardo Bartolini e compagni, battiloro” (goldbeaters). They were also active in international commerce, through a series of specialised firms: a partnership between Gherardo Bartolini and Giovanni Cavalcanti carried out trade with England, whilst the Zanobi & Gherardo Bartolini & partners traded with the Levant, extending its European business as far as Germany, with a partnership in accomandita with Piero Saliti.32 Their insurance activities were exceptionally intense: the various “underwriting subjects” referable to their partnership agglomerate covered 4% of the insurance supply and more than 5% of the insurance demand for the years 1524–1526. The Libro di ricordi di sicurtà allows us to date the end of this 31

32

Concerning Gherardo Bartolini and Bartolomeo Lanfredini, we should also consider the other firms in which they were involved; these in their turn often acted in the “leading insurer’s” role: the Gherardo Bartolini and partners Goldbeaters (8 times), the Zanobi and Gherardo Bartolini and partners (5 times), and the Pitti & Lanfredini and partners (5 times). The case of the last two firms is especially significant, as they operated only during the four final months covered by our documentary sources. Cf. Bullard, Filippo Strozzi and the Medici, op.cit., pp. 73–76, 123, 127; S. Calonacci, under Lanfredini, Bartolomeo, in DBI, vol. LXIII, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2004, pp. 596–598; V. Arrighi, under Lanfredini, Lanfredino, in DBI, vol. LXIII, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 2004, pp. 602–605; R. Cantagalli, under Bartolini Salimbeni, Gherardo, in DBI, vol. VI, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1964, pp. 630–631; Id., under Bartolini Salimbeni, Zanobi, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, in DBI, vol. VI, Rome, Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana, 1964, pp. 631–633; Goldthwaite, The Economy of Renaissance Florence, op.cit., p. 199.

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business association, which coincided with the last months of 1525, when the two started to underwrite quotas using their own names, followed by the unusual formula “a parte” (“separately”).33 The split was formally confirmed in the following financial year, at the end of March 1526, when Gherardo started operating in partnership with his son Zanobi (using the denomination Zanobi & Gherardo Bartolini & partners), whilst Bartolomeo set up a new business firm: the Francesco Pitti & Bartolomeo Lanfredini & partners.34 The total number of policies stipulated as “leading insurer” is only generally indicative of Florentine operators’ degree of specialisation. As we anticipated when discussing the insurers of the Datini firms, “opening” often a contract could be a simple and direct consequence of their overall involvement in the market. To obtain a better picture of the “risk experts”, figures must be considered in relative terms, that is by comparing it with the quantity of contracts that each of them should have been expected to “open” in the case of regular distribution among all the underwriters.35 If we adopt this point of view, three types of operators emerge: those who tended to act as “leading insurers” also in relative terms (the true specialists); those that do not diverge from the expected average; and lastly, those that seemed to apply a “follower” strategy and preferred to shadow the “lead” of othersubjects. Among the last, we find businessmen who had a remarkable role in absolute terms; however, when they decided to subscribe a policy, they always did so in the wake of someone else’s decision. This was the case for Filippo degli Albizzi, Gerolamo da Gavina and Gherardo Taddei—whom we suggested made up a “syndicate” of co-insurers acting according to a coordinated strategy—and were usually operating following Agnolo del Rosso’s business choices. The true “risk experts” are thus reduced to a small number of “underwriting subjects”, about fifteen operators characterised by homogeneous socioprofessional profiles (see Table 11.1). They “opened” 434 out of 833 policies recorded by Raggi in 1524–1526; this detail shows, more than any other, to what extent the role of “leading insurer” was the preserve of a restricted minority. 33

Cf. for example, SALVIATI 70, fols. 104v, 106v, 108v, 109r–v, 110v, 112v, 113r, 114v, 115r, 123v, 124r, 126r (for the denomination “Gherardo Bartolini a parte”) and doc. 122v (for “Bartolomeo Lanfredini a parte”). 34 Ibid., docs. 126r–v, 128r, 129r–v, 130r–v, 131r, 135r, 137v, 138r–v, 139v, 141v, 142r–v (for the Francesco Pitti & Bartolomeo Lanfredini & partners) and docs. 130r, 137r–v, 138v (for “Zanobi & Gherardo Bartolini & partners”). 35 In the hypothesis of homogeneous distribution of the subscriptions opening the policies, an intervention as “leading insurer” should appear in about 10% of quotas covered by each “underwriting subject”. This is obviously an average value, which enables us to measure, for every insurer, his greater or lesser propensity to commit himself to putting his signature at the top of the contract.

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table 11.1 Underwritten quotas by the main “leading insurers” in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

Total n. of Underwritten quotas

Quotas as “leading insurer” as a percentage of all underwritten quotas

“Underwriting subject”

N. of underwritten Quotas as “leading insurer”

Salviati, Averardo and partners Bartolini, Gherardo & Lanfredini, Bartolomeo and partners Bartolini, Gherardo (individually) Del Rosso, Agnolo di Pierozzo Capponi, Ludovico Dini, Agostino di Francesco and partners Venturi, Neri Segni, Mariotto di Piero Del Nero, Marco di Simone and partners Antinori, Alessandro (individually) Saliti, Zanobi (individually) Ginori, Leonardo & Pini, Giovanbattista and partners Del Palagio, Mariano (individually) Del Benino, Stefano di Filippo and partners Da Filicaia, Leonardo Gondi, Bernardo & Antonio and partners Total “Leading Insurers” Other insurers Overall Total

145 48

230 131

63.0 36.6

8 63 8 36

23 209 29 143

34.8 30.1 27.6 25.2

34 8 14

137 33 64

24.8 24.2 21.9

13

76

17.1

13 8

77 48

16.9 16.7

11

71

15.5

6

39

15.4

7 12

46 81

15.2 14.8

434 399 833

1,437 6,839 8,276

30.2 5.8 10.1

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r.

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Some of the major businessmen of the time subscribing individually can be counted in the group (Alessandro Antinori and Gherardo Bartolini), while others were operating through their firms (Bernardo and Antonio Gondi, Marco del Nero, Bartolomeo Lanfredini and Averardo Salviati). Many others were principal investors or partners in business firms and could boast of a long family tradition in the fields of trade and finance. For example, Agostino di Francesco Dini, who was principal of a silk cloth firm in Florence, son of a merchantbanker operating Venice and grandson of the substantial Florentine businessman Antonio di Salvestro Serristori; or Mariano del Palagio who was partner of a business firm operating in the city, the Giovanbattista Guidotti & partners.36 Neri Venturi, principal investor of a wool manufacturing firm, was part (with his cousin Leonardo) of a commercial network trading in the Levant, while Zanobi Saliti had established a flourishing business in Nuremberg, and Ludovico Capponi, if the identification we are putting forward is correct, was the principal of an important bank in Rome.37 The others were certainly no outsiders in the business world. Stefano del Benino, Leonardo Ginori and Giovanbattista Pitti acted on behalf of their own partnership firms; Mariotto Segni and Leonardo da Filicaia belonged to families that had been steeped in commerce for generations; Agnolo del Rosso, as we have seen, could boast of an insurance tradition dating back to his grandfather.38 It is clear that, although with varying intensity depending on the insurer, this group of specialists had easier access to information than the “occasional” or “intermittent” operators. 36 37

38

On the Dini family’s activities see Tognetti, Da Figline a Firenze, op.cit., pp. 74–75, 87–88; SALVIATI 742, fol. 24 and SALVIATI 749, fol.8. For the Giovanbattista Guidotti and partners see SALVIATI 742, fols. 150–151. On Neri and Leonardo Venturi, cf. Dini, Saggi su una economia-mondo, op.cit., pp. 252 and following; on the Saliti family members and their commercial activities in Germany, cf. M. Spallanzani, Le compagnie Saliti a Norimberga nella prima metà del Cinquecento (un primo contributo dagli archivi fiorentini), in Wirtschaftkrȁfte und Wirtschaftswege: Festschrift fȕr Hermann Kellenbenz, vol. I: Mittelmeer und Kontinent, ed. by J. Schneider, Nuremberg, Klett-Cotta, 1978, pp. 603–620. On Ludovico di Gino di Ludovico Capponi (at first manager of the Guiducci bank, and then partner in his father-in-law Giovanfrancesco Martelli’s bank) see F.W. Kent, Household and Lineage in Renaissance Florence: The Family Life of the Capponi, Ginori and Rucellai, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977, pp. 94–95 and Bullard, Filippo Strozzi and the Medici, op.cit., p. 148n. Mariotto di Piero, politician and father of Bernardo, the author of the Istorie Fiorentine, was likely the brother of that Alessandro di Piero Segni who, thanks to the Salviati bank’s documents, we know owned a goldbeating firm, cf. SALVIATI 742, docs. 22 and 34; on the Segni family’s commercial activities see Hoshino, L’Arte della lana in Firenze, op.cit., p. 271 and Dini, Saggi su una economia-mondo, op.cit., p. 277. On Leonardo from Filicaia, refer to F. Melis, Documenti per la storia economica dei secoli XIII–XVI, Florence, Olschki, 1972, p. 408.

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A business agglomerate such as the Salviati one, for example, could take advantage of the news circulating among the firms operating in Florence, Lyon, Pisa and Naples, but it was also constantly updated by its correspondence with businessmen working in all corners of Europe. For the years under investigation, the extant letters of the Salviati firms give us a glimpse of a network that, radiating from the axis between Tuscany and Lyon, encompassed all the major trading centres of the time, from Dubrovnik to London, Antwerp to Rome, Seville to Milan, Genoa to Constantinople, including Venice and Nuremberg.39 These “risk experts” could profit from not only updated information, but also business expertise, as well as the often longstanding involvement in the insurance sector. The combination of such features makes it easier to understand the reason why they showed a marked propensity for “opening” the subscriptions of a policy. While brokers were placed in the best position to formulate forecasts using pseudo-frequentist approach, the “leading insurers” of Florence were perfectly suited to making predictions through unconscious inferences. The wealth of information deriving from commercial level, their high-level mathematical training in the abbaco schools and the skills developed in years of operations in maritime trade, all these combined factors made them the real experts, capable of evaluating both structural and contingent risks.40 A closer look to the profiles of some of these “leading insurers” provides further elements to comprehend the influence they had on the market. Some of them seem to have acted as “catalysts” for insurance supply, showing a particular attitude to take the “lead” whenever it was necessary to find a considerable number of underwriters, and/or to cover contracts worth large amounts of money. In almost 40% of the 110 policies stipulated by more than 20 coinsurers, the Averardo Salviati & partners “opens” the subscriptions, and a similar tendency, albeit less evident, was shown by the firm agglomerate of Gherardo Bartolini. In these situations, a deliberate strategy seems to have been at play: by exploiting the undoubted credibility of these substantial businessmen, brokers and the insurance buyers managed to attract other underwriters that normally remained at the margins of the market, but who had to be mobilised for these special occasions.41 39

40 41

In addition to SALVIATI 481, see SALVIATI 475 and SALVIATI 493, which include the correspondence from the Lyon firm to the cities north of the Alps (“di qua da’ Monti”) for the years 1520–1523 and 1526–1530, as well as SALVIATI 738 which records the Averardo Salviati and partners’ Florentine bank’s correspondence (1520–1525). Cf. Sylla, Business Ethics, Commercial Mathematics, op.cit., pp. 323 and 325. These cases make up about a third of stipulations in which the Averardo Salviati and partners appears at the top of the list of co-insurers and about one fifth when the first signatory was the Bartolini & Lanfredini bank; cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 1r–144r.

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Some type of geographical specialisation can be inferred in the case of yet other “leading insurers”, as some of them prevalently took on this role in connection with certain itineraries. A good example is the Marco del Nero & partners, that seemed more willing to “open” the subscriptions of contracts covering transports coming from the Levant and from Northern Europe. Not coincidentally, these trading routes and markets represented a good share of this wool firm’s turnover, which often imported raw material directly from England and re-exported the finished products to Constantinople.42 A similar trend can also be noted for Agostino Dini’s firm, which seemed instead specialised in contracts relating to the inter-Tyrrhenian routes, and more precisely, to those connecting the Sicilian and Sardinian ports with Rome and Liguria.43 The willingness to take the “lead” on certain itineraries shown by these operators reveals strong similarities with what happened, in later centuries, in London and Amsterdam, at least according to contemporary testimonies. After learning from the insurance buyer which itinerary the policy was supposed to cover—an English broker explained in early 19th century—he approached an insurer who was well-known for his business in that region, so that others would follow in his decision, though they might have known little about the risks of that route.44 It has been mentioned that, for 14th to 16th-century Florence, there is no such sources. No explicit descriptions of the role played by “leading insurers” in formulating a reliable evaluation of risk, which would then influence and 42 Ibid., docs. 102r, 102v, 109v, 112v, 113v–114r, 129r, 130v, 139v. Out of 14 times when the firm figured as “leading insurer”, 4 concerned cargoes departing from the North Sea (Bordeaux and Southampton) and 4 related to transports coming from the East (Alexandria and Constantinople); about 1/5 of contracts stipulated by the “Neri & partners” in the role of insured related to transports from England; moreover, insurance cover in favour of this firm makes up slightly less than 25% of all policies recorded for trips from and to the northern Atlantic. Further proof of Marco del Nero’s intense trading connections with the English markets, is provided by a policy stipulated on a commission by a firm based in London, the Jacopo Capponi and partners; ibid., docs. 106v–107r. 43 They represent almost one third of the 34 policies signed by the Dini firm as “leading insurer”: 7 for the Sicily-Rome or Sicily-Liguria routes; one for Tunisia-Naples; two for Sardinia-Liguria; cf. ibid., docs. 6r, 8r, 9r–v, 10r, 11v, 41r–v, 90v–91r, 94v. 44 This was a testimony given by a London broker in front of the British Parliament’s investigating commission (Select Committee on Marine Insurance), recorded in Kingston, Intermediation and Trust, op.cit., p. 30: “If I have a cross risk to make, if it is from America, I go to a box where there are Americans to give me information; and so it is from the Baltic or any other part […] they are the people who can begin the policy for me better than the others, and I can by that means get it done”. Something similar probably happened in Amsterdam in the 17th century, as insurers were separated according to their geographical origins and sat in three different places within the city’s Stock Exchange, cf. Spooner, Risk at Sea, op.cit., pp. 18–19.

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attract less competent underwriters can be found. And yet, if we look closer, we find an unexpected testimony in the writings of Giovanni da Prato, dating from the mid-15th century. Giovanni was a Franciscan preacher, a disciple of Bernardino of Siena and the son of the Prato merchant Pietro di Milanesi (probably a distant relative of a Francesco di Domenico del Milanese, included among the underwriters of our 1524–1526 sample). This friar seems to have been rather familiar with marine insurance;45 his treatment of the subject, which was in line with the longstanding position of theologians and jurists on this type of contract, becomes more interesting when he tackles the issue of premiums. Giovanni da Prato understood that the underwriter’s payment depended on the percentage of risk (“proportio periculi”) that he accepted to take on; but Giovanni also added that this should be quantified (“taxare”) by expert operators, skilled in the business (“iustorum mercatorum”).46 Behind his terminology, strongly influenced by Scholastic literature, we can detect a not-too-veiled reference to subjects recalling the “leading insurers” of Renaissance Florence, i.e., a group of specialists, to whom the Franciscan preacher seemed to delegate the task of pricing the risks of maritime trade. We cannot be entirely sure if such indications were always followed by those operating in the market. Yet, seeing the Salviati firm or the Bartolini & Lanfredini bank “opening” the subscriptions of a policy could undoubtedly convince others to add their signatures to the contract. Following the lead of a “risk expert”, be it a skilled broker or a competent insurer, had the disadvantage of limiting an individual’s bargaining power in negotiating the premium. It, however, had an advantage inasmuch as it spared “occasional” underwriters from extra costs that research for information on the risks of navigation would have entailed. 45

Giovanni from Prato’s intellectual profile is described in C. Piana, L’evoluzione degli studi nell’Osservanza francescana nella prima metà del ’400 e la polemica tra Guarino da Verona e fra Giovanni da Prato a Ferrara (1450), in “Analecta Pomposiana” 7 (1982), pp. 249–289. For further biographical details, see F. Bacchelli, under Giovanni da Prato, in DBI, vol. LVI, Rome, 2001, pp. 185–187. Francesco del Milanese underwrote two policies between April and May 1526, with total exposure of just fl. 75; cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 63v and 77r. 46 Ioannis de Prato, Summula Contractuum, Biblioteca Universitaria di Padova, ms. 694, f. 145r: “[…] sequitur quod assecuration mercantiarum non videtur iniusta; ut si quis merces existentes in periculo assecurat ex ratione hac iuxta proportionem periculi quod assecurat aliquid accipit, non videtur iniuste facere; et maxime si quod accipit taxetur arbitrio iustorum mercatorum”. For a deeper analysis of this text, and for Giovanni da Prato’s views on ethics and economics, may I refer the reader to G. Ceccarelli, Quando rischiare è lecito. Il credito finalizzato al commercio marittimo nella riflessione scolastica tardomedievale, in Ricchezza del mare. Ricchezza dal mare, op.cit., pp. 1187–1199 and to Id., Concezioni economiche dell’Occidente cristiano alla fine del medioevo: fonti e materiali inediti, in Religione e istituzioni religiose nell’economia europea (1000–1800), ed. by S. Cavaciocchi, Atti della Quarantatreesima settimana di studi dell’Istituto internazionale di storia economica “F. Datini” in Prato, Florence, Florence University Press, 2012, pp. 271–280.

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Institutions Again: Informal Safeguards Making mistakes in evaluating the risks of maritime trade was (and still is) a main issue of the insurance industry. If the premium rates were too high, insurance demand could look for alternative solutions by moving to another market, but if they were too low, underwriters would not be able to honour their commitments in the long run. The difficulties encountered by Giovanbattista Bracci in 1526 show that even a top level operator could decide to call it a day. When a trend as such became widespread, the lack of insurance supply might be difficult to refill, making the market itself cease to function properly. This was not the only issue, however, facing both the insurance buyers and the underwriters. An equally serious threat (if not worse) was represented by contractual violations which, if frequent, could result in higher costs and undermine trust relationships on which the transactions were based. Violations concerned both the demand side and the supply side of the market. Insurance buyers could resort to a variety of frauds to cheat underwriters, who, in turn could cause serious losses to the former, by delaying damage compensations or by trying to renegotiate their terms. Francesco Datini himself highlighted this last behaviour in his own strong words, talking sarcastically about those underwriters who “[…] when the disaster of loss comes […] everyone pulls back his arse, and would fain not pay”. An episode told by Scipione Ammirato, occurred in Florence right in the 1520s, shows the threat represented by fraud on the part of the insurance buyers. A young man belonging to one of the best Florentine families, the Corsini, plotted to swindle some insurers, hoping to gain the enormous amount of fl. 12,000, with the complicity of an artisan and of a Pisan shipmaster. The deception consisted in lying about the sinking of a ship departed from Alexandria. Unfortunately, news arrived from Venice which unmasked the imposture, and the three were harshly punished: the young man was banned from the city, the shipmaster had one hand chopped off and the artisan (who, in the meantime, had committed an unspeakable sexual crime) was burnt at the stake, after being flayed alive.1 1 Cf. S. Ammirato, Istorie Fiorentine, Tome IX, Florence, L. Marchini & G. Becherini, 1826, pp. 300–301. Datini’s words are reported by Origo, Il mercante di Prato, op.cit., p. 180. It is interesting to note that after almost 300 years, one of Colbert’s chief advisers put forward an almost identical concept; see J. Savary, Le parfait négociant ou Instruction générale pour ce qui regarde le commerce des marchandises de France et des pays étrangers, Paris, J. Guignard et fils, 1675, p. 52.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004442450_014

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We saw in the previous chapters how, against these frauds, more and more effective legislation was issued over time, establishing new norms and specialised institutions charged with enforcing them. Plenty of examples are available of litigations that the Tribunale della Mercanzia and the Insurance officials were called to settle.2 But the range of violations was wide, and constantly evolving, as shown by the numerous cases occurring in Florence as well as in other insurance markets. Insurance buyers could defer payment of the premium, lie about the value of the goods transported (declaring higher values in order to obtain larger coverage), complete contracts concerning the same cargo in two different markets, and demand insurance cover when they had already got news of shipwreck. On the other hand, underwriters were able to create all sorts of obstacles to avoid claim and compensation: for example, by forcing the insurance buyer to file individual lawsuits against every single co-insurer, or demanding further evidence about the damage which was obviously difficult to obtain, or accepting arbitrations in exchange for a strong reduction of the compensation, or even by declaring bankrupcy.3 It is hard to believe that the available legal tools could keep pace with the variety of expedients that could be devised if one or the other party did not want to honour the agreement. The difficulty of adapting the rules to the situation was reflected, as we have seen, in the provisions issued in Florence in 1526, which were a further attempt at solving some problems that the norms established two years earlier had been unable to deal with. And yet, creating a framework that could offer clear safeguards as to contract enforcement was a primary factor in determining the fortunes of any insurance market. Anyway, this was the accepted view when, at the end of the 18th century, contemporaries tried to explain Amsterdam’s success compared to other markets like Genoa and London.4 Up to the late 18th century, the frauds 2 See the examples included in Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., pp. 174–177, but reference to decisions made by the Ufficiali alle sicurtà can also be found in the Salviati bank’s cash ledgers, when the registrations concerned compensation; cf., as an example, SALVIATI 742, fol. 106 (Antonio Martellini’s bank account). 3 For an extensive review of this type of fraudulent behaviour in Florence during the 15th and 16th centuries, in 15th-century Venice, and in London and Amsterdam during the 17th and 18th centuries, see: Barbour, Marine Risks and Insurance in Seventeenth Century, op.cit., pp. 581–587; Piattoli, Ricerche intorno all’assicurazione nel medioevo VI, op.cit., pp. 165–176; John, The London Assurance Firm, op.cit., p. 128 and 140; Nehlsen-von Stryk, L’assicurazione marittima a Venezia, op.cit., pp. 216–228. Cf. also Melis, Origini e sviluppi, op.cit., p. 64 and Kingston, Marine Insurance in Britain and America, op.cit., pp. 381–382. 4 Barbour, Marine Risks and Insurance in Seventeenth Century, op.cit., pp. 580–583; cf. also John, The London Assurance Company, op.cit., pp. 138–139, which explains the London insurance market’s take-off in the 1720s with the reduction in fraud and litigation.

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concocted by insurance buyers and the schemes adopted by underwriters to delay compensation could be considered to be the main obstacles preventing the development of an insurance market’s full potential.5 Countermeasures to stop these practices might not necessarily come from above. In 17th- and 18th-century London, after queen Elizabeth’s attempt to regulate the sector in 1601 had proven wholly ineffective, the operators themselves autonomously devised some mechanisms that promoted high levels of contract enforcement.6 Something similar must have happened in Renaissance Florence, where, as we have seen, the insurance business had developed in the absence of an organic legal framework, by essentially using the rules included in the policy and a series of customary practices that became largely codified in written form only with the 1524 and 1526 laws. Two mechanisms in particular may have contributed to curbing contractual violations: a high degree of interchange between those demanding for insurance cover and those that supplied it; the presence of a considerable “barrier to entry”, i.e., a minimum and far from negligible amount of exposure demanded by the insurance buyer to each underwriter. Neither device brought about the sanctioning of violations after they had occurred, but they could certainly exert an effective preventive function, by limiting the chance that operators would frequently indulge in frauds and by increasing their willingness to respect commitments. Browsing through the names that appear in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, we cannot help but note how often, as in a well-orchestrated “role-play”, the operators alternated as insurance buyers and underwriters. The picture emerging is thus clear and reveals very strong complementarity between supply and demand: two-thirds of those who, individually or through a partnership firm, had demanded insurance cover (75 out of 114) also operated as underwriters (see Table 12.1). Contracts stipulated by those operating in both roles represent more than 90% of the total (797 out of 879), corresponding to over 94% of the total insured value (more than fl. 621,000). Considered from the supply side of the market, the same trend appears obviously less pronounced. Underwriters also operating as insurance buyers were slightly more than one-fifth of all those figuring in Raggi’s registrations (72 out of 323), although the sum of their transactions corresponds to 44% of the total number of subscribed quotas and 48% of the total value of insurance cover.7 5 Cf. Kingston, Marine Insurance in Britain and America, op.cit., pp. 380–382. 6 John, The London Assurance Company, op.cit., p. 139; see also Jones, Elizabethan Marine Insurance, op.cit., pp. 65–66 and Boiteux, La fortune de mer, op.cit., pp. 117–118. 7 Some businessmen (Alessandro Antinori and Francesco Corbinelli) operated on the supply side of the market as a single “underwriting subject”, while they bought insurance using more than one denomination: Alessandro Antinori Antinori, Alessandro and Francesco Antinori

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table 12.1 Insurance operations as insurance buyer and insurer of “underwriting subjects” active in Florence (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

Type of “underwriting subjects” “Underwriting subjects” also acting as insurers “Underwriting subjects” that never acted as insurers Ufficiali alle sicurtà (Insurance officials) Unknown “underwriting subjects” or not indicated Total

“Passive” operations (in the role of insurance buyer)

“Active” operations (in the role of underwiter)

N. of Insured N. of “underwriting contracts values in florins subjects”

N. of Insured N. of “underwriting quotas values in florins subjects”

75

797

39

1

621,300.5

72

3,282

278,853.3

82

36,495.0 248

5,210

380,792.2

2

3,600.0 –

–

–

–

–

–

–

115

881

661,395.5 320

24

1,750.0

8,516

661,395.5

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r.

The “insurance accounts” of the Salviati bank confirm that such strong interchange was not a peculiar trait of Raggi’s customers, highlighting the extent & partners, Alessandro Antinori & Jacopo Bettoni & partners; Francesco Corbinelli and Antonio & Francesco Corbinelli. This reduces to 72 the number of “underwriting subject” or “insured subjects” that operated. The real figure, however, might be higher, since in the case of partnership we have only considered the identity of the person figuring in the “underwriting subject” or “insured subjects” and not other individuals (partners and employees) who could be connected to the same business firm. For example, we have not counted the over fl. 2,000 subscribed by Calandro Calandri, the Salviati bank’s cashier, nor the single contract stipulated by Ludovico di Antonio Dolfi, which not coincidentally covered a policy having the Niccolò di Piero Capponi and partners as the beneficiary, the firm of which he was a working partner; cf. SALVIATI 70, fol. 87v.

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to which this was a standard feature in the Florentine insurance industry. The phenomenon is also clearly visible in policies drawn up by Ricoveri, upholding the view that underwriters turned equally to both the sworn brokers. Almost 80% of the policies that have been reconstructed were in favour of insurance buyers that operated as underwriters in Raggi’s records (66 contracts out of 85).8 It is unclear whether the strong complementarity emerged during the 16th century, or if this mechanism had been long rooted in the Florentine insurance business. Unfortunately, the late 14th-century documents do not lend themselves to this kind of analysis because, as we know, the role of insurance buyer in the extant contracts was almost always occupied by Francesco Datini and his firms.9 However, some clues are offered by other sources where we find some insurance buyers to whom the Datini provided insurance cover during the same period. If we turn once again to our late 14th-century policies, we note that many of these insurance buyers also underwrote contracts in favour of the Datini firms: Luigi and Gherardo Canigiani, Giovanni Orlandini, Jacopo Guasconi, Jacopo Covoni, Domenico Giugni and Niccolò Capponi, Luca di Piero Rinieri and Averardo Medici.10 It is impossible to go beyond this simple observation, and in order to improve our understanding of what this interchange actually meant, it is necessary to return to the 1520s. At the level of the single “underwriting subjects”, the ratio between “passive” (i.e., as the insurance buyer) and “active” (as an underwriter) transactions reveals the basic reasons why someone operated in the market. Clearly, a comparison of this nature is only possible for those who exclusively used Raggi as broker.11 For some of them, like the Averardo Salviati & partners or Paolo di Giovanni da Romena, the trade-off tends to be in balance, showing they were

8

For the purposes of this calculation, two policies stipulated in favour of an “institutional” body such as the Arte della Lana (Wool Trade Guild) have been ignored. 9 The only exception is the previously discussed policy in favour of Zanobi di Taddeo Gaddi, Datini’s correspondent in Venice; cf. DATINI 1159, doc. 34. For the remaining ones, as mentioned, the contract beneficiaries were the Florentine firm of the Datini business agglomerate, the partnership specialised in the silk and cotton trade set up by the Prato merchant with Domenico di Cambio, and the firm engaged in banking and exchange activities in which Francesco Datini was in partnership with Bartolomeo Cambioni. 10 Ibid., docs. 151 and 156, for the first three insurers; for the last two, cf. DATINI 616 ( Journal marked B), docs. 39v and 262v. Similar confirmation is obtained by looking at underwriters’ names in the policies in favour of Averardo Medici’s firm, cf. MEDICI, 84, docs. 2–5. 11 The identification was made possible by the “insurance accounts”, and more in general, by the Salviati bank’s complete accounting documentation.

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interested to both the supply side and the demand side of the market.12 For others, passive transactions clearly prevail over active ones, revealing their main role as insurance buyer; for example, the Marco del Nero & partners appears to have underwritten quotas corresponding to less than 15% of the insurance cover they demanded. It is interesting to note that many operators matching this profile were foreigners, like Miquel and Francesc “Catalan” or Pere Labia.13 Between the two ways of carrying out the interchange insurance buyer/­ underwriter, there was a wide range of intermediate situations, and many operators who did not seem interested at all in taking advantage of it. According to the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, about 40 “underwriting subjects” figured only as insurance buyers, while the “pure” underwriters exceeded 200 units. It is very difficult to guess how many of them really managed to escape this mechanism, and how many might have filled the opposite role in the contracts drawn up by Ricoveri. The marked unbalance of this phenomenon between the demand and the supply sides leads us to suppose that interchange may have mostly served as a tool against frauds committed by the insurance buyers. As a matter of fact, if we consider those who operated only in the latter role, it becomes clear that they were, with some rare exceptions, “small-size” subjects that operated rather sporadically in the Florentine market.14 However, it is not at the individual level that we must look, in order to investigate whether interchange could function as a contract enforcement 12

The Averardo Salviati’s and partners took on insurance risks for a figure that, according to the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, represented over a third of what they had received as insured; Paolo da Romena’s active operations exceeded, in terms of insured values, 40% of passive ones. Considering the quotas that these two subjects must have subscribed in contracts mediated by Ricoveri, it can be assumed that their overall exposure was in the region of 60–80% of the insurance cover they had obtained. Probably the group of “underwriting subject”/“insured subjects” revolving around Gherardo Bartolini and the Niccolò di Piero Capponi and partners, whose loyalty towards Raggi was less clear, may have shared a similar profile. 13 Considering total insurance activities by the two Catalans (Miquel and Francesc), the ratio between active operations (about fl. 5,000) and passive ones (fl. 34,000) was clearly unbalanced in favour of the latter; Pere Labia received cover for an amount ten times larger than the sum for which he accepted exposure as an underwriter. The Genoese Leonardo della Torre too seems to correspond to this kind of profile: with at least 18 policies stipulated in his favour, he was perhaps Ricoveri’s most important customer, but in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà he is hardly mentioned as an insurer (11 operations for just fl. 1,100). 14 The average of these 43 “insured subjects”, which never acted in the underwriter’s role, is just over two contracts each in the 29 months under consideration, and the average value is slightly more than fl. 1,000. It would seem that the majority had bought insurance only once and half of them remained below fl. 500 as regards total coverage.

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mechanism, but we need to explore the wider framework. The first level at which active and passive transactions could balance one another out was the that of reciprocal relationships. An attempt will therefore be made to discover how bilateral connections were articulated between five “underwriting subjects”, all of them Raggi’s exclusive customers, but differing as regards nationality, turnover and business organisation (see Table 12.2). From this standpoint, bilateral operations seem to be balanced between the Averardo Salviati & partners and Pere Labia, as well as between this latter and Marco del Nero’s firm. In the first case, the Salviatis provided insurance for almost 12% of all its active operations, obtaining a similar cover in terms of value. In the second example, Labia benefited from almost 10% of the whole capital underwritten by the Del Nero & partners and provided coverage to this latter corresponding to 7.5% of his total operations as an insurer. The equilibrium is broken if we look at the last possible combination among these three. The Salviati bank significantly provided insurance in favour of Marco del Nero’s firm (almost 12% of their total operations), receiving in exchange cover worth less than 2% of the total values underwritten by the latter. Thus, in bilateral interactions, interchange could not be taken for granted. In this perspective, it is very interesting to spot a case in which the mechanism did not take place at all. Paolo da Romena underwrote policies in favour of all the other four “underwriting subjects” considered, but not all of them reciprocated: Del Nero’s firm, as well as Pere Labia did not. This outlier aside, a multi-faceted picture emerges with well-balanced bilateral relationships appearing side by side with others displaying evident imbalance. It is, therefore, necessary to expand the scope of our investigation further, to learn whether active and passive operations levelled each other out within larger groups. The same circumstance has been observed for other markets, such as Dubrovnik in late 16th century. Here, interchange has been interpreted as a by-product of family ties and ethnic identity. Therefore, contrary to our starting hypothesis, complementarity between insurance buyer and underwriters would derive from a more general propensity towards cooperation and mutual support among businesspeople.15 In 16th century Florence, many examples can be found where the commitment to take on other merchants’ risks was the unmistakable consequence of kinship. This is revealed by a policy in favour of the Heirs of Giovanni Mannelli & partners, subscribed in sequence by Matteo Mannelli, by the firm of Francesco di Leonardo Mannelli and Giovanni Cavalcanti, and by the Leonardo Mannelli & partners. This contract brought together all the members of the family 15

Tenenti, Tenenti, Il prezzo del rischio, op.cit., pp. 138–139, 169, 195.

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table 12.2 Active and passive transactions by five selected “underwriting subjects” operating in the Florentine insurance market (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

Active insurance transactions (as a percentage of the total value of underwritten quotas) “Underwriting Acciaioli, Da Romena, Del Nero, Labia, Pere Salviati, Averardo subjects” Dardano Paolo Marco and and partners partners Passive Insurance As a percentage of the Total Underwritten Values

Acciaioli, Dardano Da Romena, Paolo Del Nero, Marco and partners Labia, Pere Salviati Averardo and partners

–

2.2%

0.7%

2.3%

1.3%

–

0.0%

0.0%

2.1%

11.1%

15.6%

–

7.5%

11.8%

12.0% 3.7%

6.7% 6.7%

– 10.1%

11.0% –

1.9%

9.9% 1.9%

SOURCE: SALVIATI 70, fols. 3r–144r.

involved in the insurance sector, with the sole exception of Alessandro, who had underwritten in favour of his relatives on other occasions.16 Nevertheless, the overall picture that can be reconstructed through Raggi’s registrations does away with any possible doubts. By comparing, for each policy, the name of the beneficiary with that of the underwriters, we discover that only a very modest share of active transactions can be attributed to a relative of the insurance buyer. Only 55 quotas in all—worth fl. 4,425—distributed over 50 contracts, that is less than 6% of the total. Although the main criterion followed for the identification of family relationships (the same surname) is 16 SALVIATI 70, fol. 104v. Another significant example is that of Francesco di Piero del Nero, who offered insurance to the Marco di Simone del Nero and partners for a sum equivalent to a quarter of his total operations; ibid., docs. 105r, 107v, 109v, 117r. The two belonged to collateral and distinct branches of the family and apparently did not have any business interests in common. On Francesco di Piero, financially linked to Filippo Strozzi, see Bullard, Filippo Strozzi and the Medici, op.cit., pp. 159–172.

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rather broad, the numbers shown above demonstrate an unequivocal trend: in Florence, complementarity between insurance buyers and underwriters was not so frequent at the family group’s level.17 Switching from kinship ties to connections deriving from a shared origin, the picture does not change. Being foreigners was not enough to trigger more intense interchange than what could be observed in general. For all the registrations by Raggi, quotas stipulated by non-Florentine underwriters represented about 8% of the total insured values. However, if we just consider the 172 policies with a foreign insurance buyer, this percentage only rises to 13%.18 The situation remains the same even when we look at what occurred within the single “colonies” operating in the Florentine market. Whilst for Spaniards the correlation between active and passive interventions stabilised around 12% in terms of covered values, none of the almost 50 quotas underwritten by Dubrovnik insurers was directed to cover any contract stipulated by an insurance buyer from the same city (Giovanni and Tommaso di Giunta, and Luca di Bona).19 Nor do we find the Englishman Thomas Watts among those willing to risk their money in favour of William Watles, who, with his 49 subscriptions, appears as his only fellow countryman operating as an underwriter in Florence.20 Therefore, in 1524–1526 Florence, kinship and common origins did not seem to function as catalysts for the interchange of roles between insurance buyers and underwriters. Thus, the balanced trade-off between active and passive transactions recordable on market in its entirety is not the result of complementarity carried out on a reduced scale, within groups that shared a common identity. We do not know if this trait was peculiar to this market, but it is certain that interchange was not an exclusive feature of insurance in Florence. In the early 15th-century Barcelona, as in Burgos in the second half of the 16th century, or in Venice during the early part of the 17th century, it was difficult to

17 Family connections through the female line escape this survey; often they were closer than those determined by simply belonging to the same lineage. This is confirmed by some precise testimonies, as in the case of quotas underwritten by Lorenzo Segni in favour of his brother-in-law Niccolò di Piero Capponi; cf. SALVIATI 70, fols. 94v, 101v, 108r, 110v. 18 In detail, 28 non-Florentine “underwriting subjects” subscribed 203 of the 1,787 covered quotas in favour of foreign insurance buyers, worth fl. 17, 525 out of a total of fl. 135,000. 19 SALVIATI 70, fols. 16v, 47v, 122r. Other insurers from Dubrovnik active in Florence, besides Giovanni and Tommaso di Giunta and Luca di Bona, were Niccolò di Marino de’ Giorgi and Antonio Sfondati. 20 Ibid., doc. 6v.

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find anybody who could benefit from insurance cover without sharing, even to a modest extent, the risks entailed in subscribing a policy.21 A testimony included in an insurance litigation which took place in Venice in 1433 helps revealing the meaning operators attached to such interchange. Asked by a broker who was trying to sell quotas to cover a policy, Andrea Contarini replied that he was ready to subscribe it without knowing any details of the itinerary, the goods, or the premium, because the insurance buyer, Andrea Zorzi, had promised to reciprocate as an underwriter for him at the first occasion.22 Interchange was, therefore, considered as a sort of safeguard that insurance buyers offered to the underwriters, a token of their good faith concretely manifesting itself and corresponding in turn to a financial commitment also by the insurers. In the case just mentioned, the guarantee moreover takes the form of a bilateral, direct, and personal relationship. What happened when the balance between active and passive operations did not result from interaction between two subjects, nor was it reached within a homogeneous group such as a family or a foreign community? If transposed onto the market in its entirety, as in Florence during the 1520s, complementarity determined a framework in which everybody accepted to provide cover for everybody else, in a tangle of reciprocal obligations that no insurance buyer was keen to violate.23 So, interchange appears as a practice shared by most operators, almost like an informal rule which, complementing the official norms, strengthened overall contract enforcement. In addition to the mechanisms aimed at protecting underwriters, the market developed another one with the complementary function of providing safeguards to insurance buyers. From this point of view too, the preferred method was to prevent contractual violations, by means of informal practices that could limit insolvency as much as possible; for example, by informally establishing that subscriptions were not accepted below a certain amount. If we look at Florentine policies of the 1392–1400 period, we immediately realise how rigorous the mechanism could be: very few quotas are worth less

21

Cf. Del Treppo, Assicurazioni e commercio internazionale, op.cit., p. 521; Cruselles Gómez, Los mercados aseguradores, op.cit., p. 619; Tenenti, Naufrages, corsaires et assurances, op.cit., pp. 63–64; Casado Alonso, Los seguros maritimos de Burgos, op.cit., p. 216. 22 Nehlsen-von Stryk, Aspetti dell’assicurazione marittima nella vita economica veneziana, op.cit., pp. 3–22. 23 In this sense, great similarities can be discovered with the credit market of modern England, cf. C. Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 1998.

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than fl. 50 (9 out of a total of over 460).24 Such low subscriptions were an exception to the norm, as is confirmed by the fact that they are only found in particular circumstances beyond the insurer’s will: for example, they were determined by clauses that diminished the coverage initially demanded, causing a further reduction of the single quotas; or else, lower amounts sometimes derived from the necessity to insure goods whose estimated value was not divisible by fl. 50, and in these cases the “abnormal” subscription was always placed at the end of the contract. Situations in which these odd amounts resulted from a precise wish on the part of one of the negotiating parties were definitely rare, although it might occasionally happen that subscriptions for the standard amount (fl. 100 or f. 50) were further split into “sub-quotas”.25 To get a concrete idea of the sums involved, we can examine some examples relating to Florence in the last quarter of the 14th century. In this period, a wetnurse’s monthly salary reached 1 golden florin at the most, equivalent to the amount that a skilled construction worker could earn in six days’ work. The yearly wages of employees at the Florentine Datini firm ranged from a minimum of fl. 16 to a maximum of fl. 40.26 Leaving aside individual propensity to take risks, a fl. 50 exposure in the insurance market was not a feasible option for most Florentines. The Pisan policies confirm the impression that this sum represented an important threshold; like in Florence, the Datini firms seeking insurance in Pisa were unwilling to accept cover from underwriters planning to risk lesser amounts: there are only 12 instances out of the total 472. The data from the 1520s can help us verify whether this attitude was peculiar to just one insurance buyer, Francesco Datini, or if maintaining a strong barrier to entry was a more general feature of the insurance business. The preliminary impression is of prevailing uniformity as regards the minimum quotas normally taken out by any insurer. Out of over 8,500 subscriptions included in the Libro di ricordi di sicurtà, only 233 are lower than fl. 50 (mostly fl. 25). This is truly a small proportion of the total (around 3%), not too dissimilar to that inferred from the 14th-century policies (just below 2%). The Salviati bank’s documentation further upholds the rather sporadic character of operations below 24 Cf. DATINI 1159, docs. 15–133. To make the data more relevant, subscriptions have been selected from the period characterized by greater homogeneity in the documentation, that is the 1392–1400 interval. 25 Cf. DATINI 1159, docs. 62, 122, 123, 129. 26 Cf., respectively, Goldthwaite, Mandich, Studi sulla moneta fiorentina, op.cit., p. 71; Goldthwaite, I prezzi del grano a Firenze, op.cit., pp. 13–14; Melis, Aspetti della vita economica medievale, op.cit., pp. 208–209. In 1402 the yearly salary of employees of the Medici Bank’s branch in Florence ranged from 20 to 60 gold florins, cf. de Roover, Il banco Medici, op.cit., pp. 64–66.

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this threshold: 20 out of 435 in Giovanbattista’s and Zanobi Bracci’s “insurance accounts”, and not a single one among the almost 180 subscriptions recorded in the Quadernuccio di ricordi di sicurtà of 1520–1521.27 This outcome is somewhat surprising, because several factors might have pushed subscriptions downward: the institutional framework determined by the 1524 laws increased the safeguards for insurance buyers; a more unstable international situation due to political and military turbulence might have increased risk fragmentation; and finally, the significant rise in the nominal and real values of the florin of account. Despite all these aspects, the 25-florin submultiple never managed to impose itself as the new minimum barrier to entry, which remained firmly anchored to the level used at the end of the 14th century, demonstrating the strength of a custom rooted to such an extent in the market that it had taken on a quasi-symbolic meaning. We must also add that, as we have seen, a great share of subscriptions actually exceeded this amount, up to and over fl. 100 (see Tables 9.3 and 9.4). In the long run, the picture traced by the 14th-century policies and by Raggi’s records appears quite stable, with a first rather high barrier to entry, which in everyday business went along with a second one worth double that amount. If one takes a closer look, however, the 1520s actually show some signs of dynamism, as the distribution of underwritten quotas gradually exhibited greater fragmentation of risk. A comparison between data relating to the three months from March to May 1524 and the same period in 1526 reveals a slight increase in subscriptions for sums below fl. 50 (see Table 12.3). This feature cannot by itself demonstrate a clear trend, especially if compared to the coinciding and definitely more evident rise in insurance cover for higher amounts (fl. 200 and over). If we really want to identify some basic elements emerging in the course of the whole decade, we must leave aside for the moment the barrier to entry and investigate the relative weight of the highest and lowest classes of value. According to the Quadernuccio di ricordi di sicurtà, in the period between 1520– 1521, insurance operations for amounts equal to or greater than fl. 100 made up to 60% of all the quotas (103 out of 177). In the three months from March to May 1524, the percentage decreased to about 47% of the total, losing another two points in 1526. As suggested by Giovanbattista’s and Zanobi Bracci’s insurance accounts, the trend must have continued in the following period (from

27 Cf. SALVIATI 735, fols. 128r–137v; SALVIATI 742, fol. 243 and SALVIATI 749, fols. 75, 87, 177, 254, 266, 477.

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table 12.3 Class distribution of insurance operations in the Florentine market in two selected three-month periods (1524–1526), according to Raggio Raggi’s Libro di ricordi di sicurtà

Value of underwritten quotas in florins

< 49 ≥ 50