Representative Bureaucracy and Performance: Public Service Transformation in South Africa [1st ed. 2020] 978-3-030-32133-8, 978-3-030-32134-5

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xviii
Representative Bureaucracy and Performance (Sergio Fernandez)....Pages 1-21
Apartheid and the Bureaucracy (Sergio Fernandez)....Pages 23-68
Addressing the Legacy of Apartheid (Sergio Fernandez)....Pages 69-111
Public Sector Reform and the Quest for a Capable Public Service (Sergio Fernandez)....Pages 113-142
The Theory of Representative Bureaucracy (Sergio Fernandez)....Pages 143-188
Representative Bureaucracy and Performance: Empirical Evidence from South Africa (Sergio Fernandez)....Pages 189-237
Why Do Representative Bureaucracies Perform Better? (Sergio Fernandez)....Pages 239-265
What We Have Learned and the Way Forward (Sergio Fernandez)....Pages 267-279
Back Matter ....Pages 281-288

Citation preview

EXECUTIVE POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE

Representative Bureaucracy and Performance Public Service Transformation in South Africa Sergio Fernandez

Executive Politics and Governance Series Editors Martin Lodge London School of Economics and Political Science London, UK Kai Wegrich Hertie School of Governance Berlin, Germany

The Executive Politics and Governance series focuses on central government, its organisation and its instruments. It is particularly concerned with how the changing conditions of contemporary governing affect perennial questions in political science and public administration. Executive Politics and Governance is therefore centrally interested in questions such as how politics interacts with bureaucracies, how issues rise and fall on political agendas, and how public organisations and services are designed and operated. This book series encourages a closer engagement with the role of politics in shaping executive structures, and how administration shapes politics and policy-making. In addition, this series also wishes to engage with the scholarship that focuses on the organisational aspects of politics, such as government formation and legislative institutions. The series welcomes high quality research-led monographs with comparative appeal. Edited volumes that provide in-depth analysis and critical insights into the field of Executive Politics and Governance are also encouraged. Editorial Board Philippe Bezes, CNRS-CERSA, Paris, France Jennifer N. Brass, Indiana University Bloomington, USA Sharon Gilad, Hebrew University Jerusalem, Israel Will Jennings, University of Southampton, UK David E. Lewis, Vanderbilt University, USA Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, University of Nottingham, UK Salvador Parrado, UNED, Madrid, Spain Nick Sitter, Central European University, Hungary Kutsal Yesilkagit, University of Utrecht, the Netherlands More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14980

Sergio Fernandez

Representative Bureaucracy and Performance Public Service Transformation in South Africa

Sergio Fernandez Indiana University Bloomington Bloomington, IN, USA

Executive Politics and Governance ISBN 978-3-030-32133-8 ISBN 978-3-030-32134-5  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32134-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my parents

Acknowledgements

I owe a great debt of gratitude to many for their assistance, participation, and support in bringing this book to fruition. I would like to thank a number of my colleagues for their honest feedback and helpful advice, including Jennifer Brass, Jill Nicholson-Crotty, Sean NicholsonCrotty, Claudia Avellaneda, Nikolaos Zirogiannis, Maureen Pirog, Brad Heim, Anh Tran, Tom Rabovsky, David Good, and Coady Wing at Indiana University; Margaret Chitiga-Mabugu, David Fourie, Gerda Van Dijk, Lianne Malan, Natasja Holtzhausen, and Onkgopotse Madumo at University of Pretoria; Christelle Auriacombe, Danielle Nel, and Fanie Cloete at University of Johannesburg; and Gerrit Van der Waldt at North-West University. Chris Thornhill at University of Pretoria, Kenneth Meier at American University, and Robert Cameron at University of Cape Town were instrumental in helping me formulate and refining ideas and offered comments on portions of the manuscript. I owe a special thanks to Samuel Koma of Milpark Education for teaching me so much about South Africa, introducing me to important and knowledgeable public figures, and believing in the value of this research. I am also indebted to anonymous reviewers and editors at Journal of Modern African Studies, Governance, Public Administration Review, and Palgrave Macmillan for their critical and constructive assessment of the research. Michael McGuire and John Graham at Indiana University provided generous support for travel and research assistance and Nervison Temba and Shepherd Moyo’s logistical support proved invaluable for field research. Of course, this book could not have been written without vii

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

the gracious participation and insight of dozens of public officials from national departments and Chapter 9 institutions. I owe the biggest debt of gratitude to Hongseok Lee at University at Albany, who spent countless hours searching for sources, coding archival data, and serving as a frank sounding board. A heartfelt thank you goes out to my wife, parents, and old friend John Clark for their love and encouragement. Most of all, I give thanks to my Lord for his love and grace.

Contents

1 Representative Bureaucracy and Performance 1 2 Apartheid and the Bureaucracy 23 3 Addressing the Legacy of Apartheid 69 4 Public Sector Reform and the Quest for a Capable Public Service 113 5 The Theory of Representative Bureaucracy 143 6 Representative Bureaucracy and Performance: Empirical Evidence from South Africa 189 7 Why Do Representative Bureaucracies Perform Better? 239 8 What We Have Learned and the Way Forward 267 Index 281

ix

About

the

Author

Sergio Fernandez is Associate Professor at Indiana University O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs and Affiliate Faculty in Indiana University African Studies Program. He also has appointments as Extraordinary Professor at University of Pretoria School of Public Management and Administration and Visiting Professor at University of Johannesburg Centre for Public Management and Governance. He earned his Ph.D. in Public Administration from the University of Georgia. His research focuses on organizational behavior in the public sector, public sector leadership, representative bureaucracy, and government outsourcing. His work has appeared in leading policy and management journals, including Public Administration Review, Governance, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, American Review of Public Administration, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Leadership Quarterly, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, and Journal of Modern African Studies. He has served on six journal editorial boards and is an editor for Africa Today. He lives in Bloomington, Indiana, with his wife and three dogs.

xi

Abbreviations

ANC African National Congress ASGISA Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa BAD Bantu Administration and Development Department BLA Black Local Authorities CODESA Convention for a Democratic South Africa COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions DA Democratic Alliance DG Director-General DPME Department of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation DPSA Department of Public Service and Administration GEAR Growth, Employment, and Redistribution GNU Government of National Unity IFP Inkatha Freedom Party MPAT Management Performance Assessment Tool NDC National Deployment Committee NDP National Development Plan NDR National Democratic Revolution NGP New Growth Path NP National Party NPC National Planning Commission NPM New Public Management NSMS National Security Management System PAC Pan Africanist Congress PERSAL Personnel and Salaries Management System PFMA Public Finance Management Act PSC Public Service Commission xiii

xiv  

ABBREVIATIONS

RDP Reconstruction and Development Plan RENAMO Resistência Nacional Moçambicana SACP South African Communist Party SADF South African Defense Force SAP South African Police SAPS South African Police Service SMS Senior Management Service TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission UDF United Democratic Front UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola WPAAPS White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service WPHRMPS White Paper on Human Resource Management in the Public Service WPPSTE White Paper on Public Service Training and Education WPRD White Paper on Reconstruction and Development WPTPS White Paper on Transformation of the Public Service WPTPSD White Paper on Transforming Public Service Delivery

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 6.1

Fig. 6.2 Fig. 6.3

Fig. 6.4

Fig. 6.5

Fig. 6.6

Trends in education, age, and job tenure of public sector employees, 1996–2017 (Source DataFirst, University of Cape Town, 2017) Range and average for percentage of goals achieved by national departments and Chapter 9 institutions, 2006–2015 (N = 279) (Source National department and Chapter 9 institution annual reports) Racial representation in national departments and Chapter 9 institutions, 2006–2015 (N = 303) (Source National department and Chapter 9 institution annual reports) Gender representation in national departments and Chapter 9 institutions, 2006–2015 (N = 303) (Source National department and Chapter 9 institution annual reports) Racial proportional representation in national departments and Chapter 9 institutions, 2006–2015 (N = 303) (Source National department and Chapter 9 institution annual reports) Gender proportional representation in national departments and Chapter 9 institutions, 2006–2015 (N = 303) (Source National department and Chapter 9 institution annual reports) Marginal effects of changes in racial and gender representation, across variable range (Note Based on generalized linear model estimation of Model 1)

125

195 201

201

202

203 211

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 6.7 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2

Marginal effects of changes in racial and gender proportional representation, across variable range (Note Based on generalized linear model estimation of Model 1) 215 Evidence of causal mechanisms linking demographic representation to organizational performance (N = 30) 244 Causal processes linking bureaucratic representation to organizational performance 261

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Public sector employment in central, provincial, local, and homeland authorities, and public corporations, by race, 1960–1991 Table 2.2 Public sector employment in central, provincial, local, and homeland authorities, and public corporations, by gender, 1960–1991 Table 3.1 South African public service, by race and level, 1995–2010 Table 3.2 South African public service, by gender and level, 1995–2010 Table 3.3 South African public service, by race and gender, 2016 Table 5.1 Differences between blacks and whites, partisanship, trust in public institutions, and attitudes toward role of government Table 5.2 Differences between black women and white women, partisanship, trust in public institutions, and attitudes toward role of government Table 6.1 Variables, measures, and descriptive statistics Table 6.2 Regression results for racial and gender representation, random effects estimator, dependent variable = percent goals achieved, 2006–2015 Table 6.3 Regression results for racial and gender proportional representation, random effects estimator, dependent variable = percent goals achieved, 2006–2015

41 44 96 97 99 172 178 192 210 214

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 6.4 Regression results for racial diversity, random effects estimator, dependent variable = percent goals achieved, 2006–2015 219 Table 6.5 Regression results for bureaucratic representation and workforce diversity, fixed effects estimator, dependent variable = percent goals achieved, 2006–2015 220

CHAPTER 1

Representative Bureaucracy and Performance

Sathyandranath Ragunanan “Mac” Maharaj is one of the iconic figures from the struggle against apartheid. Maharaj became involved in liberation politics as a young man. At the age of twenty-nine, he was arrested and convicted on charges of sabotage. After serving twelve years in prison on Robben Island with Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, Ahmed Kathrada, and other liberation stalwarts, Maharaj went into exile to continue the fight against apartheid. During the system’s waning years, he returned to his country to conduct dangerous underground activity. Maharaj subsequently became Minister of Transport in the first nonracial democratically elected government. In his biography, Mahraj provides a telling account of his initial encounter with bureaucrats from the previous regime (O’Malley 2007). As he recalls, “Those of us who came into the cabinet from the ANC had a huge sense of wariness about the existing civil service. At the same time, the civil servants had a huge sense of unease about us. They just didn’t know how to relate to us. Some of our people’s wariness was so strong that it literally translated to ‘I won’t show it, but I’m going to get rid of this bastard as quickly as possible. Not because the man is bad, but because I proceed from the assumption that he comes from the old guard. I want someone else I have confidence in from my ranks. So until then, I’ll just interact civilly’” (O’Malley 2007, p. 406). Maharaj goes on to describe how he developed an amicable relationship with his Director-General, Dr. C. F. Scheepers, for three months before the © The Author(s) 2020 S. Fernandez, Representative Bureaucracy and Performance, Executive Politics and Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32134-5_1

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latter’s replacement was appointed. Maharaj, explaining his motivation for not reappointing Scheepers, states, “Was I distrustful of Scheepers? No. I got rid of him because he was not suitable for managing the consultative process that I wanted to inculcate as the key instrument in policymaking – one which would ensure that the concerns of all stakeholders were taken into consideration. The DG had to be someone who would come in with confidence and would have the personality to win the confidence of all the role players. I needed a person who would relate to all the players without transmitting his suspicion and who would respect the facts. Dr. Scheepers was not suitable for that role. But I did not interfere with the other senior staff” (O’Malley 2007, p. 408). Maharaj’s brief account reveals much about the significance of ­representative bureaucracy for governance. When the African National Congress (ANC) came to power in 1994 as part of the Government of National Unit (GNU), with the National Party (NP) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) as its junior partners, it encountered an unrepresentative bureaucracy established by the NP to perpetuate oppressive rule by the white minority and ensure the political disenfranchisement and economic exploitation of the black majority. A long history of colonization, minority rule, and racial discrimination profoundly skewed the demographics of the South African bureaucracy, such that whites, who constituted approximately one-seventh of the country’s population, occupied nearly nine-tenths of all administrative, clerical, professional, and technical positions in the public sector (South African Institute of Race Relations 1989). With the ratification of a new constitution and enactment of landmark legislation and regulatory changes, the ANC set out to transform the public service into a bureaucracy that is broadly representative of the South African population in order to uphold the cherished values of representativeness and equality enshrined in the constitution. As Chapter 10, Section 195 of the 1996 Constitution states, “Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation” (Republic of South Africa 2017). Now a quarter-century since the dawn of nonracial democracy, the ANC has achieved notable success in transforming the public service into a bureaucracy that is broadly representative of the citizenry. Maharaj’s account also points to the role of representative bureaucracy as a mechanism for ensuring political control of the bureaucracy.

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During the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) ­negotiations, which paved the way to a new political dispensation, ANC leaders expressed concern about the need to bring the bureaucracy under its control and transform it into a responsive instrument of democratic governance. A bureaucracy still under the control of the white minority was deemed to be an obstacle to bringing about the transformation of society and the economy envisioned by ANC leaders, one that would require implementing an ambitious and far-reaching policy agenda aimed at undoing the harm caused by apartheid and uplifting the historically disadvantaged who constitute a large majority of the population. What was needed was a bureaucracy representative of the South African people and its elected leaders, infused with the values of a liberal constitutional democracy, and dedicated to implementing the policies of a black majority government. Finally, the story raises the issue of bureaucratic performance. Maharaj explains that he replaced the Director-General (DG) not because he distrusted him but because he lacked the right skills and disposition to manage the department and formulate policy in an effective manner. While in power, the ANC has employed affirmative action to promote representation of blacks, women, and those with disabilities on both instrumental and normative grounds. From a normative perspective, demographic transformation of the bureaucracy serves to promote the constitutional values of representativeness and equality (Ndletyana 2008). In addition, the ANC has endeavored to create a broadly representative public service in order to improve public sector performance (Ndletyana 2008; Department of Public Service and Administration 1995, 1998). The belief is that a representative bureaucracy will possess certain qualities critical to governmental performance that the apartheid bureaucracy lacked, including legitimacy and support from the public, the ability to communicate with a multiracial and multilingual citizenry, empathy for historically marginalized communities, and a strong commitment to serve and respond to the needs and expectations of all South Africans. Representative bureaucracy is the central theme of this book. What were the reasons behind the reforms initiated to transform the South African public service into a representative bureaucracy? How has this transformation come about, and what does the public service look like now, particularly in regards to representation of blacks, women, and those with disabilities? Most importantly, what happens to the performance of bureaucracies as they become increasingly representative?

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How does representation of historically disadvantaged groups impact the performance of public organizations, and what are the causal mechanisms linking bureaucratic representation to performance? These are the questions this book sets out to answer.

Focus of the Book The theory of representative bureaucracy rests on the basic premise that the demographic composition of public organizations matters. The social identity of public employees—including their race, ethnicity, gender, and other features that constitute identity—can affect popular attitudes towards bureaucracy, the degree of legitimacy conferred on the institution and its members, and the extent citizens are willing to comply with laws and regulations, cooperate with bureaucrats, and engage in coproduction of public services. Social identity also influences the behavior of bureaucrats themselves, their responsiveness to citizens, organized groups, and politicians, and their performance. Since Kingsley’s (1944) groundbreaking study of the British civil service, representative bureaucracy has emerged as a central focus of public administration and governance. Kingsley considered a representative bureaucracy one that is dominated by a society’s ruling class and whose ranks are filled by members of that class. Krislov (1974) viewed this as a distortion of the concept of representative bureaucracy, arguing instead that a representative bureaucracy is one that is reflective of society. A main assertion made by representative bureaucracy researchers is that a bureaucracy that mirrors the citizenry, so that all social groups, including minorities and women, are proportionally represented within it, has intrinsic value apart from any consequences it might produce. As Mosher (1982) argues, a representative bureaucracy signifies an open system to which all citizens can turn for social or economic support, and for protection and justice, regardless of their social origins or identity; it is also designed to limit employment discrimination and ensure equality of opportunity for all. In short, a representative bureaucracy comes to embody Abraham Lincoln’s notion of government by the people (Mosher 1982). Representative bureaucracy promotes citizen satisfaction with public services, increases trust and confidence in government, and confers legitimacy on the administrative organs of the state (Theobald and Haider-Markel 2008; Gade and Wilkins 2013; Riccucci et al. 2014).

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Long (1952) and Krislov (1974) concluded that the legitimacy of American bureaucracy rests largely on two key features: that compared to the other branches of government, its demographic composition more closely resembles American society, and that in its decision making, it is more in tune with, mindful of, and responsive to the diverse wills within a pluralistic society. In addition, representative bureaucracy serves as a means to ensure political accountability and control over the bureaucracy (Long 1952; Van Riper 1958; Mosher 1982). Researchers have explored and debated various approaches to ensuring that bureaucrats remain accountable to their political leaders and carry out the will of the people. This discussion has centered around the distinction between internal and external checks on bureaucratic power, with the former focusing on internal features of bureaucracy that can promote accountability (e.g., ethical standards and professional norms), and the latter relying on external stakeholders with political and legal influence over bureaucrats, such as legislators, chief executives, and judges, to curb bureaucratic discretion (see Meier and Bohte 2007). Representative bureaucracy has been advanced as an internal check on bureaucratic power, the main argument being that if social origins influence attitudes and behavior, and bureaucracies recruit members in a manner that ensures that the social origins of bureaucrats mirror those of the general population, then bureaucrats will be responsive to the citizenry and act to promote its varied interests (Meier 1975, 1993; Meier and Bohte 2007). Policies to promote representative bureaucracy are pervasive throughout the world. They frequently take the form of affirmative action, the use of deliberate measures to ensure equal opportunity for all social groups in society. Such measures include recruitment and outreach programs, hiring targets and quotas, identification and removal of barriers to employment, job reservation or earmarking of positions, and training and development programs (Agocs and Burr 1996; Kellough 2006; Ndletyana 2008; Tummala 2015). When transformation of unrepresentative bureaucracies into representative institutions is the goal, affirmative action is the method typically used to achieve it. Van Riper (1958) notes that in the United States, major civil service reforms dating back to Andrew Jackson’s presidency were motivated by concerns regarding the unrepresentative character of the bureaucracy. However, it was not until after World War II that significant steps were taken to promote representation of historically disadvantaged groups in the civil service. A series of executive orders issued during the 1960s, along with the

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passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, placed restrictions on employee discrimination based on race and gender in the federal bureaucracy and called on agencies to take positive steps to overcome historic patterns of discrimination in employment and contracting (Krislov 1974; Kellough 2006). The 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act imposed further restrictions against employment discrimination in the public and private sectors. Later, the landmark 1978 Civil Service Reform Act endorsed the concept of representative bureaucracy in the federal government, emphasizing equal opportunity recruitment and promotion in the civil service and calling on federal agencies to employ affirmative action goals and timetables to address underrepresentation of minorities and women (Krislov 1974; Kellough 2006). Many other countries have also grappled with the challenge of fostering representative bureaucracy (see Von Maravic et al. 2013). Several notable cases emerge from Asia and the Pacific. Since the middle of the twentieth century in India, the central government and various states have earmarked a percentage of new hires and promotions in the public sector for members of disadvantaged castes and tribal groups; the requirements for sitting for and passing the civil service examination have also been relaxed in an effort to end discrimination against marginalized communities (Paswan and Jaideva 2004; Jaffrelot 2006; Tummala 2015). While affirmative action in the public sector has enjoyed broad support among Indians, the manner in which it has been interpreted and implemented remains controversial, especially when it comes to designating the social groups that are to receive preferential treatment (Van Gool and de Zwart 2013). In Malaysia, where indigenous Malaysians constitute the majority of the population, minorities occupied most of the positions in the bureaucracy when the country was founded in 1963. Since then, the state has relied on hiring preferences and recruitment quotas to promote Malaysian representation in the public sector (Jaunch 1998). These measures have been so effective that by the 1990s, the civil service had been transformed into a Malay enclave, raising concerns about the unintended consequences of using affirmative action to advance ethnic integration and the need to recruit more non-Malays into the bureaucracy (Guan 2005). In Fiji, following military coups in reaction to perceived Indo-Fijian domination of the state and economy, a new government ratified a constitution with provisions to institutionalize ethnic Fijian political control. The constitution instructs the Public Service Commission to ensure that ethnic Fijians and Rotumans

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comprise no less than 50% of employees at each level of each department within the public service, a requirement that was subsequently formalized in the public service regulations. By the 1990s, this mandate had been achieved through a combination of deliberate displacement of Indo-Fijians and the introduction of hiring and promotion preferences for ethnic Fijians and Rotumans (Ratuva 2013). In Belgium and Canada, the rise of Flemish and Québécois nationalism together with concerns over underrepresentation of ethnolinguistic minorities in the bureaucracy precipitated the introduction of measures to promote representative bureaucracy (Turgeon and Gagnon 2013). The Belgian government adopted a policy of linguistic parity in senior management, with positions established for Dutch and French speakers, even though the later constitute less than fifty percent of the population (Turgeon and Gagnon 2013). For the rest of the workforce, representation is determined based on the relative importance of a language for an area of administration (Van de Walle et al. 2013). In Canada, the government has refrained from using quotas, instead instituting individual multilingualism as an element of merit and earmarking a large portion of senior management positions for people who can demonstrate proficiency in both English and French (Kubler et al. 2012; Turgeon and Gagnon 2013). As a result of these measures, representation of French speakers has significantly increased in both countries (Turgeon and Gagnon 2013). In Namibia, the constitution and 1990 Public Service Amendment Act call for a demographically balanced public service. While preserving the principle of merit and avoiding the use of employment quotas, the public service introduced preferences in hiring, promotion, and transfers of blacks and women to transform the public service from a bureaucracy in which whites were overrepresented and occupied nearly all of the senior management positions into one that mirrors the Namibian population, an objective nearly achieved within a decade of independence (Jaunch 1998; Southall 2013). South Africa’s 1996 Constitution stipulates creating a public administration that is efficient, economical, effective, and importantly, broadly representative of the South African people. As in Namibia, the government has refrained from using quotas. Instead, many whites employed by the public service were offered voluntary severance packages during the early years of transformation to create space in the public service for historically disadvantaged people (Ncholo 2000; Franks 2014). To ensure

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proportional representation of all social groups in the public service, the government issued the White Paper on the Transformation of the Public Service (WPTPS) in 1995 and the White Paper on Affirmative Action in the Public Service (WPAAPS) in 1998 to provide guidance on how to increase employment of blacks, women, and those with disabilities in the public service (DPSA 1995, 1998). These policies require national and provincial departments to take deliberate measures to affirm historically disadvantaged groups, including identifying and removing barriers to implementing affirmative action, establishing targets as part of a comprehensive affirmative action plan, and regularly monitoring progress toward achieving those targets. In order to ensure efficiency, economy, and effectiveness, affirmative action hires must be qualified for the positions they are to fill and should receive training, career counseling and planning, and mentoring from their employers to enable them to rise up the ranks (DPSA 1995, 1998). Significant progress has been achieved in transforming the public service into an institution that is broadly representative of the South African population. According to a recent report from the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA 2016), black and female representation in national and provincial departments stood at 91 and 60%, respectively, figures comparable to and exceeding these groups’ share of the national population. Black representation in senior management exceeded the government’s target of 75%, but female representation in senior management, while the highest it had ever been at 41%, still fell short of the 50% target. The percent of those with disabilities was just 0.76%, well below the 2% target. Despite these gains, affirmative action has come under fire from those who believe demographic transformation has eroded bureaucratic capacity and performance (Johnson 2010; Franks 2014; Jeffery 2014). The use of affirmative action to promote employment of historically disadvantaged persons and foster representative bureaucracy is controversial, engendering fierce opposition in South Africa and other countries (see Kellough 2006; Schuck 2002; Selden 2006). One argument made against affirmative action is that it violates the principle that individuals are the fundamental unit of a democratic society and that they should be judged based on their personal abilities and performance, not their social identity (Skrentny 1996). Since it is individuals who face discrimination, those who have been victimized should be compensated, not entire groups. From this perspective, laws that strictly prohibit discrimination

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suffice to ensure justice and equity. A related critique is that affirmative action is reverse discrimination, a new wrong committed against innocent victims (Wildman 1996). Those who bear the cost of affirmative action today, typically members of privileged ethnic groups, are not the same individuals who perpetrated discrimination in the past and are therefore guilty by association. Additionally, critics of affirmative action claim that deliberate measures to affirm certain social groups, although formulated with good intentions, end up benefitting the wrong people. Although a group may have been historically disadvantaged, not all of its members experienced discrimination, and ironically, it is often those who are least disadvantaged, because of their access to education and other resources, who end up benefiting from preferences in higher education and employment (Kellough 2006). Other arguments against the use of affirmative action to promote representation of historically disadvantaged groups focus on how the policy adversely affects its beneficiaries. One claim that has been made is that affirmative action stigmatizes and discredits those affirmed, as others tend to question their abilities and qualifications and come to believe that their selection was not based on merit. Crosby et al. (2003) point to various studies showing that people rate the competence and qualifications of individuals designated as affirmative action hires lower than those not designated as such. To make matters worse, some critics argue, affirmative action adversely affects the self-confidence and self-efficacy of beneficiaries. Heilman et al. (1998) found that those who believe they were selected based on their group identity rather than on individual merit rated their own performance lower. Finally, the argument is made that preferential treatment of minorities and other groups who had been victimized in the past is no longer needed due to the impressive achievements and progress made by these groups (Thernstrom and Thernstrom 2009). While affirmative action may have been worthwhile in the past, it has become outdated and burdensome. Perhaps the strongest claim laid against the use of affirmative action to foster representative bureaucracy is that it necessitates a trade-off: while equal opportunity and proportional representation in public organizations are advanced, less qualified employees end up taking the place of more qualified ones, diminishing knowledge, skills, and abilities and adversely affecting performance. Such an argument is frequently made in the United States by opponents of affirmative action, generally (Holzer and Neumark 1999; Crosby et al. 2003), and in the public

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sector, specifically (Kellough 2006). Concerns about lowered standards and weakened capacity have also been raised by opponents of affirmative action in the public sector in India, Fiji, Namibia, Canada, and elsewhere (Kernaghan 1978; Jaunch 1998; Ratuva 2013; Tummala 2015). The head of the Public Service Union of Namibia claimed that affirmative action in the public service favors the unqualified and incompetent and undermines the system of incentives and rewards that underlie a merit system (Jaunch 1998). Concerns have been repeatedly raised in India about how the use of quotas in hiring and promotion have diminished public sector efficiency (Tummala 2015). Similarly, in Canada, critics of efforts to foster representative bureaucracy have argued that the quest for representativeness adversely affects efficiency, as persons are appointed based on their ethnicity instead of their qualifications (Kernaghan 1978). Opponents of affirmative action in South Africa also claim it has undermined bureaucratic capacity and performance. Previous leaders of the Democratic Alliance (DA), the main opposition party, have been particularly harsh critics of affirmative action. Solidarity, a large trade union, maintains that implementation of affirmative action without proper consideration for the skills and competencies of those being hired has led to a deterioration in service provision (Solidarity 2013). Luiz (2002) maintains that representativeness in the public sector is a legitimate goal but fears it is being advanced at the expense of diminished state capacity. Johnson (2010) has called affirmative action a huge disaster, citing a litany of problems it has created for the public service, including a sharp decline in the quantity and quality of many public services, high vacancy and turnover rates, hiring and pay discrimination against white civil servants, chronic absenteeism, and low morale. Finally, Jeffery (2014) accuses the ANC of using racial quotas to fill government jobs with unqualified blacks, thereby diminishing the capacity of the public service. Is such a trade-off between equity and representativeness, on the one hand, and capacity and performance, on the other, a foregone conclusion? Can greater representation of historically disadvantaged groups in the public sector be achieved without compromising bureaucratic expertise? Is it possible that by increasing representation of historically disadvantaged groups, governments can actually improve the effectiveness of bureaucracies and the programs and policies they implement? Despite what critics of affirmative action in South Africa and elsewhere claim, mounting evidence from various fields of study suggests that achieving greater representation of historically disadvantaged groups

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in bureaucracies does not inevitably compromise capacity and performance. Empirical studies of the labor market effects of affirmative action in the United States indicate that affirmative action does not result in hiring minority and female job candidates who are far less qualified than whites and males. Holzer and Neumark (1999, 2000) found that women and minorities hired under affirmative action were slightly less qualified on easily observable job qualifications like educational attainment. As they note, however, affirmative action hires seem to compensate for this shortfall by utilizing unobserved skills and exerting greater effort. Despite slightly lower qualifications, they found little evidence that women and minorities hired under affirmative action performed worse, in part because of additional training and development opportunities offered to affirmative action hires (Holzer and Neumark 1999, 2000). Similar studies focusing on specific occupations like police officers, university professors, and physicians, corroborate Holzer and Neumark’s findings (see Holzer and Neumark 2006). In addition, the findings from a growing number of representative bureaucracy studies support the ANC’s claims about the advantages of representative bureaucracy for public sector performance. Empirical studies show that increasing representation of historically disadvantaged groups, including racial and ethnic minorities and women, can improve the effectiveness of various public policies and programs. Researchers have found that hiring more minority and female teachers improves standardized test scores for minority and female students (Meier et al. 1999; Keiser et al. 2002); local jurisdictions that employ more female police officers are more effective at enforcing laws against rape (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006); federal agencies that hire more racial minorities are better at achieving the goal of awarding contracts to minority-owned businesses (Fernandez et al. 2013); and child support payments increase as agencies hire more women (Wilkins and Keiser 2006). To be sure, representation of historically disadvantaged groups does not automatically translate into substantive benefits or better performance. The relationship between bureaucratic representation and performance is contingent on several conditions: that bureaucrats have discretion when implementing policies; that the policies are salient to the demographic group in question; and that decisions and actions taken by bureaucrats impact the demographic group (Meier 1993; Keiser et al. 2002; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Moreover, for bureaucratic

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representation to impact performance, the goals of bureaucrats should align with those of policymakers and the policies and programs they establish, thereby mitigating the risk of moral hazard and ensuring faithful execution of policy mandates (McCubbins et al. 1987). It is also important to note that to date, nearly all the evidence linking representation of historically disadvantaged groups to performance comes from studies conducted in the U.S. In the U.S., affirmative action is meant to increase representation of racial or ethnic minority groups in public organizations. This should affect relatively modest changes in the demographic composition of bureaucracy and, by extension, in its capacity and performance, if one assumes affirmative action means less qualified and experienced employees taking the place of more competent ones. In South Africa, however, it is the large black majority that is being affirmed, resulting in seismic changes to the public workforce, particularly at the managerial level. Considering that until 1994 most blacks in South Africa had been denied the same educational and employment opportunities as whites, expecting greater representation of blacks in the bureaucracy to lead to higher performance, as evidence from the U.S. indicates, becomes a much riskier proposition. Hence, testing the impact of bureaucratic representation on performance in South Africa represents what the renowned philosopher of science Karl Popper (1963) called a “severe test” of the theory of representative bureaucracy. Popper rejected the notion of induction and argued that scientists can never confirm a theory or conclude that it is true. Severe testing entails expanding the breadth or content of a theory so that it tells more and generates bolder and riskier predictions, and then testing those predictions under conditions where they are most likely to be rejected. Failure to reject a bold and improbable prediction corroborates a theory and advances scientific knowledge until a better theory with greater empirical content and explanatory power emerges. Using a mixed methods approach that combines quantitative and qualitative analyses, this study empirically examines the relationship between representation of historically disadvantaged groups and performance in the South African bureaucracy. Quantitative analysis of longitudinal data from national government departments and Chapter 9 institutions during a ten-year period, combined with analysis of data gathered from semi-structured interviews with nearly three dozen senior officials from these organizations, serve to answer two questions: What impact does representation of historically disadvantaged groups

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have on organizational performance, and how does representation of historically disadvantaged groups impact performance? Unlike most previous studies of representative bureaucracy, which focus on a particular policy or program, this study assesses how variation in racial and gender representation across an entire national bureaucracy over time relates to organizational performance, a matter of consequence beyond South Africa to countries like Belgium, India, Brazil, Canada, and the United States where policies to foster representative bureaucracy have a national scope (see Von Maravic et al. 2013). Moreover, in South Africa, it is greater bureaucratic representation of the majority—not of minority groups—that is hypothesized to improve organizational performance. Importantly, the study seeks to advance research on representative bureaucracy by identifying the causal mechanisms or explanatory processes linking bureaucratic representation to performance, phenomena often disregarded by representative bureaucracy researchers (Lim 2006; Keiser 2010). Quantitative methods are powerful tools for analyzing relationships and investigating the impact of one factor on another, but they often fail to reveal how or why an impact occurs (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010). The “black box” approach to causality, by which statistical estimates are used to establish the effect of one variable on another, has been criticized by a growing number of social scientists who believe that rigorous testing of theories aimed at advancing scientific knowledge requires observing and understanding how variables are related to each other and their position and role in a theoretical structure or model (Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Hedström and Ylikoski 2010; Brady and Collier 2010). The quantitative analysis undertaken offers compelling evidence that representative bureaucracies perform better. As these organizations employ greater numbers of blacks in general, and Africans in particular, they become more effective at achieving their performance goals. This supports the ANC government’s assertion that gains in performance can be obtained from having a public service that is broadly representative of society. Moreover, the findings are consistent with a growing number of studies showing representation of historically disadvantaged groups can improve the effectiveness of public programs and organizations. The link between female representation and organizational performance is more tenuous and conditional. The quantitative analysis fails to show a positive relationship between overall female representation and organizational performance. When gender is broken down by

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race, however, the analysis reveals that an increase in African female representation leads to higher performance. This demonstrates the importance of intersectionality, or the intersection of multiple demographic characteristics, when examining social identity and its link to bureaucratic outcomes. In the case of South Africa, the intersection of race and gender creates a unique identity for African women, a social group that was doubly disadvantaged by racial and gender discrimination during apartheid but that now stands to gain from policies to provide both racial and gender redress, making the policies they are tasked with implementing especially salient to them. In addition, the findings reveal that greater female representation in senior management, as well as the promotion of women within these public organizations, improves organizational performance. This underscores the importance of achieving proportional representation at all levels of the bureaucracy and how failure to develop, promote, and adequately represent women in senior management may cause public organizations to forgo gains in performance that can be realized from representative bureaucracy. The quantitative findings are robust and corroborated by qualitative findings from interviews with nearly three-dozen senior officials, the overwhelming majority of whom reported having a more demographically representative workforce enhances the performance of public organizations. Evidence from these interviews also points to multiple causal mechanisms operating in the South African context. One way in which representation of historically disadvantaged groups can improve performance is through bureaucratic advocacy on behalf of these social groups, for example, blacks or women in the bureaucracy pressing for the interests of black and female citizens. This, however, is not the only, or even most important, causal mechanism at play. Greater representation of historically disadvantaged groups can increase performance by eliciting a more favorable response from citizens, including greater compliance, cooperation, and coproduction of public services, as well as by enhancing bureaucracy’s ability to communicate effectively with a multilingual citizenry. These particular causal mechanisms are prominent in the South African context due to the multiethnic character of South African society, as well as to the long history of hostility and distrust of bureaucracy dating back to the country’s colonial past. Empathy for citizens, especially when bureaucrats and citizens are of the same race or gender, also emerged as a way in which greater representation of historically disadvantaged groups can improve performance. In addition, greater

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representation of historically disadvantaged groups in the bureaucracy helps to mitigate biases and discriminatory behavior directed against members of those communities.

Plan for the Book The remainder of the book proceeds in seven parts. Chapter 2 focuses on the South African bureaucracy during the apartheid era. The discussion begins with a brief overview of racial oppression and exploitation in South Africa, including the period of apartheid (1948–1994). The critical role played by the apartheid bureaucracy in realizing the NP’s vision of a racially separated and white-dominated South Africa is explained. The focus then shifts to the apartheid bureaucracy’s formal structure, demographic character, values and norms, and capacity and performance. This descriptive analysis of the South African bureaucracy prior to 1994 sheds light on the reasons behind efforts to reform the public service, and in particular, to transform it into a representative bureaucracy. Implicit in some of the criticisms of transformation is the notion that the apartheid bureaucracy was a highly capable, efficient, and effective institution and that affirmative action eroded its capacity and diminished its performance (Habib 2013; Picard 2005). As the analysis will reveal, the apartheid bureaucracy poses a paradox: while it possessed impressive capabilities and achieved notable successes, it was also plagued by chronic deficiencies that limited its efficiency and effectiveness and necessitated major changes to its function and form. Against this historical backdrop, Chapter 3 positions administrative reform and demographic transformation of the South African bureaucracy since the end of apartheid within the context of the ANC government’s efforts to address the legacy of apartheid. For nearly two decades, the ANC in power has pursued an ambitious and far-reaching policy agenda whose central thrust has been to undo the harm caused by apartheid by ending racial and gender inequality and reducing poverty, particularly among blacks. As described in the chapter, such policies include a significant expansion in social grants and the provision of basic public services like water, sanitation, housing, and electricity, as well as policies designed to promote employment equity, black economic empowerment, and gender equity. These policies are highly salient to historically disadvantaged groups in South Africa, especially blacks, creating propitious conditions for representation of historically disadvantaged

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groups to improve bureaucratic performance. The discussion then turns to efforts since 1994 to promote employment equity in the public sector and transform the public service into a representative bureaucracy. The policy framework for public service transformation and affirmative action is described, followed by an assessment of the demographic changes that have occurred within the public sector during the last quarter-century. The chapter concludes by presenting the various claims made by critics and opponents of affirmative action in the public sector, including that demographic transformation has eroded bureaucratic capacity and performance. The ANC views the bureaucracy as an indispensable tool for transforming society and redressing the harm caused by colonialism and apartheid. Chapter 4 examines major administrative reforms in South Africa since 1994. Like affirmative action in the public service, these administrative reforms have been undertaken to address the deficiencies in the bureaucracy inherited from the apartheid state and are designed to establish an integrated, capable, effective, representative, and accountable public service that responds to the needs and interests of all South Africans. The discussion them turns to ongoing challenges facing the public service, including deficiencies in skills and management, high vacancy and turnover rates, the low quality and undersupply of many public services, cadre deployment, and corruption, all of which undercut governmental performance. Chapter 5 lays the theoretical foundation for the empirical analysis that follows, focusing on the theory of representative bureaucracy. It begins with a discussion of bureaucratic accountability and the various mechanisms used to control the bureaucracy. The discussion then critically examines the theory of representative bureaucracy, its assumptions, and predictions. The empirical evidence regarding bureaucratic representation and its effects on public organizations and citizens is reviewed, including evidence of the link between bureaucratic representation and performance. The chapter then introduces the concept of workforce diversity, discusses the distinction between bureaucratic representation and workforce diversity as properties of bureaucracies, explains how workforce diversity can affect performance, and offers a brief review of the empirical evidence linking workforce diversity and performance. Chapters 6 and 7 describe the methods and data and report the findings from the empirical analysis. Chapter 6 investigates the impact

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of representation of historically disadvantaged groups—blacks and women—on organizational performance in South Africa. Multivariate regression analysis of data from a ten-year panel of national departments and Chapter 9 institutions is undertaken to examine the relationship between different forms of racial and gender representation and these organizations’ effectiveness at achieving their performance goals. This study is concerned as much with determining if there is a relationship between representation of historically disadvantaged groups and performance as with understanding how representation of historically disadvantaged groups can impact performance. Thus, Chapter 7 reports on the findings from in-depth interviews with senior officials in South African national departments and Chapter 9 institutions to identify the causal mechanisms, or underlying pathways, connecting bureaucratic representation to organizational performance. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes by discussing the study’s limitations and its implications for policy, management, and theory.

References Agocs, C., & Burr, C. (1996). Employment equity, affirmative action and managing diversity: Assessing the differences. International Journal of Manpower, 17, 30–45. Brady, H. E., & Collier, D. (Eds.). (2010). Rethinking social inquiry: Diverse tools, shared standards. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. Crosby, F. J., Iyer, A., Clayton, S., & Downing, R. A. (2003). Affirmative action: Psychological data and the policy debates. American Psychologist, 58, 93–115. Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA). (1995). White paper on the transformation of the public service. Pretoria: DPSA. DPSA. (1998). White paper on affirmative action in the public service. Pretoria: DPSA. DPSA. (2016). Annual report on employment equity in the public service 2015/2016. Pretoria: DPSA. Fernandez, S., Malatesta, M., & Smith, C. R. (2013). Race, gender, and government contracting: Different explanations or new prospects for theory? Public Administration Review, 73, 109–120. Franks, P. E. (2014). The crisis of the South African public service. Journal of the Helen Suzman Foundation, 74, 48–56. Gade, D. M., & Wilkins, V. M. (2013). Where did you serve? Veteran identity, representative bureaucracy, and vocational rehabilitation. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 23, 267–288.

18  S. FERNANDEZ Guan, L. H. (2005). Affirmative action in Malaysia. Southeast Asian Affairs, 1, 211–228. Habib, A. (2013). South Africa’s suspended revolution: Hopes and prospects. Athens: Ohio University Press. Hedström, P., & Swedberg, R. (1998). Social mechanisms: An introductory essay (pp. 1–33). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Hedström, P., & Ylikoski, P. (2010). Causal mechanisms in the social sciences. Annual Review of Sociology, 36, 49–67. Heilman, M. E., Battle, W. S., Keller, C. E., & Lee, R. A. (1998). Type of affirmative action policy: A determinant of reactions to sex-based preferential selection? Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 190–205. Holzer, H., & Neumark, D. (1999). Are affirmative action hires less qualified? Evidence from employer-employee data on new hires. Journal of Labor Economics, 17, 534–569. Holzer, H., & Neumark, D. (2000). What does affirmative action do? ILR Review, 53, 240–271. Holzer, H., & Neumark, D. (2006). Affirmative action: What do we know? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 25, 463–490. Jaffrelot, C. (2006). The impact of affirmative action in India: More political than socioeconomic. India Review, 5, 173–189. Jaunch, H. M. (1998). Affirmative action in Namibia: Redressing the imbalances of the past? Windhoek: New Namibia Books. Jeffery, A. (2014). BEE: Helping or hurting? Cape Town: Tafelberg. Johnson, R. W. (2010). South Africa’s brave new world: The beloved country since the end of apartheid. New York: Overlook Press. Keiser, L. R. (2010). Representative bureaucracy. In R. F. Durant (Ed.), Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy (pp. 1–28). New York: Oxford University Press. Keiser, L. R., Wilkins, V. M., Meier, K. J., & Holland, C. A. (2002). Lipstick and logarithms: Gender, institutional context, and representative bureaucracy. American Political Science Review, 96, 553–564. Kellough, J. E. (2006). Understanding affirmative action: Politics, discrimination and the search for justice. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Kernaghan, K. (1978). Representative bureaucracy: The Canadian perspective. Canadian Public Administration, 21, 489–512. Kingsley, J. D. (1944). Representative bureaucracy. Yellow Springs, OH: Antioch Press. Krislov, S. (1974). Representative bureaucracy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Kubler, D., Kobelt, E., & Andrey, S. (2012). Towards a representative bureaucracy: Promoting linguistic representation and diversity in the Swiss and Canadian federal public services. World Political Science Review, 8, 272–296.

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Lim, H. (2006). Representative bureaucracy: Rethinking substantive effects and active representation. Public Administration Review, 66, 193–204. Long, N. E. (1952). Bureaucracy and constitutionalism. American Political Science Review, 46, 808–818. Luiz, J. M. (2002). South African state capacity and post-apartheid economic reconstruction. International Journal of Social Economics, 29, 594–614. McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1987). Administrative procedures as instruments of political control. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 3, 243–277. Meier, K. J. (1975). Representative bureaucracy: An empirical analysis. American Political Science Review, 69, 526–542. Meier, K. J. (1993). Latinos and representative bureaucracy: Testing the Thompson and Henderson hypotheses. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 3, 393–414. Meier, K. J., & Bohte, J. (2007). Politics and the bureaucracy: Policymaking in the fourth branch of government (5th ed.). Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth. Meier, K. J., & Nicholson-Crotty, J. (2006). Gender, representative bureaucracy, and law enforcement: The case of sexual assault. Public Administration Review, 66, 850–860. Meier, J., Wrinkle, R. D., & Polinard, J. L. (1999). Representative bureaucracy and distributional equity: Addressing the hard question. Journal of Politics, 61, 1025–1039. Mosher, F. C. (1982). Democracy and the public service. New York: Oxford University Press. Ncholo, P. (2000). Reforming the public service in South Africa: A policy framework. Public Administration and Development, 20, 87–102. Ndletyana, M. (2008). Affirmative action in the public service. In A. Habib & K. Bentley (Eds.), Racial redress and citizenship in South Africa (pp. 77–98). Cape Town: Human Sciences Research Council. Paswan, S., & Jaideva, P. (Eds.). (2004). Encyclopedia of dalits in India: Reservation (Vol. 5). Delhi: Kalpaz Publications. Picard, L. A. (2005). The state of the state: Institutional transformation, capacity and political change in South Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University Press. Popper, K. (1963). Conjectures and refutations. New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Ratuva, S. (2013). Politics of preferential development: Trans-global study of affirmative action and ethnic conflict in Fiji, Malaysia and South Africa. Canberra: Australian National University. Riccucci, N. M., Van Ryzin, G. G., & Lavena, C. F. (2014). Representative bureaucracy in policing: Does it increase perceived legitimacy? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 24, 537–551.

20  S. FERNANDEZ O’Malley, P. (2007). Shades of difference: Mac Maharaj and the struggle for South Africa. New York: Penguin Books. Republic of South Africa (RSA). (2017). Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, No. 108 of 1996. Pretoria: Government Communication and Information System. https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution-republicsouth-africa-1996. Schuck, P. H. (2002). Affirmative action: Past, present, and future. Yale Law and Policy Review, 20, 1–96. Selden, S. C. (2006). A solution in search of a problem? Discrimination, affirmative action, and the new public service. Public Administration Review, 66, 911–923. Skrentny, J. D. (1996). The ironies of affirmative action: Politics, culture, and justice in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Solidarity. (2013). Stop “race-firmative” action. Johannesburg: Solidarity. http:// solidariteit.co.za/en/affirmative-action-campaign/. South African Institute of Race Relations (SOIRR). (1989). Race relations survey 1988/89. Johannesburg: SOIRR. Southall, R. (2013). Liberation movements in power: Party and state in southern africa. Woodbridge, UK: James Currey. Theobald, N. A., & Haider-Markel, D. P. (2008). Race, bureaucracy, and symbolic representation: Interactions between citizens and police. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19, 409–426. Thernstrom, S., & Thernstrom, A. (2009). America in black and white: One nation, indivisible. New York: Simon and Schuster. Tummala, K. K. (2015). Politics of preference: India, United States, and South Africa. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press. Turgeon, L., & Gagnon, A. G. (2013). The politics of representative bureaucracy in multilingual states: A comparison of Belgium, Canada and Switzerland. Regional and Federal Studies, 23, 407–425. Van de Walle, S., Groeneveld, S., & Vandenbussche, L. (2013). Representative bureaucracy in Belgium: Power sharing or diversity? In P. Von Maravic, B. G. Peters, & E. Schroter (Eds.), Representative bureaucracy in action: Country profiles from the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia (pp. 69–86). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Van Gool, B., & de Zwart, F. (2013). Politics of representative bureaucracy in India. In P. Von Maravic, B. G. Peters, & E. Schroter (Eds.), Representative bureaucracy in action: Country profiles from the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia (pp. 188–203). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Van Riper, P. P. (1958). The history of the U.S. Civil Service. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson and Company.

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Von Maravic, P., Peters, B. G., & Schroter, E. (Eds.). (2013). Representative bureaucracy in action: Country profiles from the Americas, Europe, Africa and Asia. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Wildman, Stephanie M. (1996). Privilege revealed: How invisible preference undermines America. New York: New York University Press. Wilkins, V. M., & Keiser, L. R. (2006). Linking passive and active representation by gender: The case of child support agencies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 16, 87–102.

CHAPTER 2

Apartheid and the Bureaucracy

Good empirical research is properly contextualized, so that the analyst and reader understand the circumstances and forces that shape actors, institutions, and events. The demographic transformation of the South African public service into a bureaucracy whose demographics mirror the population has been one of the major developments in the country’s recent history. Sweeping institutional change, however, does not occur in a vacuum. The emergence of representative bureaucracy in South Africa and its impact on the public service cannot be fully understood without a firm grasp of the conditions that preceded and have surrounded public service transformation. The next three chapters seek to provide this, starting with an analysis of the bureaucracy during the apartheid era and the historical, political, and economic forces that established the basis for transformation and influenced the nature and pace of change. In various countries, radical political change destroyed existing administrative systems and gave birth to new ones. In 1958 in Guinea, a former French colony, voters overwhelmingly rejected French President Charles de Gaulle’s offer of greater autonomy, opting instead for independence. The French government retaliated by pulling out administrative personnel and cancelling aid, decimating the bureaucracy (Rudin 1959). More recently, the Coalition Provisional Authority established after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 instituted a policy of de-Baathification, dissolving the Iraqi military and security services and purging © The Author(s) 2020 S. Fernandez, Representative Bureaucracy and Performance, Executive Politics and Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32134-5_2

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senior management in many public organizations and government corporations (Ricks 2006). By way of contrast, the apartheid regime was not defeated on the battlefield, nor was the apartheid bureaucracy disbanded when the system ended. As the following pages will reveal, in 1994, the newly elected government inherited a bureaucracy with notable capabilities and a history of impressive achievements. At the same time, it was a bloated and fragmented bureaucracy plagued by chronic deficiencies in skills and expertise, with a demographically skewed workforce, and lacking the ability to meet the basic needs of the majority of the population (Miller 2005; Naidoo 2008; Levin 2009; Cameron and Milne 2013). Upon assuming power, the African National Congress (ANC) sought to reform the apartheid bureaucracy while ensuring that the administrative institutions it inherited continued to function satisfactorily so that it could expand service provision to all South Africans and begin the long process of redressing for the harms caused by apartheid (Thornhill 2005). Existing administrations were not so much eliminated and supplanted as incorporated into new ones operating in different spheres of government (Ncholo 2000). The negotiated settlement between the regime and the liberation movements offered temporary job protection to existing bureaucrats (Sparks 1995). No wholesale purge of apartheid-era employees occurred, with the new government having opted instead to induce many to leave by offering voluntary severance packages (Ncholo 2000; Franks 2014). Moreover, hundreds of thousands of bureaucrats working in the Bantustan administrations and serving much of the African population were transferred to the new provincial administrations (Chipkin and Lipietz 2012). Relying on a range of primary and secondary sources, this chapter explores the central role of bureaucracy in realizing the National Party’s (NP) vision of a racially segregated and white-dominated South Africa. It also describes the formal structure, demographic composition, and prevailing values and culture of the apartheid bureaucracy and assesses the institution’s capacity and performance. In this way, it seeks to understand the conditions that gave rise to public service transformation and other administrative reforms that have altered the function and form of the public service in South Africa since 1994. Chapters 3 and 4 elaborate on the course of administrative reform in South Africa, with demographic transformation at the center of this process. This chapter’s analysis offers valuable insight into the motives behind administrative reform, the

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perceived need for change, and the potential effects of those changes on the bureaucracy. It challenges the narrative of the apartheid bureaucracy as a paragon of administrative effectiveness and efficiency, a false image perpetuated by apartheid leaders and sympathizers of the state (Posel 1999; Picard 2005). This false image is at the root of many of the criticisms laid against the use of affirmative action to foster representative bureaucracy and the widely held view that transformation has depleted the public service of human capital and severely undercut its ability to meet its obligations to citizens (Habib 2013), as discussed in Chapter 3. If one assumes that the pre-1994 bureaucracy was a highly capable and effective institution, it is not difficult to see why one would conclude that attempts to fundamentally alter its demographics would reduce its capacity and adversely affect its performance. This proves to be facile and erroneous conjecture, leading many observers to overlook the potential for representative bureaucracies to perform better, one that has been established by representative bureaucracy researchers. Chapter 5 provides a comprehensive review of that body of research.

A History of Racial Oppression and Exploitation Affirmative action in South Africa was instituted in response to the country’s troubled history of racial domination, the harm and indignities experienced by millions of South Africans at the hands of a repressive bureaucracy, and the systematic denial of equal employment opportunities for blacks. Few political systems have been as reviled as apartheid. The roots of racial discrimination and exploitation in South Africa, however, run deep to the founding of the Cape Colony by the Dutch East India Company. Slavery was introduced in 1658, a practice abolished by colonial authorities in 1834 after Britain took possession of the colony. Throughout the 1700s and 1800s, military conflict and land dispossession relegated a growing number of Africans to a grim life in overcrowded rural tribal areas (De Kiewiet 1941; Davenport 1977). The passage of the 1913 Land Act set aside less than 10% of country’s land for native African reserves. Within the reserves, an authoritarian system of rule was established that enabled a small number of white officials to lord over millions of Africans and contain their influx into urban areas and white-owned farms (Hammond-Tooke 1975; Thompson 1995; Picard and Mogale 2015).

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Outside of the native reserves, Africans were prohibited from purchasing or renting land or from sharecropping, forcing many to become wage laborers (Beinart 1994; Wilson 1971; Beinart and Delius 2015). An elaborate system of migrant labor was established to provide cheap, low-skilled, and quiescent workers to white-owned mines and farms, with the native reserves as its wellspring (Wolpe 1972; Marks and Trapido 1987). Color bar was legalized in 1911 with passage of the Mines and Works Act, setting aside a wide range of semi-skilled and skilled occupations for white workers, excluding Africans from such jobs, and denying them adequate wages (Wilson 1971; Beinart 1994). In the early 1920s, a policy of “civilized labor” was introduced to reserve higher paying jobs for whites and protect industries employing large numbers of white workers (de Kiewiet 1941; Thompson 1995; Lodge 2002). Besides suffering land dispossession and labor exploitation, blacks also had the right to vote severely restricted prior to 1994, except within the ten tribal homelands or Bantustans established by the apartheid government for the African population (Davenport 1977; Lodge 2002). With the rise to power of the NP in 1948, apartheid came into being, an elaborate and comprehensive system of laws and administration that expanded the scale and scope of racial segregation, promoted separate development of the races, and ensured white minority rule. Apartheid did not represent a radical break from a more liberal and just past but rather a continuation of how things had been in South Africa (Adam 1971; Dubow 2014). As Piet Cillie, the editor of the prominent newspaper Die Burger explained, apartheid was not so much a system, ideology, or coherent blueprint, but a process of consolidating the Afrikaner nationalist movement to ensure the self-determination and welfare of the Afrikaner community (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1989). The system had both negative (or defensive) and positive aspects to it, the former being policies that furthered white domination and the latter those that promoted national self-determination and development for different ethnic groups (Moodie 1975). As such, it came to affect nearly every sphere of human activity (Rhoodie 1969; Adam 1971; Moodie 1975; Davenport 1977; Giliomee and Schlemmer 1989). Since the key to apartheid was for individuals to enjoy different rights and privileges based on race, one of the first acts passed was the 1950 Population Registration Act (Guelke 2005). The law required everyone to be classified as either white, Native, or Coloured; in 1959 the Coloured category was disaggregated into seven subcategories, including

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Cape Coloureds, Indians, and Asians. It also required that everyone be listed in a national registry and carry a national identity card indicating his or her race. That same year, the Group Areas Act was passed, imposing a system of segregation across the entire country. The law granted the government the right to proclaim certain areas as fit for occupation—including the right to own land—by one racial group and to forcibly remove members of all other groups. This led to the forced removal of millions of blacks from urban and rural locations set aside for the white population to townships in the periphery of cities and towns or to their designated tribal homelands (Dubow 2014). Complementing these laws were the 1950 Population Registration Act and 1970 Native Laws Amendment Act. The former prohibited Africans from being in an urban area designated for whites for more than 72 hours without a permit indicating that they were legally employed; it also stipulated that no African who had not been born in an urban area could live there unless they had resided there continuously for 15 years or worked for the same employer there for 10 years (Clark and Worger 2004). The latter act institutionalized the practice of requiring South Africans of all races to carry a pass wherever they went. New laws were also enacted to prohibit sexual relations and marriage between whites and nonwhites (Dubow 2014). The 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and 1950 Immorality Act outlawed marriages and sexual relations between whites and nonwhites, respectively. Separate areas on buses and trains and in parks and beaches were established for whites and nonwhites, and separate ambulances, hospitals, toilets, and pools were established for the various groups. Many buildings, including, post offices and railway stations, were also created just for whites or nonwhites. Apartheid labor regulations were designed to further protect white workers from black competition, inflate wages for whites, and ensure an adequate supply of cheap black labor, while minimizing the presence of Africans outside the homelands (Wolpe 1972; Giliomee and Schlemmer 1989). The 1952 Bantu Laws Amendment Act, and its amendment in 1957, sought to minimize migrant labor from the homelands by giving Africans who had been residing in cities and towns for a lengthy period of time preference in hiring and requiring all migrants to possess a short-term permit from a labor bureau to work in urban areas (Clark and Worger 2004). African labor in the agricultural sector was likewise limited to Africans possessing a short-term permit from a labor bureau; tens of thousands of Africans lacking such permits and congregating in

28  S. FERNANDEZ

“black spots” adjacent to white-owned farms were forcibly removed. The 1951 Native Building Workers Act, 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act, and other legislation designed to expand labor rights for white workers, including the right to unionize, institutionalized job reservation in the industrial and mining sectors. Most skilled and higher-paying jobs were set aside for whites and the ratio of white-to-African employment was fixed in various industries and occupations (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1989). The government relied on a series of laws to promote public safety and stamp out political dissent and resistance to apartheid (Adam 1971; Fullard 2004; Guelke 2005; Magubane 2010; Dubow 2014). The 1950 Suppression of Communism Act, created ostensibly to outlaw the Communist Party of South Africa, granted wide powers to the Minister of Justice to declare illegal and limit the political activities of any organization engaged in disturbances or disorder aimed at bringing about political, social, or economic change. The Public Safety Act and Criminal Amendment Act, both enacted in 1953, enabled the state to declare a state of emergency and suspend normal law; they also established strict penalties for civil disobedience, incitement, and protest. The 1962 General Law Amendment Act, or Sabotage Act, established the crime of sabotage and imposed the same penalties associated with acts of treason, including the death penalty. The 1963 General Law Amendment Act allowed the police to detain someone for 90 days without access to a lawyer; the 1965 Criminal Procedure Amendment Act extended the period to 180 days. Finally, the 1967 Terrorism Act granted the police broad authority to detain and charge with terrorism anyone committing, attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or inciting an act that endangered law and order. Among the most destructive policies of the apartheid state was the segregated system of Bantu Education (Beinart 1994; Thompson 1995). The 1953 Bantu Education Act established a separate educational system for Africans aimed at retribalizing Africans and developing a large pool of low-skilled laborers. The act eliminated state subsidies for mission schools, which until then had provided instruction to most African students. While African student enrollment nearly tripled within the first two decades after the passage of the act, Africans were relegated to an underfunded and inferior educational system that prepared them for life in the homelands or in the service of whites in mines, farms, and ­cities (Christie and Collins 1982). The 1959 Extension of University

2  APARTHEID AND THE BUREAUCRACY 

29

Education Act barred blacks from attending white institutions of higher education and established inferior colleges for them. A series of laws, starting with the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act, was passed to segregate Africans into designated tribal homelands based on ethnicity and language and to grant them political rights, including the right to vote, only in these territories (Hammond-Tooke 1975; Butler et al. 1978; Rogers 1980). With passage of the 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, tribal homelands were transformed into self-governing quasi-states, or Bantustans, which remained economically dependent on the national government and were never recognized internationally as sovereign states. Finally, the 1970 Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act was enacted to complete the process of denaturalization by denying Africans citizenship and political representation in South Africa, compelling them instead to become citizens of a Bantustan. By the time of its demise in the early 1990s, apartheid had wrought tremendous injustice, violence, and death across the South African landscape and throughout the region. Dubow (2014) estimates that during the last decade of apartheid alone, approximately 10,000 South Africans were killed as a result of political violence orchestrated by the apartheid state, or against the state and suspected collaborators by the liberation movements, with thousands of others jailed, tortured, and maimed (Bell 2003; Boraine and Plummer 2000). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), a restorative justice body set up to bear witness to and record human rights violations committed during apartheid, received over 21,000 statements from alleged victims of human rights abuses during apartheid, along with over 7000 requests for amnesty from those committing such acts (Republic of South Africa 1999). In addition, the commission recognized the deaths of hundreds of thousands killed in the civil wars in Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia as the result of the apartheid system and the struggle against it, including military interventions by the South African security forces to destabilize neighboring states sympathetic to the struggle (Republic of South Africa 1999). Between 1960 and 1982, the state forcibly removed 3.5 million people from white-owned farms and urban areas designated for a particular racial group, dislocating families, destroying entire black communities, and causing unspeakable psychological trauma to victims (Marais 2001). So heinous was apartheid that in 1976, the United Nations General Assembly ratified the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (ICSPCA),

30  S. FERNANDEZ

declaring apartheid a crime against humanity and a threat to international peace and security (see United Nations 1973). By the early 1990s, the system had produced tremendous social and economic inequality along racial lines. World Bank and South African government statistics indicate that nearly 99% of all the poor in South Africa were African or Coloured and that Africans had approximately ten times the unemployment rate of whites (MacDonald 2006; Bundy 2016). In regard to land ownership, whites held close to 90% of the land and nearly all commercial farms (Beinart 1994; Manji 2001). The percent of Africans with running tap water, electricity or gas as the main energy source for cooking, and flush or chemical toilets was 33, 46 and 42%, respectively, while more than 97% of whites enjoyed such amenities (MacDonald 2006). Teacher-student ratios were 1:18 in white schools, 1:24 in Asian schools, 1:27 in Coloured schools, and 1:39 in African schools; in addition, more than 95% of teachers in white schools had teaching certificates, compared to less than one-fifth of those in African schools (Byrnes 1997). A huge disparity in public spending on education between blacks and whites meant that whites had a considerable advantage in the labor market, leading to enormous income inequality among the races that persists today (Seekings and Nattrass 2005, 2016). Huge disparities in old-age pensions, health care expenditures, and access to primary and specialized health care services until the waning years of apartheid resulted in whites experiencing significantly lower infant mortality rates and much higher life expectancy than Africans (Thompson 1995; Seekings and Nattrass 2005). Apartheid became increasingly unworkable due in part to the enormous influx of Africans to the cities, urban revolt in townships throughout the country, and economic and cultural sanctions against South Africa. Elected prime minister in 1978, P. W. Botha attempted to reform apartheid in the hope of making it more palatable to the black majority and the international community. A new constitution was adopted in 1983 that created a tri-cameral parliament with chambers for whites, Coloureds, and Indians—but not Africans—and with seats apportioned so that white parliamentarians always outnumbered Coloureds and Indians. Each chamber handled “own affairs” issues pertaining to each racial group, including health, education, and culture, and a cabinet under white control became responsible for “general affairs” such as taxation, the economy, and security and defense. The dreaded pass laws that limited movement of people and ensured segregated living were

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31

completely repealed in 1986. Black Local Authorities (BLA) were created to give political representation to blacks living in the periphery of white urban centers and improve the provision of services to these communities. And throughout the 1980s, spending on education and public services for blacks increased, spurring the growth of the African middle class (Beinart 1994; MacDonald 2006; Marais 2011). These efforts failed to reform apartheid and preserve white minority rule, however, as domestic and international pressure continued to mount, pushing the system to the brink of collapse. This ushered in a period of secret talks between the ruling NP and black opposition groups that ultimately brought both sides to the negotiating table where many of the details of a new government and constitution were ironed out (Sparks 1995). On April 27, 1994, South Africans of all colors went to the polls to elect a new government under a new interim constitution. The ANC earned 62% of the vote and led a Government of National Unity (GNU), with Nelson Mandela of the ANC as president and F.W. De Klerk of the NP and Thabo Mbeki of the ANC as deputy presidents. A bloody conflagration between the races was avoided and freedom and democracy for all South Africans was achieved.

Bureaucracy’s Role in Perpetuating Apartheid Enforcing the labyrinthine system of apartheid laws was a colossal undertaking that required considerable effort and skill on the part of the South African bureaucracy. The public sector, from the central government down to local and homeland authorities, was implicated in committing what in the eyes of the global community was a crime against humanity, while at the same time, ensuring that the white minority received services and enjoyed a standard of living on par with industrialized countries. Three segments of the bureaucracy played a particularly prominent and pernicious role in implementing apartheid and preserving white minority rule: the security agencies, including the police and defense forces, the Bantu Administration and Development Department (BAD), and the homeland or Bantustan administrations. An expanded discussion of the structure of the apartheid bureaucracy is provided in a latter section of this chapter. The South African Police (SAP), predecessor to the South African Police Service (SAPS), was one of the principle guardians of the apartheid system. One of its many responsibilities was enforcement of the

32  S. FERNANDEZ

Group Areas Act and pass laws, which restricted the presence of blacks in white residential areas and central business districts. This entailed routinely checking people’s identity papers to ensure that they were authorized to live, do business in, or travel through a particular area, arrest those found to be in violation of the law, and assist with the forced removal and resettlement of entire black communities from designated white areas. The police exercised wide powers under the Suppression of Communist Act and the Internal Security Act, including the authority to arrest, detain, and interrogate suspected members of banned organizations and those distributing seditious literature and participating in unauthorized public gatherings, among other activities (Frankel 1980; Cawthra 1993; Boraine and Plummer 2000; Pillay 2005). Police officers surveilled perceived enemies of the state and enforced banning orders that severely limited where the banned individual could live, who they could interact with, and where they could travel. The role of the police intensified during periods of heighten unrest, including the 1960 Sharpeville Massacre, the 1976 Soweto Uprising, and the township uprisings that swept the country in 1984 and 1985 (Cawthra 1993; Jeffery 2009). Among the most heinous acts perpetrated by the police during apartheid were those performed by special counter-insurgency units, like the notorious unit operating out of the Vlakplaas Farm outside of Pretoria whose members carried out political assassinations of suspected members of the ANC, PAC, and other liberation organizations (Welsh 1994; Bell 2003). The South African Defense Force (SADF), the South African armed forces during apartheid, was the government’s main instrument by which to implement President Botha’s Total Strategy, a foreign policy aimed at creating a benign regional environment for the apartheid state by neutralizing threats to its security (Hanlon 1986; Barber and Barratt 1990). SADF waged a protracted conventional war in Angola from 1975 to 1989 to destabilize a regime friendly to the ANC and South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), the liberation movement fighting to end white minority-rule in South-West Africa, now Namibia. In addition, in Angola as well as Mozambique, SADF waged war by proxy by arming and providing training and logistical support to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO), insurgent groups opposed to the regimes in Luanda and Maputo, respectively. SADF also carried out a series of cross-border strikes on suspected offices and military installations of

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33

liberation movements situated in Botswana and other frontline states. The military even played a domestic security role in 1984 and 1985 when soldiers were called into the townships to assist in putting down the urban revolt and again in 1992 when elements within the military became involved in “third force” activities aimed at inciting violence between the ANC and its rival, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) (Sparks 1995; Bell 2003). Besides the critical functions performed by the security forces, much of the routine work of implementing apartheid fell on employees and managers of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development (BAD). After the NP’s victory in 1948, BAD (known as the Department of Native Affairs until 1958) grew into a sprawling bureaucratic empire that eventually became the main custodian of apartheid and Prime Minister Henrik Verwoerd’s policy of separate development. What in 1950 had been a small bureaucracy staffed mostly by English-speaking whites had by the early 1970s become a virtual state within a state with around 75,000 employees, mostly Afrikaans-speaking whites, with jurisdiction over Africans living in urban and rural areas and the homeland territories (Evans 1997; Picard and Mogale 2015). The department was noted for its loyalty and responsiveness to the apartheid regime, its upper echelons filled by white Afrikaners ideologically aligned with the NP (Giliomee 1979b). BAD exercised awesome powers over the lives of Africans. It conducted surveillance, arrested and detained Africans suspected of subversive activity, regulated the flow of labor between rural and urban areas, controlled the provision of public housing for Africans in rural and urban areas, and administered rural betterment programs (Evans 1997). Its labour bureaus assessed the need for African labor in the mines, cities, and white-owned farms and regulated the flow of African workers to and from the rural areas by granting permission to work in a particular location. BAD was responsible for urban planning and construction of segregated housing for Africans in urban areas apart, and often at great distances, from white residential areas and central business districts. Its officials granted access to urban housing only to those legally permitted to reside in cities and towns, limited the construction of housing in black urban areas, and provided additional housing only in rural areas where economic opportunities were scarce (Evans 1997). In addition, the department coordinated with police in carrying out forced resettlements of Africans to the homelands (Giliomee and Schlemmer 1989).

34  S. FERNANDEZ

Native commissioners became an important element of the coercive state apparatus used to enforce and safeguard racial domination (Hammond-Tooke 1975; Picard and Mogale 2015). Among the powers at their disposal, Native commissioners coordinated police surveillance of suspected members of the ANC and PAC, prosecuted violators found to be living and working in areas without proper authorization, reviewed and approved (or denied) petitions for gatherings and meetings, and together with the homeland administrations, harassed and detained suspected subversives (Evans 1997; Giliomee and Schlemmer 1989; Morris and Hindson 1992). These officials also administered betterment programs in African rural areas. The South African government undertook betterment planning ostensibly to combat the deterioration of soil and other natural resources, improve agricultural production, and promote economic development (de Wet 1994). Betterment schemes, however, wrought havoc on the lives of Africans. From 1913 until the end of apartheid, these programs destroyed existing social and economic patterns, reduced the volume of land available for agricultural production, and uprooted nearly 7 million Africans who were made to resettle (McAllister 1991; de Wet 1994). Rural betterment, often carried out by force, served to control the location and movement of Africans in the rural areas and stem their flow into urban areas and white farms. Bitter resistance to betterment schemes was evident in the popular revolts of the late 1950s and early 1960s in the areas of gaMatlala in Limpopo, Zeerust in North West, and Mpondoland in the Eastern Cape, uprisings that were ruthlessly put down by the authorities (Matoli and Ntsebeza 2004; Zondi 2010). Equally noteworthy was the role played by the homeland or Bantustan administrations in implementing the NP’s policy of separate development. Starting in 1951 with the passage of the Black Authorities Act, the white minority government established ten African homelands where the majority of the African population was to eventually reside and enjoy political rights. These homelands had their own administrations staffed overwhelming by Africans from the corresponding ethnic group. However, many high-ranking officials in the homeland bureaucracies were whites seconded by the central government to provide skills and to exert control over the homeland governments (Butler et al. 1978; Peires 1995). Homeland administrations remained fiscally dependent on the apartheid state, lacked popular support, and elicited strong and often violent opposition from African residents. Bureaucrats in the

2  APARTHEID AND THE BUREAUCRACY 

35

Bantustans actively suppressed dissent and assisted the central administration in implementing apartheid policies. In the Transkei, Ciskei, and Bophuthatswana, the security forces, police, and other bureaucratic entities suppressed political activities of liberation movements, carrying out arrests, beatings, and imprisonment of suspects. They also intimidated and harassed political groups opposed to the homeland authorities, enforced banishment of Africans to rural areas, quelled protests by students and other groups, assisted in the forced removal of Africans from white urban and rural areas to the homelands, and partook in the implementation of the dreaded betterment schemes (Mbenga and Manson 2006). Hence, many homeland residents came to view the homeland bureaucrats and politicians as collaborators doing the biding of a racist and oppressive government (Levin and Weiner 1996).

Structure of the Apartheid Bureaucracy To speak of an apartheid bureaucracy is somewhat misleading, as the apartheid state comprised an array of administrations operating at the central (or national), provincial, and local spheres of government, along with the Bantustan administrations. From 1948 to 1994, the central administration came under the direct political control of the state president (or prime minister), his executive council (or cabinet) comprised of ministers, and appointed department heads (or secretaries). The Public Service Commission (PSC) (later Commission for Administration) exercised broad powers over personnel classification, selection, recruitment, remuneration, and removal policies and practices in the various departments that constituted the central administration. The PSC reported directly to the Minster of Interior, but the commission and heads of departments were delegated substantial authority over administrative matters (Roux 1975; Seegers 1993). This was justified based on the alignment of values and interests between Afrikaner politicians and their political appointees who were overwhelming Afrikaners themselves (Miller 2005). The largest and most important organizational entities in the central administration were the more than three dozen large state departments, many of which were dedicated to core governmental functions like justice, police, defense, finance, foreign affairs, and education (Roux 1975; Cloete 1988). In addition, the central administration included various other types of organizational entities, including state-owned enterprises and government-controlled commercial

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enterprises (South African Railways and Harbours and South African Airways); public corporations (e.g., the Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa, South African Reserve Bank, South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation, South African Broadcasting Corporation, Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, and Electricity Supply Commission); agricultural control boards (e.g., Wheat Industry Control Board and Livestock and Meat Industry Control Board); special-purpose control boards (e.g., Board of Censors and National Transport Commission); advisory boards (e.g., National Educational Advisory Board and Bantu Affairs Commission); trades and professions councils (e.g., South African Medical and Dental Council); boards and councils with delegated judicial authority (e.g., Unemployment Benefits Council); national research institutes (e.g., Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and South African Bureau of Standards); and ad hoc committees and commissions (Roux 1975; Cloete 1988).1 The four provinces—Transvaal Province, Orange Free State Province, Natal Province, and Cape Province—each had its own provincial administration under the authority of a chief executive officer, the provincial administrator, who, after passage of the 1986 Provincial Government Act, was appointed by the state president and served as the agent of the central government at the provincial level (Cloete 1988). Provincial administrations served both blacks and whites and had just a few departments dedicated largely to education, health, and roads, but with their own series of advisory councils and boards (Seegers 1994). Provincial authorities were under the strict political and financial control of the national government and remained highly dependent on it for financial transfers, which amounted to about 85% of the revenues available to provincial authorities (Seegers 1994). At the local sphere during apartheid, South Africa had more than 450 local authorities of all types by 1970. These were largely multi-purpose entities, including rural authorities, peri-urban local authorities, and urban local authorities (Roux 1975). The urban local authorities, generally under the authority of an elected executive committee who appointed a chief executive officer (e.g., a town clerk), provided a wide range of services, including public transportation, electricity and water supply, housing, cultural amenities, libraries, museums, fire-fighting and

1 For

a detailed analysis of these other types of public organizations, see Cloete (1988).

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37

ambulance services, and business and motor vehicle licensing (Roux 1975). Importantly, in accordance with the policy of “own management for own matters”, Bantu Administrative Boards (BAB) were created in 1972, freeing white local governments of responsibility over neighboring black townships. Lack of financial capacity, misadministration, and corruption led to the collapse of the BAB’s (Picard and Mogale 2015), paving the way for the 1982 Black Local Authorities Act, which created new Black Local Authorities (BLA). These authorities had very limited fiscal capacity, since retail businesses and industries were prevented from locating within their jurisdictions and white residents and businesses paid taxes in the typically smaller white localities (Ministry for Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development 1998; Kanyane and Koma 2014). In an effort to increase revenues, BLA’s raised user fees and rents, helping to spark the urban uprisings of the 1980s (Jeffery 2009). The African homelands developed fairly extensive bureaucracies of their own. The 1951 Bantu Authorities Act established the basis for African self-determination in tribal areas by granting authority to establish tribal or territorial governments. Nearly a decade later, the Bantu Self-Government Act advanced Prime Minister Verwoerd’s vision of a commonwealth of independent African states politically separate from, but economically dependent on, South Africa. It formally recognized the homelands as states and promoted the development of their legislative and executive institutions, including their bureaucracies (Cloete 1988). By the 1980s, there were four “independent” Bantustans (Transkei, Ciskei, Venda, and Bophuthatswana) and six “self-governing” ones (Lebowa, Gazankulu, KwaNdebele, Qwaqwa, KaNgwane, and KwaZulu) (Philips 2017). The homeland administrations were tasked with providing a range of services to Africans in tribally-designated and largely rural areas, including education, housing, public works, and manpower training (Hammond-Tooke 1975; Butler et al. 1978). As explained further below, homeland administrations were unique in the sense that the overwhelming majority of their employees was African, giving rise to a technocracy that spurred the growth of a nascent middle class in the homelands (Picard 2005). The homelands were created ostensibly to become independent states where Africans would govern themselves and take responsibility for their own development, and their bureaucracies therefore received some degree of autonomy over administrative matters

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(Seegers 1994). However, white officials seconded by the central government continued to exert influence over them (Picard 2005). Despite efforts by the central government to prop up the Bantustan governments through a substantial infusion of money, personnel, and technical assistance, the capacity and performance of these bureaucracies remained rather dismal. The homeland administrations suffered from chronic shortages of skilled employees and managers and offered scant educational and training opportunities to their employees (Cochrane 1977; Wronsley 1972; Picard 2005). Moreover, bureaucrats in the homeland administrations at times proved to be politically unreliable, having engaged in political obstruction, strikes, and revolts in Ciskei, Lebowa, Venda, and Bophuthatswana (Picard 2005). High levels of waste and corruption perpetrated by politicians and senior managers in these administrations starved them of desperately needed resources to meet the needs of their residents (Hyslop 2005). From the birth of the Union of South Africa in 1910 to 1979, and especially after 1948, the bureaucracy burgeoned. The number of government departments and quasi-governmental organizations grew from 13 and 2 to 39 and 952, respectively (Thornhill 1983). The public workforce also seemed to grow uncontrollably as the apartheid system became more complex, the security situation worsened, and the weight of economic sanctions grew. Basing her estimates on various official and unofficial sources, Seegers (1994) reports total public sector employment increasing from 150,718 in 1920 to 481,518 in 1950, more than a threefold increase; by 1989, total public sector employment had once again more than tripled in size to 1,601,158. The nearly tenfold increase from 1920 to 1989 far exceeded the growth in population during the same period of time (Byrnes 1997; Christopher 2011). In 1979, concerns about inefficiency and poor coordination led to the adoption of a rationalization program that by 1982 had reorganized the central administration and reduced the number of departments down to 22, along with reforms aimed at streamlining the cabinet committee system and redesigning the personnel system (Seegers 1994). This reorganization, however, had little impact on the size of the public workforce or government expenditures (Seegers 1994). During the last decade of apartheid, the structure of the bureaucracy became more complex, fragmenting the state even further. The 1983 Constitution established a tri-cameral parliament with houses for whites (House of Assembly), Coloureds (House of Representatives),

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and Indians (House of Delegates). Seats were apportioned among the houses in a manner that ensured white control of the government. The new constitutional arrangement distinguished between “general affairs” departments (e.g., Defense, Transport, Posts and Telecommunications, and Foreign Affairs) and “own affairs” departments (e.g., education, health, recreation, and social welfare) for whites, Coloureds, and Indians. Nearly two dozen existing departments were entrusted to the Cabinet to handle general affairs, but new departments were established to handle own affairs, under the authority of new Ministers’ Councils for each of the three racial groups (Cloete 1988; Boulle 1994). This expansion of administrative responsibilities and entities placed additional strain on an already large and overburdened bureaucracy that was suffering from poor coordination and a shortage of qualified personnel (Griffiths 1987). Driven by the need to collect and disseminate intelligence and improve implementation of national security policy, President P. W. Botha established the National Security Management System (NSMS), which became fully operational in 1980. It imposed on the existing bureaucracy a new hierarchy of interdepartmental committees, whose members were senior bureaucrats responsible for a range of functions and services related to national security, including police, intelligence, social welfare, labor, transportation, and culture (Seegers 1991). The structure stretched from the State Security Council, a sub-committee of the Cabinet composed of 15 coordinating interdepartmental committees, down to joint management centers in 12 regions spanning the entire country, 60 sub-regional joint management centers, and approximately 450 mini-regional joint management centers in cities and towns (Seegers 1991; Cawthra 1993). So massive and all-encompassing was the NSMS that every government institution had to participate at the national, regional, sub-regional, or mini-regional level (Seegers 1991). Although effective in dealing with certain outbreaks of violence, the perception among many participants was that the system imposed new workloads and red tape, did little to improve efficiency, and created new divisions and riffs within the bureaucracy (Seegers 1991; Cawthra 1993; Miller 2005).

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Demographic Character of the Apartheid Bureaucracy In addition to its large and complex structure, one of the defining features of the apartheid bureaucracy was its unrepresentative character. The public workforce remained demographically skewed and a poor reflection of the country’s diverse population until the dying days of apartheid, despite gradual gains in representation of blacks and women after 1960 (see Table 2.1). Official statistics reveal that from 1960 to 1991, the percent of the population that was white stood at less than 20%, yet whites constituted between 40 and 50% of those working for the central administration (Department of Statistics 1960, 1970; Central Statistical Services 1980, 1992). Whites were also overrepresented in the public corporations and state-owned commercial enterprises attached to the central government. Overrepresentation of whites at the provincial level was also significant, as they occupied approximately half of all the positions in the provincial authorities until 1980. Africans, who constituted approximately 70% of the population from 1960 to 1990, were notably underrepresented in central and provincial authorities and public corporations and commercial enterprises, and only slightly less so in local authorities. Only in the homeland administrations did Africans achieve or exceed proportional representation. Chapter 3 describes the process of public service transformation that has been underway since 1994 to foster representative bureaucracy in South Africa at the national and provincial spheres of government. Besides occupying a disproportionate share of positions in the bureaucracy, whites were also privileged in regard to rank and pay. Relying on data from the Commission for Administration, the South African Institute for Race Relations (1983, 1984) reported huge disparities in racial representation by occupational category. For the period 1978– 1983, whites occupied close to 100% of all administrative, clerical, and technical positions in the central government (see Table 2.1). Black representation in professional and Class A occupations as a percentage increased substantially during that period but remained low at around 30% of the workforce. Black representation was more substantial in semiskilled occupations in the Class B category and in the Prison Service where they filled approximately 40 and 50% of all positions, respectively, by 1983. And in the non-classified and education occupation categories,

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Table 2.1  Public sector employment in central, provincial, local, and homeland authorities, and public corporations, by race, 1960–1991 1960

1970

1980

1991

92,456 (44%) 104,049 (50%) 10,572 (5%) 941 (