Religion and Politics in Burma 9781400878796

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
PREFACE
1. BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA
BUDDHISM: RELIGION OF INDIVIDUAL SALVATION
BUDDHISM: RELIGION OF SOCIO-POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT
THE EVOLUTION OF BURMESE BUDDHISM
RELIGION AND THE KING
POLITICS AND THE SANGHA
2. RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE
THE INDIAN BACKGROUND
POLICY TOWARD THE SANGHA HIERARCHY
MONASTIC SCHOOLS AND WESTERN EDUCATION
PALI SCHOLARSHIP UNDER THE BRITISH
TEACHING OF BUDDHISM IN STATE SCHOOLS
THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN BURMA
3. BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM
TRADITIONAL BURMESE NATIONALISM
RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS AS NATIONALIST ISSUES
U OTTAMA AND THE POLITICAL MONKS
PONGYI POLITICAL METHODS
NATIONALISM, REBELLION, AND COMMUNALISM
SECULAR BURMESE NATIONALISM
4. RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
NATIONALISM AND BUDDHISM
SOCIALISM AND BUDDHISM
DEMOCRACY AND BUDDHISM
5. STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM
U NU'S RELIGIOUS REVIVAL
THE BUDDHA SASANA COUNCIL
THE SIXTH GREAT BUDDHIST COUNCIL
CEREMONIES, RELICS, AND PAGODAS
GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SPIRIT WORSHIP
BUDDHISM IN STATE SCHOOLS
THE RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IN PERSPECTIVE
6. THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM
THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SANGHA
PONGYI POLITICAL METHODS
THE SANGHA AND POLITICAL ISSUES
THE DECLINE OF THE SANGHA
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE SANGHA
SANGHA REGISTRATION AND ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS
THE SANGHA ASSEMBLY ISSUE
THE PROMOTION OF PALI SCHOLARSHIP
7. THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA
THE 1947 DECISION
THE 1960 ELECTIONS
THE DEBATE INTENSIFIED
THE STATE RELIGION BILLS
THE DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT
SEQUEL: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
8. REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM
RADICAL REORIENTATION IN POLICY
PHILOSOPHY OF THE MILITARY REGIME
SOLDIERS, SPIRITS, AND MONKS
9. DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS
RELIGION AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
RELIGION AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
RELIGION AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION
RELIGION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
STATE PROMOTION OF RELIGION
APPENDICES
1. THE CONSTITUTION (THIRD AMENDMENT) ACT, 1961
2. THE STATE RELIGION PROMOTION ACT, 1961
INDEX

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RELIGION AND POLITICS IN BURMA

RELIGION and

POLITICS

in B U R M A BY D O N A L D E U G E N E

PRINCETON,

NEW

JERSEY

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY 1965

SMITH

PRESS

Copyright © 1965 by Princeton University Press ALL RIGHTS RESERVED L.C. Card: 65-14311 • Composed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To My Wife Violet

PREFACE

WHILE THE interaction of indigenous tradi­

tion and imported political institutions provides much of the subject matter for the study of contemporary South and Southeast Asian politics, relatively little has been written on the problem of religion and politics. Yet it is quite obvious that religion occupies a central place in the cultural traditions of each of these newly independent states. The message of Buddhism has profoundly influ­ enced the cultural development of most of Asia, and con­ tinues to mold the social values of many millions of Asians. This book is concerned with the interaction of Buddhism and politics in Burma, the nation which claims leadership among Theravada Buddhist countries of South and Southeast Asia. No previous work has examined in detail the problem of religion and politics in any of the Theravada Buddhist countries since independence. The case of Burma provides illustrations of a wide spectrum of religio-political phenomena: the breakdown of an effective Buddhist ecclesiastical hierarchy under the impact of foreign rule, the role of religion in Burmese nationalism, the interaction of Buddhism and modern political ideologies, the uses of religion in democratic politics, the political role of Buddhist monks, the unique leadership of a politician in promoting religious revival, and the contrasting role of a military regime. Burma has indeed passed through a remarkable cycle: from General Aung Sans secular state (1948) to Premier Nus state religion (1961), and back to a secularist orientation fol­ lowing General Ne Win's coup (1962). The study of independent Burma provides partial an­ swers to several important questions. Can religion, a vital source of political legitimacy for traditional Burmese

PREFACE

kingship, provide equally effective support for presentday democratic regimes? U Nu's government-sponsored revival of Buddhism must be examined, at least in part, in these terms. The question of legitimacy is closely related to the psychological problem of identity. Can Buddhism pro­ vide the values needed to create a modern Burmese national identity? In the attempt to solve the problems of political legitimacy and national identity through reli­ gion, what happens to the religious minorities and the delicate fabric of national unity? And what will be the long-range effect of Buddhist revival on the crucial task of economic development? Other important questions concern the way in which the relationships between religion and political ideologies have been defined. What are the limits of compatibility? We shall examine Burmese attempts to relate Buddhism to the ideologies of nationalism, democracy, and social­ ism. Of particular importance is the question of whether Buddhism is reconcilable with Marxian communism and, if not, the extent to which Buddhism could provide a positive ideological defense against communism. The interaction of religion and politics in Burma thus con­ fronts us with problems of great diversity, range, and inherent importance. Religio-political developments in Burma have frequently been highly dramatic. This book is the result of a three-year research project on religion and politics in South and Southeast Asia. This project, under my direction, was sponsored by the Coun­ cil on Religion and International Affairs and financed by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. The Council on Religion and International Affairs is an inter-faith organization interested in stimulating serious discussion of the actual and potential relevance of the major world religions to international politics. The

PREFACE

present research project is based on the recognition that a clearer picture of the role of religion in the internal politics of the emergent nations is necessary before com­ ing to grips with the more elusive factors of foreign policy. The material presented in this study was gathered during two visits to Burma, in 1961 and 1963, and during a year of full-time research work at the Southeast Asia Studies Center at Yale University, 1961-1962. Considera­ ble work was also done at the India Office Library, London, in the spring of 1963. I am grateful to the Carnegie Corporation of New York for the research grant which made this study pos­ sible. Dr. A. William Loos, president of the Council on Religion and International Affairs, gave much encourage­ ment, guidance, and practical help as the project devel­ oped, and I am deeply appreciative of his contributions to this book. Professor John F. Cady of Ohio University and Mr. John S. Thomson of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, reviewed the entire manuscript with meticulous care, and I am grateful for their many valuable criticisms and suggestions. Professor Fred R. von der Mehden of the University of Wisconsin provided me with several references which were useful in revising chapter 8 of the manuscript, and I greatly appreciate his assistance. I wish to thank Mr. John K. Musgrave, Curator of the Southeast Asia collection of Yale University Library, for his useful suggestions regarding source materials. I am grateful to Ko Tha Din and Miss Nu Nu Mae, both grad­ uate students at Yale, who translated important Burmese materials into English for this study. Warm thanks are due to Mrs. Charles G. Hoffmann, who typed the manu­ script twice with great patience. I also wish to thank Mr. Wayne R. Swanson, for his assistance in the prepara-

PREFACE

tion of the index. Finally, a word of deep appre­ ciation to my wife, Violet Ramanjulu Smith, who was my first instructor in Asian studies, and who has con­ tinued to lend encouragement and inspiration to my work. DONALD E. SMITH

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania December 1964

χ

CONTENTS PREFACE

vii

1. BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA BUDDHISM: RELIGION OF INDIVIDUAL SALVATION

3 4

BUDDHISM: RELIGION OF SOCIO-POLITICAL

RELIGION AND THE KING

7 12 20

POLITICS AND THE SANGHA

31

INVOLVEMENT THE EVOLUTION OF BURMESE BUDDHISM

2. RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

38

MONASTIC SCHOOLS AND WESTERN EDUCATION

39 43 57

PALI SCHOLARSHIP UNDER THE BRITISH

66

TEACHING OF BUDDHISM IN STATE SCHOOLS

71 78

THE INDIAN BACKGROUND POLICY TOWARD THE SANGHA HIERARCHY

THE CHTJRCH OF ENGLAND IN BURMA

3. BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

81

TRADITIONAL BURMESE NATIONALISM

81

RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS AS NATIONALIST ISSUES

86

U OTTAMA AND THE POLITICAL MONKS PONGYI POLITICAL METHODS NATIONALISM, REBELLION, AND COMMUNALISM SECULAR BURMESE NATIONALISM

4. RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT NATIONALISM AND BUDDHISM SOCIALISM AND BUDDHISM DEMOCRACY AND BUDDHISM Xl

92 99 107 114 117 118 125 136

CONTENTS

5. STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

140

THE RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IN PERSPECTIVE

141 148 157 165 172 177 182

6. THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

186

U NUS RELIGIOUS REVIVAL THE BUDDHA SASANA COUNCIL THE SIXTH GREAT BUDDHIST COUNCIL CEREMONIES, RELICS, AND PAGODAS GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SPIRIT WORSHIP BUDDHISM IN STATE SCHOOLS

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE SANGHA PONGYI POLITICAL METHODS THE SANGHA AND POLITICAL ISSUES THE DECLINE OF THE SANGHA GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE SANGHA

187 192 197 205 210

SANGHA REGISTRATION AND ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS THE SANGHA ASSEMBLY ISSUE THE PROMOTION OF PALI SCHOLARSHIP

7. THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA THE THE

1947 1960

DECISION ELECTIONS

THE DEBATE INTENSIFIED THE STATE RELIGION BILLS THE DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT SEQUEL: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

8. REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM RADICAL REORIENTATION IN POLICY PHILOSOPHY OF THE MILITARY REGIME SOLDIERS, SPIRITS, AND MONKS

215 220 224 230 230 235 243 253 262 269 281 281 288 294

CONTENTS

9. DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS RELIGION AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY RELIGION AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP RELIGION AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION RELIGION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STATE PROMOTION OF RELIGION

APPENDICES

307 307 312 320 323 325 329

1. THE CONSTITUTION (THIRD AMENDMENT) ACT, 1961

329

2. THE STATE RELIGION PROMOTION ACT, 1961

332

INDEX

337

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN BURMA

CHAPTER 1

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

T X

HE SOCIO-POLITICAL role of Theravada Bud­ dhism under the Burmese kings, from the eleventh century onward,1 was of fundamental importance in shaping the history of the country. The traditional pat­ tern of relationships between state and religion came to an end in 1886 when the British deposed King Thibaw. After the unpleasant interlude of sixty years of foreign rule, Burmese Buddhists have set out to restore Buddhism to its "rightful place" in Burma's national life. As this "rightful place" is necessarily defined in terms of the past, it is of considerable importance that we examine in some detail the role of Buddhism in the pre-colonial period. Before dealing with Burma, we shall present a brief exposition of the principal doctrines of Theravada Bud­ dhism,2 and discuss its transformation from a religion of individual salvation into a religion deeply involved in society and government. In the Theravada countries, the teaching of the Buddha was preserved with a high de1Anavvrahta

(1044-1077) was "the first king of Burma and with him Burmese history proper begins." D. G. E. Hall, Burma, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1960, p. 14. 2 Theravada, "Way of the Elders," is the form of Buddhism which, in the opinion of most scholars, is closest to the original teachings of the Buddha. It is professed by the Buddhists of Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos. Mahayana Bud­ dhism is found chiefly in China, Japan, and Korea and contains a number of doctrines which developed centuries after the Buddha. Adherents of the Mahayana (Great Vehicle) refer to the Thera­ vada disparagingly as Hinayana (Small Vehicle) Buddhism. Western writers sometimes use the terms "Northern School" and "Southern School" when referring to the Mahayana and the Theravada respectively.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

gree of doctrinal purity, but the way in which it was related to its socio-political milieu changed radically. BUDDHISM: RELIGION OF INDIVIDUAL SALVATION

Siddartha Gotama was a historical figure of the sixth century B.C., a prince in a small kingdom of southern Nepal.3 The Buddha (Enlightened One) was an honorary title later applied to him by his disciples. While Gotama the Buddha taught new doctrines which contradicted basic tenets of the Hindu philosophical and religious tra­ dition, it is also true that his system was built upon two of these older tenets, samsara and karma. Samsara is the wheel of rebirth; all creatures are involved in an endless cycle of existence—birth, death, and rebirth. This proc­ ess is interpreted in moral terms by the doctrine of karma (kamma in the Pali of the Theravada scriptures), accord­ ing to which all acts performed in one existence are re­ warded or punished by an appropriate state in future existences. This universal law of causation operates in such a manner that a man's next existence might be that of a god, a prince, a beggar, or an animal. It was in the Buddha's analysis of the precise nature of this cosmic process that his distinctive doctrines ap­ peared. Chained as it is to the wheel of rebirth, all exist­ ence is impermanent (anicca), substanceless (anatta), and full of suffering (dukkha). While good deeds in one existence will lead to a better material and spiritual life in the next, this approach does not get to the root of the real problem, which is that suffering is inherent in the endless round of existences. Emancipation from the cycle of rebirth is the only solution to the problem of suffering. This is the goal which the Buddha called nibbana (San­ skrit nirvana), and which he attained himself. The path to nibbana is the essence of the Buddha's message. 3 Christmas Humphreys, Buddhism, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1952, pp. 25-33.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

The Four Noble Truths epitomized the new doctrine. First, existence is suffering; birth, decay, death, sorrow, pain, not to get what one desires—all are suffering. Second, the origin of suffering is found in the desires and cravings which are doomed to unfulfilment and frustra­ tion by the transitory nature of existence. Third, the ex­ tinction of suffering comes only with the extinction of desire, with the liberation and detachment from craving, with the attainment of nibbana. Fourth, the path that leads to the extinction of suffering is the Noble Eightfold Path—right understanding, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindful­ ness, right concentration. In explaining the Noble Eightfold Path to his disciples, the Buddha emphasized not only the excellence of the goal, but the highly individualistic nature of the quest, and the withdrawal from society which it required. 'If you follow this path, you will put an end to suffering. But each one has to struggle for himself; the Perfect Ones have only pointed the way. . . . And that supreme goal of the holy life, for the sake of which sons of good families rightly go forth from home to the homeless state: this you will in no long time, in this very life, make known to yourself, realize, and make your own."4 The layman, involved in all the cares and concerns of worldly life, could not seriously aspire to nibbana in this existence; the meditation and self-discipline required to attain en­ lightenment was clearly beyond his capacity. With very few exceptions, salvation could be won only by re­ nouncing the world. The earliest Buddhist monks did not constitute an order in the sense of an organized monastic community. They were wandering mendicants attempting to follow 4 See U Thittila, "The Fundamental Principles of Theravada Buddhism," in Kenneth W. Morgan, The Path of the Buddha, Ronald Press Company, New York, 1956, pp. 103-104.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

the dhamma (teaching) of Gotama the Buddha. The in­ dividualistic path toward the spiritual goal implied the unsocial life of the seeker. The early wandering monks came together chiefly during the rainy seasons; only later did monasteries become permanent residences. Only gradually did the followers of the Buddha evolve into the Sangha (monastic order) with its fixed rules and disci­ pline, regular meetings twice a month, and distinctive appearance (yellow robes and shaved heads).5 The Buddha rejected the suggestion that he appoint a successor, and after his death none appeared. In a histori­ cally unique development, the governance of the Sangha changed from a monarchical form into a democratic one. Full and frequent assemblies were held, and elaborate rules of procedure were evolved. The Vinaya, rules of conduct based on the Buddha's admonitions and decisions (but attributed to him in their entirety in the texts), provided procedures for handling all kinds of disputes within the Sangha. While the monk was expected to show deference and respect to his seniors, there was no re­ quirement of obedience to a superior as in Christian monasticism. "The idea of the paramount authority of a person—a recognized head, a spiritual dictator, an abbot or a ganadhara—was foreign to the constitution of a Buddhist Sangha."6 There was very little place for the laity in the early Buddhist scheme of things. Their most important func­ tion was to provide the material support of the monks, who were actively seeking nibbana. Such good works would maximize their chances of attaining salvation in a later existence. The lay morality taught by the Buddha was very elementary; the Five Precepts instructed the layman not to kill, steal, commit adultery, lie, or drink 5

Sukumar Dutt, Early Buddhist Monachism, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1960, pp. 94-102. ® Ibid., p. 119.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

alcohol. Attempts to elaborate a way of life for Buddhist laymen were half-hearted and superficial. Jainism, another heterodox system which arose in the sixth century B.C., produced an effective parish organization of the laity, but no such development took place in Buddhism. Comment­ ing on the nature of early Buddhism, Max Weber as­ serted: "Its inner consequence, and thereby also its ex­ ternal weakness, lay in the fact that in practice it con­ fined salvation to those who actually followed the path to the end and became monks, and that at bottom it hardly bothered about the others, the laity."7 From what has already been said, it will be clear that early Buddhism was, to use Weber's words, "specifically unpolitical and anti-political."8 It had no political theory, because political structures were unrelated to the path of salvation. Buddhism rejected the priestly claims of the Brahmans and ignored caste within the Sangha, but made no attempt to change the social order. Buddhism evolved no civil law based on sacred texts, and while Buddhists ridiculed the alleged authority of the Vedas, they con­ tinued to follow the regulations of Hindu law in civil disputes and other matters. Buddhism arrived late on the Indian scene; a complex and pervasive Hinduism had already provided answers to the questions of political theory, law, and social order. The unique message of Buddha concerned the way to nibbana, and this was what early Buddhism offered. BUDDHISM: RELIGION OF SOCIO-POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT

For any religion to maximize its socio-political role, three developments are essential. First, it must receive recog­ nition and support from the political authority. Second, religion must come to provide the integrative principle in 7 Max Weber, The Religion of India: The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism, Free Press, Glencoe, 111., 1958, p. 233. 8 Ibid., p. 206.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

the social and cultural life of the people, and it must assume, at least partially, the function of social control. Third, religion must develop an effective internal organi­ zation, ideally an ecclesiastical hierarchy, by which it can exert its influence in a coordinated manner over both government at the top and society at the bottom. Theravada Buddhism did not develop in all three of these areas with equal success, but its transformation from a religion of individual salvation into a religion of socio­ political involvement was nevertheless most remarkable. In the first two centuries after the Buddha there were already indications of new opportunities for the partici­ pation of the laity. Laymen were excluded from the bimonthly gatherings of the monks, since these were devoted to the recitation of the 227 rules of the Sangha and disciplinary confessions. But the veneration of relics of the Buddha, the construction of stupas in which the relics were kept, and the worship of Buddha-images, pointed to the gradual emergence of a Buddhist cult in which the laity could take an active part. An important turning-point in the political relations of Buddhism came with the conversion of the Indian emperor Ashoka in the third century b.c. It is not mean­ ingful to speak of Buddhism as the "state religion" of India under Ashoka. The emperor was too wise to at­ tempt to promote his own faith at the expense of the Hinduism of the majority of his subjects. He was in­ tensely interested in furthering a code of universal mor­ ality (dharma) acceptable to all. He gave material aid to the Sangha, but supported Hindu and Jain sects as well, and repeatedly emphasized the virtue of religious toler­ ance. His specifically Buddhist acts included: the pro­ hibition of the slaughter of animals as sacrifices (this indeed was a blow at Brahmanical religion, although motivated by the Buddhist precept against killing); edicts recommending to the Sangha the study of seven

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA selected texts of the Pali canon,9 and warning that monks who created schisms in the Sangha would be unfrocked and expelled; the sending of Buddhist missionaries to foreign countries, resulting in the conversion of virtually all of Ceylon to Buddhism. There were obvious limits to the process of Buddhist socio-political involvement in India. As mentioned above, India could claim a highly developed civilization which had already evolved its own systems of government, law and social organization. Furthermore, India was a vast subcontinent characterized by a high degree of racial, cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity. Nothing but a religion as amorphous yet at the same time as allpervasive as Hinduism could contain it. And India re­ mained Hindu. However, in Buddhism's first and highly successful mission field, Ceylon, conditions were very different. A small island, relatively primitive in culture, ethnically and linguistically homogeneous—Buddhism here had its first real opportunity to demonstrate its socio­ political potential. With the conversion to Buddhism of the Sinhalese king Devanampiya-Tissa by Mahinda, the son of Ashoka, there began a process which resulted in the virtual fusion of Buddhism with the Sinhalese national identity. From the third century B.C. to the end of Sinhalese rule in 1815 the established customary law of the country held that only a Buddhist could legitimately become the king of Ceylon. The chief function of the king was to protect and promote the faith; in the words of a tenth-century monarch, to 9 In the Bhabra Rock Edict, addressed to the Sangha. "You know, reverend sirs, the extent of my reverence for and faith in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha. Whatever the Lord Buddha has said, reverend sirs, is of course well said. But it is proper for me to enumerate the texts which express true dharma and which may make it everlasting." N. A. Nikam and Richard McKeon, eds., The Edicts of Ashoka, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1959, pp. 66-67.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

defend "the alms-bowl and the robe of the Buddha."10 Sinhalese rulers ceremonially offered the whole kingdom to the Buddha sasana, or to the sacred tooth relic; one monarch presented the white umbrella (the symbol of kingship) to the Sangha. The kings suppressed heresy, sometimes violently, burning texts containing false teach­ ings and branding, banishing, and even executing heret­ ical monks. The rulers adjudicated Sangha disputes, and enforced monastic discipline by unfrocking and punish­ ing wayward monks. Having given vast tracts of produc­ tive land to the monasteries, kings supervised the admin­ istration of the temporal affairs of these institutions. Just as the king performed religious functions, so the monks had certain political duties or prerogatives. Monks imparted instruction to the young princes; they frequently served as advisers at the royal court and intervened as mediators in disputes involving the king. In a few cases monks actually selected and supported princes for the throne, contrary to the laws of succession, and in the tenth century the claim was even advanced that the Sangha conferred kingship. The coronation was trans­ formed into a distinctively Buddhist ceremony, and by the ninth century was being held within the sacred precincts of the temple. The coronation ritual did more than confirm a legitimate claim to the throne; it was believed to create legitimacy. The possession of certain Buddha relics (the sacred tooth, the alms bowl) were essential for the exercise of kingship.11 In a few cases monks cast off their yellow robes to ascend the throne. But in general their political power lay in their enormous influence over the masses. They were in an effective position to discourage disruption or rebellion; the ruler needed their support, and they knew it. 10 Walpola Rahula, History of Buddhism in Ceylon, M. D. Gunasena and Company, Colombo, 1956, p. 66. 11 Ibid., pp. 69-74.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

The social role of the Sangha was important, as the laity depended on the monks for education, medical ad­ vice, and personal counseling. The monastery became a place where laymen as well as monks worshipped the relics and Buddha images and heard the preaching of the dhamma. Pilgrimages and popular festivals developed around Buddhist themes. The Sinhalese script was de­ rived from that of the sacred Pali, Sinhalese architecture evolved in the building of temples and stupas, Sinhalese sculpture and painting were absorbed in the creation of Buddha images. The Buddhist monastery was the center of Sinhalese culture. The phenomenon of monastic land­ lordism also made it a center of economic power, al­ though this was not controlled directly by the Sangha. Buddhism in Ceylon was thus intimately related to political authority on one hand, and to society and ethnic culture on the other. The fusion of Buddhism and Sin­ halese nationalism was in evidence as early as the second century B.C. Duttha-Gamani, a great national hero, or­ ganized a military crusade to liberate the northern part of the island from the Hindu Tamil invaders. His battle cry: "Not for kingdom, but for Buddhism."12 By the time Theravada Buddhism became firmly es­ tablished in Burma (eleventh century A.D.), its develop­ ment as a religion of socio-political involvement in Ceylon had long been complete. And throughout the formative period of Burmese Buddhism, Ceylon was regarded with veneration by Burma, Siam, and Cambodia as "the fountain-head of the pure Theravada doctrines."13 In certain respects the development of Buddhism in Burma differed considerably from the Ceylonese pattern, but the basic relationships of the Sangha to government and society evolved along similar lines. 12

Ibid., p. 79. Le May, "The Development of Buddhist Art in Burma," Journal of Royal Society of Arts, June 1949, quoted in Humphreys, p. 63. 13

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

No attempt will be made here to present a chrono­ logical account of the development of Theravada Bud­ dhism in Burma. Attention will rather be focused on the aspects of that development which have particular rele­ vance to our subject. THE EVOLUTION OF BURMESE BUDDHISM

Relatively little is known about religion in Burma before the eleventh century A.D. An indigenous animism—the worship of nat spirits—coexisted and coalesced with various religions of Indian origin, including several Hindu sects and both Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism. In­ dian cultural influence became especially strong in the Mon kingdom at Thaton, situated on the coast, and it was probably the Mon connection with the great Theravada Buddhist center at Conjeeveram, in south India, which resulted in the predominance of that faith at Thaton. King Anawrahta founded the first Burmese dynasty in A.D. 1044, and his kingdom of Pagan was the first to bring most of the country under some measure of unified polit­ ical control. Anawrahta was powerfully influenced by Shin Arahan, a Mon monk from Thaton and a persuasive exponent of the Theravada doctrine.14 Shin Arahan be­ came the primate of the kingdom, and under his guidance Anawrahta set out to establish the dhamma throughout his domains. Anawrahta vigorously suppressed the Aris, a lawless group of monks who probably followed a cor14 For accounts of the establishment of Theravada Buddhism in the kingdom of Pagan, see: Sir Charles Eliot, Hinduism and Buddhism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1957, vol. 3, pp. 53-56; Niharranjan Ray, Theravada Buddhism in Burma, Uni­ versity of Calcutta, 1946, pp. 98-101; G. E. Harvey, History of Burma, Longmans, Green and Company, London, 1925, pp. 26-33; Than Tun, "Religion in Burma, A.D. 1000-1300," Journal of the Burma Research Society, 1959, vol. 42, part 2, pp. 47-69.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

rupted form of Mahayana Buddhism. Many of the Aris were banished, and others became villagers. Shin Arahan urged Anawrahta to obtain copies of the Pali Tripitaka, the Buddhist scriptures, from Thaton. When Anawrahta's request was contemptuously refused by the king of Thaton, the Burmese armies destroyed the royal city of the Mons and carried off to Pagan the court, all the monks, 30,000 captives, and thirty-two white ele­ phants laden with relics and scriptures. With these new resources at their disposal, Anawrahta and Shin Arahan directed the propagation of Theravada Buddhism through­ out the realm, and Pagan rapidly became a great center of religion and culture. When in 1071 the king of Ceylon, after a Tamil invasion in which Buddhism had suffered severe persecution, asked Anawrahta for scriptures and monks, he gladly complied and also sent a white elephant. In return the Burmese monarch requested the sacred Buddha tooth, but had to be satisfied with the duplicate which was sent to him from Ceylon. Anawrahta's greatest architectural achievement was the Shwezigon pagoda in which this tooth and other relics were kept. King Anawrahta's zeal in promoting Buddhism led him to attempt the suppression of nat worship, the indigenous animistic religion. The nats were originally regarded as impersonal spirits which inhabited trees, hills, and lakes, but later became identified as distinct personages whose detailed life histories were known by their worshippers. In the time of Anawrahta there were thirty-six leading nats worshipped all over the country. Two of these were the Lord of the Great Mountain and his sister Lady Golden-Face, whose abode was on Mount Popa in cen­ tral Burma.15 Anawrahta at first went about the city of 15 Two centuries before Anawrahta the worship of the Lord of the Great Mountain was well established as a national cult. "Every king's first visit to the mountain (Mount Popa) was considered as

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

Pagan and the kingdom pulling down nat shrines. But he found the indigenous cult too firmly established to eradi­ cate completely, and ultimately made a compomise. The king added Thagyamin, the guardian god of Buddhism, to the list of spirits (making thirty-seven), and declared him the new head of the pantheon. Images of the thirtyseven nats in an attitude of worship were set up on the platform of the Shwezigon pagoda to show their sub­ servience to the Buddha. King Anawrahta's reasoning: "Let the people come to worship their old gods, and then they will discover the truth of the new faith of Bud­ dhism."16 Anawrahta's successors relaxed the insistence on orthodoxy still more and even allowed the surrepti­ tious revival of animal sacrifices at the annual nat festival on Mount Popa. Nat worship continues to be a powerful element in popular Burmese Buddhism, and in recent years, as in the eleventh century, governmental policy toward it has alternated between stern rejection and accommodation.17 By the end of Anawrahta's reign one important charac­ teristic of traditional Burmese Buddhism was already clear, namely, the extraordinary degree to which the pro­ motion of the faith was regarded as the function of the king. The establishment and propagation of the Theravada doctrine in the kingdom of Pagan was almost en­ tirely the result of the ruler's determined efforts, and important as his coronation, and as the date of his coronation was noted down carefully by palace officials, so the date of his 'climb­ ing the Golden Mountain' was carefully recorded. The Lord of the Great Mountain was believed to make himself visible to each reigning king of Pagan and to advise him on important state affairs." Maung Htin Aung, Folk Elements in Burmese Buddhism, Oxford University Press, London, 1962, pp. 66-67. 16 Ibid., p. 75. 17 For a helpful interpretation of the relationship between these two elements in popular religion, see John Brohm, "Buddhism and Animism in a Burmese Village," Journal of Asian Studies, 1963, vol. 22, pp. 155-167.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

royal support continued to be essential to its maintenance. A second characteristic of Burmese Buddhism—the de­ velopment of an ecclesiastical hierarchy—was clearly foreshadowed by the role which was assumed by Shin Arahan. As the chief religious adviser to the king, Shin Arahan and his successors exercised considerable author­ ity over religious affairs in the realm, and the office became that of a kind of primate or archbishop. A fourteenth-century inscription referred to a great Sangharaja (ruler of the Sangha) who was a royal pre­ ceptor and exercised great influence over the king, and who even had authority to use the white umbrella re­ served for royalty. The inscription glowingly described him as "preceptor of the Great King Tryaphya, being the Mahasangharaja (great ruler of the Sangha), the Chief ruling millions of monks, being the glorious personage who could use the best of the white umbrellas, called kanakkatan with golden rod and cotton cloth spread, being the meritorious monk who has great faith in the Three Gems."18 The more frequently used Burmese equivalent for Sangharaja was thathanabaing, meaning literally the lord or owner of the Buddhist religion (thathana, from the Pali sasana). Burmese Buddhism thus departed radically from the original monastic pattern in an effort to construct some kind of coherent organization by which the affairs of the Sangha could be controlled. "Although, strictly speak­ ing, it is contrary to the theory of the founder of the sacred order, which declared that there was no superior­ ity in rank, but only superiority in piety and length of observance of the vows, a hierarchy was established to regulate the conduct of the monks."19 The thathanabaing was frequently the head of the monastery in which the 18 Than Tun, "Mahakassapa and His Tradition," Journal of the Burma Research Society, 1959, vol. 42, part 2, p. 114. 19 Upper Burma Gazeteer, part 1, vol. 2, pp. 3-4.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

king himself had spent some time as a youth. He was appointed by the king and held office at his pleasure, and was replaced when a new king ascended the throne. The thathanabaing's exalted status could be gauged by the splendor of his monastery in the capital. A nineteenthcentury British officer wrote that the primate "is supreme in all matters connected with religion and next to the king is the person to whom the greatest external homage is paid. . . . He lives in a magnificent monastery, highly decorated with carving and richly gilt, and from the center of which rises a lofty shwe-pyathat (gilded spire), a dignity which is not allowed an heir apparent to the throne."20 The primate was assisted at the capital by a council of eight to twelve learned sayadaws (senior monks who had been elevated to the rank of royal teachers), also appointed by the king. The whole country was divided into ecclesiastical districts, and each was placed under a gainggyok ("bishop"). Each of these ecclesiastics had under him a number of gaingoks, and these in turn had authority over the local gaingdauks. In theory, and to some extent in practice, there was a true hierarchy with a chain of command from the primate down to the head of the village monastery. But the monks were after all individual ascetics who had not vowed obedience to any superior, and the hand of ecclesiastical authority rested on them very lightly indeed in normal times. The principal function of the ecclesiastical organization was the maintenance of discipline within the Sangha. While minor monastic disputes or breaches of the Vinaya (code of conduct for the monks) were handled within the local monastery, more serious matters were settled by the district gainggyok, and an appeal from his decision could be made to the thathanabaing and council of saya20 Albert Fytche, Burma Past and Present, C. Kegan Paul and Company, London, 1878, vol. 2, p. 195.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

daws at the capital. Many of the important cases involved disputes over the ownership of monastic property, hereti­ cal and schismatic teaching, and crimes committed by the clergy. Unworthy monks were unfrocked and expelled from the order, and if guilty of crimes were then turned over to secular justice.21 The thathanabaing and his subordinates in the hier­ archy had no executive arm of their own to enforce their decisions, but relied on the royal authority which sup­ ported them, chiefly through two high-ranking govern­ ment officials directly responsible to the king. The wutmye wun, or commissioner of ecclesiastical lands, supervised the administration of pagoda properties in land and slaves. The mahadan wun, or ecclesiastical cen­ sor, prepared each year an official list of all the ordained monks, their ages, and dates of ordination. Every local monastery was required to report this annually as well as additional information concerning the background, schol­ arly work, and conduct of each resident. It was the ecclesiastical censor and his staff, under the guidance of the primate, who took disciplinary action against serious offenders.22 The Sangha hierarchy, like the government officials concerned with ecclesiastical affairs, was in one sense simply a means of keeping the monkhood under effective royal control. However, the thathanabaing was not with­ out some measure of influence and authority of his own, even in political matters, as we shall see. With respect to the interpretation of ecclesiastical law, the Vinaya, there was no authority superior to him. Thus, in the im­ portant cases involving disputes over monastic property, there could be no appeal from his decisions to the king's Hlutdaw (council) or secular courts of justice. This point 21 John

F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma, Cornell Univer­ sity Press, Ithaca, 1958, pp. 53-56. 22 Harvey, p. 326.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

was made with some emphasis in a letter written by the primate and sayadaws to the British judicial commissioner of Upper Burma in 1893.23 However great the desire of the king to regulate the Sangha, the intricacies of the Vinaya were such that no layman ever attempted to usurp the function of giving its authoritative interpretation. Buddhism became the pervasive element in the evolu­ tion of Burmese culture from the eleventh century on­ ward. Pagodas, shrines, and Buddha images provided the finest examples of Burmese architecture and sculpture. Pali greatly enriched the Burmese language, and until modern times most of the noted writers in both Pali and Burmese were monks. They wrote not only commentaries on the Tripitaka, but chronicles, lawbooks, treatises on grammar, and even poetry. In the thirteenth century the Shan king Wareru had his monks produce the dhamtnathat, a lawbook based on ancient Hindu sources but adapted to Burmese religion and custom.24 This work became the basis of Burmese law literature; later mo­ nastic scholarship contributed heavily to its development. The Buddhist monks became the custodians of the learning of the past and the teachers of each new genera­ tion. The village monastery was also the school which was attended for a few years by most of the small boys of the locality. While instruction was generally limited to reading, writing, and the basic principles of Buddhism, the net educational result was quite remarkable. A care­ ful British observer at the beginning of the nineteenth century was convinced that Burma's literacy rate was higher than that of England.25 This educational role of 23 U Te Za v. U Pyinnya. Upper Burma Rulings, 1892-1896, vol. 2, p. 70. 24 The Brahmanical priestly function was ignored, and marriage was regarded simply as a consensual relationship, not a sacrament as in Hindu law. 28 Henry Gouger, Personal Narrative of Two Years' Imprison­ ment in Burma, John Murray, London, 1860, pp. 21-22.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

the Sangha became one of the important sources of its social prestige and influence among the masses. In a country whose central political authority was frequently ineffectual outside of the capital, the Sangha performed an important function of social control. It was noted above that one of the weaknesses of early Buddhism was its neglect of the laity, and the wide gulf which separated the monk from the laymen. The monk's educational function in Burmese Buddhism was one im­ portant bridge across this gulf. A more dramatic solution to this problem was provided by the Burmese shinbyu ceremony, by which each male Buddhist in his early teens becomes a monk for a short time. As John Brohm stated: "It is significant that in Burmese society the event which more than any other signifies 'becoming a man or 'being reborn a man—the direct implication of the shinbyu—should involve Buddhist ordination and the assumption of the yellow robes of the order."26 In the shinbyu ritual reenacting the Buddha's own renunciation of the world, the Burmese boy is formally inducted into the Sangha. This ceremony both exalts the ideal of the monastic life and denies its absolute separation from the life of the laity. Various festivals mark the Burmese year, and among the most important are those with religious significance— festivals at the beginning and the end of Buddhist "Lent" (a three-month period of reduced social activity), Bud­ dha Day, which commemorates the Buddha's birth, en­ lightenment, and death, etc. Festivals of non-Buddhist origin generally acquired a certain Buddhist significance and came to be celebrated by visits to the monasteries or pagodas, gifts to the monks, and other merit-making acts of devotion. In short, Theravada Buddhism provided the 26 John Brohm, "Religion," in Frank N. Trager, ed., Burma, Human Relations Area Files, Inc., New Haven, 1956, vol. 1, p. 207.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

integrative themes in the development of Burmese social life. We stated earlier that for any religion to maximize its socio-political role it required: (1) recognition and sup­ port from the political authority, (2) an effective ecclesi­ astical hierarchy, and (3) the development of an inte­ grative role in die social and cultural life of the country. It need only be pointed out here that to a very consid­ erable extent Theravada Buddhism met all three of these requirements as it evolved in Burma. We must now look more closely at the pattern of relationships between Bud­ dhism and the state, the Sangha and the king, in old Burma. RELIGION AND THE KING

The religious sanctions which buttressed kingship in Burma had two distinct sources, Hindu and Buddhist; there was no logical relationship between them, and in many respects they were based on contradictory prin­ ciples. The Hindu tradition of kingship attributed divine status to the king and emphasized the need for the ministrations of Brahman priests at the palace and the magical potency of the court regalia. The Buddhist tra­ dition of kingship emphasized the ruler's function as the defender of the faith, the builder of pagodas, the patron and protector of the Sangha. The Hindu tradition empha­ sized the ruler's ritually legitimated status; the Buddhist tradition lay stress on his religious function. These two kinds of religious sanction, of course, coalesced in popular attitudes of reverence for the king in Burma. The ancient Indian code of Manu declared that the king was a "great deity in human form."27 Hindu colonists took their traditional laws based on Manu to Burma in 27 D. Mackenzie Brown, The White Umbrella: Indian Political Thought from Manu to Gandhi, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1953, p. 28.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

the early centuries of the Christian era, and these pro­ vided the basis for much of the development of Burmese law. The coronation ritual in Burma was Brahmanical, with but minor adaptations to identify the king as a Buddhist monarch. According to immemorial Hindu cus­ tom, the ceremony was performed by Brahman priests. In the procession the king was accompanied by the royal white horse and the white elephant; the Brahmans handed him the five sacred regalia endowed with magi­ cal properties, the white umbrella, yaktail fan, crown, sword, and sandals.28 Buddhist elements in die coronation were relatively inconspicuous and were sometimes set in curious juxta­ position to Brahmanical forms. The ceremony took place in the month of Kason because the attainment of king­ ship due to past merits was analogous to Gotama's attain­ ment of Buddhahood, which occurred on the full moon of Kason. Buddhist monks and Brahman priests together recited some of the sacred verses. In one part of the elaborate ceremony, the participants went to the river to draw water for the consecration of the king. In accord­ ance with the ritual formula, men dressed as ferocious spirit guardians of the river asked: "Will the king work for the weal of the Religion, the Sangha, and the people, and act according to the law?" The Brahman court priest answered in the affirmative, and permission was then given to draw the water. Hindu, Buddhist, and animistic elements were here blended together with no sense of incongruity. Near the end of the ceremony the king proclaimed words ascribed to the Buddha and meditated on the Three Jewels—the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sangha. The assumption of the royal residence after the coronation was a predominantly Buddhist ceremony in­ volving the chanting of the Tripitaka by monks and the 28 Harvey,

p. 325.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

offering of rich alms to pagodas, Buddha-images, and the Sangha.29 The doctrine of karma, which was taught by both Hin­ duism and Buddhism, provided an irrefutable rationaliza­ tion of the near-absolute power of the Burmese monarch. The very exercise of this power proved conclusively that the king had achieved a vast accumulation of merit in previous existences. "The king's mundane acquisitions— his worldly riches and power—came to him as his due by the law of karma; his was an outstanding example of merit and reward, and his high status therefore should stir noble instincts of his subjects rather than base ones; they should look upon him with admiration rather than envy. The king's unassailable position became acceptable to his subjects when it was interpreted as a corollary of the doctrine of karma."30 A closely related but distinctively Buddhist idea identi­ fied the monarch as a Bodhisattva, a future Buddha. The idealized Buddhist king was a Universal Ruler (Cakkavattin) who governed by virtue of his merit and was des­ tined to achieve Buddhahood. This conception reflected Mahayanist influence, but was also found in a noted Pali work by Buddhaghosa (fifth century A.D.),31 Many Burmese kings were firmly believed to be Bodhisattvas; one of them stated in an eighteenth-century inscription: "In virtue of this my good deed, may I become a Bud29 Yi Yi, "Life at the Burmese Court under the Konbaung Kings," Journal of the Burma Research Society, 1961, vol. 44, part 1, pp. 118-129. This article contains a wealth of detailed information on Burmese court ceremonies. 30 Thaung, "Burmese Kingship in Theory and Practice During the Reign of Mindon," ibid., 1959, vol. 42, part 2, p. 173. 31 Richard A. Gard, ed., Buddhism, George Braziller, New York, 1961, pp. 216-217; Manuel Sarkisyanz, "On the Place of U Nu's Buddhist Socialism in Burma's History of Ideas," in Robert K. Sakai, ed., Studies in Asia, 1961, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1961, pp. 54-56.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

dha .. . an omniscient one."32 This popular tradition gave powerful support to the authority of die king. It was the monarch's unique role as defender and pro­ moter of Buddhist religion which in the final analysis confirmed his legitimacy. As the highest layman in the land, commanding vast resources and exercising almost unlimited powers, he was in an unequalled position to exalt the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Sangha. The faithful performance of this royal function not only strengthened popular allegiance to the king but served as a powerful unifying influence among the various ethnic groups of the country which professed Buddhism—the Burmans, Mons, Shans and Arakanese.33 Brahman priests performed vital functions in the dayto-day life of the Burmese royal court. Their Sanskrit incantations were believed to ward off all evil forces, and were essential for success in war. As experts in astrol­ ogy and numerology, they were sought for advice, which was usually followed in determining the auspicious time for any major undertaking. King Bodawpaya wrote in 1787 that he had in his service ten learned pandits and 104 Brahman priests of unexcelled wisdom.34 Hindu cos­ mology also had a direct bearing on Burmese kingship, for the royal palace was symbolically identified with Mount Meru, the city of the gods and the theoretical center of the universe. The palace precincts were sacred, and according to Burmese conceptions their occupancy by the monarch was absolutely essential to his status as a divine ruler. Without general acknowledgment of this status, his position was precarious in the extreme.35 The Hindu conceptions, rituals, and personnel associ­ ated with kingship continued to be an important part of 32 Eliot,

33 Cady, pp. 8-9. 3 4 Ibid., p. 5. p. 63. Robert Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia," Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Data Paper, no. 18, 1956, pp. 2-7. 35

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

the Burmese system until the royal court itself was abol­ ished in 1886. But, apart from the continued use of astrology in the decision-making process, there has been since independence no indication of the survival of this Hindu element in the religion-state relationship. On the other hand, frequent references have been made to the desirability of restoring to government its time-honored role as the patron of Buddhism. We must therefore ex­ amine the religious functions of the Burmese kings in greater detail. Broadly speaking, there were two basic religious functions of the king—the promotion of Bud­ dhism and the protection of the Sangha. In promoting the Buddhist faith, all the kings, from the time of Anawrahta, built and adorned pagodas. King Bayinnaung in the sixteenth century followed a royal custom when he broke up his crown and used its jewels to adorn the spire of the Shwedagon and other pagodas. The kings engaged in a continuous search for relics and especially for the elusive sacred tooth relic which the Sinhalese kings were so reluctant to part with.36 In the early nineteenth century King Bodawpaya squandered enormous sums of money from the public revenues in the construction of impressive pagodas and shrines. King Thibaw, the last Burmese monarch, in 1884 visited the famous Mahamyatmuni pagoda in Mandalay to unveil an image of the Buddha and adorn it with a golden crown and shoulder bands studded with nine kinds of gems. He placed the crown upon the head of the Buddhaimage "in order to make it look grand as a living Lord."37 The kings took active steps to propagate Buddhism in those parts of the country where animist practices still predominated. King Bayinnaung, for example, sought to 36

Harvey, pp. 172-173. Taw Sein Ko, trans., Selections from the Records of the Hlutdaw, Superintendent, Government Printing, Rangoon, 1889, p. 18 (in Burmese). 37

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

turn the Shans toward Buddhism by prohibiting their heathen practice of killing the slaves, horses, and ele­ phants of a chieftain upon his death. Bayinnaung built numerous monasteries in the Shan country and invited learned monks to live there and teach the dhamma to the chieftains and their counsellors. Under King Thibaw the ministers requested the Buddhist bishops (council of sayadaws) to submit a list of learned monks who could be sent as missionaries to distant parts of the realm for the propagation of Buddhism. The bishops complied with this request, and Thibaw commissioned the chosen monks to carry the message of enlightenment to the heathen hill peoples.38 In the performance of such pious deeds, most of the Burmese kings were strongly motivated by the need to acquire sufficient merit (kutho) to overcome the conse­ quences of their own bloody and ruthless acts. However, in the twelfth century King Alaungsithu had inscribed on the walls of a temple his magnificent prayer in Pali verse, which expressed the hope that the merit acquired would help all to cross the river of samsara (the cycle of re­ birth) and reach the distant shore of nibbana. By this abundant merit I desire Here nor hereafter no angelic pomp Of Brahmas, Suras, Maras; nor the state And splendors of a monarch; nay, not even To be the pupil of the Conqueror. But I would build a causeway sheer athwart The river of Samsara, and all folk Would speed across thereby until they reach The Blessed City. I myself would cross And drag the drowning over.39 Over eight hundred years later Prime Minister U Nu declared that it was the responsibility of the government 38

Ibid., pp.

214-215.

39

Harvey, p. 47.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

to look after the welfare of the people not only in the present existence but in countless future existences, and that it was therefore necessary to make Buddhism the state religion of Burma.40 In the promotion of Buddhism one of the vital concerns of the Burmese kings was the preservation of the sacred scriptures, the Tripitaka. As we have noted, it was Anawrahta's spurned request for copies of the scriptures which led to his sack of the Mon city of Thaton. In 1871 King Mindon, deeply concerned over the errors which over the centuries had found their way into the texts through the process of copying, convened the Fifth Great Buddhist Council at Mandalay. This large assembly of learned monks from all parts of the realm worked for more than three years, with the king himself presiding, to determine the correct readings from among variant texts and to produce an authoritative Pali version of the Tripitaka. At the king's orders the corrected text was inscribed on 729 marble slabs which were posted verti­ cally at regular intervals over a large lawn within the enclosure of the Kuthodaw pagoda at the base of Manda­ lay hill.41 Each year the Burmese king issued an order fixing the date on which the Buddhist Lent was to be observed by the Sangha. From time to time royal orders were issued commanding qualified monks to recite the Pali scriptures at the palace. By royal command, annual examinations in the Buddhist texts were conducted to promote religious learning.42 The spiritual concerns of government were so extensive that competence in this area was held to be one of the three main qualifications for a member of the king's 40

The Guardian, August 18, 1961. Ray, p. 249. This council, of course, provided the direct in­ spiration for the Sixth Great Buddhist Council convened by U Nu at Rangoon, 1954-1956. See chapter 5, "State Promotion of Buddhism." 42 Taw Sein Ko, pp. 11-12, 14, 17. 41

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

council (Hlutdaw). The appointment order of a minister stated that he was to be responsible for "the prosperity of the Religion, the well-being of the king, and the wel­ fare of the state."43 In carrying out their numerous reli­ gious functions, the king and his ministers frequently consulted the twelve-man council of sayadaws. Through formal correspondence, the advice of the ecclesiastical council was sought by the ministers on such matters as: the order of the scriptures to be recited in a public cere­ mony, the ritual to be observed at the enshrining of relics in a pagoda, the adjustments to be made in the calendar according to the calculations of the royal astrologers, etc.44 The second major category of religious functions per­ formed by the Burmese kings could be described as the protection of the Sangha. Like all Buddhist laymen of wealth, the king regularly fed the monks on a large scale, built monasteries for them and performed similar acts of reverent patronage. But the responsibilities of the king extended far beyond this; he was expected to appoint and support the Sangha hierarchy, suppress heretics and schismatics within the sacred order, reform the Sangha when it became corrupt or lax in discipline, and settle controversies in the Sangha by royal decree. We have already described the ecclesiastical hierarchy headed by the thathanabaing and council of sayadaws, all appointed by the king. This was not an inflexible arrangement, however, and on occasion the king varied it. Bodawpaya (1782-1819) appointed four learned monks to purify the order and designated them as Sangharajas (rulers of the Sangha), with four younger monks as assistants. Over this group of eight he placed a su­ preme patriarch with the title of Mahasangharaja (great ruler of the Sangha). This fundamental reorganization of 43 Ma Kyan, "King Mindon's Councillors," Journal of the Burma Research Society, 1961, vol. 44, part 1, p. 45. 44 Taw Sein Ko, pp. 213-214, 217-224.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

the hierarchy by the king, whatever the real motives behind it, was never questioned by the Sangha.46 While there was generally a very tolerant attitude toward not worship, other heretical views and practices were sometimes suppressed violently by the kings, from the time of Anawrahta's persecution of the Mahayanist Aris to the nineteenth century. Great concern was evi­ denced for the doctrinal purity of the Sangha, and while generally the hierarchy (supported by the ecclesiastical censor and other government officials) dealt with heretics and schismatics, extraordinary measures were sometimes taken by the king. In the eighteenth century King Hsinbyushin persecuted a heretical sect called the Paramats, a puritanical group which objected to shrines and images. King Bodawpaya, his successor to the throne, occasionally executed heretics, and also punished with death the drinking of intoxicants and killing of oxen or buffaloes (acts contrary to the Five Precepts).46 In the history of Buddhism in Burma the two most serious problems which plagued the Sangha were, first, its tendency to become divided into contending sects and, second, its laxity in following the Vinaya code of monastic discipline. The unity and sound discipline of the Sangha were desiderata which frequently proved elusive. Dviring periods of Sangha decline in Burma, Buddhist kings sought to purify the order by sending monks to Ceylon to receive ordination according to the strict regulations of the Vinaya. Burma, Ceylon, and Siam all received help from each other to preserve the ortho­ dox Theravada doctrine and discipline. In the twelfth century a monk from Burma received ordination in Ceylon, the validity of his previous ordina­ tion having been in doubt, and on his return to Burma started the Sinhalese order which was strongly supported 45 Eliot, 46

pp. 64-65. Ibid., p. 63, and Harvey, pp. 275, 278.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

and patronized by King Narapatisithu. The king encour­ aged the elders of the Sinhalese order to confer ordination on the many monks who desired to receive it. For three centuries there was bitter rivalry in the Sangha of Btirma between the Sinhalese and the Burmese orders, and in addition each of these became divided into various con­ tending sects.47 A fundamental reformation of Burmese Buddhism was achieved by King Dhammaceti, himself a former monk, in the fifteenth century. The Sangha had degenerated and was split into many sects, knowledge of the Tripitaka among the monks had declined seriously, and the ordina­ tion ceremony had become corrupted and invalid. Dham­ maceti therefore sent forty-four monks to Ceylon bearing letters to the Sinhalese king and clergy requesting that arrangements be made for their ordination. After the reordained monks returned to Burma, King Dhammaceti set out to purify and unify the Sangha through this standard Sinhalese ordination ceremony. Monks who were without faith or who transgressed the Vinaya rules were excluded, but devout monks were invited to receive the new ordination, and their number soon swelled to over 15,000. This reformation represented a complete victory of the Sinhalese over the older Burmese order in the Sangha of Burma.48 The important point to be emphasized here is the vital role which King Dhammaceti himself assumed as a reli­ gious reformer. In the words of Ray: "The initiative came not from the order of monks but from the king himself, and in all the acts of that great drama he was the one and only hero; the monks, even the most venerable ones, to whom nevertheless he showed throughout the most devoted and respectful consideration, were completely at his bidding."49 This was true of virtually every signifi47 Ray, 49

pp. 110-115.

Ibid., p. 191.

48

Ibid., pp. 182-192.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

cant effort to reform the Sangha in the history of Burmese Buddhism. When in the nineteenth century there was great laxity in the observance of the Vinaya code, King Mindon decreed that all monks should take a vow before the Buddha to conform strictly to these rules. The elders of the Sangha were indeed consulted about this move, but the initiative came from the king, and the decree was issued in his name. The kings played an indispensable role in settling con­ troversies within the Sangha. Burmese Buddhism was singularly free of controversies over theological, philo­ sophical, or metaphysical points of doctrine, but was fre­ quently troubled by disputes concerning the interpreta­ tion of the Vinaya rules of monastic discipline. Through­ out the entire eighteenth century the Sangha was deeply disturbed by the bitter Parupana-Ekamsika controversy, which revolved around the seemingly trivial question of whether a monk could keep one shoulder uncovered or had to keep both shoulders covered by his robe while making the daily rounds for alms. King Alaungpaya issued a temporary directive supporting the Ekamsika (one shoulder) party, but this was reversed by a decree of King Singu. The dispute was revived and not settled permanently until 1784 when King Bodawpaya issued a final decree imposing the more orthodox Parupana (two shoulder) practice on all members of the Sangha.50 During certain periods the Burmese kings interfered with the economic affairs of the Sangha, chiefly to pro­ tect their own interests. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the kings of Pagan sometimes confiscated reli­ gious lands where the legal title was in doubt. From the rulers' point of view, the chief problem was that land dedicated to the Sangha was exempt from taxation! On one occasion the monks objected strenuously to the sei­ zure of their lands and made the king appoint a six-man 50

Ibid., pp. 217-236; Eliot, pp. 62-63.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

commission to investigate. When the commission reported that the lands had indeed been given to the monastery by the king's father and had been duly dedicated to the Lord Buddha, the king had to return them.51 The increase of religious lands through the gifts of pious laymen in time posed a serious threat to the royal treasury, as no revenue could be collected from them. Ultimately a sys­ tem was evolved by which the king's presence and par­ ticipation were required in all ceremonies for the dedica­ tion of lands to the Sangha. In this way the king was in a position to prevent some good lands from becoming tax-free.52 As this discussion of the religious functions of the king has already made abundantly clear, there was no sharp separation between the two areas of religion and govern­ ment. We must now consider the political functions and activities of the monks. POLITICS AND THE SANGHA

According to the Vinaya rules of discipline, monks were expected to eschew all interest in mundane political activities and devote themselves exclusively to religion. Nevertheless, the history of Burmese Buddhism reveals several important areas in which their political influence was far from negligible. While not strictly political, sev­ eral functions which in the modern state are the responsi­ bility of government were performed by monks in old Burma. As we have already noted, education was entirely in the hands of the Sangha, and monks were responsible for the writing of the most noted lawbooks. The Sangha was a powerful agency of social control in a country whose purely political structure was highly 51Than

Tun, "Mahakassapa and His Tradition," pp. 111-114. Tun, "History of Burma: A.D. 1300-1400," Journal of the Burma Research Society, 1959, vol. 42, part 2, p. 120. 52 Than

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

unstable at the center and ineffective in the provinces.53 Along with the headman, the monks kept watch over the manners and morals of the village and admonished the people to obey the laws and to pay their taxes. "When the people of a district or township refused to pay reve­ nue, or arrears of taxes, the local gainggyok [bishop] or gaingok, the abbot or friar, or in important cases some influential sayadaw, was commonly asked to speak to them on behalf of the government, and his intervention was usually successful."54 The people's great reverence for the monks could thus be drawn upon to support the government. Conversely, the monks on occasion interceded with the king on behalf of the people, and the traditional defer­ ence shown to the Sangha usually resulted in acceptance of the monks' recommendations. In 1875 the gaingok and other sayadatvs of Thayain presented a memorial to the king stating that because of the scarcity of rain and con­ sequent crop failures, the people were unable to pay the taxes demanded for the maintenance of a cavalry unit there, and were in a very unsettled state. The king sent a royal despatcher to the local government officials order­ ing them to submit a full report, after consultation with the sayadaws, indicating what steps should be taken for the recovery of taxes due without working a great hard­ ship on the people.55 The Sangha had certain quasi-judicial powers. No monk, of course, was directly subject to the secular courts, but was dealt with first by the ecclesiastical authorities. Only if he was unfrocked by the latter could he be turned over to the ordinary courts of justice. But even where the 53 This point is well made in the excellent study by John F. Brohm, "Burmese Religion and the Burmese Religious Revival," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1957, pp. 58-59, 305. 54 Upper Burma Gazetteer, part 1, vol. 2, p. 5. Taw Sein Ko, p. 160.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

defendant was a layman, an eminent sayadaw could have the case pending before the secular courts transferred to him for settlement.56 Monks sometimes intervened to save a condemned man from execution, and "their robes, flung over a criminal when he was kneeling under the execu­ tioner's uplifted sword, were so absolute a reprieve that government usually took steps to prevent their attend­ ance."57 A criminal pardoned in this manner became the monk's slave and served in the monastery. On numerous occasions monks interceded before the king to save the lives of captured rebels or prisoners of war. Leading members of the Sangha were sometimes sent on diplomatic missions by the king. Monks were sent to Ceylon in the twelfth century to restore the friendly rela­ tions which had been disrupted by hostilities between the two countries. In the thirteenth century a celebrated Burmese monk was sent to south China to sue for peace and offer humble submission to the invading Mongol armies. In the sixteenth century monks went to Ceylon charged with the important mission of obtaining a Sin­ halese princess to become the wife of King Bayinnaung.58 Within the country, monks were frequently used to intercede for peace to end the internecine wars which the Burmese waged against the Mons and the Arakanese. The most dramatic incident occurred in 1406 when a Burmese monk went forth riding an elephant, attended by three hundred fasting elders dressed in white and three hundred old men bearing presents, to meet the invading Mon King Rayadarit. The monk spoke pious words on the sin of bloodshed and persuaded the king to withdraw his army.59 King Bagyidaw even sent a monk to meet the invading British in 1826!60 56

Upper Burma Gazetteer, part 1, vol. 2, p. 5. Harvey, p. 278. 58 Ibid., pp. 57, 68, 173. 59 Ibid., p. 88. 60 John James Snodgrass, Narrative of the Burmese War, John Murray, London, 1827, pp. 270-273, 311. 57

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

In some ways the Sangha constituted a check on the exercise of the king's absolute power. The monks' inter­ cession for the lives of convicted criminals or prisoners of war, noted above, was one illustration of this fact. The primate and leading sayadaws on occasion advised the king, and, according to Harvey, "they represented the public conscience, and every good king strove to win their approval."61 In relations with the thathanabaing especially, most Burmese rulers found it expedient to tread very carefully. As Thaung pointed out: "It is true that the king appointed the primate; but the fact does not imply that the king had great influence over the primate. On the contrary, it was the primate who, as a preceptor of the king, was recognized as a superior commanding the latter's respect and esteem. There were many instances in history when the primate as modera­ tor' had urged the king to review and modify his de­ cisions."62 Popular attitudes of reverence and veneration for the Sangha contrasted sharply with the universal fear of government, which was commonly classified as one of the five scourges (along with fire, flood, thieves, and malevolent persons) to be avoided at all costs. The approval of the Sangha was therefore of some importance to the king in gaining a measure of popular support for his regime. In some cases, few to be sure, the monks dared to defy the royal will directly. In the twelfth century King Narathu, upon ascending the throne, sent the primate Panthagu to make peace with his brother, who was marching on Pagan to claim the throne. When a reconciliation had been effected, the king promptly had his brother poi­ soned. The old primate denounced Narathu boldly ("A king more damned than thou there is not in all the 61 Harvey, 62 Thaung,

p. 199. pp. 179-180.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

world!"), left the palace, and after some time departed to Ceylon.63 In the wars among the Burmese, Mons, Arakanese, and Shans, the Sangha in a conquered territory was quickly recognized as a potential instigator of resistance and revolt and was dealt with accordingly. A Shan king of the sixteenth century declared: "Monks surround them­ selves with followers and could rebel if they like. They ought to be killed." He therefore put 360 Burmese monks to death. A Burmese king of the same period deported a large number of Mon monks from his newly conquered territory. In the eighteenth century the Burmese King Alaungpaya had 3,000 Mon monks trampled to death by elephants as punishment for having helped the city of Pegu to resist the Burmese siege.84 There were several instances in the history of Burma in which monks left the Sangha to accept high-ranking positions in government or even to ascend the throne itself. In the eighteenth century King Bodawpaya ap­ pointed a former monk commissioner of the granaries and honored him with many titles and a jewelled staff. Dhammaceti in the fifteenth century was one of two devout monks who greatly impressed the Mon Queen Shinsawbu. The queen having decided that one of them should succeed her, the lot fell to Dhammaceti who thereupon left the sacred order, married Shinsawbu's daughter, and ascended the throne. In the eighteenth century one Mon monk was raised to the throne of Pegu and ruled for seven years, another for a few days, and a Burmese monk occupied the throne of Ava for a week before he was executed by Bodawpaya.65 While there were thus isolated cases in which monks became kings, the dominant tradition was that monkhood 63 64 65

Ray, pp. 109-110; Harvey, p. 276. Harvey, pp. 107, 180, 235. Ibid., pp. 117-118, 212, 215, 263, 268.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

signified a completely nonpolitical status. In the tenth century a minor Bimnese ruler was tricked by his enemies into visiting a monastery where he was forced to become a monk. With shaved head and wearing the yellow robe, he lived under a guard in the monastery and was thus effectively isolated from mundane concerns. An identical fate befell a Shan king in the thirteenth century.66 King Bayinnaung allowed the captive king of Siam to become a monk and even to return home on pilgrimage, but upon his arrival he flung off the yellow robe and defied the Burmese. On several occasions deposed kings and their families pleaded that their lives be spared, promising to retire to monastic life, but their pleas were rejected.67 Regardless of the cunning or cruelty of the individuals involved, the important point is that there was in Burma a common conception of the accepted role of the monk which placed him at the opposite pole from the monarch. * * # β In concluding this chapter, two generalizations may be made about religion and the state in old Burma. First, the king's interference in religion was far more conspicu­ ous and far more important than the Sangha's involve­ ment in political affairs. The monarch's religious functions as the promoter of Buddhism and the protector (and regulator) of the Sangha were universally acknowl­ edged as valid by monks and laymen alike, and there was an unbroken continuity in their performance by the kings regardless of dynasty or ethnic identity. Apart from the Sangha's more general functions in education or as an agency of social control, the performance of specifi­ cally political acts tended to be isolated instances involv­ ing a few individual monks. Burmese society could not repudiate the Vinaya rules of discipline which required the monk's withdrawal from mundane concerns. ββ

Ibid., pp. 19, 76.

βτ ibid,., pp. 169, 193, 199.

BUDDHISM AND THE STATE IN OLD BURMA

Secondly, the relationship between the king and the Sangha is best described as one of interdependence. The king patronized the Sangha, appointed its hierarchy, and settled its controversies; the Sangha upheld law and order, was useful in diplomatic missions, and could use its immense social prestige to support the king. Neither the king nor the Sangha could long afford to ignore the traditional prerogatives of the other party.

CHAPTER 2

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

!RESIDING OVER the inauguration of the Bud­

dha Sasana Council in 1951, Religious AfiEairs Minister U Win spoke movingly of the disintegration of the reli­ gious structure of Buddhism during the sixty years of British rule. With the advent of independence and a democratically elected government, he asserted, it was inevitable that the government become the Promoter of the Faith.1 There can be no doubt that Buddhism did decline seriously under the impact of foreign rule. It is necessary, however, to distinguish clearly the aspects of that decline directly attributable to governmental religious policy from the unintentional yet inevitable consequences of the processes of modernization. In the final analysis, the latter were more important than the former. While the Buddhist nationalist of today might decry the partial secularization of Burmese life which resulted from the introduction of western institutions and values, he would not be willing to repudiate most of these contributions of foreign rule. Concerning the colonial government's direct role in religious affairs, the chief criticisms could only refer to what the British failed to do. Their government, unlike all previous governments in Burma since the eleventh century A.D., was not the patron and promoter of Bud­ dhism. British lieutenant governors built no pagodas. The government declined to support the Buddhist ecclesiasti­ cal hierarchy by enforcing its decisions, and failed to 1

The Nation, August 27, 1951.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

perpetuate the hierarchy by new appointments. The in­ ternal discipline of the Sangha suffered as the ecclesiasti­ cal structure gradually weakened. The indirect eflFects of western rule on Buddhism were profound, especially in the realm of education. Western learning to some extent undermined faith in the Buddhist cosmology and prescientific traditional lore. The British made a serious attempt to assimilate the monastic schools into their scheme of primary education, but the attempt was unsuccessful, and government, missionary, and Bud­ dhist lay schools gradually eclipsed the traditional pongyi kyaungs. This decline in the monk's role as teacher less­ ened his influence over the people, at least in the cities and towns, while the English language cut him off from effective communication with British officials. The monkhood's role as a molder of public opinion was thus diminished, while a new English-educated class emerged to fill positions of influence in the professions, government service, and politics. The ideas, attitudes, and values of this elite were largely divorced from the traditions of which the monks were guardians. These social changes did not come about through any British hostility to Buddhism, but their impact on traditional religion was nevertheless disastrous. This chapter is de­ voted to an examination of British official policies which directly or indirectly affected Buddhist religion. THE INDIAN BACKGROUND

Despite the great differences of race, religion, language, and culture between India and Burma, geographical proximity and superior British-Indian armies linked them together. The British extended their Indian Empire through conquest in the Anglo-Burman wars of 18241825, 1852, and 1885, and Burma remained a province of British India until 1937. In considering British religious policy in Burma, it is important to remember the connec-

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

tion with India, for the basic principles had already been formulated there. The British policy of religious neutrality was clearly stated in the eighteenth century and reflected the commercial-imperial interests of the British East India Com­ pany.2 As representatives of a commercial enterprise, the directors of the company were opposed to any meddling with the religious affairs of those with whom they wanted to do business. As the company occupied more territory and assumed extensive governmental functions, the policy seemed doubly valid: interference in religion would pro­ duce neither good business relations nor loyal subjects. When the company assumed responsibilities in the field of education, no religious instruction at all was provided for in government schools. There was such sensitivity over the religious question that even the practice of sati, which was supported by certain Hindu scriptures, was not abolished until 1829 and only after long debate.3 The principle of religious neutrality, interpreted as strict non-interference by the government in religious matters, was sound imperial policy. But it conflicted with the conception of the ruler's responsibilities which pre­ vailed among both Hindus and Muslims. As the East India Company displaced Indian rajas, it inherited cer­ tain religious functions which they had always performed. Both Hindu and Muslim rulers made grants in money and land to religious institutions, and supervised the administration of their temporal affairs. Some of the an­ nual grants made to Hindu temples in perpetuity by devout rajas were continued by the British government, in fulfilment of agreements made at the time of annexa­ tion of the new territories. 2 See Donald E. Smith, India as a Secular State, Princeton Uni­ versity Press, Princeton, 1963, pp. 65-84. 3 Sati was the self-immolation of a widow on the funeral pyre of her husband. Women were frequently drugged or forced to perform sati.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

Public opinion insisted that it was the duty of govern­ ment officials, regardless of the fact that they were foreigners and Christians, to protect the financial admin­ istration of the Hindu temples from unscrupulous priests and managers. Regulations were passed in Bengal in 1810 and in Madras in 1817 providing for the regular administration of temple endowments by the government. By 1833 the Madras government was administering the temporal affairs of no less than 7,600 Hindu temples. The collector of North Arcot indicated in his report the gov­ ernment's deep involvement in temple affairs. "Our inter­ ference has extended over every detail of management; we regulate their funds, superintend the repairs of their temples, keep in order their cars and images, appoint the servants of the pagodas, purchase and keep in store the various commodities required for their use, investigate and adjust all disputes, and at times, even those of a religious nature."4 It was inevitable that these activities of the govern­ ment would come under fire both in India and in Eng­ land. Christian missionaries publicly denounced these evidences of "government connection with idolatry," questions were asked in Parliament, and great pressure was put on the court of directors to abandon its policy of "promoting Hinduism." In 1833 a despatch from the directors ordered the withdrawal of all government offi­ cers from the administration of Hindu temples. The di­ rectors explained this step as "no more than a recurrence to that state of neutrality from which we ought never to have departed."5 Very little was done in India to implement the decision until 1838, when another despatch from the directors 4 Quoted in John William Kaye, Christianity in India: An His­ torical Narrative, Smith, Elder and Company, London, 1859, pp. 391-392. 5 Ibid., p. 417.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

reaflBrmed the order. Thereafter, the government slowly disentangled itself from temple administration and en­ trusted these functions to committees of Hindu laymen. The process was completed by the middle of the nine­ teenth century. Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858 included the following: ". . . we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure." The important point for our discussion here is that seventy-five years before the Government of India's an­ nexation of Upper Burma (1886), it accepted the tradi­ tional religious role of a native regime, experimented with it for a time, and then decisively rejected it. The experiment produced difficulties for the British govern­ ment which were solved only by reverting to the earlier policy of strict religious neutrality. The abandonment of the government's religious functions produced some re­ sentment among the Hindus, but there were no conse­ quences serious enough to lead the British to believe that this step had been a mistake. Essentially, the British attempted to apply in Burma the lessons they had learned in India. As we shall see, there were important concessions made to traditional Burmese practices. But the basic principle of religious neutrality, by now firmly established, was extended to the new province of Burma much as it was to the Indian princely states which were annexed. This policy largely ignored two important differences in the religious situations obtaining in India and Burma: (1) the extent of religious diversity and (2) the relative development of ecclesiastical organization. In India, the policy of religious neutrality was dictated not only by the religious differences which separated the rulers from their subjects; the differences among the subjects themselves

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

were no less important. While the Hindus claimed first consideration by virtue of their numerical superiority, the Muslims (one-fourth of the population) were very conscious of their place as the "ruling race" of the coun­ try, and the British government recognized the theoretical sovereignty of the Mughal emperor until 1858. In Burma, on the other hand, over 90 per cent of the population professed one religion, Buddhism, and the minorities were of little importance socially or politically. In India neither Hinduism nor Islam ever developed an ecclesiastical structure; their strength lay in the socioreligious institutions (caste, Islamic law) which regu­ lated virtually every aspect of day-to-day life. The vitality of Buddhism in Burma (as in other Theravada Buddhist countries), however, was largely dependent on the ecclesiastical structure which maintained the unity and discipline of the monkhood. Any religion in which eccle­ siastical organization plays such an important role is vulnerable in an uncongenial political environment. This brings us to a consideration of the first important area of the British government's religious policy in Burma. POLICY TOWABD THE SANGHA HIERARaHY

The ecclesiastical structure of Buddhism in old Burma has already been described in detail.6 Two characteristics of that structure must be emphasized if one is to under­ stand the western colonial impact upon it. First, the hierarchy was fairly well organized; the king appointed the thathanabaing, a kind of archbishop, who in turn appointed regional gainggyoks (bishops) and other ec­ clesiastical officials. But each monastic community exer­ cised a large degree of autonomy and was composed of persons engaged in the highly individualistic quest for nibbana. Secondly, the thathanabaing's ecclesiastical au6

See chapter 1, "Buddhism and the State in Old Burma."

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

thority to settle monastic property disputes, punish or expel disorderly monks, and generally maintain the disci­ pline of the Sangha was enforced by government officers appointed by the king. However great the moral author­ ity and prestige of the thathanabaing, it was the strong secular arm of the royal commissioners which made the system effective. With the annexation of the remainder of Lower Burma in 1852, the British were faced with the problem of the ecclesiastical leadership of that part of the Sangha within their territories. The thathanabaing, of course, remained with the king in Mandalay, the capital of independent Burma. Many of the leading monks of Lower Burma continued to regard Mandalay as the focal point of their religious loyalty. But, understandably, British officers found it impossible to recognize in their dominions the authority of an ecclesiastic who owed his power and appointment to a foreign ruler. Such a step would inevi­ tably have tended to undermine whatever loyalty the Burmese subjects might have felt toward the British government.7 Another possibility would have been for the British to appoint their own thathanabaing, and many observers felt that ready acquiescence would have been given to this move by all concerned.8 But the principle of reli­ gious neutrality, as interpreted then, ruled out this step also. There was widespread agreement that the discipline, morale, and unity of the Sangha suffered greatly during the years that followed. The headless ecclesiastical organ­ ization deteriorated rapidly. Lieutenant-General Albert Fytche wrote: "The English government, while tolerating every form of religion, will not appoint spiritual heads, 7

Herbert Thirkell White, A Civil Servant in Burma, Edward Arnold, London, 1913, p. 187. 8 C . J . F . S m i t h - F o r b e s , British Burma and its People, John Murray, London, 1878, pp. 325-326.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

or enforce the canons of any religious sect by the secular arm, and schisms have crept in since the establishment of our rule, which threaten to disorganize the ecclesiastical structure."9 If mistakes had been made in the British government's religious policy in Lower Burma, an opportunity to set matters right presented itself with the annexation of King Thibaw's dominions, bringing all of Burma under British rule. Colonel Edward Sladen, who had served as British resident at Mandalay for five years, declared in 1884 that the people of Upper Burma would probably welcome British rule if the traditional Buddhist ecclesiastical or­ ganization were recognized and supported.10 When the annexation took place in 1886, however, the decision was made to eliminate all elements of the old regime which were potential centers of resistance to British control. The abolition of the monarchy constituted a heavy blow at Buddhism, although this was not the intention of the British. In the integrated traditional structure of old Burma the king performed numerous functions in the promotion of religion. British rule pro­ vided no substitute for the royal patron and protector of Buddhism. With only slight exaggeration, D. M. Smeaton, financial commissioner in the British administration, wrote: "The Burman cannot conceive of a religion with­ out a Defender of the Faith—a king who appoints and rules the Buddhist hierarchy. The extinction of the mon­ archy left the nation, according to the people's notions, without a religion. We have overthrown the king and destroyed all traces of kingly rule."11 9

Albert Fytche, Burma Past and Present, C. Kegan Paul and Company, 1878, vol. 2, p. 195. 10 G. E. Harvey, British Rule in Burma 1824-1942, Faber and Faber, London, 1946, pp. 26-28. 11 D. M. Smeaton, The Loyal Karens of Burma, Kegan Paul,

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

Not only the royal court, but the ecclesiastical com­ missions which enforced the thathanabaing's decrees were swept away.12 During the rebellion of 1886-1887, in which monks participated openly, the primate and thir­ teen of his bishops met the commander-in-chief, Sir Frederick Roberts. They offered to preach submission to British rule throughout the country if the government would recognize and support their authority by appoint­ ing the usual commissioners to enforce it, but to no avail. The British readily agreed to recognize the thathanabaing's ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but refused the means to make it effective.13 Promises were made to continue the primate in office, and a certain amount of deference was shown to him by the British. The chief commissioner, Sir Charles Bernard, was anxious to make use of the thathanabaing's moral influence to help restore law and order and induced him to visit Rangoon as a first step toward extending his authority over Lower Burma. The journey, at government expense, was made in state with a large retinue of monks. The government built a rest-house for him and his suc­ cessors on the slope of the Shedagon pagoda. The MandaIay dignitary soon discovered, however, that his authority meant little in Lower Burma, where the Sangha was by then fragmented into hostile factions and sects. Sir Charles Crosthwaite, who became the chief commissioner in 1887, was not interested in securing the thathanaTrench, London, 1887, p. 4. Quoted in Fred R. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, University of Wis­ consin Press, Madison, 1963, p. 124. 12 John F. Cady, "Religion and Politics in Modem Burma," Far Eastern Quarterly, 1953, vol. 12, pp. 152-153. 13 G. E. Harvey, "The Conquest of Upper Burma," The Cam­ bridge History of India, Macmillan Company, New York, 1932, vol. 6, pp. 440-441; D. G. E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia, Macmillan and Company Ltd., London, 1960, p. 623.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

baing's cooperation and refused his request for recogni­ tion of the hierarchy's traditional prerogatives.14 What was the nature and extent of the legal power which was left to the primate? Under the old regime, monks who committed lesser crimes were punished di­ rectly by the ecclesiastical censor, a government official who acted on the authority of the thathanabaing. In cases of more serious crimes, monks were unfrocked and turned over to the secular authorities. Under British rule, monks became subject to the police and secular courts just as other citizens were, since the Sangha hierarchy no longer had at its disposal the means to enforce its discipline. In civil cases involving monks and monastic property, the primate was technically deprived of his jurisdiction, although this was by inference only. The Upper Burma Civil Justice Regulation 8 of 1886 provided that the civil courts should be of five grades; no mention was made of the thathanabaings ecclesiastical tribunal, nor was any jurisdiction conferred upon it subsequently by any com­ petent authority.15 This, however, was a legal technicality which was not taken seriously by the courts until 1935. In practice, the appellate courts regularly upheld the primate's civil jurisdiction in firm and decisive language. The leading case of U Te Za v. U Pyinnya, 1893, involved two monks who sought to evict a third monk from a kyaung, which they claimed as their property under Bud­ dhist law. Upon his refusal to vacate, the matter was referred to the thathanabaing and his council of Thudhamma sayadaws, who issued two orders to eject the de­ fendant. Upon his continued refusal to vacate the prop­ erty, a suit for ejectment was sought from the Civil Court, 14 White, pp. 189-190; John F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1958, p. 169. 15 U Pyinnya v. U Ottama. Indian Rulings: Rangoon Section, 1935-1936, vol. 8, p. 231. See O. H. Mootham, Burmese Buddhist Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1939, pp. 123-127.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

Mandalay. The civil judge in his judgment held that the courts were bound to support the orders of the thathanabaing only if they were found to be just and proper. In this case he disagreed with the primate and hence dis­ missed the suit for ejectment. This decision was reversed, however, by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner which held that "the measure of authority claimed for the thathanabaing and the Thudhamma council of sayadaws as the ruling body of the Buddhist Church is moderate, and there appears to be no good reason why is should not be recognized by the civil courts of the country. So long as the thathanabaing in council as the head of the church keeps within his jurisdiction and does nothing contrary to law, it is not for the courts to question the correctness of either his orders or proceedings in ecclesiastical matters."16 In another case the same court upheld the right of the ecclesiastical head of a monastery to expel a monk who defied his authority, created disunion and discord, and disrupted the discipline of the religious community. The thathanabaing had confirmed the order of expulsion, but this was not necessary to make it valid, since heads of monasteries held their position and rank as part of the ecclesiastical and hierarchical organization of the coun­ try. The court reaflSrmed "the absolute power of that organization within its own province and within the lim­ its of its own jurisdiction to deal with all ecclesiastical matters." If anyone wished to remain a member of a monastic community, he would have to conform to its rules on pain of exclusion. The civil courts "would surely be bound to refuse to grant a specific relief which would be subversive of the authority of the Buddhist church."17 The death of the thathanabaing in 1895 produced seri16 U Te Za v. U Pyinnya. Upper Burma Rulings, 1892-1896, vol. 2 (civil), pp. 66-67. 17 U Te Zeinda v. U Teza. Ibid., pp. 75-76.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

ous problems for the Buddhist hierarchy, the British government, and the civil courts. This individual, the Taungdaw Sayadaw, was the last primate appointed by the Burmese royal court.18 The question of his successor caused a serious split in the Sangha of Upper Burma. One group supported the claim of the Pakan Sayadaw to be appointed the thathanabaing, the other adhered to the twelve satjadaws who claimed through the late in­ cumbent authority to recommend the Mogaung Sayadaw for the position. In the face of conflicting claims and attempts to exercise the prerogatives of the office (the appointment of bishops and other ecclesiastical digni­ taries), the chief commissioner in 1896 issued a circular stating that since the death of the late thathanabaing "no person or persons have been officially recognized as possessing authority to make such appointments."19 The lack of a primate, however, did not invalidate the authority of the rest of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. In a decision handed down in 1898, the authority of the lower ecclesiastical dignitaries within the sphere of their several jurisdictions was reaffirmed. Furthermore, the court declared that "not only should the civil courts be bound by the decisions of these authorities in matters within their competence, but they should also abstain from deciding points which fall within the sphere of ecclesiastical jurisdiction."20 For eight years there was no thathanabaing in Burma. Had there been an established procedure for the selection 18 He

had been appointed by King Thibaw in 1875. dated September 3, 1896. Secretariat Circulars, 18881901, Superintendent, Government Printing, Rangoon, 1901, pp. 102-103. In 1899 the Court of the Judicial Commissioner struck down a decision made by the Pakan Sayadaw in pursuance of his claim to have been elected the new thathanabaing. U Thanwaya v. U Kethaya. Upper Burma Rulings, 1897-1901, vol. 2 (civil), pp. 45-51. 20 U Thatdama v. U Meda. Ibid., p. 44. 19 Circular

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

of the primate other than direct appointment by the ruler, the British would undoubtedly have implemented it. But for the government to choose a successor when the Sangha itself was sharply divided between two rival candidates would have been to land itself in precisely the kind of difficulties which the policy of religious neu­ trality sought to avoid. Finally, an "influential and ven­ erable assembly of monks at Mandalay" selected the Taunggwin Sayadaw, and in 1903 Sir Hugh Barnes, lieu­ tenant governor of Burma, granted a personal sanad recognizing him as the new thathanabaing. The terms of this official agreement carefully delimited the sphere of the primate's jurisdiction; it was not to extend to matters within the jurisdiction of the courts of justice. The thathanabaing was to have no authority to do anything in the enforcement of monastic discipline which would be contrary to the civil or criminal law. "But, subject to these provisos, I recognize the thathana­ baing as supreme in all matters relating to the internal administration and control of the Buddhist hierarchy in Upper Burma, the discipline of the monastic order, and the repression of abuses therein." The sanad went on to state that the civil courts would give effect to the orders of the thathanabaing, the gainggyoks, and other ecclesi­ astical authorities duly appointed by him, in matters within the competence of those authorities. The hierarchy was expected to exert its influence on the side of law and order and to support the government, and the lieutenant governor reserved the right to cancel the sanad and with­ draw his recognition should these conditions not be ob­ served. Finally, the thathanabaing was granted an official seal and authorized to issue seals approved by the gov­ ernment to subordinate ecclesiastics.21 Writers who have been critical of British religious 21

The sanad is quoted in full in U Pyinnya v. U Ottama, pp.

230-231.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

policy in Bxirma (and it has had few defenders) have dismissed this document as containing little more than moral support for the primate.22 However, the statement that the civil courts would give effect to the orders of ecclesiastical authorities did have substance. It was a confirmation of the judicial decisions noted above which gave the hierarchy considerable authority to settle mo­ nastic property disputes and to discipline unruly monks through the ultimate power of expulsion. The civil courts were indeed a very inadequate substitute for the ecclesi­ astical commissioners appointed by the Burmese kings to enforce the hierarchy's orders directly. But the judicial method did have some significance. In the years which followed, however, judicial decisions gradually eroded the thathanabaing's jurisdiction in civil disputes. In one of the early cases cited above, the posi­ tion was taken that an order issued by a duly constituted ecclesiastical authority need not be confirmed by a civil court before enforcing it. A later judgment reversed this vital decision.23 The sanad of 1903 recognized the author­ ity of the thathanabaing in Upper Burma only, so the civil courts of Lower Burma had jurisdiction to decide suits of a civil nature in which points of ecclesiastical law arose. In 1918 the Lower Burma Chief Court re22 Harvey, British Rule in Burma 1824-1942, p. 28; Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 170. The Baptist missionaries, on the other hand, protested that the government had done far too much for Buddhism by granting the sanad. "This presentation," one missionary reported, "is virtually appointing that functionary Chief Archbishop or Pope of all Burma. Such an act looks very much like recognizing Buddhism as the established religion of the country." In October 1903 the Burma Baptist Missionary Conven­ tion, attended by more than 4,000 Baptists from all parts of the country, adopted a resolution deploring "the new departure of the Government of India from the traditional, constitutional policy of maintaining a strictly neutral attitude in matters of religion." The Baptist Missionary Review, 1903, vol. 9, pp. 354, 473-474. 23 Sisir Chandra Lahiri, Principles of Modern Burmese Buddhist Law, Eastern Law House Private Ltd., Calcutta, 1957, pp. 361-362.

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quested and received from the Mandalay thathanabaing an advisory opinion which it took into consideration in deciding a point of ecclesiastical law concerning the inheritance of lands owned by a monk. The thathana­ baing advised the court that in such a case an ecclesi­ astical tribunal would rely solely on the Vinaya text and commentaries. The court, however, held that the general Buddhist law of inheritance applicable to laymen should also be taken into account where it was not inconsistent with the Vinaya.24 The unity, discipline, and dedication to religion of the Buddhist monks declined alarmingly during the 1920's. There can be no doubt that this decline was in large measure a consequence of the disruption of the traditional system of ecclesiastical authority, although numerous other factors were also involved. This period witnessed a corresponding increase in the political activities of na­ tionalist monks directed against British rule. Ironically, the government's failure to support the ecclesiastical hierarchy freed the monks from the traditional disci­ plinary restraints and enabled them to lead the nationalist attack against the government.25 In the early 1920's two minor attempts were made to strengthen the thathanabaing's authority: the extension of his jurisdiction to Lower Burma, and the appointment by the government of an ecclesiastical censor to implement his decisions in matters of discipline. The government supported these proposals partly in response to lay Buddhist nationalist sentiment which condemned the government's willing­ ness to stand by passively and permit the disintegration of the Sangha. But the government also clearly hoped 24 Shwe Ton v. Tun Lin. All India Reporter: Lower Burma, 1919, p. 91. 25 Pongyi leadership in the nationalist movement is discussed in considerable detail in the following chapter.

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that these measures would help to bring the troublesome political monks under control. The question of extending the ecclesiastical jurisdic­ tion of the Buddhist primate to Lower Burma had been considered several times after the granting of the sanad of 1903. The Young Men's Buddhist Association sub­ mitted a memorial to the government in 1917 requesting that this step be taken. The reply was sympathetic but negative. The government feared that such a step would not meet with the approval of the leaders of the smaller sects of the Sangha in Lower Burma, and that even in the Thudhamma sect high-ranking sayadaws who for so many years had not been subject to any higher control would object strenuously. In response to another me­ morial, the government in 1920 finally appointed a com­ mittee of sayadaws and laymen under the chairmanship of Justice Maung Kin to determine "whether there exists a widely diffused desire on the part of the great majority of the members of the Buddhist community throughout Lower Burma for such an extension of the thathanabaing's jurisdiction."26 After a thorough inquiry, the committee reported that the proposal had wide support. In 1922 the government announced that if, when the occasion arose to elect a successor to the thathanabaing then in office, the opinion of the Buddhist community remained the same, the government would be prepared to recognize a single head of the Sangha hierarchy for the whole of Burma.27 When Sir Hugh Barnes' sanad was granted in 1903, no mahadan wun (ecclesiastical censor) was appointed to help the thathanabaing as his executive officer. In 1907 the Buddhist primate requested the government to ap28 Proceedings of the Government of Burma in the General Department, No. I-E. 7, April 16, 1920. The complete text was published in Rangoon Gazette Weekly Budget, April 19, 1920. 27 Ibid., July 5, 1920; July 3, 1922; March 19, 1923.

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point two officers to assist him, with special responsi­ bilities for conducting the traditional census of the monks, reporting to the sayadaws in charge any breaches of monastic discipline, and arranging the trial and punish­ ment of offending monks. He was informed that it would be contrary to the established policy of the British gov­ ernment to appoint government officers to assist him in the discharge of his ecclesiastical functions. In 1919, after some Europeans were assaulted at the Eindawya pagoda in Mandalay by a group of monks, representative Burmese Buddhists supported by the thathanabaing re­ newed the request. In 1920 the government announced that it had received the sanction of the Government of India to the appointment of a mahadan wun with the necessary clerical establishment. To cover salaries and expenses, a government grant of Rs. 500 a month was sanctioned for a trial period of five years. The mahadan wun was to be a layman appointed by the thathanabaing with the approval of the commissioner of Mandalay.28 The first mahadan wun to be selected under the British was a retired deputy superintendent of police, U Aung Gyaw, appointed in March 1921. It was made clear that the mahadan wun had not been empowered as a special police officer or magistrate, and that monks who were believed to have committed criminal offenses would con­ tinue to be dealt with under the ordinary law. His func­ tion was to deal only with offenses against the Vinaya or ecclesiastical law, reporting such cases to the sayadaw superiors of the accused monks.29 The British commissioner in Mandalay took a very active interest in Buddhist religious reforms and con­ vened several large meetings of leading sayadaws and laymen in connection with the appointment of the maha28

29

Government press communique, ibid., December 6, 1920. Ibid., March 21 and May 16, 1921; December 3, 1923.

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dan wun.30 But the government's interest in Buddhist reform was closely tied to the discouragement of the monks' involvement in nationalist activities. Among the conclusions reached by the Buddhist leaders were the following: "that it is highly undesirable for junior monks to tour about in the country doing political propaganda work at the bidding of laymen and on behalf of secular societies entirely contrary to the spirit of the Vinaya rules; that it is also undesirable for laymen to persuade Buddhist monks to join them in undertaking political propaganda work, thereby infringing the Vinaya rules and bringing the Buddhist Church into disrepute, dis­ order and chaos."31 The British had earlier feared that a well-organized and disciplined Sangha under a strong Buddhist primate might become an independent political power capable of challenging the government. By 1920 the challenge came, not from the Sangha hierarchy, but from political pongyis (monks) quite free from the discipline of the hierarchy. The British now found an ally in the thathanabaing and set about restoring his authority. In 1921 the primate issued an order aimed directly at the activities of the nationalist Sangha Sametggi Association, enjoining monks to abstain from any form of political agitation. The thathanabaing instructed the mahadan wun to enforce this order and to prevent monks from speaking at politi­ cal meetings held near the primate's monastery.32 Despite 30 The very conservative outlook of these elders of the Sangha, especially with respect to reforms, caused one reporter to comment with irony: "The learned sayadaws, some of whom were over seventy or eighty years old, had been accustomed to the con­ templation of the eternal verities like anicca, dukkha and anatta— change, suifering, and impermanence—and were not in a position to appreciate the social, educational and political changes that had taken place around them." "Mahadan Wun [Buddhist Censor], Mandalay," Rangoon Gazette Weekly Budget, May 16, 1921. 31 Loc.cit. s2Ihid., September 12, 1921.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH R U L E the government's support of these ecclesiastical digni­ taries, pongyi involvement in nationalist politics in­ creased. The fatal blow to the legal jurisdiction of the eccle­ siastical hierarchy fell in 1935. In U Pyinnya v. U Ottama the Rangoon High Court held that "the Buddhist com­ munity in Burma and the thathanabaing and the hier­ archy set up by him in Upper Burma have no constitu­ tional or legal status, and are in the same position as any other religious body not established by the state."33 The Upper Burma Civil Justice Regulation 8 of 1886 recog­ nized no ecclesiastical tribunal, and the sanad of 1903 created no such court. Furthermore, the ecclesiastical hierarchy could claim no consensual jurisdiction to de­ termine monastic property disputes, since monks at the time of their ordination gave no pledge to obey the orders of these authorities. They promised to observe the 227 rules of the Vinaya, but these rules provided for a quite different procedure for the settlement of monastic disputes. According to the court, the submission of a monk to the jurisdiction of the thathanabaing was con­ trary to specific rules in the Vinaya by which he had undertaken to be bound at his ordination. In going to the ancient Vinaya in order to undermine the authority of the thathanabaing (and this line of reasoning undermined his purely religious as well as his legal authority), the court chose to disregard the histor­ ical evolution of religious institutions. The judgment in­ cluded a list of the thathanabaings of Burma going back to A.D. 1368, but rejected custom as being of any rele­ vance in the recognition of legal jurisdiction. The court overruled all the previous decisions which had accorded 33

U Pyinnya v. U Ottama. Indian Rulings: Rangoon Section, 1935-1936, vol. 8, p. 232. This was a unanimous decision of the full bench of the Rangoon High Court; two of the five judges were Burmese Buddhists.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

any substantial legal authority to the ecclesiastical hier­ archy. This judgment created widespread apprehension among Buddhist monks and laymen that the government would soon abolish the office of thathanabaing altogether. The government therefore issued a communique stating that the primate was still recognized as "supreme in the internal administration and control of the Buddhist priest­ hood."34 However, after the death in 1938 of the Taunggwin Sayadaw (to whom the 1903 sanad had been granted), the office of thathanabaing lapsed.35 MONASTIC SCHOOLS AND WESTERN EDUCATION

The monastic school was an institution of fundamental importance in the molding of Burmese social, cultural, and religious life. The intimate relationship between monastery and school in the traditional system is reflected in the fact that the same Burmese word, kyaung, was and is used for both. Boys were sent to the monastery for their schooling at the age of around eight years. They served the pongyis in the menial tasks of monastic life and learned to read and write. Instruction was imparted in the teachings of the Buddha, Pali formulas and prayers used in pagoda worship, and the Jataka tales. At the age of twelve to fifteen the boys were initiated by the shinbyu ceremony and became novitiates in the Sangha. Most of them returned to secular life after a few months, but some remained in the monastery, continuing their study of the Pali scriptures, and received ordination at the age of twenty. The monastic school was thus completely integrated with Buddhist religious practice. It taught all youths the 34

Rangoon Gazette, December 9, 1935. See "The Thathanabaing," editorial in New Burma, March 20, 1938. Cited in von der Mehden, p. 125. 35

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rudiments of the Dhamma and pointed some to the path of liberation through membership in the Sangha. The skills of literacy were taught primarily because they were necessary to the study of religion, but the educa­ tional result was impressive. Burma had the highest rate of literacy in all of South and Southeast Asia. British administrators were duly impressed by the effectiveness of this indigenous system of primary educa­ tion. In 1866 Sir Arthur Phayre, the chief commissioner, introduced a plan to integrate the monastic schools of Lower Burma into the government's educational pro­ gram. His hope was that the pongyis would be willing to cooperate by modifying their curriculum and methods of teaching to bring them more into line with the require­ ments of modern times. This inevitably meant the intro­ duction of secular subjects, especially arithmetic and geography, and the employment of lay schoolmasters qualified to teach these subjects. In return for the monks' cooperation, the government would provide books, equip­ ment, and money for buildings. The plan was put into operation, and some teachers trained in the government normal school were attached to selected pongyi kyaungs. In an article published in 1892, "An Episode in Bur­ mese History," a former director of public instruction in Burma emphasized the uniqueness and daring of Phayre's plan for the monastic schools. There were many obvious diflBculties, and most administrators were convinced that it would be folly for a foreign government to interfere in an educational system so intimately associated with Buddhism and controlled by the Sangha. "Even if the leaders of the Order could be won over to acquiescence in any such interference, it would have seemed that the absolute neutrality in all matters of religion, which is one of the axioms of Anglo-Indian administration, would render impossible any alliance between the Buddhist

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

monastic order and the English officials."36 Despite the serious problems, Phayre saw a great educational op­ portunity and moved quickly to seize it. But progress was slow; thousands of monastic schools continued to func­ tion, but chose to remain totally independent of govern­ ment aid and regulation. Phayre's successor therefore decided to encourage the opening of lay schools under private management. By 1873 there were 801 monastic schools and 112 lay schools under government inspection and receiving government aid.37 The monks were generally distrustful and unwilling to cooperate, and, as Professor Cady pointed out, "the government could not possibly control thousands of small village kyaungs without the assistance of a Buddhist primate for Lower Burma, whom the authorities in India would not appoint."38 After the annexation of Upper Burma in 1886, a thathanabaing was available, but he unfortunately sought to defend Buddhism by the most uncompromising opposition to any form of governmental interference in the monastic schools. In 1891 the thatha­ nabaing in council issued a circular prohibiting the intro­ duction of any secular education (the chief issue was the teaching of arithmetic) in monastic schools; the cer­ tificated lay teachers provided by the government were not to be accepted. Every effort was made to enforce the primate's order, not only through the regular hierarchy, but by personal emissaries who traveled from monastery to monastery, admonishing the pongyis to obedience on pain of excommunication.38 38 P. Hordern, "An Episode in Burmese History," Asiatic Quar­ terly Review, 1892, vol. 4, p. 34. 37 J. S. Fumivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India, New York University Press, New York, 1956, pp. 124-125. 38 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, p. 96. 39 Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1891-1892, Superin-

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

There was far from unanimity in the Sangha regarding the stand taken by the hierarchy. In some of the monas­ teries the more liberal pongyis believed that effective teaching of secular subjects, whether by monks or lay­ men, would greatly enhance the prestige of their schools. Some pongyis defied the primate's circular, even in the city of Mandalay. But the thathanabaing's authority was still impressively demonstrated; in the following year it was reported that recognized monastic primary schools had decreased by 1,316, involving a loss of 10,087 pupils. In the years following, the opposition gradually died out, and the education department was able to reestablish relations with many of these schools. Despite the difficulties encountered in working with the monastic schools, the chief commissioner wrote in 1894: "Where kyaungs exist, which are supported by the people, and in which the instruction is efficient, it is not desirable to encourage the opening of lay schools. The efforts of the department should be devoted to improving the indigenous institutions of the districts. . . ."40 The monastic schools had important natural advantages over the lay schools: they enjoyed the prestige of religion, charged no fees (and frequently even provided free meals for the pupils), and had their classroom buildings already provided. The layman who started a school had to de­ pend on government grants and pupils' fees for his liveli­ hood and had to build his own classrooms. Many of the lay schools were started primarily for girls, who were not generally admitted to the monastic schools. Nevertheless, the opposition to the teaching of arithmetic in the kyaungs gave a great stimulus to the opening of more lay schools for both girls and boys. It was increasingly realized that tendent, Government Printing, Rangoon, Resolution, pp. 9-10; Upper Burma, pp. 1-2, 24, 35-36, 39, 43-44, 48, 50. 40 Ibid., 1893-1894, Resolution, p. 3.

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monastic schooling without such secular subjects led nowhere vocationally. In 1900 the director of public instruction stated the case clearly: "We base our vernacular work on the mo­ nastic school, and do all we can, with all the patience and tact we can bring to bear on the question, to make the monks realize that the very small amount of secular education required cannot and does not interfere with their religious work; and that if they, as leaders of the people in education, do not take up the work in earnest, it will drift away from their hands into those of secular managers, and there will be no pupils for them [the monks] left to whom religious instruction can be given. The people will have education, and, if the monks will not supply it, the people will go to others who will."*1 By and large the warning went unheeded, with the inevitable consequences indicated above. British policy, however, continued through the first two decades of this century its serious efforts to make the monastery school the foundation of primary education in the country. Financial considerations were undoubtedly weighty in the formulation of this policy; surely a system of state primary schools would have been prohibitively costly. Lay schools under private management required larger grants-in-aid from the government than monastic schools, and their work was not always satisfactory either. But positive as well as negative considerations strongly indicated the desirability of a policy of strengthening the monastic schools. The buildings were there, the teachers were there, and the pupils were there; the necessary machinery existed for the education of almost every boy of school age throughout the land. If only the curriculum and teaching in these schools could somehow be adjusted to the twentieth century! il Ibid.,

1899-1900, p. 1. (Italics in source.)

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The lieutenant governor of Burma was acutely con­ scious of the other values promoted by monastic primary education. His views were well expressed in a 1912 resolution: "The vital problem, then, is how to improve the teaching in these indigenous schools. The alternative course—to abandon this system, which is closely bound up with the national life and religion of the people, to deprive the vast army of pongtjis of what is perhaps their greatest sphere of usefulness to the community, to re­ move from them the opportunity of inculcating in the rising generation the tenets of Buddhism, with its ad­ mirable moral precepts and discipline, and to substitute instead a vast and costly network of lay schools which, though more efficient in imparting the elements of liter­ ary instruction, must inevitably fail in the field of moral and religious education—such a course appears to the lieutenant governor to be opposed to the best interests of the country, and to every principle of good govern­ ment."42 In 1917 the lieutenant governor's resolution held that the assimilation of monastic schools in the government's educational system and the improvement of their teach­ ing staffs was "the main problem of primary education."43 From 1900 to 1920 numerous steps were taken to deal with this main problem. In 1904 the department, in an effort to win the monastic schools over to its side, made Pali an alternative subject to geography and elementary science in the vernacular curriculum. In the following year the attempt was made to enlist the support of the new thathanabaing (recognized in 1903) by seeking his advice regarding the modification of the curriculum. In 1908 the grants-in-aid system was modified by the intro42

Ibid., Fourth Quinquennial Report, 1907 to 1912, Resolution,

p. 3. 43

p. 3.

Ibid., Fifth Quinquennial Report, 1912 to 1917, Resolution,

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

duction of a new classification of vernacular schools: "A schools," which followed the department's curriculum, and "B schools," which did not. It was hoped that by meeting the few simple requirements of the latter classi­ fication, many pongyis could be induced to register their schools on the department's lists. In 1912 six deputy inspectors of schools were put on special duty, sent out to contact the pongyi headmasters, explain the department's program to them, and if possible secure their cooperation. In 1913-1914 elementary train­ ing classes for vernacular teachers were established in two monasteries and in several others in the following years. In 1914 special arithmetic examinations for monks were started, with rewards for successful candidates. In 1920 two monastic training schools, one in Mandalay and one in Moulmein, were established to provide systematic training for pongyi teachers. The optimistic comment of the director of public instruction was as follows: "The scheme, it is believed, offers the best means yet devised of bringing monastic schools into the public system of education on terms at once acceptable to the Buddhist priesthood and conducive to secular efficiency."44 All of these measures met with little success. There were indeed some encouraging signs throughout the entire period. Some pongyis offered their cooperation, accepted trained lay teachers, received training them­ selves, and developed excellent schools. Their pupils con­ sistently did well in examinations conducted by the deputy inspectors of schools. But such monks and such schools constituted the exception to the rule. Most of the monks disliked not only "secular education" but attend­ ance records and the rest of the paper work so dear to the heart of the British colonial administrator. The num­ ber of monastic schools on the government register was 2,352 at the end of 1912, and rose to 3,418 in 1916 as a 44

Ibid., 1919-1920, p. 17.

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result of the special efforts of the six deputy inspectors. However, the total number of unregistered monastic schools was over 16,000. The first world war necessitated strict economy in government expenditures for education. In 1917 the system was decentralized, and divisional boards were made responsible for vernacular education, with a large number of inefficient schools but little money to support them. A policy of retrenchment was begun, and inefficient schools were disregistered. While both lay and monastic schools were affected, a much higher percentage of the latter were found to be inefficient. The number of registered monastic schools fell to 2,648 in 1920 and to 1,182 in 1925. By the latter year there were four times as many pupils in lay schools as in recognized monastic schools. The director of public instruction reported: "There can be little doubt that the kyaungs have no edu­ cational future."45 By and large, the attitude of the Sangha toward the education department remained one of distrust. A note of dissent to the 1924 report of the Vernacular Education Committee was presented by Maung Maung Su, the thathanabaing's nominee. In his final sentence he appealed to the government "to leave the Burmese Buddhist monastic schools severely alone now and for ever hereafter."46 For more than half a century the British policy had been to link the monastic schools to the government's educational system. By 1920 it was clear that this policy had failed, and that the monastic schools had no future. Both the government and the people lost interest in the pongyi kyaungs. In the new social and economic structure of the country, the instruction imparted in these schools was irrelevant.47 The more progressive Burmans saw that «Ibid., 1924-1925, p. 19.

«Ibid., 1925-1926, p. 10. In 1907 the director of public instruction remarked: "It is the fashion to laud the old monastic system of instruction and to imply 47

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

the doors of opportunity opened from the government and mission schools where English subjects were taught. The government, contrary to its stated policy but in response to popular demand, devoted an increasing pro­ portion of its resources to secondary and correspondingly less to primary education. Clerks were needed for govern­ ment and business offices, and the secondary schools were multiplied to meet the demand. The monastic schools, of course, continued to function as they had for centuries before the British tried to reform them. According to Furnivall, "two-thirds to threequarters of the villages still had no provision for learning except in the monastic school, if any; and the monastic schools were no more closely in touch with the modern world, and were losing their hold on the people, because the wealthier and brighter lads were forsaking them for schools which paved a quicker way to better jobs."48 The eclipse of the monastic school was the result of British rule, but not of British policy. The failure of British policy in the monastic schools was also a failure for Buddhism. Had the Sangha been willing to cooperate with British educational reforms, a national system of primary schools incorporating the basic elements of both religious tradition and modern knowledge might have developed, to the great advantage of Burmese Buddhism. Since the effort to build elements of secular education on a religious foundation did not succeed, present-day Buddhist leaders must now attempt to tack religious instruction on to a secular educational structure. The former attempt, which failed, might conceivably have that the education department is rapidly subverting it and pro­ viding an inferior substitute. If the officers and persons who admire the ancient methods of the pongyis were to be left dependent upon them for the supply of subordinates, they would rapidly arrive at a better appreciation of their practical value." Ibid., Third Quinquennial Report, 1902-1907, p. 15. 48 Furnivall, p. 126.

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produced schools which effectively integrated the values of religion and modern knowledge. The present attempt, in Burma as in the West, is likely to produce, at best, an artificial and ineffective compartment in the student's educational experience. In the light of the almost complete disruption of tra­ ditional Burmese life after 1885—especially the abolition of the royal court and the decline of the ecclesiastical hierarchy—it would have been extremely difficult for the pongyis to credit the British with good intentions when they sought permission to interfere in their monastic schools. Young deputy inspectors in the department of public instruction were sometimes tactless and lacking in the customary deference to the monks and alienated them unnecessarily. Nevertheless, the Sangha itself must bear much of the responsibility for the failure to bring the monastic schools into line with the requirements of modern life. During a period of over half a century, there did not develop within the Sangha any considerable body of opinion inclined to come to terms with modernity. We must now consider two other aspects of the British government's educational policy in Burma which had a direct bearing on religion. One involved the revival of a traditional practice of the Burmese kings; the other was an attempt to inject some religious influence into the secular curriculum of government and lay schools. PALI SCHOLARSHIP UNDER THE BRITISH

For many centuries the royal court had been the chief patron and promoter of Pali scholarship. Pali was not only the language of the Theravada Buddhist scriptures, but had contributed greatly to the development and en­ richment of the Mon and Burmese languages. One of the methods by which the Burmese kings encouraged the study of Pali was to conduct annual examinations (called

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

patamabyan examinations) in the Pali texts, with royal recognition and rewards for the successful candidates, most of whom were monks. The continuation of this system of examinations was one of the concerns of the thathanabaing when in 1886 he headed a deputation to Sir Frederick Roberts asking for confirmation of the ecclesiastical commission's jurisdiction.49 The commission was allowed to lapse, but five years later the proposal was made to revive the Pali examinations. In his report for 1891-1892, the director of public in­ struction stated that arrangements were being made to resuscitate the patamabyan examinations "to encourage theological training as well as secular education in the pongyi kyaungs." The central aim of the plan, he went on, was to promote Pali scholarship, and "the possibility of its ever drifting into an examination for ordination, carried on by the Mandalay monks, and paid for by the government, should be very carefully guarded against."50 To the director's surprise, however, the Mandalay monks, far from wishing to exploit the examination for their own purposes, would have nothing to do with it. After the education department had appointed a central commit­ tee, drawn up a syllabus, determined the time and place of examination, fixed the rewards for successful candi­ dates, and found funds to finance the examinations, the thathanabaing and his sayadaws registered their com­ plete disapproval of the whole plan. In the face of this unexpected opposition, the department reluctantly but realistically shelved the scheme.51 Several years later, however, the opposition disap­ peared, and the first Pali examinations conducted by the 49 D. G. E. Hall, Burma, Hutchinson University Library, Lon­ don, 1960, p. 145. 50 Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1891-1892, Upper Burma, p. 2. 51 Ibid., 1892-1893, Resolution, p. 8; Upper Burma, p. 1.

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department were held in June 1895. There were 116 can­ didates (66 of them monks), and 34 passed the examina­ tion. In the official resolution on the report for that year it was stated that the chief commissioner "sets a high value on these examinations, not only as a stimulus to Pali learning, but also as a means of winning the goodwill of the Buddhist monks and securing their cooperation in the general work of education."52 In view of the efforts then being made to persuade the pongyis to register their monastic schools with the education department, it seems most likely that the latter objective was uppermost in the minds of British officials. The Pali examinations were held annually in Mandalay, Moulmein, and Rangoon, and the traveling expenses of successful candidates were paid by the government. There were four standards of examinations and corre­ sponding rewards in money for the successful candidates in each. For the For the For the For the

patamagyaw (highest honors) patamagyi standard patamalat standard patamange standard

150 100 75 50

rupees rupees rupees rupees

The Education Code provided that any successful candi­ date who was forbidden by his habit of life to take money (i.e. a monk) would receive presents of robes of value equal to the above. Every successful candidate received a certificate signed by the president of the central committee (the director of public instruction), and the patamagyaw received a certificate signed by the lieutenant governor of Burma.53 The first patamagyaw under the British-sponsored system of examinations was a monk, U Ketu, and the presentation of his certificate in 52

Ibid., 1895-1896, Resolution, p. 5. Education Code, Burma, Superintendent, Government Print­ ing, Rangoon, 1901, pp. 172-173. 53

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

1898 was made by the lieutenant governor in person. In addition to the administration of the examinations, the central committee (on which several sayadaws served) sponsored the publication of a complete and scholarly edition of the Tripitaka.54 In 1899 the patamabyan examination had to be can­ celled because the questions leaked out.55 But the popu­ larity of the examination grew at an astonishing rate; the number of candidates was over 400 in 1905, 1,200 in 1912, and 1,600 in 1920. All but a few of these candidates were pongyis, and usually between one-fourth and onethird of them were successful. For a few years after 1920 the number of candidates decreased under the pressure of nationalist sentiment. The Sangha Sametggi Society made determined efforts to boycott the examination as one form of non-cooperation with the British government. Pongyi candidates were intimidated and even subjected to violence.56 But by 1924 the Pali examinations were again popular, attracting over 1,700 candidates. By 1929, despite controversy over attempts to intro­ duce the Vinaya (rules of conduct for monks) as a com­ pulsory subject in the examination, the number of candi­ dates rose to 2,800. With the increase in cheating and disorderliness in the Pali examinations as well as pongyi political activity, British officials thought that the study of the Vinaya might do some good. It was ultimately made an optional subject, which very few monks chose. With the great increase in the number of candidates, many new examination centers were opened. Despite the intensity of Buddhist-oriented nationalism through the 1930's, in almost every year of that decade the number 54

Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1897-1898, pp. 3-5. There have been several instances of this happening since independence; see chapter 6, "The Sangha, Politics, and Reform." 68 Report on Public Instruction in Burma, Quinquennial Report, 1917-1922, p. 22. 55

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

of candidates was over 3,500. In 1940 the Burma Pali Education Board was constituted by the government to administer the examinations. The following year a government resolution an­ nounced: "The governor of Burma desires to expedite the formulation of the scheme for the establishment of a Pali University and Colleges." Accordingly, a five-man Pali University Inquiry Committee was appointed, with Dr. Thein Maung as chairman. The committee's 1941 report pointed to "the essentially tolerant spirit and the superb ethics of Buddhism," which was attracting an ever-increasing number of earnest scholars in the West. "Many of them find in Buddhism the basic truths of all religions. These truths constitute a common denominator of essential tenets and embrace a sufficiently large meas­ ure of agreement likely to furnish a convenient formula for uniting the intellectual and spiritual forces of man­ kind. Along with this world-wide movement outside Burma in favor of a careful study of Buddhism, it is but natural that there should be a parallel movement in the present spiritual home of the religion toward a deeper interest in its vast and varied literature and toward a more comprehensive and critical study of its doctrines. It is considered therefore that having regard to the unique position it occupies among the Buddhist countries of the world today, Burma should be the seat of a Pali University for advanced studies in Buddhist religious literature. . . ."57 This interesting statement combined Buddhist universalism with Burmese nationalism. Buddhism contained the basic truths of all religions, but as a body of doctrine it was nevertheless distinct, and in its propagation Burma had a special mission because of its unique position among 57 Report of the Pali University Inquiry Committee, Superin­ tendent, Government Printing and Stationery, Rangoon, 1941, p. 12.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

the Buddhist countries of the world. The committee recommended the creation of a Pali University of the affiliating type, with recognition of the large teaching monasteries of the country as constituent colleges. The Japanese invasion intervened to prevent the implementa­ tion of the report.58 The conclusion is inescapable that Pali scholarship not only survived but flourished under British rule. Superior administrative organization brought the Pali examination to a much larger number of monks than under the Burmese kings. Fairness and efficiency in the administra­ tion of the examination produced its very considerable popularity and prestige among the members of the Sangha, however vehement their other objections to British rule. TEACHING OF BUDDfflSM IN STATE SCHOOLS

In India the British government's policy of strict religious neutrality was very early interpreted to exclude religious instruction from state schools. In 1835 Lord William Bentinck made this point very explicit. The educational despatch of 1854 forbade religious instruction in govern­ ment institutions, the reasoning being that as these "were founded for the benefit of the whole population of India . . . the education conveyed in them should be exclusively secular." India was one of the very first countries in the world in which a system of secular government schools was developed. Despite agonizing reviews of the position by successive official commissions, which were acutely conscious of the absence of religious instruction from the curriculum, the original decision was each time reaffirmed.59 The provision in the 1950 Consti58 The

Pali University and Dhammacariya Act of 1950 followed this committee's recommendations on most important points. See chapter 6, "The Sangha, Politics, and Reform." 59 Smith, pp. 335-347.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

tution of India which prohibits all religious instruction in state schools has well over a century of history behind it. The significant point is that a quite different pattern emerged in Burma, despite the fact that it was (until 1937) a province of British India. By 1905 British officials in Burma were openly questioning the wisdom of the policy of excluding religious instruction. The questions were raised in the context of the growing lawlessness which swept the country in the decade prior to World War I. Rapid economic expansion in Lower Burma was one important factor in the rise of antisocial forces.60 But the breakdown of traditional village and religious author­ ity was obviously a fundamental aspect of the situation, and British "secular education" received more than its share of the blame. Some critics went so far as to assert that opium and education were the chief causes of the rising crime rate.61 The director of public instruction during most of this troubled decade, J. G. Covernton, devoted considerable attention in his reports to the analysis of the decline in morality, but saw no easy solutions. The teaching of religious scriptures or textbooks on morality in the schools would have little effect, for the real crisis in­ volved "the disintegration of ancient systems and timeworn ideals."62 Covernton doubted that religion still afforded a vivifying stimulus to true morality and indeed hinted that its chief sanctions were the bulwarks of super­ stition. "If . . . religious faith is indeed decaying or decayed, the pattering of Pali versicles, the repetition of sacred texts and the inculcation of maxims no longer potent will do less than nothing for its restoration. We are then thrown back upon the creation of a moral con­ viction apart from religion, for which the establishment 60

Cady, A History of Modern Burma, pp. 173-178. Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1906-1907, pp. 33-34. 82 Ibid., 1905-1906, p. 24. 61

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

of a valid principle of life and conduct is requisite. And this is the business of education."03 Neither Covernton's superior, the lieutenant gover­ nor,64 nor his subordinates agreed with his secularist conclusions. Most of the inspectors of schools were of the opinion that the kyaung exercised a potent influence for good upon Burman character and manners. The com­ missioner of Minbu reflected a rather negative opinion of the Burman character while acknowledging the in­ fluence of Buddhism: "Reverence for the priests and his religion is more likely to delay the deterioration of the Burman than anything else."65 Of the seven commis­ sioners consulted in 1907-1908, all but two favored the introduction of direct religious or moral instruction as a necessary part of the curriculum. A majority of the com­ missioners and other officials agreed that effective moral teaching could only be imparted through the medium of the pupil's own religion. "Practical difficulties were ad­ mitted, among them that of reversing a traditional policy of government, but it was pointed out that conditions are not the same here as in India, and that a policy of reli­ gious indifference is unsuited to a country where more than 90 per cent of the inhabitants are of one faith."66 The view of the majority prevailed, and in 1910 came the concession under which the Government of India permitted as an experimental measure the imparting of religious instruction in government, district, and munici­ pal schools. The announcement of this decision was welcomed by the Burmese Buddhists with great enthuIbid., 1908-1909, p. 24. "It cannot be denied that the Burmese people have by them­ selves attained a high standard of morals and have developed many admirable characteristics. This can hardly be the result of the muttering of a few unintelligible prayers or the learning by rote of unassimilated Pali texts." Ibid., 1907-1908, Resolution, p. 6. 6 5 Ibid., Third Quinquennial Report, 1902-1907, p. 34. β β Ibid., 1907-1908, p. 28. 63

64

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

siasm. Instruction could be arranged in whatever religion or religions were professed by the pupils, but no pro­ vision for this purpose was made from public funds. The religious instruction was conducted in the school build­ ing, but out of school hours, without compulsion, and at the expressed desire of the parents. No religious ceremony or act of worship was permitted. Religious teachers were selected by the parents and approved by the inspector of schools. In many government schools Buddhism was the only religion taught, since the Muslims, Christians, and Hin­ dus frequently preferred to make their own arrangements for religious instruction outside of the school. In many cases pongyis imparted the instruction in Buddhism; in other cases this work was undertaken by lay Buddhist teachers who used especially prepared manuals of re­ ligious instruction. In some cities and towns the Young Men's Buddhist Association organized the religious in­ struction in the government schools, conducted examina­ tions in Buddhism, and awarded prizes to successful can­ didates. The visits of the pongyis helped to break down the barriers between the monks and the lay schools. The thathanabaing himself in 1916 visited a government school at Sagaing and addressed the pupils and staff.87 While the rules published in 1910 left the responsibility for arranging religious instruction in the hands of parents and guardians, in practice the education department and local school authorities assumed a much more active role. It was made clear that whether arrangements were made for instruction in Buddhism at a given school was defi­ nitely not a matter of indifference to the department. Schools in which such instruction had not been instituted were mentioned in a tone of disapproval in the annual reports. While the religious instruction experiment met 67

Ibid., Fifth Quinquennial Report, 1912-1917, p. 31.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

with considerable apathy in a few places, the response was generally favorable, and the consensus of opinion among education department officers was that it was doing some good. By the late 1920's Burman participation in both local and provincial government was beginning to make a significant impact on educational policy. Some of the new district school boards took a keen interest in Bud­ dhist religious instruction, and, contrary to the original rules, spent public money to encourage it by holding examinations and awarding prizes. The ministry of educa­ tion, now headed by a Burmese, approved such expendi­ tures, which a few years before would have been vetoed as contrary to the principle of religious neutrality. "It is clear that rigid insistence on that principle will prove incompatible in Burma with any real transfer of control of education to elected bodies," the director of public instruction reported in 1928. "Buddhism is closely as­ sociated in the public mind with nationalism, and the Burmese believe strongly in the moral efficacy of re­ ligious instruction."88 Two years later the same official had occasion to re­ mark that religious neutrality, the policy observed by all Indian governments, was gradually breaking down in Burma under the pressure of public opinion. "When the bulk of a nation is of the same religion, you cannot under any form of representative government separate church and state." Despite the existence of religious minorities, the basic fact was that the Buddhist church represented the Burmese nation; as the state became more democratic it would inevitablv become more Buddhist.69 The Buddhist Beligious Instruction Committee, ap­ pointed by the government, submitted its report in 1929. In accordance with its recommendation, the government in 1931 ordered that provision should be made for daily 68 Ibid., 1927-1928, p. 22.

9 Ibid., 1929-1930, p. 24.

75

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

religious instruction to Buddhist pupils during the first period of the morning in all lay70 and monastic schools and also in government Anglo-vernacular schools. Fur­ thermore, lay school teachers were ordered to take their pupils to monastic schools for service or instruction once a week or invite monks to visit their schools for this purpose. The committee, in drawing up a syllabus for Buddhist religious instruction, expressed the conviction that such a course of study should arouse "faith in the young mind in the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Sangha."71 The change in government policy was an important one. In 1910 instruction in all religions was permitted in government schools outside of school hours. In 1931 government schools were required to provide daily in­ struction in Buddhism for Buddhist pupils during the first period of the morning. From their inception the mission schools in Burma included classes in the Bible and Christian doctrine as an integral part of their curriculum, and this instruction was compulsory for all pupils regardless of their religion. Because of the generally high standard of instruction and discipline in these Protestant and Roman Catholic schools, and also because of a tolerant attitude toward other faiths, Buddhist parents were willing to acquiesce in this form of coercion. The position of the missionaries was that no one compelled Buddhist parents to send their children to the Christian schools, but that if they sought 70 From 1925 the rules had included the following: "Daily re­ ligious instruction should however be provided in all schools under Buddhist lay managers." Manual of Vernacular Education Rules, Superintendent, Government Printing and Stationery, Ran­ goon, 1929, p. 8. 71 Report of the Committee Appointed by the Government to Consider the Syllabus in Buddhist Religious Instruction for Ver­ nacular and Anglo-Vernacular Schools, Superintendent, Govern­ ment Printing and Stationery, Rangoon, 1934, p. 2.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

admission they must be prepared to accept the entire curriculum of studies. In any event, there were extremely few conversions from Buddhism to Christianity as a re­ sult of such religious instruction. The government was involved in this form of religious coercion in two ways. First, all of the mission schools received sizable grants-in-aid from the government. The mission schools had to comply with certain education department regulations in order to qualify for the grants, but these regulations placed no restrictions on the ar­ rangements for religious instruction. Second, it was the policy of the department to refrain from opening govern­ ment Anglo-vernacular schools in one-school areas where mission schools were already established. While the de­ partment's object was to avoid competition with private educational agencies, one of the results was that the Buddhist parent had no alternative to sending his child to the mission school, where instruction in Christianity was compulsory.72 From time to time inspecting officers recommended the enactment of a "conscience clause" to remove this element of coercion and to provide for freedom of con­ science. In 1920 the government adopted a conscience clause which was applied to one-school areas and later to all areas. Among the rules for government recognition and grants-in-aid to privately managed schools the fol­ lowing was inserted: "It shall not be required as a con­ dition of the admission or retention of any pupil that he shall attend or abstain from attending any religious observance or instruction."73 In 1930 pongyi politicians led the organized opposition to the teaching of Christian­ ity to Buddhist students in the mission high schools of Rangoon. While technically the students' participation in 72

Report on Public Instruction in Burma, Fifth Quinquennial Report, 1912-1917, p. 11. 73 Manual of Vernacular Education Rules, p. 8.

η

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

these classes was not compulsory, the pressures to con­ form were probably considerable. The government in 1931 changed the form of the conscience clause to make it more effective.74 THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN BtTRMA

We have noted above that the religious policies of the British government in India reflected the diverse roles which it had to assume. The commercial-imperial role of the East India Company led logically to its policy of religious neutrality, but its role as an Indian ruler imposed upon it the duty of patronizing and regulating religious institutions. Still a third role was imposed on the company by an act of Parliament, namely, that of a Christian government. In 1813, when Parliament renewed the company's charter, it provided for an Anglican eccle­ siastical establishment in India. The bishop of Calcutta, appointed by the crown and paid from the public reve­ nues of India, formed the visible link between the Church of England and the Government of India. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Burma was vested in the bishop of Calcutta until 1877 when the see of Rangoon was created. Half of the Rangoon bishop's salary was paid by the government and half was provided through an endowment raised by the diocese of Winchester and the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. The jurisdiction of the bishop of Rangoon extended over the whole of Burma. He was appointed by the secretary of 74 Cady, A History of Modern Burma, pp. 306-307. The follow­ ing was incorporated in the education rules. "All schools which require the attendance of non-Christian pupils at Christian religious instruction or worship without having first obtained the consent of their parents, must make it known to all parents and pupils that exemption can be obtained if parents desire it." This was followed by regulations regarding public notices on the school premises and other procedures to make the conscience clause effective. Report on Public Instruction in Burma, 1930-1931, p. 29.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

state for India and held his position by virtue of letters patent from the crown. Under the bishop there were one archdeacon (with special responsibilities for the care of government cemeteries) and four chaplains. The primary function of this small ecclesiastical estab­ lishment of six Anglican clergymen was to minister to the spiritual needs of British civil and military personnel in Burma. Because the number of government chaplains was insufficient for the province, government allowances were given to the metropolitan bishop of Calcutta for the provision of additional clergy. Under this system ten clergymen in Burma received grants-in-aid; the rest of their maintenance was met by voluntary contributions.75 Under the Government of Burma Act of 1935, ecclesiasti­ cal affairs were a "reserved subject" personally controlled by the governor. While the work of the government chaplains was al­ most entirely with British personnel and not directly related to missionary work, the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the bishop of Rangoon extended over all Anglican clergy and laity in Burma. In this sense the bishop was the head of the Anglican missionary agencies such as the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and the Church Missionary Society. The Burman Anglican churches which resulted from this missionary work were directly under the bishop's spiritual authority, and the ordination of Burman clergy could only be performed by him. The bishop of Rangoon, partly paid by the British govern­ ment, was in this way involved in propagating Christian­ ity among the Buddhists of Burma. The official status of the Church of England, however, could not be considered a very important part of the reli­ gious policy of the British government in Burma. It was, 75 Report on the Administration of Burma, 1931-1932, Superin­ tendent, Government Printing and Stationery, Rangoon, p. 159.

RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF BRITISH RULE

to be sure, an anomaly in the light of the British pro­ fession of religious neutrality, but its significance was not great. Anglicans had some influence as a result of the connection of their church with the government, but always remained a small communion. Of the 331,000 Christians in Burma in 1931, Baptists accounted for 64 per cent, Roman Catholics 27 per cent, and Anglicans only 7 per cent.76 Under the Indian Chvtrch Act, the Church of India, Burma, and Ceylon severed its legal connection with the Government of India and ceased to be an established church in 1930. ft ft ft ft ft

As one reviews the salient points of British religious policy in Burma, it is clear that there was no deliberate effort to disrupt the Buddhist religion of the country. In the legal recognition of the Sangha hierarchy (however incomplete and unsatisfactory to the Buddhists), in the efforts to base primary education on the monastic schools, in the continuation of the Pali examinations, and in the introduction of Buddhist religious instruction in govern­ ment schools, the British government revealed considera­ ble awareness of the importance of Buddhism in Burmese life and a willingness to promote it, within the limits of a vaguely defined policy of religious neutrality. The decline of Buddhism which undoubtedly occurred was more the result of the social, economic, political, and intellectual upheaval brought about by the sudden confrontation with the West than of government policies dealing specifically with religion. In such policies the British government in Burma was far less "secular" than it was in India. 76 John

Leroy Christian, Modern Burma, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1942, pp. 205-207.

CHAPTER 3

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM MODERN phenomenon of nationalism in the West has its roots deep in the past. It is useful, in fact, to think in terms of a traditional nationalism which grad­ ually developed in England and France in the medieval period. In England early political unification, the evolu­ tion of the English language, the isolation of the island from the continent, and long struggles against foreign powers all combined to create a sense of cohesion and separateness from other lands. Modern nationalism did not emerge until the second half of the eighteenth cen­ tury. With the French Revolution came the idea of the nation as the whole people, the nation as the object of ultimate political loyalty, the nation as endowed with an inalienable right to self-determination and separate state­ hood. Traditional and modern nationalism alike have contained closely interrelated positive and negative ele­ ments. The sense of cohesion of a group of people united by a common race, language, religion, culture, territory, and history has frequently become strong only through the belief that the nation was threatened by an external enemy which was different in at least some of these respects. Nationalist sentiment is based on the group consciousness of "what we are" and "what we are not." The positive national identity has meaning only because of its self-differentiating character. RJ-HE

TRADITIONAL BURMESE NATIONALISM

In striking contrast to the history of India, a traditional nationalism did develop among the Burmese. With the

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

establishment of Anawrahta's kingdom at Pagan in the eleventh century A.D. the Burmese consolidated their military and political supremacy over the other ethnic groups inhabiting the area. The territorial boundaries of the Burmese kingdom expanded or contracted with the varying fortunes of successive dynasties, but the central area of present-day Burma has been inhabited and ruled by Burmese since Anawrahta's time. The Burmese had a fierce kind of national pride which enabled them to look with contempt upon other peoples, Mons, Shans, Kachins, Karens, Indians, and Chinese alike. A distinctive lan­ guage, a common ethnic identity, some degree of political centralization, a shared history, a territorial base, the proximity of different and frequently hostile peoples, all contributed to the development of traditional Burmese nationalism. Buddhism was another component, and one of the utmost importance, in this traditional nationalism. The point has been well made that, of the three major reli­ gions of South and Southeast Asia, both Hinduism and Islam had certain characteristics which militated against their fostering a spirit of nationalism. Hinduism empha­ sized the institution of caste and thus promoted loyalty to a group that was much smaller than the potential nation, while a universalist Islam with the caliphate promoted loyalty to a religio-political institution which far tran­ scended the limits of the potential nation.1 Hinduism and Islam became vital focal points of nationalist sentiment only in the modern period, in the struggle against the imperialism of Christian European powers. Theravada 1 Hting

Aung, "Commentary," in Philip W. Thayer, ed., Na­ tionalism and Progress in Free Asia, Johns Hopkins Press, Balti­ more, 1956, pp. 84-85. For a useful comparative study of the role of religion in nationalist movements, see Fred R. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1963, which discusses nationalism in Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

Buddhism, on the other hand, emphasized neither class nor supranational loyalties, and readily lent itself to the development of traditional nationalism, especially in Burma and Ceylon. It has been suggested that the Burmese profession of Buddhism was merely a negative factor in this develop­ ment, that it allowed nationalism to evolve unhindered.2 But the evidence is overwhelming that in many different ways Buddhism became a powerful positive component in traditional Burmese nationalism. The founding of the first Burmese dynasty in the eleventh century coincided with the establishment of Buddhism as the state religion. The king was revered as the chief promoter of the faith and indeed as a future Buddha. Burmese architecture found its chief expression in the building of pagodas, especially in the glorious wonder of Pagan, the first capi­ tal. The Burmese language was strongly influenced by Pali, the language of the Buddhist scriptures, and many of the best writers in Burmese were monks. The monks were teachers of the youth in virtually every Burmese village and, consciously or unconsciously, an agency of social control inculcating an attitude of reverence for the king and customary law. Buddhism was undoubtedly the most important integrative influence in Burmese society and culture. A saying frequently repeated in modern Burma is: "To be a Burman is to be a Buddhist." This is an expression of the Burmese national identity as under­ stood by the Burmese themselves, and draws upon tradi­ tional nationalist attitudes rooted in nine centuries of history. Writing in 1922, a discerning observer asserted: "The Burmese people cannot think of nationality apart from the religion that they hold, for it is Buddhism which has welded the Burmese together and the idea of nationhood owes its inception to Buddhism."3 2 8

Hting Aung, loc.cit. Burma Observer, July 24, 1922.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

It is quite inaccurate, then, to think of Burmese na­ tionalism simply in terms of a reaction to British rule some decades after its imposition,, a reaction led by middle-class politicians who had to some extent appro­ priated western values, ideologies, and techniques. The British were the last of a long series of external enemies which threatened Old Burma. A xenophobic traditionalist society girded up its loins and sought to protect itself with all its resources, material and spiritual. The important components of traditional Burmese na­ tionalism, and especially Buddhism, were clearly revealed in King Thibaw's proclamation of 1885 issued just before the outbreak of the Third Anglo-Burman War. "To the Headmen of all towns and villages . . . and all subjects and inhabitants of the royal territories: Those heretics, the English barbarians, having most harshly made de­ mands likely to impair and destroy our religion, violate our national customs and degrade our race, are making a display and preparation as if about to wage war against our state . . . if these heretic barbarians should come and attempt to molest or disturb the state in any way, His Majesty the King, watchful that the interests of religion and of the state shall not suffer, will himself march forth . . . and with the might of his army will efface these heretic barbarians and conquer and annex their country. To uphold the religion, to uphold the national honor, and to uphold the country's interests will bring about three­ fold good; good of our religion; good of our Master; and good of ourselves, and will gain for us the notable result of placing us in the path to the celestial regions and to Nirvana, the eternal rest."4 The British victory was fol­ lowed by the abolition of the Burmese monarchy, a national and religious symbol in which Buddhism and the semidivine protector of the faith were fused together. 4 E. C. V. Foucar, They Reigned in Mandalay, Dennis Dobson, London, 1946, pp. 133-134.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

The consequences of this rash act surprised only the British. In 1886-1887 an utterly unprecedented phenome­ non was observed in many places throughout both Upper and Lower Burma. Buddhist monks dressed in their yellow robes led bands of armed rebels against the vic­ torious British forces.5 In the anti-colonial struggle, the pongyis were the first nationalists. A good case could be made for the proposition that Indian nationalism was a product of British rule. In Burma there was clearly an indigenous, traditionalist pat­ tern of nationalism. The political, economic, social, reli­ gious, and cultural changes wrought by British rule were overwhelming and sometimes devastating. But part of the nationalist response to that rule must be understood in terms of the traditional nationalism described above, not in terms of new social forces created or released by foreign rule itself. There is very little in the sacred texts of Buddhism to give positive support to any kind of nationalism. Unlike Hinduism and Islam, Buddhism developed no substantial body of political theory. Doctrinal Buddhism did not include such concepts as state, nation, race, or history, and indeed interpreted human existence in terms which made these ideas irrelevant and meaningless. Man's fundamental problem lay in his being chained to the wheel of rebirth, and his salvation lay in freeing himself from the desire inherent in all worldly striving and in extricating himself from history. Doctrinal Buddhism would appear to offer no support to the mobilization of militant resistance against an ex­ ternal enemy. The Buddha preached a message of peace and compassion toward all sentient beings. He rejected violence, and the prohibition on killing was one of his Five Precepts. This was interpreted to forbid the killing 5

John F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1958, pp. 130, 137, 139-140.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

of all animal life as well as human beings. Could a pacifist Buddhism ever inspire a militant nationalism? Ideologi­ cally, no. By contrast, Islam had the concept of dar-ulharh (abode of war), a land ruled over by non-Muslims against whom a holy war could be launched for the glory of the faith. Also by way of contrast, the Bhagavad Gita of Hinduism taught that the warrior who kills in battlefulfils his dharma (divinely ordained duty), a principle which was effectively used by the nationalist Tilak to justify terrorism against the British. Buddhism did not supply ideas to support the tradi­ tional Burmese nationalism discussed above. Rather, it provided an essential component in the nationalist selfconcept which helped to differentiate the Burmese from the foreigner. Thus, in King Thibaw's proclamation, the English were the 'lieretic barbarians" who threatened the Burmese' religion, national customs, and race. Thi­ baw's assertion that defense of Buddhism and the old order would lead to Nirvana was a natural use of religion in the interest of group self-preservation, but it would have been impossible to justify it in terms of the Buddha's doctrine. The limited usefulness of Buddhism in the de­ velopment of a nationalist ideology meant that the rich source of powerful sentiment found in the depths of pop­ ular religious devotion would sooner or later be tapped in other ways. RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS AS NATIONALIST ISSUES

The Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) was organized in 1906 by a group of laymen who clearly saw the futility of the traditional nationalist response to the challenge of the West. The Sangha's blind lashing out against the foreign intruder who threatened the old order could only fail; it was necessary to come to terms with the West. The founders of the YMBA were western-edu­ cated, middle-class Burmans who wished to preserve

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

certain distinctive values of their Burmese Buddhist her­ itage and found that a western Christian institution, the YMCA, provided a useful organizational pattern by which this could be done. During the first decade of its existence the YMBA concerned itself only with religious, social, and cultural questions: adherence to the Five Precepts, edu­ cation (religious and secular), social reform, the encour­ agement of art and literature. Early attempts to divert the organization toward political objectives were unsuc­ cessful.® In 1916, however, the YMBA was thrust into the center of the political arena when its criticism of British reli­ gious policy created a nationalist issue, the first serious issue to be raised by modern Burmese nationalism. It concerned the practice of Europeans in Burma of wearing shoes while walking on pagoda premises, contrary to the Buddhist custom which required the removal of footwear. British official policy long assumed that Europeans had some kind of right to ignore Buddhist feelings on this matter, and was reversed only after a powerful agitation had crystallized Burmese nationalist sentiment. The agitation was led by U Thein Maung, a lawyer from Prome, and the fifty branches of the YMBA quickly took up the issue of the alleged insult to Buddhism. An All Burma Conference of Buddhists met at Jubilee Hall in Rangoon in 1916 and sent a memorial to the govern­ ment demanding that the customary rule against the use of footwear on pagoda platforms be recognized legally. The controversy became intense, and the government banned further public discussion of the issue. The gov­ ernment's stated justification for this action was that the war was then at a critical phase and that the ban was necessary in the interests of public tranquility. However, 6 N. C. Sen, A Peep into Burma Politics, Kitabistan, Allahabad, 1945, pp. 7-8; von der Mehden, pp. 7-8, 32-33.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

the government's refusal to concede the Buddhist de­ mands at that time, which it could easily have done, served only to intensify nationalist sentiment. In 19181919 new memorials were drafted by U Thein Maung and other leaders of the "no footwear" agitation.7 While the leadership of the movement was provided by Buddhist laymen, members of the Sangha felt no less deeply about the matter and made their own contribu­ tion. The much revered Ledi Sayadaw published a 95page book in Burmese entitled On the Impropriety of Wearing Shoes on Pagoda Platforms, which helped to provide the religious authority for the Burmese position.8 Other monks were unwilling to confine themselves to the writing of pamphlets. On October 4, 1919, a group of Europeans (including several women) wearing shoes at the Eindawya pagoda in Mandalay was violently attacked by angry pongyis. Four monks were later arrested, tried, and convicted for perpetrating the attack. The leader, U Kettaya, was convicted of attempted murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.9 One month after this violent assault the government of Burma published a lengthy resolution on the subject of footwear at pagodas. It praised the traditional tolerance of Buddhism and its lofty ethical principles. "Christians of all degrees recognize and admire in the founder of the Buddhist religion one of the greatest Teachers of humanity that the world has produced."10 The resolution pointed out that Europeans wearing shoes had no desire to offend the Buddhists, and that previously no question had been raised over the matter. Extensive correspond­ ence with the governments of Ceylon and Siam had 7

Rangoon Gazette Weekly Budget, November 3, 1919. Ledi Sayadaw, Zediyingana Wineiksaya Kyan, Mingala Times Press, Rangoon, 1920. 9 Rangoon Gazette Weekly Budget, October 27, 1919, and March 15, 1920. 10 Ibid., November 3, 1919. 8

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

established the fact that no objection was raised to the European practice of wearing shoes at pagodas in those countries. It was pointed out that, for the Englishman, the proper way to show respect was by removing his hat, not his shoes, and that to do the latter would be regarded as disrespectful in his country. The government resolu­ tion sought at every point to disprove the assertions made by the Burmese memorials, but finally conceded the major demand. In future it would be left up to the man­ agers and trustees of each pagoda to lay down rules. The exclusion from pagodas of Europeans who found it im­ possible to conform to the Burmese custom after all these years "must be regarded as an unfriendly act, but one to which they have no inherent right to demur." There was, however, one exception. The government reserved the right to send soldiers, police, or magistrates into pagodas when necessary to maintain public order without ham­ pering their movements by the removal of shoes. By its former uncompromising attitude the government had undoubtedly played into the hands of the national­ ists. The official position itself was peculiarly vulnerable, for it denied the professed policy of religious neutrality and non-interference in the internal religious affairs of the Buddhists. By its initial refusal to grant discretion to pagoda trustees to establish rules for pagoda entry, the government had placed itself in an untenable position. The final capitulation was painful to die-hard colonial officers, who were acutely conscious of the loss of face. A British paper in Rangoon editorialized: "No European, unless a cheap notoriety hunter, even if he faced the filth of the average pagoda platform would put up with the discomfort of walking unshod or reconcile himself to the feeling of disrespect entailed by the casting aside of so essential a portion of his usual attire."11 This nationalist victory did not end the matter, how11

Ibid., November 10, 1919.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

ever, for controversy continued over the exception speci­ fied in the government's resolution. The government re­ fused to yield on this point, and public notices stating the exception to the no-footwear rule were posted promi­ nently side by side with the trustees' notices.12 In 1921 a meeting of the Buddhist associations of Rangoon dis­ cussed the Prince of Wales' forthcoming visit to Burma and speculated on whether he might attempt to visit the Shwedagon pagoda dressed in his military uniform and thus claim exemption from the rule.13 However, it was later announced that he would not visit the pagoda. Indeed, almost no British visitors or residents were will­ ing to give the Burmese the satisfaction of observing their shoeless humiliation at pagodas down to World War II. This ostensibly religious issue became the first impor­ tant expression of anti-British political sentiment after the pacification of Upper Burma. According to Professor Cady: "The primary role played by religious considera­ tions in the emergence of naissant Burmese nationalism can be attributed to the fact that religion afforded the only universally acceptable symbol to represent an ac­ cumulation of grievances, economic, social, and psycho­ logical, which were as yet for the most part inarticulate and incapable of direct political exploitation."14 The most basic source of nationalist resentment was the simple fact that the Burmese, a proud race which gloried in its religion and culture, were ruled over by kalas (a con­ temptuous term for foreigners). British policies which directly or indirectly seemed to indicate lack of respect for Buddhism (for the pagodas, the monks, the Sangha hierarchy, the monastic schools, the Teaching itself) thus easily became nationalist issues. The footwear controversy produced the greatest up12 Ibid., June 13 and 20, 1921. « Ibid., August 29, 1921. " Cady, p. 190.

90

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

surge of nationalist sentiment, but other religious ques­ tions were also of some political importance. As noted in the preceding chapter, after the annexation of Upper Burma the British government refused to take steps to enforce the decisions of the Buddhist primate, the thathanabaing, on the ground that this would constitute interference in religious affairs. This refusal was deeply resented by the Buddhists, many of whom could see only a deliberate attempt by a Christian government to promote the disintegration of the Sangha. In 1914 the YMBA began to press for the extension of the thathanabaing's ecclesiastical jurisdiction to Lower Burma. Me­ morials were submitted to the government in 1917 and 1919, a committee appointed by the lieutenant governor in 1920 reported favorably on the proposal, and the gov­ ernment accepted its recommendations.15 But the con­ cession came too late. One nationalist wrote that if such a measure had been enacted ten years earlier, it would have been "hailed with delight." But now, "after the events of the great war, while the cries of democracy, self-determination, and the upheaval of economic enter­ prises are still ringing in the ears of Burmans, it falls flat "1β The government's educational policy regarding mo­ nastic schools was constantly under fire. The critics charged that it was the government's fault that it had not been able to secure the cooperation of the monks. It was even alleged that the government had "destroyed" the indigenous system of monastic schools in order to replace it with a network of government and Christian missionary schools. While very few educated people really believed in the superiority of the indigenous schools, this conviction was loudly affirmed, and Burmese 15 Rangoon Gazette Weekly Budget, February 24, 1919, April 19, 1920, and December 6, 1920. 18 Ibid., July 5, 1920.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

nationalists called for "the restoration of our own edu­ cational system of free primary education through the medium of our religious teachers, the pongyis"17 U OTTAMA AND THE POLITICAL MONKS

The westernized, middle-class leadership of the YMBA was undermined by its very success in attracting mass support for its religio-nationalist demands in the footwear controversy. The General Council of Buddhist Associa­ tions, which grew out of the YMBA movement, gave way to the General Council of Burmese Associations in 1920. Despite the change in name from "Buddhist" to "Bur­ mese," the leadership of the new organization was less westernized, more traditionalist, and more in touch with the masses. This orientation inevitably involved a deeper respect for the authority of the pongyi and a willingness to accept his collaboration and even leadership in politi­ cal causes. According to Professor von der Mehden: "In Burma, pongyi power became so great on the constitu­ ency level during the 1920's that candidates had to be cleared with the Sangha associations, a pongyi was man­ ager of a major party paper, and two pongyis became auditors of the finances of the General Council of Bur­ mese Associations, Burma's largest political party of the time."18 The political monk became a major factor in the devel­ opment of Burmese nationalism as a popular movement. The pongyi was the one major symbol of the old Burmese order which survived the events of 1885-1886. The British had destroyed the traditional monarchy with one stroke, but by 1920 it was clear that foreign rule was also rapidly eroding the status and prestige of the monk. There was no place for him in the new western-oriented social hier­ archy, his educational functions were assumed by other 17

Loc.cit.

18 Von

der Mehden, pp. 121-122.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

agencies, an unknown foreign language prevented him from understanding what was going on, and westernized Burmese laymen increasingly regarded him as irrelevant to modern life. Of all sections of Burmese society, the pongyis had the strongest reasons for hating the British and became the most uncompromising nationalists. Various relationships and circumstances combined to maximize the pongyis' political role. First, the breakdown of ecclesiastical authority meant that the Sangha was no longer capable of exercising effective internal discipline, however much the elders of the order might deplore the contravention of Vinaya regulations through the political activities of the younger monks. Ironically, the British refusal to give firm support to the Sangha hierarchy in 1886 now resulted in the emergence of a substantial number of militantly anti-British political monks who were free to carry on their nationalist activities. Second, there was a vacuum of political leadership at the village level arising from the near monopoly of overt nationalist leadership by the westernized urban elite. The pongyis, already recognized as village leaders, moved in to fill this vacuum. Third, the monks enjoyed relative immunity from gov­ ernmental control. It is true that some monks were ar­ rested and sentenced to imprisonment, but these were very few in proportion to those who participated in anti-government activities. It was difficult and embarrass­ ing for the government to prosecute Buddhist monks in view of the widespread popular indignation which this invariably aroused. Political parties, labor unions, or stu­ dent organizations could be curbed or even banned, but what government could attempt to interfere with pongyi associations, even though some of these were predomi­ nantly political in orientation? The British found them­ selves trapped by their own stated policy of non-interference in religious matters.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

Fourth, the monks had little or nothing to lose, and hence could afford to indulge in irresponsible extremist attacks on the British government. Moderation is a qual­ ity which is little appreciated in most nationalist move­ ments, and pongyi extremism attracted many admirers. Many of the leading politicians among the Buddhist laity were members of the legislative council after 1922, and parliamentary politics imposed a certain discipline of its own. The political monks, of course, were subject to no restraints of this nature. The pongyis had no jobs, families, or material possessions which might be jeopard­ ized by extremist politics, and so there was little need for moderation. Furthermore, tradition-oriented monks suffered from none of the ambivalences which tortured some of the westernized nationalists, many of whom were culturally and psychologically torn between East and West. Fifth, the monks' high social prestige (one of the Three Gems, the Sangha was entitled to adoration) and their traditional role in society as teachers and advisers gave the pongyis unique advantages once they decided to put their influence to political use. Finally, the monks had that essential element in political effectiveness, or­ ganization. Hundreds of pongyis lived together in kyaungtaiks (clusters of monasteries) in the cities and larger towns and could be mobilized on short notice for a public meeting, procession, or demonstration. At least one or two pongyis resided in virtually every village of Burma; the Sangha had a network of local units which no political party could match. Pongyi associations were quickly formed to carry on political work in close collabo­ ration with the GCBA (General Council of Burmese Associations). The monks were thus in a uniquely advantageous position to participate actively in nationalist politics.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

Nevertheless, the emergence of the political pongyi in the 1920's came as a great shock to many, British and Burmese alike. Fielding-Hall, a close observer of the Burmese scene, had written at the turn of the century: "No one can imagine even in the far future any monk of the Buddha desiring temporal power, or interfering in any way with the government of the people." Like many others, Fielding-Hall erred by drawing logical inferences from Buddhist doctrine instead of analyzing the political potentialities of the Sangha itself. His line of reasoning: "There is no hierarchy in Buddhism: it is a religion of absolute freedom. No one can damn you except yourself; no one can save you except yourself. Governments can­ not do it, and therefore it would be useless to try and capture the reins of government, even if you did not destroy your own soul in so doing."19 But new interpre­ tations can always be devised to rationalize change. As a religious question (the footwear controversy) became the first nationalist issue, so a religious leader, the monk U Ottama, became the first popular nationalist hero and martyr.20 U Ottama had lived in India for some time, had served as president of the Hindu Mahasabha, and was intimately acquainted with Indian National Congress politics. He returned to Burma in 1921 bringing with him the inspiration and techniques of Gandhi's noncooperation movement. U Ottama's unusual background and experience en­ abled him to combine a traditionalist Burmese Buddhist nationalism with a broader outlook which interpreted the Burmese and Indian struggles against the British as essen­ tially one nationalist movement. The emphasis varied with the situation. In 1921 U Ottama made several speeches in which he made full use of his presumed 18

Harold Fielding-Hall, The Soul of a People, Richard Bentley and Son, London, 1898, pp. 104-105. 20 See Cady, pp. 231-232, 250-253; von der Mehden, pp. 134136.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

religious authority as a member of the Sangha. In these "sermons" he conceded that if the Buddha were alive he would not preach on political topics but on Nirvana. However, in the light of the Burmese enslavement to the British, the people should not ask for Nirvana yet. "When Lord Buddha was alive, man had a predilection for Nirvana. There is nothing left now. The reason why it is so is because the government is English." Nirvana is release from cosmic slavery (the wheel of rebirth), but it cannot be attained by those who do not even enjoy earthly freedom. "Pongyis pray for Nirvana but slaves can never obtain it, therefore they must pray for release from slavery in this life."21 U Ottama accused the British of debasing the Burmese religion and culture and of corrupting the people's mor­ als. Under foreign rule, he charged, there were many opium eaters, thieves, dacoits, and drunkards, but it was not so in the days of the Burmese kings. How could the national religion and national education possibly prosper under foreign rule? The monk has lost the patronage of the state, and why should he not fight to prevent the total destruction of his religion? The lieutenant governor, Sir Reginald Craddock, declared in 1922 that in entering the field of militant politics the monk was sacrificing "the veneration of the ages for the nine days' applause of a gaping multitude." U Ottama replied bitterly that the prestige of the monk had been steadily declining since the beginning of British rule and as a direct result of British policies. Out of taxes paid by Buddhists, mis­ sionaries of an alien religion are being paid and fed and provided for while the monk is being deprived of his natural living."22 21 Rangoon Gazette Weekly Budget, July 11 and September 19, 1921. 22 "Reception to U Ottama: Speech at Jubilee Hall," Supple­ ment to New Burma, July 5, 1922.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

While U Ottama carefully insisted that rebellion was not the method to achieve Home Rule, since the British were far too powerful, the use of violence was not re­ jected in principle and was in fact given religious sanc­ tion. He cited the story (from the Jataka tales) of the Prince of Evil, Devadat, who was king of the buffaloes. To preserve his rule, he killed every male buffalo at birth. The Embryo Buddha, however, was secretly born in the jungle to one of the female buffaloes, who in­ structed him to stay in hiding until his hoof prints were as big as those of his father, Devadat. When this time came, the Embryo Buddha rose and killed him. Then only did peace reign in the land. U Ottama pointed out that the British government took care to keep the Bur­ mese' hoofs pared. He urged non-payment of taxes, the boycott, and other Gandhian techniques, but the possible use of revolutionary violence was also clearly implied in his message.23 Many of U Ottama's political speeches had little dis­ tinctively Buddhist content. In much the same manner as the lay politicians, he exposed the delusion of dyarchy in his 1922 speeches. He commented on the views of other politicians and newspaper editors and referred to his status as a monk only to disparage his political op­ ponents. The people worshipped and adored the pongyis, he declared, because they taught the way to Nirvana. The dyarchists, on the other hand, talked at the top of their voices, but would not part with the company of their wives. U Ottama was careful not to allow Buddhist religious appeals to become a divisive force in the antiBritish movement. He spoke in Hindustani frequently and urged the unity of the Muslims, Hindus, and Bud­ dhists. Burmans and Indians are friends and brethren, he declared. The Lord Buddha was an Indian, and the 23 Rangoon Gazette Weekly Budget, July 11 and September 19, 1921.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

Burmese had learned much from the nationalist move­ ment in India. He supported the Muslim Khilafat agita­ tion, as this was simply another facet of the struggle between European imperialism and Asian nationalism.24 U Ottama was arrested in 1921 on a charge of attempt­ ing to excite disaffection toward the government of Brit­ ish India. He was tried by a Burmese magistrate, con­ victed, and sentenced to twenty months' imprisonment.25 U Ottama's conviction was the spark which ignited sullen discontent into fiery anti-British passion. Hartal (the closing of all shops and businesses) was declared for one day by the GCBA and various Indian associations and was observed throughout the city of Rangoon with few exceptions. Mass meetings were held at the Shwedagon pagoda, and nationalist sayadaws, moulvis, and swamis addressed the mixed gathering, condemning the government and recording their appreciation of the "valuable services" rendered by U Ottama to the coun­ try.26 "A true Buddhist" in a letter to the editor de­ nounced U Ottama and others "who go about in the guise of monks preaching sedition in open defiance of Vinaya rules and who now in order to pose as martyrs court arrest and imprisonment in spite of repeated warnings."27 But the writer did not dare to sign his name to this letter! To most Burmese, the first martyr to the nationalist cause was sent to prison for defending Buddhism and the Bur­ mese nation. Released in 1922, U Ottama was again in jail from 1924 until 1927, and from 1928 until his death in 1939. But his influence on Burmese nationalism was 24 See Boycott of the Council, a speech delivered at the GCBA meeting on July 15, 1922, and U Ottama at Mandalay, a speech delivered two weeks later, Rangoon Daily News, Ltd., Rangoon, 1922. 25 On appeal the conviction was confirmed by a British judge, but the sentence was reduced to one year's imprisonment. 26 Rangoon Gazette Weekly Budget, March 21, July 11, and 18, 1921. 27 Ibid., July 25, 1921.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

great, far greater than would be suggested by his brief periods of political activity. U Ottama captured the pop­ ular imagination to a degree not approached by any other nationalist figure of the 1920's. PONGYI POLITICAL METHODS

Most of the pongyi politicians were extremists, and their anti-British propaganda was frequently characterized by utter irresponsibility. U Thawbita, a traveling preacher of the Sangha Sametggi Society, told his village audiences that in that year (1923) the government would demand the capitation tax from unmarried girls as well as from heads of households. Out of those girls who could not pay the tax, the government would take twenty-five from each village and send them to Mesopotamia, where they would be compelled to cohabit with soldiers until each had three sons, who would eventually be put into the army. The girls would then be sterilized and forced to work as nurses in a hospital. Furthermore, he intimated that the British government planned to levy a tax on all who worshipped at pagodas, the tax varying in amount with the importance of the pagoda. If the people did not worship at pagodas because of the tax, the government would then destroy them and dig mines at the sites, on the pretense that mineral ore had been found. U Thaw­ bita was convicted of sedition under section 124A of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to eighteen months' rigorous imprisonment.28 Another monk, U Tiloka, admonished the villagers to refuse to pay land revenue and capitation taxes. When the headman came to collect these taxes, the people should break his two legs and throw him into the water. By refusing to pay, the Burmese would obtain Home Rule quickly. He usually concluded his speeches by ask­ ing all who accepted his preaching to say "Sadhu" ("It is 28

Ibid., September 3, 1923.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

good"). The audience would thereupon exclaim "Sadhu" three times. U Maung Ba, the sessions judge who con­ ducted the monk's trial, declared in his judgment: "I think a deterrent sentence is called for. It is in the interest of the state as well as of the Buddhist religion—the principal religion of the country—that Buddhist monks should be deterred from meddling with politics and cre­ ating trouble in the land, and the laity should be dis­ couraged from making use of the monks as political agitators. It is a most painful duty for a Buddhist to send a Buddhist monk to jail but . . . I have no alternative."29 This pongyi was also sentenced to eighteen months' rigorous imprisonment. During the turbulent period of 1921-1923 a number of pongyi nationalists were sent to prison for having made seditious speeches,30 and the government's treatment of monks in jail became in itself an issue of some impor­ tance. The executive committee of the All Burma Sangha Council met with the chief secretary to government to demand that pongyis be exempt from handcuffing, that they not be required to wear jail clothing, that they be allowed to receive food and religious books from outside, and that facilities be provided to enable them to keep the sabbath in accordance with Buddhist monastic prac­ tice. The government used this meeting to extract a promise from the leaders of the Sangha Council that they would call in all members of the organization then en­ gaged in political propaganda and by a course of lectures instruct them not to come into conflict with the law. In reply to the council's demands, an official letter stated: "The treatment of pongyis in jail must necessarily be decided upon the intrinsic merits of the case, and in the ordinary way no pongyi can claim to be given any privi29 Ibid., June 25, 1923. 30 Ibid., July 4, 1921, May 15, 1922, February 26, and July 16, 1923.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

leges except those which are ordinarily accorded other persons." However, the lieutenant governor, Sir Reginald Craddock, did agree to one special concession. Monks in prison were to be allowed to keep the sabbath twice a month in a temporary thein consisting of an open space ten feet by ten feet marked off by temporary posts.31 Sangha political organizations in 1921 described their objectives in the following terms: (1) to promote national unity among the Burmans; (2) to substitute arbitration for litigation in the courts in minor civil and criminal cases; (3) to boycott foreign goods; (4) to promote abstinence from liquor and other intoxicants; and (5) to establish national schools.32 These objectives revealed the powerful influence of Gandhi's non-cooperation move­ ment. It should be noted, however, that several of them were also closely related to traditional concerns of the Sangha in Burma. Boycott of the civil courts was one way of defying the British authority and would result in the government's loss of stamp revenue. But the proposed substitute for litigation—arbitration—was also a tradi­ tional function of the monk which might be restored. The drinking of liquor and other intoxicants was an evil prac­ tice introduced by the foreigners. To persuade people to give up this habit would be to reduce the amount of excise revenue flowing into the coffers of government, restore the traditional Buddhist value of total abstinence (one of the Five Precepts), and reestablish the Sangha's public authority as the defender of morality. The estab­ lishment of national schools would bring an end to the "slave education" which was oriented around western culture and Christian values and restore the monk to his traditional role as the teacher of youth.33 31

32 Ibid., July 4, 1921. national school movement was a dismal failure, but brought the monks into nationalist politics in unprecedented num­ bers. See Cady, pp. 217-221.

Ibid., June 12, 1922.

33 The

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

A discerning observer wrote in 1922: "The rushing tide of foreign influences, the increase in the store of modern learning had gradually weaned the people away from the pongyi. He had gone out-of-date, old-fashioned, archaic, at best a living past, and the slackening of his influence was everywhere apparent. . . . Then came the national movement basing itself on unity, using every available resource at its command, and some pongyis thought that they could once more strive to win back their waning glory."34 To a large extent, the pongyi political movement was a resurgence of the traditional Burmese nationalism discussed earlier. The ultimate goal of the movement was "Home Rule," a term borrowed from India, but given an entirely different meaning by the traditionalist elements of Burmese society. In a letter to the editor one Burmese politician pointed out: "Many pongyis have an idea that Home Rule means an inde­ pendent kingdom with a Burmese king and Burmese ministers."85 The basic objective was the restoration of the old order in which king and Sangha supported each other and in which the moral influence of the monk in society was unchallenged. There were some interesting peculiarities in the monks' interpretation and use of the boycott as a political weapon. U Ottama and other extremist pongyi politicians joined Tharrawaddy U Pu in urging the GCBA to boycott elections to the legislative council under the Burma Re­ forms Act of 1922.86 Among Buddhist laymen in politics the question was debated in terms of strategy: would the attainment of Home Rule be delayed or hastened by contesting elections and participating in the legislative council? But other considerations strongly predisposed the pongyi to reject the reforms. Parliamentary institu34

Burma Observer, July 24, 1922. Rangoon Gazette Weekly Budget, July 31, 1922. 36 Ibid., July 24, 1922.

35

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

tions were of foreign origin and little understood, and, most important, they provided no scope for the func­ tioning of the pongyi politician himself. Not even the most radical political monk could openly contest elec­ tions; this would be going too far and in 1936 was for­ bidden by law. It was clear that the monk excelled in the field of agitational politics, where his natural advan­ tages lay, and any development which tended to shift the center of attention and power to the legislative cham­ ber inevitably meant a diminution of his influence. The boycott of the 1922 elections was very effective; less than 7 per cent of the eligible electorate voted. The pongyis' political effectiveness was illustrated by other uses of boycott. The Buddhist monk is not a priest and has no direct spiritual authority over the layman. The latter is not dependent on the monk for the absolu­ tion of sins or the administration of sacraments. The Bud­ dhist clergy has no power to excommunicate the erring layman. Nevertheless, the Buddhist equivalent of ex­ communication was soon developed into a potent politi­ cal weapon. Following the conviction of U Ottama and two other monks in 1921, over 1,500 pongyis held a meet­ ing at the Shwedagon pagoda. Resolutions were passed which enjoined all monks not to receive offerings from those who gave evidence on the side of the prosecution in these three cases. The monks were in a position to deprive the layman of the opportunity to gain kutho (merit), without which there was little hope for eventual liberation (after many existences) from the wheel of rebirth.37 The Burmese magistrate who convicted U Ottama was subjected to a very damaging form of religious and social boycott. When his sister died, the YMBA ordered a boycott of the funeral, and not a single pongyi could be found to perform the religious rites. Shop37

Ibid., October 3, 1921, and July 24, 1922.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

keepers refused to sell him food, and life-long friends became strangers overnight. When four Rangoon newspapers criticized the efforts of a group of political monks to control the GCBA and force it to boycott the legislative council, the monks held a mass meeting at the Shwedagon pagoda and issued an ultimatum. If the newspaper editors did not tender an apology for these statements which tended to "injure the prestige of pongyis," they and all their employees would be boycotted by the monks.38 When the Burma AntiBoycott Bill was debated in the legislative council in 1922, members of the council were themselves threatened with boycott by pongyis if they passed the bill.30 The threat of such religious and social sanctions was not al­ ways sufficient to secure compliance with the monks' wishes, but only the most westernized Burmese Buddhist laymen could afford to defy the pongyis outright. The venerable Aletawya Sayadaw, when asked to give an authoritative opinion on the validity of the monks' use of the boycott, issued an order in which he requested "that the members of the Sangha Sametggi Associations, except in instances in which boycott is doubtlessly justi­ fied by religious law, will not drop their customary rela­ tions with others out of feelings of animosity simply because their wishes do not prevail, and will not concern themselves with boycott and ostracism but will conduct themselves and preach from sentiments of love for the people."40 But such mild admonitions had little or no effect on the political monks. In some cases monks were prepared to resort to physi­ cal violence against those who disobeyed their boycott orders. The GCBA and the Sangha Sametggi Associations decided to boycott the Prince of Wales when he visited Burma in 1922 and urged the people to do likewise. A 38 40

Ibid., July 31, 1922. Ibid., March 19, 1923.

89

Ibid., February 27, 1922.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

Burmese theatrical troupe which ignored the boycott and performed for the visiting royalty was later attacked by some pongyis at a pagoda festival. When the police at­ tempted to interfere, they too were attacked by the monks with stones, knives, and sticks, and several were seriously wounded.41 Two months before this incident, very serious riots involving several hundred monks took place at the Shwedagon pagoda during an important festival. The conflict started over differences between the proprietor of a pwe (Burmese theatrical production) and a large number of monks who had been admitted free to watch the per­ formance (despite Vinaya rules forbidding worldly pleas­ ures ). However, the riot soon took the form of a pitched battle between the pongyis and the police. An official committee held an exhaustive inquiry into the riots, and the government resolution in its report found the follow­ ing connection between pongyi lawlessness and national­ ist politics: ". . . there is a spirit of hooliganism abroad among a number of the younger members of the priest­ hood in Rangoon, which is a standing menace to the cause of law and order. There is unfortunately reason to believe that unscrupulous persons in pursuance of their own political ends, are stirring up these men to set them­ selves against government in a manner calculated to em­ barrass the administration. . . . The lieutenant governor appeals to the older monks and heads of monasteries in Rangoon and to their lay supporters to do all that in them lies to cope with this evil, and to counteract the efforts of those who are striving to undermine the restraints which their religion imposes on all members of the priesthood."42 In reply to a question in the legislative council, the home minister stated in 1923 that over the last three years there had been a noticeable increase in the number of 41

42

Ibid., January 16, 1922.

105

Ibid., February 13, 1922.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

offenses of murder, assault, and counterfeiting in which the persons convicted were pongyis.43 Political motives were not involved in most of these crimes, but the arrest of monks by the police, their prosecution by state attor­ neys, their conviction by magistrates, and their incar­ ceration by prison officials, inevitably emphasized conflict between the Buddhist monks and the British government. Pongyi lawlessness made its own contribution to militant nationalism and forced the government into a position in which it could be accused by irresponsible agitators of persecuting the sacred Buddhist Sangha. The General Council of Sangha Sametggi (GCSS), or­ ganized in 1922, was the principal coordinator of pongyi political activities. Relations between the GCBA and the GCSS during the period 1922-1925 were characterized by frequent tensions, and the factions which split the lay­ men's GCBA had their counterparts in the monk's GCSS. In the absence of a sizable indigenous middle class such as was found in India, Burmese nationalist politicians in search of popular backing had to align themselves with the pongyis who controlled the leadership of village na­ tionalist associations. At the same time, even the more traditionalist lay politicians resented pongyi domination and found it to be in their own interest to preserve the basic social structure and political institutions created by British rule, which the extremist pongyis rejected in toto. The majority faction of the GCBA broke completely with the GCSS in 1925, and during U Ottama's second term in prison (1924-1927) the influence of the political monks declined markedly.44 The second most important pongyi nationalist was U Wisara, who died in jail in 1929 as a result of a hunger strike undertaken to secure the right to wear his yellow 4 3 Ibid., December 3, 1923. « Cady, pp. 232-233, 250-255, 260-261.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

robe while a prisoner. His death in a British jail, con­ nected with an issue of such potent symbolic significance, produced a violent upsurge of nationalist feeling. During the 1930's the monks' political role became an increas­ ingly indirect one, exercised through their influence over members of the legislative council.45 They never recov­ ered the political prominence they had enjoyed earlier in the heyday of direct agitation and boycott. NATIONALISM, REBELLION, AND COMMUNALISM

The Saya San rebellion of 1930-1931 was an authentic expression of traditional Burmese nationalism. It owed nothing to western political ideologies or institutions and received neither inspiration nor political techniques from the Indian nationalist movement. It was an auda­ cious attempt to overthrow the British government, led by a Burmese king whose authority had been validated by traditional religio-magical coronation ceremonies (Brahman, Buddhist, and animist) and by the possession of royal regalia which in themselves conferred legitima­ cy. It was precisely in this traditionalist element that the great emotional power of the rebellion lay. As noted in a government communique, a movement for the boy­ cott of foreign cloth could not long command general support among the Burmans, but "open rebellion headed at once by a real live pretender appeals to the Burman imagination. . . ."4e Economic depression had produced widespread agrarian discontent, which helped to nurture the tradition-bound revolt. Saya San was an ex-pongyi, a quack doctor, and for­ merly a member of the pongi/t-influenced So Thein GCBA. Toward the end of 1930 he began secret preparations in « Ibid., pp. 280-281, 339, 361. 46 Report of the Rebellion in Burma Up to 3rd May, 1931, and Communique of 19th of May, 1931, Cmd. 3900, Η. M. Stationery Office, London, 1931.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

Tharrawaddy for the rebellion. The symbol of his army was the galon (or garuda) of Hindu mythology, a bird which attacked and destroyed the naga (snake). In Saya San's interpretation the naga represented the foreign ruler; the galon emblem was thus a symbol of victory over the British. Recruits to the rebel army were tattooed with the galon emblem, which was believed to confer invulnerability in battle. Amulets, charms, and the aid of guardian nuts were thought to ensure military success, despite the fact that the galon soldiers were armed with little else. At the auspicious moment determined by astrologers, Saya San was proclaimed king with the title of Thupannaka Galon Raja on October 28, 1930. The same night at the foot of an image of the Buddha he swallowed a medi­ cine with magical properties. The king became a pongyi at a monastery (in fulfilment of an ancient prophecy) and remained in the Sangha for a brief time, then put off his monk's robes and was proclaimed king a second time. On this occasion he assumed the throne with all the royal regalia: ruby earrings, gem-studded slippers and sword, fan, and the white umbrella (Hindu symbol of divine kingship). After Saya San's coronation, the army marched past, and he declared: "I, Thupannaka Galon Raja, for the advancement of Buddha's religion, under­ take this mission. Guardian spirits of Gotama Buddha's religion, together with the inside 37 nats, outside 37 nats and Weik-za, I entreat you to help my soldiers to victory and to protect them from any harm."47 The galon soldiers were no match for the well-armed British Indian army, and it was soon discovered that tattoo marks did not deflect bullets. Still, the rebellion spread, largely through the activities of itinerant pongyis in the village nationalist associations, and its complete 47 From Saya San's diary, Rangoon Gazette Weekly Budget, October 5, 1931.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

suppression by the government took eighteen months. In its traditionalist orientation and astounding defiance of British power, the rebellion captured the popular imag­ ination as no other movement had done. Anti-Indian (and particularly anti-Muslim) communalism, manifested in the riots of 1938, revealed another dimension of Burmese nationalism. The riots erupted over an ostensibly religious issue, but underlying ten­ sions over economic and social questions had made conflict in some form inevitable. Unrestricted immigra­ tion from India had led to a situation in which vital segments of Burma's economy were dominated by In­ dians. From 1930 to 1937 the Indian Chettyars increased their holdings from 6 to 25 per cent of the agricultural land in Lower Burma. In the city of Rangoon, over 55 per cent of the total property taxes was paid by Indian owners and landlords. Social tensions were also created by the marriage of Indian men with Buddhist Burmese women. While such marriages were valid under Burmese Buddhist law, they were frequently held to be invalid under the Hindu or Muslim law of the husband, and the Burmese woman and her children had no legal status. Burmese wives of Muslims sometimes embraced Islam in order to overcome this legal difficulty, but her renuncia­ tion of Buddhism was equally objectionable to the Bur­ mese community.48 The outbreak of disturbances was occasioned by the publication of excerpts from a book written by a Muslim, Shwe Hpi, containing highly disparaging references to the Buddha. The book was originally published in 1931 and was reprinted in 1936, but attracted no attention until offensive extracts from it were included as an ap­ pendix to a trivial novel written by a Burmese Buddhist 48 Interim Report of the Riot Inquiry Committee, Government Printing and Stationery, Rangoon, 1939, pp. 11-18, 28-33.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

and published in 1938. The Burmese press seized the issue of this Muslim insult to the Buddhist religion and set about inflaming Burmese public opinion. Extremist pongyis wrote articles and letters urging immediate ac­ tion against the perpetrator of this outrageous offense, and these were published prominently in Burmese daily news­ papers. Shwe Hpi's book was held up as a grave menace to the Buddhist religion and the Burmese nation.49 The All Burma Council of Young Monks Association, which had been active in political agitation and in fomenting strikes, called a mass meeting at the Shwedagon pagoda to protest the book. Over 10,000 people, in­ cluding 1,500 monks, passed a resolution demanding that the author be punished, warning that if the government should fail to take necessary action, "steps will be taken to treat the Muslims as enemy No. 1 who insult the Bud­ dhist community and their religion, and to bring about the extermination of the Muslims and the extinction of their religion and language."50 A protest procession was organized by the leaders of the Young Monks Association and made its way toward downtown Rangoon. After a violent clash with the police, the frenzied mob indis­ criminately attacked Muslims and looted Muslim shops in the bazaar section. Some of the pongyis in the mob were wounded in the encounter with the police, and the following day the Burmese newspapers published photo­ graphs of such scenes with captions such as the following: "A venerable sangha lying prostrate, pathetic and uncon­ scious . . . overcome by the severe injuries caused by European sergeants Nos. 12 and 30 with their batons while he was running panic-stricken owing to the indis­ criminate charge made by the Rangoon police."51 The disturbance quickly spread to other parts of the city and within a few days to most of the cities and 49 50

Final Report of the Riot Inquiry Committee, pp. 1-11, 51 Ibid., p. xiii. Ibid., p. x.

110

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

larger towns of Burma. The riots were anti-government as well as anti-Indian, and anti-Hindu as well as antiMuslim. In a sense the Indians became a scapegoat, since the Burmese extremists were not in a position to attack the British government directly. And in attempting to protect the Indians from attack, the British government naturally appeared in the role of enemy to the Burmese nationalists. While the insult to Buddhism had been per­ petrated by a Muslim, the underlying economic griev­ ances of the Burmese were against all Indians, Hindus as well as Muslims. A total of 181 persons were killed in rioting all over the country, of whom 139 were Muslims, 25 were Hindus and 17 were Burmese.52 Monks everywhere played a leading role in instigating and directing the rioters; monasteries became armed strongholds and sanctuaries for those sought by the police. The official inquiry committee reported: "In our evidence we have a mournful record of these so-called pongyis, upazins, and koyins up and down the country promoting meetings in their kyaungs for political or sub­ versive ends, participating in rioting and, arms in their hands, leading or accompanying crowds of hooligans, committing assaults, looting, and even murder, and in general breaking the civil laws of the country and the laws of their own order."53 The committee pointed out that the traditional reverence accorded monks in the past had now in the changed circumstances made them "the greatest political force in Burma," and that every poli­ tician was careful to maintain the support of his own local pongyis or the pongyi association. The committee saw in this situation the gravest threat both to democracy and to Buddhism itself in Burma. It attributed the ab­ sence of healthy public opinion and civic sense in the 52

In addition, 59 were killed by crown forces, 56 of whom were Burmese. Ibid., p. 281. 53 Ibid., p. 277.

Ill

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

country to "the complete and unquestioning surrender in the past of the Buddhist mind to the influence of the Sangha." With the degeneration of the monastic order, democratic institutions were greatly weakened by the lack of a sound public opinion independent of pongyi influence. The committee called for Sangha reforms by which the internal discipline of the order could be restored.54 Communal conflict tended to define Burmese national­ ism more clearly in that it emphasized the positive con­ tent of the national identity. Nationalism was not simply anti-British sentiment and a movement for freedom from foreign rule. Many Indians in Burma were equally antiBritish. Traditional Burmese nationalism was based, among other things, on a common race, language, and religion. In terms of these significant characteristics which identify and distinguish peoples, the Indians were as different from the Burmese as the British were. "Burma for the Burmans," a typical nationalist slogan, struck at both the British and the Indians. Indian nationalism inspired and aided Burmese na­ tionalism. We have noted the considerable influence of Gandhi's non-cooperation movement on U Ottama's po­ litical aims and methods. India's constitutional progress set the pace for Burma, and Burma benefited from this association, even after it ceased being a province of British India in 1937. Nevertheless, anti-Indian sentiment was one component of Burmese nationalism. The Indians in Burma, after all, were foreigners of different race, lan­ guages, and religions, and were regarded as exploiters of the Burmese. Anti-Indian and anti-British sentiment merged at several points, for the British were responsible for the unregulated immigration of Indians into Burma and sought to protect their rights even when exercised at the expense of Burmese interests. 54

Ibid., pp. 291-297.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

In Burma, Buddhist Burmese communalism coalesced easily with nationalism. There was little support for the concept of a nation composed of diverse ethnic groups, speaking different languages, and professing different re­ ligions. In contrast, Indian nationalism by definition had to mean something more inclusive than Hindu or Muslim communalism. Undoubtedly, the nationalist theme of the glory of India's ancient culture was closely associated with Hinduism, but this could not be emphasized to the exclusion of the thousand years of Indian Muslim culture. The Muslims were a large minority (25 per cent), mostly of the same racial stock as the Hindus and speaking the same languages. Only the most extreme Hindu communalist could call the Muslims foreigners. Communalism, whether Hindu or Muslim, was clearly recognized as divisive, useful to the maintenance of British rule, and opposed to Indian nationalism. In Burma, on the other hand, many of the non-Bud­ dhists were aliens, and this fact tended to reinforce the traditional notions of the Burmese national identity. Buddhism was a Burmese national symbol. The Buddha was an important figure in the national heritage, and many Burmese villagers refused (and still refuse) to believe that he was an Indian. The Dhamma was ideally the national way of life, and no Muslim could be per­ mitted to insult it. The Sangha was the visible symbol of the national religion and, in the absence of the Faithful Ruler (Buddhist king), became the chief defender of the faith. Buddhism (Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha) provided a vital component of the corporate identity, and Burmese Buddhist communalism merged easily with nationalism. Unfortunately, this tack which Burmese na­ tionalism took also excluded various non-immigrant groups: Burma Muslims who had lived in the country for hundreds of years, Zerbadis (descendants of Muslim

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

men and their Burmese wives), domiciled Hindus, Chris­ tians, and the non-Buddhist ethnic minorities. Extremist pongyis regarded all these groups as beyond the pale of Burmese nationalism. Lay politicians found it expedient to emphasize the religious element in Burmese nationalism, quite apart from the influence of the pongyis. Buddhism was ex­ ploited by candidates in the election campaigns of the 1930's, and Burmese premiers instinctively sought to strengthen their position by appealing to religious tradi­ tion. Thus Premier U Saw declared in the legislative council in 1940: "Government shall consider it to be its sacred duty to play the role of the Sasana Dayaka (Pro­ moter of the Buddhist Religion). As the structure of society in Burma is based on religious foundations, it is necessary to usher in a religious revival to strengthen and purify the foundations of the social order."55 In Burma the British principle of religious neutrality became in­ creasingly compromised by the extension of democracy. The same process after independence led gradually to the abandonment of the concept of the secular state. SECULAR BURMESE NATIONALISM

As has been shown, Buddhism was an extremely impor­ tant factor in the development of nationalism, in terms of the traditional national identity, the choice of nationalist issues, the role of pongyi politicians, the nature of the 1930 rebellion, and anti-foreign communalism. Equally significant, however, is the fact that secular nationalist issues were on the whole more important and that, in the decisive stage, leadership of the nationalist movement was captured by a party which made no concessions to Buddhist revivalism. As early as 1925 the more progressive urban faction of 55 Legislative Council Proceedings, House of Representatives, 1940, vol. 8, p. 251. Cited in von der Mehden, p. 162.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

the GCBA, strongly opposed to pongyi dictation, formed the Home Rule Party, and in 1929 the Separation League made freedom from pongyi domination one of its cardinal tenets. This rejection of the monks' political leadership constituted one aspect of the development of secular nationalism, although the lay politicians involved were not necessarily opposed to making use of religious issues. As noted previously, the monks' political influence did in fact decline greatly toward the end of the 1920's. The Dobama Asiayone (We Burmans Society) was formed in 1935 by the amalgamation of two student nationalist groups. Its members addressed each other as "Thakin," the word for "lord" or "master" customarily used in addressing Englishmen. The youthful Thakins, unlike the older generation of politicians interested in securing the plums of office, were militantly nationalist and committed to a program of radical political action. They had the same revolutionary fervor as the political monks of the early 1920's, but they regarded political independence for Burma as an end in itself and saw no need to resort to religious appeals to fight their cause. Aung San declared in 1940 that the Thakin movement was "the only non-racial, non-religious, and impersonal movement that has ever existed in Burma. Formerly, and still now among a certain section of the Burmese public, nationalism was conceived in terms of race and reli­ gion."56 Aung San's concept of a nation explicitly rejected the centrality of these factors. In a speech delivered in 1946, he declared: "A nation is a collective term applied to a people, irrespective of their ethnic origin, living in close contact with one another and having common inter­ ests and sharing joys and sorrows together for such historic periods as to have acquired a sense of oneness. Though race, religion, and language are important fac56

New Burma, May 10, 1940. Cited in von der Mehden, p. 81.

BUDDHISM AND BURMESE NATIONALISM

tors it is only their traditional desire and will to live in unity through weal and woe that binds die people together and makes them a nation and their spirit a patriotism."57 This secular nationalism was reinforced by the influ­ ence of Marxism.68 Some of the Thakins became Marxists, and a number of leading Burmese communists joined the party in the late 1930s. Marxism, however, was only one of several ideological influences, and, apart from its radi­ cal nationalism, a clear-cut Thakin ideology was never formulated. The Thakin party, with its secular orienta­ tion, became the most important component in the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), which emerged in the closing years of World War II. During this period of Japanese occupation the political pongyis reemerged as collaborators of the invaders, being taken in by anti-British slogans and by assertions that the Japa­ nese were fellow Buddhists. The disillusionment which developed with respect to Japanese rule served to dis­ credit further the leadership of the political pongyis and contributed support to the ideal of a secular state espoused by Aung San, Thakin Mya, Ne Win, and most other leaders of the AFPFL. 57

This statement was reaffirmed by the military regime in 1964. See Forward, vol. 3, February 15, 1965, p. 4. 58 "Marxism did not present the challenge to religious supremacy in the Burmese nationalist movement that it did in the Indies because religion was no longer an aggressive force when Marxism entered the country. By the end of the thirties Buddhism and the Sangha had largely retired from the national political scene under the impact of non-Marxist secularism and the changing political climate." Von der Mehden, p. 73.

CHAPTER 4

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

FROM 1950 until General Ne Win's coup

detat in March 1962, Burma pursued a steady course of increasingly close association between Buddhism and the state. In 1949 and 1951 Parliament enacted the Ecclesiastical Courts Acts intended to strengthen the Sangha's internal organization, authority, and discipline which had broken down under the impact of foreign rule. The Pali University and Dhammacariya Act of 1950 sought to restore the monastic order's tradition of schol­ arship in the Pali scriptures. The Pali Education Board Act of 1952 established a statutory body to administer the government-sponsored system of Pali examinations. The Buddha Sasana Council Act of 1950 created a body of laymen charged with the responsibility of promoting and propagating the Buddhist faith. The legislation of 1949-1952, however, was merely the beginning. At great expense and with much fanfare, the government dramatized its commitment to the promotion of Buddhism by sponsoring the Sixth Great Buddhist Council, from May 1954 to May 1956. The proposal to proclaim Buddhism the state religion was made at the close of the Sixth Council and became an important issue in the 1960 elections. U Nu's overwhelming electoral victory paved the way for a constitutional amendment in August 1961 in which Buddhism was adopted as the state religion of the Union of Burma. All of these topics are discussed in considerable detail in the following chapters. It will be useful, however, to survey first the broad trends which contributed to Bur-

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

ma's remarkable evolution from a secular state to a Buddhist state in fourteen years. Nationalism, socialism, and democracy—both in ideological formulations and in practical politics—have been three basic components of the Burmese political scene since independence. In this chapter we shall examine the relationship of each to Buddhism and show how each contributed to the increas­ ing importance of the religious factor in Burmese politics. NATIONALISM AND BUDDHISM

Independent Burma inherited not one but two nationalist traditions, and both continued to influence its political development. The U Ottama-Saya San tradition had re­ ceded into the background during the period 1935-1948, but had not been forgotten. This tradition emphasized the total rejection of western culture, intense and partly violent struggle against the British rulers, the leadership of political monks, and the value complex of Burmese Buddhist race, religion, language, and culture as the highest loyalty. The other nationalist tradition was the Thakin-Aung San tradition, militant in its opposition to foreign rule but with considerable regard for western political insti­ tutions, secular and Marxist-inclined in its ideological orientation. General Aung San declared in 1946: "We must draw a clear line between politics and religion, be­ cause the two are not one and the same thing. If we mix religion with politics, then we offend the spirit of reli­ gion itself."1 He condemned the exploitation, injustice, superstition, and priestcraft frequently associated with religion, while holding that Buddhism could become "the greatest philosophy in the world" if its ritual could be eliminated. 1 From the inaugural address at the AFPFL convention, January 1946. Maung Maung, ed., Aung San of Burma, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands, 1962, p. 127.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Thakins were attracted to and influenced by Marx­ ism chiefly because of the ideological weapon which it provided in the struggle against British imperialism. Here was an ideology which demonstrated scientifically that imperialism was the last stage of a capitalism about to disintegrate under the pressure of inner contradictions. In the fight against western imperialism, the victory of Burmese nationalism was thus inevitable and imminent. The Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League ( AFPFL) gradually took shape during the last two years of the Japanese occupation, 1944-1945. Aung San, as leader of the Burma National Army, was one of the prime archi­ tects of this nationalist coalition, along with the com­ munist Than Tun. When independence was achieved in 1948 the ThakinAung San nationalist tradition was so completely dominant that there was little awareness of the older Buddhist-oriented nationalism. In the following years, however, events tended increasingly to emphasize the necessity of reasserting the Buddhist content of Burmese nationalism. This development was not accidental. Na­ tionalism, wherever it has existed, has contained both positive and negative elements. In general, during the period of western colonialism in South and Southeast Asia, the negative aspect was predominant. The Asian nationalist was, above all, opposed to the foreign ruler. The struggle against western imperialism was a powerful unifying force, which by its very nature reduced the importance of differing ideologies. In the anti-colonial phase of nationalism, the Marxist, the Buddhist monk, and the liberal democrat were united on the most funda­ mental tenet of political faith: foreign rule must be ended. After the attainment of independence, Asian national­ ism could only be sustained by something more positive. The Marxist-Leninist ideology which was such a useful

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

weapon against imperialism, after independence proved to be a disruptive element, as local communist parties made their bid for power by revolutionary means. Fur­ thermore, Marxism was an alien ideology with no roots in the culture of the people. Post-independence national­ ism had to be nurtured on something which was both positive and indigenous. The new phase of Asian na­ tionalism was well described as "a search by the new nationalist leaders to find a distinctive content to their own particular nationalism, to discover (and in some cases to invent or deliberately fabricate) a body of na­ tional ideals, institutions, attitudes, myths, traditions, history, literature, and even language."2 Strengthened by such social values, nationalism had to be directed to the positive task of building a modern state and society. Anti-western sentiment, of course, continued to exist and on occasion proved useful as a unifying force in national life. But with the foreign ruler gone and no like­ lihood of his return, this appeal could have but limited usefulness. Asian nationalism, "deprived" of the hated symbols of western dominance, could only thrive by emphasizing the positive, indigenous elements of dis­ tinctive culture, language, and religion. This was the obvious course to follow. The alternative was the more difficult course of building a sense of nationality on the imported western notion of a common citizenship which disregarded internal cultural or religious differences. While this concept of citizenship was readily embodied in written constitutions, it clearly lacked the emotional appeal necessary to make it an effective unifying force. In Burma, the promotion of Buddhism by the govern­ ment must be interpreted in part as an attempt to 2 William

L. Holland, "New Trends in Asian Nationalism," Asian Nationalism and the West, Macmillan Company, New York, 1953, p. 6.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

make religion a positive and visible symbol of Burmese nationalism. Under U Nu's leadership, the AFPFL moved in the direction of the older U Ottama-Saya San nationalist tradition. U Nu's increasing deference to the monks in political matters, his elaborate programs for the promo­ tion of Buddhism, his faith in astrology and nat worship, and his conviction that Buddhism constituted an essential component in the evolving Burmese national identity all indicated the new direction of post-independence na­ tionalism. Premier Nu was, of course, a forceful cham­ pion of parliamentary democracy and evolutionary so­ cialism, and there was much in his political credo and leadership which completely repudiated the U OttamaSaya San tradition. But on the points noted above he had little or nothing in common with Aung San. Definite steps were taken to keep the historical tradition of Buddhist-oriented nationalism alive and to reaffirm its relevance after independence. U Ottama Day celebra­ tions were held annually, and statues were erected to honor the memory of the departed sayadaw.3 While U Ottama's political influence had been greatest in the early 1920's, his death in prison came in 1939, less than a decade before independence. He was not a remote, shadowy figure out of history, but a still potent symbol of Burmese nationalism. In January 1962 Religious Af­ fairs Minister U Ba Saw opened the U Ottama Gardens, declaring that this great nationalist leader had been re­ sponsible for the political awakening of Burma. After the ceremony, alms-food was offered to the many monks present.4 Annual meetings were held at the U Wisara statue to commemorate the sayadaw s death in the Ran­ goon Central Jail on September 19, 1929, after a hunger 3 4

The Nation, August 29, 1951. The Guardian, January 18, 1962.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

strike reported to have lasted 166 days. Speeches de­ livered at these meetings and over the radio stressed the fact that the monk's death had inspired the people to fight for their freedom.5 Mass rallies annually commemorated the Saya San rebellion of 1930-1931. Sao Shwe Thaike, former presi­ dent of the Union of Burma, in 1962 extolled the courage and patriotism of Saya San who had made a daring attempt to wrest Burma's freedom from the mighty Brit­ ish Empire. Although he and many of his brave followers had paid for their audacity with their lives, they had lit the torch of patriotism.® Public meetings and tributes such as these were of course only superficial indications of the renewed association of Buddhism and Burmese nationalism. This important relationship became the an­ swer to some serious problems of nation-building. In the days of the Burmese kings, who were defenders and promoters of the faith, Buddhism provided the indis­ pensable bond which united the Burmans, Mons, Shans, and Arakanese in a common loyalty. The religious bond was broken by the intrusion of the infidel foreigner, but with the attainment of independence the new Burmese nationalism could flourish (so the argument went) only by restoring the one influence capable of uniting Burma's diverse ethnic groups. The return to the state's role as promoter of Buddhism was also an expression of na­ tionalism simply in that it honored the traditional Bur­ mese concept of the ruler's responsibilities. If it was not desirable to restore the monarchy, here at least was one aspect of national tradition which deserved support. The conscious use of Buddhism by the government for nationalist ends was only part of the picture. Buddhist resurgence in Burma must also be seen as a spontaneous 5 The Nation, September 18, 1951, and September 15, 1954; The Guardian, September 15, 1962. β Ibid., January 15, 1962.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

expression of nationalist pride in a distinctive heritage. U Kyaw Thet's comment on the place of religion in the independence movement is equally valid with respect to present-day nationalism: "Painfully aware that their national pride—even their continued existence—was manifestly debatable, the Burmese had to produce some­ thing tangible and traditional to justify their future as a separate entity. They found what they needed in Bud­ dhism. The assorted Europeans might be richer, stronger, better trained, but it was comforting to know that all this was as nothing because they did not possess the jewel of the true faith."7 One of the assertions of Burmese na­ tionalism today is that Burma, as the leading Theravada Buddhist country, has a special mission to carry the message of the Dhamma to the West. The intimate relationship between nationalism and the promotion of Buddhism was reflected in the statements of several Asian leaders at the Sixth Great Buddhist Council. Dr. Makoto Nagai of Japan declared to the synod: 'Tour country has now escaped from the bondage of a foreign nation and has attained complete independ­ ence. Accordingly, you are now holding this Great Bud­ dhist Council."8 In similar vein Mr. Dudley Senanayake, leader of the Ceylon delegation, spoke of "the resurgence of Asia free from the yoke of foreign bondage, awake once more after centuries of servile slumber." In this new context, Senanayake declared, the independent nations of Asia could make an important contribution to world peace by propagating the message of Buddha. Nationalist sentiment was clearly present in the Buddhist conviction that Christianity had failed to bring peace to the world 7

U Kyaw Thet, "Continuity in Burma: The Survival of His­ torical Forces," Perspective of Burma: An Atlantic Monthly Sup­ plement, New York, 1958, p. 21. 8 The Chattha Sangayana Souvenir Album, Rangoon, 1954, p. 109.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

and that Buddhism was the only ideology capable of doing this. U Nu and other Burmese leaders have argued that the government's religious program and the movement to­ ward the adoption of Buddhism as the state religion were steps taken in response to a popular religious revival. It is undoubtedly true that considerable popular enthusi­ asm for Buddhism has been evidenced, but much of it was generated by the government's religious program itself. In 1953 a Christian leader from India interviewed the Narada Sayadaw of the Brama Vihara in Rangoon. Questioned as to the reason for the revival of Buddhism in Burma, the sayadaw mentioned three points: national­ ism, the patronage of the government, and the leadership of Prime Minister U Nu. The interviewer later com­ mented: "It was interesting to notice that this great Buddhist monk attributed the revival of Buddhism purely to political factors, and made no mention of the religious. Whatever may be the underlying motives one has to reckon with the religious revival as a solid fact."9 In his careful study of the Bxirmese religious revival, John F. Brohm found that there was little evidence of revival in the villages, where life had never lost its tra­ ditional Buddhist orientation. A vital new sense of reli­ gious commitment was clearly present among many members of the urban elite, however. These Burmese who had been "culturally disinherited by colonial accul­ turation," who had succumbed to western values and ways of life, found in the reassertion of their Bimnese Buddhist identity a truly galvanic experience.10 The re9 R. B. Manikam, "The Revival of Buddhism in Burma," National Christian Council Review (India), 1953, vol. 73, p. 203. 10 John F. Brohm, "Burmese Religion and the Burmese Religious Revival," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1957, pp. 449-453, 458-461.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

vival, then, must be interpreted largely in terms of postindependence nationalist resurgence, the same phenome­ non which largely explains the increasingly intimate association between Buddhism and the state during the first fourteen years of freedom. SOCIALISM AND BUDDHISM

As anti-imperialism became largely irrelevant after 1948 and Burmese nationalism turned with renewed interest to Buddhism, Marxism-Leninism, the most powerful ideological weapon against imperialism for a decade and a half, suffered a corresponding decline. After abortive attempts to secure the cooperation of the Burmese com­ munists, the government adopted a policy of Buddhist revival as part of a decisive shift away from its previ­ ously Marxist orientation. Doctrinally, Marxism was at first held to be complementary to Buddhism, then incom­ patible with it, and finally, militantly opposed to the Dhamma. Burmese politics underwent a profound ideo­ logical evolution from doctrinaire Marxism to moderate democratic socialism; Buddhism was one important fac­ tor in this evolution. The AFPFL, which came to full power in 1948, was a loosely knit nationalist coalition which had already begun to disintegrate. Six months after independence, with the communists (formerly within the AFPFL) and other groups in open revolt, Prime Minister U Nu attempted to placate the leftist insurgents by proposing his fifteenpoint Program, of Leftist Unity. This statement, replete with Marxist cliches, concluded with the proposal "to form a league for the propagation of Marxist doctrine, composed of socialists, communists, Pyithu Yebaws (PVO'S) and others who lean towards Marxism and to read, discuss, and propagate the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, Tito, Dimitrov, and other

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

apostles of Marxism."11 This last point aroused such a heated controversy that it was quickly dropped, but even in its original form the program proved unacceptable to the majority of the leftist rebels. Throughout 1949 the insurrections threatened to engulf the country completely. With the failure of new attempts to secure leftist unity, the government moved decisively in the second half of 1950 away from its Marxist orienta­ tion. The shift was signalized by Burma's support of United Nations action in Korea, the acceptance of United States technical aid, and the enactment of legislation dealing with religion.12 The Pali University and Dhammacariya Act had no far-reaching implications for govern­ mental policy, but the Buddha Sasana Council Act created a state-financed agency for the promotion and propagation of Buddhism. In the parliamentary debate U Nu made it clear that in propagating the faith the Buddha Sasana Council would have to challenge openly other ideological forces at work in the country. "It is far from our intention to disparage in any way other religions like Mohammed­ anism, Hinduism, Christianity, or spirit worship. We have been prompted by the sole consideration to combat effectively anti-religious forces which are rearing their ugly heads everywhere." U Nu denounced the communist effrontery which elevated Marx over the Buddha. 'It will be our duty to retort in no uncertain terms that the wisdom or knowledge that might be attributed to Karl Marx is less than one-tenth of a particle of dust that lies 11 U Nu, Towards Peace and Democracy, Ministry of Informa­ tion, Union of Burma, Rangoon, 1949, pp. 92-94. 12 Saul Rose, Socialism in Southern Asia, Oxford University Press, London, 1959, pp. 111-116; John Seabury Thomson, "Marxism in Burma," in Frank N. Trager, ed., Marxism in South­ east Asia, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1959, pp. 42-45; John F. Cady, A History of Modem Burma, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1958, pp. 607-613.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

at the feet of our great Lord Buddha."13 While Marxism had still not been rejected as a political philosophy and economic doctrine, the government's commitment to Bud­ dhism as an ultimate loyalty was clearly established. In December 1950 the AFPFL was shaken by a serious ideological and organizational split in the Socialist Party, one of its constituent units. Forty-three left-wing Social­ ists, reaffirming their faith in Marxism-Leninism, broke with the Socialist Party, though not with the AFPFL. The defectors formed the pro-communist Burma Workers and Peasants Party (BWPP). U Ba Swe, general secretary of the Socialist Party, supported the right-wing Socialists and denounced the BWPP for its ideological dogmatism, which extended even to the Marxist rejection of religion. The AFPFL took formal action and expelled all members of the BWPP, and U Nu condemned them publicly for having accepted the atheism of orthodox MarxismLeninism.14 In October 1951 U Nu announced that the government would take the momentous step of convening the Sixth Great Buddhist Council, a historic act of merit remi­ niscent of the Buddhist kings of old. Commenting on the series of events which led up to this decision, Professor Cady wrote: "Thus did Premier Nu in little more than three years time accomplish a complete swing around from a confused advocacy of compulsory [sic\ training in Marxist principles as the solvent of Burma's political feuding to a full throttle promotion of religious revival."16 U Nu reasserted the traditional role of the Burmese state as the defender of the faith, the Buddhist faith 13 U Nu, From Peace to Stability, Ministry of Information, Union of Burma, Rangoon, 1951, pp. 106-109. 14 The Nation, December 24, 1950. These events are narrated in considerable detail in Thomson, pp. 42-45. 15 John F. Cady, "Religion and Politics in Modern Burma," Far Eastern Quarterly, 1953, vol. 12, p. 161.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

which embodied the values of Burma's own culture but which was now under attack from an alien Marxist cult. Burmese nationalism, nurtured by Marxist ideology for a generation, now returned to indigenous traditions for its sustenance. While the government's shift away from leftist policies was quite clear by the end of 1950, the task of theoretical reformulation obviously required more time. The So­ cialists of the AFPFL, after all, continued to speak and think in Marxist terms, the political language which was their mother tongue. The reassessment of Marxist ideol­ ogy and the adjustments necessary to bring it into line with parliamentary democracy and Buddhism could only be effected by degrees. In December 1951 U Ba Swe, then minister of defense and mines, gave a speech en­ titled The Burmese Revolution, which was later reprinted as a pamphlet by the government. U Ba Swe declared categorically that ideology alone was the genesis of revo­ lution and that in the case of Burma this ideology was Marxism. "Marxism is the guide to action in our revolu­ tionary movement, in our establishment of a Socialist Burmese State for workers and peasants. Our revolution can only be achieved with Marxism as a guiding prin­ ciple." However, he was careful to emphasize that ad­ herence to Marxism did not mean the adoption of Russian methods or Chinese methods in Burma, nor did the acceptance of Marxism make one a communist.10 In attempting to reconcile Marxism and Buddhism, U Ba Swe first emphasized common ground in the rejec­ tion of a theory of creation, then went on to assert the complementarity of the two philosophies, functioning in two neatly divided spheres of life. "Marxist philosophy 16 U Ba Swe, The Burmese Revolution, Ministry of Information, Union of Burma, Rangoon, 1952, pp. 5-7. To become a communist, U Ba Swe asserted, one had to observe strict party discipline and unequivocally accept Soviet leadership.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

rejects the theory of creation; but it does not oppose religion. In point of fact, Marxist theory is not antago­ nistic to Buddhist philosophy. The two are, frankly speaking, not merely similar. In fact, they are the same in concept. But if we want to have the two distinguished one from the other, we can safely assume that Marxist theory occupies the lower plane, while Buddhist philoso­ phy occupies the higher. Marxist theory deals with mun­ dane aflFairs and seeks to satisfy material needs in life. Buddhist philosophy, however, deals with the solution of spiritual matters with a view to seek spiritual satisfaction in life and liberation from this mundane world."17 Moving from the sphere of abstract principle into that of personal faith, U Ba Swe sought to show that Bud­ dhism and Marxism had indeed been brought into a compatible relationship in his own inner experience. "I declare that I have implicit faith in Marxism, but at the same time I boldly assert that I am a true Buddhist. In the beginning, I was a Buddhist only by tradition. The more I study Marxism, however, the more I feel con­ vinced in Buddhism. Thus I have become a true disciple of Lord Buddha by conviction, and my faith in Buddhism has grown all the more. I now believe that for any man who has deeply studied Buddhism and correctly per­ ceived its tenets there should be no obstacle to becoming a Marxist."18 U Ba Swe admitted that Marxism provided no answer to man's yearning for spiritual liberation. Only Buddhist philosophy could deal with this ultimate ques­ tion of human existence. The erosion of Marxist ideology in the following years proceeded under the pressure of internal economic prob­ lems, world events, and Buddhist philosophy. Marxist slogans condemning all capitalists were singularly un­ helpful in the task of attracting capital for long-range industrialization plans. At the second plenary Asian 17

18

Ibid., p. 7.

129

Loc.cit.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Socialist Conference held in Bombay in 1956, U Ba Swe himself, then prime minister of Burma, condemned Rus­ sian communist imperialism in Hungary along with the more familiar western variety of imperialism. Finally, in January 1958 came U Nu's four-hour speech at the third all-Burma AFPFL Congress. In this carefully pre­ pared statement U Nu reexamined the whole scientific and philosophical basis of Marxism and found that dia­ lectical materialism could not be reconciled with either modern science or Buddhism. According to the doctrine of dialectical materialism, U Nu explained, everything in nature can be reduced to minute particles called atoms which are unchanging and indestructible. Karl Marx was quite confident that his theory had the authority of science behind it, but scien­ tific advances since his time have completely disproved his fundamental assumption. The Buddhist doctrine of thinkhata dhat (the principle or inherent property of change), on the other hand, holds that in the whole uni­ verse there is no such thing as "matter," nothing which is unchanging, unchangeable, or indestructible, but only inherent properties. As scientific knowledge advances, U Nu declared, more evidence is found to support the Buddhist belief, and the position of Marxist materialism becomes increasingly untenable. From this relatively insignificant point of doctrinal difference between Buddhism and Marxism, U Nu pro­ ceeded to a very sweeping conclusion: "It is entirely impossible to take the attitude that both Marxism and religion are in the right, and that therefore both can be accepted." Then, a confession of youthful folly: "When we were younger, we had not studied Marxism in detail and in all its aspects. Neither did we know Buddhism in detail or with any exactness. At that time, more or less on hearsay and cursory reading, we impetuously and

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

loudly claimed that Marxism was the same as Buddhism. We are very remorseful for having made at one time such ill-considered and unfounded claims."19 The alleged incompatibility of the two systems of thought was indeed the most powerful single argument in U Nu's rejection of Marxism. U Nu set the establishment of a socialist state as the goal of the party, but rigorously delimited the role of Marxist principles within Burmese socialism. "As the AFPFL does not believe that Marxism is a doctrine that is infallible and is true without reservation, (1) the AFPFL approves of only some parts of the economic doctrine of Marxism, and (2) rejects Marxism as a guiding political philosophy or as the ideology of the AFPFL."20 The Marxist economic doctrine which was found acceptable was hardly revolutionary: "Commodities should not be pro­ duced for profit-making, but for the consumption and use of the people." This idea, in fact, could easily be supported by Buddhist ethical principles. Although some opposition was voiced to U Nu's new ideological formu­ lation, it received the overwhelming approval of the AFPFL Congress. As Professor Totten has pointed out, "the Burmese leaders were nationalists first and socialists second, both 19 New Times of Burma, February 1, 1958. An example of Nu's youthful impetuosity in this connection was an article he wrote in the late 1930's entitled "I Am a Marxist." In a fictional dialogue with a friend, Nu at first contended that communism was antireligious, but was later persuaded that communism and Buddhism were reconcilable. Communism addressed itself to the problem of man's basic material needs which had to be met before he could devote himself to the practice of religion. Ultimately, Nu agreed that "to help work for Marxism would be to repay our gratitude to Buddha for his suffering in all his aeons of existences for the benefit of mankind." In U Thein Pe, ed., Communism and Dobama, Pyidaw Soe Press, Rangoon, 1954, pp. 43-63 [in Burmese]. Quoted in Richard Butwell, U Nu of Burma, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1963, p. 27. 20 New Times of Burma, February 1, 1958.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

in time and conviction."21 Ideology was always a second­ ary concern, a fact which enabled important theoretical shifts to take place with a minimum of intra-party con­ flict. While U Ba Swe's 1951 speech and U Nu's 1958 speech were far apart ideologically, they had one im­ portant point in common: both regarded Buddhism as the prime loyalty. U Ba Swe could advocate Marxism because he found it compatible with Buddhism; U Nu could reject Marxism because he found it irreconcilable with Buddhism. Socialist ideologies could come and go, but they would be judged by their relationship to a Buddhism which was indissolubly merged with Burmese nationalism. Buddhism was a philosophy, but it was far more; it symbolized and embodied the culture and tradi­ tions of a renascent Burmese nation. The chief influence of Buddhism on Burmese socialism was to limit and moderate its Marxist content, to strength­ en the trend toward a democratic socialism committed to peaceful methods. However, Buddhism also made a posi­ tive contribution to the theoretical content of socialism in the thought of U Nu. The basic idea was that the attainment of nibbana was the supreme goal of human existence. Nibbana could only be achieved through the practice of meditation, which required leisure and free­ dom from entanglement in the cares of an acquisitive society. At present only a few individuals could start on the path toward liberation by renouncing the world and becoming monks. Capitalism encouraged the acquisitive instinct, ignoring the Buddhist truth of the impermanence of all material things. U Nu asserted in 1959 that "the reason why an average Buddhist concerns himself not with the final release from samsara [endless rebirths] but with the acquisition of property is to be found in the 21 George

O. Totten, "Buddhism and Socialism in Japan and Burma," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1960, vol. 2, p. 295.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

economic system that prevails in the world."22 A truly socialist state, however, would promote economic equal­ ity, discourage the acquisitive instinct in man, and pro­ vide sufficient leisure so that virtually everyone in the entire society could devote time to meditation in the quest for nibbana. Socialism was thus regarded as the means for the attainment of religious goals.23 If U Nu in his 1958 speech demonstrated in academic fashion that Buddhism and Marxism were philosophically irreconcilable, General Ne Win's vigorous anti-communist propaganda campaign of 1959 stressed the idea that Marxist ideology was in fact militantly and violently antiBuddhist.24 The pamphlet Dhammantaraya ("Buddhism in Danger"), prepared by the Psychological Warfare Department, sought to warn the nation of the threat to Buddhism posed by the Burmese communists and their aggressive Marxist ideology. Hundreds of mass meetings were held in which a total of over 800,000 laymen and monks resolved to defend the faith from the ideological at­ tacks of the communists. The army officers who directed the campaign, of course, were primarily concerned with mobilizing public opinion behind an all-out effort to end the communist insurrections. 22 U Nu, "What is Socialism?" (Pyidaungsu Niti, Guide for the Peoples of the Union of Burma), 1959, p. 10. Quoted in Richard Butwell, "The Four Failures of U Nu's Second Premiership," Asian Survey, vol. 2, March 1962, p. 8. 23 New Times of Burma, November 17, 1959. This basic idea had been expressed by U Nu as early as 1935. See Manuel Sarkisyanz, "On the Place of U Nu's Buddhist Socialism in Burma's History of Ideas," in Robert K. Sakai, ed., Studies on Asia, 1961, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1961, pp. 53-62. There are other points at which Buddhism could be used to support socialism. For example, in one sense the Sangha represents the ideal Buddhist society in miniature. The monastic community is socialistic in that all property is held in common and the private accumulation of wealth is forbidden by the Vinaya. 24 See Fred von der Mehden, "Burma's Religious Campaign Against Communism," Pacific Affairs, 1960, vol. 33, pp. 290-299.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The pamphlet Dhammantaraya quoted extensively from notes taken in a communist indoctrination class regarding the relationship of Buddhism to dialectical materialism.25 According to the communist instructor, Thakin Soe, the two philosophies are diametrically op­ posed. Religion is indeed the opium of the people, and "Buddhism is opium of the worst kind." The whole frame­ work of Buddhist doctrine epitomized in the Four Noble Truths was rejected completely. "A fortiori, the Buddha's teachings, beginning, middle and end, are dead wrong. The ideology of deliverance from suffering by escaping to nibbana is among all fantasies the most extravagant." Instead of admitting that he had no solution for the world's ills, the Buddha urged the people to turn their backs on the world and seek "that preposterous nibbana." The Buddha's concept of nibbana is "an ideology of de­ spair" which promises liberation only through escape from the world. The pamphlet attacked the dialectical materialism of the Burma communists as nothing more than a modern version of one of the sixty-two heresies rejected by the Buddha 2,500 years ago. The communists were accused of rifling the relic-chambers of pagodas and desecrating images of the Buddha. A communist leader was quoted as stating that when he came to power he would strip all the gold from the Shwedagon pagoda spire and use it for the government. Buddhism was under attack! "Already the communists of Burma are calumniating the Buddha, the Sangha, the Buddhist traditions, and traducing the best tenets of the Buddha's teaching, hell-bent on the destruction of that gentle influence which is the founda­ tion of our civilization." Here again Burmese nationalist sentiment was evoked in the condemnation of an alien influence. 25 Dhammantaraya, Director of Information, Rangoon, 1959. The entire text of the pamphlet was published in New Times of Burma, April 26, 1959.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

A pamphlet published in 1959 by the Young Monks Association used some of these emotional appeals, but also probed deeper. Why were the communists bent on annihilating Buddhism? Because of its basic incompati­ bility with Marxian materialism. "The communists be­ lieve that in this world, only the physical form (matter considered as an object of the senses) is the main and basic factor; and the idea of spirit and the mental powers evolved only due to the presence of form or matter. Therefore, the spirit is of minor consideration. Since they believe that human beings are only made up of physical form or matter, they believe that in death the body decays and that is the end for them all. Hence their belief in one existence only, that of the present. For them, there is no previous existence, they do not believe in the transmigration of the soul or in reincarnation."26 In short, the Burmese people's faith in the teachings of the Buddha represented the greatest obstacle to widespread accept­ ance of Marxism. Buddhism was therefore under system­ atic attack by the communists. General Ne Win's anti-communist propaganda cam­ paign based on religion had the unintended effect of giving support to U Nu's election proposal to make Buddhism the state religion. Many people were appar­ ently convinced by Dhammantaraya that Buddhism in Burma was indeed seriously threatened. In the 1959-1960 election campaign, therefore, many were inclined to see U Nu's proposal, not as an issue between the opposing concepts of a religious state and a secular state, but as an issue of Buddhism versus communism. The way to defend Buddhism against communist attack was to make its place secure as the state religion. The question was clearly stated in one editorial: 26 Proclamation on the Subject of Dangers to Buddhist Religion by the Headquarters of the All Burma Young Monks Association, Pitaka Electric Press, Mandalay, 1959 [in Burmese].

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

"From the point of view of religious tolerance, from the point of view of freedom of worship, and in fact from the overall consideration of constitutional freedoms, there is no urgent need nor any special reason to make Buddhism a state religion. From the point of view of defending Buddhism from the attacks of communism, alone, does the question . . . arise. Is the communist menace to Buddhism a serious and unavoidable one? If so, then, there is good reason for making Buddhism a state re­ ligion and if not, there is no good reason."27 In another editorial one week later the writer gave his own answer to the question. "Whatever the merits of a secular state, the issue of Buddhism versus communism is a serious one in Burma because the communists are turning their weap­ ons at Buddhism whenever opportunity offers."28 Iron­ ically, although General Ne Win favored the Stable AFPFL, his use of Buddhism to combat the communist insurgents paved the way for the electoral victory of U Nu and the Clean AFPFL. DEMOCRACY AND BUDDHISM

Historically, the association of Buddhism with democracy in Burma is a recent development. The Burmese kings who defended and promoted the faith with such fervor were also, with few exceptions, arbitrary and cruel des­ pots whose absolutism was qualified only by the inherent difficulties of building a highly centralized bureaucracy in the country and to a lesser extent by the influence of the Sangha. Ideologically, present-day Burmese leaders who are committed to the principles and institutions of parliamentary democracy find considerable support in certain Buddhist teachings. Thus, in 1958 U Chan Htoon, then judge of the Supreme Court and secretary general 27 "Religion

and Politics," New Times of Burma, December 1,

1959. 28

Ibid., December 8, 1959.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

of the Buddha Sasana Council, declared that Buddhism is democratic and that its emphasis on self-reliance strongly supports democratic values. "It therefore tends to promote an individualistic outlook which is characteristic of Bud­ dhists, both in their personal relationships and their national life. The rejection of all forms of authoritarianism stems from the Buddha's insistence upon freedom of will and choice. . . . It is thus the antithesis of the totalitarian concept in which the individual has only a group-exist­ ence subordinate to the needs of the state."29 In similar vein a Ceylonese Buddhist firmly declared: "Democracy is not something new in Asia, and is not western-imposed as many people in the West seem to think.. .. Democracy is inherent in the very principles of Buddhism. . . . Toler­ ance, individual freedom and responsibility, the spirit of understanding, the value of individual and collective service, all these constitute a part of the Buddhist philos­ ophy of life."30 Our chief concern here, however, is neither with precolonial history nor with ideology, but with the way in which the democratic process stimulated and sustained the trend toward the identification of Buddhism with the state. Universal adult suffrage placed decisive political power in the hands of the Burmese masses, whose out­ look was rooted in the traditional Buddhist way of life. The religiously inclined politician who could manipulate the symbols of religion in a convincing manner inevitably stood in an advantageous position before the new mass electorate. Clearly conscious of this as one of the im­ portant sources of his political effectiveness, the politician naturally sought to confirm the religious image of himself 29

U Chan Htoon, Address to the Sixteenth Congress of the International Association for Religious Freedom, Union Buddha Sasana Council Press, Rangoon, 1958, p. 9. 30 R. S. S. Gunewardene, "South and Southeast Asia look at the United States," in Philip W. Thayer, ed., Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1956, p. 21.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

on every possible occasion, and to emphasize traditional religious values even more vigorously when his leader­ ship was challenged. Periodic elections also gave the monkhood new scope for political influence. Sangha as­ sociations gave their energetic support to favored candi­ dates, and individual monks actively campaigned on behalf of those who promised to strive for the interests of Buddhism. The political uses of religion and the clergy, however attractive, could not be availed of indiscriminately. There has always been a certain distrust of the political pongyi, since the Vinaya assigns to the monk a purely religious role unsullied by contact with mundane concerns. Nor have many voters been taken in by the sudden burst of religiosity which overtakes lay politicians shortly before elections. In the 1960 election campaign U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein, leaders of the Stable AFPFL, desperately attempted to become devout Buddhists overnight by wellpublicized acts of piety. As Professor von der Mehden explained: "These acts were almost futile, for their op­ ponent is the symbol of Buddhism to large numbers of his countrymen. It was Nu who convened the Sixth World Buddhist Synod, a feat which only monarchs had pre­ viously accomplished. It was Nu who had for years sprinkled his speeches with Buddhist stories and sayings. It was Nu who was looked upon by many people as a Buddha in the becoming."31 U Nu himself, the dominant figure on the Burmese political scene from 1948 until 1962, embodied this close relationship between democracy and Buddhism. His sin­ cere zeal for the cause of Buddhism and his unique religious leadership were political assets of inestimable importance in the context of the democratic process. In the 1960 elections, which came after sixteen months of 31 Fred von der Mehden, "The Changing Pattern of Religion and Politics in Burma," in Sakai, p. 71.

RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

rule by a caretaker military regime, democracy and Buddhism became linked as campaign issues. U Nu prom­ ised the restoration of democracy and a constitutional amendment to make Buddhism the state religion; his Clean AFPFL won a resounding victory. The state religion amendment was adopted by a large majority vote in Parliament and reversed only by General Ne Win's decree following the 1962 coup d'etat. Unlike India, where de­ mocracy is closely associated with secularism, in Burma it is associated with Buddhist revivalism. In Burma, and to some extent in Pakistan, secularism is associated with revolutionary regimes. The ever-increasing resort to religious appeals in the democratic politics of independent Burma was a com­ pletely natural development. It need not be interpreted as the deliberate political exploitation of religion. It is worth noting that the Constitution explicitly prohibited such exploitation in article 21 (4): "The abuse of religion for political purposes is forbidden; and any act which is intended or is likely to promote feelings of hatred, enmity or discord between racial or religious communities or sects is contrary to this Constitution and may be made punishable by law." U Nu was indeed accused of violat­ ing this provision by introducing the state religion issue into the 1960 election campaign, but the basic problem was not simply the manipulation of religion for political purposes. In Burma the growing connection between democracy and religious revivalism was rooted in the nature of democracy itself. Democracy does not encour­ age the emergence of secular politics in a religious society.

CHAPTER

5

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

rJ-His

CHAPTEB deals with the governmental agencies and programs which since independence have sought to promote the interests of Buddhist religion in Burma. The reasons most frequently put forth by officials for the government's deep involvement in religious affairs are as follows: (1) The promotion of Buddhism has tra­ ditionally been one of the chief functions of government in Burma. (2) Government must encourage the revival of Buddhism because of its decline during sixty years of foreign rule. (3) The government's promotion of religion will help to end lawlessness and disorder in the country and strengthen the nation's moral fiber. (4) The govern­ ment has a positive duty to promote the people's welfare in future existences as well as in this life. (5) The re­ vival of Buddhism is the most effective way to counteract communist ideology. Partly reflected in these reasons, but underlying the whole development of Burma's official promotion of Bud­ dhism, has been the desperate need to establish the legitimacy of the political system and its leadership. Could parliamentary democracy and socialism be built in a country whose indigenous political traditions were basically monarchical and autocratic? Buddhism repre­ sented an important component of Burmese tradition which could be associated with a western-type political system. Yet this obvious source of legitimacy would prob­ ably never have been tapped had it not been for the personal convictions of independent Burma's first pre­ mier, U Nu. Had U Kyaw Nyein come to power after the assassination of General Aung San, secularist policies based on essentially secularist personal assumptions

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

would probably have continued. But U Nu's philosophi­ cal outlook was fundamentally different. Υ NU'S RELIGIOUS REVIVAL

U Nu is a deeply religious man. Any analysis of the governmental promotion of Buddhism in Burma must start with this basic fact. More than any other major political figure of South and Southeast Asia, U Nu is the authentic representative of the religious tradition of his country. While U Nu has derived immense political advantage from his fervent expressions of faith in Bud­ dhism, very few observers have found it possible to question his basic sincerity about religion.1 Even during his student days in the 1930's, every week U Nu led a group to the Shwedagon pagoda to undertake the meri­ torious work of cleansing its great platform. He spent several hours every day counting his Buddhist rosary beads and attributed much of the success of the 1936 students' strike to the devas (spirits), whose help he had invoked by writing auspicious numbers on a wall of the University convocation hall.2 His religious devotion pre­ ceded his political importance, was deepened by the experiences of public office, and continues to charac­ terize his private life. 1 It seems clear that the late S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, who became prime minister of Ceylon in 1956, had carefully calculated the political consequence when, returning to Ceylon from Oxford in the early 1930's, he set about identifying himself with the symbols of renascent nationhood. He learned Sinhalese and re­ nounced Christianity to embrace Buddhism. Bandaranaike's pro­ fession of Buddhism was not necessarily insincere, but the element of political calculation was undoubtedly present to a greater extent than in the case of U Nu, and he was regarded by many as a "political Buddhist." See Ivor Jennings, "Politics in Ceylon since 1952," Pacific Affairs, 1954, vol. 27, p. 344. 2 Richard Butwell, U Nu of Burma, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1963, p. 24. This biography contains a good discussion of U Nu's religiosity, pp. 61-71.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

On the eve of independence U Nu gave public expres­ sion to his profoundly religious approach to the responsi­ bilities of political power: "I have just returned from my religious observance at the Myathabeik Pagoda Hill. I made a solemn prayer while I was there that if by any chance I misuse my powers as premier for my personal gain in any respect, may I go headfirst to the lowest hell of Maha Avici."3 By July 1948 the country appeared to be disintegrating under the pressure of the insurrections. To counter this threat, the prime minister knelt before an image of the Lord Buddha and, although a married man, made a solemn vow that he would lead a life of celibacy from that day until death, and prayed that by virtue of this vow the menace of the insurgents would disappear. According to his testimony at a press conference ten years later, he had never committed a breach of that vow.4 Stepping down from the premiership in October 1958, U Nu divested himself of all personal possessions (these were later sold at auction and the proceeds used for charity), renounced the secular world, put on the yellow robe of the monk, and spent a week in a monas­ tery.5 Nu has become a monk seven times in his life, including a six-week period shortly before the 1960 elec­ tion campaign. Held in "protective custody" after the coup of March 1962, it was natural for U Nu to request a Buddha image, which was provided by the army authorities.6 3 U Nu, Towards Peace and Democracy, Ministry of Informa­ tion, Rangoon, 1949, p. 16. 4 New Times of Burma, October 26, 1958. 5 U Nu had planned to spend one week in a monastery in June 1958 after he had survived a vote of no confidence in Parliament by only eight votes with the unsolicited support of twenty-eight communists. He had to give up the plan, however, because he was advised that this would debar him from standing for election. Burmese Review and Monday New Times, June 23, 1958; New Times of Burma, June 26 and July 5, 1958. 6 The Guardian, March 7, 1962.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

Professor Hugh Tinker wrote that it was Buddhism's insistence on the transient and substanceless nature of the world which enabled Burmese leaders to view with equa­ nimity the collapse of the economy and institutions of government during the civil wars. Of U Nu he remarked that "amidst unceasing trials and upheavals he has emerged a selfless being, completely relaxed, without terision, inspired by vision and compassion; and his driv­ ing force is a Buddhism which permeates his every thought and action."7 While this tribute is well deserved, it should be accompanied by some consideration of the negative effects which U Nu's religion has had on his political leadership. His indecision and vacillation in dealing with lawless­ ness—one of the fundamental weaknesses of his adminis­ tration—is in one way or another connected with his reluctance to use force which might result in the taking of life, an act which perpetuates the Buddhist's imprison­ ment in the cycle of rebirth (samsara). U Nu declared in the Chamber of Deputies in 1961: "I am a man who greatly fears the dangers of samsara. Accordingly I have resolved to avoid all evil deeds in matters which concern my (personal) material progress and welfare. However, since the prosperity of religion and the welfare of the people is wholly based upon democracy, when the ene­ mies of democracy arise I will, without . . . fearing . . . the dangers of samsara, take all necessary action de­ cisively and promptly."8 Whether the fear of samsara was the cause or the rationalization for U Nu's indecisiveness, in either case he would have been a more effective prime minister without it. On this occasion he had to justify his threat to use force by appealing to other religious considerations ("the prosperity of religion"). 7 Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma: A Study of the First Years of Independence, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, p. 177. 8 The Nation, March 14, 1961.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

The government-sponsored religious revival was based on the assumption of U Nu's personal religious faith, which is traditionalist and uncritical. In four lengthy lec­ tures on Buddhism, delivered in Rangoon in January 1958, U Nu demonstrated his considerable knowledge of the scriptures. His discourses, replete with Pali terms, gave a superficial impression of scholarly profundity, but were in fact completely uncritical summaries of tradi­ tional Theravada doctrine. The following quotation will serve to illustrate the point: "Besides human beings and other living beings which are visible to us, there are many other kinds of beings in the world. The following are the various categories of the beings in the whole world: (1) the Brahmas, or higher spiritual beings; (2) the Devas, or lower spiritual beings; (3) human beings; (4) animals; (5) Peta, or departed spirits or beings in a state of continual misery; (6) Asuraka, or fallen woeful spiritual beings; (7) Nerayika, or beings in the nether­ most plane of existence."9 The govfcuimental promotion of Buddhism in Burma, like U Nu's personal practice of religion, made practically no distinctions. If the study of the Pali scriptures was encouraged, so was the veneration of relics. If emphasis was placed on the observance of Buddhist ethical prin­ ciples, an equal emphasis was put on the building of pagodas and other acts of merit. If facilities for the prac­ tice of meditation were provided, shrines were also built for the propitiation of the nats (spirits). U Nu's religious revival was a movement without any particular direction; it was essentially the undiscerning promotion of existing traditional Burmese religion. U Nu personally found value in all of these heterogeneous elements of religious tradition, and the government accordingly promoted them all. 9

New Times of Burma, January 8, 1958.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

Mysterious and supernatural phenomena occupy an important place in U Nu's religion. In 1961 he spent forty-five days at Mount Popa observing the sabbath regulations and meditating. Upon his return to Rangoon, the prime minister related that after he had led a life of prayer for forty days he was privileged to witness an extraordinary sight. For three successive days the Sudaungpye pagoda on Mount Popa sent out mysterious rays of light. The newspaper reporter who described U Nu's narration of the incident commented: "This was regarded by his listeners as a good omen, and as the cause of U Nu's confident mien in returning to mundane affairs."10 There have been a number of similar accounts of his extraordinary experiences. U Nu has also frequently been described as a firm believer in astrology who would not make any major decision without consulting an astrol­ oger. This charge he denied emphatically, claiming that he had consulted an astrologer only once during his entire lifetime.11 If U Nu's religious faith is traditionalist and uncritical and hence contains important elements of popular super­ stition and animism, it is also true that it is exceedingly naive in coming to grips with the problems of the world. Buddhism is the panacea which he would apply to all problems, and this basic assumption is important to an understanding of the government's efforts to stimulate religious revival. U Nu has shown little awareness of the difficulties involved in applying the individualistic ethic of Buddhism to the complex problems of society. Thus, in a lecture delivered in 1959, he traced all forms of con­ flict (in family, labor-management relations, politics, and international affairs) to the fundamental egocentricity of man. From this sound diagnosis, however, he simply pro10 11

The Nation, June 27, 1961. New Times of Burma, June 26, 1958.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

ceeded to prescribe the Buddhist doctrine of anatta. "To put it briefly, Buddhism is the way or the philosophy for the annihilation of causes that give rise to the T con­ sciousness."12 However valuable this philosophy for the spiritual progress of the individual, U Nu somehow neg­ lected to indicate how a labor union, political party, or nation could practice it. The tendency to regard the general principles of Bud­ dhism (which were originally elaborated exclusively as a way of individual salvation) as the key and the solution to all problems has characterized the government's reli­ gious involvement. U Nu declared in early 1951 that apathy to religion was responsible for 80 per cent of the disorders in Burma and that to overcome them it was necessary to bring about a religious revival.13 Eight months later Parliament passed the following resolution moved by U Win, minister of religious affairs: "That not being satisfied with the measures usually undertaken hitherto by the peoples and governments of the world for the solution of the problems confronting mankind by promoting the material well-being of man in his present existence . . . this Parliament declares its firm belief that it is necessary to devise and undertake such measures for the spiritual and moral well-being of man as would re­ move these problems and help man to overcome greed (Iobha), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha), which are at the root of all the violence, destruction and conflagra­ tion consuming the world."14 The tendency to propose religious platitudes where specific policies and vigorous action are required was illustrated most notably in 1960 when U Nu's finance minister, Thakin Tin, told the press that profiteering and black-marketing would be stopped by appealing to all 12

Burmese Review and Monday New Times, April 27, 1959. The Nation, March 1, 1951. 14 Burma: The Sixth Anniversary, vol. 4, January 1954, p. 1.

13

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

business men to observe the Buddha's teaching concern­ ing metta (all-embracing compassion). One year later this "policy" was abandoned, having proved a total fail­ ure, and the government announced that stern measures would be taken to control the prices of essential com­ modities.15 Whether the teaching of metta was seriously believed to be adequate, or was simply a rationalization for inaction, in either case its use was rather pathetic. In the discussion thus far we have focused attention primarily on U Nu's personal religious faith as the key to understanding the Burmese government's promotion of Buddhism. His role was indeed a dominant one, and this fact has been widely recognized. In his presidential address to the World Fellowship of Buddhists in 1954, Dr. G. P. Malalasekera of Ceylon declared that U Nu stood "unique among the world's statesmen, by his un­ paralleled piety and the embodiment of the ideal of Rajarsi, the ruler who is also a sage." The Burmese prime minister, he continued, had brought about a great renas­ cence of Buddhism in the country.16 But general condi­ tions in Burma were also favorable to a governmentinspired return to religion. Independence brought to the war-ravaged country the insurrections, lawlessness, a serious communist threat, and a general sense of inse­ curity. In its search for new foundations the westernized elite found the new emphasis on Buddhism psychologi­ cally satisfying as a symbol of the reassertion of their national identity. The masses were responsive to tradi­ tional symbols and could identify with the leaders who 15 See

the editorial, "Action Against Profiteers," The Guardian, October 6, 1961. 16 The Nation, December 4, 1954. For another interpretation of the Buddhist revival see E. Michael Mendelson, "Buddhism and the Burmese Establishment," Archives de Sociologie des Re­ ligions, 1964, No. 17, and "Religion and Authority in Modern Burma," The World Today, March 1960.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

used them. Thus, while U Nu boldly led the way, he was supported by all levels of Burmese society at every step. THE BUDDHA SASANA COUNCIL

A ministry of religious affairs was created in 1950 and has played a significant role in the governmental promo­ tion of Buddhism. Its chief responsibilities, however, have been the implementation of the various legislative acts dealing with religion, such as the Ecclesiastical Courts Acts, the Pali University and Dhammacariya Act, etc. It was felt that there was need for a separate body, not directly responsible to the government, which could de­ vote itself exclusively to the promotion and propagation of the Dhamma. Accordingly, the Buddha Sasana Coun­ cil Bill was debated and passed by Parliament in October 1950.17 Attorney General Chan Htoon played a leading role in the Buddhist revival movement, and, according to his account, the Buddha Sasana Council was his brainchild. As U Chan Htoon saw it, there was an urgent need to restore Buddhism to its rightful place, the place of honor and patronage which it held under the Burmese kings. Buddhism would constitute the essential cement to mold Burmese nationhood; it would provide national ideals and values. An emphasis on Buddhism would restore whole­ some ethical standards to political life. But most impor­ tant, Buddhism alone could check the expansion of com­ munist ideology in Southeast Asia. U Chan Htoon pointed to the expansion of Islam in this area in the fifteenth century and asserted that it was halted by the revival of orthodox Buddhism. In the Theravada Buddhist countries Islam made little head17 As sometimes used, the word sasana means not only "doctrine" (the primary meaning), but the Sangha, laity, and all of the practices associated with the faith. The closest English equivalent to so broad a term as Buddha sasana is "Buddhism."

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

way, whereas Hindu and Mahayana Buddhist countries succumbed to this alien ideology and force. Drawing an analogy between fifteenth-century Islam and present-day communism, he found both to be aggressive ideologies demanding man's total submission and loyalty. Today, as five centuries ago, only the revival of Buddhism can pre­ vent the ideological conquest of Burma and much of Southeast Asia. In U Chan Htoon's determined words: "We must make history repeat itself."18 Buddhism, he declared, is rational and anti-authoritarian; its emphasis on individual self-reliance is the antithesis of collectivist totalitarianism. According to U Chan Htoon, Premier Nu was at first hesitant over the proposal to create a Buddha Sasana Council. The Socialist Party within the AFPFL was op­ posed to the idea. Some of the politicians feared that an integrated Buddhist Council, organized at the local as well as national level, would have too much influence and might eventually become an independent center of political power. Other Socialists, steeped in Marxist cliches, found it hard to approve of any organization designed to promote religion. Still others opposed the move primarily because of their adherence to the western concept of separation of church and state. U Nu finally brushed these objections aside, and the bill was intro­ duced in Parliament. U Tun Pe, minister of information and religious affairs, who introduced the bill, reported that U Chan Htoon and he had previously explained the provisions of the bill to the leading sayadaws of the Sangha in Mandalay. Prime Minister U Nu in his speech dealt with the aims and objects of the legislation. First, the Buddha Sasana Council would be a body which would represent all the Buddhists in the country, an organization which would 18

From interviews with U Chan Htoon in Rangoon, February

1963.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

provide a united religious leadership. Second, the council would lay a firm foundation for Buddhism in the country by encouraging the true practice of religion. Third, the council would defend Buddhism from ideological attack; to those who doubted the omniscience of the Buddha, this organization would be prepared to explain that "Karl Marx's knowledge is much smaller than one-tenth of a particle of dust at Lord Gotama's foot." Fourth, the council would send Buddhist missionaries to other coun­ tries to propagate the Dhamma, just as America and Britain had sent out Christian missionaries. The bill was passed the same day it was introduced, with the members of Parliament reciting the threefold "Sadhu."19 The act provided for the creation of two important bodies composed entirely of Buddhist laymen. In view of the Sangha's historical importance in the promotion of the sasana, this might have appeared strange. However, from another point of view the councils, established by the government, represented a revival of the long tradi­ tion of the ruler as defender of the faith. Furthermore, in 1950 the government had high hopes that a genuine ecclesiastical organization of the Sangha would soon be forthcoming. The Union Buddha Sasana Executive Coun­ cil was to be composed of twenty-seven laymen, includ­ ing the minister for religious affairs and nine persons appointed by the president of the Union on the advice of the Ovadacariya Sayadaws.20 The Union Buddha Sa­ sana Council was to be a much larger body (over eighty members) composed of all the members of the executive council and regional representatives of Buddha Sasana 10 Hanthawaddy, October 4, 1950. "Sadhu" is similar to "Amen," and is repeated three times at the conclusion of Buddhist religious acts. 20 The Ovadacariya Sayadaws were selected under the provisions of the Ecclesiastical Courts Act of 1949.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

AfiFairs Organizations in all the states and districts; its duties were to be exclusively advisory in nature. The most important powers conferred by the act were to be exercised by the Union Buddha Sasana Executive Council. Its responsibilities were stated as follows: ( a ) to work by itself or in cooperation with other or­ ganizations for the propagation and advancement of the Buddha Sasana within and outside the Union of Burma; ( b ) t o e s t a b l i s h Dhamma-duta (Buddhist missionary) centers within and outside the Union of Burma and to open and establish classes and institutions for that purpose; ( c ) t o h o l d o r a l a n d w r i t t e n Pariyatti examinations and to do other things for the purpose of pro­ moting the Pariyatti Sasana; and ( d ) t o w o r k f o r t h e p r o m o t i o n o f t h e Patipatti Sasana.21 The other five points described the council's objectives in extremely vague terms—to promote Buddhist culture, Buddhist unity, the observance of the Dhamma, and the peace and happiness of all people. The act listed "con­ tribution by the Union government" as one of the six sources of income for the fund of the executive council, and this has been by far the largest source. Presiding over the inauguration of the Buddha Sasana Council on August 26, 1951, Home and Religious Affairs Minister U Win declared that the government had ac­ cepted the role of promoter of the Buddhist faith. After the fall of King Thibaw in 1885, the Buddhist public had tried to promote religion as best it could and for over sixty years had struggled to perform this task without the material support of a Faithful Ruler. But now the 21 The Buddha Sasana Council Act, 1312 B.E. (1950), section 18. Pariyatti examinations stress the content of the Buddhist scriptures; Patipatti refers to the practice of the Buddhist doctrine.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

circumstances had changed, and Burma had an inde­ pendent and freely elected government. "It is but inevi­ table that the government becomes the Promoter of the Faith on behalf of the people who elected it. The gov­ ernment thus elected cannot merely look on indifferently at the religious structure which was disintegrating during the last sixty years. The government wishes to see the unity of the Sanghas, the zealous devotion of the Sanghas to religious knowledge and practice, and wishes to en­ courage to the utmost the propagation of the Dhamma."22 U Win declared that the progress of Buddhism de­ pended on three factors: (1) a true and devoted Sangha, (2) a strongly united laity, and (3) a government deter­ mined to promote the faith. The Buddha Sasana Council would make an important contribution to the progress of religion. The organization was to be completely free from political interference; the minister for religious af­ fairs was a member of the executive council only because this was thought desirable by the representatives of the religious organizations when the bill was drafted. U Win referred to several specific religious projects which were being planned, including the renovation of dilapidated pagodas "wherein sacred relics of Lord Bud­ dha are authentically stated to be enshrined," the encour­ agement of the study of the Dhamma "as befits the lead­ ing Buddhist country in the world," and the convening of the Sixth World Buddhist Council. The Burmese' national pride in their Theravada Buddhist heritage, reflected in U Win's speech, was nicely summed up in the following editorial comment: "Burma is one of the few strongholds of Buddhism in its purest form, and has a special re­ sponsibility to the world to foster that purity and hand it on unsullied to future generations."23 22

The Nation, August 27, 1951. and Buddhism," ibid., September 16, 1951.

28 "Burma

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

The first oflBcers of the Buddha Sasana Executive Council were eminent men who had long been identified with the cause of Buddhist renascence in Burma. The president, U Thwin, was a wealthy philanthropist who had played a leading role in the development of the Sasana Yeiktha meditation center. The vice president, U Thein Maung, was then chief justice of the Supreme Court. He had been a prominent nationalist and had led the fight against the British practice of desecrating Bur­ mese pagodas by wearing shoes. The general secretary was U Chan Htoon, formerly attorney general of the Union, and at that time a justice of the Supreme Court.24 The Buddha Sasana Council has been very active in the publication of Burmese translations of the Buddhist scriptures and, with printing presses donated by the Ford Foundation, has produced them in large quantities. As a stimulus to the study of the scriptures by the laity, ex­ aminations have regularly been held, with appropriate prizes for successful candidates. In 1952, when this pro­ gram was initiated, 12,000 candidates appeared at eightyseven centers throughout the country to take the exami­ nation in the Abhidhamma Pitaka (philosophical scrip­ tures, the third "basket" of the Tripitaka).25 In 1960 over 15,000 candidates took the Abhidhamma examination (ordinary and honors); over 8,000 of these candidates passed.26 These examinations are conducted in Burmese and are designed to meet the needs of the lay people, as 24 John

F. Brohm, "Burmese Religion and the Burmese Religious Revival," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1957, p. 406; Tinker, p. 170. 25 "The Union Buddha Sasana Council's Activities," The Light of the Dhamma, vol. 1, January 1953, pp. 42-43. 28 Burma: The Fourteenth Anniversary, Director of Information, Government of the Union of Burma, Rangoon, 1962, p. 176. For five years (1955-1959) the Buddha Sasana Council conducted Abhidhamma examinations in Ceylon, reflecting recognition of the high attainments of Burmese scholarship in this field.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

contrasted with the more advanced Patamabyan exami­ nations sponsored by the Pali Education Board. The Pali examinations are primarily intended to raise the level of scholarship in the Sangha. The council also prepared a special series of elemen­ tary examinations on the Mangala Sutta (Buddhist ser­ mons) as part of a program for the rehabilitation of prisoners. The examination, in four parts, is given twice a year in jails throughout the country. To prepare the candidates for the examination, monks hold regular classes in the jails. The reward for passing the examina­ tions is a remission of sentence according to the following scale: part ι—fifteen days; part π—one month; part in— two months; and part iv—three months. The maximum remission of four months is earned by the candidate who passes all four parts in the same year. Certificates are presented to the successful candidates in the jails by representatives of the Buddha Sasana Council.27 In 1960 the number of prisoners who appeared as candidates in these examinations was 5,542. The council has been very active in propagating the faith among the non-Buddhist hill peoples, both directly and through its support of such missionary agencies as the Society for the Propagation of Buddhism. Monks have been sent out, and new monasteries have been estab­ lished and endowed in the frontier areas, where formerly animism was challenged only by the Christian mission­ aries. This kind of Buddhist activity was not permitted by the British, but has now become a significant aspect of the government's cultural "Burmanization" of the Chins, Kachins, Nagas, Shans, Karens, and other peoples. 27

The Nation, November 28, 1954. In 1955 the government formed a committee to explore the possibility of similar examina­ tions in Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism, as non-Buddhist prisoners protested the discrimination in not being given the opportunity to earn remission of their sentences. Ibid., June 10, 1955.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

At Myitkyina, in the Kachin state, a large procession marched through the streets in November 1959 to mark the ceremony in which forty-one residents of the hill tracts (including Nagas, Kachins, Shans, and Chinese) became novices in the Sangha. Indicative of the impor­ tance attached to such acts in government circles, the ceremony was attended not only by state officials but also by the Union Director of Religious AfiFairs Bandoola U Sein, Deputy Premier and Religious AfiFairs Minister U Lun Law, and other high-ranking officials.28 Although animism was constitutionally recognized among the reli­ gions professed by citizens of the Union, this formal abandonment of it in favor of Buddhism received enthu­ siastic official approval. It was reported in 1959 that Buddhism was spreading steadily in the mountainous area along the northern bor­ der due to the untiring efforts of the Buddha Sasana Council. A total of 122 missionary schools had been estab­ lished in remote parts of the country, and 124 monks were engaged in propagating Buddhism through these institutions. In addition, itinerant preachers were spread­ ing the message of the Buddha in areas where schools would one day be started. It was reported that over 6,000 students, both boys and girls, had embraced Bud­ dhism, and the total number of converts in these areas was 131,322. Apparently as an inducement, the regular practice was to supply free textbooks and clothing to students who became Buddhists. A convert who wished to become a novice in the Sangha was provided with the yellow robe, rice bowl, and other requirements of a monk free of charge. The Buddha Sasana Council made a pub­ lic appeal for donations in cash or kind for distribution among the converts.29 28

New Times of Burma, November 21, 1959. Burmese Review and Monday New Times, September 21, 1959. See also Burma: The Fourteenth Anniversary, pp. 178-179. 29

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

In U Nu's speech in Parliament supporting the creation of the council, an important point was the missionary work which it would undertake in foreign countries. In fact, the establishment of Dhamma-duta (Buddhist mis­ sionary) centers was one of the specific tasks assigned to the council by the act itself. A Dhamma-duta College was officially opened in December 1952 at the Kaba Aye pagoda, with all of the officers of the sponsoring Buddha Sasana Council in attendance.30 The main emphasis of the curriculum was the study of Hindi and English, which would prepare the graduates for effective mis­ sionary work in Hindu India, the homeland of Buddhism, England, and America. Admission was restricted to monks who had passed the Dhammacariya examination and who were thus already well equipped in terms of their knowledge of Buddhist doctrine. Of the twenty original students, however, twelve dropped out in less than a year, and the institution continued to languish with little enthusiasm or sense of direction.31 There un­ doubtedly exists among certain Burmese Buddhists the fervent conviction that they have a vitally important message for the world, but ambitious projects to carry out their mission have thus far failed dismally. Undoubtedly the most active Burmese Buddhist mis­ sionary to foreign countries has been U Nu himself. He has delivered many lectures on Buddhism in India, Eng­ land, the United States, and other countries. In 1962 he consulted with Bhikku Kathapa, head of Pali and Bud­ dhistic Studies at Banaras Hindu University, about his plan of inviting forty boys (fifteen years of age or younger) from different parts of India to study the theory and practice of Buddhism in Burma. These forty stu­ dents, together with ten from Nepal already invited, Official claims of Buddhist missionary successes among the hill tribes were greatly exaggerated, according to reliable observers. 3 0 New Times of Burma, December 21, 1952. 31 Brohm, pp. 415-416.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

would receive several years of training in a monastery in Upper Burma to become Buddhist missionaries. After graduation they would return to their respective coun­ tries to propagate Theravada Buddhism.32 The Buddha Sasana Council has strengthened the emphasis on meditation in modern Theravada Buddhism. Various vipassana (meditation) groups provide for their members expert instruction in the techniques of "insight" meditation, as a means of hastening progress toward the goal of nibbana. One such private organization, the Buddha Sasana Nuggaha Association, is engaged in building a network of meditation centers throughout the country, a project subsidized by the council. At the Sasana Yeiktha retreat center monks are trained to take charge of meditation centers elsewhere. THE SIXTH GREAT BUDDHIST COUNCIL

The convening of the Sixth Great Buddhist Council (or Synod) in Rangoon in May 1954 and its labors, which lasted for two years, were undoubtedly the most dra­ matic evidence of the government's determination to promote Theravada Buddhism in Burma and in the world. Theravada Buddhists accept the historicity and validity of five previous councils, the first three in India, the fourth in Ceylon, and the fifth in Burma. At the Fifth Great Council, convened at Mandalay by King Mindon in 1871, the Tripitaka texts were inscribed on 729 marble slabs.83 32

Burma Weekly Bulletin, January 25, 1962. In a speech at New York University in 1955 U Nu appealed to the American people to put Buddhism to the test in the same way that a scien­ tific theory is tested. He suggested that ten persons be selected to travel to Burma to practice the required course of spiritual exercises and then to return and report their experiences to the American people. U Nu5 What is Buddhism?, New York Univer­ sity, New York, 1955, p. 11. 33 See chapter 1, "Buddhism and the State in Old Burma."

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

The decision to convene another great council to re-edit the scriptures, only eighty-odd years later, derived from both religious and non-religious considerations. The ap­ proaching 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha's mahaparinibbana (death and attainment of nibbana) was thought to be especially auspicious and would be suit­ ably marked by the convening of a great council. As stated in one official publication: "There is a common belief in all the Buddhist countries that this anniversary will initiate a great revival of Buddhism throughout the world when the Buddhist way of life and thus universal peace will prevail."34 But the recent attainment of inde­ pendence and the close association of Buddhism with a renascent Burmese nationhood were clearly important factors also. There was, in the initial stages of planning, considera­ ble confusion over the timing and the sponsorship of the synod. Thus, in the first official announcement in 1951, U Nu declared in New Delhi that Burma was witnessing an unprecedented religious revival and that the synod would be convened in May 1952.35 At first the prepara­ tions for this very ambitious project were made the responsibility of the ministry of religious affairs. It was not until November 1951 that the government decided that it would be "more beneficial to the public in acquir­ ing merit" if the synod were entrusted to the Buddha Sasana Council, which represented the Buddhists of the country.36 It was decided to inaugurate the great council on the full moon day of Kason, May 17, 1954. While the firm decision to convene the Sixth Great Synod had already been made by the government and its implementation entrusted to the Buddha Sasana Coun34 "The

Sixth Great Buddhist Council," Burma, the Sixth Anni­ versary, vol. 4, January 1954, p. 2. 35 The Nation, October 26, 1951. 36 Chattha Sangayana: 2,500th Buddha Jayanti Celebrations, Rangoon, 1956, p. 56.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

cil, these were both bodies of laymen, and it was essential to gain the support and cooperation of the Sangha, which alone could make the synod authoritative. In February 1952 a conference of fifty-three leading mahatheras (sayadaw judges appointed under the Ecclesiasti­ cal Courts Act and monks on whom the title of Agga Maha Pandita had been conferred) was held to consider the question. Two of the resolutions adopted by the conference were as follows: "(1) Resolved that there being plenty of mis­ spellings made by the scribes in repeatedly copying the five Nikayas and the teachings of the Buddha, it is ex­ pedient to hold the Chattha Sangayana (Sixth Council) for the purpose of purifying the texts, scrutinizing, edit­ ing, reciting and arranging all the teachings of the Bud­ dha. . . . (3) Resolved that in order to enable the Union of Burma, in collaboration with the other Buddhist coun­ tries of the world, to propagate Theravada Buddhism in foreign lands, and to promote the Buddha's Sasana as far as practicable, it is expedient to hold the Sixth Great Buddhist Council."37 A Supreme Sangha Council, com­ posed of twenty-four eminent Burmese mahatheras, was formed to organize and direct the work of the monks in the synod, which was after all central to its funda­ mental purpose. The choice of a site for the meeting fell on a hillock where the Kaba Aye World Peace pagoda had already been constructed (completed in March 1952). The build­ ing of this pagoda was one of U Nu's pet projects financed by the government and earned him the title of payataga (giver of a pagoda). The sacred relics of two chief disciples of the Buddha, Sariputta and Moggalana, do­ nated by the government of India, were enshrined with great pomp in the Kaba Aye pagoda. The new buildings 37

Loc.cit.; The Nation, February 6, 1952.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

required for the Sixth Great Buddhist Council were constructed adjacent to the pagoda. Most notable among these was the Great Sacred Cave, modeled after the Sattapanni Cave at Rajagaha, India, where the first council was believed to have been held shortly after the death of the Buddha. The cave is a large assembly hall (seating capacity, 10,000) covered by a huge mound of earth and rock forming an artificial hill. The six entrances to the cave mark the Sixth Council, and twenty-four windows represent the twenty-four causal relations of Buddhist doctrine. Before the foundation stone of the Great Cave was laid by the prime minister on January 15, 1953, prayers were recited at the site con­ tinuously for three days by five hundred monks. The construction of the cave took fourteen months and cost over $2,000,000. Many thousands volunteered their labor and made cash donations toward this meritorious work. The central AFPFL paid for the six huge concrete columns which support the roof, and 60,000 volunteers connected with AFPFL organizations worked on the cave. The other buildings constructed for the synod were: four hostels with accommodations for 1,000 monks, a refectory capa­ ble of serving 1,500 monks at one time, a dispensary, a library, and a building housing a large printing press.38 There was a vast amount of work on the Pali texts which had to be completed before the inauguration of the Sixth Council. In fact, the sessions of the council did little more than recite the revised texts and give the Sangha's formal approval to them. Much of the essential preparatory work was done by a body of lay scholars at the office of the Buddha Sasana Council. They prepared a first draft based on the Pali texts adopted by the Fifth 38 Ibid., May 11, 1954; Chattha Sangayana, p. 16; see also Pe Maung Tin, "The Resurgence of Buddhism and the Search for New Foundations," U Kyaw Than, ed., Witness Together, East Asia Christian Conference, Rangoon, n.d. (I960?), pp. 51-59.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

Council in 1871, revised after comparison with texts from Ceylon, Thailand, Cambodia, and England (the Pali Text Society, London) and authoritative commentaries. The next step was for 1,129 qualified Burmese mahatheras, divided into 116 committees, to check and re-edit the texts.39 Simultaneously, 185 Ceylonese monks divided into 37 groups also re-edited the same texts. After reediting by these separate national groups, the final ver­ sion was decided on by boards of revisers composed of Burmese, Ceylonese, and Thai mahatheras. It was re­ ported that lengthy and sometimes heated discussions arose between the Burmese and Ceylonese representa­ tives before the texts were finally accepted.40 Two months before the inauguration of the Sixth Great Buddhist Council, U Nu introduced in Parliament the Pitaka Bill, which sought to prevent the publication and circulation of careless and erroneous versions of the scriptures. The prime minister complained that certain irresponsible publishers were in the habit of printing editions of the Pitakas which contained many mistakes. With the revision and standardization of the scriptures now being completed by the Sangha and the final seal of approval to be given shortly by the synod, it was necessary to ensure that all future printings be under­ taken with reverence and care.41 A few days before the opening of the council, U Nu hastily called a meeting of the leading sayadaws of the three sects of the Burmese Sangha (the Thudhamma, the Shwegyin and the Dvara), occasioned by serious differ­ ences among them over the procedure to be followed during the sessions. The seventeen sayadaws accepted a 39

If the number of editors seems large, it must be remembered that the Pali canon, when printed in its entirety, will come to about fifty volumes of 400-500 pages each. 40 Chattha Sangayana, pp. 57, 64-65; The Nation, May 13, 1954. 41 Ibid., March 15, 1954.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

compromise solution by which the members of all three denominations would participate jointly in the recitation of the scriptures. With respect to the consecration of religious buildings, sabbath observances, and other reli­ gious practices, they would be free to participate or not as they might wish. A written agreement to this effect was drawn up and signed.42 Many steps were taken by the government to make the Sixth Council an unforgettable occasion of profound reli­ gious and national significance. A general three-month remission of prison sentences was announced, and those under sentence of death found that the Buddhist teach­ ing of compassion had resulted in its commutation to life imprisonment. Special stamps commemorating the event were issued by the postal department. Special concession rates on fares for people proceeding to Rangoon to attend the synod were also announced (50 per cent on travel by state-owned rail and launch transportation; 30 per cent on Union of Burma Airlines). The government directed that all slaughter houses be closed during the first four days of the synod.43 Drums, gongs, and conch shells greeted the auspicious moment—exactly twelve minutes thirty seconds after noon on May 17, 1954—when the Sixth Great Buddhist Council solemnly began its work. The first three days were devoted to opening ceremonies, addresses, and the reading of messages of goodwill.44 In his speech of vener­ ation delivered on the first day, U Nu recounted as sober historical fact the fabled visit of the Buddha to Thaton with 20,000 of his followers and his subsequent daily journeys by air between Upper Burma and India. U Nu urged the members of the Sangha to devote themselves exclusively to their primary tasks, the study and teaching 42 Ibid., May 16, 1954. Ibid., March 30 and May 16, 1954. 44 Burma Weekly Bulletin, May 19 and 26, 1954. 43

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

of the scriptures and meditation. He reported on the activities of the government since independence for the promotion of Buddhism and in conclusion respectfully requested the 2,500 assembled monks to edit the Pitakas bravely, without any fear, in the knowledge that they were under the protection of the government.45 The primary task of the synod was the ceremonial recitation and formal confirmation of the re-edited Tripitaka texts by the monks. The entire Pali canon was recited and confirmed in five sessions over a two-year period. The first session completed the recitation of the five Vinaya Pitakas comprising five books of 2,260 pages. The first and part of the second sessions were presided over by the most eminent elder of the Burmese Sangha, the much-revered Nyaungyan Sayadaw, who died in the midst of his labors. The first part of the third session was presided over by the Sangharaja of Cambodia and the second part by the Sangharaja of Laos. The fourth ses­ sion was chaired by the Sanghanayaka of Thailand, and the fifth, by the head of the Malwatte chapter of the Siam sect of Ceylon.46 While the vast majority of the monks who participated in the council were Burmese, recogni­ tion was thus given to all five Theravada Buddhist coun­ tries in its leadership. The closing of the two-year synod coincided with the 2,500th anniversary of the Buddha's death, and the cele­ brations on that day (the full moon day of Kason, 2,500 B.E.—May 24, 1956) provided a fitting climax to the intensive religious activities in which the whole country was caught up. Special postage stamps commemorating the 2,500th Buddha Jayanti were issued. Clemency was granted to 2,000 prisoners, who were released; the ma­ jority had been sent to jail for short terms, but fifteen 45 Thakin Nu, Forward with the People, Ministry of Informa­ tion, Rangoon, 1955, pp. 144-169. 48 Chattha Sangayana, pp. 15-16, 25-26.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

had been sentenced to life imprisonment. The president, prime minister, and chief justice of the Union led the people in offering gifts to honor the monks at the closing ceremonies in the Great Cave. In a scene of unparalleled religious fervor, 2,668 youths entered the Sangha in a mass initiation ceremony. The plan had been to induct 2,500, but so many parents ardently desired to have their sons become novices on that auspicious day that the number was exceeded.47 In country-wide celebrations, the Sasana flag was displayed, novices were initiated and monks fed, slaugh­ ter houses and liquor shops were closed, birds and animals meant for slaughter were freed, pagodas were gilded, religious plays staged, and Burma Air Force planes dropped leaflets proclaiming the success of the council and the Buddha Jayanti celebrations over eight cities and towns. The government originally planned to use the entire group of buildings at Kaba Aye for an International Buddhist University, to be founded soon after the con­ clusion of the Sixth Council. As a nucleus for the pro­ jected university, the government-supported International Institute for Advanced Buddhistic Studies began func­ tioning in 1955 under the direction of U Hpe Aung. The Ford Foundation contributed sizable funds toward the founding of this institute, which was expected "to serve all of Southeast Asia and to provide a center for eastern and western scholars interested in Buddhism and in the philosophies and cultures of the East."48 The institute has continued to carry on its program of teaching, re47

The Nation, May 21-26, 1954. From the agreement between the government and the Ford Foundation. Ibid., April 2, 1954. See the brochure, The Interna­ tional Institute of Advanced Buddhistic Studies, Superintendent, Government Printing and Stationery, Rangoon, 1959, and Burma: The Fourteenth Anniversary, pp. 180-185. 48

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

search, publication, and cataloguing of Buddhist manu­ scripts, and has attracted a few research scholars from the West each year. The International Buddhist University, however, has thus far failed to materialize. Meanwhile, the buildings at Kaba Aye have shown signs of serious neglect and decay.49 The significance of the Sixth Great Buddhist Council had many dimensions, national and international, reli­ gious and political; its implications for government, Sangha, and laity were profound. The council's greatest significance was symbolic; it dramatized in unforgettable fashion the government's commitment to the promotion of Buddhism, which was regarded as an essential com­ ponent of the Burmese national identity. The holding of the council was a supreme act of religious merit from which U Nu, members of the government, the Sangha, and ultimately every Burmese Buddhist derived personal karmic benefit.50 The council, while it had special mean­ ing for the Burmese, was also a demonstration of the solidarity of all Theravada Buddhists and, in a more lim­ ited way, of all Buddhists. In one sense it was an expres­ sion of resurgent Buddhist Asia in the post-colonial era, pointing to the spiritual bankruptcy of the Christian West in failing to achieve world peace and reasserting the validity, vitality, and relevancy of the message of the Buddha. In the light of these considerations, the cere­ monial recitation of re-edited Pali texts almost paled into insignificance. CEREMONIES, RELICS, AND PAGODAS

Two western observers of the Burmese religious scene have claimed to see a distinctive emphasis in the course of Buddhist revival since independence. According to Hugh Tinker, the "supreme emphasis" placed on medi48 50

The Nation, December 5-6, 1960, and March 13, 1961. See Brohm, p. 418.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

tation and the scriptures may presage the attainment of a higher plane of Burmese Buddhism.51 John F. Brohm regarded vipassana meditation as "the outstanding sym­ bol of modern urban Burmese religion and the ultimate hallmark of the religious revival."52 To the extent that these writers had in mind the private organizations which have spontaneously fostered the practice of meditation, this may be true. But if one considers the religious activi­ ties of the government, which were by far the most prominent aspects of the revival, it is very doubtful that any clear emphasis could be discerned. The superstitions and animistic practices of popular Burmese religion were sanctified and encouraged by the government with as much enthusiasm as the establishment of meditation centers. The government was very clear in its intentions, although unsuccessful in its efforts, to reform the Sangha; but in other areas of Buddhist doctrine and practice, the main effort was to revivify and strengthen long-estab­ lished religious traditions, not to effect reforms. To start with a very elementary point, government officials assumed an almost indispensable role in the opening ceremonies of practically all religious festivals. On such occasions high officials usually delivered little homilies on morality or the significance of the festival, narrated Buddhist legends, and urged the people to greater devotion and merit-making. Participation in re­ ligious ceremonies by the president, prime minister, chief justice, and others in their official capacity were frequent and sometimes ostentatious, always in the form of tradi­ tional practices—praying at pagodas, offering alms-food or robes to monks, planting sacred Bo saplings, pouring scented water on sacred Bo trees, and hoisting ornamental spires into place atop pagodas. Headed by the chief justice of the Union, all Supreme Court and High Court judges, officials of the judiciary, 51

52

Tinker, p. 166.

166

Brohm, p. 418.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

and many members of the bar visited the Shwedagon pagoda in a group to celebrate the opening of each new session of the courts. After praying on the pagoda plat­ form, the party made offerings to the senior sayadaws, who then administered the Five Precepts and admonished the judges and lawyers to seek impartial justice.53 When U Ba Swe became prime minister in 1956, he went to the Shwedagon pagoda immediately after being sworn in at the president's house. He walked at the head of his cabinet around the pagoda to solemnize the promises made on taking office and wrote in the visitors' book: "Today, the premier and the cabinet came to pay homage. May the good spirits (nats) aid us in our task of serving the people, the country and the Sasana."54 All such public ceremonies were an important means of promoting Buddhism, since the people were thereby en­ couraged to emulate the government in devotion to re­ ligion.55 While the ethical teachings of Buddhism were emphasized in some cases (as in the sayadaws' sermon to the judges), official participation in religious ceremonies generally strengthened traditional conceptions of rather mechanical merit-making.56 Religious acts were on many occasions used as a kind of substitute for definite progress toward such national goals as peace and prosperity. Consider, for example, the following front-page news­ paper report of an event which took place one month before General Ne Win's 1962 coup: "Prime Minister Dr. 53

Burma Weekly Bulletin, June 16, 1960; New Times of Burma, June 3, 1959. 54 The Nation, June 13, 1956. 55 It is hardly necessary to add that the politicians in office derive considerable political as well as religious "merit" from such acts. 56 U Nu, in addressing a large gathering at the Tazaungdaing festival at Launmadaw, "stressed the merits of Dana [offerings] and explained how the donor in return could achieve benefits in the next existence." The Guardian, November 21, 1961.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

Nu freed 602 land and water animals for physical peace and mental happiness of the people of the Union. . . . Before freeing the animals Dr. Nu exhorted them not to avenge themselves of the wrongs if the people, in their previous existences, had either ill-treated or slaughtered them and that the people would reciprocate by forgiving them [the animals] if they had similarly done such wrongs against them [the people] in samsara [rounds of births]. Picture shows Dr. Nu spraying scented water with thabye [eugenia] leaves on the cattle wishing them a peaceful life for the rest of their days."57 However ration­ alized, the element of white magic in this manipulation of kamma is unmistakable. The official performance of meritorious deeds as a means of improving present con­ ditions in the country was a common device. Active government encouragement of the veneration of sacred relics (bones, teeth, or hairs allegedly of the Buddha or his disciples) was an important part of the religious revival from the beginning. In 1950 U Nu ar­ ranged to have the relics of Sariputta and Moggalana brought from India, and other relics from Ceylon. These sacred objects were taken around the country and wor­ shipped with unprecedented fervor by vast crowds.58 As noted above, portions of the relics of the two disciples were later enshrined in the Kaba Aye pagoda. In 1951 U Nu brought back from India "sacred earth" from the spot near Gaya where the Buddha attained enlighten­ ment. The members of the Buddha Sasana Council, minister for religious affairs, and entire cabinet were at the airport to meet the prime minister, and a procession of decorated cars conveyed the sacred earth to the Bota57

Ibid., February 5, 1962. The Nation, December 25, 1950. Pilgrims claimed that a circular effulgence of rainbow colors surrounded one shrine where the relics were kept. See "Divine Effulgence of Holy Relics in Mandalay," ibid., August 30, 1950. 58

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

taung pagoda where it was deposited with elaborate ceremony.59 In 1954 U Nu brought from Ceylon a casket containing relics of the Lord Buddha presented to him by the chief monk of the Mahaceti of Anuradhapura. It was reported that the premier stepped off the plane barefoot, in veneration of the sacred objects.60 In 1957 Chief Justice U Thein Maung, vice president of the Buddha Sasana Council, headed a special mission to Peking to receive the sacred tooth of the Buddha on loan from the Chinese Buddhist Association. The relic was displayed for public worship throughout the country, returned to China, and again brought back to Burma in 1959. U Nu brought more sacred relics from India the following year.61 The veneration of relics must surely be regarded as one of the non-rational elements in traditional Buddhism. In the religious program of the Burmese government this element was not only recognized as valid but ener­ getically promoted. U Nu's references to the "scientific approach" of Buddhism, or to the importance of medita­ tion, must always be considered in the light of this fact. Along with the veneration of relics, the building of pagodas is a religious activity which in Burma has tra­ ditionally been accorded high priority. The two are also intimately related in that a pagoda must contain a relic chamber, for without sacred relics the monument is meaningless. Dr. Pe Maung Tin wrote: "Burmans are a nation of pagoda-builders. When Theravada Buddhism was introduced into Pagan, the first Burmese kingdom in the eleventh century, it produced a great outburst of religious feeling manifested in the whole-hearted devo­ tion to the building of pagodas."62 After independence 59

60 Ibid., May 6, 1954. Ibid., October 31, 1951. New Times of Burma, January 11, 1958, September 26, 1959, and March 13, 1960. 62 Pe Maung Tin, p. 53. 61

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

this tradition was to some extent revived through the government's efforts to restore ancient pagodas and build new ones, another means of promoting Buddhism. We have already mentioned the construction of the Kaba Aye World Peace pagoda, also known as U Nus pagoda, largely with state funds. The chief emphasis, however, was on the rebuilding of historic shrines such as the Botataung pagoda in Rangoon, the Shwemawdaw pagoda in Pegu, the Shwesandaw in Toungoo, the Ananda in Pagan, the Kyauktawgyi in Amarapura, and the Shwezigon pagoda in Tagaung. The first of these was destroyed by bombing during the war and the second by earth­ quake, but most of the famous shrines restored since independence simply suffered the ravages of weather and time.63 Pagoda reconstruction projects were frequently under the auspices of the ministry of religious affairs, but pri­ vate contributions to this meritorious work were sub­ stantial. In January 1962 the rebuilding of the massive Mahazedi pagoda at Pegu was begun after Prime Minister U Nu secured from the directors of the nine Joint Ven­ ture Corporations (government-sponsored trading or­ ganizations) the promise of donations of 100,000 kyats each. According to one editorial comment, the directors "either through a desire to curry favor or to avoid incur­ ring political displeasure could not help but comply with the request."84 After the coup of March 2, the directors decided to stop payment of further instalments of their promised donations. While religious considerations were probably primary in the government's program of restoring ancient pagodas, the historic and cultural significance of these monuments 63 Tinker,

pp. 171-172; The Nation, September 28, 1951 and March 12, 1961. 64 "Forced Donation," The Guardian, April 9, 1962. For addi­ tional information on the Mahazedi project, ibid., January 6, April 7-9, 1962.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

is also obviously great. The best examples of Burmese architecture, sculpture, woodcarving, and painting are found in these shrines, some of which are truly mag­ nificent. Much of the work of restoration could be justified on purely secular grounds. Indeed, during the British period the archeological department made a great contri­ bution toward restoring some of the splendor of Pagan. The superstitious element in traditional pagoda-build­ ing, however, was evoked in November 1961, when the ministry of religious affairs issued instructions for the simultaneous building of 60,000 sand pagodas all over the country "to avert impending dangers and to achieve complete peace and tranquility in the Union."85 The directive, sent to all district commissioners and district religious affairs officers, specified the exact dimensions of the pagodas and the ritual to accompany their con­ struction, in both of which the auspicious number nine was prominent. The sand pagodas were to be nine cubits in height, to have nine-tiered spires of brass or iron, and were to be built on December 9, between the astrologically determined hours of 6 A.M. and 8:24 A.M. After the completion of each pagoda, nine monks were to be offered vegetarian alms-food, and religious texts were to be recited by nine men and nine women for three days. The directive was of course obeyed, without question for the most part, although one editorial writer dared to suggest: One day, all in good time, U Nu will perhaps tell us what kind of danger he has averted from us by the act done today—building 60,000 sand pagodas."66 65

Ibid., November 26 and December 10, 1961. December 9, 1961. Saya Daung Setkya, a well-known astrologer of Mandalay, however, predicted that the construction of the sand pagodas would bring about adverse circumstances and that U Nu would resign during the parliamentary term. Ibid., De­ cember 27, 1961. About nine weeks later came General Ne Win's coup. e e Ibid.,

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SPIRIT WORSHIP

The interpretation of the government's religious program as the undiscerning promotion of all aspects of traditional Burmese religion is strongly supported by a consideration of official policies toward the animistic practice of nat (spirit) propitiation. This primitive, indigenous, preBuddhist religious practice has been assimilated by Bur­ mese Buddhism to such an extent that the average layman is completely unaware of its separate origin. The per­ sistence of nat worship, despite its radically different approach to the universe from that taught by orthodox Theravada Buddhism, is largely explained by the fact that it enables the devotee to cope with the pressing immediate problems of this life, while the Buddha's austere doctrine offers no supernatural help, but only a path which in some undetermined future existence will lead to nibbana. Thus the Burmese avails himself of both the way of ultimate salvation and the help of the nats in promoting his own welfare in this existence. The rather prominent place of nat worship in popular religion has always been something of an embarrassment to many educated Burmese Buddhists, monks and laymen alike. Most learned discourses on Buddhism give no hint even of the existence of the practice. Even Dr. Htin Aung in writing on the subject felt constrained to assert that "such beliefs and practices cannot overwhelm Bud­ dhism in any way, for they have been shorn of their primitive meaning and philosophy."87 On the contrary, it is most likely that the survival of such practices is directly attributable to their primitive meaning, namely, 67 See Maung Htin Aung, "Folk-Elements in Burmese Bud­ dhism" Perspectwe of Burma: An Atlantic Monthly Supplement, New York, 1958, p. 50. For an interesting study of nat worship published by an anthropologist see E. Michael Mendelson, "Ob­ servations on a Tour in the Region of Mount Popa, Central Burma," France-Asie, May-June 1963, no. 179, pp. 780-807.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

that by the proper rituals and offerings the capricious spirits can be placated and induced to intervene in human affairs for the benefit of the worshipper. U Nus position, which he has held consistently, is that nat propitiation can be justified on the basis of certain Buddhist texts, that it is a legitimate form of worship for Buddhists, that it has proved effective in promoting the welfare of the country, and that it should be encouraged by positive governmental action. In his National Day speech in 1950, U Nu expounded the seven tenets of Aparihaniya—the Buddhist doctrine of building up internal strength. One of the seven principles which he recommended was bhalita, which he defined as "ob­ servance of the ancestral custom of making offerings to the guardian nats of village, town, and country."68 Ac­ cording to some reports, U Nu attributed the country's recovery from the insurrections to the help given by the spirits. In 1951 sacrificial offerings were made to the nats at the prime minister's house by the members of his cabinet "to invoke the blessings of the spirits for the peace and prosperity of the country."69 This ceremony was not performed on the spur of the moment, but only after U Win, minister of religious affairs, had carefully ques­ tioned a group of leading sayadaws as to whether such practices were fully compatible with Theravada Buddhist doctrine. The monks obligingly approved, declaring: "The practice can be conducive to the achievement of a coun­ try's prosperity and advancement."70 The questions and answers were recorded, broadcast over the air, and later published in a booklet entitled Union of Burma Procedure for Propitiation of Guardian Spirits, published by the 68

The Nation, December 6, 1950. Times of Burma, April 13, 1951. 70 Ibid., April 8, 1951. This and the previous quotation cited in Brohm, p. 401. es New

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

Thudhammawaddy Press.71 Nat worship was thus sancti­ fied by the Sangha's authoritative spokesmen, confirmed and practiced by the government itself. Public nat propitiation ceremonies with the participa­ tion of government officials became a regular feature in the celebration of various Buddhist festivals. In 1957 the president of the Union presided over the traditional nat ceremonies called devata-bali held at the foot of the Kaba Aye pagoda during the Thingyan festival. The president read a special address of prayer and veneration, then made a right-hand circuit around the platform scattering seven kinds of paddy, seven kinds of beans, and puffed rice from seven silver bowls.72 Similarly, during the annual celebration of Mahathamaya Day and other festi­ vals, offerings of fruit and flowers were made to the nats. General Ne Win became premier in October 1958, and some months later the question of nat propitiation came up for reconsideration. Since the views of the new mili­ tary regime were not difficult to ascertain, the new group of sayadatvs consulted on the question were able to give an opinion rather different from the "authoritative" pro­ nouncement of the first group. The question was the relative merits of (1) direct propitiation of the nats by offerings and (2) indirect propitiation by offerings to the Lord Buddha and Sangha, with the wish that the nats would enjoy an equal share of the religious merit ac­ quired by this act. The sayadaws agreed that the second alternative would be of more benefit both to the nats and to the people.73 The following announcement was there­ fore made by the government concerning the observance of Mahathamaya Day on June 20, 1959: "Under the ad­ ministration of the present government, instead of the 71

Nga Paw U, "Politicians Seek Supernatural Aid," New Times of Burma, October 9, 1959. The Nation, April 17, 1957. 73 Burmese Beview and Monday New Times, June 22, 1959.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

procedure annually of propitiation of the guardian spirits, the deputy prime minister and minister for religious affairs will offer soon (alms-food) to 200 monks. . . ."74 U Nu and the Clean AFPFL remained unconvinced by the new ecclesiastical pronouncement delivered by Sangha spokesmen. He and his party performed an elaborate devata-bali ceremony on July 18,1959, in which offerings of bananas, coconuts, cakes, and other items were made to propitiate the nats. The ceremony was held in a large hall at the Kaba Aye pagoda at the beginning of the Buddhist Lent. The whole hierarchy of nats and supernatural spirits was invoked, including the Five Great Nats, the constellation nats for the days of the week, the guardian spirits of the nine planets, the Thirty-Seven Nats of the Inner Circle, the Thirty-Seven Nats of the Outer Circle, etc. The special prayer offered by U Nu invoked their help in his political cause (the coming elections of February 1960): "May all the noble and good guardian spirits further . . . our prospects and wel­ fare. . . ."75 The nats apparently kept their part of the bargain, for with their help, plus the promise to make Buddhism the state religion, U Nu's Clean AFPFL won an overwhelming victory at the polls. The nats were immediately reinstated in official ceremonies. An apyodaw dance, for example, was staged to invoke the assistance of the nats when the prime minister officially opened the new Burma Broad­ casting System building.76 At the ceremony to mark the beginning of the work of rebuilding the Mahazedi pa­ goda at Pegu, attended by U Nu and Judicial Minister Dr. E Maung, tables with food offerings were laid and a 74

Nga Paw U, "Politicians Seek Supernatural Aid." Translated from the program of the ceremony issued by the Rangoon District Clean AFPFL under the title of Devata-Bali Puzaw. Loc.cit. See also New Times of Burma, July 19, 1959. 76 The Nation, November 5, 1960. 75

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

separate place marked by a name card was provided for each of the 117 nats invited.77 Official recognition and encouragement of nat worship went even further when in May 1961 the cabinet decided to erect two State Nat Shrines, one in Rangoon for Lower Burma and the other in Mandalay for Upper Burma. Three months later the finance ministry sanctioned the expenditure of 100,000 kyats for each of the shrines, and the religious affairs ministry was considering the relative cost of bronze and teakwood images of the nats.78 Later, however, the government decided to build one grand shrine at Mount Popa, located in central Burma, since the amount sanctioned was not thought to be sufficient for the two shrines originally contemplated.79 Although the nat worship issue was almost completely overshadowed by the state religion controversy, it was clear that a minority of the Burmese Buddhists was strongly opposed to the government's policy. One anony­ mous letter-writer stated: "It is extremely anomalous that the Union Party government which enacted the State Religion Bill in the face of serious opposition from the minorities should propose to build a State Shrine for the benefit of nat-kadaws or nat worshippers at the expense of the taxpayers." The writer found it impossible to believe that the premier, who was a devout Buddhist and well versed in the Buddha Dhamma, really believed in nat worship.80 Another writer asserted that U Nu had many great qualities as a champion of Buddhism, but that at times he seemed to "turn primitive" and in all sincerity and 77

The Guardian, January 6, 1962. Ibid,, August 15, 1961. It should be borne in mind that an intense debate on the state religion issue (discussed in detail in chapter 7) was in progress at this time. 79 Ibid., August 29, 1961. 80 Letter to the editor, ibid., September 19, 1961. 78

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

faith become a yaukkyar-natkadaw ("male-priestess of nats"). He charged that the premier had disfigured the record of Buddhism in this Theravada land, and had inflicted irreparable degradation upon it. True Buddhism was rational and opposed to all superstition, supernaturalism, and magic; what U Nu was advocating and prac­ ticing was "bogus Buddhism."81 For the third time the leading sayadaws were called in by the ministry of religious affairs, and they dutifully gave the kind of advisory opinion which was expected of them. In reply to several questions, the monks explained that the practice of making offerings to the nats originated at the beginning of the universe, that the practice was quite proper and would not amount to heresy if con­ ducted in accordance with Buddhist regulations, and that such acts would contribute toward the prosperity of the country. The directorate of religious affairs issued a com­ munique which quoted the conclusions of the sayadaws and then admonished Buddhists not to sneer at the State Nat Shrine project, since it would contain images of the Buddha and higher level deities in addition to the images of the Thirty-Seven Nats.82 Before the shrine could be completed, however, General Ne Win was again in power. BUDDHISM IN STATE SCHOOLS

In considering the governmental promotion of Buddhism through the educational system, there are two important subjects: (1) the use of Buddhist monasteries as state primary schools and (2) instruction in Buddhism in state schools and universities. As we have noted in the first chapters of this book, the historic relationship between 81 Letter

to the editor, The Nation, May 22, 1961. The Guardian, December 10, 1961. See also the editorial "Defender of Nats,'" which discusses the problem faced by Buddhists in high office who have conscientious objections to par­ ticipation in ceremonies of nat propitiation. Ibid., December 11, 1961. 82

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

the Sangha and education has been exceedingly close, and even in modern Burmese the same word, kyaung, means both monastery and school.83 The traditional role of the monk as village schoolmaster, imparting free in­ struction in reading, writing, and religion to the boys of the community, resulted in a relatively high literacy rate in Burma. The British, however, were unsuccessful in their efforts to integrate the monastic schools into the state educational system. In some rural areas the monas­ teries continue to function as primary schools, but in the cities, towns, and larger villages state schools have re­ placed the kyaungs as educational institutions. Since in­ dependence, some devout Buddhists have dreamed of a return to the traditional education which, in retrospect, was productive of much of value in Burmese culture. The influence of the Sangha on Burmese life has of course declined with the loss of its educational role, and it is not surprising that some of the monks' associations have pressed vigorously for recognition of the monastery schools as state primary schools, with the same financial support as others.84 In 1959 strong representations were made to the government by the Presiding Monks Associa­ tion, which demanded complete reversion to the old system of primary education in monasteries. The sayadatos held that the future of Buddhism itself was at stake. They reasoned that there would be no monasteries without monks, and no monks without pongyi kyaung boys, many of whom enter the Sangha after receiving their schooling from the monks. It was therefore necessary that primary school subjects be taught in monastic schools in order to attract boys to the monasteries. 88

The Burmese word for university, tekkatho, is derived from Taxila, the name of the great center of Buddhist monastic learn­ ing in northern India. 84 Note, for example, the resolution of the executive committee of the Maha Thawthuyana Sangha Association. The Nation, July

14, 1956.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

The resolution adopted by the association stated that in each monastery where a primary school would be set up, the presiding monk would become the headmaster, with authority to appoint and remove teachers and to admit or dismiss students. These pongyi headmasters would be given suitable training in administration. An­ other resolution called for the establishment of high schools and colleges in which qualified monks could pur­ sue further studies in secular university subjects to pre­ pare themselves to be teachers and headmasters.85 Such proposals have had a certain appeal for Buddhist laymen with a highly idealized conception of traditional Burmese education, but they have never been accepted by the government. The Sangha's lack of training, organization, and discipline, in addition to the dislocation inevitably caused by such a major change, would clearly make the experiment ill-advised. Instruction in Buddhism in the regular state schools, however, was obviously more feasible. Such instruction was introduced by U Nu upon the advice of two sayadaws.8e In this case, however, the prime minister's zeal for the promotion of Buddhism was matched by his sense of fairness in the treatment of the religious minorities. An important political crisis developed in September 1954 (less than four months after the inauguration of the Sixth Great Buddhist Council) over the government's deter­ mination to provide instruction in Islam and Christianity also in state schools for the students professing those respective faiths. Sections of the Sangha objected vehe­ mently to this arrangement and were especially irate over the proposed teaching of Islam in state schools. In a broadcast talk U Nu gave a strong statement of the equality of all citizens. "These non-Buddhist citizens 85

Ibid., February 4 and 8, 1959. However, it had been well established during the days of British rule. See chapter 2. 86

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

who are serving the country share with the Buddhist citizens in the concerted efforts for the Union, sacrifices for the Union, and loyalty to the Union. They feel for the Union as intensely as the Buddhist citizens do. Therefore, it will not be fair for the government to discriminate between Buddhists and non-Buddhists in religious matters."87 In the midst of all the enthusiasm for the government-inspired revival of Buddhism, U Nu found it possible to return to fundamental principles. But the 'liighly respected and closely connected sayadaws" remained unconvinced, and insisted that the government should not permit the teaching of Islam. In the face of this bitter opposition, U Nu ordered the suspension of all religious instruction in state schools. The sayadaws clearly revealed the religious and com­ munal antipathies which underlay their adamant stand on the issue. A group of leading sayadaws met at Kaba Aye and unanimously instructed U Nu and U Win (min­ ister for religious affairs) that Buddhism must be taught in state schools as had been done traditionally and that it was undesirable to give instruction in other religions because of their sinful teachings and practices which were harmful to the people.88 The prime minister, accompanied by the chief justice of the Union, flew to Mandalay to consult with the leading sayadaws, headed by the revered Nyaungyan Sayadaw. A protest meeting of 8,000 monks at Mandalay demanded not only that Buddhism should be taught, but that it should be the sole form of religious instruction, all others being forbidden. If this was found to be un­ constitutional, the Constitution should be amended, and Burma declared to be a Buddhist state.89 87

The Nation, September 7, 1954. Hanthawaddy, September 8, 1954. 89 The Nation, September 14, 1954. The Young Monks Associa­ tion, formerly a staunch ally of the AFPFL, charged the U Nu 88

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

Similar meetings were held in other parts of Burma, and with public feeling running high, the possibility of U Nu's resigning both the premiership and the presidency of the AFPFL was seriously considered. The Nation edi­ torially advised him not to resign but to give in to the majority on this issue. There would be no discrimination if only Buddhism was taught in the schools, since Muslim and Christian students could always seek religious in­ struction elsewhere and would be under no compulsion to attend Buddhist instruction.90 U Nu's capitulation, although with some effort at facesaving, came in a speech broadcast to the nation on September 25, 1954. The prime minister admitted that the government had committed two serious blunders. The first was its failure to meet the venerable sayadaws and explain that, while instruction in Buddhism in state schools was a religious issue in which the government was motivated by the desire to promote the Dhamma, the proposal to introduce other religions was a political issue—a move to encourage the continued loyalty of the minorities to the Union. The failure to explain this dis­ tinction had given an opportunity to his political oppo­ nents to spread false rumors that the government proposed to teach Christianity and Islam to Buddhist students. The second blunder was the rash decision to suspend instruction in Buddhism. "This decision was of course made out of our annoyance at the seeming interference in our political measures by the Sangha who protested against the proposed instruction in religions other than Buddhism in state schools. . . . This blunder not only saddened the venerable sayadaws who love blamelessness and uphold the right conduct,' but it also encouraged government with having alienated the entire Sangha by its insist­ ence on introducing the teaching of Islam in the schools. Hanthawaddy, September 14, 1954. 90 The Nation, September 15, 1954.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

the charlatans and the miscreants to come out in the open to 'champion the cause of religion.' "91 U Nu an­ nounced that instruction in Buddhism would be resumed immediately. Instruction in other religions would be arranged if there were a sufficient number of nonBuddhist students, but not in the classrooms of the state schools themselves—separate buildings would be pro­ vided. Moreover, such instruction would not be started immediately, but only after an inquiry committee had examined the whole question. No student would receive instruction in any religion other than his own. Finally, "in the case of state schools which are accommodated in Buddhist monasteries, religious instruction other than Buddhism will not be permitted however large the num­ ber of non-Buddhist students may be." U Nu refused to abandon openly his principle of equal treatment for the adherents of all religions, but nonBuddhist religious instruction was never introduced. The entire episode was a dramatic example of the inability of a leader to control forces which he himself had been responsible for generating. The revival of Buddhism in Burma meant one thing to U Nu, but something quite different to the sayadaws. From the point of view of public policy, these events illustrated the cost of govern­ mental involvement in religion. "The whole difficulty, of course, is that U Nu was not trying to stick to the letter of the Constitution. If he had, his task would have been relatively simple. Burma is a secular state, and the government is not responsible for instructing anyone in any religion. But U Nu set out to do something posi­ tive. . . ."92 THE RELIGIOUS PROGRAM IN PERSPECTIVE

Having considered the major areas of the government's 91

Ibid., September 26, 1954. loc.cit.

92 Editorial,

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

promotion of Buddhism,93 it is necessary to attempt an evaluation of these activities. The cost of the govern­ ment's religious involvement has been high in terms of: the unintentional encouragement of intolerant communalist forces which are disruptive of national unity, the in­ creased political power of the Sangha, the promotion of non-rational religious practices at the expense of scientific progress, and the general lack of serious interest in economic development. An early critic of U Nus religious program was U Tun Pe, minister of Union culture, who resigned from the cabinet in 1953. He charged that U Nu had become the de facto minister of religious affairs and that the religious affairs department was the most favored department in the secretariat. By a tacit log-rolling agreement, U Nu permitted the Socialist Party leaders of the AFPFL a free hand in the formulation of economic policy in exchange for their support of his religious policies and programs. U Tun Pe charged that U Nu was under the powerful influence of the sayadaws and ex-monks who gathered at Sasana Yeiktha, the monastery which served as the tem­ porary headquarters of the Buddha Sasana Council. The advice of the AFPFL and even Parliament was as nothing "compared with the persuasive whisperings into the PM'S ears at Sasana Yeiktha just as old Burmese queens did during her [sic] precious time of combing the hair of the kings."94 U Tun Pe severely criticized the expenditure of large sums from the public treasury in connection with the Sixth Great Buddhist Council and the proposed Buddhist University. Even in its purest form, Theravada Buddhism is a 93The Constitution (Third Amendment) Act of 1961 which made Buddhism the state religion, and the State Religion Promo­ tion Act of 1961, are considered in detail in chapter 7. 94 U Tun Pe, Why I Resigned from the Cabinet, Daily Herald Press, Ltd., Rangoon, 1953, p. 7.

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

doctrine which in many respects discourages scientific and material advancement. Discussing the "average Burman," one editorial writer commented: "As a Bud­ dhist, he is continually warned not to trust his senses overmuch, for they can at any moment cause him to land in avici, the hottest of hells. . . . As a Buddhist also, he knows only too well the ephemeral nature of all con­ ditioned things. . . ."95 How can a government stimulate the desire for economic improvement if it is constantly preaching the substanceless nature of the phenomenal world and the supreme value of renouncing it?98 But in Burma the problem was made even more difficult, for the government saw fit to promote animism and popular superstitions along with the Theravada doctrine. U Nu spoke of Buddhist meditation as an "exact sci­ ence," the object of which was escape from the burdensomeness of the world. U Nu also encouraged nat propitiation as a solution to political and economic prob­ lems. In different ways, both practices promoted attitudes which militate against a program of steady economic de­ velopment. A front-page cartoon in The Guardian ex­ pressed the growing disillusionment of one section of the educated public: one picture captioned "Burma" showed a kneeling worshipper making offerings to the nats, while a picture captioned Others" showed a man studying books on science and technology.97 The same newspaper commented editorially on the fear which gripped India, Burma, and other countries in early 1962, when Hindu astrologers predicted a world disaster because of a rare conjunction of eight planets. Commending Prime Minister Nehru's disdain of such fears and of prayers to appease the planets, the writer added: 'It goes without saying 95

Editorial, The Nation, September 5, 1950. See Herbert Passin, "Pagodas and Rolling Mills," ibid., De­ cember 25, 1955. 97 The Guardian, December 1, 1961. 96

STATE PROMOTION OF BUDDHISM

that we do not have such a leader who can dispel un­ reasoning fears of the people. On the contrary, they are too ready to join the crowd in propitiating all kinds of deities. . . ."98 Some Burmese Marxists have charged that U Nu has used religion, in the classical manner of reactionaries, to distract attention from glaring inequalities in the eco­ nomic sphere." But very few observers have been able to accept this doctrinaire interpretation; the sincerity and depth of his religious convictions cannot really be chal­ lenged. U Nu has not used religion as the opiate of the people, but as his own opiate—a convenient escape from hard realities. Unstable politics, a stagnant economy? Propitiate the nats, build 60,000 sand pagodas. "Bud­ dhism and worship of the spirits have become the solace for U Nu in the midst of all the political and economic troubles which are today confronting his government and his party. But, we feel that it is a legitimate question to ask U Nu whether his present mode of confronting the besetting problems by resort to religion and nat worship will bring about settlement of the issues."100 98

Ibid., February 5, 1962.

90 Editorial, 100 Editorial,

1961.

"Religion and Politics," The Nation, April 19, 1952. "Premier's Journeys," The Guardian, December 13,

CHAPTER 6

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

.^^.n idealized concept of the monastic order occupies a central place in the Theravada Buddhist con­ fession of faith. "I take refuge in the Buddha; I take refuge in the Dhamma; I take refuge in the Sangha." Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha are the Three Jewels (Triratna) and they are inseparable; the Order is cus­ todian and teacher of the Doctrine proclaimed by the Master. This exalted concept of the Sangha leads to two im­ portant relationships in a Buddhist society: (1) Popular reverence for the monks makes their influence consider­ able in whatever area they choose to exert it, including politics. (2) Internal corruption in the monastic order eats at the very vitals of Buddhist religion and is likely to elicit measures for reform from other sources of authority, especially government. This chapter is concerned with the Sangha of Burma in both these relationships, as a participant in the political process and as the object of governmental policies of regulation and reform. Estimates of the number of Buddhist monks in Burma range from 80,000 to 120,000. As in most Theravada Buddhist countries, the Sangha in Burma is divided into several sects. The three most important sects differ only in minor matters of discipline and ritual. The Thudhamma sect is the oldest and the largest numerically. Its discipline permits the use of umbrellas and sandals, the chewing of betel nuts or betel leaves, smoking, and the use of fans at the time of the recitation of certain hymns. The Shwegyin sect, which was founded only in

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

the nineteenth century, does not permit the chewing of betel nuts or betel leaves in the afternoon, nor does it favor smoking. The Dvara sect uses the Pali formula kaya-dvara, vaci-dvara, mano-dvara (the doors of body, tongue, and mind) instead of kaya-kamma, vaci-kamma, mano-kamma (the actions of body, tongue, and mind) in its ritual.1 THE POLITICAL BOLE OF THE SANGHA

The involvement of Buddhist monks in any kind of politi­ cal activity is of course contrary to the Vinaya, the code of monastic discipline. All of the mundane concerns of life—wealth, power, physical comforts, sexual love, fam­ ily ties—must be repudiated when a man renounces the world to enter the Sangha. Political concerns, centering in conflict and the struggle for power, clearly militate against the spiritual self-discipline which leads toward nibbana. In a text which portrays the future degeneration of the Sangha, one of the characteristics of the unre­ strained monks is that they have forsaken meditation and study and are "always intent on the discussion of the king's affairs."2 The phenomenon of Buddhist monks' political involve­ ment in present-day Burma finds little support in the pattern of Sangha-state relations which existed under the Burmese kings.® It is rather the continuation on a new basis of political attitudes and activities which first emerged during the nationalist struggle against British rule. Ironically, by their failure to give full support to the thathanabaing and the rest of the Sangha hierarchy in the maintenance of monastic discipline, the British un1 P. V. Bapat, ed., 2500 Years of Buddhism, Publications Divi­ sion, Government of India, Delhi, 1956, p. 136. 2 From The Question of Rastrapala, in Richard A. Gard, Bud­ dhism, George Braziller, New York, 1961, p. 212. 3 There were isolated instances of monastic interference in poli­ tics; see chapter 1.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

leashed political forces which were soon directed against them. Independence was achieved in 1948, but the tradi­ tion of the "political monk" is very much alive in Burma today. The absence of an effective ecclesiastical authority is not the only factor which continues to encourage pongyi political activity. The monks still enjoy relative immunity from governmental control. They have little to lose as a consequence of political extremism, and their monas­ teries provide a strong organizational base for political activities.4 There is a monastery in virtually every village in Burma. In Rangoon, Mandalay, and other centers there are kyaungtaiks (clusters of monasteries) in which as many as 1,500 monks reside. Even a kyaungtaik com­ posed of just a few monasteries and one hundred monks constitutes a significant nucleus for a potential political action group. It is not at all difficult to organize a public demonstration involving several hundred pongyis. The large urban monastic center, in contrast with the village kyaung, which may be occupied by a single monk, can readily become a significant political factor. The Sangha hierarchy, with a royally appointed pri­ mate, district bishops, and subordinate ecclesiastical authorities all the way down to the local monastery abbot, used to provide an integrated structure with a relatively effective chain of command. With the disinte­ gration of this traditional ecclesiastical structure, volun­ tary associations of monks have emerged which provide some link from one monastery to another. These Sangha organizations perform some of the functions of the old hierarchy, but in some cases have also become vigorous pressure groups with considerable political effectiveness. It can only be noted in passing that if, instead of nu4 These

factors are discussed in some detail in chapter 3, "Bud­ dhism and Burmese Nationalism."

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

merous associations there were a monolithic Sangha organization, its potential political power would be immense. The leading Sangha organization during the first years of independence was the All Burma Young Monks As­ sociation, with headquarters in Mandalay. This organiza­ tion, frequently known by its Burmese name Yahanpyu Aphwe, was formed during the anti-Muslim disturbances of 1938. The Thathana Mamaka Young Monks Associa­ tion was already active in Rangoon and played a major role in fomenting the riots.6 Branches were then organ­ ized in Mandalay and other cities. The original member­ ship was composed of younger monks, as the name of the organization suggests. The basic aim of the founder, U Zawtika, was to unify the monkhood in the face of the threat which the Indian Muslims were thought to pose to Buddhist religion and Burmese culture. The growth of the organization was disrupted by World War II, but has grown substantially since independence. In 1950 the organization was awarded the administra­ tion of the Mandalay Hill religious shrine, one of the most important pilgrimage sites in the country. In political matters, the Yahanpyu Aphwe has been characterized by vigorous opposition to communism. One of its leading members, U Kethaya, wrote several anti-communist pamphlets which were printed at the association's print­ ing press, a gift from the Asia Foundation. According to Brohm, U Kethaya's well-known anti-communist orienta­ tion (critics dubbed him "the American pongyi") "con­ tributed materially to the granting of that very gift."6 The Young Monks Association was extremely influ5 Final Report of the Riot Inquiry Committee, Superintendent, Government Printing and Stationery, Rangoon, 1939, pp. 6-15. β John F. Brohm, "Burmese Religion and the Burmese Religious Revival," Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1957, p. 329.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

ential politically during the early 1950's. It had a record of militant Burmese Buddhist nationalist activity, good organization, vigorous leadership, and an anti-communist emphasis which was appreciated by U Nus government. U Zawtika and his colleagues were frequently consulted by AFPFL leaders, and government patronage was ex­ tended in the form of appointments to the ecclesiastical courts. The older, more learned, monks felt that they were being neglected by the government. Yet it was precisely these scholarly monks whose cooperation was so vital to the success of U Nu's plan to convene the Sixth Great Buddhist Council for the purpose of editing the Pali scriptures. The All Burma Presiding Monks Association was accordingly formed in 1955 with the direct encour­ agement and help of the ministry of religious affairs.7 The membership of this organization was restricted to senior monks, sayadaws, who were the recognized heads of monasteries. The Presiding Monks Association has been less politically oriented, has evidenced a deep con­ cern over the problem of monastic indiscipline, and has been generally disposed to cooperate with governmental efforts to remedy defects in the Sangha. The Young Monks Association and the Presiding Monks Association soon came into open conflict over questions of government patronage. The Young Monks were closer to the Socialist group in the AFPFL, led by U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein; the Presiding Monks looked to U Nu. In 1958 came the split in the party, and the Yahanpyu Aphwe remained loyal to the Ba Swe-Kyaw Nyein Stable AFPFL. With its defeat in the 1960 elections its pongyi allies suffered a corresponding decline in influence. How­ ever, U Kuthala, general secretary of the Young Monks 7 See Discipline and Precepts of the Presiding Monks Associa­ tion of the Union of Burma, 1960 [in Burmese].

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

Association, claimed a membership of 21,000 pongyis in 1963.8 There are numerous Sangha associations with diverse political, ethnic, and functional orientations. The Yahan Nge Aphwe, which also means Young Monks Association, has a strongly leftist orientation and has frequently sup­ ported the pro-communist NUF. The president of this group is U Te Zaniya, its headquarters are in Mandalay, and its members have on occasion come into violent con­ flict with the pongyis of the anti-communist Yahanpyu Aphwe. Some pongyi groups are organized on an ethnic basis, such as the Mon Sanghas Association and the Arakanese Thawthuyana Monks Association. Other groups are committed to the specific objective of reforming the Sangha, such as the Sasana Thantshinye Aphwe (Sasana Purification Association) and the Yayawuk Papyaukye Aphwe (Association for the Prevention of Crime). Pongyi political involvement has centered in the activities of such associations. There have been no outstanding individual political monks since independence, no pongyis whose political impact could even be compared with that of U Ottama. It is true that the agitational politics of the nationalist movement provided unusual opportunities for the emerg­ ence of pongyi extremist leaders, but new opportunities for political leadership came with independence. In Cey­ lon an influential political monk, the Reverend Buddharakkhita, played a major role in the 1956 elections which brought S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike to power. Buddharakkhita was the king-maker and exercised extraordinary influence over the cabinet. He openly opposed the Marx­ ist members Bandaranaike brought into the cabinet and was partly responsible for forcing them out. As a member of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party central executive com8

Interview in Febraary 1963.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

mittee, Buddharakkhita outmaneuvered Bandaranaike himself on a number of key issues. A serious breach de­ veloped between the two men, prime minister and monk. Bandaranaike was assassinated in 1959, and Buddharakkhita was later charged with his murder and convicted. Buddharakkhita was found guilty of having master­ minded the assassination plot; another monk fired the fatal revolver shots. No monk in independent Burma has had a political career even faintly resembling that of Buddharakkhita in Ceylon. PONGYI POLITICAL METHODS

What are the techniques of political action employed by Buddhist monks? It is important to note first that direct political participation in the most obvious ways—voting and standing for election—has long been denied the pongyis. In 1936 an order in council was passed which directed that no member of the Sangha could be elected to the Senate or the House of Representatives.9 Ten years later, when the question of franchise was debated in the governor's legislative council, the Bud­ dhist monks were consulted on whether they should have the vote or not. The eminent sayadaws and older monks were of the opinion that since politics bred worldly ambition, lust for power, anger, and other qualities detrimental to the religious life of the true pongyi, they should not have the vote. Various associations of young monks contended that the Sangha's highest ideal was not escape from the world but service to humanity, and that some degree of political participation was not incom­ patible with this ideal. The council, however, accepted the sayadaws view.10 9

Rangoon Gazette, March 30, 1936. Maung, Burma's Constitution, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1959, pp. 122-123. The debate is recorded in Legislative Council, Proceedings, 1946, vol. 1, pp. 404-432. 10 Maung

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

The Parliamentary Elections Act of 1948 debarred monks from voting or standing as candidates in a parlia­ mentary election. While the Constitution provides gen­ eral guarantees against discrimination on the ground of religion, section 76 (4) states that "members of any religious order may by law be debarred from voting at any such elections or from being a member of either chamber of Parliament." Despite this limitation, the monks have found various means of exerting political influence. Virtually every Burmese politician would like to have the active support of the pongyis, and, while some can get along without it, none can afford to incur the displeasure of the clergy. This fact was dramatically illustrated by an incident which occurred in I960. One member of Parliament, U Saw Maung, was foolish enough to assert in the Chamber of Deputies that the monks of a certain kyaung were lending money at interest. The monks' resentment at this accusation (monks are forbidden by the Vinaya even to touch money) became so intense that a public apology became a political necessity. The Pyidaungsu Party, to which U Saw Maung be­ longed, informed the Pyidaungsu Sangha Association (its clerical ally) of his desire to beg the pardon of the pongyis. Accordingly, a public ceremony was arranged at which this was done; two sayadaws then admonished the MP to repent sincerely and reminded him that the habit of finding fault with others was not the right road to nibbana. A photograph of the large group of monks and the penitent Saw Maung appeared on the first page of a leading English-language newspaper; the caption under the picture read "Monks Forgive MP."11 Former Premier U Nu acknowledged on several occa11 The Nation, September 10, 23 and 25, 1960. The question of the truth or falsity of the statement made in Parliament seems to have been conveniently forgotten.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

sions that he had been directly influenced by senior members of the Sangha. In 1954 he made the decision to introduce instruction in Buddhism in state schools on the advice of two sayadaws. He decided on his own, however, that there should also be instruction in Islam and Christianity for the pupils who professed these reli­ gions. This bit of independent judgment met with the fiercest opposition of the Sangha. U Nu, accompanied by the chief justice, flew to Mandalay to consult with "highly respected and closely connected sayadaws" on the issue. In a radio talk to the nation U Nu later admitted his "blunder" in having announced his decision regarding the teaching of Islam and Christianity without having first explained the reasons for it to the learned sayadaws.12 Both individual pongyis and monks' associations have played some part in election campaigns. Prior to the 1951 elections the All Burma Yahanpyu Aphwe requested its members "to refrain from personally supporting, de­ nouncing or agitating for any candidate or party contest­ ing the elections."13 However, there were persistent re­ ports of house-to-house campaigning by monks in the elections of 1951, 1956, and especially 1960, when U Nu's declared intention to make Buddhism the state religion made it a campaign issue.14 Pongyi supporters of U Nu's Pyidaungsu Party were organized as the Pyidaungsu Sangha Association during the 1960 election campaign. The extent of their political involvement may be judged from the statement issued by the Pyidaungsu Sangha Association six months after the elections. U Nu had sought to promote a spirit of 12

The Nation, September 7, 8, 13, 14, 16, 23, 26, 1954. the All Burma Preceptors Association urged its members "to concentrate on duties proper to members of the Sangha without engaging themselves in denouncing any candidates in the elections or canvassing for them." The Burman, June 6, 1951. 14 See chapter 7, "The State Religion of Burma." 13 Similarly,

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

friendliness between his own party and the AFPFL and had urged defeated Pyidaungsu Party candidates to with­ draw election petitions which charged their successful opponents with foul play at the polls. The Pyidaungsu Sangha Association for Lower Burma completely repudi­ ated U Nu's advice. Allegations of dishonesty in elections should be investigated by a judicial inquiry, the associa­ tion declared. Furthermore, it pledged its full support to those candidates who wished to proceed normally with the hearing of their election petitions.15 It is obvious that this monks' association was deeply involved, not only in the election campaign, but also in the internal affairs of the Pyidaungsu Party. The technique of political action most commonly em­ ployed by monks' associations is the holding of a closed meeting at which resolutions are passed and later sent to the government. This familiar pressure-group technique can be illustrated by the 1956 conference of three young monks' groups, the Arakan Thawthuyana Association, the Maha Thawthuyana Association and the Mandalay Yahan Nge Association. The conference passed resolutions urg­ ing the government to make Buddhism the state religion, achieve internal peace through negotiation with the rebels, bring down prices, house all primary schools in monasteries, and place the management of all primary schools in the hands of monks. Copies of the resolutions were sent to the prime minister, the religious affairs min­ ister, the home minister, and the commissioner of police.16 In most cases the monks' associations do not actively pursue the matter beyond the forwarding of resolutions to the government, which respectfully acknowledges them. In this particular case, however, the conference sent an ultimatum to the government; the militant young monks threatened a massive public demonstration if no 15 16

The Nation, August 4, 1960. Ibid., May 20, 1956.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

action was taken within five days. The demonstration did not materialize in this case, but on numerous other occasions this political weapon has been resorted to by the pongyis. In 1953 over 5,000 monks staged a mass demonstration in front of the Rangoon City Hall to pro­ test the Muslims' slaughter of cows during the Id festival and called on the government to ban it. There was con­ siderable evidence that in this case opposition political elements had deliberately fomented the monks' agitation to create trouble for the AFPFL government.17 The monks have occasionally waged poster campaigns as a means of political agitation. When U Nu visited Moulmein in 1958 he was surprised to see posters which the Mon pongyis had tacked up all over the town. The posters warned him: "Don't divide and rule the Mons!"18 The 1961 fourth amendment to the Constitution, intended to strengthen the minorities' right of religious freedom, was bitterly opposed by virtually all the monks' associa­ tions. The pongyis posters in parts of Rangoon denounced the prime minister, the judicial minister, and the fourth amendment in harsh terms.19 One of the most extreme political measures taken by the monks, the outright coercion of legislators, took place on the day this amendment was voted on by both houses of Parliament. Over 2,000 monks surrounded and picketed the secretariat where the joint session was held. The legislators' cars were stopped, and a number of the MP'S were compelled by the pongyis to sign written promises that they would not vote for the amendment. This kind of coercion was not unprecedented. In 1951 over five hundred monks of the Sangha Thu-tethana Association picketed the Rangoon University council for five hours, 17 Ibid., August 19, 20, 1953; New Times of Burma, August 21, 1953. 18 Ibid., September 20, 1958. 19 The Guardian, September 25, 1961.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

immobilizing the vice-chancellor, a justice of the Supreme Court, and fourteen other councillors. The action was taken by the young monks to secure a reversal of the university senate decision barring monks from attending the university.20 In such situations the pongyis exploit to the fullest the grave reluctance of the police to touch a monk, even if be is engaged in disrupting public order. During the period 1949-1951 the political extremism of some sections of the Sangha manifested itself in sup­ port of various insurrectionary forces, including those of the communists. Police raids on monasteries uncovered sizable supplies of arms and ammunition which had been hidden by monks cooperating with the rebel forces. A police raid on a Mandalay kyaung in 1949 produced one Bren gun, one Sten gun, thirty-six rifles, fifty-one hand grenades and over 1,000 rounds of rifle ammunition. A quite different manifestation of unlawful political ex­ tremism was revealed in 1957 with the arrest of the twenty-nine-year-old U Nandiya, president of the Maha Sangha Association of Mandalay. This theocratic monk, with the help of the members of his association, had attempted to usurp the functions of the government by setting up a parallel administration. He adjudicated on divorce cases, meted out justice to immoral laymen by having them flogged, had squatters' huts torn down, and was especially severe in his treatment of Muslims.21 THE SANGHA AND POLITICAL ISSUES

We must now turn our attention to the nature of the political issues with which segments of the Sangha have been concerned. Some issues relate to the government's religious policies, which have generally been concerned with either the regulation of the Sangha or the promotion 20

Ibid., September 26, 1961; The Nation, June 10, 1951. New Times of Burma, August 7, 1949; The Nation, April 9, 1957. 21

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

of Buddhism. In the first category are the questions of the registration of monks, the Sangha assembly, the ecclesiastical courts, and the Pali examinations, all of which are considered in a later section of this chapter. In the second category are the questions of the Buddha Sasana Council, the teaching of Buddhism in state schools, the Sixth Buddhist Council, and the making of Buddhism the state religion, all of which are discussed elsewhere in this book. It is important to note the fairly broad range of nonreligious issues with which sections of the Sangha have become involved. Buddhist monks from the ethnic; minor­ ities have given powerful support to their politicians' demands for separate statehood. Historically, the Mon Sangha has played a major role in preserving the linguis­ tic and cultural heritage of this minority and since independence has joined in the demand for a separate Mon state within the Union of Burma. The officers of the Dagon Mon Sangha Association, in underlining this de­ mand in 1952, reminded the country that at one time the Mons held sovereign powers like any other nation in the present United Nations.22 Monks have played a prominent role in Arakanese separatist movements. For ten years an armed rebellion in Arakan was led by an all-powerful ecclesiastic, Sayadaw U Seinda. His Tri-partite United Action Committee, incidentally, included the leaders of the Arakan branch of the Burma Communist Party. At an impressive cere­ mony in January 1958, U Seinda and his followers laid down their arms, and Deputy Premier Thakin Tin as­ sured them that the government had made full arrange­ ments for their rehabilitation and resettlement as free, peaceful citizens.23 The Arakanese Thawthuyana Monks Association was 22 23

Ibid., January 24, 1952. New Times of Burma, January 28, 1958.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

long identified with the demand for a separate Arakan state. In 1954 over three hundred pongyis undertook a three-day fast at the Sule pagoda in Rangoon to dramatize this demand.24 In 1957 almost five hundred members of the association surrounded the secretariat and staged a demonstration, despite the police commissioner's refusal of a permit. The pongyis complained that the afpfl Socialists were ruling Arakan like a colony, and even charged that the government was encouraging the Mujahids, a Muslim insurgent group. The Arakanese monks' battle cry: "Give us statehood and we will defend our state and our religion."25 In 1958 another demonstration outside the secretariat was staged by the Arakanese Thawthuyana Monks Association, three hundred monks participating, while mp's of the anuo (Arakan National Unity Organization) made another futile attempt to secure parliamentary approval for the creation of an autonomous Arakan state.26 Communism is another major issue in Burmese politics in which the monks have become involved from time to time. We have already referred to the forceful anticommunist stand of the All Burma Yahanpyu (Young Monks) Association. In 19¾) several conferences of pongyis were held in Mandalay to denounce communism. "For the sheer survival of Buddhism, we must do some­ thing to check the spread of communist ideologies in Burma. The atheistic communists accept the Marxist dictum that religion is opium," warned a venerable sayadaw. Another speaker declared: "Abolition of class is nonsense as one's present existence is determined by the law of karma." The 8,000 Buddhist monks reportedly in attendance passed resolutions attacking the communist ideology. In a later conference Sayadaw U Kethaya 24

The Nation, September 29, 30, 1954. Ibid., September 28, 1957. 26 New Times of Burma, February 20, 1958.

25

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

warned against the communist tactic of trying to create a "democratic front."27 Like all other Burmese politicians, the communists have been fully aware of the prestige of the monks and have been quite willing to exploit it for their own politi­ cal purposes, ideological differences notwithstanding. In a speech delivered in 1952 U Nu declared: "Notwith­ standing their blind faith in false and evil doctrines which make them believe that religion is the opium of the people, that everyone must work and none shall depend on others' work for existence and that the clergy are unnecessary parasites to humanity, these irreligious persons themselves are now soliciting monks to recite scriptures at their mass meetings and conferences and are even feeding the monks. They are putting up a pre­ tense of revering religion."28 The communists have had some success in influencing the Sangha by appealing to the monks' traditional role as mediator and peace-maker. In 1952 U Nu warned the monks against the "power-mad" communists who would subvert their true work. The Burma Communist Party in 1953 made several unsuccessful approaches to the leaders of the Young Monks Association requesting their help as intermediaries in initiating negotiations for a settlement between the government and the communist insurgents.29 In 1957, however, the communists demonstrated greater subtlety in approach and were more effective. A com­ mittee of eight laymen headed by Thakin Kodaw Hmaing, a noted Burmese writer and recipient of the Stalin Peace Prize, sent an appeal to all the sayadaws of the Rangoon area, drawing attention to the sad plight of the country 27

The Nation, August 11, September 20 and November 1, 1950. U Nu, Towards a Welfare State, Rangoon, 1952, p. 23. 29 See the editorial, "Communists Woo Buddhist Monks," The Nation, November 14, 1952; Ibid., June 23, 1953. 28

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

due to the insurrections and seeking their guidance on the right course of action. At the second annual confer­ ence of the Presiding Monks Association the sayadaws formulated the following basis for peace in the country: "a just solution which would be completely impartial between the government and the revolutionary forces, and would cause neither hurt nor gain in any way to either side at the expense of the other."30 This formula applied the individualistic ethic of Buddhism to a com­ plex political problem and made no moral or legal dis­ tinctions at all between the two parties to the "dispute." Thakin Kodaw Hmaing's peace committee immedi­ ately seized the sayadaws' formula and organized a 5,000strong demonstration to urge the end of the insurrection through negotiations. Over 2,500 pongyis, representing eighteen monks' associations and 3,000 lay people, par­ ticipated in the demonstration. The Nation commented editorially on the communists' clever engineering of the peace campaign. "On this vague, pious expression [the sayadaws' formula], the communists have built a sham fagade to give the impression that the Sangha has spon­ sored the peace drive."31 Sangha organizations sponsored numerous meetings to denounce communism throughout the year 1959. The anti-communist propaganda campaign was almost wholly government-inspired, however, and under the direction of the Psychological Warfare Department.32 The main emphasis of the campaign was defensive; Buddhism was under severe ideological attack by the communists and 30

Ibid., January 18, 1957. Ibid., October 15, 1957. Information Minister Thakin Chit Maung's analysis: "Thakin Kodaw Hmaing's peace committee is nothing but an instrument of the Communist Party of Burma." Ibid., October 26, 1957. 32 This took place, of course, during the period of military rule under General Ne Win. See Fred von der Mehden, "Burma's Re­ ligious Campaign Against Communism," Pacific Affairs, 1960, vol. 33, pp. 290-299. 31

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

must be defended. At a mass meeting in Rangoon one venerable sayadaw declared that in the whole history of Burma there had been but one case of persecution of Buddhism (by a Shan king), and even British secularism had not constituted a real danger to the Dhamma. Now, however, Burmese communists were attacking Buddhism openly, and their onslaughts had to be staunchly resisted.33 A widely circulated pamphlet published by the Young Monks Association described the attempts made by com­ munist insurgents to destroy Buddhism in the areas which they controlled. "They prohibited the teaching of children in the monasteries so that, as they put it, the children might not be overcome by the fumes of Bud­ dhism. They overshadowed the religious influence by gradually substituting communist propaganda celebra­ tions in place of the traditional religious festivals. They chose sabbath days (which are meant to be kept for practicing the precepts) to hold mass meetings. Through their party members, they spread the propaganda that instead of offering to the monasteries and the temples, people should make donations to the communist fund which would bring about immediate benefits. . . . And they have worked hard so that more and more of the village population would abandon religious beliefs."34 The pamphlet declared that the communists regarded the Buddhist clergy as their number one enemy, for as long as the Sangha existed there would be faithful lay­ men, and as long as there were faithful laymen Buddhism 33 New Times of Burma, June 7, 1959. Demonstrations were also held to protest Chinese communist atrocities in Tibet, and the All Rangoon Presiding Monks Association adopted a resolution calling on all Buddhists to pray for the safety of the Dalai Lama and the early liberation of the Tibetan people. Burmese Review and Monday New Times, April 10, 27, 1959. 34 Proclamation on the Subject of Dangers to Buddhist Religion by the Headquarters of the All Burma Young Monks Association, Pitaka Electric Press, Mandalay, 1959 [in Burmese].

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

would flourish. "Hence, wishing to destroy the Buddhist religion, these communist non-believers have ear-marked the clergy as their greatest enemy to be rid of." The students at Rangoon University have long been an important factor in Burmese politics. Student national­ ist groups emerged in the early 1930's, and the student strike of 1936 provided the political initiation of many who were later to become prominent AFPFL leaders. Since independence the pattern has continued; the various political parties have encouraged the organization of their student supporters, and communist influence has been strong, especially in the Rangoon University Stu­ dent Union. In the face of increasing student indiscipline and political involvement, the government in 1956 banned all students' unions. A number of young pongyi associations joined the communist-controlled student forces to fight the govern­ ment's order. The ofiBcers of the All Burma Federation of Student Unions met with the representatives of six Sangha organizations: the Arakanese Thawthuyana, the Sangha Front, the Peace Sanghas, the Mandalay Young Monks, the Maha Thawthuyana, and the Yamahatha asso­ ciations. Whatever their ideological differences with the communist students, the aggressive young pongyis saw common interests as the basis for their cooperation. The monks declared that the government was the common enemy of the opposition political parties, the students, and the Sangha. The students were now getting the worst of it, but the Sangha would undoubtedly be next in line. The monks charged that the government had already muzzled the older members of the Sangha by the skillful use of patronage. The assembled monks formed a Sangha Committee for the Preservation of Student Unions.85 35

The Nation, November 10, 1956.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

A week later two hundred monks joined several thou­ sand students to stage a "funeral of oppression." Fiery speeches condemning the government were delivered by the monks, and a procession was begun with the monks chanting verses from the scriptures and the students carrying black flags. CofiBns, in which the premier and deputy premier were imagined to be, were deposited in the middle of the road. The monks started chanting the funeral ceremony, and the students then set fire to the coffins.36 The All Burma Sangha Party was a vigorous opponent of U Nu and his party on several political issues. Shortly before the 1951 elections this monks' association held a convention at which it denounced the AFPFL and urged the people to vote for any other party. The monks con­ demned Thakin Nu's Fourteen Points, especially the land nationalization scheme, which, they asserted, was opposed to the creed of Buddhism.37 The government's action in arresting U Ba Pe in 1954 on charges of treason which dated back some years was strongly denounced by the Sangha Party.38 Most of the activities of government and most of the issues which occupy the attention of Burmese politicians are of little or no interest to the Sangha. But, as we have seen, there are political issues which under certain cir­ cumstances become important to very aggressive and articulate sections of the Sangha. This is an urban phe­ nomenon, and the monks with a deep interest in politics constitute a minority even in the cities. The Sangha's potential political power is considerable, but in very few instances (the state religion issue was one of them) has this potential been approximated in actuality. What are the political roles of the Sangha association? 36

Ibid., November 16, 1956. Ibid., June 4, 6, 12, 1951. 38 Ibid., December 8, 19, 20, 22, 1954.

37

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

It is a vigorous pressure group when defending its own interests or what it regards as the interests of Buddhism. It is a useful ally of the politicians at election time and a useful tool of the government in the ideological strug­ gle against communism. It is frequently a channel of discontent and protest against the government. While all of these political roles go contrary to the Sangha's raison d'etre, which is totally non-political, in a more stable Burma they might serve a somewhat useful pur­ pose. In general, however, the political monks have only worsened the chronic instability of the country. Further­ more, the causes they have chosen to espouse have fre­ quently been narrowly communal and disruptive. THE DECLINE OF THE SANGHA

In the second half of the chapter our emphasis is on the efforts which have been made by the government to regulate and reform the Sangha and the Sangha's re­ sponse to these efforts. The political involvement of some sections of the Sangha, which we have considered above, is part of a larger pattern of monastic worldliness, disorderliness, indiscipline, and defiance of constituted au­ thority. In the urban centers the misconduct of the monks is fairly widespread. There is a general neglect of the religious pursuits of study and meditation and an inclination to enjoy a life of idleness enlivened by forbidden worldly pleasures. Attendance at football games, movies, and theatrical performances is very common, and clandestine love affairs are far from unknown. Disputes over the owner­ ship of monastic property frequently arise and in many cases have erupted into violence. Deploring the present condition of the Sangha, U Nu observed: "Everybody who puts on a yellow robe is not a pongyi. . . . If (he) indulges in all sorts of evil deeds, like having an affair

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

with a woman, gambling, and drinking, then . . . he is just a rogue in a yellow robe."39 Whether the offenders started out as sincere monks or as criminals who put on the yellow robe to escape detec­ tion, there have been cases of their involvement in many serious crimes including forgery, sedition, opium smug­ gling, armed robbery, destruction of private property, rape, assault with deadly weapons, and murder.40 While such offenders are few in relation to the entire member­ ship of the Sangha, the problem is still a serious one, about which both the older sayadaws and earnest Bud­ dhist laymen are deeply concerned. Isolated cases of crim­ inal acts have stained the record of the clergy in all coun­ tries, but in Burma they are more frequent and stem from a general background of indiscipline and lawlessness. There have been quite a few cases of serious violence in which large numbers of monks have been involved. This is not the problem of the individual criminal in the ranks of the Sangha, but of the emotion-charged group which quickly turns into a lawless mob. In 1951 two pongyis were refused free admission to a theatrical per­ formance, and a fight ensued. The next night 150 monks tore down the thatch walls of the pwe (Burmese-style theatre) and further violence was prevented only by the timely arrival of the police.41 In 1954 a violent clash be­ tween two dissident factions of monks over who should be the presiding monk of a large kyaungtaik resulted in the death of two pongyis. The dispute was pending be39 U Nu, Forward with the People, Ministry of Information, Union of Burma, Rangoon, 1955, p. 62. 40 To cite a few of the many references in the daily press which could document this statement: New Times of Burma, August 17, September 20, 1949; May 29, June 20, 1952; September 15, 1959; The Nation, May 20, 1951; January 21, 1952; May 18, 1953; April 9, November 14, 1956; September 28, 1957; January 17, 1959. 41 Ibid., December 24, 1951.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

fore the ecclesiastical courts when the fight broke out.42 A serious intra-Sangha conflict erupted in Mandalay in 1956 over elections to the board of trustees of the famed Mahamyatmuni pagoda. The powerful Yahanpyu Aphwe (Young Monks Association, discussed above) had controlled these elections, but was now challenged by a leftist group, the Yahan Nge (Young Monks) Aphwe. According to press reports members of the former group, armed with guns and daggers, launched a deliberate attack on the latter group and murdered two pongyis.48 In the same year monks of the Mandalay Yahanpyu Aphwe, believing false rumors that Indians had assaulted Burmese, destroyed several shops in the bazaar, stormed a police station, forced their way in, and flogged three men who were being kept in the lock-up.44 In 1959 a fight between the residents of two adjacent monasteries in Rangoon, with a heavy exchange of brick­ bats, was stopped only when the police resorted to teargas bombs and arrested 89 monks.45 Such incidents are certainly not daily occurrences, but their frequency is disturbing; there is a definite pattern of lawlessness and violence in certain sections of the Sangha in Burma. The worldliness, indiscipline, and lawlessness of the Sangha which we have described is not a new condition. The gradual breakdown of monastic discipline, in large measure a consequence of the disintegration of the eccle­ siastical hierarchy under British rule, was observable in the early years of this century. Under the Burmese kings an annual register of clergy was prepared, and the mahadan wun (ecclesiastical censor) under the primate's guidance disciplined disorderly monks and unfrocked serious offenders.46 But, as a British official described the 42 44 45

Ibid., July 12, 1954. Ibid., April 9, 1956.

43

Ibid., November 14, 1956.

New Times of Burma, March 19, 1959. chapter 1, "Buddhism and the State in Old Burma."

46 See

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

situation in 1936: "There is little difficulty in becoming a pongyi, and little organization in the Order and no system of registration of those who enter it. Conse­ quently it is easy for any Burman who wishes to escape arrest or for other reasons to conceal his identity to assume pongyi's robes, and he will be treated as a pongyi without questions being asked."47 Among educated Buddhist laymen there is considera­ ble dissatisfaction with the present state of the Sangha and recognition of the pressing need for reform. But public criticism of the monks, however scandalous their conduct, is subdued if made at all. Tet Pongyi ("Modern Monk"), a bitter satirical novel published in 1935, attacked immorality and breaches of discipline among the Buddhist clergy. The book was written by U Thein Pe Myint, and included a glowing preface by Thakin Nu. The work was sincerely undertaken in a spirit of reform, but caused a furor and was scathingly denounced by the monks. Eventually, the book was banned by the government and the author made a public apology to the Sangha. A new edition of the book was printed in 1954, but was again banned by the home ministry and all copies were confiscated by the police.48 The extreme sensitivity of the monks to any hint of criticism and their ready resort to violence to suppress it have been demonstrated on several occasions. In 1951 the Burmese-language Rangoon newspaper, the Oioay, published a letter written by an anonymous Buddhist monk criticizing the disorderliness and violence of other monks at an exhibition the previous night. A group of fifty monks invaded the newspaper's offices and, on the refusal of the editor to disclose the name of the writer 47

F. Burton Leach, The Future of Burma, Rangoon Gazette, Ltd., 1936, p. 105. 48 The Nation, November 3, 1954.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

of the letter, destroyed office furniture and overturned files and type cases.49 The following year a somewhat similar incident occurred in Mandalay. The Burmese-language daily, Myanma Lanzin, editorially criticized the indolence and worldliness of some sections of the Sangha and suggested that those who preferred a worldly life should leave the order altogether. A large group of monks entered the editor's office and remonstrated with him, and the follow­ ing day he printed a retraction. Violence threatened when a second large group of monks visited the editor and was averted only by the timely arrival of the police and army troops. The editor's complete capitulation to the angry monks was expressed several days later by his signed advertisement in the newspaper inviting all pongyis to the Dahatdaw pagoda to receive his obeisance. "Without making obeisance to the pongyis, my humble self believes that the evil deeds will not be washed away from his body."50 If public opinion and the press have been ineffectual in stimulating the regeneration of the Sangha, monks' associations committed to a program of reform have been equally so. As a matter of fact, rival reform groups have in some ways contributed further to the pattern of indis­ cipline and disorder. The two most important reform organizations are the Sasana Thantshinye Aphwe (Sasana Purification Association) and the Yayawuk Papyaukye Aphwe (Association for the Prevention of Crime). In 1951 a monk was accused by leaders of the Sasana Purification Association of having had affairs with women. He was unfrocked and then taken to a police station where the sayadaws swore that they had found ammunition in his bag. The monk was arrested, released 49

Ibid., March 30, 1951. incident is narrated with much interesting detail in Brohm, pp. 310-312. 50This

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

on bail, and then proceeded to Rangoon. He was called away from his monastery on a false summons, taken to the association headquarters on Sule Pagoda Road, un­ frocked again, and then taken around the town in disgrace.51 Ten days later the rival Association for the Prevention of Crime held a meeting at the Shwedagon pagoda, attended by two hundred monks, to denounce the high­ handed and "fascistic" methods employed in this case. A resolution adopted at the meeting said that the minis­ try of religious affairs was sowing seeds of dissension among the pongyis by encouraging the activities of the other group. The deputy commissioner later cancelled the detention order, the unfrocked monk was released, and the court ordered the case closed.52 With the release of the allegedly immoral monk and some expression of the religious affairs ministry's disap­ proval of its methods, it was now the turn of the Sasana Purification Association to complain to the government. A large meeting of the association resolved that the gov­ ernment should enact special laws to eliminate unde­ sirables from the Sangha. However, if the government was unable to do so, it should not interfere with the Sasana Purification Association, which would take action on its own against wrong-doers. The members of the association also resolved "to fight and sacrifice their lives" should the government interfere in such cases.53 GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE SANGHA

In the traditional system of old Burma the ultimate authority responsible for the regulation and disciplining of the Sangha was the government. The continued effec­ tiveness of government in this role can be seen in present81

The Nation, July 5, August 3, 1951. Ibid., July 16, August 11, 1951. 53 Ibid., September 1, 1951. 52

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

day Thailand, where modern bureaucratic methods are utilized to perform traditional regulatory functions. The Sangha of Thailand, although twice the size of its Bur­ mese counterpart, is effectively regulated by an elaborate government-controlled ecclesiastical structure. In the words of Kenneth E. Wells: "It is a pyramidal system by which instructions can be disseminated quickly from the top to monks in the most distant temples, and informa­ tion from village monasteries can be readily dispatched to the Council of Ecclesiastical Ministers in Bangkok. Under this hierarchical system temple activities are kept under careful supervision and good discipline is main­ tained among the quarter-million monks and novices."54 The organizational structure of the Sangha closely parallels that of the government at both the central and provincial levels, and has separate branches performing legislative, executive, and judicial functions. At the head of the Sangha is the Sangharaja, or Supreme Patriarch, who is appointed by the king. A legislative assembly of forty-five high-ranking monks, the Sangha Sabha, is ap­ pointed by the Supreme Patriarch on the basis of senior­ ity and enacts regulations relating to monastic duties and discipline. The Council of Ecclesiastical Ministers consists of the Sanghanayaka and nine ministers, corresponding to the prime minister and cabinet in the civil government. The administrative work for which this council is responsible is divided among four functional departments: adminis­ tration, education, propagation, and public works (build­ ing and repair of monasteries and temples). The judiciary is composed of monks appointed by the Supreme Patri­ arch on the recommendation of the assembly. There are courts of first instance, a court of appeals, and a supreme court; their function is to enforce the monastic discipline 54 Kenneth E. Wells, Thai Buddhism: Its Rites and Activities, Christian Bookstore, Bangkok, 1960, p. 7.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

of the Vinaya and regulations enacted by the Sangha assembly.55 The ecclesiastical structure in its present form was provided for in a measure enacted by the king and the Assembly of the People's Representatives in 1941. It might appear that with such a highly developed internal organization the Sangha would be largely independent of government control. This, however, is not the case. At virtually every crucial point, decisive power is exercised by the government department of religious affairs in the ministry of education. In the 1941 legislation the minister of education is given power: to issue regulations for the implementation of the act, to countersign the appointment of the presi­ dent and vice-president of the Sangha Sabha, to attend the meetings of this assembly and submit proposals for its deliberation, to determine the day on which its session opens and request the convening of special sessions, to grant or withhold permission for the publication of any matter discussed in the assembly or council, to counter­ sign the appointment of the Sanghanayaka and to remove him from office. Furthermore, all of the administrative work involved in the implementation of decisions or enforcement of regulations emanating from the Sangha assembly or council is performed by the department of religious affairs.56 Within this framework of integrated governmentSangha authority, the individual monk has been kept under strict discipline. Not every thera (monk of ten years standing) can perform the ordination ceremony in Thailand, but only those who have been appointed by the department of religious affairs and given a special 55

Ibid., pp. 7-11. The Act on Buddhist Brotherhood, B.E. 2484 (1941), Depart­ ment of Religious Affairs, Bangkok, 1958, sections 4, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 24, 27, 28, 31, 48, 49, 59. 58

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

seal and certificate. This regulation has prevented popu­ lar theras from gathering around them cliques of young disciples which would tend to divide the Sangha. The abbot of each monastery has extensive authority to main­ tain the discipline of his monks. He must submit an annual report to the district head giving much detailed information about the monks, their progress in study, charges of misconduct and how these cases were settled, the attendance at morning and evening worship, etc. The district head of the Sangha prepares a tabulated report for the provincial head, and the provincial reports are sent to the department of religious affairs in Bangkok.57 Upon ordination each monk or novice receives a book­ let of credentials bearing his name, age, and photograph, also the name and address of his parents, and the details of his ordination. Transfers of residence to other monas­ teries are recorded in the book, and some abbots use an official stamp or seal for this purpose. No abbot will permit a monk into his monastery without these cre­ dentials. The book also records examinations passed, positions held, and any legal charges preferred against the monk. In case of his expulsion from the order, the circumstances are noted, and the book is sent to the department of religious affairs.58 The system is very effective in protecting the reputation of the Sangha from the acts of "rogues in yellow robes." The ecclesiastical organization and monastic discipline of the Sangha in Thailand points the way to one possible solution of the Sangha's problems in Burma. The Sangha of Thailand has not distinguished itself in scholarly pur­ suits and on other points also might suffer by comparison with the smaller orders in Burma and Ceylon. But the discipline of the Thai monks is strict and rigidly enforced; the monks do not get involved in politics, and they do tend to their religious duties. Burmese Buddhist laymen 57 Wells,

pp. 182, 186-188.

ss ibid., pp. 188-189.

213

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

who sincerely desire the spiritual renewal of the Sangha in their own country therefore look with considerable interest to their Theravada Buddhist neighbor on the East. There were indications in the first few years of Burmese independence that vigorous government intervention in the affairs of the Sangha would soon set matters right. The Ecclesiastical Courts Act of 1949 and the establish­ ment of a ministry of religious affairs in 1950 seemed to herald a new era of effective Sangha reform. The govern­ ment's intentions were stated with the utmost clarity in 1951 when U Win, then minister for religious affairs, declared: "The government wishes to see the unity of the Sanghas, the zealous devotion of the Sanghas to reli­ gious knowledge and practice, and wishes to encourage to the utmost the propagation of the Dhamma. The gov­ ernment is determined to help the Sanghas in their endeavors to cleanse the great religion of undesirable elements and . . . will implement by means of legislation what the Sanghas desire to carry out according to the Dhamma."59 Strong support for governmental action came from the leading sayadaws of Burma. In 1952 home minister Bo Khin Maung Gale convened a meeting of twenty-seven of the most eminent sayadaws and made the humble submission that the Buddhist faith, replete with its eight wonders, was in danger of becoming dimmed through the misconduct of certain worldly and disorderly monks. After deliberation the venerable sayadaws issued a state­ ment affirming "the right of civil authority to act as defender of the Buddhist faith in times of religious indis­ cipline and schism." The sayadaws then cited a number of precedents, from the time of the Buddha to the nine­ teenth century, for the use of civil power to reform the Sangha by ridding it of bad elements.60 59 60

New Times of Burma, August 28, 1951. The Nation, November 11, 1952.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

Despite fundamental agreement on the major role of government in Sangha reform, the simple fact is that fifteen years after the attainment of independence the deplorable condition of the Sangha in Burma still con­ tinues. If the British government lacked the will to purify the Sangha for the greater glory of Buddhism, this could not be said of U Nu's government. Why, then, have the results been so disappointing? Aside from such general considerations as the insur­ rections in the earlier period, the reasons for the govern­ ment's failure appear to be the following: (1) The Sangha is already so divided that any government pro­ posal for reform legislation, if supported by some sections of the order, will automatically be violently opposed by others. (2) The popularly elected government, recog­ nizing the considerable political power of the monks, is reluctant to alienate some sections of the Sangha in order to press for reform and thus finds it safer politically to acquiesce in the status quo.61 (3) There has been an almost incredible failure in administrative implementa­ tion of the few sound measures which have been enacted, due both to gross inefficiency in the bureaucracy and to the political pressures mentioned above. We must now consider in detail the government's frustrated attempts to reform the monastic order. SANGHA REGISTRATION AND ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS

One of the most elementary steps which must be taken is the creation of a system of registration, so that spurious monks can be separated from those who have had the proper training and ordination. Under the Burmese kings 61

The whole democratic structure has complicated and hindered the progress of Sangha reform in Burma. It is no coincidence that strict monastic discipline was found in association with the auto­ cratic tradition of the Burmese kings and that this discipline is still strong in Thailand where western liberalism and democracy are weak.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

an annual register of clergy was prepared, and we have noted the usefulness of the monk's booklet of credentials in Thailand. Thus far the Burmese government has been unsuccessful in its attempts to register the pongyis. No one even knows how many monks there are in Burma. The National Registration Act of 1949 provided that all citizens of the Union of Burma, including monks, would be registered and provided with identity cards. Registration was regarded as an indispensable measure in order to stop the insurrections, ensure fair elections, and crack down on antisocial practices. Meetings of monks in various parts of the country adopted resolutions denouncing the act in its application to monks, and the Sangha in general refused to register or to accept identity cards. At a mass meeting one venerable sayadaw declared that the Lord Buddha had laid down 227 rules of disci­ pline for fully ordained monks, and even the five Arahants (chief disciples of the Buddha) had nothing to add to them. What right did the government have to introduce new rules for the monkhood?62 The attempt to register the monks was abandoned by the end of 1950. Government moves in 1957 to create a Sangha assembly, considered below, included the registration of monks as a basis for the election of representatives, but this effort also failed. In 1959 another attempt was made, this time by Gen­ eral Ne Win's military government. The Sasana Purifica­ tion Association supported the registration of monks, pointing out that this in no way contravened the Vinaya and would be very useful in checking the infiltration of the Sangha by undesirable elements.63 Colonel Sithu Chit Myaing, director-general of the National Registration and Census, declared that while the registration work done by previous governments had been a failure, General 62 83

The Nation, October 24, December 18, 1950. New Times of Burma, June 5, 1959.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

Ne Win was determined to push it through successfully. An appeal was made for the cooperation of the monks, and some pongyis of the Yahanpyu Aphwe (Young Monks Association) complied in a few districts. When 250 monks of Myaungmya registered, this event was con­ sidered a newsworthy item. But protest meetings were staged by the Central Committee Against the Registra­ tion of Sanghas, and the attempt finally had to be abandoned.64 In early 1961, with U Nu again in power, a new plan was formulated which made the registration of monks a function of the ministry of religious affairs. There was a sugar coating on the pill this time, however, for the registration cards which the monks would have to carry would also qualify them for special rebates when travel­ ing by government-owned transport. The new plan would have required the appointment of more religious affairs officers in the districts.65 But the plan was not imple­ mented, and in March 1962 General Ne Win was back in power. The Ecclesiastical Courts Act of 1949 represented a second line of approach to Sangha reform.66 This act provided for the creation of a three-tiered judicial sys­ tem; the township and district courts had over them the Union Ecclesiastical Court. By this act all ecclesiastical matters (disputes involving monks, monasteries, and monastic property) were removed from the jurisdiction of the civil courts, which under the British had grad­ ually usurped the authority of the Buddhist primate and hierarchy. For the purpose of hearing and deciding a dispute, a ei Ibid.,

June 13, August 19, 1959; Burmese Review and Mon­ day New Times, August 31, 1959. 65 The Nation, January 11, 1961. 68 The official title uses Pali terms: The Vinicchaya-Thana and Vinicchaya Tribunal Act, 1311 B.E. However, the Burmese term is also used, and the legislation is frequently referred to as the Vinasaya Act.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

court at any of the three levels would have to consist of at least three ecclesiastical judges (Vinayadhara Sayadaws). The law to be applied by the judges was clearly specified in the act: "The Vinayadhara Sayadaws shall pass such judgments based on the canonical Pali Text of Vinaya of Theravada School of Buddhism, as recited at the First Synod and inscribed on stone at the Fifth Synod, together with the relevant commentaries thereon (athakatha-tika-mahapadesa) "6T Orders of an ecclesiastical court, if not complied with, would be enforced by the civil court within the same local jurisdiction. The Su­ preme Court of the Union has power to hear appeals from the Union Ecclesiastical Court, but has shown no inclination to overrule the latter's decisions.68 The act provided for the representation of the minority Shwegyin and Dvara sects on the Union Ecclesiastical Court.69 The procedure for the selection of judges was that the ministry of religious affairs would prepare elec­ toral rolls of the monks in all townships, and the monks would then elect the judges of each township court. These in turn would elect the members of the district 67

Section 22 (1) (a). The Nation, December 4, 1951; August 10, 1954. A dispute between a monk and a layman over a piece of land (whether it was private or dedicated religious land) was decided in favor of the former by a township ecclesiastical court, and the district civil court refused to interfere with this decree. The district judge declared: "In the dispute the Vinasaya Court has decided rightly or wrongly that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and passed a decree. To entertain this suit would, in my opinion, be nothing short of not only sitting in judgment over the decision of an independent court with exclusive jurisdiction but also usurp­ ing the appellate functions of the District Vinasaya Court and this, I am afraid, I cannot do under any pretext." Ibid., February 11, 1954. 69 Section 6 (3) (c). These sects, however, refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. See Hugh Tinker, The Union of Burma, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, p. 167. 68

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

court, and the judges of each district court would then elect one judge of the Union Ecclesiastical Court.70 The plan looked excellent on paper, but of course fell apart entirely with the refusal of the monks to submit to regis­ tration. With no township electoral rolls, the plan could not be implemented. Therefore, the Provisional Ecclesi­ astical Courts Act of 1951 provided for the appointment of Vinayadhara Sayadaws by the president of the Union. There was considerable optimism in 1950-1951 that the ecclesiastical courts would constitute an effective church hierarchy which would unify the Sangha and raise the standard of monastic discipline. But over the following few years these bright hopes were first dimmed and then extinguished altogether. In 1954 there were several mass demonstrations of monks protesting the functioning of the courts. They complained that the judges (who had been appointed and not elected) were enjoying political patronage and were guilty of partiality and corruption.71 In 1958 the Presiding Monks of Ran­ goon declared that some of the courts failed to comply with even the elementary principles of justice. Some courts, for example, did not give the respondent or de­ fendant an opportunity to state his case, and some of the monks who acted as judges were ignorant of the pro­ visions of the act.72 The sayadaws who sat on the Vinasaya courts com­ plained at their annual meeting in 1957 that many of the courts were not functioning or were very inefficient because the judges were not being paid their travel ex­ penses by the ministry of religious affairs. One editorial decried their inaction in the face of glaring immorality 70 Section

7 and Second Schedule (Election Rules). The Nation, June 21, August 11 and 21, 1954. 72 New Times of Burma, September 18, 1958.

71

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

in the monkhood, and observed: "No one seems to have much faith in these ecclesiastical courts. . . ."73 The most astounding revelation of the non-functioning of many of the courts came in 1959. U Thein Maung, deputy prime minister and minister of religious affairs in the Ne Win government, discovered that some sayadaws, chosen four years before to serve on the ecclesiastical courts, still had not received their appointment cards. About eight hundred cards had not been sent by the directorate of religious affairs for signature by the Union president and religious affairs minister. Another batch of seven hundred cards had been signed but had never been sent out to the respective district officers for dis­ tribution to the sayadaws. Disciplinary action was taken against the officials involved.74 THE SANGHA ASSEMBLY ISSUE

We must now consider a third major attempt by the government to deal with the problem of monastic indisci­ pline. The Sixth World Buddhist Council, held in Ran­ goon, generated intense religious devotion and renewed pressures for Sangha reform. On the last day of the great council, May 24, 1956, over 3,000 monks and sayadaws meeting at the Great Cave drew up a proclamation enjoining virtue and austerity upon the Sangha. Only thus could the Buddha Sasana be preserved during the next 2,500 years. The proclamation forbade the monks from handling money, treating sick persons, attending any form of entertainment, gambling, wearing their robes incorrectly, or wandering about idly.75 The Sasana Purifi73 "In a recent case, where a Buddhist monk was openly living with a woman in a monastery, we were told that the ecclesiastical courts could take no action because no complaint had been pre­ ferred." The Nation, July 1, 1957. 74 Ibid., February 23, 1959. 75 Ibid., May 26, 1956. See the editorial, "The Yellow Robe," which optimistically pointed to this proclamation as one of the

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

cation Association declared that this proclamation was far too mild, that drastic measures were required to purify the order, and that the only effective method was the formation of a Sangha council with far-reaching powers.76 In late 1957 the department of religious affairs, after consultation with some of the leading sayadaws, an­ nounced a plan for the creation of an effective agency of Sangha self-rule with important disciplinary powers.77 The registration of monks was begun in 179 townships; the object was the preparation of lists of monks eligible to vote for representatives on the drafting committee to be composed of one hundred monks. There would be ten monks each from the large centers like Rangoon and Mandalay and one delegate from each district.78 After its election the drafting committee would meet and decide on the composition and powers of the Sangha Hlutdaw or assembly. The government envisaged the assembly as a legislative body with power to enact regu­ lations for the clergy and an executive council composed of sayadaws who would be authorities on the Vinaya. But Bandoola U Sein, director of religious affairs, empha­ sized the fact that the drafting committee would have full liberty to frame a constitution for the Sangha assem­ bly according to its own wishes.79 The Sangha assembly proposal received the support of a number of monks' associations, including the Union Presiding Monks Association, the Mon Maha Sangha Maggi Association, the Maha Sangha Association, and the influential All Burma Yahanpyu Aphwe (Young Monks most significant developments in the entire course of the Sixth Synod. Ibid., June 7, 1956. 76 Ibid., June 13, 1956. 77 See "Monks Under Criticism," Eastern World, vol. 12, Janu­ ary 1958, pp. 17-18. 78 The Nation, October 1, 1957. 79 Ibid., October 6, 1957.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

Association). But opposition to the proposal was power­ ful and well organized; 1,500 Buddhist monks, repre­ senting twelve different monks' associations, held a mass meeting at the Shwedagon pagoda. Presided over by the eminent Pakokku Sayadaw, the meeting expressed its strong disapproval of the use of secular authority to form the Sangha assembly and to impose repressive restric­ tions on the monks. The meeting warned that, if the government persisted in its plan for the Sangha assembly, there would be violence. According to an editorial com­ ment, the protesting monks also put forward "the stupidly chauvinistic charge that the government was attempting to imitate Thailand, and that this was ipso facto a disgrace."80 A Committee of Nine was formed by the monks of the opposition, and it announced at a press conference that it would fight the government on the Sangha assembly issue to the bitter end. There was nothing in the Bud­ dha's teachings to support the proposed assembly, the committee warned, and the scheme would only lead to the emergence of pongyi policemen trying to keep watch over their brother monks. The need for reform was greatly exaggerated; the vast majority of the monks were devout and studious. Even if the presiding monks had admitted their inabil­ ity to maintain discipline in the monasteries, there was no need for drastic action. After all, the committee pointed out, misdeeds would inevitably be punished in future existences. The government was composed of laymen, whose duty was to support the Sangha with worldly goods, nothing more. If a layman did not respect a monk, he did not need to donate to him, but the layman had no authority to exercise power over the monk. If the 80 Ibid., September 24, 1957; editorial "Monks in Revolt," Sep­ tember 25, 1957.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

present-day Sangha needed reform, let the sayadaws of the three monastic sects initiate it, not the government.81 A second mass meeting of 1,500 monks denounced the assembly proposal and rejected the imitation of Thailand (the Thai monks were immoral and did not follow the Buddha's teachings!). One sayadaw said that the AFPFL Socialists in the government believed in Marxism-Leninism and were therefore the enemies of religion. These heretics had no right to interfere with the Sangha. All monks who fought against the Sangha assembly would be performing a meritorious deed which would help them toward nibbana.82 The Arakanese Thawthuyana Monks Association directed its fire at U Nu himself. The assembly proposal was but another of his misdeeds; U Nu had written a foreword to the anti-clerical book Tet Pongyi, he had tried to divert the riches of the Shwedagon pagoda to the people's use, he had scolded the monks who opposed the teaching of the Koran, and he had always found fault with the monks at religious gatherings instead of doing honor to them.83 The agitation against the Sangha assembly proposal achieved its objective, and in 1958 the plan was quietly suspended. After General Ne Win became prime minister in that year the anti-Sangha assembly committee wrote him a letter offering its cooperation in the registration of monks on the condition that this registration not be used to revive the assembly plan.84 After U Nu returned to power in 1960, efforts were made by the directorate of religious affairs to implement the plan. Elections were held at which 105 monks representing the three major sects were chosen. Opposition from highly vocal seg81

82 Ibid., October 6, 1957. Ibid., October 3, 1957. Ibid., October 12, 1957. See also Hanthawaddy, October 2, 6, 7, 12 and 17, 1957. 8i New Times of Burma, March 20, 1959. 83

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

ments of the Sangha continued to be intense, however, and it was clear that many monks would never accept the authority of this body. In a 1962 government publica­ tion the directorate of religious affairs somberly reported: "Through prevailing circumstances one of the chief major functions of this department of establishing the Sangha Council had been delayed. . . . At present the Sangha Council scheme is under deep consideration."85 The problem of the Sangha in Burma appears to be insoluble at the present time. The pressing need for re­ form is obvious; according to one editorial writer, "the clergy have reached an anarchic situation."86 What is needed is an ecclesiastical structure in which abuses can be dealt with from within with a minimum of govern­ mental intervention. But the Sangha is incapable of building this structure itself. The older, more stable monks perceive the need but lack the qualities of dynamic leadership required to reconstruct the Sangha. The vital impulse for change must thus come from outside, from the government. But functioning in a democratic setup and responsive to diverse and conflicting pressures, U Nu's government proved to be extremely ineffectual, as has been shown. General Ne Win's authoritarian regime, established by the 1962 coup, has done no better. THE PROMOTION OF PALI SCHOLARSHIP

The discussion thus far has centered on the indiscipline of the Sangha, the government's efforts to reform the monastic order, and the frustration of these efforts by recalcitrant elements within the Sangha. This discussion has probably conveyed the impression that the govern­ ment's objectives have been negative (the eradication of abuses in the order), and that the principal relationship 85 Burma: The Fourteenth Anniversary, Director of Information, Government of the Union of Burma, Rangoon, 1962, p. 174. 86 "Reforming the Buddhist Church," The Nation, September 23, 1957.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

has been that of government versus Sangha. This indeed has been an important part of the total picture, but only a part. The government has also consistently sought to honor the Sangha, raise its prestige, and promote its interests by positive measures of support. There have been innumerable public ceremonies, widely publicized in the press, at which the prime minister, the president of the Union, and other high officials have humbly offered soon (alms-food), gifts of yellow robes, and even money (Vinaya regulations not­ withstanding) to the monks. The president of the Union customarily leads such activities on important religious holidays; at an impressive Buddha Day ceremony in 1958 he personally offered soon to 2,500 pongyis. Pictures of U Nu kneeling before monks at various ceremonies have frequently appeared in the press.87 Apart from the religious merit which accrues to the individual official involved and the obvious political "merit" which is gained by identifying himself publicly with religion, "the constant repetition of acts of obeisance and humility before members of the Sangha is intended as a model for dutiful citizens. . . ."88 U Nu's own periodic retreats from the world to the contemplative life of the monastery, however brief, have served as forceful re­ minders that, for the Burmese Buddhist, the Sangha is still one of the Three Jewels, and the monkhood is still the highest expression of Buddhist values. The government has sought to honor the Sangha in a more formal manner through the annual bestowal of honorary ecclesiastical titles on monks who have distin­ guished themselves in Buddhist scriptural learning. This traditional practice of the Burmese monarchy was dis­ carded by the British but partly revived in 1915 with 87

Ibid., November 30, 1955; New Times of Burma, April 8, 1958; May 12, 1960; Burma Weekly Bulletin, April 20, 1961. 88 Brohm, p. 392.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

the creation of the title Agga-Maha-Paudita, conferred on eminent religious teachers.89 In 1953 a still higher rank was created, Abhi-Dhaja-Maha-Rattha-Guru (Most Re­ nowned Teacher of the Great Country), and a system of annual stipends established, 750 kyats for the bearers of the former title and 1,000 kyats for the latter. In a very diplomatic move the government in 1953 conferred the highest title on the respective leaders of the three major sects of the Sangha.90 By far the most significant positive measures which the government has taken to enhance the status of the Sangha have been those designed to encourage Pali scholarship among the monks. The Pali University and Dhammacariya Act of 1950 created an organizational framework for higher Pali studies in the monasteries of the country. There is no Pali University campus; those monasteries which have at least ten advanced students and meet the other requirements become "colleges" affili­ ated with the university. Three lecturing dhammacariyas (teachers of the dhamma), who must be monks, may be appointed for every ten students. The principal of the "college" (presiding monk) and each lecturer are paid 60 kyats per month (as a "rice-grant") by the govern­ ment.91 The uniform curriculum, standards, and procedures which link together the affiliated monasteries are estab89 Ibid., pp. 390-391; Burma's Freedom: Second Anniversary, Directorate of Information, Union of Burma, Rangoon, 1950, p. 138. 90 The Nation, July 2, 1953. 91 The Pali University and Dhammacariya Act, Second Sched­ ule. According to the Vinaya, a monk may accept rice but not money. In addition, each of the participating monasteries receives from the government an annual donation of 500 kyats for miscel­ laneous expenses. For the first official proposal to create a Pali University, see Report of the Pali University Inquiry Committee, Superintendent, Government Printing and Stationery, Rangoon, 1941. This report is discussed in chapter 2.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

lished by the governing body, the Central Council of the Pali University. Each monastery has one representa­ tive on this council, and the government also nominates some members (not over 30 per cent of the total). It was reported in 1962 that there were 84 monasteries affiliated to the Pali University. The institution has been quite successful in stimulating more work in advanced Pali studies in the participating monasteries. In the Pali Uni­ versity examinations held in 1961, there were 2,034 candidates for the three degrees offered, 434 of whom were successful.92 At the less advanced level, the study of the Pali scrip­ tures had long been promoted by the Burmese kings, and by the British government after them, through the holding of annual Pali examinations. Since independence this program has been greatly expanded. The Pali Edu­ cation Board Act of 1952 transformed the original board, created by executive order in 1948, into a statutory body. The Pali Education Board is responsible for the entire administration of the Pali examinations: prescribing the subjects, conducting the examinations, appointing boards of examiners, and awarding prizes and certificates.93 Separate examinations are held for the three grades of Pali scripture studies: the patamange, patamalat, and patamagyi examinations constitute respectively the lower, middle, and senior grades. The examinations have at­ tracted an ever-increasing number of candidates, the vast majority of whom are monks. The phenomenal growth of the program is indicated by the following statistics for the patamagyi (senior) examination: 1950 1953 1959 92 93

772 candidates 1,821 " 3,627 "

52 passed 420 " 694 "

Burma: The Fourteenth Anniversary, p. 175. The Pali Education Board Act, 1952, section 23.

THE SANGHA, POLITICS, AND REFORM

In 1959 the total number of candidates in all three stand­ ards was 12,433, of whom 3,133 were successful.84 In accordance with the traditional practice followed by both the Burmese kings and the British government, cash prizes are awarded to the successful candidates. In an impressive ceremony attended by cabinet ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and other high officials, the Union president personally presents the certificates and prizes.95 The government's success in this aspect of its policy toward the Sangha has unfortunately been somewhat marred by irregularities in which both the examiners and the candidates have been involved. The leakage of ques­ tions in the 1950 Pali examinations was traced to three monks who were members of the Pali Education Board.96 In 1957 a demonstration was staged by 1,000 monks who demanded larger monetary prizes for successful candi­ dates, the prescription of the same texts for five years, and quicker marking of the papers. Seven buses were commandeered, and the monks drove around Rangoon exhorting "comrade monks" to join in the boycott of the government Pali examinations.97 In 1961 over three hundred pongyis picketed the gates of the secretariat, compelling three cabinet ministers to spend the night there. The siege was called off after 94 "A Short Account of the Government Pali Examination in Burma," Sangayana Souvenir, Union Buddha Sasana Council, Ran­ goon, 1954, p. 56; New Times of Burma, July 1, 1959. In addition to these examinations conducted by the Pali Education Board, an annual examination in the Abhidhamma (metaphysics, the third "basket" of the Tripitaka) is sponsored by the Union Buddha Sasana Council. Ibid., December 3, 1959. 85 The Nation, December 3, 1950. »«Ibid., October 5, 1950; July 17, 1951. 97 Ibid., March 31, April 2-5, 22-26, 29 and May 4, 10, 12, 1957. The monks were supported by the communist-dominated All Burma Federation of Student Unions. A number of young monks' associations had supported the ABFSU the previous year, it will be recalled, when the government banned all student unions.

T H E SA N G H A , P O L I T I C S , A N D R E F O R M

twenty-six hours only with the arrival of U Nu who, being informed of the crisis, returned to Rangoon by air from Sandoway. The grievance: the list of successful candidates for that year included the names of ninetyfive monks who had not even taken the examination, and when the attention of the authorities was drawn to this fact, a revised list was published which omitted 153 names. U Nu promised to hold an investigation and deal sternly with those responsible for this ineffi­ ciency and/or dishonesty in the administration of the Pali examinations.98 In an address to the sayadatos U Nu also revealed the considerable amount of open cheating and intimidation of supervisors by the candidates. He reported that in Mandalay in 1959 army and police officers had searched the monk candidates and found over one hundred dag­ gers in their possession." Unfortunately, sound govern­ ment measures designed to elevate the Sangha have also provided new opportunities for disruption by violent elements within the sacred order. 98 99

Ibid., February 17, 18, 26, March 8, 1961. Ibid., March 15, 1961.

CHAPTER 7 THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

I N 1948 Burma was a secular state with a government strongly influenced by Marxist ideology. By August 1961 Burma was constitutionally committed to the promotion of Buddhism as the state religion. We have already examined the major steps in the government's ever-deepening involvement in religious concerns since 1948. The evolution of official religious policy was grad­ ual and met with exceedingly little opposition until the final step—the adoption of a state religion—gave explicit constitutional recognition to the already intimate rela­ tionship between church and state. The political and religious controversy which this final step generated, the theoretical and practical issues which it raised, and the government's responses to diverse pressures concerned with it will be considered in this chapter. THE 1947 DECISION

The first draft of Burma's Constitution was the work of a political party, not a constituent body. In May 1947 the AFPFL held its "small constituent assembly" at Jubilee Hall in Rangoon. A Ill-member committee was entrusted with the task of drawing up the draft Constitution. During the discussions of the committee some of the more traditionalist leaders, especially U Ba Choe, pressed for the constitutional recognition of Buddhism as the state religion. The proposal was vehemently rejected by Bogyoke Aung San, who was convinced that such a pro­ vision would seriously impair national unity.1 Such a clause in the Constitution would inevitably be resented 1

See the editorial "Shades of Aung San" in The Nation, July

15, 1961.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

as an attempt to impose the religion of the majority on the minorities. Aung Sans convictions concerning the secular state prevailed, and the draft Constitution which was endorsed by the entire AFPFL convention on May 23, 1947, contained the following provision: "The Union shall observe neutrality in religious matters. It may, however, extend material or other assistance to religious institutions."2 The Constituent Assembly had already been elected before the AFPFL convention and began its first session on June 9, 1947. The pressure for the constitutional recognition of Buddhism as state religion continued. The question was still under discussion when Aung San, U Ba Choe, and five of their colleagues on the executive council were assassinated on July 19.3 A compromise provision was then drafted which moved significantly from the position of the AFPFL document, but was still far from proclaiming a state religion. Two months after the assassinations the Constituent Assembly adopted the Constitution containing this compromise formula. Section 21. (1) The state recognizes the special posi­ tion of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union. (2) The state also recognizes Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and animism as some of the religions existing in the Union at the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution.4 This same compromise between secularism and an official religion was struck in the drafting of the 1937 Constitu2 The draft Constitution approved by the AFPFL is included as an appendix in Maung Maung, Burma's Constitution, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1959; the section on "Rights Relating to Reli­ gion" is found on p. 247. 3 Ibid., p. 98. 4 The Constitution of the Union of Burma, section 21, before the promulgation of the Third Amendment on August 26, 1961.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

tion of Eire, which recognizes the special position of the Roman Catholic Church but also grants recognition to other religions. There was virtually no evidence of dissatisfaction with the 1947 constitutional settlement during the first few years of independence. The government was chiefly occu­ pied with a most fundamental concern—the survival of the state. As the worst crises of the insurrections passed, some attention was given to the religious legislation of 1950-1951. The question of a state religion, however, was clearly not a matter of pressing public concern.5 During the Sixth Great Buddhist Council, 1954-1956, religious enthusiasm rose to a high pitch, and considerable interest was evidenced in the question. Toward the end of 1955 preparations were made for the coming general elections, and the political potential of the state religion issue was not overlooked. The Republican Party was formed and announced its program as rightist, anti-communist, and democratic; it advocated that Buddhism be made the state religion.® While the political strength represented by this group was negligible, its espousal of this issue was indicative of the changed climate of opinion. A crucial step in the development of the state religion issue came in May 1956 at the conclusion of the Sixth Buddhist Council. Meetings were convened by three Sangha organizations, the Maha Thawthuyana Association of Rangoon, the Yahan Nge (Young Monks) Association 5 In 1951 the All Buddhist Central Organization in Mandalay sponsored a public debate on the general principle of a "theo­ cratic state." While speakers made historical references to Burma ("During the times of King Anawrahta and King Mindon the country was peaceful and progressive because they ruled on the strict principles of Dhammathats"), and the implications for present-day policy in Burma were clear enough, the debate was focused on abstract principles. The 5,000 people in the audience voted overwhelmingly in favor of the motion: "Resolved, that the government of a country should be based on religion." The Nation, April 13, 1951. 6 Ibid., October 15, 1955.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

of Mandalay, and the Arakan Thawthuyana Association, at which resolutions were passed demanding that Bud­ dhism be declared the state religion of Burma. Copies of the resolution were forwarded to the prime minister, the religious affairs minister, and other officials, threaten­ ing mass demonstrations if the government failed to take appropriate action.7 But more important was the less overt pressure on the government exerted by the older and more learned monks who had worked hard to make the Sixth Buddhist Council a success. In an address to the sayadaws and monks who had participated in the council, Prime Minister U Nu declared that he and his colleagues were as anxious as any to see Buddhism made the state religion. However, there were three difficulties which would have to be considered: (1) The step might have a serious effect on the unity of the country. (2) It might be used by other countries to disrupt the internal stability of Burma.8 (3) It might create misunderstanding among the many loyal govern­ ment servants who were not Buddhists. The important thing to be done first, U Nu continued, was to convince the non-Buddhists that such a move would not affect their religious freedom, equal citizenship rights, or state assistance to their respective religions.9 U Nu later revealed that this declaration to the saya­ daws had been made after full consultation with both the AFPFL executive committee and his cabinet. U Ba Swe had advised that the issue be approached with great 7

Hanthawaddy, May 20 and 22, 1956. the moment, throughout the world, when one country is employing various means of sabotaging another country by rearing followers, stooges and fifth-columnists, if we hurriedly declare Buddhism the state religion, we would fall an easy prey to such countries. . . ." U Nu did not explain this point, but it was appar­ ently an allusion to Pakistan's suspected role vis-a-vis the Muslim population in the border areas of Arakan. 9 The Nation, May 28, 1956. 8 "At

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

caution, and other members as well had had grave doubts and misgivings about it. Finally, however, the cabinet had reluctantly yielded to his fevered importunities, and the promise to the Sangha was made with the authority of the government.10 The 1956 statement indeed sug­ gested the desirability of declaring Buddhism the state religion, but was heavily burdened with the negative considerations involved, and asserted that the necessary preliminary step was to secure the approval or at least acquiescence of the minorities. In his subsequent state­ ments, however, the premier seemed to regard the 1956 declaration as an unconditional promise which he was honor-bound to keep.11 He had made a solemn promise to the venerable sayadaws, and this fact enabled him to dismiss objections which might otherwise have led to serious reconsideration. In June 1956 U Nu decided to vacate the premiership for one year in order to give more attention to the party, and a new cabinet led by U Ba Swe was sworn in. In his capacity as president of the AFPFL, however, U Nu continued his preparatory work for the adoption of the state religion. In February 1957 he held a preliminary meeting with the leaders of the non-Buddhist faiths— Muslim, Christian, and Hindu—to discuss the legislation which the AFPFL intended to introduce.12 Shortly there­ after U Nu resumed the premiership. The AFPFL rapidly lost its cohesiveness at the center as reciprocal recriminations between U Nu and U Kyaw Nyein became increasingly bitter and open. The split in the AFPFL organization came in the spring of 1958; U Ba Swe, U Kyaw Nyein, and their colleagues in the cabinet 10

New Times of Burma, November 24, 1959, and The Nation, August 31, 1960. 11 This shifting of ground is discussed in a lengthy "Open Letter to U Nu," The Guardian, August 1, 1961. 12 The Nation, February 21, 1957.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

resigned. With the threat of civil war hanging over the country, General Ne Win was installed as premier in October 1958. His caretaker government proved to be stable, honest, and efficient; not a few Burmese greeted the prospect of general elections in early 1960 and a return to party politics with understandable misgivings. THE

1960

ELECTIONS

Despite the grave political problems which confronted the country during this period, the state religion issue was by no means forgotten. Shortly before General Ne Win assumed the premiership, nine veteran politicians led by Sir M. A. Maung Gyee formed a new political party known as the Buddhist Democratic Party. The first article in their 23-point program was to make Buddhism the religion of the Union of Burma; in religious affairs the party promised to act strictly on the advice of the Buddhist sayadaws.13 The sayadaws themselves made their wishes known in no uncertain terms. In March 1959 the Union Presiding Monks Association passed a resolution expressing its profound desire that Buddhism be proclaimed the state religion. In presenting this resolution, the Sagaing Inbin Sayadaw declared that it was incomprehensible why the government had procrastinated on this particular issue.14 This well-organized group (its annual conference is attended by some 1,000 presiding sayadaws from all parts of Burma) commands great respect among both monks and laymen. The Committee for Making Buddhism the State Reli­ gion, an organization of laymen without political affilia­ tion, set about publicizing the issue through meetings and pamphlets. The secretary of the organization, U Thant Zin, was a grandson of the late King Thibaw. As 13 14

New Times of Burma, September 19, 1958. Ibid., March 22, 1959 and May 7, 1959.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

the election campaign progressed, its views tended to coincide with those of the Clean AFPFL, but leaders of the group emphasized that their sole objective was that indicated by the name of the organization.15 The Clean AFPFL (U NUS party), the Stable AFPFL (the party of U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein), and the NUF (the National United Front, a communist-oriented party) were the chief contenders in the 1960 elections. In the campaign, U Nu portrayed his party as the under­ dog struggling for the reestablishment of democracy in Burma against the "fascists"—the Stable AFPFL supported unofficially by the military regime. He accused the Ne Win government of resorting to political persecution when it arrested a number of Clean AFPFL leaders on charges of corruption. Although his opponents were credited with much greater organizational strength, U Nu early seized the initiative in the campaign and never relinquished it.16 U Nu's well-known religious piety was an enormous asset in the campaign, and no efforts were spared to take full advantage of it. Whatever his original motives in promoting the Buddhist faith by such dramatic acts as convening the Great Buddhist Synod (and genuine reli­ gious motives, among others, should not be discounted), U Nu now appeared before the electorate as the per­ sonification of certain traditionalist values—the devout Buddhist ruler, the Defender of the Faith. So that the voter could not fail to perceive the relationship which linked together the personality, the party, and the faith, the Clean AFPFL'S ballot boxes were deep yellow, the 15

Ibid., October 29, 1959. Richard Butwell and Fred von der Mehden, "The 1960 Election in Burma," Pacific Affairs, 1960, vol. 33, pp. 144-157; Lee S. Bigelow, "The 1960 Election in Burma," Far Eastern Survey, 1960, vol. 29, pp. 70-74; Fred von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism, in Southeast Asia, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1963, pp. 98-102. 16 See

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

traditional Buddhist color, with a large picture of U Nu in the center.17 During the campaign, U Nu was fre­ quently photographed offering soon (alms-food) to Bud­ dhist monks, visiting pagodas, or participating in other religious ceremonies. The pledge to make Buddhism the state religion did not appear in the election manifesto and program pub­ lished by the Clean AFPFL. On September 26, 1959, shortly before the official opening of the campaign, U Nu announced at Kaba Aye that Buddhism would defi­ nitely be made the state religion if his party won the election. The statement was made by U Nu at a meeting of the Clean AFPFL executive committee and district party officials and in his capacity as president of the party.18 U Nu then retired from the political scene to wear the yellow robe of a Buddhist monk for a six-week period. By making this announcement before the opening of the election campaign and by excluding the issue from the party manifesto, U Nu sought to avoid legal prob­ lems connected with the anticipated allegation that he was exploiting religion for political purposes. Section 21 (4) of the Constitution states: "The abuse of religion for political purposes is forbidden; and any act which is intended or is likely to promote feelings of hatred, enmity, or discord between racial or religious commu­ nities or sects is contrary to this Constitution and may be made punishable by law." By U Nu's shrewd ma­ neuver, the most important single issue of the campaign received no recognition in the Clean AFPFL manifesto. This fact also enabled U Raschid, a Muslim and a close 17

New Times of Burma, August 28, 1959. Later commenting on this announcement, U Nu related it to his 1956 "promise" to the sayadaws. "Immediately after the con­ clusion of the [Sixth Buddhist] Council I submitted to the saya­ daws that I would take necessary steps to make Buddhism the state religion." Ibid., November 24, 1959. 18

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

political associate of U Nu, to campaign vigorously for the party and yet later to oppose the state religion legis­ lation in Parliament while a member of the cabinet. The Stable AFPFL responded to the Kaba Aye pro­ nouncement with a booklet entitled State Religion—A Stepping Stone. The accusation, of course, was that U Nu was deliberately using religion as a stepping stone to political power. However, the Stable AFPFL leaders found it almost impossible to attack the use of religion without engendering the suspicion that they were un­ friendly to religion itself. And their opponents were quite willing to foster the general impression that U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein were atheists devoid of moral standards. Deriding U Nu's lofty but vague preachments on the subjects of democracy and morality, U Kyaw Nyein de­ clared that observance of the Five Precepts alone would not make a man a good political leader. What was needed was a sound program and the ability to implement it. In this speech he drew a sharp distinction between reli­ gion and politics.19 U Nu and his party promptly de­ nounced this statement as one which held the Five Precepts to be "unnecessary." Attempting to clarify his position, U Kyaw Nyein explained that while it was a good thing to observe the Five Precepts, it was quite impossible for all members of the government to do so. The government had to execute criminals, dispossess landlords (under the Land Nationalization Act), issue licenses for the sale of liquor, and engage in other activ­ ities prohibited by the Five Precepts.20 U Kyaw Nyein's labored explanation was reasonable enough, but the political damage had already been done. Three months after the statement had been made, he was still trying to convince people that he was a good 19 20

Burmese Review and Monday New Times, September 7, 1959. Ibid., November 30. 1959.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

Buddhist. He finally invited to his house for a 5 A.M. breakfast the fifty-one sayadaws who were attending the executive committee meeting of the All Burma Presiding Monks Association. He assured them that he had not repudiated the Five Precepts and promised to meet their demands if the Stable AFPFL were elected.21 After three days of exhaustive discussion and delibera­ tion, the Stable AFPFL issued an eleven-page statement which asserted that making Buddhism the state religion would in no way provide substantial aid to the advance­ ment of the faith, although it might afford some moral satisfaction to Buddhists. T h e statement charged U N u s party with having violated section 21 (4) of the Consti­ tution by making religion a political issue for purposes of the coming election. It then went on to cite the lessons of history to show the social and political evils which inevitably accompanied the confusion of religion with politics. State control over the church, discrimination against minorities, and religious persecution were among the evils which western nations sought to avoid by the principle of freedom of conscience and separation of state and religion. In general, this principle is linked today with parliamentary democracy and republicanism, whereas a state religion is frequently associated with monarchy. In Burma, the statement continued, making Buddhism the state religion would greatly weaken na­ tional solidarity by undermining the confidence of the ethnic and religious minorities in the majority community. Citing numerous scriptural quotations, the Stable AFPFL statement sought to show the ways in which the state could substantially advance the cause of Buddhism as an alternative to making it the state religion. The party then gave an impressive ten-point list of measures which it would undertake by necessary legislation for the pro21

New Times of Burma, December 1, 1959.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

motion of Buddhism. These included the following: making Buddhism a compulsory subject for Buddhist students, providing material support for monks, location of future state primary schools in monasteries, vigorous prosecution of Buddhist missionary work in the hill tracts and abroad, etc. The party thus sought to refute the charge that it was unconcerned about the future of religion. While proposing these measures as an alterna­ tive, the statement went on to recognize the feelings of many Buddhists that their faith could flourish only if exalted to the status of the state religion; it weakly con­ cluded by proposing that this be taken up as a separate issue after the elections and decided according to the will of the Sangha and the people.22 The Stable AFPFL statement, then, held that the idea of a state religion had been productive of great evils in the past, was wrong in principle, would undermine the unity of Burma and prove ineffectual in achieving the desired ends, but should be implemented if the people wanted it! The lengthy election manifesto issued by the party one week later, however, was conspicuously silent on the question of religion.23 The ambivalence in the attitude of the Stable AFPFL leaders toward the state religion issue was in evidence right up to election day. Torn between the desire to attack the issue and the necessity to offer similar promises to the people, the party pleased nobody. And even when, toward the end of the campaign, U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein began to imitate their opponent in outward expressions of deference to religion and tradition, their performance was unconvinc­ ing to the common man. The communist-oriented NUF in its election manifesto castigated those political parties which were trying to 22 Burmese Review and Monday New Times, December 14, 1959. 23 New Times of Burma, December 23, 1959.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

confuse religion and politics and which were repudiating the constitutional aim of setting up a modern welfare state in favor of a "theocratic state for a life of bliss in the next world." The manifesto accused those parties of trying to drag the country back to the fifteenth or six­ teenth century. The NUF recognized freedom of religion and the special position of Buddhism in the Union, but would not go beyond this constitutional recognition.24 The NUF'S arguments for a secular state were interpreted by most observers simply in terms of the ideological conflict between Marxism and religion. Commenting on the NUF manifesto, one editorial writer stated: "Whatever the merits of a secular state, the issue of Buddhism versus communism is a serious one in Burma because the com­ munists are turning their weapons at Buddhism whenever opportunity offers. In the face of this danger to the Dhamma from the communists, it is rather significant that the NUF should disapprove of Buddhism being made the state religion."25 One interesting sidelight of the pre-election political situation was that General Ne Win's government had waged a vigorous propaganda campaign against commu­ nism on the basis of its threat to Buddhism. The ministry of information and the ministry of defence had jointly published a pamphlet entitled Dhammantaraya (Bud­ dhism in Danger), which had been widely distributed throughout the country.26 Ironically, while the Ne Win government was generally more sympathetic toward the Stable AFPFL as the elections approached, it was the Clean AFPFL which was able to capitalize on the Dham24

Burmese Review and Monday New Times, December 7, 1959. New Times of Burma, December 8, 1959. 26 Fred von der Mehden, "Burma's Religious Campaign against Communism," Pacific Affairs, 1960, vol. 33, pp. 290-299. For a discussion of the broader ideological implications of Buddhism in Burmese politics, see chapter 4. 25

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

mantaraya campaign by pledging to make Buddhism the state religion. If Buddhism was threatened by the com­ munists, what better way to protect it than jy electing a party which would make its protection and promotion the special responsibility of the state itself? The Buddhist monks played a significant role in the election campaign, although it is difficult to gauge the extent of their activities. In November and December 1959 municipal elections were held throughout Burma. The district commissioner of Mandalay reported that some monks had been tearing up or removing posters of candidates they disliked, intimidating voters, and con­ ducting house to house campaigns for the benefit of candidates they favored. The situation was so serious that the district commissioner called a meeting of repre­ sentatives of nine monks' associations and secured signed promises that they would prevent their members from engaging in such activities in the future.27 The Sangha Front, allied to the Stable AFPFL, de­ nounced U Nu's proposal to make Buddhism the state religion. The Sangha Front interpreted U Nu's somewhat ambiguous 1956 statement as a flat refusal of the eminent sayadaws' request that this be done. Being out of office, U Nu now was simply canvassing votes for the coming elections. If he had been sincere about the state religion question, why had he not acted while in office?28 Some monks campaigned vigorously on behalf of the Stable AFPFL. However, the majority rallied to the support of U Nu and became his most effective propagandists in the towns and villages of Burma. While U Nu had never spelled out the implications of the adoption of the state religion (despite repeated demands by his opponents that he do so), the pongyis and sayadaws were satisfied 27 28

New Times of Burma, November 27, 1959. Ibid., October 11, 1959.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

that such a step would inevitably mean greater power and prestige for the Sangha.29 The elections of February 7, 1960 resulted in an over­ whelming victory for U Nu and his party. The NUF won three seats, the Stable AFPFL and allies took 45, and the Clean AFPFL and allies emerged with an astonishing 168 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. THE DEBATE INTENSIFIED

The first meeting of the new cabinet was held on April 4, and during the first half-hour Prime Minister U Nu appointed an advisory commission to determine what steps should be taken to make Buddhism the state reli­ gion of the Union. The membership of the State Religion Advisory Commission consisted of eighteen sayadaws and seventeen Buddhist laymen; there were thus no nonBuddhist members. The chairman and vice-chairman, retired Chief Justice U Thein Maung and Justice U Chan Htoon, were prominent Buddhist laymen who had already played important roles in the development of the govern­ ment's religious policies and programs. According to its terms of reference, the commission was to advise the government on what legislation or constitutional amend­ ments might be required to adopt the state religion. The attorney-general of the Union was made a member to handle the drafting of bills. The commission was to be free to visit any part of the Union to consult with the leaders of both Buddhist and non-Buddhist religious associations. It was directed to present its report within the year I960.30 The procedure adopted by the commission had two principal phases: first, the issuance of a questionnaire to solicit information and opinions from individuals and 29 Kingsley Martin, "Nu's Victory," New Statesman, March 12, 1960. 30 New Times of Burma, April 6, 1960.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

organizations; second, tours which would enable the commission to interview religious leaders personally. The questionnaire which was issued did little to dispel the growing apprehensions of the religious minorities regard­ ing the state religion proposal. One question was as follows: "Will it be desirable or proper to enact the following law? . . . The Public Service Commission and other employment giving state committees, boards, mu­ nicipalities, and other democratization boards shall give priority to candidates who have passed [examinations] in Pali or Buddhism, other things being equal."31 To be sure, this was a question which could simply be answered in the negative, but the Muslims and Christians were dis­ turbed that the possibility of such discriminatory legis­ lation had occurred to the commission. The commission's tours around the country were regu­ larly reported in the press. The usual pattern of such visits was for the commission to be welcomed and enter­ tained by government officials and leaders of various Buddhist associations and escorted around the notable pagodas of the town or city. Special morning meals were invariably arranged for the venerable sayadaws of the commission. Public meetings were held at which the sayadaws administered the Five Precepts to the audience and a secretary of the commission explained the aims and objects of making Buddhism the state religion. The commission met with the leaders of various religions and heard their views on this subject. Of the 416 persons who gave evidence before the commission, 300 were Bud­ dhists, 44 were Christians of various denominations, 33 were Muslims, 33 were Hindus and six were animists.32 Violence erupted when the commission visited the Kachin state, where the religious objections of animists 31 Commission on State Religion, "Questionnaire on the Benefits to be Derived from Making Buddhism the State Religion." 32 The Guardian, August 2, 1961.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

and Christians coalesced with the hill peoples' long­ standing resentment of government policies of Burmanization. The train which brought the state religion commission to Myitkyina, the northernmost town in the Union, was turned back by hundreds of demonstrators who hurled stones as it steamed into the station. A vast crowd—reported to be 5,000 strong—massed at the sta­ tion, carrying banners and shouting slogans against the state religion proposal.83 A few days after this incident the commission com­ pleted its tour of the country and submitted its report to the government. Its chief recommendation was that section 21 (1) of the Constitution be amended to estab­ lish Buddhism as the state religion.34 The activities of the commission had undoubtedly helped to stimulate a lively public interest in the state religion issue, but con­ tributed nothing toward a more intelligent debate on the subject, for the government declined to publish the report at that time. And eight months later, when the Constitu­ tion was amended in accordance with its recommenda­ tion, the commission report had still not seen the light of day. Meanwhile, U Nu attempted to reassure the religious minorities that the adoption of Buddhism as the state religion would in no way diminish their citizenship rights or freedom of religion. On May 1, 1960, he was host at a tea party given in honor of Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and animist religious leaders. In response to his assurances some Muslim leaders stated that, while fully convinced of U Nu's good faith and good intentions, they were apprehensive that the adoption of the state reli­ gion might have serious future repercussions on their faith under a less liberal regime. The Anglican bishop 33 34

The Nation, December 21, 1960. Ibid., December 25, 1960.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

of Rangoon expressed general satisfaction with the assur­ ances given. The Roman Catholic archbishop of Rangoon lauded the great spirit of tolerance prevailing in Burma and then gave an assurance of his own regarding the state religion issue: "As a head of the Catholic com­ munity, let me assure you the Catholic will not oppose it or obstruct it."35 In the months which followed, how­ ever, these mild reactions were replaced by vehement opposition among many Muslims, Protestants, and Catho­ lics, although the Catholic hierarchy maintained its same position. Tensions heightened, emotions became inflamed, and moderate language was abandoned by some on both sides of the issue. There was an implied threat in Duwa Lawang Li's statement in Parliament that violence was likely to break out if the government pushed the measure through without regard to the minorities. Prime Minister U Nu replied that the flame of religious zeal burned no less fiercely in the breasts of Buddhist leaders. Ever since the dawn of independence, state religion had been the watchword and battle cry of every Buddhist layman and monk, which he personally had found impossible to repress since the time of the Sixth Great Buddhist Coun­ cil. Referring to the talk of violence, he declared: "I am not a man of violence, and therefore I cannot match the threat to kill anyone or let anyone's blood, but I am determined to bring in state religion, even if I have to die in the attempt."36 The prime minister conceded, how­ ever, that the minorities' fear of being relegated to second-class citizenship would have to be examined and safeguards devised. U Nu's Clean AFPFL had by this time changed its name to the Pyidaungsu (Union) Party.37 U Nu announced 35

Burma Weekly Bulletin, May 12, 1960, p. 16. The Nation, August 31, 1960. 37 The Stable AFPFL thereafter became simply the AFPFL. 36

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

at a press conference that non-Buddhist MP'S of the party were perfectly free to oppose the state religion bill which would be introduced if they so desired. They were allowed to exercise their own personal judgment inde­ pendently of party considerations. However, if Buddhist MP'S of the Union Party failed to support the govern­ ment's bill, they would be expelled from the party.38 As indications of opposition from various quarters became clearer, U Nu moved well in advance to head off any possible trouble from the Buddhists of his own parlia­ mentary party. Among the Burma Muslims there was a very small minority which supported the government's proposal to make Buddhism the state religion. In a letter sent to the commission the All Burma Moulvi Association took the position that a state with a religion was preferable to a state without religion and that since Buddhism was the faith of the majority of the citizens, the desire to elevate it to the status of the state religion was but natural.39 The president of the association, Moulvi U San Shar, reiterated this stand in several public statements. However, there were clear indications that the moulvi's position was dictated more by practical considerations than those of principle. Thus, he explained to one group of Muslims that those who opposed the state religion proposal demonstrated a lamentable lack of common sense. Had the Moulvi Association also opposed the government's move, the entire Muslim community would have incurred the animosity of the Buddhists, and this would have led to religious and racial conflicts. As it was, his association's positive stand had helped to maintain friendship between Muslims and Buddhists.40 Far more representative of informed Muslim opinion was the statement issued by the Islamic Religious Affairs 38 38

New Times of Burma, June 30, 1960. Ibid., May 15, 1960. «ibid., May 21, 1960.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

Council in May 1960. The council recalled that national solidarity had been the basic aim when the Constitution was drafted and that in pursuance of this objective state and religion had been kept separate. Under the existing constitutional provisions, the government had been able to advance the cause of Buddhism in a most spectacular way in the decade preceding the AFPFL split. Therefore, what was the necessity for constitutional changes at this point? The council's most fundamental objection to the state religion proposal was that it would create two classes of citizens—first-class Buddhist citizens and second-class non-Buddhist citizens. Even if the rights of non-Buddhist citizens were protected by law, in actual practice there would almost certainly be discrimination in economic, political, social, and religious matters. Non-Buddhist citi­ zens might become demoralized by the government's new move and not participate in the development of the coun­ try with the same enthusiasm and devotion as before.41 Various other Muslim organizations, including the Ulama Association, the Muslim Central Fund Trust, the Arakanese Muslim Association, the All Burma Muslim Students' Union and the Burma Muslim Organization, vigorously opposed the state religion legislation. The president of the last-mentioned group, the BMO, was U Raschid, minister for labor and mines in U Nu's cabinet. The Roman Catholic Church, which for a variety of reasons had long enjoyed better relations than the Prot­ estants had had with the government (U Nu once re­ ferred to it as a "model church" in Burma), remained faithful to Archbishop Barzin's pledge not to attempt to obstruct the adoption of Buddhism as the state religion. The Burma Christian Council, representing the Protestant churches (Anglican, Baptist and Methodist), took a firm stand in opposition to the government's move. In a state41

Ibid., May 5, 1960.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

ment issued in May 1960 the council expressed sympathy with the government's avowed object of encouraging Buddhism and thereby elevating the religious and moral life of the people, but asserted that this was the responsi­ bility of religious bodies rather than that of the state. "The council is deeply grieved because the concept of a state religion is diametrically opposed to the modern democratic ideal of separation between religion and the state."42 If Buddhism became the state religion, the state­ ment concluded, the government would have to take adequate measures to safeguard all the fundamental rights of the non-Buddhists. The Burma Hindus generally supported the govern­ ment on the issue. In view of the racial conflicts of the past, it would have been foolhardy for this unpopular minority to antagonize the Burmese Buddhists. The Hindu Mitra Mandal adopted a resolution which recalled the long tradition of religious freedom granted to Hindus by Buddhist rulers and noted that Hindus regard the Lord Buddha as one of the incarnations of Vishnu. The resolution concluded that in view of these facts and in deference to the prime minister's great piety, the Hindus of the Union would strongly support the adoption of Buddhism as the state religion.43 The All Burma Hindu Central Board issued a statement pledging the govern­ ment the full support of the Hindu community on this issue. One Hindu expressed his profound disagreement with the central board in a letter to the editor. "Is it not then strange that while the Hindu of India swears by a 42

Ibid., May 13, 1960. This stand was later endorsed by the ninety-second annual meeting of the Burma Baptist Convention, the largest Christian denomination in Burma. The meeting was held at Myitkyina in the Kachin state, and the resolution opposing the state religion proposal was reported to have been adopted by 12,000 people. The Nation, October 20, 1960. 43 New Times of Burma, May 13, 1960.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

secular state where no religion, not even his own, must be the state religion, the Burma Hindu should be said to be supporting the move that converts secular Burma into a theocratic state? Do principles change with place?"44 The Chins and Kachins of the northern hill tracts, who are mostly animists and Christians, bitterly opposed the government's move as another form of Burmese cultural and political domination. There were long-standing grievances among the hill peoples over the arrogant attitude of government officials from Burma proper and the inadequate financial contribution of the Union to the states. We have already described the hostile reception accorded the state religion commission in the Kachin state. Other demonstrations were staged around the sec­ retariat of the Kachin state government, with as many as 10,000 people participating in the protest.45 Similar demonstrations were held in several places in the Chin Hills, and a Chin People's Anti-State Religion Organization was formed.46 The Chin Affairs Council, consisting of all the members of Parliament representing the Chins, is a body provided for by the Constitution to aid and advise the minister for Chin affairs,47 who is also a member of the Union cabinet. In December 1960 the Chin Affairs Council unanimously adopted a resolution opposing the government's move to make Buddhism the state religion. The resolution was moved by a mem­ ber of the Union Party and supported by U Zahre Lian, the minister for Chin affairs and a Christian. U Zahre 44

The Guardian, August 15, 1961. The Nation, August 25, 1960. The state religion issue was held to be one important factor in the events which later culmi­ nated in the formation of the insurgent Kachin Independence Army, a group inspired by a pronounced racial and religious hos­ tility toward the Burmese majority. See the editorial, The Guard­ ian, September 25, 1961. 46 The Nation, October 9 and November 5, 12, 30, 1960. 47 The Constitution of the Union of Burma, sections 196-198. 46

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

Lian made it clear that he had nothing to say as a min­ ister of the government, but as an ordinary member of the Chin Affairs Council he agreed with the resolution.48 The non-Buddhist Kachins and Chins were not the only ethnic minorities who became involved politically in the state religion issue. The mainly Buddhist Mons and Arakanese had been conducting vigorous campaigns for statehood within the Union, campaigns in which Buddhist monks had played a very active role. The prime minister had promised that separate states would be created for the Mons and the Arakanese, provided the majorities in these areas favored the move.49 The Bud­ dhist Shans, who had their own state, began to urge the adoption of a system of federalism in which the powers of the states would be greatly enlarged.50 By the middle of 1961 this proposal was under active official con­ sideration. A former president of the Union of Burma, Sao Shwe Thaike, organized the National Religious Minorities Al­ liance, composed of Baptists, Burmese Muslims, animists, and even some Buddhists from the Shan and Kachin states. Sao Shwe Thaike, himself a Shan Buddhist, de­ clared that making Buddhism the state religion would violate the "Panglong spirit," a reference to the Panglong conference of February 1947, at which Aung San had guaranteed the rights of the ethnic minorities in a united Burma.51 There were press reports of possible political deals 48

The Nation, December 6, 1960. New Times of Burma, April 7, 1960. 50 For the background of this problem see Josef Silverstein, "Politics in the Shan State: The Question of Secession from the Union of Burma," Journal of Asian Studies, 1958, vol. 18, pp. 43-57. 51 The Nation, September 17, 1960, and The Guardian, Febru­ ary 13, 1961. 49

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

taking shape—that in return for all-out support for the federalism proposal, the Kachins, Chins, and Karens in Parliament might be joined in opposing the state reli­ gion bill by the Shans and Kayahs.52 It was thought that the Arakanese and Mons, with their strong separatist sympathies, might also oppose the state religion legisla­ tion in compact with the Shans, who led the demand for federalism. The possibility of such a deal between the non-Bud­ dhist objectors to the state religion proposal and the Buddhist proponents of federalism was apparently some­ what alarming to the prime minister. In a meeting of the cabinet U Nu declared in unequivocal terms that if the Arakanese and Mon representatives in Parliament op­ posed the state religion bill, he would revoke his promise of separate statehood for these minorities. If the Shans and Kayahs used the state religion issue as an instrument of bargaining to achieve their ends, the government would not consider the federalism proposal any further.53 While some felt that the prime minister's handling of the matter was a bit rough, it was undeniably effective—the ethnic minorities fell in line. This, in addition to making support of the state religion bill a matter of party disci­ pline for the Buddhist members of the Union Party, ensured the smooth passage of the legislation. The Army was strongly opposed to the state religion proposal. General Ne Win and his colleagues had been disappointed by the results of the 1960 elections and now saw in the state religion issue the politicians' irresponsible tampering with the delicate fabric of national unity. The armed forces, composed of men representing all the ethnic groups of Burma, were an authentic expression of the discipline and unity of Burmese nationalism in the Aung San tradition. It was reported that high-ranking officers 52

The Nation, July 7, 1961. 53 Ibid., July 21, 1961.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

attempted to persuade U Nu to limit the state religion bill to Burma proper, but their advice was refused.54 THE STATE RELIGION BILLS

The two bills dealing with Buddhism as the state religion were published in the press on August 1, 1961.55 The Constitution (Third Amendment) Bill made one vital change in section 21 (1), and inserted several lengthy new sections. The amended section 21 (1) was as follows: "Buddhism being the religion professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union shall be the state religion." The recognition extended to Islam, Chris­ tianity, Hinduism, and animism in section 21 (2) re­ mained unchanged. A new sub-section, 21 (5), provided that the Union government would render financial aid amounting to a minimum of .5 per cent of its annual current expenditure for matters connected with religion (Buddhism and the other religions mentioned above). Section 21A , a new insertion, described in precise Pali terminology the scope of the government's new responsi­ bilities in the field of religion. Buddhism being the state religion of the Union, the Union government shall— (a) promote and maintain Buddhism for its welfare and advancement in its three aspects, namely, partyatti sasana (study of the Teachings of the Buddha), patipatti sasana (practice of the Teach­ ings), and pativedha sasana (enlightenment); ( b ) h o n o r t h e Tiratana, namely, the Buddha, Dhamma and Sangha; (c) protect the said religion in its three aspects and the Tiratana from all dangers including insult and 54

Daniel Wolfstone, "The Pongyis and the Soldiers," Far East­ ern Economic Review, 1961, vol. 33, p. 323. 55 For the full text of the legislation as enacted, see appendices 1 and 2.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

false representation, made by words, either spoken or written, or by other means. Explanation.—"Sangharatana" means the religious Or­ der of the Bhikkhus [monks] not individually but collectively as a whole irrespective of sects. Sections 21B and 21c charged the Union government with the responsibility of preserving the Tripitaka Pali texts and regulating their publication to avoid errors in printing, and of maintaining properly the epigraphs of the Pali texts at Mandalay (the stone tablets produced at the Fifth Great Buddhist Council). Section 21D provided that the Union government would convene a meeting of leading sayadaws at least once a year, report to them on the measures taken for the state religion, and hear the sayadaws observations, advice, and instructions concerning these measures. Section 43A pro­ vided that the state would give assistance and aid in the restoration of ancient pagodas and temples. Section 43B provided that the state would establish special hospitals for the Sangha throughout the country.56 In accordance with the rules of Vinaya, such hospitals would not be housed under the same roof with hospitals provided for the laity.57 Along with this proposed amendment to the Constitu­ tion the government prepared the State Religion Pro­ motion Bill. This bill provided that Buddhist scriptures would be taught to Buddhist students in all state schools; 56

One MP submitted to the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a proposed amendment to the bill which would have added the following to section 43 B: "The provisions of this section shall be deemed to apply to monks who are under trial or who are under­ going sentences in the prisons of the Union of Burma." The Guard­ ian, August 5, 1961. This well-intentioned amendment, later with­ drawn, would hardly have elevated the prestige of Buddhism as the state religion! 57 The Vinaya forbids a monk to lie down when there are women under the same roof.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

such instruction would also be provided in the univer­ sities and constituent colleges where there was a sufficient number of students desirous of taking it. Buddhist scrip­ tures would also be taught (and studied compulsorily by Buddhist students) in all state teachers' training schools. Government servants were to be granted leave to take examinations in Buddhist scriptures conducted by the Buddha Sasana Council or other state agencies. A provision with far-reaching potential implications was found in section 6: "In cases where it is proposed to open new state primary schools, preference shall be given for the purpose to those monasteries which can provide suitable and adequate accommodation, and where a suffi­ cient number of pupils is available, and the presiding monk is willing to accept the conditions laid down by the government." This partial return to the pre-British system of the pongyi kyaung raised important questions of educational policy, and of the place of the religious minorities in such state schools.58 Other parts of the State Religion Promotion Bill provided that on Buddhist sabbath days the state broad­ casting system would broadcast religious programs, gov­ ernment offices and schools would be closed, and no liquor would be sold or served in any shop, restaurant, or public place in a hotel. Buddhist scripture classes would be opened in prisons, and all state public libraries would be provided with a complete set of Tripitaka Pali texts and commentaries. Arrangements would be made for the teaching of Pali in state schools, it would be included among the subjects for matriculation examina­ tions, and in selecting candidates the Public Service Commission would give the same value to Pali as to other 58

There is surely an issue of religious liberty involved when the Muslim or Christian child is compelled to receive his state-provided primary education on the premises of a Buddhist monastery, in an atmosphere permeated with religious traditions very different from those of his parents.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

subjects. The president of the Union would be em­ powered to issue instructions which, among other things, might order: (1) the installation of an image of the Buddha in an easily accessible shrine-room or a separate dhammarama in every court building and (2) arrange­ ments in all state schools for the Buddhist teachers and students to pay their homage to the Buddha, to recite Buddhist scriptures, and to hear sermons on the teachings of the Buddha. While the over-all impression conveyed by the Consti­ tution (Third Amendment) Bill and the State Religion Promotion Bill was that the government was exceedingly thorough in its plans to make Burma a Buddhist state, there was a very important provision which was not included in this legislation. There was no requirement that the head of state or other high officials be Buddhists. Such a provision would have greatly intensified the objections of the religious minorities that the adoption of the state religion would create two classes of citizen­ ship. U Nu had given repeated assurances that the citizenship rights of the minorities would not be ad­ versely affected, and the absence of a religious qualifica­ tion for high public office was evidence of his sincerity.59 The question had been subjected to considerable public discussion earlier. The Committee for Making Buddhism the State Religion, mentioned above, focused attention on this problem in several of its public statements.60 There was strong feeling in some circles that if Buddhism was made the state religion, the president, prime minis­ ter, and cabinet ministers should be Buddhists by consti­ tutional requirement. In March 1960 the committee's discussions with the Burma Nationalist Party ended in 59 The fourth constitutional amendment, discussed below, pro­ vided further evidence of his desire to retain (or recover) the goodwill of the minorities. 60 New Times of Burma, March 5, 1960.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

a deadlock because of the latter organization's insistence on the compulsory profession of the Buddhist faith by the president, the prime minister, and the chief justice of the Union. The committee's position was that this was a separate issue, which should not be raised at that time.61 Shortly after the publication of the two bills, the executive committee of the AFPFL decided that its MP'S would be free to vote according to their individual con­ science when the legislation came up in Parliament. Party discipline would be waived since this was a matter of religious conviction, and Buddhist MP'S would not be expelled from the party for voting for the bills. The Central Council of Sangha for Implementing the State Religion sent a letter to U Ba Swe urging AFPFL support for the measures. The council declared that the state religion issue was a matter of life and death for both the Sangha and the Buddhist laity, and saw no reason why the AFPFL should not support it, since most of the party's members were Buddhists.82 Despite pressure for a positive party stand on the issue, a week later the AFPFL reaffirmed its prior decision in a public statement. However, it was also learned that all the Buddhist AFPFL MP'S would support the bill but intro­ duce amendments. Characteristic of the party's vacilla­ tion under diverse pressures on this issue, evident during the 1960 election campaign, an AFPFL spokesman now stated that the bills fell far short of Buddhist expecta­ tions—the real attributes of a state religion were lacking. AFPFL members who initially rejected the whole idea of a state religion now insisted that the Constitution ought to require that the president of the Union of Burma be a Buddhist!63 The influential All Burma Young Monks Association, 61

Ibid., March 18, 1960. The Guardian, August 3, 1961. 63 Ibid., August 11, 1961.

62

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

a political ally of the AFPFL, explained its position in a lengthy pamphlet published shortly after passage of the state religion amendment. The association, it claimed, had annually passed resolutions demanding the estab­ lishment of Buddhism as the state religion. But U Nu's measure was a meaningless gesture which established a state religion in name only. First, a true state religion would have reserved offices such as those of president, prime minister, judicial minister, attorney general, etc., for Buddhists, but this measure extended no such privi­ leges. Second, there were no previous limitations placed on state expenditures for religious affairs; in 1953-1954 the amount spent on the Buddha Jayanti celebrations came to 1.67 per cent of the total budget. But now, the amendment ostensibly making Buddhism the state reli­ gion provided for the expenditure of a mere .50 per cent of the budget for religious affairs. Third, even this small amount was not to be spent exclusively for Buddhism, but was to be divided up on a proportional basis among all the religions of the country. There was no previous constitutional guarantee of financial support for these religions. "Though it gives the impression of making Buddhism the state religion, actually it has only made all religions the state religion."64 The NUF could claim the virtue of consistency, and was the only political group to reject the state religion bills. A four-page statement issued on August 6, 1961, by the NUF presidium appealed to the members of Parlia­ ment to exercise wisdom and courage in dealing with the bills. The statement decried the departure from the democratic principles adopted in 1947 and the mixing of religion and politics following the AFPFL split. The adoption of a state religion would lead to the undue 64 Clarification Number One by the Young Monks Association on Objections to the Fourth Amendment Act, Pitaka Electric Press, Mandalay, 1961 [in Burmese].

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

influence of religion in political affairs, endanger equal citizenship rights, create hatred and discord among the different religious groups, and undermine democratic principles in the Union.65 The Guardian editorially ap­ plauded this statement. In view of the fact that any opposition to the state religion proposal was extremely unpopular politically, the NUF'S stand was "not only con­ structive but also courageous."66 From the latter part of July through most of August 1961 the state religion issue dominated the Burmese scene. The political pressures for enactment of the bills heightened. At a press conference U Nu repeated that Buddhist MP'S of the Union Party would be expelled from the party if they opposed the state religion legisla­ tion. The Association of Presiding Monks (Lower Burma) in a letter addressed to all presiding sayadaws asked them to get their local MP'S to promise at public meetings that they would support the legislation. Copies of the promises of the MP'S and the minutes of such meetings were then to be forwarded to the association head­ quarters.67 Mass rallies in support of the state religion bills, addressed by sayadaws and cabinet ministers, were held in various places around Rangoon and Mandalay. About three hundred members of the Rangoon district Union Women's League (associated with the Union Party) prayed at the Shwedagon pagoda in support of the bills. After their prayers they walked around the pagoda reciting in unison the Metta Sutta (the Buddha's sermon on compassion).68 The prime minister had a number of meetings with leaders of the minority religious groups in a vain attempt to secure their cooperation, or at least to tone down their opposition. The leaders of the Burma Christian 65

66 Ibid., August 8, 1961. Ibid., August 7, 1961. The Nation, July 23, 1961. 68 The Guardian, August 7 and 12, 1961. 67

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

Council, however, simply reaffirmed the stand which they had previously taken. In another meeting with Hindu and Muslim leaders, U Nu was told by the former that they had no objection to the bills. The Muslim leaders had objections, however, and in trying to allay their fears the prime minister revealed that the two bills which he was going to introduce were far better for the minorities than the measures recommended by the ad­ visory commission.69 Meanwhile, the National Religious Minorities Alliance was drawing up elaborate plans for a mass anti-state religion demonstration in front of the Parliament on the days when the bills were to be intro­ duced and debated.70 The futility of such demonstrations and the possibility of violent clashes between Buddhists and non-Buddhists began to weigh heavily on the minds of various political and religious leaders of the minorities. Two members of U Nu's cabinet played a key role in crystallizing these thoughts and also in conveying to their own religious communities the deep concern felt by the government over the possibility of disturbances. U Raschid took the lead in discouraging demonstrations by announcing that the Burma Muslim Organization, of which he was presi­ dent, would refrain from holding demonstrations. Ten days later he convened a meeting of the representatives of nine important Muslim organizations and appealed to them not to hold demonstrations in public places where there might be clashes with pro-state religion processions. The representatives of all the organizations except the Burma Muslim Congress agreed to abide by this advice.71 U Zahre Lian, a cabinet minister and a Christian, held a similar meeting with leaders of the 69

Ibid., July 23, 1961, and The Nation, July 29, 1961. The Guardian, July 31, 1961. 71 The Nation, August 2, 1961, and The Guardian, August 11, 1961. 70

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

Burma Christian Council and various other Christian organizations. While all were opposed to the move to make Buddhism the state religion, they agreed that pub­ lic demonstrations of protest were likely to prove harmful and were to be definitely discouraged.72 It was announced that Prime Minister U Nu would move the Constitution (Third Amendment) Bill in the Chamber of Deputies on August 17, 1961. As the day approached, extraordinary measures were taken to pre­ vent the eruption of disorder and violence. On August 8 the government asked the press to refrain from publish­ ing anything on the state religion issue which was likely to provoke clashes between people of different faiths. On August 10 the police force airdropped 100,000 leaflets over Rangoon. The leaflets stated that the people in exercise of their democratic rights could make any lawful demonstration for or against the state religion bills. The police would discharge their duties impartially, irrespec­ tive of the faith or creed of any citizen. Unlawful and unruly activities would be severely dealt with according to law.73 On August 12 the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies issued an order banning processions and demon­ strations within 1,000 feet of the precincts of the chamber during the parliamentary session.74 As the parliamentary session began, there were 1,500 armed policemen, including 750 drawn from the district forces, on duty throughout the city. Armored tanks and platoons of police guarded the approaches to the Old Secretariat where the Chamber of Deputies was in ses­ sion.75 With rumors of riots likely to break out in the city, many of the schools and most of the shops were 72

The Nation, August 12, 1961. The Guardian, August 11, 1961. 7i Ibid., August 15, 1961. 75 The Nation, August 16, 1961. 73

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

closed, and the streets were deserted. All was quiet in the city on August 17 when the prime minister moved the bill. THE DEBATE IN PARLIAMENT

In a surprise move, on August 16 an application was filed before the Supreme Court asking for the issue of a writ of quo warranto (by what authority) against Prime Minister U Nu for moving the bill to make Bud­ dhism the state religion. Section 25 of the Constitution gives the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of any of the funda­ mental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Under the "Rights relating to Religion" specified in the Constitution is found section 21 (4), which was made the basis for this application. Section 21 (4) reads: "The abuse of religion for political purposes is forbidden; and any act which is intended or is likely to promote feelings of hatred, enmity or discord between racial or religious communities or sects is contrary to this Constitution and may be made punishable by law." The applicants were U Tun Pe, editor of the Burmeselanguage Htoon Daily; Duwa Zau Lawn, a Kachin MP; and four others (a Burma Muslim, a Karen Christian, a Chin, and a Kayah). The applicants also asked the Supreme Court for an injunction to stay the bill pending the disposal of the application for the issue of the writ. The applicants contended that while the national flag, the national anthem, and the state bank belonged to all the citizens of the Union, Buddhism, if made the state religion, would not belong to some 5,000,000 citizens. To make any religion the state religion would therefore be ultra vires of the Constitution. The applicants asserted that such a move would be likely to promote enmity and discord between different communities or sects and would undermine the national unity which had been built up in the country.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

The large amount of money spent on religion during the past ten years was unconstitutional, according to the applicants. Instead of giving the country peace and the rule of law, the Union Party government was building nat shrines and making Buddhism the state religion in order to make its power secure. This amounted to an abuse of religion for political purposes, which was for­ bidden by section 21 (4). The application also stated that the formation of the State Religion Advisory Commis­ sion itself was illegal and that to move the constitutional amendment before its report was published was un­ democratic.76 This desperate legal maneuver met with the failure which must have been anticipated. The Supreme Court refused to stay the motion of the constitutional amend­ ment bill and one week later dismissed the application for a writ of quo warranto against the prime minister.77 The court observed that the question of whether the bill was proper or not to be moved in Parliament was solely for the MP'S themselves to decide as the elected repre­ sentatives of the people. The prime minister, as a member of that legislative body, was entitled to move a bill to amend any provision of the Constitution. Moreover, as Parliament was a sovereign body, the proceedings done in the course of its business were not subject to restriction by the Supreme Court. Prime Minister U Nu's speech in moving the Constitu­ tion (Third Amendment) Bill in the Chamber of Depu­ ties contained some very interesting statements.78 The most important argument he advanced was that making Buddhism the state religion was "the desire of the over­ whelming majority of Buddhists." Why had this desire 76

The Guardian, August 17, 1961. Ibid., August 18 and 25, 1961. 78 The full text of this speech is given in The Guardian, August 18, 1961. 77

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

remained dormant during the fourteen years since inde­ pendence? Out of concern for the non-Buddhist minor­ ities, the Buddhist monks and laymen "curbed their intense desire and held themselves from moving stub­ bornly forward." Three months before the close of the Sixth Great Buddhist Council (1956), U Nu continued, he resolved to make Buddhism the state religion. The prime minister revealed that the personal desire to acquire religious merit (kutho) for himself was a significant factor in coming to this decision. "I noticed that with each day of the Great Council there arose in me overwhelming generous faith. Through the stimulation of this great generous faith there arose in me the overpowering desire to perform urgently, after the great deed of merit of successfully and gloriously convening the Sixth Great Buddhist Council, another equally great meritorious deed of making it possible for Buddhism to become the state religion." U Nu had frequently been accused of exploiting reli­ gion for political purposes; if these words are to be taken seriously he was certainly exploiting politics for religious purposes! Some Burmese are quite convinced that U Nu is well on the way to Buddhahood; the goal is still per­ haps a number of existences away, but its attainment is inevitable.79 It is likely that U Nu himself believes this, and it is clear from the above quotation that the desire to acquire religious merit to advance his own spiritual progress constitutes a significant motive for politica1 acts. In his speech the prime minister also stated that because the desire to make Buddhism the state religion 79 "A perfect Buddhist ruler, closely associated with the future Buddha, is the theme of some of Burma's most popular proph­ ecies. ..." See Manuel Sarkisyanz, "On the Place of U Nu's Buddhist Socialism in Burma's History of Ideas," in Robert K. Sakai, ed., Studies on Asia, 1961, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1961, p. 55.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

was daily rising like a great tide in the hearts of the people, he decided to act promptly in order to prevent the matter from falling into the hands of "fanatical political leaders and fanatical Buddhist monks and lay­ men." These elements would make unjust laws which would not be efficacious in the promotion of Buddhism and would increase the distrust of the non-Buddhist citizens. U Nu therefore decided that he should take the initiative in this matter promptly. The prime minister rejected the contention that state and religion should be kept separate and that it was wrong for the state to enter into the sphere of religion. Those who put forth these objections agreed that it was the government's responsibility to look after the health, education, social and economic welfare of the public. In an interesting interpretation of the welfare-state con­ cept, U Nu asked: "If this view is correct that govern­ ment should provide leadership in works which offer well-being to the public in the short span of one exist­ ence, why should not the view be correct that government should provide leadership in works which offer wellbeing in the inestimably long future existences?" He said that the state, then, must help to make available to the people the means by which they can escape from the cycle of rebirth. People took note only of those in authority, according to U Nu. If, therefore, the government encouraged and promoted religion, the people would do likewise. U Nu also advanced the anti-Marxist argument: The notion has been spread abroad in the world that religion is an opiate; certain governments are vigorously propagating this view, and therefore those governments which cherish and respect religion will have to assume leadership in religion in order to resist this notion effectively. These explanations and arguments constituted the first

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

half of U Nu's speech; the second half took the form of a sermon to the Buddhists of the Union. He said that Buddhists must help fulfil completely the wish of Lord Buddha. "He does not wish living beings in the thirtyone worlds to circle incessantly in the four nether worlds, the world of humans, the six celestial abodes, and the twenty domains of brahma gods, subject to birth, old age, disease, death . . . and other suffering of samsara' s cycle of existences. If possible He desires living beings to be delivered urgently of these sufferings of samsara and to realize nibbana. . . ." If U Nu had any intellectual doubts regarding the validity of the elaborate Buddhist cosmology, there was no evidence of it here or in his other statements on the subject. The prime minister went on to exhort all Buddhists to practice diligently the great virtues prescribed by the Teaching. He spoke at length of the problems created by "unrestrained monks" who disregard the Vinaya rules and commit evil acts, and urged the laity not to worship, take refuge in, or offer gifts to such monks. Finally, he urged all Buddhists to welcome the adoption of Bud­ dhism as the state religion by resolving to attain nibbana in this very existence. Speeches in support of the constitutional amendment, both in the Chamber of Deputies and on August 23 in the Chamber of Nationalities, stressed the arguments that this step was ardently desired by the Buddhists, and that it would in no way restrict the rights of other reli­ gions. One MP declared that the adoption of Buddhism as the state religion would prevent the outbreak of a third world war. Speeches opposing the bill relied on now-familiar arguments: the move was against modern democratic principles, would create two classes of citizenship, was contrary to Bogyoke Aung San's convictions, was being

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA forcibly imposed on the minorities, and would disrupt national unity. One Chin MP pointed out that in the final analysis, the real promotion of religion could not be brought about by legal or administrative action, but only by one's own free conscience. U Zanhta Sin, former head of the Kachin state, attempted to rebut U Nu's antiMarxist argument by asserting that Russia became com­ munist because the rulers were too absorbed in religion, paid too much attention to religious advisers, and thus neglected the economic welfare of the people. Perhaps the most telling argument was that presented by U Raschid as he attempted to spell out the practical consequences which the minorities feared would follow. "Mr. Speaker, I am apprehensive that the adoption of a state religion will have a deep psychological effect upon the Buddhists in the country. They will begin to imagine that they have a special role in the administrative, eco­ nomic, social, and educational life of the country. The adoption of a state religion will open the door to extrem­ ists to make more and more demands based on religion." Serious proposals had already been made that a religious qualification be fixed for high public offices, and it would not be easy for succeeding governments to resist such demands. U Raschid expressed concern over how the adoption of a state religion would affect the mentality and attitude of the junior officials who came in daily contact with the people and who, if so inclined, could be a source of much annoyance to the religious minorities.80 U Nu indicated in the Chamber of Nationalities that similar thoughts had occurred to him. "Mr. Speaker, Sir, in making Buddhism the state religion there are certain fears and anxieties in the minds of non-Buddhist citizens of the Union. I admit that some of these fears are legitimate. Mr. Speaker, Sir, in making Buddhism the 80

The Guardian, August 18, 1961.

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state religion there is a matter which has always made me anxious. It is my anxiety that after Buddhism has been made the state religion Buddhist monks and lay­ men might not be able to conduct themselves in a manner which befits the dignity of a state religion." He referred to his sermon to the Buddhists of the country delivered in the Chamber of Deputies, and concluded with the hope that they would live up to it.81 The Constitution (Third Amendment) Bill was passed separately by both houses of Parliament with overwhelm­ ing majorities. On August 26, following the procedure for constitutional amendments, the bill was passed by both houses in joint sitting by a vote of 324 to 28, with 19 MP'S absent. The act was promulgated immediately by the president of the Union in a solemn ceremony.82 The State Religion Promotion Bill was passed a few weeks later.83 The entire period from the introduction of the amend­ ment bill (August 17) to its final enactment and promul­ gation (August 26) was fraught with deep religious significance for the Buddhist leaders of the Union. During this period President U Win Maung and the members of his household observed sabbath regulations, confined themselves to vegetarian meals, and offered alms-food to pongyis.84 On August 25, Prime Minister U Nu freed 540 animals, including cattle, sheep, goats, ducks, fowls, pigeons, pigs, crabs, and fishes at a special ceremony in commemoration of the adoption of the state religion. All the animals were freed in threes or multiples of three, since three and nine are regarded as auspicious numbers by the Burmese Buddhists. In keeping with the Buddhist emphasis on compassion, the death sentences of ninety81

Ibid., Ibtd., 83 Ibid., 84 Ibid., 82

August 24, August 27, September August 16,

1961. 1961. 16, 1961. 1961.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

eight prisoners were commuted to life imprisonment, and other convicts were granted remission of sentences.85 The adoption of the state religion was hailed by government officials as a great achievement. President U Win Maung, on the occasion of the fourteenth anni­ versary of Burma's independence, stated: "Of our accom­ plishments in the economic, social and cultural fields during the past year, the most outstanding was the pro­ mulgation of Buddhism as state religion as ardently desired by Buddhist citizens who form the majority of the people in the Union."86 The evidence would suggest that, unfortunately, the state religion was a substitute for, rather than an evidence of, the country's progress in economic development and social welfare. Two months after the president made this address he was arrested, and General Ne Win's Revolutionary Council took over the government. SEQUEL: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

The adoption of Buddhism as the state religion did not mark the end of the religious controversy which had enveloped the issue. In an effort to regain the confidence of the religious minorities, U Nu decided to push through another constitutional amendment intended to safeguard their rights, and promptly found himself confronted by the most militant opposition of the Buddhist monks. The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Bill dominated the Burmese political scene throughout September 1961. The amendment itself was of almost negligible sig­ nificance, and the leaders of the minorities viewed it generally with apathy. By and large they were silent spectators on the sidelines as U Nu and the well-organ85 Ibid., August 26, 1961. This measure of clemency had been recommended by the Union Sangha League in a memorandum sent to the prime minister. Ibid., August 5, 1961. 86 Burma Weekly Bulletin, January 11, 1962, vol. 10, p. 314.

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ized pongyi associations met in an open clash. From the viewpoint of Buddhist interests the amendment was so innocuous as to make the Sangha's fierce opposition incomprehensible apart from U Nu's earlier references to "fanatical monks." This manifestation of fanaticism came less than one month after the prime minister's homily emphasizing the greater responsibility of the Bud­ dhists to act with fairness and tolerance now that Bud­ dhism was to become the state religion. In U Nu's discussions with the leaders of the religious minorities in July, someone had suggested that the right to teach their respective religions might be given explicit constitutional recognition. Rather anxious to find some­ thing which he could do for the minorities as a counter­ balance to the state religion move, U Nu seized upon this idea, and early in August it was announced that the Constitution would be amended accordingly. The amendment would substitute the words "the right freely to profess, practice and teach religion" for "the right freely to profess and practice religion" in section 20 of the Constitution.87 Late in August it was decided to add another provision also, to become section 21 (6): "The Union government shall protect the religions from all dangers including insult and false representation made by words either spoken or written or by other means."88 This would simply accord to the non-Buddhist religions recognized by the Constitution the protection granted to Buddhism by one part of the third amendment. In point of fact, such protection of both Buddhism and the other religions was quite unnecessary in the Constitution, since sections 295 and 298 of the Penal Code dealt adequately with offences relating to insults to religion. Early in September the cabinet began to concern itself 87 88

The Guardian, August 9, 1961. Ibid., August 31, 1961.

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with the use which might be made of the right to teach religion in Christian mission schools. There was anxiety in some circles that this might encourage the mission schools to teach Christianity to Buddhist and other nonChristian children. A five-man advisory committee recom­ mended the inclusion of a conscience clause. The cabinet decided against this, as it might be considered by the non-Buddhists as a restriction to the right given by section 20. A few days later, however, the decision was reversed.89 The conscience clause was to take the form of a pro­ viso attached to section 20: "Provided that no minor in school shall be taught any religion other than the reli­ gion of his parents without the previous consent in writing of his parents or guardian." It is interesting to note that, while the basic anxiety which led to the draft­ ing of the conscience clause concerned the teaching of Buddhist children in Christian mission schools, it was later described in terms of the protection of the minorities. In moving the fourth amendment bill in the Chamber of Deputies, judicial minister Dr. E Maung referred to the proviso as one which the government had accepted to further allay the fears of the non-Buddhist parents that their children in state schools would be taught Buddhism on its becoming the state religion. To under­ line this interpretation, the proviso was moved by min­ ister U Raschid, a Muslim.90 The proviso, of course, accomplished both purposes and in itself was a perfectly sound requirement. However, if the press accounts are reliable at this point, there was a real difference between the reasons which motivated and the reasons which later explained its insertion. This, then, was the fourth amendment. All persons were to have the right to teach religion, but school89 90

Ibid., September 13 and 17, 1961. Ibid., September 19, 1961.

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children could not be taught a religion different from their own without the parents' consent. All religions were to be protected by the government from insult or misrepresentation. Powerful monks' associations, how­ ever, saw in these provisions a sinister threat to Buddhism. The opposition to the fourth amendment was led by the Union Sangha League, a staunch supporter of the ruling Union Party. In a statement issued on September 13 the USL declared that existing provisions for the pro­ fession and practice of other religions were adequate and that an inquiry commission should be appointed to deal with any proposed changes. But the most basic objection, one which was frequently reiterated in the following weeks, was that the proposed amendment would amount to recognizing all the other religions as state religions of the Union.91 The reasoning behind this particular complaint was never explained, but it soon became the monks' battle cry. On September 14 representatives of the Union Sangha League met Judicial Minister Dr. E Maung and Defence Minister Bohmu Aung in a vain attempt to dissuade the government from moving the bill in Parliament.92 Two days later the USL issued another statement denouncing the proposed amendment: "There is now no meaning that Buddhism has been made the state religion." The statement declared that the Buddhists should not allow U Nu to give such privileges to other religions as if he were distributing his own legacy. It further warned the Union Party MP'S not to vote for the bill, regardless of party discipline. "Should the bill be passed with the support of the MP'S, the sins of the fourth amendment would greatly outweigh the merits of making Buddhism the state religion."93 91

Ibid., September 14, 1961. Ibid., September 15, 1961. 93 The Guardian, September 17, 1961. 92

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

A lengthy pamphlet published by the All Burma Young Monks Association pointed out that in 1954 the Sangha had vigorously protested U Nu's plan to introduce in­ struction in Islam for Muslim students in state schools, and had ultimately defeated the proposal. The fourth amendment, however, now sought to guarantee the Mus­ lims the right to teach their religion, and they would undoubtedly use this opportunity to attempt to restore Islam to the state school curriculum. The provision protecting the religions from "all dangers including insult and false representation" would also be used to harm Buddhist interests, the pamphlet continued. In the past, Buddhist monks and laymen had strongly objected when a Muslim married one or several Burmese Bud­ dhist women, since the women were frequently either deprived of their legal rights or converted to Islam. Buddhist monks and laymen had also protested the slaughter of cows during the Muslim Id festival. In Islam, marriage and cow slaughter were both regulated by religious law and were a part of religion. Henceforth, Buddhists would not be permitted to protest these prac­ tices, since the Muslims would claim that their religion was being attacked in violation of the fourth amendment. Before, the Buddhists—90 per cent of the population— "had the right to protest and stop all the cruel and wicked deeds contrary to their religious faith. Now, due to the fourth amendment act, all these privileges are entirely lost."94 On September 17 about one hundred monks, together with some six hundred laymen, attended a rally at the Shwedagon pagoda sponsored by the Sangha Action Committee Against the Constitution (Fourth Amend­ ment) Bill. The meeting passed resolutions condemning the bill as being against Buddhism, urging that it be 9i Clarification

Number One.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

held in abeyance until public opinion could be ascer­ tained and promising an unceasing struggle against it if it were moved. The hundred monks then proceeded to the official residence of the prime minister. They told U Nu's secre­ tary that they had come to deliver the three resolutions passed at the rally and that, unless the demands were acceded to, they would not leave. The monks were told to wait, as the prime minister was preparing an important speech he was going to make over the radio that night. Five of the monks were allowed in the house, but had to wait for two hours to see U Nu. Both they and the other monks waiting outside felt that they had been slighted. Furthermore, when they finally saw him, U Nu firmly refused either to drop or postpone the fourth amendment bill.95 In his radio talk that night the prime minister ex­ plained to the people that the fourth amendment was being introduced out of fairness to the minorities; never­ theless, the rights guaranteed by it were for non-Bud­ dhists and Buddhists alike. In attempting to convince the country of the urgent necessity of accepting the amendment, U Nu grossly exaggerated the seriousness of the internal situation, declaring that it was as bad as or worse than in 1948-1950. In view of this critical situa­ tion, the fourth amendment was designed to prevent bloodshed, internal strife, destruction of the Union, and loss of independence! Once more the police took up their positions around the Old Secretariat, and riot cars were kept ready on the morning of September 18. There was, however, no un­ toward incident, and the bill was passed by the Chamber of Deputies without a dissenting vote. The speaker of the Chamber of Nationalities issued an order banning 95

Ibid., September 18, 1961.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

processions and demonstrations within 1,000 feet of the precincts of the chamber. But there was no disorder, and on September 22 the upper house unanimously passed the bill. There remained only the joint session of the two chambers. These placid scenes in Parliament gave no hint of the fever-pitch emotionalism which by now charged the monks' agitation against the amendment. The voices of moderation were voices crying in the wilderness. U Guna Kara, the secretary general of the Union Sangha League, appealed to the monks through the press to suspend the struggle. Simultaneously, however, other USL monks held their own press conference and declared that they were determined to sacrifice their lives in the struggle against the fourth amendment. They doubted U Nu's sincerity in making Buddhism the state religion—this, they as­ serted, was merely a move to enhance his own popularity. The fourth amendment nullified whatever benefits the third amendment had conferred on Buddhism, and the state religion had become a sham.96 Over five hundred monks of the Sangha United Front held a meeting at the Shwedagon pagoda and attacked U Nu's policies, claiming that he only talked of democ­ racy when he was out of power and that he had reduced Buddhism to the level of spirit-worshipping religions. The front vowed to oppose the fourth amendment to the bitter end.97 The Committee of All Sangha Organizations published an appeal in printed leaflets to all MP'S to stay away from the joint sitting of the Parliament on Sep­ tember 25 as a protest against the amendment. The appeal stated that the monks and laity alike were in a state of mental agony over the bill "as if they had been bitten on the head by a snake."88 98 97

Ibid., September 21, 1961. Ibid., September 22, 1961.

98

Ibid., September 23, 1961.

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

The All Burma Sanghas' Front addressed an appeal to U Win Maung, president of the Union of Burma, re­ questing him to refuse to append his signature to the fourth amendment bill when passed by Parliament. U Nu and the MP'S were refusing to respect the wishes of the people, and it was up to the president to uphold the Constitution and prevent the outbreak of internal strife and bloodshed." The monks began a poster campaign in various parts of the city. Posters denouncing U Nu, the judicial min­ ister, and the fourth amendment were affixed to trees and pagoda walls. The day before the joint session of Parlia­ ment, two protest meetings of monks were held, one sponsored by the Maha Sangha Raja Association and the other by the Sangha Action Committee Against the Con­ stitution (Fourth Amendment) Bill. The members of the Sangha Action Committee made vows to struggle for the destruction of the fourth amendment even at the sacrifice of their lives. This legislation, they protested, would immeasurably damage the Buddha Sasana, and they as "sons of the Buddha" had to resist it at all costs.100 With tensions rising, the secretary of the Chamber of Nationalities issued to all MP'S a letter stating that all precautions were being taken for their safety and urging them to attend the joint session without fail. At 5:30 A.M. on September 25, about 2,000 monks picketed all ap­ proaches to the Secretariat where the joint session was to be held. They did not attempt to break through the armed police cordon which had been thrown around the Secretariat area. They stopped all vehicles traveling to the Secretariat and forced MP'S riding in them to sign pledges that they would not vote for the fourth amend­ ment bill. 99

The Guardian, September 24, 1961. Ibid., September 25, 1961.

100

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

This plan of action would probably have succeeded had not news of it reached U Nu in advance. The chief whip of the Union Party issued secret instructions to all MP'S of the party to get to the Secretariat no later than 4 A.M., and they obeyed their orders. Only six MP'S, members of other parties, were caught by the pickets. Four of them were forced to sign the pledges and abstained from voting. All the 310 MP'S who participated voted for the bill, more than the two-thirds majority required for a constitutional amendment.101 Thus, with some loss of sleep the normal processes of parliamentary democracy were preserved. A month later came a more forceful demonstration of the monks' antagonism toward the government and the minorities. Emboldened by the fact that Buddhism was now the state religion and infuriated by the passage of the fourth amendment, a group of young Buddhist monks played the leading role in events which led to serious anti-Muslim riots in a suburb of Rangoon.102 The home ministry had granted permission for the construc­ tion of three mosques in North Okkalapa. On October 29 a demonstration protesting the government's order was staged by over two hundred monks in front of the private residence of Prime Minister U Nu. The premier, however, had gone to Mount Popa for a period of tran­ quil meditation after the strenuous session of Parliament. In his absence the home minister, Dr. E Maung, was summoned. He heard the monks' case, replied that the government could not accede to their demand to with­ draw the order, and requested them to disperse peace­ fully.103 101

Ibid., September 26, 1961. the riots in 1961 were on a much smaller scale, the monks' role was in some respects very similar to that of the monks in the 1938 outburst of anti-Muslim violence. See chapter 3. 108 The Guardian, October 30, 1961. 102Although

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

The irate monks returned to their monasteries to plan the next move. That same night about fifty of them occupied a partly-constructed mosque, one of the three to which they objected. They installed a loudspeaker and spent the night shouting insulting epithets against U Nu, U Raschid, and Dr. E Maung. At 2 A.M. the monks con­ ducted a burial service in effigy of the home minister, who was responsible for granting permission to build the mosques. The following day high-ranking police officials explained to the monks that they were violating the law and asked them to withdraw from the mosque. The monks replied that they would leave only if they were guaranteed a meeting with the prime minister and if construction of the mosques was suspended in the mean­ time. The young monks stood their ground.104 In the face of this extreme form of communal provocation—the occupation of their mosque by Buddhist monks—Muslim leaders appealed to the community to exercise restraint and forbearance and to pray for the peaceful settlement of the problem.105 The government's clear duty was to arrest the monks who were illegally occupying the mosque, but rather than incur the further displeasure of the Sangha the government preferred to temporize. The presiding sayadaws of three monasteries from which the young monks came were approached by the prime minister with a request for their intercession. The demonstrating monks decided to negotiate with the government and on No­ vember 10 relaxed their demand and agreed to the con­ struction of one mosque in North Okkalapa on condition that the government forbid the construction of the other 10i

Ibid., October 31, 1961. See the editorial, "Monks in Mosque," ibid., November 3, 1961. U Raschid, minister of industry and mines, played an impor­ tant role in urging the Muslim community to remain patient while tiie government sought a solution to the problem. Ibid., Novem­ ber 9, 1961. 105

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

two. This offer was revoked two days later because the government had not made any decision on it. The pre­ siding sayadaws informed the prime minister of their failure to persuade the young monks to leave the mosque. After two weeks in the mosque, with the government carefully refraining from any action and with matters at an impasse, the monks resorted to violence. Followed and aided by a mob estimated at 1,500, the monks de­ molished the partially constructed mosque which they had been occupying and set fire to another mosque. Two Muslims were killed by the mob, and two Burmese Buddhists were killed when the police opened fire on the mob to prevent looting in the area. The police arrested 371 persons, including 92 monks.106 Fearful of the possible political consequences of taking vigorous action against those who wore the yellow robe, the government had waited in the hope that the prob­ lem would somehow resolve itself. The government suc­ ceeded in outwaiting the monks, who by their resort to open violence finally forced the government to act and at the same time enabled it to act with a minimum of political damage. The day after the riots U Nu consulted with the executive committee of the Lower Burma Pre­ siding Monks Association, and the sayadaws requested him to deal leniently with those who had been arrested. It was later announced that the government, in com­ pliance with the sayadaws' wishes, had ordered the release of all detenus except those involved in serious crimes.107 The following day, however, a mass meeting of 1,500 monks declared that the government was re­ sponsible for the Okkalapa riots and had resorted to "brutal actions" in dealing with the disturbances.108 One week later U Nu, AFPFL president U Ba Swe, and 106

Ibid., November 14-15, 1961. The Guardian, November 18, 1961. 108 Ibid., November 19, 1961. 107

THE STATE RELIGION OF BURMA

Dr. E Maung distributed gifts of yellow robes to 996 monks at the Lanmadaw Tazaungdaing festival. Some monks from the Federation of Sanghas Organizations distributed leaflets requesting the invited monks not to accept any alms from Premier U Nu and Dr. E Maung, whose hands, they asserted, were still wet with the blood of North Okkalapa. While some monks refused the robes, most accepted them.100 After the fourth amendment and the riots in which 92 monks were arrested, the successful completion of this ceremony must have been reassuring to a prime minister who gave such high priority to good relations with the Sangha. 109

Ibid., November 24, 1961.

CHAPTER 8

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM "WE HAVE traced the ever-deepening involve­ ment of government in religious affairs and the increasing identification of Buddhism with the state from 1949 to the state religion amendment of 1961. The rapid course of religio-political events from General Aung Sans secu­ lar state to Premier U Nu's state religion is unparalleled elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia, although similar forces are at work throughout the area. After General Ne Win's coup of March 2, 1962, and the formation of a government by the Revolutionary Council, official pol­ icy regarding religion came full circle. As in the days of General Aung San's premiership, religion was again to be a private matter, and the state was to be secular. This at least was the clear intention of the revolutionary regime. RADICAL REORIENTATION IN POLICY

Religious factors were of considerable significance in the deteriorating situation which, according to the military, necessitated the take-over.1 The state religion issue had created new tensions between the Buddhist community and the religious minorities. The formation of the insur­ gent Kachin Independence Army was in large part a consequence of this controversy.2 In their bitter and irrational opposition to the fourth amendment certain sections of the Sangha had demonstrated their complete disregard for public order and governmental authority. A few months later a number of monks occupied a 1

See Richard Butwell, "The Four Failures of U Nu's Second Premiership," Asian Survey, 1962, vol. 2, pp. 3-11; Frank N. Trager, "The Failure of U Nu and the Return of the Armed Forces in Burma," The Review of Politics, 1963, vol. 25, pp. 309-328. 2 The Guardian, September 25, 1961.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

mosque in a suburb of Rangoon; Buddhist-Muslim riots ensued in which several people were killed.3 Premier U Nu during this period was busy warding off unspeci­ fied dangers to the Union of Burma by propitiating the nats and having 60,000 sand pagodas built all over the country. U Nu's encouragement of the demand for a complete revision of the Constitution and especially the serious proposal of a new federal structure for the Union were the final moves in which the army saw the imminent disintegration of the state and were the main factors which precipitated the coup. But there was also a strong feeling that the country was in the hands of a religious obscurantist whose policies had the effect of disrupting national unity, encouraging the aggressiveness of certain elements of the Buddhist clergy, and promoting an irra­ tional and superstitious outlook among the people. Five days after the coup Brigadier Aung Gyi of the Revolutionary Council declared that normally in coun­ tries like Burma there were two reasons, political and economic crises, which could lead to a military take-over. "In Burma we had economic, religious and political crises with the issue of federalism as the most important reason for the coup."4 When questioned about the new govern­ ment's attitude toward the state religion, he replied: "We do not overemphasize one religion at the expense of the other." The Guardian asserted editorially that the Revolutionary Council faced the major task of restoring religious and racial amity among the people of the Union, since national unity had been seriously disrupted by the state religion and fourth amendment issues.6 The coup was widely interpreted as a repudiation of U Nu's revivalism and medievalism in favor of a modern 3 See

chapter 7. The Guardian, March 8, 1962 (italics added). 5 Ibid., March 4, 1962. 4

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

scientific approach to Burma's problems.6 Less than three weeks after the take-over one writer noted: "Whatever be the causes of the coup d'etat in Burma, with the establishment of a military government, an era of giving effect to her administration by telling metaphorical stories and ostentatious display of piety and worship of nats (spirits) has at last come to an end." Another writer commented on the passing of this era in Burmese poli­ tics: "Shameless incantations at not propitiations, thun­ dering threats against the fourth amendment, neverending story telling in the Parliament—all, all are gone, the old familiar noises."7 For many socialist intellectuals in Burma the new regime's nationalism, impatience with tradition, and apparent earnestness in tackling economic problems came as a breath of fresh air, although appre­ hension over the future of democracy also weighed heavily on their minds. The State Religion Promotion Act, which had gone into effect in October 1961, provided for the closing of all government offices and schools on Buddhist sabbath days as well as Sundays. Since the sabbath days fall irregularly on any day of the week, this system broke up the continuity of the work week and was found to have greatly affected the output of work. Four days after the coup the military government ordered the abandonment of this system and restored the old practice of Sunday and half-day Saturday holidays. The State Religion Pro­ motion Act also banned the sale of liquor on Buddhist sabbath days. The revolutionary regime considered the regulation unnecessary and quickly issued orders to lift the ban.8 The regime showed no hesitation in taking β U Nu, members of the cabinet, the president, and the chief justice were all arrested at the time of the coup and placed in an army camp jail. 7 Letters to the editor, ibid., March 16 and 21, 1962. 8 Ibid., March 7, 9, 13-14, 1963.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

these steps which seemingly involved the prestige of Buddhism. One of the Five Precepts of Buddhism forbids the taking of life in any form. Under U Nu's government even harmful insects, rodents, and other pests found sanctuary in this Buddhist teaching. Shortly after the coup an all-out war on pests was conducted throughout Rangoon. Thousands of stray dogs, potential carriers of rabies, were rounded up and killed; DDT was sprayed in mosquito-infested areas, and poison gas on rat nests, in a major public health campaign. One week after the military take-over it was announced that the ban on beef was lifted. The new order permitted the slaughter of cattle and buffaloes of the age of ten years and over.® While the desired economic effect was to make meat plentiful and thus bring down the prices of all kinds of meat (this was achieved), the removal of the ban on cow slaughter had considerable symbolic sig­ nificance from the religious point of view. Although the cow is not made an object of veneration in the Buddhism of the texts, Burmese Buddhists at some point or other assimilated the Hindu viewpoint on this matter. As in India, legislation banning cow slaughter quickly acquired communal significance; it became a symbol of the dominance of the majority religious community. The measure was first enacted in 1947, over the strenuous objections of beef-eating Muslims and animists (espe­ cially the Kachins) who also slaughter cows and buffaloes as religious sacrifices. Three years later, under Premier Nu, the act was amended to make the offense punishable with fine, whipping, and imprisonment for a term of one year. This legislation was immediately repealed by General Ne Win's caretaker government in 1958, immediately reenacted when U Nu returned to 9

Ibid., March 9-10, 25, 1962; The Nation, March 20, 1962.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

power in 1960, and, as we have seen, immediately re­ scinded by the Revolutionary Council in 1962. The mili­ tary regime was not prepared to have the machinery of the state used for the enforcement of the tabus of the majority community on all citizens. Colonel Kyaw Soe became the minister for religious affairs in the revolutionary government. Three weeks after the take-over, Chairman U Thein Maung, U Chan Htoon, and U Ba Tin of the Buddha Sasana Council met the minister to request the sanction of 3,600,000 kyats (about $758,000) which, under the Constitution, still remained to be spent for the promotion of Buddhism during the financial year 1962-1963. According to the third amendment to the Constitution, the Union gov­ ernment was required to spend 0.5 per cent of its annual budget on the religions of the country, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and animism. The amount was to be divided proportionally among the various religions on the basis of population, so that 85 per cent of the money would be spent on Buddhism, and the Buddha Sasana Council was the official agency to perform this function. The minister told the representatives of the Buddha Sasana Council that the matter would have to be considered by the cabinet.™ Three weeks later, however, the Buddha Sasana Coun­ cil was abolished by a decree of the military government. The Buddha Sasana Council (Amendment) Act, No. 6 of the Revolutionary Council, came into force with im­ mediate effect. The activities of the Buddhist body ceased, and an inquiry committee was appointed to investigate its functions, accounts, assets, and liabilities.11 Thus, the organization which U Nu had created to pro­ mote the revival of Buddhism in Burma was destroyed 10 11

The Nation, March 26-27, 1962. The Guardian, May 18, 1962.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

by a stroke of Ne Win's pen. In September 1962 the religious affairs ministry cancelled the government grant of 65,000 kyats designated for Muslim religious organiza­ tions after six such groups failed to reach agreement on the distribution of the funds.12 A representative of the Revolutionary Council declared that its policy was one of "minimum participation by the government in reli­ gious affairs."13 Another early decision of the military government was to reduce greatly the number of Buddhist sermons broad­ cast over the Burmese Broadcasting Service. In future, sermons by sayadatvs would be broadcast only on special occasions such as religious festivals.14 This decision also struck at the State Religion Promotion Act, which had stipulated that the BBS would broadcast religious pro­ grams on all Buddhist sabbath days. Interestingly, two other decrees of the Revolutionary Council seemed to implement the Buddhist ethic as interpreted by many sayadaws: the banning of horse racing and of beauty contests. However, General Ne Win was apparently motivated only by the recognition that the gambling associated with horse racing was a social evil and that the original objective of the beauty contests, the pro­ motion of physical fitness among Burmese women, had not been realized at all.15 It was soon clear that the military regime which in­ stalled itself in March 1962 was not to be a mere care­ taker government such as that which had achieved its limited objectives in eighteen months (1958-1960) and had voluntarily returned power to civilian hands.16 Less 12

Ibid., September 13 and 22, 1962. 14 Ibid., March 16, 1962. Ibid., May 8, 1962. isIbtd., March 16-17, 1962. 16 See John Badgley, "Burma's Military Government: A Political Analysis," Asian Survey, 1962, vol. 2, pp. 24-31, and "Burma: The Nexus of Socialism and Two Political Traditions," ibid., 1963, vol. 3, pp. 89-95. 13

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM than two months after the take-over, the Revolutionary Council published a policy declaration entitled The Burmese Way to Socialism, which clearly revealed the long-range objectives of the new regime. The statement stressed the welfare state goals of a socialist society, the attainment of which would necessitate nationalization of all the means of production, including agriculture.17 An authoritarian structure of the state was held to be essen­ tial: "The nation s socialist aims cannot be achieved with any assurance by means of the form of parliamentary democracy that we have so far experienced."18 Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the High Courts had been quickly abolished by Revolutionary Council decrees. From the time of the coup it had been widely assumed that the state religion provision of the Consti­ tution was a dead letter. The army had discreetly op­ posed U Nu and his state religion proposal in the 1960 election campaign and had supported the secularist AFPFL leadership. In this first policy declaration, the Revolu­ tionary Council recognized the right of everyone freely to profess and practice his religion.19 However, in another section dealing with the reorientation of the people's views as a necessary part of the program for transition to socialism, it was asserted that attempts would be made to do away with "bogus acts of charity and social work for vainglorious show, bogus piety, and hypocritical religiosity. . . ." But every effort would be made to foster "bona fide belief and practice of personal morals as taught by ethics and traditions of every religion and culture."20 While there was no explicit rejection of the state religion provision, it was clear that Buddhism was not to be accorded any special recognition by the new regime. 17 The Burmese Way to Socialism, Information Department, Rangoon, April 30, 1962, p. 3. 18 Ibid., p. 4. 19 Ibid., p. 6. 20 Ibid., p. 4.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM PHILOSOPHY OF THE MILITARY REGIME

In an earlier chapter it was stated that any discussion of the government-promoted Buddhist revival in Burma must start with the observation that U Nu is a deeply religious man. By the same token it is important to note that General Ne Win and most of his colleagues are not only convinced that the mixing of religion and politics is bad for the country, but in their personal outlook on life they are not religiously inclined. Secularism in poli­ tics stems partly from secularism in private life. In terms of its public philosophy the regime placed its major emphasis on the solution of Burma's economic problems. It correctly perceived that significant economic development was partly dependent on non-economic fac­ tors, especially the people's basic assumptions about the valid objectives of individual and social life and the possibility of their attainment. In attempting to find the "Burmese Way to Socialism" the Revolutionary Council found it necessary to emphasize: (1) a rational and scien­ tific view of the world, (2) the idea that rapid and sub­ stantial improvement in the material standards of human life was possible, (3) the importance of making this the primary national goal at that point in history, and (4) the conviction that man can achieve such goals by intel­ ligence and hard work, without reference to any super­ natural powers or agencies. The rationalism, humanism, and secularism with which the regime sought to indoctrinate the masses were not simply random philosophical views which the military government happened to favor; they related to basic attitudes which had to be popularized for the sake of economic development. Along with some economic pol­ icies derived from doctrinaire Marxist assumptions (for example, the policy of nationalizing everything in sight), the regime was seriously attempting to create and nourish

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

the cultural prerequisites for economic growth. In this process some of the fundamental tenets of Buddhism were ignored and others explicitly rejected. In July 1962 the Revolutionary Council adopted "The Constitution of the Burma Socialist Program Party for the Transitional Period of its Construction." The origin and purpose of this new party was described as follows: "1. The Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma, having rescued the Union, not a moment too soon, from utter disintegration, now strives to reconstruct the social and economic life of all citizens by the Burmese Way to Socialism. 2. The Revolutionary Council, forged by pecul­ iar and powerful historical forces is revolutionary in essence, but wears the outward garb of a military council. This the Revolutionary Council deems undesirable. The Revolutionary Council believes that the natural leader of a revolution should be a revolutionary political party."21 Hence the formation by the Revolutionary Coun­ cil itself of the Burma Socialist Program Party. In January 1963 the new party published a lengthy statement of its philosophy entitled "The System of Cor­ relation of Man and his Environment."22 The attempt to produce an elaborate and profound ideology was not an unqualified success. Some passages were tedious in their repetition of commonplace ideas, others abounded with logical inconsistencies and non sequitur's, and others parroted such Marxist conceptions as the class struggle with no attempt to examine their relevance to Burma. But it was nonetheless a most interesting document. The statement claimed that the party program for the building of a new socialist society was based on this 21 The Constitution of the Burma Socialist Program Tarty, Di­ rector of Information, Rangoon, July 4, 1962. See Fred R. von der Mehden, "The Burmese Way to Socialism," Asian Survey, 1963, vol. 3, pp. 129-135. 22 The Guardian, January 18, 1963.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

philosophy, which had been framed "from a close study of the nature of man and of his society." The first section dealt with metaphysics and made use of several concepts of traditional Buddhist thought, together with the appro­ priate Pali terminology. In nature there are three worlds: (1) the material world, okasaloka, composed of abstract earth, water, air and heat; (2) the animal world, sattaloka; and (3) the phenomenal world, sankharaloka, which consists of "the entire process of nature manifested in the space-time continuum of events of mind and mat­ ter, interacting in infinite patterns—matter interacting with matter, mind with mind, and matter with mind." Man is concerned with all three worlds. "Matter and mind in man are inseparably linked on the ever-turning wheel of change." The Pali terms for matter and mind (rupa and nama) appeared elsewhere in the document, and in the discussion of the continuous process of change and evolution in the history of human society the law of dialectics (paticcasamuppada) was mentioned. Analyzing the philosophy, Dr. Ba Maw criticized the device of "turning religio-metaphysical speculations into social truths and laws."23 This was presumably an at­ tempt to justify the claim that this was the Burmese way to socialism, but Dr. Ba Maw deplored the confusion of religion and society. "In this way a social philosophy based upon laws and conditions which are continually changing has been kept tied to religious dogmas which claim to be absolute and unchanging and go centuries back to an age immeasurably different from today." Dr. Ba Maw, in replying to critics of his analysis, conceded that only a few Pali terms were found in the party document, but contended that nevertheless "the whole trend of thought underlying an important part of 23 Dr. Ba Maw, "Some Thoughts on the Philosophy of the Burma Socialist Program Party," ibid., January 23, 1963. See also the editorial, ibid., January 24, 1963.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

the philosophy is derived from the most abstruse Bud­ dhist teachings in Burma."24 He agreed that the statement as a whole revealed the clear intention to keep religion out of political life. "But this cannot be done as long as the people are taught to see and interpret the society in which they live in basic religious terms." Dr. Ba Maw put his finger on a very real inconsistency in the document. But the concessions made to traditional conceptions faded into insignificance before the revolu­ tionary assertions and implications of the world view which was expounded in the party philosophy. It would be well to point out first some of the relevant tenets of Buddhism which were ignored. First, in the discussion of "the three worlds" there was no hint of the existence of spiritual beings such as those which U Nu had cata­ logued with such precision in his discourses on Buddhist metaphysics. Second, the life of man was discussed in great detail without reference to the doctrine of samsara—the wheel of rebirth. Third, man's ability to direct his own destiny was asserted in the strongest language, without the slightest intimation that this might be limited by his kamma. Fourth, the philosophy left little place for the ideal of renunciation or the consideration that tran­ quility and contentment might be found through mini­ mizing one's needs and desires, as in the monastic life. The argument from silence surely cannot be pressed too far. However, the scope of the philosophy was so broad that it could not be argued that the above points were not directly relevant to its basic theses. If the doc­ trine of rebirth was true, this was surely the most basic single fact about the nature of human life, and all manner of logical consequences would flow from this fact. If the attainment of nibbana was seriously accepted as the only valid ultimate objective of human life, it would be quite 24Letter

to the editor,

ibid., February 2, 1963.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

impossible to ignore it in social and economic planning.25 The statement made it clear that the party did not regard its ideology as complete, final, or ultimate. "The philosophy of our party is a purely mundane and human doctrine. It is neither religious nor supernal. The ideol­ ogy of our party should not therefore be looked at from a religious or super-mundane point of view."26 The party would continue to strive to adapt its ideology to chang­ ing conditions and to make it "more and more entire." But the ideology could not be regarded as secular simply in the sense that it did not deal with religion; it was also secular in the sense that it attempted to provide secular answers to some of the basic philosophical problems concerning the meaning of human existence. Buddhism was not explicitly rejected, but its own answers to these same philosophical problems were completely different. The humanistic emphasis of the party philosophy was expressed most eloquently in the discussion of the proc­ esses of history. 'It is therefore only man, the living being possessed of reason and intellect, who plays the deter­ mining role in causing the changes throughout the history of society; it is man s own creative imagination and efforts that lead and guide all human achievements; . . . in solving the problems of society we must adopt and go by the motto: Man Matters Most." And in another context: "Man is the master and captain of history. . . . Accordingly, the welfare of man shall be our main con­ cern. The progress of man shall be our aspiration. And the material and spiritual happiness of man shall be the guide in all our activities." 25 Commenting on the basic secularism of the document, one writer noted: "Put in a nutshell, the essence of Buddhism is the theory of the Eight-Fold Noble Path. It is nothing but the way to nirvana, which is apart from this material world. But the whole trend of this new philosophy is . . . giving a solution for building up a material socialist society 'where affluence and justice for all shall prevail.'" Ihid., February 7, 1963. 26 Ibid., January 18, 1963.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

The party's interpretation of the "spiritual happiness of man" was a most interesting point. The statement repeatedly asserted that the desire for the fulfilment of both material and spiritual needs was fundamental to the nature of man. The spiritual life of man was defined in very comprehensive terms, yet, significantly, without ever using the word religion. "The spiritual life of the human society is a collective term embracing such an entire range of development as man's desires and aspira­ tions, thoughts and ideas, arts and sciences, policies and plans (political, economic, educational, social), knowl­ edge and experiences, philosophies and ideologies." The party philosophy declared that the attainment of material prosperity was not enough; the spiritual life of the people also had to be "improved." Material pros­ perity itself was indeed an important step toward the second objective, for a wholesome morality is possible only when the stomach is full. But even in a socialist society of abundance, the economic system could at best only mitigate and not really bring under control the human proclivities of lust, greed, hate, pride, and selfaggrandizement. The socialist state must therefore plan for the improvement of the people's spiritual life. "Psychi­ cal principles (such cultural values as morality, selfexamination, and self-criticism, treating others as we would like others to treat us, loving kindness, etc.) which purify, control, study, and examine the mind are necessarily to be extolled and nurtured." It would appear that the Revolutionary Council did not see any important connection between religion and spiritual life, nor between religion and morality. Further­ more, it was assumed that the state could and should do something positive to improve the people's spiritual life and morality. This official statement of the Burma So­ cialist Program Party was described as "a philosophy that

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meets both material and spiritual needs."27 There was in this attempt an incipient totalitarianism which could not be ignored. The liberal state recognizes that important areas of human life are outside of its sphere of operations; this state philosophy accepted no such limitations. The position taken in the party document that "mind and matter in man exist as correlates" and that both the spiritual and the material aspects of human life are supremely important was significant for its repudiation of the tenets of Marxist materialism. The philosophy, in fact, criticized "some so-called leftists" for their dogmatic views of "vulgar materialism." As a consequence of such views, man's mind and mental factors were devalued, and basic principles of morality and social ethics were ignored. Vulgar materialism robbed man of his essential dignity: "The meaning of man is nullified." While the statements of the party philosophy on man's mind and spiritual life constituted a strong affirmation of human values, the emphasis was not on individual freedom to realize these values (this is hardly mentioned), but on the responsibility of the state to promote them through its reconstruction of society on a socialist basis. SOLDIERS, SPIRITS, AND MONKS

The Revolutionary Council quickly addressed itself to the task of tightening up its control over various areas of the nation's cultural life. News Agency, Burma, set up in the ministry of information, acquired the exclusive right to distribute Reuters, Tass, Agence France Press, and United Press International news in Burma. The Printers and Publishers Registration Act provided that publishers of newspapers and magazines would have to apply for 27

U Maung Maung, "A Philosophy that Meets both Material and Spiritual Needs," Forward, vol. 1, February 22, 1963.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

registration certificates every year and would be subject to extensive regulation. The minister for information arranged a short "training course" for news reporters and correspondents, at the conclusion of which they pledged to cooperate with the military government. The Cine­ matographic Act established a full-time Film Censor Board charged with eliminating undesirable films which adversely affected the character of the people. The min­ istry of culture sponsored a national literary conference, the first of its kind, to give Burmese writers the benefit of the government's views on their role in the new setup in the country. All of these steps were taken by the military regime during 1962. In mid-1963 other far-reaching measures were an­ nounced. The Private Schools Registration Act required all private schools to teach only the textbooks prescribed by the government and in accordance with the curriculum laid down. The act specifically forbade the teaching of lessons which militated against the policy of the govern­ ment. Ava House Ltd., a subsidiary firm of the state Burma Economic Development Corporation, was made the sole importer of books and periodicals. It was an­ nounced that the import of paperback novels and cheap periodicals would be stopped, and, with respect to books dealing with Burma, only those which gave a "true and accurate" portrayal of the country would be imported. The Burma Translation Society was taken over by the government and placed under the ministry of informa­ tion. A state newspaper, the Working Peoples Daily, with Burmese and English editions, was opened in September 1963 by Information Minister Colonel Saw Myint. How was the military regime to approach religion, which after all was probably more influential in molding popular attitudes (and at a much deeper level) than books, newspapers, or movies? Under U Nu's leadership,

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government moved boldly into the sphere of religion with the object of promoting a revival of Burmese Bud­ dhism. General Ne Win was torn between two conflicting views: (1) the conviction that religion and politics ought to be kept separate, and that the state should concern itself only with secular matters; and (2) the belief that governmental intervention was required to eliminate reli­ gious attitudes and practices which were clearly detri­ mental to the building of a modern, rational, progressive, socialist society, and to promote spiritual values which would encourage progress toward this objective. The latter view was reflected most clearly in the Revolutionary Council's policies toward nat worship. The world of the nats is an irrational world completely unre­ lated to the orderly operation of orthodox Buddhism's law of kamma. Capricious spirits bedevil and thwart man's best efforts unless these spirits are adequately propitiated. U Nu in his official capacity frequently made public offerings and prayers to the nats; General Ne Win found it impossible to tolerate such animistic practices, however popular they were with the masses. During the caretaker regime the military mayor of Rangoon had all the nat shrines in public places dismantled. The attrac­ tively decorated shrines were then presented to foreign diplomats and anthropologists.28 Following the 1962 coup a determined attack on nat worship was launched by the government. Of necessity, the main weapon used by the government in its war against the nats was propaganda. Forward, the popular magazine which serves as the official organ of the Revolutionary Council, published a number of articles in which nat worship was held up to ridicule.29 One such 28 U Ba Than, The Roots of the Revolution, Director of Informa­ tion, Rangoon, 1962, p. 71. 29 See, for example, Thawda Swe, "The Nat and I," Forward, vol. 1, September 22, 1962, pp. 22-23.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

article gave a purportedly true account of the writer's cousin who held nat feasts in order to cure his wife's defective eyesight. A medium had told him that one of the nats was angry and had to be propitiated by an elaborate feast. A year later the cousin took his wife to Rangoon to consult an eye specialist. The doctor reported that there was now no hope—they should have come a year earlier. The account concluded with the writer's comment: "A year earlier! I still can see the nat feast held a year ago. But, alas, the eyes of my cousin's wife can see nothing now. They are forever blinded by cataracts."30 With very evident official inspiration, a number of plays and skits presented at Buddhist festivals elaborated on the theme of the foolishness of following ignorant and superstitious customs which had nothing to do with the Dhamma of the Lord Buddha. A more drastic step came in July 1962 with a government ban on the production and showing of films with nat stories as their main theme. With their wealth of romance and fantasy, these tradi­ tional stories had provided much material for Burmese films. The movies, in turn, had undoubtedly done much to confirm popular faith in the world of the nats.31 The Revolutionary Council was determined to use every avail­ able means to reorient popular attitudes along lines more conducive to the attainment of a socialist society. Another area of great importance was the regime's relations with the Sangha. As the army viewed matters, the monks had no useful function to perform in the reconstruction of society along socialist lines and were far more likely to be a recalcitrant or obstructionist ele­ ment in the military's program of reorienting popular 30 Thawda Swe, "Cataracts," Forward, vol. 1, December 22, 1962, pp. 20-21. 31 The Guardian, July 27, August 3 and 4, 1962. See also Khin Myo Chit, "Nats! What's Wrong with Them?" Ibid., February 23, 1963.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

attitudes. The party had its own ideas on how the spirit­ ual life of the people should be improved, and the monk­ hood did not figure in these plans at all. The European tradition of leftist anti-clericalism was undoubtedly one element in the situation. In Marxist terms, the Burmese Sangha eminently fulfilled the definition of a parasitic clerical class. If socialism was to be established, material resources could not be wasted in building monasteries and maintaining a large class of totally unproductive monks. If socialism was to be established, resources in manpower could not be squandered by permitting a sys­ tem to flourish which swelled the ranks of this unpro­ ductive class. All the previous governments of independent Burma also claimed to be socialist, but they had to function within the framework of parliamentary democracy. This in turn meant a degree of responsiveness to public opin­ ion and the official espousal of values cherished by the masses, especially Buddhism. EflForts were therefore made to emphasize the compatibility of socialism with Buddhism. Once the "handicap" of democracy was re­ moved by the coup of March 2, 1962, it became possible for the government to recognize the obvious truth that some important aspects of Buddhism were not compati­ ble with socialism and in fact militated against it. The problem for the military regime was to determine how fast it dare proceed in the necessary task of reorientation of popular attitudes. In this unfavorable political climate the Sangha as a whole kept its silence, publicly at least.82 The attitudes of many monks toward the regime ranged from sullen resentment to outright hostility. As they saw things, U 32

On the other hand the university students, another focus of political power, continued to defy the regime after the tragic firing on a student demonstration at Rangoon University on July 7, 1962, in which a large number were killed.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

Nu, despite his many mistakes (the fourth amendment was the greatest), was a layman who honored the Sangha. As prime minister he had consulted frequently with the venerable sayadaws to seek their advice in the traditional manner of the Burmese ruler. But not the present pre­ mier; since the 1962 coup, General Ne Win had ignored the Sangha. Knowledgeable monks quickly realized that there was no place for them in the Burmese way to socialism. The possibility of open conflict between the govern­ ment and the Sangha developed in 1963 over a relatively minor incident which involved the vital interests of neither party, but which was nevertheless of considerable symbolic significance for the Sangha. The Ancient Monu­ ments Preservation Act of 1957 was amended in 1962 by the Revolutionary Council. One of the new provisions of the law was that no renovation of any ancient building could be carried out without obtaining the prior permis­ sion of the government. In April 1963 the revolutionary government issued an order declaring the entrances, prayer halls, and stairways of the famous Mahamyatmuni pagoda in Mandalay as scheduled ancient edifices to be maintained by the government. The pagoda proper had been classified as a protected ancient monument since 1909. The government order was signed by the director of archaeology, who had learned that the trustees of the pagodas were planning to demolish the war-damaged prayer halls and stairways and build new ones. It was explained that these parts of the pagoda contained valu­ able and historic carvings and paintings, which the gov­ ernment sought to preserve as part of Burma's cultural heritage.33 The Union of Burma Presiding Monks Association took the strongest exception to this action of the government. 33

The Guardian, April 22 and May 14, 1963.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

In an emergency executive committee meeting a resolu­ tion was adopted which pointed out that the pagoda was already well administered by a body of monks and a body of lay trustees. The resolution declared that the order of the director of archaeology was therefore wholly unnecessary, and unconditionally supported the objec­ tions voiced by these two bodies. Leaders of the associa­ tion also explained that it was their duty to protect Buddhism when danger threatened it, that the govern­ ment's action was unprecedented, and that they feared there would be increasing interference with religion.34 Three months later the government capitulated. At a large gathering of monks and officials, Union Culture Minister Colonel Saw Myint offered soon (alms-food) to the fourteen leading sayadaws of Mandalay, then con­ veyed to them the decision of the government to place the entrances, prayer halls, and stairways of the pagoda entirely in their care. In response to this announcement the monks called out "Sadhu" (well done) three times. The sayadaws spokesman admonished the officials that in matters relating to religious affairs, administrators would do well to consult the religious organizations. Otherwise, religious questions might easily become politi­ cal issues.85 It is very likely that it was precisely this consideration which led to the government's conciliatory decision. A pro-government newspaper commented edi­ torially: "It is clear that while the Revolutionary Govern­ ment is busy promoting socialism, creation of problems of religious nature cannot be afforded. There are ele­ ments which are waiting for an opportunity to exploit any situation which can excite the religious passion of the people."36 The government's promotion of socialism, and not its interference in religious affairs, created the most serious 34 35

Ibid., May 9 and 12, 1963. Ibid., August 7, 1963.

36

Ibid., August 8, 1963.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

tensions with the Sangha. The policy of large-scale na­ tionalization of the means of production, which was being rapidly implemented by the end of the first year of the revolutionary regime, was bitterly denounced in private by many monks. "The Revolutionary Council is a first-class communist government!" "Ne Win is outdoing even Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung!"37 Some held that the nationalization policy was opposed to one of the Five Precepts—the precept against stealing. According to the Buddhist definition, stealing is taking another's property against his will; what else is the government doing when it nationalizes private businesses? When questioned as to why they, members of the Sangha who had withdrawn from worldly affairs, were so concerned about the government's economic policy, some revealed that they had very clearly perceived the implications of socialism for the Sangha. If the govern­ ment takes property away from the wealthy laymen and reduces them to the status of others, who will patronize the monastic order? Who will build monasteries for the revered sayadaivs? Socialism means that the concentra­ tion of wealth will be in government hands, and the government is clearly not disposed to assume the role of chief patron of the Sangha. Unquestionably, the stage was set for an open conflict between the revolutionary regime and the Buddhist clergy. In October 1963 a one-man political war against General Ne Win's government was launched by a noted Mandalay sayadaw, U Kethaya. Long known for his strong anti-communist views, he had been dubbed "the American pongyi," a title which he rather enjoyed. The eighty-three-year-old monk held a number of mass meet­ ings without the permits required by law, at which he 37 Statements made to the author by leading sayadaws in Ran­ goon and Mandalay in Febraary 1963.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

unequivocally condemned the Revolutionary Council's Burmese way to socialism. Enthusiastic audiences, re­ portedly as large as IOjOOO people, heard the sharptongued sayadaw predict that just as General Aung San was assassinated in 1947, so General Ne Win would meet his death in due course.38 As he and many other political pongyis had done during the nationalist struggle, U Kethaya again capitalized on the Sangha's natural politi­ cal advantages to defy the government. As distasteful as his seditious speeches were to the regime, could the government (even a military government) run the risks involved in imprisoning a well-known Buddhist monk, especially an aged and learned (Agga Maha Paudita) sayadaw? Emboldened by the government's inaction, U Kethaya openly courted arrest, declaring that his arrest would serve the cause of Buddhism in Burma. Whatever else it might do, it would certainly crystallize opposition to the military regime. U Kethaya had long been associated with the Yahanpyu Aphwe (Young Monks Association), the important Sangha group which supported U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein after the 1958 split in the AFPFL. During the period of General Ne Win's caretaker regime, 1958-1960, the government tacitly supported this faction, which became the Stable AFPFL. In view of this alignment of forces, the army, the Stable AFPFL, and the Young Monks Associa­ tion, it was natural for the Young Monks to cooperate closely with the first Ne Win government, especially in the 1959 anti-communist propaganda campaign. While the campaign was organized by the army's Department of Psychological Warfare, the Young Monks Association printed many thousands of pamphlets, organized mass meetings, and in other ways assumed a very vigorous role. After the 1962 coup the situation was completely 38

New York Times, November 3, 1963.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

different. U Ba Swe and U Kyaw Nyein continued to emphasize the need for the restoration of democracy, and the military clearly had no intention of abdicating power. The Young Monks remained loyal to the AFPFL. It was reported that General Ne Win had approached the leaders of the Young Monks Association and solicited their support shortly after the coup, but that his request was denied.39 In August 1964 serious disturbances erupted in MandaIay following the publication of an article by U Ottama, a recent convert from Hinduism who had entered the Sangha. The article, published by the Burmese news­ paper Bahosi, criticized popular religious practices at pagodas and shrines and called for the purification of the Buddhist clergy. Leaders of twelve Sangha associa­ tions in Mandalay quickly met and condemned the article as an attack upon the Sasana written by "a Hindu calling himself a Buddhist" which would likely lead to Hindu-Buddhist communal disturbances. The sayadaws called on the government to take prompt action against those responsible for this insult.40 With the prospect of imminent violence, U Ottama fled the city. About forty enraged monks attacked and destroyed the Bahosi Press, and on the following day five hundred monks destroyed the house and personal effects of the chief editor, U Mya Than, who had also gone into hiding. The agitation took an anti-government turn as irate monks blamed the disturbances on the Revolutionary Council, which had "failed to take timely action against U Ottama." A large poster captioned "Public Statement from the Sangha Masses" pointed out that the govern­ ment had dealt very quickly with those who had tried to obstruct socialism. "The Sangha masses are doubtful as 39 Interview with U Kuthala, general secretary of the Young Monks Association, Mandalay, February 1963. 40 Bahosi, August 15, 1964.

REVOLUTION AND SECULARISM

to whether the Revolutionary Council shows as much respect to Buddhism as it does to socialism."41 Similar anti-government posters and leaflets appeared in all parts of Mandalay. The Sangha associations, however, soon became divided over tactical questions. Some groups, such as the Young Monks Association, urged restraint and the restoration of peaceful conditions, while the leftist Yahan Nge group sought to intensify the pressure on the government. The Revolutionary Council announced that it would appoint an inquiry commission to investigate the U Ottama incident and warned: "The Revolutionary Gov­ ernment will defend itself against hostile attacks launched on plausible pretexts by bogus monks."42 The government statement made it clear, however, that the general reform of the Sangha would be the responsibility of the leading sayadaws and in accordance with the Vinaya. The gov­ ernment was ready to render every assistance, but the initiative for reform would have to come from within the Sangha itself. Government-Sangha relations were also strained by the Revolutionary Council's decision to demonetize 100and 50-kyat notes, a measure designed to bring secret untaxed wealth into the open. A heavy tax was deducted when the demonetized notes were exchanged. In a meet­ ing held in Rangoon, representatives of various Sangha associations were told by the chairman that monks were now faced with the prospect of starvation, since donors were left impoverished after surrendering their demone­ tized currency notes to the government. The sayadaws, in a resolution, demanded refund in full value of demone­ tized notes belonging to pagoda trust funds and Sangha common funds.43 While the government made concessions 41

Botataung, August 19, 1964. Working People's Daily, August 28, 1964. 43 Botataung, August 24, 1964. 42

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on this point, currency notes held by monasteries and individual monks were not exempted from the operation of the law. Articles by Buddhist laymen pointed out that money was poison to monks, according to the Vinaya, and that the government's policy would therefore raise the spiritual level of the Sangha. It was also argued that in the long run socialism would benefit religion materi­ ally. "There can be no doubt that the government's de­ monetization measure will raise the standard of living of the poor people and therefore increase the number of pagodas, shrines, kyaungs, zayats, etc., in the near future. I would therefore appeal to the most venerable Sangha to kindly look forward to that future and raise no objection to the demonetized currency policy at this moment."44 Needless to say, very few monks found this argument convincing. On January 18, 1965, General Ne Win promulgated a law which repealed the major pieces of legislation which U Nu had hoped would strengthen and purify the Sangha. Law No. 1 of 1965 repealed the Ecclesiastical Courts Act of 1949 (the official title was the VinicchayaThana and Vinicchaya Tribunal Act, 1311 B.E.), the Pali University and Dhammacariya Act of 1950, and the Pali Education Board Act of 1952. The ministry of religious affairs issued a statement explaining that these acts were repealed because they had failed to achieve the purpose for which they had been enacted. Appropriate arrange­ ments would be made and the advice of the Sangha given due consideration in deciding cases presently before the ecclesiastical courts, the statement continued. Full con­ sideration would also be given to the advice of the Sangha in connection with the promotion of scholarship in the Pali scriptures.45 44 Letter

to the editor by "A poor devout Buddhist," ibid,., Au­ gust 21, 1964. 48 Forward, vol. 3, February 1, 1965.

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Unlike all previous governments of independent Burma, the present Ne Win regime has adopted policies which are clearly inimical to the long-range prestige and power of the Sangha. Unlike all previous governments, it does not enjoy the support of any significant monastic organi­ zation. It seems likely that more active Sangha opposition to the regime will be one factor in future developments.

CHAPTER 9

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE preceding chapters we have sought

to analyze and describe the interaction of religion and politics in Burma since independence. The diversity, range, and inherent importance of the problems con­ nected with this interaction in Burma are unequalled elsewhere in South and Southeast Asia. In no other coun­ try of this region has there been such a dramatic religiopolitical development from a secular state to the adoption of a state religion, under the leadership of a prime min­ ister who epitomized the values of renascent Asian religion. In no other country has the mixing of religion and politics demonstrated so clearly both the usefulness and the limitations of religion in relation to: the legiti­ macy of the political system, effective political leader­ ship, national integration, economic development, and the democratic process. In no other country has the role of government in the promotion of religion been ex­ panded so earnestly and the inherent limits of that role been revealed so clearly. Finally, in no other country have we observed the full-circle reversion to secular politics under an authoritarian military regime which has rejected religion as a source of legitimacy. With such a wide range of phenomena before us, we must attempt to answer, however tentatively, the important questions with which this study began. RELIGION AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY

A political system acquires legitimacy when the belief becomes widespread that its political institutions and procedures are right and proper for the society and that

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

its decisions should be accepted and rules obeyed as a matter of moral obligation. In general, political leaders strive to maximize legitimacy, since it permits them to govern day to day without resort to coercive power and this power can then be reserved for possible major crises in the future. As Seymour M. Lipset has pointed out: "Groups will regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit in with their primary values."1 Throughout South and Southeast Asia religious values rank high, possibly high­ est, among the primary values of the masses. The close association of religion with the political system would thus appear to constitute an invaluable means to maxi­ mize legitimacy. And nowhere has the experiment been more elaborate than in Burma.2 It would obviously be incorrect to interpret political legitimacy as the sole object of the government's religious program. In arguing the case for making Buddhism the state religion, U Nu asserted that government was respon­ sible for advancing the welfare of the people not only in this existence but in countless future existences by pointing the way to nirvana. There is every reason to believe that he was quite sincere in stating this convic­ tion. But undoubtedly, as some of U Nu's other state­ ments reveal, he was also consciously striving to associate 1 Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Po­ litical Science Review, 1959, vol. 53, pp. 86-87. 2 Pakistan was created on the theory that the Muslims of British India constituted a separate nation. From the inception of the state, therefore, Islam was deeply involved in the definition of Pakistani nationality. Despite the declaration in two constitutions that Pakistan is an Islamic Republic, the visible connections be­ tween Islam and the political system are startlingly few. The government of Burma, on the other hand, started with a secular state and moved steadily into deeper religious involvement, with an ostentatious program for the promotion of religion and with the object (at least in part) of increasing its political legitimacy.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

the parliamentary democracy of Burma's formal political structure with the primary values of Buddhism. Max Weber held that the most universal source of legitimacy was tradition. Legitimacy rested on "the sanc­ tity of immemorial traditions" which were carefully followed by the rulers.3 From the days of Anawrahta in the eleventh century A.D., the Burmese kings were the defenders of the faith, the promoters of Buddhism, the builders of pagodas, the patrons of the Sangha. Bud­ dhism itself (along with Brahmanical rituals) consti­ tuted the sacred tradition through which their rule acquired legitimacy. Then came the short interlude of foreign rule (1885-1948), and then again a Burmese government. In associating Buddhism with the political system, Premier Nu sought to acquire legitimacy through tradition in a double sense. Buddhism itself was the sacred tradition which conferred legitimacy, and the offi­ cial promotion of Buddhism was part of the historical tradition of Burmese kingship which helped to confirm legitimacy. U Nu's government, by honoring the religion of the Buddha, followed the tradition of all the Burmese rulers which had gone before. Thus far we have considered Buddhism as part of the tradition which was deliberately associated with Burma's democratic political system in order to legitimate that system. Viewed from this point of view, Buddhism might be used to legitimate any conceivable political system. But there is a deeper question. Does Buddhism as a religious value system contain elements which are espe­ cially favorable to the development of democracy? Over the past two centuries stable democratic states have developed in the West, in cultures profoundly influ­ enced by Christianity and in particular by predominantly 3

Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organiza­ tion, Oxford University Press, New York, 1947, p. 328.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

Protestant Christianity. The historical association is a simple fact, but the precise nature of the relationship between Christianity and democracy is a most complex question, which is still being debated.4 There is consid­ erable agreement, however, that certain Christian ideas (e.g., the concept of the individual) have provided important philosophical foundations for democratic government. Looking at the problem of, religion and democracy in present-day Burma, we see quite clearly that Buddhism is not only compatible with democracy but also provides some important values which strongly support it. The Buddhist religious quest is a highly individualistic one characterized by self-reliance rather than blind faith in authority. Totalitarian systems would appear to be com­ pletely contrary to Buddhist individualism. Furthermore, in Buddhism there is considerable tolerance of differing ideas and practices, and the principle of the Middle Way emphasizes the spirit of compromise and mutual adjust­ ment. The compromise of opposing beliefs and interests is clearly central to the functioning of democracy.5 The late prime minister of Ceylon, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, invoked the doctrine of the Middle Way in explaining 4 Note the remark of Η. B. Mayo: "Although the close logical affinity of Christianity and democracy may be justifiably doubted, it is enough for present purposes if we assume compatibility. . . ." An Introduction to Democratic Theory, Oxford University Press, New York, 1960, p. 306. 5 Seymour M. Lipset noted that "religious value systems which are more universalistic in the sense of placing less stress on being the only true church will be more compatible with democracy than those which assume that they have the only truth. The latter belief, held much more strongly by the Catholic than by most other Christian churches, makes it difficult for the religious value system to help legitimate a political system which requires, as part of its basic value system, the belief that 'good' is served best through conflict among opposing beliefs." Op.cit., p. 93.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

his compromise solution to the country's thorny language problem in 1958.® While Buddhism as a religious value system can sup­ port democracy, the point should not be overstated. For centuries this religion flourished in Burma under despotic rulers, and there was little evidence of conflict between Buddhism and autocracy. The system of parliamentary democracy was abolished by the military government in 1962 and Ne Win's increasingly authoritarian regime was accepted with very little protest. However, as we shall explain later, the basic problem was not loss of legiti­ macy but failure of leadership. In modern times, ideology has frequently supple­ mented or even replaced tradition as a prime factor in the legitimation of political systems. An ideology is a more or less coherent body of ideas indicating the basic assumptions, values, and objectives of a political move­ ment or a political system. Among other functions, an ideology explains and justifies the political system. In independent Burma, nationalism, democracy, and social­ ism have all been important elements in the thinking of politically conscious Burmese, although a national ideol­ ogy as such was never formulated before the present military regime came to power. Nevertheless, nationalism, democracy, and socialism constituted a significant ideo­ logical foundation, on which there was considerable consensus, for the establishment of political legitimacy. The association of Buddhism, the most important source of primary values for the masses, with each of these three ideological elements (which had most strongly influenced the western-educated) helped to legitimate the composite ideology, which in turn served to legiti­ mate the political system. Buddhism also proved to be 6 Tarzie

Vittachi, Emergency '58: The Story of the Ceylon Race Riots, Andre Deutsch Ltd., London, 1958, pp. 27-28.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

an invaluable weapon in defending the political system against the attacks of the only hostile ideology capable of posing a serious threat, i.e. communism. As it was possible for U Nu to demonstrate that Buddhism and democratic socialism were completely compatible and indeed complementary, he could with equal ease show that Buddhism and Marxism were diametrically opposed on fundamentals and that it was this same ideology which threatened both the Union of Burma and the religion of the Buddha. Was the association of religion with the political system of Burma useful in increasing legitimacy? I believe that it was very useful. Buddhism clothed government with an aura of sanctity; Buddhism in both tradition and ideol­ ogy undergirded the political system and ensured strong popular support. The religious minorities were unenthusiastic about the government's religious program and actively opposed the state religion proposal, but on the whole there was no fundamental alienation of the reli­ gious minorities. U Nu's gesture of the fourth amendment was of some use in this respect. The quest for political legitimacy through religion was largely successful. How­ ever, legitimacy is not the only consideration; the gov­ ernment's religious involvement also had important (and mostly adverse) effects on political leadership, national integration, and modernization. The military coup of 1962 did not come about because the existing political institutions were held to be illegitimate, but because of the failures of the leadership identified with these insti­ tutions. RELIGION AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

Whatever the degree of support given by Buddhism to democracy, it is quite clear that the democratic political system stimulated and encouraged the trend to bring

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

religion openly into political life. To the politician func­ tioning in a democratic setup, the appeal to Buddhism was an obvious path to greater power, regardless of constitutional restrictions.7 The democratic process thus encouraged the politics of religious revivalism, which tended to undermine the principle of the secular state, an important aspect of western-type democracy and modernization in general. Military rule is in some ways more conducive to modernization in that it can afford to emphasize the secular, rational, and scientific approach to problems. However, the record of many military re­ gimes in promoting modernization has not been impres­ sive, and the success of General Ne Win's present effort in Burma is by no means assured.8 On the surface, U Nu's strong religious convictions and fervent desire to restore Buddhism to an honored place in Burmese public life appeared to be an invaluable asset to his political leadership. Much of the above dis­ cussion of the legitimacy of a political system is equally applicable to the political leader's need for legitimacy. U Nu's personal leadership acquired legitimacy through the association with religious-oriented tradition. To use another of Max Weber's categories, there was in addition a "charismatic" quality to U Nu's political leadership which endowed it with legitimacy. U Nu eminently ful­ filled Weber's definition of a charismatic leader as one possessing "exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character." U Nu was the model Buddhist layman. He daily spent two hours in meditation; although married, 7 Article 21 (4) of the Constitution forbade the abuse of religion for political purposes. 8 For useful discussions of the role of the military in moderniza­ tion and related problems, see John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1962; and S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Militarti in Politics, Frederick A. Praeeer, New York, 1962.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

he had lived a life of celibacy in accordance with a reli­ gious vow made in 1948. He was popularly regarded as a future Buddha, and he himself apparently believed that Buddhahood was only a few existences away. There is no doubt that U Nu knew how to put all of this to good political use. He was highly successful in using religious symbols in election campaigns. He won the 1960 elections on his promise to make Buddhism the state religion, and it was indeed a resounding victory. Good political leadership, however, also requires effec­ tiveness in other areas, and it became increasingly clear that U Nu's preoccupation with religion adversely af­ fected his performance in these areas. National unity and stability, the improvement of education and health, economic development and the raising of living stand­ ards were all pressing needs and professed national goals, and any regime would ultimately have to be judged on the criterion of whether measurable progress had been made toward these goals. In many ways U Nu's political leadership was an attempt to bridge the gulf between the values of tradition and modernity, and between the two segments of Bur­ mese society which represented these divergent values. Bridge-building, however, is a hazardous occupation. In the case of U Nu, there was a fundamental and unre­ solved uncertainty over how the two sets of values were to be integrated and, in particular, over the definition of ends and means. Commenting on U Nu's religious com­ mitment in relation to his political leadership, John F. Cady asserted: "The weakness of his government stemmed not only from the magnitude of its problems, but also from his own divided allegiance to religious traditionalism and to westernized political and techno­ logical norms."9 Some observers of the Burmese scene 9 John F. Cady, "Religion and Politics in Modern Burma," Far Eastern Quarterly, 1953, vol. 12, p. 156.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

have expressed the view that U Nu's increasing involve­ ment in religion, especially after the 1960 election, unfitted him for dealing with the political realities of the day. Frank N. Trager commented: "I believe that U Nu could no longer reconcile the requirements of political leadership with his desire to achieve Buddhist religious integration and carry out in public life its consequences"10 To a large extent the problem centered in the definition of the ends of human existence and the choice of means by which progress could be made toward these ends.11 For U Nu the supreme end had to be defined in terms of his religious faith—spiritual enlightenment, and ulti­ mately nibbana. If one takes this ultimate goal seriously and spends two hours each day meditating deeply on the impermanence of all earthly things, the vanity of man's striving for power, and the need to eradicate all human desire from the heart, this will inevitably do something to one's effectiveness as a politician. If nibbana is the true end men ought to strive for, can politics be con­ ceived simply as a means to attain this end? This is a partial answer, and on occasion U Nu revealed that he was indeed exploiting politics for personal religious ends. Both in convening the Sixth Great Buddhist Council and in making Buddhism the state religion, U Nu was con­ vinced that one of the religious consequences was that vast amounts of merit (kutho) accrued to him personally to help him on his way to nibbana and Buddhahood. He was undoubtedly convinced also that these meritori10 Frank N. Trager, "The Failure of U Nu and the Return of the Armed Forces in Burma," The Review of Politics, 1963, vol. 25, p. 320. 11 It should be clear to the reader that the analysis put forth in this and succeeding paragraphs is highly tentative, because the kind of detailed psychological studies of U Nu which are needed have not been made. For a pioneering work in this general field, see Lucian W. Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1962.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

ous acts would bring untold spiritual blessings to his people. Political leadership, then, could be a means to a higher, spiritual end. Socialist Nu, by working to replace a capi­ talist economic structure based on acquisitiveness and competition with a cooperative socialist society, could help the common man toward the ultimate goal. "The reason why an average Buddhist concerns himself not with the final release from samsara [endless rebirths] but with the acquisition of property is to be found in the economic system that prevails in the world."12 U Nu could thus justify his socialism by associating it with Buddhism. But of equal importance is the fact that he could in this way rationalize his own deep involvement in politics as a means for the attainment by vast numbers of the ultimate spiritual goal. It was vital to U Nu's religious and psychological well-being that neither politi­ cal power in itself nor the economic prosperity of the nation could be regarded as a valid ultimate objective. U Nu's ability to function effectively as an integrated person depended on his ability to subordinate political activity to religious goals and to relate the two meaning­ fully. And it was precisely this connection between religion and politics, related as ends and means, which was often so doubtful. U Nu failed as a political leader partly because he could never regard political or economic objectives as valid in and of themselves, and they frequently bore little relationship to the religious values which were at the top of his hierarchy of values. Indeed, some of the politi­ cal and economic objectives of his government militated against the values of Buddhism. Notwithstanding his efforts to reconcile socialism and Buddhism, material 12 U Nu, Pyidaungsu Policy, Clean AFPFL, Rangoon, 1959, p. 26. Quoted in Richard Butwell, "The Four Failures of U Nu's Second Premiership," Asian Survey, March 1962, vol. 2, p. 8.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

prosperity was more likely to prove a snare and a delu­ sion to the devout Buddhist seriously engaged in the quest for nibbana. How could the politician's struggle for power be reconciled with the devout Buddhist's quest for the extinction of desire? Six times after he became prime minister of Burma, U Nu donned the yellow robe of a monk and entered a monastery. These were far more than displays of piety meant to impress a religious people whose votes he needed. The retreat to the monastery revealed the pro­ found inner conflicts of a Buddhist politician involved in manipulating power while engaged in the serious reli­ gious life. No matter how U Nu might seek to rationalize his political work as means to the higher end, the simple fact was that Buddhist teaching had consistently held the monastic life itself to be the appropriate means. If U Nu really wanted nibbana, the logical step prescribed by the Buddha himself was withdrawal from the world and complete dedication to religion. If U Nu really wanted many Burmese to attain nibbana, the most im­ portant step he could take was not the establishment of socialism, but leading the masses in the renunciation of worldly life. In a famous passage Machiavelli asserted that it was useful for the prince to seem merciful, faithful, humane, sincere, and religious, but for him to be all these things was dangerous.13 In the West, the political leader who is serious about his Christian faith is frequently troubled by the ethical problem of the means which he has to employ in politics. But the professed ends of his political program, defined in terms of temporal human welfare, create no inner conflicts. The Buddhist politician, how­ ever, is plagued by uncertainties over the ultimate com­ patibility of both the means and ends of political leader13

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, Mentor Book, New York,

1952, p. 102.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

ship with Buddhism. The psychological conflicts thus engendered can immobilize him. In a far more profound sense than understood by Machiavelli, for the Buddhist politician to be too religious is "dangerous," and U Nu, clearly, was too religious. U Nu's exercise of political leadership was hindered by his religious commitment in other, more obvious, ways. Lucian W. Pye listed as one of the characteristics of transitional politics the following: "The affective or expressive aspects of politics tends to override the problem-solving or public-policy aspect."14 The affective or expressive aspect of politics refers to the elaborate cere­ mony which was a fundamental component of life for the traditional Asian monarch. The performance of court ritual and related activities was to a large extent regarded as an end in itself, an "emotionally satisfying drama" enjoyed by those in power. As we have seen in chapter 1, vast amounts of time, money, and energy were ex­ pended by the Burmese kings in court ceremonies, pagoda-building, public recitation of the scriptures by monks, royal visits to pagodas, religious festivals, offer­ ings to Buddha-images and the Sangha, etc. It can readily be seen that U Nu's activities corre­ sponded closely to this traditional pattern. While there was no more royal court, there was still a Burmese ruler who performed many of the same functions. The hitch, however, was that in King Mindon's time the government was expected to do little more than carry on this tradi­ tional, expressive aspect of politics, while Prime Minister Nu was required to tackle difficult issues of public policy and to solve a host of formidable problems. In the face of the hard requirements of political leadership in his time, U Nu increasingly sought escape from reality in the kind of religious activity prescribed for the Buddhist " Pye, p. 28.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

ruler by tradition. The problems, of course, remained unsolved. U Nu's continuous immersion in religion robbed his political leadership of a rational approach to the prob­ lems with which he did attempt to deal. While in his speeches and writings U Nu frequently emphasized the rational and scientific approach found in Buddhism, in practice he relied heavily on the irrational, superstitious, and animistic elements of popular religion. He attributed much of the victory over the insurgents to his vow of celibacy taken in 1948. He ordered 60,000 sand pagodas to be built all over Burma in order to ward off unspecified dangers. He regularly made offerings to the nats, invoked the aid of these spirits in his political affairs, and attrib­ uted his success to their favor. While political leaders in the West may personally be devout Christians and may publicly call upon God to guide and bless the nation, such invocations of divine help are usually made to ensure the success of rationally determined measures taken to attain the desired objec­ tive. In the case of U Nu it would appear that too often the object was to manipulate the unseen powers to his advantage as a substitute for rational action. The world of the nats is a highly capricious, unpredictable world in which rational action will usually be frustrated anyway. Intellectually, U Nu lived a good deal of his life in this world. Finally, U Nu's personal religiosity and public involve­ ment in the promotion of Buddhism led him to accept with meekness the increasingly belligerent interference of the monks in Burmese politics. In the year before the March 1962 military coup it was obvious that U Nu had lost much of his authority as a political leader. He was quite unable to control the militantly communalist monks, even in clear-cut situations requiring the simple preserva-

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

tion of law and order. Ironically, one of the most impor­ tant groups which had helped to establish his political legitimacy based on Buddhist revivalism now helped to destroy it. RELIGION AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION

In the thinking of most Asians as well as of most west­ erners, the problem of national integration has generally occupied a secondary place, with primary importance being attached to the need for rapid economic develop­ ment. In the decade and a half since independence it has become increasingly clear that a substantial measure of national unity is a basic requirement without which steady advances on the economic front, as well as other aspects of modernization, are rendered exceedingly diffi­ cult. In different forms, the problem of national integra­ tion is a pressing one in India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ma­ laysia, Indonesia, and Burma. The important question which must be considered is whether religion, which has been a powerful integrative force in the traditional societies of all these countries, can reenact this role and provide the unifying values which will weld together the populations of these new states. This was clearly one of the objects of the governmental promotion of Buddhism in Burma, and the experiment must be evaluated in these terms. Buddhism had indeed been closely associated with the traditional Burmese national identity: "To be a Burman is to be a Buddhist." There was good reason to believe that Buddhism could make a significant contribution to some aspects of na­ tional integration. To begin with, the Buddhists constitute a large major­ ity, over 85 per cent of the population. The Buddhists are divided in two important ways: (I) by the social-cultural division between the westernized urban-centered elite and the tradition-oriented village masses; (2) by the

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

different ethnic groups—Burmese, Mons, Shans, etc. Buddhist religion appeared to offer a set of primary values capable of bridging all social, cultural, and ethnic differences. The westernized official or lawyer in Ran­ goon might have been considerably secularized, but he found in the revival of Buddhism a reassertion of his true Burmese identity as well as a potent national symbol. With his sharpened consciousness of himself as a Bud­ dhist came a new sense of solidarity with the village masses, who had never been subjected to the acculturative process which had alienated him from tradition. He did not have to cast off his western learning (an impos­ sibility anyway) but could emphasize the rational and scientific aspects of the Buddhist world view while shar­ ing with the villager the experience of praying at the Shwedagon pagoda. Historically, Buddhism had played a most important role in binding together the diverse ethnic groups of the country. In the words of Professor Cady: "The most important positive basis on which popular allegiance to the king was acknowledged by the leading ethnic peoples of Burma (the Burmans, Mons, Shans, and Arakanese) was that royalty functioned as the promoter and defender of the Buddhist faith."15 Under Prime Minister U Nu, the official promotion of Buddhism undoubtedly exercised a similar integrative influence to some extent. In the crucial period preceding the adoption of Buddhism as the state religion, however, the two issues (state religion and ethnic minority demands) were related in a very different manner. U Nu had promised separate states for the Mons and the Arakanese and had agreed to consider the de­ mand of the Shans and the Kayahs for a form of federal­ ism in which the states would have greatly increased powers. U Nu resorted to threats in order to keep the 15 John F. Cady, A History of Modem Burma, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1960, p. 8.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

ethnic minorities in line on the state religion bill, the enactment of which now became his most important objective.16 By these tactics Buddhism as the state reli­ gion became not an integrative system of values for the nation but a matter of hard political bargaining not without elements of coercion. The state religion issue thus created new tensions be­ tween the government and the Buddhist ethnic minorities. Among the non-Buddhist ethnic minorities, especially the Kachins, opposition to the state religion proposal was intense and violent. While animism was recognized as a separate religion by the Constitution, the primitive peo­ ples who practice it have always been regarded as fit subjects for assimilation by Burmese Buddhist culture ("Burmanization"). The adoption of a state religion for the whole of Burma was inevitably regarded as another attempt to impose the culture of the majority on the animist minorities. Another insurgent movement, the Kachin Independence Army, had its origin in the bitter opposition to the state religion bill. Among the religious minorities, the Muslims were most seriously alienated by the state religion, although the Christians were also deeply disturbed. Both the third and the fourth amendments helped to stimulate and intensify communal antagonisms, and the anti-Muslim riots of November 1961 in a suburb of Rangoon were directly related to the controversy over these measures. While religion under certain circumstances might con­ ceivably be useful in promoting national integration, it 16 "On his own admission, U Nu told the Mon and the Arakanese leaders that if they were working against the state religion bill in compact with the demand for federalism, he would have to counter the threat by revoking his promise . . . of statehood for the Mons and the Arakanese. Similarly, he told the Shan and the Kayah ministers that if they were thinking of opposing the state religion bill he would have to disregard their demand for federalism." Editorial, "State Religion Bill," The Guardian, August 19, 1961.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

is impossible to avoid the conclusion that in Burma it became a divisive, disruptive issue which did consider­ able damage to the fabric of national unity. Governmental promotion of religion may help to unify the majority, although even this is not a certainty, but the alienation of the minorities and the creation of communal conflict are clearly predictable consequences. In the final analysis, the pluralist societies of South and Southeast Asia can achieve national integration only through the develop­ ment of a general concept of citizenship and territorial nationalism. There is little in the experience of inde­ pendent Burma to suggest that indigenous religion is capable of providing a sound alternative to the slow process of nation-building along the lines of these im­ ported concepts. RELIGION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Rapid economic growth has been one of the major objec­ tives of the Burmese government since independence. During much of this period the government also devoted considerable energy and resources to promoting the re­ vival of Buddhism and propagating its teachings among the people. The important question which must be raised here is whether economic development and religious revival in Burma were compatible, conflicting, or totally unrelated goals. Religious values can not only be compatible with rapid economic growth but can indeed provide the dynamic motivation necessary to stimulate and sustain such growth. In this connection one has only to recall Max Weber's famous thesis on the intimate relationship be­ tween the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Calvinist theology rejected the medieval religious atti­ tudes toward work, business, and the profit motive. According to the new doctrine: "Labor is not merely an economic means; it is a spiritual end. Covetousness, if

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

a danger to the soul, is a less formidable menace than sloth. So far from poverty being meritorious, it is a duty to choose the more profitable occupation. So far from there being an inevitable conflict between money-making and piety, they are natural allies, for the virtues incum­ bent on the elect—diligence, thrift, sobriety, prudence— are the most reliable passport to commercial prosperity. Thus the pursuit of riches, which once had been feared as the enemy of religion, was now welcomed as its ally."17 Does Buddhism contain other values which can per­ form a similar function in the economic development of present-day Burma? No serious observer has claimed to see such values, but many have noted the "complex set of traditional attitudes, values, behavior patterns and social relations which are, for the most part, not con­ ducive but are even inimical to economic development."18 Buddhism emphasizes giving and deprecates the accumu­ lation of wealth. The devout Buddhist gives daily alms to the monks, contributes to the building of pagodas and monasteries, and affixes gold leaf to Buddha images and pagoda spires, thus substantially reducing the resources available for savings and investment. Recruitment to the Sangha reduces the manpower available for productive work. The Buddhist precept against the taking of life is followed without regard for its adverse economic consequences.19 According to Buddhist doctrine, the cause of one's involvement in the unending cycle of rebirth is desire, which must be rooted out if one is to attain liberation. Detachment from and ultimate renunciation of the world, epitomized most clearly in the monkhood, is the highest 17 R. H. Tawney, "Foreword," in Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1930, p. 3. 18 Louis J. Walinsky, Economic Development in Burma 19511960, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1962, p. xxv. 19 Ibid., pp. 389-394.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

value for the Theravada Buddhist, for this path alone leads to nibbana. There are, of course, intermediate steps which may be taken over several existences; wealth, explained as the result of merit, may be spent to feed monks or build pagodas, and by such deeds one earns additional merit for the next existence. But the desire for wealth, as a means of merit-making, does not appear to be a significant economic motive. "Merit is a value . . . by which people explain what happens in life, including poverty and wealth, illness and health, misery and happi­ ness, rather than a value which serves as an incentive for systematic, rational efforts to accumulate more wealth for capital investment."20 It is abundantly clear that economic growth and Bud­ dhist revival were conflicting governmental objectives. Success in one area would inevitably tend to undermine efforts in the other. Economic development in Burma can take place only as part of a broad pattern of social and cultural change in which basic values become increas­ ingly secular. This fact has been grasped by the Revolu­ tionary Council which came to power in 1962. Whether its secular socialist ideology will be powerful enough to produce the needed revolutionary transformation of pop­ ular attitudes and values is very doubtful, but the regime has at least recognized the fundamental nature of the problem. STATE PROMOTION OF RELIGION

The Burmese government's deep involvement in religious affairs and its elaborate program for the promotion of Buddhism raise a question of considerable importance. 20 David E. Pfanner and Jasper Ingersoll, "Theravada Buddhism and Village Economic Behavior: A Burmese and Thai Compari­ son," Journal of Asian Studies, 1962, vol. 21, p. 356. See also Mya Maung, "Cultural Value and Economic Change in Burma," Asian Survey, 1964, vol. 4, pp. 757-764.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

To what extent is government capable of advancing the cause of religion or the spiritual welfare of people? What are the inherent limitations of government when it seeks to function in the spiritual realm? Historically, one of the reasons for the separation of church and state in the West was the recognition of the fact that no government could ascertain with complete certainty what the truth was with respect to differing religious doctrines. To most men in the modern world this still seems a compelling argu­ ment. However, assuming for the moment the objective truth and validity of the Buddhist teaching, we must ask how effective the government of Burma has been in pro­ moting the "prosperity of religion." Under U Nu's leadership the government built pa­ godas, convened the Sixth Great Buddhist Council, pub­ lished a new edition of the Tripitaka, and carried out other similar projects successfully. The over-all effect of such religious activities was to raise the prestige of Buddhism considerably, and undoubtedly some people became more devout by emulating their prime minister and other leaders. The religious revival was genuine among some members of the westernized elite; they also reaffirmed their Burmese identity by renewed faith in Buddhism. The government-sponsored religious revival failed to raise the moral tone of Burmese political life, failed to lower the alarmingly high crime rate, failed to reduce corruption in administration, failed to reduce group con­ flicts and secure social justice. It would be unnecessary to mention these points except for the fact that U Nu fully expected that the panacea of Buddhism would be quite adequate to solve these problems. The revival of Buddhism was both nationalistic and pietistic. The simple assumption was that pious individuals would ultimately produce the good society. There was no awareness of the complexities and difficulties involved in forging a mean-

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

ingful social ethic out of the individualistic precepts of the Buddha. Unlike the Burmese kings of old, U Nu's government made no attempt to "purify" the Buddhist religion of beliefs and practices deemed incompatible with ortho­ doxy. Elements of traditional popular religion which many Buddhist scholars regard as superstitious accre­ tions—nat worship, the veneration of relics, astrology— were not only tolerated but positively encouraged. U Nu made little effort to adjust Buddhism to the modern world, although this was obviously needed. Possibly he sensed the unity and cohesiveness of traditional ideas and values. He sought legitimacy for his political leader­ ship by associating it with this unbroken network of tradition. To reject part of this network of tradition would be to weaken the source of legitimacy. But the failure to do so was also, in terms of the challenges of the mod­ ern world, a disservice to Buddhism. Buddhism today is faced by serious problems of in­ ternal organization. Under the conditions of modern life, religion can function effectively only if organized coher­ ently so that it can transmit its teachings to each new generation, protect its collective interests, and exert its moral influence on society and government. In Buddhism the laity is not organized into effective local units, the problem of indiscipline within the Sangha is very serious, and there is only the most tenuous connection between the laity and the Sangha. The Buddha Sasana Council and the Ecclesiastical Courts Act were sincere attempts by the government to meet this problem, but it cannot be claimed that they were successful. Governmental ef­ forts to reform the Sangha have been dismal failures, partly because of the monks' own political power. Auto­ cratic kings in old Burma could take drastic steps to purify the Sangha, but not politicians functioning within a democratic setup.

DILEMMAS OF RELIGION AND POLITICS

In Burma, the government's efforts to strengthen, pro­ mote, and advance the cause of religion were successful only at a relatively superficial level. The fundamental problems of Buddhism remain unsolved. It is likely that a more effective government could have done a better job of dealing with these problems, but no government is really equipped to do well.

APPENDIX 1

THE CONSTITUTION ( THIRD AMENDMENT) ACT,

1961 IT IS hereby enacted as follows: 1. (1) This Act may be called the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1961. (2) It shall come into force on such date as the President may, by notification, appoint. 2. In section 21 of the Constitution— (a) for subsection (1) the following shall be substituted as subsection (1), namely:— "(1) Buddhism being the religion professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union shall be the State religion"; and (b) after subsection (4) the following shall be inserted as subsection (5), namely:— "(5) The Union Government shall render financial aid amounting to a minimum equal to .50 per cent of its annual current expenditure for matters con­ nected with religions. "Explanation.—'Religions' means Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Ani­ mism mentioned in sub-sections (1) and (2) of this section." 3. After section 21 of the Constitution, the following shall be inserted as sections 21A, 21B, 21C, and 21D, namely:— "21A. Buddhism being the State religion of the Union, the Union Government shall—

APPENDIX 1

(a) promote and maintain Buddhism for its welfare and advancement in its three aspects, namely, pariyatti sasana (study of the Teachings of the Buddha), patipatti sasana (practice of the Teachings), and pativedha sasana (enlightenment); (b) honour the Tiratana, namely, the Bud­ dha, Dhamma and Sangha; (c) protect the said religion in its three as­ pects and the Tiratana from all dangers including insult and false representation, made by words, either spoken or writ­ ten, or by other means. "Explanation.—cSangharatana' means the religious Order of the Bhikkhus (monks) not indi­ vidually but collectively as a whole irre­ spective of sects. "21B . The Union Government shall— (a) Properly maintain and preserve the Tripitaka Pali Texts, the Commentaries and Sub-commentaries thereof, as re­ examined and recited at the Sixth Great Buddhist Council; (b) grant permission for printing the said Pali Texts, Commentaries and Subcommentaries within the Union only to those who comply with such conditions as may be prescribed, in order that there may be no errors in printing the same. "21c. The Union Government shall properly main­ tain the epigraphs of the Tripitaka Pali Texts recited at the Fifth Great Buddhist Council, situated within the precincts of Mahaloka Marajina Pagoda near the foot of the MandaIay Hill, and the epigraphs of the Commen-

APPENDIX 1

taries and Sub-commentaries of Tripitaka situated within the precincts of Candamuni Pagoda nearby. "21D . The Union Government shall convene a meeting of the following Sayadaws at least once a year and submit to the said meeting a report on the measures taken for the State religion and shall hear the observations, ad­ vice and instructions made by the Sayadaws in connection with the measures taken:— (a) Abhidhajamaharatthaguru Sayadaws, (b) Aggamahapandita Sayadaws, (c) Union Ovadacariya Sayadaws, and (d) The Union Vinayadhara Sayadaws." 4. After section 43 of the Constitution, the following shall be inserted as sections 43A and 43B, namely:— "43A. The State shall give assistance and aid in the restoration of those ancient pagodas which were built by the kings of old and famous in the Buddhist history as enshrining any relics of the Buddha, and which may have fallen into ruin on account of wars, insurrections, earthquakes, or other calamities. "43B . The State shall have hospitals provided for the Sangha throughout the Union. In order that there may be no contravention of the Rules of Vinaya, such hospitals shall not be housed under the same roof and within the same walls with the hospitals provided for the laity but shall be such as are permissible to the monks. Such attention and food as are not inconsistent with the Rules of Vinaya shall be given to the monks in the said hos­ pitals."

APPENDIX 2 THE STATE RELIGION PROMOTION ACT,

1961 I T I S hereby enacted as follows: 1. (1) This Act may be called the State Religion Pro­ motion Act, 1961. (2) It shall come into force on such date as the President may, by notification, appoint. 2. (1) Buddhist Scriptures shall be taught to Buddhist students in all the State schools within the Union. (2) In all the State schools within the Union— (a) examinations in Buddhist Scriptures shall be held for Buddhist students; ( b ) certificates shall be granted to successful candidates in the said examinations; (c) prizes shall be awarded to those who have passed the said examinations with distinc­ tion. Explanation.—The purpose of holding the ex­ amination under this section shall be to grant pass certificates to those who are successful, but not to bar those who fail in the said examination from promotion. 3. In all the Universities and their constituent Colleges within the Union, if there is a sufficient number of students who are desirous of studying Buddhist Scriptures as a subject for examination they shall be allowed to do so in the same way as they are allowed to study other subjects for the same purpose. 4. The Government or Boards, Municipalities or other

APPENDIX

2

local authorities shall grant, in accordance with the rules made by the President in this behalf, those members of their services, who have made actual preparations to appear for any examination of Bud­ dhist Scriptures to be held by any organization constituted by an Act, such as the Union Buddha Sasana Council, Pali Education Board, or Pali Uni­ versity Central Council, such leave as is admissible to them under the law for the time being in force, for the days on which the examination is held and for such days as are actually required for the journey to and from the nearest place where the examination is held. 5. (1) In all State Teachers' Training Schools and Teachers' Training Colleges, Buddhist Scrip­ tures shall be taught as a subject in order to enable students to teach the said Buddhist Scriptures. (2) This subject shall be compulsory for the persons who are Buddhists, and optional for the persons who are non-Buddhists, undergoing teachership training. Explanation.—The teaching of this subject un­ der this section is to grant pass certificates to those who pass in the said subject but the failure to pass therein shall not be a bar to promotion. 6. In cases where it is proposed to open new State primary schools, preference shall be given for the purpose to those monasteries which can provide suitable and adequate accommodation, and where a sufficient number of pupils is available, and the pre­ siding monk is willing to accept the conditions laid down by the Government. 7. The State Broadcasting Service shall broadcast on Buddhism for at least one hour either continuously or at different periods on Uposatha (Sabbath) days.

APPENDIX

2

8. The Government shall have classes opened in prisons to enable prisoners to learn Buddhist Scriptures. 9. The Government or Boards, Municipalities or other local authorities shall— ( a ) close their offices w i t h i n t h e U n i o n o n U p o satha (Sabbath) days. ( b ) close t h e i r schools also o n U p o s a t h a ( S a b ­ bath) days. Provided that the President may from time to time, by notification, direct any other day to be a holiday in any office, if he is satisfied that because of the nature of business in such office it is inexpedient to close such office on Uposatha days. 10. (1) All ordinary shops licensed by the Government to sell toddy, fermented or distilled liquor or foreign liquor shall be closed on Uposatha days. ( 2 ) N o liquor shall b e sold o r served i n restaurants on Uposatha days. ( 3 ) I n a n y h o t e l n o liquor shall b e sold o r served on Uposatha days in rooms open to the public except that it may be sold or served in lodging rooms. 11. All State public libraries shall be provided with a complete set of Tripitaka Pali Texts, the Commen­ taries, Sub-commentaries and Burmese translations thereof and other suitable Buddhist literature. 12. (1) If there is a sufficient number of students who are desirous of studying Pali in all the State schools within the Union, arrangements shall be made in order to enable them to take Pali like other subjects beginning from the eighth stand­ ard and to provide a sufficient number of teach­ ers for the said students. ( 2 ) I t shall b e o p e n t o a n y s t u d e n t t o t a k e Pali a s a subject for all matriculation examinations held within the Union.

APPENDIX

2

(3) In selecting candidates for appointment to any post, whether by competitive examination or otherwise, the Public Service Commission shall give the same value to Pali as to other subjects. (1) For the purpose of ensuring compliance with any provision of this Act or any order made thereunder, the President may issue instructions to any authority. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the gen­ erality of the foregoing power, such instructions may provide for the following matters: (a) installation of an image of the Buddha in a place easily accessible to the public for worship, either in a separate shrine room or in a separate Dhammarama in every Court building or group of Court buildings; (b) arrangement to be made in all State schools for the Buddhist teachers and students to pay their homage to the Buddha, to recite Buddhist Scriptures and to hear sermons on the teachings of the Buddha; (c) closing of the Government shops, the Mu­ nicipal bazaars and the bazaars belonging to other local authorities on Uposatha days; (d) provision for the teaching staff and students in all State schools, Universities and their constituent Colleges with reading rooms; (e) provision of such reading rooms with Bud­ dhist Scriptures, periodicals and papers; (f) assistance to be given by the Government to such public libraries within the Union as require assistance for providing them­ selves with the Tripitaka Pali Texts, the Commentaries, Sub-commentaries and the Burmese translation thereof.

INDEX Abhi-Dhaja-Maha-Rattha-Guru, 226, 331 Abhidhamma, 153, 228 Agga Maha Pandita, 159, 226, 302, 331 Alaungpaya, 30, 35 Alaungsithu, 25 Aletawya Sayadaw, 104 All Burma Sangha Council, 100 All Burma Sangha Party, 204 Amarapura, 170 Ananda pagoda, 170 anatta, 4, 55, 146 Anawrahta, 3, 12-14, 24, 26, 82, 232, 309 Ancient Monuments Preserva­ tion Act, 299 Anglicans, 80, 245, 248 Anglo-Burman Wars, 39 anicca, 4, 55 animism, 12-14, 24, 107, 126, 145, 154-55, 166, 172, 184, 231, 244-45, 250-51, 253, 284-85, 296, 319, 322, 329 Anti-Boycott Bill, 104 Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), founding of, 116, 119, 203; Marxist in­ fluence, 116, 119, 125, 12728, 130-31, 149, 223; promo­ tion of Buddhism, 121, 149, 160, 183; and Young Monks Association, 180-81, 190-91, 257-58, 302-03; 1958 split, 190, 234-35, 248, 302-03; after 1960 election, 195, 233, 257-58, 287; opposed by monks, 199, 204, 223; and drafting of Constitution, 23031; and state religion, 233, 257-58, 287. See also Clean AFPFL, Stable AFPFL, Union Party, Pyidaugsu Party Anuradhapura, 169 aparihaniya, 173

apyodaw, 175 arahants, 216 Arakan National Unity Organi­ zation, 199 Arakan Thawthuyana Associa­ tion, 191, 195, 198, 203, 223, 233 Arakanese, 23, 33, 35, 198, 25152, 321-22 Arakanese Muslim Association, 248 Aris, 12-13, 28 Ashoka, 8-9 Asia Foundation, 189 Asia Socialist Conference, 129 Association for the Prevention of Crime, 191, 209-10 astrology, 23, 24, 27, 121, 145, 171, 327 Aung Gyaw, 54 Aung Gyi, 282 Aung San, on secular state, vii, 140-41, 230-31, 266, 281; on nationalism, 115, 118-19, 252; definition of nation, 115-16; and ethnic minorities, 251; assassination, 302 avici, 142, 184 Ba Choe, 230-31 Badgley, John, 286 Bagyidaw, 33 Bahosi, 303-04 Ba Maw, 290 Banaras Hindu University, 156 Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D., 141, 191-92, 310 Bandoola U Sein, 155, 221 Bapat, P. V., 187 Ba Pe, 204 Baptists, 51, 80, 248-49, 251 Barnes, Sir Hugh, 50 Barzin, Archbishop, 248 Ba Saw, 121 Ba Swe, on Marxist dogmatism,

INDEX

127; on Marxism and Bud­ dhism, 128-29, 132; on com­ munist imperialism, 130; acts of piety, 138, 167, 240; sup­ ported by Young Monks Asso­ ciation, 190, 302-03; opposi­ tion to state religion, 238, 257 Ba Than, 296 Ba Tin, 285 Bayinnaung, 24-25, 33, 36 Bentinck, Lord William, 71 Bernard, Sir Charles, 46 Bhabra Rock Edict, 9 Bhagavad Gita, 86 bhalita, 173 bhikkhus, 254, 330. See also Sangha Bigelow, Lee S., 236 Bishop of Calcutta, 78-79 Bishop of Rangoon, 78-79, 24546 Bodawpaya, 23-24, 27-28, 30, 35 Bodhisativa, 22 Bohmu Aung, 272 Botataung pagoda, 168, 170 Bo trees, 166 boycott, 102-05, 107 Brahmans, 7-8, 18, 20-21, 23, 107 Brohm, John F., 14, 18, 32, 124, 153, 156, 165-66, 173, 189, 209, 225 Brown, D. Mackenzie, 20 Buddha, life and teachings, 4-5, 259; as leader of Sangha, 6, 186, 216, 276; and shinbyu ceremony, 19; future Buddha, 22-23, 83, 138, 314-15; the Embryo Buddha, 97; insult to, 109; compared with Marx, 126-27, 150; relics of, 152, 168-69; anniversary of death, 158, 160; fabled visit to Burma, 162; Hindu view of, 249. See also Buddhism Buddhaghosa, 22

Buddha Jayanti, 163-64, 258 Buddharakkhita, 191-92 Buddha Sasana Council, 137, 183, 198, 228; creation of, 38, 117, 126, 148-52, 327; func­ tions of, 152-59, 168-69, 255, 333; abolished by Revolution­ ary Council, 285 Buddhism, Theravada and Mahayana, 3-4; origin, 4-5; as re­ ligion of individual salvation, 4-7; as religion of socio-political involvement, 7-11; evo­ lution in Burma, 12-20; and king in Old Burma, 20-31. See also Buddha, Buddha Sasana Council, Religious Af­ fairs Ministry, Sangha, state religion, Third Amendment Buddhist Democratic Party, 235 Buddhist Religious Instruction Committee, 75 Burma Christian Council, 248, 259, 261 Burma Economic Development Corporation, 295 Burma Muslim Congress, 260 Burma Muslim Organization, 248, 260 Burma Nationalist Party, 256 Burmanization, 154, 245, 322 Burma Reform Act, 102 Burma Socialist Program Party, 289-94 Burma Translation Society, 295 Burma Workers and Peasants Party, 127 Butwell, Richard, 131, 133, 141, 236, 281, 316 Cady, John F., 17, 23, 46-47, 51, 59, 72, 78, 85, 90, 95, 101, 106-07, 126-27, 314, 321 cakkavattin, 22 caliphate, 82 Cambodia, 3, 11, 161, 163 Candamuni pagoda, 331

INDEX

capitalism, 119, 132, 316, 323 caste, 43, 82 Ceylon, 3, 9, 11, 13, 28-29, 33, 83, 88, 137, 147, 153, 161, 163, 168-69, 191, 310, 320 Chamber of Deputies, 143, 193, 243, 254, 261, 263, 266-67, 271, 274 Chamber of Nationalities, 26667, 274, 276 Chan Htoon, 136-37, 148-49, 153, 243, 285 Chettyars, 109 China, 3 Chinese, 82, 155, 169 Chins, 154, 250-52, 262, 267 Chit Maung, 201 Christianity, 77, 123, 126, 141, 154, 179, 181, 231, 253, 271, 285, 309-10, 329 Christian, John L., 80 Christians, 41, 74, 78-80, 88, 114, 124, 181, 234, 244-45, 249-50, 255, 260, 262, 322 Church Missionary Society, 79 Church of England, 78-79 Cinematographic Act, 295 Clean AFPFL, 136, 139, 175, 236-37, 241, 243, 246, 316 Committee of Nine, 222 communalism, 111-14, 180, 183, 205, 277-78, 313 communism, viii, 109, 120, 131, 135-36,140, 148-49,189, 199, 205, 241, 312. See also Marx­ ism, socialism communists, 116, 125, 128, 13436, 142, 147, 197-98, 20003, 229, 240-42, 267 Conjeeveram, 12 conscience clause, 77-78, 271 Constitution of Burma, and abuse of religion for political purposes, 139, 237, 239, 262, 313; recognition of animism, 155; state religion amend­ ment, 180,183, 237, 239, 241,

245, 248, 253-54, 256-57, 261-63, 268-69, 285, 287, 322, 329-31; and religious instruc­ tion, 182; and voting by monks, 193; Fourth Amend­ ment, 196, 269-70, 276; its drafting, 230-31; Chin Affairs Council, 250; and federalism proposal, 282 coronation, 10, 14, 21 coup d'itat, 117, 139, 167, 17071, 224, 281-84, 287, 298-99, 302, 312, 319 Covernton, J. G., 72-73 cow slaughter, 284 Craddock, Sir Reginald, 101 Crosthwaite, Sir Charles, 46 Dagon Mon Sangha Association, 198 Dahatdaw pagoda, 209 Dalai Lama, 202 dana, 167 dar-ul-harb, 86 Daung Setkya, 171 democracy, and political influ­ ence of monks, 111-12, 138; and religious neutrality, 114, 239; and Buddhism, 118, 13640, 143, 236, 298; U Nu's commitment to, 121, 238; and Marxism, 128; and military regime, 283, 287, 303; and political legitimacy, 307-13 demonetization, 304-05 Devadat, 97 Devanampiya-Tissa, 9 devata-bali, 174-75 Dhamma, 6, 8-9, 11-12, 21, 23, 25, 58, 76, 113, 123, 125,148, 150-52, 176, 181, 186, 202, 214, 241, 253, 297, 330 Dhammaceti, 29 Dhamma-duta centers, 151, 156 Dhammantaraya, 133-34, 24142 Dhammathat, 18, 232

INDEX

dialectical materialism, 130, 134-35, 294 Dobama Asiayone, 115 dosa, 146 dukkha, 4, 55 Dutt, Sukumar, 6 Duttha-Gamani, 11 Duwa Lawang Li, 246 Duwa Zau Lawn, 262 Dvara sect, 161, 187, 218 East India Company, 40, 78 ecclesiastical courts, 117, 148, 159,198, 207, 214-15, 217-20, 305, 327 ecclesiastical organization, 8,1617, 38-39, 42-43, 45, 48, 327 economic development, 307-08, 314, 323-25 Eightfold Noble Path, 5, 292 Eindawya pagoda, 54, 88 Eire, 233 Ekamsika, 30 elections, of 1922: 102-03; of 1951: 194; of 1956: 194, 232; of 1960: 135, 138-39, 142, 175, 235-43, 257, 287, 31415; to Sangha assembly, 216, 221, 223 Eliot, Charles, 12, 23, 28, 30 E Maung, 175, 271-72, 277-78, 280 examinations, 26, 153-54, 213, 228-29, 332 federalism, 251-52, 282, 321-22 Federation of Sanghas Organi­ zations, 280 Federation of Student Unions, 203, 229 Fielding-Hall, Harold, 95 Fifth Great Buddhist Council, 26, 157, 218, 254, 330 Finer, S. E., 313 Five Precepts, 6, 28, 85, 87, 101, 167, 238-39, 244, 284, 301

footwear controversy, 87-90,153 Ford Foundation, 153, 164 Foucar, E. C. V., 84 Four Noble Truths, 5, 134 Fourth Amendment, 196, 256, 269-77, 281-83, 299, 312, 322 Furnivall, J. S., 59, 65 Fytche, Albert, 16, 44-45 gaingdauk, 16 gainggyok, 16, 32, 43, 50 gaingok, 16, 32 galon, 108 ganadhara, 6 Gandhi, 95, 97, 101, 112 Gard, Richard A., 22, 187 Gaya, 168 General Council of Buddhist As­ sociations, 92 General Council of Burmese As­ sociations, 92, 94, 98, 102, 104, 106, 115 Gotama, 4, 6, 21, 108, 150. See also Buddha Gouger, Henry, 18 Government of Burma Act, 79 Great Sacred Cave, 160, 164 Guna Kara, 275 Gunewardene, R. S. S., 137 Hall, D. G. E., 3, 46, 67 Harvey, G. E., 12, 17, 21, 24, 28, 33-36, 45-46, 51 Heine-Geldem, Robert, 23 heresy, 10, 17, 27-28, 134, 177, 223 Hinayana Buddhism, 3 Hindu Central Board, 249 Hindu Mahasabha, 95 Hindu Mitra Mandal, 249 Hinduism, 4, 7-9, 12, 18, 20-22, 24, 40-41, 43, 82, 86, 108, 113, 126, 149, 154, 184, 231, 253, 284-85, 303, 329 Hindus, 11, 40, 42-43, 74, 97, 109, 111, 113-14, 234, 244-45, 249, 260

INDEX

Hlutdaw, 17, 27, 221 Holland, William L., 120 Home Rule, 102 Home Rule Party, 115 Hordern, P., 59 House of Representatives, 192 Hpe Aung, 164 Hsinbyushin, 28 Htin Aung, 14, 82, 172 Htoon Daily, 262 Humphreys, Christmas, 4, 11 Id, 196, 273 India, 7-9, 12, 39-40, 42-43, 59, 71-73, 82, 95, 102, 106-07, 109, 112, 124, 139, 156, 15960, 162, 168, 178, 184, 249, 308, 320 Indian National Congress, 95 Indian Penal Code, 99 individualism, 137, 145, 310 Indonesia, 82, 320 Ingersoll, Jasper, 325 insurrections, 120, 200-02, 21516, 232, 250, 281, 322 integration, national, 307, 32023 International Buddhist Univer­ sity, 164-65, 184 International Institute for Ad­ vanced Buddhistic Studies, 164-65 Islam, 43, 82, 86, 109, 126, 14849, 154, 179-81, 231, 253, 273, 285, 308, 329 Islamic Religious Affairs Coun­ cil, 247 Jainism, 7 Japan, 3 Jataka tales, 57, 97 Jennings, Ivor, 141 Johnson, John J., 313 Kaba Aye, 156, 159, 164-65, 168, 170, 174-75, 180, 237-38

Kachin Independence Army, 250, 281, 322 Kachins, 82, 154-55, 244, 24952, 262, 267, 284, 322 kamma, 4, 168, 291, 296. See also karma Kanakkatan, 15 Karens, 82, 154, 252, 262 karma, 4, 22, 199 Kathapa, 156 Kayahs, 252, 262, 321-22 Kaye, John William, 41 Kethaya, 189, 199, 301, 302 Kettaya, 88 Khilafat movement, 98 Khin Maung Gale, 214 Khrushchev, 301 Kin Myo Chit, 297 Kodaw Hmaing, 200-01 Koran, 223 Korea, 3, 126 Kuthala, 190, 303 kutho, 25, 103, 264, 315. See also merit Kuthodaw pagoda, 26 Kyauktawgyi pagoda, 170 kyaung, 47, 57, 59-60, 64, 73, 111, 178, 193, 197, 305. See also monastery kyaungtaik, 94, 188, 206 Kyaw Nyein, 138, 140, 190, 234, 236, 238, 240, 302-03 Kyaw Soe, 285 Kyaw Than, 160 Kyaw Thet, 123 Lahiri, Sisir Chandra, 51 Land Nationalization Act, 238 Laos, 3, 163 Launmadaw, 167 Leach, F. Burton, 208 Ledi Sayadaw, 88 legitimacy, political, vii-viii, 10, 20, 23, 140, 307-12, 320, 327 Le May, 11 Leninism, 119, 125, 127, 223

INDEX

Lipset, Seymour M., 308, 310 lobha, 146 Lord of the Great Mountain, 13-14 Lower Burma, 44-46, 51-53, 5859, 85, 176, 195, 279 Lun Law, 155 Machiavelli, 317-18 McKeon, Richard, 9 Mahaceti, 169 Mahadan Wun, 17, 53-55, 208 Mahakassappa, 15, 31 Mahaloka Marajina pagoda, 330 Mahamyatmuni pagoda, 24, 207, 299 mahaparinibbana, 158. See also nibbana Maha Sangha Association, 197, 221

Mahasangharaja, 15, 27 Maha Sangha Raja Association, 276 Mahathamaya Day, 174 Maha Thawthuyana Association, 178, 195, 203, 232. See also Arakan Thawthuyana Asso­ ciation mahathera, 159, 161. See also sayadaw Mahayana Buddhism, 3, 12-13, 22, 28, 149 Mahazedi pagoda, 170, 175 Mahinda, 9 Ma Kyan, 27 Malalasekera, G. P., 147 Malaysia, 320 Malwatte chapter, 163 Mandalay, 26, 44-46, 48, 52, 54, 60, 67, 88, 149, 157, 168, 171, 176, 180, 188-89, 191, 195, 197, 199, 207, 221, 229, 232-33, 242, 254, 259, 299301, 303-04, 330 Mangala Sutta, 154 Manikam, R. B., 124 Manu, 20

Mao Tse-tung, 301 Martin, Kingsley, 243 Marxism, and nationalism, 11820, 230; and Buddhism, 12536,149-50,185,199-201, 223, 241, 267, 298, 312; and Revo­ lutionary Council, 288-89, 294, 298 Maung Ba, 100 Maung Gyee, Sir Μ. A., 235 Maung Kin, 53 Maung Maung, 116, 118, 192, 231, 294 Maung Maung Su, 64 Mayo, H. B., 310 Member of Parliament, 193, 196, 199, 254, 257, 259, 26263, 266-68, 272, 275-77 Mendelson, E. Michael, 147, 172 merit, 165-68, 170, 174, 225, 264, 272, 315, 325. See also kutho Meru, Mount, 23 metta, 147 Metta Sutta, 259 Middle Way, 310 Mindon, 22, 26, 30, 157, 232, 318 minorities, ethnic, 198-99, 239, 251-52, 321-22. See also Arakanese, Chins, Kachins, Kar­ ens, Mons, Shans minorities, religious, 179, 181, 196, 231, 233-34, 239, 24446, 251, 255-56, 259-60, 264, 267, 269-70, 274, 277, 281, 312, 322. See also Christians, Hindus, Muslims missionaries, 41, 51, 76, 96, 150, 154-57, 240 modernization, 38, 313, 320 Mogaung Sayadaw, 49 Moggalana, 159, 168 moha, 146 monastery, 11, 16, 18-19, 25, 27, 31, 36, 57, 59, 63, 94, 111, 142, 154, 157, 177-78,

INDEX

182, 188, 190, 195, 197, 202, 207, 210-11, 213, 217, 220, 226-27, 240, 255, 278, 297, 301, 317, 333. See also kyaung monastic school, 39, 57-66, 76, 80, 91 monks, see Sangha Mon Maha Sangha Maggi As­ sociation, 221 Mons, 12-13, 23, 26, 33, 35, 66, 82, 191, 196, 198, 221, 251-52, 321-22 Mon Sangha Association, 191 Mootham, O. H., 47 Morgan, Kenneth W., 5 Moulmein, 196 Moulvi Association, 247 Mughal emperor, 43 Mujahids, 199 Muslim Central Fund Trust, 248 Muslims, 74, 197; British policy in India, 40, 43; and Burmese nationalism, 97, 109-14; antiMuslim riots, 109-14, 277-79, 282, 322; and religious in­ struction, 179-82; and cow slaughter, 196, 284; Mujahids, 199; and state religion, 234, 237, 244-48, 251, 255, 260, 262; and Fourth Amendment, 271, 273; and creation of Pakistan, 308 Muslim Students' Union, 248 Mya, 116 Mya Maung, 325 Myanma Lanzin, 209 Myathabeik pagoda, 142 Mya Than, 303 Myaungmya, 217 Myitkyina, 155, 245, 249 naga (snake) 108 Nagai, Makoto, 123 Nagas, 154-55 nama, 290 Nandiya, 197

Narada Sayadaw, 124 Narapatisithu, 29 Narathu, 34 nationalism, and Buddhism, 11, 38, 75, 81-114; role of monks in Burmese nationalism, 52, 55-56, 69, 88, 91-112, 11418, 190; analysis of, 81, 11821; traditional nationalism, 81-85, 107, 112, 118-23; and communalism, 112-14; secular nationalism, 114-16, 118-20, 252; Aung San's concept, 11516, 252; and Marxism, 116, 118-20, 230; and national in­ tegration, 282, 320-23 National Registration Act, 216 National Religious Minorities Alliance, 251, 260 National United Front ( NUF), 191, 236, 240-41, 243, 258, 259 nats, 12-14, 28, 108, 121, 144, 167, 172-77, 184-85, 263, 282-83, 296-97, 319, 327 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 184 Nepal, 4, 156 Ne Win, 1962 coup, vii, 117, 139, 167, 171, 177, 217, 224, 269, 281, 311; nationalist leader, 116; caretaker govern­ ment, 133, 135-36, 174, 201, 216, 220, 223, 235-36, 241, 284; anti-communist cam­ paign, 133, 135-36, 201, 241; on state religion issue, 252-53; secular outlook, 288; against nat worship, 296-97; relations with Sangha, 299-303, 30506; efforts at modernization, 313 Nga Paw U, 174-75 nibbana, 4-7, 25, 43, 132-34, 157-58, 172, 187, 193, 223, 266, 291, 315, 317, 325. See also Nirvana Nikam, Ν. A., 9

INDEX Nikayas, 159 Nirvana, 4, 84, 86, 96-97, 292, 308. See also nibbana Nu, and state religion, 25-26, 117, 135, 233-34, 237-38, 242-43, 245-46, 253, 256, 259-62, 267-68, 281, 287; and 1960 elections, 117, 235-38, 242-43; and Buddhist-oriented nationalism, 121; and religious revival, 124-25, 138, 144-46, 183-85, 282, 285, 326-27; on Buddhism and Marxism, 12627, 130-33; personal religi­ osity, 140-48, 184-85, 225, 236, 288, 291, 313-20; and Buddha Sasana Council, 149, 156; and Buddhist missionary work, 156-57; and Sixth Great Buddhist Council, 157-65; and pagoda-building, 170-71; and not worship, 173, 175-76, 296; and religious instruction, 179-82, 193-94; influence of monks, 181-83, 193-94, 280; and Presiding Monks Associa­ tion, 190; opposed by monks, 195-96, 204, 258, 274, 27679; on communist use of monks, 200; on Sangha re­ form, 205-06, 208, 217, 22324, 229, 305; resignation from premiership, 234; and reli­ gious minorities, 245-46, 248, 256, 259-60, 262, 269-70, 322; and ethnic minorities, 252, 321-22; and Fourth Amendment, 269-70, 274-75, 276-77, 299, 312; and cow slaughter, 284; and political legitimacy, 308-09, 312; as political leader, 313-20 numerology, 23 Nyaungyan Sayadaw, 163, 180 okasaloka, 290

ordination, 19, 28-29, 56-57, 67, 79, 164, 212-13, 215 Ottama, 92, 95-99, 102-03, 106, 112, 118, 121, 191, 303-04 Ovadacartya Sayadaws, 150, 331 Oway, 208 Pagan, 12-15, 30, 34, 82-83, 169-71 pagodas, 18-20, 22, 24, 27, 38, 41, 54, 57, 87-89, 99, 105, 134, 144, 152-53, 159-60, 165-67,169-71,184, 237, 244, 254, 259, 276, 282, 299, 300, 303, 305, 309, 318-19, 32426, 331 Pakan Sayadaw, 49 Pakistan, 139, 308, 320 Pakokku Sayadaw, 222 Pali, 9, 11, 13, 15, 18, 22, 2526, 57, 62, 66-69, 71-73, 83, 117, 144, 154, 156, 160, 163, 165, 187, 190, 217-18, 224, 226-29, 253-55, 290, 305, 330, 334-35; Pali examinations, 6671, 80, 227-29; Pali Educa­ tional Board, 70, 117, 154, 227-28, 305, 333; Pali Uni­ versity, 70-71, 117, 126, 148, 226-27, 305, 333; Pali Text Society, 161 Panglong Conference, 251 Panthagu, 34 Paramats, 28 pariyatti sasana, 151, 253, 330 Parliament, 41, 78, 117, 146, 148-50, 161, 183, 193, 196, 238, 250, 257-58, 260, 263, 268, 275-76, 283, 287 Parupana-Ekamsika controver­ sy, 30 Passin, Herbert, 184 Patamabyan examinations, 6769, 154. See also Pali patamagyaw, 68 patamagyi, 68, 227 patamalat, 68, 227

INDEX

patamange, 68, 227 paticcasamuppada, 290 patipatti sasana, 151, 253, 330 pativedha sasana, 253, 333 Peace Sanghas, 203 Pegu, 35, 170, 175 Pe Maung Tin, 160, 169 Penal Code, 270 Pfanner, David E., 325 Phayre, Sir Arthur, 58-59 Philippines, 82 Pitaka Bill, 161 pongyi kyaung, 39, 58, 64, 67, 178, 255. See also monastery pongyis, see Sangha Popa, Mount, 13-14, 145, 172, 176, 277 Presiding Monks Association, 178, 190, 201-02, 219, 221, 235, 239, 259, 279, 299 primate, 12, 15-16, 18, 34, 4651, 53, 55, 57, 59, 91, 209, 217. See also thathanabaing, sangharaja Prince of Wales, 104 Printer and Publishers Registra­ tion Act, 294 Private Schools Registration Act, 295 Prome, 87 Protestants, 76, 246, 310. See also Anglicans, Baptists Protestant ethic, 323-24 Psychological Warfare Depart­ ment, 201, 302 Public Service Commission, 255, 335 Pye, Lucian W., 315, 318 Pyidaungsu Party, 193-95, 246. See also Union Party, Clean AFPFL

Pyidaungsu Sangha Association, 193-95 Rahula, Walpola, 10 Rajagaha, 160 Rajarsi, 147

Rangoon, 46, 56, 78, 87, 89-90, 98, 104-05, 109-10, 121, 124, 145, 157, 162, 170, 176, 18889, 196, 199-200, 208, 210, 220-21, 228-30, 232, 259, 261, 282, 284, 296, 301, 304, 321 Rangoon University, 196, 203, 299 Raschid, 237, 248, 260, 267, 271, 278 Ray, Niharranjan, 12, 26, 29-30, 35 rebirth, see samsara relics, 8, 11, 13, 24, 27, 134, 144, 152, 159, 165, 168-69, 327, 331 Religious Affairs Ministry, 38, 121, 180; speeches by minis­ ter, 146, 149, 151-52; func­ tions of, 148, 155, 158, 168, 170-71, 173, 175-77; U Nus role in, 183; and Presiding Monks Association, 190; and Sangha reform, 210, 217-21, 223-24; under Revolutionary Council, 285-86, 305 religious instruction, 40, 65, 7178, 80, 270-71 religious neutrality, 40-42, 50, 71, 75, 78, 80, 89, 114 Republican Party, 232 Revolutionary Council, 269, 325; policies concerning Bud­ dhism, 281-87; secularist phi­ losophy, 288-94; policy con­ cerning culture, 294-95; pol­ icy on nat worship, 296-97; relations with Sangha, 297306 riots, 110-12, 206-09, 260, 27779 Roberts, Sir Frederick, 46, 67 Roman Catholic Church, 76, 80, 232, 246, 248, 310 Rose, Saul, 126 rupa, 290

INDEX

sabbath, 148, 162, 255, 268, 283, 286, 333-34 sadhu, 99-100, 150, 300 Sagaing, 74 Sagaing Inbin Sayadaw, 235 Sakai, Robert K., 22, 133, 138, 264 samsara, 4, 25, 132, 135, 143, 168, 266, 291, 316 sanad, 50-53, 57 Sandoway, 229 Sangha, origin and early devel­ opment, 5-11; ecclesiastical organization, 8, 16-17, 38-39, 42-43, 45, 58, 217-24, 327; political functions in Ceylon, 10-11; reform of, 27-31, 112, 152, 166, 210-15, 217-24, 327; traditional political func­ tions, 31-37, 136; British pol­ icy regarding Sangha hier­ archy, 39, 43-57, 80; role in nationalist movement, 52, 5556, 69, 88, 91-112, 114-18; British policy regarding mo­ nastic schools, 57-66, 76, 80; British policy regarding San­ gha scholarship, 66-71, 80; as socialist society in miniature, 133; opposition to commu­ nism, 134, 199-202; political influence, 138, 180-83, 187205, 319-20; and Buddha Sasana Council, 150; missionary work, 154-55; and Sixth Great Buddhist Council, 159-65; and nat worship, 173-75, 177; decline of monastic school, 178-79; description of, 18687; Sangha assembly issue, 198, 211-12, 216, 220-24; in­ discipline of, 205-10, 277-81, 319-20; registration of, 21517; and ecclesiastical courts, 217-20; and Pali scholarship, 224-29; and state religion, 234, 243, 253-54, 257, 330;

and Fourth Amendment, 270, 272-77; and Revolutionary Council, 297-306; and eco­ nomic development, 324. See also sayadaws Sangha associations, analysis of, 188-91, 204-05 various associations; All Burma Sangha Council, 100; All Burma Sangha Party, 204; Arakan Thawthuyana Associ­ ation, 191,195,198, 203, 223, 233; Association for the Pre­ vention of Crime (Yayawuk Papyaukye Aphwe), 191, 209-10; Dagon Mon Sangha Association, 198; Federation of Sanghas Organizations, 208; Maha Sangha Associa­ tion, 197, 221; Maha Sangha Raja Association, 276; Maha Thawthuyana Association, 178, 195, 203, 232; Mon Maha Sangha Maggi Association, 221; Mon Sangha Association, 191; Peace Sanghas, 203; Pre­ siding Monks Association, 178, 190, 201-02, 219, 221, 235, 239, 259, 279, 299; Pyidaungsu Sangha Association, 19395; Sangha Front, 203, 242, 276; Sangha Sametggi Asso­ ciation, 55, 69, 99, 104, 106; Sangha Thu-tethana Associa­ tion, 196; Sangha United Front, 275; Sasana Puri­ fication Association (Sasana Thantshinye Aphwe), 191, 209-10, 216, 220; Union San­ gha League, 269, 272, 275; Yahan Nge Aphwe, 191, 195, 207, 232, 304; Yahanpyu Aphwe (Young Monks Asso­ ciation), 110, 135, 189-91, 199-200, 202-03, 207, 221-22, 257-58, 273, 302-04; Yamahatha Association, 203

INDEX

Sangha Front, 203, 242, 276 Sanghanayaka, 163, 211-12 Sangharaja, 15, 27, 163, 211. See also primate, thathanabaing Sangha Sametggi Association, 55, 69, 99, 104, 106 Sangha Thu-tethana Association, 196 Sangha United Front, 275 sankharaloka, 290 San Shar, 247 Sariputta, 159, 168 Sarkisyanz, Manuel, 22, 133, 264 sasana, 10, 15, 148, 150-51, 167 sasana dayaka, 114 Sasana Purification Association, 191, 209-10, 216, 220 Sasana Thantshinye Aphwe, 191, 209 Sasana Yeiktha, 153, 157, 183 sati, 40 sattaloka, 290 Sattapanni Cave, 160 Saw, 114 Saw Maung, 193 Saw Myint, 295, 300 sayadaws, in Sangha ecclesiasti­ cal structure, 16, 18, 25, 27, 47-49, 53-54, 67, 161; politi­ cal functions, 32-34, 167, 27879, 299; and PaU examina­ tions, 69; in nationalist move­ ment, 98, 121; and Buddha Sasana Council, 149; and ec­ clesiastical courts, 159, 21920; opinions on nat worship, 173-74, 177; on religious in­ struction in schools, 178-82; and Presiding Monks Associa­ tion, 190; and Sangha reform, 192, 206, 209, 214, 216, 221, 223, 229, 303-04; political in­ fluence, 193-94, 239, 254, 299, 331; opposition to com­ munism, 199; and peace ef­

forts, 200-01; and state re­ ligion, 233-35, 237, 242-44, 254, 259; under Revolution­ ary Council, 286, 299-304 Saya San, 107-08, 118, 121-22 secular state, vii, 116, 118, 13536, 182, 230-31, 239, 241, 250, 281, 288, 292, 307-08, 313 Sein, 155 Seinda, 198 Sen, N. C., 88 Senanayake, Dudley, 123 Separation League, 115 Shans, 18, 23, 25, 35, 82, 15455, 202, 251-52, 321-22 Shin Arahan, 12-13, 15 shinbyu, 19, 57 Shinsawbu, 35 Shwedagon pagoda, 24, 46, 90, 98, 103-04, 110, 134, 141, 167, 210, 222-23, 259, 273, 275, 321 Shwegyin sect, 161, 186, 218 Shwe Hpi, 109-10 Shwemawdaw pagoda, 170 shwe-pyathat, 16 Shwesandaw pagoda, 170 Shwe Thaike, 122, 251 Shtve Ton v. Tun Lin, 52 Shwezigon pagoda, 13-14, 170 Siam, 11, 28, 36, 88. See also Thailand Siam sect, 163 Silverstein, Josef, 251 Singu, 30 Sinhalese, 9-11, 24, 29, 33 Sithu Chit Myaing, 216 Sixth Great Buddhist Council, 26, 117, 123, 127, 138, 152, 179, 190, 198, 236, 330; prep­ arations for, 157-62; work of, 162-65; criticism of, 183; and Sangha reform, 220-21; and state religion, 232-33, 246, 264, 315 Sladen, Edward, 45

INDEX

Smeaton, D. M., 45 Smith, Donald E., 40, 71 Smith-Forbes, C. J. F., 44 Snodgrass, John James, 33 socialism, viii, 118, 121, 140, 287, 325; Marxist content in relation to Buddhism, 125-36, 311-12; Burmese Way to So­ cialism, 287-94, 296, 298; Sangha opposition to, 30002, 304-05; and U Nu's politi­ cal leadership, 316-17 Socialist Party, 127-28,131,149, 183, 190, 225, 283 Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 78 Society for the Propagation of Buddhism, 154 Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 79 Soe, Thakin, 134 soon, 175, 225, 237, 300 So Thein GCBA, 107 Sri Lanka Freedom Party, 191 Stable AFPFL, 136, 138, 236, 238-43, 246, 302 Stalin Peace Prize, 200 state religion, 8, 26, 83, 139, 176, 195, 198, 204, 230-35, 275, 277; and 1960 elections, 117, 135-36, 175, 194, 23543; State Religion Promotion Act, 183, 254-56, 268, 33235; State Religion Advisory Commission, 243-45, 260, 263; and Revolutionary Coun­ cil, 281-82, 287; and legiti­ macy 307-08; and national in­ tegration, 321-23. See also Third Amendment stupas, 8, 11 Sudaungpye pagoda, 145 Sule pagoda, 199, 210 Supreme Court, 136, 153, 166, 197, 218, 228, 262-63, 287 Supreme Patriarch, 211

Tagaung, 170 Tamils, 11, 13 Taungdaw Sayadaw, 49-50 Taunggwin Sayadaw, 57 Tawney, R. H., 324 Taw Sein Ko, 24, 26-27 Taxila, 178 Tazaungdaing festival, 167, 280 tekkatho, 178 Tet Pongyi, 208, 223 Te Zaniya, 191 Thailand, 3, 161, 163, 211-13, 222-23. See also Siam Thakins, 115-16, 118-19 Than Tun, 12, 15, 31, 119 Thant Zin, 235 Tharrawaddy, 108 Tharrawaddy U Pu, 102 thathanabaing, 15-17, 27, 34, 43-44, 46-52, 54-60, 62, 64, 67, 74, 91, 187 Thaton, 12-13, 26, 162 Thaung, 22, 34 Thawbita, 99 Thawda Swe, 296-97 Thayer, Philip W., 82, 137 thein, 101 Thein Maung, 70, 87-88, 153, 169, 220, 243, 285 Thein Pe, 131 Thein Pe Myint, 208 thera, 212-13. See also sayadaws Theravada Buddhism, vii, 3, 8, 11-14, 20, 28, 43, 66, 82, 123, 144, 148, 152, 157, 159, 165, 172-73, 177, 183, 186, 214, 218, 325 Thibaw, 3, 24-25, 45, 49, 84, 151, 235 Thingyan festival, 174 thinkhata dhat, 130 Third Amendment, 183, 270, 275, 322; recommended by commission, 243-45; reactions of religious minorities, 24550, 259-61; and ethnic minori­ ties, 250-52; description of

INDEX bill, 253-54, 256; and AFPFL, Uposatha, 333-35. See also sab­ 257, and Young Monks, bath 257-58; parliamentary debate, Upper Burma, 42, 45, 47, 49-51, 56, 59, 85, 90-91, 157, 162, 261-68; passed by Parlia­ ment, 268-69; and Revolu­ 176 tionary Council, 285; text of U Pyinnya v. U Ottama, 50, 56 U Te Za v. U Pyinnya, 18, 47amendment, 329-31 48 Thirty-Seven Nats, 175, 177 U Te Zeinda v. U Teza, 48 Thittila, 5 Thomson, John Seabury, 126-27 U Thanwaya v. U Kethaya, 49 Three Gems (Jewels), 15, 21, U Thatdama υ. U Meda, 49 94, 186, 225 Thudhamma sect, 47-48, 53,161 Vedas, 7 Victoria, Queen, 42 Thupannaka Galon Raja, 108 Thwin, 153 Vinasaya Courts, 217-219. See Tibet, 202 also ecclesiastical courts Tilak, B. G., 86 Vinaya, 6, 16-18, 28-31, 36, 52, Tiloka, 99 54-56, 69, 93, 98, 105, 133, Tin, 146, 198 138, 163, 187, 193, 212, 216, 218, 221, 225-26, 254, 266, Tinker, Hugh, 143, 153, 165-66, 218 304-05, 331 Tiratana, 253, 330 Vinayadhara Sayadaws, 218-19, 331 tooth relic, 10,13, 24, 169 totalitarianism, 137, 149, 294, vipassana, 157, 166 Vishnu, 249 310 Vittachi, Tarzie, 311 Totten, George O., 131-32 von der Mehden, Fred R., 46, Toungoo, 170 57, 82, 87, 95, 114-16, 133, Trager, Frank N., 19, 126, 281, 138, 201, 236, 289 315 Tri-Partite United Action Com­ Walinsky, Louis J., 324 mittee, 198 Tripitaka, 13, 18, 21, 26, 29, Wareru, 18 69, 153, 157, 163, 254-55, Weber, Max, 7, 309, 313, 32324 326, 330-31, 334-35 We Burmans Society, 115 Tryaphya, 15 Wells, Kenneth E., 211, 213 Tun Pe, 149, 183, 262 White, Herbert Thirkell, 44, 47 Win, 38, 146, 151-52, 173, 180, Ulama Association, 248 214 Union Party, 176, 246-47, 250, Win Mnung, 268-69, 276 252, 259, 263, 272, 277. See Wisara, 106, 121 also Pyidaungsu Party Wolfstone, Daniel, 253 Union Sangha League, 269, 272, Working People's Daily, 295 275 World Fellowship of Buddhists, Union Women's League, 259 147 United Nations, 126, 198 World Peace pagoda, 159, 170 United States, 126, 156 wutmye wun, 17

INDEX

Yahan Nge Aphwe, 191, 195, 207, 232, 304 Yahanpyu Aphwe, 189-91, 194, 199, 207, 217, 221, 302. See also Young Monks Association Yamahatha Association, 203 yaukkyar-natkadaw, 177 Yayawuk Papyaukye Aphwe, 191, 209-10 Yi Yi, 22 Young Men's Buddhist Associa­ tion, 53, 74, 86-87, 91-92, 103 Young Monks Association, and anti-Muslim riots, 110, 189; opposition to communism,

135, 189, 199-200, 202-03; and teaching of Islam, 18081; founding and organiza­ tion, 189-90; conflict with other Sangha groups, 190-91, 207; and Sangha assembly, 221-22; and Third Amend­ ment, 257-58; and Fourth Amendment, 273; and Ne Win government, 302-04 Zahre Lian, 250-51, 260 Zanhta Sin, 267 Zawtika, 189-90 Zerbadis, 113