Regional Security and Global Governance : A Study of Interaction Between Regional Agencies and the un Security Council with a Proposal for a Regional-Global Security Mechanism [1 ed.] 9789054874041

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Regional Security and Global Governance

“I believe we can develop a new vision of global security. A vision that respects human rights while confronting the threats of our age, including the threat of terrorism. A vision that draws upon the resources and legitimacy of a network of effective and mutually reinforcing multilateral mechanisms – regional and global – that are flexible and responsive to our rapidly changing and integrating world.” H. E. Kofi Annan Secretary-General of the United Nations July 2003

“The fact is, however, that the Council does not deal with all regional arrangements on the same footing. While the Council may give a particular regional organization an opportunity to assist in preventing or settling a crisis, it may ignore another regional organization in a similar situation. We believe that the proper functioning of the international collective security system in the coming years will require the Council’s efficient use of assistance by the regional organizations in addressing various crises.” H. E. Amr Moussa Secretary-General of the League of Arab States April 2003

Kennedy Graham & Tânia Felício

Regional Security and Global Governance A Study of Interaction Between Regional Agencies and the UN Security Council With A Proposal for a Regional-Global Security Mechanism

Institute for European Studies – publication series, nr. 5 The Institute for European Studies is a Jean Monnet Pole of Excellence. It promulgates European Studies in general, and studies of Globalisation, European and Comparative Law, Environment and Regional (European) Integration specifically. The IES is an education and research centre, carrying out research on various European issues, and responsible for the Programme on International Legal Cooperation (PILC), an advanced Masters programme leading to an internationally renown LL.M.

Cover design: Danni Elskens (Koloriet) Book design: Textware, Leuven @ 2006, VUB Brussels University Press Waversesteenweg 1077, 1160 Brussels, Belgium Fax: ++ 32 2 629 26 94 e-mail: [email protected] www.vubpress.be ISBN 90-5487-404-X NUR 828 D/2006/1885/03 All rights reserved. No parts of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Preface

All over the world, sovereign states co-operate with each other on many different issues such as trade, investment, water basins management, environmental protection, security issues and so on. Such an intensification of relations between countries can be referred to as regional integration. Although not new, regional integration has become a major phenomenon in recent years that challenges current views on global governance and global security. Within this context, regional security is commanding increased attention as a result of the experience in conflict resolution and management during the 1990s. The relationship between the UN Security Council, operating at the global level with its awesome powers of decision-making, and the regional and sub-regional agencies is proving to be increasingly critical to success in maintaining international peace and security. A better understanding of the issues at stake and the processes involved in streamlining that relationship can only advance our common understanding of how to proceed in the future. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter allows for regional agencies to play a role in maintaining peace and security in support of the Security Council. Today, with the growing importance of the regional arrangements and within the context of a shifting world order, (the end of world war, globalization, terrorism...) there seems to be pressing need for new thinking about the ‘architecture of peace and security’. Indeed, no issue before the world today has higher importance, both in a strategic and moral sense, than regional peace and security. Peace around the world, at the local level, the national level, the regional and finally the global level is inextricably associated with the achievement of the other overarching aspirations of humanity – sustainable development, environmental integrity, and political and cultural understanding of one another. Put simply, the Millennium Goals proclaimed at the UN Summit of 2000 cannot be attained without peace at all levels. 5

Preface This book is a deliverable of a research project on the relationship between regional security and global governance, conducted at the Comparative Regional Integration Studies Programme (UNU-CRIS) of the United Nations University. It reviews the development of the ‘architecture of peace’ over the past century and analyses the state of regional organizations with special attention to the current complexities and shortcomings. On the basis of the analytical work it then advances original and thought-provoking policy-proposals. The research for this book has been made possible thanks to the financial support of the Belgian Foreign Office and the Institute for European Studies (IES) at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. A first draft of the manuscript was discussed at an IES workshop ‘The Role of Regions in Global Security’ organised on 11 June, 2004. The views expressed in this book are advanced by the authors in their individual capacity and do not reflect policy positions of UNU-CRIS or the IES. On the occasion of the 2003 fifth high-level meeting between the UN and regional organizations the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his hope that the UN and regional organizations would be able to contribute together to a new vision of global security. The present study hopes to be able to contribute modestly to realizing this vision!

Prof. Dr. Luk Van Langenhove Director, UNU-CRIS

6

Prof. Dr. Bart De Schutter President, IES

Executive Summary

The role of regionalism in the maintenance of international peace and security has always been marked by uncertainty on the part of policy-makers. The two previous formative moments (Versailles, 1919; San Francisco, 1945) resulted in the primacy of the national-universal relationship – institutionalised in the direct interface between the nationstate and the United Nations. Regionalism took second place. During the first four decades of the UN era, bipolar divisions and the nuclear stand-off paralysed the Security Council, and peace was sought largely through extra-constitutional means outside the Charter. During this time the spread of sovereign nations around the planet and their increasing interdependence resulted in the growth of regional and sub-regional agencies and arrangements. The character of this early regionalism, however, was mostly confined to economic development and regional defence. In the post-Cold War era that interdependence has intensified with the process of globalisation. The 1990s has witnessed a ‘new regionalism’ that reflects a more complex skein of mutual interest through economic, social, cultural and political interaction among states, including the effective replacement of defence alliances with regional and cross-regional mechanisms of collective security. This trend, closer to the original purposes of the Charter, has been paralleled by an increasing recognition that the UN, as the central body for universal peace and security, lacks the resources, and on occasion the institutional will, to deal with all conflicts of every kind at all levels everywhere. The recognition that an effective ‘regional-global security mechanism’ is needed to ensure global stability and peace in the future is evident in the initiative by the UN Secretary-General to convene a series of meetings with regional organizations over the past decade. In recent years the Security Council has also 7

Executive Summary held meetings with regional organizations, and these are likely to be repeated in the future. A ‘third formative moment’ has thus opened up for strengthening the role of regionalism in peace and security. This comes at a fluid moment in international security thinking when many cardinal principles of the contemporary multilateral system are under strain. The high-level reports of 2004-5 on the millennium development goals, the relevance of the UN Charter and the need for UN reform provided the basis for the seminal decisions by the 60th UN General Assembly summit. These decisions will shape much of the international order for perhaps the next half-century. But the most critical aspect of all – the nature and role of the Security Council – remains unresolved. The rise of regionalism in that security mechanism is likely to play a significant role in this endeavour. Realising the opportunities at such a ‘formative moment’ will prove to be a challenging task. The concept of ‘region’ is elusive and complex. Regional and sub-regional agencies comprise a complicated institutional mosaic, with overlapping membership, ambiguities over their focal areas and different and occasionally competing mandates. Some organizations have ‘backed into’ a security function from an economic mandate without the constitutional authority or the conflict-prevention and management procedures or mechanisms appropriate for the task. Several have transgressed the strict provisions of the UN Charter by undertaking enforcement action without the advance authorisation of the Security Council. Some states, acting sub-regionally or through ad hoc coalitions, have extended the self-defence provisions of the Charter beyond the standard deviation. There is a need for greater clarity in the current ‘security regionalism’ for an effective partnership mechanism to be strengthened in accordance with the provisions of chapter VIII of the Charter. Organizations partnering with the UN should be distinguished, by their membership, mandates and focal areas, as regional or sub-regional agencies and cross-regional or trans-national organizations. Only regional and sub-regional organizations would act under Chapter VIII of the Charter. A future ‘regional-global security mechanism’, as called for by the Secretary-General, could rest on a structure that reflects the two fundamental prescriptive propositions in this book, namely: – A set of ‘security regions’, that would each have jurisdiction over a clearly-defined security zone, could be identified. 8

Executive Summary – A responsible regional agency could be identified for each ‘security region’ that would act within the meaning of Chapter VIII. Each ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ would have a dual representation and reporting function. Each agency could be responsible for the electoral mechanism to ensure permanent membership on the Security Council. It could also be responsible for reporting on all developments pertaining to peace and security within the ‘security region’. An executive role by each agency in pacific settlement could also be envisaged. This would not prevent the Security Council from utilising, in addition to these regional arrangements, other organizations (cross-regional and trans-national) in the executive roles of pacific settlement and enforcement under appropriate provisions elsewhere in the Charter (Chapters VI, VII and IX). These arrangements could be made without Charter amendment – through an additional protocol or a General Assembly resolution. Such a regional approach to the Security Council would carry far-reaching implications for Security Council reform. The most recent, and most serious, attempt at enhancing Council legitimacy through greater representation in the form of Council enlargement has foundered on the rocks of national rivalry. As long as Council enlargement remains based on nationalism, this will always be the case. Once the political dust has settled from the failed 2005 exercise, a more sobered, rational and forward-looking approach to Council enlargement could be based on the identification of ‘security regions’, and associated ‘responsible Chapter VIII regional agencies’, which would be represented by Member States by rotation. This regional approach could be developed, over a five-year period, by 2010.

9

Contents

Introduction: Aims and Outline

15

A.

Reviewing the Mechanism

23

1.

Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ The Historical Development The Contemporary Challenge

25 25 34

1.1 1.2 2. 2.1 2.2 2.3

Regionalism under Construction: Developing a ‘RegionalGlobal Security Mechanism’ The Constitutional Phase: Shaping the Relationship The Institutional Phase: The Growth of Organizations The Co-operation Phase: Regular Meetings and the HighLevel Panel

53 53 62 64

B.

Analysing the Mechanism

83

3. 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

Complexities of Regionalism Concepts of ‘Region’ and ‘Arrangements or Agencies’ Issues of Membership Issues of Focal Area Issues of Mandate Effect on UN Security Planning: The ‘Strategic Choice’

85 85 88 92 92 97

4. 4.1

A Typology of Security Regionalism Membership: Organizations Involved in Peace and Security Focal Area: Geographical Application of the Mandate Mandate: Issues of Terminology and Charter Provisions

4.2 4.3

11

111 112 113 114

Contents 4.4

Formalising the Partnership: The Question of Criteria

133

C.

Reviewing the Experience

147

5. 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4

Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies Africa and the Arab World Europe and the Caucasus Asia and the Pacific The Americas

149 149 169 178 192

6. 6.1 6.2

Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations Cross-Regional Organizations Trans-National Organizations

199 200 217

D.

Analysing the Experience

221

7. 7.1 7.2 7.3

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security The Cultural Dimension The Political Dimension The Legal Dimension

223 224 237 249

8. 8.1 8.2

Findings and Conclusions Central Findings Specific Conclusions

265 266 268

E.

Exploring the Future

279

9.

Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: Towards a Schematic Model A Structure of ‘Security Regions’ A Structure of ‘Chapter VIII Regional Agencies’ Implications for Security Council Reform

9.1 9.2 9.3 Annex 10.

Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ Constitutional Clarity Functional Co-operation Doctrinal Reformulation Security Council Reform

10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4

List of Acronyms & Bibliography 12

281 282 288 308 314

329 329 339 339 341 343

Contents List of Tables and Boxes 1

‘Threats to the Peace’: Evolution in Security Council Judgement 2.A Historical Development of ‘Regional Organizations’ (1945-2003) 2.B Attendance at UN-Regional High-Level Meetings (19942003) 2.C Attendance at UN Security Council – Regional Meetings (2003-5) 3 Duplicative Membership in Regional, Sub-Regional and ‘Other’ Organizations 4.A Categorization of UN Peace Enforcement Missions 4.B UN Missions and Mandates 4.C Possible Schema for Analysing Contemporary UN Peace Theory 4.D Security Organizations with General Assembly Observer Status 4.E Security Council Appellation of Regional Organizations 4.F UN Observers 2003 6 ‘Division of Labour’: Roles of CROs and TNOs in Peace and Security 7.A Regional Hegemony: Alpha and Beta Hegemons in ‘Security Regions’ 7.B Sub-Regional Hegemony: Alpha and Beta Hegemons in Selected Sub-Regions 7.C Typology of UNSC-Regional Organization Relationships 7.D ‘Comparative Advantage’ in Global and Regional Hegemonic Involvement 7.E ‘Political Primacy’ of Security Council, the P-5 and the P1: 2004 7.F UNSC Criteria: Top Ten Rankings of UN Member States 7.G UNSC Criteria: Top Ten Rankings with EU Included 7.H Armed Intervention: An Historical Review 9.A ‘Chapter VIII Executive Functions’ 9.B Executive Roles of Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies to Date 9.C Declining Representative Nature of the Security Council 9 Ann.I Comparison of Current and ‘Chapter VIII’ Electoral Mechanisms 9 Ann.II Possible Regional Responsibility in the Security Council 13

49 63 69 81 99 121 125 128 135 139 145 100 241 242 244 246 246 248 249 261 291 292 309 315 320

Contents Boxes 1.A

‘Pre-emption: The UN Charter is Outdated’: Minister of Defence of Australia ‘We Have Come to a Fork in the Road: Now We Must Decide’: UN Secretary-General ‘A Framework for Co-operation’: Nine Principles from the High-Level Meeting’ ‘Towards a Regular Dialogue’: Statement by Security Council President, July 2004 Typology of Organizations: By Membership Focal Area: Geographical Area of Application ‘A Vision Short-Lived’: The Brief Fate of ‘Agenda for Peace’ ‘Spearheading Doctrinal Change’: African Innovations in Peace and Security Legitimacy and the Contemporary Regional-Global Security Mechanism ‘A Question of Identity’: NATO’s Changing Relationship with the United Nations ‘Leading in the Mission of Freedom and Democracy’: US National Security Strategy “‘Enforced Disarmament’ or ‘War’?”: Culture-based Perceptions of the Iraq Crisis ‘Why We Intervened’: Stated Reasons for Intervention in Three Controversial Cases Regionalism and Linguistic Diversity: Connections to Politics and Security ‘Glimpses of the Future’: Excerpts from Recent EU Policy Statements Regionalism and Security Council Reform UN Security Council Reform: Regional Membership? Elements of a ‘Partnership for Peace’ Protocol Possible Guiding Principles for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’

1.B 2.A 2.B 4.A 4.B 4.C 5.A 5.B 6 7.A 7.B 7.C 9.A 9.B 9.C 9.D 10.A 10.B

Postscript: Proposal for an International Conference on Regional Security 14

36 42 70 79 113 114 120 157 168 211 227 237 252 284 307 311 313 332 335

342

Introduction: Project Aims and Outline

The two quotes in the frontispiece of this book, one by the UN SecretaryGeneral, the other by one of his counterparts from a regional organization, capture the essence of the security challenge facing the world in the early 21st century. One offers a vision of a future security system that is holistic and global in its nature, emphasising the concept of legitimacy that can come ‘only from the United Nations’. The other is a lament of the present situation, critiquing the Security Council for alleged inconsistency in its political judgements, and tagging the future vision with a prerequisite of greater consistency and impartiality on the part of the global body. That the two quotes should come from two of the most eminent diplomatic practitioners of the present age, whose collegial relationship stretches back decades in time, testifies to the nuanced judgement and careful calibration of operations that will be required if what might be called the future ‘regional-global security mechanism’ is to realise its potential. The essential themes implicit in the two quotes – flexibility and pragmatism on the one hand and impartiality and consistency on the other – will need to be synthesised for that potential to be attained. Dialectical only in their prima facie relationship, the two themes are in fact mutually reconcilable. Only by combining flexibility with impartiality, and pragmatism with consistency, will the endemic uncertainties and occasional tensions between the global body responsible for international peace and security and the regional agencies that are meant to play a supporting role in that endeavour, be defused and the global-regional dialectic, in turn, be synthesised. The aim of this book is to explore the potential of a ‘regional-global mechanism’ for maintaining international peace and security. It is based on the recognition accorded by the international community over the 15

Project Aims and Outline past decade of the potential for greater involvement by regional agencies in conflict prevention and management in all regions, in co-operation with the United Nations. Analysing the role and actions of regional organizations requires a crossmatrix of both threats and responses. Specifically: – the threats to peace are comprised of traditional (inter-state aggression), modern (complex national and regional emergencies) and future challenges (global systemic breakdown); while – the response involves early warning, conflict prevention, pacific settlement, enforcement and peace-building. This study does not analyse the role and actions of regional organizations in all these categories. Nor does it systematically explore in depth the perceptions of regional organizations to the future challenges such as WMD proliferation, terrorism and trans-national crime. It focuses most specifically on the traditional and modern threats – inter-state aggression and complex national and regional emergencies. What is covered here is an exploration of the relationship between the Security Council and the regional organizations in the area of traditional and modern threats and the policy response to these in terms of pacific settlement and enforcement. It is not the aim of this study – which was pursued as an applied research undertaking – to delve into international relations theory. The book is not intended as an exercise in pure research for consideration by the academic community. Rather it is advanced as applied research intended for policy-makers primarily in government and international organizations. Nonetheless, placing the subject within a comprehensible context requires some understanding of certain theoretical issues that derive from academic enquiry. In this respect a number of issues perhaps need clarification or explanation from the outset. First, whilst a fundamental distinction exists between regional co-operation and regional integration, it is assumed here that such a distinction is more pertinent to the economic dimension of regionalism than to the security dimension. This is not to say that the distinction is absent from security considerations – indeed, it remains relevant. But regional integration has not been taken so far in any region that it has yet totally guaranteed security for the states involved. Only one truly integrative movement is underway at present – in Europe – and its recent expansion in membership stands inevitably to slow the pace of the integrative process. All other regional endeavours including the recent visionary inno16

Project Aims and Outline vations in Africa and its faint echo in the Pacific, despite their conscious emulation of the European experience, take the form of enhanced cooperation.1 But in the late-Westphalian world this is the most the international community can realistically aspire towards. In short, ‘security regionalism’ is essentially a study of how some 200 nation-states interact, not whether and how they are integrating. Secondly, it is nonetheless clear that regionalism – drawing on the socalled ‘new regionalism’ of recent decades – is in the ascendancy, including in the area of peace and security. Where it fits in the ‘world order’ political system, however, cannot be easily predicted. Previous and present world order systems – early multipolarity (1919-39); bipolarity (194890); unipolarity (1990-) – have rested on certain underlying features of the international community. Whether the future system of the early 21st century will feature regionalism as an alternative to unipolarity or a component part of multilateralism remains to be seen but it is likely that the latter will occur. The judgement of the international community today appears to be that the rise of regionalism as a component of multilateralism is both desirable and feasible – and even necessary. This is a far cry from the judgement entered by one UN scholar only a decade ago, that ‘regional authorities generally lack the credibility, the capacity and, hence, the clout to act effectively as agents for collective security and peaceful settlement’.2 The rise in regionalism is what underpins the stated vision of the UN Secretary-General, of a mutually-reinforcing regional-global mechanism for peace and security. Indeed, whether it is desirable or not is perhaps secondary to the fact that regionalisation is an objective feature of our time – an ongoing multifaceted phenomenon to which nation-states and the United Nations have no choice but to respond and adapt. The security dimension of this phenomenon in terms of UN Security Council structures and procedures will prove critical to peace and security in the 21st century. Third, and as a corollary of the above, it would seem that regionalism is now set to fill a yawning gap in the international system of the past halfcentury. The constitutional order bequeathed by the UN Charter of the 1.

2.

The relationship between integration and security is not explored in detail in this study. While the European experience represents the epitome of the integrative process in terms of rational, systematic planning, if the pooling of sovereignty over the issue of armed intervention is the ultimate criterion of integration then Africa now leads the world. Benjamin Rivlin, quoted in Schlesinger, ‘Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations’, Westview; Boulder, CO, 2003) p. 191.

17

Project Aims and Outline mid-20th century rested in reality upon a dual national-universal axis, notwithstanding the provision made for regionalism in the document. Regionalism of that time was a mere concept before the powerful reality of the nation-state and the tangible, if unhappy, experience of international organization. It seemed natural that nation-states should mount a second attempt at the ‘high jump’ – a centralised global body. But although global and centralised, the system was not at that time universal. Those were the days when nation-states were few in number – some 51 signing the Charter as founding members. A limited number of that size was manageable – effectively forming a diplomatic ‘club’, however fractious and disputatious their intercourse might be. But today’s reality is different – 191 nation-states comprise not a ‘club’ but a ‘crowd’. That such a number is unmanageable for global policy-making is evident from the imperfect functioning of the General Assembly in recent years. Yet the smaller ‘executive body’ for peace, the Security Council, has obverse problems of unrepresentative membership and associated shortcomings in global legitimacy. This explains the new interest shown, and initiatives taken, in regionalism – as a policy approach that attempts to steer a course between the illegitimate and the unmanageable towards a genuine global authority. Regionalism, and even sub-regionalism, is of the correct ‘executive size’ for today’s global politics and has thus to some extent become the new ‘club’ for policy-making. Fourth, with the above considerations in mind, the question needs to be addressed of the relationship of the Charter to 21st century realities. The temptation exists for some to go back compulsively to the Charter – insisting on a strict and literal interpretation of its provisions. This requires forcing early-21st century realities to fit the constitutional mould of the mid-20th – neither an easy nor a sensible undertaking. But an alternative is possible and feasible. The ‘dynamic interpretation’ of the UN Charter that was articulated by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld in the early 1960s, and echoed most notably by his current successor Kofi Annan, should enable the Charter to adapt in the 21st century. This, however, takes creativity and political courage. The rise of regionalism and the revival of chapter VIII of the Charter will prove to be a crucial component of that future dynamism, requiring creativity and courage of a comparable magnitude. The choice between the ‘literal’ and the ‘liberal’ interpretations lies at the heart of the contemporary security debate. Fifth, the metamorphosis in the nature of regionalism – from its almost exclusively economic and defence dimensions, from the 1940s to the 1980s, towards a comprehensive multi-sectoral movement of the 1990s involving political, cultural, economic and security issues in the broadest 18

Project Aims and Outline contemporary sense – is transforming international organizations as regions develop an integrated skein of mutual interests among Member States. But much of this, most particularly in the area of security, has been ad hoc and haphazard. The challenge of the next decade is to replace this improvised, politically-selective, resource-skewed approach to regionalism with a more planned, consistent yet flexible, and resourcebalanced style of regional and global governance – most especially on the part of the UN Security Council. To assist in that endeavour is the prescriptive aim of this book. Sixth, one of the perennial issues that bedevil International Relations theory – the definition of a ‘region’ and the delineation of ‘regions’ – cannot be avoided in any study on the subject of regionalism. Certainly, some assumptions are entered in this respect in the study. But as noted, the study is an applied, not a pure, research undertaking, and so the theoretical considerations pertaining to the conceptual and definitional elements of the subject of regionalism are treated less from an academic than from a practical stand-point. For reasons that become apparent the distinction will be drawn throughout between genuine ‘security regions’ and associated agencies on the one hand and other ‘groups’ of states on the other.3

Method and Outline The nature of this study is theoretical, analytical and prescriptive. The methodology employed is empirical and inductive. The work is self-evidently inter-disciplinary in nature. It draws, in varying degree, upon history, public administration, political science, sociology, international and constitutional law, and moral philosophy. It neither fits into a particular academic discipline nor draws exclusively from a single disciplinary method. While part of the work draws on comparative analysis of regional experiences, it is not exclusively confined to the comparative method. The intention, as noted, is to be policy-oriented rather than a purely academic product. 3.

On a point of terminology, the use of the word ‘region’ in this study is taken to refer to a particular grouping of nation-states – that is, at the supra-national level. Of the manifold terminology employed for sub-national entities (the ‘Flemish Region’; the ‘Canton of Schwyz’; the ‘State of Uttar Pradesh’; the ‘Republic of Karelia’; the ‘Province of Sichuan’), the word ‘province’ is employed in this study for any generic subnational reference.

19

Project Aims and Outline The outline of the book is determined by the above considerations. Specifically: – Section A reviews the historical development of the ‘architecture of peace’ painstakingly constructed over the past century (and more), especially the past few decades, highlighting the present ‘crisis moment’ in which fundamental tenets of contemporary security thinking are under strain. It then explores the efforts over the past decade at streamlining the working relationship between the UN Security Council and regional agencies in conflict resolution and management – the early construction of a ‘regional-globalsecurity mechanism’. – Section B analyses the mechanism as it currently exists. It acknowledges the elusive nature of the concept of ‘region’ and highlights the complex regional arrangements in the modern world – especially their overlapping mandates and memberships, and uncertainties over focal area – and the detrimental effect this has on clarity of planning and operations in peace and security. It then seeks to apply some order and clarity to what is a bewilderingly complex mosaic of regional structures around the world through the development of a suggested typology of ‘security regionalism’. – The study then undertakes an empirical survey of regional and sub-regional agencies, and cross-regional and trans-national organizations (Section C). – On the strength of this historical, analytical and empirical work, Section D explores the three principal dimensions of regional security – cultural, political and legal – seeking to provide explanatory insights into the nature of global and regional security behaviour in the contemporary world. From this combined thematic-analytical work general conclusions are drawn. – The final part (Section E) is prescriptive. It seeks to clarify regionalism within collective security by developing a schematic model that could potentially act as the structure of a future ‘regional-global security mechanism’. This entails two fundamental propositions pertaining to the new concepts of ‘security regions’ and ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’. The book finishes with a series of recommendations pertaining to constitutional clarity, functional co-operation and doctrinal reformulation that might facilitate the successful realisation of the Secretary-General’s vision for such a mechanism. Through this sequential approach to the subject involving historical, analytical, empirical, explanatory and prescriptive methods, the aim is to of20

Project Aims and Outline fer a comprehensive understanding of, and policy insights in, ‘security regionalism’ for the benefit of practitioners in the field of international relations. The prescriptive section contains some far-reaching ideas of the possible structuring of a future ‘regional-global security mechanism’. The aim is to stimulate discussion – to ‘shift the mind-set’ with regard to possible treatment of chapter VIII of the UN Charter in the 21st century. Many of the ideas advanced in Section E would need careful thought and reflection based on further research.4 Some will no doubt incur opposition, based on preference for the status quo or aspirations of national interest. This is to be expected. Change of this order and magnitude takes time – time in which reasonable argumentation is pursued and in which a consensus slowly builds around competing ideas and proposals of which those advanced in this study will simply be a component part.

4.

It is for this reason that many concepts remain within single quotation marks persistently throughout the study – such as, for example, ‘security regions’ and ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’. This is because, it is held here, no amount of repetition within one study can, of itself, give a new concept currency. What is required is peer scrutiny and considered reflection before the quotation marks are discarded, if at all.

21

A. Reviewing the Mechanism

1. Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ “...the nature of new security risks and threats facing the international community has largely outstripped the global security framework envisioned after the Second World War. ... Regional organizations are increasingly recognized as instrumental mechanisms in the new collective security system...” Background Paper (S/2004/546) Security Council Thematic Debate 20 July 2004

Throughout history human societies of every size and type have sought, above all, to ensure their own security and safety. The building of what has become known as the ‘architecture of peace’ has been the institutional aspiration through which humanity might avoid warfare and live together. In the modern Westphalian era of the past four centuries, nation-states have sought, in various ways, to construct such an architecture. Within that context, the relationship between the global approach and the regional approach to security has proven to be rather vexed.

1.1 The Historical Development Within the Westphalian era three broad phases are discernible in the construction of an ‘architecture of peace’: co-operation based on national sovereignty (from the 17th to the 19th centuries); and the first two experiments in a gradually integrating multilateral order (in the 20th century). 25

Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’

1.1.1 Early Regional Security Arrangements Prior to the 20th century, regional security represented the height of political statecraft and diplomatic strategy. Global security – the notion of the world acting as one unit for its own safety and redemption – was a concept yet unborn beyond, at least, the philosophical realm of Kantian idealism. The 19th century witnessed efforts at forging continental peace through state policy in two regions – Europe and America. In Europe, the evolutionary development in the regional security architecture that has led the international community to the present stage can be traced to the 17th century. But progress in circumscribing and ultimately proscribing conflict between human societies has been slow and painstaking. Under the Peace of Westphalia that saw the transformation from medieval empires and theocratic spheres of influence to the nationstate system, warfare could still be lawfully prosecuted. Despite provisions for preserving the ‘Publick Peace’ through ‘perpetual Law’ by arbitration, no ‘security architecture’ was established with an enforcement mechanism for avoiding conflict.1 Through the 18th and early 19th centuries ‘legal wars’ among states thus continued on the European continent, spawned largely by imperial ambition, until the Congress of Vienna (1815) when a conscious attempt was made to maintain regional peace and security through a balance of power system. The ‘great powers’ of Europe observed a series of ‘shifting alliances’ as they sought to maintain continental order. The ‘concert of Europe’, however, lasted only four decades and the second half of the 19th century saw periodic wars among the great powers culminating in the devastation of World War I in the early twentieth. In America the 19th century saw the early growth of a continental security arrangement. In 1823 the US, not long independent itself, proclaimed a hemispheric sphere of influence in the Americas in which Europe had no role to play thenceforth.2 The Monroe Doctrine was seen by 1. 2.

Treaty of Westphalia: Peace Treaty between the Holy Roman Emperor and the King of France and their respective Allies (24 October 1648), articles 120-125. In light of the recent independence from European colonialism won by Latin American states, the US would consider any attempt on the part of European powers to extend their system to ‘any portion’ of the American hemisphere as ‘dangerous to our peace and safety’. The US could not view any interposition by any European power for the purpose of oppressing such newly-independent states, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, ‘in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the US’. Proclamation by President Monroe, December 1823, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/19th.htm

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ the US as a genuine regional security mechanism – less so by other countries including its neighbours. For the rest of the 19th century pan-Americanism effectively became a movement for securing Latin American freedom from Europe. Towards the end of the century, however, this metamorphosed into a system of ensuring stability on the continent and, as such, it can be seen as the first genuine regional security arrangement in the Americas. In 1890, the first Pan-American Conference was held in the United States with the purpose of preserving ‘peace among the Americas’. The Pan American Union was established out of this conference in 1910, with the goal of promoting friendship and co-operative action in the Americas. Elsewhere in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, traditional polities of vast size and periodic civilizational zenith were subjected to imperial sway by European powers in the late-Westphalian era. Regional security in these areas was the obverse of what is known today – comprised as it then was of strategic rivalry by predatory external powers bent on maximising mercantilist gain for their own purposes.

1.1.2 Global Collective Security: The League of Nations (1921-1945) The first attempt to prevent war and preserve international peace on a global scale, laid down in the League of Nations Covenant in 1919, rested on four fundamental principles: non-aggression and pacific settlement, collective security, minimum arms levels, and self-determination. The non-aggression/pacific settlement principle was, however, partial and not absolute. States Members of the League undertook to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all others.3 They agreed that whenever any dispute arose between them which they deemed suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement and which could not be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they would submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration or judicial settlement.4 In no case would they resort to war until three months after an arbitration award or judicial decision, or following a report by the League’s Council.5 But once all such remedies were exhausted, a State could initiate warfare. 3. 4. 5.

League of Nations Covenant, article 10 [hereafter LoN]. LoN, Article 13 LoN, Article 12

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ Under the collective security principle, any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members or not, was declared a ‘matter of concern’ to the whole League. The League would ‘take any action that might be deemed wise and effectual’ to safeguard the peace of nations.6 Should any Member resort to war in disregard of its covenants it would ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all others. It was then the duty of the Council to recommend what military contingents the Member States would ‘severally contribute to the armed forces’ to be used to protect the covenants of the League.7 The principle of ‘minimum arms levels’ was the first global attempt to reduce armaments. The League recognised that the maintenance of peace required the reduction of national armaments ‘to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations’.8 The principle of self-determination was also an innovation. At the beginning of the 20th century, many colonies and metropolitan territories still existed, inhabited by peoples regarded by the framers of the League as ‘not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’. Many, however, had ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which had formerly governed them – essentially the defeated powers. The League accordingly handed a mandate to certain victorious States to assume the ‘burden’ of their governance. Such peoples would need to be entrusted to ‘advanced nations’ which, by reason of their resources, experience or geographical position, could ‘best undertake this responsibility’, and which were willing to accept it. This tutelage would be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. Thereafter, however, this would be done according to the new principle of self-determination – until such time as they were ‘able’ to govern themselves. The well-being and development of such peoples formed a ‘sacred trust of civilisation’.9 All this less than a century ago. The principal limitations of the League were three-fold. The right of a state to resort to war in the event pacific settlement was unsuccessful provided a loophole for an aggrieved state to take up arms again. Secondly, the universal veto on decision-making thwarted consensus in crisis situations. Thirdly, the voluntary nature of military contributions to 6. 7. 8. 9.

LoN, Article 11 LoN, Article 16 LoN, Article 8 LoN, Article 22

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ enforcement action weakened the collective security mechanism. Thus the League collapsed in the face of aggression by some Member States in the late-1930s.

1.1.3 Global Collective Security: The United Nations (1945- ) Global collective security was strengthened in the second experiment of the mid-20th century with the United Nations whose Charter sought to remedy the League’s weaknesses. Building on the Covenant, the Charter of 1945 laid down the fundamental precepts on which the modern ‘security architecture’ of the international community continues to rest, over half a century later. The UN has four proclaimed purposes: the maintenance of peace and security, the self-determination of peoples, the resolution of international problems, and the harmonization of national actions for these common ends.10 Achievement of these purposes is governed by seven principles that have shaped international relations in the UN era.11 These are the sovereign equality of all Member States; fulfilment in good faith of all Charter obligations; the pacific settlement of international disputes; affirmation of the non-use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of members; the collective security by all members in support of preventive or enforcement action; full non-member compliance; and non-intervention in domestic jurisdiction of all members except during enforcement measures. The advances in the ‘security architecture’ achieved in the UN system beyond the League were three-fold. First, ‘war’ was completely abolished under the Charter, with an effective enforcement mechanism – at least in theory.12 Secondly, the veto on enforcement decisions was confined to the five ‘great powers’ only, rather than all Member States. Thirdly, military contributions from all Member States for enforcement action was henceforth compulsory and not voluntary.13 10. UN Charter, article 1. 11. United Nations Charter, article 2. 12. In fact, in the 1928 Kellog-Briand Pact, States renounced all war. But with no effective enforcement mechanism under the League, the treaty rapidly became dormant. 13. “All Members ... undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security”. Article 43.1

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ In the six decades of the UN era, however, collective security has not functioned in the untrammelled manner envisaged by the Charter’s framers. The reasons are threefold: – The advent of nuclear weapons made the multilateral dimension of collective security asymmetrical. – The ideological divisions between the US and USSR polarised the international community and effectively paralysed the Security Council for over 40 years. – Partly because of the bipolar nuclear stalemate and partly through normative progress in international relations, inter-state conflict declined; yet intra-state conflict concomitantly increased as a result of post-colonial tensions exacerbated by the intensifying pace of global change. Through this period strategic stability at the global level was effectively secured, albeit precariously, on bipolar nuclear deterrence. For its part the UN sought to contribute by adapting conflict resolution techniques in ways that have been innovative and creative yet practical and politically feasible. Two discrete periods are discernible through this period, viz. – Since the 1950s ‘classical peacekeeping’ has been employed by the UN, through informal reference to ‘chapter six-and-a-half’ of the Charter, with UN peacekeepers verifying mutually-agreed ceasefires following a truce and with the consent of the belligerent parties; – Since the early 1990s a new kind of UN peace operation has been increasingly deployed, with UN or UN-authorised forces engaging in enforcement action to help implement peace agreements.14 The increased peacekeeping activity has strained the Organization’s resources and capacity because of both quantitative and qualitative changes in the operations.15 14. Often referred to as ‘robust peacekeeping’ in UN jargon, coined initially in the Brahimi Report. 15. “Today’s operations are considerably more complex and demanding. Various factors contributing to the changing nature of peacekeeping operations include the intrastate nature of conflicts; the lack of full consent and co-operation of the parties; the breakdown of law and order and general banditry as a result of the emergence of undisciplined militia and armed civilians; the collapse of State structures; and the targeting of civilians in such conflicts, with consequential humanitarian disasters, including mass movements of people who become refugees and displaced persons.” ‘Co-operation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment: Suggested Principles and Mechanisms’, Lessons Learned Unit, DPKO, March 1999, para. 3.

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ The Security Council summit of January 1992 invited the Secretary-General to produce an analysis and recommendations on ‘ways of strengthening and making more efficient, within the framework and provisions of the Charter, the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping’. It was believed, in 1992, that an opportunity had been regained to achieve the objectives of the Charter. In the words of the Secretary-General as he presented the report, “this opportunity must not be squandered. The Organization must never again be crippled as it was in the era that has now passed.” In the past decade the UN has developed a ‘framework for peace’ that reflects a more sophisticated approach to the complex security challenges of the modern world than purely the collective security response to inter-state aggression formalised in the Charter. Since the end of the Cold War, with the spread of intra-state conflict and the experience the UN has gained, a lexicon of peace operations has been developed. The concepts employed are not rigorously distinguished for academic purposes but they broadly suffice for operational clarity.16 From its principal reports (Agenda for Peace, 1992; Agenda Supplement, 1995; Brahimi Report, 2000) and its website, the UN has developed a natural meaning for five principal operational concepts that comprise an interwoven ‘fabric of peace’.17

16. The United Nations goes to great lengths to disown responsibility for the precision or significance of its terminology. Its website disclaimer describes the material therein as the ‘findings, interpretations and conclusions’ of the UN staff, consultants or advisers who prepared the work which does not necessarily represent the views of the UN. It makes no representations as to the accuracy of the material and carries no liability for any damage resulting from use of the site. 17. Beyond the five concepts, however, the UN also refers to ‘conflict management’ and ‘conflict resolution’ without defining these two concepts (see http///www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fr_prev_dip_introduction.htm, accessed August 2004). It is concluded here that ‘conflict management’ is synonymous with ‘peace enforcement’ and ‘conflict resolution’ is synonymous with ‘peacemaking’.

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They are: conflict prevention,18 peace-making,19 peace-keeping,20 peaceenforcement21 and peace-building.22 A natural, albeit rough, chronology attends these five operational concepts. Conflict prevention is designed to ensure that imminent conflict does not erupt into violence. If this fails, peace-making efforts are undertaken to cease hostilities through peaceful means. If peace-making fails, peace-enforcement may be used to force a party to negotiate or withdraw from a conflict area. Once hostilities end, even through a temporary 18. Conflict prevention comprises: - preventive diplomacy: mediation, conciliation, negotiation - preventive deployment: the fielding of peacekeepers to forestall probable conflict - preventive disarmament: destroying old weapons and reducing small arms in conflict areas - structural prevention: political, institutional and developmental efforts at root causes 19. Peacemaking refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and negotiate a pacific settlement of their dispute. It includes: - Security Council recommendations of ways to resolve a dispute - Secretary-General’s envoys or missions for fact-finding or negotiation - Secretary-General’s mediation between disputant parties 20. Peacekeeping can cover any of the following four purposes: - Conflict Prevention: deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or spill-over of conflict across borders; - Ceasefire Verification: stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement; - Peace Implementation: assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements; - Governmental Transition: lead States or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development. 21. Peace Enforcement refers to the use of force against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities. On several occasions the Security Council has authorized Member States to use ‘all necessary means’, including force, to achieve a stated objective in situations where consent of the parties is not required. This has occurred on seven occasions, viz. Korea in 1950; Iraq in 1990, Somalia in 1993, Rwanda in 1994, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Albania in 1997, and East Timor in 1999. See section 4.3.1 for further elaboration. 22. Peace-building refers to assistance to countries and regions in the transition from war to peace. It includes: - demilitarization - institution-building, including police & judicial systems - human rights promotion - election-monitoring - political participation - rehabilitation - economic & social development

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ cease-fire, peace-keeping is undertaken.23 Once a peace settlement is concluded, peace-building commences to ensure non-recidivism. While these concepts are operationally adequate, their precise relationship to the UN Charter is less clear, and there remains some overlapping in their meaning. This is explored in chapter 4. In April 2004 the UN’s chief peacekeeping official warned that new missions might further strain the UN’s capacities in the first decade of the 21st century. In fact, fewer people were being killed in conflicts than in earlier times – some 25,000 in 2002, about 10% of the annual figure during the previous decade. Fewer conflicts were starting and some were being brought to an end. The paradox, however, was that the military resources needed to keep the peace are being strained by ‘so much peace to keep’. The scale of peacekeeping had grown to 15 UN missions on three continents, involving 50,000 soldiers and police and costing $4 billion per year. Four ‘well-established principles’ should guide UN decisionmaking in the future. These were: – ‘No UN engagement in hot wars.’ The UN could not ‘fight hot wars’ and could not keep the peace if there were no peace to keep. The practice of authorising military coalitions is the answer to the use of armed force. – ‘Partners count.’ The UN working alongside ‘regional organizations’ such as the EU, NATO and ECOWAS was necessary. While these arrangements ‘have their complications’, neighbours and friends had an interest in seeing problems through. – ‘No job without the tools.’ Effective peacekeeping required not only troop contributions but also specialised military support services, adequate funding, strategic force reserves, and sustained political commitment.

23. Operationally, some complexity arises with regard to the concept of ‘peace-keeping’ since it can be undertaken in conflict prevention and peace-building phases of UN operations as well as being undertaken in its own right. Its principal functions, however, are to verify temporary cease-fires or assist in implementation of permanent peace agreements.

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ – ‘Stick with it until peace takes root.’ Post-conflict peace-building takes time and the international community must be prepared to work with local institutions until democratic governance, legal order and sustainable economic development take hold. Peacekeeping must be linked to a longer-term plan for stability of this kind to be achieved. 24 Thus has the ‘architecture of peace’ evolved – fundamentally over the past century, significantly over the past decade, and in detail over the past year.

1.2 The Contemporary Challenge Through the past half-century, the UN has laboured for peace under three identifiably discrete ‘eras’. For four decades a global balance of power prevailed during the Cold War. For most of the 1990s an ‘assertive multilateralism’ was pursued by the major powers which found common ground in the collective pursuit of global security. In the past five years an ‘assertive unilateralism’ has developed in which the sole superpower, threatened by an increasingly virulent brand of ‘global terrorism’ aimed primarily (though not exclusively) against it, has conflated its national security concerns with a proclaimed ‘threat to international peace and security’ on behalf of the international community.

1.2.1 Principles under Strain The ferment in security thinking of the past few years is placing strain on many traditional principles and tenets of multilateral security. The ‘architecture of peace’, it is held by many, is in need of redesign. The ‘contemporary challenge’ to the multilateral system is generally attributed to the US security strategy of September 2002, but in fact the challenge to the UN Charter itself is most succinctly captured in an observation advanced by one of the closest US allies, Australia (see Box 1.A). Specifically, fault-lines within the system are running beneath the following principles of the traditional ‘architecture of peace’:

24. Jean Marie Guéhenno, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, IHT, 19 April 2004 (long version).

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ – the principle of the non-use of force is under challenge from the doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ in a ‘just war’;25 – the principle of domestic jurisdiction is undergoing a far-reaching metamorphosis as a result of the controversial notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ of the 1990s, refashioned in a more acceptable form in the doctrine of a ‘responsibility to protect’;26 – the principle of sovereign equality (through regime recognition) has been challenged by the forced ‘regime change’ of a recognised government of a Member State (Iraq), without explicit UN authorisation, in 2003;27 – the principle of the concurrence of the permanent members of the Security Council has been challenged by the notion of an ‘unreasonable

25. “The gravest danger our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. ... as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies’ plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation.” US National Security Strategy, September 2002. [White House website]; and “... Mr. Annan said the UN now had to decide whether radical change was needed in the face of this new doctrine of pre-emptive force... The new doctrine represented a fundamental challenge to the principles of collective security and the UN Charter, which had guided the world body since its foundation, Mr. Annan said, and he was concerned it could lead to a proliferation of unilateral and lawless use of force. ... According to this argument, Mr. Annan continued, countries were not obliged to wait until there was agreement in the Security Council but instead, reserved themselves the right to act unilaterally, or in ad hoc coalitions. “This logic represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty-eight years,” he said.” UN News Centre, 23 September 2003. 26. ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (IDRC, Ottawa, December 2001). 27. This is the first occasion in the post-Cold War period that a government whose credentials are recognised at the UN has been subjected to regime change. Previous regime changes authorised by the General Assembly (Korea, 1950) or Security Council (Southern Rhodesia, 1965; Haiti, 1994; Afghanistan, 2001) concerned ‘illegal regimes’ not recognised at the UN. Regime change in Iraq (2003), removing for the first time a recognized government, was not authorised by the Council.

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ veto’ developed during the Iraq crisis in February 2003;28 – the right under customary law of all states to possess weaponry (including WMD) that they deem necessary for their self-defence, and to enter into and withdraw from disarmament treaties, has been replaced by a new norm over the past decade – the doctrine of ‘compulsory but selective disarmament’.29

Box 1.A ‘Pre-emption: The UN Charter is Outdated’ Address by Mr. Robert Hill, Minister of Defence, Australia “In a world of spreading terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the international community should review the limits of self-defence and the right of national governments to take pre-emptive action. Long-established principles of international law need to be reinterpreted in an age of over-the-horizon weaponry, computer network attack and asymmetric threats, when warning times are reduced virtually to zero and enemies can strike almost anywhere. The world in which the United Nations Charter was drafted was very different. Then, the preoccupation was to prevent massive conventional wars between states that disfigured the first half of the twentieth century. It is clear that, when an armed attack against a country is imminent, the government is not compelled to wait until the first blow has been struck. But what action can a state legitimately take when that attack is to be launched by a non-state actor in a non-conventional manner, operating from a variety of bases in different parts of the world? There are no tell-tale warning indicators such as the mobilisation and pre-deployment of conventional forces.

28. If, argued the British Prime Minister, all ‘reasonable efforts’ had been undertaken to gain consensus within the Security Council on a major issue, and a veto still remained likely, then such ‘obstructionism’ was, ipso facto, ‘unreasonable’. Member States would then be acting within rights in circumventing the Council, even in the prosecution of military action (BBC World Service, radio reports of February and March 2003). Such an argument directly challenges the principle of P-5 concurrence enshrined in article 27(3) of the UN Charter. 29. Such a doctrine has emerged from a series of actions since 1991, viz. Security Council resolution 687 (requiring Iraq to forgo its WMD programme), the Council’s summit declaration of January 1992 that the (further) proliferation of WMDs constituted a threat to international peace and security, and the Council’s refusal in 1993 to accept North Korea’s stated reasons for withdrawing from the NPT. The DPRK’s second ‘withdrawal’ from the NPT in 2003 is currently subject to negotiation with the major global and regional powers.

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ Article 51 of the UN Charter permits the use of self-defence if a criminal attack occurs. But this has not settled the debate between those who adopt a literal interpretation and those who argue that contemporary reality demands a more liberal interpretation. The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice does not include a definitive statement on the scope of the law of anticipatory self-defence under the Charter. States act according to their interpretation, no doubt informed by the interpretation of others. The clear view of the United States, set out in its National Security Strategy in September, is that there is an ‘option of pre-emptive action to counter a sufficient threat to our national security’. The document says the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively to ‘forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries’. Such clear statements by America reflect the view that the concept of ‘imminent threat’ must be adapted to the ‘capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries’. In short, international law cannot sit still. But the United States still couched this right as self-defence rather than as a distinct new doctrine. The same was the case in 1986 when America responded with bombing raids on Libya to an attack on a discotheque in Berlin that killed a US soldier. President Ronal Reagan said that the purpose of the mission was self-defence and the pre-emptive action would not only diminish Libya’s capacity to export terror but also provide it with reasons and incentives to change its criminal behaviour. Other examples include the US imposition of a maritime quarantine on Cuba in 1962 to force the Soviet Union to remove its nuclear weapons from Cuba, and the 1981 Israeli attack on a nuclear reactor in Iraq. Continuing efforts by Iraq to acquire weapons of mass destruction have rekindled this important debate. For the moment the issue has been avoided by a new UN Security Council resolution ordering certain actions linked to weapons inspections in Iraq and warning of ‘serious consequences’ in the event of noncompliance. It is to be hoped that Baghdad can be persuaded by the consensus of the international community to disarm, and that the need for armed intervention can thus be avoided. But in the longer term, the issues and the uncertainty remains unresolved. Some would argue that it is time for a new and distinct doctrine of pre-emptive action to avert a threat. A better outcome might be for the international community to seek an agreement on the ambit of the right to self-defence better suited to contemporary realities. International legal machinery is slow to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. It is important that international lawyers seek to catch up and ensure that the world’s legal framework remains relevant to its security challenges. It would be useful if the United Nations contributed to the further development of these principles. Advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice might also be helpful. Meanwhile, those responsible for governance will con-

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ tinue to interpret self-defence as necessary to protect their peoples and their nations’ interests. The writer is Australia’s defence minister. This comment was adapted by the IHT from the John Bray Memorial Oration delivered at the University of Adelaide on November 28, 2002.” International Herald Tribune, 2 December 2002

These five issues do not comprise all the fault lines in the contemporary multilateral system. Other tremors are being felt as a result of the counter-terrorism strategy – interdiction on the high seas,30 ‘extraordinary renditions’ and ‘shared interrogations’, indefinite detentions and military trials of foreign nationals without full legal rights. More generally, the trend to include the individual as a subject of international public law is changing the traditional state-centric nature of the system – as witnessed by the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the International Criminal Court, and the abortive attempts by the Security Council to arrest individual warlords in Somalia in the mid-1990s. Finally, the vast discrepancy in size and power among the 191 Member States of the General Assembly, with an associated lack of political force for its resolutions, is coming under increasing scrutiny in such a fluid time of change. The five issues identified, however, are of special significance. They portend qualitative change to the multilateral system due to conflation in major power perception of the two principal threats to peace and security – private terrorist groups, and their suspected links to some UN Member States with the possible acquisition of WMDs. This is generating a stronger instinct for urgent military action by the major powers at a time when the world is metamorphosing from a state-centric system to a global community. The strain placed on these principles raises some fundamental issues pertaining to international peace and security. On the one hand, the chal30. The Spanish-US interdiction, in December 2002, of the North Korean vessel with missiles for Yemen, operating under a Cambodian flag but displaying neither the flag nor any other identification, is a case in point. States have the right to stop unidentified vessels but not to confiscate legal cargo, and the vessel was released. The US, however, defended the seizure as consistent with its policy of ‘interdicting arms sales if a potential exists that they could be used to make or deliver WMDs’. The boarding, said one US official, ‘should send a strong message to proliferators everywhere’. The ship was eventually released due to a lack of legal basis. CNN, 12 December 2003.

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ lenge has been laid down to the current global security mechanism that had itself been fashioned by the United States – a challenge that now comes from the US with the support of the UK and Australia.31 On the other hand, the ‘regional security’ views of some other regions present an alternative challenge. This is a theme that will be explored further throughout this study.

1.2.2 The Secretary-General’s Challenge Shortly after the Iraq invasion the UN Secretary-General brought these tensions to the surface of diplomatic debate. In April 2003, he called for the UN and regional organizations to ‘redouble their efforts’ to ensure peace. “The feeling of insecurity”, he said, “has seldom, if ever, been greater than it is today”.32 Subsequently the Secretary-General reiterated his concern in more forthright terms. “We can no longer take it for granted”, he said in September 2003, “that our multilateral institutions are strong enough to cope with all of the challenges facing them.” Some institutions might be in need of ‘radical reform’. The relevance of current multilateral rules and institutions had come into question.33 The consensus enshrined in the Millennium Declaration, he observed, now looks less solid than three years ago: “We seem no longer to agree on what the main threats are, or on how to deal with them.”34 Above all, we must be ‘intensely aware’ of the changes in the security environment: “The challenges to peace and security today are predominantly global. While they are not necessarily or entirely new, they take place in a new context and have far-reaching effects. They re31. In addition to the Australian view, for example, the UK has argued for change to the present UN system as well: “We need new rules for international co-operation and new ways of organizing our international institutions. ... We need to focus in a serious and sustained way on the principles of the doctrine of international community and on the institutions that deliver them. This means ... reconsideration of the role, workings and decision-making process of the UN and in particular the UN Security Council. ... [W]e need to find new ways to make the Security Council work if we are not to return to the deadlock that undermined the effectiveness of the Security Council during the Cold War”. British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, ‘Doctrine of the International Community’, Chicago, April 1999. 32. ‘UN and Regional Organizations Must Redouble Efforts to Ensure Peace – Annan’, UN News Service, 11 April 2003 33. Secretary-General’s Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, A/58/323 of 2 September 2003 34. UN News Centre, 8 September 2003

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ quire complex and collective responses which are possible only if the web of multilateral institutions is adequately developed and properly used. Co-operation across the globe is needed more than ever. Legitimacy of action, which may include military action, is essential to ensuring durable solutions to the security needs of our time.” It was ‘vitally important’ not to allow recent differences to persist, and to find a unity of purpose based on a ‘common security agenda’ with a global consensus on, and response to, the major threats.35 Finally, lest there be any studied misunderstanding on the point, the Secretary-General told the General Assembly that year that the international community had come to ‘a fork in the road’: “This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself when the UN was founded. ... Now we must decide whether ... radical changes are needed. ... History is a harsh judge – it will not forgive us if we let this moment pass.” (See Box 1.B).36

1.2.3 Human Security: The Revolutionary Concept Within this rather fraught security environment one overarching concept is emerging that holds promise of offering a single conceptual framework through which to approach global strategy in the 21st century. ‘Human security’ is the notion that at the heart of the concept of security is to be found the individual human person, not the state which is simply an instrument to the end of individual security. ‘Human security’ postulates that the state exists to provide security to the individual, surrendering the traditional view that the individual exists to serve the security of the state. Once this revolutionary idea is accepted, several corollaries flow. Above all, security is no longer seen solely in terms of ‘hard security threats’ but also ‘soft threats’ – ‘freedom from want’ as well as ‘freedom from fear’. This raises the question of what the Security Council, in its six decades of decision-making, has determined to be ‘threats to international peace and security’. Table 1 shows the evolution in thinking which the Security Council has experienced to date in its determination of ‘threats to the peace’. Thus: 35. A/58/323, paras 45, 12 th 36. Opening Address to the 58 General Assembly Session, UN Press Release, 23 September 2003

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ ‘Traditional’ Threats to Peace: Inter-State Conflict – The Council determined two of the major inter-state conflicts to have been a ‘threat to peace’ (Israel/Arab states; India/Pakistan) and four conflicts to be a ‘breach of the peace’ (DPRK/ROK; UK/Argentina; Iraq/Iran; Iraq/Kuwait). Only two actions have been deemed to be an ‘act of aggression’ (by the General Assembly during the intervention by the PRC in the Korean war and by the Council over a South African incursion into Angola). Only in two of these situations however (Korea; Iraq/Kuwait), was collective security through the use of armed force undertaken. – The Council failed to designate several major inter-state conflicts to constitute a ‘threat’, a ‘breach’ or an ‘act of aggression’ (the British and French intervention in Egypt; the US intervention in Vietnam; the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; and the Iraq invasion of Iran). ‘Modern’ Threats to Peace: Internal Crises – Through the 1990s the Council was heavily involved in internal crises which it had no hesitation in determining as ‘threats to peace’. These have ranged across a variety of political situations, most notably repression of secessionist movements, racism, failed states, civil war, restoration of legitimate governments, genocide and humanitarian disasters. ‘Post-Modern’ Threats to Peace: Generic Global Conditions – More recently the Council has declared certain global conditions of a generic nature to be a ‘threat to international peace and security’. To date these have comprised the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, acts of international terrorism, and the proliferation of small arms and mercenary activity (in West Africa). While at present the first two threats are seen as global and the small arms proliferation as sub-regional, it is unlikely that the Council would not make the same determination in other regions if necessary. – The Council has also stressed that the HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, could ‘pose a risk to stability and security’. This does not amount, however, to a determination of a ‘threat to international peace and security’ that would trigger binding powers under chapter VII.37

37. S/RES/1308, 17 July 2000.

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ Box 1.B ‘We Have Come to a Fork in the Road... Now We Must Decide’ Statement by the UN Secretary-General, September 2003 “The last twelve months have been very painful for those who believe in collective answers to our common challenges and problems. ... Since this Organization was founded, States have generally sought to deal with threats to the peace through containment and deterrence, by a system based on collective security and the United Nations Charter. Article 51 of the Charter prescribes that all States, if attacked, retain the inherent right of self-defence. But until now it has been understood that when States go beyond that, and decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, they need the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations. Now, some say this understanding is no longer tenable, since an ‘armed attack’ with weapons of mass destruction could be launched at any time, without warning, or by a clandestine group. Rather than wait for that to happen, they argue, States have the right and obligation to use force pre-emptively, even on the territory of other States, and even while weapons systems that might be used to attack them are still being developed. According to this argument, States are not obliged to wait until there is agreement in the Security Council. Instead, they reserve the right to act unilaterally, or in ad hoc coalitions. This logic represents a fundamental challenge to the principles on which, however imperfectly, world peace and stability have rested for the last fifty-eight years. ... Excellencies, we have come to a fork in the road. This may be a moment no less decisive than 1945 itself, when the United Nations was founded. At that time, a group of far-sighted leaders, led and inspired by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, were determined to make the second half of the twentieth century different from the first half. They saw that the human race had only one world to live in, and that unless it managed its affairs prudently, all human beings may perish. So they drew up rules to govern international behaviour, and founded a network of institutions, with the United Nations at its centre, in which the peoples of the world could work together for the common good. Now we must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed then, or whether radical changes are needed. And we must not shy away from questions about the adequacy, and effectiveness, of the rules and instruments at our disposal. Among those instruments, none is more important than the Security Council itself. In my recent report on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration, I drew attention to the urgent need for the Council to regain the confidence of States, and of world public opinion – both by demonstrating its ability to deal effectively with the most difficult issues, and by becoming more broadly representative of the international community as a whole, as well as the geopolitical

42

Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ realities of today. The Council needs to consider how it will deal with the possibility that individual States may use force “pre-emptively” against perceived threats. Its members may need to begin a discussion on the criteria for an early authorisation of coercive measures to address certain types of threats – for instance, terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction. And they still need to engage in serious discussions of the best way to respond to threats of genocide or other comparable massive violations of human rights – an issue which I raised myself from this podium in 1999. Once again this year, our collective response to events of this type – in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in Liberia – has been hesitant and tardy. As for the composition of the Council, that has been on the agenda of this Assembly for over a decade. Virtually all Member States agree that the Council should be enlarged, but there is no agreement on the details. I respectfully suggest to you, Excellencies, that in the eyes of your peoples the difficulty of reaching agreement does not excuse your failure to do so. If you want the Council’s decisions to command greater respect, particularly in the developing world, you need to address the issue of its composition with greater urgency. ... Excellencies, I believe the time is ripe for a hard look at fundamental policy issues, and at the structural changes that may be needed in order to strengthen them. History is a harsh judge: it will not forgive us if we let this moment pass.” Opening Address to the UN General Assembly, 23 September 2003, http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923.htm

Thus it may be seen that the Council, with its broad and far-reaching powers of determination, hitherto unconstrained by any form of judicial review,38 is increasingly prepared and indeed determined to range widely across all aspects of human activity that might, in its judgement, pose a security threat. The Council, however, has yet to embrace the full spectrum of ‘human security’ that includes the ‘soft global threats’ of a ‘critical and pervasive’ kind enunciated in the seminal 2003 report, such as in the areas of health (epidemic disease), sustainable development (systemic poverty, resource depletion and environmental degradation) and civil society (impeded educational opportunities, human rights violations and stunted 38. The possibility of judicial review of the Council has been a matter of scholarly exploration for a long time. Notwithstanding ICJ references to the possibility (Lockerbie case), no constraints currently exist.

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ political and administrative institutions).39 But it is probably a matter of time before it does so.

1.2.4 Recent High-Level Reports and the 60th UNGA Declaration In late 2003 the UN Secretary-General established a ‘High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’. Its mandate was to examine the landscape of peace and security, ‘broadly defined’; identify the contribution of collective action in addressing the major challenges and threats, ‘both hard and soft’; and recommend the changes necessary to ‘ensure effective collective action, especially by the United Nations’.40 The Panel’s report, released in November 2004,41 contained far-reaching proposals to settle the ‘security debate’ and facilitate a common security agenda, with global consensus over threat perceptions and agreement over an effective collective response and a reformed United Nations Organization. The Panel reaffirmed collective security which, it believed, rested on three pillars, viz.: – Collective vulnerability: today’s threats recognise no national boundaries; – National limitations: no State can by its own efforts dispel that vulnerability; – National fallibility: it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own peoples and not harm its neighbours. Responsibility for each other’s security is shared, and the test of global consensus will be action. In the 21st century, the Panel thought, the world faced six clusters of threat: economic and social; inter-State conflict; internal conflict; spread of certain weaponry; terrorism; and trans-national crime. Despite these ‘new threats’, no UN Charter amendment was needed concerning the use of force. Specifically, – The self-defence provision (article 51) needed neither extension nor restriction of its long-understood scope. As in the past, a threatened 39. ‘Human Security Now: Protecting and Empowering People: Final Report of the Human Security Commission’ (United Nations, May 2003) http://www.humansecuritychs.org/finalreport/FinalReport.pdf 40. UN Press Release SG/SM/90/51, 4 December 2003 41. ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A/59/565, 29 November 2004), [hereafter, HLP Report]

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ State could take military action as long as (i) the threatened attack is imminent; (ii) no other means would deflect it; and (iii) the action is proportionate. A State could therefore act in anticipatory self-defence on a pre-emptive basis, including against a threat of terrorism. – The collective security provision empowering the Security Council to authorise any other military action was also adequate, with the language of chapter VII inherently broad enough. No State could take preventive action against, for example, acquisition of nuclear weapons-making capability, in the name of anticipatory self-defence; such action needs Security Council authorization. But the Council might need to be more proactive in this respect in future. – In deciding whether to authorize force, the Council should systematically address five criteria: seriousness of threat; proper purpose; last resort; proportional means; and balance of consequences. The international community had a ‘responsibility to protect’ the citizens of any State, including through intervention, if its government were unable or unwilling to protect its own people from ‘avoidable catastrophe’ (genocide or other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of humanitarian law). With regard to institutional reform, the Panel believed that Security Council reform should meet four principles: membership for ‘contributing countries’; representativeness; effectiveness; and accountability. To this end the Council should, it suggested, be expanded to 24 members (this is explored in more detail below). And a Peace-building Commission should be established to identify and assist fragile States. The Panel also focused on regional co-operation. Consultation and cooperation between the UN and regional organizations should, it said, be expanded and could be formalized in an agreement. But authorization from the Council for regional peace operations was necessary in all cases. The Panel’s recommendations were ‘fully endorsed’ by the Secretary-General and conveyed to Member States for consideration. In March, the Secretary-General followed up with a report of his own which reflected the Panel’s prescriptions and added a proposal of his own that would replace the UN Human Rights Commission with a Human Rights Council.42 The Secretary-General also indicated his intent to conclude memoranda of understanding with regional organizations to streamline the operational partnership. 42. ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All’, Report of the Secretary-General’ (A/59/2005, 21 March 2005)

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ These issues were debated at the 60th summit session of the General Assembly in September 2005. The Summit Declaration, which should prove to be the critical declaratory document of the international community for the early part of the 21st century, makes some fundamental propositions: – Reaffirmation of collective security, which rests on ‘effective co-operation ... against trans-national threats’ facing a ‘global and interdependent world’, which had to be tackled at the global, regional and national levels; – Identification of ‘three pillars’ of the UN system that form the foundations of collective security’: development, security and human rights; – Reaffirmation of pacific settlement of all disputes in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter; – Renewed commitment to a ‘culture of [conflict] prevention’ to address the interconnected security and development challenges facing the world; – Reaffirmation that the UN Charter provisions on the use of force are sufficient to address the ‘full range of security threats’.43 The landmark achievement of the Summit was the new doctrine of ‘responsibility to protect’. The international community, through the United Nations, now recognises the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means ‘in accordance with Chapter VI and VIII of the Charter’, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. It is prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the UN Charter including Chapter VII, in a case-by-case basis, and ‘in co-operation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate’, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail so to protect their populations.44 In addition, the Summit recognised the ‘important contribution’ being made by regional organizations to peace and security, and the importance of forging ‘predictable partnerships’ between them and the UN. Global leaders supported a ‘stronger relationship between the UN and re-

43. World Summit Outcome Document (adopted as A/60/L.1 on 15 September 2005), adopted by UN General Assembly as resolution A/RES/60/1 on 16 September 2005, paras. 7, 9, 71-80. 44. Ibid. para 139

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ gional and sub-regional organizations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter’. They therefore resolved to: – expand co-operation through formalised agreements between the respective secretariats, and as appropriate, involvement of regional organizations in the work of the Security Council; – ensure that regional organizations that had the capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping consider the option of placing such capacities in the UNSAS framework; – strengthen co-operation in the areas economic, social and cultural fields.45 The 60th Summit Declaration will no doubt be seen as a landmark document of the contemporary age. Despite this, one major accomplishment was missing. The Assembly failed to reach agreement over an enlarged composition of the Security Council – the most important and pressing challenge of all in the restructuring of the ‘architecture of peace’. National rivalries (India and Pakistan, China and Japan, Italy and Germany, Brazil and Argentina) assigned the aspirations of the Group of Four46 to permanent Council membership to failure. Political tensions ran high from national rivalry over Security Council composition during 2005, and always will every time the issue is reopened on the basis of national membership. The future legitimacy of the body, which rests on a broader and more equitable representation, is likely to be achieved only through some form of regional institutional representation of an inclusive nature rather than national rivalry that necessitates the exclusion of many. This is the fundamental premise on which the prescriptive part of the book rests.

1.2.5 International Security and Regional Security What is the significance of this historical evolution in, and contemporary challenge to, modern security thinking for the relationship between the global and the regional approach to the international order? By and large,

45. Ibid. paras. 93, 170 46. The Group of Four (Germany, Japan, India and Brazil), seeking permanent membership of the Security Council, circulated a draft UNGA resolution in July 2005. This was quickly followed by a rival draft by the so-called Coffee Club composed of the ‘second-tier’ rivals.

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Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ the steady circumscription on ‘warfare’ as opposed to ‘conflict’ has been observed equally by all regions, and equally as between regions and the universal body. But as the UN Security Council increasingly acts as a body of global governance rather than as simply an instrument of international peace, the doctrinal issues underpinning the system become more relevant to the issue of legitimacy. In this event, the views of different regions – usually coinciding, occasionally competing, sometimes clashing – become more relevant to both public opinion and official policy-making at the global level. More specifically, with the transformation underway both in the Security Council and the policy-making community generally, in threat perception, the question arises of the relationship between a ‘threat to international peace and security’ and a ‘threat to regional peace and security’. Under the Charter no distinction exists; a threat to regional peace comprises, ipso facto, a threat to international peace and security. On many occasions the Council has determined that a situation constitutes a ‘threat to peace and security in the region’.47 On other occasions, however, it has determined that a conflict constitutes a ‘threat to international peace and security’.48 Although it is not a hard-and-fast rule, there is a discernible tendency by the Council to draw such a distinction and rely on regional, sub-regional or cross-regional organizations in the former cases, and to rely on multinational forces under its own direct authority in the latter cases. This distinction, both in a theoretical and a practical sense, could be subject to further research. It is within the context of the above historical developments and contemporary challenges that the development of a regional-global security mechanism is to be pursued. The current doctrinal tension lies between three visions of change in the contemporary multilateral system. – There is what might be termed ‘selective change’ – the view of the superpower that some aspects of international law require a certain refraction to accommodate political initiatives it deems necessary for protection in the 21st century, and that the UN must adapt accordingly if it is to avoid irrelevancy of historic proportions. – Arraigned against this is what can be called ‘institutional reform’ – articulated principally by African, Arab and Asian nations – calling for 47. Examples include Albania (S/RES/1101, 28 March 1997); Liberia (S/RES 788, 19 November 1992) 48. Examples include Libya (S/RES/748, 21 January 1992); Afghanistan (S/RES/1267, 15 October 1998, and S/RES/1368, 12 September 2001).

48

Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ broad change to UN organs in order to redress structural inequalities and inequities. – Between these rather polarized positions, there is ‘positive continuity’ – articulated principally by European countries – of an ‘effective multilateralism’ that reaffirms the current principles and precepts of the United Nations. That the first call for change comes from the superpower that has traditionally favoured a centralized global body in the maintenance of peace and security while the other two positions reflect more regionalised views, is of considerable significance. That context sets the backdrop for the remainder of this study.

Table 1 ‘Threats to the Peace’: Evolution in Security Council Judgement (i) Inter-State Crises Matter

Year

Conflict Area

UNSC Resolution

Inter-state hostilities

1948

Israel/Arab states (Palestine) Greece/Turkey (Cyprus) India/Pakistan (Bangladesh) Iraq-Iran South Africa/Namibia Armenia/Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) Eritrea-Ethiopia Yugoslavia/Croatia (Croatia) Israel/Iraq (nuclear reactor)

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1964/74 1971 1982 1985 1993 1999 Inter-state ceasefire violations 1993 Inter-state pre-emptive strike

1981

186/353 303/307 [UNGA 2793] 514 566 822 1227 807 487

(ii) Decolonization Crises Guerrilla action 1963 Independence 1964/66 declaration Annexation of UN Trust Terri- 1999 tory

Portuguese Territories Southern Rhodesia

180 217/221

Timor Leste

1264

49

Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ (iii) Regional Crises Hostile racist policies towards 1985 neighbouring states Support for rebel neighbours 1999

South Africa

566

Liberia

1270

Libya

748

(iv) Challenge to Council Authority Suspected ‘terrorist’ action: non-compliance with resol.

Suspected WMDs/missiles; non-compliance with resol.

1992

1996 Sudan 1999/2001 Afghanistan

1070 1267/1386

2002

1441

Iraq

(v) Internal Crises Repression of secessionist movement

1991/92

Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina) 1993 Georgia (Abkhazia) 1998 Kosovo Racist policies 1963/72/7 South Africa 6/79 ‘Failed state’ 1992 Somalia Civil war/disorder 1961 Congo 1992 Liberia 1997 Albania 1997 CAR 2000 DR Congo 2001 FYR Macedonia 2003 Cote d’Ivoire 2004 Sudan Restoration of legitimate govt. 1994 Haiti 1997 Sierra Leone ‘Very numerous killings’ 1994 Rwanda Magnitude of humanitarian 1996 Zaire crisis

713/757 858 1199 181/311/392/4 47 733 161 788 1101 1125 1291 [PRST 2001/7] 1464 1564 841 1132 918 1078

(vi) International Terrorism Terrorism

50

2001 2002 2002 2002 2003 2003

[in Afghanistan] [in Indonesia] [in Russia] [in Kenya] [in Colombia] [in Turkey]

1373 1438 1440 1450 1465 1516

Regionalism in Context: Constructing the ‘Architecture of Peace’ (vii) Generic Threats WMD proliferation

1992

Global

International Terrorism

2001

Global

2003

Global

2003

[West Africa]

Small Arms

S/23500[Declaration] 1377 [Declaration] 1456 [Declaration] 1467

Notes: The Council has declared a ‘breach of the peace’ on four occasions, viz. June 1950 Korea April 1982 UK-Argentina (Falklands/Malvinas Islands) July 1987 Iraq-Iran Aug. 1990 Iraq-Kuwait It has determined an ‘act of aggression’ on three occasions, viz. March 1976 South Africa (against Angola) Nov. 1979 Southern Rhodesia (against Rep. of Zambia) Oct. 1985 Israel (against Tunisia) The General Assembly, under the ‘Uniting for Peace’ procedure (resolution 498, of 1 February 1951) also determined an ‘act of aggression’ on one occasion, viz. Feb. 1951 Peoples’ Republic of China (in Korea)

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2. Regionalism under Construction. Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ “ [In late 1943] Roosevelt and Churchill met with Stalin in Tehran. Here, Roosevelt convinced Stalin to back a centralized organization with a heavy Big Four presence in place of the regional-based body that Churchill (and Stalin) had long sought.” Stephen C. Schlesinger ‘Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations’

The structural relationship between the Security Council and the regional organizations is fundamental to the maintenance of international peace and security. The construction of the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ to date is best understood as comprising three distinct periods: shaping the constitutional relationship (1919-45); building the institutional network (1946-92); and developing a framework for co-operation (1992- ). The constitutional, institutional and co-operation phases of the development of the mechanism bring us to the present time – a third ‘moment of opportunity’ in which development of the co-operative framework has yet to run its course.

2.1 The Constitutional Phase: Shaping the Relationship The fundamental relationship between universalism and regionalism in security doctrine has been slowly shaped in the two formative moments of institutional planning: 1919 and 1942-45. The deliberations over both the League and the UN have laid the foundations for the present system. 53

Regionalism under Construction. A paradox is implicit in the League’s approach to regional-global security. The wholesale embrace of global security in the Covenant did not mean that regionalism was non-existent in the search for international peace and security. There was, for example, one major exception to the universal approach to security written into the League’s Covenant, upon US insistence, namely: “nothing ... shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace”.1 The United States, whose president was the chief architect of the League, was determined to ensure that its regional hegemony for security in the Americas would not be adversely affected by the new experiment in collective security at the global level. In one sense the security arrangement embodied by the League was, to some extent, an essentially regional affair, being wrought in the aftermath of the Great War in Europe and designed to prevent any repetition thereof – with the same approach being applicable to Latin America. The US, however, saw the League in diametrically opposite terms: as a vehicle for the translation of a successful regional security mechanism (in the Americas) onto the world stage in the first attempt at global collective security.2 The ‘paradox of the League’ was thus that, while the organization promoted global security and eschewed a regional mechanism, its underlying concept of collective security had been taken from a regional arrangement as the model. Overall, however, regionalism played no significant role in the League’s attempts at conflict resolution and management, ill-fated as they were. 1. 2.

Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919, article 21 See, for example, Margaret MacMillan, ‘Peacemakers: Six Months that Changed the World’ (John Murray, London; 2001): “Wilson tended to draw on Latin American examples since most of his formative experience in foreign relations had been there. He had recast, at least to his own satisfaction, the Monroe Doctrine, that famous defiance hurled at the Europeans in 1823 to warn them off attempting to colonize the New World again. The doctrine had become a fundamental precept in American foreign policy, a cloak, many said, for US dominance of its neighbours. Wilson saw it rather as the framework within which all the nations of the Americas worked peacefully together, and was a model for the warring European nations.” p. 17. And: “Wilson introduced a carefully worded amendment to the effect that nothing in the League covenant would affect the validity of the Monroe Doctrine, designed to preserve the peace. ... It was a model for the League.” p. 105.

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Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’

2.1.1 Drafting: Contest between Universalism and Regionalism In the early planning for a new world organization during World War II, the issue of ‘security regionalism’ became a matter of considerable dispute among the framers of the initial outline. Within the US State Department, where initial planning was concentrated in the early 1940s, disagreement arose. The preliminary outline of an ‘interim UN’ envisaged 26 Member States, with an Executive Committee of nine, comprising the Big Four which had ‘policing duties’ (US, UK, USSR and China) and five ‘regional representatives’. The ‘regional nature’ of such an Executive Committee, however, was subsequently opposed by a majority of the official planners, including the President, and the outline was dropped.3 Yet in October 1942, when the first full draft of a charter was presented to the President, regionalism was re-incorporated – this time with seven regions. When confronted again with the ‘regional idea’, the President doubted whether ‘amorphous entities’ such as the Pacific and the Middle East could be properly organized to serve as Security Council members.4 During the following year there were widening policy differences within the US State Dept. over a ‘regional UN’.5 At the critical meeting with the President in February 1944, universalism triumphed over regionalism in

3.

4. 5.

“Franklin Roosevelt was not sure in which direction he wanted to go. Sometimes he expressed more sympathy to regionalism, a position held by Winston Churchill, who, as a balance-of-power partisan, wanted councils for Asia, Europe, and the Americas. At other times, FDR drifted in the direction of a unitary global body proposed by Pasvolsky and Hull. No matter how he was ultimately going to decide, though, Roosevelt adhered unswervingly to one central realpolitik tenet derived from his disillusionment with the League’s enforcement operations, that the four major powers – China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States – should act as policemen and provide the security for any world organization.” Stephen C. Schlesinger, ‘Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations’ (Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 2003) pp. 39-40. Ibid. pp. 40-41. “Hull immediately began a series of executive actions to seize back authority from Welles. First, he instructed Welles’ sub-committee to focus on a ‘universal rather than regional basis’ for the post-war assembly. The committee quickly agreed. Next, he began to lobby Roosevelt directly to change his views about regional autonomy. ... Basically, Hull and his entourage contended that regional councils might break up the Big Four coalition, could dilute the UN’s authority, and would undoubtedly interfere with the capacity of the world body to deter war – as well as diminish the enthusiasm of Americans for the UN.” Ibid. pp. 42-43.

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Regionalism under Construction. the US planning for the Security Council.6 For its part the UK favoured regionalism over a central authority, even envisaging a series of regional councils – a Council of Europe, for example, and a Council of Asia, maintaining regional peace and security under the roof of the United Nations.7 At Dumbarton Oaks in August 1944, the US then reached a compromise agreement with the UK, which was later endorsed by the USSR. This acknowledged the possibility of regional agencies and arrangements in the future with a degree of autonomy while ‘mildly discouraging them’.8

6.

7.

8.

Hull and Pasvolsky met with Roosevelt again on February 3. In what was later seen as a historic turning point, Roosevelt placed his official imprimatur on the latest Pasvolsky draft... Roosevelt also told Hull and Pasvolsky that he thought the General Assembly should elect smaller states to Council membership – which meant, as Pasvolsky put it, that ‘the regional principle goes out’. Ibid. p. 46. “As far as Churchill is concerned, we know that he originally visualised a concept of the post-war world which differed from the American one. He sympathised, it is true, with Roosevelt’s concept of the Four Great Powers, as a kind of directorate leading a world of nation-states and guaranteeing their peaceful behaviour. Deviating from this concept, however, Churchill wanted to entrust the peacekeeping function to regional organizations – a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia under the common roof of the world organization.” Grewe, W.G. in Bruno Simma, Ed., ‘The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary’ (OUP, Oxford; 1995), p. 7. “Next the British and Americans reached a compromise (later accepted by the Russians) on the question of regionalism based on a paper presented by Pasvolsky entitled ‘Role of Local and Regional Agencies’. Pasvolsky had originally emphasized the subordination of regional groupings to the Security Council, but the US delegation finally gave way somewhat to the British position, which favored a higher profile for regional assemblies. It accepted language stating that ‘nothing in the charter should preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies’. Washington, struggling to accommodate to its own regional pan-American Congress, was, in any event, in an ambivalent frame of mind about the matter. In acquiescing to the amended phraseology, it was, in effect, mildly discouraging regional bodies while somewhat enhancing their autonomy”. Schlesinger, p. 49 Compare Simma: “... the ideas of some realists (like Churchill), aiming at regional agencies for the preservation of peace, also failed to succeed. The promoters of such ideas were forced to recognise that the US was aiming firmly at a universal peace-enforcing mechanism which would accommodate regional agencies under the roof of the central authority and, in particular, under the guidance of the Security Council.” Simma, p. 9.

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Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’

2.1.2 Negotiating: Self-Defence as the Compromise The issue of regionalism, however, continued to be a preoccupation in the final preparatory process for the United Nations. In February 1945, in a meeting with the US, Latin American states made it clear that, while they wished to endorse the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, they also aspired to establish their own Latin American security system, separate from the UN. The US sought a way to mediate between the two impulses, global and regional. The resulting Act of Chapultepec (March 1945) enshrined what was to become the first post-war collective defence arrangement: an attack on one state in the region would be considered an attack on all and would demand immediate collective consultation – though not necessarily a military response. In preparing for the San Francisco conference the Latin bloc of 19 countries signalled that they wanted official recognition of Latin ‘methods and procedures’ in settling local controversies.9 The Latin American bloc was not the only source of support for the regional approach to international security. A major power and putative permanent member of the future Security Council, France, harboured its own anxieties, conveying its concern that regional treaties might be ‘subordinated to the previous agreement by the Security Council’. Such a development, France held, could be dangerous because the ‘automatic nature of regional pacts is ... the essential element of collective security’. France secured Belgian support and approached the UK over a proposed amendment that would clarify the section on regional arrangements.10 France had, for its part, decided to forgo the fifth permanent seat on the Council that had been assigned to it, and had become the leading force of the groups opposing the veto. It was, however, persuaded by the United States to change its policy, accepting a permanent seat with the veto and dropping its ‘regional concerns’.11 At the San Francisco conference in May 1945, the issue of regionalism or universalism became one of the major points of controversy. Of the 50 delegations present, about 30 advocated a regionalist approach – the 20 Latin American, the six Arab and four of the European states (Belgium,

9. Schlesinger, p. 66 10. US National Archives & Records Administration, Record group 457 (Records of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service), ‘Magic Diplomatic Summaries’ 1942-45; 13 April 1945, pp. 6-7. Cited in Schlesinger, p. 101. 11. Ibid. p. 102.

57

France, Netherlands and the UK).12 The Latin bloc in particular mounted pressure against the provision in the draft charter that would accord the Security Council power to veto any action by a regional body. It understood that the USSR, determined to pre-empt any Axis revival, had gained an exemption for itself in this respect in Europe. The Latin Americans wished for a similar exemption. Without this, they feared the prospect of a foreign power attacking them with the impunity of a Security Council veto on any collective regional response. They went as far as to insist that the inter-American security pact should be ‘completely free of the world arrangement’. This proposal caused serious division within the US delegation and between the US and the Latin bloc.13 It was also rumoured that the Arab states were trying to broaden the fight against the regional veto.14 The proposal was leaked to, and assailed by, the media which accused the Latin bloc of throwing a ‘flying wedge into the very soul of the organization’.15 A related proposal was put forward by Chile which sought an amendment concerning the treatment of regionally limited conflicts. In such

12. Simma, B., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary’ (OUP, Oxford; 1995) p. 685, fn. 17 13. “[The US Secretary of State] sharply reminded the [Latin] ministers that ‘the primary goal was the world organization and that the success of the San Francisco Conference must not be impaired by any exaggerated emphasis on regionalism’. [He] pressed his point that the Latins must decide whether they were seeking a world body or a regional body. He warned too that ‘rumours of the desire of the American republics to build a fence around the Hemisphere were causing a great deal of damage. We cannot let the policy of hemispheric solidarity interfere with a world system of security’.” Schlesinger p. 186. 14. “They [the Latin Americans] were even dismayed that the Monroe Doctrine, long resented by Latin Americans as an instrument for unilateral intervention, might be discarded. They insisted in the end that the inter-American security pact should be ‘completely free of the world arrangement’. Pasvolsky disagreed, arguing that, from his perspective, the real danger for the UN were regional alliances because they could subvert, if not destroy, the world organization. Regional groupings of any sort for Pasvolsky, as was true for his old boss, Cordell Hull, were ‘reprehensible spheres of influence’. ... ‘If we open up the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to allow for regional enforcement action on a collective basis’, he warned, ‘the world organization is finished.’ He drew a picture: ‘We then move into a system in which we rely for our security on regional groups, large states with their spheres of influence surrounded by groups of smaller states. We will convert the world into armed camps and end up with a world war unlike anything we have yet seen’. ” Ibid; pp. 176-181. 15. Washington Post, in Ibid; p. 182

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Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ cases, Chile suggested, other states outside the region should not be obliged to participate in military enforcement measures.16 These issues proved to be contentious. The close nexus between regionalism and global security was reflected in the institutional structure of the negotiations at San Francisco, where Commission III focused on the Security Council and regional bodies. The proposal by the Latin American bloc, however, that its regional Act of Chapultepec be specifically exempted from the Charter provisions encountered opposition at the Conference, not least by the UK which feared the emergence of similar demands for regional exemption from the Arab states and perhaps elsewhere. The resulting compromise proved to be fateful. Finally negotiators introduced into the Charter the principle of the ‘inherent right of individual and collective self-defence’ in case of armed attack. The aim was to convince ‘regionalists’ of their freedoms to respond to aggression from outside their region without being hobbled by any Security Council stalemate. Explicit provision for self-defence had not been included in the Dumbarton Oaks draft and was not inserted in the Charter until midMay 1945, half way through the San Francisco Conference and five weeks before final agreement on the Charter was reached. In the view of some authorities article 51 saved the international community, or at least the West, from a dire fate.17 But the self-defence article was to have enormous repercussions for the way in which international security is prosecuted, as is shown later in this study.

2.1.3 Agreeing: Regionalism in the Charter The final provisions agreed upon in the Charter reflect the ‘mild discouragement’ of regionalism. Under the UN Charter the primary responsibil16. INCIO III, pp. 282-91 at 284, DOC.2G/7(i), quoted in Simma, B, The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (OUP, Oxford, 1995) p. 129 17. “Hence, John Foster Dulles called Article 51 ‘of incalculable value’. Without it, he observed, ‘the Soviet Union would have had an unlimited right to prevent organization of effective agreements against its own possible aggression’.” In Schlesinger, p. 192. Other interpretations are varied: Evan Luard suggests that article 51 substantially lessened the UN’s ‘revolutionary significance’ as a world enforcement agency. Gabriel Kolko believes the article gave ‘spheres of influence and competing blocs a formal legal structure’. Carey Reich is of the view that it hobbled UN peacekeeping and turned the UN into a ‘helpless bystander to bloody conflicts to come’. (Ibid. p. 191)

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Regionalism under Construction. ity for international peace and security rests with the Security Council.18 The Council determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.19 It makes recommendations, or decides what measures will be taken to maintain or restore peace. The Council’s powers include provisional measures, the application of sanctions, and military action.20 (a) Establishing Regionalism The Charter also, however, allows for regional security arrangements for the maintenance of peace and security as a support to the primary role exercised by the Security Council. Nothing, says the Charter, is to preclude the existence of regional agencies for dealing with international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided they are compatible with its purposes and principles.21 But this was not provided through any prefabricated mechanism. Instead, the Charter made provision for a dimly-conceived and vaguely apprehended regionalism. (b) Encouraging Regional Pacific Settlement The critical distinction in the maintenance of international peace and security is between pacific settlement and enforcement action. Under the Charter, Member States entering into such regional arrangements shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements before referring them to the Security Council.22 Indeed the Council is to encourage pacific settlement through regional action.23 (c) Authorising Regional Enforcement Under the Charter, the Security Council has far-reaching powers to – determine a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression;24 – decide upon provisional measures or sanctions to restore peace;25 and, as necessary – take military action by air, sea or land forces to restore peace.26 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

Article 24.1 Article 39 Articles 40, 41, 42. Article 52.1 Article 52.2 Article 52.3 Article 39 Articles 40, 41 Article 42.

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Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ In doing so, the Security Council has ‘primary’ but not exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. That responsibility is also theoretically revocable – it is ‘conferred’ upon it by the UN Member States. In carrying out its duties under this responsibility, the Council acts on their behalf.27 When it comes to enforcement action, the Charter is clear on the globalregional functional relationship. It shall, where appropriate, utilise such regional arrangements for enforcement action ‘under its authority’. But no regional enforcement action shall be undertaken without the Council’s authorization28. And the Council is to be kept fully informed at all times by regional agencies of activities for the maintenance of peace.29 Thus, in considering the actions of regional organizations in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building, there exists a critical distinction between pacific settlement (in which regional bodies have considerable latitude to take initiatives) and enforcement (in which they are completely subject to Security Council approval and oversight). But, as noted in chapter 1, that distinction is a fine one in the real world of crisis and conflict, and it is often difficult to perceive and obtain consensus on which activities are peacekeeping and which are enforcement. The historical experience shows that the situation as it is understood in the Security Council, in capitals, and in the field is always complicated and often confusing.

2.1.4 Chapter VIII in a Constitutional Context Chapter VIII must not be regarded as a ‘linear part’ of the Charter. It is exogenous to the other chapters, including the three ‘functional chapters’ immediately before and after it pertaining to peace and security (chapters VI, VII and IX). Essentially, the ‘architecture of peace’ that is contained in the UN Charter and elaborated upon in doctrinal refinement over the past decade applies, mutatis mutandis, to regional agencies in the same manner as it does to the UN Security Council – with the important modification of delegated and subordinate authority. 27. Article 24. 28. Article 53.1 29. Article 54

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Regionalism under Construction.

2.2 The Institutional Phase: The Growth of Organizations If the League of Nations contained a paradox in the early regional-global relationship, the UN contained something of a chimera. Despite the operational relationship between the Security Council and regional agencies and arrangements enshrined in the Charter, virtually no such agencies or arrangements existed at the time. The provisions pertaining to a regional-global security mechanism reflected only a future abstraction in the minds of the framers. It took the following four decades for the institutions that have become known as ‘regional organizations’ to come into existence. The forty-year period of the Cold War functionally paralysed the Security Council and thus the development of any regional-global security mechanism. It was during this period, however, that time was allowed for the decolonisation process to run its course and witness the growth and consolidation of regional agencies in virtually all regions of the world. In fact the 1940s saw the creation of regional agencies in the two regions in which the political consciousness of ‘regionalism’ was most developed at that time – Latin America and the Arab world. It was no accident that it was these two regions that had been the most vocal proponents of regional security during the ‘constitutional phase’. This was followed in the 1950s with a burst of creativity in European regional institution-building of a kind unparalleled before or since. The European integration movement, designed primarily to ensure the avoidance of conflict, continues apace with the simultaneous ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ processes half a century later. The ineluctable process of regionalisation continued through the ensuing three decades. Once the decolonisation process had run its course in Africa and Asia in the 1960s and the Caribbean and the Pacific in the ‘70s, supplemented by ‘latecomers’ in the ‘80s and the newly-independent states of Central Asia in the ‘90s, a global network of regional (and subregional) agencies was finally in place. This evolutionary development is shown in Table 2.A.

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Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ Table 2.A Historical Development of ‘Regional Organizations’* Year

Africa

1945 1947 1948 1949

Americas

1996 1997 1999 2001 2002

Asia

Pacific

Arab World LAS

[SPC] OAS COE NATO

1951 1952 1955 1958 1957 1960 1963 1966 1967 1971 1973 1974 1975 1976 1981 1983 1985 1986 1989 1991 1992 1993 1994

Europe

ANZUS Nordic Cncl [ECSC] WEU NORAD [EEC] CACM [OAU] UDEAC [EC]

ASEAN PIF

MRU

CARICOM

ECOWAS CEPGL

LAES

[CSCE]

OECS

GCC

CEEAC SAARC [IGADD] APEC SADC

ARF IGAD

AMU MERCOSURCIS CBSS EU OSCE SEECP PC CSTO SCO

AU

Notes: Includes only sub-regional as well as regional organizations and cross-regional, not trans-national [see Box 4.A]. See Glossary for full names of organizations. Organizations in bold are political-security oriented; others have economic functions. Organizations in brackets are predecessors of subsequent agencies identified (AU and EU).

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Regionalism under Construction. The creation and development of such regional ‘arrangements and agencies’ in the security area proceeded largely independently of the UN Charter provision, reflecting rather more the political and security exigencies of each region at a particular point in time. The development of the regional mechanism, inside and outside the UN system, and in both economic and security areas, was spread over time and bore little relationship to the UN provisions as such.

2.3 The Co-operation Phase: Regular Meetings and the HighLevel Panel Concomitantly with the development of the global ‘fabric of peace’ developed during the 1990s, the UN began to act on the recognition of the potential for greater involvement of regional agencies in a co-operative relationship with the UN in the pursuit of international security. In 1992 Russia put forward a proposal aimed at improving co-operation between the UN and regional organizations. The proposal included the suggestion that regional organizations create peace-making forces and police units that would be at the disposal of the Security Council for enforcement under its guidance.30 A series of meetings has been held since the mid-1990s designed to develop a strategic partnership between the global body and the regional agencies. This has taken two forms: (a) a series of five high-level meetings of the UN Secretary-General and UN specialised agencies with regional organizations, and (b) two general meetings between the Security Council and regional organizations.

2.3.1 The General Assembly Declaration In January 1993 the Security Council invited regional organizations31 to study ways of strengthening their functions in peace and security and, within this context, to improve co-ordination with the UN. In the course of the year the Secretary-General signalled his intention to develop a ‘set 30. UN Doc. A/AC/1992/CRP.1, Add. 5. Also Doc. A/AC.182/L.72 (1992), in Simma, p. 1188. 31. The formal reference, within the UN, is always to ‘regional organizations and arrangements’. For brevity this study will, henceforth, refer to ‘regional organizations’ or ‘ROs’.

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Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ of guidelines’ governing such co-operation and this was welcomed by the General Assembly.32 In 1994, reflecting the new interest in regionalism, the General Assembly adopted a declaration on the enhancement of co-operation between the United Nations and regional arrangements or agencies. The initiative was undertaken in the context of the committee work on strengthening the role of the Organization. The Declaration, however, is little more than a reiteration of the provisions of chapter VIII of the Charter, identifying in addition possible areas of co-operation in information-sharing, personnel exchanges, field operation training and regional participation in the work of UN organs.33

2.3.2 UN High-Level Meetings Since then six ‘high-level meetings’ (HLMs) have been held between the UN Secretariat and regional agency heads. The first four meetings, held between 1994 and early 2001, focused on the prevention of armed conflict; and strengthening the ‘fabric of peace’ through global-regional cooperation. Subsequent to September 2001, the fifth high-level meeting with the UN Secretary-General was held in July 2003, reflecting the changed security environment that had already developed since then. The sixth, held in July 2005, introduced procedural innovations of potentially far-reaching significance. (a) ‘Flexible and Pragmatic Approach’: First HLM (August 1994) The first meeting, involving ten organizations, focused on three areas: issues of intervention, principles of action and modalities for co-operation. A ‘universal model’ of co-operation was eschewed in favour of a flexible and pragmatic approach to the UN/regional agency relationship in crises. Financial constraint was cited as the main obstacle to regional peace initiatives. 34 (b) ‘Resources for Peacemaking and Peacekeeping’: Second HLM (February 1996) The second meeting, attended by thirteen organizations, focused on peacemaking and peacekeeping. The problem of limited resources was discussed and the OSCE made suggestions for sharing its knowledge and 32. A/RES/48/42 (para 63), 10 December 1993 33. A/RES/49/57, 9 December 1994 34. UN Press Release, SG/2020, 12 February 1996

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Regionalism under Construction. expertise with other regional agencies. The need for impartiality by regional agencies in dealing with conflicts in their regions was also raised, in the context of determining the ‘comparative advantage’ of global and regional organizations in conflict prevention and management. 35 (c) ‘Modalities for Conflict Prevention’: Third HLM (July 1998) The third meeting identified two ‘categories of co-operation’ for developing a ‘culture of prevention’ of conflict. ‘Structural prevention’ would address the root causes of conflict and seek to strengthen human rights, the rule of law and democratic institutions. ‘Operational prevention’ would encompass early warning, preventive diplomacy and disarmament, and preventive deployment.36 Both the UN and regional agencies stressed the need to develop specific ‘modalities for co-operation’ on conflict prevention. No single model was seen as universally applicable but 13 ‘modalities’ were identified.37 They included: – more regular consultation at UN headquarters – better field co-ordination including joint missions – common indicators for early warning – a common conflict-prevention capability data base – better information flow – liaison officer exchanges – mutual working-level visits – joint training in conflict prevention – civil society involvement in awareness-raising.38 It was agreed that these modalities needed to be further developed at the working level. (d) A ‘Co-operation Framework for Peace-building’: Fourth HLM (February 2001) The fourth meeting, attended by 16 regional and international organizations, identified eight ‘guiding principles’ for co-operation in peacebuilding. These were: – Self-reliance: Peace-building needed to be a ‘home-grown process’ 35. SG/SM/5895, 14 February 1996 36. Summary Statement of UNSG at conclusion of Third HLM, A/52/1021, S/1998/785, 21 August 1998, Annex, para 4. 37. S/2001/138, Annex III, Section III, 14 February 2001. 38. AS/52/1021, S/1998/785, 21 August 1998, para. 7.

66

Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ – Rapid Response: There should be an ‘optimum mobilization of resources’ – Non-recidivism: Peace-building should prevent the recurrence of conflict – Comparative Advantage: co-operation should reflect complementarity of effort – Multi-disciplinarity: Five ‘key areas’ should reflect a multidisciplinary approach, viz. security stabilization, good governance, democratisation and human rights, justice and reconciliation, and humanitarian relief and sustainable development. – International Assistance: Such assistance should complement national efforts. – Impartiality: Peace-building should reflect ‘need’ rather than ‘geographic preference’ – Legitimacy: Peace-building must rest on international legitimacy.39 Possible areas for future co-operation were identified as capacity-building, strategic development, operational interaction and monitoring. There was a need to mobilize political will and more resources for the task ahead. A working level meeting to develop the agreed modalities in both conflict prevention and peace-building was planned for late-2001. The Secretary-General emphasised that each organization needed to conduct its peace-building activities ‘on the basis of its own mandate’ so as to ensure the legitimacy of its actions.40 (e) ‘Responding to the New Security Challenges’: Fifth HLM (July 2003) The fifth HLM, attended by 19 regional and international organizations,41 was of a qualitatively different order from the four previous meetings, focusing on the need for the international community to provide effective responses to the ‘current challenges to global peace and security’.42 While these challenges were not new, they were ‘converging in novel ways and at an increasing speed’. Broad agreement was reached between the UN 39. S/2001/138, 14 February 2001, Annex I, Section I, 14 February 2001. 40. Ibid. Annex II. 41. It is usually claimed that this meeting was attended by 21 organizations. In fact, three of those represented one regional entity – the European Union Presidency, the European Commission and the European Council of Ministers (see Table 2.B). To assert that 21 organizations attended is to undermine the notion of the EU as a single regional agency. 42. UN News Centre, 30 July 2003

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Regionalism under Construction. and regional agencies over the major threats to global peace and security facing the international community in the early 21st century. This achievement, however, was overshadowed by a certain dread over the way the international community was divided by the Iraq crisis. In a clear statement of concern over the developments in Iraq, the meeting reaffirmed the role of multilateralism in general. In a ‘serious exchange’ over the implications of the use of force, participants reaffirmed that force should be used only in accordance with the UN Charter, under the Security Council’s authority.43 (f) Introducing Procedural Structures: Sixth HLM (July 2005) The preparations for the Sixth HLM were more thorough than before, with six working groups44 producing some 16 proposals for action to strengthen the regional-global mechanism, all of which were adopted. Among these was endorsement of a ‘Regional Capacity Survey’ to be undertaken of all regional, sub-regional and other organizations in the area of peace and security. One minor but significant development was the theoretical distinction drawn, for the first time, between ‘regional organizations’ and ‘other inter-governmental organizations’ attending the HLM. The UN stopped short, however, of actually identifying which participating organizations were in either category. A potentially far-reaching development was the agreement by the UN-regional leaders to establish a Standing Committee from within their own ranks. The Committee would meet between high-level meetings and oversee the further work of the working groups and streamline the process of strengthening the operational partnership.45 (g) General Observations It is clear from the above that the United Nations is serious in seeking to develop a ‘regional-global security mechanism’ for the 21st century. Two phenomena in particular characterise to date the experience in strategic 43. UN Secretary-General Press Release (SG/2084), 30 July 2003 44. The Working Groups focused on selected issue areas, viz., the dialogue among civilizations, peacekeeping, disarmament, humanitarian issues, human rights and counter-terrorism, and the issue of UN reform and regional organizations. 45. Conclusions of the Chairman of the Sixth High-Level Meeting between the United Nations and Regional and Other Inter-governmental Organizations, A/60/341-S/2005/567, 8 September 2005, nex.

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Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ planning for that goal: increased interest from the ‘regionals’ and the development of a normative framework of co-operation. The steady growth in attendance at the six high-level meetings is shown in Table 2.B Table 2.B Attendance at UN-Regional High-Level Meetings (1994-2005)*

Sub-Saharan Africa

North AfricaWest Asia Asia

1st 1994

2nd 1996

OAU

3rd 1998

4th 2001

5th 2003

6th 2005

OAU OAU OAU ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS SADC

AU ECOWAS

AU

LAS

LAS

LAS

LAS

CIS

CIS ASEAN

CIS

LAS

Cross-Regional Organizations

CIS ASEAN PIF WEU WEU WEU EU [+ EC + EU EU EU [+ EC] E Cncl] COE COE OAS OAS OAS OAS CARICOM CARICOM CARICOM OSCE OSCE OSCE OSCE NATO NATO NATO NATO

Trans-National Organizations

COMM COMM OIC OIC

COMM OIC IOF

COMM OIC IOF

Total No.

10

14

16

Pacific Europe

America

13

CIS ASEAN PIF EU [+ EC + E Cncl] COE OAS CARICOM OSCE NATO CSTO SCO COMM OIC IOF CPLP Interpol 19

SADC ECCAS LAS CIS PIF EU [+ EC + E Cncl] COE OAS CARICOM OSCE NATO CSTO SCO COMM OIC IOF CPLP Interpol OPCW 20

* Categorisation of organizations is explained in Chapter 4.

The table shows that interest in strategic planning for a ‘regional-global security mechanism’ has grown significantly. Yet it is clear that there is considerable progress still to be made in the attendance. No representation has come from South Asia or East Asia, the two most populous subregions of all. And sub-regional attendance is light from East Africa, 69

Regionalism under Construction. Southern Africa and Central Africa – all areas where conflict or tension remains rife. As a result of the efforts to date in constructing a ‘framework for co-operation’ between the Council and regional agencies, nine principles can be discerned (see Box 2.A). Their relevance to the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ in the real world of conflict prevention and management will be assessed throughout this study. Box 2.A ‘A Framework of Co-operation’: Nine Principles from the High-Level Meetings 1. A ‘flexible and pragmatic approach’ to regional crises, with no ‘universal model’. 2. A clear division of labour between the UN and regional agencies. 3. Regular consultations between the UN and regional agencies. 4. Mutual support in diplomatic and operational activities. 5. Joint operational deployment where appropriate. 6. Regional impartiality in handling conflicts. 7. Common conflict prevention modalities. 8. Common peace-building principles. 9. UN primacy in all crises.

2.3.3 Security Council Meetings The high-level meetings have been devoted to developing a framework of co-operation between the UN and its specialised agencies on the one hand, and the regional organizations on the other. And the focus has been on prevention and peace-building rather than dispute settlement and enforcement. Before long, however, the high-level meetings were beginning to attract the attention of the Security Council. On the completion of the fourth meeting in 2001 the Council issued a statement in which it further encouraged the UN and regional and sub-regional organizations to establish ‘consultative processes’ to ensure that peace settlements mediated by these organizations included commitments by the parties to concerted action in different areas of peace-building. The Council stressed the need to identify such areas at early stages of negotiations.46 The Council then proceeded to conduct its own meetings with regional organizations. 46. Statement by the President of the Security Council, 20 February 2001, S/PRST/2001/5

70

Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ (a) The Open Meeting (April 2003) In April 2003, the Security Council met, on the initiative of Mexico in its capacity as president for the month, for the first time with regional agencies. Only six organizations attended: the OAS, the Arab League, the African Union and ECOWAS, the European Union and the OSCE. Reflecting the ‘new realities’ of post-September 2001, the Council chose the theme ‘The Security Council and Regional Organizations: Facing New Challenges to International Peace and Security’. The stated objective of the meeting was to engender an ‘interactive dialogue’ between the Council and regional organizations.47 The meeting might perhaps mark a ‘new stage’ in international relations, since the current situation then prevailing obliged the Council to identify courses of action that would strengthen international security. It was left unclear, however, whether the meeting with the Security Council was to focus on enforcement issues exclusively or to range more broadly into issues of conflict prevention and possibly post-conflict peace-building. To the extent that it dealt with the latter ‘soft security’ issues, the Council’s focus overlapped with that of the UN high-level meetings under the SecretaryGeneral’s auspices. The fact that a few of the organizations present had not undertaken ‘hard security’ responsibilities (EU, OSCE) suggests that ‘soft security’ was indeed within the Council’s focus. The Secretary-General noted that the world was at a ‘crucial juncture in the development of the international relations system’. The meeting demonstrated the joint interest of the Security Council and the regional organizations in ‘forging common strategies’ to address the challenges faced by all. The feeling of ‘global insecurity’ had seldom been greater, nor had there been a more keenly-felt desire among peoples and nations for a peace and security framework based on the rule of law. The UN had, in the past, relied to a greater or lesser extent on regional partners – in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. There was a need to transform a sense of collective insecurity into a system of collective security – and this was the purpose of chapter VIII. “We need”, said the Secretary-General, “to move towards creating a network of effective and mutually reinforcing mechanisms – regional and global – that are flexible and responsive to the reality we live today”. The Council’s meeting with regional organizations promised to inject new momentum into ‘our partnership’

47. S/PV/4739, 11 April 2003, p. 3

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Regionalism under Construction. which, for the sake of the world’s people, had to succeed.48 The meeting was held at the height of the Iraq crisis, as the coalition’s military campaign in Iraq was concluding, two days after President Saddam Hussein’s statue had fallen in Baghdad. Despite the fraught atmosphere prevailing, the Council achieved a general consensus on the broad strategy to be followed. A consensus emerged that: – The Security Council’s primary responsibility and authority in peace and security had to be reaffirmed. – Within that context, regional organizations had an increasingly important role to play. – These considerations suggested that a ‘dynamic relationship’ between the Council and regional organizations should be developed, based on the provisions of chapter VIII. – A co-operative partnership should reflect ‘complementarity of action’ with due regard to ‘regional differentiation’. But significant differences in perception among regional organizations were evident at a more detailed level of the discussion. No detailed discussion ensued over how such a dynamic relationship, based on the twin principles of complementarity and differentiation, might be developed. As a first meeting, the regional organizations confined themselves to describing their relative strengths, so to that extent a natural complementarity emerged. These were as follows:49 – Americas: The OAS mainly faced non-traditional threats of terrorism, corruption, narcotics and arms trafficking, and trans-national crime in Latin America; and mainly natural disasters in the Caribbean. In response it had developed strengths in democracy, human rights, pacific 48. Ibid, pp. 3-4: “The feeling of global insecurity has seldom, if ever, been greater than it is today. ... Yet despite the sense of vulnerability and uncertainty that pervades the global consciousness, people and nations retain the hope of strengthening the foundations of stability and uniting around our common humanity. People look for institutions and systems to uphold shared principles and ensure multilateral solutions. ... In all these endeavours, the United Nations has relied, to a greater or lesser extent, on regional partners in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. Together, through all the turbulent years of the past few decades, we have learnt a great deal about the need to transform a sense of collective insecurity into a system of collective security. ... Now we need to redouble our efforts to find common ground and purpose again. We need to move forward towards creating a network of effective and mutually reinforcing mechanisms – regional and global – that are flexible and responsive to the reality we live in today”. 49. Ibid. p. 5 ff.

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Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ settlement and the rule of law. Its experience in both pacific settlement procedures and counter-terrorism efforts could be of use to other regional organizations. – Africa: The AU and ECOWAS noted their experience in conflict resolution and enforcement action, but pointed out the shortage of resources, especially financial. The AU had created a regional Peace & Security Council for handling disputes but there was a need for further developing ‘structural arrangements’ that would allow ‘all regions’ to participate in the collective security system. It was necessary to collectively define the relationship between the UN and regional organizations; any other approach would lead to chaos and anarchy. – Europe: The EU pledged to support the Security Council in its crisis management work.50 All such efforts needed a range of instruments from civilian to military and needed to have ‘real added value’. The EU had four priority areas in civilian crisis management: police, rule of law, administration and civil protection. – The Arab World: For its part the LAS was critical of the Security Council. After having refused to authorize the invasion of Iraq, the Council’s ‘silent acquiescence’ in the occupation had reduced it to executing policies it had not designed, ultimately being invited to legitimize the occupation itself. The Council could not legitimize a government that had been ‘artificially installed’ by foreign forces. Chapter VIII allowed regional organizations considerable leeway in the settlement of disputes – the Council should use their assistance in dealing with such crises. The OSCE, announced that it had ‘reaffirmed itself’ as a regional arrangement under chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Its work was based on the concept of comprehensive, common and indivisible security. It therefore promoted civil objectives of human rights, the rule of law, democratic institutions, free media, free and fair elections and good governance; alongside the traditional political and military aspects of security. It was developing a Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century, with an associated inventory of such threats, analyzing their nature and causes. The OSCE encouraged partnerships with other organizations in peace and security.

50. The EU spoke on behalf of the (putative) enlarged Union plus Bulgaria and Romania – 27 states in all.

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Regionalism under Construction. Security Council members themselves were generally positive and supportive of the idea of building a regional-global security mechanism. – Germany thought that the ‘remarkably promising’ contacts that were developing showed that the potential of chapter VIII was now unfolding in a positive manner. The debate under way was part of the ongoing reform of the UN. It was, however, ‘imperative’ that regional security arrangements remain mandated by the Council. In order to bring the Security Council primacy and regional complementarity in sync with each other, the dialogue should be placed on a regular substantive basis. – The United States agreed that the UN should increasingly rely on regional organizations, which had a vested interest in solving crises close to home. – The UK wondered whether regional organizations were sufficiently informed of Council decisions; and whether there should be stronger liaison among them and the UN. – Russia agreed with the LAS that it should have a greater role in maintaining peace and security in the Arab world. There should be greater interaction between the UN and regional organizations based on a clearer division of labour. Security Council authority, however, needed to be retained over enforcement. – Bulgaria believed that the Council should strengthen co-operation with regional organizations in the area of ‘soft security’ – law, democracy and human rights. – China suggested that the Security Council should summarize its experience of co-operation with the regional organizations. (b) The Thematic Debate (July 2004) A second Security Council meeting on the subject of regional organizations was convened in July 2004 on the initiative and under the presidency of Romania. Seven regional agencies and other international organizations attended (AU, CIS, EU, LAS, NATO, OSCE, and ECOWAS). One was represented by a UN Member State (ASEAN/Laos). Two agencies (COE, OAS) were invited but did not attend. Only one executive head of an agency was present (the LAS Secretary-General). The discussion reflected the more reconciliatory mood established since the first Council meeting fifteen months previous. A number of substantive points were advanced: Changing Nature of the Security Challenge The nature of the new security threats had outstripped the traditional global security framework, calling into question the strategies, measures 74

Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ and instruments of the Security Council. A greater reliance on partnership with regionals was now required. (Romania51; China; Spain52; USA53) A Regional-Global Security Mechanism Regional organizations are not just sub-contractors; there is a need to develop a ‘mutually-reinforcing partnership’ between the UN and regional organizations (UK). The Need for a ‘Regular High-Level Dialogue’ In the first Council debate in April 2003, the proposal had been advanced to carry out, on a regular basis, a high-level dialogue between the Security Council and regional organizations. The purpose would be to promote information exchange and operational co-operation. The 6th HLM in mid-2005 would be an opportunity to review progress to date in developing the mechanisms. (UN Secretary-General; Russia; Algeria; Angola; Romania) Development of Co-operation Mechanisms The UN would discuss with regional partners co-operation mechanisms for (i) civilian protection (ii) civilizational dialogue (iii) field experience in peacekeeping and peace-building. The Secretary-General is committed to implementing the specific points in the frameworks already established. (UN Secretary-General) Need for Sound Preparation & Research There was a need for sound preparatory research of the high-level meetings in the future. (Germany54; Philippines55) 51. “Today we are addressing one of the main issues of modern thinking in international relations. With the support of regional organizations, we can build a more stable foundation for peace and security in all regions of the world.” 52. “Co-operation under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides enormous opportunities.” 53. “Regional organizations have a key role to play in responding to conflict within their regions. Often, regional arrangements are the most timely and appropriate response.” 54. “[Germany] welcomed the practice of high-level meetings with the UN Secretariat and heads of regional organizations and was supportive of increasing such meetings, because, if well prepared, and if the results were meaningful, such meetings could be an important contribution to a co-ordinated and consistent multilateral approach to crisis management and peace-building;” 55. “...understanding the root causes of conflict was vital in drawing up strategies for stabilization; consultations should not only include the UN and concerned regional organizations, but also academics or regional think tanks”.

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Regionalism under Construction. Comparative Advantage of Regional Organizations Regional organizations had the advantage of physical proximity to threats and a greater understanding of them (Chile). They also had comparative advantage in human rights monitoring; and understanding the root causes of conflict which are region-specific (Brazil). They could offer a range of advantages (UK56). But the virtues of regional knowledge could be qualified by local agendas (USA57). Unrealised Potential of Certain Organizations It was important that the Arab League and the OIC play a lead role in the efforts to bring about peace in the Middle East. (Russia; Arab League; Pakistan58) Also, SAARC was now playing an important role in promoting economic and social development, and could also contribute to peace and stability. (Pakistan) For their part the regional organizations committed themselves to a strengthened co-operation with the UN: – The African Union reaffirmed its commitment to collective security and the Security Council’s primary responsibility, but the Council was not always in a position to meet the challenge and intervene. The spread of conflicts and their growing complexity called for regional involvement. – The European Union recalled that its security strategy had two pillars: preventive engagement and effective multilateralism. Under the 2003 EU-UN Joint Declaration on Crisis Management, the EU would contribute to UN-led missions. – The Arab League advised that it had a special partnership with the AU, permitting a positive partnership for peace-building under chapter IX. – ASEAN undertook to implement the ‘landmark’ General Assembly resolution 57/35 on UN-ASEAN co-operation. 56. “...regional organizations can bring a great deal to the partnership. They can provide an accepted framework in which to take forward stabilization. They have greater knowledge of the situation on the ground. In many cases they are developing appropriate, regionally-accepted norms and standards, and they match them with the right mechanisms for monitoring and enforcement.” 57. “On the one hand a troop-contributing country may share language, cultural elements and a common understanding with the host country. However, it may also have its own agenda independent of the peacekeeping agenda. We need to watch carefully for that possibility, given the goal of long-term peace and stability.” 58. “If such a regional arrangement had existed in south-west Asia, it could have played a salutary role in stabilizing both Afghanistan and Iraq, obviating the need for intervention from far-away nations.”

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Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ – The CIS reported that it was establishing a regional mechanism for conflict prevention and management. Co-operation was important for counter-terrorism and anti-drug-trafficking and anti-crime. – The OSCE was considering how early-warning systems could enhance the UN’s capacity. – Because of its imperfect experience in peacekeeping, ECOWAS ‘wholeheartedly identified’ with an ‘enhanced strategic partnership’ between the UN and regional organizations. Counter-balancing such commitment to security regionalism were some caveats which some regional organizations and States judged necessary. In ASEAN’s view, the Council debate would generate a new impetus for further enhancing UN-RO co-operation, ‘based on the principle of consent and national sovereignty and in accordance with international law and the UN Charter’. Pakistan was suspicious of regional hegemony: the participation of regional arrangements in maintaining peace and security in regions, it said, needed to be impartial. They had to facilitate peace rather than promote the agenda of any regional power. A few States argued against too formalistic a framework for regional co-operation. In France’s view, with the variety of situations and different levels of regional organization commitment, it may not be possible to set up, a priori, a framework for procedures for the division of labour, which might become more a constraint than a benefit. ‘Excessive formalism’, thought the UK, might produce an artificial approach. It would be better to create a ‘realistic dynamic’ process between the UN and regional organizations on a pragmatic, case-by-case basis. A number of proposals were advanced for future consideration, namely: – Regional Organizations in Chapter VI and Chapter VII Debates The Council should seek formulas for incorporating regional organizations in debates regarding chapters VI and VII. (Chile) – International Conference to Amendment Chapter VIII An international conference should be convened to examine issues threatening compliance with the rule of international law. Chapter VIII should be emended to take into account ‘new developments’. (LAS) – Data Bank Given the UN’s expanding duties, a ‘data bank’ could be established on the co-operative plans underway in UN-regional co-operation and the resources that are available. (Russia) 77

Regionalism under Construction. – Co-operation Framework A realistic & innovative framework for co-operation between the UN and regional organizations needed to be formulated. (Algeria) – Hostage-Situation Code of Conduct It was necessary to develop a code of conduct for hostage-taking situations. (OSCE) – Early-Warning Links A formal ECOWAS/UN early-warning link should be established. (ECOWAS) – Transitional Arrangement Improvements There was a need to work on the hand-over arrangements from a regional organization to the UN. These needed to be properly prepared, involving an exchange with the Security Council (France). – Interaction between the UN and Regional Organizations There needed to be joint appointment of special representatives, exchange of liaison officers and cross-sectoral committee co-operation. (Romania) – Creation of New Regional Agencies/Consolidation of Existing Agencies There was a need to foster the creation of regional organizations in all parts of the world. It was also necessary to consolidate emerging regional entities (Romania59). – Relate Security Council and High-Level Meetings There was a need to explore the possible synergies between the two types of meetings held with regional organizations (the Security Council meetings and the Secretary-General’s high-level meetings). This would enhance the ‘architecture of interaction’ between them. (Romania). – Relationship to UN High-Level Panel The Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel had been asked to take the role of regional organizations into account and strengthen that role, including addressing the causes of conflict such as poverty, underdevelopment and terrorism. (LAS) The Panel should advance practical 59. “We should not lose sight of the fact that while some States belong to several regional organizations, not all States are members of a regional organization. For that reason, support should be given to fostering the creation of regional organizations in all parts of the world, and to the consolidation of emerging regional entities.”

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Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ ideas of how the role of regional organizations can be carried forward (UK). Presidential Statement At the end of the debate the Council concluded that ‘regular dialogue on specific issues between the Council and regional organizations would bring significant added value’ to UN-regional co-operation for peace and security, based on ‘complementarity and comparative advantage’. It invited the Secretary-General to take into account the views of Council members in preparation for the 6th HLM in 2005 and called upon regional organizations and all parts of the UN system ‘with relevant experience and expertise, to contribute to this process.60 (See Box 2.B) Box 2.B ‘Towards a Regular Dialogue’: Statement by the President of the Security Council July 2004 “Member States and heads of regional organizations ... stressed their interest in enhancing co-operation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. They also considered that regular dialogue on specific issues between the Council and regional organizations would bring significant added value in this respect. ... The Security Council welcomes the ongoing practice of high-level meetings of the SecretaryGeneral with regional organizations and the consensus reached over modalities of co-operation in peace-building. It invites the Secretary-General to give consideration to the relevant views expressed in this debate in preparation of the next high-level meeting and to keep the Council informed as appropriate. .... The Security Council invites regional organizations to take necessary steps to increase collaboration with the United Nations in order to maximize efficiency in stabilization processes.... The Council invites all members of the United Nations and other parts of the United Nations system with relevant experience and expertise to contribute to this process.” S/PRST/2004/27, 20 July 2004

60. S/PRST/2004/27, 20 July 2004

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Regionalism under Construction. (c) The Closed ‘Counter-Terrorism’ Meeting (March 2003) In the previous year the Security Council, in a demonstration of its intensifying concern over terrorism, had had its Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) convene a special meeting with international, regional and sub-regional organizations. The objective of this meeting, which was closed to the public, was to encourage the development of a co-ordinated approach by the Council and regional organizations in the global counter-terrorism strategy. Some 39 organizations attended, including global bodies in aviation (ICAO) and customs (WCO), trans-national bodies such as OIC and Interpol, cross-regional organizations (NATO) and sub-regional organizations (such as ASEAN).61 Only nine were regional or sub-regional organizations. The Committee Chairman (UK) thought that the meeting would be an ‘historic day’ in the fight against terrorism, since it was the first time such a range of experts, professionals and officials had gathered to develop a more structured framework in counter-terrorism. The meeting considered three issues: global standards; the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in strengthening the global CT capacity; and the role of regional and international organizations in CT assistance. The aim was to develop codes and standards and agree on co-ordination mechanisms. In the Secretary-General’s view, for the counter-terrorism fight to be effective, co-operation among international, regional and sub-regional organizations was essential. Such co-operation needed to be systematic, ensuring a proper division of labour based on comparative advantage. But while there was a ‘clear and urgent need’ to prevent specific acts of terrorism, it was equally important to pursue the broader MDG vision since success in fighting poverty and injustice would help counter the conditions that served as justification to those who would commit such acts.62 The Outcome Document of the meeting showed agreement that a coordinated approach to counter-terrorism would be based on four principles, viz: – Information-sharing: including data-sharing and best practices – Complementarity: avoidance of duplication – Independent effort: within a co-ordination mandate, each would pursue its own tasks – Political momentum: Counter-terrorism efforts would be given high priority, under Security Council resolution 1373 61. UN Note 5777, 3 March 2003 62. SC/7679, 6 March 2003

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Developing a ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ The CTC undertook to act as the focal point of a range of co-ordination activities between the UN and regional organizations. It was agreed that the OAS would convene the next UN – regional counter-terrorism meeting.63 Thus, the Security Council has rather belatedly – a decade after the Secretary-General took the initiative – begun to develop a relationship with the regional and sub-regional organizations that is focusing on the range of peace and security challenges – counter-terrorism, conflict prevention and management, and peace-building. There is some progress to be made, however, in clarifying the relationship between the UN meetings chaired by the Secretary-General and the Security Council meetings. Perhaps the UN meetings should be focusing on the ‘soft’ security issues while the Council focuses on the ‘hard’ security issues. This is explored in Section E. Table 2.C Attendance at Security Council Meetings (2003-4) ‘Security Region’*

Open Meeting (April 2003)

Sub-Saharan Africa

AU ECOWAS LAS

Nth Africa-West Asia Asia Pacific Europe Americas Cross-regional Orgs.

Closed CT Meeting (March 2003)

AU ECOWAS LAS ASEAN CIS

LAS ASEAN

EU OAS OSCE

EU OAS NATO

Trans-national Orgs.

NATO OSCE

OIC Interpol

Other Organizations

Total No.

Thematic Debate (July 2004)

6

ICAO WCC IMF IBRD IMCO 50**

8

* The classification of a ‘security region’ is explained in chapter 4. ** UN Note 5777, 3 March 2003. Many attendees, however, were not international organizations.

63. S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/4, 31 March 2003

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2.3.4 Formalization of the Regional-Global Partnership The Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel (referred to in Section 2.3.4) produced a series of recommendations pertaining to regional-global cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. The two principal recommendations were: – Consultations and co-operation between the UN and regional organizations should be expanded and could be formalized in an agreement, covering such issues as meetings of the heads of the organizations; more frequent exchange of information and early warning; co-training of civilian and military personnel; and exchange of personnel within peace operations.64 – The UN should encourage the establishment of regional groupings, particularly in highly vulnerable parts of the world where no effective security organizations currently exist.65 In response, the Secretary-General advised in his report that he intended to conclude a series of Memoranda of Understanding with each organization separately. This was noted and endorsed by the Sixth High-Level Meeting.

64. HLP Report, para. 272. 65. HLP Report, para 271.

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B. Analysing the Mechanism

3. Complexities of Regionalism “I shall focus on one of the possible dimensions of the complex relations between the Security Council and regional organizations. ... those relations are productive and important. ... [Today’s] complex threats demand an additional effort on the part of the Security Council to adapt to them and to confront them. And there, in our view, the role of regional organizations is essential.” Bulgaria Security Council 11 April 2003

The development of the regional-global security mechanism is hampered by an array of complexities. These pertain to uncertainties over the meaning of the central concepts of ‘region’, ‘agency’ and ‘arrangement’; the structural duplication of regional agencies and other organizations (involving overlapping of membership); ambiguity over their objectives (involving, inter alia, improvised and occasionally competing mandates); and contention over the area of application of their functions. In politics and diplomacy a balance is usually sought between flexibility and clarity in forging agreement for operational collaboration. But it is by no means certain that such a balance has yet been attained in developing an effective and efficient partnership between the UN Security Council and regional organizations in conflict prevention and management.

3.1 Concepts of ‘Region’ and ‘Arrangements or Agencies’ For the purposes of this study the meaning of the essential terms – ‘region’; and ‘arrangement’ and ‘agency’ must be considered in both an academic and a political context. 85

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3.1.1 ‘Region’ Academic definitions of a ‘region’ inevitably vary. Deutsch perceives a region as ‘groups of countries markedly interdependent over a wide range of different dimensions’. Nye views it as ‘a limited number of states linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence.1 A comprehensive review of academic definitions of the concept can be found in a recent article by Tavares.2 A useful categorisation of the characteristics of a ‘region’ has recently been proposed, involving unity, identity and boundary delimitation. Van Langenhove introduces two related concepts of ‘regionhood’ (that which distinguishes one region from another) and ‘regionality’ (the historical, geographical, economic, cultural and social conditions that comprise such distinctions).3 More broadly, some definitional comment advanced by UNU-CRIS is useful, albeit infinitely malleable: “One can define regions as territorially-based subsystems of the international system. They ‘exist’ as they occur in discourses. This definition implies that there are many varieties of regional subsystems with different coherence. Regions can be found at all territorial levels. There are regions within nation-states, cross-border regions on a subnational level, as well as regions above the nation-state. ... The point is that regions define themselves; they are only identifiable post factum. There is no use in looking for one universal criterion that defines a region, nor to come up with a ‘catch-all’ cocktail of criteria. It is the process of regionalisation that eventually defines the region, or in other words regions become ‘visible’ by patterns of interaction, such as discursive practices occurring within geographical, historical, cultural, political and economic variables.”4 An authoritative source on the meaning of regionalism within the UN context identifies two criteria for ‘regionality’. The first, which might be termed the ‘geographical concept’, identifies geographical proximity of 1. 2.

3. 4.

Both definitions contained in Nye, J. ‘International Regionalism: Selected Readings’ (Little Brown, 1968) p. 68. Tavares, Rodrigo, ‘The State of the Art of Regionalism: The Past, Present and Future of a Discipline’ Dept. of Peace and Development Research, Gothenburg University, Sweden (forthcoming) See Van Langenhove, L., ‘Theorising Regionhood’, UNU-CRIS e-Working Papers, W2003/1, p. 26. United Nations University – Comparative Regional Integration Studies Programme website: www.unu.edu/cris

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Complexities of Regionalism Member States. The second, the ‘commonality concept’ eschews geographical criterion per se and allows virtually any grouping – including a military alliance as under the ‘enemy states’ clause (article 107 of the Charter) or simply common cultural, linguistic or historical relations.5 The UN Charter does not define ‘region’, its framers having decided, after much effort, against any self-restricting ordinance of that kind. A definition advanced during the San Francisco Conference by Egypt and voted down, however, gives as good a conceptual notion as is perhaps necessary: “There shall be considered, as regional arrangements, organizations of a permanent nature grouping in a given geographical area several countries which, by reason of their proximity, community of interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or spiritual affinities make themselves jointly responsible for the peaceful settlement of any disputes which may arise ... as well as for the safeguarding of their interests and the development of their economic and cultural relations.”6

3.1.2 ‘Arrangement’ and ‘Agency’ It is generally accepted that the practical distinction between ‘agency’ and ‘arrangement’ concerns whether an inter-governmental organization exists as a legal entity with a functioning secretariat and address (an ‘agency’) or whether it is simply an arrangement by sovereign states through treaty-making (an ‘arrangement’).7 It has been suggested that little distinction exists between the two.8 Both, in any event, are relevant to chapter VIII, provided they meet the other criteria pertaining to a ‘local dispute’, pacific settlement objectives, and subordination to the UN Security Council. This is explored further in chapter 4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

Simma, B. The United Nations Charter: A Commentary (OUP, Oxford; 1995) p. 692. Through reasoned legal argumentation, the authors of this chapter (Profs. Waldemar Hummer and Michael Schweizer) find the geographical criterion ‘untenable’. There is, however, nothing in the Charter that explicitly renounces this criterion which, moreover, appears politically to be gathering force. UNCIO XII, pp. 850, 857, 8 June 1945, in Simma, pp. 688-9. Also, Russett, Bruce ‘International Regions and International System: Study in Political Ecology’ (Rand McNally & Co.; Chicago; 1967) p. 4. Simma, p. 694 Ibid.

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3.1.3 A Working Definition Having regard to the various considerations pertaining to both ‘region’ and ‘arrangements or agencies’, an authoritative definition has been advanced as follows: “A union of states or an international organization, based upon a collective treaty or a constitution and consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, whose primary task is the maintenance of peace and security under the control and within the framework of the UN”.9 The members of such a regional arrangement or agency, must be smaller in number than the UN itself, and must be ‘so closely linked in territorial terms’ that effective local dispute settlement by means of a special procedure is possible. Thus, regional agencies are ‘internally focused’, thereby distinguishing themselves from, inter alia, externally-focused systems of collective self-defence under article 51 of the Charter.10

3.2 Issues of Membership The membership of regional agencies and similar organizations is bewilderingly complex. This begs the question, as noted above, of what constitutes a ‘region’ and indeed, what is the truly meaningful concept of ‘region’. It is, in this respect, difficult to posit the most appropriate and authoritative departure-point for gaining clarity over geographical regionality. What has the international community done, to date, in answering to the concept of ‘region’? This chapter reviews the factual situation as it pertains to the practice of international organizations to date. Chapter 4 explores the more theoretical dimensions of the issue.

9.

This definition is adapted from Simma, p. 699. The reference to ‘peace and security’ is altered to be primus inter pares rather than exclusive, since regional organizations such as the African Union are developing general competencies. Strictly, moreover, it should be noted that regional organizations, not being an integral part of the UN system, operate perhaps ‘within the framework of’ the United Nations but not under its ‘control’ – apart from the requirement of enforcement authorisation. 10. Ibid.

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3.2.1 The UN Regional Economic Commissions The closest adherence to the most basic concept of region in the political world is maintained by the UN economic regional commissions of which there are five. Yet even the economic commissions lose clarity from the outset as the imperatives of global and regional politics confound apparent geographical simplicities. Of the five commissions only one (ECA) is a ‘pure’ regional body whose 53 members are exclusively regional (African) and comprehensively form a region (Africa). The other four are political hybrids. – Asia is split into two commissions – Asia-Pacific (ESCAP) and West Asia (ESCWA). In the Asia-Pacific Commission (ESCAP), four exogenous metropolitan countries are ‘non-regional members’ (Britain, France, Netherlands and the United States). It also includes the land continent of Australia, neighbouring New Zealand, and the island States of Oceania. – The Commission for West Asia (ESCWA) includes an African country (Egypt, which is also a member of ECA). – With the Latin America-Caribbean Commission (ECLA), eight exogenous countries are non-regional members (Britain, France, Netherlands, United States, Canada, Italy, Portugal and Spain). – The European body (ECE) is perhaps the greatest hybrid of all. It includes the membership of Israel, the five Central Asian ‘stan’ countries (which are also members of ESCAP), Moldova and three Caucasian countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia – the former two being also members of ESCAP). For their parts, Russia and Turkey are seen to be ‘within the geographical scope’ of two regions (Europe and Asia) and thus ‘regional members’ of two regional commissions.11 Thus, in what might have been supposed to be the clearest example of regionality – UN economic commissions – no light is shed on the inherent meaning of the concept of ‘region’ for the practical purposes of international diplomacy.

3.2.2 Regional Integration Bodies Of the two regions with avowed integration objectives, Africa and Europe, the situation is similar. Africa again has a ‘pure’ membership: the 11. United Nations Handbook (NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Wellington, 1997) pp. 120-5.

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Complexities of Regionalism African Union’s 53 Member States are the same as the 53 ECA Member States, with the exception of only one state (Morocco) which is not a member of the AU (the Saharawi ADR, better known as Western Sahara, taking its place). Europe, again, is more complicated. The European Union today has 25 Member States comprising some 450 million citizens. An almost equal number of European countries (twenty-two) comprising a comparable population are absent – 7 West European countries,12 11 East European countries,13 3 Caucasian countries14 plus Russia, all of which are seen as regional members of Europe by the United Nations [see section 3.2.1]. Even the recently-expanded EU can scarcely claim to be the basis of a fully integrated ‘Europe’.

3.2.3 Regional Groupings at the United Nations Adding to the confusion is the set of regional groupings of Member States at the United Nations. This grouping is ‘unofficial’, having been developed in 1963 in order to achieve a more ‘equitable representation’ in the Security Council and other UN organs.15 As a result of this, UN Member States are divided into five ‘regional groups’ for electoral purposes, namely: African states, Asian states, Eastern European states, Western European and Other States, and Latin American and Caribbean states. These groupings reflect yet another ‘hybrid’ of geography and political concerns. Europe is split between east and west (reflecting the Cold War whose termination has not yet, over a decade later, been reflected in any new electoral formulation). North America is in ‘Western Europe and Other’, as are two ‘antipodean’ countries (Australia and New Zealand), and also Turkey. Turkey, however, also ‘fully participates’ in the Asian group. Cyprus, which has just joined the EU, is ‘in Asia’.16 The United States, for its part, advises that ‘it is not a member of any regional group’, 12. Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Andorra, Monaco, San Marino. 13. Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine. 14. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 15. UNGA res. 1991 (XVIII), 17 December 1963 16. This has been explained by Cyprus officials on the grounds that co-existence with Turkey in the WEO group was politically unacceptable. By this logic, North Korea and Iraq, both at odds with neighbours in the Asian group, could seek inclusion in the WEO group.

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Complexities of Regionalism but it attends WEO meetings ‘as an observer’ and is considered to be a member of that group for electoral purposes, leaving to the imagination what other purpose ‘membership’ would serve. And Israel is not a member of any group.17 Clearly, the electoral grouping at the UN does nothing to add clarity to the institutional issues of regional security. On the other hand, the grouping does have significance for security behaviour, insofar as the voting patterns on peace and security issues bears a correlation with electoral breakdowns. This is explored in chapter 9 (Annex).

3.2.4 The World Bank Group The World Bank Group adopts a different regional categorisation. This is comprised of six regions, viz. Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa & Middle East, Europe & Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia & Pacific and Latin America & Caribbean. Clearly regionalism should be taken to respond to the organizational perceptions – whether economic, electoral or security. In fact, as will be shown later, this categorisation offers in many ways a workable system for security purposes (see chapter 4).

3.2.5 Cross-Regional and Cross-Sub-Regional Membership As Table 3 shows, many countries have membership in more than one region or sub-region. Thus: – In Africa, both Angola and DR Congo are members of the agencies for the sub-regions of southern Africa and Central Africa (an economic agency in that latter case). – Also in Africa, North African countries are members of the Arab League as well. – In ‘Europe’, the complexities are less cross-sub-regional membership as much as cross-organizational membership. Some 17 European countries have membership in both NATO and WEU whose military mandates are closely similar. Some 11 countries have membership in NATO and the EU which, as the latter strengthens its common defence policy, will become more problematic with time. – In America, Canada and the US are members of cross-regional organizations that focus primarily on Europe (NATO, OSCE). 17. UN Handbook 1997 (NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade, Wellington, 1997) p. 19

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3.3 Issues of Focal Area Also relevant is what has been called, in the General Assembly, ‘jurisdiction over a clearly-defined security zone’ (see section 4.4.1). The area of application of a regional agency or other international organization has become an increasingly contentious issue. The phenomenon in recent years of NATO operating ‘out-of-area’ in a ‘hard security’ function has caused some political controversy but the United Nations appears to be willing for the present to recognise such operations as not only legitimate but welcome. The EU is also aspiring to an ‘out-of-area’ role in, at least for the present, a ‘soft security’ function. This issue is linked to both membership and mandate. – It raises the question of whether it is appropriate, in a constitutional sense, for a ‘regional agency’ under chapter VIII to operate outside the national territories of its regional members. – Secondly in regard to mandate, it raises two questions. The first is whether, in doing so, it would surrender its strict mandate of ‘regional collective security’ for itself in favour of ‘global collective security’ on behalf of the United Nations. The second is whether a true ‘regional agency’ could combine in one organization a ‘regional collective defence’ function under chapter VII and a ‘regional collective security’ function under chapter VIII. These issues are explored further in chapter 4.

3.4 Issues of Mandate The overlapping mandates of the international organizations that seek to ‘partner’ with the United Nations in peace and security may be inferred from an analysis of their statutory objectives. The question of mandate of regional arrangements and agencies is problematic – some pertain to economic issues, some to security, and some to broader political and cultural ‘identity’ purposes.

3.4.1 The UN Regional Economic Commissions The UN regional economic commissions were created by the UN Economic and Social Council within a few years of the UN’s founding – the fifth a decade later when the ‘first wave’ of the decolonisation movement was complete in Africa. Yet their mandates are not identical. The Euro92

Complexities of Regionalism pean Commission aimed at the economic ‘co-operation and integration’ (italics added) of member countries and their ‘policy convergence’, but subsequently dropped reference to integration.18 The others originally omitted reference to integration, confining themselves to ‘facilitating cooperation in economic and social development’ (Asia-Pacific);19 ‘facilitating concerted action’ for dealing with economic problems arising from World War II (Latin America-Caribbean);20 and ‘raising the level of economic activity and levels of living’ (Africa).21 Some, however, have since adopted references to integration.22 Either way, the UN commissions act as facilitators rather than drivers of regional economic integration. Be that as it may, the UN regional economic commissions, as subsidiaries of ECOSOC and not the Security Council, play no part in international peace and security activities. This contrasts with sub-regional economic agencies which have been created independently of the UN commissions and some of which are their own spontaneous creations. As will be shown later, a number of sub-regional agencies have metamorphosed into ‘hybrid’ bodies in which a strong security function has been added to their original economic mandates (see chapter 5).

3.4.2 Regional Defence Alliances A qualitative distinction exists, in security terms, between the UN as the central global body and all regional organizations. Once universality has been achieved, the UN has no ‘external aggressor’ – only internal aggressors in terms of its Member States.23 In contrast, a regional agency as a sub-universal body can, ipso facto, have an external aggressor. Its security provisions, therefore, may provide for a response to either external ag18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

ECOSOC res. 36 (IV) 1947 ECOSOC res. 37 (IV) 1947 ECOSOC res. 106 (VI) 1948 ECOSOC res. 671A (XXV) 1958 Viz., ESCAP, ESCWA and ECA. Theoretically, a non-UN Member State could have been seen as an ‘external aggressor’ in the event of an attack by it. Indeed, the Charter envisaged this through identifying ‘enemy states’ (the Axis Powers of WW II) in articles 106 & 107 (and 53). China (PRC) could have been seen potentially in this light from 1949 to 1971 when it was outside the UN. Indeed it was cast exactly in this category in 1951, being labelled an ‘aggressor’ by the General Assembly when it entered the Korean War (see Table 1.A: Notes). But in the intervening years with virtually universal membership today, this notion has become anachronistic. This is not to say, of course, that a Member State cannot commit ‘aggression’ – see Table 1.A: Notes’.

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Complexities of Regionalism gression (from a non-regional state) or internal aggression (by a regional state, member of the organization). This distinction is important in understanding the critical difference between regional defence alliances and genuine regional security agencies. With the onset of the Cold War early in the UN era, several groups of states formed military alliances, loosely based on regional geography, for the purpose of their common defence. In Europe, NATO and the Warsaw Pact became the principal collective defence pacts for the continent, designed to deter and prevent mutual aggression.24 Yet even within the same sub-region (Western Europe), the respective security mandates of multiple organizations are confusing, as between, for example, the Western European Union and NATO.25 In the South Pacific, ANZUS was formed as a defence alliance between the US, Australia and New Zealand.26 Other regional defence pacts (CENTO and SEATO in Asia), formed in the 1950s as a bulwark against possible communist expansionism, have been disbanded as the perceived threat receded. None of these defence alliances, however, was the kind of ‘regional arrangement or agency’ conceived by the framers of the UN Charter as support for global collective security under chapter VIII. Their existence reflected, rather, the comatose nature of genuine collective security in a bipolar world where global stability was governed, in effect, by a balance of power arrangement based on nuclear deterrence.

24. NATO’s adversarial organization, the Warsaw Pact, collapsed with the end of communism. 25. See chapters 5 & 6 for further exploration of this. 26. New Zealand has been effectively excluded from ANZUS by the US since 1987 when it banned US (and all other) nuclear-capable warships from its territorial waters as part of its nuclear-free policy. The US decision was ultra vires the ANZUS Treaty since no Member State was granted the power of excluding others. In fact, today the US and Australia maintain a bilateral defence relationship retaining the name of ANZUS. For its part, New Zealand remained in favour of continued ANZUS defence co-participation but on a non-nuclear basis. The US refusal to drop its ‘non-disclosure’ policy regarding nuclear-capable warships made the two policies irreconcilable. The non-nuclear policy was enshrined in a regional security structure through the Treaty of Rarotonga (1985), which created a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone.

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Complexities of Regionalism

3.4.3 Regional Collective Security Agencies Two regional agencies of the appropriate kind, however, did exist from the early UN era, combining regional defence with regional collective security. – In March 1945, three months before the UN Charter was signed in San Francisco, the Arab League was formed with a broad ‘regional identity’ mandate, which included a clear security function. The stated purpose of the League was, and remains, the ‘strengthening of the relations between the Member States, policy co-ordination for the sake of their independence and sovereignty and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries’.27 Its original provisions included a non-use of force clause, a binding pacific dispute settlement mechanism,28 and a collective enforcement mechanism against both regional and non-regional aggressors.29 – In 1948 three years after the Charter was signed, the Organization of American States was formed, whose first principle was to ‘strengthen the peace and security of the continent’.30 The OAS had provisions for preventive diplomacy and pacific settlement,31 common action in response to aggression,32 and ‘effective limits on conventional weapons’.33 Among its principles was the provision that ‘an act of aggression against one American State is an act of aggression against all American States’.34 Thus the Arab League and the OAS, being comprised of regional members seeking to govern themselves through pacific settlement and collective enforcement, were the first ‘regional agencies’ of the kind envisaged in the UN Charter for collective security support. Others (NATO, CENTO, SEATO, ANZUS) were not of the same kind, being comprised of regional members and external powers seeking to deter an external adversary through a balance of power strategy. Both the Arab League and OAS made provision for compatibility with the UN in their security func27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

Charter of the League of Arab States, Cairo, 22 March 1945, Article II. Arab Charter, Article V Arab Charter, Article VI OAS Charter, Bogotá, 30 April 1948, Article 2 (a) OAS Charter, Article 2 (c) OAS Charter Article 2 (d) OAS Charter Article 2 (h) OAS Charter Article 3 (h)

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Complexities of Regionalism tions.35 While NATO does the same, its reference is within the context of chapter VII, and not chapter VIII. A third organization, the African Union, may be regarded as a recent addition to the ranks. Its Constitutive Act (2000) provides clearly for collective security on a regional internal kind (see Chapter 5 below).

3.4.4 Regional Integration Bodies Only two organizations, the European Union and the African Union, might be seen as broad integration movements whose objectives include the maintenance of peace and security. The achievements and sense of purpose of the EU in this respect outstrip those of the AU; indeed it is not clear whether the AU is currently a true integration movement or simply a close association of sovereign States. In any event, as was observed in the Introduction, integration per se is not a factor of direct relevance to ‘security regionalism’. The AU, as noted above, may be regarded as a regional collective security agency.

3.4.5 Sub-Regional Economic Agencies The UN Charter says nothing of ‘sub-regional’ agencies playing a role in the collective security function.36 But circumstances have forced an innovation in peace and security that, in some ways, is as significant as the innovation of peacekeeping in the 1950s. In the past four decades a number of sub-regional agencies, created for purely economic purposes, have been forced by circumstance to develop security functions at short notice. The most notable among these are in Southeast Asia (ASEAN, 1967), the Pacific (PIF, 1971), West Africa (ECOWAS, 1975) and south35. The Arab League’s Council was to decide upon the means by which the League would co-operate with ‘international bodies to be created in the future’ in order to guarantee security and peace (Article III of the Charter). In the case of the American regional agency, “within the United Nations, the Organization of American States is a regional agency” (OAS Charter, preamble). 36. Article 48(2) provides that decisions of the Security Council shall be carried out by Member States directly ‘and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members’. A sub-regional agency may be thus employed to implement Council policy. It is not suggested here that the Charter precludes subregional action; simply that it clearly accords primacy to regionalism over sub-regionalism, having devoted a whole chapter to the relationship between regionals and the UN.

96

Complexities of Regionalism ern Africa (SADC, 1992).37 Their respective experiences, and those of others as well, are recounted in chapter 5. There is no a priori reason that excludes the possibility of this kind of occurrence – that is to say, economic concerns may well precede and pave the way for security functions of an organization. But the fact that it has occurred is testimony to the lack of clear strategic planning within the UN on the regional-global security relationship throughout the past halfcentury. The framers of the Charter clearly envisaged at San Francisco a role for regional agencies – clearly spelt out in Chapter VIII. Yet with one exception, those agencies did not exist at the time, and no systematic thought was given to their creation. They came into existence in a rather haphazard manner reflecting the exigencies of regional particularities from one decade to another. Thus, it can be seen that the evolution of regional and other organizations has given rise to some unusual developments regarding mandates. Some organizations have experienced ‘mandate creep’ through force of circumstance, entering the field of peace and security from the vantagepoint of an economic mandate. Others have taken on what might be called ‘mandate crab’, ranging laterally across geographic space, broadening and extending their focal areas. And a few have undertaken actions that reflect ‘mandate stray’ – effectively exceeding their constitutional authority in certain cases beyond the confines of the UN Charter. There is a need for greater clarity and order in the matter of mandates in the regional-global mechanism for peace and security.

3.5 Effect on UN Security Planning: The ‘Strategic Choice’ The above analysis reveals a confusing admixture of regional and sub-regional agencies, with different membership and statutory mandates in peace and security, together with other organizations with qualitatively different mandates, all assembling together for meetings with the United Nations over the maintenance of international peace and security (see section 2.3). This invites institutional confusion; indeed it almost institutionalises that confusion in a divided and fractious world and on the most sensitive issue of all. 37.

ASEAN’s original mandate was dual: to accelerate economic growth and to promote peace and stability. The latter, however, was to be achieved through respect for justice and the rule of law, and no mechanism for pacific settlement or enforcement was included at that stage. Its primary focus in the early years was on economic and related issues.

97

Complexities of Regionalism While complexities of this nature must be taken as a given in the real world, they can develop to a point where they thwart a necessary clarity in global policy-making. When such policies attend to matters of life and death of citizens around the world, the issue needs to be addressed. The extreme crises in particular – such as those in Iraq where some 20,000 lives have been lost in 2003, and the DR Congo where some 250,000 lives have been lost through violence and an additional 3 million lost through famine – demand a more clear-sighted attention by the international community. A profoundly confusing overlapping of membership of regional and subregional agencies, with an additional ‘tier’ of membership overlaid through trans-national organizations make it unlikely that a clear chain of command and co-ordination between the UN Security Council and its partner organizations can exist, as the system is presently constructed. The complexities that arise from the overlapping membership among all ‘relevant’ organizations are set out in detail in Table 3. In such a situation the effectiveness of regional security and global governance is compromised. This is less the case in traditional collective security (involving inter-state aggression and an enforcement response) than in the more complex areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building where regionality is a naturally stronger factor. The international community faces a ‘strategic choice’ with regard to the relationship between universalism and regionalism. An inchoate partnership has been built up between the United Nations and other international organizations in the name of regionalism but that relationship is complex, informal and constitutionally invertebrate. The choice is between two future courses. The UN can continue with ‘business-as-usual’ in which several score entities revolve around the Security Council and the Secretariat with no clear sense of common direction. Or it can commence the process of clarifying, and to some extent formalising, the relationship with a view to making it more effective. As noted, the UN High-Level Panel supports expanded co-operation with regional organizations, possibly including a formalized agreement. If UN Member States endorse this recommendation, that is the strategic direction in which the international community will head over the next decade or so. Indeed, the Heads of State present at the 2005 World Summit endorsed the proposals that had been put forward by the UN High-Level Panel, confirming this to be the strategy for the future.

98

Angola

Angola Algeria Benin Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Cape Verde Central Afric. R. Chad Comoros Congo Congo D.R Côte d’Ivoire Côte d’Ivoire Djibouti Egypt Equat. Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Gambia Ghana Ghana Congo D.R

Botswana

SADC

African Union ECOWAS

Gabon

Eq. Guinea

Congo Congo DR

Central AR Chad

Burundi Cameroon

Angola

ECCAS

Djibouti Egypt

Comoros

Algeria

LAS

Africa

Algeria

Maghreb Union

Gabon Gambia

Côte d’Iv. Djibouti Egypt Eq. Guinea

Chad Comoros

Cameroon

Burkina F.

Algeria Benin

OIC

Gabon

Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central AR Chad Comoros Congo Congo DR Côte d’Ivo Djibouti Egypt Eq. Guinea

Benin

La Francophonie

Table 3 Duplicative Membership in Regional and Sub Regional Organizations

Gambia Ghana

Cameroon

Botswana

Common wealth

Complexities of Regionalism

99

100

Mali

Liberia

Guinea Bi. Guinea Con.

Mozambique ri0Namibia Niger Niger Nigeria Nigeria Rwanda S. Tome & Prin. Senegal Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Somalia South Africa Sudan

Guinea Bissau Guinea Conakry Kenya Lesotho Liberia Libya Madagascar Malawi Mali Mauritania Mauritius

African Union ECOWAS

South Afri.

Seychelles

Mozambiq Namibia

Mauritius

Malawi

Lesotho

SADC

Rwanda S. Tome

ECCAS

Africa

Sudan

Somalia

Morocco

Mauritania

Lybia

LAS

Morocco

Mauritania

Libya

Maghreb Union

Sudan

Sierra Le. Somalia

Senegal

Niger Nigeria

Morocco Mozambiq.

Mali Mauritania

Libya

Guinea Bi.

OIC

Rwanda S. Tome Senegal Seychelles

Niger

Mali Mauritania Mauritius Morocco

Madagascar

Guinea Bissau Guinea Con.

La Francophonie

South Africa

Seychelles Sierra Leone

Nigeria

Mozambiq. Namibia

Mauritius

Kenya Lesotho Malawi

Common wealth

Complexities of Regionalism

Zambia Zimbabwe

Swaziland Tanzania

Swaziland Tanzania Togo Tunisia Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe

Togo

SADC

African Union ECOWAS

ECCAS

Africa

Tunisia

LAS

Tunisia

Maghreb Union

Togo Tunisia Uganda

OIC

Togo Tunisia

La Francophonie

Uganda Zambia

Swaziland Tanzania

Common wealth

Complexities of Regionalism

101

Albania Andorra Armenia Austria Azerbaijan Belarus Belgium Bosnia-Herz. Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland FYROM France Georgia Germany Greece Holy See Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Kazakhstan

OSCE

102 Germany Greece Hungary Iceland

Germany Greece

Hungary

Italy

France

France

Ireland Italy

Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia

Bulgaria

Belgium

NATO

Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland

Belgium

Austria

EU

Italy

Germany Greece

France

Belgium

WEU

Europe

Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy

Belgium Bosnia & H Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Rep Denmark Estonia Finland FYROM France Georgia Germany Greece

Albania Andorra Armenia Austria Azerbaijan

CoE

Kazakhstan

Georgia

Azerbaijan Belarus

Armenia

CIS

FYROM France

Bulgaria

Belgium

Albania

Franco.

Cyprus

Comm.

Kazakhstan

Azerbaijan

Albania

OIC

Complexities of Regionalism

Kyrgyzstan Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Moldova Monaco Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russian Fed. San Marino Serbia & Mnt Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland Tajikistan

OSCE

Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania

Netherl.

Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden

Slovakia Slovenia Spain

Lithuania Luxembourg

Lithuania Luxemb. Malta

Poland Portugal

Latvia

NATO

Latvia

EU

Spain

Portugal

Netherl.

Luxemb.

WEU

Europe

Latvia Liechenst. Lithuania Luxemb. Malta Moldova Monaco Netherl. Norway Poland Portugal Romania Russia San Marino Serbia & M Slovakia Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland

CoE

Tajikistan

Russian Fed.

Moldova

Kyrgyzstan

CIS

Switzerland

Romania

Moldova Monaco

Luxemb.

Franco.

Malta

Comm.

Tajikistan

Kyrgyzstan

OIC

Complexities of Regionalism

103

Ukraine UK

UK

104 Uzbekistan

Ukraine

CIS

Franco.

UK

Comm.

Uzbekistan

Turkey Turkmenistan

OIC

* Countries such as Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, even if they are Central Asian countries, were added in this table in order to clearly show the membership of the regional organization (OSCE) and one sub-regional organization (CIS). However, they will be found again in the table on Asia. * Canada and USA are also members of OSCE.

UK

Turkey

Turkey

Europe CoE

Turkey Turkmenistan Ukraine UK UK Uzbekistan

WEU

NATO

EU

OSCE

Complexities of Regionalism

Afghanistan Australia Bangladesh Bahrain Bhutan Brunei Cambodia China Fiji India Indonesia Iran Iraq Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kiribati Korea, North Korea, South Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Laos Lebanon Malaysia Maldives Marshall Is.

States

Leban.

Kuw.

Jordan

Iraq

Bahrain

LAS

Kuw.

Bahrain

GCC

Kyrg.

Kazak.

China

SCO

Kyrg.

Kazak.

CIS

Malaysia

Laos

Indones.

Brunei Cambod.

ASEAN

Asia-Pacific

Maldives

India

Bhutan

Banglad.

SAARC

Marshall

Kiribati

Fiji

Austr.

PIF

Lebanon Malaysia Maldives

Kuwait Kyrgyzstan

Jordan Kazakhstan

Indonesia Iran Iraq

Brunei

Bangladesh Bahrain

Afghan.

OIC

Laos

Cambod.

Franco.

Malaysia Maldives

Kiribati

Fiji India

Brunei

Australia Bangladesh

Commnw.

Complexities of Regionalism

105

106

LAS

Oman Oman Palau Pakistan PNG Philippines Qatar Qatar Saudi Arabia S.A. Samoa Singapore Syria Syria Solomon Isl. Sri Lanka Tajikistan Thailand Timor-Leste Tonga Turkmenistan Tuvalu Taiwan

Micronesia Mongolia Myanmar Nauru Nepal N. Zealand

States

Qatar S. A.

Oman

GCC

Tajikistan

SCO

Turkm.

Tajik.

CIS

Thailand

Singap.

Philipp

Myanm.

ASEAN

Asia-Pacific

Sri Lanka

Pakistan

Nepal

SAARC

Tuvalu

Tonga

Solom.

Samoa

PNG

Palau

N. Z.

Nauru

Micron.

PIF

Turkm.

Tajikistan

Syria

Qatar Saudi Ar.

Pakistan

Oman

OIC

Franco.

Tuvalu

Tonga

Solomon Is. Sri Lanka

Samoa Singapore

Pakistan PNG

New Zealand

Nauru

Commnw.

Complexities of Regionalism

UAE

U.A.E. Uzbekistan Vanuatu Vietnam Yemen

UAE

GCC Uzbekist.

SCO

CIS

Vietnam

ASEAN

Asia-Pacific SAARC

Vanuatu

PIF

America

* Russia is also a member of the SCO and CIS, although not included in this table as an Asian country. * Although members of PIF, the Cook Islands and Niue are not independent states.

Yemen

LAS

States

Yemen

UAE Uzbekistan

OIC

Vanuatu Vietnam

Franco.

Vanuatu

Commnw.

Complexities of Regionalism

107

Antigua & B. Argentina Bahamas Barbados Belize Bolivia Brazil Canada Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Dominica Dominican R. Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay

OAS

108 Grenada

Grenada

Jamaica

Guyana Haiti

Dominica

Antigua & B.

Org. Eastern Carib. States

Dominica

Bahamas Barbados Belize

Antigua & B.

CARICOM

Ecuador

Colombia

Bolivia

Nicaragua Panama

Honduras

Guatemala

El Salvador

Costa Rica

Belize

Andean Commu- Cent. Amer. nity Int. System

Haiti

Dominica

Canada

Francophonie

Jamaica

Guyana

Grenada

Dominica

Canada

Bahamas Barbados Belize

Antigua & B.

Commonw.

Guyana

OIC

Complexities of Regionalism

St. Kitts & N. Saint Lucia St. Vincent G. Suriname Trinidad & T.

St. Kitts & N. Saint Lucia St. Vincent G.

Venezuela

Peru Saint Lucia

Trinidad & T.

St. Kitts & N. Saint Lucia St. Vincent G. Suriname

* Althought members of the OECS, Anguila and the British Virgin Islands are British Dependencies. Sources: - Regional Integration Information System, UNU-CRIS Website, available at: http://www.cris.unu.edu/regintinfsys.htm - Organization’s websites: The Commonwealth (http://www.thecommonwealth.org); AU (www.africa-union.org); La Francophonie (http://agence.francophonie.org/agence/etats.cfm); OIC (www.oic-oci.org); PIF (www.forumsec.org.fj); Arab League (www.arableagueonline.org); GCC (www.gcc-sg.org); OSCE (www.osce.org); SAARC (www.saarc-sec.org); ECOWAS (www.ecowas.int); ECCAS (www.ceeac-eccas.org); SADC (www.sadc.int ); OAS (www.oas.org); ASEAN (www.aseansec.org ).

Peru St. Kitts & N. Saint Lucia St. Vincent G Suriname Trinidad & T. United States Uruguay Venezuela

Complexities of Regionalism

109

4. A Typology of Security Regionalism “[T]he time has come for the Security Council itself to undertake a responsible and fruitful dialogue in order to achieve a real partnership with mechanisms and structures world-wide that contribute to the maintenance of peace and security.” Algeria Security Council 20 July 2004

It is evident from the foregoing chapters that there is some confusion over what is a regional organization, which ones might attend the meetings with the UN and enter a partnership with it, and under what constitutional authority they would be acting. Some 20 organizations attended the 6th high-level meeting. About 50 are claimed to have attended the Security Council’s CTC meeting, some of which are patently not international organizations. And there is uncertainty over what activities some of the organizations might be undertaking in terms of the provision of the UN Charter. If the Secretary-General’s vision of a ‘regional-global security mechanism’, endorsed by both the Security Council and regional organizations, is to have real meaning, the shape of that mechanism will need substantive content. This requires, as a prerequisite, some analytical clarity. This chapter seeks to meet that need. The essential concept in that mechanism is ‘regionality’. The first requirement is to reach a common understanding over the concept of ‘region’ for the purposes of international peace and security – that is, to develop a structure for identifying ‘security regions’. Once this is achieved, 111

A Typology of Security Regionalism it would be useful to clarify three related issues: membership, focal area and mandate. These three dimensions lay the basis for analysis of the regional activity to date and the prospects for developing a ‘regional-global security mechanism’ in the future.

4.1 Membership: Organizations Involved in Peace and Security Concerning the organizations themselves, the Security Council has identified three categories – international organizations, regional and sub-regional. The UN Secretariat has, as noted, drawn the dual distinction between ‘regional’ and ‘other’ inter-governmental organizations in its most recent 6th high-level meeting. Neither of these distinctions drawn to date, however, have any formal status or operational significance. It would be useful to have some greater clarity in distinguishing international organizations for the purpose of applying chapter VIII. In a theoretical sense it is possible to distinguish in this respect between six types of international organization (see Box 4.A). It may be contended that the concept of ‘region’ should be interpreted flexibly and that a ‘region’ could therefore cover an area such as the North Atlantic, rather than insisting upon a precise geographical division between Europe and North America; or ‘Eurasia’. This, however, confuses matters. Such areas are more clearly classified as a ‘cross-regional collective defence areas’. Sub-regional agencies are, by definition, closer to the national and local levels of jurisdiction than regional agencies and other organizations. They respond more directly to the political drive of the people and their communities to forge co-operative links. The phenomenon of sub-regionalism is occurring independently of the United Nations and even the regional agencies. Sub-regionalism is not explicitly referred to in the UN Charter and was largely non-existent in 1945. Their appearance in the 1970s and rapid spread since then have created ‘facts on the ground’ with which regional agencies and the UN must learn to live. They exist and operate in something of a constitutional lacuna in terms of international peace and security. While they undoubtedly have a role to play, there is some way to go before a clear constitutional relationship can be developed with the regional agencies that are, self-evidently in logic if not politically, their parental agencies. In no case did the regional agencies es112

A Typology of Security Regionalism tablish a sub-regional agency; rather they sprang from the sub-regional soil fully formed. The future relationships are therefore potentially a case of more formal adoption of a sub-regional agency by a regional agency.

Box 4.A Typology of Organizations: By Membership – Global Organizations Those that have universal or near-universal membership from all regions of the world; – Trans-national Organizations Those that have membership from all or many regions of the world but whose membership is confined to a selective criterion that precludes universality (political, religious, cultural); – Cross-Regional Organizations Those that have operational focus on one region but whose membership extends beyond the region; – Regional Organizations Those that have both operational focus on a region and whose membership equates totally or near-totally with the region, with no external membership. – Sub-Regional Organizations Those that have both operational focus on a sub-region within a ‘parent region’, and whose membership equates totally or near-totally with the sub-region, with no external membership. – Cross-Sub-Regional Organizations Those that have operational focus on a sub-region but whose membership extends beyond the sub-region to include other members with (but not beyond) the ‘parent region’.

4.2 Focal Area: Geographical Application of the Mandate The second area of uncertainty concerns the geographical territory for which the organization is responsible. Some organizations have a clearlydefined area of application; others do not. Some are clearly intended to have global scope in their area of application; others have regional or sub-regional area focus. 113

A Typology of Security Regionalism Thus, the delineation in Box 4.B can be developed for analysis. It is closely comparable to the membership typology (in Box 4.A). The difference is, however, that some organizations may have a focal area that extends beyond their precise membership. This is important for distinguishing between those with a genuine ‘internal focus’ and those that may also have an ‘external focus’ as well – a distinction that has important implications that are explored later (see section 4.3.7.d and chapter 9).

Box 4.B Focal Area: Geographic Area of Application – Global The focal area of the organization covers the entire planet. – Trans-national The focal area of application covers the territory of membership, i.e. from all regions around the world but confined to the selective criteria of membership. – Cross-regional The focal area of application covers the territory of its cross-regional membership. – Regional The focal area of application covers the territory of its regional membership or, by consensus, other territories of non-members of the organization within the same region. – Sub-regional The focal area of application covers the territory of its sub-regional membership or, by consensus, other territories of non-members of the organization within the same sub-region. – Cross Sub-Regional The focal area of application covers the territory of its cross-sub-regional membership.

4.3 Mandate: Issues of Terminology and Charter Provisions The development of the ‘architecture for peace’, described in section 1.1.3, has undergone some refinement in the conceptualisation of UN peace support operations over the past decade. The chronological rela114

A Typology of Security Regionalism tionship from conflict prevention, through peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement to peace-building has engaged the United Nations in a series of challenging crisis management operations since the end of the Cold War. In the broader sweep of institutional development, however, the art of conflict prevention and management remains rudimentary and imprecise. There is some way to go before a fully coherent ‘fabric of peace’ is constructed to handle future crises. Two shortcomings afflict the current state of the art. There remains still some conceptual overlap and confusion in the terminology employed.1 And in some cases the relationship of UN operations to a precise Charter provision remains uncertain. This section explores these two issues, assesses the implications for regional security, and proposes a schema for relating peace support missions to the UN Charter. On this basis, it then identifies regional agencies according to mandate.

4.3.1 Terminology: Peacekeeping, Peace-Enforcement and Collective Security Since its inception the UN has sought to improvise and adapt conflict resolution and management techniques to the facts on the ground in a manner that has been innovative and creative yet practical and politically feasible. The fundamental distinctions today are between peace-keeping, peace-enforcement and collective security. (a) UN Peacekeeping (chapter ‘six-and-a-half’) Peacekeeping is now seen as of two kinds: ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’. They are distinguished by two characteristics pertaining to a mission’s mandate: breadth and strength. That is to say: whether its mandate is narrowly-focused on ceasefire verification alone or encompasses a broad 1.

“... the UN’s formal policy framework [for peacekeeping operations] does not yet reflect the fluidity of peacekeeping evolution (nor indeed is it much reflected in academic analysis). ... This is reflected in a confused lexicon for referring to the various hybrid or partnership operations that now dominate the peacekeeping landscape. Even among those familiar with recent developments, there is a disparity in views about whether these trends represent a challenge to the primacy of the UN, or a helpful addition to the conflict-management repertoire. Certainly, the proliferation of regional and multinational force responses to internal conflicts in the past few years has generated a heated debate, requiring clarification.” Dr. Bruce Jones, ‘Evolving Models of Peacekeeping: Policy Implications and Responses’, External Study, UN-DPKO Best Practices Unit, 2004

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A Typology of Security Regionalism range of post-conflict activities; and whether it constrains the use of force to self-defence only or allows force to be used, on the mission’s initiative, to ‘enforce an end to hostilities’.2 – ‘Traditional Peacekeeping’ ‘Traditional’ peacekeeping, defined in section 1.1.3, pertains to the verification of mutually-agreed ceasefires following a truce and with the consent of the belligerent parties. Force is to be used only in selfdefence. It is intended essentially as a tool for conflict containment – creating space for further negotiations even at the cost occasionally of freezing the conflict for a considerable period. – ‘Modern Peacekeeping’ ‘Modern peacekeeping’ – involving missions that have been deployed in the post-Cold War era – differs from its traditional counterpart in two ways. l First, such missions are ‘multidimensional’ in that their mandates extend beyond ceasefire verification to encompass a broad range of post-conflict activities, viz. disarmament; demobilisation; repatriation and rehabilitation; police and armed forces training; humanitarian delivery assistance; civilian protection; human rights promotion; electoral assistance; and judicial reform.3 l Secondly, some of these missions are ‘robust’ in that they are given an enforcement mandate to use force beyond strict self-defence (the ‘all necessary means’ formula used in the Security Council resolutions).4 These mandates characterise missions that are implementing final, comprehensive peace agreements. Such missions are deployed into unstable and insecure environments, which can occur even in post-agreement situations. The ‘robust’ enforcement mandates are required to enforce the agreement against ‘minor order challenges’ such as those mounted by spoilers, bandits, loosely commanded forces or splinter movements. Some ‘multidimensional missions’ may lack a military component but perform their tasks alongside a regional or multinational force. Many, however, are given a military component with a ‘robust mandate’ to en2. 3. 4.

See http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fr_peacemaking.htm for a definition of ‘peace enforcement’. Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, DPKO, December 2003) p. 1. See UNDPKO website: ‘The Power of Persuasion Backed by Force’ http://www.un.org/DPETS/dpko/dpko/intro.3.htm

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A Typology of Security Regionalism sure, on their own resources, that their primary tasks are not thwarted. These latter missions therefore fall within the conceptual category of ‘peace enforcement’. That is to say, some peacekeeping missions have a peace enforcement dimension. To this extent the two concepts of peacekeeping and peace enforcement overlap. It is generally assumed that fine distinctions of this kind are unnecessary for operational purposes. But the distinction is important for constitutional reasons. If ‘traditional peacekeeping’ is seen as part of chapter VI of the Charter (‘chapter six-and-a-half’), then it is part of pacific settlement, and regional agencies are free to undertake such missions on their own initiative under article 52 without Security Council authorization. A ‘peace enforcement’ mission, however, using ‘all necessary means’, is authorized under chapter VII. A regional agency undertaking such enforcement action, therefore, requires advance authorisation of the Council under article 53. This is explored further in section 7.3. (b) UN Peace Enforcement Missions (chapter VII, article 40) ‘Peace enforcement’, a product of post-Cold War thinking, is conceptually complex and politically controversial.5 It is to be seen as a tool for governing and implementing a peace agreement. The UN is currently not well-equipped to take on the challenge of forcing a major party to a conflict that has not yet done so to sign up to a peace agreement. In fact, a robust peace-enforcement operation should be reconsidered in the event a major party to a conflict that had signed up to a peace agreement (as opposed to a minor spoiler) subsequently withdraws from the peace process. The idea of peace enforcement (as distinct from military action for collective security against aggression) emerged in the 1992 report, ‘Agenda for Peace’. Reflecting the optimism and the sense of urgency of the early 1990s, the proposal advanced by the Secretary-General was that ‘peace enforcement’ would fill the void that existed between pacific settlement activities 5.

“Peace enforcement is a relatively new concept which precariously lies in the grey area between the logic of peace and the logic of war. Despite the lack of a well-established peace enforcement doctrine, the international community has increasingly turned to peace enforcement as a mode of intervention in its efforts to maintain world peace and security in the post-Cold War environment. As a consequence, this operation is inherently complex, misunderstood, difficult to manage, and often highly controversial.” Major Robert D. Allen, ‘Lessons from Somalia: The Dilemma of Peace Enforcement’, Global Security CSC Paper (1997) http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Allen.htm

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A Typology of Security Regionalism (under chapter VI) and inter-state collective security measures (under chapter VII). Collective security was envisaged, in 1945, as a heavy military response by national armies against inter-state aggression – the full and final application of force. Peace enforcement was envisaged, in 1992, as the more controlled response to national (intra-state) or regional (crossborder) emergencies – the judicious application of lighter military force against ‘threats of a lesser order’. Collective security was envisaged under article 42 (military action); ‘peace enforcement’ under article 40 (provisional measures). The latter, however, would still come under chapter VII, involving the use of force and requiring a determination by the Security Council of a threat to peace, triggering its binding powers. The concept is, however, fraught with difficulties. The operational concept of ‘peace enforcement’ should be distinguished from the vision of UN ‘peace enforcement units’. The idea in ‘Agenda for Peace’ was that ‘peace-enforcement units’ would be under UN command, made available from Member States on a volunteer basis, highly-trained and more heavily-armed than peace-keeping forces. As such they would fulfil a function that had hitherto been lacking. The idea gained immediate positive attention when first advanced.6 No such units materialised, however, and the negative experiences with ‘peace-enforcement’ using traditional national military contingents in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia soured the concept. These setbacks prompted a policy reversal by the United States from support for, to antipathy towards, UN peace enforcement.7 By January 1995 the ‘Supple6.

7.

“It is essential to give the necessary authority and strength to the Security Council to deal with [crisis] situations more effectively in the future. The capacity to deploy credible and effective peace enforcement units, at short notice and at an early stage in a crisis, and with the strength and moral support of the world community behind them, would be a major step in this direction. Clearly, a timely intervention by a relatively small but highly trained force, willing and able to take combat risks and representing the will of the international community, could make a decisive difference in the early stages of a crisis.” Sir Brian Urquhart, ‘The United Nations’ Capacity for Peace Enforcement’, Address, International Institute for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, May 1994, http://www.iisd.org/security/unac/urqudoc.htm US Presidential Decision Directive PDD-13, would have committed large numbers of US combat forces to UN command as part of the early Clintonian policy of ‘assertive multilateralism’. Following Somalia, and just as Rwanda was breaking, PDD-25 reversed that approach, requiring instead stringent criteria for any US involvement in UN operations and a clear exit strategy. Since then the US has effectively eschewed UN peace operations as the best means of maintaining international security, preferring coalitions or unilateral action.

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A Typology of Security Regionalism ment to Agenda for Peace’ had signalled a clear retreat from the ambitious concept of ‘peace enforcement units’ (See Box 4.C). Since then, UN operations have continued to receive peace enforcement mandates from the Security Council under chapter VII but they have been implemented by means of the same operational arrangements as before – national contingents made available on a voluntary basis by troop contributing countries. Effort has been invested, however, to streamline this practice. In 1994 a UN Stand-By Arrangement System (UNSAS) was established in which Member States would make conditional pledges to contribute specific resources for UN peacekeeping within agreed response times. By July 2003 some 81 States were participating of which 43 had signed MOUs pledging contributions. UNSAS has been useful in planning for over 14 peace operations.8 Within UNSAS, fourteen countries established SHIRBRIG in 1996, a co-ordinated arrangement for the rapid deployment of an integrated brigade. SHIRBRIG was deployed as a precursor for UNMEE in the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict in 2000. Both UNSAS and SHIRBRIG, however, are restricted to ‘classical peacekeeping’ operations, not as yet for ‘peace-enforcement’ operations. Thus the trend in recent years has been away from reliance on UN-commanded peace enforcement operations in favour of ‘hybrid’ operations’ in which the UN and other international organizations co-operate in various ways over the same mission. These have been identified as comprising four kinds:9 – Integrated: where the UN and others operate within a single chain of command; – Co-ordinated: where the UN and others operate side-by-side; – Parallel: where the UN deploys alongside another organization’s force; – Sequential: where the UN precedes or follows a multinational, regional or bilateral force. The peace enforcement operations may thus be classified as follows, in Table 4.A.

8. 9.

Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Stand-By Arrangements for Peacekeeping, S/2000/194, 8 March 2000, para. 14 Jones, ‘Evolving Models’. The author, acting as consultant to the UN’s DPKO, suggests, however, that the categorization obscures more than it reveals since in some cases the differences between missions within a category are wide. The differentiation is useful for political labelling, less so for functional analysis.

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A Typology of Security Regionalism Box 4.C ‘A Vision Short-Lived’: The Brief Fate of ‘Agenda for Peace’ Vision 1. ‘Peace Enforcement Units’ – under Article 40 Agenda for Peace, 1992 “Cease-fires have often been agreed to but not complied with, and the United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain the cease-fire. This task can on occasion exceed the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider the utilization of peace-enforcement units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance. Such units from Member States would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces. Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorization of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the Secretary-General. I consider such peace-enforcement units to be warranted as a provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter. Such peace-enforcement units should not be confused with the forces that may eventually be constituted under Article 43 to deal with acts of aggression or with the military personnel which Governments may agree to keep on stand-by for possible contribution to peace-keeping operations.” [para. 44] Supplement to Agenda for Peace, 1995, “Neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, or command and control [peace enforcement] operations, except perhaps on a very limited scale. I believe that it is desirable in the long-term that the UN develop such a capacity, but it would be folly to attempt to do so at the present time when the Organization is resource-starved and hard-pressed to handle the less demanding peacemaking and peacekeeping responsibilities entrusted to it.” [para. 77]

Vision 2. ‘Armed Forces on Call’ – under Article 43 Agenda for Peace, 1992 “Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the authority to take military action to maintain or restore international peace and security. While such action should only be taken when all peaceful means have failed, the option of taking it is essential to the credibility of the United Nations as a guarantor of international security. This will require bringing into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter, whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council for the purposes stated in Article 42, not only on an ad hoc basis but on a permanent basis. Under the political circumstances that now exist for the first time since the Charter was adopted, the long-standing ob-

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A Typology of Security Regionalism stacles to the conclusion of such special agreements should no longer prevail. The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential aggressor would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response. Forces under Article 43 may perhaps never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons. They would be useful, however, in meeting any threat posed by a military force of a lesser order. I recommend that the Security Council initiate negotiations in accordance with Article 43, supported by the Military Staff Committee, which may be augmented if necessary by others in accordance with Article 47, paragraph 2, of the Charter. It is my view that the role of the Military Staff Committee should be seen in the context of Chapter VII, and not that of the planning or conduct of peace-keeping operations. ... The mission of forces under Article 43 would be to respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual.” [paras. 43, 44] Outcome: In 1992-93 a joint US Senate-House resolution proposed that the United States enter negotiations for an article 43 agreement with the United Nations. The resolution was debated inconclusively until Presidential Directive 25 fundamentally altered US policy towards UN peace support operations. Subsequently, the UN developed a system of stand-by arrangements involving armed forces for peacekeeping only (UNSAS).

Table 4.A Categorization of Peace Enforcement Missions Operation Type Year

Conflict

Integrated

Haiti OAS/UN (MICIVIH) Kosovo UN (UNMIK) / EU / OSCE Bosnia-Herzeg. UN (UNPROFOR) / NATO (SFOR & IFOR) Georgia UN (UNOMIG) / CIS (PFG) Tajikistan UN (UNMOT) / CIS (CPF) / OSCE Sierra Leone ECOWAS / UNOMSIL Kosovo UN (UNMIK) / OSCE (KVM) / NATO (XFOR) Eritrea-Ethiopia UN (UNMEE) / AU (OF) Afghanistan UN (UNAMA) / ISAF Côte d’Ivoire ECOWAS (ECOFORCE) / Licorne / UN (MINUCI) Rwanda NMOG / UNOMUR (&UNAMIR) / Turquoise Iraq Coalition / Multinational / UNAMI Somalia UNOSOM I / UNITAF / UNOSOM II Timor Leste UN (UNAMET & UNTAET) / Interfet DR Congo UN (MONUC) / Artemis Sierra Leone UN (UNAMSIL) / Palliser Liberia UN (UNMIL) / ECOWAS (Ecomil) / US Burundi UN (ONUB) / AU (AMIB)

Co-ordinated

Parallel Sequential

1994 1998 1992 1992 1994 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002 1992 2003 1992 1999 1999 2000 2003 2003

Organization & Mission

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A Typology of Security Regionalism (c) UN-Authorised Multinational Peace Enforcement Separate from UN peace enforcement missions are military operations authorised by the UN to use force (‘all necessary means’) to achieve a stated objective without the necessary consent of the parties to a conflict. Such actions, although endorsed by the Security Council, are entirely under the control of the participating States and not under UN command. They are therefore distinctly different from UN peacekeeping operations. These operations, however, usually act as precursors to subsequent UN peacekeeping missions, and may parallel them (as described in ‘b’ above), providing the ‘hard security’ protection for a ‘soft’ UN mission. (d) Collective Security against Armed Aggression (chapter VII, article 42) All of the above operations – UN and multinational – are focused on what are now termed ‘complex emergencies’, national and regional. These are distinct from the traditional inter-state conflicts of the kind that precede the UN and for which the UN was fundamentally designed to handle. Apart from the distinguishing characteristics of the two kinds of conflicts, the Security Council perceives the complex emergencies to constitute a ‘threat to peace’ under the Charter whereas it perceives interstate conflict to comprise either ‘aggression’ or a ‘breach of the peace’. Military operations authorised by the Security Council to respond to aggression or breaches of the peace are infrequent – only two such operations have been undertaken (against North Korea in 1950 and Iraq in 1990). The question of the international community’s capability to respond to inter-state aggression through collective security arrangements has always been uncertain. The Charter envisaged ‘article 43 agreements’ in which Member States would enter a binding commitment to make available their designated armed forces which the Security Council could rely upon. Because such agreements were never concluded, the Council can only rely upon voluntary commitments. In the early 1990s when hopes were high for a reinvigoration of the UN’s collective security system, an attempt was made to rectify this. Under ‘Agenda for Peace’ the Secretary-General called for agreements to be concluded by Member States with the UN, as originally envisaged in Article 43, to make available ‘on call’ national armed forces for immediate response to ‘outright aggression, actual or imminent’ authorized by the Security Council under Article 42. This call also went unheeded (see Box 4.C). In lieu thereof, as noted, the practice has arisen of Member States pledging contributions to peacekeeping stand-by forces, involving light 122

A Typology of Security Regionalism infantry, helicopter and personnel carriers. Once the ambitious proposals of ‘Agenda for Peace’ were nullified by the US policy change of 1994, no serious thought was thereafter given to national contingents of armed forces for collective security as originally envisaged by the framers of the Charter.10 Table 4.B summarises the above conceptual distinctions. It shows the four principal categorisations of UN and UN-authorised missions. – As noted, only two operations qualify as collective security against inter-state armed aggression’ in which UN-authorised collective enforcement action was undertaken under article 42. In both cases the Council determined a ‘breach of the peace’ rather than an ‘act of aggression’ (see Table 1, chapter 1). – Eight cases of UN-authorised multinational enforcement action have been undertaken, under article 42, in which the Council has determined a ‘threat to the peace’ and authorised enforcement action by States or coalitions. – There are currently eight ‘UN peace enforcement missions’ involving ‘multidimensional peacekeeping’ of the modern type, following a determination by the Council of a ‘threat to the peace’, which have been given, under article 40 (provisional measures), permission to use ‘all necessary means’. – There are also eight ‘traditional UN peacekeeping missions’ currently deployed for the purposes of ceasefire verification, established under chapter VI, with a mandate only to use force in self-defence. (e) ‘Flexible Interpretations’ of the Charter As noted, ‘Agenda for Peace’ made it clear that a qualitative distinction was to be drawn between peace enforcement under article 40 and collective security against armed aggression under article 42. That distinction, however, has not been strictly maintained by the Council which never specifies the precise article under which it is mounting an enforcement action. As a result the major powers often afford themselves considerable latitude in interpreting both the constitutional provisions of the Charter and the specific language and meaning of a Security Council resolution.

10. This is a far cry from the original attitudes of 1945, when the US estimated its military contribution under article 43 at twenty divisions (300,000 troops), 1,250 bombers, 2,250 fighters and a large naval force. (See Urquhart, Brian, ‘The UN’s Capacity for Peace Enforcement, http://www.iisd.org/security/unac/urqudoc.htm)

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A Typology of Security Regionalism Thus the distinction between specific operations authorized by the Council and what is claimed to be ‘legitimate’ and even ‘legal’ can become blurred. Recent examples are: – Kosovo Justified by NATO in the name of ‘peace enforcement’, the bombing campaign was not authorised by the Security Council. NATO claimed legal justification through a retroactive interpretation of a binding Council resolution which authorized force for safe humanitarian deliveries. Comments by US policy-makers, however, make it clear that the purpose of the bombing was to force the FRY to agree to peace settlement terms (the Rambouillet Accords). – Afghanistan Originally justified by coalition states under the self-defence provision of the Charter (Article 51), the continuing military presence has conceptually become validated under peace-building (UNAMA) and stabilisation (ISAF). The counter-terrorism operation (Operation Enduring Freedom), however, continued outside explicit Security Council authorization, its claimed legal justification switching imperceptibly from ‘collective’ self-defence to a bilateral request from the post-Bonn Afghan government to the US.11 – Iraq The proclaimed legal justification for the 2003 invasion and regime change was ‘enforcement of the authority of the Security Council’. The Council, however, pointedly withheld approval of the military action amidst controversy. This has also become conceptually validated under peace-building (UNAMI), and stabilisation (multinational force authorised under resolution 1511).

11. One of the major weaknesses of the UN Charter is that the framers, having introduced the self-defence provision (article 51 late in the planning stages (May 1945), made no requirement for statements of reason to be submitted to the Security Council. As a result, bilateral requests for external military intervention or assistance, issued by an established government or by one recently installed through international or regional action of some kind, are not subject to any transparent or systematic scrutiny by the international community. A vast array of policy-making at the global level is thus shielded from public view and subject to political obfuscation.

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A Typology of Security Regionalism Table 4.B UN Missions and Mandates Year

Conflict

Mission

UNSC Resol.

Mandate

UN-Authorised International Enforcement: ‘Breach of the Peace’ (Chapter VII; Article 42) 1990 1950

Iraq Korea

MNF UNCK

660 82

Withdrawal Iraqi forces from Kuwait Withdrawal DPRK forces from Rep. of Korea

UN-Authorised Multinational Enforcement: ‘Threat to the Peace’ (Chapter VII; Article 42) 2004

Haiti

MNF

1529

1999

Timor Leste

INTERFET

1264

1997 1997 1994 1994 1992 1995

Cen Afr. Rep. Albania Rwanda Haiti Bosnia-Herz.

MISAB MNPF MNPF MNF NATO MNF (IFOR)

1125 1101 929 940 771 1031

1996

1992

MNF (SFOR) 1088

Somalia

UNITAF

794

Contribute to secure and stable environment Restore peace & security; assist UNAMET Monitor agreement; disarmament Humanitarian relief; secure environment Protection of displaced persons Departure of illegal de facto regime Facilitate delivery humanitarian supplies Assist in implementation of the territorial and other military-related provisions of the P.A. Ensure implementation of Peace Agreement Secure environment for humanitarian relief

‘Multidimensional Peacekeeping’ (Peace Enforcement)12 (Chapter VII, Article 40) 2005

Sudan

UNMIS

1590

2004

Burundi

ONUB

1545

2004

Haiti

MINUSTAH

1542

Support implementation of peace agreement; humanitarian assistance; civilian protection. Verify ceasefire; DDR; arms trafficking; humanitarian assist; help elections; protection Ensure secure & stable environment; assist Transitional Govt; support constitutional & political process; protect human rights

12. Each Mission in this category is authorised to take ‘all necessary means’ to fulfil its mandate.

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A Typology of Security Regionalism 2004

Côte d’Ivoire UNOCI

1528

2003

Liberia

UNMIL

1509

2002

Timor Leste

UNMISET

1410

2000

DR Congo

MONUC

1291

1999 1998 2001

Kosovo Sierra Leone

UNMIK UNAMSIL

1244 1181 1346

Ceasefire; DDRRR; protection; re-establish govt. nat. unity; humanit. assist; law & order Ceasefire; protection; humanitarian assist; security reform; support peace process Assist core administrative structures; interim law enforcement; external & internal security Ceasefire; POW release; disarmament; de-mining; Establish Interim Administration Monitor agreement; DDR; humanitarian law; Assist Govt; restore law & order

‘Classical UN Peacekeeping’ (Chapter VI) 2000

Eritr.-Ethiopia UNMEE

1993 1994

Georgia

1991 1978 1974

Westn. Sahara MINURSO Lebanon UNIFIL Syria UNDOF

690 425 350

1964 1951

Cyprus UNFICYP India-Pakistan UNMOGIP

186 91

1948

Palestine

UNOMIG

UNTSO

1320 858 937

50

Monitor ceasefire; redeployment; demining Verify compliance with ceasefire agreement Ceasefire; monitor weapons storage Monitor ceasefire; organise referendum Confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces Maintain ceasefire between Syria and Israel Prevent recurrence of fighting Continue supervising ceasefire (postUNCIP) Supervise Truce in Palestine

Sources: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/intro/enforce.htm and associated links (accessed August 2004) http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpa/intro/enforce.htm (accessed August 2004)

4.3.2 Implications for Regional Security The rapid lowering of the expectation level over ‘peace-enforcement’ and ‘collective security’ in the mid-90s portended far-reaching significance for regional security. The fall-back to a reliance on national armed forces, made available on national conditions of engagement, together with the conceptual ambiguities between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and collective security, plus the stringent financial approach to funding peace operations, has impaired the UN’s ability to mount rapid and effective 126

A Typology of Security Regionalism peace operations in circumstances. This, in turn, has led to a loss of confidence in the UN’s ability to maintain the peace, and a self-reinforcing belief on the part of national policy-makers that nationally-driven, coalition-structured operations are, in the curent age, the best solution from a range of imperfect options. This view has coincided with, and been partially reinforced by, the phenomenon of regional and sub-regional organizations entering conflict situations to fill a void created by such multilateral incapability compounded by national indifference from the major powers. Thus, in the maintenance of international peace and security involving peacekeeping, peace enforcement and collective security, regional organizations are ranging alongside the United Nations as indispensable strategic partners. The experience with UNSAS and SHIRBRIG has been cited by the Secretary-General as a potential model for regional and sub-regional peacekeeping in the future.13 The inherent differences between regions in cultural, political and security terms, however, exacerbate the conceptual uncertainties over how peace support operations of the various kinds required to cope with today’s complex modern challenges can relate to the Charter provisions in a manner that promotes a uniform and consistent multilateral policy. This is explored further in the next section.

4.3.3 Peace Operations and the Charter: A Possible Schema Some uncertainty prevails over the precise constitutional context in which some of the UN peace operations involving ‘regional organizations’ are undertaken. It might therefore be useful to seek to relate the peace operations hitherto undertaken to the Charter provisions. A possible relationship is set out in Table 4.C. The historical experience of regional organizations, explored in this study, is thus based on the conceptual schema set out in the Table. From the schema it can be seen that the mandate for an organization might be seen as falling within the five principal doctrinal components of 13. “In order to further reduce response times and achieve better cost-efficiency, sub-regional arrangements would be another option, and the Brigade could be used as a model. Member States are encouraged to build up brigade-based ‘packages’ on a subregional basis for geographical areas of responsibility close to their planned points of embarkation.” S/2000/194 op. cit. para. 19.

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A Typology of Security Regionalism today’s ‘fabric of peace’ – in normal chronological sequence, prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace-building. As noted earlier (section 2.1.3.d), chapter VIII does not form a component part of global collective security. Chapter VIII is exogenous to this, being applicable to the entire ‘peace fabric’ on a regional basis. Chapter VIII’s scope covers the ‘regional fabric of peace’ on behalf of, and delegated by, the global provisions of collective security elsewhere in the Charter. Thus, Article 52 covers the regional dimension of peacemaking (‘pacific settlement’) laid out in chapter VI of the Charter, and perhaps by implication, prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building. Article 53 covers the regional dimension of enforcement laid out in chapter VII. It is the ‘regional microcosm’ of the global ‘fabric of peace’. Thus, the following activities may be provisions: – Global collective security: – Cross-regional collective defence – Regional collective security

perceived in terms of the Charter Articles 33-42 Article 51 Articles 52-53

This typology has important implications for analysing the historical experience of ‘regional organizations’ in peace and security in the past; and perhaps for prescribing greater clarity of peace operations in the future as the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ is strengthened. Table 4.C Possible Schema for Analysing Contemporary UN Peace Theory ‘Fabric of Peace’

Charter Operation Chapter

Conflict prevention

IV VI IX XV VI

Peacemaking (‘Pacific Settlement’)

128

Ch VI

Charter Activity Article

Early warning § 11 § 35 § 65 § 99 UNSC § 34 investigation Judicial § 33 Settlement

Provision of information to UNSC by UNGA, Member States, ECOSOC & UN SG

Mediation § 33 Procedural § 36 measure Obligatory ref- § 37 erence

Diplomatic negotiations UNSC recommended procedures

Fact-finding missions to help determine a ‘threat to intern. peace’ Tribunal/court decisions

Unresolved disputes to be referred to UNSC

A Typology of Security Regionalism Recommended § 38 measures Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping ‘Ch. VI.5’ Peace Ch. VII Provisional Enforcement measures

Peace-building Ch. IX

XII

§ 40

Sanctions

§ 41

Peace enforcement Collective security Self-defence

§ 42

Human Security

§ 42 § 51 § 55

Self§ 76 determination

UNSC recommendations for dispute settlement Ceasefire verification with mutual consent Peace agreement implementation (a) mandatory DDR (b) civilian protection (c) humanitarian protection (d) force against ‘spoilers’ Economic embargoes Rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic & radio interruption Diplomatic relations severance Arms embargoes Armed action for enforcement of peace settlement Armed action for expulsion of aggression Individual or collective s.d. against aggression UNGA [& ECOSOC] promotion of: (a) poverty alleviation, employment, social progress (b) improved health; cultural & education co-operation (c) human rights, fundamental freedoms UNGA promotion of: (a) appropriate self-government or independence (b) interdependence of world’s peoples (c) equal treatment in social, economic, commercial matters

4.3.4 Identifying Regional Agencies by Mandate The above relationship of peace operations to the Charter sheds some light on the question of identification of regional agencies. As noted, no formal criteria have been devised by the UN, at the time of its founding or since, to facilitate a determination of what is, or is not, a regional agency under chapter VIII. 129

A Typology of Security Regionalism The question then arises, if the international community is to rely more upon regional organizations for peace and security, what criteria should be employed to determine which organizations meet the definition of a regional agency for the purposes of chapter VIII. The following questions in this respect need to be addressed: – Is it essential for a regional agency to have an internal dispute settlement mechanism? – Is it essential for a regional agency to have an internal enforcement mechanism? – Is it appropriate for a regional agency to have an external collective defence mechanism? – Is it appropriate for a regional agency to deploy armed force ‘out-ofarea’ in another region, even under UN authority? – Is it desirable for a regional agency to have exclusive competence for a distinct region? (a) Internal Dispute Settlement Mechanisms: Is an internal dispute settlement mechanism a necessary condition of a regional agency to act under chapter VIII? The wording of the Charter, which requires Member States constituting regional agencies to ‘make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes ... by such regional agencies’ suggests that such a mechanism is highly desirable, if not necessary.14 The central purpose of chapter VIII concerns the existence of regional arrangements or agencies ‘for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action’.15 The definition of a regional agency advanced in section 3.1.3, moreover, would make at least a dispute settlement mechanism seem essential, if not an enforcement mechanism. It is therefore concluded here that if an agency does not have an internal dispute settlement mechanism, it does not qualify as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. This view is reinforced by the relationship between the Security Council veto and regional agencies under chapter VIII, which is often overlooked. In laying down the ‘veto rights’ of the permanent five, the Charter stipulates that decisions of the Security Council on substantive (non-procedural) issues shall require, inter alia, the concurring votes of the P-5.16 This has been interpreted by the Council over the years to mean a positive vote or an abstention (rather than solely a positive vote). But the 14. Article 52(2) 15. Article 52(1) 16. Article 27(3)

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A Typology of Security Regionalism Charter also stipulates that, when the Council is making decisions on matters of pacific settlement under chapter VI, or when it is encouraging a regional agency to engage in pacific settlement under chapter VIII (article 52.3), a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting. The result of this is potentially far-reaching. It means that, if the Council is faced with a conflict situation in a region and is considering requesting a regional agency to engage in pacific settlement, and if a permanent member is a party to the dispute, then it shall abstain from voting. That is to say, it may not exercise the veto in such circumstances. Examples of situations when this might obtain could include the following: – If the Council judges that the Arab League should settle the Iraq crisis and if the US is a party to the dispute, the US may not cast a veto; – If the Council judged it useful for the PIF to engage in pacific settlement efforts to resolve the problem of New Caledonian or French Polynesian self-determination, then France could not cast a veto. – If the Council judges that that CIS should settle the crisis in Georgia by pacific settlement under chapter VI, then Russia, if it is a party to this dispute, may not cast a veto. – If the Council judged it expedient that the COE (or the EU) engage in pacific settlement between Spain and the UK over Gibraltar, the UK could not exercise a veto. – If the Council were of the view that a crisis between the US and Cuba, or Venezuela should be handled by the OAS, then the US could not cast a veto. The same would obtain with respect to China and Taiwan in the event that a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ existed for East Asia. Such constitutional subtleties would, of course, be politically lost in the last three above-cited cases, since the permanent member of the Security Council, being also a member of the ‘chapter VIII regional agency’, would ensure that the agency would be paralysed by a negative policy on its part. Thus Russia in the CIS, the UK in the COE or the US in the OAS might thwart progress in this respect.17 But in cases where the permanent member is not a member of the regional agency, a possible route around the veto exists. This would only be the case, however, when the Council is prepared, by the required majority, to proceed around the will of such a permanent member, and provided that another permanent member does not cast a veto ‘on its behalf’. To the extent that the permanent five 17. This would not be so, however, in the case of a sub-regional agency of which the major power was not a member – such as CARICOM and the United States.

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A Typology of Security Regionalism are increasingly acting as a ‘security oligarchy’ in developing multilateral policy for the Security Council, and paying due regard to one another’s vital interests, such scope for ‘veto circumvention’ is limited. These scenarios do show, however, the importance given in the Charter to the potential role of ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ in pacific settlement. It would thus appear that a pacific settlement mechanism should be seen as a sine qua non of a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. (b) Internal enforcement mechanism Is an internal enforcement mechanism a necessary condition of a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’? The Charter’s reference to enforcement action (the Council shall, ‘where appropriate’, utilize them ‘under its authority’) suggests that this is not a necessary condition, but rather an optional feature of such an agency, which the Council can call upon as one of a range of choices. In respect of enforcement the Council can, as noted, call upon a full array of instruments for enforcement: acting under chapter VII it may call upon Member States individually or any international organization (for example, a cross regional organization such as NATO) or under chapter VIII it may call upon a regional agency. Such an enforcement mechanism would therefore not seem to be a necessary condition of a chapter VIII agency. (c) External Self-Defence If an international organization includes an external self-defence mechanism, should this preclude it from acting as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’? Nothing in the Charter explicitly precludes this – there appears to be no relationship between the ‘inherent right’ of self-defence under article 51 and the responsibilities for regional peace and security assumed by an organization under chapter VIII. Indeed if the right is ‘inherent’, a Member State or an international organization cannot be deprived of it. It therefore seems that a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ might, though need not necessarily, be ‘double-hatted’ in having an internal enforcement mechanism and an external defence mechanism. In fact, the original regional security organizations incorporated such a dual function from the outset (LAS, 1945; OAS, 1948). (d) Out-of-Area Deployment A number of organizations (NATO, EU, OSCE) have or are considering operating ‘out-of-area’. Others (AU, LAS, CIS, PIF, OAS) have deployed armed force within their region but would not consider doing so ‘out-ofarea’. 132

A Typology of Security Regionalism It would seem desirable that a regional agency that operates under chapter VIII should not, in principle, deploy out-of-area. Its principal security focus should be within its own region. Two exceptions to this principle could be accepted by the international community. The first would occur in response to external aggression, thus acting in self-defence. The second would be at the explicit request of the UN Security Council – such deployment being confined to peacekeeping troops for ‘peace-enforcement’ operations authorized by the Council. (e) Exclusive Competence Considering the competence of a regional agency, two issues arise. First, the question of relative competencies within and between ‘security regions’ needs to be addressed. A conflict, for example, that straddled two ‘security regions’ would need to be handled by the two designated ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ in collaboration within the auspices of Security Council deliberation. Secondly, the question of failure by a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ to meet its responsibilities might also arise. In such a situation, it remains open for the Security Council, under its primary responsibility for peace and security, to determine what measures are required, independent of what role the regional agency may or may not have taken. Within the context of this three-dimensional matrix – membership, focal area and mandate – it is possible to classify all the international organizations with which the United Nations interacts on peace and security, all the activities they undertake within the context of the Charter, and all the locations in which those activities are undertaken.

4.4 Formalising the Partnership: The Question of Criteria As the foregoing chapters show, there is some confusion over precisely what comprises a regional or sub-regional organization and, accordingly, what organizations are to be seen as legitimate partners with the United Nations in the future development of a regional-global security mechanism. In the absence of any clear formal definition in the Charter of a ‘region’ or a ‘regional arrangement or agency’, the question arises of what criteria an entity must satisfy before it can be recognised as a ‘regional arrangement or agency’ by the United Nations. Without some formality and application of criteria, any grouping could, theoretically, ‘gain entry’. Un133

A Typology of Security Regionalism like the specialized agencies which are closely linked to the UN, regional agencies are exogenous to the UN. Thus any formal ‘acceptance’ of each one for the purposes of Chapter VIII should require a specific decision by the UN. The formality and solemnity with which a nation-state is admitted to UN membership under chapter II of the Charter (and the credentials of its government scrutinised and accepted) is not emulated when it comes to regional organizations participating in meetings with the UN or partnering with it in peace support operations. What is the procedure to date? What might it be in the future? Hitherto, four possible ways of classifying ‘regional partners’ with the UN have been observed: through General Assembly observer status, Secretariat invitation, Security Council appellation and self-proclamation. Each of these is considered below.

4.4.1 Observer Status The relationship between an international organization’s observer status at the UN and a regional organization’s status under chapter VIII of the Charter has no formality and has never been properly clarified. Not all permanent observers are regional organizations and not all regional organizations are permanent observers. Permanent observers to the United Nations have access to all open meetings of the UN organs including the Security Council. The only explicit criterion for acceptance of observers, the decision being taken by the General Assembly, is that they be inter-governmental organizations.18 At present there are 49 organizations that have such observer status (see Table 4.F). Sixteen of these are regional or sub-regional organizations but not all of them undertake security functions. About 14 observer organizations do undertake security functions, of which nine are regional/subregional organizations (see Table 4.D). Thus it would seem that observer status per se is neither necessary nor sufficient for acceptance by the UN as a regional organization. The matter becomes complicated, however, when the history of General Assembly decision-making is reviewed. The Assembly appears to have conflated 18. Correspondence with UN Dept. of Political Affairs, April 2004. There are, however, many exceptions to this rule (Palestine, Inter Parliamentary Union, Latin American Parliament, Partners in Population and Development, ICRC, Red Cross/Crescent Federation, Sovereign Military Order of Malta).

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A Typology of Security Regionalism the two issues of observership and regionalism which has caused a degree of confusion. When, for example, the Assembly first considered the acceptance, as observers, of bodies purporting to be regional entities in 1948, it used the term ‘regional organization’. Table 4.D Security Organizations with General Assembly Observer Status Trans-national Organizations

Cross-Regional Organizations

Regional Organizations

Sub-Regional Organizations

OAS (1948) LAS (1950) OAU/AU (1965) EC (1974) OIC (1975) COE (1989) Commonwlth. (1976) CARICOM (1991) OSCE (1993) Francophonie

CIS (1994) PIF (1994)

Interpol (1996) Lucophone (1999) CSTO (2004) SCO (2004)

SAARC* (2004)

BSEC (1999) ECOWAS (2004) OECS (2004) SADC (2004)

* SAARC at present has no security mandate (see Section 9.2.2.a below) Sources: UNGA doc. A/INF/56/4, 15 February 2002 UNGA resolutions 48 to 53 of the 59th Session (GA/10309, 2 December 2004)

When it first considered such an issue in 1947, the General Assembly referred to the Arab League as an example of a ‘regional organization in the Middle East’.19 As noted in chapter 2 the LAS was the only regional agency existing when the Charter was negotiated at San Francisco in April-June 1945. Established in April 1945, the LAS was not, however, accepted by the UN General Assembly as an observer until November 1950.20 Indeed the Arab League proved controversial despite the Assem19. UN General Assembly resolution 120 (II), 31 October 1947 20. UNGA Res. 477, (V), 7 November 1950.

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A Typology of Security Regionalism bly’s earlier reference to it as a ‘regional organization’, occasioning considerable discussion over the merits of its admission as an observer. It was suggested, for example, that the League might fail to meet some prerequisites of a ‘regional arrangement’ such as ‘jurisdiction over a clearly defined security zone’, enforceable legal remedies, public sessions and membership transparency. It was even queried whether its specific feature of ‘ethnic uniformity’ might be inconsistent with the UN’s principles. And finally that it did not refer specifically to the UN Charter in its constitution.21 Accordingly the recommendation to the General Assembly was that the invitation to the Arab League should not ‘in any way imply that [it] was or was not a regional agency within the meaning of Chapter VIII’.22 In contrast the OAS was accepted as an observer with some alacrity. Its Charter was signed in April 1948, and its Secretary-General was accepted as an observer in October the same year, three years before the Charter even came into force. Yet no legal reference was made to the governing article 52 nor was any reference made to the criteria that might be used for judging its consistency with UN purposes and principles.23 Indeed, as is shown below (section 4.4.3.e), its status as a ‘regional agency’ was queried by a major power at the height of an international crisis. In fact, no reference to a ‘regional agency’ per se was made by the UN during its first 20 years.24 In December 1964, however, the Congo crisis prompted the first recognition by the UN of the role that could be played by regional agencies in peace and security. The young OAU, having been established only the preceding year, was forced to become involved in the Congo, passing a resolution in September pertaining, inter alia, to the goal of national reconciliation. The Council expressed its conviction that the OAU should be able, ‘in the context of article 52 of the UN Charter’, to help find a peaceful solution to all the problems and disputes affecting peace and security on the continent of Africa. It encouraged the OAU to continue its peacemaking efforts in the Congo.25 The following year it granted observer status to the OAU, having regard to the ‘purposes and 21. UN docs. A/C.6/SC 215, paras. 21, 44; and AC/C.6/SC 217, para 28, quoted in Simma, p. 690 22. UN docs. GAOR (V) Annexes (Agenda Item 58) p.6; A/1442, in Simma, p. 690 23. UNGA Res. 253 (III), 18 October 1948. The Charter entered into force on 13 December 1951. (Political Handbook, 1999, p. 1202) 24. Compared with the more general reference to ‘regional organization’ – a more common parlance, yet not the terminology used in the Charter. 25. UNSC res. SC res. 199, 30 December 1964

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A Typology of Security Regionalism principles of the charters of both organizations’.26 Thus the first formal acknowledgement of a ‘regional agency’ in partnership with the UN under chapter VIII was in relation to Africa. The Council of Europe has experienced a different destiny. It was created in 1949 by West European states as the Cold War was breaking.27 As the Cold War was winding down it applied for and was given observer status in 1989.28 The OSCE (then the CSCE) was similarly accorded observer status by the Assembly in October 1993.29 No reference was made, in this decision, to the body as a ‘regional organization’. However, as noted below (section 4.4.4), the UN had already ‘welcomed’ the OSCE’s ‘self-designation as a ‘regional arrangement for the purposes of chapter VIII’.

4.4.2 Secretariat Invitations Through the six high-level meetings, from 1994 to 2005, the UN Secretary-General has simply extended an invitation to those organizations with which the UN had experienced close operational relationships in the area of peace and security. While this is no doubt the most sensible criterion of a ‘partnership’ for operational purposes, it is not a precise criterion and could cause political difficulties during a crisis. The Secretariat’s use of nomenclature has in the past been surprisingly loose in this respect. For the first five meetings all participating organizations have been broadly designated as ‘regional organizations’, including some (Interpol, Commonwealth, Francophonie, Lucophone and OIC) that clearly are not. As noted, the 6th meeting in July 2005 drew the broad distinction between regional and other inter-governmental organizations.

4.4.3 Security Council Appellation The Security Council itself has built its own history of dealings with regional agencies and other organizations. There appear in this respect to be five general ways in which the Council has chosen to relate – or not to relate – to regional (and sub-regional) agencies, namely: 26. UNGA res. 2011, 17 October 1965 27. Statute signed 5 May 1949, effective 3 August, structure defined by General Agreement of 2 September. (Political Handbook, 1999, p. 1149) 28. UNGA Res. 44/6, 17 October 1989. 29. UNGA Res. 48/5, 13 October 1993

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A Typology of Security Regionalism – referring to an organization explicitly as a ‘regional agency’; – referring to chapter VIII and to specified agencies, thus relying upon an organization for a peace and security partnership, implicitly indicating that it perceives it to be a ‘regional agency’; – referring to chapter VIII and to ‘regional agencies’ without specific identification, for enforcement action under chapter VII, thus implicitly indicating that whichever organization undertakes the action is to be regarded by the Council as a ‘regional agency’; – referring to chapter VIII without specifying a particular agency’s involvement in a crisis: – avoiding reference to chapter VIII while acknowledging the role of an organization that perceives itself to be a ‘regional agency’. These are set out in Table 4.E. A sixth scenario has also occurred, namely, the authorisation by the Council of a ‘multinational force’ which is subsequently led by a regional (or cross-regional) agency, without specific request or acknowledgement by the Council or any reference to chapter VIII. Examples of the different kinds of appellation of a regional agency are as follows: (a) Explicit reference to an organization as a regional agency: – In 1964 when the Congo crisis erupted a second time and with the OAU barely one year old, the Council expressed its ‘conviction’ that the OAU should be able, ‘in the context of article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations’, to help find a peaceful solution to ‘all the problems and disputes affecting peace and security on the African continent.’ The Council appealed for a ceasefire in accordance with the OAU resolution, requested ‘all States’ to assist the OAU attain that objective, and requested the OAU ‘in accordance with article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations’, to keep it fully informed. Clearly the Security Council regarded the OAU as a regional agency under chapter VIII.30

30. S/RES/199, 30 December 1964

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A Typology of Security Regionalism Table 4.E. Security Council Appellation of Regional Organizations Appellation

Year

Organiza- Crisis tion

Source (UNSC res.)

(a) Reference to Chapter VIII Specific reference to organization Explicit recognition (b) Reference to Chapter VIII Specific reference to agency Implicit recognition

1964

OAU

DR Congo

199

1960 1991 1992 1992 1992 1993

OAS EC/CSCE OAU/LAS EC/CSCE ECOWAS OAS

144 713 733 743 788 841

(c) Reference to Chapter VIII Reference to ‘regional agencies’

1992

Cuba BosniaHerzeg. Somalia Yugoslavia Liberia Haiti Croatia

(d) Reference to Chapter VIII Reference to ‘regional states’

1993 1996

(e) No reference to Chapter VIII Recognition of specific agency

1990 1993 1993 1994 1997

BosniaHerzeg. Croatia LAS Kuwait CIS Tajikistan CIS Georgia OAU Rwanda ECOWAS Sierra Leone

816

660 PRST/94/65 929

(b) Specific identification of organization; implicit recognition as a regional agency31 – In 1960 the Council relied on the OAS to resolve a dispute between the US and Cuba, deferring further consideration of the problem until it had received the OAS report.32

31. In addition to these six examples involving the Security Council, the Secretary-General made comparable reference to the PIF in the context of the Solomon Islands crisis in 2003. In August he commended ‘countries in the Pacific Islands region’ for their collective support to restore law and order in the Solomon Islands. He recognised the ‘particular importance’ of the unanimous support for ‘this concerted regional initiative’ undertaken within the framework of the PIF’s Biketawa Declaration. (UN News Centre, 5 August 2003) 32. S/RES/144, 19 July 1960

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A Typology of Security Regionalism – In 1991 during the Bosnian crisis the Council recalled the provisions of chapter VIII and expressed full support for the efforts of the European Community, with CSCE support, at peacemaking in the crisis.33 – In 1992 during the Somali crisis, the Council recalled the provisions of chapter VIII, and noted the appeals of the OAU and the LAS (also the OIC as well). It then requested the Secretary-General to co-operate with the OAU and LAS in mediation efforts.34 – Also in 1992 during the Yugoslav crisis, the Council recalled the provisions of chapter VIII; and commended the efforts of the European Community ‘with the support’ of the CSCE to reach a peaceful political settlement. It established UNPROFOR and called upon it to provide protection to the EC mission and called upon all the Yugoslav parties to accept a political settlement consistent with the principles of the CSCE.35 – In 1993 during the Haitian crisis the Council, recalling the provisions of chapter VIII and acting under chapter VII, affirmed that any solution should take into account the decisions of the OAS (as well as those of the UN General Assembly) and that resolution of the crisis by the UN should be in co-operation with the OAS. The Council imposed a global trade embargo on the recommendation of the OAS, and charged the UN Secretary-General with determining compliance by the Haitian junta ‘having regard to the views’ of the OAS.36 In this crisis the OAS and UN were co-operating closely in the beginning on peacemaking efforts, with one person acting as special representative of both organizations. By the time the Council authorised enforcement action, however, OAS co-operation had fallen away as a result of its internal divisions: on the Council itself Argentina, Canada and the US cosponsored but Venezuela did not (but voted for) and Brazil abstained. Yet overall, with the OAS having declared itself from the outset in 1948 as a ‘regional agency’ within the United Nations (see 4.4.4 below), it is clear from this that the Security Council regards the OAS as a ‘regional agency’ – even though this has never been explicitly acknowledged in a formal manner.

33. 34. 35. 36.

S/RES/713, 25 September 1991. See also S/RES/752, 15 May 1992. S/RES/733, 23 January 1992 S/RES 743, 21 February 1992 S/RES/841, 16 June 1993

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A Typology of Security Regionalism (c) General reference to chapter VIII; general reference to ‘states through regional agencies’ – In 1993 during the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis the Council, recalling chapter VIII and acting under chapter VII enforcement powers, authorised Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements’ to take, under Council authority and subject to close co-ordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures to ensure the no-flight ban over Bosnian airspace.37 – In 1996 during the Croatian crisis the Council, acting under chapter VII enforcement powers, decided that Member States, ‘acting nationally or through regional agencies’, could at the request of the UN peace operation there (UNTAES) and on the basis of procedures communicated to the United Nations, take all necessary measures including close air support, to defend UNTAES and assist in its withdrawal. This was an unusual move in that enforcement authority was accorded to non-specific nation-states and regional agencies. (d) General reference to chapter VIII; no identification of organization – In some other situations the Council has made general reference to chapter VIII of the Charter without clear reason as to its implications. In 1992 during the Croatian crisis the Council ‘recalled’ the provisions of chapter VIII but issued directives to Yugoslavia without reference to any regional or sub-regional agency.38 (e) Non-reference to chapter VIII; identification of organization – In 1990, immediately upon the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the Council expressed support for all efforts at conflict resolution ‘and especially those of the League of Arab States’.39 As the crisis intensified, however, and the Council developed a firmer grip on the situation, no further reference to the LAS was ever made again. Yet in November 2002 the LAS, acting ‘in accordance with article 54 of the Charter’, conveyed its own resolution on the latest crisis (Resolution 6257) to the Council.40 37. 38. 39. 40.

S/RES/816, 31 March 1993 S/RES/779, 6 October 1992 S/RES/660, 2 August 1990 S/2002/1238, 12 November 2002

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A Typology of Security Regionalism – In 1993 during the Tajikistan crisis the Council went to some lengths to avoid referring to chapter VIII – but rather to the ‘states of the region’.41 This did not prevent it subsequently from acknowledging the role of the CIS peacekeeping force in what was effectively an enforcement role (justified initially under self-defence).42 This reflects the political confrontation at the time between the CIS which wished to be seen as a regional agency and Western powers which opposed the notion of the CIS as an agency with European responsibilities. Since then the CIS has attended every one of the five UN high-level meetings ostensibly in the role of a ‘regional organization’ (Table 2.B). – During the Georgian crisis of 1993-4, the Council scrupulously avoided referring to chapter VIII but rather commended the peacemaking efforts of the OSCE ‘with Russia as facilitator’.43 It also initially rejected the idea of a CIS peacekeeping force, but finally reconsidered and accepted such an operation, while still avoiding reference to chapter VIII. – In 1994 during the Rwandan crisis the Council, in establishing the short enforcement action for humanitarian purposes, welcomed the co-operation of the OAU without referring to chapter VIII.44 With regard to the sixth scenario: – In August 2002, NATO advised the UN Secretary-General, ‘in a spirit of transparency and co-operation’ that it had ‘assumed command’ of the multinational force in Afghanistan (ISAF). In its authorisation of ISAF the Council had not requested any regional agency or other international organization to undertake any action. NATO’s assumption of command was undertaken on its own initiative. – In May 2003 the Council authorised, under chapter VII, an Interim Emergency Multinational Force for the DR Congo, which was spearheaded by a non-African sub-regional agency (the EU, dominantly by French troops) but with other non-European states also participating.45

41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

S/PRST/1994/65, 8 November 1994 S/RES/968, 16 December 1994 S/RES/849, 9 July 1993 S/RES/929, 22 June 1994 S/2003/970, 8 October 2003

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A Typology of Security Regionalism The Council has also referred to sub-regional agencies in the context of chapter VIII, implying that it considers peace and security activities by sub-regional agencies as well as regional agencies as also falling within the provisions of chapter VIII. Thus: – In 1992 the Council, determining that the situation in Liberia constituted a threat to international peace and security ‘particularly in West Africa as a whole’, and recalling the provisions of chapter VIII, welcomed the continued commitment of ECOWAS to a peaceful solution and commended its peacekeeping force in the country (notwithstanding that ECOWAS had undertaken enforcement action without its explicit authority).46 – In 1997 the Council repeatedly referred to ECOWAS efforts in the Sierra Leone crisis without expressly placing its work in a chapter VIII context. On other occasions, such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the Council was unable to adopt any resolution because of cross-veto certainties. In that crisis, the USSR proposed that an ICJ advisory opinion be sought on various questions, namely: 1. whether the OAS should be seen as a regional agency under chapter VIII; 2. whether the OAS had the right, under article 53, to take enforcement action; 3. whether the OAS procedures empowered it to expel a Member State because of its social system; and 4. whether the OAS Charter took precedence over the UN Charter.47 In fact the OAS enforcement action over Cuba in 1962 was never authorised by the Council. Thus the Security Council’s dealing with ‘partner organizations’ in crisis management has reflected a range of perceptions as to the precise nature of the organization involved in terms of the UN Charter. While in some cases it has explicitly acknowledged that an organization is a ‘regional agency’ under chapter VIII, in most cases this question has been left unclear, often deliberately for political reasons.48 The Council’s own history with partners does not conclusively determine the question of an inter46. S/RES/788, 19 November 1992 47. UN Yearbook, 1962, pp. 101 ff. 48. The call for ‘flexibility’ and ‘pragmatism’ in dealing with regional organizations suits the powerful Member States which appreciate the scope accorded thereby for discretionary judgement. But it does nothing to promote clarity in crisis situations as the Soviet enquiry during the Cuban crisis underlined.

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A Typology of Security Regionalism national organization’s status as a ‘regional agency’, and indeed in some cases it has perhaps compounded the issue further.

4.4.4 Self-Proclamation Two organizations have taken it upon themselves to declare themselves to be a ‘regional agency’ or ‘regional arrangement’ for the purposes of chapter VIII of the UN Charter.49 A third has declared that it is acting under Chapter VIII. The 1948 OAS Charter explicitly asserts that ‘within the United Nations the Organization ... is a regional agency’.50 As noted above (section 4.4.1), the General Assembly six months later admitted the OAS as an observer, although its authorising resolution did not specifically identify it as a ‘regional agency’ for the purposes of chapter VIII. In 1992 the Member States of the OSCE (at that time CSCE) declared “our understanding that the CSCE is a regional arrangement in the sense of chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations. As such it provides an important link between European and global security”.51 The UN General Assembly shortly thereafter ‘welcomed’ the CSCE declaration pertaining to that ‘understanding’ and stressed the need for enhanced cooperation between the CSCE and the UN, requesting the Secretary-General to report back to it on such co-operation.52 Two further initiatives should be recorded. As noted above (section 4.4.3.e), the LAS has passed a resolution in which it acted under Chapter VIII (article 54) of the UN Charter. And in 1998, the COE Parliamentary Assembly resolved to urge the Council of Ministers to declare the COE a 49. See: ‘The UN and Regional Organizations’, Mary MacKenzie, in The United Nations and Human Security, Edward Newman & Oliver P. Richmond, Eds. (Palgrave Macmillan, London; 2001), p. 154. 50. “Article 1. The American States establish by this Charter the international organization that they have developed to achieve an order of peace and justice, to promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their independence. Within the United Nations, the Organization of American States is a regional agency. ... Article 2. The Organization of American States, in order to put into practice the principles on which it is founded and to fulfil its regional obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, proclaims the following essential purposes: a) To strengthen the peace and security of the continent...” Charter of the Organization of American States 51. CSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration, 1992, para. 25 52. UNGA resolution, A/RES/47/10, 28 October 1992

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A Typology of Security Regionalism ‘Chapter VIII regional agency’.53 To date, however, the Council has not acted upon this recommendation. Such self-proclamations of this kind should not be accepted as a formal criterion for ‘partnership’ since they could be open to abuse by other organizations seeking to make similar pronouncements.

4.4.5 Formalisation of the Partnership The foregoing analysis shows that a range of factors – observership, invitation, Council reliance and self-proclamation – have all been relevant to the question of an organization’s status as a ‘regional agency’ under chapter VIII, but that none is sufficient or conclusive. If the regional-global security mechanism is to strengthen and acquire more ‘muscle definition’, there is a need for some other procedural mechanism for clarifying the partnership status, involving formal application, clear criteria and transparent decision-making. Table 4.F UN Observers 2003 Organization Type

Organization

Regional Organization

African Union Commonwealth of Independent States Council of Europe League of Arab States Organization of American States Pacific Islands Forum Sub-regional Organization Andean Community Caribbean Community Central American Integration System Community of Sahelo-Saharan States East African Community Economic Community of Central African States European Community GUUAM Latin American Economic System Cross-Regional Organization African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States Association of Caribbean States Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organization

53. COE Parliamentary Resolution 11367, 22 April 1998, para. 15(i).

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A Typology of Security Regionalism Economic Co-operation Organization Eurasian Economic Community Org. for Security and Co-operation in Europe Trans-national Organization Commonwealth Secretariat Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries International Organization of la Francophonie Org. for Economic Co-operation and Development Organization of the Islamic Conference Other Organizations African Development Bank Agency for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in LAC Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization Asian Development Bank Customs Co-operation Council Inter-American Development Bank Internat. Centre for Migration Policy Development International Committee of the Red Cross International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) International Development Law Institute Intern. Fed. of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies International Hydrographic Organization Intern. Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance International Organization for Migration International Seabed Authority International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea International Union for Conservation of Nature Inter-Parliamentary Union Latin American Parliament Palestine Partners in Population and Development Permanent Court of Arbitration Sovereign Military Order of Malta Source: A/INF/58/6 Notes: Organizations undertaking a security function (‘soft’ or ‘hard’) are in bold.

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C. Reviewing the Experience

5. Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies “... we have as many lessons to learn from co-operation between the Security Council and the African Union as we do from co-operation between the African Union mechanisms. Under article 16 of the Protocol, there are also plans for drawing up a memorandum of understanding between the AU Commission and regional African mechanisms.” African Union Security Council July 2004

The following chapter deals with the organizations involved in a ‘security partnership’ with the United Nations and the Security Council – which, however, should not be regarded formally as regional or sub-regional organizations.

5.1 Africa and the Arab World In many ways, sub-Saharan Africa is the most appropriate region for the benefit of regional security – being the most geographically compact and the one most in need of assistance in conflict resolution. Over the past two decades the security situation in Africa has been of such persistent concern to the international community that the United Nations has adopted a specific focus on the continent. In 1995 it welcomed the Secretary-General’s recommendations on improving capacity for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa.1 In 1997 and ’98 the 1.

S/1995/911

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies UN’s DPKO convened meetings on the subject. In April 1998 the Council welcomed the Secretary-General’s report on the causes of conflict in Africa and the promotion of durable peace.2 It established a working group to review and implement the recommendations and decided to convene ministerial meetings on Africa on a biennial basis.3 In September 1998 the Council expressed a commitment to exercising its responsibility for peace and security in relation to Africa in particular. It called upon the international community to contribute to the various trust funds for Africa and to assist in training of peacekeepers. It encouraged African states in particular to participate in the UN standby arrangements. And it stressed the need to be kept ‘fully informed’ of peacekeeping activities carried that were out or planned by regional or sub-regional organizations.4 Also in September 1998, the Council at foreign ministerial level called for an ‘enhanced partnership’ between the UN and African regional and sub-regional organizations in peace and security. It is thus clear that the UN and particularly its leading Member States, having acknowledged culpability for the profound failures to maintain peace and security in Africa during the 1990s, is now committed to developing a support mechanism and the political focus to ensure the nonrepetition of this in the future.

5.1.1 The African Union (AU) The African Union has recently been established as the successor to the Organization of African Unity. Early moves towards regionalism in Africa in the 1960s were complicated by rival visions of the continent’s future. Tensions existed between the ‘Casablanca group’ which advocated socialism, anti-colonialism and panAfricanism and the ‘Monrovia gr4oup’ which favoured a more evolutionary approach based on sub-regionalism. Finally an African summit reached sufficient consensus to found the regional organization in May 1963 – the OAU. The OAU reflected its own distinctive characteristics that separated it from other regional organizations – notably a continent-wide pride in the 2. 3. 4.

S/1998/318 S/RES/1170, 28 May 1998 S/PRST/1998/28, 16 September 1998

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies achievement of independence from colonialism and a determination to preserve what had been won.5 Its principal political aims were to combat the scourge of apartheid and free South Africa; to ensure respect for the post-colonial boundaries as a route to maintaining regional peace and security; and to strictly respect the principle of non-intervention. From the outset the OAU was drawn into crisis management during the 1964 DR Congo crisis. As noted (section 4.4.3) the Security Council explicitly accorded it the status of a regional agency.6 The first attempt at direct peacemaking was in response to a request from Chad in 1981 and the despatch of a pan-African peacekeeping force. The force withdrew through lack of funding within a year, with the OAU continuing in the role of mediator.7 Funding difficulties through the 1980s thwarted any dynamic role by the body, which focused primarily on South Africa and a reaction to economic marginalisation by the global economic powers. A 1993 summit declaration endorsed the proposed creation of an ‘OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution’ (MCPR), both between and within Member States. Governments declined, however, to endorse the establishment of an OAU peacekeeping force. Because of this and also continuing problems of funding, the regional agency was unable during the 1990s to exert a potent influence on the crises in Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan and Zaire. In early 1994 at the beginning of the genocide in Rwanda, the OAU’s Central Organ for Conflict, Management and Resolution ‘expressed concern’ at the developing events, but no substantive initiative was taken to intervene.8 A summit in 1995 called for greater co-operation between the OAU and the UN in deploying missions to contain cross-border disputes. 5.

6. 7. 8.

“Inspired by a common determination to promote understanding among our peoples and co-operation among our states in response to the aspirations of our peoples for brother-hood and solidarity, in a larger unity transcending ethnic and national differences; convinced that, in order to translate this determination into a dynamic force in the cause of human progress, conditions for peace and security must be established and maintained; determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states, and to fight against neo-colonialism in all its forms...” Preamble to OAU Charter, 1964. S/RES/199, 30 December 1964 Political Handbook, 1999, p. 1200 S/PRST/1994/21, 30 April 1994. The UN Security Council president endorsed the OAU’s concern.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies During the 1990s, however, the OAU displayed a trenchant policy orientation on certain peace and security issues, including defiance of the UN Security Council. It supported Libya in its efforts to survive the economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council.9 In 1998 it endorsed the proposal to have the Lockerbie suspects tried in a third country outside the US or UK, and agreed to disregard the UN sanctions on Libya, notwithstanding their binding nature.10 In 1997 the OAU endorsed the regime change of President Mobutu in Zaire by the Kabila insurgency movement, while endorsing the use of force by the sub-regional agency (ECOWAS) for the restoration of the elected government in Sierra Leone in 1997. In November it also despatched a small military observer force to Comoros islands during the separatist crisis there.11 And in 1998 it sent a mediation mission under the ‘mechanism’ to Eritrea-Ethiopia. The late-1990s witnessed the beginning of a qualitative change in Africa’s regional security orientation. In 1998 former South African President Mandela, criticising the Eritrean mission as ineffective, called for the OAU to abandon its strict non-intervention principle. African nations, he argued, had a responsibility to protect other Africans living under oppressive regimes.12 In 1999 following the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania the previous year, the OAU adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. African nations agreed that terrorism could not be justified ‘under any circumstances’, but they also reaffirmed the legitimate right of peoples for self-determination and independence pursuant to the principles of international law. Agreeing on a definition of ‘terrorism’, they undertook to review national legislation for terrorist acts and develop areas of co-operation including extra-territorial investigation, extradition and mutual legal assistance. A new African resolve to strengthen regional unity and galvanise regional economic redemption – the ‘African renaissance’ as the South African president has labelled it – resulted in the metamorphosis of the OAU into the African Union in July 2000. Inspired by a ‘common vision of a united 9. Political Handbook, p. 1201 10. Political Handbook, p. 1202. UNSC doc. S/RES/748 of 31 March 1992 had imposed, under chapter VII, aviation and arms sanctions against Libya for its failure to ‘renounce terrorism’ or respond to legal procedures in the Lockerbie investigation. 11. Ibid. pp. 1201-2 12. P.H. p. 1202

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies and strong Africa’, and by the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of Africa’s development and integration agenda,13 the African Union is consciously modelled along the lines of the European Union. But, with virtually pan-regional membership and one particular innovative development, the AU has broken new ground in security thinking and institution-building – reversing a decades-old policy of non-interventionism in favour of a clearly-enunciated policy of collective intervention under certain circumstances. The AU, whose first president is the highly-regarded former Mali president, Alpha Oumar Konaré, represents the new will and vision of continental unity that is embracing Africa in the early 21st century. The outstanding and most distinctive feature of this new trend is the creation of a Peace and Security Council under separate protocol of July 2002. The Council’s Protocol reflects the repeated call of the UN highlevel meetings (1994, ‘96, ’98 and 2001) for greater co-operation between regional organizations and the UN.14 Desiring to establish an operational structure for conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace support operations and post-conflict reconstruction, the AU established the Council as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the continent. Its substantive functions are five-fold: early-warning and preventive diplomacy; peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry; ‘peace support operations’ and intervention in accord with the AU’s constitutive act; peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; and humanitarian action and disaster management. Such ‘intervention’ is governed by two relevant principles of the AU’s Constitutive Act, namely: – the right to intervene in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances (war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity), subject to a decision of the AU Assembly upon the Council’s recommendation; or th

th

13. Constitutive Act of the African Union, preamble. Lomé, Togo, July 2002, 7 & 8 preambular paragraphs. 14. “Mindful of the ... need to forge closer co-operation and partnership between the United Nations, other international organizations and the African Union, in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa”. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, th Durban, July 2002, 4 preambular paragraph. Article 7.k (Powers) requires the Council to promote and develop a strong ‘partnership for peace and security’ between the AU and the UN.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies – the right of a Member State to request intervention in order to restore peace and security. The Council is also entrusted with imposing sanctions if unconstitutional changes of government take place.15 And it is to ensure implementation of the international Terrorism Convention. The Council takes over from the former Central Organ of the OAUMCPR. It is composed of 15 members, none permanent but each with eligibility for immediate re-election. A two-thirds majority is required on substantive issues, with no veto provided. A ‘Panel of the Wise’ composed of five ‘highly-respected African personalities’ supports the Council, especially in the area of conflict prevention. An early-warning system is established with a ‘situation room’ located in headquarters. In May 2004, on the inauguration of the Council, the UN Secretary-General hailed it as a ‘potentially powerful tool’ for the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflict on the continent. “With the establishment of this important body, the African Union has crossed yet another significant threshold in its quest to promote lasting peace and stability, strengthen democratic institutions and support sustainable development throughout Africa.”16 In establishing this regional security organ the AU is careful to recognise the provisions of the UN Charter conferring on the UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security as well as the provisions of chapter VIII, thereby making it clear that it will act as a subsidiary body.17 The African Council is to maintain close and continued interaction with the UN Council through periodic meetings and regular consultations.18 In February 2004 the AU, conscious of ‘the indivisibility of security in Africa’, adopted a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). This embraces a definition of defence which encompasses ‘both the traditional, military and state-centric notion of the use of armed forces for the state to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the less traditional, non-military aspects which relate to the people’s cultural, social and economic values and ways of life’.19 The 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

Article 7.g UN News Centre, 25 May 2004 th 4 preambular paragraph. Article 17.3 Solemn Declaration on a Common Defence and Security Policy, adopted in Sirte, Libya, 28 February 2004, Article 5.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies common security of Africa required a definition of security that encompasses both the traditional, state-centric notion of state survival with the non-military notion ‘which is informed by the new international environment and the high incidence of intra-state conflict’. The newer, multidimensional notion of security embraces such issues as human rights, participatory governance, equal development, access to resources and the basic necessities of life, protection against poverty, good education and health, gender equality, and environmental integrity.20 The AU meticulously listed 22 internal threats to Africa’s common security and nine external threats. Under the CADSP an Africa Standby Force (ASF) was established with military, police and civilian components for ‘peace support missions and intervention’.21 Its troops are to be deployed from 2005 and in full strength by 2010. The ASF is to be comprised of brigades ‘from the five African regions’.22 In fact, this is not a qualitatively new development; existing units of national armies will be earmarked for deployment as a peacekeeping force when called upon to do so by the AU. In April 2003 the new regional body’s Central Organ for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution authorised the deployment of the first AU peacekeeping force. The African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), composed of troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa under the latter’s command, has a one-year ‘soft peacekeeping’ mandate (monitoring a ceasefire with mutual consent) until a UN peace mission takes over. In May the UN Security Council expressed support for the speedy deployment of AMIB, and appealed for international assistance to it.23 In June 2004, the AU announced plans to deploy its second mission – an observer mission of 60-80 troops with an initial protection force of 300 to Darfur. The Peace and Security Council had initially foreseen a civilian protection mandate, but it soon retreated from its initial concept and on 20 October 2004 decided that the AMIS mandate should be mainly to monitor and support the implementation of the peace agreement. Considering that the mission was not fully effective, on 28 April 2005, the PSC approved a second expansion of AMIS to 7,731. AMIS has contributed to the reduction in combat through its limited presence and its reporting. It has also 20. 21. 22. 23.

Article 6. A Libyan proposal for a standing African Army was rejected. Declaration: ‘Building Blocks: (A.1.iii)’ S/PRST/2003/4, 2 May 2003

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies had some success in reducing insecurity for civilians in the areas where it has deployed. Thus the African Union has forged a new development in doctrinal thinking and institution-building, through its regional security council, of the kind that Churchill envisaged sixty years ago, with the right of intervention in certain stipulated circumstances for the first time by majority vote without veto, enshrined in international law (see Box 5.A). With the 27th ratification, this far-reaching innovation entered into force on 26 December 2003. However, the AU Constitutive Act, despite a general reference to the primacy of the UN Security Council, makes no reference in the operative part of the document to the need for advance approval by the Council of any AU intervention in a Member State. The implication is that a decision by the AU summit would suffice. Strictly, any such intervention without UN Security Council advance authorisation would violate the Charter. That implication therefore needs to be clarified. Under the AU’s recent security planning, Africa is now designated as comprising five ‘security sub-regions’ – north, west, east, central and southern. As noted before, North Africa is treated in this study as part of a separate ‘security region’. Central Africa is the scene of considerable conflict but has to date not created a sub-regional agency for peace and security. Other sub-regional agencies exist (ECCAS, EAC, COMESA) but these are devoted to economic issues. In fact, the new African Union has tended, in its short time to date, to discourage the further growth and evolution of sub-regional agencies, preferring to develop greater clarity on pan-African issues within the single regional agency and to assert greater authority over pan-African affairs.24

24. Notwithstanding that in earlier times it explicitly relied upon sub-regional agencies for conflict management through enforcement action (as in the Sierra Leone crisis of 1997).

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies Box 5.A ‘Spearheading Doctrinal Change’: Innovations by the African Union in Peace and Security “... Inspired by the noble ideals which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organization and generations of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity; ... Determined to take up the multifaceted challenges that confront our continent and peoples in the light of the social, economic and political changes taking place in the world; Have agreed as follows: 4 (d) establishment of a common defence policy for the African Continent; (e) peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States of the Union through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly; (f) prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among Members of the Union; (g) non-inteference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another; (h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (i) peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right t olive in peace and security; (j) the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security...” Constitutive Act of the African Union Done at Lomé, Togo, 11 July 2000 “Article 7. 1. ... the Peace and Security Council shall: (a) anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity; (f) approve the modalities for intervention by the Union in a Member State, following a decision by the Assembly...; (g) institute sanctions, whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in a Member States; 2. The Member States agree that in carrying out its duties under the present Protocol, the Peace and Security Council acts on their behalf. 3. The Member States agree to accept and implement the decision of the Peace and Security Council, in accordance with the Constitutive Act. Article 8. 13. Decisions of the Peace and Security Council shall generally be guided by the principle of consensus. In cases where consensus cannot be reached, the Peace and Security Council shall adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters shall be made by a two-thirds majority vote of its Members voting.” Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of the Africa Union First African Union Assembly, Durban, South Africa, 9 July 2002

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies The biggest challenge to implementing such far-reaching innovations remains financial resource capacity but the international community has given a quick response to these regional innovations. In April 2004 the EU announced a 250m. Peace Facility, designed to support African peace-keeping and improve the institutional capacities of the AU and sub-regional organizations in relation to peace-keeping and conflict prevention.25

5.1.2 West Africa (ECOWAS) Internecine intra-national conflict and cross-border arms, financial and refugee flows have rendered this sub-region an endemic challenge for peacemaking. Four national conflicts have displayed a causal inter-relationship, with one conflict spilling over into another (Liberia, 19902003; Sierra Leone, 1997-2003; Guinea-Bissau, 1998-2003; and Cote d’Ivoire, 2003-4). The overwhelming dominance of the hegemon (Nigeria) has not inhibited it from taking bold initiatives for conflict prevention and management, yet political divisions between Anglophone and Francophone countries and external interests continue to thwart unity and policy cohesion in sub-regional action. Economic integration was the original motivation of the sub-regional agency (ECOWAS) in the mid-1970s, based on the premise that such an accomplishment would raise living standards and enable member countries to escape strong post-colonial metropolitan influences. ECOWAS was originally designed in 1975 to promote co-operation in trade and economic activity. With the outbreak of civil war in Liberia in 1990, however, ECOWAS was obliged to become involved in an impromptu attempt at conflict resolution. Its involvement, calling for a ceasefire and sending a military observer group, proved to be misjudged as the force entered a battlefield situation and immediately engaged in offensive combat. Efforts had in fact been made early on to develop a conflict resolution and management mechanism. The 1978 Non-Aggression Protocol enjoined member countries to refrain from “committing, encouraging or condoning the acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the terri-

25. http://www.politics.ie/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=4300

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies torial integrity or political independence of other Member States”. The 1981 Defence Protocol forbade ‘all acts of subversion, hostility or aggression’ directed against a Member State, and considered them to constitute a ‘threat or aggression against the entire Community’. Yet these institutional developments notwithstanding, the first crisis prompted an ad hoc peacekeeping arrangement since no institutional mechanism had been constructed. In 1990 a Standing Mediation Committee was formed to mediate in disputes between Member States. In 1993 the original treaty was replaced by a new ECOWAS Treaty that settled a lingering rivalry between several sub-regional movements. The focus of the new treaty, however, remained on economic integration. In the two major crises, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the sub-region has undertaken the enforcement action performed while the global body (the UN Security Council) has performed the ‘soft’ peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions. The original mandates of ECOMOG (ostensibly a ‘military observer group’) were imprecise and the first force (ECOMOG I in Liberia) undertook enforcement action virtually from the outset, initially without Security Council authorisation and thus strictly in violation of the UN Charter. The question also arises whether ECOWAS was acting ultra vires its own constitution which did not provide for security functions of either a ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ kind. In the aftermath of the conflicts, moreover, the global and sub-regional bodies are wrestling with the tensions and contradictions between postconflict stability on the one hand and reconciliation and criminal justice on the other. Sub-regional policies on the former and non-regional superpower policies on the latter have intermingled and even clashed. In the political context the global body has consistently commended the sub-regional body for its ‘hard peacemaking’ efforts, and indicates that it believes the functional relationship between the two to be a good one. It may be concluded, however, that this propensity on the part of the Council to rely upon and commend the sub-regional body reflects a preference on the part of its permanent members to avoid any major involvement in West Africa with its limited strategic importance to global interests, rather than to any genuine admiration for the clarity and effectiveness of the sub-region’s peacemaking efforts. Despite this, ECOWAS has one of the closest relationship with the UN of all sub-regional agencies, in or outside Africa, having regularly briefed the Council in its own right and having attended all but the first UN high-level meeting, and being the only sub-regional agency to attend the 159

Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies Security Council’s open debate. It was also granted observer status at the UN General Assembly in December 2004.26

5.1.3 East Africa (IGAD) East Africa has been wracked by conflict, some of which has commanded global attention (such as Somalia 1992 – 4) and some of which has been largely ignored (such as Sudan 1955 – 2004). Recent developments indicate that a sub-regional initiative designed to promote a more effective peace and security function in East Africa is well under way. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in 1996 as a successor to a sub-regional body that had been devoted to drought relief for the previous ten years, with a broader security mandate. IGAD, with its seven Member States,27 has developed a collaboration mechanism with COMESA and EAC to ensure the avoidance of duplication in activities. The IGAD Agreement refers to the Charter of both the OAU and the UN, noting that ‘integration between the countries of the region’ will contribute to the achievement of the purposes’ of both organizations.28 The Agreement takes as one of its objectives the promotion of peace and stability in the sub-region and the creation of mechanisms for the prevention, management and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts through dialogue.29 Member States are required to ‘act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability which are essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress’. To this end they shall take collective measures to eliminate threats to regional co-operation, peace and stability, establish effective mechanisms of consultation and co-operation for pacific settlement. They are to deal with disputes ‘within this sub-regional mechanism’ before referring them to ‘other regional or international organizations’.30 In November 2000 IGAD completed a Protocol establishing a Conflict Early-Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) for the sharing of information pertaining to potential conflict and the promotion of a co26. A/RES/59/51, 2 December 2004. 27. Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda; 28. Agreement Establishing the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Nairobi, th 21 March 1996, 6 preambular paragraph 29. Article 7.g 30. Article 18.a

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies ordinated response. In February 2004 IGAD chiefs of staff commenced planning for the East African Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) within the framework of the African Union’s ASF. Despite these developments in the security field IGAD has not attended any of the UN-RO High-Level meetings. Although it accepted an invitation to attend the 6th UN-Regional High-Level Meeting in 2005, it did not appear.

5.1.4 Central Africa (ECCAS) Conflict in Central Africa over recent decades has engulfed Rwanda, Burundi, DR Congo, Congo (Brazzaville) and the CAR. A complicating factor is the decision of the sub-regional hegemon, the DR Congo, to join what is effectively a different sub-regional organization (in southern Africa). As a result the crises of Central Africa (in the Great Lakes area) have directly involved the UN and the OAU. Thus: – The early crisis of the 1960s in the DR Congo did, as noted, engage the OAU in its infancy, but the management of that crisis was left almost exclusively to the UN Security Council. – As noted, the genocide in Rwanda of April 1994 drew the concern of the OAU but prompted no substantive action. In 1998 the OAU launched an enquiry into the Rwanda events in order to ensure that these would not be repeated. – The more recent crisis of the DR Congo (1997-2004) has involved the sub-regional organization of SADC (of which the DRC is a member) for mediation purposes. Recent intervention in Bunia was undertaken by the EU-led mission ‘Artemis’ (see section 5.2.3.b). – In Burundi the AU has, as noted, intervened with its first peacekeeping mission. The ongoing and traumatic crises in Central Africa highlight the need for a clearer understanding of the division of labour between the UN and the regional and sub-regional organizations in the area of peace and security. The regional economic body, ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States), which was established in 1983, has adopted four priority areas in 1999 which included the development of capacities for peace, security and stability which were ‘essential prerequisites for economic and social development’. In this capacity ECCAS attended the UN-Regional High-Level Meeting for the first time in 2005. 161

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5.1.5 Southern Africa (SADC) The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), with a membership of 14 Member States,31 was established in 1992 as a successor to a 1979 ‘front-line state’ organization devoted to the ‘economic liberation’ of South Africa. The security goals of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) were achieved in the early ‘90s with the ending of apartheid. In 1992 SADCC was thus dissolved and SADC created for economic co-ordination of all southern states, including South Africa, the stated goal being the creation of a sub-regional common market. One objective of the new body, however, is also to ‘consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability’.32 Member States also agree to co-operate in the areas of politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security,33 and the Treaty provides for the establishment of an Organ of Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (‘the Organ’).34 In the mid-1990s the problem of membership duplication between SADC and COMESA/PTA absorbed much of the agency’s attention, and little attention was given to the agency’s inchoate security function. In 1994, however, SADC welcomed South Africa to its ranks and also began to address security issues such as the creation of a dispute resolution mechanism and a regional peacekeeping and defence force. In November SADC defence ministers authorised the formation of a ‘regional deployment force’ that would not be a standing army but an armed force composed of troops from national forces. In 1996 SADC established the Organ for security issues, but it immediately became a matter of controversy when, under the chairmanship of Zimbabwe’s president, it clashed with the main authority of SADC under the then chairmanship of the South African president. Two sub-regional conflicts in particular caused difficulty. SADC also attended the UN regional high-level consultations for the first time in 2005.

31. Angola, Botswana, DR Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 32. Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, article 5.1.c 33. Article 21 34. Article 9

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5.1.6 The League of Arab States (LAS) More than any other region, the Arab world experiences the most intractable and deadly of the conflicts in the world, and comprises one of the most strategically-important areas of the world. Two of the three principal conflicts (Iraq-Iran, 1980-1988; Iraq-Kuwait, 1990-91) were traditional inter-state conflicts of the kind the UN was specifically designed to handle. The third (Arab-Israeli dispute over Palestine, 1948 – 2004) encompasses both inter-state and intra-state issues. Currently, the continuing Iraqi crisis (1991 – 2004) tests the international community’s ability to agree upon a common security agenda and a legitimate response to the security challenge posed by the former Baathist regime. The formation of the regional agency (the League of Arab States) was prompted early in the UN-era by a need felt by the independent Arab states for political-cultural identity. The League of Arab States was created in March 1945 to promote ‘policy co-ordination for the sake of their independence and sovereignty and a general concern with the affairs and interests of the Arab countries’. Shortly thereafter in 1950 this was supplemented by a collective security mechanism. Economic integration has little significance in such regional political activity. Unlike the hegemonic nature of West Africa, the Arab world is led but not dominated by a leading state (Egypt), and the strong centrifugal forces at play within the region make for weak multipolarity within the regional body. Indeed the internal strains caused by the Egypt-Israel Peace Accord of 1979 resulted in Egypt being suspended from participation in the League, its headquarters being moved out of Cairo and no summit being convened for over ten years. Unity over the Iraq-Iran war proved easier because of the Arab identity with Iraq against Iran’s Persian population. The situation could be seen as the League acting against an external adversary – setting aside the legal and political merits of the conflict. And the LAS sent a pan-Arab peacekeeping force into Lebanon in 1976 (led by Syria). But the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, being a fratricidal conflict between two Arab States, caused deep division within the regional body. More recently the LAS has rejected the ‘Greater Middle East Initiative’ advanced by the US as part of its attempt to place its invasion of Iraq into a positive regional perspective. Notwithstanding these internal problems, the League has done better than is generally allowed in developing a cohesive, consistent and rational policy towards the on-going Iraq crisis (1990-2004). It has aspired to strike a regional policy that remains compatible with UN Security Coun163

Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies cil policy over the years. To its considerable concern, the events of the past two years have resulted in the Council marginalizing it as events moved inexorably along the path of the ‘logic of war’ in Iraq. Its potential role in being the principal actor in a post-conflict scenario, playing a legitimising and stabilising role, has been disregarded and opposed by the superpower and, consequently, the Security Council. These concerns were spelt out by the League’s Secretary-General before the Council in the immediate aftermath of the conflict in April 2003 (see Box 5.B). The Council has focused on the League principally as a useful instrument for legitimising the interim governing council in Iraq. On balance, the global body tends to downplay and minimise the potential of the regional agency for playing a constructive role in peace and security in the region. The cultural significance of this marginalisation, with its political consequences in terms of regional state policies towards terrorism, WMD and US troop presence in the region, is not yet fully appreciated outside the region. With the invasion and occupation of Iraq, controversial from the outset on legal grounds but also encountering severe political difficulty, the original dismissal of the potential role of the Arab League is now being regarded by some in the Western world as a mistake. In May 2004 the Prime Minister of Spain thought that the idea of a NATO-led force in Iraq similar to the one in Afghanistan ‘would not be a feasible alternative’. It was more likely that an Arab force ‘could give the Iraqis peace of mind’.35 The LAS, however, continues to have internal political difficulties among its Member States, including at its 16th summit in May 2004. In July the idea of an Islamic force being sent to Iraq was raised by Saudi Arabia, but it was unclear whether such a force would be intended as a supplement or a substitute for coalition forces. The LAS Secretary-General emphasized the need for a unanimous League decision on the matter.36

5.1.7 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) The security crises of the Arab world are mostly located in West Asia (Iraq, Palestine) rather than North Africa. 35. IHT, 7 May 2004 36. www.arableagueonline.org, 27 July 2004

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies The only ongoing crisis in North Africa – the Western Sahara issue – has been handled principally by the UN but the OAU-AU’s involvement has been controversial within the regional body. The OAU’s acceptance of the independence movement in 1984, the ‘Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic’ (the national political name for the Polisario Front independence movement) prompted Morocco to withdraw from the regional body.37 Although not recognised at the UN, the SADR is now a full member of the AU while Morocco remains a non-member. The Maghreb Union (AMU) is an attempt by Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia to create sub-regional co-operation. In the late 1980s, following a rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco, the five nations proposed a treaty that would encompass the ‘Greater Arab Maghreb’. Launched in 1989, the AMU was intended as a general co-ordination mechanism among the countries of the Maghreb sub-region. The aim is ‘to strengthen the bonds of brotherhood’, to realize freedom of movement, development, and ‘preserve the spiritual and moral values derived from the tolerant teachings of Islam’, and to ‘safeguard the Arab national identity’. The continuation, however, of territorial disputes, political rivalries and ideological differences have tended to thwart any serious movement towards unity or even co-operation. The Libyan vision of a greater union – ‘one invincible Arab nation’ stretching from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf – has not been completely embraced by other countries. Libya’s preference to include Chad, Mali, Niger and Sudan in the Maghreb Union was rejected by the others, but the Arab Maghreb Treaty left open the membership to other countries ‘belonging to the Arab nation or the African group’. 38The Iraq-Kuwait crisis of 1990 also split the Union, with Morocco contributing troops to the coalition and the other four opposing a US military presence in the Gulf. Divisions intensified in 1992 when the other four also decided to observe the mandatory UN sanctions against Libya for its failure to fulfil the Security Council demands over the Lockerbie investigation. In 1993 the AMU summit decided that discussion on integration should be postponed until the various divisive issues could be settled, including the sanctions issue, the Western Saharan issue and the disparate ‘economic orientation’ of Member States. The refusal of Libya to accept chairmanship in 1995 because of the sanctions dispute and the heightened tensions between

37. Political Handbook 1999, p. 1200 38. Political Handbook 1999, p. 1127

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara resulted in no summit meeting being held since 1994 and a request by Morocco to freeze the body’s institutions. With one exception, the Arab states of North Africa do not play a major role in AU affairs. Libya, however, has emerged as a leader of African unity, playing host to many AU meetings and offering far-reaching proposals such as a pan African army. This involvement in the African Union poses an inextricable relationship between Arab and African security spheres that complicates all efforts to develop a clear-cut delineation of regional security agencies.

5.1.8 The Mashreq The sub-region of the Mashreq – the area comprising Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq – has no sub-regional agency. Yet it is one of the most crucial geo-strategic areas in the world and, if Palestine is included, comprises the worst area of deep-rooted conflict in the world. At the World Economic Forum in Jordan, King Abdullah II said Jordan will not send peacekeeping troops to Iraq, and neither should any other neighbouring nations because it could be ‘too tempting to use them to improperly influence Iraqi society’.39

5.1.9 The Gulf (GCC) The Gulf region, comprised of six Member States (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman), is also a strategically sensitive sub-region, having regard particularly to the oil interests of both the developing and developed world – the sub-region containing nearly 40% of global reserves.40. The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) was established in 1981 with the stated aim of achieving co-ordination, integration, and co-operation among Member States in all fields ‘in order to bring about their unity’. The institutional underpinnings, states the GCC, confirm the “special relations, common qualities and similar systems founded on the creed of Islam, faith in a common destiny and sharing one goal, and that the co39. Christopher Torchia, Associated Press, 17 May 2004 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Allen.htm 40. Political Handbook 1999, p. 1176

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies operation among these states would serve the sublime objectives of the Arab nation.” Thus, while the sub-regional agency is a continuation, evolution and institutionalisation of old prevailing realities, it is also a “practical answer to the challenges of security and economic development in the area. It is also a fulfilment of the aspirations of its citizens towards some sort of Arab regional unity.”41 Although in the beginning the GCC had denied any intention of becoming a military grouping, events in the broader Arab region prompted it to develop joint security policies. It undertook extensive efforts at mediation during the Iran-Iraq war, though to no avail. In 1983 it undertook joint military exercises. A 1985 summit confirmed its willingness to assist in finding a peaceful solution to the Iran-Iraq conflict with appropriate regard to the ‘legitimate interests of both parties’. In the late 1980s it appealed for both regional and global support against ‘Iranian aggression’ and agreed to avail themselves of US naval support to oil tankers reflagged under US auspices. As the war receded the GCC turned its attention again to economic issues. In August 1990, however, the GCC faced difficulty, in the face of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, to mount a rapid coordinated response. It was criticised for being slow to condemn the invasion of one of its own Member States. At its summit in December it called for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraq, warning Baghdad that failure to adhere to the coalition’s demands would result in war – effectively reiterating the position of the UN Security Council. It still took the GCC some time to deploy its sub-regional force, ‘Peninsula Shield’, its troops finally being absorbed into the UN-authorised, US-led multinational force. During the conflict with Iraq the GCC initiated discussion with Egypt and Syria (which had also opposed Iraq) for the creation of a new sub-regional defence organization, and the ‘six-plus-two’ defence arrangement was outlined in the Damascus Declaration of March 1991. The initial support for an Arab defence force waned in the course of the ensuing months.

41. GCC: Introduction, tions.html

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies Box 5 B Legitimacy and the Contemporary Regional-Global Security Mechanism Arab League Statement to the Security Council, April 2003 A Framework Vision for Regional Security In addition to dealing with these two major issues, the League of Arab States has defined a framework vision for regional security in the Middle East. That vision can be realized only through the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction from the region, without exception. Disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction is just one step on the road towards making the Middle East region a nuclear-weapon-free zone, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, which makes compliance mandatory. I would like to speak frankly about Israel’s possession of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and about the need to address the threat they pose and to subject them to inspections as the preliminary steps ultimately leading to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, thus preventing an arms race there. Invigorating Its Regional Role The League of Arab States is thus seeking to invigorate its regional role in the prevention, management and settlement of disputes by peaceful means. The Ministerial Council of the League recently recommended the establishment of an Arab mechanism for that purpose, which we are planning to activate as soon as possible. Collective Security System under Challenge The collective security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations was based on solid principles, foremost among them respect by all for international law; the commitment of the Council to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security; and co-operation in pursuit of these objectives with regional arrangements as defined in Article 52 of the Charter. While seeking to address these challenges that the system faces, we should note that the system – which has thus far stood the test of time – is currently facing one of the most serious challenges to its authority. Bypassing the law and the Charter and giving precedence to the use of military force outside the context of international legitimacy has become almost commonplace. Some are even deliberating on how to codify occupation and on ways in which foreign forces might administer an independent state. The Council is even being called upon to jump on the bandwagon and legitimize these cases, which were generally considered a thing of the past. This is an extremely bad omen for the future of international relations. Should such a scenario come to pass, the system enshrined in the Charter will be threatened with collapse.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies Legitimacy Inherently Local The United Nations cannot legitimize or legalize a government installed as a result of military invasion, contrary to the will of the people concerned. Legitimacy is the product of the people’s acceptance of its Government, not the product of a decision taken by foreign forces – not, indeed, of a programme drawn up by an international organization, even if that organization is the United Nations. Council’s ‘Double-Standard’ towards Regional Organizations Chapter VIII of the Charter allows regional organizations and arrangements considerable leeway within which they can navigate the containment and settlement of disputes, always recalling that the primary responsibility remains with the Security Council. The fact is, however, that the Council does not deal with all regional arrangements on the same footing. While the Council may give a particular regional organization an opportunity to assist in preventing or settling a crisis, it may ignore another regional organization in a similar situation. We believe that the proper functioning of the collective international security system in the coming years will require the Council’s efficient use of assistance by the regional organizations in addressing various crises. Abridged from S/PV/4739, 11 April 2003

5.2 Europe The regional security architecture of Europe is complex. In terms of membership it combines cross-regional organizations (OSCE, NATO) with truly regional agencies (COE) and sub-regional organizations aspiring to be truly regional (EU). In terms of mandates, it combines collective defence alliances (NATO, WEU) with ‘soft security’ organizations (OSCE) and integration organizations (EU). This panoply of institutions does nothing for clarity of chapter VIII peace operations. Yet all have attended the UN high-level meetings. Compounding the difficulty of European regionalism is the political convulsion that has transformed Europe from a strategically bifurcated to an essentially unified region. The move by Eastern European states to join what in the past were West European regional organizations has transformed these agencies into truly pan-European institutions. The size and continuing isolated status of Russia appears in starker relief today in relation to Europe, raising the hitherto hypothetical question whether Russia is to be seen as a component part of Europe in the 21st century or remains sui generis. 169

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5.2.1 The Council of Europe (COE) One of the more difficult challenges of regionalism is to identify the most appropriate regional agency for Europe. As chapter 4 has noted the Council of Europe is, for the present, the most appropriate choice.42 The COE is composed exclusively today of all 45 European states (including Russia and Turkey), having expanded after 1991 to include the eastern bloc countries. It was the COE that adopted the European flag that was later observed by all other European institutions including the EU. In 1946 Winston Churchill put forward a plan for a ‘United States of Europe’ through a United Europe Movement.43 This culminated in the establishment of the COE in 1949. The COE’s aim is to ‘achieve greater unity between its members, in order to realise the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and to facilitate economic and social progress. This is to be done through common action on economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters. Those relating to national defence are not included.44 Thus, while there is considerable overlapping of function between the COE and the EU, the latter is developing a hard security function including ‘out-of-area’ operations while the COE concentrates on the region of Europe. More importantly, the EU is an integration movement whereas the COE is an assemblage of nation-states devoted to co-ordination of political and legal standards and cultural interaction. These differences, however, do not disqualify it as a regional organization. The COE’s original objectives were threefold: defend human rights, parliamentary democracy and the rule of law; to standardise European social and legal practices; and to ‘promote awareness of a European identity based on shared values and cutting across different cultures’. With the end of the Cold War it re-oriented its work towards the re-integration of Europe in three ways. It has acted as a political anchor and human rights watchdog for Europe’s post-communist democracies. It has assisted central and eastern European countries with political, legal and constitutional reform in parallel with economic reform. And it has provided knowledge and capacity-building in human rights, local democracy, education, culture and the environment. 42. See also section 8.2.5 43. Political Handbook 1999, p. 1149 44. COE Statute, article 1

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies In 1993 the COE Vienna Summit set out new political aims. European leaders cast the Council of Europe as the guardian of ‘democratic security’ – founded on human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Democratic security, they said, was ‘an essential complement to military security’, and a pre-requisite for the continent’s stability and peace. In 1997, an action plan was adopted to strengthen its work in four areas: democracy and human rights, social cohesion, the security of citizens and democratic values and cultural diversity.45 In this respect the COE may be seen as embracing the innovative concept of human security at an early stage. In its view, terrorism repudiates the Council’s three ‘fundamental values’ (human rights, the rule of law, pluralist democracy) and it is determined to combat it. It has accordingly drafted a number of international counter-terrorism legal instruments and standards. The underlying message is that it is possible to fight efficiently against terrorism while upholding the basic values that are ‘the common heritage of the European continent’.46 The COE perceives itself to be a regional organization for UN purposes, having attended the last three of the five UN-RO high-level meetings although not the Security Council meeting of April 2003.

5.2.2 The Nordic Council (NC) Northern Europe, composed of the Scandinavian states, has been peaceful for several centuries. A study of how this has been achieved without any integration movement and relying purely on inter-state co-operation would be a useful model for sub-regional conflict prevention. A genuine respect for the rule of law would appear to be the principal reason. Four of the five sub-regional states have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ (Denmark, 1956; Sweden, 1957; Finland, 1958; Norway, 1996). A number of contentious cases have been litigated among sub-regional cases and between them and external states.47 For its 45. http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe/ 46. http://book.coe.int/EN/ficheouvrage.php?PAGEID=36&lang=EN&produit_aliasid=1 664 47. Contentious cases have included UK v. Norway (1949), France v. Norway (1955), Netherlands v. Sweden (1957), FRG v. Iceland and UK v. Iceland (1972), Denmark v. Norway (1988), and Finland v. Denmark (1991) – a far higher incidence of litigation than the global average.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies part Iceland, which has not accepted ICJ compulsory jurisdiction, has had more of a history of hostilities, having engaged in three ‘cod wars’48 and experienced tensions with Norway in 1994. It also has difficulties with the IWC over whaling regulations. Although the Nordic Council expressly excludes foreign policy and defence issues from its mandate, its overall functions have a strong indirect bearing on peace and security in the sub-region. The Council grew out of an unsuccessful attempt in 1948-9 to establish a Scandinavian defence union. Established in 1952, it is composed of an inter-parliamentary assembly and a ministerial council. The Assembly, comprising national parliamentarians elected by their parliaments, has the task of harmonising national legislation in social affairs. The Ministerial Council, established in 1971, has given a higher profile and status to the Council’s work, but the differing strategic outlooks of the Member States (with Denmark, Iceland, Norway as members of NATO, the other two having neutral status during the Cold War) prevented alignment of a common foreign and defence policy. The split also over EU membership (three in, two out) along with the gradual development of an EU-CFSP continue to produce a surprising degree of complexity for Nordic sub-regionalism. Because of these considerations, the Nordic Council does not perceive itself to be a regional agency for the purposes of chapter VIII of the UN Charter, and does not attend the UN-RO high-level meetings.

5.2.3 The West European Union (WEU) European sub-regionalism, and a strong aspiring regionalism, is centred in Western Europe. The carnage of the two world wars of the 20th century left a deep conviction among policy-makers on the continent that economic, then social, political and finally foreign policy integration would prove to be the only enduring guarantee against further conflict and trauma. The Monnet-Schumann initiatives that led to the ECSC, Euratom, the EDC and then the EEC and EC, culminating in the EU, have proved to be perhaps the most far-reaching and inspiring model of regionalism of all time. The EU is proving, through its proclaimed ideals and impressive achievements, to be an inspiration for other regions. It has been cited as a model to be followed by regions as diverse as Africa (with the new African Union) and the Pacific (the recent vision of a Pa48. Conflicts erupted with the UK, Ireland and FRG in 1958; and the UK in 1973 and 1974.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies cific Union). Yet it does not follow that it is necessarily a model for other regions to emulate entirely, having regard to their different political histories and cultural characteristics. The European integration movement was preceded by efforts at a West European defence agency, the WEU. As a result of the EU and WEU, and also the defensive posture of NATO, violent conflict has been absent in Western Europe for sixty years – a remarkable achievement in light of its history over the preceding millennium. The WEU, created by five West European states in face of US reluctance to become involved in European defence in the immediate post-war period, soon expanded to include West Germany and Italy. It ceded primacy in European defence matters to NATO, however, once US policy changed, with its military structure merging with NATO’s in 1950. In the early 1980s the WEU played a role in the moves towards a European security identity: the Rome Declaration of 1984 reaffirmed the Brussels Treaty provisions that the WEU could ‘consider the implications for Europe of crises in other regions of the world’.49 To this end it has undertaken operational missions during the Iran-Iraq and Balkans conflicts.50 The WEU today has a complicated membership structure with 10 Member States, 6 associate members (which are also members of NATO), 5 observers (which are also EU members and of which one is also a NATO member) and 7 associate partners. It attended the first three UN highlevel meetings between 1994 and ‘98 but not the subsequent two meetings. In June 1999 the WEU’s crisis management responsibilities ended, as part of the political decisions aimed at strengthening the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the EU. It is likely that, at some stage in the future, the WEU will have ceased as a separate entity as the EU security and military component takes over. 49. Rome Declaration, October 1984; reaffirming the modified Brussels Treaty, Article VIII.3. See WEU website: ‘Origins of WEU’. Article VIII.3: “At the request of any of the High Contracting Parties the Council shall be immediately convened in order to permit them to consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace, in whatever area this threat should arise, or a danger to economic stability.” 50. Thus in 1988-90 the WEU participated in minesweeping operations in the Gulf of Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq conflict. In 1992 it despatched naval forces to the Adriatic in enforcement of the UNSC embargo against Yugoslavia, merging this operation with NATO from 1993 to ’96 in support of SCR 820. It also extended operational assistance to states on the Danube for enforcement of the sanctions. From 1997 to 2001 it undertook crisis management operations in police support in Albania and demining in Croatia. In 1998 it undertook satellite surveillance of Kosovo.

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5.2.4 The European Union (EU) The European Union is the most high profile model of supra-national integration of the contemporary age. It is the natural focus of attention when regionalism is considered. Its recent enlargement, encompassing the Baltic states and Central European states (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) extends its geographical scope while possibly slowing the pace of integration. But even an enlarged EU of 25 members cannot be credibly seen as representing Europe as a whole, when its enlarged membership covers some 60% of the total number of European countries. The entry of Romania and Bulgaria, and subsequently Turkey will partially modify this, but not totally. The EU must therefore be regarded, for the present, as a sub-regional organization if Europe is to be regarded as a ‘region’. The roots of the European Union are based on political and security considerations. The desire to create an area of peace, forging a new relationship between the two rival countries – France and Germany – in the aftermath of World War II, led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community by the Treaty of Paris in 1951. Free trade became an instrument of interlocking national economies with a view to preventing war. These were the foundations of the European Union, developing from ECSC, EURATOM and the EEC (European Economic Community), and finally established in 1993, by the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty established also the EU ‘Second Pillar’ on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that includes all areas of foreign policy and defence. This was a major breakthrough in the EU integration process, finally overcoming the failure of the European Defence Community in the 50s.51 The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) strengthened the CFSP pillar and incorporated the Petersberg tasks into the Treaty of the European Union, but with no fundamental changes. Since 1998, however, the European Union’s defence policy has been developing faster, with progress achieved at Cologne (June 1999), Helsinki (December 1999) and Feira (June 2000). Under the Cologne Declaration the EU has the capacity to act autonomously, with policies backed by credible military force, in order to be able to take the full range of decisions regarding the ‘Petersberg Tasks’52. This required enhanced military 51. See Title V TEU, Art. 11 and Art.17 (ex articles J.1 and J.7). 52. European Council Conclusions and presidency report on strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, quoted in WOUTERS Jan and NAERT Frederik, Op. Cit, p.546.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies capability and a transfer of functions from the WEU to the EU. Helsinki established a target for the military capabilities, paying attention to civilian crisis management capabilities. It also focused on the relationship between WEU and NATO, and the involvement of non-Member States. In June 2000 more detailed consideration was given to the EU-NATO relations and civilian crisis management, with special attention to police forces. These developments have finally resulted in tangible examples of EU operational deployment outside its own sub-region. Thus: – The EU developed the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in July 1999. The Pact, described as the EU’s first ‘preventive, strategic and pan-continental action,53 is centred on the concept of regional and trans-frontier co-operation. It seeks to strengthen and support the Southeast European countries in their efforts to promote peace, democracy, human rights and economic prosperity – a transformation process through ‘partnership’ with Euro-Atlantic structures explicitly designed to facilitate their eventual membership in the EU ‘once the Copenhagen criteria have been met’. The Pact is composed principally of a set of three thematic ‘regional and working tables’ (democratisation and human rights; economic reconstruction; and security issues (including justice, home affairs, migration, police, counter-terrorism, arms control and conflict prevention). – The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and the Agency for Reconstruction comprise the economic dimensions of the same subregional redemption in Southeast Europe after the Balkans conflict. – An agreed framework for co-operation between EU and NATO (2002) was followed by the EU’s first military mission deployed in Macedonia in April 2003 (Operational Concordia). – The EU’s first police force mission, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, commenced deployment in January 2003. – In June 2003 the first EU ‘out-of-area’ peace-enforcement mission was deployed with a ‘robust mandate’ to take all necessary steps to ensure security and humanitarian deliveries in the town of Bunia in DR Congo. The EU’s Operation Artemis was in response to UN Security Council call for an ‘interim emergency multilateral force’ in Bunia.54 The mission, authorised for three months only, was led by France and comprised of 2,000 troops from 17 countries, including Brazil, Can53. Juan Diego Ramirez-Cardenas Diaz, ‘The Stability Pact’ in Mahncke D. Ed., Old Frontiers, New Frontiers (College of Europe, Bruges; 2001) 54. SCR 1484, 30 May 2003

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies ada and South Africa, operating under the EU flag. Unlike the EU’s mission in Macedonia, the Congo mission was undertaken without NATO logistical backing. Its presence provided the ‘teeth’ to halt the killing of UN troops until MONUC was numerically strengthened and given its own ‘robust mandate’. – In April 2004 a senior EU military official raised the possibility of the EU sending a preventive force, under UN mandate, into Sudan with a view to ensuring stability in the western province of Dafur where indications of ethnic cleansing practices are causing concern.55 – The EU assumed command of the NATO-led force in Bosnia in December 2004 with the EUROFOR police mission. The EU is now working to create a 60,000-strong rapid reaction for future humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.

5.2.5 The Southeast European Co-operation Process (SEECP) Since the end of the Cold War, Southeast Europe has been the place of internecine conflict on the European continent, absorbing the attention of the rest of Europe and indeed the rest of the world. The post-Tito Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, involving secessionist movements, inter/intrastate warfare and ‘ethnic cleansing’, has become, along with Iraq, Palestine, Somalia and Rwanda, the symbol of the ‘new realities’ of state insecurity in the contemporary world. Nor, at the time of the Balkans conflagration in the early 1990s, was there any sub-regional organization devoted to its own stability objectives. Responsibility for sub-regional peace and security came from outside the sub-region – from Western Europe in the form of the EU, from the North Atlantic in the form of NATO and the US in particular, and universally in the form of the United Nations. The US success in achieving the Dayton Accord demonstrated the effectiveness of a powerful single state exercising ‘diplomacy backed by force’ while the EU devoted itself to the ‘softer’ dimensions of security in the Balkans. In 1996 before the EU Stability Pact was developed, a sub-regional movement was commenced for peace and security on Bulgarian initiative. The South-East European Co-operation Process (SEECP), which consists of

55. Financial Times, 12 April 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/sudan/ 2004/0412eu.htm

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies eight countries,56 lays the ‘foundations for regional co-operation aimed at creating a climate of trust, good neighbourliness and stability’, with the stated goals of strengthening security and political co-operation, intensification of economic relations, the judiciary and the ‘struggle against illegal activities’. The SEECP Charter formalised this mechanism in February 2000: Member States solemnly reaffirmed their ‘unreserved commitment’ to the principles and norms enshrined in the UN Charter, and stressed the ‘crucial importance’ of turning South-Eastern Europe into a region free from violence and instability, and building security, prosperity and democratic civil societies, thus integrating their countries into the ‘Euro-Atlantic family of free and democratic nations’.57 The SEECP refers to the principles of the UN Charter (along with the COE and OSCE) as the inspiration for its guiding principles. The two initiatives – the indigenous sub-regional initiative (SEECP) and the pan-European initiative (EU Stability Pact) – may be seen as mutually reinforcing. The SEECP ‘welcomes’ the EU initiative58 while the EU has expressed positive support for the SEECP.59 The relationship between the EU and the OSCE with respect to the Stability Pact is complex. Launching the ‘common position on the Pact in May 1999 just before it was formalised, the EU asserted that the EU ‘will play’ the leading role in establishing the Stability Pact, but that the OSCE had a ‘key role’ to play in fostering security and stability, and the Stability Pact should be developed and implemented in close association with the OSCE”.60 Subsequently, however, the Pact was placed under OSCE auspices.61 56. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Former Republic of Yugoslavia (now Serbia-Montenegro), and Turkey. 57. Charter on Good Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and Co-operation in Southeastern Europe. 58. CEEP Charter, article 1.4 59. “Indeed, we consider the Stability Pact as a catalyst for an improved and goal-oriented co-operation between regional initiatives and processes such as the SouthEastern Europe Co-operation Process (SCEEP).” EU Statement before OSCE Permanent Council, 21 November 2002. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ osce/stment/sp211102.htm accessed 17-4-03. 60. Annex to Council Conclusions, Brussels, 17 May 1999; http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/docs/ stability_pact_15_may_99.htm 61. EU Statement before OSCE Permanent Council, 21 November 2002. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/docs/stability_pact_15_may_99.htm

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5.3 Asia and the Pacific With some 4.0 billion people, Asia is the most populous and heterogeneous region of the world. Unsurprisingly, its security issues are manifold. Tensions arise from traditional statecraft on the Korean Peninsula and secessionist movements in China (especially in the west but also including the stand-off with Taiwan in the east). Islamic fundamentalism is rife in Southeast Asia and bilateral nuclear deterrence and secessionist movements afflict South Asia. And the global Islamic terrorist movement in Afghanistan that spawned the attacks of September 2001 coexists with great power rivalry in Central Asia and local instabilities in Caucasia. Notwithstanding Churchill’s vision of an Asian Security Council in the 1940s, there exists, perhaps because of the sheer size and heterogeneity of the region, no over-arching regional organization for Asia that could handle the above panoply of security threats. China is the natural regional power with its nuclear capability, yet it chooses neither to dominate the region nor to lead it in a particular direction. India, now a nuclear power as well and with almost the same population,62 would vigorously challenge any hegemonic initiatives by its northern neighbour with which it fought a border war in the 1960s. No serious thought appears to be given to the idea of a regional agency for Asia as a whole. For the present, the Asian states are concentrating their efforts at making sub-regional organizations work to good effect in the security field. Even here the progress is spasmodic and uneven. Two cross-regional arrangements do exist: the ARF and APEC.

5.3.1 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) An innovative development in recent years has involved the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The ARF takes the form of cross-regional membership with a specified cross-regional ‘geographical footprint’, namely Northeast East Asia, Southeast Asia and Oceania. Established in 1994, the ARF now has 23 Member States. Eighteen are within the ‘area’ – the ten ASEAN members, all five East Asian states and three from the Pacific (Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea). In addition there are five ‘external states/entities’ – India, Russia, the EU, 62. India’s population is projected to surpass China’s by around 2025, making India by then the most populous nation in the world.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies the US and Canada. Applications are currently lodged from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Timor Leste. In a region with little history of security co-operation, the ASEAN Regional Forum is described as the ‘principal forum for security dialogue in Asia’. The ARF complements the various bilateral alliances and dialogues which underpin the region’s security architecture. The ARF is characterised by consensus decision-making and ‘minimal institutionalisation’.63 It runs a ‘two-track’ process (official and non-governmental) and focuses on, inter alia, conflict prevention, confidence-building measures, maritime security and counter-terrorism. The third Forum (ARF3) of 1996 agreed to criteria for future membership applications from individual countries. These include a commitment to key ARF goals and previous ARF decisions and statements; relevance to the peace and security of the ARF ‘footprint’; gradual expansion; and consultation and consensus by all ARF members on all future membership decisions.64 The ARF is already making a significant contribution to the security dialogue in a strategically critical area of the world. It is of considerable significance that South Asian states are resorting to an ‘adjacent mechanism’ as one way of pursuing a vicarious regional security agenda – which they have chosen to foreclose on for themselves in their own regional setting. The ARF looks set to play an important role in the future in monitoring security developments, defusing tensions before or as they arise, and strengthening security confidence. It may be seen perhaps as a ‘cross-regional arrangement’ under chapter VIII of the UN Charter. It has no formal structure, however, and is not a ‘regional agency’ as such.

5.3.2 Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) The cross-regional trading arrangement, APEC, adds little to the security focus of East Asia per se. Established in 1989, APEC’s 21 ‘member economies’, spanning the Pacific from East and Southeast Asia to the Americas, account for 60% of global GDP, 47% of trade and 33% of population. The appellation ‘member economies’ in lieu of ‘Member States’ enables Taiwan to be present along with the PRC – the only international gathering 63. Background to ASEAN Regional Forum, http://www.dfat.gov.au/arf/background.html 64. ARF Regional Forum: Chairman’s Statement; Ibid.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies where this occurs. With no statutory document and ‘without binding commitment’, APEC aspires to ‘further enhance economic growth and prosperity for the region and to strengthen the Asia-Pacific community’. In 1991 it proclaimed its commitment to ‘open regionalism’ under the principles of free trade. Some tentative steps in the direction of security have recently been taken. In December 2003 APEC identified its priorities as liberalising trade and investment, directing globalisation along positive lines and promoting ‘human security’. Steps to this end would require Member States to dismantle trans-national terrorist groups that threaten APEC economies; eliminate the growing danger of WMD proliferation through strengthened control regimes, and confront ‘other direct threats’ to the security of ‘our region’.65 These two arrangements – ARF and APEC – are conceptually broad and institutionally weak. When the focus is confined to Asia itself, without ‘external involvement’ from Europe, Pacific or America, the security situation becomes more geographically concise but politically weaker. Asia may be seen as composed of the following ‘security regions’: Central Asia – Caucasia;66 South Asia; East Asia and Southeast Asia.

5.3.3 The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS and the CSTO) As noted, the Caucuses are geographically located in Asia yet regarded by the United Nations DPKO as part of Europe.67 The Caucuses (comprised of three states, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) form a sub-region of instability – with the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ erupting after the collapse of the USSR. Part of the Soviet Union until the early 1990s, the subregion has confronted, over the past decade, an inter-state dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan (over Nagorno-Karabakh) and intra-state civil unrest in Georgia (in three provinces, Abkhazia, South Ossettia and Adzharia). 65. ‘A World of Differences: Partnership for the Future’; APEC Leaders’ Declaration, Bangkok, Thailand, 23 October 2003 66. The ‘geographical region’ of West Asia includes the Mashreq states and the Gulf in the Arab world as well. But, as explained in chapter 5, these sub-regions are taken to fall into the Arab region (North Africa – West Asia). 67. http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies Central Asia is usually regarded as comprising five countries – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The three Caucasian and five Central Asian states together with Russia might be seen as comprising the Central Asia-Caucasia ‘security region’. The security orientation of Georgia is, however, a complicating factor in this respect. Thus the CIS was created as a sub-regional agency in 1991, upon Russian initiative and comprising (by 1993) twelve newly-independent states – all the former Soviet republics except the three Baltic countries.68 Under the original Agreement of 1991, Member States will co-operate in international peace and security, striving to ‘eliminate all nuclear weapons’. They are to preserve ‘the common military and strategic space’ under a unified command including unified control over nuclear weapons. They are also to co-ordinate, inter alia, their foreign policies.69 A CIS Charter, adopted in January 1993, included an ambiguous agreement covering both self-defence and peacekeeping.70 Member States are to take all possible measures for conflict prevention and shall render one another mutual assistance ‘in the regulation of such conflict’ on the basis of mutual consent.71 If they do not resolve a dispute through fair and peaceful means, they may transfer it to the CIS heads of state council which shall have authority to ‘recommend an appropriate procedure or methods’ for its resolution to the parties.72 In September 1993 the CIS states also signed a Treaty on Economic Union involving free movement of goods, services, labour and capital. Thus, with the development of a common strategic space, common peacekeeping and collective defence arrangements and an economic union, the twelve CIS states rapidly refashioned a regional co-operative 68. Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine (1991) and Georgia (1993) 69. Agreement on the Establishment of the CIS, December 1991, Article 6 70. “In the event a threat arises to the sovereignty, security or territorial integrity of one or several Member States, the Member States shall without delay bring into action the mechanism for mutual consultation for the purpose of coordinating positions and for the adoption of measures in order to eliminate the threat which has arisen, including peacekeeping operations and the use, where necessary, of the Armed Forces in accordance with the procedure for exercising the right to individual or collective self-defence according to Article 51 of the UN Charter.” Charter of the CIS, January 1993, Article 12 71. Article 16 72. Articles 17, 18

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies model that began to approximate the nation-state of the former USSR. The CIS has attended every one of the five UN high-level meetings, though not the meeting with the Security Council. The Collective Security Treaty was signed in May 1992 by nine CIS states ‘within the framework of the CIS’.73 Its main objective is to provide a regional collective defence arrangement of a type comparable to NATO and the former Warsaw Pact for those former Soviet republics that judged this to be necessary. During the Tajikistan crisis of 1993 the four intervening countries cited collective self-defence under the CST as the legal basis for their intervention. In 1999 three states (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan) withdrew from the CST. The same year the six remaining states adopted a new charter, which re-established the arrangement as an agency with a permanent secretariat – renaming it the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) – comparable in its aims to those of NATO. Its principal focus is on the co-ordination of strategy and action in counter-terrorism in Central and West Asia. The CSTO sees itself as a separate organization to the CIS and attended the fifth UN high-level meeting in July 2003. It was accorded UNGA observer status in December 2004. Recent years have witnessed considerable political instability within CIS Member States with popular revolutions and leadership changes in some (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan). These events have placed further strain on the organization, and its viability is being questioned by some."74 At a 2005 summit between the presidents of Russia and Belarus, the latter noted that the CIS was ‘undergoing the most critical phase of its history’.)

5.3.4 The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) South Asia is a region of considerable strategic importance, maintaining security through a tense stability. The principal conflicts in the region involving Member States of the regional agency are the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, the Sri Lanka civil war, the insurgency in

73. The twelve CIS states excepting Moldova, Turkmenistan and Ukraine 74. At a 2005 summit between the presidents of Russia and Belarus, the latter noted that the CIS was ‘undergoing the most critical phase of its history’.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies Nepal and the Bangladesh hill-tribe disturbances.75 The continuing instability of Afghanistan, which is a not a member of the regional agency, also affects South Asia. South Asia is one of the weakest ‘security regions’ in terms of institutional development. It is the last, to date, to establish a regional agency (the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation – SAARC ) in December 1985. The seven Member States76 originally envisaged five broad areas of co-operation in the Integrated Programme of Action (IPA): agriculture, rural development, telecommunications, meteorology, health and population planning. Others were later added to the IPA (transport, postal services, science and technology, sports, arts and culture). SAARC is a regional organization that disavows security in its mandate while permitting its consideration on the sidelines. Peace and security issues have never been explicitly included in the SAARC mandate. The first objective of SAARC under the Charter is to ‘promote the welfare of the region’s peoples’ and improve their quality of life. But, although economic and cultural co-operation remains the mainstay of the collective South Asian regional identity, two of the eight objectives in the Charter can be interpreted as implicitly involving political, and to some extent, security dimensions. These are: – to strengthen ‘collective self-reliance’; and – to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another’s problems. The SAARC Charter, moreover, opens with the affirmation of South Asian countries being ‘desirous of promoting peace, stability, amity and progress in the region through strict adherence to the principles of the UN Charter’. It also aims to promote respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use of force, pacific settlement and non-interference in international affairs.77 They are aware of the need for ‘joint action’ within their respective politi75. Other inter-state conflict issues involve Pakistan and Bangladesh (over the repatriation of the stateless Biharis); Nepal and Bhutan (over Bhutanese refugees of Nepalese descent, in Nepal); and territorial disputes between India and three neighbours (Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan). Intra-state tensions also continue within all regional states. 76. Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 77. Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation, Dhaka, 8 Decemst ber 1985, 1 preambular paragraph.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies cal systems and cultural traditions.78 Despite this, the Charter contains an express repudiation of ‘bilateral and contentious issues’ from its deliberations.79 Given that most conflict situations between states are of a bilateral nature (even those of a primarily internal domestic concern to one of them), and given above all that any conflict situation is, ipso facto, a contentious issue, this leaves no scope for SAARC to even discuss intra-regional conflicts. Lest there be any risk of misunderstanding the point, however, the rule of unanimity is firmly written into the Charter as well.80 Thus the security problems of South Asia have never figured on the formal agenda of the regional agency. SAARC has not even addressed bilateral economic disputes such as the Himalayan river waters dispute between India and Bangladesh. Indeed, summits have been postponed, rather than convened, because of conflict tensions – such as on three occasions involving ethnic violence, in 1989 (Sri Lanka), 1991 (Bhutan), and 1993 and 1994 (India).81 Despite this formal repudiation of security issues, SAARC meetings have provided opportunities for regional leaders to discuss contentious issues in an informal environment outside diplomatic and political constraints.82 In 1995, amidst considerable dissatisfaction over the lack of progress in SAARC in the area of peace and security, Pakistan formally called for charter amendment to allow bilateral talks to occur. Bangladesh suggested the creation of a ‘Conciliation Group’ that could alleviate bilateral rd

78. 3 preambular paragraph 79. SAARC Charter, Article X. General Provisions. “2. Bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from consideration.” 80. SAARC Charter, Article X. General Provisions. “1. Decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity.” 81. Political Handbook 1999, p. 1224 82. In the Bangalore summit of 1986, for example, India and Bangladesh discussed bilateral issues such as the Chamka insurgency and the Teen Bigha dispute. In the 1987 Kathmandu summit, India and Pakistan resumed border talks over, inter alia, the Siachen Glacier issue. At the Dhaka summit, India and Pakistan agreed to the nonattack of nuclear facilities. At a 1987 foreign ministers meeting, India and Sri Lanka agreed on the deployment of an Indian peacekeeping force in Sri Lanka. In1993 a side meeting between Bhutan and Nepal laid the groundwork for an official dialogue on the refugee issue. And in the 2004 Islamabad summit, the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers held their first bilateral meeting in three years, generating a breakthrough in the Kashmir peace process. [Acknowledgement: private correspondence with Rodrigo Tavares, Ph. Candidate, Gôteborg University, Sweden, May 2004]

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies tensions. Both ideas encountered the continuing opposition of India. In 1997, however, it was agreed that a process of ‘informal political consultations’ would assist regional efforts in fostering better regional relationships. India and Pakistan accordingly reached a bilateral agreement ‘within the SAARC setting’. In 1998 Pakistan again proposed the introduction of a political element into the SAARC through charter amendments, including the creation of a ‘regional peace council’ but this proposal was rejected.83 SAARC, therefore, is an instrument for regional countries to comment collectively on international security issues rather than resolve regional conflict. This has been the case particularly with respect to global strategic stability and especially WMD non-proliferation. Nothing in the Charter excludes this and the regional countries, being in a strategically sensitive region and maintaining distinctive policies towards nonproliferation, have given themselves considerable scope to offer a regional view on the WMD issue. This was the case, however, for only as long as the regional states retained what they took to be the ‘high moral ground’ on nuclear non-proliferation – essentially from 1985 when SAARC was created, to 1998 when their nuclear innocence was shed. During this period the NonAligned Movement, led on this issue by India, called for negotiations towards the ‘ultimate goal’ of eliminating nuclear weapons from the world. Such appeals figured prominently in SAARC communiqués from the outset. In its first communiqué of 1985 SAARC recognized that ‘mankind’ was confronted with the threat of self-extinction arising from the massive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. The arms race violated the principles of the UN Charter. The second communiqué of 1986 called for negotiations towards the ‘ultimate goal’ of eliminating nuclear weapons from the world. Disagreement arose, however, during the third summit in 1987 over a Pakistani proposal for a South Asian nuclear weapon-free zone. Regional states confined themselves to noting their collective resolve to ‘contribute’ to nuclear disarmament. With the ending of the Cold War, SAARC intensified its commitment to a nuclear-free world. In 1991, it noted the ‘changing power structures’ in international relations and the reduction of international tensions, hoping that these developments would restrain the pursuit of military power in all areas of the world.84 In 1993 it reiterated its call for all nuclear 83. Political Handbook, p. 1225 th 84. SAARC, 6 Summit Communiqué, December 1991.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies powers to collectively endeavour to attain the ‘ultimate goal of complete elimination of nuclear arsenals in the shortest possible time.’85 In 1995 it noted that while the international community had successfully created a norm against chemical and biological weapons, it had ‘unfortunately’ been unable to do so with regard to nuclear weapons. The utmost priority needed to be given to nuclear disarmament, given the danger posed by nuclear weapons. SAARC urged the international community to negotiate an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances and to negotiate also the ‘complete elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specified timeframe’.86 The call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention was reiterated in 1997.87 This regional non-nuclear policy underwent a sudden and profound transformation following the rival Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998. At their 10th summit SAARC two months later, Member States were suddenly of the view that stability, peace and security in South Asia could not be considered ‘in isolation from the global security environment’. Despite the abatement of post-Cold War tensions, some states still sought to maintain ‘huge arsenals’ of nuclear weapons. SAARC Member States underscored their ‘continuing commitment’ to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the need for promoting nuclear disarmament ‘on a universal basis under effective international control’. They reiterated their call for a convention to that effect. Regional tensions and the nuclear stand-off resulted in no summit meetings being held for four years. At the 11th summit in 2002, SAARC leaders reaffirmed their commitment to nuclear disarmament. In the aftermath of the September 2001 attacks, they focused on the need to update the 1997 regional counter-terrorism convention and ensure that their policies were aligned with the Security Council resolution 1373. By the 12th summit in January 2004, however, for the first time no reference was made to nuclear disarmament. The proud South Asian policy stance on nuclear disarmament had slipped off SAARC’s agenda. Instead, the new regional focus was on counter-terrorism, with a protocol to the 1997 convention adopted. The relationship between the UN Security Council and SAARC is virtually non-existent, SAARC having attended none of the UN high-level th

85. SAARC, 7 Summit Communiqué, April 1993 th 86. 8 SAARC Summit Communiqué, May 1995 th 87. 9 SAARC Summit Communiqué, May 1997

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies meetings. Since 1998, however, the relationship between the Council and the two South Asian rival states over the nuclear issue has been prominently on the agenda. In June 1998, responding to the South Asian nuclear testing, the Security Council condemned the tests. It recalled its summit statement of January 1992 that ‘the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and security’ (which thereby accorded the Council binding powers under chapter VII). It called upon India and Pakistan ‘immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes, to refrain from the weaponization or the deployment of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. The Council recalled that, in accordance with the NPT, neither India nor Pakistan could ‘have the status’ of a nuclear-weapon state.88 Despite the Council’s theoretical denial of ‘nuclear-weapon status’ to the South Asian rivals, nuclear deterrence is alive and well in the sub-continent, and indeed the deterrence strategy is seen by many as exerting the same sobered constraint on ‘hot conflict’ that it did between the two superpowers during the Cold War. And despite its condemnation of the tests the Council refrained from applying collective sanctions. The United States and Japan applied bilateral sanctions but these were revoked after 2001 when Pakistan sided with the US in the global counterterrorism strategy. Thus, as a regional agency SAARC has been supine in terms of regional conflict resolution, while its ‘superior position’ on WMD proliferation lost most of its lustre when the two leading regional states became nuclear powers. The specific conflicts have been left to peacemaking efforts independent of any regional security mechanism. Despite this disavowal of a security function, SAARC has recently applied for, and been granted, observer status at the UN General Assembly.89

5.3.5 East Asia The East Asian ‘security region’, comprised of five states (China, Mongolia, North Korea, South Korea and Japan) is of the highest strategic importance to global stability. The most populous of all ‘security regions’, hosting one-quarter of the global population, it contains one numerical superpower (China) and one economic superpower (Japan). It is a region 88. S/RES/1172, 6 June 1998 89. A/RES/59/53, 2 December 2004.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies of high strategic sensitivity and tension (most particularly on the Korean Peninsula, a left-over from the Cold War). And it has boundary issues of global strategic importance as well – with the China-Russia, Japan-Russia and China-India frontiers. The tectonic plates of global security collide most forcefully in East Asia. Notwithstanding this, or perhaps because of it, East Asia has experienced the least progress in security regionalism of all areas of the world. No agency exists for handling any aspect of inter-state co-operation – economic, cultural or security. At present there is no regional agency for East Asia. Some informal arrangements exist, such as the ‘ASEAN plus three’ process, but this involves only three of the five countries of the region and is focused on security relationship with another region – Southeast Asia. It is a thus a case of inter-regional dialogue rather than a true regional relationship. This organizational lacuna requires redress. This is explored further in Section E.

5.3.6 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Southeast Asia is a clearly delineated region of ten states (Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei and Philippines). The region has faced major conflicts, especially of an internal nature, throughout the UN era. ASEAN has emerged as one of the more viable regional agencies of the world. When it was established in 1967 as a general co-operation organization, the focus was on economic interaction. The founding ASEAN Declaration expresses the view that ‘ties of history and culture’ bind the ‘countries of the region’ together. The Association reflects the ‘collective will’ of the Southeast Asian nations. Membership is open to all states ‘in the Southeast Asian Region’.90 Yet the founding premise did include a vision of peace and security and envisaged a relationship of some kind with the United Nations. The second of seven main purposes of ASEAN is ‘to promote regional peace and stability’. This is to be achieved in two ways: an ‘abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region’; and ‘adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter’. rd

90. The ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, 8 August 1967, 3 preambular para. and operative paras. 4 & 5.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies At the time of ASEAN’s founding, the most sensitive security issue concerned the stationing of foreign troops in the region, particularly US bases in Thailand and Philippines. Accordingly the ASEAN Declaration affirmed that all foreign bases were temporary and remained only with the express concurrence of the countries concerned. They were not intended to be used directly to subvert the national independence of regional states. The second major document, the ZOPFAN Declaration of 1971, during the US-Vietnam war, declared the ASEAN region to be a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality.91 Despite this oblique focus on security issues, ASEAN concentrated primarily on economic issues from the 1960s through the 1980s. Perhaps more than any other region, a strict adherence to the principle of non-intervention characterised its policies and actions. It thus declined to become involved in internecine conflict situations in its ‘regional nonmembership area’ such as the Vietnam war with the US or the Cambodian revolution and genocide. It maintained a strict hands-off policy visà-vis its own ‘membership area’ – such as secessionist movements in Indonesia and Philippines. It left mediation efforts over the Indonesian province of Aceh to a Geneva-based NGO and over the Mindanao secession in Philippines to the OIC. The other major conflict issue, East Timor, was left to the UN to mediate directly between Indonesia and the former colonial power, Portugal. In the post-Cold War era, this policy has undergone a significant yet cautious metamorphosis. With the socialist countries (Vietnam and Laos) joining and Cambodia engaging in successful peace-building, ASEAN has gradually developed a regional security policy. The litmus test of its unity and its security thinking, however, has for the past decade been its policy towards Myanmar. In 2005, ASEAN announced its intention to adopt a charter as a basic document to govern its future activities – an initiative that was welcomed by the United Nations.92

91. Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, Malaysia, 27 November 1971 92. “The United Nations welcomed ASEAN’s decision to establish an ASEAN Charter, as it moves towards realizing an ASEAN Community. The United Nations also welcome the possibility of ASEAN seeking an observer status in the United Nations.” Joint Communique of the Second ASEAN-UN Summit, New York, 13 September 2005. http://www.aseansec.org/17710.htm

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5.3.7 Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) The South Pacific (whose regional agency has recently been renamed the Pacific Islands Forum) is the most remote region in global strategic terms. Yet it is not without significance and its regional politics to a large extent represent a microcosm of global politics. As such, the policies of regional states and the attitudes of the major powers and the Security Council towards the regional agency are of some significance. As with West Africa, economic harmonisation (rather than integration), together with a need for cultural identification on the part of the South Pacific island states as a way of shaking off post-colonial influence were the twin motivating forces prompting the creation of the South Pacific Forum in the early 1970s. Unlike West Africa, however, the South Pacific had, and still has, a cultural division between the European-oriented metropolitan countries (Australia and New Zealand) and the Pacific-oriented island states. Exacerbating this division is the vast discrepancy in size – with Australia having the same dominant influence and role in the region as Nigeria does in West Africa. The difference, however, is that Australian interests derive from, and reflect, a Western-Northern value system, while the island states live an indigenous culture and pursue developing country interests. In addition, the sheer remoteness and small size of the Pacific island countries renders them uniquely vulnerable to all security threats, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ – making them dependent on the two metropolitan powers. A clear policy distinction, however, is discernible between Australia which single-mindedly pursues Western-oriented national interests, aligning itself intimately with the United States, and smaller New Zealand whose bi-cultural society encourages a greater sensitivity towards island concerns. These issues are manifest in the attention given to the ‘Pacific Way’ – the customary propensity of island states to eschew overt conflict situations, engage in (lengthy) dialogue, and pursue pacific settlement techniques ‘in their own time-frame’. The regional body was thus slow to develop a security consciousness. But with the increasing concern of recent years over the rise of terrorism, trans-national crime, corruption and money-laundering, the Pacific Forum has become obliged, with Australia in the lead, to address the issue. 190

Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies The prospect of small ‘failed states’ has become the security syndrome driving the regional body. Since the late-1980s the region has experienced more instability than before. A secessionist rebellion in Vanuatu upon independence (1980) signalled trouble ahead for the region. Coups for the first time in Fiji (1987, 1998) focused attention on the security dimension of the South Pacific. Another secession movement in PNG (Bougainville) (1988-2003) resulted in a low-level but intense civil war. And the recent crisis in the Solomon Islands arising from a general breakdown in law and order through inter-island strife (1998-2003) required military intervention by a ‘regional peacekeeping force’ with an enforcement mandate. Above all, the spectre of terrorism has coloured the region’s politics since the Bali bombing of October 2002. Australian casualties and policy reaction mirrored, at a regional level, the global dimension of American postSeptember 11 perceptions and reactions. Australia, one of only two allies that participated with the US in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, has emerged as a chief spokesperson for the policy debate on collective security and the doctrine of pre-emption initiated by the United States. As was noted in chapter 1, Australian policy on regional security in the Pacific is thus a useful barometer of the state of security thinking on the global level (see Box 1). The Pacific Islands Forum may be seen as a genuine regional agency. Its statutory goals are more modest that those of Europe and Africa. The PIF has no founding constitutive document. Indeed in the early 1970s the island leaders went out of their way to make the creation of the South Pacific Forum a low-key event, given the sensitivities on the part of the ‘external’ metropolitan countries (France, UK, US), which are full members of the older South Pacific Commission. The Forum’s more political nature, deriving from its exclusive regional membership, was masked by innocuous references to co-operation in trade and technical areas.93 In 93. Established in August 1971 at a meeting of a sub-group of the South Pacific Commission (which was constitutionally barred from discussing political matters). According to the communiqué, ‘leaders of seven independent South Pacific states met for a private and informal discussion on a wide range of matters of common concern’. The talks were ‘essentially exploratory’ and concentrated on matters of trade, shipping, tourism and education. The goals of the ensuing SPF were to enhance the co-operation and co-ordination among the South Pacific countries in the fields such as trade, economic development, aviation, marine transportation, telecommunication, energy, tourism, education and other issues of common concern.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies 2005, however, it initiated measures to develop a legal agreement as a basic document. As with the other economic bodies the PIF slowly, and in its case belatedly, developed a security consciousness that it had lacked at the time of its creation. In August 2003 the idea of a Pacific Union, reflecting the principles and purposes of the EU, surfaced on the political agenda. An Australian Senate committee report of 2003 recommended a union that would involve a regional airline and shipping line, and the adoption of the Australian dollar as a regional currency. The Australian Prime Minister was reported as having informally advanced the proposal.94 An Eminent Persons Group reviewing the PIF recommended the development of a Pacific Plan to guide the region’s destiny, and a draft has been produced by the PIF Secretariat for consideration by regional leaders.95 The idea of regional air and shipping lines has been on the agenda for some time and was endorsed at the PIF’s 34th Forum in 2003, but a regional currency is a new idea. The proposal is perceived as an Australian effort inspired by its desire to restrict the scope for terrorism and transnational crime in weak or failed states in the region. Fiji has recently expressed opposition to the idea.96

5.4 The Americas More than any other region America has been free of conflict, both interstate or intra-state, of a kind that has required a UN peacekeeping presence. Its strong tradition of juridical settlement has meant that most such border conflicts have been resolved through pacific settlement. 94. ‘Howard Push for Pacific Union’, The Age, 18 August 2003 http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/08/17/1061059717704.html 95. The PIF Secretary-General has said that consultations on the Pacific Plan will continue ‘for some years to come’, given the ‘scale of the regional initiative’. The Forum welcomed the diversity of views received regarding the draft Plan. Some had been supportive, some critical, but all evinced a concern that the Pacific Plan be robust and relevant to Pacific communities. PIF News Release, 16 September 2005. http://www.forumsec.org.fj/ 96. http://onenews.nzoom.com/onenews_detail/0,1227,264873-1-9,00.html

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5.4.1 The Organization of American States (OAS) In April 1948 the nations of the American hemisphere (involving the United States and Latin America) adopted the OAS Charter. The Charter affirmed their commitment to common goals and respect for each nation’s sovereignty. Since then, the OAS has expanded to include the nations of the Caribbean, as well as Canada. The original idea of regionalism in the Americas dates from the early 19th century,97 but the notion took tangible form near the end of that century. In 1890 the First International Conference of American States established the International Union of American Republics (with a permanent secretariat) which in 1910 became the Pan American Union. Created to promote international co-operation, it offered technical and informational services to all the American republics, served as the repository for international documents, and was responsible through subsidiary councils for the furtherance of economic, social, juridical, and cultural relations.98 The notion of regional security, as opposed to the broader goals of regional co-operation, was embraced in earnest by America in the first half of the 20th century. The ‘inter-American system’ of non-intervention and non-use of force had been enshrined in successive conventions since 1890 but these had comprised a loose ‘regional arrangement’ only. Accordingly before the end of World War II, in March 1945, the Latin American states and the US concluded a treaty noting that such principles of regional solidarity and security needed to be reaffirmed ‘at a time when the juridical bases of the community of nations are being re-established’. The new and difficult situation in the world made ‘more imperative than ever’ the union and solidarity of the American peoples, for the defence of their rights and the maintenance of international peace. American states therefore agreed, in the Act of Chapultepec, on what was to become the first collective defence pact of the post-war world – that an attack on one would comprise an attack on all. Even at this early stage, however, reference was entered to compatibility of the regional arrangement with the ‘United Nations’ fighting as allies, and to consistency with the purposes and principles of the ‘general international organization, 97. In 1826 the Congress of Panama espoused the idea of creating a hemispheric association of states. But no permanent structure was established. 98. In 1948 it was made the General Secretariat for the OAS, although the name was not dropped until 1970. http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/P/PanA1mU1.asp

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies when established’.99 This was formalised, two years later, Rio Treaty of 1947. The OAS, established in 1948, subsumed the earlier Pan American Union as the first truly regional organization covering an entire continent. The OAS has as its main objectives: – to achieve an order of peace and justice, promoting solidarity among the American States; – to strengthen their collaboration and defend their sovereignty; their territorial integrity and their independence, – to establish new objectives and standards for the promotion of the economic, social and cultural development of the peoples of the Hemisphere, and to speed the process of economic integration. Concomitant with the OAS Charter, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man was also concluded in 1948 – the first international expression of human rights principles. This is explored in section 8.1.2.

99. “Part I, para. 3. That every attack of a State against the integrity or the inviolability of the territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State, shall, conformably to Part III hereof, be considered as an act of aggression against the other States which sign this Act. In any case invasion by armed forces of one State into the territory of another trespassing boundaries established by treaty and demarcated in accordance therewith shall constitute an act of aggression. Part I, para. 5. That during the war, and until the treaty recommended in Part II hereof is concluded, the signatories of this Act recognize that such threats and acts of aggression, as indicated in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, constitute an interference with the war effort of the United Nations, calling for such procedures, within the scope of their constitutional powers of a general nature and for war, as may be found necessary, Part II. That for the purpose of meeting threats or acts of aggression against any American Republic following the establishment of peace, the Governments of the American Republics consider the conclusion, in accordance with their constitutional processes, of a treaty establishing procedures whereby such threats or acts may be met by the use, by all or some of the signatories of said treaty, of any one or more of the following measures: recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; breaking of postal, telegraphic, telephonic, radio-telephonic relations; interruption of economic, commercial and financial relations; use of armed force to prevent or repel aggression. Part III. The above Declaration and Recommendation constitute a regional arrangement for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action in this Hemisphere. The said arrangement, and the pertinent activities and procedures, shall be consistent with the purposes and principles of the general international organization, when established.” Act of Chapultepec, Mexico, March 1945.

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies Strictly, America should be seen as being composed of four ‘security subregions: North America, the Caribbean, Central America and South America.

5.4.2 North America (NORAD) The different cultural, political and military characteristics of Canada and the United States from those of their Caribbean and Latin neighbours separate these two countries from the rest of America. During the Cold War these two countries operated as one strategic unit, with the strategic air defence system of NORAD trained against the USSR over the northern polar area. In the post-Cold War era, the ties binding them together have loosened and the strategic partnership has weakened. NORAD continues to function, however, switching its focus principally to counter-terrorism purposes in the post-September 11 environment. It now uses its ground-based radar, airborne radar, satellite, fighter aircraft and command structures and intelligence capabilities to enforce control of the skies over the US and Canada.

5.4.3 The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) The proximity of the Caribbean to the United States has always ensured an intimate, though not necessarily harmonious, security relationship. As noted in chapter 1 the US under the Monroe Doctrine foreclosed on any conceivable security threat to its national territory. The past two centuries have witnessed a series of armed interventions by the US in Caribbean countries (see section 5.9.3 below). The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) was established in 1973 with both an economic and security agenda, with the goals of ‘deepening the integrative process’ and ‘co-ordinating the foreign policies’ of the 15 Member States – all English-speaking members of the Commonwealth plus Haiti and Surinam. Nonetheless CARICOM has focused heavily on economic issues and, apart from some collective statements on counter-terrorism, has not significantly been active in security. During the Grenada crisis of 1983, CARICOM remained passive, leaving it to its tiny offspring organization, the OESC, to align itself with the US intervention. Notwithstanding this, CARICOM has chosen to attend all but the first of the UN high-level meetings. 195

Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OESC) is a tiny sub-subregional organization, comprised of the smallest members of CARICOM – with a combined population of some 700,000. Its goal is to increase cooperation in foreign relations, harmonising economic policy and coordinating defence and security arrangements. In October 1983 during the Grenada crisis it formally requested the intervention of troops from the United States and other Caribbean states,100 and a ‘sub-regional force’ of US and OESC troops duly intervened.

5.4.4 Central America Central America has been the principal scene of insecurity in America, with the complex national and regional emergencies of the 1980s in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua. The US did not intervene with ground forces during this regional crisis although its mining of the Nicaraguan harbours was judged by the ICJ to have been illegal. The invasion by the US of Panama in 1989 was also condemned by the UN General Assembly as a violation of international law. Despite its systemic instability the sub-region has no agency for security. The Central American Common Market (CACM) focuses exclusively on economic issues. The regional body, the OAS, was involved in the mediation efforts of the Contadora process and the Esquipulas accords, although the actual negotiation was left informally to an eminent group.

5.4.5 South America Similarly South America has no sub-regional agency on security, Mercosur and the Andean Pact being economic arrangements for various South American countries. More than other regions, however, South America has a tradition of pacific settlement through juridical means – examples being the settlements between Argentina and Chile, Argentina and Brazil, Venezuela-Guyana and Venezuela-Colombia. The only border dispute that has spilled over into hostilities during the UN era (in 1994) is the Peru-Ecuador problem, which has subsequently been resolved. 100. Political Handbook 1999, p. 1206

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Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies

5.4.6 The Relationship of the Global Superpower to the Region Despite its overwhelming might and presence in the American hemisphere, and notwithstanding its hegemonic claim to ‘influential governance’ of the region through the Monroe Doctrine, the US has trodden lightly in South America. It has long been suspected of covert involvement in many changes of government in the continent (Cuba, 1961; Chile, 1974). But it has not intervened militarily since 1945 and has left it to the countries concerned to settle their local differences through pacific means. The situation is different in the two sub-regions closer to home – Central America and the Caribbean. There, the US has had no compunction to intervene militarily if it judges its vital national interests to be at stake. This has been undertaken in two opposite contexts: with UN authorisation (Haiti 1991-4) or unilaterally (or with token sub-regional support) in the face of overwhelming condemnation from the UN and OAS (Grenada, October 1983; Panama, December 1989). In the case of the most dangerous crisis of the UN era, the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the US utilised the Security Council for the provision of evidence to back its allegations against the USSR, but the regional OAS naval quarantine around Cuba was prosecuted outside UN authorisation and has been subject to legal controversy ever since. Similarly its blockade of Nicaragua during the Central American crisis was judged by the ICJ to have been illegal (the US subsequently revoked recognition of the Court following the decision).

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6. Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations “Although the Alliance does not consider itself formally a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, NATO’s transition from a purely collective-defence organization into a security manager in a broad sense has enabled it to act in the same spirit.” NATO Security Council 20 July 2004

Chapter 5 considered the experience with the regional and sub-regional agencies. Of equal importance is the activity of the other international organizations that work in partnership with the UN in peace and security. These are organizations whose work, strictly, does not pertain to chapter VIII of the Charter but rather to chapters VI, VII and IX. Unlike regional agencies whose work is constitutionally inherent under chapter VIII, their contributions to peace and security are epigenetic to the Charter. In light of the confusion that surrounds popular perception of the work of such organizations, it is important to maintain this distinction. In accordance with the schematic model developed in chapter 4, a crossmatrix can be developed with respect to these organizations – pertaining to their membership structures, their mandates and focal areas. In terms of membership there are, as noted in chapter 4, two kinds of organizations – those with membership across regions but whose focal area is concentrated on one region (cross-regional organizations) and those whose membership can be of global geographical scope but which is confined to a selective criterion that precludes universality (trans-national 199

Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations organizations).1 In terms of mandate, such organizations operate in three functions. The first is ‘soft security’ through civilian means (early-warning, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and post-conflict peacebuilding). The second is ‘soft security’ through ‘classical peacekeeping’. The third is ‘hard security’ through collective enforcement, and collective self-defence. A new area – international police operations (crowd control; criminal investigation and prosecution) – is emerging as a fourth.2 A natural breakdown of operational function can be discerned among the cross-regional and trans-national organizations. Table 6 depicts this.

6.1 Cross-Regional Organizations Table 6 ‘Division of Labour’: Roles of CROs and TNOs in Peace and Security* Dialogue

Conflict Preventn.

Peacemaking

Peacekeeping Troops

Police

Peace Enforcement Collective SelfSecurity defence

Peacebuilding

Cross-regional Organizations OSCE SCO

OSCE SCO

OSCE SCO

OSCE SCO NATO CSTO

CSTO

NATO3 CSTO4

Interpol Trans-national Organizations Cmmnwlt IOF CPSC OIC

Cmmnwlt IOF CPSC OIC

Cmmwlt IOF CPSC OIC

Cmmnwlt Cmmnwlt

Cmmnwlt IOF CPSC OIC

* This matrix excludes such military operations as aerial bombing campaigns, such as that undertaken by NATO to force Yugoslavia to cease attacks on civilians and humanitarian deliveries and force it to accept a negotiated settlement.

1.

2. 3. 4.

The Non-Aligned Movement may be seen as a trans-national arrangement. Designed during the Cold War as a ‘third way’ between the capitalist and communist blocs, it has lost considerable momentum since the end of that era. While it has engaged in mediation efforts in the past (notably in the Iran-Iraq war which was acknowledged by the Security Council in SCR 514 of July 1982), it does not seem to perceive itself as a formal partner to the UN, and does not attend the UN high-level meetings. The relationship of these operational functions to the constitutional provisions of the UN Charter has also been identified in Table 4.A. Afghanistan, 2001 Georgia, 1993

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations These organizations tend to draw membership from adjacent regions and concentrate on one regional focal area. The most prominent are the two North Atlantic structures – OSCE, operating in the area of ‘soft security’, and NATO, operating in ‘hard security’. Both draw membership from North America as well as Europe (and also, in the case of OSCE from Central Asia) and both have traditionally focused on security in Europe.

6.1.1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Established in 1949 by twelve West European and North American states on the basis of collective self-defence against potential aggression from the USSR and Eastern Europe, NATO has undergone a metamorphosis since the end of the bipolar period in 1991. There is, as a result, some uncertainty over the relationship between its originally-stated mission and its modern ‘strategic concept’, to some extent with regard to the EU but more particularly with regard to its relationship with the United Nations. (a) NATO and the European Union As the European Union took stronger political shape in the early 1990s, the challenge of establishing a meaningful relationship with NATO emerged. In January 1994 NATO supported the development of a European Security and Defence Identity as called for in the Maastricht Treaty which, in the longer-term perspective of a common defence policy within the EU, might in time lead to a common defence compatible with NATO. It supported the strengthening of the European pillar of NATO through the WEU which remained the military arm of the EU under the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. In January 2001 NATO and the EU established a formal relationship. In December 2002 a Joint Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) outlined political principles for cooperation in crisis management and conflict prevention, and gave the EU assured access to NATO’s planning and logistics capabilities.5 In March 2003 they agreed on a set of ‘crisis management arrangements’ (the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements), aimed at avoiding duplication of military resources. Both the NATO Secretary-General and the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy have stressed the need for ‘complementarity’ and an avoidance of duplication between NATO and the EU in future security operations.6 5. 6.

EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP (NATO Press Release No. 142, 16 December 2002) NDA Conference, Brussels, 17 May 2004, Question and Answer session.

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations (b) NATO and the United Nations: NATO’s work in partnership with the UN needs to be understood in terms of the two non-membership criteria identified in chapter 4, viz., mandate and focal area: – With regard to the mandate, the distinction needs to be drawn between its traditional ‘self-defence’ and its modern ‘collective security’ functions. Self-defence is carried out under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (and chapter VII (article 51) of the UN Charter). Its more recent collective security functions – the so-called ‘non-article 5’ missions – are carried out under chapters VI, VII and IX of the UN Charter.7 – With regard to the focal area, the distinction needs to be made between its traditional ‘area of application’ under article 6 of the Treaty and its more recent ‘out-of-area’ focus beyond the North Atlantic area.8 NATO’s evolution in these two criteria give rise to a third issue, namely the WMD non-proliferation policy of NATO and the retention by NATO of its own weapons of mass destruction. (i) Mandate: The Constitutional Relationship between NATO and the UN According to NATO, the relevance of the UN Charter to NATO is twofold. First it provides the juridical basis for the creation of the Alliance. Secondly, it recognises the ‘overall responsibility’ of the UN Security Council for international peace and security.9 In the preamble to the 1949 Treaty, NATO Member States reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. They are determined to safeguard the ‘freedom, common heritage and civilisation’ of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the ‘North Atlantic area’, and are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and the preserva7.

8.

9.

The only ‘article 5 operation’ (i.e. self-defence) NATO has undertaken comprises what it terms ‘compliant maritime inspections’ in the Mediterranean Sea for WMD counter-proliferation purposes, and an escort service for maritime vessels through the Gibraltar Straits (‘Operation Endeavour’). Under the NATO Treaty (article 6), the ‘NATO area’ covers (i) the national territory of the states parties in Europe and North America; (ii) their islands in the North Atlantic north of the Tropic of Cancer; and (iii) an attack against any of the forces in the Mediterranean Sea or the same North Atlantic area. Turkey has subsequently been added to this area through an amendment. NATO Handbook 2001, Ch. 15, p. 339

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations tion of peace and security. Under article 1 the parties undertake, ‘as set forth in the UN Charter’, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered. They will refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force ‘in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations’. NATO is considered to be integral to, and compatible with, the UN Charter. In the Treaty the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them, in Europe or North America, shall be considered an attack against them all.10 They therefore agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, ‘in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations’, will assist the Party attacked by taking the necessary action, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain ‘the security of the North Atlantic area’. Under article 7 the Treaty does not affect in any way the rights and obligations of NATO states pertaining to the UN Charter, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. The NATO Treaty also envisaged, from the outset, an evolution in the NATO-UN relationship. Provision was made for a possible, though not mandatory, review of the Treaty after ten years (i.e. any time after 1959 at the request of any one party). Such a review would have regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, ‘including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security’.11 Since the end of the bipolar period NATO has undergone a transformation. In July 1990 its leaders agreed on the need ‘to transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe’. The ‘New Strategic Concept’ of 1991 perceived a changed environment in which a ‘single massive and global threat’ had given way to ‘diverse and multi-directional risks’. NATO leaders reiterated that the security of North America was ‘permanently tied’ to the security of Europe. NATO looked forward to a Europe ‘whole and free’ – to which end it would search for a co-operative approach to European security. 10. North Atlantic treaty, 4 April 1949, Article 5 11. Article 12.

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations In April 1999 NATO agreed on a new (sixth) Strategic Concept, responding to changes in the Euro-Atlantic security environment. It focused on the following key elements: – Collective Defence: The ‘enduring core mission’ remained the collective defence of its members under Article 5 of the Treaty. – Military Capabilities: NATO would strengthen alliance defence capabilities through more mobile, sustainable and survivable forces able to engage effectively on the full spectrum of its missions. – New Missions: NATO would improve its capability to undertake new missions to respond to a broad spectrum of possible threats to alliance common interests, including: regional conflicts, such as in Kosovo and Bosnia; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and trans-national threats such as terrorism. – New Members: NATO’s openness would continue towards new members and towards its commitment to enlargement as part of a broader effort to enhance peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic community. – Strengthened Partnerships: NATO would build wide-ranging partnerships with the aim of increasing transparency and mutual confidence in security matters and enhancing the capacity of allies and partners to act together. – European Capabilities: NATO highlighted the development of a European Security and Defence Identity ‘within NATO’ as an essential element of its ongoing adaptation, enabling European allies to make a more effective contribution to Euro-Atlantic security. – Peacekeeping Contribution: Under the new strategic concept NATO allies could be called upon to ‘contribute to global stability and peace’ by providing forces for UN missions.12 In May 2004 the NATO Secretary-General stated that, in today’s ‘fluid strategic environment’, NATO would defend itself against ‘new threats’ in a ‘new way’ – by ‘projecting stability’. While territorial defence remained a core function, NATO would move to deal with threats ‘far from home’. Yet the idea of NATO as a ‘global collective security organization’ was ‘premature’.13

12. North Atlantic Alliance Sixth Strategic Concept, 1999. 13. Joop de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary-General, Address to the New Defence Agenda Conference, Brussels, 17 May 2004

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations The ending of the Cold War has witnessed a transformation in the way in which NATO perceives its relationship with the United Nations and, to some extent, vice versa. During the Cold War there was virtually no relationship. But in the ‘new era’ NATO has been operationally active in support of some UN missions and has attended each of the five UN highlevel meetings and also the second Security Council meeting in July 2004. To date the United Nations has not gone to great lengths to distinguish between genuine regional agencies and other intergovernmental organizations. As a result there has been some confusion, at least in popular perception, as to whether NATO was, or is, a regional organization. Although the matter became a subject of debate in the early 1950s, NATO was never accepted as a ‘regional agency’ on several grounds. Three issues differentiate NATO from a regional agency under chapter VIII. – The criterion for a regional agency is whether it is immediately concerned with the maintenance of peace through the pacific settlement of local disputes – i.e. whether a regional arrangement or agency is competent to take effective dispute-settlement measures of a coercive and pacific nature in a particular region. Because of an absence of common culture and geographic proximity it could never take ‘measures of a regional nature’ over a ‘local dispute’ (as in article 52.1). – Secondly, its obligations pertaining to a military alliance were inconsistent with the prohibition of the use of force. It had been agreed at San Francisco that an offensive/defensive military alliance per se was ‘obviously not a regional arrangement within the meaning of the Charter’.14 An alliance looks externally for its defence, while a regional agency within article 52 has competence only with respect to intra-regional disputes. – The third issue is whether the defence alliance subordinates itself to, and reports to, the Security Council under Chapter VIII.15 Thus, NATO is to be seen as a collective defence alliance potentially using force in the exercise of the right of collective self-defence under Chapter VII, article 51. In any event NATO itself has recently made it explicitly clear that it does not regard itself as a regional agency for the pur-

14. Simma, p. 691 15. Simma p. 691

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations poses of chapter VIII of the UN Charter.16 (ii) Focal Area: NATO’s Operational Support for UN Missions

Under its ‘new strategic concept’, NATO has undertaken ‘non-article 5’ operational support of UN peace operations over the past decade in three crises. The first two (Bosnia, 1992-95; Kosovo, 1999) were conducted within Europe. The third (Afghanistan, 2001-4) is outside Europe. Within Europe: Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-95) As noted, during the Cold War relations between the UN and NATO scarcely existed but in 1992 this changed. In July NATO ships and patrol aircraft began monitoring operations in the Adriatic in support of UN embargoes against all former Yugoslav republics17 and against Yugoslavia specifically.18 In October NATO AWACS began monitoring operations in support of the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.19 In November NATO and WEU began enforcement operations in support of UN resolutions aimed at preventing an escalation of the conflict.20 In April 1993 NATO commenced aerial enforcement of the no-fly zones.21 In August the creation by the UNSC of ‘safe areas’ led to NATO being ready to enforce these.22 16. “... allow me to make a caveat on NATO’s participation in meetings with regional organizations. Over the last years, NATO has participated in meetings between the UN and regional organizations, but does not consider itself a regional organization (‘arrangement’) in the sense of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.” Statement by Mr. Pol De Witte, Head NATO and Multilateral Affairs, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO International Secretariat; Round Table on ‘Co-operation between the UN and the regional organizations in the process of stabilization’, Bucharest, 26 April 2004. Also: “Although the Alliance does not consider itself formally a regional organization under chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, NATO’s transition from a purely collective-defence organization into a security manager in a broad sense has enabled it to act in the same spirit, first in Europe and now beyond”. Statement by Mr. Robert F. Simmons, Deputy Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Security Council, 20 July 2004, (S/PV.5007, p. 24) 17. SCR 713, 25 September 1991 18. SCR 757, 30 May, 1992 19. SCR 781, 9 October 1992 20. SCR 787, 16 November 1992 21. SCR 816, 31 March 1993 22. SCR 836, 4 June 1993

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations In January 1994 NATO expressed its readiness to carry out air strikes to stop the ‘strangulation’ of Sarajevo. On 6 February, following the Serbian mortar attack on the Sarajevo marketplace, the UN Secretary-General requested NATO to launch such strikes, and on the 28th NATO aircraft shot down four planes violating the no-fly zone in the alliance’s first military action ever undertaken. Other air strikes were subsequently carried out by NATO. On 4 August the UN Secretary-General confirmed that NATO’s actions in support of UNPROFOR were undertaken under the authority of the UN Security Council, namely, resolutions 770, 776 and 836.23 In December 1995 following the Bosnian Peace Agreement, NATO was given a mandate by the UN to implement the military aspects of the Agreement.24 Thereafter NATO’s aerial contribution changed to ground forces. In February 1998 it announced that, subject to a Security Council mandate, NATO was prepared to lead a multinational force after the end of SFOR’s initial mandate. This occurred, under the same name, SFOR. Kosovo (1999) NATO’s air strikes against Belgrade in February 1999 were justified on the basis of Security Council resolutions 1199 (September 1998) and 1203 (October 1998). These resolutions, however, were essentially humanitarian in nature, calling upon both Albanian Kosovars and the Yugoslav Government to reach a political settlement and ensure an end to the humanitarian suffering. They did not authorise, in advance, any enforcement military action by any Member State or regional organization. On 13 October 1998 (nine days before resolution 1203), NATO authorised ‘limited air strikes and a phased air campaign’ in Yugoslavia, execution of which was to begin within four days. This was in response to a briefing by Ambassador Holbrooke that further pressure on Yugoslavia was necessary to ensure further progress in the diplomatic negotiations. NATO’s letter of 30 January 1999 gave Yugoslavia a ‘final warning’ before air strikes were to be commenced. NATO’s strategy was to halt the violence and support the completion of negotiations with a view to ending the humanitarian crisis. The air strikes of March-June 1999 were thus taken without a specific Security Council authorisation. Yugoslavia complained to the Security Council that the ‘decision by NATO, as a regional agency’ to have its Sec23. NATO Press Release (93) 52 24. SCR 1031, 15 December 1995

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations retary-General authorise air strikes represented ‘an open and clear aggression’ against it, since no Council authorisation of enforcement action had been given under article 53(1). Yugoslavia called for an emergency Council meeting to consider this aggression.25 In April Yugoslavia took ten NATO states to the ICJ for interim measures, but in June the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the cases and dismissed them. It is notable that, in advancing its complaint, Yugoslavia accepted NATO as a ‘regional agency’ for the purposes of chapter VIII. Outside Europe The controversial development of recent years has been the operational move by NATO beyond the North Atlantic-European area. To date, NATO has been present only in Asia (Afghanistan), but the possibility has been raised of ‘out-of-area’ operations in other regions, namely, in the Arab world and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Afghanistan (2003) In September 2001, in response to the terrorist attack in the United States, NATO invoked for the first and hitherto only time, the self-defence clause under article 5. The US, however, chose not to formally involve NATO in the ‘collective self-defence’ action against the Taleban that became Operation Enduring Freedom because it feared that the consensus principle of NATO’s procedures could thwart efficiency of action. Enduring Freedom thus became a multilateral coalition action under US leadership, reported to the UN as a collective self-defence undertaking, with no NATO involvement despite many NATO countries individually contributing troops. Subsequently, however, after the UN-authorised international force was established, NATO became operationally involved, providing support when ISAF was led by Germany and The Netherlands in 2003. On 11 August 2003, some 20 months after ISAF had been established, NATO ‘assumed strategic command, control and co-ordination’ of the force in what is its first ‘out-of-area’ military operation beyond Europe. ISAF, established under UNSCR 1386, 1413 and 1444 with the mission of creating a stable security environment in and around Kabul, is composed of some 30 troop contributing countries including 23 NATO states. Thus,

25. S/1999/107, 2 February 1999

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations ISAF has been led successively by the UK, Turkey, Germany/ Netherlands and now NATO. On 1 October 2003 the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed upon a ‘longer-term strategy’ for NATO in its ISAF role in Afghanistan. On 2 October the NATO Secretary-General advised the UN Secretary-General that an expanded ISAF mandate would require a specific UN Security Council resolution. On 6 October he advised the UN Secretary-General, in a ‘spirit of transparency and co-ordination’, that the NAC had approved a set of ‘preliminary decisions’ related to a ‘possible expansion of NATO’s ISAF mission’. Work was continuing within NATO regarding a possible expansion of its ISAF mission. NATO would ‘keep [the UN Secretary-General] informed about further developments.26 On 13 October the Security Council, noting the NATO letter of 6th, believing the Afghan situation to continue to be a threat to peace, duly authorised an expansion of the ISAF mandate outside of Kabul, with an enforcement mandate. In April 2004 the US strengthened its troop presence in Afghanistan by an extra 2,000, taking the total number of US troops in Enduring Freedom to 13,500.27 The relationship of UNAMA and ISAF – the two ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ security operations established by the UN – and the self-defence military operation Enduring Freedom is a problematic issue. UNAMA was established in March 2002 with a ‘soft’ peace-building mandate.28 ISAF, as noted, was established as a military force to provide ‘hard’ security in and around Kabul. Enduring Freedom had been the coalition assembled and led by the US, on the basis of collective self-defence in October 2001, to respond to the September 11 attacks. Sub-Saharan Africa In March 2004 the UN Secretary-General advanced some far-reaching comments about the potential role for NATO in UN-mandated operations in the future, suggesting that it be encouraged to consider further ‘out-of-area’ operations of the kind it has undertaken in Afghanistan – in,

26. S/2003/970, 8 October 2003 27. IHT, 20 April 2004 28. S/RES 1401, 28 March 2002; S/2002/278, 18 March 2002

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations for example, Iraq and Africa.29 In this same line, NATO has been showing interest to deploy in Darfur, having met with AU in order to flesh out plans for NATO assistance to the AU mission in the region. The expectation is that NATO will send a team to the region to assist with planning, communications and training. The Arab World On 1 April 2004 the NATO Secretary-General said that the alliance might be willing to play a role in Iraq if the UN Security Council authorized an international security force to serve there. It might even be willing to take command of part of that force. In fact, at present 16 of NATO’s 26 Member States have troops stationed there already under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). (c) NATO and Nuclear Proliferation A third issue – NATO’s nuclear doctrine within the context of its partnership with the UN – has been generally overlooked. Essentially, it is a question of organizational identity (see Box 6). Chapter VIII organizations are required under article 52 to operate in partnership with the UN on matters pertaining to peace and security in a manner ‘compatible with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter’. While NATO affirms that it is not a ‘regional organization’ for the purposes of chapter VIII, it adds that it ‘acts in the same spirit’ (see footnote 301). It is incontestable that every operational partner of the UN is required to meet the same standards as those envisaged for regional agencies in chapter VIII. In this respect a qualitative difference exists between a regional defence alliance under article 51, justified under chapter VII of the UN Charter, 29. “Looking to the future, NATO’s increasing willingness to ‘go global’ presents important opportunities, in particular for Africa. ... Should such a surge [in UN peace operations] take place, stronger help from NATO would be tremendously helpful. Specifically, NATO might be employed in a ‘peace enforcement’ role, much as the European Union deployed ‘Operation Artemis’ in the DR Congo as a bridging force before the deployment of a UN operation. NATO could also provide an ‘over-the-horizon’ capacity, should the need arise for localised enforcement tasks. We look forward to continuing our dialogue on such issues. Moreover, now that your own Secretary-General has indicated a readiness to send troops to Iraq, if so requested, by a new sovereign government and if approved by the Security Council, we may well work together in that context as well. Of course, the UN-NATO relationship is not focused exclusively on peace operations. We also share a concern about the proliferation of WMD and about terrorism. I would welcome your thoughts on how to move ahead in this area...” Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Address to NATO Parliamentarians, New York, March 2004. (SG/SM/9188, 8 March 2004)

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations and an agency (whether regional under chapter VIII or cross-regional under chapter VII) which operationally partners with the UN on peace missions under articles 40-42. The UN has no operational control over national or regional self-defence; but operational missions for collective security are another matter, involving a wholly different set of global standards and responsibilities.

Box 6 ‘A Question of Identity’: NATO’s Changing Relationship with the United Nations “The relevance of the UN Charter to the North Atlantic Alliance is therefore two-fold. First, it provides the juridical basis for the creation of the Alliance; and second, it establishes the overall responsibility of the Security Council for international peace and security. ... The readiness of the Alliance to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the UN Security Council was formally stated by NATO Foreign Ministers in December 1992. The measures already being taken by NATO countries, individually and as an Alliance, were reviewed and the Alliance indicated that it was ready to respond positively to further initiatives that the UN Secretary-General might take in seeking Alliance assistance in this field.” NATO Handbook (2001) p. 339-40 “NATO’s nuclear forces continue to contribute, in an essential way, to war prevention. Their role is now more fundamentally political and they are no longer directed towards a specific threat. They are maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.” NATO Handbook (2001) p. 53 “To protect peace and prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept ... at a minimum sufficient level.” NATO 6th Strategic Concept, 1999, para. 46 “The [United Nations] General Assembly: Reaffirming the commitment of the international community to the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the establishment of a nuclear-free world: Recognising that there now exist conditions for the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons, and stressing the need to take concrete practical steps towards achieving this goal...

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations 1.

Recognises that, in view of recent political developments, the time is now opportune for all the nuclear-weapon states to take effective disarmament measures with a view to achieving the elimination of such weapons... 4. Recognises that there is a genuine need to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.... 7. Reiterates its call upon the nuclear-weapon states to undertake the step-bystep reduction in the nuclear threat and to carry out effective disarmament measures with a view to achieving the total elimination of these weapons; 8. Calls upon the nuclear-weapon states, pending the achievement of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and to agree on an international and legally-binding instrument on a joint undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.... 21. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its 59th session a report on the implementation of this resolution.” S/RES/58/56, 8 December 2003

The retention of nuclear forces by NATO now spans two historical eras: the bipolar divisions of the Cold War and the unipolar hegemony of the United States. The rationale for such retention has shifted from deterrence of inter-state aggression to deterrence of private WMD ownership and general prudential policy towards non-NATO powers. As the Cold War was winding down the leading NATO powers spoke of the need nonetheless to provide a credible deterrent ‘well into the 21st century’.30 As noted above, in the post-Cold War environment this prognostication has experienced a subtle change: the Alliance will maintain ‘for the foreseeable future’ an ‘appropriate mix’ of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe which will be kept ‘at a minimum sufficient level’. This 30. “The first submarine equipped with the Trident II missile will become operational in late 1989, and this combination will gradually become the mainstay of the SSBN forst ce, maintaining the US submarine force as a reliable deterrent well into the 21 century”. US F/Y 1988 Arms Control Impact Statement (US GPO, Washington, DC, June 1987), p. 39. Also, Annual Report to Congress: Secretary of Defence, F/Y 1985 (US GPO, Washington, DC, 1 February 1984, pp. 187, 189 which, inter alia, refers to the Advanced Technology Bomber as being able to penetrate other nations’ air dest fence systems ‘well into the 21 century’. See also British statement: “... Trident is intended to provide the minimum capability necessary to maintain a credible strategic nuclear deterrent from the mid-1990s, when Polaris nears the end of its useful life, st until well into the 21 century’. UK Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (Hansard), 29 June 1987, p. 38.

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations is seen by NATO as part of its ‘commitment’ to maintain ‘only the minimum number of weapons necessary to support its strategy of preserving peace and preventing war’.31 NATO stresses the extent to which nuclear forces levels have been reduced; others note that there will remain some 5,000 strategic nuclear weapons still deployed by 2012 and thereafter, a significant proportion of them under NATO operational command. This raises the question of what strategic situation needs to exist before the NATO nuclear powers (and indeed the other five non-NATO nuclear powers) are prepared to proceed to the ‘elimination of nuclear weapons from their nuclear arsenals’ as the NPT envisions. Since the UN’s inception the General Assembly has reaffirmed the ‘commitment of the international community’ to the goal of the ‘total elimination of nuclear weapons’. The 2000 NPT Review Conference identified a ‘thirteen step’ process to that end. The Millennium Declaration resolved to strive for nuclear weapon elimination.32 In its most recent call of November 2003, the Assembly recognized that there now exist ‘conditions for the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons’. There was a genuine need ‘to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrines and security policies’. The time is now opportune, said the Assembly, for the nuclear powers to eliminate these weapons. They should refrain from the use or threat of use of such weapons ‘in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ and agree on a legally-binding instrument against first-use. The necessity for this was heightened by the danger of nuclear terrorist acts.33 31. “...the Alliance has lived up to its commitment to maintain only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary to support its strategy of preserving peace and preventing war. ... NATO’s nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in war prevention, but their role is now more fundamentally political, and they are no longer directed toward a specific threat. ... The Allies have judged that the remaining much smaller sub-strategic force posture will for the foreseeable future continue to meet the Alliance’s deterrence requirements. ... The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces that remain is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion. NATO’s nuclear forces contribute to European peace and stability by underscoring the irrationality of a major war in the Euro-Atlantic region. They make the risks of aggression against NATO incalculable and unacceptable in a way that conventional forces alone cannot. Together with an appropriate mix of conventional capabilities, they also create real uncertainty for any country that might contemplate seeking political or military advantage through the threat or use of weapons of mass destruction against the Alliance.” NATO Fact Sheet: ‘NATO’s Nuclear Forces in the New Security Environth ment’. NATO 6 Strategic Concept, 1999, para. 46 32. UNGA RES 55/2, 18 September 2000 33. UNGA RES 58/56, 17 December 2003

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations The dilemma that exists in this respect concerns an underlying issue – the relationship between the Security Council (the executor of global power) and the General Assembly (the forum of global opinion). The Assembly calls by overwhelming majority for a nuclear-free world within a time-bound framework; the Council rejects that goal ‘for the foreseeable future’. Where does this leave the United Nations as a single Organization, vis-à-vis regional organizations under chapter VIII – and other organizations under other provisions of the Charter? The injunction for all official policies – national, regional or international – to be compatible with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter applies not only to regional agencies but also to all UN Member States (explicitly under article 2.4) and international organizations (implicitly under article 103). But what are those purposes and principles when it comes to nuclear weapons? Do such principles tolerate nuclear weapon ownership and first-use policy ‘for the foreseeable future’? It is an uneasy partnership, it would seem, that marries the United Nations to a cross-regional organization which retains a ‘nuclear weapons policy’. National ownership of nuclear weapons by UN Member States including the P-5 is regarded as falling within their national responsibility despite UN calls for their elimination. But a conscious decision by the UN itself, as an Organization, to partner with a ‘nuclear-weapon organization’ is another matter. Nuclear weapons were originally given political justification on the basis of self-defence under article 51 but this appears to be transforming into a justification based on regional and global collective security. A ‘nuclear schizophrenia’ continues to afflict the UN as an Organization but the General Assembly’s commitment to a nuclearfree world raises questions of policy. Should a cross-regional organization that relies on nuclear deterrence as an explicit strategic policy be accepted by the UN as a partner for enforcement purposes under chapter VII’s collective security system?34

6.1.2 Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) The OSCE has emerged as an active and effective ‘soft security’ mechanism for Europe and beyond – including in Central Asia. Its original conception (the CSCE of 1975) was based on a mutual recognition of the need for discussion of East-West security issues between the two regional defence alliances of Europe – NATO and the Warsaw Pact. A product thus of Cold War tensions and rivalry and perceived at the time as a po214

Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations litical spearhead against the socialist bloc, the OSCE rapidly became the central forum for East-West dialogue on the ‘three baskets’ of security, economic co-operation and human rights. The Final Act of Helsinki, signed in August 1975, and establishing the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), contained the basic principles for East-West dialogue and co-existence. The OSCE is characterised by its broad security concept, its large membership (55 states) and its consensual decision-making procedures.35 Its Chairman in Office, together with its main permanent institutions (the Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Centre, the High Commissioner for National Minorities and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights), plays a significant role in the day-to-day crisis management actions of the Organization. Today the OSCE operates as the natural leader of ‘soft security’ issues in Europe and Central Asia. It believes that it acted as a catalyst for ending the Cold War by maintaining a focus on human rights, encouraging greater openness and transparency, stressing arms control and generally promoting unity in Europe. More recently it is active in counter-terrorism, policing, broader security, election-monitoring and media freedoms. It has undertaken field operations in, inter alia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. Perhaps more than any other organization, the OSCE has been keen to promote itself as a ‘special partner’ of the United Nations. As noted in chapter 4, it declared itself in 1992 to be a regional agency for the purposes of chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In 1993 it concluded with the UN a framework agreement for co-operation – the only organization to date to have done so. The OSCE, too, is aspiring to an ‘out-of-area’ role in the world. In May 2004 it gave a briefing to the Security Council in which it offered to assist in rebuilding democratic institutions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In recognition of the problems in Iraq, however, it suggested also that the Council invite the participation of the OIC, the Arab League or the Gulf States, and not limit the involvement of the international community in

35. Decisions require unanimity and exceptionally unanimity minus one / minus two – in case the parties in a conflict are members. See Wouters, J and Naert, F. “How effective is the European Security Architecture? Lessons from Bosnia and Kosovo”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.50, July 2001, p.544.

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations those Muslim countries to NATO and OSCE.36

6.1.3 The Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) The Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) emerged in June 2001 from the informal process of the ‘Shanghai Five’ between 1996 and 2001. The SCO rests on the basis of a Declaration of June 2001 and the adoption of a charter in June 2002. Composed of six states,37 the SCO stresses the ‘dynamic development of political multipolarity, economic and information globalisation in the 21st century’. SCO members will jointly contribute to the strengthening of peace and stability in the region and the world, proceeding on the basis that preservation of the global strategic balance is of signal importance in the present-day situation’.38 This might be seen as a clear intention to counterbalance the global reach and power of the United States, especially in Central Asia, not least in the four Central Asian states that are members. The SCO, however, is at pains to stress that it is ‘not an alliance directed against any other states and regions’. It adheres to the principle of ‘openness’ and expresses its readiness to dialogue with other states.39 The SCO ‘assigns priority to the principle of regional security’ and ‘exerts all the necessary efforts to secure it’, with an emphasis on counter-terrorism actions.40 It takes as a principal objective the maintenance of peace, security and stability ‘in the region’, and the building of a new democratic, just and rational political and economic international order.41 The SCO makes a point of stressing the compatibility of its actions with the UN Charter. It considers it necessary to establish a ‘global system of counteraction against new threats and challenges with the central coordinating role of the UN and its Security Council’. It is important, inter alia, to formulate, within the context of the United Nations, principles and a legal base for anti-terrorist actions. This would need, however, to give no 36. UN Press Release, SC 8087, 7 May 2004, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8087.doc.htm 37. Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgystan, China. 38. Declaration on the Creation of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, Article 10. 39. SCO Declaration, Article 7. 40. SCO Declaration, Article 8 41. SCO Declaration, Article 2.

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations cause for any ambiguous interpretation of their content or serve as a cover for interference in the affairs of other states.42 Thus the SCO is not a formal collective self-defence organization. It should be seen rather as a cross-regional agency designed to respond to the modern security challenge of terrorism and intra-state conflict. It has not, however, become involved to date in any such conflict.

6.2 Trans-National Organizations Trans-national organizations, as defined in chapter 4, are widely accepted as natural partners of the United Nations. And to an indefinable extent they are accepted in some quarters as constituting a particular form of ‘regionality’. At the San Francisco Conference, for example, New Zealand advanced, unsuccessfully, the proposal that would allow the UN to qualify any ‘typical union of states’ as a regional agency.43 Notwithstanding, trans-nationals have made a significant contribution in the ensuing years to international peace and security.

6.2.1 The Commonwealth Composed of the former colonies of the British Empire, the Commonwealth identifies its principal purpose as giving expression to a ‘continuing sense of affinity’ and fostering co-operation among states ‘presently or formerly owing allegiance to the British Crown’. In its public image the 53 Member States stress the qualities of ‘a shared past, a common language and, despite [our] differences, an enhanced capacity to trust one another’.44 There is, however, no formal statutory document or statement of objectives. The membership cuts geographically across all regions of the world. The symbolic head of the organization is the British monarch, following a declaration by India upon becoming a republic in 1949 that it would accept the Crown as a symbol of the Commonwealth association and recognize the British sovereign as head of the Commonwealth.45 An excep42. 43. 44. 45.

Declaration, June 2002, Section III. Simma (1995) p. 689 http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeID=34493 Political Handbook 1999, p. 1144

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations tion in membership was made in 1995 for a ‘unique and special case’ of Mozambique on the grounds of regional trade concerns in southern Africa.46 In earlier decades the Commonwealth focused most of its attention on apartheid in South Africa. Its policy on this issue, however, reflected a split between the UK and its old dominions on the one hand and the newly-independent countries of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Its modern agenda derives from the 1991 Harare Declaration which redefined the Commonwealth’s priorities to focus on democracy, human rights, judicial independence, women’s equality, educational opportunities and ‘sound economic management’. Accordingly, the practical focus has been on the temporary suspension of members that have lapsed from such a state of grace through coups or political repression (inter alia, Fiji in 1987, Nigeria in 1995, Pakistan in 1999 and Zimbabwe in 2003). The Commonwealth has undertaken ‘soft security’ missions of pacific settlement (under chapter VI of the UN Charter) or peace-building (under chapter IX) in many of its Member States (such as Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands, Guyana, Pakistan, Nigeria, Zambia and Zimbabwe). It has undertaken peacekeeping missions involving police and armed forces with a ‘soft mandate’ but has not undertaken, and is not designed to undertake, any enforcement action under chapter VII of the UN Charter.

6.2.2 La Francophonie (IOF) Established in 1970, the IOF was founded on the basis of ‘sharing in a common language’, and is charged with promoting and spreading the cultures of its members.47 La francophonie claims 50 states and government members (47 states members plus one Belgian and two Canadian provinces). At Bucharest in 1998 it agreed on a number of chantiers – ‘major strategic issues that would shape the organization’s future’ – focusing principally on maintaining the French language and culture. In its Bamako Declaration of 2000, however, it affirmed that democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law and good governance were ‘essential factors’ of a durable peace. It has sent some 80 electoral observer missions to member countries but it has not undertaken any security operation. 46. Ibid. 47. http://agence.francophonie.org/agence/historique.cfm

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations The IOF has attended the last three of the UN high-level meetings.

6.2.3 The Lucophone (CPLP) The Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries, with seven members,48 was established in 1996 for the purpose of promoting ‘concerted political and diplomatic action’ by Member States and, inter alia, implement projects ‘for the promotion and diffusion of the Portuguese language’. Its members recognize eight statutory principles, which include the upholding of peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Its main activities to date have been support for Timorese self-determination and a permanent seat for Brazil on the UN Security Council. It has not undertaken any security operations. The CPLP attended the last of the UN high-level meetings in 2003.

6.2.4 The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) The Organization of the Islamic Conference, established in 1969 and currently with 53 Member States, is designed to ‘promote Islamic solidarity’ and further co-operation among Member States in economic, social, cultural scientific and political fields. Its world-view reflects a belief that it is the ‘concrete expression of a great awareness, on the part of the Ummah, of the necessity to establish an organization embodying its aspirations and capable of carrying out its just struggle against the various dangers which threatened it and still persist’.49 Its 53-strong membership spans Africa and Asia. The OIC has in the past engaged in a security function, promoting the interests of the Muslim communities, in a number of ‘inter-cultural’ conflicts. These have involved opposition to occupation in Afghanistan and Palestine; opposition to Serbian policies in Bosnia-Herzegovina; and mediation efforts in the Philippines (over the Mindanao secessionist movement). The OIC has also aspired to mediate in conflicts within the Ummah, most notably in the Iran-Iraq war. It called upon the United Nations to use force ‘if necessary’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Member States offered 48. Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, Sao Tome & Principe 49. OIC website: http://www.oic-oci.org. Accessed 9 May 2004

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Cross-Regional and Trans-National Organizations troops for the purpose, but the OIC stopped short of creating an Islamic Force of its own, rejecting an Iranian proposal to this effect.50 The OIC has attended all of the five UN high-level meetings to date.

6.2.5 Interpol Established in 1923 to enhance cross-border police co-operation, Interpol was revised in 1956 with the stated aim is to ‘ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the law existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’. With 181 members, Interpol has three core functions: – provide Member States with a secure global communications system for exchanging police information; – maintain a database and analytical support system; and – offer operational police support in terrorism, drugs, organized crime, human trafficking, child abuse and financial and high-tech crime. Interpol works to recognize criminal patterns and trends from a global perspective, and it develops the resource capacity to assist with specific international criminal cases. It attended the 5th UN high-level meeting in 2003. All these cross-regional and trans-national organizations must be recognised as partners with the United Nations within the framework of the Charter but, subject to further clarification byb the UN itself, not necessarily under chapter VIII.51

50. Political Handbook 1999, p. 1208 51. For example, as noted in section 4.4.4, the OSCE has declared itself to be a regional organization ‘in the sense of chapter VIII of the Charter’.

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D. Analysing the Experience

7. The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security “... the role of regional agencies and their activities with respect to the UN have taken a quantum leap forward. ... the Millennium Declaration relevantly recalled that the multidimensional nature of the challenges facing the Organization calls for a multidisciplinary approach involving multiple actors at both the diagnostic and the treatment phases of a crisis.” Algeria Security Council July 2004

Attaining a balance between ‘flexibility’ and ‘consistency’ in a future ‘regional-global security mechanism’ can be achieved if the underlying forces that shape global security today are fully comprehended. Three dimensions characterising the distinguishing features of regional security that support global security can be identified: cultural, political and legal. At bottom lies the cultural dimension: the need to understand the cultural factors that drive political perceptions and decision-making from country-to-country and region-to-region. Superimposed on societal cultures is the political dimension to regional security – the behaviour of the major powers within both the global security structure (the UN Security Council) and within a regional organization. Such political behaviour, in turn, addresses the legal issue of whether an action undertaken by a major power, a regional organization or even the Security Council itself is lawful. Thus a sound understanding of the cultural, political and legal dimensions of regional security is essential to any future realisation of the vision of a future regional-global security mechanism. 223

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security

7.1 The Cultural Dimension “Since wars begin in the minds of men”, states the UNESCO constitution, “it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed”. Peace, declared the UN General Assembly, is not only the absence of conflict. Peace requires a ‘positive, dynamic participatory process where dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual understanding and co-operation’. The fuller development of a culture of peace is integrally linked to, inter alia, advancing the ‘understanding, tolerance and solidarity among all civilizations, peoples and cultures’.1 Culture, says UNESCO, is ‘at the heart’ of contemporary debates about identity and social cohesion. Respect for the diversity of cultures, dialogue and co-operation, in a climate of mutual trust and understanding, are among the best guarantees of international peace and security.2 The cultural diversity of all peoples around the planet offers a positive vision of humanity, yet at the same time it poses a major challenge. The basic principle should be the ‘fostering of respect for all cultures whose values are tolerant of others’ concluded the World Commission on Culture and Development (WCCD). The vision is thus of a pluralistic global society living harmoniously and addressing the emerging global problems in a rational, constructive manner.3 The challenge is to overcome the instinct, inherited from antiquity, of clinging to one’s world-view, abiding by security perceptions that foster exclusivist and hostile policies. Cultural and regional world-views do still compete and clash. The fact that, as the Secretary-General observed, 1. 2.

3.

UN General Assembly ‘Declaration on a Culture of Peace’ (A/RES/53/242, 6 October th 1999, 4 preambular para. and operative para. 3) ‘From Diversity to Pluralism: UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity’, 2 November 2001. http://www.unesco.org/culture/pluralism/diversity/html_eng/decl_en.shtml “In our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential that persons and groups having plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities should live together in harmonious interaction and proper accord. Policies that seek the integration and participation of all citizens are an earnest of social cohesion, vitality of civil society and peace. Defined in this way, cultural pluralism is the policy offshoot of cultural diversity. Since it is inseparable from a democratic context, cultural pluralism is conducive to cultural exchange and the flowering of the creative potential that sustains life in society.” In ‘From Praising Diversity to Building Pluralism’ http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security ‘we seem no longer to agree on what the main threats are, or on how to deal with them’ derives from different world-views held by our various societies that reflect differences in culture and perceptions. The North, seized with the defence of prosperity and political ‘freedoms’ from various perceived threats, views the world differently from the way the South, intent on eradicating poverty and emulating that prosperity, views threats to human security. Further complexity is added by the various religious traditions which, their underlying common insights notwithstanding, are taken, through extreme interpretations, to be expounding different world-views of redemption and salvation. The danger that regionalism might dilute global cohesion has always been entertained in the security debate; and this apprehension underpinned the ‘mild discouragement’ of regionalism in the UN Charter negotiations. A modern interpretation of this issue by UNESCO, however, is more optimistic: “There are moves underway towards the formation of trans-national but less than global regional unions: the European Union, the North American Free Trade Area, and other more limited trade and monetary agreements between groups of like-minded countries. Although these could, in principle, be steps towards a more fragmented world with more powerful self-contained blocs (as was the case before the Second World War), it looks more likely that they are moves towards a global order with freer movement of goods, services, capital, money, people and ideas beyond the confines of the regions.”4 The importance of ensuring that one culture or region does not dominate the global order was eloquently expressed by a highly-respected former African head of state and the current chairman of the AU Commission: “As long as any civilization applies political, intellectual and moral coercion on others on the basis of the endowments nature and history have bequeathed to it, there can be no hope of peace for humanity; the negation of the cultural specificities of any people is tantamount to the negation of its dignity.”5 The cultural dimension of security is most starkly portrayed in the tendency of societies to fight, aggressively or defensively, for the kind of society they wish to be, or which they believe others should be. This has, since the first empires, driven the more dominant societies to recreate 4. 5.

Our Creative Diversity, p. 48 Alpha Oumar Konaré, President of Mali, 1993, in ‘Our Creative Diversity’, p. 53

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security others in their own image. Today, as in the past, the dominant powers embrace a ‘manifest destiny’ to lead other societies to better states of being. As Box 7.A illustrates, the most contemporary manifestation of this concerns notions of human rights and democracy.

7.1.1 Human Rights: The Regional Dimension The debate over human rights is highly attuned to the issue of culture. As one authoritative view has put it: “the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], despite its youth, has acquired major significance in national societies and international relations. The impact extends to the moral, political and legal spheres. The UDHR and the forces of moderation, tolerance and understanding that the text represents will probably in future historywriting be seen as one of the greatest steps forward in the history of global civilization. ... The UDHR constitutes both a moral platform ... and a future-oriented project requiring continuous efforts at all levels to make human rights universally enjoyed in reality. ... It is often argued that the UDHR is predominantly ‘Western’ (or ‘Northern’) in approach. There is some truth to it, but it is frequently exaggerated. ... participants came from all parts of the world. Admittedly, there was only one participant from the African continent (Egypt). Indigenous peoples and minorities had no representation during the drafting and adoption stages. While this may be true, today the broad wording of the Declaration and its general principles together with subsequent standard-setting and implementation activities reduce the value of this statement to history. ... These remarks do not mean that there is universal consensus about human rights. There are still disagreements and conflicts on various points and many instruments... There are indications to the effect that previous tensions between East and West are being replaced by increasing differences between North and South”.6

6.

Eide, A. & Alfredsson, G. Eds. ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary’ (Scandinavian University Press, Oxford; 1992), pp. 5-12.

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security Box 7.A ‘Leading in the Mission of Freedom and Democracy’ US National Security Strategy, September 2002 “These values of freedom are right and true for every person, in every society – and the duty of protecting these values against their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people across the globe and across the ages. Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favours human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty. ... [T]he United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. ... Freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person – in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and it has been tested by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission. George W. Bush, The White House, September 17, 2002.” The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, http://www.whitehouse.gov

The balance between universality and particularity was explicitly captured for the first time in the Vienna Declaration, which accorded special recognition to the societal context of human rights. And successive General Assembly resolutions speak of the sovereign right of each State freely to choose and develop its political, economic and cultural systems, ‘whether or not they conform to the preferences of other States’. No single political system or electoral method, says the Assembly, is equally suited to all nations and their people. It is significant that the Vienna Declaration, in its theoretical formulation, rendered the ‘particular’ subordinate to the ‘universal’. “All human rights”, said the Declaration, “are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds 227

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”7 Most regions have in fact produced their own human rights charters (namely, the Arab world, Africa, America and Europe). The content of the charters reflect a basic commonality of values, reaffirming the universality of human rights. But significant differences exist in terms of the historical source of those rights and also on certain issues of substance. Thus: – The Arab Charter (adopted in 1994) stresses the human relationship before God and the ‘Arab Nation’s’ conviction that God honoured it by ‘making the Arab World the cradle of religions and the birthplace of civilizations’. It speaks of the pride in the ‘Arab Nation’s long history’ and its major role in disseminating ‘centres of learning between East and West’. It upholds the eternal principles of brotherhood and equality among all human beings which were ‘firmly established by the Islamic Shari’a and the other divinely-revealed religions’. It is conscious of the fact that the entire Arab World has always worked together to preserve its faith. Citizens have a right to live in an intellectual and cultural environment in which Arab nationalism is a source of pride. Four phenomena in particular – racism, Zionism, occupation and foreign domination – pose a challenge to human dignity and constitute a fundamental obstacle to the realization of the basic rights of peoples. There is a need to condemn and endeavour to eliminate all such practices.8 The Charter has never been ratified, however, and in March 2004 signatory states undertook a redrafting exercise. – The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) also speaks of the virtues of the ‘historical tradition and the values of African civilization’ which should inspire and characterise African reflection on the concept of human and peoples’ rights. Unlike the American and European charters it stresses the right to development, and the duty of states, individually or collectively, to ensure the exercise of the right to development. The family is the custodian of ‘morals and traditional values recognised by the community’ but it is the duty

7. 8.

World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration & Programme of Action, June 1993. Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted 5 August 1990, preamble, articles 1, 4 and 35.

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security of the state to assist the family. All peoples shall have the right to the assistance of the state in their liberation struggle against foreign domination, be it political, economic or cultural. And states shall also undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation, particularly that practised by international monopolies. This, too, is not to be found in the European or American charters. – In the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1963) the Council of Europe recalls the Universal Declaration and reaffirms its ‘profound belief’ that the fundamental freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world are best maintained ‘on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common understanding and observance of the human rights upon which they depend’. The COE is therefore resolved, ‘as the governments of European countries which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’, to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration.9 Similarly, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is conscious of Europe’s ‘spiritual and moral heritage’ while recognising that this is founded on the ‘indivisible, universal values’ of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity. The EU is founded on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities. – The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man preceded the Universal Declaration by six months. The Declaration states that all men are born free and equal in dignity and rights. Being endowed by nature with reason and conscience, they should conduct themselves as brothers to one another. A prerequisite of those rights are certain duties ‘interrelated in every social and political activity of man’. Duties of a juridical nature presuppose others of a moral nature which support them in principle and constitute their basis. Inasmuch as spiritual development is the ‘supreme end of human existence’ and the ‘highest expression thereof’, it is the duty of man to serve that end with all his strength and resources. Since culture is the highest social and historical expression of that spiritual development, it is the duty of man to preserve, practice and foster culture by every means within his power. And, since moral conduct ‘constitutes the noblest flower-

9.

http://www.pfc.org.uk/legal/echrtext.htm

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security ing of culture’, it is the duty of every man to hold it in high respect.10 The American Convention on Human Rights (1969) closely reflects the Universal Declaration, but it accommodates capital punishment albeit with certain restrictions (non-reinstatement once abolished; confined to ‘the most serious’ crimes; prohibited for political offences). Thus the regional structure of human rights reflects a common universality but also some historical differentiation and some differences in emphasis, occasionally of a fundamental nature. Specifically: – The Arab Charter ensures non-discrimination based on gender but there is no mention of ‘equality between men and women’ or of measures ‘providing specific advantages in favour of the under-represented sex’ as the European Charter does; – The African and, to some extent, the American Charters impose duties on both individuals and states that are largely absent from the European text; – Both the Arab and African charters focus on the eradication of foreign economic exploitation including corporate, which is not to be found in the two Western charters; and – The Arab charter calls for the elimination of Zionism as incompatible with human rights – which has become anathema to the Western societies.11 Asia has not adopted a human rights charter, reflecting perhaps its vast size and cultural heterogeneity. A cultural rivalry with the West, however, has been present through the promotion of a distinct identity on the basis of a different value system (evoking the ‘Asian values’ debate of the 1990s). Similarly, the Pacific sees its cultural style (the ‘Pacific Way’) as significantly different from that of other regions. Essentially the cultural differentiation in human rights concerns the differing priority given to communalism by traditionalist societies in Africa, the Arab world, Asia and the Pacific, and individualism embraced by Europe and America through their modern revolutionary experiences. This was played out in the Cold War rivalry between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, cultural and social rights on the other. 10. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, preambular paragraphs http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic2.htm 11. This makes it impossible, for example, for Israel to be a part of an ‘Arab security region’. The ‘Zionism is racism’ issue has poisoned the Israeli-Arab relationship for decades and also the US-UN relationship since the General Assembly resolution of 1975 (revoked in 1995).

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security The very fact that each of these four regions has felt it necessary to develop its own charter of human rights, in addition to the universal declaration, indicates the cultural differentiation on such issues that characterises their regional belief patterns.

7.1.2 Democracy: The Regional Dimension The challenge of democratisation is a sensitive political issue for the United Nations. The term ‘democracy’ is not to be found in the UN Charter (1945), which speaks rather of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Thus the international community recognised democracy as a politically subjective, not a juridical, concept. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) speaks of a ‘democratic society’ without defining the phrase.12 The Vienna Declaration (1993) identifies ‘democracy’ as an objective of the international community, also without defining the concept.13 So while democracy has become established as a global goal, the term has been left so all-encompassing as to invite a continuation of struggle, and often conflict, within and between societies over its meaning and its attainment. Although ‘democracy’ is not explicitly identified, the Charter identifies respect for ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental freedoms’ as one of the UN’s four purposes. Both the Universal Declaration and its associated political rights covenant assert that ‘everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives’.14 The authority to govern is to be based on ‘the will of the people as expressed in periodic and genuine elections’. Those elections are to be held by universal and equal suffrage, and by secret vote or equivalent voting procedures, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors.15 12. The Declaration refers to the ‘just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society’. This appears in Article 29 on ‘duties and limitations’ of individual rights; and ironically, it was (pre-communist) China that proposed that this become the Declaration’s penultimate rather than its second article on the grounds that it was illogical to foresee limitations on rights before identifying them. (see Eide, A. et al.; The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary; Oslo; Scandinavian University Press; 1992, pp. 449-65). 13. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration & Programme of Action, June 1993. 14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 21.1 [hereafter UDHR]; International Civil and Political Rights Covenant, article 25.1 [hereafter ICPRC]. 15. UDHR, article 21.3; ICCPR, article 25.2.

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security ‘Democracy’ has always been subject to differing interpretations throughout the world. The modern era has witnessed tension over what might be called the ‘trialectic of democracy’ – a dispute over three competing contexts: the political and the economic, the secular and the theocratic, and the modern and the traditional. Such a debate is subjective, however, since there is discord even over the frame of reference within which it must be pursued. Some embrace one form of ‘democracy’ (liberal, secular, free-market) as the only genuine model of democracy, perceiving other ‘models’ as threats to democracy itself. Others see that form as simply one model of democracy, reflecting one cultural background, and believe that different models can be realised. Yet others simply reject ‘democracy’ itself as a concept if it is to be defined in purely liberal terms. This definitional regression prevents a genuine debate over democracy and democratisation at the international level. Some progress has been made within the UN in recent years, however, in developing greater clarity towards a consensus on what is a politicallycharged concept. In February 2003 the General Assembly reaffirmed that everyone was entitled to a ‘democratic and equitable international order’. Democracy was not only a political concept but also had economic and social dimensions. It was imperative to ensure that globalisation became a positive force ‘for all the world’s people’. Intolerance everywhere was aggravated by the inequitable distribution of wealth, marginalisation and social exclusion. Only through broad and sustained efforts, based on ‘common humanity in all its diversity’, could globalisation be made fully inclusive and equitable.16 Recent developments have also emphasised the regional dimension of democracy. Five international conferences on new and restored democracies has been held with a conscious regard for regionality – convened first in Asia in 1988 (Manila), then in Latin America in 1994 (Managua), Europe in 1997 (Bucharest), Africa in 2000 (Cotonou), and Asia again in 2003 (Ulaanbaatar). The current Action Plan requires Member States to draw up regional action plans through ‘regional intergovernmental organizations’ with the collaboration of governments and civil society. The regions are to adopt regional declarations or charters ‘that are more catered to the conditions in the regions’ and that focus on regional collaboration for the promotion and support of democracy. They are to organize regular regional events ‘within the framework of regional organizations or fora’ to assess progress and create regional networks of policy-makers 16. UNGA resolution A/RES/57/213, 25 February 2003 (and 56/151 & 55/107 before it).

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security and civil society, and promote ‘regional dialogue’ on human rights and fundamental freedoms.17 Some 118 states plus the EU participated in the 2003 conference, criteria for involvement being simply UN membership. Thus it was not for Western states to oppose the attendance of any other UN Member State. This was particularly relevant to some ten Arab states (including Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia), the Peoples Republic of China, Belarus which is barred from membership of the relevant regional agency (COE) on grounds of human rights shortcomings, or Cuba which is suspended from its regional agency (OAS) on similar grounds. The principle of universality requires their attendance, while the principle of regionalism requires a certain acknowledgement of the regional particularities of sensitive political issues such as the multiple ‘models’ of democracy. This was stressed by the UN Secretary-General in his address at Ulaanbaatar. Democracy, he observed, could not be imposed ‘from abroad’ even though it can be encouraged and assisted through international efforts. “Since the future of democratic government cannot be divorced from the global context in which each society must function, a global dialogue is essential.” That meant not only that new and restored democracies could learn from each other, but that old and established democracies could, and should, learn from newer ones. “So let us not look at our work as the export of one form of government from one part of the world to another. Rather, let us focus on common challenges to governance in the 21st century, and ensure that democracy is at the heart of our solutions.”18 The differences over human rights and democracy, region-by-region, require careful and sensitive analysis. In April 2004 the UN Human Rights Commission resolved to enhance the role of regional, sub-regional and other organizations and arrangements in the promoting and consolidating of democracy. The Commission has invited regional, sub-regional and other organizations and arrangements to identify best practice and experience ‘at regional, sub-regional and cross-regional levels’ in democracy. It encourages ‘regional and cross-regional organizations and ar17. Ulaanbaatar Plan of Action: Democracy, Good Governance and Civil Society, 12 September 2003, 4.1 - 4.13. (See also Ulaanbaatar Declaration.) 18. Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 10 September 2003 - Secretary-General’s message to the Fifth International Conference of New or Restored Democracies [delivered by Danilo Turk, Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs] http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=490

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security rangements’ to initiate partnerships to assist in disseminating knowledge about the role of democratic institutions and mechanisms ‘in facing the political, economic, social and cultural challenges in their respective societies’.19 The Commission does not specify what these might be nor does it explicitly assert that different models of democracy are dependent on the cultural background of a society. But in fact this has been asserted before – the institutional diversity of democracy has been explicitly affirmed by the UN Secretary-General. While warning that resistance to the democratisation process in some cases can ‘cloak authoritarianism in claims of cultural difference’, he stresses the ‘undeniable fact’ that there is no one model of democratisation or democracy suitable to all societies. The reality is, he suggests, that individual societies decide if and when to begin democratisation, and that, throughout such a process, each society decides the nature and pace of democratisation. The starting point from which a society commences democratisation will bear greatly upon such decisions.20

7.1.3 Linkage: The Effect of Culture on Security What does this have to do with the Security Council in its pursuit of international peace and security? The underlying issue has to do with the manner in which societies choose their social and political systems. The WCCD was clear as to the nexus between cultural diversity and the power differential: “More is at stake here than attitudes. It is also a question of power. Cultural domination or hegemony is often based on the exclusion of subordinate groups. The distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the significance attached to such distinctions is socially determined and the distinctions are frequently drawn on pseudo-scientific lines so that one group can exercise power over another and justify to itself the exercise of that power.”21 th

19. UN Commission on Human Rights, 55 Meeting, Resolution 2004/30, 19 April 2004. 20. Supplement, para 4. 21. See ‘Our Creative Diversity: Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development’ (UNESCO Publishin,g/Oxforc & IBH Publishing, 1995), p. 25

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security Conflicts are often fought, ostensibly at least, on the promotion or repudiation of a particular social and political ideology or system. The task of peace-building, in particular, in contemporary UN missions, draws from the nature of the ‘democratic society’ which the United Nations, driven by its guiding documents of the UDHR, associated covenants, Vienna Declaration and associated UNGA resolutions, is bound to promote. There remains, however, some resistance to the manner in which those guiding documents are interpreted. At issue is the extent to which the Council aspires to attain objectivity in the prosecution of enforcement action – for the sake of a particular notion of the kind of society that should be in place through post-conflict peace-building. Over the past decade a debate has been joined between universality and relativism in human rights. The culturally and politically dominant states stress their universal nature while the weaker states stress the relative nature of the cultural dimension that underpins that universality. The idea of a ‘culture of peace’ advanced by UNESCO seeks to reconcile these dichotomous tendencies within a single concept. Thus the ‘regional particularities’ of human rights need to be borne in mind within the overarching universal obligation to promote them. It follows that the Security Council, in determining whether a particular Member State in a particular region is failing in its human rights or democratic obligations, needs to take into account ‘regional particularities’. In the Iraq crisis the three coalition countries circumvented the Security Council on the grounds of the need to enforce the Council’s authority regarding WMD non-proliferation. The adoption, as a post-invasion rationale, of the goal of promoting democracy in the Arab world risks overlooking the ‘regional particularities’ of the area in which they became engaged. This included the need to consult the regional agency (Arab League) which opposed the invasion and continues to argue against an exogenously-conceived democracy that is imposed by force. The poignant juxtaposition, at the height of the 2003 Iraq crisis, of the formal statement of Anglo-America policy in Iraq and the response of the Arab League testifies to the manner in which non-Western societies judge the legitimacy of the Security Council or, mutatis mutandis , an ultra vires coalition (see Box 7.B). The cultural dimension underpinning a ‘regional-global security mechanism’ will prove critical to the manner in which it develops in future decades. As noted before (section 2.3.3), the fifth UN high-level meeting expressed concern that, despite some progress in the ‘dialogue among civilizations’, there remained discrimination amongst peoples and cultures, and there remained a need for greater cultural and religious understanding. 235

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security The sense of moral rectitude is a hallmark of every culture. With the Western powers playing a pre-eminent role in the maintenance of international peace and security over the past half-century, the issue of perceived ‘moral superiority’ on the part of some attains special importance and sensitivity.22 The moral authority of the leading Western powers has been brought into question as a result of the controversial nature of the invasion and occupation of Iraq – in particular the shift in rationale from non-proliferation to human rights, and the subsequent human rights abuses committed against Iraqi prisoners. Culturally-based notions of a moral superiority are closely correlated with presumptions of a moral authority that supports political leadership at the global level, which rests in turn on the employment of superior military force for a global hegemonic order. If those cultural perceptions are seriously undermined, then over time the political basis for such hegemony collapses.23 In the 21st century sustainable global security can only be built on the foundations of a genuine mutual respect for all cultures in all regions by all cultures, and an equal input from those cultures into political decision-making within the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council thus needs to be better informed, at the interface where culture drives politics, by a more uniform input from regional agencies. Failure to recognise and acknowledge this, and to act on that acknowledgement, will promise more difficulty and conflict ahead. This is where culture, human security and terrorism intersect. 22. In September 2001, the Prime Minister of Italy remarked that “We must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation, a system that has guaranteed well-being, respect for human rights and - in contrast to Islamic countries - respect for religious and political rights. ... The West will continue to conquer peoples even if it means a confrontation with another civilisation, Islam, firmly entrenched where it was 1,400 years ago.” Quoted in The Guardian, 28 June 2003. The Arab League demanded an apology. In May 2004, US Senator Evan Bayh expressed the view that “The tragedy [of the prisoner scandal in Iraq] is this, it goes directly to the heart of how we hope to win the war against terror and what we’re hoping to accomplish in Iraq. And that is that we are morally superior to our adversaries.” Quoted in IHT, 10 May 2004. 23. This concern is particularly acute among US allies in Europe. “In Munich, Süddeutsche in an editorial suggested ... ‘The price is high: America is not just losing its authority and credibility, but also its values’.” IHT, 7 May 2004. And: “A NATO official, asked to speak his mind about the effects of the US military’s prisoner abuse scandal in Iraq, leapt – despairingly – to the task. ‘It’s the worst blow to American credibility in 25 years’, he said. ‘People in Europe’, he added, are telling the Americans ‘they’ve lost their moral authority. It’s impossible to underestimate [sic] the problem’.” IHT, 12 May 2004.

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7.2. The Political Dimension The political dimension of regional security essentially concerns the ‘comparative advantage’ of the global and regional approaches to peace and security. Is the world governed more effectively and more wisely by a single global hegemon exerting influence over the entire planet or by a number of regional hegemons performing the same role under delegated authority from the centre? Is global hegemony or regional hegemony preferable for international stability? Must they be seen in contradistinction or might they be reconciled within an ‘effective and mutually reinforcing multilateral mechanism’ for an integrating world? The sustainable role of hegemony in peace and security – global or regional – depends upon two principal factors: size and repute.

7.2.1 Global Hegemony and Regional Security (a) Global Hegemonic Size: ‘Hard Power’ The issue of regional hegemony contends with that of global legitimacy. In a world of ‘perfect regionalism’ each UN Member State would belong to one particular region. The UN Security Council could delegate responsibility for a conflict to one particular regional or sub-regional agency and remain uninvolved, leaving the agency with an unfettered hand to pursue, to good effect, conflict resolution and management and report back to the global body.

Box 7.B “‘Enforced Disarmament’ or ‘War’”: Culture-based Perceptions of the Iraq Crisis A. United Kingdom Note to Security Council, 21 March 2003 “I have the honour to inform you ... that the Armed Forces of the United Kingdom – in association with those of the United States and Australia – engaged in military action in Iraq on 20 March 2003. ... The objective of the action is to secure compliance by Iraq with its disarmament obligations as laid down by the Council. All military action will be limited to the minimum measures necessary to secure this objective”. Note to Security Council President, S/2003/350

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security B. Arab League Statement to the Security Council, 11 April 2003 “In fact the Council was right when it refused to give a licence or authorisation to a single State to declare war on Iraq. The Council was also right when it refused to qualify the war on Iraq as legitimate. Once the war was started, the Council’s role was discarded completely. Fighting raged for more than three weeks yet the Council remained silent, and this silence has seriously affected its credibility and role. More, it has affected the credibility of the collective security system with which the United Nations is entrusted under the Charter ... Some do not see a role for the Security Council in the preservation of peace in light of the new developments and are trying to marginalize it, while others believe that the Council’s role has already been marginalized. Some want the Council to resume the role assigned to it and want it reaffirmed. Others see that the role of the United Nations as a whole is diminishing. Is this not to be expected, given the international situation and the attempts to call the shots of war and peace worldwide and to steer the situation away from the existing standards of international legitimacy? This can only happen at the expense of the United Nations, both the Organization itself and the system as a whole... This makes us wonder about the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Have they not been violated and threatened? What is the position of the Council? Where is its role? Judging by the way things are, can we think that the Security Council can remain faithfully entrusted with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter? Can the Council concede – or perhaps has it already conceded – that force is a source of legitimacy, or a substitute for it? .... ... we cannot accept that the Security Council should be held in contempt. We cannot accept that its role should be confined to repairing the damage of war, thus reducing it to an executing arm for policies it did not design. We cannot accept that the Council should be forced to face the consequences without first having addressed the causes. This is in many ways a dangerous course, not in the least because it usurps the Council’s role in preventive diplomacy and in fulfilling its mandate under the Charter – the maintenance of international peace and security – but because it thus gives legitimacy to the consequences of war once it is over. I cannot imagine that any on the Council would accept that. The permanent members are not authorised to do that, and the non-permanent members were not elected to bear witness to the diminished value of the Council and its compromised role. ... Like other elements of the international system, the League is currently under severe attack, given the distressing circumstances of the Middle East as accentuated by the invasion of Iraq as well as by the deliberate failure to arrive at a just, balanced and peaceful settlement of the Palestinian question and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli question. The League did, however, play the role expected of it by responding to the deteriorating political and security situation in the region with regard to Palestine, Iraq and regional security. All of these tasks were an expression of our upholding and furthering the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and the Articles relevant to the role of the

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security Security Council and of regional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes.” ... a fait accompli has forced itself upon us; we are all aware that the war in Iraq is a dangerous international conflict. Perhaps its first chapter is over, but there are surely more chapters to come. Foreign occupation, in whatever guise, will sooner or later lead to a revolution, particularly since emotions are running high. People in the region are enraged and infuriated. Then there is the failure by the Security Council and the General Assembly to address this conflict as mandated by the Charter. This failure threatens the core of our system of collective security. I say this because the situation is both novel and grave. Indeed, the Security Council was silenced, and the war is raging. It is a real war – one that members can watch day in and day out, as if it were a sad movie.” Secretary-General of Arab League, Statement to Security Council 11 April 2003 (abridged from UN doc. S/PV/4739)

The reality, however, is different, with an inextricable skein of inter-woven national interests competing between regional and exogenous states. In particular the position and role of one superpower, the United States, complicates any ‘perfect regionalism’ in the maintenance of international peace and security. The US, with only a small fraction of the global population, is nonetheless unique in its economic and military pre-eminence.24 Since the end of the Cold War the US, with its far-reaching global interests and reach, is the only nation-state that can credibly claim to perceive the whole world as its ‘region’. This poses further challenges for the development of a regional-global security mechanism. It is not possible to maintain a clear delineation between the UN Security Council on the one hand, and a regional or subregional agency on the other hand, in dealing with a conflict in a particular area, with a clear separation of interests between the two bodies. In reality every conflict situation delegated to an agency by the Council will nonetheless have the US national interest involved, along with those of

24. With some 6% of the population, the US accounts for 32% of global GDP. Its military expenditure, comprising close to 40% of the global level, is six times larger than the second military power, and greater than the next 25 countries combined. It currently deploys some 360,000 troops around the world in 100 countries (Roger Cohen, IHT, 9 June 2004, p. 2).

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security the regional hegemon and other regional states.25 The issue of global and regional hegemonic legitimacy is not confined to the United States. Some former colonial powers tend to see it as their ‘responsibility’ to intervene if circumstances in a conflict situation strike at what they perceive to be their vital national interests. Examples are the UK in Sierra Leone, France in Burundi and Belgium in Rwanda. In each case national interests and regional security interests are closely related. (b) Global Hegemonic Repute: ‘Soft Power’ The reputation of a hegemon – its ‘soft power’ – is critical to its capacity to successfully apply political and military influence – the application of ‘hard power’ within its sphere of influence. This applies equally to the US as the global power and to all regional hegemons. Nye defines ‘soft power’ as ‘the ability to get what we want by attracting others rather than by threatening or paying them’. Soft power, he suggests, is based on ‘our culture, our political ideals and our policies’. The US, he asserts, ‘has squandered it badly’, yet he believes that it can be regained.26

7.2.2 Regional Hegemony and Global Security (a) Regional Hegemonic Size: ‘Hard Power’ The nature of regional hegemony varies around the world: regional and sub-regional hegemons differ widely in their relative size and power within the local context. Table 7.A shows the relative pre-eminence of 25. The two clearest recent examples of this concern the Liberia and Iraq crises. In the former case, Nigeria, as the regional hegemon, acting through ECOWAS as the subregional agency, negotiated a peace agreement in which the encumbent president would be exiled in Nigeria. The US, however, having given considerable rein to Nigeria and ECOWAS for ten years in conflict management in Liberia, subsequently developed a policy of bringing the exiled leader before a criminal court, thereby offending Nigeria. (See chapter 5). In the second case the US, intent on prosecuting an invasion of Iraq independent of the UN Charter if necessary, simply marginalized the Arab League in the negotiations, the military operation, and the occupation. [see section 8.1 above). 26. “Being pro-American has become so politically toxic in the domestic politics of many countries that their leaders have had to limit their co-operation with us. Sceptics about soft power argue that anti-Americanism is inevitable because of our role as the world’s only military superpower. They regard popularity as ephemeral and advise us to ignore the polls. As the big kid on the block, we are bound to engender envy and resentment as well as admiration. But the ratio of hate to love depends on whether we are seen as a bully or a friend. .... Can the United States regain its soft power? We have done it before.” ‘America Must Regain Its Soft Power’, Joseph Nye, in IHT, 19 May 2004.

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security one or more hegemons in each of the nine ‘security regions’ compared with the ‘second state’, taking into account factors of population, economic strength and military might. Two types of hegemon might be distinguished for the purposes of political analysis: – Regions that have what might be termed an alpha hegemon – a regional state with overwhelming pre-eminence in terms of population, GDP and military expenditure; – Regions that have no pre-eminent power but a number of leading states of comparable size and military strength – beta hegemons. Table 7.A Regional Hegemony: Alpha and Beta Hegemons in ‘Security Regions’ ‘Security Region’

State

Population (mill.)

%

GDP US$ (bn.)

Military Spending %

US$ (bn.)

%

86% 6% 80% 9% 22% 70% 87% 12% 81% 4%

48.0 1.9 13.1 2.5 48.3 37.0 7.5 0.6 329.6 9.8

89% 4% 77% 15% 47% 36% 92% 8% 90% 3%

35% 14% 4% 2% 14% 28% 20% 16% 14% 27% 12% 19%

1.7 0.5 0.9 0.9 3.2 20.9 31.5 35.2 38.0 6.2 1.5 1.7

23% 7% 13% 13% 7% 46% 16% 18% 19% 28% 7% 8%

Alpha Regions Central Asia - Russia Caucasia Kazakhstan South Asia India Pakistan East Asia China Japan Pacific Australia NZ Americas USA Brazil

144.1 14.8 1048.3 144.9 1280.9 127.1 19.6 3.9 288.4 174.5

66% 6% 76% 11% 87% 9% 63% 13% 31% 19%

346.5 24.2 515.0 60.5 1237.1 3978.8 410.6 58.2 10416.8 452.4

Beta Regions Sub-Saharan S. Africa Africa Nigeria Angola Congo North Africa- Egypt West Asia S. Arabia Europe Germany UK France Southeast Indonesia Asia Philippines Thailand

43.6 132.8 13.8 53.8 66.4 22.1 82.5 58.9 59.4 211.7 79.9 61.6

7% 21% 2% 8% 23% 8% 12% 9% 9% 40% 15% 12%

104.2 43.5 11.4 5.7 89.8 186.5 1976.2 1552.4 1409.6 172.9 77.1 126.4

Sources: - World Bank, World Development Indicators Database, July 2003 (GDP and Population data from 2002) - IISS, The Military Balance 2003/2004 (military expenditure data from 2002)

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security From Table 7.A it clear that; – Five ‘security regions’ have alpha hegemons, namely: Russia in Central Asia-Caucasia, India in South Asia, China in East Asia, Australia in the Pacific and the United States in America; – Four ‘security regions’ have beta hegemons, namely: Sub-Saharan Africa (with South Africa, Angola, DR Congo and Nigeria), North Africa-West Asia (with Egypt and Saudi Arabia), Europe (with Germany, UK and France) and Southeast Asia (with Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines). A similar analysis is possible on a sub-regional level. Table 7.B, for example, shows sub-regional hegemony features in three sub-regions of SubSaharan Africa (West Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa) and one sub-region in America (South America). Unsurprisingly, the leading states generally emerge in a more clearly-defined alpha role within their respective sub-regions. Nigeria is pre-eminent in West Africa, South Africa in Southern Africa and Brazil in South America. In East Africa, however, Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan are broadly equivalent in size, wealth and military strength, making it a beta sub-region. Thus the ‘comparative advantage’ issue of Security Council reliance on a particular state for leadership initiatives in a conflict situation differs significantly between regional or sub-regional agencies. Initiatives are more likely to be taken by an apha hegemon, whether regional or sub-regional, and the Council is more likely to rely upon such initiative. This has implications for Council decision-making in many areas – constitutional, political and operational. Table 7.B Sub-Regional Hegemony: Alpha and Beta Hegemons in Selected Sub-Regions ‘Security Region’

State

Population (mill.)

%

GDP US$ (bn.)

Military Spending %

US$ (bn.)

%

0.5 0.1 1.9 0.9 9.5 1.4

53% 13% 56% 24% 50% 7%

Alpha Regions West Africa Southern Africa South America

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Nigeria Côte d’Ivoire South Africa Congo Brazil Argentina

132.8 16.3 43.0 52.5 172.6 37.5

55% 7% 15% 19% 49% 11%

43.5 11.7 104.2 5.7 452.4 102.2

53% 14% 64% 3% 50% 11%

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security Beta Sub-Regions East Africa

Kenya Ethiopia Sudan

31.3 67.3 32.4

19% 40% 19%

12.1 6 13.5

28% 14% 31%

0.3 0.4 0.6

20% 25% 36%

Source: – IISS, The Military Balance 2003/2004 (military expenditure data from 2002)

(b) Regional Hegemonic Repute: ‘Soft Power’ There are, however, constraints on alpha hegemony, deriving from political considerations in many cases. The United States, for example, has unquestioned pre-eminent status within the Americas. And it will from time to time intervene in a security situation when its vital interests are perceived to be at stake, particularly in its ‘proximate neighbourhood’, the Caribbean and Central America. Yet it usually exercises self-restraint in purely Latin American intra-regional disputes, having regard to considerations of cultural differentiation between North and South America, Latin pride and the Iberian-derived tradition of juridical dispute settlement.27 India is constrained, even within the political asymmetry in South Asia, by its intense rivalry with Pakistan. South Africa has been hesitant, for historical reasons of its apartheid-era ostracism, over exerting its hegemony within Southern Africa. In contrast, no such constraint is exhibited by Nigeria in West African politics. Associated with such political constraints are those pertaining to issues of regional legitimacy. One of the framework principles identified from the high-level meetings was regional impartiality (see section 2.4.1). The ‘purity factor’ of regional leadership depends more upon political quality than military quantity. Irrespective of relative size, the reputation of a country is a central factor in its propensity to take leadership initiatives and the disposition of regional neighbours to accept them. This can pertain to insinuations of pariah status (Zimbabwe’s occasional critique of South Africa when it wishes to inhibit the latter), perceived hypocrisy (Nigeria under General Abacha seeking to restore ‘democracy’ in Sierra Leone), or allegations of ‘cultural insensitivity’ (Australia’s increasingly robust strategic policy in its Pacific neighbourhood). Such characterisations are naturally dismissed by the hegemon as subjective, inaccurate or unfair, but political appearances within the multilateral context are always an important factor in shaping the merits, and judging the prospects, of security initiatives. 27. In such cases, however, armed intervention may give way to covert subversion of a regime (such as alleged involvement in Chile, 1974; and Venezuela 2005).

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security

7.2.3 Typology of Regional-Global Security Relationships These considerations of relative hegemony affect the manner in which a region or sub-region will behave in peace and security matters, and how the United Nations will perceive a region’s potential role. It is no accident that the regions in which ‘assertive regionalism’ is discernible, and where the Security Council has relied upon regional initiative, are the alpha regions or sub-regions – most notably West Africa, the Americas and the Pacific. A typology can be developed for the relationship of the Security Council to each region (Table 7.C). Its correlation with hegemonic size is high. The correlation with ‘repute’ is more complex, reflecting considerations of political-cultural links between the global and the regional hegemon more than local repute within the region. Table 7.C Typology of UNSC-Regional Organization Relationships Region Relationship Type I

‘Security Region’

Regional (or Conflict Cross- or SubSituation Regional) Agency (examples)

Hegemon intervenes if Central Asia‘vital interest’ involved; Caucasia UNSC initially disregarded UNSC led by organizational deci- Europe sion-making UNSC relies on organization; Sub-Sahara incl. Latitude to use force Africa UNSC gives freedom to settle or Southeast defer ‘in its own way’ Asia

CIS

Tajikistan Georgia

COE/OSCE/ EU/NATO AU/ECOWAS

Balkans

V

As above

PIF

VI

UNSC intervenes directly; Arab World marginalizes organization UNSC gives latitude to regional South Asia states or ‘extenals’; no ‘security agency’; hegemons involved in dispute UNSC intervenes directly; East Asia no regional organization

II III IV

VII

VIII

244

Pacific

ASEAN

LAS

Liberia Sierra Leone Philippines Myanmar Indonesia Fiji PNG Solomon Islands Iraq (1990) India-Pakistan Sri Lanka Korea

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security America: Sub-Regions I

Hegemon intervenes if ‘vital interest’ involved; UNSC initially disregarded

Caribbean/ Central America

OAS/CARICOM

IV

Hegemon engages in some self- South Amer- OAS restraint; gives scope for regional ica agency or states

Cuba Grenada Panama Nicaragua Peru/Ecuador Chile/Argent. Venez./Guyana

7.2.4 ‘Comparative Advantage’ of Global or Regional Hegemony The question to be addressed, therefore, is whether the ‘international legitimacy’ offered by the global hegemon, the US, in virtually every conflict situation is greater or less than that offered by the relevant regional hegemon. Table 7.D depicts the comparative advantages and disadvantages of global versus regional (and sub-regional) hegemonic involvement in a conflict situation.

7.2.5 Claims to Security Council Representation The above sections explored the issue of regional hegemony in terms of the relative size and repute of states within a particular ‘security region’. A related issue is whether the relativities between ‘security regions’ themselves and between them and the UN Security Council carry meaning. The political dimension of regional and global security, for example, inevitably evokes the issue of permanent representation on the UN Security Council. In the development of the ‘regional-global security mechanism’, the power differential between Member States of the Security Council (both the permanent five and the elected ten), and between them and regional hegemons, will be a crucial factor. It is instructive to explore this in assessing the merit of ‘regional representation’ on the Council in the event of significant Council reform at some stage in the future.

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security Table 7.D ‘Comparative Advantage’: Global and Regional Hegemonic Involvement Type Advantage

Global Hegemon Disadvantage

Regional Hegemon Advantage Disadvantage

Limited, often inOverwhelming US Regional resent- Acknowledged resource capability ment at domina- right to become in- adequate, capability volved tion Political Authority of UN Perceived remote- Greater tolerance Greater knowlCharter ness; fear of ‘global of indigenous con- edge, occasional contempt, of local cop’; resentment at stitution constitution ‘double standards’ Economic Potential for com- Regional suspicion Lesser potential for Local suspicion of mercial spin-off of commercial in- economic spin-off regional commerfrom US contracts terests cial interests Cultural Perceived attrac- Regional resent- Regional compati- Familiar culture tion of American ment of ‘cultural bility of cultures occasions lesser propensity to abide lifestyle spin-offs imperialism’ by obligations

Military

As noted earlier, one of the cardinal tenets of the contemporary multilateral system is the ‘constitutional primacy’ of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, established in article 24 of the Charter and principle 9 agreed upon in the UN high-level meetings (see section 2.3.2). But how accurately does this constitutional fiat reflect the realities of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power in the early 21st century? Table 7.E depicts the ‘political primacy’ of the Security Council, having regard to four central factors – military expenditure, economic size, UN regular budget (UNRB) contributions and population. Table 7.E ‘Political Primacy’ of the Security Council, the P-5 and the P-1: 2005 (Percentages expressed in context of global totals)

P-1* P-5 UNSC

Military Expenditure

GDP

UN Regular Budget Contributions

Population

39% 59% 69%

32% 46% 62%

22% 37% 61%

5% 30% 38%

* P-1 is a common term for the United States, within the Security Council.

The table shows that the Security Council, in 2005, reflects a clear ‘global primacy’ in terms of objective realities of military and economic power, 246

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security financial contribution and global population.28 It accounts for over twothirds of global military expenditure, almost two-thirds of the global economy and the financial contributions to the United Nations, and nearly two-fifths of the global population. These statistics are significant in terms of the ever-evolving concept of ‘global legitimacy’. The proportion of global representation, however, declines progressively from ‘hard’ power (military, and then economic) towards ‘soft power’ (financial contributions and then population). This succinctly captures the dilemma of UN Security Council reform in the early 21st century. The analysis of national claims to permanent membership of the Council can be extended further, with clear implications for the question of regional representation. Table 7.F shows rankings for the ‘top ten’ countries of the world in terms of similar criteria: population, military spending, financial contributions (both regular budget and peacekeeping) and troop contributions. Again, the five permanent members rank high in military spending and financial contributions to peacekeeping. But again, with the ‘new legitimacy’ factor of population, and also UN peacekeeping troop contributions, their claims are not strong. This raises the question whether, in developing the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ for the next century, greater regard should perhaps be paid henceforth to ‘security regionalism’. This is evidenced dramatically, for example, with regard to the regionalism underway in Europe. Table 7.G shows the same ranking, but with an enlarged European Union included. The EU ranks extremely high in the global charts – third in population; second in military spending; first in UN financial contributions to both the regular budget and peacekeeping; and fourth in UN peacekeeping troop contributions. Clearly the legitimacy of the Security Council would be greatly enhanced if the EU were to ‘occupy’ a permanent seat on the Council at some stage in the future, conflating the permanent membership of France and the UK both of which are of more modest global significance in the 21st century than during the 20th.29

28. Analysis for 2002 returns comparable figures, within a range of 5% to 15% variance 29. Refer to the European Parliament’s resolution calling for this, adopted 29 January 2004, Res. 2003/2049 (INI); (see Box 4).

247

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security Table 7.F UNSC Criteria: Top Ten Rankings of UN Member States

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Population

Military Spending

UN Regular UN Pckpg. Budget Contri- Financial Contributions butions (Level)

UN Pckpg. Troop Contributions

China India United States Indonesia Brazil Pakistan Bangladesh Russia Nigeria Japan

United States China Russia France Japan UK Germany Italy Saudi Arabia India

United States Japan Germany UK France Italy Canada Spain China Mexico

Pakistan Bangladesh India Nepal Ethiopia Ghana Jordan Nigeria Uruguay South Africa

China A France A Russia A UK A US A Japan B Germany B Italy B Canada B Spain B

Sources: Population Population Reference Bureau website (Washington, DC) = 2004 Military Spending ‘Military Balance 2003-4’ (IISS, London) = 2003-4 UN-RB contributions Global Policy Forum Website (New York) = 2003-4 UN Peacekeeping contributions Global Policy Forum website (New York) Figures = 2003 UN peacekeeping troop contributions UN Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations website = 2004 Note: P-5 Member States in bold

An EU ‘seat’ on the Security Council would not be a national seat which is open only to UN Member States, but would rather take the form of ‘sub-regional representation’. It should not be confused with the ‘security region’ and its associated regional agency for chapter VIII. The latter responsibility is separate from the question of which Member State (or agency) has membership on the Council. A ‘security region’, through its associated regional agency, may be ‘represented’ on the Council, by a Member State or a relevant agency. This is explored further in later chapters. Whatever the future holds in this respect, the rise of ‘security regionalism’ is destined to have a powerful effect on the composition and functioning of the UN Security Council in the 21st century. The political dimension of regional-global security will need increasingly to take into account the broader factors of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power than has been the case in the past. 248

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security Table 7.G UNSC Criteria: Top Ten Rankings with EU Included*

1 2 3

Population

Military Spending

UN-Regular UN-Pckpg. Budget Financial Contributions Contributions

UN Pckpg. Troop Contributions**

China India

United States European Union China

European Union European Union A United States United States A

Pakistan Bangladesh

Japan

Japan

B

India

Russia Japan Saudi Arabia India South Korea Brazil Israel

Canada Brazil RoK Australia China Switzerland Russia

China Canada Australia RoK Switzerland Norway Russia

A B B D B B A

European Union Nepal Ethiopia Ghana Nigeria Jordan Uruguay

European Union 4 United States 5 Indonesia 6 Brazil 7 Pakistan 8 Bangladesh 9 Russia 10 Nigeria

* Sources – UN A/RES/55/235 (30 January 2001) and UN A/58/157 (15 July 2003); and ** August 2005 (http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2005/aug2005_2.pdf)

7.3 The Legal Dimension The relationship between politics and the law has always been a tenuous one at the international level. The extent to which states hew to the strictures of international law is itself a debatable point. On the one hand they will go to great lengths to cloak their political and military actions in the highly flexible garb of legal precepts. On the other hand governments, and even scholars, are prone to argue that the law must adapt to changing political realities, particularly in a time of flux such as the present. In exploring the legal dimension of ‘security regionalism’, the essential distinction to be drawn is that between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ security. As noted before (section 2.1.3), regional agencies may take initiatives under article 52 in prevention and pacific settlement (chapter VI of the Charter) and peace-building (chapter IX) but article 53 precludes them from taking such initiatives on their own in enforcement. Yet how often, and how egregiously, has such enforcement action been undertaken, in advance of Security Council authorisation? 249

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security In the aftermath of the Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq experiences, there is a growing tendency in Western circles to distinguish between the ‘legitimate’ and the ‘legal’ – the difference between the so-called ‘Munich’ (illegal, therefore illegitimate) and ‘Zorro’ (illegal but legitimate) principles.30 Thus, in the case of Kosovo, Cassese regards the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia as ‘legitimate but unlawful’;31 Simma regards it as not ‘that much illegal’;32 while Pellet regards it as ‘not persuasive enough to make it a winning case’.33 In the case of Iraq (2003), opinion differs on whether the trilateral coalition invasion was legal and legitimate, legitimate but illegal, or illegal and illegitimate.34 These are explored further below. Legal opinions on the merits of policies in conflict situations often cover a range of positions reflecting political interests. The issue of armed intervention is, in general, politically controversial and legally contestable. Two issues in particular are germane to the constructive development of a regional-global security mechanism: armed intervention and self-defence.

7.3.1 Armed Intervention Table 7.H shows the extent of armed intervention by UN Member States over the past sixty years that has been authorised or not by the Security Council. The Table indicates the following: – Some eleven interventions by UN missions, coalitions or individual states with an enforcement mandate have been authorised in advance by the Council in a manner compatible with the UN Charter. – Some five such interventions have been authorised by the Council retroactively. 30. See, for insightful overview of this, Pellet, Alain, ‘Brief Remarks on the Unilateral Use of Force’, EJIL (2000), Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 385-92. 31. Cassese, Antonio, ‘Are We Moving towards International Legitimization of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’, EJIL (1999), pp. 23-30 32. Simma, Bruno, ‘’NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’, 10 EJIL (1999) pp. 1-22 33. Pellet, op.cit., p. 389 34. The first view rests on a proclaimed authority for coalition enforcement action rooted in the original 1991 WMD resolutions on Iraq. The second view claims legitimacy through the moral imperative of removing a dictator but acknowledges the illegality of acting ultra vires the Charter and in circumvention of the Council. The third view claims illegality for the same reason but also illegitimacy based on a demonstrably fraudulent rationale (existence of WMDs in Iraq without convincing proof).

250

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security – Some twenty-two interventions were unauthorised (though not necessarily, ipso facto, illegal). In addition, three recent interventions should perhaps be seen as sui generis, having regard to the intensely competitive judgements pertaining to the legal merits of the stated reasons for intervention (see Box 7.C). Kosovo (1998), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) continue to be a source of legal debate. Thus: – In the Kosovo case, one line of opinion contends that, without a Council resolution explicitly authorising the use of armed force against Yugoslavia, the NATO bombing campaign against Belgrade, designed to coerce that regime to agree to proposed terms of a peace agreement, was illegal. An opposing opinion is that the bombing campaign, aimed at ensuring civilian protection and humanitarian delivery, was legally within the Council’s humanitarian resolution adopted four months previously, and that this validity was affirmed by the Council’s rejection of a subsequent draft resolution criticising the action. – In Afghanistan, one legal opinion is that invasion and regime change in Kabul was a legitimate and proportionate response to the 9/11 attacks in the United States, having regard, inter alia, to the fact that the Taleban regime was not recognised at the United Nations. An alternative opinion is that regime change was a disproportionate response and that, in any event, self-defence does not justify an open-ended military presence in the country (beyond a UN-mandated presence). – The Iraq invasion of 2003 by the US, UK and Australia is less in doubt. One legal opinion holds that the intervention was legal since continuing Iraqi material breaches of the Council’s disarmament resolutions collapsed the terms of the cease-fire of April 1991 as laid down by the Council twelve years previously, reviving the authority to resume armed action. It was thus necessary to ‘uphold Security Council authority’. An opposing opinion is that the invasion was illegal since no explicitly-authorising resolution was passed by the Council and indeed a majority of the Council appeared likely to vote against such a resolution. It appears to be the general view of the legal community that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was not a legal action. Certainly the UN Secretary-General queried its ‘legitimacy’.35 Yet the decisions of the Council post-April 2003 to acknowledge the Coalition Provisional Authority as occupying power, the Iraqi Interim Governing Council as the legitimate transitional body, and to authorise a 251

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security multinational force together comprise acknowledgement of a fait accompli that borders on retroactive authorisation.36 For all intents and purposes this is the effect, and this is how it has been interpreted in the Arab region. As a result, the United Nations is increasingly perceived, at least in the Arab region, as an instrument of P-2 policy and thus increasingly becomes a target of terrorist actions.37

Box 7.C ‘Why We Intervened’: Stated Reasons for Intervention in Three Controversial Cases Avert Humanitarian Catastrophe (Kosovo, March 1999) Following the withdrawal of the Kosovo Verification Mission on 20 March, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has increased its military activities and is using excessive force, thereby creating a further humanitarian catastrophe. It is in violation of Security Council resolutions 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) during the period of 16 January to 22 March. Letter from NATO to Security Council President, S/1999/338 (23 March 1999) The US believed that the NATO action was justified and necessary. NATO had begun its military action with the greatest reluctance but it was necessary to respond to Belgrade’s brutal persecution of Kosovar Albanians, violations of international law, excessive and indiscriminate use of force, refusal to negotiate and recent military build-up in Kosovo – all of which foreshadowed a humanitarian catastrophe of immense proportions. Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203 had laid out the steps that Belgrade had to take to resolve the crisis but it had chosen to defy repeatedly the will of the international community. Statement by United States to Security Council, 24 March 1999,UN Yearbook 1999, p.342

36. SCR 1483 of 22 May 2003; SCR 1500 of 14 August 2003; SCR 1511of 16 October 2003. 37. The bombing of the UHN Office in Baghdad of 19 August 2003 had a traumatic effect on UN morale and security perceptions. The reward offered by al Qaida in May 2004 for the slaying of the UN Secretary-General and his Special Representative to Iraq, in addition to the US president and British prime minister, demonstrates the extent to which the UN is perceived as an instrument of P-2 policy within extremist but influential circles in the Arab region.

252

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security Self-Defence (Afghanistan, October 2001) “In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf of my Government, to report that the United States of America, together with other States, has initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence following the armed attacks that were carried out against the United States on 11 September 2001. ... Since 11 September, my Government has obtained clear and compelling evidence that the Al-Qaida organization, which is supported by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had a central role in the attacks. There is still much we do not know. Our inquiry is in its early stages. We may find that our self-defence requires further actions with respect to other organizations and other States. ... These actions include measures against Al-Qaida terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.” Letter from the United States to the Security Council President, S/2003/351 (7 October 2001)

WMD Disarmament (Iraq, March 2003) “Coalition forces have commenced military operations in Iraq. These operations are necessary in view of Iraq’s continued material braches of its disarmament obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1441 (2002). These operations are substantial and will secure compliance with those obligations. In carrying out these operations, our forces will take all necessary precautions to avoid civilian casualties. ... [These operations] are necessary steps to defend the United States and the international community from the threat posed by Iraq and to restore international peace and security in the area”. Letter from United States to Security Council President, S/2003/351 (21 March 2003)

Such legal debates will, as before, continue without closure. There is no dispute, however, that interventions with armed force without Security Council authorisation (explicit or implicit) are a violation of the Charter and international law. What is more disputable is the occasional retroactive approval given by the Council. Strictly, retroactive authorisations are incompatible with the Charter and as such are violations of international law. As Table 7.H shows, five regional or sub-regional enforcement actions have been retroactively approved by the Council and one such action was never

253

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security authorised. Yet there is a body of opinion that proposes ‘some leeway’ should perhaps be given in this regard in the future for regional organizations.38 The general view advanced by governments is that the primacy of the Security Council must continue to be upheld, and thus that only advance authorisation is permissible. The problem, however, is that the Council’s historical record on this matter does nothing to inspire confidence that it will apply such standards with any rigour. Its studied disregard of some interventions and the ease with which retroactive approvals have been extended, including the tendency to ignore the ‘hard security’ aspects of what the Council has occasionally seen fit to label a ‘peacekeeping mis-

38. “A further possibility [when the Security Council fails to act] would be for collective intervention to be pursued by a regional or sub-regional organization acting within its defining boundaries. Many human catastrophes will have significant direct effects on neighbouring countries through spill-over across national borders taking such forms as refugee flows or use of territory as a base by rebel groups. Such neighbouring states will thus usually have a strong collective interest, only part of which will be motivated by humanitarian concerns, for dealing swiftly and effectively with the catastrophe. It has long been acknowledged that neighbouring states acting within the framework of regional or sub-regional organizations are often (but not always) better placed to act than the UN, and Article 52 of the Charter has been interpreted as giving them considerable flexibility in this respect. It is generally the case that countries within the region are more sensitive to the issues and context behind the conflict headlines, more familiar with the actors and personalities involved in the conflict, and have a greater stake in overseeing a return to peace and prosperity. ... All that said, organizations with a comprehensive regional membership have generally not displayed a notable zeal for intervening in the affairs of Member States”. And: “In Africa and, to a lesser extent, the Americas, however, there has been acceptance of the right of regional and sub-regional organizations to take action, including military action, against members in certain circumstances. ... The UN Charter recognizes legitimate roles for regional organizations and regional arrangements in Chapter VIII. In strict terms, as we have already noted, the letter of the Charter requires action by regional organizations always to be subject to prior authorization from the Security Council. But, as we have also noted, there are recent cases when approval has been sought ex post facto, or after the event (Liberia and Sierra Leone), and there ‘may be certain leeway for future action in this regard.’ The Responsibility to Protect; Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’ (IDRC, Ottawa, 2001), p. 53-4 Yet, despite these thoughts, the Commission came down in favour of Security Council primacy: “Security Council authorization must in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention being carried out. Those calling for an intervention must formally request such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on his own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter.” Ibid., p. 50

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security sion’, gives cause for some disquiet. If the primacy of the Council is to be genuinely reasserted, the onus will be on the Council itself to ensure that the constitutional provisions that grant it such far-ranging powers are safeguarded and respected.

7.3.2 Self-Defence The self-defence provision of the UN Charter, article 51, has ‘ballooned out’ over the past half-century to become the most oft-cited and flexiblyinterpreted legal justification for armed action. This was never intended by the framers of the Charter and it is not conducive to the strengthening of the collective security system. The Security Council was not given explicit provision to judge the legal, or even the political, validity of a claim of self-defence. Member States are required simply to notify it of actions taken. Notable examples of ‘extreme use’ of article 51 include: China’s intervention in Korea against the UN enforcement operation (1950); Soviet-led Warsaw Pact interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia to defend the socialist community (1956, 1968); Israel’s pre-emptive strike against Egypt (1967); US-led OAS naval quarantine against Cuba in response to Soviet missile installations (1962); Israel’s pre-emptive strike against Iraq to destroy its nuclear reactor (1981); US reprisal strike against Libya in response to a terrorist attack on US servicemen (1986); Russian-led CIS intervention in Tajikistan (1993); Israeli and Palestinian mutual attacks during the second intifada (2000-04); and the US-led coalition’s intervention in Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks (2001). A variant of self-defence is the ‘protection of nationals’ policy which has been used to justify other cases of armed intervention. This has prompted intervention in a number of Cold War and post-Cold War cases. Examples include: Belgian intervention in DR Congo (1960); Israeli rescue mission in Uganda (1976); US helicopter rescue mission in Iran (1980); US-led OECS intervention in Grenada (1983); Russian intervention in Georgia (1992); and British intervention in Sierra Leone (1997). Armed intervention for the protection of nationals is generally regarded as a customary right in international law that long preceded the UN Charter. When the operation is short and swift and operationally confined to the sole objective of rescuing specified individuals, it is generally condoned. When it is used as a cover for the continued presence of for255

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security eign troops and the nationals no longer remain the focus, it clearly violates the Charter. The most problematic case of self-defence in recent times concerns the US-led intervention in Afghanistan. The legal justification for Operation Enduring Freedom had been SCR 1368, recalling the right of self-defence and the Security Council’s readiness to ‘take all necessary steps’ to combat all forms of terrorism. Three years later, however, the Enduring Freedom coalition continues to remain in Afghanistan with the objective of eradicating terrorism – still under the justification of self-defence. Very few references to Enduring Freedom have, in fact, been made by the United Nations. On 6 December 2001 the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that the ‘US-led coalition’ had committed military operations in Afghanistan and that, as the Taliban had continued to refuse to hand over bin Laden, ‘the coalition war aims were articulated as including their removal from power’.39 Thereafter the focus has been on UNAMA and ISAF, both of which have explicit Security Council authorisation. The first explicit reference by the UN to Enduring Freedom was not until October 2003 when the Security Council called for IASF (with its ‘hard security’ mandate) to work in ‘close consultation’ with both UNAMA (with its ‘soft’ mandate) and Enduring Freedom.40 In doing so, the Council formally linked for the first time the security mandate of the multinational force ISAF with the counter-terrorism mandate of the ‘self-defence’ coalition force of Enduring Freedom. Since October 2003 the Council has asserted a ‘legitimate role’ for Operation Enduring Freedom without specifying whether its original ‘self-defence’ mandate has terminated or simply transmogrified quietly into a UN counter-terrorism operation.41 This raises the question of when a so-called ‘self-defence’ operation might be seen to have lapsed. No criteria have been developed by the UN Security Council for judging either the original validity of a self-defence operation or a time-limit for its operations. This contrasts with peacekeeping missions authorised by the UN, including ‘robust’ missions with enforcement mandates under chapter VII which always have short-term renewable mandates. This greater latitude accorded to self-defence operations under Article 51of the Charter is ironic in light of the historical cir39. S/2001/1157, 6 December 2001, para. 39 40. S/RES 1511, 13 October 2003 41. See S/RES/1589, 24 March 2005; and S/RES/1623, 13 September 2005

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The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security cumstances in which Article 51 was born – as a compromise between universal and regional collective security.

7.3.3 Implications for a Regional-Global Security Mechanism A strengthened ‘regional-global security mechanism’, in which regional agencies would have a more direct input into Security Council deliberations, is likely to have an effect on the Council’s policy on intervention. The concept of self-defence raises three issues for consideration today: – the distinction between the individual and the collective; – the nature of the aggressive action that evokes the response; – the nature of the response itself. (a) Individual and collective dimensions of self-defence As noted in chapter 2, the self-defence article was introduced in response to concerns that the absence of an effective system of regional security in the UN Charter could leave some regions vulnerable to external aggression. The concept of collective self-defence was thus introduced. But the inclusion in article 51 of individual self-defence (by one nation) as well as the collective self-defence (by a number of nations) broadened the issue irremediably. It essentially accorded the major powers that possess global reach a justification for intervention. If conflict management were left to regional agencies rather than to the UN Security Council, it is likely that self-defence of the traditional kind (a military response by national armed forces to aggression by another nation’s armed forces) would be significantly curtailed. Regional agencies would most probably be more inclined to look to regional collective security as the means to respond to aggression rather than to leave the victim state to respond by itself; solidarity would be higher at the regional than the global level. There would, moreover, be less inclination, and certainly less scope, to ‘reach beyond the region’ in the name of self-defence – resulting fewer post-colonial ventures. The traditional notion of self-defence is largely confined today to contiguous areas of high tension – Israel-Palestine, India-Pakistan, North and South Korea. (b) The nature of the aggressive action The above considerations, however, pertain to the traditional notion of self-defence. In the modern age, a new notion of self-defence has emerged. September 11, 2001 is the nodal point for change in perceiving the concept of self-defence in two ways, spatial and temporal. In a globalising world where the ‘new realities’ of terrorism and WMD prolif257

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security eration make any society anywhere on the planet vulnerable to ‘attack’, the notion of self-defence has become commensurately global; an attack on buildings in New York is answered with regime change in Kabul. Secondly, the unpredictable and lightning nature of such an attack has prompted the extension of self-defence, at least on the part of the United States, to include pre-emptive strikes. While neither of these features – global application and pre-emptive action – is new, the circumstances in which they have been prosecuted in recent years are new. Pre-emption was traditionally confined to a response to the massing of armies along a border in times of high bilateral tension. Geographical contiguity and the pace of armoured vehicles or fighter aircraft characterised the traditional concept of pre-emptive selfdefence. Today the modern concept is shaped by massive explosions in major world cities, carrying immediate implications for global stability and evoking an immediate global response. In such 21st century scenarios the universal role of the UN Security Council is self-evident. Regional agencies are subordinate to the need of the Security Council to marshal a global response to a global threat. (c) The nature of the response Further complications arise in respect to the nature of the response. If the aggressive action depicts a globalising world in both a spatial and a temporal sense, it is logical that the response will be of the same order. As the world transforms from the Westphalian to a post-Westphalian order – from the world of sovereign nation-states to a prototype global society – matters become subject to change. The individual has entered the international scene – in the context of individual rights (through the UDHR), individual responsibilities (the ICC) and individual jurisdiction (targeted sanctions and arrest orders by the Security Council). In this state of flux civilian protection is undergoing a conceptual transformation from national defence to global prosecution. Individual terrorists and torturers (inside or outside the establishment) and individual proliferators are now subject to individual prosecution, enacted now at the global level as well as the national. In such a scenario, the question arises as to who issues the orders. The Security Council has the responsibility of responding to inter-state aggression. But non-state aggression by private groups against states is relatively new. The question is what is the correct body to respond. The Security Council responds to private aggression as if it is a refined case of traditional aggression – evoking notions of national defence that rely on national intelligence and a military response. But a military response to 258

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security private aggression is proving to be an inappropriate strategy. There is possibly a need to consider another body designed for applying the rule of law – criminal investigation, apprehension, prosecution and conviction – at the global level. Both conceptually and institutionally, the world is currently poised between an inter-national community and a global society, with criminality thus poised between national security and global protection. In this light there would seem to be a compelling case for a stronger role for Interpol to support the work of the new International Criminal Court. As an inter-governmental organization of universal scale (with 181 Member States), Interpol has the potential for applying justice at the global level in a manner that national jurisdiction and international jurisdiction (through extradition) cannot. To date, however, Interpol is principally an executive body without policy-making powers – international machinery for exchanging information and issuing arrest warrants. Policy-making in response to ‘modern’ acts of aggression (as opposed to the traditional kind) remains confined to the Security Council where the traditional concepts of nation-state and national defence are still dominant. As notions of national defence cede to notions of global security, some new procedures will be needed. It is significant that Interpol was present at the 5th UN high-level meeting in July 2003 and also at the Security Council’s counter-terrorism meeting four months previously. But more is needed than simply co-ordination of the existing structure. A revised structure is required for the 21st century. The notion of national defence, for so long the dominant concept that has driven policy-making through the Security Council, needs to be balanced with the notion of an integrated pattern of civilian protection and criminal prosecution at all jurisdictional levels – global, regional and national. Regional agencies will have a role in this. Their interaction with the Security Council on the ‘modern threats’ of terrorism and proliferation is already on the agenda as a result of the Council’s two meetings in 2003 – the first on counter-terrorism and the second on ‘new threats’. But the extent to which a stronger role for regionalism in security affects the issue of ‘self-defence’ depends on the evolution in the above normative considerations. What would clarify matters would be a decision by the Security Council that any Member State intervening in another’s territory with armed force for the purpose of protecting its nationals is required to submit a statement to the Council president stating the particulars of the situation 259

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security and the nationals concerned, together with an estimated date by which the forces will be withdrawn. (d) The Matter of Requests A major complicating factor to armed intervention is the issuance of a request from the leader of a country for foreign intervention. Strictly, if a request is forthcoming – if a foreign power is invited into another country, the Charter does not prevent this. There is no requirement for the intervening state to cite self-defence under article 51 and the Council is not required to authorise such intervention under its chapter VII powers. The problem arises when the validity of such a request is queried by other UN Member States. Often in a crisis situation the circumstances are not easily understood with accuracy by the Council. Nonetheless, matters could be clarified if the Council were to decide upon a policy in which a UN Member State requesting armed intervention by another is required to formally advise the Council president of the purpose of such intervention and the time-frame for such action. One statement each by the requesting and the intervening states would suffice to make such situations more transparent to the international community. (e) The Regional Dimension Is there a particular regional dimension to these legal issues? It may be that the major powers have less incentive to ensure transparency in situations of armed intervention than other states. A regional agency could undertake the responsibility on behalf of the Security Council to ensure that a request for intervention was genuine and not issued under duress. While similar logic may obtain at the regional level as at the global level (a regional hegemon may display a similar indisposition), it may be more likely that a regional or a sub-regional agency will ensure transparency than the global body. This issue could be explored through further research.

260

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security Table 7.H Armed Intervention: An Historical Review A. Advance Authorisation by the Security Council Conflict Area Year Intervening Entity North Korea DR Congo Iraq-Kuwait

Somalia BosniaHerzegovina Rwanda

Haiti

Croatia Timor Leste

DR Congo

Reason Cited

Source

1950 UNC

Breach of peace; withdraw forces 1960 ONUC ‘Belgian withdraw troops’; Military assistance to Congo 1990 MNF (Coalition) ‘Withdraw forces from Kuwait’

RES/82, 83, 84 June/July 1950 S/RES 143 14-7-60 S/RES 660 2-8-90 S/RES 678 29-11-90 1992 MNF (UNITAF) ‘Create secure environment for S/RES/794 humanitarian relief’ 3-12-92 1993 NATO ‘Enforce no-flight ban’ S/RES/816 31-3-93 1994 France / Senegal ‘Contribute to security & pro- S/RES/929 tection of DPs, refugees & civil- 22 June 1994 ians at risk’ 1994 OAS ‘Facilitate departure of military S/RES/940 leadership & return of legiti- 31-7-94 mately-elected President’ [Request of Govt.-in-exile] 1996 NATO ‘Defend UNTAES, assist in S/RES/1037 withdrawal’ 15 January 1996 1999 MNF (Interfet) ‘Restore peace & security; pro- S/RES/1264 tect UNAMET; facilitate hu12-9-99 man. assist.’ 2003 IEMF ‘Stabilize security & humanitar- S/RES/1484 ian situation; civilian protec- 30-5-03 tion’ B. Retroactive Authorisation by the Security Council

Liberia

1990 ECOWAS

Tajikistan

1992 Russia/CIS

Georgia (Abkhazia)

1992 Russia/CIS

Monitor ceasefire; civilian pro- ECOWAS tection; maintain essential ser- A/DEC.1/8/90 vices; provide security to interim administration; observe elections; conduct policing duties. Collective self-defence under UN Yrbk 1993 CSTO p. 515 ‘Protection of national interests’ Evgeny Kozhokin, Rand Corp. Report

261

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security Sierra Leone

1997 ECOWAS

‘Creating the conducive atmo- ECOWAS sphere that would ensure the A/DEC.7/8/ 97 early reinstatement of the legiti-29-8-97 mate government’ [Govt. request] Cote d’Ivoire 2003 France / ECOWAS‘Implement Linas-Marcoussis S/RES. 1464 Peace Agreement’. 4-2-03 Solomon Is- 2003 PIF/UNSG ‘Restoration of law & order’ PIF/PR 75/03 lands [Govt. request] 30-6-03 C. Unauthorised North Korea

1950 China

Resist US aggression

Egypt

1956 Israel (& France, Self-defence UK) Hungary 1956 USSR Czechoslova- 1956 USSR kia DR Congo 1960 Belgium ‘Restoration of order; protection of nationals’ Goa 1961 India Cuba 1962 OAS Collective self-defence (Rio USA Treaty)

Dominican Republic Bangladesh Angola Uganda Cambodia Afghanistan

Iran ntblGrenada Western Sahara Libya Sri Lanka Panama

262

1965 USA

‘Protection of nationals’

1971 India

‘Response to refugee crisis’

1976 Cuba/Sth. Africa Suppress insurgency/regime change 1979 Tanzania Respond to border provocations 1979 Vietnam Border provocations 1979 USSR Collective self-defence: ‘repel armed intervention from outside’ [Govt. request] 1980 US Protection of nationals 1983 US/OECS Restore order [Request of Governor-General] 1984 Morocco/Algeria Annexation/ support insurgency 1986 USA Self-defence (reprisal raid) 1987 India Restore order 1989 US Regime change; arrest of HOG

People’s Daily 14-3-51 Israel, UNGA 1-11-56

‘Blue Helmets’, p. 218 OAS Council US 47 State Dept. Bull. 722 US PD 3504 23-10-62

PHB 1999 p. 957, 999 UNYB 1980 p.

S/17990

The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security Lesotho DR Congo

1998 Sth. Afr/Botsw. 1998 SADC

Sierra Leone

1999 UK

Govt. request: restore order ‘Collective self-defence’ [Govt. request] ‘Protection of nationals’; ‘bolster morale and resolve of UN peacekeepers’

Blue Helmets, p. 76 Adibe, p. 150 (Hirsch, 2001; 87; Francis, 2001; 175)

D. Sui Generis Former Yugo- 1999 UNSC/NATO slavia. (Kosovo)

Afghanistan

Iraq: WMD

Enforce UN humanitarian reso- S/RES/1160 lutions; 31-3-98 Force political settlement on S/RES/1199 Belgrade 23-9-98 and S/RES/1203 24-10-98 2001 UNSC/Coalition Collective self-defence S/2001/946 and S/2001/947 7-10-01 2003 US/UK/Australia ‘Secure compliance with UNSC S/2003/350 and disarmament obligations’ S/2003/351 21-3-03

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8. Findings and Conclusions “Today we are addressing one of the main issues of modern thinking in international relations. With the support of regional organizations, we can build a more stable foundation for peace and security in all regions of the world.” Romania Security Council July 2004

In 1943 the President of the United States, as noted in chapter 2, persuaded the leaders of the USSR and the UK to back a centralized organization in preference to a ‘regional-based body’. The provisions of the UN Charter of 1945 accordingly gave a ‘mild discouragement’ to regional agencies in the international ‘architecture of peace’. Six decades later, the President of the Security Council acknowledges the evidence of the contemporary era – that the Council is addressing ‘one of the main issues of modern thinking on international relations’ when it focuses on the role of regional organizations in the maintenance of peace and security. This does not mean that the Charter is to be rewritten, reversing strategic decisions made at the time of its formation – with ‘regional security councils’ supplanting the central body in power and influence. What it does mean, however, is that a balance will be sought in which regionalism and universalism will come to mutual terms, developing the means of effective co-operation to an extent hitherto unrealized, and perhaps even unimagined until now. One ‘regional peace and security council’ has indeed been created in recent years and other regional organizations 265

Findings and Conclusions are entering the field of peace and security with determination and commitment.1 It is therefore necessary to develop a clear analytical understanding of the present state of the UN-regional relationship before proceeding to give prescriptive thought to what might be achieved in the future. This chapter assesses the central findings and specific conclusions of the analytical review undertaken in the study.

8.1 Central Findings The analytical parts of this study conclude with three central findings. They concern legitimacy, burden-sharing and constitutional clarity.

8.1.1 ’Legitimacy’ The key finding of this study is that a flexible and consistent ‘regionalglobal security mechanism’ is essential to the legitimacy of the UN Security Council in the 21st century. The Council is evolving away from its original, rather narrowly-conceived role as the international community’s instrument for maintaining peace through responding to inter-state aggression. The trend is towards a centralised body of global governance empowered and determined to assert its authority in respect to all types of threat to human security. This trend is being led by the major powers themselves. With that evolution the objective of ensuring a balanced input into Council deliberations from all regions, with different historical, cultural and religious backgrounds, changes from an ideal to an imperative. This is a message already conveyed to the Council by the LAS with the support of Russia and a number of other Member States. The United States itself, so strenuously the protagonist of centralism during the previous ‘formative moments’ of 1919 and 1945 and vigorously assertive in the post-2001 environment, is itself on record as favouring an increasing reliance on regional agencies for peace and security (see section 2.3.3.a). 1.

th

At the 6 UN-regional high-level meeting in July 2005, a suggestion was put forward that every regional organization should emulate the Au by creating its own ‘regional peace and security council’.

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Findings and Conclusions Without this – if such increased reliance is not placed on regionalism – the Council will continuously struggle against challenges to its legitimacy from those quarters – Member States and civil society operating within or outside the law – which perceive its decisions and actions to reflect a particular civilizational bias. Too great a response of this kind to future Council policy-making would be unfortunate and potentially disastrous. The Council, freed of the shackles that bound it for a half-century, possesses too much promise for promoting peace and stability in the world for this to be allowed to occur. Whether that perception is fair and accurate or not is of secondary importance. What counts is the fact that such perceptions are rife in the world and will foment deepening dissatisfaction leading to continual violence against the established order unless the problem is rectified. With the passage of time a political consensus is likely to develop that increasingly acknowledges this need, and efforts will commence to shape guidelines and precepts for strengthening that mechanism. As the Council continues to evolve into a body of global governance, its composition will need to reflect not only military power but also demographic and economic power. The demographic and economic superpowers of the world should be equally represented and have equal input into Council policy-making as the military superpower. This is explored further in chapter 9.

8.1.2 Burden-Sharing The second key finding is that a greater role by regional agencies in peace and security would relieve the United Nations of part of the burden it currently faces in this area. This would entail streamlining the relationship regional agencies have with the Security Council. The way to strengthen and develop the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ is to further clarify, and to some extent formalize, the ‘comparative advantage’ of each ‘partner organization’ in its contribution to international peace and security under UN auspices. In particular a way must be found of clarifying the distinctive roles which regional agencies (and their sub-regional components) might play under chapter VIII, as compared with the ‘common but differentiated roles’ which cross-regional and trans-national organizations might play under other chapters of the UN Charter. This will require strategic judgement, diplomatic sensitivity and political will. Some preliminary ideas are advanced along these lines in Part E. 267

.

Findings and Conclusions

8.1.3 Constitutional Clarity The third key finding is that the principal shortcoming in the fledgling ‘regional-global security mechanism’ of the early 21st century is the constitutional lacuna in the relationship between the UN and regional agencies. While the UN Charter provides for the existence of regional agencies and gives broad direction to their functional relationship with the Security Council, it is silent with regard to their constitutional relationship. Regional organizations have appeared independently of the United Nations, and they often answer to different political needs and aspirations. While there is some ‘cross-reference’ on their part, this is of a broad nature, and in any event the lead must be given by the UN itself. There is therefore a need for greater clarity in the way in which the UN perceives regional agencies, distinguishes them from other international organizations, formally recognizes them and accords them delegated responsibilities. The mutual status of the UN and regional agencies, and after them the sub-regional agencies, requires clarification.

8.2 Specific Conclusions Specific conclusions that support the above finding are as follows.

8.2.1 The Architecture of Peace 1.

21st Century Threats and Challenges The profound changes in the international order since 1945 have transformed the perceptions and assumptions that underpinned security thinking at the time of the Charter. Threat perception and response doctrine have fundamentally changed, with nation-states being joined by the parliamentarian, civil and corporate worlds as principal actors, and by private anti-establishment forces as principal threats. The security challenges in the 21st century will be generally concerned with ‘global systemic breakdown’, involving threats to global governance per se, threats to human security, and threats to the rule of law by trans-national crime. A system of global governance is being developed to ensure a comprehensive and integrated response to the multiplicity of future threats. The current lack of consensus over a ‘common security agenda’ derives from, reflects and exacerbates regional differentiation, impeding progress in con268

Findings and Conclusions structing a legitimate and sustainable global security system for the 21st century. 2.

Dynamic Multilateralism Despite the strains placed on the 20th century architecture for peace, the UN system is sufficiently resilient and flexible to adapt to, and deal with, such far-reaching change. A ‘dynamic multilateralism’ embraced by all Member States that interprets the Charter as a ‘dynamic instrument’ should enable the international community to introduce the necessary changes required to make the UN system relevant to the 21st century. It should embrace the strengthening of regionalism within that context in a positive and constructive, and not defensive, manner. In the past decade, the trend has developed of the UN providing the ‘soft security’ (early-warning and pacific settlement under chapter VI; peace-building under chapter IX) while regional and sub-regional agencies, cross-regional agencies and ad hoc coalitions have provided the ‘hard security’ (enforcement under chapter VII). Indeed the UN has become a rather ‘soft organization’, extolling global values and virtues and occasionally legitimising enforcement actions after the event, occasionally not at all. A strengthened ‘regional-global security mechanism’ should halt this trend, restoring more proactive authority to the United Nations, and greater reliance on constitutionally-delegated executive functions to genuine regional agencies under chapter VIII.

3.

State Security as a Subset of Human Security An important conceptual change is underway in security thinking from the notion of ‘state security’ to that of ‘human security’. The perception that state security (security from aggression, WMD proliferation and terrorism) responds to short-term concerns of the North while human security (from systemic poverty, resource depletion, health and environmental risks) responds to longer-term concerns of the South is incorrect. Yet it drives much policy-making at the international level. The relationship between these two concepts, and the manner in which the Security Council deals with the latter as well as the former, will need to be clarified in the next few years. Regional agencies will have a potentially important role to play in advising the Council of their priorities and needs in this respect.

4.

Doctrinal Strain on Collective Security A number of cardinal principles of the 20th century security architecture are under strain. The non-use of force (and the subordinate 269

Findings and Conclusions right of self-defence) is challenged by a new doctrine of preemption. Normal recognition of governments is challenged by regime change. The primacy of the Security Council is challenged by unauthorised regional initiatives and by the theory of the ‘unreasonable veto’. Domestic jurisdiction is challenged by the proposed doctrine of intervention through a ‘responsibility to protect’. And the customary right to possess any weaponry for self-defence is challenged by an emerging norm of ‘compulsory WMD disarmament’. The international community will need to strike the correct balance between each of these; and also between three areas of ‘thematic tension’: between human rights and counter-terrorism; between peace through stability and peace through justice; and between ‘robust peacekeeping’ and ‘soft peacekeeping’ in UN operational missions. Regional agencies will have specific views on the manner of responding to these doctrinal challenges. The strain which the collective security system is experiencing at present could be ameliorated by a greater respect on the part of the Security Council for regional agency views. 5.

Peace Missions The distinction between ‘classical’ and ‘robust’ peacekeeping is subtle and sometimes porous, usually clearer in doctrinal terms than in the facts-on-the-ground. The distinction is occasionally lost, or deliberately overlooked, by the Security Council itself. It appears to be difficult for the Council to maintain a clear distinction in its dealings with regional and sub-regional agencies between according them freedom for pacific settlement initiatives under article 52.3 and advance authorization for enforcement action under article 53.1. The Council should consider drawing a distinction henceforth between ‘traditional peacekeeping’ (under chapter VI) missions and ‘peace enforcement’ missions (under chapter VII); referring to the latter as ‘peace enforcement missions’. This has important implications for authorisation of regional agencies’ executive roles in peacekeeping (under article 52) and peace enforcement (under article 53).

8.2.2 Constructing the ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ 6.

Regionalism: The Third Debate The relationship between regional and global approaches to security, actively debated during two formative moments in the past (1919, 1945), is on the agenda again in the early 21st century. The 270

Findings and Conclusions mind-set has moved from ‘mild discouragement’ in 1945 to a ‘measured encouragement’ in 2004. The experience of UN peace operations in the early/mid-‘90s has produced a consensus that the UN must rely more upon regional organizations in the maintenance of peace and security in the future. A series of high-level meetings convened by the UN Secretary-General has produced a set of ‘modalities for conflict-prevention’ and a set of ‘guidelines for peace-building’ as an aid to a more co-ordinated relationship between the UN and regional organizations. But there remains some way to go before a fully co-ordinated mechanism is in place that can efficiently handle the total ‘peace chronology’ (early warning, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, enforcement and post-conflict peace-building). In particular the mechanism will need to play to the ‘comparative advantage’ of global and regional approaches to security, including the particular contributions of regional agencies and other organizations. 7.

Institutional Growth The institutional growth of regional and sub-regional agencies and other international organizations has been haphazard, independent of and without regard to chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Some were conceived in the early years as ‘identity institutions’ to preserve a newly-won independence; some as genuine regional security organizations. Others were a response to the post-war bipolar divide in the form of regional collective defence alliances. For the most part, however, the growth in regional and sub-regional institutions has been driven by economic concerns of free trade and common markets. No conscious effort was invested, in or outside the United Nations, to develop a co-ordinated set of regional security organizations to act as a part of, and serve the provisions of, chapter VIII. A qualitative distinction exists between a collective defence agency whose focal area looks externally and whose mandate is defence and a genuine ‘chapter VIII’ regional agency whose focal area is internal and whose mandate is collective security.

8.

Ad Hoc Security Mechanisms As a result, the regions and sub-regions have often been forced, in the post-Cold War era of the past fifteen years, to adapt their economic institutional structures to security functions in an ad hoc and improvised manner. These organizations have accordingly metamorphosed during the past decade from economic institutions into agencies of a general regional and sub-regional nature – prototype bodies of a general regional governance. Although this has resulted 271

Findings and Conclusions in some hasty and occasionally unsatisfactory developments on-theground, this overall trend has been beneficial to international peace and security. It is significant that the evolution into regional security agencies has come more from regional economic bodies than from collective defence agencies. For the purposes of chapter VIII the mandate has transformed within the same focal area rather than the focal area changing within the same mandate (of collective defence). The collective defence agencies remain of potential utility to the UN for enforcement purposes under chapter VII, without any constitutional constraints on focal area. The UN, however, will need to to have regard to the political constraints on this development. 9.

Integration and Co-operation Economic integration portends a positive effect on regional security and stability through strengthening group identification. But the results are significant only over the longer-term (measured in halfcenturies). Regional security agencies are essentially institutions of co-operation among nation-states for collective security rather than integration. While regional or sub-regional integration strengthens group identification to a point where ultimately national security becomes an internal rather external phenomenon, this is not the essential characteristic of chapter VIII of the Charter. Integration is the teleological end-point of group security but it does not comprise the essential nature of regional security in the nation-state age. Chapter VIII regional security is simply a special form of international co-operation.

10. Framework for Co-operation The structural nature of ‘regional arrangements and agencies’ is complex, imprecise and confusing. This thwarts the development of effective co-operation between global, regional and sub-regional agencies in their security functions – and the easy attainment of a ‘regional-global security mechanism’. Some progress has already been made in implementing the recommendations of the six highlevel meetings. Some liaison exchanges of staff have occurred between the UN and regional organizations. Greater exchange of information is underway. But a clear division of labour in which responsibility for a particular task is clearly understood by all has not yet been developed. The Framework for Co-operation focuses essentially on the functional relationship between the Security Council and other organizations in the field; it does not address the constitutional relationship that affects their relative roles in policy-making for peace and security. 272

Findings and Conclusions 11. Implementation of the ‘Guiding Principles’ The principles agreed upon for peace-building at the 4th high-level meeting are also relevant to the total ‘peace chronology’ in the relationship between the UN itself and regional organizations. They are therefore briefly assessed in turn: Self-Reliance – The creation by the AU of a regional Peace and Security Council, that deals with African conflicts but which remains subordinate to the overall direction of the UN Security Council, is a clear step forward for Africa. – Southeast Asia has always insisted upon solving its sub-regional conflicts without undue external intervention. – East Asia has no regional organization yet is striving to co-operate in a transparent and efficient manner to resolve WMD nonproliferation issues. – South Asia does not use its regional agency for peace and security issues, and looks on occasion to external assistance while on other occasions refusing it. – The Pacific has traditionally been able to handle its own disputes in the ‘Pacific way’, but the dominance of a European-oriented hegemon in the sub-region complicates the further development of self-reliance. – America has always handled traditional disputes through its own juridical procedures, however fractious these can become through the US-Latin relationship. – Europe has been unable in the past to resolve its conflicts without cross-regional involvement, but is rapidly strengthening its capacity for self-reliance. – The Arab region has shown a greater capacity for self-reliance in conflict resolution than is generally acknowledged by the Security Council; its scope for resolving conflicts within its own region is largely thwarted by the insistence of major external powers to remain politically and militarily present. The issue of Israel vis-à-vis the Arab world needs to be seen as sui generis. Rapid Response In terms of conflict prevention and management, the development of a rapid response mechanism within Europe is a significant feature of recent years. Africa is also making progress in this direction. Elsewhere, less progress is visible. The United Nations itself has developed a mechanism for rapid response but it requires some way to go 273

Findings and Conclusions before this is fully developed. Non-Recidivism Progress has been made throughout the UN peace-building operations of the past five years in ensuring that conflict does not recur once a ceasefire has been attained. Examples of success in this respect include Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Cambodia and Central America. Situations in danger of recidivism in the past or present include Liberia, Sri Lanka, DR Congo, and Sudan. Comparative Advantage Much attention has been devoted during the UN high-level meetings and the Security Council meeting to ensuring comparative advantage between the UN and regional organizations. This is a complex and sensitive issue and there remains scope for further progress to be made. It involves essentially questions of mandate and respective constitutional responsibilities of the various organizations. Some organizations have concentrated in the past on prevention (OSCE, AU, OAS) while others have been more geared to enforcement (NATO, CIS, ECOWAS). Many are currently developing both capabilities. There has, on occasion, been considerable overlapping and duplication of effort between the UN and regional organizations. Further thought needs to be given to the comparative advantage of the universal, trans-national, cross-regional, regional and sub-regional bodies with respect to various security functions – early warning, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, enforcement and peace-building. Multi-disciplinarity A multi-sectoral approach is clearly essential to success in peacebuilding. Regional organizations have shown an awareness of the need for this. International Assistance The international community has made Africa a priority in extending assistance in the ‘peace chronology’ – through early-warning in the AU, troop training and logistical assistance, and in peace-building. Other regions are less favoured, being relatively less in need. Impartiality The complaint of the Arab League over the lack of impartiality on the part of the Security Council towards all regions is perhaps the 274

Findings and Conclusions single most problematic issue undermining the efficacy of the Council’s work in current times. This needs to be resolved to greater effect if the Council’s work is to receive more support from world opinion. 12. Limited Effect on Policy-making Despite the above developments, the framework for global-regional co-operation remains rudimentary and has to date had limited effect on practical decision-making in conflict management. 13. ‘Flexibility’ and ‘Consistency’ Principles The principle of flexibility and pragmatism in the regional-global relationship has been taken to extremes by the Security Council, at the price of the principle of objectivity and consistency. This has had the effect of fostering a degree of policy bias as between regional conflicts and situational strategies. Some regional agencies have been marginalised in crisis situations, not because of their inherent incapability but through particular strategic interests; others have been left to struggle with crises even when they have not developed crisis management capacity. There is a need for a more judicious balance in Security Council policy-making between flexibility and consistency.

8.2.3 Complexities of Regionalism 14. The Concept of ‘Region’ The concept of ‘region’ is complex and defies easy political capture. 15. Membership Membership of different ‘regions’ at the UN (economic commissions, electoral groupings) are subject to extensive overlapping and omissions. 16. Focal Area The focal area of an intergovernmental organization is critical to its identity as a regional agency. Some organizations operate ‘out-ofarea’ and thereby do not qualify as a regional agency. The ‘out-ofarea’ issue is complex and sensitive, notably arising from recent NATO and to a lesser extent EU operations. This problem ought not be overstated: UN Member States axiomatically operate nationally ‘out-of-area’ when they participate in UN peacekeeping missions. NATO and EU operations beyond the North Atlantic-European area might be more positively seen in this light – as an operational arm 275

Findings and Conclusions for the UN through the means of cross-regional and sub-regional mechanisms. The sensitivity, however, is political. It is significant that ‘out-of-area’ operations have a uni-directional flow – essentially from the North Atlantic into the Arab region and sub-Saharan Africa. To date, the AU and the LAS have not been seen operating ‘outof-area’ in Europe or North America, despite sensitivities over Muslim interests in the Balkans crisis. The ‘out-of-area’ phenomenon is tolerable to the international community when it is undertaken under UN auspices, less so when it is not. 17. Mandates The mandates of the various organizations that attend the UN-RO meetings vary considerably. It is possible, however, to devise a typology of such organizations in a manner that distinguishes their regional/non-regional nature and their statutory functions. 18. Partnership Criteria To date, no criteria have been developed for acceptance by the UN of an organization at its meetings with regional organizations – beyond a history of functional collaboration in the field. In reality, some regional agencies have observer status, some receive invitations from the Secretary-General, others have unilaterally declared themselves to be a ‘regional arrangement’ for the purposes of chapter VIII. There is a need to introduce greater clarity and objectivity for admission to the ‘partnership’. To this end it is possible to develop criteria for acceptance by the UN of an organization to a ‘partnership for peace’ under chapter VIII. A cross-matrix can be constructed that identifies the nature of an organization for chapter VIII purposes, by the factors of membership, mandate and focal area.

8.2.4 The Multidimensional Phenomenon of Regional Security 19. The Cultural Dimension The cultural, historical and religious dimensions of regionalism have a subtle and indirect yet profound effect on the maintenance of international peace and security. This is particularly marked in the area of peace-building (the rule of law, human rights standards, models of democracy). But it is also influential in the area of mediation and enforcement action. A greater recognition by the Security Council of the importance of the cultural dimension of peace and security would help advance a general respect for its own legitimacy. Power at the global level, manifested in Security Council per276

Findings and Conclusions ceptions and policies, will never reflect a perfectly balanced input from all regions. But the 21st century should witness a broadening of values in global policy-making from all regions and cultures. 20. The Political Dimension The quality of leadership on the part of a hegemon in conflict prevention and management is critical to success in the maintenance of international peace and security. The relationship between the United States, as the global hegemon of the contemporary age, and regional and sub-regional hegemons is critical to effective peacemaking in specific conflict situations. In general theoretical terms, the ‘comparative advantage’ of involvement by a global hegemon or a regional hegemon in a particular conflict situation is broadly equivalent. Each situation therefore needs to be judged on merit Global hegemony, however, will for the foreseeable future be characterised by veto power while regional hegemony is likely to be subject to majority decision-making. The global reach and interests of the superpower together with the primacy of the Security Council will always circumscribe the scope of effective regional security mechanisms – the spheres of influence of the major powers will intersect with regional spheres of influence. 21. The Legal Dimension The legal dimension of regionalism has two important features. First, significant departures from the strict constitutionality of the Charter have occurred over the past decade through unauthorized enforcement action by some regional agencies (CIS, OAS) and subregional agencies (ECOWAS, OECS). Although some latitude has been called for in this regard, the international consensus is that the requirement of advance Security Council approval must remain sacrosanct. Secondly, the Charter’s self-defence article requires review. Armed intervention by an extra-regional State, usually a major power, in the name of self-defence (including the protection of nationals) has been interpreted too broadly, and bilateral requests for armed intervention currently have no requirement of international transparency.

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E. Exploring the Future

9. Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: Towards a Schematic Model “The statements made by the Secretary-General and the various representatives of regional organizations have broadly laid the groundwork and opened extensive prospects for exemplary co-operation between the universal Organization and regional organizations. ... it is now up to us to give them substance by establishing appropriate frameworks for our work...” Algeria Security Council July 2004 Chapter 3 depicted the complexity of regionalism in its geographic, economic, electoral and political dimensions. It noted that such complexities almost institutionalised confusion in the relationship between the UN and its various partner organizations. Chapter 4 introduced a typology for classifying international organizations, distinguishing between regional agencies and other UN partner organizations. Chapter 8 concluded that there was a need for greater clarity in the relationship. How might this be achieved? This chapter explores possible ways in which some clarity might be introduced into the relationship as a ‘regional-global security mechanism’ is developed in the future. Two fundamental concepts are advanced for consideration: – the identification of ‘security regions’ for the maintenance of peace and security; and – the identification of a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ for each ‘security region’, with roles derived from chapter VIII of the UN Charter. If these two innovations are developed, they are likely to have implications for UN Security Council reform. This is also explored in the Annex (p. 162). 281

Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security:

9.1 A Structure of ‘Security Regions’ For the purpose of constructing a ‘regional-global mechanism’ that can be effective in the area of peace and security, it might be useful to arrive at a common understanding of a ‘region’ for the practical purposes of chapter VIII of the Charter. To this end it is suggested, as the first ‘fundamental proposal’ of this study, that a series of ‘security regions’, contiguous but not overlapping, be identified by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council.1 This chapter considers ways in which this could be approached. Three factors in particular would need to be considered: geography, culture (including ethnic and linguistic factors), and geo-strategic political considerations. Each of these is considered in turn.

9.1.1 Geography: The ‘Primary Pattern’ The instinctive perception of regionalism – even in traditional peace and security terms – has to do with geographic delineation. When Winston Churchill spoke in the 1940s of separate councils for Europe, Asia and the Americas ‘under the common roof of the world organization’, he clearly had in mind security councils attending to the maintenance of peace in those regions – not complicated in any way by cross-regional membership. When the Latin American bloc urged the acceptance of a ‘Latin American security system’ at San Francisco, they had in mind only the Americas. When ASEAN was created as a regional agency, the founding Member States opened membership up to all states ‘in the Southeast Asian region’ that subscribed to certain principles, and when one particular state aspired to join from afar it was declined on the grounds of geographical criteria. The departure point for regionalism in peace and security, therefore, if not the exclusive criterion, has to be geography. If this is accepted, then the principal geographic regions of the world form the ‘primary pattern’ for the mosaic of regional peace and security for the purposes of chapter VIII of the Charter – namely, Africa, Asia, Eu1.

This is in line with a reference, albeit brief, in 1950 in a General Assembly discussion over the ‘regional status’ of the Arab League, to the question of ‘jurisdiction over a clearly defined security zone’ (see section 4.4.1). The concept is also consonant with that of ‘regional security complexes’ developed by Buzan and Waever in ‘Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security’ (CUP, Cambridge; 2003).

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Towards a Schematic Model rope, the Americas and Australia which comprise the five geographic continents.2

9.1.2 Culture, Ethnicity and Language: The ‘Secondary Pattern’ Closely related to and complicating the geographical pattern is the cultural factor – in particular the location and spread of ethnic groups with their various distinguishing characteristics, particularly linguistic. Historical factors of ancestral migration together with modern socio-political engineering have resulted in a dizzying mosaic of the 3,000 or so languages still spoken around the world – especially in overlapping areas where certain regions ‘collide’ or where post-colonial traces of forced migration linger. UNESCO and eminent scholars have spoken of 200 nation-states and 10,000 ethnicities.3 The link between language, with its ethnic and cultural ties, and security was identified in chapter 7 (section 7.1.3). The link between regionalism and language, portrayed in the struggle for survival, is poignantly described in Box 9.A.

2.

3.

Australia is the only continent to be comprised of a single nation-state; with neighbouring New Zealand and the Pacific island states it comprises a region known as the Pacific. The term ‘Oceania’ is normally employed in reference to the small island countries of the Pacific (occasionally this will include New Zealand). See UNESCO, Our Creative Diversity (http://www.unesco.org/culture/policies/ocd/index.shtml). Also, Prof. Elise Boulding, former Secretary-General of International Peace Research Association, interview, 2003. “...there are these 6 billion people and maybe about a million families who belong within the boundaries of some state; one of 191 states. But all across those state boundaries are the 10,000 ethnicities (the culture, language, and racial groups). It is those 10,000 peoples who are our human family. To think in terms of boundaries being a convenience in a certain mode of development of state systems, which are changing already, we should take away this worship of the sovereignty of states. This is so much of our trouble in coming to agreement. Each state says “No limitations on my sovereignty.” This is so difficult, but if you see what has happened in the European Union, they have set up a special commission on minority peoples in Europe. There are now several countries that are beginning to give regions self-rule. In Spain for example, Catalonia has self-rule except for military defence matters. The map of Europe is essentially changing, with provinces becoming autonomous. But it is a very slow process.” (http://www.beyondintractability.org/iweb/audio/boulding-e.html)

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: Box 9.A Regionalism and Linguistic Diversity: Connections to Politics and Security “There are three or four thousand languages still spoken in the world today – several thousand fewer perhaps than were spoken before the levelling surge of the great world languages of the present time, but nevertheless an awesome figure to the non-linguist. ... It is important, however, to view these figures in perspective. A single statistic tells a great deal: of the several thousand languages of the world, fewer than 100 are spoken by over 95% of the Earth’s population. Chinese accounts for 20% all by itself, and if we add English, Spanish, Russian and Hindi, the figure rises to about 45%. German, Japanese, Arabic, Bengali, Portuguese, French and Italian bring the figure to 60%, while the next dozen most important languages raise it to 75%. When we realise that the last 5% speak thousands of different languages, it is clear that the great majority of these languages are spoken by tiny numbers of people – a few thousand in some cases, a few hundred in others, many only in a single village, some by only a few families, some even by only one or two people. As the number of speakers diminishes in each case, a fateful decision must inevitably be made: the members of the rising generation must abandon their mother tongue and adopt instead a more widely-spoken neighbouring language that will be of greater use to them. By such a decision a lesser language is literally condemned to death, its ultimate passing awaiting only the death of its last surviving speaker.” Katzner, K., ‘The Languages of the World’ (Reference Publishers, London-New York; 1992) pp. vi-x.

It is impossible to disentangle such a complex linguistic skein, at least for purposes of institutional planning. Such efforts would, in any event, prove politically counter-productive. At the same time, the clash of ethnic groups is one of the most potent causes of national and sub-regional instability, and issues of linguistic and minority rights form one of the most sensitive areas of political and security concern.4 Peace or conflict in a country or sub-region often turns on the skill with which leaders have reached agreement on such matters. It follows that effort in struc4.

The issue has more than academic significance. In 1985 when negotiations were concluding for the Rarotonga Treaty establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, delegations initially assumed that the treaty text would be translated into all languages of the region, until it was recognised that one regional Member State had 700 languages alone. In 2005, the enlarged EU is translating and interpreting into 20 languages. Somewhere, the balance has to be struck between concern for minority rights and logistical capacity.

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Towards a Schematic Model turing institutions and designing procedures for conflict prevention and management must have regard to this factor. This is particularly so in certain sub-regions, such as Central Africa, Caucasia and, to a lesser extent, the Caribbean and Central America.

9.1.3 Geo-strategic Politics: The ‘Qualifying Factor’ From this departure point, issues of geo-strategic politics begin to intrude. The following issues are particularly acute: The Arab World The Arab world, a politically and culturally distinct and homogeneous ‘region’, straddles two geographic regions – Asia and Africa. The political and cultural distinctiveness of the Arab world is so fundamental to its self-identity, and strikes so deeply at the heart of strategic policy considerations today, that it should be accepted as a separate region. Thus, the Arab states of North Africa and West Asia should be seen as comprising a ‘security region’ in itself.5 If this is accepted, then it follows that the ‘security region’ of Africa would exclude the Arab states of North Africa, thus comprising Sub-Sahara Africa alone. In turn, the ‘security region’ of Asia would exclude the Arab states of West Asia. Asia As noted above, the size and heterogeneity of Asia, comprising some 70% of the global population, exceeds the dimensions of one ‘security region’, both numerically and geo-strategically. Asia is so vast, populous and heterogeneous that there is a strong case for perceiving its geographic subregions – East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Caucasia and Central Asia as ‘security regions’ in their own right. The appropriate ‘security regions’ for Asia must reflect the balance of geographical and geo-strategic considerations – the ‘primary pattern’ modified by the ‘qualifying factors’. Each of these – Central, South, East and Southeast Asia – would therefore comprise a separate ‘security region’. The Pacific The Pacific is so relatively small that there might be justification for perceiving it as an adjunct of Asia, within one region of Asia-Pacific – which 5.

The term ‘Middle East’, although still used universally as the standard terminology for this area, connotes a colonial heritage in linguistic terms and has no formal geographic status.

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: is often how it is treated by UN agencies. Yet despite its small regional population, the Pacific is a politically and culturally distinct area from Asia. It is also geographically vast: the Pacific Ocean, encompassing the island states and New Zealand, covers 33% of the planet’s surface, and Australia comprises an additional 1.5%. The enormous EEZs of the tiny island countries make for serious policy challenges to regional security. It therefore could stand separately as a ‘security region’ in its own right. The Americas The Americas have traditionally been seen as a ‘security region’ for both collective defence and internal conflict prevention and management; indeed the policies of American states at Versailles (including the USA) and San Francisco were predicated on this perception. Latin America (South, Central, Caribbean) is so different from North America in a political and cultural sense that there might be justification for perceiving these as two regions. Yet the historical depth of pan-Americanism suggests that the Americas are one, as a ‘security region’, and each of the subsidiary areas should be seen as a sub-region.

9.1.4 The Boundaries Issue The security dimensions of the world, it is clear, is not amenable to analytical clarity. The interplay of geographic, ethno-cultural and geo-strategic factors results in politically unstable areas at many of the boundaries. In two particular cases the ‘boundaries’ are especially difficult to define – essentially where ‘Europe’ meets ‘Asia’. Europe’s geographical ‘border’ with Asia is problematic. First, two states, Turkey and Russia, themselves straddle the two regions not only geographically but also in a geo-strategic sense. Secondly, the ‘extended border’ might be seen as stretching as far as the small but distinctive sub-region of Caucasia comprising Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This sub-region is in one sense both European and Asian and in another sense, neither European nor Asian. – Georgia is composed of four different ethnic groups (Georgians whose religious affiliation is Orthodox Christian and Abkhaz, Adzharis and Ossetians who adhere to Islam). – Armenia is composed dominantly of an Armenian ethnic and linguistic group while Azerbaijan is comprised of a Turkic-speaking Muslim group. 286

Towards a Schematic Model – The sub-region is shown (along with Turkey) as geographically a part of Asia.6 Yet both Georgia and Armenia have a Christian heritage and all three states are members of the Council of Europe. Politically they aspire to be seen as part of Europe yet they have close links with Russia, which remains suspicious of a pan-European expansion in the area. The continued presence of Russian forces in Georgia along with the recent deployment of some US military advisers compounds the geo-strategic situation and makes for a potential area of tension. Three alternatives are possible: that Caucasia be seen as part of Europe; that it be conjoined with Central Asia; or that it stand as a separate ‘security region’. With only three states and a population of only 16 million, it is undoubtedly too small to be seen as a separate ‘security region’. Regarding it as part of Europe raises the problem of determining where ‘Europe’ ends. It is therefore judged most appropriate to treat Caucasia as a sub-regional conjoint with Russia and Central Asia, its security issues being seen as more symptomatic of the Asian dimension of post-Soviet geostrategic politics. This is, however, a highly sensitive issue, given the politically volatile nature of the sub-region. It is clear that this issue above all others is the most problematic in terms of regional identity, as well as being one of the more challenging for the maintenance of peace and security. Policy-making on this issue will require considerable care and discretion. Similar difficulties could attend to Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine – included in Europe but, with the exception of the recent Ukrainian experience, is aligned strategically with Russia. These countries are, however, clearly geographically a part of Europe.

9.1.5 Identification of ‘Security Regions’ Having regard to the above considerations, the following structure of nine ‘security regions’ could be envisaged:7 – Sub-Saharan Africa – North Africa – West Asia – Europe 6. 7.

See Times Atlas of the World (plate 74-5) and Readers Digest Illustrated Atlas of the World (plate 112). It is of passing significance that this regional delineation corresponds loosely to the regional structure employed by the World Bank.

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: – – – – – –

Central Asia – Caucasia South Asia East Asia Southeast Asia The Pacific America

9.1.6 The Question of Choice It may be contended that the question of inclusion of a state in a ‘security region’ should be left to the sovereign discretion of the State concerned. It might be prudent to leave the self-identification to the regional States themselves, yet neighbouring major powers may well insist on exerting influence. There is no argument against this: no State could be compelled to be in a ‘security region’.8 But on the grounds of the above considerations, it is suggested that the nine ‘security regions’ as depicted above would correspond to the most rational delineation.

9.2 A Structure of ‘Chapter VIII Regional Agencies’ If the ‘strategic choice’ is accepted for a formalisation of the ‘partnership structure’ of regionalism with the United Nations, then it would be necessary to develop a distinction between regional agencies for the purpose of chapter VIII of the Charter and all other international organizations. While all organizations would have a genuine partner relationship with the UN, the designation of a ‘Chapter VIII regional agency’ would be acknowledged as separate and distinct. How might this be done? The 2004 UN High-Level Panel drew the distinction, without identification, between those organizations that operated ‘within the meaning of Chapter VIII’ and those that did not but which might have similar characteristics.9 This distinction needs to be developed further for the sake of 8. 9.

For similar considerations on the question of choice and sovereignty concerning agency membership, see sections 9.2.3 and 9.2.4. “In recent years, such alliance organizations as NATO (which have not usually been considered regional organizations within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter but have some similar characteristics) have undertaken peacekeeping operations beyond their mandated areas.” UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, para. 273.

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Towards a Schematic Model clarity in developing the operational partnership between the UN and regional, sub-regional, and ‘other’ organizations. The second fundamental proposal of this study, therefore, is that a set of ‘Chapter VIII regional agencies’ be identified, corresponding to each ‘security region’. What would be their role?

9.2.1 The Role of a ‘Chapter VIII Regional Agency’ In developing the strategic partnership between the UN and international organizations, a fundamental distinction needs to be drawn between two roles: institutional and executive. (a) Institutional Role A ‘Chapter VIII regional agency’ would have two institutional functions: representation and reporting. The representation function would pertain to the electoral mechanism whereby Member States are elected to the Security Council. At present the informal electoral groupings still reflect Cold War delineations and as such are simply anachronistic, especially when the East European countries become members of the EU. The ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ would replace this obsolescent mechanism and act as the nine-fold institutional mechanism through which a certain number of UN Member States for each agency would be elected. That number would include the ‘permanent five’ in their relevant agency, which are not elected but which have permanent membership on the Council. This is explored further in the Annex to this chapter. The reporting function would also be a responsibility of a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. Each agency would be responsible, acting either directly or through one of its Member States on the Security Council, for keeping the Council informed about the security situation in its ‘security region’. Perhaps a custom could be developed by the Council of inviting the secretary-general of each ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ to meet with it on a regular basis. The secretary-general of such an agency could also be accorded the right to request attendance in the Council if, in his/her opinion, a threat to regional peace has arisen in the relevant ‘security region’. This would be compatible with, rather than replace, the responsibility of a ‘regional Member State’ on the Council. It could be seen as a derivative of article 99 which accords responsibility to the UN SecretaryGeneral to draw to the Council’s attention any situation that, in his opin289

Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: ion, might threaten international peace and security. Such agency heads could exercise a comparable function at the regional level. (b) Executive Role An executive role would involve acting as an executive agency on behalf of the Security Council in carrying out the Council’s recommendations (in pacific settlement) and decisions (in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and collective security). The executive function – carrying out the Council’s decisions through the peace agenda – may be carried out by a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’, or it may be carried out by any other strategic partner – by a sub-regional, or by a cross-regional or trans-national organization. The particular choice in this respect would be made by the Security Council, having regard to the circumstances of each conflict situation and exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. If it is carried out by a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’, the Security Council would be acting under chapter VIII. If it is carried out by any other international organization, the Council would be acting under chapter VI (in pacific settlement), chapter VII (in enforcement) and chapter IX (in peace-building). In exploring the question of an executive role for a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’, two issues necessarily arise: internal dispute settlement and internal enforcement. It was earlier established that an internal pacific dispute settlement mechanism should be seen as a necessary condition of a regional agency for the purposes of chapter VIII (see section 4.3.4.a). It therefore follows that a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ should be prepared for an executive role in pacific settlement. An executive role in enforcement, however, would depend on whether the regional agency has developed such an enforcement function and mechanism.

9.2.2 Identifying the Agencies While in some cases the identification of the agency would appear to be self-evident, in other cases the issue would involve a complex set of considerations that could affect the political sensibilities of regional states or one or more organizations. For this reason it would be prudent to develop criteria for guiding such a process. 290

Towards a Schematic Model (a) Developing Criteria for Identification Three obvious criteria for the purpose would seem to be those employed in Part B, namely, membership, mandate and focal area. A fourth criterion might be the operational relationship which an organization has already developed with the United Nations. Thus the pertinent questions to be addressed would be: – Does the ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ genuinely represent all the UN Member States in the ‘security region’? – Is the organization’s ‘focal area’ appropriate for a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’? If the organization engages in security actions outside its region, is this a problem for such an agency? – Does the organization possess an appropriate mandate to be a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’? Does its mandate include an internal regional dispute settlement mechanism, which was identified as a necessary condition? Does it include an internal enforcement mechanism (not identified, however, as essential)? Does the mandate also include an external self-defence mechanism (which does not necessarily disqualify it)? – Has the organization developed a close operational partnership with the UN in security matters, or is it aspiring to do so in the future? (b) Applying the Criteria Having regard to the above criteria, the following thoughts are advanced in exploring the question of identification of ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’. The membership characteristics of the regional organizations were identified in Table 3 of this study. The executive functions of such organizations are identified in Table 9.A. Table 9.A ‘Chapter VIII Executive Functions’ Executive Function Internal dispute settlement §52

Agency

Yes Statutory Reference

No Agency

AU OAS CIS ASEAN LAS PIF

AU-PSP, art. 7.1 (a & b) OAS Charter, arts. 24-27 CIS Charter, art. 17 ASEAN-TAC, arts. 13-17 LAS Charter, art. V Rarotonga Decl. paras. 7-14

COE EU SAARC

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: Internal enforcement §53

External self-defence §51

AU AU-PSP, art. 7.1 (e) OAS OAS Charter, arts. 28-29 CIS CIS Charter, art. 18 LAS LAS Charter, art. VI PIF Biketawa Decl. paras. 1-2 AU AU-Const. Act, para 4 (d) OAS OAS Charter, arts. 28-29 CIS/CSTO CIS Charter, art. 12 LAS LAS Charter, art. VI

ASEAN COE EU SAARC COE EU SAARC ASEAN PIF

The record to date of regional and sub-regional agencies in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement is shown in Table 9.B Table 9.B Executive Roles of ‘Regional & Sub-Regional Agencies’ to Date* Organization

Peacekeeping

Peace-Enforcement**

OAU/AU

Chad 1981 Burundi 2003

Sudan 2004

ECOWAS SADC IGAD LAS COE*** EU CIS SAARC ASEAN PIF OAS OECS *

Collective Security

Lebanon 1990 Sierra Leone 1997 Lesotho 1998 Lebanon 1983 Macedonia 2003 Georgia 1994 Tajikistan 1994

DR Congo 2003

Solomon Is. 2004 Dominican Rep. 1965 Grenada 1983

Cuba**** 1962

The roles identified above include peacekeeping (under chapter VI) and peace-enforcement and collective security (under chapter VII); but exclude the peacemaking role (under chapter VI). ** Peace enforcement, as identified in chapter 1 (footnote 25) and section 4.3.1.a, requires permission to use ‘all necessary means’ to achieve mission objectives granted by the Security Council acting under chapter VII. *** COE, SAARC and ASEAN have to date undertaken no executive actions of any kind. **** During the Cuban crisis, the OAS resolved to take measures, individually and collectively, ‘including the use of armed force’, to ensure that the Cuban Government could not continue to receive military material from the Sino-Soviet powers.

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Towards a Schematic Model On the basis of these characteristics, the criteria outlined above can be applied. There would appear to be six organizations which would be selfevidently ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’; two cases which would require further political evolution in their development; and one especially complex case. (i) The Self-Evident Cases Six ‘security regions’ would have agencies that would seem naturally to fulfil the function of a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. – The African Union (AU) would clearly be the responsible agency for Sub-Saharan Africa, having regard to its pan-sub-Saharan membership, its far-reaching security mandate and its exclusively African focal area. A difficulty arises with respect to membership and focal area, which includes the Arab states of North Africa as well as Sub-Saharan Africa. In this respect it would need to be understood that the AU’s task would be to cover sub-Saharan Africa only. The North African states would not play an active role in the AU’s reporting function for sub-Saharan Africa; they would have a ‘passive role’ in issues of peace and security in that ‘security region’ – a voice but no vote (see section 9.2.3). Morocco’s absence from AU membership would thus not present any difficulty since its own involvement in the LAS would be sufficient. As noted in chapter 5, the AU now has the most innovative and far-reaching internal dispute settlement mechanism in the world. Its establishment of a ‘common defence policy’ implies an external self-defence mechanism, which would not prevent a role as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. The AU has strong links with the UN, its Peace and Security Council Protocol referring to chapter VIII of the Charter and requiring ‘close and continued interaction with the UN Security Council’.10 In its most recent resolutions on the subject, the UN General Assembly has ‘recalled the provisions of chapter VIII of the Charter’ before commending further co-operation between the two bodies.11 – The League of Arab States (LAS) would be responsible for all reporting of the North Africa – West Asia region that comprises the Arab world. Its membership and focal area pertain to the Arab world only, by statutory definition, and its mandate encompasses internal dispute 10. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, article 17, paras. 2 & 3. 11. A/RES/57/48, 20 January 2003, and A/RES/59/213, 20 December 2004

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: settlement. It also has an external self-defence mechanism, but this is not seen to be a problem. The LAS Charter makes an ‘anticipatory’ reference to co-operation with the UN, having preceded the UN’s foundation (March 1945 and June 1945 respectively); it envisaged co-operation with international bodies ‘to be created in the future in order to guarantee security and peace’. It has frequently referred since to the need for co-operation with, and respect for, the United Nations. It is significant, however, that in its resolutions on co-operation with the LAS, the UN General Assembly does not refer to chapter VIII of the UN Charter.12 – The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would be responsible for Central Asia – Caucasia, comprising Russia and eight other states. Among its twelve-strong membership, three European States (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine) would be ‘passive’ within the CIS for the Central Asia – Caucasia ‘security region’ (see section 9.2.3). The CIS mandate contains an internal dispute settlement mechanism. Its external selfdefence mechanism would not be a problem. The founding document of the CIS does not refer to the United Nations, but it is clear that the UN Secretary-General regards the CIS as a regional agency in the area of peace and security.13 – The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the clear choice of agency for the Southeast Asian ‘security region’, in terms of membership and focal area. Its mandate contains a ‘soft’ security func-

12. A/RES/57/46, 16 January 2003, and A/RES/59/9, 6 December 2004 13. “The participation of the CIS in a closer working relationship with the organs of the United Nations, including the Secretary-General, is, in my view, a primary example of the successful implementation of a division of labour between a regional structure and the United Nations. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter defines the role that regional arrangements and agencies can play in the maintenance of peace and security. Forms of co-operation between the UN and regional organizations include consultations, diplomatic support, operational support, co-deployment and joint operations. ... The specific operations in which the UN and the CIS have been co-operating can serve as a model for positive international endeavour. ... I therefore, on this occasion, and on behalf of the international community, express my profound gratitude for the ongoing material and diplomatic efforts of the CIS in establishing and maintaining regional peace and security. ... The United Nations, even with its vast experience and unmatched global network, cannot take on all the world’s problems by itself. Decentralization and delegation increasingly will be required. The role of the CIS will be ever more important. Just as the UN has warmly welcomed the CIS into the international community, so it also looks to the CIS to play its vital role in the UN System.” SG/SM/5987, 16 May 1996.

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Towards a Schematic Model tion but it has no military enforcement capacity. Its founding document takes as one of its aims and purposes the promotion of ‘regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter’.14 The UN General Assembly has welcomed co-operation with ASEAN including its participation in the HLMs, and has encouraged increased contact and further areas of co-operation.15 – The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is similarly the clear choice for the Pacific in the event that it were to be seen as a separate ‘security region’ given its distinctive cultural and geo-strategic features that makes it sui generis. Since 1997 the PIF has developed, through its annual summit declarations and decisions, an informal but effective dispute settlement and internal enforcement mechanism. Co-operation with the United Nations is strengthening rapidly. The UN General Assembly, in fact, has recently called for a closer relationship ‘bearing in mind the provisions of chapter VIII of the Charter of the UN on the existence of regional arrangements and agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action’ – a clear recognition of the PIF as a ‘chapter VIII agency’. The Assembly welcomed the assistance given by the UN ‘towards the maintenance of peace and security in the Pacific Islands Forum region’. It called for contact and co-operation ‘in a more structured, regular and transparent manner’, including an examination of the option of formalizing such co-operation in the future.16 In the existing Security Council of only 15 Member States, however, there would be no scope for separate PIF representation, given the pressure on seat allocation. But in an expanded Security Council, this might be possible, despite its relatively small size. This would depend on whether the future Security Council has 25 Member States or only 24. With a Council of 25 Members, the PIF could probably figure as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ in its own right. With 24, however, it may need to be ‘twinned’ with ASEAN (see Annex for more details). Given that the UN’s High-Level Panel has opted for a Council of 24, the Annex explores the statistical implications on that basis – with 24 Member States, and the PIF ‘twinned’ with ASEAN.

14. ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, August 1967, article 2 (2). 15. A/RES/57/35, 10 January 2003. 16. A/RES/57/37, 15 January 2003

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: – The Organization of American States (OAS) is clearly suitable to be the responsible agency for the Americas. Its membership and focal area are appropriate. It has an internal dispute settlement mechanism and an internal enforcement mechanism. Its external self-defence mechanism (resulting from the Act of Chapultepec and enshrined in the Rio Treaty and the OAS Statute), which was the principal stimulus for incorporating chapter VIII in the UN Charter in 1945, would, with some irony, not be seen as an impediment to its acceptance as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. OAS-UN co-operation is of long-standing, the UN General Assembly recently recalling that the OAS Charter ‘provides that that organization is a regional agency under the terms of the Charter of the UN’.17 It thus is clear that the above organizations already meet the four criteria stipulated here for acceptance by the UN as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. (ii) Two Evolutionary Cases Two ‘security regions’ would require some evolution in their security self-perception before any ‘Chapter VIII regional agency’ could operate in partnership with the Security Council. In one case (South Asia) the question of mandate is a problem. In the second case (East Asia) the complete absence of a regional agency suggests that much time will need to pass before this issue is resolved. – South Asia The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) would need to be invited to adopt a security function before it assumed such a role in reporting to the Council. This would require, as a prerequisite, further agreement between India and Pakistan over how SAARC would deal with the Kashmir issue, given India’s insistence on bilateral treatment of the dispute and Pakistan’s preference for a multilateral approach. It is also significant that SAARC is the only one of the eight regional organizations identified here that includes, within its membership, two nuclear powers locked in an adversarial relationship. Yet as Europe demonstrates, the ‘positive logic’ of regional co-operation to reduce the risk of regional conflict can stand as an alternative to the ‘negative logic’ of regional problems precluding regional co-operation. As noted above, the expectation that SAARC might develop a ‘collective security function’ for South Asia 17. A/RES/57/157, 4 March 2003

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Towards a Schematic Model would presume certain positive developments in this region – generating a certain rapprochement between the leading regional powers. This is not impossible, given recent indications of a modification of Indian policy in this respect.18 Many regional and sub-regional organizations, moreover, have broadened from purely economic functions to encompass a security dimension. There is some real prospect that this could occur, with time, in South Asia as well. A first step in this direction could be the creation of a ‘conciliation group’ proposed by Bangladesh in 2005 (see section 5.3.d). – East Asia At some appropriate stage East Asia would need to be invited to form a regional agency for the purpose of Chapter VIII of the Charter. When and if this occurred, China could be expected to take the initiative. The vast population of this region makes it imperative that it be represented separately in terms of a ‘security region’ with an associated responsible agency. The constructive manner in which the four relevant East Asian states are dealing with the Korean WMD crisis suggests that a regional approach to regional problems would hold reasonable prospects for the future. The dispute over Taiwan would need to be resolved before it becomes part of the ‘security region’, but a regional agency could conceivably be formed in advance of a resolution of that dispute, excluding Taiwan (in the same manner that it is currently excluded from UN membership). And the tensions between China and Japan, which wax and wane with time and which have intensified with the issue of Security Council expansion and new permanent membership, would also need to be handled with care if an organizational initiative were to succeed. The expectation that East Asia might develop a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ is, therefore, a major presupposition. It would be prudent to allow as much time to pass as would prove necessary for this to occur. Matters could not be hastened in this respect, given the cultural style of diplomacy in that par18. The Indian Planning Commission, for example, has recently produced a report ‘India: Vision 2020’ which stated: “The competitive security paradigm cannot provide a stable basis for global peace and security. What is needed is a quantum shift from the competitive security paradigm to a co-operative security system in which countries mutually and collectively agree to refrain from acts of aggression and to protect each other from such acts by any nation. We are now at a historical crossroads: one path leads us back to a static, unstable and exclusive competitive security paradigm; the other leads us to a far more stable and dynamic co-operative security paradigm, inclusive of all nations and responsive to future needs and challenges.” ‘India: Vision 2020’ (p. 89)

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: ticular region. Yet in November 2004 China proposed an East Asian Community (albeit including Southeast Asia), envisaging both an economic and a security function, as a medium-term goal.19 (iii) The Complex Case of Europe Identifying the appropriate ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ is particularly difficult for Europe, having regard to the criteria of membership, focal area, mandate and co-operative links with the UN. It would seem, prima facie, to involve a fine judgement to distinguish between the Council of Europe and the European Union in these respects. But in fact the issue does not arise because the EU has made it clear that it sees itself as sui generis and not as a ‘Chapter VIII UN agency’. It is, nonetheless, instructive to apply the criteria to the two organizations. Membership With regard to membership the COE clearly qualifies more genuinely as a pan-European organization. With 46 Member States it has virtually all the European countries – Belarus remains the only country without membership and this will be rectified once its human rights issues are resolved. With Russia included, the ‘European population’ comprises 800 million.20 Without Russia and the three Caucasian states, the population is still nearly 650 million. In contrast, the enlarged EU has 450 million, and represents 25 of the 47 European countries. Although it often speaks informally for associated states (potential applicants and others) it cannot be seen formally as a genuinely pan-European organization; rather a sub-regional one. Some 20 UN Member States from Europe are not represented in the EU and do

th

19. 10 ASEAN Summit, Vientiane, Laos, November 2004. Less attention was paid to th the idea at the 11 ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur in September 2005. 20. Russia, of course, has a large Asian population. In any event, this study suggests that Russia and the three Caucasian states be ‘passive’ members in the European ‘security region’, and act in a separate ‘security region’ – Central Asia-Caucasia. The issue is finely balanced: Russia is active and influential within the COE. Yet the legacy of the past permeates the present. With its expansion from 15 to 25 through the addition of many former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states, the EU comprises a potential majority voting bloc within the COE. There is an increasing tendency for decisions within the COE to be taken by consensus, a trend encouraged not least by Russia.

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Towards a Schematic Model not necessarily see the EU as expressing their national views.21 Focal Area With regard to focal area, the complexities are compounded. Whereas the COE focuses exclusively on Europe, the EU is beginning to offer the UN an executive function in peace-enforcement ‘out-of-area’. While this latter development does not preclude the EU from being seen as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’, it does raise the question of what is the most appropriate function for such agencies. Mandate The mandate issue is also problematic. It is significant that neither the COE nor the EU has a formal internal dispute settlement mechanism – which is taken here as a sine qua non of a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. Nor does either organization have an enforcement mechanism for internal security. Concerning external self-defence, it is also the case that, at present, neither organization has a self-defence provision or mechanism. The COE has disavowed a statutory responsibility for defence.22 The Council interprets this, however, as eschewing the traditional notion of national and collective self-defence against inter-state aggression of the kind that is sanctioned under article 51 of the UN Charter. That was left, during the Cold War days, to NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It does, however, see itself as actively engaged in ‘soft security’ – early warning, conflict prevention, and peace-building. Of special significance, the Council has developed the concept of ‘citizen security’, which is virtually identical with the emerging concept of ‘human security’ that was coined by UNDP in the

21. Member States are now emphasising the scope for co-operation between the two organizations. See, for example, former Norwegian Foreign Minister: “The COE and the EU are based on the same fundamental values – respect for the principles of human rights and the rule of law. They both focus on democratic and economic development as means of promoting stability. The Member States of the enlarged EU make up the majority of the COE’s members, and together have the potential to exert significant influence on the way the COE works. With the new Constitutional Treaty of Europe, we may also be looking at a new institutional relationship with the EU as such. We should take full advantage of the opportunities for closer co-operation this situation presents, taking into account both the increasingly overlapping membership, and the wider geographical scope of the COE”. Jan Petersen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, NUPI Seminar, Oslo, 6 September 2004. 22. “Matters relating to national defence do not fall within the scope of the Council of Europe.” Council of Europe Statute, article 1(d).

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: early 1990s and promoted in the 2002 Ogata-Sen Report.23 The COE, however, does not involve itself in peace-making, peace-keeping or peace-enforcement. In contrast the EU does, as noted in chapter 5, involve itself in all aspects of the UN’s ‘peace agenda’, including a rapid reaction capability for peace-enforcement in out-of-area operations. Its lack of an internal dispute settlement mechanism is due to what is perhaps best described as a ‘philosophical disposition’: all Member States scrupulously regard potential border problems (Northern Ireland) or other conflict situations that could involve other parties (Spain’s Basque territory; Britain’s overseas territory of Gibraltar) as strictly internal matters of a fraternal State. That disposition derives from its raison d’être – namely, unity to avert interstate aggression – which logically precludes it from acknowledging today the possibility of such aggression. While, therefore, it is rapidly developing an effective enforcement capability for crisis management on behalf of the United Nations under chapter VII, it is not statutorily structured to act on internal dispute settlement procedures for the purposes of a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. The EU is also wrestling with the issue of an external self-defence mechanism. The draft EU Constitution contains a self-defence clause with a delphic reference to neutrality policies of some Member States.24 Countries such as Ireland had already taken issue with any implication that the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union might impose binding mutual defence commitments.25 The issue remains subject to further political debate within the context of the future deliberations on the constitution. This issue, however, is not of direct significance to the EU’s rele23. At its Second Summit in October 1997, the COE adopted a ‘Final Declaration’ in which European leaders undertook to intensify the COE’s ‘contribution to cohesion, stability and security in Europe’. The accompanying Action Plan proclaimed four principal goals, one of which was ‘Security of Citizens’ involving, inter alia, counterterrorism, and anti-corruption and anti-crime activities. http://cm.coe.int/sessions/97summit2/x3plan.htm 24. “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain States.” (Article I-41.7) 25. “Ireland confirms that its participation in the EU’s common foreign and security policy does not prejudice its traditional policy of military neutrality. ... In line with [this policy], Ireland is not bound by any mutual defence commitment. Nor is Ireland party to any plans to develop a European army.” National Declaration by Ireland, Seville European Council, Doc. 13463/02, 24 October 2002, Annex III.

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Towards a Schematic Model vance as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’, if it is accepted that a selfdefence mechanism does not preclude an organization from acting in such a capacity. Relations with the UN Both organizations maintain good working relationship with the United Nations. The COE concluded an Agreement for Co-operation with the UN Secretariat in December 1951. This was updated in November 1971 through an exchange of letters between the two Secretaries-General on Arrangements for Co-operation between the Secretariats. Under this agreement high-level contacts are periodically maintained, tripartite UN/COE/OSCE high-level meetings are convened, and expert meetings are held on areas of common interest. Although the COE was granted observer status to the General Assembly in 1989, its seat remained empty for five years and has been filled only intermittently since then. It has no mission at the UN although its Parliamentary Assembly has recently recommended that the Committee of Ministers make ‘concrete proposals’ to rectify this.26 It has attended three of the five UN-Regional High-Level meetings but it did not attend the two Security Council meetings in 2003 and July 2004 (despite an invitation). The 2002 biennial review of UNCOE co-operation became uncharacteristically contentious when the European sponsoring states included calls for support of the international criminal court, abolition of the death penalty and strict observance of human rights in counter-terrorism activities.27 Yet the COE maintains an active engagement with the UN and comments regularly on international peace and security issues. It has been active in conflict prevention and dispute settlement within its focal area,28 and it was vigorous with its views over the Iraq crisis, with the Parliamentary Assembly condemning the coalition’s invasion. The COE Secretary-General established contact with the UN Secretary-General with a view to determining how its expertise in peace-building could be of assistance in Iraq. The Assembly also urged the EU to ‘play a more active part’ in restoring peace and ‘world legal order’, expressing the belief that Europe needed to build cohesion and unity and that the EU needed a common 26. COE Parliamentary Assembly Rec. 1659, 28 April 2004. 27. UNGA resolution A/RES/57/156. The voting on these three items was 109-0-36, 7154-32, and 71-52-33 respectively. Many states explicitly criticised the COE for introducing ‘controversial issues’ into what is normally a consensual item (see UN docs. GA/10123, and A/PV.75, 16 December 2002). 28. In March 2004, for example, the Committee of Ministers urgently appealed for an end to the renewed violence in Kosovo (COM Declaration, 25 March 2004).

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: foreign and security policy.29 The Assembly has also been active on Security Council reform, calling for alterations to permanent membership and the veto, and appealing to its three UN permanent members (France, Russia, UK) to take the lead and show restraint and flexibility in this respect.30 The COE also held a discussion with the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in February 2004. Of particular significance is the interest which the COE Parliamentary Assembly has shown in having the COE accepted as a regional organization under chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In November 1994 it decided to initiate discussion on this matter.31 And as noted earlier (section 4.4.4), in April 1998 it called upon the Committee of Ministers to recognize the COE as ‘a regional organization within the meaning of chapter VIII of the UN Charter, on the basis of its contribution to democratic security in Europe, and the observer status it enjoys in the UN General Assembly’.32 It called upon the Committee to further the dialogue with the UN Secretary-General to achieve ‘maximum synergy’ between the UN and COE ‘in the COE area’.33 To date, however, it appears that the ministerial committee has not pursued this proposal. For its part, the EU has focused on crisis management with the UN for ‘out-of-area’ operations (see section 5.2.d). The potential of the relationship between the EU and the UN in peace and security is considerable. On the 50th anniversary of the UN the EU reaffirmed its attachment to the UN Charter and pledged to support the UN in a Declaration adopted at the European Council in Cannes in June 1995. The EU Joint Declaration on EU-UN Co-operation in Crisis Management of September 2003 set out a framework for closer co-operation in planning, training, communication and best practices. A ‘stand-by model’ will consist of an ‘over-the-horizon’ reserve or an ‘extraction force’ provided by the EU in

29. COE Parliamentary Assembly resolution 1326, 3 April 2003, paras. 11, 26. 30. COE Parliamentary Assembly Rec. 1367, 22 April 1998, para. 3. 31. COE Parliamentary Resolution 1048, 10 November 1994. 32. See fn. 205 (COE Parliamentary Resolution 11367). Also para. 12 of the Resolution: “The Assembly considers that the Council of Europe’s unique experience in the promotion of democratic security – based on democracy, human rights and the rule of law – qualifies it to be regarded as a regional organization for conflict prevention within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Consequently, the Council of Europe should be associated with all forms of co-operation between the United Nations and regional organizations.” 33. Ibid., para. 15 (vi).

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Towards a Schematic Model support of a UN peace operation.34 The EC Communication on EU/UN Relations aims to consolidate international support behind UN objectives and facilitate joint planning and the development of strategic partnerships with specialized agencies.35 The EU Security Strategy Paper of December 2003 highlighted the policy of ‘effective multilateralism’ in which the EU took the UN to be the central component of a future world order. Beyond these formal developments, contact between the UN and the EU is strengthening rapidly. At the UN General Assembly in September 2000 the EU (through French presidency) invited the Secretary-General to meet with EU institutions which he did that month. Continuing contact at ministerial and senior official levels is intensifying. The recent visits to the EU by the UN Secretary-General and senior colleagues reflect the importance the UN is attaching to developing an operational relationship with the EU in peace-enforcement capability. General Considerations Beyond this, the question of European identity is important. The two organizations, for example, share the same flag, conceived and introduced by the COE and subsequently adopted by the EU.36 The suggestion has already been raised of European Olympic athletes and sports teams competing under the European flag.37 Many Europeans affirm that they look forward to the day when the two organizations are united as one. This may not, however, occur since, as noted, they are inherently different kinds of bodies evoking different features of sovereignty. Both are inter-governmental organizations but the EU is an integrative movement 34. Council of the European Union, doc. 9638/1/04, 9 June 2004, para. 13. “This would be of particular relevance”, states the document, “in an African context”. 35. Council of the European Union, doc. 10051/04, 2 June 2004. 36. Since its foundation in 1949, the COE was aware of the need to give Europe a symbol with which its inhabitants could identify. In October 1955 its Parliamentary Assembly adopted a circle of gold stars on a blue background as an emblem, and in December the Committee of Ministers adopted this as the European flag. The Assembly called upon other European institutions to adopt the same symbol in order to strengthen the idea of solidarity between the different organizations in Europe. In 1983 the European Parliament resolved that the European Community’s flag should be that used by the Council of Europe, and in 1985 the European Council gave its approval. The Council of Europe agreed to the use by the Community of the European flag that it had adopted in 1955 and Community institutions have been using it since the beginning of 1986. http://www.coe.int/T/e/Com/About_coe/flag.asp 37. In August 2004 the outgoing Commission President expressed the “hope to see the EU Member State teams in Beijing carry the flag of the European Union alongside their own national flag as a symbol of our unity." This was supported by a number of MEPs. The EU gleaned about one-third of all medals at the Athens Games.

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: while the COE is a co-operative association of states. As was pointed out in the Introduction, integration per se is not a necessary criterion for security regionalism. The UN itself is an association of nation-states with sovereign equality. The other potential ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ are not integrative movements, with the possible exception of the African Union which is consciously modelling itself on the EU. But for the purposes of security regionalism, a streamlined co-operative relationship among regional states is sufficient. The ‘sovereignty threshold’ of the EU is lower than that of the UN and those of all other potential security agencies. In this respect the EU seems to be positioned between a sovereign (supra-) nation-state and an international organization. When it undertakes enforcement ‘out-of-area’, its actions more closely resemble those of a UN Member State. The European Parliament envisages the EU acting as an ‘honorary’ Member State in assuming the British-French permanent membership of the Security Council – thereby implying an institutional role in addition to an executive role. Its aspirations to be a ‘global player’ supporting the United Nations as the central component of an ‘effective multilateralism’ currently run strong, as Box 9.B shows. Such aspirations are generally welcomed throughout the world. But the extent to which this will be realized remains speculation for the future. Thus it could be that the COE might, in due course, qualify as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ while co-operating closely with the EU in this role. But the COE would need to develop a proper pacific dispute settlement mechanism to qualify. For its part, it is likely that the EU has a different, and indeed, unique future as a security partner with the UN including, one day perhaps, a Security Council seat as the European Parliament has proposed. But this would require an evolutionary time-frame, as well.

9.2.3 ‘Passive States’ and ‘Unattached States’ Would the above ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ cover the entire UN membership? And would there be any overlapping of membership between ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’? These issues are considered below. ‘Passive States’ As noted above, in two cases two agencies would have overlapping membership. This would occur between the African Union and the Arab League, and between the Council of Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. It was therefore proposed that the overlapping countries act as ‘passive members’ in one of the agencies. Specifically, the 304

Towards a Schematic Model North African States would remain passive within the AU while being active members of the Arab League. Similarly, the three European members of the CIS would remain passive within the CIS and operate as ‘active members’ within the COE. Is this feasible? The problem of overlapping membership constitutes an unavoidable weakness of any chapter VIII arrangement. Indeed, no sovereign State can be instructed to remain ‘passive’ within an international organization of which it is a full member. To enforce such an arrangement would be constitutionally impossible and could be politically disastrous. In pursuing its vital interests in regional peace and security, a State must be expected to act with more-or-less sovereign freedom. Arab countries of North Africa clearly have a vital stake in the outcome of the Darfur crisis in Sudan, which is the subject primarily of the AU’s attention. They could not be told to remain ‘passive’ in that organization on this issue, for example. Similar considerations pertain to the three European States in the CIS – indeed the headquarters of the CIS is located in one of them (Minsk, Belarus).38 The concept of ‘passivity’ must therefore be taken as a relative term; offering guidance to the ‘overlapping states’ in a second agency. The solution to this problem, to the extent it exists, would lie in the level of cooperation between the adjacent agencies. In the case of Sudan, the LAS appears to be co-operating well with the AU. There is no reason to presume that the same level of co-operation could not obtain between the CIS and the COE. ‘Unattached States’ At present, the nine agencies identified (including one putative body for East Asia) would cover 186 of the 191 UN Member States. Five states stand out of this ‘regional-global mosaic’ – Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, Israel and East Timor. For the present these five States could be acknowledged to have separate ‘reporting rights’ to the Security Council (which are already guaranteed, in any event, under article 35.2 of the Charter). The only obligation upon them in this respect is an advance acceptance of pacific settlement of any dispute in which they might be involved in. Future developments for each case might be as follows: 38. As noted, Belarus is not even a member of the COE as yet but this is likely to be resolved within the foreseeable future.

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: – Afghanistan is likely to remain a conflict situation for some time, while its national security circumstances continue to be complicated by the multiple presence of a UN peace mission, a UN-authorised international force, and a separate military coalition conducting counter-terrorism operations independently of the UN on the basis of ‘selfdefence’. It has close ethnic links to both Central Asia (Tajikistan, a member of CIS) and South Asia (Pakistan, a member of SAARC). It is considered to be geographically a part of South Asia. In fact Afghanistan applied to join SAARC in the 1980s and again in 1990, with India extending support. Following the installation of the new Afghan government in December 2001, SAARC indicated that the application could once again be taken up. It would seem to be simply a matter of time before Afghanistan becomes a member of SAARC. – Belarus applied to join the COE in January 1997 and was granted ‘special guest status’ which was then withdrawn in 1997 on grounds of the COE’s condemnation of its human rights record. Once that issue is resolved, Belarus is likely to become a member. – East Timor (Timor Leste) has been considering whether to join ASEAN or the PIF. Although it is an observer of the latter, full membership is highly unlikely. Although post-independence political sensitivities are high with respect to membership of ASEAN, this is more likely to occur at an appropriate time. – Two states (Iran and Israel) remain virtually sui generis in terms of regional identity. It may be that these two would necessarily retain separate ‘reporting responsibility’ to the Security Council under article 35.2.

9.2.4 The Constitutional Position of the United Nations The procedure by which ‘security regions’ and ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ are identified would itself be problematic. Constitutionally, the United Nations is not empowered under the Charter to engage in such a selection exercise. As noted, the regional organizations have emerged through autochthonous processes that have stood independently of the Charter and answered more closely to needs and aspirations pertaining more directly to particular regions than to considerations of global security. That is not to say that the two are not related or that global and regional security considerations cannot be satisfactorily reconciled in this respect. But it does raise the question of which institutions – the global body through the Security Council or the regional bodies through rele306

Towards a Schematic Model vant organizations – are best placed to take the initiative to develop such an institutional structure. It would seem that the Council is the appropriate body to initiate matters – being empowered under the Charter at least to deal with ‘regional agencies’. But it is not so empowered to ‘direct’ which agencies ‘shall’ form such a structure. The Council could, perhaps, ‘invite’ certain agencies to develop a closer relationship with it for a long-term, vaguely defined purpose. But it should not be seen to be exceeding its own constitutional powers in this respect. The identification of a regional agency for the purposes of a formal ‘regional partnership’ with the United Nations would not be lightly achieved. It would carry considerable political implications and would need to be handled with discretion. Such a step is, however, possible.

Box 9.B ‘Glimpses of the Future’: The EU as a Global Player Excerpts from Recent Policy Statements “As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the World’s Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union is inevitably a global player ... it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world... In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. ... The first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic ... Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early. ... Enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe. Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. .... Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. We are committed to upholding and developing international law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. ... We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention. ... Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world.” ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’ – European Security Strategy Brussels, 12 December 2003 “The challenge currently facing the UN is clear: ‘global governance’ will remain weak if multilateral institutions are unable to ensure effective implementation of their decisions and norms. .... The EU has a particular responsibility in this regard. On the one hand, it has made multilateralism a constant principle of its

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: external relations. On the other, it could and should serve as a model to others in implementing – and even going beyond – its international commitments ... the EU’s ability to act as a ‘front-runner’ [could further develop] its contribution to the effectiveness of multilateral legal instruments and commitments. ‘‘The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of Multilateralism’ European Commission, 10 September 2003 “The European Parliament: ... Notes that the success of global governance, in the face of the challenges posed by growing globalisation and interdependence, can only be based on an effective and fair multilateral system unequivocally anchored in the United Nations, and will depend on ... promoting the active participation of regional organizations; ... Urges EU Member States to reach agreement on the institutional reform of the UN system ... and increasing the composition of the Security Council (permanent and non-permanent members), which should better reflect the current situation in the world, including the European Union, as a permanent member, as soon as its legal personality is recognised, as well as a supplementary permanent seat for each of the following regions: Africa, Asia and Latin America” European Parliament Resolution, adopted 29 January 2004 Res. 2003/2049 (INI)

9.3 Implications for Security Council Reform The identification of ‘security regions’ and ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ could have implications for Security Council reform – through affecting future Council membership.

9.3.1 Security Council Reform: The Debate The question of UN Security Council reform has been under consideration for ten years now, the relevant Working Group submitting annual progress reports to the General Assembly since 1993. The General Assembly decided that any decision on equitable representation or enlarged membership would require a two-thirds majority.39 The Millennium Summit in 2000 resolved to ‘intensify our efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects’.40 Work during 39. A/RES/53/30, 1 December 1998 40. A/RES/55/2, 18 September 2000, para. 30

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Towards a Schematic Model 2004 focused on six issues, viz: enlargement; membership criteria; regional representation; relationship with the General Assembly; accountability; and the veto. Progress in all issues has been slow. The two fundamental propositions of this study pertaining to ‘security regionalism’ – the identification of ‘security regions’ and ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ – hold potential implications for two of these six issues in particular, namely, Security Council size and regional representation. These are explored below. (a ) Enlargement The representative nature of the Council has steadily declined since the UN’s first days, as Table 9.C shows: Table 9.C The Declining Representative Nature of the Security Council Year

UNSC Members

UN Members

Ratio

Percentage

1946 1963 2005

11 15 15

51 112 191

1:5 1:8 1:13

21% 13% 8%

At its last discussion on the subject in October 2003, some 49 Member States expressed views on the issues of enlarged membership with a view to making the Council ‘more representative’ and ‘enhancing the legitimacy and credibility of its actions’. Long-standing differences remained, however, over which categories of membership should be expanded and on what terms. Two issues have been debated in the Working Group: optimum size and representative nature: – Proposals on optimum size range from 20 to 30, having regard to efficiency and effectiveness. It was often suggested that the desired ratio should be that obtaining in 1963; i.e. one for every eight Member States (implying 24 Council Members). The most frequently suggested numbers ranged from 24 to 26. – The ‘general view’ was that the Council is not reflective of the current membership of the UN, and that a more representative Council would enhance its authority. Disagreement continues to exist, however, over whether an enlarged Council should include more permanent members. The granting of the veto to such new permanent members is also contentious. Some sugges309

Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: tions have been advanced that the ratio of permanent to non-permanent members should continue to be 1:3 or perhaps 1:4. This would result in an expanded Council membership of 24 or 26 with three or four extra permanent members. (b) Regional Representation The anachronistic nature of the current electoral grouping has already been noted in this study. It is generally recognized that a new electoral system is needed, although many privileged national interests resist such a trend. Specific proposals have been made on a variety of different notions of ‘region’ involving new regions. One of the alternative formulae put forward within the United Nations deliberations has involved the idea of regional representation – not ‘direct representation’ in the form of a regional agency but ‘indirect representation’ through a Member State (the specific state changing through rotation) representing a region.41 Five seats have been proposed, for example, for each of Africa, Asia, Latin America/Caribbean, Europe and the Arab group. Agreement, however, is proving to be elusive on this issue as well (see Box 9.C)

9.3.2 Implications of ‘Security Regionalism’ for Council Reform The implications of ‘security regionalism’ are explored in the Annex to this chapter. In short, the identification of (nine) ‘security regions’ and associated ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ could constitute a particular way of handling the electoral dimension of a future expanded Security Council. Considerations of ‘state representation’ and ‘population representation’ would be greatly improved through such a method. The UN High-Level Panel’s references to regionalism, referred to in chapter 2 have brought to the surface the possibilities of future global-regional collaboration between the UN and regional organizations. The General Assembly could consider exploring the implications of regionalism for Security Council reform, through providing an electoral framework through the ‘chapter VIII agencies’, membership to be filled by individual Member States representing the agencies on a rotational basis. 41. See, for an elaboration of the permutations suggested: ‘Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council’, A/57/47 (2003), especially pp. 11-15.

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Towards a Schematic Model One possible solution may be found in reviving the regional structure of the UN Security Council that was present in the first full draft of the UN Charter in October 1942 (see section 2.1.1). Today, however, the world mosaic, fully formed in a universal nation-state grid, would allow for more than the seven regions as identified in the early 1940s. The ‘amorphous entities’ that elicited the US President’s concern in those earlier times are now independent regions with robust organizations.

9.3.3 The High-Level Panel and the 60th General Assembly Session As is well-known, the international community failed during 2005 to agree on the size of an enlarged Security Council or the method by which any such enlargement would be determined. The insidious effect of national rivalries ensured the failure of any enlargement formulae. This will always be the case so long as an expansion of the Council rests on permanent national membership. It will be misguided to undertake any further attempt at Council enlargement on the basis of permanent national membership. Once the political dust settles from the failed 2005 attempt, serious consideration should be given to a qualitatively different approach to the goal of an enlarged Security Council – namely, through a regional approach. One such approach is set out in the Annex.

Box 9.C Regionalism and Security Council Reform: The Interface between National Interest and the ‘Common Interest’ “17. All five current regional groups in the UN were mentioned during the discussion in relation to an enlarged Security Council. Additionally, proposals were made for other groupings to be represented. Views were also expressed on some specific aspects of groupings. Some delegations were of the view that the system of regional groups now in place did not reflect current geo-political realities. 18. Specific comments were made on the meaning of the term ‘regional representation’ in the course of the discussion. Some delegations expressed the view that that terms ‘regional representation’ and ‘equitable geographical distribution’ were identical and were therefore interchangeable. These delegations expressed preference for use of the latter term. 19. Other delegations understood the term ‘regional representation’ to be different from the concept of ‘equitable geographical distribution’ contained in ar-

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: ticle 23.1 of the Charter. They indicated that the Charter did not make reference to ‘regional groups’, questioned the meaning of the term ‘regional representation’ and cautioned against its use. In this context, proposals were made for representation of the Middle East and the Pacific in an enlarged Security Council. 20. Some delegations also suggested that, as the Arab group had proposed several years ago, that group should have one permanent seat or two non-permanent seats on the Council. Some delegations considered the Western European and Other States Group (WEOG) and the Eastern European States Group to be anachronistic, given the increasingly close institutional linkages between Western and Eastern Europe. 21. Some delegations were of the view that regional representation should be based on the current system of regional groups. It was also proposed that there might be an expansion in the numbers of permanent seats for industrialized States and developing States as categories. It was proposed, in that regard, that two permanent seats might be for industrialized States and three permanent seats for developing countries, and these seats might be allocated on the basis of equitable geographical representation. 22. The notion of ‘regional representation’ was challenged by some delegations in respect of membership of the Council. A number of delegations were of the view that the non-permanent members of the Council, although elected on a regional basis, did not represent their respective regions. Rather, as members of the Security Council, they should have a global role and an obligation to the international community as a whole. 23. The view was also expressed that, given the growing importance of regional organizations in dealing with matters of international peace and security, they should be permitted increased participation in the decision-making process of the Security Council. 24. Some delegations suggested that permanent seats might be established for regional groups, and that Member States of the group might hold these seats on a rotational basis similar to the system of rotation practised by the African and Arab States. A number of delegations stressed that if rotation was applied within a group, it should be ensured that no country in that group was excluded. Some delegations contended that, since each region had its own characteristics, the rotation model could perhaps function for certain regional groups, while not being applicable to other regional groups. A number of delegations were of the view that the idea of rotating permanent membership of the Security Council needed to be further explored.” Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council – August 2004

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Towards a Schematic Model The idea of ‘regional seats’ on the Council, filled by Member States on behalf of a region and in accordance with the decisions of that region, is gaining new ground, as the European Parliament’s resolution illustrates (see Box 9.B). But as has been succinctly noted, reform of the Security Council depends on a Catch-22 situation in which assent is required of those with vested interests (see Box 9.D). Box 9.D UN Security Council Reform: Regional Membership? “Can reforming the composition or procedures of the UN Security Council improve its authority? In the recent and ongoing controversy surrounding a possible imprimatur for military action against Iraq, the debate over the Council’s credibility shifted from the question of adequate representation to whether the group can constrain US power. In this context, few still argue that the Council, in which Africa, Latin America and the Islamic World have no permanent voice, can genuinely speak for the international community. Yet despite the geographical representation of the ten elected members, the Security Council remains imbalanced in favour of the industrialised North. That little has changed over the past half-century is testimony to the durability of a structure in which those who benefit most from the status quo also hold the keys to its transformation.” Dr. David Malone, President, International Peace Academy 24 May 2004

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Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security:

Annex to Chapter 9

Regionalism in the Security Council: A Vision for 2010

This Annex explores the implications of introducing ‘security regionalism’ and ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ for UN Security Council reform. In particular it explores the potential improvement for Council legitimacy and authority that might be gained by adopting the representative role of ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ (as has been advanced in this chapter). One ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ would be assigned responsibility for its ‘security region’ vis-à-vis the Council. The ‘security regions’, the ‘chapter VIII agencies’, and the corresponding composition of the Security Council membership are apparent in the tables below. Comparison of Current Electoral Mechanism with a ‘Chapter VIII Regional Agency’ Arrangement Table I below compares the current electoral mechanism at the United Nations with the mechanism that would be used under a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ arrangement. It is clear that greater clarity in regional membership would obtain from a new arrangement of this sort. The 17 East European and 23 West European States would be grouped in the one ‘region’. The Arab States would be grouped in the one ‘region’ rather than split between Africa and Asia. The two North American States would be grouped in the Americas rather than with ‘Western Europe and Others’. And the two South Pacific States currently grouped in ‘Western Europe and Others’ would be grouped in the Pacific.

314

Towards a Schematic Model Annex: Table I Comparison of Current and ‘Chapter VIII’ Electoral Mechanisms Current Electoral Groupings Chap. VIII Regional Agencies. Sub-Sahara Africa North Africa- West Asia Europe Central Asia-Caucasia South Asia East Asia Southeast Asia Pacific Americas Unattached Total

Africa Asia Eastern Western Latin Ameri- UnconEurope Europe can and Ca- nected and Others ribbean States 44 10

11 5 7 5 10 10

54

3 51

17 4

1 22

24

2 2 1 29

242 33 33

2

Implications of the ‘Chapter VIII Regional Agency’ Arrangement for Security Council Reform Table II.A shows the current Council membership of 15 States based on the current electoral mechanism, compared with an enlarged Council of 24 States in Tables II.B and II.C.43 Table II.B is based on the two models offered by the UN High-Level Panel, while Table II.C is based on the ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ mechanism advanced in this paper. Because the expanded Security Council size depicted in the Table is 24 (and not 25), this places greater pressure on the number of regional agencies that might be represented for electoral purposes. Thus, although the Pacific was identified as one of the ‘nine security regions’ in the study, the Pacific Islands Forum would need to be twinned with ASEAN for electoral purposes, making eight ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ identified for electoral purposes in a Council of 24 in Table II.C. Given that no agreement was reached on the matter, it may be that final agreement 42. Two states (Kiribati and Palau) do not belong to any electoral group. 43. For the purpose of analysis, Table A shows the current membership based on the postulated eight ‘security regions’, not reflecting the current electoral mechanism of five groupings observed in the UN since 1963 (viz. Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Western Europe & Others, and Latin American/ Caribbean).

315

Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: will settle on a Security Council of 25. In that event, the Pacific would be accorded a separate ‘seat’. In analysing the data, two criteria are employed for each ‘security region’: – The first criterion pertains to Member States. It shows, first, the number of States per Council seat; and then calculates the ‘regional state spread’ (RSS), i.e. the range in the number of regional States per Council seat for each region; – The second criterion pertains to national populations in the context of the global population. It shows, first, the population size per Council seat; and then calculates the ‘regional population spread’ (RPS), i.e. the range in the average population size for each Council seat for each region. Council Expansion from 15 to 24 Members The implications of the criteria are far-reaching. The comparison shows that, compared with the present Security Council that was elected for 2004 under the current electoral group mechanism, considerable improvements will be achieved in both the RSS and the RPS if the Council is expanded to 24 members. Specifically: – the RSS improves from 19 States today (Table II.A) to 12 in the case of eight regions in Table II.C; and improves further to 3.5 in the case of four regions in Table II.B; and – the RPS improves from 1.35 billion today (Table II.A) to 476 million with the Panel’s two models (Table II.B) and, even better, to 385 million in the case of the eight ‘security regions’. Regional Implications of Four and Eight ‘Regions’ The comparisons are more complicated between the UN Panel’s two models (Table II.B) and the eight ‘security regions’ proposed in this study (Table II.C). Specifically: – In the Panel’s scenario, Asia-Pacific is disadvantaged through having an average population per Council seat of 612 m. compared with the other three regions whose populations are closely grouped around 140 m. When eight ‘security regions’ are identified, Asia-Pacific is offered a more democratic representation (with East Asia at 494 m. and South Asia at 343 m., compared with other regions ranging from 109 m. to 281 m.); – The RSS has a greater range in the case of eight regions because the number of East Asian and South Asian States is so few. But this is compensated for by their huge population sizes, and it is the demo316

Towards a Schematic Model cratic dimension of the RPS that should carry greater import in Council representation. Cultural and Strategic Implications of ‘Regionality’ In addition to the statistical dimension identified above, the cultural and strategic considerations are of critical importance. The Panel’s four regions take no account of the existing regional organizations – with a number of such agencies being included within the Asia-Pacific region. With only four large regions identified, there is no indication as to any sub-regional allocation. Nor does it accord recognition to the cultural and institutional fact of the Arab world. In comparison, the nine ‘security regions’ advanced in this study adopt the same regional identification for Africa, Europe and the Americas (and by implication regional agencies); but also perceives Asia-Pacific to be composed of an additional five agencies (plus the PIF) rather than simply one region and agency for Asia. In this way, the strategic and cultural aspects of the Arab world, and Central, South, East and Southeast Asia plus the Pacific are taken into account. There is, nonetheless, still scope for sub-regional allocation where appropriate. The merits of the alternative models of security regionalism will need to be thought through carefully over the next year. Whatever the final decisions may be, it seems that ‘security regionalism’ will become a potent factor in any future agreement on Security Council reform. Under the scenarios of nine ‘security regions’ and eight represented agencies advanced in this Annex, however, the influence of ‘security regionalism’ is carried several steps further, based on the following considerations: – ‘Security regions’ would each have separate and distinct identity; – Chapter VIII of the Charter would be given substantive meaning in peace and security, commensurate with the increasing reliance now being given to regional agencies; – There would be no need for expanded permanent membership on a national basis, since permanency for major States could be ensured in a de facto manner through wider and more equitable regional representation. – The ‘regional-global security mechanism’ envisioned by the UN Secretary-General would gain realisation through an expanded Council structured more formally along regional lines. Relationship between Regional and Sub-Regional Agencies The relationship between the ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ and sub-regional agencies would need to be clarified. As noted the UN Charter is si317

Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security: lent on sub-regional agencies, the current practice being simply to group them as if no formal distinction needs to be made. This tends to confuse the relationship between the true regional agencies and the other organizations. In an arrangement involving ‘security regionalism’, it would be left to the designated ‘responsible agencies’ to relate to their sub-regional bodies according to their own judgement. The UN Security Council would have no direct input into this; and, accordingly, no direct relationship with the sub-regional bodies themselves – a departure from the current practice. This would accord due responsibility to the regional agencies for their regions – in line with the original intent of the framers of the Charter. The sub-regionals, in turn, would be responsible to their ‘regional parent’. Thus, it would be left to each regional agency to determine how sub-regional representation would be handled in terms of UN Security Council membership. Thus, for example: – In an expanded Security Council the AU might choose to accord one Council seat to each of the four relevant sub-regions and sub-regional agencies: to ECOWAS for West Africa, IGAD for East Africa, ECCAS for Central Africa and SADC for Southern Africa. The fifth, North Africa, would be represented by the Arab League (LAS). – The LAS might choose to accord one seat to the Maghreb Union and one seat to the GCC and the Mashreq countries together. – The COE would no doubt accord its two seats to the two permanent members – France and the UK. At present, Europe is ‘over-represented’ on the Council with an additional three non-permanent seats, resulting in the lowest population spread of all (129 m., 31% of the global average). An expanded Council would give scope for only one non-permanent seat. Given its favoured position with the status quo, Europe might perceive the future situation to be less conducive to its interests. Is this arrangement fair and just for Europe? This simply reflects the privileged place the region has had within the UN structure since its inception. If population is to be taken as a major consideration for the 21st century, some provision for change needs to be entered. The average population depicted in Table II.C shows that, in the new structure envisaged, Europe would still remain relatively privileged (214 million per country compared with 494 million in East Asia). – The CIS would no doubt accord one seat permanently to Russia and, in an expanded Council, one further seat to the rest of the membership. 318

Towards a Schematic Model – SAARC countries would be freer to share one or, in an expanded Council, four seats among its membership – few Member States but with sizeable populations. – The same obtains with East Asia, comprising only five states but vast population size – with China on a permanent basis and two other Member States. It would still have the highest population representation – twice the global average. – Southeast Asia and the Pacific would share in one seat on the current Council, and two on an expanded Council of 24 (but three seats on a Council of 25). – The Americas would no doubt share four seats in an expanded Council, with the US on a permanent basis and one perhaps to Canada/Caribbean, one to Central America and one to South America. The above scenario would mark a radical departure from the current electoral groupings of the United Nations. But those groupings have never enjoyed any formal status of any kind. What has developed informally during the 20th century can be changed to suit the realities of the 21st century.

319

320 110 6,165

5 191

35

847

Unattached Total/average RSS47 RPS

24

561

ASEAN / PIF46 OAS

5

9 7

Southeast Asia / Pacific Americas

218 1,373

43 21 42

1,481

CIS SAARC

Central Asia-Caucasia South Asia

643 289 643

East Asia45

AU LAS COE44

15

3

1

1

1 1

2 1 5

19

11.7

24

5

9 7

21.5 21 8.4

1,352

– 411

282

561

1,481

218 1,373

322 289 129

Responsible S. R. Popula- No. of ReNo. of ‘Regional Spread’: UNSC Agency tion gional States UNSC Seats seats per (million) States Populatn. per seat per seat (m.)

Sub-Sahara Africa North Africa-West Asia Europe

Security Region (S. R.)

Table II.A Current Size (15 Members) - 2004 Membership)

Annex: Table II [Summary] Possible Regional Responsibility in the Security Council

5

USA

China

Russia

France, UK

P-5

Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security:

44. Excluding Russia and the three Caucasian states 45. For representation purposes at the UN, Taiwan is not seen as a UN constituent Member State. 46. Excluding Cook Islands and Niue, not being UN Member States (whose combined populations total some 22,000). 47. These ranges reflect absolute differences only, between maximum and minimum figures.

Unattached Total/Average RSS RPS 6,165

847

Americas

832 3,673

S. R. Populatn. (million)

813

Responsi-ble Agency48

Europe

Africa Asia and the Pacific

Security Region (S. R.)

191

35

47

53 56

No. of Regional States

24

6

6

6 6

No. of UNSC Seats

3.5

5.8

7.8

8.8 9.3

476

– 257

141

136

139 612

‘Regional Spread’: UNSC seats per States Population per seat per seat (m.)

11

2 3– China + 2 4 – Fr, UK, Russia + 1 2– USA + 1

Model A P5+P6

5 P + 8 SP

France, UK & Russia + 2 SP USA + 2 SP

0 P + 2 SP China + 2 SP

Model B P5 only

Permanent Members

Table II.B Expanded Size (24 members) – Models A and B Presented by the UN HLP

Towards a Schematic Model

48. The High Level Panel has not pursued the issue of responsible agency.

321

322 CIS SAARC

Central Asia-Caucasia South Asia East Asia Southeast Asia / Pacific America Unattached Total/average RSS RPS OAS

ASEAN / PIF

AU LAS COE49

Responsible Agency

Sub-Sahara Africa North Africa-West Asia Europe

Security Region (S. R.)

847 110 6,165

218 1,373 1,481 561

643 289 643

35 5 191

9 7 5 24

43 21 42

4 – 24

2 4 3 2

4 2 3

S. R. Popula- No. of Regional No. of tion States UNSC Seats (million)

49. Excluding Russia and the three Caucasian states 12.0

8.8

4.5 1.8 1.7 12.0

10.8 10.5 14

385

212 – 257

109 343 494 281

161 145 214

‘Regional Spread’: UNSC seats per States Populatn. per seat Per seat (m.)

P-5

5

USA

China

France, UK Russia

Table II.C Expanded Size (24 Members) – Based on 8 ‘Security Regions’ and ‘Chapter VIII Security Agencies’

Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security:

642.8 289.0 643.1 217.6 1,373.1 1,503.0 529.5 30.9 847.2 110.7 6,186.9

S. R. Population (million) 43 21 42 9 7 5 10 14 35 5 191

No. of Regional States

Both in the regions of Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, the numbers only refer to the security region, and not to regional organization membership, for they are larger than the regions themselves. Comparisons can be drawn from the tables below, which differentiate ‘active’ from ‘passive’ states for the concept of ‘security region’. ** In the case of East Asia, there is no regional agency; this number refers to a suggested regional agency. *** The last row shows the countries that are exceptions; still not included in any regional agency.

AU* Arab League Council of Europe* CIS SAARC No Regional Agency** ASEAN PIF OAS Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, Israel, East-Timor***

Sub-Sahara Africa North Africa-West Asia Europe Central Asia-Caucasia South Asia East Asia Southeast Asia Pacific Americas Unattached States Totals

*

Responsible Agency

‘Security Region’ (S.R.)

Annex: Table II [Details] Possible Regional Responsibility in the Security Council

Towards a Schematic Model

323

324

China (including Taiwan) Japan Korea, DPR Korea, R. Total 5 States

States

Population 9.9 4.3 48.7 280.5

Passive States Belarus Moldova Ukraine Total 12 States Total 7 States

Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri-Lanka

135.7 0.9 1,048.3 0.3 24.1 144.9 19.0

1,373.1

1281.0 + 22.3 = 1303.3 127.1 22.5 47.6 1503.0

Population (m)

East Asia – No Regional Agency

3.1 8.2 5.2 14.8 5.0 144.1 6.3 5.5 25.4 217.6

529.5

0.4 12.5 211.7 5.5 24.3 48.9 79.9 4.2 61.6 80.5

Afghanistan Belarus Iran Israel Timor Leste Total 5 States

States

Total 10 States

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

Unattached States

Total 14 States

28.0 9.9 65.5 6.5 0.8 110.7

Population

30.9

19.6 0.1 0.8 0.1 0.0 3.9 0.0 5.4 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2

Population (m)

Pacific Region Regional Agency – PIF Australia F.S. Micronesia Fiji Kiribati Nauru New Zealand Palau Papua New Guinea Marshal Islands Samoa Solomon Islands Tonga Tuvalu Vanuatu

Population (m) States

Southeast Asia Regional Agency – ASEAN

Population (m) States

South Asia Regional Agency – SAARC

Population (m) States

Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgystan Russia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 9 States

States

Central Asia-Caucasia Regional Agency – CIS

Security Regions

Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security:

Angola Benin Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon Cape Verde Central Afr. R. Chad Congo Congo D.R. Côte d’Ivoire Equat. Guinea Eritrea Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana Guinea Bissau Guinea Conakry Kenya Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi

Active states

13.9 6.6 1.7 11.8 7.0 15.5 0.5 3.8 8.1 3,.2 53.8 16.8 0.5 4.3 67.3 1.31 1.4 20.1 1.3 7.7 31.3 2.1 3.3 16.4 10.7

Algeria Bahrain Comoros Djibouti Egypt Iraq Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Mauritania Morocco Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Somalia Sudan Syria Tunisia U.A.E. Yemen Total 21 States 289.0

31.3 0.7 0.6 0.7 66.4 24.3 5.2 2.1 4.4 5.5 2.8 29.6 2.3 0.6 22.1 9.4 32.4 17.0 9.8 3.0 18.6

Antigua & B. Argentina Bahamas Barbados Belize Bolivia Brazil Canada Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Dominica Dominic. R. Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala Guyana Haiti Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama

0.1 37.9 0.3 0.3 0.3 8.7 174.5 31.4 15.6 43.7 3.9 11.3 0.1 8.6 13.1 6.5 0.1 12,0 0.8 8.2 6.8 2.6 100.9 5.4 2.9

Albania Andorra Austria Belgium Bosnia & H. Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech Rep Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Latvia Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Moldova

3.2 0.1 8.1 10.3 4.1 7.9 4.4 0.8 10.2 5.4 1.4 5.2 59.4 82.5 10.6 10.2 0.3 3.9 57.9 2.3 0.0 3.5 0.4 0.4 4.3

Population (mil)

European Region Regional Agency – CoE

Population (m) Active States

The Americas Regional Agency – OAS

Population (mil) States

North Africa-West Asia Regional Agency – LAS

Population (mil) Active states

Sub-Sahara Africa Regional Agency – AU

Towards a Schematic Model

325

326

Mali Mauritius Mozambique Namibia Niger Nigeria Rwanda S. Tome & Prin. Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone South Africa Swaziland Tanzania Togo Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe 43 states

Active states

11.3 1.2 18.4 1.8 11.5 132.8 8.2 0.2 100 0.1 5.2 43.6 1.1 35.2 4.8 23.4 10.5 13.0 642.8

Paraguay Peru S. Kitts & N Saint Lucia S. Vincent G. Suriname Trinidad & T. US Uruguay Venezuela Total 35 States 847.2

5.5 26.7 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 1.3 288.4 3.4 25.1

Monaco Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania San Marino Serbia & M. Slovak Rep Slovenia Spain Sweden Switzerland FYR Macedonia Turkey Ukraine UK 42 States

0.03 16.1 4.5 38.6 10.0 22.4 0.0 10.7 5.4 2.0 41.2 8.9 7.2 2.1 69.6 48.7 58.9 643.1

Population (mil)

European Region Regional Agency – CoE

Population (m) Active States

The Americas Regional Agency – OAS

Population (mil) States

North Africa-West Asia Regional Agency – LAS

Population (mil) Active states

Sub-Sahara Africa Regional Agency – AU

Clarifying Regionalism within Collective Security:

801.7

Population 31.3 0.6 0.7 66.4 5.5 2.8 9.4 32.4 9.8

Population (mil) Active states Passive States Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Russia Total 45 States

803.6

Population 3.1 8.2 5.2 144.1

Population (mil)

European Region Regional Agency – CoE

Population (m) Active States

The Americas Regional Agency – OAS

Population (mil) States

North Africa-West Asia Regional Agency – LAS

* Cuba remains a member of OAS, but its Government has been excluded from participation in the Organization since 1962. Source: World Bank (data from 2002); World Bank Development Indicators Database, July 2003

Passive States Algeria Comoros Djibouti Egypt Libya Mauritania Somalia Sudan Tunisia Total 52 States

Active states

Sub-Sahara Africa Regional Agency – AU

Towards a Schematic Model

327

10. Recommendations for a Future ‘RegionalGlobal Security Mechanism’ “In April 2003... I argued that we needed to move towards creating a network of effective and mutually reinforcing mechanisms – regional and global – that would be both flexible and responsive to the complex reality we face today ... This meeting is, I believe, evidence that we are serious about implementing those proposals.” H. E. Kofi Annan UN Secretary-General July 2004

Based on the foregoing analysis this study identifies three key areas of recommendations for a future ‘regional-global security mechanism’: – Greater constitutional clarity in the regional-global relationship, – Refinement and implementation of the guiding principles for functional co-operation between the regional agencies (and other organizations) and the Security Council; and – Reformulation of some of the fundamental principles and doctrinal precepts of the multilateral security system with due regional input. Each of these issues – constitutional clarity, functional co-operation and doctrinal reformulation – is considered below.

10.1 Constitutional Clarity In the course of the five high-level meetings the United Nations has had over the past ten years, effort has been given to developing guiding principles for governing the relationship between the UN and regional organizations. But these principles pertain primarily to the functional rela329

Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ tionship (co-operation ‘in the field’). These ‘functional principles’, moreover, apply primarily to the ‘soft security’ operations (prevention, pacific settlement, peacekeeping and peace-building). While this is a necessary condition of an effective mutually-reinforcing mechanism, the area most in need of improvement today is in the broader constitutional relationship. There is a need to clarify the meaning and application of the Charter provisions, and the intent of the Charter’s framers, in forging the continual development of the regional-global institutional relationships. This is most important particularly in the area of ‘hard security’ (enforcement action). The rather haphazard organizational growth of the international system, understandable in an historical sense, is in need of some clarification and order, for the mechanism to become more effective in the 21st century. The three ‘fundamental propositions’ of this study are contained in the set of recommendations below, namely, Recommendations 1, 2 and 9. Recommendation 1. Identification of ‘Security Regions’ The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council, could identify specific and separate ‘security regions’ for the regional-global security mechanism – that do not overlap and which encompass virtually every UN Member State.

Recommendation 2. Identification of ‘Chapter VIII Regional Agencies’ The General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Security Council, could identify one ‘responsible regional agency’ for each ‘security region’ whose membership is coterminous with the States located in the ‘security region’ and which are accorded special ‘chapter VIII responsibilities’ – each to be regarded as a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’. These two recommendations would form the essential structure of a future ‘regional-global security mechanism’. Such an arrangement would accord two special roles to the ‘responsible regional agencies’: permanent representation on the Council (without veto rights) for Member State elections to the Council; and a special reporting role for all matters relating to peace and security under the purview of the Council. This arrangement would acknowledge existing sub-regional agencies engaged in security and peace activities also as ‘Security Council partners’ 330

Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ in the network of organizations comprising the ‘regional-global security mechanism’. But it would require that each sub-regional agency proceed through a parent regional agency (a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’) in its dealings with the Security Council. The arrangement would also acknowledge other designated cross-regional and trans-national organizations as ‘Security Council Partners’ (see Recommendation 3). These organizations, however, would not be a component part of the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ for the purposes of chapter VIII; engaging their activities with the Council under chapters VI, VII and IX of the Charter. The above two initiatives could be undertaken by the Security Council within its current powers and without any necessary Charter amendment. At some stage in the longer-term, consideration might be given to whether the designated ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ should become an integral part of the United Nations system, as is the case with specialised agencies. Recommendation 3. Acceptance of Selected Organizations as ‘UN Partners for Peace’ The Security Council could introduce an arrangement of ‘UN Partners for Peace’ with the designated agencies of ‘security regions’, and other selected international organizations. A ‘Partners for Peace’ arrangement could be established by the Security Council, along the lines suggested by the OSCE in the first Security Council meeting of April 2003 (see section 2.3.3.a). This would accord a special status to those organizations that are admitted to the ‘Partnership’. Such an arrangement has been utilised by other organizations. The United Nations might use the terminology contained in article 52 of ‘regional agencies’ and ‘regional arrangements’, in preference to ‘regional organizations’, in order to remain in conformity with the Charter. It could develop criteria, to be laid down by the General Assembly, for accepting regional agencies and arrangements as ‘partners in peace’. The threshold should be observer status at the General Assembly but under a special category of ‘regional agency and arrangement’. A ‘UN-Regional Partnership for Peace’ would be aimed at the ability of the responsible regional agencies, and also cross-regional and trans-national organizations to act effectively in concert with the Security Council in conflict prevention and management, enforcement and post-con331

Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ flict peace-building. This could include joint operations, in which DPKO could initiate plans for inter-operability, and also a system of permanent financial mechanisms for regional peace operations. A protocol or declaration could be adopted, as an annex to a General Assembly resolution, for the above arrangement. A possible draft for such an arrangement is set out in Box 10.A. Some difficult issues, however, are raised in such an exercise. The draft suggests, for example, that the Security Council could request enforcement action by a sub-regional agency through a ‘parent regional agency’ but that in doing so it should not normally proceed against the advice of the regional agency (paragraph 5). This raises the sensitive issue of the relationship between regional and sub-regional agencies and their respective powers. An alternative approach could be to confine enforcement action to regional agencies alone, empowering sub-regional agencies to undertake only pacific settlement action under chapter VI and peace-building activities under chapter IX. Similar sensitivities arise for cross-regionals and trans-nationals. The draft suggests that the Security Council might authorise these organizations to undertake enforcement action, but that before doing so it should consult with the regional agency on the merits of such an action, and should not proceed against the latter’s advice. A stronger formulation of this norm would be an understanding that the Security Council should only proceed in this fashion on the basis of a resolution by the ‘responsible regional agency’ requesting it to authorise such an action by a crossregional or trans-national organization. It may be, for example, that the LAS or the CIS would have their own views on the merits of NATO undertaking enforcement action in Palestine, Iraq, or Georgia or Tajikistan. The OAS may be divided over similar action in the Caribbean. Box 10.A Elements of a ‘Partnership for Peace’ Protocol 1. For the purposes of chapter VIII of the UN Charter: (i) A regional agency is an intergovernmental organization whose active membership is confined to states within one of the following nine ‘security regions’: Sub-Saharan Africa; the Arabic-speaking group of states of North Africa and West Asia; Europe; Central Asia – Causasia, South Asia; East Asia; Southeast Asia; Pacific; America. There will be one responsible agency for each of the nine ‘security regions’. (ii) A regional arrangement is an intergovernmental agreement whose parties are confined to states within any one of the above ‘security regions’.

332

Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ 2. A regional agency may make application to the president of the General Assembly to be granted observer status as a ‘Regional Partner for Peace’. The granting of such observer status is a condition of participating in the Partners for Peace arrangement as a regional agency under chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The Security Council will refer to a ‘responsible regional agency’ for consultation on any matter pertaining to the maintenance of peace and security within the ‘security region’ for which it is responsible. The Council will call upon it, and through it an appropriate sub-regional agency, for the pacific settlement of any dispute within a region or sub-region. 3. Trans-national organizations and cross-regional agencies may also participate in the Framework but shall not act as regional agencies under chapter VIII. These may include organizations whose statutory objectives involve security co-operation, collective defence, law enforcement, or political, cultural or religious identity. Their partnership status would be dependent upon acceptance by the President of the General Assembly, on advice from the Credentials Committee, as an observer in the capacity of a trans-national organization. Such organizations will act, as appropriate to their statutory provisions, in partnership with the United Nations in pacific settlement and peacekeeping under chapter VI, enforcement under chapter VII and peace-building under chapter XI. 4. Sub-regional agencies may participate in specific deliberations and undertake specific activities within the Framework upon the invitation of the regional agency of any of the ‘security regions’ within which their sub-region is located. 5. The Security Council may, in accordance with chapter VIII, article 53, call upon a ‘responsible regional agency’ to undertake enforcement action on its behalf, under the provisions of chapter VII. No regional agency may undertake, or be called upon to undertake, enforcement action outside its own ‘security region’. The Security Council may, through a ‘responsible regional agency’, also request a sub-regional agency to undertake enforcement action within its sub-region, but the Security Council should not, other than in exceptional circumstances, proceed with such a request against the advice of the regional agency. No regional or sub-regional agency will undertake enforcement action unless and until it has received a formal communication from the President of the Security Council through the Secretary-General. That communication shall be based on an authorising Security Council resolution adopted under chapter VII of the Charter. 6. The Security Council may authorise a cross-regional or trans-national agency to undertake enforcement action on its behalf in any ‘security region’ under chapter VII of the Charter. Before authorising such action, the Council shall consult with the responsible regional agency on the merits of such an action, having regard to the particular historical, cultural, and religious traditions of the region. The Security Council should not, other than in exceptional circumstances, proceed with such a request against the advice of the regional agency. It may recommend joint operational action by a regional agency with a cross-regional, trans-national agency or sub-regional agency.

333

Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ Recommendation 4. Constitutional Principles The General Assembly could consider adopting, on the recommendation of the Security Council, a set of ‘constitutional principles’ for the partnership between the UN and regional agencies and other international organizations. A possible set of principles for the ‘regional-global security partnership’ is set out in Box 10.B. These principles could guide the future development of a ‘regional-global security mechanism’ in a way that satisfies the interests of the major powers in ensuring the efficiency of the Security Council with scope for flexibility while restoring the trust of all regions and cultures of the world in the Council’s legitimacy. The Council must remain the universal centralised body for the maintenance of peace and security. It must retain superior authority on such matters. But its sovereign powers are not unbridled and it must always remain subject to the constraints of international law and serve the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.1 There is a natural principle that overrides even that of Council primacy, namely the ‘supremacy of international law’ of which the UN Charter is the central component part. Security Council actions must be within the constraints of the Charter. This includes, in particular, the Council’s acknowledgement of the relationship between chapters VII and VIII, especially sovereignty (article 2.7), collective security (articles 39 to 42) and self-defence (article 51). Acts of self-defence are subordinate to collective security measures, and they should be seen as having a time-limit. Self-defence cannot be extenuated by the Council or any other body beyond normal reasonable circumstances (an issue for consideration in Afghanistan). The Council should also acknowledge the increasingly important role that regional agencies have to play in the future, in the interests of both legitimacy and burden-sharing. The Council should be accorded a degree of flexibility in determining a threat to regional peace or international peace in a particular region. Yet it must avoid according undue reliance on particular regional agencies or other organizations while minimising or marginalising the role of others.

1.

Article 24.2 requires that the Security Council shall act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Its discretion is thus not uncircumscribed or its power unbridled.

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Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ For their part, regional agencies should display the same impartiality that is required of Security Council members (under, for example, article 27.2 which cross-refers to chapter VIII agencies). And the regional agencies should look in turn to sub-regional agencies to undertake pacific settlement efforts within their sub-region – such efforts being undertaken at the lowest level of jurisdictional authority that is appropriate to a conflict situation. Recommendation 5. A ‘Consultative Framework’ A ‘Consultative Framework’ could be established to govern the strategic and planning relationship between the United Nations and all partner organizations in peace and security. The nature and format of the different meetings currently held by the United Nations with regional and other organizations could be rationalised through various arrangements agreed upon through a consultative process. The United Nations could commence a process towards a ‘constitutional clarification’ of the relationship it has with regional agencies and other international organizations in the area of peace and security. The following possible arrangements could be considered. A ‘Consultative Framework’ could be established as recommended by the Council in February 2001 (see section 2.3.2.d). Two separate meetings might be arranged on a regular basis as proposed by Germany at the first Council meeting (section 2.3.3.a). – ‘UN – Regional Consultations’ would be convened bi-annually by the Security Council and would be confined to the ‘Chapter VIII regional agencies’. Each regional agency would be required to report to the Security Council on the security situation in its region. – ‘UN – Partner Consultations’ would be convened annually by the Secretary-General and would include all other partner organizations (transnational, cross-regional and sub-regional as well as the regional agencies). Box 10. B Possible Constitutional Principles for the ‘Regional-Global Security Partnership’ 1. The Principle of Charter Supremacy The supremacy of the UN Charter and of international law must be scrupulously observed. No action by any Member State, organ of the United Na-

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Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ tions or partner organization may be contrary to the provisions of the Charter. 2. The Principle of Primary Responsibility Subject to Principle 1, the primacy of the UN Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security must be faithfully respected. 3. The Principle of Secondary Responsibility The secondary responsibility of regional agencies acting under chapter VIII of the Charter must be observed, including their freedom to undertake initiatives in pacific settlement under chapter VI and peace-building activities under chapter IX; but enforcement action under chapter VII may be undertaken only following the advance authorization of the Council explicitly sanctioning such action in a specific situation. 4. The Principle of Tertiary Responsibility The Security Council may call upon other international organizations other than regional agencies, also to undertake prevention, pacific settlement, peacekeeping and peace-building activities on its behalf, under chapters VI and IX of the Charter, and enforcement action under chapter VII. 5. The Principle of Identity The Security Council should maintain a clear and consistent distinction between international organizations that it regards as regional agencies for the purposes of chapter VIII of the Charter and all other international organizations. 6. The Principle of Consistency The Security Council should maintain consistent and non-discriminatory ‘partner relationships’ with all international organizations it regards as regional agencies. 7. The Principle of Flexibility Subject to Principle 6, the Council may exercise flexibility in its judgements and decisions over the delegating authority to regional agencies for responsibility for peace and security within its region, according to the specific circumstances of each threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. 8. The Principle of Impartiality Both the Security Council and ‘chapter VIII regional agencies’ undertake to maintain impartiality in the execution of their respective responsibilities for peace and security under the Charter, subordinating national interests to the common regional and universal interest, particularly in the use of armed force as required under the Charter. 9. The Principle of Subsidiarity Decisions of the Security Council with respect to regional agencies and their sub-regional organizations will be based on a recognition that conflict prevention, pacific settlement and peace-building activities are most appropriately undertaken at a level closest to the local community as is feasible.

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Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ 10. The Principle of Comparative Advantage Subject to Principle 9, the Security Council should have conscious regard to the capabilities and experience of all international organizations with which it has a ‘partnership relationship’, and should rely on each one in order to ensure optimal effectiveness and efficiency in the development of the ‘regional-global security mechanism’.

The second alternate UN – Regional Consultations could be held back-toback with the annual UN – Partner Consultations, perhaps immediately preceding the annual General Assembly Session. The kind of meetings held to date – by the Secretariat and Security Council – could be folded into the above Framework. They could be twinned, as the component parts of the ‘regionals’ and the ‘partners’ meetings, back-to-back with one day allocated to each. The agenda of such meetings could be cross-referenced. It might be more efficient if the Council meeting preceded the Secretary-General’s meeting.

General Comments: A Critique These five recommendations comprise broad and far-reaching proposals. There would be a need for considerable thought to elucidate the practical implications of such a constitutional arrangement. – What, for example, might be the ‘line of command’ and reporting responsibility between the regional and sub-regional agencies? – Should ‘sub-regionals’ report strictly through their regional parent bodies or might they be empowered to deal directly with the Council, as currently occurs? – Might other international organizations (the Commonwealth, la francophonie) be authorised to take initiatives in conflict resolution – and what might be their relationship to the Security Council and to regional agencies? There will remain, it is clear, some complexities in the relationship. But through such a formal delineation much of the current duplication and overlapping of mandate and membership in the maintenance of peace and security would be eliminated. Some political sensitivity exists over whether or not any kind of ‘hierarchy’ should be introduced into the network of organizations that co-operate with the UN in peace and security. Some States are in favour of such a development while others oppose changing the status quo. The 337

Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ fact is, however, that the Charter had already introduced a ‘hierarchy’ in chapter VIII, making it clear that the Security Council had primacy over all other organizations in the pursuit of peace and security. Article 52 gives flexibility to regional agencies in ‘soft security’ while article 53, on ‘hard security’, affirms universal primacy with secondary responsibility to the regionals. This does not mean than an artificial clarity should be introduced into the international system. This has never been desirable and the trend in international relations is in the opposite direction, from a state-centric and hierarchical order towards a more flexible, inclusive and interactive system of multifaceted co-operation among institutions of all types. That trend, however, can be taken too far. A point can be reached where institutional uncertainties militate against effective planning and co-ordination, both in policymaking and field operation. The goal is to strike an optimal balance between political flexibility and constitutional clarity so that each partner organization knows with confidence what its responsibilities are, and the timing in which it is to carry them out. Conversely, too formalised a relationship between the Security Council and ‘responsible regional agencies’ might be criticised for interposing a new layer of ‘global bureaucracy’ in the policy-making process for peace and security. In today’s globalising world, however, with instantaneous communication and ‘virtual meetings’, an arrangement of this nature should not unduly delay matters even in times of crisis. The Council has, on occasion, not been noticeably concerned to react with forthright speed during a crisis, the most egregious example being the three-month delay over Rwanda in 1994. The enhanced legitimacy of Council action provided by such a regional input into global policy-making should outweigh any concerns over efficiency of timing. It is, moreover, likely that in a majority of cases the regional agency and the Security Council will have together been seized of a matter prior to such decision moments and will have developed a sound mutual understanding of each other’s views. The ‘new generation’ of regional agencies, such as the African Union, have procedures in place for standing bodies to function continuously (such as the African Peace and Security Council).2 2.

“The Peace and Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. For this purpose, each Member of the Peace and Security Council shall, at all times, be represented at the Headquarters of the Union”. Protocol Relating to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, July 2002, Article 8.1 (in force since December 2003.)

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10.2 Functional Co-operation Principles of functional co-operation in the areas of conflict prevention and peace-building have already been identified in the UN high-level meetings. But little has been achieved to date in translating these principles into real achievement in co-ordination between the United Nations and its partners. Some staff exchanges and other liaison measures have been introduced but more needs to be done. Recommendation 6. Implementation The United Nations could, as the first step in the ‘Partnership for Peace’, commence a process with regional agencies and other partners to ensure more effective implementation of the ‘functional principles’ of co-operation in conflict prevention and peace-building. There is a need to ensure more effective implementation of the nine principles of co-operation agreed upon between the regional organizations and the UN during the high-level meetings (see section 2.3.2. f). This process would no doubt take the initially modest form of intensified exchanges, liaison visits and a shared data base pertaining to conflict and early-warning. The UN Department of Political Affairs might be seen as the natural central co-ordinator in this process. The suggestion advanced by China in April 2003 (noted in section 2.3.3.a) that the Security Council summarise its experience of co-operation with regional organizations could become the starting point for this broader exercise.

10.3 Doctrinal Reformulation The debate over the UN principles and security doctrine identified in section 1.2 will inevitably be influenced by the strengthening of the regional-global relationship in peace and security. As chapter 8 noted, a more symmetrical cultural input into Security Council thinking by all ‘security regions’ would increase the legitimacy of the Council’s policymaking. Recommendation 7. Regional Reviews The Secretary-General could invite regional agencies to undertake a review of the security situation in their region and its relationship to the global security situation, focusing in particular on the threats and challenges faced by the international community in the 21st century. 339

Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ An invitation of this kind from the Secretary-General to regional agencies would send a signal of the value which the United Nations attached to the views of regional bodies. In particular each regional agency might be invited to assess the current and future threat situations as they pertain to its region and to the world. It might then consider the most appropriate response by the international community through regional and global collective action, and offer views on any procedural or institutional change that might be warranted to make future collective action effective. The effect of such regional input might be felt in the following areas: – the definition of terrorism and the treatment of terrorist groups; – the WMD non-proliferation policy towards all states (including a WMD-free zone in the Arab region plus Israel); – the reach of the Security Council on human security issues that might threaten the peace through ‘critical and pervasive’ pressures; – the different historical, cultural and religious dimensions of universal human rights that would affect the post-conflict peace-building operations undertaken by the UN. Recommendation 8. A ‘Regional Peace and Security’ Concept The UN Security Council could distinguish more clearly between a ‘threat to regional peace and security’ and a ‘threat to international peace and security’. As noted before, under the UN Charter all Member States confer upon the Security Council ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’. The Charter empowers it to determine the existence of ‘any threat to the peace’ and decide what measures are required to ‘restore international peace and security’. Nowhere does the Charter refer to ‘regional security’ per se, but refers rather (in chapter VIII) to ‘regional action’ through ‘regional arrangements or agencies’ to maintain ‘international peace and security’. There is no formal distinction between the two concepts in the Charter. This, however, does not preclude the possibility of a political distinction being made. Based on these constitutional provisions the Security Council could strengthen the ‘regional-global security mechanism’ by introducing the concept of ‘regional security’. In fact, it has on occasions in the past referred to ‘regional peace and security’ though not in any systematic or consistent way. There is scope, therefore, as regionalism strengthens in the field of peace and security, for the Council to draw a more formal distinction between ‘regional peace and security’ and ‘global peace and security’ (both being understood to be ‘international’). It 340

Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ would be for the Council to determine when the circumstances of a particular dispute or conflict situation is of a quintessentially ‘regional’ rather than ‘global’ kind. It has proved itself capable of making this determination in the past. The practical implications of such a conceptual distinction could be considerable. When the Council makes a determination of a ‘regional threat’, it would follow that it would rely upon a ‘chapter VIII regional agency’ for operational responsibility for conflict prevention and management. When it determines a situation to constitute a ‘global threat’, it would maintain direct involvement.

10.4 Security Council Reform The third ‘fundamental proposal’ of this study is that the identification of ‘security regions’ and associated ‘chapter VIII agencies’ could have implications for Security Council reform – through the issue of permanent membership. That debate, now over a decade old, has stalled over the irreconcilable demands of some Member States for permanent membership. One of the alternative formulae put forward in UN deliberations has involved the idea of regional representation – not ‘direct representation’ in the form of a regional agency but ‘indirect representation’ through a Member State (the specific state changing through rotation) representing a region. This merits more serious consideration in the future. Recommendation 9. Security Council Reform The General Assembly could consider exploring the implications of regionalism for Security Council reform, through allocating permanent membership to the ‘chapter VIII agencies’; such membership to be filled by individual Member States representing the agencies on a rotational basis.

Summary of Recommendations The nine recommendations advanced above contain some far-reaching proposals. They would require extensive consideration by both scholars and diplomats before any political decisions are made. If the idea of a ‘re341

Recommendations for a Future ‘Regional-Global Security Mechanism’ gional-global security mechanism’ is to be taken seriously in the future – if the ‘strategic choice’ referred to in section 3.5 is made – there will be a need for innovative thought and some practical changes to be made in the present security arrangements. The strengthening of global security in the future cannot be based on the disparagement of any UN Member State, the strongest or the weakest, or the marginalisation of any region or regional agency. Humanity confronts its fate as one, or that fate will be dire. The ‘flying wedge’ of regionalism that in May 1945 ‘threatened the very soul of the organization’ holds the prospect of becoming, 60 years on, the ‘vital strut’ that will reinforce the multilateral structure and restore the legitimacy of the UN Security Council to its earlier level. In the 21st century regionalism, in finding its correct place within the multilateral context, may, paradoxically and for the first time, reinforce effective multilateralism.

Box: Postscript Proposal for an International Conference on Collective Security Arab League Statement to the Security Council, April 2003 “I would suggest that we call for the convening of an international conference, under the auspices of the United Nations .... It is high time for us to convene an international conference on international peace, its maintenance and the challenges facing it. Such a conference should be preceded by regional meetings on the same subject. These could be organized by region or by geographic grouping and would do preparatory work relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They would also consider the status of the collective security system in the wake of the blows it has been dealt with, with a view to averting any further blows. International and regional security cannot and should not be allowed to be defined by one State alone, or even by a group of States, outside of the United Nations. As long as it is possible for the Council to be silenced and the General Assembly to be prevented from undertaking its role, the only solution may be the convening of an international conference to address existing problems. We hope, Sir, that the Council will, under your presidency, propose this idea and that it will be addressed in other regional organizations. We hope that this idea will not be ignored – as the Security Council and the General Assembly are at one of the most critical moments for regional and international security.” Statement by Secretary-General of the League of Arab States UN Security Council, April 2003 S/PV/4739, 11 April 2003

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List of Acronyms

AMIB – African Mission in Burundi AMU – Arab Mahgreb Union ANZUS – Australia New Zealand United States Security Treaty APEC – Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation ARF – ASEAN Regional Forum ASF – African Standby Force ASEAN – Association of South East Asian Nations AU – African Union BONUCA – Bureau de l’Organization des Nations Unies en Centrafrique BSEC – Organization of the Black sea Economic Co-operation CACM – Central American Common Market CADSP – Common African Defense and Security Policy CARICOM – Caribbean Community CBSS – Council of the Baltic Sea States CEEAC – Economic Community of Central African States CEMAC – Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale CENTO – Central Treaty Organization CEPGL – Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries CEWARN – Conflict Early-Warning and Response Mechanism CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States CNE – Complex national emergencies COE – Council of Europe COMESA/PTA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa / Preferential Trade Agreement CPSP / (CPLP) – Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries CRE – Complex regional emergencies CRIS – Comparative Regional Integration Studies CRO – Cross Regional Organization CSCE – Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe CST – Collective Security Treaty CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organization CT – Counter Terrorism CTC – Counter Terrorism Commission

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List of Acronyms DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations DPRK – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo E-10 – The ten elected members of the UN Security Council EAC – East African Community EASBRIG – Eastern Africa Standby Brigade EC – European Community EEC – European Economic Community ECE – Economic Commission for Europe ECCAS – Economic Community of Central African States ECLA – Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ECOMICI – ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Mission in Ivory Coast ECOMOG – ECOWAS Monitoring Group ECOWAS – Economic Community of Western African States ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community EDC – European Defense Community ESCAP – Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific EU – European Union EURATOM – European Atomic Energy Community FRY – Former Republic of Yugoslavia GCC – Gulf Co-operation Council HLM – High Level Meeting IBRD – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization IOF – International Organization La Francophonie ICJ – International Court of Justice IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development IGADD – Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development IHT – International Herald Tribune IMATT – International Military Advisory Training Team IMCO – International Maritime Organization IMF – International Monetary Fund INTERFET – UN International Force in East Timor IPA – Integrated Program for Action ISAD – Inter-State Aggression and Disputes ISAF – International Security Assistance Force IWC – International Whale Commission KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army KFOR – Kosovo force LAS – League of Arab States LAES – Latin American Economic System LoN – League of Nations MCPR – Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Resolution MDG – Millennium Development Goals MEP – Member of the European Parliament MERCOSUR – Southern Common Market MFO – Multinational Force and Observers

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List of Acronyms MNF – Multinational Force MNPF – Multinational Protection Force MINURSO – United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara MNSC – Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission MONUC – United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo MRU – Mano River Union NAC – North Atlantic Council NAM – Non-Aligned Movement NATO – North Atlantic Security Organization NDA – New Defence Agenda NLA – National Liberation Army NORAD – American Aerospace Defence Command NPLF – National Patriotic Front of Liberia NPT – Non Proliferation Treaty OAS – Organization of American States OAU– Organization of African Unity OECS – Organization of Eastern Caribbean States OIC – Organization of Islamic Conference OLG – Overthrow of legitimate governments OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe P-5 – The Permanent five members of the UN Security Council PC – Pacific Community PIF – Pacific Islands Forum PLO – Palestine Liberation Organization PM – Prime Minister PMG – Peace Monitoring Group PRC – People’s Republic of China RAMSI – Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands RO – Regional Organization ROK – Republic of Korea RUF – Revolutionary United Front SAA – Stabilization and Association Agreement SAARC – South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation SADC – Southern African Development Community SADR – Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic SADCC – Southern African Development Coordination Centre SAP – Stabilization and Association Process SCO – Shanghai Co-operation Organization SEATO – Southeast Asian Treaty Organization SEECP – South East European Co-operation Process SFOR – Stabilization Force SLMM – Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission SOA – Secessionist or autonomy movements SPC – South Pacific Commission TNO – Trans-national Organization UDEAC – Union Douanière des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights

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List of Acronyms UK – United Kingdom UNAMA – United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNAMSIL – United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNCIO – United Nations Conference on International Organizations UNDOF – United Nations Disengagement Observer Force UNFICYP – United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus UNGA – United Nations General Assembly UNIFIL – United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon UNIIMOG – United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group UNMIBH – United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina UNMIK – United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo UNMISET – United Nations Mission of Support in East-Timor UNITAF – United Task Force (in Somalia) UNMOGIP – United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan UNMOT – United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan UNMOVIC – United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission UNOCI – United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast UNOMIG – United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia UNOMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia UNPREDEP – United Nations Preventive Deployment UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force UNSC – United Nations Security Council UNSCOM – United Nations Special Commission UNTOP – United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace-Building UNTSO – United Nations Truce Supervision Organization UNU – United Nations University US – United States USSR – Union of Socialist Soviet Republics WCO – World Customs Organization WEU – Western European Union WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction ZOPFAN – Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

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