Indonesia and Regional Security: The Djakarta Conference on Cambodia 9789814380119

Table of contents :
PREFACE
I
II
III
IV
FOOTNOTES
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES SINGAPORE LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Established as an autonomous corporation in May, 1968, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focussed on the many-faceted problems of modernization and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a 24-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nan yang University, appointees from the Government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is ex officio chaired by the director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

"Copyright subsists in this publication under the United Kingdom Copyright Act, 1911 and the Singapore Copyright Act (Cap. 187). No person shall reproduce a copy of this publication, or extracts therefrom, without the written permission of of Southeast Asian Studies, Institute the Singapore."

First Printing May 1972 Second Printing June 1974

INDONESIA AND REGIONAL SECURITY: THE DJAKARTA CONFERENCE ON CAMBODIA

by

Lau Teik Soon

Occasional Paper No. 14

In.s titute of Southeast Asian Studies Price: $3.00

PREFACE In any discussion of Southeast Asia, Indonesia, because of its size, potential and its growing involvement in regional affairs, always enters the conversation . The remarkable changes which have taken place there since 1965 cover all areas: politics, economics, society and international affairs. It is in the latter area that Indonesia's leadership in the region is assuming prominence. Participation in .-\SE:\N and other regional groupings and leadership in the United Nations are but two aspects of this phenomenon. As might be expected, when the war in Vietnam spilled over into the other Indo-China states, Cambodia and Laos, it drew the attention of Indonesia's leaders and the nation sought to mobilize the reg i on toward finding a workable solution in the Cambodian crisis of 1970. Mr. Lau Te1k Soon, a lecturer at the University of Singapore and a former Fellow of th~ Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, has been following Indonesia's emergence in international affairs since the mil1tary succeeded Sukarno a s the nat i on's leader. At the request of the Inst i tute, he prepared this paper for presentation at its seminar on November 19, 1971, in order to acquaint J...:·~al scholars and other interested participants at the meeting with the new dimensions of Indonesia's efforts to give regional leadership in international affairs. Following the seminar, Mr. Lau revised and expanded his paper and the Institute is pleased to publish and d1stribute it to a wider audience. The facts, interpretations and method of presentation are those of the author alone and the Institute is not responsible nor should it be considered as advocating either the ideas or i nterpretations included in this paper , May 13, 1972

Professor Josef Silverstein Director

Any discussion of Indonesia's attitude towards

regional security must begin with a statement of its general foreign policy guidelines . The official position is generally known; Indonesia pursues an independent, active and non-aligned foreign policy. An explanation of this policy can be observed in President Suharto's speech before the Djakarta Conference on Cambodia o He stated, We strive for world peace, international cooperation without discrimination in the interest of progress and welfare of all nations, mutual respect for the sovereignty and integrity of nations, non-interference in internal affairs Indonesia's non-alignment of other countries . is not based on opportunistic principles but it has become part of the identity of the For Indonesia, Indonesian people and state. its foreign policy of non-alignment is not identical to non-involvement. That is the reason why Indonesia prefers to call it an independent and active policy, because to us non-alignment is not sterile or idle. Indonesia's foreign policy is independent in the sense that Indonesia is free from any ties whatsoever, be it military, political or ideological, so that Indonesia is truly free to evaluate any problem or event without any influence from any ties, military, political Indonesia's foreign policy or ideological. that Indonesia actively sense is active in the tries and cooperates with other peace-loving countries to overcome problems which endanger world peace and security, so as to achieve an abiding peace all over the world, to create justice and prosperity for all mankind.l In practice, however, Indonesia distinguishes the various areas where its different foreign policy attitudes prevail. Non-alignment in the accepted sense 1s discern1b l e in Indonesia's policy towards Great Power issues . 2 Here Indonesia as with other non-aligned countries manifests its opposition against Great Power dominance, power blocs, armaments, imperialism, colonialism and growing economic In matters of stability and security, Southeast disparity. Asia has obviously been the region of Indonesia's main concern. Specifically, Indonesia's area of dominant interest has been the insular states of Southeast Asia, which today comprises the Association of Southeast Asian These interests are not mutually Nations or ASEAN

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exclus ive; non-al ignme nt vis-a- vis the Great Powers may result in greate r flexib ility for the achiev ement of Indon esia's Asian object ives: firstl y, a balanc e of power in the region , and second ly, a sphere of influe nce under Indon esia in Southe ast Asia . Within the last five years, Indon esia has evolve d a new framew ork for its Asian policy , which aims to assert its power status and role in the region . The breakd own of the so-cal led Djaka rta-Pe king axis is a remark able examp le of the fluidi ty of intern ationa l relatio ns in Asia 3 With the deteri oratio n in its relatio ns with China and also with the Soviet Union, there has been a result ing shift toward s close relati ons with the United States . This does not mean that Indone sia will become an ally of the United States , but it does want to achiev e an indepe ndent power status with the assist ance of the United States , and to have greate r flexib ility to deal with the issues of the region . The United States , faced with proble ms of milita ry withdr awal from Indo-C hina and accomm odation with China, may be prepar ed to see a strong anti-co mmun ist Indon esia emerge simult aneou sly with the disma ntling of the wester n strate gic system in South east Aaia. In this respec t, the United States may come to accept the neutra lizatio n of South east Asia, if there is a strong South east Asian power, in prefer ence to the contin uation of the Cold War or a China- domin ated South east Asia. 4 Indon esia has the poten tial of a major power with a popula tion of about 120 millio n or about one-h alf of the popula tion of the whole of South east Asia, vast natura l resour ces and a sizeab le milita ry force which is larger than that of Japan. S It initia ted ASEAN which has promo ted region al consci ousnes s and tentat ive effort s at econom ic region al coope ration . The ASEAN states have experi enced genera l stabil ity and secur ity, though there are seriou s proble ms within each state. 6 More signif icant nists Indones~a coope rates with Malay sia agains t the commu most is what t, momen the along their cownon border . For impor tant is of course the Govern ment of Indon esia . Presid ent Suhart o and the leader s around him are highly pragm atic, develo pment -orien ted indivi duals whose priori ties are intern al develo pment and conso lidatio n, and a foreig n policy , which they hope will result in Indon esia's leader ship of the region being accept ed by its ASEAN neighb ours . Presid ent Suhart o enunc iated the "good ne~ghbour" policy in Augus t, 1967, and this has led to the norma lizatio n and develo pment of relati ons

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7 Through between Indonesia and Malaysia and Singapore . diplomacy and regional cooperat i on, Indonesia has sought to obtain Indonesian greatness and leadersh i p in the region, and it may yet achieve in peace what it tried to do through confrontatio n .

What may upset the posit i ve development to leadersh i p of Indonesia could be the impatience of certain sections, particularl y the Generals and members of the military who envisaged for Indonesia a leading security role with American support in this part of the world. This is appealing to them for reasons of aid, assistance and prestige. What is significant is that the military in Indonesia is highly politicized and has a tradition of being a force for stability and of dominance over civilian administrat ion . 8 In such a situation, the military has assumed to a considerabl e extent the functions of government, including matters of foreign policy . The low profile posture of Indonesia's foreign policy could also be upset by the regional developmen ts in Southeast Asia, particularl y the war i n Vi etnam . Indonesia's general attitude toward regional security has been a consistent one, viz. the opposition to a n y formalized military pact for Southeast Asia i nvolving foreign powers. Thus Indonesia objected to SEATO an d the Anglo-Malay an Defence Treaty, though this has been toned down since the western military withdrawal began in the late sixties and early seventies c In any case, the time for military pacts dominated by the Un i ted Sta t es or Britain may be over - a result of the American pol i cy as enunciated in the Guam Doctrine and the withdrawa l of Britain. But if Indonesia objects to a military pact organized for Cold War motives, will Indonesia consider a reg~onal security arrangement among Southeast Asian states themselves ? There has been no tradition of cooperation among Southeast Asian members collectivel y, and for this reason a collective security agreement will not be easy . But a loose security arrangement comprising a number of bilateral military agreements could be possible; in fact, this has been reached among certain ASEAN members. As indicated earlier, there is bilateral mili ta ry cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia in operat~ons against the local communists along the East Malays i aIndonesian border, and between Malays i a and Thai land

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along their common border. Such experiences could eventually lead to some form . of . a regional security pact. Indonesia's security is closely linked to that of Malaysia and Thailand and if Thailand and Malaysia were threatened by the communists, Indonesia would consider assuming responbility to defend those countries. Aside from protecting its ASEAN partners, such CYI action would indicate Indonesia's adoption of a forward defence ·strategy to protect itself.9 If a regional association were to have any prospect of becoming a regional security organization, it is ASEAN . A step ttJvlard this trend has already been taken in the ASEAN Declaration of November, 1971 which purported to: Secure the recognition of and respect for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers, and also • . . make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship •.10 Indonesia's position would be favourable towards bilateral military cooperation. Though it is adverse to any military pact, such opposition does not extend to any regional security pact whose membership comprises entirely regional members. ASEAN could become the core of a regional security organization in the future, particularly if such an organization confines itself to meet limited aggression from outside the region or externally-assisted insurgencies. Such an organization could also be useful in deterring any attempt of one neighbour to attack the other.

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II

Indonesia's attitude towards regional security has been reflected in its reactions to the Cambodian crisis of March 1970. Then Cambodia faced an internal crisis resulting from the presence of communist troops both local and foreign . It was threatened by the wider Americanization of the war in neighbouring Vietnam, with internal rebellion from the Communists and with the possible extension of an international conflict on its borders . The developments leading I~ the Cambodian crisis have been discussed elsewhere. However, the main issues relevant to the discussion should be noted < There was the question of Cambodia's neutrality. Prince Sihanouk had maintained the neutrality of the country; while this meant that he kept Cambodia out of the military conflict, he could not prevent infringement of its sovereignty by both the United States and North Vietnam, particularly as it involved their war efforts along the Ho Chi-minh trail on Cambodia's border . Secondly and 1 ed to the first, there was the problem of foreign intervention in Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk attempted to limit the presence of foreign troops both communists and anti-communists , through diplomacy and persuasion . When Lon Nol came to power, his immediate interests seemed to be to maintain Cambodia's neutrality and to expel foreign troops. The latter referred to the communist sanctuaries on Cambodian border areas but since LOn Nol did not possess the military force to do this, the consequence of this policy could be either foreign assistance from the anti-communist powers or defeat in the event of large-scale communist retaliation . In both cases, however, it meant the inevitability of Cambodia's involvement in the Indo-China war . The question of Indonesia's intervention in the Cambodian crisis was apparently discussed within government and military circles in Indonesia . In the event of a communist challenge to Cambodia, Indonesia would be faced with these alternatives: either it stayed non-involved and risked Cambodia going communist, or consider whatever means possible, both diplomatic and military, to bolster the Lon Nol regime pntil such time when the latter could hold its own against its adversaries . What could be deduced was that there was a group probably wi hin the Army which argued that in such a regional crisis

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Indonesia should participate militarily, though the nature of the 1nvolvement was not quite clear. What was certain was that the Indonesian Government sympathized with the Lon Nol regime and it sought to mobilize all Asian s t ates to support a non-intervention Po licy with regard to Cambodia's affairs . l2 In the meantime, Indonesia considered some form of military assistance to the Lon Nol regime . The close association between the two governments began even before the coup Apparen tly a team of Cambodian officers in March. se c retly visited Indonesia in November 1969 and again in January 1970 and an objective of the mission appeared to be "to study in depth how the Indonesian army managed to overthrow Pres ide nt Sukarno. nl3 In April, it was reported that an Indonesian military mission was in Phnom Penh f~ consider Cambodia's appeal for military This could be in response to Lon Nol's assistance. appeal for arms assistance from friendly countries, including Indones1a . lS Then in early May, it was reported that a special envoy of Lon Nol was in Djakarta for talks with President Suharto on arms assistance . l6 The idea of an Indonesian military participation in the Cambodian conflict was supported by the Armed Forces daily, Angkatan BQ~B e ndjata: its view was that Indonesia would have no obJection to sending a contingent to Cambodia if this should be requested by an international 17 organ1zation such as the International Control Commission . From the above, it was clear that Indonesia had either contemp lated or accomplished sending a military mission to Cambodia, that it considered assistance of some sorts and that it would favour an international exped1tion to Cambodia.l8 There has of course been no official confirmation of any of these courses which were undertaken or cons1dered by Indonesia . What was evident was the constant denial of the Indonesian Government, particularly the Foreign Minister Adam Malik, that any of such moves were thought of : he denied even thf§ Indonesia was sending military In his view, arms assistance observers to Cambodi a. to Cambodia would not improve the situation there, on the contrary , such aid to Cambodia would provide the c ommunist countries with an excuse to step up their aid The Lon Nol Government had o the anti-Lon Nol groups . little faith 1n the International Control Commission or the Se c urity Council to maintain the peace and "neutrality" it should of Cambodia and had called for arms assistance: be noted that Lon Nol did not call for foreign troops

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to fight the communists . Failing to obtain the response from his earlier request, Lon Nol sent an urgent appeal In line with to President Nixon for military assistance . his opposition to any form of arms assistance to Cambodia, Adam Malik apparently sought assurances from the United States Ambassador in Djakarta that this would not be forthcoming . 20 Adam Malik was thus opposed to any form of military assistance to Cambodia, at the same time, he was "resisting pressure from certain military men in the government" in Indonesia who supported such a course of action . 21 It could be to forestall further pressure by the generals on the government and to check foreign military interference 1n Cambodia that Adam Malik initiated the Conference of Foreign Ministers from Asian and Pacific Countries in Djakarta to discuss the crisis in Cambodia . There were other reasons too that could have prompted Adam Mal1k to call such a meeting . The decision to hold the conferen ce was an attempt to revive Indonesia's voice in internat1onal affairs, and it was also an expression ~was also of a clear concern with regional security , faced country non-aligned a of dilemma the of out way a with a security threat . The Cambodian crisis to Indonesia was a problem of national interest . Cambodia was regarded as the soft underbelly of Southeast Asia and if it fell, there was a danger of communist expansion into the ASEAN According to Professor Leifer, "the question region. of security is perceived in a reg1onal context because the Indonesians hold the1r own variant of the 'Domino Theory' - seen as a p rocess of erosion with1n Southeast Asia culminat1ng in the establishment of springboards for the promotion of insurgency . "22 Another reason could be t!1at Adam Malik felt that an Asian consensus had an impact on 1nternational affairs, and he argued that with such a consensus, "we can ask for the avoidance of a cold war or of a war l1ke that in Vietnam . "23 Finally there is the view that Adam Malik was concerned less for the 1rnrnediate problems of Carnbod1a than with pre s erving the concept of non-alignment in Southeast 24 Asia, "with an eye to future Asian and Pacific solidarity . 11

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III From the March coup until early April, Indonesia backed the neutrality of Cambodia and non-intervention in Cambodian affairs, called for the reactivation of the Internat i onal Control Commission and the reconvening of a Geneva-type meeting, and supported the French and U Thant's proposals for an international confe rence to In midd i scuss the latest developments in Cambodia . April, Adam Malik took the opportunity to sound out Asian and Pacific representatives present in Manila for t he One Asia Assembly meeting and in Bangkok for the ECAFE meet i ng, on the possibility of holding an international conference confined to themselves and limited On his return to a discussion of the Cambodian crisis . to Djakarta, Adam Malik met with the Ambassadors of the United States and the Soviet Union to seek their support It was only in late April, that it for the conference. was de c ided that the Conference of Foreign Ministers wou l d be held in D j a~arta.25 It may be significant to note that at about the same time, the first summit meeting of the Indo-Chinese people was inaugurated, and China launched its first satellite heralding "the East is Red. n26 The Djakarta Conference had little impact on those issues pertaining to Cambodia . As an exercise, in "Asian solutions to Asian problems" it was a failure. Even in this respect, Indonesia was unable to obtain The communist countries an Asian consensus on the crisis. rejected the invitations on the ground that the Conference was "a vicious act aimed at legalizing the United States and satellites intervention in Cambodia to carry out the policy of using Asians to fight Asians . "27 Of the twenty countri es invited viz . Afghanistan, Australia, Burma, Ceylon, People's Republic of China, India, Japan, People's Democratic Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippi nes, Singapore, Thailand, Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Republic of Vietnam, and the Mongolian People ' s Republic, only ten countries responded favourably, viz c Australia, Japan, South Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and South Vietnam c Cambodia was given the opportunity to explain and clarify matters related to the crisis . These members, with the exception of Indonesia, were either members of t he Anglo-Malaysian Defence Treaty, SEATO, or military allies of the United States . Six of th~m were directly

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involv ed in the Vietna m War and all with the excep tion of Indon esia and Singa pore were membe rs of the Asian and Pacif ic Counc il and all with the excep tion of Indon esia, Malay sia and Singa pore were membe rs of the anti-c ommu nist Asian Parlia menta rians Union . Excep t for Indon esia where its relati ons with China are stra1n ed, none of the other s has any offic ial relati ons with China , Toget her with the absen ce of such non-a ligned count ries such as Burma , Ceylo n and India , the absen ce of the comm unist count ries and the anti-c ommu nist overto ne of the membe rs of the Djaka rta Confe rence assum ed the image of an anti-c ommu nist gathe ring, thoug h this was clear ly not the inten tion of the initia tor, Indon esia . The Djaka rta Confe rence arrive d at decis ions which were of immed iate conce rn to Cambo dia ,. After the delib eratio ns held on May 16-17 , the Confe rence dec1d ed on the follow ing: In the light of the above consi derat1 ons the Minis ters earne stly and emph atical ly urge: (i)

that all acts of hosti lities be stopp ed forth with and all foreig n force s be withd rawn from the territ ory of Cambo dia;

(ii) that all parti es respe ct the sover eignt y, indep enden ce, neutr ality and terri toria l integ rity of Cambo dia and refra in from inter fering · in the inter nal affai rs of the count ry in order to enabl e the Cambo dian peopl e to solve their proble ms by peace ful means of their own choic e witho ut any exter nal ·interf err:!n ccs or press ure; (iii)t hat the co-Ch alrma n and partic ipant s 1n the 1954 Genev a Confe rence and the membe rs of the Inter natio nal Contr ol Comm ission on Can~od1a set up by the Confe rence , consu lt and coope rate toget her in react ivatin g the said Cor:un ission; (iv) that the parti cipan ts in the 1954 Genev a Confe rence and all other inter ested parti es consu lt toget her w1th a view to arrivi ng at a conse nsus for the early conve n1ng of an Inter natio nal Confe rence to find a JUSt, peace ful and effec ti.ve resol ution of t .he prese nt situa tion ... 28

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The Conference decided to place their recommendations on record with the United Nations and appointed a "task force" comprising representatives from Indonesia, Japan and Malaysia to "embark upon urgent consultations among themselves and others as well as the co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference on ways and means of implementing paragraph 7 (iii) and (iv) and to in1tiate discussions with the Secretary General of the United Nations and the President and Members of the Securit¥ Council with a view to action by the United Nations , " 9 The Task Force visited the capitals of the members of the I . e C viz. New Delhi, Warsaw and Ottawa and the co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference viz. London and Moscow, and the United Nations during June 1970. The results of these miss1ons were reported to the Conference members b y the Indonesian Foreign Min1ster c According to Adam Malik, the participants would study the report of the Task For ce and further efforts would In early August, however, depend on the answers from them . he stated that the task of the Conference was in reality already completed and that it was up to the I , c.c , to He revealed that he had received no reactivate itself. reply to the re p ort of the Task Force from any member of the Conference.30 With specific reference to the Cambodian situation, Indonesia and the other Conference members achieved little beyond indicating an Asian concern for an Asian There was no lack of enthusiasm on the part problem. of Indonesia but the management of the cris1s was beyond Th1s its hands or those of the Conference members became evident when the issues involved 1n the Cambodian crisis were examined, parti c ularly the quest1ons of foreign interference , international act1on, neutrality, and the general Indo-China situation. Foreign interference in Cambodia was noth1ng new. MaJor North Vietnamese incursions and m1nor Arner1can operations in Cambodia had been tolerated by Pr1nce Sihanouk. His removal only paved the way for an increased foreign presence in Cambod1a, when the American and South Vietnamese began operations 1n Cambodia . 31 Thus a fortnight before the Conference and only a few days after the American Ambassador's assurance that the United States would not supply arms to Cambodia, the United States extended the Vietnam War into Cambodia e For the Americans, it was argued, this was necessary to achieve their overall objectives of

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driving the communists out of their Cambodian sanctuaries and to strengthen the anti-communist position in South Vietnam, so as to permit the continuing withdrawal of But once Cambodia became embroiled the United States. in the general war in Indo-China, it was difficult to isolate Cambodia's problems; any solution to these problems would have to be included in an overall settlement of the Indo-China war. What was more significant was that Cambodia reestablished its relations with Thailand, South Vietnam and South Korea in May and these paved the way for military assistance from these countries to Cambodia. A week after the Conference, the Cambodian Foreign Min1ster declared that American and South Vietnamese troops were to remain in Cambodia until the North Vietnamese and Vietcong had been defeated.32 A polit1cal settlement at an internat1onal conference on the lines of the Geneva Conference of 1954 would not be acceptable to the communists, particularly China and North Vietnam, in view of the past failures to abide by This explains partly the lukewarm the agreements reached. to the Conference's call Moscow response from London and It was also the for a reconvening of the conference. reason for the rejection of India, Poland and Canada to India reactivate the International Control Commission. refused to attend the Djakarta Conference on the ground that 1t was a member of the I.c . c , and Canada would not agree to the reactivation of the I.C . C. unless some form of international agreement had been reached on its political and military objectives . 33 The United Nations' Secretary who had himself proposed an international conference to solve the problem of Cambodia welcomed the Conference's report but nothing was done to place the matter before the Security Council. Cambodia's neutrality was a reaJ issue though there was l1ttle that Cambodia or others would do to maintain it . Prince Sihanouk's strategy was apparently one of "a carefully negotiated accommodation with the communists," as he realized that the alternative was a war which was sure to r a vage the country and probably result in it being taken over eventually by the communists.34 He managed to contain communist infiltration and sought to maintain Cambodia's independence, sovereignty, More significant, neutrality and territorial integrity. After he kept out the fighting of the war in Cambodia. his downfall however, the presence of American and South Vietnam aggravated the problem of Cambodia's

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neutrality and this was to lead to Cambodia's alignment on the side of the anti-communists, signified by Cambodia's acceptance of American military assistance and reestablishment of diplomatic relations with South Vietnam, South Korea and,Thailand . Cambodia was then plunged into the war, which it had so long avoided o

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IV The Djakarta Conference on Cambodia _is an illustration of Indonesia's attitude towards regional security o The stability of Cambodia and the rest of Indo-China is of national interest to Indonesia and while it was not prepared to extend arms assistance, it was prepared to attempt some influence through diplomacy to check the tide of the cold war in Southeast Asia o 35 In the event it was not successful. However, its concern for regional security could have inspired other countries in Southeast Asia to consider other alternatives to maintain stability in the region o Malaysia's proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia with Great Power guarantees and the Philippines' call for an Asian summit could be consequences of such an Indonesian initiative. It may yet be that an international conference of the sort that Adam Malik first intended, but broadened to include those Western powers directly involved, could be the answer to the problems of Indo-China. It may be that the mantle of leadership on security matters pertaining to the region of Southeast Asia may fall on Indonesia. This will be the case if the in t ernational situation as prevalent today persists. The gradual American military withdrawal, and the increasing acceptance of self-reliance in security matters may impose on Indonesia a regional security role despite its non-aligned foreign policy. Presently, howeverf this would project Indonesia in an anti-communist role in Southeast Asia. Firstly, the Indonesian Army is avowedly anti-communist and anti-China . Post-coup events had badly damaged relations between Peking and 36 Djakarta and the Army leaders have never trusted China . The fear of China by Indonesia was not that of direct Chinese military intervention but it was the fear of Chinese direction of local communist parties and particularly of Chinese influence of the resident minorities.37 The Indonesians were not trustful of the Russians as well. It rejected a Russian move after the March coup to revive Brezhnev's proposal for a collective security pact for the area.38 Both China and Russia rejected the report of the Djakarta Conference o Adam Malik said Russia would regret its decision and he ~ accused China of conducting a policy of setting the nations of Asia against one another over the question of Cambodia.39 Secondly, Indonesia's relations with the United States have become closer . Aside from

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American assistance and i nves t ments, both the Presidents of Indonesia and t he Un ited St a t es have exchanged visits.40 Whether I ndone si a would assume a regional security role in Southeast Asi a may be clearer in the future. What is certain is t hat Indonesia has indicated concern that the ASEAN region should not fall to the communists. ASEAN is the vehicle f or Indonesia's primacy and it is concerned with the i n s urgency situations in the member states . 41 Finally , it may be useful to remember that at the AS EAN ministeri al meeting i n 1970 Adam Malik sugges ted th a t a milit ary bloc centred on ASEAN was Referring t hen to the American military possible . di engagement and Brit ain' s withdrawal, he stated, As a solution to the problems arising out fr om those developments, a shift in the I am ce ntre of gravity is often suggested. shift a of the opin i on that should there be i n the cent r e of gravity among the Southeast A ian states , it 1s our duty to direct such centre int o that of: a p o larization of forces o f the Sout heas t Asian nations themselves. Far too long already has the fear engendered by the cold war and the ensuing fight for s ecurity dr i ven us into a blind reliance to a non-region al power which most often has no p a rallel 1.n erest w1 th ur m.Jn . Therefore, Indonesia considers the reduction on nonregional powers involvement in our reg1on not to be un derstood as an invitation for the expansion of the interest of another non-region al power.42 In Djakarta, the Conferen c e on Cambodia has come t o be regarded as the most important diplomatic initiative since the Bandung Conference of 1955 . 43 It has manifested an aspe ct of Indonesia's independent, active and non-aligned policy in that where the issues pertains to regional s ecur1ty, it will take the 1n1tiat iv r~ Desp1te towards exer c ising inf luence on the matter . in a that is known difficulties Indonesia's attitude regional crisis, Asians themselves must attempt to solve the problem, part icularly when the Great Powers concerned seem unprepared to do anyth1ng about it. An international confe rence will express their concern and at the same time i t is hoped that the Great Powers and the United Nations will take heed of their Specifically, the Cambodian crisis r c ommendations .

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Indo nesia fears affe cts Indo nesi a's natio nal inter esto a radi cal shif t in the balan ce of powe r in main land est~. Sout heas t Asia whic h will affe ct its long term inter Whil e the mili tary with in Indo nesia may want to take stron ger meas ures to aid Camb odia, the poli tica l le cons idera tions have prev ailed . Howe ver, it is conc eivab that in the area of Indo nesi a's imme diate envi ronm ent, Indo nesia may take mili tary actio n to meet a regio nal ns cris is. This is stren gthe ned by the fact that Indo nesia are alrea dy coop erati ng in mili tary oper ation s with . Mala ysia, and othe r ASEAN memb ers are ·doin g likew ise It is know n that Indo nesia has alrea dy cons idere d ASEAN h as the basi s of a regio nal secu rity orga niza tion, whic nts may take into acco unt the pres ent secu rity arran geme in the area .

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FOOTNOTES 1.

From the speech of Presid ent Suhart o at the openin g of the Confer ence of Foreig n Minis ters, Djaka rta, 16 May 1970 (origi nal t ext in Indon esian) , Depart ment of Foreig n Minis try, Djaka rta, 1970 Confer ence of Foreig n Minis ters, pp . l7-19. Djaka rta, 16-17 May 1970.

2.

The term "non-a lignme nt" is commo nly used to descri be the foreig n polici es of nation s which are not in an allian ce with either the Commu nists or the Wester n bloc, though it may not convey satisf actorily a descri ption of their polici es . Other terms used are "non-b loc", or "uncom mitted " and Non-a ligned nation s claim "act ively neutra l". a right to be non-n eutral to partic ipate active ly in world affair s includ ing certai n aspect s of the J.M. Burton , Intern ationa l Relati ons, ma i n rivalr y. A Ge n e ra l T heory, Cambr idge Unive rsity Press, London 1967, p. 164-16 5.

3.

For a study of this see W.J. Ju, The Rise and Fall o f the Dj a karta- Peking Axis, 1946- 1966,M ississi p?i State Unive rsity, Rl.D. 1967. Unive rsity Micro films Inc , Ann Arbor , Michig an .

4.

The Unit e d States so far has not been keen on the propo sal for the neutr alizat ion of South east Asia or1gin ated by Malay sia . For a brief discus sion of the proble ms assoc iated with the propo sal, see Lau Teik Soon, 'Malay sia and the Neutr alizat ion of South east Asia" in Trends in Southe ast As i a : No . 2 Proc eeding s and Backgr ound Paper of Semina r Instit ute of South east on Trends in Malays i a. Asian Studie s, Singap ore, July 1971, pp . 27-32 ,

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5.

Major Asian Arrred Forces, 19 70

Japan

Olina

Taiwan

North Korea

South Korea

118,250

103,650

750,00)

14,400

13,600

31,800

Amty ((XX))

275

2,500

570

40 50 365

150 180 2,830

387 34 65 486

370

Navy

179 38 42 259

13 30 413

19

23 612

0.31

0.25

0.38

3.38

3.04

1.92

Indooesia

Pq>ulatioo ((XX))

((XX))

Air Force (CXX>) Total ((XX))

%of populatioo Solroe:

Strrategic Survey, 1970. Landen, 1971, p. 37.

'!he Institute for Strategic Sttrlies,

6.

See Lau Teik Soon, "Security and Stability in the ASEAN region", Asia Research Bulletin (Singapore) Vol. I . No. 4 September 1971, pp. 242-243 and Vol. I No. 5 October 1971, pp. 316-317.

7.

Addressing the Indonesian Parliament in August 1967 General Suharto, then Ag. President stated, "The old order had carried out a confrontation against these two countries(Malaysia and Singapore) a confrontat1on which had not been beneficial nor advantageous to Indonesia. Good neighbourliness means mutual respect and cooperation. It means that every nation enjoys equal rights, big or small. Under the good neighbour policy, cooperation can be carried out which will bring about not only national but also regional benefit." For General Suharto's State address to the Indonesian Parliament, see Monitoring Digest (Singapore), 17 August, 1967, pp. 26-34.

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8"

For a revealing discussion on the theme of the military as a force of stab i lity in Indonesia, see T. B. Simatupang ( Lieut-General Indonesian Army-Retired) The Role of the M i l ita~ y i n Stab ili zat i on of Southeast As i an Nat ions , with Sp e c i al Focus on Indon e s i a, 20 January 1970 , See also ~ugroho ~otosusanto, The Dual (Mimeo). Function o f the Ind onesian Armed Forc es , especially s ince 196 6 , Departemen I=ertahanan - Keamanan, Paper F\.lsat Sedj arah ABRI, DJakarta, 19 70. presented at the S. E Aslan Seminar of the Instltut fur Aslen Kunde, Hamburg ,

9.

Thls argument of a forward defence strategy has been Although it has not been very successful, well tried. lt has bought time for those countr1es that have felt themselves threatened, Such an attltude has bee n adopted by the allies of the United States in Thailand, the lliilippines, Australla the Vie tn a m War. and ~ ew Zea land have actively partlclpated in the wars fought in distant lands on the ground that lf the threat is not met there, lt would advance towards This lS the "domino mentality" of these countries . them.

10.

M

11 .

.Eeter A Poole, Expans~on of the Vietn am War i n ro Cambodi a, Action and Res p onse b y the GovernmGnts o f North Vietnam, South V~et nam, C ambod~a and the Un~ted States, Ohio University Center for Inte rnational Studies, Southeast Asia Frogram, See also J. L. S. r, l rlinq ' s .\ t '1ens, Ohio, 1970. d1sc ussion of the internal determin a n t s le a dln g to the downfall of S1hanouk: see hi s Cambodia and the S i hanouk myths, Instltute of Southe ast As1 an Studies, Singapore, 1971 ,

12.

Donald Hindle y, ''Indonesia 19 70: The Work1ng o f fant]aslla Democracy", Asian Su:r•vey, Vol . IX ~ o . 2 February, 1971, pp " lll-119 .

13.

Wilfred Burchett, 'The Second Indo-Chlna War", New York, 1970, p . 65, quoted in Newswee k , 25 May 1970, see Donald Hindley, ~b~d . p , 113 .

o f Fo r ei g n Mi nist e r s o f ASEAN membe r c ountries Decl aration and Jo~n t Comm un i qu e , 26-27 ~ovember, 1971, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

et~n g

- 19 -

14 ,

According to Radio Hanoi quoting an AP report, "four Indonesian officials including two military off i cers, one military intelligence man and one civilian government official have quietly arrived in Phnom Penh to consider Cambodia's appeal for mil i tary assistance." Monitoring Digest~ ( Singapore ) ~ 23 April 1970, p. 17. The Djakarta Ti mes of 9 April 1970 also quoting Radio Hanoi stated that a eight member military police team from Indonesia would arrive in Phnom Penh on 19 April .

15 .

In his first. press conference, Lon Nol named Indonesia and France as two of the countries from which he expected a favourable response to his request for arms assistance. Far Eastern Economi c Review ~ 9 April, 1970, p. 18 .

16,

According to the report, a former Cambodian Cabinet member, May Say was in Djakarta as the special envoy of Lon Nol for talks with President Suharto. One of the issues discussed was the urgent need of Cambodia for arms. Asian Almanac~ Vol . 8, No. 25, June 20 19 70 , p. 4024.

17.

Reported in Monitoring Digest (Singapore ) , 1970, p . 20 .

18.

Michael Leifer, who visited Indonesia in late 1970 s tated, "it was thought that some generals would support an Indonesian expeditionary force to Cambodia especially as they saw such an undertaking as a way of securing American military aid to replenish their rundown arms and equipment . " Michael Leifer, "Indonesia's Future Role", The World Today ~ Vol. 26, December 1970, p. 517 .

19.

The Djakarta

20.

The United States Ambassador on 20 April gave an assurance that the United States would not supply arms a i d to Cambodia and supported Indonesia's proposal for an Asian Conference. Monit oring D i g e st ~ ( Singapore)~ 21 April 1970, p . 20.

2 1.

See the report by 0 . G. Roeder in the Far Eastern Economic Review~ 7 May 1970, p. 15.

22 .

Michael Leifer, op.

23.

0 . G. Roeder, op , cit , , p . 15 .

T i mes~

24 April,

9 April, 1970.

cit,~

p. 514 .

- 20 -

24.

Francis Starner, in the Par Eastern Economic Review, 4 June, 1970, p. 62-63 ,

25.

Indonesia approached Malaysia to host the meeting between 5-11 May as the former would be occupied with the visit of certain Heads of Governments It was Malaysia did not accept. to Indonesia . Tengku Minister, Prime noted that the Malaysian Abdul Rahman wanted to extend the discussions of the Conference to the general security situation in Southeast Asia and not just confine them to Monitoring Digest, rSingap or·ei, 21 and Cambodia. 2 5 Apr i 1 , 19 7 0 .

26 .

The summit meeting of the Indo-Chlnese peoples was attended by Prince Sihanouk (Cambodia) Prince Souphanouvong (Laos) Pham Vang Dong (North Vietnam) Nguyen Hue Tho (NLF of South Vietnam) and held on 23 Apr1l, 1970, "somewhere 1n the Laos-VietnamChina border area . " Monitoring Digest ( Singapore ) 28 April, 1970, pp. 12-16.

27.

For a summary of Hanoi's reply dated 27 April to Indonesia invitation see Monitoring Digest rsingaporei, 30 April, 1970, p. 22.

28 .

Department of Foreign Affairs, DJakarta: p. 73, Conference of Foreign Ministers, j6-l / May, l970 ,

29.

Ib1-d , , p. 74.

30.

Nusantara, 6 August 1970. Translation in the Indonesian Current Affairs Translation Serv i ce !ICATS) Djakarta .

31.

When the Un1ted States and South V1etnam moved 1nto Carnbod1a on 1 May, 1970, Lon Nol stated that he had no~ been consulted in advance and that he might lodge a protest against the American and Far East e rn Econom i c South Vietnamese incurs1ons . . 1970 April, 30 Review,

32.

Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 June, 1970, p. 7