Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus: Regional Conflicts and Transformation [1 ed.] 1409422747, 9781409422747

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
List of Figures, Tables and Maps
List of Abbreviations
List of Contributors
Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Part I: Risks, Threats and Conflict Settlement
1 Georgia-Russia Conflict in August 2008: War as a Continuation of Politics
2 Unfreezing Conflict in South Ossetia: Regional and International Implications
3 Armenia’s National Security: External Threats, Domestic Challenges
4 Breaking the Deadlock: Karabakh, Nabucco and the Madrid Principles
Part II: Cooperation with Regional Neighbours: Toward a New Balance?
5 Azerbaijan in the Changing Status Quo: Adaptation Strategies
6 Armenia: Managing New Opportunities for Regional Integration
7 Georgia’s National Security and Regional Policy after the August 2008 War
8 Changing Dynamics of Turkish Foreign and Security Policies in the Caucasus
9 Iranian Foreign Policy towards the South Caucasus: Between Revolutionary Ideals and Realpolitik
Part III: Integration into the Eurasian Community: Taking Stock
10 Nato’s Engagement in the South Caucasus
11 The European Union’s Policy in the South Caucasus: In Search of a Strategy
12 Armenia’s Foreign and Security Policy: Is Complementarity Possible?
13 Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: Explaining Georgia’s Alignments in Security Institutions
Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus Regional Conflicts and Transformation

Edited by Annie Jafalian

Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus

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Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus Regional Conflicts and Transformation

Edited by Annie Jafalian Université Jean Moulin – CLESID, France

© Annie Jafalian 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Annie Jafalian has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editor of this work. Published by Ashgate Publishing Limited Ashgate Publishing Company Suite 420 Wey Court East Union Road 101 Cherry Street Farnham Burlington Surrey, GU9 7PT VT 05401-4405 USA England www.ashgate.com British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Reassessing security in the South Caucasus : regional conflicts and transformation. 1. Security, International--Caucasus, South. 2. Security, International--Caucasus, South--Cross-cultural studies. 3. Caucasus, South--Politics and government--1991I. Jafalian, Annie. 355'.033'0475-dc22 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jafalian, Annie. Reassessing security in the South Caucasus : regional conflicts and transformation / by Annie Jafalian. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4094-2274-7 (hbk) -- ISBN 978-1-4094-2275-4 (ebk) 1. Security, International--Caucasus, South. 2. Caucasus, South--Foreign relations--1991- 3. National security--Caucasus, South--International cooperation. 4. Conflict management--Caucasus, South--International cooperation. I. Title. JZ6009.C38J34 2011 355'.0330475--dc23 ISBN 9781409422747 (hbk) ISBN 9781409422754 (ebk)

2011017894 III

Contents List of Figures, Tables and Maps    List of Abbreviations    List of Contributors     Preface    Acknowledgements    Introduction   Annie Jafalian PART I 1

vii ix xi xv xvii 1

Risks, Threats and Conflict Settlement

Georgia-Russia Conflict in August 2008: War as a Continuation of Politics    Thornike Gordadze

11



Unfreezing Conflict in South Ossetia: Regional and International Implications    Sergey Markedonov

33

3

Armenia’s National Security: External Threats, Domestic Challenges 47 Richard Giragosian

4

Breaking the Deadlock: Karabakh, Nabucco and the Madrid Principles    Hayk Kotanjian

2



PART II

65

Cooperation with Regional Neighbours: Toward a New Balance?

5

Azerbaijan in the Changing Status Quo: Adaptation Strategies   Burcu Gültekin-Punsmann

75

6

Armenia: Managing New Opportunities for Regional Integration    91 Alexander Iskandaryan and Sergey Minasyan

Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus

vi

7 8 9

Georgia’s National Security and Regional Policy after the August 2008 War   Nika Chitadze

105

Changing Dynamics of Turkish Foreign and Security Policies in the Caucasus   Mustafa Aydin

117

Iranian Foreign Policy towards the South Caucasus: Between Revolutionary Ideals and Realpolitik   Clément Therme

137

PART III Integration into the Eurasian Community: Taking Stock 10 11 12 13

Nato’s Engagement in the South Caucasus: Looking for Energy Security or Expanding Norms and Values?   Pierre Jolicoeur and Frédéric Labarre

157

The European Union’s Policy in the South Caucasus: In Search of a Strategy   Laure Delcour

177

Armenia’s Foreign and Security Policy: Is Complementarity Possible?  Tevan Poghosyan

195

Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: Explaining Georgia’s Alignments in Security Institutions   Levan Tsutskiridze

209

Conclusion   Annie Jafalian

223

Index   

231

List of Figures, Tables and Maps Figure 10.1 Projected Gas Pipelines to European NATO States (UNEP/GRID-Arendal)  

176

Tables 3.1 The South Caucasus: Regional Military Spending (2004-2009)   53 3.2 Armenia: Economic Growth (Annual GDP)   60 10.1 Caucasus Reserves at a Glance for 2009 (U.S. Department of Energy)   173 10.2 NATO Countries Energy Statistics for 2009 (U.S. Department of Energy)   174 10.3 NATO Countries Energy Statistics (Natural Gas) for 2009 (U.S. Department of Energy)   175 Maps 1  States and Borders in the Caucasus   2  The Caucasus: An Energy Corridor  

xviii xix

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List of Abbreviations BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan BTE Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CSCP Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organisation FSA Freedom Support Act EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office EU European Union EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission ENP European Neighbourhood Policy CFE Conventional Forces in Europe GTEP Georgian Train and Equip Program IDP Internally Displaced Persons INOGATE Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe IPAP Individual Partnership Action Plan JCC Joint Control Commission LNG Liquefied Natural Gas MAP Membership Action Plan NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NIS Newly Independent States NK Nagorno-Karabakh OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement PfP Partnership for Peace SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SOCAR State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic TACIS Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia UN United Nations UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WTO World Trade Organisation

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List of Contributors Mustafa Aydin, Professor of International Relations, is the Rector of the Kadir Has University (Istanbul) and the Director of International Policy Research Institute (TEPAV-IPRI) of Ankara. He holds an MA in International Relations and Strategic Studies (1991) and a PhD in Political Sciences and International Relations from Lancaster University, UK (1994). He joined Ankara University’s Faculty of Political Sciences as academic member in 1995. Between 2005 and 2009, Professor Aydin worked for the University of Economics and Technology as the Head of the Department of International Relations. He is an expert on Foreign Policy, Security and Strategic Studies, with a specific interest in Turkey and Eurasian Politics. Nika Chitadze graduated from Tbilisi State University (1993) and the Georgian Diplomatic Academy (1999) before obtaining his PhD in Political Science on Georgia’s role in Caspian oil projects (2004). He held various positions at the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997-1998), Ministry of Defence (19982000), State Agency for Regulation Oil and Gas Resources (2000-2004), and National Security Council (2004-2005). After some lecturing experience abroad (Poland and Germany), he has been actively involved in Georgian academic circles: Tbilisi State University (since 2008), American University for Humanities (since 2002), University of Georgia (since 2009), and Black Sea International University (since 2010). Laure Delcour holds a PhD in political science (Sciences Po, Paris). She is currently with the Directorate of European Affairs, French Ecole Nationale d’Administration, and with the Institute for International and Strategic Relations (IRIS, Paris). Her research focuses on EU policies in the post-Soviet area (specifically on policy reception and region-building aspects). Her publications include: Pioneer Europe? Testing European Foreign Policy in its Neighbourhood (co-edited with Elsa Tulmets, Nomos, 2008); Shaping the Post-Soviet Space?: EU Policies and Approaches to Region-Building (Ashgate, 2011). Richard Giragosian is the Director of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS) in Yerevan, Armenia. He is a regular contributor to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) publications and is a contributing analyst for the London-based Jane’s Information Group, covering political, economic and security issues in the South Caucasus, Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.

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Thornike Gordadze holds a PhD in Political Science (2006) from Sciences Po, Paris, for a dissertation on the socio-historical formation of the Georgian nation. He was Fox Fellow at Yale Center for International and Area Studies (Yale University, 2002-2003), lecturer at Sciences Po, Paris, and worked for the Forward Planning Unit of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004-2005). He is a member of the Central Eurasian Studies Society and the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN, London). In 2006, he joined the Institut Français des Etudes Anatoliennes (IFEA) as director of its Caucasus Laboratory in Baku. In 2010, Thornike Gordadze was appointed Georgia’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Burcu Gültekin-Punsmann is a senior foreign policy analyst at the Economic Policy Researcher Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) and a lecturer at the Department of International Relations, TOBB-ETU University (Ankara). From 2003 to 2009, she worked with the London-based NGO International Alert. She was previously a post-doctoral research fellow at the Centre for European Studies, at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara (2006-2008). In 2004-2005, she received NATO Manfred Wörner Fellowship and researched on security in the Black Sea region. She worked in 2000-2002 at the Istanbul-based French Institute for Anatolian Studies. Burcu Gültekin-Punsmann holds a PhD from the Paris Institute of Political Studies. Alexander Iskandaryan is a political scientist and the Director of the Yerevanbased Caucasus Institute. His areas of study are ethno-political conflicts, postCommunist transformations and nation building in the former USSR in general and in the Caucasus in particular. He has widely published on the region and edited, in cooperation with Aybars Gorgulu and Sergey Minasyan a report entitled “Assessing the Rapprochement Process”, Turkey-Armenia Dialogue Series, TESEV-CI, Istanbul, May 2010. Annie Jafalian is a Lecturer in Political Science and International Relations at the Jean Moulin-Lyon III University (France) and a Research Fellow at the Lyon Centre for International Security and Defence Studies (CLESID). She specialised in conflicts and security in the South Caucasus and extended her field of expertise to energy policies in the Caspian Sea region, an experience she acquired in particular while working at the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS). Pierre Jolicoeur is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston (Ontario) and Research fellow at the Queen’s Centre for International Relations (Queen’s University). His researches are mainly focused on the Caucasus region, Russian foreign policy, secessionism, de facto states, and federalism.

List of Contributors

xiii

Hayk Kotanjian, Major General, Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary (ret.). Dr Hayk S. Kotanjian is the Head of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), MOD, Armenia, member of the Academic-Expert Board of the CSTO (Moscow), and Chairman of the Academic Commission on Conferment of Doctoral Degrees in Political Science (Yerevan). MG Kotanjian is a graduate and a Counterterrorism fellow, National Defense University (20032004). He has two PhD degrees; Social Psychology of Management (Moscow, 1981) and Political Science and Strategic Security Studies (Moscow, 1992). Dr Kotanjian has previously served as Armenia’s first Defense Attaché to the USA (1998-2002); Head, Department of External Relations and International Cooperation, MoD, Armenia (1995-1998); Founder-Editor in Chief, Armenia’s Scientific Defense Quarterly Magazine (1994-1998). He served as a Senior Political Analyst in Afghanistan (1982-1983). He has also held several academic and research positions in Armenia, Russia and the USA. Frédéric Labarre has been a strategic analyst and international project manager since the late 1990s. He has been Head of Department of Political and Strategic Studies at the Baltic Defence College, ADL Chair at the NATO Defense College, and International Liaison for the Royal Military College of Canada. He holds a BA from Ottawa University and an MA from Bradford University. Sergey Markedonov is an expert on the Caucasus and Black Sea regions, specialising in security, nationalism, interethnic conflicts and de facto states. He graduated from Rostov-on-Don State University in 1995 and earned his doctoral degree in history in 1999. From 1996 to 1999, he was a lecturer in the History Department of Rostov-on-Don State Pedagogical University. After serving as senior fellow at the Governor’s Press-Service in the Rostov Regional Administration (1998-2001), he worked as head of the Interethnic Relations Group and deputy director at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow (2001-2010). Sergey Markedonov is currently a visiting fellow in the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program in Washington. Sergey Minasyan, a political scientist and holds a PhD in Military History. Since March 2006, he has headed the Political Studies Department of the Caucasus Institute, Yerevan, Armenia. Minasyan’s publications focus on regional security and conflicts in the South Caucasus. He has contributed widely to the review Central Asia and the Caucasus and recently published “Prospects for Normalization between Armenia and Turkey: A View from Yerevan”, Insight Turkey, 12(2), 2010. Tevan Poghosyan has been Executive Director of the International Center for Human Development (ICHD) since it was established in 1999. In 2001, he also became the executive of the Armenian Atlantic Association. He has been lecturing on Conflict Management and Leadership at the Russian-Armenian (Slavonic)

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University for almost ten years. Tevan Poghosyan graduated from the American University of Armenia (Department of Political Science) in 1996. Levan Tsutskiridze is a specialist in international relations with a focus on strategic and security studies. He completed his BA degree in International Relations at Tbilisi Ivane Javakhishvili State University and his MA degree at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins. Mr. Tsutskiridze has worked in the research, education and democratic development sectors at the OSCE, Open Society Foundation and the Georgian Institute of Public Affairs. He is the founder of the Association for International Relations – a professional association of international relations educators and institutions. Currently, he serves as the Representative of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy in Georgia. Clément Therme completed his PhD on “Iranian Foreign Policy since 1979: The Soviet-Russian Case” at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS, Paris) and at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva) in 2011. From 2005 to 2009, he worked for the “Iran” program of the French Institute of International Affairs (IFRI) in Paris.

Preface The idea of publishing this book arose out of a conference which was held in Yerevan in May 2009 on the initiative of the Lyon Centre for International Security and Defence Studies in France and the Institute for National Strategic Studies in Armenia. Geopolitical developments like the enlargements of NATO, the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 and the launch of the EU Eastern Partnership created a new security environment in the South Caucasus that required an updated analysis on the region. The present volume aims at reassessing security interests, perceptions and policies at national, regional and international levels through cross-national studies. The authors contributing to this collection are from different countries: Armenia, Georgia, Russia, Turkey, Canada, France – all of them holding key positions in academic and research institutions, and with extensive experience in the area. Experts from Azerbaijan, Iran and the US were also invited to contribute but, in the end, for reasons beyond our control, could not take part in the project. We hope that more favourable circumstances will make it possible next time for them to participate and for us to benefit from their contributions. The approach chosen in this book is based on a comparative analysis of security perceptions of the main players involved in the South Caucasus. Each chapter provides a detailed account of the views expressed by a given state or international organisation on regional security events or actors. There are a number of obvious reasons for this. Despite new information and communication technologies, growing interaction and interdependence worldwide, increased sensitivity towards outside events and shared values and concerns, security perceptions are still deeply rooted in their geographic, political, historical and cultural environments. On the one hand, distances or proximity continue, to some extent, to shape and differentiate security perceptions and interests, thereby prioritising international political action. This was especially true in the early 1990s, at a time when the South Caucasus was considered by the West to be a remote and rather unknown area, and when the experience of war created divided lines and visions of security among regional actors. On the other hand, the South Caucasus has evolved since then, showing some signs of increased interaction with the West and growing regional cooperation. As a whole, this compiled work reflects different ways of understanding and interpreting security developments in the South Caucasus, depending on the actor concerned. Whenever possible, priority was given to local expertise that, balanced against others and taken all together, offers key indicators of emerging similarities and differences in security perceptions, and denotes changing and continuing

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trends in regional security affairs. This book is an attempt to identify to what extent the South Caucasus has been transformed in security terms over the last two decades. Annie Jafalian 2011

Acknowledgements This collective work would not have been possible without valued support provided by several institutions. From the early steps until full completion of this book, the European section of the Armenian General Benevolent Union, involved in cultural and educational programmes and headed by Alexis Govciyan, has invested major human, organisational and financial resources in the project. The Eurasian Partnership Foundation, chaired by Gevorg Ter-Gabrielyan in Armenia, has also provided important financial assistance, especially to cover authors’ fees. The Lyon Centre for International Security and Defence Studies, under the leadership of Professor Jean-Paul Joubert, and the Institute for National Strategic Studies, directed by Major General Kotanjian, provided a reliable framework for cooperation. My thanks first go to those who agreed to fund and materialise this project. Like all compiled volumes, this book is the product of active collaboration with a team of authors who interrupted their busy schedules to produce their papers and update their contributions. I would like to thank them for their commitment and their patience, especially those who have been mobilised to provide helpful advice and information: Laure Delcour and Richard Giragosian. I should also like to express my gratitude to Professor Roy Allison and Professor Mohammad-Reza Djalili for their guidance and contacts. Jonathan Kirk kindly accepted to proofread the text and make essential corrections. I am particularly grateful to Sheila Adrian for invaluable support in the very last steps and working hours. Finally, I would like to thank Kirstin Howgate and Margaret Younger from Ashgate, for their trust and encouragement. Lastly, I would like to address a more personal word to Violette and Gabriel, for their special care and attention, our breaks and good times; Sophie and Gérard, who are an essential reference and a great source of inspiration; Agnès and Eric, for their friendship and support at every single step of the project; and those who have departed but are still in my thoughts: Bagrat, Jeannot and Selim. I owe these people more than words can express.

International boundary Internal boundary

Azov Sea

State capital Other city

Conflict areas / de facto states in the South Caucasus

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

ADYGEYA Maykop

KAZAKHSTAN

Cherkessk Karachaevsk KARACHAYEVOCHERKESIYA ABKHAZIA Kodori Valley Sukhumi

Black Sea

KABARDINOBALKARIYA

CHECHNYA

Nalchik

NORTH- Magas Grozny OSSETIA Vladikavkaz INGUSHETIYA

SOUTHOSSETIA Tskhinvali Batumi

AJARIA

GEORGIA

Makhachkala

Tbilisi

ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN

Yerevan Lake

Sevan

NAGORNOKARABAKH Stepakanert

TURKEY NAKHICHEVAN (Az.)

Credits: Annie Jafalian / Cartography: Nicolas Rageau

Caspian Sea

DAGESTAN

Pankisi Gorge

Lake Van

Map 1  States and Borders in the Caucasus

IRAN

Baku

Existing oil pipelines Existing oil flows towards the BTC

GERMANY

Existing gas pipelines

POLAND

Proposed gas pipelines

CZECH REPUBLIC

RUSSIA

UKRAINE

Possible gas flows towards the Nabucco

KAZAKHSTAN

SLOVAKIA AUSTRIA

HUNGARY

SLOVENIA

MOLDAVIA

N

ab

CROATIA

ROMANIA uc

co

SERBIA BULGARIA

MONTENEGRO

Novorossisk

ea h Str Sout

BOSNIA ITALY

Caspian Sea

MACEDONIA

Blue Supsa Stream

Erzerum

Black Sea

N abu

ALBANIA

TURKMENISTAN

GEORGIA

m

Tbilisi

AZERBAIJAN

c co

TURKEY

GREECE

IRAN Ceyhan

SYRIA CYPRUS Credits: Annie Jafalian / Cartography: Nicolas Rageau

CRETE

Baku

ARMENIA

Mediterranean Sea

Map 2  The Caucasus: An Energy Corridor

IRAQ

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Introduction Annie Jafalian

When I first visited the South Caucasus in Autumn 1993, I realised how wrong some of my research assumptions were, faced with the events on the ground. Field experience and interviews are precisely an effective way to correct misperceptions that outside observers may construe in interpreting facts and words, no matter how knowledgeable and well informed these observers are. Collaboration with local experts is another way to approach reality and express how specific events, considered as crucial in one part of the world, are perceived in another part of the world. In this regard, this book serves a major purpose: it sheds new light on regional security issues by grouping specialists who are mainly from inside the region or the countries in question. This compiled volume thereby seeks to provide greater visibility to analyses developed on the periphery of the world system. General Background In the early 1990s, the South Caucasus, located at the intersection of Europe and Asia, was generally viewed by the West as a far-away and landlocked area within the post-Soviet space. Comprised of three newly-independent republics, that is, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, which emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, the region was mainly presented as Russia’s south1 and integrated de facto by the Kremlin into its Near Abroad policy.2 As the successor state of the USSR, and a South Caucasus’ border country, Russia claimed to have specific interests in the region and therefore created a regional organisation in December 1991 aimed at integrating the former Soviet republics: the CIS. Armenia became a member from the start, whereas Azerbaijan and Georgia joined the organisation later, in 1993.3 By the same token, Moscow drafted a collective security treaty in May 1992 to enhance security cooperation with some of its CIS partners, institutionalised in 1999 as the CSTO. Armenia then extended its participation in the treaty, but Azerbaijan and Georgia withdrew from it. 1  This was, for instance, the case in France (De Tinguy 1993), Germany (Halbach and Tiller 1994), the US (Blank 1995) and the UK (Allison 1996). 2  For some references to Russia’s Near Abroad policy, see in particular: Jonson 1996, MacFarlane 1997. 3  In August 2008, Georgia announced it would withdraw from the CIS and officially completed the process in August 2009.

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Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus

At the time, the South Caucasus was also characterised by spiralling violence and wars, thereby becoming “an exception” in the overall peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union (Zürcher 2007: 2). In the late 1980s, Armenians from NagornoKarabakh, representing over 75 per cent of the local population but integrated into the republic of Azerbaijan, called for self-determination with Yerevan’s support and for incorporation into the neighbouring republic of Armenia, thus challenging Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. Hostilities escalated after the dismantlement of the USSR and the NK declaration of independence, confirmed by a local referendum. A full-scale war followed between 1992 and 1993, resulting in the opening of a land corridor between NK and Armenia, as well as in the occupation of some Azerbaijani territories serving as an Armeniancontrolled buffer zone around the conflict area. As a consequence, Turkey closed its frontier with Armenia. A ceasefire was signed under Russian mediation in May 1994, integrating the lines of the Armenian armed forces position. In Georgia, the local leadership of the autonomous republic of Abkhazia, composed of only 18 per cent of Abkhaz, drifted away from the Georgian movement for independence from the Soviet Union. Clashes erupted, tensions increased and Georgian forces entered the local capital, Sukhumi. They soon faced Russian governmental and irregular troops, and were pushed back and compelled to accept a Russian-brokered ceasefire in May 1994. Ossetians from South Ossetia, closely tied to Georgia but concerned about Tbilisi’s oppressive cultural policy, also demanded autonomy and independence. Georgian troops were ordered there, then were repelled by local, North Ossetian and other Russian forces, and asked to cease fire in June 1992. CIS-Russian peacekeeping operations were therefore deployed throughout Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The ceasefire agreement was monitored in Abkhazia by a UN Observer Mission (UNOMIG) patrolling the border area. In South Ossetia, it was supervised by a quadrilateral Joint Control Commission4 and the OSCE.5 European and Western countries stayed out of the military operations but became diplomatically involved in conflict resolution processes implemented to determine the status of the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia states that emerged from these wars. In March 1992, the CSCE requested the organisation of a conference in Minsk to provide a forum for the peaceful settlement of the NK conflict. The so-called Minsk Group, composed of eleven states,6 did not convene after all, but in December 1994, the CSCE established a Co-Chairmen Group so as to facilitate negotiations. Within this framework, Russia, France and the US have played a key role in promoting a political 4  The JCC was composed of Georgian, Russian, South and North Ossetian representatives. 5  For recent publications on the history of the Caucasus, see King 2008; on contemporary conflicts in the region, see Waal 2010. 6  Among these states were Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan and, on a rotating basis, the OSCE Troika.

Introduction

3

solution to the NK conflict. As for Abkhazia, a Group of Friends of Georgia was created in 1993, comprising France, Germany, the UK, the US and Russia, later called the Friends of the UN Secretary General. An UN-led peace process, the Geneva talks, facilitated by Russia with OSCE participation and observed by the Group of Friends, attempted to prepare conditions for resolving the conflict through confidence-building measures and regular meetings with Georgian and Abkhazian representatives. However, for this and for discussions held in the more limited format of the JCC for South Ossetia, international mediation efforts failed throughout the 1990s and 2000s, leading to what was called a “no peace no war” situation or frozen conflicts. Since the early 1990s, the EU and the US have also supported transition to democratic governance and market-based economies in the South Caucasus. In December 1991, the EU adopted TACIS programmes to promote institutional, political, economic and social reforms in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, allocating almost €1.3 billion to all three countries between 1991 and 2006.7 Likewise, the US Congress passed the Freedom Support Act in October 1992 to fund assistance programmes in these former Soviet republics. As a result, the US has been a leading aid provider for the South Caucasus area, with over 4 billion US dollars allocated to the whole region from 1992 to 2007.8 The September 11th events and subsequent US-Russian rapprochement marked a new stage in bilateral assistance and security cooperation between the US and South Caucasus countries (Nuriyev 2007: 111-27). From 1994 on, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia had already participated in defence-related activities alongside NATO countries within the framework of the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace. But the fight against terrorism strengthened ties between Washington and regional countries. In October 2001, the US Congress waived restrictions on direct military assistance to Azerbaijan in exchange for involvement in the war on terrorism9 and developed, in parallel, its military cooperation with Armenia. In addition, a few months later, in April 2002, the US Administration launched the Georgian Train and Equip Program to enhance Georgia’s military capabilities.10 This was especially aimed at helping Tbilisi

7  Of the amount, €380 million were used for Armenia, €400 million for Azerbaijan, and €500 million for Georgia. These figures are from the ENPI Country Strategy Papers 2007-2013, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm 8  On the whole, over $1.9 billion US aid was allocated to Georgia, $1.7 billion to Armenia, and $0.7 billion to Azerbaijan. Cf. Mihalka and Wilcox 2010: 31. 9  Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act prohibited U.S. government-togovernment assistance to Azerbaijan until the US President could determine that Baku had taken “demonstrable steps to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and NK”. 10  As a contribution to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, Georgia currently maintains 900 troops in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan: 90 and Armenia: 40.

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Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus

combat terrorism in the Pankisi Gorge, bordering Chechnya, but also at allegedly bolstering Georgia’s capacity to guard its energy pipelines.11 Restoring peace, democracy and development in the South Caucasus has been all the more important because the area, neighbouring the Caspian Sea, helps diversify energy supply sources and hence guarantee energy security for the West. On a regional level, Azerbaijan has significant oil and gas reserves, estimated at 7 billion barrels of oil and 1.3 trillion cubic metres of gas.12 These reserves have been developed by several foreign companies, especially British Petroleum, but also the US majors Chevron and ExxonMobil, the French group Total, the Norwegian Statoil, the Turkish company TPAO, the Iranian NICO and the Japanese Inpex and Itochu, etc., which have heavily invested in Azerbaijani oil and gas exploration and production since the mid-1990s. In the meantime, with strong US support, an East-West energy corridor was promoted for bringing Caspian oil and gas to the Mediterranean Sea and Western markets. Two strategic pipelines were built from Azerbaijan to Turkey, through Georgia. The BTC oil pipeline, inaugurated in July 2006, and the BTE gas pipeline which became fully operational one year later, were both intended to bypass Russia and Iran, in order to diversify and secure Western energy imports. These lines were also conceived as possible routes for Central Asian oil and gas exported to the West. In 2009, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan thus provided – together, with all types of transport included – approximately 9 per cent of the EU oil imports.13 But the European Commission’s priority in the region has recently been to directly link the EU to Caspian gas deposits through development of a southern gas corridor and construction of a Nabucco pipeline that would potentially extend the BTE line from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to Austria (European Commission 2010).14 A Changing Environment In the early 2000s however, a number of developments impacted the delicate geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus. After Vladimir Putin was elected President of the Russian Federation in May 2000, the Kremlin expressed intent to reinforce Russia’s global positioning and prestige, especially in the CIS. As shown by its Foreign Policy Concept dated June 2000, the CIS was defined as a priority area, where cooperation in the military, political and economic fields – including in the use of Caspian Sea natural resources – was to be 11  For a discussion of NATO’s engagement in the South Caucasus, see Cornell et al. 2004. 12  British Petroleum, “British Petroleum Review of World Energy”, June 2010. Available at: http://www.bp.com/ 13  Azerbaijan represented 3.5 per cent of this; see figures released by the EU Commission, DG Energy. 14  For a recent study on Caspian energy, see Øverland et al. 2010.

Introduction

5

developed. In this same document, while cooperation with NATO was praised as being important, the Alliance was called upon to duly respect the interests of both sides. From this perspective, NATO’s enlargement to Eastern European countries in March 2004 caused concern in Moscow, at a time when the newlyelected president of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, decided to focus on restoring the country’s territorial integrity and its integration into the Alliance and the European Union. For most observers, the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 “shattered the geopolitical equilibrium of the Caucasus” (Cheterian 2008: 373). But this event was mainly viewed in existing academic literature as a matter of Russia’s relations with the West. As stated by some US scholars, “the link between Russia’s policies in Georgia and its relationship with the West is inescapable” (Cornell and Starr 2009: 4). Moreover, the confrontation was also presented as “a little war that shook the world”, raising “big questions for the future of European security” (Asmus 2010: 7). Strobe Talbot, a special adviser to the US Secretary of State for the former Soviet Union under the Clinton administration, even considered this to be a “pivotal episode in the evolution of the post-Cold War Europe, Russia and US foreign policy” (Asmus 2010: vii). Focusing on only one part of the picture, these Western-centred approaches overlook other points, in particular the local and regional implications of the Five-Day War. This study aims to reassess security in the South Caucasus in the light of recent geopolitical and security developments in the region. It consists of three parts. The first one examines potential risks, threats and conflicts in the area. In particular, it discusses the causes and consequences of the Russian-Georgian war in each regional country, evoking the possibility of a resumption of hostilities on the ground. Indeed, in June 2009, the International Crisis Group, a thinktank based in Brussels, reported on the “still insecure and dangerous” relations between Georgia and Russia (International Crisis Group 2009). Furthermore, in February 2011, it called for action to “prevent war” between Armenia and Azerbaijan (International Crisis Group 2011). In the second part of this study, regional cooperation developments with direct neighbours like Russia, Turkey and Iran are explored. It especially analyses how closed Russian/Georgian and Armenian/Turkish borders impacted foreign policies towards regional powers. Last of all, the third part of this book examines broader foreign policy alignments within the Eurasian community, in particular with the EU and NATO, requiring difficult balancing acts for the small South Caucasian states faced with substantially-larger power interests and policies. Bibliography Allison, R. 1996. Challenges for the Former Soviet South. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

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Asmus, R. 2010. A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Blank, S. 1995. “Russia’s Drive to the South”. Orbis, 39(3), 369-86. Cheterian, V. 2008. War and Peace in the Caucasus: Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitics. New York: Columbia University Press. Cornell, S., McDermott, R. and O’Malley W. et al. 2004. Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO. Washington: Central Asia and the Caucasus Institute. Available at: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/ publications/2004/nato.pdf Cornell, S. and Starr, F. (eds) 2009. The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. De Tinguy, A. 1993, “La Russie a-t-elle une politique à l’égard de son sud?”. Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, No. 15, 77-98. De Waal, T. 2010. The Caucasus: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. European Commission. 2010. Energy Infrastructure Priorities for 2020 and Beyond - A Blueprint for an Integrated European Energy Network. Communication to the European Parliament, 17 November, COM(2010) 677 final. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=SPLIT_COM:2010:0677%2801%29:FIN:EN:PDF Halbach, U. and Tiller, H. 1994. “Russland und seine Südflanke”. Aussenpolitik, 45(2), 156-65. International Crisis Group. 2009. “Georgia-Russia: Still Insecure and Dangerous”, Europe Briefing No. 53, Tbilisi/Brussels, 22 June. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/B53%20GeorgiaRussia%20-%20Still%20Insecure%20and%20Dangerous.ashx International Crisis Group. 2011. “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Preventing War”, Europe Briefing, No. 60, 8 February. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup. org/~/media/Files/europe/B60%20Armenia%20and%20Azerbaijan%20 -%20Preventing%20War.ashx Jonson, L. 1996. “In Search of a New Doctrine: Russian Interventionism in Conflicts in its Near Abroad”. Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, 5(3), 440-65. King, C. 2008. The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. Oxford: Oxford University Press. MacFarlane, N. 1997, “On the Front Lines in the Near Abroad: The CIS and the OSCE in Georgia’s Civil Wars”. Third World Quarterly, 18(3), 509-25. Mihalka, M. and Wilcox, M. 2010. “Unintended Strategic Consequences of Security Assistance to the South Caucasus”. Joint Force Quarterly, No. 57, 24-32. Available at: http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-57/MihalkaWilcox.pdf Nuriyev, E. 2007. The South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Conflicts, Caspian Oil and Great Power Politics. Berlin: LIT.

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Øverland, I., Kjærnet H. and Kendall-Taylor, A. 2010. Caspian Energy Politics: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. London and New York: Routledge. Zürcher, C. 2007. The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the South Caucasus. New York and London: New York University Press.

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PART I Risks, Threats and Conflict Settlement

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Chapter 1

Georgia-Russia Conflict in August 2008: War as a Continuation of Politics Thornike Gordadze

At the beginning of the 19th century, Karl von Clausewitz wrote that war was a continuation of politics by other means. The 2008 Russian-Georgian war fully corroborates this hypothesis. Renewed hostilities, which lasted for only a few days, were just one episode in the Russian-Georgian confrontation that began long before August 2008 and may still have a long way to go. The conflict between Russia and Georgia dates back at least to Georgia’s independence and the fall of the Soviet Union. Strikingly, very few analysts of the war in 2008 have recalled that in the early 1990s the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia already opposed Georgia and Russia, even if the latter then did not prove to be a conflicting party as clearly as during the last war, preferring large scale support to the secessionists and engaging its regular military forces only in some, albeit decisive occasions. The Russian-Georgian Conflict: From Independence to the “Rose Revolution” In January 1992, Georgia’s President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a nationalist leader with a clear anti-Russian/imperial agenda, was overthrown, amidst almost total indifference by the West.1 Once the shock of disintegration was over, both Georgia and Russia returned to their classical national projects: state-building for the first and restoration of its empire or sphere of influence for the second. Quite logically, their interests clashed again. Eduard Shevardnadze’s regime, allegedly loyal to Moscow, turned out to be as committed as its predecessor to Georgia’s independence and sovereignty. For the sake of Russian hegemony, his regime was to be punished in its own turn. Clearly, there was no serious political force in Georgia submissive enough to surrender its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Admittedly, it would be inaccurate to consider that Russia was unilaterally initiating all of these processes. At the beginning of 1990s, Russia was facing violent internal turmoil and thereby most often reacting to events inside Georgia. 1  The top priority of the EU and the US was then to guarantee stability on the territory of the dislocated nuclear empire.

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Nevertheless, the Kremlin never remained unresponsive, as these events could be instrumental in maintaining its special influence outside of national borders. Ethnic tensions in the region were indeed likely to arise, but without Russian involvement, their intensity and outcome would have probably been radically different. Georgia’s Forced Integration into Russia’s Sphere of Influence In the first years following Gamsakhurdia’s removal from the presidency, Shevardnadze was believed to be firmly tied to Russia because of his past experience in Soviet times. The peace agreement on South Ossetia that he signed in June 1992 in Dagomys with Boris Yeltsin reinforced this commonly held view. According to the provisions of the agreement, Georgian forces, which were holding a dominant position in Tskhinvali and blockading the secessionist stronghold, were called to retreat and join Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping battalions to patrol the conflict zone. The agreement was clearly profitable for Russia and turned out to be rather negative for Georgia.2 Western interest in the region was very limited compared to the weakened, but still very present Russia. Posterior claims by Russian officials and some Russian and Western analysts that Russia suffered a “severe humiliation” from the West in the early 1990s do not stand any serious analysis. Taking into consideration only the Caucasus, the events demonstrate that the West accepted almost everything Russia undertook in the region in the name of stability. At the time, the West markedly lacked willingness to get involved and the American presence was very limited in the region. George Bush Senior’s administration approved and even welcomed the creation of the CIS – which, from the very beginning, was defined by Russia as a zone of special interest.3 Moscow, which had a total freedom of manoeuvre during the Abkhaz and Karabakh wars, was the only international actor involved and did not face any serious condemnation from Western countries. The West did not really level criticism at Russia’s role in ethnic cleansing and massive killings in Abkhazia, which were committed in 1992-1993 either by Russian citizens involved as “volunteers” or by Abkhaz secessionists directly armed and trained by the Russian military.

2  The agreement, officially called “Agreement on Principles of the Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict between Georgia and Russia”, also provided for the creation of a quadrilateral Joint Control Commission, composed of the Russian, North Ossetian, South Ossetian and Georgian sides tasked to supervise the implementation of the agreement. This four-sided body was hardly acceptable for Georgia: it included a biased broker – Russia, and also two (sic) Ossetian delegations, whilst Georgia was only represented by its central government. In addition, three Peace-keeping battalions (Russian-Georgian-Ossetian) jeopardised from the outset any possibility for equal representation. 3  The concept of “Near Abroad” appeared under President Yeltsin’s first term in office.

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In April 1993, speaking to the Georgian parliament, Shevardnadze had to recognise that Georgia was facing Russia in Abkhazia. In fact, the conflict in Abkhazia and Russia’s growing involvement against Georgia had definitely nullified the hopes of partnership-like relations between the two countries. Georgian society’s mistrust towards Russia has even been reinforced compared with the Gamsakhurdia period. The final attack on Sukhumi, Abkhazia’s capital which was held by troops loyal to the government of Georgia was planned and executed by regular Russian army officers in violation of the Sochi ceasefire signed on 27 July 1992. At the end of the Abkhazian War, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev declared at the UN General Assembly: “Russia realises that no international organisation or group of states can replace our peacekeeping efforts in this specific post-Soviet space”.4 This was a clear indication that Russia’s priority was again, after some period of hesitation, to restore its hegemony in the post-Soviet space. Lacking resources and facing internal chaos, Russia could implement its new doctrine only by insisting on maintaining its military bases and by supporting separatist movements, especially those which were active in the less loyal neighbouring countries such as Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and to some extent – Ukraine. Moscow’s support was not aimed at the independence of the rebellious provinces. By trying to become the unique “peacekeeper” in the conflicts it has itself greatly fuelled, Russia’s objective was to establish its supremacy over the independent-minded states and to prevent them from getting closer to the West. Thus, the strategy of “peace-keeping” in the post-Soviet space became a neo-byzantine version of “peace keeping”. Paradoxically, even cynically, the very Russian troops which had been involved in the conflicts became “guarantors of peace”, in other words both judge and jury at once. No single international actor has tried to prevent such a process; on the contrary, the UN (in the case of Abkhazia) and the OSCE (in the case of South Ossetia) de facto endorsed Russia’s new role. A relatively small effort by today’s standards from the international community would have deterred weak Russia, which was highly dependent on international money transfers at this time.5 Georgia became the most striking example of Russia’s new policy of involvement in the post-Soviet space. Already at the beginning of the 1990s and partly because of its rather radical and not always realistic approach to regional politics, Georgia was chosen as a show-case of Russia’s ambition to stay the unique decision maker in the area. The military defeat in Abkhazia has resulted in a nearly total failure of Georgian statehood. At the end of 1993, Georgia had to bitterly accept Russian conditions for peace. Georgia entered the CIS on 21 October, despite fierce debate in the Georgian parliament, and even joined on 3 February the CSTO – a regional 4  Cf. “In Russia’s Shadow”, Time Magazine, 11 October 1993. 5  Only in 1994, Russia received 12 billion US dollars of direct financial aid from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

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security organisation dominated by Russia that looked like a new version of the Warsaw Pact, but on a rather modest CIS level. Shevardnadze had to sign a military agreement with Russia on “the status of the Russian troops in Georgia”, according to which Russia was to maintain four military bases in Vaziani (close to Tbilisi), Akhalkalaki (in southern Georgia), Batumi and Gudauta (in Abkhazia), in addition to the headquarters of the Transcaucasus Military District in Tbilisi and the Border-Guards along the Turkish frontier. A treaty on Friendship and Cooperation sealing a de facto protectorate was solemnly signed by Yeltsin and Shevardnadze on 4 February 1994. Regarding Abkhazia, Georgians had to endorse a humiliating “joint appeal” together with Russia to the Council of the Heads of States of the CIS to send a peace-keeping force to Abkhazia. Two months later, in April 1994, the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed the Moscow peace agreement, entrusting the Russian Federation with the mandate of peacekeeping. The agreement also implied the return of more than 250,000 Georgian IDP’s to their homes, a point which has never been implemented. The consequences of Georgia’s subjugation to Russia had a very negative impact on the timid cooperation between Georgia and the West. Humanitarian and financial aid was the only area of cooperation that Georgia was allowed to develop with the West. Russia jealously supervised every move of Georgian law-enforcement and security forces and their eventual links with their Western counterparts.6 Vardiko Nadibaidze, a Russian army general of Georgian origin, deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Transcaucasus Military District, was appointed as Defence Minister of Georgia in February 1994,7 while Igor Giorgadze – an experienced KGB officer and veteran of the Afghan war, became the Minister of State Security and grew in influence.8 Shota Kviraya was the third Russian protégé to advance his carrier, taking office as Minister of Interior. Not a single move was made for several years to move closer to NATO. But despite such “good conduct”, Georgia did not benefit in terms of restoration of its territorial integrity. Georgia tried even harder to gain Russia’s benevolence in order to resolve its primary problem: territorial integrity. But Russia had no clear intention to abandon Abkhazia for various, mainly domestic, political reasons; blunt antiWestern nationalism was gaining momentum and the political leadership was not inclined to defy the military, which was emotionally and economically inclined to keep Abkhazia under their firm control. Shevardnadze publicly endorsed the 6  American Embassy employee, CIA officer Fred Woodruff, who had established close links with the Georgian president’s security service, was killed in non-clarified circumstances in 1993. 7  Nadibaidze did not even speak Georgian properly and was clearly not the person who could build-up a modern style national army from scratch. While serving at ZAKVO, he was in charge of supplies. 8  The predecessors of these two ministers, respectively Giorgi Qarqarashvili and Irakli Batiashvili, inexperienced but nationalistically-minded young ministers, have resigned in protest of Georgia becoming Russia’s dominion.

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Russian invasion of Chechnya in December 1994 and authorised Russian military jets to fly over Georgian territory, hoping that Russia, confronted by its own ethnic separatism, would become more accommodating with Georgia. Georgian leadership believed that an active involvement of Chechens in favour of the Abkhaz secession was going to influence Russia’s position on Abkhazia. As early as in 1995, Shevardnadze realised that Russian internal and external politics was not going to leave him any chance for a profitable partnership with Moscow. He was increasingly viewed as one of the main gravediggers of the Soviet Union – an unforgivable sin for the Russian political elite. A quasi vassal relationship did not bring any sizable benefit to Georgia. On the contrary, Russia kept trying to weaken Tbilisi by continuously supporting the secessionists and attempting to de-sovereignise the Georgian state. New centrifugal tendencies, partly fuelled by Russia, appeared in Adjara and in Armenian-populated Javakheti, which even reinforced the Georgian state’s fragility. Georgia’s Progressive Move to the West In this context, Georgia could only welcome a slow, but irreversible awakening of Western countries in general and of the US in particular. The 1993-1994 Pax Russica in the Caucasus acted as a cold shower for decision makers in Washington, who were well aware of the strategic importance of the Caucasus region, as well as of the energy resources located in the Caspian Sea and Central Asian republics. These resources, which were underexploited at the end of the Soviet era, have raised much attention after the disintegration of the USSR, and the US was prompt in promoting the idea of a new East-West energy corridor by-passing Russia. It was consequently highly interested in the independence and stability of the countries situated between Turkey and China’s Western frontier. Shevardnadze clearly understood this opening window of opportunity. Although he had his hands tied by militias and Russian security services, he cautiously started his move towards emancipation vis-à-vis Russian tutorial system. Thus, he started to promote, inside the ruling party, that is, “Citizens Union of Georgia” (CUG), a group of young and promising Western educated politicians who, within a few years, became the most active and visible faction of the party. He also got himself surrounded by some overtly pro-occidental advisors and initiated the formation of parallel (competing) security services. This was the case, for instance, of the Presidential Guard, trained by American specialists.9 The failed terrorist act against Shevardnadze on 29 August 1995 served as a major turning point. Shevardnadze had already had a new constitution adopted, giving to the presidency more substantial powers compared to the parliament, which was traditionally dominated by nationalists. He took considerable moral 9  In 1995, according to a close collaborator of Shevardnadze, Igor Giorgadze had already alerted Russia that Georgian secret services were on the brink of being totally controlled by the Americans.

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benefit from the terrorist attack and, for the first time, directly pointed “at some obscure forces in Russia”10 who aimed at destabilising the country and jeopardising ongoing energy projects.11 Igor Giorgadze, who was a prime suspect in the case, quickly left the country on a specially chartered Russian jet, whereas Jaba Ioseliani, the leader of Mkhedrioni, was arrested and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. A few months earlier, another former Shevardnadze ally, Tengiz Kitovani, was arrested on his way to Abkhazia, accompanied by a few hundreds armed followers and a Russian colonel. The objectives of Kitovani’s march were unclear, but the manoeuvre was probably supposed to draw Georgia into a new trap of instability, ruling out the prospect of recovering control over Abkhazia. American involvement in the Caucasus became more active with the BTC pipeline project, which was harshly criticised by Russia, but also by some Western experts who viewed it as a politically driven project essentially aimed at damaging Russia’s influence and reinforcing the US position in the region. At the end of the 1990s, discussions were focussed on the lack of sufficient volumes of oil in the Caspian Sea, raising doubts about the economic viability of the BTC. The events which followed have shown that critics were not less politically motivated. Turkey also played a role as important as the US in supporting the idea of a pipeline going from the Caspian to Western markets via its own territory. Turkish President Süleyman Demirel brought up the idea as early as in spring 1992 and the first memorandums were signed in Ankara on 9 March 1993, in the midst of the Abkhaz and Karabakh wars. Final agreements were signed in Turkey too, in Ankara and in Istanbul, respectively in October and November 1998. As a result, the independence of Georgia (and Azerbaijan) vis-à-vis Russia became as crucial for Turkey as for the US.12 Nevertheless, Shevardnadze’s pro-Western move was far from a linear process and free from hindrance. Stabilisation of Georgia was seriously challenged when Shevardnadze became the target of another terrorist attack in February 1998. All fingers again pointed at Russia. A few months later, in October 1998, a military mutiny took place, with the rioters from the National Guard clearly awaiting instructions from Moscow. Provocations were regularly taking place in Javakheti13 and Adjara. Additionally, attempts to draw Georgia into a new Abkhaz

10  Shevardnadze TV interview, 29 August, 1995. 11  In a later interview, Shevardnadze claimed that President Yeltsin himself warned against “serious troubles” he could get into, if he favoured alternative ways to export Caspian energy resources. 12  In that regard, the argument that the BTC was pushed through only by the US is, at least, partial and does not take into account the efforts of regional players like Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. 13  In August 1998, Georgian armed units (artillery) were forced by several dozens of armed local Armenians to turn back from the scheduled joint military drills with the Russian base of Akhalkalaki.

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trap continued, as demonstrated by the conflict in Gali in May 1998.14 Georgian authorities received guarantees over the possible recovery of the Gali region, but were eventually mislead.15 During the second Chechen war, that started short after Vladimir Putin was appointed Prime minister by Yeltsin, Shevardnadze refused Russia’s request to use the Georgian territory against the rebels. Georgia was seriously concerned about the risk that additional Russian troops on Georgian territory could be used as a Trojan horse and could extend the Chechen conflict inside its own frontiers. Georgia’s refusal infuriated the Russian leadership and the country became the target of Russian verbal, and later, air attacks. Georgia was accused of serving, though the Pankisi valley, as a transit country for global Islamist networks heading towards Chechnya and of supplying weapons to Chechen rebels against Russia. Russia has never provided any clear evidence of Georgia’s support to the Chechens and most probably, the accusations were made to exonerate the Federal army from its first defeats in the year and half following the military intervention. The objective was also to tarnish Georgia’s reputation at the international level, to present it at best as a failed state, unable to guarantee the security of its borders, and at worst as rogue state, in league with terrorists. Russian accusations were sometimes close to ludicrous, claiming for example that Osama Bin Laden was hiding in the Pankisi gorge.16 Russian aviation bombed several Georgian mountain villages, once with casualties, and unilaterally modified the Chechen portion of the Russian-Georgian state border, advancing deeper into the Georgian territory.17 September 11th gave Russia grounds for hope to define the war in Chechnya as a war against international terrorism and to ape America’s military intervention out of its borders (Afghanistan and Iraq). Not surprisingly, Russia opposed Georgia’s demand to the OSCE to create a border monitoring mission on the Chechen portion of its state border in order to cut short Russian allegations, thereby proving that these accusations were instrumental in the preparation of Russia’s military intervention in Georgia. The Russian government’s exaggeration of the problems in the Pankisi region had disastrous results for the Kremlin itself. Constant allegations that Al-Qaeda or Taliban elements were hiding in the area aroused American interest in this region. Foreseeing the risk of a Russian military intervention in Georgia “to bring order” and “fight terrorists”, the US Administration pre-empted Russia and announced, in 14  Gali is the southernmost part of Abkhazia and was, at the time, only loosely controlled by the separatists. 15  As a result, 40,000 Georgian returnees in Gali have been displaced for a second time and more than 100 people have been killed. 16  Igor Ivanov, Russian Foreign Minister, did so at the end of the year 2001, based on some dubious information from a supposed driver of Al-Qaeda’s leader. 17  Russia sent a paratrooper division in the Itum-Kale district of Chechnya in Winter 2000, which took control of the border with Georgia. The paratroopers occupied a Georgian hamlet of Pitchvni and established their post.

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April 2002, an important program of bilateral military cooperation, called Georgian Train and Equip Program. From 150 to 200 American military trainers arrived in Georgia in accordance with the GTEP framework. Russia was eventually faced with what it feared the most: an American military presence close to its borders. Seeing no progress in Russia’s position, Georgia saw no reason why it would further tolerate the conditions imposed by Moscow since the beginning of 1990s, especially a Russian military presence on its soil, which was increasingly viewed as an element of destabilisation. The long process of getting rid of the Russian military presence started with the adoption of the “Law on State Borders” in April 1997. According to the document, Georgia had to assume full control over its state borders by 1999. Russian maritime border-guards first left in summer 1998 and, a year later, Georgia took control of its land border with Turkey. In 1999, Georgia dared for the first time to officially announce that it was willing to close down Russian military bases stationed on its territory. To begin with, it withdrew from the CSTO, the Russian-dominated military bloc, in April 1999. Georgian diplomacy then won its first notable victory when, at the OSCE summit in Istanbul in November 1999, a final document was adopted that included Russia’s commitment to dismantle two of its military bases in Georgia, out of four, and to find a solution for the remaining two before July 2001. Long and difficult negotiations took place on the fate of the two remaining bases. Ten rounds and two years of talks later, Russia was still insisting on a period of 15 years and on several hundred millions of dollars of compensation, officially for building accommodation for the evacuated military and their families. Meanwhile, Russia was pushing Armenians from Javakheti and some of the local political groups close to Russia to ask to maintain the Russian base in Akhalkalaki and to blackmail the Georgian government with the threat of stirring up revolt. For Russia, ineffective and decaying military bases were only important to impede Georgia’s rapprochement with NATO and not an arsenal to fight against any serious foreign invader. Tensions over the future of Russian military bases in Georgia caused increasing pressure from Moscow against Tbilisi. In December 2000, the Kremlin introduced a new visa regime for the citizens of Georgia, the only CIS country to receive such treatment. This decision was officially motivated by the need to stop the inflow of terrorists from Georgian territory. As many analysts emphasised, the main route for jihad fighters from Afghanistan to Chechnya went through Central Asia’s porous border with Russia. If Russia wanted to stop effectively the foreign terrorist inflow, it had to eradicate corruption in its own law-enforcement bodies. Through its decision on the visa regime, Russia has implemented a long-established plan to put pressure on the Georgian Diaspora in Russia and by doing so, to try to get a growing influence on the local regime. Russia’s new visa regime vis-à-vis Georgia had very damaging consequence for the Georgian government with regard to the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts: for so-called “humanitarian reasons”, visa restrictions have not been applied to the residents of the two secessionist provinces. In this way, the Kremlin

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was clearly calling into question the principle of Georgia’s territorial integrity. This was the first step in Russia’s policy of annexing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which was later pursued through a massive distribution of Russian passports to local residents. In Shevardnadze’s ten-year presidency, Georgia moved from a Russian quasi dominion to a country which has become the first recipient of American governmental assistance per capita. The country has paid a high price for its commitment to independence. Under Shevardnadze, the Georgian state, which had already lost control over Abkhazia and significant parts of South Ossetia, has faced two major assassination attempts against its president, two mutinies and countless plots and destabilisation attempts. Without underestimating the local roots of all these crises, Russia was often ultimately behind events. Shevardnadze’s “politics of deference”, followed by his “politics of balance” and a rather cautious approach towards Russia’s interests, did not prevent Georgia from facing a constant Russian policy of stick with no carrot. Given this whole context, all the problems that Georgia had to deal with in its relations with Russia under Saakashvili already existed under Shevardnadze. After the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia: Russia’s Attempt to Roll Back The “Rose Revolution” and the coming to power of Mikheil Saakashvili further deteriorated Russian-Georgian relations. In November 2003, when the Rose Revolution was still under way, Russia tried to help Shevardnadze, that is, probably the most criticised and disparaged head of state of the whole former Soviet Union in Russia, to stay in power. This sudden move illustrated great disarray in Russia in post-Soviet times: the Kremlin had no other choice but to back the candidate who was not supported by anyone else. The main reason for Russia’s support to Shevardnadze was not his pro-Russian orientation, but rather his weakness. If he had survived the opposition, Shevardnadze was expected to rely only on Russia, and not on his own legitimacy, to rule the country. The Kremlin probably intended to reiterate the 1993 scenario, when the defeated Georgian army was fleeing Sukhumi and when Shevardnadze, who was at the mercy of raiding secessionist and Zviadist bands, was rescued by the Russian military. Powerless, Shevardnadze would have been forced to accept Russia’s hegemony, abandon his pro-Western policy, forget about NATO and the EU, and appoint Russian nominees at key security positions. Another and not less important reason for Russia’s reaction was the Kremlin’s fears of a “colour revolution” in Moscow. The authoritarian system of government in place in Russia particularly dislikes any comparison with more liberal regimes established in neighbouring countries. One of the main bases of the moral economy of “sovereign democracy” and the “vertical of power” is the ideological assertion that Western style liberal democracy cannot work outside the geographical zone where it was originally conceived. The Kremlin ideologists traditionally use the argument of “cultural relativism” to deny the chance of success for liberal

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democracy outside the Western world. Based on the same reasoning, any attempt to set up democracy in a given region of the world is viewed as a “Western conspiracy”, an artificial importation of an “alien” model, or at best an extension of Western influence. Efforts to promote democracy in the post-Soviet space are seen in Moscow as interference from the West – Russia’s arch-enemy. Successful transplantation of democracy in a post-Soviet country strongly challenges the ideological postulates of Russia’s “specific path” and raises the danger of contagion. Moscow did not welcome the Rose Revolution, depicted not as the expression of a genuine popular wish but as the accomplishment of an American-designed scenario of regime change. Russian insistence that the US sponsored the Rose Revolution was echoed in some Western medias, which clearly overestimated American support to Saakashvili in November 2003. Even if some circles in the US like the Open Society Foundation, the Project on Transitional Democracies, etc. have backed the movement from the very beginning, the State Department was officially clearly in favour of maintaining Shevardnadze in office until the end of his term. From the beginning, Saakashvili tried to start relations with Russia from scratch. In February 2004, he made his first state visit abroad as president of Georgia to Russia. His first meeting with Putin was qualified as “positive” and “promising”, even if Saakashvili did not hide his surprise when his counterpart declared that the end of the Soviet Union was the world’s greatest geopolitical catastrophe. The first serious clash of interests between the two countries occurred soon after the meeting, when in May 2004, Adjara’s local leader, Russian backed Aslan Abashidze was peacefully ousted by the local population. Russia bitterly accepted the facts and warned the Georgian leadership that this was the last time that Russia would remain passive.18 The Georgian government quickly understood what was behind such a warning when armed clashes between Georgian forces and Ossetian militias broke out in August 2004. This time, Georgian forces met fierce resistance from their adversary, already composed of Ossetian-Russian servicemen. Following renewed clashes in South Ossetia, Russia decided to take the breakaway region under firm control. A military build-up started in clear violation of the 1992 Sochi agreements. Eduard Kokoity, the South Ossetian leader, became strictly controlled by Russian intelligence. The competing local clans, former “business” allies of Kokoity, were eliminated and ethnic Russians with no South Ossetian background were appointed members of the local government.19 As a result, South Ossetia became a Russian military outpost in the heart of the Georgian territory. Many terrorist attacks, such as the Gori blast in winter 2005,

18  Nino Burjanadze, then President of the Georgian Parliament, has in various instances recalled this episode. 19  Thus, South Ossetian Defense minister, Interior minister, Security minister and Prime minister were all originated from Russia and were acting Russian servicemen.

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sabotages of high voltage electric lines and various similar acts on the Georgian territory were planned and carried out in South Ossetia. Relations between Georgia and Russia reached their climax in September 2006, when Russia violently reacted to the arrest of several Russian secret agents in Georgia. According to the Georgian government, these officers were responsible for terrorist attacks and accused of planning plots and sabotage acts. As a retaliation measure, Russian authorities started in autumn 2006 a massive campaign of deportation of Georgian citizens living in Russia. Human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, denounced various cases of power abuses and inhuman treatments of Georgian citizens by Russian law enforcement bodies.20 Russia later took some additional punitive measures such as an official ban on Georgian agricultural products, like fruits, vegetables, wines and mineral waters, and the unilateral interruption of all kinds of transport and postal communications between the two countries, including money transfers. The Five-Day War: A New Start or an Endpoint? Re-elected President in January 2008, Mikheil Saakashvili declared that his primary objective was to normalise relations with Russia. But soon afterwards, Kosovo’s declaration of independence and its recognition by the US and several EU countries put Russian-Georgian relations to a serious test. Many countries, even among EU member states, were against recognition, but Russia was the only country to blatantly call for a re-examination of the generally accepted state borders. Not even Serbia took such an open stance. Russia was unlikely to have been prompted by feelings of “Slavic fraternity” alone. Paradoxically, Russia was claiming to defend Serbia’s territorial integrity, and meanwhile actually threatening to begin fragmentation of the post-Soviet states and starting with Georgia. Two weeks after Kosovo’s independence in March 2008, the Kremlin took measures that brought Russia and Georgia closer to an armed conflict. The first move in opening hostilities was the Kremlin’s decision to officially nullify its commitment to respect the embargo on separatist entities imposed by the CIS summit in 1996 and to establish official, almost state-to-state relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia had never fully complied with the embargo but it was the first time that it was officially lifted. After moving to unfreeze the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts, Moscow hoped to break down Tbilisi’s resistance and get major concessions from Georgia to push it into accepting a neutral status and abandoning its policy towards Euro-Atlantic integration. If Georgia continued to resist, the Kremlin intended to play a tougher game and 20  The overall anti-Georgian campaign has affected even the citizens of the Russian Federation with Georgian ethnic roots. Many of deported Georgians lived in Russia on the legal basis and their deportation was particularly inhuman: the deported were carried in cargo plains usually used to carry cattle. See Human Rights Watch Report, 30 September 2007.

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move towards integrating Abkhazia and South Ossetia into its orbit, which Georgia called “creeping annexation”. What could have happened if Georgia had adopted a more submissive stance? Georgia could probably have led a less “outrageous” policy for Russia and even rectified its foreign policy orientations. But this would certainly not have changed Russia’s attitude towards Georgia. As a matter of fact, Georgia’s dismemberment was a response by Russia to the West for Kosovo and for America’s armed interventions abroad (in Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan). Russia dearly needed a military victory to show it had restored its world power status. Whatever Georgia’s government decided to do, Georgia was just part of Russia’s global strategy. Besides, Georgia’s past experience of a more conciliatory policy towards Russia did not produce the expected results. From 1993 to 1995, Georgia did almost everything Russia demanded in terms of geopolitical concessions, but it did not get anything in return. The 2008 Presidential election in Russia did not reverse the trend towards tightening of the grip on Georgia. At the end of March, the State Duma held a special session on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which gave rise to calls in favour of the recognition of Georgia’s breakaway regions and the protection of Russian citizens living there, even if it meant using force. In response, Mikheil Saakashvili offered the Abkhazian side new peaceful initiatives, but failed to reach its objective. Proposals were sent to the Abkhazian leadership, which had the least room for manoeuvre at that time due to increasing dependence on Moscow. The period between April and June 2008 was characterised by growing troubles. It became increasingly obvious that NATO would not be offering membership to Georgia. The Alliance’s countries that voted against hoped this move would defuse tensions on the Russian-Georgian front, but they proved to be seriously mistaken. Right after the NATO summit in Bucharest, in April 2008, Vladimir Putin sent a public letter to the heads of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and a few days later signed a decree according to which the Russian government and other state structures were to establish official relations with their corresponding institutions in the two separatist regions. Other steps were taken to deliberately increase tensions. In April 2008, Georgian drones were shot down over the Abkhazian territory. This incident demonstrated the tactics used by each side. Tbilisi was trying to raise international attention by intentionally sacrificing its drones. Despite assurances of the Russian and Abkhazian military that the drones were destroyed by Abkhazian air defence systems, few doubted that Russian aviation was to blame. The UNOMIG, which usually took a cautious approach in its assessments, came to the same conclusion in its report dated 26 May 2008. Georgia wanted to show Russia’s continuous aggression. As for Russia, it was just testing the international community’s commitment to its principles and Georgian leadership’s ability to wage a war of nerves. Whereas Western reaction was limited to calls for caution, the Kremlin believed that problems were still a long way off and that it could keep pressuring Georgia.

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In late April-early May 2008, the countries showed some signs of coming close to open warfare. Russia unilaterally increased its peacekeeping contingent by sending additional paratroopers to Abkhazia, even though it was not allowed to deploy offensive forces in the area. Georgian authorities could have responded by using force but preferred to appeal to the international community, which produced more perceptible results this time. The EU, NATO, and the US asked Russia to reconsider its decisions to establish direct relations with the separatist authorities and to bring additional forces in Abkhazia. On 15 May 2008, after several months of no-go, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution prepared by Georgia calling for the recognition of the right of refugees, forced migrants, and their descendants to return to Abkhazia regardless of their ethnic origin. The international community became convinced that passivity could lead to a major international crisis and war. High-ranking European and American diplomats,21 as well as ambassadors of EU member countries and the US, began actively visiting Sukhumi, Tbilisi, and Moscow in an attempt to prevent a military confrontation. Tbilisi succeeded in raising the settlement process to an international level and getting the international community to recognise Russia as a discriminating mediator. In response, Russia built up its military might in the two rebel regions, expecting that Georgian leadership would make a serious mistake. At the end of May 2008, the Russian Federation brought rail forces into Abkhazia in order to renovate the railroad22 and accelerate the building of an unofficial military base in the Java district of South Ossetia. Despite active efforts from the international community, actions were far too indecisive and slow to force Russia to curtail its policy. After Dmitry Medvedev was elected President, some members of the Georgian leadership assumed that Russia’s two-headed executive power would not see eye to eye and that the President would take the upper hand over the Prime minister and his team of hawks. Mikheil Saakashvili’s first meeting with Dmitry Medvedev on the sidelines of the CIS summit in June 2008 kept these hopes alive. Both countries even began work on various documents, one of which called for a division of Abkhazia into Georgian and Russian “zones of responsibility”.23 But the lull in the escalation of the conflict was short-lived. Tensions emerged again in July, coinciding with Condoleezza Rice’s visit to Georgia, when it was no longer denied that Russian war planes were violating Georgian airspace. At the same time, the most extensive 21  To name a few: Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common and Foreign Security Policy (5 June 2008), Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. State Secretary (9-10 July), the German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier (17-18 July) and the U.S. Deputy Assistant of State Secretary, Matthew Bryza (25 July 2008). 22  This railway was heavily damaged during the 1992-1993 war and was out of service for almost 16 years. 23  The information was provided by Kommersant newspaper, which has supposedly been in possession of the document.

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exercises of the Russian Armed Forces in recent years were being held in the North Caucasus, in the close vicinity of Georgian borders. Scenarios of how events developed into a full war were mainly focused on who opened fire first. But events could be viewed in another way. The situation on 7 August resulted from the accumulation of very different factors. To some extent, 7 August could be considered not as the beginning of the war, but as its end. Russia had already won the war, even before the first gunshot was made by Georgian soldiers in the direction of Tskhinvali. Sending troops to South Ossetia was a desperate step by the Georgian government, aimed at saving what could be saved at this point of the crisis. In a book published in 2009,24 Andrei Illarionov, Putin’s former advisor, explained with numerous pieces of evidence that Russia had been preparing for war against Georgia at least since early 2008. Another Russian military analyst, Pavel Felgengauer, has also argued, in various articles and interviews, that the actual scope of Russia’s intervention required much more time for preparation than a few hours or even a few days, meaning that all devices for the military operation against Georgia were carefully planned and ready much earlier than August 2008. In comparison, the actions of the Georgian army looked like totally improvised solutions. Ground forces were put on maximal alert only on 6 August 2008 and started to move the day after. The government had no time to prepare for the evacuation of the local civilian population, when the adversary started to empty the city of Tskhinvali as early as 1 August. The best Georgian military units were stationed in Western Georgia (Senaki) or in Iraq. The attack against Tskhinvali was doomed to fail, taking into account the amount of military forces that the adversary had deployed in the region. Even in the case of a victory in Ossetia, Georgia would have definitely lost Abkhazia, which is symbolically and economically much more important than impoverished and depopulated South Ossetia. Moreover, year after year, Georgia’s efforts to involve the international community in the resolution of the conflict, and especially to internationalise the peace-building process, had started to produce some effects. In this context, any military action would have definitely destroyed all its efforts. Finally, if Georgia had decided to launch operations, it would have been advised by any military expert to attack in winter, at a season when all mountain passes of the Great Caucasus Range are closed because of heavy snow. August is the ideal time for those who have to cross the Caucasus, but not for those who would like to halt the advance of forces coming from the opposite mountainside. In July 2008, Russia was ready for war: its troops were already stationed along the Georgian frontiers as they did not go back to the barracks after carrying out military exercises in the North Caucasus. Coincidently, Russian Engineering Troops had repaired the Abkhaz portion of the railway, designed for the rapid 24  Cornell, S. and Starr, F. (eds) 2009. The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

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transfer of heavy military weaponry from Russia to the battlefield in Western Georgia. The international context was very favourable for Russia: two months before his departure, George Bush, weakened by two wars waged in Afghanistan and in Iraq, could not risk engaging American troops in the Caucasus. On top of that, the NATO summit in Bucharest – while offering Georgia and Ukraine a path towards membership – did not provide any clear agenda or deadline for this plan. Russia’s objective to overthrow Saakashvili in summer 2008 was almost a game won in advance. Moscow was considering two possible scenarios, both of which were supposed to be positive for Russia. Hostilities were planned to be opened by Ossetian militias, equipped and trained by Russian forces, and instructed to attack “Georgian enclaves” still loyal to the Georgian government inside South Ossetia. Their attack was expected to provoke two possible responses from Tbilisi: it could either give up the “Georgian enclaves” or react and engage in a bigger war. In the first case, Saakashvili would have been forced to resign under Georgian political opposition and pressure from public opinion, which would have never forgiven the President for the loss of additional territories. If by some miracle the Georgian President was to survive this defeat, the next blow was ready: the Ossetian leader Kokoity had beforehand announced that “historical Ossetia” was much larger than the former “autonomous region” and that he was ready to pursue territorial claims against Georgia. “An extensible Ossetia”, without clear borders was the ultimate argument of this scenario, which would have ended by the defeat of the “Saakashvili criminal regime”. One of the advantages of this scenario was that it could be officially based on “the struggle of the Ossetian people for independence”. In the case of a Georgian response, which was the less suitable scenario, the Kremlin had prepared a series of arguments based on the “defence of the Russian citizens against the genocide perpetrated by Georgia”. This is the reason why, from the very first hours of the fighting, the Kremlin improperly spoke of 2000 civilians killed to justify Russian intervention and later recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.25 After realising that Georgia was about to loose everything, on 7 August, Saakashvili proposed a unilateral ceasefire to Ossetian militias, who had been intensively bombing Georgian villages for several days. The decision to launch a large scale military operation came later at night. This was another desperate step, which did not aim at military victory over Russia – inconceivable for anyone, but at the preservation of what it was still possible to preserve. Georgians knew that, in this case, Russia would show itself to be, in the eyes of the international community, a full party to the conflict and a force combating Georgia. This would finally shatter the myth of the Ossetian struggle for independence. The international community was expected to intervene and impose a ceasefire, which could have saved at least a part of the territory under Georgian control. The decision to engage in war was extremely risky, but made sense: Saakashvili wanted the international community 25  In fact, 160 Ossetians were reported to be killed, militiamen and fighters included.

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to recognise that the conflict has always been an inter-state war between Georgia and Russia and not an ethnic conflict between Georgians and Ossetians. The Georgian government obviously made some mistakes and miscalculations. For example, it believed that its army could resist for a longer period, thereby giving enough time to diplomats and international actors to solve the crisis. Another mistake was to count on the fact that a tough Western reaction was able to stop Russia. George Bush’s ability to influence Vladimir Putin, with whom he was in Beijing, was also overestimated. The Conflict Goes On The first anniversary of the Five-Day War in August 2009 has clearly demonstrated that the military operations in 2008 were only one, albeit tragic episode in the confrontation between Georgia and Russia. As the anniversary drew near, Russian civil and military officials started to make threatening statements about Russia’s readiness to “protect South Ossetia and Abkhazia by all existing means against possible Georgian aggression”. Massive military manoeuvres involving tens of thousands of Russian servicemen and all types of armed forces have started around Georgia’s international borders and within the breakaway regions. Quite coincidently, some armed clashes were observed along the administrative border of South Ossetia, which could be used as a pretext for a renewal of military operations. Russian threats were accompanied by renewed territorial claims from the Ossetian leadership, saying that the Ossetian people was “historically” occupying a greater area than the territory under their effective control. Eduard Kokoity mentioned for instance the Truso Valley, in North-Eastern Georgia, and the Trialeti region, in central Georgia. Ossetian claims provoked tangible tensions in Georgia and among international observers. Indeed, all this sudden agitation strangely reminded people the beginning of the war in 2008. On the basis of a revisionist version of Ossetian settlements in Georgia,26 Russia could justify regular violations of Georgian borders. If the conflict was avoided in summer 2009, this campaign was probably aimed at maintaining and increasing tensions. In summer 2009, Russia could hardly justify a new intervention on Georgian soil, which would severely weaken its already damaged international reputation. In the context of a serious economic crisis in Russia, a new military confrontation with Georgia and a political conflict with the West were very risky. Russia was probably pursuing rather modest objectives: a demonstration of force in the region and, in parallel, the creation of an image presenting Georgia as an unstable country on the edge of being invaded at any time. This image was intended to discourage international investments in the country and weaken Mikheil Saakashvili, whose removal is still on Russia’s agenda. There was also a clear message to the West: 26  Since the 19th century, Ossetian communities settled everywhere in Georgia, where free land was available, in Kakheti (Akhmeta, Telavi, Lagodekhi districts, bordering Azerbaijan), Kartli (Gori, Kareli, Khashuri districts) and Trialeti (Borjomi district).

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these events took place shortly after President Barack Obama and Vice-president Joseph Biden visited Moscow and Tbilisi. Both statesmen, albeit in different terms, have clearly supported Georgia’s independence and territorial integrity. Moscow certainly manoeuvred to show that, for Russia, American statements did not have the force of law. Russia continued to pressure Georgia through other means, such as accusing Tbilisi of “supporting Chechen terrorists” by offering them a safe haven in the Pankisi valley. The Pankisi issue was already used at the end of 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. After Georgian security forces cleared the area from some “suspect” individuals and groups, Russian accusations have decreased, but reappeared in 2009 as part of an overall campaign to discredit Georgian leadership and put out feelers about the possibility of military action against Georgia. In October 2009, Russian FSB officials accused Georgia’s “special services” of being involved in the transportation of Islamist militants and their weaponry in the North Caucasus. Their statements were followed by the claims of Chechnya’s strong-man, loyal to Putin, Ramzan Kadyrov, that “secret services of Western countries”, namely the US and the UK, were behind the attacks of the militants against Russian troops and pro-Kremlin Chechen militias. Meanwhile, according to some media reports, Russia tried to distribute Russian passports to Pankisi-based ethnic Chechens and Kisti.27 Having experienced Russia’s dubious generosity in granting citizenship to Abkhazians and South Ossetians, Georgian authorities were quite concerned about Moscow’s sudden use of the Pankisi issue. Georgia’s only response was to ask for an increasing involvement of the international community and request international monitoring of the security situation in Pankisi Gorge.28 The Tagliavini Report and the War of Words From the very beginning, the EU fact-finding Commission on the Russia-Georgia war,29 set up in December 2008, has inspired scepticism and even criticism among various observers and local actors, even if everybody had agreed on the need to establish such a Commission. Some analysts were concerned by the fact that the Commission was not entirely free from political manipulation and that its conclusions could have been influenced by EU’s political agenda and motivations. The Georgian government explicitly criticised the composition of the

27  Kisti are the descendants of the Chechen clans, who migrated from Chechnya to Georgia at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. 28  Also, Russia has regularly granted special attention to the Armenian minority in Georgia’s southern region of Javakheti. 29  It was officially called the Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG). A Swiss diplomat, Heidi Tagliavini, was appointed as the head of mission.

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Commission, comprised of some experts who were clearly identified as defending “anti-Georgian” views.30 After ten months of investigation and political pressure from the different sides, the Commission published its conclusions in September 2009. These conclusions became part of massive campaigns of public relations at both the domestic and international level, both sides trying to use the report for their own benefits. The Russian side turned out to be more prepared and to have much more leverage at its disposal. Several weeks before the publication of the report, some Western media, already known to be friendly to Russia or close to Russian interests, published some “exclusive” information claiming that the Commission’s conclusions were going to be disastrous for Georgia. Obviously, Russia was attempting to prepare Western opinion for the next step supposed to follow the publication: a selective emphasis on those parts of the report which were negative for Tbilisi. Despite Tagliavini’s official denial and claims that she was wrongly quoted by the German newspaper, Der Spiegel, the Russian strategy proved to be relatively efficient. The headlines of European newspapers immediately after the publication of the report were almost exclusively concentrated on the point of “who fired first”, thus disregarding the need to put things into perspective as expressed in the report. In the Tagliavini report, the Georgian government was clearly held responsible for launching the attack against the town of Tskhinvali on 7 August 2008 as a response to the attacks of Ossetian armed militias. True, the Commission has considered Georgia’s reaction as disproportionate and its version of a massive Russian invasion before 8 August as greatly exaggerated. But, it has also stated that the Georgian offensive was “only a culminating point of a long period of increasing tensions, provocations and incidents”.31 The Russian Federation is harshly criticised for preparing and fuelling the conflict since Georgia’s independence. The Russian policy of “passportisation”, that is, a massive distribution of Russian passports to the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, was qualified as illegal and a factor that led to the conflict.32 The report also confirmed that the Russian side was involved in training and providing military equipment to South Ossetian and Abkhaz militias prior the August conflict.33 In addition, the Commission recognised that there had been “an influx of volunteers or mercenaries from the Russian Federation to South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel in early August and that some additional Russian forces, other than the peacekeeping battalion, were 30  Among the most controversial members was the German scholar from Hamburg University, Otto Luchterhandt, who, even before the investigation started, had declared that the Georgian leadership was responsible for launching the military operation. He also lost a reputation as a neutral expert when he openly supported the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 31  Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, Volume I, p. 11. 32  Ibid., pp. 18-19. 33  Ibid., p. 20.

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illegally present in South Ossetia. It acknowledged that the air bombings of the Georgian territory by Russian military planes started much earlier than the official decision of the Russian president to intervene in Georgia.34 Russia was accused of having misleadingly used the term “genocide” against the Ossetian population to justify and extend its intervention.35 Systematic destruction and burning of Georgian villages in South Ossetia were qualified as a case of “ethnic cleansing”. Finally, the unilateral recognition of the independence of Georgia’s two breakaway regions was declared to be contrary to international law and Russia’s decision considered as an “unlawful interference in the sovereignty and territorial integrity of … Georgia”.36 The Commission concluded that Russia had failed to be an honest broker and peacekeeper between Georgia and its rebel regions; on the contrary, it used these conflicts for its own interests.37 Though relatively balanced and objective, these conclusions were to some extent influenced by broader European political agenda. From a political point of view, the EU could be interested in blaming both countries. This certainly explains why the report contains some contradictions. The mission recognised that Russia was not an honest broker in the conflict; that some Russian regular troops other than the peace-keeping battalion were illegally present in South Ossetia; and that irregulars arrived in the region a few days before the beginning of the large scale armed confrontation. But at the same time, Georgia’s military operation in Tskhinvali is qualified as illegal. The report did not say a word on what Georgia should have done in the face of such an influx and a military build-up. By stating for the first time that Russia’s mandate as peace-keeper was biased and by condemning Russia’s policy as a provocation to push Georgia into the conflict, the report shows the failure of the EU to prevent the war. Despite several calls from Georgia to internationalise the peace-keeping and peace-building processes, the EU left the field wide open to Russia’s monopoly. Conclusion: Perspectives Two years after the recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence by the Kremlin, Russia’s attempts to get its decision endorsed at the international level have failed. Only three marginal states have joined Russian voices.38 However, Russia has further militarised the occupied territories, introducing additional troops and equipments in the region in violation of the six-point 34  Ibid., p. 21. 35  Ibid., p. 22. 36  Ibid., p. 17. 37  Ibid., p. 32. 38  Chavez’s Venezuela and Ortega’s Nicaragua are isolated because of their regime, and the micro-state of Nauru, with a population of several thousands inhabitants, because of its size.

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ceasefire agreement, signed on 12 August 2008. Russia considers South Ossetia, whose estimated remaining population varies from 10,000 to 20,000 according to various sources, as a military outpost in the South Caucasus, a key strategic outpost where a division of Russian military and FSB border guards have already been stationed. By deploying long range missile and artillery systems (Tochka U, Smerch) in Tskhinvali, Russia would be able to annihilate within a few minutes any location in the South Caucasus. Similar trends are visible in Abkhazia, where S-300 missiles were deployed, as officially announced by Russia in August 2010. Growing militarisation goes together with the lack of international monitoring or observation in the two regions. Moscow used its veto power to oppose the extension of the UN and the OSCE mandates and to close down their respective mission in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It also refused to allow a new ad hoc police mission to be given to the EUMM to enter the territory of the occupied regions. As a result, Moscow has total freedom of action and no international body can assess the extent of its violation of different international treaties on arms reduction. Georgia cannot enter in a comparable arms race with Russia. On the contrary, its leadership has placed its hopes in peaceful initiatives that could be endorsed by the international community. Georgia’s military expenditures have been reduced by 40 per cent over the two years following the war and now represent the smallest defence budget in the whole region. In sharp contract with Russia, Georgia has signed an agreement with the EUMM in early 2009 whereby it pledged to inform the mission each time a Georgian unit of more than 100 servicemen would move.39 In the same spirit, after Russia refused to sign a treaty with Georgia on the principle of the non use of force, Mikheil Saakashvili has unilaterally stated in his address at the European Parliament on November 2010 that the Georgian state would never resort to force to restore its territorial integrity. Together with these peaceful initiatives, Georgia’s efforts were aimed at the international recognition of the Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – the term “occupation” conferring responsibility, particularly in cases of human rights violations, human trafficking and illicit flows of weapons and nuclear materials. Official recognition of Russian occupation could, according to Tbilisi, hold Russia accountable for the actions of the “proxy regimes” of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, and thus reduce the risks of a new war possibly resulting from “uncontrolled” Ossetian and Abkhaz militias.40 Two years after the August 2008 war, Russia still refuses to recognise Georgia’s internationally borders and democratically-elected leader. Its final objective, 39  The chief of EUMM, the German diplomat Hansjörg Haber, thus qualified Georgian attitude as “constructive unilateralism”. 40  Some states and organisations (like the US, Eastern and Central European countries, the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO, etc.) have already adopted such a wording, but the EU is still hesitant because of the absence of a consensus on the issue among its 27 member states.

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the removal of the pro-Western government in power in Tbilisi, has not been achieved. Trying to undermine the Georgian government by actively supporting some oppositional forces, attempting to use or blackmail the Georgian Diaspora in Russia and even attempting to capitalise on the topic of common religious faith, the Kremlin has not ruled out an eventual military option. In case of favourable international circumstances, force could be used against Georgia. Frenzied militarisation of occupied territories demonstrates that Karl von Clausewitz’s formula is firmly anchored in the minds of Russian politicians. Bibliography Allison, R. 2008. “Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s Campaign to ‘Coerce Georgia to Peace’”. International Affairs, 84(6), 1145-71. Asmus, R. 2010. A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Blank, S. 2008. “Georgia: the War Russia Lost”. Military Review, NovemberDecember, 39-46. Available at: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/ Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20081231_art008.pdf Broers, L. 2009. “David and Goliath and ‘Georgians in the Kremlin’: A PostColonial Perspective on Conflict in Post-Soviet Georgia”. Central Asian Survey, 28(2), 99-118. Cornell, S. and Starr, F. (eds) 2009. The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War in Georgia. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe. European Union, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia. September 2009. Available at: http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html

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Chapter 2

Unfreezing Conflict in South Ossetia: Regional and International Implications Sergey Markedonov1

In August 2008, the Caucasus region became to some extent the focal point of international relations. For the first time since the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, when existing borders between the former Soviet republics were maintained as interstate boundaries, frontiers were revised in Eurasia. In an unprecedented move, partially recognised states have emerged in the South Caucasus. If their independence was denied by the UN, it was still recognised on 26 August 2008 by the Russian Federation, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, thereby demonstrating its willingness to play the role of a revisionist state. Until 2008, Russia’s priority was to defend the status quo. Changes in its foreign policy approach incurred, by extension, changes in its relations to the West (the US and the European Union). Today, these problems are not alleviated anymore by rhetorical figures and performances as they previously were by Boris Yeltsin in Istanbul in 1999 and by Vladimir Putin in Munich in 2007. Thus, the South Caucasus has formed the stage for the development of a new status quo, not only for the region alone but also for the entire post-Soviet area. That is why this region has drawn special attention. Will the “Five-Day War” be the starting point of a new confrontation between Russia and the West? Will the RussiaGeorgia conflict impact on other regional conflicts, within Georgia, in neighbouring countries and between Caucasus states? Will the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia set a precedent for ethno-political self-determination in the North Caucasus? Will Moscow allow the partially-recognised republics to build their own statehood and what influence will Russia exert on their internal political situation? This article provides insights on how much these questions have impacted on the Caucasus region as well as on Eurasian and international security.

1  This contribution is a revised and updated version of an essay entitled “The Big Caucasus: Consequences of the ‘Five-Day War’, Threats and Political Prospects”, Xenophon Paper, No. 7, May 2009.

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The History of the USSR: Three Dots Instead of a Full Stop The dramatic struggle for self-determination in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which ended with the formal recognition of their independence by Russia, showed that it was too early to put a full stop in the history of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the USSR as a legal act and the historical process of the collapse of the “Kremlin Empire” are two different things. In December 1991, the Soviet state covering over one-sixth of the world’s land area disappeared, but its disintegration was just beginning. In the same way as one cannot reduce the collapse of the Roman Empire to Romulus Augustus’ abdication, the French Revolution to the storming of the Bastille, and the Russian Revolution to the 25 October 1917 Coup, one should not reduce the collapse of the USSR to the meeting near Viskuly of the three Slavic republics, convened in December 1991 to sign the Belavezha Accords, which dissolved the Soviet Union and established the CIS. The state of the Soviet Union has ceased to exist since 1991. A new generation has grown with no experience of the Soviet state and no Soviet identity either. However, the newly-independent states have been viewed for many years through the Soviet prism or lens. The USSR was considered as a state, whose main subjects were not the citizens, but rather the socialist nations. Priority was given to the rights of nations, and not of individuals. It was the same Soviet state that defined the ethnic groups as the basic subject of policy and law. Ethnic distinctions between citizens were fixed up on a territorial basis. That is why many groups did not recognise the borders between the new independent states when the Soviet Union was collapsed, resulting in several armed conflicts. Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia2 has changed the post-Soviet space. With Russia’s help, the principles derived from the Belavezha Accords have ceased to exist, and the end point in the process of self-determination is still unclear. There are, in the area, two non-recognised states, namely Nagorno-Karabakh and Trans-Dniester, that may hope for similar recognition. Almost all republics of the former Soviet Union have their own separatist “skeletons in the closet”. The disintegration of any state obviously occurs for internal reasons first and not basically because of external support. However, by recognising the independence of the two Georgian entities, Moscow exposed itself to particular risks. Ethnic separatism in Northern Caucasus is currently declining, but Islamic radicalism now poses serious challenges. At the same time, keeping the old imperial practices in ruling the Russian South potentially creates some other kinds of danger. The other question raised by Russia’s recognition relates to the criteria or conditions for such recognition. It sounds useless today to argue whether the Russian President was right or wrong, hastily responding to the appeals of both chambers of the Federal Assembly. After making this tough and unpopular foreign policy decision, which has not been supported by any of its CIS allies, the Russian 2  These partially recognised states may be compared with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Sahara Arab Democratic Republic or Taiwan.

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state cannot revoke it without running the risk of paying a higher price than when the initial decision was taken. The 26 August 2008 decision is rooted in, and reflects a specific historical context. Dmitry Medvedev’s decree was adopted under particular conditions and it should not be dissociated from their background. As long as the conflicts were frozen, Russia could postpone recognition of the self-proclaimed republics, despite several referenda and public campaigns asking for such a step. For example, the Russian Republic of North Ossetia recognised the independence of South Ossetia 15 years ago, as early as in 1993. But this was not followed by a similar move from Moscow. In the first half of 2008, Russian foreign policy towards the Caucasus was marked by Putin’s slogan that Russia was not going to “ape the West”, which unilaterally recognised Kosovo.3 The only step from the Russian side aimed at “unfreezing” the conflict was the deployment of railroad units into Abkhazia, contrary to its 1994 commitments. The Kremlin’s policy evolved after the events of August 2008. When all the existing frameworks for the peaceful settlement of the conflicts were broken down, it was no longer possible to continue the process as before. Having ventured into a Blitzkrieg against Tskhinvali, Saakashvili finally removed any possibilities for peaceful integration of the two rebellious republics. Medvedev’s decision could be considered as too emotional, and taking a break before recognition – at least to win some allies over – might have been justified. Probably, Russia should have taken into account that it could itself be outplayed by the precedents created in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, after August 2008, Medvedev had few available options – among which was the recognition of independence that he finally chose. As soon as the status quo and traditional mechanisms for peaceful conflict settlement were broken,4 Moscow made a choice in favour of a formal and legal recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The process of ethnic self-determination, launched with the disintegration of the USSR and created with that very model of authority and government, has not come to an end. The collapse of the former Soviet Union as an historical process cannot be considered as fully completed, unless the ethno-political conflicts all over its territory are settled. Implications of August 2008 Events for the Caucasus Republics After August 2008, Russia and Georgia took up position on either side of the barricades. True, in the 21st century, full isolation of one country towards another is not possible. However, despite the preservation and even consolidation of the Russian business position in Georgia, political contacts between the two 3  See Vladimir Putin’s “big press conference” in Moscow, 14 February 2008. Available at: http://lenta.ru/articles/2008/02/14/putin 4  Russia joined to “de-freeze” the conflicts later than Georgia.

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countries are reduced to the Geneva talks, enabling diplomatic circles to monitor the other side’s position from time to time. Incidentally, the visits to Moscow by former Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli and former parliament speaker Nino Burjanadze can hardly be perceived as anything other than operations of public relations.5 By recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow made a choice about its future relations with Georgia. But even more significantly, Tbilisi also made a choice four years earlier by beginning to “unfreeze” the conflicts (Welt 2010). As a result of its decision, Russia deprived itself of the tools of political pressure against Georgia, pushing the latter closer to the US than before. In January 2009, Tbilisi and Washington signed for instance a Charter on Strategic Partnership. However, this step made Abkhazia and South Ossetia even farther from Georgia. On the contrary, it contributed to the consolidation of the new status-quo. The US and NATO had the resources to crash Russia, and the Russian Federation had no possibilities to penetrate deep into Georgia. In military terms, its potential is obviously much greater than Georgia’s, but its aim is to annihilate Georgian statehood. And indeed, such an objective would have then encountered more serious resistance from key international actors like the US, NATO and the EU than was the case two years before. At the same time, it is crucial for Russia to preserve its influence in the South Caucasus, in view of the multifaceted interactions between this area and the North Caucasus. But shaping a new status quo in the Caucasus was not limited to the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and severed diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia. The new status-quo affected the regional countries of Armenia and Azerbaijan. What lessons did Yerevan and Baku draw from the war? Baku most likely realised that the “Serbian Krajina” scenario could not be applied to the Caucasus.6 The West, that is, both the EU and the US, wanted considerably less from the Caucasus than it has sometimes been assumed. Thus, it was no accident that following the August 2008 war, Azerbaijan refrained from militarist propaganda for a few months. In turn, Armenia realised that Russia’s victory over Georgia created many problems given the fact that all of its relations with Russia went through Georgia. In this context, and understanding that the “Western factor” should not be overestimated in the region, Yerevan began looking for ways to normalise its relations with neighbouring Turkey, which was clearly willing to

5  Also, those visits by famous people like Xeniya Sobchak, former mayor of Saint Petersburg Anatoli Sobchak’s daughter, or Mikhail Gorbachev, accompanied by other influential retirees, are not taken as serious political contacts. 6  In August 1995, the Croatian army swept into the Serbian Republic Krajina, a small enclave created by local Serbs in 1991. The international community’s reaction was flaccid. Before the operation, the US had provided one-sided technical and intelligence assistance to Croatia. As a result, Croatia restored its territorial integrity but hundreds of Serbs were forced to flee.

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get more involved in Caucasian geopolitics after the August war.7 The ArmenianTurkish dialogue became a serious factor in the regulation of the Karabakh peace process. Even though the NK conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was not mentioned in the Zurich Protocols signed between Yerevan and Ankara in October 2009, Azerbaijani diplomacy eventually succeeded in connecting, in practice, the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation with some progress in negotiations on NK. The protocols were eventually not ratified, leading to stagnation in the rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey. In contrast with conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Trans-Dniester or in the Balkans, it seems that the NK conflict has become a point where Russian and US positions, starting with the agreement on an indefinite ceasefire, have not substantially deviated for all these years. Both sides, albeit in different ways, have been interested in preserving the negotiations, even they have not produced any concrete results, and in avoiding the “unfreezing” of the conflict. In addition, neither Moscow, nor Washington would like to raise the “stakes in the NK game”. Russia has its own problems to deal with in the Greater Caucasus, as has the US in the Greater Middle East.8 In theory, these factors could bring positive developments in the resolution of the NK conflict. But at the same time, existing nuances do not allow for this process to progress rapidly. Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia: A New Agenda Recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence by Russia has brought about key changes and no changes at the same time. All the problems existing before in fact remain. Having itself taken the responsibility for the former Georgian autonomies, the Kremlin also took new risks. In the circumstances of a new status quo, the associated problems and challenges are as follows. First, it is necessary to redress the point of view, widely expressed by propagandists close to official authorities in Russian society, that recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will reduce the risks to security and stability in the Russian South. The 2008 events in Georgia confirmed the famous poetical metaphor that “a battle is eternal, and peace is just a dream”. A series of murders and explosions in the Gali distrinct of Abkhazia and Western Georgia have testified that if the conflicting sides are not ready to compromise, military clashes could take place. Enmity between Tbilisi and its former autonomies will most probably not be limited by the Geneva forum. In general, it seems like the issue of recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence has been too much exaggerated by both sides – the supporters of the two partially recognised republics and their opponents. Dmitry Medvedev’s declaration in 26 August 2008 has actually not changed anything. As 7  For detailed information on the Armenian-Turkish dialogue, see Chapters 6 and 8. 8  From Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan to Turkey, Palestine and Israel.

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before, Georgia still considers Abkhazia and South Ossetia as its own territories. As before, it is still ready to conduct sabotage and guerrilla war on the disputed lands. Medvedev’s decision became historical because it has formally and legally changed Russia’s role in the Abkhazian and South Ossetian affairs. The four-year process of “unfreezing” the conflict, initiated by Georgia, pushed Russia towards revising its position as a “side that keeps justifying itself”. The “Five-Day War” has finally broken down the status quo and turned Russia into a party to the conflict. Russia transformed from a peace-keeper into a political protector of Abkhazia and the South Ossetia.9 Whatever good or bad, this change reflects nothing but the simple acknowledgement and endorsement of facts. Outside Russia and three other countries,10 neither Georgia, nor the international community has fully recognised the new realities. Certainly, Russia has not found itself isolated, an outcome that was difficult to imagine taking into account its international weight and at least problems related to the global financial crisis. However, its voice remained isolated in the international arena, “with all its consequences” as they say. This means that escalation on the Abkhazian and South Ossetian frontlines should be expected. In this situation, the choice is not between escalation and peace, but between the “Serbian Krajina” scenario and instability “beyond the friendly bayonets”. Supposedly, time will be working against Georgia, but until the emergence of its own Djindjich or Tadic, Tbilisi will live in the condition of constant ethno-political turbulence. Consequently, Moscow needs an effective policy to ensure security guarantees for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Otherwise, frustration among the residents of these entities, who thought that formal recognition meant peace, will be inevitable. So far, recognition has turned out to be just the end of their “Georgian history”. The difficult work of building-up their own statehood, although limited by complex political and economic realities, and on creating the optimal framework for Russian military presence has followed. But possible problems in bilateral relations should not be underestimated. Today, there are objective disagreements, which are not publicly stated but exist in a latent form. In South Ossetia, there is a contradiction between Moscow’s efforts to check and dominate the local situation on the one hand, and the willingness of the Ossetian elite on the other hand to control finances allocated by Russia. Another issue is that Moscow and Vladikavkaz try to “help” Eduard Kokoity by providing him competent staff, whereas the head of South Ossetia prefers his own loyal and tested forces. There may also be some disagreements over the unification of North and South Ossetias. The North Ossetian elite are not so keen on giving up leading positions to ambitious “Kudar people”.11 9  In this sense, Russia is not like Turkey, which continues to call its soldiers in Northern Cyprus “peace-keepers”. 10  Nicaragua, the Republic of Nauru and Venezuela. 11  All the Ossetians from South Ossetian and inner Georgia are called “Kudars” in North Ossetia, which is not so much correct from the academic viewpoint.

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In Abkhazia, there is a clear contradiction between the declared aim of creating a “neutral demilitarised democratic republic” and the deployment of Russian military bases. An important issue, especially for Abkhazia, is the presidential election and the electoral processes as a whole: the political landscape in South Ossetia is more homogeneous than in Abkhazia, where there is some pluralism and competition. What kind of role will Moscow play in Abkhazian domestic policy? Another urgent problem, existing in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, lies in containing radical “patriot”, who are ready to continue to struggle against Georgia even when it is not in Russia’s interests. That is why Moscow should find the optimum compromise between interference in domestic political processes in Abkhazia and the South Ossetia and defence of Russian national security in the Greater Caucasus. Otherwise, the history of the USSR may be repeating itself. The Russian Northern Caucasus: Is the Separatist Threat Real?12 Russia is a Caucasian state, as seven entities under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation are fully or partly located in the North Caucasus, and four others are more or less in the steppe of Ciscaucasia. But the point is not so much the geography. Russia itself has suffered the experience of struggle against separatism and regional particularism. The landmarks on this path were two military campaigns in Chechnya (1994-1996 and 1999-2000), the 1992 Ossetian-Ingush conflict, which has not been fully settled yet. The existence of the de facto state of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria for six years and a “special Islamic territory” in three Dagestani villages in 1998-1999 put into question Russia’s political and military presence in Northern Caucasus as such. In the last two decades, Russia also had to face such challenges as legislative “isolation” in the Republic of Adygea, where specific rules were introduced in the early 1990s about the period of residence and the knowledge of the Adygean language for any head of the republic; attempts at ethnic division of the Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Circassia republics, and outward migration of the Russian population from the whole Northern Caucasian territory. Accordingly, the question of whether Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s recognition may cause a “domino effect” inside Russia is not just an academic issue. To answer it, it is necessary to formulate a number of principle theses. Firstly, separatist aspirations are practically inevitable in any multi-cultural state. The phenomenon is visible in Spain, Britain, France, Belgium and many other countries which are part of the so-called civilised world. But these sentiments should not necessarily become prevailing and shared by the overwhelming majority of representatives of the ethnic group concerned. Secondly, the ideology and practices of separatism are not a constant. Their popularity is impacted by many external and internal factors. For example, the unstable situation in Ingushetia or Dagestan cannot be identified as an expression 12  For more detailed observation, see Markedonov 2010.

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of separatism. Not every explosion, kidnapping, sabotage or even protest against the authorities is to be interpreted as separatism. Political violence is not only used by ethno-nationalist leaders to achieve their goals. The forces, people and ideas which are behind political violence in the North Caucasus need to be thoroughly examined. Besides, the lack of powerful centres of ethnic nationalism in the region should not be considered as a guarantee for stability. Islamic radicalism, especially if it is on the rise, is not a less dangerous challenge to regional security. Thirdly, the existence of separatist agendas does not automatically generate conflicts or feed wars. In the early and mid 1990s, besides Chechen separatism, there were other ethno-nationalist movements in the North Caucasus calling for self-determination up to secession. Some put forward secession projects not only in Russia, but also in neighbouring republics, where similar ethnic groups lived. This was especially the case of Lezghin irredentism extending from Russian Dagestan to Azerbaijan. In early 1990s, for example, the Party for Independence and Revival of Dagestan was created but did not play a substantial role in the political life of the largest North Caucasian republic. The main slogan of the Republic became some time later the phrase by Rasul Gamzatov: “Dagestan did not become a part of Russia voluntarily and it will not secede from Russia voluntarily either”.13 In the Russian North Caucasus Republic of Karachay-Circassia only, five republics were proclaimed in 1991, including two Cossack ones. In KabardinoBalkaria, there was also an intensive process of fragmentation along ethnic lines in 1991-1992, with appropriate polls, referendum and land delimitation. The Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was also actively promoting the ideas of a “Common Caucasian Home” naturally excluding Russian architects. Thus, Chechnya was just the most remarkable example of ethnic separatism. The other movements have not developed into open confrontations. As Professor Charles King put it, “with Putin’s coming to power, the autonomous and separatist intentions in the region fell silent” (King 2008: 324). But they fell silent not only thanks to Putin’s will and the “vertical of power”. The point is that the ethnic nationalism suffered a historical defeat. The defeat is perhaps only temporary. Due to the poor policy of the federal centre, some “reversal movements” are also probable. But today, the reality shows that radical protest movements against Russian central power tend to use Islamist language rather than an ethno-national or separatist one. Even the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria was dissolved in 2007 by Dokka Umarov, who had proclaimed the Caucasian Emirate.14

13  Cited in Belai, A. and Gamzayev, K-A. Dagestan neotdelim ot Rossii: Beseda s predstavitelem Pravitel’stva Respubloki Dagestan [Dagestan is not Separable from Russia: A Conversation with the Representative of the Government of the Republic of Dagestan on the Recent Military Events], in Russian, Moskovskiy Zhurnal, 1 November 1999. 14  “Statement by Amir Dokka Umarov about the Declaration of the Caucasus Emirate”, 7 November 2007. Available at: http://caucasus.wordpress.com/2007/12/02/the-statementby-amir-dokka-umarov-about-the-declarationof-the-caucasus-emirate-07102007/

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Ethnic nationalism reached its apogee in the first half of the 1990s, as a result not only of state weakness but also of objective specific circumstances. First, disintegration of any imperial state is always accompanied and aggravated by the search for new roots and a new identity. Second, the North-Caucasian republics have been during seventy years part of the Soviet state, which pursued a policy of state atheism on the one hand, and on the other hand promoted the legal institutionalisation of ethnicity. Religiousness was prohibited, while ethnicity was cultivated. So in the beginning of 1990s, there were simply no skilful preachers of “pure Islam” in the region. That is why Islamic radicals who appeared then in Northern Caucasus tried to combine religious rhetoric with ethnic nationalism. Overtime, however, ethnic nationalism and separatism have lost popularity and started to decline. Considering the ethnic diversity of the Northern Caucasus, consistent ethno-nationalism was fraught with conflicts. There were many such conflicts in the 1990s, the most serious and well-known ones being the OssetianIngush and Russian-Chechen conflicts. Ethnic nationalism failed to solve some urgent problems of the local elites, which came to power, engaged a privatisation policy but forgot to fulfil their promises and people’s expectations for territorial rehabilitation. Ethnic nationalism also declined because state-building in “Ichkeria” was unsuccessful. The reason for this was not the Russian military intervention, although it caused people to experience the costs of secession, but the failure to build up an effective state in the de facto independent Chechnya, at least comparable with Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Even more, under Dudaev-Maskhadov, Ichkeria behaved aggressively towards its neighbours, which created the perception in the region that Russia was a lesser evil compared with a “free Ichkeria”. At the same time, in the mid-1990s, a radical-Islamist environment has been gradually emerging in the North Caucasus, based on the project of creating a new region, different from the Soviet experience, from failed democratisation or ethnic nationalism. The project of a “Pure Islam” was not designed by foreign forces (Saudis, Pakistanis or American) interfering in the region. It was first of all the result of internal developments and dynamics. This project became popular not because of illiteracy or alleged native provincialism among the local population. Radical Islamists appealed to the world religion and universal values, beyond ethnic groups, wirds, tarikats or clans. They stressed – egalitarianism, the fight against corruption and social injustice. The ideologists of “pure Islam” also skilfully used psychological methods to attract people, appealing to unsuccessful sections of young people, deprived of education or career opportunities. Radical Islam, also inadequately called “Wahhabism”, thus spread from the Eastern part of the region, that is, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, to the Western part, where the religious feeling had been traditionally lower. The tragic events that occurred in the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria in October 2005 were a consequence of these developments.15 Those who consider themselves 15  The Nalchik attack on 13 October 2005 was a raid by a large group of militants. A number of buildings associated with Russian security forces were targeted. More

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as the defenders of “Pure Islam” are, however, not so homogeneous at it may seem. There are, among them, such people who have already committed crimes; others who consider “Pure Islam” as a fashion or affection; and some who have simply been disoriented or just lost their path. So treating them all as “enemies of Russia” would be a big political mistake. Each world religion adapts itself to the local conditions. And if Imam Shamil spread Tarikat Islam in Dagestan and Chechnya by force in the 19th century, this trend in Islam is considered as “traditional Islam” in the Eastern part of the Caucasus.16 Most probably, “Wahhabi” Islam will go through a complex transformation, becoming more traditional and less radical. North Caucasian authorities, but also the Russian authorities, experts, and society will have to undertake a huge amount of work to distinguish and divide terrorists from the people, who would be ready for political loyalty to the Russian state. It would also be simplistic to consider protest movements in Northern Caucasus as exclusively Islamist. There is a secular opposition in Ingushetia and Dagestan as well, and their criticism is primarily addressed at the local republican authorities. While in Ingushetia, opposition unites people with very different political backgrounds and views but sharing a common dislike of the regional power, in Dagestan, they are activists of a number of all-Russian parties. Although in 2007-2008, their might and influence were seriously weakened, they are still present there. The so-called intra-apparatus opposition in the regional entities should not be ignored. Even if they do not broadcast public slogans or hold open debates, its role in staff policy and administrative decision making should not be underestimated. Therefore, the current situation in Northern Caucasus is very different now. Today, radical Islamism and not ethnic separatism poses the major challenge to security. This political movement is fuelled by the vices of both Russian central and regional powers like nepotism, closeness, inability and unwillingness to hold a dialog with opponents. However, the situation has not become irreversible. If Russia’s state-building fails and repeats the fate of the USSR, it will not be the result of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s recognition, but rather of the inability to adequately evaluate the internal situation and build up relevant national and confessional policies.

than 100 people (142 according to official tallies), including at least 14 civilians were reportedly killed during the ensuing shootout, which continued into the next day. Many people were wounded. Famous Caucasian warlord Shamil Basayev subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack. See “Units of the Caucasus Front Enter Nalchik”, 13 October 2005, Kavkaz Center News Agency. Available at: http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/ content/2005/10/13/4146.shtml 16  This trend, supposed to be pro-Russian and loyal to Moscow, has its own radicals too.

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After the Bipolar and Unipolar Worlds: A New Chance for Russia? The “Five-Day War” marked the end of another process which unfolded in a global, rather than just Eurasian framework. It demonstrated that impartial, and most importantly, effective and legitimate international arbitration has become impossible. This is a consequence of the deep crisis of international law and, and more precisely of the Yalta-Potsdam model. At the same time, it is a consequence of the failure of the unipolar world established in the late 1980s after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Most experts and politicians identified a crisis of international law right after the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. However, the events that took place in 19891991 marked only the beginning of the end. With the recognition of Kosovo and Russia’s response in the form of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s recognition, the Yalta-Potsdam model, defined as a collection of universally recognised standards, ceased to exist. The recognition of Kosovo in the beginning of 2008 became a demonstration of power in a unipolar world. The US unilaterally declared the former Serbian autonomy “a unique case of ethno-political self-determination” and legitimised it from a formal and legal point of view. In response to the challenge posed by Washington and its allies, Moscow broke the “monopoly on recognition” on 26 August 2008. Henceforth, individual centres of power, despite the lack of a common approach or criteria, have started to recognise (or not) any entity they wished. In February 2008, some UN member states, including three permanent members of the Security Council, that is, the US, UK and France, recognised the independence of the former Serbian autonomy. Then, in August 2008, Russia, another permanent member of the UN Security Council and of the “nuclear club”, recognised the sovereignty of Georgia’s former autonomies. Meanwhile, Russia has conspicuously refused to recognise Kosovo, while the US and EU member states have kept supporting Georgia’s “territorial integrity” after August 2008. Common rules, standards and criteria do not operate anymore. Instead, world policy seems to be based on political expediency. Such a move was initiated some times ago and dates back to the early 1990s. In 1991, Croatia, Slovenia, and the Soviet republics were recognised in violation of the principle of territorial integrity; meanwhile the principle of indivisibility of the former Yugoslav republics started to be broken down, culminating in the recognition of Kosovo’s independence in February 2008. Six months later, Russia, following the example set by the US and the EU, claimed to be a new world power centre, entitled to recognise any state on its own. The “Five-Day War” highlighted the ongoing collapse of postWorld War II model of world structure. Today, the UN is functioning in a formal way, but international law is shaped in reference to both the US and Russia. It has turned into the mixture of controversial theses and appeals, “double standards” applied by both Washington and Moscow. Thus, the main actors of world politics are faced with the problem of devising a new model of world order. In a period of

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vacuum, the alternatives available would be the law of the jungle and the assertive demonstration of force at the international level. The fact that other actors besides Russia may be taking such steps is a matter of great concern. In that regard, Moscow has the opportunity to encourage the formation of the basis of a new European and global security architecture. From a Russian point of view, the events of August 2008 were a consequence of the failure of the “unipolar world” model which emerged from the ashes of Yalta and Potsdam and ensured the domination of the US while ignoring the other power centres. Speaking at the international forum in Evian (France) on 8 October 2008, Dmitry Medvedev put forward his vision of the new security architecture. He stated that the former security system has become obsolete and ineffective. According to the Russian President, current agreements are not reflecting the changes in the real global situation, as clearly shown by developments in Iraq, Kosovo, the Caucasus and Afghanistan. In his words, “the current situation represents an acute phase of the continuing crisis of the entire Euro-Atlantic policy brought about by the ‘unipolar syndrome’”. At the same time, he stressed a need to find a way out of this crisis together with the West, and to conclude a new European security Treaty that could be based on five key points: • respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of states; • inadmissibility of the use of force; • reasonable limits on military build-up; • no exclusive rights to maintaining peace and stability in Europe for any state or international organisation; and finally • equal guarantees of security for all. Dmitry Medvedev added that any new security arrangements should be based on national interests and not skewed by ideological motives, while “organizations operating in the Euro-Atlantic region” should also have the opportunity to join.17 This idea was then reiterated in the President’s first address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on 5 November 2008.18 Russia’s initiative and proposals have given rise to different views and comments. Much seems to be inconsistent with the Kremlin’s policy. The idea to support the territorial integrity of the states is at odds with the unilateral recognition of the independence of the two former Georgian autonomies. However, sincere zest runs through Dmitry Medvedev’s initiatives. Unilateral actions, whether it is the recognition of Kosovo, or of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are a threat to the 17  See “Russian President to promote new security treaty for Europe”, RIA Novosti, 7 October 2008. Available at: http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081007/117507229.html 18  See “Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”, 4 November 2008. Available at: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/11/05/2144_type70029type8 2917type127286_208836.shtml

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stability of specific regions like the Balkans or the Caucasus, and of Europe as a whole, as well as to global security. Hence, it is imperative to promote effective cooperation, and therefore establish common criteria, standards and general approaches for the assessment of various national interests and aspirations. Russia and the West: No Prospect for a “Cold War” The search for new “rules of the game” seems to be much more important than the intensively discussed issue of Russian isolation. In this connection, one of the key results of the “Five-Day War” has been to determine “red lines” and “frontier situation” in the relations between Russia and the West. The war in South Ossetia has shown that the “West”, its common policy or alleged plot, is not an adequate signifier. It may be useful to describe some aggregation of relations between NATO or EU member states and Russia. But at the same time, it does not reflect the real complexity in the approaches of the leading world states, taking into account their economical potential and political influence. Based on socio-economic and socio-political criteria, Turkey cannot be fully considered as the West. But if we take into account military and political parameters, it is one of the most important parts of the Western world, a NATO member, controlling “Black Sea-LTD” and with the second largest army among the member states of the Alliance by manpower. The “Five-Day War” has revealed the different views of leading Western actors, that is, the US, NATO and the EU, as well as the internal divisions within these organisations. There are obvious differences in the approaches to Caucasian geopolitics among such members of the EU as France and Lithuania, or such NATO member states as Turkey and Poland. Even among the East European states, the positions of Czech Republic and Slovakia did not coincide with those of Estonia, Latvia or Romania. For the US, the consistent support of Georgia was based on the geopolitical role of the South Caucasus in promoting American national interests. Considered from Washington, the South Caucasus is part, the rear part of the Greater Middle East, serving as a geopolitical springboard. At the same time, it is a part of the Wider Black Sea, which is already a part of Europe since Bulgaria’s and Romania’s joining of the EU. For Europeans, this region is not of military-strategic importance first and foremost; it as primarily a space where they can promote European values through “soft security” instruments. This is the reason why they demonstrate more readiness for compromise with Moscow; refuse to apply sanctions against Russia, and try to understand the motives behind Russian policy. As a result of the “Five-Day War”, the EU has – unlike the US – visibly strengthened its positions in the South Caucasus. In any case, the “West”, with its various states and structures, is not ready for a new “Cold “War” with Russia. The invitation extended to Dmitry Medvedev to participate in NATO Lisbon Summit in November 2010 provides clear evidence for that. The meeting essentially aimed at defining the parameters

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of the partnership between Russia and the Alliance. Like the “reset” in USRussia relations, in EU-Russia relations a “fresh start” has been called for. In some ways, this is another consequence of the August 2008 war. If the South Caucasus had been recognised as an area of Moscow’s “special interests”, primarily because of security problems in the Russian South, anti-Western sentiment in the Kremlin would have decreased rather than increased. There are no ideological disagreements between Russia and the “West” – Moscow has not exported socialism into Abkhazia and South Ossetia and has not defended anybody’s dynastic interests there. Certainly, there is a conflict of interests, as well as substantial misunderstandings; some stereotypes and phobias of the past are also still preserved. But there are serious challenges in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iran and North Korea, deep concerns about energy and international terrorism that require joint efforts which alone will enable the solution of these problems. All this gives some faint, but nevertheless real, hope that the search for common rules for world order will start in the near future. Starting from 26 August 2008, all the actors involved in the new Caucasus region came up with a qualitatively new agenda, the understanding of which is only just beginning. Bibliography King, C. 2008. The Ghost of Freedom: A History of the Caucasus. Oxford: Oxford University Press. King, C. 2008. “The Five-Day War”. Foreign Affairs, 87(6), November-December 2008, 2-11. Markedonov, S. 2008. “Regional conflicts Reloaded: The Five-day War through the Prism of post-Soviet Politics”. Russia in Global Affairs, 6(4), 22-202. Markedonov, S. 2010. “The Caucasian Cauldron”. The Journal of International Security Affairs, Autumn/Winter 2010, No. 19: 123-8. Available at: http:// www.spia.vt.edu/about/events/vtpnpseries/vtpnp_lectures/markedonov_1.pdf Welt, C. 2010. “The Thawing of a Frozen Conflict: The Internal Security Dilemma and the 2004 Prelude to the Russo-Georgian War”. Europe-Asia Studies, 62(1): 63-97.

Chapter 3

Armenia’s National Security: External Threats, Domestic Challenges Richard Giragosian

Introduction For all countries, not just Armenia, the process of defining national security is one of the more basic obligations of a state. The term national security is essentially used to define a state’s mission to meet possible threats, both internal and external. This state mission is comprised of three main pillars: to protect its territorial integrity and state borders; to provide security for its population; and to preserve stability, in both political and economic terms. The challenge of national security, especially in today’s complex environment of multiplying threats, is to ensure that both the definition and defence of national security is a dynamic, not static, process of constant vigilance and preparation. For an infant state like Armenia, small in both size and population, national security holds an even greater role in influencing the formulation of domestic and foreign policy alike. Faced with the demands of a long-standing trade and transport blockade by two of its four neighbours, as well as the constraints of an unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian national security is endowed with a significance well beyond the traditional nature of small state geopolitics. Moreover, Armenia is now increasingly subject to several broader challenges, ranging from shifting regional geopolitical competition to new threats to the state-centred system of international security. More specifically, there are four key components to reassessing and redefining Armenian national security within the context of the country’s current limitations, challenges and threats. The Historical Context The Evolution of Armenian National Security The evolutionary development of Armenian national security has been closely tied to the unique history of the Armenians. Driven by its long but troubled history, the fundamental concept of Armenian national security has been dominated by the most basic and essential mission: survival. Throughout history, this mission has entailed a complex strategy of managing threats from a number of competing

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empires and regional powers. The sole driving force of this mission has been a priority of ensuring the physical survival of the Armenian nation. Although this mission of national security was not always tied to statehood, or even to sovereignty, the imperative for national survival forged a resilient and vibrant nationalism among the Armenian nation. Throughout the Ottoman period, with its sporadic threat of pogrom and massacre that culminated in the 1915 Armenian Genocide, the Armenian perception of national security was further equated with outright survival. With the birth of the first independent nation-state, through the formation of the Republic of Armenia in 1918, this historically defensive concept of Armenian national security adopted new elements of state security and military strategy. But the short duration of that early period statehood, which abruptly ended with the absorption of the first Armenian Republic into the Soviet Union, effectively halted the development of a more mature concept of Armenian national security. The Soviet Legacy Although the Sovietisation of Armenia ended the country’s short-lived independence, the incorporation of Armenia within the Soviet Union provided an important degree of security, especially in the aftermath of a series of military attacks by Turkish forces targeting the small Armenian state. Yet, while the Soviet Union offered inherent security and ensured the survival of the beleaguered state, it also impeded the course of Armenian statehood and impaired the development of a more sophisticated concept of national security. Throughout the Soviet period, Armenia was confined within the parameters of Soviet identity and policy, leading to a long period of stunted development and retarded growth. This was also evident in the misdirection of national security during the Soviet period, with its inward focus on “enemies of the state”, rather than focusing outward for potential threats. For the Soviet Union, as with most authoritarian regimes, such an inward focus of national security was necessary to maintain security and stability. Yet this resulted in an institutionalisation of “regime security” over national security. Thus, the foundations for Armenian statehood and national security were seriously flawed by the inherent limitations and impediments from the country’s legacy as a component of the Soviet system. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new independent Armenian state, there was no reservoir of experience and maturity to draw upon in preparation for the complex challenges from such an abrupt reawakening. Moreover, its legacy as a Soviet state led to a rather incoherent combination of strategy and statecraft at times grossly ill-suited for prudent policy or national power. Yet during the early years of post-Soviet independence, Armenia was still able to withstand war and blockade, and to adapt to externally imposed isolation while still achieving economic growth in only a few short years. And in terms of military security, Armenia was able to emerge as the dominant force in the region.

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But in the 15 years since a ceasefire with Azerbaijan that essentially “froze” the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there has been far too little adaptation to meet the changing nature of strategic threats and the geopolitical shifts that have so profoundly altered regional security. Moreover, and most worrisome, Armenia has yet to seriously confront the dynamic pace of change in global security, geopolitics and globalisation. The Process of National Security For Armenia, there are obvious limitations of resources, both human and financial, to the development of a more sophisticated and comprehensive strategy of national security. But Armenia faces a particularly challenging threat environment, with one neighbouring country, Azerbaijan, that is both hostile and unhappy with its territorial and diplomatic losses in its war with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, and another neighbour, Turkey, which poses its own potential threat to Armenian security. Thus, this combination of scarce resources and potent security threats requires a more sophisticated strategic response. The core mission for Armenia, from this context, is to establish a coherent process of national security. This entails both organisational and ideological reforms, including a re-examination of commonly held but little questioned tenets of Armenian national security, as well as a greater effort to maximise policy options while mitigating the inherent impediments to its national power. In terms of this imperative for forging a sophisticated strategic process of national security, Armenia needs to look for international models. One such example for Armenia stems from the US model of national security planning, which offers an important precedent for Armenia mainly because it elevates the national security process to a level of equal significance with national security policy by opening the process to a higher level of policy debate and public disclosure. The relevance of the American model of the National Security Council stems from its institutional role as a functioning consultative body that helps, but also forces the executive branch of government to formulate and articulate a coherent concept of its national security goals and perspectives. Thus, it is the process more than the policy of national security that is enhanced by this system. In the Armenian case, there has been a notable absence of public discussion and little consideration or utilisation of outside expertise during the course of national security decision-making. Moreover, even though the most recent formulation of the national security doctrine1 offered a significantly new effort to leverage inter-agency expertise through a consultative method, such progress was unable to reach out to the broader public or consult with experts in the country’s academic or public policy circles. Thus, the absence of an effective policy formulation process in Armenia remains unresolved, with the inactivity and inadequate authority of 1  The Armenian National Security Strategy was adopted on 26 January 2007. See Armenian Ministry of Defense 2007.

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each of the institutions of Armenian national security posing a serious obstacle to a longer term capacity for national security analysis and decision-making.2 This deficiency is notable not only within the Armenian National Security Council itself, which as the country’s principal security body is endowed with little real power and is largely marginalised from any lead role in the formulation and consideration of the national security decision-making process. Although there has been a marked increase in the role of parliamentary committees with jurisdiction over defence and security policy, the sheer dominance of the executive branch has only solidified the dysfunctional nature of the national security process. Therefore, a primary recommendation to improve the process of Armenian national security would be to reform the organisation of the National Security Council. Currently, the Armenian National Security Council is rarely convened as a full consultative body and, even when it meets, is usually focused on the implementation of a decision already adopted. This distorted process stems from the fact that the body is headed by a politician and former parliamentary speaker, with little experience and expertise to fulfil his role as the Secretary of the National Security Council. Given the president’s dominant role over much of the country’s military and security policies and decisions, the practical result renders the body to be organisationally impotent. In terms of the process of national security, Armenian officials must also recognise the fact that national security is a dynamic, not static process that must become more inclusive, incorporating a broader range of actors and input. The most basic mechanism to achieve such inclusion would be to focus on targeting three specific actors: (1) state bodies and ministries, through an emphasis on an inter-agency approach;3 (2) academic and civilian experts, to harness critical input from those beyond the confines of political constraints or considerations; and (3) international experts and foreign officials, to utilise “best practices” for national security decisions and to leverage the input from other stakeholders in the process, such as experts from the US, Russia and NATO, for only a few examples. The August 2008 War in Georgia: Lessons Learned For Armenian national security, the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 not only demonstrated the fragility of security in the region, but also profoundly reconfigured the regional landscape. With a ceasefire agreement signed on 13 2  According to Article 55 of the Armenian Constitution, the president is empowered to “form and preside over the National Security Council”. The Armenian National Security Council (NSC) also has an official trilingual website, available at: http://www.nsc.am. For more information, see Giragosian 2006. 3  Such a collaborative inter-agency approach was used effectively during the process to formulate the Armenian National Security Concept document and, led by General Hayk Kotanjian, was also replicated in the drafting of the country’s military doctrine strategy paper.

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August 2008, the brief five-day conflict between Georgian and Russian forces effectively ended. But in the aftermath of the war, Russian troops were not only able to significantly strengthen their positions within Georgia proper, but also threatened to permanently dismember the Georgian state, as Moscow’s decision to formally recognise the independence of Georgia’s two separatists regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia now makes any future attempt at Georgian territorial reintegration extremely difficult. The August 2008 war dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape of the region, consolidating a clear reassertion of Russian power and influence and forcibly “resolving” two of the region’s three formerly “frozen” conflicts. The Georgian war also raised new doubts over Georgia’s strategic role as the regional “centre of gravity” for the West and effectively ended Georgia’s hopes to join the NATO alliance within a broader context of regional security and stability. An Operational Assessment of the Five-Day Georgian-Russian Conflict Although the relatively brief duration of open hostilities have now been replaced by a tense and still fragile “peace”, the campaign has significantly decimated Georgian military capabilities and has effectively ended both Georgia’s long-time aspirations for NATO membership and its hopes to retake its two break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Fuller and Giragosian 2008). Although the initial Georgian offensive seems to have been triggered by a series of provocations, the Georgian military strategy was significantly flawed from the start, based on an underestimation of the Russian response and an overestimation of its own military capabilities. Moreover, the Russian military campaign in Georgia was both rapid and overwhelming and, as the first military offensive beyond Russia’s borders since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it was largely unexpected. The Russian campaign moved well beyond the objectives of securing South Ossetia and Abkhazia and pushed through to secure a perimeter security zone within Georgia proper. An essential element of this plan was to decimate fundamental Georgian military capabilities by pursuing retreating Georgian units, destroying as much heavy equipment as possible and by specifically targeting all Georgian military facilities and bases, even those not involved in the conflict, in order to almost completely degrade Georgia’s military capabilities. Thus, due to the combination of fundamental tactical shortcomings and serious strategic blunders in the Georgian campaign to retake South Ossetia, it seems clear that the flaws in Georgian military planning were based on two key factors: an over-confident assumption of its own combat readiness and capabilities, as well as by a serious under-estimation of the scale and scope of the Russian response (Giragosian 2008b). On a broader level, the war with Georgia offered Russia an important opportunity to regain its leverage over the region, an opportunity that virtually remade the map of the South Caucasus and to redefine the parameters of the region’s strategic landscape.

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From the Russian perspective, the new regional reality was marked by three distinct achievements: first, an abrupt end to NATO expansion in the South Caucasus, at least for the near-term; second, the demise of Georgian capabilities to fulfil its ambitions as a fully-fledged Western anchor in the region; and third, a serious spike in broader tension and looming confrontation with the West as a whole. Russia was also able to reaffirm the inherent energy insecurity of the South Caucasus, demonstrating the vulnerability of the region’s pipelines and ports and raising new doubts over the reliability of Georgia as a key transit state. Interestingly, this lesson was also an important concern for both Turkey and Azerbaijan. In terms of the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey energy chain, both Ankara and Baku were angered at what they interpreted as a Georgian blunder that portrayed them as weak and vulnerable. The Impact of the Georgian War on Armenia Even before the August 2008 war in Georgia, there were several dangerous trends in the region already evident. These regional trends, ranging from a regional “arms race” to a shift in the fragile military balance of power in the region, posed new and very serious threats to Armenian national security. Yet even today, the outlook for security and stability in the South Caucasus remains far from certain. But the August 2008 war further demonstrated a dramatic shift in the region’s delicate balance of power, which has already reconfigured the threat perception and military posture of the region.4 More specifically, the changing nature of the regional military balance of power is compounded by two factors: a virtual “arms race” in the region, driven by sustained increases in defence spending, which have only impeded and subverted the course of reform and development in the region, and an overall shift in the regional “balance of power”, matched by a deeper trend of “militarisation” in the region, with the amplification of militant discourse and threats of war heightening tension and increasing the danger of renewed military hostilities or war. A Regional Arms Race For several years, there has been a marked increase in a regional competition over defence spending. As Azerbaijan escalates its defence spending on a massive scale, Armenia is compelled to keep pace, fuelling a new “arms race” in the region. Over the medium term, the danger for Armenia is not simply to match Azerbaijan’s military spending and rearmament, but to prepare for a possible emergence of a much stronger Azerbaijani military. In addition, there is a related worry over Azerbaijan’s militant rhetoric to “resolve” the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict by

4  For more on the impact of the war on Armenia, see Tsereteli 2009 and Giragosian 2008a.

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force, which bolstered by several years of billion-dollar-plus defence budgets, now poses one of the most serious threats to regional security and stability. The emergence of a virtual “arms race” in the region first started in 2004, as annual defence-related expenditures increased annually. Although the precise composition of military spending differs among each of the three countries of the region, the defence spending has steadily and consistently increased over the past five years, with each country devoting an ever-larger share of limited revenue and resources to defence spending. Despite Azerbaijan’s larger defence budget, the largest increase in defence spending in the region has actually been in Georgia (see Table 3.1 below). Table 3.1

The South Caucasus: Regional Military Spending (2004-2009)

Year

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Georgia

2009

$495.3 million

$2.46 billion

N/A

2008

$370 million

$2 billion

$572 million

2007

$273 million

$1.3 billion

$575 million

2006

$166 million

$700 million

$218 million

2005

$136 million

$300 million

$146 million

2004

$81 million

$175 million

$60 million

Sources: SIPRI Database, Jane’s Information Group, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), local sources.

Most notably, Azerbaijan has increased its defence budget from $175 million in 2004 to almost $2.5 billion for 2009. But given the extent of corruption within the country,5 the increase in the annual defence budget has not been used to either invest in developing or training more capable armed forces, or for procuring modern military weapons. A similar, but less substantial, increase in defence spending has also been underway in Armenia, largely due to the pressure of feeling compelled to keep pace with Azerbaijan. But Armenian defence spending has been the lowest in the region, with Azerbaijan spending five times more than Armenia on its military for 2009 (see Table 3.1 above). The Shifting Military Balance of Power Since the August 2008 war in Georgia, the shift in the region’s already delicate balance of power has become apparent, actually presenting an even more serious 5  For more on corruption within the Azerbaijani armed forces, see International Crisis 2008 and Giragosian 2008e.

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challenge to regional stability and security. In light of the virtual “arms race” in rising defence spending, the danger of a new wave of rearmament, amid an overall climate of militarisation, suggests that any change in the fragile military balance of power in the region could pose a serious threat to security. And with Nagorno-Karabakh now the sole unresolved or “frozen” conflict in the region, any new imbalance of military power threatens the capacity for maintaining relative peace and stability in the region. Azerbaijan’s Military Aspirations But the larger problem stems from Azerbaijan’s military aspirations, as Baku has repeatedly asserted a commitment to building modern, self-sufficient armed forces on its own terms, rejecting the patronage of both NATO and Russia. Yet the course of military reform in Azerbaijan has been particularly difficult in recent years and, despite a sharp increase in its annual defence budget financed by its energy wealth, the outlook for Azerbaijan’s rise as a regional power is far from certain. Despite the benefits of three consecutive years of defence budgets of more than $1 billion, Azerbaijan has accomplished little to date in terms of procuring advanced weapons systems or investing in modern equipment. Of its three branches of service, both the army and air force have continued to suffer from neglect, with continued shortages of spare parts and poor equipment maintenance. In addition, the Azerbaijani Air Force continues to suffer from shortfalls in munitions, ordnance and even aviation fuel, making the service the least combat-ready force. The Azerbaijani army, traditionally the core service of the armed forces, also lacks power projection capabilities and is far from attaining even a minimum level of combat-readiness (Giragosian 2008e). Thus, the real potential for building modern armed forces in Azerbaijan remains little more than a distant promise at this stage. And even with the enormous state budgets for defence, a relatively small proportion of defence spending has actually been spent on arms, training and essential equipment. Moreover, although the future of Azerbaijan as a regional military power seems certain, it will require at least a decade of sustained and serious military reform before Azerbaijan can even begin to realise its potential as the dominant military power in the region. Shared Concerns For Armenia, the continued threats of war and sizable defence spending by Azerbaijan loom large in the minds of Armenian defence planners. Faced with the possibility for renewed war, some Armenian officials welcomed the February 2008 decision during the Moscow summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation to create new “Collective Rapid Response Forces”, aimed at becoming “an effective tool in providing security” within the CSTO, in the words of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. According to General Hayk Kotanjian, the head of the Armenian Defence Ministry’s Institute for National Strategic Studies,

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the decision “creates a solid political, treaty-legal and military foundation” for the collective defence of CSTO members including Armenia. In Kotanjian’s words, the formation of the force will offer “a real mechanism of resisting aggression”, hinting at the threat to Armenia from Azerbaijan (Giragosian 2009b). And for Nagorno-Karabakh, which after Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia, is now the sole remaining “frozen” conflict in the region (Giragosian 2009c), the threats posed by a re-armed and re-assertive Azerbaijan can not be ignored. For the time being, Nagorno-Karabakh remains fairly secure, mainly due to the impressive professionalism and high state of readiness of the Karabakh military, in contrast to the generally poor state of affairs within the Azerbaijani armed forces.6 Most crucially, the tactical advantages of the Karabakh military’s well-entrenched defensive fortifications also deter Azerbaijani aggression in the medium-term. But Armenia should not be the only one concerned over such a threat to regional security. The international community should also be worried, especially since the August 2008 war in Georgia only demonstrated the vulnerability of the region’s oil and gas pipelines from renewed hostilities. In addition to the fragility of the regional energy infrastructure, there are also several broader economic considerations, of even greater and longer lasting concern. The Fallacy of Economic Deterrence First, it is now clear that the war in Georgia has revealed that the flow of oil and gas from the Caspian through the region is hostage to the inherent insecurity of the countries of the South Caucasus. But such vulnerability is certainly not a new development, as Western attempts to develop Iraq’s oil sector have failed repeatedly in the face of incessant instability, for only one example. What was different in the Georgian case was the utter failure of the “economic deterrent” that was presumed to underscore Western commitments to security in the region. More specifically, although the war in Georgia interrupted the flow of oil and from the Caspian and halted pipeline operations, the response was surprising. Prior to the August war, many analysts expected that by virtue of the sizable Western investments in the regional energy sector, which included the massive Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Western oil companies would do all in their power to pressure their governments to take immediate steps to end the conflict. Yet there was no concerted pressure, neither from the Western oil companies nor the states often thought to act on their behalf. The lesson of such empty “economic deterrence” suggests that in the event of a future conflict in the region, such as a war initiated by Azerbaijan, there should be no real expectation of an immediate or effective Western response. So much for the fallacy of British Petroleum

6  The Armenian armed forces are qualitatively rated as an impressive and combatready force according to various assessments. For more details, see Blandy 2008.

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exercising its influence over Azerbaijan to prevent war in order to maintain the flow of its oil supplies. The Risk of Hostilities and the “Hostilities of Risk” The second factor of defence economics is the relationship between the risk of hostilities and the “hostilities of risk”. Notably, there is an inverse relationship between an increasing level of the risk of hostilities and an increasingly hostile level of risk, affirmed by the fact that international capital may pull out of a region once it becomes too dangerous to operate or too unstable to protect investments. Ironically, this rather basic business maxim poses more of a threat to Azerbaijan than to Armenia. It also means that by aspiring to replace Armenia as the region’s dominant military power and threatening to retake Karabakh by force, Azerbaijan may soon face a worried group of investors who may decide that the risk outweighs the profit in Azerbaijan. And Azerbaijan is especially vulnerable to any downturn in investor confidence because of its over-reliance on foreign capital amid falling oil prices and due to a lack of industry beyond its energy sector. Against the backdrop, it is clear that the military balance of power has returned as one of the most crucial considerations for regional security and stability. But at the same time, the real imperatives for regional security and stability are, nevertheless, internal in nature and depend far more on institutional legitimacy, the rule of law and good governance, and on local economics and politics than grand geopolitics. Redrawing the Regional Map: The Russian-Turkish Embrace In many ways, it is now clear that the war in Georgia in August 2008 has redrawn the regional map in the South Caucasus. In the wake of that brief but dramatic war, Russia has only enhanced its power and influence in this region. In some ways reflecting this new Russian reassertion of power and influence, Russia is also improving relations with both Turkey and Azerbaijan. The Russian-Turkish Embrace Although the recent improvement in Russia’s relations with Turkey has been marked by a warm embrace between Moscow and Ankara, it is based on short-term considerations of the energy interests of both states and the new anti-Americanism within Turkey, which drives each country closer together. But the convergence of Russian and Turkish interests is limited over the longer-term by virtue of the fact that both countries are natural rivals in the region. From an Armenian perspective, however, there is growing concern over this Russian-Turkish embrace, especially as Moscow seems intent on influencing the current state of Turkish-Armenian relations. Although Russian support for Armenian-Turkish diplomatic negotiations represents an important positive shift, it

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is largely due to the fact that is it is now in Russia’s interest to maximise the TurkishArmenian border opening for its own purposes (International Crisis Group 2009). More specifically, although Russian policy has long been opposed to any significant improvement in relations between Armenia and Turkey and the closed border was seen as a helpful way to maintaining Russian dominance over Armenia, Russia’s position has shifted dramatically recently. Moscow’s stance has shifted most clearly in the wake of Russia’s August war with Georgia, with a possible Armenian-Turkish rapprochement only serving to bolster the Russian strategy to more completely isolate, marginalise and surround Georgia. Nevertheless, Russia will only remain supportive so long as the future course of Armenian-Turkish relations remains under its control. There are also added benefits for Russia from the issue, such as the possible sale of electricity to eastern Turkey from the Russianowned energy network in Armenia. There was also a diplomatic coup by Moscow, as the Armenian invitation was made during an official visit to Moscow and coordinated closely with Russian officials.7 The Warming of Russian-Azerbaijani Relations For Armenia, the most important implication from recent changes within the Russian leadership stems from the possible shift or modification to Moscow’s policies in the “Near Abroad”. Although Armenia is already very much hostage to the broader course of Russian ambition and interest, changes in Russian policies in the region in general, and toward Azerbaijan more specifically, pose a serious threat to the security of both Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. For much of the past decade and a half, Armenia has remained ever firmly locked in the Russian orbit, with little or no tension between the two states. Over the past decade, the Russian position has only strengthened in Armenia, despite a parallel decline in Russian power and presence in the rest of the region. The overall trend in Russian relations with Armenia is consistent, however, and remains firmly rooted in the stability of a strategic relationship between the two countries. Armenia is the only country in the South Caucasus region to openly host a Russian military base on its territory, and both sides seem content to maintain this relationship. But at the same time, Moscow’s policies toward Yerevan actually weaken Armenian national security. By its very nature, the strategic relationship between Armenia and Russia is rooted in the fundamental Armenian perception of Russia as protector, which reflects a natural affinity toward a Russian alliance. This affinity for a pro-Russian orientation is due to both the legacies of the Armenian Genocide and from seven decades of Soviet rule. But it is more than simply a legacy, however, as modern 7  The official transcript of the 24 June 2008 meeting between President Serzh Sargsyan and the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, which refers to ArmenianTurkish diplomacy, is available on the official website of the Armenian president: http:// www.president.am/addons/tasks/print/?sub=visits&id=27

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Armenia is increasingly concerned over the proximity of a contentious Turkey and from Azerbaijan’s militant rhetoric. There are limits to the net gains derived from Armenia’s strategic partnership with Russia (Giragosian 2010). Generally, the core limitation is rooted in the structural dependence of the relationship, as Armenia serves as less of a partner and more as a platform for Russia. An important factor contributing to this increasingly one-sided relationship has been a crucial mistake by Armenian leaders in underestimating Armenia’s strategic importance to Russia while, at the same time, overestimating Russia’s strategic significance to Armenia. While this imbalance has tended to distort the overall development of the country, it has also belittled and weakened Armenian independence and statehood. Threats to National Security Armenia faces several new internal developments that compound the need to re-examine its concept of national security. These internal challenges, in many ways the hardest to overcome, range from a worrisome trend in authoritarianism and a widening deficit of democracy, to an erosion of self-sufficiency and independence stemming from a dangerous over-reliance on Russia. In many ways, the most serious threat to Armenian national security comes not from Azerbaijan, nor Turkey, but comes from within. It is posed by the internal threat of corruption and all of its derivatives, from the rise of the powerful oligarchs to a “rule of law” that has degenerated into a “law of the rulers”. The real threat to Armenian democracy is most clearly demonstrated by the tendency for governance by strong individual leaders over strong institutional leadership. This dominance of “strongmen over statesmen” has emerged as one of the most formidable obstacles to conflict resolution and regional reintegration. The challenges of a mounting social divide, marked by widening disparities in wealth and income constitute “economic security”. These economic and social components of national security, exacerbated by a cancer of corruption (Giragosian 2009a), constitute a threat to Armenia’s internal stability and security that has been ignored for far too long. Despite the serious problems and deficiencies with Armenian politics, there is, nevertheless, a widening “democracy divide” between pluralist Armenia and its more autocratic Azerbaijani neighbour. And although there is a troubling need to bolster the institutions of Armenia’s infant democracy and address the serious social inequalities, this advantage should not only be highlighted, but must also be exploited. The Blockade of Armenia One of the more immediate challenges driving Armenian national security has been the blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Although the term blockade usually refers to the maritime interdiction, interference and denial of

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trade and transport to a nation’s port and coastline, in the case of the blockade of Armenia, it has encompassed a total East-West closure of Armenian land borders with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.8 The blockade of Armenia was especially powerful as it included a full disruption of trade, transport and energy links, and its effects were magnified by the landlocked nature of the Armenian state. While the imposition of the blockade by Azerbaijan was a natural result of the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, its initial impact resulted in an immediate and devastating shortage of foodstuffs and basic commodities, an abrupt and severe energy crisis, and a period of isolation. Armenia was forced to quickly adapt to the sanctions and strove to accommodate the social and economic demands of crisis by concentrating on its sole remaining external trade link northward through Georgia. The structural effects, however, of such adaptation fostered a degree of mounting dependence on Georgian territory as its sole source for Russian energy and goods. This dependence was quickly exploited by the Georgians as transit and tariff fees quickly exceeded normal market rates. The second external trade route, consisting of a small border crossing point southward through Iran, was without the infrastructure necessary to provide an immediate alternative. The long-closed border with Iran through the Soviet period, the nature of the Iranian market and political regime, as well as the “rogue” state status of Iran all complicated Armenia’s use of the Iranian option. Overall, the blockade of Armenia has long surpassed its utility. Not only was Armenia able to adapt, it has achieved impressive rates of economic growth (see Table 3.2). In some ways, the effect of the blockade actually unified the Armenian (and Karabakh) population. This “siege mentality” also withstood internal divisions and enhanced outward unity far beyond that of its neighbours. Although the structural effects of such an artificial economic situation tends to foster economic development that does not correspond with an economy’s natural comparative advantage or conform to a country’s normal direction of trade, the lasting impact of the blockade on the Armenian economy was far less than originally anticipated. The New Threat Matrix In this post-post-Cold War period, there are three new types of threats, each presenting their own specific and unique challenges that transcend the parameters of traditional threats posed by nation states. First, the emergence of al Qaeda and the attacks of 9/11 demonstrated the potency of newer security threats posed by 8  The embargo and related sanctions of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey meet the minimum threshold of the most recent interpretation of the term blockade under international law, which notes the applicability of blockade on both sea and land by citing “the actual investment of a port or place by a hostile force”. See Giragosian 2006.

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Table 3.2 Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Armenia: Economic Growth (Annual GDP) GDP (Percentage Change) 13.2 14.0 10.5 13.9 13.2 13.8 6.8

Source: IMF, World Bank, Armenian State Statistical Agency.

non-state actors, such as transnational terrorist groups, and from the related dangers of weak or “failed states” as havens for terrorists. The post-9/11 threat matrix also coincides with the emergence of a second threat, from the pace of globalisation, a trend that was well underway throughout the last decade. The trend of globalisation comprises its own form of security threats, with the most pertinent stemming from the threat of isolation. The third new threat, unlike the first two, originates from within the state itself. This internal threat is one of governance, and involves the need for economic or “social” security, as well as the necessity for democracy and good governance. The Transnational Threat The new set of transnational threats that has emerged in recent years poses a daunting challenge. It is one thing to combat the traditional military threats posed by an adversary or potential aggressor, but preparations for threats of a transnational nature require new thinking and newer methods. The demands from such transnational threats also strain the resources and capabilities of most states, even the most industrialised and developed. For small states like Armenia, a lack of preparedness for transnational threats is even more pronounced and, most importantly, Armenia is generally unprepared for two other types of transnational threats, both of which pose unique dangers resulting from the intersection of threat and globalisation. First, there is a serious threat of a public health nature, comparable to the threat of AIDS, but on a much smaller and more contained scale. Multiplied by the networks and connectivity of globalisation, the security-related concerns from public health threats such as epidemics has reached alarming proportions in recent years, with the outbreak of SARS9 in Asia and “Mad Cow” disease in Europe and North America being the most recent examples. Second, the recent tsunami in South Asia underscores the need for preparedness for natural disaster. The suffering from the Armenian earthquake (Verluise 1995) 9  SARS stands for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome.

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and the still incomplete task of rebuilding are painful reminders of the power of natural disaster. Such tragedy inflicts substantial damage, in both human and material terms, and it is usually not until such disasters occur that they are recognised as threats to national security. A related long-term issue is environmental security, which for Armenia is evident in the country’s troubled state of its natural resources (as with deforestation, pollution, and other environmental threats, etc.). Environmental security is also important on a regional scale, as seen in the case of the new Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline’s threat to the ecology of Southern Georgia. The Threat of Isolation The third element in this new threat matrix facing Armenia, is the danger of isolation. This threat involves the danger of becoming isolated and disconnected from the globalised marketplace. This threat is rooted in the economics of isolation, and is a shared threat throughout the region that involves a need to keep pace with technological and economic changes inherent in the process of globalisation. Although from a regional perspective, Armenia benefits from increasing rates of foreign investment that are not resource-based like Azerbaijan, nor aid-driven as with Georgia, but are attracted by the openness and opportunity offered by the Armenian economy. The Armenian IT sector holds another important advantage over its neighbours and demonstrates the necessity for interoperability with global markets and knowledge-based development. In terms of global security, it is now accepted that “national security depends less and less on territory and natural resources and more and more on the ability to adapt and integrate into the global economy”. And for a country like Armenia, that is faced with traditional limits of demography and geography, “economic issues are increasingly linked to security” (The Stanley Foundation 2003). This recognition has yet to be embraced by Armenian national security, as the current confines of Armenian nationalism have as yet failed to expand to include the demands of “economic security”. Conclusion Traditional regional players in the region, Russia, Turkey and Iran, are now also competing for influence with the United States and the European Union. But the most significant factor for Armenia is not the role of outside players in the region, but the challenge of addressing Armenia’s unresolved domestic political crisis. Without the foundation of resilient democracy, a population whose needs are met and an economy based on opportunity, Armenia will not be strong or stable enough to resist the outside influence of external actors. In this way, Armenia needs to tackle these internal challenges in order to strengthen its own sovereignty and statehood. As an arena for both cooperation and competition, the region is strategically significant, by virtue of its geographic and geopolitical vulnerability as a region

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where the national interests of Russia, Turkey, Iran and the United States all converge. In the long-term, in order to acquire durable security in the South Caucasus, however, the real imperatives are internal in nature, stemming from several key challenges: the need to graduate from the political school of elections driven by power not politics, and for leaders to be elected, not simply selected. Legitimacy is the key determinant for durable security and stability, while the strategic reality of the region is defined less by geopolitics, and more by local politics and economics. But most crucial is the lesson that institutions matter more than individuals for real democratisation. For Armenia, there seems to be a dangerous lack of appreciation of these trends, however, and more seriously, is compounded by an incomplete Armenian strategy for national security, only matched by a lack of a coherent process of national security. Specifically, the course of Armenian national security has failed to evolve beyond the parameters of the Karabakh conflict and has only led to a hardening of Armenian political thinking in recent years, fostering an increasingly rigid nationalist posture, a closed system of politics and limited political discourse. But again, it is also the absence of the process more than the policy of national security that is most worrisome. Thus, the redefinition of Armenian national security reveals the need for not only for a clear and coherent redefinition national security, but for a new recognition of national security as a dynamic, not static, process beyond policy. But the imperative for overcoming Armenia’s national insecurity is to first address the underlying military, political and economic trends. The overwhelming focus on so-called external threats to Armenian national security has been both misplaced and mistaken. Such “threat misperception” is rooted in a rigid nationalism has been compounded by the closed and subjective nature of national security and defence policy-making. The overwhelming need, therefore, is to institute a process of national security and defence that elevates Armenia’s true national interests over more parochial partisan interests and that recognizes that the core challenges to Armenian national security come not from Turkey or even Azerbaijan, but from within. Only then, can Armenia attain real security and lasting stability. Bibliography Armenian Ministry of Defence. 2007. National Security Strategy, 26 January. Available at: http://www.mil.am/eng/?page=49 Blandy, C.W. 2008. Azerbaijan: Is War Over Nagornyy Karabakh a Realistic Option? Shrivenham: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, May. Cornell, S., Popjanevski J. and Nilsson N., 2008. Russia’s War in Georgia: Causes and Implications for Georgia and the World. Washington: Central AsiaCaucasus Institute, August 2008.

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De Waal, T. 2003. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War. New York: NYU Press. Fuller, L. 2006. “Nagorno-Karabakh: What is the Sticking Point in the Peace Talks?”. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Feature [Online: 12 June]. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1069083.html Fuller, L. and Giragosian R. 2007. “Georgia: What is Behind Expansion of Armed Forces”. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newsline Endnote [Online: 19 September]. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078720.html Fuller, L. and Giragosian, R. 2008. “Analysis: Georgia Reverses Decision to Cut Defense Spending”. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Caucasus Report [Online: 26 June]. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/ article/1347830.html Giragosian, R. 2006. “Redefining Armenian National Security”. Demokratizatsiya, 14(2) Spring, 223-34. Giragosian, R. 2007. “Redefining Turkey’s Strategic Orientation”. Turkish Policy Quarterly, 6(4), Winter, 33-40. Available at: http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_ turkey_tpq_vol6_no4_richardgiragosian.pdf Giragosian, R. 2008e. “Looking to 2020: Azerbaijan’s Military Aspirations”. Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, 23 April. Giragosian, R. 2008d. “Analysis: Are Armenian-Turkish Relations Headed For Breakthrough – Or Breakdown?”. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Caucasus Report [Online: 6 June]. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/ article/1144571.html Giragosian, R. 2008c. “Armenia’s State Security Shake-up”. Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 7 July. Giragosian, R. 2008b. “Georgian Planning Flaws Led to Campaign Failure”. Jane’s Defence Weekly, 15 August. Giragosian, R. 2008a. “Unwitting Partner to Conflict: War in Georgia Reveals Armenia’s Reliance on Regional Stability”. AGBU Magazine [Online: 1 November]. Available at: http://www.agbu.org/publications/article.asp?A_ ID=595 Giragosian, R. 2009c. “Nagorno-Karabakh: Frozen, but not still”. International Security Network (ISN) Security Watch [Online: 9 January]. Available at: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/ Detail/?lng=en&id=95151 Giragosian, R. 2009b. “Weathering the Storm: A Commentary on Armenia and the Economics of Defense”. ArmeniaNow [Online: 20 February]. Available at: http:// www.armenianow.com/news/9474/weathering_the_storm_a_commentary Giragosian, R. 2009a. “Weathering the Storm: the “Cancer of Corruption”. ArmeniaNow [Online: 12 June]. Available at: http://www.armenianow.com/ features/9990/weathering_the_storm_the_cancer Giragosian, R. 2010. “Is Armenia Russia’s Partner Or Pawn?”. Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Commentary & Analysis [Online: 3 September 2010].

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Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Commentary_Is_Armenia_Russias_ Partner_Or_Pawn/2147689.html International Crisis Group. 2006. Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus: The EU’s Role, Europe Report no. 173, 20 March. International Crisis Group. 2008. Azerbaijan: Defence Sector Management and Reform, Europe Briefing no. 50, 29 October. International Crisis Group. 2009. Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders, Europe Report no. 199, 4 May. Kaufman, S. 2001. Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. The Stanley Foundation. 2003. Strategies for U.S. National Security. Winning the Peace in the 21st Century, The Stanley Foundation Task Force Report, October 2003. Available at: http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/03stanleyfound.pdf Tsereteli, M. 2009. The Impact of the Russia-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation Corridor. Washington DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 3 March. Available at: http://dev.jamestown.org/uploads/media/Full_Mamuka_ RussiaGeorgia.pdf Verluise, P. 1995. Armenia in Crisis: The 1988 Earthquake. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Chapter 4

Breaking the Deadlock: Karabakh, Nabucco and the Madrid Principles Hayk Kotanjian1

The South Caucasus region, including the NK conflict zone, may be regarded as lying at the heart of a large geostrategic area defined by American experts as Central Eurasia, stretching from China all the way through Turkey. Because of the core importance of any potential political or security collision in the area, it is necessary to identify the peaceful or military perspectives of the NK conflict. The struggle between Russia and the West for influence over Central Eurasia will serve as an important key for analysis here. Among the other issues worth attention is also the key role played by the transit of Central Asian hydrocarbons via the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus is mainly considered in regard to transportation, economic and energy issues, while the wider, geostrategic and security context is often excluded. This paper provides a general reflection on NK peace settlement process within the framework of a changing international security and energy environment. Facts and Myths about the Nabucco The changes in the Nabucco pipeline project, originally conceived to carry Iranian gas into Europe and later redefined to transport Central Asian gas, indicate that the project cannot be considered as a purely economic one. But even from that perspective, the pipeline’s basis and prospects needs further examination. In the foreseeable future, Russia will indeed continue to buy some gas from Azerbaijan thereby reducing the latter’s gas export resources intended for other markets.2 Moreover, in the long-term, the European search for diversification of energy imports from Russia will certainly not be a top priority in terms of economic and energy security. Latest research has revealed that, in the medium term (Ronis et al. 2009), huge shale gas reserves in Europe and effective American technologies now available 1  This chapter is a revised version of the presentation made by the author at the Harvard Black Sea Security Program Workshop, Sofia, 27-29 September, 2010. 2  In June and October 2009, both parties signed agreements on Azerbaijan gas exports to Russia, involving volumes that may increase over time.

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for economically viable production3 may provide solid guarantees for European future strategic autonomy in the field of energy. According to current forecasts, about 200 trillion cubic meters of shale gas are available in Europe. This contrasts sharply with Turkmenistan’s gas reserves, estimated at approximately 7.6 trillion cubic meters, and even more with Azerbaijan’s proven gas reserves, consisting of up to 1.31 trillion cubic according to British Petroleum 2010 data (Jaffe 2010). Due to cost-effectiveness issues, especially relevant in a period of financial crisis, the Nabucco project, that requires more than 10 billion USD investments and with no future beyond a ten-year period, could presumably be viewed as unprofitable.4 This expensive project, crossing several borders, could also be burdened by a complex geopolitical context and security-related problems, which may result in a pragmatic decision by the West to reject a new architecture expected to ensure European energy security. Rather than focusing on Nabucco, the EU could promote self-reliance, that is, exploit the energy resources within its own borders. The Nabucco pipeline may become a lever in handling strategic problems of a greater importance, especially in bringing Central Asia and the Caucasus into the Western sphere of influence. Re-orienting cooperation networks in Central Eurasia is indeed a high priority in the strategic agenda of Western countries. Along these lines, it is vitally important for the Russian Federation to prevent Azerbaijan from playing a coordinating role in reducing its dominance in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia’s efforts to preserve its midterm economic and long-term geostrategic interests amount to depriving Azerbaijan of the possibility of being among the main actors supporting the pro-Western re-orientation of Central Eurasia, particularly by means of transiting oil and gas flows from Central Asia to Europe. Azerbaijan’s geo-economic interests in the transit of Central Asian hydrocarbons to Europe not only clash with those of Russia, but also with another key Eurasian power of China. Understanding the real scope of such confrontation may lay the foundation for a realistic re-evaluation of Azerbaijan’s and Armenia’s long-term roles in the face of world powers’ strategic plans, and a so-called “reset” in the US-Russian relation. Karabakh in the Context of the US-Russian Relations In a confrontational approach, the imperatives for providing regional stability do not exclude the use of local frozen conflicts as an instrument in the struggle for power among major actors in Eurasia. The example of the events that took place in Georgia in 2008 may be symptomatic of such an ‘instrumentalisation’ of a regional conflict. In the case of NK, the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as of Nagorno-Karabakh, are the main local subjects of international security. They 3  In 2009, about 40 per cent of gas consumed in the US was shale gas. 4  See “Nabucco Gas Pipeline Project”, Gulf Oil and Gas. Available at http://www. gulfoilandgas.com/webpro1/projects/3dreport.asp?id=102885

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are capable of cooperating with the international community to maintain regional stability and peace. But they are also capable of running a new armed conflict that may have a disastrous “domino effect”.5 For over 20 years, the unrecognised Republic of NK has acquired, developed, and maintained the attributes of any legitimate state, which include: legislative, executive and judicial powers elected on democratic basis; a regular and disciplined army, composed of trained and experienced highlanders, and; – an effective defence system able to launch a counter-war, with well-fortified defence lines. However, the process of resetting relations between Russia and the US, and creating prerequisites for dialogue with China and India, enables them to open new geopolitical perspectives for cooperation with the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. This means that the priorities of the main actors in the region will be reset. They should shift away from the paradigm of confrontation and the struggle for spheres of influence, towards cooperation and homogenisation of the areas of security in Central Eurasia. In this end, constructive globalisation and the reset in US-Russian relations might lead to the elimination of frozen conflicts as instruments used in regional and global security processes. For over 18 years, the OSCE Minsk Group has been involved in coordinating the positions of the co-chair state leaders with those of the NK conflict. It has proven to be irreplaceable in maintaining dialogue between the parties and in promoting the peace process. In this context, the task in 2009 of resetting the Minsk process and updating the “Madrid principles”,6 that were offering a framework for negotiations, may appear as fully justified. The recognition of the referendum on self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh, held on 10 December 1991, may serve as the legal and political ground for that reset. Such recognition would be one of the significant factors for providing a long-lasting peace and stable and secure development of the South Caucasus and Central Eurasia as a whole. Focusing on Armenia and Azerbaijan: Military Developments around Karabakh The settlement of the NK conflict through peaceful democratic means is crucial for the security of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the South Caucasus as well as the other actors involved in the region (Kotanjian 2008). Yet, the risks that war rhetoric 5  For further analysis on the domino effect, see McCormick and Anderson 2009, Hudson-Teslik 2007, Feffer 2010. 6  Originally formulated in 2005, these principles were formally presented in November 2007 at the OSCE ministerial council in Madrid in November 2007. They included: the phased withdrawal of Armenian forces; the demilitarisation of territories; international security guarantees that would include a peacekeeping operation; the right of internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes; and the determination of the legal status of NK through a legally binding expression of will.

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by the Azerbaijani leader might eventually materialise into a resumption of military operations in Karabakh cannot be denied. The implementation of the CFE treaty7 has been blocked, and no serious countermeasures have been taken by the international community against the obvious arms race violating the provisions of the CFE. Regular bombing of positions, subversive operations and the rejection of the OSCE Minsk Group recommendations to withdraw snipers from the cease-fire line have increased tensions on the NK conflict line. Such a policy has clearly had a negative impact on regional stability and security. Based on the lessons learned from the events that occurred in Georgia in 2008, the willingness to prevent renewed hostilities in the region has given birth to a renewed legal framework: an Armenian-Russian Defence Agreement signed in August 2010, extending Russian basing rights in Armenia until 2044. It also followed Azerbaijan’s preparation for a new war. As a reaction to Azerbaijan’s possible resorting to war to recover Karabakh by force, Armenia has been compelled to develop a series of countermeasures. The Armenian side has warned that, in case a new war resumes in Karabakh, it will be forced to inflict unacceptable damage to Azerbaijan, in accordance with former US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara’s principle of “unacceptable damage”. Drawing a parallel with Israel’s main security priorities, Armenia has urged Azerbaijan to bear in mind that the Republic of Armenia and Armenian communities around the world will take all necessary measures to prevent a second genocide of the Armenian nation. Azerbaijani political propaganda, actively seeking to thwart efforts aimed at the international recognition of the Armenian genocide, has played a significant role in mobilising the resources of the Armenian Diaspora. Questioning the Idea of a Second Referendum in Karabakh The idea of integrating a second referendum in the talks to resolve the NK conflict has been one of the main obstacles to further progress in the diplomatic negotiations. It ignores the lawful referendum already held in December 1991 and has led the peace settlement process into a deadlock. As one of the cornerstones of the Madrid principles, this stillborn approach seeks a peaceful resolution of the conflict within a counterproductive framework of a “threat to resume war”. This may explain why the Azerbaijani side shows its “eagerness not to resume war” as a main “basis for compromise” (Kotanjian 2009).

7  Adopted in November 1990, the CFE treaty – aimed at reducing armed forces in Europe – came into force in July 1992. Its member states embarked upon a revision of the Treaty and produced an adapted CFE Treaty, which was signed in November 1999 but ratified since by few countries, that is, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. In July 2007, Russia officially suspended its implementation of the treaty.

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During confidential talks on Karabakh, the late Azerbaijani President, Heydar Aliyev, reportedly conceded that the 1991 referendum did take place in accordance with the Soviet laws in force at the time. In doing so, he expressed a readiness to initiate joint efforts in the search for a compromise based on the recognition of the lawful secession of the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijani republic. In 1991, Azerbaijan declared its independence without organising a referendum on the secession from the USSR.8 Thus, its proclamation was made without taking into account the rights of the population of NK or complying with the law of the USSR “On the Procedures for Resolving Issues Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR”.9 NagornoKarabakh elected bodies responded by seceding from the Azerbaijani SSR by way of a referendum in full conformity with existing legislation.10 Obeying instructions from Baku, the Azerbaijani minority, for its part, boycotted the referendum (Cornell 1999: 27). The NK Republic, unrecognised but nonetheless legitimate, then reacted to Azerbaijan’s armed aggression in spring 1992. In accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, it used its right to self-defence to ensure the security of Karabakh Armenians.11 Such a common understanding on the legal and political framework of the NK dispute, shared by not only the Armenian leader but also the Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, made it possible to reach the tripartite ceasefire agreement on May 1994. The agreement has broken the deadlock of war and established a dialogue aimed at achieving sustainable peace in the region, based on the UN Security Council’s four resolutions and on the will of the heads of three states involved in Karabakh conflict. In relation to current European strategy and energy security, Azerbaijan’s place and role in the region should be not be overestimated and objectively assessed in the light of its declining importance as a transit state for Central Asian gas exports to Europe.12 While demystifying the Nabucco pipeline project, that lead the peace process to a stalemate and to renewed threats of war, the international community should address the issue of a second referendum. Such a proposal, enshrined in the Madrid principles, ignores the lawful and legitimate referendum held in 1991, 8  See the Constitutional Act on the “State Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan”, 18 October 1991, No. 19-20. 9  See the USSR Law “On the Procedures for Resolving Issues Related to the Secession of Union Republics from the USSR”, 13 April 1990, No. 1410. Available at: http://www. bestpravo.ru/ussr/data01/tex10973.htm 10  On this point, see The Report on the Results of the Referendum on the Independence of the NK Republic, 10 December 1991, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the NK Republic. Available at: http://nkr.am/rus/facts/referendum.html 11  See the UN Charter, Chapter VII: “Action with Respect to Threats to Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression”, Article 51. Available at: http://www.un.org/ en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml 12  For some arguments on this issue, see Pagnamenta, 2010, Delamaide 2010, Klimasinska 2009.

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and weakens the negotiation process by forcing the actors to operate within a dangerous regional security environment. Overcoming the Deadlock: Prerequisites to a Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict If Azerbaijan together with the co-chairs of the Minsk Group were to recognise the legal fact of Nagorno-Karabakh’s legitimate secession from the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan, they would create the ground for the constructive implementation of the three principles of non-use of force, self-determination and territorial integrity, which are aimed at a final peace deal. To break the deadlock in negotiations, reset the Minsk process and create a basis for a peaceful resolution of the NK conflict, the conflicting parties, as well as the state leaders of the Minsk Group co-chairs, should: 1. Withdraw the proposal of a second referendum from the portfolio of the NK conflict regulation; 2. Recognise the referendum held in NK on 10 December 1991, before the official dissolution of the USSR and 21 December 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration, which implicitly endorsed the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of NK. Bibliography Cornell, S. 1999. The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Department of East European Studies, Report No. 46, Uppsala University. Available at: http://www. silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/1999_NK_Book.pdf Delamaide, D. 2010. “Chevron to Seek Shale Gas in Poland as Europe Focuses on Unconventional Reserves”, OilPrice.Com, 9 March 2010. Available at: http:// oilprice.com/Energy/Gas-Prices/Chevron-to-Seek-Shale-Gas-in-Poland-asEurope-Focuses-on-Unconventional-Reserves.html Feffer, J. 2010. “Okinawa and the New Domino Effect”, Asia Times, 6 March 2010. Available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh01.html Hudson Teslik, L. 2007. “The Financial Domino Effect”, Council on Foreign Relations, 1 March, 2007. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/12731/ financial_domino_effect.html; Jaffe, A. 2010. “Shale Gas Will Rock the World”. Wall Street Journal, 10 May. Klimasinska, K. 2009. “Poland is at the top of the list for shale potential. Houston companies planning to explore for natural gas”, Bloomberg News, 12 December. Available at: http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/6766480.html

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Kotanjian, H. 2008. “Guidelines on Developing Armenian National Security Strategy in the Context of Regional Security Architecture”. Yerevan: INSS, MOD. Kotanjian, H. 2009. “The Madrid Principles” of Karabakh Regulation Are Based Upon the “Paradigm of War”: Regnum, 22 October. Available at: http://www. regnum.ru?news/1217398.html McCormick, S. and Anderson, D. 2009. “US National Security Strategy. Is There an Empirical Relationship Between Economic Freedom and Political Freedom”, Strategic Insights, 8(5), December. Available at: http://www. nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2009/Dec/ mccormickDec09.pdf. Pagnamenta, R. 2010. “Dash for Poland’s gas could end Russian stranglehold”, The Times, 5 April. Available at: http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/ industry_sectors/natural_resources/article7087585.ece Ronis, S., Polk, R. and Langberg, D. 2009. The National Security Planning & Execution Management System (NSPEMS), Project on National Security Reform, January 2009. Available at: http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/vwg_ concept_papers_combined_090128.pdf

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PART II Cooperation with Regional Neighbours: Toward a New Balance?

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Chapter 5

Azerbaijan in the Changing Status Quo: Adaptation Strategies Burcu Gültekin-Punsmann

This chapter analyses Azerbaijan’s security perceptions and strategies in the aftermath of the August 2008 war in Georgia, which led to a change in the status quo in the South Caucasus region. The cost of a return to war has become apparent for the entire area. For Azerbaijan, the war demonstrated – contrary to its prior assumption – the major risks associated with the functioning of the East-West transport corridor. Azerbaijan has had to position itself in a region where the two major powers, namely Russia and Turkey, have become more assertive and mutually supportive, and have increased the attention of the world community on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which appears as a major source of instability in the region. Russia has resorted to war as a tool to pursue its regional policy, while Turkey has started claiming a higher profile in the South Caucasus. The perception in Azerbaijan of a regional shift because of both Russia and Turkey’s behaviour has been reinforced by the perspective of the normalisation of Turkey-Armenia relations, which received full backing from Russia. This move generated fears of a change in the regional balance of power, more specifically regarding the NK standoff. The Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process on the one hand, and the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia on the other hand, combined with Russia’s support for the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, have all put under stress Azerbaijan’s balanced policy towards Russia. The Post-August 2008 War Context The Return to War and the Cost of a New Armed Conflict The Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia over South Ossetia highlighted the disruptive potential of renewed military operations anywhere in the South Caucasus. The cost of a return to war has been very high for the entire region, in particular for Azerbaijan whose energy flows were mainly transiting through Georgia to reach consumer markets. In addition to its Black Sea ports, Georgia has provided a territorial link for Azerbaijan to build oil and gas pipelines to Turkey, thus forming an energy corridor presented as crucial to Western interests.

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However, without lasting stability in the region, this corridor could hardly operate, as demontrated by August 2008 events in Georgia. As a consequence of Russia’s intervention in Georgia, Azerbaijan realised that Georgia was not a reliable pathway to the West for Azerbaijani and Caspian hydrocarbons. Russia, both through the actions of its own forces and those of its allies, targeted portions of the pipeline, destroyed a key railway bridge, and wreaked havoc in Georgian ports. Oil flows were disrupted, and Azerbaijan had to turn to Moscow for greater access to Russian pipelines to redirect its flows to the Russian Black sea port of Novorossiysk. Azerbaijan’s assumption that Georgia was a stable partner that it could cooperate with to bypass Russia has been shattered, calling into question initial calculations about itself and the world. Oil has been Baku’s chief calling card to the world, but Azerbaijan has only a limited share of world oil, and this share has become less attractive since the RussianGeorgian war. Furthermore, these developments had an immediate impact on the ArmenianAzerbaijani stand-off. The war only brought fresh humiliation and losses to Georgia, and called into question the efficiency of the use of force as a way of restoring territorial integrity. Following the Georgian-Russian war, after years of failed negotiations, the resolution of the NK conflict took on a sense of urgency and the need to rule out any military option for the settlement of regional conflicts started being advocated. The Five-Day War had a psychological effect on Baku and Yerevan with both sides realising the danger and futility of resuming hostilities. In November 2008, the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia reaffirmed, through the Moscow Declaration, their shared commitment to a peaceful, political settlement of the NK conflict.1 However, though Azerbaijan refrained from war rhetoric in the aftermaths of the August war, it has progressively made inflammatory statements again as the pace of negotiations for the settlement of the NK conflict slowed.2 After the August 2008 Russian-Georgian war, the international expert community started questioning the term of “frozen conflict”, which has been judged as misleading and potentially dangerous. The dispute has actually been in a state of constant dynamic change. With roughly a total of 60,000 troops separated by a 175km self-regulating ceasefire line, the situation has been inherently unstable. In the absence of external peacekeeping forces, Andrzej Kasprzyk, the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, and his five field assistants have been monitoring the ceasefire and Contact-Line once or twice a month, 1  This was the first time since 1994 that Azerbaijani and Armenia leaders signed such a meaningful document despite its general content. 2  In his Address to the Nation in December 2008, he stated that that the 1992-1994 war in NK was just “the first phase of the war” and that Azerbaijanis were “to be ready to liberate [their] lands from invaders by any means”, cf. Ilham Aliyev’s New Year Address to the Nation, 31 December 2008, available at: http://www.president.az/articles.php?item_ id=20090101125530380&sec_id=135

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after notifying the parties of the time and place of their intervention. Under such circumstances, each side could easily blame the other for any serious violation of the 1994 ceasfire agreement. Although a deliberate military offensive from either side is unlikely in the near future, the ceasefire that ended active hostilities 16 years ago has become increasingly fragile. There has been a steady increase in the frequency and intensity of armed skirmishes that could unintentionally spark a wider conflict. Though the ceasefire has helped to prevent a resumption of full-scale hostilities, some 3000 deaths have occurred along the front line since 1994. In 2009, around 19 people died in shooting incidents and 2010 has already matched that level of bloodshed (International Crisis Group 2009a). The armed clash that occured on 18 June 2010 was among the most serious incident to have taken place in recent times. Four Armenian soldiers and an Azerbaijani died in a fierce clash, only hours after the Russian mediated talks between the two countries’ presidents in St Petersburg (De Waal 2010). Russian and Turkish Initiatives in the Region Azerbaijan has had to position itself in a region where the two major powers, namely Russia and Turkey, have become more assertive and mutually supportive. Both started giving signs of dissatisfaction with the regional status quo, defined as a state of “neither peace nor war”. Russia used war as a tool to promote its interests in the Caucasus, and Turkey started claiming a higher profile in the region. The August 2008 war has shown that Russia was capable of conducting destructive military operations against a purported US ally in the Caucasus. It has also provided Turkey with the opportunity to enhance its role in the region thanks to a well-balanced approach and sensitive management of these events. So the Russian-Georgian war has not affected the common understanding between Russia and Turkey; it has, on the contrary favoured a rapprochement between Ankara and Moscow, which was perceived in Azerbaijan as a major shift in the Caucasus. On 13 August 2008, in a context of increasing polarisation and harsh rhetoric, Turkey proposed a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP), which made it possible to maintain the channels of communication and dialogue open with Russia. Faced with the August 2008 war, Turkey was concerned about a potential escalation of tensions between the old Cold War rivals and the idea that it might have to choose between the US and Russia, placing Ankara in a highly uncomfortable position. The initiative was a way for Turkey to strengthen its strategic importance and integrate at the same time Russia’s role in regional stability. Despite the fact that Russia dislikes encroachments into its sphere of influence, it recognised the commonality of interests with Turkey and welcomed the initiative. In August 2008, during a visit in Istanbul, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov described the Caucasus Platform as “a mechanism for limiting the

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conflict potential of the region and increasing stability”, and added that “its chief value rests on common sense, because it assumes that the countries of the region should solve their own problems”.3 A Joint Declaration signed by the presidents of Turkey and Russia on 13 February 2009 then followed and read: “The Parties [Turkey and Russia], with the understanding that security and stability in the Eurasian geography is directly related with the stability in the South Caucasus region, agree on the necessity to take effective measures for resolving frozen conflicts that constitute potential destabilising elements in the South Caucasus. In this regard, the Parties consider the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, that was proposed by the Republic of Turkey as a constructive initiative that would be complementary to existing international mechanisms and that would help overcome lack of confidence that they observe that exits among the countries that are parties to the frozen conflicts”.4 The CSCP revealed a shared desire to change the regional context characterised by the state of “neither peace nor war”. The explicit linkage between regional stability and conflict resolution came as an innovation. The Caucasus Platform aimed at developing a functional method of finding solutions to the problems within the region and was based on the acknowledgement that tensions were largely caused by a lack of confidence among the regional states. Furthermore, it was a step forward in developing a sense of regional accountability and ownership from insiders. Russia and Turkey openly started pushing for the settlement of the NK conflict and both sides have shown an increased willingness to publicise their direct involvement in efforts at mediating an agreement between the parties. Russia needed to improve its image in the eyes of the international community and made substantial diplomatic efforts to bridge the differences between Armenia and Azerbaijan. After signing the Moscow Declaration in November 2008, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan met six times in Russia in 2009, followed by meetings in Sochi on 25 January 2010 and in St Petersburg on 17 June 2010. However, little progress was made. After committing to the non-use of force, Armenia and Azerbaijan could only reach an agreement on the wording of the preamble of the updated version of the 2007 Madrid Principles in Sochi on 25 January 2010. The perception in Azerbaijan of a regional shift because of Russia and Turkey’s behaviour was increased by discussions about the normalisation of relations 3  Press conference transcript of Sergey Lavrov, Istanbul, 2 September 2008, available at: http://www.turkey.mid.ru 4  Joint Declaration between the Republic of Turkey and the Russian Federation on Progress towards a New Stage in Relations and Further Deepening of Friendship and Multidimentional Partnership, Moscow, 13 February 2009, available at: http://www. mfa.gov.tr/joint-declaration-between-the-republic-ofturkey-and-the-russian-federationon-progress-towards-a-new-stage-in-relations-and-furtherdeepening-of-friendship-andmultidimentional-partnership_-moscow_-13-february-2009.en.mfa

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between Turkey and Armenia, which received backing from the Kremlin. This created fears of a change in the balance of power in the South Caucasus in general, and more specifically in the Nagorno-Karabakh standoff. Turbulence in Azerbaijan’s Cooperation with Turkey: The Armenian Factor Public Diplomacy and the Armenian Border Question After the August war and the launch of the CSCP initiative, the efforts of the Turkish and Armenian governments aimed at normalising their bilateral relations gained visibility. However, until March 2009, Turkish-Azerbaijani relations did not seem to be affected by the new momentum in Turkish-Armenian negotiations. Azerbaijani officials mostly kept silent, at a time when Turkish-Armenian talks were being conducted under strict confidentiality. A high number of meetings were held in a very short period of time, without any substantial statement being made. Confidentiality, though justified at in the initial stages, could have been accompanied by a communication strategy. Apparently, Baku was not kept in the loop about the substance of Turkish-Armenian moves towards normalisation.5 In April 2009, with the dramatic upsurge of media attention in the issue, the process became out of control. The profusion of comments and interviews increased expectations: the impression that the Turkish-Armenian border could be opened overnight triggered panic within Azerbaijani society and its leadership and began a period of turbulence in Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. Official Azerbaijani reaction, though critical, was first quite diplomatic and measured. The notion of “state interest” was at the core of the statements made by President Ilham Aliyev, Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmar Mammadyarov and his deputy Araz Azimov. They all emphasised the fact that “Azerbaijan [did] not want to interfere in the domestic affairs of any state” and that Turkey had its own national interest – often linked with the genocide issue and the struggle against the international campaign for its recognition. However, the strong strategic ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan should not, in their eyes, be underestimated.6

5  Arif Ragimzade, Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Regional Issues, member of the political board of the Yeni Azerbaycan Party, stated: “The Turkish government should provide clear and broad information about talks with Armenia. It is a surprise that information of Turkey and Armenia about talks does not coincide. In this situation Azerbaijani public has fair resentment”. See “Fraternal relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey should not be sacrificed for some interests: Milli Medjlis deputy”, Today.Az, 10 April 2009. Available at: http://www.today.az/news/politics/51476.html 6  “Turkey-Armenian Border Can be Opened only after Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict is Resolved: Azerbaijani deputy Foreign Minister”, Trend News Agency, 9 April 2009. Available at: http://en.trend.az/news/karabakh/1453154.html

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The issue of access to information has been a major cause of concern for Azerbaijan. Information channeled by the press led to widespread confusion. However, according to the Turkish side, Azerbaijan was kept informed about every stage of the talks between Turkey and Armenia, down to the smallest details. On 6 April 2009, the Turkish daily Hürriyet, quoting unnamed “reliable sources”, reported that the Turkish-Armenian draft protocol contained wording according to which “sufficient progress on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict [was] required before the opening of the [Turkish-Armenian] border”. President Aliyev sought clarification of what was precisely meant by “sufficient progress”. During his visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels in April 2009, he said to the Turkish representative, in a clear reference to the conduct of Turkish-Armenian talks, that “informing [was] one thing, consulting [was] another”.7 This incident was singled out as a significant event given the fact that the two countries had never engaged in public polemics in the past and had rather sought to closely cooperate on international platforms. Rumours that Turkey was preparing to reopen its border with Armenia gained steam in early April 2009, when US President Barack Obama visited Turkey and gave a rousing endorsement for Turkish-Armenian reconciliation efforts. During the days leading up to Obama’s visit, a wide array of Azerbaijani officials began warning that Turkish-Azerbaijani relations would suffer grievous harm if Ankara lifted its embargo against Armenia without Baku’s consent. To underline its displeasure, Aliyev refused to attend the Alliance of Civilisations summit held on 6-7 April in Istanbul (Yinanç 2009). Immediately after President Obama’s visit to Turkey, he even said that Baku could take retaliatory measures against Turkey. He hinted that such measures could materialise through a shift in Azerbaijan’s energy policy away from the West and towards Russia. “We follow possible geopolitical changes in the region and take necessary measures”, Aliyev said during a meeting of Azerbaijan’s Security Council. “It is our [Azerbaijan’s] right to conduct our own policy concerning a possible new situation in the region, and we will use this right in any form” (Abbasov 2009c). The conviction that the opening of the border without a breakthrough in the settlement of the NK conflict would be harmful to Azerbaijan may be well-rooted. On 2 April 2009, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister said that if Turkey did not insist, as a condition for opening the border, that Armenia first withdraws its troops from at least part of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan around the NK, “this would be detrimental to Azerbaijan’s national interests”. Similarly, Deputy Foreign Minister stated that “the Turkish-Armenian borders [could] be re-opened only in the context of resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the opening of the borders out of this context [did] not correspond to Azerbaijan’s interests”. The emphasis was mainly put on the issue of the opening of the border, which could 7  See “Azerbaijan Seeks To Thwart Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement”, Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty. 6 April 2009. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijan_ Seeks_To_Thwart_TurkishArmenian_Rapprochement/1603256.html

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mean that the establishment of diplomatic relations may trigger less discomfort in Azerbaijan.8 There were fears that the opening of the border would alter the fragile balance of power in the region and push Armenia into pursuing military action. No explanation was given, though, on how these two issues could be connected and how direct communication with Turkey might transform Armenia into a military threat for Azerbaijan. The news of the impending opening of the Turkish-Armenian border also led to public outrage in Azerbaijan. Reactions have been good indicators of the potential for mobilisation of civil society organisations, and the existence of a nascent civil society. Public positions on issues considered as legitimate and patriotic could be interpreted as a first step towards wider participation in political life. These public reactions originating from Azerbaijani society revealed close similarities with the Turkish boycott campaigns. Turkish and Azerbaijani societies have indeed been getting closer for the last 15 years. Azerbaijani opposition and the ruling political parties issued a joint statement condeming the Turkish move, media organisations signed a declaration,9 the Sheikh-ul-Islam Allakh-Shukur Pashazade, Azerbaijan’s most senior Muslim cleric, addressed an open letter to Ali Bardakoglu, the head of Turkey’s Religious Affairs Directorate. Internet campaigns were launched and the Executive Director of the Baku radio station Media FM, Tural Aliyev, announced that if the TurkishArmenian border was opened, his station would cease broadcasting songs by Turkish singers. The common feature in all these statements was the feeling of betrayal of the entire Azerbaijani nation by Turkey (Fuller and Danielyan 2009). Turkish Prime Minister’s visit to Baku in May 2009 aimed at eradicating misunderstandings and misperceptions over Turkish policies. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan conducted a public diplomacy effort for mending the damage done by over-reactions and over-statements. He eloquently stated that the friendship between Azerbaijan and Turkey will last forever and added that “Nobody should have the slightest doubt that Turkey will continue to defend Azerbaijan’s interests as it has done so far”. The culture of fraternity said to be the basis of relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan overshadowed Azerbaijani statements referring to national interests as the guiding principles of inter-state relations (Muradova 2009). The Turkish-Armenian Border and the NK Conflict Azerbaijani reactions were more emotional than rational, and more connected with symbolism than the search for political efficiency. The fact that Turkey closed its border with Armenia on 3 April 1993, in the context of the escalation in the 8  “Azeri Unease on Border Prompts Phone Traffic”. Hürriyet, 9 April 2009. Available at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11394945_p.asp 9  See “Union for Democracy to send protest letter to Turkish leadership”. Today.Az. 13 April 2009. Available at: http://www.today.az/news/politics/51506.html

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NK conflict and the Armenian attack against Kelbajar, underpins the conviction that the border could not open before the withdrawal of Armenian forces from Azerbaijani territories. A decision to open the border in the current context would be tantamount to the renounciation of a symbolical but powerful gesture of support.10 As expressed in the joint statement of the government and the opposition parties, opening the border would jeopardise Turkish-Azerbaijani relations, give economic and moral support to Armenia, and negatively affect the settlement of the NK conflict.11 This line of argumentation failed to question the efficiency of Turkish support to keeping the border closed and has taken for granted that the economic blockade provided leverage on Armenia within the peace talks.12 Economic sanctions are “coercive foreign policy action of a nation in which it intentionally suspends customary economic relations such as trade or financial exchanges in order to prompt the targeted nation to change its policy or behavior” (Lopez and Cortright 1995). In other words, they are policy tools used by governments to constrain business activity across borders with intended policy outcomes. Thus economic sanctions are applied to deny a certain economic advantage to the targeted country in response to the violation of legal rules embodied in international agreements or generally accepted international law. Proponents of economic sanctions see them as a necessary foreign policy instrument to stop aggressing countries from disturbing international peace and security. They can be classified according to their rationale (Askari et al. 2003). Purposeful economic sanctions are intended by the sender to inflict economic hardship and thus coerce the target into changing objectionable policies. Palliative economic sanctions are imposed to publicly register displeasure with the actions or policies of the target. Punitive economic sanctions are intended to inflict harm on the target country without explicit consideration of policy change. Partisan economic sanctions are intended to promote parochial commercial or other interests. Some divergent voices emerged in Azerbaijan arguing that the TurkishArmenian rapprochement could reduce Russian influence in Armenia and open up new opportunities for the resolution of the NK conflict. According to this view, 10  Elkhan Polukhov, spokesperson for Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated in that regard: “we rely on the promises we have received from Turkey that the ratification of the protocols in the Turkish parliament and all further steps will take place in parallel with the settlement of the Azerbaijan-Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Any unilateral actions on this issue will call into question the entire security structure in the region and increase tensions across the board”. See Guluzade and Musabekov 2009. 11  See “Azerbaijan urges preconditions in Turkey-Armenia border talks be met”, Hürriyet, 15 April 2009. 12  Asim Mollazade, Milli Majlis deputy and chairman of the Democratic Reforms Party, “for Azerbaijan, the isolation of Armenia was the only non-violent way of pushing Armenia toward the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey’s rapprochement with Armenia will thus prompt Baku to begin searching for more active measures to secure the return of the occupied territories”, cf. Guluzade and Musabekov 2009.

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Moscow was considered as having a greater interest than Yerevan in opposing any settlement of the dispute, which would contribute to the decline of Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus (Guluzade and Musabekov 2009). It was also stressed that the Russian government had intervened whenever Azerbaijan and Armenia had reached an agreement to prevent them from making any further progress. The main issue should then be to assess whether Turkey’s boycott of Armenia has brought about a solution; how it has helped Azerbaijan on the negotiation table; and whether Azerbaijan is today close to bringing the Armenian side to a major concession. It might be time for Turkey to renounce a policy that has not produced any positive result and to start normalising relations with Armenia in order to be able to contribute more actively to the resolution of the Karabakh issue and to help Azerbaijan’s interests more effectively. Today, the normalisation process between Turkey and Armenia seems to have come to a standstill. The prospect that the protocols would return to the agenda appears quite slim. The process required speed and clarity, but the pace proved to be slow and riddled with ambiguity. Besides, talks became captive to domestic politics on both sides. The linkage between the normalisation of TurkishArmenian relations and the settlement of the NK conflict, which reemerged as a condition put forward by Turkey, has spoiled the process. At this stage, the ongoing interruption of Turkish-Armenian bilateral relations is more likely to dissipate the international attention focused on the region and decrease the chance of reaching, in a foreseeable future, any settlement of the NK conflict. The Impact on the Southern Caucasus Energy Corridor A commercial dispute over energy issues with Turkey added to the argument that Baku might reorient its energy flows through Russia if it did not receive appropriate assurances from Turkish officials that they will not betray Azerbaijani interests as they strive to normalise relations with Armenia. In a backhanded manner, the president of Azerbaijani State Oil Company, Rovnag Abdullayev, appeared to blackmail Turkey with a disruption of natural gas supplies should the Turkish-Armenian border be reopened without Baku’s consent. “I do not believe that Turkish-Armenian border will be opened, and, therefore, I do not expect stop of gas supplies from Shah Deniz field to Turkey”, Abdullayev said on 8 April 2009. The Azerbaijani President has also reportedly threatened to cut off natural gas sales to Turkey and added that it he could even close the BTC pipeline. Turkish commentators underlined that even though such scenarios would certainly harm Turkey, they would also result in renewed dependency of Azerbaijan on Russia, exactly what cooperation with Turkey was aimed at avoiding. President Aliyev’s visit to Moscow for the signature of a preagreement between SOCAR and Gazprom and the declaration that Azerbaijan will pump more oil in the Baku-Novorossiysk Russian pipeline coincided interestingly with the day when Turkish FM Ali Babacan was in Yerevan for the BSEC summit (Abbasov 2009d).

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Turkish-Azerbaijani Commercial Dispute over Gas Prices The gas dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkey was a purely commercial matter over the definition of gas prices, even if the momentum in Turkish-Armenian relations might have pushed Azerbaijan to become more assertive out of irritation. Turkey used to buy Azerbaijani gas on the basis of an agreement signed in 2001 at a price of $120 per thousand cubic meters. While international market prices for gas had climbed to over $400 per thousand cubic meters, Turkey was still paying $120 for Azerbaijani gas. Deliveries to Turkey from the Shah Deniz gas field began in 2007 at that price, that is, an undeclared subsidy to Turkey at the expense of Azerbaijan. The 2001 agreement expired in April 2008, but the old pricing seems to have continued since then. Azerbaijan then sought to redefine the price, in line with existing market prices and on the basis of valid contracts. The Turkish side, however, publicly shrugged off the proposal at first. The Transit Issue, the Nabucco Project and the Southern Gas Corridor Turkey has been viewed as the main obstacle to the conclusion of the intergovernmental transit agreement for the Nabucco pipeline, aiming at carrying Azerbaijani gas to European markets via Turkish territory. Because of delays in the transit agreement between Azerbaijan and Turkey, StatoilHydro – the commercial operator of the gas pipeline from Shah Deniz – announced on May 2009 that the consortium will postpone the start of the second phase of production at Shah Deniz until 2016. This second phase was initially scheduled for 2013-14, that is, a timetable correlated with that of the construction of the Nabucco pipeline (Socor 2009b). The Turkish government has indeed been driving a hard bargain with European partners, insisting on collecting a “tax” on the gas pumped and demanding 15 per cent of the transit gas at a discounted price, or the possibility to retain pre-emptively in Turkey at a preferential price 15 per cent of Azerbaijani gas that would cross Turkey through the Nabucco pipeline and then reach European markets. These requests were rejected by the European Commission, delaying the building of the 9 billion-euro pipeline project.13 The stalemate was apparently overcome at the EU summit in Prague on 7-8 May 2009 (Socor 2009a). A month later, in June 2009, the participants in the Caspian oil and gas forum, held in Baku, confirmed that Turkey has reverted to obstruction of the Nabucco project for Caspian gas to Europe. Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices through ‘Soccer Diplomacy’ Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Taner Yildiz met, on the sidelines of a soccer game in June 2009, with the president of SOCAR, Rovnag Abdullayev, who is also the head of the Azeri soccer federation. The event echoed what was 13  More than half of the pipeline is to be located in Turkey.

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referred to as “soccer diplomacy” a year before, when Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited Armenia to attend a World Cup qualifying soccer game in Yerevan. The Turkish and Azeri national soccer teams played a friendly game in Turkey’s central Anatolian city of Kayseri. It raised a huge public interest and over 30,000 spectators decorated the stadium with the Turkish and Azeri flags. They carried placards and chanted slogans reflecting the sense of solidarity between the two nations like: “We are all Azeris”, “Karabakh belongs to Turks”, or “We cannot be divided”.14 During his trip to Azerbaijan in May 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan promised that a new and “fair” price will be found. Natural Resources Minister Yildiz, who accompanied Erdogan to Baku, declared that “the price [offered] was as fair as possible ... I cannot give a figure. But it is not as high as [the price for] the Russian gas. We are trying to agree on a price that is not completely disconnected from world markets and one that will satisfy both us and our Azeri brothers” (Kardas 2009). Erdoğan’s unequivocal expression of support for Azerbaijan’s position on Karabakh during the same trip underscored the power of energy issues to influence geopolitical choices. Expectations were that Azerbaijan would make concessions in the gas pricing dispute. In the 1990s, the BTC pipeline project already affected Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia. As a matter of fact, Turkish regional policy locked in the framework of the BTC pipeline project contributed strongly to the freezing of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict. As a consequence, Turkish diplomatic capabilities in the region have been severely curtailed by the security versus economy tradeoff set up between Azerbaijan and Turkey. In some ways, Turkish regional energy policy has become hostage to security relations with Azerbaijan (Aras 2000). Both Azerbaijan and Georgia expanded military contacts, training and exercises with Turkey and proposed cooperation with NATO in protecting oil pipelines.15 The warming of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations was particularly visible in the military field. Since 1996, Turkey has been actively engaged in the training of Azerbaijan’s military officers helping to modernise the Azerbaijani military education system to bring it in line with NATO standards. Baku proposed that Turkey expand cooperation to include guarding the pipelines through Azerbaijan.16 On 29 April 2002, the leaders of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia met in Trabzon to discuss energy cooperation, the fight against terrorism, drug smuggling and human 14  See www.nethaber.com and www.tumspor.com, 2 June 2009. 15  This was announced by Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Vilayet Guliyev, cf. “Azerbaijan to apply for aspirant status in NATO, Jamestown Monitor, 6(1), 7 January 2000. 16  In the same way, Turkey and Georgia signed an agreement in March 1997 on military assistance and cooperation for the construction of training centres in Kodori and Gori, of a shooting range outside Tbilisi, and for the reconstruction of the Vaziani military base. Georgian military personnel have been studying at Turkish military establishments since 1998. Azerbaijani and Georgian peacekeeping units have been participating in the KFOR in Kosovo as part of the Turkish battalion.

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trafficking and agree on a Security Pact.17 According to this agreement, each of the three countries has commited itself to ensure and coordinate the safety of the pipelines on their respective territories and of the East-West energy corridor on the whole. The three partner countries attempted to enshrine their willingness to cooperate in a BTC-related official document. The “Protocol among the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Republic of Turkey relating to the provision of security for the East-West energy corridor”, was then signed on 23 July 2003. Azerbaijan has used the East-West energy corridor as a bargaining tool in its relations with Turkey. In exchange for Azerbaijan’s support for the BTC project, Turkey had to act as its security provider. Consequently, Turkey was not allowed to have a say at the negotiating table. Turkey had thus been perceived as a military ally rather than a diplomatic actor in the region. Whereas Turkey was asked to show solidarity with Azerbaijan in the battlefield, oil-based bargaining with Russia was aimed at ensuring the Kremlin’s diplomatic support. On coming to power, Aliyev’s move to improve relations with the Russian Federation was motivated by the hope that Russian-Azerbaijani rapprochement would help resolve the NK conflict on Azeri terms. The Russian Challenge: A Delicate Balance in Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy In the context of its gas dispute with Turkey, Azerbaijan started dropping hints that it might ditch the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline in favor of an expansion of energy exports via Russia. During a joint press conference with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on 17 April 2009, Azerbaijani leader Ilham Aliyev stated that he did not see any restriction on possible sales of Azerbaijani gas to Russia. The assertion has been understood to include sales of gas from the second phase of Shah Deniz production, expected to yield 14-16 billion cubic meters of gas per year. He also indicated that oil transportation via the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline crossing Russian territory could similarly increase. Meanwhile, Russia proposed in June 2008 to buy up all available volumes of Azerbaijani gas at attractive prices. Following such repeated offers by the Kremlin, a memorandum of understanding was signed on 27 March 2009 by Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company and Russian Gazprom. Moscow had reportedly offered to pay European netback prices for Azerbaijani gas, that is, European market price minus transportation costs. It has not gone unnoticed that, as talks of a potential deal on NK gained momentum, Azerbaijan appeared to be making serious overtures toward Russia in the hope that the Kremlin will push Armenia into making key concessions. Obviously, exploring relations with Moscow on a wide variety of issues could be useful; it was, at least, consistent with Baku’s past policies. But Azerbaijan has 17  Which was called “Agreement on combating terrorism, organised crime and other major crimes among the Republic of Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Republic of Turkey”.

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taken pride in pursuing a balanced foreign policy, in such a way that a wholesale shift away from Turkey and the West in favour of Russia may be rather unlikely. Azerbaijani eargerness to get Russia’s support in negotiations over NK has been more decisive than the tensions linked with a possible Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. The Turkish-Armenian normalisation process on one hand and the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia on the other hand, combined with Moscow’s support to the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia have all put under stress Azerbaijan’s balanced policy towards Russia (Abbasov 2009b). Ilham Aliyev’s “balanced” foreign policy, independent of any bloc, has been enshrined in Azerbaijan’s new military doctrine approved in June 2010. It allows for Azerbaijani forces to serve abroad and foreign troops to be based on Azerbaijani territory under exceptional circumstances. The document specifically presents Armenia and its continued occupation of Azerbaijani territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh, as the major threats to Azerbaijan’s security. In this regard, it reaffirms Azerbaijan’s right to use force in order to liberate the occupied territories. It states that Azerbaijan “has the right, using all necessary means, including force, to liberate the territories that have been seized and reestablish the territorial integrity” of the country. If the document identifies Armenia as an enemy state, it perhaps significantly does not identify any other country as an ally. However, Armenia’s military cooperation with Russia, which aims at preserving a strategic balance with Azerbaijan in response to the latter’s increased defense spending, has put Azerbaijani-Russian relations under stress. A dangerous arms race is under way, in which each side has increased its military expenditures and has accused the other of violating the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which limits deployments and materials in the region. Baku spent more than 2 billion USD on its army in 2008, almost matching the entire Armenian state budget (De Waal 2009). Even if defense spending has already skyrocketed over the past decade, it is expected to continue to increase. In October 2010, the Azerbaijani government submitted to parliament a defense budget for 2011 of USD 3.1 billion, which would represent an almost 90 per cent rise compared to the previous year. Armenia’s state budget for 2011 is projected at $2.8 billion, including about USD 400 million allocated to the military.18 Conclusion As a consequence of a shift perceived in its regional security environment, Azerbaijan has adjusted its foreign policy in recent years, in particular by intensifying cooperation with Russia, thus altering the traditional balance in its external relations. As a matter of fact, several events have upset the assumptions on which Azerbaijani foreign policy has indeed been based. The August 2008 18  ‘Azerbaijan Announces Another Surge in Military Spending’, Asbarez, 13 October 2010.

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war has shown that Georgia, a key partner ensuring Azerbaijan’s oil and gas transit to the markets bypassing Russia, turned out to be much less stable than expected. Meanwhile, Turkey’s increased efforts at normalising relations with Armenia have created fears in Baku that Ankara is not such a reliable strategic partner and security provider for Azerbaijan. A Turkish-Armenian reconciliation disconnected with the settlement of the NK conflict would deprive Azerbaijan of essential leverage against Armenia and weaken considerably its position at the negotiating table. Active diplomatic steps from Turkey towards a rapprochement with Armenia, supported by Russia, created a climate of panic in Baku and deeply upset its relations with Ankara. During the same period, Azerbaijan struggled to reach agreement with Turkey on gas cooperation. As a result of all these political and economic developments, Azerbaijan has taken steps for a closer relationship with Russia, especially in the field of energy. In some ways, this move could be considered as a reprisal for the Turkish-Armenian normalisation process. Now that this process has failed, it remains to be seen whether this move was just a short-term counter-balancing decision or whether it echoes Turkey’s own broader partnership with Russia. Bibliography Abbasov, S. 2009a. “Russia Scores Double Match Point with Azerbaijani Gas Deal”. Eurasia Insight. 30 June 2009. Available at: http://www.eurasianet. org/departments/insightb/articles/eav063009a.shtml Abbasov, S. 2009b. “Azerbaijan: Is Baku Offering a Natural Gas Carrot to Moscow for Help with Karabakh?”. Eurasia Insight, 20 April. Available at: http://www.un-az.org/undp/bulnews70/nk1.php Abbasov, S. 2009c. “Baku and the Turkish-Armenian Thaw”, EurasiaNet, 15 April. Abbasov, S. 2009d. “Azerbaijan: is Baku Ready to Cause Geopolitical Problems over Turkish-Armenian Thaw?”. Eurasia Insight, 14 April. Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav041409.shtml Aras, B. 2000. “Turkey’s Policy in the Former Soviet South: Assets and Options”, Turkish Studies, 1(1), 36-58. Aras, B. 2009. “Davutoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy”, SETA Policy Brief, May, No. 32. Askari, H., Forrer J., Teegan H. 2003. Economic Sanctions: Examining their Philosophy and Efficacy. Westport, CT: Praeger. Cornell, S. 2009. “Erdoğan, Azerbaijan and the Armenian Question”. Turkey Analyst, 2(7), 10 April. Available at: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/ inside/turkey/2009/090410B.html De Waal, T. 2009. “The Karabakh Trap: Dangers and Dilemmas of the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict”, Conciliation Resources. Available at: http://www.c-r.org/ our-work/caucasus/documents/Nagorny-Karabakh-report-AW.pdf

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De Waal, T. 2010. “Caucasian Standoff”, Foreign Policy, 30 June. Available at: http:// www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/30/caucasian_standoff?page=full Fuller, L. and Danielyan, E. 2009. “Azerbaijan Continues To Vent Anger With Turkey”, Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty. 10 April. Available at: http:// www.rferl.org/content/blog/1606118.html?s=1 Gültekin-Punsmann, B. 2009a. “Moving beyond Symbolism, the Normalization of Turkish-Armenian Relations: a Window of Opportunity for Regional Prosperity”, TEPAV Policy Note, October. Available at: http://www.tepav.org. tr/upload/files/1257767367r1562.Moving_Beyond_Symbolism.pdf Gültekin-Punsmann, B. 2009b. “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: An Attempt to Foster Regional Accountability”, ICBSS Policy Brief, No. 13. International Center for Black Sea Studies, April. Available at: http://icbss. org/images/Publications/13_policy_brief.pdf Gültekin-Punsmann, B. 2007, The Closed Armenia-Turkey Border: Economic and Social Effects: Including those on the People; and Implications for the Overall Situation in the Region, co-authored with Nathalie Tocci, Nicolas Tavitian, Licinia Simao, Study, European Parliament Directorate General External Policies of the Union, Policy Department External Policies, August. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/ download.do?file=18288 Guluzade, V. and Musabekov R. 2009. “What Does Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement Mean For Azerbaijan?”. Azerbaijani Diplomatic Academy Biweekly, 2(20), 15 October. Available at: http://ada.edu.az/biweekly/issues/ vol2no20/20091021025935244.html International Alert. 2009. Oil and the Search for Peace in the South Caucasus: the BTC Oil Pipeline, Business & Conflict BTC Research Project Team, December 2004. Available at: http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/oil_and_ search_for_peace_btc_pipeline.pdf International Crisis Group. 2009a. “Nagorno-Karabakh: Getting to a Breakthrough”, Europe Briefing, No. 55, 7 October. Available at: http://www. crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/b55_nagorno_karabakh___getting_ to_a_breakthrough.ashx International Crisis Group. 2009b. “Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders”, Europe Report, 199, 14 April. Available at: http://www. crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/199_turkey_and_armenia___opening_ minds_opening_borders_1.ashx Kardas, S. 2009. “Turkish-Azeri Talks on Gas Prices Continue through ‘Soccer Diplomacy’”. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6(17), 4 June. Available at: http://www. jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35087 Lopez, G. and Cortright D. 1995. “Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global Relations” in Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peace-building in the Post-Cold War World?, edited by D. Cortright and G. Lopez. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 3-16.

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Muradova, M. 2009. “Azerbaijan: Turkish Prime Minister Offers Strong Support for Baku’s Position on Karabakh”. Eurasia Insight, 13 May. Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav051309a.shtml Socor, V. 2009a. “Ankara Reverts to Obstruction on Azerbaijan’s Gas Pricing and Transport”. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6(109), 8 June. Available at: http:// www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35095&tx_ ttnews[backPid]=485&no_cache=1 Socor, V. 2009b, “Shah Deniz Phase Two Postponement Officially Confirmed”. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 6(84), 1 May. Available at: http://www. jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34935&tx_ ttnews[backPid]=485&no_cache=1 Yinanç, B. 2009. “Aliyev’s Turn at, One Minute, One Minute”. Hürriyet, 6 April. Available at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11369891.asp

Chapter 6

Armenia: Managing New Opportunities for Regional Integration Alexander Iskandaryan and Sergey Minasyan

Introduction The August 2008 Five-Day War opened a new page in the history of the South Caucasus and affected the entire regional situation in the field of security. The South Caucasus region has changed not only in political terms but also in geographical ones. With Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence in August 2008, two newly and “partially-recognised states” have appeared in the region. In this new context, Russian military bases have been permanently deployed in these formerly Georgian autonomous republics; Russian frontier guards have been stationed along their borders with Georgia; and their territories have been integrated into Russia’s exclusive sphere of influence.1 De facto, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have ceased to belong to the South Caucasus and have become a continuation of Russian Northern Caucasus, albeit lying on the south of the Greater Caucasus Mountain Range. On the one hand, the Five-Day War has demonstrated, for Armenia, the relevance of some of its foreign policy approaches, for example, its policy towards the NK conflict or its doctrine of ‘complementarity’ applied in foreign relations. On the other hand, it has created new realities, and a new coordinated system in Armenia’s bilateral relations with at least two of its neighbours, Turkey and Georgia. Starting in the second half of 2008, the Turkish and Georgian dimensions of Armenia’s foreign policy have become a matter of special interest and urgency for Yerevan, whereas relations with its other two neighbours, Iran and Azerbaijan, have been more static. As for Armenia’s policy and multi-faceted relations with the unrecognised Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh – a top priority on its agenda, it has also remained relatively stable.

1  About 3,000 Russian troops and about 1,000 border guards were deployed in South Ossetia, and as much in Abkhazia.

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The Conflict over NK: A Constant in Armenia’s Foreign Policy The Five-Day War overhauled the entire format of the South Caucasus but failed to shift political realities around the NK conflict. If it slightly changed some of its parameters, it generally reinforced the existing status quo. The unsettled conflict remains a key priority in Armenia’s foreign policy and renewed warfare continues to be the most serious threat to Armenia’s national security, even though risks have now considerably decreased. For as long as two decades, the NK conflict has been a major factor influencing the political map of the South Caucasus. The struggle of Armenians of NK for selfdetermination, which started in February 1988, led to a violent conflict between the Armenian local population, supported by Armenians from Armenia and around the world, and first central authorities at the time of the USSR, then, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, against independent Azerbaijan. The conflict resulted in about 25,000 deaths from both sides and hundreds of thousands refugees and IDPs (Hovhannisyan 1999, Minasyan et al. 2005). All the parties in the conflict used historical, political and legal arguments to substantiate their positions and policies. Meanwhile, the society and the elite in Azerbaijan as in Armenia and NK have remained largely unprepared for compromise. Considering the settlement process as a zero-sum game, they have generally accused each other of escalating the conflict and of lacking willingness to restore peace. Other countries and international organisations involved in negotiations do share a vision of the future and frequently pursue their own interests. As a result, negotiations over NK have given the impression of a permanent déjà vu. Against such a background, some specific questions have become key topics for discussion among political leaders and academic circles, maintaining heated debate in each country involved: who could take advantage from the preservation of a long-term status quo; and whose side was time on? A significant part of the political elite and the society in Armenia and NK believes that the existence of the independent Republic of NK in its present borders, based on the results of the war, has strengthened with time – transforming these results into permanent achievements, especially given the global tendency toward sovereignisation of similarly unrecognised states and the so-called “Kosovo precedent”. In their opinion, as time goes by and NK develops outside Azerbaijan, prospects for independence and statehood get more certain (Mailyan 2008). However, there is also an opposite but not prevailing view in Armenian society, which has been instrumentalised as a propagandistic resource in the domestic political discourse and power game. The Armenian opposition has criticised the authorities’ policy on the NK conflict not because they hold different views on the resolution of the conflict but rather as a sensitive issue they could use to destabilise the ruling party and leaders. On the contrary, almost all levels of the society and most of the political groups in Azerbaijan hope that the expected increase in oil and gas revenues

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will eventually enable Baku to win the arms race and bring NK back under its control by using force. Azerbaijan’s open threats to renew military operations have had a strong psychological impact and influenced perceptions in Western countries, international organisations as well as in Armenia and NK. Azerbaijani leaders have also gambled on the economic and communication blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey against Armenia. Up until the oil and gas boom in Azerbaijan, the blockade had indeed been the cornerstone of Baku’s main strategy in the conflict settlement process (International Crisis Group 2007). For Armenia, the issue of NK has not only been one of the foundations of its foreign policy; it has also been the ideological pivot on which the newly independent Armenian state was built. One simply cannot imagine the present Republic of Armenia without any reference to it. The burden of the unresolved conflict, the need to maintain a military balance under threat of renewed warfare, and the economic losses incurred by the blockade have all had their impact on political, social and economic developments in post-Soviet Armenia. At the same time, for almost two decades, official Yerevan has been rather efficient in using the NK factor as an independent foreign policy resource in many spheres, in its negotiations with Azerbaijan as well as in its external relations to receive political support and economic aid from the international community. However, the Armenian leadership has made it clear that Armenia was ready to build its foreign policy and engage in regional and global integration regardless of the conflict situation. Given continuing disagreement over NK, relations with Azerbaijan could hardly be resolved in the short and even medium terms. Accordingly, Armenia has not defined its relations with other regional countries, international organisations and leading world powers on the basis of the Karabakh factor. Armenia’s strategy has proceeded from the assumption that improved conditions for regional integration and creation of an environment conductive to mutual trust will one day pave the way for rapprochement with Azerbaijan. The ongoing rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey can be considered as a step in that direction. Such an approach has not prevented Armenia from using the unsettled conflict over NK to stimulate the interest of European organisations and world powers in the South Caucasus in general, and Armenia in particular. The conflict has served as a foreign policy tool in order to focus international attention on Armenia, creating a demand for information about the negotiations process, and attracting economic and political assistance. In other words, Yerevan has used the NK conflict to increase the geopolitical role of Armenia both in the regional and in the international arena (Minasyan 2008: 68-72). Another important resource used by Yerevan in the conflict is its foreign policy doctrine of “complementarity”.2 Despite growing anti-Russian stereotypes 2  Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Vartan Oskanian, is the author of this concept which means to balance the interest of the influential external actors and great powers in the implementation of Armenia’s foreign policy. In practice, this policy was used

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in the West, Armenia – Russia’s ally and CSTO member – has never been regarded in the West as an exclusively pro-Russian actor. Nor was Azerbaijan ever regarded as a fully pro-Western state, as in the case of Georgia. Meanwhile, NK has never been perceived by Western political actors as a complete parallel case compared with Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Trans-Dniester. Armenia’s policy of complementarity has enabled it to keep a balance between its relations between Russia and the West. The Armenian Diaspora in the US and in European countries has also played a role in that regard, using their lobbying and advocacy potential in their countries and providing political and financial aid to Armenia. Finally, according to Russian expert Sergey Markedonov, “while for the West, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are the puppets of the Kremlin, Nagorno-Karabakh is a different story. Many people, though not far from everyone, see it as a small freedom-loving republic that challenged the Communist party and tyranny”. Karabakh is seen as a part of the anticommunist protest, alongside Georgia and the Baltic states … For in the West (especially the US), this is a serious argument” (Markedonov 2009). As for the military aspect of the conflict, the Armenian military has been convinced that the potential increase of oil and gas revenues in Azerbaijan will not allow the country to get an upper hand over Armenia and NK in the near future and to conduct a successful rapid offensive on the Karabakh front. During the years of armistice, a multi-layered defence line has been built all along the wartime frontline in NK that will not be easily crossed. According to military experts, the Karabakh army is well equipped with anti-tank weapons and artillery that will enable it to inflict serious losses against Azerbaijani offensive forces (Merry 2009). This will compensate for the manifold superiority of the Azerbaijani army in the number of tanks and armed personnel carriers, and rule out the possibility of a Blitzkrieg or rapid breakthrough into the inland parts of NK. Moreover, as each new round of the arms race unfolds, the probability of renewed warfare in the conflict zone has gone down. Paradoxical though it may seem at first sight, such a situation was well-known in the times of the Cold War and has been thoroughly researched by political scientists (Minasyan 2008: 7071). A mechanism known as “mutual containment” comes into force when parties’ destructive potentials are exceedingly high. Any benefits that either country may gain from beginning military action will not justify resulting human and material losses, to say nothing of the political consequences of the international community’s negative reaction. There is little reason for Azerbaijan to hope for a Blitzkrieg. So a new war in NK can be expected to take the form of a long-term trench war, similar to the Iran/Iraq war (1980-1988). Both in the military and political sense, such a war will be detrimental to the initiator of the conflict. The arms race in the NK conflict zone thus raises the threshold (or reduces the probability) of renewed armed confrontations. It certainly does not prevent any military actions but is definitely a by Armenia comprehending interests of Russia, the US, European countries and Iran from the first days of the independence of Armenia.

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strong deterrent to war. As Azerbaijan uses its oil revenues to purchase new arms, it can hope to upset the military balance in its favour. However, stability in the area relies on a different balance, “the balance of threats”, which will compel the parties to sustain the fragile and unstable peace for quite a long time. From a political point of view, the strongest deterrent to a long-term military campaign in NK probably lies in the field of international politics, that is, the positions of external players and leading world powers. The international community simply will not allow the parties to engage in warfare for weeks – and even less for months – in such a strategically important region of the world, located close to oil and gas transit routes, and at the intersection of world powers interests. Besides, any attempt to resume armed hostilities with an uncertain outcome may have more serious consequences for authorities in Azerbaijan, whose internal legitimacy strongly depends on promises to bring Karabakh back under their control, than for NK or even for Armenia. If Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev unleashes war and loses it, he will at least lose power. There is an “asymmetry of purposes” between Stepanakert and Baku, an “asymmetry of attitudes” to a future war. As the experience of local conflicts in modern times has shown, the success of a military campaign does not depend only or primarily on the quantitative ratio of each the sides’ military potentials but also on the interplay between military and nonmilitary factors. The latter include political, psychological and ideological factors that determine the extent to which society can be mobilised and military actions can be legitimised in all the social strata. Time is a crucial factor, because Azerbaijan, as the potential initiator of armed hostilities, will have more problems with legitimising a new war than NK, whose population will struggle only for its survival. The history of colonial wars as well as ongoing conflicts between former parent states and unrecognised state formations show that asymmetry of wills and purposes of the parties results in a situation when “the de facto states are playing the long game, in which not losing means winning” (Lynch 2002: 848). NK may not win the next trench war with Azerbaijan but even so, it will not lose it either. Meanwhile, for Azerbaijan’s leadership, which has been calling for revenge for over 15 years, any military outcome except total control over NK will imply both political and military defeat, with subsequent disastrous consequences for the country’s ruling elite. Most importantly, the Five-Day War has demonstrated the futility of attempts to resolve conflicts in the South Caucasus by military means and has dispelled hopes that external forces will step in and resolve the conflicts. The reasons are, on the one hand, the complexity and mosaic layout of the region, and on the other, the plurality of active external influences. The Five-Day War and New Tendencies in Armenian-Georgian Relations The Five-Day War has changed the security framework in the South Caucasus and the degree of involvement of external actors. In particular, after Moscow recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and included them

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in its exclusive sphere of influence, from Russia’s perspective, the political and geographical scope of the South Caucasus has been restricted to Armenia, Azerbaijan and the conflict area in NK. As for Georgia, it has become a closed territory where Moscow has henceforth extremely limited political and economic leverage. In geopolitical terms, Georgia now lies for Russia somewhere between Washington, Brussels and Moscow. Since August 2008, relations between Russia and Georgia have no longer been strictly bilateral, especially considering the absence of diplomatic ties between the two countries. The entire sphere of mutual relations between Russia and Georgia has been included in the wider format of Russia’s relations with the US and European countries and organisations. In this context, Georgia is just one element of the complicated political layout between the “East” (Russia) and the “West” (US and Europe). Since the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, Armenia has faced new regional challenges. Ironically, Russia’s post-war strengthening position and influence in the South Caucasus also served to increase the distance between Russia and Armenia. First of all, the war interrupted land communication between the two countries, including the transportation of supplies to the Russian base deployed in Armenia.3 Russia’s right to use the transit route via Georgian territory for supplies to Russian troops in Armenia was stipulated in the 2005 agreements between Moscow and Tbilisi under which Russia withdrew its military bases from Georgia (Socor 2006). Obviously, Russian military transit via Georgia became impossible after the war and will not resume in the foreseeable future. Non-military transit from Russia to Armenia via Georgian territory has also become problematic. Until the re-opening of the Lars checkpoint in March 2010, the borders between Georgia and Russia were closed. Russian military transit to Armenia via Azerbaijan, Iran or Turkey has involved political complications and restrictions at an even higher level. In the aftermath of the Five-Day War, most supplies were carried to the Russian military base in Armenia by air via the territory of Azerbaijan. It was a unique situation taking into account the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the interruption of land communication between Armenia and Azerbaijan since the 1990s. However, Russia’s use of the territory of Azerbaijan for military transit to Armenia has obviously been limited. Azerbaijan has been afraid that Russia could supply both the Russian base and Armenian army with arms and ammunitions via its territory. Whatever new solutions are found, the Five-Day War has in fact moved Russia further away from Armenia. The changes in Russian-Armenian relations could not fail to show in bilateral relations between Yerevan and Tbilisi. The war set a test for Armenia’s ability to 3  The Russian 102nd military base, comprised of around Russian 3,500 troops, has been deployed in Gumri since 1995, when a bilateral agreement was signed for a period of 25 years as part of the CIS integrated air defence system. It was integrated in Russian North Caucasus Military District. Expiring in 2010, the agreement was extended in August 2010 until 2044.

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make practical use of its foreign policy of complementarity. When Russia, that is, Armenia’s main military and political ally, was fighting with Georgia, that is, Armenia’s closest neighbour and communication partner, Armenian leadership managed to preserve neutrality, despite the fact that it was then assuming the presidency of the CSTO, created under the aegis of Russia. Yerevan also avoided creating a negative image of Armenia both in Russian and Georgian societies due to its evasive position during the Russia-Georgia war.4 In the first months after August 2008, bilateral relations between Yerevan and Tbilisi were not free of problems. Apart from the military transit issue, regional dynamics in the South Caucasus have strongly influenced Armenian-Georgian relations. According to some Georgian experts,5 as Georgia has lost Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it considers that is has nothing to lose or to concede. Georgian society and the political elite have been particularly critical of any development that could affect its regional standing. In that regard, the settlement of the NK conflict or any positive dynamics therein have been perceived as reducing Georgia’s regional importance, depriving it of economic and political benefits that the country could enjoy as long as neighbouring Armenia and Azerbaijan were in conflict. Many people in Georgia were concerned that even a small change in the conflict negotiation process could undermine Georgia’s exclusive regional status, and especially its privileged position in regional transit and economic projects. According to Georgian political scientist Ghia Nodia, “for the South Caucasus and Georgia in particular, the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, if it takes place, will constitute a genuine and important change. Some analysts consider Georgia a potential loser from this development”. But at the same time, the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border will reduce Russian military and political presence in the entire South Caucasus, which would be in Georgia’s interests too (Nodia 2009). In its bilateral relations with Armenia, Georgia has lately emphasised its exclusive importance for Armenia’s communication needs. This was noticeable, for example, in Georgia’s tariff policy. In a way, Tbilisi has used its transit role in its political relations with Armenia. Georgia’s more stringent policies towards its Armenian-populated region of Samtskhe-Javakheti, as a compensation for loosing South Ossetia and Abkhazia, could be another factor detrimental to bilateral ties with Yerevan.6 It could potentially have a negative impact on Armenian-Georgian interstate relations.7 However, the general weakness of 4  Information based on the authors’ exchange of views with Russian and Georgian experts. 5  Ibid. 6  The Azeri-populated area of Kvemo-Kartli was then in a similar situation. 7  In Summer 2009, the Georgian authorities did not allow Shirak Torosyan, a Member of Parliament from ruling Republican Party in Armenia, to cross the border of Georgia because of his activities to protect the rights of Armenian ethnic minority in SamtskheJavakheti.

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the Georgian state has left hope that any pressure it may exert on these border regions would remain unconsolidated and unsystematic, so that the situation in these areas would not escalate. The Actualisation of the Turkish Vector In 1993, Turkey closed its border with Armenia in order to support Azerbaijan in its war over NK, while rendering Azerbaijan some military assistance too. Since that time, there have been no visible changes in Turkey’s position regarding the NK conflict. One may even say that Turkey has been instrumental in Azerbaijan’s policy towards Armenia and NK, especially in sealing Armenia’s borders and transport communications. Azerbaijani politicians expected the blockade could weaken and eventually exhaust Armenia, compelling Yerevan to make concessions at the negotiation table (Gorgulu 2008: 13-16). The situation has notably changed only after the August 2008 War, closely followed by President Gül’s historical visit to Yerevan to attend a football match in September 2008.8 In 2008, Armenian-Turkish borders had been closed for 15 years, and there was no hope any longer that Armenia would be compelled to make concessions over NK. Had Yerevan been willing and able to compromise over Karabakh in exchange for normalised relations with Turkey, it would already have done so. Nagorno-Karabakh has clearly not been a bargaining chip that Armenia could use in its negotiations with Turkey. It is highly possible that such awareness among some influential political circles in Turkey prepared the ground for a new turn in relations between Ankara and Yerevan. In addition, the blockade has not produced the expected political and even economic results: Armenia’s economy has been steadily developing, although it could – like Eastern parts of Turkey – also benefit from the opening of borders. Against this background, the Five-Day War has accelerated the rapprochement between Yerevan and Ankara. The war highlighted the vulnerability of communication routes via Georgia, making Turkey suddenly aware of the need to build alternative routes in the South Caucasus. Therefore, one of the main results of developments in 2008 and the first half of 2009 was that ArmenianTurkish relations were dissociated from the Karabakh issue and from each country’s own relations with Azerbaijan. Such a reality and approach could promote stability and security in the South Caucasus by reducing the probability of renewed military actions in the NK conflict zone. Azerbaijan would indeed no longer be able to fully rely on Ankara’s support and third-party interests will not interfere with Armenian-Turkish rapprochement to the same extent as before. Besides, the US and EU positions could play an important stabilising role in the rapprochement. Their role could grow over time as it was illustrated by President 8  For additional information, see Gorgulu, A., Iskandaryan, A., Minasyan, S. 2010.

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Obama’s visit to Turkey in early April 2009 and by the Armenian-Turkish road map announced in Switzerland in the second half of April. For Turkey, relations with Armenia are not only targeted at an Eastern neighbour; they are also, to a greater extent, a component of its interaction with the West. In terms of civilisation and politics, Turkey views Armenia as an extension of the Western world. As a consequence, Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is part of Ankara’s ties to Brussels and Washington. External powers, especially the US, are often both the source and the target of the “Armenian factor” in Turkey’s external relations. Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora employ their advocacy resources in the US and Western Europe in order to exert pressure on Turkey. Washington and Brussels also use the issue of the 1915 Genocide and the need to open Armenian-Turkish borders as means for criticising and containing Ankara whenever necessary.9 On 22 April 2009, the Foreign Ministers of Armenia, Turkey and Switzerland signed a framework agreement on a road map to normalise bilateral relations, which was approved by officials in Washington, Brussels and even Moscow. It triggered the deepest crisis in the relations between Baku and Ankara ever since the Republic of Azerbaijan became independent. Azerbaijan sharply criticised Turkey’s policy with regard to Armenia and even made a few demonstrative steps: broadcasting Turkish movies in Azerbaijan was banned; Azerbaijani authorities threatened to stop supplying gas to Turkey and declared their readiness to consider the option of selling all their gas to Russia (Iskandaryan 2009). President Aliyev’s visit to Moscow in mid-April 2009 and his meeting with President Medvedev were convincing demonstrations of Baku’s position on the road map. Nevertheless, Azerbaijan’s attempt to play the Russian card was not enough to reverse Turkish policy, nor did it push Russia into reviewing its approach to the NK conflict in exchange for Azerbaijani gas. By the beginning of May 2009, Azerbaijani media and officials calmed down and adopted slightly more realistic view about the issue. Baku probably realised that further deterioration in Azerbaijan’s relations with Turkey would only weaken Ankara’s support and eventually undermine Baku’s position at the international level and in negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh. Although the NK conflict was excluded from the general format of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, Ankara’s position about this issue could hardly be expected to change in the foreseeable future. The conflict would certainly remain on Turkey’s foreign policy agenda and in its domestic political discourse too. The framework signed in Switzerland was heavily criticised by Turkish opposition forces. Most probably for domestic political reasons, local officials started making regular statements linking negotiations with Armenia to the settlement of the NK conflict. Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdoğan for instance made some tough statements about the conflict during his visit to Azerbaijan 9  This is the case, for example, for issues such as Turkey’s accession to the EU or policy in the Middle East.

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in May 2009. According to Turkish expert Bülent  Aras, “the attempts for normalisation with Armenia triggered a nationalist Azeri response and this response found support in Turkey in a form of allegation that the Turkish government is selling out Azerbaijan. Preventing this kind of negative input should be on the agenda in relation to Turkey’s increasing activism in regional policy” (Aras 2009: 15). If foreign policy has compelled Ankara to take a pro-Azerbaijani stand on the NK conflict, Turkey itself has used the Azerbaijani factor as a tool in its policy towards Armenia. It was willing here to divert attention from a much more sensitive issue for the Turkish society and elite: the 1915 Genocide of the Armenians in Ottoman Turkey. However, as long as the borders remain sealed and diplomatic ties with Yerevan have not been established, linking rapprochement to the NK conflict heavily restricted Ankara’s ability to implement its policies in the South Caucasus. As Turkish expert Aybars Gorgulu underlined, “the lack of diplomatic ties between Turkey and Armenia jeopardises Turkey’s efforts to become a regional leader and also its attempts at mediation for the region’s protracted conflicts. The NK dispute is a good example in that sense. Turkey’s involvement in this conflict as a party rather than a mediator and its unconditional support for Azerbaijan motivated by factors both strategic – oil-rich Azerbaijan’s importance for Turkey – and domestic – Azerbaijan’s status as a kin-state to Turkey – has limited Turkey’s potential role as a mediator” (Gorgulu 2009: 24). Armenia, in its turn, has instrumentalised the Genocide topic in response to Turkey’s pressure on the NK issue. Since the 1990s, Armenia has used the recognition of the Genocide by countries and parliaments as a resource for pressuring Ankara into opening borders and establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia (Safrastyan 2005: 3). Taking into account Yerevan’s otherwise limited capacity for influencing Ankara and Turkey’s sensitivity to discussions on the Genocide, the strategy has looked quite relevant. In the negotiation process, every time Turkey started to precondition the normalisation of its relations with Armenia to settlement of the NK conflict, Armenia toughened its position on the international recognition of 1915 Genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Obviously, the history of Armenian-Turkish relations, closed borders and the lack of diplomatic ties between Ankara Yerevan make Turkey vulnerable to external pressure by leading world players such as the US and the EU. Some political forces in Brussels and Washington have also used these topics as a lever for influence on Ankara in many discussions, like those about Turkey’s accession to the EU or the future status of Kurdish-populated areas in Northern Iraq. This gave rise to growing concerns amongst the Turkish political elites and society. According to a joint report compiled by Turkish, Armenian and European experts, “a growing number of Turks have realised that their country’s international position on the Armenian question has only generated tension with important allies, while utterly failing to persuade them … So long as Turkey’s political leaders and opinion makers continue to stoke fears of loss of territory

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and reparations, Turkey will continue to respond defensively. By continuing to treat every mention of the “g-word” as attack on national honour, Turkey’s foreign policy has become hostage to events beyond its control, particularly when dealing with the Caucasus.10 Armenia and Turkey have generally perceived their bilateral relations and mutual problems in a very different way. While for Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora, the Turkish question is a matter of national security, for Turkey, the Armenian question is a problem of historical responsibility and of domestic and international image, which mars the background of its relations with the West. For the 70-million-strong Turkish society, relations with Armenia are a headache; for Armenia, relations with Turkey are of vital importance and a priority. Armenia’s position in the rapprochement has been more consolidated because Turkey means more for Armenia than Armenia means for Turkey. However, Ankara could afford progress in its relations with Yerevan. By making concessions in the Armenian question, it could receive some important political dividends in exchange. As Turkey aspires to boost its role at the global level, it could improve its image in Europe, in the US and in the Muslim world by showing impartiality, openness to dialogue, preparedness for compromise and the ability to settle relations with its neighbours. It will also be beneficial for the development of Turkish soft power, especially given the new discourse, now extremely popular in Turkish society and expert circles, according to which Turkey could play a key role in resolving regional conflicts should it succeed in winning the reputation of an impartial neighbour (Altinay 2008: 56). On the contrary, should it peg its policy with regard to Armenia on the interests of Azerbaijan, Turkey risks sacrificing its clear-cut national interests and strategic benefits to tactical moves with uncertain outcomes. By opening its border to the East, Turkey could count on dividends in the West, primarily in its dialogue with the EU, whereas Armenia would benefit in terms of security and communication, and have new opportunities for development (Gorgulu et al. 2009: 13-16). Should the border open and communication routes begin to operate, the trade turnover could significantly rise. Local officials from the struggling Eastern parts of Turkey have on many occasions expressed their enthusiasm about the potential opening of the border and beginning of trade and cooperation with Armenian businesses. Poverty levels in the regions of Turkey that border Armenia are several times higher than in better developed Western Turkey, to say nothing of Istanbul. So local residents have been looking forward to an open border with Armenia that they hope can give them a chance to improve their economic plight. In Armenia, some businesspeople have voiced fears that open borders may leave Armenian producers unable to compete against cheap imports from Turkey and make Armenian trade too dependent on the Turkish route. However, most experts believe the economic benefits will outmatch any potential damages. Business actors who have welcomed the opening of the border 10 See Noah’s Dove Returns: Armenia, Turkey and the Debate on Genocide. Berlin, Istanbul, Yerevan: European Stability Initiative, 21 April 2009, p. 22.

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have put their hopes in the access to international export markets at much smaller and more attractive costs. Conclusion The Five-Day War has considerably reduced military risks in the NagornoKarabakh conflict zone. Indeed, it demonstrated the inefficiency of violent unilateral attempts at resolving conflicts, consolidated the status quo in the area for years to come and meanwhile ruled out prospects for any settlement in the shortterm. At the regional level, it has complicated Armenia’s relations with Russia and Georgia, and accelerated its rapprochement with Turkey, which could lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations and the unsealing of borders, thus opening up new communication routes for the country. Under this scenario, the initiative would jeopardise Azerbaijan’s policy in favour of a two-sided blockade against Armenia and Georgia’s privileged position in the South Caucasus as a transit state for regional communication networks. Even though negotiations have in the end not produced expected results, Armenia’s active participation in the reconciliation process has been beneficial for its image and weight in the region. Armenia has broken out of the narrow limits of the South Caucasus political environment and secured an independent niche in the strategic Great Game by relying on the EU, the US and Russia for support in its negotiations with Turkey. Bibliography Altinay, A. 2008. “Turkey’s Soft Power: An Unpolished Gem or an Elusive Mirage?”. Insight Turkey, 10(2), 55-66. Aras, B. 2009. “Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy”. SETA Policy Brief, No. 32, May 2009. Gorgulu, A. 2008. “Turkey-Armenia Relations: A Vicious Circle”. TESEV Foreign Policy Analysis Series, No. 8, Istanbul, November. Gorgulu, A. 2009. “Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?”. Insight Turkey, 11(2). Gorgulu, A., Gundogar, S., Iskandaryan, A. and Minasyan, S. 2009. “Breaking the Vicious Circle”. TESEV – Caucasus Institute Joint Report, Istanbul, April 2009. Gorgulu, A., Iskandaryan, A. and Minasyan, S. 2010. “Assessing the Rapprochement Process”. TESEV-Caucasus Institute Joint Report, Istanbul, May. Hovhannisyan, N. 1999. The Karabakh Problem: Factors, Criteria, Variants of Solution, Yerevan: Zangak. International Crisis Group, 2007. Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War, Europe Report No. 187, 14 November.

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Iskandaryan, A. 2009. “Armenian-Turkish Rapprochement: Timing Matters”, Insight Turkey, 11(3), 37-44. Lynch, D. 2002. “Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts”, International Affairs, 78(4), 831-48. Mailyan, M. 2008. “The Place of Nagorno-Karabakh within the Region: Prospects and Dead Ends”, in Caucasus Neighborhood: Turkey and the South Caucasus, edited by A. Iskandaryan. Yerevan: Caucasus Institute. Markedonov, S. 2009. “Russia-Azerbaijan: A New Stand-Off” (in Russian), 26 January. Available at: www.politcom.ru/article.php?id=7515 Minasyan, S., Aghajanyan M. and Asatryan, E. 2005. The Karabakh Conflict: Refugees, Territories, Security, Yerevan. Minasyan, S. 2008. “Armenia in Karabakh, Karabakh in Armenia: The Karabakh Factor in Armenia’s Foreign and Domestic Policy”, in Caucasus Neighborhood: Turkey and the South Caucasus, edited by A. Iskandaryan. Yerevan: Caucasus Institute, 63-72. Available at: http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/ Caucasus_Eng3.pdf Merry, W. 2009. “Karabakh: Is War Inevitable?” OpenDemocracy, 22 May 2009. Available at: www.afpc.org/publication_listings/viewArticle/667 Noah’s Dove Returns: Armenia, Turkey and the Debate on Genocide. Berlin, Istanbul, Yerevan: European Stability Initiative, 21 April. Available: http:// www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_108.pdf Nodia, G. 2009. “How Much Has the World Changed? Implications for Georgia’s Policies”, Policy Review, April. Tbilisi: Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development. Available at: http://cipdd.org/ files/40_378_580231_Policy1e.pdf Safrastyan, R. 2005. “The Recognition of the Genocide in Armenia’s Foreign Policy: Multi-Level Analysis”. 21st Century Journal (Russian Edition), Yerevan, No. 1. Socor, V. 2006. “Agreements Signed on Russian Military Withdrawal from Georgia”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 3(65), 4 April. Available at: http://www. jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31546

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Chapter 7

Georgia’s National Security and Regional Policy after the August 2008 War Nika Chitadze

Introduction National security, as one of the basic functions of the state, aims at securing the existence and the development of a nation, of its values and interests. As such, it includes the defence and promotion of independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, in a context of constitutional order and rule of law. From this perspective, it makes it essential for the state to prevent risks from inside and outside the country (such as military, economic, financial, media, diplomatic and any other types of aggression) through the development of domestic and foreign policies. In that regard, the August 2008 war has not changed the balance of power in the South Caucasus’s regional security. It has simply announced that this balance of power had already shifted. This paper explores the consequences of the Five-Day War for Georgia and its impact on Georgia’s regional security environment and policy. Regional Reactions to the Five-Day War Russia’s Continuing Attempts to Destabilise Georgia Contrary to what Russia might have expected, the economic, political and military fallout of its war with Georgia has worked against Russia’s own interests. Russia has faced a changing security environment. Central European and Baltic states have expressed willingness to develop and strengthen their military ties with the US. Poland rushed to sign a deal with the US to deploy elements of the American missile defence system on its territory. Other Eastern European countries are expected to follow suit. The US and NATO naval presence in the Black Sea has become almost permanent. Meanwhile, the Pentagon promised to do its best to assist in the restoration of the Georgian Armed forces. Georgia may even upgrade its military cooperation with the US and NATO in the near future. At the international level, Russia might now be increasingly isolated. American and EU leaders openly condemned Moscow for its illegal action in Georgia and may become even more critical in the future. The EU has taken active measures to

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develop alternative transit routes for energy imports. In September 2008, the US suspended its civilian nuclear cooperation deal with Moscow. In addition, it will certainly be more difficult for Russia now to join the WTO, especially because of Russia’s stunted economic growth. Russia has failed to secure support from its strategic CIS and SCO partners. Despite Russian pressure, none of the CIS member countries have agreed to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Thanks to China’s firm position, all the SCO member states have also refrained from endorsing the creation of the two independent republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia’s intervention in Georgia will certainly make CIS countries more wary of Moscow’s intentions. In the long term, each of them – especially those facing the danger of separatism on their own territories – will seek alternative alliances. At the same time, Russia will, in all likelihood, continue to destabilise Georgia and weaken Georgian statehood. Against this background, Russia could operate near the occupied zones, commit terrorist attacks against infrastructures on the territory of Georgia, or support pro-Russian political forces etc. The deterioration of the political situation in Georgia will cause a lack of trust and confidence from Western states toward Georgia, uncertainty in Georgia’s further integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures and possible delays or reconsideration of regional energy projects bypassing Russian territory. The Georgian government provided a list of incidents and shootings constituting provocation from Russia near the occupied territories of Georgia. As early as 12 August 2008, that is, when the ceasefire agreement was signed, twelve Georgian policemen were killed.1 Several explosions occurred on the railway near the territory of Abkhazia and at the same time, unknown persons have exploited the electricity line “Kartli-2” near so-called South Ossetia.2 Russia has clearly not played a constructive role in the conflict resolution process. It used its veto power in December 2008 to oppose the extension of the OSCE mandate in Georgia, which was opened in 1992 to supervise peacekeeping in South Ossetia. Similarly, it vetoed the extension of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia, established in 1993 to monitor compliance with the ceasefire agreement in Abkhazia. The negotiation process has since taken place within the framework of Geneva talks.3 There were ten rounds of negotiations held with the participation of Georgia, 1  See the list of incidents recorded by the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, from August 2008 to June 2009, Georgia Update, Available at: http://georgiaupdate.gov.ge/en/ tagliavini/2e23d3845c1828554649713a4b935d3a/7667cb50368b5cffac1a5d4fc127ae9f/ d1095a8232cf2c508f68d0f1ca85f7f4 2  “Terrorist Attack Prevented on Georgian Railway”, Veztnik Kavkaza,  8 October 2010. Available at: http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/society/6711.html 3  Natalia Makarova, “Geneva talks on Caucasus end in deadlock”, Russia Today. 9 August 2010. Available at: http://rt.com/Politics/2010-06-09/caucasus-geneva-talksgeorgia.html

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Russia, the UN, the OSCE, the EU and representatives of the separatist regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Discussions brought no results because of Russia’s demand that a peace agreement must be signed between Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This could hardly make sense given the fact that international law cannot regulate a peace agreement between the central government of a state and its regions. Instead, Georgia would not oppose the signing of such an agreement with Russia as both are subjects of international law, but Russia refuses to consider this option. Since the end of 2009, Russia has openly started to support “pro-Russian” forces in Georgia. Some opposition leaders, like former Prime Minister and Chairman of Parliament Nino Burjanadze, and several former members of the Georgian Parliament have been invited to Moscow “for consultations”.4 Officials from the Kremlin have indeed stated on several occasions that they will not have any contact with the President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, considering it impossible to cooperate with him in any way. Turkey’s Balanced Policy Based on its geographic position, cultural and historic ties with Central Asia, and strategic importance as a NATO member and US ally, Turkey has played a growing role in the South Caucasus since the early 1990s. With the backing of Washington, Turkey has striven to become a gateway to Western markets for Caspian oil and gas and intensified cooperation with Georgia to build the BTC and BTE pipelines, thus creating the East-West energy corridor, bypassing Russia and Iran. As a transit country, Georgia has turned into a key strategic partner to Turkey, and its independence and territorial integrity have become crucial not only for Turkey’s strategic interest but also for the security and the stability of the whole region. At the same time, Turkey has been faced with policy dilemmas in its relations with Georgia as it has also developed and diversified its ties with Russia. Russia is indeed Turkey’s major economic partner and first energy supplier. In 2008, Russian-Turkish trade reached more than 30 billion dollars and included important volumes of natural gas.5 Gas imports from Russia accounted then for close to 70 per cent of Turkish gas consumption. Part of these volumes have been delivered via the Blue Stream pipeline completed in 2002 but officially inaugurated in 2005, that links Russia and Turkey through the Black Sea and was a direct competitor to the East-West energy corridor.6 Discussions to extend the 4  “Burjanadze Meets Putin in Moscow”, Civil Georgia, 4 March 2010. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22052 5  Government of the Russian Federation, “Russian-Turkish Relations”, 14 May 2009. Available at: http://premier.gov.ru/pda/eng/visits/ru/6106/info/4166/ 6  Rumer E. and Simon, J. “Toward a Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region”, INSS-NDU Occasional Paper, No. 3, April 2006, p. 9.

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export capacities of this line and build a parallel pipeline (Blue Stream 2), that would compete with the Nabucco project, were revived by Vladimir Putin in August 2009 and may enhance existing ties between Russia and Turkey. Other factors relating to Turkey’s relations with the West are likely to affect Ankara’s policy and involvement in the South Caucasus region. These include: political tensions in US-Turkish relations over the war in Iraq; Turkish security concerns about the impact of development in Iraq on its own Kurdish population; Ankara’s reluctance to take a back seat to the US in regional activities that directly impact on Turkey’s national interests; and growing frustration over EU accession. Due to the deterioration of its relations with the West, Turkey might be inclined to refuse to serve merely US, NATO and EU interests as a bridge between the Euro-Atlantic community and the South Caucasus. On the whole, Ankara has pursued an active but balanced policy toward Georgia and Russia. It has intensified cooperation with Moscow and developed at the same time its relations with Georgia. Turkey has remained Georgia’s first trade partner, accounting for 16 per cent of the latter’s total trade in the first quarter of 2010.7 In addition to the BTC and BTE pipelines, the two countries plan to create a railway connection from Baku to Kars via Tbilisi, currently under construction and expected to be completed in 2012. These developments have not prevented Turkey from accommodating Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus, as demonstrated by the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform initiated by Ankara. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Taking Stock of Georgia’s Vulnerability As Russia’s most faithful ally in the region, Armenia was expected to endorse the Russian aggression against Georgia. However, its heavy reliance on Georgia as a crucial transport link to reach the rest of the world caused Yerevan to adopt a moderate position. Despite strong pressure from Moscow, Armenia refused to recognise the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.8 But the Russian-Georgian war and subsequent disruption of trade relations between Russia and Armenia have convinced Yerevan to work further on normalising relations with Turkey so that borders may be reopened and economic relations boosted. Discussions held between Armenian and Turkish representatives were perceived in Georgia as a potential source of increased vulnerability. Georgia would lose its strategic position as a transit country between Russia and Armenia, leaving room for Moscow to further pressure Tbilisi. After supporting the use of force as a means to recover lost territories, Azerbaijan refrained from making such statements apparently in an attempt to avoid irritating 7  Khurtsia T. “Turkey-Georgia Business Forum promises even closer ties”, Georgia Today, 17 September 2010. Available at: http://www.georgiatoday.ge/article_details. php?id=8287# 8  Shoghikian, H. “Russia Seeks Armenian Recognition of Georgian Regions”, Armenia Liberty, 3 September 2008. Available at: http://www.armenialiberty.org/content/ Article/1597143.html

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Russia.9 If Tbilisi had succeeded in restoring its territorial integrity, Baku would have had a stronger argument for resolving the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh by military means. But the Georgian experience is likely to discourage Azerbaijan from using its armed forces to regain control over Nagorno-Karabakh. For Baku, Russia’s intervention in Georgia was a good illustration of what a military conflict with Yerevan might entail, especially taking into consideration the fact that Armenia is a member of CIS Collective Security Treaty Organisation and would be assisted by its Russian ally in the event of war.10 At the same time, the Russian-Georgian war may force the political elite in Azerbaijan to revise its foreign policy and strengthen ties with Moscow, especially in the sphere of energy, which would be detrimental to Georgia’s interests. Iran: An Alternative Support for Georgia Contrary to its Armenian and Azerbaijani neighbours, Georgia shares no common border with Iran and has the least developed relations among the South Caucasian states with the Islamic Republic. Diplomatic relations were not very strong in the past and Iran kept out of Georgia’s internal disputes. However, the war between Georgia and Russia has opened a new chapter of bilateral cooperation. Feeling isolated, Georgia has sought a way out of its dependence on Russia and has viewed Iran as a power that could play a positive role in the region and help Georgia overcome regional challenges. Georgia received valuable support from Iran in 2006, when Russia imposed harsh economic sanctions, cut transport links and announced more than doubling gas prices for Georgia. Authorities in Tehran decided, in January 2006, to export volumes of natural gas to Georgia, a step presented as a “vitally important decision” for Georgia by then Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli.11 As a regional gas producing power possessing the second largest volumes of gas in the world, Iran has the potential to supply Georgia with alternative sources of energy. Stronger economic ties with the Islamic Republic could help Tbilisi to diversify its trade relations. Tehran is itself eager to find new partners for energy exports and to expand its economic ties. Georgia’s New Security Environment The war in August 2008 has dramatically changed the political situation in Georgia. The Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts were clearly transformed 9  After August 2008: Consequences of the Russian-Georgian War, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, p. 18. 10 Ibid. 11  Government of Georgia, “Meeting of Energy Commission”, 30 January 2006. Available at: http://www.government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=105&info_ id=2345

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into a wider confrontation between Russia and Georgia. Russia openly infringed Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty forcing the Georgian central government to withdraw from parts of South Ossetia- and Abkhazia’s territories that it was still controlling before the escalation of conflict.12 Georgia’s image as an “efficient state” was shattered and the country could well plunge into new internal political turmoil. Whereas it became plainly evident to the international community that Russia supported separatist regimes in Georgia and could not be considered as an honest broker any longer in addressing the situation: Georgia’s future now depends on international security guarantees. Territorial Annexation of Georgia by Russia After the August 2008 events, direct negotiations between the conflicting parties were highly unlikely. In South Ossetia, de facto authorities became even more closely connected with and dependent on Russian military circles, while unification with North Ossetia proved to be a more attractive option for local residents than independence. Several months after the crisis, the de-facto President of South Ossetia Eduard Kokoity once declared that South Ossetia will one day become the part of Russia.13 In other words, de facto independence of South Ossetia meant full integration into Russia, or Russia’s full annexation of part of Georgia’s territory. About 98 per cent of the South Ossetia budget is financed by Russia.14 In Abkhazia, part of the ruling elite has strongly supported the idea of independence and has, despite close ties with Moscow, opposed Russia’s full hegemony in the region, giving the Georgian government some room for manoeuvre. But unless the international community is strongly involved in Abkhazia, Moscow may easily get rid of the independent-minded Abkhaz elite.15 It is important to remember in this regard that ethnic Abkhaz do not form the majority of people living in Abkhazia – they only represent about 30 per cent of local residents. As a consequence of the Five-Day War, Russia has occupied about 18 per cent of Georgia’s territory, and its military forces have been deployed on the territory of the two seceding regions. On 17 September 2008, Russia signed Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, allowing for the establishment of military bases in both regions 12  After August 2008: Consequences of the Russian-Georgian War, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, p. 21. 13  Halpin, T. “Kremlin Announces that South Ossetia Will Join ‘one united Russian state’”, The Times, 30 August 2008. Available at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ world/europe/article4635843.ece 14  “98% of South Ossetia’s budget revenues come from Russia”, RIA-Novosti, 29 August 2010. Available at: http://en.rian.ru/exsoviet/20100829/160380331.html 15  After August 2008: Consequences of the Russian-Georgian War, Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, p. 31.

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and the deployment of Russian border troops to help defend regional borders. The following year, Moscow announced that 3700 Russian troops were stationed in each facility in Java (South Ossetia) and Ochamchire (Abkhazia). Their presence has a negative impact on the security environment and stability of Georgia and the entire region. Persisting Threats from Russia These uncontrolled territories have become a serious threat to Georgia’s national security and create a favourable environment for international terrorist groups, especially considering the fact that they are located close to the unstable North Caucasus. In the early 1990s, during the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia was clearly found to be training terrorists from the Northern Caucasus to provide support to the separatists in Georgia. Today, Russia is again interested in using these groups to commit terrorist acts on the territories which are still controlled by the Georgian authorities.16 International terrorism is especially problematic for Georgia taking into account that, despite implementation of some reforms after the “Rose Revolution”, a single national crisis management system in final shape has not yet been developed. Poor control of the state borders represents another major problem for national security, increasing the terrorist threat. Illegal cross-border movement of citizens, arms and drugs trafficking and other transnational crimes have found fertile ground in the occupied territories.17 As demonstrated by the Georgian police operation that resulted in the seizure of highly enriched uranium in March 2010, these threats include the smuggling of nuclear materials. Commenting on this event, the Georgian President implied that these threats were somehow connected with Russia and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia – qualified as “black holes” by Mikheil Saakashvili.18 Possible actions directed against infrastructure of strategic importance for Georgia are a key source of concern for the country’s stability. In that regard, the protection of oil and gas pipelines and more generally of energy and transport infrastructure from terrorists and illegal armed groups has aroused great interest. It is worth remembering that, in August 2008, BP stopped pumping oil and gas through the BTC and BTE pipelines for pre-cautionary reasons due to the extension of military operations. Attempts by occupational and separatist forces to damage domestic and international transport networks, as well as Georgia’s strategic importance continue to represent a threat to national security. 16  Georgia Update, Weekly edition. 19 November 2009. Available at: http:// georgiaupdate.gov.ge/doc/10010889/GU%20Nov%2019.pdf 17  Georgia Update, Weekly edition, 14 May 2010. Available at: http://georgiaupdate. gov.ge/en/doc/10011063/GU%20May%2014,%202010%20gm.pdf. 18  Corso, M. “Tbilisi Busts Enriched Uranium Smugglers”, Eurasianet.org, 27 April 2010. Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/60945

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Finally, despite the occupation of 18 per cent of Georgian territory since August 2008, Russia has not yet achieved its final goal of overthrowing Georgia’s government. Accordingly, the risks of another Russian military aggression against Georgia cannot be ignored. In October 2009, a few days after the release of the EU-funded investigation of the war, the US diplomat Ron Asmus similarly stated that “the chances of another conflict at some point in the future [could] not be ruled out”.19 As Georgia seriously lacks defence capabilities, especially anti-aircraft systems, such a risk represents a major threat to the country’s independence, territorial integrity, national unity and welfare. Main Directions of Georgia’s National and Regional Security Policy Revisiting National Security Policy The Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 opened up a broad debate in Tbilisi on the need to update Georgia’s National Security Concept. Adopted in July 2005, this document presented Georgia’s vision of a secure environment and of fundamental national values and interests. For the advocates of a revised document, Georgia’s national security concept underestimated the probability of a direct military conflict with Russia.20 Among the threats, risks and challenges listed in the document, the “likelihood of open military aggression against Georgia” was indeed considered as “low”.21 Discussions held on the new draft of the national security concept also covered the question of “regime change in Georgia” as the major reason behind Russia’s aggression.22 Strengthening the consolidation of democratic institutions is a key priority in Georgia’s security concept. The Constitution provides for a clear separation of powers between the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of the government. For its part, the government is committed to reform and optimise their functioning in order to eradicate corruption and promote transparency, the rule of law, increased public involvement and civic culture that would ensure political change through established, constitutional procedure. 19  “Former U.S. Diplomat: Chances Of Another Russia-Georgia Conflict ‘Can’t Be Ruled Out’”, RFE/RL, 6 October 2009. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/ Former_US_Diplomat_Chances_Of_Another_RussiaGeorgia_Conflict_Cant_Be_Ruled_ Out/1844989.html 20  Aladashvili, I. “New National Security Concept Assesses New Threats”, Georgia Today, 24 February 2011. Available at: http://www.georgiatoday.ge/article_details. php?id=8756 21  See the text of Georgia’s National Security Concept dated July 2005, released by the Georgian Defence Ministry. Available at: http://www.mod.gov.ge/?page=10&Id=3&lang=1 22  “Draft of Georgia’s New National Security Concept”, Civil Georgia, 19 February 2011. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23164

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In that regard, the draft concept would read that independent and democratic Georgia is still perceived as a threat by the Russian ruling elite. Taking into account the fact that a new aggression against Georgia by the Russian Federation is still possible, the first priority in defence planning would be to achieve maximum deterrence to deter any attack. Accurate information provided by intelligence services and effective interagency coordination are very important for adequate defence measures. Based on the continuing threats from Russian combat forces, including those present in the occupied regions, and on the lessons of the August 2008 war, the training of Georgian Armed forces should be re-balanced to ensure greater emphasis on both conventional and unconventional defence capabilities while maintaining capabilities to participate in international peace support and stability operations. Under the concept of “total and unconditional defence”, rapid mobilisation of reserve forces, combined with coordinated actions of the Armed Forces and other state agencies will enable Georgia to inflict considerable damage and prevent the enemy from reaching its objectives. In order to achieve de-occupation of Georgia and restore constitutional order and territorial integrity, Tbilisi’s only option is to promote economic development thus trying to raise the interest of the seceding regions in participation in the central government’s programmes and projects. At this stage, diplomatic negotiations in the framework of the Geneva process seem to be bound to fail. Positions are still hard to reconcile: the central government in Tbilisi demands recognition of Georgia’s territorial integrity from the de facto leadership in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in exchange for a broad autonomy within unified Georgia, whereas the “leadership” of both regions insists on their right to independence and refuse to recognise their territories as being part of the Georgian state. Georgia’s State Strategy on Occupied Territories, unveiled in January 2010, specifically calls for the development of increased “economic interaction” as a way to overcome the dividing lines between each side.23 National Security and Regional Cooperation Difficulties in Improving Relations with Russia Despite Russia’s military aggression against Georgia in August 2008, Georgia needs to improve relations with its northern neighbour and avoid any further confrontation in the future. However, such a goal seems to be difficult to achieve when there is practically no contact between representatives of two countries. The Geneva talks have offered the only framework for exchange 23  See “Georgia’s State Strategy on Occupied Territories”, released by the Georgian Government. Available at: http://www.government.gov.ge/files/225_31228_370287_SMRStrategy-en.pdf

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and negotiations, but they have so far not brought any positive results. Russia continues to occupy 18 per cent of the Georgian territory and continues to state that it will not engage in any cooperation with Saakashvili’s regime. One may notice that the two previous Presidents of Georgia, that is, Eduard Shevardnadze and Zviad Gamsakhurdia, were not accepted by Russia neither. So it can be concluded that the Kremlin is fighting against Georgian statehood in general. In such circumstance, the only way for Georgia to improve its relations with Russia would be to rely on active diplomatic pressure on Moscow to protect the main principles of international law, including the withdrawal of occupying forces from Georgia. Deepening Partnership with Turkey Regarding Turkey as a leading regional partner that supports Georgia’s economic, political and military institutions, Tbilisi is keen to deepen its relations with Ankara. Turkey is Georgia’s first trading partner, and successful implementation of joint regional transportation and energy projects, such as BTC and BTE, are of strategic importance to both countries. In addition to these achievements, new projects are under way, like the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project and the “Nabucco” gas pipeline project, which should serve as new long term infrastructural links between Georgia and Turkey. Georgia gives great importance to Turkey as a military partner and a NATO member country that may help her integrate Euro-Atlantic structures. Cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan Georgia is interested in strengthening its close partnership with Armenia. Armenia is among the ten leading foreign-trade partners of Georgia.24 Furthermore, cooperation with Armenia is useful to provide stability in the Armenian-populated Samtskhe-Javakheti region of Georgia. Yerevan’s policy and support in this area plays a key role in the preservation of friendly relations between two countries. Georgia’s relations with Azerbaijan have developed into a strategic partnership. Joint energy, transportation and communications projects significantly contribute to the stability and prosperity of the two countries. Among them are two major regional energy projects – the BTC oil pipeline and the BTE gas pipeline. It should be mentioned, that the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway is expected, which will increase the volume of trade between two countries. Furthermore, both countries cooperate in the framework of GUAM. Azerbaijan is currently the main exporter of gas

24  “Georgia’s H1 Foreign Trade Up by 18%”, Civil Georgia, 23 July 2010. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22544

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into the Georgian market. The transportation of liquid Azeri gas to Romania via Georgian territory is also being considered. Conclusion Considering the events that followed the August 2008 war and the perception of persisting threats from Russia, Georgia has undertaken an in-depth review process of its national security concept. Its document, adopted in 2005, had clearly underestimated the risks of a direct military conflict with Russia and of regime change scenarios. In order to face these threats, Tbilisi has called for the support of the international community in its relations with Russia. Given the asymmetry of power between Georgia and Russia, the country needs active international involvement to restore security and strengthen democracy. At a regional level, Georgia has maintained its strategic partnership with Turkey and Azerbaijan, but Russia’s growing presence in these neighbouring countries is a source of concern for Tbilisi. It has also continued close cooperation with Armenia, whose possible rapprochement with Turkey created, however, fears in Georgia of losing its privileged position of a transit country in the region. Given its increased sense of vulnerability, Georgia will strive, in the 21st century, to bring about international actions to advance its security interests. It will also strive to contribute, within its means and capabilities, to building peace, democracy and prosperity in the world. Bibliography After August 2008: Consequences of the Russian-Georgian War. Tbilisi: Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development. Chitadze, N. 2006. “Main aspect of the NATO-Georgia Relations”. Chernomorska Bezpeka Journal (Sebastopol, Ukraine), 2(4). Chitadze, N. 2007. Materials of the Conference “Black Sea Region in the Changing European Context”. Tbilisi: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 57-65, 7991. Chitadze, N. 2007. NATO’s Role in South Caucasus Regional Security. Tbilisi: American University for Humanities. German, T. 2009. “Pipeline Politics: Georgia and Energy Security”. Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2(2), 344-62. International Crisis Group. 2009. Georgia-Russia: Still Insecure and Dangerous. Europe Briefing No. 53, Tbilisi/Brussels. Ioan, S. 2008. “National Security, National Values and National Interests. Romanian Military Thinking”. Military Theory and Science Journal. October-December, 21-9.

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Mamuka, T. 2009. The Impact of the Russia-Georgia War on the South Caucasus Transportation Corridor. Washington: The Jamestown Foundation. Rumer, E. and Simon, J. 2006. Toward a Euro-Atlantic Strategy for the Black Sea Region. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defence University.

Chapter 8

Changing Dynamics of Turkish Foreign and Security Policies in the Caucasus Mustafa Aydin

The end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the Soviet Union brought challenges and opportunities for regional and global powers at the beginning of the 1990s. While a power vacuum was created in the Caucasus with the disappearance of the USSR and the emergence of new independent states, Turkey felt the urgency of new openings in its foreign and defence policies, holding advantages from its geostrategic location bordering the region. While the Caucasian countries are almost coming to the end of their second decade as independent states, the main lines of Turkish policy which emerged in the first half of 1990s, though not changed much, have started to evolve recently based on a more complex understanding of regional dynamics. General Parameters of Turkey’s Approach to the Caucasus If one needs to highlight the basic parameters of Turkish policies in the region, the analysis should start from the background of that policy. First of all, Turkey, right from the beginning, has strongly endorsed the independence, stability and territorial integrity of all the Caucasian countries. This policy has been closely related to the strategic importance of these states for Turkey, its foreign policy tradition dating back to the earlier days of its establishment, the fears emanating from the competition of external forces for influence over the region, and the fact that any instability there could have easily spilled over into Turkish territory. Strategically, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia create a buffer zone between Turkey and its historic rival in the Caucasus: Russia. It was the Czarist Russia that threatened the Ottoman Empire, Turkey’s predecessor, for centuries and the Soviet Union that continued to threaten Turkey during the most of the 20th century. At the end of the Cold War, however, for the first time in history, Turkey found itself not sharing a land border with its bigger neighbour in the north and believed that the best way to reinforce this position was to support the independence, stability and integrity of the newly independent Caucasian countries. For similar reasons, Turkey had opposed moves from the Russian Federation to stage a political come back to the region, either through socio-economic inroads it has been able to develop over the years or in the form of Russian soldiers on Turkish borders.

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There has also been an understanding in Turkey that stability in these countries, bordering Turkey, would directly affect Turkey’s own security and stability. There is an acute realisation that if any of the Caucasian countries succumb to instability, it could, if not spill over into Turkey as a result of historical/political connections or due to activities/pressures of Turkish citizens of Caucasian origin, easily effect Turkey’s trade and transport relations with a number of countries in the east. It became clear during the early 1990s that, even if Turkey did not wish to be involved in regional conflicts, it was almost impossible for her to be completely aloof from the developments as many Turkish citizens had Caucasian ancestry,1 thus remained interested in the region, and the Turkish public had developed a sense of close kinship especially in the case of Azerbaijan as the Azerbaijanis ethnically are closely related to Anatolian Turks and speak a very similar version of Turkish.2 1  Modern day Turkey became home for many refugees from Czarist Russia over the centuries as well as scores of Soviet era emigrants. During the turbulent 19th century, as Russia consolidated its grip on the Caucasus, several thousands of Circassians (Adigey, Shapsigh, Kabardey, Cherkess, Abhaz, Karachay, and others) found their way into the decaying Ottoman Empire. Towards the end of the century, emigration continued voluntarily with the agreement between Russia and the Ottoman State, and involuntarily after 1860s when Russia decided to cleanse the region from its troubling tribes. Though the total number of emigrates are disputed, it is estimated that up to a million and half North Caucasians arrived into what was the Ottoman Empire between 1850s to the late 1860s. Also, a few hundred thousand Crimean Tatars arrived after the Crimean War. Another wave of forced emigration took place after the 1877-1878 Russian-Ottoman war. It is estimated that around 500,000 emigrates arrived from Crimea and Caucasia at this time. After the 1905-1908 and 1917 revolutions, many Russian dissidents alongside Muslim populations from the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia) arrived in Turkey, while most of the Armenians leaving in Anatolia left or were forcibly moved. The new arrivals joined to Armenian, Azeri and Georgian populations who had been settled in eastern Anatolia and decided to stay at the end of the First World War. As a result of all these movements as well as due to historical settlements, it is estimated, though disputed, that up to 5 million North Caucasians, up to 3 million Azeris and 2-3 million Georgians as well as 70,000 Armenians currently live in Turkey. For the northern Caucasians in Turkey, see Celikpala 2006, 2008; and Dundar 2000). 2  There is also a historical reason for the affinity. There was a close relationship between Azeri and Turkish intellectuals during the late 19th century as Azerbaijani intellectuals were instrumental in Ottoman Turkish enlightenment. Later, after the establishment of the Soviet Union, most of the leaders of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic of 1917-1921 as well as many of its intellectuals moved to Turkey, and contributed to the establishment of the Turkish Republic. They lived, produced academic and intellectual works, and died in Turkey, creating the backbone of the current close relationship. The connection continued throughout the Cold War and developed into a sense of oneness among the Turkish and Azeri nationalists. At the end of the Cold War, when Azerbaijan became independent once more, the large segments of Turkish society welcomed it as the independence of another “Turkish” state. Although a sense of difference from Central Asian Turkic peoples does

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In Turkish eyes, territorial integrity of the Caucasian countries has also been related to the stability and the power politics played in the region. While preserving territorial integrity of independent states in the form they were created has been a long-established principle of Turkish foreign policy, it also had regional reasons and outcomes affecting Turkey’s relations with Caucasian countries. The attitude of Turkey towards the disputes over Adjara, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia basically derived from Turkey’s strong disinclination in its foreign policy to see changes in the borders of established independent states. This attitude comes from an acute understanding that should the borders of any country in the neighbouring area be changed by force, this might easily create a chain reaction that could engulf the whole region. Moreover, Turkey’s support for territorial integrity and the independence of Caucasian states has had the aim of balancing Russian influence in the region in the post-Cold war: as long as these states are able to keep their independence and political stability, it would be difficult for the Russian Federation to have a dominant influence over them near the Turkish border. As a result, when the Caucasian countries declared their independences from the Soviet Union, Turkey extended its recognition immediately, though decided not to exchange ambassadors with Armenia for the time being to show its displeasure for discussions in Armenia about the border between the two countries and 1915 events. Later on, the Karabakh conflict added to the list (Aydin 2002: 406). Even though historical, cultural, and in the Azerbaijani case linguistic connections forged over the centuries, real or imagined, were the driving forces behind Turkey’s earlier active involvement in the region, Ankara’s attitude was also based on pragmatic economic and foreign policy considerations (Aydin 2004: 4). The main reason for these considerations arose from the characteristics of the region. It is one of the alternative natural gas and oil reserves of the world. The proven (up to 3.4 per cent of the world reserves) and estimated (up to 24 per cent of the world reserves) oil and gas (around 12 per cent of the world reserves) reserves of the region shows that, even though it is not another Middle East, the Caspian could become an important alternative support basin, preventing recurrence of energy crises of the 1970s.3 Becoming a regional hub, not only for Azeri gas and oil, but also for Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas, has thus become one of the main aims of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold war. However, Turkey has not been alone in competing to become the main transit country for the transport of Caspian energy resources to world markets. During most of the 1990s, Turkey and Russia competed to host the regional oil and gas outlets. In the end, Russia built the Tenghiz-Novorossiysk oil pipeline, while exist among Turkish population, Azeris, in contrast, are seen as the same as Anatolian Turks. This state of mind persisted until today among the wider population in general despite the independence of Azerbaijan and number of political disagreements between Azerbaijan and Turkey. 3  For most recent estimates of oil and gas reserves of various regions of the world, see BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010.

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Turkey got Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline. However, competition did not end there and expanded well into the 2000s in an attempt to host connection to Europe in natural gas as the Nabucco project, passing through Turkey, competed with Russia’s South Stream. It is not only the oil and gas transit revenues that heighten the interest to countries of having pipeline routes that pass through their territories. Pipeline routes have been seen by many players as one of the key factors in securing and maintaining influence throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus (Aydin 2004: 13). Turkey hoped that such connections could create interdependences in the region that would strengthen Turkey’s standing in its neighbourhood. Among the energy routes, the BTC project had Western, especially the US, support from the early 1990s. Washington’s backing was directly related to its Eurasian and Middle Eastern strategic priorities. As it has become clear that Turkey’s financial resources and political weight alone would not be enough to counter Russian neo-hegemonic resurgence within its ‘Near Abroad’ and given that US oil interests have become substantial in the region with its multinationals taking the lead in exploration and production of the region’s reserves, the US has moved with more determination to undermine and even replace Russian influence.4 In addition, exclusion of “Iran from participation in the production of Caspian oil and gas” and the prevention of “the development of transportation routes or pipelines that would lead from Caspian region to either the Persian Gulf or the Indian Ocean via Iran” have been among the strategic goals of the US (Shimizu 1998: 30). Even though the shortest pipeline route from Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean is through Armenia, the unresolved NK conflict made this route unrealisable. Coupled with the US opposition to passing the pipeline through Iran, this reality left Georgia as the only possible route for the Western pipeline. While the historical and cultural ties, especially in the context of Azerbaijan, as explained above, facilitates the establishment of closer economic and political relations; Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia have become strategic partners with pipeline politics. Historical and strategic ties between them also effect Turkey’s relations with Armenia and its attitude towards Abkhazian and Southern Ossetian conflicts. Even though Turkey recognised Armenia as an independent state immediately after its independence declaration, it has not yet established diplomatic relations with its neighbour as a result of historical baggage of 1915 events, the border recognition issue and the NK conflict. On the other hand, Turkey’s approach to conflicts within Georgia have been coloured by the fact that up to 5 million Turkish citizens could trace their origins to North Caucasus and they have been very active and influential politically.5 4  For American policy towards the region and its implications for Turkey, see Erhan 2004. 5  See footnote 1 above for the estimates. For an analysis of the activities and effectiveness of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey, see Celikpala 2008.

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In its policy towards the region, another important element for Turkey to take into consideration is the position and policies of the Russian Federation. Although Russia was briefly excluded from the games played in the Caucasus, its ‘Near Abroad’ policy, announced at the end of 1993, clearly indicated to continuing interests in the former-Soviet states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, and its later economic and political recovery brought Russia back into play (Tuncer 2000). Turkey, on the other hand, while it had the support of the West, especially of the US, did not possess adequate economic resources and political power to compete against Russia. As a result, Turkey, since 1994, became more conscious of the dangers of confrontation with the Russian Federation and adopted a policy of stressing the benefits of cooperation and co-existence with Russia, with increasing trade and political connections following (Aydin 2004: 8-9). AKP Government and Turkey’s Relations with the Caucasian Countries In the general elections of 3 November 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP–Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) got the 34.28 per cent of the general votes and 363 out of 450 seats in the parliament.6 Even though the general lines of Turkish policy towards the Caucasian states stayed unchanged, domestic and global developments affected the priorities of the AKP government and its attitude towards the region. When AKP came to power, questions were raised about Turkey’s commitments towards the region. There were speculations that AKP would not be as strongly predisposed towards closer relations with the Caucasian and Central Asian republics as their predecessors had been because of its holistic Islamic rhetoric. Indeed, instead of highlighting the historical and cultural ties with the regional countries, the AKP government has since preferred to focus on the development of economic relations especially on pipeline projects.7 However, it also has become clear that the apparent non-interest of the AKP government towards the region was prompted by the intense agenda of the government with international and domestic developments such as the US intervention in Iraq, ups and downs in Turkey-EU relations, Cyprus-related domestic discussions, the PKK terror, the Kurdish issue and lastly the possibility of closure of the AKP. The only area that the AKP government was seen to be interested in was the energy issue, where it pursued an active policy to bring alternative resources to Turkey for both Turkish consumption and transiting it to Europe through Turkey. 6  See “3 Kasım 2002 Seçimleri; AKP Tek Başına İktidar” [Elections; AKP became government alone], Belgenet, 3 November 2002. Available at: http://www.belgenet.com/ secim/3kasim.html [accessed: 10 November 2008]. 7  His supporters cite Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in January 2003 even before becoming prime minister, as proof of his interest in the region. See Katik 2003.

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The idea of Turkey becoming a “regional energy hub” was given much support by the government and Turkey undertook policies designed to strengthen its connections to Caspian resources through Georgia and Azerbaijan.8 Another idea that affected AKP’s Caucasian policy has been the initiative that Turkey, among others, should have its own “neighbourhood policy” based on “zero-problem with neighbours” and “region-based foreign policy” principles. These were formulated towards the middle of the first AKP government and came to signify its foreign policy understanding. Accordingly, Turkey’s foreign policy under AKP has seen a refocusing on regional matters from 2006 onwards. In this, Turkey’s inability to make substantial progress in the EU negotiation process, American operations in Iraq and its later repercussions, as well as AKP’s own general preferences have played a role. In the end, there has been substantial activity in Turkey’s policies and involvement in the Middle East in general but a clear lack of activity in other regions, including the Caucasus, until after the July 2007 general elections. With this background, 2007 was an interesting and difficult year for Turkish politics in terms of both domestic and international developments. In addition to a general and presidential election, relations with the EU, developments in Cyprus and the Middle East continued to occupy the political agenda and Turkish policymakers. In particular, the presidential elections, related political and constitutional crises, and the following early general elections kept Turkey busy for most of the 2007 and rendered the government inactive on foreign policy issues throughout 2007. However, once these multiple crises were somewhat contained and especially after the August 2008 crisis between Georgia and Russia, which showed once again the very volatile nature of the region, Turkey started to pay more attention to regional developments and came with its own initiative regarding the future of the Caucasus: The Caucasus Stability and Economics Cooperation Platform, bringing together Turkey and Russia with the three Caucasian states. Although it was not an altogether new idea, revisiting the then President Demirel’s call for the Caucasus Stability Pact of January 2000, the Platform initiative has been the only proposal since the end of the hostilities that took a long term view and regionwide approach. Developed in the immediate aftermath of the August crisis, the Platform, among others, called for economic and energy cooperation between the invited countries, as well as highlighting the importance of regional peace and stability.9 Almost impossible to realise in the short term due to fresh scars in the region, it provided the necessary background to Turkey’s opening up towards Armenia in 2009.

8  For Turkey’s latest energy strategy, see Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009. 9  For more detailed explanations of the Platform, see Gültekin-Punsmann 2009, Fotiou 2009.

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From Transportation Projects to Regional Hub: Turkey’s Energy Policy There was one important initiative that took place in 2007 despite the AKP government’s general inactivity in the Caucasus. The lack of political relations between Turkey and Armenia and the closed Turkish-Armenian border since 1993 have been creating problems for Turkey’s relations with the Caucasus and its link with Central Asian countries. However, it has also forced Turkey to search for alternative ways to develop its ties with the rest of the Caucasian and Central Asian countries. The routes of the BTE natural gas pipeline and BTC oil pipeline were chosen as a result of this search and appeared as successful projects. Obviously, the realisation of these projects had effects on regional development and security going far beyond the energy sector (Gaudiano 2007: 1-2). In the same vein, another project has been developed and an agreement was signed between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan to construct an international railroad connection between them, bypassing Armenia and linking Turkey with these countries as well as Central Asia. In fact, a railroad corridor linking Europe to Asia had already existed passing through Turkey and Armenia and branching out to three different lines from there onwards (Kanbolat 2007: 63). However, this railroad link was disused as a result of border closure and thus the railroad connection between Turkey and Asia was routed through Iran, which was longer and interrupted whenever TurkishIranian political relations passed through a rocky phase. Thus to establish a rail connection between Kars and Tbilisi was proposed as an alternative first in July 1993 during a Turkish-Georgian Transportation Commission meeting in Ankara (Kanbolat 2005: 57). Azerbaijan joined in the meetings of the Commission from 2004 onwards and the project was enlarged to become a Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railroad connection. The project aimed to create direct railroad transportation between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan in order to facilitate and increase overland transportation between Turkey and the Caucasus and between Europe and Asia through Turkey without having to pass through Iran. The strongest opposition to the project understandably came from Armenia and Armenian Diaspora around the world since the project would have further isolated Armenia in the region both strategically and economically. The Russian Federation also was not in favour of the project since it would have contributed to the development of economic and strategic relations between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan as well as increasing Turkey’s influence in regional politics. Nevertheless, the trilateral declaration of intention to build the Kars-TbilisiBaku Railroad Connection, which was referred as the “Iron Silk Road”, was signed in Baku on 25 May 2005 by the heads of states of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey (Kanbolat 2007: 66). However, the implementation of the project was somewhat slowed down as a result of financial and political obstacles. As there emerged a need to find international investments for the project, the Armenian Diaspora stepped up its activities to prevent international credit and involvement in the

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project. In fact, the strong Armenian lobby in the United States was successful in presenting and getting approval by Congress for a law that prevented American official investment to the project (Kanbolat 2007: 68). Although this slowed down the progress of the project on the Georgian side, the framework agreement was finally signed in February 2007, together with the Tbilisi Declaration, by the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan and the heads of states of Azerbaijan and Georgia, aiming to conclude the project by 2010.10 In the meantime, the BTE gas pipeline became operational in March 2007 with the delivery of gas from Shah Deniz of Azerbaijan, which effectively ended Georgia’s gas dependency on Russia and provided an alternative source to Turkey.11 In fact, natural gas that was destined for Turkey was initially diverted to Georgia, with Turkey’s consent, when Georgia was experiencing gas shortages due to its heightened tension with Russia and the latter’s retaliation by stopping delivery of gas in the winter of 2007. In addition to the advantages that the project brought to the relations of the three countries and their strategic importance to each other, it also showed an important alternative route for gas transportation to Europe and enabled Turkey to start dreaming about becoming an energy corridor. In this, Turkey was emboldened by the construction and operation of the BTC oil pipeline, which had became operational in 2006 even before the BTE. Under the BTC project, which had the support of the US from the very beginning with the prospect that “it would secure Turkey’s role as a major player in the Caspian region” as well as provide an alternative route for Caspian oil bypassing both Russia and Iran, oil entered Turkey on 17 November 2005 and the first export from Ceyhan was realised on 4 June 2006 (Aydin 2000: 70).12 Another pipeline project that captured the attention of the world at large has been the Nabucco project linking natural gas resources of Azerbaijan and possibly Iran, Iraq and Turkmenistan to Europe. Although the idea dates back to the late 1990s and the preparations started in earnest in 2002 with the talks between Turkish and Austrian companies (BOTAS and OMV respectively), the intergovernmental agreement and a joint declaration between Turkey, Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary was finally signed on 13 July 2009, providing a legal framework and highlighting the intention of these countries to build the pipeline.13 10  See “Bakü-Tiflis-Kars Demiryolu Canlanıyor” [Baku-Tbilisi-Kars Railroad is being realised], Haberler.com. Available at: http://www.haberler.com/baku-tiflis-karsdemiryolu-canlaniyor-haberi/ [accessed: 11 July 2008]. 11 See Usak Gundem. Available at: http://www.usakgundem.com/haber. php?id=11034; and Turkish Weekly. Available at: http://www.turkishweekly.net/news. php?id=45736 [accessed: 11 July 2008]. 12  For detailed information about the historical progress of the BTC pipeline project, see http://www.btc.com.tr/proje.html. 13  “EU Countries sign geopolitical Nabucco agreement”, EurActiv.com, 14 July 2009, available at: http://www.euractiv.com/en/energy/eu-countries-sign-geopolitical-

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The planned 3,300 kilometres pipeline, expected to cost some 7.9 billion euros and to carry 31 billion cubic metres of gas annually by the end of the decade, is planned to come online in 2014. Although the Nabucco agreement was hailed as an alternative gas route bypassing Russia in the wider energy game, the picture became convoluted again when Turkey signed several agreements with the visiting Russian premier Vladimir Putin on 7 August 2009, witnessed also by the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi who came just for the occasion.14 With these agreements, Turkey allowed Russia to start a feasibility study on the Turkish economic zone in the Black Sea regarding the South Stream gas pipeline project, which many consider as a direct competitor to the proposed Nabucco line. There was also an agreement to build a new oil pipeline between the Black Sea and Mediterranean costs of Turkey to transport Russian oil to the Mediterranean and on to Israel, the Red Sea and eventually to carry it to India. Although the picture regarding energy deals signed by Turkey or proposed pipelines going through or around Turkey looks rather confusing, as a result of all these projects, Turkey, by the middle of 2009, was able to position itself successfully once again between the energy producing countries of the East and energy hungry countries of the West. Bilateral Relations: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back Relations with Georgia: Key to the Caucasus and Central Asia Turkey’s relations with Georgia since its independence continued to develop within the framework of good friendship and strategic partnership. The two countries formed the skeleton of gas and oil pipelines, bypassing Iran and Russia. Providing an alternative energy route for Europe, the development of relations between Turkey and Georgia has been supported by the West. Since its establishment, Turkey has been supporting Georgia’s territorial integrity, stability and independence, as well as modernisation and the strengthening of its ties with the West. Since the “Rose Revolution”, Georgia’s relations with NATO have improved rapidly under the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) which laid out the detailed program of cooperation between NATO and Georgia.15 Turkey has been one of the countries supporting Georgia’s NATO membership as well as helping Georgia to reform its armed forces to match NATO standards. nabucco-agreement/article-184062. For the background of the project, see Schleifer 2009. 14  “Yuzyilin anlasmalari imzalandi” [Contracts of the century were signed], HaberTürk daily, 7 August 2009. Available at: http://www.haberturk.com/ekonomi/ haber/163699-Yuzyilin-anlasmalari-imzalandi.aspx 15  For detailed information about Georgia–NATO relations, see http://www.nato.int/ issues/nato-georgia/index.html [accessed: 11 July 2008].

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Besides their political relations, economic relations between Turkey and Georgia have improved rapidly, with Turkey becoming both the biggest trade partner and the second biggest investor in Georgia after 2007. Trade volume between the two countries has rapidly increased since 2003, tripling in four years16 and leading to a Free Trade Agreement between the two countries in 2007.17 At the end of the year, the yearly trade volume between them exceeded 830 million dollars, making Turkey the leading trade partner of Georgia.18 As a result of economic reforms and privatisation of state assets after Mikheil Saakashvili took power, foreign direct investments to Georgia rose sharply since 2004 and reached $1.5 billion in 2007 from $1 billion in the previous year.19 Turkish companies played an important role in this increase. In 2004, their investment in Georgia formed the 23 per cent of the total foreign investment to that country, most of which were in the fields of telecommunications, manufacturing, harbour management, glass packaging and water bottling (Yalcin 2006). Since 2006, Turkish companies stepped up their operations in Georgia adding important construction bids to their portfolio.20 In addition to direct investments, Turkish businesses contribute to the Georgian economy “no less than $500 million annually in value added tax, no less than $200 million in income tax and no less than $200 million in income tax on the payroll”.21 The increasingly vital and close economic and political relations reached a new high water mark in March 2007, when the movement of people between the two countries was enhanced by lifting visa applications for 90 day-stays and opening the Batumi airport on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, which was built and operated by a Turkish company (TAV). Since then it has been functioning as a joint Turkish-Georgian facility with a special check-in office at the Turkish border town of Hopa, from which busses shuttle Turkish passengers directly to/ from the airport. Turkish citizens destined to travel to Turkish towns, are able to travel with only their identification cards, without a passport or visa (Atli 2007).22 Moreover, the Sarp/Sarpi border gate between the two countries was renovated

16  For the trade volume between Turkey and Georgia year by year, see http://www. mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-political-relations-with-georgia.en.mfa [accessed: 11 July 2008]. 17 See http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2008/100871.htm [accessed: 11 July 2008]. 18 See http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-political-relations-withgeorgia.en.mfa [accessed: 11 July 2008]. 19  “Georgia’s Foreign Investment Booms”, Reuters, 6 January 2008. Available at: http://uk.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUKL0354894120080106 [accessed: 11 July 2008]. 20  For the detailed investment graphics of foreign investors in Georgia, see http:// www.investor.ge/issues/2008_1/08.htm [accessed: 11 July 2008]. 21 See http://www.investor.ge/issues/2008_1/08.htm [accessed: 11 July 2008]. 22  See also “Georgia Ratifies Agreement with Turkey on Batumi Airport”, Civil Georgia, 28 April 2006, available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12432 [accessed: 21 November 2010].

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and expanded, allowing improved and easier connection between Turkish and Georgian societies as well as increasing tourism. While economic and political relations between Turkey and Georgia continued to improve, the uneasy situation in Georgia caused by the Abkhazia dispute stayed unsolved and somewhat coloured Turkey’s relations with Georgia. Even though Turkey continued to support the territorial integrity of Georgia, it also pushed for a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Even tough Turkey attempted to bring the two sides together and offered alternative openings, the existence of Turkish citizens of both Georgian and North Caucasian origin complicated Turkey’s stance, creating suspicions on both sides, thus preventing repeated Turkish attempts to create a platform for peaceful resolution to bear fruit. What is more, in recent years, Turkey faced an increasingly volatile home ground as both Georgian and North Caucasian Diasporas living in Turkey became more vocal in their demands from the successive governments to take action benefitting their kin across the border in the Caucasus.23 This forced Turkey to be even more cautious in its dealings with Georgia. The August 2008 crisis showed the weaknesses and limitations of Turkey with regard to these problems. When Georgia and Russia started exchanging fire, Turkey found its policy options limited on three grounds. First of all, the Turkish government was lobbied by Turkish citizens of Georgian and North Caucasian origins, both sides wishing to stir Turkey towards their supported causes. An interesting development was to see both sides demonstrating on Turkish streets about something that Turkey did not have much power to resolve. Secondly, Turkey was pressed between its strategically important partner Georgia and its economically and politically important neighbour Russia. Territorial integrity of Georgia was important to and was supported by Turkey for various political, strategic, psychological and historical reasons, while Russia has become an important trade and political partner to Turkey in recent years. Thirdly, Turkey was squeezed between the demands of its newly emerging partner, the Russian Federation, and long-term allies, the US and NATO countries. Faced with all these pressures, Turkey’s initial reaction to the crisis was quite muted, while it became rather active later on with Prime Minister Erdogan’s direct involvement and his Platform idea, though, as indicated above, it did not make much headway. Nevertheless, the crisis once again showed that the volatile nature of the Caucasus could at any time create further hot conflicts and exacerbate the old ones while

23  For example, when armed hostilities broke between Georgia and Russia in August 2008, both North Caucasians, including Abkhaz and Ossetians, and Georgian origin Turkish citizens took to the streets in public demonstrations demanding totally opposing actions from the government. See “Turkiye’deki Gurculer Rusya’yi Protesto Etti” [Georgians in Turkey protested Russia]. Haberler.com, 10 August 2008. Available at: http://www.haberler.com/ gurcu-kokenli-vatandaslar-rusya-yi-protesto-etti-haberi; “Istanbul’da Gurcistan Kinandi” [Georgia was denounced in Istanbul], TGRT TV, 13 August 2008.

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making it harder all the time for Turkey to remain aloof or develop and implement alternative policies. Relations with Armenia: Moving under the Shadow of History Armenia has been the only Caucasian country with which Turkey’s bilateral relations, up until very recently, did not show serious improvement. While there was an understanding on both sides of the need to develop relations in the early 1990s, it was replaced by the mid-1990s with suspicion and distrust as a result of regional and domestic developments on both sides and the historical baggage that the two countries bring into their current relationship. As a result, the land border between them has remained closed and diplomatic relations have not yet been established. However, air connections have expanded significantly in recent years as Armavia and some Turkish private airline companies have started flying directly, though irregularly, between Yerevan and Istanbul throughout the year and between Yerevan and Antalya during the summer. The already complex nature of the relations between the two countries is further complicated by the fact that third parties have a stake in the continuation of the stalemate. On the one hand, the Armenian Diaspora, having developed a group identity around the 1915 events, continues in its efforts to isolate Turkey internationally; Azerbaijan, on the other hand, resents any move on the Turkish side to improve its relations with Armenia so long as the NK conflict remains unsolved. Both moves create reactions inside Turkey from different angles preventing successive governments from seriously attempting to mend the relationship with Armenia. However, after the assassination of Hrant Dink, a prominent and outspoken Turkish citizen of Armenian origin, on 19 January 2007, an interesting thawing process in the relationship, similar to the rapprochement experienced in TurkishGreek relations after the earthquakes hit both countries in 1999, started to develop (Deveci-Bozkus 2007: 10). Even though a successful solution of the disagreements between the two states did not yet come out of this thawing, important human-to-human connections and dialogue between Turkish and Armenian civil societies appeared. Continuation of the NK dispute, ambiguity surrounding the (non)recognition of the border between the two states as it was drawn under the Kars Treaty of 1921, prevention of the border crossing, claims and counter-claims regarding the 1915 events, and the activities of the Armenian Diaspora with the support of the Armenian government for international recognition of these events as genocide continues to colour the relations between the two states. Armenia countered the Turkish proposal, put forward in April 2005, to establish an international history commission to investigate the events of the turn of the century with its own proposal in early 2007 to establish alternative commissions to discuss various outstanding issues between the two countries once the diplomatic relationship has been normalised. While neither side by

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the end of 2007 agreed to the other’s proposals, opposing voices of Armenian Diaspora and Turkish nationalists were enough to stall the process, though both sides seemed to agree to continue often rumoured secretive talks between low level officials of their foreign ministries. Moreover, discussions over Turkish history in general and Turkish-Armenian relations in particular have tentatively started in Turkey among academics and experts, which will no doubt in time help to further understanding between the two peoples. Another interesting development took place in 2007, when Turkey decided to restore, and later in March 2007, open the historical Armenian Church in Akhdamar, Van, as a museum at the end of restoration works. For the opening ceremony of the museum, an Armenian committee came to Turkey through Georgia, though expected visits from the Armenian Foreign Minister or the Minister of Culture to commemorate the opening did not take place, thereby another chance was missed to further the thawing process.24 The Armenian Patriarch in Istanbul, Mesrob Mutafyan, on the other hand, expressed his pleasure at the restoration of the church in its original form and called again for the improvement of the relationship between the two countries.25 The problematic relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan as well as its isolation from enhanced cooperation in the region have been negatively affecting the economic recovery of Armenia. The worsening conditions cause many Armenians to seek employment in neighbouring countries. As a result, even though the land border still remained closed, some forty thousands Armenians came to Turkey by the end of 2006 for employment.26 By the end of 2007, Turkish officials were regularly quoting the 70 thousands figure regarding Armenian citizens working illegally in Turkey.27 Besides providing jobs and livelihood for the families of these workers, this illegal but “condoned” immigration has further created opportunities of contact between ordinary Armenians and Turks.

24  There was news on the Turkish press that this kind of a high level attendance by an Armenian minister to the opening cermony was expected by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a tit-for-tat response for Turkey’s “goodwill gesture” to restore and open the former church as a museum. When the Armenian side did not reciprocated in kind, it created a bitter taste as it strenghtened the hands of those groups that oppose any kind of improvement of relations with Armenia and also led to a perception within Turkish Foreign Ministry that Armenia was not at the time interested in improving the relationship, see “Akdamar Kilisesi’nin Açılışı Yapıldı” [Akhdamar Church Was Opened], Ntvmsnbc. Available at: http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/403946.asp [accessed: 12 July 2008]. 25 Ibid. 26  As reported in the Economist, 17 November 2006. 27  See “Ermeniler: Türk Patronlar İyi” [Armenians: Turkish Businessmen are good], Milliyet. Available at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/11/18/siyaset/siy09.html and “Türkiye’de Kaç Kaçak Ermeni Var” [How many illegal Armenian are there in Turkey?], Netteyim.net. http://www.cagdaskitap.netteyim.net/haber/Siyaset/turkiyede_kac_kacak_ ermeni_isci_var-haberi-11356.html [accessed: 12 July 2008].

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In addition, although, according to Turkish official sources, there is no trade connection between the two countries, trade through third countries has been steadfastly increasing. Especially, trade through Georgia seemed to reach significant levels, indicating that if the border between the two countries is opened for direct connections, trade would substantially increase and Turkey might easily become, as in Georgia and Azerbaijan, the biggest trade partner of Armenia. It is argued by the Turkish-Armenian Business Development Council that the indirect trade volume through third parties reached over $300 million by the end of 2009, and, in the case of the development of political relations, could easily reach up to $400-500 million.28 Under these circumstances, political relations took an interesting turn when newly elected Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan invited President Abdullah Gül to watch the football match between Turkish and Armenian national teams played in Yerevan on 6 September 2008. President Gul’s acceptance of the invitation and later his travelling to Yerevan in the first-ever visit of a Turkish Head of State marked an interesting watershed in Turkish-Armenian relations, raising hopes for reconciliation and supplying the necessary political push for long term secretive talks between Turkish and Armenian officials to normalise the relationship. The initiative seemed to pave the way for the Turkish-Armenian framework agreement towards reconciliation on 22 April 2009. The brief statement, posted on the web sites of both the Turkish and Armenian foreign ministries said that “the two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalisation of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, “a road map has been identified” (Recknagel 2009, Sheridan 2009). However, in between reactions from nationalists on both sides29 as well as Azerbaijan’s displeasure made known in various ways, the Turkish Prime Minister put a break to hopeful developments when he visited Baku on 13 May 2009, and announced that Turkey will not proceed to open the its land border with Armenia unless the latter ends the occupation of Azerbaijani territory.30 Relations with Azerbaijan: One Nation, Two States? Like the relations with Georgia, Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan have been rapidly developing since its independence, not only in terms of strategic, economic and military relations deriving from national interests but also in terms 28  “Turkey-Armenia trade volume reaches $300 mln”, World Bulletin, 2 February 2010. Available at: http://www.worldbulletin.net/news_detail.php?id=53530 [accessed: 21 November 2010]. 29  While Turkish nationalists took the streets to protest against the agreement, Dashnaktsutyun in Armenia withdrew from the ruling coalition in protest against the talks with Turkey. See Tsarukyan 2009. 30  “Prime Minister Erdogan puts Baku’s Armenia concerns to rest”, Today’s Zaman, 14 May 2009, available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar. do?load=detay&link=175222.

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of cultural and social relations of the two societies, putting a sense of reality to late Heydar Aliyev’s pronouncement that Turkey and Azerbaijan came to constitute one nation-two states. First of all, Turkey and Azerbaijan have been strategic allies in the region since the latter’s independence, which was enhanced by the establishment of the BTE gas pipeline and the BTC oil pipeline connections. In addition, Azerbaijan’s cooperation with Georgia and Turkey for the enlargement of the railroad from Tbilisi to Baku clearly shows its eagerness for further development of strategic and economic relations between the three. Turkey’s political standing in Azerbaijan in recent years seemed to improve with the strong support that Ilham Aliyev’s government received from Turkey, as well as Turkey’s continuing supportive position regarding the NK problem. Following the death of former Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, Turkey came to realise that stability in Azerbaijan would better be served by a continuity of the regime and thus supported, alongside the US, his son’s elevation to power. Since then, Ilham Aliyev proved to be a willing partner in further improving the relationship between the two countries. He even went as far to allow direct flights from Baku to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus when international support was needed for the Turkish case. Economic relations have also been booming, with trade volumes recording an average yearly increase of 40 per cent since 2003 that reached over $1.2 billion in 2007, making Turkey the biggest trade partner of Azerbaijan.31 While the trade volume increase generally favours Turkey, its imports of oil and gas from Azerbaijan have been steadily increasing and Turkey has become the biggest investor in Azerbaijan in non-energy fields. Turkish investments in non-energy fields in 2007 reached $2.5 billion while investment in the energy sector is also around those volumes, which brings total Turkish investment in Azerbaijan close to $5 billion.32 Some 1200 Turkish companies work in Azerbaijan in various sectors, from telecommunication to transportation, confection, marketing, furniture, banking, and building construction. An interesting development to watch in 2007 was settlement of a former Azerbaijani shipping magnate, Mubariz Mansimov, into Turkey together with plans to move his business headquarters to Istanbul after receiving Turkish citizenship.33 31  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-azerbaycan-ekonomik-iliskileri.tr.mfa [accessed: 12 July 2008]. 32 Ibid. 33  With his 129 ships, Mansimov’s company Palmali is rumored to be within top five operators in world maritime transportation. His group’s main operation area though appears to be oil transportation and Palmali handles 75 per cent of all Russian oil transportation between Black Sea and the Medditerranean. Apart from moving his headquarters of maritime operations, Mansimov is reported to preparing to invest in health, education, trousim, construction and avitiation sectors in Turkey. See http://www.patronlardunyasi.com/news_ detail.php?id=34674 [accessed: 12 July 2008]. Mansimov was not the only Azeri-origin

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Turkish-Azeri relations have also been developing in education and culture. Azeri students are coming to Turkey for education, and young diplomats are receiving training in Turkey organised by the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.34 Turkey was a strong supporter of the program to re-introduce the usage of the Latin alphabet in Azerbaijan, preparing and sending textbooks, thus bringing the two countries’ usage of the “Turkish” language even closer. While Turkish TV channels are easily and widely followed in Azerbaijan, there already exist 15 middle schools and 11 high schools as well as a university in Azerbaijan opened with direct Turkish investment and contribution.35 These types of cultural activities encourage closer relations between general publics, contributing and supplementing political relations. However, the relationship has increasingly come under stress since April 2009 as Turkey’s opening up to Armenia started to take shape, creating constraints in the Turkish-Azerbaijani relationship. As indicated above, after various shows of displeasure by Azerbaijan, the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan visited Baku in May 2009 and assured his Azerbaijani hosts of Turkey’s intentions and overall support to their position on the Karabakh problem.36 Conclusions The collapse of the USSR has been a mixed blessing for Turkey. While the century-old Soviet/Russian threat to Turkey’s security has disappeared, the vacuum created by this departure in Eurasia has become the breeding ground on Turkey’s borders for potential risks and threats to regional security, because of the deep tensions between mixed national groups, contested borders, economic difficulties, and competition between outsiders for influence. It is clear that Turkey has undergone a dramatic shift away from its traditional policy of isolationism since the end of the Cold War, and that Turkish foreign policy is increasingly focusing on the Caucasus, alongside the Balkans, the Middle East and Central Asia. It is also clear that the tensions in the region will continue to be contributing factors to Turkish security planning. In this context various conflicts in the region have already presented Turkey with near impossible alternatives in its foreign policy when engaging with regional actors and interested outsiders.

businessman though to operate in Turkey. For details, see http://www.stargazete.com/ ekonomi/arap-ve-ruslar-8217-dan-sonra-azeri-petrodolari-da-akiyor-84251.htm and http:// www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=2861627 [accessed: 12 July 2008]. 34  “Azerbaycan-Türkiye İlişkileri” [Azerbaijan-Turkey Relations], Azerbaiyan Ihh. http://azerbaycan.ihh.org.tr/uluslararasi/azerbaycanturkiye.html [accessed: 12 July 2008]. 35 Ibid. 36  “Prime Minister Erdogan puts Baku’s Armenia concerns to rest”, op.cit.

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The emergence of independent republics in the Caucasus represented a turning point in Turkey’s regional role and policies. Turkey has become one of the important players in a region where it previously had only a marginal influence and no active involvement. Although economic and political conditions in the region are unlikely to stabilise for some years, it is without doubt that Turkish policymakers will continue with their efforts to create new networks of interdependency between Ankara and the regional capitals. Bibliography Atli, A. 2007. “Turkey and Georgia: Opening the Roads for Trade”. Eurasianet, 7 February 2007. Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/ business/articles/eav020806.shtml [accessed: 21 November 2010]. Aydin, M. 2000. New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Ankara: Center for Strategic Research. Aydin, M. 2002. “1990–2001 Kafkasya ve Orta Asya’yla Iliskiler” [Relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus, 1990–2001] in Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasindan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, [Turkish Foreign Policy, Facts, Documents and Comments since the War of Independence], edited by B. Oran. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayincilik. Aydin, M. 2004. “Foucault’s Pendulum: Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus”. Turkish Studies, 5(2), 1-22. British Petroleum, Statistical Review of World Energy 2010. Available at: http:// www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6929&contentId=7044622 [accessed: 21 November 2010]. Celikpala, M. 2006. “From Immigrants to Diaspora; Influence of the North Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey”. Middle Eastern Studies, (42)3, 423-46. Celikpala, M. 2008. “Turkiye’de Kafkas Diasporasi ve Turk Dis Politikasina Etkileri” [Caucasian Diaspora in Turkey and Its Effects on Turkish Foreign Policy], in Turkiye’nin Avrasya Macerasi, 1989-2006 [Turkey’s Eurasian Adventure, 1989-2006], edited by M. Aydin. Ankara: Nobel, 35-71. Deveci-Bozkus, Y. 2007. “Hrant Dink Suikasti Sonrasi Turk-Ermeni Iliskilerinde Olasi Gelismeler” [Possible Developments in Turkish-Armenian Relations after Hrank Dink Assassination], Stratejik Analiz, March 2007. Dundar, F. 2000. Turkiye’de Nufus Sayimlarinda Azinliklar [Minorities in Population Censuses in Turkey]. Istanbul: Civiyaziları. Erhan, C. 2004. “ABD’nin Orta Asya Politikalari ve 11 Eylul Sonrasi Acilimlari” [US Policy towards Central Asia and Changes since September 11] in KüreselPolitika’da Orta Asya [Central Asia in Global Politics], edited by M. Aydin. Ankara: Siyasal Yayinevi. Fotiou, E. 2009. “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: What is at Stake for Regional Cooperation?”, ICBSS Policy Brief No. 16. Athens: ICBSS.

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Gaudiano, M. 2007. “Can Energy Security Cooperation Help Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan to Strenghten Western Oriented Links?”. NATO Defense College Academic Research Branch Research Note, No. 5, June. Gültekin-Punsmann, B. 2009. “The Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform: An Attempt to Foster Regional Accountability”, ICBSS Policy Brief No 13. Athens: ICBSS. Kafli, K. 1966 Türkiye’ye Göçler [Migration into Turkey], İstanbul, Çeltut Matbaacılık. Kanbolat, H. 2005. “Turkiye Kafkasya’ya Demir Aglarla Baglanacak mi?” [Will Turkey be bound to the Caucasus by Iron Networks], Stratejik Analiz, No. 65, September. Kanbolat, H. 2007. “Kafkasya’da Demir Ipek Yolu” [Iron Silk Road in the Caucasus], Stratejik Analiz, March 2007. Katik, M. 2003. “Turkish Party leader Seeks favor in Central Asia”. EurasiaNet Business and Economic. 14 January 2003. Available at: http://www. eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav011403_pr.shtml [accessed: 10 July 2008] Recknagel, C. 2009. “Turkey, Armenia Announce Framework for Normalizing Ties”, RFE/RL, 23 April. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkey_ Says_Agrees_Framework_For_Ties_With_Armenia/1614312.html Schleifer, Y. 2009. “Caspian Energy: The End of the Beginning for the Nabucco Pipeline”. Eurasia.Net. 12 July. Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/ departments/insightb/articles/eav071309a.shtml [accessed: 21 November 2010]. Sheridan, M-B. 2009. “Turkey and Armenia in Broad Accord”. Washington Post. 23 April. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2009/04/22/AR2009042203888.html. Shimizu, M. 1998. IDE Spot Survey: The Caspian Basin Oil and its Impact on Eurasian Power Games. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies. Tsarukyan, G. 2009. “Dashnaktsutyun Party’s Withdrawal from Ruling Coalition”, ArmenianDiaspora.com. 27 April 2009. Available at http:// www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?168097-TsarukyanDashnaktsutyun-Party-s-Withdrawal-From-Ruling-Coalition-T [accessed: 21 November 2010]. Tuncer, İ. 2000. “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Yeni Guvenlik Doktrini: Yakin Cevre ve Turkiye” [The New Security Doctrine of Russian Federation: Near Abroad and Turkey], in En Uzun Onyil, Turkiye’nin Ulusal Guvenlik ve Dis Politika Gundeminde Doksanli Yillar [The Longest Decade; 1990s in Turkey’s National Security and Foreign Policy Agenda], edited by G. Ozcan and S. Kut. Istanbul: Buke Yayınları, 435-60. Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2009. Turkey’s Energy Strategy. Available at: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/EnerjiPolitikasi/ Turkey’s%20Energy%20Strategy%20(Ocak%202009).pdf, January 2009. [accessed: 21 November 2010].

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Yalcin, S. 2006. “Turkish Investments in Georgia and Azerbaijan: Recent Trends and Future Prospects”. Caucaz.com, 3 September. Available at: http://www. caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=259 [accessed: 11 July 2008].

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Chapter 9

Iranian Foreign Policy towards the South Caucasus: Between Revolutionary Ideals and Realpolitik Clément Therme

Introduction Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, regionalism has become one of the main features of Iranian foreign policy (Barzegar 2010). The revolutionary dimension of the Islamic Republic’s regional behaviour remained at the rhetorical level. Nevertheless, the global diplomatic orientations of the revolutionary regime appear to frame even the most pragmatic regional approaches regarding the South Caucasus crisis in general and the NK conflict in particular. Even if Iranian diplomats used an aggressive rhetoric against “Western” and “Zionist” interference in the South Caucasus, one has to note that Iran has always presented itself as a mediator in the three main crises in the region: the Armenian-Turkish dispute, the NK conflict and the future of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Bataille and Blum, 2010: 62). This pragmatic dimension is directly linked to the khomeinist ideological corpus. The Islamist oligarchy may be pragmatic in the implementation of Iranian policy in the South Caucasus, but the broader framework of Iranian international diplomatic orientation – mainly contesting a “Western international order” – constitutes a hurdle for the consolidation of Iranian regional power. Iranian foreign policy decision makers are masters in taking advantage from tactical opportunities such as the evolution of Russian-American relations. Nevertheless, they do not have a strategic vision that allows the natural expression of Iranian national interests in South Caucasus – a region that maintained historical and cultural links to the Iranian world inherited from the Persian Empire. This article will shed light on Iran’s illusionary aspirations to an independent foreign policy and presents the main factors explaining the persisting Iranian dependency towards Russian interests in the former Soviet space.

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The Russian Framework of Iranian Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus Between New Geopolitical Opportunities and Revolutionary Constraints Given the numerous assets of Iranian diplomacy in the South Caucasus after the fall of the Soviet Union – its geographical location between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, cultural and linguistic ties, its oil and gas resources and its potential to provide economic help to very poor countries (Hunter 2010: 170) – it was possible that the Islamic Republic of Iran would become the first regional power in the South Caucasus. Why did this not happen? First of all, there is an ethnic hurdle to the increase of Iranian influence. This is particularly true for the relationship with Azerbaijan as we will see below in the chapter regarding the bilateral relationship between Baku and Tehran. Secondly, the new South Caucasus independent states chose to act following a model shared by small post-colonial states: “this has meant that, instead of allowing a particular country to unduly influence their foreign policy, they have tried to use relations with a wide range of states to maximise their own interest” (Hunter 2010: 172). This intent to maintain cordial relationships with a large range of states also explains the disappointment of Turkish diplomacy in the former Soviet space. The diplomatic model of small states is valid for all the South Caucasus states even if they have specific preferences on a strategic level: on the one hand, Armenia foreign policy orientation favours Russia; on the other hand, Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s inclination towards Western alliance (the EU and the US) was mainly justified by shared energy interests. Despite the divergences, they all try to maintain working relationships with all neighbouring regional powers – namely Iran and Turkey – and international powers like Russia and the US. During the 1990s, the geopolitical divide between the pro-Western axis (Azerbaijan-Georgia-the US) and the proRussian axis (Armenia-Iran-Russia) was the main tool to analyze the strategic evolution of the region and to explain the dynamics behind regional tensions. After 11 September 2001 and the nomination of the Islamic Republic of Iran on George W. Bush’s “axis of evil” list, Tehran’s influence in the South Caucasus was still confronted by Washington foreign policy – the reformist dialogue of the civilisation agenda did not change the Bush administration’s perception regarding the nature of Iranian revolutionary political system (Djalili 2002: 58). The main evolution concerned the geopolitical divide of the South Caucasus region following the Georgian war of August 2008 and the unforeseen consequences of Obama’s so-called reset policy of bilateral relationship with Moscow. This relative evolution did not alter Iran’s main focus in South Caucasus diplomacy: to not confront Russian interests in this area. The 2008 Georgian Crisis and American-Russian Rapprochement When Moscow formally recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August 2008, in contradiction with its former ethnic policies, Tehran

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kept a low-profile by proclaiming its neutrality. Tehran was notably very cautious in its reaction towards Moscow after the Georgian war, despite being, in the longterm, a potential gas supplier to Ukraine and Georgia (Peimani 2005; Petriashvili 2006). In January 2006, Russia cut off gas supplies to Georgia officially because of two damaged pipelines. From the Georgian official point of view, the reason was the Russian objective to impose an “energy blockade”. Consequently, Iran supplied a small amount of gas for a short period via Azerbaijan, as an emergency help for internal consumption to Georgia. In May 2010, recalling this Iranian support to Georgia, the Iranian ambassador in Tbilisi, Majid Saber, declared that “real friendship is demonstrated in hard times”,1 even if this emergency gas delivery seemed to have been first negotiated by Iranian authorities with Moscow.2 Iranian diplomacy also had an interest in the deterioration of the AmericanRussian relationship following the Georgian crisis in order to avoid a new set of sanctions by the UN Security Council (Mokhtari 2010). This interest is also related to the deterioration of the relationship between South Caucasus states and the US. The link between Iranian civil society and Russia is more difficult to analyse. Indeed, after the August 2008 war, reformist editorialists in Iran warned against “a Russian threat to world security” and the short-term perception of the post-Georgian crisis period as “advantageous” for Iran.3 According to them, the optimism of the Conservatives was misplaced. For example, the newspaper Kayhan deemed it possible that Moscow would stop cooperating with the West on the Iranian nuclear dossier.4 In contrast, the newspaper Kargozaran headlined with Putin’s commitment to the West to pursue cooperation on this very same question.5 More broadly, reformist newspapers highlighted the short-term dimension of the “optimistic” ‘read’ of the Georgian crisis as advantageous for Iran.6 According to reformists, Iranian diplomacy cannot develop on the basis of the illusion of a Russian-American split. Indeed, President Ahmadinejad tried to capitalise on this Western-Russian divide on the Georgian crisis by blaming the “interference of countries from outside the region” for the outbreak of the war.7 He also focussed on the “Zionist active role during the war” in his explanation of the Caucasus conflict.8 After the 1  Declaration quoted in Lomsadze 2010. 2  Interview with a French diplomat who was working in Tbilisi in 2006, Tehran, Summer 2008. 3  See for example “Does Russian Belligerence Favor Iran”, Iran Daily, 29 August 2008. 4  Kayhan, 31 August 2008. 5  Kargozaran, 31 August 2008. 6  See “Does Russian Belligerence Favor Iran”, Iran Daily, 29 August 2008. 7  See “Bazi Iran-o-Rousieh dar ejalese Shanghai” [Iranian-Russian Games at the Shanghai Meeting], ‘Etemad-e Melli, 30 August 2008 and “Rise of Iran, Russia disquiets West: Ahmadinejad”, Tehran Times, 30 August 2008. 8  See Ahmadinejad speech after his first meeting with Medvedev, Dushanbe, August 2008 quoted in “Enemies unhappy with powerful Iran, Russia – president”, IRNA, 28 August, 2008.

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Georgian war, the hopes of Osulgarayan, one of the conservative political factions, was that Russia would cease its cooperation with Western countries on the Iranian nuclear file9 – the same miscalculation that had prompted Ahmadinejad to support Russia after the Georgian crisis in the first place. Nevertheless, in practice, the Iranian diplomatic position has remained neutral, focusing only at a rhetorical level on Western and “Zionist” meddling as a root of the conflict.10 President Ahmadinejad’s denouncement of the responsibility of powers outside of the region in the outbreak of war in summer 2008, as mentioned above, enabled him to maintain the acquis diplomatique of regional cooperation with Moscow. This cannot solely be attributed to the ideological dimension of Iranian diplomacy. However, the desire by the osulgarayan faction for the end of Russian-American cooperation on the Iranian nuclear dossier was badly calculated, and corresponds to Teheran’s position of support to Moscow at the beginning of the Georgian crisis. In practice, Iranian diplomacy reflected its position of neutrality, thus limiting the ideological anti-Zionist and anti-American engagement to diplomatic rhetoric. The tone of Iranian diplomacy during this crisis is symptomatic of both Teheran’s foreign policy pragmatism in the region and its inability to implement regional policy independently of Moscow. Also, in the triangular relationship between Moscow, Tbilisi and Teheran, Islamic diplomacy cannot be determined solely on the basis of its interest alone; as with other regional questions, Islamic diplomacy must wait until Russian objectives are known before stating its own direction. In effect, as in other areas, Iran must bear in mind Russia’s position on whether it will support Teheran at the Security Council or not against Western pressure. The triangular relationship between Moscow, Tehran and Tbilisi demonstrates that the Iranian need of Russian diplomatic protection at the Security Council has prevented an independent Iranian regional policy in the Caucasus in general and the South Caucasus in particular. Bilateral Relationships Yerevan-Tehran: An Enduring Axis11 After the 1917 October Revolution, official relations between Armenia and Iran were greatly reduced. During the Soviet period, no aviation routes were operated between Tehran and Yerevan, and no bridges were built across the Araks, which forms the frontier between the two countries. Moreover, there was no road network to travel to Soviet Armenia from Iranian territory. However, informal 9  Kayhan, 30 August 2008. 10  See “Bazi Iran-o-Rousieh dar ejalese Shanghai” [Iranian-Russian Games at the Shanghai Meeting], op.cit., and “Rise of Iran, Russia disquiets West: Ahmadinejad”, op. cit. 11  This section is largely taken from an article previously published by the author. See Therme 2008(b).

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relations were maintained between the two countries via Iran’s Armenian minority, which numbered 130,000 people in 1973.12 The interruption of official cultural and economic relations was mainly due to the administrative centralism of the Soviet state, which made relations between the neighbouring Iranian-Armenian and Armenian populations virtually impossible. For example, a letter sent from the region of Jolfa in Iran would take two months to reach the other side of the border, just a few kilometres away.13 Moreover, political obstacles restricted communication between Iran’s Armenian population and that of Soviet Armenia. Firstly, Reza Shah (1925-1941) feared that Armenian associates of the Iranian communist party were being used by Moscow to conduct espionage activities in Iran (Hart 1998: 361-2). Secondly, although the USSR authorised holders of Iranian passports to travel to Soviet Armenia, the Pahlavi shahs, fearing communist contagion, prevented them from returning to Iran. This prohibition was finally lifted after the 1979 Islamic revolution. Following Armenia’s independence in 1991, the warmth of the IranianArmenian reunion was genuine, after a long period of separation since 1828. Flights between Tehran and Yerevan were introduced in 1992. Likewise, a temporary bridge (1992-1994), and then a permanent one (1995), called ‘the Bridge of Friendship’ by the Armenians, was built over the Araks at Meghri, enabling goods to be trucked into Armenia from Iran (Farassati 1998: 241-3). Genuine though the Iranian-Armenian friendship was, it was still primarily determined by the two partners’ national interests. The border with Iran was the only route by which Armenia could receive supplies, subject as it was to a Turkish-Azeri blockade due to the NK conflict. The other possible route, namely the Georgian border, was of limited interest, as that country was in a state of anarchy following the disintegration of the USSR. Moreover, Armenian-Georgian relations were complicated by claims from Javakhk Armenians, living on a territory belonging to Tbilisi. On Tehran’s side, the goal was to engage in active diplomacy towards the new independent states of the post-Soviet Caucasus. The decision to ally with Christian Armenia was therefore in line with Iran’s national interests, given that, over the border, the leaders of the new Azeri state were in favour, in the wake of independence, of creating a Greater Azerbaijan including the Azeri provinces in the north of Iran. It therefore made sense for the authorities in Tehran to seek to preserve the integrity of Iranian territory by supporting Armenia in its war against Baku over the NK question. The presence in Iran of an Armenian community was not the main reason behind this diplomatic alliance. However, its existence has facilitated the development of bilateral trade and cultural contacts, and in particular academic and tourism exchanges. In 2007, there were nearly 3000 Iranian students in 12  According to Hubert de Mauroy quoted by Carnoy 1997: 95. 13  The route was as follows: Jolfa, Tehran, Moscow, Baku, Soviet Armenia. Personal interview with Amir Armadian, Professor at the Faculty of International Relations, Tehran, 2 February 2008.

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Yerevan. Conversely, just ten Armenian students were studying in Iran, generally for a period of one year. There are normally two flights per week between Tehran and Yerevan, and four during holiday periods. Buses also operate daily between Tehran and Yerevan. Around 50,000 to 60,000 Iranians visit Armenia every year. Visits by Armenian tourists in Iran are very infrequent, however. In 1992, Iran became Armenia’s second-largest trading partner after Russia. This situation has continued, and in 2007, with annual trade worth 200 million dollars, Iran was still one of the country’s major economic partners. Although Iran is not the leading trade partner in quantitative terms, Russia and Turkmenistan being Yerevan’s first and second partners respectively, it remains the case that the provision of supplies to Armenia by Iran is indispensable to the survival of the Armenian economy. Moreover, many of Iran’s Armenian traders, who had applied for Armenian passports in the early 1990s, were disappointed by the poor opportunities for investment in the post-Soviet Armenian economy. Trading relations did grow after the creation, in 2003, of the Aras free zone located in the Iranian province of East Azerbaijan,14 the purpose of which was to encourage foreign investment in Iran, but Armenian investors were quickly disappointed by the commercial opportunities offered by this free zone. Trade is now pursued more in the context of bilateral relations. As a result, commercial activity in the border zone has been declining continuously since the mid-1990s. Trade relations are also complicated by the failure of bilateral negotiations on the liberalisation of trade. Since February 2003, Armenia has been a member of the WTO, whereas the Iranian economy remains state-controlled and managed on protectionist principles. These contradict Tehran’s declared objective of increasing bilateral trade, in that the Armenian economy is more liberal than the Iranian. With the increase in American pressure for relations between the Emirates banks and Iran to be broken off, significant banking relations have been formed between foreign companies establishing commercial relations with Iran and Armenia’s banks. However, the absence of any Armenian bank in Tehran underlines the financial difficulties encountered by any state wishing to trade with Tehran. In any case, Armenia’s desire to increase economic cooperation with Iran has not met with a negative reaction from Washington, as the American authorities are aware that the Armenians have no realistic alternative to trading with the Islamic Republic. Moreover, the US accused the Armenian government of favouring arms transfer to Iran in 2003, according to the leak published by Wikileaks. The American cable reveals that some of these Iranian purchases of rockets and machine guns through Armenia were “recovered from two Shia militant attacks in which a US soldier was killed and six others were injured in Iraq”. Consequently, according to a diplomatic cable on 24 December 2008, the U.S. deputy secretary, John Negroponte, threatened Armenia with unilateral American sanctions if such transfers occurred 14  See the Commercial Industrial Free Zone Organisation’s website: http://www. arasfz.com/

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in the future.15 This is far beyond the official military relationship publicised by both countries. Cooperation on energy between the two countries is also growing. Plans to build a refinery and a power station in Armenia to be used to supply Iran could, if they materialise, increase Armenian exports to Iran by 30 million dollars a year (Khachatrian 2007). Conversely, cooperation on gas has experienced numerous difficulties. Firstly, over 15 years passed between the commencement of negotiations on the plans for an Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline and its inauguration, in March 2007, during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Armenia. However, the Iranian authorities do not seem to include the Armenian market among their main targets for gas exports, as is demonstrated by Tehran’s agreement to reduce the diameter of the pipeline, at Russia’s request, and the delay in the supply of gas (Khachatrian 2006). The supply was scheduled to start in December 2008, although the pipeline has been operational since March 2007. Iran could also have developed a more ambitious long-term policy had it rejected the Russian conditions, which prevents any contemplation of Iranian gas exports to Georgia or Ukraine. This choice is due both to internal difficulties in the Iranian gas sector (Therme 2008a) and to the Caucasian policy pursued by Tehran of deference to Russian interests. The political management of Iran’s Armenian minority is used by Tehran in its foreign policy. Its aim is to demonstrate the democratic, pro-human rights nature of the Islamic Republic. This showcase is very important to the Iranian government, which is often condemned by the US and the EU for its non-compliance with international standards on human rights. According to a representative of Tehran’s Armenian community,16 Iran’s Armenian minority was down to 80,000 people by 2007.17 According to the archbishop of the Armenians of Iran, there are 200,000 in number. However, this statistic is politically motivated, as the archbishopric wishes to preserve the seats of the two members who represent the community in the Parliament, the majles: every community is entitled to one deputy per 100,000 people. Finally, according to the Islamic Republic’s own official figures, there are 150,000 Armenians in Iran. The decreasing number of Armenians in Iran can be explained by the acceleration in emigration at the beginning of the 2000s comparable to what occurred directly after the Islamic revolution. However, the living conditions of Armenians in the Islamic Republic do not appear to account for most of the departures from Iran (Vivier-Muresan, 2007: 593-603). Rather, they are to do with the emigration campaign conducted by the Hâiâz association, which since the start of the century has offered them the opportunity to emigrate to the

15  See “US embassy cables: US fury at Armenia over arms transfers to Iran”, 24 December 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/184879 [accessed: 27 January 2011]. 16  Author’s interview with a representative of Tehran’s Armenian community, Tehran, February 2008. 17  The minority is divided between the cities of Tehran, 65-70,000, Isfahan, 5-6000, and Tabriz, 2-3000.

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US via Austria for the sum of 3,000 dollars.18 Finally, the Iranian authorities often used the alliance with Christian Armenia in connection with the policy of dialogue among civilisations promoted by reformist President Mohammad Khatami (19972005). This Iranian ambition to appear as an advocate of dialogue among religions encounter the Armenian will to appear “as a bridge between East and West not only in their historical role as a diaspora but also as an important element of their contemporary identity” (Mirzoyan 2010: 133). The Islamic dimension of the postrevolutionary Iranian state is not a hurdle for further entente with Armenia; it is a diplomatic tool for both foreign policies to engage other cultural areas. On the diplomatic front, Iranian-Armenian relations can only be understood by taking Turkey’s role into account. Although Iran presents itself as a mediator in the rivalry between Armenia and Turkey,19 it has to be said that the improvement in Iranian-Turkish relations has led to a cooling-down in relations between Tehran and Yerevan. Finally, although the Islamic Republic has never officially recognised the Armenian genocide, it does so implicitly. On 24 April every year, the Armenians of Iran are authorised by the Islamic regime to commemorate the genocide of 1915. However, the scale of these commemorations varies depending on the state of Iranian-Turkish relations. Moreover, part of the Armenian Museum in Isfahan is devoted to the memory of the genocide. Thus, the Iranian-Armenian alliance is primarily based on convergent geopolitical interests. Economic cooperation with Iran is vital to Armenia, while Tehran may, if American and international economic sanctions are stepped up in the future, use its alliance with Armenia as an economic route. Thus, the isolation of these two neighbouring states, although the causes differ, could lead them in the years ahead to intensify their political and economic cooperation. On the other hand, if Armenia manages to break out of its regional isolation and Iran normalises its position in the international arena, the whole reason for the alliance could be called into question. Also, the role played by external factors, like the deterioration of Turkish-Israel relations, has produced an unexpected rapprochement between Yerevan and Tel Aviv. The two countries established diplomatic relationship at the ambassador level in October 2010.20 In Armenia, the leadership explained that this new diplomatic opportunity has to be independent from the Tehran-Yerevan and the Baku-Yerevan relationships. But this new evolution in Armenian foreign policy is a direct threat to the so-called

18  Author’s interview with a representative of Tehran’s Armenian community, Tehran, January 2008. See the association’s website: http://www.hias-vienna.at/ [accessed: 27 January 2011]. 19  During his visit to Yerevan in October 2007, President Ahmadinejad spoke out in favour of reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey. See “Rastegâri dar sa’ât bist-o tshahârom” (A visit cut short by 24 hours), Hamshari, 25 October 2007. 20  “Armenian President Proposes Closer Ties With Israel”, RFE/RL, 14 July 2010 and “Israeli ambassador hands over his credentials to Armenian president”, ARMINFO News Agency, October 29, 2010.

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“permanent alternative” (Mirzoyan 2010: 107-8) represented by the Iranian neighbour since Armenia’s independence in the post-Soviet era. Iranian Policy vis-à-vis Baku: Beyond Anti-Western Ideology? Iran’s initial difficulties in cooperating with Azerbaijan reflected the competitive nature of the Turkish-Iranian cultural relationship but also the divergence between Baku and Tehran regarding the future of the Caspian Sea and its pollution (Sadri, Entessar and Ghramanova 2010: 10). Moreover, the Islamic revolution ideology is both religious and anti-Western. Unlike the Islamic republic, the post-soviet Azerbaijani state is secular and its foreign policy’s main strategic orientation favours the search of a modus vivendi with the EU and the US. More particularly, Azerbaijani foreign policy is friendly towards Israel; this regularly provokes Iranian criticism at the diplomatic level, but also in the Iranian Azeri provinces where the regime organised anti-Israeli rallies.21 In June 2010, the visit by Israeli President Shimon Peres to Baku prompted hostile Iranian rhetoric and public protests. In response, President Aliyev stated that “it is not our problem” if Iran has unfriendly relations with Israel.22 Cultural proximity is reinforced by the ethnic dimension of the IranianAzerbaijani relationship since the fall of the Soviet Union. Before that, the Soviet Union used Iranian Azerbaijan as a diplomatic tool for political penetration and for increasing its ideological influence. In the 20th century, the Soviets were particularly active in Iranian Azerbaijan, more specifically in three distinct periods: 19051921, 1941-1947 and 1979-1981. During the last period, Moscow tried to benefit from the post-revolutionary disorder instrumentalising the Azeri cultural opening in Iran to diffuse Soviet propaganda in Iranian Azerbaijan (Nissman 1987: 47-53). After the Azerbaijani independence in 1991, the first priority of Iranian foreign policy was to maintain the territorial integrity threatened by some Azerbaijani political groups who claimed to unify “the so-called thwarted nation – separated because of imperial rivalries and the vagaries of international politics” (Hunter 1995: 115). In January 2011, Ayatollah Khatami, an Iranian cleric and an official representative of the Islamic Republic, said “enemies spread the ideology of panTurkism in the region”.23 But he accused the Israelis more than the Azerbaijanis of

21  “Iran’s Ardabil protests Israeli president’s visit to Azerbaijan”, Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran Ardabil Provincial TV, in Persian, 26 June 2009; and “Anti-Israel rally outside Azeri consulate in Iran’s Tabriz”, Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran East Azarbayjan Provincial TV, Tabriz, in Persian, 24 June 2009. Accessed via BBC Monitoring. 22  “Azeri leaders dismisses criticism of Israeli president’s Baku visit”, Rossiya TV, in Russian, July 4, 2009. Accessed via BBC Monitoring. 23  Declaration quoted in “Senior cleric says “enemies” spreading pan-Turkism in Iranian region”, Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran East Azarbayjan Provincial TV, Tabriz, 25 January 2011. Accessed via BBC Monitoring.

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being responsible for this ideological threat stating that “the Azerbaijani Republic is connected to the culture of the system and Islam”.24 According to Azerbaijani nationalists, there is an “Azeri nation” which includes Iranian provinces. National media have accused Iran of denying cultural rights to its ethnic Azeri population and they relate the action of ethnic Azeri activists in Iran.25 Nonetheless, in June 2006, an Azeri student of Qom’s Mofid University explained that, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Azeri-Iranian dream of emigrating towards post-soviet Azerbaijan has never existed: The perception of Azeris from Iranian provinces vis-à-vis Azerbaijan is not very positive: indeed, this state is not attractive due to its economic weaknesses. In addition, Azerbaijan is secular while Iran is a religious state. The positions of Azeri intellectuals are ambiguous. Indeed, even if Azeri associations have difficult relations with the central government, the raison d’être of these groups is cultural. Anyway, members of the Azeri community depend on the state because most of the time they are state employees. After the caricatures scandal [spring 2006], no public debate was organised inside the country. Protesters were accused of collaborating with foreign countries.26

Cultural dimensions of Azeri integration in the set of ideas promoted by Iranian nationalists and Islamists remain contradictory. On the one hand, there is a feeling that these populations are part of a broader Turkish cultural entity.27 On the other hand, the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, remains popular in the Iranian provinces of Azerbaijan. When he travelled in this region, people appreciated the fact that he pronounced his speeches in Azeri rather than Persian, the official language. There is equally a shared sense of religious conservatism both among the population of Iranian Azerbaijan provinces and in the political and economic elite of the Islamic republic. Nevertheless, Iranian-Azeri people are protesting for a more complete recognition of their cultural rights – particularly school teaching in Azeri language.28 Moreover, if we take into account that Azeris are not underrepresented in the political and economic oligarchy of the Islamic republic, it is difficult to define the Azeri question as a minority question. In response to the Iranian preoccupation of Baku’s interferences in the Northern provinces, it is through the talesh minority that Tehran questioned the authorities of post-Soviet Azerbaijan. Iranian taleshi represent nearly one million 24 Ibid. 25  “Pro-government MPs accuse Iran of meddling in Azerbaijan’s affairs”. ITV, Baku, in Azeri, 24 January 2011; and “Iran to try 11 ethnic Azeri activists”, Azadliq, Baku, in Azeri, 22 December 2010. Access via BBC Monitoring. 26  Personal interview with an Azeri student, Qom, June 2006. 27  For an analysis underlying the rise of “Azeri nationalism” inside Iran after the 2006 cartoon crisis, see Souleimanov 2006. 28  Author’s interviews with Iranian citizens, Tabriz – Kandovan, December 2007.

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persons between post-Soviet Azerbaijan and the Iranian province of Gilan. Their separation dates from the Russian-Iranian Turkmentchay Treaty of 1828. Among Iranian taleshi, the main demands are limited to the creation of a “talesh province” separated from the gilaki one – these demands do not include separatist or significant autonomy claims.29 The invocation of talesh rights is a card for Iranian diplomats to counter-balance the pan-Azeri ideology. Iran is exploiting the ethnic vulnerabilities of the Azerbaijani state regarding the talesh question. Faxraddin Aboszode, one of the leaders of a separatist group, the “Talis-Mugan republic” – one group among many taleshi associations – called regularly on Russia and Iran to become guarantors of “Talis democratic statehood”.30 Even if the existence of a talesh minority in Iran does not represent a determining factor of Iranian policy towards the South Caucasus, this case is interesting given the ambiguities of Iranian foreign policy vis-à-vis ethnic questions. Beyond these ethnic tensions, Baku and Tehran are at odds on ideological issues. Azerbaijani political elites have regularly denounced Iranian pressure on Azerbaijani clerics regarding, for instance, the hijab ban in secular post-Soviet Azerbaijani.31 Moreover, in January 2011, an Azerbaijani deputy Tahir Rzayev accused Iran of meddling in Azerbaijan’s domestic affairs stating that “Iran’s attempts to Islamize Azerbaijan are doomed to fail”.32 On the other hand, despite ideological and ethnic tensions, the economic entente between the two neighbours focussed on increasing bilateral trade and building a partnership based on energy. Trade between both states reached 550 million dollars in 2009. According to the Iranian minister of Commerce, Mehdi Ghazanfari, this figure could be doubled “if some obstacles between the two countries are removed”.33 This obstacle might be American pressure on Azerbaijani authorities to restrain trade with Iran and to implement unilateral Western sanctions despite economic losses. Following the visit to Baku in October 2010 of Stuart Levey, the US Treasury Under-Secretary in charge of Iran sanctions under Bush and Obama administrations, the public debate focussed on the need for the US to provide economic aid to Azerbaijan to balance the negative consequences of sanctioning a neighbouring country.34 As far as energy issues are 29  Author’s interviews in Gilan with members of the talesh ethnic group, January 2007. 30  Declaration quoted in “Ethnic group oppose activist’s appeal to Russia, Iran – Azeri report”, Turan news agency, Baku, in Russian, 12 July 2010. Accessed via BBC Monitoring. 31  “Azeri pro-government MP dismisses Iran cleric’s letter on hijab ban”, Yeni Musavat, Baku, in Azeri, 17 January 2011. Accessed via BBC Monitoring. 32  Declarations quoted in “Azeri MP unhappy with Iran ‘meddling’ in domestic affairs”, Day.az website, Baku, in Russian, 25 January 2011. Accessed via BBC Monitoring. 33  “Iran can double trade with Azerbaijan – minister”, APA news agency, Baku in Azeri, 26 October 2010. Accessed via BBC Monitoring. 34  “Azerbaijan said facing difficult choice over sanctions against Iran”, Azadliq, Baku, in Azeri, 23 October 2010. Accessed via BBC Monitoring.

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concerned, a gas agreement was signed in January 2011 between the SOCAR and the Iranian National Company for Export of Gas and both parties defined a road map for energy cooperation. The agreement foresees Iran exporting in 2011 one billion cubic metres of gas (from 1 February). This is set to double (2 billion cubic metres in 2012) with an increase in capacity of the gas pipeline between the two countries. The agreement was concluded before the visit to Baku of the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso. The Iranian-Azeri agreement can be interpreted as a reminder to European that “Europe needs Caspian energy more than the Caspian region needs the European market”.35 Other analysts posit that Baku needs to increase gas exports as a result of the stagnation of its oil production. Baku can already count amongst buyers of its gas Russia, Georgia and Turkey. Iran’s purchase price would appear to be the same as for Turkey and Russia. Given the anti-Zionist and anti-American framework of Iranian foreign policy, the Tehran-Baku relationship is likely to remain limited to good neighbourly relations without any trust – a sine qua non condition to building a real alliance between two countries which share close historical and cultural links. Georgia and Iran: A Marriage of Convenience Following the August 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict, and after the reset of AmericanRussian relation initiated by the Obama administration, the rapprochement between Tbilisi and Tehran appears without any doubt to be a consequence of external factors. Indeed, the new entente between Washington and Moscow has pushed Russian diplomatic evolution regarding Iranian nuclear program negotiations at the UN Security Council – a new trend that led to Russia’s approval of the June 2010 international sanctions against Tehran. The new relationship between the governments’ Ahmadinejad and Saakashvili appear surprising at first glance. In fact, it cannot be understood as a pure bilateral relationship. Moscow’s reaction was firstly to respect the new direction in the foreign policy of two independent states and then to warn that Russia hopes “that the development of bilateral relations between Georgia and Iran will not be directed against the third country”.36 Washington seems to be at the same time looking carefully at the new trends in the Tbilisi-Tehran relationship. From the US point of view, as in the case of Yerevan-Tehran relations, it is difficult to oppose accommodation between the 35  See eurasiaenergyanalysis.blogspot.com, 12 January 2011. 36  Andrei Nesterenko’s declaration, spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, quoted in “Russian MFA on Georgia-Iran Ties”, Civil Georgia, 2 July 2010. See also the statement of Sergei Lavrov: “Russia expressed its hope that rapprochement between Tbilisi and Tehran would not be harmful for any third countries”. According to the Georgian media, the “statement seemed so absurd that it was quietly withdrawn shortly after it was issued”, cf. Zaza Jgharkava, “Georgia: Iran’s window on the West”, Georgia Today, 12 November 2010.

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small South Caucasus states and one of the main regional powers – Iran. This new regional entente was symbolised by the decision to eliminate visa requirements between the two countries before the end of January 201137 and to increase bilateral trade. Iran’s trade balance with Georgia is positive but, in 2009, bilateral trade turnover declined by 41.5 per cent in comparison with the previous year to 36.3 million dollars. In the first nine months of 2010, the figure reached 41.5 million dollars.38 Regarding the political dimension of the bilateral relationship, there is an agreement on the need to avoid a face to face relationship with the regional hegemonic power Russia. But on the means to reach this end, both diplomacies disagree. In other words, the Russian threat to national interests perceived from Tbilisi and Tehran is not a sufficient condition to allow the construction of an alliance between these two countries. As regional partners, they disagree on NATO’s role in the South Caucasus: Georgia still pursues a counterproductive strategy of becoming a full member of NATO. The main reason is to strengthen its national security and to recover its territorial integrity. But it is very unlikely that Russia will accept Georgia as a member of a regional organisation with a hostile strategy led by Western countries against Russia’s privileged position in the former Soviet space (Gahrton 2010: 216-17). On the contrary, Iran has perceived NATO not only as military threat but also as a cultural danger for Iranian-Islamic culture. The narrative of the Islamic republic states that a “cultural NATO” sparked off the failed Iranian velvet revolution (enqelab-e makhmali) after a soft war (jang-e narm) led by the US against Islam.39 More broadly, according to the Iranian authorities, these states share the same objective of diffusing Western values in the Islamic world through NATO military means (Hidraf 2007). This ideological posture is also one of the main factors explaining the Iranian-Russian entente in the post-Cold War period. Iranian academic sources insist on the Iranian-Russian complicity against the socalled NATO threat against their interests. In Iran, this perception dates from the middle of the 1990s: The concern of Iran with respect to the expansion of NATO’s sphere of influence was first revealed when it was declared that the Balkans and the Mediterranean area had been included within the scope of NATO’s special benefits in a strategic sense. From the viewpoint of Tehran, the aforesaid areas are considered a gate to the Middle East, Caspian area and Central Asia.40 37  “Iran-Georgia visa-free travel agreement takes effect”, Rustavi-2, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 26 January 2011. Accessed via BBC Monitoring. 38  According to the Georgian state statistics, cf. “Iranian FM on “Historic” Visit to Georgia”, Civil Georgia, 3 November 2010. 39  According to the declarations of Morteza Saffari, Chief of the navy, sepah-e pasdaran, concerning the creation of a “Cultural NATO”, ‘Etemad, 9 September 2009. 40  See Hidraf 2007.

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Eastern expansion of NATO is perceived as a threat to national interest and potentially territorial integrity. Whether it be the arrival of military experts in Central Asia, the launch of the Partnership for Peace programme or the rumor relayed by the previous commander of the pasdaran, Rahim Safavi, of the entry of Iraq in NATO, Iran perceives a direct link between the American military presence in these zones and the location of its hydrocarbon resources.41 The Islamic Republic also considers that NATO has given itself the right to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs. In reaction to this, authorities in Tehran consider NATO to be the armed wing of the US in Europe and that its sphere of intervention should be then limited to Europe. This belief is held by all factions of the Islamic Republic, from reformists to partisans of Ahmadinejad. Iran does, however, show a certain degree of flexibility in the application of this principle: In general, Iran’s position towards the development of NATO and the presence of its force, which includes American forces in neighboring countries, is a negative one. However, Iran does not ignore the US as a prominent power and has always considered the possibility for negotiations on important security issues. It has to be said that it will not be possible to solve the problems of Afghanistan and Iraq without the presence of Iran. Such an understanding exists among American officials as well. Therefore, Iran and the US may form a joint committee for security that would pave the way for direct negotiations between Iran and NATO members led by the US.42

In effect, the first informal contact between NATO and the Islamic Republic occurred in March 2009. After more than thirty years without any relations, this first contact was limited to an informal meeting between the Iranian Ambassador to the EU, Ali Asghar Khaji, and a NATO negotiator in Brussels, Martin Erdmann. Amongst the topics linked to the reinforcement of security in Afghanistan, it would appear, according to several Western states such as Italy, that the supply route via Iranian territory for NATO troops stationed in Afghanistan was discussed.43 Here again, it would seem that Russia has adopted a more pragmatic approach to its contribution to NATO’s war efforts in Afghanistan since a significant part of NATO troop supply routes transit through Russian territory. This Iranian theoretical opposition to NATO can be explained by the designation of Iran by some of the NATO members during the Lisbon summit in

41  According to Tehran, NATO expansion is directed toward three regions: Central Asia, Caucasus and the Middle East. The Western objective would be to control the hydrocarbon resources of these regions. 42 Ibid. 43  According to this hypothesis, NATO supplies will transit through the Chabahar port. See “Iran and Nato end 30-year impasse”, BBC News, 27 March 2009 and “NATO Members Free to Seek Iranian Supply Route”, Strategic Forecasting, 3 February 2009.

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November 2010 as an “enemy” of the military organisation. In response President Ahmadinejad stated that: Experience from past years shows that the NATO’s decision have all been wrong. Today, humanity has gone beyond the era when military power determined regional and international relations. Under the present conditions, missile shields and nuclear weapons have lost their effectiveness. The NATO does not have a proper understanding of human and cultural developments. They should know that the nations have awakened and they cannot stop ideas with missile shields.44

This Iranian policy of philosophical opposition to NATO is not shared by Tbilisi, but after the August 2008 war with Russia and the end of the friendly Bush administration, the rapprochement with Tehran became possible due to the changes in foreign policy priorities pursued by Georgia. The first objective is no longer an aspirational one, namely becoming a full member of NATO, but to counter Moscow’s influence in the Caucasus. Even if Georgian officials deny any change in foreign policy, it is clear that Georgia seeks to diffuse the US-Iran confrontation in order to reduce Russian leverage at the Security Council against Tehran. The new regional strategy is also about moving closer to Turkey and Iran in order to limit the negative consequences of Russian regional hegemony for Georgian interests (Socor 2010). Conclusion The Iranian ambition to appear as an independent power in the former Soviet space in general and in the Caucasus in particular largely remains a failed objective. Indeed, the Russian regional hegemony and the rejection by the Islamic Republic of Iran of any American presence in the region limit the diplomatic options for Tehran. Iranian leaders cannot be at the same time antiAmerican and independent from Russian policy in the Caucasus. Consequently, even if the Realpolitik dimension of Iranian policy is undisputable – the defence of territorial integrity being at the basis of cooperation between states – the broad ideological anti-Western framework of Tehran’s diplomacy is often antonymic with the promotion of Iranian national interests in the region, particularly regarding the oil and gas sectors. Despite these limitations, geographical, historical and cultural proximity as well as shared trade interests constitute a strong incentive for Iran and its South Caucasus neighbours to increase their bilateral cooperation and to pursue the strategic objectives to control a volatile region. However, the main success of 44  Declaration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad quoted in “NATO needs Iran’s ‘cooperation’ – analyst”, Jam-e Jam website, Tehran, in Persian, 30 November 2010. Accessed via BBC Monitoring.

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Tehran’s South Caucasus diplomacy is the rapprochement with Armenia because this policy does not confront Moscow’s interest. In comparison, Iran’s new objective to become a Georgian partner is not realistic given the different strategic nature of their respective foreign policies: Georgia is a member of a pro-Western alliance and Iran favours the constitution of an anti-Western front on an international scale. The question of the Azeri-Iranian relationship suffers similar hurdles as the previous one with the same problem: the entente with Israel. Nevertheless, in the oil and gas sector, the two neighbours seem to be building a pragmatic entente. The ambition of Iran to become the fourth regional power (besides the US, Russia and Turkey) with a significant influence in the South Caucasus is limited by the shortcomings of its foreign policy. The capacity of Iranian to reduce their dependency vis-à-vis Russia will be a test for the revolutionary state to implement a truly independent foreign policy – not only at the rhetorical level but also in practice. Bibliography Barzegar, K. 2010. “Regionalism in Iran Foreign Policy”, Iran Review, 8 February 2010. Available at: http://www.iranreview.org/content/view/5334/37/ [accessed: 9 December 2010]. Bataille, C. and Blum, R. 2010. La situation dans le Caucase du Sud. Rapport d’information de la Commission des affaires étrangères de l’Assemblée nationale, Paris, 26 May 2010. Available at: http://www.assemblee-nationale. fr/13/rap-info/i2553.asp Carnoy, D. 1997. “Les chrétientés de la République islamique”, Les Cahiers de l’Orient, 1997 (48), 83-115. Djalili, M-R. 2002. “Iran and Caucasus: Maintaining Some Pragmatism”. Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 1(3), 49-58. Farassati, A. 1998. L’Iran et la crise du Caucase du Sud. PhD thesis, Centre de recherche et d’analyse géopolitique, Université Paris 8. Gahrton, P. 2010. Georgia: Pawn in the New Great Game, New York: Pluto Press. Hart, C. 1998. “Armenians of Persia Suspected of Bolshevik Activity (1931)” in The Armenians of Iran: The Paradoxical Role of a Minority in a Dominant Culture: Articles and Documents, edited by C. Cosroe, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Hidraf, A. 2007. “Negaresh Iran be gostaresh NATO” [Iranian Approaches toward NATO Expansion], faslname –ye motale’at-e asiai-ye va qafqaz (Central Asia and the Caucasus Review), 59(1386). Hunter, S. 1995. “Greater Azerbaijan: Myth or Reality?” in Le Caucase postsoviétique: la transition dans le conflit, edited by Mohammad-Reza Djalili, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 115-42. Hunter, S. 2010. Iran’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era: Resisting the New International Order, Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.

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Jgharkava, Z. 2010. “Georgia: Iran’s window on the West”. Georgia Today, 12 November 2010. Available at: http://www.georgiatoday.ge/article_details. php?id=8431 Khachatrian, H. 2006. “Economic and political implications of the rise of the Russian gas price for Armenia”, CACI Analyst, 25 January 2006. Available at: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/3694 Khachatrian, H. 2007. “Iran and Armenia tighten ties”, CACI Analyst, 14 November. Available at: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4736 Lomsadze, G. 2010. “Tbilisi Woos Iran While Washington Watches”, EurasiaNet. org, 28 May. Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61179 Mirzoyan, A. 2010. Armenia: The Regional Powers and the West. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Mokhtari, K. 2008. “5+1-2=4”, Kayhan International, 9 August 2008. Nissman, D. 1987. The Soviet Union and Iranian Azerbaijan. The Use of Nationalism for Political Penetration. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Peimani, H. 2010. “Georgia and Ukraine : Buying Iranian gas?”, CACI Analyst, 6 April 2005. Available at: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/2936 [accessed: 29 December 2010]. Petriashvili, D. 2006. “Gas Crisis over, Georgia Vows to Diversify Energy Supplies”, Eurasia Insight, 31 January 2006. Available at: http://www. eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav013106.shtml Sadri, H., Entessar, N. and Ghramanova, S. 2010. Conflict and Cooperation in the South Caucasus: Azerbaijan-Iran Relations in Transition, Paper to the 51st Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New Orleans, 1722 February 2010. Socor, V. 2010. “Georgia Develops Functional Relations with Iran”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7(101), 25 May 2010. Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/ single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36413 Souleimanov, S. 2006. “The cartoon crisis in Iranian Azerbaijan: Is Azeri nationalism underestimated?”. CACI Analyst, 14 June 2006. Available at: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4018 [accessed: 29 January 2011]. Therme, C. 2008a. “L’Iran : exportateur de gaz ?”. Notes de l’Ifri, February 2008. Available at: http://www.ifri.org/?page=detail-contribution&id=192&id_ provenance=97 [accessed: 24 January 2011]. Therme, C. 2008b. “L’alliance irano-arménienne”. Journal of International & Strategic Studies, (1), 36-9. Available at: http://www.ceris.be/fileadmin/library/ Publications/Journal%20of%20International%20%26%20Strategic%20 Studies%20N1-Asie%20Centrale,%20ancrage%20international%20et%20 r%E9gional.pdf Vivier-Muresan, A-S. 2007. “Communitarian Neighborhoods and Religious Minorities in Iran: A Comparative Analysis”. Iranian Studies, 40(5), 593-603. “Armenian President Proposes Closer Ties With Israel”, RFE/RL, 14 July 2010. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_President_Proposes_ Boosting_Ties_With_Israel/2099592.html

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“Bâzi Irân-o-Rusieh dar ejalese Shanghai” [Iranian-Russian Game at the Shanghai Meeting], Etemad-e Melli, 30 August 2008. “Does Russian Belligerence Favor Iran?”, Iran Daily, 29 August 2008. Available at: http://www.irannewsdaily.com/view_news.asp?id=170539 “Iran and Nato end 30-year impasse”, BBC News, 27 March 2009. “Iranian FM on “Historic” Visit to Georgia”, Civil Georgia, 3 November 2010. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22812 “Israeli ambassador hands over his credentials to Armenian president”, ARMINFO News Agency, 29 October 2010. “NATO Members Free to Seek Iranian Supply Route”, Strategic Forecasting, 3 February 2009. “Rastegâri dar sa’ât bist-o tshahârom” [A visit cut short by 24 hours], Hamshari, 25 October 2007. “Rise of Iran, Russia disquiets West: Ahmadinejad”, Tehran Times, 30 August 2008. Available at: http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=176547 “Russian MFA on Georgia-Iran Ties”. Civil Georgia, 2 July 2010. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22476

PART III Integration into the Eurasian Community: Taking Stock

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Chapter 10

Nato’s Engagement in the South Caucasus: Looking for Energy Security or Expanding Norms and Values? Pierre Jolicoeur and Frédéric Labarre1

Introduction NATO’s interest in the South Caucasus is rather new. Over the last decade, the organisation’s involvement in the region has intensified through the development of cooperation frameworks such as the Partnership for Peace, which was set up in 1994 and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, established in 1997 to replace the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, dating back to 1991. In this chapter, we will argue that NATO’s increasing engagement in the South Caucasus can proceed from two visions of international relations; a realist view, focused on state security and power advantages, and a constructivist approach, based on a diversity of international actors and the creation of identities, norms and values. In the first part of this essay, we will test the assumption that the Alliance’s commitments in the area have been motivated by material concerns, and especially energy security. In the second part, we will look at changes in the normative foundations of the organisation’s policy towards regional states. In an attempt to make these states more prone to integration, NATO has tried to transfer to the region principles of democratic governance, rule of law and peaceful settlement of conflicts. Through this theoretical debate, we hope to contribute to a better understanding of the Alliance’s initiatives in such a complex zone as the South Caucasus, and to identify key events, steps and turning points in its move into the region. Security Interests and Power Advantages The Lack of Consensus among Allied Members NATO’s activities in the South Caucasus have waxed and waned over the last decade. In its November 2010 Strategic Concept (NATO 2010a), the Alliance 1  The authors would like to acknowledge the funding assistance of the Academic Research Programme, Department of National Defence of Canada.

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security interests were defined as integrating defence of “energy security, including protection of critical energy infrastructure and transit areas and lines, cooperation with partners, and consultations among Allies”. It followed but did not enlarge on the risks and challenges defined in the April 1999 Strategic Concept, which already referred to “the disruption of the flow of vital resources” (NATO 1999a). It was only at the Prague Summit held in November 2002 that the Alliance expressed enhanced interest in “the strategically important region of the Caucasus” (NATO 2002a). At the time, NATO was even toying with an “Ad Hoc Working Group” dedicated to the region (Lynch 2003: 82). According to non-official sources, such an interest was linked with the fight against Islamic radicalism in the September 11 attacks (Lynch 2003: 83). As a conflict-prone region, the Caucasus may be compared to the Balkans, in which NATO has been intensely involved for 15 years, going as far as to integrate new members like Albania and Croatia. But looking back at the troubles the Balkan crisis generated for the Alliance – whether it be in the internal cooperation process among member countries or in its external relations with Russia and the UN – the Prague Summit declaration showed a lack of consensus on how far the organisation should extend its mandate. Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) were launched and opened to Caucasus countries to steer and assist domestic reforms. They were aimed at improving political and military relations with the region’s capitals, and in particular at giving Partner states access to some of the Alliance’s programmes in the field of standardisation, civil emergency planning, and management of terrorist events and biological, chemical, and radiological disasters. Most importantly, in NATO’s own words, these activities accounted for the “diversity of Allies’ interests and Partners’ needs” (NATO 2002b). They stressed more on the emerging threat of terrorism than on resource scarcity or interruption of energy deliveries. As a result, there was obviously no common threat perception among Allies that would lead to a deeper engagement in the Caucasus going beyond the above-listed actions. This lack of consensus may derive from the asymmetry of NATO country profiles regarding vital resources. Substantial differences in energy reserves, production capacities, consumption, present suppliers and potential trade partners among allied members could explain NATO’s inability to reach an agreement on a common policy towards the Caucasus. Besides, considering the estimated energy resources locked in the Caspian Sea basin, the argument that NATO’s engagement in the region was driven by the need to control local oil and gas is rather unconvincing (Howard 1998): compared to NATO countries’ own reserves, production and consumption levels, hydrocarbons from the Caucasus are barely worth the attention. Outside Azerbaijan, which holds half of what European NATO countries hold, the region is relatively poor.2 2  See Table 10.1.

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The Asymmetry of NATO Country Profiles Oil sufficiency is a main source of concern for European states, but not for North American NATO members.3 Although access to Azerbaijani oil could provide the United States with a third more resources than they presently have, these volumes are still insignificant compared to Canadian export capacities. Canada, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Angola, Nigeria and Iraq are today the main oil suppliers to the US (GlobalPost 2010). Although the US is a net importer of energy, one third of their imports are coming from North America (U.S. Department of Energy 2006a). As Table 10.2 shows, North American NATO countries produce two thirds of the energy they need, whereas European members produce only a little more than a third of the oil they consume on a daily basis. However, for both Europe and the US, the production ratio is expected to keep going down (Capros P. et al. 2008: 75). Currently, North America accounts for some 13 per cent of annual oil exports into Europe, surpassing the imports coming from Commonwealth of Independent States members other than Russia, against 41 per cent of additional oil imports to Europe coming from the Middle East and Africa, likely to increase to 50 per cent by 2030 (Capros P. et al. 2008: 27). Caucasian oil reserves being limited, some Allies have come to the conclusion that the next oil frontier will be well outside NATO’s traditional area of operation. The most promising new fields should be found in Western Africa, where regulations in the energy sector are expected to be less restrictive than in the CIS (U.S. Department of Energy 2010: 48-9). For the two coming decades, reliance on existing partners (that is, Canada for the United States, and the Middle East for Europe) will nevertheless remain essential to ensure NATO countries’ oil supply. As for natural gas (illustrated in Table 10.3), findings are even more striking. Gas consumption of European states represents roughly 80 per cent of US gas consumption. North American countries are self-sufficient (U.S. Department of Energy 2006a: 11),4 whereas Europe will remain dependent on outside sources for the next 25 years (U.S. Department of Energy 2010: 42-3). Such a situation enables dominant producers and exporters like Russia, Norway and Algeria to play a key role on European markets (European Commission 2007: 20). In fact, half of the gas supplied to Europe is provided by the CIS and North America in equal parts. As the EU seeks to diversify inflow sources, the share of these two regions will dramatically decrease in favour of the Middle East (Capros P. et al. 2008: 27). Comparatively, Azerbaijan’s natural gas export potential appears to be minor (European Commission 2007: 20). Larger volumes from Central Asia may 3  It should be noted that in Spring 2001, the United States and Canada (as well as Mexico) integrated their energy exchanges through the creation of the North American Energy Working Group (NAEWG) 4  Self-sufficiency does not mean that no imports are projected. For example, Canada is expected to import liquefied natural gas (LNG) to supply the industry, on order to be able to sell to the US the gas it would otherwise consume.

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transit through Azerbaijan to Europe, but the required pipelines are still under discussion. Over the next two decades, demand for gas and diverse suppliers will increase in Europe as European production capacity starts to decline. Between 427 and 625 billion cubic feet should be imported by 2035 (European Commission 2007: 19). On the contrary, the North American market, if not self-sufficient in energy, will at least be self-contained, with little reliance on European deliveries. To meet their future needs, all NATO countries will rely, to a much greater extent, on LNG and more sustainable forms of energy like hybrid vehicles, wind and solar power (Capros P. et al. 2008: 28, U.S. Department of Energy 2006b). However, volumes of LNG will be much smaller than Russia and Central Asia’s export capacities, and new transportation systems – through tankers instead of pipelines – will carry on their own diversification and security issues. NATO’s Increased Involvement in the Region Even though asymmetries between American and European NATO member countries did not encourage a comprehensive policy of engagement in the South Caucasus on grounds of oil and gas supplies, NATO’s involvement in the region has tended to increase since the June 2004 Summit in Istanbul (Priego 2008: 5057). The Allies then created two important positions in the area: a NATO Special Representative and NATO Liaison Officers. They also welcomed the decision by Azerbaijan and Georgia to become active IPAP members without mentioning the case of Armenia (NATO 2004a). Strategically speaking, Armenia’s conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and its traditionally tense relations with Turkey have pushed Yerevan into a closer alliance with Moscow. But in 2005, Armenia also joined the IPAP programme. Intensified relations with NATO thus favoured the formation of a land bridge between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. In this context, Georgia holds a strategic position5 as a transit zone between Azerbaijan and Turkey, which are culturally close countries; geographically, Armenia, standing between the two, is still excluded from the East-West energy corridor. Did the summit take place in Istanbul because of growing concerns over energy and the South Caucasus? Or was “the importance of the Black Sea region” explicitly worded in the Istanbul declaration simply to pay tribute to the hospitality of the hosting country? That same year, in 2004, EAPC activities were “renewed and refocused”, bringing special attention to the South Caucasus (NATO 2004b). This move followed the Rose Revolution which took place in Georgia in late 2003, put an end to Eduard Shevardnadze’s presidency and brought pro-Western leader Mikheil Saakashvili to power. The change of regime meant a change of attitudes and enabled NATO to re-orient programmatic resources hitherto devoted to reforms 5  As emphasized by senior Georgian officials at the “Energy Security and Critical Infrastructure Seminar”, which was held in Tbilisi in May 2010, cf. NATO 2010b.

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in candidate countries in favour of the Caucasus. For the first time, a NATO official document discussed hard-security interests in the region: “maritime and harbour security” were declared as “important issues for Allies and Partners alike, including all those bordering on the Black and Caspian Seas. NATO will explore, in consultation with interested Partners, whether and how PfP actions could add value to those Partners’ co-operative efforts in these areas” (NATO 2004b). The remainder of the cooperation with interested Partners from the South Caucasus has taken place within the framework of the IPAP, the PAP-DIB (Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building), the PARP (Planning and Review Process) and the PAP-T (PAP against Terrorism). Most of the efforts focused on “soft-to-hard” security matters, namely, military education and training, education in humanitarian law, legislative and administrative reforms, defence and security management, and improved civil-military relations. These objectives were mainly laid down in the PAP-DIB initiative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, designed to bring effective and efficient state defence institutions under civilian and democratic control (NATO 2004c). Considering these programmes, NATO became politically, and to a certain extent militarily, more assertive in the region and able to reach consensus on the need to maintain security at regional sea ports. Black Sea and Caspian Sea ports are strategic points for the delivery of “vital resources”, as mentioned in NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept. The control of oil and gas reserves has not been at issue. These reserves lie well within national jurisdiction and are the focus of intense competition between private companies (Labarre 2009: 102-4). It is rather the security of energy flows which has been at stake for European NATO members. In January 2006, a dispute between Russia and Ukraine over gas prices resulted in the interruption of Russian gas exports to Europe. This crisis raised heated debates about potential risks of political pressure from Russia using energy as a weapon against European states (Dempsey, 2006: 3). Some months later, at the summit held in Riga, NATO reiterated support for coordinated efforts to promote energy security and strengthen stability in the Black Sea region (NATO 2006). By the same logic, the Alliance invited Georgia in 2006 to take part in an Intensified Dialogue in order to sustain political and military reforms as well as other stability building efforts that could help resolve disputes with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian minorities (NATO 2006). The question of Georgia’s possible integration into NATO has been a striking example of conflicting interests within the organisation: on the one hand, the Bush Administration was seeking to reward the third largest contributor to operations in Iraq; on the other hand, European members were trying to limit the damage that any further extension of NATO in the Russian sphere of influence could cause for their own security. Since the gas crisis made energy security a new priority for the Alliance, American political figures have become particularly vocal in their support of a rapprochement between NATO and the South Caucasus States, if not of their accession to NATO (Gallis 2007, Monaghan 2008).

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The Limits of NATO’s Progress in the Caucasus The Riga Summit Declaration hinted at the difficulty of reaching consensus while at the same time deepening NATO’s involvement in the South Caucasus. Allied members supported “territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan [and] Georgia” (NATO 2006). Still, they remained silent about the way to settle regional conflicts. The text presented a potential strategy to link respect for territorial integrity to energy security. It stated: “Alliance security interests can also be affected by the flow of vital resources. We support a coordinated, international effort to assess the risks to energy infrastructure and to promote energy infrastructure security”. It went further by directing “the North Atlantic Council … to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security” (NATO 2006). But if NATO clarified its interests by “focusing on infrastructure rather than other dimensions of energy security” (Monaghan 2008: 5), it rejected any role in pipeline security. In calling upon Caucasian countries to resolve their conflicts, the Alliance entrusted them with the task of ensuring stability, including the physical protection of pipelines and ports. For NATO, critical infrastructure protection and civil emergency management as a part of energy security fall within national competence. In other words, NATO’s engagement in the Caucasus was aimed at helping regional countries provide their own security and at rolling back Russia’s power in the region. To this end, NATO made repeated calls for Russia to abide by its commitments to the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, especially with regard to Russian troops and equipments still stationed in the region – irrespective of flank limitations (Chillaud 2010). As long as the land bridge between the Caspian basin and the Black Sea is not under Russian protectorate, the inflow of energy resources from the area would be considered secure. However, as two other roads for gas transportation – the Nord Stream (through the Baltic Sea) and the South Stream (through Black Sea) – will directly connect Russia to Europe,6 good relations between NATO and the Kremlin will remain vital. But Russia-NATO cooperation has sharply deteriorated after the April 2008 Summit in Bucharest. In December 2007, Russia withdrew from the CFE Treaty – making it possible for Moscow to concentrate a high level of Russian troops in the South Caucasus.7 During the summit – the first one a Russian president was invited to attend – the Alliance clearly affirmed, despite Russia’s objections, that it would keep its door open to the Caucasian states. According to the Summit Declaration, NATO indeed “welcome[d] Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership” and “agreed … that these countries will become members”. But at the same time, the Allies added that “decisions on enlargement are for NATO itself to make … Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide on the [Membership 6  See Figure 10.1. 7  This decision could also be interpreted as a reaction to US plans to deploy components of their ballistic missile defence system in Central Europe.

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Action Plan] applications of Ukraine and Georgia” (NATO 2008b). This meant that new accessions were by no means guaranteed, as they must be approved and ratified by every member country. In other words, the engagement of the Alliance in the region had already reached its geographical, political and programmatic limits well before Russia’s conflict with Georgia in August 2008. The Russian-Georgian “Five-Day War” concretely set the limits of NATO’s progress in the Caucasus and crystallised the association of energy security with geographical security in that region. Allied members strongly supported Georgia’s territorial integrity at the “discursive level”.8 Russia’s policy galvanised opinion in NATO, about energy security more than about Caucasus security. In a speech he made in September 2010, the Head of the Energy Security Section at NATO Headquarters, Michael Rühle, stated that NATO’s involvement in energy security was not a “call to arms” (Rühle 2010). In the face of it, the Alliance’s presence in the Caucasus will remain stable and coordinated with a multitude of actors to discuss critical infrastructure protection; but NATO will not put “boots on the ground” to physically defend oil and gas supply routes (Monaghan 2008: 5-10, Brem et al. 2009: 9). Such a position shows how reluctant members are to deploy troops in the close vicinity of the Russian ones. While energy security was part of NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, it was mentioned in very general terms. The document referred to the issue of dependence on “foreign energy suppliers” and possible “disruption” of transportation networks (NATO 2010a). As a consequence, the increased interaction between the organisation and Caucasian countries over the last decade is poorly explained by a realistic bid for relative advantage. In fact, Realism is more relevant to explain actions of individual states than those of the Alliance as a whole. Still, it cannot be denied that there is a qualitative change in the engagement of the Alliance towards the region, and towards Russia as well. Values and Normative Change Building Institutions, Shaping Behaviours The aim of balancing Russia’s influence with the Caucasus in the field of energy implies that identity matters. The Atlantic Alliance is composed of “like-minded” states, sharing common interests and information, and trusting each other to solve disputes without resorting to violence. As Alexander Wendt wrote, “material resources acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded” (Wendt 1998: 418). It is because of a 8  They also established a NATO-Georgia Commission in September 2008, which will hold regular meetings and could, in addition, be convened “following a request from Georgia if Georgia perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security”, cf. NATO 2008a.

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common perception of Russia’s identity that the Caucasus has become an important alternative for energy resources. Identities of Caucasian countries – inhabited by non-Slavs, covering tiny territories and organised around small states, etc. – are quite different from Russia’s. Their policies are especially considered as relatively more open to collaboration with the West. NATO could thus have a sense of collective identity with the Caucasus and some expectations that new institutions will contribute to change regional states’ behaviour.9 Shared expectations would not only mean further democratisation, but also open markets and increased exchanges (including energy flows) with such partners. Allied members apparently disagreed on whether Caucasus countries should or could become like them. Looking at the debate on NATO’s enlargement to Georgia, some of them seem to doubt such a scenario. But on the whole, all hoped that regional states and also Russia would, in the long run, develop into fullyfledged and functioning liberal democracies. The Atlantic Alliance has not always been the expression of a collective identity.10 But by the end of the Cold War, all NATO members could be labelled as liberal democracies. Then, the end of the ideological confrontation was often equated with a shift of identity in formerly captive Eastern European countries and former Soviet Republics. The move towards “collective security” was also a change of identity reflecting new shared beliefs and expectations of behaviour. Understood as the safeguarding of the economic, political and value systems of NATO countries, collective security has relied on the promotion of those values in the Alliance’s neighbourhood (Dandeker 2007: 24). It resulted in the creation of structures like the NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine Councils, the PfP and the IPAP to transform the Alliance from a military to a political institution (Schmidt 2001: 153). At every turn, in every official document, the Alliance reiterated the mantra that its members shared attachment to democratic principles, the rule of law, and peaceful settlement of conflicts. These are norms and values which the Alliance has attempted to promote, protect, if not proselytise. In December 2008, the Chairman of the NATO-Georgia Commission stated, for instance, that “NATO Ministers expressed their continuing resolve to assist Georgia in its democratic development and the programme of reforms … They encouraged Georgia to continue pushing forward with deeper reforms, in particular in the areas of electoral reform, transparency and accountability in government, media freedom, and functioning of the rule of law” (NATO 2008c). 9  In fact, institutions are created by states in the hope that it would change behaviours. See Keohane, R.O. and Martin, L.L. 1995: 46. 10  When Germany integrated the Alliance, it still had to deal with its totalitarian legacy. Similarly, NATO did not reject Greek or Portuguese applications though these countries were governed by dictatorial regimes. Spanish membership could neither be explained along the lines of “like-mindedness”. During the Cold War, NATO’s balancing policy against the Soviet bloc was indeed better explained by the Realist paradigm.

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If the Alliance had pursued an agenda of integration, its involvement in the South Caucasus should have been proportionate to the success of norms transfer. All three countries became members of the PfP upon its inception in 1994. By 2005, they were active IPAP participants, engaged in strengthening democratic reforms. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have since focused on security sector reforms (including civil-military relations), civil emergency planning, public information and collaborative scientific work.11 However, NATO’s relations with Georgia have been qualitatively different. Georgia’s specific status has partly been a by-product of its conflict with Russia. But even before the “Five-Day War”, the Alliance had initiated a more intense cooperation with Georgia, especially since Mikheil Saakashvili came to power and expressed stronger commitment to Western norms and values, as well as aspiration to full NATO membership. The NATO-Georgia Commission was set up to allow closer monitoring of the country’s adjustment to its PAP-DIB goals. In that regard, Georgia was specifically invited to develop a rational and transparent threat assessment to determine its defence posture and good neighbourly relations. Analysed from a constructivist perspective, NATO’s efforts in the region were limited. Firstly, hard-security interests have outweighed normative change in the Alliance’s cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Secondly, the Alliance has obviously experienced some fatigue in conditioning membership to effective reforms. Thirdly, unresolved conflicts in the region seemed to deter the organisation from intervening in the area (NATO 2007: 2-3). Apart from Georgia, the substance of cooperation has not really evolved over the last years. The combination of a resounding official rhetoric and a fairly limited valuebased engagement is clearly reflected in NATO’s regional programs. These programs could be viewed as carefully calibrated efforts to prevent any hidden political force from steering Caucasus countries away from NATO. This could be the case for the Alliance’s major policy change to protect the inflow of natural resources from the Caspian Sea. Declarations supporting territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of local states are based not only on values, but also on clearly material security interests. If any of these countries should fall prey to hostile external powers, disruptions of oil and gas deliveries could be used as a political weapon against the Alliance. Risks could be high considering the level of energy needs in Europe, at a time when steady supplies are critical for economic recovery. In this sense, Constructivism is appropriate to explain NATO’s engagement in the Caucasus relative to Russia’s behaviour.

11  See for example, NATO’s Relations with Azerbaijan, available at: http://www.nato. int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49111.htm?selectedLocale=en, NATO’s Relations with Armenia, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48893.htm?selectedLocale=en, and NATO’s Relations with Georgia, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ topics_38988.htm?selectedLocale=en

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Russia in the Background From the Russian point of view, intensified involvement of the Alliance appears as a threat to Russia’s traditionally dominant position in the region. But the EuroAtlantic organisation cannot afford to confront the Russian Federation, which is an important energy partner, particularly to Europe, and will remain so in the foreseeable future (Antonenko 2010). Even though Russia’s policy towards the Caucasus has not always been straightforward, Moscow will not tolerate any (interest- or value-based) NATO encroachment on the area (Baev 2001: 13). Russia’s reactions to the Alliance’s decisions about Kosovo were already a good indication of how sensitive the issue was. The intervention against Serbia and Montenegro was markedly decided outside the UN Security Council, where Russia has a decisive influence. Moscow took offense at being de facto excluded from the debate and at seeing the UN lose out to NATO as the leading international security guarantor (Jolicoeur 2008a). The common fight against Islamic radicalism that brought together Presidents Bush and Putin in 2001 did not last long. Russia raised an eye-brow when the Allies invited the Baltic States to join the organisation at the November 2002 Prague Summit, and a month later, when the Americans withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The debate reached its climax with US plans to deploy interceptor missiles in Poland and with NATO formal enlargement in 2004, that is, eight months after the Rose Revolution in Georgia brought a pro-NATO leader to power. Meanwhile, a young crowd was demonstrating in Ukraine in favour of another pro-Western leader, Viktor Yushchenko. Russia was prompt and resolute in its response to each of these events. When NATO struck at Kosovo, Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, en route to meet with Bill Clinton, had his plane turn around mid-flight as a mark of protest. When the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty, Russia withdrew from the CFE Treaty. When Georgian and Ukrainian democracies bloomed in their colour revolutions, Russia put pressure on them. Increases in gas prices, cuts in gas flows and restrictions in visa regimes were among the most controversial measures. When the US announced that anti-missile batteries were to be deployed in Poland, Russia declared it was ready to move its own missiles to the Kaliningrad exclave. When NATO agreed that Georgia and Ukraine would become members, Russia flexed its muscle to keep both countries out of the organisation, and the organisation out of the Caucasus. Throughout these actions and reactions, NATO was stressing its interests in the region, and Russia was trying to prevent it from any further steps in that direction. Such a situation has converted NATO-Russian relations from cooperation to confrontation. The Kremlin has continuously sought to preserve its influence in the Near-Abroad but has not always had the capacities to do so. After a long period of decline, the Russian Federation has – however – re-emerged as a major power. Enjoying renewed capacities, Russia finally intervened in Georgia – a logical decision in the light of the Kosovo precedent (Jolicoeur 2008b).

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This cycle of confrontation pushed NATO deeper into the Caucasus region. When NATO started to appeal for the respect of Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian sovereignties, Russia began to reaffirm its interest in these countries. For example, Moscow has intensified bilateral relations with Turkey (Kart 2010), an essential partner to implement the South Stream pipeline project, and got more deeply involved in the mediation process of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict (Danielyan 2010). Actors concerned about these developments called on NATO to increase its presence in the region. In August 2010, the Atlantic Community, an online think tank, published the results of its consultations on NATO’s New Strategic Concept. Quoting a journalist for Zerkalo and Milaz Military News (Sumerinli 2010), it suggested in particular that: • A new structure had to be established for partner countries to create a “safety zone”, similar to the European Union’s “Neighbourhood”; • NATO had to act as a potential mediator in the settlement of frozen conflicts, including within the South Caucasus region; • It was necessary to increase NATO participation in regional energy security projects. NATO’s Assistant Secretary General Jyri Sedivy welcomed the report of the Atlantic Community, emphasising in particular that the Alliance was already on track with deepening its relationship with partners. Sumerinli’s points show the trouble that NATO might cause in leaving the Caucasus region. Yet, the Alliance’s commitments in the area on a normative basis are fully dependent not on the Alliance itself but on regional actors. It is up to Georgia and Ukraine (the only two partners named in the Strategic Concept outside of Russia), to demonstrate their orientation and aspiration to comply with NATO’s values (NATO 2010a). The 2008 Bucharest Summit declaration, while officially maintaining an open-door policy, also codified a consensus to limit NATO’s engagement in the Caucasus, in accordance with the belief of allied members that the region is too far from Western values and norms. Conclusion: A Contest of Integration Models Neither realist nor constructivist theories fully explain NATO’s engagement in the Caucasus. A three-level division among Alliance members reduces prospects for a clear and unambiguous policy towards the region. The first one divides North American members (self-sufficient in hydrocarbon reserves and secure in its deliveries) and European ones (heavily dependent on Russia). For European states, material interests in the Caucasus are more vital than for North American states. The involvement of the latter seems largely driven by a desire to transfer norms and values, and can therefore be better explained with a constructivist approach, whereas the motivation of European allies seems to fit more closely

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a realist explanation. Within European members, there is another split between Northern allies – that need good relations with Russia for gas deliveries through the Nord Stream pipeline, and Southern allies – mainly Turkey, which hold the key for deliveries to the South East. The asymmetry in power and natural resources is too important to create consensus. In the first half of the decade, NATO has consequently displayed a diversity of interests, plainly visible from outside. Similarly, the Alliance’s attachment to humanitarian and legal values has not generated a corresponding policy for the transfer of norms. Compared to the level of engagement enjoyed by the Central or Eastern European members of NATO, the organisation has not spent equal human, financial and material resources to help the transition process in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Constructivism has found its expression in programmes like PfP, IPAP, PARP, and Intensified Dialogues, but the integration of each country into Euro-Atlantic practices has been more or less limited to joint military exercises and support for security-sector reforms. NATO has repeatedly called for the respect of territorial integrity and independence of Caucasus countries, and has likewise called on Russia to return to the CFE table. Such appeals can be understood in either realistic or constructivist terms. From a realist point of view, supporting Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian independence amounts to preventing Russia’s grip on these countries. An extension of the CFE regime would ultimately imply local demilitarisation, which would give an advantage to Caucasus states and an over-extended, underfunded NATO. While the 2010 Strategic Concept recalled the need to honour disarmament commitments, calls were then less vigorous than they were in the past. In some ways, NATO showed its willingness to attract Russia back into the practice and spirit of multilateralism. From a Constructivist point of view, Caucasus independence from Russia’s influence means the end of power-based relations and the integration into a interdependent world. NATO’s engagement has been limited, in the first case, by divided interests among member states, and in the second, by disagreements among the Allies about the region’s potential for real integration. Both perceptions have yielded comparatively limited output programs by the organisation. Yet, both Russia’s and NATO’s interests have intensified over the last half-decade. As the Nord Stream and South Stream pipelines come online, competition will inevitably focus on the Caucasus, which both sides are striving to court, each in its own way. This will be a contest of integration models. Success of NATO’s model will depend on the attractiveness of the Euro-Atlantic institutions, compared to Russia’s. It should not be taken for granted that Caucasus states will always choose EuroAtlantic partners over their Russian neighbour (Stone 2010). First, democracies in the region are still weak. In these circumstances, power elites could easily be co-opted by external influences. Azerbaijan here is a case in point. Even Georgia could, if deprived of any prospect for NATO membership, consider liberalism as a luxury that the country cannot afford; here too, democratic reforms could be in danger. Second, Russia has apparently initiated a new rapprochement with

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the West. In a surprising move, the Russian delegation to the Council of Europe unanimously approved a report critical of its human rights records in the North Caucasus (Barry 2010).12 Even more spectacularly, it showed, at the NATO Lisbon summit in November 2010, some interest in participating in the anti-ballistic missile shield. Third, the Kremlin has attempted to court the population of the Caucasus region. Looking for ways to overcome the impasse of repressive measures in the area, Moscow has started a program of major investments to stimulate economic development and improve local standards of living (Vatchagaev 2010). Given the close links between the Northern and the Southern parts of the Caucasus, these efforts might have a positive impact on the way Russia is perceived in the three Caucasian states. Under certain conditions, Russia could become in the future a more appealing partner than it was in the past. Bibliography Ake, C. 1967. A Theory of Political Integration. Homewood: The Dorsey Press. Antonenko, O. 2010. “Concluding remarks”, 8th Global Strategic Review, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Geneva, 12 September 2010. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/conferences/global-strategic-review/globalstrategic-review-2010/plenary-sessions-and-speeches-2010/fifth-plenarysession/oksana-antonenko/ Baev, P. 2001. “Russia refocuses its policies in the Southern Caucasus”. Working Papers Series, Caspian Studies Program, Harvard University. Barry, E. 2010. “Russian Envoys Back European Criticism of Kremlin’s Caucasus Policy”, The New York Times [Online: 22 June]. Available at: http://www. nytimes.com/2010/06/23/world/europe/23russia.html Brem, S. et al. 2009. Focal Report 2: Critical Infrastructure Protection, Zurich: Centre for Security Studies and Crisis and Risk Network. Capros, P. et al. 2008. European Energy and Transport: Trends to 2030, Update 2007. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Chillaud, M. 2010. “L’improbable nécrologie du traité sur les Forces conventionnelles en Europe”, Études internationales, 41(3), 361-82. Dandeker, C. 2007. “The end of war? The strategic context of international missions in the 21st century”, in Eight Essays in Contemporary War Studies, edited by M. Christiansson, Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College. Danielyan, E. 2010. “Moscow Pushes New Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Deal”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7(203) [Online: 9 November]. Available at: http://

12  Although this may be seen as yet another attempt by Moscow to fill the security vacuum left by the inability of NATO countries to craft a consistent engagement policy in the region.

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www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37151&tx_ttn ews[backPid]=7&cHash=851d4a23ce Dempsey, J. “Gas Crisis a Warning for Europe”. International Herald Tribune, 16 February, 2006. European Commission 2007. Energy Corridors in the European Union and Neighbouring Countries. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Gallis, P. 2007. NATO and Energy Security. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. GlobalPost, 2010. Top 7 Oil Suppliers to the US, 28 July. Available at: http:// www.globalpost.com/dispatch/100726/top-7-us-oil-importers# [accessed: 31 October 2010. Hoffman, D. 2005. The Oligarchs, Wealth and Power in the New Russia. New York: Public Affairs. Howard, G.E. 1998. “NATO and the Caucasus: the Caspian axis”, in NATO after Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces, edited by S. Blank, Washington: Center for Strategic International Studies, 151-227. Jolicoeur, P. 2008a. “Qui reconnaît l’indépendance du Kosovo doit en assumer les conséquences”. Points de mire, 9(4). Jolicoeur, P. 2008b. “L’intervention russe en Géorgie  et le jeu d’équilibre des puissances”, Points de mire. 9(7). Kart, E. 2010. Russia, “Turkey Expect to Deepen Ties in More Fields”, Today’s Zaman [Online: 9 May]. Available at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/ news-209722-102-russia-turkey-expect-to-deepen-ties-in-more-fields.html Keohane, R.O., Martin L.L. 1995. “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory”, International Security, 20(1), 39-51. Labarre, F. 2009. “The sources of Russian neo-mercantilism”, in From Putin to Medvedev: Continuity or Change?, edited by L. Black and M. Johns, Manotick: Penumbra Press, 102-4. LeRoy Bennett, A. 1995. International Organizations: Principles and Issues. New-York: Prentice-Hall. Lynch D. et al. 2003. The South Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU. Chaillot Paper No. 65, Paris: EU ISS. Monaghan, A. 2008. Energy Security: NATO’s Limited, Complementary Role. Rome: NATO Defence College. NATO 1999a. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Washington D.C., 24 April. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm NATO 1999b. An Alliance for the 21st Century, Washington D.C., 24 April, NAC-S(99)64. Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-064e.htm NATO 1999c. The Membership Action Plan (MAP), 24 April, Washington D.C., NAC-S(99)66. Available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-066e.htm NATO 2002a. Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November. Available at: http:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19552.htm

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NATO 2002b. Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, 21 November. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19548.htm NATO 2004a. Istanbul Summit Declaration, 28 June. Available at: http://www. nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_21023.htm NATO 2004b. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council – Refocus and Renewal, 23 June. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-072FDF66-CAA7770B/ natolive/official_texts_21015.htm NATO 2004c. Partnership Action Plan – Defence Institution Building, 7 June. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-072FDF66-CAA7770B/natolive/ official_texts_21014.htm NATO 2005. Statement issued by the Heads of State and Government participating at a Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, 22 February. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-941E3121-4FC79D44/natolive/official_ texts_21738.htm NATO 2006. Riga Summit Declaration, 29 November. Available at: http://www. nato.int/cps/en/SID-207C0594-1F0641CE/natolive/official_texts_37920.htm NATO 2007. Partners in the South Caucasus. Brussels: NATO Public Information, September. Available at: http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_20 07_09/2009_03_11DE1DB9B73C4F9BBFB52B2C94722EAC_southern_ caucasus_partners-e.pdf NATO 2008a. Framework Document on the Establishment of a NATO-Georgia Commission, 15 September. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SIDCBCAD959-BA10B3E3/natolive/news_46406.htm NATO 2008b. Bucharest Summit Declaration, 3 April. Available at: http://www. nato.int/cps/en/SID-E7111B26-CC23EB8F/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm NATO 2008c. Chairman’s Statement, Meeting of the NATO-Georgia Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 3 December. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-ED833296A5DD97FC/natolive/official_texts_46248.htm NATO 2009a. Strasbourg/Kehl Summit Declaration, 4 April. Available at: http:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52837.htm?mode=pressrelease NATO 2009b. Chairman’s Statement, Meeting of the NATO-Georgia Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 3 December. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_59698.htm NATO 2010a. Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Lisbon, 19 November. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ official_texts_68580.htm NATO 2010b. Energy Security and Critical Infrastructure Seminar, Tbilisi, 5-6 May. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-3AF1FEC0-178CCE05/ natolive/news_63846.htm?selectedLocale=en Priego, A. 2008. “NATO Cooperation towards South Caucasus”. Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 2(1), 50-57.

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Risse-Kappen, T. 1996. “Collective identity in a democratic community: the case of NATO”, in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, edited by P.J. Katzentstein, New-York: Columbia University Press. Rühle, M. 2010. “Energy Security and NATO: Emerging Challenges to Critical Energy Infrastructure, Statement at the OSCE Special Expert Meeting”, The OSCE’s Future Contribution to International Energy Security, Vilnius, 14 September, PC.DEL/906/10. Schmidt, P. 2001. “The compatibility of security organizations and policies in Europe”, in Europe’s New Security Challenges, edited by H. Gärtner et al., Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Stone, M. 2010. “Change Ahead for Caspian Sea States?”. World Politics Review [Online], 23 November. Available at: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/ articles/7129/change-ahead-for-caspian-sea-states Sumerinli, J.M. 2010. The Potential of the South Caucasus, [Online]. Available at: http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/Open_Think_Tank_Article/The_ Potential_of_the_South_Caucasus UNEP/GRID-Arendal, Major Mineral Fuel Resources in Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, Maps and Graphics Library. Available at: http://maps.grida.no/ go/graphic/major-mineral-fuel-resources-in-europe-caucasus-and-central-asia [accessed: 1 November 2010]. U.S. Department of Energy 2006a. North America – The Energy Picture II, NAEWG/SPP, January. Available at: http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/ NorthAmericaEnergyPictureII.pdf U.S. Department of Energy 2006b. Natural Gas Workshop Report, NAEWG/ SPP, 28 June. Available at: http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/NAEWG_ Natural_Gas_Workshop_Report.pdf U.S. Department of Energy 2010. International Energy Outlook 2010, DOE/ EIA-0484(2010), Washington D.C.: Energy Information Administration, July. Available at: http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484%282010%29.pdf Vatchagaev, M. 2010. “Moscow’s Approach to the North Caucasus Looks Increasingly Deluded”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 (209) [Online: 17 November]. Available at: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_ news]=37182&cHash=33e2d3d7b5 Wendt, A. 1998. “Constructing international politics”, in Theories of War and Peace: An International Security Reader, edited by M.E. Brown, et al., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Zürcher, C. 2007. The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict and Nationhood in the Caucasus. New York: New York University Press.

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Annexes Table 10.1

Caucasus Reserves at a Glance for 2009 (U.S. Department of Energy)

Country

Oil Reserves

Gas Reserves

Billion barrels

Trillion cubic feet

Armenia

0

0

Azerbaijan

7

30

Georgia Russia

0.04 60

0.3 1680

Total Caucasus

67.04

1710.3

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Table 10.2 NATO Countries Energy Statistics for 2009 (U.S. Department of Energy) Country

Oil Reserves

Oil Consumption

Oil Production

 

Billion barrels

Thousand barrels a day

Thousand barrels a day 

Albania

0.1991

36

5.4109

Belgium

0

607.9452

11.2183

Bulgaria

0.015

125

2.9250

Croatia

0.0793

106

24.2231

Czech Republic

0.015

205.9534

10.9702

Denmark

1.06

166.5128

262.1353

France

0.1033

1827.6548

78.9099

Germany*

0.276

2440.0192

156.7650

Greece

0.01

409.5562

6.7792

Hungary

0.02018

155.7178

35.5757

Iceland

0

19.6287

0

Italy

0.4065

1527.7479

146.5222

Luxembourg

0

51.2688

0

Netherlands*

0.1

1016.4548

69.0531

Norway

6.68

218.123

2350.1759

Poland

0.09638

533.1644

34.1396

Portugal

0

270.6219

4.7211

Romania

0.6

214

117.2673

Slovakia

0.009

79.3749

4.1141

Slovenia

0

60

0.005

Spain

0.15

1466.4274

27.2293

Turkey

0.3

579.4767

52.9806

United Kingdom*

3.41

1688.011**

1501.5026

Total European NATO members

13.5298

13804.6589

4913.8413

Canada

178.092

2150.611

3294.4175

United States

19.121

18771.4

9155.748

Total North American NATO members

197.213

20922.011

12450.1655

* Countries that combine domestic with off-shore production ** Includes Gibraltar

Nato’s Engagement in the South Caucasus

Table 10.3

175

NATO Countries Energy Statistics (Natural Gas) for 2009 (U.S. Department of Energy)

Country

Gas Reserves

Gas Consumption

Gas Production

Trillion cubic feet

Billion cubic feet

Thousands of barrels

Albania

0.03

1.0595*

0

Belgium

0

595.8347

0

Bulgaria

0.2

120.071*

0

Croatia

1.08

104.709

0

Czech Republic

0.14

288.9473

0

Denmark

2.17

155.7392

0

France

0.25

1583.5599

1

Germany

6.2

3399.6338

0

Greece

0.07

124.5913

0

Hungary

0.29

399.6245

10.7507

Iceland

0

0

0

Italy

3.33

2759.0197

0

Luxembourg

0

44.7794

0

Netherlands

50

1716.2384

8.9041**

Norway

81.68

163.1553

275.9315

Poland

5.82

576.8705

0

Portugal

0

171.1365

Romania

2.23

597.5298*

7.8167

Slovakia

0.5

229.3003

0

Slovenia

0

35.315*

0

Spain

0.09

1196.6135

0

Turkey

0.3

1238.3558

0

United Kingdom

12.11

3088.2968

118.8208

Total European NATO members

166.47

18590.3811

423.2238

Canada

57.91

3341.5759

639.6694

United States

244.66

22834

1909.9288

Total North American NATO members

302.56

26175.5759

2549.5981

* Figures are for 2008 ** Includes off-shore production

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Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus

Figure 10.1 Projected Gas Pipelines to European NATO States (UNEP/ GRID-Arendal)

Chapter 11

The European Union’s Policy in the South Caucasus: In Search of a Strategy Laure Delcour

The August 2008 Russian-Georgian war was undoubtedly a turning point for the EU’s role in the South Caucasus. In the aftermath of the conflict, the European Union gained a new visibility in the region. The French mediation, on behalf of the EU, was widely relayed by European and international media, showing President Sarkozy negotiating successively with his Georgian and Russian counterparts, President Mikheil Saakashvili and Dmitry Medvedev. In the wake of the conflict in South Ossetia, the Union thus seemed to emerge as a security supplier in the region, joining other international organisations previously involved in regional conflict settlement. Moreover, since the Russian-Georgian conflict, the EU has considerably augmented its overall involvement in the South Caucasus, inter alia through launching the Eastern partnership and opening negotiations for an association agreement with all three countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) in July 2010. While the Union has recently stepped up its engagement in the South Caucasus, to what extent can it be considered an influential player in this region? This chapter will question the capacity of the Union to influence developments in the South Caucasus – more specifically, to diffuse its norms and to act as a security supplier – against the current EU policy toolbox and objectives. Assessing progress in the EU’s policy in the South Caucasus however entails that such a policy exists and presupposes that the EU previously designed a specific policy for the region which was subsequently developed or strengthened after the conflict. But to what extent does the EU’s enhanced profile in the South Caucasus reflect a specific, consistent and clear-cut ‘Caucasian’ policy at the Union level, allowing for a real European engagement in security issues and an increasing EU influence in the region? By analysing EU activity in the South Caucasus since the collapse of the Soviet Union, this chapter will contest the existence of a consistent policy; it will rather shed light on the paradoxes of EU external action in the region and highlight untidy policy processes. The existence of an EU policy vis-à-vis the South Caucasus can be questioned against two parameters. The first parameter relates to the EU as an international actor, that is, to the existence of a policy at the EU level for the South Caucasus and to its influence: is there a vision among EU institutions and Member States for the South Caucasus and, if so, along which lines was it designed? Specific

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attention will be paid to the two senses of coherence in terms of EU external action,1 understood in the context of this discussion as: the coherence between national and EU policies (often referred to as vertical coherence)2 and the extent to which various EU policies are compatible with one another (often referred to as horizontal coherence)3 within a given geographical framework. The second parameter relates more particularly to the South Caucasus, that is, to its specificity in the overall picture of EU external action: does the South Caucasus constitute a distinct geographical framework in the EU’s foreign policy? In other words, does the EU consider the South Caucasus a region and therefore promote a region-wide approach, or does the EU instead mainly rely upon bilateral tools with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia? If so, does the Union pursue similar goals in all three countries? Here, exogenous factors and local developments (that is, the role played by other region-builders such as Russia and the degree of cooperation/confrontation between the three Caucasus countries, respectively) will also be examined to explain EU choices. The EU’s role in the South Caucasus will be assessed against these two sets of parameters. The first section of this chapter will draw upon endogenous arguments (that is, the specific features of EU foreign policy) to explain the low political profile of the EU in the region in the 1990s. The second section will show that the growing importance of the South Caucasus in EU foreign policy and the EU’s enhanced political profile in the region are not associated with a specific ‘Caucasian’ policy on the part of the Union, but are rather part of a new Eastern policy on the part of the Union, aiming at forging closer ties with postSoviet neighbours.

1  Article 3 of the Treaty on the European Union, while failing to provide a definition for “consistency”, stresses the need for it nonetheless: “The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies”. For an in-depth analysis of coherence in EU external policies, see Gauttier 2004, Nuttall 2005, Lieb and Maurer 2007, Portela and Raube 2008. 2  A related notion is interstate consistency, which centres on the coherence between policies designed and implemented by EU Member States (Gaspers 2008: 21). 3  This dimension pertains to the coherence between ‘intergovernmental and communautaire aspects of EU foreign policy and the consistency of individual policies formulated within these two dimensions’ (Gaspers 2008: 21). Horizontal coherence has often been referred to as the coherence between the three EU pillars defined by the Maastricht Treaty; the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 made this division into pillars obsolete.

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The EU, a Late-Comer in the South Caucasus A Forgotten Region in EU Foreign Policy in the 1990s Throughout the 1990s, the EU kept a low profile in the South Caucasus. The EU’s limited commitment mostly reflects the low ranking on its external agenda of what was then considered a remote region; on this view, threats emanating from the area did not immediately affect the Union.4 The area remained a terra incognita to many EU stakeholders. Among 15 EU member states, only a few (France, the UK, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Greece) opened an embassy in all three Caucasus countries. The same pattern holds true for EU institutions. While European Commission delegations in the 1990s became major diplomatic tools for the EU worldwide (Bruter 1999), the EC opened, in 1995, only one delegation in Tbilisi responsible for all three countries, the activities of which then focussed on aid cooperation and humanitarian assistance management. Among the former Soviet Union countries which overall remained largely outside EU priorities in the early 1990s, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were particularly neglected by the EU and most of its member states. True, all three Caucasus countries were included in the EU policy toolbox designed for the New Independent States (NIS) after the collapse of the Soviet Union, namely partnership and cooperation agreements (PCAs) and the TACIS programme. However, close scrutiny of EU instruments highlights how little attention the EU paid to the region and reveals a discrepancy when compared to Western NIS, where EU commitments were in the 1990s much stronger than those in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, as illustrated and explained below. As far as the contractual framework is concerned, PCAs came into force later in all three Caucasus countries (as was the case in Central Asia) than in Russia or in Ukraine.5 Moreover, despite the design of a specific type of agreement common to all former Soviet Republics, the EU introduced in the PCAs a degree of differentiation clearly reflecting its priorities in the former USSR. An analysis of the various agreements concluded with NIS shows that the scope and depth of these documents is more limited in the case of South Caucasus (and Central Asian) countries than for Russia, Ukraine or even Moldova. All agreements pursue the same broad objectives, that is: • to provide an appropriate framework for developing a political dialogue, • to support partner countries’ efforts to consolidate their democracy, to develop their economy and to complete the transition into a market economy, • to promote trade, investment and harmonious economic relations between the parties so as to foster their sustainable economic development, 4  See also Lussac 2010: 61; Lynch in Baev et al. 2003: 178. 5  PCAs signed with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia entered into force in 1999 (like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan), as compared to December 1997 for Russia and 1998 for Ukraine, that also signed the agreement earlier (1994).

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• to provide a basis for legislative, economic, social, financial, civil, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation.6 But the PCAs signed with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova set an important additional objective which was not included in the PCAs signed with South Caucasus countries, that is, ‘to create the necessary conditions for the future establishment of a free trade area covering substantially all trade in goods between them, as well as conditions for bringing about freedom of establishment of companies, of crossborder trade in services and of capital movements’.7 Furthermore, the political dialogue developed with South Caucasus (or Central Asian) countries in the 1990s under the PCA framework has not reached a level similar to the one that the EU had with Russia or Ukraine at the same time. True, the institutional framework underlying the political dialogue with the EU is similar for all countries that have signed a PCA. It includes a Cooperation Council at ministerial level, regular meetings at senior official level, and a Parliamentary Cooperation Committee at parliamentary level. The agreements concluded by the EU with Russia and with Ukraine, however, envisage additional, higherlevel bi-annual meetings between these countries’ Presidents one the one hand and the President of the Council of the European Union and the President of the Commission of the European Communities on the other hand. These highlevel meetings do not exist for South Caucasus countries. This discrepancy among former Soviet republics widened in the second half of the 1990s when, in connection to the forthcoming EU enlargement, Western NIS became subject to increased EU attention and benefited from a broader array of policy instruments (for example, Common Strategies) as compared to South Caucasus countries and to Central Asian republics. Discrepancies similar to those which arise in the design and implementation of PCAs among post-Soviet republics also may be found in the provision of assistance to the area by the EC under the TACIS programme (that is, the main policy tool used by the EU in the region immediately after the collapse of the USSR). In the 1990s, South Caucasus countries received less funds than some other NIS. Over the decade, the bilateral amount committed by the EC for all three countries totals €212.1 million,8 compared to €1,274 for Russia and €460.8 6  See for example, article 1 of the PCA signed with Georgia, available at: http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:205:0003:0038:EN:PDF 7  Article 3 of the PCA signed with Russia, retrieved at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:21997A1128(01):EN:HTML. Article 4 of the PCA signed with Ukraine also envisages the creation of a free-trade area. See http://trade. ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/october/tradoc_111612.pdf 8  Of which €66 millions for Georgia, €87.2 millions for Azerbaijan, and €58.9 millions for Armenia. All three Caucasus countries also benefited from TACIS regional programmes. See European Commission, TACIS Report 1999, COM (2000)835 final, 20/12/2000.

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for Ukraine. The funds disbursed to the South Caucasus countries accounts for only 10 per cent of the funds committed under TACIS from 1991 to 1999. True, the set of demographic, political and economic criteria used by the EC to dispatch TACIS funds among the NIS can to some extent explain such a discrepancy. In the first part of the 1990s, South Caucasus countries particularly suffered from the dissolution of Soviet economic mechanisms. As a result, they lagged behind some former Soviet republics in terms of economic reform. Moreover, the lack of progress towards democracy and pervasive corruption in all three countries can also help explain the limited amount of EC assistance under TACIS. However, considered alone, the figures of funds committed under TACIS are misleading concerning European aid to Caucasus countries. The EU has indeed provided assistance to South Caucasus countries using specific EC aid mechanisms outside the TACIS framework, such as the Food Security Programme (in favour of Armenia or Georgia) or humanitarian aid managed by the European Commission Humanitarian Office, especially in the case of Georgia.9 This assistance stems from the challenges specifically faced by South Caucasus countries, whereas TACIS is meant to support the overall economic and political transition process in all CIS countries. On the whole, estimates suggest that the EU allocated over a billion euro to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia from 1991 to 2000 (Coppieters 2003: 161). Thus, while political dialogue remained circumscribed, assistance (mainly outside the TACIS programme) has been the major instrument of EU activity in the South Caucasus in the decade following the collapse of the USSR. At the same time, some authors (for example, Alieva 2006: 3) point to the limited impact of such assistance, especially on South Caucasian societies. Overall, both the contractual framework and the allocation of TACIS funds reflect the EU’s political priorities in the former Soviet Union. Starting from the early 1990s, they show a greater EU attention vis-à-vis Russia or Ukraine, which are not only the biggest and most populated countries among the former Soviet republics but the geographically closest to the EU as well and therefore of strategic interest for the Union. In comparison to the Western NIS, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan ranked low on the EU agenda in the former USSR. A Weak Political and Security Involvement The EU’s weak involvement in security issues through the early 2000s can be explained by both external and internal factors. A number of international actors and organisations had been present in the region since the collapse of the USSR, which strongly constrained the EU’s engagement (Lynch 2003: 175). Whereas Russia has continuously played a major role in all three main regional conflicts 9  Georgia received €107.35 million through the ECHO from its creation until 2008. A first phase was completed in 2000 with the end of the post-emergency programme in the South Caucasus. Cf. EC Delegation to Georgia, available at: http://www.delgeo.ec.europa. eu/en/programmes/echo.html.

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(Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh), the negotiation mechanisms introduced for each of those also involved the United Nations (UN Group of Friends in the case of Abkhazia) or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, in the case of South Ossetia or Nagorno-Karabakh). Therefore, few options for a strong EU engagement existed. Moreover, since the early 1990s, the EU has been present in negotiation processes through its member states. France co-chairs (with the US and Russia) the Minsk Group created by the OSCE to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem; the Group also includes other EU member states, that is, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Finland. Germany, France and the UK (together with Russia and the US) participate in the UN Group of Friends of the Secretary General for Abkhazia. In other words, the EU’s involvement in security issues in the 1990s has been channelled mainly through other international actors or member states, thus downplaying the Union’s potential influence. The ‘subsidiary’ political and security role played by the Union in the South Caucasus (Helly 2008) mainly derives from its specific features as an international actor. Two features are salient here: the lack of a security toolbox at the EU level and the lack of coherence among the policy goals of EU actors. While a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was initiated by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the EU’s defence policy did not gain significant momentum until the end of the 1990s. In the years following the collapse of the USSR, the EU simply was equipped with neither the legal framework nor the policy instruments that would have enabled it to participate effectively in the conflict settlement process. Such a deficiency was obvious during the wars in the Balkans, much more than in the South Caucasus conflicts to which the EU paid little attention in the early 1990s. Owing to the lack of interest in the region and to the absence of a security toolbox at the EU level, member states remained the most visible EU actors in the South Caucasus. However, among the few of them involved in the field, interests diverged and also prevented the shaping of a political strategy at the European level (Helly 2008). By managing technical and humanitarian assistance which remained the core activities of the Union in the South Caucasus, the European Commission incrementally gained influence in the field. In particular, the EU was present in the breakaway regions of Georgia through various assistance instruments managed by the Commission, including ECHO. Since the end of the 1990s, through its assistance programmes the EC has been one of the biggest contributors to efforts for settlement of internal conflicts (European Commission 2009). However, the political dimension of EU action (under the CFSP pillar) remained particularly weak and the division of the EU’s external activities into several pillars undermined the EU’s influence. Overall, EU’s policy vis-à-vis the three South Caucasus countries in the 1990s highlights a weak commitment on the part of the Union. Clearly, EU activities have mainly concentrated on technical and humanitarian assistance and development cooperation which indirectly contributed to the involvement of the EU in security

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issues while reflecting the EU’s civilian profile.10 On the whole, however, the South Caucasus has largely remained outside the top priorities of the EU’s external agenda for the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union, from either a political or an economic point of view.11 Throughout the 1990s, the EU lacked a strategy asserting its objectives and its interests in the region; as a consequence, the Union was present, though hardly influential. The EU’s Enhanced Political Profile and Limited Influence in the South Caucasus Security Challenges at the EU Periphery: The Case for Increased Involvement Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic shift in the EU’s definition of its foreign policy interests and perceptions, which in turn has led to an increased political engagement vis-à-vis South Caucasus countries. While such engagement was triggered by a number of factors, the argument here is that security issues were instrumental in enhancing awareness of the region’s strategic importance, thus leading the Council to play a major role in EU action. Eastward enlargement was clearly an incentive for the EU to create a framework for the growing interdependence with its future Eastern neighbours. Following a request by the General Affairs and External Relation Council in 2002, the European Commission proposed a new initiative meant to strengthen links with the future neighbours of the enlarged EU (European Commission 2003). This proposal resulted in the European Neighbourhood Policy which was largely modelled after enlargement methods and strategy. Subject to their complying with ‘common values’, neighbours were offered participation in specific EU policies and programmes, including a stake in the Internal Market. While the Commission’s proposal undoubtedly marked a shift in the EU’s links with Moldova or Ukraine, it did not per se constitute a turning point in relations with South Caucasus countries that were not mentioned in the document drafted in 2003. In other words, enlargement alone cannot explain the growing EU involvement vis-à-vis South Caucasus countries. Political developments in the region, more specifically the Rose Revolution in Georgia at the end of 2003, contributed to focusing EU attention on the South Caucasus and constituted an incentive for enhancing links with Tbilisi. However, the EU’s reaction mainly took the form of political declarations as well as increased 10  The expression ‘civilian power’ was first used by François Duchêne, who defined the European Community as a ‘civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed force’ (Duchêne 1973). 11  Several authors point to the marginal share of South Caucasus countries (especially Armenia and Georgia) in EU trade in the 1990s-early 2000s. Cf. Leila Alieva, op.cit.; Bruno Coppieters, op.cit.

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and revised assistance to Georgia.12 Owing to its complex decision-making procedures, the EU reacted through the use and adaptation of its traditional foreign policy instruments (especially technical assistance which allows for greater flexibility) rather than through the design of a new strategy. Whereas political developments and the prospect of enlargement fostered greater EU attention on the region, security issues were decisive in strengthening the Union’s involvement there. The September 11 attacks contributed to the development of a sense of urgency in the EU concerning hard and soft security issues (Hill 2004). These attacks shifted EU attention towards the external consequences of enlargement, specifically on the need to address security challenges at the future borders of an enlarged EU. The bulk of these challenges (possible terrorist threats, conflicts, illegal immigration, organised crime and smuggling) indeed were concentrated at the EU periphery. Accession of Central and Eastern European countries would bring the EU much closer to frozen conflicts and in direct contact with fragile States, characterised by a strong degree of corruption, institutional weakness and a limited ability to undertake reforms. As far as all three states, to a different degree, were confronted to the above political and security challenges, South Caucasus countries gained an unprecedented strategic importance for the EU. The importance of the region for the Union’s security was first brought to light during the Swedish Presidency of the EU’s council, when the EU’s troika visited all three countries with a view to contributing to conflict prevention. The appointment of a CFSP Special Representative for South Caucasus in July 2003 was an additional step forward (Grevi 2007), reflecting the Council’s willingness ‘to play a more active political role’ and to foster coordination and consistency in the EU’s actions in the region.13 The Special Representative contributes to the implementation of the Union’s objectives, defined broadly as ‘assisting the countries of the South Caucasus in carrying out political and economic reforms, preventing and assisting in the resolution of conflicts, promoting the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, engaging constructively with key national actors neighbouring the region, supporting intra-regional co-operation’.14 The profile of the two successive representatives for South Caucasus, Heikki Talvitie (2003-2006) and 12  A specific Action Programme (Action Programme bis, 2004) was drafted under TACIS after the Rose Revolution. Following a donor conference for Georgia in Brussels (June 2004), the EU committed an additional amount of €12 million. The TACIS Action Programme 2004 bis took into account the political changes and focused on new priorities expressed by the Georgian authorities (for example, legal and administrative reform). Cf. http://www.delgeo.ec.europa.eu/en/programmesactions/2004%20-%20Part_Iand_Part_ II.htm [retrieved: 10 July 2009]. 13  Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP of 7 July 2003 concerning the appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Official Journal of the European Union L169/74, 8/07/2003. 14  Ibid.

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Peter Semneby (2006-2011), highlights a clear focus on security issues, with the diplomats having strong experience in post-conflict rehabilitation, refugee issues or minority rights gained with the OSCE.15 Following the nomination of a Special Representative for South Caucasus, the first Security Strategy ever adopted by the EU (a few weeks after the Rose Revolution, in December 2003) can be considered a turning point in EU policy in the region (Council of the European Union 2003). The Strategy is based upon an analysis leading to a greater EU involvement as a global player; it indicates that after the end of the Cold War, Europe still faces security threats and challenges, but it also stresses that ‘with the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad’(Council of the European 2008). The EU’s Security Strategy therefore calls for an active EU policy in a region which is identified as crucial for the Union’s security: ‘We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region’.16 This new perception of the South Caucasus as being at the periphery of the EU led in June 2004 to the inclusion of all three countries in the European Neighbourhood Policy, as also advocated for months by the European Parliament.17 Such an inclusion was also favoured by the EU’s growing concerns on energy security. Russian-Ukrainian disputes over gas (2006 and 2009) were instrumental in the EU’s search for alternative suppliers. In this context, the South Caucasus gained substantial importance for the Union in light of Azerbaijan’s reserves and of the whole region’s role as a transit area for Central Asia’s oil and natural gas to Europe. This section has shown that the EU’s growing engagement in the South Caucasus was not the outcome of straightforward and linear dynamics but rather of a disjointed and chaotic process. In other words, the emergence of the South Caucasus as an issue on the EU’s agenda does not derive from clear-cut decisions (Lynch 2003: 174); it rather stems from numerous intermingled factors and the actions of a various stakeholders. Owing to the importance of security and conflict-related issues, the Council played a pivotal role in strengthening the EU’s involvement in the region. A Missing Caucasian Strategy? Despite the EU’s enhanced involvement, coordination and visibility in the South Caucasus (for example, the opening of new Delegations of the European Union 15  See their profiles on the webpage of CFSP’s Special Representatives and Envoys, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=263&lang=EN 16  Ibid. 17  ‘The southern Caucasus has been left outside the Wider Europe-New Neighbourhood Initiative by the Commission. This should change, and the strategy should be extended to Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The three countries are members of the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Conflict prevention needs give the EU every reason to enhance its role in the region’, cf. European Parliament 2003.

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– then Delegation of the European Commission in Azerbaijan and in Armenia in 2008), European influence in the region has yet to increase significantly. The inclusion of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the European Neighbourhood Policy has been far from sufficient in addressing the specific challenges faced by South Caucasus. The key political tools of the ENP, the Action Plans, are negotiated at a bilateral level between the European Commission and each neighbouring country. While ostensibly sound in theory, this approach exhibits significant shortcomings in practice. First, Action Plans are ‘political documents’18 relying upon partner countries’ commitments towards common values and reforms. They do not constitute a legal framework. Implementation of the objectives identified under the Action Plans is therefore a major issue for the effectiveness of the ENP in all partner countries. Yet, developments in all three Caucasus countries display an implementation gap when compared to the objectives identified in the ENP Action Plans, although Georgia (and to a lesser extent Armenia) has recently significantly progressed towards a number of objectives. The implementation gap is readily apparent in the case of Azerbaijan. The second and third priorities identified under the Action Plan relate respectively to ‘Strengthening democracy in the country, including fair and transparent electoral process, in line with international requirements’ and ‘Strengthening the protection of human rights and of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, in compliance with international commitments of Azerbaijan (PCA, Council of Europe, OSCE, UN)’.19 Recent political developments in the country, such as the October 2008 presidential election (assessed by the OSCE as non-compliant with international standards), the referendum removing the limit on presidential terms (March 2009), the law coordinating the legislature’s annual agenda with the presidential administration (June 2010) clearly show that Azerbaijan is moving away from the commitments taken under the ENP Action Plan. In other words, ENP implementation is hindered by either the lack of political will or low political commitment, not to mention insufficient institutional capacities in partner countries. In addition, between 2004 and 2009, the ENP has failed to offer adequate incentives to Eastern neighbours to advance significantly in their reform processes. This is also linked to the fact that the EU’s leverage over South Caucasus countries is weaker than in other parts of the former Soviet Union. Indeed, South Caucasus countries have lower expectations vis-à-vis the EU (Lynch 2003: 179) than Western NIS, for example, Ukraine, which has repeatedly stated its firm willingness to join the EU for over a decade. Whereas Georgia and Armenia have also expressed European aspirations, the EU was not Tbilisi’s 18  See, for instance, the text of the Plan signed with Armenia: “The EU Armenia Action Plan is a political document laying out the strategic objectives of the cooperation between Armenia and the EU”, retrieved at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf 19  EU-Azerbaijan European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan, retrieved at http:// ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/azerbaijan_enp_ap_final_en.pdf

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foreign policy priority in the period 2004-2008 and still today it is not Yerevan’s closest ally. After the Rose Revolution and until the conflict with Russia, getting closer to the US and joining NATO have been the major goal of Tbilisi’s foreign policy while Armenia still primarily focuses on Nagorno-Karabakh and links with Russia. As far as Azerbaijan is concerned, the country pursues an independent foreign policy, a path which is obviously favoured by its impressive economic performance, based upon its large oil resources. In addition to serious doubts as to its effective implementation, the ENP has so far failed to address what were considered to be the main challenges raised by the South Caucasus, namely security issues and in particular local conflicts. Contributing to a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (through diplomatic efforts and support for the OSCE Minsk Group) has been identified as a priority under the Action Plans signed by both Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the differences between the two texts reflect the limited influence of the Union. While the conflict’s settlement is the first priority under the EU-Azerbaijan ENP AP, it is ranked seventh in the text concluded with Armenia; the latter also mentions the principle of self-determination of peoples, which is not included in the former.20 The report published by the European Commission on the implementation of the neighbourhood policy in 2006 explicitly indicated the need for the Union to ‘be more active in addressing frozen conflicts’ (European Commission 2006), thus acknowledging the neighbourhood policy’s limited impact. These shortcomings are not only linked to the bilateral approach prevailing under the ENP, but are rooted in the very nature of the EU as an international actor. The ENP is considered a cross-pillar or an overarching policy coordinating various EU tools, but the war in Georgia highlighted its inadequacy in addressing urgent, complex security challenges. The EU initially reacted outside the ENP framework, through both the mediation carried out by the French Presidency and the EU Monitoring Mission deployed in September 2008. Even this limited reaction was strongly constrained by Russia’s military superiority and reliance on hard power, as evidenced by the EU observers’ inability to access the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Clearly, the ENP demonstrates the EU’s primary reliance upon its traditional ‘civilian’, ‘normative’21 or ‘soft power approach’ to security issues in the South Caucasus. However, such an approach has yielded little. Such an assessment applies first to the EU’s bilateral relations with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. EU political and cooperation programmes concentrate on state-building, focusing on the adoption of EU norms in the Action Plans, on the rule of law and good governance under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

20  See EU-Armenia and EU-Azerbaijan Neighbourhood Policy Action Plans, and also Mikhelidze 2009. 21  These terms have been analysed in-depth in the literature, see for example, Manners 2006.

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(ENPI),22 and on support to internally displaced persons and rehabilitation in conflict zones. In other words, strong and well-managed states are seen as a prerequisite for the region’s security. However, such an approach does not necessarily coincide with partner countries’ preferences. For instance, while in the aftermath of the Rose Revolution territorial integrity has ranked at the top of Georgia’s policy agenda, the EU’s approach in this country has focussed on the rule of law as a preliminary condition for stability (Di Puppo 2009). As a result of the mismatch between the ENP and Georgian domestic agenda, ENP objectives played no major explicit role in the Georgian government’s programmes in the first years of the neighbourhood policy’s implementation. The regional initiatives launched under the ENP display similar weaknesses. The Black Sea Synergy, launched in 2007 under the German Presidency, seeks to provide an added-value on cross-border issues which could not be dealt with on a bilateral basis (for example, environment) and to foster links among littoral states (including Russia, Turkey and EU member states) with a view to promoting stability over the long-term. The Black Sea Synergy’s poor record reflects the difficult security and socio-economic circumstances in the region, the weak degree of regional cooperation around this sea basin and the often competing policies of regional stakeholders. In particular, the evolution of the regional context confronts the EU with a new situation characterised by three major factors: Russia’s strong hold around the Black Sea and its resistance to increased EU influence in the region; Ukraine’s rapprochement with Russia and its possible positioning as a regional actor; Turkey’s assertiveness as a regional actor and its rapprochement with Russia (Delcour and Manoli 2010). The Eastern Partnership: A Shift in the EU’s Influence in the South Caucasus? The Eastern Partnership initiated in 2008 by Poland and Sweden (Polish-Swedish proposal 2008) and launched in 2009 may however result in an increased EU influence in the South Caucasus. It includes both a bilateral track significantly stepping up relations with the EU and four regional thematic platforms gathering the six Eastern neighbours (the three Caucasus countries, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). The deepening of EU-partner countries’ relations foreseen under the bilateral track implies further approximation with the EU acquis, especially with trade-related acquis for the negotiation of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements and with Justice and Home Affairs-related acquis for the conclusion of Mobility and Security Pacts. In other words, the EU’s offer under the Eastern Partnership (and especially the prospect of association agreements) is significantly more attractive to Caucasus countries; however, it also entails important political, administrative and financial costs for partner countries to meet EU requirements and to approximate their legal framework with the acquis. Since the Eastern 22  The ENPI (European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument) replaced TACIS for NIS and MEDA for the Southern Mediterranean in January 2007.

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Partnership was launched, significant progress in converging with EU norms has been noted in Georgia. In line with the ‘more-for-more approach’ developed by the EU (European Commission 2011), the country increasingly appears as a frontrunner in ENP implementation in the South Caucasus. To sum up, recent developments show that Caucasus countries are no longer perceived as laggards under the ENP. The opening of negotiations for association agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia should be considered a strong political signal on the part of the EU, which is expected to bring Caucasus countries at a level of relations similar to the one proposed to Ukraine. To some extent, the additional socialisation mechanisms provided by the multilateral track may foster links among Eastern partners and contribute to the emergence of the ‘Eastern neighbourhood’23 as a region. At the same time, only Georgia and to a lesser extent Armenia seem committed to getting closer to the EU. In other words, South Caucasus is no longer a region when it comes to EU policy and ENP implementation; Georgia, in particular, clearly perceives itself closer to Western NIS’. Conclusion The EU’s influence in the South Caucasus since the collapse of the Soviet Union has remained limited, owing to a combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. As far as the former are concerned, the Union’s influence stumbles on the lack of hard security tools and its reluctance to use negative conditionality. While such weaknesses are not specific to the South Caucasus, they affect there the whole EU’s policy in a more negative way owing to the prevalence of security challenges in the region. The EU’s influence is also hampered by the absence of common policies in areas which are key for relations with the South Caucasus, for example, energy. Moreover, the impact of EU actions has suffered from the lack of coherence between EU member states. As a result of endogenous constraints, until the early 2000s, the South Caucasus remained largely outside the EU’s external agenda and EU commitments (for example, the case of conflict prevention) have often fallen short at the time of implementation. At the same time, EU approaches towards the South Caucasus have been deeply affected by local and regional developments. First, the EU’s role has been strongly constrained by the intervention of other regional powers, primarily Russia. Second, deep differences and conflicts between the three countries have also prevented the Union from effectively utilising its traditional support for regional cooperation. Since the South Caucasus ‘does not constitute a region in a positive meaning’ (Coppieters 2004: 164), the EU chose to integrate Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan within the wider framework of the neighbourhood policy, 23  The expression is broadly used by the EU, more specifically by the European Commission in its policy documents.

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Popescu, N. 2009. “EU’s Borders and Neighbours”, EU Observer, http://blogs. euobserver.com/popescu/2009/05/04/eus-borders-and-neighbours [accessed: 10 March 2010] Portela, C. and Raube, K. (eds) 2008. “Revisiting Coherence in EU Foreign Policy”. Hamburg Review of Social Sciences, special issue, 3(1). Shapovalova, N. 2009. “The EU’s Eastern Partnership: Stillborn?”. FRIDE Policy Briefs No. 11, May. Sikorski, R. 2009. “The EU’s “Eastern Partnership” with former Soviet states holds the key to relations with Russia”, Europe’s World. Available at: http:// www.gees.org/files/documentation/doc_Documen-031.pdf. Smith, M.S. and Webber, M. 2008. “Political Dialogue and Security in the European Neighbourhood: The Virtues and Limits of New Partnership Perspectives”. European Foreign Affairs Review, No. 13, 73-95. Tardieu, J-P. 2009. “Russia and the Eastern partnership After the War in Georgia”. Russie-NEI Visions, No. 43, August. Tocci, N. 2007. “Can the EU Promote Democracy and Human Rights Through the ENP? The Case for Refocusing on the Rule of Law”, in The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for Modernisation?, edited by M. Cremona, G. Meloni, EUI Working Papers LAW 2007/21, 24-35. Trauner, F. and Kruse, I. 2008. “EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: Implementing a New EU Security Approach in the Neighbourhood”, CEPS Working Document, No. 290, April. Tulmets, E. 2006. “Adapting the Experience of Enlargement to the Neighbourhood Policy: The ENP as a Substitute to Enlargement?”, in The EU and its Neighbourhood: Policies, Problems and Priorities, edited by P. Kratchovil, Prague: IIR, 29-57. Vasconcelos, Á. (ed) 2009. The European Security Strategy 2003-2008. Building on Common Interests. ISS Report, No 5, February.

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Chapter 12

Armenia’s Foreign and Security Policy: Is Complementarity Possible? Tevan Poghosyan

Introduction Emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia has only recently reappeared on the world map. As a new state, with a growing Diaspora, it is still exploring its past and present security situation, which requires sustained analysis – in particular for a young political entity. In this context, Armenia’s security is important for its own existence, but also for the whole South Caucasus area, for regional powers like Russia, Turkey and Iran, as well as for the US, NATO and the EU. The region is indeed at the crossroad of the interests of many actors, from close by or far away.1 Much of the attention has been focused on the protracted conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the issue of existing de facto states. Over the last years, key political events have raised increased interests. Presidential elections were held in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2008; a referendum was organised in the last two states; and above all, a war was fought in Georgia. These developments have created a new environment for regional conflicts, military alliances and energy projects, while local societies are still involved in a transition towards democracy and a free market economy. Armenia’s foreign policy has been based on the prevailing view that stability should be reached by accommodating the interests of all the parties involved – even traditionally competing powers like Russia and the West, and by avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines. Cooperation among neighbours, open borders, peaceful resolution of disputes and maintenance of constitutional, democratic legitimacy are considered as the major tools for the prevention of renewed conflicts. Armenia is thus committed to shape dynamics in the region where cooperation could replace confrontation, where confidence and trust between people could underpin agreements between governments and where borders could be conceived as bridges instead of walls. Such a commitment was conceptualised in Armenia’s foreign policy through the basic principle of complementarity. This chapter aims at presenting Armenia’s policy of complementarity. It explores the Armenia’s security approach at both global and regional levels. In that 1  Among these countries, China, India and Japan are less often mentioned but increasingly involved in the region.

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regard, all the issues discussed here point to the need to move towards regional cooperation. It is not possible to have a secure region with closed borders, a lack of interaction between neighbours and protracted conflicts. Hence, for the sake of establishing regional stability, these countries should find ways to overcome their problems, launch a new wave of domestic reforms in favour of democracy and a market economy, and promote a regional common security system that would make it possible to face threats collectively. In doing so, the South Caucasus could turn from an area of instability and confrontation into an area of cooperation, peace and prosperity. The concept of complementarity was conceived to help reach this objective. This contribution analyses its effective content, its limits, current changes and its possible future. The Foundation of a New Concept: A Contextual Background The Conditions for Change Since the first days of its independence, Armenia has looked for a political and economic model. From the very beginning, it has called for the establishment of a democratic country committed to a market economy. In the process of building state structures, Armenia originally chose to conform to European standards, which implied the development of a parliamentary system. But the initial trend towards a parliamentary regime did not outlast very long. Like most former Soviet republics, Armenia also integrated in its political system features typical of presidential regimes, strongly inspired by French, Russian and US models. Mixing elements from all of them, it finally turned into a semi-presidential republic. Armenia’s foreign policy has likewise been oriented towards the integration of various influences. The concept of complementarity was introduced in Armenia’s foreign policy when Robert Kocharyan came to power and succeeded Levon Ter Petrosyan as President, in March 1998. According to it, Armenia would promote its national interests on the international scene while “refraining from competition and antagonism” and through reliance on “the potential of partnership and balance” among regional and global powers. In particular, it was directed to “resist the polarisation of geopolitical interests” in the region.2 In other words, Armenia would seek to shape an environment in which “the interests of Russia and the West overlap rather than contradict” (Khachatrian 2001). This concept, broadly if not loosely defined, has been long and intensively discussed by both the Armenian society and its elite. Armenia has traditionally been perceived as primarily coordinating its foreign policy rhetoric and actions with Russia’s interests and influence since the early 2  Definition provided on the website of the Armenian Mission to NATO, available at: http://www.armenianatomission.com/index.php?cnt=4&sub=12

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1990s. Yerevan’s close alliance with Moscow is rooted in history: Russia is viewed in Armenia as the country’s main security provider against any potential threats that may arise from neighbouring Turkey. But intense partnership with Russia also evolved out of necessity. Blockaded from the East and the West by Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia had no other option than to integrate the North-South axis of cooperation in order to advance its interests and ensure its security. However, changes in Russia’s position and behaviour have altered Armenia’s perceptions towards its strategic partner and the lynchpin for its security (Poghosyan 2005). From the early 2000s onwards, Armenian foreign policy has undergone some changes aimed at giving more substance to the declared policy of complementarity. Some specific events and trends have contributed to this move. The global war against terrorism created a new background for increased cooperation between Yerevan and Washington. In the aftermath of September 11, the US and Russia embarked upon a “new strategic relationship” and recognised their “common interests” in the Caucasus (U.S. Embassy to Moscow 2002). Building on the USRussia joint declaration, Armenia could adjust to the new geopolitical changes and initiate a similar rapprochement with the US. It could rely, in this process, on a strong Armenian-American Diaspora community,3 enjoying both financial and human resources, well-educated people and highly skilled entrepreneurs. Shifts in Russia’s regional policy have also raised doubts in Armenia about Moscow’s real intentions and reliability. In an attempt to regain influence in the South Caucasus, Moscow sought to improve its relations with Azerbaijan and took steps that became a serious source of concern for Yerevan. During a visit to Baku in January 2001, Vladimir Putin encouraged “a higher level of economic ties” with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan was included in the North-South transport corridor linking Russia to Iran through a strategic railway connection project. As for securityrelated matters, Armenia felt anxious about Russia playing a dual game. On the one hand for instance, Moscow extended the deadline for the presence of the Russian military base in Armenia;4 on the other hand, it sold S-300 surface to air missile defence systems to Azerbaijan.5 On the Georgian front, long-deteriorating Russian-Georgian relations, culminating in the August 2008 war and the closing of their borders, threatened Armenia’s vital security interests.6 Finally, Russia’s increasing cooperation with Turkey was another step that led Armenia to question its alliance with Russia. It raised concerns in Armenia that it could be used as a bargaining chip in the greater Russian-Turkish game. In December 2004, Putin

3  There are an estimated 1.4 million Armenians living in the US. 4  “Armenia to host Russian military base for 49 years”. Panorama.am [Online: 5 August 2010]. Available at: http://www.panorama.am/en/politics/2010/08/05/baxdasaryansecurity/ 5  “Russia to sell S-300 defense systems to Azerbaijan”, News.Az [Online: 29 July 2010]. Available at: http://news.az/articles/20018 6  Most vital supplies come to Armenia from Russia through Georgia.

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paid an official visit to Ankara,7 which resulted in the effective intensification of their multi-dimensional partnership. All these events, touching sensitive issues for Armenia’s security, definitely undermined perceptions of the Russian leadership in Armenia. Besides, Russian-Armenian bilateral relations did not produce the expected results in the economic sphere and added to Yerevan’s confusion. The Armenian government ceded to Russian companies a significant part of the country’s economic assets in debt-for-equity swaps. In its efforts to cancel its debt and moderate Russian gas prices, Armenia thus became a “hostage” to Russian capital. But Russian investments were delayed and have remained relatively low. These issues could not but fail to have implications on public opinion in Armenia. Average citizens could hardly understand the rationale behind Russia’s actions. A series of polls, conducted by a leading Armenian think-tank in 2005, showed the erosion of formerly prevalent pro-Russian sympathies in Armenian public opinion. According to the survey, 56 percent of the public considered Russia as restricting Armenia’s independence and state-building (Armenian Center for National and international Studies 2005a).8 For 72 per cent of them, the main country or institution promoting these objectives was in fact the EU. A Sustainable Trend? To address the challenges that these developments have raised, Armenia has turned towards other partners. True, its freedom to manoeuvre has been somehow limited by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and related consequences such as the blockade, refugees and political relations with its neighbours. Still, the Armenian leadership has clearly expressed its desire to strengthen relations with NATO and the EU to become a true member of the Euro-Atlantic community. It has developed new cooperation programmes with the US and NATO in the field of security. Armenia has for example adopted NATO IPAP in December 2005. Yerevan also got closer to the US and the EU in order to promote economic and political reforms. In that regard, Armenia endorsed a series of measures as a member of the ENP, in which it was included in 2004. Echoing Armenia’s foreign policy concept of complementarity, the defined objective of the ENP was to “prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe” (ENPI-Armenia 2006). The EU’s Eastern Partnership, created in May 2009, then opened up new opportunities that the Armenian leadership declared it was determined to use. However, the regional constraints from the 1990s, that is, closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey that determined Armenia’s privileged relations with Russia, are still in place. In some ways, Armenia diversified also its partnerships by developing links with Iran, especially in the energy sector, but cooperation has 7  This was the first Russian presidential visit to Turkey since the end of the Cold War. 8  But at the same time, 89 per cent of them viewed Russia as a “friend” of Armenia when Armenia’s national and international security is at stake, cf. ACNIS 2005b.

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remained focused on transportation routes and trade exchange. Given the lack of infrastructure and Iran’s autarkic economy, prospects for deepening relations between these two countries are limited. Bilateral trade has indeed stagnated to such a point that Iran barely appeared among the top ten trading partners of Armenia in 2004 (with Russia, Belgium, and Israel being the top three). Given its isolation and above all the enduring blockade from the East and the West, one may wonder whether efforts aimed at restoring a better balance through complementary could effectively be sustained. Implementing Complementarity: Institutional Cooperation with NATO and the EU Cooperation with NATO: An Awkward Partnership? NATO’s interest in the South Caucasus has become stronger since the Istanbul Summit held in June 2004. The Alliance then decided to appoint a Secretary General’s Special Representative for the South Caucasus. After NATO and EU big bang enlargement to eight Central and Eastern European countries, Armenia was entirely accepted as a lying at Europe’s border. As such, it was considered as an immediate neighbour affected by the overall process of building European security structures. Even before EU expansion eastwards, Armenia was defined by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson as “a country which holds in its hands the key of long-term peace and stability in an important area which links Europe and Asia. It is more than enough reason to count Armenia for an important and valuable partner in our search of unified and free Europe”.9 But contrary to Georgia, which actively pressed for NATO membership and Azerbaijan, which more cautiously called for an “integrational partnership” with the organisation, Armenia has not adopted accession to the Alliance as one of its foreign policy objectives. The question does not appear on NATO’s agenda either. After the Istanbul Summit, however, NATO has obviously decided to consider the region as a whole more seriously and to do so without any further delay. Developing relations with all South Caucasian countries at a common pace could indeed allow for a more effective process. Even if none of the three regional states was officially invited to join NATO at Istanbul, the Summit was a major step in preparing for such possible scenarios in future. These developments have raised questions for Armenia. “In their heart”, Armenian leaders certainly do not doubt that full integration into NATO would provide effective security guarantees. But in public, they prefer to talk about “full participation in NATO programmes” and to repeat the official position that “the 9  Cf. “Armenia Holds a Key to Lasting Stability and Peace in the Region”, Exclusive interview of Lord George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, Mediamax Agency, November 2002. Available at: http://www.mediamax.am/?sub=interview_george_robertson

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issue of joining NATO is not on Armenia’s foreign policy agenda at present”. A certain change is however apparent in this traditional phrase. A few years ago, the statements did not include any reference to a “present” time. Whatever the ultimate intention, Armenia expressed its desire to intensify cooperation with NATO by joining the IPAP – a real step towards an equal pace in relations between the three Caucasus countries and NATO. In December 2005, NATO approved the Armenian Individual Partnership Action Plan. The main objectives defined in this document were: • • • • • • • • •

to hold regular consultations with NATO on regional security issues; to develop a national security concept and a military doctrine; to improve the defence and budget planning mechanisms; to ensure interoperability with NATO forces; to renew its military education system in general; to promote civilian participation in defence issues; to strengthen the democratic control of armed forces; to enhance public awareness in support of defence and security reforms; to coordinate activities of all the ministries involved in security issues.

After 2005, Armenia’s IPAP was twice updated, first in 2007 and then in 2009 (Armenia’s Ministry of Defence 2009). Armenia has also joined its efforts to NATO peacekeeping operations. It has deployed forces to Kosovo as part of the KFOR since 2005 and has sent a small contingent of troops to Afghanistan as a contributor to ISAF since January 2010.10 Despite commitments to closer relations with NATO, Armenia concretely faces a major problem which may limit potential developments in that direction. Because of its geographical location, Armenia is rather dependent on Russia for energy supplies and transported products. Under certain circumstances, Moscow could use this leverage to apply pressure to Yerevan. If NATO really wished to draw Armenia into its orbit, the West could press on Turkey to restore communication networks and establish normal, good-neighbourly relations with Armenia. In these conditions, Yerevan would certainly have more space to manoeuvre with the Alliance. Due to ongoing geopolitical dynamics, Armenia also faces a dilemma. On the one hand, a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will allow Armenia to strengthen relations with NATO and in doing so, to finally complement and balance its national and foreign security policy. On the other hand, a peaceful settlement of the conflict could only be based on mutual compromises. This would produce a new situation, with the recognition of a new entity – the NagornoKarabakh Republic – that would defend its interests, and maybe consider the option of unifying with Armenia. 10  For additional information, see NATO Relations with Armenia 2010.

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The European Union: Closer but Still Too Far? Even though NATO has played an essential role in the European security architecture, cooperation with the EU has been fully part of Armenia’s foreign policy objectives. From 1996 on, Yerevan intensified relations with Brussels by signing a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which entered into force in 1999. Armenia has also joined major transport projects such as TRACECA and INOGATE. In 2004, the country – like the other two South Caucasus states – was eventually integrated into the European Neighbourhood Policy, encouraging closer ties between Armenia and the EU. In designing its ENP action plan, Armenia granted much importance to European values, firmly anchored in cooperation. A “copy and paste” approach, using former reform experiences of other countries, would certainly have ensured the existence of an action plan, but not its implementation. Among the set of priority objectives defined by Brussels and Yerevan, regional cooperation will certainly be instrumental in developing successful political and economic reforms. From the introduction of the action plan document, Armenia has thus been invited to “enter into … enhanced regional and cross border cooperation”. With the institutional consolidation of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and later the Armenian integration into the ENP, Armenia has started to feel the impact of the EU’s interests and actions more seriously. But written objectives have not yet generated visible changes. Putting an end to Armenia’s isolation will certainly help Yerevan make further efforts to fulfil its commitments. The inclusion of Armenia in the ENP in 2004 has positively impacted Armenian society. The idea of bringing the country in line with EU membership standards has been intensively debated. During the discussions aimed at promoting scenarios for the future development of Armenia, worked out within the “Armenia 2020” project,11 a great number of people supported the option called “Going Home [to Europe]”. This scenario envisioned Armenia’s eventual membership to the EU. Even though the ENP does not consider ultimate integration of neighbouring states,12 civil society groups have vigorously talked about integration with Europe. By signing various international conventions and passing new laws and norms, such as those required to become a member of the Council of Europe, Armenia has established the rules of the game for public life. Far fewer people now question the idea that Europe is Armenia’s final destination, at least among high-ranking officials. Demand for European integration is likely to grow and push Armenia towards the West. The US has largely supported NATO’s and the EU’s Engagement with Armenia. As stated in a factsheet issued by the U.S. State Department in February 11  Armenia 2020  is a scenario-building initiative that focuses on the identification of alternative development models for the Republic of Armenia. See the website: www. armenia2020.org 12  Neither does the Eastern Partnership initiative launched in May 2009.

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2005 during President Bush’s trip to Europe, “the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy and NATO’s Partnership for Peace… [help to] build deeper connections between the nations of the South Caucasus and the more established democracies of the West”. In this sense, Washington “work[ed] together [with Brussels] to support the aspirations of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to further integrate into the Euro-Atlantic family” (U.S. State Department 2005). A year and a half later, the EU-Armenia action plan was adopted, offering a new framework to address political, economic and security issues.13 Securing Complementarity: The Role of the US Armenia’s Relations with the US The United States, as a leading power, has global interests and is able to deploy its influence all around the world. Its primary interests in the South Caucasus region range from counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation efforts to diversification of oil and gas routes. Three factors have shaped US-Armenia relations since the early 1990s. First, as a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, the U.S. Government has promoted the peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and thus played a key role in mediating the process. Secondly, the US has engaged Armenia to foster cooperation with Euro-Atlantic structures and actively supported ArmenianTurkish reconciliation, including the opening up of the borders between the two countries,14 which has yielded no results so far. In that regard, it has generally tried to rally regional countries in favour of an East-West-oriented cooperation, which would diversify external relations of the South Caucasus states and contain Russia’s influence in the region. Thirdly, the US has closely followed ArmeniaIran relations. Even though Washington has sought to limit Iran’s role in the area, it has not objected to Yerevan’s cooperation with Tehran in the field of energy. Armenian-Iranian cooperation could indeed alleviate the effects of the NagornoKarabakh war, and especially the economic blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan, and ease Armenia’s dependence on Russia in terms of oil and gas supplies. On the whole, US foreign policy in the South Caucasus has mainly been perceived in Yerevan as being less favourable to Armenia than to its regional neighbours. Azerbaijan has huge oil reserves and Turkey is a strategic NATO partner. In comparison, Armenia has not reached the same importance on the US political agenda. However, an important and well mobilised Diaspora has been lobbying the U.S. Congress and administration in an attempt to influence American foreign policy orientations. In October 1992, it succeeded in restricting U.S. 13  It was adopted on November 2006 for a period of five years; cf. Delegation of the EU to Armenia 2006. 14  For further information about the Turkish-Armenian border issue, see International Crisis Group 2009.

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government-to-government aid to Azerbaijan until the end of the blockade against Armenia.15 Armenia’s selection as a country eligible to apply for the Millennium Challenge Account – a five-year programme aimed at reducing poverty around the world – was, in 2006, another accomplishment of the Diaspora.16 More recently, in May 2010, some US-based Armenian Diaspora organisations opposed Matthew Bryza’s nomination as U.S. Envoy to Azerbaijan17 and finally Obama appoint him without endorsement of the Senate. As a result, his nomination was delayed (Grigoryan 2010) and is still debated. Despite the Diaspora’s efforts and some Western claims that the South Caucasus has always been on the priority list of US foreign policy, conflicts and threats around the world have not made it possible for Washington to really focus on the region (International Center for Human Development 2004). However, the US has provided Armenia with substantial financial support through the Freedom Support Act, conceived to help freedom, democracy and the market economy take root in Russia and Eurasia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In that framework, assistance to Armenia has totalled almost US $1.5bn from 1992 to 2007 (U.S. Department of States 2009). Since 2002, the US has also allocated funds to Armenia for peace and security, especially to increase its ability to control borders and interoperate with US/NATO defence institutions. In addition, the US has closely monitored the local political situation, elections and reforms in Armenia. In that regard, it can potentially bring about new changes by forming and supporting a new leadership. So the US has some leverage to put pressure on Armenia on issues critical to its interests. Armenian-Turkish Relations Turkey’s closed border with Armenia, contradicting international norms, has complicated Armenia’s relations with NATO and the EU. There has been no direct land communication between the two countries since 1993. According to Armenia’s official position (Sarkisian 2010), the border should be opened and diplomatic relations established without any preconditions. Armenia has expressed its readiness to negotiate with Turkey despite existing problems and

15  These restrictions are contained in Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, and were lifted in 2002, that is, in the aftermath of September 11. 16  Within this framework, Armenia received a $236 million grant. Cf. Nikoghosyan 2010. 17  These organisations expressed doubt that Matthew Bryza could serve as an unbiased envoy to Azerbaijan. The Armenian National Committee of America, for instance, issued a 10-page report arguing its position, cf. Armenian National Committee of America 2010.

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misunderstandings. As for Turkey, it has stated and reiterated preconditions before opening borders and normalizing relations with Armenia,18 which are as follows: 1. Armenian troops should withdraw from Nagorno-Karabakh; 2. Armenians should stop pressing for recognition of the 1915 genocide; 3. Armenia should officially and explicitly recognise Turkey’s territorial integrity. Turkey’s pre-conditions are viewed in Armenia as a way to deliberately escape discussions on opening the border. For Yerevan, even if Turkey is ethnically linked with Azerbaijan, the Armenian-Turkish agenda should be decoupled from Armenia-Azerbaijan relations and the NK conflict. Bundling two separate issues would only exacerbate tensions. As a consequence, Armenian officials doubt if the Turkish government deals in good faith with Armenia (Sarkisian 2010). The same applies to the demand for official recognition of Turkey’s territorial integrity. Ankara has criticised the reference to the “Armenian Genocide in Western Armenia and Ottoman Turkey” in Armenia’s Declaration of Independence, worrying that it could trigger territorial and financial claims. As many Turkish officials and experts like to point out, Turkey was among the first countries to recognise Armenia’s independence after the collapse of the USSR. It therefore appears strange now to ask that preconditions are met by a country which was recognised on the basis of a document that only later appeared to be problematic. Ankara’s official denial of the Armenian Genocide has resulted in extensive economic and political consequences at the international level, including in Turkey’s relations with NATO and EU partners. Unilateral economic sanctions has been widely used by Turkey as a “weapon” to retaliate against countries that officially recognised it or to intimidate those which could consider doing so. Turkey, for instance, targeted French, Swiss, Canadian and US companies by cancelling tenders and preventing them from making business on its territory.19 These restrictions could not, however, last long because of Turkey’s dependence on foreign investment and export markets. From a political point of view, the Turkish Government and Embassies have also been lobbying countries from the Euro-Atlantic community to influence their agenda with Armenia. But if Turkey wants to behave as a genuine NATO member and EU partner, it should normalise

18  “Turkish FM names preconditions for border opening”, News.am [Online: 25 August 2010]. Available at: http://news.am/eng/news/28761.html 19  As a recent example, Turkey concluded in March 2010 an agreement with a South Korean company to build its first nuclear power plant. Ankara thereby bypassed the option of a tender and possible negotiations with American companies (in March 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs had indeed approved a resolution that recognised the 1915 mass killings as a genocide). Cf. Strauss 2010.

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its relations with Armenia and hence, face the issue of the Genocide recognition.20 This could create the ground for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation, a pacified security environment and regional cooperation. Is Complementarity Possible? Prospects for Success Protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus have been the major obstacle to regional stability and the main challenge to Armenia’s effective policy of complementarity. The positions of the conflicting sides are so different that it has been impossible to find any solution throughout more than a decade of negotiations. Given enduring animosities fuelled by hate speeches, positions will hardly change any time soon. Each party is trying to bring forward arguments to support its own position, asking for the return of refugees, compliance with international standards, the lifting of the blockades, etc. But if positions are irreconcilable, then a common ground can be found on the basis of the parties’ interests. In order to find solutions, the conflicting parties – whether recognised or unrecognised, should be able to move from asserting their positions to understanding their interests. They should explore and define their respective interests to overcome confrontation and constructively discuss common security issues. In this case, solutions would emerge in terms of common interests, not common positions. Here, the role of international organisations like NATO or the EU would be to create a favourable environment to ease regional security concerns and help the parties understand and define their interests. This could be based on the experience of transition in Central and Eastern Europe, where relations between countries changed from a competitive “Cold War” to a cooperative “Win-Win” mentality in the field of security, thus extending the zone of peace in the EuroAtlantic area. Bringing the three South Caucasian states together with European countries which have completed or will shortly complete their way to EuroAtlantic structures could create the proper conditions to alleviate perceptions of threats and prepare for cooperation. However, including the South Caucasian countries in the Euro-Atlantic space would not automatically enhance regional security cooperation. In their efforts to promote regional security, NATO and the EU will have to define relevant criteria. In order to promote the settlement of conflicts, each case should be characterised according to a realistic assessment of the situation on the ground, which is a key condition to achieve a lasting peace. In order to avoid creating a new dividing line, Armenia’s isolation should be ended by encouraging effective regional cooperation. It is true that each South Caucasus country has its own specificities and dynamics, but they are all in the same boat. The region 20  Inside Europe, “Turkey’s Accession Negotiations: Where Armenians Fit In”. Available at: http://www.insideeurope.org/eu-policies/enlargement/turkeys-accessionnegotiations-where-armenians-fit-in

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needs far-seeing, visionary and bold leaders who will do their best to prevent the boat from sinking. Neither Azerbaijan’s oil, nor Georgia’s sea ports or the Armenian Diaspora will separately guarantee prosperity and stability. Striving for cooperation in the economic field may be a key step towards a successful policy of complementarity and a further integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. Bibliography Armenia’s Ministry of Defence. 2009, Individual Partnership Action Plan – Armenia. Available at: http://www.mil.am/eng/index.php?page=50 Armenia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mission of the Republic of Armenia to NATO, About Armenia’s Foreign Policy. Available at: http://www. armenianatomission.com/index.php?cnt=4&sub=12 Armenian Center for National and International Studies 2005a, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy, Orientation, and Attitude toward Power Centers of the World”. Available at: http://www.acnis.am/pr/soc/Socio01eng.pdf Armenian Center for National and International Studies 2005b, “Armenia’s national and international security in the Next Decade”. Available at: http:// www.acnis.am/pr/security/Socio07eng.pdf Armenian National Committee of America 2010, “Opposition to Nomination of Matthew Bryza to Serve as U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan”. Available at: http://www.anca.org/assets/pdf/misc/BryzaNomination.pdf ENPI-Armenia 2006, ENPI Armenia Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_armenia_ en.pdf EU Delegation to Armenia. 2006. EU-Armenia Action Plan. Available at: http:// ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/armenia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf Grigoryan, M. 2010. “Armenian Diaspora, Politicians Protest Bryza’s Diplomatic Nomination as Baku Envoy”, Eurasianet.org [Online: 1 June 2010]. Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61198 Inside Europe, “Turkey’s Accession Negotiations: Where Armenians Fit In”. Available at: “http://www.insideeurope.org/eu-policies/enlargement/turkeysaccession-negotiations-where-armenians-fit-in International Center for Human Development. 2004. “Perception of SC by the West and Prospect of Conflict Resolution”, Policy Brief, 29 June. Available at: http://www.ichd.org/?laid=1&com=module&module=static&id=296 International Crisis Group. 2009. Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders, Europe Report No. 199, Brussels, 14 April. Available at: http:// www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/caucasus/armenia/199-turkey-andarmenia-opening-minds-opening-borders.aspx Khachatrian, H. 2001. “Armenia and Georgia Succeed in Reducing Bilateral Tension”, Eurasianet.org [Online: 30 October 2001]. Available at: http:// www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav103001a.shtml

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Poghosyan, T. 2005, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy: Towards Real Complementarity”, Central Asia and Caucasus Institute Analyst [Online: 23 March 2005]. Available at: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/2900 Sarkisian, S. 2010, “‘We Wanted to Break Through Centuries of Hostility”, Der Spiegel [Online: 6 April 2010]. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/ international/world/0,1518,687387-2,00.html Strauss D. 2010, “Turkey hits US business after ‘genocide’ vote”, Financial Times [Online: 23 March 2010]. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1d9ec10c36e6-11df-bc0f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Bg5ezG8Q U.S. Embassy to Moscow. 2002. “Joint Declaration on a New Relationship Between the United States and Russia”, Washington, 24 May. Available at: http://moscow.usembassy.gov/joint_05242002d.html U.S. Department of State. 2005. “U.S.-EU Cooperation on Reform in Eurasia”, Fact Sheet, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, 17 February. Available at: http://www.uspolicy.be/Article.asp?ID=16F24106-9D4B-4E8B-BCA8A47373EDD2A8 U.S. Department of State. 2009. “Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance: Armenia”, Fact Sheet, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, January 20. Available at: http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/104145.htm “Armenia Holds a Key to Lasting Stability and Peace in the Region”, Exclusive interview of Lord George Robertson, NATO Secretary General, Mediamax Agency, November 2002. Available at: http://www.mediamax. am/?sub=interview_george_robertson “Armenia to host Russian military base for 49 years”. Panorama.am [Online: 5 August 2010]. Available at: http://www.panorama.am/en/politics/2010/08/05/ baxdasaryan-security/ “NATO Relations with Armenia Relations”. 2010. Available at: http://www.nato. int/issues/nato-armenia/index.html “Russia to sell S-300 defense systems to Azerbaijan”, News.Az [Online: 29 July 2010], Available at: http://news.az/articles/20018 “Turkish FM names preconditions for border opening”, News.am [Online: 25 august 2010]. Available at: http://news.am/eng/news/28761.html

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Chapter 13

Balancing vs. Bandwagoning: Explaining Georgia’s Alignments in Security Institutions Levan Tsutskiridze

Introduction This chapter explores the key factors shaping Georgia’s foreign policy choices, and especially the historical, political, strategic, economic, and moral considerations that determined the country’s orientation towards integration into Western politico-military institutions. It describes Georgian perceptions of Russian and Western, that is, US and EU, interests in the region and reviews the first failed attempts to accommodate Russia’s interests in Georgia, in the hope of restoring the country’s territorial integrity. The paper also examines the conditions that led to Georgia’s disillusionment with Russia, from the “Rose Revolution” to the events of August 2008, when Moscow and Tbilisi embarked on a brief, albeit consequential war. It assesses the new reality that emerged from the war and weighs a range of options available in the pursuit of security and eventual prospects for reintegration. Based on the analysis of past events, the current environment and future scenarios, we conclude that, provided that Georgia’s foreign policy alignment options remain open, it will, despite the impact of the war and possible risks, continue to pursue closer strategic ties with its key Western partners since these choices do not reflect short-term but deeprooted decisions. The Russia-Georgia War of August 2008 set in motion the reformatting of the security architecture in the South Caucasus. By crossing the internationally recognised borders of Georgia and recognising the independence of the two separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia aimed at demonstrating and reaffirming its far reaching interests in the region. These events, however, were yet another climax of an already shifting status quo, both within Georgia and in the area at large. Georgia, through aggressive reform of its administrative, economic and military organisation, strove firmly towards the integration into Western politico-military institutions, thus finding itself on a collision course with Russian foreign policy priorities. This contribution analyses the perceptions, national interests, threats and future choices in Georgia’s attempt to secure an independent foreign policy.

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From Failed “Complementarity” to Aggressive Balancing against Russia The concepts of balancing and bandwagoning, which were first elaborated by neorealist writers in the field of international relations,1 are useful tools to explain the alignments of states in the pursuit of national interests. According to this framework, states may choose to balance the influence of a rival power by mobilising their internal resources (such as human or industrial power) or by aligning themselves either with other weak powers or with other, rival strong powers, when such alliances are possible. Alternatively, states might be forced to follow suit in the wake of a strong contender, in other words to “bandwagon”2 when such alliances are not available. In order to promote positive national interests, the balancing option is generally considered to be preferable as it provides more opportunities to maintain a given political course. Since the very first years of its modern independence, Georgia has tried to cope with its internal weaknesses and challenges arising from the war between the supporters of the then President Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1991-1992) and civil wars with Abkhaz (1992-1993) and South Ossetian (1988-1994) separatists. In addition to security issues, the country had to cope with a fragile economy, which caused widespread poverty, shortages in basic utilities and corruption spread across the entire spectrum of society. Separatist forces, backed by the Russian military from the onset, managed to defeat the Georgian army on both fronts and established de facto independence from Georgia. It was the first and most vivid illustration of Russia’s opposition to Georgia’s national security. While Russia allowed Chechen fighters to freely pass its Caucasian borders to fight the Georgian forces, provided ammunition, weaponry and at times aerial cover, the West and primarily the United States3 emerged as a supporter of Georgia in dealing with the dramatic consequences of these wars. It refused to back Abkhazian or South Ossetian claims to independence and provided economic, humanitarian and later political support to official Tbilisi. The West also supported Georgia’s territorial integrity within multilateral institutions such as the UN and the OSCE. From the very early stages of its independence, Georgia thus perceived alignment with the West as the only positive choice it could reasonably make. However, Georgia also made a desperate foreign policy move by joining the CIS and agreeing with the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in the two separatist regions. According to Georgia’s calculations, this step could help Tbilisi reduce pressure from Moscow and regain control over the breakaway regions. 1  See for example, Waltz 1979. 2  The term was first used by Quincy Wright. See Wright 1942. 3  The notion of the “West” is an interesting concept in Georgian politics and deserves further study. In the early stages of Georgia’s independence, the West was mostly perceived as a unitary actor; it is only after NATO denied membership action plan to Georgia that Georgian academia and decision-makers started to examine the divergent foreign policy priorities of the US and within the EU.

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By combining policies of balancing with the West (Tbilisi stated its desire to join NATO and supported the BTC Pipeline project) and bandwagoning with Russia (it also joined the CIS and appointed key law enforcement ministers who barely spoke Georgian),4 Georgia hoped to accommodate their respective interests and thus achieve a certain “balance of power” in the country, and perhaps even in the region – thus paving the way towards economic recovery and territorial reintegration. These attempts failed to either restore Georgia’s territorial integrity or to reorient Russia’s foreign policy towards more friendly relations with Georgia. The Kremlin’s continued support to Abkhaz and Ossetian separatists and aerial attacks on the Kodori Gorge within Georgia – claiming it to be a safe haven for Chechen terrorists – further undermined the atmosphere of trust towards Moscow. Under Shevardnadze’s power (1992-2003), the policy of “complementarity” did not produce the expected results: the territorial reintegration of the separatist areas and the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees to their homes. Shevardnadze’s rule, with rampant corruption, cronyism, influence of the “thieves in law5” and severe budget shortfalls eroded power legitimacy, and therefore any prospect of “complementarity” between the West and Russia in Georgia. The erosion of Georgia’s legitimacy, at both national and foreign levels, culminated in the 2003 “Rose Revolution” spearheaded by the energetic, Western-oriented Mikheil Saakashvili. Backed by frustrated voters, Mikheil Saakashvili was elected President in January 2004, after winning over 90 per cent of the votes. Saakashvili’s government, staffed with young, sometimes inexperienced but often motivated Western trained professionals sought to create a modern government, re-charge the economy and ultimately transform the nation into a modern, Western style country. On the foreign policy front, the new government was increasingly supported by the West but simultaneously faced with growing concerns from Russia. By launching a complete and successful overhaul of the police, revenue collection, the macro-economic framework, the education system and the armed forces, and pursuing aggressive policies to combat criminality, the new government achieved impressive political, economic, business and anticorruption reforms that were recognised by international partners.6 The path towards NATO membership was thought to be made shorter than ever. Along 4  Like Georgia’s Defence Minister Vardiko Nadibaidze, who served from 1994 to 1998. 5  This Soviet notion denotes a person of criminal belonging, albeit untouched by the law enforcements and thus accumulating significant material, often political and even public influence. 6  Recognition of Georgia’s efforts was perhaps best exemplified by the visit of President George W. Bush in Tbilisi in May 2005. This was the first time a US president had visited the Georgian capital. In his speech at Freedom Square on 10 May, President Bush termed Georgia a “Beacon of Liberty”, cf. US White House 2005. In the economic field, Georgia was presented as a “Top Reformer” by the World Bank in 2006, cf. World Bank 2007.

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with the re-building of the police and the armed forces, the government pursued policies intended to close the loopholes in its security systems. It was the very public exposure of alleged Russian spies in October 2006 that served as a final straw in the already poisoned relationship between Russia and Georgia,7 aggravated by Georgia’s pro-Western policy on the one hand, and unwavering US support to the new government on the other. Russia closed it markets, imposed an economic embargo, expelled Georgians from major cities and hardened its support of the separatists, both diplomatically and militarily. Political Reasons: “West is Better” Since the very first days of Georgia’s modern independence, the United States and most European countries stood by Georgia. Ranging from humanitarian aid to training and support in reforms, they provided Georgia with much of the political, diplomatic and economic assistance needed. Apart from these pragmatic and daily issues, there were broader political factors that determined Georgia’s course towards integration into Western politico-military institutions. The aspiration towards building democracy in Georgia has been an important socio-political objective. Georgia is far from being a full-fledged, traditional democracy: there are widespread hostile perceptions towards ethnic, religious, sexual and other minorities; the opinions of political minorities can often be ignored; the judiciary’s independence is contested; major television channels exhibit a strong proGovernment bias while minor TV stations openly support the opposing groups; presidential and parliamentary elections of 2008 were criticised by watchdog institutions and are still debated by some political forces.8 Still, the political discourse in Georgia is centred on democracy, transparency and the rule of law, however biased or superficial the claims made by some politicians may seem. On a broader scale, the society is largely oriented towards achieving greater democracy. Though the notion of “sovereign democracy” is unknown in Georgia, and however inappropriate the government’s actions may have been during the Fall of 2007,9 Georgia still stands out as the most democratic country in the Caucasus and Central Asia. For the first time in the post-Soviet space, a dynastic transfer of power took place in Azerbaijan (2003), whereas in Armenia, presidential elections (2008) were followed by mass protests, arrests and deaths. As for Central Asian 7  Georgia then handed over four alleged Russian spies to the OSCE. The event was widely publicised by the Georgian media and captured international publicity as well. 8  The statements by local observer organisations on the 2008 presidential elections were listed by the online newspaper Civil Georgia, cf. “Media Centre, Press Releases/ Statements”. Civil Georgia, 26 December 2007. 9  In November 2007, the Georgian government used riot police to disperse protesters and then security forces, which entered the opposition TV station Imedi, accused of fuelling unrest. The station was consequently shut down.

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states, they are mostly governed by authoritarian regimes. By contrast, Georgian society has demonstrated a clear “choice” for democracy. These values, though often trespassed by politicians, still hold firm in Georgia. Georgians are for example unlikely to accept the authority of a President who has not been elected by a majority. The problem therefore lies not in Georgia’s democratic but in its liberal credentials, in the pursuit of which its society has a long journey to make. But on the whole, despite flawed decision making, veering off course and often radical judgments that would be unacceptable in established democracies, the mainstream political debate is focused on democratic development. Western-style democracy is seen as the point of departure in Georgia’s domestic political debate. The West is viewed as a model for good governance, fair elections, welfare and security. It is considered to be the region where the most just forms of governance have taken root. Key political organisations and major civil society institutions share this view. In other words, Georgians do not look elsewhere for a model of government. This attraction towards the Western way of organising socio-political life has undoubtedly influenced Georgia’s alignment. However unconscious the acceptance of such choices may be for the large part of population, the Western model has so far not been questioned, even in the face of the Russian-Georgian war. As a matter of fact, no other option was available for Georgia. First and foremost, Russia has never made any “positive offer” to Georgia, one which would make territorial reintegration possible without jeopardising the country’s independence. The offer has always been one of “less harm”. While deterrence can be very credible and successful, it is not useful in making allies, and only helps in forcefully creating client states. For a true alliance to emerge, one need not only deliver a credible threat, but also share basic characteristics of a worldview, an important factor missing in the Russian-Georgian relationship. The policy objectives of Moscow and Tbilisi diverged at almost every level, which often led to political and diplomatic confrontation and to failed efforts to explore the potential of positive partnership. In an attempt to bring about functional and effective government institutions, reinvigorate the economy and unite the country, Georgia saw as its only option the integration in Western institutions, the alternative being deterrence by force, or inducement by Russia. In the process of coping with these threats, Georgia considered the West – no matter how insufficient its support may be – as the only alternatives that it practically had. In this sense, its policy choices were guided by both convenience and necessity. Strategic Reasons: “West is Stronger” Apart from the political attractiveness of the “West”, Georgia has also tried to balance the Russian influence and to forge closer ties with Western nations and institutions for strategic reasons. The fall of the Soviet Union has been of tremendous consequence and continues to shape opinions. The victory of an

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alliance of strong democracies over a strong but undemocratic empire with a fragile economy was an impressive achievement. As a country facing risks from a large neighbour, that is, Russia, Georgia has logically attempted to balance these risks by aligning with a stronger partner, that is, the West. Western support to Mikheil Saakashvili’s government encouraged Tbilisi to accelerate the accession process into NATO. Besides, the opportunity for more organised, democratic and transparent decision-making processes, coupled with more predictable and more stable inter-state relations, incentivised Georgia’s aspirations towards NATO. The alliance’s ability to successfully defend member countries and foster economic development through security was a telling historical lesson. After the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, Tbilisi was faced with two radically different choices. It could decide to bow to force, to bandwagon Russia by compromising its independence and thus to abandon its Western course. Or, it could choose a more difficult path and further risk its security in renewed attempts to develop into a modern, democratic nation, push for closer ties with the West and one day become a member of the Euro-Atlantic community. In the shadow of Russian guns, as Tbilisi is within the range of Russian artillery, Georgia has continued to count on support from its allies for survival in the short-run and development in the medium and long-term. Dissatisfied with the status-quo, Russia is currently seen as a country prone to war whereas the West is viewed as an attractive partner in political, strategic, economic and moral terms. Should the opportunity not be wasted or eliminated by a renewed war and Georgia’s eventual subjugation to Russia, the second alternative – leading to further integration with the West – is the one that Georgia seems to be bound to. In that regard, the key question now is whether Western political institutions themselves or Western countries in other words want to integrate Georgia; and if so, in which form this will be possible. Though Georgia dropped out of the CIS after the war,10 frameworks of integration into the Western community, that is, NATO and the EU, still remain vague. True, the establishment of a NATO-Georgia Commission in September 2008 created interesting avenues for cooperation. In particular it aimed at deepening ties between the Alliance and Georgia and provided significant assistance in damage assessment and recovery after the war. The launching of the Eastern Partnership by the EU in March 2009, that is, a major cooperation framework with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, provided additional support to democratic reforms, socioeconomic development and energy security. It also created opportunities for these countries to possibly conclude association and free trade agreements that would facilitate the movement of people and goods.11 But owing to the war, to European scepticism and to Russia’s influence on decision-making in Europe, substantial 10  Georgia announced its decision to withdraw from the CIS in August 2008 and finalised all associated formalities in August 2009. 11  For further information, see the EU Eastern Partnership website: http://www.eeas. europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm

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developments look rather uncertain. In such circumstances, bilateral relations with Western states may turn out to be the most viable option left for Georgia.12 Economic, Cultural and Moral Reasons: Is there a Russian “Soft power?” Outside political and strategic considerations, there were economic, cultural and moral reasons underlying Georgia’s foreign policy. For much of the Georgian population, the West means welfare and well-being, while Russia is associated to jailed business tycoons and daily social, economic and financial hardships.13 The West posits a more attractive option than Russia. Even if the Russian market is large and lucrative, it remains a lost opportunity for Georgian business. When Russia organised “ethnic cleansing” from its major cities by deporting hundreds of Georgian citizens and, in some instances, by preventing Georgian speaking children from attending schools,14 it dashed any hopes of popular pressure on Georgian authorities to change the course into one that would have been more beneficial to Russian interests. The strategy backfired both on economic and moral terms. The Georgian economy continued its growth even after the Russian embargo, while the possibility of a public rapprochement became slim. Georgia does not feel any longer that it is bound to its past. First and foremost, a new generation has grown up in Georgia. The educated youth speaks more English and other European languages than Russian; wealthy Georgians send their children to school in Europe and to university in the US, as more and more students go to graduate schools with fellowships sponsored by the US government and similar European exchange programmes. The US educational system enjoys a huge advantage over Russian institutions. They form the majority of the world’s top universities, while no Russian higher educational institution appears in the top 50, and only one in the top 100.15 The government initiative in September 2010 to make English the second language in educational institutions and to introduce 12  For example, the US-Georgia Strategic Partnership Charter, signed in January 2009, strengthened the formal framework on cooperation and emphasised relations in the areas of defence and security; economics, trade and energy; democratic development and people-to-people and cultural cooperation, cf. U.S. Department of State 2009. 13  Cases like booming Moscow and St. Petersburg being exceptions. 14  In March 2007, Georgia lodged an application to the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights against Russia for “harassment of the Georgian immigrant population in the Russian Federation”. See European Court of Human Rights 2007 and Khutsidze 2007. On 3 July, ECHR also decided that it would hear the case of Georgia vs. Russia over the deportation of Georgian from the Russian federation. 15  See for example, “Academic Ranking of World Universities”, which measures higher educational institutions by “the Number of Nobel Laureates, Fields Medalists, Highly Cited Researchers, or papers published in Nature or Science. In addition, universities with significant amount of papers indexed by Science Citation Index-Expanded (SCIE) and Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) are also included. In total, more than 1000 universities

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several thousand native English speakers as teachers in Georgian secondary schools will further accelerate this trend (Georgia’s Ministry of Education and Science 2010). Generational change means that the cultural and political affinities of future decision-makers and civil society activists will also change. The decline of Russia’s “soft power” (Nye 2004), something that would generate attractiveness towards Russia and Russian-led institutions such as the CIS, the CSTO or other forums, has favoured Western orientation in Georgia. The activities of the Georgian urban middle-class are no longer confined to the former Soviet Union. The dissolution of the empire opened up new opportunities and the August 2008 war buried for a long time any moral or cultural affinity for Russia in Georgian eyes. In the face of Russia’s trade and travel embargo and the breaking of diplomatic ties, Georgia has sought out and established cultural, business, educational, social and even family ties with Europe and the US – a process which was facilitated by new and more effective exchanges, and travel and business opportunities offered by Brussels and Washington. Ongoing fears of a renewed aggression have transformed Russia into a less sought-after partner. For most Georgians, Russia lost the soft power it enjoyed in the Soviet period thanks to a reigning ideology, a unified educational system and interlinked economies throughout the former Soviet republics. Now, Communism—a triumphant ideology in the region after the World War II is discarded for good, educational systems are different and economies much less interdependent. The only remaining link, that created by Russian and Georgian orthodox churches, which were considered as an important soft power instrument in the hands of the Kremlin, has not influenced political decision-making in Georgia at all. The results of the war have finally destroyed the “Russian option” even in the religious circle. The Russian-Georgian relationship was further strained when Russian Patriarch Kirill congratulated South Ossetia on “Independence Day”. In reaction, the Georgian patriarchate expressed its discontent and stated: “Such action is rather regretful and completely incomprehensible, because such a move means supporting a separatist regime, existing by means of force on Georgia’s ancient land, and recognizing [South Ossetia’s] ‘independence’, which has been declared as illegal [by the international community]”.16 Post-August 2008: The Game of Commitment The Russia-Georgia war in August 2008 introduced several new dilemmas in the shaping of Georgian domestic and foreign policy. The first question is how to continue with matters of security. Faced with the liberal use of military force are actually ranked and the best 500 are published on the web”, cf. http://www.arwu.org/ ARWUMethodology2010.jsp 16  “Georgian Church ‘Surprised’ Over Russian Patriarch’s S. Ossetia Move”, Civil Georgia, 25 September 2010.

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by Russia on the one hand, and the lack of credible defence arrangements and international commitments from the West on the other, Georgia has pledged to further strengthen its ties with its US and European partners. But it will have to go through several stages in order to ease tensions, reinvigorate investment and economic growth and stabilise at a time when regime change remains as a desired Russian policy objective. The first stage could be termed as “negative stability”. “Negative stability” corresponds to security devoid of any immediate risk of a new war, but also precludes the prospects of territorial reintegration and the withdrawal of Russian forces. Such a situation would enable Georgia to deal with the internal weaknesses of its institutions, democratic traditions and economy. In order to move towards reintegration and de-occupation, the country would have to confront its immediate threats first. These efforts would depend greatly on Western engagement. With the OSCE and the UN out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,17 where they were providing credible information to the stakeholders and some confidence-building measures, the EU Monitoring Mission18 and the Geneva Process19 serve as the only remaining sources of information exchange and incident prevention. But as the United States and Europe at large are more carefully following events on the ground, “negative security” looks probable, albeit not inevitable. The second and most challenging stage involves a change in the status-quo, with which neither Georgia nor Russia is satisfied. In Georgia, every government will be compelled to place reintegration at the top of its priorities. As for Russia, it is seeking greater control over energy export routes – in order to increase both its revenues and its influence in European affairs; Moscow also wants a more powerful say in global politics and an uncontested presence in the region. Tbilisi has been fearful and nervous about a possible new attack resulting from a spiralling out of control of the security situation or some pre-planned provocations – a factor that can produce erroneous judgments in small and weak states.20 In some ways, Russia has left the job unfinished since it openly stated its desire for “Saakashvili to go” (Charbonneau 2010). In such an incompatible framework, the status quo 17  The OSCE Mission to Georgia expired on December 2008 when the participants failed to come to a consensus on its new mandate in the wake of Russia-Georgia war. As for the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, its mandate ceased on June 2009, when the UN Security Council failed to vote for its extension, cf. UN Observer Mission in Georgia 2009. 18  The EUMM monitors the situation along the lines of hostilities (albeit only on the Georgian controlled side, since Russia, in violation to a ceasefire agreement signed on 15 September would not allow the observers inside the territory under its control). 19  The Geneva Process is the only negotiating framework in which parties meet to discuss the implementation of a ceasefire agreement and other related issues. 20  For example, in response to a question on bomb attacks in the Russian subway in March 2010, Georgia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Giga Bokeria said: “… allegations certainly raise alarms that Russia would use the subway attacks as a pretext to target Georgia”, cf. Lake 2010.

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can hardly last long. In addition, Russia is lacking any moral or political high ground in Georgia that would enable it to breed a new political elite and re-orient Georgian politics. In other words, regime change guided from Russia cannot occur in a soft, peaceful manner but only through direct intervention. Georgia and Russia look at the current situation as a zero-sum environment. Both of them are bound to either win or lose, with a mutually beneficial solution currently out of sight. Whether or not this framework is amenable to changing into a win-win environment remains to be seen, with much depending on numerous other factors such as the state of global economy and energy prices, the nature of the regimes both in Georgia and Russia, greater security architecture in the region and the willingness of the US and major European players to be a “part of the game” in this area. The key problem in the Caucasus had always been the asymmetry of foreign policy engagements. Russia views the region as vital to its interests while the US and Europe, despite official declarations and statements, mainly look at the area as part of their peripheral interests. This asymmetry of interests has caused the asymmetry of engagement formats. Russia used military force, the ultimate manifestation of hard power, to advance its interests and negate those of the US, NATO and the West in general; at the same time, the latter provided a greater engagement in areas of soft power (reforms, democratisation, trade, etc.) while shying away from integrating Georgia and marshalling stronger and longer lasting responses to the Russian intervention. This asymmetry of engagements also played a role in precipitating the conflict. The assurances of eventual Georgian accession to NATO and the extent of the support provided added to Georgia’s enthusiasm and Russia’s resolve to war. Whether and how this asymmetry can be solved, with Georgia wishing that Western engagement would outweigh Russian influence, is another critical question. In the absence of any formal security or defence “promise” towards Georgia that would guarantee credible military support in case of a new war, several important questions arise concerning Georgia’s future security. What would happen should Russian decision-makers deem the costs of a new military intervention against Georgia to be lower than the benefits? Will the Georgian state be able to withstand the offensive alone? It is in the light of these questions that some internal dynamics in Georgia should be assessed. Georgia can neither produce new defensive technologies nor withstand a renewed war again in the foreseeable future. So it has actively looked for support in terms of containing Russia and increasing the effectiveness of its own armed forces in homeland security and territorial defence. Georgia has embarked on a journey to reinstating its security through first attaining “negative security” and then paving the way towards de-occupation and re-integration of its de facto lost territories – something that can be called “positive security”. With Russia having lost the status of a peacekeeper and assuming the role of a “protector“ of the de facto independent regions, Georgia will only strengthen its efforts to integrate with the West. As “normalising” relations between Georgia

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and Russia will be impossible for quite a long time, the two countries are bound in the long run to antagonistic positions locked in a zero-sum game. Russia’s official recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence produced another, less discussed effect: the Kremlin has deliberately manoeuvred itself into a situation where it cannot easily compromise. Moscow could hardly retract the recognition, remove its military bases, allow Georgian refugees back and restore the status quo ante as stipulated in the ceasefire agreement without paying a high cost. In strategic terms, it has strengthened its presence at the crossroads of energy transportation and regional trade, offering an interesting gateway into the Middle East. Given the fact that it effectively committed its forces on the ground, Russia could hardly withdraw without losing the face. Thus, finding a face-saving solution for all parties involved will be a major task for diplomacy in the region. The stronger and the faster the commitment is, the better it serves the purposes of the one who becomes committed first and firmly.21 While Russia is now committed to the two separatist regions, it is now up to the West to clearly demonstrate (or not) its commitment to the region in general, and Georgia in particular. In any case, the task of peacemaking has become far more difficult now that Russia has formally recognised the two entities. There is, however, a significant deficiency in the Russian “commitment” stemming from the fact that the territories concerned are not “committable” in a conventional sense. These territories lack international legitimacy, especially considering the reality of ethnic cleansing that Russia itself recognised by signing various official documents (CSCE 1994, OSCE 1996). Commitment is more feasible where boundaries and principles are clearly identified, that is, one can more easily and effectively commit to defend internationally recognised boundaries or a principle of national independence than protect areas built upon ethnic cleansing, an internationally contested recognition or a situation qualified as an “occupation” by the US, the world’s only remaining superpower. In that way, Russia failed to deliver a universally acceptable and credible commitment. With the majority of population unlawfully relocated into other parts of Georgia, the West has an opportunity to develop a new, more effective commitment towards Georgia as a whole. In other words, clear Western or US “commitments” in the form of more comprehensive security mechanisms would create a much higher “political price wall” against the escalation of tensions for both sides. It would also pave the way for diplomacy in finding a mutually acceptable outcome in the best case, and at least a tolerable one. Russia became committed first in an attempt to pre-empt a full Western engagement in the region in the form of NATO membership for Georgia or any other security formats. But should either the US or the EU (or both) find it possible in turn to look for new, more credible and sustainable commitment options, then better, firmer, legally and morally advantageous “commitment areas” could exist. 21  Schelling discussed in-depth the importance of “commitment” in international relations, cf. Schelling 1966.

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This would certainly increase rhetoric and the “war of words”, but actually reduce tensions on the ground. Western commitment would be decisive in undoing Russian commitment to separatism and ethnic engineering. This is important not only for Georgia but for regional security as well: should there be another war the risk of which has subsided but still remains, it will be larger, more devastating and will bring about more far reaching consequences both for the South Caucasus and the streets of Europe. Towards the Future: New Choices? Has the August 2008 war managed to re-orient Georgian foreign policy in another direction? Has it opened new opportunities or shut the existing ones? Regarding NATO’s expansion, it definitely managed to capitalise on NATO’s hesitation to grant MAP to Georgia and Ukraine – a decision contrary to NATO traditions, which consider development and democracy as coming after security. The Russian war also delivered a significant blow to the US influence and credibility in the region and was the main source of concern in Central and Eastern Europe. These were, however, short-term consequences. From the Georgian perspective, it shut all the doors to the Russian-Georgia rapprochement and hence produced opposite results to what was perhaps initially intended, that is, to halt Georgia’s Westward realignment. It will be almost impossible for any democratically elected government to re-join the CIS and even more difficult for them to join the CSTO. With the referendum held on NATO membership in January 2008, any Georgian government is bound to respect its outcome22 unless a new vote is held or preferences change dramatically. The dilemma of choosing either balancing or bandwagoning for Georgia now seems to be solved, at least at the discursive level. It cannot and will not ally with Russia unless it is forced to, or unless other significant changes occur in a broader geopolitical context. The key problem is whether the West, as vague as this term may sound, is ready to take up a new opportunity to embrace its neighbours, thus securing both the success of democracy and enhancing security in wider Eurasia. Much depends on the conduct of the Georgian government and its society, for they must demonstrate their true commitment towards building a better, more democratic state. However, history also teaches that neither good governance, nor liberal-democratic credentials are a sure way to security. Strategic interests often trump other considerations. It is the definition or re-definition of strategic interests in NATO, the US and Europe that will play a crucial role in the future of both Georgia and the South Caucasus at large. Cynics say that the West will pay serious attention to the region only when tragic events take place. Regardless of

22  The referendum resulted in almost 80 per cent of the voters supporting Georgia’s integration into the Alliance.

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the uncertainties, both the political elites of Georgia and its supporters in the West should not waste an opportunity to prove that they are wrong. Bibliography Charbonneau, L. 2010. “U.S. suggests Russia wants ‘regime change’ in Georgia”. Reuters [Online: 10 August]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/ idUSN10272978 CSCE 1994. Toward a Genuine Partnership in a New Era. Budapest Summit Document, [Online: 5-6 December]. Available at: http://www.osce.org/mc/ documents/39554 European Court of Human Rights 2007, Press release issued by the Registrar, Inter-state application Brought by Georgia Against the Russian Federation, Press release – 190(2007). Available at: https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc. jsp?id=1111315&Site=COE “Georgian Church ‘Surprised’ Over Russian Patriarch’s S.Ossetia Move”. Civil Georgia, [Online: 25 September 2010]. Available at: http://civil.ge/eng/ article.php?id=22702&search=Patriarch Georgia’s Ministry of Education and Science 2010, “Mikheil Saakashvili Met English Language Foreign Teachers in Batumi”, 15 August. Available at: http://www.mes.gov.ge/content.php?id=1209&lang=en Khutsidze N. 2007. “Georgia Brings Russia to European Court over Deportations”, Civil Georgia [Online: 27 March]. Available at: http://civil.ge/eng/article. php?id=14868&search=Georgians%20banned%20from%20schools Lake, E. 2010. “Georgia fears Russian reprisal for bombings”, The Washington Times [Online: 1 April]. Available at: http://www.washingtontimes.com/ news/2010/apr/01/georgia-fears-russian-reprisal-for-bombings/ “Media Centre, Press Releases/Statements”. Civil Georgia [Online: 26 December 2007]. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=16688&info=p_m Nye, J. 2004. Soft Power: The Means of Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs. OSCE 1999 . Lisbon Summit Document, 3 December. Available at: http://www. osce.org/mc/documents/39539 Schelling, T. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. UN Observer Mission in Georgia 2009. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/ peacekeeping/missions/past/unomig/background.htm U.S. White House 2005. President Addresses and Thanks Citizens in Tbilisi, Georgia, 10 May. Available at: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/ news/2059773/post U.S. Department of State 2009, United States-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, 9 January. Available at: http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2009/January/20090109145313eaifas0.2139093.htm

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Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Boston: McGraw Hill. World Bank 2007. Doing Business 07: Georgia is Top Reformer in the Commonwealth of Independent States and Jumps Up the Globals Rankings. Washington. Available at: http://go.worldbank.org/CYZOLST9O Wright, Q. 1942. A Study of War. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Conclusion Annie Jafalian

Remaining faithful to its history, the South Caucasus still appears as “an array of contrasting ideas” (King 2008: 7). In light of the above chapters, regional security continues to send mixed signals of both change and continuity. Some developments like September 11th, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, and the August 2008 war have definitively transformed the area since the beginning of the 2000s. But at the same time, a resistance to change has also been noted in South Caucasian countries, leaving security perceptions, interests and policies trapped in the legacy of the early 1990s. Changing Trends in a Dynamic Security Environment War being a traditional tool for change in international relations, the FiveDay War was largely presented as having dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape of the region. As underlined by Sergey Markedonov, for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, “Russia played the role of the revisionist state” by officially recognising the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, thus modifying established international borders.1 Furthermore, in making such a decision, Russia relinquished its peacekeeping role de facto and took on the responsibility of protecting both regions. The Kremlin became strongly involved there in military, economic and political matters. However, disagreements could emerge in Moscow’s future relations with the Abkhaz and Ossetian leadership and thereby complicate Russia’s position in the region.2 These unprecedented steps may even have a “domino effect” throughout the North Caucasus, where Russia itself had to deal with its own separatist movements in the 1990s.3

1  With the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Sergey Markedonov also considered that Russia broke the monopoly of recognition (in response to the recognition of Kosovo), and thereby ended the Yalta-Potsdam model of universally-recognised standards and norms. From an international point of view, this signalled the failure of the unipolar system, and the need to define a new agenda for the post-Cold War world. 2  Iskandaryan and Minasyan added that, by leaving Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia were henceforth integrated into the North Caucasus. 3  For other references to potential instability in the North Caucasus, see Merlin 2009, De Waal 2010.

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For Georgia, in addition to leading to lost control over 18 per cent of its territory and worsened relations with Russia, the August 2008 war damaged the country’s reputation as a stable partner and transit zone for energy flows in the eyes of Western states. Nika Chitadze indeed pointed out that it undermined Georgia’s effectiveness as a functioning state and weakened its privileged position as a gateway from Europe to Asia.4 As a result of a sense of isolation resulting from the war, Georgia turned to its neighbours for support, especially moving closer to Iran. Opening a new phase in its diplomacy with Tehran, Tbilisi in particular eliminated visa requirements for Iranian citizens and agreed to increase regular air connections in order to boost tourism and bilateral economic relations. According to Burçu Gültekin-Punsmann, the Russian-Georgian war also shattered Azerbaijan’s assumptions concerning the East-West corridor. To the contrary of what was hitherto postulated, Azerbaijan realised that Georgia was not such a safe pathway to the West, and that Turkey could not be considered to be a truly reliable strategic partner. Turkey’s attempts to normalise relations with Armenia in the aftermath of the war led to a period of “turbulence in Azerbaijan” and deeply deteriorated the Azerbaijani-Turkish partnership. If Turkey were to open its borders with Armenia without conditioning such a move on some progress in the NK conflict settlement as was initially agreed, Azerbaijan would have lost its “leverage on Armenia” within the peace talks. Ankara’s move was perceived as a “betrayal” in Baku. When Azerbaijan decided to export its oil and gas through Turkey, it indeed expected the latter to serve as its security-provider in exchange. The energy corridor thus clearly appeared as a “bargaining tool” in Baku’s relation with Ankara. In an effort to adjust a perceived shift in the regional balance of power, Azerbaijan played the Russian card and for the first time in its history started to export some gas through Russian territory. As far as Armenia is concerned, the NK conflict became, in Richard Giragosian’s words, “the sole unresolved or frozen conflict” in the South Caucasus, at a time when an arms race and increasing war rhetoric in Azerbaijan were “heightening tension and increasing the danger of renewed military hostilities”. On the regional level, since the Russian-Georgian border was closed, the Five-Day War disrupted Armenia’s land communications with Russia – including transportation of supplies to the local Russian base. As a consequence, in the opinions of Alexander Iskandaryan and Sergey Minasyan, the war again positioned the long-discussed Armenian-Turkish relation issue at the centre of the political debate, thereby becoming “a matter of special interest and urgency for Yerevan”. The August 2008 events “accelerated” Armenia’s talks with Turkey in establishing diplomatic relations and in reopening their shared border. In October 2009, the two countries signed a protocol in Zurich to that end, in a ceremony attended by representatives of the US, Russia, France and the EU, and regarded as a landmark event. As a key regional power, Turkey reacted cautiously to the war and seized the opportunity to play a more active diplomatic role in the South Caucasus. By his 4  For additional comments on this point, see Chicky 2009.

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contribution, Mustafa Aydin showed that the Turkish government, concerned about regional volatility, paid “more attention” to its Caucasian neighbourhood. As early as August 2008, Ankara proposed a Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, to revisit the previously-designed Caucasus Stability Pact and bring together Turkey and Russia with the three Caucasian states. Based on a region-wide approach, this initiative enhanced Ankara’s mediation role in peace promotion in the South Caucasus. As Clément Therme put it, Iran, for its part, agreed to a “marriage of convenience” with Georgia that was favoured by the war but above all by the “reset” in US-Russia relations. As for the Iranian “economic entente” with Azerbaijan, and especially the signing of a gas agreement between the two countries in January 2011, this should be more interpreted as a “reminder” to the EU that Baku could find other export markets, than as a consequence of the FiveDay War. On the international level, Pierre Jolicoeur and Frédéric Labarre posited that the Russian-Georgian war “concretely set the limits of NATO’s progress in the Caucasus”. While the Alliance intensified cooperation with Tbilisi, especially through the establishment of a NATO-Georgia Commission in September 2008, its support remained limited “at the discursive level”. This sharply contrasted with NATO’s declared enhanced interests in the region since the early 2000s, and especially with its open-door policy toward Georgia, declared in April 2008 at the Bucharest summit. However, in a less common interpretation of the Alliance welcoming Georgia’s aspiration for membership, the authors expressed the view that the organisation, by referring to the authority of member countries to decide on membership action plans, had restricted the geographical scope of enlargements “well before Russia’s conflict with Georgia”. In some ways, Thornike Gordadze’s contribution reflected the same rationale: in Bucharest, NATO failed to provide a clear agenda or deadline for Georgia’s accession; under these circumstances, the war appeared as a means for the Kremlin to “test the international community’s commitments”. Inside NATO, the war also “crystallized the association of energy security with geographical security” (Pierre Jolicoeur and Frédéric Labarre). But considering the diversity of member countries’ energy profiles, limited Azerbaijani hydrocarbons (compared with world reserves), and prospects for LNG, it did not infer that the Alliance would deploy troops to physically protect oil and gas supplies. To these points Hayk Kontanjian added the availability of huge shale gas reserves in Europe, which could help promote European energy self-reliance and diminish the attractiveness of Caspian Sea resources. The August 2008 events finally marked, according to Laure Delcour, “a turning point for EU’s role in the South Caucasus”. Offering its mediation to the conflicting parties, the Union turned – under the French Presidency – into a facilitator of dialogue between Russia and Georgia, along with other international organisations already involved in the region. Having sent an EU Monitoring Mission to Georgia in October 2008 to supervise the ceasefire, Europe also “seemed to emerge as a

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security supplier in the region”.5 The EU’s higher profile in the Caucasus followed a period of increased European involvement in the area resulting from a series of events: the attacks of September 11 and intensified US-Russian cooperation, EU’s enlargements and growing attention to security challenges on the periphery of the Union, the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the inclusion of the Caucasus into the European Neighbourhood policy. These were all instrumental in the “dramatic shift in EU definition of interests and perception”. Continuity and Long Term Patterns in Regional Security Despite new developments transforming the South Caucasus security environment, there are still some older patterns of security perceptions, interests and policies in the region. This is especially true for conflict-related issues. Thornike Gordadze clearly demonstrated that the Five-Day War was just “the continuation of [Russia’s] politics” against Georgia, that is, the ultimate step in increasing pressure from Moscow since the early 1990s, aimed at preventing Tbilisi from moving toward Euro-Atlantic integration. The war thus reinforced the Georgian belief that Russia was simply opposed to the country’s independence and move to the West. From that perspective, Tbilisi considered that the Kremlin wished to overthrow Saakashvili and its pro-Western government. As a result, some became convinced that a relentless destabilisation campaign and even, in Nika Chitadze’s opinion, a renewed escalation of conflict, could not be ruled out, based on recorded incidents, claims and operations. Further discussing the question of the “domino effect” of Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Sergey Markedonov stressed the importance of historical circumstances leading to specific political decisions. Russia made its decision in a particular context, that is, after conflicts were de-frozen, status quo was changed, and all existing frameworks for conflict settlement were broken by Georgia. In North Ossetia, Russia is furthermore no longer facing ethnic nationalism but rather growing radical Islamist movements that create other kinds of challenges for the Kremlin, unrelated to the Abkhaz and Ossetian contexts. In any case, Sergey Markedonov presented Russia’s recognition as part of a longterm process, part of “the history of the collapse of the Soviet Union” and selfdetermination movements, whose endpoint “is still unclear”. Seen from such an historical background, the war did not change much in Russia’s position, except from a formal point of view. Widespread suppositions of renewed military unrest between Armenia and Azerbaijan over NK were also contested. For Alexander Iskandaryan and Sergey Minasyan, “the Five-Day War … failed to shift political realities in and around NK”. To the contrary, it “reinforced the existing status quo” in the area. Whatever 5  Its role was all the more useful as the OSCE and the UN mandates in Georgia were not extended after the war.

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the concerns, there is a conviction in Armenia that increasing oil and gas revenues and defence spending in Azerbaijan will not allow Baku to get the upper hand in NK. In the face of Armenian military capabilities, an Azerbaijani Blitzkrieg should be ruled out. Alexander Iskandaryan and Sergey Minasyan thus argue that the arms race should rather be perceived as an instrument for mutual containment and a deterrent to war. Moreover, for Azerbaijan, the Russian-Georgian war, and the position of external players called into question the efficiency of force. As analysed by Burçu Gültekin-Punsmann, despite an increasingly fragile ceasefire, “a deliberate military offensive from either side is unlikely in the near future”. Another item against a resumption of hostilities in NK, put forward by Richard Giragosian, concerns Azerbaijan’s alleged reluctance to risk a war that might seriously damage its national economy. As a result, the NK area should remain stable for some time to come. Faced with Azerbaijan’s growing discontent and pressure, Turkey’s efforts toward reconciliation with Armenia have ultimately not yielded the expected results. Since the early 1990s, Ankara has had strong interests in cooperating with its long-standing, historical, cultural, economic, energy and strategic partner, that is, Azerbaijan, in order to become a “regional hub” in the post-Cold War era, and especially to ensure gas connections to Europe through the construction of the Nabucco pipeline. Mustafa Aydin precisely recalled this point when he presented the general parameters of Turkish policies for the Caucasus. This fundamental aim contributed to Ankara’s “break” in the Armenian-Turkish normalisation process, which was finally tied to the NK conflict settlement. Whereas Turkey has substantially expanded its links with Azerbaijan and Georgia,6 improvements in its relations with Armenia have been limited. As for Iran, even though it may appear to be a helpful neighbour for isolated South Caucasian states or a default option to be used by regional states in their broader negotiations, its influence highly depends on Russia’s interests and policies. Tehran indeed needs Moscow’s support within the UN Security Council. This especially explains Iran’s initial reaction to the Five-Day War, when it “tried to capitalise on Western-Russian divide”. As Clément Therme noted, Tehran accused Western and ‘Zionist’ interference in the region for leading to the outbreak of war. In Russia as in Iran, NATO is perceived to be a direct threat to national interests. Taking this overall situation into account, Iran’s recent rapprochement with Azerbaijan, a country close to Israel, will likely remain limited. Its cooperation with Georgia, which is aspiring to NATO–membership, may even turn out to be unrealistic. If the August 2008 war “shut the door” to improvements in Russian-Georgian relations, in parallel it strengthened Georgia’s willingness to turn to the West. As observed by Levan Tsutskiridze, the West remains the only “attractive” model 6  Since the Rose Revolution, Turkey has particularly supported Georgia in its move to the West and NATO, in reforming its armed forces, and in increasing investments in the country after Saakashvili launched a new privatisation programme.

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available to Tbilisi, and a possible tool to “balance” out Russia, viewed as a war-prone power. A generational change, allowing young Georgians educated in American and European universities to hold key positions in the country, will certainly sustain this trend. So the war did not change Georgia’s intent to strengthen ties with the Euro-Atlantic community. On the contrary, it paved the way for enhanced commitment to the West. In Armenia, the war encouraged full implementation of its foreign policy complementarity concept, calling for partnerships and balance among regional and global powers. But Tevan Poghosyan noted that Armenia’s manoeuvring between Russia and NATO remained “limited by the NK conflict and related consequences” like the Turkish blockade. “Protracted conflicts in the South Caucasus have been … the main challenge to Armenia’s effective policy of complementarity”. Admittedly, the EU gained visibility in the South Caucasus but, taking stock of its effective action, Laure Delcour refers to European “limited impact” on hardcore security issues. As for NATO, Pierre Jolicoeur and Frédéric Labarre consider that despite “resounding official rhetoric”, the Alliance’s engagement has been “fairly limited” in the region. To quote them, “the Euro-Atlantic organisation cannot afford to confront the Russian Federation, which is an important energy partner, particularly to Europe”. *** Directly or indirectly, recurring references have been made to Russia throughout most of these chapters although none of them could be dedicated entirely to Russian foreign policy in the South Caucasus, because of a combination of complicated circumstances and time-lines. In the early 1990s, Russia’s decline and “power vacuum” in the former Soviet Union played a crucial role in regional conflicts and wars (Cheterian 2008). In the late 2000s, it was rather Russia’s “assertiveness” (Lapidus 2007; Tsygankov 2008) on the international and regional levels and the “restoration of power” that were put forward to explain security developments in the area. Considered as an enemy, an ally or a partner, Russia still appears to be a crucial point of reference that shapes security perceptions, interests and policies. In some ways, an intensive focus on external threats has overshadowed other core security challenges, whether internal or transnational. In many respects, democratic consolidation and economic development will be the additional and real imperatives for South Caucasian security in the early 2010s. Bibliography Cheterian, V. 2008. War and Peace in the Caucasus: Ethnic Conflict and the New Geopolitics. New York: Columbia University Press.

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Chicky, J. 2009. “The Russian-Georgian War: Political and Military Implications for U.S. Policy”, CACI Policy Paper. February. Available at: http://www. silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/Silkroadpapers/0902Chicky.pdf De Waal, T. 2010. “Call Off the Great Game”. Foreign Policy. 13 September. Lapidus, G. 2007. “Between Assertiveness and Insecurity: Russian Elite Attitudes and the Russia-Georgia Crisis”. Post-Soviet Affairs, 2007, 23(2), 138-55. Merlin, A. 2009. “North Caucasus since the Russian-Georgian War of Summer 2008: between Endogenous Conflicts and Regional Instability”. ISPI Policy Brief, October 2009, No. 159. Available at: http://www.ispionline.it/it/ documents/PB_159_2009.pdf Tsyganov, A. 2008. “Russia’s International Assertiveness: What Does It Mean for the West?”. Problems of Post-Communism, 55(1), 38-55.

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Index

Abashidze, Aslan 20 Abkhaz, Abkhazia ceasefire 2, 13, 106, 219, 225 ethnic composition 2, 110 IDP, refugees 14, 23 Iran 137, 138 Kitovani’s March 16 peace agreement 14, 107 Russia, base 14, 23, 38-9, 91, 110-11 Russia, direct relations 22, 23 Russia, disagreements 38-9, 110 Russia, involvement in the war 11-13, 26, 28-30, 51, 111, 209-11, 223 Russia, military build-up 23, 28-31, 110 Russia peacekeeping forces 13, 14, 23, 29, 38, 91 Russia, railroad 23, 25, 35 Russia, recognition 22, 25, 29, 33-9, 42-4, 51, 55, 91, 95, 106, 108, 138, 209, 219, 223, Russia, visa regime 18, 19, 27, 28 Turkey 119, 120, 127 US 23, 36, 43, 210 West 12, 46, 96, 210 see also CIS, Georgia, Kosovo, NATO, UN Adjara 15, 16, 20, 119 Afghanistan 3, 17, 18, 22, 25, 37, 44, 46, 51, 150, 200 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud 139, 140, 143, 148, 150, 151 Akhalkalaki 14, 17, 18, 114 Akhdamar 129 Aliyev, Heydar 69, 131 Aliyev, Ilham 76, 78-80, 83, 86, 87, 95, 99, 131, 145

Armenia, Armenian Abkhazia and Ossetia, recognition 36, 108 armed forces in NK 2, 55 Armenian General Benevolent Union 7 Armenians from NK 2 August 2008 war, lessons 36, 50, 91-2, 96-7, 108, 197 blockade, boycott, embargo 3, 47-8, 58-9, 80-81, 93, 98, 102, 141, 197-9, 202-3, 228 complementarity policy 91, 93, 94, 97, 195-9, 202, 205, 206, 228 defence, military budget, expenditure, spending 52-3, 87, 93 Georgia 97, 114, 115 Georgia, external trade link, dependence 59, 97, 108 internal threats 58 Iran 140-44, 152, 198-9, 202 Iran, energy cooperation 143, 198, 202 Iran, external trade link 59, 141-2 Iran, Armenian minority 140, 141, 143 isolation 48, 59-61, 82, 123, 144, 199, 201, 205 lobby 94, 124, 202-3 Madrid principles 78 Moscow Declaration 76, 78 national security 46-62, 92, 101, 200 Russia, alliance 57-8, 68, 87, 94, 138, 160, 196-8 Russia, base 57, 68, 96, 197, 224 state budget 87 transnational threats 60 Turkey, Armenian citizens 130

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Turkey, Armenian minority 118 Turkey, dialogue, normalisation, rapprochement, reconciliation 36-7, 56-7, 75, 79-84, 87-8, 93, 97-102, 108, 120, 123, 128-32, 198, 202, 204-5, 224, 227 Turkey, soccer, football diplomacy 84, 85, 98, 130 US 102, 197, 201-3 West 94, 101, 144, 195-6, 200-201 WTO 142 see also Arms race, CIS, Diaspora, EU, genocide, Nagorno-Karabakh, NATO, Samtskhe-Javakheti arms race 30, 52-4, 68, 87, 93, 94, 224, 227 Azerbaijan armed forces 54 August war, lessons 36, 75, 76, 108-9 Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway 108, 114, 123, 124, 131 Blitzkrieg 94, 227 defence/military budget, expenditure, spending 52-4, 87, 227 Georgia, strategic partnership 114-15, 120 Iran 145-8, 227 Iran, Greater Azerbaijan 141 Iran, Azeri provinces 145-6 Iran, Talesh minority 146-7 Iran, trading partner 147 Iran, gas agreement 147-8, 225 Lezghin minority 40 military doctrine, 2010 87 Moscow Declaration 76, 78 oil and gas reserves 4, 66, 159, 187, 202, 225 oil and gas revenues 92, 94, 95, 227 Russia, cooperation 57, 87, 88, 99, 108-9, 197, 224 Russia, gas exports to 65, 86 transit country 66, 96, 160 Turkey, energy cooperation 122-5, 131, 227 Turkey, energy, gas dispute 83-5, 88

Turkey, ethnic and cultural ties 118-20, 131, 132, 204, 227 Turkey, normalisation with Armenia, consequence and reaction 75, 79-83, 88, 98, 100, 128, 130, 132, 224 Turkey, military cooperation 85-6, 98 Turkey, strategic partnership 88, 120, 131, 224, 227 Turkey, trading partner 131, 132 US, military assistance 3 war, economic deterrence 55-6 war rhetoric, militarist propaganda 36, 52, 58, 67-8, 76, 93, 224 West 4, 55, 75, 87, 138 see also Armenia-Blockade, arms race, CIS, Energy, EU, NagornoKarabakh, NATO, pipeline Batumi 14, 126, 127 Bin Laden, Osama 17 Black Sea 45, 65, 75, 76, 105, 107, 125, 126, 132, 160-62, 188 blockade, see Armenia, see Georgia British Petroleum, BP 4, 55, 66, 111, 119 BTC, see Pipeline BTE, see Pipeline Burjanadze, Nino 20, 36, 107 Bush, George W. 12, 25, 26, 138, 147, 151, 161, 166, 202 Caspian forum 84, insecurity 55, 76 Iran 120, 124, 137, 145, 149 Turkey, regional hub 122, 124 US 15, 16 West 4, 107, 119 see also EU-Azerbaijan, Energy, CIS, NATO, Pipeline Chechnya, Chechen 39-42 Georgia, border 4, 15, 17, 210 Georgia, policy 15, 17 Russia, allegations against Georgia 17, 18, 28, 211 Islam 40-42

Index Church Armenian 129 Georgian 216 Clinton, Bill 5, 166 Cold War 43, 45, 77, 94, 117, 119, 133, 185, 205 Post-Cold War 4, 59, 149, 227 Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS Abkhazia and South Ossetia, embargo 21 Abkhazia and South Ossetia, recognition 34, 106 Abkhazia and South Ossetia, peace-keeping forces 2, 14, 23 Armenia, membership 1, 109 Azerbaijan, membership 1 Caspian 4 CSTO, Armenia 2, 46-7, 86, 89, 101 CSTO, Azerbaijan 2 CSTO, Georgia 2, 14, 18, 220 creation 1, 34 Georgia, integration 14, 210-11 Georgia, membership 1 Georgia, withdrawal 214, 220 oil exports and regulation 159 visa regime 18 Conventional Forces in Europe, CFE 68, 87, 162, 166, 168 Dagomys 12 Demirel, Süleyman 16, 122 Diaspora Georgian Diaspora 18, 31, 127 Armenian Diaspora 68, 94, 99, 101, 123-124, 128-129, 144, 195, 197, 202-203, 206 North Caucasian Diaspora 121, 127 Dink, Hrant 128 Energy corridor 4, 9, 75, 83, 86, 107, 124, 160, 224 security 4, 65, 66, 69, 157, 160-63, 167, 185, 214, 225 weapon 161, 165

233

see also Armenia-Blockade, Caspian, EU, Georgia-Russia-Blockade, NATO, Pipeline Erdogan, Reccep Tayyip 81, 85, 99, 121, 124, 128, 131, 132 Erzurum 120 European Union, EU 177-190 Armenia, Action Plan, AP 187, 201, 202 Armenia, integration 201 Association agreement 177, 189, 214, Azerbaijan, Caspian oil imports/ reserves 4, 159, 185 Azerbaijan, Action Plan, AP 187 Eastern Partnership 188-90, 198, 201, 214 ECHO 181, 182 Energy security 65-6, 69, 148, 185 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 183, 185-9, 198, 201, 202, 226, 228 European security 5, 44, 185, 199, 201 Georgia, integration 5, 98, 206 Monitoring Mission (EUMM) 30, 188, 217, 225 TACIS programmes 3, 179-81, 184, 188 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, PCA 179, 180, 201 soft power, security 45, 184, 188, 218 Tagliavani Report 27-8, 112 Gali 17, 37 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad 11, 12, 13, 114, 210 Genocide against Armenians 48, 57, 68, 79, 99-100, 129, 144, 204-5 against Ossetian population 29 against Russian citizens 25 Georgia, Georgian Armed forces 113 Azerbaijan, strategic partnership 114-15 Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway 108, 114, 123, 124, 131

234

Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus Blitzkrieg 35 citizens in Russia 21 Citizens Union of Georgia 15 complementarity policy 210, 211 defence/military budget/expenditure / spending 30, 53 drones 22 Internal Displaced Persons (IDP), refugees 14, 23, 219 Iran, rapprochement 109, 139, 148-51, 224, 225 Iran, gas exports 109, 139, 143 Iran, trading partner 149 Law on state borders 18 National security 105-15, 149, 210 Pankisi 3, 17, 27 Rose Revolution 11, 19, 20, 111, 126, 160, 166, 184, 185, 187, 188, 209, 211, 223, 226, 227 Russia, annexation, occupation, aggression 19, 22, 26, 30, 108, 110, 112-14, 216, 219 Russia, blockade, embargo, economic sanctions 21, 109, 215, 216 Russia, border 4, 5, 17, 24, 26, 31, 91, 96, 111, 197, 224 Russia, border guards 18 Russia, gas prices 109, 166 Blockade, gas shortage, cuts 124, 138-9, 166 Russia, military bases 14, 18 Russia, isolation 35, 57, 109, 224 Russia, link with Georgian officials 14 Russia, hegemony, power, sphere of influence 12-13, 19, 51, 56, 91, 96, 120, 166 Russia, Georgian opposition 107 Russia, secrets agents, spies 21, 212 Russia, Saakashvili, removal 25, 27, 31, 112, 218, 226 Russia, visa regime, passport 18, 166 State strategy on occupied territories 113 Transit state 17, 52, 59, 75, 88, 96-7, 102, 107-8, 115, 160, 224

Turkey, military cooperation 85-6 Turkey, Georgian minority 118, 127 Turkey, trading partner 108, 114, 126-7 Turkey, strategic partner 107, 125-6, US 36, 45, 202, 210, 212, 215-16, 218-20 US, Georgian independence, support 16, 43, 45 US, Georgian Presidential Guard, training 15 US, GTEP 3, 18 US, limited involvement 12, 26 US, military assistance 18, 19, 106, US, strategic partnership 36 vulnerability 52, 55, 76, 98, 108, 115 war, renewed aggression, conflict, hostilities 26, 30, 31, 37, 106, 113, 214, 216, 218, 226 West 5, 11-12, 14-16, 26, 51, 75, 96, 106, 126, 138, 152, 160, 165, 209-21, 224, 226, 227 see also Abkhazia, Chechnya, CIS, Diaspora, NATO, Ossetia, Pipeline, Samtskhe-Javakheti Giorgadze, Igor 14-16 Gudauta 14 Gül, Abdullah 85, 98, 130 Ioseliani, Jaba 16 Iraq 17, 22, 24, 25, 37, 44, 55, 94, 100, 108, 121, 122, 125, 142, 150, 159, 161 Israel 68, 125, 144, 145, 152, 199, 227 Java 23, 111 Javakheti, see Samtskhe-Javakheti Joint Control Commission (JCC) 2, 3, 12 Kars, Treaty 128 Khatami, Mohammad 144-5 Kitovani, Tengiz 16 Kocharyan, Robert 196 Kodori 85, 211

Index Kokoity, Eduard 20, 25, 26, 38, 110 Kosovo Abkhazia, Ossetia 21, 22, 35, 43, 44, 166, 223 KFOR 85, 200 Nagorno-Karabakh 92 Kozyrev, Andrei 14 Lars, checkpoint 96 Medvedev, Dmitry 23, 35, 37, 38, 44, 45, 54, 86, 99, 177 Minsk Group, see OSCE Nabucco, see pipeline Nagorno-Karabakh, NK Armed forces 55, 67, 94 ceasefire 2, 37, 49, 69, 76-7, 227 IDP, refugees, deaths 77, 92 Iran 137 Kelbajar 82 Recognition 34 Referendum 2, 67, 68-70 Russia 12, 37, 78, 182 Statehood 67, 92 Turkey 119 US 2, 37, 94, 202 War, renewed hostilities 54, 56, 68, 76-7, 92, 93-5, 102, 224-6 West 2-3, 94 see also Armenia, arms race, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, OSCE-Minsk Group, Pipeline, UN NATO Abkhazia 23, 36, 161 Armenia 160, 165, 195, 198-200, 203 Azerbaijan 54, 85, 165 Black Sea, naval presence 105 Caspian oil 158, 160, 161, 162, 165 EAPC 157, 160 Energy security 157, 161-3, 225 enlargements 5, 199 internal division, diversity 45, 158, 164, 167-8 Georgia 14, 18, 19, 37, 114, 167

235 Georgia, accession, membership 22, 25, 51, 126, 149, 151, 161-6, 168, 187, 199, 210, 211, 214, 218-20, 227 Georgia Commission 163-5, 214, 225 Georgia, intensified dialogue 161 Individual Partnership Action Plan, IPAP 126, 158, 160, 161, 164, 165, 168, 198, 200 Iran 149-51, 227 Ossetia 23, 36, 51, 161 PfP 3, 157, 161, 164, 165, 168 pipeline security 85 Russia 36, 45-6, 52, 149, 162-4, 166, 218, 219, 227, 228 Special Representative 160, 199 Strategic Concept, 2010 157, 163, 167, 168 Strategic Concept, 1999 158, 161 Summit, Bucharest, 2008 22, 25, 162, 167, 225 Summit, Istanbul, 2004 160, 199 Summit, Lisbon, 2010 45, 169 Summit, Prague, 2002 158, 166, Summit, Riga, 2006 161, 162 North/Northern Caucasus 24, 25, 27, 33, 34, 39-42, 91, 96, 111, 118, 121, 169, 223 see also Diaspora

Obama, Barack 27, 80, 98, 138, 147, 148, 203 Ochamchire 111  OSCE Abkhazia, negotiation process 3, 217, 226 Minsk Group 4, 67-8, 70, 182, 187, 202 Ossetia, ceasefire supervision 4, 13, 30, 106, 107, 182, 217, 226 Russia, veto power 17, 30, 106 summit, Istanbul, 1999 18 Ossetia 2, 195, 7 August, 2008 24, 25, 51 August 2004 armed clashes 20 ceasefire 2, 25, 30, 51, 106, 217, 219, 225

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Reassessing Security in the South Caucasus Iran 137, 138 North Ossetia 2, 12, 35, 38, 110, 226 peace agreement 12 Roki tunnel 28 Russia, appointment of local officials 20 Russia, base 23, 91, 110-11 Russia, direct relations 22, 23 Russia, disagreements 38-9 Russia, involvement in the war 11, 12, 20-22, 24-6, 28-30, 38, 51, 111, 209-11, 216, 231, Russia, military build-up 20, 23, 28-31, 110 Russia, military exercises 24-5 Russia, peacekeeping forces 12, 13, 29, 38, 91, 106 Russia, recognition 30, 25, 29, 33, 34-9, 42-4, 51, 91, 95, 106, 108, 209, 216, 219, 223, 226, Russia, visa regime 18, 19, 27, 28 Tagliavini, report, see EU Turkey 119, 120 US 36, 43, West 45, 46, 94, 210, see also CIS, Georgia, Kosovo, NATO, OSCE, JCC, UN

Pankisi, see Georgia Pipeline Baku-Novorossiysk 83, 86 Blue Stream 107, 108 BTC 4, 61, 83, 89 BTC, American involvement, US support 16, 120 BTC, August War 55, 111 BTC, Georgia 144, 211 BTC, NK conflict 16, 85, 120 BTC, security agreement 86 BTC, Turkey 83, 107, 108, 120, 123, 124, 131 BTE 4 BTE, August War 111 BTE, Georgia 114, 124 BTE, Turkey 107, 108, 120, 123, ~ 124, 131 Nabucco 4, 65, 66, 69, 75, 84

Nabucco, delays 84 Nabucco, Georgia 114 Nabucco, Iran 65 Nabucco, Russian routes 86, 108, 120, 125 Nabucco, Turkey 84, 125, 227 Nabucco, West 66 Nord Stream 162, 168 South Stream 120, 125, 162, 167, 168 see also NATO Putin, Vladimir 4, 17, 20, 22, 24, 26, 27, 33, 35, 40, 108, 125, 139, 166, 197 Rice, Condoleezza 23, 24 Saakashvili, Mikhail 5, 19-23, 25-7, 30, 35, 107, 111, 114, 126, 160, 165, 177, 211, 214, 218, 226, 227, see also Georgia Samtskhe-Javakheti 15, 16, 18, 27, 97, 114, 141 Sargsyan, Serzh 57, 78, 130 September 11th 2001 3, 17, 138, 158, 184, 197, 203, 223, 226 Shah Deniz 83, 84, 86, 124 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 106, 139-40 Shevardnadze, Eduard 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 114, 160, 211 SOCAR 83, 85, 147 Sochi Ceasefire agreement 14, 20 Meeting on January 2010 78 Tagliavini, report, see EU Ter Petrosyan, Levon 196 Ukraine 13, 25, 68, 138, 143, 161-4, 166, 167, 179-81, 183, 187-9, 214, 220 United Nations, UN 210 Abkhazia 2, 3, 13, 23, 33 Geneva talks 3, 106-7, 113, 114 group of friends 3, 182 Iran, sanctions 139, 148 NK, resolutions 69 Ossetia 33

Index Russia, SC member 33, 166, 227 Russia, veto power 30, 106 UNOMIG 2, 22, 106, 217

Vaziani 14, 85 Yeltsin, Boris 12, 14, 17, 33

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