South Asia and the Great Powers: International Relations and Regional Security 9781784537531, 1784537535

Table of contents :
Cover
Half-title
Title
Copyright
Contents
List of Illustrations
List of Contributors
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Part I: Transitions
1. Regional Cooperation in South Asia: A Political and Historical Perspective
2. When the Fighting Stays Tough, What Will the Tough Do?: The Afghan Saga Continues
3. Capacity Building as Partnership: NATO's Future Role
Part II: National Interests
4. Losing the `Forgotten War': The US Strategic Vacuum in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia
5. Silk Road Diplomacy: China's Strategic Interests in South Asia
6. India's Afghanistan Policy: In Search of a Comprehensive Strategy
7. Iran, Afghanistan and the Benefits of a Regional Approach
8. Foreign Policy Change in Pakistan: Uncertain Options
9. Afghanistan between Nation-State Building and Regional Collaboration
Part III: Perspectives
10. It’s the Strategic Narrative, Stupid!: How the United States May Overcome the Challenge of Continued Engagement in Afghanistan Beyond 2017
Conclusion South Asia in Quest of Restraint
Select Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Sten Rynning is Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern Denmark, where he also heads the Center for War Studies. He is currently Scholar in Residence at the School of International Service, American University, Washington, and was previously president of the Nordic International Studies Association and a visiting fellow at NATO’s Defense College, Rome. He is the author of NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect and co-author (with Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, 2012) of Transforming Military Power since the Cold War: Britain, France, and the United States, 1991–2012 (2013).

“Sten Rynning has assembled some of the globe’s most distinguished and knowledgeable experts to unpack the crucial links between great power competition and regional security dynamics in South Asia. This is a sharply informative expose´ of a crucial region’s politics, but, more than that, it is a window on the emerging workings of a changing international system. A signal contribution.” William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government, Dartmouth College “For anyone interested in the prospects for peace in South Asia, this book is a terrific starting point. Sten Rynning and the country and regional experts he has assembled do a fine job of describing the complexities and dangers facing the area as the American-led war in Afghanistan comes to an end. Although their hope is that the great powers will exercise mutual restraint and work to produce a stable order in South Asia, they provide much evidence to doubt that will happen.” John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago “Combining analyses from security studies scholars and regional experts, this volume deftly explores the legacies of the Afghanistan war for South Asian security and the prospects for regional cooperation and security. A most timely and essential read.” Professor Theo Farrell, Dean of Arts and Social Sciences, City, University of London “A needed and timely volume with contributions from experts in the field, Sten Rynning’s book offers unique insights into the rapid reconfiguration of regional security in South Asia. The book drives home the imperative to differentiate among our key relationships as the new geostrategic contours of the region come into view. It should be required reading for anyone interested in the growing importance of South Asia to global security.” Andrew A. Michta, author of The Limits of Alliance

SOUTH ASIA AND THE GREAT POWERS International Relations and Regional Security

Edited by STEN RYNNING

I.B. TAURIS Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, I.B. TAURIS and the I.B. Tauris logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2017 Paperback edition published 2020 Copyright Editorial Selection © Sten Rynning, 2017 Copyright Individual Chapters © Jo Inge Bekkevold, Anthony H. Cordesman, Sunniva Engh, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Houchang Hassan-Yari, Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Mohammad Mansoor Ehsan, Alessandro Marrone, Ronald E. Neumann, Sten Rynning, Paola Sartori, Meena Singh Roy, Christian Wagner, Tughral Yamin, 2017 Sten Rynning has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Editor of this work. For legal purposes the Acknowledgements on p. xv constitute an extension of this copyright page. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN: HB: 978-1-7845-3753-1 PB: 978-1-8386-0583-4 ePDF: 978-1-7867-3134-0 eBook: 978-1-7867-2134-1 Typeset by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India To find out more about our authors and books visit www.bloomsbury.com and sign up for our newsletters.

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations List of Contributors Acknowledgements Introduction Sten Rynning Part I Transitions 1. Regional Cooperation in South Asia: A Political and Historical Perspective Ronald E. Neumann 2. When the Fighting Stays Tough, What Will the Tough Do?: The Afghan Saga Continues Vanda Felbab-Brown 3. Capacity Building as Partnership: NATO’s Future Role Alessandro Marrone and Paola Sartori Part II National Interests 4. Losing the “Forgotten War”: The US Strategic Vacuum in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia Anthony H. Cordesman 5. Silk Road Diplomacy: China’s Strategic Interests in South Asia Jo Inge Bekkevold and Sunniva Engh

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6. India’s Afghanistan Policy: In Search of a Comprehensive Strategy Meena Singh Roy and Christian Wagner

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7. Iran, Afghanistan and the Benefits of a Regional Approach Houchang Hassan-Yari

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8. Foreign Policy Change in Pakistan: Uncertain Options Tughral Yamin

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9. Afghanistan between Nation-State Building and Regional Collaboration Mohammad Mansoor Ehsan Part III Perspectives 10. It’s the Strategic Narrative, Stupid!: How the United States May Overcome the Challenge of Continued Engagement in Afghanistan Beyond 2017 Peter Viggo Jakobsen

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Conclusion South Asia in Quest of Restraint Sten Rynning

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Select Bibliography Index

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures Figure 4.1 World Bank Rating of the Quality of Afghan Governance, 1996 –2014

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Figure 4.2 The Surge in Iraq vs. the Surge in Afghanistan

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Figure 4.3 Civilian Deaths by Anti-Government Elements in Afghanistan, 2009 –15

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Figure 4.4 Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Region, Afghanistan, 2009– 15

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Figure 4.5 US Foreign Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992 to FY2015

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Table Table 6.1 India–Afghanistan Trade, 2009–15 (in US$ millions)

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LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Jo Inge Bekkevold is Head of the Centre for Asian Security Studies at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS). His research focuses on China’s rise and Asian security, China – Russia relations and naval developments in Asia. He is the co-editor of Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st Century: Cross-Regional Perspectives (2015), Arctic: Commerce, Governance and Policy (2015), International Order at Sea with Geoffrey Till (2016), and China in the Era of Xi Jinping: Domestic and Foreign Policy Challenges with Robert S. Ross (2016). Bekkevold is a former career diplomat, with several postings to East Asia for the Norwegian Foreign Service. Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC. During his time at CSIS, he has completed a wide variety of studies on energy, US strategy and defence plans, the lessons of modern war, defence programming and budgeting, NATO modernization, Chinese military power, proliferation, counterterrorism, armed nation-building, security in the Middle East and the Afghan and Iraq conflicts. Cordesman has travelled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, US commands, and US embassies on the wars in those countries, and was a member of the Strategic Assessment Group that assisted General Stanley McChrystal in developing a new strategy for Afghanistan in 2009. He frequently acts as a consultant to the US State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with US officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East

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countries. Before joining CSIS, Cordesman served as Director of Intelligence Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as Civilian Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Sunniva Engh is a senior researcher at the Centre for Asian Security Studies at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, for the project “China in Indian strategic thinking”. Her academic interests include South Asian politics, Indian foreign and security policy, India–China relations, and Myanmar’s democratic transition. She has also written on Nordic and Norwegian foreign policy and development aid. Engh holds a DPhil in Modern History from Oxford University (2006). Vanda Felbab-Brown is the author of The Extinction Market: Wildlife Trafficking and How to Counter It (2017); Narco Noir: Mexico’s Cartels, Cops, and Corruption (2017); Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan (2013) and Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (2010). Houchang Hassan-Yari recently became Professor of International Politics at the Sultan Qaboos University in Oman. Previously, he was Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations (military and strategic issues) at the Royal Military College of Canada, and has been Adjunct Professor, Department of History, at Queen’s University since 2001. He was one of the special assistants to the principal for national and international liaison, Royal Military College of Canada, and also served as President of the International Society of Military Sciences (ISMS). He has been Professor at Shahid Beheshti (National) University, Tehran, Iran (1993–4); Visiting Professor-Researcher at the Lyon University Institute for Political Sciences (IE´P), Lyon, France (2007) and Visiting Professor/ Researcher at the School of International Relations, Tehran (2008). His most recent publications include Peace Process in the Middle East (2001), Canada and the Arab–Israeli Conflict Since 1947: Half a Century of Active Diplomacy (1997) and “Position of Iran on Regional and International Security”, International Studies Journal (ISJ). Peter Viggo Jakobsen is Associate Professor at the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College in Copenhagen and also a part-time full professor at the Center for War Studies, University of

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Southern Denmark. His primary research and teaching areas include Danish and Nordic defence and security, the role of NATO and the UN in international peace and security, stabilization operations, conflict management, civil–military cooperation and the comprehensive approach, strategy, use of force and coercive diplomacy. His current main projects are “Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Future of US/European Expeditionary Warfare” and “Europe’s Return to Peacekeeping”. He appears frequently in Danish and international media as a commentator on defence and security issues, gives many lectures on these issues, and has acted as an advisor and consultant for several governments and international organizations. He has been Visiting Professor of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), USA (autumn 2006) and Department of War Studies, King’s College London (spring 1996). He holds an MA and PhD in International Relations from the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University. Mohammad Mansoor Ehsan is a lecturer and chair of the Department of Political Science at Karwan University, Kabul, Afghanistan. He is the founding member of the Afghanistan Association of Political Science and International Relations (AAPSIR). He was a lecturer of Political Science and International Relations at the Center for Diplomacy and International Studies (DIS), Afghanistan University, and an associate lecturer at Rana University, Kabul, Afghanistan. His areas of expertise lie in Afghanistan and Central Asian studies, nationalism, comparative democratic regimes, and political Islam. He has published numerous articles in English and Persian, including “Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences: A Case Study of Afghanistan” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Afghanistan), “Afghanistan and China Relations: 1955–2012” (Journal of Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, New Delhi), “Illicit Drug Production in Afghanistan: A Situational Analysis” (Vestnic Kargu, Kazakhstan – coauthor), “Islam and Politics in Afghanistan” (Journal of Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation, New Delhi), and is working on a book entitled Democratization Process and the Challenge of Traditional Values: A Case Study of Afghanistan. Alessandro Marrone is Senior Fellow in the Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Security & Defence Programme, and has been responsible for research projects funded by the European Commission, the

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European Defence Agency and NATO. He currently works on research projects related to European security and Italian defence policy and co-authors the IAI annual report on Defence Budgets and Industry. He obtained an MA in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) in 2009. Previously he worked at IAI in both Transatlantic Relations and Security & Defence Programmes. He holds a BA degree in Political Science and an MSc degree in International Relations from the LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome, in both cases with first-class honours. He is a PhD student at the Sapienza University of Rome. He is interested in European security and defence issues, Italian defence policy, defence markets, defence procurement, NATO, transatlantic relations and Afghanistan. He is a member of the editorial board of IAI webzine AffarInternazionali, and collaborates as a freelance journalist with several Italian magazines and web-magazines, including Aspenia Online and Airpress. Ronald E. Neumann, formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary, served three times as ambassador: to Algeria, Bahrain and finally to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan from July 2005 to April 2007. Before Afghanistan, Ambassador Neumann, a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, served in Baghdad from February 2004 with the Coalition Provisional Authority and then as Embassy Baghdad’s principal interlocutor with the Multinational Command, where he was deeply involved in coordinating the political part of military action. Prior to working in Iraq, he was Chief of Mission in Manama, Bahrain (2001–4). Before that, Ambassador Neumann served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near East Affairs (1997–2000), where he directed the organization of the first separately funded NEA democracy programmes and was also responsible for the bureau’s work in developing the North African Economic Initiative for Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. He is the author of The Other War: Winning and Losing in Afghanistan (2009). Sten Rynning is Professor at the Department of Political Science, the University of Southern Denmark. He is the head of the Center for War Studies at the university. He served on the official Norwegian Afghanistan Commission of Inquiry (2015–16), serves on the editorial boards of International Affairs and the European Journal of International Security, and is a member of the board of the Danish Atlantic Treaty Association. He is a

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former visiting research fellow at NATO’s Defence College, Rome, Italy, a former member of NATO’s Independent Scientific Expert Group, and former president (2012–15) of the Nordic International Studies Association (NISA), whose journal Cooperation and Conflict is among the highest-ranked international relations journals in Europe. In the spring of 2017 he will be a Fulbright Scholar and visiting researcher at the American University’s School of International Service, Washington, DC. He is a frequent commentator and contributor to the media on security and international politics. He has published numerous articles and a range of books including NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect (2012), Transforming Military Power since the Cold War: Britain, France, and the United States, 1991–2012 (2013 – co-author); and NATO’s New Strategic Concept: A Comprehensive Assessment (2011 – co-editor). Paola Sartori is a junior researcher in the Security and Defence programme at Instituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), where she collaborates on research projects dealing with security and defence issues at national and European levels. She holds an MA in International Relations and Diplomacy from the University of Trieste (Gorizia campus). During her academic career, she was an exchange student at the Su¨dasien-Institut (Heidelberg University) and interned at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Division for Afghanistan and Regional Dimension) and at the IAI Security and Defence programme. Prior to joining IAI she worked as Junior Fellow (Military Affairs Desk) at the Centro Studi Internazionali (CeSI). Meena Singh Roy is currently a research fellow and coordinator at the West Asia Centre at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), New Delhi, India. She was previously a senior research scholar in the Department of African Studies, University of Delhi. She has been associated with the Institute of Commonwealth Studies and the School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS), London for research work and has been a visiting research fellow with the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Institute of Asian Studies. She has also been involved in net assessment reports on Central Asia. She has published books, such as International and Regional Security Dynamics: Indian and Iranian Perspectives (2009 – editor); Emerging Trends in West Asia: Regional and Global Implications (2014 – editor) and a monograph titled

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The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: India Seeking New Role in the Eurasian Regional Mechanism (2014). She has also completed the joint Delhi Policy Group and the IDSA Task Force report on West Asia in Transition. Her forthcoming book is titled Linking South and Central Asia in the New Strategic Environment: Envisioning India’s Future Partnership with the Eurasian Region. Christian Wagner is Senior Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). He has been Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Development Research at the University of Bonn (2001–2) and Assistant Professor at the Institute for Political Science and Administrative Studies, University of Rostock (1996–2001). His main focus of research is foreign and security policy in South Asia. He has published widely on foreign policy matters and domestic politics in India, Pakistan and other South Asian countries. Recent publications include Security Cooperation in South Asia: Overview, Reasons, Prospects (2014). His present research focus is on security architecture in South Asia. Tughral Yamin, a former brigadier, is the founding member and associate dean of the Centre for International Peace & Stability (CIPS), National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST). Professor Yamin has taught at the Command and Staff College (C&SC) Quetta, the National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad and the National University of Modern Languages (NUML), Islamabad. He has delivered lectures to international audiences at the South Asian University (SAU), New Delhi, the Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, the National University of Singapore and the George Mason University, Washington, DC on regional security, information security, confidence-building measures and UN peacekeeping. He has also delivered keynote speeches on net-centric warfare in seminars held in Singapore and has represented his country as the senior armed forces delegate in the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Laos in 2005. His academic interests include India– Pakistan relations and CBMs between the two countries, regional security, peacekeeping, peace building, conflict resolution, nuclear stability, non-proliferation of chemical weapons, netcentric warfare, strategic decision-making and information security. He is the author of two books and several research articles.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book was made possible by the support of several organizations and people, and I owe all of them a great debt. The original idea behind the project that led to the book was to bring regional and country experts together to take stock of the dearth of multilateral institutions in South Asia and assess prospects for regional stability following the folding of the international combat mission in Afghanistan. Moreover, the idea was to bring these people together in the region and thus enrich wider policy debates. Najam Rafique of the Institute for Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) and myself thus put together a team and a grant application in autumn 2013, and NATO Public Diplomacy encouragingly offered us the grant. I am exceptionally grateful to Najam Rafique and the staff at ISSI as well as NATO for their help in shaping the project and getting the team of experts together. Rajneek Koshal Singh, my research assistant, did a terrific job planning and organizing. We were on track for a major policy conference in Islamabad, Pakistan, in August 2014, when political protests and unrest reached the city and peaked right at the time of the conference. At the very last minute – with one participant in the air and the rest about to board their planes – we unfortunately had to cancel. Regrettably, we were later unable to recover and reconvene. Que´ sera´, sera´. I should like to thank Nicolas Veicharts, at the time Danish Defence Attache´ in Islamabad, Pakistan, who offered me the opportunity to try out my ideas in autumn 2012 when he organized a visit to Islamabad and Lahore. I, along with Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Peter Kim

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Laustsen – both of whom would later be involved in the organization of the grant and conference – gained the opportunity to interact with the National Defence University, the Institute for Strategic Studies Islamabad, and various Pakistani analysts. I am likewise thankful to David Vestenskov who, two years later, invited me to participate in a different conference at the National Defence University in Islamabad, which was another welcome opportunity to try out ideas. I am grateful to Jesper Møller Sørensen, Denmark’s ambassador to Pakistan, for the advice he offered during the turbulent month of August 2014, as I am grateful to Masroor Ahmed Junejo, Pakistan’s ambassador to Denmark, for his willingness to talk to me about the politics of the region. Finally, I am grateful to the handful of analysts of the Danish Foreign Service who agreed to comment on the main ideas of the book project and add insight, all on background, in the spring of 2015. Lester Crook and Joanna Godfrey, senior editors at I.B.Tauris, have been wonderfully efficient and a pleasure to work with, as has Tina Guldbrandt Jakobsen in the Political Science department of the University of Southern Denmark, who copy-edited the manuscript. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for a wealth of constructive suggestions. I owe a big debt of gratitude to the team of contributors who courageously and patiently dealt with the cancelled conference and the painstaking readjustments that enabled this book. South Asia regional security is dynamic, and one of the frustrations of the team of contributors have been the multiple deadlines involved in the project and the concomitant need to update chapters. The manuscript was completed in April– May 2016, and the contributors have admirably managed to combine historical perspective and contemporary insight. I owe another big debt of gratitude to my family – Christilla, Emil, Axel, and Clement – who steadfastly offered their love and support as I made them endure the ups and downs of the project.

INTRODUCTION Sten Rynning South Asia’s security order has become a centre of gravity to the international community on account of the war in Afghanistan, the conflict between human rights and sectarianism, the risk of nuclear proliferation and the potential for wider instability not only in South Asia but also the neighbouring Middle East and Central Asia. These concerns have raised the question of what will happen in the wake of the international combat mission in Afghanistan, which ended in December 2014. It is readily apparent that the region is transitioning from an Afghan war-centric phase to a new phase of regionalized and therefore more diverse engagements. The implications hereof in terms of war and peace are open to question, however. Ultimately, observers will have to grapple with the role played by the region’s great powers. The great powers have the capacity to pull together to create a framework for wider social and economic cooperation, just as they have the capacity to tear apart the region’s fabric by ideological confrontation and proxy warfare. Critical to the region, and the world beyond, is therefore the question of whether the region’s great powers can agree to align power in support of a concept of order. Such a concept of order can be hard to spot. The war in Afghanistan did not end with the termination of the international combat mission but merely changed in character. Perhaps Afghanistan is at the end game of a war that took root in the late 1970s, but there is much uncertainty attached to the ability of a Taliban movement fractured by leadership challenges to reconcile and transition from war to peace, the will of the

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international community to sustain “partnerships” with Afghanistan and also the capacity of mainstream political forces in Kabul to set aside their narrow aspirations and enable government. In addition, the process of regionalization mobilizes stakeholders outside Afghanistan. They will seek reassurance that their adversaries do not come out on top in a new order. Not knowing whom to trust, they might develop hedging strategies that include support for unrest and insurgency in neighbouring countries. It is sobering to keep in mind that this complex and volatile transition involves four regional nuclear powers – India, Pakistan, China, all of which are established nuclear powers, and Iran, a threshold power. It explains why the region’s future is a matter of widespread international concern, just as it explains why the United States – another nuclear power – will never quite leave the region. For the past 15 years, the United States has been heavily involved in the region and thus offered a focal point for the study of regional order. While fighting in Afghanistan, the United States has been the region’s main power broker capable of offering credible security assurances and structuring the region’s diplomacy. The United States did not succeed in embedding a new concept of order, though, and it is now pulling back – not entirely, but significantly. As the United States pulls back, others will step in. The situation calls for an engagement with some of the key international relations thinking on the balance of power and regional stability. “Balance of power” is a depiction of a pluralist or diverse international system where domination by any one nation or any one ideal or ideology is infeasible and where the political challenge is to achieve stability by way of equilibrium. In other words, it is a question of whether national decision-makers will come to see their interests as best served by “power equilibrium” as opposed to the pursuit of “power superiority”.1 A shared or common concept of order encourages policies of equilibrium. Historically, in Europe, evolving concepts of “Europe’s unity” have at times successfully restrained the autonomy and freedom of manoeuvre of the great powers to engender equilibrium and thus stability.2 South Asia’s history is different, yet the challenge is similar. In the words of Henry Kissinger, it is to “distill order from multiplicity and restraint” and build common institutions that limit the element of power.3

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Transitions The South Asian challenge can be described as one of transitions: from war to peace in Afghanistan; from US leadership to pluralist management; from mistrust to trust. South Asia’s order must selfconsciously emerge out of the shadows of the Afghan war, just as it must evolve at the point where US policy concerns intersect with those of regional and other powers. In so far as diplomatic leverage follows force numbers, then US influence peaked in 2011 when US forces numbered more than 100,000 – and when the total number of US-led international forces was nearly 140,000. At this point in time the fairly new administration of President Obama sought to streamline the armed engagement behind the objective of degrading and defeating Al-Qaeda and then shifting the policy emphasis to regional reconciliation. Yet complications soon arose and ultimately destroyed the policy momentum. The key aim of detaching the Taliban from Al-Qaeda and reconciling it with the new Afghanistan presumed a peace process that did not exist and was hard to engender for as long as the peace protagonist, the United States, was the main force actually fighting the Taliban. The United States needed a credible partner in peace, therefore, but the two key potential partners, Pakistan and Afghan president Karzai, feared for a loss of influence and did not enable US policy. In this maze of relationships the Obama administration never managed to fully sort out its regional priorities. It wanted long-term relationships with both Pakistan and India, the two nuclear powers of the region, but in the shorter term it also wanted to coerce not least Pakistan into tightening its control of the Taliban and dampening the insurgency. However, whether that meant fighting the Taliban or seeking peace negotiations was not clear, and in the end it was the fact of transition – thus, to an extent, exit – that tilted the balance in favour of negotiations. The US post-2014 mission has thus moderately alleviated the challenge of procuring diplomatic influence from military presence. Because the US mission, in the words of former President Obama, is deliberately “narrow” in design, it has brought the effort to induce power-sharing to the fore.4 Notably, President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah – political rivals – have been tenuously brought together as Afghanistan’s executive authority, and power-sharing is

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supposed to be embedded in a constitutional review (foreseen for 2016 but likely delayed). The United States maintains a limited force number to support this reconciliation but will also continue to draw down. The initial plan was to draw down the US presence to a normal embassy presence with a security assistance component – altogether around 1,000 service members – by the end of 2016. However, in the course of 2016 the plan was revised and now allows for a presence of some 8,400 US troops by the time President Obama leaves office – in January 2017.5 Declining US troop numbers translate into new opportunities. If squandered, they will open the kind of vacuum that power abhors. Regional and international diplomacy is therefore justifiably concerned with the establishment of South Asian political structures that can translate opportunity into restrained anxieties and diplomatic engagement. Tellingly, in his inaugural speech as Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani promised a new foreign policy of stability taking into account the varied interests of neighbours, be they Islamic, Western and Asian countries or the major international institutions.6 It was a call for peace, without question, but the carefully drawn distinction among distinct actors and interests was nonetheless remarkable: regional interests are complex and partnerships frail, the hopeful Afghan president was saying. Whether regional security order is possible is the question this book will address.

Contours of South Asia Regional security in South Asia must build on three complex realities. The first is the intricate geography of the region. In terms of physical geography the region can be hard to delineate. The Indian plate shielded by the Great Himalaya mountain range, its extensions to the north and the Indian Ocean to the south is an obvious place to begin. However, this physical geography excludes much of Pakistan and all of Afghanistan, just as it excludes most of Nepal and Bhutan. The region’s geography of language and religion is even more complex and divisive. The case of India is illustrative. Its national census defines 22 main languages and no less than 234 mother tongues, and it categorizes Indians into six religions along with a residual category of tribal and other faiths to which more than six million people adhere.7

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Ultimately, it is perhaps the political geography defined by the British Empire that best defines the contours of South Asia. It would leave out Myanmar but otherwise include all the other countries that are commonly included in the region. 8 To define a region predominantly by its imperial geography, however, is to draw attention to legacies of empire that might well reinforce current barriers to cooperation. One legacy, and the second complexity of the region, is the preeminence of India. It was the jewel in the crown of the British Empire, deliberately designed to enable imperial control from a central region outward, and today it remains vastly superior to its neighbours in terms of population and wealth.9 A region thus marked by plurality and power asymmetry – or, “unbalanced multipolarity” – will easily be dominated by fear, and those in fear will naturally be the neighbours to the great power.10 The history of imperial control and restive neighbours has shaped India’s strategic legacy, and it extends back to the fourth century when the Indian doctrine of enabling central control by squeezing neighbours between the centre and its farther afield allies was first articulated.11 It captures the essence of Pakistan’s fear of India and its struggle to prevent India from gaining ground in Afghanistan, just as it captures Pakistan’s unease with the occasional nationalist emphases of Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister since May 2014. The lopsided distribution of power combined with nationalism can thus corrode a unifying idea of South Asia and with it the collective attachment to diplomatic restraint. It could leave a mere chessboard on which primarily India, China and the United States will move to seek influence, akin to a new version of the Great Game. The contours of such a game are eminently traceable.12 China is aiming to “go West” via new land and maritime Silk Routes, and though its land corridor runs from its far-western Xinjiang province through Pakistan to the Arabian Sea, it must reckon with India whose rivalry with Pakistan is well-known and whose control of the Indian Ocean is increasing. China’s naval presence is enabled by emerging “bases” (at present mere stations) in Gwadar, Pakistan and Hambantota, Sri Lanka, but India not only has two carrier battle groups patrolling its seas, it is also controlling one of the choke points leading into, or out of, the South China Sea, namely the Andaman and Nicobar Islands off the northern tip of Indonesia. As far as the United States is concerned, it is

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pulling out of Afghanistan in an effort to “pivot” further east, but it cannot fully disengage from the wider South Asia region. Given India’s role in the region’s maritime strategy, and its role in the India– Pakistani nuclear balance which – if things turn out badly – could extend first to Iran and then to Saudi Arabia (both of which have received nuclear assistance from Pakistan), the United States notably must sustain its partnership with India and leverage it in regional stabilization efforts. The two countries entered a Strategic Dialogue in 2009. Before this point, in 2004, the United States made Pakistan a “major non-NATO ally” but this relationship has proven difficult and, considering the end of Afghan combat and the US pivot, is destined for further change. Finally there is India itself. Like Britain before it, independent India will seek to secure the Indian realm in its northern mountains and by way of maritime dominance in the Indian Ocean. It is a growing power, and it must learn to grow and simultaneously manage the anxiety of its neighbours as well as the interests of non-regional powers such as the contestants, China and the United States. This capacity to sustain balancing diplomacy brings us to the third regional complexity, namely the character of the states themselves. South Asian states are weak in the sense that their borders are in places disputed and their national institutions are young, contested and of limited capacity.13 India is an amalgam of continental entities brought together first by the Muslim Mughals, then the British; Pakistan is a Muslim reaction to independent India in 1948–9; and the two continue to be at war over the region of Kashmir where there is no settled border but merely a “line of control”. Afghanistan’s independence is of older vintage but its national institutions are exceptionally weak as a result of outside meddling, a weak agricultural base that engenders weak economic institutions and then a complex geography – the Hindu Kush separates north from south, east from west, and its rivers do not connect to any body of water. Its amalgam of people comes from its surrounding regions, the Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent, but Pashtuns define the dominant group. Pashtuns have historically ruled Afghanistan but have also, given that they straddle Afghanistan and Pakistan, been called one of the largest stateless nations on earth. In consequence, the Afghan – Pakistan border, the Durand Line, has little meaning for most Pashtuns and is for this reason not yet recognized by Afghanistan, to Pakistan’s

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consternation. President Ghani has, since his election in 2014, reached out to Pakistan in a way that his predecessor, President Karzai, never did. However, Pakistan remains sceptical and continues to consider its relationship to the Taliban as its ace in the hole. For as long as Ghani fails to muster a governing coalition inside Afghanistan that can promise durable Pashtun influence, Pakistan is unlikely to change its calculus. This type of social and political fragmentation, along with insecurity, feeds government by political patronage.14 To patronage we may add the concept of “geostrategic curse” to capture the way in which outside powers time and again have found it convenient to invest in the power of local despots rather than social and political transformation.15 In sum, South Asia’s contours emerge at the intersections of physical, power and socio-political geographies. Can they combine to support peace and stability? On some occasions observers express hope that stabilization can happen bottom-up, perhaps not least because of demographics and the exposure of young generations to international trends and taste.16 In a country riveted by decades of war, such as Afghanistan, one side-benefit of the international troop presence has been the internationalization of large segments of young society. Such changes could be further reinforced by both processes of liberalization – of trade, investment and human interaction across borders – and exploratory, informal diplomatic dialogues known as “track two” diplomacy.17 However, traditional diplomacy should not be left out of the equation. Such diplomacy is geared to manage the first two challenges outlined here – a complex political geography and the preeminence of India – and will, if not properly managed, have every potential to wreck bottom-up “track two” diplomacy.

South Asian Multilateralism Multilateral institutions define a tried and trusted method for bringing countries closer together. South Asia is not blessed by a plethora of multilateral institutions but rather a growing number of bilateral security relations, the downside of which is the uncertainty that all too easily can rekindle historical animosities and rivalry. The notable exception is the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which Pakistan helped found in 1985 and which Afghanistan joined in 2007. In 2006, SAARC gave birth to a South Asian Free Trade

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Area (SAFTA), which is encouraging but whose impact has been limited, as is the case with the SAARC itself. The United States has mostly been successful in entering bilateral agreements but less so in converting these into a design for regional rapprochement. The United States and Afghanistan have an Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement and, as mentioned, Pakistan is a designated major non-NATO ally while India has been drawn into a Strategic Dialogue. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that ran the combat mission in Afghanistan has followed suit with a training mission (Operation Resolute Support), which will run for 2015–16, and is preparing a civilian-led advisory mission for post2016.18 Another multilateral option is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which has a footprint mainly in Central Asia but which trains Afghan border police and which has been singled out by Pakistan as a potential vehicle for regional cooperation. The United Nations has welcomed the full range of regional partnerships and sponsors the international effort to move Afghanistan into a “transformation decade” that formally began in 2015. The United States did begin in 2011 to outline its own vision for a regional framework that went beyond the ill-fated “Af-Pak” strategy of 2009–10 that accompanied the troop surge in Afghanistan. The new initiative comes in the shape of a Silk Road project that links energy-rich Central Asia via Afghanistan to coastal South Asia. There are two main pillars in the project – a regional hydroelectricity grid (CASA 1000) designed to bring hydropower from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to neighbouring countries and a pipeline project (TAPI) that connects Turkmenistan’s riches in gas and oil via Afghanistan and Pakistan to India – but success has not come easily.19 China has different and more substantial Silk Road projects defined as late as in 2013 that could engender multilateral cooperation not least given China’s staying power in the region and its economic muscle. China has one Silk Road project running inland and through Central Asia (in addition to the China–Pakistan economic corridor) and another running through the maritime waters of Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean,20 and it has with success organized the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. China is also a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that covers Central Asia and includes Russia, and which in 2015 decided to enlarge (by 2016) to India and Pakistan.

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Afghanistan, an SCO observer since 2012, decided in 2015 to seek full SCO membership. This expanded SCO membership offers a prospect for an emerging SCO-centric security order. However, it presupposes the continued diplomatic reconciliation of China and India and then also support from both Russia – inside SCO but with its own plans for a customs union in Central Asia – and the United States. A final multilateral forum that needs emphasis is the Heart of Asia process – aka the Istanbul process – that Turkey initiated in November 2011. It is a “process” focused on confidence building measures, and it does not have the organizational pretensions of SAARC or SCO: its membership includes 14 countries but then also a network of proper international organizations and a group of supporting countries drawn from across the globe. The Heart of Asia process may not have achieved great advances but it has led to a series of ministerial conferences that offer opportunities to test new policy ideas and shape regional diplomacy. Afghan President Ghani has thus been able to advance his ideas for Afghan reconciliation at Heart of Asia meetings first in China, October 2014 and then in Pakistan, December 2015. Oddly, therefore, South Asia finds itself in the position where it has too few established options of multilateral cooperation and too many emerging ones. The established frameworks – SAARC and SAFTA – risk running aground given local animosities (notably between India and Pakistan) and a lack of interest on the part of outsiders. Conversely, new initiatives offer opportunities but also bring with them the uncertainty that may nourish political anxiety and inflame the security dilemma whereby confrontation prevails over cooperation. The end of the international combat mission in Afghanistan has stirred a general awareness that the international community can ignore South Asia only to its peril. Policy-makers and observers often refer to the lesson of the early 1990s and profess to have learnt it – that an abrupt withdrawal from a theatre of war, Afghanistan, provoked regime change, radicalization and ultimately terror and renewed war. Yet the regional legacies outlined in this introduction are a reminder that it is one thing to learn a lesson, it is something else entirely to convert it into cooperative engagement. The feasibility of this conversion defines the inquiry of this book.

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The Approach of the Book The central question in the abstract is whether regional cooperation will prevail over conflict but more specifically whether the main stakeholders can agree to principles of restraint and peaceful change. Restraint is possible if the stakeholders bend their own multilateral designs toward a middle ground where three conditions – following from the region’s geography – obtain: – No fear of exclusion. Some stakeholders may fear exclusion on account of geography or politics. Such exclusion would feed political revisionism and challenges to the very idea of multilateralism and should therefore be avoided. It concerns notably the United States and China but not only. Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan all fear for their exclusion from key decisions. Conversely, India may fear that the momentum is on the side of China, historically aligned with Pakistan in opposition to India. – Equilibrium. The balance of power must be brought to support political pluralism and counter projects of power aggrandizement. Pluralism is about domestic principles of legitimacy, and the fear that these principles are threatened will feed nationalism and unrest. The challenge is therefore to enable the balance of power by way of common principles – for instance of non-intervention and minority rights – embedded within a wider concept of order. – Embedded opportunity for economic and social change. The regional “market” for economic growth and opportunity must be politically embedded to develop. The challenge is thus to align the politics of regional development, which notably involves the various national Silk Road projects but also the multilateral capacity – of global and regional institutions – to connect issues and generate funding. These conditions will be assessed throughout the chapters of the book, though varying degrees depending on the topic and approach. To ensure a comprehensive treatment of the main issues, the book is organized in three sections: transitions, national interests and perspectives. Part 1 on “transitions” provides broad assessments of the dynamics involved in moving the region from war towards peace. It is composed of

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three chapters by Ronald E. Neumann, Vanda Felbab-Brown and Alessandro Marrone and Paola Sartori. Chapter 1 by Ronald E. Neumann addresses the political and historical record of regional cooperation, offering a macro-perspective of how the Great Game outlasted the rivalry of Britain and Russia and actually stabilized for the good of Afghanistan during the Cold War. Later phases were less generous, involving first war and radicalization beginning in 1979 and then from 2001 the effort to build and embed a new state and shield it from insurgent resistance. A new phase is opening up and we should be cognizant of the way in which politics trump economics, an argument accentuated by Neumann’s direct experience in the region as US ambassador. Peace, Neumann argues, is possible only if external players restrain their involvements and help countries of the region engage in “Track II” diplomacy. Chapter 2 by Vanda Felbab-Brown is a macroassessment not of the region’s history but the stakes involved in the transition years, 2015– 16. These years will decisively shape countries’ view of who can hope to emerge stronger from Afghanistan’s wars and how this distribution of fortune ties in with regional alignments. Felbab-Brown argues that a critical issue to follow is the ability of Afghan President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah to provide for coherent governance. The resilience of these Kabul executives and their capacity to make power-sharing a practical reality could forebode the permanence of the republic set up in 2001. Conversely, failure on their part would signal not peace but renewed conflict and rivalry in the country and the region. Chapter 3 by Alessandro Marrone and Paola Sartori looks to mainly NATO but also the EU and the OSCE to detect whether these key Western forums reflect a durable and strong commitment to Afghanistan and regional stability. There is cause for pessimism in this regard, the authors conclude: the institutions have a role to play but an increasingly marginal one, and they will be pulled toward other engagements closer to home. The sum of these “transitional” engagements is an opportunity for internationalled stabilization but a narrow one at that. The defining factor will be the restraint that both Afghan decision-makers and other countries can infuse into their national policies. This brings us to Part 2 on “national interests” and the six chapters by Anthony H. Cordesman, Jo Inge Bekkevold and Sunniva Engh, Meena Singh Roy and Christian Wagner, Houchang Hassan-Yari, Tughral

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Yamin and finally Mohammad Mansoor Ehsan. The logic is to start with the big players and gradually zoom in on the core country of the past 15 years, Afghanistan. Chapter 4 by Anthony H. Cordesman traces US policy from 2009 when the Afghan surge was defined to the present when the United States seeks to ‘pivot’ away from Afghanistan to East Asia. The “pivot” was not an afterthought but an integral component of the surge, Cordesman argues. Moreover, now that the United States has carried out the surge and is well into the policy of “transition,” the country’s strategic focus has simply shifted. The United States remains engaged notably with India, but the sum of its policies is a kind of strategic minimalism that should warn us against assuming that the United States will remain as a pillar of a restrained balance of power in South Asia. Chapter 5 by Jo Inge Bekkevold and Sunniva Engh turns to the obvious alternative, China. They examine China’s impressive Silk Road projects, but also take note of China’s historic reluctance to become engaged in the politics of peace making in Afghanistan. There are signs that China is in fact nudging Pakistan in the direction of peace talks and is actively supporting them, but the effort will remain secondary to the larger Silk Road project. The devil in the detail is not only the capacity of Afghan war to upset Chinese investment plans, including by way of unrest in China’s Xinjiang province, but also the challenge that countries in the region could begin more overtly to balance China out of a fear of encroachment or simply because they fear that Chinese projects will serve only China. China cannot simply invest its economic muscle, Bekkevold and Engh continue, but must also invest its diplomacy in its growing regional footprint. A good indicator of whether restrained or rather unrestrained balance of power policy will follow is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization that India, as mentioned, recently joined. Chapter 6 by Meena Singh Roy and Christian Wagner takes us to India, therefore, the regional hegemon and holder of the region’s asymmetrical balance of power. However, as the chapters on the United States and China have demonstrated, India cannot act simply at its will but must manage the engagements that these two global powers bring. India is likely to hedge its options, Roy and Wagner conclude, and invest in both its multilateral and bilateral policy tracks. The implication is that India is wary to get out in front on the issue of regional restraint but maintains an option for moving in this direction.

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Awaiting this opportunity, the authors continue, India should invest more in its “soft power” diplomacy in Afghanistan and take care not to antagonize Pakistan, but the situation remains fragile and the foreign policies involved are volatile and guarded. In Chapter 7 we turn to Iran, geographically at the periphery of South Asia but historically at the heart of its politics. Houchang Hassan-Yari traces a continuous Iranian desire to belong to the balance of power of the region, not least to help secure its own eastern border, but he also notes a lack of political continuity that could enable Iranian inclusion in the balance of power. Iran’s executive is split, and Iran’s relationship to post-Karzai Kabul is uncertain. In short, Iran would likely support power restraint but has at present no obvious framework of action. Chapters 8 and 9 take us inside Pakistan and Afghanistan, respectively. In Chapter 8, Tughral Yamin examines Pakistan, a country whose multifaceted role in Afghanistan’s wars has been a source of intrigue and frustration among outside observers. Clearly there is a need for foreign policy change in Pakistan, Yamin notes, but change will not be driven by a traditional foreign policy calculus – in other words, it will not come at the behest of the best and the brightest among Pakistan’s diplomats and thinkers – because the conservative element is too strong. Rather, change will emerge bottom-up from society, Yamin argues. A new Pakistani foreign policy will result from improved governance at home and notably the need to shape a foreign policy in support of better economic and social governance inside Pakistan. In Chapter 9, Mohammad Mansoor Ehsan defines a similar challenge for Afghanistan. The country was at first a delineated space; next it needed to build a state and community, a process that has been as painful as promising and which has introduced various forms of legitimizing strategies on behalf of its rulers. The process is far from complete, Mansoor Ehsan offers, and if Afghanistan is to stabilize its foreign policy, it can only happen as an integral part of this nationbuilding process and especially in regards to reconciliation between Afghanistan’s Pashtun and other communities. The challenge appears also in Chapter 8 on Pakistan, as the Pashtun’s span the Afghan–Pakistan border and nourish the claim that neither country is properly defined and therefore the fear of irredentism. For Pakistan and Afghanistan, the conclusion is that foreign policies are intrinsically tied in with community building and that positive change, if possible, will be slow and contested. These observations connect readily to the point made by Neumann in

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Chapter 1 regarding the need for patient regional “Track II” diplomacy to enable gradual but enduring social and economic change. The final section on “perspectives” returns to the connections between the West and South Asia. Chapter 10 by Peter Viggo Jakobsen turns the attention to the United States, which may not at present have a coherent strategy for the South Asia region, as noted by Cordesman in Chapter 4, but which has significant potential to help shape regional politics nonetheless. The key is not to get lost in the details of force numbers and financial commitments but to focus on the larger strategic narrative that, if invested in, can build consensus in Washington first and next in the region. Obama successfully managed this challenge in 2009– 16, Peter Viggo Jakobsen concludes, and could set his successor as president in 2017 up for similar success if he resists the temptation to simply turn the US back to the region. Finally, the conclusion sums up the arguments presented throughout the chapters and their modest optimism or outright pessimism as far as the three analytical themes – no fear of exclusion, power equilibrium and social and economic opportunity – are concerned. There is some ground for optimism, the conclusion finds in a review of the chapters. Most of the big players involved in the region are acting with visible restraint. The challenge is the lack of coordinated action and therefore the risk of renewed conflict and hostility, but perhaps countervailing trends can bolster restraint: political leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan are visibly aware of and concerned with domestic challenges to their governments; both Iran and India seem eager to stabilize their borders for the sake of national development projects; China is building up a long-term strategy of trade and investment; and the United States is increasingly ready to play the role as a honest broker in the region, a role hitherto precluded by its immense engagement in the Afghan war. Yet restraint and equilibrium will not emerge by virtue of an “invisible hand”: they require that external powers navigate the Scylla and Charybdis of the region – the threat that weak state institutions and hotly contested local politics capture great power designs for restraint and reconciliation, and then the threat that regional fragmentation follows from the desire of the great powers themselves to enlist South Asia in their contest for Asia – Pacific influence. In this balancing act, the conclusion continues, India is the key that can unlock regional relations and revive the region’s diplomatic art of restraining power.

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Notes 1. Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), p. 124. 2. See for instance Hinsley, F. H., Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 3. Kissinger, Henry, World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History (London: Allen Lane, 2014), p. 4. 4. Obama, Barack, Statement by the President on Afghanistan, 27 May 2014. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/27/statem ent-president-afghanistan. 5. Shear, Michael D. and Mark Mazzetti, “U.S. to Delay Pullout of Troops from Afghanistan to Aid Strikes”, New York Times, 24 March 2015; Nordland, Rod and Mujib Mashal, “Afghans See American General as Crucial to Country’s Defense”, New York Times, 10 September 2015; Rosenberg, Matthew and Michael D. Shear, “In Reversal, Obama Says U.S. Soldiers will Stay in Afghanistan to 2017”, New York Times, 15 October 2015. 6. “Inaugural Speech by Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai as the President of Afghanistan”, 29 September 2014, http://president.gov.af/en/news/36954. 7. These data are drawn from the 2001 census and available at http://censusindia. gov.in/. 8. Jaishankar, Dhruva, “Does ‘South Asia’ Exist?”, Foreign Policy, 26 September 2013. Available at http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/26/does_ south_asia_exist; Dossani, Rafiq, Daniel C. Sneider and Vikram Sood (eds), Does South Asia Exist? Prospects for Regional Integration (Washington: The Brookings Institution 2010). 9. In terms of population, India has 1.2 billion people where Pakistan has 196 million and Afghanistan 31 million; in terms of Gross Domestic Product (official exchange rates, 2013) India’s economy totaled $1.67 trillion in contrast to Pakistan’s $236 billion and Afghanistan’s $21 billion. Source: CIA’s World Factbook. 10. Mearsheimer, John J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), p. 44. 11. Kissinger, Henry, World Order, pp. 194– 7. 12. Kaplan, Robert, The Revenge of Geography (New York: Random House, 2012), p. 254; also Dash, P. L. (ed), India and Central Asia: Two Decades of Transition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Dombrowski, Peter J. and Andrew C. Winner (eds), The Indian Ocean and U.S. Grand Strategy (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2014); Mahnken, Thomas G. and Daniel Blumenthal (eds), Strategy in Asia: The Past, Present, and Future of Regional Security (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014). 13. Paul, T. V. (ed), South Asia’s Weak States: Understanding the Regional Security Predicament (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); Abraham, Itty, Edward Newman, and Meredith L. Weiss (eds), Political Violence in South and Southeast

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15. 16. 17.

18.

19.

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Asia (Tokyo: UNUP, 2010); and Ollapally, Deepa M., The Politics of Extremism in South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). This phenomenon has in part been captured by the widespread but also contested concept of “Oriental despotism”. See Franco Venturi, “Oriental Despotism”, Journal of the History of Ideas 24/1 (January – March 1963), pp. 133– 42; also Said, Edward, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1979). Paul, T. V., The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014). Dossani, Rafiq and Henry Rowen (eds), Prospects for Peace in South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). Hussain, Akmal and Muchkund Dubey (eds), Democracy, Sustainable Development, and Peace: New Perspectives on South Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); and Kaye, Dalia Dassa, Talking to the Enemy: Track Two Diplomacy in the Middle East and South Asia (RAND, 2007). Reuters, “NATO to Keep Some Troops in Afghanistan After 2016”, New York Times, 13 May 2015; Peker, Emre and Margherita Stancati, “NATO Plans Civilian-Led Mission in Afghanistan After 2016”, Wall Street Journal, 13 May 2015. Weitz, Richard, “U.S. New Silk Road Initiative Needs Urgent Renewal”, CACI Analysis, 4 March 2015. Available at http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/ analytical-articles/item/13155-us-new-silk-road-initiative-needs-urgent-renewal. html. McBride, James, “Building the New Silk Road”, CFR backgrounder, 25 May 2015. Available at http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/building-new-silk-road/ p36573.

PART I TRANSITIONS

CHAPTER 1 REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTH ASIA:A POLITICAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Ronald E. Neumann

It is a truism that regional cooperation depends on some degree of shared interests. In South Asia interests in stability and prosperity could, and perhaps should, draw Pakistan, Afghanistan and others in South Asia to work together and with NATO. However – and it is a big however – interests alone are not a sufficient basis for cooperation. There must be belief that the value of the shared common interests exceeds contrary individual interests. In addition there must be a degree of certainty about the policies of cooperating partners. Without trust cooperation is unlikely to be sustained. The two issues, of belief that common interests will dominate policy and that one party can trust the other, are two sides of the same coin. Actions of any state are usually taken by others as the basis for understanding a state’s “real” policies, especially when actions appear to diverge from statements. Unfortunately, at the moment there is neither clarity about nor trust in the policies of any of the key players in this discussion; not the United States, not Pakistan, not Afghanistan or Iran or Russia and certainly not NATO. This will need to change in order for there to be a possibility for substantial improvement in regional relations. There are some hopeful signs. America is showing some renewed determination.1 China is showing new activism. Above all, improved

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regional cooperation would need to bridge deep distrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As of this writing there are new efforts for cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, good words must be supported in the two areas of military cooperation and work on negotiations with the Taliban. Whether this will happen time will tell. As of this writing, distrust seems to be the predominate characteristic of regional politics. Pakistan has made many statements about its support for peace negotiations with the Taliban. But to date its military actions have been directed entirely at suppressing the Pakistani Taliban, not the Afghan. Taliban fighters out of Pakistan continue to pour into Afghanistan for large-scale attacks and spectacular suicide attacks alike. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai seems to be willing to make a further effort at negotiations but distrust of Pakistan’s intent remains rampant among Afghans, including many within the National Unity Government.2 China has become more active in calling for and participating in peace negotiations. However, there is no sign that China will use its influence with Pakistan to press the Pakistani government to take stronger measures to actually bring the Taliban to a settlement. Taliban statements in the recent Pugwash Trace II meeting in Doha3 continue to call for the withdrawal of all foreign troops – an action that would critically weaken the Afghan government – before the Taliban will engage in negotiations. America’s statements of support for the Afghan government are clouded by continued statements about how it is leaving, and by restrictions on the use of airpower that allow the Taliban to amass forces and manoeuvre without fear of American attack, and the completion of an Afghan air force to fill the gap is still several years away. This, plus the fact that the Obama administration is ending and no one knows what will be the policies of the next administration leave America’s future policy in doubt. Several NATO nations, particularly Germany and Italy, have made clear that they think the forces deployed for NATO’s current training mission should be expanded but without American leadership this is unlikely to happen. Thus there is profound regional uncertainty about how America’s policy will unfold in the coming years. The same lack of clarity is true of other regional parties. Indian– Pakistani relations have made no major breakthrough. Russia has begun limited military supply to Afghanistan4 but US– Russian relations are

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full of tension. No one knows how these tensions will affect Afghanistan. Iran has signed a nuclear agreement but its determination to carry out the agreement remains a subject of debate. And the intensification of Iranian–Arab tensions and Iranian engagement in Syria raise many problems to greater US or NATO cooperation with Iran. Fear of exclusion has always been a part of the Afghan wars. Throughout the years of fighting between the Mujahedeen, and later with the Taliban, outside support for different parties continued strongly. Pakistani support for the Taliban, which continues, fed Indian fears that Afghanistan could become a bastion for the training of groups that led attacks on India. This was part of the reason that India supported other groups. Russian fears of an Islamic state in Afghanistan led to support for anti-Taliban groups and may be among the causes for Russia’s slowly increasing military assistance to the current Kabul government. Iran supported Shia groups (Hazara parties) to keep them fighting. While much of the support was insufficient to allow any party to win it often appeared that it was motivated by a desire to exclude others from dominating the political outcome in Afghanistan. Pakistani statements of support for Pashtuns and concern that a Kabul government dominated by Tajiks or Uzbeks would suggest that the Pakistani fears of having its interests excluded from Afghanistan remain strong. What is clear is that politics, far more than economics, will drive the pace and possibility of change. In terms of this book’s three analytical themes, therefore, it is political restraint and the management of the fear of exclusion that must be seen as key enabling factors for the third theme of embedded opportunities for social and economic growth. Actions will continue to speak much larger than words alone. Hence it is not the form of dialogue or the organization of Track II meetings that are key to change but, rather, the need for visible change in the policies pursued by major regional actors. This essay will briefly examine the history of regional cooperation, the problematic actions of the major states to date and the need for change if regional cooperation is to become a reality.

A Brief Historical Perspective There have been periods of more cooperative relations. However, it is useful to remember that each stemmed more from shared interests, often

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among outsiders, than from formal arrangements. Essentially, one may consider the history of the last two centuries as falling into four periods. The first was that of the so-called “Great Game” dominated by AngloRussian relations which transformed into a continuing neutrality between the Soviets and Americans, although the creation of Pakistan added an element of tension. The second was the period beginning with the Afghan domestic communist revolt that led to the Soviet invasion, increasing American and Pakistani support for the insurgents, then civil war and, finally, the rise of the Taliban. The third period began with the American and then international intervention after the September 11 2001 Al-Qaeda attack on New York. With the ending of NATO combat operations after 2014 and the election of a new Afghan government the area entered a new phase but whether it will mark a distinct departure from the past has yet to be seen. There have been and are now efforts to promote economic cooperation in the region. However, what is clear is that politics have been the predominant element. If the political elements change then economics could become a major factor in keeping on track improvements in regional cooperation. Without political change there is nothing in the historical record to suggest faith in seeing economic interest become the driver, rather than the follower of political developments. The first and second Anglo-Afghan wars were both triggered by British fears that Russia, which had been steadily expanding across Central Asia as Britain consolidated its control of India, would arrive at a location touching India. This would have positioned Russia to attack directly into India.5 There were occasional interests from both, particularly the British, in expanding trade but the Afghan market was never large and political interests predominated.6 After the second Anglo-Afghan war, Afghanistan was essentially a neutral state in which Russian and Great Britain refrained from competing. As is well known, this state of affairs derived from AngloRussian views of avoiding conflict rather than from any particular policy about or for Afghanistan. From 1929 to 1979 Afghanistan was largely at peace. There was some small fighting with Pakistan after its creation in 1947 and relations between the two were never particularly cordial but neither was there a particularly dangerous competition. For much of this period the Soviet Union did not try to bring Afghanistan directly under its influence.

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The United States, for its part, tried to balance Soviet influence and give the Afghan’s room to manoeuvre politically without trying to match the size or composition of Soviet assistance. Thus most of Afghanistan’s army was Soviet equipped but the US provided a number of training courses. There was even a measure of rough coordination in economic assistance; the US built the east-west Kabul to Kandahar highway while the Soviets built the north-south link (subsequently used for their invasion). This is not the place for detailed consideration of this history. Rather, there are three points from it that are relevant to the subject of future cooperation. One is that the neutrality of Afghanistan and a measure of cooperation resulted not from policies about cooperation or neutrality so much as from the various parties, particularly the US and Soviets after mid-century, having larger interests elsewhere. There was no overarching formal structure of cooperation or neutrality. Secondly, there were no strong doubts about the policies of the major players. The US took care not to challenge the Soviets too directly for influence in Afghanistan. The Soviets were fairly clear that Afghanistan was too far behind in development to be ready for Communism. Pakistan worried about possible Afghan hostility but was preoccupied with two Indo –Pak wars, the loss of East Pakistan, relations with China and the early development of its relations with the United States. Afghanistan was not a front burner issue. This changed when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to rescue the failing revolution of the Afghan communists.7 Regional alliances did develop in opposition to the Soviets as America, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and others to a lesser extent acted to support the Mujahedeen. However, those alliances were part of that particular war. After 1992, following the withdrawal and later collapse of the Soviet Union the Americans essentially ignored Afghanistan. What did change was the continuing involvement of outsiders in the long period of civil conflict after the Soviet withdrawal. Pakistan remained heavily involved in support first of insurgent groups and later in support of the Taliban.8 India and Iran were drawn in, as were others. What was clear about this period is that defending political interests and groups was the central motivation. There were periodic discussions of economic interests, such as those concerning a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India (TAPI) but they neither succeeded nor did they drive the politics.

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With the American invasion of 2001, Afghanistan returned to centre stage in international affairs. Afghanistan became a central issue because of American and NATO involvement in the outcome of the war. The reemergence of the Taliban and the increasing evidence of the importance of their sanctuaries in Pakistan led to particularly bad Afghan– Pakistani relations. Afghan President Hamid Karzai became shrill in his denunciations of Pakistan and Pakistan saw Karzai as hostile and in league with India in an effort to encircle Pakistan.9 The same period also saw the growth of extremist movements in Pakistan to the extent that they increasingly threatened Pakistan as well as being directed at Afghanistan and India. The issues of terrorism and extremism that dominate so much of international concern are unlikely to ignore Afghanistan in the future. In fact, the emergence of the socalled Islamic State and the near collapse of Iraq seem to have slowed if not arrested the pace of attempted American disengagement from Afghanistan. We may now be entering a new stage with changes in the Afghan government, new language from Pakistan, new Chinese involvement and signs of a resurgence of American interest in Afghanistan. All these elements, examined below, continue to evolve faster than the lethargic pace of book publishing. However, it is possible to look at the fundamentals of what remains unclear in the policies of the major state actors. These are the elements that must change to create confidence. And confidence, much more than formal agreements, is what would be necessary to regain the clarity of understanding, even though informal and not without suspicion, which undergirded regional quiet in an earlier period. Could one go even further into more explicit cooperation in order to enhance stability and prosperity? For the moment the answer is in doubt and there are many reasons to conclude that the answer will be no. That could change. I believe the region would gain from more cooperation. But change will require both different policies and greater alignment of words and actions from all major players than exists now.

Economics or Politics First? Before World War I it was often thought that, because of economic interdependence, war between the major powers was not possible. That view was wrong. Today it is often noted that economics will

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strengthen cooperation between states. It can. But it is my experience that politics trumps trade. That is, while trade ties will help to strengthen good relations between states, I have not experienced a case where trade has replaced politics as the prime driver of relations or where trade has surmounted political differences to pull fractious states together. Perhaps a case could be made for the Coal and Steel agreement that began the move toward the European Union. Perhaps. But that was not only the particular circumstance of the aftermath of a disastrous war but the result of having a few very gifted and farsighted statesmen in charge. Those circumstances have not been replicated. In considering the political conditions for cooperation, Afghanistan is, as noted above, at the centre of the picture. So long as states contend for influence through support of conflicting military parties I do not believe that there can be a lasting cooperation in other areas. Further, differences over Afghanistan raise fundamental issues of friendliness or enmity among other states. Is the US really a dependable friend of Pakistan? There is much Pakistani doubt about that position. Is Pakistan really an enemy of the United States, complicit in the killing of our soldiers? Many Americans believe so. Is Afghanistan supporting on its side of the border Baluch or Taliban insurgents fighting in Pakistan? Some allege that this is the case. Relations can and do continue despite these suspicions but they greatly hinder sustained or expanded cooperation. Therefore, I argue that political relations have to improve in order for greatly expanded regional cooperation to take root. And for political relations to improve there has to be some measure of confidence in the policies and purposes of the parties. That, unfortunately, is exactly what is lacking. Since I am going to be criticizing others I should start with my own country.

What is the Real Policy? United States: The size and power of the United States gives it an outsized influence. Friends, enemies and those who may wish to be neither all try to take the position of the US into account as they shape their own actions. When they are not sure of the US position they guess or assume or hesitate. And US policy has been vague for some time with a decided lack of connection between words and actions.

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The invasion of Afghanistan in reply to the Al-Qaeda attack on New York and the Taliban sheltering of Al-Qaeda was initially to be a short incursion to hunt terrorists and stay away from nation-building.10 That policy changed and expanded, although without clear definition of its limits. Since Obama took office policy has been continually reshaped. It was announced that we would not do nation-building11 but that is what our efforts in governance, justice and capacity building amount to. A goal of starting a withdrawal in 2011 became one of 2014, then of an Afghan security lead in 2013.12 Over a year was consumed in wondering what the promised American presence would be after 2014. When troop decisions were announced there appeared to be anything but the firm support for Afghanistan that is cited in the Strategic Partnership Agreement13 and in multiple public declarations over the years. Our advisory presence was to shrink by half in a year.14 The policy shifted somewhat to keep the smaller force in place rather than ending after 2016, and to keep several bases open into 2017.15 This will allow greater freedom of action for the next administration. However, each incremental response to a deteriorating security situation has been accompanied by statements that the United States is no longer at war and that its intention remains to depart. These statements seem more and more disconnected from whether the policy has accomplished anything or not. Our economic assistance has declined significantly over the last two years. Given so many changes, there is ample reason for observers to wonder whether funding will continue at necessary levels for minimum economic stability and for the Afghan security forces (ASF). As of writing this, there are some (from the author’s viewpoint good) shifts in the opposite direction. The force withdrawal at the end of 2014 was slowed to bridge the gap created by the late signing of US and NATO security agreements. In November 2014, President Obama also reversed a previous decision and agreed to continue US air support for Afghan forces in serious trouble after 2014.16 Afghan President Ghani has with success requested the pace of withdrawal be slowed for 2015 and a further review of withdrawals planned for 2016 has been halted after a further review in Washington in 2016. Congressional support for a continuation of the Afghan mission appeared to be firming in February 2015 as shown in the comments during a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Nevertheless, the many changes in signals and the

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frequent disconnect between US declarations that it would continue to support Afghanistan and actions setting withdrawal timetables without regard to the situation remains too weak to provide dependable guidance for friends or enemies. That does not, by the way, guarantee that the US won’t stay engaged. The disaster of Iraq is causing more than one observer to question whether the administration’s Afghan policy should change and, indeed, seems to be a primary cause of the changes in Congressional sentiments. The behaviour of the new Afghan government has also improved US policy perceptions, although it is too soon to know if performance will justify the new optimism. And a new US administration in 2017 will make its own decisions on funding for Afghanistan. But for the moment clarity does not reign. NATO: One of the peculiarities of the Obama administration’s June decision on US forces in Afghanistan after 2014 was the absence of any discussion of NATO. The NATO alliance has been a strong player. Germany and Italy have made clear that they are willing to keep open their regional bases in Herat and Mazar, probably beyond 2016.17 But if US troops are all to fall back to Kabul by 2015, where does that leave NATO? Does the US want a NATO support mission after 2016? NATO has pledged support for a post-2016 civilian-led “enduring partnership” mission that will amount to a light footprint with a minor military component but these words have not been given clear meaning.18 But can NATO remain beyond 2016 if US troops that remain operate only within a bilateral context of assignment to the US Embassy, as the administration originally intended, or are so reduced that they cannot support our allies? And without US support, can NATO really maintain its presence? The NATO summit in July 2016 in Warsaw grappled with these questions. The three-year period of $4 billion per year of assistance to the Afghan Security Forces pledged in the NATO summit of 201419 was extended to 2020, and the Resolute Support Mission likewise extended and enhanced in terms of its flexibility. NATO, now dealing with issues of Russia, Ukraine and the Islamic State as well as Afghanistan will have to decide its course going forward. It will be singularly hampered unless the US clarifies its positions. Afghanistan: As of writing this, a new President and Chief Executive Officer have formed a unity government after a long post-electoral struggle. They have said many encouraging things about reform and the

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direction of the country. How stable and lasting that government will be, particularly after the political struggles over the vote count, will need to be proved in practice. The answers to the questions of stability and legitimacy will be important to any plans for regional stability. Thus far the results are not greatly encouraging. A second issue affecting future cooperation will be Afghan attitudes toward Pakistan. The Ghani/Abdullah government is reaching out to Pakistan in a major way. The focus of Afghan policy seems to have shifted from a total military focus on closing Taliban sanctuaries to one of seeking Pakistan’s support for peace negotiation.20 Pakistan is saying favourable things. Military cooperation is improving, at least to the extent of talking more to each other21 although this does not yet seem to involve actual coordinated operations.22 While promises and statements are important the improvement in relations will not last without action. On the basis of anecdotal evidence and my own conversations over years, it is evident that popular Afghan anger against Pakistan has steadily increased. Some of this has been nurtured by the previous Afghan government as an excuse for the lack of improvements in internal governance and corruption. But this should not hide the fact that real popular anger is growing. Many Taliban attacks that kill civilians trigger the response that “they came from Pakistan”. And I believe it is a fact that without sanctuaries in Pakistan the Afghan Taliban would be a fairly small and much more easily contained insurgency. Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan will have to show real results to keep popular Afghan anger in check. Pakistan: A question frequently debated within NATO circles is whether it is possible to speak of a single Pakistani policy. Both the present and past Pakistani governments have enunciated a desire for a stable Afghanistan and pledged to help the search for peace negotiations. Yet simultaneously with these pronouncements the intelligence service’s ties to and support of the Taliban in sanctuaries along the border has appeared to continue. No major Afghan Taliban leader has ever been captured in Pakistan or turned over to the Afghan authorities. The saga of who deals with Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar has continued for years. Even as Pakistan’s army has taken on major combat again the Pakistani Taliban and moved into areas like Miramshah news stories23 and speculation among intelligence analysts is that Haqqani leaders were all forewarned to move out of the way. How much of this is true I do not know. The point is that it is believed.

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That said, the fighting between the Pakistani army and the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) has reached new intensity and there could be policy changes. Pakistan might really deal with the tension between its combat with internal extremism on the one hand and its support for external terrorism and extremism on the other. Pakistan now seems to be increasingly worried about a too rapid US pull out from Afghanistan.24 For the moment, what is important for NATO and for regional cooperation is simply that Pakistan’s true policy is a subject of endless debate and great doubt. This is not to argue that Pakistan lacks reasons for its own concerns and actions. Questions about US reliability as a partner are as valid as the US concerns about Pakistan. So too are fears that the US will abandon Afghanistan leaving stability unachieved, Afghan security forces underfunded and a mess on Pakistan’s doorstep (as former NATO/ ISAF commander general John Allen told me he heard from then Pakistani Chief of Staff General Pervez Kayani). All these accusations may prove true. Yet the fact remains that while there is so much discrepancy between Pakistan’s stated policies and what its neighbours, partners and observers believe is true about its actions there is no stable base for long-term regional cooperation.25 On a perhaps more optimistic note, the Pakistani offensive against the TTP could signal a larger change in policy. So could the recent notice that plans have been signed on technical details for the Turkemnistan– Afghan– Pakistan– India pipeline (TAPI),26 potentially a positive sign of change. However, agreements on TAPI have been discussed and sometimes signed for many years so we will have to wait and see, just as we will have to wait to evaluate the military action. China: Discussions of regional stability necessarily include China because of its geographic position, economy, centrality in central Asian politics and relations with Pakistan. Conferences discussing Afghanistan seem to be multiplying in China in recent years and Chinese policy has changed, although to what extent still needs more definition. Discussions with Chinese officials give a sense of increased Chinese concern as the final withdrawal of US forces draws nearer. Yet only recently have Chinese leaders manifested their concern in action. Chinese involvement in Afghanistan until mid-2014 was primarily economic. China won a large and important copper investment contract but for various reasons has done little development of the resource.

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A newer exploration contract for petroleum may be more active. As recently as March 2014 one Chinese professor tellingly summarized to me, “Chinese policy remains one of cautious passivity.” This is now changing. China has announced new economic assistance for Afghanistan and begun to play an active role with Afghanistan and Pakistan in the search for a negotiated political solution.27 In off-therecord conversations Chinese diplomats have shown considerable enthusiasm for involvement including a willingness to provide military training (outside Afghanistan) for Afghan forces.28 President Ghani made his first foreign visit to China and seems to be pinning a good deal of hope on China for help with peace negotiations. The Taliban has visited China for discussions.29 These are important signs, although China is still not a major donor. How China will use its relationship with Pakistan to articulate any particular views on Afghanistan is unclear. Whether this will evolve into continued activism or clarity will be seen soon in the regional dimension. China continues to have economic interests in Afghanistan but like other parties it is politics that are driving the changing Chinese policy. Russia: Like many powers, Russia has multiple foreign policy goals. It has a strong interest in curbing the flow of Afghan opium and heroin for which Russia is a primary market.30 Moreover, Russia does not want an early US withdrawal from Afghanistan that could leave Central Asia exposed to an extremist Islamic threat from Afghanistan. Russia has given important assistance to Afghanistan and the NATO mission there, including rescheduling massive Afghan debts and facilitating transport of military supplies to Afghanistan. But at the same time, Russia does not want a permanent US presence that may project power into areas of Asia where Russia appears to be determined to maintain primacy. New strains resulting from European issues may further complicate Russia’s policies toward regional cooperation. Exactly how Russia will play in the region remains unclear. Iran: Unlike Iraq, Afghanistan has not been an historic threat to Iran although there remain some long-term disagreements such as over the division of Helmand river water. Iran played a minor role in the years of internecine warfare in Afghanistan, sending aid to its co-religionists but not becoming deeply involved, although it did come close to outright war with the Taliban. Iran cooperated with the US during the 2001 fighting and 2002 peace-making efforts31 and maintained a direct

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dialogue with the US in and about Afghanistan until 2005 when I was ordered to suspend those discussions. At present it seems to contend for influence but also to be more concerned about the dangers that could arise from US forces near its border than from particularly Afghan forces.32 There is a flow of arms from Iran to the Taliban but the intelligence picture in my time and, as far as I know, at present is not clear as to the degree of Iranian government involvement in these shipments. What is clear is that the arms flowing in have remained far less than Iran supplied to Iraqi insurgents and, hence, certainly less than Iran could supply if it were determined to support the insurgency in a major way. Iran has provided a variety of forms of economic assistance to Afghanistan, particularly in linking transport routes. With the end of US sanctions Iran could become a major transit link between Afghanistan and Central Asia. Road links already exist through southern Afghanistan. One of the more intriguing ideas for the future would be to join the Iranian railway to Herat across northern Afghanistan to link into the existing Central Asian rail network. Afghans are quick to allege that large amounts of money come from Iran for political influence.33 Evidence of exactly what influence the Iranians are renting is thin but from the allegations would appear to be temporary and tactical. Iran certainly has an interest in expanding commercial ties with and through Afghanistan. However, the interest in expanding relations is in tension with its concerns about the American presence. How this tension might be played out in the context of regional cooperation is unclear. Since most of Iran’s actions in Afghanistan appear to be heavily tactical it is not possible to discern long-term goals that would clearly drive future relations in a particular direction.

Bilaterals before Multilaterals but Room for Track II In order to really develop greater regional cooperation the foundations will have to be laid by each of the major players by clarifying its own intentions and policies. This is unlikely at the moment. Yet the imperatives for greater cooperation are clear. NATO failure in Afghanistan, particularly if it is laid at Pakistan’s door, will not be

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helpful to anyone. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan have enormous potential economic gains to realize through cooperation. Neither China nor Russia wants to see an expansion of Islamic extremism in Central Asia. Therefore, while formal progress toward regional cooperation is likely to be slow, and might not even happen, there is ample room for what is often referred to as Track II diplomacy, unofficial conferences and discussion to consider what cooperation could look like and how one might tackle the very problems that would need to be overcome for such cooperation to function. There are many such issues. They range from large military questions such as how an agreement not to harbour insurgents would be verified to detailed questions of how corruption could be lowered and border controls managed efficiently if the trade were opened more freely. What kind of cooperation against narcotics is actually feasible given the weak development of police forces in the area? If the states of the area actually were ready to move to more cooperation, how could NATO assist? When nations are either not ready to make clear policy choices or to make definite offers, there is room for unofficial discussions. In such meetings positions can be tried out without concern for whether concessions will be pocketed by opponents without offering anything in return. Discussions can be framed in terms of “if this were offered how would you respond”. In short, there is ample room for contributions to thinking that conferences and informal discussions can explore future changes in policy more freely than formal negotiations. However, the problem at present is not with the lack of Track II exchanges. Many Indo – Pakistani forums have been held over the years. Several different Track II exchanges with the Taliban have occurred as noted earlier. The so-called Herat Dialogue of October 2015 brought Indian, Iranian and Pakistani representatives together in Afghanistan.34 However, it, like many other meetings resulted mostly in restatements of existing positions. The problem is not with the existence of exchanges or with their structure or even with ideas presented. The problem is that the policies of the regional states have not shifted to take advantage of the ideas developed by these exchanges or to reduce the suspicions that are so intense with each of the states. One can only hope that the time will come when the work of such exchanges may bear fruit. Unfortunately, that time has not yet shown itself.

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Notes 1. Whitlock, Craig, “U.S., Afghanistan approach new troop-withdrawal pact”, Washington Post, 22 February 2015. 2. Private discussion of the author in Kabul, October 2015. 3. Norland, Rod, “Afghan and Taliban Representatives Meet in Qatar”, New York Times, 3 May 2015. 4. Birnbaum, Michael, “Afghan forces to receive Russian arms as Moscow seeks expanded role”, Business Insider, 13 January 2016. 5. There are many works on this historical period of which one of the best is William Dalrymple, Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, 1839 – 42 (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 6. Hopkins, B. D., The Making of Modern Afghanistan (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), has a particularly interesting discussion of the economic aspects of this history. 7. Release of Soviet documents has allowed much new study of Soviet motives for the invasion. See, for example, Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers (New York: Public Affairs, Perseus Books, 2011). 8. A great deal has been written about this period. In addition to Tomsen see also Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (London: Yale University Press, 2002); Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: How the War against Islamic Extremism is being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (London: Penguin Books, 2008); Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: the Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (London: Penguin Books, 2004); Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi (eds), The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); and Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (London: I.B.Tauris, 2010). 9. Pages could be filled with Karzai’s public statements which I have also heard in numerous private meetings over the years. A particularly frank statement about Pakistan’s policies occurred in a recent interview of former President Musharraf with John Boone, “Musharraf: Pakistan and India’s backing for ‘proxies’ in Afghanistan must stop”, Guardian, 13 February 2015. 10. Ballard, John R., David W. Lamm and John K. Wolf, From Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The US at War in Afghanistan and Iraq (Illinois: Naval Institute Press, 2012); see for example p. 105. 11. White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, 1 December 2009. 12. Obama, Barack, “Remarks by the President on a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan”, 27 March 2009, White House Press Office. 13. The White House, “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”, 2 May 2012.

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14. 15. 16.

17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

25. 26.

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Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf. Obama, Barack, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan: Rose Garden”, 27 May 2014, White House Press Office. Available at http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2014/05/27/statement-president-afghanistan. Tilghman, Andrew, “Obama extends Afghanistan Mission into 2017”, Military Times, 15 October 2015. Mazzetti, Mark and Eric Schmiitt, “In a Shift, Obama Extends U.S. Role in Afghan Combat”, New York Times, 21 November 2014. Available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/us/politics/in-secret-obama-extends-us-role-inafghan-combat.html?_r¼0. Author’s conversations with foreign diplomats. Peker, Emre and Margherita Stancati, “NATO Plans Civilian-Led Mission in Afghanistan After 2016”, Wall Street Journal, 13 May 2015; also NATO news bulletin, NATO Allies and partners stress support for Afghan Security Forces, 23 October 2013, available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_104252. htm; and Parrish, Karen, NATO Defense Ministers Set Post-2014 Afghanistan Mission, American Forces Press Service. Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan: “Issued by Heads of State and Government of Allies and their International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troop contributing partners”, 4 September 2014. Available at http://www.nato. int/cps/en/natohq/news_112517.htm?mode¼pressrelease. Private conversations with Afghan and NATO officials. Noori, Ratib, “Pakistan’s Army and ISI Chiefs to Arrive to [sic] Kabul”, TOLO News, 17 February 2015. Off-record conversation with senior NATO official. Graham-Harrison, Emma and Jon Boone, “Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of letting Haqqani militants escape crackdown”, Guardian, 17 July 2014. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/17/afghanistan-accus es-pakistan-militants-crackdown-haqqani-network. Dreazen, Yochi, “Pakistan to Obama: Don’t Pull Out the Troops from Afghanistan Just Yet”, Foreign Policy: Passport, 16 July 2014. Available at http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/07/16/pakistan_to_obama_don_t_ pull_out_the_troops_from_afghanistan_just_yet?utm_source¼Sailthru&utm_ medium¼email&utm_term¼%2ASituation%20Report&utm_campaign¼ JULY%2017%202014%20SITREP. For a particularly strong, but not unusual, attack on Pakistan’s policies see Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy; American in Afghanistan, 2001– 2014 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014). Bhatti, Sohail Iqbal, “Operational Accord on TAPI Signed”, Dawn, 18 July 2014. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1120062/operational -accordon-tapi-gas-pipeline-signed?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm _term=%2AAfPak%20Daily%20Brief&utm_campaign=2014_The%20South %20Asia%20Daily.

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27. Rudolph, Josh, “Exploring a New Role: Peacemaker in Afghanistan”, China Digital Times, 14 January 2015. Available at http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/ 01/exploring-new-role-peacemaker-afghanistan/. 28. Private conversations, December 2014. 29. “Afghan Peace Talks with Taliban could begin soon as President says Hopes high for Peace”, Associated Press and Fox News, 21 February 2015. 30. Miller, Jacqueline McLaren, “Afghan Narcotrafficking; A Joint Threat Assessment”, East-West Institute, 11 April 2013. 31. Dobbins, Ambassador James F., After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Nebraska: Potomac Books, 2008). 32. Barzegar, Kayhan, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-Taliban Afghanistan”, The Washington Quarterly, 1 June 2014. 33. I have heard this on numerous trips to Afghanistan from President Karzai through many parliamentary deputies. 34. This meeting was held following the formal Herat Security Dialogue IV that I attended. I received detailed briefings on the course of the informal talks in the week following the meeting.

CHAPTER 2 WHEN THE FIGHTING STAYS TOUGH, WHAT WILL THE TOUGH DO?:THE AFGHAN SAGA CONTINUES Vanda Felbab-Brown

Introduction After more than a decade of struggles against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, US President Barack Obama hoped to extricate the United States from participating militarily in Afghanistan’s counterinsurgency. But as the end of his presidency approaches in the summer of 2016, Afghanistan again faces crisis. Very few trends in the country are going well. The UN special envoy in Afghanistan, Nicholas Haysom, went so far as to state – in March 2016, when briefing the UN Security Council – that if Afghanistan merely survives 2016 the United Nations mission in the country will consider it a success.1 The US drone killing of the Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour in Baluchistan, Pakistan in May 2016 provides a fillip to the embattled Afghan government and may in the long-term result in fragmentation and internal withering of the Taliban. But that outcome is not guaranteed, nor is it likely to materialize quickly. In fact, the Taliban swiftly announced Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, a deputy to Mullah Mansour, as its new leader to avoid the tensions and chaos that surrounded Mansour’s appointment.

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For more than a year and half, since the US and NATO handed fighting over to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the Taliban has mounted and sustained its toughest military campaign in years, and the war has become bloodier than ever. Despite the Taliban’s internal difficulties, its military energy shows no signs of fizzling out. It has been scoring important tactical and even strategic victories. Insecurity has increased significantly throughout the country, civilian deaths have shot up and the Afghan security forces are taking large, and potentially unsustainable, casualties while other ANSF deficiencies, including retention and support functions, persist. Significant portions of Afghanistan’s territory, including the provincial capital of Kunduz or multiple districts of Helmand, have fallen (at least temporarily) to the Taliban over the past year and half. At the beginning of summer 2016, many other districts and provinces are under serious Taliban pressure. The influence of the particularly vicious Haqqani network within the Taliban has grown. Moreover, the Islamic State (IS) established itself in Afghanistan in 2015, although it faces multiple strong countervailing forces. Most ominously, Afghanistan’s political scene remains fractious and polarized. The National Unity Government (NUG) of President Ashraf Ghani and his chief executive officer and rival Abdullah Abdullah (created in the wake of the highly contested presidential elections of 2014) has never really found its feet. Fundamental structural problems of the government remain unaddressed, and after two years in power the government may face its end as a result of a possible Loya Jirga assembly in the fall of 2016. If it takes place at all, the Jirga could alter the basic power arrangements in Afghanistan, and might codify or undo the President– CEO structure of the National Unity Government. Even if the Jirga does not meet, Afghanistan’s leadership will face potentially debilitating crises of legitimacy, especially if the parliamentary and district elections scheduled, after a year’s delay, for autumn 2016, are postponed again. Afghanistan’s elite has not taken any steps to heal the country’s deep and broad political wounds. Instead, the dominant mode of politics is to plot the demise of the government and focus on a parochial accumulation of one’s power at the expense of the country’s national interest, and even the very survival of the post-2001 order. While Afghan politicians may not wish a return to a civil war, their reckless and

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selfish actions continually nudge the country in that direction. Out of the gamut of security, economic, geostrategic and political challenges, it is these rapacious, predatory and self-centred political schemes and predilections that pose by far the biggest threat to the country. This political misbehaviour further underscores the country’s vulnerability to the vagaries of foreign financial and military support, on which Afghanistan will be structurally dependent for years to come. In addition, regional powers may be more tempted to manipulate and exploit the country’s domestic factionalism. Struggling to deliver the promised improvements in government efficiency and reduction in corruption, President Ghani staked the two first years of his presidency on negotiations with the Taliban. In order to facilitate the negotiations, he reached out to Pakistan in a daring and politically costly gambit in the fall of 2014 and repeatedly since. Although there have been some halting steps toward starting negotiations with the Taliban since the spring of 2015, the payoff so far has been limited and Ghani’s political space is shrinking. The revelation of the death of the Taliban’s long-term leader Mullah Omar’s death in July 2015 and the subsequent political struggle within the Taliban over succession and against defections and fragmentation are merely one factor inhibiting any speedy peace process. The death of his successor, Mullah Mansour, in May 2016 is likely to complicate the process even more. Even when the negotiations do get under way in earnest, they are likely to take years to produce an outcome. The international community, as well as Afghan and outside observers, long predicated a bright future for Afghanistan on the “country’s young generation” – educated, urban, Westernized and speaking the language of Western NGOs and donors. Yet since 2015, many of this young generation as well as other Afghans have packed up and left the country, seeking asylum in Europe and not willing to suffer the physical insecurity and economic hardships of life in Afghanistan. Yet facing a flood of refugees from the Middle East and Africa, Europe (and for that matter also the United States) does not want them. Paradoxically, Europe’s desire to keep potential Afghan refugees in Afghanistan is perhaps the greatest motivation today for many NATO governments to stay engaged in the country. What should have been the victory march has become a desperate refugee slog.

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Although most trends are difficult, Afghanistan is not on the cusp of defeat. The Afghan military has not collapsed or ethnically fragmented. The Taliban is still not holding large cities nor does it have anywhere near the territorial control that the Islamic State enjoys in Iraq and Syria. The Afghan government did manage last year to boost its revenues, an important development. Even with the death of Mullah Mansour and a possible further fragmentation of the Taliban, the prospect is one of prolonged years-long fighting at best. What then is the theory of an endgame and cessation of conflict for the Afghan government and the international community? One answer is simply hanging on and hoping for the Taliban to self-destruct and wither from within, as a result of the mismanagement of its internal organization, internal fragmentation (perhaps intensified by a US decapitation strategy) or extensive alienation of the Afghan population even in areas where the Afghan government is not liked. The second is hanging on in the hope that the Taliban is willing to negotiate some tolerable power-sharing terms. The two are of course interconnected. The larger problems the Taliban faces on the battlefield – whether of its own doing or because of ANSF resistance or other insurgent challengers – the more willing it is going to be to accept a less ambitious negotiated deal. However, such an inflection point is so far nowhere near. And if the Taliban does one day seriously come to the negotiations table, an extensive fragmentation of the group at that time will only complicate and compromise negotiations. This chapter proceeds as follows: In the first section, I discuss the evolving international support for Afghanistan since the formation of the National Unity Government in Afghanistan out of the 2014 presidential crisis. I also describe the end of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and its transformation into the 2016 Resolute Support Mission, and the planning for a post-2016 US military and NATO presence in Afghanistan. And I show how the problem of the Afghan refugees has become a key preoccupation and policy determinant of many European partners of Afghanistan. In the second section, I describe key military developments in Afghanistan since the fall of 2014 and the intensity of the Taliban’s battlefield thrust. I also analyse the group’s internal fragmentation and leadership struggles since the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death and the US killing of Mullah Mansour. Next, I analyse President Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan

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and the effort to negotiate with the Taliban. In the final section, I focus again on the National Unity Government and more broadly the state of governance in Afghanistan, and the way it affects Taliban negotiations and the security and economy of the country.

Staunching the Government, Staunching the Migration: US and European Support for a Shaken Afghanistan Until the summer of 2014, US support for Afghanistan after that period remained uncertain and underspecified. When, in 2009, the Barack Obama administration inherited the war from the administration of George W. Bush, the military situation in Afghanistan looked ominous. The Taliban and Haqqani insurgencies had expanded, and the quality of Afghan governance was steadily deteriorating. Afghanistan was experiencing its greatest insecurity since 2001 as well as intense corruption.2 Despite all this, during his 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama emphasized Afghanistan as the important yet unfinished “war of necessity”, unlike the “war of choice” in Iraq that he promised to terminate as quickly as possible, implying that as President he would indeed focus on the Afghan conflict in a smarter, more focused way. But despite the election rhetoric, from the moment the Obama administration took over, it struggled with some of the very same dilemmas that perplexed the Bush administration. Since Al-Qaeda was the primary source of terrorist threats against the United States, was it also necessary to continue combating the (more locally engaged) Taliban? Could an effective counterterrorism mission be prosecuted essentially just from by airborne and offshore assets? Or was it necessary to defeat the resurgent Taliban on the ground and construct a stable Afghan government? Should the US military engagement be intensified – with all the blood, treasure and domestic ramifications that would entail – or should the US military engagement be significantly scaled back? By the winter of 2013, strong voices in the White House argued that what happened on the ground in Afghanistan mattered only to a limited degree for the successful prosecution of the anti-Al-Qaeda campaign, and that the needed counterterrorism operations against Al-Qaeda and its allies could be effectively conducted from the air, reducing the need for a foreign presence on the ground in Afghanistan itself.3

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The increasingly difficult relations between the White House and then Afghan President Hamid Karzai (who was alienated from, distrustful and provocative of, Washington) only strengthened the hand of those who wanted to pull the plug on US participation in the Afghanistan war. For almost two years, Karzai had been unwilling to sign a status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) between Afghanistan and the United States, an important signal to other NATO and US allies in Afghanistan. Although many Afghans, including prominent elders who were hardly effusive about the United States in other circumstances, lined up behind the SOFA, Karzai was outraged by US/ISAF accidental killings of Afghan civilians. More importantly, he remained unpersuaded that US presence in Afghanistan would help stabilize the country instead of serving what Karzai imagined were the US true interests in Afghanistan: to use the country as a platform for prosecuting a New Great Game against Russia and China in Central Asia.4 By the spring of 2014, the White House spoke of winding down the Afghanistan war5 – at the latest by the end of 2016 and, should the SOFA not be signed, perhaps as early as the end of 2014 with the expiration of the mandate of the United States and ISAF, who had been prosecuting the war in Afghanistan for over a decade. Then two developments shook the White House and the US Congress in the late spring and summer of 2014, reducing the pressure for withdrawal from Afghanistan. First, the virulent off-shoot of AlQaeda in Iraq – the Islamic State (IS)6 – swept through parts of Syria and Iraq, taking over many Sunni areas, and in May 2014 even threatened the capital of Iraq, Baghdad.7 The White House, although long determined to get out of the Iraq war and change the focus of US national security policy from the Middle East to East Asia, now sprang into action, bombing IS targets in Iraq and mobilizing an international coalition against the re-invigorated insurgency in Iraq and Syria. Yet IS was able to rapidly entrench itself in the Middle East and was becoming an inspiration for jihadi groups in Africa and South Asia. Soon, its branches were sprouting in India and Pakistan; and several renegade Taliban commanders also declared allegiance to IS. Although the presence of IS in Afghanistan was – and continues to be – limited (as discussed below), the White House took notice of the spectre of reinvigorated jihadism there.

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Second, the highly contested and fraudulent 2014 presidential election in Afghanistan ignited an intense and prolonged political crisis. By July 2014, the crisis seemed to have brought the country to the edge of major political and ethnic violence and nearly provoked a military coup, potentially sparking civil war.8 The White House now instructed the US Embassy to go into overdrive to avert such a disaster. Thus, even when the recount of the vote in the runoff election confirmed massive fraud by the organizations of the two principal contenders – Ashraf Ghani, the former Afghan minister of finance (seen as a technocratic pro-reform Pashtun candidate), and Abdullah Abdullah, the former Afghan minister of foreign affairs (seen as a Tajik status-quo candidate) – and as neither of them was ready to accept losing, the US Embassy and State Department persuaded both of them to form a national unity government.9 The September 2014 political agreement covered the bare minimum of a deal, sketching out its mere outlines, with many details as well as deeper structural electoral and constitutional reforms left to be worked out later. They remain unresolved as late 2016. Nonetheless, the newly sworn-in President Ashraf Ghani and his socalled Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah accomplished what they both highlighted as their key campaign objective: keeping the United States and other ISAF international partners in Afghanistan after 2014. Their National Unity Government (NUG) just barely beat the US October 2014 deadline to sign the SOFA. The new US and international military coalition mission – Operation Resolute Support – started in January 2015 and is slated to run through the end of 2016. Thus, after a decade of large-scale offensive counterinsurgency operations, the US and NATO missions in Afghanistan changed to the far more limited ones of advising and training – and, in extremis, active military support of – the Afghan forces. Given the intensity of the fighting and the spectre of IS in the Middle East and potentially also South Asia, the US government agreed not to reduce the US military presence in Afghanistan for the rest of 2015, and renewed that commitment for 2016. At least until then, the United States would provide 9,800 troops and the NATO allies another 2,000. Crucially, the White House also agreed to keep at least some US military bases outside of Kabul open until the next US administration took over in 2017.

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The combat mandate for US forces was officially restricted by the White House only to force-protection and counterterrorism operations confined to Al-Qaeda, whose large bases were discovered in Afghanistan in late 2015 as the terrorist group appeared to experience a second life there.10 The counterterrorism operations were also expanded to include targeting the Islamic State in Afghanistan.11 Yet as the security situation continued to deteriorate in 2015 and did not improve in the first part of 2016, US forces in Afghanistan once again engaged in limited direct offensive operations against the Taliban as well – operations which exceeded the training, advising and US-force protection mandates of Operation Resolute Support, even though US commanders justified them in those terms.12 Given the precariousness of the security situation, the White House also reversed its previous decision to change the US presence in Afghanistan after 2016 to a mere 1,000-soldier embassy-level protection force.13 Instead, at least in 2017, by which time a new US president would take over from President Obama, the United States would keep 5,600 troops in Afghanistan, the level to which US presence was originally envisioned to decline in 2016. Moreover, in May 2015, preceding the White House, NATO announced plans to keep a small civilian-led military mission in Afghanistan after 2016. According to the then head of NATO forces in Afghanistan, General John Campbell, the post-2016 NATO mission would be deployed around a base in Kabul and used among other functions to bolster the Afghan air force and intelligence service.14 What in diplomatic and military planning of 2012 was imagined as a Transformational Decade through 2024 (by which time Afghanistan would be militarily and economically capable of standing on its own feet, due to hoped-for mineral revenues) became more like a “Decade of Hanging On” and hoping for a breakthrough in peace negotiations with the Taliban. The fact that NATO member states, particularly Germany and even Italy, were more forward-leaning than the United States in pushing for continuing military presence in Afghanistan after 2016 was a bittersweet development for Washington. Throughout much of the post-2001 military engagement in Afghanistan, it was the United States that pressed ISAF partners to contribute more troops and remove combat-restrictive caveats from their mandates – mandates which caused US soldiers to dub the ISAF mission as “I Saw Americans Fight”.

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Nonetheless, it was not a newly discovered sense of burden-sharing that motivated Germany and other European governments to press for a US and NATO military perseverance in Afghanistan after 2016, but rather the crisis of Afghan refugees flooding into Europe. In 2015, nearly 180,000 Afghans applied for asylum in Europe, many in Germany, forming the second-largest refugee group after Syrians.15 Though the migrants often suffered horrific conditions at the hand of smugglers, risking drowning and other privations on their way to Europe and though European governments sought to send them back, the flow did not abate in the early part of 2016. In the spring of 2016, according to the United Nations, some 1,000 Afghans were leaving their homes daily, displaced by fighting.16 (Not all would of course seek to leave Afghanistan for abroad.) With growing European domestic opposition to accepting the Afghan refugees or those from the Middle East, various European governments, including Germany, pressured the Afghan government to prevent the would-be migrants from leaving Afghanistan, reportedly even threatening to cut off aid to the Afghan government. The European governments classified the Afghan migrants as economic migrants and not refugees from insecurity, thus making them ineligible for asylum.17 Germany extensively advertised this policy in Afghanistan, while promising to help create economic opportunities for Afghans within Afghanistan. Indeed, many of those fleeing Afghanistan were reacting to the combination, within Afghanistan, of rising insecurity and economic deprivation. The departure of the vast majority of Western forces not only radically shrank Afghanistan’s GDP, but also eliminated tens of thousands of jobs of translators, drivers and cultural advisors for many young Afghans. Many of the migrants who set foot to leave Afghanistan were of the “bright, young, Westernized educated Afghan generation” assumed to be the transformation engine of the country. Disenchanted, they now saw little economic opportunity and showed little faith in the country’s political and security developments. The 2015 Survey of the Afghan People by the Asia Foundation, conducted for the 11th year, revealed that for the first time since 2015 the majority of Afghans (57 per cent) believed the country was headed in the wrong direction, with insecurity, unemployment and a poor economy and corruption identified as the biggest problems.18 Despite Ghani’s and Abdullah’s campaign promises to improve the rule of law and reduce corruption,

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some 90 per cent of Afghans continued to report corruption as a daily problem.19 Some interviews also suggested that some of the modern and presumably transformative Afghan generation would be willing to settle for some form of Taliban rule, though with limits to the Taliban’s power, with the hope that the Taliban in power would be less corrupt than the post-2001 Afghan politicians.20 Even if not completely representative, and anecdotal, such interviews likely present a highly-skewed, situational and fluid set of preferences. Nonetheless, they were yet another indicator that the engine of Afghan transformation, the young generation’s break with the patterns of their fathers and mothers, was at best highly tenuous and up for grabs.21

The Fighting Gets Tough Despite the characterization by the European governments that only economic opportunism, not their personal safety, drove the Afghan migrants out of their country, security in Afghanistan did in fact deteriorate throughout Afghanistan in 2015 and did not show signs of improving in the first half of 2016. In fact, most analysts and even Western officials expected a tough and bloody 2016.22 According to the United Nations, 3,545 Afghan civilians were killed in 2015, with another 7,457 wounded, the highest total casualties since 2009.23 Sixty-two per cent of civilian casualties were attributed to the Taliban and other anti-government forces, 17 per cent on progovernment forces and 2 per cent on international troops, with the rest undetermined.24 These increasing civilian casualties have also intensified displacement: between January and November 2015, more than 300,000 Afghans fled their homes, a 160 per cent increase compared with the same period in 2014.25 Afghan security forces also took large casualties, another ominous indicator of the security trends. Although conflicting numbers were released and hushed up, the casualty rate might have been a 28 per cent higher in 2015 than in 2014, a year when at least some top-level US military officers considered the ANSF casualty rate unsustainable.26 In 2014, more than 20,000 soldiers and support personnel were lost due to deaths and injuries as a result of combat, desertions and discharges.27 Long facing even more pressure from the Taliban than has the Afghan military, the police lost almost a quarter of its members in 2015, some

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36,000, many through desertions.28 For years, the police force was known to have been plagued by corruption and been abusive toward civilians, while reform efforts struggled. Indeed, the problem of desertion in ANSF was only one of the longstanding deficiencies in the force that became blatantly manifest after 2014 when ISAF handed the Afghan military a stalemated war with the Taliban, requiring the ANSF to fight on their own. The problem of soldiers going AWOL and deserting is nothing new, particularly in the tougher fighting environment of Afghanistan’s south. Poor rotation and R&R practices, often undermined by corruption, with those not being able to buy themselves leave never receiving it, have been one of the causes. The increasing insecurity making it more difficult for soldiers to travel to their homes during leave is another. Western advisors have encouraged their Afghan counterparts to redress both problems.29 With the Afghan economy in poor shape since 2013, signalling a steep decline in employment opportunities for Afghans, joining the ANSF is still an attractive economic option for many (apart from opium poppy cultivation). However, a high casualty rate not only demoralizes the force, but also makes it economically costly for many Afghan families to send their sons to the ANSF. Still, at least until late 2015, recruitment seemed to have replenished the poor retention. But since then, some reports have indicated that recruitment has also fallen, in part due to the Taliban putting more effective pressure on families not to send their sons to ANSF.30 At least in some of the most contested areas, such as Helmand, poor recruitment and retention seem to have given rise to the phenomenon of ghost soldiers, i.e., those on the payroll but not actually on the battlefield.31 Other serious deficiencies include poor logistics and planning, lack of specialty enablers such as medical evacuation teams, and deficiencies in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) plus other sustainment functions. Such capacities take a long time to develop, and ISAF did not begin adequately focusing on them until 2011, late in the process of developing the ANSF. Determined far more by what excess goods logistics headquarters wants to get rid of rather than based on an area’s needs, logistics remain a combination of Afghan tribalism, the legacy of Soviet-era bureaucracy and US legalism. The complicated system of multiple authorizations for supplies at multiple levels results in ample opportunity for corruption,

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with officials at various levels holding up requests until they are paid off.32 An internet-based system the United States has provided as an alternative has reduced some of the problems, but is vulnerable to electricity and signal disruption. The Taliban frequently targets electricity and cell towers, particularly in areas where local operators do not pay sufficient extortion fees to the Taliban. ISR experienced a significant contraction when the Obama administration, for a variety of reasons, including the fight against IS in the Middle East, decided to pull significant signal intelligence assets from Afghanistan. The lack of Afghan close-air-support assets is particularly problematic and a great boost to the insurgency. Because of counterproductive restrictions on its mandate, Resolute Support has often had to allow Taliban forces to mass and strike before air assets can come to ANSF’s support. NATO officials at times suggest to their Afghan counterparts that all of these problems are far worse on the Taliban side, including no air support, and that therefore the ANSF can adapt to them.33 Nonetheless, nursed on such enablers and support functions being previously provided by ISAF, the ANSF are not accustomed to living without them. These deficiencies greatly undermine morale and lead to poor recruitment and retention. And there are chronic problems: financially, the ANSF are and will be fully dependent on US and other foreign funding for years to come. By the spring of 2016, the United States allocated $68 billion toward building self-sufficient Afghan forces, 61 per cent of the $113 billion in US reconstruction efforts.34 Arguably, the greatest achievement of the ANSF so far is having refrained from engineering a military coup in the summer of 2014 and staying together, not fracturing along ethnic lines. Nonetheless, ethnic and patronage fragmentation of the ANSF remains a real possibility, and one that may yet disastrously erupt. As an excellent recent report by Antonio Giustozzi and Ali Mohammad Ali puts it, the divisions in the Afghan Ministry of Defence and security forces more broadly go beyond “former mujahedeen versus non-mujahedeen, educated versus noneducated, corrupt versus non-corrupt, pro-Ghani versus pro-Abdullah, Pashtuns versus non-Pashtuns” and among various political factions and parties; the rifts and divisions are often highly individualistic.35 These forms of patronage and personal corruption have undermined unit cohesion and plague even senior-level appointments.

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Moreover, politically motivated long delays in appointing and replacing ministers of defence, interior, and other top military, police and intelligence officers have had serious debilitating effects on the ANSF. In a country like Afghanistan where institutions are weak, individual leadership has substantial effects. Poor unit leadership at the local level, bought with money instead of based on merit, also contributed to the dramatic fall of the provincial capital Kunduz City in September 2015, to date the Taliban’s most spectacular victory and one that shook Afghanistan. For the first time since 2001, the Taliban managed to conquer an entire province and for several days hold its capital. The psychological effect in Afghanistan was tremendous. Kunduz is vital strategic province, with major access roads to various other parts of Afghanistan’s north. Moreover, those who control the roads – still the Taliban – also get major revenue from taxing travellers, which is significant along these opium-smuggling routes. For a few days, it looked like the entire provinces of Badakhshan, Takhar and Baghlan might also fall. Many Afghans in those provinces started getting ready to leave or began moving south. If all these northern provinces fell, the chances were high, with whispers and blatant loud talk of political coups intensifying for a number of days, that the Afghan government might fall, and perhaps the entire political system collapse. In short, potentially dangerous and deleterious political and psychological effects were far bigger than from the Taliban’s other offensives. Many Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) units, led by weak or corrupt commanders, did not fight, and threw down their arms and ran away. Conversely, the boost of Taliban morale and the strengthening of its now new official leader Mullah Akbar Mansour were substantial. However, the Taliban also discredited itself with its brutality in Kunduz City. The Taliban operation to take Kunduz was very well-planned and put together over a period of months, perhaps years. Nor should the Taliban’s takeover have been a surprise: From March 2015, the Taliban was upping steady pressure on the province and its capital and desperate (and weak) provincial officials were repeatedly appealing to Kabul for help. Prominently adding to the heft of the Taliban and local militias it mobilized were some 1,000 foreign fighters from Central Asia, China and Pakistan. They overwhelmed the militias organized by the dominant local

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powerbrokers and the United States, as well as the government-sponsored Afghan local police (ALP). Moreover, the Taliban’s capacities were believed to be significantly supported by Pakistan’s Inter-services Intelligence (ISI). Islamabad has apparently not been able or willing to sever ISI action in support of the Taliban despite a decade of pressure from the United States and more recently “engagement” (not pressure, as Chinese government diplomats point out) from China. It took weeks for the ANSF to retake the provincial city, far longer than was expected (including by the Taliban). Months later, in the spring of 2016, the Taliban still exhibited substantial influence over the roads in Kunduz and neighbouring provinces. Four hundred and ninety-three civilians died and another 1,392 were wounded in the weeks-long fighting.36 A crucial reason why the Taliban succeeded in taking over the city and large rural areas in the provinces and anchoring itself among the local population is that many of the local groups, including the Pashtun minorities and communities beyond, have been alienated by years of exclusionary and rapacious politics. Such pernicious politics only intensified in March 2015 in response to Taliban’s initial push to bring down the city. And in the aftermath, despite many official visits from Kabul to Kunduz and official investigations by prominent Afghan politicians, the governance and politics in the province did not significantly improved by the summer of 2016.37 Equally, however, many of the local population groups hate the Taliban. The Taliban engaged in revenge killings and abuses, and are spoiling for more revenge. Local Afghan police units and other progovernment, pro-local-powerbroker and presumably anti-Taliban militias have been a feature of “security” in Kunduz for years. Although created with the goal of fighting the Taliban, many would simply abuse the population, particularly along ethnic lines.38 Showing far more intense problems than ALP units in Helmand or Kandahar, the Kunduz militias often have not been to resist the Taliban without a strong backup from the United States, ISAF or the Afghan National Army. Frequently they remain beholden to highly divisive local powerbrokers, engage in predation on local communities and abuse rival ethnic groups and tribes. Kunduz is one province where many of these highly problematic aspects of Afghan militias have been repeatedly manifest. Very fractious and discriminatory politics in that province, in neighbouring Baghlan, and in

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Badakhshan have attracted the Taliban in the first place, at times creating atypical support groups for the insurgents. In Badakhshan, for example, the local Taliban are mostly Tajik. When the Taliban started its push on Kunduz in March 2015, both local powerbrokers and Kabul responded by creating more such militias, only compounding the problem of abuse and alienation of subgroups among the population. The local people then embraced the Taliban.39 Indeed, a key to the Taliban’s success in taking over the city was its ability to recruit its own version of the ALP in Kunduz, part-time local fighters allowed to stay only in their village or city, unlike the Taliban regular fighters. Those same “Taliban ALP” also turned out to be a key headache for the Taliban leadership as it was often they who violated Mullah Mansour’s edicts against violence against civilians and invading of houses. Just like the Afghan government, the Taliban leadership was not able to maintain effective control over its local militias. The rampage of these rogue police and militia units exacerbated the polarization in the city and province and created major PR problems for the Taliban.40 United States air support was ultimately essential in retaking Kunduz and avoiding more of Badakhshan falling into the hands of the Taliban, thus preventing a military domino effect in the north and inflaming the political crisis. It also came with a terrible price: during the fighting, the US mistakenly bombed a Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (MSF) hospital where at least 30 patients and doctors died and more were wounded. False reports from Afghan forces on the ground that the hospital had become Taliban headquarters, reductions in IRS capacities and malfunctioning equipment were the sources of the tragic mistake of the US gunship operators.41 Despite this awful event, however, it remains vital to maintain and expand US air support for the Afghan forces, including direct application of US kinetic firepower beyond in extremis support, to prevent similar Taliban offensives. It is especially important to augment the provision of US intelligence assets. Significant reductions in US assistance, whether of troops, intelligence or air support, will greatly increase the chances of another major Taliban success – like that of Kunduz, and perhaps again in Kunduz – producing political instability. The subsequent 2015– 16 winter, like the one before, brought none of the previously typical “winter lulls” in fighting. Instead, the Taliban continued a major push in the north, continually contesting territory

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and influence in Kunduz as well as Badakhshan and Baghlan. In January 2016, the Taliban sabotaged Baghlan’s electricity pylons, cutting off Kabul from power for several weeks during a bitter-cold winter and driving home to many Kabulis relatively shielded from the Taliban violence that the fighting was no longer so distant. Violence in Kabul had been steadily on the rise before winter began. In 2015, Kabul experienced an 18 per cent rise in civilian casualties,42 including some of the deadliest attacks, mostly attributed to the Haqqani network, including on 7 August 2015 that caused 43 dead and 312 wounded. An even deadlier attack, again attributed to the Haqqanis, took place in April 2016. It caused even larger casualties: more than 60 dead and 300 wounded.43 At first oblivious to the suffering it caused and only focused on enhancing its intimidation power, the Taliban quickly claimed the attack and then, after a resulting public outrage, distanced itself from it. Well beyond these spectacular attacks, the Taliban upped pressure on businesses in Kabul during 2015 and escalating attacks against restaurants and hotels frequented by foreigners, successfully driving most to shut down. It has thus forced the international community even in Kabul into an ever-shrinking space behind fortified walls, limiting its interactions with Afghans and undermining international assistance efforts by depriving them of Afghan input. Moreover, various kidnapping rings, many unrelated to the Taliban and some rumoured to be related to Afghan security forces, proliferated in Kabul throughout the winter of 2015 and the spring of 2016, targeting foreigners, further reducing the operational capacity of the international community in Kabul. A winter lull in the fighting did not occur in Afghanistan’s south either. Instead, the Taliban mounted an aggressive campaign, particularly in Helmand and Uruzgan, further escalating attacks in the spring. After Kunduz, the losses in Helmand, the scene of the US 2010 surge were perhaps the most dramatic and some of the largest tactical victories for the Taliban in terms of psychological impact. After months-long pounding from the Taliban, the ANSF withdrew from several districts, including Musa Qala and Now Zad, with the Afghan 215 Corps assigned to Helmand melting away “due to incompetence, corruption, and ineffectiveness”.44 Even Rahnatullah Nabil, the former head of the Afghanistan intelligence agency who resigned in protest against government policies, characterized the morale of Afghan forces

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in the province as “extremely low”, with discipline breaking down and “junior commanders openly defying their superiors”.45 The Taliban also overran the Sangin district by May 2016, thus taking control or credibly contesting authority in 11 out of the province’s 14 districts. For the Taliban to strengthen influence over Helmand is important for many reasons, including because it facilitates access to the large drug revenues of the province and allows the group to develop significant political capital by sponsoring livelihoods for the rural population in the opium poppy economy.46 By the summer of 2016, further losses in the provinces were avoided only by the intensification of US air support and several emergency deployments of US and UK special operation forces and eventually an advisory battalion to assist the struggling ANSF in the province. It is likely that in the summer of 2016, the Taliban will significantly increase its pressure on Kandahar. The group has been preparing the ground for more than a year, gaining road control in Zabul and Uruzgan and developing bases and safe havens in Ghor. Attempting to assassinate the feared provincial police chief of Kandahar, General Abdul Raziq, will become a high priority for the Taliban. Accused of mafia don-like behaviour and severe human rights abuses,47 Raziq has been effective in keeping the Taliban out of Kandahar City and surrounding districts. But in addition to the consolidation of criminal rackets in Kandahar under his thumb and major human rights violations, the price of greater security from the Taliban has also been bad governance and tribal discrimination. If the Taliban succeeds in assassinating him, it will open up major power fights over political, economic and criminal influence in Kandahar, and benefit from inserting itself into the resulting power fights. Indeed, as has been the case in Afghanistan over the past decade, Taliban military efforts or those of affiliated insurgencies are not necessarily the cause of all insecurity. In many areas, Herat being a prominent example, the insecurity also crucially involves score-settling among rival powerbrokers, politicians, businessmen and tribes trying to better position themselves within patronage networks or to get the upper hand in local power struggles over economic resources. Sometimes, such as in Balkh (where the local governor Atta Mohammad Noor has refused to step down in clear defiance of Kabul) reports of insecurity are inflated to obtain government appointments and signal to

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the government in Kabul that local powerbrokers cannot be fired or else insecurity will get much worse.48 Although such violent political and economic contests may not be about the Taliban to start with, they allow the Taliban to insert itself into the local conflicts and gain crucial footholds or strengthen its local position. Yet despite significant challenges and failures at the provincial level (like Kunduz and Helmand) by the summer of 2016, the ANSF did not collapse wholesale or even quit as the Iraqi army did, for example, in facing the Islamic State in 2014. Nonetheless, the government in Kabul continued facing a difficult dilemma: should it remain spread thin throughout Afghanistan and thus be deployed in a reactive mode to the Taliban’s nimble attacks, or should it pull back further from nonstrategic rural areas, ceding more ground to the Taliban. The former has so far allowed the Taliban to dictate the tempo and areas of engagement; the latter is very politically costly. In the fall of 2015, the Afghan government attempted to escape the dilemma by significantly increasing local militias on Kabul’s payroll, including the Afghan local police. The Afghan government asked the United States, which has been footing the bill for the ALP, to pay for at least an additional 15,000 militiamen, a 50 per cent increase from the currently authorized 30,000 ALP force. In addition to generating more presumed fighters against the Taliban, such an ALP enlargement would also allow the struggling NUG to appease political opponents who have been constantly threatening to pull down the government by transferring financial resources and military and political power to them. But well aware that the NUG faced many problems controlling the ALP and that many of the powerbrokers would deliver no more than ghost ALP forces while pocketing the money, the United States appropriately refused to pay for such an enlargement.49 During the summer of 2016, the Taliban showed no signs of losing its momentum and the ANSF showed no signs of getting an upper hand. The prospect was one of a prolonged years-long fighting at best. What then is the theory of an endgame and cessation of conflict for the Afghan government and the international community? One answer is simply hanging on and hoping for the Taliban to self-destruct and wither from within, as a result of the mismanagement of its internal organization, internal fragmentation (perhaps intensified by a US decapitation strategy) or extensive alienation of the Afghan population

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even in areas where the Afghan government is not liked. The second is hanging on in the hope that the Taliban is willing to negotiate some tolerable power-sharing terms. The two are of course interconnected. The larger problems the Taliban faces on the battlefield – whether of its own doing or because of ANSF resistance or other insurgent challengers – the more willing it is going to be to accept a less ambitious negotiated deal. Nonetheless, the question is whether it is sufficient for the ANSF to merely hang on until that moment that the Taliban self-destructs, or whether the ANSF’s current problems will continue sapping its morale unless it wins some significant tactical victories against the Taliban. Yet showing such tactical victories is much more difficult for the ANSF than for the Taliban, since the Taliban accrues psychological gains by taking over districts and provinces, even temporarily, but the ANSF does not get equivalent points by hanging onto districts or provinces. The decapitation policy toward Taliban commanders has so far not created a psychological impression that the Taliban is on the ropes. Nor has it, objectively, slowed the Taliban significantly – the insurgent group has been able to replace its command structures rather effectively.

Collapse from Within? Taliban Fragmentation and its Complexities, and the Islamic State in Afghanistan Even so, the most significant challenge for the Taliban in years has come from its internal cohesion issues. After maintaining an impressively united structure for almost three decades, the Taliban experienced its first major fragmentation in 2014 and particularly in 2015. The fragmentation has come from two sources: the first was the emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan and the second was the leadership succession struggle that followed the announcement of the death of the Taliban founder and leader for two and half decades, Mullah Mohammad Omar. In the latter part of 2014, the Islamic State started flying its black flag in Afghanistan. Throughout 2015, the visibility of its presence, if not its actual power, increased. The Taliban at first tried to appeal to unity and persuade the emerging IS in Afghanistan not to become a separate and hostile force. Those appeals fell on deaf ears and the Islamic State soon came to battle the Taliban in Nangarhar, Herat and Helmand.

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Eastern Nangarhar in particular emerged as the strongest base of IS presence in Afghanistan and the area to which IS in the country has been mainly confined. In other parts of the country, such as the north, foreign elements, including Uzbek and Pakistani militants, such as factions of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Tehrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan, relabelled themselves IS. In addition to rebranded foreign factions, IS in Afghanistan has been composed mostly of dissatisfied Taliban commanders such as Helmand’s Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim.50 An IS growth in Afghanistan faces substantial obstacles. The group’s brutality, greater than even the brutality Afghans have been subjected to for decades, generates resentment.51 The Taliban has been better able to calibrate brutality and hide or excuse the violence it perpetrates against civilians. At times, the Taliban has even temporarily reduced violence and too-restrictive edicts to generate enough acceptance among local populations. Like IS in the Middle East, IS in Afghanistan has chosen to rule by sheer brutality. The Taliban has also sponsored opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and the jobs and income it provides for ordinary Afghans, thus generating political capital. IS in Afghanistan, on the other hand, has prohibited opium poppy cultivation both on grounds of ideological purity and with the strategic goal of ensuring that the only employment available to local men is as IS foot soldiers.52 IS foreign elements also reduce legitimacy among often-fiercely nationalistic Afghans. IS in Afghanistan has also drawn the attention of international actors, and the Taliban has been able to capitalize on being seen as a lesser threat by outside powers. For Russia and Iran, the Islamic State is an even greater threat than the Taliban. Russia has been rumoured to engage in negotiations with the Taliban, for example, with the spokeswoman of the Russian Foreign Ministry suggesting that the Russian government and the Taliban have shared intelligence against IS, a claim the Taliban denied.53 At the same time, Moscow has delivered small arms to the Afghan government to fight the Taliban. IS in Afghanistan has also become a top target for the United States. Yet the IS presence in Afghanistan, however weak, thinly anchored and exaggerated, also creates significant problems for the Taliban. First of all, it has anchored the presence of the United States in Afghanistan, reducing the desire of the White House to liquidate the US military involvement in the country. Without US presence and support, the ANSF would be reeling far more from the Taliban onslaught.

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Second, even for the Taliban, the IS is a loose cannon. The IS has attacked Pakistani interests in Afghanistan, including a Pakistani consulate in Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar. On the one hand, the IS threat to Pakistan could strengthen Pakistan’s support for the Taliban. Like Russia and Iran, Pakistan could see the IS as a far greater danger than the Taliban. On the other hand, perhaps the growth of the IS in Afghanistan might inadvertently accomplish what the Afghan government and the United States have long failed to do: to persuade Pakistan that it can no longer distinguish between the militant groups it can manipulate for its purposes (like the Afghan Taliban) and those which are a direct threat to the Pakistan state and hence need to be combatted (like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan). Third, the presence of IS forces in Afghanistan has reduced the cost of defection for dissatisfied Taliban commanders. Whereas before, defecting commanders would be easily subject to the Taliban’s punishment and seen as traitors, they now face more physical protection and lesser legitimacy costs by wrapping themselves in the IS black flag. Before they were mere traitors and cowards, now they can claim to be purer than the Taliban. The IS presence in Afghanistan has also cut into the Taliban’s fundraising sources abroad. If IS in Afghanistan grew, it could also cut into the Taliban’s recruitment pools both in Afghanistan and abroad. A bigger threat to the Taliban unity and cohesion has come from internal fragmentation following the revelation in July 2015 that the long-term leader and founder of the movement, Mullah Mohammad Omar, had died in Pakistan in 2013. Although current and former Pakistani officials maintain that it was the Afghan intelligence services that decided to reveal the death to scuttle the budding negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, it appears that it was the Taliban itself.54 In particular, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, Omar’s deputy, judged that the two-year-old cover-up of Omar’s death was no longer sustainable and Mansour’s support for the negotiations, for which he claimed to have Omar’s blessings, releasing supportive statements in his name, required his facing the leadership succession process. The revelation halted for over a year even the very beginnings of negotiations. The lie, as well as Mansour’s swift manoeuvring to take over the Taliban’s leadership and sideline Mullah Omar’s son Yaqub, whom some

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saw as the new leader, generated substantial disenchantment within the movement. Yaqub and Mullah Omar’s brother, Mullah Abdul Manan Akhund, were alienated and at first refused to endorse Mansour’s succession. Several influential Taliban leaders separated themselves from Mansour, bringing up old grudges about Taliban leaders whom Mansour sidelined over the years.55 Accusing Mansour of being under Pakistan’s thumb, some outright defected to form separate movements. Among the most significant splinter groups were factions of Abdul Qayum Zakir (the Taliban’s military commander sacked by Mansour in 2014), Mullah Hassan Rahmani (former governor of Helmand during the Taliban era) and Mullah Dadullah and Mullah Mohammad Rasool (the governor of Nimroz during the Taliban era). Dadullah’s faction subsequently engaged in intense and months-long military clashes with Mansour’s Taliban. Like the aforementioned Rauf Khadim who had defected to the Islamic State in Khorasan, many of the defectors had previous quarrels with Mansour. The scale of defections, in fact the very act of defection, was unprecedented in the Taliban’s history. The US and ISAF commanders had long hoped that ISAF’s decapitation and high-value-targeting policy would produce such factionalization of the Taliban, weakening the group and greatly facilitating the counterinsurgency efforts. Yet such a fragmentation did not occur as a result of the kill-and-capture policy of Taliban commanders on the Afghanistan battlefield. Did the revelation of Mullah Omar’s death finally bring about this first theory of the endgame – i.e., the Taliban weakening or collapsing from within? It did not. Mullah Mansour managed to neutralize and neuter opponents. He moved decisively to act against the defectors: appeasing and co-opting those he could, crushing those who would not come back to the fold. After much intense fighting with Mansour’s Taliban, Mullah Dadullah died from battle injuries, and Rasoul took over the faction’s leadership. Fighting continued into the spring of 2016, with intense clashes in Herat in March. Yet both in Herat and Nangarhar, the Taliban appeared to be gaining the upper hand against the splinter groups.56 Overall so far, the infighting has not hampered the Taliban’s antigovernment operational capacity. Zakir and Rahmani were ultimately persuaded to declare their support for Mansour.57 In the spring of 2016, Mullah Abdul Manan Akhund, Omar’s brother, was appointed the head of the influential “Dawat wal Irshad”, or the Preaching and Guidance

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Commission. Mullah Mohammad Yaqoub, Omar’s eldest son, was appointed to the executive council, known as the Quetta Shura, and also as the military chief of 15 provinces within the structure of the Taliban’s Military Commission.58 Now, with the death of Mansour in May 2016, these uneasy truces and accommodations may unravel. It yet remains to be seen how effectively Mansour’s replacement Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada, a deputy to Mullah Mansour, manages internal cohesion and unity. But the question remains whether this will signal the unravelling of the entire Taliban enterprise and whether fragmentation ipso facto means a reduction in violence, a more capacious ANSF, and at least some Taliban factions more inclined to negotiate. A future significant fragmentation of the Taliban, should it in fact materialize, may simply also make conflict more localized and more complicated, but not necessarily less intense. Whether as a result of Mansour’s alliance-building skills or pressure from the Pakistani intelligence services, Mansour was able to bring the Haqqani network more visibly into the fold. The Haqqanis had long declared their tribute to the leader of the Taliban, and when the United States agreed to swap five key Taliban prisoners held in Guantanamo for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, whom the Haqqanis held, they handed him over to the Taliban for the swap right away. Nonetheless, the faction has its own independent organizational networks and influence. Yet when Mansour was elected to replace Omar, it was also immediately announced that the leader of the Haqqani network Sirajuddin Haqqani was selected as one of his two deputies. Since then, the influence of the Haqqani network within the Taliban seems to have only grown. In May 2016, US military commanders in Afghanistan characterized Sirajuddin Haqqani has increasingly running day-to-day military operations in Afghanistan and having a strong say in the appointment of the Taliban’s shadow governors in Afghanistan.59 In the wake of Mansour’s death, a possible ascendance of the Haqqanis could produce an even more bloodthirsty Taliban, not its demise. The Haqqanis within may turn out a headache for Mawlawi Akhundzada or any influential Taliban leaders who might believe that at some point, negotiations with the Afghan government will have to take place and that a long-term civil war in Afghanistan is not desirable. Purveyors of bloody urban attacks including in Kabul, the Haqqanis

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have long exhibited far less restraint in violence and far less of any pretence of minimizing civilian casualties. Nor has the faction indicated any interest in negotiations. Challenges to Taliban unity – whether resulting from the emergence of IS presence in Afghanistan or following the death of Mullah Omar – have so far not undermined the Taliban’s fighting capacity against the ANSF. The Taliban has been mostly able to counter the fragmentation and co-opt or suppress major defectors. The fragmentation has thus far not weakened the Taliban on the battlefield to the point of driving the group to the negotiating table. On the contrary, the fragmentation has made negotiating more costly for the Taliban leadership. The leadership has felt compelled to outcompete the IS spectre on the battlefield and proved itself as tougher than defecting Taliban commanders. The hope is that the US killing of Mansour will critically weaken the Taliban, but there is no guarantee.

The Negotiations Gamble: Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Taliban Striking some acceptable deal with the Taliban at the negotiating table is the second theory of victory by the Kabul government and, after years of doubts, also the United States, and one on which President Ghani early on staked his presidency. To some extent, such a prioritization was surprising since as a candidate Ghani had emphasized his technocratic skills and had pitched his campaign around improving governance and fighting corruption. But as detailed below, the Government of National Unity proved a difficult beast to steer from the get-go; and at least until the summer of 2016, Ghani focused most of his attention and political capital on the negotiations – seeing Pakistan as the magic key to the negotiated deal, in the same way that Karzai had before. Immediately upon assuming the presidency in September 2014, Ghani engaged in a full outreach to Pakistan. He included an official visit to Pakistan among his first foreign trips, along with visits to Saudi Arabia and China. In all three countries, he sought to obtain support for a new push for negotiations with the Taliban, identifying a negotiated settlement as a key priority of his government. Indeed, China subsequently offered its support for the negotiations and hosted Taliban delegations in Beijing. The Pakistan trip too was widely seen as positive

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and helpful for improving Afghanistan – Pakistan relations. The arguments put forth to Pakistani officials included that Pakistan could not rely on the Taliban as a trustworthy agent.60 For some months also, Ghani managed to persuade key northern and non-Pashtun political opponents, including Abdullah, to go along with the rapprochement to Pakistan. Not all accepted the outreach, with former president Karzai a vociferous opponent of the strategy. The possibility of counterterrorism cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan – defined by Afghanistan and its Resolute Support partners as Pakistan finally cracking down against the Haqqani network and removing the safe havens that the Taliban leadership has been enjoying in Pakistan – seemed to grow after brutal terrorist attacks in Pakistan. In December 2014, one such attack by Tehrik-e-TalibanPakistan (TTP or the Pakistani Taliban) on an army school in left 148 dead, including 132 students. Claiming that the attack was orchestrated by Maulana Fazlullah, the head of TTP from Afghanistan, Pakistan’s army chief, General Raheel Sharif, flew to Kabul to demand Afghan and US cooperation against the TTP and other anti-Pakistan militants. The United States and Ghani responded positively to Pakistan’s anti-TTP cooperation request: the United States repeatedly bombed TTP targets in Afghanistan, and Ghani went so far as to divert Afghan soldiers from difficult and important fighting against the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan’s southern Helmand province in order to take on the TTP at the border with Pakistan. In Peshawar, while consoling the victims of the attack, Sharif again forswore a policy of cultivating some militants while fighting others: “We announce that there will be no differentiation between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban”.61 Further positive messages seemed to be coming from Pakistan throughout the spring of 2015. In April 2015, for example, Pakistani foreign ministry spokeswoman, Tasneem Aslam, condemned the Taliban’s “spike in violence” in its annual spring offensive in Afghanistan and added that “[Pakistan] would like to see a national reconciliation process in Afghanistan”62 – a public message apparently echoing what at least some Pakistani officials had also been telling the Taliban in private. In May 2015, during a visit to Kabul by Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif, the Prime Minister seemed to promise Islamabad’s full support against the Afghan Taliban, declaring that “the enemies of Afghanistan cannot be the friends of Pakistan”.63

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But just hours later, there was a terrorist attack on the Park Hotel in Kabul where Indian, Turkish, American and other foreign guests were gathered for a concert. To many Afghans, the attack revealed, once again, Pakistan’s duplicity. At best, the attack showed the limitations of Pakistan’s ability to control and restrain the various militant groups to whom it has frequently provided assistance and support, making it very unlikely that Pakistan could deliver the kind of pressure on the Taliban to force it to a negotiate deal or to decisively impede its capacity to operate militarily.64 The Park Hotel attack also intensified the controversy of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) Ghani signed with the Pakistani delegation about establishing cooperation between the Afghan and Pakistani intelligence agencies, elements of whom in the past had often been mortal enemies. Afghan CEO Abdullah claimed he was not informed of the deal beforehand, while Rahmatullah Nabil, the head of the Afghan intelligence agency, the National Directorate of Security, said he opposed it. (This was not a surprise, as Nabil previously sought to develop control over anti-Pakistani militants such as Latif Mehsud to administer to Pakistan some of its medicine of fostering and using militant proxies. In turn, Pakistan privately demanded that Ghani remove Nabil. Along with the minister of interior, Nabil ultimately resigned in winter 2015 in protest against Ghani’s policies, including outreach to Pakistan.) The backlash within Afghanistan against the MoU was widespread – and not just from the northern power groups and former president Hamid Karzai, but also from Pashtun politicians. And indeed, the summer and autumn of 2015 brought only a rise in Haqqani attacks and a greater Taliban push in Afghanistan, not a reduction in violence (which Ghani was hoping would be the result of his Pakistan outreach). Even before the fall of Kunduz, Ghani was left with egg on his face domestically, facing an ever-growing disapproval from Afghan politicians, including former President Karzai, for his “appeasement” of Pakistan without getting any results for it. Nor was Pakistan redeemed by its summer 2014 military operations in North Waziristan. Ironically, the United States had for years tried to persuade, cajole and pressure the Pakistani military and intelligence services to crack down on the safe-havens of the Afghan Taliban and anti-Pakistani militants, such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan, believing such action would critically improve the

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security situation in Afghanistan by eliminating safe-havens for those who fought ISAF and the ANSF.65 In the summer of 2014, after several dramatic terrorist attacks rocked Pakistan, the Pakistani military did so. In public announcements surrounding Operation Zarb-e-Azb (loosely meaning “strike of the prophet’s sword”), the Pakistani military promised a comprehensive operation in the region and determined “to eliminate these terrorists regardless of hue and color, along with their sanctuaries”.66 The recapture of North Waziristan’s capital of Miranshah from militants and the closing of their bases there and in surrounding areas did weaken and fracture the militants. But many Afghan Taliban networks managed to slip into Afghanistan. The Afghans argued that Pakistan allowed the Afghan Taliban networks to escape on purpose; the Pakistanis maintained that the United States and Afghanistan were incompetent in preventing such an escape and it was their failure to seal the border on the Afghan side, pointing out that also anti-Pakistani terrorists, such as one of TTP’s leaders, Mullah Fazlullah, also escaped into Afghanistan. A few first elements of negotiations with the Taliban emerged in the early summer of 2015, but they did not produce enough political capital for Ghani to compensate for the Taliban’s military. The first of such signs was an unofficial and indirect Track II meeting sponsored by the international NGO Pugwash in Qatar in May 2015. It was the first such meeting since the suspension of talks in Qatar almost two years before in June 2013.67 The Pugwash meeting suggested a series of non-binding confidence-building steps and concessions to the Taliban that it had long sought, including the group’s ability to publicly reopen its Qatar office. Apparently, the negotiators also agreed that the Afghan Constitution could be a subject of discussion in the negotiations, a move previously opposed by the Afghan government and the United States and frightening Afghan women, minorities and civil society, all of whom fear the loss of the rights that the Afghan constitution grants them.68 Nor was it clear at the Pugwash meeting whether the Taliban dropped its demand that all foreign troops leave Afghanistan before it would seriously negotiate peace.69 More significantly, the Afghan government held a formal meeting with representatives of the Taliban in Urumqi, China in late May 2015. Moreover, these representatives were apparently delivered to the negotiating table by the Pakistani ISI – a development at least slightly

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vindicating Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan. The Taliban negotiators who attended were all believed to be closely linked to the ISI, and ISI officials were present at the meeting.70 Delivering the Taliban to the table was a skilful move by the ISI, which in one action could please China (whom Pakistan characterizes as the all-weather, reliable friend, unlike the perfidious United States)71 and show responsiveness to Ghani, while at the same time exhibit the limits of its influence and preventively deflect pressure for delivering the Taliban more extensively in the future: The Taliban leadership subsequently expressed its unhappiness about the meeting and stated that its delegation to China was not authorized by the leadership to go. But then the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death put an end to the talks throughout the winter of 2015. Despite having little to nothing to show for his outreach to Pakistan, his efforts with the Taliban, and thus paying a large domestic political price, Ghani tried the same strategy in the spring of 2016. Once again, he reached out diplomatically to Pakistan. A series of high-level visits between Afghanistan and Pakistan followed. In a March 2016 visit to Washington for the US – Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, Sartaj Aziz, the advisor for national security to Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, became the first high-level Pakistani official to publicly admit that the Taliban leaders and their families live in Pakistan and receive medical services there. Nonetheless, while suggesting that Pakistan could “pressurize” the Taliban, he also emphasized the limits of Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban’s actions,72 a statement that is both a convenient excuse and a fact, making the excuse all the more irritating and effective at the same time. A so-called Quadrilateral Coordination Group on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation involving Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the United States was established for negotiations with the Taliban. The process comprised several meetings in the spring of 2016, with the hope that Pakistan would once again deliver the Taliban to the negotiating table. Yet through May 2016, the Taliban seats remained empty. The frustrated Afghan delegation went as far as to demand that the Taliban is declared an irreconcilable group, a move prevented by Chinese diplomats participating in the quadrilateral process.73 Nonetheless, much to the delight of the Afghan government, Mullah Mansour was killed by a US drone attack soon after. Better yet, the drone attack took place in Baluchistan, Pakistan, an area from which the United States had refrained in targeting Taliban leadership out of

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consideration for the political sensitivities of Pakistan. And to deliver even a stronger signal to the Pakistanis, the drone attack was executed by the US military, not the CIA.74 Mansour’s presence in Baluchistan once again exposed Pakistani denials of its soft-glove approach to the Afghan Taliban. In fact, despite all the prior pronouncements by Pakistani leaders that Pakistan was now going after all terrorists after the Peshawar school TTP bombing, no tangible action by Pakistan ensued to crack down on the Taliban or the Haqqanis or make the insurgents scale back violence. Instead, as had become the pattern in Pakistan – India negotiations, seemingly encouraging meetings were followed by bloody terrorist attacks, including a particularly deadly one in Kabul in April 2016. Facing an outraged Afghan public and intense power plays by Afghan politicians seeking to bring down his government, Ghani upped his rhetoric against Islamabad and Rawalpindi (the headquarters of Pakistan’s military and intelligence service), demanding that Pakistan face international accountability for its support for terrorism.75 Afghanistan and the United States could decide to bypass Pakistan in the negotiations and seek to engage the Taliban directly without Pakistan’s involvement. But it is neither clear that the Taliban would be any more receptive to the negotiations than currently (which it is not), nor that Pakistan would refrain from trying to sabotage any resulting negotiations. Pakistan in fact has more levers for affecting such sabotage than bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table. President Ghani has hoped that the increased involvement of increase tracking China in Afghanistan and the growth of China’s economic interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan would motivate China to persuade Pakistan to deliver the Taliban to the negotiating table and to scale down the violence. In 2015, China faced an unprecedented number of terrorist attacks from Uighur extremists, not just in Xinjiang but also elsewhere in the country. China has also promised a massive economic development package to Pakistan of over $40 billion, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which would fail to deliver the additional jobs to Chinese and Pakistani workers and other economic benefits if disrupted by insecurity in Pakistan. Chinese officials have indeed emphasized to Pakistan the need for safety, but so far they have maintained a sotto voce approach. Meanwhile, the Pakistan military has dedicated large military forces to protect the CPEC infrastructure and other investments. Whether

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China will ultimately get tough with Pakistan will depend on whether Chinese officials believe that Pakistan can provide sufficient security to their economic interests while continuing to distinguish between terrorist groups it cracks down on (such as TTP) and those it does not (such as the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqanis) and whether it can do so in a way that prevents the leakage of terrorism into China. Even if China joined the international chorus on the issue – and for the first time, Pakistan were to feel concerted pressure from the United States and China and other allies of Afghanistan on the issue – it remains unclear that Pakistan would in fact have the capacity to take on all of the militant groups operating from its territory. In its recent security operations to stop urban chaos in the megacity Karachi, albeit successful overall, Pakistani forces targeted predominantly only certain militant and organized crime groups, such as TTP and gangs associated with the political party Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), while not touching other militants and criminal groups, including the Afghan Taliban networks in Karachi.76 Similarly, in the security operations that the Pakistani military and law enforcement agencies initiated in Punjab in the spring of 2016, only disobedient and unrestrained leaders of militant groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba or of the Punjab Taliban, have been targeted, on the premise that Pakistan simply cannot take on all of the militants at the same time without provoking disastrous violence.77 Nor, in the minds of many Pakistani leaders, have some of these groups lost their usefulness against India for Pakistan. One hopeful outcome is that China and the United States might cooperate more closely on the terrorist issue and China would one day get tough with Pakistan. In this scenario Pakistan would finally reform its behaviour and go after anti-Afghanistan groups. But the chance is at least equally high that China will simply experience the same frustration with Pakistan as the United States has and that, like the United States, it will be unable or unwilling to strongly punish Pakistan in order to preserve its other large geostrategic, geo-economic and security interests with Pakistan involving India, Iran and access to the Arabian Sea.78 Thus far, China gave Pakistan only a slight slap on the wrist in March 2016 when China signed a military deal with Afghanistan, worth a meagre $70 million but a signal to Pakistan nonetheless.79 Within the US policy community, Pakistan’s unwillingness to provide any shred of support to Ghani and deliver tangible, if limited,

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desired action further shrank Washington’s already-diminished support for Pakistan. The threat to deny Pakistan the previously promised military aid to buy US military aircraft is one example of the loss of favour Pakistan increasingly faces in the United States.80 Not just the outreach to Pakistan, but also the negotiations with the Taliban have many opponents in Afghanistan – both in civil society and among key Afghanistan powerbrokers. Key northern powerbrokers such as Bismullah Mohammadi, Amrullah Saleh, Abdul Rashid Dostum, Fazel Ahmad Manawi and Atta Mohammad Nur have deep reservations about the negotiations. Some have military capacity at the ready and strong support networks with ANSF to oppose any future negotiated deal not satisfactory to them. But possible opponents of negotiations include not merely northern non-Pashtun elites. Many prominent Pashtun politicians have much to fear from a deal with the Taliban, including not only the loss of their political and economic power, but also quite possibly their very lives. For example, General Abdul Raziq, the police chief of the province of Kandahar and the kingpin of the province, quickly voiced his strong opposition to the negotiations.81 Any deal with the Taliban will ignite a major power struggle between the Taliban in Kandahar and Raziq, if the Taliban does not succeed in killing him first. Although Raziq does not yet have national-level power like some of Ghani’s other political rivals, such as Manawi, Mohammadi or Atta, it would be highly costly for Ghani to fully push Raziq into opposition to his government. After all, Ghani crucially depended on Raziq to help deliver the vote in Kandahar and Ghani could not easily replace Raziq there without risking a rise in insecurity in the city and province. At the same time, Raziq is a painful symbol for the Ghani government’s inability so far to reduce the power abuse that characterized the Karzai era, and drove many into the hands of the Taliban, which Ghani had campaigned against. Whenever the negotiations with the Taliban actually get under way, they are likely to last a long time. As a comparison: in Colombia, under conditions much more auspicious for the Colombian government, Bogota’s negotiations with The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC), comparatively much weaker than the Taliban and having far less battlefield momentum, have dragged on for over five years. In the Philippines, the negotiations between the

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government, again in comparison much stronger than the Afghan government, and the main faction of the Islamic separatists – the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) – took 13 years. Many other separatist and jihadist militant groups continue to fight in the Philippines and new ones have emerged. So far, the pre-talks have been just about getting to the negotiating table, not even about the process of negotiations. There is as yet little clarity as to the contours of an acceptable compromise for both parties. If the negotiations took place during current conditions on the battlefield, the Taliban would certainly demand a power-sharing deal. Though what kind of power-sharing? Would it seek to revise the constitution? Like the FARC in Colombia, the Taliban has little prospect of doing well in elections more than once, if it even manages to do well in one election: it has little capacity to deliver economically, although it can ride on its anti-corruption and swift justice credentials. Its strength lies in ruling from behind and not being responsible for formal governance. The Taliban will certainly demand that it can retain its military forces – whether one day they could be integrated into some constellation of ANSF is a big question mark, including whether northern politicians could tolerate any such development or prefer to break up the ANSF. The Taliban has demanded unconditionally that US and Resolute Support military forces leave Afghanistan. It has been equally steadfast in its determination that Afghanistan be ruled as an “independent Islamic system” and has demanded the renegotiation of the Afghan constitution. It is questionable whether its promises of commitment to “civil activities” and “women’s rights in the light of Islamic rules, national interests, and values,”82 can be trusted, or more precisely, whether such statements actually mean any form of moderation compared to its 1990s rule. Similarly, the Taliban has repeatedly stated that it would not interfere in other countries’ affairs or allow Afghanistan to be used for such purposes, yet it has been unwilling or unable to publicly disavow Al-Qaeda, for instance. A public (and also practical) rejection of global jihad will be highly costly for the Taliban leadership. Indeed, within the Taliban itself and among the splinter groups from the Taliban, and, of course, from IS, there is significant opposition to negotiations. Many medium-level commanders with operational control in Afghanistan and significant military responsibility oppose a

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negotiated deal. Many of them have been socialized to a different set of beliefs than the old top Taliban leadership and are far more internationally oriented and anchored into the global jihadi ideology and agenda than the old school Taliban.83 The US policy of targeting mid-level commanders and thus seeking to disrupt the group’s command and control systems further radicalized the new replacement leadership. However, in May 2016, it appeared that the Afghan government would have at least one negoatiating success with militants – a deal with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the nominal leader of Hezb-i-Islami and one of Afghanistan’s most notorious warlords who had been living in exile in Iran for a number of years. Although that deal would deliver a psychological and political fillip to the government, it would make little difference on the battlefield. Hezb-i-Islami has not been a prominent military factor on the battlefield for a number of years, even though maintaining strong influence in particular provinces. Moreover, Hamid Karzai beefed up his political power by incorporating many members of Hezb-i-Islami into his governing circle and these have remained powerful in the Afghan parliament and various governing structures even under the National Unity Government.

The Government of National DisUnity and its Crises Not only is there no broad societal and elite consensus on the negotiations with the Taliban, there is equally no such consensus on elemental matters of governance or appreciation by many in leadership positions of the precariousness of Afghanistan’s conditions. Afghan elites remain deleteriously fractious and self-interested, engaged in constant brinksmanship, scheming and plotting, with the belief that they can pursue their power plays without pushing the country over the cliff into civil war. Most of the scheming may well be merely to maximize political leverage and receive jobs for themselves and their clients as compensation for reducing political pressure, rather than in fact seeking to actually topple the Afghan government. But the constant crises and brinksmanship consume most of the political energy in the country and paralyze governance, despite popular disenchantment growing daily and without regard for the fact that Afghanistan cannot afford the same degree of non-governance as Nepal could get away with for a decade after

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the civil war ended there. In Afghanistan, an intense insurgency is burning. At least in the immediate term, the political space for Ghani to persevere in the negotiations overtures is circumscribed by the delayed parliamentary and district elections and a renegotiation of the PresidentCEO arrangement to decode, codify or end that arrangement and the Government of National Unity. As part of the NUG agreement and in its first year, Abdullah expected that the 2016 constitutional Loya Jirga would change the Afghan system into a parliamentary one, with a reformed voting system in Afghanistan reflecting that change. In the first year of the NUG, he defined his legacy calling for such a constitutional Loya Jirga. Yet Ghani clearly prefers the existing presidential system and sees any such future constitutional Loya Jirga (if it takes place at all) as a possible mechanism to reduce Abdullah’s role to that of an ordinary vicepresident instead of a CEO. Such constitutional changes and the political firestorm they trigger in Afghanistan may be incorporated into the negotiations with the Taliban; conversely, they may further reduce any Afghan domestic political space for the Taliban negotiations. Nonetheless, as original envisioned in the NUG deal, such a constitutional Loya Jirga cannot take place before parliamentary and district elections are held as they are to name a large portion of the delegates to the constitutional Loya Jirga. First scheduled for September 2015, the district and parliamentary elections then were rescheduled for 15 October 2016. Now they are expected in 2017. But few security and procedural preparations have been made even though both Ghani and Abdullah campaigned on devolving power to subnational areas. Electoral reform, promised to be finalized before the elections, has been stalled since summer 2015.84 Because of insecurity, the lack of preparation and snow and bad weather starting in November and excluding large parts of the country from voting, the elections are unlikely to be held before at least until April 2017, if not late 2017. That means that a constitutional Loya Jirga cannot meet until after that. The parliamentary elections are likely to be less explosive than the politics surrounding any Loya Jirga, but they too can generate a severe political crisis in Kabul. Despite the fact that a constitutional Loya Jirga cannot take place before the parliamentary elections, some Afghan politicians still insist

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that the NUG pact expires by the end of September 2016. With former President Hamid Karzai foremost among them, these powerbrokers seek to use the alleged expiration of the NUG as a mechanism to end the Ghani-Abdullah government and augment their own political power, even taking over the government themselves. Karzai has been proposing a traditional Loya Jirga, which he believes he can stuff with his supporters. Both Ghani and Abdullah are opposed to such a format and prefer no Jirga to that alternative. Other opposition politicians, such as Anwar al-Huq Ahadi, former finance minister, have called for rapid national presidential elections to take place before late 2016.85 Although such calls have so far not gathered any steam, they are indicative of the fractious politics and fragility of existing governing arrangements. Regardless of whether or not there is any binding legal requirement to hold any Loya Jirga (and there is not), the political situation is explosive one way or another. Even the absence of a process will be used as a pretext to rock, if not altogether bring down the government. Political and ethnic sentiments will be whipped up, with street violence potentially used as a coercive political mechanism or erupting spontaneously as a result of miscalculation. Like during the long irresolution of the 2014 presidential elections, the ANSF will face a critical test in how they handle potential ethnically-based and patronage-based street violence and whether or not the Afghan security forces themselves hold together. The politics surrounding the traditional Loya Jirga are about bringing the NUG down. However, even without these pressures, the Government of National Unity is deeply troubled. The chasm between the Abdullah and Ghani sides has not closed. Although the formation of the national unity government may have averted civil violence or a coup, it created another form of paralysis. More than two years after the formation of the NUG, basic daily governance in Afghanistan persists in a debilitating and corrosive limbo. Ghani and Abdullah took months to agree on ministerial appointments, even as former ministers had been fired soon after inauguration. Run by deputies and stuck in uncertainty and inertia, the line ministries thus continued to stagnate as vehicles of personal enrichment rather than being reformed into effective tools for delivering public services and administration. Crucial positions such as Minister of Defence and Attorney General were left vacant for over a

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year, and in some cases filled only with Acting Ministers. Even as of late May 2016, the Ministry of Defence and the national intelligence agency were run by acting heads only. Although all provincial governors were placed in an acting status by Ghani soon after he became president, almost two years later, many were not replaced by permanent governors. Kabul also still lacked an appointed mayor. At the national level, Ghani has sought to deal with the governance paralysis and the awkwardness of the power-sharing arrangement by not sharing power and bypassing Abdullah. Rather than running policy through line ministries and investing in institution-building, at least early on in his administration Ghani focused on building up the president’s office. Greatly expanded, the President’s Office now not only formulates policy, but also seeks to direct its implementation.86 The troubles stemming from the power-sharing arrangement and from Afghan governance in general are a forceful, if distressing, reminder that power in Afghanistan often comes from personal networks and that institutions do not function or are easily subverted by behindthe-scenes powerbrokers. Thus, even reform-minded and knowledgeable technocrats without strong personal networks, such as Ghani, may have a very limited implementation and governing capacity – as well as many political debts – even while formally sitting at the centre of power. Building up personal networks over the difficult, complex and longterm process of building up institutions is readily tempting. The distribution of power in the President– CEO arrangement, of course, continues to be intensely contested by the two men and their networks. The more Ghani manages to execute policy through different channels, such as the President Office, the more the network behind Abdullah feels disempowered and frustrated, not only with Ghani, but with Abdullah himself since he can deliver less and less to his backers. And indeed, Abdullah is increasingly considered a spent force by his former northern supporters who increasingly believe that rocking the government and generating crises is a far more effective way to secure government positions than relying on Abdullah to obtain them. It is precisely this politics of brinksmanship that debilitates Afghanistan at a time of an intense security challenge and economic morass. As long as manufacturing political crises and threatening to topple the government is the basis of political and economic redistribution in Afghanistan, any Loya Jirga or negotiated NUG or

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even collapsed NUG will not improve governance in Afghanistan or provide a way out of political paralysis. Indeed, while some Afghans believe that the Loya Jirga might end the indecisiveness and paralysis of the NUG, the odds are high that it would not. It would likely merely produce another long-lasting political crisis. Unless Afghan politicians stop behaving in narrowly self-interested predatory and rapacious ways, any new government will face many of the same problems and paralysis as the current NUG is facing. Meanwhile, the political deadlock, subnational governance paralysis and security uncertainties are compounding Afghanistan’s bad economic predicament and have had a pronounced and lasting effect on Afghanistan’s fragile economy. Domestic economic performance in 2013 and 2014 was even worse than expected, with massive economic shrinkage, large unemployment, capital flight and a chronic as well as acute fiscal crisis as tax and custom collections plummeted. From 9 per cent in 2012, Afghanistan’s GDP growth shrunk to 3.7 per cent in 2013 and 2 per cent in 2014.87 Afghanistan’s domestic revenues declined from a peak of 11.6 per cent of GDP in 2011/12 to 9.7 per cent in 2013 and continued to drop in 2014.88 Uncertain whether a new government would be formed or whether the country would be plunged into civil war, many Afghans stopped passing money to Kabul. Instead, there were amassing as much as possible, pressed by the need for skyrocketing bribes and having to repay debts much faster than previously.89 Instead of 50 per cent of revenues being diverted to personal coffers or local patronage networks, in many cases, that portion grew to 80 per cent.90 Indeed, revenue theft in 2014 turned out to be the worst since 2001. Combined with the fact that much of Afghanistan’s previous legal economic growth was tied to the money brought in by the foreign security forces who were now leaving the country, the country was experiencing more than an acute fiscal crisis. For months, Kabul could not pay salaries to civil service workers. In addition to the structural fiscal gap of 25 –40 per cent of Afghanistan’s GDP that the international community has had and will have to bridge in the coming years,91 the international community had to provide immediate stopgap funding of $190 million to allow the Afghan government to cover at least some of its most politically sensitive financial obligations, such as salaries. Even so the Afghan total budget shortfall was $537 million.92

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In 2015, Afghanistan’s government succeeded in delivering a spectacular turnaround in revenue generation: from an eight per cent drop in 2014 to a 22 per cent rise in 2015. As William Byrd and M. Khalid Payenda show, only one-fifth of this revenue growth came from currency depreciation and other macroeconomic factors. More than half came from stronger and more effective tax collection efforts, including better control of corruption. Monitoring of customs and tax departments improved; corrupt managers were fired. A little less than a quarter came from new taxes, such as on cell phones93 – not a measure widely politically popular. Nonetheless, major structural economic problems remain, with the overall economic outlook grim in the short term, as intensifying violence suppresses investment and augments financial and human capital flight. Unemployment hovers around 25 per cent and underemployment is much higher.94 At the same time, the NUG paralysis and political infighting left some 25,000 government positions vacant.95 In 2015, the value of the Afghan currency dropped by over 20 per cent, driving up the costs of imports.96 The promise of the country’s mineral wealth worth $1 trillion and producing revenues to wean Afghanistan off dependence on foreign aid, opium poppy cultivation and human development remains just a promise. Meanwhile, Integrity Watch Afghanistan estimates that 1,400 mines operate illegally in Afghanistan, while only 200 pay taxes to the government.97 Economic frustration undermines the government’s legitimacy and fuels, even indirectly, the insurgency and encourages politics of brinksmanship and populism. It is imperative that Afghan elites come to realize that not just the national interest but the very survival of the post-2001 political dispensation requires a suspension of narrow, parochial, self-interested politics and necessitates better governance and a political opposition that is loyal to the basic interests of the country and the Afghan people.

Conclusion Afghanistan passed a critical test in late 2014, when after an election, power was peacefully handed over to a new government. But the country continues to face a series of political tripwires. Among them are upcoming parliamentary elections and a possible Loya Jirga that may formalize (or undo) the power-sharing deal between President Ghani and

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CEO Abdullah. Regardless of whether or not the Loya Jirga actually takes place, it or its shadow can unleash an intense political crisis in Afghanistan. The brinksmanship politics surrounding the Jirga and the claimed expiry of the National Unity Government in the fall and winter of 2016, exploited by Afghan politicians to augment their political and economic power, risks unleashing street and ethnic violence. It can put a terrible strain on the ANSF, testing its capacity to maintain basic order even in areas not strongly contested by the Taliban and indeed, even to remain intact itself. Should such street violence erupt, it also provides an immense opportunity for the Taliban to exploit militarily and politically. Meanwhile, the power-sharing arrangement has turned out to be a stubborn beast, with governance mostly paralysed for months. Although improving governance and fighting corruption were key campaign promises of both candidates, more than two years after the formation of the government, the Afghan people notice few improvements. The potential major political crises come on top of the major structural challenges that Afghanistan has faced and will continue to face for years to come. The Afghan state continues to be dependent on increasingly fickle foreign support to fund large parts of its budget, including all of its military expenditures. Its economic prospects have significantly worsened compared to before 2014 and remain dim for the foreseeable future. The promise of mineral resources funding the Afghan state and the development of the country has been slow to materialize. The Taliban insurgency is more than entrenched; it has engaged in some of the most intense fighting since 2001. Insecurity has increased across the country, and a long hot 2016 summer and autumn lie ahead. Another major security crisis like the autumn 2015 fall of Kunduz City is likely. Civilian casualties continue growing, and Afghan security forces are challenged on the battlefield and suffering from sustainment problems. After the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death in July 2015, the Taliban faced its first fragmentation since its creation in the 1990s. Mullah Mansour who replaced him for the most part managed to quell dissent and reconsolidate the insurgency, even if at the cost of allowing more power within the Taliban to the less controllable Haqqani network.

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Amidst this very difficult governance situation, and as a way to address some of the country’s structural challenges which have been severely compounded by persisting violence, President Ghani staked his political capital on negotiations with the Taliban. In a bold move, he reached out strongly to Pakistan (often seen by Afghans as the source of all of Afghanistan’s problems). But Pakistan has not managed to persuade the Taliban to either show up seriously at the negotiating table or to reduce its violent insurgency in Afghanistan. Ghani has little to show for his pains, and his domestic political space will continue to shrink as the 2016 autumn of crises approaches. The US killing of Mansour in May 2016 may set off a new wave of Taliban fragmentation. But while the leadership replacement process may temporarily hamper Taliban attacks in Afghanistan and some years later turn out to be the inflection point that set off the Taliban’s disintegration, Afghanistan still needs to brace for a bloody summer 2016. Even with the killing of Mansour, the Taliban’s operational capacity has not collapsed. And extensive fragmentation one day, should the Taliban not be able to maintain effective cohesion, may merely fragment violent conflict and make it more complex, without reducing its viciousness and intensity. Meanwhile, the killing of Mansour further delays the already distant prospect for any meaningful negotiations with the Taliban. Whenever talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban actually get under way, they are likely to last for years, well beyond 2016 when the foreign troop presence is supposed to be reduced to 5,600. Increasingly, it is imperative to direct military operations with an eye toward their impact on negotiations, such as by targeting Taliban commanders opposed to the negotiations who might defect and create splinter groups or embrace IS. Whatever the state of (non)negotiations with the Taliban and the state of the military battlefield, governance in Afghanistan cannot persist in the condition of paralysis of the past two years or the rapacious, predatory and self-interested behaviour of Afghan powerbrokers going back to the Karzai era. Starting to deliver governance improvements is crucial for the sustainability of the Afghan state and the basic political dispensation in the country. Better governance buys time, opens up political space for the negotiations and strengthens the government’s hand in them. It also boosts the capacity of ANSF on the battlefield.

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It is imperative that Afghan politicians put aside their self-interested scheming and rally behind the country to enable the government to function, or they will push Afghanistan over the brink into paralysis, intensified insurgency and outright civil war. In addition to restraining their political and monetary ambitions and their various power plays in Kabul, they need to recognize that years of abusive, discriminatory, exclusionary governance, extensive corruption and individual and ethnic patronage and nepotism are the crucial roots of Afghanistan’s predicament. These have corroded the Afghan Army and permeate the Afghan Police and anti-Taliban militias. Beyond blaming Pakistan, Afghan politicians and powerbrokers need to take a hard look at their behaviour in recent years and realize they have much to do to clean their own house to avoid disastrous outcomes for Afghanistan. Not all corruption or nepotism can or will disappear. But unless outright rapacious, exclusionary and deeply predatory governance is mitigated, the root causes of the insurgency will remain unaddressed and the statebuilding project will have disappeared into fiefdom politicking and lasting conflict. At that point, even negotiations with the Taliban will not bring peace.

Notes 1. Najafizada, Eltaf, “If Afghanistan Survives 2016, UN Will Consider It a Success”, Chicago Tribune, 17 March 2016. Available at http://www.chicago tribune.com/news/sns-wp-blm-afghan-nations-2c8ab8a8-ec23-11e5-a9ce681055c7a05f-20160317-story.html. 2. For the increase in international military casualties, Afghan civilian casualties, and the number of insurgent attacks from 2001 through 2008, see icasualties. org. See Livingston, Ian and Michael O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index, 31 July 2012. Available at www.brookings.edu/, /media/Programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan%20index/index20120731.pdf. 3. This section draws on Felbab-Brown, Vanda, Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-building in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2013), Chapters 1 and 2. 4. Ibid., Chapter 6. For a detailed evaluation of how the rift between President Karzai and the United States emerged and whether it was avoidable, see Neumann, Ronald E., “Failed Relations between Hamid Karzai and the United States: What Can We Learn?”, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), 20 May 2015. Available at http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/20/failed-relati ons-between-hamid-karzai-and-the-united-states-what-can-we.

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5. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the Nation from Afghanistan”, 1 May 2012. Available at www.white house.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/remarks-president-address-nationafghanistan. 6. IS is interchangeably also known as the Islamic State, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or as the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (or Syria) (ISIS). 7. See, for example, Arango, Tim and Duraid Adnan, “Militants Pose Threat on Eve of National Elections in Iraq”, New York Times, 29 April 2014; Sciutto, Jim and Greg Botelho, “Iraqis ‘up against the wall’ as IS threatens province near Baghdad”, CNN.com, 10 October 2014. Available at http://www.cnn.com/ 2014/10/10/world/meast/isis-threat/. 8. Author’s interviews with Afghan politicians and civil society representatives and US, ISAF and international diplomats and military officers, September – October 2014. 9. Author’s interviews with international advisors, US Embassy officials, representatives of other embassies in Kabul and Afghan politicians, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 2014. 10. Schmitt, Eric and David Sanger, “As U.S. Focuses on ISIS and the Taliban, Al Qaeda Reemerges”, New York Times, 29 December 2015. 11. Babb, Carla, “US General: Major Taliban Split Emerging in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province”, Voice of America, 10 March 2016. 12. Ahmed, Azam and Joseph Goldstein, “Taliban Gains Pull U.S. Units Back into Fight in Afghanistan”, New York Times, 29 April 2015. 13. Peker, Emre and Margherita Stancati, “NATO Plans Civilian-Led Mission in Afghanistan After 2016”, Wall Street Journal, 13 May 2015. 14. Craig, Tim, “NATO Hopes to Keep a Base in Afghanistan, U.S. General Says”, Washington Post, 23 May 2015. 15. Cunningham, Erin, “Europe Wants to Deport Afghan Migrants, but Kabul is Reluctant to Accept Them”, Washington Post, 19 March 2016. 16. “1,000 Afghans Flee Fighting Every Day: UN”, Outlook Afghanistan, 18 May 2016. Available at http://www.outlookafghanistan.net/national_detail.php?post_ id¼15277. 17. See, for example, Stanzel, Angela, “Eternally Displaced: Afghanistan’s Refugee Crisis and What It Means for Europe”, European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2016. Available at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_170_-_ETERNALLY _DISPLACED_1430.pdf. 18. The Asia Foundation, “Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People”, 2015. Available at http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2015.pdf. 19. Ibid. 20. Craig, Tim, “Why Disaffected Young Afghans Are Warming to a Taliban Comeback”, Washington Post, 1 March 2016. 21. See, for example, Larson, Anna and Noah Coburn, “Youth Mobilization and Political Constraints in Afghanistan: The Y Factor”, USIP, 13 January 2014.

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22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38.

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Available at http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR341-Youth_Mobilizati on_and_Political_Constraints_in_Afghanistan.pdf. See, for example, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg cited in Cunningham, Erin, “Taliban Fighters Seize Afghan Territory as NATO Chief Visits Kabul”, Washington Post, 15 March 2016. UNAMA, Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Annual Conflict, February 2016. Available at https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ poc_annual_report_2015_final_14_feb_2016.pdf. Ibid. “UN Launches Appeal for $393M Humanitarian Aid to Afghanistan”, Associated Press, 27 January 2016. Harper, Jon, “US Commander: Afghan Casualties Not ‘Sustainable’”, Stars and Stripes, 5 November 2014; and “US General: Afghan Army Being ‘Rebuilt’ for Taliban Battle”, Associated Press, 25 January 2016. Rosenberg, Matthew and Azam Ahmed, “Figures from U.S.-led Coalition Show Heavy 2014 Losses for Afghan Army”, New York Times, 3 March 2015. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/03/world/figures-from-us-led-coalitionshow-heavy-2014-losses-for-afghan-army.html. Donati, Jessica and Ehsanullah Amiri, “Afghan Police Force Struggling to Maintain Membership”, Wall Street Journal, 26 February 2016. Author’s interviews with NATO officials, Kabul, September and October 2015. See, for example, Giustozzi, Antonio and Ali Mohammad Ali, “The Afghan Army After ISAF”, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Briefing Paper Series, March 2016, p. 4. Ibid., p. 3. Author’s interviews with officials of Resolute Support and top Afghan officials of ANSF, Kabul, September and October 2015. Ibid. See also Giustozzi and Ali, “The Afghan Army After ISAF”, p. 10. Sopko, John, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Statement before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives: Assessing the Capabilities and Effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces”, 12 February 2016. Available at https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/ SIGAR-16-17-TY.pdf. Giustozzi and Ali, “The Afghan Army After ISAF”, p. 11. “UN: 2015 Civilian Injuries in Afghan War Worst Since 2009”, The Associated Press, 14 February 2016. See, for example, Cooke, Peyton and Eliza Urwin, “Security and Social Developments in Kunduz”, USIP, 17 December 2015. Available at https://www. usip.org/publications/2015/12/17/security-and-social-developments-in-kunduz. See, for example, Felbab-Brown, Vanda, “Afghanistan Field Trip Report V: The Afghan Local Police – ‘It’s Local, So It Must Be Good,’ Or Is It?” The Brookings Institution, 9 May 2012; and Felbab-Brown, Aspiration and Ambivalence, Chapter 8.

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39. For details, see Felbab-Brown, Vanda, “The Dubious Joys of Standing Up Militias and Building Partner Capacity: Lessons from Afghanistan and Mexico for Prosecuting Security Policy Through Proxies”, The Brookings Institution, 21 July 2015. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/07/ 21-afghanistan-mexico-security-policy-felbabbrown; Derksen, Deedee, “The Politics of Disarmament and Rearmament in Afghanistan”, USIP, 20 May 2015. Available at http://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/20/the-politicsof-disarmament-and-rearmament-in-afghanistan. 40. Author’s interviews with RS officers, Afghan officers, northern politicians, and Afghan journalists, Kabul, October 2015. 41. See, for example, Nordland, Rod, “U.S. General Says Kunduz Hospital Air Strike Was ‘Avoidable’”, New York Times, 25 November 2015; and Rosenberg, Matthew and Joseph-Goldstein, “U.S. Role in Afghanistan Turns to Combat Again, With a Tragic Error”, New York Times, 8 May 2016. 42. UNAMA, February 2016. 43. See, for example, Pearson, Michael, Masoud Popalzai and Zahra Ullah, “Death Toll Rises after Taliban Deadly Attack in Kabul”, CNN, 20 April 2016. 44. US General Wilson Shoffner cited in “U.S. General: Afghan Army Being ‘Rebuilt’ for Taliban Battle”, Associated Press, 25 January 2016. 45. Nabil cited in ibid. 46. For details on the Taliban and drugs, see Felbab-Brown, Vanda “No Easy Exit: Drugs and Counternarcotics Policies in Afghanistan”, The Brookings Institution, 29 April 2015. Available at http://www.brookings.edu/, /media/Research/Fi les/Papers/2015/04/global-drug-policy/FelbabBrown – Afghanistan-final.pdf? la ¼ en. 47. For details on Raziq and his complex role in Kandahar, see Aikins, Matthieu, “Our Man in Kandahar”, Atlantic, November 2011. Available at http://www. theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/11/our-man-in-kandahar/308653/; and Felbab-Brown, Aspiration and Ambivalence, Chapter 5. 48. For such thinly veiled threats and manipulation by Herat’s predominant powerbroker and a key politician and warlord Ismail Khan, see, for example, “Herat Will Become Insecure within Weeks if Govt Keep Looking the Other Way: Ismail Khan”, Afghanistan Times, 28 April 2015. On Atta and Balkh, see Sukhanyar, Jawad and Rod Nordland, “‘They Cannot Remove Me by Force’: A Strongman on Afghan Infighting”, New York Times, 2 April 2016. 49. Author’s interviews with RS officials and Afghan government officials, Kabul, September and October 2015. 50. For extent of IS presence in Afghanistan, see, for example, Osman, Borhan, “The Shadows of ‘Islamic State’ in Afghanistan: What threat does it hold?” Afghan Analyst Network, 12 February 2015. Available at https://www. afghanistan-analysts.org/the-shadows-of-islamic-state-in-afghanistan-whatthreat-does-it-hold/; and Graham-Harrison, Emma, “Taliban Fears Over Young Recruits Attracted to ISIS in Afghanistan”, Guardian, 7 May 2015.

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51. See, for example, Mashal, Mujib, “Afghan ISIS Branch Makes Inroads in the Battle Against the Taliban”, New York Times, 13 October 2015; and Babb, Carla, “US General: Major Taliban Split Emerging in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province”, Voice of America, 10 March 2016. 52. Shinwari, Shah Mahmoud and Abubakar Siddique, “Pakistani Militants Lead IS Push Into Eastern Afghanistan”, Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, 30 June 2015. Available at http://gandhara.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-pakistan-islamic-s tate-taliban/27102776.html; and author’s interviews with Nangarhari elders, Kabul, October 2015. 53. Sarwar, Mustafa, “Russia Plays Both Sides in the Afghan Conflict”, Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, 8 January 2016. 54. Author’s interviews with current and former Pakistani military officials, Islamabad and Lahore, Pakistan, May 2016; and with US military and intelligence officials, Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2016. 55. For an excellent and detailed analysis of the infighting and background of the rivalries, see, Osman, Borhan, “Toward Fragmentation? Mapping the PostOmar Taleban”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 24 November 2015. Available at https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/toward-fragmentation-mapping-thepost-omar-taleban/. 56. For a detailed background on the fighting in Herat, see Foschini, Fabrizio, “Under the Mountain: A Preemptive Taliban Offensive in Shindand,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 20 April 2016. Available at https://www. afghanistan-analysts.org/under-the-mountain-a-pre-emptive-taleban-springoffensive-in-shindand/. 57. See, for example, Khan, Mirwais and Lynne O’Donnell, “Afghan Taliban Close Ranks around New Leader”, The Associated Press, 5 February 2016. 58. Rogio, Bill, “Taliban Appoints Mullah Omar’s Brother, Son to Key Leadership Positions”, Long War Journal, 5 April 2016. Available at http://www. longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/04/taliban-appoint-mullah-omars-brother-s on-to-key-leadership-positions.php. 59. Mashal, Mujib, “Haqqanis Steering Deadlier Taliban in Afghanistan, Officials Say”, New York Times, 7 May 2016. 60. Author’s interviews with Afghan and US officials, Kabul, October 2016, and former Pakistani military officials and diplomats, Islamabad and Lahore, May 2016. 61. Cited in Khan, Ismail, “Pakistani Army Chief Asks Afghans to Help Find Taliban Commanders Behind Massacre”, New York Times, 17 December 2014. 62. Gul, Ayaz, “Pakistan Tries to Publicly Widen Gap with Taliban”, Voice of America, 30 April 2015. 63. Crilly, Rob, “American among Foreigners Killed in Kabul Hotel Attack”, Telegraph, 13 May 2015. 64. For details, see Felbab-Brown, Vanda, “Get Over It: The Limits of AfghanistanPakistan Rapprochement”, The Brookings Institution, 19 May 2015; and Felbab-

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66. 67. 68.

69.

70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

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Brown, “Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan and Implications for Regional Politics”. For details on the evolving and enduring Pakistani policy toward militancy in Afghanistan and on the US-Pakistan-Afghanistan triangle, see Felbab-Brown, Vanda, “Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan and Implications for Regional Politics”, National Bureau of Asian Research, May 2015. Khan, Ismail and Declan Walsh, “Pakistan Military Wages Assault Against Militants”, New York Times, 15 June 2014. For details on the June 2013 negotiations, the political fiasco surrounding them, and their suspension, see Felbab-Brown, Vanda, “The Political Games in the Taliban Negotiations”, The Brookings Institution, 19 June 2013. For a detailed analysis, see Semple, Michael, “Rhetoric, Ideology and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement”, USIP, 5 January 2015. Available at http://www.usip.org/publications/rhetoric-ideology-and-organi zational-structure-of-the-taliban-movement. See, for example, Norland, Rod, “Some Progress is Reported in Informal Afghan-Taliban Talks”, The New York Times, 4 May 2015; and Bakr, Amena, and Jibran Ahmad, “Taliban, Afghan Negotiators Unable to Agree Ceasefire”, Reuters, 4 May 2015. See also, The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan [the Taliban’s formal name], “Statement Delivered by the Delegation of the Political Office of the Islamic Emirate in the International Pugwash Research Conference”, 5 May 2015. Available at http://jihadology.net/2015/05/05/ new-release-from-the-islamic-emirate-of-afghanistan-full-text-of-statementdelivered-by-the-delegation-of-the-political-office-in-the-internationalpugwash-research-conference/. Stancati, Margherita, “Afghans, Taliban Met in Secret China Talks”, Wall Street Journal, 24 May 2015. See, Felbab-Brown, May 2015; and Riedel, Bruce, Deadly Embrace (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2012). “Pakistan Admits that Afghan Taliban Leaders Live There”, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 3 March 2016. Author’s interviews with Afghan and Pakistani officials, Islamabad, May 2016. Landler, Mark, and Matthew Rosenberg, “U.S. Strike on Taliban Leader is Seen as a Message to Pakistan”, New York Times, 24 May 2016. Mashal, Mujib, “Afghan President Demands that Pakistan Take Military Action Against Taliban”, New York Times, 25 April 2016. Author’s interviews with Pakistani government and law enforcement officials, journalists, businessmen and NGO representatives, Islamabad and Karachi, Pakistan, May 2016. Author’s interviews with Pakistani government and law enforcement officials, journalists, businessmen and NGO representatives, Lahore, Pakistan, May 2016.

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78. See, for example, Small, Andrew, “The China Factor”, The Cipher Brief, 7 October 2015. Available at https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/chinafactor. 79. Donati, Jessica, and Ehsanullah Amiri, “China Offers Afghanistan Army Expanded Military Aid”, Wall Street Journal, 9 March 2016. 80. “Time to Put the Squeeze on Pakistan”, New York Times, 12 May 2016. 81. Addel, Mirwaiz, “Do Not Compromise with Lives of Afghans in the Name of Peace: Gen. Raziq”, Khaama Press, 3 May 2015. 82. Cited in “Taliban Reaffirms Authority of Its Qatar ‘Political Office’”, Associated Press, 24 January 2016. 83. For evolution of the Taliban, see Guistozzi, Antonio, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002– 2007 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Strick van Linschoten, Alex, and Felix Kuehn, An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 84. For details, see Miakhel, Shahmahmoud, “In Afghanistan, No Leadership Means No Elections”, ForeignPolicy.com, 29 January 2016. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/29/in-afghanistan-no-leadership-meansno-elections/. 85. Cunningham, Erin, “Afghan Elites Calling for New Elections”, Washington Post, 30 March 2016. 86. For details, see, for example, Ahmed, Azam, “Afghan Leader Said to Be Centralizing Power as Unity Government Plan Stalls”, New York Times, 20 March 2015. 87. “Afghanistan Country Economic Update”, World Bank, April 2015. Available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/ 2015/05/15/090224b082e8582d/2_0/Rendered/PDF/Afghanistan0economic0 update.pdf. 88. Byrd, William, “Afghanistan’s Continuing Fiscal Crisis: No End in Sight”, USIP, Peace Brief 185, May 2015. Available at https://www.usip.org/sites/ default/files/PB185-Afghanistans-Continuing-Fiscal-Crisis-No-End-In-Sight. pdf. 89. Author’s interviews with World Bank and IMF officials, Afghanistan, September and October 2014, and Washington, DC, November 2014. 90. Ibid. 91. Hogg, Richard, Claudia Nassif, Camilo Gomez Orsorio, William Byrd, and Andrew Beath, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013). 92. Byrd, “Afghanistan’s Continuing Fiscal Crisis: No End in Sight”. 93. Byrd, William, and M. Khalid Payenda, “Afghanistan’s Revenue Turnaround in 2015”, USIP, Peace brief 201, February 2016. Available at http://www.usip. org/sites/default/files/PB201-Afghanistans_Revenue_Turnaround_In_2015. pdf.

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94. Shevory, Kristina, “Once a Bright Spot, Afghan Telecoms Face Unsustainable Losses”, New York Times, 8 April 2016. 95. “25,000 Posts Still Vacant in the Afghan Government Institutions”, Khaama Press, 30 March 2016. 96. Craig, Tim, “Why Disaffected Young Afghans Are Warming to a Taliban Comeback”, Washington Post, 1 March 2016. 97. Research by Integrity Watch Afghanistan cited by Najafizada.

CHAPTER 3 CAPACITY BUILDING AS PARTNERSHIP:NATO'S FUTURE ROLE Alessandro Marrone and Paola Sartori

The 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent efforts of US-led Western institutions and coalitions against international Islamic terrorism turned Afghanistan into NATO’s major operational theatre for more than a decade. This in turn made NATO an important tool for the capacity building of Afghan security forces and institutions and, though to a lesser extent, for regional cooperation. NATO has thus both a history and an institutional capacity that enable it to help shape a South Asia balance of power built on restraint and the mutual recognition of political differences. Questions linger, though. Does NATO want this role, can it incite other international organizations to cooperate with it and thus share the burden of regional involvement, and, finally, can it incite local actors to look upon NATO favourably? This chapter provides an assessment by zooming in on the issue of regional partnerships and capacity building and the transition from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Resolute Support Mission initiated in January 2015. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part considers the current status of formal multilateral and bilateral partnerships in the region as the inescapable landscape NATO – and the wider Western community – has engaged. The second part examines NATO’s approach to

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partnerships and capacity building and compares it to concurrent efforts by the EU and OSCE. Finally, the third part evaluates NATO’s longterm contribution to a possibly balance of restrained power in the South Asia region. Such a roadmap allows us to put the Allied effort into context, notably by discerning the past, current and potential future NATO contribution to regional stability from the general debate over ISAF strategy, evolution and results. The comparison with EU and OSCE is also necessary to understand common elements, diversities and complementarities within the broader effort of the Western community. In doing so, it should be kept in mind – as already underlined in the introduction to this book – that the physical, language, religious and historical geography of South Asia is complex, and even contested and divisive. From the perspective of NATO the region is centred on Afghanistan. Moreover, the region of South Asia is intrinsically linked to Central Asia on account of the many ethnic, political, economic and strategic links between states and societies.1

A Difficult Regional Context for NATO-style Partnerships As Ronald E. Neumann explained in Chapter 1, the regional history in terms of multilateral and bilateral cooperation is not encouraging. Currently, formal multilateral partnership in South and Central Asia takes place within four main regional organizations with different but overlapping membership. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) counts among its eight members Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, while the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) involves ten countries including, inter alia, Afghanistan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) includes among its members China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with Afghanistan, India, Iran and Pakistan among its observers that since September 2014 are eligible to be invited for full membership. Finally, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is composed by former Soviet republics such as, among others, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and sees Afghanistan as an observer. The composition and competences of these regional organizations invite a number of overall observations. First, there is no formally

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institutionalized format for regional cooperation inclusive of all countries of South and Central Asia. The one exception could be the “Heart of Asia” process – mentioned in the introduction – but it remains an informal and loosely structured diplomatic process rather than an established international organization.2 Second, different regional formats involve and are led by different regional powers: the CSTO is clearly under Moscow’s influence, and Russia and China share somewhat ill-defined leading roles, in the SCO. Neither of these states participates in SAARC, but India, South Asia’s premier power, does. Conversely, India does not participate in the other three forums. Moreover, the four regional organizations have different thematic interests: the main difference is perhaps that SCO and CSTO are active in the security domain, while SAARC and CAREC have a much broader approach that is only remotely connected to security issues. Finally, several experts question the effectiveness of these regional formats, particularly in the security domain. According to pessimistic scholars, the regional organizations “barely function”.3 The SCO could be a case in point. In the last decade the SCO has put in place efforts to counter terrorism, extremism and separatism in Central Asia,4 and at a 2009 Moscow conference the Organization and Afghanistan adopted a joint declaration and an action plan to combat terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime.5 However, SCO is regarded as not having an impact on the ground in Afghanistan and Central Asia,6 without the military capacity and financial means for operations in the Afghan territory7 – let aside the political will to do so, particularly in Beijing. At the same time, and in parallel, the CSTO is reluctant to engage in Afghanistan – for obvious reasons considering Russia’s history – and still struggle to affirm its role in Central Asia, where Uzbekistan left the Organization in 2012 and Turkmenistan simply never joined it. The reasons for the scarce effectiveness of formal regional partnerships in that part of the world are multiple: historical rivalries, conflicting geopolitical agendas, widespread opposition to international interference in domestic affairs, lack of economic integration in the region, scepticism about supranational bodies and the tendency of smaller states to play the regional powers off each other in order to increase the national benefits achievable out of bilateral relations. Moreover, as explained in the introduction, most states in the region are weak, their

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institutions are of limited capacity, often fragile and plagued by “political patronage”: to the extent that states are the building blocks of international organizations, the weakness of the former greatly limit the effectiveness of the latter. In this context, the political talks during the series of meetings of the Heart of Asia process could be considered an achievement on its own in a region where governments often do not talk to each other8 – despite the aforementioned regional formats. More precisely, governments in the region rarely talk to each other in multilateral frameworks but via a complex and diversified network of bilateral relations. Even prominent members of the aforementioned regional organizations prefer to conduct important diplomatic business bilaterally rather than multilaterally, a pattern that is visible in regards to the diplomacy of the war in Afghanistan or, more broadly, in pattern of diplomacy established by the five former Soviet Republics in Central Asia.9 Bilateral relationships are not so much formalized in specific agreements as in the hands of political managers, such as central authorities, intelligence services, or local stakeholders relying on ethnic and personal networks. A partial exception to this pattern is the Tripartite Commission established by Afghanistan and Pakistan with the support of NATO in order to improve the joint monitoring of the Durand Line. However, the Tripartite Commission has not brought the results hoped for, and its uncertain future is in the hands of Afghan and Pakistani Army Chiefs, though also the commander of the remaining international force element.10 This pattern confirms in two ways the main assumptions of this book. First, the different membership of the various multilateral organizations active in the region, often centred on different regional powers, reflects an underlying power plurality and asymmetry where powers such as India, China or Russia are tempted to play their role within a renewed “Great Game”. Second, the lack of a formally established regional organization covering the entire region, and including all regional powers, continues to fuel the “fear of exclusion” of certain states from possible strategic agreements by other groups – an exclusion which in turn might endanger national security and interests. The “Heart of Asia” process could play a positive role in this regard because of its inclusive character. The fact that Afghan President Ashraf Ghani chose the Heart of Asia ministerial meeting of October 2014 for his first official visit

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abroad is important, but the Heart of Asia process is complex, as mentioned, and it should not be overlooked that this October meeting took place in Beijing, China. The multilateral option was thus embedded in an important bilateral relationship.

Western Efforts as Multilateral, Bilateral and Afghan Domestic Level The difficult regional context helps explain the difficulties encountered by a formally established Alliance such as NATO in developing its approach towards the region. The debate on the nature and evolution of the Alliance, as well as on the reasons Europeans got involved in Afghanistan,11 is beyond the scope of this chapter. The essential point is that NATO is an alliance of sovereign states invariably characterized by US hegemony. This is not to say that Europeans’ approach to the region is the same of the American one, but the former is greatly dependent on the latter. Without the US engagement in South and Central Asia after the 9/11 attacks there would not have been such a NATO – or EU – involvement in this region, an involvement that by large has been developed in relation with the American one. The transatlantic relationship worked relatively smoothly in Afghanistan, where the ISAF military command after some hesitation and political infight integrated European and North American troops, developed a training mission concept and managed to align EU efforts alongside it. The transatlantic relationship was looser beyond the theatre of war, such as in Central Asia where for the EU and US work reflected different focuses and approaches and ultimately lacked coordination.12 In regards to the OSCE and its efforts to facilitate regional stability we must again take note of the impact of US leadership, even as Russia is an OSCE member, and a US appreciation for a fairly smoothly functioning relationship.13 In conclusion, it is not possible to de-couple NATO’s approach from US policy. The United States sets the trend and provides the framework for regional engagement. However, NATO remains a multilateral alliance composed of two North American countries and then 26 European ones, and it develops its own distinct institutional approach to capacity building and other mission goals – notably anchored in its operational engagements in other parts of the world, such as Bosnia or North Africa.

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Having said that, the Atlantic Alliance has obviously built its approach to the region through an ISAF perspective, for example by seeking logistical support for its transport and supply needs and thus supporting border control cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan. NATO’s approach developed slowly. A “regional approach” was officially adopted only five years after NATO took over of the mission’s command, when in 2008 the ISAF Strategic Vision was approved at the Bucharest summit and pledged to deepen engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbours, in particular Pakistan.14 Since 2008 this “regional approach” of seeking the involvement of neighbouring countries in the stabilization of Afghanistan has become a pillar of NATO’s strategy, but also one that has been difficult to translate into practical policy. Over time the Alliance has increased its bilateral relations with several countries in the region, in particular Pakistan and the former Soviet Republics in Central Asia, but has not built significant multilateral venues for regional cooperation. The participation of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) has not encouraged the parties to go beyond bilateral relations. Nor has NATO’s Northern Distribution Network (NDN), organized to facilitate transport supplies from Saint Petersburg through several countries in Central Asia into Afghanistan, had a positive spillover effect in terms of regional cooperation. In contrast, some experts point out that the NDN has exacerbated rivalries and border tensions among Afghanistan’s northern neighbours because Uzbekistan has gained more from NDN than the rest, offsetting fears and jealousies related to relative power.15 The exclusive focus on bilateral relations is due to the aforementioned reality of the region marked by long-standing contrasts among neighbouring states but also a US preference for bilateralism over multilateralism to manage its most urgent regional needs, as well as to the diverging views among Western allies on how to deal with regional actors such as Iran – at least until the 2015 agreement – Russia and China. This is not to say NATO has not supported multilateral efforts, for example at working level and within donor conferences, but results have been frustrating and ISAF countries have not been able to forge a common approach to cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbours.16 On top of that, since 2014 the war in

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Ukraine has marked a watershed in NATO-Russia relations, impacting negatively on the whole range of cooperative activities between the two parties – including in South Asia. Against this background, one of the most noticeable achievements of NATO efforts is the establishment of the aforementioned Tripartite Commission that enables regular meetings among senior military officials of Afghanistan, Pakistan and international forces. However, the fate of this agreement – and generally speaking of relations with Islamabad – does not depend so much on NATO as US relations to Pakistan, as illustrated by the fact that in 2011 the American military raids on Pakistani territory led Islamabad to close its border to NATO logistical supplies. Another positive example of formal partnership established by NATO in the region are the Individual Partnership Programs (IPP) agreed between the Alliance and single Central Asia states in the EAPC– PfP framework. However, the substance of these programs is quite limited in comparison with Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP) agreed with other PfP countries more close in political terms to the Alliance (for instance, Sweden and Austria). Only Kazakhstan has established an actual IPAP with NATO and takes part in an “action plan” against terrorism. In contrast, among the five former Soviet Republics, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan remain the most difficult partners for NATO, as their governments are hostile to the Alliance reform agenda notably as it relates to democratic accountability and civil-military relations broadly understood.17 Concerning NATO relations with South Asia regional organizations, the Alliance has not tried to build an institutionalized dialogue with SCO and CSTO.18 On its part, the SCO has shown no interest in opening a channel of communication with NATO, while the CSTO at a general level and prior to the Ukraine crisis raised the idea of CSTO–NATO cooperation.19 NATO allies have regularly discussed the situation in Afghanistan and South Asia with Moscow within the NATO–Russia Council, but this format is frozen because of the aforementioned negative effects of the war in Ukraine and it was never a venue for organized political action. NATO’s partnership policy has had mixed effects on a bilateral level for at least four reasons. First, because the main regional powers have been against an increase of US influence and footprint in South and Central Asia, they have opposed NATO policy as a proxy for US

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influence. If anything, this experience confirms the importance of the regional balance of power for successful regional partnerships. Second, most elites in the region are hostile to the Western narrative about human rights and rule of law, a narrative which has marked ISAF commitment in Afghanistan and influenced NATO’s engagement with partners in terms of security sector reform and capacity building. Third, even those not against NATO on matters of principle calculated that NATO’s commitment in the region would not be enduring. In consequence, to side with the Westerners would be risky, and the better option has been to hedge ones bets and prepare for the future of post-Western South Asia diplomacy. Finally, as mentioned, the substance of bilateral cooperation with Pakistan and former Soviet republics in the last decade has lay directly with the US rather than with NATO per se.20 The same applies to a large extent to Russia and also Iran, especially following the successful conclusion of a nuclear agreement that is supposed to ease sanctions against Iran in return for its commitment to added nuclear oversight and inspection. These countries know that vital parts of their national security interests are tied in a very direct way to US policy. As a matter of fact, the main NATO contribution to regional stability has been realized by the capacity building of Afghan institutions, and particularly of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The building up of professional and self-sustaining ANSF21 represented a central effort of ISAF mission – which consisted of taking the international lead in assisting Afghanistan establish “security” while enabling other international organizations in matters of development and governance. Training the ANSF complemented ISAF’s provincial engagements – and sometimes combat missions – and blossomed in 2009 into the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A).22 The ISAF Joint Command had continuously been responsible for the formation of fielded units through advice and assistance activities, and NTM-A broke new ground mostly by tying the full Alliance to higher-level training for the Afghan National Army (ANA) as well as training and mentoring of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Announced at the occasion of the Strasbourg-Kehl North Atlantic Council, held on 12 June 2009, the NTM-A was made part of ISAF and became symbolic of the allied agreement to invest in local capacities to counter the full range of threats to Afghan stability – from insecurity over high levels of corruption to

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the lack of good governance. In particular, Allies confirmed their special commitment to strengthen ANP, as an indispensable tool to ensure the sustainability of Afghan national stability and security. The mission originated in the attempt to reach a more structured approach toward the training and mentoring activities for both ANA and ANP under a single NATO framework, in the recognition of the complementary role of both forces in the achievement of a secure and stable national environment.23 Furthermore, NATO sought also to coordinate international efforts in the field of Security Sector Reform in order to guarantee an efficient use of resources and a more coherent approach.24 For this purpose, NTM-A was to act in close cooperation with other international actors such as the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) and the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) – among others.25 In four years, from September 2009, the ANSF more than doubled in size. In September 2013 the ANA was reported to have an assigned force level of 192,595, including 6,778 personnel assigned to the air force, and the ANP an assigned force level of 152,336.26 In December 2014, the ANA reached a strength of more than 175,800 and the ANP more than 153,000, thus leading to a total number 352,000 of soldiers and police officers.27 With reference to the number of trainers employed, according to data released by the US Defense Department, 1,653 trainers were in place in November 2013.28 The NATO financial sustainment for ANSF been provided via the ANA Trust Fund, which was originally created in 2007 with the aim to cope with costs of installations and transportation of donated equipment, ANA equipment and services purchase and in- and out-of country training.29 Since then the Trust Fund repeatedly expanded: firstly in 2009 with the allied commitment to long-term sustainment of the Afghan National Army; later in 2011 with the commitment to finance long-term literacy programmes.30 Further adaptation of the ANA Trust Fund then occurred in 2013 in order to increase its flexibility to provide support to other elements of the Afghan National Security Forces, although its focus remains primarily on the Afghan National Army.31 According to NATO, 23 nations have contributed more than $761 million over the life of the Trust Fund.32 Furthermore, Allies and partners have pledged an annual support of $450 million for the transition period 2015–17.33

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To date, after incremental progress and with considerable limitations, as laid out in Chapter 2 by Vanda Felbab-Brown, the ANSF is able to perform autonomous combat operations in addition to some activities in regards to military police, intelligence gathering, route clearance, combat support, medical, aviation and logistics. As far as the ANP is concerned, its role has gradually shifted from a type of para-military force to a more conventional police one through a steady transition from counterinsurgency to civilian police functions. Nevertheless, even if official declarations34 claim for the successful accomplishment of the Inteqal (transition) process of security responsibility from ISAF to ANSF, started back in 2011, as the latter is now fully responsible for security in Afghanistan, 2015 and the years to come will mark a significant challenge for Afghan stability and security as well as a test for NATO accomplishments in terms of capacity building. In fact, the eventual deterioration of security situation throughout the country would critically challenge the legitimacy of central government and therefore lead to serious political consequences. In this sense, 2015 and “transition” more widely is a moment of truth for the training and assistance effort NATO has carried out up until now. At the NATO Summit in Wales in September 2014 allies and partners reaffirmed their commitment to Afghanistan and the capacity building missions,35 but it remains a fact that the Resolute Support Mission is relatively modest in terms of numbers and political risk taking. The main track laid out for NATO thus remains capacity building – training, advising, supporting – but the devil in the detail concerns the durable commitment to it. The complete overview of this commitment must go beyond NATO. In particular, it should be mentioned that European countries have committed resources in the region through the EU. Concerning Afghanistan, from 2002 to 2011 the Union alone contributed e2.5 billion in development and humanitarian assistance, and between 2011 and 2013 EU and Member States funding totalled e600 million.36 This is in line with the traditional EU approach to regional cooperation in crisis areas, whereby “bottom-up” reconstruction, development and stabilization efforts are deemed effective tools. At the same time, the EU Police Mission Afghanistan (EUPOL) established in 2007 has trained as of 2013 more than 5,000 Afghan police officers including officials from the Minister of Interior, prosecutors and anti-corruption units.37 Such capacity building approach has been carried out in cooperation with

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NATO, which worked mainly on Afghan military but also on the police force. Moreover, on June 2007 the EU adopted a Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia, followed by a number of cooperative initiatives including a Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA), again in line with traditional EU policy on cross-border interaction and dialogue from working level upwards. Finally, in June 2014 the EU adopted a strategy for the period 2014 –16 which outlines the guidelines for its commitment in Afghanistan, still focused on police training, humanitarian and development assistance.38 As far as the OSCE is concerned, this organization adopted a similar strategy aimed to present itself as a platform for cooperation and to contribute to the boosting of regional security and stability. OSCE has promoted a multi-faceted approach with a twofold objective of strengthening border security and encouraging regional trade and partnerships. Through the activity of the OSCE Border Management Staff College (BMSC) in Dushanbe the European organization is providing specialized training for border security agencies from Central Asia and Afghanistan with positive effects also on economic interactions.39

NATO’s Changing and Diminishing Role NATO has prepared and presented its future role in the region in two main documents: the Declaration on Enduring Partnership between NATO and Afghanistan, signed in 2010, and the Status Of Force Agreement (SOFA) between Afghanistan and the Alliance, signed in September 2014,40 which allowed the launch of the Resolute Support Mission (RS) on 1 January 2015. In line with the previous consideration on the importance of the Washington–Kabul relations in setting the NATO role in the region, it should be mentioned that the SOFA could be signed only once American and Afghan governments came to an agreement on the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the US – a security context developed in greater detail in Chapter 4. In brief, the BSA and SOFA were key condition for the implementation of the strategic and enduring partnerships agreed in recent years by Kabul with Washington or Brussels.41 The Declaration on Enduring Partnership promises strong security cooperation and, in particular, political consultations on issues of strategic concern and practical collaboration “in accordance with Afghan priorities

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and requirements and the ability of NATO to deliver sustained support”.42 The aim is capacity building and the sustained development of Afghan institutions. According to the declaration, NATO’s sustained practical support to Afghan security institutions aimed at: sustaining and improving their capacity and capability to counter threats to the security, stability and integrity of Afghanistan effectively, and contributing to regional security; and doing so with full respect for Afghan sovereignty and leadership, in a manner consistent with and supportive of the Afghan constitution and international law.43 The planned efforts on capacity building include, among others, NATO’s Building Integrity (BI) programme to strengthen integrity and transparency in the defence sector and the Defence Education Enhancement Program (DEEP) to provide for professional military education and also training activities in civil emergency planning and disaster preparedness.44 At the beginning of 2015, thanks to the signature of SOFA agreement by the Afghan government, the Atlantic Alliance confirmed its willingness to continue and enhance its efforts in the field of capacity building with the launch of a new mission. In fact, the “Agreement between NATO and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the Status of NATO Forces and NATO Personnel Conducting Mutually Agreed NATO-led Activities in Afghanistan” provides the legal basis for the Resolute Support Mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. The document specifies terms and conditions of NATO forces deployment in Afghanistan as part of the mission, as well as the activities that they are set to fulfil. It defines the status of international forces employed in Afghanistan with specific mention about their rights to carry/use weapons, their legal status and other specific aspects related to positioning of equipment, movement of vehicles and contracting procedures.45 The general purpose of the document is twofold: to confirm Afghan sovereignty on the one hand, and on the other, to give necessary legitimacy to international forces presence in order to ensure support to the country in the near future. As a matter of fact, under the agreement, a strength of about 12,900 personnel, from 40 among NATO allies and partners countries, is

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providing further training, advice and assistance to the ANSF, as part of the Resolute Support Mission.46 The US deploys half of the troops, Italy, Germany and Georgia around 800 soldiers each, Romania, Turkey and UK between 400 and 650 and the others offer an almost symbolic contribution in terms of staff. The mission is organized in five Training Assist and Advise Commands (TAAC) corresponding to former Regional Commands: North, led by Germany, East and South under US leadership, West with an Italian command and the Central one covering Kabul under Turkish responsibility. In addition, two sectorial command train and assist respectively Afghan Air Force and the defence staff in charge of budget, planning, civilian governance of ANSF – both led by the US.47 The RS capacity building effort will embrace a quite broad range of aspects: from operational planning and force generation over budgeting and the execution of programmes to intelligence and strategic communication. The signing of BSA and SOFA helped advance cooperation between the EU and Afghanistan, since the EU needs a conducive security environment for the implementation of the European – Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development, signed on 4 – 5 October 2012 in Berlin. In this document, the EU confirmed its commitment to support training and equipment of Afghan National Security Forces as well as to ensure consolidation of the Afghan government.48 By applying a comprehensive approach EU efforts covered a wider range of objectives covering, among others: promotion of peace, security and regional stability, reinforcement of local democracy, supporting Afghan economic recovery by investing in the reconstruction of infrastructure and in agricultural and rural development programmes, as well as promotion of human rights.49 The presidential elections of 2014 led, with considerable difficulty, to the appointment of Ashraf Ghani who, as the country’s new legitimate leader, could sign the BSA/SOFA. Yet uncertainty and instability continues to threaten the future of Afghanistan and its relations with both neighbouring countries and NATO. Some considerations can be made regarding the Alliance’s role envisaged by the Enduring Partnership and SOFA documents, which will likely take place in a wider “muddle through” scenario whereby a partly dysfunctional Afghan state manages to survive but in the context of simmering discontent.50

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Conclusion NATO has been a mirror of the US engagement in Afghanistan and yet not simply a reflection of US policy and priorities. Being multilateral, NATO policy has focused on the zone of consensus among its (since 2009) 28 allies, which has been the security assistance effort of ISAF. In practical terms it has translated into a dispersed engagement in Afghanistan’s provinces to help provide security for reconstruction efforts and then also an increasingly marked engagement with the building of Afghanistan’s central security institution – the ANSF. Thus partnering with the central government and building capacity is NATO’s footprint. Over time NATO has become more apt at describing its Afghan profile – notably in 2008 with its strategic approach to partnership but continuing through the US-led surge and now the transition phase of Resolute Support. As we know, a civilian-led NATO mission will follow post-2016. As this profile has become sharper, it has also diminished. International force numbers in Afghanistan have decreased dramatically and strategic attention is drawn to other conflict zones. NATO thus knows what it should do but it probably will not do too much of it. This assessment is reached by the preceding analysis and the following four concluding observations. First, the deep-rooted dynamics hampering multilateral cooperation in the region will likely continue, on the basis of geopolitical rivalries among regional powers as well as national strategies of smaller states to play powerful neighbours off each other. The key question is whether these dynamics will be mitigated or not by a convergence of the main regional stakeholders on a settlement whereby no one has the fear to be excluded from strategic agreements, the balance of power is restrained to support domestic principles of legitimacy and opportunity for economic and social development are embedded in a positive political process. Although the deal reached in 2015 between Iran and the West does constitute a positive development in the regional context, the pressure exerted by NATO, and generally speaking by the international community, in favour of the development of partnership in the region will probably decrease, in light of a reduced NATO military footprint and – above all – of a sharply decreased American interest in that part of the world. This decreasing pressure does not

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speak in favour of a trend towards restrained balance of power in the region. Second, NATO three-fold commitment based on a 12,900 troops RS Mission, substantial financial aid to ANSF and the Enduring Partnership agreement, will likely have positive effects in terms of capacity building and will provide some political leverage vis-a`-vis Afghan government for the purpose of advancing Afghanistan’s cooperation with neighbouring countries. However, NATO’s strategic reflection on how to build and manage its network of partnerships is incomplete,51 despite the fact that such “cooperative security” in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept was elevated to one of three “core tasks” of the Alliance – now on par with collective defence and crisis management.52 Declining domestic support for “out of area” crisis management operations will get the allies off the hook to an extent – they can navigate around large-scale operations, state building and counterinsurgency in favour of lighter footprints53 – but they remain saddled with an incomplete policy nonetheless. How NATO’s commitment to partnerships, including capacity building, and its reluctance regarding out-of-area operational engagements will come together in a coherent approach to South and Central Asia is not clear. It is at best a “work in progress”. As a result, it should not be taken for granted that the Alliance will play a strong role in supporting restrained balance of power in the region by capacity building, as done in the last decade and as somehow envisaged in the Enduring Partnership agreement with Afghanistan. Third, the developments of the relations between Russia and the West will influence NATO role in South and Central Asia as well as the region as a whole. Indeed, the war in Ukraine has played a dramatic role in refocusing the Alliance on the collective defence of its member states and the security of Europe. This shift has been evident in the 2014 NATO Wales Summit, and it is influencing the path towards the 2016 Warsaw Summit – including the elaboration of the Alliance’s Political Guidance and the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). A shift away from partnership and commitment in faraway regions such as South and Central Asia will not be reversed in the next years, and a renewed focus on collective defence of European Member States is likely to persist. However, Europe’s security continues to be linked to developments in the Muslim world, also via the terrorist attacks and migration flows recently experienced by Europeans, and Russia may

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plays different roles – cooperative or not – as epitomized by the Syrian case. In this security environment it is hard to foresee any substantial cooperation between NATO on the one hand and CSTO and SCO on the other. Generally speaking, the ambivalence of relations between Russia and the West do not lean in favour of a convergence of main regional and global powers over a geopolitical settlement of South and Central Asia, based on restrained balance of power and no fear of exclusion. Fourth, the current proliferation of strongholds of extremist Islamist militias in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), from Iraq and Syria to Libya, may have different impacts on NATO role in South and Central Asia. On the one hand, and since the Islamic State is predominately anchored in and the Levant and in Libya, it will draw Western attention to the MENA region and away from Afghanistan. On the other hand, international Islamic terrorism could be transforming and globalizing – as epitomized by the terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels but more generally by the radicalization of Muslim youth in Western countries – and it could lead to an appreciation of how Western capacity building will have to look beyond just Syria, Iraq and Libya. It is not by accident that Resolute Support mandate has been confirmed for 2016 with a robust contingent of 12,900 troops. Still, Western countries have finite resources, and most attention is likely to go to the “arch of instability” surrounding NATO from Ukraine to Tunisia. South and Central Asia appear to be secondary priorities in this context.

Notes 1. Interestingly, the US State Department has only one bureau for South and Central Asia which couples the two regions, while the US Department of Defense has included Pakistan, Afghanistan and the five Central Asia Republics in the Central Command (CentCom) together with the Middle East and North Africa countries. 2. The “Heart of Asia” process launched in Istanbul in 2011 involves Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan. 3. Bleuer, Christian and Said Reza Kazemi, Between Co-operation and Insulation, Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 2014, p. 9. 4. Fels, Enrico, “The SCO role in Afghanistan”, in Henning Riecke and Kevin Francke (eds) Partners for Stability (Baden Baden: Nomos – DGAP, 2013), p. 238.

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5. See SCO Secretariat, “Declaration of the Special Conference on Afghanistan convened under the auspices of SCO”, 27 March 2009; SCO Secretariat, “Plan of Action of the SCO Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on Combating Terrorism, Illicit Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime”, 27 March 2009. 6. Laurelle, Marlene et al., The Afghanistan-Central Asia Relationship: What Role for the EU? (FRIDE-EUCAM, February 2013), p. 11. 7. de Haas, Marcel, “EU and NATO engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Afghanistan as a pilot”, Europe’s World, 27 May 2014. 8. Bleuer, Christian and Said Reza Kazemi, Between Co-operation and Insulation (Afghanistan: Analysts Network, 2014), p. 9. 9. Ibid., p. 1. 10. “Border security arrangements discussed with Afghanistan”, Dawn, 20 May 2014. 11. In this regard see, among others, Alessandro Marrone, “Obama and Afghanistan. A Reality Check for European Expectations”, in Birte Wassenberg and Giovanni Faleg (eds), Europe and the Middle East. The Hour of the EU? (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2012), pp. 81– 94. 12. Boonstra, Jos and Marle`ne Laruelle, “EU – US cooperation in Central Asia: parallel lines meet in infinity?”, EUCAM Watch (July 2013), p. 1. 13. United States mission to the OSCE, Working Session IV: Afghanistan, available at http://osce.usmission.gov/jun_26_14_asrc_session4.html. 14. Heads of State and Government of the Nations contributing to ISAF, ISAF Strategic Vision, 3 April 2008. 15. Cooley, Alexander, “Roadblocks on the New Silk Road: the Challenges of Externally Promoteing Central Asian Economic Cooperation”, EUCAM Watch 11 (February 2012), p. 4. 16. Riecke, Henning and Kevin Francke, “Partners for Stability: Afghanistan neighbors and regional cooperation”, in Henning Riecke and Kevin Francke (eds), Partners for Stability (Baden Baden: Nomos – DGAP, 2013), p. 16. 17. Overhaus, Marco, “NATO and Afghanistan’s neighbors: difficult partners for stabilization and reconstruction”, in Henning Riecke and Kevin Francke (eds), Partners for Stability (Baden Baden: Nomos – DGAP, 2013), p. 216. 18. Laruelle, Marle`ne and Se´bastian Peyrouse, “Why NATO doesn’t talk with the SCO and the CSTO”, EUCAM Watch 11 (February 2012), p. 5. 19. Ibid. 20. Overhaus, Marco, “NATO and Afghanistan’s neighbors: difficult partners for stabilization and reconstruction”, in Henning Riecke and Kevin Francke (eds), Partners for Stability (Baden Baden: Nomos – DGAP, 2013), p. 221. 21. ANSF consisted of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). 22. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Training Mission Afghanistan”, News, 4 April 2009. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_ 52802.htm.

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23. Ibid. 24. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Training Mission Afghanistan”, News, 4 April 2009. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_ 52802.htm. 25. IPCB membership consists of 14 Nations (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States) and eight organizations (MoI, European Union, EUPOL, ISAF, GPPT, NATO SCR, UNAMA and UNDP/LOTFA). 26. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining Capability Assessment Efforts, SIGAR 14-33 Audit Report, February 2014. 27. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO and Afghanistan”, News. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm. 28. Department of Defence of the United States, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013. 29. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan after 2014”, Media Backgrounder, September 2014. 30. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan after 2014”, Media Backgrounder, September 2014. 31. Ibid. 32. Department of Defence of the United States, Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, November 2013. 33. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO and Afghanistan”, News. 34. USFOR-A Public Affairs, “2014 was a year of transition, drawdown for USFOR-A”, RS News, 6 January 2015. Available at http://www.rs.nato.int/arti cle/rs-news/2014-was-a-year-of-transition-drawdown-for-usfor-a.html. 35. Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, Issued by Heads of State and Government of Allies and their International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troop contributing partners, 4 September 2014. 36. Holtje, Michael and Ronja Kempin, The EU in Afghanistan (Berlin: SWP, December 2013), p. 1. 37. Ibid. 38. Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on Afghanistan, 23 June 2014. 39. United States mission to the OSCE, “Working Session IV: Afghanistan”, OSCE webside, 26 July 2014. Available at http://osce.usmission.gov/jun_26_14_asrc_ session4.html. 40. “NATO Secretary General welcomes signing of security agreements with Afghanistan”, Press Release 138, 30 September 2014. Available at http://www. nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_113393.htm. 41. See “Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership signed at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal”, 20 November 2010; “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the United States of

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44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

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America and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”, Chicago, 1 May 2012; “European Union – Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development” (Berlin, 5 October 2012). Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership signed at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal, 20 November 2010. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68724.htm. Declaration by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on an Enduring Partnership signed at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal, 20 November 2010. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68724. htm. Ibid. Agreement between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on the Status of NATO Forces and NATO personnel conducting mutually agreed NATO-led activities in Afghanistan, 30 September 2014. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_ texts_116072.htm?selectedLocale¼ en. Resolute Support Mission. Available at http://www.rs.nato.int/mission.html. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s commitment to Afghanistan after 2014”, Media Backgrounder, September 2014. European Union, Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (Berlin, 5 October 2012). Ibid. Grare, Frederic, Afghanistan Post-2014: Scenarios and Consequences, FRS-GMF (February 2014), p. 8. Casprini, Federico et al. (eds), “Flexible Frameworks, Beyond Borders”, University of Bologna and IAI, November 2014. See, among others, Alessandro Marrone, “The Equilibrium of 2010 NATO Strategic Concept”, in The International Spectator 46/3 (September 2011), pp. 93 – 111. Brattberg, Erik, Europe, Afghanistan and the Transatlantic Relationship after 2014, SIPRI (May 2013), p. 18.

PART II NATIONAL INTERESTS

CHAPTER 4 LOSING THE “FORGOTTEN WAR”:THE US STRATEGIC VACUUM IN AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA Anthony H. Cordesman

Shifting US Strategic Priorities The US will continue to engage in Central and South Asia. It will encourage Afghanistan to achieve its own security and development, seek to improve its relations with Pakistan and support diplomatic efforts to end the tensions between India and Pakistan. It will encourage security and development throughout Central and South Asia, and encourage cooperative efforts in reducing the threat of terrorism and extremism. At the same time, the US has come a long way from the days when the Afghan war was what then-candidate Obama called the “good war” in an April 2008 campaign speech, and when the Obama administration was willing to surge more troops into Afghanistan. It has come a long way from the days in which it provided major amounts of aid to Afghanistan and Pakistan, had active basing facilities in several Central Asian states, and considered plans to create a “New Silk Road” in Central Asia.1 The US now has other strategic priorities and ones that focus on what have become more important strategic interests and serious threats. The Russian invasion of the Ukraine on 22 February 2014 – and Russian

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military intervention in Syria – has refocused the US on European security and a potential threat from Russia. The political upheavals in the Middle East that began in 2011 have led to military action against the Islamic State (IS), US military intervention in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, and a concentration on terrorist and extremist threats in the Middle East, rather than Afghanistan and Central Asia. Iran’s emergence as a growing regional power has created new US military priorities in the Gulf, as well as a focus on Iran’s missile threat, asymmetric threat to shipping and naval traffic through the Gulf, and potential acquisition of nuclear weapons. North Korea has become a more serious threat in Northeast Asia since Kim Jong-un came to power at the end of December 2011, and US government reports like the annual report on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China” have shown that China has become a rising strategic competitor on a far broader level since 2011 than the US initially expected.2 At the same time, partisan US politics, and legislation like Sequestration and the Budget Control Act, have limited US resources and led to a growing priority for domestic issues and politics. As a result, the US continues to make statements about its continuing interest in Afghanistan, Central Asia and South Asia, and cooperation with regional states. Strategy, however, does not consist of concepts, good intentions or making public statements that will not be implemented in a meaningful form. It also does not consist of setting broad goals for international cooperation that cannot be put into practice. It consists of the policies and actions that are already in place and of practical plans that can be – and are – actually implemented. The “good war” has become the war and the region the US has downplayed to the point where the Department of Defense no longer in includes the war in the “top issues” section of its web page, and would like to be able to forget. To the extent the US now has a real world strategy for Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia and South Asia; it is driven by the real world impact of earlier US decisions to leave Afghanistan, focus on other regions and try to make India a partner in containing China. As Secretary Gates’ memoirs make clear, the Obama administration’s priorities began to shift away from Afghanistan even as the President approved a military surge in Afghanistan. In June 2011, the President assigned a deadline of 2014 for ending the US combat role in Afghanistan

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and – Secretary Gates again makes clear – did so in spite of the objections by several members of his cabinet and senior military advisors.3 By that time, the US has already come to see Pakistan as being as much of a problem as an ally. It was clear that the Pakistani Army was using its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization to covertly support the Taliban and other Afghan insurgents and as providing cover and sanctuary to Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda and to the Quetta Taliban and Haqqani network – problems described in detail in Carlotta Gall’s The Wrong Enemy, a book whose accuracy is broadly endorsed by a number of US officers and experts with actually working experience in Pakistan.4 As for the broader US approach to the other a states in the region, the policy levels reviews the Obama administration held at the end of 2015 called for the US to continue its current diplomatic efforts, provide limited aid and remain active in efforts to cooperate in reducing the threat of international terrorism. The administration will leave office in early 2016, but in the interim, it seems likely to talk about regional cooperation, and encourage outside efforts where these seem promising and serve US interests. There is no way to predict the choices a new President will make, but it now seems unlikely that the US will press hard for new forms of regional cooperation, make major contributions to them, make new military efforts or sustain its past aid levels. The one major exception might be US support of India, but largely a means of encouraging India to respond to the strategic challenge from China.

US Strategy and Budgets Largely Ignore Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Region These changes in US strategy and policy did not come suddenly or without warning. They were reflected in the new Defense Strategic Guidance that it first issued in January 2012.5 This guidance made it clear that US intended to leave Afghanistan and focus on other regions of the world. It called for the US to only fight where its strategic interests were directly involved and only in proportion to the importance of those interests. It explicitly said the US should avoid fighting major wars like the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan in the future, avoid large-scale land force commitments to limited wars of limited strategic value and focus on strategic partnerships where the partner would play a major role.

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Key US Strategy Documents Move Away from Afghanistan, Central Asia and Regional Approaches to South Asia The US has since repeated the key elements of this guidance in every Department of Defense and State Department budget request from FY2013 onwards. This was true of its FY2015 budget submission the US issued in February 2014 and the new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR 2014) the US issued in March 2014. The executive summary to the 2014 QDR only made a token reference to leaving Afghanistan, focused on the Middle East and Asia and discussed virtually every other region than Central and South Asia – regions that it effectively ignored.6 The 2014 QDR did not mention Central or South Asia in its section on regional trends.7 They were only mentioned in passing and as a vague priority in the final passages of the section on Building Global Security towards the end of the document – as much because the authors had to say something as a prelude to a new US strategic focus on India.8 On 27 May 2014, the President made a statement at the White House that he would effectively end any major US role in the war by the time he left office, regardless of the conditions that emerged after the departure of US combat forces at the end of 2014, and then would only provide something approaching the number of post-withdrawal US military advisors, enablers and counterterrorism officers that ISAF and CENTCOM commanders had requested for a single year:9 The bottom line is, it’s time to turn the page on more than a decade in which so much of our foreign policy was focused on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. When I took office, we had nearly 180,000 troops in harm’s way. By the end of this year, we will have less than 10,000. In addition to bringing our troops home, this new chapter in American foreign policy will allow us to redirect some of the resources saved by ending these wars to respond more nimbly to the changing threat of terrorism, while addressing a broader set of priorities around the globe. President Obama repeated this position in in a broader strategy speech he gave at West Point day later on 28 May 2014. He also made it clear that the US would transfer the burden of defending Afghanistan to the Afghans: “at the end of this year, a new Afghan president will be in

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office, and America’s combat mission will be over”.10 He went on to focus on Europe and the Ukraine, the Middle East and Asia, and touch upon Latin America and Africa, but never mentioned Central Asia or South Asia, except for one brief reference to India’s middle class as a growing economic competitor.11

Declining, Uncertain and Inadequate US Force Levels The US acted quickly in implementing these polices. It cut its total military manpower in Afghanistan from a peak of some 100,000 in 2011 to some 60,000 in early 2014. It then removed virtually all of its combat forces from Afghanistan in the course of 2014. The growing threat from the Taliban and other insurgents did, however, lead President to ease his initial plans to cut the total number of US personnel in Afghanistan to 9,800 at the start of 2015. By the spring of 2015, some press reports also indicated that the White House was considering a more conditionsbased approach to the war and might not seek to phase out almost all US advisors by the end of 2016. He agreed to keep some 9,800– 10,800 US military personnel in Afghanistan through much of 2015. However, the President did not then make commitments to avoid cutting them in half after the end of the 2015 or to not reduce them to no more than several hundred personnel in a small Office of Military Cooperation by the end of 2016. Moreover, only about two-thirds of US forces in Afghanistan – 6,839 personnel – were assigned to the training and assisting of Afghan forces. Even if combined with other international forces, the numbers were too small to cover all of the Afghan Corps, offer forward support to Afghan combat units like its Kandak – and much less train and assist the Afghan national police, local police and other security forces. This situation did change to some degree at the end of 2015. The US had originally planned to phase out all of its combat mission in Afghanistan by the end of 2016. It also eliminated much of its forward deployed aid effort during 2014–15, and made major cuts in military and civil aid spending – removing US train and assist advisors from Afghan combat forces and limiting the mission to the point it could no longer cover every Afghan command at the corps level.12 Taliban and other insurgent gains during 2015, did, however, lead the US to indefinitely delay its plans to phase out all of its military deployments in Afghanistan during a series of policy reviews in late

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2015. Yet, even the revised plans still called for the US to cut its planned deployments from an already low 10,012 in FY2015 to a request for a peak of 9,737 military personnel through most of 2016, and then to only 6,217 in FY2017. The US also steadily cut its already limited combat air support of Afghan forces, its ground support of Afghan counterterrorism forces and the military and civil aid efforts in its FY2017 budget request.

The US Defense Department Established Strategic and Funding Priorities Following the money is one of the key axioms in analysing public policy. President Obama’s proposed FY2016 defence budget and FY2016– FY2020 defence programme was sent to Congress in February 2015. It again showed that the US had other priorities, namely the coherent management of the post-Iraq/Afghanistan defence drawdown as well as the rebalancing to the Pacific.13 The literature supporting the FY2016 budget and FY2016– FY2020 programme focused on the importance of strategic partnerships in other areas, and listed major military exercises in Europe, the Pacific, Middle East, Africa and Latin America. Key portions noted that the President’s budget request would support activities including:14 . .

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Continuing the final phases of the drawdown of forces in Afghanistan; Sustaining personnel forward deployed to the Middle East to conduct a range of operations including ongoing operations and to provide training, advice and assistance to partner security forces engaged in the fight against IS; Building the capacity of the Iraqi and Syrian opposition forces to degrade and defeat IS capability in Iraq and Syria in support of the United States comprehensive regional strategy; Carrying out support activities, such as intelligence support to military operations and support to partner nations.

The Department of Defense planned to cut its spending on all overseas military operations from a peak of $162 billion in FY2012 to slightly below $51 billion in FY2016 and then to $27 billion From FY2017 to FY2020 – in spite of a new air campaign and train and assist missions in

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Iraq and Syria. The FY2016 budget proposal limited the US role in Afghanistan in FY2016 to:15 . . . . . .

Operations/Force Protection in Afghanistan ($7.7 billion); In-Theatre Support ($16.4 billion); Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat ($0.5 billion); Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) ($3.8 billion); Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) ($0.010 billion); Support for Coalition Forces ($1.7 billion).

As for the region as a whole, the Department of Defense’s overviews and supporting text on strategy, programmes, combat and strategic partnerships that came with the FY2016 US defence budget submission totalled some 1,000 pages. They made no references to Central Asia or South Asia, and focused on Iraq, Syria, Europe and East Asia. The US continued to downplay Afghanistan and these cuts in military and civil aid efforts in its FY2017 budget request. The summary budget justification limited the discussion of the request for funds for the Afghan war to requesting money for “Maintaining a US presence in Afghanistan consistent with the President’s drawdown plan”. The limits to its budget request for the Afghan conflict disguised the fact that the Department of Defense had created a category called “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS) and Related Missions”. Even this total showed a drop from a peak of $114 billion in FY2011 to $84 billion in FY2014 and $53 billion in FY2015 – with a request for $42.9 billion in FY2016 and $41.7 billion in FY2017. However, it included many administrative and overhead requests for global US power projection in the projected costs for Afghanistan.16 If one looks at the details of the request for Afghan forces, the main category for sustaining and training these forces dropped from already low levels of around $4.1 billion in FY2015, to a request for some $3.6 billion in FY2016 and $3.4 billion in FY2017 – levels that made little allowance for combat losses and attrition and are not sufficient to develop an effective Afghan air force.17

The State Department’s Similar Focus The US State Department budget requests reflected similar priorities. The US State Department did request an increase in total spending on

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South Asian and Central Asian affairs from $56.2 million in FY2015 to $104.7 million in FY2016, but this was largely because there no longer was a carryover of funds from the war years. The 182-page State Department ‘Budget Congressional Budget Justification’ for FY2016 focused on the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, China and the Pacific, Southeast Asia and other regions of the world.18 In key areas like foreign military financing, the total money for Central and South Asia in FY$2016 was all of $10.6 million out of $5.807 billion (.002 percentage of the total).19 Some $1.086 million of the $1.421 million in the State Department Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account for FY2016 was tied to phasing out US military support for the Afghan conflict and “solidifying the progress made over the last decade”. An amount of $334 million in aid to Pakistan continued largely because of Pakistan’s value as a transportation corridor and overflight route, and to help try to push Pakistan towards greater cooperation with Afghanistan in security: “The requested level of FY 2016 resources for Pakistan is critical for achieving US goals of countering terrorism and violent extremism, increasing stability in both Pakistan and the region, and making clear that the United States is not abandoning the region following the transition in Afghanistan.”20 The closest the State Department came to providing and supporting any broader strategy for Central and South Asia was to propose a limited allocation of Economic Support Fund and counternarcotic aid for some countries – most of which was the legacy of past and far larger Afghan war-related programme activity and rhetoric about goals that vastly exceeded the funds provided and real world US priorities.21 The request did make almost ritual reference to past strategic goals like the New Silk Road, but the dollars actually allocated – a total slightly above $400 million for the South and Central Asia region – showed that the words were anything by serious. The FY2017 State Department budget request continued low level aid programmes in the region, but paid even less attention to the Afghan conflict, Pakistan and Central Asia. Secretary of State John Kerry’s overview of the FY2017 budget request only contained two paragraphs dealing with the war and the region:22 In Afghanistan and Pakistan, our proposal calls for $3.4 billion to sustain our commitment to both countries. Our proposal requests

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$2.5 billion for programmes that reinforce Afghanistan’s security and development by maintaining the gains of the last decade, supporting military training and assistance, tackling corruption, countering the influence of extremists and terrorists, strengthening civil society, and supporting health, education, economic growth, and good governance. The budget also includes $859.8 million towards sustaining cooperative relationships with Pakistan and making progress to disrupt, dismantle and defeat violent extremist groups. The requested funding will support the country’s counterinsurgency missions, and bolster stability, energy access, economic growth, and social reform. The Obama administration also still concluded at the end of 2015 that the US lacked strategic priorities to sustain an active air or land combat role in Afghanistan beyond a planned exit at the end of 2016, to plan for major aid beyond 2018–20 and play any other major new role in other parts of the region. The end result is an uncertain transition to a new US administration in 2017 that runs a serious risk of leaving an unstable Afghanistan that is already partially under Taliban and other insurgent control. More broadly, the US will steadily limit its aid to Pakistan, and has long ceased to seriously compete with China, Russia or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in providing major aid efforts or conducting military exercises in Central Asia. In contrast, the US has begun to concentrate on India as a potential strategic counterbalance to China since the election of Narendra Modi as Prime Minister of India in May 2014 – key themes in Modi’s visit to the US in 2014 and Obama’s visit to India in 2015.

No Clearer Lead from NATO The US has not, however, been alone in focusing more on a departure from Afghanistan than on actual success in Afghanistan. NATO and the other allied countries operating in Afghanistan also faced changing strategic priorities. NATO’s Afghan policy continued to focus on capacity building, as explained in Chapter 3, but by 2013–14 it did not have anything approaching a broader strategy for regional cooperation.

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At the time the NATO Ministerial Summit meeting took place in early September 2014, Russian action in the Ukraine and the rising war against IS already had priority. A total of 31 paragraphs of the Ministerial statement dealt with Russia and the Ukraine. The discussion of Afghanistan was some four paragraphs long and was all political rhetoric.23 NATO focused on the estimated annual cost of providing aid to an undefined level of Afghan forces – which had risen from $4.1 billion to $5.1 billion. It did issue what it called the Wales Declaration, but this document had no real details or plans for Afghanistan beyond those NATO had repeated since 2012 – including a longer term but ill-defined NATO-Afghanistan Enduring Partnership – and did little more than highlight growing funding challenges and problems in Afghanistan’s ability to carry out a transition after 2014.24 Other NATO countries will still provide some 5,000 additional military personnel through 2016, but they have no combat mission, are generally training only from the rear and can only have a limited impact.

The Lack of an Effective Afghan Partner Both the US and NATO did, however, have to react to the fact that Afghanistan was anything but an effective security partner. More than a decade of massive military and civil aid had only had a limited impact in creating truly effective Afghan combat forces by the end of 2014, and Afghanistan did not even have a functioning government at the time that the transition occurred. The US and NATO had already had to deal with Karzai’s constant complaints about the US and NATO, and his unwillingness to sign a Bilateral Security Agreement with the US and create a basis for a lasting US and NATO presence in Afghanistan. His actions had done much to limit the transition effort during 2012 – 14, as well as alienate outside support. These problems, however, proved to be a prelude to an Afghan presidential election in June 2014 whose results were so disputed by the two key candidates – Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah – only managed to agree to an election outcome with the help of US Secretary of State, John Kerry – as examined in Chapter 2. Worryingly, Afghanistan’s broader structure of leadership for ongoing governance remains in serious question.

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A Compromise that Did Not Produce Effective Governance Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani’s tentative agreement to share power on 21 September 2014 scarcely resolved all the key issues in creating an effective overall structure of government at the ministerial, provincial or district level. The level of fraud in the election left a bitter legacy. At the time of the agreement, Ahmad Yousuf Nuristani, the chairman of the UN Independent Election Commission, said that there were “grave flaws” in the election, and the Commission’s audit could not detect all of it. All he could say was the Commission still had a duty to state that, “The Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan declares Dr Ashraf Ghani Ahmad as the president of Afghanistan”.25 Nuristani’s statement also avoided reporting on the actual results of the UN audit, although reports emerged on the Internet that the UN audit had found that Ghani had legitimately won 55.2 per cent of the vote – remarkably close to the 56.4 per cent the Election Commission had originally counted, and Abdullah Abdullah had won 44.8 per cent versus an original 43.6 per cent.26 In June 2015, a year after the second round in the election, it was still unclear when – or if – the Afghans could fully form a new government that could effectively extend down to the local level, what it would be like if it did and whether any level of the government could make good on past promises of reform, effective governance and effective security forces. There also still was no full Afghan government structure to support the transition. Symbolically, Afghanistan still did not have a defense minister by mid-2015, as Parliament in July failed to confirm President Ghani’s third nominee for the post. These problems were compounded by serious structural issues in Afghan governance. There were no clear plans to deal with an ongoing level of corruption that reached from the District and Provincial governor levels to the level of the current Attorney General. Transparency International had ranked Afghanistan as the 166th most corrupt government out of 168 countries in 2015, and CIA experts privately estimated that more than a third of its population was still living in poverty and unemployed.27 In spite of all of the hype and public relations spin that NGOs and governments had issued between 2002 and 2016 about the efforts to improve Afghan governance after the fall of the Taliban, many experts

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working on aid to, or within, the Afghan government broadly agreed with the far more critical estimates issues by the World Bank and shown in Figure 4.1.

Economic as Well as Political and Military Programmes: Abandoning the Tokyo Accord Reforms with No Clear Effective Replacement Afghanistan also faced demographic and economic challenges whose impact could not be predicted, and where much would depend on whether the country could acquire effective governance and aid, and could finally make the economic reforms that experts had long called for. Discussions with the World Bank and IMF experts made it clear, however, that Afghanistan faced major challenges in dealing with the coming cuts in aid and military spending. President Ghani did announce a broad economic reform plan at the London conference in December 2014, and made a serious effort to begin implementing such plans during 2015.28 However, no effective body had emerged within the Afghan government by the end of 2015 that showed that Afghanistan could manage and coordinate much of its budget and foreign aid or make good on the promises of economic reform made years earlier at the Tokyo conference in July 2012.29 The World Bank and IMF economic forecasts indicated there was no near-term change of major economic gains from activities like mining or in other sectors of the economy. Outside experts raised serious questions about the effectiveness of past aid programmes and the ability of the Afghan government to manage development and aid activity at a time most outside aid teams were no longer in the field. Other economic pressures on Afghanistan were already critical. No source could make truly reliable estimates of Afghan trends, and data and estimates by key sources like the UN, IMF, World Bank and CIA differed in detail. The CIA was almost certainly correct, however, in estimating that Afghanistan had one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world – 202 out of 230 countries by their ranking in early 2016.30 The CIA also estimated that outside money had made the services some 55 per cent of its GDP in 2014 – still driven largely by massive outside military and aid spending that was drastically cut in the course of 2014–15 – but that some 79 per cent of its labour force still work in

Figure 4.1 World Bank Rating of the Quality of Afghan Governance, 1996– 2014 (zero is the worst possible ranking). The inner, thicker line shows the selected country’s percentile rank on each of the six aggregate governance indicators. The outer, thinner lines show the indicate margins of error. (Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2010), The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues. Note: The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. The WGI do not reflect the official views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. The WGI are not used by the World Bank Group to allocate resources.) Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, “Afghanistan” http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports.

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agriculture.31 Even so, Afghanistan was massively dependent on outside UN food aid, and was one of the world’s few sub-subsistence economies.32 USAID estimated in June 2014 that Afghanistan remains “one of the poorest countries in the world” and that “key drivers of food insecurity include high levels of poverty, displacement, unemployment and underemployment, dependence on subsistence agriculture and price fluctuations in key food commodities.”33 The UN World Food Programme estimated in October 2014 that relative minor cuts in funding meant that, “roughly 1 million in people Afghanistan have had their food rations cut from 2,100 calories a day to 1,500”.34 Afghanistan’s only major export was narcotics – which remained a major growth industry in spite of various efforts to eradicate and control it. The April 2015 quarterly report to Congress by the US Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) warned that counternarcotic efforts had broadly collapsed throughout the country.35 Moreover, the US Special Inspector General warned that Afghanistan already faced a major post-transition budget crisis and shortfall in development funds: “The fiscal gap is large and growing. Donor assistance narrows this gap, but does not close it.”36 The SIGAR quarterly reports issued through early 2016 made it clear than nothing had changed. These problems were compounded by gross inequities in income and wealth resulting from corruption and the failure to control the allocation of aid and military spending. They were compounded by demographic pressures that had seen the Afghan population rise from under 120 million in 1960 to 22.5 million in 2000 and 32.6 million in 2015 by US Census Bureau estimates, with a projected rise to 65.8 million in 2050.37 Afghanistan had one of the worst “youth bulges” in the world, with over 64 per cent of its population aged 24 years or younger and more than 392,000 males and 370,000 women reaching job age annually.38

Limited US and NATO-Led Presence and Steadily Rising Violence and Afghan Casualties The Bilateral Security Agreement with the US went into force on 1 January 2015 and was to remains in force “until the end of 2024 and beyond” unless terminated by either side with two years’ notice. However, many details were left unclear regarding issues like basing

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rights, the right to use given levels and kinds of force and the right to conduct combat operations. It also did not establish how many US, NATO and other outside forces troops could be in Afghanistan or set any clear plans for the future.39 It was equally clear that there would be no major successor to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) training and assist mission that had existed until the end of 2014. By 26 February 2015, the ISAF mission – which had now been renamed the Resolute Support Mission – reported that it only had had only 13,195 personnel, and they came from some 40 countries, providing a disparate mess of small groups, some as little as four people and with 25 countries providing less than 100.40 Its mission was also sharply limited, and defined purely in terms of building Afghan capacity and supporting “Transition”.41 Key US commanders initially recommended that the US leave some 16,000 troops after 2014, and stay at conditions-based levels until Afghanistan was secure. This troop level was later dropped to some 9,500–9,800 as a result of political pressure from the White House, but was still supposed to be conditions based and assumed that significant additional manning from German and Italian cadres would be in place and add to the US total. As for the Resolute Support Mission, it had a total of 12,905 personnel at the end of 2015. A total of some 40 countries were listed, but 27 had less than 100 personnel and 19 countries had less than 50. Only 6,800 were American. Other major contributors included Georgia (870), Germany (850), Italy (829), Romania (650), Turkey (508), UK (470), Czech Republic (232), Australia (229) and Poland (200). This diversity did not mean there were not highly competent people in the smaller groups, but it imposed a variety of languages, different approaches, rotation cycles and other issues that sharply cut the overall effectiveness of the force.42 As noted earlier, the end result was that there were not enough US and other NATO-led train and assist advisors even to cover every Afghan Corps in 2015, and only token numbers to go out into the field to help the Afghan military in combat, the national police and the Afghan local police and other security forces. It was also to create a situation where bringing in more small teams of advisors from other countries – or sending small contingents to train in other

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Iraq

Afghanistan

Figure 4.2 The Surge in Iraq vs. the Surge in Afghanistan. Source: MNSTC-I and Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, p. A-2.

countries – would create major problems because of differences in tactics, doctrine, force management and interoperability even if other countries prove willing to provide such help. Moreover, by mid-2015, Afghanistan had so far proved to have only limited capability to help itself, and this in a deteriorating security

Figure 4.3 Civilian Deaths by Anti-Government Elements in Afghanistan, 2009–15. (E.g. the Taliban, Haqqani Network and other insurgents).

Figure 4.4 Civilian Deaths and Injuries by Region, Afghanistan, 2009–15. Source: Afghanistan Annual Report 2015: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 14 February 2016, available at http://reliefweb.int/ report/afghanistan/afghanistan-annual-report-2015-protection-civiliansarmed-conflict-february-2016.

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situation. US Department of Defense reporting showed that the “surge” of US troops in Afghanistan had little impact on Afghan security compared to the surge in Iraq. UN data showed that casualties continued to rise and violence spread steadily more widely during 2010 – 14 (Figure 4.2). Both senior US officers and Afghan officials warned in April and May 2015 that Afghan military and police casualties have become unacceptable, that the Taliban and other insurgent presence had become a major problem in more than 10 provinces and growing problems existed in urban security and movement along critical roads.43 One does need to be careful about assuming that the Afghan government cannot survive in the face of all these problems. It faces relatively weak and divided enemies with problems of their own. At the same time, there do not seem to be credible plans to shape, support, train and assist and fund the Afghan security forces at the level required. There also does not seem to be credible plans to deal with the budgetary and economic crisis that has developed because of cuts in outside aid and military spending and capital flight. It is easy to call for international cooperation in dealing with such problems, but again, more outside small efforts or groups of different countries advising and supporting in the rear, are a very uncertain recipe for effective aid. Moreover, little about the massive aid effort in Afghanistan has indicated that its problems can be solved from the outside if it lacks a government capable of solving its problems from within. John Sopko, the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) provided in a speech on 12 September 2014 a grim warning of the combined scale of the civil–military problems in Afghanistan forces and the limits to what any credible level of additional outside aid can do:44 To date, the United States government alone has provided over $104 billion for Afghanistan reconstruction [. . .] Let’s put that figure in some context [. . .] Let’s just state this simple fact that’s more money than we’ve spent on reconstruction for any one country in our nation’s entire history. [. . .] Unfortunately, Afghanistan is a case study in projects and programs set up without considering sustainability [. . .] The sheer size of the US government’s reconstruction effort has placed both

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a financial and operational burden on the Afghan economy and its government that it simply cannot manage by itself [. . .] The bottom line: It appears we’ve created a government that the Afghans simply cannot afford. Corruption is another enormous inter-agency challenge facing reconstruction in Afghanistan. The consensus among everyone I speak with is that if corruption is allowed to continue unabated it will likely jeopardize every gain we’ve made so far in Afghanistan. The quarterly reports of SIGAR, and the semi-annual Department of Defense reports on the Afghan war to congress, that followed through the course of 2015, made it all too clear that nothing had changed. Afghanistan suffered from a failed election and unstable internal politics, an incompetent and corrupt government and from a government that could not honestly and effectively administrate aid and carry out economic reform. The nation suffered from an uncertain mix of rapidly formed security forces that were nearly half police and had many corrupt and incompetent elements, more districts came under Taliban and insurgent influence and control, and casualties reached record levels. In spite of some peace efforts, Afghanistan also continued to suffer from Pakistan’s potential willingness to offer the Taliban and other extremist forces de facto sanctuary in Pakistan.

No US Pillar for International Cooperation It seems doubtful that the US will provide any pillars of support for any major new effort at international cooperation. Tensions with Russia and China limit the US role in seeking such cooperation in Afghanistan and all of Central Asia. More broadly, it is doubtful that the Obama administration or its successor can build anything the US domestic political support needed to sustain a serious military and civil aid effort, particularly one that might have to last well beyond 2018 – 20 and be large enough to be an effective response to the real world conditions on the ground. The administration, Congress and the American people would probably like to “win” in Afghanistan in the sense of some form of relatively stable Afghanistan free of Taliban and extremist control emerging

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after 2014. But, nothing about the results of either American political campaigns or public opinion polls indicate they are now willing to spend enough to achieve this. It is also unclear how many options the next US president will have left. Reality can always intervene, but President Obama will remain in office until early 2017. By that time, the US is scheduled to have cut its forces from Afghanistan to minimal levels, closed most of its remaining bases, disposed of its already limited stocks and equipment, and closed most of its major transit facilities in Pakistan and Central Asia. It is also far from clear that any new US president will want to make a major ongoing commitment to Afghanistan and the region – or deal with any major new crisis over transitions, given other US strategic priorities. These include a steady shift in the terrorist threat to the US, Europe and key US allies to the Middle East and Africa, the security challenge Iran still poses in every area of potential conflict from asymmetric warfare to a nuclear threat, the rising challenge posed by China and the impact of the Ukraine crisis on US priorities in Europe.

Uncertain Changes in US –Pakistani Relations The rationale is no clearer for other forms of international cooperation and changes in the main thrust of US strategy in Central and South Asia. Once again, broader international cooperation means dealing with Russia, China, Iran, the authoritarian regimes in most Central Asia countries, somehow resolving the tensions between India and Pakistan – and resolving with the tensions between the US and Pakistan. Ever since 2001, the US and Pakistan have been divided by the fact that they have had strategicly different objectives in Afghanistan and the region and by Pakistan’s tolerance of Taliban, Haqqani and Al-Qaeda sanctuaries in Pakistan. While some public opinion polls have shown that many Pakistanis see the US as more of a threat than India, the private US official view of Pakistan is often equally negative.

Possible Changes in US– Pakistani Relations Many US officials and senior military officers who have worked with Pakistan see it as a deeply divided and unstable country that has only supported the US in Afghanistan to the extent it has been pressured or

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bribed to do so and pursed its own interests at the expense of the Afghan war and regional stability. They see it as a state with weak governance and development whose military has long presented a constant threat of taking power. While Pakistan has finally made a peaceful transition in a democratic election, that election has scarcely united the country. Some aspects of this situation may be changing. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was peacefully elected to office on 11 May 2013 and proved able to survive the immediate political threat posed by Imran Khan and Tahir ul-Qadri. He has since consolidated power and attempted to move the country forward. In November 2013, Pakistan acquired a new Chief of Staff – General Raheel Sharif – who immediately took the extremist threat to Pakistan more seriously than his predecessor. The Pakistani Army began to conduct more intensive counterinsurgency campaigns in the areas where the Pakistani Taliban operated in western Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistani and Afghan relations seemed to improve after the election of President Ghani and his discussions with Sharif. These shifts in Pakistan’s national security position were reinforced by the threat posed by the Pakistani Taliban or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Prime Minister Sharif and General Raheel Sharif have stepped up Pakistani counterinsurgency and counterterrorism activity, and done so while requesting some support from US in areas like intelligence and UCAV strikes. They also made further attempts to cooperate with the Afghan government. They talked about securing the Durand Line zone without focusing on past border disputes and signalled to India that Pakistan would put more emphasis on internal security and less emphasis on India.

Uncertain Afghan– Pakistani Relations At the same time, the Pakistani military campaign in the FATA area has had uncertain execution and success. Pakistan military operations have often ended in simply displacing Taliban and Afghan insurgent elements rather than really defeating them and turned many civilians in the areas involved into IDPs. Many US experts feel the Pakistani military has been far too slow to shift away from a conventional war strategy focused on India and has focused many of its resources on a nuclear and missile arms race at a time it badly needs United States’ assistance in reorienting its army for counterinsurgency efforts.45 Pakistan’s handling of the border remains another area of serious concern. Afghan intelligence officers feel Pakistan’s ISI and army have

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sent in advisors and commandos to train and aid the Taliban and Haqqani fighters in the past.46 It is clear from a wide range of media sources that the campaign Pakistan started in the Waziristan area in June 2014 and continued through June 2015, pushed both Pakistani and foreign fighters across the border. Pakistani officers knew all too well that Afghan forces could not secure the border area. Pakistani forces did not then try to secure the border and they fired extensively into Afghanistan to push fighters out of Pakistan. They still failed to limit the operations of Al-Qaeda central in Pakistan, check the operations of the Haqqani network and check those of Mohammed Omar, head of the Afghan Taliban.47 Nevertheless, President Ashraf Ghani has taken a more positive approach to Pakistan and dealing with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif than Karzai. He visited Islamabad in mid-November 2014, after Pakistan’s acting foreign minister, army chief and the head of the ISI had visited Kabul to deliver “messages of support and cooperation”.48 Both Afghanistan and Pakistan then began to publicly emphasize options for cooperation rather than the tensions between them, although Ghani still made it clear at a 26 November 2014 meeting of South Asian leaders in Kathmandu that “We will not permit anybody (India and Pakistan) to conduct proxy wars on our soil.”49 Ghani also began low-level peace talks with Taliban leaders with Pakistani support in the spring of 2015.50 President Ghani made major new efforts to work with Pakistan during the first half of 2015, but had little success in moving towards peace talks and Pakistan’s military efforts in western Pakistan remained problematic. Many Afghan officials and officers felt the Pakistani campaign in the FATA area pushed insurgents back into Afghanistan, making things worse in Afghanistan’s troubled east. They also saw Pakistan as complaining unfairly that Afghanistan could not control the border region and were still trying to treat Afghanistan as Pakistan’s “strategic depth”, and exclude Indian influence. In fairness, Afghans sometimes created as many barriers to good relations as Pakistanis. President Karzai raised Afghan charges against Pakistan to new extremes as he left office in September 2014. He accused both Pakistan and the US as being the cause of the fighting in Afghanistan. He also had his National Security Council publicly say that Pakistan was deliberating pushing fighters out of

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the FATA and to attack Afghan government targets in a de facto “declaration of war”.51 Ironically, Karzai’s statement came only days after the new Pakistani military chief, Gen. Raheel Sharif, made Lt. Gen. Rizwan Akhtar, the new head of the Inter-Services Intelligence agency. Akhtar had a reputation as a strong opponent of Islamist extremist forces and had led the paramilitary Sindh Rangers. He replaced Lt. Gen. Zaheer ul-Islam, who had headed the ISI since 2012 and had been the source of many US and Afghan complaints.52 It is still not clear how much Pakistani and Afghan relations will really improve or lead to real military cooperation in their border area – in spite of the fact some Afghan military now train in Pakistan. Much will depend on how serious Pakistan is in making improvements in Pakistani and Afghan relations that ignores past disputes of the border and the Durand Line and focusing on real security needs for both countries. It is also still not clear if the Pakistani government will deny Al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban or other insurgent groups like the Haqqani network de facto sanctuary in Pakistan. As of June 2015, the Pakistani government had not taken any steps to suppress the Quetta Taliban – the centre of the Taliban’s operations and the headquarters of its leadership.

Buying Lines of Communication and Overflight Rights versus Actual Alliance Much will also depend on the size and nature of future US aid, and the US motives behind granting such aid. Until recently, many American officials and officers had come to see US aid to Pakistan as a necessary bribe to keep overflight and land transit rights – a bribe that had totalled some $26 billion in appropriations by the time most US and NATO forces left Afghanistan at the end of 2014. The low US aid levels for Pakistan in FY2016 and FY2017 described earlier are partly the result of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, but they are also a reflection of the fact that many policymakers and intelligence experts in the US national security community and military still see Pakistan as a country whose military has refused to take advantage of US efforts to help it in counterinsurgency warfare, and whose military is still committed to aiding Islamist extremist elements that threaten Afghanistan while increasingly fighting a domestic Islamist threat it has done much to generate. Attitudes reflected all too accurately in an article

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by Jeffrey Goldberg and Marc Ambinder called the “Ally From Hell” in the December 2011 issue of the Atlantic.53 It is also important to remember how serious the tensions between Pakistan and the US were in the past. They reached a low point in 2011, when Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs, publicly described the Haqqani network as “a veritable arm” of the ISI.54 Many US officials, officers and experts felt that Pakistan made a serious effort to find Bin Laden, deal with the Al-Qaeda presence on its soil, limit the flow of arms and volunteers into Afghanistan, capture or expel the Quetta Taliban or conduct counterinsurgency campaigns that were not limited to threats against Pakistan. No currently serving US senior official or official has publicly gone as far as openly making such charges as Carlotta Gall did in The Wrong Enemy.55 However, several have privately made it clear that they did not regard Pakistan as a meaningful ally and see its conduct as having sustained the threat in Afghanistan. It is also interesting to note that Chinese experts now see the IS as a major problem in allowing the training of Islamic extremist from China to take place in Pakistan.56 The election of Sharif as prime minister has made some improvements in US–Pakistani relations, as has the new Pakistani military campaign in the FATA area. The fact remains, however, that Pakistani and US relations are still at a point where there is no real strategic partnership. US officials and counterterrorism experts tend to see Pakistan as a past sponsor of terrorist groups that have come back to haunt it. These trends are clearly reflected in the database annex to the US State Department report on terrorism that was issued in the spring of 2014. The global terrorism database shows a steady and massive rise in the overall number of terrorist incidents in Pakistan from 2004 onwards that rises from under 50 in 2005 to some 2,300 in 2013 and 1,800 in 2014. The rise in casualties is even sharper, and text of the report also shows Pakistan has some of the highest levels of terrorism and internal violence of any country in the world.57 There is little – if any – private US tolerance at the official and military levels of Pakistani argument that the US has somehow failed to support a Pakistan that has made sacrifices for the US ever since the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The US sees Pakistan as serving its own interests in ways that have ended in supporting Islamic extremism and have made the war in Afghanistan far worse. A report by the US Congressional Research Service that was issued in 2013 still reflects the private views of many US officials in

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noting that Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts have been feckless and hampered by internal squabbling.58 As a result, some see US aid to Pakistan as a necessary bribe to keep overflight and land transit rights. They also feel that far too much of this aid has actually been used to build up Pakistani conventional warfare capabilities against India at a time when the steady increase in the nuclear armed missile forces on both sides, and rise in the number of Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons are sharply increasing the risks and costs of any future war.59 The aforementioned Congressional Report lists aid and EDA-related arms transfers, plus Pakistani arms purchases, whose value in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism is questionable at best, including marine patrol aircraft, anti-armour missiles, surveillance radars, transport aircraft, an ex-Perry class missile frigate, combat aircraft and trainer jets, air-to-air and anti-ship missiles and naval guns.60 The US also recognizes that portions of its aid has been wasted or effectively stolen by a government and military that rival Afghanistan in terms of corruption and a failure to meet the needs of its people. Once again, World Bank, IMF and UN reporting raise deep concerns about the degree to which Pakistan is becoming a failed state. Transparency International ranks Pakistan as the 126th most corrupt country in the world in 2014, and the World Bank ranked Pakistan as marginally higher than Afghanistan in its overall quality of governance.61 In spite of some reporting to the contrary, there also is little belief among senior US military planners that US ties to Pakistan affect the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or that bases and forces in Afghanistan can play any role in the unlikely event that Islamist extremists somehow acquire control of some weapons.62 There is equally little belief that any form of US civil or military aid – or aid from any other power – will materially affect Pakistan’s tensions with India, ties to China or ongoing dance on the edge of becoming a failed state.

Declining Support for US Aid US tolerance and interest in Pakistan has become steadily more tenuous beyond the limited number of diplomats and military that actively deal with Pakistanis. There is still serious uncertainty as to whether Pakistan is a real partner in counterterrorism, that the US can really change Pakistani behaviour in Afghanistan or dealing with terrorism or that Pakistan will be a meaningful strategic partner in the future. Actions

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like Pakistan’s offensive against its own Islamist extremists are not seen as any substitute for ISI and other efforts that have been a constant source of problems since 2002. A sharp decline in US aid is already taking place from a peak of $4.6 billion in FY2010 to $1.26 billion in FY2014 and some $860 million in FY2017.63 Barring radical shifts in Pakistan’s conduct, the US will not see it as a real strategic partner and Pakistan’s failures to develop alongside tensions with India will be seen as unfortunate but fully acceptable risks. Put bluntly, the US is as fed up with Pakistan as Pakistan is with the US, and the US will have ceased to have major strategic interests in the country. This does not mean the US will totally write off Pakistan, cancel all aid, give up on diplomatic efforts to bring an end to the India–Pakistan conflict or cease cooperation of some kinds in counterterrorism and military aid. Pakistan will play a critical role in shaping the success of Transition in Afghanistan given the critical role that Pakistan plays as a trade route, giving the United States and NATO air-sea-land access to Pakistan and in providing a sanctuary to the Taliban and other Afghan rebels. It is hard to see how this situation will change once the US phases out its presence in Afghanistan unless Pakistan directly takes on the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network and the elements of Al-Qaeda that still remain in Afghanistan, and establishes good relations with the new President and government of Afghanistan. Any major flow of US aid would also require Pakistan to serious deal with its overall extremist and terrorist threats, and see its government actually make good on decades of promises regarding reform. The Sharif government may make a start in such efforts, but unless it does, the US has no particular reason to help a Pakistan that will not help itself.

A Different US Strategic Focus on India To the extent the US now has a strategy for dealing with South Asia, it seems to focus largely on strategic ties to India rather than Pakistan. These efforts need to be kept in perspective. The US has no strategic interest in tilting towards India at the expense of Pakistan, and will not give up on diplomatic efforts to bring an end to the India–Pakistan conflict. It is important to note, however, that such efforts to end the conflict will materialize only if the US sees a real opportunity in which to act.

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The US is also unlikely to become actively involved in any continuing Indian and Pakistani struggle for influence in Afghanistan if this accelerates after 2014. The US expects Afghanistan’s neighbours to take a more active role. It will support efforts at broader “regional solutions” and development in South Asia in the abstract, but do little above the level of working diplomacy unless the probability of making major real world progress becomes far greater than seems likely today. The US will treat “bright ideas” that do not have such support as conference building measures and respond with diplomatic rhetoric and spin coupled to practical indifference.

India as a Counterweight to China The US does, however, have higher priorities in South Asia than India– Pakistan relations and India and Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan. The US has an interest in India shaped by the fact that India may emerge as a major counterweight to China, and will be a growing air and sea power in the Indian Ocean. It is unclear that US policymakers hope for a close strategic relationship in terms of some formal alliance, but it is clear that they feel India will pursue its own strategic interests in ways the US can directly and indirectly support that will make it at least a tacit strategic partner in dealing with China. At the same time, there is a serious debate in the US about the extent to which the US can and should try to form a direct and meaningful strategic partnership with India. A report by the US Congressional Research Service noted that:64 although considerable enthusiasm for deepened security engagement is found in both capitals – and not least in the US Congress – there is also a persistent sense that this aspect of the bilateral relationship lacks purpose and focus. Some observers argue that the potential of the relationship has been oversold, and that the benefits either hoped for or expected may not materialize in the near future. While Obama administration officials variously contend that India is now or will be a net provider of security in its region, many independent analysts are skeptical that this aspiration can be realized, at least in the near-term. Accordingly, much depended on how Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Obama approached these issues, and the recent trends have

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been positive. Prime Minister Modi made it clear that he wanted stronger strategic relations with the US during his May 2014 campaign, during his September/October 2014 visit to Washington and talks with President Obama and during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Washington in late January 2015.65 The same has been true of President Obama. In spite of the near silence about India in the 2014 QDR and in Obama’s West Point speech strategy, he took a visible and positive stance on strategic cooperation with India during both Modi’s visit and his visit to Modi in India. President Obama made it clear that he saw India as a critical power in Asia and the Indian Ocean Region in ways that go far beyond its limited strategic interest in Afghanistan, Central Asia and South Asia per se.66

A Good Strategic Ally Does Not Necessarily Make a Good Military Partner The US might well respond to Indian initiatives to create a stronger strategic partnership, but will may also be content to support India without trying to implement a formal relationship. Such support will also build on a different security base. Unlike NATO, US ties the Middle East, Japan and South Korea, as well as Pakistan. Indian forces and arms imports do not yet reflect major ties to the US. This is true in spite of considerable past US efforts to sell arms to India and strengthen US and Indian military ties. US estimates using declassified intelligence data indicate that India was the second largest developing world arms purchaser from 2007 to 2014. India made arms transfer agreements totalling $38.1 billion during these years (in current dollars). These increases reflected the major new military modernization efforts by India that had been underway since the 1990s.67 This US analysis also noted that “India, while the principal Russian arms customer, during recent years has sought to diversify its weapons supplier base, purchasing the Phalcon early warning defence system aircraft in 2004 from Israel and numerous items from France in 2005, in particular six Scorpene diesel attack submarines. In 2008 India purchased six C130J cargo aircraft from the United States. In 2010, the United Kingdom sold India 57 Hawk jet trainers for $1 billion. In 2010 Italy also sold India 12 AW101 helicopters. In 2011, France secured a $2.4 billion contract with India to upgrade 51 of its Mirage-2000

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combat fighters and the United States agreed to sell India 10 C-17 Globemaster III aircraft for $4.1 billion. This pattern of Indian arms purchases indicates that Russia will likely face strong new competition from other major weapons suppliers for the India arms market, and it can no longer be assured that India will consistently purchase its major combat systems. Indeed, India in 2011 had eliminated Russia from the international competition to supply a new-generation combat fighter aircraft, a competition won by France.”68 A 2014 estimate by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) indicated that India was spending some $11 billion a year on arms and had some $39 billion in outstanding arms orders. It also estimated that Russia had provided 79 per cent of India’s arms imports during 2008– 12, Britain had provided 6 per cent, Uzbekistan had provided 6 per cent, Israel 4 per cent and the US only 2 per cent – although SIPRI also felt that India wanted to reduce its future dependence on imports from Russia.69 India’s major arms import agreements still had little US content as of 2013, and work by SIPRI, IHS Jane’s and the 2014 edition of the IISS Military Balance all indicate that this remains the case.70 At the same time, India has impressive military forces by regional standards and a growing role in the Indian Ocean and along its borders with China in spite of the fact that little of its equipment comes from the US.71 The US does need to be careful about arms transfers to India for the same reason it needs to be careful about arms transfers to Pakistan. It does not want to be seen as either taking sides or exacerbating the arms race between the two states or become caught in the middle politically and strategically between two powers whose political efforts at accommodation are offset by a steady rise in their nuclear forces. Moreover, India’s long history of seeking outside aid in creating what is probably the least competent and most wasteful defence industry per dollar in the world, and in playing off one arms supplier against another, is not a game the US has great incentive to play. The US needs to be careful about arms deals with India and to avoid deals that do more to profit India’s defence industry than India’s security.72 More broadly, it is one thing for the US to encourage India’s rise as a counterweight to China in a multipolar world, and another to create links that China may see as a conspiracy to contain it and reason for

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confrontation with the US, and India may see as some form of US commitment to supporting it in boundary claims and other Indian disputes with China.

The Need to Focus on Other Aspects of US Relations with India That said, there is a strong case to be made for close diplomatic US relations with India, close cooperation in counterterrorism in fighting extremism, US efforts to help India emerge as a modern economic power and maintaining what has become a regular US and Indian Strategic Dialogue. President Obama called for such a focus for US relations with India in his speech to a Joint Session of Indian Parliament during his 2010 visit.73 The US also has good reason to respond to the kind of initiatives that Modi discussed in broad terms in his speech to the UN and visit to the US in September 2014 and in a statement he issued on the US and Indian strategic partnership. In particular, Modi’s speech at the UN emphasized the need to overcome past divisions and achieve prosperity through cooperation.74 Both India and the US set the right tone in dealing with security issues in the statement the White House issued after the two leaders met on 30 September 2014, connecting the two countries’ defence cooperation to issues of regional and international security, including maritime security, counterterrorism and criminal law enforcement.75 Strategic partnerships do not have to have an overt military focus and sometimes work better if they define security in much broader terms and focus on other areas.

US Strategic Minimalism in Central Asia? As for US strategic and economic interests in Central Asia, the near vacuum in current US strategic statements seems to reflect the fact that – in spite of all the usual US diplomatic activity and rhetoric – the US increasingly sees Central Asia as of marginal interest to the US.

Declining US Strategic Interests and Aid The war in Afghanistan no longer requires the US to seek basing and transit rights through Central Asia, and the days in which the Central Asian “front-line” states provided easy over-flight support and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan hosted coalition forces, provided

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airbase facilities and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan supported military action in Iraq are long over. Uzbekistan ended US basing rights to support operations in Afghanistan in 2005 after United States criticized the government for killing civilians and Kyrgyzstan notified the US it would not extend its basing agreement and use of the “Manas Transit Center” after mid-2014 and move operations to other locations in June 2013. The US and its allies have not had a clear need for the Northern Distribution to move supplies into and out of Afghanistan since the end of 2014.76 This helps explain the major cuts in the flow of US aid to Central Asia shown in Figure 4.5. It also helps explain the fact Central Asia received so little attention in the US Department of Defense strategy documents and in the Department of Defense and State Department budget submissions for FY2016 described earlier. The near vacuum in current US strategic statements seems to reflect the fact that the US increasingly sees Central Asia as of marginal interest (millions of current dollars) Central Asian Country

FY1992 thru FY2010 Budgeteda

FY2011 Actualb

FY2012 Actualb

FY2013 Actualb

FY2014 Estimateb

FY2015 Requestb

Kazakhstan

2,050.4

17.57

19.29

12.526

9.761

8.347

Kyrgyzstan

1,221.71

41.36

47.4

47.11

45.287

40.05

Tajikistan

988.57

44.48

45.09

37.47

34.479

26.89

Turkmenistan

351.55

11.01

9.2

5.468

5.473

4.85

Uzbekistan

971.36

11.34

16.73

11.378

11.278

9.79

Regional

130.44

23.15

8.22

17.105

25.928

23.8

5,714.03

148.91

145.92

131.057

132.206

113.727

14%

26%

34%

37%

40%

54%

Total As a percentage of aid to Eurasia

Source: State Department, Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to Europe and Eurasia; State Department, Congressional Budget Justification: Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs for FY2015, March 4, 2014 (Account Tables added March 21, 2014). a.

Includes funds from the Aid for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA) account and Agency budgets. Excludes some classified coalition support funding.

b.

Includes funds from the Aid for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia account (AEECA) and other “Function 150” programs through FY2012: since FY2013, aid to Central Asia has been included in the Economic Support Fund and other “Function 150” programs,. Does not include Defense or Energy Department funds or funding for exchanges. Country totals for FY2013–FY2015 do not include NADR, which is not broken out in the account tables cited above.

Figure 4.5 US Foreign Assistance to Central Asia, FY1992 to FY2015. Source: Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for US Interests”, Congressional Research Service, RL33458, 21 March 2014, p. 76.

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to the US. The US will not maintain a military presence in Central Asia and limited interest in regional trade. It has even less to gain in the real world from US investment in pipelines and mines, developing the region’s natural resources or from encouraging the now largely discredited myth of a “New Silk Road”. The US also has good reason to see Central Asia as a region with uncertain authoritarian leaders and limited economic and strategic value. The State Department Country Reports on Human Rights issued in 2014 summarized the status of Central Asian states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – bleakly with reference to significant human rights problems, law enforcement abuse, unlawful killings, prisoner torture and other abuse, as well as widespread corruption.77

Avoiding the “New Great Game” This scarcely means the US should write off the region or fail to encourage development and democracy. It does mean that Central Asia may be a region where a limited US role seems suitable and where the US can best serve its interests by shifting as much of the strategic burden as possible to other states and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. As has been noted earlier, the US also has no clear strategic incentive to compete with Russia and China, and it may well benefit if it makes it clear it is not attempting to use the region to challenge them – as well as encourage their interest in stabilizing Afghanistan. Russia and China have an obvious interest in regional and Afghan stability, and China is the most likely nation to place major investments in Afghan mines if Afghanistan becomes more secure. Both countries are reluctant to expand their security and aid roles in Afghanistan, and have tended to try to put the focus on action by the “international community”. Central Asia is a region of key strategic interest to China and Russia. As a result, the US can virtually count on Russia and China to intervene in dealing with extremism and terrorism, to compete to some extent in terms of trade and influence and have each state in the region try to play Russia, China and other states off against each other in an effort to serve its own interests. The US withdrawal of most of its forces from Afghanistan has already begun to force Russia and China to expand both their regional counterterrorism role and their role in supporting Afghanistan to

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protect their own strategic interests – which are far more direct than those of the US. They also seem far more likely to try to expand their influence and role in states actually in the Indian Ocean than to try to create some kind of direct route south in seeking ports or other facilities – if indeed these should become a goal. The US also needs to be careful about extending its strategic tensions and problems with states outside Afghanistan, Central Asia and South Asia into the region. Iran has never confronted the US at more than the most marginal levels in Afghanistan, and the US has much to gain if Russia and China are forced to engage more deeply at the security and economic level in Afghanistan and deal with the broader threat of violent Islamic extremism. The interests of other states like Turkey do not conflict with US interests, and having bodies like the Shanghai Cooperation Council expand their role may help both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Iran may cause future problems, but has so far played a stabilizing role in northwest Afghanistan, is a key route for grain and food shipment into Afghanistan and has a strong interest in trying to stabilize western Afghanistan and counter its narco-trafficking. Unless US and Iranian tensions in the MENA region lead to Iranian actions that threaten Afghan stability, this may well be a case where both the US and Iran can benefit from acting in parallel at a time they cannot formally cooperate. The US cannot take these trends for granted. The interests of key states like Iran, China and Russia may change over time in ways that may change US priorities. At least for the present, however, the US seems to have more to gain from open or tacit cooperation than anticipating problems. It also seems probable that all three states – as well as other outside regional powers – will be natural competitors in many ways, even though they will cooperate in others. At least in the near term the resulting checks and balances may again serve US interests – as well as those of Afghanistan and the other states in the region. In short, the best way the US can find to win the “New Great Game” is not to play it.

Shaping US Strategy: Higher Priorities and Other Commitments The US should not leave a strategic vacuum in dealing with the challenges in Afghanistan, or how it should deal with the complex mix

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of issues in Central Asia and South Asia. At a minimum, the US should assess its role in Afghanistan on the basis of need, rather than set rigid deadlines, and have some form of coherent strategy for dealing with Central and South Asia. Yet, the previous analysis shows that such strategy is unlikely to call for new US levels of activity in South Asia and Central Asia or lead to US efforts to create new forms of regional international cooperation. Even if the US did focus properly on the current trends in the region and their consequences – and did adequately assesses its options and their relative risks and benefits – it might well decide that the best solution to dealing with the complex problems in South Asia and Central Asia is a more deliberate and well-reasoned version of its present minimalist approach. The US cannot solve every problem or meet every challenge, and any effort to deal with its current strategic vacuum in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia must be judged in terms of a broader global context. The US is scarcely reducing its overall strategic and defence commitments. The US may have cut the warfighting or Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) part of it military expenditures as it ended the war in Afghanistan, but it then reengaged in Iraq, deployed new forces to deal with Syria and built up its forces in the Gulf. It continues to change its force posture in the Pacific and strengthen its security partnerships in the region and give new priority to its commitments in NATO as a result of the Ukraine crisis. The US does see India as a potential counterweight to China, but has not seen its efforts to build closer strategic relations produce major results or benefits. Accordingly, the US is focusing its “rebalancing to Asia” on Pacific states and less on the Indian Ocean. A strategy that largely leaves Central Asia and South Asia largely to conventional diplomacy does not mean some form of US isolationism, but does seem to reflect US strategic priorities. Certainly, the US should not engage simply for the sake of engagement, pursue fantasies about trade and regional development or assume that it must challenge China and Russia in Central Asia when their efforts to achieve their strategic priorities seem likely to broadly coincide with US interests. The key uncertainty that the US must deal with is not regional, but what will actually happen in Afghanistan now that most US and allied

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combat forces are gone. While the US is formally committed to maintaining a military presence in Afghanistan through 2017 – and to longer military and civil aid efforts – such aid is conditional on the Afghans both making reforms and playing a military role that may be beyond the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces. Obama repeatedly stated that he wants to phase out most of the remaining US military involvement in Afghanistan by the end 2016, but Obama has had to correct course and commit a legacy force of 8,000 plus troops to the country. At the same time, such a US effort can only have meaning if the new Afghan government remains unified and is proactive in reforming Afghan governance and making Afghan forces effective. It also will require a fundamental shift in US plans to both provide adequate advisors and enablers for as long as it takes on a conditions-based timetable. It also requires the Afghan government to adjust the country’s economy to far lower levels of outside spending, effective governance and economic planning and progress in reform. At a minimum, the US does need a far more realistic approach to the Afghan conflict, and to at least assess its options with far more realism than it has done to date.

Notes 1. Goya, Don, “Is Obama in an Afghan Box”, NPR, 29 September 2009. Available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId¼113316234; Tomsen, Peter, “The Good War”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2014. Available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2014-10-19/good-war. 2. See “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015”, US Department of Defense, 7 April 2015. Available at http://www. defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf. 3. Gates, Robert M., Duty (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), pp. 335 – 86. 4. Gall, Carlotta, The Wrong Enemy in the Wrong Country (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014). 5. Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012. Available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Defense_ Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 6. Department of Defense, “Executive Summary, Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014”, QDR 2014. Available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_ Defense_Review.pdf. 7. Ibid., pp. 5 – 6.

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8. Ibid., pp. 16 – 17. 9. Office of the Press Secretary, the White House, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan”, 27 May 2014, 2:46 P.M. EDT. Available at https://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/05/27/statement-president-afghanistan. 10. “Full transcript of President Obama’s commencement address at West Point”, Washington Post, 28 May 2014. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-commencement-address-at-west-point/ 2014/05/28/cfbcdcaa-e670-11e3-afc6-a1dd9407abcf_story.html. 11. Ibid. 12. US Department of Defense, and Washington Post. Available at http://www. washingtonpost.com/world/us-troops-in-afghanistan/2014/09/30/45477364490d-11e4-b72e-d60a9229cc10_graphic.html (accessed 1 October 2014). 13. “U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)”, Overview (February 2015), pp. 1 – 1, 3 – 9. Available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/ Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_BudgetRequest_Overview_Book.pdf. 14. Ibid., pp. 6 – 19. 15. “U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Overview” (February 2015), pp. 7 –4 to 7– 5. Available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/ defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_BudgetRequest_Overview_Book.pdf. 16. Based on interviews and OSD Comptroller, “Summary Budget Documents”. Available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/ fy2017/FY2017_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf; and http://comptroller. defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_Budget_ Request.pdf, pages 7 – 1 to 7– 5; and Anthony H. Cordesman, “Paying for America’s Wars in FY2017. The Projected Cost and Nature of U.S. Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Counterterrorism Partnerships, European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), and the World, CSIS”, Washington, 18 February 2016. Available at http://csis.org/publication/payingamericas-wars-fy2017. 17. Based on interviews and OSD Comptroller, “Summary Budget Documents”. Available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/ fy2017/FY2017_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf; and http://comptroller. defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_Budget_ Request.pdf. 18. US State Department, “Budget Congressional Budget Justification for FY2016”, 2 February 2015, p. 15. Available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 236395.pdf. 19. Ibid., pp. 119 – 20. 20. Ibid., pp. 148 – 50. 21. US State Department, “Budget Congressional Budget Justification for FY2016”, 2 February 2015, pp. 85 – 90, 107 – 8. Available at http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/236395.pdf.

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22. US State Department, “Budget Congressional Budget Justification for FY2017”, 9 February 2015, p. 3, 85 – 90, 107 – 8. Available at http://www.s tate.gov/s/d/rm/rls/ebs/2017/. 23. NATO, Wales Summit Declaration, Press Release (2014) 120, 5 September 2014. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. 24. Ibid. 25. Reuters, “Afghan Election Body names Ex-Finance Minister Ghani Presidentelect”, Kabul, 21 September 2014 6:58 p.m. IST. 26. Results in a PDF called “elections final result after audit”, and dated 14 September 2014, provided by a regional expert. The document showed Ghani had gotten 2,081,288 votes in round one, 4,485,888 votes in the initial count of round two, and 3,952,596 in the audited count. The document showed Abdullah had gotten 2,970,582 votes in round one, 3,461,639 votes in the initial count of round two, and 3,203,295 in the audited count. 27. Ugaz, Jose´, Transparency International Global Corruption Ranking, “Afghanistan”, Transparency International. Available at https://www.transparency.org/ country/#AFG. 28. “Afghan Leaders Outline Reform Plans at London Conference”, Gandhara, 4 December 2014. Available at http://gandhara.rferl.org/content/afghanistanleaders-outline-reforms/26725323.html; Shazli, Hamid and Kay Johnson, “Ambitious and impatient, Afghan leader eyes aid, peace, reform”, Reuters, 3 December 2014. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/03/ us-afghanistan-president-idUSKCN0JH2NT20141203; draft of plan Afghan Embassy to the United States, 11 December 2014. 29. Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan: The Tokyo Declaration Partnership for Self-Reliance in Afghanistan from Transition to Transformation”, 8 July 2012. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/mi ddle_e/afghanistan/tokyo_conference_2012/tokyo_declaration_en1.html; and Cordesman, Anthony H., “Afghanistan and the Tokyo Conference: Hope, Fantasy, and Failure”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 9 July 2012. Available at http://csis.org/publication/afghanistan-and-tokyo-conferencehope-fantasy-and-failure. 30. CIA, World Factbook. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed 3 March 2016). 31. CIA, World Factbook. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/geos/af.html (accessed 3 March 2016). 32. Central Intelligence Agency, “Afghanistan”, CIA World Factbook. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html. 33. USAID, Food Assistance Fact Sheet, 30 June 2014. Available at http://www.us aid.gov/afghanistan/food-assistance. 34. Murphy, Tom, “U.N. comes up short, must cut food aid for Afghanistan and Syria”, Humanosphere, 17 October 2014. Available at http://www.humanos phere.org/world-politics/2014/10/un-comes-up-short-must-cut-food-aid-forafghanistan-syria/.

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35. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress”, 30 January 2015, pp. 150 – 1; and “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress”, 30 April 2015, pp. 159 –60. Available at https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-04-30qr.pdf. 36. Ibid. 37. US Census Bureau, International Data Base (IDB). Available at http://www. census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php. 38. CIA, World Factbook, “Afghanistan”, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html. 39. Recknagel, Charles, “Explainer: Key Points In U.S.-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement”, Radio free Europe, 29 May 2015. Available at http://www.rferl. org/content/explainer-bsa-afghan-us-security-agreement-bsa/26613884.html. 40. NATO, 26 February 2015. Available at http://www.rs.nato.int/troop-numbersand-contributions/index.php. 41. See “From ISAF to Resolute Support”, Resolute Support web page. Available at http://www.rs.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/RSM/20150204_isaf_to_rs_ trifold_final.pdf. 42. Resolute Support, estimate as of 31 December 2015. Available at http://www. rs.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/RSM/151210_placemat.pdf. 43. Felbab-Brown, Vanda, “Blood and hope in Afghanistan: A June 2015 update”, Brookings Institute, 26 May 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/ 2015/05/26-isis-taliban-afghanistan-felbabbrown; Craig, Tim, “Afghan Forces Straining to Keep the Expanding Taliban at Bay”, Washington Post, 16 May 2015; Raghavan, Sudarsan, “Foreign Fighters Are Spilling into Afghanistan, Helping the Taliban”, Washington Post, 15 April 2015. 44. John F. Sopko Remarks Prepared for Delivery Georgetown University Washington, DC, Friday 12 September 2014. Available at https://www.sigar. mil/newsroom/ReadFile.aspx?SSR¼ 7&SubSSR ¼ 29&File ¼ speeches/14/ Georgetown_University_Speech.html. 45. Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, Susan B. Epstein, Congressional Research Service, R41856 (1 July 2013), p. 16. 46. Ibid. 47. Craig, Tim, “Afghan Leaders fear a covert invasion”, Washington Post, 26 September 2014, p. A6; Miller, Greg and Kevin Sieff, “As focus shifts to Syria, a foe endures”, Washington Post, 26 September 2014, p. A1, A8. Interviews; Miller, Greg and Kevin Sieff, “As focus shifts to Syria, a foe endures”, Washington Post, 26 September 2014, pp. A1, A8. 48. Boone, Jon, “Ashraf Ghani visit may mark new chapter in Afghan-Pakistan relations”, Guardian, 4 November 2014, 11.26 EST. Available at http://www. theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/14/ashraf-ghani-visit-pakistan-afghanistan. 49. Radio Free Europe, “Ghani Warns Against Afghan ‘Proxy War’”, 26 November 2014. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-pakistan-india-/ 26711944.html.

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50. Bengali, Shahshank and Ali M. Latifi, “Afghan President Pursues Peace with Taliban – his way”, Los Angeles Times, 22 March 2015. Available at http:// www.latimes.com/world/afghanistan-pakistan/la-fg-afghanistan-ghani-us20150322-story.html; Raghavan, Sudarsan and Tim Craig, “Pakistani, Afghan Officials: Taliban is Willing to Enter into Peace Talks”, Washington Post, 19 February 2015. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_ pacific/pakistan-says-the-taliban-is-willing-to-enter-afghanistan-peace-talks/ 2015/02/19/628ee7b8-b843-11e4-bc30-a4e75503948a_story.html; Khan, Wajahat S., Fazul Rahim and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Afghan Peace Talks with Taliban: Issues, Players and Challenges”, NBC News, 4 April 2015, 5:15AM ET. Available at http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/afghan-peacetalks-n333801; Schuster, Courtney, Neeli Shah, “Pakistan Condemns Afghan Taliban; Ghani: Let Taliban Be Part of Peace Talks”, Foreign Policy, 1 May 2015. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/01/pakistan-condemnsafghan-taliban-ghani-let-taliban-be-part-of-peace-talks-india-rejects-u-sreligious-freedom-report/. 51. Norland, Rod, “In Farewell Speech, Karzai Calls American Mission in Afghanistan a Betrayal”, New York Times, 23 September 2014. Available at www. nytimes.com/2014/09/24/world/asia/hamid-karzai-afghanistan.html; Craig, Tim, “Afghan Leaders fear a covert invasion”, Washington Post, 26 September 2014, p. A6; Craig, Tim, “Mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan soars as U.S. forces depart”, Washington Post, 25 September 2014; “Karzai criticizes U.S., Pakistan as he bids farewell”, Pakistan Today, 23 September 2014. Available at http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2014/09/23/foreign/karzai-criticises-uspakistan-as-he-bids-farewell/. 52. Craig, Tim, “Afghan Leaders fear a covert invasion”, Washington Post, 26 September 2014, p. A6; Craig, Tim, “Mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan soars as U.S. forces depart”, Washington Post, 25 September 2014; Masood, Salman, “New Chief of Spy Unit is Appointed in Pakistan”, New York Times, 22 September 2014. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/ world/asia/pakistani-military-names-new-spy-chief.html?_r¼ 0. 53. Available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/12/the-allyfrom-hell/308730/. 54. Schmitt, Eric, “U.S. Recalibrates Remarks About Pakistan”, New York Times, 28 September 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/world/ asia/us-recalibrates-mullens-remarks-about pakistan.html?_r¼0. 55. Gall, Carlotta, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001 – 2014 (New York: Mariner Books, 2015). 56. Based on background briefings, and private interviews in August and September 2014, and November 2015; and Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information, Bureau of Counterterrorism Country Reports on Terrorism 2014. Available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/ 239416.htm.

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57. US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism, 2013. Available at http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf, and http://www.start. umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search¼ Pakistan&&sa.x ¼ 43&&sa.y ¼ 16&&sa ¼ Search.). 58. Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, Susan B. Epstein, Congressional Research Service, R41856 (1 July 2013), p. 16. 59. Ibid., p. 21. 60. Ibid., pp. 19 – 20. 61. Transparency International Global Corruption Ranking, “Afghanistan”. Available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results; and World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, “Afghanistan”. Available at http://info. worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports. 62. Pakistan’s steady expansion of its holdings of tactical nuclear weapons and their scattered deployments is both steadily increasing this risk and limiting the already marginal change an outside power could intervene. For example, see Craig, Tim and Karen DeYoung, “Pakistan is eyeing sea-based and short-range nuclear weapons, analysts say”, Washington Post, 21 September 2014. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/pakistan-is-eyeing-seabased-and-short-range-nuclear-weapons-analysts-say/2014/09/20/1bd9436a11bb-11e4-8936-26932bcfd6ed_story.html; Detsch, Andrew, “Pakistan’s Oversized Submarine Ambitions”, The Diplomat, 9 October 2013. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/10/pakistans-oversized-submarine-ambitions/; Miller, Greg, Craig Whitlock and Barton Gellman, “Top-secret U.S. intelligence files show new levels of distrust of Pakistan”, Washington Post, 2 September 2013. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/top-secretus-intelligence-files-show-new-levels-of-distrust-of-pakistan/2013/09/02/ e19d03c2-11bf-11e3-b630-36617ca6640f_story.html; Kerr, Paul K. and Mary Beth Nikitin, Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, Congressional Research, Service RL34248 (19 March 2013). Available at as.org/ sgp/crs/nuke/RL34248.pdf. 63. Epstein and Kronstadt, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, and US Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture; US Agency for International Development; and Briefing on the President’s FY17 Budget Request for the US Department of State and USAID; and Heather Higginbottom, Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources, “Briefing on the President’s FY17 Budget Request for the U.S. Department of State and USAID”, US Agency for International Development (USAID) Washington, DC, 9 February 2016. Available at http:// www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/02/252303.htm. 64. Kronstadt, K. Alan, Sonia Pinto, U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues, Congressional Research Service, R42948, 24 January 2013. 65. “PM Narendra Modi’s U.S. visit: Eight highlights”, Economic Times, ECONOMICTIMES.COM, 1 October 2014, 01.03PM IST. Available at http://articles. economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-10-01/news/54516929_1_prime-ministernarendra-modi-modi-and-obama-saath; Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “What Did

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67. 68. 69.

70. 71. 72.

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Narendra Modi’s U.S. Trip Accomplish?” The Diplomat, 2 October 2014. Available at hediplomat.com/2014/10/what-did-narendra-modis-us-tripaccomplish/. Panda, Ankit, “9 Takeaways on U.S.-India Ties After Obama’s India Visit”, The Diplomat, 26 January 2015. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/9takeaways-on-us-india-ties-after-obamas-india-visit/; The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-India Joint Statement – ‘Shared Effort; Progress for All’”, 25 January 2015. Available at ttps://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-statement-shared-effort-progress-all. Theohary, Catherine A., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007– 2014, Congressional Research Service, 21 December 2015, pp. 13 – 14. Ibid. Harris, Gardiner, “World’s Biggest Arms Importer, India Wants to Buy Local”, New York Times, 6 March 2014. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 03/07/business/international/worlds-biggest-arms-importer-india-wants-tobuy-local.html?_r¼0; Pizzi, Michael, “India Remains the World’s Largest Arms Buyer”, Al Jazeera America, 8 March 2104, 12:09PM ET. Available at http:// america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/3/17/india-still-worldslargestarmsbuyerasasi anrivalriesheatup.html; Sivaraman, Siddharth and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “India: Diversifying Arms Purchases”, The Diplomat, 13 August 2014. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/india-diversifying-arms-purchases/. Kronstadt and Pinto, U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues, pp 17 – 19. Ibid., pp. 13 – 15. The problems lie in India’s defence planning efforts as well. For typical media reporting see, Gokhale, Nitin, “The Trouble With India’s Military”, The Diplomat, 26 April 2012; Gokhale, Nitin, “Naresh Chandra Task Force’s Report on National Security: An Appraisal”, Vivekananda International Foundation, July 2012; Gokhale, Nitin, “Hopes for Indian Defense Reform Fade”, The Diplomat, 16 December 2013. Available at http://thediplomat.com/ 2013/12/hopes-for-indian-defense-reform-fade/; Kanwal, Gurmeet, “Defense Reforms in India: Slow by Steady Progress”, Issue Perspective, CSIS Wadwani Chair. Available at http://csis.org/files/publication/121120_WadhwaniChai r_IssuePerspective.pdf; Joshi, Manoj, “Shutting His Ears to Change”, India Today, 22 November 2013. Available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/ national-security-naresh-chandra-gom-manmohan-singh-cabinet-committeeon-security-ministry-of-defence-chandra-committee-iaf-army/1/325970.html; “India’s Fighter Upgrades: Mirage 2000s Grounded for Parts, Waiting for Upgrades”, Defense Industry Daily, 23 September 2014. Available at http://www. defenseindustrydaily.com/indias-fighter-upgrades-mirage-2000s-next-02891/. White House transcript for 8 November 2010. Available at http://www.whi tehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/08/ remarks-president-joint-sessionindian-parliament-new-delhi-india.; Kronstadt, K. Alan and Sonia Pinto, U.S.-India Security Relations: Strategic Issues, Congressional Research Service, R42948 (24 January 2013), p. 39.

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74. Sengupta, Somini, “Premier Outlines Goals for India on Eve of a Visit With Obama”, New York Times, 28 September 2014. Available at http://www.nytimes. com/2014/09/29/world/asia/narendra-modi-madison-square-garden-obama.htm l; Sengupta, Somini, “Narendra Modi, in U.N. Speech, Inserts India Into Terrorism Fight”, New York Times, 27 September 2014. Available at http://www. nytimes.com/news/un-general-assembly/2014/09/27/narendra-modi-in-u-n-s peech-inserts-india-into-terrorism-fight/?smid¼ nytcore-ipad-share&smprod ¼ nytcore-ipad; Burns, Nicholas, “Obama’s Second Chance with India”, Washington Post, 29 September 2014, A17; Narita, “Narendra Modi’s speech at United Nations General Assembly: Complete text”, 28 September 2014. Available at http://news.oneindia.in/india/narendra-modi-s-speech-at-unitednations-general-assembly-complete-text-1531113.html. 75. Office of the Press Secretary, “U.S.-India Joint Statement”, The White House, 30 September 2014. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 2014/09/30/us-india-joint-statement. 76. Nichol, Jim, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests”, Congressional Research Service, RL33458 (21 March 2014). 77. US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, 27 February 2014. Also see Nichol, Jim, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests”, Congressional Research Service 7-5700, RL33458 (21 March 2014). Available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ RL33458.pdf.

CHAPTER 5 SILK ROAD DIPLOMACY: CHINA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA Jo Inge Bekkevold and Sunniva Engh

Introduction Afghan president Ashraf Ghani’s first official visit abroad following his inauguration was to China in October 2014. During his visit to Beijing the two countries issued a joint statement on Deepening Strategic and Cooperative Partnership.1 Celebrating 60 years of Sino –Afghan diplomatic relations in Kabul three months later in January 2015, Ghani stated that “We hope that China will play a proactive role in bringing peace to Afghanistan, because whatever the Chinese do, they do it according to a plan and with focus [. . .] Now, as they have become involved, we will witness more steps toward achieving peace.”2 An increased Chinese footprint in Afghanistan, China’s well established long-term partnership with Pakistan, and Chinese president Xi Jinping’s high-profile new “Silk Road Diplomacy”, launched at a time when the United States is pulling out of Afghanistan, forms the basis of a timely discussion of China’s future role in South Asia. Through its “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative” China aims to build infrastructure and economic relations across Central Asia and South Asia.3 Showing China’s economic muscles through a Silk Road Fund, the newly established Asian Infrastructure

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Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Shanghai-based BRICS New Development Bank, China’s Silk Road Diplomacy gives cause for optimism regarding a possible regional economic boost. At the same time, however, China’s new diplomatic and economic offensive may also be interpreted as a move to fill the power vacuum in the region after the United States, and as evidence of greater Chinese ambitions to consolidate a strategic inroad into Central and South Asia. In this chapter we take a closer look at China’s Silk Road initiative and examine the role of South Asia in the larger context of Chinese strategic thinking and foreign policy priorities. We analyse China’s strategic interests in South Asia, and China’s advantages and disadvantages when pursuing a more prominent presence in South Asia. Furthermore, we discuss whether China is able to contribute towards increased co-operation and a stable regional security order or whether China’s more pro-active role instead may lead to increased competition and rivalry in the region.

China’s Geostrategic Outlook In order to understand China’s future role and level of engagement in Afghanistan and South Asia it is important to see where South Asia belongs in China’s overall foreign policy priorities. A country’s foreign policy is influenced by a number of factors. Balance of power, perceived threat, geography, energy, trade and investment interests are all fundamental in shaping a country’s geostrategic outlook. One of the most fundamental geopolitical shifts in recent history, with major structural implications for regional developments, is China’s transformation from land power to sea power.4 After the end of the Cold War, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, China has for the first time in history been free from any major land based threats to its security. This has allowed China over the last two decades to shift its geostrategic outlook towards the sea. Only once before has China managed to develop a true maritime outlook, during the late Song and early Ming dynasties in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.5 China’s recent maritime transformation stems from its coastal provinces, which have been the main drivers behind China’s economic miracle. China now has one of the world’s largest merchant fleets, and is one of the world’s top three shipbuilders, together with South Korea and Japan. China’s ongoing

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naval modernisation and a rapidly growing Chinese Coast Guard are the final steps buttressing China’s growing position as a maritime power. This transition into a maritime power is also reflected in China’s Defence White Papers, with the latest 2015 version advocating an unprecedented maritime emphasis. As China goes to sea, unresolved territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas have come to the forefront, and the strategic rivalry between the United States and China in East Asia has become more prominent. China challenges Japan’s claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea and China’s island reclamation activities in the South China Sea is the latest example of a more assertive Chinese maritime policy. Since the Korean War in the early 1950s, East Asia has been characterized by Chinese domination of the mainland and US domination of the maritime theatre.6 Although China’s Navy (PLAN) still has limited warfighting capability beyond the Near Seas,7 increased Chinese naval capabilities and power projection at sea does challenge the US as the dominant sea power in East Asia. As the United States withdraws from Afghanistan, it is rebalancing towards East Asia in order to give more attention to economic possibilities and security policy challenges in the region. Naturally, China’s main overall strategic priority today is not to fill the power vacuum left behind by the US in Afghanistan, but to secure its growing sphere of influence in the East Asian maritime theatre. Wang Jisi, one of China’s most influential international relations scholars and a noted expert on China– US relations, has argued that China should place greater focus on its western frontier. In 2011, he argued that: When communication lines in Central Asia and South Asia were poor, China’s development strategy and economic interests tilted toward its east coast and the Pacific Ocean. Today [. . .] China should and will begin to pay more strategic attention to the west. The central government [. . .] is now more actively initiating and participating in new development projects in Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Central Asia, and throughout the Caspian Sea region, all the way to Europe. This new western outlook may reshape China’s geostrategic vision as well as the Eurasian landscape.8

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In 2012, Wang Jisi followed up by suggesting a new “March West” strategy for China.9 In a recent book on the “One Belt, One Road” policy, Wang Yiwei states that China’s ambition is to build closer relationships with countries across the Eurasian continent.10 Now that these visions of China paying greater attention to its western region have become policy through the Silk Road initiative, should this be interpreted as the beginning of a new geostrategic shift in China’s foreign policy? Most likely not, and at least not in the foreseeable future. China’s foreign trade figures provide us with an additional context for understanding Chinese foreign policy priorities. China’s combined trade with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka – “Greater South Asia” – in 2013 amounted to $135 billion, which accounted for a mere 3 per cent of China’s total foreign trade.11 China’s foreign trade in the same year with Japan, China’s third largest trading partner after the European Union and the United States, was more than twice as large, at $312 billion. Even if we add China’s total trade of $129 billion in 2013 with its current fellow members in the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) on top of China’s trade with South Asia of $135 billion, it falls short of China’s trade with Japan. In comparison, China’s trade with the ten ASEAN member states in 2013 amounted to $443 billion, more than three times larger than China’s trade with South Asia. Indeed, the same year, China’s trade with Malaysia alone at $106 billion was almost as large as its trade with all of South Asia. Thus Chinese economic interests in East Asia far outweigh Chinese economic interests in South Asia, and even those of South and Central Asia combined. It is obvious that South Asia is not at the top of China’s foreign policy agenda, however this does not mean that China lacks strategic interests in the region. We argue that China’s policy towards Central and South Asia is largely driven by four overarching strategic interests. First, China seeks to secure stability on its western frontier. Second, China wants access to energy and mineral resources. Third, China seeks to establish expanded land transit and access to the Indian Ocean for its landlocked inner provinces. Fourth, China has traditionally been concerned with countering strategic dominance in its backyard from the three great powers – India, Russia and the United States – and China’s partnership with Pakistan has been part of this strategy. However, as we will revert to

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later in this chapter, this “defensive” approach to managing great power relations in Central and South Asia is now turning into a more “offensive” Chinese approach. Before we examine China’s strategic interests further, we will take a closer look at the drivers behind China’s Silk Road initiative.

China’s Silk Road Diplomacy: Drivers In March 2015, China’s mighty National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued an official road map for China’s Silk Road initiative, entitled “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”. The road map was issued jointly by the NDRC, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce.12 This means that the Silk Road initiative – also known as the “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) policy, is embedded in China’s economic and development policies as well as in the country’s foreign affairs and that both domestic and foreign policy considerations are driving this initiative. In the second half of 2013, Xi Jinping launched three main foreign policy initiatives that we argue should be seen together, as they show the setting within which China’s westward policies have been formulated. Visiting Kazakhstan in September 2013, Xi Jinping talked publicly for the first time about the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and expanded co-operation with countries in Central Asia.13 The following month he launched the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative” in Indonesia, emphasizing the importance of building closer relationships with countries in South East Asia.14 Also in October 2013, China hosted a large “Periphery Diplomacy” forum with participation from China’s political elite and prominent representatives from its diplomatic corps. Seeking stable borders and good relations with its neighbours is of course nothing new for China’s foreign policy,15 however the October 2013 meeting was the first major top-level foreign policy forum since 2006 and the first one specifically dedicated to periphery diplomacy since 1949.16 Since 2009, China has been perceived as pursuing a more assertive foreign policy, in particular towards Japan and the littoral countries in Southeast Asia.17 China is also seen to be departing from Deng Xiaoping’s mantra of “keeping a low profile” (Tao Guang Yang Hui) in

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her foreign policy; replacing this with a more pro-active foreign policy characterized by Fen Fa You Wei – “striving for achievement”.18 As a result of China’s more assertive foreign policy, however, the country’s maritime neighbours gradually showed reservations regarding China’s foreign policy intentions and economic rise. From 2013 onwards, China has increasingly prioritized relations with its neighbour countries through the “Periphery Diplomacy”. This was an attempt to mitigate the development of a China threat narrative and to counter the tendency of China’s neighbours to lean further towards the United States. Both Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang have stated that within the new periphery diplomacy, China’s relations with ASEAN countries have priority.19 The Chinese government hopes this new policy initiative will help China improve bilateral relations through investments and trade relations, while at the same time ensuring Chinese companies’ access to markets and natural resources. Of course, Chinese island-building in the South China Sea has not contributed to improve China’s relationships in the region, but China’s high-profiled Silk Road Diplomacy should be understood within this larger context of managing Chinese foreign policy and its development. To fully understand the Silk Road initiative we also need to take into account important changes in China’s economic model beyond the fact that China as the world’s second largest economy now has the economic muscle to undertake large-scale projects. First, China is seeking to transform its economic model from an investment driven to a more consumption and market driven model, and this transformation is taking place just as China’s annual GDP growth is falling to a more normal level than the double digit figures we have seen over the last two decades.20 This means that there will be surplus capacity in China’s economy, including in the extraction and construction industries and related business sectors. Opening new markets and engaging these industries in large scale energy, minerals and infrastructure projects abroad instead of closing them down and risking domestic protests against a necessary shift in China’s economic model seems to be a winwin solution for both the government and industries. Second, Chinese companies are now more than ever before encouraged to invest abroad and China has become the third largest overseas investor. In 2014, China’s outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) was almost equal to inward FDI.21 Third, the financial instruments established to support

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the Silk Road initiative – the $40 billion Silk Road Fund,22 the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development Bank are a constructive way of making use of China’s huge stocks of foreign exchange reserves. The OBOR road map states that China also intends to sign bilateral currency swap and settlement agreements with countries in the region, develop the bond market in Asia and establish a Shanghai Cooperation Organization financing institution.23 In sum, the multi-faceted drivers behind the “One Belt, One Road” policy, the policy’s wide geographic range building infrastructure and developing economic relations with most of Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa, as well as the ambitious new Chinese-led multilateral finance institutions imply that the Silk Road policy is of a potentially much larger scope than simply China wanting to improve its standing in South Asia. At the same time however, China’s Silk Road diplomacy will be an important tool enabling China to increase its footprint in South Asia, both on land and at sea.

China’s Strategic Interests in South Asia As already alluded to, China’s policy towards South Asia is largely driven by four overarching strategic interests: stability on the country’s western frontier; access to energy and mineral resources; expanded land transit and access to the Indian Ocean; and managing great power relations in its own backyard.

Stabilizing China’s Western Frontier First, China’s government is concerned about the stability on its western frontier. China shares land borders with 14 countries, and the most volatile border region is the western frontier in Tibet and Xinjiang, the latter being “China’s Muslim Borderland”.24 One reason for this instability is continued ethnic reservations and resistance to Han Chinese control in these two “provinces”, as evidenced through the large-scale unrest in Tibetan areas in 2008 and in Xinjiang in 2009. Another reason for concern in Beijing is that instability in the neighbouring countries could have negative spill-over effects into Xinjiang in particular, creating calls for Turkestan separatism. This latter scenario became a real worry for Beijing with the collapse of the

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Soviet Union in 1991 and the birth of new nation-states in Central Asia.25 While these new states also presented China with new economic possibilities, Beijing’s initiative to establish the Shanghai Five in 1996, today the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO), was mainly aimed at stabilizing its frontiers through combating the so-called “three evils” – religious extremism, ethnic separatism and international terrorism – in the Central Asian region.26 Since its inception, the SCO has taken several steps to strengthen internal cooperation in fighting the “three evils”, including the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) established in 2004, and China has conducted a series of joint military exercises with SCO members on anti-terrorist scenarios.27 While China was supportive of the US-led War on Terror, the US included East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) on its own “Terrorist Exclusion List”. In order to sever the links between ethnic separatist groups in Xinjiang and Central Asian states and prevent the spread of Islamic fundamentalism into China, Beijing has both encouraged and pressurized Central and South Asian governments into shutting down separatist activities and to return Uighurs to China.28 For instance, during Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan in April 2015, the Chinese president praised Pakistani military operations which targeted Uighur fighters in the tribal region of North Waziristan. His host, Nawaz Sharif, responded that “Pakistan considers China’s security as its own security”.29 As the US-led military involvement winds down in Afghanistan, Beijing is concerned that instability in Afghanistan may lead to a surge in violence in Xinjiang and possibly also in urban areas elsewhere in China.30 In 2014, more than 200 people were killed in clashes between the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces and Uighur activists in Xinjiang.31 The Chinese government hopes that the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) will encourage economic development in Xinjiang and economic integration in the region, and thus contribute to stability.32 At the National People’s Congress (NPC) annual session in Beijing in March 2015, the Xinjiang Party Secretary stated that the “One Belt, One Road is an important historic opportunity to safeguard social stability and lasting political order,” and the Tibet Party Secretary referred to Tibet’s role as a “main international thoroughfare”.33 China has floated a plan with India and Nepal involving the improvement of the roads through Tibet and Nepal to India and the construction of a 540 kilometre long high-speed rail link between Tibet and Nepal

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passing through a tunnel below Mount Everest, and both Nepal and India seem positive to the idea.34 Afghanistan has been called the “Missing Link” in China’s Greater Central Asia policy.35 In 2001, the same year as the establishment of the SCO, the United States moved into Afghanistan. Between 2001 and 2013, China provided Afghanistan with a total of $240 million of aid,36 but the enduring instability in Afghanistan and the heavy US military presence prevented China pursuing an active engagement policy in the country. In recent years, however, China has stepped up its Afghan policy. When Zhou Yongkang of the Politburo Standing Committee made a four hour stopover in Kabul in September 2012, this was the highest level Chinese visit to Afghanistan since 1966.37 In November 2014, Guo Shengkun, China’s Minister of Public Security and State Councillor responsible for domestic security visited Afghanistan for discussions that reportedly focused on ETIM.38 Recent Chinese initiatives prove that China has an interest in a stable Afghanistan: China has announced that it will train Afghan professionals and police officers in fields such as counterterrorism, anti-drug trafficking, agriculture and diplomacy, and is also providing scholarships for Afghan students to study in China.39 Throughout the 2000s, China quietly maintained a relationship with the Taliban leadership based in Pakistan and has intensified this contact over the last 3 – 4 years, sounding the Taliban leaders out on security issues ranging from separatist groups in Xinjiang to the protection of Chinese resource investments.40 By engaging the Taliban, Beijing can contribute to successful reconciliation talks and a stable Afghanistan, however it also gives Beijing the opportunity to build relations with different constellations in preparation for an uncertain political future in Afghanistan. In addition, dealing with the Islamist insurgents is also a “hedge against the risk that the Taliban might decide to view Chinese citizens, investments or even mainland China itself as a legitimate target”.41 Beijing is concerned about how Taliban-linked groups view its policy in Xinjiang. In 2014, Beijing appointed Sun Yuxi, its former ambassador to Kabul and New Delhi, as a special envoy on Afghanistan. In 2014 and 2015 China helped broker direct peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, with the latest round of talks taking place in Beijing in late July 2015.42 According to Afghan Chief Executive Officer Abdullah speaking to

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Indian media in March 2015, Beijing can use its influence over Pakistan to help broker peace talks.43

Access to Energy and Mineral Resources Second, China aims to tap into energy and mineral resources in Central and South Asia. Coal still constitutes two thirds of China’s energy mix, with oil 20 per cent and gas 5 per cent, but in September 2013, China’s net imports of petroleum and other liquids exceeded those of the United States for the first time, making China the top importer.44 More than half of China’s oil imports originate in the Middle East and Iran. The Kazakhstan– China oil pipeline was put into operation in 2005, but Kazakhstan only provides two per cent of China’s total oil imports. In 2011, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) also gained rights to develop oil fields in northwestern Afghanistan.45 According to Tunsjø, Chinese investments in cross-border pipelines into Central Asia are not motivated by cost-effectiveness, but are rather part of a diversification strategy and “an insurance strategy that seeks to hedge against a potential disruption in China’s seaborne petroleum supplies.”46 China furthermore wishes to increase its energy cooperation with Iran. Iran holds the world’s fourth-largest crude oil reserves and the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves. Anticipating a phased end to sanctions with an expected nuclear agreement in June 2015, Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh visited China in April the same year.47 Central and South Asian countries are prominent suppliers of gas to China. China became a net importer of gas as late as 2007, but demand is rapidly increasing, and already in 2013 imports accounted for as much as 32 per cent of China’s gas demand. The Chinese government aims to boost natural gas’ share of the total energy consumption to ten per cent by 2020 to alleviate pollution, and China is expected to continue importing natural gas in the form of seaborne LNG and pipeline gas from Central Asia (mainly from Turkmenistan), Myanmar and Russia.48 Turkmenistan is the world’s sixth largest natural gas reserve holder, and China has developed the Trans –Asia Gas Pipeline (TAGP) stretching from Turkmenistan to China through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In 2014, Turkmenistan gas accounted for 44 per cent of China’s total natural gas import.49 A new sub-line to the TAGP project to be completed in 2020 will run from Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan,

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Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to China.50 China’s gas pipeline network even extends to Iran and Pakistan. China is currently building a pipeline to bring natural gas from Iran to Pakistan to address the latter’s acute energy shortage,51 and in July 2015 Pakistan and China began joint construction of a 700-kilometre pipeline to import natural gas from China to Pakistan.52 In terms of metals and minerals Afghanistan is the region’s most interesting country, with nearly $1 trillion in untapped deposits, including iron, copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals such as lithium. According to US sources, Afghanistan could eventually become one of the world’s most important mining centres.53 China is among the first to tap into these resources with Metallurgical Corporation of China and the Jiangxi Copper Corporation having already in 2007 won a bid to develop one of the world’s largest copper deposits, the Anyak Copper Mine – to date the largest foreign investment in Afghanistan.54 While China may be the biggest foreign direct investor in Afghanistan, as late as 2014 the country only ranked as Afghanistan’s seventh largest import partner and its seventh largest export market.55

Access to the Indian Ocean Third, it is a stated goal of the “One Belt, One Road” policy to connect China with the Indian Ocean, through South Asia. Since nearly 80 per cent of China’s crude oil imports, and a large part of China’s trade in goods, traverse the Strait of Malacca, much has been written about China’s so-called “Malacca Dilemma”. While Tunsjø has demonstrated that this maritime choke point constitutes only a minor security risk for China,56 the “Malacca Dilemma” continues to shape Chinese strategic thinking. China is constructing a network of roads, railways and pipelines through Afghanistan and Pakistan, through Myanmar and Tibet down to Nepal and Bangladesh that will provide China with access to the Indian Ocean and allow a diversification of the country’s trade channels while diffusing the risks inherent to sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), which according to Chinese thinking are mainly controlled by the US. This is supported by Chinese investments in deep-sea ports in Pakistan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. From the early 2000s, China described oil and gas pipelines through Myanmar as alternative transport routes for crude oil from the Middle East, thereby bypassing the Strait of Malacca.57 This has recently become a reality with the first gas pipeline between Kyakpyu in Myanmar

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and Kunming in Yunnan opening in October 2014, and the first oil pipeline in January 2015.58 Of all the infrastructure projects linked to the Silk Road Initiative, the China– Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) seems the most ambitious. Constructing a vast network of roads, railroads and oil and gas pipelines, the CPEC will connect the Chinese-funded Gwadar deepsea port in Pakistan with Kashgar city in Xinjiang region. Proposed by Premier Li Keqiang during his 2013 visit to Pakistan, the project’s overall costs are now estimated at $46 billion. The CPEC will reduce China’s routes for oil and gas imports from Africa and the Middle East by thousands of kilometres, making Gwadar Port, which is about 400 km from the Strait of Hormuz, a vital link in China’s supply chain. The plan involves an upgrade of Gwadar and construction of an airport in the area.59 While General Raheel Sharif, head of Pakistan’s Army, recently stated that the CPEC would be operational before the end of 2016,60 a World Bank report has warned that the slowing Chinese economy and Pakistan’s economic policy may prevent the CPEC from materializing.61 Nevertheless, in the case of a US– China conflict, these alternative channels enabling China more direct access to the Indian Ocean will not stop the US from enforcing a trade embargo on China if the US is still in control of vital SLOCs in the Indian Ocean Region.

Consolidating Influence in China’s Backyard Fourth, China has been concerned with countering great power dominance from India, Russia and the United States in the Central and South Asian region. A persistent feature of China’s regional policy has been to prevent India from becoming a regional hegemon in South Asia, and its main tool has been a close relationship with Pakistan. After Indian independence in 1947 and Chinese “liberation” in 1949, Mao Zedong and Jawaharlal Nehru for a brief period seemingly held a shared outlook on international politics, emphasizing their roles as leaders of the newly independent developing countries. The early optimism was soon replaced by strategic realities however. The 1962 Sino–Indian War inherently changed the bilateral relationship, and throughout the Cold War it was characterized by political and diplomatic conflicts, mainly caused by security concerns.62 While China has settled most of its land border disputes, the Sino–Indian border is yet unresolved. China would not like to see India powerful enough to block Chinese interests in South

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Asia, but for now China views India’s rise as a positive development which promotes China’s strategic objectives more than it threatens or challenges them, and sees enhanced cooperation with India as a countermeasure to a closer US–India relationship that would increase US influence over China.63 While the two Asian giants for a number of years experienced strong economic growth, the balance is uneven, and this has bearings on the two countries’ perceptions of each other. Today, China’s GDP being five times larger than India’s,64 it would seem that New Delhi has grown considerably more concerned by China’s new power than Beijing is concerned by India. Russia was one of the main players in the original “Great Game” of the nineteenth century, when China was one of the victims. Following a period of very strained relations in the second half of the Cold War, China and Russia are today on better terms than ever, sharing a common scepticism of American hegemony in international affairs. While China remains wary of Russia’s traditionally close links with the Central Asian states, India and Iran, China is nevertheless outgrowing Russia on all accounts and is clearly the stronger party. According to IMF estimates, in 2015 China’s GDP was ten times larger than Russia’s.65 China’s trade with Central Asian states surpassed that of Russia in 2008,66 and even though “Central Asia once may have been Russia’s backyard, China has redrawn the fences”.67 It seems very unlikely that Russia will be able to challenge China in South Asia; however Russia could of course potentially be an alternative partner for the South Asian countries. Aware of Russian sensitivities on increased Chinese influence in Central Asia, Beijing has adjusted some of its original plans for railways and pipelines in the Silk Road Economic Belt programme in order to ease Russian concerns.68 With the Russian–US/NATO antagonism over the Ukraine crisis lingering, Russia is also becoming more dependent on China. Traditionally, China’s main strategic concern has been US encirclement and “to prevent China’s neighbours from moving into alignment with the United States and with one another to counter China’s rise”.69 When US and NATO forces moved into Afghanistan in 2001 and established military bases in several countries in Central Asia, this of course caused alarm bells to ring in Beijing.70 Because stabilization of Afghanistan was in China’s own interest and China officially supported the War on Terror, the Chinese government was careful in its rhetoric, but Chinese media and some observers strongly

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criticized the US strategy in Central Asia.71 China also reacted to what it saw as US meddling in the colour revolutions in the mid-2000s, including the 2005 Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan.72 Pakistan also plays a part in Chinese concerns regarding US encirclement, and the bilateral relationship can be a useful tool in efforts to restrain US interests in the region, as well as for pressurizing India.73 However, as a result of China’s increased economic and military capabilities vis-a`-vis India and Russia, and with the US leaving Afghanistan, we may have reached a point where China is becoming less concerned with countering other great powers’ influence in its own backyard and more concerned with promoting and consolidating its own influence.

Silk Road Diplomacy: Chinese Advantages China has a number of advantages, which help the country play a prominent role in South Asia. One first obvious advantage is China’s economy, the attractiveness of China’s huge market and well-established financial schemes supporting Chinese enterprises investing in the region. A second and related advantage is China’s increasingly dominant economic and political position in the region. While in East Asia China is “competing” with the United States and Japan for influence, Chinese power is increasingly less contested in Central and South Asia. As Cordesman argues, the US has other strategic priorities, and as shown above, China’s GDP is several times larger than both India and Russia. Third, China is rapidly building a strong relationship with Afghanistan. China does not have any historical baggage of imperialism in Afghanistan, it is willing to invest, helping Afghanistan to gain greater economic independence, and it also engages in the peace process, supporting the Afghan nation-building. China did not participate in the war in Afghanistan and has avoided making enemies with any of the domestic political forces, something which makes it easier for all involved parties to accept China’s contributions. Furthermore, China’s “all-weather” long-term strategic relationship with Pakistan is already a pillar in China’s Silk Road policy. In the mid-1950s, China and Pakistan reached a strategic understanding of their common interests towards India, China supported Pakistan in their 1965 war with India and has greatly assisted Pakistan’s building of nuclear deterrence. It is currently debated if Pakistan still holds the same importance for China in its

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South Asia policy.74 For instance, China seems increasingly concerned by the possible consequences of Pakistani instability. However, Beijing’s promise of the $46 billion CPEC construction suggests that China still attaches great importance to its partnership with Pakistan, and this will actually add an earlier underdeveloped economic dimension to their partnership. China’s relationship with Kabul and Islamabad enables China to build a corridor through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean, and to connect its expanding road, rail and pipeline network into Iran. China’s relatively good relationship with Iran is another advantage, as Iran is an important player in Afghanistan. Garver shows how the dominant nationalist narratives of China and Iran create basis for solidarity between the countries, feeding a wish to restore their international status.75 Founded on interests rather than values, both countries seek to increase their influence through cooperation: “A cooperative relation with Iran multiplies China’s own influence in an important region,” and for Iran a benefit is Chinese counterbalancing of US influence.76 During his visit to China in April 2015, Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh stated that “This country [China], as one of the biggest buyers of Iran’s oil, has been greatly cooperating with the Islamic Republic under conditions of sanctions and we are willing for that cooperation to continue when sanctions are removed.”77 Finally, China has pursued a pro-active regional multilateral diplomacy and is a member of most regional institutions and policy dialogues in Central and South Asia, a platform Beijing can make use of in its Silk Road policy. China is part of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) programme and in 2015 the CAREC Institute was established in Urumqi, the provincial capital of Xinjiang.78 China is an important part of the Istanbul process, an international effort to engage the “Heart of Asia” countries in sincere and result-oriented cooperation for a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.79 In 2012, then Afghan president Hamid Karzai proposed an Afghanistan– China– Pakistan trilateral dialogue platform focusing on security cooperation, an initiative which Beijing endorsed. Since 2006, China has been an observer in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and seeks full membership, however India has so far blocked this.80 The most important multilateral vehicle for China in this region is the Shanghai Co-operation Organization. China wants to develop the SCO into a regional forum for cooperation on security and

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economy.81 Afghanistan was admitted as an observer in 2012, and with India and Pakistan admitted as full members in 2015 SCO may also become a useful tool for China in South Asia. However, most SCO members would be reluctant for the organization to play an active role in Afghanistan in the near future, and Moscow promotes the Russiandominated Collective Security Treaty Organization as the appropriate vehicle in Afghanistan rather than the SCO.82 Thus as Rehman shows with the SCO as example, multilateral organizations may also be arenas for power/influence contests between countries.83

Silk Road Diplomacy: Chinese Disadvantages Even with increased economic, diplomatic and military muscle and a clear ambition to increase its footprint in South Asia, China has to face some disadvantages and challenges. First, the Silk Road action plan issued in March 2015 is exceedingly comprehensive and ambitious, and with an increasing number of ministries, provinces and enterprises seemingly wanting their piece of the cake, China runs the risk of losing the overarching strategy and aim of this policy. Already in 2014, Wang Tianling warned that China “should avoid an investment frenzy caused by grand ambitions and political preference” in its Silk Road diplomacy.84 The second disadvantage is also found at home, in Xinjiang and potentially also in Tibet, China’s main corridors to Central and South Asia. While Beijing has spent huge sums on economic development in these two autonomous regions over a number of years, the local ethnic population still feels marginalized, and Xinjiang and Tibet continue to be China’s two most unstable “provinces”. A third disadvantage is that most of the countries in Central and South Asia rank among the world’s most fragile states. China hopes that the Silk Road initiative will contribute to economic integration and stability, however investing billions of dollars in infrastructure facilitating for import and export through this volatile region is certainly a risky strategy. In 2014, Kazakhstan and Pakistan ranked 126th of 175 countries on the Transparency International Corruption Index. Kyrgyzstan ranked 136th, Tajikistan 152nd, Uzbekistan 166th and Afghanistan as 172nd.85 The region is also a transit area for drug trafficking from the “Golden Crescent” (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran) to the coastal cities of China.86 There is a risk of political turbulence in this region with negative consequences for Chinese

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investments, but this is a challenge shared by other investors. Some countries, however, seem willing to help protect Chinese investments. During Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan in 2015, Pakistan’s military said it would form a special security division to protect Chinese nationals working on development projects in Pakistan.87 Fourth; with an increased presence and large-scale investment projects in fragile states like Pakistan and Afghanistan China will no longer be able to keep a low profile. China may find it increasingly difficult to maintain its stated principle of non-interference, either because it may have to assist/rescue Chinese citizens working in volatile areas or because China might find itself entangled in disputes in neighbouring countries. Chinese businesses have already been the targets of local terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. China may also become more vulnerable to terrorist attacks on Chinese soil, due to the links between Islamic groups in Xinjiang and in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and we have already seen, during the Uighur unrest in Xinjiang in 2009, that China became a target of Al-Qaeda criticism.88 Fifth, while Chinese economic strength is a great advantage, this could also turn perceptions against them. China’s rapid rise as a global player has fuelled a “China Threat” narrative, and China’s overwhelming influence over the smaller states of South Asia may incite suspicion, anti-Chinese sentiments and a wish to balance China’s influence by developing closer relationship with other great powers. To put China’s overwhelming power into perspective, in 2014 China’s GDP was 15 times larger than the combined GDP of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.89 Wang Tianling points to the Chinese investment in the Myitsone Dam project in Myanmar, which was suddenly (and famously) suspended by Myanmar’s government, as an important lesson for China’s Silk Road policy.90 The Central Asian states are concerned about their growing economic dependence on China,91 and this could also become the case for South Asian countries, forcing them to seek alternative partners to balance China. Wang Yiwei acknowledges that several countries have reservations about China’s Silk Road initiative and identifies India as the country most sceptical towards Chinese goals.92 India would certainly want to be the preferred partner of its neighbouring countries in South Asia, and with the Silk Road initiative China is now more than ever emerging as a competitor to Indian interests in South Asia. While the initial Indian response seemed

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muted,93 New Delhi now actively argues that India must seek cooperation with its neighbours, particularly within connectivity.94 In much the same way as China fears US encirclement, New Delhi fears Chinese encirclement. China and India disagree on a number of issues and have a history of conflict. Disagreement over Tibet was at the heart of the 1962 Sino – Indian War, and the border dispute is unresolved. Significantly, China still uses the name South Tibet for the Indian state Arunachal Pradesh. Furthermore they have disagreed over the status of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, and India is sceptical of Chinese intentions in Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Thus it is only to be expected that India should be concerned about the increased Chinese presence in Afghanistan. As one of the world’s largest importers of oil and gas, India also wants access to the oil and gas resources in Iran, Central Asia and the Caspian region. Chinese domination in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran would therefore be a considerable challenge to Indian security policy. In April 2016, India finalized the trilateral Chabahar agreement with Iran and Afghanistan, which will improve regional connectivity with Chabahar Port in Iran as a focal point.95 The impetus for India’s 1998 nuclear test was actually rooted in geostrategic concerns about China,96 and China’s military capabilities have increased rapidly since the late 1990s. While India in the 2010–14 period was the world’s largest arms importer, and in 2014 had the seventh largest defence budget, China’s defence budget is more than four times larger.97 India views China as a potential challenge on its continental and maritime peripheries, and “India is acutely concerned about [. . .] the prospect of a China-dominated Asia”.98 Indian observers tend to overestimate the threat from China, however, particularly in the maritime domain. China’s navy still lacks the power projection capabilities to play a prominent role in the Indian Ocean Region. While Chinese investments in port facilities in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar are a far cry from the purported military bases, and Chinese submarines docking in Sri Lanka and Pakistan only conduct support missions for Chinese anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, China will still struggle to mitigate Indian reservations. India’s first homebuilt aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant is expected to be inducted into the Indian Navy in 2017, India is planning to build new nuclear attack submarines (SSN) and the Indian navy seeks to more than double its fleet over the next decade, to 200 operational warships.99

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New Delhi may be exaggerating the China threat, but Beijing also runs the risk of underestimating Indian concerns about China, and both types of misperceptions may lead to miscalculations.100 Garver argues that the Sino– Indian relationship goes deeper than security concerns and is rooted in the fact that both nations see themselves as great nations and ancient civilizations which require a wider sphere of influence.101 If China ventures too far into India’s perceived sphere of influence, it might force India to strengthen its ties with the United States, as the US seeks to strengthen its relationship with India to counterweight China in the region. A Chinese charm offensive towards New Delhi in the early 2000s could not prevent India from moving closer to the US and the 2006 US– India nuclear cooperation agreement.102 In recent years, New Delhi has also courted Japan, with an India–Japan Foreign Ministers’ Strategic Dialogue being held in Japan and India alternately since 2007. India also participates in the US– India– Japan Trilateral Dialogue, and in June 2015 India hosted its first ever trilateral dialogue with Japan and Australia.

Conclusion We argue that Afghanistan and South Asia do not top China’s list of strategic priorities, and China’s Silk Road diplomacy has a much broader context than South Asia. China should, however, still be expected to play a prominent role in the future of both Afghanistan and the wider South Asian region. Chinese economic strength and willingness to invest in the region, as illustrated by the recent Silk Road initiative, China’s more pro-active foreign policy, China’s proximity to the region and strategic interest in South Asia, are all factors contributing to increased Chinese engagement. China has traditionally been very reluctant to engage in peace and reconciliation efforts, its facilitation of the Six Party talks on North Korea being an exception. The present Chinese engagement in peace talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government is of course a result of Chinese ambitions to play a more pro-active role in international affairs in general. It is, however, also a result of the importance China attaches to stability in Afghanistan, both for domestic reasons in Xinjiang and because a stable Afghanistan will ease Chinese access to markets and resources in South Asia and beyond.

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It seems China is becoming less concerned with countering other great powers’ influence in Central and South Asia and more concerned with promoting and consolidating its own influence. In fact, China’s Silk Road Diplomacy is perhaps the most visible example of China not only taking a more pro-active role in international affairs, but actually of China seeking to shape regional development according to its own vision and ambition. Chinese national interests partially overlap with assumed regional interests such as economic development, regional integration and the establishment of vast infrastructures which will enable an unprecedented movement of people and goods through previously inaccessible areas, and which in combination will entail numerous embedded opportunities for economic growth, stability and social development. An increased Chinese footprint will give South Asian countries economic opportunities. At the same time, however, the Chinese expansion of influence is likely to also encounter resistance, triggering fears of exclusion and suspicion regarding ulterior motives, particularly in India. We should expect South Asian countries seeking to balance Chinese influence through engaging with India and external actors like Russia, European countries and the United States. However, the question is if any of these countries will be able to match China in their own backyard, should China decide to increase its regional footprint considerably. In order to avoid balancing behaviour from India, it should be in China’s interest to show restraint when pursuing its own national interests, however given the wide range of Chinese actors and interests involved in the Silk Road initiative, there is no guarantee that China can secure a coherent Silk Road Diplomacy. China’s active participation in regional multilateral political structures may help maintain arenas for co-operation and further opportunities for economic and social change. At the same time, however, the same multilateral institutions may also constitute arenas for contests of influence and power. In this regard, it will be interesting to see how the Chinese-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization develops, with India and Pakistan as new members.

Notes 1. China–Afghanistan Joint Statement on Deepening Strategic and Cooperative Partnership, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,

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3.

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17 November 2014. Available at http://mfa.gov.af/en/news/china-afghanistanjoint-statement-on-deepening-strategic-and-cooperative-partnership (accessed 30 June 2015). Ashraf Ghani as quoted in Page, Jeremy, Margherita Stancati and Nathan Hodge, “As U.S. Exits, China takes on Afghanistan Role”, Wall Street Journal, 9 February 2015. Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-u-s-exits-chinatakes-on-afghanistan-role-1423539002 (accessed 25 June 2015). National Development and Reform Commission, Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, issued jointly by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 28 March 2015. Available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/ t20150330_669367.html (accessed 20 July 2015). See for instance Erickson, Andrew S., Lyle Goldstein and Carnes Lord, China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2009) and Perry, John Curtis, “Imperial China and the Sea” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes (eds), Asia Looks Seaward. Power and Maritime Strategy (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International 2008). Lo, Jung-pang, China as a Sea Power 1127– 1368: A Preliminary Survey of the Maritime Expansion and Naval Exploits of the Chinese People During the Southern Song and Yuan Periods (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1957/2012), and Grygiel, Jakub J., Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). Ross, Robert S., “The U.S.-China Peace. Great Power Politics, Spheres of Influence, and the Peace of East Asia”, Journal of East Asian Studies 3/3, Autumn 2003. Erickson, Andrew S., “China’s Naval Modernisation, Strategies and Capabilities”, in Jo Inge Bekkevold and Geoffrey Till (eds), International Order at Sea: How it is Challenged. How it is Maintained (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). Wang, Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way”, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011. Available at https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2011-02-20/chinas-search-grand-strategy (accessed 24 July 2015). See Yun, Sun, “March West: China’s Response to the U.S. Rebalancing”, The Brookings Institution, 31 January 2013. Available at http://www.brookings. edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/01/31-china-us-sun (accessed 24 July 2015). Wang, Yiwei, ‘Yi Dai Yi Lu’: Jiyu yu Tiaozhan, Renmin Chubanshe [‘One Belt, One Road’: Opportunities and Challenges ] (Beijing: People’s Press, 2015). These trade figures are all from China’s National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook 2014, Beijing. Available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ ndsj/2014/zk/html/Z1106E.HTM (accessed 2 July 2015). National Development and Reform Commission, Vision and Actions, 2015.

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13. China.org.cn, “President Xi Jinping proposes to build a Silk Road Economic Belt with Central Asian countries”, 1 November 2013. Available at http:// www.china.org.cn/travel/revitalize_the_silk_road_in_Shaanxi/2013-11/01/ content_30468580.htm (accessed 20 July 2015). 14. “Chronology of China’s Belt and Road Initiative”, Xinhua, 28 March 2015. Available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/28/c_134105435. htm (accessed 26 June 2015). 15. Zhao, Suisheng, “China’s Periphery Policy and Its Asian Neighbors”, Security Dialogue 30/3 (1999), pp. 335 –46; and Fravel, M. Taylor, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 16. Swaine, Michael D., “Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy”, China Leadership Monitor 44/Summer (Hoover Institution, 28 July 2014). Available at http://www.hoover.org/research/chinese-viewsand-commentary-periphery-diplomacy (accessed 29 June 2015). 17. This has been the subject of a fast-growing scholarly literature. For a recent example, see Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay”, Washington Quarterly 37/4 (Winter 2015), pp. 151 – 70. 18. Sørensen, Camilla T. N., “The Significance of Xi Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’ for Chinese Foreign Policy: From ‘Tao Guang Yang Hui’ to ‘Fen Fa You Wei’”, Journal of China and International Relations (JCIR) 3/1 (2015), pp. 53 – 73. 19. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy”, 2014. 20. For a recent assessment of China’s economy, see for instance International Monetary Fund, People’s Republic of China: 2014 Article IV Consultation-Staff Report, IMF Country Report No. 14/235, July 2014. Available at https://www. imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14235.pdf (accessed 20 July 2014). 21. Ernst & Young, “Riding the Silk Road: China sees Outbound Investment Boom. Outlook for China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment” (China: Ernst & Young, China, March 2015). 22. Reuters, “China to Establish $40 Billion Silk Road Infrastructure Fund”. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/08/us-china-diplomacyidUSKBN0IS0BQ20141108 (accessed 28 June 2015). 23. National Development and Reform Commission, Visions and Actions, 2015. 24. Xinjiang and Tibet both have status as autonomous regions; Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) and Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). For a background reader on Xinjiang, see S. Frederick Starr (ed), Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland (London and New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). 25. Millward, James A. and Nabijan Tursun, “Political History and Strategies of Control, 1884– 1978”, in Starr (2004). 26. Yuan, Jing-Dong, “China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)”, Journal of Contemporary China, 19/67 (November 2010), pp. 855 – 69. Song, Weiqing, “Interests, Power and China’s Difficult Game in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, Journal of Contemporary China 23/85 (2014), pp. 85 –101.

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27. Song, “Interests, Power and China’s Difficult Game in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”; Clarke, Michael, “China’s Strategy in ‘Greater Central Asia’: Is Afghanistan the Missing Link?”, Asian Affairs: An American Review 40 (2013), pp. 1 – 19. 28. Yua, “China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)”, pp. 857– 8. 29. Masood, Salmon and Declan Walsh, “Xi Jinping Plans to Fund Pakistan”, New York Times, 21 April 2015. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2015/04/22/world/asia/xi-jinping-plans-to-fund-pakistan.html (accessed 25 July 2015). 30. The Chinese government has blamed Uighur separatists and militants for both the Tiananmen Square incident in 2013 and the Kunming train station attack in Yunnan province in 2014 where 33 people were stabbed to death and another 113 injured. 31. Cheng, Joseph Y. S., “The Afghanistan situation and China’s New Approach to the SCO”, Asian Survey 55/2 (March/April 2015), p. 367. 32. A clearly articulated goal of the March 2015 road map launched by the NDRC is to develop China’s inner provinces, and turn the city of Xian into an economic hub for China’s interior and the Silk Road Economic Belt. Xian was the capital of China during the Tang Dynasty, in the heyday of the Silk Road in the seventh-ninth centuries. This is a parallel to China’s “Grand Western Development Program” of the late 1990s, when the city of Chongqing was given the role as economic hub. National Development and Reform Commission, Vision and Actions, 2015. 33. Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Nathan, “In a Fortnight: NPC meeting Touts New Silk Road as New Driver for Economic Growth”, China Brief, Jamestown foundation XV/6 (19 March 2015). 34. Dasgupta, Saibal, “Modi positive about China-Nepal-India corridor, Chinese official says”, The Times of India, 2 July 2015. Available at http://times ofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Modi-positive-about-China-Nepal-Indiacorridor-Chinese-official-says/articleshow/47913474.cms (accessed 24 July 2015). 35. Clarke, “China’s Strategy in ‘Greater Central Asia’”. 36. Huasheng, Zhao, “What Is Behind China’s Growing Attention to Afghanistan?”, Carnegie Middle East Center, 8 March 2015. Available at http://carnegie-mec.org/2015/03/08/what-is-behind-china-s-growingattention-to-afghanistan (accessed 25 June 2015). 37. Yun, Sun 2013; Scobell, Andrew, “China Ponders Post-2014 Afghanistan: Neither ‘All in’ Nor Bystander”, Asian Survey 55/2 (March/April 2015), p. 328. 38. Zhao, “What Is Behind China’s Growing Attention to Afghanistan?”. 39. Ibid.; and Page, Jeremy, Margherita Stancati and Nathan Hodge, “As U.S. Exits, China Takes On Afghanistan Role”, Wall Street Journal, 9 February 2015. Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-u-s-exits-china-takes-onafghanistan-role-1423539002 (accessed 25 June 2015).

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40. Zhao (2015); Page, Stancati and Hodge (2015); Tridivesh, Singh Maini, “Competing for Influence in Afghanistan”, The Diplomat, 27 March 2015. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/china-and-india-competingfor-influence-in-afghanistan/ (accessed 25 June 2015); and Small, Andrew, “Why is China Talking to the Taliban?”, Foreign Policy, 21 June 2013. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/21/why-is-china-talking-tothe-taliban/ (accessed 26 July 2015). 41. Small, “Why is China Talking to the Taliban?”. 42. Associate Press, “Next round of talks between Kabul government and the Taliban set for July 30 in China”, 24 July 2015. Available at http://www.us news.com/news/world/articles/2015/07/24/afghan-official-next-talks-withthe-taliban-set-for-july-30 (accessed 26 July 2015). 43. AwazTV, “China held rounds of Taliban talks: Afghanistan’s Abdullah”, 14 March 2015. Available at http://www.awaztoday.tv/News_China-heldrounds-of-Taliban-talks-Afghanistans-Abdullah_1_55522_Political-News. aspx (accessed 26 July 2015). 44. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “China is now the world’s largest net importer of petroleum and other liquid fuels”, March 2014. Available at http:// www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id¼15531# (accessed 25 July 2015). 45. Scobell, “China Ponders Post-2014 Afghanistan”, pp. 325 – 45. 46. Tunsjø, Øystein, Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy: Hedging Against Risk (Columbia University Press, 2013), pp. 150– 1. 47. Aneja, Atul, “China reaps rewards for standing by Iran”, The Hindu, 11 April 2015. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-reapsrewards-for-standing-by-iran-during-tough-times/article7092356.ece (accessed 25 July 2015). 48. Unless otherwise noted, facts and figures on China’s energy import and demand are taken from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, China Country Report, 14 May 2015. Available at http://www.eia.gov/beta/ international/analysis.cfm?iso¼ CHN (accessed 25 July 2015). 49. Downs, Erica, “Mission Mostly Accomplished: China’s Energy Trade and Investment Along the Silk Road Economic Belt”, China Brief, Jamestown foundation XV/6 (19 March 2015). 50. Downs, “Mission Mostly Accomplished”. 51. Shah, Saeed, “China to Build Pipeline From Iran to Pakistan”, The Wall Street Journal, 9 April 2015. Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-bui ld-pipeline-from-iran-to-pakistan-1428515277 (accessed 25 July 2015). 52. “Construction work started on 700-km pipeline from China to Pakistan: Abbasi”, Dawn.com, 20 July 2015. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/ 1195279 (accessed 25 July 2015). 53. Risen, James, “U.S. Identifies Vast Mineral Riches in Afghanistan”, New York Times, 13 June 2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/14/ world/asia/14minerals.html?_r¼0 (accessed 25 July 2015). 54. Scobell, “China Ponders Post-2014 Afghanistan”, pp. 325 – 45.

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55. Cheng, “The Afghanistan Situation and China’s New Approach to the SCO”, pp. 346 –70. 56. Tunsjø, Security and Profit in China’s Energy Policy. 57. Ibid. 58. U.S. Energy Information Administration, China Country Report (2015), Tunsjø (2013), pp. 170– 3. 59. China Daily, “Backgrounder: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”, 22 April 2015. Available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015xivisitpse/201504/22/content_20503693.htm (accessed 21 July 2015); Aneja, Atul, “Xi comes calling to Pakistan, bearing gifts worth $45 billion”, The Hindu, 18 April 2015. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/xijinping-visit-to-pakistan-preview/article7114980.ece (accessed 21 July 2015). 60. Gen Raheel, “First Cargo from China to Reach Gwadar this Year”, Express Tribune, 13 April 2016. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/ 1083729/first-cargo-from-china-to-reach-gwadar-this-year-gen-raheel/ (accessed 7 April 2016). 61. Rana, Shabaz, “Politicking may hurt CPEC, says World Bank”, Express Tribune, 12 April 2016. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/1083086/ politicking-may-hurt-cpec-says-world-bank/ (accessed 7 April 2016). 62. Garver, John W., Protracted Contest. Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 4. 63. Fravel, M. Taylor, “China Views India’s Rise: Deepening Cooperation, Managing Differences”, in Ashley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner and Jessica Keough (eds), Strategic Asia 2011– 12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers – China and India (The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2011). 64. International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook”, October 2015 Database. Available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/02/ weodata/index.aspx (accessed 15 April 2016). 65. Ibid. 66. Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 86. 67. Ibid, p. 96. 68. Yan, Xuetong, “Silk Road Economic Belt Shows China’s New Strategic Direction: Promoting Integration With Its Neighbors”, 21st Century Business Herald, 27 February 2014, reprinted in Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy. Available at http://carnegietsinghua.org/2014/02/27/silk-road-economicbelt-shows-china-s-new-strategic-direction-promoting-integration-with-itsneighbors (accessed 24 July 2015). 69. Garver, John and Wang Fei-ling, “China’s Anti-encirclement Struggle”, Asian Security 6/3 (2010), pp. 238– 61. 70. Scobell, “China Ponders Post-2014 Afghanistan”, pp. 325 – 45. 71. People’s Daily, “US scheming for ‘Great Central Asia’ Strategy”, 4 August 2006. Available at http://en.people.cn/200608/03/eng20060803_289512. html (accessed 26 July 2015).

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72. Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, pp. 81 – 3; and Yuan, “China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)”, p. 862. 73. Clark, “China’s Strategy in ‘Greater Central Asia’”, p. 7. 74. Garver, John et al., “Book Review Roundtable”, Andrew Small’s ‘The ChinaPakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics’”, Asia Policy 21 (January 2016), pp. 147 –73. 75. Garver, John, China & Iran. Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World (London and Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), pp. 4 – 11. 76. Garver, China & Iran, p. 20. 77. Aneja, Atul, “China reaps rewards for standing by Iran” (2015). 78. Asian Development Bank, http://www.adb.org/news/speeches/statement-adbvice-president-wencai-zhang-launching-carec-institute (accessed 20 July 2015). 79. Heart of Asia, Istanbul Process, http://www.heartofasia-istanbulprocess.af/ (accessed 20 July 2015). 80. Madan, Tanvi, “China’s Role in SAARC”, Brookings India, 20 November 2014. Available at http://www.brookings.in/chinas-role-in-saarc/ (accessed 20 July 2015). 81. Song, “Interests, Power and China’s Difficult Game in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”; Yuan, “China’s Role in Establishing and Building the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”. 82. Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, pp. 84 – 5. 83. Rehman, Iskander, “Keeping the Dragon at Bay: India’s Counter-Containment of China in Asia”, Asian Security 5/2 (2009), pp. 114– 43. 84. Wang, Tianling, “Eight Risks Silk Road Fund Faces”, China Daily, 19 – 25 December 2014. 85. Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2014, https://www. transparency.org/cpi2014/results, (accessed 21 July 2015). 86. Wishnick, Elisabeth, “There Goes the Neighborhood: Afghanistan’s Challenge to China’s Regional Security Goals”, Brown Journal of World Affairs XIX/1 (Autumn/Winter 2012), pp. 83 –100. 87. Masood, Salmon and Declan Wals, “Xi Jinping Plans to Fund Pakistan”. 88. Wishnick, “There Goes the Neighborhood”. 89. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 2015 Database. 90. Wang, Tianlin, “Eight Risks Silk Road Fund Faces”. 91. Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, pp. 86 – 7. 92. Wang Yiwei, ‘Yi Dai Yi Lu’: Jiyu yu Tiaozhan, pp. 90, 107. 93. Price, Gareth, “India’s Take on China’s Silk Road: Ambivalence with Lurking Worries”, Global Asia, 26 September 2015. 94. “India cannot grow in isolation, needs growth in connectivity with neighbours: S. Jaishankar”, Times of India, 9 April 2016. Available at http://timesofindia. indiatimes.com/business/india-business/India-cannot-grow-in-isolation-needsgrowth-in-connectivity-with-neighbours-S-Jaishankar/articleshow/51756081. cms (accessed 9 April 2016).

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95. Ministry of External Affairs, Finalisation of Trilateral Chabahar Agreement, 12 April 2016. Available at http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/ 26625/Finalisation_of_Trilateral_Chabahar_Agreement (accessed 14 April 2016). 96. Garver, Protracted Contest, p. 8. 97. Perlo-Freeman, Sam, Aude Fleurant, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2014”, SIPRI Fact Sheet, April 2015. Available at http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1504.pdf (accessed 28 July 2015). 98. Kalyanaraman, S., “The sources of military change in India”, in Jo Inge Bekkevold, Ian Bowers and Michael Raska (eds) Security, Strategy and Military Change in the 21st Century: Cross-regional perspective (London, Routledge, 2015), p. 89. 99. Keck, Zachary, “Watch Out, China: India’s Navy Wants 200 Warships”, The National Interest, 15 July 2015. Available at http://nationalinterest.org/ blog/the-buzz/watch-out-china-indias-navy-wants-200-warships-13340 (accessed 24 July 2015). 100. Fravel, “China Views India’s Rise”, p. 67. 101. Garver, Protracted Contest, pp. 11 – 12. 102. Garver and Wang, “China’s Anti-encirclement Struggle”, pp. 241– 3.

CHAPTER 6 INDIA'S AFGHANISTAN POLICY: IN SEARCH OF A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY Meena Singh Roy and Christian Wagner

Introduction The regional dynamics of Afghanistan’s politics and conflicts cannot be fully grasped without an examination of India’s role in Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s importance for India lies in its strategic location. Economically, a stable Afghanistan is India’s gateway to the oil and gas of Iran, Central Asian and the Caspian region. Politically, no government in New Delhi wants Afghanistan to become a hotbed for extremist forces again or a springboard for insurgencies against India.1 Since the late 1980s, Pakistan has used its influence in Afghanistan to train militants and to export jihad to Jammu and Kashmir, just as the Afghan civil war in the 1990s was, to a great extent, a proxy war between India and Pakistan. In the larger context of foreign policy, Afghanistan has also been seen as a test case of India’s rising powers ambitions both on the regional and the international level.2 India’s political, economic and security interests indicate that the country will become more involved in the search for a conflict resolution in Afghanistan after the drawdown of the Western troops in 2016. However, India has traditionally pursued at least two different approaches for conflict resolution. First, since Nehru’s time India was

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active on the multilateral stage where it has participated in international efforts for conflict resolution like in Southeast Asia or has supported the efforts of the United Nations with the deployment of Indian troops to UN peace operations. Second, on the regional level, India has for a long time pursued a strategy of direct or indirect interventions. The different interventions in Nepal since the 1950s, in East Pakistan in 1971, in Sri Lanka after 1987 and the Maldives in 1988 are illustrations hereof. The situation in Afghanistan after 2016 will be an interesting case because it is a rare example in which India seems to pursue both strategies. Afghanistan has a special place in India’s South Asia policy. On the one hand, India has both security and economic interests in Afghanistan. The rivalry with Pakistan over political influence in Afghanistan and the country’s geographical position as a transit to Central Asia illustrate these interests. On the other hand, Afghanistan is the only SAARC country with which India does not share a common border. This limits India’s efforts because goods and personal have to be transported by sea and land over Iran to circumvent Pakistan. India has invested massively in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 and is the largest non-Western donor. But India also supports the different efforts by other powers and regional organizations to promote political stability and economic development in Afghanistan. After a short historical overview the article will look into India’s economic, political and security strategies both on the bilateral and the multilateral level vis-a`-vis Afghanistan.

The Historical Context Afghanistan, a plural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual country, has been an area of grand ambitions and competition for imperial powers both in medieval and modern history, as noted both in the Introduction and Chapter 1. The Indian connection is noteworthy for its history and richness. Long before the British imperial power came to the region, Indian rulers like the Mauryan Empire developed strong cultural and trade links to Afghanistan. Despite foreign interventions, repeated violence between various power structures, Afghanistan continued as a geo-political unit and attracted the attention of regional and extraregional powers. The Delhi Sultans were aware of the strategic importance of Afghanistan for their security and later the British tried to

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transform Afghanistan into a buffer state against Russian expansionism in Central Asia.3 Afghanistan has been the playground for these powers either to retain their influence or to contain their adversary.4 These competitions and rivalry among various actors have negatively affected the political and economic development of Afghanistan. Besides these external factors, the constant domestic struggle between the forces of modernization and orthodox Islam and the ethnic divisions within the Afghan population has also contributed to instability and tensions.5 The only period which could perhaps be considered as comparatively stable was from 1933 to 1973 when King Mohammed Zahir Shah ruled the country. The political process and structure of the government during this period remained decentralized and feudal. King Zahir Shah focused mainly on developmental activities in the capital, Kabul, and important cities. In rural Afghanistan, tribal leaders were free to manage their affairs according to the local traditional practices and customs. However, Afghanistan became a battle ground following Daud’s bloodless coup against King Zahir Shah, the Soviet-backed violent revolution resulting in Soviet military intervention (in 1979) and later the proxy war led by the Cold War rivals, the US and Soviet Union.6 The Soviet withdrawal at the end of the 1980s led to a period of instability that escalated into a civil war in the mid-1990s. This paved the way for the emergence of the Taliban who were supported by Pakistan and whose ascendency closed off most Indian channels of influence. During the Taliban regime between 1996 and 2001 Afghanistan became a hotbed of extremism and a breeding ground for jihadi forces involved in exporting terrorism with in the region and beyond. The Western post9/11 intervention offered Afghans an opportunity to stabilize their country, just as it offered India a new opportunity to help shape the regional politics of the country.

India’s Economic and Political Relations The Bilateral Dimension Barring the period of Taliban rule between 1996 and 2001, India has enjoyed strong cultural bonds and trade links with Afghanistan. Already in 1950, both countries signed a bilateral friendship treaty.7 After 2001, India has built a strong relationship with the Karzai government

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through its high level of political and financial engagement. India has already committed economic assistance amounting to more than $2 billion, mainly in large infrastructure projects and “Small Developmental Projects” (SDP). India’s “developmental partnership” is tantamount to a “soft power” policy approach towards Afghanistan. Its policies included providing humanitarian assistance, capacity building, augmenting economic growth and developing infrastructure. Moreover, India supported Afghanistan’s membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 2007 with the aim of reviving the traditional role of Afghanistan as a land bridge connecting South Asia with Central Asia and West Asia. India has always seen Afghanistan as a potential land bridge for trade with Central Asia. This view was quite eloquently expressed at a Moscow Conference by the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy, S. K. Lambah. “Historically”, Lambah argued, “Afghanistan has prospered when it has served as the trade and transportation hub between Central Asia and South Asia. If we were to implement the projects and activities on the anvil, which allow greater commercial and economic exchanges by removing barriers to investment, trade and transit, this would transform not just Afghanistan but other regional countries as well.”8 India’s economic support has contributed in a major way in reconstruction of Afghanistan but also been hampered due to the deteriorating security situation within the country and the efforts of extremist groups backed by Pakistan to sabotage India’s endeavours. India’s pledged bilateral commitment to the rebuilding and reconstruction of Afghanistan has now reached the level of $2.3 billion.9 This aid has been mainly for projects in power, roads, agriculture and education.10 India’s bilateral engagement has resulted in the construction of the 218 km Zaranj– Delaram road project, at a cost of $150 million (Rs 750 crore), which was inaugurated by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee in January 2009. The road will help link Afghanistan with Chahbahar port in Iran. Moreover, the Pul-e-Khumri transmission line to Kabul will soon be completed by the Power Grid Corporation of India, which will bring power from Uzbekistan to Kabul. From an Indian perspective, projects such as these connect Afghanistan with its neighbours and make them stakeholders in Afghanistan’s development. Finally, it is worth mentioning the largest project that India has delivered is the 42-MW Salma Dam Power Project in the

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western Afghanistan province of Herat, run by the state-owned Water & Power Consultancy Services Ltd (WAPCOS).11 Moreover, India has since 2009 offered wheat aid – up to 250,000 metric tons – to Afghanistan to alleviate its food crisis.12 There are also over 4,000 Indians working in Afghanistan on various projects in institution building, infrastructure, education, power, telecommunications and agriculture and food assistance. There are about 43 registered Indian and Indian joint-venture companies in Afghanistan,13 and India’s assistance has extended into education, health care and the training of Afghan diplomats and police. India’s trade with Afghanistan has thus gone up over last five years from $588.74 million in 2009– 10 to $683.10 million in 2013–14 and $684.48 million in 2014– 15. But the figures show that Afghanistan remains only a marginal partner in India’s overall trade (see Table 6.1). Afghanistan’s most important trading partners are Iran, Pakistan and China. India ranks number two for imports to Afghanistan.14 A new impetus for cooperation occurred with the visit of Afghanistan’s External Affairs Minister, Rangin Dadfar Spanta to Delhi in July 2009, when the two countries agreed to set up an India– Afghanistan Partnership Council composed of separate working groups on political consultation, capacity development and education, power and water, culture, trade and industry, health and agriculture. This was an attempt to enlarge developmental cooperation and harness greater institutional support for the implementation of ongoing developmental programmes.15 The next step came in 2011 when India and Afghanistan signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). It was Afghanistan first strategic partnership agreement and it underlined the desire of both countries to expand their bilateral political, economic and security relations. Four years after the signing of the SPA, the implementation does not seem to have been very effective so far.16 India has established broad relations with the Afghan elite and the civil society. India has always been an attractive destination for the moderate Afghan elite. Former President Karzai studied in India, the family of former President Najibullah stayed in Delhi after 1992.17 India is also an attractive destination for medical treatment for members of the Afghan elite.18 In cooperation with the United States, India has also been working in the areas of agricultural development and women empowerment in the NGO sector in Afghanistan. The Self-Employed Women’s Association

Table 6.1

India – Afghanistan Trade, 2009 –15 (in US$ millions)

S.No

Year

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

EXPORT %Growth India’s Total Export %Growth %Share IMPORT %Growth India’s Total Import %Growth %Share TOTAL TRADE %Growth India’s Total Trade %Growth %Share TRADE BALANCE India’s Trade Balance

2009– 10

2010–11

463.55

422.41

178,751.43

249,815.55

0.26 125.19

0.17 146.03

288,372.88

369,769.13

0.04 588.74

0.04 568.44

467,124.31

619,584.68

0.13 338.36 2109,621.45

0.09 276.38 2119,953.58

2011–12

2012–13

2013–14

2014–15

510.90 20.95 305,963.92 22.48 0.17 132.50 29.26 489,319.49 32.33 0.03 643.41 13.19 795,283.41 28.36 0.08 378.40 2183,355.57

472.63 2 7.49 300,400.58 2 1.82 0.16 159.55 20.42 490,736.65 0.29 0.03 632.18 2 1.74 791,137.23 2 0.52 0.08 313.07 2190,336.07

474.34 0.36 314,405.30 4.66 0.15 208.77 30.84 450,199.79 2 8.26 0.05 683.10 8.06 764,605.09 2 3.35 0.09 265.57 2135,794.49

422.57 2 10.91 310,572.44 2 1.22 0.14 261.91 25.46 448,044.62 2 0.48 0.06 684.48 0.20 758,617.06 2 0.78 0.09 160.66 2137,472.18

Source: http://www.commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp (accessed on 24 August 2015). (Note: Since 2006 – 7, Petroleum figures are being computed from Import Daily trade Returns (DTRs) to generate country-wise/port-wise tables. Up to 2005 – 6 consolidated petroleum import figures were being received from the Petroleum Ministry).

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(SEWA) is an Indian NGO that has been working in Afghanistan since 2008 and which is estimated to have trained over 3,000 Afghan women so far. The trilateral dialogue between India, Afghanistan and the US, which took place in September 2012, has great potential to work in the area of social and economic development of Afghanistan.19 Nonetheless, India has sought to reassure President Ashraf Ghani and his new executive of India’s long-term commitment to the security and development of Afghanistan. With its bilateral developmental assistance of more than $2 billion, India is the largest non-Western donor in Afghanistan. In 2013/14 Afghanistan was among the top three countries that have received support under India’s Technical Cooperation programme.20 Prime Minister Modi underscored India’s commitment to Afghanistan to the President Ghani during his visit to India in April 2015. Modi promised India’s exploration of new trade and investment opportunities and expansion of “development partnership, which includes infrastructure, agriculture, connectivity, human resource development, community projects and humanitarian assistance”.21 In addition he emphasized that India will particularly focus on Afghan children and conveyed New Delhi’s fresh support for Habibia School in Kabul, the Indira Gandhi Child Health Care Hospital and Red Crescent Society Fund for treatment of children with congenital heart disease.22 Moreover, India will continue to scale up its contribution to Afghan reconstruction and development and particularly invest in four types of projects or activities: large infrastructure projects; humanitarian assistance; capacity building initiatives; and “Small Development Projects”. As part of this effort, a consortium of public and private Indian companies has been selected to make one of the biggest investments in Afghanistan’s mining sector, in the Hajigak iron ore reserves.23 Indian governments have also promoted the process of democratization in Afghanistan after 2001. India has always supported the efforts of government in Kabul for an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, broad-based and inclusive process of peace and reconciliation. The new parliamentary building in Kabul was part of India’s strategy of democracy promotion. Moreover, India’s election commission has intensified its collaboration with its Afghan counterpart in order to improve the electoral process. Finally, it should be mentioned that India invests in increased people-topeople contacts, for instance by extensive scholarship programmes for Afghans who come to India to study.

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These different activities have contributed to India’s positive image in Afghanistan. In 2010, India was rated by 29 per cent of Afghans as “very favourable”, highest compared to other countries included in the survey: Iran 18 per cent, Germany 17 per cent, United States 8 per cent and Pakistan 2 per cent. India was also seen as playing a “neutral” role by a highest 44 per cent of those surveyed.24 This positive image of India continues even today. From the Afghan perspective “India is seen as a more mature and trustworthy partner” as compared to Pakistan.25 President Asraf Ghani has described India as the foundation of Afghanistan’s diplomacy and economic strategy. During his visit in April 2015 he highlighted India’s importance for Afghanistan’s foreign policy. Ghani said, that India was part of each circle of Afghanistan’s Foreign Policy: first as part of its neighbourhood; second, being the second largest country with a Muslim population as part of the Islamic countries; third, as part of its Asia policy; fourth, as part of major aid providing country; and fifth, as part of its global policy as a major global player.26 During the visit no agreements were signed but the tasking of follow-on agreements was comprehensive and included:27 1. Extradition Treaty between India and Afghanistan 2. Agreement on Transfer of Sentenced Persons between India and Afghanistan 3. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) in Criminal Matters 4. Bilateral Treaty for Mutual Legal Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters between India and Afghanistan 5. Motor Vehicles Agreement for The Regulation Of Passenger, Personal And Cargo Vehicular Traffic Between India and Afghanistan 6. MOU on Visa free entry for holders of diplomatic passports. While there seems little doubt that India and Afghanistan are ready to advance their broad-based cooperation, the critical question is how India and Afghanistan will jointly be able to expand their partnership given the fear of a return of the Taliban, the uncertainty regarding the role of Pakistan, including the ISI and its links with the extremist groups, as well as the uncertainty surrounding Afghanistan’s new policy of engaging Pakistan and Pakistan’s capability to deliver. This situation

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gets even more complicated with the rise of new extremist entity, Islamic State (IS)/Daesh in West Asia and its implication for the South Asian region.

The Multilateral Dimension India has expressed its support for the continued international attention on Afghanistan’s rehabilitation and security issues concerning Afghanistan’s neighbours. For instance, in July 2009, India’s External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna said that India had a direct interest in the success of the international efforts in stabilizing Afghanistan and Asia.28 Regional countries seem to have greater and certainly more durable stakes in Afghanistan than extra-regional powers. It is imperative that regional countries should share the responsibility in Afghanistan and create a favourable atmosphere for dialogue and cooperation to rebuild Afghanistan. The regional approach remains a challenging strategy because Afghanistan’s neighbours have more conflicts among each other rather than common interests.29 New Delhi has always emphasized the importance of regional cooperation in order to address trans-border issues, to develop commercial and economic opportunities and to end cross-border infiltration and terrorism. Following the Kabul Declaration of December 2005, the Second Regional Economic Cooperation Conference (RECCA) was hosted jointly by India and Afghanistan in New Delhi in November 2006. India has also connected Afghanistan to the SAARC in order to intensify regional economic collaboration. In 2007, Afghanistan joined SAARC as the organization’s eighth member. In 2008– 9 the new administration in the United States under President Obama reformulated its Afghanistan policy. There were serious efforts at that time to link the Afghanistan– Pakistan (Af– Pak) scenario with the India– Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. India achieved a major diplomatic success because the new Af–Pak policy of the Obama administration finally refused to link the two issues.30 Noteworthy is the UN backed conference on future of Afghanistan on 31 March 2009 in The Hague that took place parallel to President Obama’s decision to gradually “surge” the US engagement in the country and which, in a sense, started the train of diplomacy that led to “transition” (2013– 14) and “transformation” (2015–24). In The Hague delegates from more than 80 countries and organizations agreed to

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strengthen security, enhance regional cooperation, promote economic growth and strengthen institutions, and this call for a broader regional approach thus had the support of, among others, Pakistan, Iran, China, Russia and the Arab world.31 The London international conference on Afghanistan in 2010 further advanced this broad agenda of transition, reconciliation and regionalization. It emphasized the importance of “regionally-owned and steered initiatives that showed the need for neighbouring and regional partners to work constructively together”.32 In parallel, also in early 2010, the Istanbul Regional Summit on Friendship and Cooperation – the starting point of the Heart of Asia process – underscored opportunities for regional development and coordination. The conference welcomed Afghanistan’s initiative to invite the regional groupings like the aforementioned SAARC and RECCA but also the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) and the OIC (Organization of Islamic States) to develop as soon as possible a coordinated plan for Afghanistan’s regional engagement.33 The critical issue in this context concerns the viability of regional cooperation. So far, most of the regional countries have adopted the strategy of engaging Afghanistan bilaterally rather than through multilateral mechanism. There are various sub-regional mechanisms at work but with few results to show for them. India is nonetheless trying to invest in multilateral formats and integrate Afghanistan into them. India thus organized a major “Investment Summit on Afghanistan” in Delhi in June 201234 and more broadly took an active part in the diplomacy – at the Afghanistan Conference in Istanbul, November 2011; Bonn, December, 2011; Kabul, June 2012 and Tokyo, July 2012 – of defining the “transformation decade” of 2015–24 that now is the framework for international support for Afghanistan. However, because of rivalries between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, there is still no direct trade connection between the two outliers, Afghanistan and India. Afghanistan’s international trade is handled within the framework of the Afghanistan Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA), but simmering hostility has caused governments in Islamabad to refuse to establish a direct trade link between India and Afghanistan.35 India’s Modi Government has expressed its desire to

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improve these regional connectivity issues. During President Ashraf Ghani’s visit to India in April 2015, Prime Minister Modi said: We are ready to welcome Afghan trucks at the ICP Attari. We are also prepared to join the successor agreement to Afghan Pakistan Trade and Transit Agreement. This will re-establish one of the oldest trading routes of South Asia. I also reaffirmed my commitment to take the Chahbahar Port project in Iran forward. We will also quickly conclude a bilateral Motor Vehicles Agreement.36 For improving the connectivity with the region India, Afghanistan and Iran have intensified their collaboration by signing a trilateral agreement of transit and transportation corridor in May 2016. In May 2015, India and Iran signed a bilateral contract on Chabahar for port development and operations for ten years for two terminals and five berths with cargo handling capacity. On 14 August 2015, both countries emphasized their commitment to establish the International North South Corridor (INSTC) which is expected to become operational by December 2017. The cooperation between both countries on improving connectivity is likely to get major boost after the sanctions against Iran have been removed. The development of Chabahar port will not only help create economic corridor connecting Afghanistan and Central Asia but also help connecting with Russia through INSTC. This initiative will help enhance trade between India and Afghanistan through Iran.37

India’s Security Relations The Bilateral Dimension India and Afghanistan’s traditionally good relations are intrinsically linked to their common historic rivalry with Pakistan. Afghanistan was the only country that voted against Pakistan’s accession to the United Nations in 1947. Moreover, all governments in Kabul have refused so far to recognize the Durand Line as an international border.38 India maintained close ties with Afghan King Zahir Shah, and even after his ouster in 1973 New Delhi managed to keep close ties with subsequent governments. But India refused to condemn the intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in December 1979.

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This has also created resentment among parts of the Pasthun elite vis-a`vis India’s support. Pakistan has used the conflict with India to legitimize its intervention in Afghanistan and its support for the Taliban in the 1990s. The Pakistani military wanted to achieve “strategic depth” and aimed to prevent “encirclement” by India.39 Therefore, the Afghan civil war in the 1990s was also a proxy war between India and Pakistan, in which India and other powers supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. Besides its economic assistance, India also contributed to the training of the Afghan security forces after 2001. The governments in New Delhi and Kabul have repeatedly refused to deploy Indian troops in Afghanistan.40 This has been necessary because India’s diplomatic missions in Afghanistan have been attacked several times, for instance in Kabul 2008, in Herat 2014 and in Mazar-e-Sahrif and Jalalabad in 2016. It seems that these attacks have been targeted both against India’s engagement in Afghanistan and against India’s rapprochement with Pakistan. But India refuses to deploy larger troop contingents. This would run counter to the principle to deploy troops abroad only under a UN mandate.41 Moreover, this would further aggravate the relations between India and Afghanistan vis-a`-vis Pakistan.42 The Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) of 2011 also expanded the military cooperation between the Indian Army and the Afghan security forces (ASF). The number of Afghan officers that will be trained in Indian military institutions should be increased to at least 100, and India has promised more logistical support for the ASF with vehicles and technology.43 With the partial withdrawal of the international forces, India gave in to American requests to increase its training capacities for Afghan officers.44 For the period 2013 – 14, India plans to train more than 1,000 members of the ASF.45 In 2013, it hosted a 60-member Special Forces group and supplied equipment such as combat vehicles and field medical support facilities.46 Moreover, India will also train members of the Afghan police forces.47 In July 2013, in a sign of the delicate balance that India must walk, Indian foreign minister, Salman Khurshid, turned down the request by the Afghan government to supply “lethal” weaponry but promised to continue support for training, transport and logistics.48 As a result of this increased bilateral engagement will, nearly 1,000 Afghan soldiers will be trained by India on an annual basis.49 India has moreover

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conveyed its continued support for capacity building of Afghan security forces, including both training and equipment. In April 2015, New Delhi has delivered three Cheetal helicopters to Afghanistan.50

The Multilateral Dimension India has also a tradition in multilateral military efforts especially vis-a`-vis Afghanistan. During the civil war in the 1990s, India worked closely with Iran, Russia and Tajikistan in order to support the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. During this period, India helped to reconstruct the military base in Ayni (Tajikistan), maintained a hospital in Farkhor and sent defence advisors and technicians to support the Northern Alliance.51 Although since 2001 India has been unwilling to provide lethal weapons to the Afghan security forces, the issue and thus the challenge of defining the limits of engagement has repeatedly popped up during bilateral consultation.52 In order to accommodate Afghanistan’s military requests, the Indian government seems to have taken the multilateral route. According to unconfirmed media reports in April 2014, India has agreed to compensate Russia for the supply of arms and equipment to the Afghan military. Concerned by the return of militancy in Afghanistan, this development is indicative of Russia and India seeking to play a greater role in Afghanistan after the ISAF withdrawal.53 Besides these concrete forms of cooperation, India has also opened up various multilateral channels in order to address the security situation in Afghanistan with different countries. The trilateral collaboration between India, Russia and China provided another opportunity for stabilizing Afghanistan. In 2009, they have agreed to expand their cooperation in combating international terrorism. All the three countries have major stakes in ensuring stability and want to avoid a return to the pre-9/11 situation in Afghanistan.54 Some Indian analysts have proposed the creation of a “Concert of powers”, a regional grouping including United States, India, Iran, Central Asian states and China, while others have argued for organizing a conference on “Afghanistan’s Independence and Neutrality” at an international level.55 In 2012 India, the United States and Afghanistan held their first trilateral talks in order to expand their political, economic and security cooperation.56 India and China have also opened a dialogue on their possible cooperation in Afghanistan in the future. In their bilateral

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counterterrorism consultations in 2013, the security challenges in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Western troops was also an issue.57 Both countries fear a resurgence of the Taliban because the territories under their control may provide safe havens and training camps for militant Islamic groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) who seem to be responsible for attacks in the Xinjiang province in western China. The Taliban have made it clear that they do not necessarily pursue an Anti-Indian agenda and would not allow foreign militant groups to use their territory against other countries.58 India’s efforts for a multilateral security cooperation vis-a`-vis Afghanistan will gain a further push as New Delhi has been accepted as a full member in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Indian experts have already pointed out that the “SCO processes on the stabilization of Afghanistan serve India’s interests”.

India: Difficult Choices Ahead After nearly 15 years of engagement it seems that Afghanistan has not developed into a test case for India’s regional and/or global ambitions. But Afghanistan is a good example to show the possibilities and constraints that India is facing in her attempts for conflict resolution in South Asia. India has developed good links with the moderate elite of Afghanistan but the geographical distance and the relations with Pakistan limit a stronger bilateral approach. India will continue its efforts to strengthen the elected government in Kabul by capacity building and other measures but it is not in a situation to pursue similar political strategies for conflict resolution like in past interventions in Nepal or in Sri Lanka. India is not part of the quadrilateral group consisting of Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the United States that has started a peace process with the Taliban with the Muree talks in summer 2015. The focus of India’s engagement will be mostly on the economic side by pursuing the development partnership with Afghanistan on the bilateral and the multilateral level by integrating the country in regional organizations like SAARC. Politically, India will continue its multilateral efforts with countries like China and organizations like SCO in order to establish a conducive regional framework in which the peace process in Afghanistan can be embedded.

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Notes 1. Kapila, Subhash, Afghanistan: India has Legitimate Strategic Interests in its Stability, South Asian Analysis, 16 April 2008. Available at www://south asiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers32%5Cpapers32%5Cpapers3149.html; Bajoria, Jayshre,e India-Afghanistan Relations, Council of Foreign Relations, 22 July 2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/17474/indiaafghanistan_relations.html. 2. Ganguly, Sumit and Paul Kapur, “The Unrecognized Benefits of India’s Role in Afghanistan”, World Policy, 29 May 2009. Available at http://worldpolicy.org/ wordpress/2009/05/29/sumit-ganguly-and-paul-kapur-the-unrecogniz. Accessed on June 8, 2009; Hanif, Melanie, India Involvement in Afghanistan: Stepping Stone or Stumbling Block to Regional Hegemony? Hamburg 2009 (GIGA Working Papers, 98); Pant, Harsh V., “India in Afghanistan: a test case for a rising power”, Contemporary South Asia 18/2, (June 2010), pp. 133–53; Fair, C. Christine, India in Afghanistan and Beyond: Opportunities and Constraints, New York, 2010 (A Century Foundation Report); Destradi, Sandra, “India: A Reluctant Partner for Afghanistan”, Washington Quarterly 37/2 (Summer 2014), pp. 103–17. 3. Upadhyay, Dinoj and Athar Zafar, Transition, Regional Integration and Complexities: Evolving India-Afghanistan Interface, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi 2014 (Sapru House Paper 01/2014), p. 19. 4. In the nineteenth century, the Great Game of competition was played between the British and Russian empires and during the Cold War, it became an area of competition between the US and Soviet Union. See Dixit, J. N., An Afghan Diary, (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2000) as cited in Roy, Meena Singh, “Afghanistan and Regional Strategy: The India Factor”, Marlene Laruelle, Jean-Francois Huchet, Sebastien Peyrouse, and Bayram Balci (eds), China and India in Central Asia. A New “Great Game”? (Palgrave Macmillian, New York, 2010), p. 61. 5. A majority of the people of Afghanistan belong to Sunni sect of Islam and remaining are Shias. Pashtuns are the majority with separate tribal identities of different sub-groups. Other ethnic groups are the Tajiks, Uzbeks and small number of Uigurs and Nuristanis, as cited in Singh Roy 2010. 6. See Dixit, J. N., An Afghan Diary (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2000), pp. 2 – 13. 7. See Fair, India in Afghanistan and Beyond, p. 8. 8. Statement by Shri S.K. Lambah, Special Envoy of the Prime Minister of India, 27 March 2009: http://indianembassy.ru/cms/index.php?option¼ com_ content&task¼view&id¼585&Itemid¼451; Pant 2010, p. 145. 9. Haidar, Suhasini, “India rebuffs Afghanistan on strategic meet”, The Hindu, 29 August 2015. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indiarebuffs-afghanistan-on-strategic-meet/article7592059.ece. 10. Faizi, Aimal, “Has India lost Afghanistan to Pakistan”, Al Jazeera. Available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/04/india-lost-afghanistanpakistan-150426051958020.html (accessed 25 August 2015). 11. Manjunath, K. S., “Living on the edge, Indian Soldier on for Afghanistan’s reconstruction”, Business Standard, 16 April 2009. Available at http://www.

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12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25.

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business-standard.com/india/news/livingthe-edge-indians-soldierfor-afghanistan %5Cs-reconstruction/354518/. Statement by Shri S. K. Lambah, Special Envoy of the Prime Minister of India, Embassy of India in Moscow, 10 May 2009, http://indianembassy.ru/cms/index. php?option¼ com_content&task ¼view&id ¼ 585&Itemid ¼ 451. IANS, “India Afghanistan Set up partnership council, to combat terror”, Thaindian News, 28 July 2009. Available at http://www.thaindian.com/ newsportal/business/india-afghanistan-set-up-partnership-council-to-combatterror_100224043.html; Manjunath, K. S., “Living on the edge, Indian Soldier on for Afghanistan’s reconstruction”, Business Standard, 16 April 2009, Available at http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/livingthe-edgeindians-soldierfor-afghanistan%5Cs-reconstruction/354518/. See also sources in notes 7 and 15. For Afghanistan’s trading partners see http://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnap shot/en/AFG (accessed 30 March 2016). Ministry of External Affair, Visit of Foreign Minister Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta of Afghanistan, Joint Statement, 28 July 2009. Available at http://meaindia.nic.in/ declarestatement/2009/07/28js01.htm. Haidar, Suhasini, “India rebuffs Afghanistan on strategic meet”, The Hindu, 29 August 2015. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indiarebuffs-afghanistan-on-strategic-meet/article7592059.ece. See Saurabh Shukla, “Kabul express heads for Delhi”, Mail Today, 11 October 2012, p. 14. See Abhyankar, Rajendra M., “Afghanistan after the 2014 U.S. Drawdown. The Transformation of Ndia’s Policy” Asian Survey 55/2, p. 384. Moradian, Davood, “Indo-Afghan Relationship: Afghan Expectations and Indian Reluctance”, in Vishal Chandra (ed), India-South Asia Exploring Regional Perceptions (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2015), p. 120. Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2013–2014 (New Delhi, 2014), p. 207. Ministry of External Affairs, Media Statement by Prime Minister during the visit of President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to India, 28 April 2015. Available at http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/25136/Media_Statement_by_ Prime_Minister_during_the_visit_of_President_of_Islamic_Republic_of_ Afghanistan_to_India_April_28_2015. Ibid. Reuters, “India eyes Pakistani route for Afghan mine access”, Dawn, 21 March 2012. Available at (http://www.dawn.com/news/704344/india-eyes-pakistanroute-for-afghan-mine-access). Mynott, Adam, “Afghans more optimistic for future, survey shows”, BBC News, 11 January 2010. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/share/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_01_ 10afghanpoll.pdf. Moradian, Davood, “ Indo-Afghan Relationship: Afghan Expectations and Indian Reluctance”, in Vishal Chandra (ed), India-South Asia Exploring Regional Perceptions (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2015), p. 121.

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26. Views expressed by President Ghani in his Interview to CNN-IBN, 29 April 29, 2015. 27. Ministry of External Affairs, Joint Statement during the State Visit of President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to India, 28 April 2015. Available at http://mea. gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25137/Joint_Statement_during_the_State_ Visit_of_President_of_Islamic_Republic_of_Afghanistan_to_India_April_28_ 2015. 28. ANI, “India for continuing international focus on Afghanistan’s rehabilitation: Krishna”, Thaindian News, 2 July 2009. Available at http://www.thaindian. com/newsportal/india-news/india-for-continuing-international-focus-onafghanistans-rehabilitation-krishna_100212201.html accessed on Jan 20, 2010. 29. Tellis, Ashley J. and Aroop Mukharji (eds), Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan? (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010). 30. See Fair, India in Afghanistan and Beyond, p. 17; Mukund Padmanabhan, “How India kept Kashmir out of U.S. Af-Pak envoy’s brief ”, The Hindu, 21 May 2011. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/the-india-cables/how-india-keptkashmir-out-of-us-afpak-envoys-brief/article2035576.ece. 31. “International Afghan Conference Signals ‘New Beginning’”, Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, 31 March 2009. http://www.rferl.org/articleprintview/1565188. html. 32. Communique of Afghanistan: The London Conference, Afghan Leadership. Regional Cooperation, International Partnership, http://afghanistan.hmg.gov.uk/ en/conference/communique/ (accessed 12 February 2010). 33. Ibid. 34. Sachdeva, Gulshan, The Delhi Investment Summit on Afghanistan, IDSA Comment, 26 June 2012. Available at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ TheDelhiInvestmentSummitonAfghanistan_gsachdeva_260612. 35. See Key Pakistani – Afghan trade deals stall on India, souring ties, in: The Express Tribune, 17 September 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/958367/key-pakis tani-afghan-trade-deals-stall-on-india-souring-ties/. 36. Military of External Affairs, Media Statement by Prime Minister during the visit of President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to India, 28 April 2015. Available at http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/25136/Media_Statement_by_ Prime_Minister_during_the_visit_of_President_of_Islamic_Republic_of_ Afghanistan_to_India_April_28_2015. 37. Roy, Meena Singh, International North-South Transport Corridor: Re-energising India’s Gateway to Eurasia (New Delhi: IDSA Issue Brief, 18 August 2015). 38. Wagner, Christian and Amina Khan, “The Changing Character of the Durand Line”, Internationales Asienforum, 44/1-2 (2013), pp. 71– 84. 39. “India’s Role in Afghanistan Is Encirclement of Pakistan”, Gen. Athar Abbas, Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR, Islamabad), Observer Research Foundation, 8 October 2009. Available at http://www.orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/html/ interview/interview.html.

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40. Antony, A. K., “India will not send troops to Afghanistan”, The Hindu, 29 October 2009. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/antonyindia-will-not-send-troops-to-afghanistan/article40006.ece; “Karzai rules out Indian soldiers on Afghanistan’s soil”, The Nation, 23 May 2013. Available at http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/ national/23-May-2013/karzai-rules-out-indian-soldiers-on-afghanistan-s-soil. 41. The Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990 were the only case so far when Indian troops have been deployment abroad on the basis of a bilateral agreement between the respective governments. 42. Haidar, Suhasini, “Former Afghan president Karzai: Pakistan demanded we reduce India’s presence”, The Hindu, 22 November 2014. Available at http:// www.thehindu.com/opinion/interview/former-afghan-president-karzai-pakistandemanded-we-reduce-indias-presence/article6625342.ece. 43. Gokhale, Nitin, “India All Set to Train Afghan Army”, New Delhi Television, 17 November 2011. Available at http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/india-allset-to-train-afghan-army-150491. 44. Rajghatta, Chidanand, “America Persuades India to Expand Afghan Footprint”, Times of India, 14 June 2012. Available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes. com/2012-06-14/us/32234576_1_afghanistan-and-pakistan-afghan-nationalarmyafghan-military-personnel. 45. See Routray, Crossing Borders (see note 8), 30 (accessed 6 May 2014). 46. Reuters, “India begins training Afghan commandos as ties deepen”, The Daily Times, 21 December 2013. Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/region/ 21-Dec-2013/india-begins-training-afghan-commandos-as-ties-deepen; “India begins training Afghan Commandos as ties deepen ahead of 2014”, http:// www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-begins-training-afghan-commandos-as-tiesdeepen-ahead-of-2014-545156. 47. Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, Annual Report 2009 – 2010, New Delhi, 2010, p. 115. 48. “India Turns Down Afghanistan’s Arms Plea”, The Hindu, 5 July 2013. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/indiaturns-down-afghanistans-armsplea/article4884695.ece. 49. “52 Afghan Army cadets to pass out of IMA today”, The Hindu, 13 December 2013. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/52-afghan-armycadets-to-pass-out-of-ima-today/article5456439.ece. 50. Ministry of External Affairs, Joint Statement during the State Visit of President of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to India (28 April 2015), http://mea.gov.in/ bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25137/Joint_Statement_during_the_State_Visit_ of_President_of_Islamic_Republic_of_Afghanistan_to_India_April_28_2015. 51. See Fair, India in Afghanistan and Beyond, p. 11; Pant 2010, p. 145; Abhyankar, “Afghanistan after the 2014 U.S. Drawdown”, p. 390. 52. Swami, Praveen, “Karzai to renew request for lethal military aid from India”, The Hindu, 10 December 2013. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/ national/karzai-to-renew-request-for-lethal-military-aid-from-india/article

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54.

55. 56. 57.

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5444871.ece; Haidar, Suhasini, “Kabul renews plea for military aid from India”, The Hindu, 24 June 2014. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/ national/kabul-renews-plea-for-military-aid-from-india/article6142599.ece. Mohanti, Arun, “India, Russia mull over meeting Afghan defence requirements”, Russia and India Report, 28 January 2014. Available at http://in.rbth.com/economics/ 2014/01/28/india_russia_mull_over_meeting_afghan_defence_requirements_ 32601.html; Miglani, Sanjeev, “India turns to Russia to help supply arms to Afghanistan”, Reuters, 30 April 2014. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 2014/04/30/us-india-afghanistan-arms-idUSBREA3T0J320140430. Krishnan, Ananth, “India, China, Russia hold talks on Afghan issue”, The Hindu, 17 January 2014. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/internati onal/world/india-china-russia-hold-talks-on-afghan-issue/article5583356.ece? ref¼ relatedNews. Gharekhan, Chinmaya R., “Afghanistan – a way forward”, The Hindu, 24 September 2009; D’Souza, Shanti Mariet, “Securing India’s interests in Afghanistan”, The Hindu, 22 October 2009. “First India-U.S.-Afghan trilateral talks in New York”, The Hindu, 24 September 2012. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/fi rst-indiausafghan-trilateral-talks-in-new-york/article3931383.ece. Ananth, Krishnan, “Afghan concerns lend weight to India, China terror talks”, The Hindu, 12 April 2013. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/ international/world/afghan-concerns-lend-weight-to-india-china-terror-talks/ article4610722.ece; “Beijing explores India, China, Pakistan joint security mechanism”, The Economic Times, 27 June 2014. Available at http://economic times.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/beijing-explores-india-chinapakistan-joint-security-mechanism/articleshow/37303430.cms?prtpage¼ 1. “Taliban hail India for resisting Afghan entanglement”, Daily Times, 18 June 2012. Available at http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/18-Jun-2012/ taliban-hail-india-for-resisting-afghan-entanglement.

CHAPTER 7 IRAN, AFGHANISTAN AND THE BENEFITS OF A REGIONAL APPROACH Houchang Hassan-Yari

“We believe in this kind of [regional] cooperation to solve regional problems.” President Karzai of Afghanistan, emphasizing the importance of cooperation between Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Mehr News Agency, 20 July 2010 Fifteen years of war led by the US and NATO against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups have shown that there is no quick or easy solution to the security crisis in Afghanistan. The country remains unstable with a weak government, divided military loyalties and a generally poor infrastructure. The 2001 invasion of Afghanistan by the world’s superpower largely neglected the valuable part which neighbouring Iran could play in the country’s process of stabilisation. This chapter will focus primarily on Iran, exploring its relationship to Afghanistan and other regional stakeholders to assess Iran’s potential in helping bring stability to Afghanistan. The analysis will also consider Iran’s relationship to Pakistan and the United States and will only tangentially involve other countries such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, China, as well as India to deepen our understanding of a regional approach. China and India are examined at length in Chapters 5 and 6 of this book.

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As internal conflict and fighting between the Taliban and government forces in Afghanistan continues to intensify, bringing stability to the country becomes ever pressing to bordering nations like Iran and Pakistan for which security could be threatened with an unstable neighbour. Iran in particular has many historical and geopolitical commonalities with Afghanistan and it is precisely their shared background, interests and sources of tension which makes a cooperative approach not only desirable but necessary in bringing stability to the region. This chapter will explore the common security concerns between Afghanistan and Iran to show why a cooperative approach would benefit both countries. Iran’s investment in Afghanistan’s infrastructure can strengthen a weak Afghan government, helping to bring stability to the country and consequently ensuring security to Iran’s imminent and perceived threats. However, the positive potential of an Iran – Afghan partnership also runs against a political reality in Tehran marked by contested ideas and strategies about the Iranian role in its western border region. Iran’s regional engagement, therefore, will emerge gradually and with great sensitivity to the political initiatives of other countries in the neighbourhood as well as transnational powers.

Establishing Security at a Regional Level The end of the Cold War marked the end of bipolar system. This major shift as well as the process of decolonization helped open space for regional powers to emerge.1 The regional level is crucial in considering Afghanistan or Iran’s national security. As Barry Buzan explains, “the regional level is where the extremes of national and global security interplay, and where most of the actions occurs.”2 The US invasion of Afghanistan and attempts at re-establishing stability in the country thereafter, largely excluded Iran in the process. The US must recognize the importance of Iran as a regional actor and remember that it shares strategic interests with Iran in so far that both countries have suffered at the hands of the Taliban and both share the same goal of preventing a return to power of the Taliban, and more recently the Islamic State (IS/ISIL/ISIS). The three Islamic Republics of Afghanistan, Iran (IRI) and Pakistan command a geographical position that puts them at the epicentre of the

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strategic battleground of the past two centuries – as explained by Ronald E. Neumann in Chapter 1. To understand the nature of their relations and Iran’s role in the diplomacy of the region, it is necessary to briefly consider each state’s security concerns. Of the relationships between the three Islamic countries, it is the Iran –Afghan relationship that is of greatest substance and thus of greatest potential for the region. This is mainly because Iran does not have territorial disputes with Afghanistan (unlike Pakistan). In 1904, the British McMahon Boundary Commission demarcated the border between the two countries by taking Herat from Iran and annexing it to Afghanistan. Both countries accepted the boundary despite continuing reservations by Iran regarding the Helmand (also known as Hirmand) River and its water distribution.3 Iran can also act as a potential economic corridor to Afghanistan, in cooperation with India (see Chapter 6). As it is geographically landlocked, Afghanistan is at the mercy of its neighbours for its imports and exports. Of all the countries surrounding Afghanistan, Iran provides the safest and shortest access to international waters. Iranian territory can also connect India and Afghanistan, who have established close relations in recent years and are separated by Pakistani territory. This chapter shall therefore give the relationship between Iran and Afghanistan special attention and evaluate Iran’s possible contribution to the development of a regional order of restraint.

Iran’s Stake in the Afghan Game Iran and Afghanistan share cultural, linguistic, religious, ethnic, territorial, historical, economic, political, and strategic values as well as interests. The relationship between Afghanistan and Iran dates back to the time of the Persian Empire under Darius the Great, which is to say that Persians had effective control over present-day Afghanistan long before the Great Game started.4 More recently, Iran’s strategic interest and stakes in Afghanistan have been shaped by its revolution and the upheaval both countries have experienced. After the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran’s Afghan policy was primarily ethnic oriented and religious based, i.e., Persian/Dari-speaking and Shia-centric. Following an approach similar to the one the late Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had initiated in Lebanon in early 1970s to help the Shia community, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini generously supported Afghanistan’s oppressed Hazara Shias. Because of

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their potential alignment with the Hazara Shias, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and all Dari-speaking Afghans were considered by Tehran as effective and potential allies. These and other relationships have solidified Iran’s engagement in Afghanistan over the years. Details of their shared history are beyond the scope of this chapter, however, it is important to recognize that they are heavily intertwined.

Security Concerns An unstable Afghanistan presents a strategic threat to Iran’s security and forces Iran toward a fuite en avant. It is obvious that insecurity causes downturn in Iran’s economic activities and power-sharing in Afghanistan, which in turn can aggravate religious and ethnic conflicts with the possibility of spillover in the region. Any sorts of negative spillover effects emanating from an unruly or unfriendly Afghanistan increasingly concern Iran. This has translated into a real push by Iranians to become so influential in Afghanistan that Iran’s interest cannot be ignored. Hence, the question is how Iran’s influence fits into security equilibrium in Afghanistan where the central government is weak and external actors are many and often strong. Whether informed by delusion or reality, some Iranian Revolutionary Guards commanders believe Afghanistan is firmly under their control. Brigadier Ali Shadmani, Deputy Director of the General Staff of Iran’s Armed Forces, has claimed: “Now in Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Afghanistan all the people who are willing to fight the arrogance (USA) stand under the banner of the Supreme Leader of Iran.”5 This continuous effort to secure an undeniable and massive presence in Afghanistan is primarily made to secure Iran a place around the table when it comes to the question of security in the region. Iran and Afghanistan share the Taliban as an ongoing security concern. The Taliban’s 1998 Mazar-e-Sharif killing of a dozen Iranian diplomats and journalists triggered a massive Iranian force build-up on the Afghan border and revived traditional Iranian hostility to the movement. The Taliban continue to cause civil strife within Afghanistan by attacking civilians, NGOs, government officials and installations, as well as foreign forces that support the government troops that fight Taliban and Islamic State terrorists. Though the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan was welcomed by Iran, the US invasion of the country in 2001 raised serious concerns as Tehran perceived the presence of

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US/NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan as the most eminent and strategic threat against the survival of the Islamic regime. As a preventive measure, Iran tried hard to deter the “enemy’s” influence by making itself indispensable for the safety and security of Afghanistan. There is a direct correlation between the degree of insecurity Tehran feels and its pursuit of a more aggressive policy in the region. However, while Iranian state officials did not miss an opportunity to blame the Americans operating in Afghanistan as the source of Afghan insecurity, they failed to provide any viable replacement alternative to the US and NATO forces. During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, 2005–13, Iranian diplomacy had no contingency plan for deployment capabilities in Afghanistan due to its legacy of inactivity and internal strife in Tehran between the president and his office on the one hand and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the other – where the former tends to be motivated by a political agenda of US opposition and the latter in part by the pragmatics of searching for policy alternatives.6 One example of Iran’s failure to develop coherent policy was the meeting of International Contact Group on Afghanistan. Representatives of 46 countries and representatives of NATO, EU, the United Nations, Iran’s envoy and for the first time a representative of the Organization of Islamic Conference (representing 57 Muslim countries) attended the October 2010 meeting in Rome where one of the most important issues discussed was the transfer of Afghan security from foreign troops to Afghan forces by the year 2014. As expected, Iran played a marginal role and failed to position itself in the new context of a comprehensive initiative in Afghanistan. Inevitably, observers were led to attribute the Iranian presence in Rome as a counter to the growing Pakistani influence in helping with talks with the Taliban and the fact that “Iran and Pakistan have always tried to curb one another’s influence in the area”.7 Iran’s policy in Afghanistan was and remains more reactive than proactive. Tehran felt squeezed by US (and NATO) forces in Iraq, the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan, and could not make the most of its collaboration during the first phase of American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Confusion and paralysis of the Islamic leadership in the decision-making process is caused by its internal dynamics. It is engaged in a perpetual balancing act between the national interest and that of his supporters, including military elite. The regime has failed to reconcile these often conflicting interests.

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This balancing act is made even more difficult by the apparent choice Iran has in terms of choosing between an Afghanistan stabilized by US-led forces or alternatively one stabilized by a resurgent Taliban movement. Reconciliation of the Afghan government with the Taliban for national security is a concern to Iran. The process has been led variously by Afghan president Ghani and outside powers such as Pakistan, China and the United States – for greater details see Chapter 1 – and has no obvious place for Iran. President Ghani’s first visit to Tehran, in April 2015, was therefore met with considerable anticipation, and where the Iranian agenda was to impress on Ghani the extent to which Iran remains an undeniable part of the regional peace equation. President Ghani responded in kind, emphasizing the need for cooperation between the two countries to deal with issues such as terrorism, extremism and the fight against IS.8 The country’s main currency into diplomatic efforts remains its lack of territorial disputes with Afghanistan and then its potential as an economic corridor to Afghanistan established in close cooperation with India (see Chapter 6). The challenge represented by IS is also an opportunity for the two countries to cooperate, but it will take some careful diplomatic management to give substance to the effort.

Refugees Security issues within Afghanistan have led to a large number of Afghan refugees settling in Iran and Pakistan and both of these nations see this influx as a threat against their stability. In Iran, there are thousands of children from mixed marriages who are deprived of rights to education, health and even parents.9 Moreover, Afghan refugees are often associated with crimes in Iran and suffer very bad press. They serve as cheap labour in construction and are subject to abuse by their employers because of their precarious residential situation. Their contribution to the black market is substantial, however. A regional approach makes it possible to reach trilateral agreements to resolve these refugees’ predicament, but their situation is best characterized as a humanitarian tragedy. In the past three decades, more than two million Afghan refugees have lived in Iran and, according to the UN’s refugee commission, close to one million Afghan refugees still live there.10 There are also a considerable number of illegal refugees who return to Iran every year after being expelled for their lack of proper documentation. While a small number of

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refugees have integrated into Iranian society, the majority live in precarious conditions under tremendous pressure from Iranian authorities.11 Iran has confirmed that half of the two million Afghan citizens who live in Iran are undocumented and their presence is illegal.12 Iran’s dire economic situation, due to both international sanctions and mismanagement, regularly causes the Iranian authorities to expel Afghan refugees, for instance close to 50,000 in April 2007. That action created a humanitarian and political crisis for the Afghan government and brought a swift but inconclusive reaction from Kabul. When Afghanistan’s foreign minister accused Iranian authorities of political manipulation, Afghan parliamentarians impeached him. Indeed, the deterioration of the political and military situation in Afghanistan has helped Iran increase its political influence in the country. Survival has become the ultimate goal of all Afghan political groups, and Iran has been able to cater influence by serving as an alternative source of support for Afghans alienated from the mainstream US-backed political process.13 Iran’s interference in the Syrian crisis has created some opportunities for poor Afghan refugees. Syria represents a high strategic value for Iran and supporting Bashar Assad in his fight for survival is clearly a strategic decision for Tehran. The Islamic republic believes Syria is at the forefront of resistance to Zionism and imperialism as well as a bridge between Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) actively recruits paramilitary forces to combat the enemies of President Assad. IRGC and Basij, a paramilitary force formed by the IRGC, organize the funeral of “Afghan volunteer martyrs” killed in Syria when their corps are repatriated in Iran. There is no reliable information on the number of Afghan nationals fighting in Syria, but Iranian media praise their bravery in defending the Shia holy sites in the country. The Iranian government agencies also support the families of martyrs. Ironically, while thousands of Afghans seek refuge in Iran from dysfunctional or abusive state institutions, Iran recruits and honours refugees who serve and die in Iran’s most embittered foreign conflict. It seems that in Iran, a good Afghan is an Afghan who died for the cause. While refugees clearly warrant regional cooperation, they tend rather to be caught up in and squeezed by local political interests. A strong Afghan government will mean better infrastructure and thus lessen the number of Afghan refugees in Iran. This is a desirable outcome for Iran as Afghan refugees put pressure on the economy and job market.

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Water Scarcity Water is a clear source of friction between Afghanistan and Iran. Iran, as mentioned, does not have any territorial quarrel with Afghanistan, but its dispute over the use of water from the Helmand River remains unresolved and could lead to a real crisis between the two countries.14 The dispute over Helmand (Helmand) goes back to the nineteenth century and various attempts to resolve the dispute have failed. In 1939 Afghanistan and Iran signed a treaty on water sharing, but tension continued because the Afghans refused to ratify it. The mediation efforts of the US resulted in “The Afghan–Iranian Helmand River Water Treaty” of 1973.15 The agreement supplied Iran with an average of 26 cubic meters of water per second. The Treaty also established a new Helmand Commission to administer the provisions of the agreement. However, Kabul failed to ratify and effectively implement the accord on account of security upheavals: first there was the 1973 coup against the monarchy and its aftermath; then the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 followed by the civil war; and then the rise and the demise of the Taliban (1994–2001).16 Iran criticized Afghanistan for this break-down of the accord, but the Afghan side believed Iran had helped cause Afghanistan’s instability in order to get more of Helmand’s water. Troubled relations between the Iranian government and the Taliban regime prevented the two countries from reaching an accord on the use of the river’s water. The Taliban completely cut the flow of water from the Helmand to Iran in 1999.17 Dozens of Iranian localities in the Sistan and Baluchistan region became uninhabitable because of the continued dispute over the nonimplementation of the Helmand Treaty, drought during the past few years, diversion, wasteful irrigation practices, water waste and mismanagement.18 Water shortages provoked thousands of internal environmental refugees in this part of Iran. This, in turn, has exacerbated security19 in the south-west of Iran and the tensions between Iran and Pakistan.20 Poverty in the region feeds terrorist activities on the Iranian side of Pakistan– Iran border. Terrorist groups that strike in Iran use Pakistan as their rear base when they are pursued by the Iranian law enforcement officers. The inertia of Pakistani military forces against this infiltration is a constant source of irritation on the Iranian side. According to Tehran Times, 11 November 2004, over 1.2 million local people living in Sistan and Baluchistan are facing livelihood problems

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due largely to lack of water previously supplied from the Helmand River.21 Moreover, drought causes sand storms and helps infectious diseases to spread thus further aggravating the water politics of the two countries. In 2003 Afghanistan completely blocked the river in an attempt to save its water for local consumption and generation of power for the city of Kandahar, and its long-term project is to construct a dam – the Kamal Khan Dam – that will solve some of its water needs. This Afghan solution will cost Iran its water supply, and Iran has been accused of conducting covert military operations in Afghanistan in order to, among other things, disrupt work on the dam.22 Another dam – the Salma Dam – is under construction in Herat province, being built by India, and will likewise reduce the flow of water to Iran, this time from the Harirud River. United Nations Development Programme Iran produced a report in February 2005, “Restoration and Sustainable Use of the Shared Sistan Basin. A Baseline Situation Analysis”,23 on the biggest and most visible ecological disaster in the region concerning the now dried up interconnected wetlands called the Hamoun Lakes, also known as the Sistan Basin. In their heydays, the lakes stretched across parts of southwestern Afghanistan and southeastern Iran. The three lakes covered approximately 216,000 hectares and normally received water from the Helmand) River. During successive droughts (1970– 1; 1998– 2004), major parts of the lakes became completely dry threatening natural and human life on a large scale. This is an environmental and humanitarian disaster for both Iran and Afghanistan. The scale of drought related problems requires close collaboration between Afghanistan and Iran alongside the UN. As the entire region is to face more water scarcity in the years to come, both human and state security will become under more stress. Water scarcity is in fact a concern also of Pakistan – which eyes the Kabul and Kunar rivers flowing from Afghanistan into Pakistan – and if Afghanistan fails to manage its water resources, it could find itself locked in a dual struggle with both Iran and Pakistan. Calls for proper water management within frameworks of durable diplomatic agreement are long-standing.24 They continue to be pertinent. Regional water management can both engender economic growth – because water irrigates land and can produce electricity – and can enable a degree of diplomatic contact that will be of wider benefit.

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Goods Trafficking and Terrorism The existence of a weak government in Kabul and the absence of Islamabad’s effective authority in its Baluchistan province have created favourable conditions for both traffickers and terrorist groups to operate with impunity. The Jundallah, an Iranian Baluchi group, has for years kept the Iranian authorities on alert. The group has a local or regional focus and has carried out a few spectacular raids on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. The declared aim of the group is to defend the rights of poor Baluchis by forcing the government to stop discriminating against them. For many years, the group used the Pakistani and Afghan territories as safe havens from which it could attack targets inside Iran. Iranian secret forces captured the leader of the group, Abdolmalek Rigi, in February 2010,25 and executed him few months later, but other members of the Jundallah have carried on military attacks against Iranian forces. The group remains a low-level and largely manageable threat to the Islamic regime’s security.

The Pakistan Connection Though a more robust analysis of the role of Pakistan in the region can be found in Chapter 8, it will briefly be considered here to give further context to its relationship with Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan enters naturally into the equation among Muslim countries in the region. However, Iran’s relationship with the country is fraught with difficulties, and diplomatic relations can best be summarized as a game of cultivating and managing ambiguity. Pakistan was not destined to become an independent state but instead became one by default in 1947 as the Land of the Pure. However, being Muslim did not ease the ever-growing tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are two historical reasons for this conflict-infested situation, both touching on issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity: one is the problem of the Durand Line26 that established the shared but disputed Afghanistan– Pakistan border; a second is Afghan support for the Pakhtunistan, or Pashtunistan, (the Land of Pashtuns) movement in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP).27 Iran and Pakistan are not locked into a similar relationship of territorial hostility and in fact share many common concerns when it comes to their relations with Afghanistan. Like Islamabad, Tehran is

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concerned about refugees, security issues, border control, infiltration of terrorists and smugglers of goods and narcotics, as well as the plague of addiction. Iran remains sensitive to the fate of Persian-speaking and Shia minorities who suffered under the Taliban rule in Afghanistan or in the hand of Lashkar Tayebeh (LeT – Army of the Pure) in Pakistan.28 The Shia community of the Indian subcontinent played an important role in the creation of Pakistan. Pakistan’s founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was a Shia, as were several others who helped him create the new country for Muslims.29 Many of Pakistan’s leaders have been Shias, including the country’s first governor-generals, three of its first prime ministers, two of its military leaders, landowners, industrialists, artists and intellectuals, as well as prime ministers Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and his daughter Benazir – whose mother was Iranian and whose husband, Asif Ali Zardari, president of Pakistan 2008– 13, comes from a big Shia landowning family.30 However, the sectarianism that prevailed under the reign of Zia ul-Haq meant that the political peaceful coexistence of communities gave way to religious and tribal exceptionalism. Some Sunni groups began to see Shia religious ceremonies as heretical rites and accused Shias of not being authentic Muslims. This characterisation of “the other” legitimized virtually any excess, including murder. This sad reality of communal politics explains the advanced state of sectarianism in Pakistan. In this country, where 6 per cent of respondents to a survey conducted by Pew Research Center identify as Shia, 50 per cent of Sunnis say Shias are Muslims, while 41 per cent say they are not.31 Religious and communal strife provides the context for the politics of managing Iran and Pakistan’s common border, which cuts the ancient Baluch region into two. Pakistan has long faced a Baluch movement of resistance to Pakistan control, and Pakistan regularly claims that both Iran and Afghanistan provide either tacit or overt support for insurgents. Conversely, Iran is sometimes assailed by Sunni militants that it claims are based in Pakistan’s Baluch region and supported by Pakistani security services. The use of Pakistani territory by “terrorist” groups such as Jundallah is a failure of Islamabad in controlling its borders, and many in the Iranian security apparatus, mainly among the Revolutionary Guard Corps, accuse Pakistan for deliberately using Jundallah as part of its foreign policy. Irredentism is not the only issue troubling Iran – Pakistan relations, though, as all the illicit activities that follow from Afghanistan’s lack of proper government – such as narcotrafficking,

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arms smuggling, human trafficking and refugee flows – plague both countries. The Iranian government decided in 2001, therefore, to dig canals and build physical barriers to block its eastern border. Since then, Iran erected several kilometres of wall, canals and concrete dams between busy roads and valleys in Sistan and Baluchistan provinces neighbouring both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The balance sheet is that Iran and Pakistan cannot exploit all the existing possibilities in their political, economic and strategic bilateral relations. There exist very strong ideological opposition to the Islamic republic of Iran among Pakistani Sunni militant groups. Moreover, local issues tie in with wider geopolitical rivalries. The Iranian–American hostility is one of the most important obstacles in deepening relations between Tehran and Islamabad, and will likely remain so in spite of the recent agreement to regulate Iran’s nuclear activities. Part of the problem is Saudi Arabia’s distrust of Iran and Riyadh’s pressure on Islamabad to join its policy of Iranian containment and confrontation. Iran has applauded Pakistan’s parliament’s unanimous decision against military involvement in the Saudi-led coalition fighting Houthi rebels in Yemen and remains neutral.32 Should the parliament decide otherwise, Iran–Pakistan relations would be taken hostage and experience a fresh round of hostility.

Iran’s Potential in Bringing Stability to Afghanistan Soft power is the most effective and least costly tool Iran can use to remain relevant and influential in Afghanistan. One of Iran’s main objectives in the implementation of its security strategy in Afghanistan is to create an economic sphere of influence in Herat and turn it into a security buffer zone. At the International Pledging Conference in Tokyo in 2002, Iran pledged $560 million to Afghan reconstruction, making Iran one of the leading contributors. At the London Conference in 2006, Iran promised an additional $100 million.33 Iran operates dozens of joint ventures in Afghanistan and in 2006 ranked first in terms of foreign investment.34 Despite a shortage of electricity at home, Iran provides more electricity to Herat than the city can really absorb. Iran has built one of the best roads in Afghanistan, stretching the 120 km to its border;35 Iranian radio broadcasts fill the airwaves; Iran-funded road and building projects are under way; a new teacher-training centre is planned for Kabul; and a Herat– Khaf rail link

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is being constructed to connect Afghanistan and Iran by train. Iran has also offered humanitarian aid to Kabul in the form of fuel and transport worth $500 million since 2001, according to the US Congressional Research Service. The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief confirms that Iran has disbursed nearly half a billion dollars in aid since 2001. In fact, Iran is one of the most effective donors in the country, delivering 93 per cent of the aid it has pledged. By comparison, the US has delivered only 48 per cent of $5 billion in pledged aid; India has contributed 24 per cent of its $200 million in pledged aid. Iran has built mosques, education centres – including a $100 million university in Kabul, and has provided loans to Afghan businessmen and poured investment dollars into the country.36 Afghanistan’s Investment Support Agency (AISA) and Afghan Business Delegation to Tehran noted, in the context of a Tehran conference in January 2008, that Afghanistan implements $1.5 to $2 billion for civil, dam, road, silo and house-building projects per annum. Omar Zakhilwal, president and CEO of AISA, emphasized that given the commonalties in religion, culture, language and traditions, Iran can participate in significant number of the projects.37 The volume of Iranian investment and involvement in economic activities, particularly the western region of Afghanistan, raises all kind of questions about Iran’s motives related to communal attachment and meddling in Afghan politics – where some claim that Iran only helps Shias and only seeks to extend Iran’s cultural influence.38 Still, Iran’s economic interest and heavy investment in Afghanistan has made Tehran a big stakeholder with no interest in promoting the failure of an Afghan government. In spite of its declared desire to witness US and NATO troops’ departure from Afghanistan, Iran has a clear stake in peace and security of its eastern neighbour. Being a multinational society itself, Iran has everything to lose by openly and overtly privileging religious or ethnic communities in Afghanistan or limiting its development projects to the west and northern Afghanistan. To further their bilateral relations, Iran and Afghanistan signed a security Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on strategic partnership on 4 August 2013. The agreement was comprehensive and emphasized military cooperation, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and training, combating terrorism, organized crime and strategic economic cooperation. Kabul and Tehran will also establish multilateral cooperation

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with Russia and India in the field of regional peace and security.39 During his meeting with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in Kabul in January 2015 (organized to finalize the terms of a major bilateral strategic cooperation agreement in expanding their trade and transportation links), Iranian Foreign Minister Jawad Zarif noted that Iran would be interested in establishing a joint force with regional states to contain extremism.40 President Ghani’s 2015 visit to Iran thus also had a distinct economic dimension. President Ghani spoke of the high unemployment in his country and stated that Afghanistan needs Iranian investor’s help and welcomed Iranian investors in all fields including agriculture, mining, banking and transit.41 Consider Afghanistan’s estimated $1 trillion untapped mineral wealth – from iron, copper, gold, uranium and precious stones such as emeralds – which countries such as the UK, Italy, South Korea, China and India are already actively engaged in exploiting. Iran is only slowly beginning to enter this arena.42 During his visit to Tehran, presidents Ghani and Rowhani discussed a range of potential joint economic ventures between the two countries in all areas of mutual interest mainly economy, energy, industry, mines, trade, as well as investments in the fields of economy, transit, railway and roads, plus expansion of Iran’s southern ports to connect Afghanistan and other eastern and northern countries of the region to free waters. President Ghani said that Afghanistan will turn into a center for transit and electricity trade for the whole region.43 Despite the international sanctions, Iran’s participation in Afghanistan’s infrastructure development through building roads, power transmission lines, border stations and many other infrastructure projects is substantial. Afghan Ambassador to Tehran Nassir Ahmad Nour has confirmed that in 2014 “Iran and Afghanistan’s trade balance shows a 10-fold rise as compared with five years ago, and is rising steadily.” “The value of trade between Iran and Afghanistan, including transit of goods and fuel products, has hit $5 billion per year,” Afghan Ambassador told Fars News Agency.44 To further their bilateral relations, Iran and Afghanistan signed a security MOU on strategic partnership on 4 August 2013. The agreement was comprehensive and emphasized military cooperation, intelligence sharing, joint military exercises and training, combating

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terrorism, organized crime and strategic economic cooperation. Kabul and Tehran will also establish multilateral cooperation with Russia and India in the field of regional peace and security.45 During his meeting with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan in Kabul in January 2015 to finalize the terms of a major bilateral strategic cooperation agreement to expand their trade and transportation links, Iranian Foreign Minister Jawad Zarif noted that Iran would be interested in organizing a joint force with regional states to contain extremism.46 The challenge in regards to this opportunity and President Ghani’s encouragement of private initiative is that the private sector in Iran remains extremely weak and small because of the IRGC’s (Revolutionary Guards) massive presence in the country’s economy. The Guards enjoy a monopoly over the most lucrative sectors of the national economy, and those Iranian companies working in Afghanistan’s infrastructure are all directly or indirectly connected to IRGC. Wresting economic collaboration from the security apparatus will remain a challenge for the two countries in the years to come.

Conclusion Each of the three Islamic Republics – Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan – follows its own approach to the regional issues, and it remains a challenge for Iran to constructively explore the ambiguity of its regional relations. Iran is intrinsically linked to Afghanistan by history and the social and economic geography of their common borders. The biggest challenge facing Iran – in terms of the framework applied by this book – is its fear of exclusion and the negative foreign policies that this fear can engender. Iran has an extensive and growing economic engagement in Afghanistan, and it has repeatedly called for common regional diplomacy, but the fear of exclusion defines the devil in the detail that can undermine these other efforts. The many issues examined in this chapter, from security over refugees to narcotics, can disrupt relations. What seems particularly important, though, and a precondition for positive developments is the coming together of regional governments on the basis of human security policies – policies that are not overtly tied to and thus hostage to the geopolitics of the region and which can address immediate national needs of all the countries.

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Afghanistan is caught in a transition from a large international and US-led presence to a new security regime where its own governance capacity and regional relations increase in importance. As examined elsewhere in this book, Kabul must navigate this transition while decoding the whims and intentions of particularly the United States but also other major players such as India and China. The bilateral security agreement entered with the United States in 2014 provides a roadmap only for the short term; the longer term is, in essence, political. Iran, for its part, sees the American forces as a threat and prefers their complete withdrawal, despite the great service rendered by them in removing the threat of the Taliban, their arch enemies. Iran wants to see a strong and friendly government in Kabul that can control their side of the common border, stop the flow of refugees into Iran, and help solve the narcotics traffic. Iran is not hostile to Afghanistan– USA friendship in a broad context but sees the continued presence of American forces as a strategic menace that in the short term, to a considerable degree, will define Iranian policy. Iran can help alter the regional dynamic if it seizes the opening that Obama proposed for in talks on Afghanistan, and if the United States is serious about it. Obama has suggested that Iran could be a constructive partner and should be included in regional talks about stability in Afghanistan and the region.47 However, a US opening to Iran on this issue will not be easy. There is no a single negotiating strategy in the Islamic Republic, which is reflective of a divided regime. Conflicting declarations by different authorities on relations with the US are thus a clear indication of the chaos that governs the decision-making process in Iran. While President Rowhani proposes collaboration with the US for solving bilateral and regional problems, Iran’s Leader, Ali Khamenei, as well as the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards oppose to bilateral negotiations. Khamenei has the most authority in this matter and has hitherto rejected any sort of negotiations with the United States with the sole, though yet significant, exception of nuclear issues. The United States and its international partners reached a nuclear deal with Iran in July 2015, but any wider positive spinoff must await the deal’s implementation, which will be long and without question fraught with difficulty. Meanwhile Afghanistan and Iran and also Pakistan, have direct and strategic interests in regional development. The advanced underdevelopment of their border regions generates instability and insecurity,

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and a regional approach would mean investment in education, youth, job creation, health and culture. Although some time off, a common market offers the prospect of positive change, and it is possible to take steps in this direction via, for instance, the Economic Cooperation Organization that engulfs Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan and the five Central Asian republics. Such change will not come easy. The security establishments of these countries must be made to decrease their duplicitous game of proxy warfare, which feeds off insecurities and the fear of exclusion. In Iran, as elsewhere, the balance is entrenched in favour of the security establishment, but as also noted there is dissent within the elite and real opportunities for addressing very urgent national problems by way of collaboration. It goes for Iran and the other states that change is possible if informal change and Track II diplomacy is pursued and linked to a policy of inclusion, but it will be long in the making and continuously uncertain. The new strategic landscape in the Middle East and southwest Asia can enforce the position of inclusionist forces in the region and beyond. The post-Arab Spring is hijacked by state repression and extremist Islamist groups. The anarchy has created a vacuum of authority and order that will be quickly filled by old and new terrorist groups, including the Islamic State. The emergence of the latter in Afghanistan and Pakistan has rapidly degenerated into a security threat to both countries. Alarmingly for Iran – and Pakistan – [Afghanistan President] Ghani [confirms] that the IS scouts are primarily operating in the south and west of Afghanistan. Those areas neighbor Baluchistan, a nexus of militancy, smuggling and drug trafficking on both sides of the Iranian– Pakistani border. Indeed, the prospect of IS seeking to join forces with militant Iranian Baluchi Salafists should not be taken lightly.48 The nuclear deal reached between Iran and p5 þ 1 (US, Russia, China, France, United Kingdom plus Germany) could, as dividend, encourage Tehran to engage more actively with the American-led anti-IS coalition. In an op-ed in the Washington Post, Vali Nasr writes Iran has been fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and it could be doing the same in Afghanistan before long. This could be

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a long war, and that reality has forced Iran to rethink its strategic calculus. Confronting the Islamic State requires not a nuclear umbrella but a reduction of tensions with the international community and greater economic resources. The threat of the Islamic State, more so than any promise of hegemony over the region, was likely a decisive factor in Iran’s decision to sign away the nuclear cover for its regional strategy.49 Including Iran in a regional equation makes strategic sense and facilitates its reintegration in the international community in a historical juncture. Isolating the Islamic republic reinforces the position of extremist elements in the country by inciting them to be less accountable and more destructive. Engaging Iran restrains the free-forall behaviour of those who prosper in chaos. Despite its fiery, but empty rhetoric against the presence of foreign forces in the region, the Islamic Republic of Iran wants to preserve its interests in Afghanistan. It shares Afghan concerns for security, narcotics traffic, shortage of water and political instability. Iran has maintained good relations with Afghanistan since 2001 and Tehran has provided Afghanistan with millions in aid assistance, development projects and reconstruction. The complexity of these problems and their transnational nature challenge the limits and constraints of each of the three republics, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Confronting them requires a collective effort. Iran has announced its support to the Afghan peace process through regional cooperation. Cooperation and partnership with regional countries is a key foreign policy issue for Afghanistan and its neighbours as the US and the NATO allies are withdrawing their forces from this country.50

Notes 1. Buzan, B. and O. Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 2. Ibid., p. 40. 3. Wilde, Andreas, “Continuity and Hiatus: Structural Patterns of Iran’s Policy in Afghanistan”, Internationales Asienforum, 40/1 – 2 (2009), p. 13. See also Royal Geographical Society, From Kabul to Kandahar 1833 – 1933 (Part One). Available at https://www.rgs.org/NR/rdonlyres/E282F655-A241-4D7CA5A8-19B5E089C580/0/FromKabulto KandaharPartOnefinal.pdf.

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4. Frye, Richard N., The History of Ancient Iran (Munich: Beck) provides a detailed account of historical of relationship between Persia and eastern Iran (present-day Afghanistan). 5. BBC: http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2015/04/150425_l12_iran_babel mandeb_sepah. 6. The situation has not changed under the presidency of Hassan Rowhani. The systemic failure is due to two factors. (1) Formulation of Iran’s foreign policy belongs to the Leader, thus constant; (2) Iran has neither the means nor the credibility to offer a viable alternative to the presence of US forces in Afghanistan. Afghans know that as Iranians do. For an analysis of the power structure and decision making process in Iran, see: Mehran Kamrava and Houchang Hassan-Yari, “Suspended Equilibrium in Iran’s Political System”, The Muslim World 94 (October 2004), pp. 495 – 524. 7. Waheed Muzhda, a former Taliban official turned political analyst in Kabul, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/ world/ middleeast/19iran.html. 8. Harress, Chritopher, “Islamic State Group In Afghanistan: ISIS Growing Outside Of Syria And Iraq, Pentagon Report Finds”, International Business Times, 15 December 2015. Available at http://www.ibtimes.com/ islamic-state-groupafghanistan-isis-growing-outside-syria-iraq-pentagon-report-finds-2226688. 9. “The Price of an Education for Afghan Refugees in Iran,” Guardian, 5 September 2014. 10. According to the “2015 UNHCR country operations profile – Islamic Republic of Iran” there are 982,070 registered Afghan refugees in Iran. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/5461e609b.html. 11. Mir, Haroun, “The Impact of US-Iran Enmity on Afghanistan,” 28 February 2008. Available at http://quqnoos.com/index.php?option¼ com_content& task ¼ view&id ¼121&Itemid¼50. 12. Radio Farda, 19 March 2015. Available at http://www.radiofarda.com/content/ f35_khamenei_meet_afghan_president/26966512.html. 13. Ibid. 14. Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh affirms, “Hirmand is an Ancient Persian Word meaning ‘Abundant in Water’”. Lake Hamun, a Disaster in the Making. Hydropolitics of Hirmand and Hamun, UN Environment Programme, Division of Technology, Industry and Economics. Available at http://www.unep.or.jp/ietc/Publications/ techpublications/TechPub-4/lake1-7.asp. 15. For the text of the Treaty see http://internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/ regionaldocs/1973_Helmand_River_Water_Treaty-Afghanistan-Iran.pdf 16. Samii, Bill, “Iran/Afghanistan: Still No Resolution For Century-Old Water Dispute”, 7 September 2005. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/ 1061209. html. 17. Diba, Bahman Aghai, “Iran-Afghanistan: Water Dispute over Hirmand or Helmand River”, Iranian.com, 11 September 2011. Available at http://iranian. com/main/blog/diba/iran-afghanistan-water-dispute-over-hirmand-orhelmand-river.html.

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18. In 2000, the United Nations Technical Mission prepared an alarming report “On the Drought Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran In Iran”. The report studied the state of water shortage in the four of the hardest-hit provinces (Sistan-Baluchistan, Ilam, Khuzestan and Khorasan). The investigation found out “irrigation efficiency is generally estimated at 30%”. It blamed mismanagement as real source of water shortage and suggested the implementation of adequate water management programmes to address the droughts. The report studied the effects of drought on livestock production, agriculture, environment and trans-boundary migration (population and movements of livestock from Afghanistan to Iran). Beside the resettlement of nomadic population and rural exodus to urban areas, the report painted a grim picture of heavy toll of drought on Iran’s socio-economic situation: more than 50 per cent of the population affected by the drought; 60 per cent of the rural population in the farming and livestock-rearing sectors may be forced to move to cities; 10 million people in urban and rural areas experiencing a shortage of potable water; etc., p. 20. 19. For an account of the well-organized Baluchi ethno-religious insurgency in this part of Iran, see: Taheri, Ahmad Reza, “Baloch Insurgency and Challenges to the Islamic Republic of Iran”, Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict (4 April 2012). 20. Iran accuses Pakistan to act as a haven for terrorist groups active in Sistan and Baluchistan. 21. Tehran Times, 11 November 2004. 22. Bezhan, Frud, “Insecurity Springs from Afghan Dam Projects”, Reuters, 23 July 2015. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/afghan-dam-projects/24936270. html. 23. http://www.ir.undp.org/content/dam/iran/docs/News/2014/March%202014/ Towards%20a%20solution%20for%20Iran’s%20dying%20wetlands/Hamoun %20Wetland/Hamoun%20Wetland%20Baseline%20Situation%20Analysis% 202005.pdf. 24. For an in-depth analysis of this old dispute, see: Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh (ed.), Boundary Politics and International Boundary of Iran (Boca Raton: Florida, Universal Publishers, 2006). 25. BBC News, 24 February 2010. 26. For the complete text and analysis of the Durand Line Agreement see Brad L. Brasseur, Recognizing the Durand Line: A Way Forward for Afghanistan and Pakistan? The Durand Line cut through Pashtun tribal areas and villages, The EastWest Institute, New York, 2011. Available at http://www.ewi.info/sites/ default/files/ideas-files/durandline.pdf. The agreement was a cause of dispute between the governments of Afghanistan and British India and later between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Nystrop, Richard F. and Donald M. Seekins (eds), Afghanistan a Country Study (Washington: Library of Congress, 1986), p. 38. Available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/geogmap/pub/afghanistan.html?e13. The Durand Line is a 2,450 kilometre (1,519 miles) border between Afghanistan and Pakistan; from the spur of the Sarikol range in the north, to the Iranian

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29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

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border to the south-west. See Mahmood, Tariq, “The Durand Line: South Asia’s Next Trouble Spot”, MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California (June 2005). At the time of writing his thesis, the author was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Pakistan army. See also Institute of Policy Studies, “Pak-Afghan Relations: The Durand Line Issue”, Policy Perspectives, Special Issue Afghanistan (Islamabad, 2008). Afghans consider the 12 November 1983 Durand Line Agreement “The Time Bomb” (www.hazara.net/2014/08/ durandline-the-future-time-bomb/). “The boundary has been a source of dissension between Afghanistan and British India (later Pakistan) ever since.” For a report on Afghanistan’s reluctance to accept the agreement see, Spain, James W., The Pathan Borderland, reprint (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1985). Nevill, H.L., Campaigns on the North-West Frontier, reprint (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1977) invokes the Afghanistan Amir Abdur Rahman opposition to the conclusion of the agreement he signed as well as the tribesmen apprehensions and opposition to the treaty. For an ethnic dimension of the current conflicts in the Af– Pak region see: http://pashtunistan.8k.com/pashtuns_ own_state.htm. Sectarian conflict between Shiite minority and Sunni majority in Pakistan has intensified during the last few decades and exacerbated by Islamic revolution in Iran and radicalisation of several Sunni groups in Pakistan. For an analysis of the “Shiite in Pakistan and Iran’s Islamic Revolution” see http://navideshahed.com/ en/index.php?Page¼definition&UID ¼ 220815. LeT is a jihadi group of Wahhabi persuasion backed by Saudi money and protected by Pakistani intelligence services (ISI). The group fights India and conducts terrorist attacks directed against Pakistan’s Shia community. See GlobalResearch (Dr Ismail Salami, “Terrorist Killings Directed against Pakistan’s Shia Population”, 3 February 2015. Available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/terrorist-killingsdirected-against-pakistans-shia-population/5429229); and Council on Foreign Relations, Bajoria, Jayshree, “Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (aka Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba)” 14 January 2010. Available at http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/lashkar-e-taiba-army-pure-aka-lashkar-e-tayyibalashkar-e-toiba-lashkar – taiba/p17882. Ispahani, Mahnaz, “Religious Sword Over Pakistan”, Los Angeles Times, 21 May 2004. Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York, London, W.W. Norton & Company, 2006), pp. 88 – 90. Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life, The World’s Muslims: Unity and Diversity, 9 August 2012, 21. Available at http://www.pewforum.org/ files/2012/08/the-worlds-muslims-full-report.pdf. BBC, “Yemen conflict: Pakistan rebuffs Saudi coalition call”. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32246547. Milani, Mohsen, “Iran and Afghanistan”, The Iran Primer. Available at http:// iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-afghanistan. According to Iran Daily: http://www.iran-daily.com/1385/2661/pdf/i6.pdf.

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35. Leithead, Alastaeir, “Iranian Influence in Afghanistan”, BBC News, 11 June 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south_asia/6741095.stm. 36. Christian Science Monitor, 3 April 2009. 37. http://www.aisa.org.af/Downloads/AfghanBusinessDelegationIran.pdf, 15 January 2008. 38. Christian Science Monitor, op.cit. 39. The MOU is written in Farsi, Pashtun and English. See: http://mfa.gov.af/ Content/files/MoU%20on%20Strategic%20Cooperation%20between%20 National%20Security%20Councils%20of%20Afghanistan%20and%20Iran %20-%204%20August%202013.pdf). 40. Panda, Ankit, “Iran, Afghanistan Approach Strategic Cooperation Pact”, The Diplomat, 22 January 2015. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/ 01/iran-afghanistan-approach-strategic-cooperation-pact/). 41. “Ghani Urges Iran’s Private Sector to Invest in Afghanistan”, Tolo News, 20 April 2015. Available at http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/1 9149ghani-urges-irans-private-sector-to-invest-in-afghanistan. 42. “Afghanistan welcomes Iranian mining investment”, The Iran Project, 25 April 2015. Available at http://theiranproject.com/blog/2015/04/25/afghanistanwelcomes-iranian-mining-investment/. 43. “Afghanistan and Iran Ink Cooperation Agreements”, Office of the President Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 19 April 2015. Available at http://president.gov. af/en/news/44773. 44. Fars News Agency, “Envoy: Iran-Afghanistan Trade Value Hits $5bln”, 12 August 2014. Available at http://english.farsnews. com/newstext.aspx?nn¼139305210 00967. 45. The MOU is written in Farsi, Pashtun and English. See: http://mfa.gov. af/Content/files/MoU%20on%20Strategic%20Cooperation%20between% 20National%20Security%20Councils%20of%20Afghanistan%20and%20Iran %20-%204%20August%202013.pdf. 46. Panda, Ankit, “Iran, Afghanistan Approach Strategic Cooperation Pact”, The Diplomat, 22 January 2015. Available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/ iran-afghanistan-approach-strategic-cooperation-pact/). 47. Ignatius, David, “Obama offers Iran an opening on engagement”, Washington Post, 5 August 2010. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2010/08/04/AR2010080406238_pf.html. 48. Shabani, Mohammad Ali, “Tehran-Kabul relationship faces difficult road”, Al-Monitor, 31 March 2015. http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/ 03/iran-afghanistan-islamic-state.html#ixzz3icubsE6d. 49. Nasr, Vali, “Why did Iran sign on to a deal that will weaken its regional hold?”, Opinions page, Washington Post, 31 July 2015. 50. Bahrami, Abdul Ahad, “Afghanistan-Iran Relations: The Needs and Challenges”, Daily Outlook Afghanistan, 26 April 2015. Available at http://outlookafghanistan. net/topics.php?post_id¼12045?ixzz3if99NoUL.

CHAPTER 8 FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE IN PAKISTAN:UNCERTAIN OPTIONS Tughral Yamin

Introduction A country’s foreign policy is based on its genuine national interests as manifested in its behaviour and relationships with other states.1 Its raison d’e´tat is shaped by a number of factors, such as its history and geography.2 More comprehensively a “set of political, economic and strategic objectives” guides a country’s foreign relations.3 Practically speaking, long-term national interests override all relationships in international affairs. Lord Palmerston, the nineteenth-century British prime minister, famously quipped that in international relations there are “neither permanent friends nor permanent enemies”, only “permanent interests”.4 Implementing national interests diligently means major foreign policy corrections to suit changing circumstances. Practically speaking, paradigm shifts in policy matters take years to materialize and may not always match with existing ground realities. Each country calibrates its foreign policy goals according to its power potential. A country trying to punch above its weight will fall short of achieving its national aims. Small states in particular are not likely to cross the bar when they set it too high “because of their anomalous power capabilities”.5

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Foreign policy makers examine a host of issues on the available menu to craft a policy best suited to their country. The priorities that they set reflect the sum total of national interests and can sometime lead to a clash of interests; for example, nuclear non-proliferation is a major foreign policy issue for the US,6 whereas Iran had long defied international nonproliferation strictures on the plea that it considered acquisition of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as its sovereign right.7 A level-headed foreign policy avoids conflict and creates cooperation. For Pakistan, security is of overwhelming interest. It has been argued that paramount security concerns, to the exclusion of other issues, provide the defence establishment in Pakistan an extraordinary say in policy making.8 To its advantage Pakistan’s geo-strategic location provides it regional salience. Historian Arnold Toynbee has described the area making up modern day Afghanistan and Pakistan as the “roundabout of the ancient world”.9 Located at the confluence of the Persian, Indian, Chinese and Russian empires of yore, Pakistan has consistently used its location as a foreign policy tool. In the 1950s and the 1960s, Pakistani leaders were able to earn a place within the Western alliance system as a regional bulwark against international communism.10 Its pivotal location again elevated it to the status of a frontline ally of the US in the 1980s and in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Pakistan is not likely to lose its geostrategic importance in the foreseeable future but, owing to the rapidly changing regional situation, it needs to improve its relations with its neighbours and pursue mutually beneficial trade and economic activity. To achieve this end, Pakistan must engage a number of nuanced policy changes laid out in this chapter.

Framework of Analysis For small and vulnerable states like Pakistan, located in hostile neighbourhoods, survival is of utmost importance. Until recently Pakistan’s survival strategy has mainly meant surviving India.11 Towards this end Pakistan has developed a strategic triad of a nuclear deterrent and dependence on a system of alliances. In addressing its external threats, the official narrative has banked heavily on a sense of its manifest Muslim identity to buttress its security. The twin combination of survival and identity has heavily influenced its foreign policy.

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Slowly but gradually Pakistan’s official threat perception has changed. It has been acknowledged through various policy statements that the main threat is now from within. It is also generally agreed that a number of countries hostile to Pakistan are actively involved in fomenting unrest within Pakistan through an explosive mix of virulent ideologies, sectarianism and violence. Keen observers are quick to blame states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran for sponsoring proxies furthering their brand of sectarian Islam. A lot of instability in Pakistan has been created jointly by the Soviet Union and the US for using Pakistan and Afghanistan as a battleground for their Great Game of the twentieth and twenty-first century. India has exploited the situation by spreading unrest in the restive province of Baluchistan. Pakistan’s current foreign policy is an outcome of a traditional security threat from the East and a growing internal threat created by state and non-state actors, who have found ample space for their activities in a state wracked by wars in Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Context of Multiple Relationships To properly grasp Pakistan’s current foreign policy challenges and the complexities of its policy options, it is useful first to consider its complex relationships with rivals and partners, including India, the United States, China, Saudi Arabia and others. It is from this contrasting group of friends and foes that Pakistan has to leverage foreign policy advantages.

Relations with India Traditionally Pakistan’s foreign policy has been India-centric. A historical baggage of mistrust and suspicion defines this difficult relationship. Independence came suddenly, in 1947, leaving the two countries ill prepared to handle the consequences of an arbitrary and hasty partition of the subcontinent.12 Pakistan was denied a fair share of its territory and assets, forcing Mr Jinnah, the founder, to call his new born country “mutilated” and “moth-eaten”.13 The initial problems were aggravated due to the arrival of millions of refugees and the outbreak of war in Kashmir. Building the state machinery without matching resources was a gigantic task. The national exchequer was

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empty. Indians had stopped a badly needed tranche of Rs 550 million due to Pakistan.14 The Government of Pakistan was actually entitled to receive Rs 1.7 billion from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) but the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) received assets worth only Rs 1.2 billion. In SBP’s record, the RBI still owes it Rs 5.6 billion.15 The administrative difficulties were grossly compounded because the eastern and western wings of the new country were separated by a thousand kilometres of hostile and unfriendly territory. The army had to be reorganized into new units with Muslim soldiers trickling in from as far off as Ben Ghazi and Burma and the far reaches of the Indian subcontinent.16 The Pakistani armed forces were short of senior leadership and were denied their part of weapons and equipment. Pakistan had no industry worth the name and there was hardly any trained and experienced manpower to run and manage the existing factories and businesses. Under such turbulent circumstances Mr Jinnah wanted peace with his immediate neighbours and with the world at large, within the framework of the United Nations Charter.17 He actually thought that the idea of joint defence with India was possible, provided the two countries could amicably resolve their disputes. The proposal for joint defence remained under discussion in Pakistan’s policy-making circles for a long time. It was reiterated by Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra in 1953 and by President Ayub Khan in 1959.18 There was little traction for collective defence on the Indian side. Nehru rejected Ayub’s proposal outright. He was not sure against whom Pakistan wanted a joint defence and had strong misgivings about the Pakistani stance on Kashmir.19 The war in Kashmir in 1947 ruined the chances of long lasting peace between the two countries. The dispute arose when the Hindu Maharaja of this Muslim majority state dithered on whether to join India or Pakistan or remain independent. As he mulled over his choices, World War II veterans belonging to Poonch rose in rebellion against the tyrannical rule of the Maharaja.20 As units of the state army and the Gilgit Scouts joined forces to fight a liberation war, Indian regular forces were air lifted to Srinagar, without the Maharaja having formally signed the Instrument of Accession.21 The Indian Army was able to stem the tide and prevent the Valley from falling into the hands of the Pathan tribesmen.22 As fighting petered out and the battle lines stabilized, one

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third of Jammu and Kashmir became Azad (free) territory, while the Indians were able to keep the remainder under their occupation. Over the years, multiple UN resolutions have called for referendum, giving the Kashmiris the choice to decide their own fate, but India has slowly and steadily hardened its position on the disputed territory and is no longer willing to discuss the issue. The Indian government under Narendra Modi wants to repeal Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, giving the territory of Jammu and Kashmir special status.23 It hasn’t succeeded so far. Another contentious issue that has marred India– Pakistan relations is the sharing of water resources – as mentioned also in Chapter 7. The haphazard partition of Punjab created an “international water dispute between the two newly formed nation states”.24 To avoid an imminent water supply cut-off, Pakistan signed a standstill agreement in 1948 with India. This arrangement was blatantly violated in 1949 and 1950 and India briefly stopped the water of Upper Bari Doab Canal to Lahore and its hinterland.25 Troop mobilization took place in the spring of 1950 and again between July and October 1951. According to the Pakistan Army’s official website, during this time, the Indian Army trespassed into Azad Kashmir and West Pakistan territory 48 times and the airspace was violated 30 times. This activity brought the two countries precariously close to an all-out war.26 It took a decade to resolve the water issue through the intervention of the World Bank, which enabled the two countries to conclude the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) on 19 September 1960.27 Pakistan got the unrestricted use of three western rivers of the Indus Rivers System, i.e. the Indus, the Jhelum and Chenab. The three eastern rivers, namely the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi, were allocated to India. New canals were dug up and dams and dykes were constructed to make up for the rivers given to India. A transition period of ten years was permitted in which India was bound to supply water to Pakistan from these rivers until the latter developed a canal system for utilization of waters of Jhelum, Chenab and the Indus. The treaty thus resulted in the partitioning of the rivers rather than sharing of their waters. Pakistan received one-time financial compensation for the loss of water from the eastern rivers. Since 31 March 1970, India has full rights to use the waters of the three rivers allocated to it. The countries regularly exchange data and co-operate in matters related to the treaty through the Permanent Indus

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Commission.28 Optimists claim IWT as a major foreign policy success. However, the current thinking in Pakistan is that India regularly flouts the provisions of the treaty and encroaches upon its share of waters. Water sharing is the only area, where India and Pakistan could reach an agreement; otherwise it has mostly been a story of conflict. During the Cold War, India officially maintained a facade of non-alignment but pragmatically befriended USSR.29 The only choice left with Pakistan was to join the Western camp. Fortunately its interests conflated with that of the US as the latter was looking for regional allies to contain communism. After the 1971 War, Pakistan embarked on a secret nuclear programme in a bid to balance the growing Indian military threat of both conventional and nuclear weapons. India had a longstanding nuclear programme and had tested its first nuclear device in 1974. In May 1998 it conducted six nuclear weapons tests. Pakistan responded with its own nuclear explosions a fortnight later. The nuclear deterrence created a balance in the relations of the two countries. There has been no war since 1971 and military conflict has remained below the nuclear threshold. In the diplomatic field a Confidence Building Measures (CBM) regime has been created in the military and non-military but it has only created an environment of no peace – no war. Over the past two years there have been a number of serious ceasefire violations along the LOC. The foreign secretaries’ talks scheduled in Islamabad in August 2014 were called off by India on the grounds that the Pakistani high commissioner had extended an invitation to the leaders of the Kashmir All Parties Hurriyat Conference to tea.30 In March 2015 the Indian foreign secretary did visit Islamabad as part of his trip to SAARC countries.31 Hopes were again raised when the leaders of Pakistan and India met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in the Russian city of Ufa on 10 July 2015 but were quickly dashed after the attack on a police station in the Indian border town of Gurdaspur. The Indian foreign minister’s visit to Islamabad proved fruitful and it was agreed to revive talks under the new title of bilateral comprehensive dialogue. There have been attempts from both sides to lessen tensions and improve relations by building business and trade networks. Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani prime minister, took a calculated political risk by attending the inauguration of Narendra Modi as the new prime minister

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of India in May 2014.32 Unfortunately this bold diplomatic manoeuvre was in vain, as Modi deliberately ignored Sharif at the SAARC summit held in Kathmandu in November the same year.33 Nawaz Sharif’s government wants India to get the Non Discriminatory Trade (NDT) of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status but it has not been able to gain domestic support for this proposal.34 Modi visited Lahore in December 2015 to congratulate Sharif on his birthday and the two have met on the sidelines of a number of international events. This on-off relationship has been marred by incidents like the attack on the air base in Pathankot,35 and the apprehension of an Indian spy in Baluchistan,36 but the two countries have managed the crises well and there has been no mobilization of troops or nuclear sabre rattling.

Alliance with USA Mutual security concerns have been the underpinning of US– Pakistan relations. After World War II, the US policy of containment shaped its foreign policy and it found Pakistan to be a convenient ally in the new world order. Even before Pakistan had come into being, Jinnah – the founder of Pakistan, had realized that he desperately needed foreign aid for the survival of his new country. The only country from where he could get financial support was the US. In a revealing interview given to Margaret Bourke-White, of Life magazine, Mr Jinnah argued that “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America”. He described Pakistan as “the pivot of the world” since the country was placed on “the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves.” Russia, he warned, was “not very far away”.37 To explore possible avenues of help and cooperation, Jinnah sent Mirza Abol Hasan Ispahani to tour the US as his personal representative before Pakistan became independent. Ispahani would later become Pakistan’s first ambassador to the US – a post that he would occupy till February 1952.38 American tilt towards Pakistan was sealed with Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to the US in May 1950.39 Nehru’s visit to the US in 1949 had only exposed fundamental differences between the two countries.40 Nehru was a dyed in the wool socialist and was naturally inclined towards the USSR. He refused to become part of the Western camp. Pakistan gladly occupied the space that India had ceded. American military aid to Pakistan began in 1954.41 Writing for the prestigious Foreign Affairs in January 1964,

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Pakistan’s first military ruler Mohammed Ayub Khan summed up the chronology of these alliances in the following words: In May 1954, Pakistan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States. Later in that year it became a member of SEATO along with the United States, Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. A year later, it joined the Baghdad Pact, another mutual defense organization, with Britain, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The United States has not joined this organization, but has remained closely associated with it since its inception. In 1958, when Iraq left this pact, it was renamed CENTO (Central Treaty Organization): it continued to comprise Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as its regional members. Early in 1959, Pakistan signed (as did Turkey and Iran) a bilateral Agreement of Cooperation with the United States, which was designed further to reinforce the defensive purposes of CENTO.42 This special relationship came to an abrupt end as a result of the 1965 India–Pakistan War. The US stopped its military aid and greatly reduced its economic help to Pakistan. As a result Pakistan’s interest in the two Western sponsored military pacts declined.43 Ayub Khan expressed his bitterness on America’s fickle behaviour on the cover page of his 1966 official autobiography. He lamented that “People in developing countries seek assistance but on the basis of mutual respect; they want to have friends not masters.”44 After the break from the US, Ayub Khan twice visited Moscow to improve relations. The Russians helped set up a steel mill in Karachi but the relationship proved short lived.45 As secessionist tendencies became evident in the eastern wing, the USSR moved decisively in favour of India, which was actively supporting the Mukti Bahini (Freedom Force). A 20-year Treaty of Friendship was concluded with India in 1970 in the events leading up to the war that resulted in the breaking up of Pakistan.46

“All Weather” Friendship with China Pakistan is most comfortable in its relations with China. The friendship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan transcends ideology. Both countries hail their friendship

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with platitudes like “higher than mountains, deeper than the oceans and sweeter than honey”.47 These platonic sentiments notwithstanding, Pak– China relations are firmly grounded in practical reasons that form a central part of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Moreover, Pakistan’s official stance with regards China finds popular resonance: according to a Pew poll, Pakistanis view China most favourably, being second only to the Chinese themselves.48 This feeling is reciprocated in China, e.g. when the Pakistani team entered the Bird’s Nest arena as part of the inaugural ceremony of 2008 Olympic in Beijing, the entire audience broke out into spontaneous ovation.49 Pakistan provided much needed political support to China as it struggled to establish itself as an independent country. Chinese – Pakistani diplomatic relations were established in 1950, with military cooperation following in 1966. Pakistan was among the first countries to end diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Although Pakistan remained neutral during the 1962 China– India clash, it soon began cultivating relations with China. On 29 April 1964 PIA earned the unique distinction of becoming the first airline from a non-communist country to fly into the PRC.50 For some time it was the only foreign carrier flying to China. Pakistan played an important role in bridging the gap between China and the West by facilitating the 1972 Nixon visit to China. Pakistan also supported mainland China’s re-entry into the UN, just as it continues to support China on the issues of Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan. China has in return supported Pakistan’s principled stance on Kashmir and opposed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan has benefited from Chinese economic, military and technical assistance that has been free of political conditionalities. The military ties with China have been particularly strong. Pakistan imports 54 per cent of its arms from China.51 It has well established joint ventures with the Chinese defence industry, such as production of fighter jets and guided missile frigates.52 China has also helped Pakistan improve its civil nuclear power sector.53 Pak – China relations assumed strategic proportions with the construction of the Karakoram Highway (KKH). This engineering marvel over one of the highest mountain ranges in the world was built jointly by Pakistani and Chinese engineers between 1966 and 1982. KKH is of immense commercial and military value to both countries.54

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Another strategic project completed by China in Pakistan is the Gwadar deep sea port. The port was officially inaugurated in 2008.55 Gwadar Port is now being linked with Xinjiang within the multi-billion dollar China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This is part of China’s wider plan – examined also in Chapter 5 – to rebuild the ancient Silk Road to improve trade and economic connectivity.56 However, despite the proximity and connectivity the bilateral trade volume is low. As of 2013 it is roughly $12 billion and heavily tilted in favour of China. In fact Pakistan’s trade deficit with China has more than doubled between 2004 and 2012.57 On the positive side Foreign Direct Investment from China and Hong Kong is picking up. About 120 Chinese companies employing 13,000 Chinese nationals are working on 250 projects in Pakistan in oil and gas, IT and telecom, power generation, engineering, automobiles, infrastructure and mining sectors. A joint investment company with a paid up capital of $200 million was launched in 2007. Still, all this is far below the actual potential of this all-weather friendship.58

Inclination towards Islamic Countries, Particularly Saudi Arabia Drawing inspiration from its Islamic identity, Pakistan has all along tried to find common cause with other Muslim countries. Pakistan is especially close to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi state is important in the Islamic world because it hosts the holy Kaaba in Makkah and the Prophet’s mosque in Medina. It is enormously rich because of its oil wealth and holds a prominent place in the Muslim Ummah (nation). Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have overtime developed extensive commercial, cultural, religious, political and strategic relations. According to a Pew survey, Pakistanis hold the most favourable perception of the desert kingdom, with 95 per cent viewing Saudi Arabia positively and none expressing a negative view.59 With one of the largest armies in the world and as the only declared nuclear power among the Muslim states, Pakistan has maintained a unique position to assist Saudi Arabia with its defence needs. It has provided manpower and training under bilateral military agreements. Both countries have been quick to dismiss insinuations that there had ever been any nuclear cooperation between them.60 Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif enjoys exceptionally close ties with senior members of the Saudi royal family. When Sharif was

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toppled in the bloodless 1999 coup d’e´tat, Saudi Arabia persuaded the military chief, Pervez Musharraf, to relent and allow Sharif and his family to travel into exile in Saudi Arabia. After Sharif’s return to power, the Saudi government in early 2014 readily granted $1.5 billion to Pakistan.61 Keeping in mind the criticism that the Pak–Saudi partnership is a quest to maintain Saudi hegemony in the Arab world,62 Pakistan has been careful not to take sides and wisely chose not to become part of the Saudi–Houthi conflict in Yemen. However, it did agree to become part of large multinational anti-terror alliance formed by Saudi Arabia in December 2015.63 Pakistani troops took part in the Thunder of the North exercise with other coalition members in March 2016.64 The image of Saudi Arabia in Pakistan has been sullied lately and many believe that Saudi money has been used to stoke sectarian hatred in the country.65 Similar accusations have been levelled against Iran.

International and Regional Partnerships Initially Pakistan concentrated in building partnerships with its western neighbours. This included military as well as economic associations. During the Cold War Pakistan, Turkey and Iran were all part of the western alliance system. All three were members of the Baghdad Pact later renamed Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).66 Iran, Pakistan and Turkey also partnered in the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) established in 1964 for socio-economic development. These groupings were reinforced by strong bilateral relations. However, while economic and military ties with Turkey remain vibrant, those with Iran have significantly cooled. The gas pipeline from Iran can be a game changer in reviving the relations and there is yet hope that it may yet materialize after western sanctions are lifted. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the RCD was dissolved and gave way to the more recent Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), established in 1985. Seven new members were added: Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. There have been ECO proposals to get gas either from Iran or Turkmenistan, but political and security reasons have hindered these projects. One project that holds significant promise is the Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA 1000). The main objective is to create conditions for sustainable

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electricity trade between the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic and the South Asian countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan.67 In the 1980s Pakistan became part of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Member states include India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan.68 The Association, which has the potential to become another European Union (EU), never really got off the ground due to India–Pakistan hostility. There was some hope recently, when Narendra Modi invited all SAARC heads of states to his inauguration, to which the Pakistani prime minister responded positively.69 Modi also spoke about the utility of this organization on the occasion of the Indian Independence Day.70 One area of partnership that is often ignored within the framework of SAARC is UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs). Presently Pakistan, India and Bangladesh are the largest Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) to UNPKO. A common SAARC voice within the framework of UNPKOs can help these countries emerge as a potent international bloc.71 Pakistan also has observer status in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In July 2015, Pakistan and India were accepted as full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This has only been possible due to the improvement in Pakistan–Russia relations. These ties had been frozen in the framework of the Cold War. The deep-rooted Russia– India defence ties during the post-Cold War era did not help either. The first signs of a thaw became visible after the long anticipated visit of Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu to Pakistan in 2014. Several agreements were signed during this visit including the sale of Russian Mi35 helicopters to Pakistan. Further opportunities for cooperation exist in regards to UN peacekeeping operations, in which Pakistan has considerable expertise that Russia has expressed an interest in benefiting from.72

Key Foreign Policy Challenges for Pakistan Within this intricate skein of relationships, Pakistan has a number of foreign policy challenges as well as opportunities. The key challenges relate to India and Afghanistan. The changes happening in the Middle East and its internal situation can also limit or enhance the freedom make foreign policy choices.

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Afghanistan The situation in Afghanistan after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan looks murky at best. The US presence in Afghanistan since 2001 and its inability to quell the Taliban insurgency has affected US– Pakistan relations – as also demonstrated in Chapter 4. A raft of incidents in 2011, including the US Navy SEAL Team 6 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, the Raymond Davis incident in Lahore and the NATO raid at the Salala border check post raid in November 2011, combined to create an all-time low in an already strained relationship. Since then there has been a marked improvement. The real issue that confronts Pakistan is how things will materialize in Afghanistan after a complete withdrawal of US and international troops. Pakistan does not want chaos and anarchy to return in Afghanistan but almost anything can happen. Regional actors are jostling to occupy the space created by American departure. This includes India. Pakistan is already wary of Indian involvement in Baluchistan through its consular offices located near the Afghan border. It is in Pakistan’s interest that it can play a meaningful role in the political and economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. Multiple visits by the Pakistani army chief to Kabul and the newly elected President, Mr Ashraf Ghani, to Islamabad in November 2014 have signalled a new era of genuine friendship and cooperation.73 Ghani’s participation in the Heart of Asia conference organized in Islamabad also raised a lot of expectations. After the terrorist attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar on 16 December 2014, the Afghan authorities promised to help bring to book Mullah Fazlullah, the mastermind of the attack, who is in hiding in the province of Kunar.74 They haven’t been able to lay their hands on the elusive mullah but Pak –Afghan relations have steadily improved. The Pakistani Inter Services Intelligences (ISI) and the Afghan National Intelligence, the National Directorate of Security (NDS) have signed an MOU to improve intelligence cooperation. Pakistan has also been instrumental in arranging the first direct talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government in July 2015 in Murree and its stock has risen as a facilitator. The process was suspended unceremoniously after the news leak that Mullah Umar had been dead for two years. Quite predictably, a war of succession broke out and the next meeting never took place. Pakistan has been feverishly trying to get the Afghan and Taliban interlocutors back on the negotiating table within the framework of the

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Quadrilateral Coordination Committee (QCC),75 but the Taliban response has not been encouraging so far.

Changes in the Middle East The Middle East is in a flux of unprecedented proportions. The Westphalian model of the modern state system seems to have come to a regional dead end, and the arbitrary boundaries produced by the infamous Sykes – Picot agreement of 1916 may be redrawn.76 Seething public anger has made the monarchies, sheikhdoms and dictatorships become extremely brutal after the unfinished promise of the Arab Spring. Dissent, no matter how legitimate, has been dealt with a heavy hand. In Egypt and Syria the military regimes have struck back with bloody ferocity. The civil war in Syria has fragmented the country and displaced large segments of society. Syrian refugee camps in countries like Jordan and Turkey are stretched to the limits. More people are now fleeing across the Mediterranean to Europe in flimsy boats. Libya is reeling from the chaos created after the lynching of Gaddafi and the assassination of the US ambassador by unregulated militias. Israel has pursued a bloody campaign inside the Gaza strip but could not stop Hamas from firing rockets, despite its state-ofthe-art iron dome air defence system. IS has physically occupied territories in Iraq and Syria and jangled Western nerves. In response, a US-led coalition of Western and regional countries has launched a military campaign against IS. Turkey joined the coalition in mid2015, though it vehemently opposes the arming of Kurds by coalition partners. If things get out of hand, the fallout in the shape of unwanted refugees and a violent ideology that had earlier driven Al-Qaeda could be potentially and directly damaging to Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Internal Situation and its Impact on Foreign Policy Pakistan’s military is heavily involved inside the country in rooting out sanctuaries of armed insurgent groups, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Afghan militant factions such as the Haqqani network in North Waziristan.

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Operation Zarb-e-Azb, in North Waziristan has received widespread support from domestic political, defence and civilian sectors, including the two largest Islamic clerical groups i.e. the Pakistan Ulema Council and the Council of Islamic Ideology. It is proceeding successfully and has expanded to include other tribal agencies such as Khyber and Shawwal. One unintended impact has been the very large number of internally displaced people from the conflict zone. Unless they are quickly rehabilitated, they may yet produce another crop of angry young men, who can fall prey to the lure of the terrorist organizations. On the political front, things came to a head during the summer of 2014, when Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) led by cricketer-turnedpolitician Imran Khan and Dr Tahir ul Qadri’s, Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) converged on to Islamabad to launch a prolonged protest. They failed in their ultimate goal to dislodge the government but did manage to put on a show of street power that created enough political turbulence to shake up the government and produce a sense of uncertainty about the future of the existing political system. The school massacre in Peshawar brought to an abrupt end the long summer of dharnas leaving the current administration to tackle the sticky issue of election reforms and the implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP) to defeat terrorism.77 In March of 2016 the capital witnessed another dharna by the supporters of Mumtaz Qadri, who had been hanged for assassinating the Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, who had voiced his support for a Christian woman accused of blasphemy. This time, the government was able to negotiate their way through with the agitators in a few days’ time. This twin challenge of public demonstrations and terrorism has forced the government to cede a lot of political space to the security establishment. Wrongly or rightly, a feeling has developed that the military is the only credible institution to combat terrorism and keep the civilian-led government from failing. In the long run, however, the eradication of terrorism and the political maturity that can underpin reform requires a societal transformation. The enforcement of capital punishment and conduct of counterterrorism operations in tribal areas may be necessary but are also insufficient to bring about a change in mind sets. In particular, the disenfranchized segments of the society most likely to become willing recruits of militant ideology must be integrated into mainstream society. There is a foreign policy dimension

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to this challenge: Pakistan needs to translate its anti-terrorism resolve into improved bilateral relations with both Afghanistan and India.78 Pakistan has already declared that it will not make any distinction between the so-called good and the bad Taliban and would tackle terrorism in all its forms and manifestation. Meanwhile domestic terrorists are also being dealt with seriously, as was evident in the elimination of the Lashkar Jhangvi supremo Malik Ishaq in a police encounter and the cleanup operation by Rangers in Karachi. Change will come slowly as Pakistan reviews old relations and considers ways to introduce good governance, the rule of law, social and economic reform.

Conclusion Pakistani policy makers will ignore the changes taking place in Pakistan’s local, regional and international environment at their peril. Four significant trends should be noted: The end of NATO’s combat mission in Afghanistan after 13 years of fighting;79 turmoil in the Middle East that threatens to cascade and radicalize regional politics;80 the economic ascendance of India despite its abject poverty81 and an incipient revival of relations between Iran and the West.82 The most important change from the Pakistani perspective is the rise of India. Its economic growth has won it a place in the forum of emerging markets known by its acronym BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa): the new BRICS Bank is threatening to challenge the hegemony of the US dollar.83 Moreover, India has moved out of the Cold War camp to become a strategic partner of the US, while maintaining strong military and economic links with Russia and other world powers. Despite boundary disputes, it has a healthy trade relationship with China. The bilateral trade volume is expected to increase from $70 to 100 billion by 2015.84 The volume of China– Pakistan trade in comparison is merely in the region of $12 billion.85 Pakistan knows that it cannot compete on par with India and that its primary issues are domestic. First Pakistan has to successfully bring to an end the military operations against the insurgents before it can attend to the more serious business of subsuming the tribal areas into the national mainstream and to reintegrate the former Taliban into the civil society. There is also a growing realization that a faltering economy can do more harm than any hostile country, just as serious issues like rampant

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corruption, a narrow tax base and an acute shortage of energy are serious threats to the country’s development and stability. In short, the system of governance needs a serious overhaul. The Pakistani state thus has to think beyond mere survival and ponder how to improve the lot of its people. Its unique geo-strategic location and Muslim identity can lend strength to its foreign policy only if used in conjunction with other elements of national power. It is only fair to say that the national aims and objectives should focus on the welfare of the people in all matters of state. Pakistan thus has a long and difficult task ahead of it, as changes incorporated now will start showing results only in ten to 15 years’ time. Pakistan is thus susceptible to all improvements in the foreign policies examined elsewhere in this book, and Pakistan’s inclusion in regional endeavours will without question advance restraint and reform.

Notes 1. For an understanding of “national interests”, read Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth Edition, Revised (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp. 4 – 15. 2. Amin, Shahid M., “Historical Basis of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Making Process”, in Moonis Ahmar (ed.), Foreign Policy Making Process: A Case Study of Pakistan (University of Karachi: Department of International Relations in Collaboration with Hans Seidel Foundation, Islamabad 2009). 3. Ahmed, Shamshad, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy”, Daily Nation, Lahore, 17 March 2007. 4. Lord Palmerston quotes. Available at http://thinkexist.com/quotes/lord_ palmerston/ (accessed 4 July 2014). 5. Chong, Alan, “The Foreign Policy Potential of ‘small state soft power’ Information Strategies”, 2. Available at http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/ files/events/turin/Chong-ALAN%20CHONG%202007%20The%20Foreign %20Policy%20Potential%20of%20Small%20State%20Soft%20Power.pdf (accessed 28 July 2014). 6. Nonproliferation – United States Nonproliferation Policy: A Dossier. Available at http://www.uspolicy.be/dossier /nonproliferation-united-states-nonproliferation-policy-dossier (accessed 4 July 2014). 7. “Iran will never compromise on its sovereign rights: Analyst”, Press TV, 15 July 2014. Available at http://www.presstv.com/detail/2014/07/15/371429/iranwont-back-down-on-its-rights/ (accessed 16 July 2014). 8. Fair, C. Christine, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 5.

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9. Toynbee, Arnold J., Between Oxus and Jumna (Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 2. 10. Khan, Mohammad Ayub, “The Pakistan-American Alliance”, Foreign Affairs, July 1964 issue. Available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23567/ mohammed-ayub-khan/the-pakistan-american-alliance (accessed 4 July 2014). 11. Burgess, Stephen, “Pakistan’s Security Dilemma and a Quest for Strategic Stability”, p. 135 in Amit Gupta (ed.), Strategic Stability in Asia (Adershot: Ashgate, 2012). 12. For the indecent haste exhibited by the British in leaving the Indian subcontinent, read Stanley Wolpert, Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006). 13. Zaidi, Zawar H., Jinnah Papers 1/2, pp. 643, 649. 14. Ghose, Sankar, Jawaharlal Nehru – A Biography (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1992), p. 168. One Crore is the equivalent of 10 million. 15. Alam, Kazim, “Post-Partition: India still owes Pakistan a little over Rs5.6b, says State Bank”, The Express Tribune, 16 July 2014. Available at http://tribune. com.pk/story/736390/post-partition-india-still-owes-pakistan-a-little-overrs5-6b-says-state-bank/ (accessed 22 July 2014). 16. Arif, K. M., Estranged Neighbours: India-Pakistan 1947 –2010 (Islamabad: Dost Publications, 2010), p. 150. 17. Message to the Nation: On the occasion of the inauguration of the Pakistan Broadcasting Service, 15 August 1947. Available at http://www.therepublic ofrumi.com/archives/jinnah19470815.htm (accessed 4 July 2014). 18. Khan, Mohammad Ayub, Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography (Islamabad: Mr. Books, 2006), pp. 146– 7. 19. Dixit, J. N., India-Pakistan in War and Peace (London: Routeledge, 2002), p. 128. 20. Snedden, Christopher, “The Forgotten Poonch Uprising of 1947”, in Kashmir: The Unwritten History (HarperCollins Publisher India). Available at http://www. india-seminar.com/2013/643/643_christopher_snedden.htm (accessed 17 July 2014). 21. Lamb, Alastair, Kashmir: A Disputed legacy: 1846– 1990 (Karachi: OUP, 1991), p. 136. 22. For competing narratives of the 1947 – 8 Kashmir operations, read Maj Gen M. Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir (Karachi: Pak Publishers Limited, 1970) and Lt Gen S. P. Sen, Slender was the Thread: Kashmir Confrontation 1947– 48 (New Delhi: Sangam Books, 1973). 23. Bhat, K. N., “Article 370 can be repealed”, Deccan Chronicle, 7 June 2014. Available at http://www.deccanchronicle.com/140607/commentary-op-ed/ article/article-370-can-be-repealed (accessed 18 July 2014). 24. Vaid, Manish and Tridivesh Singh Maini, “Indo-Pak Water Disputes: Time for Fresh Approaches”, Peace Prints: South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding 4/2 (Winter 2012). Available at http://www.wiscomp.org/pp-v4-n2/Indo-Pak_Water_ Disputes.pdf (accessed 21 July 2014).

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25. Burki, Shahid Javed, South Asia in the New World Order: The Role of Regional Cooperation (USA: Routeldge, 2011), p. 70. 26. Pakistan Army: War History. Available at https://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/ AWPReview/TextContent.aspx ?pId¼47&rnd ¼ 443 (accessed 29 July 2014). 27. Ibid., p. 28. 28. Indus Waters Treaty 1960. Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497-1105737253588/IndusWatersTreaty1960. pdf (accessed 21 July 2014). 29. Harshe, Rajen, “India’s Non-Alignment: An Attempt at Conceptual Reconstruction”, Economic and Political Weekly 25/7-8 (17–24 February 1990), pp. 399-405. Available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/4395968 (accessed 23 July 2014). 30. Haider, Mateen, “India calls off foreign secretary level talks with Pakistan”, Dawn.com, 18 August 2014. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1126123 (accessed 20 August 2014). 31. Indian Foreign Secretary Visits Pakistan After Months of Tension, VOA, 4 March 2015. Available at http://www.voanews.com/media/video/indian-forei gn-secretary-visits-pakistan-after-months-of-tension/2667082.html (accessed 23 March 2015). 32. “PM Nawaz arrives to attend Modi’s inauguration”, Such TV, 26 May 2014. Available at http://www.saach.tv /2014/05/26/pm-nawaz-arrives-to-attendmodis-inauguration/ (accessed 7 August 2014). 33. “Modi-Sharif handshake a face-saver for Kathmandu SAARC Summit, Pakistan to host next one in 2015”, IBNLive.com. Available at http://ibnlive.in.com/news/ modisharif-handshake-a-facesaver-for-kathmandu-saarc-summit-pakistan-tohost-next-one-in-2015/515282-3.html (accessed 16 December 2014). 34. “Pakistan working to give India ‘most favoured nation’ status”, Express Tribune, 24 July 2014. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/740373/pakistan-worki ng-to-give-india-most-favoured-nation-status/ (accessed 14 August 2014). 35. “Ghulam Nabi Azad accuses Pakistan of “abetting” Pathankot attack,” PTI. Available at http://www.india.com/news/india/ghulam-nabi-azad-accuses-pakistanof-abetting-pathankot-attack-832804/ (accessed 14 February 2016). 36. Shah, Syed Ali, “RAW officer arrested in Balochistan”, Dawn, 25 March 2016. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1247665 (accesed 31 March 2016). 37. Bourke-White, Margret, Halfway to Freedom: A Report on the New India (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949), pp. 92– 3. 38. Ispahani, Farahnaz, “My Grandfather: Abol Hassan Ispahani”. Available at http://farahnazispahani.wordpress.com/my-grandfather-abol-hassan-ispahani/ (accessed 22 July 2014). 39. Aziz, Qutubuddin, “Quaid-i-Millat’s visit to the United States – The foundation of friendship and economic co-operation”, Jang. Available at http:// jang.com.pk/thenews/spedition/liaqat_ali_khan/page2.htm.html (accessed 23 July 2014). 40. Lacey, Michael J (ed.), The Truman Presidency (New York: Woodrow Wilson Institute for International Scholars, 1989), p. 359.

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41. Chhabra, Amit K., “Breakthrough or Breakdown? US – Pakistan Military Alliance of 1954”, Foreign Policy Journal, 22 November 2011. Available at http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/11/22/breakthroughor-breakdown-u-s-pakistan-military-alliance-of-1954/ (accessed 28 July 2014). 42. Khan, Mohammed Ayub, “The Pakistan-American Alliance”, Foreign Affairs, January 1964. Available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23567/ mohammed-ayub-khan/the-pakistan-american-alliance (accessed 28 July 2014). 43. Amin, Shahid M., Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Foreign Policy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 57. 44. Khan, Ayub, Friends not Masters, title page. 45. “Russian – Pakistani Relations”, http://www.rusconsulkarachi.mid.ru/RUSSIAPAKISTAN.htm (accessed 23 December 2014). 46. Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, p. 58. 47. “Sweet as can be?”, Economist, 12 May 2011. Available at http://www.economist. com/node/18682839/comments?comments (accessed 7 August 2014). 48. “Opinion of China”, PEW Research Global Attitudes Project, July 2014. Available at http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/24/ (accessed 14 August 2014). 49. Speech of the Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Sun Weidong to the students of NUST on 16 December 2014. 50. “About PIA – History”. Available at http://www.piac.com.pk/pia_about/piaabout_history.asp (accessed 17 August 2014). 51. “South Asia and the Gulf lead rising trend in arms imports, Russian exports grow, says SIPRI”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 17 March 2014. Available at http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2014/AT_march_2014 (accessed 17 August 2014). 52. “Pakistan, China to enhance cooperation in defence production: Rana Tanveer”, Business Recorder, 24 March 2014. Available at http://www.brecorder.com/topnews/109-world-top-news/164141-pakistan-china-to-enhance-cooperation-indefence-production-rana-tanveer.html (accessed 18 August 2014). 53. Ehtisham, Hasan, “China has safe grasp on Pakistan’s civilian nuclear power market”, Global Times, 25 February 2014. Available at http://www.globaltimes. cn/content/844615.shtml (accessed 14 August 2014). 54. For details regarding the history of KKH read Brigadier Muhammad Mumtaz Khalid, History of Karakoram Highway Vol I & II (London, A and C Black, 2009). 55. Khan, Zahid Ali, “China’s Gwadar and India’s Chahbahar: an analysis of SinoIndia geo-strategic and economic competition”, Strategic Studies (2013), p. 81. Available at http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1379479541_87064200. pdf (accessed 14 August 2014). 56. “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor poised for implementation: Wang Yi”, Economic Times, 11 August 2014. Available at http://articles.economictimes. indiatimes.com/2014-08-11/news/52687125_1_china-pakistan-economiccorridor-wang-yi-bcim (accessed 14 August 2014).

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57. Sabir, Ismat, “Pak-Saudi Ties set to rise”, Financial Daily, 16 August 2014. Available at http://www.thefinancialdaily.com/NewsDetail/153444.aspx (accessed 17 August 2014). 58. Mahmood, Khalid, “Pakistan-China strategic relations”, Strategic Studies (August 2011), p. 12. Available at http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/ 1315801593_45294286.pdf (accessed 14 August 2014). 59. “Saudi Arabia’s Image Falters among Middle East Neighbors”, PEW Research Global Attitudes Project, 17 October 2013. Available at http://www.pewglobal. org/2013/10/17/saudi-arabias-image-falters-among-middle-east-neighbors/ (accessed 14 August 2014). 60. Farshori, Kokab, “Saudi-Pakistan Military Ties Getting Stronger”, Voice of America, 19 February 2014. Available at http://www.voanews.com/ content/saudi-pakistan-military-ties-getting-stronger/1855116.html (accessed 17 August 2014). 61. “Dar terms $1.5bn donation a ‘gift from friends’”, Dawn, 16 March 2014. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1093342 (accessed 17 August 2014). 62. Al-Rasheed, Madawi, “Saudi strategy includes alliance with Pakistan”, Al Monitor, 7 January 2014. Available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ originals/2014/01/saudi-pakistan-investment-alliance-cooperation-military. html? (accessed 18 August 2014). 63. Syed, Baqir Sajjad, “Pakistan confirms participation in Saudi-led anti-terror alliance”, Dawn, 17 December 2015. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/ 1226894 (accessed 28 March 2016). 64. “PM, army chief witness ‘Thunder of the North’ military exercises in Saudi Arabia”, The Express Tribune. Available at http://tribune.com.pk/story/1063273/ pm-army-chief-witness-northern-thunder-military-exercises-in-saudi-arabia/ (accessed 28 March 2016). 65. Ahmed, Khalid, “The Roots of Sectarianism in Pakistan”, Criterion Quarterly 2/4, 4 October 2013. Available at http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/the-roots -of-sectarianism-in-pakistan/ (accessed 31 March 2016). 66. “The Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)”, US Department of State Archives. Available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/ time/lw/98683.htm (accessed 18 August 2014). 67. For details read “Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000)”. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/projects/ P145054?lang¼en (accessed 14 August 2014) and visit CASA 1000 homepage http://www.casa-1000.org/. 68. For details about SAARC visit their homepage http://www.saarc-sec.org/. 69. Evans, Sophie Jane, “Historic handshake leads to hopes of a thaw in relations between India and Pakistan as new PM Narendra Modi shakes hands with his Pakistani counterpart at his inauguration”, Mail Online, 26 May 2014. Available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2639327/Modi-IndianPM-Pakistani-leader-watches.html (accessed 14 August 2014).

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70. Haidar, Suhasini, “Modi wants SAARC war against poverty”, The Hindu, 15 August 2014. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cant-wedefeat-poverty-modi-asks-neighbours /article6321202.ece (accessed 18 August 2014). 71. The author outlined this idea in a paper he read on UNPKOs as a confidence building measure in South Asia in February this year at the South Asian University, New Delhi. The paper will be published as part of the conference proceedings. Go to “United Nations Peacekeeping: South Asian Perspectives”. Available at http://sau.ac.in/, irconf/programme.html. 72. Syed, Baqir Sajjad, “Pakistan, Russia sign landmark defence cooperation agreement”, Dawn, 21 November 2014. Available at http://www.dawn.com/ news/1145875 (accessed 24 November 2014). 73. Haider, Mateen, “Afghan president assures Pakistan of anti-terror cooperation”, Dawn, 14 November 2014. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1144446 (accessed 22 December 2014). 74. Haider, Mateen, “Gen Raheel visits Kabul, seeks handover of Mullah Fazlullah”, Dawn, 17 December 2014. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1151412 (accessed 22 December 2014). 75. “Afghan reconciliation process: Sartaj kicks off four-nation meeting with four guiding points”, Dawn, 11 January 2016. Available at http://www.dawn.com/ news/1232235 (accessed 28 March 2016). 76. Koch, Martin, “Sykes-Picot drew Middle East’s arbitrary borders”, DW, 6 June 2014. Available at http://www.dw.de/sykes-picot-drew-middle-easts-arbitraryborders/a-17734768 (accessed 18 August 2014). 77. “PM summons meeting to review progress on National Action Plan”, Dawn.com. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1153650 (accessed 30 December 2014). 78. Qazi, Ashraf Jehangir, “What will we actually do?” Dawn.com, 30 December 2014. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1153890/what-will-weactually-do (accessed 30 December 2014). 79. “NATO ends combat mission in Afghanistan after 13 years”, Dawn.com, 29 December 2014. Available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1153752 (accessed 30 December 2014). 80. Bertrand, K. and Y. Bar-Yam, Contagion and cascades through the Middle East: Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria . . ., NECSI Technical Report 2011-2-01. Available at http://www.necsi.edu/research/social/middleeastcontagion.html (accessed 30 December 2014). 81. For a detailed discussion on the paradox of India’s economic rise and abject poverty read Jean Dre`ze & Amartya Sen, An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions (NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). 82. Dalton, Richard, “Decline or Revival? A New Year for a New Iran”, 22 April 2014. Available at http://muftah.org/decline-revival-new-year-new-iran/?. VKJk4V4AGw (accessed 30 December 2014). 83. Totten, Jordan, “BRICS New Development Bank Threatens Hegemony of U.S. Dollar”. Available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/12/22/

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brics-new-development-bank-threatens-hegemony-of-u-s-dollar/ (accessed 23 December 2014). 84. “India, China aim to boost trade volume to $100 billion by 2015”, The News, 18 September 2014. Available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2273445-India-China-aim-to-boost-trade-volume-to-$100-billion-by-2015 (accessed December 2014). 85. “Linkage of Gwadar Port with Karakorum Highway will multiply Pakistan exports to China”, Pak Observer, 24 September 2013. Available at http://www.pakistan-china.com/news-detail.php?id¼ MTg2&pageid ¼ news? sthash.4N8snk1I.dpuf (accessed 22 December 2014).

CHAPTER 9 AFGHANISTAN BETWEEN NATION-STATE BUILDING AND REGIONAL COLLABORATION Mohammad Mansoor Ehsan

Afghanistan, ravaged by war and subject to intense rivalries, holds the key to regional stability in South Asia in so far as the building of a functioning nation-state in Afghanistan will lessen these rivalries and incite political restraint among its neighbours. We have seen elsewhere in this book, and especially in Chapter 2, how Afghanistan’s transition from international security assistance under ISAF to greater autonomy is tenuous and involves all the complexities of building a nation while reconciling governments. This is Afghanistan’s predicament and one that will be explored in a historical context in this chapter. It will argue that regional restraint must follow from plurality. In terms of foreign policy, it means order defined by an open and dynamic balance of power as opposed to hegemonic or top-down designs. In terms of Afghan governance, it means a distinctively Afghan culture of diversity that transpires into governing principles, as opposed to the unity that typically is associated with a melting pot. Imposing uniformity on Afghanistan is a crushingly difficult challenge. It breeds resistance and flames conflict. Ultimately, Afghan stability depends on the ability of its institutions to embrace and contain diversity, a capacity that Afghans can be cultivate if its regional setting is one of similar pluralist restraint.

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Nation-State Building in the Region South Asia is one of the world’s most ethnically and linguistically complex regions. It is regarded as one of the most conflictive regions, there has been a tremendous rise of population, and spread of religious fundamentalism and extremism, all rooted in ethnic conflicts, identity crises, separatism, autocratic and totalitarian regimes, human security threats, environmental crises, regional cynicism and state defeatism, socio-economic backwardness and lack of legislative autonomy. However, the term “South Asia” like “Central Asia” is a legacy of the colonial world1 and no longer makes sense in terms of the region’s geographic, demographic, historical, cultural and ecological complexity, nor in terms of current economic and security developments. Ethnic and religious mobilization has defined the histories and nation-building experiences of South Asian states. The determination of boundaries among South Asian countries by colonial powers took place with consideration to imperial interests rather than local demographic and geographic circumstances.2 In South Asia the presence of empires made ethnic plurality by and large manageable because the nationalist movements and organizations, which existed in these states, could and did generate a common political agenda for achieving independence from colonial rule. However, this feeling of unity was more a function of colonial exploitation and dominance than the expression of a common political will of the constituent ethnic groups. Consequently, different ethnic and religious groups found little in common once independence was achieved.3 Ethnic and religious minorities in all the states of South Asia today feel disadvantaged and resent the inability of the central government to deal effectively with their concerns. Conversely, South Asian governments are concerned about the destabilizing effect of ethnic disorder. Ethnic issues thus influence both domestic and regional politics in South Asia: domestically, South Asian governments worry about the possibility of transformation of ethnic crisis into an autonomistseparatist movement; regionally South Asian governments worry about the spillover effects of the ethnic crisis from one country to the other and the potential involvement of neighbouring countries in their domestic affairs.4 The presence of ethnic/theo-nationalism in South Asian states after 1945, in spite of the best efforts of some of them to promote the

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homogenization of ethnically diverse populations, has led to social tension. In turn, political instability, social fragmentation and economic chaos have been characteristics of many of these states’ post-independence experience. Political development and regional cooperation have been prime casualties.5 Dominant ethnic, racial or religious groups have generally followed two main strategies in their relations to subordinate groups in South Asian states. The first strategy is one of assimilation (homogenization), where the dominant forces have sought to homogenize all other identities and bring them under the single identity of the dominant group and thus their political and economic power. The second strategy is one of unequal pluralization whereby dominant political groups maintain distinct ethnic and religious identities while pursuing discriminatory policies that systematically deprive marginal ethnic and religious groups of political power and economic wealth.6 Partha Chatterjee argues that nationalism in the east consequently has been accompanied by an effort to remake the entire nation culturally, to transform it into a homogenous entity. This cannot be done by the imitation of a foreign culture, since the nation would then lack a distinctive identity. Hence, the search was for a regeneration of the national culture adapted simultaneously to the requirement of progress and distinctiveness.7 In contrast, Ashis Nandy believes that Asia has always been a salad bowl of cultures. In his view, the region has avoided an American-style melting pot model with its individualistic assumptions and anti-communitarian bias – to the exasperation of modern nationalists and statists of the right and left. In a salad bowl ingredients retain their distinctiveness, but each ingredient transcends its individuality through the presence of others. Conversely, in a melting pot the primordial identities are supposed to melt: those that do not are expected to survive as coagulates and are called nationalities or minorities, and the long-term expectation is that they must dissolve. Much of the recent violence in Asia can in fact be traced to the systematic effort to impose the melting pot model upon different ethnic and religious groupings.8 As Nandy explains, the escalating communal and ethnic violence in South Asia is a product of statebuilding and nation-building formation, and it could thus have been handled differently – by the law and order machinery of states willing to give adequate recognition to different groupings inside their

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societies.9 The ethnic and religious diversity of South Asia has thus been a foundational factor in the processes of nation-state building, as well as in the ongoing development of domestic politics and regional cooperation. As in case of Afghanistan, the historical mindset of Afghan political elites who believe in accumulation of political power through tribal affiliation and consider tribalism as an effective strategy for political mobilization of masses, however, distorted the secular essence of nationstate so far. The tribal architecture of domestic policies and compression of different ethnic and religious groups by the politically dominant one led to official nation-building10 process since 1890s that has been followed by manipulation of history – falsification of social and political narratives, as well as, implementation of discriminatory economic, political, social and cultural strategies in the country. Political and economic supremacism of the past no doubt influenced the present scenario of nation-state building in Afghanistan; it also caused equivocation in the state’s foreign policy and broadens the tension between Afghanistan and the neighbouring states.11 As mentioned, other chapters in this book have addressed some of these challenges, and Afghanistan’s current predicament is treated in Chapter 2. This chapter is designed to shed a wider light on the history of nation-state building in Afghanistan and its impact on regional political stability and economic cooperation.

Building Modern Afghanistan The area which is known as “Afghanistan” did not assume its current geographical presence until the end of the nineteenth century, when the neighbouring British and Russian imperial powers started demarcating Afghanistan’s borders, in the east with India and in the west with Persia.12 The following treaties were foundational: the “Treaty of Gandomak” on 26 May 1879,13 the “Treaty of Durand line” on 12 November 1893, the settlement of “Amu Darya” in 1888 and that of “Pamir” with Tsarist Russia in 1895;14 the defined frontiers were purely imperial and strategic and divided the tribes and ethnic groups into several states that did not correspond to ethnic and historical lineages. Certainly, this is how Afghanistan was created as state from a buffer land.15 Warikoo quotes from the American geographer Niger Allen as

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saying that: “Afghanistan became a state, but in reality a space between Russian Central Asia and the British.”16 Earlier in the 1880s, numerous terms were used for the region known as Afghanistan today: the northern half was usually called “Khurasan” or “Zabulistan” as well as “Turkistan,” and the southern part was identified as “Kabul” or “Kabulistan.” The usage of the term “Afghanistan” came about naturally enough in so far as it resulted from the British southern approach to the country in the nineteenth century and thus from the region where Pashtun tribes were settled. Afghanistan could be justified due to the political dominance of Pashtun rulers.17 The term Afghanistan as Welayat Afghanistan was used for the first time for some specific parts of today’s Afghanistan (not all) on 8 August 1838 by Lord Auckland, the British India’s governor-general in his reply letter to Shah Shuja after the trilateral Pact of Lahore between British India, Ranjeet Singh of Punjab and Shah Shuja. Afghan rulers have tended to ignore this history and rewrite it for the purpose of creating a homogenous Afghan nation, pretending that Afghanistan came into being as a nation-state in 1747 when Ahmad Khan ceased to hold power.18 However, Ahmad Khan created a “Durrani Dynasty” (not Afghan state), which encompassed present-day Afghanistan, northeastern Iran, eastern Turkmenistan (around the Panjdeh oasis), the Kashmir region, the whole of modern-day Pakistan and then also northwestern India.19 Mahdi quoted from Mahmoud al-Hussaini the author of Tarikh Ahmad Shahi who wrote: The term Afghanistan had no existence during the twenty-five years of Ahmad Shah rule, nevertheless, the territory under his rule was known as Khurasan, and he himself was known king of Khurasan.20 Afghanistan as a “state” emerged during the Abdu Rahman era in the 1890s. Abdu Rahman, who received money and weapons from the British in return for giving up control over Afghanistan’s foreign policy, used those resources to mobilize Pashtun tribes, put down revolts in minority areas, control new areas where the state had no reach, move populations to pacify rebellious areas and dispose of rivals. Abdu Rahman Khan was thus the first ruler who seriously attempted to break the power of the tribes. The campaign to impose central rule

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and authority over formerly autonomous areas of Afghanistan varied in intensity and ferocity in the region later known as Nuristan where the indigenous tribes of Kafirs were forcibly converted to Islam. The campaigns against Shia Hazara in the large mountainous central region of Hazara-jat was similarly brutal, Hazaras were cruelly massacred and dispossessed of their lands which were given to Pashtun tribesmen. They were forced to leave the country, and the Pashtuns enslaved a large number of Hazaras. Similarly, in the north, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen were brought under control, and their rich lands were taken over by Pashtun settlers.21 Abdu Rahman shifted thousands of Pashtuns, including his major enemies from the Ghilzai tribe in the south-central Afghanistan to the north of Hindu Kush, not only to neutralize his rivals Ghilzai Pashtuns but also to dilute the non-Pashtun ethnicity.22 Homogenization and the bringing together of diverse ethnic groups in the formation of a homogenous nation state was a challenge, as it continues to be today.23 There are two possible interpretations about the essence of the Afghan state: first, a territorial and dynastic view, which identifies Afghanistan with the area ruled by Abdu Rahman and thus with reference to tribal origin. Second, a religious perspective, which identifies the country with the area which had remained Muslim, surrounded as it was by the kingdoms of the infidels Britain and Russia, and also the Shia Muslim Persians; this was the Millat (the geographical sub-region of the Umma) in the sense given by Ottoman law – a religious community in which the Amir legitimized the authority of the state by rousing the people in defence of the Muslim-Millat threatened by the infidels.24 Afghanistan’s modernization then accelerated with the seizure of power by Habibullah after the death of his father, Abdu Rahman. The event tempted the Tarzi family to return back from exile and establish the newspaper called Seraj-al-Akhbar. Mahmood Tarzi who is known as the father of Afghan Fascism among many other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, tried to influence the public mind by fictitious narratives and persuaded the ruling elites to accelerate the building of an homogenous Afghan nation. We are Afghan and our land name is Afghanistan. We have distinct morals and habits; we also have a distinctive language called Afghani. We should guard our language (Afghani) like our

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life. We should also try to improve this language. Not only Afghans themselves but also all other ethnic groups who are living in Afghanistan should learn Afghani. School education should be in Afghani. Priority should be given to Afghani than English, Turkish and even Persian. The Higher Education Board should give priority for the improvement of Afghani. Afghani is the mother of all other languages, and the Afghan tribes are the ancestors of all Arian tribes.25 The Anglo-Afghan peace treaty of 1919 – following the third AngloAfghan war – ended 40 years of British control of Afghanistan’s foreign relations. Afghan nationalists regarded the brief war of 1919 as a successful struggle for independence and as such, the treaty began to be celebrated as an annual official national day.26 From this point on, from 1919, the two themes that were vigorously pressed by the political elite were anti-colonialism and nation building, both underpinning the modern national bureaucracy and state legal system established by king Amanullah. Afghanistan’s diplomatic relations with outside world began in 1921 when Afghanistan became a member of the League of Nations and established cordial relations to major European states.27 From 1924 onwards, and granted the recognition of Afghanistan by the European nations, the idea of pure nationalism began to shape. The constitution of 1923 defined Afghanistan as a nation-state in which every resident had the right of citizenship, whatever his religion, since no reference was made to the “Muslim Millat”.28 Likewise, neither ancient nor the medieval history were well integrated into the emerging presentation of Afghanistan’s national history. For instance, the image of the colossal Buddhist statues at Bamiyan, though they did appear on national postage stamps, was never adopted methodically as the symbol of the nation’s past glory. The most plausible reason behind these political moves was bias towards Islam and also a serious endeavour by the Afghan elites to eradicate the historical backgrounds and identity of other ethnic groups to pave the way for establishing a homogenous Afghan national identity.29 The “official nation-building” process led to the changing the names of geographic areas,30 institutions, academic and military titles31 as well as the omission of ethnic names on the census forms and national identity cards.32 Imposing the title of “Afghan” over other “non-Afghan”

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ethnic groups in Afghanistan has been the most visible example of ethnonationalistic tendencies in Afghanistan governments.33 It is essential to understand Afghanistan’s 1964 constitution and how the ruling elite ingeniously differentiated the Afghanistan Farsi (Persian) from that of Iran by labelling it solely and exclusively Dari.34 There were several main objectives behind this political move: First, to terminate the improvement of Farsi language inside Afghanistan by ending linguistic interaction and intercourse with Iran, which could include the exchange of new words, expressions and other linguistic improvements to the Farsi/Dari language. Secondly, the Pashtun elite believed that by thus stalling improvements of Farsi/Dari they could erode Farsi/Dari’s position as lingua franca and pave the way for the imposition of Pashtu language as the influential national language, in effect replacing Farsi as lingua franca and streamlining ethno-linguistic groups in the process. Thirdly, the Pashtun nationalist elite wanted to undermine the historical and cultural linkages of the Farsi/Dari speakers of Afghanistan with the rest of the Farsi world by imposing an artificial differentiation among them. In their view, it would simplify the process of Afghan/Pashtun ethnic nation-building in Afghanistan. The official drive to make Pashtu more viable as the national language, at the expense of numerous regional dialects, led to the creation in 1937 of a Pashtu Academy (Pashtu Tolaney) and thus the concerted attempt to invent a new compound of Pashtu words to replace Persian and other foreign words in common use.35 Repeated attempts were made to foster the growth and spread of Pashtu, officially specified as the key language for government. Persian language newspapers were obliged to publish pages in Pashtu. During Mohammad Daoud’s premiership, from 1953 to 1963, official patronage of Pashtu was systematically attempted but also, and remarkably, failed.36 Despite of all endeavours by the Afghan elites since the emergence of Afghanistan as a state, they never achieved to create a unitary sense of national political identity to pave the way for creation of national solidarity among different ethnic groups inside the country. The history of government formation shows that the Pashtun tribes have come together to choose their political leader. Tribes have always been the main pillars of the political power, and the political leaders in Afghanistan have always received their political legitimacy through tribal backing. However, Pashtun tribes, in return of their support to

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central leaders, have demanded the implementation of their interests through political institutions. The “support” and “demand” exercise between the political power and the tribes have led political leaders into a tribal trap whereby national interests are sacrificed in favour of ethnic and tribal interests. As a consequence, the Afghan state has always been weak relative to the social structure of tribe and clan in Afghanistan.37 Central political powers have had little autonomy from civil society, and all major political changes happened in the tribal context and framework. From the perspective of citizens, the political structure provided little opportunity for political contributions and other engagements in regards to the Afghanistan government. In the words of Shahrani: Perhaps the most remarkable legacy of the policies of the old form of “tribalised” state system in the contemporary political culture of Afghanistan may be their effect upon the rise and formation of many forms of political communities opposing the corrupt and oppressing state system itself.38 The tribal and in fact discriminatory government, which has been dominated by Pashtuns, has fuelled a hateful vision among different non-Pashtun ethnic groups regarding Pashtuns, and also among different Pashtun tribes themselves. Internal Pashtun antagonism and frictions have appeared violently, especially at moments when the central government weakened and lacked sufficient power to control dissent. The effort to establish nationalism and patriotism is one of the main factors that have restrained the search for thoughtful and practical solutions to Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious rivalries.39 As Anthony Hyman puts it: It arguably makes more sense to analyze rival ideas of the nation held by the country’s different ethnic groups than some hypothetical all-embracing Afghan nationalism.40 Community- and institution-building in Afghanistan simply requires the consideration of ethnic and religious distinctions, the mosaic of society and also antagonistic relations among different ethnic and religious sects influenced by a history of discrimination and deprivation at the hands of

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other ethnic groups and especially the social wealth and political power achieved by dominant Pashtuns. Adeney thus believes that: Diversity by itself cannot be the explanatory variable of state instability, because, often all multiethnic states are not necessarily doomed to failure. In addition, a sense of Afghan national identity does not indeed exist, irrespective of the complex ethnic diversity in the country. Although no survey data exist, the existence of an Afghan national identity is supported by the empirical fact that Afghanistan has not suffered from a secessionist movement, even though there have been serious conflicts between groups.41 Approaches to Afghan society as one single “package” with no diversity have consistently failed at the point of implementation. Afghanistan’s peoples are neither one people nor one political community; the relevant community cleavages in Afghanistan are multiple.42 The ethnic and religious cleavages among some groups are similar to cleavages among the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens. However, the Hazaras and Aimaq are different and, in their own way, condense and solidify the cleavages.43 It is thus necessary to evaluate and understand the inter-ethnic and religious challenges and diversities of Afghanistan more consciously and purposefully. It is also important to take into account the number and relative size of groups, as well as their territorial concentration, which requires a clear census of the population with regard to the population of each ethnic and religious grouping.44 The benefit of such a census of the ethnic and religious community could help undermine unreal claims and exaggerations by elites for the purpose of political exploitation45 – a dynamic which regrettably has been the main cause of civil war and chaos in the country to far. A census could also help advance the regulation of Afghanistan’s ethnic and religious heterogeneous society through a comprehensive and national rule of non-discrimination and effective political inclusion.

The External Dimension of Afghanistan’s Nation-State Building Afghanistan’s ethno-centric domestic policy has influenced the state’s regional strategy during the course of history. President Daoud launched

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radical reforms to promote Pashtunism as the foundation for Afghan nationalism and thus acquired means with which he could claim the right to determine the fate of the Pashtuns also on the Pakistani side of the border.46 Partly as a result of Pashtun chauvinism and also financial support and sympathy of Pashtun leaders in Afghanistan, separatist tendencies among Pakistani Pashtuns grew strong in 1949. In August 1949 Afridi tribesmen formally announced the birth of an independent Pashtunistan. Though All India Radio coined the term “Pashtunistan” for the first time,47 Afghanistan was the first and the only country that extended recognition to this new state, and since then the issue has remained a major irritant between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The irredentist national policy during Daoud era, with the goal of forming a Pashtun state to be called “Pashtunistan” and eventually uniting them with Afghanistan, was also part of the troubled nation- and state-building that, as it increased and exposed inter-Afghan tensions, ultimately paved the way for the gradual penetration and consequent invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union.48 Daoud’s pro-Pashtunistan policy was therefore on the whole negative in impact, which we shall explore here. The Pashtunistan policy caused in 1963 a series of confrontations with Pakistan, leading to periodic closure of the Torkham border and transit trade and inflicting serious economic damage on Afghanistan.49 The Afghanistan’s government’s Pashtunistan policy was popular with many Pashtuns but it sharply divided the population. Some scholars thus argue that the core of Afghanistan’s chaos and political instability is defined by the homogenizing strategies pursued by Pashtun-dominated governments, partly because the Pashtuns established a sense of superiority and marginalized other ethnic groups, partly because Afghanistan gained an irredentist foreign policy notably in terms of claims to the lands of Pashtuns and Baluchs.50 Symptomatically, Afghanistan did not approve of the Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) in 1953 that would encompass a number of Arab states, Turkey, Iran and not least Pakistan. Similarly, it rejected the Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact in 1955 and its successor, the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which Pakistan joined in September 1954, because they ran contrary to Kabul’s quest for a resolution to its significant border dispute with Pakistan concerning the Durand Line and the tribes of the NorthWest Frontier Province and also a lesser border problem with Iran.51

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Such irredentist foreign policy moves from Afghanistan towards Pakistan during the 1950s, and particularly the non-participation of Afghanistan in MEDO, CENTO and SEATO, led the United States to reject Afghanistan’s demand for military assistance in 1954. As such, it was the headstrong Daoud’s obsessive pursuit of the Pashtunistan issue and ethnic-based foreign policies that led him into an embrace of the Soviet Union. Put differently, Daoud’s “ethno-language” policies gave the Soviet Union the opportunity to penetrate Afghanistan, through economic means initially. The Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had apparently solved the ethnic diversity theoretically based on Marxism ideology, but only in theory, not in practice. The party believed that the basic and fundamental problem of society is division of classes by economic factors. Hence, according to Marxism, the end of class diversity would end the challenge of ethnic diversity because ethnicity has no meaning in a world void of class, religion and race.52 The Marxist imprint on Afghan policy was strong under party chairman and later president, Babrak Karmal, who continued to emphasize Pashtunistan but as part of the PDPA strategy to unite all the freedom movements of Afghanistan, Pashtunistan and Baluchistan along with universal working class and national freedom appeals that, essentially, addressed themselves across Asia, Africa and Latin America.53 The Afghan nationalist themes of defence of the homeland against foreign aggression remained dominant, though, and were particularly extolled by the Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA against the neighbouring countries of Pakistan and Iran but also the United States and Britain. This trend ran through the leaderships of both Babrak Karmal and his successor, Mohammad Najibullah. However, the PDPA attempt to utilize nationalism and anti-foreign sentiment was fraught with difficulty because many Afghans considered the successive PDPA governments as puppets of the Soviet Union, and greatly resented them. Though, the PDPA was the best organized party in the history of parties in Afghanistan, it could not create the institution of national unity and social justices. Rather, it paved the way for ethnic elements to exploit political power for narrow ethnic-based goals and purposes. In consequence, the PDPA was split into two main branches of Khalq and Parcham, and also the Chinese Maoist variety.54 Liberal democratic

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ideas, which notably took root among the educated but also cruelly oppressed urban elites, survived mainly among Afghan diaspora communities.55 The opposition of the PDPA, the Islamist Mujahedeen leaders sought to solve the problem of ethnic diversity by applying the theory of Muslim Umma. The theory of Muslim Umma was further elaborated by Islamist organizations of the Muslim Brotherhood, who believed in the creation of a supranational Islamic nation. Afghan Islamists have thus been entirely influenced by the two biggest mainstreams of Islamic organizations, namely the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e Islami Pakistan, so much so that the Afghan Islamist movement sometimes has been seen as just an offspring of these organizations. Both were instrumental in the formation of the Afghan Islamist cadres, Ghulam Mohammad Niyazi, Burhanudin Rabbani and also Sibghatullah Mujadeddi – who spent years at Al-Azhar University where they were involved in Muslim Brotherhood activities. Younger members like Hekmatyar were close to the Jamaat-e Islami Pakistan.56 The idea of Muslim Umma was preached by the Afghan jihadi leaders, such as Burhanudin Rabbani who believed that loyalty and brotherhood are not only slogans in Islam, but a strategy.57 Olivier Roy in his book The Failure of Political Islam quotes the Afghan Islamists as saying: “The Quran Is Our Constitution” is the slogan encountered from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood to the Afghan Islamists. But what institutions are to be derived from this generality? Two concepts recur constantly among most Islamist theoreticians: that of the leader (Amir) and that of the advisory council (Shura), around which both the Islamic political party and the future Islamic society are structured.58 The supranational networks of the Muslim Brotherhood and the World Muslim League have played a defining role in the distribution of Islamist propaganda but have never been able to shape an international policy that amounts to anything more than a reflection of the conflicts of interests among regional states. Therefore, their policies are reduced to their smallest common denominator.59 As Mahdi argues, the theory of Muslim Umma could not find its ground in the international system and therefore remained as an abstract ideal, just like the idea of communism.

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The citizens of an Islamic state cannot have the same rights in another foreign Islamic state. National identity in the Islamic world has been sharpened further by ideas of nation-state, civic nationalism and geographical boundaries between or among Islamic nation-states and also visa requirement and the prohibition of free cross-border communications.60 In effect, the failure of Afghan Islamist jihadi groups in 1990s to create an Islamic government as well as multi-dimensional solutions to domestic and external problems makes the Islamists’ idea of Muslim Umma in Afghanistan nothing but an unattainable utopia.61 The point is underscored by the inability of the Muslim Brotherhood to tackle Egypt’s political and economic problems via an Islamic agenda and ultimately its toppling by a military coup on 3 July 2013.62 Though Islam at times has served as a unifying force against foreign and non-Muslim invaders in Afghanistan, it has never been enough in itself to regulate and remove or unite ethnic rivalries. The resistance against Soviet-backed PDPA did give rise to a nationalist sentiment among the citizens of Afghanistan and especially among the exiled population. However, this kind of national sentiment did not develop deep roots in society. Following the Soviet retreat, the rise of political jihadi parties and local guerrilla fronts challenged the establishment of an Islamic state and caused renewed ethnic tension.63 Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and other non-Pashtun groups that lacked political clout organized themselves along ethnic lines during the struggle and effectively challenged the long historical dominance of Pashtuns. The conflict among Afghan Mujahedeen was thus based more on ethnic and tribal than ideological issues.64 The Taliban movement come into existence in 1994 and captured Kabul in September 1996. Their leader, Mullah Omar, who called himself Amirul Momenin and professed to want to create a pure Islamic state, changed the country’s name to Afghanistan Islamic Emirate, imitating the United Arab Emirates. Afghan nationalism as such has had no important place in the Taliban worldview. However, in reality, the movement has been a Pashtun group with fascist-like traits and Salafi ideology. The reason why the Taliban, being overwhelmingly Pashtun in composition and appeal, could rise to national power lies in its mobilizing appeal in Kandahar and other Pashtun heartlands where it exploited Pashtun resentment against the eclipse of Pashtun power, as evidenced by the rise of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras in the Afghan struggle from 1992 onwards.65

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The reference to fascist-like traits is loaded, of course, and it is useful to refer to categorization of two types of “fascism”. One is like the Hitleric fascism where the dominant group establishes its racial supremacy and subjects but never eradicates or demolishes the language, culture and historical pride and background of other nations. The other is like Talibani fascism, where the dominant group seeks the eradication and dismemberment of other ethnic and religious groupings, including their language and culture. The Taliban’s visceral sectarian prejudices, their ruthless treatment of many groups in society, including nonPashtun groups, their destruction of Buddha’s and many other archaeological objects at the museum of Kabul,66 as well as the smuggling of a large number of antiquities to Pakistan and London markets are examples.67 The ceasing of Nawruz celebrations, the Ashura Festival, the stopping of Afghanistan’s Hindus and Sikhs from practicing their religions exceeds definitions of religious policy and fall into the category of aggression against other ethnic groups’ history, mythology, tradition and beliefs in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s discriminatory behaviours regarding other ethnic groups are tantamount to ethnocide and erode their claims to legitimacy as a serious Islamic force that could bring about order, stability and national reconciliation in a unified Afghanistan. As Afghanistan seeks a new future as a stable nation and state and as an important economic hub for the exchange of energy and goods among Central Asia, South Asia and West Asia, this is the legacy with which Afghans must come to terms.68 The history of internal divisions and the limited ability of political leaders to bridge them have brought Afghan and regional and international developments together in unfortunate constellations of narrow and repressive interests, to the harm of Afghan society writ large. The further implications bring us to the conclusion.

Conclusion The primary lesson of this assessment concerns the proper policies for managing state development in a regional context: it requires and must build on a civic definition of national interest, in which the overall national interest of state as political institution matter, but not exclusive ethno/theo-centric ones that favour only a single group in a multi-ethnic and religious state in the region. The latter have brought hostility

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among the South Asian states and are a cause of pessimism because the need for regional restraint and inclusion consistently is taken hostage by the local politics of divide and rule. In spite of a troubled legacy and real challenges, though, the region’s positive potential should not be overlooked. Common interest on regional solidarity and economic cooperation could help turn states away from militarism, xenophobic nationalism, elitist exclusivism, cultural stereotyping and rigid borders – towards inclusion and democratic debate. Admittedly, in the case of South Asia, history has not been favourable for the growth of regionalism. History has enormously influenced people’s perception and government policy.69 Decades ago, the demographic complexity and newly constructed political identity of South Asia’s states tempted political leaders to develop doctrines of exclusion – of neighbourly rivalry – to justify their political distinctiveness and embed their rule. Fictitious narratives and myths emerged as the main national strategy for the survival of political regimes in the region. Hence, state leaders have been preoccupied by the vagaries of nation-state building rather than the reasonability of regional cooperation – as is the case of Afghanistan. Attempts to homogenize national identity thus accounts for the weak growth of regionalism. South Asian states have effectively been trapped between their historical narratives and existing political, social and economic challenges.70 Despite repeated frequent calls by South Asian leaders for building trust and mutual confidence in their relations, the ground reality remains unchanged. The current strategy of South Asian leaders to set aside contentious issues in order to build trust gradually through concrete acts of economic cooperation is a sound one, but the establishment of broad and civic-based democratic regimes – which can manage ethnic division, separatism, regional identities, poverty and human security crises – are a precondition for regional stability. This does not mean that all efforts must now focus on domestic politics. A regional framework of restrained power balancing could be the international facet of political plurality that underpins domestic reform. The move from regional hegemonic stability into a deliberate balance of power among the South Asian nations could thus be of benefit.71 However, the key conclusion here is that such regional policies must support and underpin domestic reconciliation and democratization.

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Notes 1. The term “Central Asia” has emerged out of Soviet domination of Transoxiana, which included only the five former Soviet Republics, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. While it excluded the larger cultural zone at the heart of Asia, one that included what are now the new states of Central Asia, but much more besides, such as Afghanistan, Northern Pakistan, east of early Persia (today Iran) and the Chinese province of Xinjiang. See Starr, S. Frederick, Lost Enlightenment: Central Asia’s Golden Age From the Arab Conquest to Tamerlane (India: Harper Collins Publishers, 2014), pp. 5 – 6. Also see Dossani, Rafiq, Daniel C. Sneider and Vikram Sood (eds), Does South Asia Exist? Prospects for Regional Integration (Stanford: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, 2010). 2. Cole, Jauan R. and Deniz Iand Kandiyoti, “Nationalism and Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia”, in Dave Bhavna (eds), Politics of Modern Central Asia: Critical Issues in Modern Politics 2 (London & New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 25 – 6. 3. Phadnis, Urmila and Rajat Ganguly, Ethnicity and Nation- building in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd, 2010), pp. 16 –17. 4. Dash, Kishore C., Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 120– 1 5. Phadnis, Urmila and Rajat Ganguly, Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001), p. 38. 6. Sajjadi, Abdul Qayoum, Political Sociology of Afghanistan (Kabul: Farhang Printing Press, 2012), pp. 56 – 7. 7. Chatterjee, Partha, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 2. 8. For instance, Nandy reflects upon the cultural engineering of Hindus and the endeavour to create political ideology, later given the name of Hindutva (today Hinduism), to convert Hindus into a conventional European style nation. The new Hindus sought to chalk out a new pan-Indian religion called Hinduism that would be primarily classical, Brahmanic, Vedantic and therefore, not an embarrassment to the modern or semi-modern Indians in touch with the more civilized parts of the world. It was this high culture, more acceptable to the modern or Westernized Indians and to post-Enlightenment Europe, which was sought as the basis of the new Hindu nation. The nationhood was also projected into the past and the Hindu cultural uniqueness was reinterpreted as merely the marker of a modern national ideology. Nandy, Ashis, Creating a Nationality: The Ramjanmabhumi Movement and Fear of the Self (London: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 57 – 8. 9. Ibid., p. vi. 10. “Official nationalism”, involved the imposition of cultural homogeneity form the top to bottom through state action. Anderson points out to the internal characteristic of official nationalism as “In almost every case, official nationalism concealed a discrepancy between nation and dynastic realm. Hence, a

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11.

12. 13.

14.

15. 16. 17.

18.

world-wide contradiction: Slovaks were to be Magyarized, Indians Anglicized and Koreans Japanified, but they would not be permitted to join pilgrimages which would allow them to administer Magyars, Englishmen or Japanese. The reason for all this was not simply racism; it was also the fact that at the core of the empire nations too were emerging – Hungarian, English, and Japanese. And these nations were also instinctively resistant to foreign rule”. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 110– 11. “Hamid Karzai warns Paki-Punjabi ISI to stop the genocide of Pashtuns in Waziristan in name of Taliban”, Afghanistan National TV. Available at https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v ¼ _lCs95VtyF0; “‘Afghanistan would back Pakistan if US or India attack’, Karzai claimed,” South Asia News. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v ¼ lUtqGo7SEmE; The Ministry of Tribes and Clans of Afghanistan paves the way for Pakistani Pushtuns to benefit from educational scholarship which is donated by India to Afghanistan’s citizens, Every Hour News, Yak (1) TV. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= LyYUHzr-2YY; Mahmood Khan Achekzai the head and chairman of Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party Pakistan says that he was born in Pakistan and he is Pakistani not Afghan. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch? v ¼ C0erDJzIRB4. Hopkirk, Peter, The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia (London: John Murray Publisher, 1990), p. 499. The treaty was concluded between the British government and Amir Yaqub Khan, signed by the Amir and Major Louis Cavagnari on 26 May 1879, and ratified by Lord Robert Lytton, Viceroy of India on 30 May 1879. See Adamec, Ludwig W., Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan (Lanham, Maryland, & Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, 2003), p. 128. Ghubar, Mir Ghulam Mohammad, Afghanistan Dar Maseer Tarikh (Kabul: Maiwand Press, 1984) (Persian Version), pp. 1218– 19, 1223 –5. Roy, Olivier, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, (Cambridge Press Syndicated of the University of Cambridge, 1990), p. 17. Adamec, Ludwig, The Political History of Afghanistan: From Amir Abdu Rahman era till Independence, Translated by Ali Mohammad Zama (2005), pp. 29–30, 33, 87. Warikoo, K., “The Afghanistan Conundrum: Implications for India”, Himalayan and Central Asian Studies 15 (2011), p. 108. Hyman, Anthony, “Nationalism in Afghanistan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34/2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial legacy in the Middle East and Central Asian (London: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 301– 303. For instance, Anwar-ul Haq Ahadi, the head of Afghan Melat Party by falsifying the history of Afghanistan is trying to screen Afghanistan as a state that existed since 1747. He wrote “The Pashtuns established the Afghan state in 1747.” See Ahadi, Anwar-ul-Haq, “The Decline of Pashtuns in Afghanistan”, Asian Survey 35/7 (California: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 621– 34.

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19. Barfield, Thomas J., “Problem in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan”, Iranian Studies 37/2 (Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of International Society for Iranian Studies, 2004), p. 269; also see Hopkins, B. D., The Making of Modern Afghanistan (UK: Palgrave Macmillan Publishers Limited, 2008), pp. 2 – 3; and also see Shahrani, Nazif. M., “State building and social fragmentation in Afghanistan: A historical perspective”, in Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner, The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics: Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987), pp. 30; Ghubar, Mir Ghulam Mohammad, Afghanistan Dar Maseer Tarikh (1984), p. 517. 20. Mahdi, Muhaiyuddin, “Nazaria ha ‘Tamin Subat’ wa Al Munasibat Tabari”, in Fazil Aq Fayez (ed), Al Monasibat Tabari dar Afghanistan (Kabul: Izb-e Mardom Afghanistan Publication, 2008), p. 102. 21. “Abdu Rahman practiced methods just short of genocide. In the course of pacification of Kafaristan, 10,000 were killed and 16,000 forcibly resettled throughout the country, reducing the local population to half. To make way for Taraki Pashtun settlers in Bamiyan, the indigenous Hazara population was deported – so thorough was this ‘ethnic cleansing’ that not even the dogs remained behind. The ‘Powinda’ allies of the Amir were encouraged to seize lands and pastures of the Hazaras, dooming the latter to poverty and starvation.” See Saikal, Amin, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London, New York: I.B Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2004), pp. 38– 9; see also Barfield, Thomas J., “Problem in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan”, Iranian Studies 37/2 (Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of International Society for Iranian Studies, June, 2004), p. 279. 22. Dupree, Louis, Afghanistan (Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 419. 23. Warikoo, K. “The Afghanistan Conundrum: Implications for India”, Himalayan and Central Asian Studies, June/July 2011, p. 108. 24. Roy, Olivier, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 17 – 18. 25. Seraj-al-Akhbar, Kabul: Issue 2, 20 June 1294 (Solar Calendar). 26. Some analysts on Afghanistan believe that more than other factors it was the series of foreign military invasions, which developed nationalism in Afghanistan. The invasions by British and later on Soviet Union created a kind of emotional and cognitive national feeling among the citizens. See Hyman, Anthony, “Nationalism in Afghanistan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34 (2002), p. 303. 27. Ibid., p. 304. 28. Roy, Olivier, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 17 – 18. 29. Muhaiyuddin, Mahdi, Nazaria ha “Tamin Subat” wa Al Munasibat Tabari (2008), p. 90. 30. During the Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah era, the names of many regions were changed from Parsi and Uzbeki into Pashtu, such as: Asafzar into Shendand, Qaratepa into Torghondi, Charbagh Gulshan into Shenkai, Qalacha into Espinkot,

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31. 32. 33.

34.

35.

Bangi Harq into Nawi Kot, Dakberjen into Shalghi, Azara Chaqesh into Estiwalgi, Rahmat Habad into Jergi, Yolboldi into Landai, Deh Daraz into Ghashi, Qosh Tepa into Mangoli, Samarqandyan into Zarghonkot, Esarak into Oghiz, Charsang into Solortegai, Palasposh into Zozan, Ehbad into Deragai, Chehelsitoon into Ghandan, Kodokhana into Bandgi, Bahudeen region into Ishpula, Kashek Abdul into Banda, Kol Anbu into Mandatai, Elmani into Wacha Wana, Sultan Khuja Wali into Mirondi, Baghe Waraq into Haji Kot, Zamokan into Kaka koot, Bengala into Warzi, Haq tapa into Spinkai, Takht Soleman into Sheenkot, Hasain Tabin into Ghazgi, Haqcha Noma into Bati Kot, Gomak Saleh into Batai, Boyeni Qara into Sholgara, Gul Qeshlaq into Joghi, Kata Qeshlaq into Jaga Banda, Meng Qeshlaq into Zandi Kot, Joi Zendan into Joi Zhowndoon, Dara Zendan into Dara Zhowndoon, Kota Sangi into Mirwais Maidan, Deh Buri into Jamal Mena, Shah Shahid and Sya Sang into Sayyed Noor Mohammad Shah Mena, Deh Afshar into Spinkalai, Qalai Jarnail into Khushal Mena, as well as nomination of many regions, such as: Jada Nadir Pashtun, Wazir Akbar Khan Mena, Nadir Shah Mena, Ahmad Shah Mena. Government of Afghanistan, The Constitution for Application of Military Titles (Kabul: Kabul Languages Topographic Press, 1921). “The ethnicity of the citizen will not be mentioned in the electronic ID, Farakhabar”, TOLO News, 29 May 2013. Available at http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v¼ Q-rOClgeygc&feature ¼ share. Mohammad Ali Watan Yar, head of the Central Statistics Department, in an interview with Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) said that “the census would not take account of ethnicity, race, or language, for reason of unity; we are all considered one nation.” See Abasin, “New Census Key to Progress”, Afghanistan: Institute for War and Peace Reporting ARR 45 (21 February 2005). Available at http://iwpr.net/report-news/new-census-keyprogress; see also Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook: 2010 –2011, Central Statistic Organization 33 (September 2011). Farsi and Dari both are the same terms, which have been used interchangeably so far. Publications in Afghanistan before 1964, including the state publications by the Ministry of Education of Afghanistan government always applied the term “Farsi”. Besides, the Pashtun communities are still calling Tajiks of Afghanistan as Parsiwan/Farsiwan, which means Farsi speakers. Also see Hyman, Anthony, “Nationalism in Afghanistan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34/2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia (Cambridge University Press, May 2002), p. 300. According to the historical records, initial steps for imposing of Pashtu language as national language and lingua franca in Afghanistan were taken by Mahmud Tarzi, through publication of his article on the second release of Serajal-, under the title “The Afghan Language is the Ancestor of Languages.” He wrote in this article that the Pashtu language should be the language of education at schools and Pashtu should be given priority over other languages, like Farsi/Dari, Turkey and English. Lahlzad, Oyat, Melat wa Nasunalism dar Asr

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40. 41.

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Azir, in Fazil Aq Fayez (ed), Al Monasibat Tabari dar Afghanistan (Kabul: Izb-e Mardom Afghanistan Publication, 2006), pp. 42 – 3. Hyman, Anthony, “Nationalism in Afghanistan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34/2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia (Cambridge University Press, May 2002), pp. 300–301. Sajjadi, Abdul Qayoum, Political Sociology of Afghanistan (Kabul: Farhang Printing Press, 2012), p. 75. Shahrani, Nazif. M., “The Future of the State and the Structure of Community Governance in Afghanistan”, in Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (2004), p. 10. Gellner offered a more comprehensive theory of nationalism with regard to industrialization which requires the creation of political nation state. Deutsch who developed the concept of “mobilization” and “assimilation” within the framework of the modernization paradigm, argues that modernization of those mobilized, was primary cause for the development of nationalism, It could be argued that nationalism could not exert its peculiar ideology appeal until the majority of Afghanistan’s population are not integrated into the collective life of society. The national or patriotic idea remained very weak and undeveloped, altogether lacking appeal of influence except in a small and unrepresentative educated urban class. Afghanistan’s rural population lives for the most part in remote areas and has very restricted horizon and minimal political consciousness, their identities congealed around family and tribes and they are rather loyal to their tribal and sectarian values than patriotism and the concept of nation state. Although, the modernization of Afghanistan made considerable progress form 1950s, its impact is restricted almost entirely to the capital, Kabul, and even there mainly within the educated elite, while, within provinces and rural areas, the family and tribal ties remain as strong as before. Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism (England: Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited, 1983), pp. 35 – 8, 53 – 6; Phadnis, Urmila and Rajat Ganguly, Ethnicity and Nation-building in South Asia (New Delhi: Sage Publications India Pvt. Ltd, 2001), p. 39; Hyman, Anthony, “Nationalism in Afghanistan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34/2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 299– 300. Hyman, Anthony, “Nationalism in Afghanistan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34/2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 299. Adeney, Katharine, “Constructional Design and Political Salience of ‘Community’ Identity in Afghanistan: Prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Taliban Era”, Asian Survey 4 (July/August 2008), pp. 538– 9. Hyman, Anthony, “Nationalism in Afghanistan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34/2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 299.

NATION-STATE BUILDING AND REGIONAL COLLABORATION 259 43. Sajjadi, Abdul Qayoum, Political Sociology of Afghanistan (2012), p. 37. 44. Adeney, Katharine, “Constructional Design and Political Salience of ‘Community’ Identity in Afghanistan: Prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Taliban Era”, Asian Survey 4 (July/August 2008), p. 358. 45. Muhaiyuddin, Mahdi, Nazaria ha “Tamin Subat” wa Al Munasibat Tabari (2008), p. 113. 46. Dupree, Louis, Afghanistan (Pakistan: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 538– 9. 47. Saikal, Amin, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004), p. 120. 48. There was valuable Soviet diplomatic backing for Afghanistan on this issue against Pakistan, which was not only the enemy of the USSR’s against regional ally India but a member of CENTO alliance at the same time. Remarkably, in Soviet published works of this period it was taken as a matter of course that all Pashto-speakers were “Afghans” rather than accepting that they were divided between two states. See Hyman, Anthony, “Nationalism in Afghanistan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34/2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 308. 49. Andishmand, Mohommad Ikraam, Mah Wa Pakistan (Kabul: Maiwand Press, 2009), p. 89. 50. Lahlzad, Oyat, Melat wa Nasunalism dar Asr Azir (2006), pp. 44 – 5. 51. Saikal, Amin, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2004), pp. 119– 20. 52. Muhaiyuddin, Mahdi, Nazaria ha “Tamin Subat” wa Al Munasibat Tabari (2008), p. 74. 53. Andishmand, Mohommad Ikraam, Mah Wa Pakistan (Kabul: Maiwand Press, 2009), p. 271. 54. Muhaiyuddin, Mahdi, Nazaria ha “Tamin Subat” wa Al Munasibat Tabari (2008), p. 74; see also Hyman, Anthony, “Nationalism in Afghanistan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34/2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 310. 55. Ibid., p. 311. 56. Roy, Olivier, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?”, in William Maley (eds), Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, 1998), p. 201. 57. Payam Mujahid Weekly, issue no. 21, 7 July 1386 (Persian year), quoted by Muhaiyuddin, Mahdi, Nazaria ha “Tamin Subat” wa Al Munasibat Tabari (2008), p. 76. 58. Roy, Olivier, “The Failure of Political Islam”, Council of Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 42. 59. Ibid., p. 129.

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60. Cole and Kaniyoti argue that making religion as the base of nationalism can provoke apparent contradictions. The argument that religions are universal and are so excluded from playing such a specific role is deeply flawed. What does one make of co-religionists outside the nation state that is founded on religion? These contradictions, however, do not stand in the way of the implementation of religion-based nationalisms. Cole, Jauan R. and Deniz Iand Kandiyoti, “Nationalism and colonial legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia”, in Dave Bhavna (eds), Politics of Modern Central Asia: Critical Issues in Modern Politics 2 (2010), p. 31. 61. Muhaiyuddin, Mahdi, Nazaria ha “Tamin Subat” wa Al Munasibat Tabari (2008), pp. 80 –1. 62. “Egypt Crisis: Interim President to be Sworn in After Morsi Ousted”, BBC News, Middle East, 4 July 2013. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-23176401. 63. Roy, Olivier, “The Failure of Political Islam”, p. 108. 64. Hyman, Anthony, “Nationalism in Afghanistan”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 34/2, Special Issue: Nationalism and the Colonial Legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia (Cambridge University Press: May 2002), p. 311. 65. Ibid., p. 312. 66. Dupree, Nancy Hatch, “Cultural Heritage and National Identity in Afghanistan”, Third World Quarterly 23/5, Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: Afghanistan (October 2002), p. 986. 67. Muzhda, Wahid, Afghanistan and the Five Years of Taliban Rule (Persian Version) (Tehran: Nashrani, 2004), p. 88. 68. Rasanayagam, Angelo, Afghanistan: A Modern History: Monarchy, Despotism or Democracy? The Problems of Governance in the Muslim Tradition (London, New York: I.B.Tauris, 2003), p. 152. 69. Dash, Kishore C., Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures (2008), p. 193. 70. Mohlin, Marcus, Presented at Conference on Regional Peace Building: Lessons Learnt and Future Stability (Islamabad: Pakistan National Defense University, 2014). 71. Rynning, Sten, Presented at Conference on Regional Peace Building: Lessons Learnt and Future Stability (Islamabad: Pakistan National Defense University, 2014).

PART III PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER 10 IT'S THE STRATEGIC NARRATIVE, STUPID!:HOW THE UNITED STATES MAY OVERCOME THE CHALLENGE OF CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN BEYOND 2017 Peter Viggo Jakobsen

We have to recognize that Afghanistan will not be a perfect place, and it is not America’s responsibility to make it one. The future of Afghanistan must be decided by Afghans. But what the United States can do – what we will do – is secure our interests and help give the Afghans a chance, an opportunity to seek a long, overdue and hard-earned peace. US President Obama, May 20141

Introduction The US commitment to stay engaged in Afghanistan has been questioned ever since President Obama presented his strategy for bringing the troops home.2 By early 2017 the United States plans to have 5,500 left in Afghanistan (4,500 more than initially planned),3 while NATO will have 11,000 personnel.4

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Critics view the withdrawal of US forces as driven by politically convenient end-dates rather than the officially stated end state: a stable, democratic and secure Afghanistan.5 They find proof in the Obama administration’s determination to stick to its timetable despite of a deterioration of the security situation through 2014 –15 and in its repeated refusals to grant the US military more time and resources. The drawdown has also fuelled widespread fears of abandonment in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, where no one has forgotten that US turned its back on their region the minute the Soviet Union left Afghanistan in 1989. The Obama administration has tried hard to counter such perceptions. It has reiterated its commitment to stay engaged beyond 2017 time and again and has entered a number of long-term agreements with the Afghan government. In 2012, it signed a strategic partnership agreement pledging to provide military and economic assistance until 2024, and designated it as a Major Non-NATO Ally. The administration has requested $41.7 billion for 2017 for Afghanistan and related operations.6 It has also pushed its friends and allies in NATO and the EU to stay engaged. NATO signed a Declaration on an Enduring Partnership with Afghanistan in 2010, which provides a framework for long-term political consultations and practical cooperation after 2014. The alliance also launched a train, advise and assist mission (12,000 of which 4,000 are non-US personnel) on 1 January 2015 to replace its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Finally, NATO member states and partners have also reaffirmed their commitment to maintain their share of funding for the Afghan National Army (ANA) at the current level through 2017 as well as their long-term commitment to help fund the ANA at lower levels until 2023.7 The EU has extended its police training mission (189 personnel) through 2016 and pledged to spend e1.4 billion on development assistance from 2014 until 2020.8 Finally, at the London conference in December 2014, the major international donors reaffirmed their 2012 Tokyo commitment to provide $16 billion through 2015, and sustaining support, through 2017, at or near the levels of the past decade. They also reaffirmed their commitment to continue to provide significant development support through 2024, albeit at declining levels.9

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While these commitments through 2017 look firm, many analysts and commentators are sceptical that the United States (and hence its allies) will remain committed to Afghanistan beyond 2017 when the number of US forces will be reduced to a minimum. No one expects NATO to hang around for longer than that, although no end date as yet has been put on its Resolute Force mission. Beyond 2017 US and international assistance is expected to fall considerably and become increasingly contingent upon improved Afghan performance in the fields of security, good governance and fiscal self-reliance as stipulated in the 2012 Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF).10 The big question is therefore to what extent the United States will stay engaged after 2017? The current policy debate on Afghanistan focuses primarily on whether the US should stay engaged, and whether the Obama administration is withdrawing too quickly.11 Few analyses have dealt with the question of US staying power at any length theoretically. The assumption in most analyses is simply that US, and hence Western, interest will drop once the troops have been withdrawn, and that lack of money and public support will induce American decision makers to limit their involvement to a minimum beyond 2017.12 This chapter takes issue with this view arguing that US staying power primarily will be determined by the ability of the US President to craft a strategic narrative that can convince most members of Congress that it is necessary to stay engaged, that it is the right thing to do, and that the United States, Afghanistan and the world will benefit from it. In addition, the President must promise success at an acceptable price and deliver it by demonstrating that progress is being made on a continuous basis. The argument has three parts. Part one explains why elite consensus is the key to sustain US engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2017, and why it takes a successful strategic narrative to create it. It provides an analytic framework specifying the requirements for success that a strategic narrative must meet in order to convince its intended audience. Part two shows how President Obama’s Afghanistan narrative met all these requirements for success and maintained US elite consensus for his 2009–16 Afghanistan strategy. By equating success with the drawdown of US troops Obama was able to present the steady stream of soldiers returning home as incontrovertible proof to Congress and the American

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people that his strategy was working. Part three discusses the implications of these findings for sustaining the American engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2017. They suggest it is possible to do so provided that the US President can craft a new strategic narrative that promises and delivers success in clear and compelling way to the US Congress and the American people. The main findings of the analysis are summed up in a conclusion at the end.

Strategic Narratives: The Key to Staying Power in Costly Engagements States usually justify decisions to wage wars and invest their blood and treasure with reference to their national interests. This is also the case in Afghanistan where the US engagement since 2001 has been justified with reference to its “vital” and “strategic” interests. The initial decision to go to war in Afghanistan, the decisions to escalate the US involvement during the Bush administration, and President Obama’s decisions to surge in 2009 and subsequently withdraw all US forces by 2017, save an embassy presence, were all justified on the basis of vital or strategic US interests. Since the interpretation of state interests and the political willingness to invest blood and treasure in their defence vary greatly across time and space, we need to look elsewhere in order to be able to gauge the American ability to stay engaged in Afghanistan beyond 2017. Expectations that the US will reduce its engagement to a minimum beyond 2017 are based on financial constraints, the lack of public support and the need to manage more urgent challenges elsewhere. These analyses take their cue from the “event-driven” school, which views foreign and security policy as primarily driven by external events that policy-makers cannot control. Yet there is nothing inherent in this logic to prevent events in Afghanistan from driving US decision makers to surge troop numbers once again to prevent the security situation from collapsing. It was the desire to prevent such an outcome that drove the Obama administration to send advisors, air power, special forces and trainers back to Iraq in 2014. Moreover, this perspective underestimates the stickiness of existing military engagements, which are caused by a variety of factors such as credibility concerns, the creation of constituencies benefitting from continued military engagements, such

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as the Pentagon, the State Department, USAID, humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, and the psychological aversion to losses that creates a bias among decision makers to “throw good money after bad” in the hope of redressing a deteriorating situation.13 It is simply hard to accept that major sacrifices in blood and treasure have failed to produce an acceptable result, and any US president will likely be prepared to invest significant resources to avoid the accusation that (s)he “lost” Afghanistan. It is therefore more fruitful for our purpose here to use the “elite competition school” as the point of departure. This perspective views staying power as a function of a government’s ability to create elite consensus on a given issue. Following this logic, the US ability to stay engaged in Afghanistan will depend on how successful the next administration is with respect to creating a “Beltway” consensus among leaders in Congress, the Joint Chiefs and influential think tanks on the need for continued engagement. If such a consensus can be established, then the media will be reduced to a transmission belt as all its elite sources will speak with one voice in support of continued engagement. This will also make low public support less of a problem, as this will deny dissatisfied voters the ability to punish politicians for their Afghanistan policy on Election Day.14 This begs the question how a government can create and sustain such a consensus on continued engagement in Afghanistan. Here the elite competition school is not particularly helpful, which is why we turn to recent research on strategic narratives. A strategic narrative is a public explanation of a decision to go to war that is deliberately constructed in order to mobilize and sustain the domestic and international support required to wage it. This research suggests that a strategic narrative must win both “hearts and minds” of the intended audiences in order to be effective, and that this usually will require answers to the three big “why” questions that decisions to wage war inevitably raise: why is this war necessary? why is this war just and why will the government’s strategy secure a desirable outcome at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure? And a fourth on accountability: How do we know that the strategy is working? To answer these questions convincingly, a narrative must appeal to deeply held values and ideals in order to inspire the audiences to accept the sacrifices that are required for success. It must resonate with national

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interests (why necessary), values and role conceptions (why just) already held by the targeted elites and the public, promise success (why government strategy will succeed) and provide measurable benchmarks (the strategy is working).15 It follows that a US president must do two things in order to create and sustain an elite consensus in support of continuous US engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2017. First, the president must craft a narrative that explains why US interests and values warrant continued engagement; why it is both necessary and just. The narrative must resonate with US national strategic culture reflecting generally accepted pre-existing (elite-) ideas and discourses about US interests, values and role in world politics. Second, the president must promise success at an acceptable price. Success, the desirable end-state, must be defined in a way that makes continued engagement worthwhile in the eyes of US elites, and this definition must be coupled with benchmarks that make it possible for the united elites to demonstrate to the media and the public that progress towards the desired end state is being made.

How Obama Sustained the American Engagement in Afghanistan The purpose of this section is to show how the strategic narrative employed by the Obama administration met these requirements and created the elite consensus that was required to sustain continued US engagement in Afghanistan through 2016. The final part discusses its implications for sustaining the existing elite consensus for staying engaged in Afghanistan beyond 2017.

Obama Appealed to Deeply Held Interests, Values and Role Conceptions The “fit” between President Obama’s strategic narrative on Afghanistan and US strategic culture is near perfect. President Obama’s key speeches on Afghanistan between 2009 and 2014 constitute a deliberate and systematic attempt to present his Afghanistan strategy in a way that maximizes its appeal to American elites and the public at large. These speeches portray the war in Afghanistan as a just and necessary war that was imposed upon the United States as a result of an unprovoked attack on the US mainland (“the worst since Pearl Harbor”). The Taliban and

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Al-Qaeda are portrayed as “ruthless and repressive” terrorist enemies that threaten everything that the United States values and fights for – “peace and security, justice and opportunity”. Obama praises the American soldiers and civil servants who have made heroic sacrifices to make the United States and the world safer and to promote America’s universal values. The Afghanistan war and the need for a continued presence are justified with reference to American security interests, American values and American exceptionalism. In Obama’s interpretation, the latter means that the United States as the greatest nation on earth has a special obligation to lead on the world stage to defend democracy, human rights, rule of law and personal freedom. It is in US interest to do so and part of the American identity, the source of America’s moral authority in the world, and what all great American presidents (Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy) have done since World War II.16 Obama’s strong emphasis on American exceptionalism and its duty to lead in world affairs in his Afghanistan speeches since 2012 is not coincidental. It was a response to a Gallup poll from 2010 showing that 80 per cent of Americans believe that the United States “has a unique character because of its history and Constitution that sets it apart from other nations as the greatest in the world”. In the same poll 66 per cent agree that the United States has “a special responsibility to be the leading nation in world affairs”.17 It was also a response to the strong domestic criticism triggered by Obama’s decision to “lead from behind” in the 2011 air campaign against Libya, and accusations made by Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney during the 2012 election campaign that Obama did not believe in American exceptionalism and had failed to exert global leadership.18

Obama Promised and Delivered Success Obama defined success in a way that is acceptable in terms of US values, interests and role conceptions, affordable in terms of blood and treasure, achievable in terms of the time and resources devoted, and accountable in the form of clear metrics of progress. To make his Afghan strategy acceptable in terms of US interests and values, Obama presented it as necessary in order to prevent the US from losing the war. Without it Al-Qaeda would regain its capacity to attack the United States and its allies, and all that America had achieved with respect to building democracy, human rights and

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opportunity for the Afghans would be lost. To make the strategy affordable Obama made the surge temporary (18 months) and promised to gradually withdraw US forces and phase out US economic and military assistance to Afghanistan over an extended period of time. Achievability was ensured by limiting US objectives narrowly to fighting Al-Qaeda, enhancing civil– military coordination and training of the Afghan security forces, and by asking the Afghans to gradually do more themselves. Finally, Obama made his promise of success accountable by providing a clear timetable for the withdrawal of US forces.19 By framing success in this way, Obama ensured that his strategy would appear successful to American elites and the American people if he was able to withdraw US troops on time without causing a major deterioration of the security situation. His success in doing so through 2015 consequently allowed him to set the parameters for the US debate on Afghanistan, and it has significantly limited the negative impact of other problems such as corruption, bad governance, declining fiscal sustainability, rising opium production,20 and the poor management of US reconstruction funds and activities, which has been subjected to a barrage of criticism from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in his quarterly reports to Congress.21

Obama Maintained Broad Elite Consensus on Continued Engagement The Afghan war enjoyed extremely high elite and bipartisan support in the immediate wake of 9/11. Only one of the 531 members of Congress (House and Senate) voted against the joint resolution (12 abstained) authorizing the President to use force against the perpetrators of the attack. The level of support remained high as the disagreements over the Iraq war induced many Democrats, including Obama,22 to portray Afghanistan as everything that the war in Iraq was not: defensive, just and legal.23 Yet the mood began to change when Obama became president and support for the Afghan war no longer served as an effective way to criticize a Republican President. The increasing war weariness in the American people then induced an increasing number of Democrats in Congress to voice their misgivings about the war. This forced Obama to make a determined effort to maintain the consensus he had inherited. His challenge was to find a middle course between the mainly Democrat doves in Congress and in his administration, who wanted out sooner

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rather than later, and his military commanders and mainly Republican hawks, who wanted to send more soldiers to Afghanistan to regain the initiative on the battle field and bring the war to successful and honourable conclusion on American terms. This was precisely what Obama’s Afghanistan strategy was crafted to do. It worked because he sold it with a narrative appealing to broadly shared conceptions of US interests, values and role conceptions, and because he succeeded in bringing US troops home on time. Although US commanders have continued to demand more troops and more time,24 and although some members of Congress, including a bipartisan majority in the Senate,25 have called upon Obama to speed up the withdrawal of US troops, most analysts, military commanders, members of Congress and newspaper editorials support the strategy and emphasize the need for the US to stay engaged to prevent Afghanistan from collapsing. The administration has not had difficulty getting its budget requests for Afghanistan approved by Congress, and the principal criticism voiced of Obama’s strategy in 2014 and 2015 was that his planned withdrawal was too swift, and that it should be determined by the situation on the ground in Afghanistan rather than his political calendar.26 In short, US elites agree with the President that Afghanistan must not be allowed to collapse and that continued US support is required for a sustained period of time to prevent this. Moreover, there is strong support for leaving more US troops in Afghanistan for longer than envisaged by President Obama’s strategy.

Implications for Sustaining Elite Consensus beyond 2017 As long as the current elite consensus on the need for continued engagement beyond 2017 can be sustained, lack of public opinion and budgetary constraints will not become the key drivers of disengagement that many analyses assume. The existence of a bipartisan consensus in Congress not only allows the members of Congress and the President to pay less attention to public opinion as this insulates them from electoral punishment but i also reduces the media to a conveyor belt transmitting their views to the public with scant critical questioning. It is difficult for the media to generate sustained interest in a story if most elite sources agree on the issue at hand, because it deprives the story of the drama and controversy that makes it newsworthy. The elite consensus on

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Afghanistan is a major factor why the war did not generate more than 5 per cent of the news coverage in major US outlets in 2009 when Obama sent 50,000 additional US soldiers to the country. The following year during which 100,000 US troops were deployed in Afghanistan and nearly 500 of them got killed, the coverage fell to 4 per cent.27 In 2011 as US forces began to withdraw coverage was halved to 2 per cent.28 In 2012 and 2013 the Afghan war did not make it onto the Pew Research Center’s list of the year’s top 15 news stories.29 This lack of media attention gives the US President and Congress considerable leeway to stay engaged in Afghanistan despite the lack of public support. While opinion polls show a declining level of support for the Afghanistan war,30 the dearth of media coverage reveals something that most analyses of US public opinion tend to ignore, namely that the US public does not care much about it. Budgetary constraints are also less important than they are made out to be in most analyses. The onset of the financial crisis did not prevent President Obama from increasing spending significantly in 2009 and 2010 in order to prevent a looming defeat. The US debate on Afghanistan clearly shows that it is not the level of spending per se that generates debate and controversy; it is whether the resources are wellspent and produce positive results. What interests Congress the most is whether the resources devoted to the training of the Afghan security forces will enable them to keep the Taliban at bay, and whether the funds spent on development and reconstruction are producing sustainable results rather than fuelling corruption and creating a culture of dependency.31 Assuming that the current drawdown of US troops remains more or less on schedule so that 5,000 – 10,000 remain by January 2017, elite attention will shift to the civilian metrics of success. As mentioned above, it is critical to promise and demonstrate success to sustain support for any strategy, and this means that President Obama and especially his successor in the White House must craft a strategy and narrative that makes it possible to demonstrate that Afghanistan is on the right track and that progress is being made in the civilian sphere as well. Civilian metrics are already used widely to measure progress. Since the TMAF was established in 2012 to enhance the effectiveness of the international aid effort, the progress of the Afghan government with

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respect to meeting the following five goals has been monitored and measured with a total of 16 indicators: 1. Credible, inclusive and transparent Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2014 and 2015. 2. Access to justice for all, particularly for women. 3. Integrity of public financial management and the commercial banking sector. 4. Revenue collection and capacity for budget development and execution. 5. Inclusive and sustained growth resulting in an improved ranking in the human development index. While progress can be documented in all five areas,32 it is generally viewed as disappointing by most donors and analysts. To give but one example: although a new president was elected in 2014, the electoral process can hardly be called “credible, inclusive and transparent”, and it took massive US pressure to coerce the two presidential candidates, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, to finally agree on a powersharing arrangement after a 5-month standoff.33 Making continued US (and international) engagement conditional upon the ability of the Afghans to make swift progress in these areas would therefore be self-defeating. The genius of Obama’s 2009– 16 narrative was his decision to tie success to the withdrawal of US troops, a metric under his own control. His success in bringing the troops home on time gave his Afghanistan policy an aura of success, which greatly facilitated the task of maintaining elite consensus. A new strategy and narrative must therefore define and promise success in a similar way if elite consensus for continued engagement is to be sustained. Since corruption, bad governance and fiscal gaps will continue to plague Afghanistan for decades ahead, US strategy must privilege US performance in its framing of success. The key is not whether the Afghan government becomes less corrupt, but whether the US government succeeds in reducing the amount of US aid money that is wasted on failed projects or lost to corruption. Evidence that taxpayers’ money are being wasted upsets Congress far more than the fact that progress in Afghanistan proceeds at a snail’s pace.34 To keep Congress on board, it is therefore more

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important to keep the General Accounting Office (GAO) and SIGAR happy than to make a difference on the ground in Afghanistan, although the latter of course is a sine qua non also if the engagement is to be sustained. If GAO and SIGAR reports to Congress document that the US tax payers get value for their money in Afghanistan, Congress can be expected to continue to back engagement in Afghanistan beyond 2017. It is far more important for a US president to be seen not to fuel corruption in Afghanistan than to fail to eradicate it since the latter is generally seen as an impossible task. To paraphrase President Obama, no-one expects Afghanistan to be “a perfect place” for decades to come.

Conclusion It is not a foregone conclusion that the United States will abandon Afghanistan to its fate in 2017. The US will not be forced out by a lack of public support or financial difficulties. These factors did not prevent President Obama from sending more troops, civilian specialists and money to Afghanistan in 2009, and they need not prevent his successor from staying engaged and continue to fund the Afghan security forces and Afghan state well beyond 2017. Obama overcame these obstacles and secured elite consensus for his strategy by crafting a strategic narrative in support of his strategy that successfully convinced the Beltway elites that the surge was necessary, in accordance with US values, ideals and role conceptions, and likely to work. Obama demonstrated this to be the case by bringing his troops home on time. Obama also succeeded in laying the foundation for continued US engagement beyond 2017 by creating a context in which many analysts and members of Congress criticize Obama for withdrawing his forces and scaling down economic assistance too fast. This sentiment can be exploited by his successor to keep the United States engaged. To do so the next president will have to craft a strategic narrative that meets the requirements for success stipulated by the framework presented in this chapter. It worked for Obama and there is no reason why it should not work for his successor as well. This said, the United States cannot generate the measurable progress that a continued US engagement will also require. A perfectly constructed narrative is necessary but not sufficient to sustain a continued American and hence Western presence beyond 2017. The future US engagement

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will also be determined by the actions of the regional actors analysed in the other chapters in this volume. While a continued US presence is critical in ensuring a continued Western engagement in terms of development assistance and security assistance, this engagement will be terminated if the regional actors do not cooperate with respect to enhancing regional stability. At the end of the day it is their actions that will make or break the ongoing efforts to stabilize the South Asia region.

Notes 1. The White House, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan”, 27 May 2014. 2. The White House, “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, 1 December 2009. 3. The White House, “Statement by the President on Afghanistan”, 15 October 2015. 4. Emmott, Robin, Arshad Mohammed and Sabine Siebold, “NATO Agrees to Keep Troops in Afghanistan, Seeks Army Funding”, Reuters, 1 December 2015. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-nato-idUSKBN0T K5C520151201. 5. Cordesman, Anthony H., “Paying for America’s Wars in FY2017”, CSIS Working Draft, 18 February 2016, pp. 7-8; Filkins, Dexter, “After America: Will civil war hit Afghanistan when the U.S. leaves?”, New Yorker, 9 July 2012. Available at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/07/09/after-america-2; Gates, Robert M., Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), pp. 556–7; Landler, Mark, “U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016”, New York Times, 27 May 2014; Mu¨nch, Philipp, “Resolute Support Light: NATO’s New Mission versus the Political Economy of the Afghan National Security Forces”, AAN Discussion Paper, 1 (January 2015), pp. 4–5. 6. Under Secretary of Defense, US Overview – FY2017 Defense Budget, US Department of Defense, February 2016, p. 70. 7. Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, NATO Press Release 121, 4 September 2014. 8. EU Police Mission in Afghanistan FACTSHEET, January 2015; EU announces further support for the development of Afghanistan, European Commission Press release, 11 October 2014. 9. The London Conference on Afghanistan Communique´, 4 December 2014, para. 4. 10. Roehrs, Christine, “Return of the Goodwill? London conference as symbol of a new start”, Afghanistan Analyst Network, 1 December 2014. 11. Baker, Pauline, “Picking Up the Pieces. Unraveling Afghanistan”, The American Interest 9/3 (19 December 2013). Available at http://www.afghanistans tudygroup.org/2010/08/13/americas-interest/; Lieven, Anatol, “Karzai’s Dangerous Game”, The New York Times, 20 December 2013; Miller, Paul D., “America, Don’t Give Up on Afghanistan, This war is still winnable”,

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New Republic, 30 November 2014; Petraeus, David and Michael O’Hanlon, “The U.S. needs to keep troops in Afghanistan”, The Washington Post, 7 July 2015. Battiston, Giuliano, “Afghan Concern Over Western Disengagement”, Inter Press Service, 11 December 2014; Chonghaile, Cla´r Nı´, “Afghanistan: what will happen when the troops – and their dollars – depart?”, Guardian, 27 November 2014; Goodson, Larry P. and Thomas H. Johnson, U.S. Policy and Strategy Toward Afghanistan After 2014 (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2014), pp. 32– 4; Miller, Charles A., Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010). Levy, Jack S., “Loss Aversion, Framing, and Bargaining: The Implications of Prospect Theory for International Conflict”, International Political Science Review 17/ 2 (April 1996), p. 190. For elaborations on the event-driven and the elite-competition schools see Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Jens Ringsmose, “Denmark, Afghanistan is Worth Dying for: How Public Support for the War was Maintained in the Face of Mounting Casualties and Elusive Success”, Cooperation and Conflict, 50/2 (June 2015), pp. 211– 227. On strategic narratives see Beatrice De Graaf, George Dimitriu, and Jens Ringsmose (eds) Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War Winning domestic support for the Afghan War (London and New York: Routledge, 2015); Emile Simpson, War From the Ground Up. Twenty-first-century Combat as Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), pp. 179– 226. Based on President Obamas key Afghanistan speeches held on 27 March and 1 December 2009, 22 June 2011, 1 May 2012 and 27 and 28 May 2014. The transcripts are all available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/ speeches-and-remarks. Jones, Jeffrey M., “Americans See U.S. as Exceptional; 37% Doubt Obama Does”, Gallup Politics, 22 December 2010. Available at http://www.gallup.com/ poll/145358/Americans-Exceptional-Doubt-Obama.aspx?version¼print. Edwards, Jason A., “American Exceptionalism, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the 2012 Presidential Campaign”, E-International Relations, 10 December 2011. Available at http://www.e-ir.info/2011/12/10/american-exceptionalism-u-sforeign-policy-and-the-2012-presidential-campaign/; Wilson, Scott, “Obama, Romney differ on U.S. exceptionalism”, The Washington Post, 26 September, 2012. “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 1 December 2009; Statement by the President on Afghanistan, The White House, 27 May 2014. Cordesman, Anthony H., “The Civil Transition: in Afghanistan: The Metrics of Crisis?”, CSIS, 17 December 2014. These reports are available at http://www.sigar.mil/quarterlyreports/.

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22. Politics, “Obama’s Remarks on Iraq and Afghanistan”, New York Times, 15 July 2008. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/15/us/politics/15textobama.html?pagewanted¼all&_r ¼ 0. 23. Miller, Charles A., Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), p. 15. 24. Landler, Mark, “U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016”, New York Times, 28 May 2014. 25. Associated Press, “Senate backs quicker withdrawal from Afghanistan”, CBS News, 29 November 2012. Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/senatebacks-quicker-withdrawal-from-afghanistan/. 26. Bergen, Peter, “Why U.S. needs to stay in Afghanistan”, CNN National Security Analyst, 5 January 2015. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/05/opini on/bergen-keep-troops-in-afghanistan/; Moore, Evan, “Year of Decision”, U.S. News and World Report, 22 December 2014; Flournoy, Miche`le and Richard Fontaine, “The steps a divided government can take to protect national interests”, The Washington Post, 16 January 2015; Gaskell, Stephanie, “Will Afghanistan Become the ‘Forgotten War’ Again?”, Defence One, 6 October 2014. Available at http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2014/10/will-afghanistanbecome-forgotten-war-again/95921/; Landler, Mark, “U.S. Troops to Leave Afghanistan by End of 2016”, New York Times, 27 May 2014; Miller, Paul D., “America, ‘Don’t Give Up on Afghanistan, This War is Still Winnable’”, New Republic, 30 November 2014; After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part III), Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of The Committee on Foreign Affairs House Of Representatives 113th Congress, 2nd Session, 10 December 2014, 2, 6. 27. Stelter, Brian, “Afghan War Just a Slice of U.S. Coverage”, New York Times, 20 December 2010. 28. Stelter, Brian, “Afghanistan Low on News Agenda”, 25 December 2011. Available at http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/25/afghanistanlow-on-news-agenda/#. 29. Stelter, Brian, “Among Top News Stories, a War is Missing”, New York Times, 31 December 2012; “Network TV: Top 20 Stories of 2013’. Available at http://www.journalism.org/media-indicators/top-20-network-news-storiesof-2013/. 30. See http://www.pollingreport.com/afghan.htm; and http://www.gallup.com/ poll/116233/afghanistan.aspx. 31. Afghanistan in Transition: U.S. Civilian Presence and Assistance Post-2014, A Majority Staff Report prepared for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 27 October 2014; After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part III), Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and the Subcommittee on

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Asia and the Pacific of The Committee on Foreign Affairs House Of Representatives, 10 December 2014. 32. TMAF Joint Report for Special Joint Coordination Monitoring Board, 29 January 2014. 33. Nordland, Rod, “Afghan Presidential Rivals Finally Agree on Power-Sharing Deal”, New York Times, 20 September 2014. 34. Afghanistan in Transition: U.S. Civilian Presence and Assistance Post-2014, A Majority Staff Report prepared for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 27 October 2014.

CONCLUSION SOUTH ASIA IN QUEST OF RESTRAINT Sten Rynning If international preeminence were a simple question of military muscle, then South Asia’s future would be Indian. India continues to spend around 75 per cent of the region’s defence money, and figures are climbing. In 2001 the defence expenditure of South and Central Asia amounted to $37.2 billion, of which India accounted for 28.6 and Pakistan 5.1; in 2014 the numbers had climbed to 65 for the region, 50 for India and 7.8 for Pakistan.1 All the other countries of the region fall below the Pakistan level of expenditure. In short, in military terms, the region is India’s. Military muscle does not equate control over political outcomes, however. Diplomatic resolve following from the relative intensity of interests involved, along with a so-called strategic interaction capacity to fight conflicts on favourable terms, explains why “the weak win wars”.2 Moreover, outsider powers have a vote. They can rein in the local power house by way of a classical balance of power policy. More graphically, they can provoke war between regional players in a “bait and bleed” strategy or become the “bloodletter” that causes its rivals to bleed each other white.3 We see all this at play in the South Asia region. For the 1980s the United States was the “bloodletter” that sought to bleed the Soviet Union white in Afghanistan.4 In the 2000s the table turned: now the United States was the outside great power bleeding as segments of

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Pakistan’s government along with groups from Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran aided the Taliban.5 In a wider context, Pakistan and India have employed the full range of policy tools in their rivalry: they have fought four wars, mobilized China and Russia as external sponsors in a traditional balance of power policy and stoked insurgency and terrorism in a test of relative resolve and intimidation.6 The US combat experience in Afghanistan holds many lessons but from the perspective of regional order and thus the concern of this book the perhaps most important lesson is the need to tailor ambitions to policy resources. Grand ambitions invited an insurgency the United States and allies were bound to suffer from fighting, just as they invited tension among broad Western policy aims cobbled together under the heading of nation-building.7 Consider President Obama’s decision to surge the war and stabilization effort in 2009–10 which quite rightly emphasized the regional dimension of the war. To succeed, the strategy would have to reduce and preferably eliminate the sanctuary the Taliban enjoyed in Pakistan and relatedly entice Pakistan to support political reconciliation. However, pushing Pakistan in this direction implied a cost in terms of weakened partnering with Pakistan to control nuclear weapons – which the United States had difficulty tracking and which Pakistan was reluctant to be transparent about.8 Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is growing, on its way to becoming the world’s third largest nuclear stock pile, and it is notably expanding in terms of small or theatre nuclear weapons that generally are considered both strategically destabilizing and difficult to effectively control. In regards to Pakistan the United States thus entered a nuclear-surge dilemma, and the US’s decision to prioritize nuclear cooperation effectively weakened the surge.9 The United States is seeking to move beyond this dilemma as it transitions out of Afghanistan and pivots further east, as laid out in Chapter 4, but Afghanistan offers no easy exits and India will continue to anchor the United States in the region, as we saw in Chapters 2 and 6, and the underlying challenge of reconciling US interests in order to gain regional impact thus remains. None of the other major players in the region are immune to these same challenges – of resolve and strategic interaction. For India, China and also Iran the main difference is that they are not fighting a war, like the United States has been, but they must nonetheless shape their political engagements as carefully as the United States to avoid the trap of conflicting priorities or the embroilment in other peoples’ conflicts.

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China, as we saw in Chapter 5, has a clear strategic interest in countering US influence in Asia and perhaps especially its backyard, in South and Central Asia. However, Chinese policy must still be balanced. As an emerging power, China has an interest in establishing a reputation for good neighbourly relations and for playing by the rules. Moreover, China’s domestic development needs are so acute that they in and of themselves caution against costly foreign policies. China’s Silk Road diplomacy is the outcome of these conflicting trends and thus China’s way of navigating the challenge of ambiguous resolve and local resistance. The same goes for India, which is perhaps the clearest case of a soft diplomacy in action. As argued in Chapter 6, India’s soft, if extensive touch in Afghanistan is designed to ease Pakistan concerns and minimize the risk of Pakistani retribution in the form of added support for radical politics in Kashmir and India proper. Soft power is also not lost on Iran, as Chapter 7 demonstrated. Iran has fewer means at its disposal and remains locked in durable conflicts – an ideological conflict with the West and a territorial conflict with Pakistan over the Baluchistan province – but it has nonetheless employed soft power to enhance governance capacity in western Afghanistan, an area historically linked to Persia and from where instability spills across the Iranian border. The trouble for the region, therefore, is not so much the absence of restraint but rather the lack of coordinated or mutual restraint. The proselytizing seal of regional players seems for now to be held in check by the fear of renewed warfare – Afghanistan has been at war for close to four decades, and this is only one of the region’s armed conflicts – and the concomitant fear that opportunities for growth shall once again be squandered. Yet the underlying pattern of insecurity remains. The sum total is a degree of restraint but not a system of restraint that follows from political agreement. It puts South Asia at a tipping point. The region can slide back towards mistrust and unchecked competition, or it can seek a collective agreement to conduct policy according to some standard of regional morality. Any such agreement must emerge from an understanding of the most basic regional condition – the persistence of ethnic politics and territorial insecurity – but must notably also link moral proscriptions, so widely present in the region, to a concern for equilibrium.10 We turn first to the regional condition as it emerges from this book; next we turn to the wider geopolitical context and the prospect of balance of power stability.

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The Regional Condition: Ethnic and Territorial Politics The overall message of the chapters of this book is sobering: South Asia has a surplus of national interests and security concerns but a deficit of coordination and cooperation and then notably also an intractable problem of insecure regimes and unsettled borders. Chapter 9 on Afghanistan is a case in point. In taking a long perspective on Afghanistan’s challenge of national cohesion and governance, Eshan zooms in on ethnic diversity and politics. Such diversity was manageable as long as it could be channelled into resistance to colonial exploitation, but it has had a debilitating effect on South Asia’s post-colonial states. The answer to diversity has too often been an elite’s attempt to fashion unity according to foreign ideas or, in a variation hereof, to advance a fac
ade of pluralism behind which its own dominant identity had preference. The outcome has been discrimination, resistance and ethnic tension that have spilled across borders. In a rich and powerful analysis, Mansoor Eshan traces the history of the Afghan national project as it has been anchored in Pashtun dynastic and religious politics from Ahmad Shah’s rule in mid-eighteenth century onwards and the “modern” Afghan state fashioned by Abu Rahman in the late nineteenth century, which launches him into a critique of Pashtun nationalism as it emerged in the 1920s and 1930s – with strong affinities to the fascism of the era – and how the Taliban and related jihadist groups today remain stuck in this nationalist track. Eshan’s appeal is that an Afghan political process now can reconcile rather than harden ethnic identities. This appeal is valiant but unlikely to come to fruition in the short term which, as Vanda Felbab-Brown describes in Chapter 2, is marked by the dysfunctional sharing of power between president Ghani and his chief executive Abdullah, a frustrated attempt by Ghani to enlist Pakistan in peace talks and the fragmentation and radicalization of parts of the Afghan insurgency as witnessed by the politics of electing successors to Mullah Omar – first Akhtar Muhammad Mansour and then Mawlawi Haibatullah Akundzada – and the Islamic State’s encroachment on Taliban territory abided by Taliban dissent. In spite of its intrinsic appeal, the peace process is a considerable political gamble. For Afghan President Ghani, the question is how far to trust Pakistan – a historical rival – in becoming an interlocutor of

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peace, and how far his own political base is willing to let him go. If his Pashtun base turns on him, Ghani will be finished politically, and it is worth noting that Ghani does not have credentials as a former Mujahid but comes to the presidency with a Western and technocratic profile. His domestic base is fragile, therefore. For Pakistan’s leadership, the question is whether it risks pushing the Taliban leadership beyond its extent of control – it is not coincidental that the Taliban moved to set up their political office, led by Syed Tayyab Agha, outside Pakistan, in Qatar, in 2012 – and whether, if push comes to shove, Pakistan will experience a violent backlash among Pakistani-based militants. For the Taliban, the question is one of political autonomy from Pakistan and internal cohesion, a challenge illustrated by the resignation of Agha following the appointment of Mansour as Omar’s successor and the ability of Islamic State to make inroads into Afghanistan. The dearth of credible net assessments of belligerents’ strengths and weaknesses raises many questions but it seems certain that the peace process is greatly weakened and that renewed momentum awaits a clarification of Taliban authority and purpose.11 Chapter 2 and Chapter 9 capture how political community, historical animosity and current opportunities combine to make the Afghan peace process both highly complex and an integral facet of the power-sharing process that the two key Afghan political figures – president Ghani and chief executive Abdullah – have painfully opened. Afghanistan is not the only regional focal point for ethnic and territorial politics. Kashmir – the state of Jammu and Kashmir – is another particularly sore issue. In spite of its involvement since 1948, the UN Security Council has been unable to forge a compromise and remains limited to observing a ceasefire and a “line of control” agreed to in 1972. This conflict lives on because it is so intimately tied into the national identities of Pakistan and India. In Chapter 8, Tughral Yamin depicts the turbulence and confusion that marked Pakistan at its point of creation in 1948 and how its underlying sense of insecurity remains wedded to India, from which Pakistan emerged. India’s attempt to drawn Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union can only enhance Pakistan’s unease about Indian nationalism. Indian Prime Minister Modi, who took office in 2014, has stoked Pakistan’s insecurity by seeking to repeal the constitutional Article 370 that assigns a special status to Jammu and Kashmir – the implication of which could be the

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“normalization” of Jammu and Kashmir within the Indian Union. Conversely, as Roy and Wagner show in Chapter 6, India claims that Jammu and Kashmir has become a front for an insurgency that Pakistan security forces are conducting against India. Where Prime Minister Modi’s Indian supporters see a desire to move towards a durable political settlement in his questioning of Article 370, his Pakistani detractors see a nationalist urge that threatens their security. Baluchistan is another focal point of ethnic unrest and territorial dispute, and it involves all the main players discussed so far and then also Iran. Baluchistan is situated at the intersection of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In a peculiar take on its two-front war, Pakistan fears that India with the aid of Kabul is begetting resistance from its Baloch region to Islamabad, while Iran has built a physical barrier along its bordering provinces of Baluchistan and Sistan to fend off Sunni insurgents and criminal activity. In Chapter 7, Houchang Hassan-Yari depicts a considerable degree of Iranian frustration with lawlessness across its borders and its search for trustworthy partners. Naturally, Iran’s search for such partners is made difficult by its own character as state run and dominated by an opaque constellation of religious and security elites. Moreover, these elites are caught up in a durable rivalry with the United States and its Western allies and are therefore disposed to be doubly distrustful of Pakistan – on account of its Baluch intransigence and US alliance. There is potential for cooperation in this part of South Asia, Hassan-Yari emphasizes, notably as it relates to the management of trade and natural resources, and in particular water, but for now nationalist and narrow interests dominate. One issue to follow in this regard is Iran’s engagement with the Taliban, which is Sunni and historically an enemy of Iran, but which in its search for alternative sponsors to Pakistan could come to befriend Iran, and Iran may welcome the opening in order to counter the more radical Sunni movement of the Islamic State. Another issue is whether the nuclear framework agreement reached between Iran and a group of dominant world powers in mid-2015 will decrease the ideological rivalry between Iran and the West and thus allow Iran along with Afghanistan and India to realize some of its plans for an economic corridor reaching the port of Chabahar. A security agreement might thus enable wider regional cooperation, but it is a tenuous prospect. China is mainly a South Asia outsider by weight of geography but does have a territorial foothold in the region. Its Xinjiang province

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shares borders with, among others, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, and, as Bekkevold and Engh explain in Chapter 5, is one of two provinces – along with Tibet – that from Beijing’s perspective raises the spectre of territorial unrest. China’s “One Belt, One Road” policy for South Asia cannot be fully appreciated outside this territorial context, they argue. At issue is no longer simply the challenge of Uighurs resisting Beijing, a long standing conflict, but also growing links between Islamic groups in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Xinjiang. This is also the backdrop to Beijing’s engagement with the Taliban and Afghan reconciliation talks: China’s leaders held parallel talks with Afghan President Ghani in October 2014 in the context of the “Heart of Asia” ministerial meeting and then sponsored a first meeting in May of 2015 in Beijing between the Taliban and Ghani’s people. China’s engagement in these talks has been welcomed by the United States on account of a common interest in confronting Islamist extremism and is bolstered by the potential for China to become a regional peacemaker in support of its long-term Silk Road policy. However, China’s involvement is complicated by Pakistan’s successful insistence on continuing peace talks in Pakistan and then the reluctance of the Taliban to enter into these talks, which have therefore become a type of exploratory high-level peace talks among key diplomatic stakeholders – Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the United States. China’s longerterm challenge as depicted by Bekkevold and Engh is to contain this peace process and then to bring its impressive resources – a large economy and financial muscle, a geographical presence and also its political patience – to bear in a region of weak states. Its “all-weather friendship” with Pakistan has enabled the China – Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that promises to connect Xinjiang to Pakistan’s deep-sea port in Gwadar, but the CPEC is vulnerable not only to Islamabad’s relationship to Baluchistan where Gwadar is located but also to India’s wariness of a solidified China – Pakistan alliance and its encirclement by Chinese interests and relations. India’s loss in the armed border conflict with China in 1962 thus continues to linger: it fed Indian anxiety in regards to its national cohesion and power and Pakistan’s desire to test it; and it feeds an underlying suspicion that South Asia may not be big enough for both China and India. The United States is a big part of this equation, which brings us to the wider geopolitical setting.

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Geopolitics and the Regional Balance of Power Anthony H. Cordesman writes in Chapter 4 that the United States has lost strategic interest in Afghanistan – where it will continue to support efforts at stabilization but at a diminished scale and well short of levels that would allow it to compete with China and Russia for Afghan influence – but is building up its interests in India. From a US perspective, Cordesman continues, the purpose is to help India emerge as a modern country – which is to say a country that overcomes localized territorial rivalries to focus its energy on investment and governance and which is the line Prime Minister Modi is adopting in his speeches – and then also a power that can help the United States contain China and preserve liberal-inspired institutions of global order, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. These two institutions are explicitly mentioned in the US– India Joint Strategic Vision of January 2015 focused on “peace, prosperity and stability” in the Asia Pacific and India Ocean region.12 This trend – of the US reaching out to South Asia via the Pacific – also helps explains why NATO as a whole by and large has lost interest in Afghanistan and its surroundings, even though the pretence is there to continue a partnership programme. As Marrone and Sartori write in Chapter 3, NATO’s interests in a continued substantial engagement are simply not intense enough. For as long as the United States makes no effort to connect South Asia to Europe’s security, therefore, European allies will focus on more immediate needs in their neighbourhood and effectively delegate South Asian affairs to the United States and to a lesser degree to Great Britain and France. The US –India Joint Strategic Vision talks of peace and stability but could be a harbinger of modern great power rivalry. It will not be the Great Game of days past when Russia and Britain from their respective and quite solid spheres of influence met in Afghanistan to demarcate one from the other. Rather, it is a Chinese –US contest in which the full region of South Asia is drawn into a wider sphere of contested influence, namely the Asia –Pacific. The stakes in this maritime rivalry extend far beyond control of specific resources that lie beneath the seabed or access to certain almost uninhabitable reefs in the South China Sea; they concern prestige and the enabling of more concrete forms of power.13 The United States is therefore not only in opposition to Chinese

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expansion in the Paracels and Spratleys but readying to support India’s inclusion in the Asia– Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and later likely also the Trans– Pacific Partnership (TPP). Such institutional enlargement would boost not only India’s modernization but also naturally the network of US partners in Asia, tying in with US security commitments to a number of countries, including Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. The question is whether China – a member of APEC – will concur to India’s inclusion, and how other APEC members less riveted by the stakes of the great rivalry and keen to balance relations to the two great Pacific powers will position themselves. The wider question of particular relevance for this book is whether the Asia – Pacific contest inevitably will come to dominate South Asia. Ronald E. Neumann usefully reminds us in Chapter 1 that external interests never quite managed to control the South Asia agenda. China and the United States may be today’s great powers, but South Asia has through all the phases of its experience been captured by its own inner security dynamics that outsiders must grasp and work with, not in opposition to. Neumann continues that politics must come first because where fractious politics reign, the impact of economic opportunities and trade will be marginal. The nature of this fractious state of affairs is the key to the geopolitics of the region, and it involves three types of states defined in part by their geographic location, in part by their histories and character. The most coherent, productive and commanding state in South Asia’s game is the one located the farthest away from the region, the United States. The ultimate challenge for the United States is not to amass resources but to sort out its own rival priorities and then connect policy to local politics across great distance. China, India and Russia are continental-type states in command of great resources, like the United States, but they are less coherent and more subject to the pull of pluralist, fragmenting politics. They are also all located on the edges of or within the South Asia region. The fragmentation they experience is of the kind that characterizes South Asia politics, but their size insulate them from some of the effects hereof. Finally there are the smaller states of the region, which are all postcolonial and post-imperial and inherently linked to the challenge of creating a nation coinciding with the state. These states thus combine

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pride and fear – pride at having overcome adversity; fear of renewed domination. Their civilian government institutions are mostly weak and overwhelmed by the leadership that strong security institutions – the men on horseback, the militaries – provide. Military establishments thus capture state resources, define state ideology and allow societal representation only within this ideological framework. This type of state is not limited to South Asia but has made it strong imprint there. Returning to the United States and Ronald E. Neumann’s point that the region has an irresistible local core dynamic, we arrive at a first set of conclusions regarding regional stability. The first conclusion is that there is a definite risk given both the changing character of the region’s states and the geographic distance from the region to Washington – the capital the furthest afield – that US policy makers can come to overemphasize the strategic nature of policy in the region. The continental-type states of the South Asia region – China, India and Russia – are as much if not more motivated by their own sense of continental and national vulnerability as by strategic designs for expansion and influence. This defensive character of their policies should both be appreciated and nurtured, if regional stability is a policy aim. It presupposes an engagement with the way in which their culture and civilization drive their foreign policies and define opportunities for strategic coexistence.14 Issues of military armament and doctrine remain critically important – in 2015 China moved to emphasize new offensive options in its overarching military doctrine and match these with naval and air capacities, and the United States simultaneously seeks to maintain military superiority by way of a dash for innovation, known as the “third offset” strategy – but should be explicitly tied into such a policy of political coexistence. A related conclusion is that the attempt by the United States or other outside powers to address issues of regional influence and governance via alliances with the lesser states of the region invariably will get caught up in the politics of these weak states. Their primary concern is local: it is to survive as a state and to ensure that the nation does not turn against it. Everything else follows from here. To think otherwise – to think that outside assistance will engender a sense of security that will lead to a change in priorities and objectives – is to chase a mirage, as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2011, Husain Haqqani, writes in his book Magnificent Delusions.15

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The Asia –Pacific may be pulling South Asia into its geopolitical orbit, and there may be good reason to thus connect the two realms and strengthen the Western flank of Pacific zone of American engagement. However, and as reflected perhaps especially in the chapters by Neumann and Cordesman but really throughout all the chapters, the United States should resist this temptation to read policy through a strategic lens privileging the relative power of continental-type states. If the weak can win wars by gaming political resolve and the complexity of the battlefield, then they can also win diplomatic tests of strength. Pakistan is the preeminent case in point, being weak in relative terms and yet having overcome significant and sustained US pressure for it to join the War on Terror. Pakistan did join the war but on its own terms. Grasping state insecurity and anxiety is the first step for outsiders in the effort to fashion regional order, as Peter Viggo Jakobsen so vividly points out in Chapter 10: it forms the basis for realistic political ambitions that are the key to strategic narratives and thus the mobilization of political will and national resources. President Obama mastered this art once, Jakobsen continues, which is a cause for moderate optimism. What was once possible can be imitated, but it requires leadership and a focus on the key piece in the regional puzzle, India.

Equilibrium and Restraint: India and the Rest Power sharing for the region of South Asia would entail diplomatic restraint and the collective search for equilibrium that defines the theme of this book. To Henry Kissinger, equilibrium is achievable but only if statesmen manage to balance the two aspects of order – pure power and human values.16 We know from the chapters in this book that embedded opportunities for cooperation are present but also that fears of exclusion and challenges to domestic legitimacy predominate. The question for the region is where to look for guidance. Historical analogy is one possible source of inspiration. Europe achieved a “concert” of powers in the early nineteenth century after having gone through more than a century of upheaval and a decade of Napoleonic warfare. The concert, mostly an informal arrangement among the great powers to counter systemic challenges, brought stability to the continent for decades – tough it also channelled Britain– Russian rivalry into South Asia. However, the analogy of

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concert is inadequate, if tempting. Europe’s concert was made possible by an overwhelming threat – France and the Napoleonic warfare it proved capable of – and South Asia does not have an equivalent. For sure, Afghanistan has for more than three decades been a sort of centre of gravity for regional armed conflict but not at the scale of Napoleonic warfare. South Asia’s equivalent to France of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries would be India, and there is no prospect that other South Asian countries can concert power to manage India. To the contrary, a South Asia concert would have to be led by India. The defining question is whether India will want a concert. A concert cannot simply be wished for; it involves the checking of nationalist impulses at home, reconciliation along contested frontiers, such as in Kashmir, and the offering of security to other countries in the region. For India, it implies a leadership test that extends beyond its non-aligned history and its current balancing act between China and the United States. If India’s leadership will want to move in this direction, it must graft onto policies of power, balancing a policy to promote values that have regional resonance and appeal. It must connect pure power and human values. In the Europe of 1815, the values were mostly aristocratic and promised orderly change. In the South Asia of 2015, the values remain to be defined, but India is at an advantage compared to China and the United States because it lies within the region and has an intuitive feel for the region’s history and moral fibre. Reinhold Niebuhr once wrote that an international community is possible if “moral obligations” rooted in philosophy and religion come to be defined in such a way that they transcend “the geographic and other limits of historic communities”.17 India is not only the holder of the regional balance but also in a position where it can explore the limits of South Asia’s historic communities and ways to reconcile national interests and common moral obligations. India has moved in this direction since the early 1990s when the so-called Indira doctrine of national security was replaced with more liberal and cooperative principles, and Prime Minister Modi has spoken eloquently of the need for reconciliation.18 However, Modi’s leadership is associated with a nationalist agenda that has proven hard to dissipate, and as the chapters in this book demonstrate, India’s mature regional leadership is more of a valiant aspiration than an established fact. The continental powers of China and the United States will naturally help set India’s compass. These continental powers will be

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tempted to draw India into their wider and emerging contest centred on the Pacific region but should be cautious. India is increasingly aligning with the United States, though in respect of its history of non-alignment and in reaction to terms of engagement that the United States is continuously updating. More than any other partner, therefore, the United States is in a position to foster a culture of regional leadership in New Delhi. China, Pakistan’s all-weather friend and India’s traditional rival, has an opportunity to demonstrate the bona fide of its rather grand Silk Road diplomacy. China’s issues with internal development and regional unrest suggest a moderate foreign policy, but Beijing must still define its political aims beyond economic cooperation, align them with regional interests and then also provide for coherence between its actions in South Asia and elsewhere, such as in the South China Sea where its territorial expansion threatens to ignite wider hostilities. In 2014 Afghan President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah agreed to share power and in time embed their agreement in a constitutional review. The fate of this Kabul power-sharing agreement defines the perhaps the most succinct snapshot of the conditions for regional restraint. Power-sharing in Kabul will signal that Afghanistan’s political elites – both Taliban and non-Taliban – are able to reconcile and, significantly, are not torn apart by conflicting policies in the wider region. Conversely, the failure of Kabul powersharing will be a signal that external players are fearful of losing Afghanistan and prefer fragmentation to stability.19 This is all the more the case as Ghani, Abdullah and other Afghan leaders have proven unable to actually prepare for the constitutional review of 2016. Though it is too early to definitely tell, the lack of organized preparatory work suggests a deeper crisis of legitimacy that threatens the very principle of Afghan power-sharing. It brings us to the kind of vacuum that power abhors – as noted in the introduction. If Kabul fails, fear could take control of policy, in Afghanistan and the region. There is an opportunity to steer clear of this hazard but it presupposes the investment of India’s political imagination and capital in a regional vision of balance and restraint, and then also a courageous decision by China and the United States to desist from integrating South Asia’s security dynamics with those of the wider Asia – Pacific.

292

SOUTH ASIA

AND THE

GREAT POWERS

Notes 1. SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2015. Available at http://www.sipri.org/ research/armaments/milex/research/armaments/milex/milex_database. 2. Mack, Andrew J. R., “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict”, World Politics 27/2 (January 1975), pp. 175– 200; Arreguin-Toft, Ivan, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict”, International Security 26/1 (Summer 2001), pp. 93 – 128. 3. Mearsheimer, Johan J., The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), pp. 153– 5. 4. Coll, Steve, Ghost Wars (London: Penguin, 2004). 5. The strongest argument for singling out Pakistan as the external sponsor of the insurgency can be found in Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 (Boston: Mariner Books, 2014). For a more complex view of the Taliban’s network of external support see Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2007). 6. Ganguly, Sumit, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 7. Rynning, Sten, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal Disconnect (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 8. The Obama team discovered in early 2009 that it would have to develop a “graduated plan” on this nuclear issue because it had none. Pakistan, meanwhile, made clear that US overtures to Pakistan had to begin with the offer of conferring legitimacy to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars: The Inside Story (London: Simon and Schuster, 2010), pp. 35, 245. 9. Author’s private interview with official of the Obama administration. 10. Kissinger, Henry, World Order (New York: Allen Lane, 2014), p. 367. 11. Bokhari, Farhan and Victor Mallet, “Taliban reject Afghanistan peace talks”, Financial Times, 6 March 2016; Cordesman, Anthony H., The Afghan Campaign and the Death of Mullar Omar, CSIS Commentary, 2 August 2015. Available at http://csis.org/files/publication/150731_Cordesman_AfghanCampaign DeathOmar_Commentary.pdf. 12. “U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and India Ocean Region”, 25 January 2015. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2015/01/25/us-india-joint-strategic-vision-asia-pacific-andindian-ocean-region. 13. Moran, Daniel and James A. Russell (eds), Maritime Strategy and Global Order: Security, Markets, Resources (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2016). 14. Kissinger, Henry, World Order; also Henry Kissinger’s interview with Jacob Heilbrunn in the National Interest, 19 August 2015. Available at http://www. nationalinterest.org/feature/the-interview-henry-kissinger-13615?page¼2. 15. Haqqani, Husain, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013). 16. World Order, pp. 366 –7.

CONCLUSION

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17. Niebuhr, Reinhold, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York: Scribner, 1944), p. 154. 18. Christian Wagner provides a fine overview of India’s policy and engagement in “Security Cooperation in South Asia: Overview, Reasons, Prospects”, SWP Research Paper, RP6, June 2014, Berlin. 19. On the link between political settlement and institution building in Afghanistan, see Antonio Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan: The History of a Fragile Institution (London: Hurst, 2016).

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296

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Dalrymple, William, Return of A King; The Battle for Afghanistan 1839– 42 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013). Dash, Kishore C., Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures (New York: Routledge, 2008). Dash, P. L. (ed.), India and Central Asia: Two Decades of Transition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). De Graaf, Beatrice, George Dimitriu, and Jens Ringsmose (eds), Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War (London: Routledge, 2015). Dixit, J. N., India-Pakistan in War and Peace (London: Routledge, 2002). Dobbins, James F., After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Nebraska: Potomac Books, 2008). Dombrowski, Peter J. and Andrew C. Winner (eds), The Indian Ocean and U.S. Grand Strategy (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2014). Dossani, Rafiq, and Henry Rowen (eds), Prospects for Peace in South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). Dossani, Rafiq, Daniel C. Sneider, and Vikram Sood (eds), Does South Asia Exist? Prospects for Regional Integration (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2010). Erickson, Andrew S., Lyle Goldstein, and Carnes Lord, China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2009). Fair, C. Christine, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2014). Felbab-Brown, Vanda, Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-building in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2013). Fravel, M. Taylor, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008). Gall, Carlotta, The Wrong Enemy in the Wrong Country (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014). Ganguly, Sumit, Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). Garver, John W., Protracted Contest. Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001). ———, China & Iran. Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006). Gates, Robert M., Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014). Grygiel, Jakub J., Great Powers and Geopolitical Change (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006). Haqqani, Husain, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: Public Affairs, 2013). Harpviken, Kristian Berg and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, A Rock Between Hard Places: Afghanistan as an Arena of Regional Insecurity (London: Hurst, 2016). Hopkins, B. D., The Making of Modern Afghanistan (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). Hussain, Akmal and Muchkund Dubey (eds), Democracy, Sustainable Development, and Peace: New Perspectives on South Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). Kaplan, Robert, The Revenge of Geography (New York: Random House, 2012).

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INDEX

Abdullah, Abdullah, 3– 4, 11, 27– 8, 42, 60, 61, 115, 273 Loya Jirga, 69 see also NUG Adeney, Katharine, 247 Afghan Security Forces/ANSF, 26, 27, 29, 51 – 4, 76, 84, 122, 123, 139, 185, 186, 270, 274 achievements, 47, 93 ALP, 49, 53 ANA, 48, 91, 92, 264 ANP, 45 – 6, 48, 91 – 2, 93, 76 casualties, 45, 46, 122 challenges, 45 – 8, 74 corruption, 46 – 7, 48, 51, 123 ISR, 46, 47 NATO/ISAF/NTM-A, 91 – 2, 93, 95 –6, 97 Afghanistan, 1, 3, 13, 14, 116, 180, 238– 60 aid, 44, 73, 97, 105, 107, 109, 114, 116, 118, 122, 123, 139, 205, 264 aid from India, 177, 178, 180, 181, 205 brinksmanship, 68, 71, 73, 74 civilian metrics of success, 272– 3 Cold War, 11, 176, 279 Constitution, 4, 62, 67, 291

corruption, 40, 44 –5, 46 – 7, 74, 76, 115, 117, 118, 123, 162, 270, 273 counterinsurgency, 36, 93, 98, 125 economic issues, 26, 29 – 30, 31, 44, 46, 52, 72 – 3, 116, 139 elections, 37, 42, 69, 70, 73, 96, 114, 115, 123, 180, 273 end of the international combat mission in, 3, 9, 22 funding, 26, 27, 47, 74, 92, 93, 97, 116, 118 governance, 11, 49, 52, 68, 74 – 6, 115, 117, 139, 238, 270, 273 insecurity, 40, 43, 45, 46, 51, 52 – 3, 70, 74, 120, 122, 123, 197, 264, 281 IS, 37, 54 – 6, 283 legitimacy, 28, 37, 73, 291 mining, 73, 157, 180, 206, 224 poverty, 44, 115, 118 reconciliation, 9, 13, 60, 155, 183, 282, 291 regional cooperation, 20, 21, 22 –3, 25, 27 – 8 Soviet invasion of, 22 – 3, 176, 184– 5, 223, 248 the Taliban, 37, 45 – 54 passim, 122, 123, 176, 251 –2

300

SOUTH ASIA

AND THE

transition, 1, 11, 12, 114, 119, 130, 182, 208, 238 UN, 8, 36, 115, 118, 122 uncertainty, 1 – 2, 20, 70, 72, 96 young generation, 7, 38, 44– 5, 118 see also the entries below for Afghanistan; Afghan Security Forces; China/ Afghanistan relations; India/ Afghanistan relations; Iran/ Afghanistan relations; NATO; NUG; Pakistan/Afghanistan relations; US/Afghanistan relations Afghanistan Conference, 183, 264 2012 Tokyo, 116, 204, 264, 265 Afghanistan, nation-building, 13, 26, 238, 282 ethnic/religious diversity, 246– 7, 249 ethno-nationalism, 245, 248, 249 external dimension of, 247–52 foundational treaties, 241 homogenization, 243 – 5, 248 Islamic identity, 243, 244, 250 Islamism, 250 – 1 modern Afghanistan, 241– 7 Muslim Umma, 250– 1 Pashtuns, 242, 243, 245–6, 247, 248, 251, 282 population census, 247 recommendations for, 252– 3 the Taliban, 251– 2 see also ethnic issues Agha, Syed Tayyab, 283 Ahadi, Anwar-ul-Haq, 70 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 197 AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), 8, 148, 153 AISA (Afghanistan’s Investment Support Agency), 205 Akhtar, Rizwan, Lt. Gen., 127 Akhund, Abdul Manan, Mullah, 57 – 8 Akhundzada, Haibatullah, Mawlawi, 36, 58, 282 Ali, Ali Mohammad, 47

GREAT POWERS

Al-Qaeda, 3, 22, 26, 40, 43, 107, 126, 127, 228 Amanullah, King of Afghanistan, 244 Ambinder, Marc, 128 Anglo-Afghan Wars, 22, 244 APEC (Asia– Pacific Economic Cooperation), 287 Arab Spring, 209, 228 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 150, 152, 226 Asia– Pacific contest, 286 – 7 Aslam, Tasneem, 60 Assad, Bashar, 199 Aziz, Sartaj, 63 Badakhshan, Afghanistan, 48, 49 – 50, 51 Baghlan, Afghanistan, 48, 49, 51 balance of power, 2, 10, 13, 84, 197– 8, 238 equilibrium and restraint, 90 – 1, 97 – 9, 289– 91 geopolitics and regional balance of power, 286– 9 power equilibrium, 2, 10, 14, 289 see also power Baluchistan, Pakistan, 204, 209, 217, 249, 284, 285 Iran/Pakistan relations, 200, 202, 281 Mansour, Akhtar, Mullah, 36, 63, 64 Baradar, Abdul Ghani, Mullah, 28 Bekkevold, Jo Inge, 11, 12, 147 –73, 285 beyond 2017, 265, 266 – 7, 274 ‘elite competition’ school, 267 elite consensus, 265, 267, 274, elite consensus beyond 2017, 270 –4 ‘event-driven’ school, 266 national interests, 266, 268 Obama’s Afghanistan narrative, 265– 6, 268– 74 regional cooperation, 275 strategic narrative, 265, 267– 8, 289

INDEX strategic narrative, requirements for success, 265, 267– 8, 272– 4 sustaining US engagement, 268, 274 US administration, 26, 27, 42, 107, 113, 124 see also US/Afghanistan relations Bhutan, 4, 164, 226 bilateralism, 89, 183 India, 12, 176 – 82, 184– 6, 187 Iran, 205, 206– 7 NATO, 89, 90 South Asia, 7, 8, 85, 86, 87, 88 Bin Laden, Osama, 107, 128, 227 BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), 230 New Development Bank, 148, 153, 230 Britain, see Great Game; UK Bush, George W., 40, 266 Buzan, Barry, 194 Byrd, William, 73 CAREC (Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation), 85, 86, 161 CASA 1000, 8, 225– 6 CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), 222, 225, 248, 249 Central Asia, 1, 31, 85, 87, 225 – 6, 239 Afghanistan, 176 bilateralism, 89 China, 136, 147 –8, 150– 1, 154, 159, 163, 166 OSCE, 8 Russia, 136 US, 105, 134– 7, 138 Chatterjee, Partha, 240 China, 14, 147 – 73, 281, 291 Central Asia, 136, 147– 8, 150– 1, 154, 159, 163, 166 challenges, 149, 162, 285 counterterrorism, 154, 159 economic issues, 147– 8, 150, 151, 152, 154, 156– 66 passim

301

EU, 150 fear of exclusion, 10, 166 ‘going West’, 5, 149– 50, 153 great power, 5, 148– 9 India, 5, 9, 10, 158, 163 – 5, 186– 7, 230, 285, 291 Iran, 161 Japan, 150, 151 peace negotiations, 20, 59, 62 – 3, 155– 6, 165, 285 Periphery Diplomacy, 151, 152 regional cooperation, 19, 20, 29– 30, 147, 161– 2, 166, 291 Russia, 159 SCO, 8, 12, 86, 153, 154, 161– 2, 166 sea power, 5, 148– 9, 291 terrorism, 163 Uighur extremism, 64, 154, 163, 285 US, 106, 113, 123, 136, 149, 150, 159, 281, 285, 286– 7 Xinjiang, 5, 12, 64, 153 –4, 155, 158, 162, 163, 165, 187, 223, 224, 284– 5 see also the entries below for China; Nepal; Tibet China/Afghanistan relations, 29, 30, 62– 3, 64, 87 – 8, 136– 7, 155, 160, 165, 280 Deepening Strategic and Cooperative Partnership, 147 reluctance to engage with, 12, 30 China in South Asia, 147 – 8, 150–1, 153–60, 165 –6, 284– 5, 287 access to energy and mineral resources, 150, 153, 156– 7 access to Indian Ocean, 150, 153, 157– 8, 164 consolidating influence in China’s backyard, 150, 153, 158– 60 stabilizing China’s western frontier, 150, 153– 6 see also China, Silk Road initiative

302

SOUTH ASIA

AND THE

China/Pakistan relations, 12, 20, 30, 63, 64 – 5, 150, 157, 160– 1, 163, 222– 4, 230 CPEC, 64 –5, 158, 161, 224, 285 Gwadar Port, 5, 158, 224, 285 KKH, 223 IS, 128 China, Silk Road Diplomacy, 8, 12, 147, 148, 151– 3, 166, 291 21st Century Maritime Silk Road initiative, 147, 151 Chinese advantages, 160– 2 Chinese disadvantages, 162 – 5 ‘One Belt, One Road’ policy, 150, 151, 153, 154, 157, 285 ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’, 147, 151, 154, 159 Silk Road initiative, 5, 8, 12, 105, 112, 136, 150, 152, 158, 165, 281, 285 see also China in South Asia CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 64, 115, 116 civilian, 53 – 4, 55, 59, 196 casualties, 37, 41, 45, 49, 50, 51, 74, 121, 122, 135 Cold War, 11, 159, 176, 220, 225, 226, 279 cooperation, 1, 9, 289 military cooperation, 20, 28, 109, 127, 185, 205, 206 see also regional cooperation Cordesman, Anthony H., 11, 12, 105– 46, 286, 289 counterinsurgency, 36, 42, 57, 93, 98, 125, 127, 128, 129 counterterrorism, 40, 43, 60, 90, 154 China, 154, 159 Pakistan, 125, 225, 230 US/Pakistan relations, 61 – 2, 63 – 4, 65 –6, 227, 280, 289 CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization), 85, 86, 90, 98, 162

GREAT POWERS

Daoud, Mohammad, 245, 247– 8, 249 democracy, 96, 136, 180, 253, 269 Deng Xiaoping, 151 diplomacy, 4, 7, 87, 289 diplomacy vs military muscle, 279 diplomatic restraint, 5, 289 Track II diplomacy, 7, 11, 14, 21, 32, 62, 209 US, 2, 107, 134 see also China, Silk Road Diplomacy; soft power displaced people, 44, 45, 118, 125, 228, 229 donor, 30, 38, 89, 118, 205, 264, 273 non-Western donor, 175, 180 drug production/trafficking, 30, 46, 48, 52, 55, 73, 118, 137, 162, 203, 208, 210, 270 EAPC (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), 89, 90 ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation), 183, 209, 225 economic issues, 24 Afghanistan, 26, 29 – 30, 31, 44, 46, 52, 72 – 3, 116, 139 China, 147– 8, 150, 151, 152, 154, 156– 66 passim economic and social change, 10, 14, 21, 97 economic cooperation, 22, 23, 24– 5, 29 – 30, 31 economic migrant, 44, 45 Egypt, 228, 250, 251 Engh, Sunniva, 11, 12, 147– 73, 285 ethnic issues, 76, 85, 87 Afghanistan, 42, 47, 49, 70, 74, 76, 176, 195, 196, 241– 7 China, 153, 154, 162 discrimination, 240, 246 – 7, 248, 252, 282 ethnic politics, 281, 282 – 5 ethnic/religious diversity, 4, 238, 239, 241, 246 –7, 249, 282

INDEX ethnic/theo-nationalism, 239– 40, 245 ethnic violence, 42, 49, 74, 240, 252 ethnocide, 252 homogenization, 240, 243 –5, 248, 253 melting pot model, 238, 240 nation-building, 239, 241 South Asia, 4, 239, 240– 1 tribalism, 46, 241, 243, 245 – 6, 251 unequal pluralization, 240 see also Afghanistan, nation-building ETIM (East Turkestan Islamic Movement), 154, 187, 228 EU (European Union), 25, 85, 98 Afghan refugee, 38, 39, 44 Afghanistan, 11, 88, 93 – 4, 96, 264 BOMCA, 94 China, 150 EUPOL, 92, 93 European– Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement, 96 ISAF, 88 Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia, 94 Europe, 2, 99, 289–90 extremism, 30, 32, 99, 106 Uighur extremism, 64, 154, 163, 285 see also terrorism FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), 125, 126– 7, 128 Fazlullah, Mullah, 60, 62, 227 fear of exclusion, 10, 14, 21, 87, 97, 166, 207, 289 Felbab-Brown, Vanda, 11, 36– 83, 93, 282, 283 foreign policy, 215– 16 Gall, Carlotta: The Wrong Enemy, 107, 128 Garver, John, 161, 165 Gates, Robert M., 106– 7

303

Germany, 181, 209 NATO, 20, 27, 43 –4, 95 – 6, 119 Ghani, Ashraf, 3 – 4, 11, 27 – 8, 42, 96, 115, 116, 273, 283 China, 87 – 8, 147 India, 181 Iran, 198, 206, 207 Pakistan, 7, 20, 38, 39 –40, 59– 61, 63, 64, 75, 125, 126, 227, 282 the Taliban, 38, 59 – 60, 65 see also NUG Giustozzi, Antonio, 47 Goldberg, Jeffrey, 128 Great Game, 11, 22, 41, 159, 195, 217, 286 New Great Game, 5, 41, 87, 136– 7 great powers, 5, 14, 24, 87, 194 China, 5, 148– 9 India, 5, 6, 12, 14, 230, 290– 1 US, 25 Habibullah, 243 Haqqani, Husain, 288 Haqqani network, 28, 37, 40, 58, 74, 107, 126, 127, 128, 228 attacks by, 51, 58 – 9, 61 Haqqani, Sirajuddin, 58 Hassan-Yari, Houchang, 11, 13, 193–214, 284 Haysom, Nicholas, 36 Heart of Asia process/Istanbul process, 9, 86, 87–8, 161, 177, 183, 227, 285 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin, 68, 250 Helmand, Afghanistan, 37, 46, 49, 51– 2, 53, 54 – 5, 60 Herat, Afghanistan, 27, 52, 54, 57, 178, 185, 195, 201, 204 Herat Dialogue (2015), 32 Hezb-i-Islami, 68 Hezbollah, 199 al-Hussaini, Mahmoud, 241 Hyman, Anthony, 246

304

SOUTH ASIA

AND THE

ideology, 1, 55, 204, 251, 281, 284, 288 state ideology, 288 IMF (International Monetary Fund), 116, 129, 159 India, 4, 5, 14, 86, 279, 287, 289 China, 5, 9, 10, 158, 163 – 5, 186–7, 230, 285, 291 concert of powers, 14, 290– 1 conflict resolution, 174 – 5, 187 great power, 5, 6, 12, 14, 230, 290– 1 Indian Ocean, 5, 6, 132, 133 nuclear power, 164, 220 restraint, 12, 14 Russia, 186, 230 soft power, 13, 177, 281 UN, 175, 185 weaponry, 132– 3, 164 see also the entries below for India India/Afghanistan relations, 13, 176– 81, 207, 280 Afghanistan’s importance for India, 174 bilateral dimension, 12, 176– 82, 184– 6, 187 historical context, 175– 6 Indian assistance, 177–8, 180, 185– 6, 187, 205 multilateral dimension, 12, 175, 182– 4, 186–7 Pakistan, 174, 177, 181, 183– 5, 187 security issues, 184– 7 SPA, 178, 185 the Taliban, 176, 181, 185, 186, 187 trade, 179, 183 see also India/Pakistan relations India/Pakistan relations, 5, 6, 20, 32, 125, 216, 217– 21, 230, 281, 283– 4 animosities/rivalry, 9, 13, 175, 177, 217– 18, 220, 280 collective defence, 218

GREAT POWERS

Kashmir/Jammu and Kashmir, 6, 174, 182, 218–19, 223, 283– 4, 290 water issue, 219– 20 see also India/Afghanistan relations India/US relations, 3, 6, 12, 130 – 4, 159, 230, 280, 286– 7, 291 containing China, 106, 107, 113, 131– 2, 133– 4, 138, 165, 286 Strategic Dialogue, 8 US– India Joint Strategic Vision, 286 Indian Ocean, 4, 137 China, 150, 153, 157– 8, 164 India, 5, 6, 132, 133 INSTC (International North South Corridor), 184 IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plans), 90 IPCB (International Police Coordination Board), 92 Iran, 13, 14, 193 – 214, 284 1979 Revolution, 195 balance of power, 13, 197 –8 China, 161 fear of exclusion, 207 gas pipeline from, 157, 225 IRGC, 196, 199, 202, 203, 207, 208 IS, 194, 198, 209– 10 nuclear agreement, 21, 208, 209, 284 regional cooperation, 30 – 1, 194, 198, 207, 209 –10, 284 sanctions, 31, 91, 156, 161, 184, 199, 206, 225 Syria, 21, 199 the Taliban, 31, 194, 196, 198, 200, 280, 284 US, 31, 137, 193, 194, 196 – 8, 204, 208, 284 see also the entries below for Iran; Shia Islam Iran/Afghanistan relations, 30 – 1, 194, 248, 280, 281 Afghan refugee, 198– 200, 203, 204, 208

INDEX bilateral relations, 205, 206– 7 challenges, 194, 197, 207, 209 Helmand River, 30, 195, 200– 1 importance of, 195, 204– 7 Iran/Afghanistan commonalities, 195, 205, 210 multilateralism, 205 – 6 railway, 31, 205 security concerns, 196 – 8, 203–4, 206– 7, 208–10 terrorism, 200, 202, 203 209 UN, 201 water scarcity, 200– 201, 210 Iran/Pakistan relations, 197, 202– 204, 210, 281, 284 Saudi Arabia, 204 Iraq, 24, 27, 39, 41, 53, 110 – 11, 266 IS (Islamic State), 21, 24, 39, 43, 53, 128, 182, 209 Afghanistan, 37, 54 –6, 283 brutality, 55 Iran, 194, 198, 209– 10 Middle East, 42, 106, 228 Pakistan, 56, 209 the Taliban, 54 – 6, 59 US, 110, 114, 228 ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) 39, 42, 43 –4, 46, 47, 49, 57, 85, 89, 97, 238 ANSF, 91 – 2, 93, 95 – 6, 97 end of mission, 41, 119, 264 EU/US cooperation, 88 Resolute Support Operation, 39, 84, 119 see also NATO ISI (Inter-services Intelligence, Pakistan), 49, 62 – 3, 64, 125– 6, 130, 181, 227 Haqqani network, 107, 126, 127, 128, 228 ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) see IS Islamic identity, 216, 224, 231, 243, 244, 250, 251

305

Islamic state, 21, 251 Islamism, 250 – 1 Italy, 20, 27, 43, 95, 119, 132, 206 Jakobsen, Peter Viggo, 14, 263–78, 289 Jamaat-e Islami Pakistan, 250 Japan, 132, 148, 149, 150, 151, 160, 165, 287 jihad, 67, 68, 174, 176, 251, 282 Jinnah, Mohammed Ali, 203, 217, 218, 221 Jundallah, 201, 203 Kabul, Afghanistan, 42, 43, 51 Kandahar, Afghanistan, 23, 49, 52, 66, 201, 251 Karachi, Pakistan, 65, 222, 230 Karmal, Babrak, 249 Karzai, Hamid, 3, 24, 59, 61, 66, 68, 126–7, 161, 178, 193 BSA, 114 SOFA, 41 Kazakhstan, 85, 89, 90, 135, 136, 150, 151, 156, 162, 225 Kerry, John, 112–13, 114 Khadim, Abdul Rauf, Mullah, 55, 57 Khamenei, Ali, 208 Khan, Abdu Rahman, 242 – 3, 282 Khan, Ahmad 242 Khan, Mohammad Ayub, 218, 222 Khomeini, Ruhollah, Ayatollah, 195 Kissinger, Henry, 2, 289 Kunduz, Afghanistan, 37, 48 – 51, 53, 61, 74 Kunduz militias, 49 – 50 Kyrgyzstan, 8, 85, 89, 134 – 5, 136, 150, 157, 162, 225 Lambah, Shri S. K., 177 Lashkar-e-Taiba, 55, 65 legitimacy, 10, 28, 37, 73, 289, 291 Li Keqiang, 152, 158 Libya, 99, 228, 269 Loya Jirga, 37, 69 – 70, 71 – 2, 73 – 4

306

SOUTH ASIA

AND THE

Mahdi, Muhaiyuddin, 242, 250 Mansoor Ehsan, Mohammad, 12, 13, 238– 60, 282, 283 Mansour, Akhtar Mohammad, Mullah, 48, 56 – 8, 64, 74, 282, 283 death, 36, 38, 39, 58, 59, 63, 75 Mao Zedong, 158 Marrone, Alessandro, 11, 84 – 102, 286 MEDO (Middle East Defense Organization), 248, 249 MENA (Middle East and North Africa), 99, 137 Middle East, 1, 42, 106, 209, 228 the military, 279, 288 military cooperation, 20, 28, 109, 127, 185, 205, 206 militia, 48 –50, 53, 76, 99, 228 Modi, Narendra, 113, 131 – 2, 134, 180, 183– 4, 219, 220– 1, 226, 283– 4, 286 nationalism, 5, 290 MQM (Muttahida Quami Movement), 65 MSF (Me´decins Sans Frontie`res), 50 Mujahedeen, 21, 23, 47, 250, 251 multilateralism, 7, 162, 166 India, 12, 175, 182– 4, 186– 7 Iran, 205– 206 NATO, 88, 89, 96 South Asia, 7 – 9, 85, 97 see also partnership; regional cooperation Muslim Brotherhood, 250, 251 Myanmar, 5, 156, 157– 8, 163, 164 Nabil, Rahnatullah, 51 – 2, 61 Najibullah, Mohammad, 178, 249 Nandy, Ashis, 240 nation-building, 26, 239, 241, 280 see also Afghanistan, nation-building national interests, 11 – 12, 215, 282, 290 foreign policy and, 215– 16

GREAT POWERS

regional cooperation, 19, 86, 97, 166, 199, 216, 252– 3, 282 strategic narrative, 266, 268 nationalism, 5, 246, 290 Afghanistan, 245, 248, 249, 252, 282 ethnic/theo-nationalism, 239– 40, 245, 248, 249 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 84, 88, 96– 9, 119, 265, 286 Afghanistan, 8, 11, 22, 24, 27, 30, 84, 97, 114, 263, 286 balance of restrained power in South Asia, 90 – 1, 97– 9 bilateralism, 89, 90 capacity building, 84, 91 – 4, 95, 97 – 8, 113, 119 Enduring Partnership Agreement, 94 – 5, 97 – 8, 114, 264 Germany, 20, 27, 43 – 4, 95 – 6, 119 Italy, 20, 27, 43, 95, 119 multilateralism, 88, 89, 96 NDN, 89 Pakistan, 6, 8, 89, 90 regional cooperation, 19, 20, 21, 27, 31 – 2, 84, 90 – 1, 113 regional stability, 11, 85, 88, 91 Resolute Support Operation, 8, 20, 27, 39, 42, 43, 47, 94, 97, 98, 119, 265 Russia, 89– 90, 98 – 9, 114, 159 SOFA, 41, 42, 94, 95 – 6 Tripartite Commission, 87, 90 US, 88, 89, 90 – 1, 96, 97, 113 – 14, 138, 264, 286 see also ISAF Nehru, Jawaharlal, 158, 174– 5, 218, 221 Nepal, 4, 68, 150, 154– 5, 157, 164, 175, 187, 226 Neumann, Ronald E., 11, 13 – 14, 19– 35, 85, 195, 287, 288, 289

INDEX NGO (non-governmental organization), 38, 62, 115, 178, 180, 196 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 290 North Korea, 106, 165 North Waziristan, Pakistan, 61– 2, 126, 154, 228– 9 nuclear power, 1, 2, 3, 106, 216 India, 164, 220 Iran, 21, 106, 208, 209, 284 Pakistan, 125, 129, 216, 220, 223, 280 NUG (National Unity Government), 20, 37, 39 – 40, 42, 53, 58, 68 – 73, 193 challenges, 37, 42, 70, 74, 115, 122 end of, 70, 74 fiscal crisis, 72 – 3, 118, 270, 273 power-sharing, 3 – 4, 11, 71, 74, 115, 273, 282, 283, 291 see also Abdullah, Abdullah; Afghanistan; Ghani, Ashraf Obama, Barack, 3, 4, 14, 20, 26, 36, 108– 9, 132, 134 Afghanistan, 40, 105, 106 – 7, 108– 9, 111, 139, 182, 208, 263, 264 see also US Obama’s Afghanistan narrative, 265 –6, 268– 74, 289 appealing to interests, values and conceptions, 268– 9 maintaining broad elite consensus, 270– 1 promising and delivering success, 269– 70, 272– 3 see also beyond 2017 OIC (Organization of Islamic States), 183 Omar, Mohammed, Mullah, 58, 126, 251, 282 death, 38, 39, 54, 56, 57, 59, 63, 74, 227 order, concept of, 1, 2

307

OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), 8, 11, 85, 88, 94 BMSC, 94 Pakistan 13, 14, 125, 202, 215– 37, 283 bottom-up change, 13, 229– 30 counterinsurgency, 127, 128, 129 domestic issues, 228– 30 a failed state, 129, 229 foreign policy, 13, 216, 226– 30, 231 geostrategic importance, 216, 231 governance, 13, 230 –1 international/regional partnerships, 225– 6 Islamic identity, 216, 224, 231 Middle East, 228 NATO, 6, 8, 89, 90 nuclear power, 125, 129, 216, 220, 223, 280 Pakistani Army, 28, 29, 87, 107, 227 Pashtuns, 21, 248 regional cooperation, 20, 21, 28 –9 Russia, 226 Saudi Arabia, 6, 217, 224– 5, 280 UN, 218, 219 see also the entries below for Pakistan; China/Pakistan relations; India/ Pakistan relations; Iran/Pakistan relations; ISI; US/Pakistan relations Pakistan/Afghanistan relations, 28, 125–7, 184, 230, 248– 9 APTTA, 183 border issues, 6, 13, 125– 7, 248 distrust, 20, 66 Durand Line, 6 –7, 87, 125, 127, 184, 202, 241, 248 improvement in, 28, 59 – 60, 127, 227 Pashtunistan, 202, 248 water scarcity, 201 see also Pakistan and terrorism

308

SOUTH ASIA

AND THE

Pakistan and terrorism, 29, 60, 62, 65, 128, 130, 200, 203, 228, 229– 30, 289 Afghanistan/Pakistan/Taliban negotiations, 59 – 68, 227– 8 Al-Qaeda, 126, 127, 228 counterterrorism, 125, 225, 230 extremist/militant groups, 24, 29, 65, 107, 124, 126– 7, 128, 130, 200, 202, 228 Haqqani network, 107, 126, 127, 128, 228 IS, 56, 209 the Taliban, 20, 24, 28, 60, 127, 230, 283 the Taliban, Pakistani support to, 21, 23, 28, 49, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 107, 123, 124, 125– 6, 130, 176, 181, 185, 280 see also US/Pakistan relations Palmerston, Lord, 215 partnership, 4, 97, 288 see also multilateralism; NATO; regional cooperation Pashtuns, 6 – 7, 13, 21, 42, 245, 246 Afghanistan and, 202, 242, 243, 245– 6, 247, 248, 251, 282 Pakistan, 21, 248 Pashtunistan, 202, 248, 249 the Taliban, 251, 282 patronage, 7, 47, 52, 70, 72, 76, 87, 245 Payenda, M. Khalid, 73 PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan), 249– 50, 251 peace, 1, 10– 11, 21, 283 see also transition PfP (Partnership for Peace), 89, 90 politics, 10, 21, 87 ethnic and territorial politics, 281, 282– 5 political interests/relations, 23, 24 –5, 30, 287 political restraint, 14, 21, 238

GREAT POWERS

power, 2, 66, 86 concert of powers, 289 – 90 Europe, 2, 289– 90 NUG, power-sharing, 3 –4, 11, 71, 74, 115, 273, 282, 283, 291 political pluralism, 10, 87 power asymmetry, 5, 12, 37 – 8, 87 power-sharing, 3 – 4, 11, 54, 289 power vacuum, 4, 137– 8, 148, 149, 291 see also balance of power; great powers Pugwash meeting, 20, 62 Punjab, Pakistan, 65, 219, 229, 242 Qatar, 62, 280, 283 Quadrilateral Coordination Group on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation, 63 Rabbani, Burhanudin, 250 radicalization, 9, 11, 68, 99, 282 Raziq, Abdul, General, 52, 66 RECCA (Regional Economic Cooperation Conference), 182, 183 reconciliation, 3, 14, 253, 290 Afghanistan, 9, 13, 60, 155, 183, 282, 291 refugee, 198, 200 Afghan refugee, 38, 39, 44, 198– 200, 203, 204, 208 Syrian refugee, 44, 228 regional cooperation, 10, 11, 19 – 35, 85– 6, 183, 275 Afghanistan, 20, 21, 22 – 3, 25, 27 – 8 China, 19, 20, 29 – 30, 147, 161– 2, 166, 291 common interests, 19, 21 – 2 deficit of, 282 economic cooperation, 22, 23, 24– 5, 29 – 30, 31 effectiveness, 86 – 7 history of, 21 – 4

INDEX Iran, 30 – 1, 194, 198, 207, 209– 10, 284 national interests, 19, 86, 97, 166, 199, 216, 252– 3, 282 NATO, 19, 20, 21, 27, 31 – 2, 84, 90 –1, 113 OSCE, 8 Pakistan, 20, 21, 28 – 9 political interests/relations, 23, 24 –5, 30, 287 recommendation for improvement, 24, 25, 31 – 2, 91, 253 refugee, 199 regionalism, 253 Russia, 20– 1, 30 Track II diplomacy, 11, 21, 32 trust, 19, 20, 24, 25, 32, 253 US, 14, 19, 20 – 1, 25 – 7, 106– 7, 123, 137, 138 see also bilateralism; cooperation; multilateralism; partnership; South Asia Rehman, Iskander, 162 restraint, 11, 12, 13, 14, 76, 84, 281 diplomatic restraint, 5, 289 equilibrium and restraint, 90 – 1, 97 –9, 289–91 political restraint, 14, 21, 238 principles of, 10 rights, 10, 62, 67 human rights, 1, 52, 91, 136, 269 Islamic state, 251 Rowhani, Hassan, 206, 208 Roy, Olivier, 250 rule of law, 44, 91, 117, 230, 269 Russia, 55, 98, 136, 159, 226, 287 Afghanistan, 20, 21, 30, 136– 7, 207 India, 186, 230 NATO, 89 – 90, 98 – 9, 114, 159 regional cooperation, 20 – 1, 30 SCO, 8, 9, 86, 226 Syria, 98, 106 Ukraine, invasion of, 89–90, 98, 105, 114, 124, 138, 159

309

weapons, 132 – 3 see also Great Game; Soviet Union; US/Russia relations Rynning, Sten, 1– 16, 279– 93 SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), 7 – 8, 9, 85, 86, 161, 220, 221, 226 Afghanistan, 7, 85, 175, 177, 182, 183, 187 SAFTA (South Asian Free Trade Area), 7– 8, 9 Sartori, Paola, 11, 84 – 102, 286 Saudi Arabia, 6, 23, 204, 217, 224 – 5, 280 SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization), 8, 85, 86, 90, 183 Afghanistan, 9, 187 China, 8, 12, 86, 153, 154, 161– 2, 166 counterterrorism, 154 membership, 9, 85, 166, 226 Russia, 8, 9, 86, 226 US, 113, 136 SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), 222, 248, 249 sectarianism, 1, 203, 217, 225 Shah, Ahmad, 242, 282 Shahrani, Nazif M., 246 Sharif, Nawaz, 60, 125, 126, 128, 154, 220–1, 224– 5 Sharif, Raheel, General, 60, 125, 127, 158 Shia Islam, 21, 188, 199, 203 Hazara Shias, 21, 195– 6, 243, 247 see also Iran SIGAR (US Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction), 118, 122–3, 270, 274 Singh Roy, Meena, 11, 12 –13, 174–92, 284 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), 133

310

SOUTH ASIA

AND THE

soft power, 13, 177, 204, 281 see also diplomacy Sopko, John, 122– 3 South Asia, 1, 4, 42, 239, 287 bilateralism, 7, 8, 85, 86, 87, 88 challenges, 3, 14, 239, 280, 281 complexities of the region, 4 – 7, 85, 239, 253 ethnic/religious plurality, 4, 239, 240– 1 geography, 4 – 5, 7 India, 5, 7, 14, 290– 1 multilateralism, 7 – 9, 85, 97 nation-building, 239 power, 2, 84 regional stability, 7, 11, 29, 85, 88, 91, 96, 238, 253, 275, 288, 290 three types of states, 287– 9 US, 8, 14, 97, 105, 138, 280, 287, 288 see also regional cooperation Soviet Union, 220, 221, 222, 249 invasion of Afghanistan, 22 – 3, 176, 184– 5, 223, 248 see also Russia state, 13, 288, 287 – 9 failed state, 129, 229 weak state, 6, 86– 7, 285, 288 Sunni Islam, 41, 188, 203, 204, 284 Syria, 21, 39, 98, 106, 110– 11, 199, 228 refugee, 44, 228 TAGP (Trans-Asia Gas2 Pipeline), 156– 7 Tajikistan, 8, 85, 89, 134, 136, 150, 157, 162, 186, 193, 225, 226 the Taliban, 7, 22, 32, 43, 60, 280, 283 Afghanistan, 37, 45 –54 passim, 122, 123, 176, 251– 2 attacks by, 61, 196 brutality, 55, 252 China, 59, 62 – 3

GREAT POWERS

fascism, 251, 252 fragmentation, 39, 53, 54, 56 – 9, 74, 75, 282 fundraising, 56 India, 21, 176, 181, 185, 186, 187 Iran, 31, 194, 196, 198, 200, 280, 284 IS, 54 –6, 59 Pashtun group, 251, 282 Pugwash Trace II meeting, 20, 62 Al-Qaeda, 26 Quetta Taliban, 107, 127, 128 Russia, 55 success, 37, 48 – 50, 51, 54, 251 US, 3, 36, 53, 54, 57, 68 see also Pakistan and terrorism; Taliban negotiations; TTP Taliban negotiations, 58, 59 – 68, 69, 75, 76, 126, 227– 8 China, 20, 59, 62 – 3, 155– 6, 165, 285 opposition to, 66, 67 – 8 Taliban requests, 67 TAPI, 8, 23, 29 Tarzi, Mahmood, 243– 4 terrorism, 24, 64, 84, 99, 106, 163, 176 9/11 attacks, 22, 26, 84, 88, 176, 270 Iran, 200, 202, 203 209 US, 107, 108, 124, 128 see also counterterrorism; Al-Qaeda; extremism; Haqqani network; IS Pakistan and terrorism; the Taliban; TTP Tibet, 153, 154– 5, 157, 162, 164, 223, 285 TMAF (Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, 2012), 265, 272 – 3 TPP (Trans –Pacific Partnership), 287 transition, 1, 10– 11 Afghanistan, 1, 11, 12, 114, 119, 130, 182, 208, 238 Transparency International, 115, 162

INDEX TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), 29, 55, 56, 61 – 2, 65, 125, 228 Peshawar school attack, 60, 64, 227 Tunsjø, Øystein, 156, 157 Turkey, 95, 119, 137, 209, 222, 225, 228, 248 see also Heart of Asia process Turkmenistan, 8, 85, 86, 89, 90, 136, 156, 193, 225, 242 UK (United Kingdom), 52, 95, 119, 206 Ukraine, 27, 99, 109 Russian invasion of, 89– 90, 98, 105, 114, 124, 138, 159 UN (United Nations), 116, 175, 185, 201, 218, 219 Afghanistan, 8, 36, 115, 118, 122 UNPKO, 226 UN Security Council, 36, 283 UN World Food Programme, 118 US (United States), 2, 5, 10, 25– 6, 105– 46, 279– 80, 291 9/11 attacks, 22, 26, 84, 88, 176, 270 2017 administration, 26, 27, 42, 107, 113, 124 aid, 105, 107, 109, 114, 116, 127, 129, 135, 139 budget, 106, 108, 110– 13, 127, 135, 271, 272 Central Asia, 105, 134– 7, 138 China, 106, 113, 123, 136, 149, 150, 159, 281, 285, 286– 7 Defense Department, 92, 110– 11, 122, 123, 135 Defense Strategic Guidance, 107 diplomacy, 2, 107, 134 Iran, 31, 137, 193, 194, 196 – 8, 204, 208, 284 Iraq, 110– 11, 266 IS, 110, 114, 228 moving away from Central/South Asia, 105– 7, 108– 9, 111, 124, 138– 9, 280, 286

311

NATO, 88, 89, 90 –1, 96, 97, 113– 14, 138, 264, 286 regional cooperation, 14, 19, 20 – 1, 25 – 7, 106– 7, 123, 137, 138 South Asia, 8, 14, 97, 105, 138, 280, 287, 288 State Department, 111– 13, 128, 135 the Taliban, 3, 36, 53, 54, 57, 68 terrorism, 107, 108, 124, 128 Tokyo Accord Reforms, 116 see also the entries below for US; Obama, Barack; India/US relations US/Afghanistan relations, 3 – 4, 12, 14, 23, 40, 138 – 9, 249 BSA, 94, 96, 114, 118– 19 Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement, 8, 26 funding, 26, 27, 47, 53, 105, 111, 264, 272, 273 international cooperation, 106, 122, 123– 4 invasion of Afghanistan, 24, 26, 193, 194, 196– 7 lack of effective Afghan partner, 114 US air support, 20, 50, 52, 110, 113 US troops in, 3, 4, 7, 8, 42– 4, 95, 109, 119, 122, 263, 272 US withdrawal, 4, 12, 20, 26 – 7, 29, 36, 41, 106 – 10, 124, 127, 136, 139, 227, 263, 271 see also Afghanistan; beyond 2017; US US/Pakistan relations, 3, 90, 113, 124–5, 127– 30, 216, 220, 221–2 counterterrorism, 61 – 2, 63 –4, 65 – 6, 227, 280, 289 overflight and land transit rights, 127, 129 US counterterrorist raids, 227

312

SOUTH ASIA

AND THE

US/Russia relations, 20– 1, 88, 105 –6, 113, 123, 136 USAID (US Agency for International Development), 118, 267 Uzbekistan, 85, 86, 89, 90, 133, 134–5, 136, 156–7, 162, 177, 193, 225 IMU, 228 Wagner, Christian, 11, 12 – 13, 174 – 92, 284 Wang Jisi, 149 – 50 Wang Tianling, 162, 163 Wang Yiwei, 150, 163 Warikoo, Kulbhushan, 241 – 2

GREAT POWERS

World Bank, 116, 117, 129, 158, 219 World Muslim League, 250 Xi Jinping, 147, 151– 2, 154, 163 Yamin, Tughral, 11– 12, 13, 215 –37, 283 Yaqub, Mohammad, 56 – 7, 58 Yemen, 106, 196, 204, 225 Zahir Shah, King of Afghanistan, 176, 184 Zarif, Jawad, 206, 207 Zhou Yongkang, 155