Prosperity, Region and Institutions in Maritime China: The South Fukien Pattern, 946-1368 0674003713, 9780674003712

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Contents
Tables, Maps, and Figures
Introduction
Part I The Process: An Economic Cycle of Medieval South Fukien
I South Fukien as a Frontier Prior to A.D. 946
2 Takeoff of the Local Economy, 946-I087
3 Maritime Trade and Cross-sectoral Prosperity, 1087-ca. 1200
4 Economic Setback and Local Power, ca. 1200-1276
5 Prosperity Under a New Order, 1276-1368 and Beyond
Part II The Space: South Fukien as a Regional System
6 South Fukien as an Internally Integrated Region
7 Ch'uan-chou City as Regional Center
8 Regional Economic Integration: A Case Study of Export Ceramics in South Fukien
Part III The Structure: A Transaction-Cost Analysis of the South Fukien Economy
9 Patterns of Trade: Merchants, Organizations, and Knowledge
10 Formal Institutional Constraints: Law, Property, and Contracts
11 Informal Institutional Constraints: Rationality, Ethics, Beliefs, and the Social Fabric
Conclusion
A Fukien from Han to Sui
B P'u Shou-keng: A Reassessment
C The Process of Administrative Division in South Fukienin the Tenth Century
Notes
Bibliography
Character List
Index

Citation preview

Prosperity, Region, and Institutions in Maritime China The South Fukien Pattern, 946-i368

Harvard East Asian Monographs, 195

Prosperity, Region, and Institutions in Maritime China The South Fukien Pattern, 946-1368

Billy K. L. So

Published by the Harvard University Asia Center and distributed by Harvard University Press Cambridge (Massachusetts) and London, 2000

© 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College

Printed in the United States ofAmerica The Harvard University Asia Center publishes a monograph series and, in coordination with the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, the Korea Institute, the Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, and other faculties and institutes, administers research projects designed to further scholarly understanding of China, Japan, Vietnam, Korea, and other Asian countries. The Center also sponsors projects addressing multidisciplinary and regional issues in Asia. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data So, Billy K. L., 1952Prosperity, region, and institutions in maritime China / Billy K. L. So. p. cm. -- (Harvard East Asian monographs) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-674-00371-3 (alk. paper) 1. Fujian Sheng (China)--Economic conditions. 2. China--History--Sung dynasty, 960-1279. 3. China--History--Yiian dynasty, 1260-1368. I. Title. II. Series. Hc428.F84 s58 2000 330.951 •024--dc21 00-063441 Index by Mary Mortensen ® Printed on acid-free paper

Last figure below indicates year of this printing IO 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 Frontispiece: Tz'u-t'ung was a popular place-name for Ch'iian-chou used by both the locals and

foreign traders during medieval times. Meng-hua-lu is borrowed from the title of a twelfth­ century work recounting the glamour of the Northern Sung imperial capital K'ai-feng long after its decline. It literally means "to dream of the lost prosperity."

Dedicated to those who devoted their lives to bringing lasting peace and prosperity to more people

Acknowledgments

This book is the final product of a long-term research project that has lasted over two decades. It began with my research for the Master of Philosophy degree at the Chinese University of Hong Kong from 1976 to 1978. During these years, I have received much valuable advice and assistance from so many that only a small fraction of them can be mentioned here. First, I thank all the history professors who equipped me to work in this discipline at both the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Aus­ tralian National University, where I completed my undergraduate and post­ graduate education. In particular, I am indebted to Ch'iian Han-sheng for introducing me to the field of socioeconomic history. and to Yii Ying-shih for the enlightenment I gained in his courses on intellectual history. My the­ sis supervisors-Wang Gungwu, Colin Jeffcott, and the late Yen Keng­ wang-broadened my horizons so that I could see the significance of the topic from which the present book evolved. I am grateful to the Australian government for a generous British Commonwealth Scholarship that enabled me not only to finish my doctorate but also to conduct intensive research in local libraries and archives in South Fukien and Japan in late 1980 and early1981. My subsequent academic career at the National University of Singapore and the Chinese University of Hong Kong brought me such stimulating colleagues as Lee Cheuk-yin, Alan Chan, Yung Sai-shing, Leung Yuen-sang, Hsii Cho-yun, Chan Hok-lam, Chu Hung-lam, Lian Peng. Kwok Siu-tong, Yip Hon-ming, and Wang Fan-shen, just to name a few. In particular, I owe much to Leung Yuen-sang for his constant moral support in the final stage of this project. Also, I was much inspired by the humanistic and cross-

Vlll

Acknowledgments

disciplinary scholarship of Hsii Cho-yun, an orientation that is echoed in this book. Although Shiba Yoshinobu has never-been my formal supervisor, he certainly is the most important mentor of my academic pursuit. His con­ stant concern and encouragement, scholarly enthusiasm, and penetrating in­ sights into Chinese economic history have generated a vital driving force in me, and I am profoundly indebted to him. I thank Liu Ts'un-yan and Denis Twitchett for their invaluable encouragement and advice since my Canberra days. Thanks also go to James Lee for first introducing me to the scholarship of G. William Skinner in 1977 and then in 1993 to his friend Lian Peng, who brought the works of Douglass C. North to my attention. The work of these constituted the pillars of the conceptual framework of the present book. From fall 1996 to spring 1997, I had the wonderful opportunity of spend­ ing a year in Cambridge, Massachusetts, as a Harvard-Yenching Visiting Scholar. That was a crucial moment in the conceptualization of the third part of this book. I owe thanks to the enormous intellectual stimulation I re­ ceived in the classes and seminars offered by Peter Bol, Tu Wei-ming, Jef­ frey Sachs, and William Alford, among others. They helped shape my thinking in the final version of this work. I thank Patrick Hanan, Tu Wei­ ming, and the Harvard-Yenching Institute for making that visit possible. In my struggle for access to South Fukien data, I owe much to those local scholars, especially the staff of the Museum of Overseas Relations in Ch'iian-chou, who braved enormous risks to preserve local archives during the Cultural Revolution; and to those who endured great hardship in the field to create a rich body of information, without which the present study would have been impossible. I especially thank Ch'en Ta-sheng, Yang Chin­ chang, and the late Chuang Wei-chi for kindly providing me many crucial materials. As an interdisciplinary study, this book involves certain fields outside Chinese economic history. There are many who took pains to significantly improve my otherwise amateur arguments in those areas. Regarding trade ceramics, thanks must be given to Kamei Meitoku, Peter Lam, Teng Chung, Lai Shuk-yi, Richard Pearson, John Guy, Hsieh Ming-liang, and the late Hsii Ch'ing-ch'iian and Mikami Tsugio. To Ho Chui-mei, I am especially indebted for her supply of both illuminating ideas and rich and rare data. In my discussion of the complex issues of the Chinese legal tradition, I was

Acknowledgments

IX

much inspired by Brian McKnight, Albert Chen, Philip Huang, Liang Chih-p'ing, and William Alford. On issues of informal institutions, I bene­ fited greatly from feedback at various stages from Yii Ying-shih, Julia Ching, John Lagerway, Daniel Overmyer, and Cynthia Brokaw. Yeung Yue-man kindly read Part II and suggested many improvements from a geographer's perspective. Han Li-ming, Leslie Young, and Tam On-kit gave important advice on business organization, risk management, entrepreneurship, and the book's potential implications for contemporary China's economic re­ form. I learned much from my psychologist colleague Leung Kwok's good knowledge of rational choice theory. John Miksic, Ben Bronson, Janice Star­ gardt, and an anonymous reader for the Journal of Southeast Asian Studies· kindly enriched my understanding of Srivijayan history. And Irving Lo has immensely improved the English translations of poems and rhythmical ma­ terials in citations. Throughout the years, it has been a delight to enjoy the scholarly com­ radeship of Lee Tung-hua, Hugh Clark, Angela Schottenhammer, and, more recently, Wang Lien-mao. Despite scholarly disagreements, we share a common interest in the serious study of South Fukien and Ch'iian-chou. For the final draft, I am very grateful to David Faure, Peter Golas, Peter Bol, Richard von Glahn, and the anonymous reviewers for the Harvard Univer­ sity Asia Center, who kindly read through the lengthy manuscript and pro­ vided important advice for improvement, and to John Chaffee, Hugh Clark, David McMullen, Donald Sutton, and Wang Yeh-chien, who greatly en­ couraged me by taking an interest in it. Acknowledgment should be made to the Research Grant Council in Hong Kong for an earmarked grant that partially supported research leading to some findings on legal practices in Part III. Earlier versions of parts of the book appeared in T'oung Pao, Journal of Sung and Yuan Studies, and Journal of the American Oriental Society. Their kind consent to the use of these materials is deeply appreciated. In the process of research and rewriting, I enjoyed the reliable assistance of Leung Wei-kei, Josephine Khu, and Charles Fossel­ man. Too See-lou kindly prepared the maps. The remarkably professional hands of John Ziemer have transformed the manuscript into a far more readable presentation, corrected numerous errors, and urged me to rethink and refine many arguments. I owe him much for greatly enhancing the book's overall quality. And I sincerely thank Wang Fan-shen for his exqui­ site calligraphy on the Chinese title.

x

Acknowledgments

Finally, it is difficult to find adequate expression for my profound grati­ tude to Sufumi for her great intellectual aspirations and for her unfailing support, often accompanied with inspiring advice, at various frustrating stages of this long process, which has virtually accompanied our marriage for the past eighteen years. Without her constant moral support and sacrifices in shouldering the leadership of the family while pursuing her own academic career, I would never have been able to complete this project. Also, I must thank Duane for contributing countless evenings in his childhood that he could have spent playing chess with his dad. It is not entirely a coincidence that I write this acknowledgment on his birthday. Despite all this wonderful assistance, there admittedly remain defects in this final product. It goes without saying that for them I am solely respon­ sible. B.K.L.S.

Contents

Tables, Maps, and Figures

xv

Abbreviations

xix

Note on Transliteration

XXl

Introduction

Part I The Process: An Economic Cycle of Medieval South Fukien I South Fukien as a Frontier Prior to A.D. 946 Fukien Under the Sui and T'ang Empires 12/ Djanfou I7/

II The Puzzling Port of

South Fukien Under the Kingdom ofMin

24

2 Takeoff of the Local Economy, 946-I087 Changes in Agriculture 27/ Markets 33/

27

The Transshipment Trade and Overseas

The Office ofMaritime Affairs and State Control over the

Maritime Trade 42

3 Maritime Trade and Cross-sectoral Prosperity, m87-ca. 1200

50

Market Expansion 51/ Characteristics ofTrade in South Fukien 62/ Government Participation 67/ Commercialization ofthe Agricultural Sector 71/

Local Industries 79

4 Economic Setback and Local Power, ca. 1200-1276 The Coming ofFinancial Crisis 88/ 9I/

The Decline ofthe Overseas Trade

Domestic Trade and Problems in Agriculture 95/

Maritime Economy 9 8/

87 Money in the

The Local Elite and Localized State Power

IOI

Xll

5

Contents Prosperity Under a New Order, 1276-1368 and Beyond

107

Restructuring of the Local Elite During Dynastic Change 107I Dominance of the Foreign Community in Ch'iian-chou n4/ The Re-emergence ofProsperity: Continuity and Change n7/ Destruction at the End of the Yuan 122/ South Fukien in Ming Times and Beyond 125 Part II The Space: South Fukien as a Regional System 6

South Fukien as an Internally Integrated Region

131

Regional Administrative Divisions and the Urban System 131/ Registered Household Distribution in South Fukien 141/ Rural Structures 142/ Cross-regional Overland Communication Routes 15r/ Spatial Integration Through Intraregional Bridge Networks 154/ South Fukien as a Conceptualized Region 156 7

Ch'iian-chou City as Regional Center

161

Basic Layout 162/ Location Pattern of Principal Buildings 166/ The Commercial District and Local Industries 173/ Residential Districts of the Local Elite 174/ Ch'iian-chou Versus Fu-chou: Intra-prefectural Population Distribution 178/ Urban Population in Ch'iian-chou and South Fukien 183/ Ch'iian-chou as a Commercial City or an Administrative City? 184 8

Regional Economic Integration: A Case Study of Export Ceramics in South Fukien

186

Export Ceramics of South Fukien 186/ Sung-Yuan Kilns in South Fukien 188/ Structure of the Export Ceramics Industry 193/ Export Ceramics and the Local Economy: A Comparative Analysis 197 I Part III The Structure: A Transaction-Cost Analysis of the South Fukien Economy

9

Patterns of Trade: Merchants, Organizations, and Knowledge

205

A Typology of the Merchant Group 205/ Commercial Practices in the Overseas Trade 210/ Local Education and Commercial Knowledge 218/ Patterns ofTrade in Overseas Markets: The Case ofSrivijaya 220

ro Formal Institutional Constraints: Law, Property, and Contracts The Legal Framework for a Maritime Economy: Regulations of Maritime Affairs 228/ Property Rights in Maritime Transactions 236/ Sung Contract Procedures and Contractual Agreements in the Maritime Trade 240/ Litigation and Mediation in Commercial Disputes 246

227

Contents n Informal Institutional Constraints: Rationality, Ethics, Beliefs, and the Social Fabric

xm 253

Bounded Rationality in Action: The Popular Mentality of South Fukien 254/ Commercial Implications of Confucian Teachings 258/ Religious Beliefs and Commercial Ethics 263/ Enforcement Through the Social Fabric: Kinship Organizations and Guaranty Mechanisms 272

Conclusion The South Fukien Pattern Revisited 28r/ Power, Localized State Power, and Institutional Change 284/ Institutions in Space and Space in the New Institutional Economics 286 Appendixes

A Fukien from Han to Sui

293

B P'u Shou-keng: A Reassessment

3or

C The Process of Administrative Division in South Fukien in the Tenth Century

306

Reference Matter

Notes

3II

Bibliography Character List

435

Index

447

Tables, Maps, and Figures

Tables

I.I 3.I 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.I 4.2 6.I 6.2 6.3 7.I 7.2 7.3 7.4

Mid-T'ang population (households) data for Fukien South Seas countries sending more than one envoy to Sung China, 1087 to I200 Countries with sugar and wine markets as recorded in Treatise on Foreign Lands Population and cultivated land in Fukien, 1080, n82, I490 Estimates ofper capita output of foodgrains in coastal Fukien, 1080 and n82 South Fukienese performance in the civil service examinations South Fukienese appointments in the Ch'iian-chou prefectural government during the Southern Sung Sung counties in South Fukien Household distribution patterns in South Fukien, 980-I290 The number of rural settlements in Chin-chiang, Nan-an, An-ch'i, and P'u-t'ien counties Distribution pattern of principal buildings in Sung Ch'iian-chou Distribution pattern of nonofficial temples in Sung Ch'iian-chou by religious affiliation Distribution pattern of Sungfang by category of name Household distribution in Fu-chou prefecture, n82

I4 56 66 76 77 102 104 I34 I42 I49 I70 I72 I77 I79

XVI

7.5 7.6 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 9.1 9.2

Tables, Maps, and Figures Reconstructed household distribution in Ch'iian-chou prefecture in 1250 Intra-prefectural population distributions for Ch'iian-chou and Fu-chou Distribution of kiln sites in Ch'iian-chou

190

Distribution of the four categories of ceramics in South Fukien during the Sung

191

Proportion of county population involved in export ceramics in the late Southern Sung Distribution of Sung kiln sites in Kuang-nan East Circuit Return distribution to each oftwo merchants for two voyages Wooden labels discovered in the Sung shipwreck

195 198 213 217

180 182

Maps LI

The region of South Fukien

6.1

Urban structure of South Fukien during the Southern Sung Reconstructed rural structure of Chin-chiang county in the Sung

6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 8.1 8.2 A.I

3 133 145 146 147

Reconstructed rural str:ucture of Nan-an county in the Sung Reconstructed rural structure of P'u-t'ien county in the Sung Overland communication routes from Ch'iian-chou to major cities in other circuits The city walls of Ch'iian-chou from the T'ang to the Yuan Conceptual division of Sung Ch'iian-chou Location of principal buildings in Sung Ch'iian-chou Distribution ofJang in Sung Ch'iian-chou Distribution of kiln sites in South Fukien, Southern Sung-Yuan Distribution of kiln sites in Kuang-tung during the Northern Sung

199

Development of administrative divisions in Fukien and neighboring areas from the Han to the end of the Northern and Southern Dynasties

298

153 163 167 168 176 189

Tables, Maps, and Figures

xvii

Figures

6.1 6.2

Regional structure of subregions Networks of communication routes between cities and county cities

135

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the text and notes. For complete ti­ tles and publication information of titles cited here in short form, see the Bibliography, pp. 385-433. CCD CCFC (1612) CCFC (1763) CCHC

central commercial district Yang Ssu-ch'ien, Ch'uan-chouJu-chih Huai Pu-yin, Ch'uan-chou fu-chih Fang Ting, Chin-chiang hsien-chih

CD CP CTS CWTS CYD FCTC (1684) FCTC (1867) HTS HWTS PMTC

Li T'ao, Hsu tzu-chih-t'ung-chien ch'ang-pien Liu Hsii, Chiu T'ang shu Hsueh Chii-cheng, Chiu Wu-tai shih central yamen district Cheng K'ai-chi, Fu-chien t'ung-chih Ch'en Shou-ch'i, Fu-chien t'ung-chih Ou-yang Hsiu, Hsin T'ang shu Ou-yang Hsiu, Hsin Wu-tai shih

RS SHT SHYCK

rural settlement Tou I, Sung Hsing-t'ung Sung hui-yao chi-kao

commercial district

Huang Chung-chao, Pa-Min t'ung-chih

xx

Abbreviations

SKCS SPTK SPTKCP SSC

Ssu-ku ch'iian-shu Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an ch'u-pien Liang K'e-chia, San-shan chih

SS SYTFCTS TPHYC TT WHTK YFCYC YHCHTC YS YTCS

To To, Sung shih Sung-Yuan ti-fang-chih ts'ung-shu Yiieh Shih, T'ai-p'ing huan-yu chi Tu Yu, T'ung-tien Ma Tuan-lin, Wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao Wang Ts'un, Yuanjeng chiu-yu chih Li Chi-fu, Yuan-ho chun-hsien t'u-chih Sung Lien, Yuan shih Wang Hsiang-chih, Yu-ti chi-sheng

Note on Transliteration

I follow the Wade�Giles system for province names in a historical context, but use the modern names to signify the spatial units largely equivalent to the modern territories of such provinces. For instance, Fukien is a modern geographical concept, whereas Fu�chien is a historical name. In this case, both refer roughly to the same physical area.

Prosperity, Region, and Institutions in Maritime China The South Fukien Pattern, 946-1368

Introduction

Prosperity signifies success in economic performance. Economic perform­ ance always takes place in a spatial context. And institutions matter in eco­ nomic performance. These are the three interwoven themes underlying the present inquiry into the regional economy of South Fukien during the Sung (960-1276) and Yuan (1276-1368) dynasties, when the region outperformed other parts of maritime China.1 Sung and Yuan China witnessed significant achievements in many areas of economic performance. Rising productivity in agriculture and industry, the development of a money economy, large-scale urbanization, unprece­ dented population growth, regional specialization in production, advances in transportation, the emergence of a national market of exchange, and increasingly sophisticated commercial operations are but a few of the im­ portant aspects of this progress. This historical development has been inter­ preted by Mark Elvin as a medieval economic revolution2 and by Hao Yen­ ping as one of the three major commercial revolutions in Chinese history.3 For both Elvin and Hao, one of the factors accounting for this development is the opening of China to foreign economies. In terms of commerce, mari­ time China had by this time surpassed the overland Silk Road as the major channel for international exchange. Although the prosperity of maritime Sung and Yuan China was not the sole source of growth in the Chinese economy as a whole, it was a leading contributor to national development. South Fukien is representative of the prosperity of maritime China from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries largely because of the seaport-city of Ch'iian-chou. The subsequent chapters unfold the importance of this geo­ graphical fact. At this point, suffice it to note that during this period the city

2

Introduction

played a role in maritime China much like that of Shanghai in the 1920s and 1930s or of Hong Kong since the 1970s. In this sense, I am not seeking to ex­ amine a typical case that would enhance our knowledge of the general pat­ tern of the Sung and Yuan economy. South Fukien was, rather, a special case, almost without parallels in other parts of China, as is Hong Kong vis­ a-vis today's Chinese economy. Yet, these examples reveal the economic po­ tential of China in different times and under different structures. The South Fukien pattern therefore makes a good empirical case relevant to broader theoretical issues of concern to students of the Chinese economy, both pre­ modern and modern. South Fukien is a regional concept of human geography. Its prefectural components and location in Fukien are shown on Map I.1. More details about the topography of this region are given in Chapter 6. The Chinese equivalent of this geographical concept is Min-nan (southern part of Fukien province), a term in common use since the Ming (1368-1644). The earliest usage of this geographic term that has come to my attention is found in a lo­ cal inscription dated n56.4 Usually "Min-nan" signifies the area encompass­ ing at least the two prefectures of Ch'iian-chou and Chang-chou; hence at times the region is also called Chang-Ch'iian. Sometimes Hsing-hua-chiin prefecture to the north of Ch'iian-chou is included. For the present study, I take the latter approach, for two reasons. First, the Hsing-hua-chiin area was until the early Sung part of Ch'iian-chou prefecture. Sung and Yuan sources frequently allude to a "Hsing-Ch'uan-Chang" area, where specific fiscal measures or policies were enacted. Second, in the Sung and Yuan land and water communications between Hsing-hua-chiin and Ch'iian-chou were far better than those between Hsing-hua-chiin and Fu-chou. This study sees the economic performance of South Fukien from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, the first of my major themes, largely as a process. Performance changes over time. So did the South Fukien economy. It is therefore imperative to chronicle the process with careful periodization that will highlight the characteristics of each phase of development. By scru­ tinizing these characteristics, however, we may achieve an even more im­ portant objective-understanding the meanings of prosperity in the pre­ modern Chinese context. I use a concept of cross-sectoral prosperity to capture the best performance in this process. Methodologically speaking, this prosperity can be reconstructed mainly through qualitative accounts;

Legend Present provincial border Hsia-men-shih

District border ( 1991) Sung-Yuan prefectural border within South Fukien [=1

Sung-Yuan prefectural name

:>-----

River SO

Map I.1 The region of South Fukien (source: Tan Ch'i-hsiang, Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t'u-chi, 6:32-33, 67-68)

100

km

4

Introduction

quantifiable data are notably lacking. And often such qualitative data are impressionistic. Hence, our task is to attain valid knowledge about this sub­ ject. Using a multidimensional approach and through cross-verification, we may be able to construct a more holistic and reasonable understanding and ultimately reduce the chance of misinterpretation. To analyze the process of economic development, we also need to incorporate a political dimension, since political forces often exert a strong impact on economic performance in the Chinese context. This inquiry forms the first part of the book. The second theme, economic performance in space, constitutes the con­ tent of Part IL G. William Skinner has highlighted the importance of space as a necessary framework for knowledge of China and developed a highly articulated regional construct based on central place theory to embody such a spatial approach.5 Although the broader objective of his approach is to make sense of the spatial differentiation of various human phenomena, from economic exchange to political control, the Skinnerian model is built pri­ marily on reconstruction of marketing and urban systems at different levels. It can therefore be highly instrumental in our understanding of South Fu­ kien's economic performance in space. Using that model, I have developed key categories for a spatial reconstruction of the region's economy. This re­ construction illuminates many important facets of the economic history of the region neglected in previous scholarship. Moreover, to capture the es­ sence of the prosperity of South Fukien, I have employed the concept of an "internally integrated region," another idea explained by the Skinnerian model. This concept underscores the spatial dimension of South Fukien's prosperity and places its implications in a broader perspective. Finally, in the field of economics and economic history, it has become in­ creasingly clear that to account for economic performance, especially over time, institutions do matter. An understanding of the long-term economic performance of South Fukien from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries de­ pends on incorporating an institutional component into our overall analyti­ cal framework. The importance of institutions in economic performance has been explored by many since Ronald Coase,6 especially Douglass North. North has sought a theoretical framework capable of accounting for eco­ nomic performances in different economies over time.7 His institutional ap­ proach offers the flexibility of a better cross-cultural application, and it makes the study of premodern Chinese economy even more relevant to contemporary economic theory and policy.

Introduction

5

North defines institutions broadly as the rules of the game. This rubric comprises rules ranging from formal laws to ethical codes of behavior. En­ trepreneurs and other economic actors must operate within an institutional matrix. Economic performance is linked to institutions by the transaction costs arising from the institutional framework. Certain institutions reduce transaction costs; others push them up. A society that is able to generate, intentionally or unintentionally, more efficient institutions with lower trans­ action costs will channel more talents and more resources into growth­ generating sectors and maintain economic growth over the long run. I deal with this institutional dimension of the South Fukien economy in Part III. There my goal is to explore the transaction-cost effects of a wide range of in­ stitutions, from laws to ethics to the social fabric. As I think my findings will show, transaction-cost analysis not only advances our understanding of the reasons behind the prosperity of South Fukien but also relates economic performance to many other facets of social life in the region. The literature on Ch'iian-chou during the Sung and Yuan periods is siz­ able. Briefly speaking, the subjects treated in this literature can be classified into four categories: foreign contacts, fine arts, local history, and socioeco­ nomic history. The first category includes studies of foreign records that deal with Ch'iian-chou, the activities of foreigners in that prefecture, alien religions, diplomatic relations, foreign trade, and so on. The main theme of these studies is the relationship between Sung-Yuan China and other con­ temporaneous countries and cultures. Ch'iian-chou is of interest to such studies largely because, as a major maritime trading center, it was a focal point for China's links with the outside world. The second category consists of researches on aesthetics, folklore, and technical aspects of antiquities in Ch'iian-chou. The third category comprises the growing literature on the lo­ cal history of Ch'iian-chou. Mainly the work oflocal scholars, it covers many interesting anthropological and ethnographical aspects of the city's past. The final category encompasses recent studies of the socioeconomic aspects or the political economy of Sung and Yuan Ch'iian-chou. These works constitute the foundation of empirical knowledge for the present study. As the ensuing chapters will reveal, I have made extensive use of these contributions. Since the regional center of South Fukien was Ch'iian-chou, any factual knowledge about this city is relevant to this discus­ sion. Nevertheless, Ch'iian-chou is but par.t of the story. South Fukien is our main concern. In this field, the two important monographic works are my

6

Introduction

own dissertation, completed in 1982, and the book published by Hugh Clark on the economic history of "Southern Fujian" in 1991.8 The present book evolves from my dissertation, but I have substantially changed the scope, structure, and theme of my work over the years. Clark's book was the first English-language publication taking South Fukien as an object of inquiry. Three works have had an important impact on my own work. The first one is on P'u Shou-keng, a prominent historical figure associated with Ch'iian-chou during Sung-Yuan dynastic transition, by Kuwahara Jitsuzo.9 (See Appendix B for this work.) Although my views on the subject' differ considerably from those of Kuwahara, his seminal work in the l9ros and 1920s directed scholarly attention to the importance of Ch'iian-chou. And without the subsequent scholarship that followed his lead, I would not even have thought of this study. In many senses, the present book is but a sup­ plement to or revision ofKuwabara's work. The second work is that of Li Tung-hua on Ch'iian-chou and Chinese contacts with foreign cultures during medieval times.10 His focus is on Ch'iian-chou, and his period of concern the Tang (618-907) through the Ming dynasty. Li tried to chronicle and explain the rise and fall of maritime trade in Ch'iian-chou. He cited extensive documentary evidence on the sub­ ject and presented a faithful synthesis of previous scholarship. Part I of the present study also deals with economic development of Ch'iian-chou through a roughly similar time span. But my scope is a region and its econ­ omy, not a single prefecture. The conceptual framework underlying this study is also much broader than that of Li. The third work is that by Hugh Clark. His work is by far the most com­ prehensive English-language treatment of South Fukien's economic history from the Tang to the Sung. In addition to using most available documen­ tary sources, he was innovative in the reconstruction of many facets of the economy, for example, its demographic structures and intraregional com­ munication networks as shown through the locations of bridges. Although his contribution is part of the foundation on which the present study is built, there are important differences between his framework and mine. Clark focuses more on different aspects of the South Fukien economy dur­ ing the Tang, the Five Dynasties (907-60), and the Sung. He does not dif­ ferentiate economic development under the Northern and Southern Sung. Nor does he cover the Yuan. Such a framework works well for Clark's own

7

Introduction

theme, but a longer time span that includes the Yuan is necessary to reveal a full cycle ofdevelopment in the medieval South Fukien economy. More important, Clark's theme is that commercialization in a highly de­ veloped maritime economy like that of South Fukien was routinized to an extent comparable to the phenomenon of routinized commercialization that, as William Rowe and others held, did not occur until the late Ming and Ch'ing (1644-19n) periods. In contrast, my spatial cum institutional frame­ work is less concerned about the routinization of commercialization in South Fukien. Clark and I are in fact dealing with rather different sets of questions. We share a concern with regional integration, but, as the follow­ ing chapters make apparent, we also differ on many issues, ranging from in­ terpretation of data to their explanation. Despite my disagreements with Kuwabara, Li, and Clark, I see the present work as a positive result of schol­ arly discourse in which the free fl.ow of critical ideas does advance knowledge and open up new approaches to old problems. Had I not been inspired by their scholarship, this book would not be what it is. Finally, mention should be made of two recently discovered source mate­ rials about the city of Ch'iian-chou in Sung and Yuan times. One is an ac­ count of the city in the 1270s, supposedly written by a medieval Italian Jew­ ish merchant who visited the place. It is the so-called Jacob D'Ancona manuscript recently translated and edited by David Selbourne. 11 This manuscript is full of fascinating accounts of the people of Ch'iian-chou and urban life there on the eve of Mongol conquest. For instance, it records local Chinese women as having very open-minded sexual attitudes. Despite its fascinations, however, I am reluctant to rely on this document. Apart from the skepticism many share about its contents, I am particularly unconvinced about the source itself It is inaccessible to any scholar except Selbourne, be­ cause, as explained by him, it contains anti-Christian comments. Until it can be subjected to open and critical examination, I prefer not to add it to my primary sources, even though what is revealed in this source would probably support rather than undermine many of the main arguments in the present study. The other work is Miscellaneous Notes of the West Hill (Hsi-shan tsa­ chih), a local genealogy discovered in Ch'iian-chou in the 1980s. Unlike most genealogies discovered there, this contains unusually rich and detailed biog­ raphies and accounts of ancestors dating back to the Sung and Yuan. Many local scholars believe in the authenticity and reliability of these accounts.

Thi

d

l d df

132 174 250 150

F i 03 S

2021 23 01 58 UTC

8

Introduction

However, the narratives also present dubious and conflicting contents that have led other scholars to conclude that at least the Sung and Yuan stories contained in this work were fabricated much later.12 In any event, it is diffi­ cult to verify these narratives using other existing source materials. Given the real possibility and common practice of fabricating genealogies, I am cau­ tious about using it in the present study.13

P A RT

I

The Process An Economic Cycle of Medieval South Fukien

ONE

South Fukien as a Frontier Prior to A.D. 946

Although the economic takeoff of South Fukien started as late as the mid­ tenth century, earlier developments in South Fukien, and throughout Fu­ kien, provided the foundation for the region's prosperity in the Sung and Yuan. That foundation is the focus of this chapter. (To avoid burdening this chapter with historical details, an outline of the history of Fukien from the Han [ 206 B.c.-A.D. 220 J to the Sui (581-618], which is not a main concern in this book, is presented in Appendix A, pp. 293-300.) The first section of this chapter covers developments in Fukien in general and in South Fukien in particular during the Sui and T'ang, and the third section deals with de­ velopments under the Kingdom of Min ( 897-946) during the Five Dynas­ ties. In the second section, I challenge the prevalent theory that Ch'iian-chou had already been established as one of the prime centers for overseas trade by the ninth century. As shown in Appendix A, due to its physiographic isolation and the immense difficulties in communicating with other parts of China, the geo­ graphical area encompassed in modern Fukien developed much later than the surrounding areas (modern Kwangtung, Kiangsi, and Chekiang). Han Chinese migration to this area had begun by at least III B.c.; larger waves of immigration occurred in times of turbulence in North China dur­ ing the period of division from the third to the sixth centuries A.D. This led to growing numbers of administrative units in Fukien and strengthened the potential for economic growth. South Fukien certainly shared in this

12

South Fukien as a Frontier Prior to A.D. 946

momentum but nevertheless remained rather peripheral and unimportant compared with the Min River delta near modern Fu-chou.

Fukien Under the Sui and T'ang Empires With the reunification of China under the Sui dynasty, measures were taken to amalgamate counties (hsien) and commanderies ( chun) so as to lower ad­ ministrative costs.1 Most of the administrative units established in Fukien during earlier periods were abolished, and the decrease in the number of units in Fukien should not be interpreted as implying a proportionate downturn in development. The territory of Fukien was by this time under the jurisdiction of a prefecture (chou), which had been called Feng-chou un­ der the Ch'en dynasty (557-88) but was now renamed Ch'iian-chou and later Chien-an commandery. The capital of this territory was located in Min county at the site that is now the city of Fu-chou. This prefecture contained four counties: Min, Chien-an, Nan-an, and Lung-ch'i.2 The capital of Chien-an county had long been a major city in Fukien and was situated in an inland area near modern Chien-ou. Both Nan-an and the newly established Lung-ch'i were, however, located in the previously less developed coastal re­ gion of South Fukien. The capital of the form..!r was situated to the east of modern Nan-an City, and that of the latter was in modern Chang-chou city. The concentration of half the subordinate counties under Ch'iian-chou, es­ pecially after the administrative streamlining, in this part of the province re­ flects the increasingly important role of South Fukien in the overall devel­ opment of Fukien. Despite occasional adjustments, the administrative divisions of Fukien during the T'ang dynasty laid the general foundation for the subsequent ter­ ritorial structure of the province. Many of the counties that existed during the Sung and Yuan were established during this period, and their bounda­ ries have altered little since 800. As an administrative unit immediately above the county, the prefecture had also been permanently institutionalized during the T'ang, replacing the older system of commanderies. In Fukien, altogether five prefectures were established. Fu-chou prefecture in the Min River delta had long been the most im­ portant center of political power and control in Fukien. It has been called by various names: Ch'iian-chou (pre-Sui), Feng-chou (Sui-623), Ch'iian-chou again (623-7n),3 Min-chou (7n-25), and finally Fu-chou (725-present), the

South Fukien as a Frontier Prior to A.D. 946

13

name by which the prefecture (and city) has been known ever since. The number of counties within its jurisdiction increased from four at the time of its initial establishment to ten after the mid-eighth century.4 A governor­ general's office (tu-tuju), which was a local investigatory and supervisory unit above the prefectural unit,5 was also located in Fu-chou from 7n on6 and governed most of the prefectures within what is now Fukien province. Another prefecture with a long history was Chien-chou in inland Fukien. It was established as a prefecture in 621 and contained six counties by the mid-eighth century.7 T'ing-chou prefecture was set up in 736 in southwest­ ern Fukien, with three counties.8 One of them, Lung-yen, was later trans­ ferred to the jurisdiction of Chang-chou prefecture in South Fukien in 777.9 The communication route linking Fukien with Chekiang and Kiangsi, which ran along the Min River basin, over the inland mountain ranges, and through the city of Chien-chou, was well developed by the mid-T'ang.10 The march of the rebel Huang Ch'ao's army into Fukien in the late ninth century also had an effect on transportation along this route. For military purposes, Huang Ch'ao had to improve the passage through the mountains in the area of the present provincial border between Fukien and Chekiang.11 These ef­ forts undoubtedly had a considerable impact on the development of Fukien. In South Fukien, a prefecture called Feng-chou was separated from Ch'iian-chou, present-day Fu-chou, and established in Nan-an county in 622 to govern the counties of Nan-an and P'u-t'ien. But this prefecture was abolished in 627, and its two subordinate counties were once again placed under the jurisdiction of Ch'iian-chou. In 699, a new prefectural capital named Wu-jung-chou was set up east of the Nan-an county capital, with ju­ risdiction over the counties of Nan-an, P'u-t'ien, and Lung-ch'i. It was abol­ ished the following year but re-established almost immediately. By 7n, it had taken over the name "Ch'iian-chou," and the former Ch'iian-chou was re­ named Min-chou. The administrative seat of the new Ch'iian-chou in South Fukien was located in a newly formed county named Chin-chiang.12 It was to become the most important city of South Fukien in later periods. The administrative division of South Fukien continued. In 686, a new prefecture named Chang-chou was established in the Chiu-lung River delta. Toward the end of the eighth century, there were four counties under Ch'iian-chou and three under Chang-chou.13 Altogether, of the five prefec­ tures in Fukien, two were in South Fukien; of the twenty-six counties in Fu­ kien, however, only seven were located there.

South Fukien as a Frontier Prior to A.D. 946

14

Table I.I Mid-T'ang Population (Households) Data for Fukien Date

7I3-4I (7I4r) 742-55 (755:') (752:')

806-20 (809:')

Fu­ chou

Chien­ chou

Ch'iian­ chou

Chang­ chou

T'ing­ chou

3I,067 29,527 (2I7,877]

34,084 [?s,876]

20,800 2I,459 (I42,I64]

22,770 (I43,n4]

50,754 24,586 (I54,009]

23,806 (160,295]

' ..... ..... -

tw,1 I lil I I

NE I

ES

(Eastern Suburb)

SE II

(Southeast)

Chin-chiang

SS

(Southern Suburb) 0

0.5

I km

Map 7.2 Conceptual division of Sung Ch'iian-chou

area were the offices of the prefect, the county magistrate, and all subordi­ nate prefectural officials except the administrator for public order. The pre­ fect's office was centrally located midway on the northern half of the north­ south axis inside the inner city. Its entrance faced the main street running south to the south gate. At the crossroads of the two main streets stood a monument called the Double Gates Tower, which was probably a drum tower. In the SWII area, where more yamens can be found, were two offices

�

-N-

Legend

�

Prefectural yamen ofCh'Oan-chou•

®

County yamen ofChin-chiang'

•

Other yamens

0

Government granaricsc

•

Educational institutions

!::,.

Non-official temples

...

Official temples

B

Double Gates Tower"

�

Bridges

�

Commercial districl

C::)

Small hills

..._

......._ Possible gardens, farmlands, uninhabited spaces Riverbank in the twentieth century

0

0.5 km

Map 7.3 Location of principal buildings in Sung Ch'iian-chou (souRcEs: •ccFC (1612), 4: 1a­ b; bCCFC (1612), 4: 16b; 'CCFC (1612), 24: 3a; aYTCS, 130: 61) Principal Buildings in Sung Ch'uan-chou as Shown on Map 7-3 (A) Yamens 1. Office of the Prefectura!Judge (chieh-tu t'ui-kuan), PMTC, So: na 2. Office of the Administrator for Revenue (ssu-hu ts'an-chun), CCHC, 2: 15b 3. Prefectural Bureau ofTaxation (tu-shui-wu), CCHC, 2: 16a; 3a, b. Taxation stations 4. Office of the Executive Administrator (lu-shih ts'an-chun) , CCHC, 2: 15b 5. Office of the Surveillance Circuit Judge (kuan·ch'a t'ui· kuan), CCFC (1612), 4: 22a 6. Southern Outer Office oflmperial Clansmen Affairs (nan·wai tsung-cheng·ssu ), CCHC, 15: 15b 7. Office of the Administrator for Public Order (ssu-li ts'an-chun), CCFC (1612), 24: 5a

Ch'uan-chou as a Regional Center s. Office ofthe Military Commander in Chieffor Fu-chien (Fu-chien ping-ma tu-chien) , CCFC

(1612), 24: 4b 9. Old Office of the Bureau of Distant Imperial Relatives (chiu mu-tsung-yiian), PMTC, So: 11a 10. New Office ofthe Bureau ofDistant Imperial Relatives, built in 1202 (hsin mu-tsung-yiian), PMTC, So: 11a 11. Office ofthe County Sheriff (wei), CCHC, 2: l5b 12. Office of the Deputy Prefect (t'ung-p'an), CCFC (1763), 12: l7a-b 13. Office of the Signatory StaffSupervisor (ch'ien-shih p'an-kuan), CCFC (1763), 12: 1Sa 14. Office of the Law Inspector (ssuja ts'an-chiian), CCFC (1763), 12: lSb 15. Office of the Superintendent ofMaritime Affairs (shih-po-ssu), CCFC (1763), 12: 2oa 16. Office of the Vice Magistrate (hsien-ch'eng), CCHC, 2: l5b 17. Office of the Assistant County Magistrate (chu-pu), CCHC, 2: l5b (B) Education Institutions

l. Prefectural school (fu-hsiieh), PMTC, 44: 21b 2. County school (hsien-hsiieh), PMTC, 44: 22b 3. Examination Hall (kung-yiian), PMTC, So: 11a/b 4. School for Imperial Clansmen (tsung-hsiieh), CCHC, 2: na 5. Ch'iian-shan Academy (Ch'iian-shan shu-yiian), PMTC, 44: 23a 6. Ch'ing-yiian Academy (Ch'ing-yiian shu-yiian) , PMTC, 44: 23b (C) Official Temples

l.

Prefectural altar ofland and grain (fu she-chi t'an), CCFC (1763), 16: 1b 2. County altar ofland and grain (hsien she-chi t'an), CCHC, 16: 1b/2a 3. Temple of the Ancient Sages (hsien-hsien tz'u), CCHC, 15: 2b 4. Prefectural altar of the masters ofwind, cloud, thunder, and rain (feng-yiin-lei-yii-shih t'an), CCFC (1763),16:2a 5. Prefectural temple of the city god (fu ch'eng-huang miao), CCHC, 2: l6b, 15: 3a, 16: 19b 6. Prefectural school Confucian temple 7. County school Confucian temple (D) Nonofficial Temples Buddhist temples l. K'ai-yiian Temple, CCHC, 15: 13b 2. Tzu-shou Temple, CCFC (1763), 16: 7a 3. Ch'ung-fu Temple, CCHC, 15: l4a 4. Pao-ch'in ch'ung-shou Temple, CCHC, 15:

lSb 5. Pei-tsang yiian Temple, CCFC (1763), 16: 26a 6. Feng-shan Temple, CCFC (1763), 16: 27a 7. Kuang-hsiao Temple, CCHC, 15: l5a S. Ch'eng-t'ien Temple, CCFC (1612), 24: l8a­ b 9. Pao-lin Temple, Chao Ju-kua, Chujan-chih chiao-chu, pp. 44-45. Popular religious temples

A. T'ieh-lu Shrine, CCFC (1763), 16: l4a-b B. T'iao-ti Shrine, CCHC, 15: l5b C. Hua-ch'iao chen-jen Shrine, CCFC (1763), 16: 15a

D. Chung-i Shrine, CCHC, 15: l7a E. Wan-hsien-fei Shrine, CCHC, 15: 16a-b F. Tung-yiieh Shrine, CCHC, 15: 13a-b G. Temple of the Heavenly Consort (t'ien­ Jei kung), CCFC (1612), 24: 21a-b H. Nan-yiieh Shrine, CCHC, 15: 17a Taoist temples

a. Hsiian-miao Shrine, CCFC (1612), 24: 2Ja b. Tzu-chi Shrine, CCFC (1612), 24: 2ra c. Ch'ing-chen Shrine, CCHC, 15: 2ob d. Shun-chi Shrine , CCHC, 2: 31b Foreign religious temples

i. Sheng-yu Mosque, Ch'en Ta-sheng, "Ch'iian-chou Ch'ing-chen ssu." ii. Ch'ing-ching Mosque, ibid. iii. Yeh-men Mosque, ibid.

Ch'uan-chou City as a Regional Center

170

Tablq.1 Distribution Pattern of Principal Buildings in Sung Ch'iian-chou

Zone

Yamen

NWI NWII NEI NEII SWI SWII SEI SEII SS ES

5

Educational institutions

Official temples

Nonofficial temples

Total

Percent

3 2 7 2

7 3 12 6 0 6 8 3 IO 3

12 5.2 20.7 10.35 0 10.35 13.8 5.2 17.2 5.2

24 41.4

58 IOO

100

0 0

8 0 0 4 0 3

TOTAL 23 PERCENT 39.7

0

0 0

0 0 0 3 0 0 0

6 10.3

5 8.6

0

3 5 0

relating to public order: the branch headquarters of the military commander in chief for Fu-chien, who was responsible for the defense and security of the entire prefecture,28 and the office of the administrator for public order. Also found in this zone were two yamens dealing with the imperial clansmen. Several government offices were located outside the city walls. In the southern suburb, there were two branch taxation stations along the river­ bank and the office of the superintendent of maritime affairs, which handled all matters dealing with maritime trade. The yamen of the county sheriff, whose duty was to maintain local order with the help of a militia force, was placed in the eastern suburb.29 Despite these suburban offices, however, the overall location of official buildings inside the city tended to be central. This coincides with the general pattern in Chinese cities, as described by Chang Sen-dou.30 Although the geographical area of the city expanded more than six times from the T'ang to the late Southern Sung, the administrative center, or CYD, remained per­ sistently in the congested northern half of the inner city, probably a result of classical ideology. The exceptions were four yamens in the SWII zone, noted above. Two of them dealt with the affairs of the imperial clansmen

Ch'uan-chou City as a Regional Center

171

residing in this city during the Southern Sung.31 Another exception was the office of maritime affairs outside the southern wall, which was not protected by any wall until 1230. In contrast with the centrally ·located administrative buildings, educa­ tional institutions were rather scattered. Although the examination hall and the county school were next to the yamens, the more important prefectural school stood near the south gate, adjacent to the commercially oriented southern suburb. It is unclear whether this was a common location for a prefectural school in Sung times. Its proximity to the commercial center re­ sulted in conflicts between the literati and the foreign merchants.32 Of the two known locations of nonofficial academies, which played an increasingly important role in. Sung education,33 one was located to the east of the CYD along the main east-west axis, and the other was to the north. Last but not the least, the school for imperial clansmen was, like the yamens for this prestige group, found in the SWII zone.34 As for official temples, the two altars ofland and grain, for the prefecture and the county, respectively, together with the altar of the masters of wind, cloud, thunder, and rain, were set up to the south of the CYD but still inside the inner city. Situated on both sides of the prefectural yamen were the city god temple, which can be t_raced to T'ang times,35 and a temple commemo­ rating certain ancient sages. Since Confucian temples usually constituted part of local government schools, they can be found inside both the prefec­ tural and the county schools. It is clear that all these official temples were erected in, or very close to, the CYD. This suggests that official religious in­ stitutions were primarily devices to strengthen government authority. The religious function of these temples was hence subordinated to the adminis­ trative function. The locations of 24 nonofficial temples are indicated on Map 7.3. Table 7.2 shows their distribution. In the eastern half of the inner city, there were as many as six such temples established next to the government offices and the official temples. NEII had five such temples; of the other three extended walled areas, NWII and SWII had only one each, and SEII had two. An­ other area with a high concentration of nonofficial temples was the southern suburb, which had seven. When the affiliation of these temples is taken into consideration, a few intriguing phenomena can be observed. First, Buddhism and popular

Ch'uan-chou City as a Regional Center

172

Table 7.2 Distribution Pattern ofNonofficial Temples in Sung Ch'iian-chou by Religious Affiliation Zone

Buddhist

Popular

Taoist

Other

Total

NWI NWII NEI NEII SWI SWII SEI SEII SS ES

0

0 0 2

0 0 0

0

0

0 0 2 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0

4

3

TOTAL

3 0 0

0 2 9

8

3 5 0 3 2 7 2 24

religions seem to be dominant in numbers, almost double that for the other two categories. Second, the six temples located in the inner city were divided equally among Buddhism, popular religions, and Taoism. The two Taoist temples represented half the total for· this category in Ch'iian-chou city. These were long-established religious institutions in China. Although it would be difficult to substantiate that their physical proximity to the yamens reflected a rapport between clerics and bureaucrats, the phenomenon may at least indicate that their existence in the heart of the CYD did not irritate the officials working there. Third, three out of five of those built in the NEII zone were Buddhist ones. Zone NWII on the other side of the north-south axis had only one nonofficial temple. This was not only a Buddhist institu­ tion but also the largest temple in the city, namely the K'ai-yiian Temple. Buddhism dominated the left and right sides of the CYD. It gave way, how­ ever, to other religions in the southern part of the city. Finally, the southern suburb accommodated all three identified temples in the other category, namely, three mosques.36 Since the zone was not only a central commercial district ( CCD) but also a popular residential area for foreign inhabitants (see below), the concentration of foreign religious insti­ tutions is understandable. However, the relative remoteness of the district from the CYD and its low rank in terms of administrative control also ac-

Ch'uan-chou City as a Regional Center

173

count for this phenomenon. The Temple of the Goddess of Seafarers was also located on the riverbank in this zone. Among the popular religious in­ stitutions, this was the one most relevant to maritime trade and perhaps the most popular among the maritime merchants. There thus seems to be a cor­ relation between the �onofficial temples' locations and their relationship with the government. A closer location to the CYD seems to imply a better relationship, and vice versa.

The Commercial District and Local Industries There is little doubt that the CCD of Sung Ch'iian-chou was located in the southern suburb.37 Maritime trade was the most important sector of the lo­ cal economy, and this tract of land on the northern bank of the Chin River surely offered an advantageous location for a CCD. Its suburban status out­ side the southern wall throughout most of the dynasty and its remoteness from the CYD may have also made it a place of less government control than areas within the wall. This would certainly increase its attraction to the merchant class.38 The location of CCDs in Chinese cities has been viewed in different ways by scholars. Among these views, that of Skinner, although mainly concerned with Ch'ing cities, is perhaps the one most relevant to the case of Sung Ch'iian-chou. Skinner describes the CCD as a place "that is never central but instead sharply skewed in the direction of the city's main commercial trade routes."39 This statement holds true in the case of Ch'iian-chou if the Chin River is conceived as the lifeline for the city's maritime trade. Extant evidence does not show any noticeable exchange markets near the east, the north, and the west gates, from which main overland communica­ tion routes connecting the city with other inland provinces departed.40 Even if markets did exist at these gates, they must have been of minor significance. This seems to further substantiate the view that commercial activities in this city were dominantly oriented toward the ocean, either for overseas trade or long-distance domestic trade. Relating to this southern suburban CCD is the issue of foreign settlement discussed in Chapter 3. There was at least one lane in the city with many foreign inhabitants by the end of the twelfth century, and there may have been others where foreigners mixed with the lo­ cals. We cannot verify that this lane was located inside the CCD, but given the fact that most foreign settlers were merchants, the lane may well have existed in a commercial district.

174

Ch'iian-chou City as a Regional Center

As documented above, the rapid growth of maritime trade in Ch'iian­ chou under the Sung led to a marked boom in local industries, and they flourished as a supporting sector to the commercial sector. However, con­ trary to the clearly identifiable CCD, there were virtually no industries lo­ cated in the city of Ch'iian-chou. Instead, they were largely dispersed in the hinterland despite their importance to the local economy. The nearest pot­ tery kiln, for example, was located 8 kilometers (5 mi) northeast of the city.41 Under Liu Ts'ung-hsiao, an arsenal had been set up inside the outer city wall near the southwest gate to produce iron weaponry for his army. The fate of this urban iron workshop after Ch'en Hung-chin's submission to the Sung court is not known; however, the site had been taken over by a nonofficial temple some time before 1201.42 Ironware production on a large scale in Ch'iian-chou city during the Sung is unlik;ely since it would have been necessary to transport both iron ore and fuel a long way from the countryside to the urban area to support this resource-consuming industry. Inside the city, as in other contemporary cities, there may have been some small craft workshops supplying daily necessities for the urban population,43 but they are not mentioned in sources. Their scale is likely to have been small and insignificant for the local economy. Finally, as discussed in Chap­ ter 3, although some have suggested that there might have been shipyards on the bank of the Chin River near the southern commercial suburb, the evi­ dence is too thin to substantiate such a claim.

Residential Districts of the Local Elite Due to the lack of data, it is impossible to establish a clear picture of socio­ economic differentiation in urban Ch'iian-chou under the Sung.44 There is, however, indirect evidence to indicate the distribution of the local elite, par­ ticularly scholar-official households. For this, we can refer to the informa­ tion on the Sungfang (ward) system recorded in the' local gazetteers. The changes in the meaning offang in Chinese cities has been thoroughly examined by scholars.45 It is generally agreed that there was a residential ward system with rigid regulations and control under the T'ang, which started to decline toward the end of that dynasty. By Sung times, most cities were no longer regulated by the ward system. Nevertheless, the terminology offang had not disappeared. The name of afang was not infrequently used to signify a particular residential area and was often inscribed on an arch

Ch'uan-chou City as a Regional Center

175

hanging above or erected beside the entrance to such an area.46 In the case of Ch'iian-chou, the names of Sungfang mentioned in local gazetteers are otten associated with buildings. For instance, the sources otten note that the resi­ dence of a certain official was situated within a particular fang, which is a clear reference to residential area. Map 7.4 shows the approximate locations of some 77 fang that can be dated to the Sung dynasty. On the basis of their names or for the reasons they were established, as noted in the sources, they can be divided into five categories: (1) success in an official career, ( 2) success in the civil service examination, (3) contribution to local education, (4) moral examples, and (5) commerce. Table 7.3 provides subdivided figures under each category for discussion. Most of those singled out in the first category, success in an official ca­ reer, which constituted 44 percent of the total, lived in the enlarged walled area outside the inner city where the CYD was located. Also, in contrast to the concentration of yamens in the northern part of the city, almost twice as many of those mentioned in this category resided in the southern half of the city rather than the northern part. Map 7.4 shows that there were two areas where denser concentrations of these elite households were located: ( 1) the southern side of the east-west main street to the east of the inner city; and ( 2) both sides of the east-west main street to the west of the inner city. There does not seem to be a clear relationship between the CYD and the residential preference of the elite class. This does not agree with the general pattern in later cities, as summarized by Skinner, in which the urban gentry preferred to live near the administrative nucleus.47 Whereas fang in the first category reflected the success of a household member or members in the officialdom, those in the second category indi­ cated households whose members had succeeded in qualifying for an official career and thus for local elite status. From Table 7.3, it is clear that over 80 percent of these cases came from the southern half of the city; again, there is little relationship between their residences and the CYD. On the other hand, cases representing success in the civil service examination do exhibit a closer relation with those pertaining to education. Without exception, all six fang distinguished by a contribution to this field are concentrated in the southern half of the city as well. Interestingly, most of them were close to the prefectural school, which may have played a significant role in training successful candidates for the civil service examination, regardless of its aca" 48 dem1c . and moral reputation.

-

•

N-

DO

Categories offang denomination !::,.

Success in official career

•

Success in civil service examination

[l!iJ -II-

Prcfectural yamen ofCh'Uan-chou Gates

• Contribution to local education

Bridges

0

Moral examples

Commercial district

*

Commercial

0

0'.)

Small hills

-""'" """"- Possible gardens, farmlands, and

0.5

I km

uninhabited spaces ........... Riverbank in the twentieth century

Map 7.4 Distribution offang in Sung Ch'iian-chou (SOURCES! PMTC. 14: sb-nb; CCFC {1612), 5: 27a-28a; CCHC, 2: 21b-23b)

Tablq.3 Distribution Pattern ofSungfang by Category ofName Zone

NWI NWII NEI NEII SWI SWII SEI SEII SS ES TOTAL PERCENT

Official career

Civil service examination

Local education

Moral exemplar

Commerce

l 6 l 4 2 8 2 IO 0 0

0 l 0 2 2 9 l 2 0 l

0 0 0 0 0 3 l 2 0 0

0 4 0 2 2 4 0 0 l 0

0 0 0 0 0 l 0 0 5 0

34 44

18 23

6 8

13 17

6 8

Total

Percent

II

14

8 6 25 4 14 6

II 8 33 5 18 8

77 IOO

IOO

Ch'uan-chou City as a Regional Center The fourth category contains fang names with moral implications, such as "filial piety" ( ching-hsiao) , "harmonious brotherhood" (hsiao-t'i), "righteous­ ness" (hao-i), and so on. They were usually established to commemorate ex­ emplary figures who were commoners. Two areas in which a higher con­ centration of such fang occurred deserve our attention. The first one was in SWII zone, an area inhabited by many imperial clansmen and elite house­ holds. The other one was located north of the CYD, where there were rela­ tively few elite households. Being in the vicinity of the elite does not seem to have a prerequisite for a reputation of this sort. The last category conspicuously reflected the commercial interests of the inhabitants in the area. These included names such as "accumulating for­ tune" (fu-ts'ai), "mound and gate of an enclosed market" (huan-k'uei), and so on. Thesefangs may well indicate residences and shops of the merchant class. Most of them were located in the southern suburb, the CCD of the city.

Ch'uan-chou Versus Fu-chou: Intra-prejectural Population Distribution In the last chapter, we briefly dealt with the inter-prefectural population distribution pattern of S01.1:th Fukien in order to illustrate the differences among its three prefectures. However, prefectural population may not ade­ quately indicate the nature of the local economy. There were prefectures that accommodated a larger population and yet did not develop a prosper­ ous local economy. Ch'iian-chou was both a center of the regional economy and the prefecture with highest population concentration within the region. But in the provincial context, its population was less than that of the provin­ cial capital prefecture of Fu-chou, which engaged far less in maritime activi­ ties and was economically less prosperous than Ch'iian-chou from mid-tenth century on. Fu-chou's population in n89, for example, was 321,284 house­ holds, whereas Ch'iian-chou had only 255,758 by 1250.49 These two prefec­ tures hence constitute a good comparison. Tables 7.4 and 7.5 present their respective population-distribution patterns by county. The population distribution among the counties in Fu-chou prefecture for the year n82 is recorded in detail in the Sung prefectural gazetteer for Fu-chou, the San-shan chih. The percentage of the total prefectural popula­ tion living in each county is shown in Table 7.4. Since the territory of the prefectural capital comprised the two adjacent counties of Min and Hou-

Ch'uan-chou City as a Regional Center

179

Table 7.4 Household Distribution in Fu-chou Prefecture, u82 (by county) Households

County Min Hou-kuan Huai-an Fu-ch'ing Ch'ang-ch'i Ku-t'ien Lien-chiang Ch'ang-le Yung-fu Min-ch'ing Lo-yuan Ning-te TOTAL

Percent

32,745 26,916 23,310 48,512 46,324 43,836* 18,714 13,264 21,367 14,558 12,389 19,349

IO 8 7 15 14 14 6 4 7 5 4 6

321,284

IOO

*The figure for Ku-t'ien is incomplete in the source. This figure is de­ rived from the prefectural total. SOURCE: SSC,

IO:

6b.

kuan, its actual percentage of the total population should be the sum of them, 18 percent, or in number of households, ca. 601000. Even so, the capi­ tal territory of Fu-chou prefecture apparently contained a population only slightly larger than those of the three other large counties: Fu-ch'ing (15 per­ cent), Ku-t'ien (14 percent), and Ch'ang-ch'i (14 percent). More important, each of these three were located at a considerable distance from the Fu-chou city-approximately 120 km (75 mi) for Fu-ch'ing, 150 km (93 mi) for Ku­ t'ien, and 240 km (149 mi) for Ch'ang-ch'i. These distances would make them difficult to integrate into a single population concentration for any economic advantage. This indicates that the degree of population concentration in or near the territory of the prefectural capital was rather low. Within this terri­ tory, a proportion of the population must have been living in adjacent sub­ urbs, meaning that the intramural city ofFu-chou might not have accommo­ dated a high proportion ofthese 60,000 registered households. In this case, its urban population would be well under 20,000 households.

180

Ch'uan-chou City as a Regional Center Table ].5 Reconstructed Household Distribution in Ch'iian-chou Prefecture, 1250 (by county) 1250

County Chin-chiang Nan-an T'ung-an Hui-an An-ch'i Yung-ch'un Te-hua PREFECTURAL TOTAL

1490

Households

Percent

97,000 60,000b 14,000 36,000 15,000 15,000

l8,oood

38 23 6 14 6 6 7

256,000

100

a

c

Percent

44 15.5 16 II

6 4.5 3 100

NOTES:

Figures in bold are raw data from the records or their percentages unless specified. "Based on 38 percent of the prefectural total. bLin Yu, Nan-an hsien-chih, 6: 2b, provides a household figure of 58,802 for ca. n26. Since the overall prefectural population had been steadily increasing in the twelfth century (from 201,406 households recorded in 1080 in SS to 255,758 in 1250), it would be a very modest esti­ mate to put Nan-an's population at 60,000 households in 1250. 'Based on 6 percent of the prefectural total. dTe-hua hsien-chih pien-tsuan wei-yuan-hui, Te-hua hsien-chih (1531), 3: 2a, provides a house­ hold figure of 17,781 for ca. 1200. It would be a modest estimate to assume 18,000 households in Te-hua in 1250. SOURCES: 1250: Mo Shang-chien, Hui-an hsien-chih, 6: 1b-2a; Lin Yu-nien, An-ch'i hsien-chih, 1: 18a- b; Chai Piao, Yung-ch'un hsien-chih, 3: n3. The figures for Chin-chiang and Tung-an are calculated according to the prefectural total of 255,758. 1490: PMTC, 20: 3a/b.

The pattern in Ch'iian-chou was the opposite of Fu-chou's. Although a complete set of county household figures for Sung Ch'iian-chou is not avail­ able, we do have raw household figures for the prefecture as a whole and for five of the seven counties in this prefecture in the Southern Sung. These en­ able us to make a rough reconstruction of the distribution. The prefectural total for the year 1250 was 255,758. Figures for each county would have been recorded in the 1250 edition of the prefectural gazetteer, which is not extant. However, the mid-Ming editions of the County Gazetteer of Hui-an (Hui-an

Ch'uan-chou City as a Regional Center

181

hsien-chih) , the County Gazetteer of An-ch'i (An-ch'i hsien-chih), and the County Gazetteer of Yung-ch'un (Yung-ch'un hsien-chih) quote the 1250 figures for these counties. In addition, the Ch'ing edition of the County Gazetteer of Nan-an (Nan-an hsien-chih) provides a figure for around 1126, and a Ming edition of the County Gazetteer of Te-hua (Te-hua hsien-chih) gives a figure for ca. 1200.

These last two figures can allow us to project estimates for 1250. Only the figures for Chin-chiang and Tung-an are unknown. However, the figures for the other five counties in the prefecture as well as the prefectural total from a set of 1490 county-level distribution records from the Provincial Gaz­ etteer of the Eight Fukien Prefectures (Pa-min t'ung-chih) allow us to make edu­ cated guesses for these two counties. As indicated in Table 7.5, the prefec­ tural capital county of Chin-chiang and the county of Tung-an together had to share 44 percent of the prefectural total, yersus 44 percent for Chin­ chiang and 16 percent for Tung-an in 1490. Since the heyday of Ch'iian­ chou as a great commercial center virtually ended after the Yuan dynasty, and maritime commercial activities in Ming Ch'iian-chou were not compa­ rable with those under the Sung-Yuan period, it is safe to assume that Chin­ chiang in 1250 would have contained the lion's share of 44 percent. I allocate the minimum possible proportion of the 44 percent to Tung-an-6 per­ cent-and the remaining 38 percent to Chin-chiang. If this reconstruction is not entirely conjectural, it is clear that the popu­ lation of Ch'iian-chou prefecture during the late Sung was densely concen­ trated in the prefectural capital county of Chin-chiang and its neighboring county of Nan-an, just a few kilometers away. Together they accounted for over 60 percent of the prefectural population total. This is obviously quite different from Fu-chou's 18 percent and represents a high-density population concentration sharing the same economic environment and opportunities. In terms of actual figures, the household population of the Fu-chou pre­ fectural capital territory in 1182 was ca. 60,000,' and that of the Ch'iian-chou prefectural capital territory in 1250 was around 97,000, or 157,000 if that of Nan-an is included. The population of the capital territory of Ch'iian-chou thus was 62 percent larger than that of Fu-chou, or 162 percent larger if Nan-an is included. This differentiation in the degree of population con­ centration in the prefectural capital territory is significant. This is illustrated in Table 7.6. . To understand this phenomenon, I present two hypothetical economic

Ch'uan-chou City as a Regional Center

182

Table 7.6 Intra-prefectural Population Distributions for Ch'iian-chou and Fu-chou (in households) Households

Fu-chou (N 12)

Ch'iian-chou (N 7)

5 2 0 3 I (2)"

4 0

=

10,000-20,000 21,000-30,000 31,000-40,000 41,000-50,000 51,000-60,000 61,000-70,000 71,000-80,000 81,000-90,000 91,000-roo,ooo

=

0

b I

0 0 0 {

• Hou-kuan and Min. These were twin counties, and their county capitals were in Fu-chou city. They combined to form the prefectural capital territory and are counted as one unit here. They are counted as two units in N. bNan-an. 'Chin-chiang, the prefectural capital county.

models for Ch'iian-chou and Fu-chou in order to compare prefectures with similar populations and comparable capital territories. The first model pre­ supposes a situation in which most of the population within a prefecture is scattered over a vast number of smaller agglomerations, ranging from rural villages to county capitals, with a relatively small concentration in the pre­ fectural capital territory and the prefectural city. One likely implication of this is that relatively more people would be directly engaged in agricultural production in the rural areas. There may be frequent exchanges of necessary goods, but only on a small scale in terms of both quantity and market value of the .goods traded. The second model assumes the converse situation, in which the popula­ tion of a prefecture is relatively concentrated in a small number of central places, particularly the prefectural capital territory and the prefectural city. Two plausible explanations of such a population distribution pattern are that a great proportion of the prefectural population is engaged in non­ agricultural occupations and that the scale of commerce in this prefecture is much larger than that of the first model. The factors contributing to such a

Ch'iian-chou City as a Regional Center population concentration may vary from case to case. One frequently occur­ ring factor, however, is that unfavorable return from agricultural efforts on less fertile lands drives more people to turn to non-agricultural occupations. And of the non-agricultural occupations, trade, on a large or small scale, is perhaps the one open to most. In the first case, the local economy would be more self-contained and static. External exchange on a large scale is not necessary and thus not en­ couraged. Intensive economic development resulting from commercial ex­ pansion becomes accordingly less possible. In the second case, as local sub­ sistence production falls behind local demand, external sources of wealth would be keenly sought to cover the deficit stemming from imports of sub­ sistence goods. Long-distance trade, whether overseas or domestic, trans­ shipment or export, is the usual and logical solution. The local economy is thus more dynamic and open. These two models are put forth here to make sense of the cases of Fu­ chou and Ch'iian-chou as illustrated in Tables 7.4 and 7.5. Prefectural population has often been used in studies of demographic distribution, and many implicit assumptions have been made in these studies. One of them is to assume that there is a logical linkage between population growth as re­ flected in prefectural population totals and the degree of economic prosper­ ity. The discussion here suggests that it is imperative for us to also look at the intra-prefectural distribution so as to understand the characteristics of the economy.

Urban Population in Ch'uan-chou and South Fukien The �egree of population concentration in the urban area within the capital territory may also reflect the importance of commerce in the local economy. The urban population of Ch'iian-chou city during Sung times was not re­ corded in detail. Two pieces of evidence, however, are relevant to this issue. In an inscription commemorating the rebuilding of the city wall in 1120, the then-prefect Lu Shou stated: "There are eighty residential wards inside the walled city, totaling about 500,000 inhabitants."50 A piece of parallel prose written in late Southern Sung records: "The city wall encloses over 100,000 households."51 Using the first piece of evidence, Liang Keng-yao estimated the urban population of Ch'iian-chou city in the Southern Sung at 50,000 to 100,000 households.52 His claim may gain support from the second piece of evidence.

Ch'uan-chou City as a Regional Center However, taJ?ng,into consideration the physical size of the walled area and the q1:1estion of"population density, I would suggest that the lower side of that range might well have been the closer to the case. Let us assume a maximum size of the urban area, including the southern suburb walled in 1230 and the small suburbs outside the east and southeast gates, of 700 hectares ( 2.7 mi2). The city would have a population density of 185,185 persons per square mile if it had 500,000 inhabitants or 92,593 persons per square mile in the case of having halfthat number of city dwellers. Compared with the imperial capitals of Ch'ang-an in the T'ang dynasty and of Peking in 1578, whose population densities per square mile have been estimated as 34,483 and 29,149, respec­ tively,53 even the smaller estimate of 92,593 looks quite enormous. A safer es­ timate therefore is to put the population of the city at 50,000 households, or 250,000 persons, at the most.54 Even on the basis of this conservative estimate, nearly half the county's population of 97,000 households would have resided in the urban area in the mid-thirteenth century. And most of these residents must have made a living in non-agricultural occupations. Such a high degree of urbanization within a county territory is likely to have been extremely unusual among Sung cities.55 In comparison, Fu-chou city may, as suggested earlier, have taken up only one-third of the 60,000 households registered in_ the two counties of Min and Hou-kuan, which jointly constituted the prefectural capital, in the late twelfth century.56 This means that there were only some 20,000 households living in Fu-chou city. Also, Michael Finegan has found, among the Sung cities he studied, that the highest proportion of population in the prefectural capital in terms of total population of the prefectural capital county was in Chen-chiang-fu. Even in this case it was less than 40 percent. In most other cases, the proportion was around IO percent.57 This further illustrates the uniqueness of the high con­ centration in Ch'iian-chou, which resulted from the prosperity of the mari­ time economy.

Ch'iian-chou as a Commercial City or an Administrative City? As discussed above, the overall intramural structure of urban Ch'iian-chou shows that there were two conspicuously different districts: the CYD and the CCD. The administrative center was in the northern half of the inner city, and the commercial district was located in the southern suburb. Moreover, there were two nuclei of elite residences: both were situated out-

Ch'iian-chou City as a Regional Center side the inner city and along the east-west main street, one in the eastern half of the city and the other in the western half. Although this scenario is different from the binuclear concept put forth by Skinner, according to which the elite nucleus would converge with the administrative one,58 there is a clear separation between the elite residential nucleus and the commercial nucleus. Although we lack further information on demographic structure, this feature echoes Rozman's typology of urban areas in his analysis of Ch'ing Tientsin. He has succinctly demonstrated the demographic differen­ tiation of the administrative inner-city area and the commercial outer-city area.59 At least in terms of social composition, there are intriguing com­ monalities between the two cities despite the temporal difference of almost 600 years. The case of Sung Ch'iian-chou reinforces the notion of the growing im­ pact of the economy on Sung cities. The emergence and prosperity of the CCD in the southern suburb as the most distinguishable development of the city during the dynasty illustrates this point. The dispersion of industries in the hinterland may further suggest that the city's economy was basically commercially oriented. Nevertheless, economic forces, important as they were, should not be considered strong enough to override political forces in this case. As shown in the analysis of the intramural structure of Ch'iian­ chou city, the administrative nucleus still occupied the heartland of the city, manifesting the principle of the cent�ality of the governing apparatus, the yamens. Next to it emerged two nuclei of residential districts of the local elite; this reflects not only its dominant core location and authoritative posi­ tion in the overall layout but also its attraction to the elite in selecting their residential area. In contrast, the economically important but physically pe­ ripheral, and ideologically subordinate, commercial nucleus was located out­ side the city wall. This unequal binuclear phenomenon indicates that al­ though the Sung government policy toward commerce became more positive and merchants enjoyed a somewhat better social position during the Sung in comparison with their status in previous dynasties,60 the administrative function continued to dominate urban life.

E I G H T

Regional Economic Integration: A Case Study of Export Ceramics in South Fukien

As we have seen, the maritime trade in Ch'iian-chou at the height of its de­ velopment in the twelfth century was by no means merely a transshipment trade of luxury imports. Large quantities of agricultural products and manufactured items were exported. This export capacity, in addition to the cross-regional and long-distance transshipment trade, played a vital role in making Ch'i.i.an-chou a commercial center at the national level. In this chap­ ter, I seek to explore the resulting cross-sectoral economic integration of the region by examining an important local industry that was oriented toward exports on a significant scale-the manufacture of export ceramics, or wai­ 1

mao-tz'u in Chinese. In the next two sections I present an overview of this industry in South Fukien. I then analyze its structure and operation, and fi­ nally I compare the export ceramics industry in South Fukien with that in other major maritime regions in the last section in order to demonstrate the economic integration of the region's economy.

Export Ceramics of South Fukien Export ceramics played a significant role in the industrial sector of the South Fukien economy. Only a few non-agricultural export items-export ceramics, iron implements, silk and cotton textiles, and miscellaneous handicrafts-are known to have come &om South Fukien.2 However, in terms of geographical distribution, scale of production, market value, employment, and reputation earned overseas, export ceramics occupied a prominent role in the region's

Regional Economic Integration industrial sector. We also have more information on this industry because the remains of export ceramics and the kilns that manufactured them are better preserved today than other Sung products and their manufactories. This in­ formation does not come from primary sources, for export ceramics were never a prominent topic in the writings of traditional literati, and the scattered refer­ ences to ceramics in those materials are too fragmentary to allow meaningful analysis. However, a large body of archaeological reports, many never pub­ lished, that has accumulated over the past few decades provides an intriguing picture of the ceramics industry in the region. In fact, exciting discoveries are still being made, and in another decade, our understanding of this topic will be far more substantial than it is today.3 The analysis in this chapter is necessarily subject to future revision as new materials appear. Nevertheless, it is based on what has been published by those with firsthand knowledge of the field and can be taken as valid until proved otherwise by future findings.4 Chapter 6 outlined the county system of South Fukien. Four counties in Ch'iian-chou prefecture and three each in Hsing-hua and Chang-chou were lo­ cated in or close to coastal areas. Another three counties in Ch'iian-chou and one county in Chang-chou were established in the mountainous interior. Of these counties, more information on export ceramics production is available for three counties in the lowlands:5 Chin-chiang,6 Nan-an,7 and T'ung-an.8 Kiln­ sites have also been found in two other coastal regions under the jurisdiction of Ch'iian-chou prefecture during the Sung: Amoy island (called Chia-ho Is­ land and under the jurisdiction of Tung-an during the Sung),9 and in Hui­ an county.10 There are also sites in P'u-t'ien (prefectural capital county) and Hsien-yu counties of Hsing-hua-chiin11 and in Chang-p'u county of Chang­ chou.12 In addition, all three highland counties, An-ch'i,13 Te-hua,14 and Yung­ ch'un, 15 participated in export ceramics production. Accurate dating of the specimens and kiln sites is still a formidable task. However, archaeologists have fixed approximate dates for some of them. To judge from available information, large-scale production of export ceramics in South Fukien started some time in the late eleventh century and continued through the end of the Yuan dynasty.16 This is in line with the regional devel­ opment pattern documented in Part I. Although ceramics were produced in South Fukien in earlier periods, it was not until the twelfth century that the commercial sector was able to spur the industry to substantial growth. Once this process started, the fast growth ofthis industry to satisfy an ever-increasing demand in overseas markets generated further impetus for commercial

188

Regional Economic Integration

expansion. As discussed below, successful imitation of popular wares that originated in the Liang-che and Chiang-hsi circuits also significantly reduced the problems and costs of obtaining such goods for transshipment from the ports of South Fukien.17

Sung-Yuan Kilns in South Fukien The overview of the distribution of known kiln sites in the seven counties of Ch'iian-chou prefecture presented in Table 8.r shows that they were concen­ trated on the coastal plain during Sung-Yuan times.18 This is the opposite of the situation during the Ming and the Ch'ing, when the kilns in the mountain­ ous inland area enjoyed much greater prosperity, probably because the industry consumed a great deal ofwood as fuel and supplies had been exhausted faster in the plains area. In fact, even during the Sung-Yuan period, the primary centers appeared first on the plains in late Northern Sung and then spread to the hilly hinterlands in the Southern Sung and the Yuan.19 As shown in Map 8.r, Nan-an had the largest number of kilns in South Fu­ kien during the Southern Sung and the Yuan and is thought to have been a primary center. Chin-chiang and Te-hua were also primary centers for ceramics production at this time. These three counties had the largest number of kiln sites and produced most of the export ceramics for the region.20 Tung-an also played a significant role in the industry, although, as shown in Table 8.r, it did not have many kiln sites during the Sung-Yuan period.21 In order to facilitate further analysis of the structure of the industry and its export characteristics, it is necessary to categorize the wide range of wares from these kilns. Ceramics can be classified in different ways. In the case of Sung wares, the usual classification distinguishes more than ten categories. Each re­ fers to a rather distinct style and is named after the principal kiln specializing in that style. This classification, needless to say, carries a geographical implication. A particular category of ware, however, was often produced by kilns specializ­ ing in other styles. Furthermore, this scheme is problematic for South Fukien wares, because few of them find a place in the kiln name-based categorization of Sung wares. For the purposes of the present investigation, it is more con­ venient to classify them first by color and then by such considerations as deco­ ration, body quality, and other stylistic features. Accordingly, among the ce­ ramics baked in Sung-Yuan kilns in this region, four major categories can be identified: celadon wares, amber-like dark-colored earthenwares with lead glazes ( tsa-se t'ao), white wares, and ying-ch'ing (bluish white) wares.22

189

Regional Economic Integration

Legend

40

80

km

CO : 5)

*

Kiln sites

•

Kiln area by county

•

Kiln area by county/prefecture

•

Regional maritime center (kiln area by county)

Map 8.1 Distribution of kiln sites in South Fukien, Southern Sung-Yuan

Celadon was a leading type of Sung-Yuan Chinese stoneware. Those found in South Fukien can be divided into two subcategories. The first is an imitation of the Lung-ch'iian celadon, the most valuable and admired Sung green-colored stoneware, so called because it was primarily produced in a county of the same name in the southwestern part of the Liang-che circuit.23 These imitations were . ch·m-ch.rang,24 Nan-an,25 An-ch"r,26 and P'u-t1en. made mai·n1y m ,. v The second variety of celadon is a group of dark olive-green or yellowish green stoneware bowls with a dotted comb decoration. In Japan, this type of celadon is known as juko seiji (Ch. chu-kuang ch'ing-tz'u) teabowls. Although their provenance was previously unknown; it has now been established that they originated from

190

Regional Economic Integration Table 8.r Distribution of Kiln Sites in Ch'iian-chou County

Pre-Sung

Sung-Yuan

Ming-Ch'ing

Coastal Chin-chiang Nan-an Hui-an T'ung-an

9 3 6

An-ch'i Yung-ch'un Te-hua

o

TOTAL

14 (10.8%) 47 (36.1%) l ( 0.8%) 6 (4.6%)

8 3 0 0

o

o

23 (17.7%) 6 (4.6%) 33 (25.4%)

105 15 152

19

130 (100%)

283

Inland

SOURCES: Yeh Wen-ch'eng, Chung-kuo ku-wai-hsiao-tz'u, Yiian Ch'iian-chou t'ao-tz'u," p. 89.

p. 193;

Hsii Ch'ing-ch'iian, "Sung­

South Fukien, especially Tung-an. They are now labeled the 'Tung-an style" by ceramics scholars.28 Kilns in Amoy, Chang-p'u, P'u-t'ien, and An-ch'i, how­ ever, also baked similar wares.29 Amber-like earthenwares with dark-colored glazes (hereafter "colored wares") were baked mainly in Tz'u-tsao in Chin-chiang. It is believed that their bodies were first baked at low temperature without a glaze and then colored with a layer of lead glaze and fired again. Such wares were produced in a wide range of heavy colors such as dark green, brown, black, and so on.30 A kind of black-glazed teabowl was in fact an imitation of a famous variety of teabowl, called temmoku (Ch. t'ien-mu) in Japan, that had originated in Chien-chou on the upper tributary of the Min River.31 White wares came mainly fi:om Te-hua. The texture of their color was chalkier than that of contemporary white wares fi:om Ching-te-chen in the Chiang-hsi circuit, and their glaze looks creamy. They are clearly distinguish­ able fi:om the celebrated white wares fi:om Ting-chou in north China during the Northern Sung, which had a strong ivory tinge. As Te-hua's white wares developed in later dynasties, they earned a reputation in the European market, where they were known by the name of blanc de chine. At this stage, they

191

Regional Economic Integration Table 8.2 Distribution of the Four Categories of Ceramics in South Fukien During the Sung

County Chin-chiang

Wan-yao

Tz'u-tsao Nan-an T'ung-an Hui-an Te-hua

An-ch'i

Yung-ch'un P'u-t'ien

Hsien-yu

Chang-p'u

Celadon

Colored

White

*

Ying­ ch'ing *

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

* *

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

SOURCES: Feng Hsien-ming, "Hsin Chung-kuo t'ao-tz'u k'ao-ku," pp. 52-53; Ch'en Peng, "Fu­ chien ch'ing-tiu k'ao-ch'a."

remained a "soft porcelain" with a high alkali content, baked at a temperature lower than that required for making ying-ch'ing.32 Both the colored and white wares of South Fukien were local products rather distinct from ceramics made in other parts of Sung-Yuan China. Ying-ch'ing ceramics are characterized by a translucent white body covered with transparent glaze and are very close to high-fired porcelain. The glaze is white with a strong bluish tinge and clearly distinct from Te-hua white wares. The most famous variety was produced in Ching-te-chen under the Southern Sung and Yuan. In South Fukien it was made mainly in Tung-an, Nan-an, An­ ch'i, Yung-ch'un, Chang-p'u, and Te-hua.33 Theying-ch'ingofSouth Fukien were probably imitations of those made in Ching-te-chen, but based on techniques and knowledge transferred from Ch'ao-chou, which was a primary center ofying­ ch'ing production prior to the rise ofSouth Fukien ceramics industry.34 Table 8.2 shows the locations in terms of counties where different categories of ceramics have been found at kiln sites. Among the four categories, celadon is the most commonly found product in the region, available in around 90 percent

192

Regional Economic Integration

of the excavated sites.35 The second most common ware was ying-ch'ing. In gen­ eral, kilns in the plain areas tended to concentrate more on the baking of cela­ don or dark-colored wares, whereas those in mountain areas specialized in the light-colored ying-ch'ing or white wares. The various wares discussed above are believed to have been largely, though not exclusively, produced for export. This view can be supported on at least two grounds. First, the size and number of kilns and their concentration far ex­ ceeded the level necessary to satisfy local demand. Second, many specimens of the products of these kilns have been found in Japan, the Philippines, Indone­ sia, and other Southeast Asian countries, and their physical characteristics tend to be quite different from those of the wares produced locally.36 The more important South Fukien ceramics fall into two categories: imita­ tions of popular wares or wares of a distinct local style. For commercial pur­ poses, the production of wares imitating famous, high-quality, and lucrative products of other regions is understandable. Such wares were in high demand overseas, yet they were made in regions remote from South Fukien, and the cost of transporting them to Ch'iian-chou for export was high.37 Geographi­ cally, the ports of Fu-chou, Wen-chou, Ming-chou, and even Kuang-chou had better access to the sources of these popular wares. It is therefore natural that maritime traders in South Fukien would encourage local potters to produce imitations. After north China came under Jiirchen control, potters from the northern kilns may also have migrated to this region. The most noticeable imi­ tations were those of Lung-ch'iian celadon and Ching-te-chen ying-ch'ing. Al­ though coarser than the authentic products, these replacements were good enough for the overseas markets, especially since they were mass-produced, lower-priced wares. Less important in quantity but still a good example of imi­ tation export ceramics is the temmoku teabowl. Temmoku imitations from Te­ hua were clearly inferior to the original Chien-yao products, but for export ce­ ramics their quality was good. There were, however, other types of ceramics from this region that had a stronger local identity and even constituted particular categories of Sung ce­ ramics. Examples are thejuko seiji, Te-hua white wares, and Tz'u-tsao colored wares mentioned above. The first group enjoyed a high reputation in Kama­ kura Japan, and the other two types have been found in abundant quantities in Southeast Asia.38 Like the imitation wares, these were not very refined ceram­ ics, in spite of their unique characteristics. They were mass-produced and sold

Regional Economic Integration

193

to the overseas markets as cheaper ceramics for the populace instead of the ruling elite. The latter class of customers preferred authentic products from well-established kilns like Lung-ch'ii.an and Ching-te-chen.39

Structure of the Export Ceramics Industry Most of the kilns mentioned above are large in size. For instance, the length of a kiln in Ch'ii.-tou-kung in Te-hua was over 57 meters.40 Kilns of such size could not have been operated by a single household. Two possible modes of opera­ tion have been suggested by investigators: (r) each of these kilns belonged to a single owner, possibly a rich merchant, who paid wages to a large pool of em­ ployees working the kiln;41 or (2) the kilns were joint ventures by individual ce­ ramics workshops. Each workshop made its own pottery up to the stage before firing; then the wares from several workshops were baked in the same kiln.42 The first mode of operation finds support from the case of Ching-te-chen. The T'ao chi, a treatise on the Ching-te-chen ceramics industry written during the Southern Sung, reveals that a certain division of labor existed. Different sections of the industry, each with specialized craftsmen and workers, may have taken charge of different duties, such as preparation of the clay, shaping of the body, decoration, baking, and so on.43 To date, however, no large workshop has been found near a major kiln in South Fukien. Instead, it is not unusual to find the trademarks of various workshops on specimens from a single site. For in­ stance, in the Tz'u-tsao kiln sites of Chin-chiang, there are trademarks such as "Ch'eng-chia" (literally, "the Ch'eng family" or "the Ch'eng family workshop"?), "Wu" (Wu as a surname, workshop of the Wus?), "Chang Chin chi" (shop or workshop of Chang Chin, a potter's name?).44 The shards discovered in Chang­ p'u have incised marks with the surnames Ts'ai, Cheng, Lin, Wang, and a Ch'en from a place called Hou-shan.45 Thus the second hypothesis may be the correct one for the larger kilns. Another possibility is that,other private work­ shops, although not involved in the building of the kilns, may have paid to have their products baked during the firings. These small pottery workshops must have located near the kilns, for unfired pottery is extremely fragile and simply cannot be transported in a pack for more than a couple of kilometers. The first hypothesis, if valid at all, may apply only to smaller kilns. Since ceramics pro­ duction requires considerable skills and knowledge and can be carried on throughout the year, we may expect that most, if not all, potters in the industry worked full-time rather than part-time.

Regional Economic Integration

194

Kilns in South Fukien were typically constructed on a hillside, with a stream or river nearby.46 These "dragon kilns" (lung-yao) were long and slender, and each kiln consisted of many connected firing chambers. The firing capacity of each large kiln is estimated at required 3,000 to

10,000-30,000 pieces,47 and each firing possibly

5,000 kilograms of wood as fuel.48 This estimate is based on

fuel-consumption figures for the early twentieth century. Since firing tech­ niques and the kiln design have improved over time, actual fuel consumption in the Sung-Yuan period would be higher than this. Fuel could be obtained in the woods and forests on the hills where the kilns were located. Another important raw material for ceramics is kaolin, which was also abundant throughout the region.49 Hence, the cost of transporting fuel and kaolin to the kilns would not have been high. However, the cost of shipping baked ceramics from the kilns to the markets in cities was certainly much higher, for they are fragile and heavy when piled up and packed for shipment. This explains why the kilns were lo­ cated near waterways and why the industry first flo urished in the coastal coun­ ties nearest to the maritime shipping centers. As the case of Te-hua shows, however, the industry was lucrative enough to make the transportation costs of finished products within the region a secondary rather than a primary consid­ eration. How many people were supported by this industry? Mary Tregear esti­ mates that "several hundreds of people were required for quite a modest pot­ tery" and that "the larger well-known potteries employed thousands."50 Her es­ timates are probably based on the degree of specialization in the ceramics industry and the scale of the kiln sites discovered to date. Although they are educated guesses and refer to Sung kilns in general, still the average kiln in South Fukien probably involved hundreds, if not thousands, of workers. If those engaged in the various stages of export ceramics distribution are also con­ sidered, the projection would even be higher. However, to be more conserva­ tive, I assume that each kiln supported at least rqo households, or

500 people.

Apart from the potters and kilnworkers, these also included a wide variety of people ranging from the porters and peddlers who carried the export ceramics to the towns or the port to the maritime traders who shipped them overseas.51 A total of 130 Sung-Yuan kilns have been discovered in Ch'iian-chou alone (see

Table 8.r). If those in the other two prefectures are included, the total is 144. A

crude but conservative estimate would be that at the height of the maritime trade well over

13,000 households,

or

65,000 people,

may have engaged in the

Regional Economic Integration

195

Table 8.3 Proportion of County Population {in households) Involved in Export Ceramics in the Late Southern Sung Households Number of County (prefecture)

involved Proportion

households

Kiln

in export

(est.)

sites

ceramics

(%)

Te-hua ( Ch'iian-chou)

18,000

33

3,300

18.3

An-ch'i (Ch'iian-chou)

15,000

23

2,JOO

15.3

Nan-an (Ch'iian-chou)

60,000

47

4,700

7.8

Hsien-yu (Hsing-hua)

6,ooo

3

300

5

14,000

6

600

4.3

Yung-ch'un ( Ch'iian-chou)

15,000

6

600

4

Chang-p'u ( Chang-chou)

34,000

7

700

2

Chin-chiang (Ch'iian-chou)

97,000

14

I,400

1.4

P'u-t'ien (Hsing-hua)

661000

4

400

o.6

Hui-an (Ch'iian-chou)

36,000

IOO

0.3

Tung-an (Ch'iian-chou)

NOTE: The estimate for households/kiln has been revised fi:om 50 to roo. SOURCE: So Kee Long, "Liang Sung Min-nan Kuang·tung wai-mao-tz'u ch'an·yeh," p. 140.

production and business of export ceramics in Ch'iian-chou. Against a prefec­ tural population of over one million in early thirteenth century, this estimate suggests that over 6.5 percent of the inhabitants of Ch'iian-chou prefecture re­ lied directly on income generated from this industry. If the entire region is taken into consideration, against a population of over two million at the same period, 72,000 persons, or 3.6 percent, would have been involved in the export ceramics business. Although all these kilns might not have been in operation simultaneously, the chance is that, in such a concentrated and market-driven industry, they are likely to have come into being when the region's maritime economy was booming. If we assume that 75 percent of the 144 kilns existed at the time of highest demand, some 50,000 persons relied on this industry and trade for a living. These estimates suggest that a substantial proportion of the local population were engaged in but one non-agricultural industry, an impres­ sive phenomenon in Sung-Yuan China. Table 8.3 shows the estimated proportion by county of the population in­ volved in export ceramics. The ratio ranged from 0 .3 percent (Hui-an) to 18.3

Regional Economic Integration percent (Te-hua). But the highest three percentages-18.3 percent (Te-hua), 15 (An-ch'i), and 7.8 (Nan-an)-are all above the prefectural figure of 7.3 percent for Ch'iian-chou and clearly indicate the prominent role export ceramics played in the local economy. Under the Yuan, the population of Ch'iian-chou, as well as that of the entire region, declined dramatically, from 255,758 households in 1250 to 89,060 in 1290.52 However, the export ceramics industry continued to prosper in this new regime (see Chapter 5). If we assume the number of house­ holds involved in the industry remained unchanged, it would now account for around 14 percent of the prefectural population, double the percentage at the end of the Southern Sung. There are no extant records on the costs and profits for the ceramics indus­ try. As a rough estimate, let us assume in the export ceramics industry that the average production cost for one piece was IO cash,53 the price at the port 20 cash, and the selling price in overseas markets 40 cash. During the process of circulation, a commercial value of 50 cash would be created out of the produc­ tion cost of IO cash. If we further assume a 50 percent net profit for the produc­ ers and commercial agents at various points of the circulation (the other half being the circulation cost), the estimated profit per piece was 25 cash. If an av­ erage kiln could bake 30,000 vessels in one firing and there were 15 firings each year, 75 percent of the 144 kilns in South Fukien, which is the minimum num­ ber of kilns for the 144 known kiln sites, could well generate an annual profit of nearly three-quarters of a million of strings of cash. On the other hand, the assumption that the production cost for each vessel was IO cash would mean that the potters had to inject around 480,000 strings of cash into the production each year. This represented a sizable investment in production alone, not to mention the capital investment in the kilns and other prod�ction tools. Would the kiln owners and the potters bear this enormous cost solely by themselves:' Would they bear the risk of investing a huge sum without first securing buyers:' These questions point toward a closely integrated operation between the producers and the commercial agents not only in deci­ sions about what to produce and in what quantity, but also in financial ar­ rangements. It is possible that the production sector was financially supported by the commercial sector, and in turn it guaranteed a supply of what was de­ manded in overseas markets. Ho Chuimei has estimated that no less than Sao experienced and skilled potters worked the South Fukien kilns at the early stage of development of this

Regional Economic Integration

197

industry. She believes that this was possible only because of organized migra­ tion of potters from Ch'ao-chou, probably initiated and funded by the South Fukien merchants. She also estimates that starting a large-scale production al­ most overnight in this highly populated region would have required enormous local power to settle a wide range of problems, such as transfers of land and changes in land use and the land tax. All these would call for the involvement of the local elite or highly influential locals.54 Ho's interpretation thus supports the argument for a close connection between the ceramics industry and the maritime commercial sector.

Export Ceramics and the Local Economy: A Comparative Analysis The development of an export ceramics industry in South Fukien reflects the high degree of sectoral integration of the region's economy. The impetus for integration apparently came from the maritime trade. During the prolonged boom in the twelfth century, various parts of the region responded to this op­ portunity. As a result, kilns for export ceramics spread widely. As mentioned earlier, virtually all counties in Ch'iian-chou, including those in the remote inte­ rior highlands, became involved in this industry. Supplementing their output were similar products from neighboring Hsing-hua and Chang-chou. A brief comparison with other contemporary maritime centers will help reveal some characteristics of the industry in South Fukien. Kuang-chou prefecture, Ch'iian-chou's major competitor, comprised eight counties under the Sung, of which only Nan-hai and Ch'ing-yiian counties had kilns producing known export ceramics. For the entire Kuang-nan east cir­ cuit,55 63 known Sung kiln sites have been discovered to date. These were spread across twelve counties, in ten different prefectures. Apart from Ch'ao­ chou, which was the major center of export ceramics industry in this circuit, only Kuang-chou and nearby Hui-chou had two counties each that were pro­ ducing export ceramics. Table 8.4 and Map 8.2 show the distribution of coun­ ties in this circuit where Sung kiln sites were discovered. Although seven out of the twelve sites were located in the interior, the three most important ones­ Kuang-chou fo kiln-sites), Ch'ao-chou (22 kiln-sites), and Hui-chou (6 kiln­ sites)-were along the Kwangtung coast. This indicates a distribution pattern clearly looser in integration and concentrating more highly along the coast than the pattern of South Fukien depicted above.56

Regional Economic Integration Table 8.4 Distribution ofSung Kiln Sites in Kuang-nan East Circuit Prefecture/county Ch'ao-chou/Hai-yang Kuang-chou/Nan-hai Hui-chou/Kuai-shan Nan-en-chou/Yang-chiang Shao-chou/Ch'ii-chiang K'ang-chou/Tuan-ch'i Hui-chou/Po-lo Mei-chou/Ch'eng-hsiang Hsiin-chou/Lung-ch'uan Nan-hsiung-chou/Pao-ch'ang Feng-chou/Feng-ch'uan Kuang-chou/Ch'ing-yiian

Kiln sites 22

r6 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2

TOTAL SOURCE:

So Kee-long, "Liang Sung Min-nan Kuang-tung wai-mao-tz'u ch'an-yeh," p.

139,

Table 2.

Moreover, the rise and fall of the Ch'ao-chou kiln area may serve as refer­ ence points to illustrate the complex functioning of maritime trade in Kuang­ chou and Ch'iian-chou. It is generally accepted that the kilns in that remote coastal region which produced quantities of highly refined ying-ch'ing and cela­ don wares reached their height of development in the second half of the elev­ enth century,57 both in terms of technological advancement and of scale of pro­ duction. Ch'ao-chou ceramics have been found in abundance in overseas markets and are believed to be a major item of export through the port of Kuang-chou during this period. This trade, however, began to decline mark­ edly toward the latter part of the eleventh century, and by the Southern Sung the once prosperous export ceramics industry had vanished.58 Meanwhile, just about 300 kilometers to the north of Ch'ao-chou, kilns had mushroomed and begun to spread to the interior mountainous area as far as Te-hua. How can one interpret this phenomenon? Was it because Ch'iian-chou replaced Kuang­ chou as the maritime trading center during the Southern Sung to the extent that export ceramics from Ch'ao-chou were no longer in demand?59 This is not a convincing explanation because Kuang-chou continued to be a strong

Regional Economic Integration

Fcng-ch'uan (Feng-chou)

199

Ch'ing-yUan *

*

Legend

80

t60

km

0 : 5)

*

Kiln sites (

•

Kiln area by county

•

Kiln area by county/prefecture

•

Regional maritime center (kiln area by county)

Map 8.2 Distribution oflciln sites in Kuang-tung during the Northern Sung

competitor to Ch'iian-chou even in the Southern Sung. More important, Ch'ao-chou is geographically close to South Fukien, and its flourishing export ceramics industry could have survived by changing its distribution point from Kuang-chou to Ch'iian-chou or simply by expanding production to supply the market to its north. In short, Ch' ao-chou should have been in the advantageous position of enjoying a strong demand from export ceramics from two maritime centers under the Southern Sung instead of one as in the Northern Sung. One possible explanation is that during the Northern Sung Ch'ao-chou ceramics were exported via Kuang-chou mainly by Ch'iian-chou maritime merchants, who had to visit Kuang-chou for export customs clearance and the necessary travel permits. Ch'ao-chou, located midway between Ch'iian­ chou and Kuang-chou, developed a flourishing industry and enjoyed the benefits of concentrating on production, leaving the highly risky circulation

200

Regional Economic Integration

business to maritime merchants from elsewhere. We do not need to exclude local Kuang-chou merchants from this process, for they, too, could have participated in the domestic trade of lucrative commodities. In this case, they could ship the wares from Ch'ao-chou to Kuang-chou and sell them to those running overseas voyages. These channels together ensured a great demand that would support a boom in the Ch'ao-chou ceramics industry. Of course, Ch' ao-chou kilns faced strong competition from other kilns in the Pearl River delta, such as the Hsi-ts'un kiln60 near Kuang-chou city, and the technologically advanced kilns in Hui-chou.61 But such competition was not strong enough in terms of technology and scale to ruin the Ch'ao-chou kilns.62 Rather, the decisive blow could have come only from an institutional change in the export ceramics trade. Beginning in ro87, Ch'iian-chou merchants could clear customs locally, saving a trip to Kuang-chou. Under the new system, they no longer needed to support a ceramics center in Ch'ao-chou. Instead, it became more efficient for them to develop a reliable supply in their home region. As such, export ceramics production began to prosper in South Fukien. Earlier I speculated that some initial investment or operational funds might have come from the commercial circle, which would benefit economically from a more prosper­ ous ceramics industry near the home port in many senses: regularity in sup­ ply, better control of quality, easier communication in placing of orders, lower production and transportation costs, cheaper price. Other advantages would be closer social ties among the local potters, the middlemen handling the local circulation, and the merchants operating overseas voyages. In fact, if the factor of transaction costs, which I discuss in detail in Part III, is taken into account, Ch'iian-chou merchants would have an even stronger incentive for ensuring that there was a booming export ceramics industry in South Fukien. As noted above, Ho Chuimei suggested that there may well have been a massive technological transfer from Ch'ao-chou to,Ch'iian-chou. We may not be able to substantiate this scenario with documentary evidence, but the reciprocal development of the export ceramics industry in these two regions certainly fits this hypothesis. Another good example is Ming-chou, which was clearly among the major maritime centers under the Southern Sung. Yet there is hardly any noticeable development of an export ceramics industry there comparable to that in Kuang-chou, much less in Ch'iian-chou. The coast ofHang-chou Bay had ac­ commodated the legendary Yiieh-yao kilns during the Wu-yiieh regime and

Regional Economic Integration

201

early Sung, with main production taking place in Yii-yao county of Yiieh-chou (modern Shaohsing). The Yiieh celadon was a highly exquisite ceramic pro­ duced for imperial consumption. It was also used as a tributary item and luxury export. At its height, production spread to Ming-chou, but this pottery de­ clined drastically during the eleventh century and thereafter almost disap­ peared.63 Export ceramics kiln sites closer to Ming-chou datable to the South­ ern Sung have been discovered only in Sheng-hsien ofYiieh-chou. These were small in scale and hardly comparable to those in South Fukien.64 There was another highly esteemed kiln in Hang-chou, called Chiao-t'an-yao. Its produc­ tion, however, was destined mainly for imperial consumption rather than for export.65 Under the Southern Sung, ceramics centers existed in the southern part of the Liang-che circuit in prefectures such as Ch'u-chou (Lung-ch'iian­ yao), Wu-chou, and Ch'ii-chou.66 Although mainly for domestic consumption, wares from these kilns were also exported through Wen-chou and Ming-chou in the same circuit as well as through ports in Kuang-tung circuit. Even with such exports, it is hard to claim that the Lung-ch'iian kilns flourished mainly as a response to the maritime trade in Ming-chou alone. As we have seen, such a relation can, however, be postulated between South Fukien export ceramics and the Ch'iian-chou maritime trade. It is thus apparent that the maritime trade in South Fukien was far more extensive than that in the Pearl River and Yangtze deltas. The scale of this trade generated a strong momentum for sectoral integration within the re­ gion's economy unparalleled in other parts of Sung-Yuan China. And, as discussed above, the proportion of the local population engaged in the in­ dustry was remarkably high, another clear indicator of high-level integration. This phenomenon could be an effect of the considerably higher share of maritime trade in the hands of the local traders, who are more likely than foreign sojourner traders to invest heavily in the local economy to promote commercialization in other sectors.

P A RT

III

The Structure A Transaction,Cost Analysis of the South Fukien Economy

N I NE

Patterns of Trade: Merchants, Organizations, and Knowledge

Part III investigates the institutional structures of South Fukien that were significant to the economic development outlined in Part I and the spatial integration examined in Part IL The first step in this investigation is to map out the pattern of trade, to see how business was conducted and who was in­ volved in it. Both the formal and informal institutional dimensions, to be analyzed in the following two chapters, respectively, can be meaningfully ex­ plored in terms of transaction costs only with an understanding of the per­ sonnel and organizations they affected. In the following sections, I first con­ struct a typology of South Fukien merchants to show the complexity of this group as well as its underlying dynamics. I then give an account of commer­ cial practices traceable in Sung sources and analyze them in terms of com­ mercial capital and risk. The third section deals with the importance of co1"!-"lmercial knowledge and its availability. As a conclusion, I present a case study of the Srivijayan market to illustrate the dynamic interplay among merchants, organizations, knowledge, and, above all, the market.

A Typology of the Merchant Group Information about the merchants of South Fukien is far from plentiful. Most of it has been noted in Part I. Rather than repeat that information here, I will attempt to put it in perspective. I postulate four dimensions as a typological framework to elucidate the structure of this group of merchants: the business base, ethnic identity, the scale of business, and the context of business.

206

Patterns of Trade

· First, in order to a,halyze the structure of merchants in South Fukien, we peed· a· definition th�t defines the boundary of the group. I have found the concept of"business base" useful for this purpose because it not only offers a more precise criterion for classification but also helps reveal the extent to which a merchant's business was likely to promote local wealth and, more important, local economic integration. A merchant's business base is deter­ mined not by his major theater of operations but by his native roots. In Sung legal terms, this was his registered household, which theoretically possessed all the property employed in the business as well as any property derived therefrom. That defined his business base. In social terms, the business base was also the home for which the merchant bore enormous social and eco­ nomic responsibilities and to which he would aim to return at the end of the business venture. No less important is that a locally based business often enjoyed much bet­ ter 'networking and credibility. As will be shown in the following chapters, these could reduce transaction costs in the maritime trade. At this point, we can consider the possible benefits such locally based business brought South Fukien through the same channels of personal networks and credibility. In contrast, merchants, regardless of origin and ethnicity, who were based else­ where and came to South Fukien merely to trade temporarily were sojourn­ ers. Although they also contributed to maritime trade in general, they were much less likely than locally based merchants to benefit the region, because they took their profits home instead of reinvesting them locally. In the light of this distinction, it is intriguing to see that almost without exception all the Chinese merchants mentioned in Sung sources in relation to the South Fukien maritime trade before the mid-eleventh century were based in South Fukien. Some foreign merchants visited the region in the late Northern Sung, but relatively few settled there at this stage. By the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, however, there is considerable evidence of foreign merchants settling and establishing a business base in South Fukien.1 Moreover, many of the Chinese merchants operating in Kuang-chou and Ming-chou were sojourners from South Fukien.2 Only in Kuang-chou do we find foreign merchants settling more permanently, but by and large they formed a segregated community3 and, unlike the local Chinese merchants in Kuang-chou, never achieved eminence in local politics or merged into the lo­ cal social fabric to the extent of their counterparts in South Fukien. It is ap­ parent that the South Fukien region was able to attract significantly more

Patterns of Trade

207

merchants to base their businesses there. When we look at the South Fu­ kien merchants as a group, the concept of business base constitutes the most fundamental criterion for identifying the boundaries ofthis grouping. Another vital factor in the typology of merchants is ethnic identity. As noted above, foreign merchants based in South Fukien can be identified as South Fukien merchants. In fact, there were so many foreign merchants based in South Fukien that we can, as noted in Chapter 5, speak of the dominance of the foreign community in South Fukien. This statement is based on an ethnic distinction between Chinese and non-Chinese (foreign). Throughout the Sung and Yuan periods, although there were intense cross­ cultural interaction and intermarriage among different groups residing in South Fukien, ethnic differences remained clear. There seems to have been little assimilation. Rather, each ethnic group by and large retained its iden­ tity. But did a sense of a larger common identity ever emerge among these divergent ethnic groups, especially among the merchants? And if so, what was it? I would suggest that the sense of being a South Fukienese may have constituted something closer to a common identity for locals and settlers alike in this locality. This identity again relied more on the de facto home of a merchant in the legal and social senses. For instance, Pu Shou-keng's family was clearly a South Fukienese fam­ ily, despite its foreign origin.4 Once a person migrated to another place, he could claim only a South Fukien origin or connection, but he was not a South Fukienese. Examples are the Chinese and foreign merchants Sun T'ieh-fu, Ch'en Pao-sheng, and Chu Tao-shan mentioned in Chapter 5, all of whom migrated to the Yangtze delta in late Yuan times and hence are not named in South Fukien gazetteers. Although there is no evidence that the term "South Fukienese" (Min-nan jen) was in use at this stage, the term "South Fukien" (Min-nan) was. But a common identity that transcended ethnicity can clearly be discerned in P'u Shou-keng's case during the Sung­ Yuan dynastic transition, when the local elite divided into groupings based mainly on political orientation and private interests instead of ethnicity. And the winning group can only be identified as a South Fukienese group that consisted of both Chinese and foreign locals. A common identity derived from a shared institutional setting within a geographic region would have social and economic effects on merchants' commercial behavior. Third, merchants can be distinguished by the scale of their business. The determinant factor is the amount of capital involved. The scale in South Fu-

208

Patterns ojTrade

kien ranged from petty merchants in local markets at one end to entrepre­ neurs in the maritime trade at the other. The most important subgroup is no doubt the latter one, which covers virtually all the South Fukien or Ch'iian-chou merchants mentioned in Part I. They were named in the source materials because of their success as entrepreneurs in business. The term "entrepreneur" is used here to refer to merchants who were able to seize market opportunities and succeed in the maritime trade through what­ ever commercial mechanisms were available. Entrepreneurs could be inves­ tors as well as professional traders who organized the business activities with commercial capital assembled from others, and they might not even be the ones who benefited most in the trade. Yet as the crucial persons who initi­ ated, facilitated, and implemented such businesses, their role in the trade is outstanding. Many such entrepreneurs in South Fukien arose from very low social status and had little family support in initiating their business careers. This reflects the very high mobility found among merchants as well as the considerable accessibility of business opportunities to anyone with the talent and ambition to excel in maritime trade. However, a merchant family that had been successful in the maritime trade for generations was likely to have become part of the local elite either through the civil service examinations or through purchase of official positions. So in the long run, we have reason to believe that most entrepreneurs were from the local elite families. Finally, we can classify the South Fukien merchants according to the context of their business. There were at least three categories: import­ export, intraregional redistribution, and interregional redistribution. Mer­ chants in the first category were engaged in the core of the maritime trade, conducting both import and export businesses through organized voyages overseas. Those who participated directly in this area would presumably benefit most. In Sung sources, they were often called "ove�seas traders," po­ shang, or occasionally "foreign merchants," Jan-shang. Some of them were of foreign origin or were actually sojourner foreign merchants. But there is strong evidence that the term was also used to refer to ethnic Chinese mer­ chants trading in overseas countries.5 Among the overseas traders two types are particularly noteworthy. The first consists of the voyage captain (kang­ shou) and the crew. Often the voyage captain was the one who organized the venture and took charge of it overseas. He was authorized by the Sung gov­ ernment to maintain law and order on board while away from China.6 He might be the shipowner as well, but many captains hired an oceangoing ship

Patterns of Trade

209

(see Chapter IO). The other members of the crew were his employees. How­ ever, every member of the crew, officer and ordinary seaman alike, was a merchant and could engage in trade during the voyage. The second category of merchants had little or no involvement in the operation of the ship, but simply traveled on board. They were passenger-merchants, who sometimes were packed in the cabin and slept on top of their own goods.7 As will be discussed in the next section, they played an important role in the heyday of the South Fukien maritime trade. Merchants in the second category of maritime business engaged in the intraregional redistribution of imports and exports. They handled the im­ mediate redistribution of all import items. Under the government monopoly system, a large portion ofluxury imports were first processed by the relevant government agency, the shih-po-ssu. Some of these monopolized goods were transshipped to the imperial capital; others were sold locally at the port. These, together with imports that were not covered by the government mo­ nopoly, would enter the region's commercial networks for circulation. Dur­ ing the Southern Sung, as local consumption rose because of the settling of imperial clansmen in Ch'iian-chou, intraregional redistribution became not just a part of the transshipment process but also a lucrative retail business in itself. Local merchants participating in such commercial activities increased substantially as a result. On the export side, intermediaries linked the pro­ duction units, for example, kilns, across the region, and the overseas traders at the port city of Ch'iian-chou, making the large-scale production of export ceramics described in Chapter 9 viable. Liao Ta-k'o has studied the role of of­ ficially authorized middlemen, yajen, and their shops, ya-hang, and concluded that they constituted an important part of the maritime trade by providing a wide range of officially licensed services to merchants, such as guarantors for overseas voyage, cargo inspections, evaluations ofgoods, and so on.8 Other merchants engaged in the interregional redistribution of imports and exports. They traveled to other parts of China, carrying import items obtained in South Fukien, either via the overland routes detailed in Chapter 6 or by sea along the coast. In addition, some transshipped imports to other countries as re-exports and brought goods back to China. Since inter­ regional redistribution entailed much higher operational costs and capital, not to mention the necessary interregional networks beyond South Fukien, many of these merchants may have come from better social and economic backgrounds, such as p�werful families or lineages. They took greater risks,

210

Patterns of Trade

and there was a longer period on the return of their investment than was the case for those engaged solely in intraregional trade. But the profits were cor­ respondingly greater, second only to those of overseas traders. From the above discussion, it is clear that South Fukien merchants can be conceptually analyzed in an interwoven typological schema. Theoreti­ cally, nothing barred an individual from crossing from one category to an­ other or from pursuing dual or multiple roles. But thus far I have not come across any examples, and, as I will argue in the next section, a merchant could not gain higher profits by pursuing a dual role.

Commercial Practices in the Overseas Trade The organization of the overseas trade is not well recorded. Some practices can be traced, but their prevalence is hard to determine. Nor is it certain that they" represent all that existed. The patterns discussed below are but exam­ ples of trading practices, which may throw light on the commercial character of the region. First of all, the overseas trade relied completely on oceangoing vessels, which were expensive to build, slow to return the investment in them, and highly uncertain in terms of operational duration. This kind of trade also bore tremendous risks, from both natural causes such as storms at sea and human sources like piracy. A poem by the renowned Ch'iian-chou shih-po­ shih Wang Shih-p'eng (n77-I2I9) presents a vivid image: "Big merchants venture ten thousand deaths to sail the sea. / Goods from afar are brought back to the government from all directions."9 Both cost and risk were equally high. Given this background, we can surmise that in the overseas markets, the luxury export trade was carried out between overseas traders, on the one hand, and local nobles and rulers, on the other. This is more obvious in the case of countries with a more central­ ized state apparatus, such as Japan, Srivijaya, Java, and Champa.10 Overseas voyages could be very lucrative if the cargo was of high market value, such as high-quality ceramics and silks. Naturally, the market for these expensive commodities was likely to be found in the upper and ruling classes. More­ over, overseas trade was often related to tributary missions. This also illus­ trates the close relationship between maritime trade and the local ruling class. In such a concentrated pattern of trade, the volume remained small but the commodities traded consisted mainly of luxury goods. The merchants

Patterns of Trade

2II

normally owned large amounts of capital, and their trading partners were highly concentrated among the ruling classes in overseas polities. This kind of trade pattern was built on specific market knowledge and connections. The obvious advantages were lower transaction costs and better market pre­ dictability. The trading partners, who were often the elites in regional he­ gemonies, handled the intraregional redistribution or further transshipment, thereby saving the overseas traders valuable time between monsoons. This arrangement would benefit mainly well-established overseas traders who possessed the necessary capital to engage in the luxury trade. As is shown in the Sriviyajan case below, this pattern was favorable to South Fukien mer­ chants as they started to develop the market in maritime Southeast Asia. In some places, however, the local political structure was dispersed, cre­ ating a large number of political centers and hence potential markets for trade. The chiefdoms in the Philippine archipelago and Hainan are exam­ ples.11 In other case, local polities that had been subject to a regional hege­ mony were able to exercise fuller autonomy, providing new and ample op­ portunities for business, albeit in a much more diffused manner. Overseas traders facing this situation had to trade directly with local tribes or small polities spread across considerable distances. This meant prolonged travel on seas and even higher transportation costs. Their trading partners were mostly petty, often less wealthy, and more diverse compared with the ruling classes of the regional hegemonies. This made personal connections hard to develop and maintain, and hence lowered market predictability. Moreover, this market demanded lower-quality and cheaper products. The resulting lower unit return led to an increase in trade volume so as to cover the high cost of prolonged travel. However, this diffuse pattern also enabled more merchants with much less capital to participate in overseas voyages. These individual small merchants formed a consortium under the leadership of a voyage captain, paid for a certain amount of space on board, and carried with them the maximum amount of commodities they could assemble and fit in this space.12 I referred to them above as "passenger-merchants." Although the business carried out by an individual passenger-merchant was small in scale, as a group they significantly expanded the scope of over­ seas trade. They attracted capital from various social and economic sources and linked other sectors of the South Fukien local economy with the over­ seas trade. In order to enhance their profit margin, they had a much stronger incentive to search for new markets. Their efforts contributed to the

212

Patterns of Trade

momentum of market expansion and increased the flexibility of overseas trade. Moreover, the expansion in the human and capital resources involved in the trade eventually lowered the risk of overseas voyages by spreading it out among the participants. A hypothetical case will help explain the ad­ vantage of having many small traders. Assume that each voyage requires a minimum investment of IO,ooo strings of cash, and the profit margin is con­ stant at IOO percent.13 Let us further assume that the risk, that is, the prob­ ability of no return either because of natural disasters or piracy, is IO percent. We have two merchants. Each has IO,ooo strings of cash to invest in the overseas trade. Their first choice is to invest individually in separate voyages. In this event, each of them becomes the sole investor in a single voyage, and if both ships return safely, each of them will double his investment. How­ ever, they have a second choice: they can invest in two joint-venture voyages together. If the two voyages return safely, they will earn the same profit in the first choice. The difference between these two choices is the risk factor. And risk is always high for an overseas voyage. The calculation of risk and return for these two choices is presented in Table 9.1.14 The average outcome remains the same under both alternatives. However, Choice Two is less risky because, intuitively, it reduces the probability of a total loss from IO percent in Choice One to l percent. There is an 18 percent chance that there be a 50 percent return, but the chance of a IOO percent return falls from 90 percent to 81 percent. In short, Choice Two gives the same expected return but lowers the likelihood of a total loss and is thus preferred by merchants who are risk-averse. Given the availability of such an alternative, diversifying one's investment in overseas voyages is the rational decision. Was there a division of labor between those who traded overseas and those involved in the domestic market? There are reasons for believing that this was the case. First, since the overseas trade required considerable experi­ ence in navigation on particular sea routes, good connections, and a thor­ ough knowledge of the overseas markets, those who had already developed trade relations would most likely have restricted themselves to that type of business rather than attempting to branch out into domestic trade. Second, an overseas voyage usually took a year or more. The time between monsoons was short, just enough for repairs and making arrangements for a cargo. Of course, these two points are not direct evidence, but there is also no evi­ dence to show that merchants engaged in both domestic and overseas trade.

213

Patterns of Trade Table 9.1 Return Distribution to Each ofTwo Merchants for Two Voyages Choice One (each invests in a single voyage): 90% chance for a rno% return rn% chance for a 0% return Expected return (weighted average return) = 0.9 (rno%) + o.r (0%) Standard deviation = 30%

=

90%

Choice Two (each invests in half of the two voyages): 81% chance for a rno% return (both voyages return safely) 18% chance for a 50% return (one of the two voyages is lost) 1% chance for a 0% return (both voyages are lost) Expected return = 90% Standard deviation = 21%

Nevertheless, merchants involved in the overseas trade did cooperate with those in the domestic trade to manipulate prices. An example of this is men­ tioned in a memorial by Lin Kuang-chao written around n75. Lin com­ plained that foreign merchants running shops in Kuang-chou were selling imported items at inflated prices. Yet their partner shops in Lin-an were de­ liberately selling the same items at normal prices, making it very difficult for the Chinese merchants in Kuang-chou to benefit from transshipping such goods to Lin-an and controlling the transshipment business.15 Still, there is no mention of any case in which the same merchant engaged in both the domestic and the overseas trade concurrently. In terms of capital investment in the overseas trade, although practices may have varied among the merchants on a single voyage and from voyage to voyage, we can still discern certain models of operation. Shiba Yoshinobu has amassed abundant evidence, and according to him there were basically three operational models: the capital owner, the salaried manager, and the ered.it operat1. 0n.16 At a time when the region's trade was not yet as prosperous and commer­ cial capital not as abundant as it became later, the first model of operation was probably more prevalent. The example of Lin Chao-ch'ing of the mid­ eleventh century noted in Chapter 3 is typical of this sort of operation. As a capital owner, he directly participated in maritime trade. Lin's case also indi­ cates that on occasion capital owners would combine their money and

214

Patterns of Trade

engage in a joint venture. The profits would be divided according to the share of capital each had provided. This was called a joint-capital partner­ ship, or ho-pen.17 This practice became so common during the Sung that it formed the basis for a sample question in a mathematics textbook of the time. One such question postulates four investors in an overseas voyage, each of whom contributes a different combination of instruments of value (gold, silver, sacks of salt, and monk certificates). The exotic goods the ship brings back are to be divided according to the proportion each partner con­ tributes to the total capital.18 The joint biography of Ch'en Pao-sheng and Sun Tieh-fu, the two Ch'i.ian-chou merchants mentioned in Chapter 5, mentions that they pooled their capital to participate in the overseas trade. They decided not to split the accumulated profit, even after ten years, so that the joint venture could expand through reinvestment.19 Of course, we can assume there were many who chose to operate individually. In the second model of operation, professional and salaried managers administered the overseas trade or the domestic maritime trade with capital that was not their own. They were called kanjen or hsing-ch'ien, and, at times, ching-shang.20 They were salaried employees of the capital owners. This ar­ rangement seems to have been more popular in immobile operations such as shopkeeping and pawn businesses.21 In Chapter 3, I made mention of a voy­ age by a Ch'i.ian-chou merchant Wang Yi.ian-mao from n78 to n88. Wang, the capital owner, employed a hsing-ch'ien named Wu Ta to manage the voy­ age.22 This is a revealing example of the practice. The arrangement could be either temporary, lasting only for the duration of a given voyage, or more permanent. The third model, in which the merchants' operational capital was ob­ tained mainly on credit, was probably more prevalent in the maritime trade, with its heavy capital requirements and considerable risks. A common prac­ tice, pointed out by Shiba, was for the manager, also called a ching-shang, to borrow money or goods from the capital owner. In this case, the manager was not a salaried employee. He worked primarily for himself, even though he was not the capital owner. The loan was often for the duration of a round-trip. The interest rate would be fixed beforehand, and repayment made on completion of the voyage.23 On the one hand, this was indeed a safe and profitable means of commercial investment for the capital owner. On the other hand, it enabled capable merchants without capital to seize busi­ ness opportunities and embark on a trading voyage. If successful, the voyage

Patterns of Trade

215

promised to benefit both sides. The m9 miscellaneous work Canton Stories by Chu Yii gives a brief account of commercial lending in Kuang-chou. Kuang-chou locals offer loans (chii-chai) [to maritime merchants when the latter purchase export commodities on credit], charging an interest rate of 100 per­ cent, and the contract (yiieh) requires repayment to be made only when the ship returns [to Kuang-chou]. Even though the borrower does not return, that is, re­ sides abroad (chujan), for ten years, the total interest remains unchanged. How­ ever, the rich can store up silk textiles and ceramics so as to push up the prices [of those commodities in Kuang-chouJ. They then request the borrower to re­ pay [in kind] when the latter returns from overseas. At the end, the interest these rich men earn is almost five times higher. The government in Kuang-chou accepts and adjudicates litigation concerning debt with interest (yu-li chaiju). It is because of the special imperial order (chuan-ch'ih) granted to the office of maritime affairs so as to ensure smooth operatiol). of the [maritimeJ trade.24 To judge from this passage, the commercial capital that the manager­ merchants borrowed from the capital owners was not infrequently in the form of goods rather than cash. The contract did not set a length of time for repayment, and the rate of interest was fixed. Had the loan been made in cash, the value of the interest would not have increased as a result of a rise in prices. The only way we can account for the interest increasing in value with a fixed interest rate is that the loan was in the form of goods and interest was calculated on the basis of the prices of the same items at the time of repay­ ment or else the repayment was to be made in kind. If this interpretation is correct, it suggests that borrowing commercial capital in the form of goods was practiced in the overseas trade in Kuang-chou. A similar practice must have occurred in South Fukien as well, for there is one example of the credit purchase of a cash crop in Chang-chou for the maritime trade.25 Purchase on credit (she) was a rather common practice in Sung commerce in general. It could be readily applied to the maritime trade.26 A key question in this practice is what happened if the merchant did not return from the voyage. There is evidence that the merchant had to repay the debt even if the voyage resulted in the loss of the entire cargo. 27 In this way, repayment was guar­ anteed, and most of the risk was transferred from the investor to the mer­ chant. In fact, the Chinese practice of maritime trade may have been influenced by the practices of foreigners. The borrowing of commercial capital was in fact more institutionalized in medieval Italy than in Sung China. There, a

216

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traveling tractator might borrow commercial capital from a commendator un­ der a kind of contract called a commenda. As summarized by Robert Lopez, the commendator "bore all the risks of capital and was entitled to a share of the profits," while the tractator "bore all risks of labor and kept back the rest of the profits."28 In the Middle East, Arab and Persian merchants also prac­ ticed a similar form of commercial investment and management. Abraham Udovitch, in his account of commenda in eleventh-century Muslim trade, de­ scribed it as "an arrangement in which one party invests capital and another party trades with it on the understanding that they share the profits in an agreed upon ratio, and that any loss resulting from normal trading activity is borne by the investing party."29 The ching-shang in Sung China may be con­ sidered a variation of commenda,30 but lacked a similar risk-sharing function. So a safer conclusion may be that although commercial credit was widely practiced in overseas trade in Sung times, risk-bearing by the lender had not become fully institutionalized, probably because of the formal institutional setting to be discussed in the next chapter. Even so, it must have been used by foreign merchants in South Fukien at least. The practice of commenda had made a significant contribution to the commercial developments in the me­ dieval Italy and the Muslim world.31 Since Chinese merchants in Kuang­ chou and South Fukien had ample opportunities to acquire knowledge of such commercial practices through their interactions with Arab and Persian merchants, we can infer that Chinese commercial credit practices in the overseas trade were further stimulated by cross-cultural learning. It certainly played an important role in South Fukien, a region in which local participa­ tion in overseas voyages was high, even though the risk-sharing element of the commenda might not have found roots among Chinese merchants. Archaeological evidence may provide concrete evidence about some of the commercial practices mentioned above. In 1974, an ancient shipwreck, be­ lieved to have sunk around the end of the Southern Sung,32 was excavated in an outer port, Hou-chu, of Ch'iian-chou Bay. Discovered in the hull were 96 wooden strips, 72 of which were inscribed with identifiable characters.33 It is clear that these labels were used to identify the owners of the cargo on board (the legal implications are explored in the next chapter). Many carried the terms X chi, or X chi-hao, the "trademark of X." There is some controversy over the interpretation of these labels. Fu Tsung-wen has provided the most plausible reading.34 According to Fu, the labels fall into five main categories:

217

Patterns of Trade Table 9.2 Wooden Labels Discovered in the Sung Shipwreck

Category Southern Office Imperial relatives Occupational tides Officials of the Southern Office Salaried managers working for the imperial clansmen Ship crew members Passengers Trademarks

Numbers (N 72) =

r9 8 33

2 20* II

IO

2

*Under three surnames. SOURCE: Fu Tsung-wen, "Hou chu ku-ch'uan," pp. 77-80.

(1 ) the southern outer office of the imperial clansmen affairs; (2) imperial relatives; (3) occupational titles; (4) passengers; and (5) trademarks (see Ta­ ble 9.2) .35 He further shows that labels in the shipwreck strongly indicate the active participation of the imperial clansmen in the overseas trade in both official and private capacities, that the crew was organized in a hierarchy commonly adopted in maritime voyages during the Sung and Yuan times, and that although the ship was operated mainly by the imperial clansmen or their agents, other merchants were allowed to take part as passengers. As for the large numbers of labels bearing the terms kan or kan-chi, Fu holds that these identified goods belonging to salaried managers working for the imperial clansmen, but this last point is hard to substantiate. In the light of the preceding discussion of the second model of operation, I would prefer a more cautious interpretation: these were professional managers specializ­ ing in overseas trade who invited investment from others but operated pri­ marily on their own. This kind of occupational specialization can have oc­ curred only in a highly flourishing commercial setting. As discussed in Chapter 4, the overseas trade in South Fukien declined markedly in the thirteenth century. The fact that this practice still existed at the end of the Southern Sung indicates that it must have originated and spread in the twelfth century when commerce was still expanding strongly.

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Patterns of Trade

Local Education and Commercial Knowledge Education has positive effects on complex commercial activities like mari­ time trade, and Sung China would not have been an exception. For instance, some level ofliteracy was essential to the use of wooden labels to identify the ownership of cargo. Contracts, accounts, inventories, merchant manuals, business communications, and written information on markets require a certain degree of education to understand and use. Although none of these practices was so complex as to completely exclude illiterates, those who had education definitely had an advantage in acquiring knowledge vital to com­ merce.36 The question is whether South Fukien was home to an educational environment that can be considered conducive to maritime trade. For several reasons, the answer seems to be yes. In general, education in Sung China was characterized by the spread of printed materials, which drastically reduced the price of reading materials and increased their accessibility to the masses. Although South Fukien was not a prime center of printing, it was close to Chien-chou in inland Fukien, which was one of the most important national centers at the time. A second institution that emerged in Sung China contributed greatly to local educa­ tion: private academies (shu-yuan) extended education to those of lower so­ cial backgrounds.37 At least two academies were located inside the city of Ch'iian-chou (see Map 7.3; p. r68) , and reputedly the Neo-Confucian master Chu Hsi ( 1130-1200 ) established an academy called Shih-ching shu-yiian in the port town of An-hai. Another newly developed social institution of sig­ nificance was the local lineage. The lineage became a dominant aspect of so­ cial ecology in the Ming and Ch'ing in South Fukien, but at this early stage lineages had already begun taking shape prominently (see Chapters 4 and 11) . One of their functions was to provide education for members of the line­ age so as to strengthen their socialization or improve their performance in the civil service examinations.38 Buddhist temples had long been an impor­ tant place of learning for the poor literati for many centuries;39 and as men­ tioned in Chapter 4, they were particularly affluent in South Fukien except during the recession in the thirteenth century. They, too, made education available to a wide social stratum. Both Lin Chao-ch'ing in the mid-eleventh century and Wang Yiian-mao in the twelfth century received an education at Buddhist temples. The knowledge of markets and foreign languages that Wang acquired from the

Patterns of Trade

219

monks enabled him to serve at the court of a Champa king for ten years and then return to Ch'iian-chou as a wealthy merchant. Apparently, Buddhist temples in South Fukien maintained frequent contacts with their counter­ parts in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean.40 Since overseas voyages were expensive and dangerous and their duration was conditioned by the monsoon, knowledge of overseas markets became a vital factor ensuring success in business. In the early stages of the maritime trade in South Fukien, few would have possessed such market information except the very small group of Chinese local merchants who had ventured overseas via other coastal regions. Since market information was so vital, it is likely that most of them would not readily share it with their competitors, real or potential. However, the advent of more foreign merchants in the re­ gion in the eleventh century would have made it more difficult to sustain a monopoly over market information. A noticeable phenomenon is the com­ pilation of maps on foreign lands. In the n2os, two Ch'iian-chou merchants ·specializing in the Korean trade submitted detailed maps of foreign coun­ tries to the Sung court for military intelligence purposes.41 In the mid­ twelfrh century, the Ch'iian-chou superintendent of maritime affairs Yeh T'ing-kuei compiled the Treatise on Aromatics from the Southern Barbarians (Nanjan hsiang-lu), based on information obtained from foreign merchants.42 By the turn of the thirteenth century, Chao Yen-wei recorded a number of foreign countries and their exports to Ch'iian-chou. He based his account on the archives of the shih-po-ssu.43 Twenty years later one of the most impor­ tant extant Chinese treatises on foreign countries and exotic commodities, the Treatise on Foreign Lands by Chao Ju-kua, was compiled. In his preface, Chao stated that because he had seen many maps of foreign countries but been unsuccessful in obtaining written accounts of them, he decided to write one himself by gathering information from foreign merchants.44 Finally, there is the Treatise on the Island Barbarians (Tao-i-chih) partially extant in the Encyclopedia ofDaily Life (Shih-lin kuang-chi) compiled by Ch'en Yiian-ching in the mid-thirteenth century. These books on foreign lands and overseas markets compiled by the lite­ rati were based on commercial knowledge available in maritime China of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Their contents overlapped, but each con­ tains substantial portions of new information reflecting later developments. The popularity of such writings reflects not only the increasing curiosity about foreign things among the literati but also the availability of informa-

220

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tion that could be used as vital commercial knowledge. Under these circum­ stances, local education and literacy skills became even more necessary for business.

Patterns of Trade in Overseas Markets: The Case ofSrivijaya Scholars agree that Srivijaya should be identified with a prosperous South­ east Asian empire named Shih-lijo-shih in T'ang sources, Sanjo-ch'i in Sung sources, and Zabaj or Sribuza in medieval Arabic records. It is believed to have been the dominant maritime power in insular Southeast Asia men­ tioned in a number of local inscriptions discovered in the region, which date from the seventh to the twelfth centuries.45 By the seventh century, it be­ came a thalassocracy in the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, claiming suze­ rainty over many local Malay polities as vassals in both Sumatra and the Malay peninsula. Strategically situated, it dominated the sea route between China and the Indian Ocean and hence the lucrative international Nanhai trade.46 Its capital was first located at Palembang but may have moved else­ where after the eleventh century.47 The Srivijayan empire relied heavily on the domination of international trade resulting from its control of vassal states, which in turn were subju­ gated by a Srivijayan navy that was maintained by the wealth derived from the international trade. The Srivijayan order was an organic one. The order survived when the king controlled the vassal states, had a st�ong navy, and monopolized the international trade. Yet, a weakening in any one of these three variables would in theory rapidly lead to the decline of the rest and ul­ timately the dissolution of the entire empire. Recently, some scholars such as Kenneth Hall have postulated that the Srivijayan empire began to shrink as early as the eleventh century, in con­ trast to the view that it decayed after the thirteenth century.48 In this view, the first devastating blow to Srivijaya was the 1025 raid by the Cola king Ra­ jendra from the Coromandel coast in southeastern India.49 Thereafter, the empire appeared to fall apart, as its vassals in northern Sumatra and the Malay peninsula became more actively engaged in the international trade against their overlord's interest.50 The situation in the isthmus was more acute with successive Khmer and Burmese expansions into this region after the 1025 Cola raid; these resulted in closer commercial and cultural ties be­ tween the isthmus of Kra and the mainland empires of Angkor, Pagan, and the emerging Thai power.51 On the east, from the early eleventh century

Patterns of Trade

221

Srivijaya was being undermined by its eastern Javanese rival, the kingdom of Java based in Kahuripari under the rule of King Airlangga. Srivijaya lost not only political control over central Java but also control of the increas­ ingly lucrative spice trade with the Moluccas.s2 Although Srivijaya remained a powerful center in insular Southeast Asia through the eleventh century, it was in a process of decay that may well have been complete by the twelfth 5 century. 3 0. W. Wolters has suggested that these regional political developments were accompanied by a new pattern of international trade that witnessed the advent of Chinese merchants as major players and the rising demand for Southeast Asian products.s4 He argues that the new traders preferred a dif­ fuse pattern of trade and direct dealings with the indigenous peoples. This enabled them not only to gain better access to forest products but also to market lower-quality ceramics in more localities in Southeast Asia instead of shipping them first to Srivijaya for redistribution. This new pattern of trade was no longer conducive to a regionally dominant entrepot such as Srivijaya­ Palembang and accelerated the dissolution of Srivijayan hegemony over in­ sular Southeast Asia.ss This argument may find support from findings of massive imports around this period of Chinese export ceramics of medium to low quality in Southeast Asia.s6 I have examined in detail elsewhere the Chinese images of this empire as recorded in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.s7 In contrast to the views of Hall and Wolters, my findings show that the Srivijayan empire continued to exercise overlordship over its vassals in Sumatra as well as the Malay penin­ sula during this period, even though all these vassals participated in interna­ tional trade. The condition for doing so was that they not challenge the Srivijayan maharaja's monopoly of Indian Ocean commodities such as frankincense and ivory. A new pattern of trade did emerge in insular South­ east Asia in the late eleventh century. Local products such as resins and spices were, as noted by Hall and Wolters, increasingly in demand in both the Indian Ocean and China. It is also evident that the coarser Chinese ex­ port ceramics produced in South Fukien had attracted a market among the smaller polities in Southeast Asia (see Chapter 8). It is true that the new pattern promoted more direct and diffuse transactions between the interna­ tional traders and the inhabitants of the region. This reduced the need to trade through the elaborate distribution system of the Srivijaya kraton (royal capital). However, despite all these new political and economic changes, the

222

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8rivijaya empire remained prosperous, maintaining a formidable navy and sustaining overlordship over its vassals. This was made possible because it continued to monopolize the transshipment of Indian Ocean commodities. This is attested by the considerable number of contemporary Chinese ac­ counts of a strong Srivijaya in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. How were South Fukien merchants incorporated into these changing patterns of trade with one of their major partners, Srivijaya? As is apparent from the discussion in Part I, the Ch'iian-chou merchants' success in the Nanhai trade is basically a story of adaptability in a changing business envi­ ronment. Their early efforts to penetrate the Nanhai market would not have been smooth. The earliest sign of direct Srivijayan links with Fukien comes from the beginning of the tenth century with Wang Shen-chih's kingdom in Fu-chou. There is evidence that he received envoys from Srivijaya.58 It is also apparent that during the decades when local warlords in South Fukien es­ tablished their independence against first the Min and later the Wu-yiieh kingdoms, they established trading connections with Southeast Asia by dis­ patching semi-official local traders overseas and by inviting foreign traders to call at Ch'iian-chou.59 We do not know much about this trade. But to judge from the lavish tributes of large quantities of Nanhai commodities such as frankin.cense and ivory these warlords sent to the Sung court,60 it is clear that their trade with Nanhai, in which Srivijayans must have played a major role, was prosperous. A local legend dating to the eleventh century told that around 959 a Srivijayan envoy had shipped aromatics to Chang-chou to sell to raise funds to build a Buddhist temple.61 This does support the claim of a link between South Fukien and Srivijaya in this period. Nonetheless, from the Sung conquest ofKuang-chou in 971 until the late twelfth century, there is little record of Srivijayan missions arriving in Ch'iian­ chou or South Fukien. Of the 28 Srivijayan missions to Sung China counted by Lin T'ien-wei, 25 took place between 971 and rr78, the last recorded tribute from Srivijaya under the Sung. Most of these records do not specify at which port the missions arrived, but the limited information we have implies that their usual destination was Kuang-chou.62 Only the last mission of rr78 was recorded as landing in Ch'iian-chou.63 As such, the maritime trade between Srivijaya and Ch'iian-chou from the late tenth to the late eleventh century would not have been the result offrequent visits by Srivijayan missions. Further complicating the situation before 1087 were the regulations that required all outgoing Chinese vessels to register at designated ports. Ch'iian-

Patterns of Trade

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chou was not one of them. South Fukien merchants had to register at Ming­ chou in Chekiang for voyages to Koryo and Japan and at Kuang-chou for trips to the Nanhai markets. A maritime law implemented prior to 1085 spe­ cifically permitted trading voyages to "Srivijaya and the like" but not Koryo, Japan, and Ta-shih, insofar as the merchants, including those of Ch'iian­ chou, registered in accordance with the regulations.64 The situation changed in 1087 when the court set up an office of maritime affairs in Ch'iian-chou65 . (see Chapters 2 and 3). There are a number of revealing examples of Ch'iian-chou merchants fre­ quenting Srivijaya in the twelfth century. For instance, there are two tales concerning Ch'iian-chou merchants shipwrecked en route to Srivijaya in the Records of the Listener (I-ch'ien chih) by Hung Mai (n23-1202).66 Some of the details seem to have been mixed up, but the stories are from different sources and most likely refer to two different persons. One of them men­ tioned that the son of the merchant involved was still alive during the Shao­ hsing reign period (u31-62). From these two tales, it is apparent that voyages by Ch'iian-chou merchants to Srivijaya had become common by the turn of the eleventh century, and many of them may have been acquaintances in South Fukien. Moreover, the commercial links between Ch'iian-chou and Srivijaya can also be substantiated by the fact that a small Srivijayan community, along­ side the other foreign communities, existed· in Ch'iian-chou by the mid­ twelfth century (see Chapter 3). Srivijayan commercial interest in Ch'iian­ chou is attested by a passage in Yeh T'ing-kuei's Treatise on Aromaticsfrom the Southern Barbarians of the mid-twelfth century. [FrankincenseJ is shipped to Srivijaya by the Arabs in exchange for other goods. Therefore, there is a high concentration of frankincense as a commodity in Srivijaya. Each year, Srivijaya. dispatches large vessels [shipping frankincenseJ to Kuang-chou and Ch'iian-chou. The promotion prospects of officials serving at the offices of maritime affairs in these two ports are determined by the amount of frankincense [arriving in their jurisdiction]. There are thirteen grades of frankincense [for the purpose of deciding the total value of the imported frank­ incense so that an appraisal of the related officials can be madeJ.67 This confirms an uneven temporal distribution of records on the Ch'iian­ chou-Srivijayan link and indicates that there are two succeeding stages. The first stage, from the mid-tenth to the late eleventh century, witnessed increasing efforts by Ch'iian-chou merchants to open up the

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Srivijayan market, with little reciprocal interest from their Srivijayan coun­ terparts in this partnership, due mainly to the institutional constraints. In Chapter 2, I interpret the Ch'ii.an-chou overseas trade at this stage as essen­ tially a transshipment trade of Nanhai commodities conducted mainly by the South Fukienese, with insignificant participation by foreign traders. These merchants also purchased luxury goods directly from the government monopoly warehouses or indirectly from other private suppliers who ob­ tained them from the government. They then shipped them to Koryo, Ja­ pan, or other parts of China. They also exported Chinese products to these overseas markets, although there were no major local products from South Fukien for large-scale export. Nor was there a local retail market for luxury imports (there was a wholesale market for the transshipment trade). It is clear that the imported luxury items were primarily frankincense, ivory, and other products from the Indian Ocean. The next stage, roughly from the late eleventh to the early thirteenth century, saw a fully developed commercial link between the port and the empire. I argue in Chapter 3 that the overseas trade in Ch'ii.an-chou evolved from a transshipment trade to a mixture of transshipment and export trade. It now was maintained not only by the locals but also by a growing commu­ nity of foreign traders. Although transshipment of import items to Koryo and other parts of China continued, there emerged a substantial local con­ sumption market for luxury goods in both Ch'iian-chou and Fu-chou after hundreds of imperial clansmen settled in these two cities at the beginning of the Southern Sung. Equally important was the rise of local industries, most notably the export ceramic kilns and cash-crop farming. Both sectors be­ came so commercialized by the early thirteenth century that they may well have constituted some of the basic structural problems behind the financial crisis South Fukien suffered in the first half of that century. This scenario of the Ch'ii.an-chou-Srivijaya link from the tenth to the . twelfth century also coincides with the evolving pattern of trade in insular Southeast Asia. During the first stage, the Ch'iian-chou transshipment trade concentrated on the import of luxury goods from the Indian Ocean via Srivijaya. Important export items such as ceramics were mainly high-quality wares from the North China Plain and the Yangtze Delta and lesser wares from Kuang-chou and Ch'ao-chou. In any case, all southward voyages from Ch'iian-chou had to register in Kuang-chou before departing with the win­ ter monsoon and then return there for customs clearance on their way back.

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Some maritime commodities were then carried back to South Fukien, but the key market for these imports lay elsewhere. Similarly, small quantities of high-quality export ceramics would be purchased directly from Central and North China; lesser-quality ceramics, in larger quantities, could be picked up locally in Kwangtung. Since the port of Kuang-chou remained the pri­ mary center for the Nanhai trade, this was the most efficient way of doing business on the China coast, which was possible mainly because these South Fukien merchants were familiar with the Chinese market. However, when Chinese merchants started to venture into the Southeast Asian market and challenge the monopoly of foreign traders over this sea route, the initial transaction costs would have been relatively high. Knowl­ edge about supply and demand patterns, exchange mechanisms, social and political infrastructure, geographical and navigational information that would not only satisfy curiosity but also ensure safety and profits could have been acquired only at great cost. The most efficient way of doing business in these circumstances was to concentrate operations in a small number of markets so that knowledge about trading partners as well as business con­ nections could be built up quickly. The concentration of the Ch'iian-chou merchants' trade with Champa and Srivijaya during this stage is a rational phenomenon. The domination of international trade in insular Southeast Asia by the maharaja in Palembang, who concentrated mainly on Indian Ocean commodities, certainly provided the best opportunity for the new­ comer Ch'iian-chou merchants. By visiting a port only a month's voyage from Kuang-chou, they could gain access to most Arabian and Indian com­ modities plus a smaller amount of Southeast Asian products as well, which were sent to Palembang as tribute from the Malay and Sumatran vassals. They had to deal with only one person: a Malay king who was so rich that he was probably not too exploitative to these new faces from the north. As analyzed above, sea voyages incurred enormous costs and risks. Had there not been a conducive business environment in insular Southeast Asia where the Ch'iian-chou merchants could make a start with bearable transaction costs, they might not have been able to open up this market in just about a hundred years, given the fact that each round-trip voyage would take one to three years. We may also infer the reason why Ch'iian-chou merchants had a stronger incentive to risk unpredictable seaborne ventures than did their Kuang-chou counterparts. Merchants in Kuang-chou could profit from the international trade by just waiting at that port for foreign merchants to

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come; this put the burden of risk on the foreign merchants. In contrast, Ch'iian-chou merchants had to travel to the goods, because few foreign mer­ chants were initially attracted to their home port. A different advantage underlay the success of Ch'iian-chou merchants in the second stage, when a more diffuse trade pattern emerged. By this time they had been frequenting insular Southeast Asia for more than a hundred years. Knowledge of this region had been accumulated over time and was greatly enhanced later by the growing community of foreigners visiting or setting up business bases in Ch'iian-chou. Added to these were the business connections, first with the major trading partners such as the Chams, Srivi­ jayans, Arabs, and Indians, then with more and more indigenous peoples in other parts ofSoutheast Asia, many of whom had seldom ventured to China before for tributary missions or trade. By this stage, trading channels had al­ ready taken shape. What the trade required to take off was a rise in demand. And it was exactly at this time that we witness a rising demand for South­ east Asian products like resins and spices in China and a growing market for coarser Chinese export ceramics among both nobles and commoners in these Southeast Asian societies. Both of these new businesses were better conducted through more direct contacts and tranfactions between the pro­ ducers and the international traders or between the latter and the users, than by channeling the trade through �he more elaborate distribution hierarchy centered in the Srivijayan kraton. South Fukien was now much better pre­ pared and equipped to take advantage of these new business opportunities. The local market for luxury goods, including Nanhai products, was now considerable. Export-oriented kilns mushroomed from the region's coast to the hilly interior, forming a highly integrated network of production and ex­ portation. This clearly was a response to the new demand overseas as well as the active participation of South Fukienese in the international trade. As such, the transaction costs on both ends of the trade would be low enough for Ch'iian-chou merchants to gain an edge against their competitors in Kwangtung and the Lower Yangtze region.

T E N

Formal Institutional Constraints: Law, Property, and Contracts

Douglass North has provided a useful framework for the study of the insti­ tutional matrices within which merchants operate. Working within the in­ centive and opportunity structures defined by a particular matrix, merchants explore markets and seek to maximize profits. When fundamental institu­ tional change occurs, the rules of the game also change, and merchants move to adjust to the new structures. Following North, a matrix can be analyzed in terms of either the formal or the informal institutional constraints on merchants' behavior.1 This chapter deals with formal institutions; the fol­ lowing chapter considers the informal constraints on trade and merchants' activities. The formal constraints on South Fukien maritime merchants in terms of transaction costs were manifested most clearly in the legal aspects of the maritime trade, such as maritime, property, and contract laws, as well as their enforcement. Although the data pertaining to these issues are lim­ ited, the discussion in this chapter will show that as a whole they created a formal institutional framework that significantly reduced transaction costs and provided an incentive structure and opportunities conducive to mari­ time business. Indeed, the formal framework contributed significantly to the region's prosperity.

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Formal Institutional Constraints

The Legal Framework for a Maritime Economy: Regulation of Maritime A.ffairs Chapter 2 discusses the major functions of the office of maritime affairs, the establishment of this office in Ch'iian-chou, and its institutional implications for the region's maritime trade. The regulation of maritime affairs by this office constituted a legal framework for lawful maritime commercial activi­ ties. In this section, we look more closely at how these legal regulations shaped opportunity and incentive structures as well as transaction costs in maritime trade. Maritime regulations changed many times from 1087 to 1314, and it would be tedious to document in detail their evolution over time.2 In order to ex. plore their effect on transaction costs, it is sufficient to focus on a represen­ tative set of regulations from the era of prosperity for the maritime trade in South Fukien. This set of regulations was included in the permit issued by the Ming-chou shih-po-ssu to the Ch'iian-chou merchant Li Ch'ung in no5 (see Chapter 3). These regtilations probably remained in effect through the end of the Southern Sung without significant change. In addition, we shall briefly examine two other sets, implemented in 1293 and 1314 under the Yuan regime. These derived from the Sung laws with modifications to fit the Yuan sociopolitical situation. The no5 permit cited the main statute of the maritime regulations in force at the time, supplemented with a few emendations from later edicts that provide rules or specifics on implementation of the regulation. For con­ venience, I divide the text of the main statute into five sections.3 §1. Any merchant trading along overseas routes shall apply to his native prefec­ ture, which, after verification, will report to the prefecture in which the ocean voyage is to embark. A permit shall be issued to the merchant by the prefecture of embarkation. Upon return, the merchant shall submit the permit to the shih­ po-ssu of the prefecture of embarkation. §2. Anyone who sets sail without permit, or sails into the boundary river be­ tween the Sung and the Liao, or visits the prefectures of Teng-chou and Lai­ chou [in present-day Shantung] shall be liable to two years of labor servitude. Anyone who trades in the Liao empire shall be liable to three years oflabor ser­ vitude, and the case be reported to the imperial court. §3. There shall be a reward for those providing information that leads to the ar­ rest of anyone violating the above regulations. It shall be equivalent to one-half

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of the total value of the vessel and its cargo. ([Explanatory note:] The punish­ ment will be reduced by half if the voyage without permit has not materialized. If it has already materialized, the vessel and cargo will be confiscated, after set­ ting aside the proportion of their value to pay the informant's reward.) §4. All participants [in an illegal voyageJ shall be liable to punishment of over So strokes with the heavy stick, even though they are not the owners of the ship or the cargo. §s. The guarantors shall be liable to a punishment three degrees lighter [mean­ ing 50 strokes with the heavy stick]. As noted above, these provisions were supplemented by later edicts, which were also cited in the permit. Here I summarize some of the more important rules. It was decreed that (§6) "apart from the northern neighbor [Liao/Chin] and An-nan [Vietnam], all overseas countries are lawful desti­ nations for maritime trade"; that (§7) "[mercantile ships carrying] weapons and female slaves as commodities or enemy spies and army deserters as pas­ sengers were strictly prohibited";4 and that (§8) "merchants were prohibited from claiming the status of ambassadors [representing Sung China] over­ seas." For evasion of customs duties or for trading in prohibited countries, the edicts stipulated (§9) the criminal liabilities for every party involved­ from the ship's captain to the guarantors to watchmen to warehouse owners who stored the goods and even to peddlers who sold the illegal imports. Even if the illicit goods belonged to only one of the merchants on board the vessel and all the other participants were unaware of the illegal activities, they were to be punished for failing to be vigilant (§ro ). The permit did not mention the number of guarantors required, but from another source we know that the law required three guarantors for each ship; each of the guar­ antors had to hold a sizable amount of property in the prefecture of embar­ kation:5 This is verified by the three names of guarantors listed in the uo5 permit. From the merchants' point of view, what is the significance of these regulations? First, by the early twelfth century, a South Fukien merchant could choose from among a wide range of overseas markets, stretching from Japan and Korea in the northeast to the South Seas. Moreover, it was lawful for him to do business in those countries if he so wished. A merchant ven­ turing overseas knew which commodities could be lawfully exported and which were prohibited. He had a clear idea of which import items were mo­ nopolized by the government and under what terms. The tariff rates and the

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Formal Institutional Constraints

percentages of imports liable to compulsory purchase were no secret and could be computed well ahead of time. The formal framework clearly set the regulatory controls and procedures that had to be followed and specified in detail the penalties for violating any specific regulation and the criminal li­ abilities of various parties concerned. This legal framework made lawful profit possible and defined how it could be done. What, then, was the incentive for merchants to comply with the laws? Did not the illicit trade allow one to avoid the standard procedures as well as the occasionally exploitative customs tariff or compulsory purchases? To understand why merchants complied with the laws, we can compare illicit and lawful trade in terms of transaction costs. There are at least four aspects in which lawful trade had considerably lower transaction costs and greater potential for profit. First, the illicit trade could incur severe punishment. The no5 document mentions penalties ranging from 50 strokes with the heavy stick (§4) to three years of labor servitude ( §2 ). The latter category ranked just below ex­ ile in severity in the Sung code. These punishments were by no means negli­ gible deterrents. Further strengthening the possibility of punishment were the attractive rewards offered to informants-half the value of the ship and the cargo (§3). It would be an overstatement to claim that the penalties and the rewards successfully and completely eliminated the illicit trade along the China coast. They never did so. Nonetheless, their very existence created additional transaction costs for illicit maritime activities, such as the expense of maintaining an adequate coercive force to deter betrayal by insiders or by informants, given the attractive rewards for doing so; the potential forfeiture of an expensive oceangoing vessel (§3); and the need to lower prices of ille­ gally imported items for quick sale (§9). The costs of illicit trade could be enormous, rendering the activities ei­ ther much less lucrative or even unprofitable. Only if there were strong de­ mand for a good or a limited supply would its relative price in the black market be driven up to the extent that the illicit trade, despite all the extra transaction costs, would be lucrative enough and worth the risk of violating the laws. However, none of these conditions existed in the case of South Fu­ kien. The local market for imported goods did not develop until the latter part of the twelfth century when the community of imperial clansmen grew substantially, and there was no way to control the supply of goods in the il­ licit trade. In short, the transaction costs for the illicit trade were considera-

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bly higher than those for the lawful trade in this region. The legal frame­ work provided a way to avoid these extra transaction costs. Insofar as a mer­ chant was willing to comply with the maritime regulations, he could elimi­ nate the risks and costs of the illicit trade. Prior to 1087, South Fukien merchants by and large complied with the laws and registered at Chekiang or Kwangtung ports and absorbed the extra costs by lowering their profit margin rather than by converting to the illicit trade en masse. Their willing­ ness to do so may be indirect evidence that the transaction costs of the illicit trade were greater than the cost of voyaging to a port with an office of mari­ time affairs. Following the establishment of the office of maritime affairs at Ch'iian-chou, merchants confronted a choice between incurring the transac­ tion costs of the illicit trade and participating in the lawful trade without the added expense of registering in Ming-chou or Kwangtung. The rational choice is apparent and must have significantly encouraged merchants to build commercial bases in South Fukien, a phenomenon that became appar­ ent toward the mid-twelfth century. Second, in terms of measurement and enforcement, there were significant differences in transaction costs between the illicit and the lawful trade. Many problems of measurement arose in maritime trade. For instance, there was a large variety of aromatics and spices, which often were further graded into many classes.6 Their value varied sharply according to the grade, and this made the measurement of quality a vital process in the maritime trade. Fur­ ther complicating the problem of quality was the difficulty in determining quantity. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the units of accounting in Sung rec­ ords are highly confusing because of the multiple-units summation method. But even for a single item such as ivory, the counting unit of chu (literally, "a trunk") certainly renders opaque the dimensions of size and weight that are equally important in determining the market value of a particular piece of ivory.7 So the measurements had to be done carefully; preferably they were to be verified by a reliable authority, such as the government, to safeguard the interests of all parties to the transaction.8 Without such safeguards, fraud would have been rampant. An illicit trader who was the victim of de­ ception could not appeal to the authorities for mediation or adjudication. This would result in very high transaction costs. One effective way of shielding oneself against malpractice and lower the transaction costs in this regard was to trade within the legal framework and enjoy the safeguards provided by government authorities.

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Formal Institutional Constraints

Similar problems may also have arisen in the transaction costs of en­ forcement. For the South Fukien maritime trade, significant enforcement costs arose in areas such as orders for export ceramics, commercial capital lending, and the storage of luxury items. All these activities required credi­ bility and trust among the participants. As discussed in the next chapter, informal institutions played an important role in fostering mutual trust in the business community. The participants in the illegal trade, however, would have required much stronger informal institutional constraints. In contrast, the merchants in the legal trade could rely on government sanc­ tions in cases of breaches of contract. We shall return to contractual con­ straints in the last section of this chapter, but the basic prerequisite for gov­ ernment-sanctioned contractual enforcement was that the trade be lawful. Suffice it to say that in terms of transaction costs in relation to measurement and enforcement, the advantage lay with the lawful trade. Merchants also confronted a third set of considerations in choosing be­ tween the illicit and the lawful trade: namely, the factors of predictability, expandability, and convertibility. By "predictability," I refer to the ability to plan the trade. This was especially drucial in a maritime trade in which each round-trip voyage took at least one year to complete. The voyage was not only expensive but full of risk on the high seas, not to mention piracy or pre­ dation by local rulers overseas. Back home there were also the uncertainties of securing an adequate supply of export commodities and market outlets for imports. In a region like South Fukien, which before the twelfth century was not blessed with abundant local products or substantial local wealth to consume imports, the maritime trade would have been a highly uncertain business. It would have been to the advantage of a merchant determined to engage in such a high-risk enterprise to increase the predictability of his business as much as possible. One such avenue among the �any available was to observe the law, for the lawful trade allowed open dealings in the prime market of the region, Ch'iian-chou city. The benefits were access to the largest markets for consumption as well as transshipment, the largest sources of export goods, the largest pool of human and capital resources, and, above all, the largest pool of information on overseas markets. These benefits would significantly increase the degree of certainty, making long­ term business planning far more effective and profitable. By "expandability," I refer to the scale of the business. As explained in Chapter 9, a common mode of commercial operation in the maritime trade

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was to form a consortium of individual voyages, each comprising a large group of independent small traders or agents. Although in theory such a practice could be carried out in the illegal trade, the advantage of engaging in lawful trade would be the greatly expanded pool of human resources avail­ able to such a consortium, resulting in a larger scale of trade and, presuma­ bly, higher profits without additional transaction costs. By "convertibility,'' I refer to the wealth generated immediately from the maritime trade. One important factor in the utility of such wealth would be the alternative forms of storing it available to maritime merchants. Profit could be made in both the illicit and the lawful trade, but when it became wealth-which had to be stored in a means not only durable but also easily convertible to other forms of value-storage instruments-its source would make a significant difference. The durability of wealth derived from illicit trade was always uncertain, for it could be confiscated even generations later. The same is even more true of convertibility. The conversion of illicit profits into other forms of value-storage instruments would incur relatively high transaction costs. For instance, any trader who converted part of his wealth into land had to go through the middleman required in property transac­ tions. The middleman was held responsible if it was later discovered that the money used in the land transaction had been illegally earned. The middle­ man would have to be compensated one way or another for facilitating such a deal for an illegal trader. As a result, the latter had to bear additio�al, pre­ sumably substantial, transaction costs for the illicit trade. A final advantage of conducting maritime trade lawfully was that lawful merchant status might be vital in transaction disputes overseas. For this there is little documentation, but the circumstances in which the no5 permit was recorded in Japan may be illustrative. The permit provided the major le­ gal text for our analysis earlier, and it has been cited often by scholars since Mori Katsumi first published it in his book on Sino-Japanese trade during the Sung dynasty. The background of this document is of interest here. Ac­ cording to the full Japanese text quoted by Mori, the no5 permit issued by the Ming-chou shih-po-ssu was an attachment to an investigation report written by officials of the Dazaifu, the headquarters of the regional govern­ ment of Kyushu near present-day Fukuoka, that was later submitted to the central government. Li Ch'ung had petitioned a branch office of the Dazaifu claiming that he had loan.ed a quantity of goods to local Japanese traders in no2 during his last voyage to Japan, but now those Japanese traders were

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refusing to fulfill their contractual obligations. In response, the Japanese of­ ficials interrogated Li:9 Question: Li Ch'ung, [you] claimed that there are [local] people who have failed to pay you for goods they borrowed from you last time. Why didn't you make a claim last time? You now claim that you have come here for the purpose of col­ lecting the debt. This is not creditable. . . . You must submit to us the permit is­ sued by your home country, together with information on the cargo, names of passengers, and the ship capacity. . . . [Li gave his explanation.] Question: The contract of the transaction in question that you have submitted will be handled by our office, but you need to submit information on your cargo for our records. Li Ch'ung: The cargo is detailed on the permit issued by my own country that has been submitted to you already. There is no other document or information to submit. Unfortunately, the report does not indicate the outcome of this contractual dispute. Nonetheless, it is apparent that in some overseas countries, the Sung maritime permits could be used as documentation to verify the lawful status of a Chinese merchant. This status would be vital in disputes requir­ ing government intervention. From this analysis of the transaction costs involved in the illicit and the lawful trade, a rational South Fukien merchant would reasonably prefer the latter path. I am not saying that all trade was conducted according to the law. At any given time, as noted in Chapter 4, there probably were pirates and illicit traders in South Fukien. But I am saying that conducting mari­ time trade lawfully in South Fukien under the Sung maritime regulations incurred much lower transaction costs than did the illicit trade. The legal framework was hence conducive to the cross-sectoral prosperity or regional economic integration discussed in the first two parts of this book. Even though the illicit trade might have led to temporary success and wealth for a few, it would never have generated and sustained the kind of regional devel­ opment seen in South Fukien during this period. The 1293 maritime regulations, the first enacted under the Yuan, basically followed the Sung system, with minor alterations.10 The most important one was the prohibition of tariff evasion by voyages conducted by officials of the provincial government, the provincial financial bureau, and the office of

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maritime affairs; by imperial envoys dispatched overseas who conducted pri­ vate trade; and by privileged households such as monks and Mongolians. It also forbade port officials to lower tariffs for their own agents by under­ valuing the luxury imports the latter brought back from overseas on their behal£ Another notable change in the regulation was an increase of the number of guarantors required for each voyage from three to five. Whereas the first few regulations reflect the dominance of foreigners in maritime trade and their rising political status, the last change promoted the integra­ tion between maritime trade arid landownership. It increased the incentive for a merchant to transform part of his commercial wealth into real property so as to acquire guarantor status and thereby secure an advantageous posi­ tion in the maritime trade. This problem was especially acute for local Chi­ nese merchants who had to struggle against unequal competition with their foreign counterparts. 11 A second set of Yuan maritime regulations was promulgated in 1314. Again, it largely followed the 1293 regulations but tightened the restrictions on officials and the privileged classes. Officials were prohibited from dis­ patching agents overseas for trade, and imperial envoys were not allowed to engage in trade while they were on a mission unless they had obtained prior approval. The most striking change in this piece of legislation is that the list of prohibited export items was extended to include floss silk, silk textiles, golden vessels, and rice and other grains. There is no doubt that rice was ex­ ported mainly from Kuang-chou rather than Ch'iian-chou,12 but it is more difficult to tell from where the prohibited silk exports came. As discussed in Chapter 51 the Ch'iian-chou textile industry seems to have earned a reputa­ tion during the Yuan, and we may assume that the ban had an effect on tex­ tile production in the region. But any loss in the export trade would easily have been replaced by the domestic trade in silk textiles and increased ce­ ramic exports. As a whole, this prohibition should not have had a devastat­ ing impact on the local economy. In terms of transaction costs, the analysis of the Sung laws can also apply to Yuan times, for the factors that induced lower transaction costs for compli­ ance with the law were by and large passed on from the Sung to the Yuan. The basic legal framework within which South Fukien maritime merchants operated continued in effect for almost three hundred years. As noted in Chapter 5, the formal institutional matrix did not change until the early Ming.

Formal Institutional Constraints

Property Rights in Maritime Transactions The categorization of property is not an easy task. In this study, I follow the conventional categorization of property in the literature on Chinese legal history as movables and immovables.13 Also, I confine my discussion to tan­ gible property. There are two major issues involving property rights and the maritime economy. The· first is the ownership of immovable property, mainly land and buildings, that constituted a basic prerequisite for attaining the status of guarantor required in any lawful maritime trade. Immovable property was a popular form of storage for the wealth generated from the maritime trade. In the Sung Code, it is usually referred to as ch'an or yeh. Households owning considerable amounts of such immovables were classi­ fied as wu-li households, literally "landed households." The preceding section touched on this issue; in this section, we will focus on the second issue, the ownership of movable property,14 often termed in the Sung legal lexicon as ts'ai-wu and occasionally ts'ai in a narrow sense,15 in relation to the maritime trade. This second category of property included such tangible physical objects as (1) import or export goods; (2) capital facilities; (3) the immediate capital from which the goods derived; or (4) the immediate profits they created. The first subcategory is self-explanatory; the most important item in the second subcategory was the ship that transported the goods. The last two subcategories were, however, more diverse in contents. They would be other goods (including precious metals such as gold or silver), various entitlement instruments with a market value (for example, monk certificates), or money (paper or copper coins). All these kinds of movable property were transfer­ able and convertible, and all carried a monetary value. Without an estab­ lished institution of property rights to guarantee the ownership of such property, a maritime economy of the scale witnessed in South Fukien would have been impossible. The issue of property rights in relation to such objects can be further defined as whether the Sung and Yuan states in theory and in practice provided legal recognition and protection to the ownership of such property. How might such formal institutions affect the transaction costs in maritime trader Legal provisions pertaining to the recognition and protection of private ownership of tangible movable property are not uncommon in the Sung Code. Some salient examples are given below. (1) The movable property,

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ts'ai-wu, of a deceased sojourner merchant could be turned over only to im­

mediate relatives in the same household.16 (2) Robbery and stealing were de­ fined as unlawful appropriation of movable properties belonging to others who were legitimate owners, ts'ai-chu. The difference between these two of­ fenses was that the former was done by force and the latter by stealth.17 (3) A distinction was also drawn between the unlawful or fraudulent possession of landed property and of movable property, making them separate crimes.18 (4) Unauthorized consumption of movable property in one's custody that was owned by others was made a crime.19 (5) Failure to submit movable property left in a public space with no known owner to the government within five days was declared an offense. The property would then be pub­ licly displayed so that the owner could come forward to identify it. In order to prevent fraud, the owner needed to produce evidence of his ownership before the property could be returned to him. His claim further had to be supported by a guarantor.20 ( 6) More revealing is the provision stipulating that anyone who participated in an illegal transaction involving official prop­ erty using his own "private movable property,'' ssu-ts'ai-wu, would be pun­ ished in accordance with the theft laws.21 This indicates that private owner­ ship of movable property functioned to identify culprits involved in criminal transactions. (7) Finally, all illegally acquired properties were classified as tsang, literally "illegal property,'' for which no official recognition or protec­ tion would be provided.22 This applied to whatever properties into which the tsang were converted, even in otherwise legal transactions.23 Given these provisions, it is clear that the ownership of private property rights over mov­ able property was recognized and protected by formal law. To what extent was this legal recognition and protection extended to the maritime trade? In the preceding section, I mentioned the laws dealing with evasion of customs duties and trading in prohibited countries (§9). The ownership of each item in a cargo had to be clearly identified so that the criminal liabilities could be determined. Moreover, §10 stipulated that every­ one on board a vessel with illicit goods would be punished, whatever his in­ volvement. This shows that the ownership of every item in a cargo must have been clearly identified. The law fully recognized such property rights. The wooden labels discovered in the Sung shipwreck in Ch'iian-chou Bay were attached to the goods to identify the owners. Kamei Meitoku has ar­ gued forcefully that the character kang frequently written in ink on the bot­ tom of twelfth-century Chinese ceramics discovered in Kyushu, many of

Formal Institutional Constraints which originated in South Fukien, was meant primarily to identify owner­ ship.24 One implication of these practices is the legal recognition of estab­ lished property rights over maritime goods. Also, as noted in Chapter 3, over a period of six years a Ch'iian-chou merchant Ts'ai Ching-fang had dealings with the office of maritime affairs that eventually yielded a profit, ching-li­ ch 'ien, of 980,000 strings of cash for the office. As a reward, Ts'ai was granted a low-ranking official position. Ts'ai's case shows that the office must have kept records of the sources of all import items it acquired, whether by tax or by purchase. These records must have been detailed enough to enable the office to trace and calculate the accumulated profits made by reselling goods it acquired from a certain individual and to deter­ mine the rewards accordingly. The system would not have been possible, however, had there not been official recognition of the ownership of such goods at the time the office of maritime affairs acquired them. Furthermore, ownership was distinguished from custody of property, vaguely analogous to the distinction between legal possession (or animus pos­ sidendi) and de facto possession (or factum possidendi).25 In provision (r ) above, a dead person no longer held de facto pqssession of his movable property, but his right of legal possession made the property inheritable by his immediate kin. Although the custodian as noted in (4) possessed de facto property that did not belong to him, his defacto possession did not allow him unauthorized consumption of the property. The original owner did not physically control the property, but he was still clearly recognized by law as the legal proprie­ tor. A finder oflost property had, as stipulated in (s), five days to hand over the item to the government. He would have temporary lawful defacto posses­ sion of the lost property but was never recognized as its owner. Another salient feature of the traditional Chinese concept of property is that the property rights or ownership discussed thus far pertained 'primarily to the collective rather than the individual.26 Lineages, guilds, or villages could be legally recognized entities owning common properties. But the most basic collective unit of ownership in the law of property rights was the household, hu. Under the Sung, it became the fundamental social unit capa­ ble of owning either movable or immovable property. In theory, movable property, much like immovables, belonged primarily to the household and not to its individual members. Exceptions to this rule were property derived from capital other than the common property of the household, property purchased by a son during his tenure as government official, or property de-

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rived from his wife's dower.27 Nevertheless, the head of the household had the authority to manage all household property.28 And it was only by his or­ der or permission that a junior member of the same household could put some of the household property into profit-making undertakings. The maritime trade was not exempt from this stipulation. We may assume that most of the merchants noted so far were either household heads or someone with authorization from the head of household to engage in the trade. In such cases, the profit derived from the trade would also end up part of the household property instead of the merchant's personally. In contrast, the profits made by those who employed individual property, whether as a per­ sonal loan or as wife's dower,29 would naturally enrich their own coffers. Even from this sketchy overview of property rights in relation to the maritime trade, the implications in terms of transaction costs are not diffi­ cult to see. First, a lawful maritime trade would not be practical without an established formal system of property rights, for the criminalization of cer­ tain ways of trading in maritime goods would require unmistakable and in­ disputable ownership of these goods. Otherwise, it would be impossible to enforce the law and hold offenders criminally liable. Second, had there not been established property rights for goods belonging to different merchants that formed a single cargo for overseas voyages, there would have been higher transaction costs to minimize disputes over ownership or to maintain an authoritative mechanism to settle such disputes. If the costs were too high, it might even have deterred owners of different goods from sharing the same voyage and hence increased the voyage cost and the risk. The advan­ tage of such consortium voyages in terms of risk-sharing was made clear in Chapter 9. We can therefore infer that the very existence of property right laws as mentioned above would provide an institutional setting of lower transaction costs, at least for such practices. Third, the distinction between legal possession and de facto possession, and the resulting legal protections, would be instrumental to maritime trade because it facilitated more complex trade patterns in which the owners of the gobds need not be present at a transaction or on a voyage. It allowed a more extensive use of agents without a corresponding surge in transaction costs that might have arisen had there been no protection of ownership other than defacto possession. Finally, the attribute of household ownership of property rights affected transaction costs, too. In the next chapter, I discuss kinship units as a mechanism of informal institutional constraints. But the economic founda-

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tion of these informal constraints relied on the common property rights that belonged to the household. As such, the property rights pattern would in fact reinforce the effectiveness of the informal constraints. It naturally low­ ered transaction costs at the same time. Even individual property employed in the maritime trade required good individual credit for a loan or a marriage that brought in a sizable dower for the husband's disposal. Since both con­ ditions would depend heavily on the family, this supports rather than weak­ ens the argument thus far.

Sung Contract Procedures and Contractual Agreements in the Maritime Trade The issue of Chinese traditional contracts is as complex as that 9f property rights. The first and foremost question is whether contracts existed in Sung China. If so, were they legally binding, and how did they affect the maritime _ trade in relation to transaction costs? Since the nineteenth century, the con­ ventional view has been that officially enforceable contracts did not exist in traditional China. This view is best represented in Geoffrey MacCormack's words. To him, a contract in the West is "an agreement between two or more parties which the law makes enforceable, provided certain conditions are met." Contract law is "concerned with actionable agreements, whatever the precise conditions for actionability, and has provided a systematic expo­ sition of the formation of contract, the rights and duties of the parties and remedies for breach."30 In contrast, traditional Chinese contracts were mainly "a set of rules which governed contracts for the sale of goods" devel­ oped in private commercial practices outside the formal legal system over time. "These rules were often not formally stated in the contract by the par­ ties but were understood by them and the transaction was assumed to be conducted and regulated on their basis. Their operation depended primarily upon the good sense and readiness to co-operate of the parties." But this, MacCormack claims, had no backing from the government. "Such contracts appear seldom to have been considered by the magistrates and, even should they come before the court, no attempt was made by the judge to apply or develop the law." There were no comprehensively established '1egislative rules governing the formation of contracts, the rights and duties of the par­ ties, and the remedies for breach." Nor was an attempt made to define a valid contract or develop requirements for it.31 For MacCormack, traditional

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Chinese contracts pertained mainly to customary constraints. Although there is some truth to the notion of enforcement by custom, to which we shall return in the next chapter, the formal legal system did in fact play a more active role in the enforcement of contracts, even in Sung China, than the conventional view has it. Valerie Hansen's meticulous work on Chinese contracts from the Tang to the Yuan supplies ample evidence of this.32 On a more theoretical level, Hugh Scogin has also cautioned that it is more con­ structive to explore traditional Chinese contract law in its historical, social, and cultural contexts rather than to assess it in terms of the highly articu­ lated standards of the modern Western contract.33 Hansen's working definition of Chinese contracts-"written agreements between two or more parties to buy, sell, rent, or borrow a given commodity. . . . After being read out, they were signed by witnesses and guarantors"34captures certain essentials of the traditional Chinese contract: the parties, the contents, and the oral and written formalities. It also avoids the problem of defining Chinese contracts by employing modern legal concepts of contracts, which imply, among other things, the requirement of a con­ sideration.35 To Hansen's definition, we can add three further elements that address formal issues in Sung law relating to the role of the government in contract enforcement. First, the government did recognize privately drawn contracts insofar as they followed prescribed procedures, and it enacted laws to support their enforcement by criminalizing the breach of such contracts. In law, those who failed to repay a debt or to deliver as promised under a contractual agreement, fu-chai wei-ch 'i pu-ch'ang, were to be punished in proportion to the delay in payment or fulfillment.36 There was a clear distinction between a contract that was officially recognized and thus legally binding and a con­ tract that was privately concluded and socially enforceable but not officially recognized if disputes arose. The former was termed a hung-ch'i, literally a "red contract," or a contract stamped with a red seal; the latter was called a pai-ch'i, a "white contract," or one without a stamp.37 In short, the parties could conclude either a red contract, which would enhance the chance of fulfillment, or a white one, which had no legally binding effect. The choice depended on the calculations of the contracting parties. The government, for its part, enforced only the red ones. Second, the government charged a fee for a red contract. The contract tax grew from 4 percent of the value of the contract at the beginning of the

Formal Institutional Constraints dynasty' to 6 percent in the early twelfth century to ro percent in n30. There is evidence that the rate was around 8 percent in Chang-chou in the early Southern Sung.38 Before the turn of the thirteenth century, the costs of con­ cluding a contract, including the tax, printing charges, and bribes to the gov­ ernment clerks to smooth the process, was well over 15 percent.39 Under­ standably, many chose to avoid the contract tax and committed themselves , in white contracts. But the continuing existence of red contracts argues that there were advantages in paying the charges. The influential scholar-official Yiian Ts'ai warned people to conduct business only in a lawful manner: "Transactions must be in accord with the legal articles in every single par­ ticular in order to avoid later complications. You should not neglect this and let your guard down by depending on your friendship with the other party. Should there be a falling-out, these ambiguities could become the basis for disputes."40 His advice was not only to observe the requirements for red contracts but also to attend to every detail in the contract. Third, the parties to a contract ha� to meet certain qualifications. For transactions involving household property, the buyer or seller had to be the family head, his representative, or a person authorized by the government in cases where no person of authority was available within the family.41 Other­ wise, even a red contract .was void, and any loss was not remediable. As mentioned in the preceding section, the basic unit of ownership was the household rather than the individual. The parties engaging in a contractual agreement involving household property were representatives of family col­ lectives. These three stipulations in Sung contract laws applied to legally binding contractual agreements in general, but they had particular effects on certain types of contracts common in the maritime trade, especially in terms of transaction costs. Three types can be traced in documents: purchase on credit, production orders, and rental of oceangoing vessels. We shall look at each of these contractual agreements and explore their transaction costs. The purchase of export commodities on credit, which was discussed in the preceding chapter, was rigidly regulated by contract law. Such arrange­ ments had to be concluded through a broker, and there had to be at least one guarantor to protect the interests of the seller.42 A clear example comes from the passage from the Canton Stories on the maritime trade in Kuang­ chou quoted in part in Chapter 9:

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If the northerners (peijen) [i.e., people from the north of Ling-nan, including Fukienese] who travel overseas do not return in the same year, it is called chufan [literally, "staying in foreign lands"]. If the foreigners who came to Kuang-chou stay until the next year, people will call it chu-T'ang [staying in China]. Kuang­ chou locals offer loans (chu-chai) [to maritime merchants when the latter pur­ chase export commodities on credit], charging an interest rate of 100 percent, and the contract (yueh) requires repayment to be made only when the ship re­ turns [to Kuang-chou]. Even though the borrower does not return, that is, re­ sides abroad for ten years, the total interest remains unchanged. However, the rich can store up silk textiles and ceramics so as to push up the prices [of those commodities in Kuang-chou]. They then request the borrower to repay [in. kind] when the latter returns from overseas. At the end, the interest these rich men earn is almost five times higher. The government in Kuang-chou accepts and adjudicates litigation concerning debt with interest (yu-li chaifu). It is be­ cause of the special imperial order (chuan-ch'ih) granted to the office of maritime affairs so as to ensure smooth operation of the [maritime] trade.43 From this passage, it is apparent that the commercial practice of purchase on credit was categorized as a kind of debt that incurred legitimate interest to be repaid by the borrower to the lender under a formal contract. The statu­ tory provision on the interest on private loans or debts capped total interest at 100 percent for any one loan regardless of its duration and set the maxi­ mum monthly interest rate at 6 percent.44 This was observed in the maritime trade in Kuang-chou. The difference between private debt and purchase on credit in the maritime trade was that the former was not normally consid­ ered a concern of the government,45 whereas the latter received special at­ tention from the government, which, in order to keep trade flowing, was more willing to enforce such contracts. In one case, a Ch'iian-chou merchant died during a voyage overseas, resulting in the loss of the entire cargo. The government forced his son, also a maritime trader, to sell the family-owned oceangoing vessel at unfavorable terms so as to repay the loan and interest his father had used on the ill-fated voyage.46 This is indicative of the role the government played in the enforcement of this type of contract. Moreover, given the fact that each voyage would take no less than one year to complete, it was not uncommon for a loan to yield the maximum le­ gitimate interest of 100 percent. And it was not unusual for maritime traders to stay overseas for many years. Two consequences of the uncertainty in the

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timing of the repayment was that prices would fluctuate, at times sharply, and the parties to the contract might not survive the duration of the voyage. Some lenders certainly tried to take advantage of these circumstances by manipulating the market prices of the commodities in which the debt was repaid. There were bound to be disputes. If they could not be solved pri­ vately or mediated through informal mechanisms, the government's willing­ ness to play a role in settling these disputes would be particularly significant in maintaining the practice of purchase on credit. Under the same maritime laws, presumably similar practices of purchase on credit by red contracts were followed in Ch'iian-chou. The government regulation of this kind of contractual agreement would have an important bearing on transaction costs. It generated security in commercial lending in the absence of informal institutional constraints that might have guaranteed enforcement, the subject of the next chapter. As a result, investment in commerce, which was vital for the sustained boom in the maritime trade, could be extended to a much wider pool of lenders and borrowers who might lack reliable informal institutional linkages. Although the maritime sector in Ch'iian-chou certainly was not an economy of impersonal transac­ tions, the existence of less personalized commercial practices sanctioned by the government through its contract law opened up opportunities for in­ vestors and maritime traders alike to tap human resources and capital in kind or in money for the maritime trade. Given the almost certain return of roo percent on a loan, transaction costs under such formal contractual terms of 15, or even 20, percent of the value of the loan were low compared with the possible transaction costs in commercial lending without government sanction. A second type of contract in the maritime trade pertained to production orders, which were akin to a futures contract today.47 As de�cribed in the discussions of lichee exports in Chapter 2 and export ceramics in Chapter 8, production orders were a common practice and allowed maritime traders to secure a supply of export commodities in high demand overseas. They also gave the traders more influence over production decisions and prices paid the producers. The case of lichee production orders is well known: "When [the lichee trees] begin to flower, [merchants] will come to place orders for [the entire harvest of] certain numbers of lichee trees. These orders will be drawn up in contracts [between the merchants and the farmers]. If the har­ vest later turns out to be abundant, the merchants will be informed."48 What

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is interesting for the present context is the use of contracts to secure supply. Similar practices could also be found in tea production in Chang-chou; contracts between tea-producing households and merchants were drawn up by brokers and guarantors, and payments were made in advance.49 And . there IS . evI"dence that tea was among the export Items.50 Apart from these cases, there is little information about contract terms. Nevertheless, we may infer that they were red contracts, for the rationale behind drawing up a contractual agreement was to provide for enforcement. For production orders made prior to the harvest, the uncertainty that either side could fulfill the terms was considerable; a bad harvest due to natural calamity or human error or a sudden change in price because of an extraor­ dinarily good harvest or a drastically higher demand must have been as common then as they are now. Whether the farmer was paid at the time when the contract was signed or when he delivered the produce,51 both sides had ample motives for breaching the agreement. The very existence of the practice implies an effective enforcement mechanism. Again, the legally binding effect of red contracts must have contributed greatly to the continu­ ity of such commercial activities. The final type of contract to be discussed here provided for the rental of an oceangoing vessel. As noted above, ships, even riverboats, were considered movable properties, and as such, transactions involving them, especially the more costly oceangoing vessels, were required by law to be conducted with officially recognized contracts.52 In the permit issued by Ming-chou shih-po­ ssu to the Ch'iian-chou merchant Li Ch'ung mentioned above, the ship was emphatically identified as self-owned, tzu-chi ch'uan. This implies that a ship might not belong to the captain. Direct evidence of the practice of ship rental for overseas voyages cannot be found in Sung records, but two hints may serve to indicate its existence. The first is the legal regulation cited in Li Ch'ung's permit stating that merchants or captains who ventured to prohib­ ited countries would be punished as would others on board, "even though they were not the owners of the ship or the goods."53 This suggests that al­ though the owner of the ship might not be present when the crime took place, he, too, was liable to punishment, in addition to having his ship con­ fiscated. In Chapter 5, we noted the case of a foreign merchant based in Ch'iian-chou who owned over Bo mercantile ships in the late thirteenth century. How would these Bo ships be managed in the overseas trade? The owner might send out his salaried agents to operate some of the ships as

Formal Institutional Constraints captains or invite partners to share the voyage costs so as to lower the risk, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Given the size of his fleet of mercantile ships, he is likely to have been attracted to the third option of renting out a certain number of the ships so as to further reduce risk and ensure profits, if he could be certain of the enforcement of the rental contract. In the provi­ sions of the 1314 maritime law, the ship's owner was to be listed together with the captain and other major officers on board in order to identify those liable to criminal charges if any law was violated.54 This contractual practice persisted through the Yuan because it helped reduce transaction costs for the less wealthy traders who lacked sufficient capital to purchase a ship but were nonetheless able to assemble sufficient funding for participating in the overseas trade. If they were ambitious enough to operate a voyage by themselves as captains, they had to rent a ship. To do so without strong connections or powerful political backing would mean that they were more likely to have been exploited and would need to pay a considerable fee to cover the enforcement risk for the ship's owner while trying to conclude an unofficial rental arrangement. The exist­ ing contract practice would lower this kind of transaction cost and make the leasing deals much easier for them. Without ship-leasing contracts, their participation in overseas ventures would have been limited to joining others' voyages as petty traders. This is another area in which Sung contract law affected transaction costs.

Litigation and Mediation in Commercial Disputes Whatever the legal rules were, had they not been enforced, they would have little effect on commercial behavior and decisions. Nor would they have been able to affect transaction costs in the ways discussed above. This sec­ tion examines the enforcement of these formal institutional constraints and focuses on violations of maritime laws, civil justice in commercial disputes, and elite attitudes toward litigation. In general, the maritime laws were deliberately designed as harsh criminal laws in order to deter offenders. Not only would convicted offenders be punished severely, but also many other related parties, such as those on board the same ship, the ship's owner, or even a warehouse keeper who stored the goods, were liable to punishment. Collective culpability was a major aspect of Legalism, the dominant imperial ideology before the emer­ gence of Confucianism in the Former Han dynasty. But from the first cen-

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tury B.c. on, it gradually became unimportant in traditional Chinese crimi­ nal law, except for offenses against the imperial order, in which close kin were punished along with the prime offender. Occasionally under the Sung, a neighborhood was held collectively responsible for a criminal offense in or­ der to improve social order.ss These, however, were decided on an ad hoc basis. The extension of penalties in maritime cases thus means that the maritime laws were in general among the more severe in Sung China. To what extent were these harsh laws enforced? And what factors seemed to have shaped the enforcement agents' decision to enforce the law? The central government was usually serious about implementing these regulations. However, the actual degree of implementation depended on of­ ficials of local government organizations ranging from the office of maritime affairs and the prefectural offices to coastal county and market-town gov­ ernmental units, such as the An-hai-chen officer, for these were the actual enforcement agents, not the policymakers at the imperial court. Some local officials implemented the laws vigorously, with mixed results; others pro­ moted trade, and still others inhibited it. And then there were those who were incapable of enforcing the laws or simply indifferent to them. Two variables, among others, may be noted here: the local social connections of the government officials and their personal integrity and aspirations. The social linkages between the local elite and local government officials do not seem to have been strong during the takeoff period for Ch'iian-chou's maritime economy. A closer relationship between the two groups became more visible after the early thirteenth century and peaked after the dynastic change.s6 Since the criminal penalties for violation of the maritime laws were quite harsh and might be extended to rich and influential local families serving as guarantors, we may assume that the closer the social ties between officials and powerful local families, the higher the social costs to them of strictly implementing the laws. Some officials, however, apparently had strong views about the violation of laws by the local merchants in overseas ventures. One clear example is Su Shih's handling of the illicit trade with the Liao and Koryo mentioned in Chapter 3. He sentenced a Ch'iian-chou mer­ chant to penal registration in a prefecture r,ooo Ii distant for the offense of shipping and selling a printed Buddhist sutra to his Korean clients for 3,000 taels of silver. Moreover, the merchant was charged with the unauthorized transport of a group of Korean envoys consisting mainly of Buddhist monks to pay tribute to the Sung court.s7 Another two, probably also from Ch'iian-

Formal Institutional Constraints chou, who were found guilty of smuggling into Liao territory received a similar punishment.58 The most notable feature in Su's memorials reporting these cases is in fact his strong determination to punish these lawbreakers and to deter others.59 The laws were implemented vigorously under aspiring local officials like Su Shih, and there was no lack of such officials in South Fukien.60 Many officials, of course, did not live up to their responsibilities. Others were corrupt. Mention was made in Chapter 2 about the situation in Ch'iian-chou in the mid-106os. Even the prefect Kuan Yung, long regarded by historians as innocent, broke the standing law prohibiting an official from doing business with merchants under his jurisdiction and made a profit from such deals. Corrupt officials probably did not enforce the maritime regulations vigorously or enforced them selectively. But as argued in Chapter 4, although some corruption may have existed in South Fukien, it would seldom have been a severe problem. Otherwise, the region's maritime econ­ omy would not have survived, let alone prospered for centuries. Moreover, highly corrupt enforcement within the local government would significantly raise the transaction costs, for example, by necessitating the payment of bribes. It could well exceed the normal transaction costs induced by a prop­ erly enforced formal legal system, as that under Prefect Chen Te-hsiu dis­ cussed in Chapter 4. And the consequence would be a decline in the com­ mercial sector that would not benefit the locals, rich or poor alike, in the long run. Therefore, it would always be local pressure for proper enforce­ ment. Brian McKnight, Kuo Tung-hsii, and Yeh Hsiao-hsin have provided ex­ cellent accounts of the Sung civil justice system in general that allow us to explore how the system would deal with commercial disputes in the mari­ time trade.61 According to them, most civil litigation was normally adjudi­ cated at the county or prefectural levels. Nonetheless, if either party were unsatisfied, it could appeal the case to the circuit or even the central gov­ ernment. 62 But the litigant had to begin by submitting a petition, su-chuang, to the county government. At the beginning of the Northern Sung, litigants were allowed to prepare the petition themselves or with assistance of others. As time went on, the government introduced more regulations to control the writing of these legal documents in order to simplify litigation. By as early as the twelfth century, households specializing in drawing up contracts or writing legal documents for clients had already become established in so-

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ciety; these were licensed by the government to provide related legal services to those who could not do it themselves. These were called hsieh chuang ch'ao shu-p'u; and their staff, sung-shih, or tz'ujen, literally "litigation practitio­ ners.''63 The civil justice system at the local level depended on the quality of the local officials. For commoners with little power or wealth, it could be prohibitively expensive to become entangled in this system.64 In South Fukien, there is evidence that merchants involved in the mari­ time trade were seldom deterred by the cost of litigation. Nor were they re­ luctant to mobilize all the resources at their disposal to win a case concern­ ing a commercial dispute. In fact, some even bribed officials for a favorable judicial decision.65 In the credit purchase contract noted above, we can see an explicit official policy to encourage settlement of commercial disputes through the formal civil justice system at the prefectural level. This was said to be motivated by the need to facilitate the practice with government sanc­ tion so that it would help promote the expansion of maritime trade. When more natives began to gain official positions in the local government, the use of the civil justice system is likely to have intensified, giving more room for manipulation by the local merchants. As such, the system may have been more utilized in a maritime region such as South Fukien than elsewhere. There were thus clear advantages for the government to implement it effec­ tively and for the merchants to us� it as a viable means of dispute settlement. One factor in the workings of civil justice in traditional China is the issue of the attitude of local officials toward litigation. Were they all strongly op­ posed to litigation due to the Confucian doctrine of no litigation, wu-sungr Chang Chin-fan and Liang Chih-p'ing have recently provided a precise analysis of this tradition. According to the materials they amassed, the no­ tion of wu-sung can be traced to the Chou dynasty and was shared by the major schools of thought prior to the Ch'in. The tradition was maintained and further elaborated in the legal systems of subsequent dynasties. It was one of the major legal ideals for governance at all levels. Sung China was no exception. There are ample examples of local officials' upholding this orien­ tation when they sat on courts adjudicating civil litigation. Certain negative factors of litigation were often highlighted to discourage such actions. For example, the desire to bring disputes to court instead of settling them in pri­ vate was said to reflect low ethical standards, such as intolerance, selfishness, aggressiveness, and so on. It might be further complicated by a sung-shih pur­ suing personal interests. Often, the court would impose corporal punish-

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ment during the course of the trial, and the costs of litigation could end up being prohibitively high, higher indeed than the settlement rendered the litigant.66 There is, however, evidence that local officials, while upholding the ideal of wu-sung, pragmatically exercised their judicial responsibilities in civil jus­ tice adjudication insofar as the litigation was legitimate and necessary. An excellent example comes from the Neo-Confucian master Chu Hsi. I would argue that he had little objection to litigation in cases in which the legitimate rights of the litigants were severely violated. In a public notice posted by Chu Hsi when he was serving as prefect of Chang-chou, he commented on the 243 litigation documents passed to him from the circuit judiciary. Ac­ cording to him, some of them involved official malfeasance and public inter­ ests; others were disputes over minor property issues among locals of all classes from commoners to the elite. Many of the cases in the second group were complicated by the fabrication of documents or the involvement of dis­ honest litigation practitioners. He promised that the judgments from the circuit government would be re-examined by his office to ensure that justice was done. All decisions together with a discussion of the reasons behind them would be made available to those with a legitimate interest in the case. And he urged the litigants to check carefully the appropriateness of the deci­ sions. If they were unfair, they should appeal to the government.67 This indi­ cates that although he discouraged unnecessary litigation, which would turn out to be extremely costly for both the litigants and the government, he did recognize the necessity of certain cases and encouraged those concerned to pursue justice. More revealing is a passage in his discussion of the commu­ nity compact, hsiang-yueh. After arguing that litigation (sung) was among the deeds contrary to rightfulness, Chu Hsi explained that "by sung I refer to people who report [to the government] the violation of laws by others with the intent to harm these lawbreakers and to litigation based on fabricating evidence while refusing to compromise under mediation. But these ·do not include cases of debts or litigation to rectify damages inflicted by others."68 The same line of thinking can be found in a letter of petition written by one of Chu's disciples, Ch'en Ch'un (u59-1223). Ch'en wrote a series ofletters to the then prefect of Chang-chou, Fu Po­ ch'eng, in the late u9os. Both were South Fukienese, and both had studied under Chu Hsi. In one of the letters, Ch'en gave a vivid account oflitigation in Chang-chou in the late twelfth century. He called Fu's attention to the

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reputation of some locals as litigation experts. These experts were well versed in official procedures and the internal personnel structure of the gov­ ernment. With this knowledge, they encouraged and advised people to liti­ gate frequently so that they could make a living out of it. The litigants even praised them as meng-chu (covenant master) or chujen-t'ou (principal of the masters). These were the kind of sung-shih who fabricated materials in law­ suits. As a result of their intensified legal activities, Ch'en noted that one former prefect had confronted 400-500 cases daily; since Fu had come to Chang-chou, he still had to face a pile of several hundred a day. Ch'en ex­ plained that because many of these sung-shih were former students of gov­ ernment schools, failed civil service examination candidates, relatives of powerful families, imperial clansmen, former government clerks, and the like, it would not be easy to punish them. But he recommended the measure taken by another former prefect who had set up a prison-style reading chamber named the Library of Self-litigation ( tzu-sung chai) and forced sung­ shih of scholarly or official background (shih-lei) to read classics like The Ana­ lects for a whole year. This was so effective that the numbers of cases before that prefect had dropped to around 30. Ch'en concluded that without the distortion and damage caused by sung-shih, "all litigations submitted thereaf­ ter to the government for mediati.on or adjudication would be necessary ones. There will be no fabrication of the materials. It therefore will become possible to maintain justice always. Moreover, you will be able to keep law­ suits to the minimum."69 Two points are worthy of mention here. First, Ch'en, much like Chu Hsi, admitted the necessity of government adjudica­ tion in litigation insofar as it was legitimate and served to maintain justice. Second, sung-shih of local elite background must have been common. In other words, the local elite community must have accepted this occupation as a viable alternative to farming, commerce, or the civil service. From the preceding analysis, it is apparent that as far as the maritime econ­ omy of the region was concerned, the legal system involving maritime laws, property laws, and contract laws was likely to have been enforced in the re­ gion when local government was not particularly corrupt. This does not im­ ply that the laws were implemented so effectively that illicit trade was totally eliminated, that contract obligations were always fulfilled, or that property disputes never arose. Rather, the argument here is that the formal institu­ tional framework as it existed in the region significantly reduced transaction

Formal Institutional Constraints costs and thereby provided an incentive structure and opportunities highly conducive to the maritime economy, without which the sustained commer­ cial expansion and regional prosperity depicted in the first two parts of this book would have never occurred. However, the legal system was not always implemented effectively and impartially at the local level throughout the pe­ riod of our inquiry. As discussed in Chapter 4, there was a trend toward lo­ calization of state power in South Fukien in the thirteenth century, and this further intensified under Mongol rule. This would have had a negative im­ pact on enforcement. Under such circumstances, we may infer that the for­ mal institutions helped reduce transaction costs in the maritime trade, but the beneficiaries of these institutions became more and more limited.

E LE VEN

Informal Institutional Constraints: Rationality, Ethics, Beliefs, and the Social Fabric

Formal institutions are but one facet of the institutional matrix that shapes the incentive structure of an economy by imposing constraints on mer­ chants' behavior. The other fundamental aspect of institutional constraints is more subtle, albeit equally effective, especially in the premodern Chinese societal context, namely, what North calls the dimension of informal insti­ tutional constraints, such as norms of behavior, conventions, and self­ imposed codes of conduct.1 In the case of South Fukien, the main question is: Were there informal institutions that constrained behavior to the extent that they lowered transaction costs in the maritime trade and helped pro­ mote the region's economy? To answer this question, we begin by exploring the popular mentality in South Fukien with regard to commercial behavior, especially the basic issue of human nature-profit-maximization for self­ .interest-in the regional context, which is fundamental to this attempt to understand the economic behavior of South Fukien merchants as well as the effects of this behavior. Subsequent sections discuss three sources of infor­ mal constraints that might have lowered transaction costs: Confucian ethics, religious beliefs, and the social fabric. A major concern of these last three sections is how these cultural and so­ cial institutions could in theory strengthen trust, or fiduciary relationships, in commercial interactions and thereby contribute to the enforcement of commercial agreements and to cooperation in business operations in South Fukien. Recent sociological and business studies on the relationship between trust and management in general and in cases of successful Chinese entre-

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preneurs in the 1970s and 1980s have empirically established the contempo­ rary relevance of this traditional ethic.2 Unfortunately, for Sung and Yuan China, the relation between the trust derived from those institutions and transaction costs can be established only in a theoretical context of informal institutions as defined by North. It is futile to look for empirical evidence of quantitative links between the historical phenomenon of those institutions and a measurable reduction of transaction costs in the maritime trade. In that sense, this chapter, much like the preceding one, is meant primarily to construct an explanation rather than to document further details of the South Fukien economy. Moreover, because of a scarcity of specific informa­ tion on that region, we have to rely on knowledge gleaned from other areas.

Bounded Rationality in Action: The Popular Mentality of South Fukien To what extent were South Fukien merchants motivated by the drive to maximize for self-interest? What does profit-maximization mean in the South Fukien context? It is difficult to examine these questions without re­ ferring to the debate on rationality, or rational choice, in the social sciences and humanities. Rather_ than engaging that complex issue here, however, I instead draw on the views of several writers whose works can enhance our understanding of the South Fukien case particularly, those by Herbert Simon, Douglass North, and Daniel Little. The key concept is Simon's no­ tion of "bounded rationality."3 In Simon's succinct account of the formal theory of rational choice, or "subjective expected utility" (SEU) theory, a key theoretical foundation of mainstream economics, he noted that it has several major components: (1) the decision maker is assumed to have "a well-defined utility function" against which preferences can be measured; (2) "the decision maker is confronted with a well-defined set of alternatives to choose from"; (3) "the decision maker can assign a consistent joint probability distribution" to the outcomes of all al­ ternatives; and (4) the decision is made to "maximize the expected values" in terms of the utility function of the decision maker.4 In contrast, Simon has established a powerful behavioral model of rationality to elucidate human thinking. He argues that in the real world rational decision making is often driven by the decision maker's attention and specific deliberations, rather than being based on a comprehensive ranking of all choices under a cardinal

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utility function. It usually relies on a limited knowledge of alternatives and their probability distribution rather than a comprehensive understanding of all possible choices and the respective consequences. Individuals are never aware of all the facts and alternatives of preference when making a decision. And to the human mind, the environment is factorable in the sense that only certain factors in it are calculated in reasoning out a particular decision. This is rationality in the real world, a rationality that is always bounded.5 In other words, a rational decision is basically reached "in a way that is procedurally reasonable in the light of available knowledge and means of computation."6 Although not explicitly using the term "bounded rationality," North has adopted a similar cognitive approach in modifying the SEU assumption of rationality. In his new framework of institutional economics, a rational deci­ sion is made under conditions of uncertainty due to the severe limitations on the decision maker's knowledge about the environment and choices in the real world as well as on his computational power. Therefore, a mental model, built on categories and classifications gained through learning and experience and embodied in the belief structures in the human mind, plays a significant role in decision making because "the mental models are the inter­ nal representations that individual cognitive systems create to interpret the environment." Belief structures "get transformed into social and economic structures" when institutions -lay down both formal rules and informal norms, which are externally created "to structure and order the environ­ ment." 7 For North, it follows that, even for economic decisions, rationality is bounded by mental models and institutions. In contrast to Simon and North, who discuss the issue of rationality in general terms, Little has considered it more specifically in the context of Asian studies. Rational choice theory, as summed up by Little, assumes that individual behavior is goal directed and calculating.8 It involves an abstract description of goals (interests, utilities, or preferences) and a simple mode of reasoning (utility maximization). As applied to neoclassical economic theo­ ries, it was narrowed further into a paradigm of economic rationality: the as­ sumption that the individual is a maximizing egoist who makes rational and comprehensive calculations for choice in an environment in which the fac­ tors that count are prices and income. This is done without interference from norms and values. Although highly useful in methodological constructs for economic modeling, the assumption of self-interested profit maximiza­ tion has been strongly criticized by social scientists for its inability to explain

Informal Institutional Constraints human behavior adequately and for the weaknesses of many of its assump­ tions. Such sweeping assumptions have encountered particularly strong ob­ jections from scholars working in area studies.9 Nevertheless, Little defends rational choice theory in area studies on the grounds that narrow assump­ tions of economic rationality need not be mandatory when we apply rational choice theory. He proposes that we incorporate such notions as utility for maximization that is individually rather than universally defined, institu­ tional constructions underlying opportunities and preferences, and the working of norms and values in the reasoning out of maximum returns. Lit­ tle calls this a "broadened practical rationality model." This model discards the notion that individual agents are goal directed but not the ideas that de­ cision making is influenced by a set of goals, a set of beliefs about the envi­ ronment, and a set of norms about possible choices of action. Little also re­ vised the comprehensive rational calculation assumption and suggests that decisions are based only on rough preferences without a comprehensive ranking and on approximate calculations of the probable costs and benefits of the various possible choices without an exhaustive computation of all probabilities.10 This is compatible with the more widely known concept of bounded rationality mentioned above. In the South Fukien case, the assumption of bounded rationality in rela­ tion to commercial behavior refers to (1) merchants' intrinsic urge for self­ interested profit maximization in business; and (2) the boundaries placed on that urge by the institutional matrix in which they live and operate. The as­ sumption of an egoistic and materialistic self does not exclude the possibility that the same person makes decisions on altruistic and spiritual grounds, for example, funding a public project. As noted above, people have abandoned economic pursuits to pursue religious enlightenment. Nevertheless, business decisions per se are most likely dominated by the profit-maximizing urge.11 This profit-maximizing mentality is illustrated in accounts written by con­ temporaries. A few examples are provided below. In the early fourteenth century, the eminent Chinese scholar-official Wu Ch'eng (1249-1333) described the popular mentality of Ch'iian-chou: Its residents are often crafty and oriented toward profit. Very few bother to lis­ ten when it comes to matters of right and wrong. This situation has become more serious in recent years. In the beginning [when the prefecture was first es­ tablished under the T'ang dynasty], this was not the case. . . . Now there are na­ tives and sojourner-settlers living in Ch'iian-chou. Both are obsessed with the

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pursuit of materialistic benefits without being able to cultivate themselves with higher moral principles. If one can cultivate the people in this prefecture along the lines that Prime Minister Ch'ang [Yen] did to the entire province [in T'ang times] and make everybody a learned person, even those who continue to engage in business will understand the damage of being obsessed by materialistic pur. 12 SUltS. Although this passage clearly indicates the existence of the profit­ maximizing mentality, it does not tell explicitly when it became prevalent. Evidence on this point can be found in a note written by the Sung scholar­ official Ts'ai Hsiang (1012-67), who wrote in the mid-eleventh century about the local customs of Fu-chou: All human beings want to become rich. Every peasant household, artisan household, and merchant household works .day and night to run a business so as to seek [maximum] profit. And to this end, peasants become hungry for land, and merchants trade dishonestly. In most circumstances, they exploit the poor. By doing so, they neglect the Heavenly Spirits and Principle (shen li) Now if you want to accumulate fortune, there is no better way than to eradicate your mean and greedy mind so that the poor suffer less and to refrain from exploita­ tive behavior so as to respect the Heavenly Spirits and the Principle. By doing this, you accumulate fortune for your descendants in the long run, and it estab­ lishes you as a benevolent and respectable man in your own community.13 • . • •

Ts'ai clearly believed that there was an opportunistic and egoistic side of human nature that was universal rather than contextual. Although he was addressing the people of Fu-chou, his observation on human nature was clearly general. Since he was a South Fukienese himself, Ts'ai's account of the profit-maximizing desire and disposition to opportunism in the human mind presumably was based on his observations of his native place. To be sure, writers in the 1070s and n3os observed that the natives of Ch'iian-chou were rather simple and honest and not given to disputes and litigation.14 I would, however, hold that their statements do not contradict my arguments about the profit-maximizing mentality and the local attitude toward litigation mentioned in the preceding chapter. Given the ample op­ portunities in the maritime trade and other sectors, the strong profit-seeking drive could be accommodated in different undertakings and would not in­ crease tension and conflict. That is one effect of a balanced cross-sectoral prosperity. Conflicts and disputes could also be avoided or mediated within

Informal Institutional Constraints informal institutions before they reached formal channels. Balanced pros­ perity not only increased the region's total wealth but also helped maintain harmonious internal human networks. But this harmony disappeared in the early thirteenth century when South Fukien faced a downturn in the mari­ time trade. Lawsuits increased considerably during this period.15 Wu Ch'eng's description of the early fourteenth century reflects a deteriorating social and economic structure that could no longer accommodate the profit­ maximizing aspirations of a wide spectrum of South Fukienese. To sum up, we can assume that for the individual South Fukien mer­ chant, self-interested profit maximization might constitute a strong motiva­ tion in his utility function when he made decisions pertinent to the maritime trade.16 Yet, it cannot account for all his commercial decisions. Widespread opportunism alone would have ruined most maritime businesses and made the sustained economic prosperity documented in Parts I and II impossible. A second part of the assumption of bounded rationality is that a merchant's utility function, knowledge of the environment, and computational capacity are to a significant extent bounded by other factors, most important the formal and informal institutional settings within which he operates. Thus, for South Fukien merchants bounded rationality in action must be under­ stood within the context of institutional constraints. We explored the for­ mal institutional framework in the preceding chapter. What follows is a dis­ cussion of the informal one. One difference to bear in mind is that whereas the formal institutional framework is largely nationwide, except for its en­ forcement characteristics, the informal institutions are certainly more re­ gional and contextual.

Commercial Implications of Confucian Teachings The relationship between Confucian ethics and commerce has attracted considerable attention since the 1980s. Some have argued that Confucian ethics constituted an instrumental factor in the rise of the East Asian econ­ omy since the 1970s; others hold to the more critical view that it was an ob­ stacle to modernization.17 What concerns us here, however, is not the ques­ tion whether Confucian ethics promoted commercial activities. Rather, the main issue is whether there were ethical components in the mainstream Confucianism prevalent in South Fukien during the Sung-Yuan period that might in theory strengthen trust among merchants, either in joint partner-

Informal Institutional Constraints

25 9

ships and employment or among trading partners. By doing so, Confucian ethics would in fact constitute part of the informal institutions that helped bring down transaction costs and thereby stimulated and sustained the maritime economy in the region. I approach this issue from two points of view: ( I ) What aspects of Confucian ethics can be applied to a commercial context? (z) How did the South Fukien Confucian elite view such ethics? By the Sung-Yuan period, the element of fidelity had long been estab­ lished in Confucianism. For instance, The Analects quote Tseng Tzu on daily reflection: "Every day I examine myself on three counts. In what I have un­ dertaken on another's behal£ have I failed to do my best? In my dealings with my friends, have I failed to be trustworthy in what I say? Have I passed on to others anything that I have not tried out myself?"18 In the context of commerce, the first reflection could be applied to a person's loyalty to his employer or to someone who has entrusted certain business to him; the sec­ ond reflection speaks directly to the issue of trust. Both inevitably involve a fiduciary relationship. Even the last reflection could apply to trust, for failing to behaving responsibly could lead to a loss of trust. The key virtue of fidel­ ity in Confucianism was thus in theory applicable to commercial ethics. Yii Ying-shih has provided a succinct account of the value of Confucian ethics for merchants in traditional China. He emphasizes three moral values that would be important to the Confucian merchant: diligence (ch'in), fru­ gality (chien), and fidelity (ch'eng-hsin). All three were major values in Confu­ cianism, and all had special meaning for merchants.19 Among them, fidelity is especially important in the context of transaction costs analysis. The value of trust is well recognized in recent studies in the fields of economics, man­ agement, and other social sciences as a highly significant factor in entrepre­ neurship and one that could constitute a powerful informal institutional constraint on the self-interested maximizing rationality of a merchant.20 Furthermore, Confucianism does not object to the desire for profit, which was common among merchants in traditional Chinese society, insofar as it was accomplished in a rightful way. This can be illustrated by another famous citation from The Analects: "Wealth and high station are what men desire but unless I got them in the right way I would not remain in them.''21 To accumulate wealth in a rightful manner requires one to earn it properly rather than through dishonest behavior and activities. Hence, the more in­ dustrious the merchant, the more rightful the profit he gains. There is no shortcut to wealth; nor does luck play a role in gaining it. Moreover, a mer-

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chant who spends more than he makes cannot save, and extravagance can ruin a business. Frugality is hence important to ensure not only the accu­ mulation of capital for business but also the maintenance of wealth over time. Moreover, it discourages cheating. Finally, being honest and trust­ worthy is in harmony with the Heavenly Way (t'ien-tao), for Heaven never deceives anyone. Merchants who successfully practice these ethics would earn the respect of people in other professions, including scholar-officials. It would bring them self-esteem and confidence as well. Yii amassed ample evidence to illustrate the emergence of these commercial ethics in sixteenth­ century China. And he rightly attributed this phenomenon to the unprece­ dented commercial prosperity oflate Ming China in general.22 Recent studies of Ming and Qing merchant manuals also confirm the important role of Confucian ethics in business. As summarized by Ch'en Hsueh-wen, the commercial ethics promoted in merchant manuals of the sixteenth century include various norms such as fidelity, philanthropy, fru­ gality, diligence, observance of the law, liberality of spirit, forgiveness, and benevolence.23 Again the eminent role of fidelity is apparent. Admittedly, this promotion of commercial ethics was done mainly through printed mate­ rials widely circulated in the highly commercialized Chinese society of the sixteenth century. There is no clear evidence that merchant manuals circu­ lated widely in China as early as the twelfth century. Nevertheless, I would argue that similar ethics, though perhaps not yet embodied in the form of printed manuals, are likely to have been practiced in a highly commercialized region like South Fukien by the Southern Sung and the Yuan. To illustrate this point, we can observe certain traces in the writings of the Sung-Yuan Confucian elite. The foremost case comes from Chu Hsi. In his influential model of the community compact, mentioned in the preced­ ing chapter, Chu stipulated six violations of righteousness (fan-i). Two of them are pertinent to the present discussion.

(4) Being untrustworthy (yen pu chung-hsin): this refers to those who deliberately

betray their employers or masters, those who strike a deal with others but breach the agreement later, and those who fabricate false information to confuse others (6) Being unrestrictedly self-serving (ying-ssu t'ai-shen): this refers to those who readily exploit others (p'ou-k'e) while doing business, those who are concerned with nothing but selfish advantage, those who borrow from others without specific and genuine needs, and those who deceive others who entrust them wit. h property.24 .

•

.

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261

Although Chu Hsi's emphasis on fidelity was meant primarily to establish norms for regulating social behavior in rural communities, their application can be extended to commercial interactions. One of the most important Neo-Confucians after Chu Hsi, Chen Te­ hsiu, provides another illustrative example. In order to improve the quality of social customs in Ch'iian-chou during his second term as prefect in the 1230s, Chen advised the locals: Although the main purpose of running a business is, of course, to seek profit, it has to be done without fraud. One should be honest and accurate when meas­ uring the quantity of the goods. Cheating your trading partner about the size and quantity of the goods is a sin not forginble by the Heavenly Principle. Mixing water with rice and meat [so as to increase the weight] causes consider­ able harm to others. In earning interest by making loans to others, one should charge a reasonable rate. If overcharged, the poor will inevitably suffer. When borrowing from others to conduct business, one must repay in accordance with the contract. Do not wait until the case is litigated before the court, for you will have to repay any way by that stage.25 For Chen, all these commercial activities, which were primarily meant to maximize profits, were legitimate pursuits, but they had to be conducted ethically. Since he was addressing the people of Ch'iian-chou, who had b�en highly commercialized long before the early thirteenth century, there was no point in trying to discourage profit-maximizing behavior. All he could try to do was to regulate such behavior. And underlying Chen's moral principles is the prominent norm of fidelity. As far as mainstream Confucian circles in South Fukien were concerned, both Chu Hsi and Chen Te-hsiu were highly esteemed not only as grand masters of Neo-Confucianism but also as elite scholar-officials who had spent a considerable period of their official careers in this region. Chen's im­ pact on local affairs has been noted many times in previous chapters. Chu Hsi had a similarly deep relation with South Fukien. Chu's father served in An-hai, a small town on the coast to the southeast of Ch'iian-chou city. Chu Hsi himself also began his official career in T'ung-an county and established an academy in An-hai. Later he served as prefect of Chang-chou, where he left behind many influential disciples, such as Ch'en Ch'un. Later aca­ demic circles in South Fukien often emphasized their direct descent from Chu Hsi.26

Informal Institutional Constraints In Chapter 3, we mentioned the essay written by Lin Chih-ch'i to com­ memorate the completion of a public cemetery for foreigners built by a Srivijayan merchant named Shih No-wei in the mid-twelfth-century. In the essay, Shih was praised as philanthropic and public-spirited. An even more revealing case is that of the Ch'iian-chou merchants Ch'en Pao-sheng and Sun T'ieh-fu mentioned in Chapter 5. Wang I, a Neo-Confucian scholar of the late fourteenth century,27 praised them as two virtuous men (i-shih). Wang singled out for praise the solid mutual trust between the two, an ex­ emplary model of brotherly partnership without any deception, and the fi­ duciary reputation they had earned among their overseas trading partners. Their moral accomplishments had significance beyond their own businesses: [Under the present peaceful regime,] foreign envoys stream to pay tribute to the Yuan court. Chinese have frequented overseas countries as if visiting their next­ door neighbors. However, those who went as merchants knew nothing but transaction and profit. Although these two gentlemen (Ch'en and Sun] were also traders, foreigners found them very unusual. Indeed, for over a hundred years since contacts between China and those foreign lands were established, few Chinese who went there behaved as they did. These two men visited the countries themselves and developed an intimate rapport with the locals. They were able to prove to these foreigners that they were more reliable than the reputation [of Chinese traders] would suggest. . . . These two men often ob­ served Chinese rituals and customs while overseas, often talked about the two [ancient sage-Jemperors, the three (sage-Jkings, the Duke of Chou, and Confu­ cius. They were eager to promote China's image, stressing that the present Chi­ nese emperor possessed tremendous virtue, that Chinese civilization was at its height, and that it accommodated countless talents. Their case was so convinc­ ing that people in those countries believed that our Way of the Sage was indeed universally applicable. Those foreigners gave them a title that can be translated as "Two Virtuous Men from Ch'iian-chou." Honorable scholar-officials in China agreed with this [assessment] as well. . . . In this case, Mr. Sun and Mr. Ch'en visited foreign lands only as traders but were able to earn such a reputa­ tion. They must have read the works of the sages and determined to put such teachings into practice. Otherwise, how could they possibly accomplish this in the foreign landsr28 It is intriguing that these two trustworthy merchants were recognized by a Neo-Confucian writer as promoters of Confucian order overseas. The same author also gave an account of a foreign merchant named Chu Tao-sheng,

Informal Institutional Constraints who was a friend of Sun and Ch'en: "Chu Tao-shan was a Ch'iian-chou na­ tive who traded in precious commodities. He was so trustworthy and right­ eous that many other merchants both from China and from overseas took him as a model."29 Associated with this group of Ch'iian-chou merchants is Ch'en Pao-sheng's mother, Madame Chuang. It was recorded in local gaz­ etteers that after her husband died, she sold all the family's properties to pay back the debt her late husband owed a friend who had been jailed for not being able to repay some loans. One account states that she pledged: "I can­ not betray people's trust in my husband after his death."30 There is no doubt that Sung Neo-Confucian ethics contained ethical ele­ ments that could strengthen the observance of the virtue of trust. Although the moral philosophy of Neo-Confucianism stressed the need to constrain and transcend human desires so as to reactivate one's inner nature of Heav­ enly Principle, it did not advocate asceticism among the populace.31 In Chu Hsi's explanation of the teaching of"manifesting the Heavenly Principle and eradicating the human desire" (ming t'ien-li mieh jen-yu), it was in line with Heavenly Principle to desire food and drink. Only when that desire became gluttony did it contradict the Heavenly Principle and thus was deemed unde­ sirable.32 A commercial ethics that combined frugality and trust theoretically would not conflict with the main teachings of Neo-Confucianism. Chu Hsi and Chen Te-hsiu, although not actively promoting commercial pursuit, did not object to merchants seeking maximum profit insofar as it was done in a rightful manner. Fidelity occupied a central position in commercial ethics. In this sense, Chu and Chen and the Neo-Confucian tradition in South Fukien unintentionally contributed to the informal institutional structure in the re­ gion's commercial sector by promoting trust, thereby reducing the transaction costs in the region. Derk Bodde correctly observed that Chinese merchants never developed a distinctive ethics outside the prevailing ethics, especially that of Confucianism. However, I have reservations about his assumption that the mainstream ethics were detrimentai to the profit motive and failed to generate innovation in productivity.33 As discussed above, Confucian ethics might not have been totally detrimental to commercial activities.

Religious Beliefs and Commercial Ethics Religion constituted one of the major behavioral constraints in premodern Chinese society. Commerce was no exception. Whereas Neo-Confucian teachings emphasized the inner morality of the human mind as the ultimate

Informal Institutional Constraints source of ethical norms and advocated self-cultivation to bring out human nature, various Chinese religious beliefs worked toward strengthening ethics in daily practice among elites and commoners alike. By "religious belie£" I refer to beliefs pertaining to the existence and functioning of supernatural beings and forces. They provided a view of how the supernatural world op­ erated and how it related to the human world. It is, of course, not our pur­ pose here to discuss the vast subject of Chinese religion. Rather, the main concern is whether religious beliefs constituted informal institutional factors strengthening trust in contractual agreements in the maritime trade, thereby diminishing transaction costs, in South Fukien. In other words, did those engaged in the maritime trade believe in the supernatural enforcement of commercial contracts? To answer this question, we do not need to consider all major religions in Sung-Yuan China. Instead, we can concentrate on popular religions influential among the merchants, particularly the impact of religious beliefs on commercial ethics. Since these beliefs belonged to the realm of popular culture, they provided believers a hybrid mental model rather than a systematic and coherent theology. As discussed by C. K. Yang and others, despite many variations, religious mental models in traditional Chinese communities usually included four as­ pects: (1) a belief in the existence of supernatural beings, some anthropo­ morphic, that could bestow good fortune and inflict harm on the living; (2) an organic worldview that assumed what happened to individual human beings was often related to the supernatural world; (3) the principle of retri­ bution, which explained good or bad fortune as the consequence of human actions; and (4) a stress on ethics as the standard guideline of behavioral ret­ ribution. In short, people believed in the existence of gods who would pun­ ish them if they committed wrongs but protect them if they observed proper conduct.34 Recent studies on Sung religions by Valerie Hansen confirm that a similar religious mentality was prevalent in Sung times.35 In the maritime context, such beliefs had a strong impact on believers. One of the most significant features of maritime trade was the enormous risk of venturing onto the high seas. Two major causes of uncertainty were the weather and pirates. Yet both were totally beyond control and calcula­ tion. It was this vulnerability that made overseas undertakings undesirable to many. A mental model of deities strong enough to control the weather and to check pirates-in other words, to protect seafarers from shipwreck or predators-could definitely provide merchants some certainty and peace of

Informal Institutional Constraints mind. And it is hard to imagine a more effective solution for risk aversion, even though mainly psychological, available to merchants daring enough to take such high risks for profit. In the Canton Stories, there is an account of the potential dangers of overseas voyages and the resort to supernatural powers: Merchants said that they dared to venture overseas only on board a large ship together with many other merchants. This was because pirates were rampant. Another danger was that many countries raided mercantile ships passing their shores. For instance, if one held a permit to visit Champa but accidentally landed in Chenla, the entire cargo would be confiscated. All those northerners [Fukien merchants?] 36 on board would also be sold as slaves. . . . On the high seas, storms and huge waves were not as fearful as being stranded. There was usually no way out in the latter case. . . . There was a kind of giant shark with saw-nose that could break up a ship as easily as cutting rotten wood into pieces. During one voyage, people saw a large pile of rotten wood in a distance. The captain suspected that it was in fact a dragon, for there was no island near that location [on previous voyages. In response,] he cut his hair and burned it to­ gether with fish bones and fish scales. As a result, the woodpile gradually sub­ merged. All these were emergencies on the high sea, and most people who en­ countered them would not even have a chance to survive. Therefore, merchants respected [the spirit of] a foreign monk. They said that when caught in danger on the ocean, they often prayed to that monk, and he would appear in the air to save them. Upon arrival in Kuang-chou, the merchants would make offerings [to the spirit of the monk] and arrange a feast [for the living monks]. This was called the Banquet of the Arhat.37 This passage indicates the genuine risks and the uncertainties confronting seafarers, as well as their readiness to resort to supernatural solutions in dangerous situations. A belief in a supernatural worldview that lessened risk does not necessar­ ily lead to better enforcement of contractual agreements, however. The commercial manuals printed and circulated in the late Ming and Ch'ing pro­ vide direct evidence of a linkage between supernatural beliefs and the com­ mercial ethic of trust,38 but there are far fewer extant materials dating to the Sung and Yuan dynasties. Nevertheless, we can still discern a similar em­ phasis on the relation between commercial ethics and supernatural forces in Sung and Yuan examples. Yuan Ts'ai's famous Precepts for Social Life (Shih fan) was written in the Southern Sung and exerted considerable influence on the elite of the time. It laid down a wide range of behavioral precepts for all

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major aspects of family life, including how to run a business.39 In Patricia Ebrey's translation, under the section of "Responsible Entrepreneurs" there are passages like this: Those whose enterprises lead to substantial profit, with the result that they be­ come rich, usually got that way because of the good luck of the Creator blessing them in an unapparent way. Yet some people who notice that others are making great profits and becoming wealthy quickly wish to usurp the prerogatives of Heaven and manage this by human efforts. If they sell rice, they add water to it; if they sell salt, they mix it with ashes; if they sell lacquer, they add oil to it; if they sell medicine, they substitute other things for it; their ploys are innumer­ able. Since before their eyes they are gaining a lot, they are happy. They do not realize that the Creator will take away what they have on some other occasion and they will end up in poverty. And think of the many who lose their capital because they substituted the fake for the genuine! This is what is meant by the saying, "Men cannot win over Heaven." In general in trade and manufacture, the first thing is to be conscientious.40 A second example comes from the short but famous Taoist text entitled Book of Actions and Their Retributions (T'ai-shang kan-ying-p'ien). Considerable portions of this text were extracted from earlier Taoist writings. But the text in its present form was first included in the Eternal Taoist Canon of Cheng-ho (Cheng-ho wan-shou tao-tsang) compiled at the order of Emperor Hui-tsung (r. no1-25) in the early twelfth centutr. One century later, Emperor Li-tsung (r. 1225-64) was so impressed with ,�his text that he personally wrote a prefatory motto for its cover page and allocated one million cash for it to be printed for wide distribution.41 The main theme of this text is the retributive consequences of good and evil deeds. Among the unethical behavior that leads to painful retributions, it lists the following deeds pertaining specifi­ cally to merchants, as translated by James Webster: "He repents his gifts; contracts debts which he does not repay; schemes to obtain what he has no right to; . . . (in trade), he sells bad food; . . . (in small business), gives short measure-a short foot, a false measure, a light scale, a small pint-and mixes bad with good, in order to amass fraudulent profits."42 These so-called unethical actions point explicitly to the transaction cost issues of contract enforcement and measurement costs. A commentary to the passage "mixes bad with good" (i chia luan chen), attributed to a Sung writer, gave two exam­ ples showing that traders who committed forgery in business would be killed by lightning.43 The overall message is clear: a merchant who profited from

Informal Institutional Constraints wrongdoing would be punished by supernatural forces that were, it was be­ lieved, inescapable and irresistible, and that had no conception of a statute of limitations. To believers, this was a far greater deterrent than laws or other government-imposed sanctions. In its concluding remarks, the text remon­ strated, to use James Legge's vivid translation, "To take to one's self un­ righteous wealth is like satisfying one's hunger with putrid food, or one's thirst with poisoned wine. It gives a temporary relie£ indeed, but death also follows it."44 The idea of unrighteous wealth (pu-i chih ts'ai) is a key concept in Confucian discussions of profit-seeking undertakings. The Book of Actions and Their Retributions makes a revealing case for the present study. It incor­ porated elements not only from Taoism but also from Buddhism and Con­ fucianism. Officially endorsed by the court, it was printed and circulated with many prefaces written by elite scholars including Chen T e-hsiu.45 So we have reason to assume that the religious beliefs expounded in the text were acceptable to the elite and appealing to commoners. Cynthia Brokaw has rightly pointed out that there is no evidence con­ firming that the Book of Actions circulated widely during the Sung.46 It may not be groundless to assume, however, that a short tract whose printing was subsidized with a fund of one million cash was at least available to a wide readership, especially among the commoners.47 Of course, the existence of a belief in retribution does not mean that all traders would necessarily comply with the ethical constraints based on this belief. In particular, we can assume that traders who utilized overland or river transport, even though they still faced risks such as floods and theft, operated in a relatively stable and less risky business environment. In contrast, maritime business undertakings often confronted enormous uncertainties and even life-threatening dan­ gers.48 It is far more likely that maritime merchants would take such relig­ ious beliefs more seriously than their land-based counterparts. My third example is even more indirect but nonetheless still highly in­ dicative. As discussed in the preceding two chapters, it was rational for in­ vestors to form joint-capital ventures for overseas voyages in Sung China. And it was common to cement the agreement with an officially sanctioned contract. However, none of the thousands of extant contract samples from the entire imperial period of Chinese history are examples of such agree­ ments. The great majority of extant contracts deal with transactions, in par­ ticular land transactions, and some may consider them deeds rather than contracts. This is not unreasonable, for transaction-agreement documents

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were used to certify ownership and had to be kept by the new owners for generations, but documents pertaining to a joint-capital business agreement would be valid and functional only within the limited duration of the joint venture. Once the venture was over, the document became useless and, as a result, was less likely to have been preserved over time. More important, by nature the former required a much lower degree of voluntary compliance by the participating parties and a less binding guarantee of enforcement. In contrast, the latter implied a far greater need to ensure that all parties ful­ filled their contractual obligations. My argument is that because of this unique requirement of joint-capital commercial contracts, they would in­ clude a blood oath that was not common in other types of contracts. Usually, the format of sale agreements, say a land deed, includes, among various conditions of sale, a clause on the order of "Now, we worry that people may not be trustworthy/reliable. Therefore we sign this as a documentary evidence" (chin k'ung jen-hsin wu-hsin/wu-p'ing, Ii tz'u . . . wei chao) .49 This implies more an obligation of the parties not to renege on the deal in the future than a serious concern about enforcement. To the con­ trary, it is possible to find in the oldest extant joint-capital sample contract the following provision: .

•

.

No parry shall appropriate this fund or fabricate the account. Therefore, we swear with blood to forge a covenant (sha-hsueh ting-meng) to ensure that we are in harmony; that we share joys and sufferings; that we will not quarrel; and that none of us will dishonestly appropriate common funds. Those who breach this agreement will be killed by the gods and men (ju wei tz'u i che shenjenfan ch'i chi).50 This evocation of the powerful popular mentality of supernatural retribu­ tion is unmistakably meant to secure enforcement. Its prominent placement in a contract format of this kind but not of others reflects both the need to strengthen the contractual bond and the greater possibility of one or other of the parties breaking the agreement. It also indicates the effectiveness of em­ ploying supernatural constraints as an enforcement strategy. The earliest known examples of such sample contracts can be traced back only to the Ming, when China as a whole evolved into a highly commercialized society. Nonetheless, the logic of appealing to supernatural retribution to enforce highly fragile joint-capital business contracts would have been the same in the highly commercialized region of South Fukien during the Sung and Yuan periods.

Informal Institutional Constraints The effect of religious beliefs on the merchant's behavior may also be ex­ plored by examining the local cult of the Heavenly Consort (Ma-tsu or T'ien-hou). There is now a sizable literature on worship of this local deity, which first appeared in Fukien during the Sung and grew to become one of the most widespread popular cults, especially along the coast.5 1 Here I ex­ plore the possible link between belief in this deity and informal constraints operating in the maritime trade. The religion of Ma-tsu originated in P'u-t'ien in the early Northern Sung, with worship of a deceased local woman. By the late Northern Sung, the court had officially recognized the cult and conferred a noble title on the deity. Shortly thereafter the goddess was granted the higher title of Heav­ enly Consort. The first temple for this goddess was built on the coast of P'u­ t'ien county. Following the spread of this cult, partly due to the official rec­ ognition and promotion and partly due to beliefs in the goddess's powers, temples dedicated to Ma-tsu proliferated along the coast. This well­ documented process of popular religious development in premodern China need not be recounted here. On the surface, the belief that Ma-tsu would protect those who chanted her name with sincerity while in danger at sea is understandable. Moreover, temple building and offerings were · among the major practices to gain favor from Ma-tsu. But were there any ethical ele­ ments involved in the doctrine of Ma-tsu? Did people believe that the god­ dess would indiscriminately protect whoever came to her, for aid including those who had committed unethical deeds? Most of the extant religious documents on Ma-tsu concentrate on her effi­ cacy and stress the necessity of sincere devotion to gain her protection. Apart from the legend that she was a filial daughter during her lifetime, there is little hint of an ethical dimension to this deity. More relevant to our concerns is a Taoist liturgical text preserved in the Taoist Canon, entitled Scripture of Lord Lao, the Most Highest, Speaking on the Numinous Efficacy of the Heavenly Consort in Relieving Distress (T'ai-shang Lao-chun shuo T'ienjei chiu-k'u ling-yen ching). This scripture was probably compiled in the early fifteenth century and reflects the assimilation of Ma-tsu into the Taoist pantheon.52 I would argue that, apart from attributing the source ofthis goddess's powers to the Lord Lao, the same authority found in the Book ofActions and Their Retributions, the following pas­ sages from this text may also be interpreted as carrying moral implications. [Sermon: . . . The Heaveniy Consort pledged:] "From this day forward, whether a travelling merchant or resident shopkeeper seeking assets in doing business, . . .

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should anyone [so mentioned] but reveal reverence and respect in his/her heart and call my name, then I will offer immediate and trustworthy response and cause them to attain whatever it is they wish and to achieve whatever pursuits they have in mind. I will always keep watch over humankind, to the extent that whatever is sought on land, within spring waters, rivers, or at sea-in every lo­ cation-all will be granted as wished." Thus it was the Perfected of Far­ reaching Salvation (Kuang-chiu chen-jen), . . . recited the following verses: ". . . Oh, Celestial Consort of noble ardor, The blessings of your goodness illuminate this age. On your journeys throughout all three realms, You are ever vigilant of the chthonian chthonic spirits. As the wind and thunder are put on defensive guard, The [spirit-]troops and generals offer their support, Surging down upon the moral realm, To extirpate all noxious wrong-doing. As they penetrate the terrestrial offices, They make reports to the sacred bureaus throughout. Those of oppressive and tyrannical means are slaughtered. And all murderers are be­ headed. Those who are charitable towards others will know love. But those who scheme against their brethren will be overcome. With heart and mind, submit in trust. And all living creatures will be granted serenity. . . ." . . . Once Lord Lao heard the Celestial Consort give her pledge, . . . [he said:] ". . . If within the mortal realm men and women express a sincere faith, bow down in devotion and call her name- . . . Outlaws and rebels will no longer encroach, . . . Assets and emoluments will be more than adequate, those engaged in business transactions will gain profit, and both travelling merchants and local businessmen will ac­ quire treasures and gems. On sea and land, all will be well and under control, and no alarm need ever arise."53 It is apparent that among the many evil forces Ma-tsu was able to control was greed leading to fraudulence in trade. And we may safely infer that in the mental model of her devotees adherence to some basic commercial ethics like trust, which was also emphasized as a virtue of Ma-tsu, would have a certain weight. Also, as indicated in this passage and further verified by the prayers to her written in the early thirteenth century by local officials like Chen Te-hsiu, Ma-tsu's devotees often called on her during pirate attacks.54 We may also assume that a beliefin Ma-tsu, at least in its early stage under the Sung and Yuan periods, would not encourage its believers to engage in piracy. It was only in later dynasties that Ma-tsu also became a patron deity for many pirates because ofher legendary prowess in quelling storms at sea.55 Finally, another local cult in South Fukien whose deity was believed by merchants to possess the power to protect them from both piracy and

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storms at sea may provide further clues about the link between ethical con­ duct and supernatural protection. Like Ma-tsu, this deity also received an official tide from the Sung court, the Marquis of Manifested Benefit (Hsien­ hui hou). His temple, the Hsiang-ying Temple, was also located in P'u-t'ien. But unlike the worship of Ma-tsu, the cult of the Marquis declined after the Southern Sung and never developed into a major regional religion in ensuing dynasties. Yet at least under the Southern Sung, he enjoyed popular support from believers in other prefectures in South Fukien as a protector-god. In an inscription of u38 commemorating the renovation of the Hsiang-ying Tem­ ple, we find the following passage: In earlier days, traveling traders and maritime merchants, who risked the storms and waves as well as enormous obstacles and dangers to pursue profit in other prefectures and overseas, had never tried to offer prayers at this temple. Many of them suffered misfortune, either having their ships sunk at sea or encountering pirates in reedy marshes. On one occasion, a Hsing-hua native Chou Wei made a prayer to the god before trading in Liang-che. When his ship approached Kuei-tzu-men, the weather turned bad . . . [Chou] called the god's name for help. . . . The ship was intact at the end. There was a voyage captain named Chu Fang from Ch'iian-chou who traded in Srivijaya. Prior to departure he came to pay homage to this god and sincerely worshiped him. His voyage was swiftly done without encountering any troubles. He returned in less than a year and earned a hundredfold profit. Merchants who previously traded overseas had never been so fortunate. They all believed that it was but a blessing of the Mar­ quis. And thereafter, all merchants venturing afar came to pray [for protection] . . . . The duties of deities are to ensure sufficient rainfall, defend [people] from disaster, admonish devils, clear up misfortune, bestow fortune on the good, and punish the bad. Likewise, this Marquis has won the worship of people in this land. He first demonstrated his power and efficacy so as to earn the official ti­ tles. To show his gratitude to the imperial grace, he fulfilled all his duties to support the trustworthy and loyal ones.56 To his devotees, this deity offered, among other fortunes, protection at sea. Meanwhile, he might also exact moral retribution, much like other gods. This is in line with the religious beliefs that related the efficacy of supernatu­ ral protection to a devotee's behavior. And in the context of the maritime trade, this belief helped strengthen the self-imposed ethic of fidelity, rein­ forcing the enforceability of commercial agreements.

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Enforcement Through the Social Fab�ic: Kinship Organizations and Guaranty Mechanisms The focus of this section is the effect of the social fabric, particularly kinship organizations and guaranty mechanisms, on the enforcement of contracts in South Fukien. We shall examine the rise of large kinship organizations in this region during the Sung and Yuan periods, the cohesive effect of the re­ sultant social fabrics, and the functions of these personal networks in com­ mercial transactions. My main argument is that merchants who were able to operate within a cohesive social fabric would gain an enormous advantage in terms of reduced transaction costs over those who could not. Moreover, the social fabric in turn reinforced behavioral constraints on these merchants and created an environment conducive to business and South Fukien's sus­ tained growth in maritime trade. Chapter 4 discussed local elite families in South Fukien. They were noted by contemporary scholar-officials as one of the major reasons that the governance of Ch'iian-chou prefecture was difficult. Although but a small part of the population, they held sizable landed properties and produced large numbers of successful candidates in the civil service examinations. They represented the wealthiest segment of local society and were able to exert a strong political influence. Although documentary evidence is not abundant, a common view is that the members of these families, with their enormous family resources, played an important role in the maritime trade. Although the phenomenon of an emerging local elite was widespread in Sung China,57 it is unusual to find a local elite in traditional Chinese society so economically interwoven with maritime trade. The first task in exploring a social fabric based primarily on kinship is to clarify terminology. The concept of lineage as the most influential and basic element in large and functional Chinese kinship organizations was fully es­ tablished by Maurice Freedman in the mid-r96os. His fieldwork in Kwangtung, Fukien, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia led him to assert that cor­ porate property and common ancestral worship were the two major features of these kinship groups. Corporate property constituted the material foun­ dation for a wide range of functions and activities that forged a strong cohe­ siveness among lineage members.58 Subsequent studies on contemporary as well as historical Chinese lineages, especially those by anthropologists and historians such as Hugh Baker and David Faure, greatly revised and en-

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riched Freedman's notion of Chinese rural control in relation to lineage and refined the concept of lineage in discussions of the Chinese family.59 If Freedman's interpretation of the role of lineage in Chinese rural communi­ ties is no longer as appealing. his conceptualization of lineage as one of the most powerful forms of non-governmental organizations in China remains largely valid to many in the field. This idea oflineage is best spelled out in a set of definitions by Patricia Ebrey and James Watson,60 which I shall follow in the discussion below: [Family] The term "family" will be reserved for domestic groups, the basic unit of production, consumption, and political authority, whose members normally reside together and share a common budget for everyday expenses. [Descent group] The term "descent group" will be used to refer to groups of ag­ nates, defined by descent from a common ancestor, who are not all members of a single family chia or a single line. Thus "descent group" is a group , whose members are aware of their kinship connections, but corporate behavior may be limited to activities such as ancestral rites or compilation of genealogies. . . . Generally, when it is clear from historical sources that a set of agnates formed a group or had a well-developed sense of group consciousness, they will be called a descent group even if positive evidence of principles of recruitment and ritual activities are absent. [LineageJ "Lineage" will be reserved for descent groups that have strong corpo­ rate bases in shared assets, usually but not exclusively, land. . . . A diagnostic feature oflineages . . . is that a lineage has ownership of collective assets vested in the group or segments of the group. . . . The main reason for distinguishing lineages from other descent groups is that, when a group provides material benefits for members, this fact will affect not only how individuals look on membership but also the internal dynamics of the group and the power the group can exert in society. •

•

•

In short, "lineage" refers to those highly cohesive agnatic descent groups of individual families that organize regular ancestral worship, compile genealo­ gies, and, most important, possess corporate property. Nevertheless, al­ though many new elite families emerged during the Sung. most scholars be­ lieve that they had yet to evolve into such a highly organized mode and that the lineage did not become a common practice until the Ming dynasty.61 Although such a model prevailed in the South Fukien region in the past two centuries, one may wonder how far we can project it back to earlier dy­ nasties. In this regard, I concur with Hugh Clark that in South Fukien a

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transition from descent group to lineage had already taken place by the Southern Sung. Clark has made a considerable contribution to our understanding of the rise of elites in South Fukien. In a recent work, he meticulously studied the genealogies of an eminent local descent group, the Fu family, and related his findings on their organization with the broader discourse on families and kinship organizations by historians and anthropologists of traditional China. Among those findings, some are particularly relevant to this discussion, and I summarize them here. Clark amassed convincing evidence to demonstrate, among other points, that (1) marriage was based more on "long-standing so­ cial ties among kin groups rather than [being] part of an integrated strategy for family advancement," and these ties were built on networks of "friends, allies, and patrons" within social circuits of the local elite. (2) Within the larger kin group, there evolved a differentiated matrix of identities among different descent groups, between different branches within the same de­ scent group, and between individual families as households. And he identi­ fied the branch as the more significant unit of identity "in the affairs of daily life and in the competition for material well-being and social prestige." Meanwhile, the individual family remained the unit where "the benefits of any particular individual's success could have the greatest effect." (3) There is evidence of failed attempts by one of the Fu descent group to establish and perpetuate corporate property. This, as Clark claimed, "suggests that the transition from descent group to lineage was fully underway."62 Clark's notion can be further substantiated by another local lineage that was far more eminent than the Fu-the Liu lineage, descended from the lo­ cal warlord Liu Ts'ung-hsiao of the mid-tenth century, who is mentioned many times in previous chapters of this book. In calling them a "lineage," I am applying the definition of lineage noted above. I am cqnvinced that this descent group had already developed a rather stable institution of corporate property by the Sung. The genealogy of the Lius, which was last compiled by Liu Ming-hui in 1766,63 documents a particular West Branch (hsijang) that was descended from the eldest adopted son of Liu Ts'ung-hsiao and remained settled in their home village in Yung-ch'un. Biographical data about eminent members of this lineage can also be found in local gazetteers, especially the Book of Min and the 1526 County Gazetteer of Yung-ch'un. Alto­ gether thirteen members in four generations of this lineage became eminent enough to occupy a place among the thirty-some entries of Sung gentry in

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the Yung-ch'un section of the Book of Min. Among them were one prime minister, many high-ranking officials, and esteemed Confucian scholars. Although there certainly were ties between this branch and other branches also descended from Liu Ts'ung-hsiao as well as corporate activities,64 I fo­ cus here mainly on the internal structure of this branch, which already con­ stituted a lineage by definition. The genealogy contains four prefaces of earlier compilations dated 1237, 1279, 1378, and 1550, respectively; the authors of the first two are the subjects of biographies in the local gazetteers.65 The first of these prefaces, written by Liu Tuan, mentioned two earlier initiatives to compile a genealogy, by Liu Ts'ung-hsiao himself in 962 and by Liu Cheng ( u29-1206 ) in n92. The latter rose to the position of prime minister in the Sung government.66 It is appar­ ent that the compilation of genealogies began early in this lineage and helped forge a strong sense of common identity and a cohesive relationship among members of the lineage, regardless of their fortunes or social status.67 A contract signed in n90 by the heads of different Liu branches and the abbot of a large Buddhist temple in Ch'iian-chou city that was recorded in the genealogy indicates regular ancestral worship by the various Liu descent groups. It required that, with the income from property previously donated to the temple by four eminent Lius, the temple would perform annual wor­ ship rituals for them and their spouses on the days of their death at the an­ cestral hall located inside the temple. Each branch head was charged with the duty of assembling the members of his branch to attend the ceremo­ nies.68 Since the contract was recorded in the West Branch genealogy, we can assume that it was meant to be observed by at least that branch. The ge­ nealogy also gave a list of 28 ancestral halls for the Lius in various locations: eight in Ch'iian-chou, two in Hsing-hua, one in Chang-chou, four in inte­ rior Fukien, two in Fu-chou, four in Chekiang, and seven in Kwangtung. Among these, only two can be verified to have existed in the Southern Sung. One was in the home village of Liu Ts'ung-hsiao in Yung-ch'un, and the other was built inside Ch'iian-chou city in the name of Liu Cheng.69 To­ gether with the one in the temple, there were at least three ancestral halls in Ch'iian-chou prefecture under the Sung. All were related to the West Branch lineage, and all required that members of the lineage attend regular ritual activities. The issue of corporate property is, however, even more crucial in deter­ mining the characteristics of this Liu lineage. In the 1526 County Gazetteer of

Informal Institutional Constraints Yung-ch'un, a passage in the biography of Liu Tuan, the author of the earliest extant genealogical preface, touches on the subject. Tuan had left one-third of his assets to establish a charitable estate (i-chuang) for the purpose of pro­ viding for impoverished descendants of Liu Ts'ung-hsiao. This project was initiated by his nephew Liu Yiian-kang, who failed to complete the project before his sudden death.70 We can learn more about Tuan's basic arrange� ment from an essay commemorating the establishment of this charitable es� tate, which was written by Liu Yung�hu in 1237 and is preserved in the same genealogy. The Lius have been a great clan (tsu) in Ch'iian-chou. During the two hundred years from Liu Ts'ung-hsaio's times, we produced eminent descendants every generation. Chung-hsiian [Liu Cheng] was especially successful in his official ca­ reer. Our patrilineal line extended far back. Our root was solid, and the branches flourished. However, because our clansmen were now numerous, some might succeed in official careers, and others lose out. Some might make an enormous fortune, and others sink into poverty. This is like [our five] fingers, which would hardly measure the same. For this reason, Lung-t'u [Liu Tuan] feared that those remote relatives would become strangers [to usJ and be given a cold shoulder [when in needJ. He therefore established this charitable estate The purpose is to provide for both close and remote clansmen. He set aside landed property under his household, with a property-tax value of 21 strings and 800 cash. It can generate rents equally distributed to the six major branches [de­ scended from Liu Ts'ung�hsiao]. Each branch would receive an annual income of 240 strings of cash, plus 130 tan of grain. The provision is quite adequate and fair. Cautious about its sustainability, he also laid down regulations and re­ ported it to the prefectural government, so that the endowment would be treated as a contract of permanent effect, effectively barring any descendant from breaking it up in the future.71 . • . .

This document shows that the estate was placed under a government­ sanctioned contract regulating its operation. It no longer belonged to the original owner-household, was exempt from the land tax, and could not be legally sold or divided by later generations.72 The income from it was to be distributed among the clansmen, including the West Branch. We have only a few details about the management of the estate; we do know that it was run by monks from the Ch'eng-t'ien ssu, a major Buddhist temple in Ch'iian-chou city.73 It might have been run by the West Branch, since one of its members had donated the property. In any event, it is apparent that the

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West Branch possessed corporate property for the common welfare of the lineage. This charitable estate was designed in a manner close to the corpo­ rate model mentioned above. The idea of setting up such a charitable estate had been initiated and propagated by Fan Chung-yen (989-1052) in the Northern Sung, but records of scholar-officials following his lead to develop similar projects under the Southern Sung are quite rare.74 Liu Tuan's chari­ table estate is a revealing example, not to mention that it was five times larger than Fan's estate. The cases of both the Fus and the Lius demonstrate that in spite of dif­ ferent degrees of success in maintaining their corporate properties, these families were conscious of the advantage of consolidating a cohesive kinship organization. But even more important is the implication that these kinship groups engaged in projects to strengthen their kinship-based social fabric. Other elite families emerging in South Fukien under the Sung may have done likewise. In the realm of maritime trade, kinship organization defi­ nitely played an important role. In Chapter 9 we noted the kinship-based operation of overseas trade by the imperial clansmen, a few thousand of whom resided in Ch'iian-chou city alone by mid-thirteenth century. A good part of the discussion in Chapter 5 also touched on kinship among foreign settlers doing business in South Fukien under the Yuan. Anthropologists have long observed the functions of such cohesive kin­ ship organizations. As noted by Baker, they provided, among other services, dispute mediation and upheld a code of conduct among members under the authority of the organization's leadership.75 Needless to say, the more cohe­ sive the lineage or descent group became, the more effective the constraints it imposed on its members. As for the Sung elite community in South Fu­ kien, we _can further infer that the more eminent the lineage became, like the Lius, the greater the pressure on them to maintain their collective family reputation. When we consider this factor in the context of maritime trade and trust, it is apparent that those with membership in, or close ties to, well-established lineages or descent groups in the region would enjoy an enormous advantage. Not only would commercial capital be far more accessible to them, but they could also easily gain the trust of capital investors, joint-venture partners, or creditors, when in need ofcredit instruments for expansion in maritime trade. Not only could their creditors and partners more readily turn to their lineage for mediation or perhaps for compensation, but also they had more reason to

Informal Institutional Constraints honor their agreements. A merchant from such an eminent and reputable background was much less likely to desert the homeland where his family was entrenched. Although it could not be guaranteed that every son from these families was as honorable as the family rules would have him be, the very fact that he belonged to such an informal organization would no doubt make him far more credible in theory than those who did not. In terms of transaction costs, we can infer that transaction costs of business deals between merchants who were members of a highly cohesive and reputable social fabric would be significantly reduced because of mutual trust. Traders of lesser fiduciary reputation in terms of social fabric had to make a greater effort to develop per­ sonal credibility. Falling short of that, they would simply have to pay addi­ tional transaction costs to compensate for their lack of creditworthiness; they might, for example, have to agree to disadvantageous terms in concluding a commercial agreement. The social fabric factor can be further assessed in terms of the widely practiced mechanism of requiring guarantors for contractual agreements as well as for maritime ventures, as detailed in the preceding chapter. Under T'ang and Sung legal practices, the guarantor of loan or credit contracts was responsible for repayment of the loan if the borrowers absconded, failed to fulfill the terms, or died without repaying the loan.76 Even more onerous was the legal requirement that a voyage captain have more than one guarantor, with considerable landed property, before he could obtain an embarkation permit. The legal responsibility of these guarantors was much more severe, for they would be held liable for any violation of maritime regulations by members of the voyage and, worse still, would be subject to criminal pun­ ishment. These features of the guaranty mechanism have been well documented in previous literature on the subject, but one basic question remains to be an­ swered: Given these responsibilities, who would be willing to become a guar­ antor for others? Some did so in the capacity of professional transaction middlemen, as mentioned in Chapter 9. But even for them, there had to be a profit margin worthy of the risk. Moreover, their main function was con­ fined largely to commercial agreements rather than embarkation permit ap­ plications, because middlemen had to have considerable landed property to qualify. As for wealthy landowning families, they would probably need more incentive than a service charge. For them, personal trust perhaps counted for a lot. In any event, there would be a transaction cost for securing enough

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279

guarantors for any lawful voyage. Unfortunately, we do not have figures on how high such costs could be. We can only infer that in theory it should not have been a meager price, given the prohibitive risk and liability imposed on the guarantor. Members of a strong social fabric would be able to reduce such transaction costs substantially by resorting to guarantors within their network. The costs would come down further if they were members of the same lineage or descent group. Members of elite lineages or large and cohe­ sive descent groups clearly enjoyed much better prospects of finding a quali­ fied landholding relative willing to offer a helping hand without asking a prohibitively high price. In this case, the transaction cost was actually paid off by personal trust derived from a common informal institution. Naturally members of a cohesive kinship organization would be subject to its various behavioral constraints, including fiduciary duties. South Fukien merchants were inclined to be self-interested, rational, and profit-maximizing, but this mentality is best described as bounded rational­ ity in action. The utility function, worldview, and computation capacity of these merchants were largely bounded by their own institutional matrix. In addition to the formal institutions discussed in the preceding chapter, we examined three key informal institutions in the context of South Fukien. Neo-Confucian teachings could have had a positive effect on the commercial ethics of these merchants. Their religious beliefs further consolidated ethical constraints and promoted trust. Their social fabric, most notably those inte­ grated by cohesive kinship organizations, gave an immense advantage to them in maritime trade. All three informal institutions underwent notice­ able development in South Fukien during the Sung and Yuan dynasties, paralleling exactly the path of economic growth. I have argued that in theory all helped to reduce transaction costs in maritime trade and, as a result, contributed to sustaining regional prosperity for centuries. My interpretation also implies that this phenomenon could take place only within an integrated region because the effects of these in­ stitutions would not have operated so powerfully in premodern China had they not been set in the confined spatial context of South Fukien. My argu­ ment, however, does not imply that the informal institutions had the magic power to eliminate opportunism and cheating among South Fukien mer­ chants. Rather, like the formal institutions, they provided an incentive and self-imposed motivation to live up to fiduciary responsibilities.

Conclusion

We have examined the process of cyclical economic development in South Fukien primarily from the mid-tenth century to the late fourteenth century. Even if we ignore the takeoff and downturn phases, we can still say that South Fukien enjoyed economic prosperity for around two hundred years­ a sustained record of economic success for a regional economy. By way of a conclusion, I shall sum up the political economy of this pattern in the first two sections of this chapter and reflect on the theoretical implications of this study in the last.

The South Fukien Pattern Revisited The South Fukien pattern, as presented in this study, is a story of cross­ sectoral prosperity. In the long development of the regional cycle, prosperity spilled over from one sector-the maritime sector-to other sectors, such as agriculture and industry. As part of this development, larger and larger areas of South Fukien and increasing portions of its population were able to benefit either directly from the booming maritime ttade or indirectly from other sectors that grew in response to the surge in demand for export prod­ ucts. Expanding economic opportunities for different strata of the commu­ nity improved people's livelihood in general rather than simply enriching a handful of urban-based merchants, as was more commonly seen in other traditional Chinese maritime centers. As pointed out by Clark, the Nanhai trade was the linchpin of the process of commercialization underlying all these changes.1 The maritime trade brought together ever-increasing re­ sources. In addition to local Chinese merchants, foreign merchants began to

Conclusion settle in the area and eventually constituted an integral segment of the local community. The permanent settlement of imperial clansmen added their enormous consumption and investment capacities. Eventually, the maritime sector successfully connected people, production, capital, and business over a large geographic area along the coast. This pattern of internal integration was also manifested spatially in the region's highly differentiated demo­ graphic landscape, hierarchical urban and rural structures, skewed urban morphology, and the location pattern of the export ceramics industry. Eco­ nomic expansion in South Fukien was thus integrative, and it created an in­ ternally integrated region in South Fukien and a relatively harmonious social structure. And all of this was accomplished in keen competition with mer­ chants in other maritime centers along China's coast as well as with foreign merchants not based in Ch'iian-chou. The state played an important role in this process. In general, a funda­ mental policy of the Sung and Yuan governments was to encourage indige­ nous participation in the overseas trade. On the one hand, this opened a much wider range of economic opportunities for coastal communities. On the other hand, it generated a new source of revenue for the government at both the central and the local levels. Eventually, indigenous participation ex­ panded to encompass a very dynamic community in the coastal regions con­ sisting of not only Han Chinese but also foreign settlers. One manifestation of this policy was the establishment of the office of maritime affairs in Ch'iian-chou in 1087. Although the open-trade policy alone cannot account for the success of the South Fukien pattern since it was applied equally to other regions, these policies and measures did create an important institu­ tional framework for South Fukien. Moreover, both the Sung and the Yuan governments engaged in and benefited from the domestic distribution, and at times even the retailing, of luxury imports in this region. On the whole these advantages seem to have made up for the problems arising from the booming maritime trade, such as the outflow of copper coins. As a policy, the state usually prohibited the use of metal currency in maritime trade. This, however, did not significantly hinder the development of that sector. The situation in the maritime trade contrasts with the more detrimental role played by the Sung government in Szechwan; there, as Paul Smith has shown, overenthusiastic implementation of fiscal policy by local officials, many of whom were native elites, had a ruinous effect on local industry.2

Conclusion The political dimension of the South Fukien economic process was more conspicuous during the initial takeoff stage under the independent local warlords. Politics became less dominant than economic forces in shaping the region's development under the Sung dynasty because of the state policy of open trade. This changed in the early thirteenth century when the economy confronted a downturn. Although the causes of this crisis were complex, overcommercialization and monetary problems, which intensified around this time, dealt heavy blows to the maritime sector. Facing contractions in the overseas trade and decreases in the demand for local products, the re­ gion's economy could no longer absorb conflicts stemming from competition for the limited regional resources among a population that had increased during the era of prosperity. Nor was it able to feed its residents. Power be­ came the only way to safeguard one's position and wealth, let alone to pursue commercial profit. Local elite families now had to turn their attention more than before to the acquisition of land and government positions. State power became more noticeably localized. This development had detrimental consequences. It widened the gap between different social strata, allocated opportunities in the maritime trade unequally, and intensified the tensions among elite groups. The Sung-Yuan transition witnessed the fall of certain groups and the rise of others, most notably the foreign community headed by P'u Shou-keng. The trend con­ tinued during the Yuan dynasty. But under the dominance of the foreign community, the South Fukien economy was much less balanced, despite the fact that its prosperity surpassed that of its major competitor, Kuang-chou. Internal tension and conflicts among different local powers led to a decade of civil war that largely devastated the region as well as its economy in the mid­ fourteenth century. Following the end of the Mongol rule, South Fukien also lost forever its pre-eminent position in maritime China. Even the re­ markable age of commerce in China in general and the immense quantity of silver imports to Chang-chou in particular during the sixteenth and seven­ teenth centuries failed to revive the region to an extent close to that of its glorious past. The desire for wealth provided the strongest motivation for the success of the South Fukien economy. And in the pursuit of prosperity, South Fu­ kienese made rational decisions, albeit being bounded unknowingly by the institutional matrix in which they operated. Indeed, their commercial activi-

Conclusion ties are rather comprehensible in terms of bounded rationality. In this regard, premodern maritime China does not fit the model of moral economy often used in contrast to the rational-choice model to interpret preindustrial and non-Western economies and societies.3 The desire for prosperity was, however, not limited to the South Fukienese. So the profit-maximizing urge by itself is not a sufficient explanation of their success. I have employed North's theoretical framework to explore the institutional dimension of this regional pattern of economic performance. The Sung and Yuan legal system as it was enforced in South Fukien clearly functioned to reduce transaction costs in the maritime trade, as did the informal constraints on commercial behavior deriving from such cultural and social variables as Confucian teachings, religious beliefs, and the social fabric. Together, these variables provided an institutional matrix conducive to long-term economic growth in a preindustrial yet highly commercialized regional maritime economy.

Power, Localized State Power, and Institutional Change In recent years, the role of power in institutional change has become one of the major issues in theoretical reflections on North's approach.4 In premod­ ern China, power often played an important role in the allocation of re­ sources. Yet, the case of South Fukien reveals a pattern in which the variable of power alone cannot account for commercial and economic choices and their effects. The complex political and spatial structure of Chinese history renders it difficult to apply modern theoretical concepts like rational choice and institutional change without elaborate qualification. For instance, in South Fukien, the driving force for formal institutional change would, as North emphasizes, have come from the rational calculations of members of the local elite to advance personal or family interests; P'u Shou-keng of the Sung-Yuan transition is one such example. On other occasions, institutional changes took place due to efforts by committed Confucian officials to pro­ mote the welfare of those in their administrative jurisdiction, for example, Chen Te-hsiu in the early thirteenth century. Regardless of the motives behind such initiatives for change, the formal institutional framework is, by North's definition, determined by the state. In applying this idea to the Sung and Yuan context, we may differentiate the state power of the central authorities from that of the local authorities.

Conclusion (From the viewpoint of the commoners, of course, both embodied the impe­ rial order.) When the central government had the political will and author­ ity to control local governance, such as the centralization efforts made in the early Northern Sung, state powers at both the central and the local levels were more in line with each other. Yet, there were times when these two authorities did not share the same policies, directions, and priorities. At times of weaker central control, national laws and policies were implemented with varying degrees of efficiency and enthusiasm at the local level. And when the state power became localized to a considerable extent in some re­ gions, the actually enforced framework became quite different from that found in other places; for example, the maritime law in action in Ch'iian­ chou diverged from that in Kuang-chou. This led to regional diversities in institutional change. In this sense, in regional perspective institutional change took place not so much in the structure of the formal institutions themselves but in their enforcement characteristics. Institutional change in the informal institutional structure is far more complicated.5 In South Fukien, the three major informal institutions dis­ cussed in this study-Confucian ethics, religious beliefs, and cohesive linea­ ges-emerged under the Southern Sung, despite their ancient cultural and social roots. Were these generated by initiatives from the maritime sector? There is indeed no evidence to support such a claim from Sung and Yuan texts. Extant evidence of this link comes mainly from late Ming sources. Thus it is more difficult to explain informal institutional change in South Fukien in terms of payoff for the entrepreneurs, as North suggests. It is, for example, unconvincing to argue that Chu Hsi and Chen Te-hsiu deliber­ ately encouraged their disciples to engage in commerce. A more plausible interpretation is that the beneficial effects of these informal institutional changes on the maritime trade were unintended consequences. In other words, they were initiated and promoted primarily for non-economic rea­ sons, such as certain Confucian ethical ideals. Yet, the effect of these teach­ ings was to create a cultural and social environment conducive to advance­ ment of the maritime trade. Moreover, many of these institutions existed in other areas in China, but without a maritime economy, they did not have a similar effect on transaction costs. In the maritime economies ofKwangtung and Chekiang, also part of maritime China, parallel institutions flourished only later, under the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties. And since during those pe­ riods state policy was unfavorable to maritime trade (i.e., the institutional

286

Conclusion

matrix differed), even the same informal institutions generated different transaction-cost effects.

Institutions in Space and Space in the New Institutional Economics The institutional approach developed by North in his New Institutional Economics has been instrumental to this re-interpretation of South Fukien. It provides an important framework for incorporating a wide range of vari­ ables in the economic, political, legal, ideological, social, and demographic realms and relating them systemically to economic performance over time. A regional approach allows us to focus on a well-defined, and confined, geo­ graphic unit of observation and analysis and to reconstruct and interpret complex historical phenomena. Combining the strengths of the two ap­ proaches creates a powerful analytical framework. And they in fact comple­ ment each other well. The idea of space has not been recognized as theoretically significant in institutional approaches. The unit of analysis in empirical studies adopting this approach is often either a particular institution, industry, and organiza­ tion or one national economy.6 Research on a particular institution or in­ dustry contributes greatly to our understanding of institutions and their economic implications at the micro level. In contrast, the national approach attempts to integrate many variables into the framework of an institutional matrix and to produce macro-level knowledge of a single national economy. And it is exactly at this level that we can observe an important limitation of the approach. National economies vary in scope and scale. Comparing the early modern economies of France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Britain and analyzing the institutional implications of their divergent paths does not pose any spatial issues because the physical size of these economies are, after all, limited. North has demonstrated the fruitful results that can come from this approach and has had a significant impact on economic history.7 Nev­ ertheless, conceptualizing a Chinese economy in the twelfth century as a homogeneous whole may not turn out to be as constructive. As G. William Skinner and Robert Hartwell have cautioned, China is too vast to be taken simply as an undifferentiated whole. Its history is, as they have pointed out, the combined histories of many constituent regions, each of which had its own pattern of development, often unsynchronized with one another.8

Conclusion Moreover, the effects of institutional factors, such as the legal system, local religious and educational establishments, and the local social fabric, were spatially differentiated. Each of them had a geographic core, or jurisdiction, where the constraint effect was strongest. Away from the core, the influence of the institution decreased. As this study has shown, even in maritime China, the different institutional matrices found in Kuang-chou and Ch'iian-chou led to different patterns of economic performance. In other words, to deal with an economy the size of China's, the New Institutional Economics may need to give more consideration to what constitutes the ap­ propriate spatial unit of analysis. In Skinner's spatial approach, the most fundamental model of central place theory is used primarily to explain the distribution of central places in terms of retailing and services, and it seems to work well with the marketing and the urban systems of China. Attempts to broaden the application of this system to rural structures and non-economic phenomena have had mixed results.9 One reason may be that the theoretical construct implies a close link between economic and non-economic factors based on differentiated density of resources, but the theoretization that would consolidate this link may need to be further strengthened. The factor of density is, of course, uni­ versally significant and often implies important social effects. Although there is no doubt that it provides a powerful conceptual tool, density is by no means an adequate instrument to account for not only economic perform­ ance but also economic and social choices. One way of strengthening the connection between economic and non-economic factors is to place them in the New Institutional Economics framework developed by North. This theoretically relates most of the economic and non-economic factors to an institutional matrix and facilitates interpretation of their roles in economic performance by means of transaction-cost analysis. The Skil).nerian regional approach may thus be considerably enriched by the concept of institutional matrix. Its explanatory power will be enhanced because the matrix also pro­ vides a better elucidation of economic development in regions over time, and economic development after all led to major changes in the urban and mar­ keting systems in the long term. Finally, we may explore the implications of this study for China's economy, past and present. The case of South Fukien indicates that the rationality ex­ hibited by the premodern Chinese economy is by no means intrinsically in-

288

Conclusion

compatible with the logic of modern economic growth. There were, to be sure, enormous limitations that prevented medieval maritime China from evolving into the first regional capitalist economy. Nor were there similarly efficient institutional settings, for example, property rights, 10 in place that would have enabled South Fukien entrepreneurs to advance their businesses as their British counterparts did in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But the institutional framework they lived with was nonetheless not entirely detrimental to enduring economic growth. To the contrary, we have seen in this study many examples of the instrumental role of institutions. When the institutional matrix operated smoothly and the state power remained basically neutral in economic competition, as witnessed in South Fukien during the twelfth century, prosperity beneficial to a relatively wide section of the population could be achieved, allowing more people to benefit from the economic opportunities stimulated by maritime ventures. This is, of course, an atypical case in Chinese history. It represents one of the best performances by China's regional economies in the past, in terms of both duration and scale. The combined force of rationality and certain traditional institutions may have led to long-term and balanced prosperity, even in a preindustrial economy. There has been quite a controversy over how we should understand China's economic performance in the past two decades and, more impor­ tant, over how we can identify workable directions for the future.11 One major issue in these debates is institutional reform in China, which, most would agree, will be a decisive factor in China's quest for sustainable growth in the twenty-first century.12 What can be projected from the findings of this studyr First, prosperity may be achieved in such a way that a wider spectrum of the society benefits from it. But it can also be achieved by con­ centrating resources into the hands of a few. Long-term prosperity requires institutional support, and a prosperity whose benefits are more widely en­ joyed would likely be more sustainable because of its broader and strength­ ened informal institutional support. Is it not then imperative to perceive China's economic performance over the course of two decades in the light of a differentiated schema of prosperity? Second, to follow North's lead, informal institutional change is as crucial as formal institutional change in the transition to a structure of higher adaptive efficiency. This implies that achieving meaningful institutional change conducive to a lasting and broadly based prosperity takes far more

Conclusion than the introduction of a new legal framework, such as laws on contract, company, property rights, and so forth, in imitation of international legal standards. Those are, no doubt, of paramount importance. But what needs to be done concurrently is to explore how an informal institutional frame­ work might support the formal system. As yet, far fewer detailed researches, both empirical and theoretical, address these crucial issues. Third, recent researches have pointed to the problem of the widening disparity among the regions of China in economic performance, which are largely thought to result from national policies and exogenous factors.13 In the light of the present study, it is imperative to explore the internal struc­ tures of individual regions, however one may reasonably define them given the interpretive nature of such spatial concepts, and to better understand the interplay between the dynamic of those defined entities and external struc­ tures. Such inquiries may bring more insight to our search for solutions to the problem of regional inequalities. To conclude, it is intriguing to note the strikingly parallel paths of pros­ perity driven by surging foreign trade opportunities in maritime China in the twelfth and in the late twentieth centuries. Both in fact derived from the highly positive open policy of the state. South Fukien's cross-sectoral pros­ perity was no longer sustainable as state power became localized, even before the advent of the Mongols. Nor did the economic boom under foreign domination in Yuan times bring lasting peace. Will maritime China fare better in the new century under a lasting favorable political climate that gives "Mother Market" a chance?

Appendixes

A P PEND I X

A

Fukien from Han to Sui

Information on the early history of Fukien, much less that of South Fukien, is extremely sparse. Most of the available information concerns territorial units of administration. Inadequate as it is, such information at least points to the process of development in terms of human settlement and the state's . to 1.t.1 reaction The history of Fukien prior to the Han is very poorly recorded. All that is known is that Fukien may have been under the rule of the kingdom of Yiieh before the grand unification of the Ch'in dynasty (221-207 B.c. ) and that under the Ch'in, a commandery called Min-chung-chiin was established in the former territory of that kingdom. Its capital was located in modern­ day Fu-chou by annotators of the Records of the Historian (Shih chi) and the Dynastic History of the Former Han (Han shu).2 By 205 B.c., a new indigenous, autonomous state named Min-yiieh had been established in Fukien by the Han court. Its capital was in a place called Tung-yeh in the Records of the Historian or Yeh in the Dynastic History of the Former Han.3 After several years of intermittent conflict with the court, this indigenous state was crushed by Emperor Wu's army in III B.c. To eliminate this source of trouble, the court decided to resettle the people of this state by force to areas in what are now Kiangsu and Anhwei.4 Some people escaped and fled to the mountainous areas, where they remained a potential threat to Han rule. According to the Dynastic History of the Liu Sung in the Southern Dynasties (Sung shu), under the Han a county administration was established in the Min River delta, previ­ ously the homeland of the Yueh people, to tackle the problem. It was named Yeh, a legacy from the name of the Min-yiieh capital. This jurisdiction was further divided into two headquarters under the army command of K'uai-

294

Appendix A

chi commandery; the Southern District Headquarters (nan-pu tu-wei) and the Eastern District Headquarters ( tung-pu tu-wei). The Southern District Headquarters remained in Yeh and continued to serve as a garrison to attain military control of this frontier. But in the later years of the Former Han, the residents of this county of Yeh became a culturally integrated community of Han settlers and Yueh locals who eventually accepted Han rule, as dis­ cussed below, thereby raising the significance of the civil administration. Al­ though the garrison headquarters was later relocated north to modern Che­ kiang, the city itself continued to be the site of the county capital from the Former Han to the Later Han, under the new name ofTung Hou-kuan.5 The exact location of Tung-yeh has been a controversial issue among scholars since the Southern Dynasties.6 The controversy arises from a con­ fusing annotation to the "Geographical Monograph" of the Supplementary Dynastic History of the Former Han (Hsu Han shu) by Ssu-ma Piao (ca. A.D. 240-300 ) , which is preserved in the Dynastic History of the Later Han (Hou Han shu).7 Under the entry for Chang-an county in K'uai-chi commandery, which is generally accepted to have been situated n5 Ii to the east of T'ai­ chou on the eastern coast of modern Chekiang, is a note reading: "This was previously Yeh, a place of Min-yiieh, the name of which was changed by Emperor Kuang-wu [r. A.D. 25-57] ." Accordingly, it has been asserted that a county named Yeh existed on the eastern coast of Chekiang and that its name was changed to Chang-an in the Later Han. It is further claimed that this Yeh, one of the 26 counties of K'uai-chi commandery listed in the "Geo­ graphical Monograph" of the Han shu for the year A.D. 1,8 is not the same Tung-yeh that was the capital of the Min-yiieh kingdom.9 Another assertion made on the basis of this note is that Tung-yeh and the territory of Min­ yiieh were located in the eastern part of Chekiang rather than in F ukien. 10 Neither of these assertions is convincing. In the first place, the text of the Supplementary Dynastic History of the Former Han has been shown to contain many discrepancies, especially in this note. It is not adequate to postulate an assertion on the basis of a single authority.11 Second, it is impossible to es­ tablish that Chang-an is identical with the county of Yeh within the context of the Dynastic History of the Former Han. In this source, Chang-an is said to be identical with another county named Hui-p'u and listed among other counties, including Yeh, under K'uai-chi commandery. More impor­ tant, it is stated in the Supplementary Dynastic History of the Former Han that the Eastern District Headquarters, which was established in Yeh in III B.c.,

Appendix A

29 5

had been shifted to Hui-p'u at an unknown date later.12 How could this be so if the two places were identical? Furthermore, in the Records of the Historian and the Dynastic History of the Former Han, there is a nearly identical passage narrating the founding of the Min-yiieh kingdom in the early Han. Ssu-ma Ch'ien called the kingdom's capital Tung-yeh, and Pan Ku named it Yeh. Since both men lived closer to the event than later annotators, their accounts should provide a more reli­ able basis for our discussion. It is apparent that to them Yeh and Tung-yeh are interchangeable place-names.13 According to the annotators of the Records of the Historian and the Dynastic History of the Former Han, Tung-yeh, the capital of Min-yiieh that became a county capital some time after the fall of that kingdom, was in the Min River delta near modern Fu-chou. This can be confirmed by two considerations. First, during the conflict with Min-yiieh, the main Han army, which was di­ vided into three forces, attacked from eastern Kiangsi and southwestern Chekiang by land. A fourth force was transported by ship from the eastern coast of Chekiang to raid the capital of Min-yiieh directly; and it was this expedition that eventually defeated the Min-yiieh forces and led to the assas­ sination of the Min-yiieh king.14 Judging from the overall military situation, Tung-yeh could not have been on the eastern coast of Chekiang from where the expeditionary forces embarked and must have been in Fukien.15 Second, a memorial written by Chu Mai-ch'en, a native of K'uai-chi, ob­ served that the king of Min-yiieh had earlier taken a defensive position on a mountain called Ch'iian-shan. This position was so strong that any direct attempt to take it might have caused tremendous casualties. However, the king later moved his forces some five hundred Ii southward and entrenched them on the banks of rivers and lakes. This, as Chu advised, was a golden opportunity to conquer the kingdom.16 The location of Ch'iian-shan is hence crucial to the discussion of the location of Tung-yeh. Although any answer to this question may never be fully substantiated with clear-cut documentary evidence, it is likely that the mountain was located near mod­ ern Fu-chou, as the early Tang annotator Yen Shih-ku suggested.17 Was the county capital ofTung-yeh, established in present-day Fu-chou, the first Han settlement in Fukien? From the documentary evidence, this may be plausible. Nevertheless, the answer becomes more problematic when we take into account the walled city located in the highlands of Fukien on the bank of an upper branch of Min River, now termed by archaeologists as

Appendix A the Han-era city of Ch'eng-ts'un in Ch'ung-an. It has been a controversial finding, and both among those who participated in the excavation and among those who closely examined the site and the excavated items there are divergent views. There is, as yet, no consensus on even the date of the set­ tlement; estimates range from the Min-yueh kingdom to the end of the Former Han. There are also conflicting opinions about its nature; some con­ sider it the Min-yueh capital of Yeh, and others think it was just a fortress. Unfortunately, there is little convincing documentary support for any of these claims, and insufficient archaeological evidence to allow a conclusive JU . dgment.18 We may, however, approach the issue from a different angle. Wu Ch'un­ ming has provided a precise account of the archaeological landscape of pre­ Ch'in and Han Fukien.19 He noted that sites from Fu-chou to Ch'ung-an show dual characteristics. In the Min-yueh period, Han elements are re­ flected mainly in city layout, building materials, and metal artifacts, whereas Yueh elements, quantitatively more evident, prevail in architectural style and pottery. However, from sites dated well into the Han period, also situated along the upper and lower Min River valley, he noticed that relics with Han cultural elements prevailed, even though Yueh characteristics persisted in certain ceramic items. It is therefore quite clear that more than one wave of Han settlement may have taken place in the Min River valley during the Han dynasty. But most of these settlements, as shown in archaeological findings summarized by Wu, probably consisted of both Han Chinese and the assimilated Yueh people. Only one administrative center came into being during the Han-the county capital of Tung-yeh in present-day Fu-chou. Even here, the evidence of ethnic mixture is indisputable. Up to the fall of Han, Tung-yeh, renamed Tung Hou-kuan in the Later Han, was the only recorded administrative unit established in modern Fu­ kien.20 Communications with other parts of China relied heavily on the sea route. Overland passages to eastern Kiangsi and southwestern Chekiang may have existed, but they were too primitive and inconvenient to have any significance in terms of transport and development. The pattern of devel­ opment at this stage was therefore concentrated on, and confined to, the Min River delta. There are few records of other parts of the province in ex­ tant sources. The period from the end of the second to the end of the sixth century

Appendix A

297

witnessed increasing Chinese immigration into Fukien. This was a result of prolonged social chaos, civil wars, and political instability in North China throughout the four hundred years of disunity and frequent dynastic changes following the fall of the Han. The motivation behind these move­ ments was basically to seek refuge in an area of relative stability and security. The physically isolated character of Fukien served this purpose well, despite its primitive environment and economy. On the political front, during the Three Kingdoms Period (220-65), ef­ forts were made by the kingdom of Wu (222-80) to expand its territory to the south.21 This policy was followed by the Western Chin (265-317), the Eastern Chin (317-420), and the four succeeding Southern dynasties (420589). Fukien was one of the main targets of this expansionist policy. This is shown by the increased number of administrative units both within the province and along its lines of communication with neighboring areas. Ad­ ministrative units were established in the southern coastal region of Fukien, although not on a scale comparable to that in the Min River basin. From Map A.I, it can be seen that besides the long-established Han county capital of Tung Hou-kuan, two more county capitals were set up near the mouth of the Min River. Upstream, eight new county capitals ap­ peared from the period of the Three Kingdoms to the Sui dynasty that once again reunited China. All were located on tributaries of the Min River. Five county capitals were established in coastal South Fukien, although one of them was abolished after a short while. Apart from these, three other county capitals were established in A.D. 282, but their locations are unknown. At a higher level of local administration, the headquarters of the army commander in the southern area of K'uai-chi (nan-pu tu-wei) was established at the county capital of Hou-kuan on the banks of the middle reaches of the Min River in, or shortly before, A.D. 203.22 Fifty-seven years later, a com­ mandery capital was established in this city under the name of Chien-an commandery, which encompassed almost the entire territory of modern Fu­ kien province.23 This was the first time that the administrative units of this area became independent of K'uai-chi commandery. As for southern coastal Fukien, it is notable that a county called Tung-an was, for the first time, es­ tablished in this region, with its capital probably at or near modern Nan-an county.24 In A.D. 282, probably because of the recent development of the area, the

Appendix A

298

•

-N -

Legend Han t< End of Han to Wu o Chin (locations of three counties in Fukien are unknown) • Eastern Chin • Liu Sung 6. Ch'i to Ch'en @ Established during Chin, but abolished later at unknown date

*

0

1 20

240

km

Map A.I Development of administrative divisions in Fukien and neighboring areas from the Han to the end of the Northern and Southern Dynasties (souRcE: based on Bielenstein, "Chinese Colonization of Fukien," pp. 105 -7)

newly unified authority of Western Chin decided to split the Chien-an commandery in two. One, keeping the name Chien-an commandery, gov­ erned seven counties in the upper Min River. Its territory consisted of northern inland Fukien, and the commandery capital remained at Chien-an. The other, incorporating eight counties under the name of Chin-an com­ mandery, was set up in coastal Fukien. Two of these counties were located

Appendix A

299

in the southern part of Fukien-namely, Chin-an county, which was origi­ nally Tung-an, and Tung-an county, which was identical with modern Tung-an county. The capital of Chin-an commandery was probably in Hou-kuan, originally Tung Hou-kuan.25 Interestingly, one county in this commandery, called Hsin-lo, was located in southwestern inland Fukien, near modern Ch'ang-t'ing. This corner of the province was at the further­ most edge of development. The reason for including this remote inland county in the territory of a littoral commandery is not clear, but its name cannot be found among the counties of the same commandery under the Liu Sung (420-79) and Ch'i (479-5q2) of the Southern dynasties.26 It may have been a temporary arrangement of no significance. In fact, during these two dynasties, according to available information, Chien-an commandery still contained seven counties, but Chin-an commandery lost three, namely Tung-an, Hsin-lo, and another that cannot be identified with any modern location. It now had only five counties, of which only one, Chin-an county, was in southern coastal Fukien. The reason for the abolition of Tung-an county is not mentioned. It may have been due to underpopulation. When the Liang dynasty (502-57) began to consolidate its rule of Fukien around A.D. 510, a commandery named Liang-an was established on the southern coast. Its headquarters were first set up in Nan-an county, on the old site of the capital city of Chin-an county. Under the jurisdiction of this new Liang-an commandery were at least three more counties in the south­ eastern part of the region.27 This was the first time South Fukien was ruled by an administrative unit above the county level. In 557, the Ch'en (s57-89) government, the last of the Southern Dynasties, changed its name to Nan­ an commandery, probably in order to remove Liang elements from impor­ tant place-names. Moreover, it established a chou (prefecture), which was superior to the commanderies, called Min-chou in the capital of the Chin-an commandery. But Min-chou was soon abolished. A similar unit called Feng­ chou was re-established in the same city in 568 and lasted to the end of the dynasty. It governed the three existing Fukien commanderies of Chien-an, Chin-an, and Nan-an.28 The general trend of settlement in Fukien during the first two centuries after the Han flowed from the Min River delta upstream along the river ba­ sin, passed through the mountains on the present provincial border, and followed the inland waterways to the neighboring provinces. Another smaller flow moved south along the coast, reaching the Chin River delta and

300

Appendix A

stopping there. The abolition ofT'ung-an county at the tip of this flow may indicate a lack of continued movement south at this stage. However, the opening up of southern coastal Fukien had begun. Before the reunification of China under the Sui, three more counties were set up in the Chiu-lung River delta. Apart from these administrative developments, from the time of the Eastern Chin, there seems to have been another flow of immigration moving from Kuang-chou to the northeastern coast of Kwang­ tung. Bielenstein interprets this as a new flow of immigration that expanded from Kwangtung to South Fukien.29 It is true that some county capitals were established in northeastern Kwangtung at this time, but even down to the Northern Sung, communications and living conditions in the area be­ tween the Chiu-lung River delta and the Han River delta in northeastern Kwangtung remained hazardous.30 Moreover, the indigenous tribes in this area were far from being pacified throughout the T'ang dynasty.31 There­ fore, the effect of this movement in Kwangtung on the development of South Fukien in pre-T'ang times should not be overestimated. Historically important as these developments in Fukien may have been, in terms of population growth, they were rather insignificant. Extant figures for households and total population for the Han refer only to the entirety of K'uai-chi commandery and thus do not give a demographic picture of Fu­ kien. The figures for A.D. 282 show some 4,JOO households each in Chien-an commandery and Chin-an commandery.32 These are, of course, gross under­ estimates. Moreover, it is doubtful that two commanderies would just hap­ pen to have the same number of households. Nevertheless, it can safely be assumed that the population in both commanderies must have been quite sparse. Population figures dating to the Liu Sung regime of the Southern Dynasties claim that the inland commandery of Chien-an had 3,042 house­ holds and 17,686 k'ou (persons), and the coastal commandery of Chin-an 2,843 households and 19,838 k'ou.33 Although these figures cannot be as­ sumed to be particularly accurate, they do suggest that population growth in the area that is now called Fukien, throughout the four hundred years from the Three Kingdoms to the Sui, was rather slow. The figures for 609, thirty years after reunification of the empire under the Sui, indicate that there were only 12,420 households in the whole of Fukien.34 Even taking into account that these figures, too, must have been underestimates, they still suggest a slow rate of growth.35

A P PEND I X

B

P'u Shou-keng: A Reassessment

The surrender of P'u Shou-keng has been considered crucial to the fate of the Sung resistance movement by many scholars, since it is believed that he possessed a strong maritime force, both in terms of naval vessels and of mer­ cantile ships.1 ·0n the one hand, his defection significantly reduced the naval forces that the resistance movement could mobilize in the battles to come; on the other, it contributed tremendously to the Mongol navy, which hith­ erto had been no match for the Sung's. Despite his crucial role in the final years of the regime, documentary evi­ dence shedding light on his position in Ch'iian-chou is rare and often con­ tradictory. That was why Kuwabara made a major contribution when he re­ discovered this long-forgotten figure. However, how a person like P'u suddenly emerged to hold such a decisive position deserves further elucida­ tion. In particular, we must examine in detail the office he held to determine if it constituted the major source of his power, as is often assumed. The fol­ lowing summarizes the studies on the issue by others and myself in the past two decades.2 The Dynastic History of the Sung mentions only that P'u Shou-keng held two official posts in late 1276: chaoju-shih (marshal of pacification) and shih­ po-shih.3 As mentioned in previous chapters, the shih-po-shih was responsible for the management of the maritime trade, tariff collection, and foreign en­ voys in a designated coastal region, in this case, Ch'iian-chou and South Fu­ kien. In the capacity of shih-po-shih, P'u Shou-keng could exercise consider­ able influence over maritime affairs at Ch'iian-chou. But his control over all the mercantile vessels in the region should not be overestimated, even though such vessels could be used as warships in an emergency.4 There is no

302

Appendix B

evidence that during the Southern Sung shih-po-shih were ever given com­ mand over the mercantile vessels. At most he controlled his own large fleet.5 However, the significance of the post of chaoju-shih is less clear, and it has not been discussed at length in previous literature on P'u. According to the administrative section of the Dynastic History of the Sung, the post of chaoju­ shih was an irregular institution under the Southern Sung.6 No mention is made of its function or the criteria for appointment. But to judge from the appointments to this post recorded in the Dynastic History of the Sung and the Compiled Government Documents of Sung China, the usual holders of the posi­ tion were high-ranking generals with a special military commission.7 The appointment of a person like P'u Shou-keng without the appropriate official rank to this post can only reflect the political disorder following the submis­ sion of the Lin-an court to the Mongols in early 1276.8 Nevertheless, the ap­ pointment itself suggests that P'u must have controlled a substantial local military force in Ch'iian-chou, whose support would mean a great deal to the resistance. Further evidence of this military capacity is that P'u was able to reject the Sung emperor in 1276 and successfully defended the city of Ch'iian-chou during the loyalists' siege in 1277. The reason for P'u's appointment to this office is not given in the Dynastic History of the Sung. In many Ming and Ch'ing gazetteers and geographical ac­ counts, for example, the Geography and Landmarks of the Unified Ming Empire (Ta-Ming i-t'ung yii-ti ming-sheng-chih), the Prefectural Gazetteer of Ch'iian-chou (Ch'iian-chou fu-chih), the Book of Min, and the Provincial Gazetteer of Fu-chien (Fu-chien t'ung-chih), it is recorded that the P'u brothers repelled a pirate raid around 1274.9 Accordingly, Kuwabara Jitsuz6 contends that P'u's official ca­ reer began as a reward for his merit in repelling pirates. On the other hand, Kuwabara also accepts a statement in the Dynastic History of the Sung that P'u had held the office of shih-po-shih for 30 years by 1276. In this case, there appears to be an inconsistensy in the dates. In order to solve this problem, Kuwabara further suggests that the year 1274 given in Ming sources is a mistake for 1250.10 This hypothesis is not convincing. There is no ground to support the assumption that P'u's career as shih-po-shih must have started as a result of repelling pirates in 1274. Indeed, the length of his term in this office prior to 1276 is itself questionable. In contrast with Kuwabara's notion of 30 years, Lo Hsiang-lin argued that P'u would not have held the office before 1259.11 Yii Chia-hsi, however, pointed out that there were two other shih-po-shih in office during those 30

Appendix B

303

years, namely, Wang Hui-ch'i and Chao Jih-ch'i.12 Other than these, at least four others held the office successively from 1252 to 1262.13 Furthermore, there is evidence that Wang Hui-ch'i did not leave the of­ fice until 1266.14 It is thus certain that P'u Shou-keng could not have been appointed shih-po-shih earlier than 1266. The possible length of his tenure as shih-po-shih is unlikely to have been more than ten years. The statement in the Dynastic History of the Sung that he had been in that office for 30 years is either an exaggeration or a mistake.15 Another possible explanation of this textual confusion, suggested by Ch'en Kao-hua, is that the 30 years men­ tioned in the Dynastic History refers to length of time P'u dominated the overseas trade in Ch'iian-chou as a merchant rather than as shih-po-shih.16 Whether P'u's power extended beyond Ch'iian-chou is a crucial factor in determining his influence. Kuwabara and other scholars claim that his mili­ tary influence covered the entire Fu-chien circuit, and possibly Kuang­ tung.17 Their assertion is based on an account iri the Book of Min, which was compiled in the early seventeenth century: The forefather [of P'u Shou-keng] was a man of Western Regions. When he was young, P'u Shou-keng was a turbulent and depraved fellow, but towards the end of Hsien-chun or about 1274, he succeeded with his brother Shou-ch'eng in repelling sea-pirates. For this merit, he was successively appointed the governor­ general of Fu-chien province and the chief defender of the sea-coast. During the period of Ching-yen, 1276-7, he was further promoted to the post of commis­ sioner-general (anfu-shih) of Fu-chien and Kuang-tung provinces, and also the superintendent of the sea-ships of those provinces.18 In order to attest the reliability of this source, Kuwabara maintains that simi­ lar accounts appeared in other Ming sources, such as the Geography and Land­ marks of the Unified Ming Empire and the Prefectural Gazetteer of Ch'uan-chou.19 This assertion needs to be reconsidered. First, the late Ming edition of the Prefectural Gazetteer of Ch'uan-chou was not an independent source from the Book of Min. The compiler of the latter, Ho Ch'iao-yiian, also partici­ pated in the compilation of the former.20 Nor is the account given in the 1612 edition of the Prefectural Gazetteer of Ch'uan-chou consistent with that in the Book of Min. It mentions only that P'u had held the office of yen-hai tu-chih­ chih-shih (commander in chief of the coastal navy) and does not mention that he held other offices.21 Furthermore, the Geography and Landmarks of the Uni­ fied Ming Empire states only:

304

Appendix B

The two brothers of Western origin, P'u Shou-keng and P'u Shou-ch'eng, came [to Ch'iian-chou] as maritime merchants [or officials in maritime affairs] in the Sung dynasty. They won merit by repelling a pirate attack. At the end of the Hsien-ch'un era [1265-74], Shou-keng was promoted to the post of chaoju-shih and Shou-ch'eng was appointed prefect of Chi-chou. Shou-ch'eng refused the appointment and persuaded his brother to occupy Ch'iian-chou and submit to the Yuan.22 This passage adds nothing to our knowledge of P'u's official posts other than that given in the Dynastic History of the Sung. It does not support the claim in the Book ofMin. Second, to judge from the general political situation, including appoint­ ments of other officials before and in 1276, P'u was unlikely to have exercised military power outside the prefecture. The anju-shih (provincial military commissioner; translated "commissioner general" by Kuwabara) of a circuit was normally the highest civil and military authority in a circuit; essentially this was a high-ranking civil position.23 The military office given P'u as a re­ ward for repelling pirates was not remotely sufficient to put him on a fast track to promotion to such a high position within a decade. A list of ap­ pointments to the position of anju-shih in Fu-chien down to the very end of the dynasty can be found in the Provincial Gazetteer of Fu-chien.24 P'u Shou­ keng's name is not among them. Supporting evidence is the record of ap­ pointments to the same post from 1264 to 1276 in the Dynastic History of the Sung.25 Thus, it is evident that P'u never held this office. Another post mentioned in the Book of Min, which would have given P'u an opportunity to extend his control beyond the prefectural level, is yen-hai tu chih-chih-shih, "chief defender of the sea-coast" in Kuwabara's translation or "military commissioner general of coastal defense" in Lo Jung-pang's. The duty of this office was to guard the seacoast, as Kuwabara put it on the basis of the description of the post in the Dynastic History of the Sung.26 But he overlooked an important statement preceding that description. It is clear that this office was usually held concurrently by the prefect of Ming-chou,27 which raises the question how P'u Shou-keng could have received this ap­ pointment. Further investigation in a Yuan gazetteer of Ming-chou discloses that most of the prefects of Ming-chou held the post of yen-hai chih-chih-shih at least until 1261. The list of holders of this office is continuous from 1241 to 1261.28 At least three other concurrent appointments to this post and to the prefectship of Ming-chou can be found in the Dynastic History of the Sung,

Appendix B and 1275.29 It is thus evident that the office was given to the prefect of Ming-chou until the very end of the dynasty and that P'u Shou-keng never held this office. This implies that P'u's political influence, although significant due to his control over mercantile ships in Ch'iian-chou, was confined to Ch'iian-chou. Worth mentioning is a newly discovered source, the History of the Won­ deiful (Li shih ), a miscellaneous history of Ch'iian-chou in the Yuan dynasty compiled by an unknown author before the mid-sixteenth century. Parts of it were included in the genealogy of a Chin family of Ch'iian-chou entitled Ch'ing-yuan Chin-shih tsu-p'u, which was compiled in 1555.30 This History of the Wondeiful was written before the Book of Min and the Geography and Land­ marks of the Unified Ming Empire, and it was used as a primary source for the 1 1763 edition of the Prefectural Gazetteer of Ch'uan-chou. 3 It seems to have been an independent source from these references. It gives a different account of P'u Shou-keng's career: 'There have been many foreigners of western origin in Ch'iian-chou for a long time. Because of their merit of repelling pirates at the end of the Sung, P'u Shou-keng was appointed chaoju-shih and concur­ rently in charge of the shih-po-ssu, and Shou-ch'eng was appointed prefect of Chi-chou."32 This account does not make clear· whether P'u held the office of shih-po-shih when he received the appointment of chaoju-shih, nor does it explicitly state that he was appointed to both offices at the same time. But it does show unambiguously that P'u was chaoju-shih, but not Fu-chien anju­ shih or yen-hai tu chih-chih-shih. It would support my argument that his politi­ cal and military influence was local and never extended beyond the prefec­ tural level, much less the provincial level as suggested by Kuwabara and Lo. 1269, 1271,

A P PEND I X

C

The Process of Administrative Division in South Fukien in the Tenth Century

In 979, a new prefecture was created from the eastern part of the territory of T'ang Ch'i.ian-chou and given the name of Hsing-hua-chi.in.1 This measure was justified by the need to gain more effective control over the unstable hilly periphery in the area neighboring Fu-chou prefecture. The capital of this new prefecture was located first in the capital of Hsing-hua county, which was established concurrently. The counties ofHsien-yu and P'u-t'ien, previously subordinate to Ch'i.ian-chou prefecture, were placed under the ju­ risdiction of Hsing-hua-chi.in shortly thereafter. A few years later, the capi­ tal of the new prefecture was moved to the county capital of P'u-t'ien. The reason given for this change was that the city of P'u-t'ien occupied a better strategic position. However, the economic function of the site may also have played a role in the decision.2 The number of counties in the region also increased twofold. This pro­ cess had started in the last years of the Min kingdom. By the end of the tenth century, there were altogether fourteen counties in South Fukien, half of them established during this period. Of these, five were located in Ch'i.ian-chou prefecture. A Tung-an county was established between Ch'i.ian-chou and Chang­ chou in 939. Its capital was important in the sense that it not only controlled the connection between the two prefectural capitals but also shared Chang­ chou Bay with the capital of Chang-chou as its sea outlet. Prior to this, an inland county called Te-hua had been formed upstream on the Ta-chang River, a tributary of the Min River. This is a mountainous area to the north

Appendix C of Ch'iian-chou prefecture. In 933, the Min court decided to carve this new county out of the territory ofYung-t'ai county in Fu-chou prefecture. How­ ever, ten years later, the county came under the control of the independent warlord Liu Ts'ung-hsiao of Ch'iian-chou. From that time on, it was at­ tached to Ch'iian-chou prefecture and became part of South Fukien. This development may reflect the difficulties of navigation along the lower reaches of the Ta-chang River.3 Shortly before the fall of the Min kingdom, another inland county named Yung-ch'un was established in a hilly northern section of Ch'iian-chou pre­ fecture. Although situated away from the coast; the capital of Yung-ch'un was connected by a navigable waterway to the lower reaches of the Chin River and thus was able to interact with the prefectural capital without great difficulty.4 Two other counties were established under Ch'iian-chou prefecture during this period. One was Ch'ing-ch'i in 955, which was renamed An-ch'i in II21.5 Its capital had originally been a small market-town situated on a tributary of the Chin River and was connected by a navigable waterway with the prefectural capital. At the time it was set up, it was home to about 2,000 garrison soldiers and some 2,000 households. The place seems to have been of both military and economic importance.6 The other new county was Hui­ an, split off from the northern part of Chin-chiang county in 981 and located on the coast between the prefectural cities of Ch'iian-chou and Hsing-hua­ chiin. Not far from the eastern bank of the Chiu-lung River, a county called Ch'ang-t'ai was established under Chang-chou prefecture by Liu Ts'ung­ hsiao Jn 955. Since its capital was probably too close to the city of Chang­ chou prefecture, it was put under the jurisdiction of Chang-chou prefecture shortly after the region came under the direct rule of the Sung government in 978. /

Reference Matter

Notes

For complete author names, titles, and publication data for the works cited here in short form, See the Bibliography, pp. 385-433. For the abbreviations used here, see pp. xix-xx.

Introduction l. By "maritime China," I refer to the areas mainly but not exclusively along the coast that to varying degrees had an economy with an important maritime commercial sector at different points in history. This concept of "maritime China" contrasts with the view of China as a monolithic, homogeneous, land­ based, agrarian society. For a recent, comprehensive discussion of maritime ac­ tivities in Chinese history that provides evidence against the thalassophobic and xenophobic image of traditional China, see G. Deng, Chinese Maritime Activities and Socioeconomic Development. 2. Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese Past. For a recent discussion of the Sung-Yuan economic revolution in relation to the broader context of the premodern Chi­ nese economy, see G. Deng, The Premodern Chinese Economy, pp. 301-24. 3· Hao, "Chung-kuo san ta shang-yeh-ke-ming yii hai-yang." Hao considers the commercial booms during the Warring States period and the reform era of the People's Republic since 1979 as the other two commercial revolutions in Chinese history. 4. Ting Ho-sheng and Cheng Chen-man, Fu-chien tsung-chiao pei-ming hui­ pien, p. 17. 5. Skinner's conceptual framework is best elaborated in three works: "Mar­ keting and Social Structure in Rural China"; City in Late Imperial China; "Presi­ dential Address: The Structure of Chinese History."

312

Notes to Pages 4-13

6. Coase's most basic contributions are collected in The Firm, the Market and the Law. For recent important works on transaction-cost economics, see Wil­ liamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism; and the works collected in William­ son and Masten, Transaction Costs Economics. 7. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Peiformance; and idem, "Economic Performance Through Time." 8. So Kee-long, "Economic Developments in South Fukien, 946-1276"; Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks. 9. Kuwahara, Ho ]uko no jiseki. 10. Li Tung-hua, Ch'uan-chou yu wo-kuo chung-ku te hai-shang chiao-t'ung. n. D'Ancona, The City of Light. 12. For the controversy, see Chuang Wei-chi, "Wen-lai-kuo Ch'iian-chou Sung-mu k'ao-shih"; Lin Shao-ch'uan, "Po-ni yu Sung Ch'iian-chou p'an-yiian P'u-kung chih mu hsin-k'ao"; Ch'en Tieh-fan and Fu Wu-k'ang (Wolfgang Franke), "Hsi-shan tsa-chih chieh-wen chih-i"; and Kung Yen-ming, "Wen-lai­ kuo Sung-mu p'an-yiian P'u kung so-chieh." 13· I have no objection to the use of genealogies for Sung and Yuan history. They are certainly important sources of data. But I would rather be more cau­ tious. For instance, I use only a few genealogies in this study. All of them pro­ vide information that can at least partially or indirectly be verified by other source materials, such as local gazetteers.

Chapter r l. Yen Keng-wang, "Ts'ung Nan-pei-ch'ao ti-fang cheng-chih chih chi-pi lun Sui chih chih-fu." 2. Wei Cheng, Sui shu, 31: 879. Tan Ch'i-hsiang, Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t'u-chi, 5:

21-22. 3. The Chiu T'ang shu (CTS 40: 1598) says that Ch'iian-chou was established in Min county around 627. This is contradicted by Li Chi-fu's Yuan-ho chun­ hsien t'u-chih (YHCHTC 29: 715), which claims that this took place in 623. Since

CTS was completed much later than YHCHTC and contains many errors, and since a prefecture called Chien-chou was established in the Chien-an county of upper Fukien (near modern Chien-ou) in 621, it is more likely that a prefecture would have been set up at an equally important spot in the Min River delta at about the same time. 4. CTS, 40: 1598. 5. So, T'ang-Sungfa-chih-shih yen-chiu, pp. 39-96. 6. In YHCHTC 29: 715, it is dated in 625. But both Ch'iian-chou and Chien­ chou were under the Yiieh-chou governor-general from 635 until at least 658

313

Notes to Pages 13-15

(see Yen Keng-wang, T'ang-shih yen-chiu ts'ung-kao, p. 258). It is possible that the governor-generalship was abolished after 625 and not re-established until 7II. 7. CTS 40: 1600. 8. Ibid., 1600-601. 9. YHCHTC 29: 722. 10. Hans Bielenstein, "The Chinese Colonization ofFukien Until the End of T'ang,'' pp. 109-II. II. CTS 19B: 702. 12. Ibid., 40: 1599· 13. Ibid.; also YHCHTC 29: 722. 14. The figures in the Chiu T'ang shu and the Hsin T'ang shu (HTS) are not re­ liable in general. Although those from the T'ung-tien are also flawed due to the practice of including other enumerations to fill in certain gaps of information, they came from a census and are therefore more reliable. See Bielenstein, "Chi­ nese Historical Demography A.D. 2-1982," pp. 31-39. Also, Weng Chiin-hsiung (T'ang-ch'ao ting-sheng shih-ch'i cheng-ch'a ya jen-k'ou, pp. 1-29) argues that the HTS figures were copied from the CTS, which preserves two sets of incomplete na­ tional figures for 639 and 753. For further discussion of the T'ung-tien figures, see Weng, "T'ung-tien chou-chiin-men so tsai T'ang chou chou-hsien chien-chih yii hu-k'ou shu-tzu hsi-nien k'ao" and Liu Hai-feng, "Liang T'ang shu ti-li-chih huk'ou tzu-liao chi-nien." 15. E.g., Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 20. 16. For the serious underreporting and other problems with the YHCHTC figures, see Yen Keng-wang, "Yuan-ho chih hu-chi yii shih-chi hu-shu chih pik'an." 17. There is disagreement on the dating of these figures among scholars. For instance, Hans Bielenstein ("Chinese Historical Demography," p. 28) holds that it represents the enumeration of 714, and Edwin Pulleyblank ("Registration of Population in China in the Sui and T'ang Periods," pp. 297-98) attributes it to 726. Notwithstanding, both notions would support the argument here. 18. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 204n5. 19. There is again disagreement on the dating. Both Bielenstein ("Chinese Historical Demography,'' pp. 39-44) and Weng Chiin-hsiung (''T'ung-tien chou­ chiin-men," p. 186) believe that it is 765 and 741, respectively, whereas Pulleyblank ("Registration of Population," pp. _292-93) puts it at 754-55. Bielenstein's and Weng's notions are based on the fact that some identifiable enumerations be­ longed to 741 and 765. However, these are rare cases. For our discussion, the years 754-55 may be more reliable because they represent the dates for most figures in T'ung-tien, and to date no evidence shows that the figures for Fukien differ. ·

314

Notes to Pages 15-16

20. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 21; Li Tung-hua, Ch'uan-chou yu hai-shang chiao-t'ung, pp. 37-38. 21. Clark (Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 21-24) has done a painstaking job of working out the rural distribution of South Fukien's population under the T'ang. Borrowing from Robert Hartwell's work, he assumes that each hsiang (township) in the T'ang rural administration regularly consisted of 500 house­ holds. Accordingly, Clark believes that there were 18,ooo households in the 36 townships of Ch'iian-chou organized into four districts. He attributes the bal­ ance of 6,ooo households to the urban population. Thus he sees the urban population as constituting a remarkable 25 percent of the total population in Ch'iian-chou. The problem for Clark is that Hartwell's notion is a statistical av­ erage rather than an empirical fact. It may conflict with the reality when applied to a specific locality. For example, the YHCHTC provides the numbers of town­ ships and household figures. In the case ofFu-chou, for 713-41 there were 31,000 households and 66 townships. On the basis of Hartwell's figures, 66 townships would imply 33,000 households. The figures for 806-20 are even further off. At 500 households per township, there would have been over 40,000 households in the 81 townships, but the registry shows only 19,000-odd households. The method of determining population distribution according to the township numbers is hence not employed here. 22. HTS 41: 1065. See also Kitayama, "To So jidai ni okeru Fukkensho no kaihatsu ni kansuru ichi kosatsu," pp. 94-96. 23. Li Tung-hua, Ch'uan-chou yu hai-shang chiao-t'ung, p. 37; Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 28-30. 24. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 28-29. 25. Kitayama, "Fukkensho no kaihatsu," pp. 99-100. 26. Cheng Te-k'un, 'The Excavation of T'ang Dynasty Tombs at Ch'iian­ chou, South Fukien," esp. pp. 4-9; Chuang Wei-chi, Ku Ch'uan-chou-kang pp. 103-4. 27. This Chinese character mien meaning "floss silk" has sometimes been confused with the character mien meaning "cotton." Under the T'ang t'iao tax system, all peasants possessing allocated lands were obliged to submit a certain quantity of textile products and a certain amount of raw textile fibers annually. The latter included mien (floss silk), which was collected throughout the coun­ try. At that time, cotton was a newly imported species and was being planted only in peripheral areas on the southern and western borders (see Amano Mo­ tonosuke, Chugoku niigyiishi kenkya, pp. 483-98; Yen Chung-p'ing, Chung-kuo mienfang-chih shih-kao, pp. 2-3; and Chao Kang, The Development of Cotton Textile

Notes to Pages 16-18

315

Production in China, pp. 4-16). On the confusion of cotton and floss silk, see also Schafer, The Golden Peaches ofSamarkand, pp. 204-6. 28. YHCHTC 29: 802; HTS 41: 1065; Yen Keng-wang, T'ang-shih yen-chiu, pp. 646-52. 29. HTS 41: 1065. 30. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 3I; see also p. 207n39 for his ex­

planation. 3I. TPHYC 102: 3b. The text termed it as sheng-chiao, literally "raw banana." This makes more sense if we understand it as coarse banana cloth. 32. YFCYC 9: 402. 33. Yen Keng-wang, T'ang-shih yen-chiu, pp. 647-52. Ta T'ang liu-tien, 20: 7b-8a. 34. See also Ch'en Yen-te, "T'ang-tai Fu-chien te ching-chi k'ai-fa." Ch'en's account of economic development in Fukien under the T'ang as a whole is ac­ ceptable in general, but he appears to overestimate the degree of growth and commercialization in South Fukien at this stage. 35. For T'ang overseas trade, see Schafer, Samarkand, chap. 1; Fang Hao, Chung-hsi chiao-t'ung-shih, vol. 2; and Wang Gungwu, "The Nanhai Trade." 36. There is more than one European-language translation of the original Arabic text. But the most commonly used version, at least in relation to the pas­ sage in question here, is a French version by Barbier de Meynard ("Le livre des routes et des provinces," esp. pp. 292-93). For convenience, I use the passage as translated by de Meynard. There is also a Chinese translation of the French ver­ sion; see Chang Hsing-lang, Chung-hsi chiao-t'ung shih-liao hui-pien, 3: I44-47· For the background and importance of Ibn Khordadbeh's work, see Elliot and Dowson, The History of India as Told by Its Own Historians, 1: 13-14; and Tibbetts, A Study of the Arabic Texts Containing Material on South-east Asia, pp. 4-7. 37. Yule and Cordier, Cathay and the Way Thither, I.I: I35-36. Note that in Yule's translation "el-Wakin" and "Djanfou" were transliterated as "Al-Wakin" and 'Janfu," respectively; he mistakenly identified the latter as Yang-chou. I have replaced these two with the transliterations used by de Meynard. 38. Kuwabara, "Ibun==Korudadobe ni mietaru Shina no boekiko koto ni Janfu to Kantsu ni tsuite"; Chang Hsing-lang, "Chung-shih-chi Ch'iian-chou chuang-k'uang." For recent scholarship on this topic, see Clark, "Consolidation on the South China Frontier," pp. 58-65; and Li Tung-hua, Ch'iian-chou hai­ shang chiao-t'ung, chap. I. 39. Recently, other scholars have indicated doubts about Kuwabara's view. See Han Chen-hua, "I-pen Ho-ta-pa-shih so-chih T'ang-tai ti-san mao-yi-kang chih Djanfou"; Shen Fu-wei, "Lun T'ang-tai tui-wai mao-i te ssu-ta hai-kang''; and Liao Ta-k'o, "T'ang-tai Fu-chou te tui-wai chiao-t'ung ho mao-i." Other

316

Notes to Pages IB-22

contemporary Arabic accounts usually suggested only three centers of maritime trade, i.e., Kuang-chou, Chiao-chou, and Yang-chou. And, more important, all these can be verified by T'ang sources. For instance, see the travel account on India and China written by the Arab merchant Sulaiman in 851, entitled Akhbiir al-Sin wa'l-Hind (Tibbetts, A Study of the Arabic Texts, pp. 5-6). In this work there was no mention ofkey seaports other than Khanfu (Kuang-chou). 40. Original text in Tung Kao, Ch'iian T'ang wen, 75: 2b-3a. The translation is based on Kuwabara's translation in "On P'u Shou-keng," p. 13. 41. So, T'ang-Sung shih-tai Min-nan Ch'iian-chou shih-ti lun-kao, pp. 41-42. 42. Yang Shu-fan, T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih, pp. 264-73; Han Chen-hua, "I-pen Ho-ta-pa-shih," p. 46. 43. Tung Kao, Ch'iian T'ang wen, 417: 2b. It recorded a memorial in which the author applied the title "prefect ofFu-chien" in place of"prefect ofFu-chou" in a context concerning his appointment to the position of Fu-chien kuan-ch'a-shih. See another similar usage of the term Fu-chien in Ch'en Kuo-ts'an and Liu Chien-ming, Ch'iian T'ang wen chih-kuan ts'ung-k'ao, pp. 246-47. 44. So, Min-nan Ch'iian-chou, pp. 68-79. 45. Ch'en Ta-sheng, "Ch'iian-chou Ch'ing-ching-ssu te li-shih wen-t'i," pp. 102-14; Ch'en Ta-sheng, "Ch'iian-chou Ling-shan sheng-mu nien-tai chii-t'an"; Ch'en Ta-sheng, Ch'iian-chou I-ssu-lan-chiao shih-k'e, pp. 8-10. 46. For detailed arguments against such a claim, see So, Min-nan Ch'iian-chou, pp. 62-94. 47. Yang Shu-fan, T'ang-tai cheng-chih shih, pp. 209-38. 48. CTS 39: 1539; TPHYC 141: 2a/b. 49. Yen Keng-wang, Chung-kuo tijang hsing-cheng chih-tu shih, 3: 70-72. 50. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 32-36. Other evidence pro­ vided by Clark pertaining to South Seas trade was either mentioned by Kuwa­ bara or referred to Fu-chou instead of Ch'iian-chou. For Li Tung-hua's brief mention of this material, see his Ch'iian-chou yii hai-shang chiao:lung, p. 46. 51. WuJen-ch'en, Shih-kuo ch'un-ch'iu, 58: Ia. 52. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 34 and 208nn56, 57. He cited Wu-kuo ku-shih, Hsin T'ang shu, and Ou-yang Hsiu's Hsin Wu-tai shih as exam­ ples. 53. HWTS 65: 809 54. There are many examples of such usage; see, e.g., CTS 177: 4591. 55. Wu-kuo ku-shi, 2: 1b, states that Liu migrated to and settled in P'an-yii. CWTS (135: 1807) uses the name Ling-piao; HTS (190: 5493) makes no mention of Liu An-jen at all.

Notes to Pages 22-25

317

56. The earliest account of it is from the 1221 work of Wang Hsiang-chih,

Yu-ti chi-sheng (YTCS 130: Sa). It quotes a Ch'iian-chou gazetteer compiled dur­ ing the Chia-ting reign (1208-24) that an ancient local grave called King Liu's Grave was that of Liu An-jen, who migrated to Fukien, became a trader in Ch'iian-nan (Ch'iian-chou), and subsequently settled in the place. This account contradicts all other Five Dynasties and early Sung accounts, which, without ex­ ception, claimed instead that Liu settled in Kuang-chou. I hold that the YTCS account cannot override the reliability of all earlier sources. What it provided us is no more than a local legend about the Five Dynasties that gained some popu­ larity in South Fukien at the turn of the twelfth century. 57. See Kawahara Masahiro, Kan minzoku kanan hattenshi kenkya, pp. 239-42. 58. For instance, Wang T'ien-liang and Cheng Pao-heng, "Li-shih shang te Ch'iian-chou-kang," p. 75; Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 32-33. 59. YTSC 130: ua. For a different translation, see Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 32-33. 60. So, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, pp. 48-49. 61. Liao Ta-k'o, "T'ang-tai Fu-chou," pp. 38-39. 62. For full documentation and discussion of other minor points, see So, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, pp. 36-94. 63. For a narrative account of political developments in Fukien under the Min kingdom, see Schafer, The Empire of Min, pp. 31-62; and Hsii Hsiao-wang, Min-kuo shih, pp. l-164. 64. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 40-43. See also Hino Kaisa­ buro, Hino Kaisaburo Toyoshigaku ronshu, 10: 270-72. Hino notes that there was a tendency in Ch'iian-chou during the Five Dynasties to ignore the authority of the Min court by submitting directly to the much stronger but more remote Northern dynasties in Central China. He mentions Wang Yen-pin as one of the examples, but only to demonstrate the existence of such an ambition. Hino does not use Wang's case as evidence of autonomy. He illustrates his observa­ tion of a politically autonomous Ch'iian-chou with the cases of Liu Ts'ung-hsiao and Ch'en Hung-chin. 65. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 41. 66. Ibid., p. 42. 67. See my review of Clark's book in Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 37, no. l (1994): 83-84. 68. Schafer, The Empire of Min, pp. 75-78; Hibino Takeo, "To-So jidai ni okeru Fukken no kaihatsu," p. 23; Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 65. 69. Wu-kuo ku-shih, 12: 10a. This is my own translation. See also Clark, Com­ munity, Trade, and Networks, p. 65.

318

Notes to Pages 25-28

70. This legend was cited also in some later sources; e.g., WuJen-ch'en, Shih­ kuo ch'un-ch'iu, 94: 7b-8b, which contains a preface dated 1669. 71. For a brief note on Wu-kuo ku-shih, see Hervouet, A Sung Bibliography, pp. n4-15. There are numerous errors in this source. The most obvious one about Wang Yen-pin concerns his birth. A white bird, it is said, started to dwell at a hall of the K'ai-yiian temple when he was born and remained there until his death 30 years later. According to CCFC, 1763 ed., 26: 4b-5a, Wang Yen-pin's first term as prefect of Ch'iian-chou began in 904, and his last term of the same office lasted until 930. Apparently, the tale of the white bird is an unrealistic leg­ end, but it is followed immediately by the passage in question here. Before other references are discovered to support the reliability of this source, it is hard to ac­ cept it as a sole piece of evidence. 72. SS 483: 13957-65. 73. For the overseas trade in Fu-chou under the Min Kingdom, see HTS 68: 846; Tung Kao, Ch'iian T'ang wen, 841: 8a-12a. Hibino, "Fukken no kaihatsu," pp. 22-23; Schafer, The Empire of Min, p. 78; Hino Kaisaburo, "Godai Binkoku no tai chugen choke to boeki," 10: 208; and Han Chen-hua, "Wu-tai Fu-chien tui-wai mao-i." 74. Fu-chien-sheng po-wu-kuan and Fu-chou-shih wen-kuan-hui, "T'ang­ mo Wu-tai Min wang Wang Shen-chih fu-fu mu ch'ing-li chien-pao." 75. Wang Gungwu, "The Nanhai Trade," p. 88.

Chapter 2 l. For a general discussion of the effects of agricultural development on commercial growth in Europe on the eve of the commercial revolution in Italy, see Lopez, The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, pp. 56-60. Lopez holds that it was the agricultural breakthrough that, together with other human and cultural factors, made the reorientation toward commerce possible. He argues, however, that even though there may have been agricultural surpluses in Chi­ nese history, they never propelled a commercial expansion. Although Lopez's understanding of a static agrarian Chinese past is outdated, his observation of the relationship between commerce and agriculture, which underlies the theme of this paper, is not. 2. TPHYC, 102: l2a. 3. Amano, Nogyoshi, pp. 189-90. 4. Ibid., p. 191. 5. Ibid., PP· 191-92. 6. Was tsai-shou-tao simply another name for the early-ripening rice from Champa to be discussed below? Clark (Community, Trade, and Networks,

Notes to Page 28

319

p. 154) argues that it is, based on the fact that both yield two harvests a year. Further, he infers that Champa rice was introduced to China through Ch'iian­ chou during the Five Dynasties period, for Ch'iian-chou was the only place where tsai-shou-tao was listed as a local product in the National Geography of 980. This argument is questionable. Since the cultivation of this strain elsewhere in China can be dated to the Western Chin, and since it remained a rare strain in the Southern Sung, it was certainly not identical to Champa rice. It was unique in that it yielded two harvests a year with a single planting. 7. My discussion is based on the substantial literature that explores the im­ plications of this event. See, e.g., Kato Shigeshi, "Shina ni okeru Champa ine saibai no hattatsu ni tsuite," in his Shina keizaishi kosho, 2: 659-75; Ho Ping-ti, "Early-Ripening Rice in Chinese History"; Amano, Nogyoshi, pp. 2u-20. For a general discussion on the varieties of rice grown in this period, see Sudo Yoshi­ yuki, "Nan-So ni okeru ine no shurui to hinshu no chiikisei," in his Sodai keizai­ shi kenkya, pp. 141-205; and Bray, Science and Civilisation in China, 6.2: 489-95. 8. Ho, "Early-Ripening Rice," p. 207. 9. See Amano, Nogyoshi, p. 201. In all, 30,000 bushels (tan) of Champa rice were taken from Fukien for dissemination to these drought-stricken circuits. At the same time, detailed instructions for its cultivation were distributed (Ho, "Early-Ripening Rice," p. 207). This shows that Fukien farmers already had considerable experience with this variety. 10. Ho, "Early-Ripening Rice," p. 201. u. SSC, 41: 8082. Amano, Nogyoshi, p. 107. The earliest gazetteer cited is enti­ tled Min-ch'ing t'u-ching. In the citation, it refers to the two categories of rice as han, "drought-resistant," and wan, "late-ripening." It does not seem to be consis­ tent in its classification. It is most likely that han is a mistake for tsao, "early." Min-ch'ing was at this time a county in Fu-chou prefecture to the north of the prefectural capital. No information on this particular Min-ch'ing t'u-ching can be traced in extant sources (see Chang Kuo-kan, Chung-kuo ku fang-chih k'ao, p. 415). It apparently was not part of the Fu-chou t'u-ching compiled during the Shao-hsi reign period (u90-94), since the San-shan chih was compiled in u82. However, from 1010, there had been a practice of compiling local gazetteers by the local governments. Min-ch'ing t'u-ching was one of these locally compiled works and must have been compiled no later than the mid-twelfth century; it probably dates from the previous century (see Aoyama Sadao, To So jidai no kotsa to chishi chizu no kenkya, pp. 480-85). 12. Chuang Wei-chi, Chin-chiang hsin-chih, p. 29; Ch'en Cheng-hsiang, Chung­ kuo ti-li t'u-chi, pp. 67-68; Taiwan sotokufu nettai sangyo chosakai, Minami-Shina no shigen to keizai, p. 55.

320

Notes to Pages 28-30

��. Sung Hsi, "Pei-Sung tao-mi te ch'an-ti fen-pu," p. rn9. 14. Since rain in,this region results from the arrival of a monsoon from the ocean, the timing of the monsoon has been another important factor affecting the local climate. If it comes late, as has not infrequently happened in history, there is drought (see Chuang Wei-chi, Chin-chiang hsin-chih, p. 30; Wang Shih­ mou, Min pu shu, 6b) . 15. The imperial initiative to disseminate this variety to other parts of China also reveals the contemporary attention to its drought-resistant nature rather than its early-ripening character. Bray (Science and Civilisation in China, 6.2: 49495) notes two major advantages of the Champa rice: its drought-resistant and fast-maturing qualities. See also Hung Chao and Cheng Hsiieh-meng, "Sung­ tai Fu-chien yen-hai ti-ch'ii nung-yeh ching-chi fa-chan," pp. 43-44. 16. Sudo Yoshiyuki, "Nan-So inasaku no chiikisei," in his Sodai keizaishi ken­ kyu, p. 124; Bray, Science and Civilisation in China, 6.2: 493; Wang Tseng-yii, "Sung-ch'ao Fu-chien-lu ching-chi wen-hua te fa-chan," p. 155· 17. For the effect of Champa rice on the double-cropping system and other subsidiary crops that played a significant role in Chinese agricultural history, see Ho, "Early-Ripening Rice," p. 2rn. 18. For details of farming techniques in this period, see Sudo, "Nan-So ina­ saku," pp. 75-138; and Amano, Nogyoshi, pp. 687-918. For a brief analysis of the implications of some key techniques, see Elvin, Pattern, pp. n8-21. 19. Amano, Nogyoshi, pp. 767-72; Bray, Science and Civilisation in China, 6.2: 180-86. 20. For improvements in the maneuverability of plows, see Ko Chin-fang, Sung Liao Hsia Chin ching-chi yen-hsi, pp. 56-59, and esp. p. 62. 21. Hung and Cheng, "Fu-chien yen-hai nung-yeh ching-chi," pp. 36-37. 22. Ho, "Early-Ripening Rice," p. 207. 23. Sudo, "Nan-So inasaku," pp. 81-84. 24. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 218-26. For the compilation of this gazetteer, see Maejima, "The Muslims in Ch'iian-chou at the End of the Yuan Dynasty," pp. 40-42. 25. Hung and Cheng, "Fu-chien yen-hai nung-yeh ching-chi," p. 37. 26. Ch'i Hsia, Sung-tai ching-chi-shih, l: 97 27. For discussion on water-raising machines in general in Chinese history, see Needham, Science and Civilization in China, 4.2: 339-52. On the square-pallet chain-pump in Fukien in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries, see Ko Chin-fang, Ching-chi yen-hsi, pp. 59-62. 28. TPHYC, rn2: 3b. 29. YFCYC, 9: 402.

Notes to Pages 30-32

321

30. Ibid. 31. SHYCK, "Shih-huo," 64: 21b-22a. See also Sudo Yoshiyuki, 'Nan-So no karamushi seisan to sono ryiitsii katei," in his Sodai keizaishi kenkya, p. 342. 32. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 31. 33. Kato, "Shina ni okeru kansho oyobi sato no kigen ni tsuite," in his Shina keizaishi kosho, 2: 676-87. 34. Shiba Yoshinobu, Sodai shogyoshi kenkya, pp. 215-18. 35. Kato Shigeshi, "Shina ni okeru kansho," in his Shina keizaishi kosho, 2: 68182. The other three centers were Fu-chou, Chi-chou (in Chiang-hsi), and Kuang-chou. 36. In 980, of the four coastal Fukien prefectures, only Fu-chou produced sugar (TPHYC, 100: 3b; see also Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 215-18; and Aizawa Takuji, "Sodai kansho togyo no ichi kosatsu," pp. 64-82) . 37. Wang Cho, T'ang-shuang p'u, p. l; Kato, "Shina ni okeru kansho," in his Shina keizaishi kosho, 2: 682; Aizawa, "Kansho togyo," p. 65. 38. For the limitations of sugar production in Fukien around this time, see Hsii Hsiao-wang, "Fu-chien ku-tai te chih-t'ang-shu yii chih-t'ang-yeh." 39. Ts'ai Hsiang, Li-chih p'u, 2b-3a. There were many other comments on and in praise of Fu-chou and Hsing-hua-chiin lichees by people of this period (see Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 204-6, 210-1znnr-u) . However, the dates of these ac­ counts are highly pertinent to the present study. Only Tseng Kung was a con­ temporary ofTs'ai Hsiang; the others were figures oflater times. 40. Amano, Nogyoshi, pp. 482-84; Bray, Science and Civilisation in China, 6.2: 536-39; Ch'i, Sung-tai ching-chi-shih, 139-45. 41. Ch'i Hsia, "Sung-tai chih-mien k'ao." 42. Chao Kang, Man and Land in Chinese History, pp. 168-69. 43. For general discussions of the correlation between great landholdings and advancements in Sung agriculture, see Twitchett, Land Tenure and the Social Or­ der in T'ang and Sung China, pp. 27-32; and Golas, "Rural China in the Song," esp. pp. 309-10. 44. Chikusa Masaaki, "Sodai Fukken no shakai to jiin"; Huang Min-chih, Sung-taifo-chiao she-hui ching-chi shih lun-chi, pp. n9-64. 45. See, e.g., SS, 173: 4191-92. 46. Chikusa, "Shakai to jiin," pp. 6-7. 47. Yiian Hsien, K'ai-yiian-ssu chih, 4: 35a-38a. 48. Fang Shao, Po-chai pien, 2: 4b-5a. See also Chikusa, "Shakai to jiin," p. 7; Huang Min-chih, Sung-dai Jo-chiao she-hui ching-chi shih lun-chi, p. 127. Chikusa cites a document indicating that rich landlords in Ch'iian-chou usually had holdings ofless than ten ch'ing. He notes that this is taken from the Po-chai pien.

322

Notes to Pages 32-36

But in fact Fang's work does not have this passage. Instead, it comes from a late Ming miscellaneous work entitled Ch'iian-nan tsa-chih by Ch'en Mao-jen, 1: 5a. Since Ch'en was of a later time, and many social and economic changes had taken place in Fukien, I do not use Ch'en's account to justify a reconstruction of the picture of Sung Ch'uan-chou. 49. For agricultural commercialization in Sung Fukien, see also P'eng Yu­ liang, "Sung-tai Fu-chien shang-p'in ching-chi fa-chan te yuan-yin ho nung-yeh chung shang-p'in ching-chi te fa-chan." 50. In the case of South Fukien, the large landholdings of the monasteries could facilitate such a transfer of agricultural surplus to commercial capital through either long-established moneylending mechanisms of the monasteries or their direct participation in trade. On the participation of Buddhists in com­ mercial activities, see Huang Min-chih, Fo-chiao she-hui ching-chi shih, 217-28. For moneylending by Buddhist monasteries, see Yang Lien-sheng, "Buddhist Mon­ asteries and Four Money-Raising Institutions in Chinese History," pp. 198-215. 51. Hino, "Godai Binkoku no tai chugen choko to boeki," pp. 13-16; Hibino, "Fukken no kaihatsu," pp. 22-23. 52. Liu Ming-hui, Ch'ing-yiian Liu-shih tsu-p'u, pp. 48-49. 53. SS, 483: 13958. 54. Ch'en Meng-lei, ed., Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'eng, nos: 9936c-37a. I am in­ debted to Chu Wei-kan, Fu-chien shih-kao, l: 163. 55. Ch'en Meng-lei, Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'eng, 483: 13961; SHYCK, "Fan-i," 7: la-9a. 56. CP, 5: 3a-b. 57. TPHYC, 102: 3a, 6a. 58. HWTS, 67: 843. 59. Mori Katsumi, Nissii boeki no kenkya, pp. 536-38. 60. HWTS, 67: 843. 61. SS, 480: 13898. 62. Ibid., 13900-902. See also SHYCK, "Fan-i," 7: la-roa. 63. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: la. On identification of place-names, see Fujita Toyohachi, "Sodai no shihakushi oyobi shihaku jorei," p. 191. 64. On the identification of Ku-lo, Hirth suspects that it was on the western coast of the Malay peninsula (see Hirth and Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua, p. roonn; see also Chao Ju-kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, p. 26n7). 65. Chao Ju-kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, pp. 44-45. 66. Chang Hsing-lang, Chung-hsi chiao-t'ung shih-liao hui-pien, 6: 449-5rn1. 67. SS, 489: 14096-97. 68. Ibid.

Notes to Pages 36-38

323

69. Ibid., 490: 14103-6. 70. Wang Gungwu, "The Nanhai Trade," chap. 4; Kuwahara, Ho ]uko, pp. 4S-49, 77· 71. Chong Lin-ji, Koryosa. 72. Sung Hsi, "Sung-shang tsai Sung-Li mao-i chung te kung-hsien," pp. S6-96. 73. For Sung merchant activities in Koryo, see Mori Katsumi, "Nihon Koryo boeki raiko no So shonin"; Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 431-34; and Ch'en Kao-hua, "Pei-Sung shih-ch'i ch'ien-wang Kao-Ii mao-i te Ch'iian-chou po-shang." 74. Mori, Nissa boeki, pp. 542-50. 75. For the list of tributary states, see SHYCK, "Fan-i," 7: ra-3Sb; Lin T'ien­ wei, Sung-tai hsiang-yao mao-i shih, pp. r6S-200; and Hartwell, Tribute Missions to China. On identification of the place-names, see also Hirth and Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua, pt. r; Fujita, "Shihakushi oyobi shihaku jorei," p. 191; Chao Ju-kua, Chu­ Jan chih chiao-chu, pp. r-39; and Lin T'ien-wei, Hsiang-yao mao-i, pp. 161-67. 76. Fujita, "Shihakushi oyobi shihaku jorei," pp. 171-205; Shih Wen-chi, "Sung-tai shih-po-ssu chih she-chih yii chih-ch'iian," pp. 55-S4. 77. SS, rS6: 455S-60; SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: ra-Sa. 7S. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: rb. 79. Ibid., 2a. So. Ibid., 5b-6a. Sr. Arnaiz and Berchem, "Memoire sur les antiquites musulmannes de Ts'iuan-tcheou," pp. 704-5; Chang Hsing-lang, "Ch'iian-chou fang-ku chi," pp. S-9; Kuwahara, Ho ]uko, pp. 26-27. For recent discussion of this mosque, see Ch'en Ta-sheng, Ch'iian-chou I-ssu-lan-chiao shih-k'e, pp. S-10; "Ch'iian-chou Ch'ing-ching-ssu," pp. 102-14. S2. Fujita, "Shihakushi oyobi shihaku jorei," pp. r7S-Sr. A revealing example is from the biography of the renowned Ch'iian-chou scholar-official Su Chien who served in Kuang-chou in the early years of his career. The record states that many eminent foreign merchants (shang-ch'iu) in Kuang-chou were from pow­ erful local families (see Wang Ch'eng, Tung-tu shih-liieh, no: 7b). Ch'iu literally means "barbarian chie£" It would not be used to signify an eminent Chinese merchant. S3. Sung Hsi, "Sung-shang tsai Sung-Li mao-i chung de kung-hsien," pp. S696. S4. Yen Keng-wang, T'ang-shih yen-chiu, pp. 64S-5r, 655. The other center of silk textile industry wa.s in modern Szechwan. S5. Ching-te-chen t'ao-tz'u yen-chiu-so, Chung-kuo te t'ao-tz'u, pp. 7S-So, no12; Ch'en Wan-li, Chung-kuo ching-tz'u shih-liieh, pp. n-13, 15-22.

324

Notes to Pages 38-42

86. Feng Hsien-ming, "Hsin Chung-kuo t'ao-tz'u k'ao-ku te chu-yao shouhuo," pp. 33-34. 87. Ibid., pp. 39-40. 88. Ibid., p. 39. 89. Data are taken from a statistical distribution chart displayed at the Mu­ seum for Overseas Relations in Ch'iian-chou during my fieldtrip there in Octo­ ber 1980. These are no longer on display, and I am not aware of any updated figures in this regard. 90. CP, 137: 6a/b. gr. It is unrealistic to date this poem. Hsieh Lii was a native of Hui-an county, passed his chin-shih degree in ro57, then served many terms in Ch'iian­ chou as a local official during his official career. He died at the age of 79. A poem like this could have been composed almost at any point during his long life. The middle of the century is probably the best guess. 92. YTCS, 130: na-b. 93. See, e.g., Fu Tsung-wen, "Sung-tai Ch'iian-chou shih-po-ssu she-Ii wen­ t'i t'an-so," esp. p. 70; Li Tung-hua, Ch'iian-chou yu hai-shang chiao-t'ung, pp. 7374; Clark, "The Politics of Trade and the Establishment of the Quanzhou Trade Superintendency," esp. p. 380; and idem, "Muslims and Hindus in the Culture and Morphology of Quanzhou from the Tenth to the Thirteenth Century," p. 58. However, my interpretation of the passage and its origins is very different from those of these writers. 94. SS, 330: ro632. 95. Ch'ao Fu-chih, Chi-lei chi, 62: 7b. 96. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 65: 26b. The Sung Code defined this as a capital crime for an official-far more serious than as the negligence mentioned in the funerary essay (see SHT, rr: 176-84). 97. It was so decreed in 995 (SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 2b 3a). 98. Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 300-301. 99. SS, 185: 4523. roo. An iron mine called Ch'ing-yang was first restored in An-ch'i in 999. Four others were established in Yung-ch'un and Te-hua in ro46, ro63, ro74, and ro75 (SHYCK, "Shih-huo," 33: 4a). IOI. SS, 185: 4380. ro2. SSC, 41: 8083; Shiba, Shogyiishi, p. 301. ro3. There is evidence that Fukien merchants did transit exotic goods to the Shantung peninsula (see Umizawa Kuni, "Hoku-So matsu no shihaku boeki," p. ro9n25). -

Notes to Pages 42-46

325

104. On the early history of maritime trade down to the end of T'ang, see Wang Gungwu, "The Nan-hai Trade." 105. For the shih-po-shih system under the T'ang, see Fujita, "Shihakushi oyobi shihaku jorei," pp. 164-71; and Shih Wen-chi, "Sung-dai shih-po-ssu chih she­ chih yii chi-ch'iian," pp. 45-55. See also Wada Hisanori, "Todai ni okeru shiha­ kushi no sochi," pp. 1051-53; Lin Meng, "Kuan-yii T'ang Wu-tai shih-po chi­ kou wen-t'i te t'an-t'ao"; Wang Kuan-cho, "T'ang-tai shih-po-ssu chien-ti ch'u­ t'an"; and Fu Tsung-wen, "Chung-kuo ku-tai hai-kuan t'an-yiian." 106. Li Ch'ing-hsin ("Lun T'ang-tai Kuang-chou te tui-wai mao-i," p. 15) ar­ gues that it existed as early as in 661. 107. Tung Kao, Ch'iian T'ang wen, 75: 2b-3a. 108. Fujita, "Shihakushi oyobi shihaku jorei," pp. 165-67; Wada Hisanori, "Shihakushi," pp. 1057-58. 109. Shih Wen-chi, "Shih-po-ssu," pp. 52-53; Wada Hisanori, "Shihakushi," p. 1058. no. Wang Zhenping ("T'ang Administration of Maritime Trade," pp. 25-35) argues that it was the local officials who often controlled the maritime trade and thereby accumulated enormous personal wealth. m. Fujita, "Shihakushi oyobi shihaku jorei," p. 172. n2. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: la; see also Kusano Hiroko, "Hoku-So matsu no shihaku seido," p. 33. n3. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: la-b. n4. Ibid., 44: lb. The text states that it was a consequence of the establish­ ment of a special office called ch'iieh-i-yiian (bureau of monopoly business). For the exact date ofits establishment, see CP, 18: 8b-9a. n5. SS, 5: 76. Both Fujita ("Shihakushi oyobi shihaku jorei," p. 181) and Shih Wen-chi ("Shih-po-ssu," p. 59) admit that it represented a ban on overseas trade by Chinese merchants. n6. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 2b. n7. Shih Wen-chi, "Shih-po-ssu," p. 59· n8. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 2b. The text states: "From now on, merchants trading in overseas countries must report to the shih-po-ssu in the Liang-che cir­ cuit and request a permit for the voyage. Otherwise, their precious exotic goods will be confiscated." Here, "merchants" most likely refers to all Chinese mer­ chants. n9. Fujita, "Shihakushi oyobi shihaku jorei," p. 183. 120. Mori, Nissa boeki, pp. 540-41. 121. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 2a-3b.

Notes to Pages 46-53 122. Fujita, "Shihakushi oyobi shihaku jorei," pp. 215-46; Shih Wen-chi, "Shih-po-ssu," pp. 97-139; Ch'en Kao-hua and Wu T'ai, Sung-Yuan shih-ch'i te hai-wai mao-i, pp. 70-93. For a concise account of the functions of the shih-po-ssu, see also Shiba Yoshinobu, "Sung Foreign Trade: Its Scope and Organization," pp. 105-6. 123. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 5b-6a. A decree of 1074 ordered that ships ar­ riving at Fukien without a certificate were to be sent to a nearby shih-po-ssu for registration and customs clearance. 124. Ibid., 6a. 125. For the date of the enactment of this regulation, see Ch'en Kao-hua, "Kao-li mao-i," p. 53· 126. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 6b. See also Fujita, "Shihakushi oyobi shi­ haku jorei," pp. 210-n; Kusano, "Shihaku seido," pp. 34-37; and Liao Ta-k'o, "Pei-Sung Hsi-ning Yiian-feng nien-chien te shih-po chih-tu kai-hsi." 127. Ch'en Kao-hua, "Kao-li mao-i," p. 53. 128. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 9a. 129. Su Shih, Tung-p'o tsou-i, 13: 2a. 130. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: Sa. 131. Fu Tsung-wen, "Shih-po-ssu she-li wen-t'i," pp. 68-73. See also Clark, "Politics of Trade," pp. 385-86. 132. For instance, in 976, the penalty for trading privately with foreigners in goods exceeding a value of fifteen strings was to be branded on the face and ex­ iled to a remote island (SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: la-2b).

Chapter 3 Sung Hsi, "Sung-Li mao-i," pp. 91-96. 2. Su Shih, Tung-p'o tsou-i, 6: 5a-b. 3. Ibid., l2a-b. 4. Yeh Meng-te, Shih-lin tsou-i, 3: 5a-6b. 5. SS, 487: 14053. 6. Mori, Nisso boeki, pp. 322-34, 540-58. 7. Mori, Zoku Nisso boeki no kenkya, p. 548. 8. Mori, Nisso boeki, pp. 36-41. 9. Ibid., pp. 36-37. 10. SHYCK, "Fan-i," 4: 73a-74b. n. Ibid., 82a; 7: 5oa-b. 12. Chao Ju-kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, p. 49. 13. SS, 433: 12861. 14. SHYCK, "Fan-i," 4: 75a; FCTC, 1867, 90: l4b. I.

Notes to Pages 53-56

327

15. Lin Chih-ch'i, Cho-chai wen-chi, 15: l2a-b. Pai Shou-i (Chung-kuo I-ssu-lan­ shih kang-yao ts'an-k'ao tzu-liao, pp. 269-70) did notice this piece of evidence. But relying on the text of the Chujan chih, he asserted that Lin mistook Shih Chou­ wei as a Srivijayan instead of an Arab. Pai is actually using a secondary source to verify an original one, overlooking the fact that the Chujan chih was written a half-century later and was based on Lin's account. Thus, I cannot agree with Pai's assertion. Also noteworthy is that Pai overlooked other important differ­ ences between Lin's account and the information in the Chujan chih. Although he cites this important document of Lin's in his work, he does not seem to real­ ize its importance. I first discussed this in detail in my "Economic Develop­ ments," pp. 133-34. The passage was partially cited in Li Tung-hua, Ch'uan-chou hai-shang chiao-t'ung, p. 170. 16. Kuwabara, Ho ]uki5, pp. 141-43. 17. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 127-29, and n37· A fuller ar­ gument by Clark that Lin's account was less reliable than Chao's can be found in his "Muslims and Hindus," pp. 54-63. 18. Hirth and Rockhill, Chao Ju-kua, pp. 16-17. 19. Kuwabara, Ho Juki5, pp. 52-53. 20. Many scholars take "Ch'iian-nan" to refer to the southern suburb of the city of Ch'iian-chou. See, e.g., ibid. I have discussed this problem before and have established that Ch'iian-nan was another name for Ch'iian-chou (see So Kee-long, "Sung-tai Ch'iian-chou chi-ch'i nei-lu chiao-t'ung chih yen-chiu," pp. 86-92). But the references I had found at that time indicated this usage only in the Southern Sung. More recently I have noticed passages that allow us to trace the usage back not only to the Northern Sung in the eleventh century but also to the Min regime (see Chu Mu, Fang-yu sheng-lan, 12: 6a; CCFC, 1763, 29: 9a, 75A: 34a-b; and Lu Chen, Chiu-kuo chih, ro: lor). 21. Kuwabara, Ho]uki5, pp. 51-54; Fang Hao, Chung-hsi chiao-t'ung-shih, 2: 61-64. 22. Chu Mu, Fang-yu sheng-lan, 12: 5a. 23. Cheng Hsia, Hsi-t'ang chi, 7: roa-b. 24. Ibid., 8: 20b. 25. Ho Ch'iao-yiian, Min shu, 55: 1489. 26. Wada Hisanori, "Teman Ajia ni okeru shoki kakyo shakai," pp. 82-83. 27. SHYCK, "Fan-i," 7: 5oa-b, 4: 82a. 28. Wada Hisanori, "Shoki kakyo shakai," pp. 84-89. 29. Chou Ch'ii-fei, Ling-wai tai-ta, 2: l3a-b, 3: l2a. On the history of Srivijaya, see Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce; and Kuwata, "A Study of Srivijaya.'' For recent scholarship on the highly controversial history of this maritime empire, see my "Dissolving Hegemony or Changing Trade Pattern?"

Notes to Pages 56-58 30. Chou Ch'ii-fei, Ling-wai tai-ta, 2: l3a-b, 3: l2a. 31. Chang Hsiang-i, "Nan-So jidai no shihak.ushi boeki ni kansuru ichi ko­ satsu." 32. SHYCK, "Fan-i," 4: 75a-76b. 33. Kuwahara, Ho ]uko, pp. 82-83. 34. Chou Ch'ii-fei, Ling-wai tai-ta, 2: l5a. 35. Ibid., 3: l2a. 36. SS, 490: l4u8-21. 37. Kuwahara, Ho ]uko, pp. 53-56, 67, 104. 38. There has long been a controversy over the date of foundation of the mosque, which still exists in the city of Ch'iian-chou. According to an Arabic in­ scription carved on the wall behind the main gate, it was built in 1009. Another Chinese inscription of 1350, preserved on a tablet inside the mosque, notes the foundation date as u31 (see Wu Wen-liang, Ch'iian-chou tsung-chiao shih-k'e, pp. 21-25). However, a recent article has revealed that the Chinese inscription was in fact completely rewritten in 1507. More important, it proves that the mosque built in u31 was located in the southern part of the city and was not the same as the one that exists today (see Ch'en Ta-sheng and Chuang Wei-chi, "Ch'iian­ chou I-ssu-lan-chiao ssu-chih te hsin yen-chiu.") 39. SHYCK, "Fan-i," 4: 94a. 40. Kuwahara, Ho ]uko, pp. 129-30, 132-34. On Muslim merchants in elev­ enth-century Champa, see also Schafer, Vermilion Bird, pp. 76-78. 41. Although Chou Ch'ii-fei (Ling-wai tai-ta, 3: l2a) mentions that Java pro­ duced more luxury goods than Srivijaya, this does not suggest a more frequent direct trade between South Fukien and Java. 42. Chou Pi-ta, Chou Wen-chung-kung ch'iian-chi, 67: 5b. 43. Chao Yen-wei, Yiin-lu man-ch'ao, 5: l9b-2oa. 44. Recent archaeological scholarship on the pre-Hispanic Philippine politi­ cal economy shows that although the archipelago had imported Chinese ceram­ ics during the Sung-Yuan era, it is the late-Ming period that witnessed a tenfold increase in the inflow of Chinese wares (Junker, 'Trade Competition, Conflict, and Political Transformations in Sixth- to Sixteenth-Century Philippine Chief­ doms," pp. 241-43). 45. Chao Yen-wei, Yiin-lu man-ch'ao, 5: 2oa. 46. Credes, The Indianized States ofSoutheast Asia, chaps. 9-u. For an insight­ ful bibliographical survey on scholarship on ancient Southeast Asian history, see Reynolds, "A New Look at Old Southeast Asia." 47. See also Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese, p. 203.

Notes to Pages 59-62

329

4S. Chaffee, "The Impact of the Song Imperial Clan on the Overseas Trade of Quanzhou." 49. Kinugawa Tsuyoshi, Sung-tai wen-kuan Jeng-chi chih-tu, pp. 36-3S; Ho Chung-li, "Sung-tai kuan-li te feng-lu." 50. For the bureaucracy in prefectural and county levels, see SS, 167: 3972-S3. 51. Hirth and Rockhill, Chao ]u-kua, pp. 175-90; Chao Ju-kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, pp. 145-51; Kuwahara, Ho ]uko, pp. 134-36; Liu Ming-shu, "Sung-tai hai-shang chiao-t'ung-shih tsa-k'ao," pp. 1750-53. For a general account of Hainan under the T'ang and Sung, see Schafer, Shore ofPearls. 52. Chou Ch'ii-fei, Ling-wai tai-ta, 2: 9a. 53. SS, lS6: 4544. Schafer (Shore ofPearls, p. S3) mentions this, but he does not note the change in the taxation method in 10S3. Under the Sung, the principal commercial tax was kuo-shui (passage duties) levied on the basis of the value of commodities. Supplementing this was li-sheng-shui (capacity duties) levied ac­ cording to the carrying capacity of the ship. The commercial tax introduced in Hainan before 10S3 differed from the above two duties. However, after 10S3 the island had a tax system that conformed to the mainland pattern (see Shiba, Sho­ gyoshi, pp. 500-522). 54. Chou Ch'ii-fei, Ling-wai tai-ta, 2: Sa; Li Hsin-ch'uan, Chien-yen i-lai hsi-nien yao-lu, lS7: l2b-13a. 55. Chou Ch'ii-fei, Ling-wai tai-ta, 2: Sa. 56. Fan Ch'eng-ta, Kuei-hai yu-heng chih, 50: na-b. See also Schafer, Shore of Pearls, pp. 79-So. 57. Chou Ch'ii-fei, Ling-wai tai-ta, 2: Sb-9a. 5S. Mori, Nissa boeki, p. 40. 59. There is a substantial literature on this subject. See, e.g., Ch'iian Hansheng, "Nan-Sung Hang-chou te hsiao-fei yii wai-ti shang-p'in chih shu-ju." 60. See, e.g., ibid., pp. 320-22. 61. Hung Mai, I-chien chih, "Ting chih," 6: 5SS-S9. 62. Ch'iian Han-sheng, "Sung-tai Kuang-chou te kuo-nei-wai mao-i." 63. Shiba, Shogyoshi, p. 433. This biography is preserved in Ch'in Kuan, Huaihai chi, 33: 2a. 64. Liu K' e-chuang, Hou-ts'un hsien-sheng ta ch'uan-chi, 12: 10a. 65. Shih Wen-chi, "Shih-po-ssu," p. 71. 66. CP, 341: 4b-5b, 409: 5a-6a. 67. In n62, three former county sheriffs and one former chief of the coast­ guard, who had previously served in Ch'iian-chou prefecture, were demoted one rank. The reason was tl).at they had connived with native merchants to trade in

330

Notes to Pages 62-66

Shantung, a territory occupied by the Chin at that time (see Chou Pi-ta, Chou Wen-chung-kung ch'uan-chi, 94: 19a-b ). 68. SHYCK, "Shih-huo," 50: na. 69. Ibid., 41: 43b. 70. Ming Ho, Pu-hsu Kao-seng chuan, 134, 23: 171a. 71. Huang Huai and Yang Shih-ch'i, eds., Li-tai ming-ch'en tsou-i, 349: 14b. For the dating of this memorial, see Lin Kuang-chao, Ai-hsuan chi, ro: 7b-8a. 72. Wheatley, "Geographical Notes," pp. 31-40. 73. Wang T'ing-k'uei, "Liang-Sung shih-po mao-i ch'u-k'ou-shui ch'u-t'an." 74. Wheatley, "Geographical Notes," pp. 5-139; Lin T'ien-wei, Hsiang-yao mao-i, pp. 325-45. 75. On prices of aromatics under the Sung, see Lin T'ien-wei, Hsiang-yao mao-i, pp. 356-60. 76. Wheatley, "Geographical Notes," pp. 31-32. 77. On the contents ofthis category, see ibid., 38-39. 78. Mori, Nisso boeki, pp. 270-71. 79. CP, 343: 6a. Bo. Wheatley, "Geographical Notes," p. 36. 81. Kato Shigeshi, To Sojidai ni okeru kin gin no kenkya, 2: 546-47. 82. On exports of copperwares, see Ch'iian Han-sheng, "Sung-tai Kuangchou," pp. no-n. 83. Ibid., pp. n2-27; Kuwahara, Ho ]uko, pp. 32-34. 84. Ch'iian Han-sheng, "Sung-tai Kuang-chou," p. 123. 85. Wheatley, "Geographical Notes," p. 39. 86. Mori, Nissa boeki, pp. 267-68. 87. Chao Yen-wei, Yun-lu man-ch'ao, 5: 2oa, states that cotton cloth was the major item of trade with the tribes in the Philippine archipelago. 88. Wheatley, "Geographical Notes," pp. 35-36. 89. Chao Yen-wei, Yun-lu man-ch'ao, 5: 2oa. 90. Chao Ju-kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, 48. 91. Liu Xinru, Silk and Religion, p. 185. She cites Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, l: 454-55n53. 92. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, l: 455n53. 93. Mori, Nisso boeki, pp. 272-78. 94. Chao Ju-kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, p. 90. 95. Mori, Nissa boeki, pp. 271-72. 96. Wheatley, "Geographical Notes," pp. 87, 73. 97. Li Hua-jui, "Sung-tai niang-chiu-yeh chien-shu"; idem, "Shih-lun Sung­ tai chiu-chia yii chiu te Ii-jun"; Yang Shih-ch'iin, "Sung-tai te chiu-k'e."

Notes to Pages 66-69

331

98. Li Hua-jui, "Niang-chiu-yeh," p. 17. 99. Li Hua-jui, "Sung-tai chiu-chia," p. 127. roo. SHYCK, "Shih-huo," 19: l9b; CCFC, 1612, 7:4b. 101. Fu-chien-sheng Ch'iian-chou hai-wai chiao-t'ung-shih po-wu-kuan, Ch'iian-chou-wan Sung-tai hai-ch'uan te Ja-chiieh yii yen-chiu, pp. 39-41, 128-30. For a detailed analysis of the issue, see Ch'en Hsin-hsiung, P'eng-hu Sung Yuan t'ao-tz'u, pp. n5-26. 102. Wheatley, "Geographical Notes," p. 124. 103. Chao Ju-kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, 17, So. 104. Ch'in Chiu-shao, Shu-hsiieh chiu-chang, 9B: 15b-16a. 105. Fujita, "Shihakushi oyobi shihakujorei," pp. 2n-12. ro6. There is revealing evidence of such a concern, which has often been cited by scholars. In n37, the emperor Kao-tsung stated explicitly that the profit from maritime trade was so remarkable that it could ease the taxation burden of the commoners. Therefore, he was very much concerned about this matter (SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 2oa-b). 107. Lin T'ien-wei, Hsiang-yao mao-i, pp. 234-37; Hirth and Rockhill, Chao Ju­ kua, p. 21. ro8. For instance, a n67 decree ordered the Ch'iian-chou shih-po-ssu to take 250,000 strings of cash from the tribute quota of silver for the four coastal pre­ fectures of Fukien and use the sum as capital for official purchases in maritime trade (SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 29a-b) . 109. During the Sung dynasty, an ordination certificate from the government was required by anyone who wanted to acquire the status of monk. Local gov­ ernments sometimes used these certificates to make payments, and the cost of the certificates fluctuated (see Yuan Chen, "Liang-Sung tu-tieh k'ao," pp. 21420, 228-58). no. Lin T'ien-wei, Hsiang-yao mao-i, pp. 260-68. m. Ibid., pp. 266-67, 360-68; Chang Hsiang-i, "Shihakushi boeki," pp. 28690; Kawahara Yoshir6, "Hoku-So ki koyaku (Nankai boekihin) no kokka zaisei ni okeru igi." n2. See Lin T'ien-wei, Hsiang-yao mao-i, pp. 266. See also Kuo Cheng-chung, "Nan-Sung hai-wai mao-i shou-ju chi ch'i tsai ts'ai-cheng sui-fu chung te pi-lii." n3. See Chang Hsiang-i, "Shihakushi boeki," p. 287. n4. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 19b. II5. Ts'ao-Hsiin, Sung-yin chi, 23: 7b; Doi Hiroko, "Nan-So chuki igo ni okeru Senshu no kaigai boeki," p. 51. n6. For a list of such items, see Hirth and Rockhill, Chao Ju-kua, p. 22.

332

Notes to Pages 69-73

n7. SS, 186: 4560. For the Sung accounting unit in fiscal administration and related problems, see Kuo Tao-yang, Chung-kuo k'uai-chi shih-kao, pp. 405-7. n8. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 25a-26b. n9. Clark, "Politics ofTrade," pp. 387-90. 120. WHTK, 20: 2ooc. 121. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 9a-b. 122. PMTC, 30: 626. 123. Fang Ta-ts'ung, T'ieh-an chi, 21: 4b; see also Shiba, Shogyoshi, p. 216. 124. Shiba, Shogyoshi, p. 216. 125. Sudo, Sodai keizaishi kenkyii, p. 172. 126. Fang Ta-ts'ung, T'ieh-an chi, 21: 4b. 127. Sudo Yoshiyuki, 'Nan-So ni okeru bakusaku no shorei to nimosaku," pp. 236-74. 128. Ibid., pp. 237-39. 129. Ibid., pp. 239-42. 130. Ibid., p. 266. 131. On the domestic production and circulation of silk products, see Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 271-95. 132. Since local mulberry trees were not fertilized enough, the raw silk pro­ duced was full ofknots (PMTK, 3: 63b; Mo Shang-chien, Hui-an hsien-chih, 5: 6a­ b; Lin Yu-nien, An-ch'i hsien-chih, l: 16b; Chou Ying, Hsing-huaju-chih, 12: 10a-na). 133· A Sung gazetteer contained the comment: "Raw materials for textiles were shipped from Wu-che [Liang-che] every year" (cited in Chou Ying, Hsing­ hua ju-chih, 12: 10a-na). The period to which this piece of evidence refers is not clear. Judging from the fact that it is a citation from a Sung gazetteer of Hsing­ hua-chiin, it may well have been some time in the Southern Sung. 134· Su Sung, Su Wei-kung wen-chi, 7: 2a. For a brief account of silk textiles in Ch'iian-chou under the Sung, see Li Yii-k'un, Ch'iian-chou hai-wai chiao-t'ung shih­ liieh, pp. 38-40. 135· Fu-chien-sheng po-wu-kuan, Fu-chou Nan-Sung Huang Sheng mu, p. 137· 136. A revealing example comes from a memorial of n33, which mentions that the hemp cloth supplied by Yang-chou prefecture as tribute had been made in Wen-chou and Ch'iian-chou. Because of the war, cloth merchants had almost stopped trading with this prefecture. Thus, the memorial suggests a two-year exemption for Yang-chou (SHYCK, "Shih-huo," 41: 43b). 137· PMTC, 26: 18a. 138. Chou Ying, Hsing-hua ju-chih, 12: 10a-na. 139· PMTC, 26: l8a. 140. Amano, Nogyoshi, 486.

Notes to Pages 73-78

333

141. Shih Hung-ta, "Nan-Sung Min-Kuang ti-ch'ii te mien-fang-chih sheng­ ch'an," p. 26. 142. Hung Chao and Cheng Hsiieh-meng, "Fu-chien yen-hai ti-ch'ii nung­ yeh ching-chi," pp. 37-40. See also Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 148-58; Lin T'ing-shui, "Ch'iian-chou p'ing-yiian te wei-k'en yii shui-li chien­ she," pp. 39-45; Yuan Ping-ling, "Hai-shang mao-i yii Sung Yuan Ch'iian-chou nung-yeh ching-chi t'e-se." The most famous irrigation project among those completed in South Fukien during this period was the Mu-lan weir (p'o); see Fu-chien-sheng P'u-t'ien-hsien wen-kuan-hui, "Pei-Sung te shui-li kung-ch'eng Mu-lan-p'o." This weir alone was able to support over 10,000 ch'ing of fields. 143· Ch'en Yen-te and Chang T'ien-hsing, "Sung-tai Fu-chien ke-ti nung-yeh ching-chi te ch'ii-yii t'e-cheng." 144· PMTC, 21: 12b-15b. 145· By arable land, I narrowly refer to cultivated land primarily used to grow grain. In the sources, it was usually referred to as "farming field," t'ien-ti. 146. By "gardens," I refer to cultivated lands that were not used for the pro­ duction of grain. In the sources, they were often referred to as yuan-ti, which were probably used for planting cash crops such as cotton, fruits, or mulberry trees. Occasionally, the term includes other land uses for agricultural purpose such as weirs, ditches, ponds, and so on. 147· SSC, IO: lb. 148. WHTK, 4: 6ob. The 4:6 ratio is based on the average ratio of arable land to gardens in Fu-chou for u82. 149· Perkins, Agricultural Development, p. 15. 150. Chao Kang, Man and Land, p. 216. 151. Ibid., pp. 216-17. 152. Liang Keng-yao, "Nan-Sung nung-ch'an shih-ch'ang yii chia-ke," p. 356; Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 161-62. 153· Chu Hsi, Chu Wen-kung wen-chi, 98: 8a-b. 154· For details of tonnage duty in the Sung times, see Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 496-522. 155· Yeh Shih, Yeh Shih chi, 16: 305. 156. Ch'iian Han-sheng, "Nan-Sung tao-mi te sheng-ch'an yii yiin-hsiao," l: 276-77. 157· Chou Pi-ta, Chou Wen-chung-kung ch'uan-chi, 67: 6b. 158. The need to import rice was not determined solely by the net rate of population growth. Other factors, such as occupational diversification, expan­ sion of specialized cropping, and commerce, have to be taken into account as well.

334

Notes to Pages 78-83

159· Liang Keng-yao, "Nan-Sung nung-ch'an shih-ch'ang yii chia-ke," p. 427. 160. Ibid., p. 424; Sung shih ch'iian-wen hsii tzu-chih t'ung-chien, 228: 49b. 161. Ch'i Hsia, "Sung-tai fang-chih shou-kung-yeh sheng-ch'an te fa-chan i­ chi fang-chih shou-kung-yeh te ke-chung hsing-shih." 162. Li Hua-jui, "Niang-chiu-yeh," pp. 20-21. 163. Li Hua-jui and Chang Ching-chih, "Sung-tai ch'iieh-chiu, t'e-hsii chiu­ hu ho wan-hu chiu chih-tu chien-lun." 164. Li Mi-hsiin, Yiin-ch'i chi, 24: 6a. 165. Wang Hsiang-chih, Yii-ti chi-sheng, 130: nb. See also Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 162. 166. For the technology and productivity of the wine-making industry during the Sung, see Li Hua-jui, "Niang-chiu-yeh." 167. SHYCK, "Shih-huo," 21: 7a. The same memorial suggested that the households making wine in the prefectures exempted from the monopoly should in principle be taxed. However, it recognized the diversity of local situa­ tions and implied that decision should be decentralized to the respective cir­ cuits. The imperial court accepted these proposals. We cannot tell whether they were implemented in South Fukien or not. According to later gazetteers, the wine monopoly was not introduced until the Yuan dynasty, and I assume that these proposals did not affect South Fukien. See also Li Hua-jui and Chang Ching-chih, "Sung-tai ch'iieh-chiu," pp. 18-19. 168. Chu Hsi, Chu Wen-kung wen-chi, 98: 3a. 169. Aizawa, "Kansho togyo," pp. 67-70. The fact that sugarcane planting was seriously affecting rice production is also indicated by the evidence men­ tioned earlier. An official complained that in Hsien-yu county a lot of farmland had been devoted to sugarcane cultivation and consequently local food supplies had been significantly reduced (Fang Ta-ts'ung, T'ieh-an chi, 21: 4b). 170. Li Hsin-ch'uan, Chien-yen i-lai ch'ao-yeh tsa-chi, A16: 8b-9a. 171. On the use of charcoal as prime fuel in smelting in South Fukien, see Mo Shang-chien, Hui-an hsien-chih, 5: 21b-22a. 172. Chao Ju-kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, 13: 25. 173· Li Hsin-ch'uan, Chien-yen i-lai hsi-nien yao-lu, 177: 2a. 174· Hartwell, "Market, Technology and the Structure of Enterprise in the Development of the Eleventh-Century Chinese Iron and Steel Industry,'' pp. 40-48. See also Wang Ling-ling, "Sung-tai k'uang-yeh ching-ying fang-shih te pien-ke ho yen-chin." 175· Mo Shang-chien, Hui-an hsien-chih, 5: 21b-22a. 176. Chou Ying, Hsing-huaJu-chih, 12: l2a. 177· Huang Yen-sun, Hsien-ch'i chih, l: l7b.

Notes to Pages 83-85

335

178. YFCYC, 9: 4IO. No such mine existed in the late tenth century (TPHYC, I02: 6a-b). 179. SS, 185: 4525. 180. SHYCK, "Shih-huo," 33: 9b-1oa. 181. Chiba Hiroshi, "Hoku-So no kozankeiei," 2: 157-58, 162. 182. CCFC, 1612, IO: ub; Ho Chiung, Ch'ing-yiian wen-hsien, 16: 9b. 183. Chou Pi-ta, Chou Wen-chung-kung ch'iian-chi, 62: 14b-15a. This reference is dated u8o according to CCFC, 1763, 26: ub. 184. Yeh Shih, Yeh Shih chi, l: 4-5. In this source, T'ai-chou has been replaced by Hsiian-chou. Whether this is a mistake in transcription or an alteration in actual practice is unknown. In any case, it does not affect my argument. 185. Kato Shigeshi, To-So jidai ni okeru kin gin no kenkyu, l: 213-20. 186. That Ch'iian-chou had to contribute tributary silver for four other prefectures that did not have access to silver mines illustrates this point clearly. 187. Liang Keng-yao, "Nan-Sung Fu-chien te yen-cheng," pp. 200-213. 188. Kawakami Koichi, "Sodai Fukken ransei shoron," pp. 147-52. 189. Ibid. 190. Ibid., pp. 151-52. 191. Ibid., pp. 158-60; Tai I-hsiian, Sung-tai ch'ao-yen chih-tu yen-chiu, p. 76. For details of the salt monopoly system in Fukien under the Sung, see Liang Keng­ yao, "Fu-chien te yen-cheng," pp. 189-241. 192. For details of the distribution of official shipyards in Sung China, see Chang Chia-chii, "Sung-tai tsao-ch'uan kung-yeh chih ti-li fen-pu"; Feng Han­ yung, "T'ang-Sung shih-tai te tsao-ch'uan-yeh," pp. I0-14; and Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 72-76. 193· Wang Tseng-yii, "T'an Sung-tai tsao-ch'uan-yeh," p. 25. 194· CCFC, 1763, 29: 31a-b; 29: 34b; FCTC, 1867, 125: 2b-3a. 195· Ch'eng Chii-fu, Hsiieh-lou chi, IO: 9a-b. 196. So Kee-long, "Sung-tai Ch'iian-chou," pp. 96-104. 197· For details, see Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol. 4, pt. 3, pp. 379-699, esp. PP· 695-99. 198. Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 74-75. For Sung shipbuilding technology as seen from the Ch'iian-chou shipwreck, see Fu-chien-sheng Ch'iian-chou hai-wai chiao-t'ung-shih po-wu-kuan, Sung-tai hai-ch'uan, pp. 81-86; and Chuang Ching­ hui, Hai-wai chiao-t'ung, pp. 68-78. 199· For analysis of the timber used in the sunken Sung ship, see Fu-chien­ sheng Ch'iian-chou hai-wai chiao-t'ung-shih po-wu-kuan, Sung-tai hai-ch'uan, pp. 147-50. Three types of timber were used for that ship: Pinus massoniana lamb, Cunninghamia lanceolata (lamb) hook, and Cinnamomum camphora (1.) presi.

Notes �o Pages 85-90 200. On the use of wood oil, see CCFC, 1763, 19: 13b. 201. FCTC, 1684, 33: 15b. 202. Chou Ch'ii-fei, Ling-wai tai-ta, 6: roa-b.

Chapter 4 l. For instance, Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, pp. 35-37; Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng yen-chiu, pp. 93-107; and Narita Setsuo, "So Gen jidai no Senshil no hattatsu to

Kanton no suibi," pp. 30-36. 2. This question was first raised by Ch'en Yii-ching in his annotated transla­ tion of Kuwabara's book on P'u Shou-keng. Ch'en gave evidence that overseas trade in Ch'iian-chou had begun to decline markedly in the early thirteenth century and did not flourish again until the Yuan (see Kuwabara, trans. Ch'en Yii-ching, P'u Shou-keng k'ao, pp. 35-36). Ch'en's remark was not pursued by oth­ ers until Doi Hiroko brought it up again in the 1980s and discussed it in more detail (see Doi, "Nan-So chilki igo ni okeru Senshil no kaigai boeki"; and idem, "Sodai no Senshil boeki to soshitsu"). For more recent accounts of the recession, see Li Tung-hua, Ch'iian-chou yii hai-shang chiao-t'ung, pp. 174-94; and Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 170-80. 3. For a comprehensive account of the economic decline in Southern Sung, see Ch'eng Min-sheng, "Shih-lun Nan-Sung ching-chi te shuai-t'ui." 4. So Kee-long, "Financial Crisis and Local Economy: Ch'iian-chou in the Thirteenth Century." 5. Chen Te-hsiu, Hsi-shan hsien-sheng Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi, 17: 9a-b. 6. Ibid., 16: 6a-7a. 7. SS, 437: 12960. 8. Chen Te-hsiu, Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi, 15: 13b. 9. Ibid., 17: la-b. 10. Liu K'e-chuang, Ta ch'iian-chi, 62: 52a-b. u. Ibid., 69: 58ob. 12. In contrast, edicts relating to appointments of the prefect of Ch'iian-chou in the twelfth century seldom mention financial difficulties as such. For in­ stance, see the edict concerning Yen Shih-lu, who was in office in u89 (Lou Yueh, Kung-k'uei chi, 35: 12a). 13. P'u Shou-ch'eng, Hsin-ch'iian hsiieh shih kao, l: roa. 14. Doi, "Senshil no kaigai boeki," pp. 60-64. 15. Chen Te-hsiu, Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi, 15:ua. 16. I am indebted to John Chaffee ("Song Imperial Clan," p. 19) for pointing out that between u31 and 1231, per capita support for the clansmen had shrunk

Notes to Pages 90-93

337

from 177 strings of cash to 63, a significant drop of 64 percent, not to mention the factor of inflation. 17. Chen Te-hsiu, Chen Wen-chung kung wen-chi, 15: na-13a. 18. Ibid., 15: 13a. 19. Ibid., 15: 13a-b. 20. Here my view differs from that of Doi. She conceives the phenomenon as a chain-effect resulting from the increasing number of imperial clansmen (Doi, "Senshu no kaigai boeki," pp. 60-64). 21. Liu K'e-chuang, Ta ch'uan-chi, 12: 10a. 22. Chang Shen ("Nan-Sung shih-po-ssu ch'u-t'an") studied the evolution of the shih-po-shih appointment during the Southern Sung and came to the conclu­ sion that beginning in the early 1200s overseas trade declined more rapidly in Ch'iian-chou than in Kuang-chou. He fails, however, to provide evidence on Kuang-chou. 23. Liu K'e-chuang, Ta ch'uan-chi, 12: Sa. For Liu's term of office in Kuang­ chou, see Juan Yiian, Kuang-tung t'ung-chih, 16: 312a-b. 24. For instance, see Chao Ju-kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, pp. 30-34n7, 47n2; Hirth and Rockhill, Chao ]u-kua, pp. 36-38. Hirth and Rockhill, however, made a minor mistake by saying that information on Srivijaya in the book came pri­ marily from the author's own oral survey. Important passages in Chao's account of Srivijaya are taken from Chou Ch'ii-fei's work (see Chao Ju-kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, p. 13). See Chao Yen-wei, Yun-lu man-ch'ao, 5: 19b-2oa, for another brief account of the countries and commodities involved in the overseas trade of Ch'iian-chou, further evidence of a flourishing seaport. But this account is in­ cluded in a miscellaneous work whose preface is dated 1206. It is thus more likely to have reflected the situation in the twelfth century when local economic problems were not yet acute. 25. Fang Ta-ts'ung, Hu-shan ssu-liu, pp. 5a-b. 26. The case of Tu Ch'un mentioned in Chapter 2 is illustrative. It reflects corrupt behavior of local officials in relation to maritime trade in the mid­ eleventh century (SS, 330: 10632). Li Tung-hua (Ch'uan-chou yu hai-shang chiao­ t'ung, pp. 178-84) also stresses the negative effect of corruption, apart from heavy tariffs, on overseas trade. 27. Li Tung-hua, Ch'uan-chou yu hai-shang chiao-t'ung, pp. 174-80. 28. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: lb. 29. Ibid., 44: 25a. 30. Ibid., 44: 27a-b. 31. Lo Chiin, Pao-ch'ing Ssu-ming-chih, 6: 2a-3a. See also Sato Keishiro, Isuramu shogyoshi no kenkya, pp. 345-46.

Notes to Pages 94-97 32. CCFC, 1612, 24: 3ob-32a; CCFC, 1763, 73: 17a-18a; Fang Ting, Chin-chiang hsien-chih, 15: 43a-44b; FCTC, 1867, 86: 33a-b. 33. Sung Hsi, "Sung-shang tsai Sung-Li mao-i," pp. 95-96; Mori, Zoku Nisso boeki no kenkya, pp. 410-12. For details of the Mongol-Koryo conflicts and the latter's internal power struggle, see Henthorn, A History of Korea, chap. 7; and idem, Korea: The Mongol Invasion. 34. Mori, Nisso boeki, pp. 235-79, 322-50. In 1251, an official in Kuang-chou noted that about 50 Japanese ships visited China every year (Pao Hui, Pi-chou kao-lueh, 1: 18b ). A similar trend is visible in the realm of trade ceramics, one of the most important Chinese imports to Japan at the time (Kamei Meitoku, Ni­ hon boeki tojishi no kenkya, pp. 218-21). 35. Chao Ju-kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, p. 90; Hirth and Rockhill, Chao ]u­ kua, p. 171. 36. Cocdes, The Indianized States, pp. 169-72, 181-82. 37. The decline of Srivijaya has become a highly controversial debate among Southeast Asianists; see So Kee-long, "Dissolving Hegemony or Changing Trade Pattern? Srivijayan Images in the Chinese Sources of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries." 38. Cocdes, The Indianized States, pp. 178-80, 183-84; see also Wolters, The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History, pp. 39-48. Interestingly, it is argued that the de­ cline of the maritime empire of Srivijaya has much to do with the coming of Chinese maritime merchants to the Southeast Asian waters, which weakened the monopoly of the lucrative trade hitherto enjoyed by the maharajas. 39. See, e.g., Shiba, Shogyoshi, p. 148. Mark Elvin (Pattern of the Chinese Past, pp. 128-29) also cites this as an example of agricultural specialization in Sung­ Yuan China. 40. Fang Ta-ts'ung, T'ieh-an chi, 21: 4b. With minor changes, this translation is from Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese Past, p. 129. 41. Ch'iian Han-sheng, "Nan-Sung tao-mi," 1: 284-91; Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 161-62. 42. Fang Ta-ts'ung, T'ieh-an chi, 20: 13a-16a. 43. Ibid., chuan 33; cited by Amano Motonosuke, Chugoku nogyoshi kenkya, pp. 486-87. I cannot locate this reference in the SKCS edition of T'ieh-an chi to which I have access. For the time of Fang's term of office in Kuang-chou, see Juan Yuan, Kuang-tung t'ung-chih, 16: 10a. 44. Chikusa Masaaki, "Shakai to jiin"; Huang Min-chih, "Sung-tai Fu-chien te ssu-yiian yii she-hui." 45. Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 461-65. 46. Chou Pi-ta, Chou Wen-chung-kung ch'uan-chi, 67: 6b.

Notes to Pages 98-100

339

47. Chen Te-hsiu, Chen Wen-chung-kung wen-chi, 15: l3a-b. 48. Ch'ai Piao, Yung-ch'un hsien-chih, 9: l6a. This is a biography of a Chang­ chou prefect named Chuang Hsia from Yung-ch'un. Chuang held the office in 1213. See also Lo Ch'ing-hsiao, Chang-chou Ju-chih, 24: l5b-16a. Another source, a letter to the prefect of Chang-chou by the Neo-Confucian scholar Ch'en Ch'un (Pei-ch'i ta ch'uan-chi, 43: 10a-b) in l2II, gives a different picture. Ch'en stated that six-sevenths, i.e., about 85 percent, of the registered farmlands in that prefecture were owned by the temples. But in another letter to the prefect by the same scholar at approximately the same time, he gives the proportion of 75 percent. It thus seems that he did not necessarily have accurate information concerning temple landholdings, but gave merely an impressionistic estimate. Moreover, after reading his fierce criticism of the temples, one cannot but wonder whether he made those statements free of bias and exaggeration. A more cautious con­ clusion to be drawn from Ch'en's writings is that temples in Chang-chou proba­ bly still held large properties at that time, but the decline in their holdings was about to begin, as indicated in Chuang Hsia's biography. 49. Wen T'ien-hsiang, Wen-shan hsien-sheng ch'uan-chi, u: 231a-33a. 50. For a general picture of the monetary system of the Sung dynasty, see P'eng Hsin-wei, Chung-kuo huo-pi-shih, chap. 5. 51. Kato, Shina keizaishi kosho, 2: 73. For details of the history of chiao-tzu, see Hino Kaisaburo, "Koshi no hattatsu ni tsuite"; Chu Ch'i, "Liang-Sung hsin­ yung huo-pi yen-chiu"; and P'eng Hsin-wei, Chung-kuo huo-pi shih, pp. 280-90. 52. Miyazaki Ichisada, Godai Sosho no tsuka mondai, pp. 93-u7. 53. SS, 180: 4380. 54. For instance, Kuwahara, Ho ]uko, pp. 32-35; Sogabe Shizuo, "So no senko"; Ch'iian Han-sheng, "Sung-tai Kuang-chou," 2: u2-27. For the tremen­ dous quantity of Sung coins imported to Japan in Sung times and its impact on the Japanese economy, see also Mori Katsumi, Zoku zoku Nisso boeki no kenkya, pp. 137-49, 157-201; and idem, Nisso boeki, pp. 474-89. For the influence of Sung coins in the context of the monetarization of Southeast Asian economies, see Wicks, Money, Markets, and Trade in Early Southeast Asia. 55. Ch'iian Han-sheng, "Sung-tai Kuang-chou," p. u3; Sogabe, "So no senko," pp. 332-35; P'eng Hsin-wei, Chung-kuo huo-pi-shih, pp. 326-28. 56. Ch'iian Han-sheng, "Sung-tai Kuang-chou," pp. 39-41. 57. Chu Ch'i, 'Hsin-yung huo-pi," pp. 30-33; Sogabe Shizuo, Sodai zaiseishi, pp. 269-96. There is evidence that a branch office of the Bureau of Paper Money in Hang-chou operated in Ch'iian-chou toward the end of Southern Sung and issued hui-tzu for regional circulation (Sogabe, Sodai zaiseishi, p. 278).

340

Notes to Pages 100-102

58. Ch'iian Han-sheng, "Sung-mo te t'ung-huo p'eng-chang chi ch'i tui-yii wu-chia te ying-hsiang," l: 325-26. 59. Ibid., pp. 325-54. 60. The factors behind the coin shortage in Southern Sung are manifold. See Cheng Chia-feng, "Shih-hsi Nan-Sung ch'ien-huang te ch'eng-yin"; and von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune, pp. 49-56. On the decrease in minting, see SHYCK, "Shih-huo," n: lb. 61. Pao Hui, Pi-chou kao-liieh, l: l9a-b. On the Japanese demand for Sung coins, see Mori, Nissa boeki, pp. 474-89; and Yamamura and Kamiki, "Silver Mines and Sung Coins.'' 62. There is evidence that in the early thirteenth century, Ch'iian-chou alone paid l,400,000 to l,500,000 strings of cash annually for rice imported from Kuang-chou. All payment was solely in cash coins (see Ho Chiung, Ch'ing-yiian wen-hsien, 16: loa-b ). 63. Ch'iian Han-sheng, "Sung-tai Kuang-chou," pp. 41-43. 64. The most outstanding example is the descendants of Liu Ts'ung-hsiao. In the middle of the Southern Sung, this family produced the national political figure Liu Cheng, who became a prime minister. For the long list of eminent members of the Lius, see Ho Ch'iao-yiian, Min shu, 91: 2752-57. 65. SS, 320: 10397-401, 472: 13721-28. 66. Hugh Clark, "Overseas Trade and Social Change in Quanzhou Through the Song." 67. Chaffee, "Song Imperial Clan.'' 68. Ibid.; Clark, "Overseas Trade and Social Change.'' Both note a decline in South Fukienese performance in the civil service examinations as recorded in lo­ cal gazetteers from the mid-thirteenth century on, and they interpreted this as an effect of the decline of the maritime economy. Although there is some truth in such an assertion, I have reservations about the sharp decrease in the number of chin-shih noted in local gazetteers for the last few decades of Southern Sung rule. That may represent not so much a drastic decline in examination perform­ ance as a lapse of the records due to political turmoil during the dynastic change. For example, PMTC, 50: 168, 51: 188, and 54: 263, lists only 22 South Fukienese chin-shih under the year 1256. In fact, the actual number of South Fukienese chin­ shih who succeeded in the civil service examination in that particular year, as re­ corded in far greater detail in the Pao-yu ssu nien teng-k'o-lu, was 33. This shows that there may have been serious distortions of the data in the local gazetteers for these few decades, and therefore we cannot take those figures for the last decades of the Southern Sung as reasonably comparable with the data for earlier years of the regime. In contrast with the case of South Fukien, the Pao-yu ssu

Notes to Pages 103-9

341

nien teng-k'o-lu lists only three chin-shih from Kuang-chou for 1256. This shows that the 1256 list does not artificially boost success across regions. 69. Hartwell, "Demographic, Political, and Social Transformation of China, 750-1550," pp. 405-25; Hymes, Statesmen and Gentlemen. 70. For example, Kuang-chou had a prosperous maritime economy but neg­ ligible performance in civil service examinations. Ming-chou fell into the same category, although its chin-shih numbers surpassed those of Kuang-chou. Fu­ chou also accommodated huge numbers of imperial clansmen and was much more successful in the civil service examinations than all of South Fukien com­ bined, yet it lacked economic opportunities comparable to those available in South Fukien. 71. There is a sizable literature on the rise oflarge kinship organizations from the Sung times; see, e.g., Ebrey, Family and Property in Sung China; Ebrey and Watson, Kinship Organizations in Late Imperial China, 1000-1940; and Hsii Yang­ chieh, Sung Ming chia-tsu chih-tu shih-lun. 72. Hugh Clark, "The Fu ofMinnan." 73. Hartwell, "Foreign Trade, Monetary Policy, and Chinese 'Mercantilism,"' p. 456. 74. Chaffee, "Song Imperial Clan." 75. Liang Keng-yao, Sung-tai she-hui ching-chi-shih, 2: 277. 76. Fu Tsung-wen, "Hou-chu ku-ch'uan." 77. Chaffee, "Song Imperial Clan."

Chapter 5 1. Kuwahara, Ho ]uko. 2. So Kee-long, Min-nan Ch'iian-chou, pp. 1-35. 3. For discussions of P'u's ancestry, see Kuwahara, Ho ]uko, pp. 109-51; Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. n-37; and Sugimoto Naojiro, "Hojuko no ko­ kuseki mondai." 4. Kuwahara, Ho ]uko, pp. 109-16, 136. For the dispute over the reliability of Hsin-shih, see ibid., pp. 120-24. 5. For biography of P'u Tsung-meng, see SS, 328: 10570-72. 6. Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. n-37. 7. For textual contradictions in the genealogy of the P'u family, see Kawagoe Yasuhiro, "Senshii. kaikyoto Hoshi keifu ko.'' A crucial defect in this view is that no subprefect named P'u Shih-pin can be found in the lists of names of subpre­ fects for Chin-chiang in any gazetteer (see CCFC, 1763, 27: 2b-5b; FCTC, 1867, 93: 6b-8a).

342

Notes to Pages ro9-ro

8. For the ranking of military titles, see SS, 169: 4054-58. For Ts'ai Ching­ fang, see Chapter 3. 9. Certain low-ranking official posts and titles were open to purchase in Sung times. The price for ch'eng-chieh-lang varied over time; in u61, it cost 5,000 strings of cash, but by u94, the price had risen to ro,ooo strings (Wei Mei-yiieh, "Sodai shinno seido ni tsuite no ichi kosatsu"). ro. The Ch'ing scholars who compiled the Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu suspected that the two names were simply the result of printing or handwriting errors (Chi Yiin, Ssu-k'u ch'uan-shu tsung-mu t'i-yao, 165: 47a-48a). Kuwabara (Ho Juko, p. 159) did not concur and held that the issue could not be solved. u. Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. 55-69. 12. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, pp. 2ro-u; Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. 56-59. 13. Liu K'e-chuang, Ta ch'uan-chi, 123: ro97a. In a reply to a congratulatory message on his seventy-eighth birthday from P'u Shou-ch'eng, Liu K'e-chuang addressed P'u as ling-wei. Yii Chia-hsi (Ssu-k'u t'i-yao pien-cheng, pp. 1477-78) cor­ rectly interpreted this as a reference to one of the huan-wei-kuan, a term for those generals and commanders in the middle and upper ranks of the imperial guards. For details of huan-wei-kuan, see SS, 166: 3931-32; SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 33: la5b, esp. Ia and 3a. There were many ranks ofhuan-wei-kuan. I am inclined to pre­ sume that Shou-ch'eng's rank was among the middle ones because he lacked previous qualifications that would have entitled him to a high rank. Yet his ap­ pointment as prefect of Mei-chou suggests that he probably was in the middle ranks of officialdom by 1265. 14. His influential friends included Liu K'e-chuang, an active political figure in the mid-thirteenth century; Hu Chung-kung, a Ch'iian-chou native and poet; Ch'iu K'uei, a Ch'iian-chou native and scholar; and Ch'ang Ting, prefect of Ch'iian-chou ca. 1265 (Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. 56-61; Yii Chia-hsi, Ssu­ k'u ti-yao, 1480-81; Ch'en Yiian, "Hsi-yii jen hua-hua k'ao," pp. 5b-7a; and P'u Shou-ch'eng, Hsin-ch'uan hsueh shih kao, l: roa-b,r: l3a-b, 2: 5a-b). 15. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, pp. 2u-12. 16. Ch'en Yiian, "Hsi-yii jen," l: 6b-7a; Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. 6061; Yii Chia-hsi, Ssu-k'u t'i-yao, pp. 1485-86. 17. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-chih, pieh-chi, 1: ub-12b. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, pp. 16364. The tale talked about a certain P'u pa-kuanjen, whom Kuwabara correctly identified as P'u Shou-keng. See also Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. 39-40. 18. Kuwabara (Ho ]uko, p. 164) was unable to identify Wang Mou-yiieh. Lo Hsiang-lin (P'u Shou-keng, p. 40) conjectures that he was Wang Hui-ch'i. See also Liu Ming-shu, "Ch'iian-chou shih-k'e san-pa," p. 62. Wang was appointed prefect and shih-po-shih of Ch'iian-chou in 1240 (CCFC, 1763, 26: 24a). He was

Notes to Pages 110-12

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reappointed only to the post of shih-po-shih around 1265-66 (P'u Shou-ch'eng, Hsin-ch'uan hsueh shih kao, 2: la-b; Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang, "P'u Shou-keng Sung-mo t'i-chii shih-po san-shih nien shou k'ao-pien," p. 161). 19. P'u Shou-ch'eng had written a number of poems for Wang Hui-ch'i or commemorating events to do with Wang (Yii Chia-hsi, Ssu-k'u t'i-yao, pp. 147879; Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang, "P'u Shou-keng," pp. 161). 20. For a detailed account ofthese local garrisons, see CCFC, 1763, 24: 23a-28b. 21. On Sung naval forces, see Sogabe Shizuo, "Nan-So no suigun"; Lo Jung­ pang, "The Emergence of China as a Sea Power During the Late Sung and Early Yuan Periods"; and idem, "Maritime Commerce and Its Relation to the Sung Navy." For a discussion of the naval establishment in Ch'iian-chou, see Sogabe Shizuo, "Nan-So no boekiko Senshii no suigun to sono kaizoku boei­ saku." According to Li Hsin-ch'uan (Chien-yen i-lai ch'ao-yeh tsa-chi, A18: 18b), the naval component of tso-i-chun had 3,000 men in the late n8os. This figure is doubtful and, in all likelihood, a mistake for the entire force of the tso-i-chun. Even in 1218, when the prefecture was so threatened by pirates, there were only about 500 men in the tso-i-chun navy (Chen Te-hsiu, Chen Wen-chung-kung wen­ chi, 8: l2b-24a). 22. During every recorded instance of piracy threatening Ch'iian-chou in the 1220s and 1230s when the local officials called on imperial troops to repulse the attack, they mobilized the tso-i-chun, assisted by local regulars and militia (Chen Te-hsiu, Chen Wen-chung-kung wen-chi, 8: 5b-10b). The sources do not mention the mobilization of the other imperial units, and we can hence surmise that the latter had little significance in local affairs. 23. This was the result of a request made by the then prefect of Ch'iian-chou, Chen Te-hsiu (see Chen Te-hsiu, Chen Wen-chung-kung wen-chi, 8: 24b-25b; and CCFC, 1763, 24: 28a). 24. Huang K'uan-chung, "Fu-chien tso-i-chiin-Nan-Sung ti-fang-chiin yen­ pien te ke-an yen-chiu"; idem, "Cheng-chii pien-tung yii cheng-chih chiieh-tse." 25. Hai-yiin was a style-name of P'u Shou-keng (PMTC, 73: 751). 26. Wen-chou was located in southern. Che-chiang, but no significant battle took place there during the resistance movement. This place-name may have been a mistake for Fu-an, i.e., Fu-chou, the provincial capital of Fu-chien. 27. Huang Chung-yuan, Huang Ssu-yu chi, 4: 22b-23a. See also Yii Chia-hsi, Ssu-k'u t'i-yao, p. 1476. 28. SS, 47: 942; FCTC, 1867, 193: 3b. T'ien's name was sometimes mistakenly written as T'ien Tzu-chen, but there is no doubt that the two names refer to the same person. In some sources, T'ien has been described as the chou ssu-ma (vice prefect) instead of the prefect of Ch'iian-chou. See, e.g., Min shu, 41: 3a; and

344

Notes to Pages u2-15

CCFC, 1763, 33: 36a. Based on these sources, there is a notion that he was in fact a chou ssu-ma rather than a prefect; see, e.g., Lo Jung-pang, "Maritime Commerce," p. 5on3. Judging from the prefectural government structure, I take the view that T'ien was a prefect. The reason is that the chou ssu-ma was a senior assistant officer under the prefect during the T'ang (Yen Keng-wang, "T'ang-tai chou fu shang-tso yii lu-shih ts'an-chiin"). However, this post was abolished in Sung times (SS, 167: 3975-76). It is thus impossible that T'ien would have held it. 29. T'ien Chen-tzu's great-great-grandfather was an anju-shih, and his father a t'i-kung-lang (gentleman in pursuit of merits). For T'ien's family background, see So Kee-long, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, p. 17; see also Wang Lien-mao, "Yuan-tai Ch'iian-chou she-hui tzu-liao chi-lu," pp. 126-28. Intriguingly, his name has been excluded from the lists of chin-shih holders in all local gazetteers, probably due to his defection. 30. Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. 44. 31. Ibid. It is intriguing that Lin Ch'un-tzu, a Chinese, held the position of ta­ lu-hua-ch'ih in a county government; the post was usually reserved for a Mongol or a member of a group closely allied with the Mongols. 32. This information on the Yus comes from Min Ch'uan Wu-hsing fen-p'ai ch'ing-t'ien Yu-shih tsu-p'u (held at the Ch'iian-chou wen-kuan-hui; it was com­ piled in the Republican period), l: 93b-94a, 95b-96a. See also Wang Lien-mao, "Yuan-tai she-hui tzu-liao," pp. 133-34. 33. Records on these loyalists are much better preserved in local gazetteers. For instance, see the biographies of Chuang Ssu-ch'i and Lii Ssu-shih-ch'i, in CCFC, 1763, 57: roa-b. Particularly in the latter, it is mentioned that when the Sung em­ peror came to Ch'iian-chou, three local powerful families, the Liis, Huangs, and Tsengs, eachjoined the loyalists with a militia force ofa thousand men. 34. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, pp. 156, 180; Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. 45-46. For a discussion of the date ofthis massacre, see Kuwabara, Ho]uko, p. 180. Other accounts date the massacre to 1276; see, e.g., SS, 47: 942; and "Li-shih," in Ch'ing­ yuan Chin-shih tsu-p'u (1555 ed. in Fu-chien Provincial Library), p. 5ob. It is impos­ sible to verify which version is correct. But Kuwabara argues convincingly that since all other gazetteers attribute the event to 1277, that is the more reliable date. 35. Yanai Wataru, Yuan-tai Meng Han Se-mu tai-yu k'ao. For a discussion of the ethnic identity of these Ch'iian-chou residents, see So Kee-long, "Chinese Identity in the Traditional Context." This issue is also discussed in Chapter 9. 36. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, p. 182; Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. 44-46. 37. Wu Yu-hsiung, "Yuan-tai Ch'iian-chou pa tz'u she-sheng yii P'u Shou­ kengjen Ch'iian-chou hsing-sheng p'ing-chang cheng-shih k'ao."

Notes to Pages n5-16

345

38. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, pp. 182-83. This is documented in PMTC, 86: 5a. For the establishment of P'ing-hai hsing-sheng, see YS, 19: 409. Kuwabara had reserva­ tions about this information, since he thought P'u would have been too old had he started his political career as shih-po-shih thirty-odd years before 1276. How­ ever, it is now clear that P'u had been in that position for a much shorter period and could have remained in active service to the Yuan regime at the turn of the century. The epitaph of Hsia Ching, cited in this chapter, also testifies that, by the time it was written, P'u was customarily addressed with the title p'ing-chang. 39. Kuwabara, Ho Juko, pp. 186-88; Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. 63-75. 40. For Fo-lien, see Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, pp. 214-18. 41. Most gazetteers do not mention the relation between Na-wu-na and the P'u family. It is recorded, however, in a local history entitled Li-shih, part of which is included in the Ch'ing-yiian Chin-shih tsu-p'u, 5oa. Na-wu-na might not be a son-of-law of P'u Shou-keng himself, but he married a member of the P'u family. According to that record, he became powerful as a result ofthis alliance. 42. They were mainly Tamil merchants. Having played an active role in the Indian Ocean trade linking the Arabian world of the west with Southeast Asia and China of the east, they had traded and settled in Ch'iian-chou long before the Mongol conquest, even though in much smaller numbers than the Arabs. Under the Yuan, the Tamil merchants became more active, as is attested by the estab­ lishment in 1281 of what could well be the first Hindu temple to the god Siva in Ch'iian-chou (see Subramaniam, "A Tamil Colony in Medieval China"; and Guy, "Tamil Merchant Guilds and the Quanzhou Trade"; for a concise account of the Indians in the Indian Ocean trade in relation to Sung and Yuan China, see Ray­ chaudhuri and Habib, Cambridge Economic History ofIndia, l: 125-59). 43. For the medieval relics found in Ch'iian-chou, pertaining to a variety of foreign religions, see Wu Wen-Hang, Ch'iian-chou tsung-chiao shih-k'e; and Ch'en Ta-sheng, Ch'iian-chou I-ssu-lan-chiao shih-k'e. 44. For the privileges granted to foreigners, see Meng Ssu-ming, Yuan-tai she­ hui chieh-chi chih-tu, pp. 25-68; and Yang Chih-chiu, "Yuan-tai Hui-hui jen te she-hui ti-wei." For the practice of claiming foreign household status by the Chinese, see Yanai, Meng Han Se-mu, pp. 61-64. For such practices in South Fu­ kien, see ]ung-shan Li-shih tsu-p'u, p. 76a. For an English introduction to this ge­ nealogy, see Chan Hok-lam, Li Ch'ih (1527-1602) in Contemporary Chinese Histori­ ography, pp. 70-7rn3. Another local genealogy, the Ch'iian-chou Kuo-shih tsu-p'u (held at the Ch'iian-chou wen-kuan-hui) also gives evidence that some of the Kuo adopted Muslim registration status under the Yuan. This is mentioned in "On Conversion to Islam," an essay included in the genealogy. 45. YS, 20:428. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, p. 226.

Notes to Pages n6-18 46. Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. 90-94. 47. Wang Ta-yiian, Tao-i chih-liieh chiao-shih, pp. 209-13. 48. Feng-ch'ih Lin-Li tsung-p'u (1807 manuscript, held at Ch'iian-chou wen­ kuan-hui), p. 14; Chan Hok-lam, Li Ch'ih, pp. 8-9. 49. Ch'en Kao-hua, "Yuan-tai Ch'iian-chou po-shang." 50. This event is detailed in an essay entitled "Chih-ta chih pien t'ao-ts'uan shih-mo" (An account of the l3II tragedy), which is included in the Yen-chih Su­ shih tsu-p'u, pp. 89b-9oa. 51. For this part of the genealogy, see Yen-chih Su-shih tsu-p'u, pp. 9ob-91b. 52. For details of the maritime trade in Yuan times, see Rockhill, "Notes on the Relations and Trade of China with the Eastern Archipelago and the Coast of the Indian Ocean During the Fourteenth Century"; H. F. Schurmann, Eco­ nomic Structure of the Yuan Dynasty, pp. 222-36; Sato Keishiro, "Gendai ni okeru Nankai boeki"; Ch'en Kao-hua, "Yuan-tai te hai-wai mao-i"; Wang Kuan-cha, "Yuan-tai shih-po chih-tu chien-shu"; and Ch'en Kao-hua and Wu T'ai, Sung­ Yuan shih-ch'i te hai-wai mao-i. For the maritime trade in Ch'iian-chou in particu­ lar, see Chang Hsing-lang, "Chung-shih-chi Ch'iian-chou chuang-k'uang"; Na­ rita Setsuo, "Senshii no hattatsu"; Ch'en Kao-hua and Wu T'ai, "Sung-Yuan shih-ch'i te hai-wai mao-i yii Ch'iian-chou-kang te hsing-shuai"; and Yii Ch'ang­ sen, "Yuan-tai hai-wai mao-i fa-chan te chi-chi tso-yung yii chii-hsien-hsing." 53. YS, 94: 2401. 54. Ibid., IO! 204. 55. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, pp. 199-201. 56. Narita, "Senshii no hattatsu," pp. 25-35; Ch'en Kao-hua and Wu T'ai, Sung-Yuan shih-ch'i te hai-wai mao-i, pp. 148-52; Chuang Ching-hui, Hai-wai chiao­ t'ung, pp. 99-no. 57. Wu Ch'eng, Wu Wen-cheng chi, 28: l3b-14b. 58. Cited from Moule and Pelliot, Marco Polo, the Description of the World, p. 351. This passage has been widely cited by scholars who deal with the prosperity of Ch'iian-chou during the Yuan. Most of them, however, cited die translation by Henry Yule (Yule and Cordier, The Book of Sir Marco Polo, 2: 234-35). The two translations are basically the same, but the Moule and Pelliot version is more detailed and thus cited here. For the time of Marco Polo's departure from China via Ch'iian-chou, see Cleaves, "A Chinese Source Bearing on Marco Polo's Departure from China and a Persian Source on His Arrival in Persia"; and Yang Chih-chiu, "Kuan-yii Ma-k'o Po-lo te yen-chiu." 59. Yule and Cordier, Cathay and the Way Thither, 4: n8-19. 60. For a challenge to this generally accepted notion of Ch'iian-chou su­ premacy under the Yuan, see Tseng Chao-hsiian and Tseng Hsien-shan, "Hai-

Notes to Page II9

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shang ssu-ch'ou chih lu li-shih ti-li ch'u-t'an," p. 59. The authors, however, vaguely dated Ibn Batuta's 1349 visit to Zaitun as taking place toward the end of the Yuan dynasty in the late 1360s. 61. For a comprehensive account of these countries, see Li Tung-hua, Ch'uan­ chou yil hai-shang chiao-t'ung, pp. 195-220. 62. For Wang Ta-yuan's life and overseas voyages, see Su Chi-ch'ing's intro­ duction to Wang Ta-yiian, Tao-i chih-lueh chiao-shih, pp. l-15. 63. For Yuan trade with Japan, see Kinomiya Yasuhiko, ]ih-Chung wen-hua chiao-liu shih, p. 400; Ch'en Kao-hua and Wu Tai, Sung-Yuan shih-ch'i te hai-wai mao-i, pp. 43-44. For Koryo imports to Yuan China via the sea route, see Wang Yiian-kung, Chih-cheng Ssu-ming hsu-chih, 5: 3b. This, of course, does not imply that there were no trading links between Ming-chou and Southeast Asia. For instance, there is evidence that the Ming-chou office of maritime affairs did is­ sue permits for voyages from that port to Southeast Asia by at least the 1320s (Fu Lin, Hsing-t'ungfu shu, pp. 2a-b). 64. Persians might have been the largest group (see Chang Hsing-lang, Chung-hsi chiao-t'ung shih-liao hui-pien, 3: l83n15; and Ch'en Ta-sheng, Ch'uan-chou I-ssu-lan-chiao shih-k'e, p. 3). That the Persians and Arabs constituted a majority among the foreigners can also be confirmed by the hundreds of Arabic epigraphs discovered in Ch'iian-chou in recent decades (see Wu Wen-liang, Tsung-chiao shih-k'e, pp. 6-27 ). According to Ch'en Ta-sheng ("Ch'iian-chou Ch'ing-ching-ssu te li-shih wen-t'i"), the locations of at least six mosques that can be dated to Yuan times have been identified. Recent excavations have shown that renovation of the mosques was frequent during the Yuan (Fu-chien-sheng po-wu-kuan, "Ch'iian­ chou Ch'ing-ching-ssu feng-t'ien-t'an chi-chih fa-chiieh pao-kao"). 65. The presence of a South Indian community is attested by the remains of a Hindu temple in urban Ch'iian-chou (Wu Wen-liang, Tsung-chiao shih-k'e, pp. 48-59; Coomaraswamy, "Hindu Sculptures ofZayton"). Two epigraphs held in the Hsia-men University collection were found in Ch'iian-chou. Wu Wen-liang (Tsung-chiao shih-k'e, p. 85) was unable to identify the language in which they were written, but Professor A. L. Basham, whom I consulted in 1981, confirmed that it is Tamil. Unfortunately, the text is so incomplete that its context cannot be known. 66. Many indicators are available to show the European presence in Yuan Ch'iian-chou. For instance, extant letters by the archbishop of Zaiton, Andrew of Perugia, mention the missionary community and Italian merchants living in the port city. Another Christian envoy to the Yuan court, Marignolli, who re­ turned to Italy via Ch'iian-chou around 1346 or 1347, also counted three churches in the city and described the enormous wealth possessed by these

Notes to Pages II9-22 churches (Chang Hsing-lang, Chung-hsi chiao-t'ung shih-liao hui-pien, 2: 130-36, 174; Yule and Cordier, Cathay and the Way Thither, 3: 71-75; 229). 67. YS, 94: 2402; Wang Kuan-cho, "Yuan-tai shih-po," pp. 80-81; Ch'en Kao-hua, "Yuan tai te hai-wai mao-i," pp. 99-ror; Yu Ch'ang-sen, "Yuan-tai kuan-pen-ch'uan hai-wai mao-i chih-tu"; Liao Ta-k'o, "Yuan-tai kuan-ying hang-hai mao-i chih-tu ch'u-t'an." 68. For instance, the ban implemented in 1291 was due to the smuggling of kidnapped Mongols onboard maritime mercantile ships (Ch'en Kao-hua and Wu T'ai, Sung-Yuan shih-ch'i te hai-wai mao-i, p. 149). 69. For examples of loans for traders and potters in the Yangtze Delta, see Liu Ch'iu-ken, "Lun Yuan-tai ssu-ying kao-li-tai tzu-pen," p. 78. 70. For details of the organization, operation, and evolution of wo-t'o and ch'uanju-ssu, see Murakami Shoji, "Gencho ni okeru senfushi to attatsu"; H. F. Schurmann, Economic Structure, pp. 222-24; Otagi Matsuo, Chugoku tiizai kiishiishi, 'pp. 133-200; and Endicott-West, "Merchant Associations in Yuan China." For the general practice of high-interest lending, see Ch'iao Yu-mei, "Sung-Yuan shih-ch'i kao-li-tai tzu-pen te fa-chan"; Liu Ch'iu-ken, "Yuan-tai kuan-ying kao­ li-tai tzu-pen shu-lun"; Rossabi, "The Muslims in the Early Yuan Dynasty,'' pp. 278-83; and Liao Ta-k'o, "Yuan-tai kuan-ying hang-hai mao-i," pp. 44-45. 71. Ch'en Kao-hua, "Yuan-tai hai-wai mao-i," p. ror. 72. Moule and Pelliot, Marco Polo, p. 352. For identification of Tingjiu, see Otagi, Chugoku tiizai kiishiishi, pp. 339-48. n Yule and Cordier, Cathay and the Way Thither, 4: n8. 74. Hung Yung-pin, "Yuan-tai te mien-hua sheng-ch'an ho mien-fang yeh." 75. PMTC, 20: 393; YS, 62: 1505. 76. Maejima, "The Muslims in Ch'uan-chou at the End of the Yuan Dy­ nasty,'' pt. 2. See also Chang Hsing-lang, "The Rebellion of the Persian Garri­ son in Ch'uan-chou (1357-1366)"; Chuang Wei-chi, "Yuan-mo wai-tsu p'an-luan yu Ch'uan-chou-kang te shuai-lo"; Chu Wei-kan, "Yuan-mo jou-lin Ch'uan­ chou te I-ssu-fa-hang ping-luan"; and Ch'en Ta-sheng, "Na-wu-na fan-fo-ssu," PP· 42-47. 77. Most Chinese scholars hold that it referred to Ispahan, a Persian city in present-day Iran. However, Maejima's ("Muslims in Ch'uan-chou," p. 50) no­ tion that it stands for ispah (army), or sipahi (soldier or knight) in classical Per­ sian is more plausible, because the term was used as an expression for a garrison mainly formed by Persian soldiers recruited from the predominantly Persian foreign community in Ch'uan-chou. This does not contradict our understand­ ing of the community in general, but it is more difficult to substantiate that the majority of them were actually from a single city in Persia. For the many places

Notes to Pages 124-26

349

in Persia from which these Ch'uan-chou foreigners originated, see Ch'en Ta­ sheng, I-ssu-lan-chiao shih-k'e, p. 3. Also, it has been claimed that the term means the head of a foreign settlement (Liao Ta-k'o, "I-ssu-pa-hsi ch'u-t'an"). I have reserva­ tions about this claim and would like to see more evidence to substantiate it. 78. This is recorded in Chin Chi's biography in the genealogy of the Chins (Ch'uan-chou-shih Ch'uan-chou li-shih yen-chiu-hui, Ch'uan-chou hui-tsu p'u-tieh tzu-liao hsiian-pien, 83b). For the relationship between the tso-i-chiin and the tsoju-i wan-huju, see CCFC, 1763, 24: 29a. For the status of surrendered Sung armies un­ der the Yuan in general, see Wang Hsiao-hsin, "Yuan-tai hsin-fu-chun shu-lueh." 79. Maejima, "Muslims in Ch'uan-chou," p. 56. A more derailed description of the devastation is given in the Li-shih (see Wang Lien-mao, "Yuan-tai Ch'uan­ chou she-hui tzu-liao chi-lu"). Bo. Ch'en Kao-hua, "Yuan-tai Ch'uan-chou po-shang," pp. 430-31. Sr. Wang I, Wang Ch'ang-tsung chi, supp.: 6a-7a. 82. Ch'en Wen-shih, Ming Hung-wu Chia-ching chien te hai-chin cheng-ts'e, pp. r­ uo; Chang Wei-hua, Ming-tai hai-wai mao-i chien-lun, pp. 16-98; Li Chin-ming, Ming-tai hai-wai mao-i-shih, pp. u-183; Chang Pin-ts'un, "Ming-Ch'ing liang ch'ao te hai-wai mao-i cheng-ts'e"; Ch'en Shang-sheng, "Ming-tai shih-po-ssu yu hai­ wai mao-i." 83. For a detailed account of the Ming-Ryukyu tributary system, see Kobara Atsushi, Chusei nanti5 tsuki5 boekishi no kenkyu, pp. 99-325. For the profits generated by this trade, see LinJen-ch'uan, Fu-chien tui-wai mao-i yii hai-kuan-shih, p. 102. 84. Li Chin-ming, "Ming-tai shih-po-ssu te yen-ke yu shih-po-ssu chih-tu te yen-pien," p. 44; idem, "Ming ch'u Ch'uan-chou-kang shuai-lo yuan-yin hsin­ lun." For the role of Ch'uan-chou in the relations between Ming and the Ryu­ kyus, see also Chuang Ching-hui, "Ch'uan-chou tsai Ming Liu chiao-wang chung te ti-wei ho tso-yung,'' pp. 47-48. 85. LinJen-ch'uan, Fu-chien tui-wai mao-i, pp. 95-104. 86. For the Ming offices of maritime affairs, see Li Chin-ming, Ming-tai hai­ wai mao-i-shih, pp. 68-79. 87. Chang Pin-ts'un, "Ming-Ch'ing liang ch'ao re hai-wai mao-i cheng-ts'e," pp. 46-52. 88. For the Ming ban on maritime trade, see Ch'en Wen-shih, Hai-chin cheng­ ts'e; Ch'en Wu-r'ung, "Ming Hung-wu nien chien te mu-lin wai-chiao yu hai­ chin"; Ts'ao Yung-ho, "Shih-lun Ming T'ai-tsu te hai-yang chiao-t'ung cheng­ ts'e"; and Li Chin-ming, "Ming ch'u Ch'uan-chou-kang shuai-lo yuan-yin," pp. 59-61. For the impact of the ban on maritime traders and its relations to piracy, see Tai I-hsuan, Chia Lung chien te wo-k'ou hai-tao yu Chung-kuo tzu-pen chu-i te meng-ya. For the negative effects of this policy on South Fukien in particular, see

350

Notes to Pages 126-36

Lin Jen-ch'uan and Ch'en Chieh-chung, "Shih-lun Ming-tai Chang-Ch'iian hai­ shang tzu-pen fa-chan huan-man te yiian-yin," pp. 94-98. 89. For Fukien's coastal economy under the Ming in general, see Fu I-ling, Ming-Ch'ing shih-tai shangjen chi shang-yeh tzu-pen, pp. 107-60; Evelyn S. Rawski, Agricultural Change and the Peasant Economy of South China; and Chang Pin-ts'un, "Maritime Trade and Local Economy in Late Ming Fukien." 90. LinJen-ch'uan, Fu-chien tui-wai mao-i, pp. 120-24. On the relaxation of the maritime trade prohibitions, see Ch'ao Chung-ch'en, "Lun Ming chung-yeh i­ hou te hai-wai mao-i." 91. On the rise of Amoy, see Ng, Trade and Society, pp. 42-94.

Chapter 6 r. For a thorough analysis of the development of Chinese urban administrative divisions, see Whitney, China: Area, Administration, and Nation Building. 2. Rozman, Urban Networks in Ch'ing China and Tokugawa Japan. 3. Goodall, Dictionary ofHuman Geography, pp. 487-88. 4. Hsia-men ta-hsiieh, Li-shih-hsi, "Ch'iian-chou-kang te ti-Ii pien-ch'ien yii Sung-Yuan shih-ch'i te hai-wa� chiao-t'ung"; Migo koshi, Fukken jijo jissa hokoku, PP· 2-3. 5. So Kee-long, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, pp. 133, 142. My estimate of overland transport on foot is based on practices in Te-hua in the 1930s; a laborer carrying 50 kg (no lbs) of goods could travel 30 km (r8 mi) a day (Te-hua hsien-chih pien-tsuan wei-yiian-hui, Te-hua hsien-chih, p. 282). 6. See Ch'eng Kuang-yii, "Sung-Yuan shih-tai chih Ch'iian-chou ch'iao-liang yen-chiu." 7. The best example is an eminent scholar-official of Hsien-yu origin named Ts'ai Hsiang, who planted pine trees alongside the road for 700 Ii to provide shady resting places for weary travelers (Huang Yen-sun, Hsien-ch'i chih, 4: 7a-b ). 8. Taiwan sotokufu nettai sangyo chosakai, Minami Shina no shigen to keizai, · PP 48-49. 9. So Kee-long, "Sung-tai Ch'iian-chou,'' pp. 75-84. ro. On communications between the capital ofTe-hua county and the city of Ch'iian-chou, see So Kee-long, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, pp. 147-52. The cities of Yung-ch'un and An-ch'i were located upstream of the two rivers that joined to form the Chin River. The city of Nan-an was located downstream from the con­ vergence point ofthese two rivers, some 5 km from the city of Ch'iian-chou. Thus, communications from either Yung-ch'un or An-ch'i had to go through Nan-an. n. The historical location of Nan-an city can be found in every local gazet­ teer compiled before the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45. The shift in location

Notes to Pages 137-39

351

was mainly due to wartime strategic needs (see Li Han-ch'ing, Nan-an hsu-chih, 2: m9-20). 12. Shiba Yoshinobu, "The History of Water Conservancy"; idem, Sodai Ko­ nan keizaishi kenkya, pp. 167-226. 13. For comprehensive treatments of Sung urbanism, see Finegan, "Urbanism in Sung China"; Laurence Ma, Commercial Development and Urban Change in Sung

China. 14. Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China"; idem, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems." 15. Umehara Kaoru ("Sodai chiho shotoshi no ichimen") claims that Sung towns are predominantly market towns and that genuine manufacturing towns are extremely rare. This does not square with the case of South Fukien. 16. For an overview of the emergence of market towns in Sung times, see Fu Tsung-wen, Sung-tai ts'ao-shih-chen yen-chiu; and Kuo Cheng-chung, Liang-Sung ch'eng-hsiang shang-p'in huo-pi ching-chi k'ao-lueh, esp. pp. 66-77. 17. For a brief description of this system, see McKnight, Village and Bureau­ cracy in Southern Sung, chaps. 2 and 3. 18. Tan Ch'i-hsiang, Ti-t'u-chi, 6: 32-33, 67-68; So Kee-long, "Liang Sung Min-nan Kuang-tung wai-mao-tiu ch'an-yeh te k'ung-chien mo-shih," pp. 16869. See also Chapter 8 for an updated analysis. 19. Skinner, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," p. 277. 20. See Ch'eng Su-lo, "Sung-tai ch'eng-shih ching-chi kai-k'uang," esp. pp. 14-15. In fact, most of the evidence used to substantiate this notion relates mainly to the metropolitan capitals of K'ai-feng and Hang-chou. Moreover, ur­ ban factories were mainly official enterprises. That similar booming industries existed in other major Sung cities still needs to be confirmed. However, at least for the mining industry, most identifiable workshops were located away from urban centers. 21. In modern times, there are navigable waterways connecting most parts of Te-hua to both Fu-chou and Ch'iian-chou. Yet there is evidence that such was not the case down to 1949 (see Te-hua hsien-chih pien-tsuan wei-yiian-hui, Te­ hua hsien-chih, pp. 269, 276-77). 22. On these market towns, see So Kee-long, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, pp. 13258; Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. no-19; Fu Tsung-wen, Ts'ao-shih­ chen, pp. 530-32; Tan Ch'i-hsiang, Ti-t'u-chi, 6: 32-33, 67-68; CCFC, 1763, 4: 5b, 5: l2a; PMTC, 15: 285; Wang Ta-ching, P'u-t'ien hsien-chih, l: l4a-15b, 3: 46a; Lo Ch'ing-hsiao, Chang-chou Ju-chih, 12: 27b, 22: 35a, 23: l3a, 29: 5b; Huang Yen-sun, Hsien-ch'i-chih, l: 7b; and Ho Ch'iao-yiian, Min shu, 36: 897. 23. An-hai chih, 2: nb; K'o Ts'ung-huang, Chung-hsiu An-p'ing chih, 3a-b.

352

Notes to Pages 139-43

24. Huang Yen-sun, Hsien-ch'i chih, l: 7a. 25. SHYCK, "Shih-huo," 16: 21a-22b. 26. SSC, 9: 7716a. 27. Fu Tsung-wen, Ts'ao-shih-chen, 273-82. 28. Chao Kang, Chung-kuo ch'eng-shih Ja-chan-shih lun-chi, pp. 139-99. See also the discussion by Harriet Zurndorfer (Change and Continuity in Chinese Local History, pp. 126-30 ) on the export-directed "dendritic system" of markets in Hui-chou, in which local producers in the hinterland cultivated and produced tea and timber for collection by merchants who shipped the products to remote external metropolises, thereby depriving the farmers of the chance of direct contact with the markets. 29. Skinner, "Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," pp. 276-81. 30. Yii Yiieh-tsu ("Kuan-yii Sung-tai chien-chih-chen te chi ke li-shih ti-li wen-t'i") classified Sung market towns into three categories in accordance with their economic function: nodal transportation towns, local marketing towns, and industrial outlet towns. These categories no doubt reflect the diversity of Sung market towns. However, what Yu did not explore is the possibility that a given town had more than one function. Also, his classification of the town of Hai-k'ou near Chang-chou city as an industrial outlet may not fit the economic function of that town well, for there was not much industrial output from that area under the Sung. Rather, it functioned as a trading center for agricultural sur­ pluses vis-a-vis the regional center of Ch'iian-chou city. It was Tun-chao, further south on the coast, the center for a cluster of kiln towns specializing in the pro­ duction ofexport ceramics, that fulfilled the condition ofindustrial outlet. 31. Clark discussed the population of South Fukien at length. 32. Lo Ch'ing-hsiao, Chang-chouJu-chih, ro: 4b. 33. PMTC, 20: 393-94. 34. Goodall, Human Geography, pp. 417, 495. 35. For a general discussion of the rural administrative system and its evolu­ tion in Sung and Yuan times, see Yanagida Setsuko, So-Gen gosonsei no kenkya, pp. 377-424. 36. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 80. 37. McKnight (Village and Bureaucracy, p. 75) provides different translations: "canton" for hsiang and "township" for li. I think McKnight's definitions are more precise. He states: "The canton (hsiang) was an areal subdivision of the subprefecture (called county in this study], and the township (li) an areal sub­ unit of the canton." The key point is that although the township was subordi­ nate to the canton, both designate geographic entities rather than the agglom­ erations of rural households that the term "village" usually implies. In this dis-

Notes to Pages 143-52

353

cussion, I prefer to use the terms "subdistrict" for hsiang and "canton" for Ii to avoid further confusion with "township" and "village" used by these two authors. 38. For a summary of the pao-chia system, see McKnight, Village and Bureau­ cracy, chap. 4; and Wu T'ai, "Sung-tai pao-chia-fa t'an-wei." 39. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 80-95. 40. Mo Shang-chien, Hui-an hsien-chih, 1:3a-4b. See also CCFC, 1763, 5:13a. I follow Clark's translation here. 41. So Kee-long, review of Hugh Clark, Community, Trade, Networks, p. 85. 42. For instance, the Pa-Min t'ung-chih of 1490 notes: "[In Hui-an county,] it was under the Yuan dynasty that the former Sung system of Ii was transformed into 34 tu" (PMTC, 16:5b). Moreover, it is recorded in the 1763 edition ofCh'iian­ chou Ju-chih that, for the counties of Chin-chiang, Nan-an, T'ung-an and Hui-an, which had the tu system in later dynasties, in all but Hui-an the system was transformed from Ii to tu in Yuan times. Hence, there was no standardized measure to introduce a uniform tu-pao system in place of the old hsiang-li system in South Fukien from the Sung to the Ming, despite the national policy of abolishing the latter. More important, the Sung tu-pao system, with its rather rigid numerical regularity, often joined families inhabiting different villages. In any event, the location of tu can hardly be taken to indicate locations of rural settlements. For the confusion in implementation of the pao-chia system from the Sung to the Yuan, see Tseng Tzu-sheng, "Sung Chin yii Yuan te hsiang-li chih-tu kai-k'uang"; Ch'en Yen-te, "Yuan-tai nung-ts'un chi-ts'eng tsu-chih yii fu-i chih-tu." 43. CCFC, 1763, 5: 2a-9a. 44. Ibid., 5: 9a-13a. 45. Wang Ta-ching, P'u-t'ien hsien-chih, l: 7a-21b. 46. By "rural settlement" (RS), I refer to a village whose inhabitants engaged primarily in agricultural production. Occasionally market towns and kiln towns were included in this category in the gazetteers. Since their numbers are small, they would not significantly skew the general picture. 47. For an overall account of Sung villages, see Yanagida, Gosonsei, pp. 38895, 413-24; and Shiba Yoshinobu, "Sodai Koshu no shuraku fukugen." 48. Chou Ying, Hsing-hua Ju-chih, ro:rb. See also Li Yu-chieh, P'u-yang pi-shih, l: 4a. 49. Huang Yen-sun, Hsien-ch'i chih, l: 13a. 50. So Kee-long, Min-nan Ch'iian-chou, pp. 132-80. Note that, naturally, this land-route system developed and changed over time. Certain routes were more important in earlier periods but were replaced by others that emerged later.

354

Notes to Pages 152-61

51. Ibid., pp. 163-64. Hsien-hsia Mountain Road had been in use since antiq­ uity. Yet it was a thorough renovation in the n7os that made it the most popu­ lar route among travelers. Prior to that, there was another popular route linking Chien-chou to Ch'ii-chou and the Che River via Ch'ien-chou in southern Che­ chiang circuit. 52. Ch'eng Kuang-yii, "Ch'iian-chou ch'iao-liang,'' pp. 313-16. 53. So Kee-long, "Economic Developments," p. 184. 54. For the text, see An-hai chih (early Ch'ing ed.), 3: 9a-na. Some measure­ ments were supplied by the Museum for Overseas Relations in Ch'iian-chou in 1980. See also Ch'eng Kuang-yii, "Ch'iian-chou ch'iao-liang,'' pp. 317-25. 55. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 95-no. 56. Ibid., p. no. 57. See Ch'eng Kuang-yii, "Ch'iian-chou ch'iao-liang,'' pp. 325-27. 58. Shen Ting-chiin, Chang-chou Ju-chih, 39: 3a. 59. Wang Hsiang-chih, Yu-ti chi-sheng, 13: 3a. 60. Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 74-75. 61. Skinner, The City, p. 216. The difference between functional and formal regions is quite important in Skinner's framework. For debates regarding this point, see Sands and Myers, "The Spatial Approach to Chinese History"; and Little, Understanding Peasant China, pp. 68-104. 62. Skinner, The City, pp. 281-83, 2n-13. 63. Skinner, "Presidential Address: The Structure of Chinese History"; see esp. pp. 275-79 for a discussion of the SEC. 64. Ibid., pp. 279-86. 65. For a brief account of the controversy over the concepts of core and pe­ riphery, see Little, Rural China, pp. 88-94. 66. For a discussion of this elaborated core-periphery schema, see Lavely et al., "Chinese Demography: The State of the Field." 67. Hartwell, "Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations of China, 750-1550," pp. 367-n

Chapter 7 l. See, e.g., Kato Shigeshi, Shina keizaishi koshii, l: 299-346; Kracke, "Sung So­ ciety: Change Within Tradition"; Lawrence Ma, Commercial Development; Elvin, The Pattern of Chinese Past, esp. pp. 175-78; Shiba Yoshinobu, "Urbanization and the Development of Markets in the Lower Yangtze Valleys"; Liang Keng-yao, "Nan-Sung ch'eng-shih te fa-chan"; and Finegan, "Urbanism in Sung China." 2. For K'ai-feng, see Kracke, "Sung K'ai-feng''; and Wright, "The Cosmology of the Chinese City." For Hang-chou, see Shiba Yoshinobu, "Soto Koshii no

Notes to Page 161

355

shogyokaku"; Umehara Kaoru, "Nan-So no Rin'an"; Ho Yeh-chu, Chung-kuo ku­ tai ch'eng-shih kuei-hua shih lun-ts'ung, pp. 218-85; and Lin Cheng-ch'iu, Nan-Sung tu-ch'eng Lin-an. For Su-chou, see Ibara Hiroshi, "To-So jidai no Sessei ni okeru toshi no hensen"; Liang Keng-yao, "Sung-Yuan shih-tai te Su-chou"; Kao Yung­ yuan, "Ku-tai Su-chou ch'eng-shih pu-chu te li-shih fa-chan"; Tonami Mamoru, "To-So jidai ni okeru Soshu"; and Michael Marme, "Heaven on Earth: The Rise of Suzhou, u27-1550." For a brief account of the urban landscape of Sung Ming­ chou, see Umehara Kaoru, "Sodai toshi no zeifu." 3. Many important works on this topic are collected in Skinner, The City, esp. Chang Sen-dou, "The Morphology of Walled Capitals"; Mote, "The Transfor­ mation of Nanking, 1350-1400"; Shiba Yoshinobu, "Ningpo and Its Hinter­ land"; and Skinner, "Introduction: Urban Social Structure in Ch'ing China." See also Chang Sen-dou, "Some Aspects of the Urban Geography of the Chinese Hsien Capital"; idem, "Some Observations"; and Shiba Yoshinobu, "Sodai no toshi jokaku." 4. For my earlier work on this subject, see So Kee-long, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, pp. 95-131. 5. There are two extant editions of the prefectural gazetteer for Ch'uan-chou. The earlier one was compiled by Yang Ssu-ch'ien in 1612, and the later one was compiled by Huai Yin-pu in 1763. 6. Many of these works were published in local periodicals such as Ch'uan­ chou wen-shih and Hai-chiao-shih yen-chiu. Most relevant here are Ch'en Yun-tun, "Ch'uan-chou ku ch'eng-chih t'a-k'an chi-yao"; and Chuang Wei-chi, "Ch'uan­ chou li-tai ch'eng-chih te t'an-so." Ch'en's article also provides a 1:15,000 city map, which was particularly useful for reconstructing the urban landscape of Sung Ch'uan-chou in the present article. However, I find it difficult to concur with Ch'en's reconstruction of the Sung city wall, since he contends that it was much smaller than the Ming-Ch'ing wall. First, there is no documentary evi­ dence in Ming-Ch'ing gazetteers for such a major alteration of the city wall during these periods. There were minor alterations made from time to time, but they hardly affected the overall layout of the city wall. If the compilers of gazet­ teers noted even those minor changes, would they have neglected to mention a major undertaking to expand the city wall? Second, in terms of population and prosperity, Ch'uan-chou declined drastically after the Yuan. It is therefore un­ likely that the city wall would have been enlarged during these periods. In this chapter, I identify the Ming-Ch'ing city wall, which still existed in the early twentieth century, with that of the Sung-Yuan periods. 7. Such as CCFC, 1612; CCFC, 1763; CCHC; PMTC.

Notes to Pages 162-66 8. Among the sources, CCHC, 2: ra-2b, provides the most reasonable account of the city walls in Ch'iian-chou. 9. SS, 483: r3957-59. IO. YHCHTC, 29: 720. n. HTS, 4r: ro65. r2. CCHC, 2: rb. Note that in CCFC, r6r2, 4: rb, the date of construction was mistakenly noted as 905. This error was corrected in CCHC. r3. HTS, 4r: ro65. r4. Chang Sen-dou, "Morphology,'' pp. 87-89. For a discussion of the origin of this concept, see Wright, "Cosmology,'' pp. 47-48. r5. Chang Sen-dou, "Morphology,'' p. 88. His example of such a small city is Shih-hsing in Nan-hsiung chou ofKwangtung province, which occupied a mere 0.65 hectares (r.6 acres). r6. Chuang Wei-chi ("Ch'iian-chou li-tai ch'eng-chih," p. r6) estimated that the original prefectural city in Nan-an county before the establishment of Ch'iian-chou city at its present site was around 4 Ii in length. r7. CCFC, r763, n: 2a. Both CCHC, 2: 2b, and CCFC, r6r2, 4: 2a mistakenly date it to n3r. r8. CCFC, r763, n: rb. It measures ro.8 km ( 6.7 mi) on the r:r5,ooo city map in Ch'en Yiin-tun, "Ch'iian-chou ku ch'eng-chih." r9. Chang Sen-dou ("Morphology,'' p. 90) gave an estimate of 640 hectares, covering virtually the same city area. From the r:r5,ooo city map, I found the size of the corresponding area to be 720 hectares (r,778 acres). I also measured the r:50,ooo map of coastal Fukien, "Senshii no. 7," compiled by the Imperial Land Survey Section of the Japanese General Staff in r906. The result was 570 hec­ tares (r,408 acres). Although it is difficult to obtain an exact measurement of the city's size, we may assume that it was not too far from the average of these fig­ ures, i.e., 640 hectares. 20. For an excellent survey of r50 Sung city walls, see Shiba, Kanan keizaishi, pp. 285-3n. 2r. Chuang Wei-chi, "Tan tsui-chin fa-hsien te Ch'iian-chou chung-wai chiao-t'ung te shih-chi." Chuang cited a passage from the Liu genealogy that suggests that the outer wall was built in 944. 22. Chang Sen-dou, "Morphology,'' p. 90. 23. CCHC, 2: 2a. 24. Chuang Wei-chi, Chin-chiang hsin-chih, p. 4. 25. SS, 483: r3958. 26. CCFC, r763, n: 2a. 27. See, e.g., CCHC, r5: 43b-44a.

Notes to Pages 170-74

357

28. SS, 167: 3973. The military commander in chief was stationed in the provincial capital ofFu-chou. 29. Ibid., 167: 3978. 30. Chang Sen-dou, "Morphology," p. 99. 31. For a brief account of the imperial clansmen living in Ch'iian-chou, see Kuwahara, Ho ]uki5, pp. 180-81; and Doi Hiroko, "Sodai no Senshii boeki to soshitsu." 32. Chu Hsi, Chu Wen-kung wen-chi, 98: 3a-b. 33. Liu Tzu-chien, "Liieh-lun Sung-tai ti-fang kuan-hsiieh ho ssu-hsiieh te hsiao-chang''; Chaffee, The Thorny Gates ofLearning in Sung China, pp. 89-94. 34. For a brief account of the education of imperial clansmen under the Sung, see Sung Hsi, "Sung-tai te tsung-hsiieh." 35. Chao Yii-shih, Pin-t'ui lu, 8: 14a. For a brief account of the development of city god temples in Sung times, see Johnson, 'The City-God Cults ofT'ang and Sung China." Johnson contends that the spread of city god temples under the Sung may have had much to do with commercial growth. In the case of Ch'iian­ chou, such establishments seem to have occurred even before the takeoff of the local commercial sector. 36. Ch'en Ta-sheng ("Ch'iian-chou Ch'ing-ching-ssu") established that there may well have been more than seven mosques in Ch'iian-chou during the Sung and Yuan periods. The locations of only three of these are known. I previously believed that there may have been a Hindu temple in this zone, but I now re­ serve judgment on this issue because of inadequate evidence. There may well have been one or two Hindu temples in this area, but we cannot establish their locations (see Guy, "The Lost Temples ofNagapattinam and Quanzhou"). 37. Liu Ming-shu ("Sung-tai hai-shang chiao-t'ung-shih tsa-k'ao," p. 1772) provides rather concrete evidence to substantiate this point. For a precise ac­ count of the more and more common phenomenon of suburban commercial districts outside the city gates in Sung times, see Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 309-12. 38. For a general account of suburban development in Sung cities, see Ch'eng Yii, "Sung-tai ch'eng-chiao fa-chan te yuan-yin yii t'e-tien." 39. Skinner, The City, p. 527. 40. For detailed discussion of these overland routes, see So Kee-long, Min­ nan Ch'uan-chou, pp. 132-58. 41. Yeh Wen-ch'eng, "Chin-chiang Ch'iian-chou ku wai-hsiao t'ao-tz'u ch'u­ t'an," p. 105. 42. CCFC, 1763, 16: 14a-b. 43. For small workshops in Sung times, see Chu Ch'ing-yiian, T'ang-Sung kuan-ssu kung-yeh, pp. 52-56.

Notes to Pages 174-85 44. For an excellent account of the urban social structure of the Southern Sung, see Liang Keng-yao, Sung-tai she-hui ching-chi-shih lun-chi, l: 591-680. 45. For instance, Fang Hao, Fang Hao liu-shih tzu-ting kao, 2: 1335-60; Ho Yeh-chii, Chung-kuo ku-tai ch'eng-shih, pp. 200-217. 46. See Ihara, "To-So jidai," pp. 64-66; idem, "Sodai Sessei ni okeru toshi to shidaifu"; Umehara, "Nan-So no Rin'an," p. 25; and Ho Yeh-chii, Chung-kuo ku­ tai ch'eng-shih, pp. 215-16. In CCHC and CCFC, explanatory notes for Jang or other buildings always use the existence of the residence of eminent city dwellers to indicate their locations or importance. 47. Skinner, The City, p. 533. 48. Chaffee, The Thorny Gates, pp. 86-88. 49. SSC, lo: 7722b; PMTC, 20: 3a-b; CCFC, 1763, 18: l6b. 50. Wang Hsiang-chih, Yu-ti chi-sheng, 130: 4b. 51. Chu Mu, Fang-yu sheng-lan, 12: 9b. 52. Liang Keng-yao, "Nan-Sung ch'eng-shih," pp. 435-36. Clark (Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 139) accepts the estimate of 500,000 persons. 53. Chang Sen-dou, "Some Observations on the Morphology of Chinese Walled Cities," pp. 70-71. A higher estimate of the urban population of T'ang Ch'ang-an puts it at approximately 58,000 persons per square mile, which still makes even the lower estimate of Sung Ch'iian-chou look unusually dense (Yen Keng-wang, "T'ang-tai Ch'ang-anjen-k'ou shu-liang chih ku-ts'e," pp. l-20). 54. This is comparable to an estimate of 200,000 persons in the physically larger Fu-chou city made by Michael Finnegan in an unpublished manuscript (cited in Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 139, 23on70). 55. Liang Keng-yao, "Nan-Sung ch'eng-shih," pp. 431-41. 56. For the population of Fu-chou prefecture, see Table 7+ For the urban population of Fu-chou city, see Lin Chih-ch'i, Cho-chai wen-chi (SKCS ed.), supp.: 2a. 57. Finnegan, "Urbanism in Sung China," pp. 307-9. 58. Skinner, The City, pp. 533-37. 59. Rozman, Population and Marketing Settlements in Ch'ing China, pp. 62-65. 60. For the growth of commerce in Sung times, see Liang Keng-yao, "Nan­ Sung ch'eng-shih," pp. 420-31; for government policy on foreign trade, see Ku­ wabara, Ho ]uko, pp. 31-32, 56-60; for the social status of the Sung merchants, see Sung Hsi, Sung-shih yen-chiu lun-ts'ung, pp. l-14; and Chu Jui-hsi, "Sung-tai shang-jen te she-hui ti-wei chi ch'i li-shih tso-yung." For a general picture of the status of merchants in traditional China, see Yang Lien-sheng, "Government Control of Urban Merchants in Traditional China."

Notes to Pages 186-87

359

Chapter 8 r. Instead of"trade ceramics," I use the term "export ceramics" (wai-mao-tz'u), which is becoming more popular among ceramic scholars because it conveys the character of the commodity better. It primarily refers to wares expressly pro­ duced for export rather than for the local or interregional domestic trade, even though some of these wares may have circulated in domestic markets, albeit not a significant proportion in terms of the total output. 2. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, chap. 6; Wheatley, "Geographical Notes." 3. For instance, Ho Chuimei has been working on a project to investigate every known kiln-site in South Fukien and to update our knowledge of the ce­ ramics industry in this region from the middle periods. 4. Two forthcoming publications by Ho Chuimei will shed important light on this topic: "The Ceramic Boom in Minnan During Song and Yuan Times"; and "Provincial, National or International? The Minnan Glazed Ceramic In­ dustry in the Last Millennium." I am indebted to Ho for allowing me to make use of these works. As she remarked, although her studies greatly enhance our understanding of the details of that industry, her accounts do not contradict the general thesis of my previous writings on the subject. Due to the incomplete nature of her research results, I therefore note her findings in this chapter only as a point of reference, but do not substantially revise my argument based solely on these two forthcoming works. 5. On the ceramics industry in Ch'uan-chou in general, see Feng Hsien-ming, "Hsin Chung-kuo t'ao-tz'u k'ao-ku"; Ch'en Wan-li, ''Tiao-ch'a Min-nan ku-tai yao-chih hsiao-chi"; Tregear, "Chinese Ceramic Imports to Japan Between the Ninth and Fourteenth Centuries"; Li I-piao, "Kuan-yii Sung-Yuan Ch'uan-chou tz'u-yeh chung tzu-pen-chu-i meng-ya te ch'u�t'an"; Hsu Ch'ing-ch'uan, "Sung­ tai Ch'uan-chou tz'u-yeh te fa-chan yu wai-hsiao"; idem, "Sung-Yuan Ch'uan­ chou t'ao-tz'u"; and Hughes-Stanton and Kerr, Kiln Sites ofAncient China. 6. Hsu Ch'ing-ch'uan, "Sung-tai Ch'uan-chou tz'u-ch'i shou-kung-yeh"; Fu­ chien-sheng Chin-chiang ti-ch'u wen-kuan-hui, "Chin-chiang ti-ch'u wen-wu k'ao-ku p'u-ch'a"; Yeh Wen-ch'eng, "Chin-chiang Ch'uan-chou ku wai-hsiao t'ao-tz'u ch'u-t'an"; Ch'uan-chou hai-wai chiao-t'ung-shih po-wu-kuan, Tiao­ ch'a-tsu, "Chin-chiang-hsien Tz'u-tsao t'ao-tz'u-shih tiao-ch'a-chi"; Ch'en P'eng, "Fu-chien Chin-chiang Tz'u-tsao ku-yao-chih"; Yeh Wen-ch'eng, "Chin-chiang Tz'u-tsao-yao te fa-chan chi ch'i wai-hsiao." 7. Huang Ping-yuan, "Pu-chien Nan-an Shih-pi-shui-k'u ku-yao-chih shih­ chueh ch'ing-k'uang"; Ch'uan-chou hai-wai chiao-t'ung-shih po-wu-kuan, "Fu-

Notes to Page r87 chien Nan-an Ssu-tu fa-hsien hsin-shih-ch'i shih-tai i-chih ho Sung tz'u-yao yao-chih." 8. Fu-chien-sheng wen-kuan-hui, "T'ung-an-hsien T'ing-ch'i shui-k'u ku tz'u-yao tiao-ch'a-chi"; Huang Han-chieh, "Tung-an Sung-tai yao-chih"; Li Hui-ping, "Fu-chien-sheng T'ung-an-yao tiao-ch'a chi-liieh.'' 9. Yeh Wen-ch'eng, Chung-kuo ku wai-hsiao-tz'u, pp. 23-24. ro. Fu-chien-sheng po-wu-kuan, "Fu-chien Hui-an Yin-ts'o-wei ku-yao-chih fa-chiieh chien-pao." n. Feng Hsien-ming, "Hsin Chung-kuo t'ao-tz'u k'ao-ku," pp. 38-39, 52-53; Li Hui-ping, "P'u-t'ien yao-chih ch'u-t'an"; K'o Feng-mei and Ch'en Hao, "Fu­ chien P'u-t'ien ku-yao-chih"; Kamei Meitoku, Fukkenshi5 koyi5seki shutsudo ti5jiki no kenkya, pp. 50-56. 12. Feng Hsien-ming, "Hsin Chung-kuo t'ao-tz'u k'ao-ku," pp. 38-39, 52-53; Fu-ctiien-sheng po-wu-kuan, "Fu-chien Chang-p'u-hsien ku-yao-chih tiao-ch'a"; Wang Wen-ching, "Fu-chien Chang-p'u Sung-Yuan yao-chih"; idem, "Fu-chien Chang-p'u-hsien Ch'ih-t'u ku-yao-chih tiao-ch'a"; Kamei, Fukkenshi5 koyi5seki, pp. 62-65. 13. An-ch'i-hsien wen-hua-kuan, "Fu-chien An-ch'i ku-yao-chih tiao-ch'a." 14. Hsii Pen-chang et al., "Liieh t'an Te-hua-yao te ku wai-hsiao tz'u-ch'i"; Te-hua ku-tz'u-yao-chih k'ao-ku fa-chiieh kung-tso-tui, "Ch'ii-tou-kung yao­ chih fa-chiieh chien-pao"; Tseng Fan, "Kuan-yii Te-hua Ch'ii-tou-kung-yao te chi-ke wen-t'i"; Li Hui-ping, "Kuan-yii Te-hua Ch'ii-tou-kung-yao te wo­ chien"; Lin Chung-kan and Chang Wen-yin, "Sung-Yuan Te-hua-yao te fen­ ch'i tuan-tai." 15. Yeh Wen-ch'eng, Chung-kuo ku wai-hsiao-tz'u, p. 191. 16. This belief is based on the observation that a technique of inverted stacking, or "stepped saggar," was commonly found in these South Fukien kilns. This technique was first employed by kilns in North China, especially Ting­ yao, from the late tenth century on and spread to the south around the end of the Northern Sung, when it was further developed in Ching-te-chen and Te­ hua to maximize the space inside the kiln for mass production. It thus provides a good indicator for the dating of Sung kilns (see Li Hui-ping, "Kuan-yii Te­ hua Ch'ii-tou-kung-yao," p. 67; Tregear, Song Ceramics, pp. 36-37; for a brief de­ scription of this technique, see Guy, Oriental Trade Ceramics in Southeast Asia, pp. 74-75) . For more recent efforts to date the Te-hua kilns, which attribute the early export ceramics production in that remote county to the late Northern Sung, see Lin Chung-kan and Chang Wen-yin, "Sung-Yuan Te-hua-yao te fen­ ch'i tuan-tai," p. 559. Kamei (Fukkenshi5 koyi5seki, pp. 24-34) holds that the prime time of T'ung-an celadon production did not occur until the second half of the

Notes to Pages rBB-90 twelfth century. Ho Chuimei ("Ceramic Boom") has tentatively postulated a more detailed breakdown of the studied South Fukien kiln sites. According to her findings, the earliest cluster of large-scale kiln sites can be dated only to Phase A (1050-n50) in her five-phases scheme, most probably around the 1080s and 1090s. Phase B covers those from the twelfth to the thirteenth century. The next two phases are for the Yuan period, followed by Phase E of the early Ming. This dating scheme roughly coincides with my assumptions in this chapter. 17. Hsii Ch'ing-ch'iian, "Sung-Yuan Ch'iian-chou t'ao-tz'u," pp. 90-91. 18. This is based on reports up to the mid-199os. Ho Chuimei, however, has done a more thorough counting of the sites and claims to have found about 25 percent more. Adding her figures to my overview would only further substanti­ ate my argument. But Ho used an innovative method of counting that diverges from the conventional methods and has yet to be accepted as standard. For in­ stance, she double-counts a site that appears to have had production booms at two different dates. To avoid controversy and make the data used here more comparable, I have decided not to revise my counting of kiln sites according to her method. 19. Hsii Ch'ing-ch'iian, "Sung-tai Ch'iian-chou tz'u-yeh," pp. 5-6. Ho Chuimei, "Ceramic Boom," also supports this observation. 20. Feng Hsien-ming, "Hsin Chung-kuo t'ao-tz'u k'ao-ku," p. 38; Yeh Wen­ ch'eng, "Chin-chiang Ch'iian-chou ku wai-hsiao t'ao-tz'u"; Li Hui-ping, "Kuan­ yii Te-hua Ch'ii-tou-kung-yao," p. 68; Tseng Fan, "Kuan-yii Te-hua Ch'ii-tou­ kung-yao," pp. 63-65. Ho Chuimei ("Ceramic Boom") has identified Nan-an and Te-hua as two major "zones" of ceramic production in South Fukien. Ac­ cording to her, the Nan-an zone includes the three coastal counties of Nan-an, Chin-chiang, and Tung-an, whereas the Te-hua zone covers the three interior counties ofTe-hua, An-ch'i, and Yung-ch'un. 21. Li Hui-ping, "Fu-chien-sheng T'ung-an-yao," p. So. 22. For a more detailed classification into thirteen groups, see Ho Chuimei, "Ceramic Boom." 23. On Lung-ch'iian celadon, see Ch'en Wan-Ii, Chung-kuo ch'ing-tz'u shih-lueh. 24. Ch'en Wan-Ii, "Tiao-ch'a Min-nan ku-tai yao-chih," p. 56. 25. Ch'iian-chou hai-wai chiao-t'ung-shih po-wu-kuan, "Fu-chien Nan-an Ssu-tu," p. 63; Huang Ping-yuan, "Fu-chien Nan-an Shih-pi-shui-k'u ku-yao­ chih," p. 53. 26. An-ch'i-hsien wen-hua-kuan, "Fu-chien An-ch'i ku-yao-chih," p. 65. 27. Li Hui-ping, "P'u-t'ien yao-chih," p. 42. 28. Feng Hsien-ming, "Hsin Chung-kuo t'ao-tz'u k'ao-ku," p. 38; Li Hui­ ping, "Fu-chien-sheng T'ung-an-yao"; Kamei Meitoku, Nihon boeki tojishi, pp.

Notes to Pages I90-93 158-59. Recently hundreds of pieces belonging to this type were unearthed in downtown Fukuoka in Kyushu (Kamei, Fukkensho koyoseki, 24-49 ). 29. Yeh Wen-ch'eng, Chung-kuo ku wai-hsiao-tz'u, pp. 23-24; Fu-chien-sheng po-wu-kuan, "Fu-chien Chang-p'u-hsien ku-yao-chih," pp. ro8, 123; An-ch'i­ hsien wen-hua-kuan, "Fu-chien An-ch'i ku yao-chih," p. 65; Li Hui-ping, "P'u­ t'ien yao-chih," p. 42; Li Hsi-ching and Li Chih-yen, 'Juko seiji ni tsuite no ken­ kyu sensetsu." 30. An important group of small-mouthed jars with black-brown glaze was probably used as wine containers (Ho Chuimei, "Ceramic Boom"). 31. Ch'en P'eng, "Fu-chien Chin-chiang Tz'u-tsao," p. 497; Yeh Wen-ch'eng, Chung-kuo ku wai-hsiao-tz'u, p. 232. Ho ("Ceramic Boom") notes that sometimes these black-glazed teabowls were stonewares. 32. Guy, Oriental Trade Ceramics, pp. 71-72. 33. Ibid., p. 72; An-ch'i-hsien wen-hua-kuan, "Fu-chien An-ch'i ku-yao-chih," p. 65; Li Hui-ping, "Kuan-yii Te-hua Ch'ii-tou-kung-yao," p. 67; Te-hua ku­ tz'u-yao-chih k'ao-ku fa-chiieh kung-tso-tui, "Ch'ii-tou-kung yao-chih," p. 57; Wang Wen-ching, "Fu-chien Chang-p'u Sung-Yuan yao-chih," p. 107. Ho Chuimei ("Ceramic Boom"), however, cautions that there may be confusion among ceramic scholars because some South Fukien ying-ch'ing had a grayish green color that was between celadon and standard ying-ch'ing. To me this is a matter of terminology, and I continue to use the looser definition assumed in previous reports. 34. Ho Chuimei, "Ceramic Boom." 35. Hsii Ch'ing-ch'iian, "Sung-Yuan Ch'iian-chou t'ao-tz'u," pp. 91-92. 36. An illustrative example is the kendis. This type of ware was used mainly in Southeast Asia but seldom in China (see Hsii Pen-chang et al., "Liieh t'an Te­ hua-yao," pp. 149-50; Yeh Wen-ch'eng, Chung-kuo ku wai-hsiao-tz'u, pp. 183-201; and Ho Chuimei, "Ceramic Boom"). 37. For communication routes from Ch'iian-chou to Lung-ch'iian and Ching­ te-chen, see So Kee-long, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, pp. 132-80. These two kilns were the most famous and popular kilns during the Southern Sung and Yuan. 38. Li Chih-yen and Ch'en P'eng, "Sung-Yuan shih-ch' i Ch' iian-chou-kang te t'ao-tz'u shu-ch'u." 39. For a precise analysis of the trade ceramics market in Southeast Asia, see Guy ("Trade Ceramics in Southeast Asia and the Acculturation Process"). He concludes that demand for lower-quality ceramics by the populace prompted the unprecedented expansion of this trade from the Sung. For the various uses of Chinese export ceramics by the ruling classes and commoners in Indonesia, see Sumarah, Antique Ceramics Found in Indonesia, pp. 34-52. For the relationship

Notes to Pages 193-94 between Chinese export ceramics and Southeast Asian political culture, see Manguin, "The Merchant and the King,'' esp. p. 52. 40. Te-hua ku tz'u-yao-chih k'ao-ku fa-chiieh kung-tso-tui, "Ch'ii-tou-kung yao-chih," p. 52. 41. Li I-piao, "Kuan-yii Sung-Yuan Ch'iian-chou tz'u-yeh," p. 5. 42. Te-hua ku tz'u-yao-chih k'ao-ku fa-chiieh kung-tso-tui, "Ch'ii-tou-kung yao-chih," p. 58. 43. The T'ao chi was written by Chiang Ch'i. It was previously believed to be a Yuan work, but recent studies date it to around 1214-34 (see Liu Hsin-yiian, "Chiang Ch'i T'ao chi chu-tso shih-tai k'ao-pien"; Sakuma Shigeo, "Sho Ki Toki nendai ko"; Otagi Matsuo, Chugoku toji sangyoshi, pp. 413-40). For a criticism of this view, see Hsiung Liao, "Chiang Ch'i T'ao chi yen-chiu." Hsiung holds that the treatise was written in Yuan times. The issue is not yet conclusively settled, but I find Liu's arguments more convincing. For a brief account of the produc­ tion process, see Tregear, Song Ceramics, pp. 34-37. 44. Ch'en P'eng, "Fu-chien Chin-chiang tz'u-tsao," pp. 491-92. 45. Wang Wen-ching, "Chang-p'u-hsien Ch'ih-t'u ku yao-chih,'' p. 251. 46. Hsii Ch'ing-ch'iian, "Sung-tai Ch'iian-chou tz'u-yeh," p. 5. 47. Guy (Oriental Trade Ceramics, p. 76ni8) estimates the capacity of a Sung Lung-ch'iian kiln as 20,000 to 25,000 pieces for each firing. The length of this Lung-ch'iian kiln was 50.36 meters, and the average width 2.5 meters. The length of the Ch'ii-tou-kung kiln ofTe-hua is estimated at 57.10 meters, and the width at 1.4-2.95 meters (Te-hua ku tz'u-yao-chih k'ao-ku fa-chiieh kung-tso­ tui, "Ch'ii-tou-kung yao-chih," pp. 52-53). The capacity of the Lung-ch'iian kiln can be used to estimate that of this South Fukien kiln. Since the sizes of all kilns discovered in South Fukien are not available, a conservative estimate of 10,000 to 30,000 pieces seems reasonable. 48. Migo koshi, Fukken jijo jissa hokoku, first report, p. 32; Taiwan sotoku kanbo, Chosaka, Nan-Bin jijo, pp. 153-54. 49. For kaolin deposits in modern Fukien, see Fu-chien tzu-jan ti-Ii pien­ hsieh-tsu, Fu-chien tzujan ti-Ii, pp. 37-38; and Qiu Guodong, "Kaolin Deposits in Eastern Fujian," pp. 103-9. 50. Tregear, Song Ceramics, p. 36. 51. So Kee-long, "Liang-Sung Min-nan Kuang-tung wai-mao-tz'u ch'an-yeh te k'ung-chien mo-shih." Previously, I have put forth estimates of 200 and 50 for households per kiln. I now believe that 100 is a more plausible estimate. This is also comparable to recorded cases in Ching-te-chen in the early Ch'ing, where a ceramic workshop would employ around seventeen workers and potters (Liang Miao-t'ai, "Ch'ing-tai Ching-te-chen i-ch'u lu-ts'un yao-hao te shou-chih ying-

Notes to Pages 196-201 Ii"). Ho Chuimei ("Ceramic Boom") estimates at least 47 potters working on a single kiln, not including other supporting workers and traders. This is close to my estimate if the latter two types of personnel are included. 52. Yuan Chen, "Sung-tai hu-k'ou," p. 4r; YS, 62: 1505. 53. Liang Miao-t'ai ("Ch'ing-tai Ching-te-chen," pp. 3-5) estimates that a workshop producing 270,000 medium-size vessels a year would need to invest a production cost of 8.4 cash per vessel. The cost of making a wheat cake in late Northern Sung was around seven cash (Ch'iian Han-sheng, "Sung-mo te t'ung­ huo p'eng-chang chi ch'i tui-yii wu-chia te ying-hsiang,'' r: 240 ). 54. Ho Chuimei, "Ceramic Boom." 55. Dozens of Sung kiln-sites have been discovered on the Lei-chou Penin­ sula to the west of Kuang-chou. These are not included in the present discus­ sion since there is no evidence that any of the production was exported to over­ seas markets (see So Kee-long, "Liang-Sung Min-nan Kuang-tung wai-mao-tz'u ch'an-yeh," p. r3r1 esp. nu). 56. For detailed references on the ceramics industry in Kuang-nan east cir­ cuit, see ibid., pp. r30-3r, esp. n8. 57. Ho Chuimei, "Ceramic Boom." 58. For the rise and fall of Ch'ao-chou kilns, see Kuang-tung-sheng po-wu­ kuan, ed., Ch'ao-chou Pi-chia-shan Sung-tai yao-chih Ja-chueh pao-kao; Huang Yii­ chih and Yang Shao-hsiang, "Kuang-tung Ch'ao-chou Pi-chia-shan Sung-tai tz'u-yao"; and Lam, "Northern Song Guangdong Wares." 59. This is a rather common view. See, e.g., Yeh Shao-ming, "Sung-tai Kuang-tung te tz'u-yao." Ho chuimei ("Ceramic Boom") points out that this had something to do with the competition from South Fukien. 60. Kuang-chou-shih wen-wu kuan-li wei-yiian-hui and Hsiang-kang Chung-wen ta-hsiieh wen-wu-kuan, Kuang-chou Hsi-ts'un-yao, p. 72. 6r. Tseng Kuang-i et al., "Kuang-tung Hui-chou Pei-Sung yao-chih ch'ing-li chien-pao." 62. Ho Chuimei ('The Chaozhou Ceramic Complex 'of 8th-r2th Century China") has suggested an innovative explanation from the decline of Ch'ao-chou in the late twelfth century, attributing it to competition from other kilns and to the localism of the Ch'iian-chou merchants. I do not concur fully with the first factor, but her localism factor supports my argument. 63. Chin Tsu-ming, "Che-chiang Yii-yao ch'ing-tz'u yao-chih tiao-ch'a pao­ kao"; Li Hui-ping, "Tiao-ch'a Che-chiang Yin-hsien yao-chih te shou-huo"; Lin Shih-min, "Shih-lun Ming-chou-kang te li-tai ch'ing-tz'u wai-hsiao"; Gray, Sung Porcelain and Stoneware, pp. 25-37. 64. Feng Hsien-ming, "Hsin Chung-kuo t'ao-tz'u k'ao-ku," p. 37.

Notes to Pages 201-14 65. Gray, Sung Porcelain and Stoneware, pp. 160-79. 66. Feng Hsien-ming, "Hsin Chung-kuo t'ao-tz'u k'ao-ku," p. 37.

Chapter 9 l. For instance, there existed a Srivijayan community in Ch'iian-chou, which, together with other foreign merchants' communities, was large and stable enough to demand a common cemetery (see the last section of this chapter). Another good example is the P'u family discussed in detail in Chapter 5. They moved from Kuang-chou to Ch'iian-chou in the early thirteenth century and, within two generations, had emerged as the most powerful local family in both economic and political terms. 2. For instance, many Chinese merchants actively engaged in the Korean and Japanese trade were based in Ch'iian-chou but registered for overseas trading permits in Ming-chou. Ample evidence can be found in Chapters 2 and 3. 3. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of foreign settlement in maritime Sung China. 4. So Kee-long, "Chinese Identity in the Traditional Context." 5. This usage is very common in the Chufan-chih and refers to Chinese merchants trading in overseas countries with Chinese export goods. 6. Chu Yii, P'ing-chou k'o-t'an, 2: 2b. 7. Ibid., 2: 3a. 8. Liao Ta-k'o, "Sung-tai ya-jen ya-hang yii hai-wai mao-i." 9. Wang Shih-p'eng, Mei-ch'i hou-chi, 17: 16b. ro. Wada Hisanori, 'Teman Ajia ni okeru shoki kakyo shakai," pp. 80-86; Mori, Zoku Nissa boeki, pp. 253-60; and Hsii Ching, Hsuan-ho feng-shih Kao-Ii t'u­ ching, 27: 5b-6a. n. Hirth and Rockhill, ChaoJu-kua, pp. 160-62, 175-90. 12. Chu Yii, P'ing-chou k'o-t'an, 2: 3a. 13. Liao Ta-k'o ("Shih-lun feng-chien shih-li te ya-p'o yii Nan-Sung chung­ hou ch'i hai-shang tzu-pen te shuai-lo," pp. 68-69) estimates the total value of goods on each outgoing vessel at around 10,000 strings and that of each incom­ ing vessel at 70,000 strings. After deducting customs tariffs, official purchases, the interest for credit purchase, operational costs, and so on, the net profit could be around 250 percent. So roo percent is a conservative assumption here. 14. I am indebted to Han Li-ming for help in bringing my calculations more in line with the standard in the field of risk management. 15. Huang Huai and Yang Shih-ch'i, Li-tai ming-ch'en tsou-i, 349: 14b-15a. 16. See Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 435-66. 17. Ibid., pp. 458-61.

Notes to Pages 214-17 18. Ibid.; Ch'in Chiu-shao, Shu-hsueh chiu-chang, 98: l5b-16a. 19. Wang I, Wang Ch'ang-tsung chi, supp. 5a-b. 20. Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 441-47. There were also kanjen and hsing-ch'ien in other economic organizations such as manors and shops. 21. Ibid., pp. 439-41. 22. Ibid., p. 443; Wada Hisanori, 'Teman Ajia ni okeru shoki kakyo shakai," pp. 82-83. 23. Shiba, Shogyoshi, pp. 439-41. 24. Chu Yii, P'ing-chou k'o-t'an, 2: 4a-b. 25. Kato, Shina keizaishi, 2: 228. 26. For a general survey of the Sung practice of purchase on credit, see ibid., 2: 222-34; and Chiang Hsi-tung, Sung-tai shang-yeh hsin-yung yen-chiu, pp. 28-45. 27. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 20: 3oa-b. . 28. Lopez, Commercial Revolution, pp. 76-77. 29. Udovitch, "Credit as a Means oflnvestment in Medieval Islamic Trade," p. 261. 30. Shiba, Shogyoshi, p. 444. 31. Lopez, Commercial Revolution, 76; Udovitch, "Credit as a Means of lnvest­ ment," p. 261. 32. See Ch'iian-chou-wan Sung-tai hai-ch'uan fa-chiieh pao-kao pien-hsieh­ tsu, "Ch'iian-chou-wan Sung-tai hai-ch'uan fa-chiieh chien-pao," pp. 5-7; Ch'en Kao-hua and Wu T'ai, "Kuan-yii Ch'iian-chou-wan ch'u-t'u hai-ch'uan te chi-ke wen-ti"; and Ch'iian Wen, "Ch'iian-chou-wan Sung-tai hai-ch'uan yu-kuan wen-ti te t'an-t'ao," pp. 50-51. 33. For a precise account of these wooden labels, see Fu-chien-sheng Ch'iian­ chou hai-wai chiao-t'ung-shih po-wu-kuan, ed., Ch'uan-chou-wan Sung-tai hai­ ch'uan, pp. 27-31. 34. Fu Tsung-wen, "Hou-chu ku-ch'uan." For different views, see Ch'en Kao-hua and Wu T'ai, "Kuan-yii Ch'iian-chou-wan ch'u-t'u hai-ch'uan te chi ke wen-t'i"; and Chuang Wei-chi and Chuang Ching-hui, "Ch'iian-chou Sung ch'uan mu-p'ai mu-ch'ien k'ao-shih.'' 35. There are only two labels in the last category, but they clearly relate to cash crops and aromatics, respectively. And each carries a brandname: Hsi-ho, or western river; and Li-hsien, meaning "virtuous and polite." The term "trade­ mark" is loosely used here to indicate established brands of certain businesses. It does not carry the same connotation of a modern trademark. For an insightful discussion on the implications of trademarks in the traditional Chinese econ­ omy, see Han Ke-Ii (Gary G. Hamilton) and Lai Chi-kong (Li Chi-kang), "Chung-kuo chin-shih te p'in-p'ai ho shang-piao.'' This is a substantially revised

Notes to Pages 218-21 version of Hamilton and Lai's earlier English article: "Consumerism Without Capitalism.'' 36. Ting Kang, Chin-shih Chung-kuo ching-chi sheng-huo yii tsung-tsu chiao-yii, pp. n3-14. 37. For a precise account of academies in Sung-Yuan China, see Walton, "The Institutional Context of Neo-Confucianism: Scholars, Schools, and shu­ yiian in Sung-Yuan China"; and idem, Academies and Society in Southern Sung

China. 38. Ting Kang, Chin-shih Chung-kuo ching-chi sheng-huo, pp. 107-38. 39. Zurcher, "Buddhism and Education in T'ang Times." 40. E.g., the case of Pao-lin Temple (see the key to Map 7.3, pp. 168-69). 41. Huang Huai and Yang Shih-ch'i, Li-tai ming-ch'en tsou-i, 348: 9a-na. 42. Ch'en Ching, Hsin-tsuan hsiang-p'u, Preface, 4b. 43. Chao Yen-wei, Yiin-lu man-ch'ao, 5: 19b-2oa. 44. Chao Ju-kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, p. l. 45. Ccedes, Sriwijaya; Wheatley, The Golden Khersonese; Wolters, "Studying Srivijaya"; Tibbetts, A Study of the Arabic Texts. For a new reading of the local in­ scriptions, see Kulke, '"Kadatuan Srivijaya'-Empire or Kraton of Srivijayat For a discussion on the diverse usages and derivations of these Chinese and Arabic terms, see Tibbetts, A Study of the Arabic Texts, pp. 100-18. 46. Ccedes, Sriwijaya; Wolters, "Studying Srivijaya"; Rahman, "The Kingdom of Srivijaya as Socio-political and Cultural Entity"; Tarling, Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, vol. l. On the importance of foreign trade in the rise of Srivijaya, see Wolters, Early Indonesian Commerce. 47. Wolters, "A Note on the Capital of Srivijaya During the Eleventh Cen­ tury"; Manguin, "Palembang and Sriwijaya.'' 48. Tarling, Cambridge History ofSoutheast Asia, l: 207-8. 49. According to the Tanjavur inscription, most of the important kratons, in­ cluding Palembangitsel£ had been sacked (Sastri, History ofSri Vijaya, pp. 79-85). 50. For instance, Kedah, Barus, and Lamuri handled international trade rather independently by the end of the eleventh century (Hall, Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia, pp. 195-99). 51. Hall and Whitmore, "Southeast Asian Trade and the Isthmian Struggle"; Hall, Maritime Trade, pp. 197-202. 52. Tarling, Cambridge History ofSoutheast Asia, l: 207-15. For a recent study of the clove trade in Java, see Ptak, "China and the Trade of Cloves." 53. Hall, Maritime Trade, pp. 209-14; Rahman, "Kingdom of Srivijaya," · PP 78-79.

Notes to Pages 221-23 54. Wolters, The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History, p. 42; Hall, Maritime Trade, pp. 193-97. Wolters recently revised his view that Chinese had begun to fre­ quent Southeast Asia two hundred years prior to noo (see Wolters, "Restudy­ ing Some Chinese Writings on Sriwijaya"). Although there is no doubt that Chinese, especially Fukien, merchants, did venture to Southeast Asia from the middle of the tenth century, I still hold that such undertakings did not develop into an established practice until around or shortly after the middle of the elev­ enth century (see Chapter 2). 55. Hall, Maritime Trade, pp. 209-14. 56. There is quite a literature on the Chinese export ceramics in Southeast Asia concerning this period. See, e.g., Roxas-Lim, The Evidence of Ceramics as an Aid in Understanding the Pattern of Trade in the Philippines and Southeast Asia, pp. 610. For the use of Chinese ceramics in different localities in Southeast Asia, see Sumarah Adhyatman, Antique Ceramics Found in Indonesia, pp. 18-22, 34-48. For a general account of the export ceramics industry in southern Fukien, see Chapter 8. 57. So Kee-long, "Dissolving Hegemony or Changing Trade Pattern?" 58. Li Tung-hua, Ch'uan-chou hai-shang chiao-t'ung, pp. 58-59. 59. Ibid., pp. 59-63; see also Han Chen-hua, "Wu-tai Fu-chien tui-wai mao-i." 60. Lin T'ien-wei, Sung-tai hsiang-yao mao-i-shih, pp. 169-73. 61. Ch'en Meng-lei, Ku-chin t'u-shu chi-ch'eng, no5: 9936c-37a; cited in Chu Wei-kan, Fu-chien shih-kao, l: 163. 62. Lin T'ien-wei, Sung-tai hsiang-yao mao-i-shih, pp. 171-93. Also note the fa­ mous inscription in Kuang-chou commemorating the generous donation made by the Srivijayan king Diwakara for the repairs to a Taoist temple in 1079 (Tan Yeok Seang, "The Srivijaya Inscription of Canton," pp. 18-19 ). 63. WHTK, 332: 2610c. 64. This is preserved in a voyage certificate of no5 issued by the Ming-chou office of maritime affairs to a merchant ofCh'iian-chou origin (Mori, Nissc3 boeki, p. 40). 65. For the long process of institutional evolution of maritime control in South Fukien, see Li Tung-hua, Ch'uan-chou hai-shang chiao-t'ung, pp. 65-72; and Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 125-27. 66. Hung Mai, I-chien chih, pp. 59-60, 787. 67. Ch'en Ching, Hsin-tsuan hsiang-p'u, l: 9b. See also Wolters, Early Indone­ sian Commerce, p. 107. For Yeh's compilation of this treatise on aromatics, see Wada Hisanori, "Nanban koroku to Shohanshi to no kankei."

Notes to Pages 227-36 Chapter 10 1. See esp. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Petformance; and idem, "Economic Performance Through Time." There is a growing litera­ ture on various aspects of the institutional approach. A useful one in relation to this discussion of prosperity and power is Eggertsson, "A Note on the Eco­ nomics oflnstitutions." 2. Kuo Tung-hsii, Sung-taifa-chih-shih, pp. 313-19. 3. Mori, Nissa baeki, pp. 39-40. 4. The list of prohibited items was later extended to include goods made of gold, silver, copper, and iron (WHTK, 20: 202a). 5. This is a simplified version of the statute; see Su Shih, Tung-p'o ch'uan-chi, 58: 5b-6a. 6. For instance, frankincense was classified into thirteen grades (Chao Ju­ kua, Chujan chih chiao-chu, pp. 97-98). 7. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 44: 13b-14a. In n31, some 209 tusks, or pieces, of ivory were brought by an Arab merchant to Kuang-chou. After an investigation by the superintendent, it turned out that each tusk was unusually heavy, i.e., at least 50-70 catties. The cost of compulsory official purchase at the officially set price of 2,694 cash per catty would be some 50,000 strings. It was ordered that the weight of each tusk should be carefully measured by officials of the shih-po­ ssu so that this shipment of ivory could be properly handled. 8. For punishments to deter wrong measurements by government officials and private traders, see SHT, 26: 425-27. 9. Mori, Nissa baeki, pp. 36-37. ro. Ta-Yuan sheng-cheng kuo-ch'ao tien-chang, 22: 71a-79b. n. T'ung-chih t'iao-ke, 18: 230-37. 12. Ibid., 18: 237. 13. The most authoritative work is Niida Noboru, Chugoku haseishi kenkya; see esp. 4: 329. For recent examples of this categorization as applied to Sung civil law, see Chao Hsiao-keng, Sung-tai fa-chih yen-chiu, p. 56; and Kuo Tung-hsii, Sung-tai fa-chih-shih, pp. 474-86. For a general account of property rights in pre­ modern China, see Yang T ai-shuenn, "Property Rights and Constitutional Order in Imperial China," pp. 1-23, 62-92. For a precise account of the categori­ zation of property in Western law, see Walker, Oxford Companion to Law, pp. 1007-8. 14. The category of movable property in traditional Chinese lexicon is close to chose ofpossession in English law (Walker, Oxford Companion to Law, p. 213).

370

Notes to Pages 236-41

15. When used in a broader sense, ts'ai includes both movables and immov­ ables. In maritime trade, we can, however, talk only about movables. For the distinction between ch'an and ts'ai in Sung usage among the literati, see Ebrey, Family and Property in Sung China, pp. 101-2. 16. SHT, 12: 200. 17. Ibid., 19: 300, 302-3, 305. 18. Ibid., 25: 395-96. 19. Ibid., 26: 4II. 20. Ibid., 21: 446. 21. Ibid., 20: 3II-12. 22. Ibid., 4: 60-66; see also 26: 406 for lesser crimes involving the illegal ac­ quisition of property. For a succinct account of tsang, see MacCormack, Tradi­ tional Chinese Penal Law, pp. 210-12; and idem, "The Concept of Tsang in the T'ang Code." 23. SHT, 4: 62-63. 24. Kamei, Nihon boeki tojishi, pp. 201-15. 25. Walker, Oxford Companion to Law, pp. 970-72. 26. There is quite a literature on this topic, and there are discrepancies in the interpretation. However, that the ownership of private property, with some ex­ ceptions, was more often attributed to a household instead of an individual, re­ gardless of how one would interpret the role of father or family head, is proba­ bly indisputable. For earlier authorities on the subject, see Niida, Chugoku hoseishi, 3: 365-80; Schurmann, 'Traditional Property Concepts in China"; Shiga Shuzo, "Family Property and the Law of Inheritance in Traditional China"; idem, Chugoku kazokuho no genri, pp. 68-85, 149-73; MacCormack, Traditional Chinese Penal Law, pp. 210-34. For a summary of recent work, see Lau Nap-yin, "Sung-tai t'ung-chi.i chih-tu hsia te so-wei kung-ts'ai." 27. Lau Nap-yin, "Sung-tai t'ung-chi.i chih-tu hsia te so-wei kung-ts'ai," pp. 268-69. 28. SHT, 12: 196-97; 13: 205-7; Shiga, Chugoku kazokuho, pp. 149-234. For the general pattern of managing family property, see Ebrey, Family and Property, pp. 121-55. 29. Since officials were prohibited by law from engaging in trade while they were in office, we can rule out individual property purchased during government service as a possible source. 30. MacCormack, Traditional Chinese Penal Law, p. 235. 31. Ibid., pp. 235-36. 32. Hansen, Negotiating Daily Life in Traditional China. 33. Scogin, "Civil 'Law' in Traditional China: History and Theory."

Notes to Pages 241-44

371

34. Hansen, Negotiating Daily Life, p. IO. For a different view, see MacCor­ mack, Traditional Chinese Penal Law, pp. 235-58; and idem, "The Law of Contract in China Under the T'ang and Sung Dynasties." 35. Hansen, Negotiating Daily Life, p. 6. "Consideration" is a legal term with a special meaning in modern Anglo-American law of contract. The doctrine of consideration is a fundamental component of the legal definition of modern contract. In Treitel's (The Law of Contract, pp. 52-58) succinct account, its "basic feature" is "the idea of reciprocity: 'something of value in the eye of the law' must be given for a promise in order to make it enforceable as a contract." And its traditional definition emphasizes that the requirement of something of value may be "either some detriment to the promisee or some benefit to the promi­ sor." Treitel also provides a concise analysis of some other important definitions of the term. 36. SHT, 26: 4II-15; see also Hsieh Shen-fu, .Ch'ing-yuan t'iaoja shih-lei, 32: 23a. It was stipulated in this Southern Sung compilation oflaws that if the borrower run away from a debt, it was the responsibility of the guarantor to make repay­ ment. 37. Hansen, Negotiating Daily Life, pp. 88-89; Yeh Hsiao-hsin, Chung-kuo minJa-shih, pp. 347-48. 38. Liang Keng-yao, "Nan-Sung Fu-chien te yen-cheng," p. 204. 39. Hansen, Negotiating Daily Life, pp. 76, 86-87, 92. 40. Ebrey, Family and Property in Sung China, p. 313. 41. SHT, 13: 205-7; 26: 412. 42. SHYCK, "Shih-huo," 30: 37b-38a. It was recorded that contracts dealing with purchases of tea on credit signed between tea garden owners and clients without property, such as junior members in a household who had no authority to strike a deal, were subject to the law of contract for debt with interest. This indicates that other, properly authorized contracts for credit sales would nor­ mally be regulated by the same law. For contracts involving credit sales in Sung China in general, see Kuo Tung-hsii, Sung-taiJa-chih-shih, p. 513. 43. Chu Yii, P'ing-chou k'o-t'an, 2: 4a-b. 44. SHT, 26: 412. Yeh Hsiao-hsin, Minja-shih, pp. 356-58. 45. The relevant statute stated that "lending to others with private or official properties shall be conducted by concluding private contracts. These are not to be handled by the government" (SHT, 26: 412). 46. SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 20: 3oa-b. 47. Kuo Tung-hsii, Sung-taiJa-chih-shih, p. 512. 48. Ts'ai Hsiang, Li-chjh p'u, l: 2b.

372

Notes to Pages 245-48

49. SHYCK, "Shih-huo," 31: 26a-b. An official reported that some junior members of tea garden households were lured by dishonest brokers into draw­ ing contracts specifying prepayment with merchants without authorization from the household heads. Subsequently they used up the money; if the family failed to fulfill the contractual obligation, it could lose its household property. 50. SHYCK, "Hsing-fa," 2: 144a-b. It was recorded that tea, wine, and ce­ ramics constituted three important export items. 51. Chiang Hsi-tung (Sung-tai shang-yeh hsin-yung, pp. 90-91, 94-95) assumes it was a prepaid transaction, similar to tea transactions in Szechwan, where farmers received payment in advance. 52. Kuo Tung-hsii, Sung-tai Ja-chih-shih, pp. 5n-12. 53. Mori, Nissa boeki, pp. 39-40. 54. T'ung-chih t'iao-ke, 18: 231-35. 55. McKnight, Law al'!d Order in Sung China, pp. 121-24. 56. In a recent study, Clark ("Overseas Trade and Social Change in Quanz­ hou Through the Song") presents useful data on the relationship between civil service examination results and maritime prosperity in South Fukien, especially under the Southern Sung. He has demonstrated that local success in the civil service examinations, the most preferred channel to officialdom, corresponded with success in economic development. 57. Su Shih, Tung-p'o ch'uan-chi, 56: 10a-13b, 58: la-b. 58. Ibid., 58: lb-2b. 59. Ibid., 58: 3a-b. 60. For instance, the Nee-Confucian scholar-official Chen Te-hsiu did much to check bribery and other malfeasance in Ch'iian-chou to the benefit of the maritime trade during his two terms of service (see Chapter 4). 61. On Sung civil litigation procedure and operation, see Yeh Hsiao-hsin, Chung-kuo minja-shih, pp. 436-52; Yang T'ing-fu and Ch'ien Yiian-k'ai, "Sung­ ch'ao min-shih su-sung chih-tu shu-liieh"; McKnight, "Civil Law in Sung China"; Kuo Tung-hsii, Sung-taifa-chih-shih, pp. 589-623; and Tokunaga Yosuke, "Nan-So jidai no sosho to saiban." The civil justice component of traditional Chinese law, such as contract law, was rather neglected in earlier scholarship on Chinese legal history. Philip Huang and others have recently produced illumi­ nating works on civil justice in late imperial China, highlighting the working of that system in relation to disputes settlement of a non-criminal nature. See, in particular, Philip Huang, Civil Justice in China, esp. pp. 223-36 on the Weberian notion of Chinese law as a contrasting example to modern legality; pp. 76-109 on the formal institutional mechanism of civil justice in Ch'ing China; and pp. 172-97 on the use oflitigation in the pursuit of personal interest.

Notes to Pages 248-55

373

62. The central government official who handled civil dispute cases on appeal from local governments was the left attendant of the department of households, hu-pu tso-ts'ao (Kuo Tung-hsii, Sung-taiJa-chih-shih, pp. 589-90) . 63. Yeh Hsiao-hsin, Chung-kuo minja-shih, pp. 443-48; Kuo Tung-hsii, Sung­ tai Ja-chih-shih, pp. 609-12; Tai Chien-kuo, "Sung-tai te kung-cheng chi-kou"; and Ch'en Chih-cn'ao, "Sung-tai te shu-p'u yii sung-shih." 64. Recent studies like that by Philip Huang (Civil Justice in China) have questioned the notion of a widespread distrust of the legal system in traditional China. See, in particular, the excellent analysis of a novel case in the late Ch'ing by William Alford, "Of Arsenic and Old Laws." But our present concern is not the complex issue ofjustice but the relationship between the civil justice system and the commercial sector in South Fukien. 65. Ming-kung shu-p'an ch'ing-ming chi, l: 5. 66. Liang Chih-p'ing, Hsiin-ch'iu tzujan chih-hsii chung te ho-hsieh, pp. 188-217; Chang Chin-fan, Chung-kuofa-Iii te ch'uan-t'ungyii chin-tai chuan-hsing, pp. 277-302. 67. Chu Hsi, Chu Hsi chi, roo: 5093-95. 68. Ibid., 74: 3904. For the importance of the community compact in the so­ cial projects of Neo-Confucianists, see Obelhor, "The Community Compact (Hsiang-yiieh) of the Sung and Its Educational Significance." 69. Ch'en Ch'un, Pei-ch'i ta ch'iian-chi, 47: la-3a.

Chapter II r. North, "Economic Performance Through Time," p. 360. In his earlier works, the term "ideology" was more prominent; see, e.g., North, Structure and

Change in Economic History. 2. See, e.g., Wong Siu-lun, "Chinese Entrepreneurs and Business Trust"; Hamilton, "Organization and Market Processes in Taiwan's Capital Economy"; and Casson, The Economics ofBusiness Culture, pp. n-17. 3. Simon, Reason in Human Affairs. Simon has further elaborated the compu­ tational limitations of the human decision-making process in the context of pro­ cedural rationality in "From Substantive to Procedural Rationality" and "Ra­ tionality in Psychology and Economics." 4. Simon, Reason in Human Affairs, pp. 12-13. 5. Ibid., pp. 17-20. 6. Simon, "Rationality in Psychology and Economics," p. 27. 7. North, "Economic Performance Through Time," pp. 362-63. 8. Little, "Rational-Choice Models and Asian Studies." Two important col­ lections relate the theory of rational choice to the social sciences and humanities: see Elster, Rational Choice; and Hogarth and Reder, Rational Choice: The Contrast

374

Notes to Pages 256-59

Between Economics and Psychology. For an insightful recent work that applies more to political science, see Green and Shapiro, Pathologies ofRational Choice Theory: A Critique ofApplications in Political Science. 9. Little ("Rational-Choice Models," p. 36) has summed up the most impor­ tant critiques of narrow economic rationality: the substantivists emphasize the cultural functions of norms and values; the interpretive social scientists hold that the notion of instrumental rationality itself is culturally specific; and the area specialists stress that an overtly abstract characterization of the environ­ ment of choice cannot replace detailed studies of particular environments. For a very insightful discussion on the critiques of rational choice theory and the rea­ sons why it continues to be powerful in economic theorization, see Elster, Ra­ tional Choice, pp. 1-33. 10. Little, "Rational-Choice Models and Asian Studies," pp. 38-39. n. Ptak ("Merchants and Maximization") has explored the profit-maximiz­ ing behavior of maritime merchants in premodern Asia and proposed a frame­ work to accommodate commercial activities that would be interpreted as both material and spiritual. His example of Muslim merchants performing the hajj to Mecca is illustrative. He also notes the cases of Banarsidas and peddlers in In­ donesia for whom subsistence and survival are instead the dominant motivations behind commercial behavior. To him, self-interested profit maximization is but one part of "the individual's total life strategies." However, in the South Fukien case, there is no evidence of similar non-economic profit maximization or of trading for subsistence in the maritime trade. As for peddling, the availability of other occupational opportunities and the high costs of the maritime trade would render it a negligible mode in South Fukien. 12. Wu Ch'eng, Wu Wen-cheng chi, 28: 13b-14b. 13. Ts'ai Hsiang, Tuan-ming chi, 34: Sb. 14. Wang Hsiang-chih, Yu-ti chi-sheng, 130: 4b. 15. Chu Mu, Fang-ya sheng-lan, 12: 9b. 16. This assumption of a profit-oriented and egoistic human nature was quite a common belief in traditional Chinese culture. Even the Sung Neo-Confucians believed in it and developed theories to explain this human desire and designed practices to contain it. 17. See, e.g., Tai Hung-chao, Confucianism and Economic Development; Rozman, The East Asia Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation; and de Bary,

The Trouble with Confucianism. 18. Lau, The Analects, p. 3. 19. Yii Ying-shih, Chung-kuo chin-shih tsung-chiao lun-li ya shang-jen ching-shen, pp. 137-41. Yii ("Business Culture and Chinese Traditions") forcefully rebuts

Notes to Pages 259-64

375

Max Weber's notion that merchants in traditional China were basically dishon­ est and distrusted each other. 20. For a succinct account of the literature on trust and order in various dis­ ciplines, see Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity, pp. 3-45. For a broader discus­ sion of trust and its economic functions, see Casson, The Economics of Business Culture, pp. 3-28. In Casson's words: "Culture can impact on economic perform­ ance in many different ways, but one of the most significant is its influence on trust. Trust reduces transaction costs a�d so improves the allocation of re­ sources" (ibid., p. 28). 21. Lau, The Analects, p. 29. 22. Yii Ying-shih, Chung-kuo chin-shih tsung-chiao, pp. 104-66. 23. Ch'en Hsueh-wen, Ming-Ch'ing shih-ch'i shang-yeh-shu chi shangjen-shu chih yen-chiu, pp. 71-77. For the background and significance of merchant manuals in late Ming and early Ch'ing, see Lufrano, Honorable Merchant: Commerce and Self

Cultivation in Late Imperial China. 24. Chu Hsi, Chu Hsi chi, p. 3904. 25. Chen Te-hsiu, Chen Wen-chung-kung chi, 40: 6na. 26. For the influence of Chu Hsi and Chen Te-hsiu on South Fukien's Confucian tradition, see Kao Ling-yin and Ch'en Ch'i-fang, Fu-chien Chu-tzu­ hsiieh, pp. 69-212; and Kojima Tsuyoshi, "Fukken nanbu no meizoku to Shushi­ gaku no fukyu.'' 27. Wang Tzu-ts'ai and Feng Yiin-hao, Sung-Yuan hsiieh-an pu-i, 82: 266b. 28. Wang I, Wang Ch'ang-tsung chi, pp. 5b-7a. 29. Ibid., supp. 6a. 30. Ch'en Mao-jen, Ch'iian-nan tsa-chih, 2:r9b. 31. For Chu Hsi's concept ofhuman desire, see Ch'ien Mu, Chu-tzu hsin hsiieh­ an, l: 406-19. For a precise account of Chu Hsi's philosophy, see Chan Wing­ tsit, Chu Hsi. 32. Li Ching-re, Chu-tzu yii-lei, 12: 7a; Ch'ien Mu, Chu-tzu hsin hsiieh-an, p. 407. 33. Derk Bodde, Chinese Thought, Society, and Science, pp. 220-21. 34. For the organiC Chinese religious worldview, see Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, 2: 281. For traditional Chinese religions, see C. K. Yang, Re­ ligion in Chinese Society; Teiser, "Popular Religion"; idem, "The Spirits of Chinese Religion"; and Brokaw, "Supernatural Retribution and Human Destiny.'' 35. For a general picture of the religious world of Sung lay people and the reciprocity between the believers and the gods in whom they believed, see Han­ sen, Changing Gods in Medieval China, 1127-1276, pp. 29-78. Hansen emphasizes not the tenet of moral retribution underlying these popular religions but the importance of their efficacy. However, we can discern the basic belief in super-

Notes to Pages 265-67 natural retribution in the many anecdotes she cites from The Recorder of the Lis­ tener (I-chien chih) by Hung Mai. See also Gregory and Ebrey, "The Religious and Historical Landscape." 36. The term literally means "northerners" (peijen). It is not easy to interpret, but a possible reading is that it refers to all those from north of Kwangtung, in­ cluding Fukien. In that case, it would mean the Fukienese merchants since, so far, there is no evidence suggesting that large numbers of native Chinese other than Fukienese participated directly in overseas voyages in Kuang-chou during Sung times. 37. Chu Yu, P'ing-chou k'o-t'an, 2: 3a-4a. 38. There is quite a literature on Ming and Ch'ing popular ethical readings with a theme of supernatural retribution; the most important ones are Brokaw, The Ledgers ofMerit and Demerit; and Sakai Tadao, Chugoku zensho no kenkyu. 39. For a detailed study of this book and its author, the best reference remains Ebrey, Family and Property in Sung China. 40. Ibid., pp. 319-20. 41. Ch'ing Hsi-t'ai, Chung-kuo Tao-chiao shih, 3: 100. 42. Webster, The Kan Ying Pien, p. 25. 43. This commentary was attributed to Li Chang-ling, who probably lived during the Northern Sung period; see T'ai-shang kan-ying p'ien, 24: 9. 44. Legge, The Texts of Taoism, p. 685. 45. For a brief background of this text and its social effects, see Sakai, Chu­ goku zensho, pp. 359-69; Brokaw, Ledgers of Merit and Demerit, pp. 36-43; Cheng Chih-ming, Chung-kuo shan-shu ya tsung-chiao, pp. 41-61; and Ch'ing Hsi-t'ai, Chung-kuo Tao-chiao shih, 3: 100-5. For contemporary views of this text, see T'ai­ shang kan-ying p'ien, Introduction, pp. I-II, which contains eleven prefaces written between 1233 and 1349. Even Neo-Confucian masters might not have abandoned religious beliefs. For Chu Hsi's supernatural worldview, see Daniel Gardner, "Zhu Xi on Spirit Beings." 46. Brokaw, Ledgers ofMerit and Demerit, p. 42. 47. Attached to the extant version of T'ai-shang kan-ying p'ien is a short ac­ count of seven anecdotes on the efficacy of its teachings. All of the events related in these anecdotes occurred in the Southern Sung. This indirect evidence sug­ gests that the text was already popular at that time (Ch'ing Hsi-t'ai, Chung-kuo Tao-chiao shih, 3: 100-101). 48. C. K. Yang (Religion in Chinese Society, p. 72) noted that the unique reason for the worship of Ma-tsu among sailors was "the highly hazardous nature of the occupation."

Notes to Pages 268-73

377

49. For the most comprehensive collection of Chinese contracts, see Chang Ch'uan-hsi, Chung-kuo li-tai ch'i-yiieh hui-pien k'ao-shih; see pp. 519-696 for samples of Sung and Yuan land deeds. 50. Ibid., p. m5. This is a Ming contract format. For a concise discussion of joint-capital commercial contracts in late imperial China and more samples with similar provisions, see Yang Kuo-chen, "Ming-Ch'ing i-lai shang-jen ho-pen ching-ying te ch'i-yi.ieh hsing-shih." 51. For examples, see Watson, "Standardizing the Gods"; Ter Haar, "The Genesis and Spread of Temple Cults in Fukien"; Hansen, Changing Gods in Me­ dieval China, pp. 129-48; Dean, Taoist Ritual and Popular Cults of South-east China, pp. 21-42; Lin Kuo-p'ing and P'eng Wen-yi.i, Fu-chien min-chien hsin-yang, pp. 142-201; and Hsi.i Hsiao-wang, Fu-chien min-chien hsin-yang yiian-liu, pp. 147-386. David Johnson ("The City-God Cults of T'ang anq Sung China") also observed the relationship between the rise of merchant communities in urban areas and the spread of city gods in Sung China. 52. For an in-depth discussion of the background and content of this text and an English translation, see Boltz, "In Homage to T'ien-fei.'' 53. Ibid., pp. 224-27. For the original text, see Li Hsien-chang, Boso shinko no kenkya, pp. 34-38. 54. Chen Te-hsiu (Chen Wen-chung-kung wen-chi, 50: 768a-b, 773a-b) prayed at least twice to Ma-tsu for protection before his naval campaigns against the pi­ rates. 55. Watson, "Standardizing the Gods," p. 322. 56. Ting Ho-sheng (Kenneth Dean) and Cheng Chen-man, Fu-chien tsung­ chiao pei-ming hui-pien, p. 13. 57. There is a sizable literature on this subject; see, e.g., Hartwell, "Demo­ graphic, Political, and Social Transformations of China"; and Hymes, Statesmen

and Gentlemen. 58. Freedman's standard works on this subject are Lineage Organization in Southeastern China; and Chinese Lineage and Society. 59. See, e.g., Baker, Chinese Family and Kinship; Beattie, Land and Lineage in China; and Ebrey, "Types of Lineages in Ch'ing China.'' For a succinct overview of the Sung concept of family and the differentiating orientations of chia and tsung, see Ebrey, "Conceptions of the Family in the Sung Dynasty." David Faure (The Structure of Chinese Rural Society, pp. 4-n) has made a significant contribu­ tion by disclosing the limitation of Freedman's notion by highlighting two other powerful integrative forces iti.. rural communities-land rights and religious ac­ tivities. 60. Ebrey and Watson, Kinship Organization in Late Imperial China, pp. 4-5.

378

Notes to Pages 273-84

61. The most important work on the rise of lineage under the Sung is Twitchett, "The Fan Clan's Charitable Estate." For a succinct survey of descent group development in Sung and Yuan times, see Ebrey, "The Early Stages in the Development of Descent Group Organization." See also Hsii Yang-chieh, Sung Ming chia-tsu chih-tu shih-lun. Wang Shan-chiin ("Sung-tai tsu-ch'an ch'u-t'an"), however, holds that there were already quite a few cases oflineages with corpo­ rate property under the Sung. For a precise review of the Japanese scholarship on lineage, see Satake Yasuhiko, "Sodai no kazoku to sozoku." 62. Clark, 'The Fu ofMinnan." 63. Liu Ming-hui, Ch'ing-yuan Liu-shih tsu-p'u. 64. For instance, a list of genealogy compilers recorded in this genealogy in­ dicates that many compiled genealogies for more than one branch; e.g., Liu Cheng was said to have done one each for the Ch'iian-chou branch and the Hsing-hua branch (ibid., p. 23a). 65. Ibid., pp. 1b-6b. 66. Ibid., p. 1b. 67. Ibid., p. 2a. 68. Ibid., pp. 12a-13a. 69. Ibid., pp. 17a-18a. 70. Ch'ai Piao, Yung-ch'un hsien-chih, 1526, 6: 317. 71. Liu Ming-hui, Ch'ing-yuan Liu-shih tsu-p'u, pp. l6a-17a. This source also mentions that the property generated an annual rental income of 2,180 tan (ibid., p. l5a). 72. The Sung government introduced laws to such effect in the early 1090s; see Ebrey, "Early Stages in the Development of Descent Group Organization," p. 42; and Wang Shan-chiin, "Sung-tai tsu-ch'an," pp. 134-35. J3. Liu Ming-hui, Ch'ing-yuan Liu-shih tsu-p'u, p. l5a. 74. See Twitchett, "The Fan Clan's Charitable Estate." 75. Baker, Chinese Family and Kinship, pp. 59-62. 76. Niida Noboru, Chugoku hoseishi, 2: 499-510; Chiang Hsi-tung, Sung-tai shang-yeh hsin-yung, pp. 128-43.

Conclusion l. Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, p. 168. 2. P. Smith, Taxing Heaven's Storehouse. 3. Little, Understanding Peasant China, pp. 29-67. Little gives a concise and il­ luminating review of the model of moral economy, as represented by James Scott, and that of rational choice, as represented by Samuel Popkin, as applied to studies of empirical cases in Asia.

Notes to Pages 284-89

379

4. Eggertsson, "A Note on the Economics of Institutions." 5. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Petformance, pp. 83-91. 6. See the many empirical case studies collected in Alston et al., Empirical

Studies in Institutional Change. 7. North, Structure and Change in Economic History, pp. 143-57; idem, Institu­ tions, Institutional Change, and Economic Petformance, pp. n2-17; idem, "Institutions, Transaction Costs, and the Rise of Merchant Empires." 8. Skinner, "Presidential Address: Structure of Chinese History"; Hartwell, "Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations of China." 9. For the controversy over regional approach, see Little, Understanding Peas­ ant China, pp. 68-104. IO. There is a growing concern about the problems of property rights in China, past and present. Many believe that it is one of the fundamental obsta­ cles to China's economic growth. The property rights approach of the Kirby Puzzle, for example, highlights the failure in China to establish successful firms following the Western model of privately owned, publicly traded corporations (see Bowen and Rose, "On the Absence of Privately Owned, Publicly Traded Corporations in China"; on the Kirby Puzzle, see Kirby, "China Unincorpo­ rated"). u . This is essentially a debate between the convergence school and the gradualist school over the scope, pace, and direction of China's institutional re­ forms. The convergence school advocates that only by rapid convergence with the Western or East Asian capitalist systems can China maintain its growth (see, e.g., Yuan Zheng Cao et al., "Chinese Economic Reforms"). In contrast, the gradualists argue that only by incremental and experimental changes will China be able to evolve into a sustainable economic power (see, e.g., T. Rawski, "Progress Without Privatization"; Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan; and Nolan and Ash, "China's Economy on the Eve of Reform"). For a more recent attempt to understand China's reforms in institutional perspective, see Gore, Market Communism. There is, moreover, a growing concern, especially after the Asian financial crises that began in 1997, that China's economic success thus far may have been exaggerated (see Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?"). One ma­ jor problem with these divergent assessments on China's economic.performance is the problematic nature of the economic figures available to researchers. 12. For an overall assessment of China's transition to a market economy, in­ cluding the issue of structural reforms, see Chai, China: Transition to a Market

Economy. 13. See, e.g., Wu An-kang et al., Chung-kuo ti-ch'u ch'a-chu pao-kao.

380

Notes to Pages 293-94 Appendix A

In this regard, I am indebted to Hans Bielenstein for his pioneering work on the early history of colonization in Fukien; see esp. his "Chinese Coloniza­ tion ofFukien." 2. Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih chi, n4: 2979; Pan Ku, Han shu, 95: 3859; T'an Ch'i­ hsiang, Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t'u, 2: n-12. 3. Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih chi, n4: 2979; T'an Ch'i-hsiang, Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t'u, 2: n-12. 4. Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih chi, n4: 2984, records: "[Emperor Wu] issued an im­ perial order to the staff of his army to evacuate the people (min) of Min-yueh [from Fukien] and move them to somewhere between the Yangtze River and the Huai River. Therefore the country of Min-yueh was depopulated." The term "people" here should refer to everyone, including nobles. Of course, this was merely a policy. It does not imply that in actuality every Yueh individual was moved from Fukien. On the contrary, some of them reportedly fled to' the mountains and escaped the relocation. For a different interpretation of the word min, see Clark, "Settlement, Trade and Economy in Fukien to the Thirteenth Century," p. 36. 5. Wang Kuo-wei, Kuan-t'ang chi-lin, 12: 23a-24b; Shen Yueh, Sung shu, 36: 1092. For the Chekiang location of the tung-pu tu-wei, see T'an Ch'i-hsiang, Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t'u, 2: 24-25. 6. For early discussions of this matter, see the commentary note in Ssu-ma Kuang, Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, 62: 1986-87. For modern scholarship on it, see Ichi­ mura Sanjiro, "To izen no Fukken oyobi Taiwan ni tsuite"; Yeh Kuo-ch'ing, "Ku Min-ti k'ao"; idem, "Yeh pu tsai chin Fu-chou-shih pien"; Lao Kan, "Han Chin Min-chuPg chien-chih k'ao"; Wada Kiyoshi, "Shin no Binchugun ni tsuite"; Hibino Takeo, "Ko Binchi ni tsuite no shiken"; Li Tsu-pi, "Min-chung chiang-yu k'ao"; Wei Sung-shan, "Han Min-yueh wang Wu Chu Yeh-tu k'ao"; P'eng Wen-yu, "Kuan-yu Min-yueh wang Yeh-tu te ch'u-i"; Hsin T'u-ch'eng, "Ku Min-ti kou-chi"; and Lin T'ing-shui, "Ch'in Han Min-chung ti-ming k'ao­ hsi erh-tse." 7. For the text with commentary, see Wang Hsien-ch'ien, Hou Han shu chichieh, 22: 3996. For Ssu-ma Piao's life, see Fang Hsuan-ling, Chin shu, 82: 2142. 8. Pan Ku, Han shu, 28A: 1590-91. 9. Ichimura, "To izen no Fukken," pp. 6-7. ro. Yeh Kuo-ch'ing, "Ku Min-ti k'ao," pp. 79-82. l.

Notes to Pages 294-96 n. For discussion of this textual problem, see the commentary note in Ssu­ ma Kuang, Tzu-chih t'ung-chien, 62: 1986-87; Ch'ien Ta-hsin, Erh-shih-erh shih k'ao­ i, 14: 304-5; and Yang Shou-ching, "San-kuo chiin-hsien piao," 3: 2945-46. 12. This is according to the geographical record of 282, which was cited in the commentary for the place-name Chang-an in Fan Yeh, Hou Han shu, 22: 3489; see also Wang Kuo-wei, Kuan-t'ang chi-lin, 12: 23a-b; and Wu Sung-ti, "Yeh chi Tung-pu hou-kuan pien." 13. Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih chi, n4: 2979; Pan Ku, Han shu, 95: 3859; see also Lao Kan, "Han Chin Min-chung," p. 55; Chu Wei-kan, Fu-chien shih-kao, l: 44-47; and Wu Sung-ti, "Yeh chi Tung-pu hou-kuan," p. 176. To support this argu­ ment, it is, however, necessary to clarify another textual confusion. In the biog­ raphy of Yen Chu in Han shu there is a paragraph telling how Yen, as an impe­ rial envoy, defended the aggressive policy toward Min-yiieh to the king ofHuai­ nan, who had earlier openly opposed this idea. In it, one line goes: "The king of Min assembled his troops in Yeh-nan [to rebel against Han] in the eighth month." For the place-name Yeh-nan, an annotation by Su Lin (b. late 2d c. A.o ) states: "[Yeh-nan] is a mountain's name. It is now called Tung-yeh and is within the territory of K'uai-chi commandery" (Pan-Ku, Han shu, 64A: 2789). Based on this annotation, Hsin T'u-ch'eng ("Ku Min-ti," pp. 135-36) argues that Tung-yeh was the name of a mountain situated to the south of the capital of Yeh and that Yeh and Tung-yeh are different place-names. He, however, finds it contradictory that there is another record of a county named Tung-yeh in the Hou Han shu. This argument is in fact a misunderstanding ofSu's statement. He apparently interpreted "Yeh-nan," the name of mountain, as "to the south of Yeh." In fact, Lao Kan made a similar mistake, even though that did not affect his overall conclusion, with which I basically concur. 14. Ssu-ma Ch'ien, Shih chi, n4: 2983. 15. See also Wu Sung-ti, "Yeh chi Tung-pu hou-kuan," pp. 177-78. 16. Pan Ku, Han shu, 64A: 2792. 17. Ibid. See also Wei Sung-shan, 'Han Min-yiieh wang Wu Chu Yeh-tu k'ao," pp. 127-28. Alternatively, FCTC, 1867, 5: lb, mentions another mountain named Ch'iian-shan near modern Ch'iian-chou. But this could not be the one mentioned by Chu Mai-ch'en, since it was geographically too far south to have been the capital of the Min-yiieh kingdom. See also Chu Mu, Fang-yii sheng-lan, 12: 5a. 18. See, e.g., Fu-chien-sheng po-wu-kuan, "Ch'ung-an Ch'eng-ts'un Han­ ch'eng t'an-chiieh chien-pao"; Ch'en Chih, "Fu-chien Ch'ung-an Ch'eng-ts'un Han-ch'eng i-chih shih-tai te t'ui-ts'e"; Chiang Ping-chao, "Kuan-yii Fu-chien

Notes to Pages 296-301 Ch'ung-an Han-ch'eng te hsing-chih ho shih-tai te t'an-t'ao"; and Yang Ts'ung, "Lun Ch'ung-an Ch'eng-ts'un Han-ch'eng te nien-tai ho hsing-chih." 19. Wu Ch'un-ming, "Min-chiang liu-yii hsien-Ch'in liang-Han wen-hua te ch'u-pu yen-chiu." 20. T'an Ch'i-hsiang, Chung-kuo li-shih ti-t'u, 2: 51-52. 21. For the expansion of the kingdom of Wu in modern Chekiang and Fu­ kien and its policies toward various indigenous peoples, see T'ang Ch'ang-ju, Wei-Chin-Nan-Pei-ch'ao shih lun-ts'ung, pp. 3-29; and Wang Chung-lo, Wei-Chin­ Nan-Pei-ch'ao shih, 1: 101-3. 22. Ch'en Shou, San-kuo chi, 60: 1377· 23. Ibid., 48: rr58. 24. CCFC, 1763, 3: 2b. 25. In Fang Hsiian-ling, Chin shu, 15: 462, Hou-kuan was not listed before the other counties, which is the usual way to indicate the capital of a commandery. But since Yiian-feng, the place listed first, had been promoted to a county only in 282, it seems more likely that the long-established Hou-kuan would be cho­ sen as the commandery capital. For the two South Fukien counties, see CCFC, 1763, 3: 2b-3a. 26. Shen Yiieh, Sung shu, 36: rr5; Hsiao Tzu-hsien, Nan-Ch'i shu, 14: 262. 27. CCHC, 1: 2a; Wei Cheng, Sui shu, 31: 879. For recent studies that confirm the administrative evolution in South Fukien from Liang to Sui, see Chang Hsiin, "Chen Ti chuan chung chih Liang-an chiin"; and Liao Ta-k'o, "Liang-an chiin li-shih yii Wang-shih chia-tsu." 28. FCTC, 1867, 2: 15a-b. 29. Bielenstein, "Chinese Colonization ofFukien," p. 107. 30. So Kee-long, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, pp. 139-43. 31. FCTC, 1867, 121: 13b-14a. 32. Fang Hsiian-ling, Chin shu, 15: 461-62. 33. Shen Yiieh, Sung shu, 36: 1092-93. 34. Wei Cheng, Sui shu, 31: 879. 35. South China's economy as a whole, of course, achieved a more vibrant growth during this period (see Wang Chung-lo, Wei-Chin-Nan-Pei-ch'ao shih, 2: 475-506).

Appendix B 1. Kuwahara, Ho ]uko, pp. 155-56; Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. 39-41; see also Lo Jung-pang, "Maritime Commerce," p. 98. 2. For a comprehensive, albeit not very substantial, critique of both Kuwa­ hara and Lo, see Li Hsien-chang, Boso shinko no kenkya, pp. 675-94. My own ac-

Notes to Pages 301-3 count was published in So Kee-long, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, pp. l-35. I am amazed by the penetrating insight ofCh'ien Mu (Ch'ien Pin-ssu hsien-sheng ch'uan­ chi, 53: 234), who, in correspondence with Yang Lien-sheng in 1965, pointed out in passing the possible significance of P'u Shou-keng and the office of maritime affairs on the local economy and intellectual elite and remarked that they might deserve further inquiry. I thank Wang Fan-shen for drawing my attention to this dialogue. Although this study had its own genesis, it turned out to substantiate the insight ofone ofthe greatest Chinese historians ofthe twentieth century. 3. SS, 47: 942. 4. It was a regular practice to draft civilian vessels, including mercantile ones, to engage in coastal defense on a rotation basis. Examples can be found in Fu­ chou (SSC, 14: 7746-49). 5. So Kee-long, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, pp. 4-5. 6. SS, 167: 3966. 7. Ibid.; SHYCK, "Chih-kuan," 42: 67a-68a. 8. Examples of unprecedented appointments to prestigious offices as a means to call on loyalty to the resistance movement are not uncommon; see So Kee­ long, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, p. 28n29. 9. CCFC, 1763, 75A: 37a-38a; CCFC, 1612, 24: 31b; FCTC, 1867, 266: l9b. ro. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, p. 152. u. Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, pp. 39-41. 12. Yii Chia-hsi, Ssu-k'u t'i-yao, p. 1483. 13. Doi Hiroko, "Nan-So chiiki igo ni okeru Senshii no kaigai boeki," p. 56; Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang, "P'u Shou-keng." 14. Chou Mi, Kuei-hsin tsa-shih, pieh-chi, 2: 33b. Wang Hui-ch'i was also named Wang Mou-yiieh. According to CCFC, 1763, 29: 23a, Wang was ap­ pointed prefect of Ch'iian-chou with a concurrent appointment as shih-po-shih in 1240 for one year. It is possible that Wang was re-appointed as shih-po-shih around 1265. 15. Ch'en Tzu-ch'iang ("P'u Shou-keng," pp. 162-63) held that P'u was in the office for only seven months. For a discussion of this issue, see So Kee-long, Min-nan Ch'uan-chou, p. 6. 16. Ch'en Kao-hua, "Yuan-tai te hang-hai shih-chia Kan-p'u Yang-shih," p. 12. 17. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, pp. 154, 174; Lo Hsiang-lin, P'u Shou-keng, p. 41; Lo Jung-pang, "Maritime Commerce," p. 98. 18. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, p. 162. Quoted here is a translation from the English version ofKuwabara's work, "On P'u Shou-keng," p. 45. Kuwabara cited it from Ho Ch'iao-yiian, Min shu-, vol. 152. The entire passage is also cited in CCFC, 1763, 75A: 36b-37b.

Notes to Pages 303-7 19. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, 162. 20. See CCFC, 1612, preface by Huang Feng-hsiang, 2a; table of contents, 5b. It is clearly stated that one of the four local scholars involved in the compilation of this gazetteer was Ho Ch'iao-yiian. 21. CCFC, 1612, 24: 31b-32a. 22. Cited in CCFC, 1763, 75A: 37b-38a. 23. SS, 167: 3960-62. Lo Jung-pang ("Maritime Commerce," p. 98) described it as one that dominated the civil administration, but he fails to show the central importance of that office. 24. FCTC, 1867, 90: 2b-3b. 25. SS, 45: 886; 46: 902, 904, 907, 910, 917; 47: 937. 26. Kuwabara, Ho ]uko, p. 174· 27. SS, 167: 3956. 28. Yiian Chiieh, Yen-yu Ssu-ming chih, 2: 9b-13b, esp. pp. 12b-13a. 29. SS, 46: 905, 405: 12249, 414: 12436. 30. Ch'ing-yuan Chin-shih tsu-p'u; see also Ch'en Ta-sheng, "Na-wu-na yii fan­ fo-ssu," p. 47nrr. 31. CCFC, 1763, 29: 55a. 32. Ch'ing-yuan Chin-shih tsu-p'u, p. sob.

Appendix C 1. There were four titles for prefectures in Sung times: chou, ju, chun, chien. Classification was based on size and degree of importance. Their governmental structures were similar, but the numbers of officials differed, again according to size and degree of importance (see SS, 167: 3973-77). 2. FCTC, 1867, 2: 28a. 3. Ibid., 6: 31b-2:28a. 4. For the taming of natural obstacles on this waterway, see CCFC, 1612, 2: 26b-37b. On navigability, see also Akamatsu Hiroyuki, Shina kakusho keizai jijo, p. 748. See also Clark, Community, Trade, and Networks, pp. 109-10. 5. FCTC, 1867, 2: 36b. 6. Feng Teng-fu, Ming-chung chin-shih-chih, 5: 22a-24a.

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Aizawa Takuji wUl .Ej[ �. "Sodai kansho togyo no ichi kiisatsu" 5j