Political Protest in the Congo: The Parti Solidaire Africain During the Independence Struggle 9780691198644, 0691198640

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
Acknowledgments (page vii)
Introduction (page xiii)
Part One  ·  The Evolution of Political Parties in the Congo: Historic Steps and Functional Problems
PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS (page 2)
INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE (page 3)
I. THE ELITE BEGINNINGS OF CONGO POLITICS: TO JANUARY 1959 (page 6)
II. THE LEOPOLDVILLE RIOTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MASS PARTICIPATION: JANUARY TO JUNE 1959 (page 17)
III. PRESSURES FOR INDEPENDENCE: SUMMER 1959 TO DECEMBER 1959 (page 23)
IV. THE TERMINAL COLONIAL PHASE AND THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THE PARTIES: JANUARY TO JUNE 1960 (page 41)
APPENDIX TO PART ONE (page 64)
Part Two  ·  A History of the Parti Solidaire Africain
INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO (page 75)
V. THE ORIGINS OF THE PSA (page 76)
VI. THE FOUNDING OF THE PSA IN THE INTERIOR (page 86)
VII. PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY: JUNE 1959 TO MAY 1960 (page 102)
VIII. THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP (page 160)
Part Three  ·  Rural Radicalism: The PSA and Its Mass Following
INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE (page 183)
IX. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION (page 186)
X. RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS (page 216)
XI. THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE PSA (page 251)
XII. CONCLUSION (page 291)
Appendices (page 301)
Bibliography (page 313)
Index (page 319)

Citation preview

POLITICAL PROTEST IN THE CONGO

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POLITICAL PROTEST IN LHE The Parti Solidaire Africain During the Independence Struggle

HERBERT F. WEISS

Copyright © 1967 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

L.C. Card: 66-14316

Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

TO MY PARENTS

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Acknowledgments THIS STUDY would not have been possible without the generous help of the leaders and members of the PSA and other Congolese political par-

ties. I have been very fortunate indeed in having been given access to vast amounts of material and information. I should like to acknowledge my particular indebtedness and gratitude to Messrs. Antoine Gizenga, Cleophas Kamitatu, Yvon Kimpiobi, Félicien Kimvay, Raphael Kinkie, Valentin Lubuma, and Gabriel Yumbu. I must pay special homage to my

friend Louis Mandala, who escorted me through the PSA stronghold and opened my eyes to many Congolese realities which I would no doubt have missed without his untiring help. I should also like to express my thanks to Donatien Mokolo, who permitted me to read his thesis on the PSA and allowed me to interview him about his own research results. Many friends, colleagues, and mentors gave me great help in transforming my research into a book. I owe my greatest debt to Terence K. Hopkins and Bernard Hennessy, both of whom spent dozens of hours giving me the benefit of their political and stylistic insight. Richard Sklar and Elliot Berg not only helped with the manuscript but also gave me

early encouragement in the approach I adopted. My thanks also go to Benoit Verhaegen, who is most knowledgeable about the period in the Congo’s history covered in this book, he always gave me the benefit of his thinking and also helped enormously in collecting data and information. I should also like to express my gratitude to Michael Banton, L. Grey Cowan, S. N. Eisenstadt, Igor Kopytoff, Laurent Monnier, Peter Novick, Abraham Bargman, M. Crawford Young, and Marvin Markowitz for their generous support, criticism, and help. My field trip to the Congo was undertaken while I was a member of the African Economic and Political Development Project at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. I owe a great debt to the Center and especially to Arnold Rivkin, the project’s director, and to Donald L. M. Blackmer for their help, comments, and

above all, their patience. I should also like to acknowledge the help of Marion Newell in translating many complicated quotations, and the assistance of Marie-Louise Cullum, Beatrice Braude, Milene Polis, Susan Denvir, Romayn Knapp, and Jane Seitz. To Leni Schur goes my appre-

ciation for preparing the complex maps and to Ruth Rocker for editing the manuscript. Needless to say, I am alone responsible for the result. Vii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Since independence the names of administrative sub-divisions have changed several times. Also, in 1966 the names of the major cities were altered. In this volume all names used are those which were current when the events described occurred.

Vill

CONTENTS 2902020202029)?

Acknowledgments , Vil

Introduction xii

Part One + The Evolution of Political Parties in the Congo: Historic Steps and Functional Problems

PRINCIPAL ABBREVIATIONS , 2 INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE 3

To JANUARY 1959 6

I. THE ELITE BEGINNINGS OF CONGO POLITICS:

II. THE LEOPOLDVILLE RIOTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT

OF MASS PARTICIPATION: JANUARY TO JUNE 1959 17

DECEMBER 1959 23

III. PRESSURES FOR INDEPENDENCE: SUMMER 1959 To

The General Picture and Leopoldville Province | 23

The Provinces up to the End of 1959 28

The December 1959 Elections 36 IV. THE TERMINAL COLONIAL PHASE AND THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THE PARTIES:

JANUARY TO JUNE 1960 41 The Round Table Conference 4] The Major Problems Facing the Political Leaders 42

Leadership and Styles of Party Extension 51

Relations with Traditional Chiefs 53 The Varieties of Support Given the Political Parties 55

The May 1960 Elections 56 The Aftereffects of the Elections 59 APPENDIX TO PART ONE , 64 ix

CONTENTS Part Two + A History of the Parti Solidaire Africain

INTRODUCTION TO PART Two 75

V. THE ORIGINS OF THE PSA 76

Why a New Party? 78 The PSA Structure 82 The National Leadership 83 Aftermath of the January 1959 Riots in Leopoldville 76

Initial Policy and Plan of Action 84

VI. THE FOUNDING OF THE PSA IN THE INTERIOR 86

Early Political Activities in Kikwit 87 The ASAP Delegation to Leopoldville 89

The Start of the Kikwit PSA 91

Farly PSA Activities in the Kwilu District 93 Early PSA Activities in the Kwango District 99 VII. PSA POLiIcy AND STRATEGY: JUNE 1959 To May 1960 102 Defining a Nationalist Policy and the Search for Allies:

June to August 1959 103 Hard-Line Nationalism: September to December 1959 118

The Constitutional Way to Independence: December

1959 to May 1960 138

VIII. THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP 160

Background 160 from Exile 176 The Politics of Ethnicity as It Affected the PSA and

Its Leaders After the Round Table Conference 169

Leadership Relations After Gizenga’s Return

Part Three + Rural Radicalism: The PSA and Its Mass Following

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE 183 IX. DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION 186

Kwilu Area 186

Early Anti-Colonial Manifestations in the Kwango- , x

CONTENTS

The Leopoldville Riots and Their Effect on Rural Life 189

Early PSA Organization 192

The PSA Organization Takes Hold 198

The Local Impact of the Hard-Line Policy Adopted

by the PSA in August 1959 203

The Boycott of the December 1959 Elections and

Relations with the Local Administration 208 X. RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS 216

PSA Relations with Traditional Leaders 216 PSA Relations with the Catholic Church and the

Congolese Clergy 223 Extensions of PSA Functions 228 The Local Executive Colleges 244

ON THE PSA 251

XI. THe May 1960 ELECTIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS

The General Problem of Discipline in the Rural Areas 252

Discipline Within the PSA 254

The Election Results and Their Significance 270

The PSA After the Elections 279

XII. CONCLUSION 291

, Appendices 301

Bibliography 313

Index 319

MAPs

1. Congo Administrative Map—1960, following page 43 2. Political Allegiances—May 1960, following page 59

3. Kwango-Kwilu Ethnic Map, following page 162

xi

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INTRODUCTION 22)02))2))2)))))))))))))2))2)2)2)))))))) HE CIRCUMSTANCES under which a political study is re-

OTL searched and written almost inevitably affects its content, focus,

and even conclusions. Circumstances are largely fated, and only mildly affected by the will of the researcher. Yet, even though he has little control over them, they are profoundly personal. Ideally one would decide on a topic which is important and interesting, read up on background material, collect the necessary data, and write one’s conclusions. But field research in developing countries can rarely be undertaken in so

neat a fashion. And this was especially so in the Congo during the tumultuous days of its independence struggle. Field research involved much more groping than execution of plans. The results can of course be placed in an acceptably logical format. The subject which was most readily researchable can be interpreted as having been most important. But in following such a procedure a real dimension of the result is lost. Especially when the conditions under which the research was done were far from ideal, the reader should have some sense of what actually occurred, the avenues which were tried and rejected, the personal relations which were involved, the moments when good or bad luck intervened. Such knowledge ought to make it easier for the reader both to become aware of the inherent weaknesses and prejudices of the observer

and to intuit aspects of a total reality which cannot be portrayed in what is—hopefully—a scholarly presentation and analysis. For these reasons I wish to recount chronologically and biographically the essential elements of my experiences during the Congo’s struggle for independence. It was largely by chance that I came to study the Congo’s political

evolution. Before joining the M.I.T. project under whose auspices I went to the Congo in the fall of 1959, I had concentrated on Frenchspeaking West Africa and on north-east Africa. I had very little knowledge of either Belgian colonial policy or nationalist movements in the Congo. Indeed, I was afraid that the Congo would hardly offer material for a study of terminal colonialism and the growth of nationalist parties, and I was really looking forward to research I hoped to conduct

in Guinea under the same project. , Despite this overriding ignorance about the Congo, I realized afterwards that I had brought with me a collection of assumptions which amounted to a complete scenario. It went something like this: During the post-World War II period colonial rule in Africa had come under

INTRODUCTION

increasing challenge. ‘This was so both because of the relative weakening of European powers and because of the growth of movements among the Africans aimed at equality, self-determination, and independence. What were the essential characteristics of these movements? First, they were led by a Westernized, militant or radical elite, sympathetic to leftof-center European ideologies and parties. This elite embarked on political action by leading urban voluntary associations—in which ethnicity played a large role; this led ultimately to mass parties, sometimes unified on a national scale, but at other times limited to regions or other subdivisions of the colonial “national” society. Because the elite adopted modern party organizations and invested a vast amount of effort, they

were able to overcome the obstacles put in their way by the colonial administrations. Having finally aroused the urban and rural masses from their apathy and disciplined them in organizations, they could challenge the remaining power of European authority. Often this was possible largely because of the “charismatic” qualities of the top leader. His charisma permitted rapid political mobilization and iron discipline. Frequently the contradictions between the goals of the modern elite and those of the traditional chiefs were the greatest source of danger for the unity of the African side. But however a particular situation might develop, an essentially militant, politically aware, Western-educated elite was the driving force of African nationalism.

With regard to the Congo specifically, two factors were generally viewed as important: a highly paternalist policy had been pursued and the modern elite was very weak largely because of the unwillingness of the colonizer to permit education to university level until about 1956. Unlike West Africa, there was no university-trained elite and little devolution of power to Congolese even at the local level. Indeed, the calm

and quiet with which the Congo had passed through the 1950’s was often attributed to the absence of a “radical intelligentsia.” So much for the scenario. My initial plan on reaching the Congo was to attempt a comprehensive study of Congolese political movements and parties, and as I set

about this task the scenario outlined above came very much to life. I | arrived at a time when the first nationwide local elections were about to be held. Several of the more militant parties were opposed to them and had organized boycotts. No one to whom I spoke could do more than guess at the probable effectiveness of the boycotts nor could they predict whether there would be any violence during the elections. However, a picture emerged which suggested that at least some of the parties XIV

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were far more developed and better organized than I had supposed, and further, that they were led by a very militant modern elite. When one spoke to the average Belgian in the Congo he tended to place all the country’s political problems at the door of this elite, sometimes specifically blaming the leniency with which the government was allegedly

dealing with it. In his version the rural population—the mass—had always been content, even happy, but the “evolués’” had destroyed all this by their rabble-rousing. Now, either because they were deceived or

terrorized, this mass was at the beck and call of an elite leadership which was half-educated, ambitious, and egged on by foreign leftists.

One did not have to buy these colonial attitudes in order to accept the important premise that members of the modern elite were a militant, even radical, nucleus of anti-colonial protest and that an essentially

passive, but perhaps impressionable, rural mass appeared in certain areas to be following this leadership. This premise was largely supported by empirical studies in West Africa, and was also to be found in much of the literature dealing with revolutionary movements in Europe. Furthermore, these views were re-enforced by virtually all my early

contacts with members of this elite; more specifically by such party leaders as were willing to meet with and—infinitely more rare—actually talk with an unknown American who claimed to be writing a book. Those with whom I did manage to speak during these first months almost always insisted that they were leading large and completely dis-

ciplined parties with total or virtually total support in large regions of the country. How this degree of support had been engendered was subject to various interpretations, but on the whole it was credited to the energy, skill, and self-sacrifice of a determined group of elite leaders. Later on I was to find it increasingly difficult to reconcile this scenario with some of my own observations, but during the first months of my field trip I assumed unreservedly that the “radical modern elite” was the key element in the Congo story. This assumption imposed some difficult choices. Was I to study all the parties or only some? Was I to concentrate on party leadership in the different provincial capitals or seek out

the nature of protest at the grass-roots level? Finally, realizing that in the charged atmosphere which existed in late 1959 and early 1960 I was not likely to be trusted by all parties, should I start with the presumably more welcoming moderate or “pro-Belgian” parties, or risk failure by starting with the more radical ones?

At the time I made the choices between these various alternatives I was probably acting in response to a mixture of personal predilections XV

INTRODUCTION

and quite accidental opportunities. In retrospect it was clearly at this juncture that the direction of my research was decided. Above all, I de-

cided to try to study in some detail the political organization, and in particular the grass-roots support, of those parties which appeared to be the best organized and the most determined in their opposition to Belgian colonial authority. The outstanding movement in these terms was the ABAKO, representing the Bakongo people. It was also a party which was based in Leopoldville and had its rural hinterland close at hand. When the results of the December 1959 elections showed that the

boycott order issued by the ABAKO had been followed almost one hundred per cent, I became even more determined to gain entry into this party. At first I was rather lucky in making contact with the ABAKO leadership. This was just before the Kisantu Congress (which is dealt with

in some detail in the text), and I was delighted when I was not only invited to attend but to attend as a “visiteur @honneur.” This special treatment, however, turned out to be somewhat less glamorous than I had anticipated: the accommodations which were supposedly waiting for me were non-existent, and I received slightly less access than the journalists present. Nonetheless, my experiences at the Congress led me to question the degree of effective authority wielded by the leadership and thus to inquire into the sources of their rural support—which became one of the main points raised by this study. My interest in these matters was triggered not by the proceedings of the Congress, but by the atmosphere which surrounded it and especially by my observations at a great public meeting which was called at the end of the Congress. Villagers from the surrounding countryside flocked to hear the

ABAKO president, Joseph Kasavubu, and they apparently expected that he would make a unilateral declaration of independence. Surprisingly, the meeting kept being postponed and for a while there was some question whether it would be held at all. Finally toward evening it did

take place and I found myself, with two other “whites,” engulfed in a sea of Congolese villagers facing the president. To my amazement this “charismatic” leader appeared to be struggling to persuade his listeners to accept the decisions of the Congress and not to do anything violent. Where was the “charisma” and the “rabble-rousing” if the lead-

ing radical leader of the day was so unsure of his ability to persuade his most devoted followers to do his bidding, especially when what he was asking for was inaction not action? Of course, with hindsight the lesson of that meeting—that the “radical elite—apathetic peasants” thesis XV1

INTRODUCTION

must be challenged—appears much clearer than it was at the time. But I did afterwards persist in examining the type of authority which Con-

golese leaders had over their followers, and that has proved to be a rewarding field of inquiry.

With the end of the Kisantu Congress my luck turned against me. Most of the important leaders left for the Round Table in Brussels, and I had not made sufficient contact with any Congolese groups or parties to be welcomed by the secondary leadership. The approximately two months which followed were filled with frustration and defeat. Liv-

ing in the “European” part of town seemed a bad idea so I moved to Lovanium University in the hope that I would be able to make good contacts with the first crop of Congolese university students. The intelligentsia was obviously important. But I neither succeeded in getting

very close to students nor did they turn out to be important in the independence struggle. Finally, I decided to take a house in the “African” part of town, assuming that that would give me a certain “grassroots” contact. That too turned out to be an illusion. The atmosphere was too tense and my functions too ambiguous and obscure for many persons to give me the interest and the leads I needed. I filled my days by running to unkept appointments and tracing the public history of Congolese voluntary associations—an unrewarding endeavor. Of course I could probably have obtained access to the nascent Parti National du Progrés (a loose grouping of moderate parties and leaders with considerable Belgian backing), but I decided to follow my hunch and not

start off with an “administrative” party on the assumption that that would make me persona non grata with the radical or militant ones. My luck changed largely as a result of mosquitoes. For some time they had been eating me up alive, and I decided to make a great plea to the people who owned the house to put some netting over the windows. The owner himself was a university student in Belgium, but his father had just returned from the Round Table and we met to negotiate this complex problem. He turned out to be Nzeza Simon, the Treasurer General of the ABAKO, and after settling the insect problem I exposed my research dilemmas to him. I found a sympathetic ear. He not only

introduced me to a number of ABAKO militants but invited me to join him on an inspection tour he was about to undertake of the financial records of local ABAKO sections. The tour through the ABAKO-controlled Bas-Congo and Cataractes districts was really what oriented my entire thinking about the evolution of Congo politics. I was given very wide latitude in making obXVil

INTRODUCTION

servations and asking questions although I did not have access to party files. I was allowed to be present at section meetings and during inspec-

_ tion of the financial records of local committees and to interview at will. The ABAKO had achieved formidable areas of strength. Virtually every man, woman, and child had been enrolled into the party, that is,

had paid membership dues and was identified with the party. Every village had its party organization. Boycotts of administration functions were almost total. There was very great respect for Kasavubu and the party’s Central Committee. One sensed that the leaders could demand considerable sacrifice on the part of their followers. But there were also weaknesses. Local party leaders sometimes seemed to operate without control by the Central Committee. The enthusiasm for boycotting the administration reached “irrational” extremes and seemed to go beyond what the leaders wanted. Directives tending to restrain protest against Belgian rule seemed to be ignored. There were some internal conflicts

and divisions over authority. Finally, the expectations held for independence were extreme. The example which remains vivid in my mind is the local committee member who explained why he had organized

a boycott of the inoculation service. He was afraid that the Belgian doctors would poison the Congolese and when I pointed out that Congolese nurses would be giving the injections he exclaimed that in any

case since talk of independence had taken hold no one was ill! The modern elite leaders present clearly did not agree, but neither did they say anything to contradict him. After the ABAKO trip I found myself suddenly faced with an embarrassment of riches. The slow process of getting to be known, the fact of having been allowed entry into what was considered the most Closed and best disciplined party, and renewed access to top leaders after their return from the Round Table all resulted in my being able, in effect, to obtain permission to tour the stronghold of virtually any of the parties. Indeed, in most cases leaders agreed to give me a “guide,” which under the prevailing conditions was absolutely necessary since letters of recommendation would have been far from enough accreditation.

Still hoping to study all major parties, I worked out a schedule according to which J would pass through one party stronghold after another and thereby tour the whole Congo. Needless to say, this was an overambitious plan and it broke down—because of rain and impassable roads—shortly after being put into effect. But that was no longer a major setback; I was able to study the Parti Solidaire Africain after the XVII

INTRODUCTION

ABAKO and then flew to Stanleyville and Bukavu and studied the Mouvement National Congolais (Lumumba) and the Centre de Regroupment Africain. As it turned out, after the May 1960 elections these were the most important political parties (excluding the Parti National du Progrés, which was not really a unified organization), the four among them having won approximately 30 per cent of the seats in the Chamber of Representatives. Since there were several dozen parties operating at the time when I “made” my choices, I had obviously been lucky. The PSA Central Committee assigned Louis Mandala, the Secretary

of the National Political Bureau, to accompany me during my trip through the party’s stronghold in the Kwango and Kwilu areas. Here again I was extraordinarily fortunate in finding a person who devoted himself completely to facilitating the research and like Nzeza Simon became a good friend. During the trip through PSA territory many of the features I had begun to discern during the ABAKO trip came into far clearer focus. I had also added new tools to my research method; I was now after hard evidence in the form of party documents and formal testimony and I had equipped myself with a camera powerful enough to microfilm documents in daylight and a photoprint machine which could, if neces-

sary, be run off the car battery. I also had a portable tape recorder. Many scholars writing and discussing field research techniques have argued against such mechanical aids. My own experience leads me to argue very strongly in the opposite direction. Once one is trusted and accepted—and no research results are worth much if he is not—these machines not only facilitate the recording of information but also may in fact enlarge the amount of cooperation one receives. There is something “serious” and thorough about taping a man’s views or photographing a local section’s documents, and this sensed seriousness of purpose helps rather than hinders the gathering of material. Furthermore, the ability to collect a mass of unsorted documents which can be analyzed and sorted later, adds immeasurably to the scope and volume of the material collected.

The details of what I discovered during this trip are of course dealt with in the body of the study. I shall therefore only recount here some of the personal experiences which may help the reader interpret the results reported. The trip through PSA country occurred at the end of April and May 1960. This meant that I was able to observe at firsthand how the PSA handled the all-important electoral campaign which was then taking place. It was also the moment when the party’s National X1X

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President, Antoine Gizenga, made a tour of the interior after a long absence in Europe (West and East) and West Africa. He was accompanied by a somewhat mysterious lady, Andrée Blouin (she is discussed in Part

III), who was alternately characterized as a Russian and a Guinean. All this made me very eager to join the presidential motorcade, but since no one knew exactly where it was located, and they were all expected in Kikwit in a few days, I was advised to wait. In the meantime I was given complete access to party headquarters files in Kikwit (the most important PSA stronghold) and spent days photographing correspondence, party reports, and so on. At the time I was rather naively unaware of the many antagonisms which existed in the party. When Gizenga, Mulele, Blouin et al. finally arrived in Kikwit I was surprised

to find a sudden and complete change of atmosphere. I was given formal interviews, no more access to files—in effect, the door was shut. I had gained entry via one faction of the party and that made me suspect to the other. In addition it was my impression that the closing of the door was in part the result of Blouin’s influence, and one can hardly blame her for considering it imprudent to give such total access to an unknown American. Nonetheless, I continued to gather information at

the grass-roots level. However, the hand of fate is obvious: if I had rushed on to watch Gizenga campaigning, this study could probably not have been written since much of the documentation was gathered while I was impatiently waiting in Kikwit. This part of the story had a sequel. Two years later some PSA leaders inquired whether the Centre de recherche et d’information socio-politiques (C.R.I.S.P.) could compile an annotated collection of the party’s documents. C.R.ILS.P. had done this on a yearly basis for Congo documents in general and also for ABAKO documents. Benoit Verhaegen, a colleague at Lovanium University, and I agreed to edit the proposed

volume on the PSA. Because of all the turmoil which had occurred in the Congo it turned out that much of the original documentation had

been lost and that the photocopies in my possession had become the only copies extant. In addition, much material was obtained from leaders who on hearing of the compilation searched their files for old minutes, letters, and reports. Some of this material was directly airmailed to me

in the United States. For my own work, there was an approximately twenty-five per cent increase in important source material. The volume which resulted, Parti Solidaire Africain—Documents, has made it possi-

XX |

ble for the reader to consult in full documents which are only cited in part, or referred to in passing. Finally, when I returned to the Congo

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in 1966 I found that I could “legitimize” myself in the Kwilu and elsewhere by referring to this volume or presenting it to persons I wished to

interview or solicit for documentation. The fact of having edited a volume of Congolese papers not only helped to define my function but was welcome because there is a great desire to see African history recorded. This desire is not restricted to the intellectuals but penetrates down to villages where there are only a few persons who are vaguely literate.

After my trip through PSA territory ended, I went on to Orientale and Kivu Provinces. The material gathered there will not be analyzed in this study but will form the basis of another study dealing with the Mouvement National Congolais (Lumumba). However, I shall briefly recount some of my experiences afterwards so as to complete the “trip story.” My entry into the Mouvement National Congolais was, of course, dependent on Lumumba’s agreement, and the difficulty there was that when I first came to the Congo he was in prison and when he was let out he immediately flew to the Round Table in Brussels. By

the time I was finally introduced to him I had already traveled in ABAKO territory. He immediately agreed to have me visit the MNC at the grass-roots level and typed out instructions to all sections ordering them to cooperate with me. Although the original plan of entering the MNC stronghold via Equateur Province did not work out, I was given a most generous welcome when I arrived in Stanleyville. It was a very tense moment; the Force Publique was everywhere and an MNC Congress was “buzzed” by what appeared to be an army plane. Lumumba himself was in an exuberant mood and took me with him to his casual meetings in bars, to the Congress, and even to a wrestling match held in his honor. He was easily the most open and outspoken of the Congolese leaders I had met. He had one or two Belgians on

his payroll and was on very friendly terms with a few others. The M.N.C.(L) was organized on a much larger scale than the other parties I had seen; there were more people employed, larger party offices, more activity. But when I made a short trip into the interior I perceived that it had been hastily put together, was staffed by a large number of unemployed youths, employed harsh pressure techniques, and in general was | more “out of control” than either the ABAKO or the PSA. I stayed in the Congo another six months after independence. The changes in this period, however, were so radical that apart from additional documentary materials, I was unable to collect very much more about the independence struggle itself. I left with the conviction that the XX1

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Congolese political elite had done an amazing job of synchronizing protest and cajoling the masses into such concerted action as was required for an effective assault on the Belgian administrative apparatus and for an effective use of the ballot. Having sensed the profound grassroots tendency toward a complete rejection of everything that was ad-

ministration, law, and order, indeed an almost magnetic pull toward anarchy, I was amazed at how successful the political elite had been in channeling protest and calming it. Anyone familiar with opinions about the Congo in late 1960 and 1961 will appreciate how “far out” that put me. When I began my “office research” I had the choice of attempting to

weave all my observations and research together, in order to write a general study of Congolese nationalism, or to concentrate on one party and, with this more limited focus, to delve as deeply as possible into those phenomena of Congolese political behavior which I considered

to be both important and distinctive to the Congo. I chose the latter even though I have devoted the first part of this study to a general analysis of recent pre-independence history. The Parti Solidaire Africain was chosen because it was one of the most important and militant parties,

because it was collegially led and therefore in principle not subject to one man’s whims, and most important because I had been given the greatest access to its archives and had had the greatest contact with its rural sections.

I have paid particular attention to the relationship between the PSA leadership and its mass following. In the process of examining this re-

lationship, and as a direct consequence of the adoption of a “case study” approach, I have stressed the importance of “rural radicalism”: the rural population in the area dominated by the PSA manifested a

largely spontaneous anti-colonial protest that was more radical and more aggressive than the anti-colonialism of the elite leaders. How this rural radicalism manifested itself and its importance for the Congo, and

possibly for other parts of Africa, are dealt with in the body of this study and in the conclusions.

My own thinking on this problem, I now see in retrospect, really began when I was preparing a short statement for a panel discussion on the Congo in October 1961.1 I began my argument by pointing out 1 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, African

Studies Bulletin (New York: African Studies Association) Vol. IV, No. IV, December 1961, pp. 8-9. XXil

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that the early evolution of Congolese nationalism had not been very different from the patterns set in West Africa, but went on to say that, from 1958 on, the Congolese veered away from this precedent. It was possible to discern an eruption of non-ideological radicalism among the masses. Indeed, the leadership was more moderate than the urban masses, and the urban masses were more moderate than the rural masses. . . . [There were] several reasons why this curious political situation developed. First, . . . the psychological factor: nowhere else in newly independent Africa had the impact of the colonial process on locally existing societies been greater. Individual Congolese were touched more quickly and more deeply than were Africans in West Africa, not merely because of the political accoutrements of colonial rule but also because of the evangelization of the Congolese (50 per cent were considered Christian), the accompanying mass primary education, and the Belgian failure to give status to traditional leaders or to a new elite. . . . [further] the degree of urbanization and detribalization as a result of economic development meant a great loss of cohesiveness in tribal society.* Independence, to the large mass of Congolese, was to mean the end of humiliation by the whites and an end to the white way of doing things. The evolué, on

the other hand, accepted much of the white man’s system, but desired to substitute himself for the colonizer. In this sense the leadership had essentially economic goals, i.e. the white man’s job, his house, and his general standard of life, whereas the villager’s goals ended in a state of total revolution. At the time that I made this statement, the concept of a revolutionary peasantry was anything but accepted theory. No doubt even today there will be many who will argue that the emphasis which I have given to this aspect of the independence struggle is much too great. But there is no denying that ultimately the rural masses in the area covered by this

book and most of the Congo did manifest revolutionary protest. The rebellions of 1963 and 1964 are both tragic and complete proof of this.

Because I saw this rural revolutionary impetus as so important, I came to argue the thesis of the Congo’s uniqueness. This was not done in the manner so fashionable a few years ago, that is to say by pointing to the alleged lack of preparedness and education of the Congo’s po* Today I would argue that traditional social patterns had been affected to an extraordinary degree, but that identification with ethnic groupings remained— and still remains—strong. XXiil

INTRODUCTION litical elite, but rather by placing emphasis on the great impact which the whole colonial experience had had on the country. In effect, in seeking to explain something which appeared to be unique—trural radicalism— I sought a cause in something which appeared to be extreme—colonial impact. Since this time, however, the existence of a rural revolutionary impetus has come to be seen as having existed—or existing—elsewhere in Africa. As a result, I have become increasingly ambiguous about the “unique-

ness” theory. If this doubt is valid, the example of the Congo may be considered as a sort of model both for a re-analysis of the independence struggle in other African countries and for an analysis of post-independence protest movements.

XXIV

PART ONE | The Evolution of Political Parties in the Congo: Historic Steps and Functional Problems

Principal Abbreviations

ABAKO Alliance des Bakongo

ABAZI Alliance des Bayanzi APIC Association du Personnel Indigéne du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi

ARP Alliance Rurale Progressiste ASAP Association des Anciens Eléves des Péres Jésuites ASSORECO Association des Ressortissants du Haut-Congo BALUBAKAT Association des Baluba du Katanga

CEREA Centre de Regroupement Africain

COAKA Coalition Kasaienne CONAKAT Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga

COOPESA Coopérative de la Solidarité Africaine

LUKA L’Union Kwangolaise pour l’Indépendance et la Liberté

MNC Mouvement National Congolais MSM Mouvement Social du Maniéma

PNP Parti National du Progrés

PP Parti du Peuple PSA Parti Solidaire Africain PUNA Parti de l’Unité Nationale

PUC Parti de Unité Congolaise RADECO Rassemblement des Démocrats du Congo

RDLK Rassemblement Démocratique du Lac du Kwango et Kwilu

UC Union Congolaise — UNACO Union Nationale Congolaise (Stanleyville)

UNIMO Union des Mongo UNISCO Union des Intéréts Sociaux Congolais

INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE 22 22}22000020023-2210220010020

HE FIRST PART of this study attempts to portray the setting in

Thich the Congo independence struggle took place. It is hoped

that this will provide the reader with a framework for the case study of

the Parti Solidaire Africain which follows. In addition this general analysis will show how very important the ABAKO-PSA axis in Leopoldville Province was for the independence struggle, while underscoring

the regional limits of these two parties, and pointing to some of the political constellations which were emerging in other parts of the Congo.

The historical analysis in Part One highlights the most important political events from approximately 1958 to independence. Included in this review is an examination of the major problems which faced Congolese parties during the independence struggle and especially in the

period between February and June 1960. In addition, a chart is presented in the appendix indicating the main characteristics of the nine most successful parties to emerge from the May 1960 elections. A discussion of Congolese parties poses a problem in the choice of

language or labels to be used. The parties were of very recent origin, and for this and other reasons it is almost meaningless to characterize them ideologically. Some of the categories established for African parties

in other parts of the continent are also not very useful. Perhaps the most important distinction for the reader to keep in mind is the one between policy and style. By policy is meant the degree of pressure exerted on Belgium toward a liberalization of the colonial regime and the granting of independence. In addition it involved opting for one of several possible structures for the Congolese state after independence, 1.e., federalist or centralist. By style is meant the degree of aggressiveness shown by the parties, especially at the local level, toward enrolling members, opposing other parties, and dealing with the local administration and the white population. It is noteworthy that one of the characteristics of Congolese parties before independence was the fact that very often no real correlation existed between a party’s style and policy.

Although political parties existed for only about two years prior

to the achievement of independence by the Congo on June 30, 1960, an analysis requires that this short period be divided into four fairly distinct phases. The first period, up to the January 1959 riots in Leopoldville, involved the politicization of urban associations, the development of ideologically oriented elite discussion groups under various forms of Belgian patronage, the early crystallization of urban 3

INTRODUTION TO PART ONE

political loyalties during the communal elections of 1957 and 1958 in the major cities, and the early formulation of nationalist demands vis-a-vis Belgian colonial authority.

The second period started with the Leopoldville riots and lasted up to the summer of 1959. It was marked by the extension of political consciousness and protest from the modern elite to large segments of the urban and rural masses. It was in this period that political parties were first able to establish broadly based organizations with local sections in the villages.

The third period, from the summer of 1959 to March 1960, was characterized by the virtual collapse of Belgian administration in large areas of the Congo and by the extension of the role of parties to quasigovernmental functions. It is difficult to establish a really precise date for this development. In a few areas, such as the Lower Congo, it was already present in April 1959; in other areas, not until the May 1960 elections. But in most regions of the Congo at some point the people in effect divorced themselves from the administration—without in fact engendering a strong reaction—and the young, ill-prepared party organizations filled the void thus created. This period also saw a nearly complete reversal of Belgian colonial policy: a vague plan for inde-

pendence in four years became a commitment for independence in one year. The fourth period, from March to May 1960, was one of virtually

revolutionary anarchy the true nature of which was somewhat obscured by a succession of dramatic political events which in turn served

as a sort of outlet for these tendencies. The electoral campaign, the granting of transitional power to the top political leaders of the day, the elections for the first Congo parliament and for the provincial assemblies, the negotiation between party leaders for a coalition government, the exodus of many Europeans, and the preparations for independence festivities, all of which occurred in rapid order, tended to

cover up the fact not only that political power had passed from the Belgian administration into the hands of the Congolese political leaders but that the latter could usually exert this power only within relatively narrow limits. In effect, no one had any real control over the large masses of Congolese at a moment when the most exaggerated

expectations had been raised with regard to independence. Not only was the power to reassert government authority lacking on such vital matters as taxation, but to compound the difficulties inter-ethnic con4

INTRODUTION TO PART ONE | flicts flared up into small wars and several regions saw a dramatic increase in rather destructive forms of millennial movements. The mutiny of the Force Publique was a part of this general decomposition of the social fabric, but it brought with it so many new developments that the period after independence cannot be dealt with in this study.

5

CHAPTER I 2340222222202) 2222290) The Elite Beginnings of Congo Politics: To January 1959 ‘6 ONGOLESE politicalcenters, parties!that almost their capital, origins in the metropolitan is to uniformly say, in the had national

Leopoldville, and in the five other provincial capitals, Luluabourg, Elisabethville, Bukavu, Stanleyville, and Coquilhatville. The population of these centers can be roughly divided into three major components: the modern elite, the established employed workers with their

families, and the floating labor force—made up overwhelmingly of young males recently arrived in the city and without regular employment, if employed at all. Since it is usually assumed that established workers have different political reactions from anomic crowds of unemployed it would have been desirable to distinguish between the two groups throughout the analysis which follows. Unfortunately this cannot be done because of lack of adequate information; consequently, these two categories of urban residents will be referred to as the urban mass or population. It should be noted, however, that this handicap is perhaps less serious than may appear at first glance because there is some question as to whether the established workers and the floating labor force do in fact always behave in a distinctly different manner. Where information does exist which indicates a significant difference in behavior, the material will be treated accordingly. The Congolese modern elite—sometimes referred to as the évolués or the intellectuels—was made up of those who had had the benefit of

advanced schooling. The elite included former seminary students, teachers, medical assistants, agricultural technicians, and all whitecollar workers in the administration and the commercial companies. It did not include any university graduates during the period under

discussion because virtually no Congolese had been given such training.’

In the smaller towns and villages those calling themselves and con1The main characteristics of the parties which emerged as the most successful ones at the end of the independence struggle are presented in tabular form in the appendix.

2 Even when university graduates began to appear they seem to have been regarded as a special class. As one Congolese told the writer, “For us university graduates are already scholars (des savants).”

6

ELITE BEGINNINGS OF CONGO POLITICS sidered by other Congolese to be the elite often had less education. In this environment it was frequently sufficient merely to be literate. In fact, in Congolese eyes the elite consisted of those who filled the specific socio-political role of knowing how to deal with the Belgian system or the modern world. For this, some modern education was needed,

and the persons in such positions had some prestige and economic advantage both among Europeans and Congolese. It was in this sense

that they were a class in Congolese society. Thus, for the Congolese it was the role they played, their function, which defined the elite,

while for the Europeans the criterion was a minimum of advanced education.

Prior to the advent of political parties urban Congolese organizations fell into two general categories: those made up exclusively of the elite, and those whose membership was largely drawn from the urban mass. It is noteworthy that both kinds of organizations were led by the elite. The Belgian administration allowed and even encouraged these organizations, but at the same time restricted their activities rather severely. For instance, in the mid-1950’s some of the elite associations were permitted to discuss cultural and philosophical questions, but they were forbidden to act as political groupings. In this respect the Congo experience was, of course, very similar to that of the other African countries. The elite associations were made up of several sub-categories: alumni associations, usually organized around missionary orders which had been responsible for the education of their members; discussion groups, of which the most prominent, the Union des Intéréts Sociaux Congolais (UNISCO), emerged from several Leopoldville alumni associations;?

and, later, ideologically oriented discussion groups, which emerged especially during the 1954-58 period at which time the Belgian authority in the Congo reflected deep divisions in Belgium between Cath-

olic and anti-clerical forces. Thus Catholic, Liberal, and Socialist+ groupings were formed which, while not political parties, did naturally reflect political viewpoints. In addition, labor unions must be included 3 M.C.C. De Backer, Notes pour servir a étude des “Groupements Politiques” a Leopoldville (Brussels: INFORCONGO, 1959), pp. 5-8. 4 The Catholic party—Parti Social Chretien (PSC)—reflects a wide range of economic points of view but is united by its affirmative religious identification. The Socialist party—Parti Socialiste Belge (PSB)—in addition to its economic policy is anti-clerical. The Liberal party—Parti Libéral Belge (PLB)—is classically liberal, that is to say, in favor of free enterprise and also anti-clerical. This party has

been renamed Parti de Liberté et du Progrés (PLP). , 7

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO

in this category since their membership constituted at least a labor aristocracy, and white-collar workers, i.e., members of the elite, made

up a heavy proportion of the total union membership. Congolese unions, very much like the ideologically oriented discussion groups, tended to be tied to Belgian unions, which were divided among Catholics, Socialists, and Liberals. One important exception was the Association du Personnel Indigéne du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi (APIC), an independent union of Congolese government employees. The urban mass-membership organizations were largely composed of ethnic and regional associations. Their evolution reflects almost perfectly the pattern which has frequently been described in West Africa.° The function of such associations was mutual help in a new and sometimes harsh environment, and the affirmation of traditional cultural ties and values. For example, the most important organization of this type in Leopoldville, the Association des Bakongo (ABAKO), sought, among other things, to revive Kikongo, the language of the Bakongo. In Leopoldville especially, the large number of immigrants of different ethnic origins coming from many different regions resulted in several types of associations; purely ethnic ones, federations of sub-ethnic or tribal groupings, and regional organizations. As has been noted, the modern elite led essentially all the organizations in the urban centers. Those which came closest to actual political activity were the ideologically oriented study groups. However, they were very small and made up of a few self-selected persons who represented no one but themselves. Although the subject matter dealt with

in their discussions was quasi-political and many members of the groups ultimately became important political leaders, these organizations had limited influence and for the most part did not emerge into parties. Of these study groups the Catholic ones naturally were most important since virtually all the members of the Congo elite had studied at mission schools. It was a group of this nature congregated around a small publication, Conscience Africaine, which issued the first formal

nationalist manifesto in July 1956: “Le Manifeste de ‘Conscience Africaine.’ ’® It demanded an end to racial discrimination and freely 5 Thomas Hodgkin, African Political Parties (London: Penguin African Series, 1961), pp. 48-50. Also by the same author, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1956), pp. 84-92. 6 Full text given in Jean Labrique, Congo Politique (Leopoldville: Editions de Avenir, 1957), pp. 252-64. The proposal for a thirty-year evolution toward independence was first made by Professor A.A.J. Van Bilsen several months before it appeared in the manifesto. 8

ELITE BEGINNINGS OF CONGO POLITICS

negotiated relations between the Congo and Belgium, with eventual independence after a thirty-year evolution. While this declaration was obviously of major importance—in fact several of the drafters became leaders in the early Mouvement National Congolais (MNC)— it also reflected and furthered a division among the elite in Leopoldville which

was to have very serious repercussions for the Congo’s future. The group around Conscience Africaine was largely dominated by immigrants from Equateur and Kasai Provinces (see map in appendix), and represented relatively few true natives of Leopoldville. On the other hand, the ABAKO (at that time the ethnic association of the Bakongo and not yet a political party) operated upon a base of about 50 per cent of the city’s population. A double competition ensued: an ethnic one which pitted the Bakongo and the “Upper River’’’ people

against one another; and a structural one which pitted a dominant ethnic association against an ideologically oriented elite group. The ABAKO issued its own manifesto in which the moderate thirtyyear plan for independence was opposed by a demand for immediate

emancipation. Furthermore, it was suggested that the true political divisions among the Congolese were ethnic and that political parties should be based upon these divisions.®

This, then, was the situation which prevailed until the end of 1957. At that time the first communal elections were held in Leopoldville, Elisabethville and Jadotville; they were held in the other provincial capitals in 1958. Naturally, the elite viewed this development as an opportunity to participate in a move toward local self-government. It meant, however, that the divisions and conflicts which had taken place

exclusively among the elite until then were transferred to a much broader arena—the entire urban population. The election results in Leopoldville demonstrated that the Bakongo stuck together and also received the support of large sections of the non-Bakongo residents of

the city, while the “Upper River” people were divided and consequently elected only a few communal councillors.

The communal elections left their stamp upon Congo politics. What was most evident was that the city electorate saw political conflict in largely ethnic terms. This does not mean that there was a direct correlation between the size of any given ethnic group and the vote which 7“Les gens du Haut” were the people who had come down the Congo river largely from Equateur Province. Although sometimes referred to as Bangala, they were rather mixed ethnically. In fact, the only thing which united them was the geographic direction of their migration. 8 Labrique, op.cit., pp. 266-75, especially pp. 270-71.

9

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO

its leaders received; in Leopoldville, for instance, the Bakongo constituted only 46.5 per cent of the electorate while the Bakongo candidates won 78.2 per cent of the communal seats.®° But the important conclusion to be drawn from the 1957 elections is that ethnic considerations predominated. In other words, ethnic origin was politically crucial even though the boundaries of such ethno-political loyalties had not as yet been clearly fixed. The communal elections were also important in their effect on subsequent political alignments in the Congo. Yet, because they had been held exclusively in the major urban centers, the political and/or ethnic divisions which they had reflected and sometimes crystallized did not represent the ethno-political make-up of the provinces in which these cities were located. Thus, when the franchise was extended to the whole

Congo population in December 1959, massive and time-consuming realignments were necessary. Prominent leaders suddenly found themselves at the head of insignificant political organizations and, conversely, ethnic groups with great electoral power sometimes had to fill positions of leadership with those who had not had the benefit of performing such roles in the early political organizations. The two best examples of this phenomenon were the situations which

evolved in Leopoldville and Elisabethville, the most important urban arenas. In Leopoldville the conflict between the Bakongo and the Upper

River people continued. The Bakongo, by this time politically represented by the ABAKO, focused their political concerns on their urban opponents without quite realizing how antiquated this conflict would become once the franchise was extended, for the Upper River people, who were of some consequence in the city, were only a small minority in the whole province. On the other hand, there were regions in the province, for example the Kwilu district, which for all intents and purposes had remained outside the arena of political activities until very late merely because relatively few persons from this region lived in the city. As will be noted later, the cavalier manner in which other densely populated areas of the province were treated by the ABAKO was partly ®It is probable that the Bakongo candidates received the support of Leopoldville residents from the Kwango and Kwilu districts. No conclusive evidence for this exists, but several ties between the Bakongo and the ethnic groups living in the Kwango-Kwilu region suggest this conclusion. Centre de recherche et d'information Socio-politiques (hereafter referred to as CRISP), ABAKO, 1950-60, Documents (Brussels: 1963), pp. 123-25. 10 For instance, the Kwango-Kwilu electorate in the city almost certainly gave its support to non-Bakongo candidates in later elections.

10

ELITE BEGINNINGS OF CONGO POLITICS responsible for the creation of the PSA, which, although an ally of the ABAKO between the summer of 1959 and spring of 1960, had started as a competitor and ultimately became its chief rival. In other words, the ABAKO concentrated on an unreal problem and neglected a real one.

The same was true in Elisabethville, where the 1957 elections resulted in a much-resented victory for Kasai immigrants. The native Katangans thereupon formed the Confédération des Associations Tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT), whose goal was mainly to oppose the privileged position which the Kasai immigrants had attained. But the Kasai immigrants were no more than an insignificant minority in Katanga as a whole, and the conditions which gave rise to Katangan unity were only present in the urban centers. Katangan unity within the

CONAKAT was therefore unreal and soon collapsed. By 1959 the more fundamental Katangan divisions—mainly the conflict between the Baluba of Katanga and the Lunda (the two most important Katangan ethnic groups)—-came to the fore, but by then a great deal of time and energy had been used up in dealing with a marginal issue while central political problems were left in abeyance. This type of problem is in all probability the inevitable result of the

initial concentration of modern political events in the urban centers, which causes leaders to neglect politically relevant events in the countryside. Since similar situations must have existed in other parts of Africa, especially where cities are relatively new, the question arises why this was so great a problem in the Congo. The difference is to be found in the people to whom the franchise was first extended; which in turn determined the initial lines of communication. In the British and French areas of Africa the franchise was first given to an educated or

propertied elite no matter where these people lived. Thus the provincial and local elite was in the political picture from the beginning

even though the political arena was inevitably concentrated in the urban environment. In contrast, in the Congo the franchise was first given to all male residents of the urban centers irrespective of education. Later, in December 1959, it was extended to all males everywhere.’ This meant that the lines of communication which were established were in the cities between the elite and a mass following rather than among the elite. Moreover, because the elite was forced so early to create a mass following and because of the absence of any11 However, these were local elections and the full electoral impact of the urbannational discrepancy was not felt until May 1960.

11

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO

thing but common ethnicity, the ethnic constellations of the urban centers became extremely important. Once politics extended to the rural environment, however, these constellations became unimportant.

Finally, the rapidity with which Congolese politics evolved after 1958 made it especially costly, in a sense, for leaders and parties to expend their energies on unreal problems. At best, the whole political process was a race against time toward the goal of rationalizing differences and alliances so that viable government could emerge. The aftereffects of the 1957 (and 1958) communal elections were an obstacle to the achievement of this goal.

An analysis of the period between the communal elections of December 1957 and the Leopoldville riots of January 1959 is complicated by the presence of a multitude of events and the absence of any very clear patterns. It was the calm before the storm. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to set forth the main developments which marked this year.

First, despite the increased elite concern with the urban mass, the main focus of elite attention was still on its own activities, rivalries, and relations with Belgian authority. Second, the leaders of all sorts of organizations were increasingly active in what amounted to political

caucuses. Third, after alignments and realignments these caucuses evolved into political parties toward the end of 1958. Several types of

parties emerged and their formation engendered a number of conflicts. , The most politically conscious members of the elite—very often those who had participated in ideologically oriented study groups—tended to form parties which reflected their ideological orientations and their personal contacts with Belgians.*? Such parties usually had the backing of Belgian ‘“‘advisers.” Some examples were the early MNC in Leopoldville, which reflected a largely Catholic viewpoint; the Parti du Peuple (PP) also in Leopoldville, which reflected a Socialist position; the Union Congolaise (UC) in Elisabethville, which reflected a Catholic position; and the Centre de Regroupement Africain (CEREA) in

Bukavu, which tended toward a Socialist position but did include leaders who were later identified with a more “Catholic” viewpoint.

At the same time many of the ethnic associations and especially the ethnic “federations” in the larger cities veered toward political activity and, while not at first recognized as parties, they in fact performed all the functions which parties did at that time. That is to say, they made 12 Labels such as “Catholic” and “Socialist” reflect affinity to Belgian parties rather than a comprehensive acceptance of these ideological postures on the part of the Congolese elite.

12

ELITE BEGINNINGS OF CONGO POLITICS statements concerning the Congo’s political future and sought to enroll members in the cities. The outstanding example was the ABAKO, but

there was also CONAKAT and the Interfédérale des Groupes Ethniques, a rather loose union of ethnic federations in Leopoldville which excluded the ABAKO, and therefore the Bakongo, and usually pursued a very moderate policy. This process created much tension among the elite leadership. Those who formed political parties with ideological planks were frequently divided by their different ethnic backgrounds. On the other hand, the

leaders of ethnic associations were not always in agreement as to whether they wanted to pursue an overtly political course. Thus a number of ethnic associations split, with some leaders moving toward the formation of political parties and others retaining the old format. Needless to say, the same persons were often involved in both types of organizations and conflicts. At another level, the elite leadership had numerous opportunities in 1958 to react to events which profoundly affected the Congo. The pronouncements made by them not only represented their increasingly bold demands but also became the method by which they competed with one another. During this period, the ABAKO was usually in the forefront in mak-

ing nationalist demands. It also had the most solid relationship of any political group with the urban mass which supported it. Furthermore, this urban mass, the Bakongo, was the largest single ethnic group in any urban center of the Congo. An example of such ABAKO pioneer-

ing was the Dendale Commune speech of Joseph Kasavubu, the ABAKO president, in April 1958 on the occasion of his assuming the functions of mayor of the commune. He called for internal autonomy, Africanization of the civil service, the police and the army, universal

suffrage, and general elections. Another example was the ABAKO tract circulated in September 1958 in Leopoldville after General de Gaulle’s Brazzaville speech, in which the party stated that only total independence for the Congo would facilitate a peaceful resolution of Belgo-Congolese differences. The ABAKO tone was usually harsher and more militant than that of other political organizations.*?

Another characteristic of this period was the repeated mismanagement of encounters between nascent political leaders and Belgian au-

thorities. There were many instances of this: for example, the discriminatory treatment given to the first Congolese university graduate, 13 CRISP, ABAKO, pp. 144-45.

13

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO Thomas Kanza, in his job classification; the closing down of the first independent Congolese newspaper, Congo, over a relatively minor matter; the suspension of Kasavubu from his post as mayor because of the content of the above-mentioned speech, and the almost immediate reversal of the suspension. The non-inclusion of Congolese in the Parliamentary Commission which was to recommend major reforms also angered many of the elite. By mid-1958 they felt they ought to have a direct say in changes which would profoundly affect the Congo. Not the least of these psychological errors was the organization of the Congo pavilion at the Brussels World Fair, complete with a “typical Congolese village.” A Congolese reaction to this was: “Why should our people and our children be exposed to view as if they were animals in a Zoo?’’*4

Conflicts of this type during the process of decolonization are not surprising, and not unexpectedly, clashes were often the result of essentially liberal moves on the part of Belgian authorities. However, there does seem to have been an unnecessary degree of clumsiness. The

first elected commune councils and mayors were expected to satisfy the elite—and up to a point they did—yet the cumbersome treatment of Kasavubu immediately erased much of the good feeling which might

have been created. The many Congolese brought to Europe for the first time for the Fair were presumably pleased by this action of the Belgian government, but the insensitivity shown in placing the Congolese on exhibition destroyed some of the anticipated good will.

The Brussels Fair was important for another reason, namely, the organization of a discussion group in Belgium by the Congolese participants. This development culminated in the formation of a Congolese

political party several months later and also hastened the founding of the far more important MNC in Leopoldville by elite leaders, most of whom had not come to the Fair. By far the most dramatic event of 1958 was the revolutionary change which occurred in French colonial policy. General de Gaulle’s speech

in Brazzaville on August 24, in which he offered complete independence to all French overseas territories, had a profound effect on the Congo. One immediate reaction was a letter drafted by some of the outstanding elite in Leopoldville and addressed to the Minister for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi.** Their key demand was for a firm time14 Ruth Slade, The Belgian Congo (London: Institute of Race Relations, Oxford

University Press, 1960), p. 14. , 15 CRISP, Congo 1959 (Brussels: 1960), 2d ed., pp. 26-28.

14

ELITE BEGINNINGS OF CONGO POLITICS table leading up to independence. Most of those who signed the letter were to participate in the formation of the MNC two months later. Included among them were the Congo’s first three prime ministers. However, the fact that Kasavubu was not one of the signatories represented a serious division among the more militant Congolese leaders.

Since the entire future of Congolese nationalism was so heavily influenced by the exclusiveness of the ABAKO, one may well ask why the Congolese leaders in Leopoldville (not to mention the other urban centers) could not have presented a common front. Ultimately the key to this enigma is probably to be found in the political style of Kasavubu himself. However, there were many other contributing factors. First, the ABAKO had clearly shown that it had a wide mass following and that it was willing to take a front-line position in formulating nationalist demands. During the year 1958 these were not made in the name of the Bakongo; on the contrary, Kasavubu went to considerable length to counter the ethnic antagonisms which manifested themselves increasingly in Leopoldville.** He attempted to speak in the name of all Congolese. But this subtle bid for overall leadership was not rewarded with any real response. Neither the elite leaders who had gone to the Brussels Fair nor the ones who shortly afterwards formed the MNC took their cues from the ABAKO leader. In addition, it was well known that both of these nuclei of political leaders were frequently advised by Belgians affiliated with Belgian parties. Kasavubu had early opposed the development of Congolese parties with Belgian ideological orientations; consequently, this too must have soured him. At any rate, the division between the ABAKO and other Leopoldville leaders continued, became more acute, and ultimately had a crucial effect on the development of the nationalist movement.

While the elite leaders made increasingly bolder demands for independence and spent much time seeking ideological and ethnic nuclei for the founding of political parties, another development was taking place which was to have an even greater impact on Congo politics. For several years following the end of the Korean war, economic conditions

in the Congo had deteriorated. This reversal had its greatest impact upon the urban populations. There was growing unemployment, accompanied by deep social unrest.1”7 Naturally, the increasing number of 16 CRISP, ABAKO, pp. 142-43.

17 CRISP, Courrier Hébdomadaire, January 16, 1959, “Eléments pour une sociologie d’une émeute.” “In December, 1958, the Administration had registered 22,600 unemployed (in other words nearly 20 per cent of the total salaried popu-

15

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO political meetings and declarations, and the events in the French territories, added to this malaise. Finally, on January 4, 1959, a severe riot broke out in Leopoldville which was to change the entire course of Congo history. A new phase had begun. lation). . . . Apart from the registered unemployed, several thousand Congolese were in ‘irregular residence’ and youths from thirteen to seventeen without jobs (further) extended the number of residents without revenue” (p. 8); “In a confidential report published in 1956 a Catholic observer estimated the number of boys without work between thirteen and sixteen/seventeen at 10,000” (p. 7).

16

CHAPTER IT 2222220222222) The Leopoldville Riots and the Development of Mass Participation: January to June 1959 Ts isSuffice not theitplace blow-by-blow description the riots. to sayfor thataas the result of a minor police of intervention in dispersing a crowd which had assembled for a political gathering, the entire African section of Leopoldville was soon engaged in a riot

which lasted several days. The rioters showed particular violence against missions, schools, and social centers. In the end, with the use of the Force Publique, the riot was quelled. Estimates of the number of dead among Congolese (whites were molested and wounded but none were killed) as a result of the Force Publique repression varied widely. Many Congolese estimated the number to be about 500; the official figure was 49.1 Whatever the actual figure, in terms of political repercussions the number estimated by the Congolese leaders was, of course, the important one.

At first the responsibility for the riot was placed upon the ABAKO

leaders. Kasavubu and the Central Committee were jailed and the organization dissolved. In retrospect, it may be said that this move only served to harden the position of the ABAKO leaders and to make martyrs out of them. In fact, every indication leads to the conclusion

that the riot was entirely spontaneous and that the elite leaders, far from plotting it, were thoroughly frightened by this destructive eruption. Indeed, the most important effect of the riot was the appearance of a very rebellious urban mass. From now on politics could no longer be viewed as essentially an elite interest. The urban mass, without having produced its own identifiable leadership, had nonetheless produced its own political method or style. And at that very moment, through

the unjustified arrest of the most militant leadership—the ABAKO high command—the mass was given its heroes. The ABAKO leaders were virtually pushed into filling the leadership void which the more ageressive mood of the urban mass had created. Furthermore, the arrest of the ABAKO leaders contributed to the rapid spread of the organization into the Bakongo rural regions, despite the fact that its 1Chambre de Représentants, Commission Parlementaire chargée de faire une enquéte sur les événements qui se sont produits a Léopoldville en janvier 1959, Session 1958-1959, March 27, 1959, Brussels, pp. 90-91.

17

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO existence was now illegal. Many rural branches were founded as a by-

product of an ad hoc organization which had been set up to collect funds for the legal expenses which the trial of ABAKO leaders was expected to entail.”

The riots had other effects no less important for future developments. The white residents of the Congo appeared to panic; some organized self-defense groups® and some ostentatiously went in for rifle practice.‘ Others called for a military take-over, a la Algeria, by the commanding

general of the Force Publique.® This reaction did not, of course, go unnoticed by the Congolese and seems to have encouraged both urban and rural protest. Finally, the Belgian policy of sending large numbers of city unemployed who presumably were the most active rioters back to their villages can only be compared to the sorcerer’s apprentice breaking the broom. Not only did the Belgian administrators find the returnees to the village unmanageable,* but even the village chiefs frequently could not control these partially de-traditionalized youths. In other words, the period after the riots was marked by an enlargement of the political arena from an essentially elite preoccupation to one that included urban and rural protest. The nature of these types of protests was as noted above quite different.

Immediately after the riots, on January 13, the Belgian government outlined a new policy for the Congo. For the first time, the goal of in-

dependence was clearly stated although no timetable was set.’ The generally liberal tone of the Government Declaration, coupled with the shock of the riots, had a somewhat appeasing effect, but only on the elite. The main beneficiary of this mood was the relatively new Minister for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Maurice Van Hemelrijck. With the encouragement of most of the elite leaders, many Congolese were soon acclaiming him as the “de Gaulle of the Congo.”® But this mood 2Interview with Nzeza Simon, Treasurer General of ABAKO, March 1960. Professor Benoit Verhaegen of Lovanium University is in the process of completing a very detailed study of the ABAKO which can be expected to shed further light on the rural expansion of the party in 1959. 3 Jean Kestergat, André Ryckmans (Brussels: Charles Dessart, 1961), p. 220. 4Interview with Professor Igor Kopytoff, May 1962. Professor Kopytoff was in the Kwango-Kwilu area during and after the riot.

5 Jacques Marres and Pierre de Vos, L’Equinoxe de janvier (Brussels: Euraforient, 1959), pp. 85-86. 6 Kopitoff, op.cit. 7 CRISP, Congo 1959, pp. 45-49.

8 It has been suggested that this interpretation of Van Hemelrijck’s relationship to the Congolese—and especially the elite—is somewhat biased because the Min-

18

THE LEOPOLDVILLE RIOTS

lasted only for about six months, at the end of which it became apparent that Van Hemelrijck could not be the de Gaulle of the Congo since the Belgian government and the Congo administration were far from ready to pursue a policy of immediate decolonization.®

The ABAKO was profoundly disappointed in the reaction of other Congolese leaders to the riots and to the Government Declaration.?° | There was very little effective non-Bakongo solidarity with the imprisoned leaders, and the support given the Government Declaration, even if qualified, was under these circumstances also unwelcome. It was in this atmosphere that the ABAKO developed its separatist posture and called for the immediate independence of a “Republic of the Central Kongo,”** comprising most of Leopoldville Province.

It should be noted that many administrators did their best to enlarge the gap which existed between the ABAKO and other political groupings.** Viewing the ABAKO as the cause of the riot, as the most radical element in the Congo, and as a major danger to Congo unity,

they played up such themes as the reputed scorn of the Bakongo for other ethnic groups and their alleged desire to rule all the Congolese. Thus the Leopoldville riots and their aftermath further enlarged the gulf between the ABAKO and other Congolese political groups.

During the spring, the main focus of attention for the non-Bakongo was the Luluabourg Congress in April. This congress assembled several political parties, with the MNC clearly dominant." It called, among other things, for independence in 1961, and a centralist state.‘* This was by no means a moderate stance, and it would be wrong to regard the division between the ABAKO and the dominant element at Luluabourg as one of militants vs. moderates.° The main difference between the ister’s popularity allegedly rose sharply after he resigned in September 1959. This view may well be correct since all the research for this study took place after December 1959, 9 Interview with Maurice Van Hemelrijck in May 1961. The Minister was good enough to supply the writer with several documents clearly showing his own directives aimed at an immediate liberalization of the policies pursued by the administration in the Congo, and the reticence with which they were received and only slowly executed—if at all. 10 Interview with Nzeza Simon, op.cit. 11 CRISP, Congo 1959, p. 76. 12 This will be discussed in detail in Part III. 18 The MNC split into two main factions several months after the Congress. One was led by P. Lumumba and the other, eventually, by A. Kalonji. 14 CRISP, Congo 1959, pp. 122-24. 15 Moderates did exist, for instance, the Interfédérale des Groupes Ethniques,

19

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO ABAKO and the MNC can be summarized as follows: The ABAKO saw ethnic divisions as the real political lines in the Congo. On this basis it had achieved considerable mass support in a key geographic and political area, and with this backing it had frequently been the avant-garde of the struggle for reforms and independence. The MNC was the creation of the leading elite, especially in Leopoldville, who had particularly well-developed ties with Belgian political circles and

leaders.1° Its mass support was very uneven, and in Leopoldville Province it had practically none, but it wanted to create a broadly based mass party which would express the nationalist will of all the Congolese.

In a word, the MNC employed a modern strategy but had ambitions which at the time went beyond its means since it did not in fact represent the masses of the Congolese. The ABAKO, on the other hand,

had a far more solid if severely restricted mass base, but especially after its disappointment at the reactions following the Leopoldville riots it employed a tactic which aimed at the separation of most of Leopoldville Province from the national unit and, as a result, from the emerging nationwide independence struggle. Whereas Van Hemelrijck could presumably bow to a certain amount

of pressure on such issues as the speed of decolonization and the extension of the suffrage, he did not want to nor, given the then existing political mood in Belgium, could he have jeopardized the unity of the

Congo. This was particularly true in view of separatist tendencies which had manifested themselves in Katanga, especially among the white residents, some of whom thought in terms of emulating or even joining British settler-dominated areas of East or Central Africa.

But resisting ABAKO pressure became an increasingly difficult proposition. For, just as in 1958 it had been the malaise and subsequent spontaneous uprising of the urban mass in Leopoldville which had changed the entire political constellation in the Congo, so it was the rural mass which effected a similar change in 1959. In effect, the area between Leopoldville and the sea, inhabited by nearly a million which became the Parti de l’Unité Congolaise (PUC) and, with many twists and turns, created a tradition which was finally inherited by the Parti National du Progrés (PNP).

16 In this connection, it is interesting to note that as late as May 1959, the Belgian Sureté classified the MNC Central Committee on the basis of Belgian party affiliations, i.e., “Liberal,” “Catholic,” or “Socialist,” without even mentioning ethnic origins. Unpublished document, author’s files, MNC-100.

20

THE LEOPOLDVILLE RIOTS Bakongo, underwent a blitz-politicization in the course of which the administration lost virtually all control. As is suggested in Parts II and III much the same thing seems to have occurred in the Kwango and Kwilu districts only a few months later. The seriousness of these developments in the Bakongo has been corroborated by a report from the Vice-Governor General to Van Hemelrijck on August 13, 1959: Everyone I met [during a trip to the Cataract district] unanimously

agrees that at the political level contact with the population has become impossible. Directives, advice, efforts at persuasion, attempts at a dialogue, everything which emanates from the Administration, from Europeans in general, or from Congolese viewed as collaborators of the whites, is rejected without discussion. The answer one receives is that only one thing counts: immediate independence; that only one person is competent to decide everything: M. Kasavubu.?”

Recognition of the fact of rural protest and an administrative breakdown in the Bakongo region in a sense gave the political initiative to the ABAKO. The administration could go to great lengths to oppose special considerations for any particular ethnic group, it could initiate information sessions about constitutional practices as part of a pro-

gram of “preparation” for autonomy and eventual independence, it could enter into more substantive conversations with some political leaders, but the fact remained that the loss of government authority in the Bakongo region had become the most prominent issue. Since Belgian internal politics prevented the expedition of Belgian troops and since “another Algeria” was a most dreaded prospect in Brussels, the only alternatives were a rapprochement with the ABAKO or a dangerous impasse. This situation had several by-products. First, Kasavubu became a popular resistance figure beyond the Bakongo region.

This in turn inspired or even forced many other political leaders to emulate his intransigence, if not ABAKO separatism.** Second, the reaction of the Belgian administration and particularly the white “man in the street” to the reforms outlined by Van Hemelrijck were on the

whole so negative that the atmosphere created by the Government Declaration among the elite was soon dissipated.*® 17 CRISP, Congo 1959, p. 129.

18 F.g., “Memorandum de parties politiques Congolais,” June 24. 1959, ibid., . 163. ° 19 This development within the PSA will be discussed in Part III.

21

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO In summary, by the middle of 1959 three different types of protest had manifested themselves: elite, urban, and rural. The elite wanted Africanization and independence. The masses were expressing a far more visceral type of protest against colonial rule: they simply wanted to stop following the innumerable orders of white men; in effect, they seemed to want the end of the system. The emerging political parties attempted to encompass these different ambitions and the different protest forms which they engendered. The administration proved incapable of dealing with any of them effectively. Thus protest was “cheap” and did not entail many sacrifices, and this in turn tended to heighten the mood of resistance. Finally, as the Congolese masses increasingly participated in the political process, it became ‘“Africanized.” In other words, the divisions among the political elite which had prevailed until then changed. Belgian political ideologies coupled with city-based ethnic divisions lost much of their importance as the great

rural populations and the divisions among them began to dominate the political process.

22

CHAPTER ITI 2492042249204>2924929-2249 Pressures for Independence: Summer 1959 to December 1959 The General Picture and Leopoldville Province

yN JUNE 1959, when Belgian already lost itsagrip over the Bakongo region and theauthority ABAKOhad was demanding separate

state, a number of important parties, largely Leopoldville-based and headed by the MNC, met and agreed to a common memorandum which was submitted to the Belgian Parliament. In effect it rejected the Government Declaration, reasserted the demand for a firm timetable leading

up to independence, and further demanded that this be achieved by January 1961. It also insisted that control of proposed elections should

be taken away from the Belgian administration and placed in the hands of commissions made up of representatives of all Belgian and Congolese parties.*

On the day the memorandum was mailed, Van Hemelrijck, respond-

ing to the pressures of both the white settlers and the ABAKO, addressed the country in harsh terms. Rejecting the ABAKO demands, he warned against activities that would compromise public order.? It was the general impression in the Congo among both Congolese and whites that the warning had been aimed only at the Congolese, and this strongly contributed to a general worsening of the political atmos-

phere in the Congo and especially in Leopoldville Province.2 Van Hemelrijck, who had only recently been hailed as the “grand ministre,” the friend of the Congolese, was now seen as having betrayed them.

The ABAKO had of course never really supported the short-lived popularity of the Minister, but now many of the parties which had

signed the above-mentioned memorandum also hardened their position.

This was particularly significant in the case of the Parti Solidaire 1 CRISP, Congo 1959, pp. 163-64. 2 Ibid., p. 117.

8In an interview with the writer in April 1961, M. Van Hemelrijck indicated that he meant his Leopoldville speech to apply equally to the Congolese and the

Europeans in the Congo, but that the Congolese saw it as directed primarily against themselves and the Europeans also viewed it as directed against the Congolese.

23

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO Africain (PSA), a party which had not been in the limelight until then.* Although it had ambitions of becoming a national party, the PSA represented only the Kwango and Kwilu districts, but this area had a pop-

ulation of about a million and a half. The PSA had been founded largely because of the high-handed ABAKO claim to represent the Kwango and Kwilu districts. Indeed, these districts were included in , the plan for a separate “Republic of the Central Kongo.” Thus the PSA was not at first favorably disposed toward the ABAKO. However, seeing the political horizons darken and wishing to participate effectively in a struggle against Belgian colonial rule, the PSA leaders reversed their early stand and formed an alliance with the ABAKO. The compromise involved in this alliance was to be of the greatest significance for the Congo. The PSA gave up its centralist policy and agreed to federalism; the ABAKO gave up its separatist stand and agreed to a federalism encompassing the whole Congo.’ At the same time both parties initiated a campaign of passive resistance and civil disobedience

covering four out of the five districts in Leopoldville Province. This campaign involved instructions to boycott local elections and to refuse the payment of all taxes. However, civil disobedience in the villages went far beyond these instructions. The courts were boycotted, police authority was rejected, even medical services were prevented from functioning normally. Since these developments (in the fall of 1959) coincided with the organizational campaigns of both parties (i.e., membership drives and dues collection), and a continuing severe deterioration of their relations with the Belgian administration, the super-enthusiasm of the rural masses and local leaders for protest against colonial rule was not checked by the national leaders. Indeed, it would have been strange if they had done so. One result of this broad

boycott of all government services in the villages was that the party organizations were pushed into performing quasi-governmental functions. There is evidence to show that the national leaders of the two parties concerned at first resisted this extra burden. However, the local situation forced their hands. Thus rural protest was given ample opportunity for expression and the party became an all-Congolese substitute or parallel government. Furthermore, in their disappointment with Belgian policy and their eagerness to gain the support of the rural masses, the elite leaders moved in a direction of ever-increasing in4The PSA and the Leopoldville Province situation will be analyzed in detail

in Part I. 5 CRISP, PSA Documents (Brussels: 1963), p. 90.

24

PRESSURES FOR INDEPENDENCE

transigence. It was of course precisely for this that the rural masses had shown a predilection, and the gap between the two protest forms or moods was therefore narrowed appreciably. Probably the most important result of this development was the harnessing of the previously spontaneous rural protest by the party organizations led by the modern elite. Rural protest had existed before in the Congo, but now for the first time it was channeled into modern political action.

Because Leopoldville Province contained the national capital, and had given birth to the most important political organizations as well as to the urban and rural protest forms described above, it held a very special and important place in the Congo’s political evolution. This was so despite the fact that inter-party conflicts, even in this province, were fought and continued to be fought on an essentially provincial

basis. It is, therefore, not surprising that one result of the changes which had occurred in the summer of 1959 was that the ABAKO, or more exactly the ABAKO-PSA Cartel,® came close to actually leading the entire nationalist struggle. Since Kasavubu’s personality over-

shadowed the careful balance which was maintained between the ABAKO and the PSA leaders in the Cartel, he appeared to unify and

hold the support of virtually the entire population of Leopoldville Province. The basic reasons for this growing Cartel influence were the disappointment of Congolese expectations in Wan Hemelrijck, the extension of the Cartel’s federalism to the whole Congo, and, most important, its intransigence and militancy vis-a-vis Belgian authorities.

If there was to be a real independence struggle—and the Algerian example was in the mind not only of the Belgian political leaders but also of the Congolese—then the spirit of the Cartel was an example which other leaders felt called upon to follow.

In this situation the practical alternatives open to the Belgian authorities were still either to allow the impasse to continue or to come to an accommodation with the Cartel and other parties. The passage of time since the spring had strengthened the militant Congolese leaders. An accommodation would probably have entailed a tight timetable leading up to independence negotiated between the then existing political leaders and the Belgian government prior to any elections or other constitutional changes. It might also have entailed agreement on a provisional Congolese government and formal acceptance of a federal governmental structure. Whatever the minimum 6 Hereafter called the Cartel.

25

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO

demands of the Cartel might have been, the Belgian authorities did not make a really serious attempt to negotiate with it. The Cartel had three different types of reactions to these develop-

ments. First, it came to the conclusion that a negotiated settlement was unlikely and therefore that preparations had to be undertaken for possible violent action. Second, it laid the groundwork for a government-in-exile and attempted to gain the support of other African states

and members of the Soviet bloc for this endeavor. Third, it aimed, successfully, at enlarging the number of parties affiliated with it.’ The main direction of these policies never became a political reality—the parties did not organize systematic violence and did not form a government-in-exile—but this was largely due to the subsequent reversal of Belgian policy and agreement to independence in 1960. In analyzing

the evolution of political parties in the Congo, it is important to remember the lengths to which the Cartel was determined to go in pursuit of its goals and the relatively advanced state of its local organizations which made this possible.

With respect to the Congo in general, much of the political activity in the fall of 1959 focused on the projected December elections. They were to result in territorial councils which would at a later date become electoral colleges; these in turn would elect provincial councils, ultimately leading to a nationwide parliament. The elections were the first to be held throughout the Congo at the same time, for the same purpose, and with general male suffrage. For this reason alone they were important. But, in addition, they became a test of strength between the Belgian administration and the Cartel, with the latter calling for total abstention.* The issue was basically one of legitimacy. If the well-organized parties in December 1959 had allowed local councils in effect to decide the fate of the Congo they would have been largely

outnumbered since, except for Leopoldville Province, there were _ few areas where the rural population had as yet been organized and its protest impetus channeled by political parties. Precisely for this reason the administration stressed the importance of these elections and helped the “administrative” party, the PNP, to extend its activity into large areas of the country. At this time there were still many areas 7 In the fall of 1959 the MNC (Kalonji) and the PP joined. Later, in December, other parties established ties of varying strengths. 8 The MNC (Lumumba) also opposed participation in these elections, but, with Lumumba in jail, the MNC (L) in Stanleyville, the party’s stronghold, decided to participate.

26

PRESSURES FOR INDEPENDENCE

in which the local administrator could persuade the local chief (often an administration appointee) to throw in his lot with a given party.

Anticipation of the December 1959 elections, coupled with the general evolution of the independence struggle and protest against colonial

rule, ended the period in which the outstanding elite leaders could make general demands in the name of the Congolese people without well-defined mass support. A rapid look at the early national parties, largely inspired it will be recalled by European ideologies, will show concretely what happened to these organizations. The relevant parties were the MNC, the Union Congolaise (UC), and the Parti du Peuple

(PP). The first, it will be recalled, was formed by the leading elite leaders of the day, mostly from Leopoldville, with a heavy, but not exclusive representation of “pro-Catholic” elements. Perhaps the distinguishing characteristic of this group was less their partisanship with respect to one or the other Belgian party than the fact that they were a sort of elite within the elite, or in other words, the most politically conscious, Westernized, and active personalities. The UC had a very

definite pro-Catholic tendency, and took a more moderate position than the MNC. Its original base was Elisabethville, and the stress placed on its inter-racial make-up gave it the appearance of being under considerable European influence. The PP followed a straightforward Socialist policy. Its base was Leopoldville and from the start it suffered under the handicap of the relatively small influence which Socialists wielded in the Belgian community in the Congo.

Of the three organizations only the MNC retained any real significance by the end of 1959. Both the PP and the UC declined, largely

because they did not successfully make the transfer from an eliteoriented organization to one which catered to the Congolese masses. The UC had managed to establish a number of party organizations in the eastern Congo, but these either affiliated with other parties (e.g., UC sections defected to the MNC [Lumumba] in Maniema district in the Kivu) or became local ethnic parties (e.g., the Lulua in Kasai).

The MNC clearly followed a different path; yet the party went through such fundamental changes as to suggest that of that early confluence of elite leaders in Leopoldville only the name had remained. The first major change, as previously noted, occurred in the summer of 1959 when the party split into several factions which soon crystallized around two personalities, Patrice Lumumba and Albert Kalonji. 9 The UC was distinguished from most other parties by having a Belgian among its top officials.

27

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO Up to this point the MNC had hardly extended its organization into the rural areas anywhere in the Congo. The relatively early militancy of the Baluba in Kasai did create an ethnic base for the party there but the extent to which this went beyond the urban centers remains to be investigated. In Orientale Province sections outside Stanleyville were

very slow in being formed. And in Leopoldville Province the party had no mass support whatsoever. The MNC’s influence in the remaining provinces appears to have been negligible. Thus, in the fall of 1959, neither of the two MNC’s were any longer “national” parties except for the fact that their leaders wanted them to have a nation-wide extension. But in this they were no different from the leaders of several

regional parties such as the PSA or the Centre de Regroupement Africain (CEREA), who, because they were not at the hub of political events in 1958, had not participated in the earliest political manifestations of the Congolese elite in the capital.

Since, as noted before, inter-party conflicts occurred essentially within the provincial arenas and no parties were able to claim national

extension with effective centralized control, it will be necessary to analyze briefly the political evolution of each province.’° It should however be noted that up to now less analytic work has been devoted to these arenas than to Leopoldville Province. Much of what follows must therefore be regarded as hypotheses which will have to be revised when more of the facts become available. The Provinces up to the End of 1959

In the fall of 1959 the provinces of the Congo, with the exception of Leopoldville, had not yet attained the state where political manifestations and controversies reflected the electoral realities which were

to dominate the elections of May 1960. These five provinces can be divided into two categories: those where political consciousness had been aroused to a high degree in the urban centers but was sidetracked into urban conflicts between the “sons of the land” and “foreigners,” and those where politics was still very largely an elite affair.

Katanga and Kasai were in the first category. In both provinces the conflict which emerged during the 1957 and 1958 communal elections in the major cities continued to dominate political life. In Katanga, as noted previously, the victory of “immigrant” Baluba from Kasai during the communal elections'' gave rise to an all-Katangan associa10 Leopoldville Province has already been dealt with above. 11 For an analysis of the Katanga elections, see Antoine Rubbens, “La consulta-

28

PRESSURES FOR INDEPENDENCE

tion, CONAKAT, aimed at eliminating the influence of the “foreigners.” CONAKAT at first included the Association Générale des Baluba du Katanga (BALUBAKAT). Although ethnically closer to the Baluba of Kasai than to most other Katangan ethnic groups, the Baluba of Katanga initially allowed their interest as Katangans to dominate their choice of allies. The “anti-foreigner” attitude of Katangans during 1958 and most of 1959 coincided with the secessionist predilections of many resident whites in Katanga, who initiated additional arguments against administrative centralization in Leopold-

ville and the transfer of Katanga’s wealth to other regions of the Congo. As we have seen, it was only relatively late, in November 1959,

that the fundamental ethno-political realities of Katanga came to the fore. BALUBAKAT split away from the CONAKAT, thus pitting the main Katangan ethnic clusters against each other, the Baluba against the Lunda. The Lunda were the largest South Katangan ethnic group and dominated this important mining area. Consequently it was logical that they should continue to be most antagonistic toward “foreigners” and favorable to arguments supporting loose federation or secession.’ It must, however, be stressed that despite the readjustment of political alignments in accordance with the fundamental ethnic divisions existing in Katanga, the center of political activity was still overwhelmingly urban. Neither the CONAKAT nor the BALUBAKAT nor any of the smaller parties had come very far in establishing party Organizations in the interior of the province. In addition, the relative

vitality of Katanga’s traditional leaders (i.e., tribal chiefs) tended to accentuate the difference between the rural and urban political arenas. In Kasai, the initial urban preoccupations of political leaders were somewhat closer to the true ethno-political divisions in the province than in either Leopoldville® or Katanga. In effect, early Luluabourg politics revolved around the conflict between the Lulua “sons of the land”** and the Baluba (of Kasai) “foreigners.” As in Katanga, the tion populaire du 22 décembre 1957 4 Elisabethville,” Bulletin du CEPSI, September 1958, pp. 77-81. Also M. Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo: Decol-

onization and Independence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), Chapter VI. 12 The actual location of the Katanga mineral belt was adjacent to Lunda tribal

land, but this did not become a major political factor until after independence. 13 It will be recalled that in Leopoldville the initial conflict occurred between the Bakongo and the “Upper River” people. 14 The Lulua were in fact immigrants, but they had come to the area around Luluabourg before the Baluba and considered themselves the possessors of the Jand.

29

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO

Baluba had shown a great deal of initiative and had quickly been employed by the Belgians with the result that they tended to hold the better jobs open to the modern elite. However, in contrast to Katanga, the Baluba of Kasai were not only numerically important in the city but also represented almost 30 per cent of the province’s population as against the Lulua who represented 16 per cent.1® The conflict was therefore an intra-provincial one, and “foreigners” were properly at home in Kasai but came from a different part of the province.'® The two ethnic groups were initially represented by the Lulua Fréres and the Mouvement Solidaire Muluba. Soon, however, these organizations overlapped, and to a certain degree merged with, the Kasai sections of the Union Congolaise and the MNC respectively. Important Kasai ethnic groups, representing more than half the province’s population, remained outside the main focus of political attention because of the predominance of the Luluabourg conflict. A momentary break

in this pattern occurred during the Luluabourg Congress in April 1959. Patrice Lumumba managed to reconcile the leaders of the Lulua and the Baluba. He was, in a sense, well suited to do this since he was not only the National President of the MNC but was also an Otetela—

an ethnic group which dominated the northern part of Kasai. The reconciliation soon broke down, however, and by October 1959 the conflict reached violent proportions. Here, as in Katanga, the relative Strength of traditional leadership, especially among the Lulua, may have helped to end the reconciliation. None of the political parties had by the fall of 1959 been able to do very much to extend their organization to the rural areas. Lumumba tried to organize the northern part of the province in September 1959,1” but his imprisonment in October prevented a continuing effort and by December this initial 15 In Luluabourg, however, the Baluba constituted 56 per cent and the Lulua 25 per cent of the city’s total population. A. Lux, “Migrations, accroissement et urbanisation de la population congolaise de Luluabourg,” Zaire, XII, No. 7 (1958), 680-81.

16 Although Belgian rule initially helped the Baluba in Luluabourg (and in several other centers), the fact that they were the first to press for a liberalization of the colonial regime led the administration, or at least some of its members, to help the Lulua in the period under discussion. During the 1958 communal elections the Lulua in effect won, despite the Baluba majority in the city. The Baluba then refused to share in the communal responsibilities. Young, op.cit., p. 124. 17 His efforts were closely watched by the administration, which compiled a dossier with reports of his activities and speeches in several north Kasai towns and villages. After independence the writer was permitted to microfilm these documents by the Congolese authorities in Luluabourg. (Author’s files, MNC-L.Kasai, G 33-39.)

30

PRESSURES FOR INDEPENDENCE

attempt had not borne any significant fruit. Political self-assertion by the smaller ethnic groups was eclipsed by the bloody Baluba-Lulua conflict. Its intensity tended to underscore the ethnic basis of political affiliation and thus prevented the early development of a Kasai inter-

ethnic party (like the PSA), which would have been a logical solu- | tion for these ethnic groups and did in fact evolve somewhat belatedly in 1960.18

The remaining provinces, Orientale, Kivu, and Equateur, were not as encumbered by urban conflicts as were Leopoldville, Kasai, and Katanga. This was due partly to the absence of any dominant or near dominant ethnic group and partly to a somewhat retarded political awakening even on the part of the elite.

In Orientale Province early manifestations of elite political activity were marked by a vague division between moderates and radicals and by the appearance of certain individuals who inspired a very personal following. The outstanding figure was, of course, Patrice Lumumba. After the Leopoldville riots of January 1959 (it is interesting to note that they had a very real impact as far away as Stanleyville) two parties emerged: the MNC, representing the more militant elements, and the Union Nationale Congolaise (UNACO),?® representing the more moderate. Both these organizations had a slow start, the MNC being handicapped by the absence of Lumumba, who, after having been imprisoned in 1956, had taken up residence in Leopoldville. Indeed the MNC did not really make an impact in Stanleyville until Lumumba returned in May 1959 and spoke at the first large political meeting ever held there. Ten thousand persons heard him mount an effective and hardhitting attack on Belgian rule, in which he countered arguments employed in support of a “go slow” policy on independence.”° Subsequently, the MNC made rapid headway in Stanleyville even though Lumumba was not frequently there. The tone of local MNC leaders became rapidly more militant and, coupled with severe unemployment in the city, created an increasingly tense atmosphere. In August the moderates, who had become relatively insignificant, held a congress which resulted in a fusion of UNICO with the Union Congolaise (UC), but in effect Stanleyville had become an MNC stronghold. 18 The Coalition Kasaiénne (COAKA). 19 Sometimes abbreviated as UNAKO. Unpublished review of political events

leading up to the MNC Congress of October 1959 prepared by the Orientale Province administration (no title). (Author’s files, P.O. Pre-indep. Int. SO, p. 1.) 20 “En Guinée il y a onze ministres et 8 secrétaires d’Etat, 3 seulement sortent des universités.” Transcript of tape recording, ibid., p. 2.

31

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO It was at this moment that Lumumba organized a major MNC congress in Stanleyville. It had several purposes. First, the split in the MNC necessitated a coming together of Lumumba’s wing of the party. Second, the increasingly ethnic or regional nature of political loyalties made it desirable for Lumumba to move his organization to Orientale Province into high gear. Third, the growing strength of the (ABAKO-

PSA) Cartel with its federalist policy made it desirable to create a rallying point for the parties which supported a unitary policy. Indeed, the congress was to be divided into two successive parts: the first ex-

clusively for the MNC,” and the second for an inter-party meeting following the pattern set at Luluabourg in April 1959. It is interesting to speculate on the impact which this congress might have had on the future political evolution of the Congo. An alliance of the leading parties in Orientale and Kivu Provinces,”? strongly in support of centralism and actively led by Lumumba, might have come close to pulling the center of gravity away from Leopoldville. The continuance of Bakongo dominance over the Cartel was certainly a handicap in its relations with other ethnic groups or parties. But once again the largely spontaneous rebelliousness of the urban populace changed what might

| have been. While the congress sessions were taking place, masses of increasingly agitated Congolese congregated outside the hall and eventually clashed with the police and the Force Publique, which had, perhaps unjustifiably, been very much in evidence. A large-scale riot resulted, and the re-establishment of law and order by the army cost the lives of many Congolese. Stanleyville had had its own January 4th, and Lumumba, much like Kasavubu before him, was jailed. There were, however, some major differences between the two situations. Because of the lack of ethnic cohesion in Orientale Province and, more important, the increasingly fast tempo of political events, the absence

of Lumumba was a much more crippling matter for the MNC (Lumumba) than Kasavubu’s absence had been for the ABAKO. Nonetheless, the spread of the MNC (Lumumba) in Orientale Province after the congress was in many ways similar to the spread of the ABAKO in the Lower Congo area after the January 4 riots. Here too the events in the city helped to make political martyrs of both the leaders who had been jailed and the ordinary Congolese who had been 21 Although Lumumba was still claiming the presidency of the entire movement, the party had in fact definitively split by this time. It is therefore proper to begin calling it the MNC (Lumumba) or MNC (L). 22 CEREA, then the dominant militant party in the Kivu, sent representatives to the inter-party congress.

32

PRESSURES FOR INDEPENDENCE

killed during the riot. It was only after the events in Stanleyville that rural protest came increasingly into evidence.”*

The early political evolution of Kivu Province has unfortunately received very little attention indeed. The province seems to have escaped the urban ethnic conflicts which appeared in the major cities of the southern Congo.‘ In this respect it is, of course, similar to Orientale Province. Another important factor which undoubtedly had an impact on Kivu developments was the large number of Belgian settlers

who were quite articulate in putting forward their own political demands. The relatively conservative administration of Kivu Province was at least partially influenced by this settler element. As elsewhere,

political activity began in the provincial capital, Bukavu. A purely local Kivu party sprang up as early as the summer of 1958. This party, the Centre de Regroupement Africain (CEREA), was distinguished by two characteristics: first, it appears to have had an initial monopoly of the support of the politically interested elite in Bukavu, and second, it made a very serious effort to outline a comprehensive political program. In other words, it concerned itself with more than the immediate problems of Belgo-Congolese relations and independ-

ence. Later, in 1959 and 1960, this initial elite cohesion in Bukavu broke up, but many of the leaders who formed the new parties had taken part in early CEREA activities.2> Two reasons suggest themselves, purely as hypotheses, for this atypical evolution. First, the vocal

political activities of white settlers created an atmosphere in which the political opposition was between the Congolese and the resident whites; this helped to bring about at least a temporary cohesion among

the Congolese elite. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the CEREA demanded in 1959 the dissolution of the settler party, the Rassemblement Congolais, and “all foreign political movements which

have a tendency to counteract government action and to handicap 23 This theme will be elaborated in a forthcoming study on the MNC (Lumumba). The writer is indebted to Pierre Duvivier, onetime chef de cabinet of Patrice Lumumba, for first pointing out the relationship between the Stanleyville riot and the extension of the MNC (L) into the rural areas of the province. Additional research has confirmed much of this analysis.

24 Young, op.cit., p. 123. With regard to the 1958 communal elections “. . . the Bashi constituted an unchallenged majority in the two African communes, but there was very little ethnic tension at this point.” 25 The writer is indebted for much of this information to Charles Francois, an

independent Belgian businessman in Bukavu. He was a frequent contributor to La Presse Africaine, a liberal weekly published in Bukavu.

33

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO the Congo’s accession to independence.”*® Second, it has been suggested?’ that the traditional cultures of Kivu (presumably the eastern part), had exceptionally sophisticated political forms, and that this tradi-

tion manifested itself in the period under discussion. A further reason may have been the proximity of the Kivu to Uganda, with its relatively well-established nationalist movement.

Initially CEREA had to contend with two types of opposition launched against it by the white community. Leaders were put under pressure from their employers to avoid political activity, and when this failed to produce very concrete results, certain Europeans sponsored or supported moderate parties which were meant to take the wind out of the CEREA sails. Examples of such movements were the Alliance Rurale Progressiste (ARP), the Union Congolaise, the Mouvement Social du Maniéma (MSM), and eventually the PNP.

The very active political participation of resident whites in Kivu was not entirely an obstacle to the growth of Congolese nationalist sentiments and parties there. In the first place, as already mentioned, this condition may have contributed to a certain degree of unity among the early political elite, especially in Bukavu. In addition, the whites were anything but united. This was of course the case everywhere in

the Congo, but it appears to have been particularly evident in Kivu and sometimes resulted in helping the emerging nationalist leaders. For instance, in 1958 a group of whites formed an association, the Alliance du Kivu-Maniéma, with the vague goal of organizing European opinion in view of the changing political circumstances in the Congo. After the Leopoldville riots some of the founders of this association wanted to invite some of the Congolese to participate. This suggestion split the organization and resulted in the “progressive wing” making direct contacts with Congolese party leaders. The “right wing”

made common cause with an already existing “ultra” sentiment and formed the Rassemblement Congolais—an all-white party. Another

example of an instance where divisions among the whites of the Kivu helped the nationalist leaders was the occasion when Van Hemelrijck was splattered with tomatoes by some elements of the white Bukavu population.? Obviously such open rifts among the whites constituted a trump in the hands of the Congolese leaders, especially those 26 CRISP, Congo 1959, p. 284. 27 By Jean-Chrysostome Weregemere, one of the earliest CEREA leaders, in an interview with the writer, August 1960. 28 Bulletin Hébdomadaire Interafricain “Belga,” No. 42, June 8-14, 1959, p. 58.

34

PRESSURES FOR INDEPENDENCE

of CEREA and MNC (Lumumba), who were not tied to any white groups or promoters.

In sum, up to the end of 1959, political life in Kivu centered on the urban conflict between the more militant Congolese leaders and the

vocal white resident community. The latter did on some occasions sponsor various moderate parties but these did not gain any spectacular successes. At any rate, party political activity seems hardly to have touched the rural masses, and the strong ethnic differences existing between the Maniéma and eastern Kivu had not yet manifested them-

selves in the political arena. , Equateur Province was by far the slowest to develop an active party political life. By the end of 1959 political parties were only beginning to show signs of life in Coquilhatville and had made almost no effective inroads in the rural areas. This tardiness was no doubt due in part to the relatively low economic activity which existed in this province. It

may also have been due to the large immigration to Leopoldville. Equateur Province probably lost more of its elite to Leopoldville than any other province in the Congo. Indeed, a listing of Leopoldville elite leaders who had their origins in Equateur Province would include some of the best-known leaders of the Congo: Joseph Ileo, Cyrille Adoula, and Jean Bolikango. Yet Coquilhatville politics, although slow in getting started, appear to have followed the pattern of the

southern Congo cities. The ethnic balance in the city was essentially bipolar, between those coming from the Mongo ethnic cluster and those who were Ngombe. The former were not only in the majority but had come to the city earlier and held the better positions. During the 1958 elections the Mongo were so divided among themselves that

one of their groups sided with the Ngombe. This so incensed the Mongo that it is thought to have engendered the formation of a Mongo

political party, the Union des Mongo (UNIMO), and eventually to have led to the division of the province after independence.”° As has been noted earlier, the political evolution of the six provinces

up to the end of 1959 was quite individual and separate. The most important variable which distinguished them was the relationship existing between urban groups, and in turn the relationship between the urban arena and the provincial and national ones. Another important variable was the different tempo or rhythm with which the rural masses became politically conscious and were inducted into 29 Young, op.cit., pp. 123-24.

35 |

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO

parties. In respect to both these factors Leopoldville Province was a case unto itself.

The December 1959 Elections

Toward the end of 1959 and early 1960 a number of events occurred which to some extent unified the rhythm of political evolution in the different provinces of the Congo. First came the December 1959 territorial elections. Although the results did not reflect the true political mood of the country at the time—essentially because of their very local nature—the fact that the whole Congo was for the first time going to the polls tended to accelerate the politicization of even those

areas where parties had made virtually no inroads. In a word, the slower less militant areas began to catch up, a trend which was strengthened by a major change in administration policy. Up to the eve of the elections, the administration had been generally opposed to the growth of parties, especially in the rural areas. With the prospect

of nationwide (albeit only local) elections, the administration began to take an active and partisan position in support of moderate parties or, even more frequently, in support of local notables of whom it approved. It is at this stage that some of the characteristics of the “patron’’*° party appeared in the Congo. This of course created opposi-

tion and again resulted in an accelerated overall politicization. It should be noted that this administrative activity in the introduction of

party politics into the rural areas of all but Leopoldville Province marks yet another distinction between that province and the rest of the Congo. In fact, the results of the December 1959 territorial elections confirm the great difference existing between the extension of parties into the rural areas of Leopoldville Province and the rest of the Congo. For instance, in Leopoldville Province,*? out of a possible 500 council seats, 107 were captured by local, ethnic, or individual candidates. In Orientale Province, out of 417 rural seats, 307 were won by local, ethnic, or individual candidates.*? These figures become even more impressive when two factors are taken into account. First, the major parties in Leopoldville Province had ordered a boycott of the 30 A term employed by Ruth Schachter (Morgenthau) in “Single Party Systems

in West Africa,” American Political Science Review, LV, No. 2 (June 1961), 294-96. 31 Excluding Lac Leopold II district, which, being a very backward region, never

became a part of the mainstream of Leopoldville Province developments. Its population constitutes less than 10 per cent of the province’s total. 82 Remarques Congolaises, “Les résultats complets des élections Communales Congolaises de décembre 1959,” No. 4, January 25, 1960.

36

PRESSURES FOR INDEPENDENCE

elections which was very widely obeyed,** but which naturally enhanced the chances of an individual who wanted to brave public opinion and become a candidate. Second, of the 107 seats captured by “local lists,” 87 were in the Kwango district and were in fact a manifestation of the LUKA** breakaway from the PSA. Thus, in the other three districts, which contained 75 per cent of the province’s rural population, party discipline was so dominant that only twenty nonparty candidates presented themselves and were elected. This discipline is further indicated by the fact that only about 2 per cent of the eligible voters participated in the election in these three districts.*°

To cite another example, in Katanga, where participation reached an average of well over 80 per cent of those eligible, and despite the fact that the dominant political parties (CONAKAT and BALUBA-

KAT) were strongly tied to specific ethnic groups, out of a total of about 325 rural council seats only 49 were captured by candidates from party lists, the vast majority of the victors coming from ethnic, local, or individual lists.**

It is evident from the above that only in Leopoldville Province had party organization reached the village by the end of 1959." But this was not the interpretation given the elections at the time. Owing to various manipulations and ad hoc arrangements, many of the local and ethnic lists were formally tied to the PNP and this led much of Belgian opinion, apparently even in government circles, to conclude that this party was the strongest in the Congo. The error of this conclusion was of course soon demonstrated in the May 1960 elections.

Special emphasis has been placed upon the extension of party activities, organization, and discipline to the rural areas because this variable was of cardinal importance in the evolution of Congo politics. Moreover, it manifested itself differently in virtually every party and 33 About 8 per cent of those eligible voted in the four districts under discussion (Cataractes, Bas Congo, Kwango, and Kwilu).

84 T’Union Kwangolaise pour lIndépendance et la Liberté (LUKA). This breakaway will be discussed in detail in Part II.

35 Remarques Congolaises, op.cit. 36 [bid. 87 The situation in Kasai was marginal. Participation in the election was on the average high. Political parties won 189 council seats, and ethnic, local, and individual lists won 166. But included in the 189 figure are 134 seats captured by the PNP. It is a question whether, from the point of view of political party organization, these PNP victories can be considered as indicating the extension of party organization into the rural villages. As noted earlier, in many of these areas local notables simply allowed their names to be placed on PNP lists. The May 1960 election results gave the PNP only 4 out of 70 provincial assembly seats,

37

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO

region. The speed of decolonization was so great that the variables usually examined in an analysis of political parties—ideological difference, degree of internal party democracy, party relations with traditional leaders, professional and educational backgrounds of the party leaders, and so on—had only secondary importance in the period up to the end of 1959. This was so because until then almost everything about political parties was in a state of flux. Ideologies were accepted or rejected according to the exigencies of the moment, leaders rose and fell in a similar manner, and many parties were created and disappeared shortly after their inception. The variables which had a fundamental long-range impact were ethnicity, the relation between

parties and rural protest, and the particular political history of each province and sometimes each district.

The December 1959 election was not the only event of that period which. had a profound impact on Congolese political life. The Belgian government, faced with increasing pressure for independence, unable politically to commit Belgian draftees to the Congo, fearing a possible “Algeria,” and holding very exaggerated hopes and expectations regarding the political future of the moderate PNP,**® decided in Decem-

ber 1959 to grant independence within a year.*® It is likely that this decision was at least in part inspired by the success of French policy in 1958. De Gaulle’s policy of early self-determination, which on the whole resulted in moderate, pro-French governments in former African possessions, was, under the circumstances, an appealing example for Belgium. At any rate, the immediate practical result of this de-

cision was that the already scheduled Round Table Conference of Congolese political leaders and representatives of the Belgian government and Parliament would in effect decide the Congo’s future.* 88 CRISP, Congo 1960, I (Brussels: 1961), 17. 89 The exact words of the Minister for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Auguste de Schrijver, were: “[Belgium] . . . will prove definitively to the Congolese people that in 1960 independence will be an accomplished fact.” CRISP, Congo 1959, pp. 256-58. Another version of the speech gives the Minister’s words as follows: “, .in 1960 an independent regime will be for this country [Congo] an established fact.” [. .. en 1960 un régime d’indépendence sera pour ce pays une chose acquise.] Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, La Crise Congolaise, XIII, No. 4-6, July-November 1960 (Brussels), 472. Déclaration de M.A.E. de Schrijver, December 15, 1959. 40 Ibid., p. 471. As indicated above, the Belgian government had already decided

to grant independence by 1960, but all other outstanding problems were to be resolved at the Round Table Conference. In view of the suspicion with which most Congolese regarded Belgian pronouncements, the full impact of the Belgian government decision in December was not, in the view of this writer, generally appre-

38

PRESSURES FOR INDEPENDENCE The choice of Congolese delegates was made on the basis of December election results, but for the areas where the boycott had been effective

the leaders of the dominant political parties were simply given full delegate rights. Paradoxically, these decisions had the opposite effect from that which had occurred in the French possessions. No wind was

taken out of the sails of the more militant parties, but, on the contrary, protest especially at the grass-roots level increased, and the administration rapidly lost its remaining effectiveness. The immediate result was that the type of protest which had occurred in most of Leopoldville Province earlier now spread swiftly eastward and manifested itself even more rapidly than in Leopoldville Province. The parties did

establish parallel authority structures but they were even more improvised than before. The collapse of administration authority was further intensified by the increase of inter-ethnic tension brought on by heightened political consciousness all over the Congo. In some in-

stances this additional element resulted in inter-ethnic warfare and consequently a total absence of any effective authority whatsoever. In general, this situation benefited the most militant and aggressive bidders for mass support. The moderate leadership found that it had less and less to offer since almost everywhere it had now become a handicap rather than an advantage to “have the ear” of the administration. The administration for its part could no longer do very much to protect or help these elements.

One reason for this acceleration of protest and governmental collapse was of course the deep sense of demoralization felt by the average Belgian administrator at what he considered the Brussels “sellout.” As a result he tended more and more to look the other way whenever there was any trouble in the area of his responsibility. Or else he found that a tough line was countermanded by higher authority which wanted to enhance the chances of the “Congo gamble” paying off. But it is a question whether the impetus of protest (partly organized by the

militant parties, partly spontaneous) was not so great that even the most dedicated and determined action on the part of local administrators would have substantially changed the evolving condition of revolutionary protest and virtually anarchic liberty.

These developments naturally had their impact on the leaders. Many of the moderates simply switched sides** (or attempted to), and ciated and Congolese public opinion did not feel that independence had in fact been granted until the actual date was set at the Conference. 41 For example, Jean Bolikango. He was deputy Commissioner General of In-

39

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO

others experienced a rapid decline in their political fortunes. In fact, the then moderate parties*? only survived the coming phase of the political evolution in the areas where the strongest local—usually ethnic—treasons prevailed for their continued existence; in other words, for reasons having nothing to do with their moderate characteristics.* formation of the Belgian Congo government up to the Round Table Conference in January 1960 at which time he gave up that post to lead the Association des Ressortissants du Haut-Congo (ASSORECO) delegation. In that capacity he repudiated the role he had played in the Congo Information Service and subsequently tried to form various alliances with leaders who had had a very much more militant past.

42 After the May 1960 elections the meaning of the word “moderate” when applied to Congolese parties rapidly changed—at least in everyday usage. It became associated with opposition to strong centralized government and the position the party in question took with regard to “cold war” issues. Thus the most militant party of the second and third phase here discussed—the ABAKO—became almost the prototype of moderation after the elections. This, of course, again shows up how difficult it is to establish a valid spectrum running from radical to conservative; it all depends when and on what issue the question is posed. 43 For example, the LUKA, which was the most successful PNP affiliate during the May 1960 elections. The reasons for its strength and victory in the Kwango were purely ethnic, the Bayaka having had long-established antagonisms toward the Bakongo and therefore the ABAKO and also the people residing in the Kwilu and therefore the PSA. This will be covered in detail in Part II.

40

CHAPTER [V_ 222222222222) 22 The Terminal Colonial Phase and the Problems Encountered by the Parties: January to June 1960 The Round Table Conference

HE first outward sign of a move in the direction of radicalization

Tin the policies of most parties occurred at the beginning of the Round Table Conference in January 1960. The Belgian expectation had been that the militant and moderate leaders would disagree sharply, but to everyone’s surprise all the Congolese representatives formed a

Common Front, which at least for the crucial early sessions of the Conference unified Congolese demands. Significantly it was a Cartel demand—that Belgian commitments regarding action to be taken on Conference resolutions be made more binding and explicit—which resulted in the formation of the Common Front. The issues confronting the Congolese delegates can be divided into two categories: those dealing with the date and the completeness of independence; and those dealing with constitutional matters such as the composition of the parliamentary bodies, the electoral system, and the role of traditional chiefs.2 The Common Front was largely effective

in maintaining a militant and united position on questions dealing with the first category, but on the second a spectrum ranging from conservative to militant positions evolved. Although very little hard evidence exists as to why so many moderate leaders followed the more militant ones on the crucial question of the date of independence, two

hypotheses can be put forward. First, the change in the attitude of the Congolese masses and the knowledge of the leaders that they would have to return from Brussels and face a general election more or

less forced their hand; every leader had to be able to claim that he had made sure that immediate independence was forthcoming. Second, as individuals many of these leaders had been less committed to a mod-

erate ideology than to prudent behavior. So long as the Belgian administration was a real force, their prudence expressed itself in not challenging it too energetically. Now that this power was collapsing and the Congolese masses demonstrated radical and even revolutionary

tendencies, it became prudent to be militant. This is not to say that 1 CRISP, Courrier Africain, March 25, 1960, p. 10. 2 CRISP, Congo, 1960, p. 27.

41

EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO such leaders were necessarily opportunists; many had merely underestimated how far the Belgians could be pushed.

What passed for conservatism or moderation (as against militancy

or radicalism) regarding the second category of issues at the Conference derived from a variety of motives. There were leaders who had

personal predilections in that direction and bowed to the militant mood only where it appeared absolutely necessary in order to maintain their positions. There were traditional chiefs who tried to secure their roles in Congolese society after independence. And, in several instances, leaders opted for such positions because their local opponents chose opposite policies.*

On the other hand, the militant parties in the context of the second category of issues at the Conference were largely those which had spearheaded Congo nationalism and established the most effective party organizations. Thus they included the ABAKO and the PSA, which were already in virtual control of the entire population in their respective strongholds. Added to this group were such parties as the MNC (Lumumba), which, despite organizational weakness, had consistently opted for a broadly based democratic system with strong centralized government. However, cutting through the militant-conservative division was the issue of federalism versus centralism which divided both ends of this spectrum. The Major Problems Facing the Political Leaders

When the delegates to the Conference returned to the Congo they faced a multitude of problems. In the first place, they were immediately plunged into the electoral campaign for the future Congo parliament and for the provincial assemblies. Since no united political arena as yet existed in the Congo, they operated essentially within a local, usually provincial, arena. This had the effect of largely undoing the various alliances that had emerged at the Conference. For instance, just prior to the Conference the Cartel held a congress at Kisantu which enlarged its membership and laid down a federalist program.‘ In Brussels the members of the Cartel largely followed through on the Kisantu decisions, which in effect constituted the core of militant fed8 Many of the decisions taken at the Conference did not result from a formal vote. For example, the date of independence was decided in a caucus meeting of the Common Front, and the Minister for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi “accepted” it. However, those votes which were taken are tabulated in CRISP, Congo 1960, pp. 48-49. 4 CRISP, Courrier Africain, January 22, 1960.

42

THE TERMINAL COLONIAL PHASE

eralist opinion. But, when the members returned to the Congo, the issue at hand was the election, which in Leopoldville Province pitted the ABAKO against the PSA and thus rapidly destroyed the close alliance they had formed earlier.» The same development occurred among the militant centralists. Starting with the Stanleyville Congress

in October 1959, a working relationship had evolved between the MNC (Lumumba) and the CEREA. To counter the Kisantu Congress the centralists organized a congress in Bukavu in January 1960 at which the MNC (Lumumba) and the CEREA were dominant.®

At the Round Table Conference these two parties voted together on all issues. Yet, on returning to the Congo, both parties campaigned against each other in the Kivu and, for the time being at least, electoral exigencies ended their alliance.’ Thus, while it was possible in Brussels to categorize Congolese parties according to the policies they espoused, this was no longer possible when the main concern of party activities reverted to the local or grass-roots level. Indeed, alliances were frequently made on the basis of the principle “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” The second problem facing the leaders was how to organize the turbu-

lent mass rebelliousness which had spread throughout the Congo so that it would profit their different parties. The May election results show clearly that they were generally successful in getting the vast majority of Congolese to identify with political parties. In contrast to the situation in

December 1959, the May results show that well over 90 per cent of those elected had been the candidates of parties as against ethnic, local, or individual lists. But different parties employed different methods for spreading their influence. Here again it is difficult to draw

any connection between the position a given party had in the moderate-militant spectrum and the organizational methods employed. In the first place, virtually all the parties performed quasi-governmental functions. They were more or less pushed into this by the administrative paralysis and by the attitude of the mass, which in vast 5 This development will be recounted in detail in Part II. 6 CRISP, Congo 1960, pp. 174-75. 7 Ibid., pp. 172-73. 8 In the Chamber of Representatives only 9 out of 137 seats were won by “local interests” or “individuals.” This way of calculating may, however, give a slightly biased picture since the electoral system tended to work against purely local candidates at the national level. If all the provincial assembly results are pooled, the results are the following: Out of 420 seats 53 were won by local interests, or individual lists, or 13 per cent. The election results can be found in CRISP, Congo 1960, pp. 156, 166, 172, 183, 215, 243, and 262-63.

43

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EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE CONGO militant predilections, to positions of power. But for the most part the parties had not been able to establish institutionalized leadership pat-

terns which were viewed as legitimate by their followers. Nor had problems of renewal and succession been faced or dealt with. While the independence struggle was in progress, the goals of the modern elite and those of a very agitated and often revolutionary mass appeared to coincide, but once independence was assured,”* a growing schism became noticeable between the two.

With the election of virtually all top or middle-range leaders to the national parliament and the provincial assemblies, and the appointment of the leftovers to civil service functions, the internal life of the party organizations declined sharply after the elections. Yet the leaders who had thus “abandoned” their followers (as it seemed to the latter) had few opportunities to employ their newly acquired power to satisfy even a symbolic portion of the expectations which the masses held. A concrete example of this divergence came when the General Executive College had to decide what to do about the promised “independence bonuses.” The idea that everyone would be given a fat cash payment on independence day had circulated throughout the Congo, spread in part no doubt by young party propagandists

but soon accepted by wide sections of the population. Despite the critical financial situation of the Congo, it was decided to pay all government employees a modest sum.?4 The employees of white-owned establishments often were given substantial amounts, some in Stanleyville receiving as much as $30 per person. But the large masses ended up with nothing.

At another level it has been noted that a rationalization of political forces occurred in the provincial arenas but was not really reached at the national level. This is not to argue that the Congo was too large to form a single unit. On the contrary, since the most intense and violent conflicts were intra-provincial (e.g., Baluba vs. Lulua in the Kasai, Bakongo vs. Bayaka in Leopoldville, Baluba vs. Lunda in Katanga), the national government had a very real function to perform in keeping these antagonists apart until they compromised their differences or 23 That is to say, even before June 30, 1960. 24 Commissariat Général 4 L’Information, Service de Presse, No. 217, June 11, 1960. “The independence bonus is fixed at 100 francs ($2.00) .. . for all Congolese agents and workers of the Administration who are employed under the work con-

tract ... the same bonus of 100 francs will be paid to Congolese veterans.” See also Author’s files: Micro-BOX. This bonus was estimated to total more than 14,200,000 francs ($284,000). General Executive College (minutes), Meeting of June 10, 1960.

62

THE TERMINAL COLONIAL PHASE until constitutional measures could be devised to separate them geographically.*° Under more favorable post-independence developments this probably would have become the main internal concern of any central government.

Very great progress was made between December 1959 and May 1960 in extending mass identification with parties and broadening the context of political activity from urban to provincial arenas. This would indicate that a further extension was both possible and probable. Indeed, in part it had already taken place, in the alliances— especially the MNC (Lumumba)—PSA—CEREA combination—and even more Significantly in the inter-provincial expansion of the MNC (Lumumba) itself. There is some likelihood that this party would have made important gains in Equateur Province had the election taken place a few months later. The point here being made is not, therefore, that the Congo was too large but that time was too short. 25 The latter is what eventually happened when the six provinces were split up into twenty-one.

63

APPENDIX TO PART ONE 222)2>2032049222220>23.220222.2))

Chief Characteristics of the Most Successful Congolese Parties: Toward a Comparative Study of Parties During the Independence Struggle HE PURPOSE of this appendix is to present a chart indicating the TH characteristics of the most successful parties to emerge out of the May 1960 elections. The chart is intended, first, to permit comparisons between parties. Second, it attempts to pinpoint internally “inconsistent”? characteristics within a single party. For example, a party’s “moderate” policy with regard to the relations of the Congo and Belgium was not necessarily reflected in the behavior of the party leadership and members toward individual Belgians living and working in its stronghold. Third, the chart is also a taxonomy of characteristics which the writer considers to be most important in the study of African parties. Some of these characteristics, of course, restate analytic categories which other writers have introduced, but some (mostly dealing with rural developments) have not received the attention they would seem to deserve. It needs to be stated openly that some of the information presented is of unknown accuracy. Congolese parties have, up to now, been given

only superficial attention, and except for the notations made for the PSA and the ABAKO, most of the information provided below is tentative. In a number of “slots” the notations made are particularly uncertain—they are no more than informed guesses—and in other instances the writer has no information whatsoever. In the former case the nota-

tion has been followed by a question mark, and in the latter only a question mark is entered.

It is of interest to note that there is almost no information about variables dealing with local developments. Yet one of the main conclusions of this study is the importance of such developments and what 1 What is consistent or inconsistent is, of course, dependent on one’s assumptions, expectations, or prejudices. It would seem to the writer that much of the literature about African parties implicitly makes certain assumptions about the coincidence of characteristics which always or usually occur together. It is here that such words as “militant” often become misleading since the question is rarely asked “Militant about what?” In making a separate column for every type of opportunity in which parties could express an attitude or policy, it is hoped that this chart will make a small contribution to the manner in which African parties are analyzed.

64

APPENDIX TO PART ONE they may mean about the relationship between leaders and their followers. In the Congo what this means is that conditions which were of cardinal importance—and may be intimately related to the 1963-65 rebellions—have remained largely unexplored and unknown.

Congolese parties changed their characteristics from one phase to the next even though the entire period of their existence prior to independence was never more than two years and often much less. The information here presented deals mainly with the final pre-independence phase, but important vacillations have been noted. By May 1960 all the

parties had had to present themselves to the electorate; consequently the ones here analyzed are those with real backing and therefore significance. The nine parties included in the chart obtained 113 seats out of a total of 137 in the Chamber of Representatives. The next most

important party (i., the tenth in rank of seats won) had only four members in the chamber.

The information contained in the chart falls into sixteen columns. The first five columns (I to V) deal with basic characteristics of the parties; the next three (VI to VIII) with leadership; and the remainder with style of organization, local conditions in the party’s stronghold, and the election behavior of the party’s followers. In order to clarify some of the language used in the chart, comments on each column follow: Column I. Type of party: This deals mainly with the extension (national, regional, or ethnic) of the party. However, as mentioned earlier, there are various overlapping possibilities which are briefly noted when important. Column II. Date founded: It will be noted that when the parties split definitively the founding of both the original party and the faction which

participated in the May 1960 elections is noted. However, when divisions were not yet absolute (e.g., the several wings of CEREA) or were only temporary, no notice has been taken of this fact even though these wings may have competed in the elections. It should also be noted

that in the case of the BALUBAKAT Cartel the original party (the BALUBAKAT) and its later allies are lumped together and there are therefore two “founding” dates. Column III. Militant to moderate spectrum: This spectrum runs from

“very militant” to “militant” to “indifferent” to “moderate” to “very moderate.” This refers exclusively to nationalist policy as it affected the party’s relations with, and attitudes toward, Belgian authority. It does

not affect the relations of the party with local Belgians or with the 65

APPENDIX TO PART ONE local administration in its stronghold (which is dealt with in the columns dealing with the party’s “style”). In other words a “very militant” party is so categorized because it favors immediate independence, departure of all Belgian troops, complete control over the economy, and so forth. The positions of the parties in this regard became clearest at the Round

Table Conference, but there were a few changes of position between February and May 1960. For instance, the ABAKO moved in a more moderate direction. Column IV. Federalist to centralist spectrum: This refers to the position of the parties on centralization versus decentralization of government authority in an independent Congo. Column V. Type of traditional society in party’s stronghold: The basic

alternative was whether the party’s support came from an ethnically homogeneous or heterogeneous area. Naturally there were various grada-

tions; for example, an ethnically heterogeneous area with one ethnic group clearly dominant. Such characteristics are noted when possible. In addition, the relative strength of traditional chiefs is noted. Column VI. Degree of influence by traditional chiefs: The subject of this column is self-evident, but it is particularly difficult to make any generalizations about it since the role of traditional chiefs varied from area to area even within one party’s stronghold. There are, however,

dramatically clear cases such as the ABAKO over which traditional chiefs had virtually no influence because traditional chiefs had all but disappeared among the Bakongo.

Column VII. Top party control: Here an attempt is made to state how the party was controlled at the top echelon. Needless to say, it is very difficult to assess this with any degree of certainty, unless a careful study is made of each party. Column VII. Background of secondary leadership: By secondary leadership is meant the section committees up to, and sometimes including, the territorial committees. Propagandists sent out by the national or provincial organization would also fall in this category. Unfortunately, very little is known about this very important subject for many of the parties. Column IX. Date of main rural thrust: As noted in Chapter I, perhaps the most important element in the growth of Congolese parties was the date when they began to organize the rural populations from whom they could expect support. This date is far more important than

the formal founding of the party in one of the capitals. It should be noted how very late most of the parties undertook this activity.

66

APPENDIX TO PART ONE Column X. Style in enrolling members: Some parties merely collected

dues and gave out membership cards; others went so far as to use the threat of violence and even violence. This column seeks to give a very

rough estimate of how each party tended to behave in this regard. The | conceived spectrum runs from “very aggressive” to “aggressive” to “dy-

namic.” Insofar as all the parties in this table succeeded in enrolling vast numbers of members none appear to have been less than dynamic. Column XI. Style toward opponents: In most instances the style in enrolling members was essentially the same as the style employed in dealing with opponents or opposition parties. However, there were some exceptions. For instance, the PSA found small ethnic break-away parties being formed in what it considered to be its domain. In order to hold

on to its earlier gains the party became relatively aggressive. The ABAKO, on the other hand, was sure of its supporters and reacted with real passivity to many provocations on the part of smaller parties in and around Leopoldville. Column XII. Style toward local Belgians (or whites in general): In some parts of the Congo the independence struggle aroused very active anti-white feelings among the urban and rural populations. Party leadership either encouraged such tendencies or, by omission or active opposition, dampened them. In the case of parties which were given adminis-

tration support (such as the PNP) the leadership tended to discourage anti-white manifestations. However, the leadership did not necessarily

have the power to do so. Furthermore, a distinction must be made between the general atmosphere in this regard at the grass-roots level and attitudes toward specific whites whom the leaders regarded as their friends. There was not a single Congolese party which did not regard some whites as friendly and in such instances the leaders were always able to persuade their followers to treat them with great hospitality, trust, and warmth. This column seeks to take all these factors into consideration and to give each party a crude cumulative characteristic. Column XIII. Degree of administrative collapse in the party stronghold: During the independence struggle the administration became increasingly incapable of performing even the most basic functions of gov-

ernment. This occurred for three reasons: spontaneous protest on the part of the rural masses, organized campaigns of protest and resistance by the parties, and the demoralization and “‘laisser-aller” attitudes among administrators. The alloy which resulted from the mixing of these three elements was, of course, different from region to region. This column seeks to indicate to what extent the result was a collapse in 67

APPENDIX TO PART ONE administrative services. The spectrum runs from “very great” to “great” to “medium” to “small” to “very small.” Column XIV. Degree to which party performed governmental functions: In some areas in which administrative services had collapsed or come close to collapsing the dominant party increasingly replaced the services with its own organization. This was in part dependent on party policy. Some parties resisted doing this as much as possible while others

set up their own structures and services in competition with the administration even when the latter was still operative. There were also situations in which the rural party organization was simply too young to set up party services even though the population was no longer employing those offered by the administration. At the maximum, a party would have its own courts, militia, police, and even prisons; some parties allowed schools and medical service organizations to be set up in their name. Minimally, a party would simply enroll members and direct its entire effort toward the elections. Column XV. Party discipline regarding the May 1960 elections—one

or more lists submitted: As noted elsewhere in this study, Congolese parties were usually unsuccessful in preventing factions within their ranks from submitting their own lists for the May 1960 elections. This occurred, in part, because of the regulation which directed that lists had to be submitted locally in each electoral district. As a consequence competing lists within the same electoral district were particularly prevalent for the provincial elections where the list had to be submitted at the territorial level. It should be noted that in such areas where the party in question was the only one with any substantial backing this

phenomenon did not cost the party any strength; in effect, a party primary and an election took place simultaneously. In areas where an opposition party did have some strength this phenomenon could, of course, be quite costly since each list would be separately tallied and seats would then be distributed in accordance with a proportional representation system. It is a fair guess that virtually all national leaders tried to prevent the submission of multiple lists, and thus this column is a good index of the actual discipline which party leaders were able to exert over the lower echelons of their parties. Column XVI. Degree to which preferential votes were cast: The Congolese elector had the choice of voting simply for the party he picked or else picking one candidate from among those on his preferred list and

placing his mark next to that person’s name. In both cases the party was credited with that vote, but the actual candidates declared victorious 68

APPENDIX TO PART ONE were those who had received the largest number of “preferential votes.” The party leaders naturally made up the lists of candidates and anticipated that their followers would accept the hierarchy laid down. When the electorate employed the preferential option, it radically altered this hierarchy in almost all instances. As a result of this system the degree to which the preferential option was employed was also a very good

index of the amount of discipline which the top leaders were able to exert both on their followers and on the lesser leaders who sometimes had a personal interest in encouraging the electorate to vote preferentially, i.e., for themselves.

69

I II III IV V

Militant to Federalist Type of traditional

Type of Date moderate to centralist society in Party

Parties party founded spectrum spectrum Stronghold

National Summer Very Strongly Ethnically heterogeneous in

with 1959 militant centralist Orientale Province and

(MNC in District Maniema District. Sankuru MNC (L)effective centralized 1958) more homogeneous. structure Eastern Mongo ethnicity played some part in rapid

growth; was crystallized by

Lumumba.

National Fall Very Indifferently Very mixed, but party’s without 1959 moderate federalist greatest strength tended to

PNP effective be in areas were whererelatively traditional centralized leaders

structure strong (e.g., via LUKA among the Bayaka)

Regional Early Very Indifferently Ethnically heterogeneous.

PSA withnational 1959 militant federalist leaders tended (Began asTraditional to be weak.

ambitions centralist)

Ethnic As party, Very Strongly Ethnically homogeneous

(Bakongo) Summer militant federalist (Bakongo). Some differABAKO 1959. As (becoming more ences between different

1950. Traditional leaders

organization moderate) Bakongo tribes.

virtually non-existent.

Summer Very Centralist Ethnically heterogeneous. CEREARegional with 1958 militant Traditional leaders tended

national to be strong. ambitions

Theoretically Fall 1959 Militant to Federalist Ethnically homogeneous

national (MNC in indifferent (Baluba ofboth Kasai). MNC (K) but in fact 1958) Support came from ethnic rural stronghold and

(Baluba urban Baluba.

Kasai)

Regional Summer Very Federalist Ethnically heterogeneous

with strong 1959 moderate bordering on with Lunda predominant. CONAKAT ethnicor secessionist Traditional chiefs very (Lunda) confederal_ strong.

overtones ist

Regional BALUBAKAT Militant Indifferently BALUBAKAT (party),

with strong in fall (more centralist ethnically homogeneous ethnic 1959. moderate (Baluba of Katanga). BALUBAKAT (Baluba of Cartel in at start) Strong traditional leaders, Cartel Katanga & spring 1960 but also severe traditional Tchokwe) divisions between sub-

overtones groups. Cartel, ethnically heterogeneous including Tchokwe.

Regional Early Moderate Centralist Ethnically heterogeneous. PUNA with ethnic 1960 (sometimes Main support from overtones veered toward Ngombe and Budja. federalist )

a ae, VI VII VIUI IX x Date of main

Top Background of rural thrust with Style in

Degree of influence party secondary months left enrolling

Parties by traditional chiefs control leadership before election members Different patterns with One Very mixed. November Very

paramount and local chiefs. man In Orientale 1959. 6 months aggressive

MNC (L) Former rarely influential, (Lumumba) Province propagan-

latter mixed but serious dists were often

factor in Orientale Prov. unemployed youths and northern Kasai.

Usually very large Diffused Mixed, but local Constituent Very PNP and in some notables parties instances very direct probably had a various mixed (e.g., LUKA

big role dates aggressive)

Very small Collegial Modern elite far Summer Dynamic PSA down toward 1959.local 9 months (Initially level aggressive)

Collegial, Modern elite Early Dynamic ABAKONone dominated farbydown 1959. 14 months (Initially one man __ toward local aggressive ) (Kasavubu) level

Probably small Collegial Essentially the Early Dynamic

(?)probably modern elite, 1960. 3 months or CEREA but less (7?) ageressive . than ABAKO (?) or PSA (7)

(?) Collegial, Probably modern Fall Very dominated elite 1959. 6 months aggressive

MNC (KR) by one man (?) (?) (Kalonji)

Very large and Collegial, Some were probably Early Dynamic CONAKAT in some ways dominated traditional chiefs 1960. 3 months (?)

| (2)

quite direct by one man and notables, but (?) (Tshombe) unclear (?)

Probablyalthough large, Collegial (?) Early Dynamic BALUBAKAT less (?) 1960. 3 months Cartel than CONAKAT (7) (?) (?)

(?) One man Early (?) PUNA (Bolikango) 1960.(?) 2 months (?)

eee XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI Degree of

Style administra- Degree to which One or more Degree to Style toward tive collapse party performed lists submitted. which pref-

toward local in party governmental Election erential

Parties opponents Belgians stronghold functions discipline. votes cast

Very Very Very Small great In all territories provinces More Very great. aggressive aggressive than

MNC (L) existed in which 75% more than one list was submitted

Mixed. Mixed. Mixed, Very Widespread Very Some like Probably but small use of multiple mixed

PNP LUKA very mostly generally lists aggressive passive. small

Aggressive Restrained Great Great No instances Very great. PSA aggressive of more than one More than list 80%

ABAKO one list

Temperate Aggressive Very Very A few territories Very small.

great great with more than About 5%

Aggressive Great Verythan frequent Very CEREA (?) (?)(?) use of (?) more mixed one list. Party split into several

factions.

Very Aggressive (?) Very No instances Mixed. Where aggressive (?) great of more than competition was

MNC (K) (?) one list great, percent(?) Probably Small (?) territories In nearly half Fairly great very the CONAKAT passive more than one

age was high; otherwise small

list

(?) Probably Small (?) Member parties Great BALUBAKAT restrained (?) of the Cartel Cartel aggressive submitted own

(?) lists in competi-

(?) (?)territories (?) (?) A few Great PUNA tion with Cartel.

with more than one list

PART TWO

A History of the Parti Solidaire Africain

BLANK PAGE

INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO —1R)2020020222202020)20> ART ONE of this study has attempted to describe the general set-

P ting in which Congolese parties evolved. In order to do this it has been necessary to make certain assumptions which are by no means proved. Indeed, it will not be possible to write a definitive analysis of Congolese parties until some of the major ones have been studied in detail. The present study proposes to do this in the case of the PSA, by approaching the subject from two slightly different points of departure:

Part II presents an institutional or political history of the PSA, and Part III, an analysis of the relationship between party leaders and the rural masses with emphasis on the evolution of protest. These two strains will be joined in Chapter XI, which deals with the PSA’s participation in the May 1960 elections. There are positive methodological reasons for writing a history with-

out immediately bending the material to serve a more functional analytic framework. If political history is employed largely to illustrate how certain tensions and relationships developed, it is inevitable that specific events extraneous to these developments will be left out or at best dealt with in a superficial manner. And if no history exists, such an eclectic analysis runs the danger of perpetrating a version upon future students of the subject which—even if it is rigorously objective —allows them little opportunity to reinterpret the facts and events which make up the total historic evolution. In the case of Congolese political parties before independence, it is unlikely that more than one study will be devoted to a single party. This makes it all the more important to devote a major portion of the present work to a straightforward recounting of the PSA’s history.

These considerations, however, do not preclude emphasis on those underlying forces which, in the opinion of the writer, had a decisive effect on the political evolution of the Congo, and perhaps of other parts

of Africa. Accordingly, in Part III, the development of rural protest is given special and detailed attention. Part II is divided into four chapters. The first two deal with the be-

ginnings of the PSA, both in Leopoldville and in the interior. The third presents a chronological history of the party’s policy and strategy from June 1959 to May 1960, a history dominated by three main concerns: relations with Belgian authorities, relations with the ABAKO, and relations with other parties. Finally, the relations among the PSA leaders are analyzed.

75

CHAPTER V so 202222)2212)2299 9) The Origins of the PSA OLITICAL parties in Africa tend to begin with elites operating in

DP ban centers. This was the case with the PSA: it ultimately became a party which, despite national ambitions, found its source of strength confined to a rural region—the Kwango-Kwilu area. In this chapter we shall consider in some detail the motivations of its founders and sketch briefly the early national structure and policy of the party.

Aftermath of the January 1959 Riots in Leopoldville

As indicated earlier, the effect of the January 1959 riots was to appreciably harden the attitude of Congolese opinion, especially in Leopoldville. This change of mood was, however, somewhat mitigated by the conciliatory tone of the January 13 Belgian Government Declaration on the Congo’s future and by the generally liberal position of the Minister for Colonial Affairs, Maurice Van Hemelrijck, whom many

Congolese regarded as sympathetic to their interests and goals. A somewhat ambivalent period thus began which lasted up to June 1959. While the elite felt deep suspicion and resentment springing from the aftermath of the January repression, at the same time, several events pointed to a fundamental liberalization of Belgian policy. In this at-

mosphere a dialogue between the Belgian government and the currently important Congolese political leaders was not only possible but was actively sought by the latter.

The PSA was founded in February 1959, but unlike so many other Congolese parties it was most restrained, even secretive, in its early operations. One of its mottoes was “work in silence,” and this goal was certainly achieved. Writing for the official Congolese Information Service, a Belgian author stated: “We had to wait up to June 1, 1959 in order to discover some signs of life of this party founded in March. . .. We were unable to find the traces of a directing committee anywhere. In effect, it would seem that this grouping was more or less

a Satellite party of the ABAKO. .. .”” |

This statement shows how little was known about this party even by persons who presumably had access to government files. 1 De Backer, op.cit., Part III, pp. 7-9.

76

THE ORIGINS OF THE PSA The PSA may have been the first Congolese party to reject “white technical advisers.” Only much later, Mr. and Mrs. Guy Spitaels were _ given a very limited role as advisers to the PSA delegation at the Round Table Conference. Even the ABAKO persistently had white advisers, and this was true of virtually every other party. The PSA SecretaryGeneral, Pierre Mulele, writing about developments in Leopoldville in June 1959, stated: “. . . certain Europeans have asked to be our advisers, so-called technical (advisers); the P.S.A. refused categorically.” The imprisonment of the top ABAKO leadership was recognized as a potentially crippling possibility for the nascent PSA. Consequently, some of the early leaders participated in party activities in a semicovert fashion. Their names were not listed when the PSA registered with the administration. Many of them were government employees who felt particularly vulnerable to administration pressures and thus had a personal reason for not wishing to be among the official leadership. Such persons were frequently the deputies of those holding formal functions, and whereas all participated in the committee meetings, the semi-covert deputies were supposed to fill the place of the formal leaders in case they were arrested. This never happened, although the administration did exercise some pressure on the PSA leaders who were government employees. For instance, the transfer of the Presi-

dent of the Kwango Provincial Committee, Joseph Herrady, from Kenge to Ruanda-Urundi in October 1959 was viewed as anti-PSA administration pressure since it forced him to abandon his party activities.

PSA suspicion of the administration and the party policy of prudence and secretiveness were further demonstrated by the manner in which Valentin Lubuma, a member of the Central Committee who was sent

on a mission to Kikwit in June 1959, applied for leave from his administration post to effect this journey.

P.S. the reason for this trip: the Kwango Kwilu Federation [Matete section] having learned of the nefarious troubles which oc-

curred during the voyage of the Minister, notably in the Bas (Congo), the Kivu, and elsewhere, has unanimously confided the mission to me to warn this vast region, which is enjoying full calm, against participating in manifestations which certain extremists threaten to provoke in Kikwit. I undertake to accomplish this mis2Letter from Pierre Mulele to President, Kikwit PSA Section, June 15, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 92.

77

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN sion with all the dignity which my position as a Government agent imposes on me.? Why a New Party

The basic reason for the founding of the PSA was of course to be found in the ethno-political situation which had developed in Leopoldville Province during the 1950's.

The initial leadership of the PSA came from one of the large, regional mutual-help and cultural associations, the Fédération Kwango-

Kwiloise.* This association was composed of persons from the Kwango-Kwilu districts who resided in the city of Leopoldville. It reflected the great ethnic heterogeneity of this region and unlike other urban associations, such as the ABAKO in its pre-political phase, it was regionally rather than ethnically based. Consequently the bonds

holding the membership together were somewhat weaker than in exclusively ethnic associations, a fact which has plagued both the Federation and the PSA.

With the beginning of proto-political activity in Leopoldville, the Bayaka in the Federation formed a splinter group called the Fédéra-

tion Kwangolaise. The rest remained together in the Fédération Kwango-Kwilu.> It is interesting to note that the “anti-tribalistic” policy which the PSA subsequently espoused had very definite roots in the ethnic diversity of the Kwango-Kwilu districts, and that this was already a dominant factor in the proto-political period.

The breakaway of the Bayaka was caused by specific ethnic and economic conditions. The largest single ethnic group within the confines of the Kwango and Kwilu districts, the Bayaka have maintained a very high degree of traditional political organization, unlike most of

the other groups in this region. Moreover, because of the particular poverty of their region, they were the main migrants from the KwangoKwilu districts to Leopoldville. Thus they were in a somewhat special and separate position both in the interior and in Leopoldville.

The Bayaka were not the only group to manifest separatist tendencies with respect to Kwango-Kwilu unity. The Bayanzi formed their 8 Letter from Valentin Lubuma to Directeur Chef de Service de l’7Economie Générale, Leopoldville/Kalina, June 18, 1959. (Author’s Files, PSA-300.) 4 Commissioner General of Information, Notice sur le Parti Solidaire Africain, Doc. 75 (Leopoldville, June 11, 1960), p. 1. 57It is unclear whether the non-Bayaka elements from the initial Fédération Kwango-Kwiloise retained that name or changed it to Fédération Kwango-Kwilu. In any case, statements in the name of the Fédération Kwango-Kwiloise were made through 1959.

78

THE ORIGINS OF THE PSA own cultural organizations, the Union Fraternelle Bayanzi-Bamputu®

and the Association Bayanzi du Territoire de Banningville.? Other ethnic groups in the region also formed organizations in Leopoldville or in the interior of the province. In most instances, however, this tendency did not result in the formation of ethnic political parties as in the case of the Bayaka and the Bayanzi. While most of the PSA founders came from the Fédération KwangoKwilu, several were from other organizations. Some were, or had been,

members of the Action Socialiste, the socialist study group which had existed in Leopoldville for some time. The President, Antoine Gizenga,

had headed a small independent union of teachers in Catholic missionary schools. Members of other labor unions (Catholic and Socialist) and government employees were also among the founders. But their common bond was that they all came from the Kwango and Kwilu districts.

Although the party’s activities were largely confined to the Kwango-

Kwilu area and all its founders came from this region, it did not regard itself as a purely regional organization but hoped to become a national party. More than that, the PSA considered itself part of a general African freedom movement, and thus its horizon extended beyond the Congo’s frontiers, even if only conceptually.* In the light of these predilections, it may be asked why the PSA leaders, instead of founding a separate party, did not join one of the existing parties, such as the ABAKO, the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), or the Parti du Peuple (PP), all of which were active in Leopoldville and predated the PSA. That the PSA founders were seriously committed to the unity of the Congolese nationalist movement is indicated not only by the declarations of some of its leaders but also by a specific clause in the Party Statutes which states: “In case a dissolution is approved by the Congress the funds of the Committee and those of the other committees shall be transferred to another Congolese political party whose doctrine shall be the same, or shall come close to,

that followed by the PSA.’® Thus the PSA even at its inception envisioned the possibility of dissolution and merger with another party. 86Tetter from Union Fraternelle Bayanzi-Bamputu to Directeur Provincial des Affaires Indigénes, Leopoldville, September 14, 1959. (Author’s Files, PSA-301.) 7 Interview with Wenceslas Mbweny, Secretary General (ABAZI), May 1960. 8 Interview with Félicien Kimvay, First Vice President, PSA, April 1960. 9 Statut du Parti Solidaire Africain, Leopoldville, February 1, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 14. 719

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN Yet there were several reasons for the creation of a separate party. The MNC was, at this time, a very “open” political organization. It had several well-known European advisers and was dominated by the outstanding “elite” leadership of the day. But with one exception, none of these leaders came from the Kwango or Kwilu districts, and thus there were few personal ties between the two sets of leaders. As previously noted, after the January 1959 riots, the very openness of the MNC was looked upon with apprehension, and the PSA founders felt that parties ought to be organized in a more clandestine fashion. Furthermore, those PSA founders who had been members of the Action Socialiste viewed the MNC as too conservative and dominated

by a mixture of “Catholic” and “Liberal,’° elements. In fact, only one member of the top MNC leadership was affiliated with a socialist

group: Cyrille Adoula. But probably the most important reason for rejecting the MNC was the fact that it did not really represent a grassroots political force in Leopoldville. It was an amorphous collection of leaders who had been helped either by Belgian Liberals or Catholics and whose base was in Equateur, Orientale, and Kasai rather than in Leopoldville Province. As the Kwango-Kwilu elite had a Leopoldville

orientation their main attention was focused on the ABAKO. This party, however, posed a number of very intricate problems which require some elaboration.

It will be noted that most of the areas which the PSA came to represent employed “state Kikongo” (Kikongo de lEtat), usually called Likeleve in Kwilu, as their lingua franca. While there were virtually no Bakongo in the Kwango-Kwilu districts, it had not been clearly established in late 1958 or early 1959 that the ABAKO would limit itself to the strictly Bakongo regions to the west of the city of Leopoldville. On the contrary, later events proved that the ABAKO wished to extend its influence as far east as Kasai. Concrete evidence for this can be found in the ABAKO plan to establish a “Republic of the Central Kongo”*? which was to include the Kwango and Kwilu districts. At first view, this expanded ABAKO interest would seem to have contained the prospect of a united Leopoldville Province nationalist movement. But

the ABAKO was an ethnic party which had placed its leadership in exclusively Bakongo hands. Non-Bakongo could expect to have virtually

no say in the “Kongo Republic” whether they were residents of the area covered by the ancient Kongo Kingdom or spoke “state Kikongo.” 10 Meaning close to the Belgian Liberal Party. 11 CRISP, ABAKO, pp. 229-30.

80

THE ORIGINS OF THE PSA Indeed, a document allegedly originating with the ABAKO was circulated (unfortunately without date) among PSA leaders which purported to give the composition of a shadow cabinet for the “Kongo Republic.” Appointments were listed down to the district commissioner level and of the twenty-four posts only two were given to non-Bakongo. From the point of view of the Kwango-Kwilu leaders in Leopoldville, therefore, there was grave danger that the ABAKO with the appeal of its history of militancy, success at challenging Belgian power and obtaining grass-

roots support, and its plan for a separate republic, would obtain the Support of the Kwango-Kwilu masses without giving the elite from this region any part in the leadership of the party or future government.

In addition, the Bakongo were somewhat resented by other ethnic groups in Leopoldville; they had achieved a high proportion of the better jobs, had won a substantial victory during the 1957 communal elections,’ and were said to affect superior airs and often contempt for other ethnic groups.** Thus, for the elite from the Kwango and Kwilu districts it was a matter of self-respect not to be “ruled” by the Bakongo, and their future as the leaders of the region of their origin

appeared to depend on their organizing a separate party. There were also basic differences in attitude between the ABAKO and the PSA leadership, not in the anti-colonial posture manifested by both, but rather in their vision of the type of society and polity which was to be created after independence. It is here that the earlier organizational connections of the leaders may have played a subtle role: the PSA, for example, stood for a socialist economy,** while the ABAKO did not express very specific views on this matter.

But it would be incorrect to conclude that the sole aim of the founders of the PSA was to organize against the ABAKO. The ABAKO’s success in organization and Joseph Kasavubu’s courage in spearheading demands for internal autonomy and independence were admired

and held up as examples to be emulated. There was a simple wish on the part of the PSA founders that their people also organize in their own name. This having been accomplished, negotiations could be initiated with other parties—perhaps especially the ABAKO—on a basis of equality.

The other alternative to a separate party would have been to join the Parti du Peuple, a socialist party which had grown out of the Action 12 Tbid., pp. 123-25.

18 One group of Bakongo declared: “In terms of progress, we are three centuries ahead of other ethnic groups in central Africa.” CRISP, ABAKO, p. 204. 14 CRISP, PSA, p. 17.

81

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN

Socialiste. However, after January 1959, Congolese parties which adhered to an essentially Western ideology rapidly lost the little support they may initially have had. Thus, despite the fact that some of the PSA leaders had participated in the Action Socialiste and despite the fact that the PSA, as noted before, adopted a “socialist economy” as part of its program, the Parti du Peuple was never, to the writer’s knowledge, a serious alternative. The PSA position was indicated in one of the early issues of the party newspaper, Solidarité Africaine: “. . . we have always been opposed to the implantation of European political ideologies in Africa. We fight against foreign ideologies which deform the African mentality.” There were then understandable reasons for the formation of a party based upon the population of the Kwango and Kwilu districts, despite the commitment by the founders to a national, non-tribal approach. The PSA Structure

The PSA’s national organization was made up of three organs:*® the National Congress, whose function was to elaborate the party’s policy (ligne de conduite); the National Political Bureau, a sort of deliberative organ without whose assent no party decisions could be executed; and the National Central Committee, charged with the actual administration of the party. The latter was composed of the chief officers of the party. It is to be noted that the Central Committee participated in the deliberations of the Political Bureau, but the reverse was not true.’ The same organizational structure was repeated at the geographically

subsidiary levels of the party. However, the PSA employed the district as its basic provincial unit. Thus, there were two provincial committees in Leopoldville Province, one for the Kwango in Kenge, and another for the Kwilu in Kikwit.

It is important to recall that at the time the party statutes were writ-

ten the PSA organization was almost entirely hypothetical. Apart from the founders, who made up the membership of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee, only a few commune sections in the city of Leopoldville actually existed. This caused some problems 15 Solidarité Africaine, March 18, 1960, p. 12. 16 CRISP, PSA, pp. 11-15. 17 The initial list of appointments consisted of six members of the Central Com-

sections. ,

mittee and fourteen members of the Political Bureau, with no overlapping assignments. However, at a later stage in the party’s history exiled Central Committee members were temporarily replaced by members of the Political Bureau. The National Congress, which never met, was to be made up of delegates from local

82

THE ORIGINS OF THE PSA

because it did not give sufficient consideration to certain political realities. For instance, the party statutes very distinctly placed all provincial committees under the complete control of the national organization. While this was entirely logical for a party which was nationwide in scope, it created a rather artificial relationship between the

national leadership in Leopoldville and the only region where the PSA was to gain a popular base—the Kwango and Kwilu districts. This imbalance was to plague the party almost from its inception and was at the root of much internal dissension.

It was also questionable whether the Kenge and Kikwit committees could be put on an equal footing since, as was shown in the May 1960 elections, the PSA’s strength was ultimately largely restricted to Kwilu district. In the day-to-day dealings of the party the Kikwit Committee

was destined increasingly to take over the leadership of both “provincial” organizations.*®

Another problem resulted from the fact that the National Congress,

which according to the party statutes was to meet once every year, was never called. This was perhaps understandable since the accelerating rhythm of political activities in the Congo in early 1960 prevented the normal functioning of any party, but as a consequence the local and provincial structures never had the opportunity to effect changes in the national—self-appointed—leadership. Hence the one real provincial committee was placed in an unrealistically subordinate position.

This basic problem of the non-representativeness of the national committees was, of course, Congo-wide and not limited to the PSA. It is to the credit of this party and its founders that much was done on a practical level to include the provincial leaders from Kikwit in the national decision-making process of the party. Furthermore, it is clear that an attempt was made to attain as wide an ethnic representation as possible in the National Central Committee and the Political Bureau. The National Leadership

The composition of the national leadership in Leopoldville—the position in the party, ethnic origin, and profession of the officers and committee members—is shown in the tabulation below. 18 When Cléophas Kamitatu, the PSA President at Kikwit, became a candidate for the May 1960 elections, he was listed as PSA Provincial President, and the term was apparently employed to mean Leopoldville Province rather than simply Kwilu district. CRISP, PSA, p. 9.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN

Position Name Ethnic Group Occupation NATIONAL CENTRAL COMMITTEE:

President Gizenga, Antoine Bapende Teacher Ist Vice-President Kimvay, Félicien Bambala-Bangongo Teacher

2nd Vice-President Yumbu, Gabriel Bambunda Bank clerk Secretary-General Mulele, Pierre Bambunda Government clerk Deputy Sec.-Gen. Pombo, Ambrois Bahungana Bank clerk

Treasurer Mwefi, Germain Bambunda Clerk, private company NATIONAL POLITICAL BUREAU:

Director Kama, Sylvain Bambala Government clerk Deputy Director Masena, Joachim Bayanzi Medical assistant Secretary Mandala, Louis Bayanzi Government clerk Member Nakasila, Gérard Bambala Government clerk Member Muyere, Nicodéme Badinga Teacher Member Kashama, Léon Bambunda Teacher Member Kingolo, David Bapindi Government clerk Member Kakula, Donatien Basuku Teacher Member Bula, Vital Bangongo Clerk, private company Member Nima, Ferdinand Badinga Government clerk

Member Angesaka, Célestin Bambunda Teacher Member Lubuma, Valentin Bayanzi Government clerk

Member Matiti, Justin Bayanzi Government clerk

Member Nzamba, Valére Bapindi Clerk

While the membership of these committees was never confirmed or changed through elections at a national congress, it was not entirely static. Some resigned from the party or in rare instances were demoted for lack of participation. It is also worth noting the limited range of

occupations represented. On the other hand, the ethnic diversity is relatively large. Both characteristics of course reflect the organizational antecedent of the party: The Fédération Kwango-Kwilu was ethnically heterogeneous and led by the urban elite.

Initial Policy and Plan of Action The basic aim of the PSA as stated in the party program submitted to the Belgian administration was the emancipation of Africans “in all domains” and the acquisition of independence by stages. The party also made many political, social, and economic demands which cannot properly be called a program but indicate the interests and desires of

its leaders. The Government Declaration of January 1959 was supported, but a Congolese government was called for, together with the training of the elite in public affairs. Primary school was to be made obligatory. “Separatism,” oppression, and exploitation were to be fought. In the economic field, the party supported the creation of col84

THE ORIGINS OF THE PSA

lective peasant communities, a consumer goods industry, and an extension of transport facilities.*°

The PSA “Plan of Action,”®° while stressing tactical questions, gives some additional indications of where the PSA stood. The most important revelation is that the PSA called for accession to independence within the “existing unity’ of the country and with the maintenance of the existing administrative subdivisions. In other words, the PSA had a centralist orientation and made a point of emphasizing it. This was, of course, in direct opposition to the ABAKO, whose federalist

position was officially defined by this time.** The PSA also associated itself with the resolutions passed at the Luluabourg Congress

in April 1959 even though it was not represented there. Among the PSA demands, great stress was laid on a completely democratic electoral system, with lists put up by the political parties, and electoral colleges and preferential voting systems excluded. The party’s support of a socialist economy was qualified as “inherently Bantu.” It also insisted that the Congo should adopt a neutralist foreign policy.

The elaboration of the statutes, the program, and the Plan of Action, and the organization of Kwango-Kwilu people in Leopoldville, was the main activity of the PSA founders between February and May 1959. Even though this is a very short period, it 1s interesting that almost nothing was done to extend the party’s activity into the interior

of the Kwango and Kwilu districts. No doubt this reflected, at least in part, the elite preoccupation with affairs in the city and with organizational structures and policy declarations which was so common in Leopoldville during this period. There had been no elections anywhere except in the city, and the degree to which all parties were destined to depend on the rural populations had not yet sunk in. As will be demonstrated later in the case of the PSA this obliviousness to the rural population in the spring of 1959 nearly cost the party its existence. 19 “Program” Kikwit PSA Section, May 1959, ibid., pp. 15-16. While this copy

of the program originated in Kikwit, later correspondence indicates that it was , drawn up in Leopoldville somewhat earlier. 20 “Plan of Action of the Parti Solidaire Africain,” ibid., pp. 16-18. This document is unfortunately undated, but the correspondence of PSA leaders indicates that the plan was passed at a meeting in Leopoldville on May 31, 1959. 21 CRISP, ABAKO, p. 205.

85

CHAPTER VI_ 2089202202292 The Founding of the PSA in the Interior HE key element in the success of African political parties has Tt usually been their extension to the rural environment where the mass of the population resides. If a sizable rural elite was also present in the interior, the metropolitan party founders usually attempted to elicit the support of that elite for their party. For the PSA this involved establishing relations between the Leopoldville founders and the elite of Kikwit and Kenge, the district capitals of the Kwilu and the Kwango respectively. As will be noted below, there were certain anomalies in

the establishment of these contacts in the case of the PSA. |

Before taking up these developments, it will be helpful to give a brief description of Belgian local administration, particularly since various Congolese officials at the lower echelons of the administrative

structure are frequently referred to in the communications among PSA leaders. The diagram below shows the hierarchy of administrative units and

subdivisions. From the central government down to the territory the administrative organization was entirely a colonial creation and headed

exclusively by Belgians. Below the territorial level the subdivisions sometimes reflected traditional African boundaries. As indicated in the diagram, a dichotomy can be made between the rural and urban settings. The urban local governmental units were divided into cities in which the communes were the lowest administrative subdivision, and the

centres extra-coutumiers which were smaller towns or industrial and commercial centers. In the rural environment there were two types of circonscription indigéne, the chefferie and the secteur (sector). The chefferie was supposed to be an entirely traditional social or political

unit. Its chief was to be appointed according to traditional rules of heredity. However, the chief’s functions were dual; he was in fact both a traditional chief and an administration functionary. The administration naturally had the power to demote chiefs and replace them with persons who were thought to be more competent or politically more acceptable. Consequently there were “traditional chiefs’’ who were

not so regarded by the population they supposedly represented. Finally, the size of a circonscription indigéne was limited by the fact that it had to be under a territory. That meant that the chief of a very 86

||

THE FOUNDING OF THE PSA IN THE INTERIOR Congo Government (Governor General—Belgian) Province (Governor—Belgian) |

District (District Commissioner—Belgian) |

Territory (Territorial Administrator—Belgian)

RURAL URBAN

Circonscription || | indigéne Centre-ExtraVille | Coutumier (1st Mayor— | | (Chef de Centre— Belgian)

hich i Chefferie Secteur Congolese) |

| | Congolese)

w hn 's a(Chief— © (Chef de Secteur— Commune either Congolese) a Congolese ) (Mayor— Traditional Groupement

subdivision (Chef de Groupement—

(Chief— Congolese)

Congolese)

large traditional political unit was administratively cut off from many of his subjects. This is what happened to the Mwata Yamvo of the Lunda and to the Kiamfu of Kasongo Lunda of the Bayaka.

The sectors were units parallel to the chefferies in areas where the population was ethnically heterogeneous or where traditional political units were found to be too small. In such instances the small traditional units themselves formed part of the sector and were given the name of groupements. The sectors also had their chiefs, but they were even more dependent on the administration than the chefferie chiefs since

they had no real tradition to back up their leadership position. On the other hand, the chef de groupement did lead a traditionally cohesive group of people at the very local level—sometimes no more | than a few villages. Early Political Activities in Kikwit

The elite of Kikwit and Kenge were not in any sense directly involved in the founding of the PSA in Leopoldville. Of the two towns 1 Young, op.cit., pp. 128-39.

87

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN

Kikwit was by far the larger and more active and also became the geographic nucleus of PSA strength. Kenge, on the other hand, posed a special problem because of the continuing disaffection of the Bayaka from the Kwango-Kwilu unity which the PSA was attempting to forge.

The Kwango Provincial Committee was therefore weak, and even dependent on the Kwilu Committee in Kikwit. For these reasons the discussion which follows will concentrate on developments in Kikwit and

surrounding areas, while the Kwango situation will be discussed in a later chapter. The first political party to make any attempt to establish a local organization in Kikwit was not the PSA but the MNC. It occurred in March and April 1959 just before the Luluabourg Congress and was led by Charles de Booth. It soon failed for a variety of reasons, two of which would appear to have been determining. First, de Booth did not belong to a Kwilu ethnic group, and second, he came into direct con-

flict with what amounted to the “establishment” of the local elite. This was the leadership of the Association des Anciens Eléves des Péres Jésuites (ASAP), the alumni association of graduates of the Jesuit missions. De Booth was a member of the Anciens Eléves des Fréres des Ecoles Chrétiennes (ASSANEF) and in fact joined a move to organize an active section of this association in Kikwit at the same time that he was attempting to start the MNC.? This incidentally indicates the close relationship which existed in the

centers of the interior between the alumni associations and the nascent

political groupings. Such a relationship is of course to be expected since other types of pre-political organizations rarely existed in the interior. Ethnic federations were rare because of relative ethnic homo-

geneity. The ideologically oriented study groups were largely restricted to the cities, there being too few Belgian Socialists or Liberals in these centers to initiate such elite activities. The only non-mission groups which sometimes, though not often, had established any roots

among the elite of the interior were the non-Catholic labor unions. This was the case in Kikwit, and Placid Penge, the local leader of the Fédération Générale des Travailleurs Belges (FGTB), the socialist union, had also participated in the attempt to start the MNC. However, the normal organizational framework for elite activities were 2 Présence Congolaise, May 2, 1959, p. 8. This move did not elicit any substantial support: “The members present were very few in number... .” Furthermore, “the President Aluku emphasized that the association did not intend to fight against the political parties of Kikwit.” As will be seen below, ASAP’s attitude was different.

88

THE FOUNDING OF THE PSA IN THE INTERIOR the “Cercle des Evolués” (administration-sponsored) and the mission alumni associations; the two frequently had overlapping leadership and even membership, precisely because most of the elite were graduates of the schools of the locally dominant mission order. The Jesuit missions which were in this position in Kikwit had the reputation of producing outstanding graduates and also sponsoring alumni associations which were very dynamic and permitted an interest in political

matters. ,

The inherent conflict between the two groups of leaders—those who

had initiated MNC activities and the ASAP leadership—came to a head when de Booth received an invitation, and allegedly also funds, to send a delegation to the first all-party congress at Luluabourg in April 1959. When it was heard that Kikwit would be represented at what amounted to the largest political gathering ever held in the Congo,

the ASAP leaders naturally wanted to be involved in the delegation. However, de Booth refused to permit this and went to Luluabourg without anyone from ASAP. Had the ASAP Committee not been rebuffed in this manner it is quite likely it would have joined the MNC. However, the consequence of the rebuff was that the ASAP Committee decided it was high time it took up the leadership of “political activity” in Kikwit. Although the committee did not doubt its ability to organize substantial support for such activity in the Kikwit area, there was little sense as to the direction such activity should take. As a result, a delegation was organized which was to go to Leopoldville in order to investigate the different political parties which had sprung up there with a view to picking one with which the Kikwit elite would affiliate.

The ASAP Delegation to Leopoldville

There is evidence of only the mildest contact between the ASAP committee and the PSA in Leopoldville at this time. The President of ASAP, Cléophas Kamitatu, did receive a letter from the PSA Central Committee (then still headed by the party’s founder, Sylvain Kama) dated May 6, 1959, in which he was asked to organize what would amount to a local PSA section. It is particularly interesting to note the arguments which were used:

This party [PSA] is created by your compatriots. Can one accuse us of tribalism? No, since all the parties created in Leopoldville reflect the origins of their founders . . . people speak of the ABAKO leaders, the leaders of the Mouvement National . . . etc., etc-—and 89

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN us? When will people speak of the Kwango or of a leader from the Kwango? Will we always remain mute?

Our two districts, Kwango and Kwilu, have about 2-1/2 million inhabitants, on the other hand, those of the Bas Congo have about 800,000 inhabitants. We, as the majority in the province, are we going to be represented and loyally led by the Bakongo who are in the minority? It’s illogical.®

First, the fact that the PSA was organized by persons coming from the

Kwango-Kwilu area is highlighted as a factor which should attract the ASAP leaders. However, the PSA Committee immediately defends itself against the not illogical conclusion that the party was an ethnic one, pointing out that all the Leopoldville parties reflected the ethnic

origins of their founders. The ethnic factor is therefore viewed as merely a coincidental early tie among the leaders which was not intended to restrict the party’s membership.* The other argument was meant to arouse the regional pride of the residents of the KwangoKwilu. Why are we never in the news? When will we assert ourselves? Finally, the committee points to the numerical superiority’ of the pop-

ulation of the Kwango and Kwilu districts to the Bakongo who, through the ABAKO, appeared to be leading the entire Leopoldville Province.

Yet despite this invitation by the PSA, the Kikwit delegation was apparently completely open-minded about which party it would recommend that the Kikwit elite should join. On reaching Leopoldville in mid-May 1959 it had discussions with leaders of the ABAKO, the MNC, the PSA, and with Monseigneur Guffens, a Jesuit dignitary considered to be particularly friendly to the Congolese. But the PSA was chosen. The ABAKO was almost necessarily rejected because of its ethnic exclusiveness. This had, if anything, grown since the January riots, and all the arguments which had been valid for the PSA founders were equally valid for the Kikwit delegation. The situation with regard to the MNC was somewhat different. The fact that the MNC was made up of “Catholics” or “Liberals” was not a deterrent since ASAP was itself a “Catholic” organization. However, by May 1959 the MNC was seriously divided, and it was Kamitatu’s impres8 Letter from PSA Central Committee to Kamitatu, Leopoldville, May 6, 1959, CRISP, PSA, pp. 19-21. 4In this connection it is worth noting that the PSA statutes explicitly excluded all considerations of race, tribe, religion or sex in the membership requirements. Ibid., p. 12. 5 Although this is exaggerated.

90

THE FOUNDING OF THE PSA IN THE INTERIOR sion that it would split, which in fact it did. There seemed little point in joining such a divided organization, apart from the difficulties which had already occurred in Kikwit.? But the principal attraction of the PSA for the Kikwit delegation was the fact that it was led by people who came from the Kwango and Kwilu districts. Theirs was a completely pragmatic attitude. The Start of the Kikwit PSA

On returning to Kikwit the delegation held a series of meetings with the general ASAP membership at which the recommendation to join

the PSA was formally made and approved. Thereafter, the main job facing the ASAP leaders was the creation of a local party organization and its extension into the interior. First, a meeting was held with

the Jembas, the tribal elders of the different ethnic groups living in the Kikwit area. They were asked to give their moral support to the undertaking. Second, a much larger semi-public meeting was held in order to acquaint the general public with the party’s goals and policies. Within a matter of days there was a general consensus in favor of the PSA and a great desire to “catch up” with the more politicized regions and cities of the Congo. Of interest in this connection was the speech by Paul Kakwala, subsequently elected Second Vice President of the Kikwit PSA section, at the first public meeting held on May 26, 1959:

We find ourselves before a problem today which will commit the future of our region. This problem consists of declaring ourselves vis-a-vis the present position of the Bakongo.... ... we are not led either by a tactic or a policy. It is to this question that we must come immediately, and it is time that we organized ourselves [“we” in this context refers to the people of the interior in the Kwango-Kwilu area]. The Bas Congo [Bakongo] want to profit by our silence in order

to use us to maneuver with them in order to gain independence tomorrow. .. . they are always thinking of returning to their ancient kingdom... . If the Kwilu and the Kwango end up by allying themselves to the Bas-Congo [Bakongo], it will end with the division into small states of the entire Congo. ... 8 Interview with Cléophas Kamitatu, September 1960. See also CRISP, PSA, . 26. ° 7It is worth noting that ASAP leaders did not exclude the MNC as a possibility

because of their experience in Kikwit. They were determined to move into the political limelight and apparently toyed with the idea of replacing the local MNC leadership.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN

A Kwangolese, be he born in Leo [Leopoldville] or within the limits of this country [area], is our brother. To try to divide us is to return to the ancient misery. ...

So what shall we do? Let us join a political movement at the Congolese [i.e., national] level which will aim at gaining the confidence of the other regions of this country.®

It is interesting to note how opposition to Bakongo preeminence and

ABAKO federalism—“it will end with the division into small states of the entire Congo”—-was used as a reason for joining the PSA. It is clear that these arguments not only motivated the PSA leaders but were employed in a very direct fashion to engender support for the PSA among the populace in the interior. At the end of this meeting the Kikwit PSA Committee was elected: °

Position Name Ethnic Group Occupation

President Kamitatu, Cléophas Bangongo Clerk, Administration Ist Vice-Pres. Katshunga, Marc Bambunda Teacher, Professional School

2nd Vice-Pres. Kakwala, Paul Bambala Clerk, Private Company

Secretary Mafuta, Christian Bapende Clerk, Bank Deputy Sec. Kipoy, Conrad Bambala Clerk, Bank

Treasurer Kimwanga, Honoré Bambunda Merchant (Ex-Chef de Centre)

Deputy Treas. Malonda, Denis* Bambala Merchant

* Denis Malonda was repeatedly identified as a Mumbala during interviews with different PSA leaders in the period under discussion. Several years later (1966) it turned out that he is really a Mukongo who had lived in Kikwit and chosen to identify with the Bambala. This opens an important—if confusing and difficult—area for research; namely, the fluidity which sometimes exists in ethnic identification.

In addition, Raphael Kinkie was elected as Chief of the Political Bureau, and the following persons became its members:?°

Yvon Kimpiobi Ignace Lukoki Henri Muzongo Albert Kanzemba Joseph Kasenda Vincent Kingambo With the entry of the Kikwit ASAP group, the PSA became a very

solidly based party. Its leadership came from a wide range of pre8 Minutes of Meeting, Kikwit, May 26, 1959, CRISP, PSA, pp. 24-26. ® Letter from Cléophas Kamitatu to National President, Kikwit, May 29, 1959, ibid., pp. 27-28. 10 Jn Kikwit, the Political Bureau was quasi-covert. Its members were not ad-

vertised as having official party functions. Of the seven persons involved, four were dependent on the administration for their jobs. The writer has been unable to discover the professions of the other three.

92

THE FOUNDING OF THE PSA IN THE INTERIOR political organizations: the Fédération Kwango-Kwilu, a multi-ethnic,

mutual-help and cultural association; a variety of labor unions; the Action Socialiste, one of the outstanding “study groups” in the Congo; and finally ASAP (Kikwit), a dynamic Catholic alumni association.

However, the leadership’s wide range of ethnic and organizational origins was a source of difficulty as well as strength.

The fact that an active and organized group of elite from the interior had joined the party on their own initiative had important repercussions. First, it had the effect of diffusing power much more than was usual in other Congolese parties. There were, of course, parties in which power was diffused because the top leaders had never man-

aged to attain even a minimum of synchronized action between the different subparties.‘t This was, however, not the case with the PSA. There was synchronization and consultation between different echelons and, what was rare for Congolese parties, the lower, or provincial,

echelon was able to participate in the decision-making process. Second, it was probably in large part because of this geographic diffusion that such a strongly collegial leadership pattern developed. As noted earlier, collegial leadership patterns also existed among other Congolese parties, but membership in the “college” was usually restricted to the top leaders residing in Leopoldville or in the provincial capitals. Several other parties lodged leadership in one man who sometimes attained a “charismatic” quality.

As has been stated previously, no Congress was ever given the opportunity to confirm the founders in their different positions, and this was an inevitable weakness. However, the party candidates for the May 1960 elections were more broadly representative of the following than were the founders. In sum, the PSA was to develop into a party which, by Congolese standards, was highly responsive to its lower echelons and membership. Early PSA Activities in the Kwilu District

During June 1959, the PSA in Kikwit began to extend its influence into the interior by organizing extended weekend trips during which delegations made speeches in one village after another. In the beginning the PSA leaned heavily on ASAP members who were widely dispersed, especially since many of them worked at Catholic mission schools in the area. In fact, the special relationship which existed be11 The Parti National du Progrés (PNP) could be considered an example of this phenomenon.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN tween the ASAP and the Belgian missionaries was used for the early

propaganda tours, as is indicated in a PSA report written after the party ceased to emphasize this connection. “This time our delegation did not represent ASAP as it had the last time, since here the problem

of making arrangements with the directors of the schools was not applicable. ...”? The overtly political purpose to which the ASAP was being put placed Church authorities in a rather delicate position. In some instances the missions acted with heavy-handed hostility, allegedly refusing to distribute mail which announced forthcoming PSA meetings. In other instances they attempted to show a benevolent interest in the development of the PSA but insisted that meetings be held outside mission grounds. Such subtle distinctions were not usually taken at

face value by PSA members. The feeling seemed to be that at last the Congolese had formed an organization which really expressed their

goals and aspirations and, as expected, the missions found ways of thwarting them. This attitude soon became even more pronounced in relations with the administration, despite the fact that at the outset the administration in Kikwit viewed the party’s activities with relative benevolence.?® Conflicts, however, immediately arose over permission to hold public meetings. Delays and obstacles were not infrequent and

were considered by the PSA leaders as indications of antagonism and sabotage. I deeply regret to inform you that the Administration of Kikwit is opposed to P.S.A. meetings at Kikwit.

The Principal A.T.A. [Assistant Territorial Administrator] Croonenborghs has not authorized this meeting. But after consulting Assistant District Commissioner Simon, I was informed of the

| following:

1. No meetings may be held Sundays or holidays. 2. A list of those attending the meeting must be furnished. 3. The meeting must be a private, and not a public one.™4

The Kikwit PSA leaders also felt that the administration was applying more stringent controls to political parties in the interior than in the urban capitals. 12 Report signed by Raymond Manessa, July 6, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 39. 13 Interview with District Commissioner Lehman, Kikwit, May 1960.

CRISP, PSA, p. 29. |

14Letter from Cléophas Kamitatu to Sylvain Kama, Kikwit, May 24, 1959,

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THE FOUNDING OF THE PSA IN THE INTERIOR One might have hoped that after the Declaration [i.e., the Government Declaration of January, 1959], the Congolese would enjoy all fundamental liberties. . . . In Leopoldville political meetings (private??) are permitted, but not in the countryside?

When will this discrimination between the city and the rural environment end? And then we are told that the second ten-year plan is based on the rural economy. In this spirit?*®

Despite such difficulties the Kikwit Committee achieved amazing success in enlisting the support of the populations in both towns and villages. In the first two weeks of activities in Kikwit the PSA collected

67,500 francs ($1,350) in dues, at the rate of 100 francs per man and 50 francs per woman.?® The success in the villages and plantations was even more spectacular.’ The motto employed by the Kikwit Committee is somewhat indica-

tive of the basic organizational policy pursued: “The intellectuals conceive, the elderly support, and the youth executes.”?* The “intellectuals” are the general group here referred to as the elite. The combination of the early establishment of Jesuit schools and a fairly developed economy had given Kwilu a relatively large and diffused educated or elite class. The PSA drew a double advantage from this: first, ASAP members in all corners of the district had old personal ties with the Kikwit Committee, and second, local—even village—leadership could in almost all instances be placed in the hands of resident elite. The presence and diffusion of this elite—not typical of all regions of the Congo—no doubt greatly helped the PSA to achieve organizational efficiency and effectiveness.

The vieux, or the lembas as they were sometimes called, were largely _

sought for moral support. In the Kwilu there were few areas where the traditional chiefs still had substantial power. For the most part, chiefs and notables were administration appointees. Whether they were true chiefs “of the blood” or administration appointees, the PSA was willing to give them outward signs of respect in return for their support of the party. The frequently observed conflict in other African coun-

tries between the modern elite leaders and the traditional chiefs was 15 Declaration by Cléophas Kamitatu, Kikwit, May 24, 1959, ibid., p. 30. 16 Interview with Cléophas Kamitatu, Transcript of tape recording. (Author’s files, C.K. 1.) Hereafter referred to as: Kamitatu, tape. 17 The expansion of the PSA into the villages will be dealt with in Part III. 18 Minutes, “Meeting of the intellectuals of Kikwit,” Kikwit, July 10, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 51.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN not present in the PSA.*® The relationship between the chiefs and the party will be analyzed in some detail in a later chapter; it is enough to note here that the vieux did in fact usually support the PSA and that this was of substantial help to the party, especially in the villages, even though these vieux would hardly have been in a position to set up any Serious counterforce.

The “youth” were composed of various subcategories: urban and rural, employed and unemployed. On the whole, the PSA does not seem to have made much use of the unemployed urban youth. This was probably because the party propagandists were to a large extent the elite group mentioned above. Relatively few propagandists were full-time employees of the party. In the villages the local youth (and here it is impossible to distinguish between employed and unemployed) did perform such party functions as policing party meetings and pro-

tecting party leaders. Their functions naturally grew as the party increasingly took on a quasi-governmental role. It is worth noting here that certain other parties made far greater use of the unemployed city youth”? with the probable result that propaganda activities in the villages were far less disciplined than in the PSA. Since Cléophas Kamitatu, as President of the Kwilu Provincial Com-

mittee, was mainly responsible for organizing the PSA’s extension to the villages, his account of the early activities of the Kikwit Committee

is of particular interest.

We first established the Kikwit section . . . next week .. . we went to Leverville to start a local section there. Each time we first held a public meeting to explain the aims of the

party and its activities, leaving it to the local people to form their own committee.

... we made contact with the person whom everyone had felt to be the local leader [chef de file] and asked him to gather the others and form a committee. . . . [We] explained how a committee was organized and always left someone with local responsibility. In some cases this person would be elected president of the section,

but in others he was not. | 19 As noted earlier, this appears to have been true of virtually all Congolese parties. A full explanation for this will have to await further studies of Congolese parties.

20 Interview with Pierre Duvivier, former adviser to the MNC (Lumumba) in Stanleyville, May 1960.

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THE FOUNDING OF THE PSA IN THE INTERIOR | Since, at this time each one of us had his own profession, we stopped work on Saturday at noon, ... at two o’clock we rented cars in order to go in all directions . . . on some Saturdays 3 or 4 missions would depart at the same time.”?

It would of course be valuable to have a statistical breakdown of the origins and professions of those persons “whom everyone had felt to be the local leader.” Such information is unfortunately unavailable. The composition of section committees does exist, but the lists do not give the professional, educational, or ethnic backgrounds of the mem-

bers. The little information which the writer was able to collect on this question, however, suggests that, apart from the previously mentioned tendency of the local elite to become PSA section leaders, no particular pattern can be discerned. In other words, it is not possible to say that the village committees were in the hands of persons who, because of their employment or lack of employment, could be classed as inherent malcontents or outside the existing local power structure. For instance, the PSA on occasion asked chefs de secteur (administration appointees without traditional sanction) to take the initiative for calling the first meeting.?? This all too vague impression could be

of some importance because other Congolese parties, such as the MNC (Lumumba), do not appear to have followed the same pattern of local leadership.

Whereas the membership of local committees was elected by the local population, the organizational scheme followed was usually patterned after the National Central Committee. Each committee had a president, two vice presidents, a secretary and a deputy secretary, and a treasurer or ordonnateur. Some of the committees added several counselors and a “President of the Political Bureau” whose job it was to follow general political developments which might be important for the section.?? Once the party had created a few local committees, territorial committees were set up. These coincided with the administrative subdivisions in the Congo. Kikwit, as the seat of the Provincial Committee, remained the main center of activities; however, in a few instances territorial committees jumped out of the normal chain of

command and dealt directly with the Central Committee in Leopoldville. 21 Kamitatu, tape.

22 Letter from Cléophas Kamitatu to chef de secteur at Pay-Kongila, Kikwit, July 8, 1959. (Author’s files, PSA-33.) See also Part III. 23 Kamitatu, tape.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN Kamitatu points out that PSA activities were entirely dependent on the financial contributions of its members.?* This is reflected by references to financial matters in the correspondence between the Kikwit and Leopoldville committees. The lack of funds in Leopoldville— due to the paucity of PSA members in the city—is shown by the following appeal to Kikwit, only about two weeks after the Kikwit Committee started its activities: “But what happened to Kama’s [Director of the Political Bureau in Leopoldville] telegram, asking for money so that membership cards could be ordered? We do not have enough money to be able to satisfy your section; can you help us as quickly as possible, and so help yourselves as quickly as possible? Would you, please, send us at least five thousand francs .. . ? [$100].” Because of the importance to the whole PSA structure of funds coming from the Kwilu, both the method of collection and the successes and failures in this realm will be discussed in some detail. After the

Kikwit Committee and some territorial committees were set up, a regular pattern was developed according to which the Central Committee

sent a few thousand membership cards to the territorial committees, at the same time informing the Kikwit Committee. The territorial committees would divide the cards, send them to the local committees, and

collect the receipts from their sale. Territorial committees were not

supposed to keep more than about 20,000 francs ($400); the remainder was to be transferred to the Provincial Committee in Kikwit.?¢

By July 22, 1959 (i., less than two months after the Kikwit activities began) the PSA estimated its receipts at 300,000 francs ($6,000) .?” Several months later, when the party’s activities were in full swing, this was no longer an imposing amount: “. . . every three

days, they [the Territorial Committees] arrived bringing 300,000400,000 francs ($6,000-$8,000) in dues.”’?®

The enthusiasm with which the PSA was received in the villages was such that the machinery set up for collecting funds was at times unable to cope with the massive desire to join the party and pay the dues. For instance, the following report was made to the Kikwit Committee concerning a propaganda tour at the beginning of August 1959: 24 Ibid.

257 etter from Pierre Mulele to President, Kikwit Committee, Leopoldville, June 15, 1959, CRISP, PSA, pp. 91-92. 26 Kamitatu, tape. 27 Minutes of meeting of Messrs. Kamitatu, Kipoy, Mukelenge, Kama., Kikwit, July 22, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 76. 28 Kamitatu, tape.

98

THE FOUNDING OF THE PSA IN THE INTERIOR Everybody decides to pay his dues and is awaiting the passage of

the Tango Committee [local section] to do so. A model P.S.A. [membership] card is given to the chef de groupement to avoid confusion with other political movements. ... [at the next stop] . . . everybody wants to pay their dues the very next morning if we can wait until then. —- Mr. Kakwala asks them to keep the money and will give instructions to the Tango Committee to visit the different groupements. . .. some people have brought money and pay, and very soon we have 8,000 francs in addition to what the Tango Committee already had before. .. . The Provincial Committee, which has the means to travel, must

try to visit the larger groupements and there see to the payment of dues. We must authorize important sections to travel economically at the expense of the PSA to rural districts to [encourage] the life of our movement in the most remote places.?®

It will be noted that the larger sections, such as the one in Tango, had not yet been given the appropriations which were necessary to organize fund collection. In other words, it is doubtful that the money which the propaganda team from Kikwit had told villagers to keep until the Tango committee came to collect it was, in fact, collected. Early PSA Activities in the Kwango District

The PSA’s position in the Kwango district was in many ways differ-

ent from its position in Kwilu. The Provincial Committee was inaugurated on August 10, 1959, in Kenge. Although this was only about two and a half months after the inauguration of the Kwilu Provincial Committee, the tempo of political developments was so rapid that the PSA was going through a radically different phase in its national policies by this time.

The PSA organization in the Kwango district never achieved the secure and strong position of its counterpart in Kwilu. There were many reasons for this. First, the Kenge Committee was not based on an already existing structure as was the ASAP in Kikwit. Second, the original membership of the Kenge Committee, while made up of local

elite much as was the Kikwit Committee, did not reflect the ethnic 29 Report of Propaganda Tour through Tango, Moaka, Mayoko, and Lundu, August 1-2, 1959, Kikwit, August 6, 1959, CRISP, PSA, pp. 44-47.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN makeup of the district. Indeed, while the Bayaka are by far the largest ethnic group in the Kwango district, not a single Bayaka was on this

first Kenge Committee. The first president did not even come from anywhere in Leopoldville Province, but rather from Kivu. While this clearly shows that the PSA meant what it said about rejecting “tribalism,” there were self-evident political disadvantages to a provincial committee which was ethnically rather marginal. The root of this prob-

lem goes back to the division in the Fédération Kwango-Kwiloise from which, as noted above, the Bayaka seceded. This is not to say that there were absolutely no Bayaka active in the PSA, but it meant that from the start the Bayaka as a whole had a predilection toward a separate organization—which was eventually created.

There were other factors which appear to have handicapped the PSA in the Kwango district. It is a largely underdeveloped and poor area—in contrast to most of Kwilu. This had two important consequences for the PSA. First, the number of elite were relatively small since there were few jobs for them and they were not as diffused as in Kwilu. This in turn meant that it was much harder to set up a multiethnic, elite-led party. Second, the power of the traditional chiefs, especially that of the paramount chief of the Bayaka, the Kiamfu of Kasongo Lunda, had been maintained on a relatively high level in Kwango. Unlike most other areas, therefore, the traditional structure was still strong enough so that the chief did conceivably have something to lose by backing a party such as the PSA.®° This factor was to become even more important in the early part of 1960 when the Belgian administration astutely gave the Kiamfu some informal influence over the selection of local Belgian administrators.**

There were two other factors acting upon the situation in the Kwango district. In the first place, the Bayaka were at least as affected by the ABAKO as they were by the PSA. Geographically the Bayaka region lies between the Bakongo and the multiple, often heterogeneously located, ethnic groups extending from the Kwango-Kwilu bor80 This is perhaps an exception to or even a contradiction of the generalization made on p. 95. However, the emphasis here is on a powerful ethnic group with a powerful chief among small ethnic groups with weak and frequently administrationappointed chiefs. The discrepancy is resolved by the creation of an ethnic party which is also elite-led and has the chief’s blessing. Naturally the influence of this chief on this particular party is greater than that of chiefs among the other ethnic groups referred to, but there is nothing resembling a “class conflict” between chiefs and elite leaders in either instance. 81 Interview with Jan Hollants Van Loocke, formerly with the Information Service of the Belgian Congo Government, April 15, 1960, Leopoldville.

100

THE FOUNDING OF THE PSA IN THE INTERIOR der into Kasai Province. Indeed, there were “border” disputes (continued after independence) between Bakongo and Bayaka in Popokabaka territory. Furthermore, in the city of Leopoldville the conflict between the Bakongo and the more recent Bayaka immigrants eventually reached very heated proportions. Second, apart from the special Bayaka attitude, a form of Kwango “regionalism” also developed. This

had two causes. The first was the fact that the Kwango district was very poor and sandwiched in between two relatively flourishing areas,

Cataractes district and Leopoldville to the west and the Kwilu district to the east. Indeed, the Kwango district was in part created precisely because the Belgian administration viewed it as functionally preferable to join together poor regions which faced the same sort of economic and social problems. At the moment of political consciousness this naturally brought about an attitude of regional antagonism (especially among the elite) toward the centers, such as Kikwit and Leopoldville, in which the means existed for dynamic developments. The second cause of Kwango “regionalism” must be tied to Bayaka separatism. In attacking the PSA position the charge was made that the party was Kikwit-controlled, that since the Kwiluese had their party—the PSA—why should the Kwangolese not also have their party?*?

This argument became increasingly difficult to counter as the PSA grew rapidly in the Kwilu district and as general political consciousness increased ethnic and regional self-awareness. It is parenthetically interesting to note the important influence which Belgian administrative subdivisions had on the Congolese.

In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the cumulative effect of these forces acting upon the growth of the PSA in the Kwango district did not make themselves felt until the winter of 1959. While there is no doubt that the PSA organization was not making as much headway

in the Kwango district as in Kwilu, the abstention percentages (approximately 70 per cent) in the December 1959 elections show clearly that the combined influence of the ABAKO and the PSA (largely the latter in the view of the writer) in the district was very great indeed.*? 82 The following is an excerpt from a report by the Kimbau (Kenge territory) PSA section addressed to the Provincial Committee at Kenge: “. . . they [the local LUKA leaders] have notified all the inhabitants of Kimbau and surrounding areas that the PSA was founded in Kwilu District [and] concerns [only] the Kwiluese, there can be no question of joining for Kwangolese. ...” Letter, President, Kimbau PSA section to President, Kwango Provincial Committee, Kimbau, December 15, 1959, CRISP, PSA, pp. 154-55. 83 The significance of the December 1959 elections and the results will be discussed later.

101

CHAPTER VII 208 204>20°29204>992 7-2-2222 PSA Policy and Strategy: June 1959 to May 1960 N THE preceding chapters we traced the origins of the PSA and its Tt arly activities in the interior. The evolution of PSA policy, and the interplay of party relations during the critical period from June 1959 to

May 1960 can now be described. It is hoped that this account will provide an understanding of the PSA’s role in the wider arena of Congolese politics. Occasionally, allusion is made to events which are not, strictly speaking, part of the PSA’s own history. In the absence of published histories and documentation readily available to scholars, it has seemed best to err on the side of generous inclusion, rather than exclusion, of such materials. In some areas, however, the opposite problem has had to be faced. A paucity of documentation and information

has prevented the writer from covering some very important aspects of the PSA’s history. This is especially true with regard to the party’s own predilections and/or positions within the counsels of the Cartel which it formed with the ABAKO and other parties in the latter half of 1959. For a time this alliance was so close that public declarations did not distinguish between the participating parties, and very few declarations were made in the PSA’s own name. Obviously, there is an internal

story to be told should the minutes of Cartel meetings and other such information ever become available. A second “blind spot” is the history of the contacts made by the exiled PSA leaders in their travels through independent African states, Western Europe, and the Communist states of Eastern Europe. Again, information on this subject is so completely lacking that it is barely mentioned in the body of this chapter.

As stated earlier, this history is mainly concerned with the PSA’s relations with Belgian authorities, the ABAKO, and other parties. But these topics are dealt with as part of a general evolution of the PSA’s participation in the nationalist struggle. This evolution can be divided into three distinct periods. The first was the summer of 1959 when the party’s position was not yet fully defined and was to some degree dependent on the evolution of Belgian policy. The second was the fall of 1959 when, in alliance with the ABAKO, the PSA opted

for “hard-line” nationalism involving some civil disobedience, and | considered a massive radicalization of this trend possibly leading to a 102

PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY provisional government-in-exile. The third was the return to more con-

stitutional nationalism after Belgium had called the January 1960 Round Table Conference with Cartel participation up to the eve of the May 1960 elections. Defining a Nationalist Policy and the Search

for Allies: June to August 1959 CHANGES IN THE ATTITUDE TOWARD VAN HEMELRIJCK

Up to June 1959, the PSA’s attitude toward Van Hemelrijck was one of euphoric enthusiasm. “During his second journey to the Congo, M. Van Hemelrijck was acclaimed by the whole population. In him

we saw our De Gaulle, bringing us a message of independence and liberty. This man . . . could speak clearly and unequivocally to the retarded colonialists.”’ Indeed, apart from seeking members, the first real activity of the Kikwit Committee was the organization of a popular reception for Van Hemelrijck during this journey. The Kikwit Committee received very explicit instructions from Leopoldville in this regard: “Your duty is to support the minister by cries of ‘Long live the great minister . . . the minister of independence, hurray for the champion of independence, down with colonialism, down with the saboteurs, etc... .’ and if possible you must get banners.’” Yet, within two weeks of this astonishing enthusiasm on the part of a militant nationalist party for a minister of colonial affairs, the PSA

attitude had completely changed. Since this switch was not only a major reversal in PSA policy but was also part of a crystallization of Congolese opinion which destroyed what was perhaps one of the last opportunities for an amicable and moderate devolution of power to the Congolese, it is well to describe the relevant circumstances in some detail.

The reversal in PSA policy was triggered by a speech which Van Hemelrijck made in Leopoldville on June 24, 1959, at the conclusion of his trip around the Congo. Its tone was particularly stern.

The right of association refers mainly to recognized political parties, but it is understood that their activities must be conducted in an orderly fashion and within the framework of the Government Declaration. The limits beyond which a party may not go shall be 1 Solidarité Africain, “La Politique au Congo Jusqu’en 1959” by Nas Gérard, Leopoldville, March 26, 1960, p. 12.

2Letter from G. Yumbu and A. Pombo to Kikwit Committee, Leopoldville, June 16, 1959. Author’s files PSA-21.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN established. All associations whose activities compromise law and order shall be dissolved, and anyone who participates in the extension or maintenance of such associations after they have been dissolved or suspended will be prosecuted.

While awaiting the promulgation of this legislation, the Governor General and I must envisage forbidding all public meetings if the present tense atmosphere in the cities continues. The hour is one of firmness.

We shall not allow any deviation from the Government Declaration, which will be strictly enforced. It is therefore pointless to cast doubt on the unity of the Congo.*

There is little doubt that this language had a profound effect on Congolese opinion, especially on the leaders of the more militant political parties such as the ABAKO and the PSA. Describing the speech, Valentin Lubuma wrote, “we found it manifestly too one-sided.” One may well ask why Van Hemelrijck chose this moment to arouse the anger of party leaders, especially since he had just received a hero’s welcome by the Congolese throughout the country. The answer is to be found in the convergence of long- and short-term pressures which had descended on Van Hemelrijck and threatened both his position as minister and his policy. The most important of the long-range pressures were the following: (1) His policy of pragmatic compromises aimed at appeasing the party leaders had aroused the vehement opposition of most Belgians in the Congo. (2) He was having great difficulty with the anchor piece of his policy, namely, rapid and dramatic elimination of racial discrimination. As Van Hemelrijck has indicated himself: “To the degree to which the Minister gained the confidence of the Congolese population . . . he faced the opposition of the major-

ity of the whites, in the Administration as well as in the private sector.» , Since this process was obvious to the Congolese, the relations between

them and local Belgians could hardly have improved. (3) Powerful political forces in Belgium prevented the enactment of many measures which Van Hemelrijck thought necessary, for instance, the appointment of a new Governor General. (4) The coincidence of the virtual collapse of administrative authority in the Lower Congo, and the federalist, quasi-separatist policy of the ABAKO put Van Hemelrijck in a 3 CRISP, Congo 1959, pp. 117-18.

4Letter from Valentin Lubuma to Cléophas Kamitatu, Leopoldville, June 29, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 74.

5M. Van Hemelrijck, unpublished manuscript, no title, January 1960, p. 8. (Author’s files, VH 2.)

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PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY

position where compromising with the outstanding Congolese challenge to Belgian authority (the ABAKO) would appear to be compromising with a potential dismemberment of the Congo. (5) The

existence of a European-inspired Katanga federalism-separatism only added to the difficulties posed by any compromise. These factors had, of course, existed for several months, but their weight increased as time passed. However, they alone do not account for Van Hemelrijck having made the speech referred to above and his insistence that “l’heure est a la fermeté” at a moment when Congolese

leaders hoped and expected to hear that “l’heure est a la liberté”— which is what de Gaulle had offered at a possibly comparable moment. In addition, three weeks before Van Hemelrijck’s speech an event had occurred which was spectacular both for its inherently trivial nature and the serious political repercussions which followed.

On June 9, having just arrived in the Congo, Van Hemelrijck was welcomed by several thousand Congolese in Thysville, a town in the Lower Congo. This was an ABAKO stronghold and among the many posters hailing the promised independence of the Congo was one which proclaimed “Vive le Roi Kasavubu.” This lése-majesté against the King of the Belgians was rapidly removed but not before the press had photographed Van Hemelrijck preceded by a Congolese carrying this poster. Surprising as it may seem today, this event became a major tool in the hands of the Minister’s political opponents. On his arrival in Elisabethville, a stronghold of European opposition to a liberalization of Belgian policy in the Congo, the photo was published by local European newspapers which in Van Hemelrijck’s opinion were “short

of funds [consequently could be bought] and stopped at nothing in order to excite public opinion.”*® For his enemies and opponents, here

was the spectacle of the perpetual appeaser even going so far as to allow himself to be photographed with a Congolese who was publicly insulting the King of the Belgians. The cry of outrage was of course taken up in Belgium. It mattered little that, as Van Hemelrijck pointed out, “in effect, I could not know what was taking place ten meters in front of me,’’ or that on a good will mission such a trivial incident could well have been overlooked. The fact was that the photo existed and Van Hemelrijck’s ability to continue to walk the tightrope between Congolese nationalists and European conservatives of one sort or another was impaired. 6 Report, M. Van Hemelrijck to Belgian Government, Elisabethville, June 19, 1959, p. 2. (Author’s files, VH 1.) 7 Tbid.

105

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN It is in this context that the Leopoldville speech must be viewed. If Van Hemelrijck was to continue in office and to pursue his policy it was necessary to show his impartiality and to hold both ABAKO and European “extremism” in check. Writing of his intention to make a speech in Leopoldville he stated: “I shall insist on the necessity for firmness with regard to everyone... .’® But two factors militated against the speech being given the impartial reading which he intended it to have. First, for the Congolese the Thysville incident was for all intents and purposes non-existent.

There was therefore no expectation of a counter-balancing move. Second, the threatening words in his speech appeared to be aimed at the Congolese political parties and not at the Europeans. In any event,

that is how both the Congolese and the Europeans in the Congo interpreted it, and for this reason it was seen by the Congolese as a sellout of their interests.®

There was one additional element which aroused the party leaders. This was Van Hemelrijck’s refusal to negotiate with them. Immediately after the speech the political parties demonstrated in front of the Administration Building in Leopoldville. Describing this event Valentin Lubuma, a member of the PSA National Political Bureau, wrote:

“, . . all the political parties of Leopoldville (including ours) have demonstrated in front of the Administration Building with calm and dignity, carrying banners with various inscriptions. They were given an audience at which the Minister was the only person to speak; this

resulted in our general dissatisfaction. A reaction can be expected soon.”?°

It is of course difficult to designate a specific event so crucial that it completely qualifies subsequent history. Nonetheless, Van Hemelrijck’s speech and its aftereffects were a major turning point in the evolution of Congolese nationalism. No Belgian in a position of authority was again to achieve the popularity and hence the opportunity which was Van Hemelrijck’s. There remains the question whether it was possible for him to have acted in a different manner. After all, when the Congolese compared him to de Gaulle they left out the very crucial factor that the General was all-powerful in the France of 1958 while Van Hemelrijck was anything but that in the Belgium of 1959. 8 Ibid. ® See Chapter III, fn. 3.

10 Letter from Valentin Lubuma to Cléophas Kamitatu, Leopoldville, June 29, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 74. Italics added.

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It is very unlikely that the Belgian political constellation would have allowed him to do the things which were necessary to maintain his popularity among the Congolese; this despite the fact that six months later the same constellation practically capitulated to Congolese nationalism. Yet it is possible that Wan Hemelrijck misplayed his cards, that it was he rather than fate that lost the opportunity which appears to have existed in the summer of 1959. The answer to this question can only come from an exhaustive study of his tenure of the office of Minister for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi.

The very conception of a “lost opportunity” in the summer of 1959 must, however, be qualified in yet another manner. In the six months since the Leopoldville riots protest had spread from the urban to the rural masses and, for reasons which will be discussed in a later chapter, these masses were often less amenable to moderation than their leaders. The question must therefore be raised whether it would still have been possible for the political leaders to persuade their followers to accept even the most accelerated timetable toward independence and Africanization. For most parts of the Congo the answer has to be in the positive, but for Leopoldville Province it is difficult to make any estimate. Yet at this time Leopoldville Province was the crucial area in which the Congo’s political future was being decided. Historically, the question was of course never posed since during the remainder of the summer the increasingly acrimonious relations between the leaders of the major Leopoldville parties and the administration had the effect

of pushing the former into the arms of their more intransigent followers.

As for Van Hemelrijck, he finally resigned—in effect was forced to

resign—on September 3. On that occasion he clearly indicated that in his view opportunities had indeed been lost: “On several occasions my decisions had been weakened or slowed down. Thus the effect of these decisions was reduced or rather lost because of the slowness of their execution.” As indicated above, the PSA’s attitude hardened in the summer of 1959, and in the expectation of a more difficult struggle its relations with the ABAKO became of paramount importance. It is therefore necessary to trace this relationship which, as has been noted, was initially in large part responsible for the founding of the PSA and was soon to emerge into a close alliance known as the Cartel.

11 CRISP, Congo 1959, p. 185. , 107

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN RELATIONS WITH THE ABAKO

The positions of the Central Committee and the Kikwit Committee concerning relations with the ABAKO were basically different. From its very inception, the Kikwit Committee favored an alliance with the

ABAKO, whereas the Central Committee was somewhat reticent even after the Van Hemelrijck speech had heralded the beginning of a period in which the need for greater unity among the more militant

parties had markedly increased. As early as May 1959, when the ASAP delegation had come to Leopoldville, Kamitatu had had a discussion with Gaston Diomi, an important ABAKO leader, and they agreed that: “. .. it was at least necessary to obtain the independence of Leopoldville Province, and for this the two strongest groups in the province, that is to say the ABAKO and the Kwango-Kwilu, had to form a bloc.’’?”

This attitude may appear paradoxical in view of the arguments which the Kikwit leaders employed to arouse support for the PSA. It will be recalled that they contained an almost anti-Bakongo flavor. The explanation must be sought in an analysis of the areas where the Kikwit leaders felt secure and those where they felt insecure. They never had any doubt that it was they, and no one else, who were best placed to politicize the Kwilu district. On the other hand, they felt the persistent danger that as broussards (people from the rural bush) they would

be left out of the mainstream of Congo political developments. That is why they had sent the delegation to Leopoldville in the first place. The PSA was selected for affiliation for reasons that have been discussed above. It was, however, not selected at that time as a particularly powerful force against Belgian rule. Clearly, the ABAKO was the main Congolese challenger of. colonial authority in Leopoldville Province,

if not in the whole Congo. Thus, to participate in the real struggle, cooperation with the ABAKO seemed desirable. To the PSA leaders in the city of Leopoldville the political constella-

tion must have appeared somewhat different. As elite hailing from the

Kwango and Kwilu districts but residing in the city, they must have been concerned lest the ABAKO end up by leading the entire province. Consequently they were determined to build an effective party organization representing their own area. A premature alliance with the ABAKO might have resulted in bringing the elite of the interior into the limelight, but the over-all leadership could easily have 12 Kamitatu, tape.

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become an ABAKO monopoly. This fear was no doubt increased by the initiative which Kamitatu took in contacting the ABAKO only days after he had joined the PSA: “. . . as soon as I arrived at Kikwit; we wrote a letter to the ABAKO Central Committee... .”* It is therefore not surprising that the Leopoldville PSA leaders attempted to restrain Kamitatu: “With regard to the plan presented by the ABAKO, I urgently beg you to await our advice before giving your Opinion on it, because we are constituting a special committee which will contact the authors of the plan.”** The reserved tone is all the more understandable when it is noted that Kamitatu did not consult the Central Committee before contacting the ABAKO, but only sent a copy of his letter.*®

Kamitatu’s view of the relationship between the strength of the PSA

in Kikwit and the proposed support of the ABAKO plan for a “Republic of the Central Kongo,” as well as a general alliance with this party, is demonstrated in his letter to a Leopoldville PSA leader:

Go to Mr. Kasavubu together and undertake the necessary meas-

ures because we must act right now and not at some other time. This is urgent, the PSA has made an excellent start.

The following sections have already been formed: Leverville —Tango—Bulungu—Pindi—Vanga—Pindi Mission—Mitshakila— Nkara—Leverville Mission—-Kipuka—Kikongo.

At Masi [Manimba] an important section has been formed, and I will have more news from them on Saturday, as I am to go there. There is also a section at Idiofa. All expect membership cards and bulletins, and your complete inertia distresses me.*®

Throughout July, Kamitatu kept up the pressure for action regarding relations with the ABAKO. Toward the middle of the month the Vice President of the Kikwit Committee came to Leopoldville mainly to discuss this matter with the Central Committee. Confirming a decision apparently taken in Kikwit, Kamitatu wrote: “You know your 13 Kamitatu, tape. See also letter from Cléophas Kamitatu to Joseph Kasavubu, Kikwit, June 10, 1959. (Author’s files PSA-18.) 14 Letter from Valentin Lubuma to Cléophas Kamitatu, Leopoldville, June 29, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 74. 15 Kamitatu, tape. Kamitatu explains that “at this moment the relations [contacts] between us [i.e., the Kikwit Committee] and the Central Committee were not yet very well established.” 16 Letter from Cléophas Kamitatu to Wenceslas Kuyitila, Kikwit, July 8, 1959,

CRISP, PSA, p. 85. | 109

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mission! . . . What is their [the Central Committee] position on the KASAVUBU plan? We are in perfect agreement [with it].’’”

On the same day he again wrote to the ABAKO directly: “We are still waiting, and although we have welcomed the plan of the Republic of the Central Kongo called for by M. Kasa [vubu]’s memo with enthusiasm, we could not support it publicly because we do not have sufficient details.”2®

It will be noted that the Leopoldville request that he refrain from pronouncing himself with regard to the ABAKO plan was honored— although barely so.

Despite this pressure by the Kikwit Committee the Central Committee in Leopoldville maintained its reticence. Reporting on the results of his trip to Leopoldville, Katshunga noted that “. . . the Central Committee reproaches us with considering ourselves inferior to Kasavubu. .. . As a political party we are equal to Kasavubu. With regard to the question of the Central Kongo, Leopoldville reproaches us for being unduly credulous. ... A plan is simply a plan... .”2°

Other objections were raised to Kamitatu’s enthusiasm for an alliance with the ABAKO. The ABAKO plan for a “Republic of the Central Kongo” would have separated the political development of the area it proposed to cover (most of Leopoldville Province and a part of Kasai Province) from the rest of the Congo. In addition the ABAKO insistently supported “federalism.” Both of these positions ran diametrically counter to PSA doctrine. In its “Plan of Action” the PSA had explicitly declared that independence should be realized “. . . within the present administrative and territorial boundaries.”?° And, as was pointed out by Sylvain Kama, the Director of the National Political Bureau: “Our party . .. has adopted unity [i.e., centralism] and

not federalism.’ The disappointment with Van Hemelrijck and the pressure coming from the Kikwit Committee did push the PSA Central Committee to

make contact with the ABAKO. A PSA delegation saw Kasavubu toward the end of July and planned to return again in order to dis17 Letter from Cléophas Kamitatu to Marc Katshunga, Kikwit, July 15, 1959, ibid., p. 75. 18 Jbid., pp. 85-86.

19 Letter from Marc Katshunga to Cléophas Kamitatu, Leopoldville, July 17, 1959, ibid., p. 87. 20 “Plan of Action of the Parti Solidaire Africain,” ibid., p. 16. 21 “Interview between PSA Kikwit and S. Kama,” Kikwit, July 22, 1959, ibid., p. 77.

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cuss “lists of candidates, number of posts” in the proposed government of the “Republic of the Central Kongo.’’??

Despite these overtures great reticence still existed among PSA leaders in Leopoldville, and in effect the discussions came to nought. A good summary of the different arguments which were influencing PSA leaders in Leopoldville is given by Marc Katshunga:

The question of Kasa-Vubu’s well-known plan remains a very delicate one and requires a study in depth at the capital .. . to bind ourselves prematurely and without sufficient preparation to a people which has always disregarded us, or rather has never consulted us,

would be seriously imprudent on our part. I can assure you that these leaders are very reserved and don’t tell us any secrets! What kind of a government could we form under these conditions? They

have made their preparations without us; their list of candidates does not mention anyone of us, their arms are kept elsewhere. .. . And we, what of us?... Yet we have to realize how much they have done in the shortest possible time. Without sterile discussions, our party will be established everywhere. We have to have funds. Our candidates will be briefed for all positions, without revealing to them [the ABAKO]

our policy [re Kasavubu’s plan] be it for or against. Thus, if we are going to obtain independence with them, we will be as ready as they will be. Agreed? .. .?3

Nevertheless, some initial steps toward common action were taken

by the PSA and the ABAKO. On July 31, 1959, a joint letter was sent to the Governor General protesting against “arbitrary arrests” and

the sight of “the Force Publique running all over the Territory with arms.” It also insisted that the populations represented by the two parties abstain from all elections** if a dialogue between political party 22 Letter from Marc Katshunga to Cléophas Kamitatu, Leopoldville, July 23, 1959, ibid., p. 88. 23 Tbid.

24 Two types of elections were involved. The first, relatively unimportant ones involved the councils of the circonscriptions indigénes whose membership was to be in part selected by taking account of the “preferences of the inhabitants” ac-

cording to a 1957 decree regarding rural reforms (i.e., direct or indirect local elections). The application of this decree had for an unexplained reason been delayed in Leopoldville Province up to the middle of 1959 and did encounter some boycotts. See Young, op.cit., pp. 134-39. The second election was the December 1959 territorial council election which has already been discussed and will be dealt with further below.

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leaders and the Belgian government were not initiated.?> The latter theme was to recur on innumerable occasions.

However, this joint letter did not signify the consummation of an actual alliance between the two parties, and Kamitatu was not to be dissuaded from the firm conviction that this was indispensable. Katshunga’s report that the Leopoldville leaders viewed Kikwit’s position as excessively naive elicited an impatient retort: “You reproach us for being too credulous when in fact we do not have enough information.”**° The Kikwit Committee also demonstrated its completely pragmatic and non-doctrinaire position in explaining its point of view.

Our party has adopted [the principle] of UNITY, but have you given us the reason for this unity? We do not want federalism—but do we know why not?

We do not wish to support the Kasavubu plan; we were promised that it was being studied, but was the result of this study ever made known? A plan, you say, is only a plan. What about us, what is our plan for the future of this country?

Are we still waiting for it to be presented to us on a platter? But who will put it there? This is why, faced as we are with so many unresolved problems, we have decided to undertake a serious study which will soon produce its conclusions. Our work is merely a proposition, and the Central Committee will have to judge it.?”

Shortly after writing this letter Kamitatu himself came to Leopoldville and after several meetings with the Leopoldville PSA leaders “it was decided that we ought once again to meet the people from the

ABAKO.”?® It is interesting to note that in retrospect Kamitatu recognized the justification for the Central Committee’s reticence: **. . . Leopoldville . . . feared that in making an alliance, they [the ABAKO] would checkmate us. Basically, this was the main reason why the Central Committee hesitated, and these hesitations were perfectly justifiable... .”?° However, it was, and remained, Kamitatu’s position that if the PSA

approached inter-party discussions with plans that were well worked 25 Letter from A. Gizenga, P. Mulele, G. Yumbu (for PSA) and J. Kasavubu, D. Kanza, A. Kingotolo (for ABAKO) to Governor General of the Belgian Congo, Leopoldville, July 31, 1959, CRISP, ABAKO, pp. 243-44. 26 Letter from Cléophas Kamitatu and Conrad Kipoy to Central Committee, PSA, Kikwit, August 7, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 80. 27 Ibid.

28 Kamitatu, tape. 29 Ibid. Italics added.

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PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY out, the danger of the ABAKO “putting us in their pockets’*® was not likely.

Consequently, in mid-August 1959 the PSA worked out its own federal plan for the Congo. This document stated that federalism was the only formula for resolving the problems arising from the linguistic and cultural diversities in the Congo. “The Parti Solidaire Africain intends to organize the Congo into a Federation of States, freely entered into, and based on the present provinces. . . . It is understood that federation in no way excludes the unity of the country.”**

In other words, the ABAKO plan had been altered in two important

respects. The existing administrative boundaries were to be maintained, and the proposed federated states would encompass the entire Congo. This divergence from the ABAKO position was specifically emphasized in the covering letter which accompanied the PSA plan when it was sent to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and RuandaUrundi on August 28, 1959. “It must also be emphasized again, that it is in no way our intention to separate the Republic of Occidental Congo [i.e., Leopoldville Province] from the other Republics of the Congo. . . . On the contrary, the unitary Federal State of the Congo would have control [tout en main] over the development of the economic and social policy of the country.” On the other hand, the PSA was making a major concession to the ABAKO by accepting federalism and reversing its previous centralist position.

Whereas no documentary evidence exists regarding either the exact details or the precise date of the formal creation of the ABAKO-PSA Cartel, it is clear that the PSA Federal Plan expressed the compromise upon which this close alliance was formed. According to Kamitatu, who was in Leopoldville at the time, “it was around the 19th-20th of

August that we decided to create the Cartel.”°? This information would lead one to conclude that the presentation of the PSA Federal Plan was made with the agreement of the ABAKO. In any case, on September 27, 1959 a joint ABAKO-PSA letter to the Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi in effect repeated the PSA 80 [bid.

81 “The Federal Plan of the Congo. Resolved by the PSA,” CRISP, PSA, p. 90. 82 Letter from Antoine Gizenga and Pierre Mulele to Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Leopoldville, August 28, 1959, ibid., p. 89. 33 Kamitatu, tape.

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position with regard to a Congo-wide federation in the name of both parties.*4

In this connection it is interesting to note how little attention was being paid to the PSA by even the most informed Belgian circles at that time. Commenting on the above-mentioned letter to the Minister, the

Agence Belga stated: “Political circles in Leopoldville observe that for the first time the ABAKO accepts provincial autonomy based on the present boundaries of the provinces; this implies Congolese unity within a federal framework.”*° | Despite the fact that the PSA Federal Plan had been submitted to the Minister over a month earlier, the PSA was not even brought into the picture and only passing reference was made of the fact that three PSA leaders had also signed the letter. The myth that the PSA was no more than a satellite organization of the ABAKO continued unabated. FAILURE TO MAINTAIN KWANGO-KWILU UNITY: THE PROBLEM WITH THE BAYAKA

One of the consequences of the split in the Federation KwangoKwiloise had been that the founders of the PSA included virtually no Bayaka. This was a very serious handicap if the initial goal of representing the Kwango and Kwilu districts was to be achieved. The Bayaka, as has been previously noted, occupied the largest area of any ethnic group in the two districts, they had emigrated to Leopoldville in larger numbers than any other group, and their overall population was probably greater than that of any other group in the region.*°

The PSA made repeated attempts to realize the goal of KwangoKwilu unity. The first concrete manifestation of this was the appointment of Pierre Masikita, a prominent Bayake member of the elite, as National Vice-President a month after the founding committee had been established: “This nomination tended to make the Bayaka enter the party in a bloc, but the fact that all the other posts of the PSA Com34 TLetter from A. Kingotolo, J. Kasavubu, D. Kanza (for ABAKO) and P. Mulele, A. Gizenga, G. Yumbu (for PSA) to Minister for the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Leopoldville, September 27, 1959, CRISP, ABAKO, pp. 249-51. 85 Agence Belga, Bulletin hebdomadaire interafricain “Belga,” Leopoldville, October 3, 1959, No. 58, p. 58. 86 The Bayaka also had very ancient ties to the Lunda, the dominant ethnic group in southern Katanga. Although this was never explicitly noted, if they had formed part of the PSA the party’s goal of a national extension might have been helped as a result of these ties.

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mittee remained, after all, in the hands of Kwiluese did not result in inspiring the Kwangolese with confidence.’’>"

During the period of negotiations with the ABAKO, the PSA tried again to achieve Kwango-Kwilu unity by entering into contact with the Kiamfu of Kasongo Lunda, the paramount chief of the Bayaka and one of the most powerful traditional chiefs in the entire Congo. Although these negotiations did not bring about the disired results,

they are interesting in that they reveal the attitude adopted by the PSA leaders—not unrepresentative of the modern political elite— vis-a-vis a powerful traditional leader and also show the manner in which an unschooled traditional leader dealt with them.

The first question was how the PSA leaders should approach the Kiamfu—as his subjects, as his equals, or as his superiors. Here, as in the negotiations with the ABAKO, the Kikwit Committee again revealed itself to be more pragmatic than the Executive Committee in Leopoldville. Katshunga, reporting to Kamitatu, reveals that the Central Committee “. . . reproaches us with considering ourselves inferior to the Kiamfu . . . when, as a political party, we are superior to the Kiamfu; consequently . . . we must not address ourselves to the Kiamfu as his subjects. . . .”°8 The result was that the PSA leaders pre-

sented themselves to the Kiamfu as “delegates from the Kwiluese population.’’®

Since most of the Bayaka live in the Kwango and not the Kwilu one must assume that the delegates presented themselves as representatives of the Kwango population and that the reference to “Kwiluese” is a—somewhat revealing—slip. In any case, the Kiamfu was probably

not overjoyed at self-appointed elite leaders from Leopoldville and Kikwit with hardly anyone to back them up (this occurred in mid-July, one and a half months after the start of the PSA organization in Kik-

wit) presenting themselves as the “population’s” delegates. Yet he gave the PSA leaders a warm reception and left them with the impression that he was on the whole in agreement with them. He particularly

ingratiated himself with the PSA leaders by a long recitation of his complaints against the Belgian government. His majesty, he is reported

by Katshunga to have said, had always been slighted; his people had been exploited without remuneration at the time when the railroads were being built, during World War II large numbers of Bayaka had 87 Commissariat General of Information, Bureau of Documentation, Note on the Parti Solidaire Africain, Document No. 75, (Leopoldville, June 11, 1960), p. 1. 88 CRISP, PSA, p. 87. 89 Ibid.

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been sent to Katanga, and finally he had never been consulted about anything.

Since the Kiamfu was about to embark upon a journey to Belgium, the PSA leaders were particularly worried that he would be persuaded to “sign papers” while away from the Congo. But the Kiamfu reas-

sured them on that point. “Control over this land used to be mine, the Kiamfu added, it must return to me, because we have had enough of being cheated by the Belgians. If they give me papers to sign I shall bring them to you to examine whether they should be signed or not and to consult the population which established me as their chief even before the Belgians arrived. Don’t worry, they have invited me for the trip and not for anything else.’’*°

Indeed, the Kiamfu was so obliging that he offered to accompany the PSA leaders to the Governor so that they could present their demands

in the Kiamfu’s presence. However, Kasavubu, with whom the PSA leaders were also negotiating and to whom this offer was reported, felt that it would be preferable to give the Kiamfu a statement which he could make upon his arrival in Brussels. These apparently innocent suggestions can of course be interpreted as attempts by both the Kiamfu and the PSA leaders to gain a dominant position. For if the Kiamfu had been present when the PSA leaders made their demands known to the Belgian administration they would have appeared to be under his patronage. And if the Kiamfu read a declaration written by the ABAKO or PSA leaders this fact would certainly have been known to the Congolese public.

Whereas the PSA leaders were satisfied with their two meetings with the Kiamfu, they knew that only time would tell how much they had influenced him. “One cannot tell whether he is playing a policy of hide and seek. At any rate, all precautions have been taken.’’**

Indeed, there were two factors which weighed heavily against a close

relation between the PSA and the Kiamfu—and therefore probably the Bayaka. First, the Kiamfu did not depend only on the PSA leaders for elite advice. Second, apart from a certain competitiveness which had developed between the Kwilu and the Bayaka-dominated Kwango, the antagonism between the Bakongo and the Bayaka was rapidly reaching an intense stage. The reasons for this were many. The Bakongo and the Bayaka had been enemies as far back as the sixteenth century.*? The 40 [bid. (Again as reported by Katshunga.) 41 [bid.

42 See S. J. Plancquaert, Les Jaga et les Bayaka du Kwango (Brussels: Institut Royal Colonial Belge, 1932).

116

PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY Bayaka had been one of the latest immigrant groups in the city of Leopoldville, held a relatively low place on the economic and social ladder, and tended to be looked down upon by the Bakongo. The two ethnic groups were also geographically contiguous and there were conflicts

between them in the Kimvula region, almost directly south of Leopoldville. Thus, it was unlikely that the Bakongo and the Bayaka would

end up in the same political camp. For the PSA this meant that the closer the party came to an alliance with the ABAKO, the more difficult it would be to come to terms with the Bayaka. “In spite of the vain attempts at integrating the Kwangolese, and especially the Ba-

yaka, into the PSA, the leaders of this party turned toward the ABAKO. This attitude immediately provoked the departure of the Bayaka intellectuals who were still members of the PSA: MM. Masikita, P., Kavunzu, P., Mbuloki, J.’’*

The author of the document adds two additional reasons for this development: first, the problem of federalism which he claims the Bayaka “people” opposed, and second, their aversion to supporting Bakongo leaders against their own interests for a second time—the first

time having been the support they gave to the Bakongo during the 1957 communal elections in Leopoldville. While the Bayaka certainly would have opposed the ABAKO “Republic of the Central Kongo” there is no inherent reason why they could not have accepted the PSA “Federal Plan.” After all, the centralist position of the PSA had been

far more firmly established than that of the Bayaka “people” and yet, as has been shown, it was rapidly altered. However, the second point which again emphasizes the mark left on Congolese politics by the 1957 city elections is certainly an important one which undoubtedly had a great deal to do with the growing ethnic militancy of the Bayaka.

For the PSA, the failure to integrate the Bayaka continued to be a serious problem. First, precisely because the party was ethnically heterogeneous the very existence of one ethnic “nationalism” presented an example which, if followed by others, could destroy the organization. Second, the entire future of the PSA in the Kwango district was in the last analysis compromised by the failure to gain the support of

the Bayaka. More marginal groups such as the Suku, Tshokwe, and Lunda, even if they were inducted into the PSA, could not offset the massiveness of the Bayaka position in the district and the importance of its capital, Kenge, which was within Bayaka territory. Third, as 43 Commissariat General of Information, Document No. 75, p. 1.

117

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN Bayaka political consciousness gained ground, pressure began to build up against PSA supporters in most areas of the Kwango district. This was particularly true after the Bayaka party, LUKA, was founded in

the fall of 1959. Nonetheless, attempts at some sort of rapprochement continued to be made by the PSA. In September the Popokabaka Territorial Section of the PSA (in the Kwango district) wrote a long letter to Pierre Masikita, the former PSA National Vice President who was soon to become an important LUKA leader, commenting on the dangers of a proliferation of ethnic associations and appealing for regional unity especially among the elite.** Yet these attempts met with failure and, as will be noted below, an increasingly sharp divergence on policy matters widened the gap between the PSA and the vast majority of the Bayaka.

Hard-Line Nationalism: September to December 1959 With the consummation of the ABAKO-PSA Cartel and the general deterioration of relations with the administration and the Belgian gov-

ernment after the June 24 Van Hemelrijck speech, the leaders developed a two-fold strategy. First, continuing attempts were made to persuade the Belgian government to enter into direct negotiations with the leaders of Congolese political parties prior to any further elaborations of future constitutional changes. Second, a secret contingency plan was elaborated which involved the establishment of a government-in-exile and the beginning of a violent, revolutionary phase in the independence struggle. As part of the latter project—which was to be put into operation only if all possibilities at legitimate dialogue

failed—different leaders were sent abroad. The PSA also made up a list of volunteers who would be willing to leave the country in order to work for the government-in-exile.*®

The Cartel’s position vis-a-vis Belgium was outlined in a letter addressed to the new Minister for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Auguste de Schrijver, dated September 27, 1959. It was signed by three top leaders from both parties. (It should be noted that several leaders were already, at this time, residing outside the Congo. For instance, Leon Kashama and Wenceslas Kuyitila, both PSA leaders, had reached Conakry.) The Cartel laid down the conditions which it found to be in44 Letter from Henri E. D. Ilenda and Alphonse Pashi to Pierre Masikita, Popokabaka, September 15, 1959, CRISP, PSA, pp. 151-53. 45 Interview with Louis Mandala, Secretary, PSA National Political Bureau, September 1962.

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PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY dispensable for a “dialogue and the realization of true independence.’’*®

The first and most essential condition is to recognize that the Congo-

lese people does not only have the right to receive a charter, but has the right to choose between different possibilities on which it must be permitted to vote. ...

The second point, equally as important in order to re-establish con-

fidence [between the Congolese and Belgians] is to form a provisional government in each province employing the interlocutors who are accepted by the population. The provisional governments will prepare the final statutes within a federal framework and will settle [régleront] future relations between the Congo and Belgium.*’ The Cartel also declared the electoral system laid down for the Decem-

ber 1959 elections to be “anti-democratic,” and stated the provocative but probably correct opinion that all the reform measures taken by the administration were received by the population with mistrust.

The reasons for the opposition to the proposed December 1959 election system have already been briefly discussed and will be dealt with in further detail below. At any rate, the parties had declared earlier in a telegram to the Minister dated September 12: “. . . No voting [in] Leopoldville [city] or in the territories before negotiations with Brus-

sels.”*® Furthermore, both parties had also declared: “. . . our populations absolutely insist on independence after a predetermined delay: in January 1960.”*° But overriding these specific considerations was the deeply felt desire among the Cartel leaders, and indeed among most of the Congolese elite, that plans made in Brussels or exclusively by Belgians no matter how progressive or reactionary were simply no longer acceptable: “We demand that the Belgian Government cease to act in the manner it has never abandoned, unilaterally, always placing

before us a fait accompli without permitting us to give the least opinion.’’°°

Of course, the most important effect of the September 27 letter at the time was the already mentioned public acceptance by the ABAKO of a nationwide federalism as against the essentially separatist “fed46 CRISP, Congo 1959, pp. 215-17. 47 Tbid.

48 CRISP, PSA, p. 100. 49 Tbid. “Letter of the Cartel to the Minister” (early September 1959). 50 CRISP, Congo 1959, pp. 215-17.

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eralism” which it had espoused earlier as part of the plan for a “Republic of the Central Kongo.” But the Cartel was not especially successful in attracting other political parties to its proposals. It did, later,

add the MNC (Kalonji), the Parti du Peuple and the Alliance des Bayanzi (ABAZI)* to the Cartel, but both the moderate parties (ie., generally viewed as pro-Belgian and soon to be congregated in the PNP) and the militant centralist parties pursued their own policies. Neither the ABAKO nor the PSA was represented at the Stanleyville Congress in October 1959,*? despite an invitation extended to Kasavubu by Lumumba.

At the same time the Cartel actively pursued its contingency plan of proclaiming a provisional government-in-exile on January 1, 1960. Had this government in fact been formed it would in concrete terms have represented a little less than the original terrain covered by the ABAKO plan for the “Republic of the Central Kongo” with the important difference that the PSA would now have shared in the leadership and was increasingly in a position to produce rural support for such a move in the Kwango-Kwilu area. The MNC (Kalonji) and the other later members of the Cartel were not involved in the contingency

plan. Thus the ABAKO-PSA leadership sought to establish a broad militant federalist bloc for the eventuality that negotiations with Belgium would become a reality and would lead to a constitutional path to independence. But if this policy failed, the two parties in a more restrained and intimate alliance would pursue the more radical contingency plan.

The Cartel letter of September 27 found its answer—disappointing as it was—in the comprehensive plan outlined by de Schrijver on October 16, 1959. It was here that details were given for the steps which were to lead to independence during an evolutionary period of indeterminate length. The December elections would take place under a system of universal suffrage. 51 The ABAZI, representing the Bayanzi in the Kwilu, was an ethnic breakaway from the PSA which will be discussed below. 52 It will be recalled that the congress was called by Lumumba and was divided into two parts; the first being a party meeting of the MNC (Lumumba)—the first since the split in the original MNC—the second being an inter-party congress of

militant parties meant as a follow-up to the Luluabourg congress of April 1959. In fact only leaders from some militant centralist parties appear to have attended, and as a result of the Stanleyville riot and the imprisonment of Lumumba no concrete action resulted.

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As a result of these elections, the basic institutions, territories and communes, will be in the hands of the Congolese. ...

Immediately thereafter a second stage will commence: The constitution of provincial institutions. ... ... the composition of provincial councils will be as follows: —6/10 of the members will be elected in the second degree —3/10 of the members will be coopted —1/10 of the members will be nominated.... A third stage involves .. . the creation . . . in 1960 of two Legislative Assemblies and an Executive, that is to say a General Government

for the whole Congo.... ,

Before the end of the first legislature which may last for a maximum

of four years, the Legislative Assemblies will have to elaborate a draft constitution which will be submitted for the approbation of the population. It is at this moment that Belgium and the Congo, each country acting in full independence through its legislative and executive organs, will have to decide on the common institutions which they want.

Without prejudicing the future, the Belgian Government thinks that the interests of the two nations will be best served through a mutual Community. .. .5°

Obviously, these conditions did not satisfy the Cartel. The plan had been elaborated without the participation of Congolese leaders and/or

elite. There was no clear date fixed for independence; instead, at a time when the Cartel was calling for almost immediate independence the declaration vaguely put it off for almost four years. The electoral system was in every way to the disadvantage of the Cartel. De Schrijver did insist that he wanted to conduct an amplified “dialogue” with the political parties, but the Cartel and the militant centralist parties did not want to merely present their opinions any longer; they wanted to negotiate over their own future.

From October to December Belgian policy centered on attempting to persuade the Cartel to participate in the first stage of the plan, that is to say, the December 1959 elections. However, the possibility of massive abstentions was recognized within the councils of the Belgian

government as early as October 7: “If... the elections .. . are sys53 CRISP, Congo 1959, pp. 192-97.

12]

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN tematically sabotaged, the administration of the territory or commune will be assured in accordance with instructions of the Governor General in the interest of the inhabitants.”>* A reading of the letters of André Ryckmans, who, it will be recalled, was posted in the Bakongo area in 1959, reveals the utter absurdity of this pious decision. One statement in particular, written in November 1959, gives a sense of the situation facing the local Belgian “ruler.” “It is dishonest . . . to promise the Bakongo who would like to oppose themselves to the ABAKO the protection of their persons, of their families, of their property. It is dishonest because it is impossible. And the Bakongo of Leo [Leopoldville city] and of the interior know it well.”*°

The administration had in fact ceased to administer even as the decisions in Brussels were being made. This is the cardinal fact which has to be kept in view.

Another factor entered into the situation. During the parliamentary debate held on the Congo in early November, de Schrijver attempted to gain the support of the Belgian Socialist Party for his plans. He announced a “general colloquy” for November 20 to 30 in Leopoldville to which all Congolese political parties would be invited. Belgium was to be represented not only by the Minister himself but also by interparty parliamentary observers. However, the Parti Socialiste Belge

rejected this proposal and suggested instead a “round table” to be held in Brussels with the participation of parliamentary leaders from all parties.°* In effect the PSB went much further toward meeting the Cartel’s demands than did the government which, it insisted, no longer had the confidence of the Congolese. In that it was most emphatically correct. The failure to rally either the PSB or the Cartel to the pro-

posed colloquy made it rather pointless, and de Schrijver reduced the plan to one which would involve only informal discussions with

Congolese parties. ,

The Cartel, as part of its contingency plan, now attempted to inter-

nationalize the entire problem of the Congo’s acquisition of independence. The first move in this direction was a letter addressed to the Consuls of the powers who had signed the Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye.

A meeting of the powers which signed the Convention of St. Germain en Laye should take place at the very earliest moment, so that 54 [bid., p. 190. 55 Kestergat, op.cit., p. 319. 56 For a full account of the PSB position, see CRISP, Congo 1959, pp. 243-44.

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account may be taken of the political aspirations of the population to establish a real independence and not a trick independence which will permit Belgium to maintain, under different forms, the colonialist regime in the Congo. The present demand also bases itself on the San Francisco convention of June 26, 1947 and especially on article 73.57

At this stage, yet another new factor made its appearance. This was

the creation of the PNP (Parti National du Progrés) at the Coquilhatville Congress between November 11 and 14. This party was an amorphous collection of “moderate” parties. At its inception it was alleged to have received substantial financial backing from Belgian sources, and soon thereafter the administration gave it virtually overt support. This does not mean that some of the parties which became associated with the PNP were entirely without true support among certain segments of the Congolese population. In some areas, for in-

| stance, there were ethnic parties which supported the PNP because of local ethnic antagonisms. This was the case with the LUKA. A not entirely negligible factor was the emphasis which the PNP laid on the rights of traditional chiefs. In some of the areas where chiefs still had a considerable amount of prestige and authority, as in the case of the

Kiamfu of Kasongo Lunda—the “patron” of the LUKA—this became a strong point of attraction.*® The PNP sought to exploit the decision taken by the Cartel and the MNC (Lumumba) to boycott the December elections.°® It naturally decided to participate, and refused to involve itself in a round table prior to the elections.®°

It is not unreasonable to assume that this development was in part responsible for de Schrijver’s dropping the whole idea of the colloquy 57 Agence Belga, op.cit., No. 67, December 8, 1959, p. 52. The PSA had written to the Secretary General of the United Nations as early as mid-July complaining

about the attitude of the Belgian administration in applying the Government Declaration of January 13, 1959. The complaint was based on Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. CRISP, PSA, pp. 96-97. 58 Louis Mandala has made the following observation about the PNP: “The people supported their leaders .. . who made alliances with other parties, and the followers did not understand the significance of these accords. But nowhere was there a mass of people who supported a party called the PNP. The proof is that during the elections the Bayaka did not vote for the PNP but rather for the LUKA, and it was the LUKA which was included in the list of the PNP.” Interview with Louis Mandala, op.cit. 59 It will be recalled that the PSA and ABAKO made this decision on July 31, 1959 in the first of their joint letters addressed to the Belgian authorities. 60 CRISP, Congo 1959, p. 242.

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in Leopoldville, scheduled for November 20 to 30. As noted before, neither the PSB nor the Cartel agreed to this meeting, and now those Congolese who were “sympathetic” to his overall plan opposed a negotiation with what they termed a “sterile opposition” (i.e., the Cartel) prior to election of representatives who would be able to participate “validly” in such a round table. With the creation of the PNP, the breach between de Schrijver and the Cartel naturally became wider. It was now more difficult than ever

for the Cartel to accept participation in the elections. Indeed, it is worthwhile analyzing in some detail what was involved for the Cartel.

As has been noted earlier, the elections were to be conducted exclusively for local (commune or territorial) councils. Since the political parties had not yet succeeded in extending their organizations into the majority of the rural areas of the Congo, they started off with

an initial disadvantage. Those who, in their opinion, “sold out” to Belgium could emerge as the main spokesmen for the Congo, representing vast rural areas that had not yet been politicized. They feared,

not without cause, that the administration would be partial to the PNP.

The Cartel found the proposed electoral system undemocratic because only two-thirds of the council members would be elected by universal male suffrage. The rest were to be appointed by the Belgian

administration from among “traditional elders and local interest gsroups.”®? This was important since, according to the Belgian plan,

these territorial councils were to elect (in the second degree) sixtenths of the provincial councils and, although this was not firmly laid down, could be employed as electoral colleges which would elect the

first chamber of the projected National Legislative Assembly. The provincial councils would definitely elect the majority of the second chamber. In other words the whole future of the Congo was going to be very greatly influenced by the territorial councils with their built-in conservative and pro-administration biases.

The main purpose of establishing these territorial councils was not, however, to employ them as electoral colleges even though this became an increasingly important function as the independence struggle emerged as the dominant political issue in the Congo. The main purpose of the councils was to establish some sort of local self-government. In view of the aforementioned decline in administration authority in 61 [bid., p. 243. 62 Young, op.cit., p. 170.

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PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY the villages of Leopoldville Province, local government in the hands of Congolese might have had an important impact. Yet even here the reforms which had brought about the territorial councils were in fact very timid. The main function of the councils was to give advice on matters pertaining to local government. According to a pamphlet published by

the Information Service in Leopoldville in September 1959, the following were to be the areas where the councils would have a determining voice: “peddling, traffic, forest fires, hygiene, commercial centers, markets.’®? In addition the councils would have “the right to vote certain taxes.” Since the territorial administrator—always a Belgian—was responsible to his superiors in the administration,® it is clear that advice would

in all likelihood only be taken when it coincided with the opinion of the authorities. Certainly, this form of local self-government did not respond to the needs of the situation in most villages of Leopoldville Province—even had this consideration weighed heavily with the Cartel leaders.

In sum, the situation had progressed too far for the government to be able to create representative institutions from the base up which would end by evolving “representative” Congolese negotiators. From the Cartel’s point of view, there was no question that it represented the aspirations of the people it had awakened and politicized, and in the other areas the job remained to be done. But under no circumstances did the Cartel want to be swamped by local, rural leaders who were viewed as loyal to Belgium.

The Minister, on the other hand, while having to recognize that a Cartel abstention would be successful in large and important areas of the Congo, could, after the formation of the PNP, console himself with the idea that moderate Congolese spokesmen would emerge in the other parts of the Congo. In making these moderate leaders negotiators at the Round Table Conference (now projected for January 1960, immediately after the election), the Cartel appeared to have been outmaneuvered.

The Cartel, now including the MNC (Kalonji), kept up the pressure for its main goals: A Round Table Conference prior to the December

elections, and the formation of a Congolese federal government in January 1960. In order to achieve these goals it left itself open to negotiations over the December elections, but it “reserved itself the right 63 Commissariat General of Information, “Pages Congolaises,” No. 91 (Leopoldville, September 29, 1959). 64 Young, op.cit., p. 170.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN to reject plans imposed by Belgium.”®> The Cartel aligned itself with the position taken by the PSB regarding a Round Table Conference in Brussels prior to the December elections. But the PSB never took a

position concerning the formation of a “Congolese federal government” by January 1960.

Unfortunately the story of the Cartel’s plan to establish—unilater-

ally if need be—a government by January 1960 is sparsely documented. In fact, it is difficult to distinguish the original ABAKO plan for a “Republic of the Central Kongo,” the revised Congo-wide federalist proposals which followed the alliance of the ABAKO with the PSA, and the joint contingency plan of these two parties in the event

that negotiations failed. January 1960 was first mentioned in June 1959 as the date when the “Central Kongo” would become an “autonomous state.”®* When Van Hemelrijck flatly rejected the ABAKO proposal, the party declared that it would go ahead and “prepare the establishment of this plan within a federated Congo.” It was further stated that this would “in no way exclude the hoped-for unity.’*’ This vague reference to “hoped-for unity” became by August a clear-cut

commitment to a single Congo nation with a federal structure as a result of the influence of the PSA. The expansion of the Cartel largely

eliminated the stigma of “Bakongo separatism” from the federalist thesis, and made of the Cartel the rallying point of other militant nationalists who had adopted federalism as part of their policy.

Yet the ABAKO and the PSA had a somewhat vague contingency plan for the eventuality that all their pressure did not bend the Belgian government. According to PSA sources the two parties had intended to hold a congress in October 1959 to lay down specific plans for the

establishment of a provisional government-in-exile, but it was not held because of Kasavubu’s cautiousness. He thought the danger of arrest was too great and time too short. Thus, it would appear that the only action taken in this direction was sending leaders abroad. The existence of a radical faction among ABAKO and PSA leaders is

attested by an article published in Congo, the magazine edited by Philippe Kanza, indicating the existence within the Cartel of leaders who supported the establishment of a “provisional government” in October or November. As claimed in this article, Kasavubu opposed this tendency because he felt that “. . . the military regime or the re65 “Memorandum of the Cartel ABAKO-PSA-MNC,” November 22, 1959, CRISP, Congo 1959, pp. 245-48. 66 CRISP, ABAKO, p. 230. 67 Tbid., p. 235.

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gime of force will have no other consequence than the loss of human lives. Our wish was not to have our people killed, but to save them.”® All the other leaders accepted this view. But the question must be asked whether the Cartel here referred exclusively to the ABAKO and PSA

or also to the other member parties. If, as has been indicated, the contingency plan involved only the former, then a further question is: In whose name would the provisional government have been estab-

lished, Leopoldville Province or the whole Congo? Up to now no answers to these questions have been forthcoming but it is the writer’s view that the plans had not progressed sufficiently for this to be de-

cided. As the above-cited views of Kasavubu indicate, the leaders were aware that pursuing their contingency plan would lead to a violent situation with repressions. Such plans, therefore, called for total secrecy and the new members of the Cartel were probably not yet suf-

ficiently trusted to be told of its existence. It must be remembered that the new members joined the Cartel in the fall of 1959 at precisely the moment when these ideas were being discussed.

Kasavubu’s prudence about declaring a provisional government in October or November did not mean that the plan had been dropped. On the contrary, both the ABAKO and the PSA sent delegations to Brazzaville and to West Africa in order to acquaint African leaders with the position of the Cartel and to sound them out about the possibilities of forming a provisional government-in-exile. In November three PSA leaders, Kamitatu, Kinkie and Mulele, went to Brazzaville and later to Pointe Noire. They were very well received by the Congo (Brazzaville) authorities. Later on, both Kimvay and Yumbu were in virtual permanent residence in Brazzaville. Kinkie went to West Africa, mostly to Guinea, with Kingotolo of the ABAKO. Mulele went as far as Egypt. In other words, the door was left open throughout the fall of 1959 for the establishment of a provisional government even though the more moderate elements of the Cartel, led by Kasavubu, repeatedly sought to avoid this alternative, fearing that it would end in considerable bloodshed. There can be little doubt that Abbé Foulbert Youlou,

Premier of the Congo Republic (Brazzaville), was not only fully aware of these plans but also gave them considerable support.

As the date of the December elections and January 1, 1960 drew closer, the need to resolve Cartel policy in this regard naturally became

more urgent. Yet at the same time, there was less room for compromise, since the very preparations necessary for the establishment of 68 Congo, March 19, 1960, p. 9.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN the government-in-exile encouraged a radicalism and an intransigence which made it all the more difficult to come to an agreement with de Schrijver. The Cartel’s almost desperate appeals for a last-minute reversal of Belgian plans must be seen in the light of this dilemma.

De Schrijver did decide to make a real attempt to avoid the Cartel’s abstention plans by coming to Leopoldville on November 22. Cartel intransigence had, however, reached such a point that it took consid-

erable persuasion to bring its leaders around to holding a meeting with de Schrijver.*® Nevertheless, it was thought that a series of Belgian concessions had brought the Cartel around to a position where it would be willing to participate in the December elections but that the leaders needed a “face saver” in order to be able politically to order their followers to vote. The “face saver” to which de Schrijver agreed was a meeting in Brussels between the Cartel leaders and the repre-

sentatives of the Belgian government. He appears to have assumed that the Cartel’s leadership was far more monolithic than it was, and that the trip to Brussels would be little more than a formality. “In fact, it was the general impression that for these leaders the whole matter

was a question of saving face and the press almost unanimously emphasized that the fat was in the fire [les jeux étaient faits], that is to say that the trip was merely for show, the purpose of which was to give the contentious party leaders the opportunity to obtain a sort of preliminary dialogue before the elections, which would condition their participation.””°

For the Cartel, much more was involved. There is good reason to believe that it had come to a firm decision regarding both its minimal demands from Belgium and alternatives to a negotiated compromise. The more radical members were clearly afraid that a mere meeting with de Schrijver would in itself constitute a compromise which they were unwilling to make. It was for this reason that it had been so difficult to arrange a meeting between the Cartel and de Schrijver in the first place. When the Cartel delegation left for Brussels on December 2, the pressure to maintain a hard position was already publicly apparent. Notre Kongo, the ABAKO paper, stated:

Depart, dear ambassadors. Depart, but with the sole aim of satisfying the aspirations of the people which has delegated you. No symbolic round table or a pro forma courtesy meeting, but an authentic 69 See Notre Kongo, December 6, 1959, p. 7. 70 Agence Belga, op.cit., No. 67, December 8, 1959, p. 52.

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PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY round table with the representatives of all Belgian parties. The Mukongo people will not allow itself to be guided by those who believe that their actions [manigances] will not be discovered, and it maintains its position until victory is achieved. No compromise solution; no voting which does not base itself on an application of the clauses

of the [Cartel] memorandum and on the plan for the Republic of the Central Kongo.”

Furthermore, Daniel Kanza, the ABAKO Vice-President, and generally recognized as one of the radical leaders, was reported to have stated to an American journalist that Kasavubu “had to stick strictly to the attitude he had always maintained under pain of seeing his popularity collapse as well as some [other] ‘unpleasantnesses.’ ””?

Thus when the Cartel leaders came to Brussels on December 3, an immediate impasse developed. Not only was there no parliamentary delegation waiting for them, but de Schrijver himself was still in the Congo. On top of that, the administration in the Congo had set December 4, in other words, one day after their arrival, as the last date on which lists could be presented for the December territorial council elections. Yet Belgian authorities were surprised by the intransigent position the Cartel took. Again, the consolation they found was in the PNP, which increasingly became the great hope of Belgian policy.

It is important to note that the Belgian leaders seem to have been unaware of the extent to which the Cartel had made preparations for a government-in-exile. Yet one of the reasons why all Cartel factions wanted to go to Brussels appears to have been the ease with which they would be able to travel anywhere from that city.

The Brussels meeting was an abysmal failure. The last hour—and the deadline was literally moved forward hour by hour—for the depo-

sition of lists passed and it became clear that the Cartel would not vote. The Cartel delegation did not return to the Congo until December 15, and either immediately before this date or upon their arrival in Leopoldville the contingency plan was again under consideration. “In the month of December, after the Brussels conversations, a second attempt at a provisional government saw the light of day among some impatient members as a result of the lack of sincerity shown by the Belgian Government. . . . Once again, M. Kasavubu was formally opposed to this attempt.’’? 71 Notre Kongo, December 6, 1959. 72 Agence Belga, op.cit., No. 67, December 8, 1959, p. 52. 73 Congo, March 19, 1960, p. 9.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN It is also noteworthy that a PSA memorandum dated December 20 took a very strong line in opposing further discussions with Belgium: The Congolese people must convince itself of this fact:

INDEPENDENCE IS NOT GIVEN, IT IS CONQUERED.”

Furthermore, Gizenga had not returned to the Congo but instead had left Belgium for eastern Europe as the Cartel’s representative. Also with him was Edmond Nzeza Nlandu, founder of the ABAKO, who, however, had a change of heart in Berlin and returned to the Congo.

All this leads one to conclude that the Cartel passed through a real crisis at this time. A number of important Cartel leaders wanted to go ahead with the contingency plan for a provisional government-inexile. Yet no formal attempt to establish such a government occurred.

One important reason for this appears to have been the attitude of Abbé Foulbert Youlou, who now advised further negotiations with Belgium. Since Brazzaville would have been the logical site for the proclamation of a provisional government, his voice may well have been determining. Unfortunately, these developments cannot be substantiated by documentary evidence, although the writer was told of the circumstances by several reliable informants. A question remains whether Abbé Youlou opposed the proclamation because Kasavubu wished him to or whether he opposed it for reasons of his own. According to some informants, Abbé Youlou had initially encouraged the proposed plan for a government-in-exile. At any rate, as a result of the combined influence of Kasavubu and Youlou those leaders in the Cartel who wanted to go ahead after the failure of the Brussels meetings were persuaded to postpone or abandon such a move.

It has been stated above that de Schrijver had hoped to bring the Cartel around to voting in the December elections as a result of several Belgian concessions. He not only made concessions during the negotiations but also after they had broken down. First, he agreed that all the members of the territorial councils in Leopoldville Province would be elected entirely by universal suffrage, thus reversing the initial decision which allowed the administration to appoint onethird of the members. Second, and most important, de Schrijver stated in a speech to the chamber on December 15 that Belgium “will prove definitively to the Congolese people that in 1960 independence will 74“Qpinions and views of the PSA on the projected congress of nationalistfederalist parties at Kisantu (excerpts),” December 20, 1959, CRISP, Congo 1959, pp. 260-61.

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be an accomplished fact.”’> Third, he said that representatives to the post-election Round Table would include the “spokesmen of parties recognized as important,”’® thus opening the door to Cartel participation even if it boycotted the elections. Fourth, he agreed to coupling of the elections for provincial councils and the two national assemblies.

These were obviously very basic changes in Belgian policy. In par-

ticular, the willingness to allow the Cartel leaders to represent their parties at the forthcoming Round Table Conference constituted a direct concession to them. The main principle upon which Belgian policy had been based was that the elections would produce the legitimate Congolese interlocutors, and the Cartel leaders had always answered that they were the legitimate interlocutors and no election was necessary to prove that. On this point, as on others, de Schrijver in effect

bowed to the Cartel’s position despite the fact that the leaders had ordered its followers to boycott the election—which incidentally was punishable according to the law."’ But de Schrijver’s concessions did not really answer the Cartel’s basic demands. One of the clearest definitions of its position during the December crisis was made by Kasavubu on December 8, 1959. Although this was prior to de Schrijver’s December 15 statement in Parliament, it was as valid afterwards as before.

We want the Round Table, immediately, instead of these elections which signify nothing, which are a dupery. And also immediately, independence with a provisional government in each province and a federal government according to the Swiss system. Then, under the protection of these governments which will really be the emanation of the people, free elections for a Congolese constituent as-

sembly, and not a constituent assembly a la sauce belge. ... It is necessary that the Belgian Government realize that at this moment 75 Tbid., pp. 256-58. 76 Ibid.

77 The tense political atmosphere (especially in Leopoldville Province) during the election was exacerbated by the administration. “It is by virtue of an article of the electoral decree which forbids all incitement to abstention . .. that the Parquet [public prosecutor] of Leopoldville has just confiscated, once again, the edition of ‘Kongo Dieto’ the official organ [newspaper] of the ABAKO”; Agence Belga, op.cit., No. 68, December 8-14, 1959, p. 61. This was not atypical of the administration’s methods at the time. Bakongo opinion was affronted by a rather sterile half-measure, but the Cartel leaders, who certainly “incited to abstention,” were not touched. Yet in Kasai Province four leaders of the Parti de Défense des Intéréts Lulua (soon to join the Cartel) were imprisoned on this very charge. Ibid.

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the only possible link between Belgium and the Congo is the political leaders who are qualified to speak nationally [i.e., on a national level].7°

Consequently the Cartel maintained a ferociously anti-Belgian policy during these eventful days. In part this was because the psychological atmosphere was such that the Cartel leaders really wanted de Schrijver to go to Canossa—to give them credit for having changed his posi-

tion. This attitude is reflected in the PSA memorandum cited above. Commenting on the Minister’s willingness to couple the provincial and national elections which were to follow the December elections,

the PSA stated: ,

You are not unaware of the Minister’s reticence with regard to this proposition. Better than that, in his declaration of Tuesday, December 15, in Parliament, the Minister did not hesitate to inform public opinion that the proposition to couple the elections was the result of his initiative, and his alone. In this manner he misinformed public opinion. For this proposition was the last resolution [demand] of the Cartel submitted to him before he left Brussels.

... the nationalist parties can expect nothing from the Belgian government.’®

But such subjective reactions, while interesting and important, should not becloud the fact that de Schrijver had neither met the Cartel’s substantive demands nor really negotiated with it, and that his sudden de-

cision to make the “Congo wager” (Le Pari Congolais) created as many problems for the Cartel as it solved. For vis-a-vis the general Congolese electorate it was of paramount importance for the Cartel to be able to demonstrate that it had led the Congolese to independence. Since it did not have a nationwide organization, the frustrating possibility emerged that the leader of every ethnic or political group would reap the benefits of the Cartel’s campaign of civil disobedience, its militancy against Belgian policy, and its organization of grass-roots support. The Cartel would therefore have won independence only to see power fall into the hands of those it considered to have “sold out” to the Belgians.

Nevertheless, it is obvious that any policy on the part of the Cartel which did not in effect accept participation in the Round Table Con78 Interview in the Peuple, December 8, 1959, CRISP, ABAKO, pp. 274-75. 79 CRISP, Congo 1959, p. 261.

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ference scheduled for January 1960 would have been counterproductive, to say the least. There were only two alternatives, to allow other

parties to decide the future of the Congo and return from Brussels with independence as their prize, or to initiate the contingency plan with all the dangers which that entailed at a point in the Congo’s political evolution when independence was only months away. Under

the circumstances it is perhaps surprising that some of the leaders continued to think in terms of a provisional government-in-exile. Two reasons for this can be suggested: first, all these events occurred with unparalleled rapidity so that the Cartel, with its several member parties and factions, had to alter course within a matter of days; second, the masses had been led to expect a proclamation on January 1, and, as will be shown below, it was questionable whether the leaders could allow that day to pass without anything happening.

It was because of this complicated situation that the Cartel on December 19 called a congress to meet at Kisantu (near Leopoldville) on December 24, 1959. In the meantime the election results had been published and it became apparent that the Cartel’s orders to boycott had been generally obeyed in Leopoldville Province. The following table taken from Remarques Congolaises (No. 4; January 25, 1960) gives the relevant results.

Region Voting Remarks Percentage

LEOPOLDVILLE PROVINCE

Cataract District (pop. 500,688)

Kasangulu 22.68 Those voting were mainly Bayaka and. Bateke.

Madimba 0.0 No candidates. Thysville 0.0 No candidates. Songololo 0.0 No candidates.

Luozi 0.0 No candidates.

Bas-Congo District (pop. 397,086)

Boma 2.27 Urban center with immigrant population.

Lukula 0.0 No candidates. Tshela 0.0 No candidates.

Seke-Banza 0.0 No candidates.

Matadi 3.0* Urban center. Excluding Europeans, 58 per cent of whom voted.

* Approximately

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Region Voting Remarks Percentage

Kwango District (pop. 473,821)

Kenge 35.80 The Bayaka and Basuku population is much greater than percentage of those voting; therefore, LUKA orders to vote were not completely effective.

Feshi 6.12 The voters were probably Basuku, those abstaining, Bapende, Basonde, and remaining Basuku.

Kahemba 0.0 No candidates.

Kasongo-Lunda 63.42 Bayaka area where LUKA was most successful.

Popokabaka 52.03 Bayaka area. Kwilu District (pop. 1,157,112)

Kikwit 0.0 No No candidates. candidates. Idiofa 0.0 Gungu 0.0 No candidates. Masi Manimba 0.0 No candidates. Banningville 1.2

Lac Leopold II District (pop. 292,000)

Inongo 44.65 This area never came under Cartel influ-

Mushie 74.62 ence. It was even excluded from the Oshwe 58.01 ABAKO plan for a “Republic of the Kutu 52.04 Central Kongo.” The percentages of Kiri 71.74 those voting are below the average in the rest of the Congo.

LEOPOLDVILLE (CITY)

Commune

Leopoldville 68.46 Europeans.

Unité Mixte 70.03 Europeans and Congolese.

Ndjili Kalamo17.26 33.49 Matete 35.71 Kintambo 37.70

Bandalungwa 37.33 Sst. Jean 25.00 Nlaliema 64.74 Dendale 24.63 Kinshasa 39.98 Ngiri-N giri 30.46 Barumbu 39.08

Zone Annexe 49.83

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Abstentions also took place in other provinces, notably Kasai and Kivu. Furthermore, the MNC (Lumumba), the MNC (Kalonji), and the CEREA were all equivocal about participating in the elections. The MNC (Lumumba) had decided in October 1959 not to participate, but lists were submitted in Stanleyville where the party obtained spectacular victories. The MNC (Kalonji) as a member of the Cartel had decided not to participate unless the demand for a prior Round Table Conference was accepted by de Schrijver. Nonetheless, it submitted lists in anticipation of a positive response from the Minister. Although this was not forthcoming, the lists were not withdrawn, but the party ordered its followers to abstain. They did not follow these

instructions, and the MNC (Kalonji) registered important victories in Luluabourg. The reasons for this peculiar situation can probably be found in the intense inter-ethnic conflict between Baluba and Lulua which existed in this city. In Kivu, there were heavy abstentions in the

Maniéma district. The reasons for this remain to be researched but they have taken on increasing interest since this area became the core area of the 1964 rebellion in the Congo. Possibly the cause was the militancy of local MNC (Lumumba) leaders who did not go back on the October decision to abstain as did the leaders in Stanleyville. In Bukavu, the CEREA decided at the last moment to participate, and this may be the reason the party did not register the victories which other militant parties scored in the urban capitals.*®°

In Leopoldville Province the situation was obviously much more clear-cut and significant. With the exception of the Bayaka, the Cartel had succeeded in organizing what amounted to a total boycott in the four most important districts (Cataract, Bas-Congo, Kwango, and Kwilu) with 90 per cent of the province’s population. Although the leaders were confident that they had the support of the rural masses in these regions, they were by no means certain that they would be able

to prove this point so graphically. Considerable administration pressure had been exerted to make people vote, and the possibility always existed that the administration would falsify the results. In fact, this latter concern weighed heavily on the thinking of the Cartel before the elections and was one of the reasons why they insisted on elections taking place after Belgium had installed a provisional government which could control the administration.

Apart from the overall impact of the political control which the 80 CRISP, Courrier Africain, January 22, 1960, pp. 2-9. Many of these conclusions must be considered as tentative.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN

Cartel had demonstrated in Leopoldville Province, the local importance of the elections must be seen from two angles. First, in the areas where support for the Cartel’s position was unanimous, where no councils were elected, the impact was very small. All that had happened was that the party in question had proved—what every local resident already knew—that it alone had influence over the population. Second, in areas where some of the electorate had voted the impact was considerable, since local government councils representing a minority of the electorate took up their functions. For instance, in Matadi there was one commune in which sixty-eight voters elected nineteen council members. As will be noted from the above table, such situations were relatively rare in the (rural) territories because of the complete discipline which the Cartel had been able to attain in

most areas. However, in Leopoldville the consequences for the ABAKO of the decision to abstain were very serious and far-reaching.

As a result non-Bakongo, often Bayaka, commune mayors were elected and in the subsequent months this had a real impact on the position of the ABAKO in the nation’s capital. Since a detailed study of the ABAKO is forthcoming, the writer will not analyze this problem any further.

For the PSA, the price of having abstained was not very great, largely because no major urban centers were involved. Popokabaka, Kasongo-Lunda, Kenge, and Feshi were territories (all in the Kwango district) where the LUKA became the dominant political party in any case. It might be argued that in some of the regions the PSA could have withstood the LUKA better had it controlled the territorial councils. But in Kasongo-Lunda and Popokabaka the LUKA, in effect, already had a majority in December 1959. This argument therefore can only be made for Feshi and Kenge. In these two territories the conclusion that PSA influence decreased after December is unavoidable, but it is questionable whether any other policy would have been able to overcome the growing Bayaka unity and antagonism to the PSA.

In concluding the discussion of this phase of the PSA’s evolution it

is necessary to point to certain legitimate questions which have not been successfully answered. The first is the source and importance of foreign influence on the PSA and the Cartel in general. The documents —

available to the writer make only passing reference to Abbé Youlou

and no reference to other influences of this nature. Interviewing leaders on this subject was very difficult and did not result in any con136

PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY crete information. Although the PSA had sent some of its most important leaders abroad, no information was available as to the results of the contacts they made during the period under discussion. This research gap must be seen in the light of equally inadequate information about the proposal to establish a provisional government-in-exile. The origin of this idea remains obscure. In retrospect it does not seem to have been very appropriate to the situation in which the Cartel found itself. Yet it reflected the action of African nationalist movements in

other parts of the continent, notably Algeria. Whether the example itself was the inspiration for the Cartel plan or whether actual advice was received by its emissaries abroad, remains an unanswered question. As has been shown, a conflict arose over the proclamation of such a government. A radical wing within the Cartel favored this especially

after the breakdown of the talks in Brussels in December. The position of the PSA within the councils of the Cartel on this important issue also remains very largely unknown. An extract from a single document* suggests that the PSA stood with the more radical wing in the Cartel, but this is obviously not enough to prove the point. Indeed, very little is known about internal Cartel discussions or factions. The above-described developments are not, in the view of the writer,

merely the detailed history of a party. For the Cartel was very largely

responsible for breaking the back of the Belgian presence in the Congo.®? De Schrijver’s “Congo wager” may have included the hope of

ending up with moderates by getting out early, but it is clear that the wager would not have been made in 1959 had the Cartel not placed before the Minister painful, indeed impossible, alternatives. Thus, the key to the precipitous independence gained in June 1960 was the Cartel’s policy in the fall of 1959. Seen in this light these developments have had unparalleled impact not only on the Congo but on the whole world. Of course, the Cartel would not have been able to exert such

an influence had it not gained the support of the rural masses. For this reason, the ultimate key to the Congo’s political evolution must reside in an analysis of the politicization of the rural masses. This subject will be dealt with in detail in later chapters. 81 CRISP, Congo 1959, pp. 260-61. 82 While this is the considered view of the writer, it is implicit in his view that the actions of other Congolese parties remain to be researched and that this conclusion will not be entirely defensible until this additional task is completed and comparative analysis can be based on detailed histories of anti-colonial protest all over the Congo. In addition, the full impact of internal Belgian and international pressures will have to be thoroughly assessed.

| 137

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN The Constitutional Way to Independence: December 1959 to May 1960 THE KISANTU CONGRESS

The Kisantu Congress was one of the high points of the Cartel’s existence. It was marked by a considerable enlargement of affiliated parties: the Parti du Peuple (a member since mid-December), the ABAZI, the Parti de la Défense du Peuple Lulua (from Kasai Province), and the Fédération Générale du Congo (from Katanga Province). Both the BALUBAKAT and the CONAKAT (soon to become clearly dominant in Katanga) sent delegations, but they did not arrive until the last day of the Congress and they subsequently stated that they did not feel themselves bound by the resolutions. According to the invitations to the Congress, it was open to all “nationalist parties which accept a federal structure, the sine qua non of participation.”®? According to one source, an exception was made with regard to the MNC (Lumumba), which, however, did not reply to its invitation.** This invitation is of special interest since it would indicate that “nationalist” was more of a sine gua non than “federalist.” The PNP had adopted a federalist position, but was not invited to the Congress. In

any event, the great common denominator at the Congress was the insistence on immediate independence and federalism, and it is a measure of the Cartel’s success that both of these policies had by this time attained very wide support. Virtually every Congolese political leader now supported immediate independence; indeed, what with de Schrijver agreeing to independence in 1960, it would have been difficult for

them to ask for less. With the exception of the militant centralists— CEREA and MNC (Lumumba)—federalism also attained a high degree of support. There was a serious recognition of the need for unity at Kisantu.® This resulted in entrenched members of the Cartel agreeing to invite their greatest political opponents. The PSA, for instance, reluctantly accepted the ABAZI even though this party was organizing the Bayanzi 88 CRISP, ABAKO, p. 287.

84 Tr, Lubamba, Compte-Rendu d’un “Observateur” au Congrés de Kisantu (Leopoldville: Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales, Lovanium University, 1960 [?]), p. 1. 85 Kasavubu: “We do not struggle only for Leopoldville Province, but we want the independence of the Congo without bartering. .. . Hold out your hands to one another and march toward our common goal which is the immediate liberation of our country.” CRISP, ABAKO, pp. 290-91.

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PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY | whom the PSA viewed as included in its stronghold. The MNC (Kalonji) allowed an invitation to be extended to the MNC (Lumumba) and, after some persuasion by other delegations, even to the Parti de la Défense du Peuple Lulua at a time when a tribal war between the Baluba and the Lulua was already under way. It will be recalled that the MNC (Kalonji) drew most of its support from the Baluba. The Kisantu Congress was also a turning point in the Cartel’s evolu-

tion. It was at this time that there occurred the switch from what amounted to a revolutionary approach to a constitutional one. However, this does not appear to have been the intention of the Cartel’s leadership in calling the Congress. The PSA’s initial position at the Congress was much harder than the final resolutions.

We have adopted the principle of forming a government which alone can resolve the crisis of authority which reigns throughout the coun-

try. . . . [we] do not share the principle of a provisional government.** We must submit to the will of the people through a direct legislative election with universal suffrage. . . .

First a government; then all the rest.

If one is to accept [these] . . . several principles . . . there is no necessity for the Cartel to go to the Round Table.*" Another indication of the reservations which Cartel leaders had about

a constitutional, negotiated approach is the fact that several of the top leaders who were, in effect, in exile did not return for the Congress. This was the case with the Secretary General of the ABAKO, Antoine Kingotolo, but it was true in far greater measure in the PSA. The following officials were out of the country during the Conference: the National President, Antoine Gizenga; the Secretary General, Pi-

erre Mulele; the Ist and 2nd National Vice Presidents, Félicien Kimvay and Gabriel Yumbu; and the Director of the Provincial Political Bureau, Raphael Kinkie, as well as a few lesser figures. Indeed, all of these PSA leaders were also absent from the Round Table Conference which took place in Brussels several weeks later. At least as far as the PSA was concerned, this can hardly be interpreted as a sign 86 An interesting foreshadowing of the split which occurred within the Cartel at

the Round Table Conference over this issue, notably when Kasavubu left the Conference. 87 “Quelques considerations générales sur les élections,” PSA, Kisantu, December 27, 1959. (Author’s files, Micro-Pos. S61-3.) Italics added.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN of confidence in the new Belgian promises or in Kasavubu’s prudent leadership.

Nor did the start of the Conference exactly spell moderation and cooperation with the new Belgian proposals. Kasavubu stated in his opening remarks: “We reject, wholesale, all these texts which one is trying to impose on us, all these hasty solutions arrived at without our collaboration, all this bartering of our liberties.”®* It is true that he also spoke warmly of the Belgian “people,” but since modern politics appears to decree that one must love and respect the “people” even of one’s worst enemies, the precise meaning of his soothing remarks re-

mained somewhat obscure.

The views expressed in the PSA policy paper reflect the mood which prevailed, at least in the Cartel, at this time: . .. nowhere is independence something which is given . . . but rather it is won by those who are oppressed and exploited, and those who feel the absolute necessity of liberating themselves.

Has anyone ever seen a slave who wants to shake off his shackles ask his master to build the new house which he will occupy after he is liberated?

But, on the basis of the plan of January 13, 1959 Belgium seems to be liberating us from slavery and to want to build, by her own means, the new house which we will occupy after liberation. We can under no circumstances approve of this proposition.

This is the essential reason why we have rejected . . . [the December 1959 elections] which we consider to be anti-democratic because it was not we who established them.*®

In addition to conflicting political interests and distrust, the Congolese leaders were opposed to Belgium because they felt “left out” of the decision-making process. This strain goes far back, to the frustration felt over the lack of Congolese participation in the 1958 parliamentary Groupe de Travail, and, at least in the magnitude of its importance, is a special characteristic of the Congo’s independence struggle. The physical arrangements which had been made for the Congress, while very effective, tended to create a rather tense atmosphere. Kisantu was for all intents and purposes given over to the ABAKO “militia,” identified by yellow sashes, but around the town the Force Publique 88 CRISP, Courrier Africain, January 22, 1960, p. 11. 89 “Quelques considerations générales sur les élections,” op.cit.

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had established two cordons with checkpoints. As a result, getting to the conference hall at times involved passing through five military or paramilitary road blocs, two by the Force Publique and three by the ABAKO.°°

The Conference naturally was an important event for the man-inthe-street in Kisantu. Indeed, there was a very heavy influx of persons from other parts of the Cataract and Bas-Congo districts, all of whom

were Bakongo. As one observer noted, “For the man in the street... Kasavubu .. . after certain formal discussions, was going to proclaim the independence of the Bas-Congo [i.e., Bakongo area] at a public meeting.”®? This popular pressure also added to the militant tendencies in the Conference. Yet, as noted earlier, the outcome of the Conference was a victory

for moderation and constitutional evolution. In his closing remarks Kasavubu stated:

The Belgian Government has organized elections despite our opposi-

tion. On this day the newly elected will occupy the communal [council] seats of our cities, our villages. The Cartel orders every-

one: order, calm and discipline, respect of authority democratically or anti-democratically established. Mayors in office, turn over your powers, your offices to the newly elected. Administered people, respect order and public administration.*?

This was not the language of radicalism nor of civil disobedience, nor indeed was it the language the assembled mass of Bakongo expected to hear; yet it carried the day.

In more specific political and constitutional terms the Congress fundamentally altered Cartel policy and laid the basis for its participation and its position at the Round Table Conference. It now decided

that independence could only be realized after legislative elections and that the material organization of these elections could only be assured through the existing administration.°* This fundamental retreat was somewhat camouflaged by such stern “whereas” clauses as the following contained in the very same resolution:

Given its position for immediate and total independence of the

Congo.... 90 The writer attended the Conference and experienced this personally. ®1 Lubamba, op.cit., p. 2. 92 CRISP, Congo 1959, p. 262. 93 CRISP, ABAKO, pp. 305-06.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN Given that the elections are of sole interest to the Congolese. ...

Decides to organize the legislative elections in the interior of the national territory. Proclaims the start of the electoral campaign as of this moment. . . .**

But, in effect, the Cartel had agreed to go to the Round Table and to allow the administration to organize elections afterwards.

The same camouflaged retreat occurred with regard to the date of independence. The Congress “reaffirmed its position for immediate and total independence”;®*> then claimed credit for the changes in Belgian

policy—which was certainly justified: “Recognizing that, as a result of the energetic action undertaken recently by the leaders of the Cartel in Brussels, the Belgian Government has shown a willingness to accept

this immediate independence after the round table”; then the resolution “fixed a rendez-vous for Belgium on January 5, with a view to determine the modalities involved in the transfer of power.”°* A super-

ficial reading made it appear that the Cartel’s proclamation of independence had merely been postponed five days. Indeed, this is the interpretation which was often given the resolution.*’

The Congress naturally strongly favored a federal structure for the Congo. It also stated that the six provinces could become “republics” with the federation taking the name of “Union of Central African Re-

publics.” Finally, the Congress strongly opposed tribalism and regionalism, and supported a socialist economy for the Congo. In general, the delegates must be admired for their success in walk-

ing the tightrope between political realism and the expectations of their followers. Only the schooled political observers appear to have felt that Kisantu was a real retreat from previous positions; for the masses it seemed like a stern “last chance” which the Congolese were giving Belgium. On the other hand, the Kisantu resolutions, while a step in the direction of moderation, amounted to a small concession

when compared to the massive concessions made by de Schrijver. But it must be noted that at the time of the Congress the Cartel leaders were not really sure how far he fad retreated. De Schrijver still had the

power to pack the Round Table with the PNP and other essentially pro-Belgian delegations. In fact, this is what he did. The promised independence in 1960 could turn out to be an empty formality, less 94 Ibid, 95 Thid., p. 298. 96 Ibid. 97 CRISP, Courrier Africain, January 22, 1960, p. 12.

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than the “total independence” which the Cartel demanded. Indeed, it was revealed shortly afterwards that as late as October 1959 de Schrij-

ver had planned to reserve major responsibilities to Belgium after legislative powers had been transferred to the Congolese. These reserved responsibilities were to include the upper administration of the Force Publique, the economy, communications, and transport. Foreign affairs and national defense were also to remain Belgium’s responsibility.°° Obviously, the Minister’s plans had changed radically since

October, but at Kisantu, the Cartel leaders neither knew what had been his real intentions in October nor what they were at the end of December; hence they had good reason to be prudent. At any rate, whether legitimate or not, as noted earlier, the Cartel’s leadership was clearly suspicious of the Belgian government, and did not really believe in its good faith.

While a moderate position in fact won the day at Kisantu, it is prob-

able that this trend could only have been a lasting one if Belgium agreed substantially to the Cartel’s demands. Had the Round Table Conference failed, some of the Cartel leaders would have favored the issuance of a general appeal to total opposition to the Belgian colonial regime, and the beginning of magquis activities. Under such circumstances, the abandoned plan to proclaim a provisional governmentin-exile would no doubt have reappeared. But the Belgian government was to prove within a month that it was willing to allow the Congolese delegates, in effect, to dictate the future of the Congo. |

Unfortunately very little is known about the internal discussions at Kisantu, and therefore it is impossible to identify specifically the real bones of contention, and which leaders represented radical or moderate tendencies. The resolutions which dealt with matters such as economics—of secondary importance given the concerns of the Conference—are of limited value in determining trends at Kisantu. The reason is that each political party had prepared a study on a subject which particularly interested it, and resolutions were drawn up reflecting the conclusions. Thus the Parti du Peuple—the Congolese socialist party—had prepared the study on economics which naturally reflected a socialist point of view.®® It is very doubtful that all the parties represented at Kisantu really desired a socialist economy for the Congo. On one issue a certain amount of information is available. This re98 CRISP, Congo 1959, p. 191.

89 The divisions of themes was the following: ABAKO: Immediate Independence; PSA: Elections; MNC (Kalonji): Federalism; PP: Economic Administration. Lubamba, op.cit., p. 2.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN sulted from a discussion of the PSA draft on the elections.*°° According to Lubamba, a serious split occurred among the delegates on the

question of whether persons not native to the individual provinces (the proposed federated republics) would be eligible to vote and run for office. The division split the conference almost completely in accordance with the self-interest of the parties on this issue. Only the MNC (Kalonji) defended the thesis that the exclusion of such nonnatives would amount to tribalism. All the other main participants (ABAKO, PSA, Parti du Peuple, ABAZI) wanted to affirm such ineligibilities. Among the latter, only the Parti du Peuple would not have derived an electoral advantage from such exclusions. It is therefore surprising that the MNC (Kalonji)’s position was adopted by omission. In the resolution on elections no mention is made of the whole

issue, but one paragraph states that the Conference: “Confides to a commission which will be formed on this day the responsibility of elaborating the [electoral] text which, as a draft law, will be communicated to the Round Table.”?" On the other hand, an entire resolution is devoted to attacking tribalism and regionalism. This resolution also affirms that all Congolese citizens “shall be equal before the federal constitution.”° The persuasiveness of the MNC (Kalonji) delegation is perhaps indicative of a conclusion which at least one other observer has arrived at, namely, that this party exerted a very great intellectual influence on the Congress. It will be recalled that the original, united MNC has been described as having congregated the “elite of the elite.” When the split within the party occurred, most of the outstanding elite leaders

sided with the anti-Lumumba faction, probably for no other reason than that Lumumba was alleged to have presided over the party in a very personal manner and the committee, filled as it was with outstanding elite, tended to resent this. Out of the four delegates which the party sent to the Congress two have been prime ministers of the Congo since independence (Cyrille Adoula and Joseph Ileo), and AIbert Kalonji has had a spectacular career in his own right. If this conclusion is correct, then it provides another reason why the Congress was in many ways so moderate, since the MNC (Kalonji), at that time especially, tended to be more moderate than the other militant parties.

For the PSA, the Congress marked the first public sign of the rise of Cléophas Kamitatu to top party leadership. He was destined to lead 100 “Quelques considerations générales sur les élections,” op.cit.

101 CRISP, ABAKO, pp. 305-06. 102 [bid., p. 301.

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the party through this entire phase of the Congo’s evolution and it is interesting to note how his and Gizenga’s different personalities harmonized with the different periods through which the party was going. Gizenga, who was always somewhat “hard,” withdrawn, and cautious, had led the party through its civil disobedience phase. Kamitatu had always been more “open” and pragmatic in his approach. These qualities were to pay off handsomely now that the party’s policy was destined to concentrate on constitutional reforms and the winning of elections. Kamitatu became an excellent campaign strategist.

De Schrijver’s only comment on the Kisantu resolutions was to the effect that he did not think that it was practically feasible for the Round Table to start on January 5, although it would start in January.*® This

Belgian response, or lack of response, when coupled with the great success of the Cartel in rallying numerous other Congolese parties to its general point of view, naturally helped to strengthen the hand of the Cartel moderates. In effect, the Cartel was at the peak of its power. Even moderate or “pro-Belgian” parties were rallying to its position, if not to its ranks. The militant centralist parties were very seriously hampered by the fact that the MNC President, Patrice Lumumba, had been in prison since the October MNC Congress in Stanleyville. Under

the leadership of the then MNC Vice-President, Victor Nendaka, a congress of centralist parties was held shortly after the Kisantu Congress, but this did not constitute a real danger or even serious competition for the Cartel. The Belgian administration in the Congo as well as political leaders in Brussels of course thought that the PNP had gained a considerable following. This analysis was based on a misinterpretation of the December 1959 election results. Whether from faith in their own position or from an analysis of the situation, the Cartel leadership, rightly, was of a different opinion. The power of the Cartel was at this time so great that, given different circumstances, it could have become the nucleus of a nationwide “congress” of parties. Indeed, a very real comparison can be made between the Kisantu Congress and the Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) in French West Africa. But this unity—which, in distinction to the Lu-

, luabourg Congress in April 1959 and the inter-party congress at Stanleyville in October 1959, was based upon real, viable, popular support in several provinces but especially in Leopoldville Province—lasted only about two months, if that long. There are several reasons for this, though it is difficult to assess their relative importance. First, the fact 103 Agence Belga, op.cit., No. 70, December 29, 1959, p. 52.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN that Belgium virtually capitulated to Congolese pressure at the Round Table Conference robbed the Cartel (again expanded during the Conference) of its chief unifying force—opposition to the colonial power and the struggle for independence. Second, there was simply a lack

of time to iron out a multitude of difficulties which such a merger would have entailed. Third, while Kasavubu had amply filled the role of the determined, intransigent leader against colonial rule, he was not at his best in the political horse-trading which the forging of such a merger would have required. Fourth, once Lumumba was released from jail, he did prove to be an excellent strategist of internal Congolese politics, and this in turn brought two other obstacles into relief,

the personality conflict between Kasavubu and Lumumba and the federalist-centralist conflict which they symbolized. Yet Lumumba himself could not have unified the militant parties because he had rep-

resented too little in terms of political power before he was jailed, and on the other hand, the Belgian colonial regime was visibly destroyed by the main Cartel parties while he was in jail. Unlike a Jomo Kenyatta, he had accomplished too little before being jailed to come out as the recognized national leader. THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE IN BRUSSELS

Before the Round Table Conference could begin, one major problem still had to be resolved. This was the weight which would be given to different parties, and other Congolese groups, at the Round Table.

The basis of selection was defined by de Schrijver as follows: “, .. what will be required, . . . will be a selection which will represent

in as valid a fashion as is possible the major political tendencies of the moment in the six provinces.”?°* This “formula” allowed for considerable haggling, which of course occurred. Indeed, it forced a slight postponement of the start of the Round Table. Yet, after a great effort, the final compromise was immediately made obsolete by the first political event at the Round Table—the constitution of a Common Front,

unifying all the Congolese delegations. Although the initiative for this move was not that of the Cartel alone—the Congolese students studying in Belgium were also instrumental in effecting this unification

—it constituted a great triumph for the policy which had been pursued by the Cartel. The Belgian government was, of course, caught completely by surprise and, even more than before, the initiative was now entirely in Congolese hands. 104 Thid., No. 71, January 6, 1960, p. 45.

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The problem of representation was rapidly solved in a surprising fashion: “During the afternoon session of January 22, the assembly took up the question of the rules of order and agreed to the principle of voting ‘by delegation.’ . . . Concretely, this meant that numerically (if not politically) each delegation was equal, that is to say had one vote.*°*

Given this formula, the Cartel had only one vote. Indeed, if one compares the representation given to certain parties at the Round Table with their strength only three months later in the May 1960 elections, one discovers that the Cartel—-ABAKO, PSA, Parti du Peuple, MNC

(Kalonji), and ABAZI—and the MNC (Lumumba) together had two votes out of eleven, at the Round Table whereas these parties gained 70 out of 137 seats in the Chamber of Representatives. But despite the weakness of their voting strength at the Round Table, there

is little doubt that the Cartel and the radical centralists gained and retained the political initiative.

In terms of analyzing the role played by the PSA, the method chosen for voting is, of course, unfortunate, since the PSA never voted as a party nor indeed did it make its individual position known to the Conference in most instances. When PSA delegates spoke they did so in the name of the Cartel. A valid analysis of its position, therefore, depends upon a revelation of the debates within the Cartel or the Common Front caucus, which are unavailable at present. There are, however, a number of observations which can be made. First, as a result of Professor Van Bilsen’s appearing to be Kasavubu’s adviser, the other members of the Cartel each sought their own European advisers. This followed the pattern set by all other parties at the

Conference, with the notable exception of the MNC (Lumumba), which chose one of the Congolese students studying in Belgium as its

adviser. Kamitatu, who headed the PSA delegation, chose Mme. Spitaels. She was a lawyer who had been in practice in Leopoldville and the wife of a sociologist attached to the Institut de Sociologie Solvay, which is part of the Free University of Brussels. In terms of Belgian politics, she was viewed as partisan of the Parti Socialiste Belge, and this fact is of some interest when it is recalled that less than a year before, Kamitatu, at the head of a delegation of Catholic alumni from the Kikwit ASAP, had come to Leopoldville in part to seek the advice of Monseigneur Guffens. In taking a European adviser, Kamitatu of 105 CRISP, Congo 1960, pp. 22-23.

147

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN course broke a PSA tradition, and this was to cause some discord later within the party. The second major development was the position taken by the PSA after Kasavubu decided to walk out of the Round Table Conference on January 25. Kasavubu left the Round Table after insisting that it turn itself into a constituent assembly with a provisional government resulting immediately upon its conclusion. Addressing himself to the other

Congolese delegates, he said: “You have more than experience, and if Belgium does not see it that way, we are wasting our time. We will return to the Congo without anything. As President of the ABAKO and

of the Cartel, I declare that as long as Belgium does not accept us as valid interlocutors, conversation is useless.’’'°°

These words do not shed very much light on the real reasons why Kasavubu walked out, and indeed, despite considerable speculation, it remains one of the political mysteries of the Congo.

However, this time Kasavubu was not able to rally the Cartel to his point of view. Not only did the Cartel not leave the Round Table with

him but the ABAKO Vice President, Daniel Kanza, who had been elected Vice President of the Conference, chose to remain behind. It was Kamitatu who got up to state that “the Cartel will abide by the agenda which was signed by the Common Front.’”*°’ Indeed, throughout the Conference Kamitatu sought to maintain the unity of the Con-

golese delegates. On February 1, he was reported to have stated that “'.. it is the Congolese themselves who have constituted the Common Front, and it is really pointless to give a spectacle of their internal dissensions to the Belgians.” This attitude reflects the great concern of the PSA and the other members of the Cartel that the unity they had achieved not be lost despite the sudden and unexpected withdrawal of the Cartel’s President. Kasavubu’s exit naturally affected not only the Round Table Conference but the entire subsequent course of Congolese politics. In terms of the ABAKO-PSA alliance, this event in effect marked its break-up, even though this was not apparent until later. And the possibility of the Cartel’s becoming a nationwide “congress” of parties ended for all time. A day after Kasavubu left, Lumumba was freed by the Belgian authorities in the Congo and allowed to head the small MNC (Lumumba) delegation at the Conference. The disorientation 106 Summary Records of the Round Table Conference, Sheaf IV, p. 5. Italics

107 Tbid., IV, p. 10.

added.

108 Tbid., IX, p. 14.

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which he found among the Congolese delegates was such that he was immediately able to employ his considerable political skill to attain a position of influence and leadership among the delegates. From then on the Cartel shared its position with the radical centralists, and this change in the balance of power among them probably had a serious effect on the final resolutions, particularly with regard to the federalistcentralist issue. This is not the place to give a detailed analysis either of the resolutions and conclusions which emerged from the Round Table or of the Loi Fondamentale which the Belgian Parliament enacted, in part basing itself on the Conference results. While no definitive work on these two essentially constitutional developments has as yet come forth,

several writers have produced extensive and serious studies.’ It is however necessary to give a very brief resume of the decisions which

resulted from the Round Table and affected the political parties, especially the PSA.

The most important result was of course the fact that Belgium agreed to give the Congo its independence on June 30, 1960. The date was decided upon by a caucus of the Common Front and constituted a compromise between the most militant and the middle-of-the-road delegations. The Belgian government had naturally wanted a somewhat later date, but faced by the surprising and unexpected unity of

all Congolese delegations it accepted the Common Front decision. More significantly, the Common Front insisted and received a clearcut commitment that independence would be total and that there would

be none of the “residual rights’ which had been included in the above-mentioned de Schrijver plan in October 1959. Indeed, this doc-

ument, which was a summary record of a Belgian Cabinet meeting and had leaked out, was cited by Adoula when he insisted that independence had to be complete. After the date and the nature of independence had been resolved the Common Front no longer held together; hence a series of votes were taken in which the eleven delegations chose between alternatives on specific issues. For instance, there was the question of whether the King of the Belgians should become

the head of state of the Congo until the constitution was drafted. It should be noted that all these votes centered on essentially secondary issues or else involved alternatives which were not far from one an109 Among them: Francois Perin, Les Institutions Politiques du Congo Inde-

pendant au 30 juin 1960 (Leopoldville: Institut Politique Congolais, 1960); Georges H. Dumont, La Table ronde belgo-congolaise (Brussels: Editions universitaires, 1961).

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN other. For instance, there was a choice as to whether traditional chiefs coopted by the provincial assemblies should constitute 10 per cent or 20 per cent of the total number elected directly. None of the delegations voted for 20 per cent (not even the chiefs themselves), but the

more militant parties chose the minimum and the more moderate ones chose 15 per cent. Part of the reason for the proximity of the alternatives was the fact that these questions had been debated within the commissions of the Conference and the pressure on the delegates to return to the Congo for the imminent elections probably helped to engender a spirit of compromise.

The federalist-centralist conflict which had at one point deeply divided Congolese parties resolved itself in an essentially centralist formula while giving a fairly large degree of autonomy to the provincial governments. The provinces were to have elected assemblies which in turn would elect the provincial governments. This feature and certain specific domains reserved to provincial competence were the major concessions to federalism. But the provinces were not given any residual sovereignty, and the delicate question of what to call the system was left in abeyance.'!° This somewhat surprising development was

in large part due to Lumumba’s influence. Within the Cartel, the ABAKO had, of course, been the strongest force supporting the federalist thesis. Kasavubu’s temporary absence and Lumumba’s presence,

added to the fact that Tshombe strongly supported federalism but compromised this thesis because he was viewed as being far too closely tied to Belgian interests, all sounded the death knell of true federalism

at the Round Table. In effect, although at the time of Kisantu a relatively loose federation was proposed, the Cartel ended up by supporting resolutions which were essentially centralist formulas.1™

The Conference favored, and the Loi Fondamentale enacted, a bicameral system in which the Chamber of Representatives was to be elected directly and in proportion to the population in each electoral district. The Senate was to be composed of members appointed by

the provincial assemblies (a portion of which had to be traditional chiefs) and by coopted members. The system was parliamentary, with a President as chief of state and a Prime Minister responsible to Parliament. It should be noted that despite its extraordinary length (259 articles) the Loi Fondamentale was meant to be an intermediary instrument of government since it specifically called for the convening of 110 Perin, op.cit., pp. 20-22. 111 CRISP, Congo 1960, pp. 36-37.

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a constituent assembly in which the Congolese themselves were to draw up a constitution.

The Loi Fondamentale was complemented by the Loi électorale*** of March 23, 1960. It governed the May 1960 elections and therefore had a very immediate impact on Congolese politics. This too was a lengthy piece of legislation (99 articles) and included many intricate

clauses the full import of which—as in the case of the Loi Fondamentale—was not at the time fully understood by either Congolese political leaders or Belgian administrators (or for that matter by the writer). Some of the main characteristics have been noted earlier: proportional representation was the system to be employed for computing the strength of each party within each electoral district. Virtually every public function was incompatible with every other function so that many of the victorious candidates would have to choose between

alternative positions. In anticipation of such resignations each party was permitted to have one and a half times as many candidates as there

were seats available. Thus, there were always substitutes who could fill the place of a member of a provincial assembly who had, for instance, been elected Senator. The elector could either cast his ballot for the party or for a single candidate. The hierarchy of elected candidates on any given party list was not the order which the party had submitted but was established on the basis of the number of preferential ballots which had been cast for the candidates (or the 50 per cent “alternates” ). The party lists had to be submitted locally within each electoral district. For the national elections this meant the district (e.g., Kwango) and for the provincial councils this meant the territory (e.g., Kenge). The composition of the national government was to be submitted to Parliament by the Prime Minister designate, but the provincial governments were to be elected by the provincial councils in one vote, with the candidates who received the largest number of votes

becoming the government. That is, the provincial president had no say as to who his cabinet members would be, although he could designate specific “ministerial” functions to the cabinet which the assembly imposed on him. Of course, politically he had some influence since he would not have been elected president if he did not represent the majority of the assembly. Needless to say, the functional impact which many of these rules were to have on the parties was not fully appreciated. 112 Both largely copied the Belgian examples.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN THE PSA AND THE INTERIM INSTITUTIONS

With the termination of the Round Table, the life of the Cartel also ended, and when the leaders of the different parties who composed it returned to the Congo they did so more as antagonists than as members of a single political bloc. The failure of the Cartel to emerge as a single party or as a continuing alliance had its origin, and perhaps its main cause, in the division which occurred within its ranks during the Round Table when Kasavubu walked out.1** Of course, the fact that the main goal of achieving independence had now been reached meant that the strongest reason for keeping Congolese leaders united had disappeared. In addition, in those areas where Cartel parties were competing for the support of the same voters, the oncoming elections would have made it difficult to maintain the alliance. This was, for instance, the case in Banningville territory where the PSA and the ABAZI were in heated competition at the local level. However, there were surprisingly few such areas because Congolese parties mostly represented geographically well-defined electorates. Thus, had it been possible to

maintain Cartel unity at the leadership level, a party might have emerged which resembled the RDA in French West Africa in that each section would have controlled a fairly distinct area. In the post-Round Table period the PSA thus faced an entirely new situation. Before leaving Brussels, Kamitatu gave a lengthy press conference in which he made a tour d’horizon of the PSA’s past and present positions. Since this review not only represents a good resume of the PSA as it saw itself at that time but also demonstrates Kamitatu’s personal style and frank pragmatism, it is quoted here at length. You, in Belgium, have always believed, . . . that the PSA was a satel-

lite party of the ABAKO. This has, I believe, become our official label. But you will be hearing more about the PSA, and you will | understand that we are, in fact, the largest party in Leopoldville Province. We control 1,450,000 persons, belonging to 27 ethnic 118 One of the questions which was prominently raised at the time of Kasavubu’s

exit was his relationship with Abbé Youlou. This raised the old specter of Bakongo unity across national boundaries, i.e., unifying parts of Cabinda, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), and Angola. This concern was dramatically heightened when, at the beginning of March 1960, France invoked the 1883 accords between King Leopold II and Jules Ferry giving it the right of preemption over the Congo should Belgium give up its sovereignty over the area. This event certainly scandalized most Congolese leaders. The PSA was further antagonized by the fact that Abbé Youlou had asked PSA leaders residing in Brazzaville to leave his country in February 1960.

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groups in the Kwango and the Kwilu, that is to say nearly the total population of these two regions. Only the 150,000 to 200,000 Ba-

| yaka are not with us, and they loyally follow their Kiamfu [traditional chief] who has rallied to the PNP. But he has sought to establish contact with us and I think we will end by getting along with one another.

Our party is much more important than the ABAKO in numbers. It is also Detter organized. In all the villages of the regions which we control the leader [chef] of the village also leads the PSA. Support

is unanimous for us and the old ethnic rivalries have disappeared. We are obeyed and there are hardly any incidents in our region. Nobody voted, . . . for we, like the ABAKO, gave the order to abstain. But during the next elections we shall vote and one will see what the real importance of our party is. I have made a concession in letting M. Kasavubu take the responsibility of representing our province in the college which will work with the governor general, but after the elections it will be necessary to respect the will of the people.

I want the Belgian population to understand our position. We made an alliance with the ABAKO in order to obtain independence. But in the future we will make use of our majority and it will be we who

will give the tone in the province; it is we who will represent its majority in the national institutions. I want to say this clearly. We are willing to collaborate with the ABAKO if it wants a frank collaboration, but we will split if it continues to play a game of hide and seek as it did in Brussels.**4

In the period between February and May 1960, the PSA also had to deal with certain problems arising out of the decisions made at the Round Table. First, several “colleges” had been established to associate the Congolese with government authority over the Congo during the period between the end of the Round Table (February 21) and independence. These included the General Executive College com-

posed of the Governor General and six Congolese leaders, one from each province. The College was to exercise the powers of the Governor General and any others delegated to it by the King of the Belgians. Three areas were excepted from this collegial responsibility: the budget, the public prosecutors, and the Belgian (as against the Force 114 Agence Belga, op.cit., No. 79, March 2, 1960, pp. 45-46.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN

Publique) Army in the Congo. These areas were to remain the sole responsibility of the Governor General.*?® Each province was also given

a Provincial Executive College which operated with the Governor in the same manner as the General Executive College. Furthermore, in areas where the December 1959 elections had been boycotted (i.e., the entire PSA stronghold), executive colleges were also established at the district and territorial levels. Finally, a Political Commission of six Congolese representing the six provinces was established in Brussels with the function of cooperating with the Minister in the elaboration of laws made necessary by the resolutions of the Round Table and preparing drafts for a Belgo-Congolese treaty, a Congolese constitu-

tion, and the parliamentary rules of order. Second, an Economic Round Table was called at the beginning of May 1960 for the purpose of resolving the many financial and economic matters left outstanding by the political Round Table.

The composition of the General Executive College and the Political Commission created a number of problems. This was so because the

Congolese provinces were not politically homogeneous, and consequently each major party was at best represented on only one of the

bodies although both had important and separate functions.* The makeup of the General Executive College fairly accurately represented the dominant tendencies that were to emerge in the May 1960 elections. The situation on the Political Commission was somewhat different. Gérard-Libois and Verhaegen note the following:

The tendencies which were represented on the Political Commission were rather different than those which manifested themselves on the General Executive College. In the latter, the “nationalist” parties held a strong majority, the PNP had only one representative. On the Political Commission, only M. Kama, Sylvain (PSA) could

be considered a delegate of this [militant] tendency. The five others were: MM Kibwe, Jean (CONAKAT); Kanga, Ignace (PNP); Kasongo, Sébastien (PNP of the Kasai); Kititwa, Jean-Marie (PNP-UNERGA ); and Bomboko, Justin (UNIMO).117

Kama’s position was all the more important in view of the change in the relationship between Leopoldville and Brussels which occurred 115 Perin, op.cit., pp. 81-83. _

116 In the case of Leopoldville Province, Kasavubu became the representative

on the General Executive College, and Sylvain Kama (Director of the PSA National Political Bureau) was appointed to the Political Commission in Brussels. 117 CRISP, Congo 1960, p. 104.

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PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY in the spring of 1960. In effect, the Governor General no longer made the major decisions, since these were essentially political rather than administrative. It was in Brussels that the important decisions concerning the Congo were made during this period. Thus there was frequent frustration in the General Executive College over the “unimportant” nature of the matters which were placed before it, while crucial matters were being decided, presumably in consultation with the rather docile Political Commission, in Brussels. The most flagrant example of this was the amendment of the Loi Fondamentale without consultation of the General Executive College. The reason for changing the Loi Fondamentale was a constitutional crisis which had developed in Katanga in June 1960. The BALUBAKAT Cartel had decided to walk out of the provincial assembly because, it alleged, the administration had faked the election returns in favor of the CONAKAT, thus making them invalid. The BALUBAKAT Cartel therefore submitted a large number of challenges and refused to go ahead with the election of the provincial government until these had been dealt with. Since the election of the government could not take place unless two-thirds of the members were present, the BALUBAKAT Cartel, with over one-third of the seats, could—and did—halt the proceedings. This in turn engendered a demand by Tshombe that the Loi Fonda-

mentale be amended so as to allow a provincial government to be elected with a simple majority of the provincial assembly.**® The Bel-

gian government responded favorably and pushed an amendment through the Belgian Parliament apparently despite the opposition of the Political Commission.**® The General Executive College, composed of some of the most important political leaders of the day, was not even asked its advice about this pregnant amendment. Nonetheless, when it became aware of what was happening the issue was discussed and the Congolese members unanimously opposed this action. The minutes of the College on this matter are of some interest:

Mr. Kasavubu is astonished that Mr. Schoeller [the Governor of Katanga] could have proposed and obtained a modification of the Loi Fondamentale without referring himself to the General Execu-

tive College. ,

The members approve this [Kasavubu’s] statement, and regret that the Executive College does not have the same ability to modify the 118 CRISP, Congo 1960, p. 245. 119 Tbid.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN

laws. Mr. Kasavubu declares that it would have been possible to reconcile the [different] points of view in Katanga without having recourse to these methods, but a government imposed by force is [apparently] what is sought.

The President [i.e., the Governor General] answers that an urgent procedure was called for to modify the Loi Fondamentale in order to allow the Provincial Assembly to sit legally.**°

It should be noted that Article 256, para. 2, of the Loi Fondamentale (in its original version) stated:

In the eventuality that the provincial Government should not be constituted on June 30, 1960 and up to the day when it is constituted, the business of the province shall be dealt with by a college composed of the president and the members of the provincial exec-

utive College, on the one hand, and three provincial councillors, on the other hand.

These provincial councillors shall be designated by the Provincial Assembly.

This designation will take place at a plenary session with a single

vote. These councillors shall be elected in the order of votes obtained.14

In other words, the lawmakers had laid down specific rules to be followed should an impasse of the type which occurred in Katanga take place. There are several reasons why so much space has been devoted to this, admittedly abbreviated, recapitulation of the constitutional crisis over the Katanga government. First, it had great historic importance not only for the Congo but also for the whole world, for had the original procedure laid down in the Loi Fondamentale been observed it is questionable whether Katanga could have declared its “independence” on July 11, 1960; it would not have had a proper government and the governing authority would inevitably have included members of the BALUBAKAT Cartel which consistently opposed secession. Second, it demonstrates the roles performed by the interim organs which had been established after the Round Table. Third, it raises a question as to why the Political Commission in Brussels— 120 General Executive College, Meeting of June 10, 1960. Present: Kasavubu, (Anicet) Kashamura, Lumumba, (Remy) Mwamba, (Pierre) Nyangwile. (Author’s files: Micro-BOX.) 121 CRISP, Congo 1960, p. 135.

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PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY whose formal function it was to deal with the elaboration of laws concerning the Congo—did not resist this amendment in a public and determined fashion. Legally, the Commission had no real powers, but it could have publicized its point of view and there is little question

that this would have had an impact on the Belgian Parliament. The answer to this question can only be speculative since the minutes of the Commission are not as yet available. There is little doubt that there was a division in the Commission since Jean Kibwe, the Katanga representative, was a member of the CONAKAT and presumably backed his party’s interests in the matter. The rather conservative constellation of the Commission must also have had some influence. And finally, the Leopoldville representative, the PSA’s Kama, had left the Commission for reasons which were never Satisfactorily explained to the PSA.?”2 Therefore one potentially militant voice was lost.

Paradoxically, shortly after this crisis the PSA found itself in a situa-

tion similar to that of the CONAKAT, and it also appealed to the Belgian government to amend the Loi Fondamentale.'** The details of this incident will be given below. In conclusion, the PSA fared rather

poorly in its participation in the two most important interim organs of government: it had no representative on the General Executive College, and Kama apparently made little impact on the Political Commission.

The Leopoldville Provincial Executive College, on which Félicien Kimvay represented the PSA, was not a particularly successful instrument of government either. The main reason for this was the fact that the ABAKO representative was Daniel Kanza, who had lost virtually all support as a result of his feud with Kasavubu at the Round Table. His presence on the Provincial Executive College meant that this college had virtually no authority among the Bakongo and on the other hand when the Governor of Leopoldville Province dealt pragmatically with ABAKO leaders, the college under Kanza’s influence protested that it was being bypassed.?** Thus, at the provincial level the PSA’s participation in interim organs of government was also not especially meaningful.??5

The PSA’s participation in the Economic Round Table was nowhere

near as dynamic and purposeful as had been its participation at the 122 Interview with Louis Mandala, op.cit., October 1962. 123 CRISP, Congo 1960, p. 160. 124 Tbhid., p. 155.

125 The role played by the PSA in the district and territorial Executive Colleges which were set up in the Kwango and Kwilu districts will be dealt with in Part III.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN

political Round Table. This was largely due to the fact that the party was lukewarm about participating in the Conference because of a wide discrepancy of views between it and the Belgian government about the purpose of the meeting. The Belgians wanted firm draft agreements which would more or less bind the future Congolese governments to specific economic relations with Belgium, and in return were willing to define the type, and degree, of aid they would give the Congo. Sev-

eral of the Congolese delegations, and especially the PSA and the ABAKO, wanted the Conference to limit itself entirely to informing the Congolese as to the economic situation in which the Congo would find itself at the moment of independence, leaving until later the definition of the economic relations between the Congo and Belgium. This disagreement caused the PSA delegation to arrive at the Conference after it had started. The political constellation was of course entirely different from what it had been at the political Round Table. There was no longer a Cartel, and the PSA attended the Conference in its own right. The General Executive College in Leopoldville and some of the political parties had appointed Congolese university students to represent them at the Conference. The argument for this was that the students would be more competent to deal with the many technical details which were expected to come to the fore. However, the students had sharply different views from those held by most of the politicians, and the PSA was particularly emphatic in condemning what it considered to be the all too moderate student approach. Indeed, Gabriel Yumbu, the senior PSA delegate, went so far as to declare that the students were “neo-colonialists.”176 A Congolese “Common Front” was constituted at the Conference, but it was completely

different from the one which had united Congolese delegations in January. Its leadership was very moderate and it did not succeed in pulling all the delegations together. The PSA did not join it and, indeed, was so disappointed with the Conference results that it did not sign the resolutions.??’

The discussions at the Economic Round Table no longer have any intrinsic interest since conditions changed so drastically immediately after independence. However, the Conference did have a certain political importance in that it is one of the earliest examples of the wide gap separating the university students from the political leaders. The

pattern was, of course, not perfect, but a divergent tendency was 126 CRISP, Congo 1960, p. 99.

127 Tbid., p. 98. | . 158

PSA POLICY AND STRATEGY clearly discernible at the Conference and, after independence, it again manifested itself in numerous ways. One of the most dramatic expressions of this division within the modern elite occurred when the university students in effect took over the administration of the Congolese

government after the military coup by General Joseph Mobutu and established the College of Commissioners in September 1960.

If the PSA appeared to have lost some of its élan after the Round Table Conference in January and February, this was because the main focus of attention once independence had been assured was no longer on relations with Belgium and constitutional developments but on the electoral campaign and intra-party relations. For the PSA there was also internal discord occasioned by the return of the exiled leaders, notably Gizenga and Mulele, and the tensions which this created within

the PSA councils. Needless to say, the situation and the party had radically changed since the departure of these leaders in the fall of 1959.

| 159

CHAPTER VIII 282)2)22222922)22 9) The Evolution of Leadership N THE period between December 1959 and March 1960, the top W cadership of the PSA was, in effect, dominated by Kamitatu. The provincial organization in Kikwit was personally loyal to him—this was his stronghold; the provincial organization in Kenge was very weak and without any great influence in the party; and the national organization in Leopoldville was without its most important and dynamic leaders. It will be recalled that Gizenga, Mulele, Yumbu, and several other leaders were out of the country during this period. However, on March 2, Gizenga returned to the Congo. This event naturally affected the leadership pattern of the party. In addition, with the struggle for independence largely over, one of the strongest elements for party unity tended to wither away. It was at this moment that many latent conflicts among the leadership emerged, and new ones appeared. For an understanding of this aspect of the party’s history it is necessary

to review the evolution of leadership relations from the start of the PSA’s existence. It should however be noted that research in this area

is particularly difficult. The documentation made available to the writer was not screened, but many, if not most, of the important events in this field were never put in writing in the first place. Interviews were revealing but inevitably very subjective. Nonetheless, the subject of

leadership relations is an important one, and it is hoped that what follows gives a fair and balanced, if incomplete, picture of the situation. Background

The basic leadership conflict which runs through the entire history of the PSA was between the founders of the PSA in Leopoldville and the Provincial Committee in Kikwit. This is apparent from the analysis,

earlier in this study, of the PSA relations with the ABAKO in the summer of 1959. There were many reasons for this conflict. In the first place, the Leopoldville leaders had a sense of self-importance both

because this was a tradition among the city elite and because, as founders, they held the top national offices in the party and felt that they had a “right” to lead the party without too much interference from

lower echelons. These founders also had had more opportunity to come into contact with the outside world and viewed themselves as ideologically more sophisticated than their rural brethren from Kikwit.

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THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP From the very start, Kamitatu balked at being placed in an inferior or subordinate position within the party. As early as May 25, 1959— four days before the Kikwit Committee was formally organized—he wrote to the National President in the following manner:

You will note: 1. that I have been forced to make certain modifications in the [PSA] program as a result of having compared it with

other programs. .. . 2. In the program, it is necessary to change the words “paysannat collectif” to “paysannat sous forme de cooperative.”

As regards the statutes, I have not yet had time to study them in detail.*

Clearly, Kamitatu considered his relationship with the National Committee to be on a basis of equality. He even instructed the Leopoldville

leaders to perform certain functions. In the aforementioned letter, after calling for a high-level protest against certain acts of the local administration, he stated: “I enlist you to take all useful measures and to transmit to us... the reply of the Governor General... .”? And, after noting the PSA’s initial success in Kikwit, he added “It is your job also to put yourselves to work. Thus I insist that you send us immediately the membership cards... .”® Two weeks later the Kikwit Committee organized a delegation which

was, among other things, to make contact with Van Hemelrijck in Leopoldville—without first consulting the Central Committee. Mulele responded to this initiative somewhat coldly. Since the Minister was to pass through Kikwit, was it really necessary, he asked, for the Kikwit

Committee to come to Leopoldville to meet him?* But, in general, Leopoldville was permissive, and for two reasons: first, without Kamitatu and the local ASAP leaders the future of the PSA in the interior was bleak; and second, the national organization was almost entirely dependent on Kikwit for funds. In the very same letter Mulele literally pleads for “at least 5,000 francs ($100)’® to defray the expenses of printing membership cards.

Kamitatu’s insistence on participating in PSA political relations at all levels was not a personal inclination but represented the fundamen1 Letter from Cléophas Kamitatu to National President, Kikwit, May 25, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 31.

2 Ibid. 3 [bid.

4 Letter from Pierre Mulele to President, Kikwit Section, Leopoldville, June 15, 1959. (Author’s files, PSA-20.) 5 Tbid.

161

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN tal reason why the Kikwit elite had decided to join a party. For them, political action at first meant primarily emerging from the dark rural hinterland: they wanted to have a sense of involvement in their and their country’s future. The frustration of not having been able to do this before engendered the virtual explosion of energy with which they established the PSA organization in the Kwilu district, but it also meant that they resented taking orders from Leopoldville or any implication that they were less sophisticated. When the Central Committee sent one of the Leopoldville leaders to help organize a reception which was to be given to Van Hemelrijck in Kikwit, Kamitatu wrote:

... We were disappointed to note that you judged us to be incapable

to organize anything for the Minister’s arrival without your material intervention... .

We intend to forge the unity of the Kwilu and we ask you to work toward that goal with energy, because in a month or two the PSA

will become an important party worthy of imposing itself as an equal on the other political parties in Leopoldville.®

The Central Committee continued to evade the fundamental problem of how the chain of command was to work, while it quite justifiably complimented the Kikwit Committee on its success in establishing the PSA so quickly. “We want to tell you once again our most complete satisfaction at the competence with which you are directing the Kikwit PSA section... .’””

However, by early July the Central Committee decided to elaborate a set of rules concerning a crucial element of its relations with lower echelons of the party: what to do with the money collected from mem-

bers. Gizenga, writing for the Central Committee, indicated that 70 per cent of all dues collected had to be transferred monthly to the central treasury. In the tone of his instructions there was no question about who was in charge. “In case you desire to set up a permanent office in Kikwit, please inform Leopoldville which, following your proposals, will give you instructions to engage personnel. ... You are... charged with sending us these funds . . . as soon as possible.’’®

Disagreements between Kikwit and Leopoldville also occurred on 6Letter from C. Kamitatu to Central Committee, Kikwit, June 28, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 73.

7Letter from Valentin Lubuma to Kamitatu, Leopoldville, June 29, 1959, ibid., p. 73.

8 ‘etter from A. Gizenga to President, Kikwit Section, Leopoldville, July 7,

1959, ibid., pp. 74-75.

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN other levels. At about the same time (mid-July) an incident took place

between the population of Masi-Manimba and the local administra- | | tion in which the PSA became heavily involved. Repressive measures

, taken by the administration were considerably exaggerated by the — local PSA president in his report to the upper echelons of the party. Since this occurred just after the Van Hemelrijck speech of June 24,

i 1959 and, therefore, after PSA policy had hardened, the Central Com- — mittee sought to make extensive use of the situation in attacking the

administration. Letters were sent both to Belgian parliamentary leaders and to the Secretary General of the United Nations. In the — meantime the Kikwit Committee, discovering that some of the facts

| contained in the reports of the local section were exaggerated, suggested that the matter be dropped, but either because the message never reached Leopoldville or, more probably, because it was disre- |

| garded, the Central Committee pressed on to the end. Ultimately the Belgian administration at the highest level asked the PSA to substan-

7 tiate its allegations—which of course it could not do. The embarrass, ment caused rather hard feelings between the two committees. Leopoldville blamed Kikwit for having misinformed it, and Kikwit blamed 4

Leopoldville for not taking its advice.° The incident is symptomatic : of the difficulties which the PSA had, especially in this early period, in maintaining adequate communications. But it also shows that Leopoldville was more willing than Kikwit to take a doctrinaire and uncompromising anti-Administration stand. An incident had occurred, Congolese had been imprisoned, the opportunity therefore existed to

create a cause célébre. Kikwit was more pragmatic and reserved, and | oe more willing to examine and judge the details involved in the incident. : On the basis of careful research Kamitatu felt that what had happened was not an open-and-shut case of administration abuse and therefore should not be inflated.

Faced with growing disagreements, each committee sent a delegate to the other in order to iron out the problems which had arisen be-

| tween them. The Kikwit delegate in Leopoldville, Marc Katshunga, was given the following instructions by Kamitatu: “You know your

oo mission! Ask for a General Assembly of the PSA and point out the | facts to them [dire le fait au nez]: inertia of the Central Committee, negligence in answering letters, the lack of seriousness in their actions. ® This information is a resume of considerable correspondence which was devoted to this matter. Ibid., pp. 52-61.

164

THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP Be firm... .”?° Leopoldville had sent Sylvain Kama to Kikwit and he had a long session with the PSA Committee there. According to the Kikwit minutes of this meeting, a variety of subjects was broached, but subsequent events indicate that the differences between the two committees were not successfully resolved. A week later Gizenga ap-

parently decided that the situation could not be allowed to run its course and that Leopoldville had to impress its authority on the Kikwit Committee.

With the present letter I want to reprimand you who, wanting always to criticize and reproach the Central Committee, are using

| words which in the end show the lack of respect and confidence which you have toward it. This will inevitably push you to establish yourself independently. But do not forget that what you have done can in return happen to you a hundred times. In your propositions and decisions you seem to by-pass the General

President and his committee which you accuse of inertia and incompetence for holding the reins of the party.

Orders given to you by it for immediate execution become the objects of discussions in your committee. ...

Do not forget that after every period of success comes a period of hard campaigning. Do not let the present successes dazzle your eyes.

I want ... you to understand that the Central Committee through its President directs all sections of the party without exception and it leads the whole party toward its goal....

Having said this let us pick up our affairs in a new spirit and let us always march ahead, each in the area of his responsibility.

I want to see the funds sent in without comments at the beginning of August."?

It is perhaps surprising that after such a turbulent start the PSA leadership was able to accomplish so much.’? It must be remembered 10 Letter from Cléophas Kamitatu to Marc Katshunga, Kikwit, July 15, 1959, ibid., p. 75. 11 Letter from A. Gizenga to Provincial President in Kikwit, Leopoldville, July 29, 1959, ibid., p. 77.

12 Rough comparisons with other parties can be made with the help of the

charts on Congolese Parties in the Appendix to Part One, pp. 64ff. | 165

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN

that the letters between Leopoldville and Kikwit probably tended to center on areas of disagreement; by looking exclusively at documentary evidence a biased picture therefore emerges. One reason for its success was that the conditions under which the party operated from August on had changed radically. With the creation of the ABAKOPSA Cartel and the increasingly militant policy of civil disobedience, the PSA brought the full opposition of the administration down upon itself. From August to December 1959 the PSA passed through its most militant period, and this had a unifying effect upon the leadership. One result was that Leopoldville had to recognize the fact that the Kikwit organization was not merely a subsidiary and subservient organ but the nucleus of party activity. Consequently, an ad hoc arrangement appears to have been arrived at by which the administration of the party was lodged in the hands of Gizenga, Kamitatu, Kimvay, and Mulele. Later, when both Gizenga and Mulele were absent, this role was filled by Kama, Kimvay, Kamitatu, and Lubuma. Part of the attempt to readjust leadership relations involved a suggestion to transfer the party’s Central Committee and national offices to Kikwit. It would appear that the Kikwit Committee was very much in favor of this proposition, and even Gizenga seemed to lend it his support.*® However, nothing was done about it, probably because of other pressures and the departure of Gizenga. That Kamitatu was taken into the top leadership of the party in the fall of 1959 is substantiated by his inclusion in an important delegation which went to Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire in November of 1959 in connection with plans for a provisional government-in-exile. The other members of the delegation were Mulele and a member of the Kwilu Provincial Political Bureau, Raphael Kinkie.1*

By December, when Kamitatu led the PSA delegation at the Kisantu Congress, his integration into top national PSA leadership was a public fact. Nonetheless, since the PSA did not appear to have sufficient confidence in the outcome of this Congress to include members of its Na-

tional Central Committee among its delegates, the leadership of its delegation was not necessarily as great a distinction as it seemed. But it did show that the “rural” leader had achieved full recognition and equality as a national representative of the party.

General political events in the Congo, which were outside the control of the party, greatly affected the relative influence of different PSA leaders, and especially Kamitatu, after the Kisantu Congress. 13 Interview with Cléophas Kamitatu, op.cit. 14 [bid.

166

THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP Contrary to PSA expectations, the Kisantu Congress was a great success and Belgium did not counter the Cartel either by force or even in

hard political terms. At the Round Table Conference the policy of negotiating for independence won the day completely with a national-

ist victory which went far beyond the hopes of the militant leaders. Kamitatu, at the head of the PSA delegation, emerged as one of the outstanding Congolese politicians who maintained a staunchly nationalist position while entirely dedicated to the unity of Congolese delegates. The ABAKO, handicapped by its internal dissension, had lost much of its élan and to some extent the PSA filled the vacuum which had been created. It was also during this period that the Congo became aware of the electoral weight of the Kwilu district and, therefore, of the PSA. And, of course, it was precisely this rural area that was Kamitatu’s original source of influence.

The change in Kamitatu’s position within the party is reflected in the almost deferential tone employed by the First and Second National Vice-Presidents residing in Brazzaville in early 1960. “We know that you are very busy but is there no way you could let us know whether you expect to send us the money for a car as you promised when you passed through Brazzaville.’ Yet at the same time Kimvay and Yumbu wrote a letter to the whole Central Committee (1.e., the alternate members since the officers themselves were all in exile) and the National Political Bureau in Leopoldville in which they insisted:

1. Respect the voice and the person of the interim President [Vital Bula’*]: he is your chief.

2. [You are] formally forbidden to disturb the order established by the Central Committee in its absence, and until it returns. . . 17

Thus, while Kamitatu did rise spectacularly within the party, he was never formally recognized as a leader above the others. Mandala indicates that Kamitatu never acted alone. He had been chosen to lead the delegation in Brussels because he had demonstrated exceptional ability to the other leaders and because they wanted to associate the “interior” in all discussions and decisions. 15 Letter from Félicilen Kimvay and Gabriel Yumbu to Provincial President,

Brazzaville, February 3, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-72.) :

167 |

16 Solidarité Africaine, April 16, 1960, p. 3. Bula was a member of the National Political Bureau. 17 Letter from Félicien Kimvay and Gabriel Yumbu to Central Committee and

Political Bureau, Brazzaville, January 31, 1960, CRISP, PSA, p. 204.

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN There were, of course, also leadership conflicts at other levels. For

instance, Kamitatu at one point appears to have had some trouble keeping his own Provincial Committee functioning properly.** At the national level the division of responsibilities between the Central Committee and the Political Bureau came under criticism, and some members of the Central Committee felt that the regulation forcing them to submit all new plans to the Political Bureau for its advice was too cumbersome. But the Political Bureau naturally resisted such pressure and

although in practical terms the Central Committee appears to have had vast initiative, no formal changes were made in the statutes. The lack of information unfortunately restricts a full discussion of leadership conflicts within the Central Committee and the National Political Bureau. For instance, the writer has found virtually no information about different ideologic tendencies even though it is very likely that differences existed over such issues as the formation of a government-in-exile, economic policy, and the Cold War. It will have been noted earlier that the original PSA Program called for paysannat col-

lectif and that Kamitatu changed this to paysannat sous forme de coopérative. The difference is between rural communes and rural cooperatives, but it is difficult to say whether this in fact reflects a con-

scious identification on the part of the Leopoldville leaders with the “leftist” implications of communes. In the writer’s view this is doubtful, at least with regard to most of them, although there is some evidence that Leopoldville tended to be somewhat more ideologically left than Kikwit, which consistently took a very pragmatic position.

At another level, it is almost certain that there were latent conflicts

based on ethnic considerations or more exactly the ethnic balance within the party. Again, the degree to which they emerged cannot be measured.

It does appear, however, that within the Central Committee and the

| National Political Bureau, Gizenga held a very special personal position. In Leopoldville it was he who held the party together. Mandala’s testimony is very relevant in this regard. “The unity of the party was safeguarded in Leopoldville thanks to Mr. Gizenga, thanks to his authority. All the divergences which came to a head he was able to regulate once he became aware of them.”?® It may, of course, be argued

that keeping a few elite from the Kwango and Kwilu districts from fighting each other openly in Leopoldville, and thereby preserving the 18 Tbid., pp. 81-82.

19 Interview with Louis Mandala, op.cit. 168

THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP unity of the national organization, was not a very important feat. But this would misinterpret the importance of the national leadership in the capital for the PSA. All the successful breakaways from the PSA— and just about every other party as well—were led by the capital-city elite. Had the Central Committee and the National Political Bureau broken up, the Kikwit Committee could perhaps have run the party but it is very likely that many members of the disbanded committees would have returned to their ethnic bases and started a rash of ethnic breakaways. Thus the role performed by Gizenga in Leopoldville was, for this reason alone, an absolutely vital one for the party. Gizenga may not have been recognized as a great leader outside the party, but within its top councils he held a very special position. Of course, the fact that he did not emerge as a generally recognized supreme commander at times resulted in an increase of dissension among the leaders. But this very weakness may in the long run have been the PSA’s greatest strength. It meant that there was more participation by lower echelons of the party in policy making and consequently a greater re- _ Sponsiveness on the part of the top leaders to their desires. The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and the PSA was one of the most successful Congolese parties in maintaining its unity despite the especially difficult conditions under which it operated (e.g., its ethnically heterogeneous base). In sum, while it is obviously impossible to tell exactly how much

, influence and power any of the leaders had at any given point, it may be said that the leadership was from the start collegial, that Kamitatu and other provincial leaders were taken into the top leadership group very soon after Kikwit affiliated with the PSA, and that in Gizenga’s

absence the collegial character of leadership was particularly pronounced. The Politics of Ethnicity as It Affected the PSA and Its Leaders After the Round Table Conference

The situation in which the leadership found itself after the Round Table Conference and the break-up of the Cartel was greatly changed, both by a rapid evolution of the place that ethnicity played in Congo politics and by the return of the exiled leaders. As noted earlier, ethnicity at the grass-roots level was an element generally present in political identification. However, whether this identification resulted in separate political parties or merely in intra-party caucuses was very largely dependent on the actions of the leaders themselves. In the pe169

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN riod under discussion the situation in this regard was very fluid in Leopoldville Province. Naturally, the ABAKO and the PSA were permanent and separate elements in the situation after the end of the Cartel,

but the continued existence of other completely separate parties or the creation of new ones provided the opportunity for political jockeying within and among parties. Consequently, it would be highly arti-

ficial to make a separation between the impact which ethnicity had within parties as against its impact on inter-party relations.

Like every other Congolese party after the end of the Round Table Conference, the PSA now engaged in a number of negotiations with a view to forming new alliances consistent with the political condition that had arisen. As indicated by Kamitatu the real political arena within which the PSA operated was Leopoldville Province. This did not mean that the PSA had abandoned its hopes for national extension. On the contrary, Kamitatu re-emphasized this on February 29, upon his return to Leopoldville. He was reported as having said: “. . . that the hour no longer belonged to the ‘ethnic parties,’ but to the parties with national perspectives and that the PSA would make an effort to spread throughout the whole Congo. In this spirit the PSA offers its hand to all other parties which, wishing to work in a spirit of frankness and sincerity, seek its collaboration.”?° However, it is clear that Leopoldville Province was of primary interest to the party since this was its area of strength and it must have seemed doubtful even to the PSA leaders that they would succeed in extending the party to large areas outside the province prior to the May elections. The concern with Leopoldville Province placed the party in a delicate position with regard to the Kasavubu-Kanza split which had occurred within the ABAKO. In this connection Kamitatu stated:

The PSA .. . will not participate in the meeting called by M. Kanza

on Saturday. As I have already stated, the PSA intends to collaborate with one single ABAKO. Given these conditions and while waiting for the differences [within the ABAKO] to be resolved, the PSA will observe a sort of neutrality for the purpose of being able to serve as a bridge between the two hostile factions of this party in order, possibly, to reconcile them.”*

The problem that Kamitatu faced was particularly difficult because it was unclear whether Kanza would be able to rally a substantial por20 Agence Belga, op. cit., No. 79, March 2, 1960, p. 56. 21 [bid.

170

THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP tion of the ABAKO followers to his side. There were some indications that Kanza’s action of remaining at the Round Table and the position taken by the magazine Congo, edited by his son, were both attractive

to the PSA. Furthermore, the suspicions already cited concerning Kasavubu were a serious factor. However, the PSA was soon to face an election and subsequently the formation of a provincial government. It would have been imprudent for Kamitatu to align the PSA with one or the other ABAKO faction prior to a clear indication as to the relative political strength of each. It should be pointed out that while the PSA could at this time confidently expect to gain about onethird of the seats in the prospective provincial assembly of Leopoldville, it was most unlikely that it would be able to attain an absolute

majority. Therefore, a danger existed that the ABAKO in alliance with the other smaller parties could place the PSA in the minority. The PSA strategy seems to have been to try to form alliances with smaller Leopoldville parties itself, without burning its bridges with whoever ended up in control of the ABAKO. This was not, however, easily accomplished since the ethnic cohesion and exclusivity of the ABAKO did not place it in electoral competition with other ethnic groups except in Leopoldville. If the ABAKO made an alliance with the LUKA or the ABAZI, this would not have reduced the number of ABAKO representatives. But for the PSA the contrary was true. An alliance with one of the smaller ethnic parties would have meant recognition of its ethnic stronghold. But virtually all the small ethnic parties in Leopoldville Province were in fact nibbling away at the PSA’s ethnically heterogeneous base. Thus, to form an alliance with such a

party meant giving up the PSA’s own position among that ethnic group. This process contained two dangers. First, it obviously would reduce PSA strength in its own right, and it must be noted that some of the ethnic groups had not yet clearly veered either toward the PSA or toward the ethnic party which claimed to represent them. Second, the process of recognizing and then forming an alliance with ethnic parties held the danger of snowballing. If one ethnic group separated itself from the PSA and gained recognition and an alliance in return, why not the next one? Indeed, this was, and had always been, the greatest danger to an inter-ethnic party such as the PSA. In order to keep its party cohesion the PSA was therefore forced to fight the ethnic parties, but this reduced its chances of making alliances with them.

It is, therefore, not surprising that PSA strategy vacillated during

this period. Kamitatu attempted another reconciliation with the 171

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN LUKA. Both he and André Peti Peti, the President of the LUKA, were

reported to have announced that they would join forces during the electoral campaign in order to terminate the fratricidal conflict which existed in the Kwango-Kwilu area.” But nothing came of this agreement or later attempts at PSA-LUKA reconciliation. The size of the Bayaka area, the cohesion of this group around its Kiamfu, and the strength of its ethnic party, the LUKA, forced Kamitatu to recognize its existence and to seek organization-to-organization contact at a high level even though the two parties were fighting each other at the local level. This, it will be recalled, had already been apparent at the press conference Kamitatu gave in Brussels, when he clearly stated that the Bayaka follow their Kiamfu but that he hoped to come to a compromise with him. In other words, in this instance the old hope of integrating the Bayaka into the PSA had been given up at the top of the party. Negotiations now revolved around alliance.

But this was pointedly not the PSA attitude with regard to all the other ethnic breakaways which “trespassed” on what the PSA chose to consider its stronghold. Yet an increasing number of such challenges had to be faced. Next to the LUKA, the ABAZI was the most threatening to the PSA. This party, which claimed to represent the Bayanzi, had been formed in October 1959 as a result of a split among the group’s elite. Unlike the situation with the Bayaka, there were several Bayanzi among the

national PSA leaders in Leopoldville and some in Kikwit, and they remained in the PSA. Yet the founders of the ABAZI felt that they were underrepresented in the PSA because no Muyanzi was a member either of the National or Provincial Executive Committees.?* Like so many other parties, the ABAZI started in the capital, in Leopoldville, but by December-January the party began to have some impact in the interior partly because the Bayanzi of Banningville (the main town in the

Bayanzi area) had had very little participation in the PSA councils and therefore felt a certain frustration. Banningville territory, mostly inhabited by the Bayanzi, held a population of 113,865 and there were also Bayanzi in Kikwit and Masi-Manimba territories. In all, they numbered about 150,000 to 200,000.

The PSA repeatedly employed its own Bayanzi leaders to counter the ABAZI, and the latter found the presence of prior PSA organization the main obstacle in its path. Yet part of the effect of any politi22 Ibid., No. 81, March 8, 1960, p. 56. 23 Interview with Wenceslas Mbweni, Secretary General, ABAZI, April 1960.

172

THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP

cization of the rural areas was the increasing ethnic self-awareness of all groups. This sentiment could relatively easily be tapped in order to support real or alleged slights inflicted by one group on the other.

In the case of the ABAZI another factor which helped it was the sympathetic attitude of the ABAKO toward its development. Because of this support the ABAZI had been allowed to participate in the Cartel and indeed there is good reason to believe that it received financial subsidies from the ABAKO. The two parties had much in common and also served each other’s interests. The ABAZI supported ethnic federalism, which was essentially similar to the ABAKO’s predilections. Furthermore, since the Bakongo were by far the largest single ethnic group in Leopoldville Province, the ABAKO had much to gain from a proliferation of ethnic parties. If what had happened with the

Bayaka and the Bayanzi had continued, the PSA would have disintegrated into over twenty parties which would naturally not have been Serious political rivals to the ABAKO. The PSA policy was therefore to ignore the existence of the ABAZI at the national level and to try to

gain the support of the Bayanzi population at the local level. It will

have been noted that in his Brussels press conference Kamitatu claimed the allegiance of the whole Kwango-Kwilu area with the exception of the Bayaka—at a time when the ABAZI was a member of the Cartel! The situation became somewhat more complicated as a result of traditional tribal divisions among the Bayanzi. The masses tended to follow their elite leaders. Consequently, the Bayanzi as a whole split their allegiance between the PSA and the ABAZI, each tribe tending to veer toward one or the other party depending on where its most prominent elite happened to be.”#

Yet another challenge to the PSA came from the Rassemblement Démocratique du Lac du Kwango et Kwilu (RDLK), which had its origins in the Lac Leopold II district and was founded in January 1960. The PSA had never taken a great interest in this district, but when the RDLK sought to extend its activities into the Kwilu district, the PSA objected.”®

Finally, one of the most important leaders of the PSA organization in the Kwango district, Noel Kikwa, the Director of the Kwango PSA Political Bureau, formed a new party, the Centre de Regroupement pour les Intéréts du Kwango (CRIK), in December 1959.?° This party 24 Interview with Louis Mandala, op.cit. Mandala is a Muyanzi with a long history of participation in Bayanzi organizations. 25 Congo, January 23, 1960, p. 5. 26 CRISP, PSA, p. 156.

173

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN was unlike the others in that it sought to overcome the disadvantage—

in the Kwango—of an association with the PSA (centered in the Kwilu) and the ABAKO representing the Bakongo by playing on Kwangolese regional sentiments. In contrast to the LUKA which, while

also playing on Kwangolese regional sentiments, was generally recognized as a Bayaka party, CRIK appears to have attempted to initiate an inter-ethnic Kwangolese ensemble. For instance, during an interparty confrontation in Kobo (Kwango district) the CRIK representative made the following argument: “Why don’t the Bakongo and the people [originaires| from the Kwilu want to belong to our party, when our people who reside among them inevitably [forcément] belong to their parties and enrich their treasuries?”’?’

Unfortunately no records have become available which would indicate who actually belonged to CRIK. The only name associated with this party is that of Kikwa who was a Mupelende. The Bapelende are a small ethnic group in the northeast of the Kwango district. It is unclear whether any Bayaka, Basuku, or smaller Kwango ethnic groups belonged to this party. In the end the PSA appears to have scored a tactical victory with regard to CRIK in that the party disappeared and Noel Kikwa rejoined the PSA and was given second place on the PSA list of candidates for the Chamber of Representatives in the May 1960 elections. The PSA electorate, however, favored the last person on the

list (Dominique Mwasipu, a Tchokwe), and Kikwa failed to be elected.

Nonetheless, the short life of this party is interesting because it illustrates once again the relative importance of Belgian administrative

boundaries on Congolese political life. Not only was there no “Kwangoleseness” in the pre-colonial period, but even during the colonial period the Kwango and the Kwilu were split as recently as 1954. Paradoxically, in the Kwango district another situation existed which, at first view, tended to demonstrate exactly the opposite conclusion. Kahemba territory in the southeast of the district had, from the start, been a PSA stronghold, and there is no record of CRIK or any other Kwango party making any headway there. One reason for this was apparently the relative proximity of this area to Kikwit. Yet in another sense this territory also confirms the importance of Belgian administrative boundaries. Kahemba is largely populated by Basonde, Lunda, and Batchokwe, the latter two ethnic groups which predominate in southern Katanga. The Lunda were the main supporters of Tshombe 27 Ibid., p. 219.

174

THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP

and the CONAKAT in Katanga, yet in Kahemba they strongly supported the PSA. Obviously, these two parties and their respective leaders (Tshombe and Gizenga) were at opposite ends of the political spectrum as far as national policy questions were concerned. A final subtlety of the situation was the fact that the Bayaka had traditional ties to the Lunda Empire (its paramount chief, the Mwata Yamvo, is Tshombe’s father-in-law) and the Mwata Yamvo had been a suzerain of the Kiamfu of Kasongo Lunda. Yet the Lunda of the Kwango district sided neither with the LUKA nor with the CONAKAT, but responded to the pull of the nearest center, the town of Kikwit, which had also been the district capital up to 1954.

This example is full of paradoxes and shows that no clear-cut pattern can be found to explain political adhesion in the Congo. How-

ever, there is a dominant variable even in this contradictory story. The Key question was, usually, what did the leading elite of the locality do? In Kenge, which was a district capital, they tended to feel left out by the larger urban centers of Kikwit and Leopoldville. The rise of political consciousness led the dominant ethnic group, the Bayaka, to form an ethnic party but the others continued to feel left out and some tried the CRIK experiment. In Kahemba there was no real center and the local elite had much more in common with the elite of Kikwit than with the elite in Kenge even though Kahemba was part of the Kwango district. Since they could not aspire to form their own organization or at least had the sense not to build a party on a base of 55,000 people, they supported Kikwit, and Kikwit was the center of PSA activity. Their ethnic ties could have pushed them toward the Katanga parties but there were no functional relations at the elite level

between Kahemba and Katanga, and the Katanga parties did not, to. the writer’s knowledge, ever attempt to organize the Lunda and Batchokwe of Leopoldville Province.2* Had Tshombe organized a national party rather than a regional one it is quite possible that the situation in Kahemba would have been totally different. Lumumba’s success in Lac Leopold II district is a case in point; there vague ethnic

ties relating the population to Equateur Province—and separating them from the rest of Leopoldville Province—were obviously useful in spreading the MNC (Lumumba) in this district.

In sum, the PSA was confronted with numerous challenges to its position in the Kwango and Kwilu districts. Much of the local activity 28 This would have had to be done separately since they opposed each other in Katanga.

175

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN of the party prior to and during the elections was centered on counter-

ing such moves. On the whole the PSA was very successful even though it lost the Bayaka and a large proportion of the Bayanzi. The surprising fact is that the remaining ethnic groups stood with the PSA,

and this achievement must be credited to the effectiveness of PSA leaders in withstanding what might well have developed into a general trend of ethnic and regional breakaways. Leadership Relations After Gizenga’s Return from Exile

When Gizenga and the other leaders who had been in exile returned

to the Congo in February and March 1960, they naturally found a totally changed political situation. They had left in anticipation of a very hard anti-colonial struggle in which they sought to enlist the sup-

port of some of the independent African states and the Communist bloc. They returned to find the battle essentially over, constitutional evolution in place of the anticipated program of massive civil disobedience, and preparation for participation in the May election underway. The alliance with the ABAKO had ended. All this had occurred in a short two and a half months. Thus it is easy to imagine that they did not immediately make all the psychological and political adjustments which were appropriate to the situation. The uneasiness Gizenga appears to have felt immediately after his return was probably also in part due to the impressions he must have gathered during

his absence. This was his first trip outside the Congo and he spent most of his time in Guinea and in Eastern Europe. It is not farfetched to assume that his militancy was increased as a result of these contacts. Thus, on his return, the divergence between his outlook and the actual situation must have been doubly great.

It is probably to Gizenga’s credit that he did not immediately become very active but seemed to bide his time and reorient himself. This prudence is also, in the view of the writer, rather typical of his personal political style. On the other hand, there is some question whether party

unity did not at this time require a dramatic move on the part of the General President. An opportunity for such a move was offered by the Kikwit Congress

held between March 12 and 14. This was a “provincial” congress called by Kamitatu largely to give a detailed account of the resolutions of the Round Table Conference to the local section leaders. It was also

employed to launch the electoral campaign, to explain the election 176

THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP system, and to obtain agreement on the manner in which PSA candi-

dates would be chosen. Although only a provincial congress it, in fact, included everyone in the party but the national leaders**—and this by their own choice. Had Gizenga participated, many of the quar-

rels which marked leadership relations in the spring of 1960 might have been avoided or at least reduced. He might even have employed the congress to hold elections for the Central Committee and the National Political Bureau. It is clear that the section leaders would have elected many of the recently emerged local and provincial leaders to national positions, but the founders of the party would certainly also have been given recognition. Most important, the formal national leadership would have reflected internal realities instead of completely

antiquated personal relationships between the founding leaders in Leopoldvulle over a year earlier.

At any rate Gizenga did not participate, and this absence was made more significant by the fact that the presidents of two other political parties did make an appearance. One of them was Patrice Lumumba.*° On the last day Kamitatu sent the following telegram to Gizenga: “The Congress has finished its work. The atmosphere is very calm. We await the announcement of your arrival.’ But this was of no avail. A week later Gizenga and several of the most important national leaders came to Kikwit to begin an extended campaign tour, presumably in order to enter into direct contact with the rural population.*”

Needless to say, all this did not help to create a new and realistic relationship between the different echelons of the party. On the contrary, despite the fact—perhaps because of it—that elections were drawing near, the PSA once more moved into a period of leadership dissension.

A relatively important element in this development was the appearance in March 1960 of Mme. Andrée Blouin at Gizenga’s side. Andrée Blouin had been born of a French father and a Banziri mother from the Kwango,** in 1921. She spent the first months of her life in the Kwango and in the now Central African Republic, but was soon taken away from her mother by her father and his European bride and eventually put into a boarding school for mulatto children in Brazzaville. 29 CRISP, PSA, p. 227. 80 Courrier d’ Afrique, March 17, 1960, p. 6. 81 CRISP, PSA, p. 241. 82 Solidarité Africaine, March 18, 1960, p. 3. 83 It is questionable whether there are any Banziri in the Kwango district. Andrée Blouin may have referred to another area by the same name.

177

A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN Her life reads like a chapter out of Balzac. Eventually, she married a Frenchman and lived in Guinea during the late 1950’s where she became strongly identified with the independence struggle. In January 1960 she met several Congolese leaders in Conakry, notably Mulele and Raphael Kinkie, and shortly thereafter Gizenga, who had just returned from Moscow, Berlin, Bonn, and Paris. Gizenga invited her to come to the Congo and help the PSA with its electoral campaign and also found a women’s section for the party. Thus, in March she joined the campaign caravan led by Gizenga in Banningville.**

None of this background was generally known either by the public or even by many PSA leaders at the time. It appeared that she was a Guinean and a militant African nationalist who could bring the Congo

the political sophistication of the Parti Démocratique de Guinée (PDG). She was an immediate success, especially because she was an

accomplished orator and threw herself into the campaign with considerably more energy than most of the PSA leaders. Her brilliance was in the eyes of many attested to by the fact that although coming from Guinea she spoke the local language after having been in the country for only a few days!

There is little question that Andrée Blouin had a very great influence over Gizenga and several of the top PSA leaders. She introduced ideas that had proved eminently successful in Guinea, for instance, the organization of women, investissement humain (voluntary work), militancy against traditional chiefs, and something approaching total discipline. It would be hard to argue that these measures in the abstract would not have helped a Congolese party organization. However, she also had a very divisive effect on the PSA. This is without doubt the last thing she wanted to do—in fact in her memoirs she does not say a single word against any of her detractors—but it nonetheless occurred probably because she did not take into account how young the PSA was

and the manner in which the leadership operated. For her, Gizenga was the leader and she expected him to be followed in the manner of a Sékou Touré or a Kwame Nkrumah. This promptly resulted in some of the other leaders looking upon her as an opponent.®> Since 34 Ta Wallonie, Liege, Belgium, October 21-22, 1961. 85 Four years later Kamitatu was to write a blistering attack on Mulele, by this time the leader of the Kwilu rebellion. Referring to Andrée Blouin he stated: “In

November, 1959, Mulele made a trip to Guinea. . . . There he met the accursed Madame Blouin—an agent of international communism, under whose tutelage he placed himself despite the formal opposition of his two companions [Kingotolo from the ABAKO and Kinkie from the PSA]. .. . They got along so well that

178

THE EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP they were operating in a collegial power relationship her interventions in the Political Bureau meetings and her direct influence over Gizenga were viewed as an external interference which was changing the balance within the leadership group. It took some time for these resent-

ments to come out into the open (within the councils of the party) but by May 1960 there were formal protests concerning her presence. Some members of the Political Bureau wrote a letter addressed especially to the Central Committee in which they stated:

This work, which is about to come to a victorious conclusion, was begun without the presence of a specialist, or a technician of political matters, at least within the PSA.

It was through our meetings that the Parti Solidaire Africain grew and not through the propaganda of a specialist whose politics have an imperial character.*®

Students sympathetic to the PSA at Lovanium University also wrote a letter to the Central Committee in which they made a tour d’horizon of the problems facing the party and showed concern over the rumors

that the PSA had come under communist influence through its National President and the presence of Blouin.*" |

The attacks on Blouin were in part the result of a general decline in cohesion among the leaders. As she was in a spectacular and vulnerable position and almost everyone felt inhibited about attacking Gizenga himself, she thus became “the king’s evil councillor” and in a sense a Scapegoat.

Differences among the leaders also occurred for different reasons at this time. A big controversy erupted when Kimvay, as a member of the

Provincial Executive College, appointed an alleged member of the PNP to be his assistant on the College. His explanation was that the Governor General had insisted that such assistants be agents of the he decided to have her come to the Congo. .. . The influence of Madame Blouin on Mulele and Gizenga is well known. Distressed by this action, we undertook measures with the authorities at that time [i.e., the Belgian Administration] and we succeeded in having her expelled.” CRISP, Courrier Africain, February 20, 1964, p. 8. Andrée Blouin was expelled from the Congo just before independence and returned immediately afterwards to become chef de protocole in Lumumba’s secretariat.

86 Agenda, Members of the National Bureau, May 28, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-187.)

37 Letter from the technical personnel and students of Lovanium University, members and sympathizers of the PSA, to the President and Central Committee (PSA), May 29, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-188.)

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A HISTORY OF THE PARTI SOLIDAIRE AFRICAIN government and working at the Leopoldville Province administration and that with these restrictions he could not find a PSA member to fill this post. But his action was nonetheless roundly condemned.

Kamitatu came under attack because he had agreed to become a director of the SABENA (Belgian Airlines) in the Congo and the Institut Politique Congolais (an evening school started after the Round Table) without consulting the national leadership of the party.* Another major cause of dissension was the choice of candidates for the May elections, which will however be dealt with later.

The Political Bureau, just before the elections, made a very sober analysis of the situation. Complaining about the “lack of vigilance,

and the spirit of inertia, which characterizes the activities of the leaders,”*® pointed to a number of danger areas:

A blind faith in the twelve seats which the party can obtain in the Kwilu seems to divert the attention of the leaders:

1. regarding the suspicious actions of the ABAKO.... 2. regarding the sabotage of the LUKA....

3. regarding the tottering position of the party in Banningville

territory.... There are no preparations for exercising power, while the race for power is too generalized.*°

After this analysis the Bureau proposed, among other things, that an

Assembly (i.e., Congress) be called within a week. Several weeks later, the Lovanium students also concluded that “only an extraordinary Congress, bringing together the representatives of all the sections,

can pull the party out of the confused situation in which it finds itself.”*t But no congress was called either before or after the elections,

and divisions within the party’s leadership increased. The electoral

campaign, the selection of candidates, the voting pattern in the Kwango and Kwilu districts, and the consequences of these developments on the leadership and the party in general can only be discussed after an analysis of the relationship of the PSA to the grassroots of its stronghold and of the meaning of the independence struggle to the rural masses. To do this we must go back to the very first contacts be-

tween the PSA and the rural villages, and even earlier, to the first manifestations of anti-colonial protest in this environment. 88 National Political Bureau, Minutes, May 21, 1960. Sitting with the Central Committee and visitors. (Author’s files, PSA-185.) 89 Political Bureau, Leopoldville, no date. (Author’s files, PSA-179.) 40 Tbid. 41 Author’s files, PSA-188.

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PART THREE

Rural Radicalism: The PSA and Its Mass Following

BLANK PAGE

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE 1°202202202200200200200220)0)>

ART THREE of this study will attempt, first, to demonstrate what YP sort of protest manifestations preceded the advent of party organization in the villages of the Kwango-Kwilu area; second, to give the history of PSA extension into the rural communities and the relations which the party established with other institutions in this environment; third, to show that the rural masses were more militant than the elite leaders;

and fourth, to present an analysis of the PSA’s participation in the May 1960 elections.

There are serious methodological problems to be faced in describing the different aspects of what may be called the grass-roots situation. Evidence is scarce and for the most part highly subjective. Few opportunities existed, to use some of the more advanced sociological tools to analyze local conditions. It hardly need be pointed out that there are no attitude studies concerning, for instance, the changes that occurred in the relationship of the rural population to the admuinistration or the political parties.

What then remains in the way of research tools? First, there are the party documents made available to the writer by the PSA. Second, the writer traveled through the Kwango-Kwilu area in April 1960 and is, therefore, in a position to report both what he himself saw and what he was told by Congolese leaders and Belgian administrators. Third, the May 1960 election results can be analyzed. By interpreting the

evidence collected in this manner a fairly complete picture does emerge, but it cannot be viewed as conclusive.

In addition there are two special problems. First, the task of finding solid information is particularly difficult when an attempt is made to describe what the situation was prior to the advent of political parties

—in this case the PSA. Party documents are virtually useless since they obviously did not deal with events which occurred years, or even months, before the party came into existence. On the other hand, local administration reports are for the most part unavailable and will probably remain maccessible for another forty-five years, since political

documentation was sent to Belgium before independence and now forms part of current Belgian archives. In the early period (19081939) the Annual Report of the Belgian administration to the Parliament contained much valuable information. Popular discontent was frankly discussed. There is, of course, no way of judging how accurately

these reports assessed the extent of anti-colonial protest, but at least 183

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE it is possible to get some sense of what was going on in this regard. After World War II these reports became increasingly vague about all manifestations of popular antagonism toward the administration. All that the 1955 Report had to say for the whole of Leopoldville Province was: “Certain sects of a subversive character have continued to manifest themselves in different places.’”

This information gap, just before the advent of political parties, 1s particularly unfortunate since in order to assess the exact relationship of parties to rural protest some sense of what existed before the parties appeared is vital. In order to offset this obstacle the writer has interviewed some of the administrators who were posted in this region and also, most fruitfully, Professor Igor Kopytoff,? who was in the process

of collecting anthropological data among the Basuku in 1958 and 1959. Some of these informants wished to remain anonymous. Since the information which they kindly gave the writer was in any case impressionistic, no attempts will be made to identify information with specific sources except when it has been published. Consequently, the sub-chapters on protest manifestations in the Kwango-Kwilu area before the advent of political parties comprise a composite picture for which hard evidence is lacking.

The second special problem involves the attempt to assess the relative degree of militancy manifested by the rural population and the party leaders. Interviews with Belgians residing in the rural areas revealed that they almost uniformly blamed all agitation and protest on the elite. Indeed, there was an entire, pejorative vocabulary devoted to

politically active members of the elite; it included such terms as ““pseudo-politicians,” “evolving” (rather than evolved), and “the failures (ratés),” a reference to the fact that many had been seminary students who did not finish their courses or take their vows. In the view of most of these Belgians the political leaders were essentially semi-educated hotheads and rabble-rousers who were stirring up the “good villagers.” Such a view of the cause of political protest is of

course not restricted to the Congo, but has had its parallel in other colonial situations.

Paradoxically, interviews with party leaders also placed the roots of

protest within the elite. The leaders took complete credit for whatever protest occurred. If a leader arrived at a village and two hours

184 |

1Chamber of Representatives, Report on the Administration of the Belgian

Congo Colony, 1955, Brussels, 1956, p. 75. 2 Professor Kopytoff is presently a member of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Pennsylvania.

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE later everyone had joined the party, he did not conclude that a great deal of protest had possibly already existed and that he had perhaps only offered a framework in which it could be channeled, but rather he was impressed by his own effectiveness and skill as an organizer. In effect, he saw himself as the only initiator of anti-colonial protests and thus complemented the views of the Belgians even though the two sides naturally placed a different value on the role which the leaders were alleged to have performed. Moreover, these built-in prejudices were reflected in the bulk of the written material on both the Belgian and the Congolese side.

Nonetheless, the speed with which the rural areas where politicized and the behavior of the village sections and militants when compared with that of the leaders led the writer to question this all too readily accepted thesis of elite militancy and rural passivity. Indeed, the opposite conclusion seemed to be warranted, that is to say, that the rural masses tended to be radical and the leaders frequently tried to dampen these predilections on the part of their followers.

Since systematic research into the attitudes and motivations of the rural masses was not undertaken® this fundamental question will have to be analyzed through the use of less satisfactory methods involving rather detailed reconstructions of specific situations based on party documents. A very careful reading of some of this material reveals that the leaders, almost inadvertently, reported encountering quite a

few instances in which the rural population manifested far greater militancy than they themselves desired or thought to be appropriate.

Inherent in the thesis put forward above is the secondary thesis that | the leaders did not exert anywhere near complete control over the rural masses in the PSA stronghold. If they had, then any discrepancy in militancy would have been rapidly resolved through party orders. This aspect of the question will find some confirmation in the analysis of the May 1960 elections and the voting pattern of PSA supporters.

Part III is divided into three chapters. The first (Chapter IX) deals with the development of local party organization. The second (Chapter X) deals with PSA relations with other institutions such as the Catholic Church, the Congolese clergy, plantation officials, and traditional chiefs. The third (Chapter XI) deals with the May 1960 elections and analyzes how PSA followers voted and what happened to the party immediately after these elections. 8 The writer did not have the means to do so, and it would in any event have been almost impossible to conduct such research under the conditions prevailing in the villages at the time.

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CHAPTER LX 2°20 Development of Local Party Organization Early Anti-Colonial Manifestations in the Kwango-Kwilu Area

CONSIDERABLE degree of protest against the colonial regime had always existed in the rural areas of the Congo. The Kwango-Kwilu area was a good example of rather persistent protest existing before political parties made their appearance. After its occupation, there had been a great deal of opposition to the Congo Free State and the Belgian administration by some of the traditional chiefs, notably the Kiamfus of the Bayaka.’ At that time many of the ethnic groups living to the east of the Bayaka were considered their vassals. Belgian occupation had two effects: the Kiamfus hid in inaccessible forests, and the subject people sought to and did regain their “independence” from the Bayaka.”? As the Belgian administration somewhat later noted: “In creating individual property and consecrating personal responsibility, in fighting slavery and polygamy, we are destroying the traditional native community.’”®

Soon afterward a new type of protest manifested itself; various types of traditional and syncretic sects, some having assimilated certain aspects of Christian beliefs, made their appearance. Here again, information is altogether insufficient. Year after year the Administration Re1M. Plancquaert, S. J., Les Jaga et les Bayaka du Kwango (Brussels: Institut Royal Colonial Belge, 1932), pp. 147-48.

2H. Bailleul, “Les Bayaka: Apercu de l’évolution politique et économique de leur pays jusqu’en 1958,” Zaire, Vol. XIII, No. 8, 1959, p. 828. 8 Tbid., citing 1917 “Report on the Administration of the Belgian Congo Colony,” p. 827. 4Some of the syncretic sects, traditional secret societies, and Messianic movements which appeared in the Congo have been studied in great detail, but there is virtually no literature on some of the less famous ones which made their appear-

ance in the Kwango-Kwilu area. Probably the most outstanding movement was Kimbangism among the Bakongo about which a very full literature now exists. See, for example, Efraim Andersson, Messianic Popular Movements in the Lower Congo (Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells Boktryckeri A.B., 1958). Also, J. Van

Wing, S. J., “Le Kimbanguisme vu par un témoin,” Zaire, Vol. XII, No. 6, 1958. Another movement which has received less attention but extended its influence over large parts of the eastern Congo is the Kitawala, a vague offshoot from Watch Tower doctrine. See, for example, J. A. Paulus, “Le Kitawala au Congo Belge,” Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay, Vol. 29, 1956, No. 2-3. Also Daniel Biebuyck, “La Société Kumu face au Kitawala,” Zaire, January 1957. Re-

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DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

port makes mention of various so-called subversive sects, but except for the most famous ones they have not been given the attention which they deserve. For the administration, “sects” seem to have included any organized opposition with the exception of mutinies and tribal uprisings. Mention is made of “fetishists,” “hierarchic sects,” “xenophobic sects,” “religio-political movements,” and even “pan-African-

ism,” without any clear distinction between them, or any very enlightening explanation as to their characteristics. For the Kwango-

Kwilu area a number of specific movements are mentioned: the “Lukusu,” “Lupambula,” “Mpeve,” ‘“Muvungi,” “Kabengabenga,” and “Snake that speaks.” To the writer’s knowledge, none of these have been properly studied, or indeed even described in detail.

The Kwilu was also the scene of one of the last massive tribal uprisings. In 1931 the Bapende (Gizenga’s ethnic group) revolted, and it is estimated that 500 were killed before the uprising was put down. Afterwards the regions around the Kwilu-Kasai border continued to show signs of restiveness and many of the Bapende who had escaped to Angola during the repression did not immediately return. The cause of at least some of this rebelliousness was economic. According to the 1932 Administration Report, “the effect of the world economic crisis . .. presses heavily on the indigenous masses.”> However, there were too many protest movements at times when such an economic crisis did not exist for this cause to be accepted as the only one, or even the major one. The Kwango-Kwilu area includes regions of relatively great economic development and others which have remained utterly poor and undeveloped. The reason for the administrative division of the area, which had been one district until 1954, was that the administration wished to unite areas with the same problems. Thus the Kwango is essentially poor, and the Kwilu relatively wealthy. But there is no apparent connection between these economic facts and protest. Economic development can, of course, have as disturbing an effect on traditional, rural societies as can unmitigated poverty—indeed, it probably has a more disturbing effect. The establishment of major palm oil plantations and presses in Kwilu first caused considerable disputes garding the Kwango-Kwilu area, see Renée C. Fox, Willy De Craemer, and JeanMarie Ribeaucourt, “La deuxiéme indépendance, Etude d’un Cas: La Rebellion au Kwilu,” Etudes Congolaises, Vol. VII, February 1965. 5 Chamber of Representatives, Report on the Administration of the Belgian Congo, 1932, p. 7.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING

over land rights and then brought in immigrant labor with resulting friction. The proximity of the Kwango-Kwilu to Leopoldville engendered a continual flow of population to and from this largest of Congolese urban centers, with the result that information and new ideas emanating from the “outside world” were relatively rapidly disseminated. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the Belgian administration was unable, throughout most of the colonial period, to control

this area. Despite occasional flare-ups, a general resignation to the white man’s rule existed most of the time there as throughout the Congo. In addition, there were always some groups who profited from

the colonial situation. The first type has already been mentioned, namely, the ethnic groups who had been vassals of the Bayaka. Later, there appeared individuals or groups who profited from the economic opportunities which the colonial system offered. Salaried employment, with accompanying material advantages, and education appealed to many and made them in effect allies of the colonizer, thus reducing protest.

After World War II, and especially in the 1950’s, there was one subtle but important change in the rural situation. Paradoxically, as a result of increasing bureaucratization in the administration, and more detailed supervision of the local administrator, the control of the ad| ministration over the population in fact decreased. The local administrator found himself bogged down with paper work, his autonomy over his territory was reduced by frequent (sometimes daily) radio contact with his superiors, and his judicial decisions were periodically reviewed and sometimes reversed. This was of course part of a neces-

sary liberalization of Belgian colonial rule. Given the right attitude and atmosphere the local administrator should have accepted these innovations with good grace. However, in the context in which this occurred in the Congo it led to a general demoralization of the local administrators. As so often happens, a propaganda slogan became virtually a policy directive. “Pas de problémes au Congo” (in the Congo —no problems) was the theme which the Belgian Congo Information

Service broadcast all over the world. For the local administrator it meant that he was well advised not to report too many problems. As a result he tended to look the other way.* To document this assertion is almost impossible. It 1s the type of information which is only revealed in interviews and, because living individuals are involved, spe6 This is perhaps one of the reasons why the Administration Reports became so hazy about any anti-governmental activities in the post-World War II period.

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DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

cific situations and sources cannot be revealed. André Ryckmans’ letters give an excellent “feel” for the situation in the Kwango district around 1955.7 For instance, he describes what happened when Governor General Pétillon decided that the Kwango district would have to be developed economically. As a result the Congolese were forced to plant coffee and oil palms which the local administration knew could

not be commercialized: “. . . no one dared to tell him that it would not work.”® The result was that the administration had to buy up the coffee, while the palm planting program was simply dropped. However,

to get the program going, an unspecified number of Congolese had spent time in jail for not doing what they had been told, and for years afterwards the cooperative ones proudly showed off their young palm trees to administrators who knew that the transportation costs would be too great ever to collect their produce.® All this was, of course, not

a new development and such mistakes in planning are no doubt inevitable. But as Ryckmans points out, in the face of this situation “one continues to send in magnificent reports, and faked statistics in order to prove the commercial viability of the plan; one spends thousands of francs .. . and Pétillon who commanded ‘I want something done for

) the Kwango’. . . receives reports, statistics, studies, . . . affirming that a lot is being done and that things are rolling.”

But, despite this demoralization of the administrators, there is no reason to believe that local conditions in the years just prior to the advent of political parties changed in any radical fashion. There are no indications that the growing urban malaise and political agitation in Leopoldville during 1957 and 1958 affected the rural population of the Kwango-Kwilu area in any very significant fashion.

The Leopoldville Riots and Their Effect on Rural Life The above situation changed rapidly after the January 4 riots in Leopoldville. At first, on hearing the news of the riot, neither the elite nor

the villagers had a particularly strong reaction. “There are always troubles in Leopoldville” was the general response. But the seriousness of this particular incident was soon appreciated. In some territorial headquarters the administration distributed guns to all whites and automatic weapons to white families. In discussions with the Congolese the attitude taken by Belgian administrators was, at least

7 Kestergat, op.cit. 8 Tbid., p. 139. 9 I[bid., pp. 139-41. 10 [bid., p. 141. 189

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING in some instances, that these troubles were really the fault of the Bakongo and that if the local people backed them, they would end up being ruled by the Bakongo. Indeed, in some areas the administration plastered signs on bulletin boards and trees saying “Congo uni, pays fort” (A united Congo is a strong country), which was a counter to the alleged Bakongo separatism. The very obvious nervousness of the Belgians in itself was new and surprising to the Congolese. Guns had not been distributed for years; in one small town the whites ostentatiously had target practice and then left the bullet-riddled wooden figure they had used as a target outside the administration office. For the elite in the small towns all this was somewhat perplexing. There

were isolated instances of clerks showing open sympathy for the ABAKO leaders who had been imprisoned. In one instance a nonBakongo even began collecting money for the defense of the leaders, although this was successfully discouraged by the local administrator.

There were instances of half-joking, half-serious comments to the effect that even in the interior the Belgians would be “chased out.” But in the first two weeks after the riots the general reaction of the elite in the rural towns and larger villages was one of surprise and uneasiness, while the villagers had even less of a reaction.

Within three weeks of the riot a fundamental change occurred. This was when the first repatriated unemployed youths from the city of Leo-

poldville began to arrive at the territorial headquarters. They were sent from the city to the district capitals and then picked up by the territorial administration and brought back. In at least one instance the local administrator immediately put them in jail—as it were, for good measure—but this was stopped within days by higher authorities.

Thereafter, these “tourists,” as the Belgians sometimes called them, were told to get home to their own villages. It was at this point that the first overt protests manifested themselves. The repatriated youths insisted on being transported back to their villages—a request considered to be utterly outlandish. But, breaking all precedent, they were very aggressively insistent and showed the administrators none of the usual respect. Eventually they returned to their villages by one means or another, but significantly they had broken the psychological relationship which had heretofore existed between the ordinary Congolese and the Belgian without having had to pay for it in any way.

After that, it was only a matter of days before the normal functioning of the administration in the villages began to encounter resistance. Belgian-Congolese relations developed into a sort of game where the

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DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

Congolese would “test” Belgian reactions with ambiguous attacks on authority which if successful constituted a moral victory for the “assailant,” but if resisted would prove difficult to punish or even to define in legal terms. In the villages the repatriated youths were often the initial instigators of this “game,” but they were quickly joined by others who had never left the rural environment. For instance, people refused to appear for the census, or mothers refused to appear with their chil-

dren for medical examinations, or they asked that they be paid for bringing their children on the argument that the Belgians would not have insisted on doing this all these years if it did not bring them some advantage. Pregnant women also refused to have themselves examined

unless they received payment. There were also more subtle attacks on authority. People would no longer stand at attention when addressing administrators, they would be conspicuously slow in responding

to questions put to them, and any incident would immediately be magnified. Thus a quarrel between a mission driver and a local villager

which previously would have been stopped by a stern word from a European nun now would mushroom, and on occasion would end with the pelting of the mission truck.

It is difficult to appreciate how great a revolution—at least psychologically—was taking place. Perhaps, by comparing these conditions with those prevailing only five years earlier, some sense of the magnitude of the change may be obtained. The following is an excerpt from a letter written by Mme. Genevieve Ryckmans, the wife of the administrator cited earlier, who reports a scene in the Kwango district

during a visit to a village:

The instant André [Ryckmans] appears on the horizon, or seated at a table appears to be ready to get up, the women and children escape with all speed. At Kimpuni and at Kikamba I succeeded, slowly, to hold them back by telling them not to be afraid, but here things are more difficult. Yesterday two small children were dying to come close to Francois’ [their child] baby carriage. I called them

over and a man explained to me that they were afraid that André | would put them in jail for having looked at his son!?*

The reaction of the local administrators to these new developments was simply to ignore them. If people in a certain village did not want to cooperate, then they were left alone and the official went somewhere else. It should be noted that the spring of 1959 was the period when 11 Kestergat, op.cit., p. 118.

19] |

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING Van Hemelrijck made his great push for bettering “human” relations between the European and Congolese communities. The emphasis on avoiding troubles in which the charge of racial discrimination could possibly be lodged against the administrator was greater than ever. Most of the administrators at any rate did not agree with Van Hemelrijck’s approach and thus found excuses for doing the minimum of what was required. Of course, had there been real and massive challenges of government authority then a reaction would have been forthcoming. But in the spring of 1959 the attacks were essentially passive and subtle, and since the administration did not react, there were very few real incidents.

It is important to note that no organizations were active during this first phase of rural rebelliousness against the colonial rulers. Indeed, the majority of the modern elite in the rural centers seem to have disassociated themselves from these protests. It is very hard to judge to what extent this was a “class” reaction and to what extent it derived from the fact that these members of the elite were often from a different

ethnic group than the population surrounding the rural centers. At any rate, the elite did not get involved in village incidents such as those described above, and they are sometimes reported to have shown pos-

itive disapproval. They did point to such occurrences as a sign that the masses no longer wanted the Belgians around, and they themselves perhaps talked about independence, but there is no evidence that they did anything beyond this. The only quasi-organized incident which came to the notice of the writer was a boycott of a traveling circus in Kikwit late in spring. Ap-

parently the European manager had had an altercation with a Congolese ferry operator prior to arriving in Kikwit, and the Congolese population was sufficiently offended by his alleged insults to spread the

word that no one should attend. Some Europeans in Kikwit tried to oppose this by encouraging their employees to see the circus and even paid them the price of a ticket, but the boycott appears to have been successful and only Europeans attended. It should be noted that Kikwit

and the Bambala area around it is reported to have been somewhat more agitated during the spring than the general picture which has been drawn here would indicate. Early PSA Organization

It will be recalled that the PSA only came on the scene at the end of May 1959. Before that, a feeble attempt at organizing an MNC section 192

DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION in Kikwit had collapsed, and the villages as well as the Kikwit population had remained completely untouched by any political organization.

In other words, up to June 1959 what little party activity had taken place had been an elite affair. The relationship between the PSA organizers and the general population bears out the contention made here as to the relative moderation of the leaders as against the militancy and radicalism of those at the grass-roots level. The evidence to support this will, from here on, be drawn largely from PSA files, and generalizations made by informants even if concerned with this period are used sparingly because of their inevitably subjective, and ex post facto, character.

Even at the very first public meeting called by the Kikwit ASAP committee, on May 24, 1959, to introduce the PSA, the difference in mood between the elite leaders and the mass was already apparent. The meeting had to be cancelled as a result of an order issued by the local administrator. This infuriated the people who had assembled for this event, and as they left some tore down a large religious cross which stood at the entrance to the African part of the town.*? This outburst clearly shocked the ASAP leaders, who reported in the minutes deal-

ing with the event that they would undertake to repair this “public outrage against a symbol of the Catholic faith.”’*®

Shortly thereafter, during one of the very earliest propaganda tours of the Kikwit PSA Committee into the rural areas surrounding the town, the spontaneous popular tendency toward civil disobedience was again noted. “While we were crossing the Yambesi ferry we were a party to a very amusing scene between the ferry-man and passengers. The latter refused to pay the toll which is actually stipulated by law. Monsieur Mukelenge, B. [the leader of the propaganda team] explained in a friendly manner what the thing was all about so as to make them understand [that they had to pay].”?* Even more significant than the fact that these PSA leaders were in fact intervening against a spontaneous boycott of one form of taxation is the detachment with which this scene is reported. But it is, in the writer’s view, typical of the moderation of the elite, especially at the beginning of their political organizations. However, manifestations of 12 Note the two similarities with the Leopoldville riot, which started as a result of a political meeting being cancelled by administration order and during which Catholic missions were attacked with particular emphasis. But in no sense can the Kikwit incident be called a riot. 13 Minutes of meeting, Kikwit, May 26, 1959, CRISP, PSA, pp. 23-24. 14 Trip report, June 11-12, 1959. Kikwit, July 13, 1959. (Author’s files, PSA-8.)

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING spontaneous protest in a situation in which a political party is making a dynamic effort to enroll villagers as members soon involve the party. So it was with the PSA. Three weeks later one of the Kikwit leaders returned from a trip (probably Katshunga coming back from a stay

in Leopoldville) and made the following remarks to the Kikwit Committee: We are profoundly saddened on returning. What pushes us actively toward independence at this moment? It is the lack of freedom. 1) Must we kill people because we are free? 2) Must we abolish laws because we are free? 3) Must we abolish work and taxes because we are free? 4) Must we abolish the respect of man and of authority?

From this you will readily see that independence does not mean the

destruction of everything that exists, but it means simply that we shall take the destiny of our country into our own hands.

If we (blacks) refused to go to the circus, that is our right because we are free. But why not give others (Europeans) the freedom to attend if they wanted to?

In conclusion, I regret this act of violence, and you do so also; this should not recur because it is against our doctrine. Tell this, and re-tell it, to the children and to all those who are excited especially at such moments.* Obviously, undisciplined acts had ceased to be amusing, and the PSA leaders recognized that they would inevitably become involved. It must be stressed here that all these reports were internal documents which were never intended to be seen outside the party leadership.

During the initial period of rural politicization the PSA leaders had no inhibitions about telling their potential followers that they had to obey the existing laws. Indeed, at times their tone was almost puritanical in this regard. An example of this is one of the propaganda

tour reports in which the questions the villagers asked and the answers the PSA leaders gave them are recorded. The questions all dealt with very real, practical concerns of the villagers; why were they forbidden to plant fields in their own forests, why were they stopped from going to Kikwit, why had no one built a hospital in their region? Kamitatu’s answer as recorded by the rapporteur is revealing: 15 Minutes of meeting, August 5, 1959, CRISP, PSA, pp. 78-79.

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To all these questions only the second could receive a precise answer, since this matter had been regulated by decree. Everyone had the right to go to any center of the province for a maximum duration of thirty days without obtaining a permit of transfer. At any rate, added the President, instructions [to this effect] will be given to the chief of the sector in order to inform the people he administers.

With regard to the two other questions, it was practically difficult for our delegation to answer very precisely since they were outside our competence.*®

The regulations here referred to were among the most resented by the rural population and in fact they were on the whole neither followed nor implemented. The commercial and urban centers were filled with persons whose “papers” were not in order, that is to say, who had overstayed their thirty days. Except during “control operations” the administration usually did very little about their illegal residence status. A more graphic demonstration of the manner in which spontaneous protests and incidents involved the party during this early phase of the

politicization of the rural environment is afforded by the following incident, which also serves to illustrate the PSA’s relations with the administration at the territorial level. The incident in question occurred

at Masi Manimba and has already been referred to in the context of Leopoldville-Kikwit leadership relations.?’

On July 1, 1959, serious troubles were reported to have occurred at Masi Manimba. The Kikwit PSA Committee sent an investigatory delegation headed by Kamitatu to this town on July 11. This delegation at first had a lengthy discussion with the local administrator, M. Syts, who seems to have taken considerable trouble to explain the situation to the PSA leaders. According to the PSA report the following events took place. M. Yambeshi, the newly appointed president of the

local PSA section and also the president of the local. Cercle des Evolués (elite circle), called a meeting of the Masi Manimba elite in order to recount what had occurred when Van Hemelrijck had passed through Kikwit, Yambeshi having gone to Kikwit to be present at this occasion. The administrator had given permission for this “private” meeting, assuming that about fifty persons would attend. About four times that number showed up, which meant that the attendance was 16 Kikwit PSA Activities, Kikwit, July 6, 1959, ibid., p. 40. 17 All the information given below comes from PSA documents.

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by no means limited to the elite. Soon after the meeting began the crowd started to show its hostility toward the local administrator.

The crowd booed to show how much they detested Mr. Syts’ presence at Masi [Manimba] and in this area altogether.

There were also shouts of disapproval when Mr. Syts tried to explain himself. He was overwhelmed by the many questions, some [people] even arguing that his presence in the country was no longer

needed .. . others abused the King of the Belgians. . . . He [the administrator] left the meeting angrily.*®

One or two days later a fight broke out after a sports event and in the normal pursuit of his duties the administrator attempted to stop it. Normally he would have had little difficulty but on this occasion he was pushed about and someone threatened to kill him. This person was later identified as: “. . . one of those who had been returned from Leopoldville—[whose papers were] not in order when a control operation took place’ he had refused to identify himself.’*® Following the administrator’s intervention, the crowd or mob which had gathered: “, . . moved toward the European quarter where they publicly insulted the Portuguese, all the road signs were torn off. If a white passed, they cried ‘independence’ with a dishonest [i.e., aggressive or threatening]

meaning. What was even worse was that they destroyed public property.’*° In view of the gravity of the situation the administrator called in the gendarmes (a part of the Force Publique) from Kikwit and proceeded with a “control operation” the following morning at

4:00 a.M. Two hundred and thirteen arrests were made: 170 for nonpayment of taxes (persons were released upon settling their outstanding accounts); 34 for irregularities regarding their residence papers; and 9 for diverse reasons. The latter were placed in prison, including the man who had threatened the administrator. All 9 had been repatriated from Leopoldville.

In describing the situation to the PSA delegation, the administrator gave his views of the general situation in the Masi Manimba region. It is to be noted that although in the rest of this PSA report various commentaries and evaluations were made by the delegation’s rapporteur, these statements were left without comment.

In this region of Masi [Manimba], the inhabitants have all joined [given themselves to] Kimbanguism, they pray for independence 18 Information trip to Masi Manimba, CRISP, PSA, p. 55.

19 Tbid., p. 56. 20 Ibid. 196

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and have stopped to work since [they believe that] Kimbangu will bring them money. Eight hundred cutters have stopped work during the month of June. . . . But independence cannot be looked at like this!

... the irregulars, returned from Leopoldville, foment trouble everywhere; several [of them] have been returned manu militari to their original villages.**

Initially, the only PSA involvement in this incident had been the fact that the local PSA secretary was among the prisoners. According to the administrator, the reasons why he had been jailed had nothing to do with his party activities. Indeed, the administrator made a special point of stating his sympathy for the PSA (this incident occurred prior to the alliance with the ABAKO, and the policy switch following Van Hemelrijck’s June 24 speech had probably not as yet filtered down to the local level). He is reported to have told the delegation: Since your party has a platform which conforms to the Government Declaration, there is no reason to oppose it or to take any measures to prevent its extension in this region. Personally I have realized this for a long time. Everything must take place in good order and calm and everybody should collaborate in a frank manner.

The Parti Solidaire Africain has nothing to do with all that has preceded [i.e., the incident].??

The friendly sentiments of the administrator may, of course, have been simply a diplomatic gesture vis-a-vis the PSA leaders from Kikwit. This was more or less what the delegation concluded: “In Masi [Manimba] and the surrounding area it is sufficient to pronounce the word of independence for one to be considered a troublemaker.’’?? However, the essential point was the fact that the eruption which had occurred had little to do with the party, had not been led by the party leaders, and was part of a general effervescence which included the resurgence of Kibanguism (a messianic movement), nonpayment of taxes, cessa-

tion of work, and diverse attacks on the established colonial order. The fact that the PSA delegation recorded the analysis of the local situation given it by the administrator without contradictory comments clearly shows that although they would have preferred to blame administration provocations for the incidents they knew enough of the

21 Tbid. 22 Ibid. 23 Tbid., p. 58. 197

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conditions to let the administrator’s interpretation stand for the purpose of their own internal party information and files. The description can therefore be viewed as confirming some of the more general impressions concerning rural protest given the writer and recorded above.

Again, it is necessary to emphasize that the most important aspect of such protest manifestations was the almost intangible change which had occurred in the relationship of rulers and ruled. The traditional colonial pattern in this regard had clearly broken down, and the party leaders and/or the elite had virtually nothing to do with this change. It was of course important that the administration did not react to all challenge with its heretofore massive and stern measures. This had the effect of taking the lid off a boiling pot. The “game” mentioned earlier was being played with great success in Masi Manimba although it had become rougher, less subtle, and more openly defiant. Persons who had not paid their taxes did bow and pay them, but the net effect of bringing in the Force Publique had been only nine arrests. Now, several days later, the town’s population had the satisfaction of seeing Congolese leaders—the PSA delegation—“investigating’ the matter, with the administrator behaving like a negotiator rather than a ruler. One may ask why he did this. Probably he was already worried about having had a real incident in his territory and wanted to prove to the elite that he was of the “new school,” that he was not harsh and antiCongolese but had been forced to act by irresponsible provocations. But in so doing he lost much of the fearful prestige he used to command. At the same time, there is also some question whether he, and the many other administrators in essentially the same position, tried to change the paternalistic attitudes and the frequent disdain which so often characterized their relations with the Congolese. The consequence of not doing this amounted to the worst of both worlds; weakness without real friendship, domineering poses without the will to back them up with real power. The PSA Organization Takes Hold

Until the middle of the summer, incidents of rural protest were largely spontaneous. Certainly, the PSA did not engender them. The arena in which the situation evolved can be said to have included three different actors: the administration, the PSA (representing only some

members of the elite up to this point), and the rural masses. As has been shown, the PSA organizers did not completely identify with the 198

DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

masses and especially not with some of the expressions of mass anticolonial protest. However, as the party organization took hold, it beCame more and more involved in whatever incidents took place, and the division between the masses and the PSA leaders narrowed, especially when either opposed the administration. Thus a second phase occurred, resulting in a profound change in the

expression of protest by the rural masses which, though still pushed

by its own spontaneous impetus of protest, now found new, hard rails upon which to travel. Since the two Congolese actors—the PSA leaders and the rural masses—to some degree merged for the duration of the independence struggle, it may be well to redefine their attitudes and interests.

The elite was concerned with the following problems: (1) It wanted to participate in the independence struggle. (2) As residents of the interior, its members had not participated in the many political developments in Leopoldville and this caused them to feel “unfairly left out.”

(3) Various leaders and groups in the large cities were claiming to represent the masses of the interior without any organizational or other base, and this incensed the Kikwit elite. (Such claims were being made by the ABAKO, the PSA founders in Leopoldville, and the MNC, as well as various regional and ethnic associations such as the Federation Kwango-Kwilu.) (4) There is some evidence, although not as much as one would wish, to show that the Kikwit elite were concerned over the potential challenge to their positions which could come

from the mass itself, for example, through the repatriated city unemployed. Even if this was not a conscious element of their thinking, had the elite not acted in time their position would have been seriously compromised. But, by pursuing the opposite course, they were able to reserve political leadership for themselves. As noted earlier, even local PSA leadership was mostly in the hands of the elite, many of whom had ties with the ASAP. The repatriated city unemployed, while often initiating protest and civil disobedience, never attained important positions in the party organization.

The protest impetus of the rural masses cannot be so specifically identified. They had been interfered with in virtually every aspect of

their lives and now found that they could thumb their noses at the white administrator who had successfully put virtual terror in their hearts for so long. Superficially their protest forms appear to have been completely unselective. They boycotted not only such regulations as

the payment of taxes but also those which were entirely in their in199

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING terest, such as medical examinations. Yet, on closer analysis, it would appear that a certain selectivity did occur. For instance, schools were not boycotted. The only explanation for this is that they were aware of the advantage—material and otherwise—of having an education. The relationship between inoculations and health was not at all clear and thus the reaction: “If you keep coming around to do this you must be getting something out of it, therefore you have to pay me.” To what extent a different colonial policy could have produced a greater appreciation of the value of agricultural regulations, medical censuses, inoculation programs, and so on, is a matter for conjecture. Ryckmans

can again be cited, as he decries the manner in which a conseil de secteur (sector council) is told what had to be done in their area regarding obligatory cultivation:

About fifteen fellows listen with a gloomy expression to the speech made in “sabir’” [government dialect which they more or less scorn] which gives them a resume of the obligatory cultivation [planned] for this year. Some disciplinary remarks are made and all has been said; not the slightest diplomacy, no . . . explanation, one treats the chiefs like stupid brutes [abrutis]. That is what they no doubt are,

but it would not be all that much more difficult, and you never know. .. .?4

At any rate, the annoying regulations were more frequently resisted, while those innovations of the colonial system which had brought recognizable, tangible benefits were left to stand. One major qualification of this formula must, however, be made. In the areas where syncretic movements manifested themselves this was no longer necessarily true. Thus, whereas most of the time salaried work was not spontaneously boycotted, this did occur in some instances where such religious beliefs were prevalent. It will be recalled that in Masi Manimba several hundred palm fruit cutters had stopped work because they believed that Kimbangu (the founder of the religion) would feed them. It is significant that the elite founders of the PSA in Kikwit encoun-

tered little difficulty in obtaining the support of virtually every element of the rural population with which they came in contact, while the run-of-the-mill elite were initially wary and unenthusiastic. Every propaganda team sent to the villages came back reporting the wholehearted commitment of the villagers, but the elite had to be pushed even after the party had begun its general activities. On July 10, 1959, 24 Kestergat, op.cit., p. 105.

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DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION the Kikwit PSA Committee held a special meeting for the “Intellectuals of Kikwit.” After a description of the party policy the following statement was made.

Union gives strength . . . while leaving you free [to do what you want] I invite you to let me know what you want done, so that our party, which already has quite a number of members, can function well.

I know that the majority among you is for this party; why then don’t you attend our public meetings? The population is asking itself this question when they see that only a few clerks [1e., elite] attend these meetings. CAN THE CLERKS NOT FEEL THE NECESSITY OF BELONGING TO A PARTY IN ORDER TO FORM A GREAT MOVEMENT WHERE THE INTELLECTUALS WILL PLAN, THE OLD PEOPLE WILL LEND SUPPORT, AND THE YOUTH WILL EXECUTE IN AGREEMENT, DIGNITY AND LEGALITY?*®

But the key to the success of the PSA was not the relationship between the more dynamic elite and those who for one reason or another (possibly a disagreement over leadership) did not fall in step right away. Rather, the relationship of the PSA leaders and propagandists with the rural masses was the crucial element. The party organizers came upon amazingly fertile ground and found themselves involved in a sort of exchange. The villagers submitted themselves to an exceedingly vague party discipline and contributed important sums of money

to the party coffers. (The membership fee ranged from 30 to 100 francs and in a properly organized region virtually every man, woman

and child had a membership card.) In return, the villagers obtained an identification through which it became easier and more satisfying to protest against the colonial system. They also attained a structure which was controlled by Congolese, which belonged to them, and in which they could take pride. That too was an important part of the relation between party and followers. It perpetuated and increased the psychological gratifications of protest. Not only would they object to the white man’s rules, not only would they test out his patience and refuse to participate in his system, but they now had a substitute structure of their own. This is no doubt the reason why the PSA, and other 25 Meeting with the intellectuals of Kikwit, Kikwit, July 10, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 51.

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parties, developed so many parallel organizations which in the end constituted an almost self-contained public service structure.

This relationship between the leaders of the interior and the rural masses existed independently of the party’s policy planks. But had cer-

tain PSA policies thwarted the grass-roots desire for ever more militant forms of protest, the leaders would have been in trouble. Thus the initial PSA policy of cooperating with Van Hemelrijck was destined for considerable difficulties at the local level. Even in the summer of 1959 the PSA indulged in gross misrepresentation of what Van Hemelrijck stood for, presumably in order to obtain the support of the rural populace for the pro-Van Hemelrijck campaign which it organized in

May and June of that year. In effect, the mass was given the impression that Van Hemelrijck would literally bring immediate independence. The apparent contradiction between the support for Van Hemelrijck and the antagonism vis-a-vis many of the local representatives of the Minister—the administrators—was first of all not as great as it seemed because the latter were, quite correctly, seen as opposed to his “pro-Congolese” views, and second, this was a stratagem to reconcile the need for a party strategy in the face of Belgian policies with

the need for popular appeal among the rural population. Consequently, the administrators were described as the “incorrigibles belges de la brousse’’?*® and Van Hemelrijck as “le grand ministre.” But this did not alter the fact that Van Hemelrijck’s position was far from the one which PSA followers ascribed to him. One side effect of this stratagem was that it put pressure on Van Hemelrijck to move more quickly

toward independence. But obviously the inherent inconsistency in backing Van Hemelrijck, while at the same time opposing the administration, could not have been maintained indefinitely. When Van Hemelrijck took a harder posture toward Congolese political parties, the PSA leaders in effect escaped from this dilemma and the PSA position quickly veered away from support of the minister. In hardening its policy the PSA avoided disappointing, and perhaps being disavowed by, its followers.

After this policy switch in July 1959—which coincided with the growing closeness of elite and mass—there followed a complicated readjustment of the PSA position. Whereas one of the arguments used by the PSA in its early search for followers had been that the Kwango-

Kwilu should oppose federalism, the switch to an alliance with the 26 PSA Kikwit activities, Kikwit, July 11, 1959, ibid., p. 58.

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ABAKO and to support of federalism did not encounter any opposition at the local level. This is not surprising since protest against the colonial system had its own logic in the villages, and national alliances

or constitutional theories were far from the real local concerns. The rural masses expected the party leaders to challenge the colonial administration with ever-increasing intensity, and to involve them in this process; in other respects leadership was given a free hand.

The Local Impact of the Hard-Line Policy Adopted by the PSA in August 1959

Up to the end of August the PSA had concentrated on creating territorial and village sections in the rural regions. The speed with which the Kikwit leaders were able to do this is reflected in the rapid growth of the party’s treasury, which has been discussed in an earlier chapter.27 Suffice it to say here that the organization could not keep pace with the desire of the popluation for membership and the symbol of membership—the party card. Apart from that, the PSA attempted to channel the mass enthusiasm it encountered into organized action. It also spent a considerable amount of time explaining the party platform and identifying itself with the magic word “independence.” Beyond that the party had become involved in a few incidents of the type described above concerning Masi Manimba. Finally, the PSA had decided to boycott the summer 1959 elections of some members of the circonscriptions indigénes (C. I.) councils.?® Unfortunately very little information exists about the success of this boycott (not to be confused with the December 1959 elections). It would be logical to assume that the PSA had not yet attained sufficient organizational extension to effect such a boycott. Presumably, the decision lent moral support to the ABAKO, which was ahead of the PSA in the establishment of rural sections. This assumption is supported by a reference to these elections in a letter from the Kikwit PSA Committee dated October 13, 1959. Arguing for determined opposition to the December elections, Katshunga states: “You know very well that the functioning of the sectors [i.e., the C.I.’s] has not changed as a result of the election of their councils.”*® This indicates that in at least some 27 Although allegations have been made to the effect that the PSA received financial aid from abroad, the writer found not the slightest evidence for this. 28 CRISP, ABAKO, p. 243. These elections were held at different times in different parts of the Congo. 29 Letter from M. Katshunga and C. Mafuta to President, Idiofa PSA Section, Kikwit, October 13, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 134.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING parts of the Kwango-Kwilu area these elections had in fact taken place and the boycott order was apparently not followed.

By September the PSA had resolved the problem of its relationship with the ABAKO, and both parties took up a more militant and hard

policy. The local organizations were told to expect an all-out fight against the administration. As noted elsewhere, national policy involved plans for a possible provisional government-in-exile. This development occurred at a time when the PSA had already succeeded in extending its organization to a substantial number of the rural territories. Both the spirit and the goals of the leadership and the masses now coincided as never before. Resistance to the colonial administration grew and developed because of the spontaneous impetus already present and because of the new definition of party policy by PSA leaders.

On September 9, 1959, Gizenga sent a remarkable secret directive to all sections which gives a good picture of the new policy and incidentally sheds some light on his political style.

We are sending you below a top secret instruction which will assure the continuation of all public and private services during the transitional period. The party militants who are at present active in all sectors [i.e., professions] must receive from you prudent instructions aimed at arousing their conscience and sense of responsibility.

You may perhaps also give additional directives, informing us of them by strictly confidential communications with all your suggestions which you think will assure our success. General principle

You must always keep in mind that we demand independence so that we ourselves can run our country and that, for the time being, we only have those technicians who are at present in place. Independence will necessarily cause a severe loss both of capital and of trained personnel. A pplication

The Congolese personnel at present working in administrative, judicial, police, military, and private capacities must expect to take responsibility in their respective fields if necessary. That is to say, when independence is declared many whites will not wish to work

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DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION with us. In such a case, the positions of territorial agents, ATA, AT, district commissioner, judiciary, police, military, Provincial Governor, will automatically be taken over by Congolese based on grade, length of service, and competence. For example, should a territorial agent disappear or return to his country, then the clerk under him will immediately take his place. Similarly, if a commanding officer

were to go home, the senior sergeant major would replace him, etc... .*° Gizenga’s directive is interesting for several reasons. First, it shows how far plans for the establishment of a provisional government had

progressed. Second, in dealing with the “proclamation of independ- , ence,” he correctly assessed what many Belgians were to do after independence was granted. Thus, although the granting of independence took place under constitutional rather than revolutionary circumstances, many Belgian administrators quit the Congo both before and after the mutiny of the Force Publique, and the clerks who had worked under them took over their administrative responsibilities. Third, this directive demonstrates how determined the PSA leaders were already at this time. In comparing the content of this document with the various Belgian attempts to cajole Congolese leaders into a “reasonable” position, it becomes apparent how hopelessly far apart the two sides were, and to what extent Belgian leaders misunderstood the mood of the Cartel. Fourth, and perhaps of greatest interest, is the manner in which Gizenga thought the party could take over the administrative structure. The reliance upon the elite is not surprising since the party was in effect led by them. But the assumption that the elite could simply substitute themselves for the Belgian administrators and officers under conditions which would be revolutionary reflects a somewhat unrealistic view of what was likely to happen. It is also most questionable whether the mass of the Congolese population would have accepted such a simple and direct substitution of elite for whites, especially under revolutionary conditions. Yet the assumption that they would is typical of the elite attitude at this time.

The apparent inability of party leaders to appreciate fully the independent impetus of protest coming from the grass roots is, however,

readily understandable. It was only natural that the elite organizers thought that their spectacular success was largely due to their political skills. The fact that the masses only allowed themselves to be led in a 80 Letter to all Section Presidents from Central Committee, Leopoldville, September 13, 1959, ibid., pp. 117-18.

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restricted direction did not become clear until much later when the leaders attempted to re-establish overall social and political discipline which had collapsed during the struggle for independence. The PSA did, however, recognize that its new policy would intensify

administration opposition. Mulele, speaking to the Kikwit Committee

shortly after the Gizenga directive was launched, plainly suggested that the party prepare itself for the worst: “. . . we must expect incidents with bloodshed.’ Under such circumstancss the relations of the leaders to the mass was seen as particularly important and Mulele took cognizance of this. “Certain clerks of the auxiliary personnel affect postures of superiority, used [as they are] to seeing this example on the part of their immediate superiors [i.e., Belgian administrators]. This is a grave error on their part. We must be correct toward the administration and simple with the masses.’’*?

The problem which the leaders faced was that they in fact held two positions. They headed the PSA and also served immediately under Belgian superiors. In their first role they were very dependent on popular support and they became increasingly more concerned with this. In a review of PSA activities in Kikwit, Katshunga explained how the party disseminated its decisions: “All our declarations and decisions

must first be approved by our intellectual counselors, then by the elders of all the tribes, [and only then] may they be released. Therein lies the key to our success.”** The care with which party leaders obtained the consent of various segments of their following shows how far they were from absolute power. An example may be cited from the writer’s own experience. In Kikwit (in April 1960) he interviewed one of the top PSA leaders at party headquarters. This was a fairly unusual event, and a small crowd collected around the window of the office to listen from the street to what was going on. Since this uninvited audience was quite disturbing, the leader in question attempted on several occasions to shoo them away. However, they refused to leave and despite the fact that they were all PSA followers, indeed some of them were probably employed by the party, there was nothing that could be done. It was clear that they felt they had a right to be present at any goings on of their party and that “orders” were not meant to be given in this realm. The very same leader would have had 81 Minutes, Meeting of the Kikwit PSA Committee and Political Bureau, presided by the National Secretary General, Kikwit, September 19, 1959, ibid., p. 125. 82 Tbid., p. 123.

88 Report on PSA activities in Kikwit since its creation, Leopoldville, January 3, 1960, ibid., pp. 149-50.

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DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION no problem at all in ordering the same individuals to go out and protest even if this involved facing a police contingent and endangering their lives. Thus from the villagers’ point of view the leaders were responsive to their opinions and wishes. The same elite leaders were, however, in a totally different position

when attached professionally to the administration or to any of the large European enterprises. They deeply desired to prove that they could make the administrative system work just as well as the Belgians. Some of this is clearly revealed in Gizenga’s directive. But every

move in that direction inevitably sustained the system which was so obnoxious to the masses. It is, of course, obvious that the basic dilemma which this presented to the elite was not altogether dissimilar to the problems which the educated elites of other African nations had to face at a comparable moment in the independence struggle. If the analyses which have been made of the nationalist struggle in other

African countries are to be accepted, one difference, in this instance, lay in the existence of serious protest before the party organized it. Certainly, the accelerated speed with which the entire development took place, and the weakness of the colonial response to these challenges are special features in the case of the Congo. Not only was it impossible

for nationalist leaders to think through and decide just where the party should insist the administrative structure be maintained and where

it should be opposed, but they had not had the time to organize the disciplined apparatus with which to implement such decisions. In the period under discussion (the fall of 1959), the problem was largely solved because of the breakdown of realistic negotiations between the Cartel and the administration. In effect, but never in fact, PSA policy

came close to ordering the very actions which the population spontaneously desired—a total boycott of the administration. But had this not been the case the leaders could easily have lost the confidence of their followers to a leader or group of leaders willing to give the mass what it wanted.

A period of partially ordered civil disobedience therefore followed the September 13 Gizenga directive. In several respects the implementation surpassed the intentions of the leadership. But whereas this was not viewed with concern at that time, it did have the effect of forcing the party, at least at the local level, to perform an increasing number of governmental functions. If the courts were boycotted someone else had to arbitrate disputes, and since the role of leadership had been given to the party, someone from the party had to fill this role. At the

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same time this extension of functions widened the validity of the party’s existence in the eyes of the population and thus helped it extend its influence and obtain dues. The Boycott of the December 1959 Elections and Relations with the Local Administration

The decline in administrative control over large areas of the Congo naturally did not take place in a systematic fashion. At the local level it depended very much on the individual attitudes of the administrator in charge. At the national level it depended on a multitude of factors

such as the relations of the Governor General with the Minister for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi. One of the last really concerted efforts

of the administration as a whole was to make the December 1959 elections a success. The importance of this election within the framework of the Belgian plan for eventual independence outlined in the fall of 1959 has already been discussed. The entire Belgian colonial policy and philosophy now focused on the establishment of viable local government institutions upon which provincial and national governments could be based. Politically, the elections were seen as the an-

swer to the “radicals’—i.e., mainly the ABAKO and the PSA. Through these elections the Belgian authorities in effect hoped to pull off what de Gaulle had accomplished in 1958, that is to say, elect

moderates, give them at least formal power and independence, and thus take the wind out of the sails of their radical opponents. The scenario was completed with the establishment of the PNP and its enthusiastic endorsement of the elections and the plan to choose Congolese representatives for the forthcoming Round Table from among the elected. The reasons why the Cartel parties opposed the elections have already been discussed.

At the local level the campaign against participation in the December 1959 elections was the most critical test through which the PSA passed. The administration placed considerable pressure on the rural population to register for the election. Resisting this pressure was not usually easy; it did not involve a spontaneous explosion or a sly challenge of authority which would be hard to formulate in legal terms. Fach individual villager had to decide to say no to the administrator who had the power to throw him in jail and apparently did so on a number of occasions. It was a lonely act. It might be argued that registration for medical censuses, taxation, and other such activities were equivalent to allowing oneself to be registered for the December elec208

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tion. However, the administrative system obviously operated on the basis of large-scale voluntary participation in these programs. When people were actually caught and imprisoned for not paying taxes, they did pay them, as was demonstrated in the example cited concerning Masi Manimba. But it was manifestly impossible for the administration to catch everyone and since there was a general agreement to sabotage this effort, it succeeded. The entire administrative apparatus, however, went into high gear in

order to obtain participation in the December elections. Practically speaking, therefore, resisting registration was a far more difficult matter than resisting taxation or medical censuses. Furthermore, as has

been pointed out before, there was a positive incentive to register, since this was to result in the first real local self-government. Thus in

areas that had not been completely politicized, the PSA’s job was doubly difficult. But in order to politicize it was necessary to appear, to hold meetings, and above all, to give the local population a new

sense of identity—which all over the Congo came to be party membership.

In describing the evolution of protest, some information has been given concerning a sort of paralysis and organizational decadence which permeated the administration. It is now necessary to give further details of this governmental decay, which was in part responsible for the success of the election boycott. The following episode is illustra-

tive. Here, as in the Masi Manimba incident, elements of the relationship between the Kikwit PSA Committee and the local administration are revealed.

Before the conclusion of the ABAKO-PSA alliance, the centralist policy of the PSA resulted in its being viewed with some favor by certain echelons of the administration. The district commissioner in Kikwit had even given the PSA leaders the impression that he would help them extend their influence in Kwilu district. One report from the Kikwit Committee noted: “We have to add that we have confidence in the Belgian Government, and for this reason we have frequent contacts with the authorities in Kikwit, and in particular with Mr. Fimy [District Commissioner] who, incidentally, has promised us his support for the growth of our party in his district.”** One of the major points of contact between the administration and the local PSA leadership concerned permission to hold political meetings. On August 1, 1959, a delegation of PSA propagandists headed by Kamitatu left 34 PSA Activities in Kikwit, Kikwit, July 11, 1959, ibid.. p. 55.

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Kikwit with the intention of holding a meeting at Gungu. The territorial administrator had not given his permission beforehand, stating that he required further details. The Kikwit PSA had cabled ahead that they would come anyway and “additional explanations would be given on arrival,’’5

The next day the delegation arrived in Gungu and after a talk with local friends proceeded to ask the administrator, a Mr. Wille, for an authorization to hold a meeting, which he refused to grant. According to the PSA report: “. . . Monsieur Wille seems to take us for ambitious ones. ... [He says] that he is doing no more than applying the instructions which he has received from his chief.’** The delegation naturally responded with disbelief since his superior was District Commissioner Fimy, referred to above. On being told by the delegation of the amicable relations which the PSA had with Fimy, Wille seems to have softened his attitude. He subsequently told the delegation that they would simply have to “fill out the normal application forms.”’*”

One of Wille’s clerks (a Congolese) proceeded to write up the authorization and at the same time showed the delegation an administration instruction regarding political activities. “. . . we took note of letter No. 2,827, dated June 26, 1959, addressed to Territorial Administrators. Subject: Actions of political parties in the Territories. We have never received a copy of this letter despite Mr. Fimy’s noble promises. .. .’8 Instantly the sympathy with which the Kikwit PSA Committee had looked upon the district commissioner came to an end. “. . . it is pointless to continue talking about the A. T. [Territorial Administrator] who did no more than follow the orders he had received.”®? Needless to say, the security procedures followed by the local administrator were nothing short of astounding. By allowing a member of the local Congolese elite access to directives concerning political party activity he was in effect playing with an open deck of cards. He had also ruined the relations which his immediate superior, the district commissioner,

was attempting to maintain with the PSA. For the party the whole thing was a typical bit of administration hypocrisy.

However, the lack of vigilance over security was a minor matter when compared to what the administrator did next.

A moment later we saw Mr. Wille enter. This time he smiled wishing to flatter us a little. He asks whether everything is all right! “Couldn’t 85 Report of Kikwit-PSA activities, Kikwit, August 1, 1959, ibid., pp. 41-44. 36 Tbid. 87 Ibid. 88 [bid, 89 Tbid,

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DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION be better” we answer. He wishes us success in our plans and then we

Started a conversation speaking of this and that. He instructs [an aide] to show us the correspondence from the District regarding political parties. We read it and express much regret concerning Mr. Fimy’s attitude.*°

Obviously the administrator was swaying with the wind. At first he refused to give permission for a meeting because he did not want any trouble. When the delegation came anyway, he tried this tactic again but when they were not frightened off, and particularly when they told him they had amicable relations with his superior, he changed his tack.

Not wanting to be viewed as a “bad Belgian” he even went further and “proved” his bureaucratic innocence. He was just following orders! Wille’s relations with the PSA probably did not improve for long because of his “frankness.” Copies of his monthly administrative reports were being passed on to the PSA presumably by the clerks in his office.

Thus the PSA leaders were able to read in the month following the delegation’s trip to Gungu:

Compared to the climate of agitation which is currently prevalent nearly everywhere as a result of the boycott of the elections of next December—a subversive activity which has been carried out openly by the only local political party which had, unfortunately, been encouraged in its beginnings in several territories of the district— we can at least be glad of the relative quiet in Gungu Territory.

We believe it is our duty to combat, energetically, the above mentioned subversive activity. ... . . . it would be unforgivable to be surpassed by events because there was insufficient surveillance.*?

By his own judgment it is clear that Gungu’s administrator had in-

deed been “surpassed by events.” And with all this information in its hands, the PSA could hardly have been expected to place its trust in the administrators with whom it had to deal. On the contrary, the essential disdain with which one administrator viewed the persons in40 Tbid.

41 Activity Report of the Administrator of the Territory, a.i. Henri Wille, Gungu,

September, 1959. (Author’s files, PSA-56.) All the information given here has been collected from PSA files. This carries with it the admitted weakness that an entirely different version of the events recounted may be missing. Nonetheless, this is the story which the PSA saw and reacted to. In that respect it is in itself a valid addition to an analysis of relations with the local administration.

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volved in organizing the party was made clear in another section of the same administrative report dealing with a disturbance in the territory. “It would lead nowhere—except perhaps to an even greater poisoning of relations—to open discussions on the problems and complaints which have been introduced (purely as a matter of form). The only language which counts in these circumstances and which is un-

derstood by everybody consists in showing how clearly one sees through the nefarious game of these pseudo-politicians.”** The example of the relations between political leaders and the administration, and the decay existing within the administration, is not, in the opinion of the writer, unrepresentative of the state of affairs at this time. Incidents of this type naturally tended to push the elite leadership into an ever-increasing antipathy for Belgian colonial rule, and in turn tended to blind them to the dangers inherent in an unselective opposition to the administrative apparatus. But since such opposition was also applauded by the rank and file, it was natural that its anarchic potential was not recognized until the party leaders achieved some measure of responsibility and power over the administration. That did not occur until after the Round Table and even then was very limited.

Although there was massive civil disobedience in the PSA area during the fall of 1959, formal party directives only ordered the boycott of election registration and voting. In fact almost the entire party correspondence and the minutes of meetings during this period center on this one goal.** The writer found no documentary evidence of any other orders issued encouraging activity which could be construed to be illegal or disobedient of the civil order. However, in an interview with

the Kenge PSA Committee mention was made of a party directive ordering PSA members not to pay their taxes. This was also confirmed by Kimvay. Whether this order was in fact formally issued was, even then, academic since the population had ceased to pay taxes some time before the PSA took up its “hard-line” policy. According to District Commissioner Lehman in Kikwit, not only did the refusal to pay taxes

predate any party directives in this regard but civil disobedience touched virtually all functions and services of the administration by the fall of 1959. At the end of 1959 approximately 70 per cent of the population even refused to use their own traditional courts because

42 Ibid. |

these formed part of the judicial system set up by the administration.

It is entirely possible and likely that local PSA leaders responding

43 For examples, see CRISP, PSA, pp. 128, 131, 133, 136, 137, 138.

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to popular pressure and their own enthusiasm for the struggle taking place did encourage what had started as a spontaneous boycott. Some traces of this more aggressive local mood regarding the December election can be found in letters addressed to the Kikwit PSA Committee. For instance, the Kikongo PSA Section wrote to ask whether they could “secretly stop the other workers” from registering for the elections.*4 Unfortunately, the writer found no trace of Kamitatu’s reply. However, on other occasions national and provincial leaders laid a great deal of emphasis on the need to remain calm, and to refrain from violence. “The PSA has adopted a policy of independence, but this does not exclude all friendly or cultural relations with the rest of the world, including Belgium. The PSA is pursuing this policy with pacific means... .”*5

Or on another occasion, on being informed about some troubles between the local population at Imbongo and the administration, Kamitatu reacted as follows: “On the one hand it’s all for the best. In the future the population must be asked to demonstrate with dignity.

The Government is afraid of our position. It must be strengthened. WE WILL NOT VOTE.”** Gizenga even went so far as to make a very moderate statement on the Belgian Congo Radio, in which he said:

I profoundly regret the somewhat serious incidents which have occurred recently in all the corners of the country. ... I would like to address myself particularly to the population of the Kwango and Kwilu which, in the majority, is composed of members and sympathizers of the PSA, with a view to inviting them to be calm and quiet.

It is utterly valueless to initiate acts of violence in order to bring about our goal of independence. We know very well that the civilizing work of the Belgian people in the Congo, while exalting, con-

tains like all human endeavors many ineptitudes and imperfections and that the current policy of the Belgian government ought to be changed.*” 44 Tbid., p. 132.

45 Minutes of meeting, Valentin Lubuma, Idiofa, end November, 1959, ibid., . 141.

. 46 Letter from C. Kamitatu to President, a.i. Kikwit Committee, Leopoldville, October 10, 1959, ibid., pp. 130-31. 47 Radio appeal by the General President of the PSA, Leopoldville, November 14, 1959, ibid., p. 106.

213

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING It is clear that the boycott of administrative services was a matter which was largely left in the hands of the local population and the local section leaders. The party did not specifically encourage this, but it also did not discourage it. The reasons for this policy—or lack of policy— on the part of the PSA leaders are many. In the first place they were busy extending their organization and preparing the boycott of the elections. Second, the refusal of the administration to negotiate with them and the possibility that the party would form a provisional government-in-exile with a more aggressive and violent program in the villages meant that the boycott of administrative services might in the end form a very central part of the party’s policy. Third, the admin-

istration had, as noted before, mounted a massive campaign to get people to register and vote, and this naturally increased the PSA’s leaders’ antagonism.

Here are the measures which the administrator [Kipuka sector] has outlined. For those who will not present their identity card [for registration] a separate list will be established. Each man will receive a voting number. Then, before the elections they will be convened, but one by one. And each one will be asked for his identity card in order to place the number which has been given him on the card, with the threat of seven days in prison and a fine of 500 francs.*®

And finally the leaders also felt that the people in the interior were being treated more harshly than those in Leopoldville. The same report

goes on to ask whether any administrative steps were being taken against persons unwilling to register in the city—in fact they were not.

In the entire history of the PSA no moment existed when the leadership’s directives were as close to the grass-roots mood of rebelliousness. Nonetheless, because the party leaders were all members of the elite who were destined to inherit the administrative structure if and when Belgium did transfer power, an unrecognized and unresolved rift still existed between them and their mass following. In effect, only so long as no devolution of power had taken place could the proximity of the two levels of the party be so close. Indeed, it can be argued that in allowing the local sections to maintain and extend the boycott of administrative services the leaders largely nullified the essential point of Gizenga’s directive of September 13, 1959. For if the entire administrative apparatus was to be rejected in such a wholesale fashion, 48 PSA Kikwit Activities, Kikwit, October 1, 1959, ibid., pp. 128-29.

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there was clearly not much point for the elite to prepare to take over the functions of their Belgian superiors in the administration.

The spectacular success of the election boycott has already been dealt with. Afterwards, in January and February 1960, a leadership void existed since most of the top leaders were either in exile or in Brussels at the Round Table. There is no indication that this had a very great effect on the rural sections. The grass-roots militancy continued, and the quasi-governmental functions which were imposed on the party increased.

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CHAPTER X = 2222927922 Relations with Other Institutions S THE PSA grew in size and influence the party came into inTaN creasing contact—and often conflict—with other institutions: with the traditional chiefs and the African clergy and with the white Catholic hierarchy, and with the management of the larger commercial enterprises. Naturally, contacts with the administration continued to be

of prime concern. Apart from a continuation of the type of friction described in the preceding chapter, however, there were no dramatic changes in PSA-administration relations in the interior until local Executive Colleges were appointed for the interim period between the end

of the Round Table Conference and independence. When these colleges in fact became operative, PSA leaders, for the first time, had some governmental authority. This did produce a fairly important change in

the situation even though the colleges functioned for only about two months.

This chapter will discuss the PSA’s relations with the aforementioned institutions and describe, rather briefly, the functioning of the local colleges. In addition it will attempt to show how the PSA was virtually forced into a proliferation of its functions and activities and how the pressure to do this came especially from the lower echelons of the party.

PSA Relations with Traditional Leaders

Earlier in this study the Belgian administrative structure was diagramed and briefly explained. It will be recalled that below the territory there were circonscriptions indigénes with Congolese “chiefs” at their

head. These circonscriptions indigénes were divided into two types: chefferies, which were traditional units with traditionally sanctioned

(but administration-appointed) chiefs at their head, and secteurs (sectors), which were set up in areas where for one reason or another it was decided not to establish chefferies. The sectors were made up of small traditional units known as groupements with traditional chiefs at their head. The sector chief therefore headed an administrative subdivision which did not have any sort of pre-colonial existence. He himself was either the traditional chief of one of the groupements, or an ordinary person chosen by the administration.

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RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS For an exhaustive discussion of PSA relations with traditional leaders it would be necessary to deal with each type of chief separately;

that is to say, the chefs de groupement, the chefs de chefferie, the chefs de secteur, and finally paramount chiefs or persons who considered themselves to be in this category without having obtained formal administration recognition of this status. Unfortunately, such a com-

plete analysis is impossible since the writer was not able to collect sufficient data on this subject. Part of the reason for this was that the whole matter was not considered to be a vital one by the persons (especially in the PSA) interviewed. Party leaders, without exception, said

that relations with traditional chiefs were excellent, and to the extent | to which it was possible to observe this relationship this was completely confirmed. Since there was very little time available, it seemed advisable to concentrate the research effort on other matters and not delve too insistently into the possible distinctions which could be made in the relations of the PSA with the different types of chiefs.

The lack of conflict between the party and the traditional chiefs is probably attributable to the lack of power and dignity accorded them by the Belgians. Of all the different types of chiefs mentioned, it would be possible to hypothesize that the chefs de secteur were most depend-

ent on the administration. They were also hand picked and therefore presumably met with more approbation and support from Belgian

administrators than those (usually less educated) who were preselected by tradition. If any of the chiefs were to have had a good re-

lation with the administration it would presumably have been the chefs de secteur, and one would have expected such chiefs to follow the administration lead in opposing the PSA. Yet this did not as a rule occur. The reasons can only be speculated about, but it would appear that so long as the party did not oppose them, the chefs de secteur had very little to lose by abandoning the administration. Again André Ryckmans may be turned to for a very frank assessment of the position in which such chiefs were placed under the Belgian system.

To speak of indirect administration here is nothing but hypocrisy. Our sector chiefs are adroit collaborators whom we leave alone so long as they keep their books in order. At any rate we are illogical since we ourselves treat them with less respect than a messenger. Consequently they are detested by their people and not supported by us; and in effect they are despicable and without any initiative.* 1 Kestergat, op.cit., pp. 110-11.

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In fact, the advent of the independence struggle may have given some of the chefs de secteur an opportunity to redeem themselves vis-a-vis the population. By supporting the PSA they ceased to be “detested” by their people. They were “adroit collaborators” so long as

there was no alternative, but once such an opportunity presented itself there were very many whose very adroitness showed them that

| the administration—for which they could not have had much love in any case—no longer held the future in its power. Obviously, if this can be said about the chefs de secteur, in all likelihood the tendency to welcome the advent of political parties, the independence struggle, and in this instance the PSA, was even greater among traditional chiefs who were less dependent on the administration and possibly even less well treated by it.

Apart from these general considerations there are two more specific factors which must be considered in this discussion. First, the fact that the rural areas of the Kwango-Kwilu were in general politicized some

time before the December 1959 elections re-enforced the ease with which chiefs (here meant to include both traditional and purely administration-appointed) related to the PSA and also the ease with which the party accepted them. As has been noted in Part I, this was so be-

cause in areas where the politicization occurred later, it took place after the administration’s effort in support of moderate parties during that election. With regard to chiefs this was frequently a crucial difference since they had often received a great deal of support during the election (either directly from the local administration or via the PNP) and had in large numbers been elected to the territorial councils. They, therefore, had something more substantial to defend against the mili-

tant party leaders after the December elections. On the other hand, the militant party leaders naturally remembered that these chiefs had allowed themselves to be “used” (in their eyes) by the administration. During the elections they were often in open opposition to the militant parties.

In the PSA area, the early spread of the party had, in effect, avoided

real “class” conflict with chiefs. Realizing that the election boycott

would succeed, the chiefs in the Kwango-Kwilu on the whole refused . to become candidates in the December 1959 elections. Consequently they did not receive the sometimes lavish support which was available

for moderate candidates. In turn, this meant that they had a much smaller vested interest in ties with the administration, they did not hold the more substantial positions of territorial council membership, 218

RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS

and they had not received any material support. Therefore, they had good reasons for siding with the PSA. Of course, where an entire ethnic group followed a different path, as in the case of the Bayaka, none of these considerations held. The second factor which must be borne in mind in any discussion of

the PSA’s relationship with traditional leaders was the fact that the ethnic heterogeneity of the Kwango and Kwilu districts had reduced chefferies to a very small number when compared with the sectors. In 1956 the proportion was 8 to 71 respectively. Thus, when speaking

of traditional leaders in the context of this study, they are for the most part either the sector chiefs or the super-local chiefs of the groupement.

Faced with these conditions the PSA pursued an entirely pragmatic policy with regard to the traditional leaders. They were, in fact, treated simply as Congolese who, like everyone else, had been mistreated by the colonial system. If they “saw the light” and cooperated with the party they were welcomed; if they did not, they were condemned for being “against independence.” In fact, most of the chiefs seem to have been willing to help the party

from the very start of PSA activities. In return the PSA was careful to pay them formal respect and involve them as much as possible in party activities. A typical situation was reported in August 1959 by a PSA team touring the villages around Kikwit.

We arrived at Mobindi at 12 at night and the chief of the village, Kile Arthur, was the first to receive us. —-At this point Kipasa Wil-

son [a member of the team] began by introducing M. Kakwala [leader of the team] to the chief and explained to him the goal of our trip and asked him to be good enough to call together his population, despite the late hour... after a few strokes of the bell we are surrounded by all the inhabitants of the village, men, women, and children. —M. Kakwala immediately began to speak... .3

At another village: “A model of a PSA card was given to the chief of the groupement in order to avoid any confusion with other political movements.”* ‘The same general relationship was maintained after the PSA hardened its position in August 1959. For example, the Kikwit

PSA Committee asked that the orders to boycott the elections and 2 Chamber of Representatives, Report on the Administration of the Belgian Congo Colony, 1956, Brussels, 1957, p. 69. 8 Report of Propaganda Tour, August 2 to 8, 1959, Kikwit, CRISP, PSA, p. 45. 4 Ibid.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING some of the other party documents be translated into Kikongo so that they could be left with the traditional chiefs.°

According to PSA leaders most of the traditional chiefs were iliterate and the party therefore involved them only at the very local level to help disseminate propaganda, translate into local languages, and give their moral support especially during fund collections. And the party recognized their value. Thus in Kikwit the PSA leaders reported that

the lembas or elders of each ethnic group or tribe “are at the same time our fiercest propagandists.’’®

The traditional chiefs sometimes found themselves in the limelight because the administration, after having spent decades reducing their stature, now began to employ them as a convenient moderate counterbalance to the “radical elite.” This resulted in a sometimes ironic and sometimes pathetic tug of war between the administration and the party over these grass-roots symbols of Congolese opinion. Seeing that the administration was prone to parade “briefed” traditional leaders in front of every inspecting minister or Belgian politician, the PSA did the same. An example of this occurred when Van Hemelrijck passed through Kikwit in June 1959. The PSA wrote a lengthy declaration which about twenty chiefs and councillors signed. It stated, among other things:

In the name of our people and in our own names we demand, in

accordance with article 73 of the United Nations Charter [the following]:

1. IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE.

2. [The undersigned] reject all conclusions in the Royal Message and Government Declaration of January 13, 1959... .

3. They revoke all previous declarations made by Interfédérale [i.e., the Interfédérale des Groupes Ethniques, a very moderate union of ethnic federations in Leopoldville] . . . which cannot represent our two districts without having been recognized and

delegated by us.... 6. Desire the immediate creation of a genuinely Congolese government between January 1960 and March 1960.’ 5 Kikwit PSA Activities, Kikwit, October 1, 1959, ibid., p. 128. 6 Author’s files, PSA-68.

7 Memorandum of all the Chiefs and Councillors of the Secteurs and C.I.’s of the Kwilu-Kwango, June 22, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 93.

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RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS This militancy on the part of traditional leaders obviously aroused the ire and curiosity of the administration. In at least one instance a signatory was questioned about this by the administrator of his sector. The following is an extract of the declaration he made, which was promptly passed on to the PSA presumably by one of the clerks who

had, once again, had access to information which one would have supposed the administrator would have kept from him.

On Saturday, June 20, I learned at Kikwit that the Sector Chiefs had to sign a demand for independence since they were paid by the

State. ... On Saturday, Sunday and Monday morning I heard several people say, “Those who do not sign will get their heads cut off.” I could not tell you exactly who said this, but among others it was said by M.I.... but he said it [only] to warn me....

We were particularly sorry that on Saturday, Sunday, or even on Monday morning, we could not ask you [the administrator] for advice because you only arrived at 9 o’clock.®

It will be noted that the signatory under investigation was attempting to stay on the good side of the administrator without giving away too

much information about the PSA. This is probably a good reflection of the attitude of many traditional leaders, and indeed it would seem

the only course open to them. There can be little doubt that the signatories had little appreciation of what article 73 of the United Nations Charter stated, or many of the other statements which had been written out for them. On another occasion a PSA leader reported: “I

will make them [chiefs and notables] sign a declaration like the administrators have done with the chiefs who signed the memorandum which was handed to the outgoing Minicoru [Minister for the Congo and Ruanda-Urundi].”® Once, when the President of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives was passing through Kikwit, the PSA got wind

of the local administration’s intention of bringing together the traditional chiefs. On this occasion the PSA got there first and reported with evident satisfaction: “A car with our emissaries passed through all the groupements to warn them, and all the chiefs refused to pre8 Author’s files, PSA-38. The writer obtained access to this document through the PSA. ® Author’s files, PSA-55.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING sent themselves. . . . The baron returned to Leopoldville without see-

, ing a single native... .”*° As the power balance between the PSA and the administration shifted, the chiefs drew even closer to the party. In fact, a continuing problem was that party cards were not being printed fast enough and that the chiefs who came to get them were disappointed. The dilemma is brought out by a report written by Kamitatu and sent to Gizenga in mid-October.

. . . delegations come from everywhere asking us to travel everywhere; the initiative comes from the chiefs of the groupements who come asking for cards and bulletins in order to collect the fees in their villages. We are completely overwhelmed by such possibilities of success. Think of sending back these good Badinga who spend days on the road for no other reason than to promise us their aid.... Note that there are chiefs of groupements who get into trouble when they chase away the scribes of the circonscription indigéne when these come to stamp the identity cards with voter registration numbers. They [the chiefs] execute a party order and they have the im-

pression that the PSA does not encourage them by outfitting [munissant] them with membership cards and by justifying their position vis-a-vis the Administration.**

One of the reasons why the traditional leaders did not hold high party office and did not appear to aspire to such positions was the general recognition that the political leaders had to have a modern education in order to cope with the many complex problems which confronted the parties, especially dealing effectively with the Belgians. In the Kwango-Kwilu very many of them were illiterate and consequently confined to very local affairs. In fact, linguistic proficiency was, according to some informants, the key to the division of labor which occurred. Those proficient in French—i.e., the elite—made up the territorial committees and headed village sections in such villages where there were resident elite. The traditional chiefs were in charge of such activities as required only a knowledge of local languages. Such a division of labor was of course only possible in an area with a relatively heavy concentration of elite.

It is possible to set up a hypothesis to the effect that a real distinc10 Kikwit PSA activities, Kikwit, October 1, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 130. 11 Letter from PSA Provincial President to General President, Kikwit, October 13, 1959. (Author’s files, PSA-102.)

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tion existed between “legitimate” traditional leaders and administration-appointed ones. Thus the chiefs of the chefferies and the groupements would tend to fall into the first category, while the sector chiefs who had no traditional sanction would tend to fall into the second. It this dichotomy in fact existed, then it would be logical to suppose that the PSA allied itself with the “legitimate” chiefs. But too little information is available to put this hypothesis to the test. In the PSA documents which the writer has analyzed there is far more frequent favorable mention of the groupements chiefs than of the sector chiefs, but this probably reflects the fact that there were many more groupements . than sectors. Sector chiefs are also mentioned favorably, but it has not been possible to separate out the “legitimate” ones. In the May 1960 elections only two PSA candidates came from this milieu; both were sector chiefs, one was purely an administration appointee and the other was a “legitimate” chief. Significantly, both were literate and educated. PSA Relations with the Catholic Church and the Congolese Clergy

The relationship which the PSA developed with the Catholic Church reflected the very special role which the latter had forged for itself in

the Congo. The Church was the only European structure which had begun to Africanize almost at the very inception of its contact with the Congolese. The first Congolese priest was ordained in 1917, and by 1959 there were about 500 of them in the Congo. Some of the party leaders had attended junior and senior seminaries, and although this does not necessarily mean that their religious convictions were profound, and even less that they really meant to become priests, it did put them into very close contact with the Congolese clergy who graduated from the same institutions. Until the formation of political parties

gave the clerks, the medical assistants, and the teachers an opportunity to achieve high status, it was the Congolese clergy who were the “aristocrats” among the elite. They had obtained the highest education and the white society granted them more prestige than any other Congolese. In the case of the PSA, it will be recalled that the origins of the Kikwit Committee in ASAP constituted an additional tie both to the Congolese clergy and to some European members of the Church hierarchy.

On the other hand, there was a distinctly “anti-clerical” tendency in , the PSA. This covered a wide spectrum of opinions and attitudes rang-

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ing from an all-out antipathy for the Church to a mere opposition to some of the ties the Church maintained with Belgian political circles and the administration. Just where the mean opinion rested is impossible to judge with any accuracy, but it is probable that most PSA leaders did not oppose the strictly religious aspects of Church activities nor the educational functions of the missions, but did oppose the Church in situations where it subtly or overtly involved itself, or had an effect upon, political developments. The firm discipline imposed on the Congolese clergy by the missionary orders was also viewed as anachronistic. There was a tendency to feel that the Congolese clergy ought to enjoy some of the same autonomy from “outside” rule which was being achieved in the political field. If a closer analysis of this problem were to be attempted, it would be necessary to make a clear distinction between the following aspects of Church activities: (1) religious beliefs as such; (2) the European missionary structure; (3) the functional aspects of Church activities, i.e., education; (4) Church involvement in Belgian and Congolese political affairs; (5) the attitudes of local missionaries to the Congolese in general and specifically to the new political parties; and (6) the degree to which the Congolese

clergy was responsive to either Church attitudes regarding the independence movement or the attitudes of party leaders.

One thing is certain: the position of the Congolese clergy was sufficiently great in both the cities and the rural areas to make it virtually impossible for a mass party to oppose it in an outright fashion. This was as true for the PSA as it was for other Congolese parties.

On the local level another factor must be noted. The rural populace did not always make a great distinction between the white administrator and the white missionary. But, since the Church had Africanized

early, the Congolese clergy on the whole remained loyal to it. This was in contrast to the relationship which existed between the clerks and the administration. The clerks, while wishing to replace the Belgians in the administration, did not often fully identify themselves with

it. In this sense, the mass attitude of wishing to eliminate the white presence was more strongly reflected among the clerks than it was among the priests. Despite its reluctance to show antipathy for the white

presence the clergy naturally wanted to maintain its close relations with the rural masses. Consequently, it usually attempted to maintain an apolitical position. Such an attitude was also in conformity with directives of the Church hierarchy, as is demonstrated by the refusal to allow the Congolese clergy to participate in politics or run for elec-

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RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS

tive office. Of course the Congolese clergy was expected to oppose party activity deemed hostile to the Church.

From the point of view of the PSA this “neutral” position of the Congolese clergy was not a happy solution since the priests had considerable influence over the masses and would have been a useful ally of the party. Hence the PSA attempted to pressure the priests to support its activities. This is dramatically illustrated by the following letter sent to all Congolese clergy in the PSA area at the beginning of the civil disobedience campaign:

You know that the Kwango has never done anything about the many problems which have preoccupied other regions of the Congo. ...

Right now the question of independence is being discussed. The Kwango must therefore proudly participate in proving to the colonialists that there are many [Congolese] who could run an enterprise, several enterprises, a state, or several states, not for their own advantage, but because of their concern to get rid of the misery which has killed off our ancestors, our grandfathers, and which is still killing our fathers, ourselves, and our children.

Because of this, the Parti Solidaire Africain has been founded. Propagandize, teach, and instruct the people the advantages which will

come to them if they become party members. .. . You should fear the vengeance of current public opinion, for it is terrible. The first victims of the troubles of January 4, 1959 at Leopoldville, and of other troubles, were unfortunately priests and nuns. Doesn't this make you think? You will be respected all the more if you have openly helped to instruct the masses and [therefore] in the building of tomorrow’s Congo. At any rate this is your duty as citizens.

We, the Congolese, count on your full collaboration toward the Congo’s accession of independence.”

This pressure does not appear to have had a very dramatic effect.?* The Congolese clergy on the whole appear to have walked a tightrope between antagonizing the party and opposing Church discipline. They did not join the party, but it was clear that many were sympathetic to 12 Letter from Antoine Gizenga to Priests, October 15, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 145. Italics added. 13 In all his interviews the writer has found only one informant who claimed

that the Congolese clergy in some instances joined and helped to organize the PSA. This informant was himself a Congolese priest

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING it. They were greatly helped in this delicate game by the degree to which the Church had, through the years, legitimized itself in the eyes of the

elite and, probably to a lesser extent, the Congolese mass. If a clerk bowed to pressure from his superior in the administration not to join the party, he was almost inevitably scorned, but if a priest did the same thing and refused to oppose Church discipline against committing himself politically, he aroused little overt antagonism.

Having failed to enlist the open support of the Congolese clergy

the party employed a tactic aimed at preserving good relations with the Congolese priests and preventing them from becoming the tools of “clerical politics.” Neither the Church nor religion as such were opposed, but rather the missionary system and the attitudes of the white members of the hierarchy. Documentary evidence for this development only becomes available after the party began to publish its newspaper, Solidarité Africaine. In the March 18, 1960 issue the following argument was presented:

We will become independent and hope that after June 30 everything

will be born anew. No residue of colonialism can [then] justify the attitude of certain clerics.

We suggest that all missions be immediately disbanded, and that our prelates [i.e., Congolese] and their following be born anew in the baptism of independence. There is no reason for priests to live together in missions.

In principle, they should live in the villages among the population of which they are natives. ...

All they need is their sacerdotal equipment; build themselves a chapel, and have a stock of wheat flour to make consecrated wafers, and a case of consecrated wine. This would be real decentralization of power in this sphere.

It is no good pretending that missionaries [i.e., Europeans] do not get involved in politics, when they have sat in colonial councils [advisory bodies of the colonial administration] all the time.

We would be happy to know the opinion of the [Congolese] priests regarding this matter.* 14 Solidarité Africaine, March 18, 1960.

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RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS The article cited above had some unexpected results, however, and

caused the PSA considerable embarrassment. Not only the white Church hierarchy but apparently even some of the more pro-Catholic PSA members found the combination of this article and Gizenga’s trip to Eastern Europe to be tangible evidence that the party had be-

come anti-Catholic and pro-Communist. Since, in the context of Congolese politics, to be labeled pro-Communist was both pejorative

and dangerous, the party made a real effort to convince the public that only certain aspects of Church activities were opposed. Indeed, several articles in Solidarité Africaine leaned over backwards to such a degree that a veritably pro-Catholic position emerged. For instance, under a picture of Gizenga and Andrée Blouin, addressing a group of mission children, the caption in the May 21, 1960 issue read as follows:

Whatever people may be saying: The Parti Solidaire Africain is concerned with religious education which is necessary for the Congo’s youth. Consequently Comrade Antoine Gizenga, General President of the PSA, on the occasion of his visit to the Catholic Mission of Kandale exhorted the future mothers of Congolese families to take full advantage of the religious education which the Mis-

Sionaries offered them so that they would later become model mothers. For the family is the embryo of human society.

In the ensuing months the controversy over the PSA attitude to the Church and its different activities raged on. It became one of the few ideological issues over which a certain amount of real debate took place within the party councils.

However, this development changed little in the situation existing in the rural areas. At this level, the most important aspect of the PSAChurch relationship was the tacit recognition by the party that the Congolese clergy held an independent position. No other group of Congolese within the PSA stronghold was able to achieve such a special status. Normally, either one supported the party or one became its enemy. The reason for this exception was that the Congolese clergy had a function which was viewed as legitimate and also had real support among the population. In a word, the core activity of the Church, the conversion of the Congolese to Christianity i.e. Catholicism, had

to some extent taken roots so that large segments of the elite and the mass considered the Church as an almost natural part of their culture and society. It should also be added that many members of the 15 [hbid., May 21, 1960.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING clergy had long-standing personal relations with party leaders and in some instances were accorded a very high degree of respect. Indeed,

flict. ,

even in Leopoldville, a Congolese priest who was viewed as particularly sympathetic to the PSA was asked to mediate a major intra-party conExtensions of PSA Functions

As has been pointed out before, the most widely noted success of the

civil disobedience campaign was the extent of abstention during the December 1959 elections. In the Kwilu this abstention was virtually total, while in the Kwango only 30 per cent of the population voted, the latter being largely the Bayaka, who followed the directives of the LUKA. Unfortunately no figures exist concerning the degree of nonpayment

of taxes. It is quite possible that the extent of this civil disobedience was as great, if not greater than, the boycott of the elections. The collapse of administrative activities especially in the rural areas,

and the tendency of the mass to look to the party for leadership in all, or almost all, realms of public life, forced the PSA to accept responsi-

bilities for which party leaders had not necessarily planned. In the period between the Kisantu Congress (December 1959) and the end of the Round Table (February 21, 1960) the PSA recognized and formalized some of these functions. For instance, a party paramilitary organization came into existence and while, to the knowledge of the writer, no formal instructions were ever issued in this regard, top lead-

ers used these milice for the protection of propaganda delegations. However, this militia never attained the importance and size that it did in several other parties. No one in the PSA had what amounted to a small army, as did Jean Nlandu of the ABAKO in the Madimba area of the Lower Congo. The PSA had not organized formal party courts, but since the government judicial system fell into virtually com-

plete disuse it is probable that local PSA leaders did perform quasijudicial functions. The PSA Political Bureau set up a party cooperative society on February 19, 1960,7® the Coopérative de la Solidarité Africaine (COOPESA), but the writer never once saw any concrete evidence of its existence. This was in marked contrast to the extensive activities of the COBAKWA, the ABAKO cooperative. There was no attempt to set up party-sponsored elementary schools, as there had been in the name of the ABAKO (not necessarily with the approval 16 Statutes of the Cooperative of the Parti Solidaire Africain, February 19, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-74.)

228

RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS of ABAKO leaders). Although no party labor union was set up, local

sections clearly represented workers in labor disputes and the top leadership do not appear to have reprimanded them for this.

While the PSA formally sanctioned and organized quasi-governmental functions to a lesser degree than the ABAKO, this should not be interpreted to mean that the state of agitation and rebelliousness existing in the PSA stronghold was less than in the ABAKO region. Two factors account for the difference: first, the later start of the PSA necessarily prevented it from establishing as extensive and elaborate a party machine as the ABAKO; and second, the PSA leadership appears to have been more reluctant to allow the party label to be put onto a variety of satellite organizations. This delay or unwillingness in recognizing and structuring activities which local committees were already performing sometimes had a detrimental effect on the smooth running of the party. However, given the speed with which these developments followed one another, it was not always easy to decide which function should be formally structured and which not. For instance, the cooperative did not seem to fill a vital need, whereas the lack of instructions or framework regarding labor disputes caused considerable difficulties.

The most interesting aspect of this entire realm of developments was the manner in which the leaders’ hands were forced by local occurrences. The PSA policy with regard to participation in labor disputes is a good case in point. For this reason the situation which developed between the management of the Huileries du Congo Belge (HCB) plantation and the PSA Committee in Leverville will be described in detail.*”

Early in the relations between the Kikwit and Leopoldville PSA committees the question of a party labor union was raised. On July 22, 1959, Kama suggested the formation of a PSA union in order to defend the interests of the party’s members. The Kikwit Committee, however, opposed this:

We have asked him to adopt the Syndicat Chrétien [Catholic labor union] as the [labor] organ of our party in view of how important this would be for its present Secretary who is a devoted member of our party. The creation of another union would give him a bad im17 Jt is to be noted that the HCB, part of the Lever Brothers group, had the reputation of pursuing a particularly progressive policy vis-a-vis Africans especially regarding Africanization.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING pression [presumably of the PSA]. After this discussion, Mr. Kama promised to submit the question to the Central Committee.*®

In fact, no PSA union was created. Furthermore, the position of the Kikwit Committee was put into practice. At a meeting on August 5, 1959, the following recommendation was formulated concerning labormanagement relations: “[With regard to relations] between employee and employer: I would advise you to see Mr. Kwilu of the union who is one of our members and very competent in these matters.”?®

In other words, the PSA decided that it would refer discontented workers to the local Catholic union, and the only tie it had with this union was that the secretary of the union was a party organizer. This arrangement was also put into practice. An HCB worker came to the Kikwit PSA office at the end of September claiming that he had been dismissed for refusing to work in the forest after an accident. The PSA office wrote for information to its section president at Kikongo HCB.?° The local president replied that the person in question had not told the truth and was considered a “deserter” from his place of work.?1 The PSA thereupon sent him to the local Catholic union (CSCC)—*This is your department, be so good as to see what you can do for him.”?? Clearly the PSA Kikwit organization neither wished to, nor did, get involved in labor-management disputes.

Moreover, the early contacts between the Kikwit leaders and the HCB administration in Leverville appear to have been excellent. In June 1959 Kamitatu and Kipoy had a meeting with M. Vincke of the HCB as a consequence of which the composition of the Leverville PSA Committee was transmitted to the HCB. Furthermore: “Various materials concerning our party have been sent to you and we are instructing our delegates today to begin their activities among those of our brothers who wish to be affiliated to our party.”?3

A short time later, Raymond Manessa, passing through the HCB concession, described its policies of Africanization in most compli18 Interview between PSA-Kikwit and M. S. Kama, July 22, 1959, CRISP, PSA, . 76. , 19 Meeting at Mputu, PSA Kikwit, August 5, 1959. (Author’s files, PSA-37.) 20 Letter from M. Katshunga, PSA Kikwit Section, to the President of the PSA Kikongo Section, September 23, 1959. (Author’s files, PSA-57.) 21 Letter from Luc Mpolo, President PSA Kikongo Section, to Kikwit Committee, September 25, 1959. (Author’s files, PSA-58.)

22 Letter from C. Mafuta, Secretary of Kikwit Committee, to CSCC, Kikwit, September 28, 1959. (Author’s files, PSA-60.) 23 Letter from C. Kipoy and C. Kamitatu to Huileries du Congo Belge, June 24,

1959. (Author’s files, PSA-12.) , 230

RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS mentary terms: “We have admired the noble gesture of the HCB who have not made any discrimination with regard to Mr. Kibari’s nomination to this position which, up to now, has been occupied by Europeans.”?* The HCB authorities raised no problems—as some Missions had—about holding political meetings on its lands. Given the size of palm oil concessions in the Congo, a contrary attitude would have prevented mass meetings. In sum, it would seem that relations between the two organizations had an auspicious start. But it 1s to be noted that up to this point the local PSA sections were hardly in the picture.

The first sign of trouble occurred in mid-September over the transfer of a Congolese supervisor, Leon Kusama, who was apparently well liked by the workers. In recounting this and later incidents the writer will quote extensively from party documents. Since the basic facts and attitudes would have to be given in any case, paraphrasing would serve little purpose and would possibly sacrifice an appreciation of the atmosphere in which these controversies took place. It should be noted that most of these documents, which are not published, emanate from a local PSA section and although Leverville was by no means typical of the sub-territorial sections because it was the center of a very large plantation, the information is nonetheless interesting in that it demonstrates the reactions and positions of leaders who were much closer to their followers than most of the leaders who have been discussed up to now. The latter, as national or provincial officers, obviously only came in contact with the masses during propaganda and campaign trips.

When the Kikwit PSA Committee heard of troubles and incidents in

Leverville it sent an investigatory mission to this plantation center. Interestingly, this was done because the party was concerned about the possibility “that the Parti Solidaire Africain was involved or incriminated.”*° ‘The mission found that the workers had held a protest meeting because Kusama was about to be transferred away from Lev-

erville. This meeting occurred in the evening, and at first the HCB Director refused to discuss the matter with the protesting workers. This resulted in making them so angry that they broke the windows of his car and finally a discussion of sorts took place. The Director claimed that Kusama had “excited and spoiled the workers,’’?* but this naturally

only caused the workers to feel even more incensed. They claimed 24 Kikwit PSA Activities, Kikwit, June 27, 1959, CRISP, PSA, p. 35. 25 Kikwit PSA Activities, Kikwit, October 1, 1959, ibid., p. 129. 26 Ibid.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING that if he had at times been frank during meetings of the conseil d’en-

treprises (labor-management relations councils which existed in all large Congolese companies and were usually quite ineffectual), this was because the workers had asked him to. But they wanted to know what other evidence there was for the claim that Kusama incited them. Finally, the Director said that his secretary had told him so. On this information the protesters moved on to the secretary’s office. This unfortunate gentleman was only able to save himself from the crowd’s ire by climbing into the roofing of the house. It was at this point that the local PSA President, Sébastien Ndala, arrived on the scene.

Ndala arrived and gave orders to the men to retire. Immediately he was obeyed. He then took [the secretary] Matumbu, with him . . . in order to save him. The crowd followed Matumbu who took refuge with Pengele, André whose living room was bombarded with stones and broken bricks.

At this point Matumbu came out and asked for forgiveness stating that [in fact] he had been sent [to tell the Director] by others. . . .?”

He was then forced to give the names of those persons who had initi-

ated the story. The crowd withdrew and a telegram to the General Director of the HCB in Brussels was expedited asking that Kusama be retained at Leverville. It is unclear who exactly had the idea of send-

ing a telegram and who drafted it. At any rate, Brussels rejected the appeal and Kusama left Leverville. The workers tried to stop this at the last moment by going on strike for several hours.”®

Certain aspects of this story are both interesting and important. First, it will be noted that the “working population,” not members of workers’ councils, the PSA committee, or any other elite or quasi-elite grouping, protested. Second, although the party reporter is perhaps flattering his organization, it is probably true that a local PSA leader calmed—and indeed was the only one who could calm—the demonstrators. Third, the dividing line between labor-management relations and party activities is entirely obscured at this level.

In the following months the conditions became increasingly more agitated. This can be noted in the developing relationship between the Leverville PSA section and the HCB managers. The policy of the HCB seems to have been to attempt to stay out of political disputes as much as possible. However, this goal was as illusory as was the de-

27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 232

RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS cision by the PSA to stay out of labor disputes. The local PSA section and the workers not only did not understand such distinctions between company policy and public politics; they would hardly have seen any point to politics if it did not cover their relations with the HCB. The following letter?® addressed to M. Martin, the Director of the HCB in Leverville on March 30, 1960, graphically demonstrates this point:

Kindly tell us . . . whether we who work for the HCB have to ask for a second independence?

According to the present HCB policy, this company tries to make us believe that the independence which will take place on June 30 is exclusively for the Congolese Agents of the Civil Service. Or is it for everybody?

Is the aim of hiring many new European agents by the HCB the promotion of the economy of the independent Congo, or to check it?

To give you some idea... although the HCB is a private company, it should have a very limited number of European agents in order to give a chance to deserving Congolese to be absorbed into the management.

For Leverville district the European personnel should consist of:

Management 1

Medical 1 |

Accounting 1 Technicians 4

D.P.A. (?) 1

Chemist 1

It 1s not surprising that the HCB authorities did not view this sort of initiative with favor. On the other hand, although a copy of this letter was sent to Kamitatu, there is no record of any intervention on his part. It can be assumed that by this date the PSA party leaders accepted the situation at the local level for what it was, and did not attempt to countermand activities by local committees which transcended a purely political role but at the same time responded to the wishes of their members. The position of the Leverville HCB Directorate was essentially the 29 Letter from PSA Leverville Section to Director of HCB, Leverville, March 30, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-86.)

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING following: First, that they had pushed Africanization further than most other companies—approximately 10 per cent of the supervisory personnel were Congolese by 1960. Second, the workers had two avenues

through which they could express their views and complaints: the conseils d’entreprise which had been set up by law in 1947, and the labor unions which had become active at Leverville—the Fédération Générale des Travailleurs Belges (FGTB) which was socialist, and the Union des Travailleurs Congolais (UTC) which was Catholic.*° Third, the company did not wish to get involved in political party disputes and thus refused contact with local PSA leaders.

As a matter of fact Adoula, at that time head of the FGTB, had obtained a small pay raise for the HCB workers in the Kwilu. However, by the spring of 1960 it was evident that the unions were not really looked to by the workers for leadership. Quite clearly, the PSA had taken over this function. The unwillingness of company authorities to recognize PSA leaders in this role was viewed as a malicious policy of Opposition to the party. Since only the PSA leadership was capable of calming the boiling atmosphere which the overall politicization of the area had caused, there was some justification in the view that the party represented the mass of workers and other elements of the population. This point was well stated in a letter addressed to the Director of the HCB, M. Deveuyst, on April 14, 1960:

... you have ... declared that political parties have no right to intervene in the affairs of your company nor to demand favors for the community of workers. However, comrade N’dala, Sébastien, our President, has already intervened quite often in disputes with your workers and these interventions have always brought back peaceful relations between you and the workers. [He] . . . has convinced those who had left their work because of the insults, the threats, the disdain, and the injustice [shown them] by certain European agents to

return to work, despite the fact that the culprits have never been punished.

If we remember correctly, Comrade N’dala was once sent to Kwenge

by Mr. Martin, your predecessor, and by Mr. Vincke, in order to calm down the workers who had stopped the factory from operating because they had been infuriated by your colleague, Mr. Giard, who had insulted the wife of a driver. When Mr. Martin, accompanied by Mr. Vincke, had first gone there to reestablish order he 80 Formerly the CSCC.

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RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS

had only succeeded in aggravating the anger of the workers, and he returned to Leverville with his shirt stained by mud.

The same type of intervention took place in the case of Kakobola | of Tango, and Kisia where last December Mr. Folmer had turned himself into an Administration Agent by taking the workers’ identity booklets and bringing them himself to Bulungu in order to enroll them for the December elections.

These incidents had nothing to do with our Party, yet your company always sent Comrade N’dala there. Can you name one unfavorable intervention of our party since its beginnings in your concession?3+

Insofar as the company authorities did employ PSA leaders to reestablish calm and order, they also recognized that the latter possessed functions going beyond those which were formally political. From the company’s point of view, however, it was no doubt felt that the incidents occurred because the workers had been excited by party activities and thus it was only just that the leaders rectify situations which they had caused. It is interesting that in his reply to the above letter, _M. Deveuyst did not mention any of the examples given by the PSA.* The PSA’s position with regard to its representative function had been clearly stated in the letter of April 14:

We hope you will not say again that you do not want somebody, in his role of political party leader, coming to discuss with you the workers’ interests with a view of defending them. We see [very well]

what you are getting at. The members of the conseils d’entreprise are not elected by the workers, but are nominated by you, and this council has not produced good results ever since it was created; the workers do not have representatives worthy of this name. We, the leaders of a Political Party, elected by the people to defend the interests of the people and of the country as a whole, have the right to defend the interests of the workers, which are also those of the Kongo in general.** 81 Letter from Sébastien Ndala, President PSA Leverville Section, to M. Deveuyst, HCB District Director, Leverville, April 14, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-89.) 82 Letter from A. Deveuyst, HCB District Director, Leverville, to Marcel Nzinga and Sébastien Ndala, April 17, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-91.)

88 Letter from Ndala and Nzinga to Deveuyst, Leverville, April 14, 1940. (Author’s files, PSA-89.)

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING

Whereas it is not entirely correct to state that the conseils d’entreprise were nominated by the companies, it would in the estimation of this writer be entirely correct to conclude that these councils did not in fact effectively represent employee interests—particularly at the time under discussion. To some degree this was tacitly admitted when labor unions were allowed to establish themselves. But even the labor unions did not represent the mass of the population.

Yet another major disagreement occurred over “information sessions” which the company organized for its workers. These sessions were meant to teach the workers something about the constitutional changes which were taking place in the Congo after the Round Table Conference in Brussels. Whatever the content of the sessions or the intentions of the company officials, this activity was viewed with the most extreme suspicion and antagonism by the local PSA leaders. The company was attempting to explain such abstract concepts as the difference between company and government policies or activities, the role of political parties and labor unions, and the role of different houses of parliament and the executive. From the PSA point of view this was a direct participation in political activities. Given the atmosphere existing in Leverville at the time, the party’s position was not illogical. First, the distinctions between different aspects of government and private policy had never been explained to the workers or maintained up to the period under discussion. On the contrary, one of the characteristics of the Belgian system had been a particularly great overlapping of such functions. Second, the implications of some of the points made during these sessions would, of course, have weakened the hold that the party had over the population. Third, since the com-

pany had been the one to insist that each side play its role, the PSA was on fairly solid ground in objecting to an innovation in companyworker relations which transgressed the normal boundaries of company concerns.

Consequently, on April 22, 1960, the Leverville PSA section sent an order to all its subsections stating the following:

The Management... is currently holding meetings which are other than the meetings of the conseils d’entreprise. They are so-called information meetings.

The aim of these meetings is to study us....

We wish to draw your attention to the fact that these information meetings started after we claimed our rights, and should be ignored. 236

RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS There is, therefore, no point in answering their invitation nor their questions.**

The effect was that the information sessions began to be boycotted. Deveuyst naturally found this PSA reaction to be utterly objectionable. He considered the meetings to be a public service activity of the company in the interest of its employees. “At the end of information meetings which I held in other districts and during which I spoke on exactly the same lines as at Leverville, I received thanks. .. . For the record I

wish to mention that none of the signatories of the . . . [PSA] letter were present at the information meetings... .”*

But of greater importance was the fact that he re-emphasized the refusal of the company to deal with the PSA leaders as officers of their party.

.. . I note that this letter was addressed to me in the name of the Parti Solidaire Africain. However, I absolutely refuse to believe that the responsible PSA leaders would approve of your actions, your declarations, your insults and your threats... .

Consequently: Either you act in a private capacity, in which case I shall ignore these threats and insults, or you act as company employees, in which case please keep to the rules which in the whole world govern the relations between employees and employers.*°

If the aim was an improvement in the relations between management and workers at Leverville, this letter could not have missed the

mark more completely. On the one hand, it refused the local PSA Committee all recognition but on the other hand it claimed to know what the national PSA leaders would and would not condone under the circumstances. Furthermore, it refused to confirm or refute specific examples of party interventions in the interest of order cited in the PSA letter dated April 14. As could have been expected, this again allowed the Leverville PSA Committee to take the initiative. In a reply dated April 22, it stated the following:

Since you doubt our sincerity, we would ask you to send for Messrs.

Jonniaux and Vaneck [higher HCB officials in Leopoldville and 84 Letter to all PSA members at the HCB from PSA Leverville Section, Leverville, April 22, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-96. )

35 Letter from A. Deveuyst, HCB District Director, Leverville, to M. Nzinga and S. Ndala, Leverville, April 17, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-91.) The letter is a mimeographed copy distributed by the Leverville PSA Committee. Whereas there is no reason to doubt its authenticity, the reader should be aware of the fact that the original letter was not in the writer’s possession.

36 [bid. , 237

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING Brussels]; and we on our side will call those whom you call responsible leaders of the PSA. [They] are deeply conscious of the greater interests of the Kongo. ...

According to your letter you disregard [disdain] our responsibility toward the party and toward your workers in the presence of the workers. .. .*”

Since the company did not, however, wish to enter into formal relations with the PSA because it was a political party, the challenge was of course not met.

The situation described above was of particular interest to the writer because he arrived at Leverville at precisely this juncture in the controversy. The purpose of this visit was to investigate company policies and especially the organization of the local PSA sections. On arriving at Leverville on April 29, 1960, Louis Mandala (the Secretary of the

PSA National Political Bureau who accompanied the writer during this trip) and the writer were generously received by the local HCB directors. The writer made an appointment for the following day with

the General Director and the Personnel Director of the company. It had been agreed with PSA leaders that the writer would be free to make any investigations he desired alone without Mandala’s presence, and naturally in the talk with the HCB directors, this was advisable. The first problem arose when the local PSA Vice President discovered that the writer was to talk with company officials without his presence. It literally took about an hour of discussions to obtain his acquiescence

to this plan, and it was the writer’s distinct impression that this put him into great difficulties with his following who would not understand such a duality of roles. How could a white who was “with” the PSA also be “with” the company? With the local PSA leader’s objections pacified—though not overcome—a second problem arose. The directors in question did not want to discuss company policy and its relationship to political parties without Mandala. In effect they wanted to employ this interview in order to explain their position to a senior PSA leader and they were as adamant about Mandala’s presence as the local PSA leader had been about his own participation. The prob-

lem was resolved by bringing Mandala into the discussion with the result that the exposition of HCB policy was a rather formal recitation of its good intentions and an enumeration of all the problems which 87 Letter from M. Nzinga and S. Ndala to A. Deveuyst, Leverville, April 22, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-95.)

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RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS the company faced under current conditions. Unfortunately, the result

was that the local leaders felt themselves rather betrayed by having been excluded from what appeared to be a high-level discussion between the company and the PSA. In attempting to justify their position to a national PSA leader, the HCB directors labored under a basic misapprehension. Their assump-

tion appears to have been that any national leader would have the authority to discipline the local section. Whereas this would perhaps have been possible for someone of Kamitatu’s stature it is unlikely that any less important party personality would have wished to make such an attempt even if convinced that the local section had committed any errors—which was far from true in this case. It must also be recalled that this took place one month before the elections and there was little taste for chastising a local section which was effectively organized. Indeed, from the PSA’s point of view, there was no reason to do so, since the local leadership was simply responding to a de facto situation under difficult circumstances.

The situation at Leverville contains two interesting elements, first, the proliferation of party functions at the local level and, second, the relationship between the local elite and the mass of workers. The evi-

dence presented has presumably shown that despite party directives and policies to the contrary, the local situation forced the PSA to participate extensively in labor-management relations. In general, with the collapse in administration control the mass of the population identified with the party, which became the only major recognized authority structure. At the local level divisions of function did not appear to work in this period, with the exception of those functions performed

by the African clergy. If the party wanted to lead, it had to lead in virtually everything. It is of equal interest to note the relationship which existed between the local elite and the mass of workers. Again and again the basic content of the Leverville PSA section’s demands was directed toward en-

hancing the position of the elite. Paradoxically, even the spontaneous protests at times seemed to have the same goal. It will be recalled that the very first incident concerned the transfer of an elite supervisor. Later there was much controversy over company recognition of the special position held by the local PSA committee. In interviews the writer was able to ascertain that all the officers (with the exception of councillors) of the section were elite and usually held positions in the company offices as clerks, accountants, etc. Had the company recog-

239

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING

nized the PSA as representing its workers this would of course have greatly raised their prestige. Another example of this occurred when the PSA made its suggestions for Africanization. All Africanization would have essentially benefited the elite. And yet even at the very Start it was obvious that the mass of workers militantly supported these

elite PSA leaders and that danger to their leadership existed only if they moderated their stern opposition to the company. It was risky for a PSA leader to call off a spontaneous strike, as, for instance, in the case of the alleged insult to the wife of a chauffeur. That is partly why the leaders constantly sought some Belgian recognition of their “responsible” leadership—they seemed to feel that that was the least the company could do since it cost them something vis-a-vis their followers.

This aspect of local PSA activities is quite typical of what happened in almost every locality. At first the party was an elite affair, and it was very much concerned with proving its own maturity and pursuing direct political goals. It was welcomed by the local population, which had either already been involved in some form of protest or was at least ready to become involved. The population identified with the party and accepted its elite leadership. But then it also expected these leaders to take responsibility for any and all problems which arose while at the same time the general mood became increasingly rebellious and unmanageable. Since the administration retreated into doing the absolute minimum, and indeed much less than the minimum if judged by

the standard of effective government, the party was unhampered in picking up one supplementary function after another. In one region it became the workers’ representative in labor disputes, and in another

it took up the cause of tubercular patients who went on a hunger strike;®* in short, the local PSA president became a Jack-of-all-trades to whom the population looked for the solution of every problem. Yet

he had held this position for much too short a time—at most a few months—either to feel comfortable in it or to attain the automatic acquiescence from the villagers without which ruling becomes an almost impossible task. Indeed, the villagers seemed to have a desire to participate in every decision, probably because of some traditional patterns and the many years under Belgian rule when they were treated

like children who should be seen but not heard. Thus the local committee or its president had only persuasive power; they or he could not command without being questioned, and their days were spent 88 Pourquoi Pas? Congo, Leopoldville, November 7, 1959, pp. 73-75.

240

RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS explaining and persuading. Finally, there was always the election to be

thought of. In anticipation of the election every unpopular act was obviously to be avoided. The one escape from this unhappy situation was to attack the “enemy,” that is to say, the unpopular administrator, the rules which governed the lives of the Congolese, or the Belgian who had slighted his servant. Yet going too far in that direction would confirm the frequent Belgian assertion that the parties wanted to chase out all the whites, and destroy law and order. Furthermore, there was the fear of military action against party militants. Consequently, the top leaders repeatedly admonished lower echelons to keep calm, never to use violence, and to act within the law. For the local leader these many pressures were nothing short of a nightmare.

Yet month after month, administrative services fell into mcreasing disuse and, even more important, the mass enjoyed for the first time virtual freedom from regulation. The inherent dangers of a complete boycott of the administrative structure did seem to have been appreciated, especially the problem of taxation after the Belgian government agreed to the Round Table Conference. On December 29, 1959, Kasavubu, initially writing only in the name of the ABAKO, addressed a proposal to the Governor of Leopoldville Province with a view to “the better working of this indispensable civic obligation [paying taxes].’’*° He proposed that:

1. The collection of taxes in the villages and the C.E.C. [ExtraCustomary Centers, i.e., the towns of the interior] would be performed as in the past by responsible tax collectors;

2. At least in the beginning the important tax collecting meetings will be held in the presence of a regional member of the ABAKO,

whose sole function would be to advise all taxpayers to fulfill this patriotic duty for the benefit of all.

However, the Governor, M.J.B. Bomans, did not go along with this suggestion, clearly viewing the ABAKO position as a trick whereby the party was proposing to take over the administration in the Lower Congo prior to elections. In his reply dated January 7, 1960, he stated

the following: |

The realization .. . of the need .. . for all inhabitants of this country to pay the tribute due to the state . . . shows your resolution not to substitute a party organization for the executive branch of the State or for the judiciary system instituted by the State. 89 Congo, No. 3, January 16, 1960.

241

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING We are therefore in agreement, and neither you nor I could tolerate that a political party, whichever it may be, should dispense justice instead of the regular tribunals, or that it organize private militias to replace the functions of a State police, or collects taxes instead of the tax collectors appointed by the State, in short that the party runs a parallel administration.

However, . . . if a regional member of the ABAKO were to accompany the tax collector .. . this would only make the taxpayer think

that it was the ABAKO, and not the Administration, which was collecting the taxes.*°

The Governor continued with a gross overestimation of the power of

the ABAKO or for that matter of any political party in the Congo: , By means of its press and the voice of its leaders, the ABAKO disposes of adequate and effective channels to make its instructions known to its followers and to make them understand that during the transitional period, which is unavoidable before the installation of a fully responsible Congolese government, it is indispensable that administrative, judiciary and other services must keep functioning normally, retaining their present prerogatives, if the new gov-

ernment is not to be faced with anarchy at the time it takes over control of public affairs.

By taking it upon itself to make the people understand the absolute necessity to fulfill their duties as citizens, they will greatly contribute to putting the authority of the future government on a healthy, solid and durable basis.*

During a trip through the Lower Congo in March 1959, the writer tried to discover what were the minimum requirements of the local ABAKO sections for effecting a general acceptance of tax paying. The consensus of answers indicated the following: A radio message by Kasavubu would not be enough—his voice could be faked; a Central Committee directive signed by Kasavubu and printed in the party newspaper, Notre Kongo, would also not suffice—the newspaper was , not given total credibility on such an important issue. What then would

suffice? First, each section had to receive a formal order from the Central Committee, signed and sealed. Second, the local leaders would have to accompany the tax collectors in order to reassure the populace. The informants did not seem certain that even this would have the desired result, and it is the writer’s opinion that the ABAKO was saved

40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 242

RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS

from considerable embarrassment by the Governor’s rejection of its plan.

The situation in the Kwango-Kwilu was very similar and indeed in the subsequent correspondence with the Governor the PSA added its signature to that of the ABAKO. This document is particularly interesting because the ABAKO and PSA leaders appear to admit the

limits of their authority in their own strongholds. That this candor was probably taken for slyness by the Belgian administration is one of the tragic elements of this period in Congo politics. __ The reply stated:

While admitting that what you say is pertinent, we must inform you that the method adopted will not resolve the problem.

The mood in the Bas-Congo and the Kwango-Kwilu is such that the people have decided not to pay their taxes as long as the “go ahead” on immediate independence is not given. Moreover, as you know . . . the problem of gaining independence will be definitely decided at the Round Table Conference in Brussels.

In the meantime we would humbly suggest a delay in the collection of taxes until the Round Table Conference has come to a decision. We make this suggestion in order to avoid trouble both for the Administration and for the people....

This suggestion truly reflects the will of the people which is determined to pay its taxes only to a Congolese government . . . which, as arranged, will be established in the first months of this year.*?

There is, in the opinion of the writer, only one error in this reply. Apart from the clear-cut determination not to pay taxes during this period, the attitude of the rural masses toward taxes in general was unclear and ambiguous. Some viewed party dues as having taken the place of taxes, some felt that the end of taxation was one of the prizes of independence, and some no doubt had the expectation of paying to

a Congolese government. Even after independence had been granted , at the Round Table, the resistance to all forms of taxation remained. Once the need to pay taxes had been successfully challenged, it would take considerable effort to bring the ordinary villager back to this unpleasant convention.

The PSA did in fact send instructions to its local sections ordering them to support tax collection. 42 Ibid.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING We invite all our section Presidents to make the population understand the necessity of paying taxes. The reasons are the following:

The fruit of the taxes will immediately return in its totality to the C.I. [circonscriptions indigénes] whose job it is to occupy themselves with our villages: maintenance of roads, bridges, payment of personnel (Policemen) etc.... As a result, without credit the sectors will have to close their doors, which nobody wants.

All our militants will do their best to help the chefs de secteur in the accomplishment of this task.*

But, on the basis of interviews in April 1960, it would appear that no taxes were collected either before or after the Round Table. Indeed, in those areas where parties had politicized the rural areas over a year earlier they found great resistance on the part of the population to the payment of annual party dues. This was, on the whole, only the case in the ABAKO because the other parties had made their main rural thrust after the summer of 1959.

In some instances local administrators did attempt to collect taxes. On January 25, 1960 the PSA in Kikwit sent a telegram to the Cartel in Brussels while the Round Table was taking place, protesting “. . . against the bad treatment which is apparently inflicted on the population of the Kwango-Kwilu by the Administration for refusal to pay taxes.”’*4

But it is doubtful that many administrators were that vigilant, or indeed had the power with which to follow through.

The Local Executive Colleges

One of the resolutions of the Round Table stated that: “The Provincial Governor and his College shall take all necessary measures in order to assure the attachment of Congolese to the District Commissioners and Territorial Administrators under their authority.”* In practice this was supposed to give the higher Congolese administration em-

ployees some belated executive experience. However, in the areas where the December 1959 election had been boycotted and where, as 48 CRISP, PSA, p. 209. 44 Courrier d’ Afrique, January 25, 1960. 45 Perin, op.cit., p. 94.

244

RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS a consequence, no territorial councils had been elected, this provision was employed to create colleges whose functions, while never clearly

defined, were to be much more than mere on-the-job training. The areas of the boycott were also the areas where many administration services had been most successfully boycotted, and there was thus a very clear need to stop the rapid attrition of the entire government structure in these regions. The district and territorial colleges, it was hoped, would somehow accomplish this task. From the very start there

was considerable disagreement as to their actual functions. Indeed, on April 13, 1960, when the Leopoldville Executive College announced these appointments, it designated the individuals concerned as deputies to the district commissioners and territorial administrators, and did not use the term “Executive College,” which was reserved for the institutions which had been placed next to the Governor Gen-

eral and the provincial governors by the Round Table Conference. In addition, the Leopoldville Executive College “. . . insisted on the purely administrative character of their functions and pointed out that the mandate of these deputies is not a political one.”*® However, such a limitation on the function of the individuals concerned merely helped to confuse the situation at the local level and to place obstacles in the way of a proper functioning of these “colleges.” This point was most

brilliantly and spectacularly made by two territorial administrators, Messrs. Saintraint and Ryckmans,*’ at the time of the formal installation of the three deputies in the territory of Madimba (in the Bakongo region).

... the 12th resolution of the Round Table which established the deputies did not clearly describe their function. . . . They are supposed to participate in the running of the Territory... . I have used the term “participate” erroneously, I think, because in fact it does not correspond any more to what is possible. The first encounters . . . have convinced me that the desired goal will not be reached unless, outside of all direct political preoccupations and with the sole aim of [working for] the country’s good, these deputies

alone make contact with the inhabitants in all areas, namely: or-

ganization of the electoral campaign and of the elections, maintenance of order, making the various sectors function again, .. . functioning of tribunals, collection of market taxes... . The role of 46 Courrier d’ Afrique, April 13, 1960. See also CRISP, Congo, 1960, pp. 140-52. 47 The same Ryckmans whose letters have been quoted earlier.

245

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING the members of the College is essentially administrative: They must assert their authority on the population so that any orders they might have to give will be listened to and carried out.*®

The administrators at Madimba were temporarily relieved of their

Province.

functions for going so far beyond the meaning of the ordinance under discussion. However, the situation that they described and the remedies which they proposed were not only entirely valid for the territory of Madimba but for most of the territories existing in Leopoldville In the Kwango-Kwilu each district commissioner and territorial administrator appears to have resolved or failed to resolve the delicate problem of the real function and power of these deputies on the basis of the local conditions and his own predilections. None of them formally transferred power as did Saintraint and Ryckmans. However, it is doubtful that this courageous act could realistically have been expected to change the situation appreciably. The Madimba administrators were in fact attempting to place the entire burden of administra-

tion on a few elite who, in the eleventh hour, were attached to the administration. True, these same persons were usually intimately connected with the dominant political party (the ABAKO, the PSA, the LUKA, or the ABAZI, as the case may be), but in fulfilling their new functions they were inevitably forced to side with the administra-

tive system, its regulations, its disciplinary techniques and powers, even if they opposed the Belgian administrators. They also had to participate in the technical organization of the elections. In most instances, all that this accomplished was to place them in an exceedingly difficult personal situation. The possibility of inducing the rural population to pay taxes, to use the courts, and to acquiesce in government regulations in general was at this juncture exceedingly slim. Thus the

most constructive aspect of the work which the colleges undertook appears to have been to grapple with one incident after another, and attempt to use their persuasive skills and prestige to separate opponents, whether ethnic or political. It is nonetheless interesting to discuss these colleges individually because they again help to illustrate what conditions were like on the eve of the May 1960 elections in the KwangoKwilu region.

The first college with which the writer came in contact was the Dis48 Inaugural address on the occasion of the installation of the deputies of the Territorial Administrator of Madimba Territory, Leopoldville, April 21, 1960, p. 1 (no publisher).

246

RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS trict College at Kenge. This was on April 25, 1960—twelve days after

the proclamation of the names of its members. It was preoccupied with two main issues at this time: first, the exact nature of its role and

powers, and second, the relationship between the PSA and LUKA members of this triumvirate. The Belgian district commissioner was of

the opinion that the Congolese members were strictly his deputies and that their role was essentially consultative. He had been given no detailed instructions as to their function apart from an indication that the whole arrangement was temporary—and this was certainly true, since independence was to be achieved two months later. The college, on the other hand, felt that its role was executive and it wanted to take up a large number of responsibilities. To cite an example, one of the college members wanted to undertake a tour into the countryside with the administrator in order to inspire confidence in the administration and to calm down the very agitated masses. However, the district commissioner did not seem favorably disposed to such a suggestion. The college was made up of two PSA members and one LUKA member.

The latter was Pierre Masikita, who had been PSA National VicePresident but had left to join LUKA along with the large majority of

the Bayaka. The relationship between the two PSA members and Masikita was naturally somewhat strained. It is interesting to note that

in those instances where the colleges were made up of partisans of different parties the Belgian administrator had considerable leeway. Nonetheless, this college did make serious attempts to resolve minor

incidents; for instance, the writer was present when they visited the Catholic mission at Kenge in order to “calm down” the tense atmosphere.

The next college visited was that in Masi Manimba territory on April 26, 1960. This college was entirely in the hands of the PSA, and

one of its members, Raphael Kinkie, was one of the most militant members of the party who had recently returned from West Africa where he had been greatly impressed by his visit to Guinea. Although the formal question as to whether the colleges’ functions were advisory or executive was still unresolved, little question existed in Masi Manimba as to the executive role that the college intended, and was al-

lowed, to play. Indeed, as early as April 20 the three members and the local administrator, M. Roskam, signed a document which divided the overall functions of the local administration among the three Cong-

olese members of the college. This document stated the following: “Each [member] will take special interest in the [government] services

247

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING named below and... will transmit this information to the others; [they will] . . . examine the situation, discuss possible solutions and take the measures which impose themselves.”*® The writer was given the distinct impression that relations between the administrator and the college were very strained. The reasons for this seemed to be twofold. First, the administrator was reluctant to acquiesce in all the decisions of the college—which is not surprising in view of the fact that he had not been given orders to follow them. Second, the college had been given, as newly appointed members of the administration, the transient houses at territorial headquarters. However, on taking possession of these lodgings they found that most of the furniture which had pre-

viously been there had been taken out and only a small number of inferior chairs and beds had been left.°° The animosity between the administrator and the members of the college was, therefore, one which had a personal as well as an administrative content. Nonetheless, the college had achieved a certain number of its demands no doubt because it was a homogeneous group which, via the PSA, virtu-

ally controlled the population of the territory. For instance, it had insisted on inspecting the prison and had discovered that there were several members of the Mpeve sect in it who had apparently not been formally charged with any crimes or placed on trial. Furthermore, the juvenile prisoners were lodged with the adults, and this aroused considerable ire. It will be noted that so long as the relations between the administrator and the college were essentially bad, the latter could take an adamantly nationalist posture and thus avoid the more embarrassing, but perhaps urgent, problems of restoring law and order. The Masi-Manimba college concerned itself relatively little with the anti-social effects which the Mpeve sect had on the area.*! This is not meant as a criticism of the college. Given the position into which they had been put and the fact that two of the three were candidates for 49 Division of Information, signed R. Roskam, R. Kinkie, D. Kakulu, and A. Kanioka, for the Executive College, Territory of Masi Manimba, Masi Manimba, April 20, 1960 (italics added). (Author’s notes.) 50 The writer could, of course, not confirm this. However, he did on several occasions lodge in this type of transient housing and can confirm that in comparison the houses in Masi-Manimba were furnished in a distinctly inferior fashion. 51 This sect first made its appearance in 1947 (see Administration Report, 1947, p. 17). The writer has been able to find no analysis of its aims or mode of operation. In 1960 its members were alleged to have been concerned with purification,

which resulted in witch hunts and assassinations, cemetery cleaning, and the destruction of fruit trees. None of this information can be confirmed by personal observation.

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RELATIONS WITH OTHER INSTITUTIONS the May 1960 elections, it was natural for them to act in the way they did. However, here is an example of a college which had internal homogeneity and had to a large extent managed to impose its will on the local administrator. It did not, however, effectively restore confidence in the administration or convince the population to pay its taxes and employ the many services that had been boycotted. The next situation investigated was that in Kikwit on or about April

30. According to the District Commissioner, M. Lehman, his relation with the district college, which was composed of two PSA and one ABAZI member, was excellent. Decisions were made by majority rule, and he himself no longer took any action without collegial acquiescence. In other words, he had made them legislators and himself into an executor, and they were his “deputies” only insofar as he explained bureaucratic procedures to them. He hoped and expected that the effect of the college would be that some of the regions in this district would again become administrable. This did not mean that taxes would be paid—that he considered beyond hope for the present—but that some form of law and order could be re-established. However, he also stated that despite the goodwill which PSA leaders had shown after the end of the Round Table they were not really followed on all matters by the masses. Kamitatu had himself held a special meeting for the white population of Kikwit at which he attempted to reassure them as to their safety in the future. While this had been very much appreciated, the ability of political leaders to restrain their followers was very much doubted by white residents.

These three colleges, and the different degrees of power which they held within the administration, are of course not a sufficiently large sample to prove anything. In all there were ten district and territorial colleges which had some PSA participation, and they functioned for no more than two months. It will be seen from this that no “typical” behavior could emerge. Since most of the college members were also candidates for the May 1960 elections their position was doubly difficult. Whereas the population approved of the boycott of the administration and the establishment of such PSA parallel structures as were created, there was a considerable ambivalence of feeling about seeing these same leaders in positions of administrative power. On the other hand, the party did not have the organizational means, or the time, or the authority, to instruct the population to make the radical about-face which would have been required if the colleges were to fulfill the hope of restoring overall law and order.

249

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING The psychological situation in which many of the college members found themselves is also of considerable importance. As stated before, they had a fairly large stake in showing that they could make the ad-

ministration work as well as the Belgians had. Only the continued presence of often antagonistic Belgians, and the political requirements

of the electoral campaign, allowed them to postpone this ambition. In a sense, the “happiest” college was the one in Masi Manimba for it was united and opposed to the administrator. Under such conditions it was logical to maintain an attitude of heated antagonism to the administration. But in other areas, where power was in fact transferred, the individual college members were put into an impossible situation. They were made to realize that the entire structure of the country was endangered unless law and order were rapidly restored. Their pride as elite was committed to doing something about this problem. But most positive action forced them into a position which the population could only view as a reversal of their former staunchly nationalist stand. And,

as with everything else in the Congo, all this occurred in the drastically compressed period of one to two months.

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CHAPTER XI 2222222229902 The May 1960 Elections and Their Effects on the PSA ANY of the trends described in the preceding chapters naturally

TMA continued during the electoral campaign and the short period between the end of the elections and independence on June 30, 1960. But the electoral period was distinguished by the fact that the different echelons of the party were, in effect, forced into very close contact. Earlier, the activities of the national leaders had not touched the rural masses very directly, and although these leaders were in the last analysis dependent on rural support, it is evident that they devoted most of their interest and effort to relations with Belgium, with other parties, and to foreign contacts. The provincial leaders had expended a great amount of energy on extending the party organization throughout the rural regions. But even they had been diverted from local village concerns. Kamitatu’s participation in national politics after the Kisantu

Congress was no doubt in part responsible for this. At any rate, the village sections often had to face difficult problems without much help or direction from either Kikwit or Leopoldville.

During the elections all this changed. The different echelons of the party became more dependent on one another. Indeed, their primary interest almost coincided. Everyone had a major stake in the elections. This meant that the leaders were now directly dependent on the rural vote, and the village sections were concerned to see the party elect candidates who would represent their interests as well as elicit the enthusiastic support of the rural population.

This development occurred after the struggle for independence had in effect been won. The achievement of this goal had naturally brought with it more divisiveness among the Congolese themselves. With the

main “enemy” defeated, the impetus toward unity was severely weakened. Moreover, this occurred not only among parties but also within them, and the PSA was no exception. Consequently, one major concern of PSA leaders became the achievement of adequate discipline.

This problem had several sides to it. First, the leaders became seriously worried about the long-term effects of civil disobedience which they had in part supported and in part ignored earlier. Second, there was the problem of internal party discipline which involved the general concern over the frequent unresponsiveness of the grass roots to 251

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING orders and increasing ethnic antagonisms within the party, as well as specific problems arising out of the need for election discipline.

The situation was further complicated by the fact that leadership divisions within the PSA also increased at this time. This manifested itself at three levels: increasing tension between Leopoldville and Kikwit, certain ethnic tensions among the leaders, and a subtle increase in the role played by ideology or political predilections.

In sum, the PSA in the difficult period immediately before independence had many problems to overcome. A final judgment on how | the party fared in this situation can only be made when detailed comparisons with other parties become possible. But, at any rate, the PSA, | as we shall see, was able to accomplish much despite many handicaps. The General Problem of Discipline in the Rural Areas

The ill-fated attempt to convince the population of Leopoldville Province to pay their taxes has already been mentioned. Had it succeeded it would have been a great tribute to the effectiveness of the party leaders. During the late spring of 1960 such civic responsibility would have had to come about on a purely voluntary basis since the administration had neither the will nor the power to organize effective

tax collection. But there was also a general decline of discipline. In- | deed, it is to the great credit of PSA leaders that they publicly aired | this problem. Solidarité Africaine, the party paper, devoted a sharply .

hierarchy.” _ The article itself noted: |

worded article to this problem and gave it front page banner headlines stating: “The Congo will not be strong unless there is discipline and a

[We must] face our responsibilities. ... :

We hope that tomorrow’s authorities will apply a healthy and firm |

policy. A policy which will . . . allow no equivocation. , We insist on public law and order [les services d’ordre] because we can no longer tolerate living in anarchy as we are doing today. Hierarchy must be clearly established and respected by all the citizens.*

One of the few reports of what Gizenga actually said during his electoral tour through the Kwilu also illustrates concern about some of 1 Solidarité Africaine, June 4, 1960.

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THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA the anarchic tendencies which were manifesting themselves. Mandala,

reporting a conversation he had with a local PSA leader, states: “I succinctly repeated everything which the General President had said during the meetings: Discipline within the party; payment of taxes; the question of the Mpeve; etc.’ Party discipline will be discussed below. As regards the two other points specifically mentioned, taxes were not paid and the Mpeve sect was certainly not eradicated.° Nonetheless, the leaders probably did not appreciate just how serious the problem was. It was very difficult to distinguish between those aspects of the collapse of government authority due to popular antagonism toward local Belgian administrators and those resulting fun-

damentally from a tendency toward anarchic rebelliousness. The leaders generally attributed most of the problems to the first cause. The attitudes of the Belgians at the time—often equivalent to psychological provocations for the Congolese—made it easy for the leaders to attribute most of the anarchy to the continuing, irritating, presence of the Belgian administrators. It was therefore logical for them to expect that “tomorrow’s authorities will apply a healthy and firm policy.” The question which was not answered was whether this authority (i.e., the Congolese government) would in fact be able to exercise such a policy.

The second reason why leaders tended to underestimate the degree of anarchy prevalent in the rural areas was that this phenomenon manifested itself in its most minimal form whenever the leaders were present. A leader would arrive in a village and face an enthusiastic welcome. The population would generally be responsive to his suggestions 2 Report of Louis Mandala, Secretary of the Political Bureau, Leopoldville, May 15, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-183.) 3 As noted earlier the minor sects were not properly studied before independence and, to the writer’s knowledge, even less afterwards. It is therefore impossible to make an assessment as to how large the Mpeve sect was and how much influence Gizenga exerted against its activities. In April 1962 the following report was made by the Commissariat of Information of the Congo Government: “Fifty persons were [alleged to have been] killed and eleven others wounded during bloody inci-

dents which broke out at Idiofa. . . . these incidents are supposed to have been provoked by the tour of a Territorial administrator who had been collecting taxes. Nonetheless, the official version of the Idiofa incidents is different. According to information gathered from local authorities, persons belonging to the religious MPEVE sect began a rebellion against the Territorial authorities of Mangai. Territorial agents as well as a policeman were made prisoners and maltreated. They were found seriously wounded. After having tried to disperse the crowd with tear gas but failing, the forces of order opened fire which resulted in thirty dead and fourteen wounded.” (Commissariat of Information, Leopoldville, April 13, 1962.)

253

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING —which were, of course, usually geared toward the elections and opposition to the administration and other parties. Only those leaders who were appointed to the district or territorial Executive Colleges faced situations in which they saw a more accurate reflection of the

conditions which prevailed. | The one party report which deals with the general problem of discipline with complete realism was written by Louis Mandala at the end of the trip he had undertaken as the writer’s guide and companion. He was obviously in a very special situation; first, he was not actively cam-

paigning, and second, he was in a very delicate situation as an important national leader accompanying a white person with all too mysterious functions as perceived by the ordinary villager. Furthermore, he was often present during interviews with Belgians under circumstances which did not involve the then normal ritual of charges and counter-charges whenever Congolese leaders and Belgians met. In the conclusion of his report, Mandala notes the following: .

2. On the political plane, I do not see why we must continue to condemn colonialism when we have thoroughly beaten it and the date of independence is known. Instead of building our country, we are destroying it through facile positions.

8. Finally, one must immediately calm the whites who would be able to work better if they knew that their private lives will not be placed in danger and will be protected.* Discipline Within the PSA

The problem of discipline within the party was, of course, of far greater and more immediate importance to the PSA leaders than the attitude of the rural populace toward government authority. Here again

there seems to have been a wide gap between the actual conditions at the grass-roots level and the perception of the top leaders. Party authority was not systematically opposed and when leaders went into the interior, their “message” almost always found general approval. As a consequence they did not always weigh the long-range impact of local decisions and actions. This can best be illustrated in connection

with the growth of the party militia. The PSA had never formally approved of a party militia although most of the parties in the Congo at the time of the elections did organize such units. When leaders trav4 CRISP, PSA, p. 253.

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THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA eled in the interior they did have a few guards, but there was every reason for this since incidents with members of other parties in the marginal areas were not infrequent. Furthermore, when a local committee set up ad hoc organizations to keep order during large meetings the top leadership appreciated the value of such groups and allowed them to exist even if they were not actively encouraged. That some of these “organizations” also adopted various sashes and clothes which amounted to a uniform was also unobjectionable. Yet the result was that many local committees had a militia at their disposal. An incident during the writer’s trip will show both the atmosphere in which such units operated and the attitude of leaders toward them. On arriving at Bulungu in the evening of May 5, 1960, after a rather

long trip, Mandala and the writer decided not to get involved in a meeting with the local PSA leaders but rather to stop at a Rest House (usually reserved for Europeans) and immediately go to sleep. Mandala sent word to the local committee and the next morning “the ‘commissaire de police PSA’ came to excuse the absence of the president. ... 5 A rather tense discussion then took place between several local PSA militants and Mandala in Likeleve. Although the writer did not understand the conversation it soon became apparent that Mandala’s “credentials” were being doubted. Furthermore the Rest House was surrounded by “PSA police” wearing red sashes. Mandala stressed the fact that he was the Secretary of the National Political Bureau, but without any noticeable effect on the local PSA leaders who became increasingly aggressive in their attitude. Finally, the question which had to be resolved was whether these gentlemen would permit

Mandala and the writer to leave or were holding them prisoners. Eventually, with a great deal of shouting on everyone’s part they decided to withdraw. At that point the writer noticed that the car’s four tires had been deflated and partly slashed, and when this damage was repaired a rather aggressive crowd of villagers was encountered before the village was finally left behind.

The key to this incident, which could obviously have had far more serious results, was that the local PSA committee did not recognize Mandala as a national leader. In Mandala’s report it was, of course, this aspect of the incident which was stressed:

5. I demand that immediate steps be taken, at least a very serious warning, against the Bulungu committee which is deviating 5 Report of Louis Mandala. (Author’s files, PSA-183.)

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING from the party’s rules of conduct: non violence. Given the acts of which I was the victim, I insist that the authority of the Com-

mittee [1.e., the Central Committee] be reestablished. If the party is really well organized, a list of the Central Committee, of the National Bureau, and of the Provincial Committee ought to be included in the files of all the sections, so that on occasion they may be referred to as a proof of identity.®

But the fact that the local committee had organized its own “PSA police” (the quotation marks are Mandala’s) and was willing to throw a cordon around two travelers (whom they may have suspected of belonging to the ABAZI)* was in a sense more serious. Finally, the question must be asked how many other committees would have acted in the same way had they found a “legitimate” reason for detaining “suspicious” travelers. In the writer’s view this would probably have occurred quite frequently, which means that the local committees saw themselves as the effective authority in their areas concerned with virtually everything that was taking place.

The PSA “police” appears to have been made up of young men who

in other parties frequently belonged to a “youth wing.” In fact, the PSA also established a Jeunesse PSA (JPSA) in early May 1960.8 But this organization had been started very late and did not have any control over the local “police” or “militia.” In fact, it was little more than a paper organization whose existence was not even known to the local committees.

The general weakness of party discipline was also pointed out by Mandala:

It becomes apparent that among the sections in the interior the committee [presumably the Central Committee] does not seem to have very much authority over the members. No discipline at all. Espe-

cially at Kikwit, at party headquarters, the members allow themselves anything: curiosity, violence, insolence and a total lack of 6 Ibid.

7 Mandala is a member of the Bayanzi ethnic group. The ABAZI was an ethnic

party made up of Bayanzi. The writer was informed that some of the ABAZI leaders had hired a French chauffeur and were campaigning with this gentleman who constituted “tangible” evidence of what the relationship between whites and Congolese would be if the party was backed during the election. This “trick” naturally infuriated local PSA leaders. It may be that Mandala and the writer were mistaken for this ABAZI campaign team.

8 Letter from Cléophas Kamitatu to President, JPSA, Kikwit, May 17, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-184.) :

256

THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA discipline. We must look into this, otherwise this mood [élan] will be impossible to check.® ETHNIC DIVISIONS ON THE EVE OF THE ELECTIONS

During the electoral campaign there was a rapid upsurge of ethnic self-consciousness which heightened the danger of breakaways from

the PSA. This self-consciousness can, in part, be linked to the proximity of the prizes of independence—elected offices and government jobs—and also to quarrels over the “ethnic arithmetic” which went into making up the party’s list of candidates. But these were not the only reasons. Fundamentally, this phenomenon went hand in hand with the increased political awareness which the entire independence struggle had engendered. The ordinary Congolese became more aware of himself as a black man, as a Congolese, and as a member of a specific ethnic group. As Belgian power declined, the relative importance of each of these three identifications probably changed. Ethnicity became more important. Ethnic parties had the advantage of being able to encompass all three, although even they were often faced with an extension of this process to sub-ethnic groups. At any rate, an interethnic party, such as the PSA, could, by definition, not easily satisfy the very strong desire for self-assertion within virtually each ethnic group.

This problem was also tied to the speed of political developments. At the beginning of the process of politicization the difference between an ethnic and an inter-ethnic party was not dramatically apparent to the lowest echelons. The villager related to his local party president who was usually his kinsman. Because developments occurred so fast there was relatively little awareness of what the party was like elsewhere. Naturally, in an area like the Kwilu, population density and ethnic intermingling were so great that even the ordinary villager must have had a good idea of what was going on among his neighbors. Nonetheless, for a few months ethnic conflicts were largely held back because attention was focused on the fight against the administration and on purely local concerns. This was of course not the case among ethnic groups whose leaders—especially in the city of Leopoldville—had broken away from the PSA. If the elite of a given group organized a separate ethnic party, then the local leaders and villagers tended to follow. Such instances have already been discussed.

However, when the local Executive Colleges began to function, and ® CRISP, PSA, pp. 252-53.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING

especially when the PSA had to choose candidates for the elections, these ethnic loyalties within the PSA became an increasing danger. For the first time decisions made at the top echelon of the party had a real and direct impact on the local population. Whether the masses were aware of what was at stake is unclear, but it is certain that even the most local leaders understood that their place in a future political constellation was being decided at that time. The very small ethnic groups also began to show discontent with the weight they carried, or did not carry, in the party, while the bigger ones became concerned with their relative positions vis-a-vis other big groups. Will our man become a candidate?

Who is X or Y or Z (from a different ethnic group) who seems to think he can tell us what to do? We A’s have never allowed ourselves to be led by those B’s.

These are the kinds of remarks which were increasingly made within the party. Every party appointment, every committee, was now scrutinized for ethnic favoritism or a lack of an appropriate ethnic balance. Once this measuring stick was generally accepted it was inevitable that many segments of the party should find something to criticize. Mandala notes this with regard to the PSA’s effort to keep the Bayanzi from siding with the ABAZI. On the basis of repeated contacts with diverse elements of the popu-

lation, it becomes apparent that support which the ambitious ABAZIsts are obtaining from the Bayanzi masses comes from the fact that they exploit the weak points of our party: camouflaged tribalism and individual favoritism. This is self-evident given some of the abuses [within the PSA] which one is sometimes afraid of denouncing.?°

It should be noted that Mandala admits to the factual basis of the charges which the ABAZI leaders were making about PSA “tribalism.” On the part of the Bayanzi this was usually pointed against the Bambala, who occupied the area around Kikwit and tended to hold fairly important positions in the Kwilu Provincial Committee. Kamitatu came from an ethnic group which was closely tied to the Bambala so that he was usually referred to as a Mumbala. 10 [bid., p. 253.

258

THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA Of course another reason why ethnic factors became so important was the fact that the party was now a real organization in which communication between different echelons and different areas had been established. Quarrels thus tended to come to the fore whereas previously potential opponents had often been unaware that their interests diverged.

During the Kikwit Congress Kamitatu made a great effort to deal with some of these problems. First, he sought to stop the emergence of new or rejuvenated ethnic associations. “. . . the President declared that in the past few months a few ethnic associations have been cre-

ated; these associations are not opportune at this moment. ... The President asks who is in favor of suppressing ethnic associations. An overwhelming majority is in favor of suppression.”** Apparently this subject was quite explosive since the minutes for this session of the Congress end with the notation that the “session became turbulent.’’!”

However, at the next session a resolution was passed stating that: “The Congress unanimously decides that from now on leaders of the

party cannot be at the same time leaders of ethnic associations.’+ Later it was specified that leaders of the party should not even be members of such associations, and the Congress even discussed what should

be done with the funds of such associations after they had been curtailed. CONFLICTS OVER THE SELECTION OF CANDIDATES

The leaders attempted to obtain agreement from the local sections for the acceptance of the lists of candidates which the party would establish. It will be recalled that the electoral system operated on the basis of proportional representation between party lists which were to

be submitted locally. It was, therefore, of great importance for the PSA that its strength not be dissipated by multiple PSA lists in the same electoral district. During the Kikwit Congress, Kamitatu laid down the principle that the top party leadership would decide who the PSA candidates would be, but this suggestion immediately ran into opposition by delegates who can perhaps be described as “grass-roots democrats.” “M. Mvula asks whether this system does not represent a danger since the party could have people elected who did not have the confidence of the peo-

12 Ibid. 18 Ibid.

11 Minutes, Kikwit Congress, Kikwit, March 14, 1960, ibid., pp. 239-40.

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ple.”** Kamitatu answered that the lists would include really competent persons, and noted that some leaders would be nominated who held important functions in the party but were not well known by the population. However, the party would never submit candidates who had clearly no support at all.*° This did not still all opposition from the delegates.

M. Musongo posed the following question: In my opinion, said he,

. . . according to democracy these candidates ought rather to be presented by the people, in which case each sector could present the candidates who were most popular among the population.

To this question the President [Kamitatu] answered, no, no. He explained that individuals were free to become candidates [i.e., on their own without PSA support], but since the party was the organization which would defend [assure] the interest of the [whole] population, it had the right to present the candidates of its choice. The President became irritated and voices were raised. . . .1°

In the end, Kamitatu’s prestige was sufficiently great to overcome such opposition, and he obtained the agreement of the Congress to the effect that only one PSA list would be deposited in each electoral district. However, it is clear that on this issue he had to fight an uphill

battle. The vote in support of his proposition was repeated several times, presumably in order to emphasize its content. He also asked the Congress pertinent questions which the delegates “answered.”

. . . If someone who, for example, lives in Coquilhatville or in Stanleyville but is originally from one of the territories or districts [of

the Kwango-Kwilu] and is a member of the PSA, can he be presented? Again the assembly answered with applause.”

Kamitatu also warned against overconfidence, which was very preva-

lent in all Congolese political circles at the time, by explaining that deputies would not necessarily become ministers and that therefore the candidates should not quit their jobs. Indeed, he used this point to launch an argument in support of highly qualified candidates. If the most capable persons were chosen then they would have a good chance of becoming ministers, and ministers would have appointments 14 Minutes. Kikwit Congress, Session of March 14, 1960, ibid., p. 236.

15 [bid. 16 [bid. 17 [hid., p. 237. 260

THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA at their command. In other words there would be more jobs for PSA leaders and militants. He then listed the characteristics he thought were appropriate for candidates:

a) ...convinced militants of the party. b) Competent people . . . who could face Kalonji, Lumumba, or Kasavubu as equals.

c) Since debate will be in French . . . candidates who are competent [in this language] d) ... intelligent and able to figure things out.

e) ... full of initiative. f) Persons who are disinterested and put the interests of the people before their own. The assembly responds with applause.

g) Influential persons.

h) Tenacious.... 1) ... of good conduct.'® | Even after this debate, delegates still returned to the issue of selecting party candidates. Some wanted the party leadership to wait until Suggestions for candidates could be made by the lower echelons, and another asked why the number of candidates would be limited.

One of the delegates asked that the candidates be proportionately chosen from the sectors (circonscriptions indigénes) making up the Kwango-Kwilu. There were 49 sectors in the Kwilu, and 22 in the Kwango. Since there were to be only a total of 46 representatives elected from the Kwilu and 17 from the Kwango, such a plan would have left little room for the national and provincial leaders. Interestingly, this suggestion was also taken up by some members of the National Political Bureau.’

In sum, it is evident that considerable pressure was exerted by the section delegates and some of the lesser national leaders to democratize, as much as possible, the process of candidate selection. The delegates, especially, were the people who would have to get out the vote, and they probably knew what the reaction of the masses would be if lists did not include the most popular local leaders. Admittedly, the delegates were probably those leaders, but it would be a mistake to write the whole debate off as representing the ambitions of local 18 Tbhid., pp. 237-38.

19 Letter (names of signatories withheld) to General President, Leopoldville, May 10, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-181.)

261

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING leadership. This pressure from the lower echelons was consistent with the entire evolution of grass-roots politics.

Needless to say, the top leaders of the party did not agree to a complete democratization of the choice of candidates. The PSA lists were agreed upon by a process of hard bargaining between the Kikwit Committee and the National Central Committee. The problem of accom-

modating as many potential candidates as possible was somewhat lessened by the fact that every party had the right to submit one and a half times as many candidates as there were seats to be won in any given electoral district. It will be recalled®° that this was done because the many “incompatibilities” would result in resignations which then

had to be filled by the alternates from the same party list. For the PSA this meant that it could give 73 leaders a place on the lists, although it was expected that the lower one-third would not be elected

and that they would become representatives or assemblymen only as other PSA leaders resigned.

A breakdown of the candidates on the basis of th> positions they held in the PSA reveals that the top leaders did not employ their posi-

tions to place only national or provincial leaders on the party lists. Indeed, the extent to which this is true is astonishing.

National officers 14 candidates or 19% of total Provincial officers 16 candidates or 22% of total Local (territorial or village) 15 candidates or 21% of total Members without position 28 candidates or 38% of total If only the candidates who filled the top two-thirds of the list are counted (i.e., those who would be elected if the entire PSA list were victorious and if no changes in the order submitted by the party were made by the electorate), then the following breakdown applies:**

National officers 12 candidates or 23% as against 19% Provincial officers 9 candidates or 17% as against 22% Territorial or village officers 12 candidates or 23% as against 21%

Members 13 candidates or 25% as against 38% These figures clearly show that the leaders who decided upon the

list’s composition were sensitive to the pressures coming from the local echelons of the party. Indeed, it will be noted that in both breakdowns 20 See pp. 57-58.

21 In this instance only the candidates in the Kwilu district are counted since it

was clear that the party was to lose many seats in the Kwango, and the same relationship between full candidates and “alternate” candidates did not apply.

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THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA the largest number of candidates had no official position within the party. One can only speculate about who these “mere” members were.

Some were no doubt influential persons who represented definable groups or geographic areas which were not represented among the party officials. Some must have been placed on the lists as a result of internal negotiations (for instance, “compromise candidates”) which, unfortunately, were not revealed to the writer. Some probably were the effective leaders of the PSA in their localities but had not been given formal positions because of the pressure of time. It should, however, be noted that at the Kikwit Congress there were representatives from 87 sections and all of these had committees. The high figure of

“members” who appeared on the list is therefore representative of

mobility within the party on this crucial matter. As noted above, a comparison between the two sets of figures shows

that there was some tendency to place the candidates who were not officers low on the list with the expectation that they would not be elected. However, the difference is a relatively minor one (38 per cent as against 25 per cent).??

Despite the fact that the top leadership cannot be accused of having

hogged the party lists, considerable dissatisfaction arose over their composition. The above-cited letter from some members of the National Political Bureau makes this very clear.

The members [meaning ordinary PSA members as against Bureau members] are very dissatisfied with the list of candidates for the elections. The advisable principle for making up the list of candidates .. . in the Kwilu especially, which is the source of dissatisfaction, [would be that] the list should be made up as follows:

Kikwit 13 candidates for 10 sectors Idiofa 12 candidates for 12 sectors Masi Manimba 10 candidates for 9 sectors

Gungu 10 candidates for 12 sectors

Banningville 4 candidates for 5 sectors

.. . for the legislative [i.e., national] elections, the attention of those RESPONSIBLE should be drawn to the sectors which will not have been satisfied at the provincial echelon so that this void can first be filled, for example the territories of Banningville and Gungu where the number of seats to be split up is inferior to the number of sectors. 22 It should be noted that some candidates were listed twice since they ran in both the national and provincial elections. In these tabulations no account has been taken of this factor.

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Above all let no one come and tell us that persons capable of anSwering to the exigencies of eligibility cannot be found in the sectors which have been missed. We are ready to answer to this little objection if you give us the opportunity and to reveal more than ten candidates in your list who are blessed with an incapacity which is more than remarkable! Perhaps you are afraid to leave them aside because you are guilty and are afraid of being betrayed.”*

The letter goes on to give examples of sectors which are over-represented on the party list and others which have no representatives at all.

It is of course surprising that national leaders should support this ultra-democratic position. The reason can only be speculated upon. In general some of the members of the National Political Bureau almost became the conscience of the party during the last few months before independence. They strongly attacked all departures from collegial leadership, criticized the alleged airs of self-importance which

some of the top leaders gave themselves, and warned repeatedly against what they considered to be the grave dangers facing the party. “If it is true that the intellectuals have created this oeuvre [the party], it is also these same intellectuals who are destroying it by egoism and the avid search after glory.”’* Excepting the case of the most promi-

nent members, the need to give provincial and local party leaders places on the lists meant that the National Political Bureau was in any case sacrificed in the interest of party unity. Only six of its members had found a place on the lists and four of these held special titles (e.g., Director, Founder). Thus, although structurally the Bureau had

a very important role within the party, in fact its members were shunted aside at the moment when they could, logically, have expected the rewards for having been among the very first members of the party. An additional factor came into play in the form of accusations of ethnic favoritism. Obviously, if “ethnic arithmetic’ had been com-

pletely determining in the selection of all party councils and committees the effectiveness of the party would have been reduced. But just as obviously, in moments of malaise and discontent any ethnic imbalance became a subject of discussion and a basis of attack on the top leaders. The only way in which the objective realities in this regard could be tested would be to compare the size of each ethnic group 23 Author’s files, PSA-181. 24 Tbid.

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THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA with the number of candidates from the same group on the PSA lists. This is unfortunately impossible since the demographic data available

do not specify ethnic group. |

The following tabulation gives a breakdown of the different ethnic groups in the Kwilu district and the number of candidates from each on the PSA list. The Kwango-Kwilu ethnic map following page 162 will permit some comparisons as to the size of each group in terms of terrain occupied. Since density of population in the Kwilu district varied greatly this too is only a partially satisfactory tool.

Number of Number of candidates candidates on the on the

Ethnic Group PSA lists Ethnic Group PSA lists

Bateke 011Bakwese 31 Bambunda Bahungana Badinga 2 Bapindi 2

Bambala 1612* Bangoli 11 Bangongo SY Basongo Bapelende 3 Basuku 2

Bayaka 1 3Baboma Batchokwe Basonde 11

Bapende Balunda 00 Bayanzi 109 Bahumbu

gongo. ,

* “14” candidates refer to Félicien Kimvay who is half-Bambala and half-Ban-

The PSA also put up candidates in the Lower Congo where it had no chance whatsoever of winning. These candidates have not been included in this tabulation.

As noted earlier, the decision as to who would be placed on PSA lists was made by the Central Committee in Leopoldville and by the Kikwit Committee. Since lists had to be submitted at the local level it must be viewed as a major success of internal discipline that, with one or two exceptions, the lists were not altered by local leaders before submission to the administration. In the one or two instances where changes were made the local leaders “got away with it.” Had the na-

tional or provincial leaders disciplined this local “initiative” and changed back to the original lists, the PSA might well have found itself over the deadline and without candidates in its own stronghold. This necessity to accept local faits accomplis must have been apparent to all local leaders and therefore underscores their disciplined action. Here it must be recalled that of all major Congolese parties the PSA was the only one which maintained sufficient discipline to submit only one party list in each electoral district in which it competed.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING GETTING OUT THE VOTE

Like most Congolese parties, the PSA made rather exorbitant promises to its electorate. The official party campaign leaflet (see CRISP, PSA, p. 9) promised that a PSA government would immediately accomplish the following objectives:

1. Complete reduction of unemployment and work for everyone.

2. Increase in schools especially in the rural areas. Free primary and secondary education. _

3. Increases in everyone’s salaries. , 4. Improvements in housing in the rural regions. 5. Free medical care for all non-salaried persons. Moreover, it would not be unfair to assume that individual campaigners

interpreted this platform very liberally to suit electoral needs in any given locality.

Since, on the whole, the party was not competing with any other, having established a stronghold, the PSA was assured of the electorate’s support. The key problem, therefore, was getting people to go out and vote. Here again the party scored a real success in that over 80 per cent

of the eligible voters cast their ballots despite the fact that only four months earlier, acting on PSA orders, the entire population (in the Kwilu)

had boycotted the elections. In other words, the problem of communication facing the PSA was doubly great since any breakdown in contact with the masses might have resulted in the orders from the De-

cember 1959 elections being followed in May 1960—with the dis-

astrous results of massive abstentions. | An interesting problem was posed by the alternative methods of casting one’s vote which were open to the Congolese electorate. The voter could either cast his ballot for the “party list’ by marking a Square at the top of the party ballot, or he could employ his preferential option and mark the square next to the name of one, and only one, candidate. In interviews with national leaders the writer was told that

the party had decided to instruct its followers to vote for the “party list.” However, the provincial leaders consistently explained the system, including a clear exposition of the alternative methods, without explicitly stating that the party wanted its followers to vote “party list.” The Kikwit Congress statement read: “c) the elector receives a colored ballot (red, yellow, green). On this ballot, on the left side is the number of candidates. There are two possibilities of voting: Rither mark the white [blank?] square on the ballot to vote for the 266

THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA party. Or else mark the square next to the name of the candidate.” Later, a copy of an instruction emanating from the Central Committee (without date and typed in Kikwit) entitled “Elections” was distributed which also did not state a preference between the two possible

methods of voting.® ,

For the party as a whole, the main concern during the campaign was, of course, not centered on details of the electoral system, but rather on the marginal areas of the PSA stronghold where its position was endangered by the two ethnic breakaway parties, the LUKA and

the ABAZI. As will be noted on Table I (on page 58) giving the election results, the PSA obtained virtually no support in the Kwango. Bayaka unity was sufficiently great to give the LUKA a very strong

base, and it is very probable that other smaller ethnic groups in the Kwango also voted entirely, or in part, for this party.27 The PSA charged that LUKA leaders had initiated a number of completely illegal actions to effect their success. Allegedly they refused to allow PSA cars to cross “their” territory, i.c., the Kwango. Since many of the elite of Kenge were not born in the Kwango, resentment against such well-placed “foreigners” continued to be a fertile LUKA theme. The party’s President, André Peti Peti, allegedly declared publicly that all these “foreigners” would have to leave. Furthermore, LUKA militants were reported to have gone from village to village confiscat-

ing PSA membership cards.”®

Whether these complaints reflect a more aggressive style of campaigning by the LUKA than by the PSA is of course a matter for conjecture. In the writer’s opinion the LUKA did employ far more aggressive methods, but this view may reflect the fact that he saw PSA activities under the party’s patronage, while the LUKA was observed without the benefit of such aid.

At any rate the PSA was not only unsuccessful in gaining the support of most of the Kwango, but it clearly lost some of the support it previously had in this district. This can be demonstrated by comparing the election results of December 1959 and May 1960. It will be re25 Kikwit Congress, statement by C. Kamitatu, session of March 14, 1960, CRISP, PSA, p. 236. 26 Directive, “Elections,” Leopoldville n/d. (Author’s files, PSA-178.)

27 Compare the Kwango-Kwilu Ethnic Map with the map showing the May 1960 Province Election Results. 28 Letter from Kwango PSA Committee to Leopoldville Provincial Executive College, Kenge, April 21, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-170.) Also, Minutes of Events of April 18 and 19, Kenge, April 20, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-169.)

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING called that the LUKA ordered its followers to vote in December 1959 while the PSA and the ABAKO ordered them to abstain. The tabulation indicates how each territory in the Kwango district voted in the two elections.

DECEMBER 195929 May 1960

Terri- % of eligi- Number % of eligi- Number ,

tory ble voting voting blevoting voting LUKA PSA

Kenge 36 8,611 89 26,652 17,992 8,289

Feshi 6 1,058 80 15,510 9,734 5,361 Kahemba No Candidates No Conflict

Kasonga Lunda 63 11,945 83 19,905 14,706 not

competing

Popokabaka 52 6,057 86 15,707 8,915 not

competing

In interpreting these figures the assumption will have to be made that the abstention figures in the December 1959 elections can be laid to ABAKO-PSA Cartel influence, and the voting figures can be laid to LUKA influence. In Popokabaka and Kasongo Lunda it was probably more ABAKO influence and in the remaining territories PSA influence which caused the abstentions. At any rate the PSA did not submit a list in Popokabaka and Kasongo Lunda during the May 1960 elections. Consequently the first three territories are the ones which must be considered. In Kenge, LUKA influence during the December 1959 elections accounted for 36 per cent participation. Assuming that 89 per cent participation is the “norm” for this territory, this means that in December LUKA had approximately 39 per cent of the total potential vote. But in May it obtained 67 per cent of the vote, a gain of 28 per cent. In Feshi, LUKA influence during the December 1959 elections accounted for 6 per cent participation. Assuming that 80

per cent participation is the “norm,” this means that in December LUKA had approximately 7.5 per cent of the total potential vote. But in May it obtained 63 per cent of the vote, a gain of 55.5 per cent. In Kahemba, the PSA was and remained completely dominant. There were no candidates for the December elections, and the PSA submitted the only list during the May elections.

The balance of power between the PSA and the ABAZI cannot be analyzed in this fashion because the two parties were allies in Decem29 December 1959 election results compiled from Remarques Congolaises, No. 4,

January 25, 1960; May 1960 results compiled from territorial election reports, Author’s files, May 1960 elections.

268

THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA ber 1959 and both advocated boycotting the elections. However, ABAZI incursions into the PSA stronghold were considered as very serious indeed by party leaders. The most effective method for counter-

acting ABAZI influence was to place many Bayanzi on the PSA list and to make frequent campaign trips to the doubtful areas. In fact there were 10 Bayanzi on the PSA lists, and both the national and provincial leaders made a special effort to retain the party’s influence among this ethnic group by passing through the area and holding a relatively large number of meetings. Indeed, in order to “facilitate” these missions and to “teach the population more effectively” the leaders were accompanied by a band of musicians from Kikwit.*°

Nonetheless, the time available for campaigning was so short and the demands on the leaders so great that their efforts could never plug all the holes in the dam they were attempting to hold up. The following report coming from an area where the ABAZI was making some headway is a good example of the pressures which the local sections exerted.

[The ABAZI] is inculcating its doctrine among the population, in fact with full justification since this population never sees nor hears the voice of the PSA. [Consequently] it believes the ABAZI. Here I blame the Provincial Committee at Kikwit, which since my arrival here has never sent a single delegation to Due sector. I have asked. ... The only nourishment [we can give] . . . the population are information, meetings, and the visit of the . . . committee of the party. Do

you want everyone’s collaboration? How then? It is up to you to obtain the support or the suspicion [of the populace].**

In fact, the PSA was relatively successful in holding back the ABAZI influence, losing only two seats in the provincial assembly and one in the Chamber of Representatives to ABAZI candidates.

Unfortunately, the manner in which individual candidates campaigned has not been carefully studied. The writer was given the opportunity to see the top leaders campaigning, but, for all intents and purposes, did not find out how a Section President who was a candidate “went after the vote.” Long after the field trip was over it became apparent that this was a very serious gap in the information collected. This is so because the large number of preferential votes that were 30 Minutes of Meeting on April 14, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-166A.) 31 Report by F. Malwasa, Mayoko, April 4, 1960. (Author’s files, PSA-166.)

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING cast raises the question of whether the candidates who benefited most from these votes had done anything specifically to obtain them. After the returns were known, several national leaders indicated that some of the provincial leaders had campaigned for themselves rather than for the party and that this had cost the party some seats. The latter half of this assertion is, of course, erroneous since the proportional representation system used lumped preferential and list votes. But the question remains whether the first half of the charge is correct. The Election Results and Their Significance

The list of candidates for each electoral district has been given in a separate tabulation.*? For each electoral district the PSA submitted a list in hierarchic order. There were usually one and a half times as many candidates as places. Under the system employed, the number of preferential votes received determined which candidates would receive

the seats that the total vote cast for the party had gained. In the PSA over 80 per cent of the votes cast were preferential. Unfortunately it is impossible to give the exact figure in all instances since the tabulation of

the results only listed the preferential votes obtained by victorious candidates. Obviously, some preferential votes went to candidates who

were not elected, but the numbers involved are unknown. The total vote cast for the party is, however, listed. Consequently, the 80 per cent figure is minimal and represents the sum of all the preferential votes cast for successful candidates over the total PSA vote. As will be noted by looking at the chart, there were two territories in which no actual election took place because the PSA submitted the only list and was therefore declared the winner by acclamation. The effect of this on the candidates was obviously great since in these in-

stances, and in no others, the actual hierarchy of candidates on the lists submitted by the party was maintained.

The size of the preferential vote in the other territories varied considerably. The three most significant ones are given below:

Territory Preferential Vote Total PSA Vote %

Kikwit 34,758 63,340 55 Gungu 33,349 46,490 72 Masi Manimba 44,162 51,163 86 But in the largest single electoral district (the election for the Chamber of Representatives from the Kwilu district), 208,910 preferential votes 82 See “PSA Candidates for the May 1960 Elections” beginning on page 303.

270

THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA were cast for victorious PSA candidates out of a total of 244,979 cast for the PSA; in other words at least 85 per cent of the PSA electorate employed the preferential option.

As a result of this massive preferential vote the order of the candidates was completely altered. Persons seemingly destined to be alternates in fact moved up and were elected, while persons who held top positions on the list dropped down and were often not elected. In all, 88 per cent®* of the candidates moved from their designated positions. The most interesting and significant tendency expressed by the PSA electorate was the downgrading of national officers and the upgrading of provincial or local officers and members. The following calculations will give the full details of this trend: | MOVEMENT OF CANDIDATES ON THE PSA LISTS

Up one or No Down one or

more places movement more places Total

N 3 (20%) 2 (13%) 10 (67%) 15 PLM 22 (56%) 5 (13%) 12 (31%) 39

Total 25 7 22 54

Thus two-thirds of the candidates who were national officers (compared with less than one-third of those who were provincial or local

officers or only members) moved down; and one-half of the latter (compared with a fifth of the former) moved up.

But the N’s on the average stood somewhat higher on the lists to ; begin with: of the 15 N’s almost half (7) started in one of the first four slots, whereas of the 39 PLM’s, over half (20) started in the seventh to the 16th slots. Thus the average N could have moved | 70/15=4.7 steps upward, but 114/15—7.6 steps downward, whereas the reverse was true of the average PLM who could have moved 234/39—6.0 steps upward, but only 190/39=4.9 steps downward. Hence, to show how much the elections went against the N candidates, it is necessary to show that, even relative to the room available to each

kind of candidate to move in either direction, the N’s tended to lose ground. 33 There were 15 “national” and 39 “provincial, local and member” (hereinafter N and PLM respectively) candidates. Forty-seven changed places (88 per cent), 7 did not change places (12 per cent). These categories (N and PLM) refer to the positions which the persons in question held in the PSA, i.e., whether they were national or other officers. If residence were considered, the make-up of the categories would be almost the same, since national officers resided in Leopoldville.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING

N PLM

OPPORTUNITIES COMPARED TO ACTUAL MOVEMENT

Opportunity Actual Opportunity Actual

Upward 70 (35%) 8 (17%) 234 (51%) 69.5 (61%)

Same 1S ( 8%) 2 ( 4%) 39 ( 8%) 5 ( 4%)

Downward 114 (57%) 38.5 (79%) 190 (41%) 39 (34%) Total 199 (100%) 48.5(100%) 463 (100%) 113.5 (99%) ACTUAL MOVEMENT AS PERCENTAGE OF POSSIBLE MOVEMENT

Upward steps taken as Downward steps taken as percentage of upward percentage of downward

steps available steps available

N 8/70 or 11% 38.5/114 or 34% .

PLM 69.5/234 or 30% 39/190 or 21%

These totals are taken from the following breakdown for each electoral district. It should be noted that the territories in which no election

was held and the PSA lists won by acclamation, and the territories in which no national officers were candidates, have not been included in these tabulations. Furthermore, as noted earlier, where candidates were not victorious no figures are available on the number of preferential votes which they received. In such cases their rank order is, of course, also not known. Consequently, the medial rank of the remaining slots on the list has been given to all such candidates. For instance, in the Kwilu district there were sixteen candidates of whom 11 were

elected. Thus there are five candidates whose rank order after the election is unknown. They have all been given the medial rank of fourteenth on the list. TOTALS BY ELECTORAL DISTRICT

N Upward N Downward PLM Upward PLM Downward

N Possible N Possible PLM Possible PLM Possible

Kwango 0 1 3 2 District 0 30 6) 30 Kwilu 6 26 2146 1 District 46 74 74 Kikwit 0 2.5 16 13.5 Territory 13 11 65 67 Gungu 1 9 11 3 Territory 8 19 37 26 | Upward Downward Upward Downward

Masi Manimba 1 0 18.5 19.5

Territory 3 7 52 48 272

THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA The tabulations for each of the electoral districts listed above follow: Kwanco DIstTRIctT*

1PLM N 0 3 2 0 1 23 1 2 3.5 0 1.5 PLM 2 1 3.5 0 i)

List Position Possible Possible Voter Steps Steps

Order in PSA Steps Up StepsDown Order Up Down

4 PLM 3 0 1 3 0 SUMMATION

Percentage of Actual Actual over Possible Actual over Possible

N Possible Up == 30101/3 0/033.3 0 N Possible Down

PLM PossibleDown Up ==63323/6 PLM Possible 2/3 50.0 66.6 * The medial rank for unsuccessful candidates is 3.5. KwILvu DISTRIcCT*

1 PLM N 0 15 2 0 1 23 1 14 1 1 0 N 2 13 6 0 3 456 PLM N 3 12 9 0 5 4 11 5 0 0 N 5 10 14 0 8 798 PLM N 67 988 10 0 3 N 14 0 6 7 7 2 0 10 PLM 9 6 3 7 11 N 10 5 11 0 00

List Position Possible Possible Voter Steps Steps Order in PSA Steps Up Steps Down Order Up Down

12 PLM 11 4 4 8 0 13 PLM 12 3 14. 0 1

14 N 13 2 8 6 0 15 PLM PLM 15 14 01 14 14 21 00 16 SUMMATION Percentage of

Actual Actual over Possible Actual over Possible

N PossibleDown Up == 46 6 6/46 N Possible 74 26 26/7413.2 35.1

PLM Possible Up = 74 21 21/74 28.4 PLM Possible Down = 46 1 1/46 2.2 * The medial rank for unsuccessful candidates is 14.

273

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING KIKWIT TERRITORY*

List Position Possible Possible Voter Steps Steps

PLM 10 11 12 31 00 10 231 PLM PLM3 29 10 0 4 PLM 11.52017.5

Order in PSA Steps Up Steps Down Order Up Down

5 PLM 4 8 4 1 0 6 N 5 7 6 0 0 78 PLM 6 6711.5 014.5 PLM 5 7 0 9 NPLM 8 4 11.5 10 9 3 80 22.5 0

11 12 PLM PLM10112 111.5 5 7005

13 PLM 12 0 9 4 0 SUMMATION

Percentage of Actual Actual over Possible Actual over Possible

NPossible Possible Up= =1113 0/1322.7 0 N Down 2.5 02.5/11 PLM Possible Up = 65 16.0 16/65 24.6 PLM Possible Down = 67 13.5 13.5/67 20.1 * The medial rank for unsuccessful candidates is 11.5. GUNGU TERRITORY*

N 0 9 3 0 2 2431 PLM 1 8 9 7 PLM 2 7 6 0 3 3 6 1 3 0 5 PLM 4 5 5 0 0 6 PLM 5 4 4 2 0 7 PLM 6 3 2 5 0 8 N 7 2 7 1 0 9 PLM 8 1 9 0 10 PLM 9 0 9 1 0 0

List Position Possible Possible Voter Steps Steps Order in PSA = Steps Up Steps Down = Order Up Down

SUMMATION Percentage of Actual Actual over Possible Actual over Possible

N PossibleDown Up = 8 19 1/8 N Possible = 19 9/1912.5 47.3

PLM Possible Up = 37 11 11/37 29.7 | PLM Possible Down = 26 3 3/26 11.5 * The medial rank for unsuccessful candidates is 9.

214

THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA Mast MANIMBA*

List Position Possible Possible Voter Steps Steps

1 PLM 0 10 1 0 0 2 PLM 1 9 7 0 5

Order in PSA Steps Up StepsDown Order Up Down

27 8 9.5 0 6.5 4356 PLM N 3 3 1 0 PLM 4 6 9.5 0 4.5 PLM 5 5 9.5 0 3.5

798 PLM 6 4 4 3 0 PLM 7 3 2 6 0 PLM 8 2 6 3 0 10 PLM 9 1 9.5 i) 11 PLM 10 0 5 6 00 SUMMATION

Percentage of Actual Actual over Possible Actual over Possible

N Possible Up =3= 1.07 1/3 33.3 N Possible Down 0 0/7 0 PLM Possible Up = 52 18.5 18.5/52 35.5 PLM Possible Down = 48 19.5 19.5/48 40.6 * The medial rank for unsuccessful candidates is 9.5.

N.B. 1) Only one N Candidate. 2) A second Leopoldville resident who was, however, not an officer, was not elected although he appeared third on the list.

It is clear from the evidence presented above that the PSA electorate tended to vote for leaders or influential members who were close to the

local situation. To a certain degree the elections were a vote of no confidence in the national leadership. Interestingly, this appears to

have had no connection with ethnic factors. First, it will be noted on the chart of candidates that in the same electoral districts in which national leaders of a given ethnic group dropped sharply, other leaders of the same ethnic group rose in rank. Cumulatively, the ethnic bal-

ance of the PSA lists of candidates was roughly maintained by the electorate. Earlier a list of ethnic groups and of the number of candidates they had on the PSA lists was given. It is now possible to repeat

this listing, adding the number of victorious candidates from each group.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING

Number of Number of Candidates Number’ Ethnic Group Candidates Number

Ethnic Group’ on the List Elected on the List Elected

Bateke 0 0 Bakwese 3 1 Bambunda_ i11 6 (III)* Bahungana 1 0

Badinga 2 1 (1) Bapindi 2 1 Bambala 16% 10% Bangoli 1 0 (1) Bangongo 5Y% 3%Basuku Basongo21 2 1 Bapelende 3 0 Bayaka 1 0 Baboma 1 0

Batchokwe 36 1(II) (I)Balunda Basonde 01 01 Bapende 9 Bayanzi 10 6 Bahumbu 0 0

* In the territories in which there were no opposition lists and the PSA was therefore victorious by acclamation, the electorate did not have an opportunity to choose among PSA candidates. These victories are for the purpose of this analysis different from those where an opportunity existed for the use of the preferential ballot. Such victors by acclamation are noted in roman numerals, the total being the sum of the two figures.

Since there were one and a half times as many candidates as places, an “ideal” relationship between “the candidates on the list” and “candi_ dates elected” would be a proportion of 3:2. Roughly this proportion is represented among the larger groups. An exception is to be noted

for candidates who were elected by acclamation. At any rate, it is evident that no radical departure from the lists submitted by the PSA can be attributed to ethnic voting.

The election results lend themselves to one more test of the relative

Support given to national and sub-national leaders. There were six candidates who were placed on two lists, that is to say, they were candidates both for the Chamber of Representatives and the provincial assembly. It would be logical to expect that candidates had more success in their home territory than in the larger district arena, especially

since all of these six came from ethnic groups which were more or less concentrated in their home territories. Yet this expectation was not borne out by the actual results. The table below will permit a comparison of the relevant figures.

The following observations can be made about the table. First, the two non-officers had, not surprisingly, been placed very low on the national election list (13th and 14th out of a total of 16 of which only 11 were elected). Unfortunately the reason why these two members were placed on the list at all is unknown to the writer. They both belonged to heavily represented ethnic groups, which precludes the pos-

276

THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA

NATIONAL PROVINCIAL Preferential Votes Preferential Votes

Change in over Total in Change in over Total in

Position Name Position Electoral District Position Electoral District

Nat'l. Officer Gizenga 1 to 2 52,445 or 21% 1 to 3 5,255 or 11%

244,979 46,490 Nat'l. Officer Mulele 4 to 9 5,590 or 2% 2 to 85@ (2,141-) (5%) 244,979 46,490 Member Mulundu 14 to 8 6,181 or 3% 6 to 6 2,485 or 4% 244,979 63,340 Member Mutombo 13 to 14@ _ (2,200-) or (1%) 2 to 3 5,640 or 9% 244,979 63,340 Prov. Officer Kinkie 5 to 5 10,418 or 4% 7 to 13@ (576—) or (1%) 244,979 63,340 Prov. Officer Kamitatu 2 to 1 60,511 or 29% I1ltol 30,775 or 60% 244,979 51,163 1. “@”signifies that the candidate was not elected and that his position on the list is therefore not known. The position indicated is the medial one for all unsuccessful candidates in that electoral district. 2. (%) indicates the lowest known percentage of the vote obtained by any candidate in that electoral district. Consequently the actual percentage of the vote obtained by any candidates whose percentages are listed between parentheses is always less than the figure noted. 3. The same is the case with the number of votes indicated between parentheses. The figure for the person in question must always be less than the one noted which is the lowest one obtained by any successful candidate.

sibility that they represented an important ethnic minority without kinsmen among the leaders. Furthermore, neither of them resided in the interior, which almost precludes the hypothesis that they had become locally very influential without having been given formal titles. It will be noted that while Mulundu rose in rank at the district level

and maintained his position at the territorial level, he obtained a slightly higher percentage of the vote in his home territory than in the district. Mutombo dropped in position at both levels but also received a higher percentage of the vote in his home territory.

The comparison is more significant in the case of the other four candidates who were among the most important PSA leaders. They held the positions of National President, Secretary General, Director of the Provincial Political Bureau, and Provincial President. The most 277

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING interesting observation to be made about these four is that all but Kamitatu obtained a higher percentage of the vote at the district level

than in their home territories. Furthermore, in concrete terms, all three dropped more sharply in position on the territorial lists than they © did on the district list.

Two of these three candidates were national leaders; the third, Kinkie, was in two ways a special case and although a provincial leader had really played the role of a national one. First, he had been among the exiled leaders (as had Gizenga and Mulele) and therefore had had only very early and very late contact with grass-roots politics. Second, he is a Muyanzi, the ethnic group which had produced one of the breakaways, the ABAZI. His ethnic support was therefore split. In sum, these comparisons tend to show that the most important national leaders not only dropped in positions in both elections but also received substantially less support in their home territories than they did in the larger electoral arena.**

At a more general level, it is evident that national leaders did not exert effective control over the PSA electorate and, furthermore, that this electorate employed the system in effect both as a primary election

and an election proper. The party did not lose any strength vis-a-vis its opponents because of this since it had managed to prevent the submission of more than one PSA list per electoral district. However, within the party the composition of the leadership was radically altered

by the choice of the PSA electorate. In fact, for the ordinary PSA members the “primary” aspect of the election was by far its most significant aspect, since in most of the Kwilu the victory of the PSA was a foregone conclusion. Paradoxically, in those territories where the PSA organization had been so effective as to have become the only contender for power (i.e., the territories in which there was no other list submitted) the electorate was robbed of the means of selecting its preferred leaders from among the PSA candidates. Whether this had any long-range repercussions is hard to say, but it is a fact that in the post-independence period three territories have been plagued by al-

most continual troubles ending in total rebellion. Of these three (Gungu, Idiofa, and Kahemba) two had not had an actual election in May 1960 but had seen the PSA list victorious by acclamation. 34 Needless to say, these findings are of marginal value quantitatively because only six persons are involved. However, the positions held by Gizenga, Kamitatu, and Mulele were so important that detailed consideration of “double” candidates has been deemed worthwhile.

278

THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA The PSA After the Elections After the elections, the PSA was faced with three types of problems. First, it had to deal with growing antagonisms and divisions within the party. Second, it had to negotiate with other parties for its participation in the national and provincial governments. Third, there was the prob-

lem of restructuring its relations with the grass roots now that independence—the overriding goal up to this point—had been achieved. Obviously, much of this activity extended into the period after independence, and is thus beyond the scope of this study. Consequently, this section will deal with matters which were also the beginnings of postindependence Kwilu politics. The month between the end of the elections and the proclamation of independence was a period in which the party was almost totally preoccupied with leadership problems. The grass roots were forgotten as never before. Even the leaders who had held local positions were swallowed up in Leopoldville political life and in effect abandoned their local followers. It is here that the system of incompatibilities of public functions had, in the view of the writer, a very negative effect. While the concentration of party energies on leadership and capital politics was to cause a great many problems, it is only fair to say that in the short period before independence the tasks of the newly elected representatives and assemblymen were staggering. Thus, of the three concerns mentioned, one was almost totally ignored. The other two— internal divisions and negotiations for participation in government— were intimately linked. By the end of the election period, the PSA was hampered by several severely divisive tendencies. The old national-provincial division had not been resolved, but on the contrary was probably heightened by the tensions which the election, and the election results, brought forth. Personality conflicts abounded, especially between Gizenga and Mulele on the one hand, and Kamitatu on the other. Ideology also began to have greater importance in Congo politics and within the PSA. Finally, ethnicity became increasingly important in the internal PSA divisions. In view of the entire history of the PSA evolution, it would be logical to suppose that the most important of these divisions was that between the national and provincial (cum local) leaders. Many of the articulated antagonisms support this supposition. For instance, some of the people around Gizenga claimed that the elections had been faked to the disadvantage of the national leaders. They also objected to some of Ka-

279

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING mitatu’s independent activities—his relations with his European adviser, Guy Spitaels; his accepting an administrative post with SABENA air-

lines and agreeing to become a member of the board of the Institut Politique Congolais.

On the other side, the Kamitatu faction objected to the role which Andrée Blouin played next to Gizenga and Mulele. When the elected provincial leaders arrived in Leopoldville, they were not met at the airport and some of them at least were greatly offended by this. There was also some delay in the calling of a caucus meeting of all PSA parjiamentarians and assembly members by the National Central Committee. This was regarded as an affront and a sign that the national leaders were not being frank. In addition to these elements, ideological differences appeared which overlapped almost exactly with the division between Gizenga-Mulele and

Kamitatu. The former were the more “leftist” and the latter the more pragmatic and more “moderate.” Yet despite all that has been said above, the process of internal disintegration eventually made ethnic affiliation the most important factor.*° Exactly when this occurred is hard to say, but there were two main reasons for it. First, once discord, acrimony, and distrust became

rampant among the leaders (now no longer faced by the colonial “enemy”), they seemed to fall back on those among their colleagues

whom they could really trust—and these were not the people who shared ideology or party echelon with them but rather ethnicity. This process was probably helped along by the fact that the most important leaders came from different major ethnic groups; Gizenga was a Mupende, Mulele and Yumbu were Bambunda, Kamitatu was a Mumbala. The second cause of the growing primacy of ethnicity was, once again,

pressure from the grass roots. As has been indicated earlier, the success of the independence struggle had engendered a number of important developments at the grass-roots and middle echelon level of the party. There was an increased concern with competition between different ethnic groups. This manifested itself in part in the re-emergence of ethnic associations, and also in concern over ethnic arithmetic among PSA candidates. The relative weakness of the leadership in general here

again made itself felt. For it became clear after the elections that the modern elite leaders in the PSA were being viewed—or perhaps had been viewed all along—as delegates of ethnic interests within the party 35 For an analysis of a somewhat similar development see Terence K. Hopkins, “Politics in Uganda: The Buganda Question,” unpublished mimeographed paper, 1966.

280

THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA rather than as “guides” who would be followed unquestionably. In fact, one evaluation which can be given to the re-emergence of ethnic associations against which Kamitatu fought at the Kikwit Congress is that the competitors of the PSA leaders within each ethnic group began to manifest their discontent with the leadership which had been provided. In other words, those who led the PSA had argued against “tribalism”

and so long as Belgian power was apparent they were—possibly reluctantly—followed. But in each ethnic group there were potential leaders who did not really agree with this approach. With victory against

the colonizer at hand they asserted themselves. Needless to say, if a particular ethnic group had done particularly well in the cutting up of the political pie, then the “anti-tribalist’ PSA leader found little competition from “pro-tribalist” leaders or sentiments among his own ethnic

brethren. But if the contrary was the case his position among his own people could be threatened. What constituted “doing well’? It was not merely being represented in the parliamentary bodies in proportion to one’s numerical strength. Especially for the larger ethnic groups, it appeared to involve having the top position—in effect holding the reins of apparent and real power. This of course made it very difficult to “share” power; somebody had to be on top, and members of other ethnic groups tended to be resentful. This scheme of post-election (and post-independence) developments would logically have led to a complete fragmentation of the PSA into its component ethnic groups. That is not, however, what happened. The reason is that this arena of conflict was not the only one; there were, as noted earlier, personality and ideological conflicts and above all the reality that an ethnically fragmented party would be able to play no serious part in the provincial or national government. To play this part was one of the basic reasons why the leaders had formed the party and worked for it. Hence, the party as an institution continued to be important despite all the internal strains. This was especially true in the first part of the period covered by these generalizations—that is to say, prior to the actual declaration of independence on June 30, 1960. In sum, an evolutionary process altered the nature of internal divisions and tended toward making ethnicity the primary loyalty. It is difficult to explain each step in this evolution because little of it was ever articulated on paper. Moreover, restrospective interviews are of limited value because they tend to exaggerate the importance of variables which finally became dominant. But the history up to June 30, 1960, will give some indications as to how this process began and will 281

RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING

also terminate this account of the institutional history of the PSA up to that moment.

The PSA had won 13 out of 137 seats in the Chamber of Representatives and 33 out of 90 seats in the Leopoldville provincial assembly. The overall results for the Chamber of Representatives have been given

in Part I; the results for Leopoldville Province are given below. Under

: 9 ag : 0 ¢ Parties

S A¥ 625#&§oS 8 gw § Bus = kz £@€ QO & S838 PB BS Be Ss *# < 32 £ & < #4 0 4558 48 F

Leopoldville 7 2 1 10

Cataract 14 14 Lac Leopold II 2 2 1 1 28 Kwilu 32 2 34 Kwango 3 111 9 13 Bas-Congo 11 (city )

Total 35 33 9 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 90 * Front = Front Commun, a collection of very small parties who united to compete in Leopoldville (city). ** Cartel = Cartel MNC (K)-PSA an alliance of these two parties also in order to compete in Leopoldville (city). The one candidate which this list elected was a member of MNC (K). Source: CRISP, Congo 1960, p. 156.

the circumstances it was clear that the PSA’s best chances of obtaining a dominant governmental position was at the provincial level. This was underscored by the fact that at the national level no clear-cut majority

party or alliance at first existed and it was consequently difficult to foresee with whom to negotiate. Gizenga and the Central Committee must have perceived these elements even before all the PSA representatives arrived in Leopoldville, for he made a deal with the ABAKO over the formation of the provincial government. The key point of this agree-

ment was that the PSA would obtain the presidency of Leopoldville Province and the ABAKO the presidency of the provincial assembly.** It would appear that, as the top PSA leader, Gizenga saw himself becoming the province president.*” It is not clear exactly when Kamitatu found out about this agreement, 86 W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, Fin de la Souveraineté au Congo: Documents et Réflexions (Brussels: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1963), p. 184. 87 CRISP, Congo 1960, p. 159.

282

THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA but at any rate subsequent events make it obvious that he was completely opposed to it. Mulele and Gizenga indicated that the agreement

failed to come off because Kamitatu had wanted the PSA to obtain both presidencies.** It is more likely that Kamitatu rejected it because

: it was made at the Central Committee level and because Gizenga would have become president of the province. In addition, in the terms of their feud, had Gizenga or the Central Committee been able simply to “decide” how the PSA assemblymen were to vote, then Kamitatu would Clearly have lost face and his individual importance as a PSA leader would have been reduced. Under the circumstances the vote for the president of the assembly

(which came first on June 5) was a public show of strength between : Gizenga and Kamitatu.*® The two candidates were Joseph YumbuLemba (ABAKO) and Paul Kakwala (PSA)—the latter a close ally of Kamitatu’s, a Mumbala, and a member of the PSA provincial committee. The result of the election was 58 votes for Kakwala and 37 for Yumbu-Lemba. In other words, the vast majority of the PSA assemblymen had voted for Kakwala, thereby refusing to honor Gizenga’s commitment. Apparently the ABAKO assemblymen were completely surprised by

this development. They walked out of the assembly and although one of their spokesmen interpreted this as a simple adjournment, the net effect was that the ABAKO soon afterwards decided to form a separate 88 According to the Gizenga-Mulele versions of this accord, in addition to these two posts the ABAKO and PSA would each get 4 ministries, the LUKA would receive One ministry and the assembly vice-presidency, one ministry would be

reserved for the Lac Leopold II district representatives and another for the ABAZI. According to Gizenga and Mulele the agreement came to nought because certain PSA assemblymen did not follow the directives of the Central Com-

mittee and, under the LUKA’s influence, thought they could get both major posts. Courrier d’ Afrique, June 10, 1960.

39 Since the matter of the “ABAKO agreement” added much fuel to the fire that was by now raging between Gizenga-Mulele and Kamitatu, some PSA leaders sought to mediate between them. Obviously the PSA risked losing a great deal of influence if it split into two or more factions and this was a primary concern among the “compromisers.” A committee was established which was to be the sole agent of the party in negotiations with other parties. Its members were Gizenga, Kamitatu, Kimvay, Kimpiobi, and Iba. But it failed in this aim since different factions continued on an off-and-on basis to enter into negotiations with other parties. Perhaps these maneuvers, aimed at reconciling the two main opponents, did have some effect; the party did not formally split during this period, and intermittently the opposed leaders would join to represent the PSA vis-a-vis the resident Belgian minister and at least one of the potential prime ministers.

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Bakongo “provincial government” to cover the Cataractes and BasCongo districts.*°

This move not only threatened to split the province but also had the very serious consequence of preventing the election of the provincial government since the ABAKO controlled more than one-third of the vote and according to the Loi Fondamentale no government could be elected with less than a two-thirds quorum. In other words, the PSA was placed in a similar position constitutionally to the CONAKAT in the Katanga when the BALUBAKAT walked out of the assembly there. The PSA also reacted in a similar manner to the CONAKAT; it demanded that the law be altered to allow the election of the government with the presence of a simple majority.*? It will be recalled that this change in the Loi Fondamentale was rushed through the Belgian parliament and permitted the election of both the Katanga and Leopoldville governments.

In the meantime, however, two important developments were taking place which greatly complicated the political scene for the PSA. First, at the national level two blocs were being formed; one supported Lu-

mumba (the head of the largest single party), and the other opposed him and supported Kasavubu. From the very beginning of this controversy Gizenga and Mulele appear to have been Lumumba’s partisans. The reason for this was, for once, probably entirely ideological. They

shared a hard anti-colonial militancy. However, here as on the provincial level Kamitatu did not allow Gizenga to speak for the whole PSA. Thus, except at moments when circumstances and internal or external pressures on the party leadership pushed the different factions to

speak with one voice, Kamitatu staked out his own position at this echelon also.

The second problem was the hardening determination on the part of the ABAKO to go ahead with its plans for forming a separate province.

The Acting Governor of Leopoldville Province insisted at the time that such a move could not be contemplated before independence and would then have to be approved by the Congo government. But the ABAKO did not easily accept this view. In effect, by proving that he was a power to be contended with within the PSA, Kamitatu had triggered the possibility of a fragmented province. 40 CRISP, Congo 1960, pp. 159-60. 41 [bid., p. 160. As in the case of the BALUBAKAT, the ABAKO assemblymen

returned to elect the Senators and then walked out again.

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THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA The election for provincial president took place on June 18. The ABAKO assemblymen were still absent. There is every indication that Gizenga expected to be elected. His name had been submitted in good time and, significantly, Kamitatu’s was to be found on Lumumba’s first proposed national cabinet submitted one day earlier, on June 17.‘? The inference must be drawn that Gizenga and Lumumba thought that the former would be provincial president and that Kamitatu would receive a ministry in the national government. However, apparently at the last moment, Kamitatu also submitted his name as a candidate. When the secret vote was taken the results were Kamitatu 41, Gizenga 19.** It would of course be highly interesting to know exactly who backed each of the candidates. Unfortunately the secrecy of the voting precludes this. Some speculations in this regard are however possible. Gizenga probably received no non-PSA votes. However, according to some informants** he was supported by the assemblymen coming from his and Mulele’s territories. If one adds all the assemblymen from

Gungu and Idiofa, the total number is fifteen—four short of all the votes he received. If the calculation is made on an exclusively ethnic basis, the sum of all the Bapende and Bambunda is thirteen. Were it not for the views reported above, these calculations would of course have to be rejected as being indicative of virtually nothing. But since these opinions were expressed, and since an ethnic division along these

lines did eventually emerge, the vote may be considered as an early manifestation of the dominance of ethnicity in the internal division of the PSA. A somewhat contrary pattern, however, manifested itself when the

assembly began to vote for the cabinet. It will be recalled that in accordance with the Loi Fondamentale each assemblyman could vote for

one candidate and the ten who received the largest number of votes became the cabinet. In this instance three cabinet posts were left open in the hope that the ABAKO would return to the fold. Kamitatu, by this time eager to placate the ABAKO, strongly urged that the number be

set at four, but this suggestion was rejected by PSA and LUKA assemblymen. The vote for the cabinet is of some interest. The results were as follows:* 42 Ganshof van der Meersch, op.cit. pp. 644-65. 43 CRISP, Congo 1960, p. 161. 44 Notably Yvon Kimpiobi, interviewed in Leopoldville in July 1966. 45 Ganshof van der Meersch, op.cit., p. 508.

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Number Ethnic

Name Party of Votes Group Leta PSA 13 Bapende Kulumba LUKA 11 Basuku

Kalwanga PSA 7 Bambunda

Balongi PSA 5 Bayanzi Mombele UNIBAT 5 Bateke Mabusa RDLK 4 ? Gizenga PSA 4 Bapende Total 49

Since the total vote for provincial president was 60, it is clear that 11 votes were cast for candidates who received less than 4 each and/or for abstentions. The important lesson to be drawn from this election is that it cannot be considered a manifestation of straightforward ethnicity. For instance, 17 votes were cast for Bapende candidates whereas there were only 7 Bapende assemblymen. On the other hand, there were 10 Bambala-Bangongo assemblymen and no candidate from this group was

elected. The other interesting result was, of course, that Gizenga received only 4 votes. It would seem that at this stage Kamitatu and his supporters had a dominant position in the assembly and employed it to give some ethnic balance to the government. After he became provincial president Kamitatu went to some pains to mend his fences with the ABAKO and induce its assemblymen to return to the provincial fold. There were good reasons for this. First, the ABAKO move to form a separate province threatened to open something of a Pandora’s box. The ABAZI assemblymen also declared that they wished to form a separate province. Obviously the last thing that Kamitatu could have wanted was a fragmented province which would

have ended up with his having control over only those areas which had voted for the PSA. In addition, the ABAKO eventually developed demands in which they not only insisted that the broken agreement be lived up to (the assembly presidency and four ministries), but further claimed that Leopoldville was “their” city and that the PSA-dominated provincial government should retreat to Kikwit. To back up this position they called a strike of the—very numerous—Bakongo personnel in the employ of the provincial administration.** In the end a compromise was forthcoming. The ABAKO received the four ministries it had demanded 46 Tbid., pp. 508-11.

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THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA and also a specially created post, “provincial vice-president.’’*” In effect this amounted to a prestigious position and a fifth voice in the cabinet. In the meantime the problem of the formation of the Congo’s national government had to be dealt with. At the very beginning, as noted above,

it appeared as if the division between provincial and national government arenas would allow the two opposed PSA leaders to each have their own realm of activity. Gizenga was presumably to be president of the province and Kamitatu was inscribed as one of the ministers in Lumumba’s proposed cabinet. When Kamitatu was elected provincial president on June 18, Lumumba (on the samie day and for other reasons) proposed another cabinet in which Gizenga, Mulele, and Kimvay

were inscribed for the PSA.*® |

From this date on Gizenga and Mulele were part of all of Lumumba’s

proposed cabinets (there were two more). However, on June 19, Kamitatu was inscribed in Kasavubu’s first proposed cabinet.*® In other words, the two PSA leaders were at this point associated with the two opposed contenders for national power, Lumumba and Kasavubu. Was Kamitatu really a supporter of Kasavubu or did he lend his support at the national level for reasons of provincial politics? The answer will not be readily found. He may, in fact, have backed Kasavubu for a combination of reasons including, once again, the desire to show that he had to be reckoned with independently of Gizenga. It is also possible that he only “consulted” with Kasavubu without giving a firm com-

mitment. |

Interestingly, during this entire period of tight and heated negotiations all the PSA leaders would on occasion get together to pursue common goals. For instance, despite the fact that Gizenga appears to have given Lumumba a firm commitment as early as June 10,°° a delegation from the PSA comprised of Gizenga, Kamitatu, and Kimvay came to see the Belgian resident minister on June 16 and insisted that the party was not split, that it was not committed to Lumumba, and that if a compromise between Lumumba and Kasavubu could not be found the PSA (as the second largest national party) should be given a chance to try to form a government.* In effect, these moves indicate that the “game” was infinitely more intricate than the public record or the writer’s information reveals. There were obviously endless compromises, promises, and ruptures within the party councils. By the same token, there were almost certainly more than two factions—indeed

47 [bid. 48 Thid., pp. 644-65. 49 [bid. 50 [bid., pp. 224-25. 51 [bid., p. 237.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING Kimvay seems to have held a somewhat independent position—but no detailed information about them is available. After endless jockeying for position it seemed that Lumumba could obtain a majority for a very broadly based cabinet. Kasavubu did not oppose this government in the expectation of becoming president. But the final vote by which Lumumba’s cabinet was accepted, on June 24— six days before independence—barely exceeded the minimum (a numerical majority of all chamber seats) required. He received 74 votes out of 137 representatives.*?

The reason for this is in large part exemplified by what happened in

the PSA, which was, along with the CEREA, the party considered closest to Lumumba. The breach among party leaders had, even at this juncture, not been patched up. Kamitatu, despite the fact that he had won an important victory in the provincial assembly, was apparently

opposed to seeing his main rivals within the PSA obtain powerful positions in the national government. It would seem, although there is no hard evidence for this, that his opposition was directed far more at the PSA representation—Gizenga, Mulele, and Masena—in the Lumumba cabinet than at Lumumba himself.®* Thus the thirteen PSA representatives split. Eight supported the cabinet, two abstained, and three were absent.** Unfortunately, very little information exists concerning these develop-

ments within the PSA. The two representatives who formally abstained were Kinkie and Kama,°*° but the three who absented themselves cannot be identified.*°

Despite these gyrations of PSA representatives the party obtained several important positions in the national government. PSA representatives were directly elected by the Chamber of Representatives or the Senate to the following positions:

Name Ethnic Group Parliamentary Post PSA Office Louis Mulundu Bambunda Vice-President of the Member Chamber of Representatives

Ambroise Iba _ _Badinga Secretary of the Chamber Territorial

of Representatives Committee Member

Justin Matiti Bayanzi Secretary of the Senate National Political Bureau Member

52 Tbid., p. 283. 58 CRISP, Courrier Africain, No. 12, July 1, 1960, p. 17. 54 Ganshof van der Meersch, op.cit., p. 293. 55 It will be recalled that Kinkie was a provincial officer and a Muyanzi, Kama a national officer and a Mumbala. 56 Compte rendu analytic, Chambre des Representatives du Congo, séance du 23 juin 1960, p. 24.

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THE MAY 1960 ELECTIONS AND THE PSA Cabinet members held the following positions:

Name Ethnic Group Cabinet Post PSA Office Antoine Gizenga Bapende Vice Premier National President Pierre Mulele Bambunda Minister of Education Secretary General and Arts

Joachim Masena Bayanzi Minister of Labor Director, National Political Bureau

In addition, Kama was appointed State Commissioner for Leopoldville Province.*"

These results must be evaluated for their implications regarding the question of the re-emergence of ethnicity as a primary loyalty and also in terms of the overall judgment which it is possible to make about the success or failure of the PSA to translate its electoral strength into governmental power. The net effect of all the antagonisms and rivalries which had marked the PSA during the month before independence was that a real division

had occurred in the party. This division centered around two men, Kamitatu and Gizenga, but did not as yet imply a clear ethnic division,

although the ethnic factor was becoming increasingly important and eventually came to dominate other divisive forces. Leaders, such as Marc Katshunga, the PSA Provincial Vice-President and a Mumbunda, changed their allegiance because of ethnic considerations. Katchunga claims to have ceased supporting Kamitatu because the latter favored the Bambala.®** Kimvay, the National Vice-President, tended to oppose

Gizenga and to support Kamitatu, and that can be attributed at least in part to ethnic considerations. But examples demonstrating the opposite can also be cited. For instance, Norbert Leta, a Mupende, remained an ally of Kamitatu’s. It should also be noted that the tendency toward the emergence of ethnic solidarity under conditions which were

to become increasingly more trying and dangerous manifested itself most strongly in those groups which were large and had outstanding political personalities to lead them; the Bapende with Gizenga, the Bambala with Kamitatu, the Bambunda with Mulele and Yumbu. This phenomenon did not appear in as clear-cut a form among the Bayanzi, for instance. Bayanzi leaders were not only split between the PSA and the ABAZI, but also within the PSA—between those who supported 57 CRISP, Congo 1960, p. 297. It is noteworthy that despite this appointment Kama was one of the PSA representatives who abstained when the Lumumba cabinet was presented to the Chamber of Representatives. 58 Interview with Marc Katchunga, Kikwit, August 1966.

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RURAL RADICALISM: PSA & ITS MASS FOLLOWING Kamitatu, were neutral, or sided with Gizenga. Surprisingly, this appears to have been less of a handicap than one might have supposed, for several of their number received important government posts. The Bayanzi did not create the ethnic solidarity that the above-mentioned groups did,

| despite the fact that they lived under the same pressures and conditions. The PSA came out of a month of heated negotiations with governmental positions which more or less reflected its actual strength. Despite

all that has been explained above, the party had done fairly well. Of course it is possible to make this judgment in large part because so many

other parties were even more divided and even less synchronized in their inter-party relations.

Much of the acrimony within the PSA, and the penalty for being divided, might well have been reduced after independence because of the separation which had occurred between the arenas in which the main opponents were destined to operate. This had not taken place because of the wishes of the leaders involved; as has been seen it was rather despite them. But Kamitatu and his closest allies now dominated the provincial government, and Gizenga and some of his closest associates held positions of prestige and influence in the national government. Conceivably this de facto division would have permitted the healing of wounds. Neither side had made a move toward the formal division of the party—and that was atypical.

But whatever roles these leaders expected to play, or might have played, the mutiny of the Force Publique five days after independence changed everything. The reactions of the party and its leaders

to this and subsequent events is not part of this study. Nevertheless, overriding the now academic question of PSA unity is the paradox that this party, which had been so profoundly affected by its rural section

leaders and followers, now all but abandoned the rural masses. As noted at the beginning of this chapter the rural leaders who had been elected tended to integrate themselves into the political life of the capital. Under the trying conditions which followed the mutiny they, in fact, divorced themselves from rural problems and concerns. If one may be permitted a value judgment, this paradox was also a tragedy.

290

CONCLUSION 204>24>2029202209> 9-2 IY> HERE seems little doubt that the existence of the PSA has had Trea importance for the evolution of the Congolese independence struggle. The Congolese pressure which resulted in the sudden change in Belgian policy in 1959 was not widespread nationalism but very specifically the situation which had developed in Leopoldville Province. The main credit for this must go to the ABAKO, but the PSA played a very substantial part also. It was largely PSA influence which softened Bakongo separatist tendencies and guided the ABAKO’s militancy in

such a way that it could spearhead a nationwide struggle. The importance of this aspect of the ABAKO-PSA alliance cannot be underestimated. The PSA also accomplished a number of difficult tasks in politicizing

the people of the area in which it was active and in channeling protest into effective anti-colonial militancy. Probably the most impressive of these accomplishments was its success in holding one of the most heterogeneous and densely populated areas of the Congo together during the independence struggle.

The PSA’s success was probably due in large part to its diffused authority structure even though, as has been seen, ultimately there were deep rifts among the leadership. The PSA was virtually the only major party which submitted only one electoral list per electoral district. In sum, while much of the analysis of this study has been devoted to proving the weakness of leadership, it is the writer’s view that when detailed comparative studies of Congolese parties become possible the PSA will emerge as having been one of the most effective and disciplined. It is hoped that this study will have two values: first, as a history of the independence struggle in an area whose two million people have

had and continue to have an important place in the evolution of the Congo and Africa, and second, as an analysis of the nature of political protest in this area and by extension in many other areas of the Congo. The writer’s thesis in the latter regard has been the following: Largely spontaneous rural protest triggered by repatriated city youths existed in the Kwango-Kwilu prior to the emergence of political parties in this environment. This protest was harnessed or channeled by the modern

elite leaders of the PSA. The goals of the leaders and the masses were never really the same—the leaders wished to Africanize the existing system, while the masses appeared to wish its destruction. Nonethe-

less, the two elements harmonized to a great degree while the inde291

CONCLUSION pendence struggle was taking place. This was so for three reasons. First,

Belgian policy threw them into each other’s arms. Second, the elite provided the direction that converted the masses’ mood of protest into effective and satisfying action. Third, the masses looked up to the elite. They did this not so much because they gave recognition to the inherent

value of the skills and qualifications which the elite possessed, but rather for the more psychological reason that the elite was able to compete with the white man. No one has formulated this more accurately than Jean Paul Sartre when he wrote:

... the indigenous masses are proud of their elite who are the proof for everyone that a Negro, given that he is offered the opportunity, can equal or surpass a white man. This interpretation seems to account for two features of Congolese political behavior which, in conjunction with one another, appear paradoxical: on the one hand, the boycotting of such things as medical services and, on the other, the acceptance of a “Europeanized”’ political

elite. And this would further explain why the authority which leaders had during the independence struggle was so qualified and evaporated so rapidly after independence. There was no longer any psychological need

to prove anything to the white man; he had been defeated and kicked out and if anything the elite now became the white man. Unfortunately, no claim can be made that this thesis has been proved. Elements of it have, hopefully, been substantiated, but major points re-

main in the realm of supposition. The spontaneous protest hypothesis has been supported, but not with sufficient solid evidence. The divergence of moods between leaders and masses and the essential radicalism

of the rural masses have been supported with considerable data, but one would wish that a variety of additional information were available. The election results do seem to prove that national leaders did not control the PSA at the grass roots. But it is impossible to say whether the preference of the masses for local and provincial leaders resulted from the local leaders’ readier access to the population—and the consequent greater effectiveness of their efforts to persuade followers to vote for them personally—or from a spontaneous choice made by each voter, or from both. More microscopic research would probably also have resulted in a clearer understanding of the role played by ethnicity at the village level. Finally, there are some indications that the writer has seri1Jean Paul Sartre, “Introduction,” La pensée politique de Patrice Lumumba, ed. by Jean Van Lierde (Brussels: Editions Amis de Présence Africaine, 1964), p. Xiv.

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CONCLUSION

ously underestimated the importance of the Mpeve sect in the Kwilu during the independence struggle.? Hopefully additional research can establish more firmly the plausibility of the thesis here outlined. In the meantime, there is some value in making certain speculations on the assumption that the thesis proposed here is warranted. For the argument here made, and in particular the role assigned to rural radi-

calism, clearly runs counter to the received view of the process of decolonization in Asia and Africa. Thus Rupert Emerson—to cite one of the most influential writers on the subject—has argued what has become in American academic circles the orthodox position, that the rural peasantry (and the remainder of the old aristocracy, presumably in Asia) have “contributed neither the leadership nor the active rank and file partisans of Asian and African nationalism.”* Moreover, he states:

. . . in general the rural masses have been indifferent to the new currents or, at the best and belatedly, passive adherents to the nationalist creed. ... Except where the special circumstances inciting to peasant revolt happened to be present [local grievances and efforts to maintain the customary way of life], the typical focal points of nationalist agitation have been urban centers.*

Emerson’s estimate here is the prevailing one and is reflected in most

of the literature on nationalism in Africa. As was suggested in the Introduction, the scenario repeatedly presented by political scientists is one in which radical intellectuals head up basically urban movements and eventually, and after much effort, succeed—if they do—in inspir-

ing and arousing a mass of passive rural peasants. Part III of the present study has shown that this pattern does not apply to the political developments in the Kwilu. Now we want to go one step further and assume that conditions elsewhere in the Congo were generally similar to conditions in the Kwilu, 2 Interview with Donatien Mokolo, Lovanium University, July 1966. 8 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 195. 4 Tbid.

5 For a somewhat different interpretation of the role of the rural population see Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, A Study of the Moderni-

zation Process in Sierra Leone (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1966). Kilson employs the term rural “radicalism” although his meaning ts somewhat different from mine. His emphasis is on rural protest against the traditional elite which was being employed by the colonial power under an effective system of indirect rule.

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CONCLUSION

that if we had been able to extend the research to the other regions of the country we would have found that there too rural radicalism was an essential ingredient of the independence struggle. If this is so, we are immediately led to ask, why was the Congo so different? Why was rural radicalism so consequential in Congo politics and so inconsequential or even nonexistent, elsewhere in Africa?

But perhaps the question is wrongly put and presumes what needs to be investigated. Was the Congo so different? Was rural radicalism so inconsequential elsewhere?® For it may well be that the case of the Congo was not unique or even exceptional and, instead, that the analyses of the rise of the independence struggle in other parts of Africa have been in some measure incorrect.

In favor of the first alternative, the uniqueness of Congo politics, one might argue as follows. First, the colonial impact on the Congolese

appears to have been greater than in most other African countries, especially those to the north of the Congo. This was so because the combination of the Congo’s wealth, which allowed for massive economic exploitation, and Belgian colonial policy, with its very direct and paternalistic characteristics, resulted in more change in the life of the average Congolese than took place elsewhere. This change had an even

greater impact because it occurred relatively rapidly, again in comparison with most other areas of Africa. Furthermore, the impact may have been heightened by certain socio-psychological elements, notably the destruction, or reduction to virtual impotence, of much of the traditional elite of the country coupled with the lack of counterbalance by the emergence of a modern elite with political power and prestige. On the contrary, except in the Church, the modern elite was kept in relatively unprestigious positions and treated with paternal disdain. Under

this hypothesis the result was great social disorientation and a deep sense of inferiority on the part of the colonized Congolese. This in turn brought forth extremes of servility and frustration—a frustration which had very few outlets during most of the colonial period. When the system began to permit political expression, it rapidly led to dynamic protests among a mass which was not apathetic because it had not been allowed to be sleepy. This mass now looked to the elite, as Sartre has pointed out, because the elite at last had come over to its side, opposed the whites and knew how to do it. But this enthusiasm

for the elite did not end in uncritical obedience to it, largely because 6 Ruth Schachter Morgenthau was the first person to suggest to the writer (in 1961) that rural protest and pressure on the leadership may have been underestimated in West Africa.

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CONCLUSION

protest against the whites succeeded even without elite leadership. In other words, the elite was less necessary than elsewhere. This relationship could only have evolved under conditions which again were peculiar to the Congo—the virtual abandonment of power by Belgium. Had Belgium reacted more firmly the elite would have become more necessary and protest would have been more difficult and painful. But for various reasons, not the least of which was the example of France’s successful and apparently sudden withdrawal of colonial rule from Black Africa in 1958, Belgium did not react with firmness and hoped, thereby,

to end with moderate leaders. This did not and could not happen precisely because of the radicalism of the rural masses—it is in this that the main difference lay.

In sum it can be argued that the Congo was very different indeed! But there is a gnawing question whether these factors—even if they all prove to be correctly assessed—were sufficient to cause such a fundamentally different development of nationalism and protest. Indeed, if one looks in detail at some of the above-mentioned points one finds that they do not necessarily connect with what has been described as rural radicalism. For instance, did it really make such a difference that there was no university-educated elite? The argument can be made that not only did such highly educated persons have little importance for the independence struggle in many other parts of Africa,” but in a sense the Congo had a larger intelligentsia than most African countries at the time of independence by virtue of the large number of Congolese who had gone to seminaries to study for the priesthood. Another question can be raised about the importance of the sudden abandonment of power by Belgium. This certainly had all sorts of influences on Congolese affairs, but was it crucial for the emergence of the

type of rural protest described? The answer must be mixed. The demoralization of the administration—the looking the other way—encouraged rural protest. But was it the sole cause? In fact, may it not have been effect rather than cause? For the real abandonment of power by Belgium seems clearly to have occurred after, not before, rural pro-

test manifested itself. |

If these doubts are well-taken, the second alternative—that the nature of protest in other African states may have to be reassessed in the light of the Congo’s experience—deserves to be given serious consideration. 7 Herbert F. Weiss, “Comparisons in the Evolution of Pre-Independence Elites in French-Speaking Africa and the Congo,” in William H. Lewis (ed.), French Speaking Africa, A Search for Identity (New York: Walker & Co., 1965).

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CONCLUSION

What was the attitude of the rural population with regard to anticolonial nationalism? The key question which must be answered is: What was the mood in the rural areas on the eve and at the beginning of the spread of political parties? An admittedly cursory look at the literature reveals that very little has been written about this. Most of the material dealing with the major African political parties concentrates on the relationship of the leaders to the masses in the midstream of their move against the colonial authorities. Naturally, at that point the party exerted leadership and usually considerable discipline. But if there had not been the preconditions of rural protest would it not have taken a very long time to achieve this state? In this regard one must beware of the error of measuring the time between the founding

of such parties and the achievement of rural participation and discipline. The questions are, when did the party undertake its main rural thrust, and what conditions did it encounter? Very little has been written on these matters, but the small indications available tell not of long arduous organizing endeavors but rather of lightning successes. For instance, David Apter, writing about the spread of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) in Ghana, notes the following:

. .. Nkrumah and others were sentenced from six months to five years (in jail in 1950 after launching the Positive Action campaign). This was precisely the cap of martyrdom needed by the party. As Amegbe related in interview, “As soon as they put Kwame in jail we toured the country with Gbedemah. We went up and down the land, into almost every village, making seven or eight speeches a day, and covering thousands of miles in a week. We brought C.P.P. into every village. With Kwame in jail, Gbedemah was in command and he really organized the party.®

Since what is known about organizing large masses of apathetic people

indicates that it is generally a difficult and time-consuming task, the conditions described by Apter and others suggest a paradox. Either the process of politicization should have taken longer or the image of the rural population as “indifferent to the new currents or, at best and belatedly, passive adherents to the nationalist creed, . . .”® is incorrect. Thus the writer is drawn to the conclusion that a great deal of research remains to be done on this question. A start in a re-analysis might be made if the political sociology of independence struggles were compared 8 David E. Apter, Ghana in Transition (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p. 172. 8 Emerson, op.cit., p. 195.

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CONCLUSION

or associated with that of the early phases of revolutions rather than (as

has so often been done) with nationalism. An excellent point of departure would be Barrington Moore’s seminal study on modernization.” At any rate, it may very well be that this phenomenon was not as peculiar to the Congo as might at first seem, that it also existed in other African countries at the same stage in the evolution of their struggle for independence. Or to put it in other terms, the rural masses may very well have been under great pressure in all colonial situations and therefore protest-prone. The degree of colonial impact in the Congo will probably prove to have been extraordinarily great should it ever become possible to make measurable comparisons in this domain, but the degree of impact was—under the presently discussed hypothesis—sufficiently great in many other colonial systems to result not in a passive but in a protestprone rural populace. Should this hypothesis find confirmation it may help to explain the sometimes very great collapse in party discipline, i.e., in the influence

of the elite, which has plagued many African states since their independence. To put it in another fashion, it might suggest that there has been too great an emphasis on “horizontal” fragmentation, i.e., between ethnic groups or geographic regions, and too little emphasis on “vertical” fragmentation, i.e., between leadership and masses. Some of these speculations can now be further discussed in the light

of events in the Congo, and specifically in the Kwilu, during the six years which followed independence. The key event was the outbreak of the Kwilu Rebellion in mid-1963. Briefly, Pierre Mulele* returned to

his village on the border of Idiofa and Gungu and began to organize guerrillas. Shortly afterwards the Rebellion broke out and rapidly gained

the full support of the Bapende and Bambunda population. This Rebellion, while geographically isolated, was the forerunner of the massive

proliferation of rebellion in the eastern and northern Congo which at its apex controlled two-thirds of the Congo and has been the greatest post-independence revolutionary movement in Africa.

The character of the Kwilu Rebellion is in accord with the theme of rural radicalism outlined in this study. It was a rural uprising; in fact commercial or administrative centers when attacked were usually burnt down, not occupied. It was directed against the class which had bene10 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). 11 After Lumumba’s fall he was associated with the Gizenga regime in Stanleyville and later went into exile in the UAR and in China.

297

CONCLUSION fited from independence—the administrators, soldiers, and politicians—

and it projected the establishment of a new egalitarian regime independent of “corrupting” Western influences. A “second independence” was the promise of the uprising. On the basis of early and inconclusive evidence it would appear that the relationship between leaders and mass in the rebel organization had many similarities to the situation which existed during the independence

struggle. Leadership seems to have been placed in the hands of the modern elite (school teachers were particularly important), although the level of education of the different echelons during the Rebellion was much lower than during the independence struggle. The most educated

of the earlier protest thrust had of course been the beneficiaries of independence and were now the subjects of protest—the new “whites.”

Leadership during the Rebellion seems to have had the same type of disciplinary problems; once again it appears to have been difficult to hold back the lower echelons. In sum the Kwilu Rebellion can be considered to have been a second

chapter of rural radicalism. It was a more profound, more violent, more radical movement, but at its core was the rapid support given a small nucleus of elite leadership by the large rural mass which was obviously enormously frustrated and ready to engage in protest. Looked at from a slightly different perspective it was a clear manifestation of vertical fragmentation for there is no question that the “enemy” was the emerging administrative and moneyed middle class which, along with the army, was the only class to have benefited from the independence struggle. But, horizontal fragmentation was also of major importance and manifested itself in a very interesting manner in the Kwilu. If one ignores unimportant and minor marginal areas, only two ethnic groups supported the Rebellion. These groups, the Bapende and the Bambunda, do not have common cultural roots and do not have closer traditional ties than other Kwilu groups. The common denominator of all ethnic groups in the Kwilu was the great decline in the standard of living after independence. The common denominator of the Bapende and the Bambunda was the fact that their outstanding elite leaders, Gizenga, Mulele, Yumbu, were outside the politically dominant circle of Leopoldville and/or Kikwit. Thus, whereas

the entire area was, it would appear, ripe for rebellion, what actually triggered it was the role played—or more exactly not played—by the top political leaders of the ethnic groups concerned. The emphasis must be placed on the word “top,” for at the time that the Rebellion broke 298

CONCLUSION

out and rapidly moved from the Bambunda to the Bapende, a Mupende

was president of Kwilu (by now) Province. But he was an ally of Kamitatu, the opponent of Gizenga, the Mumbala who had risen and remained in the ruling circle. In addition, ethnic fragmentation also manifested itself within the Rebellion. After about a year of activity the tension between the Bambunda and Bapende became so great that there was a split, numerous defections, and a considerable weakening of its élan. In a sense this demonstrates the tragic position in which the Congolese peasant finds himself. He has vertically defined interests which can—in an atmosphere of gross insecurity—only find effective expression horizontally. This in turn has weakened his protest and lodged him with new leadership groups which tend to neglect his interests.

299

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Apter, David E. Ghana in Transition. New York, 1963 (revised). Artigue, Pierre. Qui sont les leaders congolais? Brussels: Editions Europe-Afrique, 1961. Bailleul, H. “(Les Bayaka. Apercu de l’evolution politique et économique

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Chomé, Jules. La crise congolaise. Brussels: Editions de Remarques Congolaises, 1960.

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———. Les Bayansi du Bas-Kwilu. Louvain: Editions de PAucam, 1933.

——-. L’évolution économique chez les Basongo de la Luniungu et de la Gobari. Brussels: Institut Royal Colonial Belge, 1951. De Decker, J. M. Les clans Abuun (Bambunda) d’aprés leur littérature orale. Brussels: Institut Royal Colonial Belge, 1948. Dettes de Guerre. Elisabethville: Editions de ‘‘L’Essor du Congo,” 1945. De Vos, Pierre. Vie et mort de Lumumba. Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1961. Doucy, Arthur, and Feldheim, Pierre. Problémes du travail et politique sociele au Congo Belge. Brussels: Editions de la Librairie Encyclopédique, 1952. Dugauquier, D. P. Congo Cauldron. London: Jarrold’s, 1961. Dumont, Georges H. La Table Ronde belgo congolaise. Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1961. Emerson, Rupert. From Empire to Nation. Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. Evolution de la crise congolaise. Brussels: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1961. Fox, Renée C., De Craemer, Willy, and Ribeaucourt, Jean-Marie. “La deuxiéme independance. Etude d’un Cas: La Rebellion au Kwilu,” Etudes Congolaises, vi (February 1965). Ganshof van der Meersch, W. J. Fin de la souveraineté belge au Congo; documents et réflexions. Brussels: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1963. Gilis, Charles-André. Kasa-Vubu au coeur du drame congolais. Brussels: Editions Europe-Afrique, 1964. ————. Kimbangu: Fondateur d’Eglise. Brussels: Editions de la Librairie Encyclopédique, 1960. Hailey, Lord. An African Survey, Revised 1956. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. Hodgkin, Thomas. African Political Parties. London: Penguin African Series, 1961.

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———.. Nationalism in Colonial Africa. London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1956. Hopkins, Terence K. “Politics in Uganda: The Buganda Question.” Unpublished mimeographed paper, 1966. Hoskyns, Catherine. The Congo Since Independence, January 1960December 1961. London: Oxford University Press, 1965. Kalanda, Mabika. Baluba et Lulua. Une ethnie a la recherche d’un nouvel équilibre. Brussels: Editions de Remarques Congolaises, 1959. Kanza, Thomas R. Tot ou tard. . . . Brussels: Le Livre Africain, 1959. Kestergat, Jean. André Ryckmans. Brussels: Charles Dessart, 1961.

Labrique, Jean. Congo Politique. Leopoldville: Editions de lAvenir, 1957.

La Crise Congolaise. Brussels: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1960. Le Congo Belge. 2 vols. Brussels: Inforcongo, 1958. Legum, Colin. Congo Disaster. London: Penguin Books, 1961. Lemarchand, René. Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. Lumumba, Patrice. Le Congo, terre d’avenir, est-il menacé? Brussels: Office de Publicité S. A., 1961.

Lux, A. “Migration, accroissement et urbanisation de la population congolaise de Luluabourg,” Zaire, xu, No. 7 (1958). Malengreau, Guy. “Political Evolution in the Belgian Congo,” Journal of African Administration, v1, No. 4 (October 1954). Marres, Jacques, and De Vos, Pierre. L’Equinoxe de janvier. Les émeutes de Léopoldville. Brussels: Editions Euraforient, 1959. Merlier, Michel. Le Congo de la colonisation belge a Vindépendance.

Paris: Frangois Maspero, 1962. |

Merriam, Alan P. Congo Background of Conflict. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961. Mertens, J. Les Badzing de la Kamtsha. Brussels: Institut Royal Colonial Belge, 1935. Moore, Barrington, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.

Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. Morgenthau, Ruth Schachter. Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. ———. “Single Party Systems in West Africa,” The American Political Science Review, LV, No. 2 (June 1961).

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Mosmans, Guy. L’Eglise a lheure de l Afrique. Tournai: Castleman, 1961.

Nicolai, Henri. Le Kwilu. Brussels: Centre scientifique et medical de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles en Afrique Centrale, 1963. Okuma, Washington. Lumumba’s Congo. New York: Obolensky, 1963.

Parti Solidaire Africain (PSA) Documents 1959-1960. Centre de Recherche et d’Information Socio-Politiques (CRISP). Edited by Herbert F. Weiss and Benoit Verhaegen. Brussels, 1963.

Paulus, J. A. “Le Kitawala au Congo Belge,” Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay, Vol. 29, No. 2-3 (1956). Paulus, Jean-Pierre. Congo 1956-1960. Brussels: Editions Terre d’Eu-

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Plancquaert, M. (S. J.). Les Jaga et les Bayaka du Kwango. Brussels: Institut Royal Colonial Belge, 1932. Poupart, R. Premiére esquisse de lévolution du syndicalisme au Congo. Brussels: Editions de |’Institut de Sociologie Solvay, 1960. Rubbens, Antoine. “La consultation populaire du 22 décembre 1957 a Elisabethville,” Bulletin du CEPSI (September 1958). Ryckmans, Pierre. Dominer pour servir. Brussels: Edition Universelle, 1948.

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reau of Documentation. Documents. Leopoldville; irregular (up to 1960). Belgian Congo Government, Commissariat General of Information, Press Service. Leopoldville; irregular (up to 1960).

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Author’s files containing copies and microfilms of Congolese party archives.

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Index ABAKO (Alliance des Bakongo), 40n, des Péres Jésuites), 88-95, 108, 199, 70, 71, 77, 90, 100, 140, 141, 143n, 223; (Kikwit), 93, 147, 161, 193 144, 147, 150, 199, 203, 244; attempt Association Bayanzi du Territoire de to revive Kikongo, 8; and collapse of Bannineville, 79 colonial administrative power, 21, 23, Association des Anciens Eléves des 228, 241-242; and December 1959 Péres Jésuites, see ASAP elections, 136, 268; elite control, 51- Association des Ressortissants du Haut52; ethnicity and, 9, 10, 13, 19, 20, Congo (ASSORECO), 40n 56, 80, 81, 90, 173, 174; Kasavubu- Association du Personnel Indigéne du Kanza split, 170-171; and Leopold- Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi ville riots, 17-19, 190; and May 1960 (APIC), 8 elections, 46, 66, 282-286; and MNC, Association Générale des Baluba du 19-20, 32; nationalist demands, 9, 13, Katanga, see BALUBAKAT 15, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 104-105, 106,

291; plans for a “Republic of the Bakongo, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, Central Kongo,” 19, 24, 80, 81, 109, 21, 23, 29n, 32, 40n, 62, 80, 81, 90, 110, 111, 117, 120, 126, 284, 286; 91, 92, 100-101, 116-117, 122, 141, and PSA, 3, 11, 24, 25, 43, 49, 80, 152n, 157, 173, 174, 190, 284, 286, 81, 85, 92, 101, 102, 107-117, 120, 291. See also ABAKO 126, 127, 149, 152, 153, 160, 167, Balongi, Sebastien, 286, 306 170, 171, 176, 203, 204, 228, 229, Baluba, 28, 29, 30, 50, 54; conflict with 243, 291; and Round Table Confer- the Lulua, 31, 51, 62, 135, 139; conence, 42. See also ABAKO-PSA Car- flict with the Lunda, 11, 29, 62

tel BALUBAKAT, 29, 37, 47, 48, 65, 70,

ABAKO-PSA Cartel, 25-26, 32, 41, 42. 71, 138, 155, 156, 284

See also Cartel Bambala, 92, 258, 286, 289

ABAZI (Alliance des Bayanzi), 49,120, Bambunda, 280, 285, 286, 289, 297,

138, 144, 147, 152, 171, 172, 173, 298, 299 256, 258, 267, 268-269, 278, 282, Bangala, 9n

283n, 286, 289 Banningville, 49n, 263, 311

Action Socialiste, 79, 80, 81-82, 93 Bapelende, 174

Adoula, Cyrille, 35, 80, 144, 149, 234 Bapende, 187, 285, 286, 289, 297, 298,

Africanization, 13, 22, 46, 107, 223, 299

224, 229n, 230, 234, 240 Bas Congo, 37n, 133, 135, 141, 243,

Akweniko, Michel, 310 282, 284

Algeria, 137 Basonde, 174

Alliance des Bakongo, see ABAKO Basuku, 174, 184, 286

Alliance du Kivu-Maniéma, 34 Batchokwe, 174, 175 Alliance Rurale Progressiste (ARP), 34 Bateke, 286 alliances, political, 49-51, 57n, 59, 63, Bayaka, 40n, 54, 62, 72, 78, 79, 88, 100,

170, 171. See also ABAKO-PSA 101, 114, 115, 116-118, 123n, 135,

Cartel 136, 153, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176,

alumni associations, 88, 89, 93 186, 188, 219, 228, 247, 267. See also Anciens Eléves des Fréres des Ecoles LUKA Chrétiennes (ASSANEF), 88 Bayanzi, 49n, 78-79, 120n, 138, 172,

Angesaka, Célestin, 84 173, 176, 256n, 258, 269, 286, 289Apter, David, 296 290 ASAP (Association des Anciens Eléves Bayeke, 54

319

INDEX Belgian colonial administration, 86-87, Bukavu, 6, 12, 33, 34, 43, 135 153-155, 189-190, 216-217; adminis- Bula, Vital, 84, 304 trative collapse, 4-5, 21, 22, 23, 24, 39, 41, 43, 46, 47, 67-68, 71, 188, 189, cabinet, 285-289 190, 191, 198, 208, 240, 241, 242, Cartel (federalist parties, ABAKO-PSA,

243, 244, 252; and Catholic Church, etc.), 25-26, 32, 41, 42, 102, 103, 224; and executive colleges, 246-250; 107, 113, 118-149, 150, 152, 166, and political parties, 12-13, 15, 23- 167, 207, 268 24, 26-27, 36, 46-47, 50, 123, 124, Cataractes, 37n, 133, 135, 141, 282, 284 218; position on elections, 26-27, 36, Catholic Church, 216, 223-227. See also 208, 209, 214; and PSA, 23-24, 164, missions 166, 199, 202, 204, 205, 206, 207, Catholics, 7, 8, 12, 20n, 27, 79, 80, 90 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, centralism, 3, 24, 42, 43, 50, 66, 70, 85,

215, 216, 220, 221, 222; relations 113, 117, 138, 146, 149, 150, 209 with ABAKO-PSA Cartel, 25-26, Centre de Regroupement Africain, see

103, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125, CEREA 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, Centre de Regroupement pour les In137, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 167, téréts du Kwango, see CRIK 207; and traditional chiefs, 34, 55, centre extra-coutumier, 86, 87 86, 100, 186, 216-218, 220, 221, 222, “Cercle des Evolués,”’ 89, 195

223. See also civil disobedience CEREA (Centre de Regroupement AfriBelgian Socialist Party, see Parti Social- cain), 12, 28, 32n, 33, 34, 35, 43, 55,

iste Belge 59, 70, 71, 135, 138, 288

Belgium: Administrative Reports on the Chamber of Representatives, 43n, 47,

Congo, 183-184, 186-187, 188n; co- 57, 58, 65, 147, 150, 269, 270, 276, lonial policy of, 3, 4, 7, 8-9, 12, 13- 282, 288, 303-305 14, 18-19, 20, 21, 26, 38, 76, 77, 104, chef de chefferie, 217, 223

105, 114, 149, 158, 188, 246, 291, chef de groupement, 87, 99, 217 292, 294, 295; Parliament, 23, 38, chef de secteur, 87, 97, 217, 218, 223 131, 149, 155, 157. See also Belgian chef de secteur imposé, 51n

colonial administration chefferie, 86, 87, 216, 219

280 203, 216, 222, 261

Blouin, Mme. Andrée, 177-179, 227, circonscription indigéne, 86, 87, 111n,

Bodesa, Michel, 311 civil disobedience, 24, 102, 132, 145, Bolikango, Jean, 35, 39n, 70 166, 176, 191, 192, 193, 194, 199,

Bomans, Governor M.J.B., 241-242 207, 212, 225, 228, 251

Bomboko, Justin, 154 COAKA, (Coalition Kasaiénne), 31n,

boycott: of elections, 24, 36-37, 39, 46, 55 111, 121-122, 123, 124, 131, 133-136, COBAKWA (ABAKO cooperative), 153, 154, 203, 204, 208-209, 212, 213, 228 214, 215, 218, 219, 228, 244-245, 266, companies, 216. See also Huileries du 268-269; of government services, 24, Congo Belge (HCB) 191, 207, 214, 241, 245, 249; of medi- CONAKAT (Confédération des Associ-

cal services, 24, 191, 200, 292; of ations Tribales du Katanga), 11, 13, taxes, 24, 193, 199, 212, 228, 241, 29, 37, 47, 49, 50, 54, 55, 56, 70, 71,

242, 243 138, 155, 157, 175, 284

Brazzaville, 127, 130, 152n, 166, 167; Conakry, 178

de Gaulle speech, 13, 14 Congo, 14, 126, 171

broussards, 108 Congolese clergy, 216, 223-228 Brussels, 128-129, 137; World Fair, 14, Conscience Africaine, 8-9 15. See also Round Table Conference conseil de secteur, 200

320

INDEX conseils d’entreprise, 232, 234, 236 18, 21-22, 24-25, 56, 62, 76, 184-185, Convention Peoples Party (CPP), 296 189, 190-214, 240, 291-299; relations COOPESA (Coopérative de la Soli- with traditional chiefs, 53-55, 95-96,

darité Africaine), 228 222. See also under rural population

Coquilhatville, 6, 35; Coquilhatville Emerson, Rupert, 293

Congress, 123 Equateur, 9, 31, 35, 47, 58, 63, 175

CRIK (Centre de Regroupement pour ethnic associations, 8, 9, 12, 13, 78, 79,

les Intéréts du Kwango), 173-174, 88, 118, 199, 259, 280-281

175 ethnicity: communal elections and, 912, 28; in Kwango-Kwilu, 10n, 78, 82,

de Booth, Charles, 88, 89 114, 116-118, 163, 172, 174, 219,

de Gaulle, General Charles, 38; Brazza- 265; political parties and, 4-5, 12-13,

ville speech, 13, 14 14, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28-40, 50, 51, 53-

de Schrijver, Auguste, 38n, 118, 120, 54, 55-56, 66, 70, 123, 169-173, 257121, 122, 123-124, 128, 129, 130-131, 259, 267-269, 286; PSA and, 78-79, 132, 135, 137, 138, 142, 143, 145, 80, 81, 90, 116-118, 168, 169, 170,

146, 149 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 252,

Diomi, Gaston, 108 257-259, 264-265, 275-278, 279, 280Duvivier, Pierre, 33n 281, 285, 289-290, 292, 298-299

évolués, 6 ,

economic conditions, 15, 78, 100, 101, executive colleges, 46, 47, 157n, 216,

187-189 244-250, 254, 257; District College,

Economic Round Table, 154, 157-159 Kenge, 246-247; Masi-Manimba Coleducation: of elite, 6-7. See also mis- lege, 247-249, 250 sions

elections: 1957-1958, 4, 9-12, 28, 30n, federalism, 3, 24, 25, 32, 42, 43, 50, 66, 35, 81, 117; December 1959, 26, 27, 70, 85, 92, 110, 113, 117, 119, 120,

36-38, 39, 43, 46, 53, 56, 101, 119, 126, 138, 142, 146, 149, 150, 173, 120, 121, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 202-203 129, 130, 131, 132, 133-136, 145, Fédération Générale des Traveilleurs 154, 203, 208-209, 218, 244, 266, 267- Belges (FGTB), 88, 234 268; May 1960, 3, 4, 11n, 28, 37, Fédération Générale du Congo, 138 40n, 43-49, 50, 54, 55, 56-63, 64-71, Fédération Kwango-Kwiloise, 78, 100,

83, 93, 147, 151, 154, 170, 176, 180, 114 223, 249, 250, 257-290, 303-312. See Fédération Kwango-Kwilu, 78, 79, 84,

also electoral system 93, 199

electoral colleges, 26, 124 Fédération Kwangolaise, 78 electoral system, 47-49, 57, 119, 121, Feshi, 136, 268 124, 150, 151, 259-262, 266-267 Force Publique, 5, 17, 18, 32, 111, 140Elisabethville, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 27, 105 141, 143, 153-154, 198, 205, 290 elite: associations, 3, 7, 8, 88, 89; com- Francois, Charles, 33n munal elections and, 9-12; composition of, 6-7; Congolese clergy, 223, Ganzumba, Albert, 309

227-228; early demands for inde- General Executive College, 62, 153, pendence, 4, 8-9, 14-15; education of, 154, 155, 157, 158 6-7, 295; labor unions and, 7-8, 88; Gizenga, Antoine, 79, 84, 112n, 113n,

Leopoldville riots and, 17, 18, 76, 114n, 130, 139, 145, 159, 160, 162, 189-190; political parties and, 6-16, 166, 168, 169, 175, 176, 177, 178, 20, 22, 24-25, 27, 33, 34, 35, 51, 52, 179, 187, 204, 205, 206, 207, 213, 59-60, 71, 80, 81, 144, 168-169, 173, 214, 222, 225n, 227, 252, 253, 277, 175, 257, 277; political protest of, 4, 278, 279, 280, 282, 283, 284, 285,

321

INDEX

304, 309 170, 171

286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 297n, 298, Kanza, Daniel, 112n, 114n, 129, 157, Government Declaration, 18, 19, 21,23, Kanza, Philippe, 126

76, 84, 103, 104, 123n, 197 Kanza, Thomas, 14

groupement, 87, 99, 216, 219, 222, 223 Kasai, 9, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 37n, 47,

Guffens, Monseigneur, 90, 147 50, 51, 58, 62, 101, 135, 138; immi-

Gulungu, Valentin, 311 grants, 11, 28

Gungu, 210, 211, 263, 270, 272, 274, Kasavubu, Joseph, 13, 14, 15, 17, 21,

278, 285, 297, 309 25, 32, 52, 59, 70, 81, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114n, 116, 120, 126, 127, 129,

Herrady, Joseph, 77 130, 131-132, 138n, 139n, 140, 141, Huileries du Congo Belge (HCB), 229- 146, 147, 148, 150, 152, 153, 154n,

239 155, 156, 157, 171, 241, 242, 284, 287, 288

; Kasende, Joseph, 309

Iba, Ambroise, 288, 305 Kashama, Léon, 84, 118

Idiofa, 263, 278, 285, 297, 308 Kasongo, Sébastien, 154

Hlenda, Henri, 118n Kasongo-Lunda, 136, 268 Heo, Joseph, 35, 144 Katanga, 47, 50, 62, 114n, 116, 138, Tlunga, Maurice, 306 156, 174, 175, 284; December 1959 “Independence bonus,” 62 elections, 37; ethnic divisions, 11, 28-

Interfédérale des Groupes Ethniques, 29, 30, 31; May 1960 elections, 48,

13, 19n, 220 54, 58; separatism, 20, 105

Intsimi, Theotime, 308 Katshunga, Marc, 92, 110, 111, 112,

Jadotville, 9 309 Jeunesse PSA (JPSA), 256 Kenge, 82, 83, 86, 87, 88, 99, 117, 136,

115, 164, 194, 203, 206, 230n, 289, 160, 175, 267, 268, 312; Kenge Com-

Kahemba territory, 174-175, 268, 278 mittee, 82, 83, 212

Kaiuanga, Celestin, 308 Kiamfu of Kasongo Lunda, 54, 87, 100, Kakula, Donatien, 84, 310 115-116, 123, 153, 172, 175

Kakwala, Paul, 91, 92, 283, 306 Kibwe, Jean, 154, 157

Kala, Robert, 311 Kifunbi, Valentin, 306 Kalaki, Pierre, 308 Kikaka, Etienne, 310 Kalonji, Albert, 19n, 27, 70, 144 Kikongo, 8, 80, 220 Kalwanga, 286 Kikwa, Noel, 173, 174, 303 Kama, Sylvain, 84, 89, 94n, 110, 154, Kikwit, 77, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 157, 165, 166, 229-230, 288, 289, 304 93, 94, 147, 175, 192, 193, 199, 249, Kamitatu, Cléophas, 83n, 89, 90, 9in, 258, 262, 270, 272, 274, 286, 298, 92, 94n, 95n, 96, 97n, 98, 108, 109, 306-307 110, 111m, 112, 113, 115, 127, 144- Kikwit Congress, 176-177, 259-261, 263, 145, 147, 148, 152-153, 160, 161-162, 266, 281 164-165, 166-169, 170, 171, 172, 173, | Kikwit PSA, 82, 83, 85n, 92, 93, 94, 95,

176, 177, 178n, 180, 194-195, 203, 96, 97, 98, 99, 103, 108, 109, 110, 209, 222, 230, 233, 249, 251; and 112, 115, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, May 1960 elections, 258, 259, 261, 166, 168, 169, 172, 193, 194, 195, 277, 278, 279-280, 281, 282-283, 284, 196, 197, 200, 201, 203, 206, 209,

285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 298, 210, 211, 213, 219, 221, 223, 229,

303, 304, 310 230, 231, 244, 252, 262, 265 Kanga, Ignace, 154 Kilson, Martin, 293n

Kangongo, Sebastien, 309 Kimbau, 101n 322

INDEX

Kimpiobi, Yvon, 305 Lehman, District Commissioner, 94n, Kimvay, Félicien, 79n, 84, 127, 139, 212, 249

157, 166, 167, 179-180, 212, 287, lembas, 91, 220

288, 289, 303 Leopoldville, 6, 7, 12, 13, 20, 27, 52,

Kimvula, 117 101, 114, 134, 175, 188, 189, 190,

Kimwanga, Honoré, 92 282, 286; communal elections in, 9, Kingandzi, Léon, 310 10, 31, 117; ethnic associations in, 8,

Kingolo, David, 84 15, 78, 79; PSA in, 78, 82, 83, 84, Kingotolo, A., 112n, 114n, 127, 139 85, 86, 87, 89, 108, 109, 111, 112,

Kinkie, Raphael, 92, 127, 139, 166, 178, 160, 161, 172, 298. See also under

247, 277, 278, 288, 304, 307 riots

Kipoy, Conrad, 92, 112n, 230 Leopoldville Committee, see National Kisantu Congress, 42, 43, 133, 138-146, Central Committee (PSA)

150, 166-167, 228, 251 Leopoldville Executive College, 245

Kititwa, Jean-Marie, 154 Leopoldville Province, 20, 28, 31, 35, Kivu, 27, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 43, 46, 58, 39, 46, 50, 58, 62, 125, 145, 173, 184,

59, 100, 135 252, 282; ABAKO separatism, 19, Kulumba, 286 24, 108; December 1959 elections, Kopytoff, Igor, 18n, 184 20, 23, 284; ABAKO-PSA axis in, 3,

Kusangila, Charles, 303 36-37, 46, 133, 135, 136; importance

Kuyitila, Wenceslas, 109n, 118 of in Congo’s political evolution, 25, Kwango, 21, 24, 37, 40n, 82, 99-101, 107, 291; MNC in, 20, 28, 32, 80. 115, 116, 117-118, 134, 135, 136, 173, See also PSA 174, 175, 177n, 187, 189, 191, 225, Leta, Norbert, 286, 309, 387 228, 261, 267, 268, 272, 273, 282, Liberals, 7, 8, 20n, 80, 88, 90

303 Loi electorale, 150

Kwango Provincial Committee, 88, 99, Loi Fondamentale, 57, 149, 150, 151,

100, 101in 155, 156, 157, 284, 285

Kwango-Kwilu area: elite in, 80, 81, 87- | Longo, Alexandre, 305

89, 108, 168, 178; ethnicity in, 10n, Lubamba, Philippe, 138n, 144 78, 82, 114, 116-118, 163, 172, 174, Lubanza, Luc, 312 219, 265; and PSA, 24, 76, 79, 82, Lubuma, Valentin, 77, 78, 84, 104, 106, 83, 85, 88, 90, 91, 93-101, 115, 120, 109n, 162n, 166, 213n 153, 162, 175-176, 183-215, 218, 222, LUKA (L’Union Kwangolaise pour

243, 244, 261, 291 L’Indépendance et la Liberté), 37,

Kwilu, 10, 21, 24, 37n, 40n, 82, 83, 93- 40n, 46, 118, 123, 136, 171, 172, 174,

99, 101, 108, 115, 116, 120n, 134, 175, 228, 247, 267, 268, 282, 283n, 135, 162, 167, 173, 174, 187, 228, 285, 286 252, 257, 261, 263, 265, 270, 272, Lulua, 27, 29, 30; conflict with Baluba, 273, 279, 282, 293, 297, 298, 304-305 31, 51, 135, 139 Kwilu Provincial Committee, 88, 166, Lulua Fréres, 30

258 Luluabourg, 6, 29, 30n, 32, 135

Kwilu Rebellion, 297-298 Luluabourg Congress, 19, 30, 85, 88, 89, 120n, 145

La Presse Africaine, 33n Lumumba, Patrice, 19n, 26n, 27, 30, 31, Labakuhana, Boniface, 305 32, 33n, 49, 50, 52-53, 59, 70, 120, labor disputes: PSA and, 229-240 144, 145, 146, 148, 150, 175, 177, labor unions, 79, 234, 236; elite and, 284, 285, 287, 288, 297n

7-8, 88; PSA union, 229-230 Lunda, 54, 56, 114n, 117, 174, 175;

Lac Leopold II district, 36n, 134, 173, conflict with Baluba, 11, 29

175, 282, 283n Luveto, Augustin, 307 323

INDEX

Lux, A., 30n Mudimu, Lin, 308

Lwa, Francois, 311 Mukelenge, Boniface, 307 Mukondo, Jacques, 312 Mabusa, Basile, 286 Mukwidi, Thomas, 305 Mafuta, Christian, 92, 203n, 230n, 309 Mulele, Pierre, 77, 84, 112n, 113n, 114n,

Makwata, Xavier, 312 127, 139, 159, 160, 161, 166, 178, 206,

Malonda, Denis, 92 277, 278, 279, 280, 283, 284, 285, Malulu, Paul, 307 287, 288, 289, 297, 298, 304, 309 Maluma, Dieudonné, 310 Mulundu, Louis, 277, 288, 305, 306 Mandala, Louis, 84, 118n, 123n, 157n, Mumbala, 92, 258, 280, 283, 298 167, 168, 173n, 238, 253, 254, 255- Mumbusi, Cléophas, 307

256, 258, 303 Munoko, Gaston, 309

Mandefo, Zacharie, 312 Munungu, Rostand, 307

Manessa, Raymond, 94n, 230-231 Mupelende, 174 Masena, Joachim, 84, 288, 289, 305 Mupende, 280, 289, 298 Masi-Manimba, 164, 172, 195-198, 200, . Mutombo, Dieudonné, 277, 305, 306

263, 270, 272, 275, 310; executive Muyere, Nicodéme, 84

college, 247-249, 250 Mwasipu, Dominique, 174, 303

Masikita, Pierre, 114, 118, 247 Mwato Yamvo, 87, 175

Masini, Armand, 310 Mwefi, Germain, 84, 308

Matiti, Justin, 84, 288 Mwenda Munongo, Antoine, 54

Mbao, Christophe, 310

Mbweny, Wenceslas, 79n Nakasila, Gérar d, 84

Mesopamba, Narcisse, 310 National Central Committee (PSA), 82, missions, 226, 227; Jesuit missions, 88, 83, 84, 89, 90, 97, 98, 108, 109, 110, 89, 95; mission schools, 7, 8, 79, 93, 112, 115, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165,

94, 224 166, 167, 168, 169, 177, 179, 229,

Mitelesi, Jean, 308 252, 256, 262, 265, 280, 282, 283 Mobutu, General Joseph, 159 National Congress (PSA), 82, 83 Mombele, 286 National Political Bureau (PSA), 82, Mobwisi, Laurent, 310 83, 84, 167, 168, 169, 177, 179, 180, Mokolo, Donatien, 293n 228, 255, 256, 261, 263, 265

Mongo, 35 Ndala, Sébastien, 232, 234-235, 308

Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), Nendaka, Victor, 145 9, 12, 14, 15, 19, 23, 27, 28, 30, 31, . Ngombe, 35 88, 89, 90, 91n, 120n, 144, 192-193, Nima, Ferdinand, 84 199; ABAKO and, 19-20; congress, Nlandu, Fean, 228

32, 145; PSA and, 80, 88 Notre Kongo, 128, 242

MNC (Kalonji), 19n, 26n, 51, 70, 71, Nzadi, Louis, 312 120, 125, 135, 139, 143n, 144, 147, | Nzamba, Valére, 84

282 Nzeza Nlandu, Edmond, 130

MNC (Lumumba), 19n, 26n, 27, 32, Nzeza, Simon, 18n, 19n 33n, 34, 35, 42, 43, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52,

54, 55, 57, 59, 63, 70, 71, 97, 120n, Orientale, 28, 31, 32, 33, 36, 46, 51, 52, 123, 135, 138, 139, 147, 148-149, 175, 54, 58 282

34 tions for, 4, 26, 42

Mouvement Social du Maniéma (MSM), parliament (Congo), 62, 150, 151; elec-

Mouvement Solidaire Maluba, 30 Parti de la Défense du Peuple Lulua,

Mpeve sect, 253, 293 138, 139

Mpolo, Luc, 230n Parti de Liberté et du Progrés, 7n 324

INDEX Parti de l’Unité Congolaise (PUC), 20n collegial leadership, 52, 70, 93, 169, Parti du Peuple (PP), 12, 26n, 27, 81- 264; and Congolese clergy, 223-228;

82, 120, 138, 143, 144, 147 elite control, 51-52, 160, 162, 184Parti Libéral Belge (PLB), 7n 185, 192-195, 198, 199, 200, 201,

Parti National du Progrés (PNP), 20n, 205, 240; ethnicity and, 78-79, 80, 81, 26, 34, 37, 38, 40n, 54, 55, 57, 70, 90, 116-118, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 71, 93n, 120, 123, 124, 125, 129, 138, 173, 174, 175, 176, 252, 257-259,

142, 145, 153, 179, 218 264-265, 275-278, 279, 280-281, 285,

Parti Social Chretien (PSC), 7n 289-290, 292, 298-299; exiled leaders, Parti Socialiste Belge (PSB), 7n, 122, 102, 159, 169, 176; foreign influence,

124, 126, 147 136-137; and Kiamfu of Kasongo

Parti Solidaire Africain, see PSA Lunda, 115-116; and Kisantu Con-

party discipline, 46, 68-69, 296, 297, gress, 138, 139, 143n, 144; leadership,

298; PSA and, 252-254 78-82, 83-84, 86, 87, 92-93, 160-180,

Pashi, Alphonse, 118n 206, 212, 215, 251, 252, 253, 254, passive resistance, see civil disobedience 255, 275, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281,

“patron” party, 36 284, 287, 288, 290, 291, 292, 298;

Penge, Placid, 58 and May 1960 elections, 46, 180, 183,

Peti Peti, André, 172, 267 251, 257-290; party discipline, 251-

Pétillon, Governor General, 189 252, 254-257, 265, 291; policy, 84Political Commission, 154, 155, 156-157 85, 102-159, 202-207, 209, 214; political parties: and colonial adminis- quasi-governmental functions, 216, tration, 12-13, 15, 23-24, 26-27, 36, 228-229, 235, 239, 240, 241, 249; and 46-47, 50, 123, 124, 218; contrasted, Round Table Conference, 42, 147, 51-55, 70-71; and elite, 6-16, 20, 22, 148, 149, 153, 157-159; secretiveness 24-25, 27, 33, 34, 35, 51, 52, 59-60, of early operations, 76, 77; structure, 71, 80, 81, 144, 168-169, 173, 175, 82-83; traditional chiefs and, 216-223; 257, 277; and ethnicity, 4-5, 12-13, white advisers, 77, 147-148. See also 14, 19, 20, 22, 27, 28-40, 50, 51, 53- ABAKO-PSA Cartel; Kwango Pro54, 55-56, 66, 78, 123, 169-173, 257- vincial Committee; Kwilu Provincial 259, 267-269, 286; main characteris- Committee; National Central Com-

tics, 3, 6, 38, 64-71; quasi-govern- mittee mental functions, 4, 24, 43, 68, 71 PSA Committee in Leverville, 229-239

Pombo, Ambroise, 84, 103n, 307 PUNA, 70, 71 Popokabaka territory, 101, 118, 136,

268 Rassemblement Congolais, 33, 34

provincial assembly, 47, 48-49, 62, 171; | Rassemblement Démocratique Africain

elections for, 4, 42, 57, 131, 150, 269, (RDA), 145, 152

276, 282, 283, 288, 306-312 Rassemblement Démocratique du Lac provincial councils, 26, 124, 131, 151 du Kwango et Kwilu (RDLK), 173, Provincial Executive College, 154, 157, 282, 286

179 riots: Leopoldville, 3, 4, 12, 16, 17-19,

PSA (Parti Solidaire Africain), 28, 31, 20, 31, 76, 189-190, 193n, 225; Stan37, 55, 59, 70, 71, 147, 152, 157; and leyville, 32, 33, 120n ABAKO, 3, 11, 24, 25, 43, 49, 85, Round Table Conference, 38-39, 40n,

101, 102, 107-117, 120, 126, 127, 41-42, 43, 53, 56, 59, 66, 77, 103, 149, 152, 153, 160, 167, 170, 171, 125, 126, 131, 132-133, 135, 139, 176, 202-203, 204, 228, 229, 243, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146-151, 152, 291; attitude toward Van Hemelrijck, 153, 154, 157, 158, 159, 167, 169, 23-24, 103-106, 202; candidates for 170, 171, 176, 228, 241, 242, 243, elections, 258-265, 270-278, 303-312; 245

325

INDEX rural population: and Congolese clergy, Uganda, 34 224-225, 227; discipline and, 252-254; unemployment, 15, 31 and elite, 22, 24-25, 35-36, 86, 87, 88, | UNICO, 31 89, 93, 95, 100, 101, 107, 183-185, Union Congolaise (UC), 12, 27, 30, 31,

189, 190, 192, 194, 195, 198, 199, 34

200-203, 205-208, 215, 291-298; main Union des Intéréts Sociaux Congolais

rural thrust of political parties, 66, (UNISCO), 7 71, 296; PSA and, 85, 86-101, 107, {ynion des Mongo (UNIMO), 35

120, 137, 180, 183-185, 193, 194, : . . 195, 196, 197, 198-215, 243-244, ee oO “wows Congolais

249, 250-278, 290, 292, 296;Bayanzi-Bamputu, theories . ‘ , , | Union Fraternelle 79 as to revolutionary role, 293-295 . . .(UNA.e Union Nationale Congolaise rural protest: beginnings, 4, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24-25, 26, 33, 37, 38, 39, 180, , 0) 31, 51

184, 186-215; spontaneous, 47, 67, Upper River people, 9, 10, 29n ;

193-203, 291-299 urban population: communal elections

Ryckmans, André, 122, 189, 191, 200, and, 3-4, 9-12; economic conditions,

217, 245 15; elite and, 11-13, 17, 30; extension

Ryckmans, Mme. Genevieve, 191 of suffrage to, 11; organizations

among, 8; political parties and, 6, 7,

Saintraint, 245, 246 13, 22; and riots, 3, 17-18, 20, 32,

Sartre, Jean Paul, 292 106 secteur, 86, 87, 216, 217, 219, 223 urban protest, 17, 18, 22, 32. See also Senate, 57, 150, 288 riots Shatula, Albert, 311

Shifela, Longin, 309 Van Bilsen, A. A. J., 8n, 147 socialism, 143, 144; PSA and, 81, 82,85 Van Hemelrijck, Maurice, 18, 19, 20, Socialists, 7, 8, 12, 20n, 27, 79, 80, 88 21, 23, 25, 34, 76, 103-108, 110, 118,

Spitaels, Guy, 28, 77 90 .

Solidarité Africaine, 82, 226, 227, 252 126, 161, 162, 164, 192, 195, 202,

145, 297n . |

Spitaels, Mme., 77, 147 Van Loocke, Jan Hollants, 100n Stanleyville, 6, 26n, 28, 31, 32, 135, Verhaegen, Benoit, 18n, 52n

Stanleyville Congress, 43, 120, 145 vieux, 99, 96

suffrage, 120, 124, 130; extension of, Wallerstein, Immanuel, 56n

10, 11, 20, 26 Weiss, Herbert F., 295n Suku, 117 Weregemere, Jean-Chrysostome, 34n

253 on

syncretic movements, 186-187, 200 West Africa, 8, 127, 247

Tango, 99 whites, 17, 18, 20, 23, 29, 67, 189, 190; taxes, 24, 47, 242, 243-244, 249, 252, political activities of, 33, 34, 35 territorial councils, 26, 46, 11, 124, 125, Yalula, Nicodeme, 308

129, 130, 136, 218, 222, 245 Yambeshi, M., 195

thirty-year plan for independence, 8-9 Youlou, Abbé Foulbert, 127, 130, 136,

Thoka, Daniel, 311 152n

Thysville, 105, 106 Young, Crawford, 30n, 33n traditional chiefs, 29, 34, 42, 51, 53-55, youth, 18, 96, 190, 191, 256, 291; con66, 70, 86, 95, 96, 100, 115, 123, 150, trol of political organizations, 52

186, 216-223 Yumbu, Gabriel, 84, 103n, 112n, 114n,

tribalism, 78, 100, 142, 144, 258, 281 127, 139, 158, 160, 167, 289, 298,

Tshokwe, 117 304

Tshombe, Moise, 70, 150, 155, 174, 175 | Yumbu-Lemba, 283

326