Political Participation in the USSR [Course Book ed.] 9781400855117

Table of contents :
Contents
Tables
Preface
Glossary
Abbreviations
Introduction
Chapter 1. Participation and Soviet Politics
Chapter 2. The Soviet Electoral System
Chapter 3. The Local Soviets at Work
Chapter 4. Social Mobilization and Social Control
Chapter 5. Mechanisms and Processes of Soviet Political Participation
Select Bibliography
Index
STUDIES OF THE RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

Citation preview

Political Participation In the USSR

STUDIES OF THE RUSSIAN INSTITUTE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Political Participation I n the U S S R

Theodore H. Friedgut

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

Copyright © 1979 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, NewJersey In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book The Russian Institute of Columbia University sponsors the Studies of the Russian Institute in the belief that their publication contributes to scholarly research and public understanding. In this way the Institute, while not necessarily endorsing their conclusions, is pleased to make available the results of some of the research conducted under its auspices. A list of the Studies of the Russian Institute appears at the back of the book. This book has been composed in VIP Baskerville Clothbound editions of Princeton University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and binding materials are chosen for strength and durability. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

Contents

L I S T OF T A B L E S

Vll

PREFACE

ix xii xvi

GLOSSARY L I S T OF ABBREVIATIONS INTRODUCTION 1

3

PARTICIPATION AND SOVIET POLITICS

Participatory Politics

11

11

Comparison and Definition

13

Political Participation in the USSR

20

Marxian and Leninist Foundations

32

Systemic Developments in the USSR

41

Participation and Administration—The Soviet Debate 2

59

T H E SOVIET ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Frequency and Saliency of Elections Election Commissions Nomination Process Election Campaign Voting Day

7i

71

77 81 95

108

Avoidance, Negative Voting, and Absenteeism Candidate Defeats and Recall

130

T h e Functions of Soviet Elections Direct Democracy

137

147

3 T H E L O C A L SOVIETS AT WORK

Revival of the Soviets

116

156

Characteristics of Deputies

162

155

vi

Contents Education, Training, and Assistance 173 Turnover Among Deputies 181 The Deputy as Representative 182 The Standing Committees 188 Deputies' Groups, Councils, and Posts 200 Deputies, Volunteers, and Executives 211 Deputies' Activities 220 Citizen Complaints and Requests 224

4 SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL Self-Help Organizations 242 Control Organizations: Comrades' Courts and the Druzhiny 249 Mobilization Organizations 262 Community Work and Service Committees 267

5 MECHANISMS AND PROCESSES OF SOVIET POLITICAL PARTICIPATION Maturity of the Soviet Political System 290 Development of Governmental Capacities 298 Building a Socialized Community 302 Who Participates? 307 Systemic Functions and Consequences 314

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

Tables

Table ι. Percentage of Negative Votes Cast at Each Level of Soviet, 1961-1975

120

Table 2. Percentage of Absenteeism in Elections to Local Soviets, 1961-1975

125

Table 3. Index of Relative Distribution of Absen­ teeism in Elections to Local Soviets, 1965-1975

125

Table 4. Distribution of Absenteeism by Size of Cities, 1975 Elections

127

Table 5. Percentage of Absenteeism by Republics, 1961-1975

128

Table 6. Absenteeism by Republic and Level of Soviet, 1961-1965 (percent)

129

Table 7. Representation of Paid Party and Govern­ ment Functionaries Among Elected Deputies, 1971

141

Table 8. Deputies of Local Soviets by Occupational Backgrounds, 1955-1975

168

Table 9. Field of Employment of Deputies Occupied in Agriculture, 1965 and 1969

170

Table 10. Educational Level of Deputies to Local Soviets as Compared to the Soviet Population, 1959 and 1970 (1959 = 100)

172

Table 11. Community Self-Help Organizations in Sakhalin Oblast' (as of July 1, 1963)

245

Preface

How numerous are the moral and intellectual debts incurred during the writing of any book! How many are the friends and colleagues who by their support, interest, and search­ ing critiques contribute to whatever is successful in such an endeavor! Throughout the attempt to grasp such a nebulous concept as political participation in the USSR I have had the help and encouragement of the Russian Institute of Columbia Univer­ sity, an inspiring academic and human environment. This work was originally conceived there, and first took shape as a Ph.D. thesis. To those who were my -teachers, Professors Seweryn Bialer, Alexander Dallin, Alexander Erlich, and John N. Hazard, I owe an incalculable debt. Professor Bialer in particular, as supervisor of my dissertation, guided me into the art of asking the right questions. He showed infinite tact and patience in challenging my shortcomings and inspiring me to overcome them. He gave of his time and thought unstintingly. To the Director of the Russian Institute, Professor Marshall Shulman, I am grateful for his warm interest and unfailing courtesy. He always extended both moral and mate­ rial support when they were much needed. Throughout the years that my manuscript was undergoing the many stages of its transformation into a book, I enjoyed the assistance of numerous members of the Russian Institute's staff. I owe a great deal to Professor H. Gordon Skilling and the Centre for Russian and East European Studies at the Univer­ sity of Toronto. The Centre's sponsorship of me as an ex­ change student at Moscow State University in 1969-1970 was invaluable. Without that crucial experience, the whole book might have remained a hollow shell. In addition, Professor Skilling's personal encouragement and perceptive judgments

χ

Preface

have been of particular value at important points in my work. At Moscow State University I enjoyed exemplary hospital­ ity and intellectual challenge in the Department of the System of the Soviets of the Law Faculty. The department was headed at that time by the late Professor S. S. Kravchuk. In particular I owe much to Professor G. V. Barabashev, who supervised my research in the Soviet Union, and to Professor K. F. Sheremet. Both devoted many hours of their valuable time to explaining the fundamentals of the soviets to me, in­ troducing me to the intricacies of the subject. Though they may not agree with all of my findings, I hope that they will read my work with interest and find in it some reflection of the good will and erudition of which they gave so freely and so kindly. Without their help I could not have hoped to pene­ trate many of the subtleties of the soviets, nor to understand the reasons behind much of what is basic to the workings of the system. I owe a similar, if smaller debt to those in the Kutaisi City Soviet, the Moscow City Soviet, and the Oktiabr' District Soviet in Moscow, who were so helpful. My colleagues at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem have been more than good to me. Aryeh L. Unger read part of the manuscript and helped me greatly with his comments and questions. In addition he has been generous in sharing with me materials from interviews directed by him. Yaacov Ro'i also read part of the manuscript, and his comments, as al­ ways, were stimulating. Nissan Oren, Jonathan Frankel, Ezra Mendelsohn, and Israel Getzler have been true colleagues, providing both intellectual example and moral support. Some portions of this volume have appeared in print pre­ viously in the journal Comparative Politics, and in the collection Soviet Politics and Society in the Seventies, edited by Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tokes (New York: Free Press, 1974). I gratefully acknowledge the editors' permission to incorporate those sections here. The responsibility for such faults as readers may find in my work despite such great assistance, is solely, and in some cases, stubbornly, my own. Finally I must offer this book as some recompense to Riv-

Preface

xi

kah, Tamar, Yonit, and Ehud, who for four years bore more or less patiently their exile from Jerusalem. While my New York was Columbia, theirs was a window facing on the I.R.T. T.H.F. Jerusalem, April 1978

Glossary

Agitation and propaganda. The dissemination of political ideas and information, whether by slogans and other forms of repetition of a single theme, or by more complex and comprehensive discussion of political values.

AGITPROP

AGITPUNKT Agitation point. A center for the organizing of agitation work and dissemination of materials, generally with regard to elections, but on occasion used to propagandize other special campaigns as well. AKTIV That portion of any public group taking on particu­ lar responsibilities of leadership and organization or im­ plementation of programs. The precise implication of aktiv may change as it refers to Party aktiv, the aktiv of a committee in a soviet, and so on. APPARAT The body of paid functionaries in any organiza­ tion, it generally refers to professional Party officials. A mem­ ber of the apparat is an apparatchik. DRUZHINY Volunteer civil guard groups aiding the local militia. Their formal designation is Narodnye Dobrovolnye Druzhiny—People's Volunteer Detachments. Each individual member is a druzhinnik. ISPOLKOM The executive committee of a local soviet. Fre­ quently compounded in Russian with the designation of the area served by the soviet. Thus, an oblast' executive commit­ tee becomes oblispolkom. KOLKHOZ A cooperative farm whose equipment and pro­ duce is owned by members of the cooperative. Kolkhoz mem­ bers are classed as peasants in Soviet statistics.

Glossary

xiii

KOLLEKTIV The public peer group, whether at work, at school, or at place of residence. Conformity to the norms and opinions of the kollektiv is an important value in Soviet public conduct. KOMSOMOL Soviet Communist youth organization for young people fifteen to twenty-eight years of age. KONTROL Inspection and auditing of an enterprise or in­ stitution, not necessarily involving any operative responsibil­ ity. KRAI Territory. A large administrative division within the Russian Republic. Generally more extensive and less popu­ lated than an oblast' (see below), a krai may contain a national autonomous region or National Area (okrug) which is not ad­ ministratively subordinate to it. The USSR contains six such territories, all in the Russian Republic. MIKRORAION A micro-district. An urban administrative subdivision with a population of 5,000-20,000 residents. A mikroraion is generally planned as a community with its own basic services and social organization, but does not have its own soviet. NATIONAL OKRUG A small administrative area in which there is a concentration of a particular national minority. A National Okrug has its own soviet which is organizationally subordinate to the supreme soviet of the republic. There are ten such national areas in the USSR, all within the Russian Republic.

Region. An administrative division existing in eight of the larger Union republics. The oblast' serves as an inter­ mediate division between the republics and the small urban and rural divisions. There are some 130 such regions in the USSR, including eight autonomous regions established to recognize various national minorities. OBLAST'

OBSHCHESTVENNOST' The public, or the community, gen­ erally referring to the socially active elements. From this the

xiv

Glossary

adjective obshchestvennyi with the connotation of public, com­ munal, or volunteer. Com­ munity self-help organizations. Volunteer councils and committees formed at places of residence or around public institutions such as schools, libraries, and clinics, to advise and assist them in their activities. OBSHCHESTVENNYE SAMODEIATEL'NYE ORGANIZATSII

ORGOTDEL The organization and instruction department of a local soviet. These departments assist the executive commit­ tee of the soviet in guiding and coordinating the activities of the elected deputies in the soviet and the public volunteer or­ ganizations working together with the soviet. RAION A rural or urban district. A rural raion is an adminis­ trative subdivision similar to a county. There are about 3,000 rural raiony in the USSR. An urban raion is a subdivision of a city, generally one of more than 100,000 population. There are close to 600 urban raiony in the USSR. REMONTNYE DRUZHINY (sometimes shortened to remdruzhiny) Volunteer repair squads, often conisting of pen­ sioners and young people, which take care of minor repairs and maintenance in public housing. SEL'SKII SKHOD A village meeting open to all adult residents of any given village. A traditional institution, often used to­ day, but enjoying no legal powers.

A state-owned farm. Those operating the farm are paid wages by government agencies and are classed as workers rather than as peasants. SOVKHOZ

A regional economic council. Established on a nationwide scale in 1957 to coordinate and administer indus­ try, the sovnarkhoz was abolished in 1965.

SOVNARKHOZ

SPRAVKA A certificate. A note signed by an official of a soviet, an elected deputy, or a neighborhood chairman, attest­ ing to a citizen's right to have a certain request fulfilled, or to his age, place of residence, or other information needed by some administrative authority.

Glossary

xv

Sabbath work. Mass public labor for community improvements or production performed without pay on what are generally weekend days of rest.

SUBBOTNIK

VNE-SHTATNYI Literally, non-staff. The term refers to vol­ unteers manning posts or organizations that are generally oc­ cupied by salaried officials. YOUNG PIONEERS A Soviet youth organization for school­ children ten to fourteen years of age. ZH. E. K. Zhilishchno-EkspluatatsionnaiaKontora. Ahousing operations office administering state-owned residences in an area containing between 5,000 and 8,000 residents. The Zh. Ε. K. is the local administrative representative of the housing department of a local soviet. ZNANIE The Society for the Dissemination of Scientific and Cultural Knowledge. A Soviet organization engaged in a broad program of public lectures, adult education, and pub­ lishing aimed at the mass public.

Abbreviations

APSA

American Political Science Association

APSR

American Political Science Review

AS

Arkhiv Samizdata (followed by serial number of document)

CDSP

Current Digest of the Soviet Press

Bulletin

Biulleten' ispolnitel'nogo komiteta Moskovskogo gorodskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia

Itogi

Itogi vyborov i sostav deputatov mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia (appropriate year added)

JPRS

Joint Publications Research Service

Narkhoz

Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR (appropriate year added)

SDT

Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia

SGP

Sovetskoe gostidarstvo i pravo

Spravochnik Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika (appropriate year added) Citations from Lenin's Works are taken from the fourth, Rus­ sian, edition

Political Participation In the USSR

Introduction

"It is precisely thanks to the soviets that the masses have a real opportunity to participate in carrying out the basic functions of state power in all its forms." "Why don't you study physics instead of politics? At least there's some truth there. In the soviets it's all play-acting. The real decisions are made at the top and behind the scenes." Both these apparently contradictory statements were made by Soviet citizens. An examination of Soviet local government will show that neither, in fact, contains the whole truth. Barrington Moore once characterized the Soviet political system as a curious mixture of police terror and primitive grass-roots democracy, and pointed to the cyclical recurrence of administrative problems followed by attempts to invigorate the lower levels of the Soviet administrative chain.1 Even when we substitute the idea of "control" for the now-dimin­ ished "police terror" aspect of Soviet society, and regard the USSR as an "administered society,"2 the administrative func­ tioning of its government provides a fascinating study of the coexistence of differing and often contradictory principles and tendencies. Although the general study of politics has come to recog­ nize the complex, many-layered nature of political processes, political scientists have noted that the study of new polities or new types of polities tends to concentrate on analysis of data produced at the centers of decision making and at the upper levels of the various hierarchies involved.3 This focus is jus1 Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics—the Dilemma of Power (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 403. 2 The coining of this term and the description of its content are in Allan Kassoff, "The Administered Society," World Politics, Vol. 16, no. 4 (July

1964), pp. 558-575· 3 Stein Rokkan, "The Comparative Study of Political Participation: Notes Towards a Perspective on Current Research," in Austin Ranney (ed.), Essays

4

Introduction

tifiable in the study of any authoritarian polity and particu­ larly so in the case of the USSR, with its heritage of czarist centralism compounded by Lenin's views on the necessity of central control of both the Communist Party and the Soviet state. However, as non-Soviet scholars have gained additional familiarity with the politics of the USSR, they have been drawn deeper into middle- and local-level politics, utilizing the freer access to both officials and materials that has been possible in the past twenty years.4 Preoccupation with centralist and "control" aspects of Soviet politics has generally excluded studies of the imple­ mentation of social, cultural, and economic programs. How­ ever, as Alfred Meyer notes, the prominence of the control aspect in Soviet life should not obscure the fact that it is far from the whole of that life.5 Indeed, the continuing develop­ ment and growing range of responsibilities of Soviet local administration should lead us to examine both the methods used to overcome problems in local government and the ef­ fects of successes and failures at the local level on the stability and functioning of the political system as a whole. For many years, little scholarly work was done on the intermediate or­ ganizations through which the Soviet regime maintains its day-to-day contact with its citizens; impressionistic works by visitors and journalists were our chief sources of information on daily life in the Soviet state.6 More recently, detailed studies of politics at the local level on the Behavioral Study of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), P- 474 For a full discussion of the causes and effects of this phenomenon see H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics,"World Politics, Vol. 18, no. 3 (April 1966), pp. 435-451. 5 Alfred G. Meyer, Leninism (New York: Praeger, 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 8 i n . 6 The most notable exceptions are Merle Fainsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), a study based on the Smolensk region Communist Party archives, captured by the Germans dur­ ing World War II and taken from them by the Americans at the end of the war; E. D. Simon et al., Moscow in the Making (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937), an early study of the municipal organization of the Soviet capital; and Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, The Soviet Citizen (New York: Athen'eum, 1968), based on the interviewing of refugees from the USSR after World War II.

Introduction

5

have been made, opening up a whole new area of inquiry into the workings of the Soviet political system.7 This coincides with a growing interest within the USSR about the impor­ tance of local government and the nature of the relations be­ tween citizen and regime, both in terms of development of the theory of state and government and in terms of the prac­ tical functioning of the local soviets. This has resulted in the accumulation of a great deal of written material debating the central issues of the subject. Indeed, where the foreign scholar might once have been deterred from tackling this sub­ ject for lack of research material, today the task of winnowing through the mountains of available chaff for essential kernels of hard data may actually be a primary obstacle to significant research. A Soviet bibliographical article dealing with discus­ sions of the citizen's role in government noted that in the years 1965 and 1966 alone some eighty books, collections, and pamphlets were published on this subject as well as more than ninety articles in magazines and scholarly journals.8 In­ dicative of the interest the Soviet authorities are now taking in the operation of local government is the fact that since 1957 a monthly journal, Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia, has been published, the bulk of its material devoted to the problems and experience of the local soviets. In keeping with the ter­ minology of the new Soviet constitution this journal was re­ named Soveiy narodnykh deputatov, beginning with the Novem­ ber 1977 issue. Some measure of field research can also be done at the local level by foreign scholars.9 This means that the now copious 7 These studies include David T. Cattell, Leningrad: A Case Study of Soviet Urban Government (New York: Praeger, 1968); Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Pre­ fects (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); Philip D. Stewart, Political Power in the Soviet Union (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968); William C. Taubman, Governing Soviet Cities (New York: Praeger, 1973); Ronald J. Hill, Soviet Political Elites: The Case of Tiraspol (London: Martin Robinson, 1977). 8 V. V. Varchuk and V. I. Razin, "Issledovaniia ν oblasti politicheskoi organizatsii sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva," Voprosy filosofii, no. 4 (April 1967), P- »34· 9 See, for instance, the work of William Taubman, B. Michael Frolic, Robert J. Osborn, and others who have benefited from exchange programs in the USSR, as well as the present volume.

6

Introduction

material to be found in the public and scholarly press can be tested against actual observation in various localities. This is not a surprising development, for while the agencies of the central government remain largely closed to the foreign ob­ server, local government deals with much less sensitive issues. Local government in the USSR is chiefly concerned with problems of everyday life and is thus much less subject to the strictures of sensitive policy-making issues and ideological de­ velopments than is the central government. To these resources can be added the insights offered by the large numbers of recent emigrants from the USSR, who, whether through organized interviewing for statistical sam­ ples or in-depth conversation for individual experiences, have a great deal to offer toward our understanding of the nuances of Soviet daily life. If we are interested in the stability and responsiveness of any political system and its ability to adjust to new demands, the arena of its closest day-to-day contact with its citizenry should provide some fruitful insights. Some Soviet research­ ers have adopted this point of view and have studied the ef­ fectiveness of local government precisely because of what can be learned about the most frequent and all-embracing con­ tacts between the regime and the citizen.10 Soviet scholars also see in local institutions and practices a reflection of the development of social relations in the Soviet Union as a whole. Thus, a Soviet professor presented a group of law students at Moscow University with the proposition that the relations between the elected representatives in the soviets and the paid staff of the administrative departments of the various levels of local government were an accurate indi­ cator of the development of the democratic content of local government. We may certainly assume that the more the av­ erage citizen has to do with the daily workings of his govern­ ment the closer will be his identification with its successes or shortcomings. Not only is this so, but the extension of gov­ ernment activity into all areas of life, bringing the state and civil society into a single framework, endows every aspect of 10 V. V. Varchuk, "Puty privlecheniia mass k upravleniiu delami obshchestva," doctoral dissertation, Moscow State University, 1968, p. 11.

Introduction

7

significance.11

society with political This means that any sig­ nificant deviation by the citizen from accepted community norms may well be interpreted as having political significance, and the community, organized as polity as well as society, may be called into action to prevent, deter, or punish such a devi­ ation. This does not mean that every expression of dissent or dis­ content at the local level is considered dysfunctional for the system and is therefore repressed. As will be explained below, expressions of citizen discontent serve as signals to the central authorities, informing them of local authorities' faults and failures. So valuable is this that throughout the Soviet system special patterns of activity and channels of communication are constructed to facilitate the legitimate expression of such discontent. The student of Soviet local government can make some rough estimates of the effectiveness of the regime's re­ sponses to its citizens by following the flow in these "signaling channels." An examination of the formation and operation of new channels of access to government on the part of the citi­ zens and new forms of mobilization of citizens by the regime should be of interest not only in the Soviet case but in all modern and modernizing countries. Such development is an integral part of the formation of new capacities, enabling a regime to remain in contact with its citizenry despite the fact that as political systems develop, both in overall size and in complexity, the individual is physically, administratively, and psychologically removed to a greater distance from the cen­ ters of decision making and implementation. Local government in the USSR is particularly subject to this need to organize its relations with its citizens because of the all-encompassing nature of socialist government, in which local government takes responsibility for the actual operation of many services that in another system are subject only to general supervision or licensing by government. The Soviet citizen who goes to a restaurant or wants to have his roof re­ paired or his boots resoled generally finds himself dealing with an agency of his local government. The agenda of the 11

For a discussion of this point, see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power, USA/USSR (New York: Viking, 1964), p. 74.

8

Introduction

executive committee of a local soviet is thus likely to contain items regarding the adequacy of the network of restaurants in the city or the efficiency of roof repairmen as well as the more conventional items of health, welfare, and education.12 Under these conditions we may expect to find that on the local level the citizen has the greatest opportunity to exercise some degree of what Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba have named "citizen competence."13 It may be suggested that the direct and personal relations to be found at the comparatively intimate level of village or urban ward politics are more con­ ducive to Soviet citizens' ability to make their individual or group wants known than are the long-distance relationships of national politics. While competence at the local level is no guarantee of citizen competence in higher political issues, the citizen's ability to make himself heard in matters affecting him most closely and most often may offset any dissatisfaction he feels over his lack of high-level competence. This may be par­ ticularly true for a revolutionary political system that has in­ troduced a largely unfamiliar set of values and orientations, thus deepening an already prevalent parochialism in a citizenry predominantly peasant, physically remote from the centers of power, and with a tradition of alienation from the regime. As the activities of Soviet local government have grown, evocation of such feelings of competence has become more frequent and has been noted with approval in Soviet sources. Turning to the local and central authorities for satisfaction of his needs, the Soviet citizen frequently overburdens the capacities of the administrative apparatus.14 To help detect and correct such breakdowns, deputies and elected neigh12 See, for instance, the Liublin Urban District Soviet, Plan raboty ispolkorna na IV kvartal 1969 goda (Moscow: 1969) (mimeographed). The plan includes scheduled discussions of the preparation of housing for winter weather, a re­ port on restaurant operations, construction of additional retail outlets, etc. 13 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 168-169. 14 See the resolution of August 2, 1958, C.C., CPSU, "O sereznykh nedostatkakh ν rassmotrenii zhalob, pisem i zaiavlenii trudiashchikhsia," Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika (Moscow: Politicheskaia Literature, 1959), P- 55°·

Introduction

9

borhood representatives are exhorted not only to receive but to seek out citizens' views on the operation of local services.15 The analysis to be made in the present work deals almost exclusively with those groups working within and subordinate to the local soviets. Although they cover almost every area of daily life and are the focus of activity for millions of citizens, the soviets are only one of several parallel channels of citizen organization within the USSR. The exclusion from this analysis of the mass public organizations—the trade unions, the Society for the Support of the Armed Forces (DOSAAF), and other similar organizations, all of which play an impor­ tant part in the mobilization of Soviet citizens—is not meant to imply any belittling of their importance, nor, particularly, is the exclusion of the Communist Party and the Komsomol. The Communist Party is, without a doubt, what article 6 of the new Soviet Constitution says it is: "The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the leading and directing force of Soviet society. It is the core of the political system and of all governmental and public organizations." Party members sit in all key positions—as members of the executive committees of local soviets and as initiators of all important changes. Clearly, the Party commands and controls. In addition, as we will show, Party members make up the indispensable nucleus of the entire participatory effort in the Soviet Union. However, the Party represents only about 10 percent of the adult Soviet population and our interest is in the broader activities into which citizens are recruited, whether they are Party members or not. In particular, we will investigate the role of participatory bodies in molding the social and political structures of the Soviet community and in socializing the citizen to the norms and modes of the Soviet regime. In addition, the intermediate organizations built on a participatory basis will be investigated as social control bodies and as capacity-enhancing organs of 15 See Vasilii K. Vasenin, Sessii sel'skogo i poselkovogo soveta (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1969), p. 44. "As experience shows, a tour of his constituency, visiting with his voters, always provides the deputy with mate­ rial for critical observations and for questions on almost any subject within the competence of the soviet."

10

Introduction

the administrative system. Our interest is in the functions fulfilled by these organizations, their role in the development of the Soviet political system, and the extent to which the citi­ zens en masse are involved. The local soviets are at the heart of this process, carrying the responsibility for day-to-day activity in the life of every citizen. In addition to their administrative functions, the soviets and their ancillary organizations provide a vital stra­ tum linking the ruling elite of Soviet society with the mass. This sub-elite is not only a recruiting ground for potential members of the elite but carries out much of the actual gov­ ernment of society. In discussing the need for such a group in any polity, Thomas Bottomore notes that "the stability of any political organism depends on the level of morality, intelli­ gence and activity which this second stratum has attained."16 Our investigation therefore is concerned with all the as­ pects of political participation that are the subject of tradi­ tional participation studies, and in particular electoral cam­ paigning and participation in elections. In addition, the community-based organs of participation that have become a focus of study in the United States in recent years hold an im­ portant place in our work. A third area of participation in the USSR, the role of the citizen as elected representative and as volunteer activist within the administrative organs of local government, plays a much smaller role in the study of nonSoviet type political systems. The development of trends and proportions both within and among these different areas of participation reflects in some measure the changes taking place within the Soviet political system. Our understanding of the mechanisms and processes of political participation in the USSR may thus be an opening through which we gain addi­ tional insights into the workings of the Soviet polity as a whole. 16 Thomas B. Bottomore, Elites and Society (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 11. Bottomore bases his discussion of this point on the work of Gaetano Mosca.

Chapter ι

Participation and Soviet Politics PARTICIPATORY POLITICS The participation of citizens in the activity of their govern­ ments is one of the principal themes in contemporary political studies. Indeed, for some scholars, the "participation revolu­ tion" is both empirically and normatively the outstanding characteristic of twentieth-century political development. "In all the new nations of the world, the belief that the or­ dinary man is politically relevant—that he ought to be an in­ volved participant in the political system—is widespread. Large groups of people who have been outside of politics are demanding entrance into the political system. And the politi­ cal elites are rare who do not profess commitment to this goal."1 Particularly in cases of radical and violent political change, a common phenomenon in our century, when the most pas­ sive and repressed elements of the population may be swept up in the flood of politics, it is the rich variety of participatory institutions that catches and defines the Zeitgeist. Parties emerge and burgeon overnight. Meetings, parades, and demonstrations attract the passerby everywhere. Newspa­ pers, manifestoes, and petitions express the clamor of the newly raised voxpopuli, not as a sedate dialogue, but as an un­ bounded babel. Paris in 1789 and Portugal in 1975 witnessed such storms. So did Russia in 1917. 1

Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, pp. 2-3.

12

Participation and Soviet Politics

At the beginning of the twentieth century Russia had a nar­ rowly restricted political class. Barriers of residence, religion, nationality, and property kept the majority of citizens from participation in affairs of state. Neither by tradition nor by education could the mass of the population have been consid­ ered inclined toward determining its own political system.2 Despite the czar's concessions of a consultative assembly and limited party activity after the 1905 revolution, the regime carried on a continuous battle to prevent the broadening of public political participation. Nevertheless, when the word flashed across Russia in Feb­ ruary 19x7 that the czar had fallen, not only the open and hidden leaders of the various established political streams took part in making the new state, but thousands of peasants, soldiers, clerks, workers, and schoolchildren poured into poli­ tics. What they understood of politics is beside the point. Un­ informed, arbitrary, and contradictory as they may have been, they were destroying the old political system and trying to create in its place something that they supposed would be quite new. For millions of Russians in Petrograd's factories, in Siberian villages, and in the trenches of World War I, politics seemed for the moment something real, urgent, and worth­ while.3 By its very nature, however, revolutionary participation must be a short-lived phenomenon, and is better suited to demolition than construction. A new state power eventually arises and attempts to structure participatory institutions of 2

For analyses of the strains of development of the Russian political system at the beginning of the 20th century see Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Λ History of Russia (2nd ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), Chapter 31; and Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia (New York: Praeger, 1952), Chapters 5, 7, 8. 3 For eyewitness accounts of the outburst of political participation see Ν. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution (2 vols.) (New York: Harper & Row, 1962); and John Reed, Ten Days That Shook the World (New York: Vintage, i960). Marc Ferro, "The Aspirations of Russian Society," in Richard Pipes (ed.),Revolutionary Russia (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, ig6g), pp. 183-208, gives an account of the source and content of thousands of communications addressed to the central political organs of Russia in the first weeks following the czar's abdication.

Comparison and Definition

13

society according to the values of the new regime. The au­ thorities cope as best they can with the persisting influences of the former society as well as with the inevitable deviations from the pure revolutionary ideal, deviations arising from the exigencies of power and the dynamics of political organiza­ tion. Such has been the history of many political systems, and it is largely from this perspective that our study of political participation in the Soviet Union will proceed. But no less important than the explosion in the participa­ tion of citizens in government has been the growing intrusion of government into the lives of citizens.4 This intrusion is often accomplished by the coopting of the citizen into various aspects of governmental activity, and in any case multiplies the points of citizen-regime contact, raising the citizen's awareness of authority, and stimulating further the growth of pressure for participation. The symbiosis between totalistic governmental activity and the participation of Soviet citizens in that activity is another focus of this study.

COMPARISON AND DEFINITION The forms and functions of participation vary greatly from system to system as well as over time. The cultural revolution in China and student ferment in the United States shared some common characteristics but were very different in polit­ ical significance and efficacy. Many of the forms of electoral politics in Great Britain are similar to those of the USSR, yet both the importance and the function of elections in the two systems are quite different. Nevertheless, the evaluation and understanding of each act of political participation within the perspective of its own system adds to our knowledge of the polity studied and the complexities of politics in general. If we wish to study political participation in a manner that will permit eventual comparison among different political sys­ tems, then both the definition of political participation and the mode of inquiry must be such that we can embrace the 4 For discussion of this phenomenon, see Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967), pp. 73-79.

14

Participation and Soviet Politics

whole range of participation and focus on its most significant forms in each particular system. In non-Communist states this focus has, with some important exceptions that we will discuss below, been largely on party membership and elec­ toral activity. Presumably this is because of the importance of inter-party competition and electoral politics in effecting pe­ riodic redistributions of political power in Western European and North American states. In addition, the main thrust of research has been behavioral.5 Once again, this focus stems from the premise that the legal and institutional frameworks of politics within the systems studied are established and sta­ ble. In the Soviet system, where neither of the above factors has quite the same significance, institutions must figure larger in our analysis, and elections must play a smaller part. Analysis of participation in non-Communist systems has focused on the individual and his activity rather than on the political system. The central question posed has been: "How and why do people get involved in politics?" Both Lane and Milbrath use this question as a subtitle. If we were to choose a subtitle for the present work, it would be: "How and why do Soviet politics involve the people?" In defining participation for their study of American poli­ tics, Verba and Nie restrict the scope of political participation, excluding "ceremonial" and "support" participation as well as citizen participation in the implementation of government policy.6 This is largely consistent with Robert Sharlet's distilla­ tion of definitions from earlier works. Sharlet proposes as a definition "political participation relevant to the functional inputs of the policy-making process."7 5 As examples see Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally1 1965); Robert E. Lane, Political Life (New York: Free Press, 1959); the series of articles on political participation in European countries in Acta Sociologica, Vol. 6, fasc. 1 (1961); Rokkan, "The Comparative Study of Politi­ cal Participation," pp. 47-90; and most recently Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). An exten­ sive bibliographical article on research in political participation is by Robert H. Salisbury, "Research on Political Participation," American Journal of Politi­ cal Science, Vol. 19, no. a (May 1975), pp. 323-341. 6 Verba and Nie, Participation in America, pp. 2-3. 7 Robert S. Sharlet, "Concept Formation in Political Science and Com-

Comparison and Definition

15

In examining this formulation we may ask whether such a narrowing of the definition of political participation is either necessary or fruitful. It may be applicable with reference to the American polity, but excludes too many relevant political phenomena for the comparative study of political systems that differ greatly in their degree of development and mode of operation. The full cycle of political functions consists of inputs, conversions, and outputs. Verba and Nie not only re­ strict themselves to the input side of the cycle but consider only demand inputs, consciously excluding the types of input categorized as supports.8 In the end, Sharlet, following a simi­ lar approach, finds (as does the present author) that in the Soviet context such restrictions hamper, rather than facilitate, the analysis of participation. In a transitional society whose regime is attempting to restructure civic and political values, supportive inputs, and particularly those of a nonmaterial nature, are prominent in politics. Indeed, measurement of the qualitative and quantita­ tive differences in the mix of demands and supports can be one part of determining the differences between political sys­ tems. Similarly, it may be claimed that the near-exclusive focus on the input side of the political cycle is related more to the traditional approach to the study of participation than to the functional requirements of participation research. Parties and interest groups jockeying for advantage in the political process quite rightly attract the scholar's attention in Amer­ ica, though even in this context the wisdom of making them a munist Studies: Conceptualizing Political Participation," in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. (ed.), Communist Studies and the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969), p. 245. Sharlet notes that all the publications from which he dis­ tilled his working definition deal with democratic societies or the pre­ requisites for development of democracy. By specifying that participation must be an input to policy making, Sharlet may be understood as rejecting ceremonials and supports as well as participation in implementation, just as do Verba and Nie. The references in Sharlet's article are a valuable biblio­ graphic supplement to Salisbury's. 8 For a clear and concise explanation of the use of these terms, with biblio­ graphic references to their origin and development in political science litera­ ture, see Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), Chapter 2.

16

Participation and Soviet Politics

near-exclusive focus may be challenged. Even in a developed, pluralist political system the importance of policy implemen­ tation by administrative organs, and the relation of the citi­ zens to such activity, should not be excluded from participa­ tion studies.9 Recent emphasis in America on community organization and participation is gradually restoring what has been a neg­ lected dimension in the study of participation—the involve­ ment of the citizen in regime outputs and the growing in­ volvement of all types of regimes in the administration of society.10 The provocative insights of Philip Selznick's pioneering study of public involvement in the administration of TVA programs are a model for studying this aspect of participation in America.11 Selznick proposes a series of conclusions that appear to transcend the American context and have great suggestive power for study of political participation in the USSR. "The rise of mass man," he writes, "or at least the in­ creasing need to take into account and attempt to manipulate the sentiments of the common man, has resulted in the devel­ opment of new methods of control. These new methods cen­ ter about attempts to organize the mass, to change an undif­ ferentiated and unreliable citizenry into a structured, readily accessible public."12 Organization of the public is achieved by coopting volun­ tary associations into the work of government agencies. This provides officials with a reliable communications system by which information, requests, and responses may be brought 9 D. Richard Little, "Mass Political Participation in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.: A Conceptual Analysis," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 8, no. 4 (January 1976), pp. 449-545, states this argument convincingly and in some detail. 10 Two studies that reflect concern with community involvement in deci­ sion making and administration are: Hans B. C. Spiegel, Citizen Participation in Urban Development (Washington: NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Science, 1968); and John N. Edwards and Alan Booth, Social Participation in Urban Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1973)· 11 Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of Califor­ nia Press, 1953). 12 Ibid., p. 219.

Comparison and Definition

17

to every segment of the population; a system with untapped reserves of administrative capacity, with specialized knowl­ edge of local conditions, and ultimately with a legitimacy flow­ ing from citizens' active involvement in government pro­ grams and citizens' identification both with the program and with the apparatus administering it. Most important in the Soviet context is Selznick's conclusion, repeated many times, that cooptation brings a sharing of "the responsibilities and burdens of power, rather than power itself."13 Voluntary community associations are invoked to strengthen existing governmental agencies that by themselves may lack historical roots or popular authority, thus impairing their capacity to implement governmental policy. Selznick points out that it is the local agency's performance which de­ termines the ultimate impact of any centrally initiated pro­ gram.14 Thisjudgment would not be unacceptable to a Soviet official or scholar, for every student of Soviet public adminis­ tration is taught the dictum, ascribed to Lenin, that "local practice is the proving ground of central leadership."15 It is precisely the mobilizing and socializing aspects of par­ ticipation brought out by Selznick that appear to have impor­ tance for the study of the Soviet Union, which has a political system that is still evolving, and is faced with a persisting in­ congruence of values between regime and society. Much dis­ cussion centers about the question of whether voluntarism is an essential ingredient of political participation. It is on this point that Verba and Nie exclude what they consider "mobi­ lized participation": parading, voting in ceremonial elections, working in regime-organized development projects. This may be a correct approach for a largely homogenous and well-socialized public, but can we dismiss such activities in a system in which participation is one of the energizing mecha­ nisms of the political system, as we will try to show in the Soviet case? Describing the mobilizing agencies of the Soviet 13 Ibid.,

lt Ibid., p. 40. pp. 14, 219, 260, 264. V. I. Vasil'ev, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo (Moscow: Vysshaia Shkola, 1967), p. 8. For the connection between regime and community through the organiza­ tional work of local soviets see also G. V. Barabashev and K. F. Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1974), pp. 11-12. 15

18

Participation and Soviet Politics

system, Sharlet contends that there is no basis for individual volition in Communist systems and that, though apathy is possible, effective withdrawal is not a choice for the Soviet citizen.16 These are challenging hypotheses worth examina­ tion, for, if upheld, they will tell us much about the persist­ ence of totalitarianism and the accuracy of the totalitarian model of Soviet society. An alternative approach to understanding the importance of the Soviet citizen's participation is suggested by Selznick's findings. He blames the failure of some TVA programs on officials who failed to create a desire for solution of local prob­ lems among the population of a particular area.17 The failure to create a desire for change among citizens may also burden the system with a paralyzing, apathetic inertia. We should re­ member that in culture and outlook the mass of Soviet citi­ zens may still be influenced by their peasant origins, and re­ sistant to externally imposed change. In an essay on peasants and politics, Teodor Shanin writes: "Enormous numbers of government decrees and orders all over the world have been voided of effect by the peasant's spontaneous, stubborn, and silent non-fulfilment."18 The avoidance of such a situation by stimulating socialized voluntary activity while controlling the possibility of dissent is a large part of the Soviet concept of political participation. The essential point in the relation of voluntarism to par­ ticipation is not whether the initiative for a given political ac­ tivity comes from the participant, but whether such an act is, in fact, compulsory. In agreement with Townsend,19 we can exclude compulsory acts from participation, that is, those acts, nonperformance of which draw state-invoked coercive sanctions, as distinct from social pressures. Although partici­ pation of a mobilized subject in politics may be quite different in quality than that of the spontaneous citizen, it has nonethe­ less an impact on the political system, fulfilling functions 16

17 Selznick, TVA, p. 225. Sharlet, "Concept Formation," p. 247. Teodor Shanin, "The Peasant as a Political Factor," in T. Shanin (ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 258. 19James R. Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (new ed.) (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), p. 5. 18

Comparison and Definition

19

which influence the performance and development of that system. Moreover, while Selznick notes the need to differ­ entiate between substantive participation involving responsi­ bility in the determination of policy and administrative in­ volvement that carries no such responsibilities, he notes that organizational activity, once initiated, tends to gain a momen­ tum of its own, so that the initiator may be pressed by rela­ tionships and demands beyond the limits of his original inten­ tions.20 This raises interesting and important questions as to possible sources of change within the Soviet political system. Studying the place of participation in the Soviet political system, it would appear that as important as the quantitative aspects of participation may be, they are far from telling the whole story. Even the answers to the questions raised by Hough regarding the quality and effectiveness of the Soviet citizen's participation do not complete our evaluation of Soviet political participation, though they are surely an im­ portant aspect.21 In addition to the quantitative and qualita­ tive aspects of Soviet political participation, it is important that we understand the structural and operational features developed to facilitate the mechanisms and processes of polit­ ical participation in Soviet communities. In summary, the concept of political participation used here will be broader than that which has generally served for the study of non-Communist systems. It will encompass the involvement of citizens in any activities relating to public af­ fairs, including the expression of ceremonial supports and as­ sistance in the administration of communities or the im­ plementation of regime policies.22 In the Soviet context, such ceremonial supports, organized in the form of public parades or rallies, lectures and agitation meetings at place of residence or work—in fact the whole election campaign—are an inte­ gral part of participation. Assistance in the administration of 20

Selznick, TVA, pp. 220, 70. Jerry F. Hough, "Political Participation in the Soviet Union," Soviet Studies, Vol. 28, no. 1 (January 1976), particularly the quantitative data on pp. 8-15 and the discussion of impact on pp. 18-20. 22 A similar, though narrower, characterization may be found in Townsend,Participation in China, p. 4. 21

20

Participation and Soviet Politics

public affairs, and work facilitating the implementation of re­ gime policies, are organized within specific groups of public activists and fit well with Verba and Nie's "cooperative activ­ ity" mode of participation.23 The three criteria—all of which must be present if an activity is to be judged as political participation—are that the activity should be community oriented; that it should be voluntary, in the Soviet sense that it is unpaid and performed (at least theoretically) in addition to the citizen's professional employment; and that it should be nonobligatory. By applying such a definition to the USSR and using it to interpret institutions and political phenomena within their own context, we may learn a great deal about the state of de­ velopment of the Soviet political system and the dynamics of that development. On a comparative basis we can construct something resembling a topographical map of political par­ ticipation, showing which functions in the particular system are served by a high component of participation and which by more restricted components. In each particular cluster of participatory activities we can then begin to delineate the modes, intensity, frequency, and duration of participation; the proportion of conflictual as compared to cooperative activities; the nature and objects of petitioning and contact­ ing, and other similar details of the nature of participatory ac­ tivity.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

IN

THE USSR

Of eight areas suggested by Stein Rokkan as potentially fruit­ ful for the study of political participation, at least four appear to be accessible to researchers despite all the existing limita­ tions of investigation of the Soviet context. The relevant areas are: (i) The exposure of the citizen to political influences in his environment through pressure of the majority, through active opinion leaders, and through mass media; (2) Mes­ sages, information, arguments, and appeals sent from units 23

Verba and Nie, Participation in America, p. 53, and passim.

Political Participation in the USSR

21

active in contests for support; (3) Actual alternatives set by the system for the ordinary citizen; (4) The state of the system, the external pressures on it, the internal cleavages, and the alignment of forces within and without.24 The remaining four areas, dealing more with individual behavior and perceptions than with systemic characteristics, are more difficult. Even after combing printed sources and in­ terviewing emigrants we can make only tentative suggestions about many aspects of citizens' reactions to their regular polit­ ical environment in the USSR. In particular, questions about the efficacy of citizens' political actions and the influence of the individual in any given situation must often be given only the most tentative answers. Both the lack of comprehensive data and what may be described as the "irregularity" of the workings of the Soviet system will often bring us to the con­ clusion that, though theory dictates what should be happen­ ing, we are unable to decide with any measure of certainty to what extent the reality coincides. The four modes of participation studied by Verba and Nie are amenable to investigation in the Soviet context without undue difficulty, once the definition of each mode's content has been broadened to include ceremonial supports and par­ ticipation in output activities as well as political inputs. Voting, campaign activity, cooperative community activities, and per­ sonalized contacting are natural foci for this study, and the dimensions of initiative, conflict, influence, and scope of out­ come used by Verba and Nie are also applicable, though not quantifiable, given the impossibility of a full field survey.25 In attempting to sort out those areas in the study of political participation that are common to Soviet and non-Soviet sys­ tems, it should be noted once again that the function of politi­ cal participation in the Soviet Union differs somewhat from its function in a political system such as that of the United States. Milbrath notes that participation serves to stimulate the responsiveness of officials and also to facilitate articulation 24

Rokkan, in Ranney, Essays, p. 65. Discussion of modes and dimensions of participation will be found in Verba and Nie, Participation in America, Chapter 3. 25

22

Participation and Soviet Politics

of the citizen's interests. It also serves to recruit him into the "gladiatorial" level of politics.26 All these functions are served in the political system of the Soviet Union as well; however, participation in the Soviet Union is not a channel for organi­ zation of autonomous forces in the political arena as it is in a pluralist system, and participation in the United States does not generally have the economic function of sup­ plementing the limited financial resources of the adminis­ trative apparatus, nor do American participatory bodies gen­ erally organize in order to facilitate contact between the bu­ reaucracy and the citizens. The emphasis in participation in Communist politics must always be essentially on the im­ plementation of established Communist Party policy rather than on the influencing of decision making. However, James Townsend, examining participation in China, follows Selznick's line of thought in pointing out that the intended or manifest functions of any policy may not be its only results and that the mobilization of citizens for implementation of policies may generate latent forces for the creation of com­ munities within an otherwise atomized society, thereby add­ ing new dimensions to political participation.27 Sidney Verba gives more explicit expression to this possibility when he notes that weakness in the network of associations of citizens in formal groups corresponds with a low level of attempts to influence government and a low sense of competence, while association of the citizen with organized local groups en­ hances the likelihood of his attempting to influence govern­ ment decisions.28 The particular form assumed by the Soviet citizen's activity and political competence is described as "totalitarian popu­ list" by Erik Allardt.29 He states that a society with strongly organized and ideologically inclusive local-level groups will 26 Milbrath, Poktkal Participation, p. ι53. For Milbrath's definition of politi­ cal gladiators, see p. 20. 27 Townsend, Participation in Chtna, p. 8. 28 Sidney Verba, "Political Participation and Strategies of Influence: A Comparative Study," Acta Sociologica, Vol. 6, fasc. 1 (ig6i), pp. 30-31. 29 Erik Allardt, "Community Activity, Leisure Use and Social Structure," ibid., p. 74.

Political Participation in the USSR

23

have a character that is both populist—due to extensive or­ ganization at the local level—and totalitarian—due to the em­ phasis on an all-inclusive, centrally determined ideology that guides local organizations. One of the features he notes for such a society is the relation and subordination of local-level activities to goals enunciated at national level. Although Allardt does not treat the question of autonomy of form or or­ ganization at the local level, his assumption of subordination of local to national goals, and the necessity of relating local actions to national goals indicates an overall centralization of politics. Allardt is attempting to establish an alternative to Wil­ liam Kornhauser's analysis of mass society, but the features of centralization in goals and organization are common to both.30 The difference centers about Allardt's description of the pervasiveness of organization on the local level as against Kornhauser's mass society in which the citizen's activity is atomistic. With all the mobilization of the Soviet citizen's ac­ tivities, he remains in local social frameworks, organized and supervised by the regime, while the elites in Soviet society re­ main well insulated from any decisive pressures emanating from the mass. Thus, Allardt's configuration of a society at once populist and totalitarian appears to be useful for appli­ cation to Soviet conditions. Soviet scholars, too, differ among themselves in defining the nature and limits of citizen participation in government. A 1954 essay on participation defined it so broadly as to in­ clude nearly the whole of the Soviet citizen's life. The possible forms of participation were noted as: (1) Participation in mass meetings, meetings of specialists, and similar rallies; (2) Par­ ticipation in socialist competition and similar production ac­ tivities; (3) Participation in nongovernmental mass organiza­ tions cooperating with state organs; (4) Participation as exec­ utives or directors of institutions and enterprises; (5) Partici30 William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959). See pp. 93-100 for Kornhauser's treatment of the importance of cen­ tral control in "mass society." It should be noted, however, that Kornhauser is explicit in noting that he is not writing of totalitarian society and that Allardt is not entirely correct in setting Kornhauser's formulation in opposition to his own depiction of Soviet political participation.

24

Participation and Soviet Politics

pation in the organs or auxiliary bodies of the soviets; (6) Par­ ticipation as an elected representative—a deputy, a people's court judge, or a lay assessor.31 It may be instructive that the elections, as such, are not included in this essay. A Soviet scholar writing at a later date, but referring back to the period in which the first definition was formulated, spoke of mass participation in the form of large numbers of Communist Party activists working in the soviets, the trade unions, and other public bodies.32 The thrust of the author's argument was that while citizen participation during Stalin's time had been limited, it had existed through active Party members working in state and public bodies, and was being broadened in the post-Stalin period to include public activity of non-Party activists as well. Two characteristics of politics in the Soviet system emerge from these definitions. The first emphasizes that virtually all social and economic activities take on political significance in the Soviet system, while the second focuses on the political primacy of the Communist Party and its members in giving effect to any political act. Two of the three criteria we posited earlier appear central to recent Soviet definitions of citizen participation. They are, first, the idea that participation is centered in administration of community affairs and, second, that this involvement is on the basis of unpaid, volunteer work in addition to the basic employment of the citizen. Discussions of citizen participation in political life are usually expressed in terms of "public selfgovernment" (Obshchestvennoe samoupravlenie) or "Communist self-government" (Kommunisticheskoe samoupravlenie), which are stated to be goals of Soviet society. Communist or public self-government is defined as consisting of (i) the fulfillment by citizens of functions given over to them by organs of state administration; (2) active participation of the public in organs of social and cultural activity; and (3) administration by citi­ zens of the internal affairs of all organizations to which they 31 Tsetsiliia A. Iampolskaia, Organy Sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo upravleniia ν sovremennom etape (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1954), p. 92. 32 Iu. E. Volkov, Tak rozhdaeUia kommunisticheskoe samoupravlenie (Moscow: Mys]', 1965), p. J 3.

Political Participation in the USSR

25

belong.33 Another commentator places the bounds of citizen participation beyond the fulfillment of delegated tasks and emphasizes the direct mass participation of citizens in admin­ istration.34 He also emphasizes the principle that unremunerated fulfillment of participatory tasks is the key to realization of self-government.35 Recent attempts have been made to define the boundaries of "Communist self-government" more rigorously. As will be seen later in this work, these attempts are the result of a reaction against what some Soviet scholars saw as an overenthusiastic broadening of the role of the citi­ zens in administration on the one hand and an erosion of the significance of participation on the other. V. I. Razin, writing in 1967, makes the point that too many commentators ap­ peared to think that any socially useful work performed by the masses was "Communist self-government" and that in the eyes of such people mobilizations to clean up neighborhoods and provide volunteers for repairing houses qualified as polit­ ical participation.36 Razin noted that taking part in the admin­ istration of the affairs of society is not the same as taking part in social labor and that the essence of public or Communist self-government is administration on a voluntary, unpaid basis—that is, the receiving of directives from above, the issu­ ing of subsequent corresponding directives to subordinates, and responsibility for the implementation of both types of directives. Razin keeps political participation from being nar­ rowed to administration only by injecting the suggestion that much of the administrative work should be handled by elected deputies because they are the people's chosen repre­ sentatives and responsible to the citizens at large.37 In this he is dealing with the same problem Selznick raises when he notes that democratic participation tends naturally to break 33 Iurii M. Kozlov, Sootnoshenie gosudarstvennogo i obshcheshiennogo upravleniia ν SSSR (Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1966), p. 63. 34 Iurii A. Tikhomirov, Vlast' i upravlenie ν sotsialistwheskom obshchestve (Mos­ cow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1968), pp. 68-71. 35 Ibid., pp. 48-52. 36 V. I. Razin, Politicheskaia organizatsiia obshchestva (Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1967), pp. 156-157. 37Ibid., pp. 156, 157, 159.

26

Participation and Soviet Politics

down into administrative involvement and that the needs of administration always tend toward dominance.38 Addition­ ally, he is narrowing the definition of participation offered by Iampolskaia in 1954, by exclusion of a part of the ceremonial and support activities of the Soviet citizen (meetings, rallies, etc.), as do Verba and Nie in their analysis of American par­ ticipation. The Soviet presentation of participation carries with it a strong normative overtone which, as will be shown later, helps both form and reflect the frameworks within which much of the Soviet citizen's participation is realized. The expression of these norms appears to have the purpose of investing existing frameworks with desired qualities—for example, declaring Soviet elections to be fully democratic—as well as serving to urge citizens to follow the normative prescription. Nonparticipation by citizens in the public affairs of capitalist countries is attacked in Soviet writings as an expression of the capitalist ethic of indifference to the social and political welfare of the community, in professed contrast to the involvement of the Soviet citizen in his system.39 Thus, along with direct partici­ pation in administration, the part the citizen plays in mass meetings and rallies or mass political acts such as campaign­ ing and voting, and the part he plays in the representative in­ stitutions of society are seen as important components of political participation.40 The above instances illustrate the differences of emphasis developed by various Soviet scholars in their treatment of the citizen's role in government. It is also clear that there is con­ siderable substantive difference between Soviet and nonSoviet treatments of participation. Where Western analysts focus primarily on electoral and party activity and the re­ cruitment of political leadership,41 Soviet writers are more in­ clined to see voluntary public service as the heart of the mat­ ter. Nevertheless, there are essential similarities that make it 38

Selznick, TVA, pp. 226, 265. See Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 10. 40 Tikhomirov, Vlast' ι upravlenie, p. 54. 41 Stein Rokkan, "Approaches to the Study of Participation," Acta Sociologica, Vol. 6, fasc. 1 (1961), p. 7. 39

Political Participation in the USSR

27

possible for the researcher to utilize much of the approach of non-Soviet political science to analyze Soviet studies of par­ ticipation. As we have seen, the concept of political participation gen­ erally used in the study of non-Communist societies is not en­ tirely congruent with the one we have chosen for the study of political participation in the Soviet Union. There is, however, a large area of overlap between the two. In the same way, the technique of studying Soviet political participation will be similar in some cases to what might be used elsewhere, but will be faced with serious limitations. Behavioral analysis, for instance, is difficult to apply in the Soviet case. Non-Soviet researchers today will have the oppor­ tunity to interview Soviet scholars and Soviet officials, but cannot conduct organized field surveys inside the USSR. In recent years Soviet researchers have conducted numerous in­ vestigations of political participation and citizen involvement in community activities, but some of these are unavailable and much relevant material goes unpublished, making systematic analysis difficult. Nevertheless, such sources have proven to be of great interest and value for the problems they raise and the data they do give, adding depth and substance to accounts published in newspapers and specialized journals. However, both the researcher and the reader should be constantly aware that this indirect analysis of Soviet life must be evaluated with great care and no small measure of skepti­ cism. Not only do we see reflected shadows rather than reality but even the broadest and most scrupulous study of Soviet printed sources will yield only a partial reflection of reality. We know that some phenomena of Soviet political life are not given open publication, and we can only guess at their impor­ tance in Soviet society as a whole. Fortunately, a part of this mystery can be penetrated by surveys and in-depth interviews among the more than 125,000 recent emigrants who have left the USSR over the past decade. Unsatisfactory as they may be as a statistical sample of Soviet citizens, they still can provide the acid test of real-life experience to our hypothetical constructions. The reader will note the influence of their testimony throughout

28

Participation and Soviet Politics

this volume. It is to be hoped that it adds both interest and accuracy to our account. The "state of the system" is, of course, a basic factor in any political analysis, and, as will be developed at some length later in this chapter, is clearly an important factor in the changes that have taken place in local politics in the USSR in recent years. Not only have administrative restructurings af­ fected the level of activity and competence of local au­ thorities, but the attempt to create a society motivated by something other than the political terror that was the mainspring of Soviet society during much of the Stalin period has created new roles for Soviet citizens and administrators alike. In addition, economic development has left its imprint, and local government must cope with an increased load of goods and services to be distributed. As naked terror di­ minishes, the alternatives before the citizen are broadened. Citizens may make more demands, may give in to apathy, or may even express certain types of dissent more openly.42 There are thus several promising areas in which the citizen's role in politics in the Soviet Union may be studied. Another question of importance is the evaluation of the scope of participation found in any system. A citizen's partici­ pation in his political system is not a purely quantitative mat­ ter that can be determined by the percentage of time and en­ ergy he devotes to activities in the sphere of politics. There is a qualitative aspect to political participation to be considered as well. Almond and Verba distinguish between the citizen, politically competent and possessing influence in the deter­ mination of policy, and the subject, who is called into action only to implement policies determined by others.43 In another context, Sydney Verba makes citizen status a prereq­ uisite for the growth of democracy through participation.44 42 Political dissidence as a form of participation will not be widely discussed in this work, which deals chiefly with regime-citizen relations within the ac­ cepted norms of the Soviet state. An enormous literature of dissidence, both analytic and programmatic, has been published in recent years. For a survey of the field see Rudolf L. Tokes (ed.), Dissent in the USSR (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1975). 43 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, p. 168. 44 Verba, "Participation and Strategies," p. 22.

Political Participation in the USSR

29

The distinction between citizen and subject status in partici­ pation is valuable, for it sensitizes us to the qualitative aspects of the citizen's participation, focusing our attention on. the areas of the political process in which the citizen is most active and assisting us in evaluating the significance of any given participatory act in terms of influence on policy and decision making. Evaluation of the democratic content of any system through observation of its participatory mechanisms is not, however, the only use to which such studies can be put. No less fruitful in terms of analysis of political systems is the ex­ tent to which participation may serve as an informational mechanism, may aid in legitimizing the regime in the citizens' eyes and may be used to augment an inadequate administra­ tive apparatus in distributional and supervisory activities in society. None of these need necessarily enable the citizen to influence policy, yet they may become an important part of politics. At the same time, as was previously suggested, exhortation of the citizen to activity in subject status may develop pres­ sures for citizen status, and in times of crisis such pressures may become important factors in the political system. The re­ peated and explicit assumption by the regime that the citizen is both duty-bound and able to manage his own affairs may well eventually make him believe it and demand the injection of a measure of reality into political slogans. In attacking this problem, we are dealing with one of the basic dualities of the Soviet system, a problem no less knotty for Soviet than for non-Soviet scholars. Marxist ideology envisions the emergence of a society with­ out classes and therefore without the class conflicts that neces­ sitate (in the Marxist view) control and repression of one part of the population by another. Yet in the Leninist develop­ ment in particular, the rejection of spontaneity for cen­ tralized planning and control has been a no less central theme.45 Every discussion of the significance of political phe45 Whether this duality has been the child of political necessity or whether it is intrinsic to the communist state is beside the point. The interesting point here is to observe the many areas in which the duality of freedom and control appears: national identity vs assimilation; egalitarianism vs social stratifica-

30

Participation and Soviet Politics

nomena in the USSR must sooner or later come to grips with this duality. In attempting to investigate political participation within this framework, differences resulting from autonomous and mobilized participation should be kept in mind. By autono­ mous participation we mean participation in which the initia­ tive to be active as well as the content and forms of organiza­ tion are principally determined by the participating citizen himself. In mobilized participation, on the other hand, actors external to the community, or a select group within it, are the sole initiators of participation among the masses, and it is they who establish the legitimate frameworks of participation, de­ termining their agenda and tone. This difference in structure may lead to basically different phenomena accompanying or resulting from such participation. Milbrath notes that his ob­ servations on participation are drawn principally from American experience and may be valid only in Western democracies and for the twentieth century.46 Thus, his con­ clusion that high socioeconomic standing is positively associ­ ated with higher participation47 may not hold true in a society in which the social background of both campaign activists and elected representatives is carefully calculated ahead of time. Indeed, the correlation may be reversed and higher social status may be the result rather than the cause of political par­ ticipation. Another conclusion common to most participation studies —that higher education leads to more exposure to politics— appears to hold true when one examines the educational profiles of Communist Party members or of elected deputies and compares them to those of the Soviet population as a whole.48 As with socioeconomic status, however, there is room here for investigation of the sequence of linkage between education and participation in Soviet politics. tion; autonomous participation vs mobilization. In each of these fields Soviet practice has been pulled in two directions by the conflict between freedom and control. Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics, develops this theme exten­ sively. 46 Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 3. ilIbid,., p. 16. 48 For a brief discussion of this point see Hough, "Participation," p. 13.

Political Participation in the USSR

31

One additional difference between the study of participa­ tion in Western democracies and that in the Soviet Union has to do with differences in the political cultures. Rokkan states that with the advent of universal suffrage and the extension of rights of association, the legal conditions for citizen par­ ticipation are no longer a focus of research, having been re­ placed by the psychological, economic, and organizational forces affecting the actual uses citizens will make of their es­ tablished rights.49 While the citizen's behavior and his use of those rights accorded him are certainly an important part of this study, the state of the Soviet political system and the re­ cent history of its institutions are such that study of the legal and institutional frameworks of participation is still of great importance. In the USSR, the political institutions now existing came into being as a result of revolution. Their development, guided by the credo that all legitimate translation of social re­ sources into political expression must take place through formal channels subject to regime control, has been seriously affected by the overwhelming weight that was given to the idea of control as a result of Stalin's strategies of political and economic development. The years of prolonged crisis—civil war, collectivization, industrialization, purge, war, and recon­ struction—accentuated the reliance on a tightly organized cadre to drive the political system rather than on institutions to facilitate any routinized activity. So deeply penetrating and all-embracing were these political arrangements that even after the social, military, and economic circumstances for which they were devised had changed, the politics of Stalinism survived. But the emphasis on prescriptive rule, in which nearly every detail of the activity of citizens or institutions is deter­ mined for them, was eventually perceived to be a hindrance to further political, as well as economic, development. If the Soviet system was not to stagnate, regulation—in which bounds are set, but the regulated individual or institution exercises options of judgment within these bounds—had to 49

Rokkan, in Acta, p. s.

32

Participation and Soviet Politics

replace strict prescription; and where some margin of regula­ tive control existed, there developed a pressure for a broadening of the boundaries and an exercise of wider op­ tions. Thus, the pressure for some sort of rule of law became prominent under the slogan of restoring and protecting "socialist legality." In the terms used by Samuel P. Huntington in the study of single party regimes, the rulers of the Soviet Union found that after close to forty years of Soviet power they had to undertake a new consolidation of their political system in order to assure the adaptability of the regime to its new social and economic structure.50 We will note repeatedly through­ out this work the extent to which Soviet scholars skip over much of the Stalin period as an aberration whenever they seek to elaborate on the development of institutional frame­ works of activity relevant to the political needs of the USSR today. The point to be made is that for the Soviet Union, the mere formal existence of universal suffrage and representa­ tive institutions did not meet the needs of the political system and that, even within the framework of continuing central control, some minimal competence had to be invested in these institutions if they were to serve as effective means of channel­ ing both inputs and outputs of politics between the regime and its citizens. The development of legally sanctioned partic­ ipatory bodies, the normative standards for their operation, and the relations between the various bodies within the politi­ cal system are thus still of central interest to the analyst of the Soviet political system.

MARXIAN AND LENINIST FOUNDATIONS Understanding the definitions of participation used by Soviet leaders and scholars and the areas of congruence with nonSoviet definitions is only part of the task of coming to terms with Soviet perceptions of citizen participation. To place these perceptions within the social and political context of Soviet 50 Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds.), Authoritar­ ian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 25-33.

Marxian and Leninist Foundations

33

life it is necessary to go back to the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin on the state and on the ideal forms of state-societal relations. In Soviet writings, the principles expounded by Marxist thinkers are claimed as scientific guides to action. However selectively they may be quoted or however broadly interpreted, they are offered as referents and as truths whose purported value is in the development of specific institutions and policies. Almost the entire experience of the Russian Communists as a conspiratorial group within the autocratic czarist state served to confirm in their eyes Engels' characterization of the repressive and administrative apparatuses of the state as class-dominated structures whose raison d'etre was the strangling of social change. Following the revolution, the Bol­ sheviks found themselves attempting to remold and direct a vast, hostile, and sluggish administrative apparatus which they could neither wholly abolish nor completely control. The "withering away of the state" as postulated by Engels and the role of the state apparatus in a revolutionary society thus con­ tinued to vex Soviet administrators and theorists. Marx and Engels had linked the emergence of the state to the division of mankind into economic classes and had concentrated on the state as an instrument of the ruling classes. However, in dealing with industrial society, they had recognized—though not developed—the idea that in any complex society there must be an agency for the organization and coordination of economic and social activity.51 While the complex questions of the role of bureaucracy in society and the stratification of modern societies are far be­ yond the scope of this work, the questions that faced the Bol­ sheviks as they attempted to develop the soviets as a novel form of mass government are tangential to them. Thus, while no general discussion of bureaucracy will be attempted, the counterposing of bureaucracy to participation and the devel­ opment of Marxist thought on the revolutionary administra­ tion of society through soviets and communes must be ex­ plored. 51 See, for instance, the essay "On Authority" by Engels in Lewis S. Feuer (ed.), Marx and Engels (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 481-485.

34

Participation and Soviet Politics

If Engels' work offered a theory of the state and a prescrip­ tion of its eventual withering away, it was Marx who provided the empirical investigation of the subject. In his work The Civil War in France52 Marx wrote what was to be literally a hand­ book of the administration of the Communist state of the fu­ ture. In it he examined the functioning of the Paris Com­ mune and set forth the principles which to this day are incor­ porated in the formal structure of the Soviet state. Universal suffrage, direct representation, unity of legislative and execu­ tive authority, imperative mandates of constituents, recall of representatives; all these, though sometimes attenuated or ignored in effective practice within the Soviet system, remain publicly honored and ideologically sanctified goals.53 Their nonobservance is often the occasion for fierce criticisms and elaborate explanation, upholding the principle even while the practice is modified.54 Along with descriptions of universal election and responsi­ ble representation, Marx wrote of the Commune representa­ tives that they were to be members of a "working, not a par­ liamentary, body."55 This phrase remains, even today, one of the most quoted of the patristic directives in any discussion of 52

Karl Marx, The Civil War in France (New York: International Publishers, 1933)· 53 Ibid., p. 40, summarizes these points. It also includes a point long neg­ lected in the USSR, though briefly honored at the time of the revolution. See Lenin's protest against Bolsheviks who demand a 9,000 ruble salary when 6,000 is adequate, in Works, Vol. 25, p. 424. Marx claimed that all public serv­ ice should be undertaken at workmen's wages—certainly not the case with Soviet ministers or high functionaries. In Soviet discussions today, the fact that elected deputies continue to work at their regular occupation and receive the wage they had before election, with no remuneration for their work as deputies, is construed as fulfillment of this principle. In similar fashion, the advocacy of elected deputies taking on the tasks of the paid bureaucracy is in part based on the Marxist stricture that every public official, from head of government to dogcatcher, should be elected. In the absence of such elec­ tions, the fact that local soviets ratify the appointment of heads of administra­ tive departments is taken as fulfillment of the elective principle. 54 See, for instance, A. Bezuglov, Deputatu dan nakaz (Moscow: Moskovskii Rabochii, 1967), pp. 32-34, for a careful hedging of the idea of the voters' "imperative mandate." For details of current Soviet practice regarding the imperative mandate, see Chapter 2, pp. 103-106. 55 Marx, Civil War, p. 40.

Marxian and Leninist Foundations

35

the local soviets. It serves as a basis for the view that the repre­ sentative organs must act primarily as a link between the executive and the citizenry, expediting administration rather than concentrating on legislative functions. The Paris Commune, as studied in Marx's work, was for the Soviet state the only model of actual experience in the admin­ istration of a revolutionary polity by its citizens.56 It had the additional advantage of having come into existence on a scale and in circumstances that made its institutions workable from the start, and of having existed so briefly that these institu­ tions were never sullied by routinization or by the problems of having to compromise and adjust to meet changing condi­ tions of development. As enshrined by Marx and extolled by Lenin, the Commune remains in Soviet writings the pro­ totype of the eventually realizable ideal state. The Com­ mune's fate served to justify the necessity of revolutionary dictatorship, while at the same time its institutions were de­ signed to draw its citizens into close contact with the daily workings of government. The influence of Marx's description of the Commune can hardly be overstated. Although it may be inferred from his work that Marx considered the Commune as an episode and unique more for the attempt to establish a revolutionary type of democracy than for the success or perspicacity with which this was done, the Paris Commune served as a recurrent motif for Lenin in the months preceding the October Revolution. On his return to Petrograd early in 1917, Lenin's first ideological pronouncement called for the establishment of a republic of soviets "from top to bottom," embodying the abo­ lition of police, army, and bureaucracy, with all officials to be elective, recallable, and paid workingmen's wages, and refer­ ring to the Paris Commune directly as an example of "the 56 Relatively little attention is paid by Soviet scholars to the experience of the soviets established during the 1905 revolution. Most of these were short­ lived and never established stable administrative structures or procedures. At the time, Lenin praised them as having great political potential for con­ solidating various revolutionary groups against the government and noted that, if supported by an armed populace, the soviets might become the nu­ cleus of a revolutionary government. See Lenin, Works, Vol. 12, pp. 62-70 and 231-232 for his references to the 1905 soviets.

36

Participation and Soviet Politics

kind of state that the proletariat needs."57 Again and again during the summer of 1917 Lenin promoted the example of the Commune, defending his April Theses as "this is the Commune in Marx's sense, in the sense of the experience of 1871."58 Even today, the Commune serves as a historic refer­ ence point for Soviet authors dealing with the theory of the socialist state. As mentioned above, Lenin dealt very little with questions of the form the state should take in the revolutionary period before the actual onset of the revolution. During most of the period between 1905 and 1917 he was preoccupied either with detailed questions of party organization and tactics or global questions of international politics and philosophy. However, in 1916, while impatiently sitting out the war in his Swiss exile, Lenin began to work on the question of the state. By the time he was able to return to Russia after the February 1917 unseating of the czar, he had almost completed the re­ search for the work that was to emerge later as "State and Revolution." Forced into hiding after the abortive July upris­ ing in Petrograd, Lenin took up his notebooks and hastily fin­ ished the writing of the book. "State and Revolution" makes puzzling reading. An end­ lessly repetitive mixture of polemic and quotes from Marx and Engels, tied together loosely by an expository text in which Lenin often paraphrases or summarizes the quoted materials, it has been characterized variously as "Lenin's most influential literary work . . . Communism's handbook of revo­ lution"59 and "a deception . . . selective . . . distorted . . . mis­ leading."60 To understand the book we must consider both its aim and the circumstances under which it was written, for both the style and values reflected in Lenin's writing remain influential in Soviet practice today. 57

Ibid., Vol. 24, p. 7. Ibid., Vol. 24, p. 13. See also pp. 20, 26, 49 for additional references. 59 Louis Fischer, The Life of Lenin (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 114. Fischer devotes pp. 114-124 of his work to analyzing the development of Len­ in's theory of the state, concluding: "Life killed a beautiful theory. Instead of the death of the state, the death oiThe State and Revolution." 60 Karl A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 58

1957)' PP- 396-398·

Marxian and Leninist Foundations

37

Originally, "State and Revolution" was to have been a theoretical tract on Marxist teachings regarding the state. The project was conceived as a polemic, originally directed against Bukharin, and later against Kautsky, Plekhanov, and all of Lenin's other rivals in the European socialist movement. Work on it started at a time when Lenin still thought that the socialist revolution was half a century away. However, cir­ cumstances changed rapidly during the turbulent summer of 1917. In hiding, and cut off from libraries or archives, in fear for his life and frenziedly preoccupied with the business of directing the Bolshevik Party by remote control, Lenin still found time to finish the writing of this book. Certainly, the circumstances are enough to explain the repetitive and dis­ jointed nature of "State and Revolution." However, the very aim of the book had changed by this time, and this is reflected in the change of its projected title. Instead of "Marxism and the State," Lenin named his work "The State and Revolution: Marxist Teachings on the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution." Lenin is occupied not with theoretical exposition, but with the formu­ lation of an agitational pamphlet; not with the past or future, but with the burning present. True to the tradition of revolu­ tionary agitation, he makes a few basic points, presenting them as a "concrete, practical task"61 to be begun "immedi­ ately, overnight."62 Lenin's points are that armed, violent revolution is the only way to establish socialism; that the bu­ reaucratic apparatus of the old state, and in particular the army, the police, the courts, and similar organs of compul­ sion, must be totally destroyed and replaced by "the pro­ letariat organized as the ruling class"; and that the example of the Paris Commune is both correct and immediately applica­ ble as a model for the socialist state. He hammers these points home, repeating the basic formulations time after time. In his discussion of what is to replace the former state ad­ ministration, Lenin reveals the Utopian and anarchistic train of thought that makes "State and Revolution" so atypical 61

Lenin, Works, Vol. 25, p. 398. Ibid., p. 397. The words "immediately, now, overnight" recur seven times in the course of this page as Lenin sets forth what can and must be done. 62

38

Participation and Soviet Politics

among Lenin's works. A half dozen times in the course of a hundred pages Lenin assures his readers that the administra­ tion of the economy and society is a simple matter of "regis­ tration, accounting and auditing, functions which can be per­ formed in full by any literate person."63 Yet Lenin is sharply aware of the problem this poses in the Russian context, and his solution is the single original proposal in the whole book. In April 1 9 1 7 , writing of the unique growth of a dual power in Russia, Lenin suggested that one of the functions of the soviets should be to see that the bureaucracy (in its widest sense), would be "replaced by the direct rule of the people, or at leastplaced under special control."64 This latter was an original element, not to be found in Marx, who wrote only of smash­ ing the bureaucracy and the substitution of direct rule of the people for it. This new thought was later developed in "State and Revolution," where Lenin noted that the functions of the economic bureaucracy could not be done away with, but could be controlled and confined under the organization of the proletariat.65 Here was the acknowledgment that in mod­ ern society work of an administrative nature is necessary no matter what the social structure, that an administrative corps (for the term "bureaucracy" is totally pejorative in Soviet us­ age) is not merely an appendage of the class state, but a fea­ ture of modernity, and of any complex society. Alongside the semianarchistic formulations of direct participatory democ­ racy, the acknowledgment of the necessity of incorporating a bureaucracy into socialist society illustrates the growth of the duality of control and participation underlying Soviet gov­ ernment. Here, too, lies the seed of the debate in the USSR as to whether the direction of development should be toward the decline and ultimate total supplanting of the professional administrator by the mobilized citizen, or whether adminis­ tration is truly an indispensable skill to be retained, though controlled by a system of checks and balances in the repre­ sentative organs and kept at a minimum by reliance on sup­ plementary citizen activity to augment the professional administrator. 63 Jbid., Vol. 25, p . 392. See also pp. 397, 398, 444, 445, 459. fi4 Ibtd., Vol. 24, p. 20. (Emphasis added.) es Ibid., Vol. 25, p p . 397, 445·

Marxian and Leninist Foundations

39

An additional point in Lenin's essay catches our attention within the context of political participation. The ultimate vision of "Communist public self-government" offered by Lenin is that, because universal popular supervision of society will make deviance so difficult, and its punishment so swift and severe, necessity will become habit and the fully socialized citizens will need no overt coercion to make them function; thus, any need for a special apparatus of enforcement will be eliminated.66 There is a strong awareness in the Soviet Union of Robert Michels' dictum that "he who says organization, says oligar­ chy."67 Although the principal open critics of oligarchy in Soviet history have been oppositionists such as Trotsky and Bukharin, there is a strong consciousness in the post-Stalin discussions in the Soviet Union of the dangers of a repetition of Stalin-type rule. All the anxiety over bureaucratization and possible oligarchic power is not rooted in fear for the fate of democratic institutions, but, rather that an entrenched bu­ reaucracy may endanger efficient central control over policy and its implementation. Soviet policy makers are well aware that "the tendency for goals to be subverted through the crea­ tion of new centers of interest and motivation, inheres in all organizations."68 Soviet anxiety over "localism" has given rise to elaborate measures aimed at assuring control of local bureaucracies, and these have been replicated throughout the administrative hierarchy. The resulting tangle of frameworks of activity on the local level begins to make sense in terms of administrative functions only when viewed as an attempt to maintain centrally controlled administration together with a measure of local participation. As noted previously, the continuing debate as to how these apparently contradictory aims should be realized will be studied closely in a later portion of this work. At one point in the development of the Soviet state, it was expected that the problem of democratic participation would solve itself with the emergence of a well-educated populace. Positing an edu66 Ibid.,

Vol. 25, p. 398. (Emphasis added.) Robert Michels, Political Parties (Glencoe: Free Press, 1949), p. 401. 68 Philip Selznick quoted by Seymour M. Lipset, introduction to ibid., p. 24.

67

40

Participation and Soviet Politics

cation explosion and a "colossal over-production of organ­ izers," Bukharin looked to an escape from inevitable bureau­ cratization through abolition of the incompetence of the masses—one of the prime causes of oligarchy, in Michels' view.69 At the time of his return to Russia in March 1917, Lenin was urging the establishment of the soviets as revolutionary organs of government on much the same grounds that he had developed in his thinking about the 1905 soviets. The soviets were to serve as a center of opposition to the established gov­ ernment, offering the workers a clear alternative to a bourgeois democratic regime. "Not a parliamentary republic . .. but a republic of soviets of workers', agricultural laborers', and peasants' deputies throughout the country. . . . "70 To his Party's conference, held in April 1917, Lenin em­ phasized the importance of combining strong, centralized na­ tional government with effective local institutions that could work face to face with the citizens. In the cities he urged the development of revolution within the framework of com­ munes formed out of suburbs and blocks, and suggested that local areas could develop model programs and use their ex­ perience to prod the central authorities into change. These suggestions were made in draft theses placed before the con­ ference,71 but the pressures working in favor of strict central control wherever it could be applied were evident even then, and Lenin's suggestions for local initiative found only weak reflection in the resolutions eventually adopted by the con­ ference.72 In the remaining years of his active life, Lenin added little to the theory of the socialist state, but labored mightily to un­ derstand and overcome shortcomings in public and industrial administration. Two of his last major essays, "How We Must Reorganize Rabkrin"73 and "Better Fewer But Better,"74 both 69

70 Lenin, Works, Vol. 24, p. 5. Ibid., pp. 26-27. 72 Ibid., Vol. 24, pp. 262-263. Ibid., Vol. 24, p. 226. 73 Ibid., Vol. 33, pp. 440-444, written in January 1923. 74 Ibtd., Vol. 33, pp. 445-460, written in March 1923. It is perhaps indica­ tive of the change in Lenin's focus on the problems of administration that in the index of a collection entitled V. I. Lenin 0 rabote sovetov (Moscow: 71

Systemic Developments in the USSR

41

deal with this problem, and the latter in particular laments the lack of "administrative culture" in the Soviet state. Thus, though Lenin started from the historic Marxist position of regarding administration and administrators as essentially foreign to a socialist society, ideally to be supplanted by the direct participation of the citizen in both elections and ad­ ministrative work, the realities of trying to build and adminis­ ter a modern state in a predominantly peasant and illiterate country, under the pressures of intervention, civil war, and reconstruction led him to spend more and more of his time solving the problems of building an efficient administrative apparatus. Lenin never renounced his earlier visions of uni­ versal participation, but in the face of overwhelming pres­ sures, chronic crisis and a lack of competent Communist leadership, they were inevitably pushed into second place.

SYSTEMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR The pressures of revolutionary transformation only inten­ sified with Lenin's death. Collectivization, industrialization, and the mass, random terror of the blood purges left no room for the type of participation exemplified by the Paris Com­ mune. Only when the Soviet Union emerged as a stable world power after World War II, and terror receded after Stalin's death, could the new regime take the first steps toward estab­ lishing "normal" patterns of political development. The aim was to reconcile the centralist, partocratic foundations of Soviet politics with the development of local soviets utilizing the contributions of mass citizen participation. It is precisely the normality of the past thirty-five years—the only such ex­ tended period in the history of the Soviet Union—that makes this period a fruitful focus for the study of political participa­ tion. Politicheskaia Literatura, 1963) the heading "System of Soviets (sovetskoe stroitel'stvo)—the struggle for perfecting of the Soviet state apparatus," has thirty-eight entries of which twenty refer to writings between the end of 1920 and March 192¾. The heading "Participation of the masses in state adminis­ tration" has a total of eighteen entries, of which the last is dated February 1920. See p. 423.

42

Participation and Soviet Politics

In addition to the passage of time and the passing of Sta­ lin's direct influence, two developmental factors have played a part in the renewed emphasis on the importance of local gov­ ernment. On the one hand, along with consolidation of smaller rural areas into larger units of government, there has been a steady proliferation of urban soviets. Industrial devel­ opment projects often give birth to new urban-type workers' settlements. In the course of time, many of these develop into full-fledged towns. During the period 1961-1975 the number of settlement soviets grew from 3,061 to 3,598, an increase of over 17 percent, while the number of town and city soviets grew from 1,678 to 2,006, an increase of nearly 20 percent.75 This involved the establishment of 865 new urban adminis­ trative units in fourteen years. During this same period the urban population of the USSR grew by close to 50 million people and the majority of Soviet citizens now reside in urban centers. The search for effective political and social control of the urban community has there­ fore become of growing importance to the Soviet authorities. At the same time the national economic situation greatly improved. By the time of Stalin's death, reconstruction after World War II was virtually complete and the economy began to climb above its pre-1941 levels of production. Slowly but surely there began to be an increased flow of goods and serv­ ices to the local level, and it was the task of the local soviets to administer their distribution. The growing complexities of planning, production, and distribution intensified the need for better flows of information and the growing scale of the economy made each error more costly. The inability of the tightly centralized apparatus of the state to cope with this growth in activity encouraged tentative efforts to decentralize some functions. In 1957, Khrushchev sponsored the creation of regional economic councils as a measure of decentralization, abolish75 Itogi vyborov t sostav deputatov mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsta 1961 (Moscow: Izvestiia, 1961), pp. 9-10 (henceforth cited as Itogi with ap­ propriate year); and Sovety deputatov trvdiashchikhsia, no. 8 (August 1975), p. 22 (henceforth cited as SDT).

Systemic Developments in the USSR

43

ing many of the central industrial ministries that had con­ trolled production of goods throughout the Soviet Union. One result of this was that in each region the industrial de­ partments of the local soviets were given a portion of the re­ sponsibility for administration of industry that had formerly been exercised by the ministries in Moscow.76 But the longdormant system of local soviets was ill-equipped and illexperienced for this new burden, and there was well-founded doubt at the center as to how the task would be done.77 Decentralization without an adequately prepared appara­ tus to handle it created a dilemma for the Soviet authorities. Not only might vital production be lost through mismanage­ ment but, as a much later resolution of the Central Commit­ tee of the CPSU found it necessary to point out, the fact that the local soviets had not yet mastered the administrative tasks involved in delivering the benefits of improved cultural and social services to their constituents was a matter of basic politi­ cal importance.78 Given effective mass organization, the local soviets could be of importance to the center as a basic source of information, aggregating the interests of the broadest sec­ tors of Soviet society.79 Hitherto, the mobilizing strength of the Party apparatus and activists and the strongly centralized state organs had led the revolutionary transformation of the USSR. Born of the revolutionary cleavage of Russian society, the Party was in ac­ tual fact—though Lenin never discusses the Party in "State and Revolution"—Lenin's "armed proletariat organized as the ruling class." But this stage had clearly ended after Stalin's death, and the post-Khrushchev leadership sought ways to 76 Α. V. Luzhin, "Vzaimootnosheniia mestnykh sovetov s sovnarkhozami i predpriiatiiami soiuznogo respublikanskogo podchineniia," Sovetskoe gosudarstvo ipravo (henceforth SGP), no. 4 (April 1959), p. 43. 77 Ibid., p. 43; and Iu. A. Tikhomirov, "Voprosy razvitiia mestnykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti SSSR," SGP, no. 1 (January i960), p. 79. 78 "Ob uluchshenii raboty sel'skikh i poselkovykh sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia," Spravuchnik partimogo rabotnika (1967), p. 347. 79 Tikhomirov, Vlast' i upravlenie, p. 87, makes this explicit, writing "They [the local soviets] are . . . the basic forum in which the interest of society as a whole is defined."

44

Participation and Soviet Politics

adapt Soviet rule to the conditions of an established one-party system.80 The intention was to enhance substantially the in­ stitutional capacities of the Soviet regime. The problem was not only one of increasing these capac­ ities. This had to be done without weakening the basic princi­ ple of the Communist Party monopoly of power. New forces had to be given responsibility for the administration of the af­ fairs of society without their being granted independent sources of political power. Moreover, the Soviet authorities were well aware of the dangerous centrifugal forces that might be unleashed.81 They sought a solution that would maintain control while attempting to promote participation, and one reached in such a way that the Soviet people would understand that a basic change had occurred. Also, there could be no vast increase of expenditures on administrative activities. A simple enlargement of the bureaucracy was out of the question for both the above reasons. The local soviets, with a multitude of mass organizations to assist them in their work, were chosen to become the vehicle of enhanced ad­ ministrative effectiveness. The system of soviets embodied a number of valuable characteristics in this connection. As a symbol, they were imbued with the aura of revolutionary legitimacy and could be connected with the mass upsurge of popular politicking of 1917. Even more important, the soviets were universal in a double sense: they existed in every com­ munity throughout the Soviet Union and they were the rep­ resentative institutions of the whole of adult Soviet society. Their mass popular nature was particularly important, both in terms of direct participation and of the legitimacy im­ parted by elected representation. 80 The change from a revolutionary to an established one-party system is studied by Samuel Huntington in Huntington and Moore, Authoritarian Poli­ tics, pp. 32-40. 81 Ibid., p. 33, lists four main areas of challenge to the ruling party's con­ trol: the increased importance of technical-managerial skills; the creative in­ telligentsia's growing alienation from regime slogans; the challenge of societal complexity; a growing popular demand for political participation and influence. While not all of these had equal weight in Soviet conditions, they must have engaged the attention of the Soviet leaders and apparently are as yet factors in Soviet political development.

Systemic Developments in the USSR

45

The statutes governing the establishment of various institu­ tional frameworks for the work of the elected deputies thus specify that these frameworks "should make it possible to draw large groups into the work of the soviets."82 A further aim of this public involvement in administration is, in the eyes of Soviet theorists, the development of the future Communist society. Thus, a basic textbook on the soviets notes that "par­ ticipation in community self-help organizations results not only in fulfilling specific tasks of the soviets, but in learning the skills and habits of Communist self-government."83 Here we have a restatement of Lenin's hope of reaching that de­ gree of socialization at which citizens perform their duties out of habit and not from coercion. The processes of socialization working within the Soviet community will thus be a focus of interest in our investigation. Another scholar, investigating the work of the local soviets, considered the strengthening of their elective basis to be a prerequisite to making the elected deputy a focus of further democratization, that is, further involvement of citizens in all aspects of government and admi nistration.84 This message is repeated frequently both to the public at large and to officials of the soviets in regular columns in such central newspapers as Izvestiia,85 and at regional conferences of officials of the 82 A. I. Bakurskii (ed.), Nornwtivnye materialy dlia rabotnikov sovetov Kubana (Krasnodar: Krasnodarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1966), p. 376· See, for example, the statutes on deputies' groups and deputies' councils. 83 Vasil'ev, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, p. 306. The term that I have translated as "community self-help organizations" is, in the Russian, obshchestvennye samodeiatel'nye organizatsii. The term obshchestvennyi has different shades of meaning in different contexts and I have translated it variously as "public," "community," and "volunteer." Thus, obshchestvennoe nachalo is rendered as "a volunteer element," while obshchestvennoe mnenie becomes "public opinion." 84 Sh. L. Papidze, "Razvitie obshchestvennykh nachal ν deiatel'nosti mestnykh sovetov na sovremennom etape kommunisticheskogo stroitel'stva" (Candidate Dissertation) (Moscow: Academy of Social Sciences, Central Committee, CPSU, 1967), p. 44. 85 Izvestiia, as the central press organ of the soviets, pays particular atten­ tion to problems of activity and organization in the system of soviets. Its col­ umns regularly carry articles by local officials describing successful innova­ tions and desirable achievements to be emulated. For example, see "Deputat—politicheskii deiatel'," ibid., April 4, 1968; "Vremia novoe—stil' novoe," ibid., July 3, 1967; "Deputat i ego dolg," ibid., February 15, 1967.

46

Participation and Soviet Politics

soviets, such as that held in Kaluga Oblast' in 1967 at which the chairman of the oblast' executive committee stated that "the soviets are called upon to be the basis for the formation of a system of self-government for Communist society."86 Thus, the representative and executive organs of the soviets have come to be regarded as important links in the mecha­ nism of participation, providing not only leadership but communication and control. Organization of mass participation, however, has economic as well as political importance to the central authorities. The main thrust of Soviet investment is still toward the develop­ ment of industrial and agricultural production. Resources available to cover the growing demands for cultural and social welfare are still meager, and both material and manpower are hoarded jealously. The successful soviet (in the eyes of the central authorities) is the one that succeeds in satisfying its citizens' needs for housing and public works out of its own "local resources and internal possibilities" by using the depu­ ties, the standing committees, and aktiv of the soviet to replace paid administrators. Such a reduction of the paid staff of the local soviets in the Altai Territory in 1956-1957 is said to have saved the labor of 3,000 people, or 23.6 percent of the staff of the local soviets, and 16 million rubles in jvages.87 Summing up, we may therefore say that the local soviets have a threefold importance in the Soviet system of govern­ ment: normative, long-range educational, and short-range 86 Kaluga Oblast' Soviet, Vozrastanie roll mestnykh sovetov (Kaluga: 1968), p. 16. In addition to speeches by senior officials, the conference was addressed by academics who dealt with theoretical questions of the work of the soviets as state organs. 87 S. Shevchenko, "Sovershenstvovat' apparat raiona," SDT, no. 2 (August 1957), pp. 42-43. The suggestion that one of the motives for cutting down on paid staff is economic has been denied by some Soviet writers. See, for in­ stance, I. A. Azovkin, "Rasshirenie uchastiia mass ν rabote apparata sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo upravleniia," SGP, no. 9 (September 1961), p. 47. Azovkin's discussion refers directly to Howard R. Swearer's "Popular Par­ ticipation: Myths and Realities," Problems of Communism, Vol. 9, no. 5 (September-October i960), pp. 42-51. An official Soviet statement of the need and possibility to economize through proper utilization of citizen par­ ticipation in the work of the soviets will be found in Partiinaia zhizn', no. 2 (January 1957), p. 4.

Systemic Developments in the USSR

47

operative. In normative terms, they are the local embodiment of regime legitimacy, constituted on the basis of direct, popu­ lar election, and working as a framework for the growth of Communist self-government. In long-range educational terms they are to be the arena for the training of all Soviet citizens in modern administration and for their socialization to the style of public life in the future Communist society. In present and practical terms, the local authorities are the ulti­ mate link in distribution and their efficiency in this task may well determine the fate of central social policies. The reaction of citizens to the lowest links of government is therefore a signal to be utilized by the central authorities as to how well local officials are able to carry out their tasks and how effi­ ciently they are able to mobilize local manpower and re­ sources to stretch the limited allotments available from the center. In meeting their obligations, the officials and deputies of the local soviets have traditionally been burdened by the lim­ ited competence granted to local soviets. Competing hierar­ chical controls and lack of independent resources are particu­ larly persistent problems for the local authorities.88 Too often the bulk of resources allocated for expenditure on the terri­ tory of the soviet is outside the control of the local authorities, and even intensive debate and legislation has not corrected this fault. However, local authorities' complaints about limited re­ sources are not considered an acceptable excuse for nonsatisfaction of citizens' demands. A Central Committee resolution states: "The facts show that the daily needs of the masses are ill-met not because the material resources and conditions are lacking in the local soviets, but because of bureaucracy and voluntarism and the irresponsibility of some functionaries of 88

For extensive and detailed treatment of these problems, see Taubman, Governing Soviet Cities, and B. Michael Frolic, Soviet Urban Politics (forthcom­ ing). For the workings of local soviets see also B. Michael Frolic, "Decision Making in Soviet Cities," APSR, Vol. 66, no. ι (March 1972), pp. 38-52; and Theodore H. Friedgut, "Community Structure, Political Participation and Soviet Local Government: the Case of Kutaisi," in Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tokes (eds.), Soviet Politics and Society in the Seventies (New York: Free Press, 1974), pp. 261-296.

48

Participation and Soviet Politics

the soviets, who, losing contact with the masses, do not see the living people through their papers."89 The pressure on the local authorities from the center is for the citizens to be given the maximum possible out of the available resources, and it is up to the local authorities to find ways to stretch these re­ sources. Local authorities are thus under pressure to prove their ef­ fectiveness by demonstrating close "contact with the masses." They have an interest in doing so, and the citizen has some interest in responding, for, as will be demonstrated, the mobilized skills and manpower of the community are often a significant addition to the resources at the disposal of the local authorities. For the citizen who wants his (state-owned) house repaired, his street paved, or his children's school refur­ bished, the time and energy cost of participation in determin­ ing and satisfying priorities (within the overall given planning and budget framework of the local soviet) may appear to be a good investment. However, the political utility of such par­ ticipation is not limited to increasing the institutional capaci­ ties of the local soviets. Scholars dealing with the participation of citizens in nonautonomous environments turn from political philosophy to industrial psychology for an understanding of the effects of participation. In particular, the pioneering Hawthorne ex­ periments have been used as a point of reference.90 Carole Pateman goes further, investigating workers' participation in industrial management and extrapolating the results to gen­ eral political participation. It is important to note here that Pateman, like Selznick, is dealing with the sharing of respon­ sibility and not the sharing of power. Her conclusion is that even "pseudo-participation" or partial participation enhance the harmony and productivity of workers.91 Harmony and productivity are central themes in Soviet discussions of par­ ticipation and local government. Beyond this, however, are two additional points. 89 Central Committee, CPSU, "Ob uluchshenii deiatel'nosti mestnykh sovetov i usilenii ikh sviazi s massami," Spravochnik (1957), p. 459· 90 See Salisbury, "Research," p. 335, for discussion of this point. 91 Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cam­ bridge University Press, 1970), Chapters 3-4, and in particular pp. 56-64.

Systemic Developments in the USSR

49

One of the important findings of the Hawthorne experi­ ment was that the workers' feeling that management paid at­ tention to them was as important in increasing harmony and productivity as was any physical arrangement. Translated into terms of community structure, the citizen's feeling that he can make himself heard, that he has some means of access to the regime, is no less important in creating a sense of effi­ cacy than the actual satisfaction of needs. The second point to be noted in this context is that partici­ pation not only increases citizens' links with the authorities, it increases people's control of each other. The creation of par­ ticipatory institutions establishes socializing limits on individ­ ual behavior. This, carried to an extreme, can prove to be a factor discouraging citizens from participation.92 Yet we have noted how Lenin's vision of "Communist public self-govern­ ment" was predicated on Soviet society achieving a high de­ gree of socialization, and how Soviet social scientists today still look to participatory institutions as a major source of sociali­ zation. The many political and administrative activities in which Soviet citizens participate take place within a dual framework of control. The hierarchical structure of the soviets, and of the Soviet political system in general, serves to coordinate the agenda and priorities of the participatory organs at any given moment, concentrating them on centrally determined goals, while the supervision of Communist Party organs provides control of staffing, leadership selection, and auditing of the quality of activities. These are explicit and unchallenged principles of Soviet political life, but as in any system, the manner of their implementation sometimes raises questions. By examining these we may gain some insight into several persisting problems of Soviet participation. The priorities to be given to one or another campaign, the determination of questions to be discussed and the basic ap­ proach to be adopted usually are made in the top organs of the Soviet hierarchy and announced through a resolution of 92 William R. Schonfeld, "The Meaning of Democratic Participation," World Politics, Vol. 28, no. 1 (October 1975), pp. 152-153, makes this point. Townsend, Participation in China, p. 204, notes unnecessary political intrusion into individual life as an obstacle to participation in China.

50

Participation and Soviet Politics

the Central Committee, the Soviet Council of Ministers, or the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. "Thus, if a reso­ lution of the CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR is adopted regarding the inclusion of state farms in the new system of economic planning, then the local agricultural committees and the whole soviet must oversee its fulfillment and if a resolution of the central organs is published dealing with the improvement of village trade then the village stand­ ing committees on trade must include in their plans measures to ensure fulfillment of the aims of this resolution."93 Relations between national and local interests are jealously guarded, to keep the latter from impinging on the former. In the matter of voters' mandates, for instance, Bezuglov writes that they must be considered from the perspective of the in­ terests of the entire Soviet people and that "a localist ap­ proach to any problem is unacceptable and foreign to Soviet citizens."94 The application of this hierarchical initiative applies not only to the local soviets vis a vis the higher soviets but also to neighborhood self-help organizations in their rela­ tions with their local soviet. The subordination of particular interests to a single general interest is an important part of the Soviet outlook on partici­ pation. It is linked to the rejection of what Salisbury calls "in­ strumental participation," based on contentious mobilizing of conflicting interests.95 Instead of contest, Soviet theorists propose a consensual participation based on a common un­ derstanding of a socially optimal allocation of resources. This approach, of course, both assumes and aspires to a high level of socialization. There is ample evidence that the evocation of hierarchical authority is generally followed in the workings of the soviets 93 V. I. Vasil'ev, Rabota deputata sel'skogo, poselkovogo soveta ν postoiannoi kommissii ι izbiratel'nom okruge (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1969), p. 14. This book is one of a series entitled "Library for workers of village and set­ tlement soviets." The series is intended as a handbook to guide executives and deputies in all fields of activity of the soviets. Each volume, however, is published in only 43,000 copies, not quite enough for one copy per village and settlement soviet. 94 Bezuglov, Deputatu dan nakaz, p. 31. 95 Salisbury, "Research," p. 327.

Systemic Developments in the USSR

51

and their ancillary organs. A standing committee of a Moscow district soviet cited a decree of the Supreme Soviet against parasitism as the basis for a planned campaign in which house committees, druzhiny units, and housing administration em­ ployees were urged to assist the militia, and the militia itself was urged to be more active in uncovering persons who are "evading socially useful employment."96 A discussion of the work of the soviets of Kaluga Oblast' notes that the main work of the sessions of the oblast' soviet in the preceding period had been the discussion of fulfillment of obligations undertaken by various local bodies in honor of the fiftieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in response to resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The Belorussian law on village soviets notes that these soviets re­ ceive indicators of economic goals for enterprises on their territories from the executive committees of superior soviets and then are charged with responsibility for seeing that these goals are reached.97 However, hierarchical control of the local soviets is not lim­ ited to supervision or determination of areas of activity by superior soviets. The soviets are also subject to close and in­ clusive supervision by organs of the Communist Party. One authority has described three main areas of Party direction of the work of the soviets. The first is one that we have already discussed: definition of the content of the work of state organs in accordance with the policies of the CPSU. Party control also includes the selection, placing, and ideological education of personnel and the supervision and verification of implementation of policy decisions.98 The all-inclusive na­ ture of this Party control over the soviets, accepted for many years without any question as to the means used to achieve it, naturally discourages the development of active executive 96 Biulleten ' ispolnitel'nogo komiteta Moskovskogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsta, no. 2-512 (January 1963), pp. 24-30 (henceforth Bulletin). Note the number of bodies mobilized for coordinated activity in this campaign. 97 Belorussian SSR, "Zakon ο sel'skikh sovetov," article 10, para. 5. The same stipulations appear in the laws of the RSFSR and other republics according to V. K. Vasenin, Sessit sel'skogo, poselkovogo soveta (Moscow: IuridicheskaiaLiteratura, 1969), p. 18. 98 Iampol'skaia, Organy, p. 74.

52

Participation and Soviet Politics

and representative organs. The 1 9 5 7 Central Committee res­ olution, which marks the beginning of organized attempts to reform local government and revive its participatory ele­ ments, noted the interference of Party authorities in matters of the soviets and called for an end to the coopting of officials into elective positions and the removal of officials of soviets from their positions without discussion of the matter and de­ cision by the competent plenary session of the soviet." What is at stake here is not the principle of Party control—that re­ mains unquestioned—but the way in which this control is to be exercised. An often-quoted resolution of the 8th Party Congress in 1919 stated that the Party "leads the activities of the soviets but does not replace them" and on the strength of this newly revived principle, Party activists are exhorted to influence the work of the soviets from within, through Party groups in the executive committees and in the plenum.100 However, old habits die hard, and some years passed before the habit of respecting formal processes of election and re­ moval of officials of local soviets could be instilled in the Party secretaries.101 Even more persistent is the problem of Party committees weakening the soviets by arrogating to themselves duties in the economic sphere that formally belong to the soviets. The local Party committees have a structure similar to the adminis­ trative organs of the soviets, with their own departments of industry, agriculture, transport, and so on. There is no doubt in the mind of an ordinary citizen that the Party committee has more authority than does the soviet, and at any hint of crisis it is the party organs that abandon their stance of politi­ cal supervision and auditing, becoming involved in every operative aspect of administration. Jerry Hough cites sources indicating that the root of this practice goes back to the exigencies of World War II.102 He paints a striking picture of the Party apparatus acting as the primary functioning bu99

C.C., CPSU, "Ob uluchshenii. . . ,"Spravochnik (1957), p. 455. L. A. Grigorian, Sovety—organy vlasti i narodnogo samoupravleniia (Mos­ cow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1965), p. 198. 101 See SDT, no. 2 (February i960), pp. 67-68, and ibid., nos. 4, 6, 7 (i960), for complaints of such happenings. 102 Hough, The Soviet Prefects, p. 218. 100

Systemic Developments in the USSR

53

reaucracy even today, despite repeated calls for reform from both Party and government organs. The chairman of the Presidium of the Kirghiz Supreme Soviet noted that in the course of a year, one oblast' soviet adopted ninety-five eco­ nomic decisions jointly with Party organs, including technical preparations for sheep shearing.103 The Party apparatus thus emerges as a bureaucracy concerned both with internal man­ agement of the Party and with the direct productive functions supposedly supervised by the various levels of soviets. The consequent removal of the soviets from responsibility has been a continuing source of debilitation and a focus in the struggle to improve their capacity to act by creating new in­ stitutions that will take back some of the functions until now performed by Party organs. The 1 9 7 1 Central Committee resolution dealing with the work of the soviets urges this point once again, claiming that "in the practice . . . of city Party committees there are still a good many instances of petty tutelage over the soviets or of the usurpation of their functions."104 This complaint persists to the present,105 and in noting its persistence we should un­ derstand that it is symptomatic of Party primacy and the con­ tinuing high priority of plan fulfillment. As long as these two features characterize the Soviet state the Party is likely to con­ tinue to take direct charge of economic affairs. Party control of the soviets' work is not, however, merely inhibiting. Party decisions also act as a spur to encourage the soviets to improve their effectiveness and overcome some of their weaknesses. A Moscow City Party committee resolution regarding the work of the local soviets of Moscow set off a chain of discussions in these soviets, which led to a sixmonth-long examination of the work of the various bodies in the soviets, from the city executive committee down to depu­ ties' groups and house committees in the districts.106 Though the main items of discussion are reported in generalities of a 103

T. Kulatov in Izvestiia,, July 22, 1966. C.C., CPSU, Ό merakh po dal'neishemu uluchsheniiu raboty raionnykh i gorodskikh sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia," Pravda, March 14, 104

197»· 105

See Partiinaia zhizn', no. 11 (June 1973), p. 28, for a recent example. no. 10-640 (May 1968), p. 6.

lm Bulletin,

54

Participation and Soviet Politics

type now condemned (though recurring) even within the soviets, e.g., "the mass-organizational work of the soviets is to be improved," "oblige executive committees to maintain timely reporting to sessions and to the public," problems of a more specific nature also come to light. The report of this dis­ cussion states that the promotion of young specialists with ini­ tiative is too slow and that some leading officials are chosen unwisely.107 Clearly, in the clash of conflicting goals and demands that surround Soviet economic and administrative bodies, the local Party secretary has the advantage of being a step above the competition and thus able to bring together the various agencies whose efforts must be coordinated to effect any change, large or small. A high-school teacher addressing a conference of local soviet officials rebuked them for ineffec­ tiveness, noting that an extended campaign to refurbish the local kindergarten had borne fruit only when the local Party committee had resolved that the repairs were a matter of urgency.108 Party organs appear to have quick access to all levels of power and, as one Soviet observer noted, "Some­ times you need to have immediate communication with somebody and often it is only through the Party organs that this can be done."109 Another way in which the Communist Party plays a domi­ nant part in citizen participation is by providing, in almost every participatory body, the core of activists for that body's work. However, joining the Soviet Communist Party, unlike party membership in non-Communist polities, is not neces­ sarily an act of political participation. Discussions with former Party members now living abroad indicate that the opening of career prospects was the most important factor in their join­ ing the Communist Party and that this is seen as increasingly true by a large part of those who join the CPSU.110 Many of 107 Ibid.,

p. 7. Kaluga ObIast' Soviet, Vozrastanie roli mestnykh sovetov (materials of the Kaluga Oblast' conference of activists of the soviets, November 24, 1967, Kaluga, 1968), p. 44. 109 Varchuk, "Puty," p. 170. 110 Of a sample of 25 former Party members interviewed, 22 named career-linked considerations as their only or dominant motivation for joining 108

Systemic Developments in the USSR

55

these people, despite their membership in the Communist Party, try to minimize their participatory activity and are one source of the dilemma of "paper activists" and nonexistent committees which are the subject of recurrent complaint in Soviet analyses of participation.111 Those joining the Party, however, are generally aware of the fact that whatever their inclination toward public activism, Party membership brings with it the demand of Party au­ thorities that members take on some activity. This aspect of Party membership is repeatedly emphasized and Party mem­ bers thus provide a pool of available manpower to establish, operate, and revitalize, where necessary, the many forms of participatory activity in the USSR, drawing after them the non-Communist citizens. Whatever the individual Party member's motivations may be, and whatever advantages may accrue to him, continuation of his Party membership entails exposing himself to some pressures for active participation in community administration and other aspects of social activism. The framework of control and supervision within which the local soviets were being revived as participatory organs provides only one part of the picture. The period following the 20th Party Congress in 1956 was in almost every sector of life one of great strain for the USSR. Politically, economically, and socially the Soviet Union was undergoing a difficult read­ justment, a readjustment loaded with explosive potential to the Soviet regime as it maneuvered out of the Stalinist period. In the aftermath of Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin's crimes at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Soviet ideologists began a reassessment of the social structure of the Soviet Union and the relations of state and society. Specifically re­ jecting Stalin's 1937 thesis of the sharpening of the internal class struggle accompanying the building of socialism, the CPSU drew up a new Party program, which was adopted at the Party. Two others named other considerations as having equal weight. Only 1 omitted career motivation. For similar considerations in an earlier survey see Inkeles and Bauer, The Soviet Citizen, pp. 324-332. 111 Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 118; Varchuk, "Puty," p. 164; and N. Podgornyi, speech at 23rd Congress of CPSU in Pnwda, April 1, 1966.

56

Participation and Soviet Politics

the 2 2 n d Party Congress in October 1 9 6 1 . In this program, after surveying the international political scene and outlining a grandiose twenty-year development plan to bring economic plenty to every Soviet citizen, the new program declared that "the dictatorship of the proletariat has fulfilled its historic mission and has ceased to be necessary to the internal devel­ opment of the USSR. The state, which grew up as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat, has been transformed in the new, present period into a state of all the people. . . 12 Immediately following this formulation in the new program came a section devoted to "the soviets and the development of democratic principles of state administration."113 This section reflected and summarized the work done over the previous five years to create a new emphasis on the involvement of citi­ zens in the administrative and representative organs of gov­ ernment. Addressing the Party Congress, at which the pro­ gram was adopted, Nikita Khrushchev declared, "Every Soviet person must become an active participant in the ad­ ministration of community affairs—this is our slogan and our task."114 He continued the speech, mapping out for the dele­ gates his interpretation of the phrase: wholesale development of state organs on the basis of volunteer labor and the con­ tinuing transfer of functions of administration to nonstate public bodies.115 One Soviet scholar noted that this interpre­ tation expressed the essence of the change from the dictator­ ship of the proletariat to the state of all the people,116 while Iurii Tikhomirov, one of the main participants in the debate on how to restructure participation, used it to renew discus­ sion of the principles of universal elective office-holding and unpaid administrative service.117 112 CPSU—Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partn Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Politizdat, 1968), p. 101. 113 Ibid., p. 102. 114 Matenaly 22 s'ezdaKPSS (Moscow: Politizdat, 1961), pp. 84-85. 115 Ibid., p. 85. 116 L. Karapetian, "Politicheskaia organizatsiia obshchestva ν periode razvernutogo stroitel'stva kommunizma," (Candidate Dissertation) (Moscow: Higher Party School and Academy of Social Sciences, Central Committee, CPSU1 1962), p. 85. 117 Iu. A. Tikhomirov, "Razvitie sotsialisticheskoi gosudarstvennoi vlasti," SGP, no. 5 (May 1963), p. 34.

Systemic Developments in the USSR

57

This "democratization" of government administration, however, was taking place within the framework of the or­ ganizational and political reshufflings that characterized the Khrushchev regime. Thus, while the Party program was urg­ ing further development of the competence of local soviets in the field of economic administration, the tide of fact was running the opposite way, and a Central Committee plenum finally stripped the local soviets of a good deal of their formal rights to local industry in November of 1962.118 The declaration of the Party program that in those fields in which the local soviets had formal competence they were truly to have the final word thus remained a programmatic state­ ment rather than a reality. Important as this development was as a precondition to meaningful public participation in gov­ ernment, the development of the local soviets provides only a convenient framework for participation and does not consti­ tute a transition in itself. The problem of the soviet has been to create an effective set of institutions which will enable it to discharge its present duties with some measure of efficiency and provide it with those reserves of administrative capacity that can make the soviet an effective contender for increased powers in any new distribution of functions. One way in which local leaders could create administrative capacity was through activating citizens as volunteer participants in gov­ ernment, for, even as the soviets were being urged to take up new powers, the weakest of them were being denuded of their professional staff. In the November 1962 plenum which gave thesovnarkhozy control of local industry, Nikita Khrushchev explained that as the country moved toward Communism many state organs would wither away, and their functions would be performed, 118 For a comprehensive study of the tug-of-war between the local soviets and the regional economic councils over industry, see David Cattell, "Local Government and the Sovnarkhoz in the USSR, 1957-1962," Soviet Studies, Vol. 15, no. 4 (April 1964), pp. 430-442. Taubman, Governing Soviet Cities, pp. 41-46, traces the struggle for housing and consumer services in which the local soviets have for the most part made only small and recent gains. A Soviet account of these developments is given in G. V. Barabashev, K. F. Sheremet, and P. Titov, "Rol sovetov ν razvitii sotsialisticheskogo khoziaistva," SDT, no. 12 (December 1965), pp. 7-20.

58

Participation and Soviet Politics

if at all, on an unpaid basis, but that organs of economic ad­ ministration ("administration of things, not of people") would remain.119 One trend of development was thus explained as the strengthening of the soviets' role in the area of culture and services, to be accomplished by transfer of all basic ac­ tivities to the elected deputies, enlarging the soviet aktiv, and broadening the scope of work on a volunteer basis.120 It ap­ peared that what was contemplated was the separation of production and service functions at the local level and per­ formance of the latter by unpaid staff organized through and around the representative organs of the soviet, supplanting in some measure the paid administrators of the local soviets. The trend to do this was presented not as an innovation, but as an extension of the original functions of the soviets. The choice of the standing committees of the soviets as bodies that could bear a great share of new administrative functions was supported by quoting a 1931 precedent and reciting the development of the standing committees from the "sections" of the local soviets of the early twenties.121 The effect of this tendency was, of course, felt most acutely at the lowest levels of government. Tikhomirov noted that between 1958 and 1964 the staffs of the central organs swelled by 60,000 ad­ ministrators, due in large part to "unjustified reorganiza­ tions," and at the expense of the lower soviets.122 Discussing the replacement of paid administrators by elected representa­ tives and the trend toward utilizing volunteer administrators, 119C-C., CPSU, Plenum, 19-23 Noiabrta, 1962 (stenograficheskii otchet) (Moscow: Politicheskaia Literatura, 1963), p. 65. 120 F. I. Kalynichev, "Sovety kak organy gosudarstvennoi vlasti i samye massovye organizatsii trudiashchikhsia" in Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia ν periode razvernutogo stroitel'stva kommunizma (Moscow: Higher Party School and Academy of Social Sciences, Central Committee, CPSU, 1961), pp. 65-66. 121 R. A. Safarov, Territorial'nye deputatskie gruppy mestnykh sovetov (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1962), p. 53. 122 Tikhomirov, Vlast' 1 upravlenie, p. 46. Tikhomirov writes that the total number of administrators grew from 1,294,000 in 1958 to 1,354,000 in 1964—a growth of only 4 percent. He notes, however, that the apparatus on the ail-Union level grew by 26 percent, Union-Republic level by 18 percent and oblast' level by 8 percent while the raion and town soviets lost 13 percent of their staff and the village and settlement soviets (which had virtually no paid staff) dropped by 5 percent.

Participation/Administration—The Soviet Debate

59

Tikhomirov had noted earlier that from 1954 to i 9 6 0 the proportion of administrative workers in the total employed population dropped from 13.8 percent to 8.9 percent, saving an estimated 1.8 billion rubles.123

PARTICIPATION AND ADMINISTRATION— THE SOVIET DEBATE There were, however, different opinions as to what should be the relationship between citizen volunteers and paid adminis­ trators. Four distinct approaches can be discerned, each with its own period of prominence. None of these denies the de­ sirability of mass participation by citizens in the administra­ tion of the state. At no time does any of these appear to have had a total monopoly on discussion or on practice in the local soviets. Though the frankest criticism of the pressures for volunteer administration came some time after Khrushchev's removal, there was searching debate and even direct criticism of Khrushchev's administrative policies while he was still in office.124 123 jurjj ^ Tikhomirov, "Predstavitel'nye organy vlasti i razvitie gosudarstvennogo upravleniia," SGP, no. 2 (February 1962), p. 36η. 124 In September 1964 an article was published by M. I. Piskotin, Β. M. Lazarev, N. G. Salitzev and lu. A. Tikhomirov, "O nauke upravlenii," S G P , no. 9 (September 1964). It was presented as the beginning of a discussion series on the place and problems of administration as a science in Soviet gov­ ernment (p. 15). The article made three main points. It criticized the recent changes in the territorial and administrative structure of the country as in­ sufficiently considered for their effects on administrative functioning (the reference is evidently to Khrushchev's November ig62 split of the Party and the soviets into industrial and agricultural branches). It noted that there are many theoretical questions about administration to be solved before the proper relations between volunteers and professional administrators can be determined (p. 23), and it notes that both interest in, and experimental in­ stitutions for, the development of administration as a science had been squashed in the period of the cult of personality of Stalin (p. 19). The open criticism of Khrushchev's administrative reshuffling is somewhat startling—the journal was approved for printing on August 24th, almost two months before Khrushchev's ouster. Since the new Party structure was one of the first of Khrushchev's measures to be undone after his dismissal, the split of Party and soviet organizations must have been considered an unbearable disorganization. For support of this view see L. G. Churchward, "Soviet Local

60

Participation and Soviet Politics

The four approaches are: (i) Supplanting of the paid ad­ ministrators by so-called non-staff (vne shtatnye) volunteers who, on an unpaid basis, man the administrative departments of the soviets. This approach originated in i960, gained sub­ stantial backing from Khrushchev and his supporters, and was most prominent during 1960-1964, after which it appears to have declined. (2) The assumption by the standing commit­ tees of the soviets of the work of the administrative organs, thus supplanting the paid bureaucracy by elected citizens. This trend, drawing legitimation from the formulations of the Party program, was urged as a variant of the non-staff de­ partments. (3) Professional administrators to be assisted by an aktiv organized around the standing committees and the elected deputies. This idea was generally supported by ad­ ministrators and by scholars involved in administration, but went against the two basic streams of administrative economy and development of the authority of the elected organs of the soviet. (4) Explicit recognition of the need for a professional administration for jobs requiring skill and continuity and the involvement of a large public aktiv in subordinated aspects of administration, together with the recognition of a supervisory rather than an executive role for the standing committees as elected organs. This trend is most prominent since the fall of Khrushchev. The difficulties involved in the supplanting of an entire administrative apparatus by volunteers quickly became ap­ parent and the argument was heard more and more fre­ quently that the paid administrative apparatus should be maintained "for the time being" to facilitate the attraction of the masses into the work of administration with the eventual prospect of administration ceasing to be a distinct profes­ sion.125 Government Today," Soviet Studies, Vol. 17, no. 4 (April 1966), p. 433; and Izvestiia, November ig, 1964, p. 1. See also Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 153-154. 125 Bulletin, no. 13-547 (July 1964), p. 24. Even a book whose ostensible main theme is to chronicle the "tempestuous development of non-staff de­ partments" found it necessary to explain that "the socialist state of all the people . . . remains a state . . . inasmuch as it still must have an administering

Participation/Administration—The Soviet Debate

61

The problem of getting work done through the efforts of volunteers alone was raised in a delicate manner by noting that the attraction of the masses into administration was not yet perfected due to "a contradiction between the character of the state of the entire people and the objectively limited pos­ sibilities of the people to perform direct administrative func­ tions in it."126 More bluntly, it was stated that where non-staff departments existed there might arise a problem of insuffi­ cient consistency and effectiveness of work due to miscalcula­ tion of the organizational capabilities, energy, will, and basic workload of those volunteering.127 The most biting criticism of the wave of enthusiasm for non-staff departments came in a 1967 work where it was stated that these departments had been "a fad" and had been "pushed from above, resulting in formalism." The author notes that "the majority of scholars specializing in state law and the administrative system of the soviets became propagandists for these departments as the basic form of drawing the public into the work of the soviets and as the basic direction for further democratizing the soviets."128 Razin objected to this trend on the grounds that the nonstaff departments are appointed, rather than elected bodies; that they are necessarily under the control of the paid admin­ istration and the executive committees of the soviets; and that, therefore, despite the volunteer nature of the non-staff departments, they do not constitute a democratizing element, as they lack the principle of elective service and responsibility to the public. Razin suggested that the most appropriate framework within which the elected deputies could take on administrative duties would be that of the standing commit­ tees of the soviets. The standing committees are formed on a functional basis parallel to that of the administrative departapparatus made up of people whose primary occupation is administration." N. G. Alexandrov and S. N. Bratus', Razvitie teorii gosudarstva ι prava 22 s'ezdom KPSS (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literature, 1963), pp. 21-22, 77. 126 Tikhomirov, Vlast i upravlenie, p. 36. 127 A. Aimbetov and Μ. T. Baimakhanov, Problemy sovershenstvovaniia organizatsii i deiatel'stva mestnykh sovetov (Alma Ata: Nauka, 1967), p. 182. 128 Razin, Politicheskaia organizatsiia, p. 156.

62

Participation and Soviet Politics

ments, and in Razin's opinion form a natural public auxiliary to the administrators, going beyond simple consultative or auditing functions.129 There is, however, a caveat in Razin's proposition, for he warns explicitly that "it must be remembered that administra­ tion is a science—and no less important than any other. Therefore when we speak of diminution of the apparatus through the drawing of the public into work, we speak of such jobs as do not require serious training."130 The idea that the standing committees should supplant the administrators was for a number of years the interpretation put by certain authors, though not by Razin, on the call to activize the committees. In 1961, R. A. Safarov had stated that the standing committees should become the basic units of administration and the central force in running the various branches of local government. He saw them as gradually re­ placing the administrators and completely taking over all their functions. Specifically, he stated that unpaid volunteers should take the crucial decisions connected with administra­ tive affairs.131 Comparatively little support for Safarov's scheme appeared in Soviet administrative literature. Evi­ dently the standing committees, despite being rooted histori­ cally in the "deputies' sections" of the early twenties, had neither the strength nor the organization to compete with the idea of non-staff departments. Those theorists who looked to the development of the standing committees usually did so from a point of view closer to that of Razin, emphasizing the development of the elected representative organs of the soviet, while deferring the abolition of professional adminis­ tration to a far-off day. An example of the above approach is G. V. Barabashev's suggestion that the standing committees should have an "ad­ vise and consent" right in the staffing of municipally coni2a Ibid., 131

R.

130 Ibid. p. 157. A. Safarov, "Ob osushchestvlenii postoiannymi kommissiiami

funktsii organov upravleniia," in Sovety vperiode, p. 239. In his Raionnye sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsui ν gorodakh (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1961), pp. 105106, 167, the same author sets forth a scheme of gradual transfer of adminis­ trative responsibility from the departments of the soviet to its standing com­ mittees.

Participation/Administration—The Soviet Debate

63

institutions.132

trolled enterprises and Barabashev noted that this had been successfully tried in Novorossisk. In a conversa­ tion in 1969, the chairman of the Kutaisi Soviet standing committee on public works and consumer services indicated to the author that consideration of personnel matters was a major activity of his committee. The problem facing Soviet scholars of public law and gov­ ernment was how to incorporate two disparate and sometimes contradictory streams of development within the ideological framework set by Khrushchev and his supporters. On the one hand there was a striving for maximal development of citizen participation. On the other was the need for more efficient administration to bring the increasing distribution of goods and services to the public. The Party program had introduced the concept of "a state of the entire people," promoting the idea that Lenin's most ambitious hopes for Soviet government and society were about to be realized. To oppose volunteer-staffed administration as ineffective was politically unpalatable. The backing for development of citizen participation and the movement toward elimination of paid administration came from too many and too powerful sources. In addition, we should note that the period from 1957 almost to the end of Khrushchev's rule was one of great ferment and experiment in numerous social and scientific fields. One veteran of the revolution, returning to Leningrad after thirty years of prison and exile, likened the excitement that prevailed among the intelligentsia to that of the summer of 1917.133 After a quarter-century of Stalinist freeze, theo­ rists were once again able to propose the most far-out, seem­ ingly Utopian directions of development. Opening the Soviet political system to new initiatives, and radically restructuring the relations both among various 132 G. V. Barabashev "Razvitie form uchastiia deputatov ν operativno1 ispolnitel'noi organizatorskoi deiatel'nosti mestnykh sovetov," in S. S. Kravchuk (ed.), Voprosy razvitiia sovetov na sovremennom etape (Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1966), pp. 136-137. 133 Maria JofFe, personal interview, Tel Aviv, April 1975. See also Medvedev, Khrushchev, p. ix: "We participated in the hopes and disenchantments . . . enthusiasm and bitterness. . . ."

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Participation and Soviet Politics

groups of officials and between officialdom in all its manifes­ tations and the mass of citizenry, appears to have been one of the fundamentals of Khrushchev's social policy.134 Khrush­ chev, while no democratic liberal, most certainly had a stronger feeling for Lenin's antistate and antibureaucratic elements than did either his predecessor or his successors. He saw mass activism and enthusiasm as keys to the reviving of the revolution, and mass participation as a valuable resource, both economically and politically. Khrushchev had some small measure of success in this pol­ icy. It may be argued that much of the vigor of permitted in­ tellectual discussion after his removal, as well as much of the courage and outspoken frankness of the various latter-day dissent movements, have roots in the expectations generated in these few years when, with the encouragement and protec­ tion of Khrushchev, various institutions began to take their functional prerogatives seriously. Various professionals, most notably writers, economists, sociologists, and biologists, began pressing to be allowed to define their own goals and methods. They thought themselves capable of determining their own contribution to Soviet society without bowing automatically to the hierarchically dispensed dictates of Party and government officials. In the end, however, there was little hope for the success of such pressures without a change of fundamental political and administrative values, a new revolution. No such revolution was forthcoming. Khrushchev's own Stalinist upbringing and his bolshevik impatience would, by themselves, have probably overweighed his popularist policies had these policies sur­ vived long enough to develop roots and branches. But Khrushchev's own limitations were not the only obstacle. There existed as well a host of bureaucratic interests, the basis on which the Soviet state had been developed. These interests were threatened by Khrushchev's new departures and they 134 George W. Breslauer, "Khrushchev Revisited," Problems of Communism, Vol. 25, no. 5 (September-October 1976), pp. 18-33, has provided a discern­ ing and provocative analysis of this aspect of Khrushchev's policies. His in­ sights and conclusions are invaluable as a key to the complexities and con­ tradictions of Khrushchev's view of society and the state.

Participation/Administration—The Soviet Debate

65

could not and would not countenance such innovation. Just as Lenin ended his career frustrated by the survivals of a czarist bureaucratic ethos in the Soviet administration, so Khrush­ chev found himself hobbled and ultimately ousted by the well-entrenched administrative elite that had grown up in Sta­ lin's years. Under Brezhnev and Kosygin a new balance was found, incorporating both the participation of mass citizenry and control by the professional administrators. As we have noted, agitation for just such a synthesis was maintained even throughout the heyday of Khrushchevian voluntarism. Fol­ lowing Khrushchev's removal it became the dominant organi­ zational trend. It is thus not the extent of citizen participation that differentiates between the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, but the institutional framework within which participa­ tion takes place. The radical restructuring of authority relationships, which George Breslauer discerns as the essence of Khrushchev's policy, has been replaced by a much milder attenuation of officialdom's prerogatives. The Brezhnev regime abandoned Khrushchev's assumption that the Leninist millennium was close at hand and that in a broad range of societal affairs per­ suasion and internalized habit could be relied on in place of compulsion and administrative control. While Khrushchev's concepts may be far more attractive to outside observers of the Soviet polity (not necessarily, however, to Soviet citizens themselves), Brezhnev's policies are probably more relevant to current Soviet needs and development. The idea that broader participation by citizens in the work­ ings of government did not necessarily mean a diminution of the professional administrative apparatus was strongly stated in 1962 by Professor Iurii M. Kozlov.135 A review of his book about a year after its publication emphasized this portion of his argument, pointing it out as particularly important in view of the fact that "opinions had been expressed" to the effect that strengthening the role of the soviets meant diminishing 135 I ur Ji M. Kozlov, Leninshii printsip uchastiia trudiashchikhsia ν sovetshom

gosudarstvennom upravlenii (Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1962), p p . 18-40.

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Participation and Soviet Politics

the role of the paid apparatus.136 In other writings, Kozlov presents public administration as a complex and specialized skill and applies the orthodox Leninist yardstick that "the functions of the state administration have not yet been trans­ formed into such simple operations of accounting and control as would be within the capacities of the overwhelming major­ ity of the population."137 The formulation "not yet," implying that administration may yet become the sphere of every citizen in his leisure time, faded gradually and was replaced by a more accentuated affirmation of the skills of administration and the need for a permanent administrative apparatus. Writing in 1966, Kozlov not only focuses on the limited administrative capabilities of volunteers but also uses the Party program to make the point that the state apparatus will continue to exist until Com­ munism is fully realized, and will be an important mechanism in the achievement of this goal.138 The coexistence between professional administration and mass participation has been the mainstream of development in recent years, with the emphasis on the development of the long-neglected science of administration.139 Indicative of the change is the devotion of an entire section in the most recent edition of the basic textbook for Soviet students of local gov­ ernment to "Scientific organization of administrative work," a subject unmentioned even as recently as in the 1967 edi­ tion.140 As Barabashev comments in another work: "The strengthening of volunteer elements in the system and activΒ. M. Lazarev, review ο{ibid. ,SGP, no. 9 (September 1963), p. 150. Iurii M. Kozlov, "Nekotorye voprosy gosudarstvennogo upravleniia ν usloviiakh sotsialisticheskogo obshchenarodnogo gosudarstva," SGP, no. 1 (January 1963), p. 59. 138 Kozlov, Sootnoshente, pp. 3, 7off. 139 It does not appear logically necessary that the intense interest in admin­ istration shown by the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime should cause a diminution in either the scope or quality of participation. The whole argument discussed by Hough, "Political Participation," pp. 3-4, and passim, seems very much be­ side the point. As noted above, Breslauer's focus on the restructuring of polit­ ical relations is the central point. 140 See G. V. Barabashev and K. F. Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literature, 1974), pp. 83-go. Cf. Vasil'ev, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo. 136

137

Participation/Administration—The Soviet Debate

67

ity of the executive organs of local soviets does not do away with the necessity of providing the soviets with better qual­ ified economists, planners . . . and other specialists. . . . The work of district and urban soviets is built on the principles of socialist democracy and the scientific demands of effective leadership."141 While the idea of full Communist public self-government is maintained as a goal, even this is tempered by some authors. They envision equal, active participation of all citizens in ad­ ministration on an elective, rotating basis, but suggest that economic and production administration will be more profes­ sionalized, more stable, less frequently elected and rotated, than will social administration. Administration will remain the basic occupation for some, who will take on additional so­ cial obligations over and above their daily tasks.142 For the present, the soviets are said to be strengthening their state na­ ture and governmental functions, since, in Soviet political sci­ ence, "the false impression that the soviets are already prima­ rily social organizations, has been overcome."143 As for the vision of the mature form of Communist public self-govern­ ment, the above authors suggest that it will be more fruitful to concentrate on the intermediate stages of administrative de­ velopment, "as Lenin particularly insisted," focusing on the next ten to twenty years.144 Are Barabashev and Sheremet perhaps engaging here in Aesopian communication? Their invocation of Lenin, coupled with the focus on the next ten or twenty years recalls Lenin's essay "On Cooperation,"145 written in 1923 when he was painfully aware of the gap between his revolutionary dream and Soviet realities. In that essay Lenin discusses how 141 G. V. Barabashev, Raionnyi, gorodskoisovet nasovremennom etape (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura1 1975), pp. 99-100. For a survey of this develop­ ment see Robert F. Miller, "The New Science of Administration in the USSR," Administrative Science (Quarterly (September 1971), pp. 247-257. 142 A. K. Belykh, Upravhnie t samoupravlenie (Leningrad: Nauka, 1972), p. 122. 143 G. V. Barabashev and K. F. Sheremet, "Razvitie sovetov i zadachi nauki," SDT, no. 8 (August 1975), p. 11. 144Ibid., p. 13. 145 Lenin, Works, Vol. 33, pp. 427-435.

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Participation and Soviet Politics

to draw the whole peasant population into active participation in cooperatives as a first step toward socialism. To succeed in this, writes Lenin, will mean a veritable revo­ lution, and may take one or two decades, which will constitute "an entire historical epoch." The prerequisites of literacy, efficiency, habits of reading, and economic development, are reminiscent of the cultural and social conditions Lenin enu­ merates in "State and Revolution." The tasks Lenin posed for the twenties and thirties, reorganizing the machinery of state and educating the peasants (read: the Soviet population) to a cooperative participatory culture, are the same he considered as having been virtually achieved in 1917, but which caused such active soul-searching among Soviet scholars throughout the sixties and into the seventies. The mainstream of reform in the local soviets has thus veered away from abolition of the paid administrative ap­ paratus with transfer of its functions to the deputies or the supplanting of the paid apparatus by volunteers, although both of the latter continue to some extent. Local government is now being strengthened through development of the capabilities of its administrators. Meanwhile broader compe­ tence and more effective activity are encouraged among elected deputies and the populace is persistently mobilized in support of both representatives and administrators. The practical pressures for such a solution were many. Government activities covered new fields and grew in quan­ titative terms as welfare and cultural programs were widened and consumer interests were given more consideration. For­ merly simple government units became more complex. The consolidation of remote populated points into single village administrative units in which people may live 10 or 12 kilome­ ters from the offices of the soviet, and the concentration of many administrative functions in the even more remote raion centers are two trends that have affected millions of Soviet citizens within the last two decades. The growth of cities and the need to meet the complexities of new urban social prob­ lems was cited in a lecture to law students at Moscow Univer­ sity as one of the bases for the development of more complex,

Participation/Administration—The Soviet Debate

69

varied and, hopefully, more effective frameworks for the work of deputies.146 The framework within which Soviet citizens participate in their government's activities has thus changed over the past twenty years and a new variety of legitimate forms of citizen activity has grown up. The development of the representative organs of the soviets stimulates an interest in analyzing changes in the framework and institutions of electoral poli­ tics. The growing field of public participation in administra­ tion, whether through the deputies' frameworks and their aktiv or as auxiliaries to the paid administrators provides abundant material for the observation of politics and gov­ ernment in Soviet Russia. Politics are taken here as meaning the process of determin­ ing allocations, sanctions, and procedures. Government, al­ lied to politics, but not identical with it, is considered here in terms of the implementation of political decisions. In the USSR, the Communist Party—and specifically its topmost bodies—enjoy a recognized monopoly on the political func­ tions of society. The government bodies—the soviets— though constitutionally the supreme organs of state power, clearly follow the lead of the Party, and implement policy rather than make it. However, the process of politics is such that policy deter­ mination and implementation are, in fact, inseparable. The executor of a decree often wittingly or unwittingly makes, dis­ torts, or subverts policy. In any complex unit the policy­ making process must necessarily be influenced by the im­ plementation of policy and the feedback received from sub­ ordinate units. Institutions with political forms, constantly exhorted to be active in the solution of their own problems, may, at a time of change or in the face of recurrent frustra146 K. F. Sheremet, lectures on local government, Moscow State University, October ig6g-January 1970. Vasil'ev, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, p. 302, supports this with the comment that because raion administrative staffs are small and the activities of the departments have been growing, volunteers, directed by the paid administrators, become a vital link between citizens and administra­ tion.

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tion, like the Golem of Prague, surprise their makers by proving to have unsuspected qualities and strength. Having reviewed the extensive debates on the subject of state structure and citizen participation, we now have a back­ ground against which to examine the citizen's direct role in representation and administration.

Chapter 2

The Soviet Electoral System FREQUENCY AND SALIENCY OF ELECTIONS Election of his representatives by the citizen has emerged as an almost universal form of participation in the modern world. Rare are the states that do not have some level of elected officials, no matter how authoritarian their political systems may be. It is the one sphere of political activity in which each individual can be truly equal—and in secret elec­ tions it is an "irresponsible" activity in that no sanction can be invoked against the voter, whether the vote is for or against any given candidate.1 The present hierarchy of elected soviets, from the bicam­ eral Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the most remote village council, encompasses over 50,000 units of government with more than 2,200,000 elected deputies. The deputies are elected on the basis of universal and equal suffrage from the age of eighteen, in secret, direct balloting. The present system was established with the adoption of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR, replacing a system of indirect election in which vot1 Cf. Rokkan in Ranney, Essays, p. 67. Maintaining the "irresponsible" na­ ture of the elections has, as we will attempt to show later, an important politi­ cal function—that of revealing independently cases of intolerable inefficiency by local officials. It is therefore doubtful that there is a basis for Everett Jacobs' comment that "voting against a candidate is made to seem an antiso­ cial, almost treasonous act." (Everett Jacobs, "What Soviet Elections Are and What They Are Not," Soviet Studies, Vol. 22, no. 4 [July 1970], p. 62.) Emi­ grants interviewed gave no evidence of pressure to prevent negative votes. See also a Soviet official's comment in Max E. Mote, Soviet Local and Republic

Elections (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1965), p. 81.

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The Soviet Electoral System

ing was based primarily on place of work and suffrage rights were limited by social origin or present or past occupation.2 The electoral arena provides the most massive and varied opportunities of participation, and in effect is structured to embrace the whole of adult society. Whether as candidates, campaigners, election officials, or simple voters, the elections engage the Soviet citizen in legitimizing the regime, demon­ strating the unanimous harmony of the society (exemplified by the electoral bloc of "Communists and non-Party People"). The elections are not presented as a possible redistribution of power, but as an affirmation of the existing power. The nominations, the campaigning, and the voting serve as an intensified period of recruitment into participation. They are also a time of intensified socialization and organized in­ formation exchange on a mass basis. For many of the candi­ dates the elections will be the start of a lengthy period of sus­ tained political activity, recruitment into an inner circle. For election commissioners and campaigners it may be an episodic involvement, part of a recurring pattern of participa­ tion. For the mass of voters uninvolved in the machinery of eleccions, the period will be one of intensification of political stimuli in what is in any case an intensely political environ­ ment. For them, the one unique moment in local elections is the solicitation by the regime of organized demands from the public in the form of voters' mandates. In accordance with the Constitution adopted in October 1977, the Supreme Soviet is elected every five years, as are the supreme soviets of the fifteen Union republics and twenty au­ tonomous republics. In addition, the remaining soviets, classed as local soviets,3 are now to be elected every two and a 2 See Chapter 13, Articles 95-101 of the Constitution of the USSR for basic electoral principles. Article 65 of the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1918 de­ fined those who were deprived of the right to vote or to be elected. A. I. Lepeshkin, Sovety-vlast' naroda: 1936-196J (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1967), Chapter 1, describes the pre-igg6 system and the transition to the present system. Although now outdated in many respects, George B. Carson, Jr., Electoral Practices in the USSR (New York: Praeger, 1955) is useful as a survey of the development of the Soviet electoral system. 3 The term local soviets is used throughout this work in the sense in which Soviet scholars use it; i.e., soviets serving a krai, oblast', raion, gorod, raion ν

Frequency and Saliency of Elections

73

half years. This will result in three separate election cam­ paigns within a twelve-month period: mid-1979, elections for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; December 1979, elections to the local soviets: and mid-1980, elections to the supreme soviets of the Union republics and autonomous republics. After this will come a four-year hiatus, broken in the middle by elections of the local soviets (due June 1982) and once again three election campaigns between June 1984 and June 1985, and so on.5 Even with such bursts of intense electioneering the Soviet Union cannot be considered an election-centered system. The election campaigns have hitherto been relatively brief, two to two and a half months in all, and the elections attract little at­ tention outside this period. The elections are clearly less sa­ lient than is a Communist Party Congress, which may serve as a point of reference in innumerable speeches and publica­ tions for the entire period between congresses. It may be suggested that local elections do not rank high on the scale of political priorities. When the 24th Party Congress was postponed by a year from March 1970 to March 1971, the elections for the local soviets, which had taken place in March every odd-numbered year since 1957, were put off to June 4

gorode, selo orposelok. The translations used for the soviet administrative units are as follows: krai "territory"; oblast' "region"; raion "district or rural district"; gorod "city or town"; raion ν gorode "urban district"; selo "village"; poselok "set­ tlement." 4 See Article go of the new Soviet Constitution. 5 Under the constitution in force 1936-1977 the Supreme Soviets were elected every four years and local soviets every two years. This made three of each four years an election year. A law of the Supreme Soviet on implementa­ tion of the new constitution extended the terms of the current supreme and local soviets to conform with the new practice. The resulting recurring bunching of three election campaigns in one twelve-month period appears awkward unless the intention is to hold what will literally be an "election year." Moreover, while extension of the term of the Supreme Soviet to five years is consistent with the staging of events around the advent of each new Five Year Plan (as was done by rescheduling the Party Congresses), the tim­ ing here is wrong and elections are scheduled the year before the next and subsequent Party Congresses approve new development plans. Some read­ justment of election schedules may be expected. The holding of the Supreme Soviet elections in March 1979, instead of June, may be the first step.

74

The Soviet Electoral System

1971 without advance notice or discussion. The announce­ ment that elections were due simply did not appear in Janu­ ary 1971 as expected, but in late March, naming June 13, 1971, as election day.® In similar fashion, the first elections to local soviets after World War II were not held until December 1947, two and a half years after the cessation of hostilities. No local elections had been held during the war, the last pre­ vious local elections having been in December 1939. A study of the newspaper coverage given to local elections supports this impression. A Party Congress will oust them from the front page, and on one occasion news coverage of International Women's Day (which fell a week before the elections) reduced their allotted space to six column inches, about 1 percent of the newspaper's contents and about oneninth of the average election coverage.7 It would be wrong, however, to conclude from the above that the elections are devoid of political significance or political functions. As we will show, both the intended and unintended political phe­ nomena that appear at election time are revealing of the inner structure and functioning of the Soviet political system, and there is much to be learned about Soviet political life from a study of the behavior of election activists, apathetics, and dissenters. When competition does not affect them, the elections are given considerable saliency. Election preparations, candidate biographies, and nominations from all corners of the USSR are given national coverage. It is assumed that the production achievements of an outstanding tractor driver nominated to a village soviet in Siberia are of interest and importance to all Soviet citizens, and not only to his own constituents. The space devoted to elections is prime space as well. During the closing weeks of the campaign it is not only the front page of 6 The announcement of elections in the RSFSR simply noted that elections for the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the local soviets would take place June 13, 1971, in connection with the expiry of their mandate. See Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, no. 11 (649), March 13, 1971, p. 155. To the best of my knowledge there was no action to prolong the local soviets' term to cover the months March-June. 7 See Izvestiia, March 8, 1969.

Frequency and Saliency of Elections

75

Izvestiia but the top half of the front page in which election news is featured, and the equivalent of a full page will be de­ voted to slogans and last-minute details on voting day. A. H. Birch, studying participation in elections in England and Wales, noted that the two most prominent newspapers in Great Britain devoted only 6 percent of their news space—a total of 1,600 column inches—in each paper, to the elections in 1955. In comparison, Izvestiia in 1975 devoted 5,455 col­ umn inches—over 9 percent of its total space—to the elections for the republic supreme soviets and local soviets.8 During the last two weeks of the campaign, election-oriented items oc­ cupied nearly one-quarter of Izvestiia's space. As to the importance of the elections in the eyes of Soviet citizens, little or no material appears in Soviet writings. The author encountered a number of citizens in Moscow who, de­ spite having little or no acquaintance with him, ventured to express discontent about the electoral system. An emigrant sociologist claims that an unpublished study of the opinions of workers in a Moscow auto plant revealed that 18 percent were dissatisfied with the existing system of elections.9 Among emigrants interviewed, none has as yet expressed any positive opinion of the electoral system, and more than any other participatory institution it appears to evoke sentiments ranging from skepticism to contempt.10 The principal reasons for this attitude appear to be dislike of the lack of choice in elections and a disbelief in the honesty of the electoral process. In view of the unrelenting pressure for unanimous participation in the elections, the result is either cynicism expressed in formal compliance devoid of content, or avoidance in some form that does not bring sanc8 A. H. Birch, "Political Participation in England and Wales ,"International Social Science Journal, Vol. 12 (i960), p. 18. In 1969, Izvestiia's coverage of the local elections was 1,770 column inches, 9 percent of its total space. 9 Ilya Zemtsov, "I.K.S.I.: the Moscow Institute of Applied Social Research" (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Soviet and East European Research Centre, Soviet Institution Series, paper no. 6 1976), p. 52. 10 Zvi Gitelman, "Values, Opinions and Attitudes of Soviet Jewish Emigres," paper delivered at the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Atlanta, Georgia, October 9-11, 1975, p. 25, reports that half of his interviewees regarded the elections as meaningless.

76

The Soviet Electoral System

tions or opprobrium onto the individual. In either case, the citizens' action is dysfunctional in terms of the goal of promot­ ing socialization and legitimation, as well as in respect to the testing of the regime's mobilizing capacities. Only rarely do such negative attitudes emerge in the open. When they do, it is generally a matter of planned protest by declared dissidents, or a near-desperate protest over difficult local conditions. As far as possible, the Soviet authorities remove any competitive or conflictual elements from the elections. Neither policies nor candidates come into open competition. Policies are determined elsewhere, in Politburo or Central Committee sessions, and are only affirmed and cel­ ebrated in the elections. Politicians run uncontested in single-member constituencies.11 The aim of the Soviet authorities is to present a picture of harmonious participation in the system, with a unanimous striving toward its perfection. In this they are largely success­ ful, for the reported election turnouts have reached 99.98 percent participation; in 1975 only 3 out of 2,210,932 elec­ toral districts had to rerun their elections for lack of participa­ tion or other violations of the electoral law, and only 68 candidates failed to receive the absolute majority needed for election.12 Only on an inter-systemic level does any element of conflict or competition appear. It can be suggested that the nonCommunist world serves as a rival candidate in absentia in the Soviet elections, for each election campaign evokes, along with praise of the Soviet Union's economic and social striv­ ings, repeated critical reports attacking the elections in the United States and Western European countries.13 11 Although the uncontested candidacy has been an inviolate practice in the whole period studied, Soviet authors writing for foreign readers em­ phasize that the electoral law does not forbid multiple candidacies and some­ times imply misleadingly that such multiple candidacies actually exist. See Vitali Latov, The Soviet Electoral System (Moscow: Novosti, 1974), pp. 52, 62; and G- Melikyants,Elected by the People (Moscow: Novosti, 1 9 7 5 ) , p. 4 3 . 12 SDT no. 8 (August 1 9 7 5 ) , pp. 2 2 - 2 3 . t 13See, as examples, articles in Izvestiia, March 11 and 1 2 , 1 9 6 7 ; V. K. Grigor ev, Vybory ν mestnye sovety deputatov triidiashchikhsia (Moscow: Izvestiia, 1 • PP- 9"IO> ^ Krutogoiov, Anti-demokraticheskaia sushchnost' burzhuaznykh vyborov (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1 9 6 3 ) .

Electiop Commissions

77

By their participation, and regardless of their level of activ­ ity or support for any particular local candidate, Soviet citi­ zens give legitimation to their regime, ostensibly affirming its superiority to alternative systems. The fact that the over­ whelming majority is successfully rallied to such activity serves to isolate and discredit the few dissidents who attempt to express a dissenting view. In addition to being part of the electorate, which embraces the entire population over the age of eighteen except for in­ carcerated convicts and those declared legally insane, large numbers of people are also involved in election activities sup­ portive of the system as members of bodies connected with the machinery of nomination and election, while still others are activists on behalf of particular candidates. The elections bring the policies of the government into direct contact with the citizen in his home. During the elections the agitprop mechanism works as at no other time to see that every citizen is spoken to and heard from. The local elections serve to test the ability of the apparatus to mobilize the population's sup­ port without the use of open coercion, and in the final analysis they provide the disgruntled citizen with a legitimate, if symbolic (for only about ι candidate in 30,000 is defeated at the polls) form of protest against inefficient government by letting him strike out the name of the single candidate offered him on the ballot. The totaling of votes, and holding of reruns where candi­ dates are defeated or elections declared invalid, are, however, only the last step in the election process and we have yet to note the part the citizens play in the preparation of the elec­ tion machinery, the nomination process, and the election campaign.

ELECTION COMMISSIONS The formation of the election commissions is provided for in each republic's electoral law. Election commissions are formed for each territorial unit, that is, for each soviet to be elected. There are also election commissions in each con­ stituency (izbiratel'nyi okrug), and in each polling precinct (izbiratel'nyi uchastok). The only exception to this is where a

78

The Soviet Electoral System

village soviet has a territory with a population of less than ι ,000. In such a case, the precinct commissions formed within the territory of the soviet fulfill the duties of the constituency commissions.14 Each of these commissions has specific duties assigned to it: the soviet commissions and the constituency commissions prepare the elections and registration of candi­ dates, and the precinct commissions supervise the electoral rolls, the balloting, and the tallying of votes. As the system of soviets has grown, so have the numbers of election commis­ sions: in 1975 they numbered some 2,260,000 and involved 9,261,423 citizens.15 The commissioners are elected as the candidates of profes­ sional organizations, institutions of learning, party groups, or workers' collectives. Their elections, although open rather than secret, have many of the features of deputy election. In­ deed, in announcing the election of commissioners the press uses much the same terms that it will use later about the depu­ ties: "The people put their trust in those who are worthy." As will be done later with the elected deputies, the social compo­ sition of the electoral commissions is given some promi­ nence—in particular the fact that workers and kolkhoz mem­ bers chair many of the commissions and that a majority of commissioners are non-Party people.16 The message presented is that the people themselves are running the elections. All the commissioners perform their duties without remuneration, and in addition to their regular work. The sole exceptions are the chairmen of the voting pre­ cinct (uchastok) commissions, who are freed from their place of work for two weeks before the elections to concentrate on their duties in the electoral preparations.17 14 Grigor'ev, Vybory, p. 33. Cf. Partiinaia zhizn', no. 9 (May 1 9 7 3 ) , p. 13. This arrangement dates from 1967 and is an attempt to produce efficient adminis­ tration of the elections under the conditions of scattered and remote popu­ lated points in the rural sector. 15

SDT, no. 8 (August 1975), p. 19. Izvestiia, June 8, 1975, p. t. 17 Grigor'ev, Vybory, p. 30. Also Polozhenie 0 vyborakh ν kraevye, oblastnye, okruzhnye, raionnye, gorodskte, sel'skie, poselkovye sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia RSFSR (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1968), article 75. The chairman receives his usual wage from his place of work during this period. 16

Election Commissions

79

The following is perhaps typical of an election commission in its work. This was the Leningrad Oblast' Soviet election commission in 1969. The chairman, V. I. Smirnov, was rector of a polytechnical institute; the members were a metal worker, a house painter, an entertainer, a Communist Party employee who served as commission secretary, a factory worker, and two other unspecified persons. At the first meet­ ing the chairman explained the statutory basis of the commis­ sion and its duties. Members of the local soviet reported to the committee on arrangements underway for the elections, pro­ vision for polling places and telephones, printing of ballots, and preparation of voters' lists. The chairman then presented the commission with a work plan, and a schedule of meetings was decided on. This scene, multiplied 2 million times, ex­ presses the function of 9 million election commissioners. They are involved in what is essentially civic service; they are good citizens who are acting as nonpartisan protagonists of the system. This extends right down to the level of individual polling precincts. In a multi-party system, the scrutineers at the polls are par­ tisans, overseeing fair play on behalf of their respective par­ ties as part of the entire system of competition. In the Soviet Union, where the idea of factional competition of views has been rejected, the role of the election committees in all phases of their work reflects a public and nonpartisan character. The Communist Party plays only a small visible role in the naming of the election commissions, though under the law Party groups may nominate commissioners. However, the percentage of commissioners who are Party members has been rising slowly but consistently: from 2 7 . 4 percent in 1 9 6 1 to 35.6 percent in 1975.18 Although the change is small, its consistency, coupled with the constantly repeated exhortation to promote the effectiveness and probity of the election ma­ chinery, is an indication to the commissioners that their duties in preparing the elections are not to be taken lightly. The election commissions and the executive committees of the soviets, charged with implementation of technical prepara18

Itogi (1961), p. 113; andSDT, no. 8 (August 1975). p. 20.

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The Soviet Electoral System

tions for the elections, are warned that the elections are a serious test. "Here there are no unimportant trifles. Every­ thing is important."19 In particular, updating the electoral rolls is of some impor­ tance, as is the correct formation of the constituencies. The press gives considerable coverage to these activities and to the importance of the election commission catching errors in their preparation.20 The activity of the election commissions also gives citizens a chance to object to inclusion of ineligible persons on the voting lists and to the dropping of eligible vot­ ers, providing the possibility of complaints to the election commission as well as to the local soviet. Thus, should an offi­ cial be tempted to pad the rolls to overcome ill feeling that might work against him in the elections, the citizen has an op­ portunity to expose his wrongdoing. This is one additional safeguard to making the elections a more stringent test of the local authorities. The election commissions are therefore a tool to activate some millions of citizens in support of the honesty and legiti­ macy of the system. They identify prominent citizens with the regime and the election system with the interests of the citi­ zen, providing a basis for the theme of integrity, unity, and harmony so prominent in the election campaign. At the same time they are a control mechanism to see that this unity is not violated by the local authorities for any preventable cause. Nine million citizens are drawn into cooperative activity on behalf of the community. Elected by their peers, they repre­ sent citizen sovereignty and the ostensible primacy of legality in the elections. As such, they are a powerful symbol of effi­ cacy, of the citizen's control of his political system. The citi­ zen's investment in such participation is a moderate amount of free time over a brief period. The dimensions of his coop­ eration in the election commissions are such as to require little or no initiative and they involve virtually no conflict. Al­ though the assignment may be to a local election commission, 19

Izvestiia, March 20, 1975. Izvestiia, February 27, 1965, lauds an election commission which discov­ ered that a local executive committee had inadvertently formed constituen­ cies on the basis of the number of registered voters rather than, as specified by law, on the basis of general population. The constituencies were redrawn. 20

Nomination Process

81

the results of the citizen's service are projected by the press onto the workings of the entire system.

NOMINATION PROCESS Nomination is, in effect, the decisive phase of elections in the Soviet Union, much as the party primary used to be in certain elections in what was once known as "the solid South" in the United States. Soviet authors acknowledge the centrality of the nomination process in the election system and note that it determines the quality of the deputies and to a considerable extent the future effectiveness of the representative organs of the soviets.21 In the light of this situation, the nature and qual­ ity of participation in the nomination process takes on some importance. At a later stage we will have to attempt to under­ stand what political significance remains in the act of balloting if the election is, in effect, decided at nomination time. The role of the Communist Party is of considerable inter­ est. The Party controls the nomination proceedings as it does every phase of the political process, yet—in the same manner as we noted regarding the election commissions—the Party rarely nominates directly. In the Supreme Soviet and at the republic level it has been the custom to nominate major figures from the Party leadership in a number of districts—as a gesture of honor and an index of their political standing. This occurs despite the knowledge that by law a candidate may stand in only one district for any one soviet. The leaders thus honored then publish a statement in the central press organs thanking their nominators and announcing that they will accept the suggestion of the Central Committee of the CPSU as to the one constituency in which each will stand as candidate.22 21 Papidze Razvitie, p. 53, or the statement of the chairman of the Central 1 Election Commission of the RSFSR calling the nominations the "most re­ sponsible phase of the election campaign." Izvestiia, January 22, 1967. 22 See Jzvestiia, April 25 and 26, 1975, for the nominations and ibid., May i3> '975' f°r t^le leaders' letters. Starting "We members of the Central Com­ mittee of the CPSU," the letter, signed by the 25 members and candidate members of the Politburo and secretaries of the C.C., concludes: "As we can

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The Soviet Electoral System

These symbolic nominations are part of the legitimizing process in which the heads of the Party are accepted publicly as leaders of the entire society, a reassurance aimed at both leaders and citizens. The nominations also establish the peck­ ing order of the leadership for all to see and note. In the 1975 elections Brezhnev received thirty nominations, including at least one from each of the fifteen Union republics. Podgornyi and Kosygin, the other members of the leading triumvirate at the time, received fifteen nominations each and each was of­ fered a seat by ten republics.23 Suslov and Kirilenko were of­ fered five places each, the remaining Politburo members three places each, and the candidates and secretaries one nomination each. Among those with equal numbers of nomi­ nations, the industrial and geographic importance of the con­ stituency may give some indication of the candidate's relative standing in the ruling bodies. The arrangements for such honorary nominations are clearly determined within the apparatus of the Central Committee in Moscow. More complex, and of greater interest as far as the study of participation is concerned, are the "or­ dinary" nominations of the more than 2 million deputies. The law gives the right of nomination to any legally constituted public organization, such as trade unions, Communist Party groups, military units, and workers' collectives, but actual nomination is today carried on exclusively at general meet­ ings of work collectives. But which of the many collectives in a constituency will be the nominators? In fact, the Communist Party apportions the right to nominate among the various en­ terprises and institutions on the territory of each soviet. Mosonly be candidates in one election district, the Central Committee of the CPSU recommended to us that we agree to the following." There follows a list of election districts. See Izvestiia, May 12, 1971, for the same letter in an earlier campaign. 23 Each of the two was offered seats in each of the five largest republics: RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. In addition, Kosygin was nominated in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Kirghizia, and Estonia,

while Podgornyi took the remaining five: Moldavia, Latvia, Tadzhikistan, Armenia, and Turkmenistan (Omnia Rossiia in partes tres dixnsa est\). Pravda, January 4, 1974, p. 3, tells how Lenin was elected chairman of a village soviet in 1923.

Nomination Process

85

cow University, for instance, had in 1970 an allotment of seventeen deputies from the city Party committee for depu­ ties to the Moscow City and Urban District Soviets. Within the university, the university Party committee assigned the right to nominate among the various university divisions. One can­ didate might be assigned to the rectorate, one to graduate students, two to the food handlers, and so forth. Nomination meetings are held at the most convenient pos­ sible times, during lunch hour, or at the change of shifts in an industrial plant, to assure the largest possible participation. Thus, the candidate can appear as the candidate of society as a whole, emphasizing the absence of any opposition. Indeed, this is the designation given all candidates, for they run as representatives of the "Bloc of Communists and non-party people." Many of the 2 million candidates are not subject to discus­ sion or bargaining because the office they occupy will entitle them to a place in a local soviet. Thus, certain Party officials, heads of large industrial plants and heads of important cul­ tural and educational institutions, are almost sure to be ex officio deputies in a local soviet. The percentage of positions ascribed ex officio rises with the level of soviets and is approxi­ mately 25 percent in an oblast' soviet and perhaps as high as 85-90 percent in the USSR Supreme Soviet.24 This practice is solidly entrenched and can facilitate com­ munication within the hierarchical structure of soviets or or­ ganization of activities in such contexts as the Soviet devel­ opment towns. Nevertheless, overemphasis of ascription has been explicitly attacked as prejudicing the participation of workers and kolkhoz members directly engaged in produc­ tion.25 An additional negative aspect of overzealous ascription of deputy status is exemplified by the case of a new director of an institution who declined nomination as a deputy because he was fully occupied learning his new responsibilities, but 24 The figure for the oblast' soviet was derived from a study of nominations to the Leningrad oblast' soviet from 1965 to 1971. The figure given for the USSR Supreme Soviet was suggested in discussions with colleagues at Co­ lumbia University. 25 C.C., CPSU, "Ob uluchshenii. . . ," Spravochnik (1957), P- 457·

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The Soviet Electoral System

was pressed to accept since "the director of this institute has always been a deputy."26 Despite these attacks, inclusion of official notables as deputies does not appear to be slackening. Inclusion of the leading economic notables of any adminis­ trative unit in that unit's soviet and in its executive committee appears natural, given the emphasis on plan fulfillment in the soviets' work. The statistical summaries for Oktiabr' District in Moscow and for the Kutaisi City Soviet showed that of 300 deputies in each, there were respectively 37 and 29 persons who were listed as "directors and specialists in enterprises or trusts." In the village soviets of the USSR in 1971, 43,064 chairmen and deputy chairmen of kolkhozy were elected rep­ resentatives, while there were only 32,800 kolkhozy in exist­ ence at the end of 1971.27 Even with the ascription of many deputies' positions, there remains a substantial body of candidates to be screened for nomination to the local soviets. Each of these candidates will be formally nominated at a general meeting at some place of work. A candidate cannot propose his own nomination, nor can an ad hoc group of friends propose a candidate. By custom in recent years all nominations have been made in the name of the general meeting of an institution or factory, emphasizing the participation of an entire social unit in the nomination of each deputy. However, long before the general meeting, a series of con­ sultations will have taken place regarding the candidate who is to be nominated. The 1957 Central Committee resolution on the local soviets instructed all Party officials to discuss pro­ spective candidates thoroughly with the trade unions and other organizations before the general nomination meeting.28 In the Soviet equivalent of the "smoke-filled rooms" of an American political convention, possible candidacies are worked out, keeping in mind criteria that we will discuss at a 26 Bezuglov, Deputatu, p. 17, and Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 131, both dis­ cuss this incident. 21 Itogi (1971), p. 162. The number of kolkhozy is from Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR, 1922-1972 (Moscow; Stahstika, J 972), p. 263. 28 C.C., CPSU, "Ob uluchshenii . . . ," SpravochnA (1957), p. 457·

Nomination Process

85

later point. One Soviet scholar emphasizes that following the 1957 reforms, the custom of sounding-out general public opinion in the various shops, brigades, and departments of the nominating body was instituted, thus giving the rankand-file workers the right of consultative participation in the preliminary discussions.29 From what can be learned through discussions with former Soviet citizens, such preliminary dis­ cussions are intended mainly to mobilize support, but do give a chance for widespread dissatisfaction with a particular can­ didate to be expressed privately rather than at a public meet­ ing. The evident object of this nomination procedure is to main­ tain the image of social unanimity around which the whole election system is built. Consensus is to be built discreetly, through individual consultations, and the public announce­ ment of nomination can then be given the authority of the en­ tire collective. To give the nominations the cachet of universal community approval, the candidacies endorsed by any par­ ticular collective are brought before mass meetings through­ out the constituency for approval of the general body of citizens, and with this constituency-wide approval, the candi­ date's name is registered with the electoral commissions. Pre­ cisely how well this control works is largely a matter of specu­ lation though, like the election system as a whole, it is certainly generally effective. Simply a combination of the nonsalience of politics to most people (whatever the intensity of political stimuli received), combined with a realistic ap­ preciation of the control exercised by the Communist Party, should assure the smooth running of the majority of nomina­ tion meetings. There has been, however, little direct observa­ tion by foreigners of these meetings. Most official Soviet de­ scriptions dwell on the unanimity shown, even though they also emphasize the thorough discussion that is supposed to take place, positing the thorough discussion as a prerequisite of ultimate unanimity.30 Max Mote, reporting contacts with Soviet officials, and L. G. Churchward, reporting as a result of 29 V. F. Kotok, Sovetskaia predstavitel'naia sistema (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, !963)· P- 36· 30Ibid., p. 38.

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The Soviet Electoral System

both observation and discussion, both emphasize the formal—indeed ritualistic—nature of nomination meetings that reveals Communist Party control of candidate selec­ tion.31 While indications are that public unanimity is virtually in­ violable regarding nominations to higher soviets, this is not necessarily so on the lower level.32 The phenomenon of gen­ eral meetings rejecting a proposed candidate for a local soviet and nominating a different person is not unknown. Only one reference has been found, however, as to the frequency of such rejections in the Soviet Union as a whole. Grigor'ev states that there were 2,000 such cases in the 1965 elections.33 This, of course, means that such rejections occur about once per thousand. Even so, this is more than ten times the rate of defeats in the 1965 elections, when only 187 candidates failed to receive a majority.34 Other sources refer to rejection of proposed nominees as occuring "frequently"35 or in "not a few cases,"36 but without more specific definition of the order of magnitude involved. The interest that this phenomenon holds for our study is its indication of an unrealized potential in the participatory ac­ tivity of Soviet citizens. Such cases are one form of the rela­ tively rare phenomenon of spontaneous and autonomous participation as well as one of the few moments in which di­ mensions of conflict and competition appear in Soviet partic­ ipatory contexts. We should note that rejection of a suggested 31 Mote, "Soviet Local and Republic Elections," pp. 32-38; and Church­ ward, "Soviet Local Government Today," pp. 104-105. Their observations are of the 1963 and 1965 elections respectively. 32 Even in nominations for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR there may be some such cases. See V. K. Grigor'ev, Poriadok organizatsti i provedentia vyborov ν verkhovnyi sovet SSSR (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1966), p. 37, where he notes that this has "in practice happened in past elections" and idem, Poriadok provedentia vyborov ν verkhovnyi sovet SSSR (Moscow: Izvestiia, 1970), p. 60, where the rejection of candidates by nomination meetings is cited as proof of democratic organization of the election process. 33 si Grigor'ev, Vybory, p. 37. Itogi (1965), p. 7. 35 Interview with a Moscow University law professor in the Department of the System of Soviets, December 1969. 36 Aimbetov and Baimakhanov, Problemy, p. 90. Emigrants interviewed also indicated occasional knowledge of such cases (see below).

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87

candidate is taken as a sign of failure of the local Party au­ thorities, who should have known that their approved choice would be rejected. Tolerance of this degree of spontaneous participation thus serves to maintain the function of auditing the local officials, making it difficult for them to hide incom­ petence or arbitrary actions from higher officials. Why are candidates rejected? The most frequent reasons given are "poor personal characteristics" or disappointing performance in their first term. (Since the accepted norms call for only one-third renewal of the soviets at each election, a second term should be virtually assured for satisfactory deputies. The implications of high turnover rates will be ex­ amined below.) One reject was accused of not sharing his production experience with colleagues.37 Another was called "uncivil and arrogant" and a third was accused of not living up to his preelection promises.38 One case in which such a "popular revolt" took place in a Moscow factory deserves re­ counting in some detail for what it shows about the potential and limits of political participation of the Soviet citizen. Lavrent'eva had been awarded a medal for distinguished work, supposedly on the recommendation of members of her production team, but actually because her vital statistics (age, Party membership, etc.) fit the guidelines passed to the fac­ tory director by local Party authorities. This aroused the re­ sentment of other workers, who "from a moral and ethical viewpoint refused to recognize her." Later, on the strength of her medal, Lavrent'eva was pro­ posed as deputy to the local soviet. "Someone was reading off a piece of paper, such and such are the circumstances and we propose nominating so and so. Suddenly everyone is shouting 'No! We don't want her!' Then suddenly someone suggests Kisseleva (a simple, but active and well-liked woman) and since no one else is nominated, Kisseleva is accepted unani­ mously with the exception of the first nominator who had come from the Party committee. 37 M. Tarasov, "K itogam vyborov ν mestnye sovety," Partiinaia zhizn', no. 5 (March 1957), p. 11. 38 Sergei Orlov, "Those Who Were Not Elected," Soviet Life (November 1965), p. 28. As we will see later on, the deputy has very little real control over fulfillment of election promises.

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The Soviet Electoral System

The evening newspaper came out with the list of candi­ dates including the name of the one who was supposed to have been nominated, for such instances, when a workers' meeting will change a candidacy, are unusual. Usually any candidacy will get by, but here was a matter of principle and people wanted to protest against that medal and that woman."39 In the end, it was a Pyrrhic victory, for Lavrent'eva was nominated to the supreme soviet of the RSFSR40 and Kisseleva, though she did a good job as deputy, was denied renomination for a second term. At a Party meeting called orig­ inally to rebuke her for haughtiness, Kisseleva was asked why she had not withdrawn her candidacy. She turned to the Party secretary and factory director and asked: "And you Konstantin Dimitrich and you Anatolii, why did you not withdraw your candidacies? You wanted to be deputies? So did I!" After this she was expelled from the Party. The expul­ sion was confirmed by the district Party committee, and only an appeal to the city Party committee won her reinstatement. This was followed by an inconclusive investigation of the af­ fair by a Central Committee commission, which saw nobody punished and Kisseleva demoted to harder, less-skilled work. In any political system, the professional politicians have the advantage of organization and resources. One of the hallmarks of a Communist system is the overwhelming and ubiquitous influence of the Party officials and their ability to limit or punish any autonomous expression. Even so, the top levels of the political hierarchy haye an interest in keeping local officials from strangling all local initiative. It may be assumed in this context that a more effective screening, whether by rejection of unsuitable candidates at nomination meetings, or by careful consideration as to which candidates can in fact win public support, is one of the factors 39

Hebrew University Soviet and East European Research Centre, Inter­

view K 2134, pp. 22-25. 40 Sovetskaia Rossiia, June 17, 1971, lists Aleksandra Andreevna Lav­ rent'eva, brigade leader and electric assembler at the Dinamo factory in Mos­ cow, as newly elected deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR for the Avtozavod electoral district in Moscow.

Nomination Process

89

in reducing the number of candidates defeated in local elec­ tions. Revelation of citizen dissatisfaction at an earlier, less public, stage must surely be preferred by the authorities to the inability of a formally endorsed candidate of the "Bloc of Communists and non-Party people" to garner half the votes cast in an uncontested election. Despite whatever marginal independence may be shown by the citizens when a totally unacceptable candidate is nomi­ nated, the overall body of those who are slated for advance­ ment to active political life is carefully controlled. Not only are individuals examined, but the configuration of the whole is carefully considered. The Communist Party wants to have a highly visible group that will embody the characteristics deemed proper for a body active in forming, leading, and representing public opinion. Along with the right to nominate a candidate, various groups are given guidelines as to what percentage of Party members, women, national minorities, workers, intelligentsia, young people, and so on are to be included among the depu­ ties. Representation of such groups varies minimally through the system of soviets, giving the body of elected representa­ tives the complexion deemed most suitable by the central au­ thorities at any given moment. When a change is initiated, the uniformity with which it takes place across the USSR bespeaks the control exercised. From 1961 to 1967, the percentage of deputies under twenty-four years of age had been dropping steadily—from 8.9 percent in 1961 to 3.8 percent in the 1967 elections.41 At the Komsomol conference celebrating fifty years of the organization's activities in October 1968, strong representations were made for the granting of a more active role for young people in the affairs of the Soviet Union. This included the formation of committees on youth affairs in the soviets and a greater participation of young people in soviets.42 Subsequently, the percentage of deputies under twenty-four years of age jumped to 10.3. This percentage ap­ pears to have been adhered to very closely in most soviets, for we find 10.6 percent of the deputies in Kutaisi up to age 41 42

Itogt (ig6i), p. 18; ibid., (1967), p. 30. See resolutions of the Komsomol Conference, Pravda, October 6, 1968.

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The Soviet Electoral System

twenty-four and 9.7 percent in the Oktiabr' District of Mos­ cow. The range for percentage of deputies under twenty-four years of age is from 9.4 at the regional soviet level to 10.6 in urban soviets. In the RSFSR it is exactly the same.43 Another example of such change is found in the national composition of the deputies to the local soviets. In the 1967 elections, 7,881 Jews were listed as deputies. In 1969, the first elections after the June 1967 Middle East War, the number of Jews elected dropped by 15 percent to 6,619. The numbers of Jewish deputies dropped at all levels of the soviets, while the total number of deputies at each level of the soviets was rising. From 1961 to 1967 there had been no unified trend in the number of Jewish deputies, which had ranged from 7,490 in 1963 to a high of 8,124 in 1965. From 1967 to 1969 none of the other major national groups underwent such a drastic change in representation. The general trend was for greater numbers in each group, while those nationalities that de­ creased did so marginally, by 0.5-1 percent.44 In the i g j i elections, by which time emigration of SovietJews in growing numbers was underway, the number of Jewish deputies in local soviets again fell at every level, the total declining by 9 percent to 6,030.45 It would appear that the intensification of anti-Israel prop­ aganda and the closer identification of the USSR with the Arab countries after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War created an atmosphere in which Party officials understood that Jewish deputies were not the image the USSR wanted to project to its people. When the exodus of Soviet Jews to Israel became a known phenomenon, the nomination of possible future emigrants became even more problematic. The uniformity of 43 Information on Kutaisi received from the organization and instruction department of the city soviet; Oktiabr' District of Moscow, Statistkheskii otchet 0 sostave Oktia.br'skogo raionnogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia goroda Moshvy, 12 sozyva (Moscow: typescript, n.d.), p. 1; Itogi (1969), pp. i8-ig;/tog^, RSFSR (1969), pp· 1 4 - 1 5 · 44 Itogi (1967), pp. 22-24, anc * (1969), pp. 26-28. 45 Itop (1971), p. 24. See also Everett M. Jacobs, "Jewish Representation in Local Soviets, 1959-1973," Soviet Jewish Affairs, Vol. 6, no. ι (1976), pp. 18-26. Jacobs (p. 22) notes that the decline continued to 5,173 in 1973. Itogi (1975), p. 26 shows 4,519 Jewish deputies in local soviets.

Nomination Process

91

the trend away from deputies of Jewish nationality and the size of the changes makes it clear that a policy, written or un­ written, exists. However, control of the composition of representative bodies is not merely or even primarily a punitive or excluding device. It is used as a modernizing and mobilizational tool to bring into active participation sections of the population that might otherwise maintain traditional parochialism and politi­ cal apathy. The consistently high representation of women is a case in point. Since 1961, the percentage of female deputies has risen steadily from 40 percent to 48.1 percent in 1975. At every level of local soviet, women constitute more than 40 percent of the deputies, with a range in the 1975 elections from a low of 41.6 percent in the villages to 56 percent at regional level.48 Were there no central guidance, it might be expected that the more traditional areas would not have large numbers of women deputies, yet in the village soviets of the seven Cauca­ sian and Central Asian republics the percentage of female deputies ranged from a low of 42.3 percent in the Turkmen Republic to a high of 46.6 percent in Armenia and Uzbeki­ stan.47 In terms both of the image of social equality and of the mobilization of women as a social resource, the inclusion of women deputies is of importance to the authorities. While the entire policy of making the elected deputies re­ flect an ideal image of society has had a considerable cost in terms of operative effectiveness of the soviets, this cost has been paid in a conscious tradeoff for broader citizen partici­ pation. As the educational level of Soviet society rises and a larger number of socially and educationally suitable candi­ dates becomes available, the loss of administrative efficiency incurred by coopting deputies who lack organizational expe­ rience and capability diminishes and the benefit of a broad social range of participation remains. Those cases in which nomination meetings substitute their own choice for the apparatus-approved candidate indicate a somewhat higher level of spontaneity and political excitement 46

SDT, no. 8 (August

1975), p. 24.

47

Itogi (1971), pp. 150-151.

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The Soviet Electoral System

than we would have generally expected. There is no question of crude force on the part of the citizens. They have no real sanctions to employ against the authorities, who, as we have noted, enjoy advantages of organization, resources, and sup­ port from higher authorities that in the long run are almost invincible. It would appear, however, that today there is a definite limit to the extent to which the citizen can be ignored without pressures being brought into play. The political am­ bience that makes this possible is the same focusing of the local soviets' activities on consumer services noted previously, together with the strategy adopted by the Soviet authorities of using citizen participation as a resource for improving all as­ pects of the local soviets' performance. On what basis are candidates chosen for the elections? What qualities are sought in those who are to represent the public to itself? No less important, how are these qualities pro­ jected to the public? As organizers and opinion leaders in Soviet society, the elected deputies are expected to be the per­ sonification of the strivings of Soviet society, the embodiment of "I have seen the future, and it works!" Finding 2 million candidates to be the "best of the best" is not an easy job. The most common criterion given is an out­ standing production record. One survey of the work of local soviets notes that in the Kirov factory in Leningrad seventyfour of the leading producers were elected deputies of the local soviets.48 In a production-oriented society in which the elected representatives are expected to reflect not only the make-up of society but also its official values, it is to be ex­ pected that this aspect of the deputies' qualities should be emphasized. In conversations, this aspect of the deputies' qualifications is almost invariably the first mentioned. So much so that it is almost a slogan. "Who is chosen as deputy?" "The best! The best producers, the best workers, the best people." Yet as the tendency to give the deputy substantive duties advances, it is recognized that the task of a deputy re­ quires qualifications other than a good production record. 48

S. P. Kotovoi, V. D. Sorokin, E. A. Chekanova, Novoe ν rabote mestnykh

sovetov (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1961), p. 36.

Nomination Process

93

Volkov notes that deputies who are chosen only on the strength of their work records without previous experience in administration or community activity often prove to be inac­ tive deputies.49 Both Bezuglov and Aimbetov and Baimakhanov echo this statement, noting that the criterion of produc­ tion accomplishment alone is too narrow a basis for the choos­ ing of a deputy.50 Scholars studying the soviets at Moscow University explained a part of the recall statistics as well as some difficulties regarding nominations by noting the excess weight given to production records in the nomination of deputies. This has been reflected in an effort to find deputies who will be effective participants in the representative institu­ tions and the governmental system. In discussing the nomina­ tions for local soviets the editors of Izvestia recently wrote: "Who should be elected? Some say outstanding producers. Another opinion is that experienced activists should be cho­ sen. Yet another opinion is that good organizers are needed—people who can get to the heart of matters. All three are right—all these qualities are needed."51 The impression created here is of an attempt to add a new dimension to the deputy's image as an outstanding producer, though exem­ plary labor results still remain first in the list of desirable at­ tributes. Moreover, those whose basic employment is administrative, and whose organizing abilities could be given public recogni­ tion in the nomination campaign, get less than their share of the limelight. In 1969 9.8 percent of all deputies were Party and soviet officials.52 However, of the 141 candidates men49

Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 133. Bezuglov, Deputatu, pp. 10-12; and Aimbetov and Baimakhanov, ProbIemy, p. 91. The latter, however, specifically note (p. 90) that the post of dep­ uty is awarded "to honor leading producers." 51 Izvestiia, January 14, 1969, p. 1. In similar vein see Grigor'ev, Vybory, p. 36. 52 Itogi (1969), p. 41. In oblast' soviets they were 26.5 percent, in city soviets 10.1 percent and in village soviets only 8.2 percent, ibid., pp. 65, 123, 161. The exception to this rule is when the Supreme Soviets of the USSR or of the 50

republics are being elected. Then the Party leadership is first to be nominated and prominently featured. See Izvestiia, April 25-26, 1975.

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The Soviet Electoral System

tioned or described by Izvestiia through February and March of 1969, only 7 held state or Party posts. The newspaper coverage gives greater prominence to workers, peasants, sci­ entists, and cultural figures, leaving the bureaucrats in the background. Analysis of the qualities of candidates given prominence during the 1969 election campaign shows that the adding of social activism and organizational skill to the prerequisites of a deputy's post are still largely in the realm of exhortation and have not yet become common practice. The 141 candidates who were named and described by Izvestiia during the 1969 campaign were, as has been noted, predominantly workers. Only during the first week of the listing of candidates does the paper give extensive description of each one. Of the 21 for whom biographies were given, 9 were mentioned as hav­ ing received the title "Hero of Socialist Labor," 3 were noted as shock workers, and 6 others were described as outstanding producers. One was a war veteran who was "loved and re­ spected," two others were presented as "responsible people." In one other case, a heroic war record was cited along with work qualities but, as may be seen, the overwhelming focus is on the candidate's work record. If a candidate's full biog­ raphy is not given, a word or two indicating his desirable qual­ ities is often thrown in. Thus, another ten candidates are identified as Heroes of Socialist Labor, while for another group, continuity of employment and work experience are emphasized. In other cases a lead sentence is attached to a paragraph, describing a number of candidates from a given district as being "leading figures in work, science, Party activ­ ity and the soviets," or chosen from among "production lead­ ers, people active in society and workers in culture." The discrepancy between the choice of candidates on the basis of their production records and the exhortation to find deputies who will be active and skilled organizers shows how slowly new outlooks trickle down through the hierarchy of the Party organizations. The emphasis is still on the collective social image of the elected deputies as a reflection of Soviet society rather than on their individual abilities to undertake tasks of administration and legislation.

Election Campaign

95

ELECTION CAMPAIGN By analyzing the participatory aspects of the Soviet election campaign we can learn much about the use of majority pres­ sure and activity of opinion leaders.53 While the Soviet public is normally subjected to a high intensity of political stimuli, penetrating almost every waking hour, the election campaign intensifies this exposure. The ranks of political agitators are reinforced greatly for the two- to three-month campaign, and particular efforts are made to bring the election message— and publish the fact of this universal penetration—to every Soviet home, hut, and ship at sea. The election campaign has many different facets. Presenta­ tion of the elections themselves; presentation of the candi­ dates; the issues; institutions for facilitating the above-men­ tioned intensification of agitational activity ; and the eliciting of citizen demands and evaluations. While considerable po­ tential exists for the spark of autonomous competition that we noted in connection with the nomination process, realization of this potential during the campaign appears to be even rarer than it is in nominations. The Soviet system as a whole is structured against open conflict and competition. Though these exist, as is inevitable in any system, the attempt is made to socialize citizens into participating in a process of reconcili­ ation of conflicting interests which leaves the ultimate deci­ sions within the authoritative institutions of the regime. In this respect, the custom of citizens' presenting "voters' man­ dates" to the candidates during the election campaign de­ serves detailed examination. The election campaign begins even before candidates and issues are presented. The first item of business presented in the media is the organization of the elections as a significant political event. The 9 million citizens elected to the election 53 Milbrath,PoliticalParticipation, pp. 112-113, discusses the importance of opinion leaders in passing messages in society. Lane, Political Life, pp. 52-53, emphasizes the private and informal aspects of the status of opinion leader. While such persons also operate in Soviet politics, the nature of the Soviet system is such that the institution of opinion leader is formalized and given defined resources and objectives at the initiative of Party authorities.

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The Soviet Electoral System

commissions are the first focus of media interest, followed by news of the organization of "agitation points" (agitpunkti) and voters' clubs across the nation. In the 1975 elections this oc­ cupied the first five weeks of the campaign until nomination of the candidates began.54 The activities carried on at the agitpunkti, voters' clubs, and other centers activated for the election activities are inde­ pendent of the candidates and begin without waiting for nominations. As we will see when we examine the work of model agitators, the characteristics of the candidates need not figure at all in their exhortations. It is the Soviet system, and not the individual, that is up for election. In fact, the only personal partisan active in the election campaign on behalf of the individual candidates is the "authorized representative" (1doverennoe litzo) chosen by nominating collectives to speak on the candidate's behalf to other collectives in the constituency, enlisting their support. Just as a candidate is not expected to be openly active in getting himself nominated, so he is not ex­ pected to campaign personally to have his nomination gen­ erally accepted. Though, as we have seen, personalities may figure large when contentious issues are eliminated from election consid­ erations, social unity and Soviet values are the basis of all phases of the campaign. Participation of the united "Bloc of Communists and non-Party People" is emphasized at every stage of the campaign, the election commissions, nomination meetings, and candidates' activity, but all candidates without exception are to be chosen from among those "whose selfdenying labor and active social involvement have demon­ strated their commitment to the Communist Party and to the people."55 The agitpunkti and voters' clubs are intended to give an extra fillip to ongoing attempts to offer social and political ac­ tivity to the citizens. Some such clubs are permanent institu­ tions, others are established on the premises of community 54 First announcement of the elections appeared in Izvestiia on March 18, 1975. Nomination of candidates, headed by Brezhnev and the top Party leaders, was reported on April 25. 55 Partiinaia zhizn', no. 7 (April 1975), p. 10.

Election Campaign

97

cultural centers. The addition of specific election topics to the regular activities can be seen in the following passage, offered as a model of organizational activity. "Hundreds of agitators are at work. They explain to the voters the domestic and foreign policies of the Party and the Soviet state, acquaint the voters with our electoral system and agitate for the indestructible Bloc of Communists and non­ party People in the forthcoming elections. In the agitpunkti, the clubs and the house of culture, meetings are held with veterans of war and labor and with production innovators. There are lectures and discussions, evenings of questions and answers, meetings with young voters, and consultations with doctors and jurists. Events connected with the thirtieth an­ niversary of the victory over fascist Germany hold an impor­ tant. place."56 Notably absent in the above is any mention of meetings be­ tween the candidates and the voters, though other sources indicate that the voters' clubs are valuable as sites for meet­ ings at which the voters may meet the candidates or other leading local officials in person and raise questions or bring requests regarding local issues. The discussion of requests and complaints is usually supplemented by the serving of light refreshments and provision of entertainment to encour­ age a good turnout.57 The clubs, in central locations, serve several constituencies. In the city of Kazan, 300 voters' clubs served the 1,724 urban and urban district constituencies.58 This means that each club served from 2,000 to 2,500 voters in the course of the campaign. Each club has its own team of agitators and is given assistance by the Komsomol or Party organization of some nearby enterprise or institution. In Kaliningrad, for instance, a teacher headed the group of agitators in one of thirty clubs in an urban district and was 56 Parttinaia zhizri', no. g (May 1975), p. 51. An almost identical description can be found in ibid., no. 10 (May 1975), p. 49. 57 See the descriptions in Izvestiia, January 22, 1967, and ibid., January 28, 1969. In the latter case, a week after the termination of a spectacular space flight, a lecture on Soviet achievements in space was used to supplement the election meeting. ii Ibid.,January 28, 1969.

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The Soviet Electoral System

assisted by the Komsomol of a knitting factory which had been assigned to staff the club.59 The agitpunkti, serving an area smaller than the voters' clubs, may serve 200-300 voters in a scattered and sparsely settled rural district, up to 1,500 in a more compact city area.60 Agitation material is also supplied to isolated herds­ men in remote corners of the country. Universal suffrage is to be implemented as close to 100 percent as possible, and no voter is to be left unlisted and uninformed. This is the wellpublicized task of the agitpunkt. The network of agitpunkti covers not only the whole territory of the USSR but reaches out to ships at sea as well. Each Soviet merchantman and war­ ship large enough to be recognized as a polling precinct has its own electoral commission and agitpunkt, headed by senior officers.61 The picture that emerges here is of a core of active partici­ pants, chiefly Party members and Komsomol youth directed by the local Party apparatus, reaching out to the general pub­ lic with information and attempting to involve the mass of citizens in a higher level of socializing activity than is achieved at other times. The aim is to surpass passive absorption of slo­ gans, information, and socializing pressures from the media and environment. The meetings, discussions, and complaint and request sessions with local officials encourage both associ­ ation with other citizens and active political expression. The important role played by the agitation corps in the election campaign stands out here. Their numbers, the additional tasks that they undertake in the electoral system, and the way that they fulfill their obligations should therefore be our next point of inquiry. The army of agitators mobilized for the elections probably represents about 5 percent of the electorate, or in 1975 over 8 59

Ibid., January 29, 1969. The rural district of Bezhetsk with an estimated electorate of 14,000 had 55 agitpunkti in the 1967 elections. Partiinaia zhizn , no. 8 (April 1975), pp. 65-66, reports Komsomolsk na Amur with an estimated electorate of 155,000 had 100 agitpunkti in 1975. 61Izvestiia, February 5, 1967. The RSFSR election statute, article 72, specifies that each vessel with more than 20 voters aboard may form its own precinct for voting if at sea on election day. 60

Election Campaign

99

individuals.62

million An important characteristic of these agitators is that they are overwhelmingly Party members—in Moscow the figure was 94 percent, an increase of 7.6 percent over 197363—and they are almost universally organized by local Party groups. In this sense, the elections are a real test of the Party's mobilizing ability. Assuming that election commis­ sioners and election candidates are not agitators, we can esti­ mate that 11-12 million Party members are actively involved in election activity, supervising, standing for election, or agitating. This amounts to about three-quarters of the mem­ bers and candidate members of the Party.84 An agitator may be assigned to visit personally with thirty to forty voters.65 The themes one agitator noted in his diary as having been discussed with the voters were the following: the plan and budget of the district soviet and how their im­ plementation would affect the family's life; youth and its fu­ ture in the Soviet system; the technical progress being made by the enterprises of the district; and Lenin, whose image was invoked in connection with the democratic features of the elections.66 The agitator's task is to tie the promise of the future to the 62 The city of Barnaul with about 320,500 voters had 20,000 agitators, ac­ cording to Partiinaia zhizn', no. 8 (April 1975), p. 66. Moscow with an esti­ mated 5,688,000 voters had 195,086 agitators, according to Agitator, no. 10 (May 1975), p. 15. These are respectively about 4 and 3.4 percent of the elec­ torates. In 1973 Moscowhad 183,500 agitators. See Pravda, June 18, 1973. 63Pravda, June 18, 1973. 64 If we take the countrywide percentage of Party members and candidates among the agitators as 90, we get about 7,200,000. SDT, no. 8 (August 1975), pp. 20, 24, gives 3,293,400 Party members and candidates as election com­ missioners and 967,906 as deputies. The total of Party members and candi­ dates active in the elections thus comes to 11.5 million. At the 25th Party Congress Leonid Brezhnev gave the total for Party members and candidates as 15,694,000. Pravda, February 25, 1976. 65 Izvestiia, February 18, 1969, notes an agitator who had 33 voters to meet. Cf. Mote, Elections, who says that an agitator in Leningrad in 1965 visited ten apartments housing a total of 10-40 families. 66 Izvestiia, February 18, 1g6g. The subjects noted in this diary are more or less standard for each campaign and indeed are published so that other cam­ paign workers may learn from them the "advanced experience of those who are judged good models to be followed." Cf. Mote, Elections, pp. 67-72, with the difference that Mote's model also introduces the candidates, which the Izvestiia model did not do.

1OO

The Soviet Electoral System

program and policy being offered by the Communist Party, and he enlists the support of the voter by demonstrating statistically the advances made over the period since the last election. For this, he is expected to arm himself with factual material and be prepared to answer questions. Carrying the election campaign into every home is, however, more than a matter of setting forth government policies, and the job of the agitator is both to explain and to listen. Thus, Izvestiia carried the following description of the agitator's function: "The people must understand the Party's work and line, and the Party must know the people's needs."67 The evocation of criticism of administrative shortcomings and the pinpointing of urgent needs and demands during the local election campaigns are the final links in the long chain of discussing government plans and their implementation, which in Soviet elections takes the place of any discussion of policy choices. In this context the press often criticizes local soviet executives who have not "used the election campaign to the fullest extent to eliminate serious shortcomings in the ac­ tivities of cultural institutions and daily services, communal economy, transport, trade and public catering enterprises."68 For the local authorities to he aware of the shortcomings in their work, they must try to get to the citizen and find out what his complaints are. What priority is assigned to meeting each complaint and in what way complaints are to be satisfied, if at all, is a matter of policy on which the voters do not touch and in which they are not invited to participate. The first step in policy making is, however, information. This, the Soviet election system is designed to supply in plenty. In addition to spreading and gathering information, the agitators fulfill an important technical task, verifying names and addresses of residents for the electoral rolls. Indeed, when one gathers the testimony of former participants in agi­ tation campaigns as well as residents whose homes the agitators visited, this emerges as the central point of agitation-in-practice. All in all, the picture given by those who have had live contact with the agitation campaign falls far 67

Izvestim, February 28, 1967.

e s Ibid.,

February 27, 1965.

Election Campaign

101

below the model. None of those former agitators interviewed spoke of learning the basic economic and political informa­ tion emphasized in the newspapers. Some carried a list of candidates to the various soviets, others knew only the date of the elections and address of the polling station. Nevertheless, there are some basic and important simi­ larities between the published model and the practice. Every house is, in fact, visited and each person of voting age listed. The voters are urged to come out to vote and generally do not resist this urging. Nor do the citizens generally make prob­ lems for the agitators by presenting them with critical ques­ tions or demands. The brief agitation visits proceed smoothly. As one interviewee put it: "Just as the people understood that we were acting as agitators from necessity rather than from interest, so we understood that they received us from neces­ sity rather than from interest."69 The mutual understanding displayed here is a key to the workings of a goodly part of the Soviet participation system. While it does not necessarily rep­ resent an acceptance of the values of the Soviet regime, it demonstrates the bowing to the forms by which the regime operates and the easing of possible conflict by mutual ac­ commodation. While the agitators are urged to elicit opinions and de­ mands from the citizens, this apparently is done only rarely. On the whole, agitators are received courteously but pas­ sively, and content themselves with the technical side of their task. In those cases in which citizens' patience is exhausted and dissatisfaction appears in the form of organized protest, the agitators are generally the first to hear and report this. The agitators' warnings should enable local or higher officials to take measures to eliminate the cause of discontent or its or­ ganized expression according to the officials' ability and un­ derstanding. The few such cases reported deal mostly with inadequate housing repairs and public utilities development. One such conflict in Moscow lasted two years. In the 1967 elections the 69 Hebrew University Soviet and East European Research Centre, Immi­ grant Interview Project, interview K 2144 SS., p. 11.

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The Soviet Electoral System

agitators' reports of an organized election boycott brought out the chairman of the district soviet to promise improve­ ments. Following this appearance only 5 of 120 voters main­ tained their refusal to vote. When by 1969 improvements had not yet been made, the agitators were unable to persuade the citizens to vote and 120 persons abstained in protest.70 In summing up the agitators' role as participants in the election campaign it is important to note that the fact that the overwhelming majority of those active as agitators are Com­ munist Party members does not appear to have a strong in­ fluence on the quality of their participation. Organizing the agitation groups is generally the duty of one of the Party committee members at a place of work, and he mobilizes al­ most every available person. The agitators are transformed into supposedly active protagonists of the Party platform not because they are chosen people, particularly convinced of its correctness, or personally inclined to political activism, but because they are a vulnerable group, available for mobiliza­ tion. The fact that Party membership makes an individual available for mobilization appears to be stronger than any other factor in determining participation in many aspects of the Soviet political system. Personal factors may determine how sincerely any task is undertaken, but the liability to be called on for activism is a price to be paid for Party mem­ bership along with Party dues. Since the task of agitator rarely involves any conflict and the time investment can be kept within reasonable bounds, refusal or nonperformance may cost more than compliance. The agitators thus all perform their basic task. Those having either convictions or personal characteristics that drive them to more elaborate perform­ ance of their duties will not meet any resistance, while those who satisfy themselves with a minimum do not appear likely to encounter criticism. While the agitators appear to provide information on citi­ zen demands only in extreme cases, a well-organized system exists in which a mass of information about local dissatisfac70

Interview K 2134 NG., p. 53. The informant states that the district is well

developed today. Cf. the classic story of such a case in Mote, Elections, pp. 81-83.

Election Campaign

103

tions and desires flows from the voters to the candidates and the authorities in general. There are two ways in which citi­ zens' demands are presented. One way is by simple individual request. At an election meeting, the request and the name and address of the citizen may be recorded in minutes of the meeting to be dealt with later. Alternatively, a citizen may re­ cord his demands in notebooks placed for this purpose in the voters' clubs. Such facilities are used for individual requests for housing, pension matters, and so on and analogous facili­ ties are always available to the citizen in the person of his elected deputy, neighborhood committee, or the administra­ tive organs of local or higher soviets. At election times a more socialized form of demand articu­ lation exists in the form of what are known as "imperative voters' mandates." To qualify as a mandate, a request must reflect a general social need, be presented formally at an elec­ tion meeting, and adopted by a majority vote of those present as a special resolution.71 If such requests are considered to be indicative of a "general will," they are written in the election meeting protocol as a recognized mandate and presented as such to the local soviet.72 A long political history is attributed to the custom of the imperative mandate from the voters. One author links its ori­ gins with demands raised in the soviets formed during the 1905 revolution. 73 Lenin notes that the famous Decree on the Land was drawn up in keeping with 242 mandates presented by local peasants' assemblies.74 Clearly, this is an institution imbued with the legitimacy of revolutionary participation, and as such is to be nurtured. Like many other participatory institutions of the Soviet Union, the voters' mandate fell into relative disuse during Stalin's time and was revived as part of the attempt to revive local government and stimulate its par­ ticipatory aspects.75 71 72

Be/uglov, Deputatu, p. 21.

N. Starovoitov, "Nakazy izbiratelei," Agitator, no. 11 (June 1973), p. 13, emphasizes that the collective social character of voters' mandates is of impor­ tance. See also Bulletin, no. 8-614 (April 1967), p. 24. 73 Bezuglov,Deputatu, p. 24. 74 Lenin, Works, Vol. 26, p. 226. 75 V. F. Kotok, "V. I. Lenin i nakazy izbiratelei," S G P , no. 4 (April 1963), p.

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The Soviet Electoral System

Today extensive use is made of the voters' mandate and it receives considerable attention in the preelection press as a yardstick of the soviets' success in meeting citizens' needs. The local soviets elected for the 1973-1975 term were pre­ sented with 847,185 such imperative mandates and by Janu­ ary 1, 1975, had fulfilled three-quarters of them. Distribution of the mandates is, however, uneven, the bulk of such citizens' petitions being directed to the higher level of local soviets. While the overall average per soviet was 17 mandates, the re­ gional soviets had an average of 280 each, while village and settlement soviets were presented with an average of 12 and 17 such mandates respectively.76 The regional soviets may, however, decide to pass some of the mandates directed to them by the voters to lower soviets for implementation, as in­ deed happened to 526 of 1,131 mandates presented to the authorities of Belgorod Oblast' in the 1965 elections.77 Even so, the citizens' initiative in articulating their demands will have borne fruit, for the mandate will have been given au­ thoritative recognition and some soviet will have to include this demand in its plan. Where the demand is such that it cannot be fulfilled by the soviet, then the deputy to whom the mandate was originally directed has the duty of explaining the matter to his constituents.78 The citizen thus knows that his request was heard and considered, and though it may be rejected as beyond the powers of the soviet for immediate implementation, the citizen knows that he is not alone in his needs and has not been ignored by the authorities. By making the mandate a collective request and postponing the discus­ sion of fulfillment priorities until after the campaign, the Soviet system once more removes any element of open con­ flict from the election campaign. The nature of requests proffered as mandates indicates 23. Kotok explicitly links the decline in the use of the voters' mandate to problems of "the cult of personality." Article 102 of the new Soviet Constitu­ tion deals explicitly with voters' mandates. 76SDT, no. 5 (May 1973), p. 31. 77 Belgorod Oblast' Soviet, Reshenie Belgorodskogo Oblastnogo Soveia (Bel­ gorod: 1965), p. 19. 78 Starovoitov, "Nakazy," p. 13.

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something of the rough spots of life that might otherwise es­ cape the authorities' attention. Not only schools, post offices, and hospitals are requested. Provision of a permanent kerosene distribution point in a settlement; provision of lumber, glass, and roofing slate for repairs to a village store; aid in establishing an enterprise to provide local employment for the women of a settlement: such are the more humble re­ quests of the Soviet voter. They are the type of problems that probably figure large in citizens' daily conversation, with which every local nominee will be well acquainted. They also reflect many of the problems of rural underdevelopment. In an urban soviet, the demands are more specific, dealing with repairs to particular houses or lighting on certain streets. These may later be combined by the district soviet into a reso­ lution accepting as a mandate the repair of half a dozen apartment blocks, repaving of several streets, or improve­ ment of street lighting throughout a large portion of the dis­ trict, according to the current economic plan and budget.79 Where the mandate consists of some small amenities that voters wish to have added to their lives and that do not affect a whole district or settlement, they (the voters) may be organ­ ized into implementing the improvement by their own efforts. This is particularly likely to happen in new urban devel­ opments where the constituents of a single deputy may be the residents of one or two high-rise apartment buildings. Thus, the voters in the Oktiabr' District of Moscow included among their mandates landscaping of the areas around houses number 87 and 89 on Leninskii Prospekt. The mandate was accepted, but the deputies' council serving the area decided that the task was one the citizens themselves could carry out. Deputies who were members of the house committees of the two buildings explained this view to the residents and organ­ ized work for several weekends, implementing the mandate quickly—by the voters' own efforts.80 In turning to his con79 Liublin District Soviet, Plan meropriatii po vypolneniiu nakazov izbiratelei (Moscow: Liublin District Soviet, 1969). The booklet lists 39 mandates for fulfillment. Those dealing with housing repairs and public utilities generally cover a group of projects. 80 Bulletin, no. 8-614 (April 1967), p. 27. Such activities go on all year round

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The Soviet Electoral System

stituents to fulfill their needs by their own efforts, the deputy was acting according to both the letter and the spirit of the law that sets the normative framework for deputies' activities. This specifies that the deputy should take part in organizing the population for the fulfillment of voters' mandates.81 The election period, representing as it does a point of re­ capitulation and rededication for the entire society, is one of the times at which individual deputies report to their con­ stituents about the activity of the soviets.82 Although deputies to the supreme soviets are likely to be personalities whose prestige puts them above blunt confrontations with the pub­ lic, local deputies meeting their peers may be at times chal­ lenged rather sharply in such encounters, particularly if they are candidates for reelection. Such is the picture offered by the secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Republic, who notes that deputies must report to their constituents before election and that "this is by no means always a friendly encounter. I know of a number of cases in which the people rejected one deputy, replacing him with another."83 Though such occasions may be infrequent, both the com­ pact structure of local constituencies and the low norms of representation—fewer than 500 voters per deputy in cities and urban districts, and less than 50 voters per deputy in vil­ lages and settlements—make it easier for citizens to raise their problems, whether as organized mandates, or as individually expressed criticism or requests regarding local conditions af­ fecting the citizen's daily life. Participation in the election campaign is, then, almost uniand not only at election time. However, the fact that this request was regis­ tered as a mandate and then fulfilled through the initiative of local deputies is a feather in the cap of the deputies, establishing them as active representa­ tives with close links to their constituents. 81 Law on the Status of Deputies to Soviets in the USSR, article 7, as pub­ lished in Izvestiia, September 22, 1972, p. 2. 82 Ibid., article 20, calls for deputies to supreme soviets of the Union, Union republics, and autonomous republics to report at least once a year to the vot­ ers and for deputies to the local soviets to give at least two reports a year. One of the achievements of the reform in local government since 1957 is that vir­ tually every deputy now fulfills this minimum. 83 Izvestiia, October 15, 1965.

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versal. Few people escape at least a visit by the agitators. For those driven by conviction, curiosity, or plain cantankerousness to be more active, numerous forms and levels of partici­ patory activity abound. Election commissioners, candidates, authorized representatives and agitators, all of whom are ac­ tive in the campaign, number something over 20 million people. These 20 million are all displaying civic activity, and are engaging in support of the Soviet regime in a manner presented to the electorate at large as a symbol of acceptance of social and political unity, acceptance of the principle of ac­ tive participation by every citizen in every sphere of life. An article preparing agitators for their meetings with the voters sums it up: "Political work carried on during the election campaign is to make possible the growth of socialist con­ sciousness of Soviet people, their political and labor activeness and the mobilization of the toilers' efforts for successful fulfillment of the third, decisive year of the five year plan."84 It is somewhat difficult to compare the scope of such cam­ paign activity with activity in other systems such as the United States. The 8 million agitators constitute about 5 percent of the total electorate, a figure almost identical with that pre­ sented by Lane for an American election.85 In America, how­ ever, the volunteer election workers are a shifting group, and research has shown that 11 percent of the American elector­ ate took part in election work over a four-year period, while nearly twice that percentage declared an interest in active election work, but remained unmobilized.86 In the USSR, as we have shown, the agitation corps, analogous in function to the volunteer election workers described by Lane, is drawn overwhelmingly from Communist Party membership, and is thus a fairly stable group. Interviewees who had been agitators spoke of repeated assignment to the same task over several election campaigns, and Mote's description of an ideal agitator emphasizes this continuity.87 The candidates' "au84

"Navstrechu vyboram," Agifafor, no. 10 (May 1973), p. 29. Lane, Political Life, p. 53. 86 Ibid., pp. 54-55. Verba and Nie, Participation in America, p. 80 find 26 percent of their sample active in political campaigning. 87 Mote, Elections, p. 67. "It is not the first time Gritsai has been an agitator. Once again in the homes on Gavanskaia, once again at apartment 29." 85

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The Soviet Electoral System

thorized representatives," numbering perhaps an additional 2-3 million persons, swell the percentage of Soviet election workers to above that in the United States, yet their task seems to be brief (little is written of them in Soviet discussions of election campaigns), and many may reasonably be sup­ posed to be included in the numbers of the agitation corps. In summary then, the Soviet system, usually regarded as highly mobilized, generates involvement as protagonists of the can­ didates of very nearly the same percentage of the electorate as does the American system. The Soviet agitators, however, make personal contact with their entire electorate, each agitator meeting about twenty voters, while American cover­ age per volunteer worker is said to be six to seven people, leaving much of the electorate uncanvassed.88 Participation in the Soviet election campaign also differs from that in Ameri­ can elections in that candidates and commissioners are consciously selected as a social and occupational sample, demonstrating the Soviet Union as a workers' society. The correlation between high socioeconomic status and more in­ tensive political activity generally found in participation re­ search has yet to be investigated in the USSR.

VOTING DAY The day of the elections represents the peak of participation. Every effort is made to ensure 100 percent turnout. Indeed, such extreme efforts are made to demonstrate the unanimous support of the public that the citizens' belief in the election system is strained, and a backlash of cynical disbelief finds ex­ pression in avoidance and abstention. In order to maintain the image of unanimity returns are falsified, political apathy is ignored, and the election laws are generally violated. The numerical importance of the dissidence in elections, which we will examine in detail below, is probably marginal. It may reach as high as 5 percent of the electorate, it almost cer­ tainly does not reach 10 percent, but the Soviet regime is not satisfied with 90 or 95 percent participation, it strives for 100 88

Lane, Political Life, p. 54.

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percent. Thus, in the 1 9 7 5 elections to the supreme soviets of the republics, 99.98 percent of the voters were said to have duly appeared at the polls. Only 30,343 citizens out of a re­ ported electorate of 163,510,389 are listed as not having voted. When these figures are broken down by republic, the claims of mobilization success become even more mindboggling. Only 27 Turkmens out of 1,156,848 failed to vote. In Tadzhikistan the figure given is 65 out of 1.5 million, and in Kirghizia 125 out of 1,639,808!89 But somehow commonsense revolts at such claims of perfection. The outside ob­ server and even the well-conditioned Soviet citizen are simply skeptical that human frailty, organizational mishaps, or the indifference of individuals in such a large and varied public should find such small expression. The arrangements for vot­ ing and the way it is carried out in practice should be carefully scrutinized here. Election day is declared a holiday and is always scheduled for a Sunday, minimizing time lost from production and mak­ ing it easier for the people to come to vote, since Sunday is a general day of rest in the USSR. Angus Campbell has noted that what he calls the "costs" of voting—registration proce­ dures, poll taxes, qualifications of property, residence or age—act as deterrents to voting for people of minimal politi­ cal inclination.90 In the USSR there has been an effort to elim­ inate as much as possible the "costs" of voting. Citizenship and age are the only qualifications and the onus of registra­ tion is on the local soviet rather than on the citizen.91 This is one indication of the regime's interest in universal participa­ tion in the elections. Further efforts are made to assure every citizen the right to 89

SDT, no. 8 (August 1975), p. 20. Angus Campbell, "The Passive Citizen," Acta Sociologita, Vol. 6, fasc. 1 (1961), p. 19. 91 RSFSR, Pobzhenie 0 vyborakh, article 2, declares the right to vote universal for citizens 18 years of age and over, except for those legally certified as in­ sane. A law of December 25, 1958, abolished the depriving of citizens of their electoral rights as a criminal punishment. See V. Chkhikvadze, The State, Democracy and Legality in the USSR (Moscow: Progress, 1972), p. 142, n. 1; cf. N. G. Starovoitov, Portadok organizatsii i provedeniia vyborov ν mestnye sovety (Moscow: IuridicheskaiaLiteratura, 1965), p. 25. 90

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The Soviet Electoral System

actually exercise his franchise. Voters who expect to travel on election day may apply to the election commission at their place of residence for a "certificate of the right to vote in another place," which they can then present in any polling place in the USSR.92 In addition, hospitals with more than fifty voters have polling stations, as do ships with twenty or more voters, long-distance trains, and major air and rail ter­ minals.93 In the 1969 elections there were 53 trains with poll­ ing stations aboard and 324 others with agitation brigades and election commissions, which arranged for the passengers to vote at designated stations.94 While the provision for an in­ valid to vote at home has been dropped from the electoral law of the RSFSR, it is still cited by Soviet authors as an indication of the zealous protection of the citizens' sacred right to vote, and still happens in practice, according to interviewees.95 The arrangements for voting are designed to attract par­ ticipation. For eighteen-year-olds who are voting for the first time there may be flowers and a congratulatory speech link­ ing them to the traditions of Lenin.96 The polling place itself will probably be festively decorated, the ballot box placed on a dais under a portrait of Lenin flanked by flags or flowers, or Young Pioneers in full uniform who salute each voter. The act of depositing the ballot slip thus becomes almost an obei­ sance. Should he wish to demonstrate his support for the candidate, the voter may receive his ballot from the election 92 RSFSR, Polozhenie ο vyborakh, article 21. One result of this is that the polls must stay open for the full period designated by law to serve possible travel­ ing voters even if all voters registered in the district may have voted early in the day. As we will later see, use of the "certificate of right to vote" plays a special role in the elections. 93 Ibid., articles 71-73. 94 Izvestiia, February 16, 1969. One can only imagine: "Next stop, Yakutsk! Ten minutes stopping time. Comrades with names from A to D will vote here!" 95 See, for instance, Grigor'ev, Vybory, p. 44. Mote, Elections, pp. 78-79, cites article 100 of the RSFSR election law and article 71 of the Law for Elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in support of his statement on this sub­ ject. In neither of these laws as amended to 1966 does this appear. Article 97 of the former states: "Each voter votes personally, appearing for this at the

polling station." The 1978 election law restores the right of "at home" voting. 96 Izvestiia, March 16, 1969.

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officials and deposit it directly in the ballot box. Thus, support of the regime requires no undue action or effort. A voting booth is provided for those who wish to consider their choice. Here, in privacy, they may consider the ballot and follow the instruction to "leave the name of the one candidate for whom you are voting, striking out all the others."97 This instruction appears on the ballot even though there is only one candi­ date. Derek Scott notes that in 1946 the instruction was dropped from the ballot, although remaining in the electoral regulations.98 As Scott gives no details as to whether this was a universal phenomenon or whether it was confined to one par­ ticular locality, it is difficult to assess the significance of the disappearance and reappearance of this instruction on the ballot itself. The persistence of such a patently empty profes­ sion of freedom of choice does, however, say something about a regime that maintains all the appearances of legitimacy while in practice retaining effective control over candidacy and election results. The polling booth is also an object of interest in the Soviet elections. A Soviet scholar emphasized in private conversation the importance of placing the polling booth between the reg­ istration table and the ballot box, and claimed that this was done to make the use of the booth easy for those who wished to avail themselves of it. However, it would appear that such an arrangement is neither universal nor even general. Actu­ ally, it seems that today no great attention is paid to those who enter the voting booth. The suspicion that accompanied this act in Stalin's time has died down, though many older Soviet citizens still remember it uneasily. If the elections are to pro­ vide the central authorities with a check on how well local offi­ cials are responding to the wants of the populace, free oppor­ tunity to vote "no" by crossing out a candidate's name is a 97 Mote, Elections, p. 105, has a facsimile of a ballot with this instruction on it. Article 99 of RSFSR, Polozhenie 0 vyborakh repeats the instruction, as does article 7g of the USSR Regulationsfor Election to the Supreme Soviet. However, a facsimile ballot for the Moscow City Soviet in the 1967 elections does not carry the instruction. See Latov, Soviet Electoral System, p. 82. 98 Derek J. R. Scott, Russian Political Institutions (rev. ed.) (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 94.

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The Soviet Electoral System

necessity. In addition, the constitutional provision for secrecy of the ballot is supported by article 96 of the RSFSR election law, demanding that there be a voting booth at every polling station. Scott states that the failure to provide voting booths for elections has been condemned as irregular by the Soviet press." Such failure is, however, probably extremely rare. The proportion of voters actually using the booth is appar­ ently small, according to the few observations made. Max Mote sets the proportion of booth users observed by him in Leningrad at one in ten, while Peter Juviler, writing on the basis of earlier observation, notes a range varying from 2-5 percent in an "ordinary" urban precinct to 24 percent in a precinct populated by Moscow University students. Church­ ward estimates the proportion entering the booth as one in fifty, while an American observation team to the 1958 USSR Supreme Soviet elections estimated that 1-5 percent of the voters used the booths.100 Former Soviet citizens' estimates fall in the same low range, and also confirm Juviler's observa­ tion that people of intelligentsia status tend to use the booth more than others. Even these observed low percentages far outstrip the number of negative votes cast in the elections. There is no evidence, either from the press or from interviewees, that election officials direct citizens to use the booths, nor does preelection propaganda exhort them to do so. We may ask then why a Soviet citizen should make use of the booth, if he has no intention of striking out the candidate's name. Some, according to Soviet sources, enter the booth to write requests on the ballot. Others write their name and address to substan­ tiate their having voted for the candidate. Still others write patriotic slogans on the ballot.101 Former election commis99

Ibid., p. 96. Mote, Elections, p. 80; Peter H. Juviler, "Functions of a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, i960, p. 44; Churchward, "Soviet Local Government Today," p. 449; Howard R. Swearer, "The Functions of Soviet Elections," Midwest Journal of Political Sci­ ence, Vol. 5 (May 1961), p. 146. 101 Vechernaia Moskva, June 15, 1970, lists a dozen such inscriptions out of "too many to list . . . they would more than fill the entire newspaper." These ranged from the standard "Glory to the CPSU" to a fervent "Had I a hun100

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sioners also report curses and obscenities, which at times were held in a special file and later investigated.102 Not all those who write praises or who cross out the candidate's name avail themselves of the voting booth for this. Cases of both types have been reported in which the voter publicly announced and performed his act.103 The Soviet Union is a huge and var­ ied system in which many things can happen. The main reasons for using the booth, other than to cross out the candidate's name, appear to be a desire to bait the au­ thorities in a way that is relatively safe, and an instinct to pre­ serve the vestiges of choice, with those who do not wish to vote negatively protecting by their own use of the booth the identity of those citizens who do vote against the candidate. Both of these reasons apply particularly to the intelligentsia, explaining at least in part the higher rate of their use of the voters' booth. Along with the impossibly high participation and the 9 9 . 8 percent support generally announced, the lack of choice in the elections appeared as the aspect that most alienated those Soviet citizens who were able to express an autonomous opin­ ion on the Soviet election system. The use of the voters' booth is the one way in which individuals, strange as they may ap­ pear to their fellow citizens (and this is how many inter­ viewees described the booth users), can put maximum possi­ ble significance into their participation in the balloting. Two aspects of the voting remain to be investigated. The first is the 99.98 percent turnout of voters and the second the 99.8 percent of votes for the candidates. How are these achieved and what is the effect of election mobilization on the citizen's participation and attitude to the election? Numerous factors contribute to the total turnout of voters. dred votes they would all be cast for the Party of Lenin which led a weak, illiterate Russia out of her darkness and made her a rich and mighty power." Such inscriptions are not regarded as invalidating the ballot. 102 Interview K 2162 BK., p. 25, K 2166, p. 58. The first related to Mol­ davia, the second to Leningrad. Ronald J. Hill, "The CPSU in a Soviet Elec­ tion Campaign," Soviet Studies, Vol. 28, no. 4 (October 1976), p. 597, confirms the practice of investigation of such comments on the basis of published Soviet sources. 103 Interview K 2134 NG., p. 96.

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The Soviet Electoral System

The first, and most important, is the detailed and total or­ ganization. With a thoroughness to be envied by any political organization, each polling precinct is broken down into small units, and agitators, very often the same ones who canvassed these homes during the campaign, are assigned to see that nothing prevents the voters from coming to the polls. What­ ever is needed, transport, babysitting, or a voting urn to be taken to an invalid, the agitator will report on the need and it will be provided. Though actual total mobilization, as we shall see shortly, is difficult in metropolitan centers, in the remote settlements and villages which make up so much of the Soviet Union everyone is visible and can be accounted for. The regime does everything to make the elections an at­ tractive occasion. Election day is not only a normal day off from work but a holiday. The festive decorations of the poll­ ing stations have already been described. In addition, buffets for refreshments may be opened near central polling stations and efforts are made to offer the public plenty of goods that are generally in short supply. Particularly in smaller centers where alternative entertainment is relatively scarce, such a civic festival does much to attract the voters. The agitators on their part are anxious to see "their" voters at the polls. They cannot go off duty until the last person on their list has been accounted for. They therefore become im­ patient with those who have not voted by mid-morning and begin to knock on doors, pleading: "Come and vote. I too have a home and family like you, and want to spend the day with them." The same rapport that serves to ease the agitators' visits in the campaign, works now, in combination with the general pressure for participation, to bring out nine-tenths of the electorate by noon.104 The general opinion is that if you are a decent fellow, you vote early and free the agitator, incidentally saving yourself increasingly frequent and importunate visits as the day wears on. There is an additional reason to turn out. While no person interviewed was able to cite a case of any sanctions being em­ ployed against someone who failed to vote, there was general 104 See Vechernaia Moskva, June 15, 1970, for a report of Moscow voters' early voting habits.

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consensus that a refusal to vote out of simple political passiv­ ity would be noted somewhere and could at some point in the future cause unpleasantness to the nonvoter. In a portion of the Soviet population, then, it would appear that the act of participation in voting stems not from citizen socialization, but from an awareness of the total power of the regime. Such pressure acts particularly on Party members and people of the intelligentsia who hold desirable jobs in science, culture, education, and administration—in short, those who have something to lose. They are, on the whole, obedient subjects who will participate in the forms prescribed by the regime, regardless of what their opinion of their content may be. For simple persons, workers and pensioners, who for some real or imagined reason or from apathy do not want to vote, another way is found. The precinct commission allows absen­ tee votes to be registered by others, although this violates elec­ tion law. An apartment building manager, not wanting the district Party committee's attention called to a high rate of ab­ senteeism in his building, collects the internal passports of building workers unwilling to appear, and brings them to the polls. A mother, apprehensive of the possible consequences of her son and daughter-in-law not voting, votes in place of them; children come in with parents' and neighbors' identi­ fication—there is a multitude of variants.105 Such voting re­ flects on the probity of the precinct commission chairman, and it is his formal duty to prevent it. However, one result of the intimate community formed for political activities in the Soviet Union is that people participating in such activities are generally known to each other, and everything is "in the fam­ ily." If no outside observer is present, and the desired 100 percent can be achieved in this way, then the chairman may consider that the end justifies the means. Such violation is perhaps not universal. At present we cannot quantify it even roughly, but evidence suggests that it exists in some degree in almost every part of the USSR. 105 Interviews: K^143 MG., p. 28: This source estimates that 30 percent of the electorate in his locality voted in absentia; K 2161, p. 38: The source claimed that this arrangement had been used for the past ten years; O 1751: Three students, one from Odessa and two from the Baltics, testify to having brought their parents' and neighbors' passports to the polling station.

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The Soviet Electoral System

Illegal though it is, this practice at least involves the presen­ tation of an identity card, even if not by its rightful holder. Cruder is the simple stuffing of the ballot box by election commissions who vote in place of those who do not show up. Here again, the identity and integrity of the election commis­ sion, and in particular the chairman, are crucial. If any one member of the commission insists on strict probity, it is main­ tained, for a complaint of election fraud means criminal pro­ ceedings against the offender.106

AVOIDANCE, NEGATIVE VOTING, AND ABSENTEEISM The possibility of criminal prosecution for election fraud on the one hand, and the fear that nonvoting may lead to future unpleasantness on the other, have led both citizens and elec­ tion commissions to adopt a strategy of avoiding the election system rather than defying or falsifying it. The strategy is de­ pendent on the existence of the "certificate of right to vote elsewhere" and is apparently used by or for 4 million people or more in each election campaign, mainly, apparently, intel­ ligentsia in metropolitan centers. The technique is simple. A voter, taking a certificate of right to vote elsewhere, is struck off the voting list in his home constituency and is, in effect, an electoral "unperson" until he presents the certificate in some other constituency. If he does not vote, he has spoiled no statistics and is not recorded on any Party official's list of nonvoters. Especially since the elec­ tions take place on a Sunday in June, when Muscovites and Leningraders like to go camping, to their country cottages, or to visit village relatives, the temptation to avoid the elections is great. Election commissions, finding that someone has not come to vote and is not at home, will sometimes assume that he has 106 Articles 129 and 130 of the RSFSR election law stipulate criminal pro­ ceedings for election fraud. Latov, Soviet Election System, p. 68, mentions an election committee chairman who was jailed for a year for crossing out the name of a candidate not to his liking on a number of ballots during the count­ ing of the vote. Nevertheless, former election commissioners report such fal­

sifications. Interviews O 5751 IZ., K 2146, p. 54, O 6761 AV.

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gone on a trip and forgotten to equip himself with a certifi­ cate. They then write out a certificate for him, and cross him off their list, a somewhat less blatant form of fraud than sim­ ple ballot-box stuffing.107 In both cases, that of avoidance by the citizen and that of cover-up by the election functionaries, a means has been found to reconcile the regime's aim of unanimity with the citi­ zen's dissent or apathy, thus avoiding conflict. Here citizens and local authorities act out an "agreed lie" to satisfy central authorities who may or may not be aware of what is going on. In other aspects of the participatory system we will see how control mechanisms are built to monitor the effectiveness and reliability of the local authorities. Indication of the extent and locus of election evasion comes from comparison of the census figures to the election statis­ tics. The Soviet population of voting age on January 15, 1970, may be estimated at about 158,500,000.108 The electorate for the June 1970 elections numbered only 153,237,112.109 In theory, the difference between the two figures should repre­ sent only the insane and incarcerated criminals, but these cer­ tainly do not number 5.25 million. Thus, we are led to believe that 4 million persons or more, wilfully, or by negligence, avoid the election system. While such a total far exceeds the 396,343 who voted against the candidates, the 64,901 who are registered as not having voted and the 420 spoiled ballots recorded by Pravda,110 thus qual­ ifying as the largest dissent phenomenon in the Soviet elec­ tion system, it is still only 2.5 percent of the electorate. In addition to relying on interviewees who testify that this phenomenon is particularly common in Moscow and Len107

Interviews O 5761 VY. and K 2162 DS., p. 54. Itogi vsesoiumoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda, Vol. 2 (Moscow: Statisiika, 1972), p. 13, yields this estimate. It is made up of all those listed as 20 years of age and over, all those of unknown age and two-fifths of the 15-19 age group. 109 Pravda, June 17, 1970. This is the number published after the elections on the basis of final tabulation of the results. No numbers of the electorate are published before the election. Hough, "Political Participation," p. 8, note a, is aware of the difference between adult population and electorate, but of­ fers no explanation. 110 Pravda, June 17, 1970. 108

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The Soviet Electoral System

ingrad, we can, by a similar comparison of figures, see what part is played by the metropolis. According to the census, the population of Moscow aged eighteen and over on January i, 1970, was 5,687,907.111 The electorate appears to be about 4.6 million.112 The missing voters thus number over 1 million, close to one-fifth of the election age population of Moscow. When we take into account the fact that the electoral roll in Moscow is swelled by the large numbers of out-of-towners who come to Moscow on holiday at this time and vote in a Moscow constituency, the number of missing Muscovites grows even more significant.113 While a certain proportion of those Muscovites taking the "certificate of right to vote elsewhere" must make use of them, it would appear that this is not more than half of the missing million, so that our final count of those evading the system in Moscow is at least half a million—about 10 percent of the electorate—plus the "large numbers" of out-of-towners who augment the Moscow elec­ toral roll, compensating for the evaders.114 The significance of election avoidance grows far beyond the 2.5 percent of the electorate involved when we see its ex­ tent in Moscow, with its high saturation of Party members and highly educated people. These are exactly the people who should, by all criteria, Soviet and non-Soviet alike, be the most active participants in elections; yet, either from disinterest, 111 Itogiperepisi (1970), Vol. 2, p. 118. Moscow has 80 percent of its popula­ tion of voting age, as compared with 65.5 percent nationwide. 112 Vechernaia Moskva, June 15, 1970, states that about 4,500,000 Musco­ vites voted, 99.3 percent of those eligible. Mathematically, this gives an elec­ torate of 4,576,500. In the same elections Muscovites elected 23 deputies to the Soviet of the Union. The theoretical constituency of each was 199,787 voters. This yields an electorate of 4,595,101. The difference between the two computations of Moscow's electorate is negligible for our purposes. 113 Vechernaia Moskva, June 14, 1970, writes of many out-of-towners voting in Moscow, particularly in the Bauman District where Brezhnev was the can­ didate. Two such, mentioned in Izvestiia, June 15, 1975, were cosmonauts in orbit who requested by radio that their votes be cast for Brezhnev. 114 Latov, Soviet Election System, p. 45, says that in the June 1970 elections, "about 500,000 Muscovites turned up with their voting certificates at polling stations outside the city." The difference between the census electorate and the electoral rolls in the RSFSR totals 3,360,898, or 3.8 percent of the census-based electorate.

Avoidance, Negative Voting, and Absenteeism

119

disbelief, or dissidence muted by prudence they choose a nonconHictual evasion of the system. And what of the counting of the votes? The same principles that govern the honesty of voting are in effect here. The in­ tegrity of the election commission chairman and his members is the determining factor unless some unusual event occurs. In most cases, interviewees with direct knowledge of the elec­ tion commissions claimed that the counting of the votes in urban polling stations was on the whole correct but that, as the totals of individual polls were aggregated upward, nega­ tive vote totals were diminished. A number of cases of votes not accurately counted at the polling stations were also noted, but these appear to affect the supreme soviets of the USSR and the republics rather than the local soviets. The most in­ teresting such case is that of a Moscow district electoral com­ mission in the USSR Supreme Soviet elections in 1966. A member of the electoral commission reports that at the end of the elections a group of persons identifying themselves as being from the district Party committee relieved the commis­ sion members of the burden of counting the votes, signing them on blank electoral protocol sheets.115 While this might have been merely a routine precaution, it is of particular in­ terest that it was in these same June 1966 elections that the prominent dissident Peter Grigorenko wrote a samizdat letter addressed to Moscow voters, explaining why he thought Kosygin an unworthy candidate, stating that Grigorenko in­ tended voting against him, and calling on other voters to do the same.116 Since Grigorenko made some efforts (however quixotic) to have his letter published in the Moscow press, the authorities may have felt it prudent to make sure that the bal­ lot box did not echo Grigorenko's sentiments. The insight we gain from all the foregoing incidents is that there is room here for exploration of the effect of the secret ballot on any political system. As Milbrath notes, there is in­ sufficient knowledge on this subject, even in America.117 In 115 116

Interview O 4761 VA. Λ5 2 4 0 , P. Grigorenko, "Open Letter to voters explaining why he can­

not vote for candidate Kosygin," June 3, 1966. 117

Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 92.

120

The Soviet Electoral System

the Soviet Union voting by secret ballot is one of the very few public acts the citizen may perform with almost total disre­ gard for subsequent responsibility and consequences. As it becomes more and more routine and the period when booth users were suspect becomes the personal experience of a steadily diminishing sector of the electorate, voting will be­ come the completely autonomous expression of opinion that it is in other countries—within the limitation that it will not express choice but will indicate approval or disapproval. Within this context it is interesting to examine the trends of negative voting to see what they may indicate as to the growth or diminution of dissent and its distribution. Table ι indicates the percentage of voters at each level of local soviet who cast negative ballots in the period 1961-1975. TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF NEGATIVE VOTES CAST AT EACH LEVEL OF SOVIET, i9 6l -i975

Level

1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971

Krai Oblast' Autonomous oblast' National okrug Rural district City Urban district Village Settlement Overall Source: Itogi p. 2 2 .

I

973

T

*975 9&3

975

I

0.44

0.48

0.25

0 .31

0.14

0.19

0.12

°-39

0.46

0.25

0.30

0.15

0.19

0.13

°-33

0.47

0.49

0.29

0.31

0 .17

0 .21

0.16

0.34

0.69

0.31

0.36

0.27

°-39

0.26

0.14

0 .17

0 .11

0.32

0.40

0.19

0.23

0.16

0.27

0.62

°-54 0 . 4 7 0 .41 0 . 2 3 0 . 5 8 0 . 6 5 °-37 °-55 0 . 6 3 °-37

0.65

0. 3 4

0.42

0.21

0.26

0.19

0. 3 4

0.56

0.44

0.47

0.28

0.30

0 .17

0.19

0.14

0.31'

0.82

0.81

0.80

> 0.47

0.47 0.67

0.27

0. 4 3 0. 4 7 0 . 2 3 0 . 2 7 0 . 1 7 up down up down up down up down

(1961-1971);

Pravda, June

23, 1973;

SDT, no.

8

(August

0 .21

1975),

A number of characteristics emerge from these figures. The first, of course, is that very few people vote against the candidate offered them. So few, indeed, that one is very hard pressed to believe that a true picture of voter satisfaction with the regime's or with individual deputies' performances is re­ flected here. The second characteristic is that over the last fourteen years even this small percentage has diminished, dropping at every level of local soviet by 60-80 percent.

Avoidance, Negative Voting, and Absenteeism

121

This has not been a steady drop, however. Instead, a clear and consistently cyclical effect appears. The reader examin­ ing the percentage of negative votes will find that, with the exception of national okrug and settlement soviets in 1965, the entire system saw a decrease in the percentage of negative votes in 1963 as compared with 1961, ahd an alternate rise and fall in each subsequent election.118 The changes are gen­ erally small, except for sharp drops in 1967 and 1971, in both of which years the negative voting rate was halved compared to the previous elections, establishing firmly the overall downward trend in negative votes. The fact that the cyclical change in negative voting occurs at every level of soviet would suggest that it is influenced by some central happening—a Moscow-initiated policy bettering the lives of all citizens, or a central directive of some nature whose eifect is to diminish negative votes. The supposition that some centrally initiated policy influences the diminution of the percentage of nega­ tive votes is strengthened when we note that the "down" stage of the cycle coincides with the elections to the Republic and Autonomous Republic Supreme Soviets (1963, 1967, 1971 and 1975). The difference in negative voting at each level is easier to understand. The general assumption made by Gilison—that negative votes are inversely related to the size of the electoral unit119—appears questionable. If we compare the village with the region, we find that the percentage of negative votes is very nearly equal, with negative votes in the village exceeding those in the region (krai and oblast' soviets) only in the years of low negative vote. The rural district shows a consistently higher rate of negative votes than the village. It may be suggested that the explanation in this case lies partly in the greater rate of ascription to higher soviets. The local candidate to an oblast' soviet is more likely to be a Party official or some other representative of authority, against 118 Because of his choice of analyzing once in four years rather than every election, Jerome Gilison, in his "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: the Missing One Per Cent," APSR, Vol. 62, no. 3 (September 1968), p. 824, misses this cyclical phenomenon. 1 1 9 I b i d . , p. 823.

122

The Soviet Electoral System

whom the Soviet citizen is not likely to vote. The negative vote is cast against one's peers, who form a larger percentage of the deputies in the village and district soviets than they do in the regional soviets.120 Together with this, local conditions and relations must play a part. The settlements, often raw development areas with new populations, though nominally urban, lack the cultural and consumer facilities of urban centers as well as the tradi­ tion, social structure, and self-sustaining capacities to be found in the village; they have, therefore, a relatively high percentage of negative votes.121 In similar fashion, negative voting in cities and urban dis­ tricts appears to be influenced by local structure, perhaps by the homogeneity and closeness of urban district constituen­ cies. While the level of potential ascription of city and urban district soviets is the same, the urban district has gradually but steadily moved ahead of the city soviet in negative voting. Last, but not least, is the phenomenon of the national okrug. The ten such units, all in the Russian Republic, not only have maintained a consistently higher rate of negative votes than any other unit but also have shown less of a decline in nega­ tive voting than any other level of soviet. The question arises whether the national okrug is influ­ enced in negative voting by being in the RSFSR, which has a higher than proportional negative vote (accounting for 80 percent of the negative votes, while having only about 55 per­ cent of the voters). The settlement soviets are proportionately 120 An examination of the professional composition of the local soviets in 1971 shows that "people of authority" who are likely to be deputies by ascrip­ tion (Party, trade union and Komsomol officials; soviet officials; kolkhoz chairmen and their deputies; directors and specialists of enterprises; di­ rectors; principals and teachers of scientific, cultural or educational institu­ tions) are as follows: oblast' soviets—39.5 percent; national okrug—33.8 per­ cent; rural district—36.3 percent; village—23.7 percent; settlement—21.6 percent. 121 Gilison 1 "Soviet Elections," and following him, Jacobs, "Soviet Elec­ tions," both lump the village and settlement together as small rural units. This seems not only unjustified from the point of view of reality, but hides the considerable difference between them in negative voting as well as in ab­ senteeism.

Avoidance, Negative Voting, and Absenteeism

123

divided between the RSFSR and the rest of the Soviet repub­ lics, ι ,843 of 3,436 within the Russian Republic. The negative vote at the settlement level is, however, concentrated within the Russian Republic. Of negative votes cast at the settlement level in 1969, 49,450 out of 61,433—about 80 percent—were in settlements in the RSFSR.122 Unfortunately, until closer field observation can be carried out among the voters of the Russian Republic, we will be un­ able to conclude whether this phenomenon represents a greater feeling of competence and independence among citi­ zens of the RSFSR, a protest against backward conditions in certain areas, excessive organizing zeal in the non-Russian Republics, or some other factor. Of all the voting phenomena, we have yet to examine the absentees, those appearing on the electoral roll who neither vote personally nor are voted fraudulently or through silent complicity by others. As is the case with those evading the election system, both apathy and dissent may be the source of absenteeism. Apathetic absentees appear to consist primarily of those who are not Party members and have no aspiration to Party membership, those who have no particular position or privileges that might be endangered through absenteeism. We may therefore expect them to be mostly workers in indus­ try or services, and located in the cities where social links and control are less strong than in the villages. The dissenters may relate to particular issues or to the sys­ tem as a whole. We have mentioned issue-oriented boycotts in our analysis of election organization and may note that this involves some level of coordination among citizens. An in­ stance of this is found in the case in which a newcomer to a rural area was nominated to be a candidate for the village soviet, though he was virtually unknown to the local voters. Only 10 percent of the electorate came to the polls, thus in­ validating the election.123 In the Soviet context, the potential conflict level involved in such activity is relatively high, as is the citizen initiative required, although the issue at stake may 122 Itogi 123

(1969), pp. 10-11; Itogi RSFSR (1969), p. 5. Orlov, "Not Elected," p. 28.

124

The Soviet Electoral System

be relatively minor—provision of some local repair or redress of a local grievance. Systemic dissent expressed through absenteeism is also rare, though it involves less initiative because it is generally a personal, rather than a socially coordinated act. Such, for in­ stance, was the refusal of the well-known dissenter Larissa Bogoraz to vote in the 1970 Supreme Soviet elections, an act later cited by the authorities as part of the reason to refuse remission of her exile.124 Such, too, were refusals.of Jews who were awaiting exit visas to emigrate, and wished to emphasize that they viewed themselves as not belonging to the Soviet sys­ tem. Systemic dissent as an organized social act has also been expressed by Jehovah's Witnesses, who urged a boycott of the elections in Kirghizia,125 as well as by a group of SovietJews acting in concert.126 In all of the above cases the refusal was a public act of con­ frontation, rejecting participation in the elections in order to raise a political issue, local or general. Unlike those who evade the system, the dissenters among the absentees invite conflict and are prepared to pay its costs. Disregarding the limits that the vast majority of Soviet citizens obey, this tiny minority of the Soviet electorate creates its own niche in the political sys­ tem, attempting to widen the choice of actions available to the voters.127 Small as is the absentee group, we may learn something of the organization and development of the Soviet political sys­ tem by examining absenteeism over a period of time and its distribution at various levels of soviets. Tables 2 and 3 give us this information. The percentage of absenteeism shows little consistency 124 125

AS 415, Kkrontki tekushchikh sobytii, no. 15, p. 36. Sovetskaia Kirghizia, January 12, 1972, p. 3, reports this activity of the

sect. 126 AS 672 reports the threat of 38 Moscow Jews to boycott the elections in June 1971 unless the candidate in their district agreed to discuss the status of SovietJews with them in public. 127 A variant of such activity was a clandestine campaign in Uzhgorod in the Ukraine in 1970, calling for a write-in campaign in favor of a local author rather than the regional Party secretary. See AS 605, Khroniki tekushchikh sobytii, no. 18, p. 28. Such write-ins invalidate the ballot.

Avoidance, Negative Voting, and Absenteeism TABLE

2.

125

PERCENTAGE OF ABSENTEEISM IN ELECTIONS TO L O C A L SOVIETS,

1961-1975

Source: Itogi (1961-1971); Pravda, June 23, 1973; SDT, no. 8 (August 1975), p. 2 3 . TABLE

3 . INDEX OF RELATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF ABSENTEEISM IN ELECTIONS TO L O C A L SOVIETS, 1 9 6 5 - 1 9 7 5 1 2 8

Level of soviet Krai Oblast' Autonomous oblast' National okrug Rural district City Urban district Village Settlement

1965

1967

1969

1971

'973

1975

0.94

0.61

'•33

2.00

1.56

1.24

1.07

0.82

1.05 0.61 1.20

0.47

0.81

o-75

0.52

0-43 1 -79 °-55

°-99 °-59

1.05

0.52

i-37 °-79

0.54

0.48

0.52

0.78

1.51

2.06

1.47

1.08

1.28

1.14

1.76

1.24

!-55

1.25

1.48

i-34

0.44

0.45

0.48

°-59

0.44

0.63

1.13

°-79

0.86

1.02

2.51

1.08

1.92

1.04

Source: Itogi (1961-1971); Pravda, June 23, 1973; SDT, no. 8 (August 1975) p. 2 3 . The index was calculated as follows: (1) The number of votes to be cast by all voters was totaled. Since each citizen votes simultaneously for several soviets (e.g., village, rural district, and region) this number is several times the number of voters on the electoral roll; (2) The number of eligible votes at each level was then calculated as a percentage of the total number of votes to be cast; (3) T h e number of absentees was totaled; (4) The number of absentees at each level was calculated as a percentage of total absenteeism; (5) The percentage of absenteeism at each level was divided by the percentage of voters at each level to yield an index. An index of 1.00 indicates absenteeism proportionate to the weight of the particular level of soviet in the entire system. An index higher than 1.00 indicates high absenteeism, and an index below 1.00 indicates low absenteeism. 128

126

The Soviet Electoral System

other than reflecting the overall striving to register 100 per­ cent participation in elections. In fact, this goal was reached in some localities as early as 1957, but has since evidently slipped away.129 When we compare the percentage of absenteeism with negative voting, the difference is striking. Negative vot­ ing, a very nearly autonomous action, is many times larger than absenteeism, which is subject to direct organizational pressure. Certain levels of soviets have had consistently low absenteeism compared with the rest of the local soviets. The villages and the rural districts stand out particularly in this re­ spect, yielding only one-half of their proportionate share of absenteeism. The settlements, on the other hand, as can be seen from Table 3, have a relatively high index of absen­ teeism in four of the six elections charted, and flare in 1973 to an absenteeism index of 2.51, with 0.11 percent of the voters abstaining. As was the case with negative voting, the small size of the unit does not seem to be the only determining factor. The same social and economic features that produced rela­ tively high negative votes in the settlement soviets may well be at work here. A similar effect may be observed in voting for city soviets. Absenteeism is not necessarily related to size. If we rank cities as very large (those divided into urban districts), medium cities (those subordinate to oblast' or republic soviets), and very small (those subordinate to rural district soviets), we will get the results shown in Table 4 . The central finding in Table 4 is that the very smallest cities—those subordinate to rural districts—have a much higher rate of absenteeism than do all the larger cities, while the very largest cities have a higher absenteeism rate than do the medium-sized cities. If we accept the hypothesis that ab­ senteeism is generally a protest against poor conditions, then this picture makes sense, for the district-subordinated towns are the most backward and poorly serviced of all Soviet 129

Scott, Institutions, p. 97, notes "regions and districts" in Tadzhikistan as

registering 100 percent voting in 1957. Itogi (1965), p. 46, shows the same, with rural districts in the Turkmen Republic, p. 78, settlements in Georgia, p. 142, and villages in Tadzhikistan and the Turkmen Republic, p. 164 also achieving electoral perfection.

Avoidance, Negative Voting, and Absenteeism TABLE 4.

Very large Medium Very small Total

DISTRIBUTION OF ABSENTEEISM BY SIZE OF CITIES, 1975 ELECTIONS130

(I)

ω

No. of eligible voters

No. of absentees

48,431,131 i3.099

44.292,752 1.895.595 94,619,478

7.39° 1.305 IO

Size of city

127

(6) (5) Absentees Absentees Electorate as % of Index as % of as % of all all city electorate city voters absentees ( 5 / 4 )

0)

(4)

0.02704 0.01668 0.06884

5119

60.10

46.81 2.00

33-91 5-99

0.02303

100.00

100.00

1.176 0-737 2-995

Source: Itogi (1975), pp. 6-7.

cities.131 Moreover, these towns have more of the impov­ erished, simple people who least respond to even the bestorganized control and pressure. Small though their numbers may be, they represent a problematic public, which has found a way to express its discontent. To add to this picture we may also suggest that the Party officials active in such cities may be expected to be of a lower caliber of organizing ability than are those in more central areas, where ambitious young officials making their way upward in Party careers tend to concen­ trate. For a full examination of the geography of absenteeism, we have data to compare all Soviet republics in general from 1961 to 1975 and at five levels of local soviet in three succes­ sive elections, 1961-1965. Examining Table 5, which gives ab130

The figures in the table were derived as follows. The number of eligible voters in very large cities was considered identical with the number of eligible voters in urban districts. See Jacobs, "Soviet Elections," pp. 72-73, for this point. The number of eligible voters in the very small cities (the 1,127 towns subordinate to rural districts) was derived as a remainder after subtracting the number of eligible village and settlement voters from the number of eli­ gible voters for rural district soviets. The number of absentees was similarly calculated on the assumption that a person not voting for any given soviet would not vote at all, i.e., the absentees at the rural district level are the same people as at village, settlement, or very small town level. 131 For discussion of such cities see Taubman, Governing Soviet Cities, pp. 76-78. "Effektivnost' deputatskoi deiatel'nosti," SOP, no. 1 (January 1969), p. 112, notes deputies in towns subordinated to rural districts as being least ac­ tive of all deputies.

128

The Soviet Electoral System TABLE 5. PERCENTAGE OF ABSENTEEISM BY REPUBLICS, 1961-1975

Republic

1961

1963

1965

*967

1969

0.07 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.10 O-O3 0.23 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.02

0.06 0.03

0.09 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.51

0.05 0.02 0.0¾ 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 033

0.07 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 °-37

0.01 O-O3 0.01 0.04 °.°9

0.10 0.19 0.14 0 0

°-55

O 0

RSFSR Ukraine Belorussia Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Georgia Azerbaijan Lithuania Moldavia Latvia Kirghizia Tadzhikistan Armenia Turkmenistan Estonia

0.03 0.01 0.45

τ

97 τ

0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.18

J

973

0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.12

I

975

0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02

Source: Itogi (1961-1971); Pravda, June 23, 1973; SDT, no. 8 (August 1975), p. 22.

senteeism by republic, we can note that the 1975 elections so reduced absenteeism that few substantial differences remain. In earlier years the citizens of the three Baltic republics, led by Estonia, showed much less readiness to participate in the elections than did other Soviet citizens. At the other end of the scale, four republics—Georgia, Uzbekistan, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan—have not had more than 0.03 percent ab­ senteeism in the whole period, while two more—the Tadzhik and Azerbaijan Republics—each had only one year in which absenteeism rose as high as 0.04 percent. As we noted before, there are scattered "flares" of absenteeism, the most outstand­ ing being in Kirghizia in 1 9 6 3 , when absenteeism rose to 0. 14 percent. When we combine analysis by region with analysis by level of soviet, as in Table 6, we learn something more about the absentees. For the three elections studied, Tallin, the Estonian capital, and the only Estonian city divided into urban districts, stands out with absenteeism of 1 percent or more. The other Baltic capitals, which might be expected to be influenced by the same factors as Tallin, show neither as high nor as consis­ tent absenteeism.

Source: Itogi {1961, 1963, 1965).

TABLE 6. ABSENTEEISM BY REPUBLIC AND LEVEL OF SOVIET, 1961-1965 (PERCENT)

130

The Soviet Electoral System

A similar lack of pattern may be found by comparing the Caucasian republics. At all levels, over the three elections, 1961-1965, Georgia has minimal absenteeism. Even the urban districts of Tbilisi register no more than 0.01 percent absenteeism. Armenia, however, shows much higher urban and urban district absenteeism, ranging from 0 . 0 4 to 0 . 1 1 percent. Neither differences in the strength of the Communist Party, nor the availability of agitators for mobilization and control, appear to explain this lack of pattern. Except for Georgia, which has a high rank among the Soviet republics (1 in 1961 and 2 in 1965) of Communists per 1,000 popula­ tion132 and is lowest in absenteeism, there is little apparent connection between Party strength and complete voting turnout. The best explanation of the level of absenteeism reported in the elections appears to be a combination of local condi­ tions and culture with possibly some variation in the effec­ tiveness of mobilization and truth in reporting by local offi­ cials.

CANDIDATE DEFEATS AND RECALL Even in uncontested elections the candidate to a local soviet may be defeated, for the law requires that over 50 percent of those voting must support the candidate for him to be elected. This means that the defeat of a candidate involves some type of organization, however informal it may be. It is not surprising, then, that defeats are rare—even rarer than negative votes or absenteeism. The number of defeats has fallen from 2 4 9 in 1 9 6 1 (about 1 in 7 , 2 0 0 ) to 6 8 in 1 9 7 5 (about 1 in 30,000). The defeats take place primarily at the village level (62 of 68 in 1975) where only 45 voters elect each deputy, and 23 negative votes can defeat him. However, in !975' 3 candidates to city soviets and 1 to a rural district soviet 132 The number of communists per thousand population in the USSR Re­ publics in 1961 and 1965 will be found in T. H. Rigby, Communist Party Mem­ bership m the USSR 1917-1967 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p· 507·

Candidate Defeats and Recall

131

were also defeated, their constituencies averaging respec­ tively 356 and 334 voters. Why the voters rise up and defeat a candidate is virtually unknown. So rare are defeats that none of the recent emi­ grants interviewed remembered the circumstances of such a happening, and Soviet sources pay scant attention to the sub­ ject. In the single reference found, two village defeats were discussed. In one, none of the incumbents of the village soviet was renominated, and the new candidates, without waiting for the elections, met and decided on a distribution of posi­ tions. The resulting criticism in the village, headed by the outgoing secretary of the executive committee, resulted in the defeat of the new secretary-designate. In another case, a sug­ gestion had been raised to move the raion center from one place to another. The chairman of the soviet opposed the move. "A group of those who favored the move campaigned against her, and she lost the election."133 While these examples are offered in a magazine designed for foreign consumption and are avowedly meant to show that the Soviet elector is free to organize to defend his view­ point (Orlov is quoted as saying, "we do know of cases where people successfully campaigned against a candidate"), they are of interest in showing two different kinds of opposition. The first case illustrates the attempt of local incumbents to re­ sist a purge—evidently instituted on the local level and for local reasons—much in the way that this might have hap­ pened in any local election anywhere in the world, with the underdogs taking advantage of an opponent's political error to turn the elections around. The second case, revolving about the shifting of a county seat, appears again to be a mat­ ter of minor local patronage engendering political competi­ tion. If we can accept the idea of certain areas of life as being "Party free," in other words, both contestants are acceptable to the Party and no questions affecting policies are really in­ volved in the dispute, then this indicates a survival of politics on a grass-roots level and a withdrawal of Party control to the "commanding heights," on which, according to the outlook of the present leadership, it is supposed to stand. 133

Orlov, "Not Elected," p. 28.

132

The Soviet Electoral System

The decline in the number of defeats probably reflects in some measure the efforts made by the Soviet regime to im­ prove local economic and cultural conditions, as Gilison as­ sumes does the decline in absenteeism and negative voting.134 At the same time, as we mentioned, the development of more careful and participatory preliminary screening of candidates at nomination time has evidently contributed to the decline in defeats by eliminating objectionable individuals at an earlier stage. As we found in the case of contests over nomination, the existence of defeats, rare as they may be, indicates a somewhat higher potential for participatory excitement than has usually been granted in the study of Soviet politics. The voters' role is not yet finished when his deputy is elected or a rerun held, for throughout his incumbency the Soviet deputy is liable to recall by his constituents and the ac­ tual use of recall is said to run to 600-700 cases per year.135 In practice, recall may be said to be a sort of "delayed defeat," a sanction which, though probably generally initiated through Party channels and most certainly dependent on Party ap­ proval, is applied through recourse to citizen action. The institution of recall has a long history in the politics of the soviets. In Tver and Kostroma, as well as other localities, it was used during the 1905 revolution.136 Only a few months after the Bolshevik seizure of power, Lenin addressed the All-Russian Central Executive Committee—then equivalent to today's Supreme Soviet—and stated that the principle of recall ran "like a scarlet thread through the history of revolu­ tionary changes of constitutions."137 The same day, recall was adopted as a principle to be applied in all Soviet representa­ tive institutions. The principle of election and recall was not, however, applied to administrative officials. In part, this was the application of the organizational principles Marx had admired in the Paris Commune. The principle of recall, how­ ever, also had an immediate political use in enabling the Bol134 135

Gilison, "Soviet Elections," p. 826.

Barabashev and Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, 1974, pp. 423-424, note 718 deputies of local soviets recalled in 1972. SDT, no. 5 (May 1975), p· 31, notes 654 deputies recalled in 1974. 136 Grigorian, Sovety, p. 29. 137 Lenin, Works, Vol. 26, p. 303.

CandidateDefeatsandRecall

133

sheviks to give immediate expression to their growing sup­ port among the people by ousting elected representatives of the other parties. In the early period of Soviet power, the recall principle was widely used. Revolutionary elan still ran high and the depu­ ties were expected to be active in administering the affairs of society. The senior archivist of the Moscow City Soviet, in an article on the importance of the standing committees of the soviets as organs of popular participation in administration, noted that nonparticipation in such committees constituted grounds for a deputy's recall in the twenties.138 The use of recall reflected the turmoil involved in restruc­ turing Soviet society. In the first half of 1931, 23,000 deputies were recalled from the village soviets of the RSFSR and over 1,000 from urban soviets.139 This is almost certainly a reflec­ tion of the bitter struggles over collectivization of Soviet ag­ riculture. In the first half of 1934, 18 percent of the urban soviet deputies in the RSFSR were recalled. Of every 100 re­ calls, 22 were purportedly for nonperformance, 3 for malfea­ sance or misrepresentation of class origins, and the remaining 75 for "other reasons."140 The other reasons were the political struggle going on following Stalin's consolidation of his power in the Party at the 17th Party Congress (the "Congress of Victors") in January-February 1934. The wave of recall went on, and in the first half of 1935 some 30,165 deputies were recalled from the 36,078 existing village soviets.141 However, the constriction of activity that appears to have been a general characteristic of the soviets from the midthirties to the mid-fifties affected the use of recall as well and it was revived only as part of the revival of the soviets as an instrument of government. The Central Committee resolution of 1957, which signaled 13s Bulletin, no. 18-624 (September 1967), p. 30. Simon et al., Moscow in the Making, p. 9, noted that in the mid-thirties a deputy might occasionally be recalled due to neglect of his regular employment—thus emphasizing at this period the connection between production excellence and elective office. 139 A. I. Lepeshkin, Kurs Sovetshogo gosudarstva i prava (Moscow. Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1961), p. 395. 140 Grigorian, Sovety, p. 30. 141 Papidze, Razvitie, p. 67.

134

The Soviet Electoral System

the attempt to make the soviets more effective, noted that the right of recall embodied in the Soviet Constitution had ceased to be practiced and new legislation dealing with recall was urged.142 In October 1959 the USSR Supreme Soviet passed a new statute dealing with recall, which served as a model for similar legislation in the various Union republics. This was ac­ companied by public discussion of the need to make "real usage of the right of recall" against ineffective or inactive deputies.143 The new powers were promptly put to work, and during 1960-1961 133 recalls were recorded. Unlike the defeat of candidates in the elections, the recalls reached into every level of soviet. Of the above number, 5 involved deputies of the Supreme Soviet and 28 involved deputies to the supreme soviets of various republics. The remaining 100 were from various local soviets.144 Actually, the above may be an under­ statement of the extent of recall, for Aimbetov and Baimakhanov note that in 1961 alone 33 local deputies in Kazakhstan (4 in rural districts, 17 in settlements and 12 in villages) were recalled.145 In contrast to such other election phenomena as defeats, negative votes, and absenteeism, which have all declined, recall has grown since its reinstitution and, though primarily a village and rural district phenome142

C.C., CPSU, "Ob uluchshenii. . . ," Spravochnik (1957), p. 453. Kalinychev, "Sovety," p. 66. See also I. Popov, Otchety deputatov (Stalin­ grad: 1957), p. 3, who states that up to 1956, despite the fact that there were deputies who did not do their jobs, did not attend sessions of the soviet, and did not report to their constituents, there were no cases of recall in the Lenin rural district of Stalingrad Oblast'. 144 Grigorian, Sovety, p. 32. 145 Aimbetov and Baimakhanov, Problemy, p. 226. These figures pose some difficulty, for they would indicate that one-third of the total recalls of local soviet deputies in the USSR occurred in Kazakhstan and, while this is not impossible,—and may represent an extreme "flare-up" of recall such as we witnessed regarding negative votes and absenteeism—it does not appear probable in the light of all the previous patterns we have discussed. This sus­ picion is reinforced when we compare the above authors' statement that in 1965 there were 21 recalls in Kazakhstan (ibid,., p. 227), with the statement by Podgornyi to the 23rd CPSU Congress, that there were 350 recalls in the USSR in 1965. CPSU, 23 s'ezd' KPSS (stenographic record) (Moscow, 1966). Vol. i, p. 242. 143

Candidate Defeats and Recall

135

non, occurs even today in every level of soviet including the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and those of the republics. The law on recall passed by the Supreme Soviet on October 30, 1959, makes the initiation of recall proceedings the pre­ rogative of the same groups that have the right of nomina­ tion: "mass organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations and cultural societies . . . and also to gen­ eral meetings of industrial workers . . . peasants . . . and serv­ icemen."146 It would appear safe to assume that the initiation of recall is indeed analogous to nomination in terms of the Party's role. That is, where a deputy is considered deficient in his duties or unacceptable in some aspect of his personal or political conduct, the Party committee responsible for his con­ stituency will initiate the calling of a public meeting in which a petition of recall will be presented. Formally, the petition is presented to the executive committee of the soviet to which the deputy belongs. The executive committee appoints a re­ call commission, which then calls a public meeting or series of meetings in the case of a large constituency, at which there is supposed to be open discussion for and against recall. The question is finally settled on the basis of an open vote in which recall is effected only if a majority of the registered voters of the district support it.147 Thus, the public at large is drawn into the recall of the deputy, but without the privilege of anonymous expression of opinion that marks the original election of the deputy. Recall today is basically a matter of personal characteristics. The deputy may be revealed in public as a drunk or a wife beater or incapable of the personal tact demanded in meeting constituents. Occasionally the man who was a fine producer in the factory turns out to be totally at a loss as a representative or as a committee member, even though a minimum is de­ manded of him in his first term. The existence of recall is used both as a spur to deputies who might tend to try to "lie low," avoiding wherever possible the burdens of their office, 146 Procedure for Recalling a Deputy of the Supreme Soviet (Moscow: Progress, n.d.), article 2. 147Ibid,., article 10.

136

The Soviet Electoral System

and as an additional link between the citizen and the deputy. The Soviet concept of the deputy is not of a man who, once elected, is on his own, but of a man who is constantly the ser­ vant of his constituents, and is bound by their instructions. One example of recall reported in the Soviet press con­ cerned a village deputy who was accused of using his deputy's post to get access to easy work and extra money, began to drink and quarrel with his family, and then stopped attend­ ing sessions of the soviet and was rarely seen in the village.148 Here all the vices for which a deputy can be recalled are rolled into one. In other cases deputies have been shown how to avoid their recall by publication of stories concerning those who took the first hints of dissatisfaction from their con­ stituents and mended their ways. Such was the case of deputy Semenov, head of the public works and utilities department of a local soviet. Threatened with recall after his constituents wrote a letter of complaint to the press in which they con­ trasted his inaccessibility and coolness to his constituents to the activity exhibited by another deputy who "listened to people's problems whether they were her constituents or not,"149 Semenov immediately took steps to meet his con­ stituents regularly on an individual basis, as well as explaining his activities to general constituency meetings.150 A third complaint to the press regarding a deputy drew a report from the offending deputy's local Party secretary, noting among other things that the deputy had been publicly rebuked by the Communist Party organization and had promised to mend his ways.151 This spate of articles dealing with the recall and near recall of deputies, appearing soon after the adoption of legislation on recall, would seem to be intended to demonstrate the vari148

"Za chto otozvan deputat Savin,"SDT, no. 11 (November i960), p. 74.

149

no

10

150 5/J7"

no

2 (February 1961). This item appears as a report from a corre­

(October i960), p. 66.

spondent who was sent to investigate the case following the letter of com­ plaint. 151

"Zarosla dorozhka,"

SDT,

no. 10 (October 1960), p. 76, appears as an

open letter from citizens to deputy Fartushny asking why he does not come to talk to his constituents. The answer appears as an editorial article in SDT, no. 1 (January 1961), p. 77.

The Functions of Soviet Elections

137

ous ways in which recall or its threat could be used as a public sanction against a deputy whose performance was unsatisfac­ tory, through the activity of citizens at large or the supervi­ sory powers of local Communist Party organizations. We should note that the sanction of recall is ultimately used only after public discussion, which should take place at least in part directly between the deputy and his constituents. The aim is, wherever possible, to effect the deputy's reform rather than his removal, strengthening the peer relationship be­ tween deputy and citizens.152 To this end, it has been sug­ gested that at the mandatory reports of the deputy to his con­ stituents, evaluation of the deputy by his constituents should take place publicly, and the opportunity used to consider whether recall proceedings might be desirable. While the incidence of recall—about 600 cases a year, or 1,200 out of every 2 million deputies elected—is low, it is not so infrequent as to be totally neglected by a deputy, and must be counted as one of the means by which the citizen is given a sense of competence in his relations with local officials.

THE FUNCTIONS OF SOVIET ELECTIONS The question is often raised by scholars, students, and jour­ nalists as to why the Soviet regime continues to hold elections if these do not provide the opportunity to choose policy or personalities.153 For the regime the elections fulfill a definite set of functions both with respect to the operation of the sys­ tem and the citizens' perception of the system. These func­ tions can be divided under three main headings: socializing, legitimizing, and communicative. The mass participation of citizens is essential to the success of the elections in each of these functions. First and foremost among the socializing functions of the 152

This point is particularly emphasized in Barabashev and Sheremet,

Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, 1974, p. 424. To the author's regret, he has no firsthand witness accounts of the conduct of recall meetings. 153 See Richard M. Scammon "Why the Russians Bother with Elections," 1 New York Times Sunday Magazine, April 6, 1958, p. 63; Gilison, "Soviet Elec­ tions," p. 826; Swearer, "The Functions of Soviet Local Elections," p. 149.

138

The Soviet Electoral System

elections is the theme of political and social unanimity of the Soviet people. It is to this end that the "Bloc of Communists and Non-Party People" is created and a majority of non-Party deputies is elected.154 Throughout the campaign the themes of unity, harmony, and unanimity are expressed in speeches, banners, and newspaper headlines such as: "We believe that once again the elections will show our strength, our unity, our stability, under the banner of the Leninist Party."155 The in­ clusion of the Communist Party in the overall unity is explicit and emphasized. The proof of the slogans' truth, and there­ fore their socializing value, lies in the mass participation of citizens in all aspects of the elections: nominating, campaign­ ing, and voting, as well as in the near-unanimous vote in favor of the candidates. The social and organizational pressure to be part of this monolith is intended to be irresistible, and in most cases it is. It is for this very reason that the exceptions are of interest and merit the attention given them here, for they add a different mix of dimensions and attitudes, enrich­ ing our understanding of both the reality and potential of Soviet citizens' election behavior. An additional socializing function of the elections is realized in the overall makeup of the body of deputies. The image is offered of the "best of the best" in Soviet society vol­ unteering to steer the affairs of society, and receiving the ac­ clamation of their fellows. The clear implication is that each and every Soviet citizen would do well to emulate these people. The emphasis during the election campaign on those nominees with outstanding work records, heroic war service, and evidence of active social concern is a clear statement of the most important values that the Soviet authorities would like to see inculcated into Soviet society. Nomination as dep­ uty is an honor accorded to those who personify these values. Where in American politics a candidate is photographed at home (preferably by a fireplace) with wife, children, and dog 154 In 1975, 56.2 percent of local deputies were non-Party people. The percentage ranged from 58.4 percent in village soviets down to 44 percent in regional soviets in which ascription increases Party representation. SDT, no. 8 (August 1975), p. 24. 155 Izvestiia, March 12, 1967.

The Functions of Soviet Elections

139

to illustrate his coming from a background of stable social vir­ tue, the Soviet candidate is pictured at work, with medals, and among his workmates. T. H. Rigby has made the point that the political identifica­ tion and legitimation promoted by broad participation in any elections helps maintain the political culture, reinforcing whatever other socializing instruments may have achieved.156 In the Soviet case, the work of building the political culture is still going on, for Soviet society so far appears to be some way from exemplifying the values and style promoted by the re­ gime. The reinforcing effect of the elections thus becomes important in the overall effort of socialization, providing an additional reason why total participation, or at least its image, is regarded by the authorities as top priority. Rokkan states that elections serve as both instrument and measure of national integration, through universalization of rights and obligations.157 This, too, is one of the aims of the Soviet authorities in their electoral campaigns, and indeed in the nationwide uniformity of the system of soviets, the care­ fully calculated national balance of deputies, and the media coverage given to representatives of small and distant lo­ calities as well as to the metropolitan centers. The broad legitimizing function of the elections lies in the fact that the regime can point to overwhelming public ap­ proval of both personnel and policy. In addition to the previ­ ously mentioned personal characteristics of the elected depu­ ties, the election of large numbers of workers and peasants (though many of these may play only a minimal role in the activity of the soviets) is important in establishing the in­ tended political character of the society to its citizens. In the same vein, the soviets, as bodies that are in part ceremonial and in part administrative, are easily made to re­ flect changes in the priorities and values of the leadership, A case in point was noted in our discussion of the raising of the percentage of deputies under twenty-four years of age from 3.8 percent in 1967 to 10.3 percent in 1969. The elected dep­ uties, whether as a particular group in society or as individ156 157

Rigby, Communist Party Membership, p. 24. Rokkan in Ramiey,£.«a).i, p. 68.

140

The Soviet Electoral System

uals, are provided by election with a symbolic reflection of their status within the society, a reflection which, because of the overwhelming majority by which deputies are usually elected, serves to establish the incumbent's authority and legitimacy in the eyes of the public at large, as well as in his own. The elections also serve to legitimize certain individuals and positions as being those from which civic leadership should come. The most outstanding example is the top Party leadership, but many other officials are also approved. Thus, as noted above, virtually no village soviet is formed without the chairman or deputy chairman of the local kolkhoz. Rep­ resentatives of the executive of large production units in urban soviets will be included in the soviet as a matter of course. In the 3,436 settlements—generally built around a major industrial development or a complex of related plants—11,298 "executives and specialists of enterprises" were elected in 1969. In 1,910 urban soviets 24,252 (almost 10 percent of the deputies) were so classed.158 The participa­ tion of such persons in the soviets is desirable from the func­ tional as well as the symbolic point of view, for the soviet has as part of its task the assisting of economic bodies in the fulfillment of their yearly production plans. The elections are often used as an opportunity to urge early overfulfillment of these plans by industrial workers and construction crews. Along with production-related executives, two other major bodies of people from leading strata of Soviet society are given popular legitimation by election to the local soviets. These are the paid administrative officials of the soviets them­ selves, and of the Communist Party. As the study of ascription to the post of deputy will show, these enjoy not only represen­ tation disproportionate to their incidence in the population but stability of tenure as well. Moreover, the higher the level of soviet, the greater the percentage of deputies who are drawn from these professional executives of party and gov­ ernment. Table 7 illustrates the scale of representation of party and government administrators in the local soviets. l 5 a Itogi

(1969), p. 124, p. 183.

The Functions of Soviet Elections

141

TABLE 7. REPRESENTATION OF PAID PARTY AND GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES AMONG ELECTED DEPUTIES, 1 9 7 1 Party functionaries Type of soviet Regional Rural district City Urban district Village Settlement Total Source: Itogi

(1971),

Soviet functionaries

No.

% of total

No.

% of total

2,264

8.1

5-278

1909

12,078

32.994 »7-417 5.779

14.4

4,227

5-3 3-4 4-4

16,752

1.2

91,128

6.7

2,047

1.0

10,881

5-3

45,980

2.1

163,477

7-5

8,612

6-9 6.0

pp. 2 0 - 2 1 .

The number of paid functionaries in the CPSU is not known precisely, but most estimates run between 100,000 and a quarter million.159 In view of recent trends toward reducing the overall paid apparat, along with the continuing growth of the Party, a figure in the vicinity of 200,000 would seem rea­ sonable. The 45,980 Party functionaries serving as deputies in the local soviets alone (excluding the various supreme soviets of the autonomous republics, the Union republics, and the USSR) thus constitute about one-fifth of the paid exec­ utives of the CPSU. Clearly, this group has a high rate of par­ ticipation in the body of elected deputies. The significance of these people in facilitating the coordination and control of participatory groups operating within and under supervision of the soviets will become clear when we examine the mecha­ nisms by which such groups operate. In like manner we may attempt to estimate the percentage of all employees of the local soviets who are also elected depu159 Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politws in the USSR ( 2 n d ed.) (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972), pp. 55-56, summarizes the discussion of the size of the paid apparatus of the CPSU in several sources. Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 25, states that of two million members of "leading Party organs," 90 percent are not paid officials. Lloyd G. Churchward, Contemporary Soviet Government (New York: Elsevier, 1968), p. 211, estimates the number of paid Party functionaries at 3-4 percent of total Party membership in 1968, i.e., 400,000-500,000.

142

The Soviet Electoral System

ties. In the USSR in i g y i there were 1,935,000 persons oc­ cupied in "organs of state and economic administration and organs of administration of cooperative and public organiza­ tions," a category far broader than that of the soviets alone.160 Tikhomirov states that 24 percent of administrative person­ nel in general were either department heads or their deputies in 1964.161 Among the deputies of the Leningrad Oblast' Soviet, all those mentioned in the newspapers as employees of the soviet were identified as heads of departments or their assistants. No clerks, bookkeepers, or other administrative workers were mentioned. If we assume, then, that the major­ ity of deputies who are employees of the soviets are senior personnel, and by Tikhomirov's reckoning there are about 464,400 such senior personnel in the larger body of adminis­ trators for which we have data, then the 163,477 func­ tionaries of the local soviets who are deputies represent a minimum of 35 percent of all such senior officials. If we sub­ tract from our 464,400 senior administrators those who are not employed by the soviets and those who work at republic level or for the Soviet federal government, the percentage might well be doubled. However rough the above calculations may be, it would seem clear that the senior administrators of the soviets are extremely highly represented among the dep­ uties, a fact of some significance when we come to examine the quality of participation of rank-and-file citizens in their role as deputies. In addition to socializing and legitimizing functions, whose many facets bear some resemblances to the functions of elec­ tions in non-Communist systems, the Soviet elections provide for an intensified transmission of information between the regime and its citizens. The constant din of propaganda about the tasks and achievements of each current Five Year Plan is augmented during the elections by the army of agita160 Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR /922-7972 (Moscow: Statistika, 1972), p. 347· No breakdown of figures into separate administrative bodies has been found, and at least one Soviet source, B. D. Lebin, Μ. H. Perfil'ev, Kadry apparata upravleniia ν SSSR (Leningrad: Nauka, 1970), p. 13, states that no such breakdown has been made public. 161 Tikhomirov, Vlast' 1 upravlenie, p. 47.

The Functions of Soviet Elections

143

tors. The production goals and most recent decisions taken by the Party are used, in the words of Nikolai Podgornyi, as "the electoral program of our Party."162 While local election meetings focus on the achievements and problems of the locality, these are normally put into the perspective of the national plan and the Party program. Thus, the 1969 elections were carried on under the dual ban­ ners of continuing to implement the resolutions of the 23rd Congress and of the preparations for celebration of the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth. The first three paragraphs of the report of the Kutaisi Soviet to its citizens were devoted re­ spectively to the Lenin anniversary, completion of the current Five Year Plan, and the implementation of the resolutions of the 23rd Congress.163 Only after this framework of reference had been established did the report go on to examine the achievements and shortcomings of the local economy and administration. There is a mutuality to this linking of national and local goals in that prominent candidates to higher soviets relate themselves to local as well as national problems in their campaigns. Thus, even when Nikita Khrushchev made a na­ tionally broadcast speech during his 1963 campaign for elec­ tion to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet from Moscow's Kalinin District, he began by reviewing progress in overcoming the district's housing shortage and speaking of the production ac­ complishments of the district's industry before moving on to problems of national and international scope.164 Once again we witness a building of national integration, a linking of the particular interests of the citizen with the universal interest of society. As is the case with any political apparatus, the elections are a time of testing. Even in noncompetitive conditions, it is a period of intense examination and self-criticism, revealing the attitude of the electorate to the candidates and the 162

Speech at the 23rd CPSU Congress, in KPSS-2311 s'ezd, Vol. 1, p. 241. Kutaisi City Soviet, Materialy ob otchete Kutaiskogo Soveta Deputatov (Kutaisi: mimeo, n.d.), p. 1. iei Pravda, February 28, 1963. Brezhnev made a similar, if more per­ functory reference to Moscow's progress before moving on to broader topics. Pravda, June 14, 1975. 163

144

The Soviet Electoral System

priorities set by the voters as to their own needs, expressed as voters' mandates. This is one time when the periodic reports of executive committees and deputies are expected to be less perfunctory and more actively debated than usual. No matter how regularly the whole electorate turns out to vote and how unanimous the vote may be, the mood of election meetings, the response of the crowd to the speakers, the questions that may be raised from the floor can all serve to indicate to a local or visiting official the reality of the local situation. In addition, the elections are a means by which central au­ thorities can get reliable information on the effectiveness of local apparatchiki. The rejection of a suggested candidate, the defeat of a nominated candidate, a large proportion of nega­ tive votes—all these are bound to attract the attention of the higher authorities as a signal that the local leaders lack au­ thority or perceptiveness. The secret ballot provides informa­ tion on the true state of relations in the locality.165 Of course, local officials may seek to short-circuit this func­ tion, protecting themselves by falsifying the results; yet such actions fly in the face of official policy. The existence of such local falsification is, in itself, an indication that the central au­ thorities are, indeed, in need of auditing mechanisms to en­ sure the accuracy of the information they receive from lower levels. The Party is not supposed to dictate the outcome of the elections, but is supposed to achieve the desired outcome through a judiciously applied combination of organization, propaganda, and achievement. Neither brute force nor spon­ taneity are permissible.166 The mass turnout to vote for the 165 Hough, Soviet Prefects, p. 163, notes a similar function for the secret bal­ lot in intra-Party elections and the recognition of this function in the defeat of a move to make all Party elections open. 166 The principle is clearly stated by N. Bannikov, First Secretary of the Karaganda Oblast' Party committee with regard to intra-Party elections, in Partiinaia zhizn', no. 11 (June 1966), p. 13. "The secretary is an elected leader. The Communists themselves decide who is fit to be leader. However, it would be incorrect if we allowed an unguided (samotek) choice of such a category of workers. Exactly here the guiding hands of higher organs should be felt." The same applies to elections to the soviets. The people will choose, but the apparat will act as a "guiding hand" in making the choice. The art lies in con­ cealing the artfulness.

The Functions of Soviet Elections

145

candidate thus becomes the test of the apparatus' ability to de­ liver in style, along with proof of ability to choose a good can­ didate and meet the voters' basic demands. The elections also serve as a means of recruitment. This is not so much the case for the professional administrators and Communist Party functionaries as for the rank and file of Soviet citizens who, elected to the soviets, are then made part of the machinery administering the country. At the level of the local soviets, and most particularly in the villages where Party membership is a smaller portion of the total population than in the cities, this serves as an important means of extend­ ing the regime's ability to reach the citizens. The utilization of 1.25 million non-Party deputies in the soviets, 0.75 million of them in the villages, is no negligible matter. Recruitment of the lay citizen as a deputy, though impor­ tant in enlarging the ranks of activists, is not, of itself, the key to entering into the most intensive participation.167 This is a role reserved for members of the Communist Party. How­ ever, in accepting the post of deputy, a citizen has undertaken a commitment to make himself available for active participa­ tion in state and community affairs at least for his term of office. He will represent the citizens to the administrative branch of the soviet, and will act as representative of the state to the citizens. Both literally and figuratively he will stand shoulder to shoulder with Party and soviet officialdom and will take part in their extractive and distributive activities to­ ward the citizens at large. For his term of office the establish­ ment has coopted him in the broadest sense of the term. The maintaining of the soviets as mass-elected bodies thus serves a number of purposes in the functioning of the Soviet political system. While the effectiveness with which any of these functions is performed is subject to wide variance over time and locale, the institution of elections is one that, if abolished, would have to be replaced by a whole new constel­ lation of activities. Particularly in the mid- 1 9 6 0 s a number of Soviet scholars 167 On this point, see Hill, Soviet Political Elites, particularly Chapters 8 and 9 in which differentiation between a "broad" and "narrow" elite is discussed.

146

The Soviet Electoral System

advanced suggestions for various forms of competitive elec­ tions, either by putting forward competing candidates in a single-seat constituency or by electing deputies to a multiseat constituency from a competitive number of nominees.168 In more recent writings, and particularly those intended for foreign consumption, the selection aspect of the nominations is emphasized while the balloting is presented as a safeguard against errors and a public affirmation of unanimity.169 Com­ petitive elections do not appear to have any current popular­ ity with the Soviet authorities.170 The practice of having competing candidates in elections has spread in the socialist world. Poland, Yugoslavia, and Hungary all make some use of this, and their practices have more than once had some influence on Soviet intellectuals. The adoption of competitive elections in the USSR would, however, involve modification of many basic aspects of the Soviet election system and the quality of citizen participation. The emphasis on harmony and unity; the idea of a single cor­ rect state policy rather than legitimate alternatives in open competition; the role of the public as a purely demonstrative and supportive force with no real opportunity of indicating policy preference; the nominating process as virtually the sole locus of decision in the elections; all these would have to be changed and given new and different content were the sin­ gle-candidate system to be abandoned. In short, the singlecandidate system is an integral part of an elaborate election 168 See, for instance, S. Zavadskii, in SGP, no. 8 (August 1963), p. 146; A. I. Lepeshkin, in SGP, no. 2 (February 1965), pp. 5-14; V. F. Kotok, "Problemy razvitiia neposredstvennoi demokratii ν Sovetskom gosudarstve" (abstract of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Institute of State and Law, Academy

of Sciences of the USSR) (Moscow: 1965), p. 14. 168 See, for instance, Latov, Soviet Election System, p. 52; I. M. Chekharin, The State and Social System in the U.S.S.R. (Moscow: Novosti, 1974), p. 42. 170 While delivering a report of his research activities to a formal session of the Department of the System of Soviets (Kafedra sovetskogo stroitel'stva) in Moscow State University's Law Faculty in 1970, the author raised the ques­ tion of possible competitive elections. The department chairman's response was so intensely negative that the two faculty members most closely associated with the work saw fit to rebut the author's suggestion at considerable length, though one of them in a different forum had himself suggested the possible utility of a multi-deputy constituency with more candidates than seats.

Direct Democracy

147

culture and a change in this could only be part of a much deeper change in the political values currently prevailing in the USSR.

DIRECT DEMOCRACY While the elections provide the broadest framework for mass participation in the representative system, there also exist in the Soviet Union provisions for mass action on the basis of di­ rect democracy. Article 5 of the new Soviet Constitution pro­ vides for the most important questions of state life to be given wide popular discussion and also to be brought to the public in a referendum. This also appears in the Party program adopted at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961. There the idea of the use of referendum was amplified to the formula: "Dis­ cussion by the people of draft laws and other decisions of both national and local significance must become the rule. The most important draft laws should be put to a nation-wide referendum."171 The suggestion of using the referendum was not a new one for the Soviet Union, and had been raised from time to time since the adoption of the 1936 Constitution. The referendum has never, however, been used, nor has there been a broad public discussion campaign to adopt the recurring sugges­ tions as a political practice. One Soviet scholar, in suggesting the use of the referendum, stated that in the past, conditions in the USSR had not been such as to make possible use of this institution. He added that, even after the declaration in the Party program, an appropriate foundation of legislation was lacking.172 With the inclusion of provisions for referen­ dum in article 5 of the new Soviet Constitution, the first step in laying such a foundation has been taken. Detailed suggestions as to how the referendum might be widely used in the Soviet system were published in 1964 by V. F. Kotok.173 With the inclusion of the referendum within 171

CPSU,Program, p. 104. 172 R. A. Safarov, "Institut referendurria ν usloviiakh obshchenarodnogo gosudarstva," SGP, no. 6 (June 1963), p. 25. 173 V. F. Kotok, Referendum ν sisteme sotsialisticheskoi demokratii (Moscow: Nauka, 1964).

148

The Soviet Electoral System

the new Constitution, Kotok's suggestions for a mandatory popular referendum in such cases as proposals of constitu­ tional reform gain new impetus. Kotok also suggested that referendum be used to put a seal of popular legitimacy on nationwide discussions of legislation. According to his pro­ posal such referenda would be carried out at the time of the general elections, with the citizen being given a ballot with two choices: "for the proposed legislation," and "against the pro­ posed legislation."174 If this were adopted, every voter would have to strike out one of the two proposals, and the use of the voters' booth would be totally transformed. Kotok's suggestion of mandatory referendum aroused neither popular nor academic discussion, however, and re­ ceived scant attention in later Soviet discussions of direct de­ mocracy.175 Under the Brezhnev regime, with its emphasis on professionalization of government processes and strengthen­ ing of administrative organs, the idea of giving the citizens authority to express policy preferences in a form that would put pressure on the regime does not appear appropriate. The implementation, if any, of the constitutional provisions for referendum will thus be of considerable interest to observers of the Soviet political system. In contrast to the inaction over referendum, the idea of mass public discussion of legislative proposals and policy changes has been widely used in the past, and continues even today as a form of participation. The difference between ref­ erendum and mass discussion is clear. Referendum puts the power of obligatory decision in the hands of the citizens, however much such a decision may be manipulated through control of the elections and formulation of the ballot ques­ tion. Discussion is a consultative activity in which an atmos­ phere can be created, values transmitted, and mobilized pub­ lic virtue demonstrated. 174Ibid.,

p. 178. See, for instance, Barabashev and Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, 1974, pp. 411-412, in which referendum is discussed in a single sentence, and N. P. Farberov, "Razvitie obshchenarodnoi sotsialisticheskoi demokratii," SGP, no. 10 (October 1975), p. 129, which refers only to the programmatic provision for referendum. 175

Direct Democracy

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The adoption of the 1936 Constitution was accompanied by a massive campaign of public discussion in meetings and in the press. Soviet sources claim that over half the adult popula­ tion of the USSR took part in this campaign, which is said to have produced 1 54,000 suggested amendments, of which 43 were eventually adopted.176 During the period of Khrushchev's leadership, mass dis­ cussions, accompanied by intense media coverage, sur­ rounded many legislative proposals. In the debates over the reorganization of the machine-tractor stations and sale of their agricultural implements to the kolkhozy, over half a mil­ lion meetings were held in which 3 million people spoke and 126,000 articles and letters were published or broadcast. Al­ most all of this took place within a period of three months. Khrushchev's proposals for educational reform were dis­ cussed by nearly 1.5 million speakers at 300,000 meetings in four of the fifteen Soviet republics.177 In the above cases, both of which have been used to discern the workings of interest groups in Soviet policy making, a common pattern can be found.178 A change in policy, after having undergone preliminary debate in restricted political or technical circles, is publicly announced by a Soviet leader.179 It is then thrown open to the public for discussion 176

Churchward, Contemporary Soviet Government, p. 80. In Brezhnev's re­ port to the Supreme Soviet on public discussion of the new constitution he claims that over 140 million people, more than 80 percent of the adult popu­ lation, participated in four months of nationwide meetings. These meetings produced no less than 400,000 proposed amendments. The Constitutional Commission recommended acceptance of 150 amendments relating to 110 articles, as well as introducing one totally new article: article 8, which specifies the social, political, and economic duties and prerogatives of work collectives. 177 Kotok, Referendum, p. 152. The republics surveyed were the RSFSR, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Lithuania. Kotok gives no figure for the media coverage of this issue. 178 See Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," APSR, Vol. 62, no. 3 (September 1968), pp. 840-851; and Theodore H. Friedgut, "Interests and Groups in Soviet Policy-Making: the MTS Reforms," Soviet Studies, Vol. 28, no. 4 (October 1976), pp. 524-547. 179 See Schwartz and Keech, "Group Influence," p. 845, in which Khrushchev prefaces his suggestion for the reforms with the comment that the Presidium has been debating the question of education for some time;

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of details and mobilization of support. The resulting discus­ sion then serves a number of purposes. It is a framework for the exposition of ideological justifications for the change, stat­ ing the new policy in terms of general developments in society and the political system. This not only intensifies the utility of the discussion as a socializing agent but clearly sets the boundaries of ideological legitimacy, a matter of some impor­ tance in the case of the sale of tractors to the kolkhoz, an ac­ tion that was explicitly frowned upon in Stalin's time. The discussion is also functional, in that it elicits both lay and spe­ cialized opinions, and provides the opportunity to anticipate possible technical problems or points of resistance. The use of nationwide discussion of proposed legislative changes did not cease with Khrushchev's retirement. In a number of cases, and most notably the legislation regarding family and marriage, prolonged mass debate of the freest kind has preceded the adoption of laws,180 and has influenced the ultimate phrasing of controversial articles of the proposed legislation. In a case such as the educational reforms, which were of immediate personal importance to parents, there has been testimony of sharp and substantive discussion on the grass­ roots level.181 In this case, public participation evidently car­ ried some weight in molding the draft proposals into their final form. Broad public discussion of the 1956 draft pension law is said by Kotok to have led to significant changes in the proposed law.182 Similar results might possibly be obtained more eco­ nomically by limited legislative hearings, but then much of the socializing effect of the discussion would be lost. As imand Friedgut, "Interests and Groups," p. 532, in which Khrushchev refers to consultations regarding the future relations between kolkhoz and MTS. 180 por an analysis of the coalescence and public expression of opinion in the early part of the debate over family law reforms, see Peter H. Juviler, "Family Reforms on the Road to Communism," in Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton (eds.), Soviet Policy-Making (New York: Praeger, 1967), pp. 29-60. The debate continued unabated until the adoption of the family law under Brezhnev and Kosygin. 181 See Schwartz and Keech, "Group Influence," p. 844, n. 23. 182 Kotok,Referendum, pp. 153-155.

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portant to the Soviet authorities as the generating of substan­ tive suggestions and improvements in legislation is the achievement of cooptation—in Selznick's sense of establishing a sense of shared responsibility for power through the estab­ lishment of reliable and orderly mechanisms for communica­ tion with the citizenry.183 The search for cooptation mechanisms by the authorities need not be understood as belittling the citizen's competence to influence certain areas of policy making, as we have indi­ cated above. Though the Communist Party maintains its veto power over any particular subject and can put a quick end to any inconvenient discussion, Party abstention from the use of this veto opens up areas of broad and effective participation, alongside such examples of regime-inspired unanimity of proposal or denunciation as that in which "thousands of let­ ters were sent simultaneously by citizens to the city and dis­ trict soviets of Moscow" about proposed legislation that would have obliged the citizens themselves to pay for current repairs on their rented apartments.184 Broad use of mass public discussions of legislation has been proposed at various levels of Soviet society. Open sessions of local soviets and their executive committees, to be held at fac­ tories, community centers, or other such public places are one such suggestion.185 For a portion of the population, participa­ tion in such assemblies may simply be additional exposure to the almost ceaseless barrage of propaganda generalities that are so much a part of Soviet daily life. However, when the issue under discussion is such that it touches the daily aspira­ tions and cares of a part of the citizenry, participation can take on new dimensions. "Attentive publics" emerge and begin to debate the issues seriously. Interested citizens who have any degree of expertise in a particular subject—scientists and educators in school reforms, psychologists and jurists on the question of family law, farm chairmen, tractor-station directors or rural Party secretaries in the agricultural reforms—can give their opinion when so­ licited, or opportunities may arise for them to write and speak 183 184

Selznick, TVA, p. 14. Kotok,Referendum, p. 140.

185

Kozlo\, Sootrwshenie, p. 172.

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The Soviet Electoral System

their minds. For the interested layman, an environment of concern and inquiry is created. Major civic issues are pre­ sented as being everybody's business. The lay citizen has the opportunity to see his fellow citizens expressing their opinion on public policy, he has the chance to ask his own questions with relative freedom, and can articulate a policy preference that stands some chance of being reflected in the finally adopted legislation. This is helped by the fact that the innu­ merable meetings are apparently generally conducted in groups in which questioning and discussion are facilitated, both because the groups are small and because everyone knows everyone else. In five different discussion campaigns through the late 1950s and 1960s, involving a total of 195 mil­ lion citizens in 2,725,000 meetings, the average attendance per meeting ranged from 72 to 86 persons.186 While both the scope and quality of discussion as well as the margin for citi­ zen influence will quite clearly differ according to the subject, the framework created is a favorable one that raises the citi­ zen's sense of competence. The development and apparent relative success of the vil­ lage assembly (sel'skii skhod) as an instrument of participation for discussion of both local and broader issues inspired at­ tempts, based on the urban mikroraion, to organize something analogous in the city.187 The differences in life-style, mobility, and cultural environment between the village and the urban setting appear to have frustrated this suggestion. However, the understanding that an intimate, organically linked com­ munity is the most promising environment for combining participation and control is a fundamental of the structure of Soviet participation; we will later examine the way in which such settings are utilized. The village meeting was a traditional instrument for involv­ ing the citizens in administrative and developmental prob186 Kotok Referendum, p. 1 5 2 . The five campaigns were the 1 9 5 6 pension 1 law, the MTS reforms, the school reforms, the 1959-1965 economic plan, and the antiparasite laws. 187 Tikhomirov, "Razvitie," p. 3 5 . For a discussion of the mtkroraion as community and convenience, see Robert J. Osborn, Soviet Social Policies (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey, 1 9 7 0 ) , pp. 2 4 9 - 2 5 9 .

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lems. The meeting has been given standing in law as a sup­ plement to the workings of the local soviet. Article 72 of the Belorussian Republic statute on village and settlement soviets states that "for discussion of the most important questions af­ fecting the lives of citizens, clarification of legislation and of the most important decisions of the local soviets, general as­ semblies or meetings of citizens living on the territory of the village or settlement soviet are called by the executive com­ mittee. ..." While the Belorussian law sets no quorum for a village meeting, some other republics do. In the RSFSR such a meeting is considered legal only if at least 25 percent of the citizens attend.188 A Soviet scholar stated in private conversa­ tion that in many villages the meetings served as a focus of social and cultural life, and were therefore generally well and actively attended, with the effectiveness of the meetings rising in proportion to the distance of the village from urban diversions. The Central Committee of the CPSU, in its March 1967 resolution regarding the work of the village soviets, urged the use of the village meeting as a forum for the discus­ sion of all local problems,189 but the effectiveness with which this is done is apparently more uneven than would appear the case from a Moscow viewpoint. A recent discussion of village soviets notes the important potential that the skhod has as an instrument of mass participation, but notes that its use has been neglected and its potential diminished by the substitu­ tion of formal for real discussion.190 Faced once more with the problem of trying to distinguish truth from fiction in any given Soviet setting, the reader must be painfully aware that we are dealing with extremely complex and sometimes con­ tradictory processes taking place within an evolving political culture that is subject to a multitude of pressures. The subject and participant components of Soviet political attitudes are in Kotovoi et el., Novoe ν rabote mestnykh sovetov, p. 68. C.C., CPSU, "Ob uluchshenii raboty, sel'skikh i poselkovykh sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia," Spravochnik (1967), p. 348. 190 Aimbetov and Baimakhanov, Problemy, pp. 138-139. The authors deal primarily with material drawn from the local soviets of Kazakhstan, but the complaint is so familiar in so many phases of the Soviet political process that it is difficult not to generalize from these observations to the rest of the USSR. 188

189

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The Soviet Electoral System

constant flux, and one of the results is the ongoing struggle between real and formal discussion.191 An author dealing with the Russian Republic notes that in Perm Oblast' during 1959—before the Central Committee had emphasized the need for such village meetings—there were 13,629 skhody in which 720,560 people participated.192 This suggests an average attendance of between 5 0 and 6 0 people per meeting, which would give sufficient intimacy for the possibility of frank discussion of problems. The calling of such a large number of meetings indicates that in this oblast' the meetings were regularly scheduled, for in 1959 the region had a total of 576 village soviets.193 This would indicate an av­ erage of twenty-four meetings per soviet per year—a meeting almost every two weeks. Even taking into account the fact that in soviets that cover a number of villages, as many of them do today, village meetings are held in each village separately, this still indicates a high level of participation in purely internal village affairs. The development of the many and varied participatory frameworks associated with the elections and institutions of direct democracy has been paralleled by a growth of public organization around the representative and administrative bodies of the local soviets. In addition, efforts have been made to strengthen organization of the citizens at their place of res­ idence. In a manner analogous to the attempts to improve the effectiveness of nomination meetings and to realize the au­ tonomy of the ballot as checks on the apparatus, so has the public been injected into numerous administrative organs to assist and to audit, providing capacity, involvement, informa­ tion, and control. It is to these forms of participation that we now turn our attention. 191 An analysis of the development and current state of Soviet political cul­ ture will be found in Barghoorn, Politics in the U S S R , particularly Chapter 2 . 192 Kotovoi,Novoe ν rabote, p. 68. 193 Rossiiskau Federatstw, statisticheskn sbormk (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia,

1959). PP- 34-35-

Chapter 5

The Local Soviets at Work Today, the elected deputies of the local soviets have become the most active focus of mass citizen participation in the USSR. Among the many mass organizations in Soviet society, the soviets alone enjoy the quality of universality, and can claim to be the institution that unites, coordinates, and repre­ sents the general will of the Soviet people. The status of the deputy as a popularly elected representative adds to this uni­ versal quality. Party members, trade unionists, members of DOSAAF or the Komsomol, are each part of a particular, lim­ ited constituency. Whatever their share in Soviet politics, the significance of such participation in terms of the whole Soviet people must be less than that of the body of deputies elected by the population as a whole. The deputy, whether acting as an individual or within one of the many collective bodies within the soviet, is strength­ ened by his elected status. The scope and outcome of cooperative activity sponsored by him, or in which he partici­ pates, are automatically improved. His initiatives, wherever directed in the system, have more weight than do those of the simple citizen, for he acts from a base of authority, legitimized by the public in elections and by the state through legislative recognition.1 The deputy's status gives him access to local decision mak­ ers and administrators that is not available to the ordinary citizen. In his dealings with local officials he may appear in many different roles: as colleague, as assistant, as supplicant, 1 The "Law of the USSR on the Status of Deputies to Soviets in the USSR," Izvestiia, September 21, 1972, is the definitive legislation on the rights and duties of elected deputies.

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or as auditor. The result is that at times the citizen will find his role as deputy demanding initiative and involving conflict as he attempts to make allocations or influence rule application. As compensation for the personal risk or discomfort in­ volved, the deputy has a much more real chance of affecting policy or effecting changes than does the election activist or dissident, whose support of or opposition to the authorities may bring personal satisfaction, but in most cases has little, if any, effect on the election outcome. The activity of the deputy takes place within an institutional framework that is as yet not fully crystallized. For close to twenty years now, the forms, jurisdiction, and interrelations of the various parts of the soviet have been evolving steadily. So, too, have the relations of the soviets to the Party commit­ tees and industrial organizations. The numerous Party and governmental resolutions treating these relations have set guidelines for institutional activity but, as in any system, polit­ ical realities are often decided by the relative strength of the interests and personalities involved, who tend to interpret the law according to their own lights.2

REVIVAL OF THE SOVIETS The physical reconstruction of the Soviet Union after World War II offered an opportunity for revamping the structure of the local soviets, facilitating amalgamation of undersized units and formation of new administrative areas, with the aim of creating more effective organs of government. An indication of the fact that reorganization of the soviets was much more than a technical job is given us by the time lag involved between the war's end and the beginnings of gov­ ernmental reform. As has been mentioned, the first elections to the local soviets after World War II took place in December 1947, and the amalgamation of village soviets began only in 1954—some four years later than the corresponding amal2 The central theme of Taubman, Governing Soviet Cities, is the ongoing competition between the executive committees of the local soviets and the other political and economic institutions acting on the same territory.

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157

kolkhozy.3

gamation of In the overall scheme of reconstruc­ tion, the local soviets appear to have been far from the top of the priority lists, and in fact it was only in 1957, after eco­ nomic reconstruction had been completed, that the energies of the regime were turned to reform of the soviets. But we should note that by 1957 Stalin was gone and deStalinization had begun. In the attempt to begin the restruc­ turing of the Soviet political system and to close the gap be­ tween the regime and its citizens, a return of the soviets to some part of their originally conceived role as popular organs of rule appeared to hold considerable promise. The premises for this appeared to be similar to those held in a number of variants by non-Soviet social scientists, namely that participa­ tion in and of itself generates socialization, that cooptation in­ creases resource availability to the authorities, and that atten­ tion paid to the citizens earns responsive understanding and cooperation.4 William Odom notes that the establishment of many of the mass organizations in the USSR was fundamen­ tally related to two problems: the gap between citizens and the regime, and the lack of administrative capacity.5 The fact that the whole reform of the network of soviets was undertaken late, and comparatively gradually, attests, in the author's opinion, both to their low relative priority and the lack of capacity of the Soviet system at that time. The Soviet regime was simply incapable of doing everything at once and production had a clear priority. In the interim between 1954 and 1957, the methods of ad­ ministration prevalent during Stalin's time, as well as during the war, continued.6 As has been noted, the Stalin period is 3

Lepeshkin, Sovety, p. 132. See the ideas set forth in Lane, Political Life, pp. 131-132; Selznick, 'i.V.A., p. 219; and Pateman, Participation, particularly Chapters 3-4. 5 William Odom, The Soviet Volunteers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. a 70, 305. 6 The Soviet system of total mobilization of the economy is said to have been inspired by Rathenau's organization of the German economy in World War I. Lepeshkin, Sovety, p. 122, states that Soviet administrators continued long after the war in a style of management that only the war had rendered permissible. 4

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avoided by Soviet scholars looking for examples of organiza­ tion for mass citizen activity within the soviets. Neither in the practice of the soviets, nor in writings about them does the x 937 _1 957 period provide substantial material. The entire system of soviets, shaken by recalls and arrests during the purges and decimated by war, lost much of its representative character. Only the administration continued to function. At the time of the first postwar elections to the local soviets, 70 percent of the chairmen and over half the members of the executive committees of the local soviets were coopted rather than elected and only 40 percent of the deputies elected in the last local elections (in 1939) were still serving.7 The jour­ nal of the local soviets, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, founded in Au­ gust of 1926, had been suspended in August of 1937 and no replacement was available until the journal Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia was founded in 1957. Administrative amalgamations must have provided larger concentrations of manpower to serve as a nucleus for the re­ vival of the local soviets,8 but an equally pressing problem was the reestablishment of the authority and procedures of the system, which had been allowed to crumble even before the war. Karapetian notes specifically the irregularity of sessions, nonreporting by executive committees and deputies, and the use of sessions only to hear questions already decided by the executive committees.9 As late as 1955, 35 percent of the local 7 Wartime losses account for a part of the problem, but cannot explain nonreplacement of deputies through by-elections and nonelection of those serving as executives. Ibid., p. 121, states that 34.7 percent of all elected depu­ ties went to the army, as did 54.1 percent of chairmen and 43 percent of executive committee secretaries. The loss of experienced activists from the soviets consists not only of those who were killed in battle, but those who were murdered by the Nazi forces during the occupation, when commissars and Jews were the two first targets of the invaders. 8 Karapetian, Politicheskaia organizatsiia, p. 135, notes this as one of the benefits of the disbanding of seven oblast' soviets, 100 rural districts, and

34,000 village soviets in the period 1954-1957. 9 Ibid., p. 96. Also C.C., CPSU, "Ob uluchshenii . . . ," Spravochnik (1957), pp. 451-454. The procedural shortcomings of the local Soviets form one of the principal themes of this first reform resolution. In later resolutions, the theme of formal correctness, though not entirely absent, is much less promi­ nent.

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soviets in the RSFSR were still not holding sessions with the regularity required by law.10 In 1954, 20 percent of town and 25 percent of rural district soviet executive committees in Sverdlovsk Oblast' did not report to their soviets and close to half the deputies did not report to their constituents.11 While the technical arrangements for frequency of reports and ses­ sions have been improved over the years, the substantive con­ tent of activities is still often a problem, to judge by Soviet comments. At the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966, Nikolai Podgornyi noted that "we should recognize that the rights and possibilities provided to the soviets by the constitu­ tion are as yet far from being utilized."12 The general trend of development outlined in the previous pages is that of a structural reform to meet growing tasks and an attempt to achieve a regularization of the procedures of the soviets that would enable them at least to take on the ap­ pearance of legitimate centers of the governing process. While these changes have not advanced evenly in all parts of the country or at all levels of the soviets, general progress is apparent and the pressure for further change continues. Within the soviets, for instance, the plenum is now formally vested with the right to review, amend, and ratify the draft budget prepared by the executive committee, where previ­ ously it had only a ratifying role. This means particularly that the standing committee on the budget in each soviet is sup­ posed to take a part in the early stages of budget planning, together with the local finance department, the executive committee of the soviet, and superior governmental bodies. Realization of this right would lay a considerable burden of planning on the members of the standing committee and their volunteer activists, but would also probably bring the committee a considerable measure of influence. It would ap­ pear that the professional administrators of the soviets are the 10

A. F. Gorkin, "O sovetskoi demokratii," Partnnaia zhizn', no. 2 (January

!959). P11 Volkov, Tah rozhdaetsia, p. 111. Although Volkov deals only with Sverdlovsk Oblast', it would appear that the observation is typical for most, or even all, of the USSR. 12 2jus'ezd, Vol. 1, p. 238.

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first to enjoy greater latitude in budget making, and that in most soviets the right to play a significant role in the budget discussion remains among the unused powers of the deputies. However, the formal change, creating a possibility of real change at a later date, is worthy of notice.13 As new tasks have been added to the soviets, they have also been under pressure to adapt their work to a whole series of new frameworks which have been created or revitalized from the previous era of inactivity of the soviets. Predictably, it has not been easy to revise habits of long standing at the drop of a fiat and it is understandable that both Soviet and non-Soviet observers will be more than slightly skeptical of such claims as the following, published only six months after the Central Committee resolution on improvement of the work of village and settlement soviets: "After publication of the resolution . . . the level of their organizational activities improved mark­ edly."14 Numerous sources discuss the persistence of "old habits of officials of the soviets which prevent collegial discussion and efficient implementation of decisions."15 Others complain of the continued concentration of control in the executive or­ gans, which prevents other bodies from taking any substan­ tive action. There are two deleterious effects of this continuing execu­ tive dominance in the soviets. First, the deputies have little independent margin for organizing their own work, since much of their activity, whether as individuals or as groups, is prescribed for them by the executive committee or its organi­ zation and instruction department.16 Second, the executive 13

K. F. Sheremet, Povyshenie roll mestnykh sovetov υ khozmistvennom, ι

sotsial'no-kulturnom stroitel'stve (Moscow: Znanie, 1967), pp. 12-13. Note also, in this connection, the statements of Soviet financial administrators in Frolic, "Decision Making in Soviet Cities," pp. 39-40. In the budget debate in the Oktiabr' District Soviet of Moscow in December 1969, though criticism was voiced in deputies' speeches, all the amendments actually suggested were purely editorial and passed unanimously. 14 Kaluga Oblast' Soviet, Vozrastanie, p. 14. 15 B. F. Bubentsov, Za vse ν otvete pered narodom (Moscow: Znanie, 1965), P- 27· 16 L, Karapetian and V. I. Razin, Sovety obshchenarodnogo gosudarstva (Mos­ cow: Gospolitizdat, 1963), p. 136.

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committees discuss and decide numerous petty details that could be decided elsewhere in the structure of the soviet.17 The picture as a whole is of persistence of old methods be­ cause of persistence of old values: strictly centralized author­ ity and strict control over decision making subordinate partic­ ipants and continue to deny them both autonomous initiative and any substantive powers. Meanwhile their active support of the working of the soviet is urged at all times. In addition, the problems of observing regularized proce­ dures and of inculcating an awareness of these procedures persist. An important part of the reform effort has been sim­ ply the struggle to establish a Weberian administration in which boundaries of competence and lines of subordination will be clearly perceived and honored. Repeatedly, in the past, instances were publicized of executive and administra­ tive organs exceeding their competence, often because of ig­ norance of the law.18 As we will note later, much effort has been invested in recent years in educating both deputies and executives about the basic normative framework in which they operate. More and more the emphasis in administrative activity has been not only on achieving the end result but on achieving it through the proper channels.19 If we compare this to the organization of the election campaign, we can per­ ceive a common denominator: an effort to create routinized institutions, ultimately controlled by the Party and operating on a basis of mass participation. But our focus here is mainly on the representative organs, and the problems of competence and style of work of the executive and administrative bodies have been presented chiefly because they are the actors who share the stage of the soviet with the deputies and the representative institutions, and deeply influence both the content and the style of the Iatter's work. The evolution of the executive and administrative 17

Grigorian, Sowfy, p. 133. p. 159. See also examples offered by the regional prosecutor in Kaluga, Vozrastanie, p. 118. 19 Bulletin, no. 8-566 (April 1965), p. 14, criticizes the administration of the Zhdanov District Soviet in Moscow, which, despite improved results, neg­ lected the recommended forms of discussion of standing committee reports and supervision of deputies' regular reception hours for their constituents. is Ibid.,

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organs is a subject in itself, though, and must be treated as a peripheral, though intrusive, factor in the study of the part that the citizen, in elected or mobilized roles, plays in his government.

CHARACTERISTICS OF DEPUTIES In the previous chapter we examined the characteristics by which citizens were chosen for nomination as deputies and showed how the body of deputies was consciously shaped ac­ cording to guidelines laid down by the center. Let us turn now to long-term developments in this area and their implica­ tions for participatory development of deputies' activities. When we examine the percentages of deputies of the local soviets from 1961 to 1975 who were Communist Party mem­ bers and candidate members, two characteristics stand out. The first is that there is a relative stability in the percentage of deputies who are Party members, with a very mild decline at every level of local soviet.20 During this period the Party grew from a little more than g million members and candidates to over 15 million. This has not, however, been reflected in the assignment of a significantly larger number of Communists to work as deputies. The soviets are set up on the basis of the "Bloc of Communists and non-Party People" and are the basic organization through which citizens are induced to identify actively with the regime, under general Party supervision but not through direct and ubiquitous Party presence. The image of popular legitimacy and democracy is predicated on the majority of non-Party people who are deputies, though it should be noted that Communist Party members, who make up about 9.6 percent of the voting-age population, are highly overrepresented at every level of soviet, as they fulfill their self-imposed task of being the leading element in all political, 20 The overall percentage of deputies who are communists in the local soviets declined from 45.4 in 1961 to 43.8 in 1975. The declines at each level of soviet ranged from 6.9 percent at the rural district level to 0.4 percent at village level. A general survey of the background of deputies will be found in Everett M. Jacobs, "The Composition of Local Soviets 1959-1969," Govern­ ment and Opposition, Vol. 7, no. 4 (Autumn 1972), pp. 503-519.

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economic, and social institutions in the country. In addition, the formal separation of Party and soviets removes the Party, at least theoretically, from the direct line of citizens' discon­ tent with administrative shortcomings and facilities for everyday life. The Party takes the lead in proposing improvements and castigating shortcomings, while the soviets (presented as being tantamount to "the people") are the cul­ prits who must make amends.21 Party control of the activity of the soviets is, however, firmly entrenched from within as well as from above. Not only does the principle of the "Party group"—which forms a separate caucus in every Soviet institution or organization—apply in the soviet, but the executive committees of the soviets are en­ tirely Party dominated. Communist Party regulations define the Party group's work as "strengthening the influence of the Party in every way and carrying out Party policy among non­ party people."22 However, the Party group has probably only a marginal influence on decisions taken in the soviet. There are several reasons for this. First, Party members, including some leaders of the local Party committee, always predominate in the Kpolkom of the soviet, and there is close coordination between the adminis­ tration of the soviet and the organs of the Party committee, which have a structure parallel to that of the soviet and are charged with supervision of the soviet's activities. Thus, little is left for the Party group to do. It would appear that the pri­ mary Party organizations in the soviets and in some other public organizations also have little to do with their actual functioning.23 The percentage of Party members and candi­ dates in the executive committees of the soviets in 1 9 7 1 ranged from 67.8 at the village level up to 91.9 at the level of 21 This view of the function of the soviets is sometimes expressed by former Soviet citizens. 22 C.C., CPSU, Ustav KPSS (Moscow: Politizdat, 1963), pp. 105-106. 23 A similar situation prevails in many central organizations. See, for in­ stance, M. Danielov, "Todjikistoni Sovety: The Tadjik Republic Newspaper in the Tadjik Language" (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Soviet and East European Research Centre, Soviet Institutions Series, paper no. 5, 1976), p· 46·

164

The Local Soviets at Work

krai and oblast'.24 This had not varied greatly over the previ­ ous decade, for the figures in 1961 were similar, ranging from 68.8 percent at the village level up to 95.6 percent at the krai and oblast' level. In 1975 the range was from 68 percent at village level to 93.1 percent in krai and oblast' executive committees.25 The 1961 figures, which are more detailed than any subsequent publication, also note Party control of the two key posts of the soviet—those of chairman and secre­ tary of the executive committee. In 89.2 percent of village soviets the chairman was a Party member and this percentage rose to 100 percent at krai and oblast' level.26 Among sec­ retaries of executive committees we find the same 100 percent Party membership at the top levels, but a surprisingly low 30.6 percent in villages and 36.8 percent in settlements. This is understandable when we recall our previous notation that executive committees of village and settlement soviets were almost nonexistent in 1961, and those that did exist per­ formed largely administrative and technical-distributive func­ tions rather than the mobilizing and coordinating functions of the secretary in a town or larger soviet.27 The second significant feature about the number of Com­ munist deputies in the local soviets is that the percentage of Communists rises as the level of soviet rises—the lowest per­ centage being found in the villages, with their constituencies of 40-50 voters per deputy, and the highest at the krai and oblast' levels, with 4,000-5,000 voters per deputy. This con­ tinues up to the USSR Supreme Soviet, where we find that close to three-quarters of the deputies are members or candi­ date members of the Party. As is the case with the constant percentage of Communists in the soviets, this phenomenon has been observed throughout the period of 1961-1975, urban districts always having a greater percentage of Communists 2 4 Itogi

(1971), pp. 90-91. 2 6 Ibid. (1961), p. 98. (1961), p. 94; (1975), p. 199. 27 This is also a matter of the weakness of the Communist Party in the vil­ lages. Kolkhoz and sovkhoz Party organizations had, in 1973, only 2,803,320 members, less than 20 percent of all Party members, while the rura) popula­ tion was still 40 percent of the whole population of the USSR. There are thus relatively few Party members to fill posts in the village soviets, and those who are most able are put first of all into responsible production positions. 2 5 Itogi

Characteristics of Deputies

165

than do cities in general, and settlements having more than villages. This could be explained by suggesting that higherlevel soviets have more responsible work and that Party members are preferred for this. However, the functions of the Supreme Soviet were, at least until recent years when its committee system was expanded and activated, more sym­ bolic and less substantive than those of many local soviets which had to arrange matters of day-to-day administration.28 An alternative, and better, explanation for allotment of more places to Party members in the higher soviets is that the higher soviets encompass a larger number of senior adminis­ trative positions, which are included by ascription in the soviets and are generally filled by Party members. This would include secretaries of Party committees within the territory of the soviet, heads of important sections and departments in the soviets subordinate to the higher soviet, and so on. As an indication of this, we return to our earlier analysis of repre­ sentation otapparatchiki, noting that 17.9 percent of the depu­ ties in the oblast' soviets of the RSFSR were members of the paid apparatus of the soviets (and almost surely Party mem­ bers) and 7.5 percent were members of the Party's paid apparat. The corresponding figures at the settlement level were 5.9 percent and 1.0 percent. In addition, although the statis­ tics available do not allow us to differentiate between school principals and school teachers in each level of soviet, it is reasonable to think that the principal is more likely to be a deputy to the higher soviet than the teacher is, and the per­ centage of principals who are Party members is 79 percent compared with only 25 percent of teachers.29 Similar tenden­ cies work in other professions as well, reinforcing the per­ centage of Party members in higher soviets as a matter of as­ cribed prestige rather than substantive function. 28 The similarity in many aspects of the deputies' duties between Supreme Soviet deputies and local soviet deputies is clearly shown in Juviler, "Func­ tions," particularly pp. 148-153. 29 Rigby, Communist Party Membership, pp. 437, 439. Cf. Danielov, "Todjikistoni Sovety," p. 47, who notes that the newspaper's editor was always a deputy to the republic supreme soviet, while other members of the editorial board might be deputies to local soviets.

166

The Local Soviets at Work

A second aspect of the composition of the soviets that may fruitfully be examined is that of the deputies' work back­ ground. Since the deputy is chosen from his place of work and remains an active worker throughout his incumbency, the place he holds in the economic and social structure of production will influence the way in which he performs his duties. If the deputy is to be in the final analysis an effective synthesis of propagandist-agitator, administrator, legislator, and public representative in a modernizing society, and, in particular, if the permanent administrative apparatus work­ ing with him is to be limited in size and reliant upon public volunteers for much of its work, then the deputy must bring to his post a rich and varied background of skills. Soviet theory tells us that this is the goal. "Every representative of the masses and every citizen must be supplied with such con­ ditions that he will be able to participate in discussion of state laws, in the choosing of his representatives and in the im­ plementation of state laws in every-day life."30 This is the as­ piration of Lenin's theory—the synthesis of political functions that makes each citizen competent in all areas. In practice, however, the organization of the soviets and their mobiliza­ tion of the citizens serves to create an effective division of labor, separating legislation and policy making from im­ plementation. One of the points upon which we will attempt to draw conclusions at the end of this work is the balance be­ tween synthesis and division that the Soviet system has achieved and the relation of the citizen to the various parts of the political process. Yet we have also seen that in the nomination of deputies the Soviet leadership has only recently started to come to grips with this problem, and to take into account experience and personality in addition to symbolic qualities and work achievements. The functional effectiveness of the deputies is only one factor, however. Soviet authorities take pride in presenting the soviets as a cross-section of all parts of Soviet society.31 Since the majority of the population are workers 30

Lenin, Works, Vol. 27, p. 185. Kotok, Sovetskaiapredstamtel'naia sistema, p. 38. See also Vasil'ev, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, p. 17. The theme presented is: "The soviets have always repre­ sented and do represent today all strata of Soviet society." 31

CharacteristicsofDeputies

167

and peasants, and they are repeatedly told that their state is a workers' and peasants' state, it was thought proper that the majority of deputies should be drawn from among them. In­ sofar as the workers were concerned this was neglected dur­ ing Stalin's time, and worker-deputies constituted only 10.7 percent of the elected representatives in 1955. Kolkhoz members, since they formed the overwhelming mass of rural society at the time, found ample room for representation in the rural soviets, which then, even more than now, made up the bulk of the system. With the first attempts to reform the soviets at the end of the 1950s the need was felt for a change in policy. The subsequent trends in representation of various occupational backgrounds are presented in Table 8. As Table 8 shows, a steady growth in the number of depu­ ties has been accompanied by a clear change in the balance of composition. Both the numbers and the percentage of work­ ers in the soviets have climbed, outstripping the general rate of expansion. At the same time, both the number and per­ centage of kolkhoz members have dropped, while the categories included under "others" have made erratic prog­ ress, first falling in absolute numbers, then climbing, and suf­ fering a sharp drop in 1969 to end up with an index of 103 as against the general growth index of 1 4 4 . The root of this change is to be found in the Central Com­ mittee Resolution of January 1957, which called for elimina­ tion of the "abnormal situation" in which, it was claimed, workers and kolkhoz members were "rarely elected" to the soviets.32 As may be seen from Table 8, workers represented, in 1955, a small percentage of the total, while nearly half the deputies came from the intelligentsia. In the Supreme Soviet at this time the situation was even more markedly in favor of the intelligentsia—with 61 percent of the deputies neither workers nor peasants. This was reversed in the 1958 Supreme Soviet elections when workers and peasants won 60.4 percent of the total and the intelligentsia only 39.6 percent.33 One explanation of the situation in 1955 was offered by a 32

C.C., CPSU1 "Ob uluchshenii . . . ," Spravochnik (1957), p. 457· Kotok, Sovetskaiapredstavitel'naia sistema, p. 39, states that the situation in the local soviets was similar to that in the Supreme Soviet, though as we have seen this was so regarding the workers only. 33

26.9

527,287

127

131 132

1.958.565

2,010,540

2,193,086

862,736

790,821

35.0 365 39-3

29.6

28.8 606,237

441 481

639,280

699,846

688,940

691,842

778,323

368

352

321

263

206

-

35-2 33.3 31-3 29-3

38.0

43-2

-

88

94

103

102

102

115

-

739.96>

801,142

761,620

742,338

696,914

684,713

-

694.424

37-9 37-9 39- 1 35-7 34-7 32-7 32-3

38.2

38.0

-

45-3

107

115

110

107

100

99

-

100

Index

750,584 108 28.8 92 624.599 613,728 103 28.0 716,622 524 9i 600,636 713,814 103 144 40.5 27.2 2,210,824 896,374 89 545 a The 1957 figures appear not to have been published in full. Pravda gives no occupational breakdown whatsoever for the Ukraine, Belorussia, Uzbekistan, Lithuania, Tadzhikistan and Turkmenia. For the other republics, a single figure for workers and kolkhoz members ranges from a low o f 50.87% in Estonia to a high of 67.9% in Moldavia. b T h e category "others" in the statistical breakdowns is sometimes referred to as "representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia"—see, for instance, Kotovoi, Novoe v rabote, p. 5. This category includes administrative, cultural and scientific personnel, as well as a small number of pensioners, housewives, representatives of the armed services, etc. Source: 1955, I. N. Ananov, Mestnye sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia na somemennom etape (Moscow: Znanie, 1957), p. 6. 1957. Pravda, March 9, 15, 16, 22, 1957. 1959, Lepeshkin, Sovety, p. 250. 1961-1971, Itogi. 1973, Pravda, June 23, 1973. 1975, SDT, no. 8 (August 1975)> P- 24-

143

2.071.333

1969 1971 !973 '975

2,166,004

135 141

2,045,419

579,074 604,997 725,135

23.8

433.293

119

1,822,049

1967

1963 1965

1961

18.8

338,627

-

118

1,549.777 -

%

100

677,466

Index

% 54.0

Number

100

Index

% 10.7

1,801,663

164,420

Number

Others"

Kolkhoz members Number

1955-1975

Workers

-

1955 1957" 1959

100

Index

8 . DEPUTIES OF L O C A L SOVIETS BY O C C U P A T I O N A L BACKGROUNDS,

(Absolute numbers, percentages, and index of change [1955 = 100])

101

Number

1,536,310

Year

All deputies

TABLE

CharacteristicsofDeputies

169

Moscow University professor, who claimed that it reflected the general view that social conflict was a thing of the past and that sufficient social unity had been achieved in the USSR for the choice of deputies to be based on their effectiveness rather than their occupation. This is hardly tenable, however, for as we know, Stalin promoted a diametrically opposite view of Soviet society, that of sharpening social conflict as the USSR approached socialism. In the last years of Stalin's life this theme was particularly prominent. The idea of Soviet social unity may have been held by some persons during Stalin's lifetime, but today such a view, at least insofar as it affects the choice of elected representatives, is considered premature. Today, deputies are chosen to reflect, at least roughly, the so­ cial strata in society, with effectiveness being only a secondary criterion. A similar drive to enlist workers and kolkhoz farmers in the Communist Party took place in the late 1 9 5 0 s , and the enlistment of workers has been reemphasized in more recent years.34 It may well be that the incomplete statistics of 1 9 5 7 are a result of the local Party organizations' being caught short by the demand to change the social complexion of the soviets. The Central Committee resolution on the matter was pub­ lished near the end of January and with it appeared an edito­ rial in Partiinaia zhizn', the Party's organizational journal, calling for election of more deputies who were workers or kolkhoz members directly engaged in production.35 The elec­ tions were held over a three-week period, on March 3 , 1 0 , and 1 7 . This means that the Party organizations had only a period of perhaps two to three weeks to change the lists of candidates which every prudent secretary had probably already pre­ pared, substituting reliable workers and farmers for "others." Many of those to be removed from the lists of candidates were very probably key figures in the work of mobilization in the localities. The "changing of the guard" was thus, of necessity, a project requiring considerable expenditure of tact, skill, and 34 See New York Times, November io, 1974, p. 5, for a report of a Party directive to recruit more workers into the Party. 35

Partiinam zhizn', no. 2 (January 1957), p. 9.

170

TheLocalSovietsatWork

energy and not necessarily one that every local secretary could or wanted to do. When the change in the composition of the local soviets is put within the context of other changes taking place within Soviet society, it becomes somewhat less significant. The drop in the kolkhoz members' representation nevertheless leaves them overrepresented, if anything, when we take note of the fact that during the period 1959-1971 the kolkhoz population dropped from 31.4 percent of the Soviet population to 19.3 percent.36 At the same time, the large numbers of workers added to the body of deputies in the local soviets are made up in part of persons whose social category was changed due to the conversion of kolkhozy to sovkhozy (state farms). A sovkhoz worker is classed as a worker in Soviet social and eco­ nomic statistics and is not differentiated from an industrial worker unless the statistics deal with branches of the econ­ omy. The figures in Table 9 illustrate the extent to which the TABLE 9. FIELD OF EMPLOYMENT OF DEPUTIES OCCUPIED IN AGRICULTURE, 1965 AND 1969

Year

Total deputies occupied in agriculture

Deputies, members of kolkhozy

Deputies, employed by sovkhozy

1,014,061 1,010,016

669,420 606,237

3^-393

-4,045

-63,183

+ 60,863

1965 !969

260,530

Change 1965^969

Source: Itogi (1965), pp. 33, 40-41; Itogt (1969), pp. 39, 44'45-

change of statistical category accounts for the increase in workers' representation. While we find a small decline in the number of deputies oc­ cupied in agriculture, due in part to the continuing shift of the USSR toward an urban, industrial structure, there is a much larger drop in the number of kolkhoz members who are deputies. This large drop is almost exactly balanced, how­ ever, by an increase in the number of sovkhoz workers, who 36

Narkhoz 1922-1972, p. 35.

Characteristics of Deputies

171

accounted for 40 percent of the total growth of worker repre­ sentation in the local soviets during the years 1965-1969.37 While this reduces the representation of urban workers to a considerable extent, it evidently still leaves them with a higher index of growth than any other group. At the same time, it is worth noting that the numbers of deputies drawn from the intelligentsia, within which fall the great majority of the as­ cribed positions discussed earlier, continue to grow slowly, despite periodic reductions. Although the subject is rarely broached openly in Soviet journals or public discussions, Soviet scholars are aware that the focus on a "socially representative" body of deputies bears with it a cost in terms of efficiency. In Sverdlovsk, research among deputies showed that one-quarter of the city's elected deputies were inactive, primarily because of lack of educa­ tional qualifications.38 In many cases the high rate of deputy turnover can be ascribed to this problem. The differing levels of personal ability among deputies and officials are apparent on all sides. In the record of the Kaluga Conference one finds the report of V. F. Zakharov, who repeats almost verbatim a section of the opening speech of the conference, and then deals in platitudes and statistics without relating them to the actual work of government. At the same conference another speaker is businesslike and specific.39 Occasionally, an article will mention the goal of linking administrative function with suitable training.40 The principle of having the deputies rep37

Prior to 1965, Itogi does not contain a detailed breakdown of deputies according to branches of the economy. It might well be possible to extend the same comparison back to 1957 were figures available. 38 Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 127. 39 Kaluga, Vozrastanie, pp. 65-72. Zakharov says: "The soviets of Tarusa dis­ trict have formed seventy-two committees. . . . Each seventy-five citizens of the town of Tarusa has a deputy to represent them." (Tarusa falls in the cate­ gory of very small, district-subordinated cities, which we discussed with re­ gard to the elections.) Ibid., pp. 78-85, carries the speech of the more effective deputy who discusses what measures have been taken to improve the training of local personnel and discusses the implications of changing eleven chair­ men and secretaries of village soviets in his district. 40 See, for instance, Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 130, in which he notes with approval the fact that 11 percent of the deputies of Sverdlovsk Oblast' are

172

TheLocalSovietsatWork

resent a cross-section of Soviet society is, however, the basic consideration in choosing candidates and the value of having workers as representatives is considered to offset any costs in reduced effectiveness of representation or of committee work. The assumption is that, within the ranks of production workers, devoted and intelligent representatives can be found or developed to fulfill the duties of a deputy, and that in the end this will strengthen the entire society. In choosing workers to be deputies, however, the Soviet au­ thorities assemble a group with an educational profile consid­ erably above the national educational profile. What is more, the educational background of the deputies has been rising rapidly and steadily over the past decade, reflecting both the general rise in the educational level of the Soviet public and the search for more effective deputies. Table 10 illustrates this TABLE 10. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF DEPUTIES ΤΟ LOCAL SOVIETS AS COMPARED TO THE SOVIET POPULATION, 1959 AND 1970 (1959 = 100)

Soviet Population 1

Level of education Higher Secondary Elementary

%

959 Index

1

%

Deputies

970

1970

1959

Index

%

Index

%

Index

2.3

100

4.2

183

11.2

100

16.7

149

33.8

100

13°

28.9

100

69.8

242

63.9

100

44·1 5!-7

81

59-9

100

135

22

Source: 1959, Lepeshkin, Sovety, p. 249, for deputies; SSSR ν tsifrakh, 1970, p. 20, for population. 1970, Itogi (1969), pp. 34-35, for deputies; SSSR υ tsifrakh, 1970, for population.

trend. The improvement in the level of education of the depu­ ties is reflected particularly among those with secondary educa­ tion and in the reduced numbers of deputies with elementary schooling only. The index shows that the rate of increase of those deputies with secondary education was greater than that of the entire population—probably reflecting the growmembers of the apparatus of the soviets and as such are experienced in pub­ lic administration. Also Tikhomirov, Vlast' i upravlenie, p. 180, who quotes Lenin to the effect that one may be the strongest of revolutionaries and yet useless as an administrator.

Education, Training, and Assistance

173

ing proportion of workers among the deputies, and the im­ proving educational level of the working population. The growth in the percentage of deputies having higher educa­ tion is also considerable, though it lags behind the rate of growth of higher education in the population at large. The improvement runs through the entire system. Even on the village level 11.6 percent of the deputies have had higher education, while only 17.8 percent have elementary educa­ tion.41 Varchuk argues that in the early years of Soviet rule the cultural level of the country was too low to allow full par­ ticipation of the masses in administration, but that today this has been overcome "if not completely then at least in large measure."42 The improvement in the educational level of deputies and the background to Varchuk's statement become clear when we note that in 1927 one in eight village soviet deputies was illiterate and the majority were only semiliterate (malogramotnye). Even in the cities, at that time, over 70 per­ cent of the deputies had only elementary education.43 The point has been made that the people who flocked to the cities at the end of the twenties, with the first great growth of indus­ trialization, were from the most educationally and culturally backward portions of Soviet society. These, transferred to the city, and to its difficult living conditions, were the people from whom deputies had to be chosen. Today, while there is still a strong tide of new arrivals to the city, and a large gap between urban and rural cultures, there exists a broad urban base to absorb the newcomers and provide the type of exemplary leadership expected of a deputy. Even the newcomers from the village are far better prepared for activism as deputies or community volunteers than were their predecessors.

EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND ASSISTANCE The emphasis on special training for deputies, and particu­ larly for those who will be occupying the most responsible posts, emerges frequently. One of the discussants at the 41ItogHi969),

p. 155. Varchuk, Puty fnivlecheniia . . . , p. 58. 43 Karapetian,Politicheskaia organizatsiia, p. 132.

42

174

TheLocalSovietsatWork

Kaluga Conference notes that in the oblast' there is a "general problem of distrust of activists in the soviets who have too low a level of general development."44 Although the discussion quoted here was aimed more at professional administrators than at elected representatives, there are many aspects of a deputy's work that resemble those of an administrator in his relations with the citizen, and the aim of the authorities ap­ pears increasingly to be to fuse the two types. Thus, many of the demands made on administrators in terms of qualifica­ tions and training are relevant to the deputy as well. After the 1967 elections to the local soviets, all 22 raion executive committee chairmen in Kaluga had full or partial higher education and included 7 agricultural specialists, 6 pedagogues and 9 graduates of higher party schools.45 That the emphasis on having better-educated officials is general is attested to by the fact that in the RSFSR the percentage of vil­ lage soviet chairmen with higher education grew by four times between 1953 and 1963, while the percentage with only primary education dropped to less than half its previous level.46 The nature of the higher education that officials of the soviets receive is of some interest here. As noted above, a large percentage of those with higher education are either technically trained specialists, whose main interest is in the economic and production supervision functions of the soviets, or they are graduates of higher Party schools who, having proved themselves loyal and able, have been given the formal political training considered necessary for the fulfill­ ment of their responsibilities. This was the subject of some discussion in the Central Committee of the CPSU, which rec­ ognized the need for giving in-service training to leaders of the local soviets. The Central Committee resolution of Octo­ ber 6, 1967, notes a decision to send more people from the local soviets to Party schools on the all-Union as well as repub­ lic and oblast' levels. These schools are for those who are chairmen and deputy chairmen of executive committees. 44

45 Ibid,., p. 24. Kaluga, Vozrastanie, p. 78. Konstantin F. Sheremet, Sel'skie 1 poselkovye sovety deputatov trudiashchtkhsia (Moscow: Mysl', 1967), p. 43. 46

Education, Training, and Assistance

175

During the 1967-1969 convocation of local soviets, the chair­ men of 100 village and settlement soviets in the Armenian Republic (out of a total of 484 in the republic) were sent to such courses.47 In Kaluga, all deputy heads of administrations and all "leading personnel" of the oblast' soviet executive committee attend such courses, while the oblast' executive holds training seminars for the chairmen and deputy chair­ men of the district soviets.48 For Party members who are deputies and people in the aktiv of the soviets who are being considered for the post of deputy or other work in the soviets, local-level Party-soviet schools are proposed. On a third level, the same resolution proposes establishment of a new correspondence course in Soviet Law and Administration for people recommended by the executive committees of the soviets.49 In addition to the more formal and long-term training programs intended primarily for officials, there is a multitude of ways in which the rank-and-file deputy is given informa­ tion, assistance, and guidance in understanding his job and carrying it out. The citizen-deputy is thus given additional stimulus to fulfill his role as a participant in government, by being given more information and analysis than the ordinary citizen receives as well as by reinforcement and guidance to increase his own sense of competence and duty. As the soviets have taken on more and more responsibility for social and economic allocation, the demands and the pro­ visions for formal training for deputies have become greater. There is a growing realization that the experience and exam­ ple of veteran deputies and even the detailed daily supervi­ sion of the officials of the organization and instruction de­ partments of the soviets cannot give the deputy sufficient systematic knowledge.50 Whether he is to supervise, supple­ ment, or supplant the professional administrator, the citizen47

48 Kaluga, Vozrastanie, p. 25. Izvestiia, March 4, 1969. C.C., CPSU, "O merakh po uluchshenii podgotovki i perepodgotovki rabotnikov sovetov trudiashchikhsia," Sprnvochnik (1968), pp. 308, 309. 50 Aimbetov and Baimakhanov, Problemy, p. 102; and L. Karapetian and V. I. Razin, Sovety obshchenarodnogo gosudarstva (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1963)· P- 70· 49

176

TheLocalSovietsatWork

turned-deputy is in need of additional knowledge. Increas­ ingly, the emphasis has been on formal training courses of some substantial length to give the deputies the knowledge they need. Thus, in Shevchenko urban district of Kiev it was reported that all local deputies were attending a two-year evening course.51 The Moscow Oblast' Soviet has run a three-month course in which thirty-two hours of lectures are given. Forty centers in the oblast', staffed by volunteers, of­ fered lectures stressing knowledge of recent legislation; the organization of the work of local soviets; budgetary laws of local soviets; and other, similar subjects, with lectures given by university personnel and senior officials. In 1967, the Prole­ tarian Urban District of Moscow organized a two-year semi­ nar for deputies, covering forms and methods of organiza­ tional and educational work in the constituency; proper use of housing resources; and supervision of trade and catering establishments.52 The Oktiabr' District of Moscow sponsored a "Popular University of Legal Studies" under the joint aegis of the district Party committee and the local branch of Znanie (The Society for the Dissemination of Scientific and Cultural Knowledge). It offered a two-year course of lectures in four different fields: Legal Studies; People's Control; Court Procedures; and Labor Law. The lectures were sched­ uled twice monthly and, in addition to such general subjects as "Soviet Foreign Policy and the International Situation," or "Education of the New Man in the Light of the Decisions of the 23rd Party Congress," students hear more specialized lec­ tures such as "Labor Disputes and Their Resolution"; "Re­ view of Case Materials in Housing Disputes and Labor Dis­ putes"; or "Pension Provisions and Social Insurance." The studies are divided approximately evenly between the more general lectures and the specialized lectures, with the general lectures including some material on Soviet law in general and the development of the Oktiabr' District.53 51

52 Bulletin, no. 8-615 (April 1967), p. 17. Izvestiia, January 6, 1967. The schedule of lectures is published in a brochure, Narodnyi universitet pravovyhh znanii (Moscow: Znanie, 1967). A similar course, but designed for officials of the Moscow City Soviet rather than for deputies is described in Bulletin, no. 13-571 (July 1965), p. 24. 53

Education, Training, and Assistance

177

The organization and instruction department and the sec­ retary of the executive committee also take part in this pro­ gram by preparing "Deputies' Days"—one-day meetings at which all deputies of a given soviet meet to receive informa­ tion regarding the work of the soviet and to exchange experi­ ences of the problems and achievements of individuals and groups of deputies. Such conferences for the exchange of leading experience are widely practiced in all spheres of activ­ ity in the Soviet Union and are a regular feature of the system of the soviets. The aim of the organizers is to find a deputy or committee chairman who has had some success in his work or who has developed a novel approach to some problem and have him relate his experiences to the group. This will then be discussed and adopted or modified and a subsequent ac­ count may be published in the bulletin of the local soviet or in the general journal devoted to the local soviets. In addition to such one-time or periodical efforts, the or­ ganization and instruction department of the soviet is also supposed to play a daily role in assisting new deputies. When the time comes to report to the public, the department will not only prepare a general report of the soviet with a note appended instructing the deputy to add items from his own work and experience,54 but it will also check to see that re­ ports are actually given and that the deputies are meeting with their constituents. At times this supervision is apparently excessive: Karapetian and Razin note that the "Orgotdel people often treat the deputies as Pioneer leaders treat their charges."55 There are thus many frameworks for giving the deputy the knowledge he needs for his work and to guide him in fulfill­ ing his tasks, but much of this guidance and particularly the most organized part of it is not available to those most in need of it. It is naturally most practiced in and near the urban cen­ ters that have the educational facilities and staff available, and least practiced in the more remote rural areas where the normal experience of the deputies is more limited and formal training all the more necessary. 54 55

See Kutaisi, Materialy • Karapetian and Razin,

Sovety, p. 70.

178

TheLocalSovietsatWork

The geographical isolation of many of the smaller adminis­ trative units makes the question of supervision and training even more difficult. In Volgograd Oblast', which is certainly far from being the most difficult or remote area of the USSR, 17 of the 32 rural district centers existing in 1974 were not on any rail line. Their distance from the railroad ranges from 3 to 84 kilometers, but 9 of the 17 are more than 40 kilometers from rail transport. They are thus largely dependent on motor transport both for contact with the oblast' center in Volgograd and for contact with the 397 village soviets subor­ dinate to them. 56 Considering the problems of winter weather and spring and autumn mud, it seems reasonable to assume that regular personal advice and supervision from the center cannot be easily forthcoming, denying much-needed guid­ ance to the primary administrative levels, or limiting it to the formal level of written reports and instructions, or telephone consultation.57 To help disseminate knowledge of successful experience and encourage awareness and discussion of current cam­ paigns and problems a vast amount of literature is printed for the deputies of the local soviets. A May 1957 resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU established the monthly journal Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia, which provides a forum for a mixture of theoretical analysis and practical re­ ports from deputies of every level of soviet as well as by mem­ bers of the public from the aktiv of the soviets.58 Izvestiia car­ ries a regular column discussing the role and activities of the deputy, the executive committee, and the various ancillary units of the soviets. Additionally, the newspapers will often carry letters from the public or from deputies discussing as­ pects of the soviets' work. These are published with clearly 56RSFSR,

Admmistrativno-temtorial'noe delenie, 1974 (Moscow: Izvestiia,

!974). PP- 90-9257 P. S. Ulitskii 1 "Avtomobilizatsiia ν razvitom sotsialisticheskom obshchestve," Sotswlogicheskie issledovaniia, no. 1 (1976), p. 132, writes that at present 70 percent of the roads in the Soviet Union are impassable during the spring thaw period. 5 8 "Ob izdanii zhurnala, Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia," Spravochnik (!957). P- 460

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179

didactic intent: to guide the deputies and the executive offi­ cers of the soviets in their daily contact with the public. Peri­ odically, these letters and the answers to them are collected and published as separate volumes.59 The discussions in the resulting volumes range from general questions about proce­ dure during sessions of the soviets to specific points of law and administration regarding pension rights and continua­ tion of benefits from a place of work after retirement.60 Whole series of pamphlets dealing with the workings of the soviets may be published for local or general use. In 1957, the Stalingrad Oblast' Soviet sponsored a fifteen-pamphlet series, published in an edition of 5,000 under the general heading "From the experience of leading soviets." Each pamphlet dealt with specific problems of the soviets—deputies' reports, committee work, and so on. In these the style is anecdotal, the tone both folksy and hortatory. One story tells of the chair­ man of a local soviet who helps a go-year-old man make an appointment to get his teeth fixed at the local clinic and thus earns the gratitude and support of the masses.61 Indicative of the change and progress in the organization of local soviets is the tone and level of the previously men­ tioned 1969 series edited by K. F. Sheremet under the head­ ing "Library for workers of village and settlement soviets." Al­ though the hortatory anecdote is still one of the primary tools of exposition in this series, considerable space is given to dis­ cussing the legislative basis of the responsibilities of local soviets in various areas and how different soviets have used these rights. This series, rather more substantial than the previously mentioned Stalingrad series, was issued in an edi­ tion of 40,000 and includes such basic administrative and procedural information as how to record citizens' complaints and how long various types of documents should be pre­ served on file.62 59 See for instance, Otvety na voprosy chitatelei (Moscow: Izvestiia, ig6o); and Vpomoshch' rabotnikam sovetov (Moscow: Izvestiia, 1962). 60 Ibid., pp. 35-36, 166-167. 61 N. Fedorov, Panfilovskii sel'sku sovet (Stalingrad: 1957), p. 15. 62 See for instance, V. N. Mikhalkevich, Deiatel'nosf sel'skogo, poselkovogo soveta ν oblasti zdravoohhranenim 1 sotsml'nogo obespecheniia (Moscow:

180

The Local Soviets at Work

What we see here is a great investment of energy and re­ sources in providing maximum guidance to citizens who are, on the whole, imperfectly prepared for the responsibilities thrust on them. The contents of the study and information sessions that the deputies attend, are split between what may be called technical information on rights, legislative norms, and procedures, and more general systemic information deal­ ing with the fundamentals of the Soviet political system. In either case these strengthen both the cognitive and affective links of the deputy to the political system, equipping him to pass on his strengthened socialization to his constituents. In­ formation and training in this context act as education gen­ erally does regarding political participation, strengthening in numerous different ways the citizen's tendency to active par­ ticipation.63 In summary, the combination of choosing the better-educated individuals among those socially and politi­ cally acceptable as deputies is combined with intensive sup­ port and information, to attempt to produce effective partici­ pants. What is the impact of these efforts? In theory, there should be a clear trend toward more active and competent deputies. Campbell states that the surest single prediction of political involvement is the number of years of formal education that a person has had.64 Verba, writing in the same journal, notes that persons with more education are more likely to have a feeling of competence in the political system.65 This appears to be an almost unanimous judgment by scholars.66 While our Iuridicheskaia Literature, 1969), pp. 6-10, in which the rights and duties of village soviets in providing hospital facilities are discussed. Also Mikhail P. Bannykh, Ispolnitel'nyi komitet sel'skogo, poselkovogo soveta (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1969), pp. 52-59. Unfortunately, the size of the edition was insufficient for each village or settlement soviet to acquire one copy for its library. 63 Milbrath, Political Participation, pp. 122-123, lists nine ways in which edu­ cation stimulates participation, basing his argument primarily on the findings in Almond and Verba's five-nation study. 64 Campbell, "The Passive Citizen," p. 20. 65 Verba, "Participation and Strategies," p. 37. 66 See for instance, Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, p. 370. Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 122, lists some twenty studies that find a positive cor-

TurnoverAmongDeputies

181

examination of the qualities stated publicly does not indicate that deputies are chosen for their educational background, the fact is that those elected are an educational elite and are likely to get some degree of additional specialized training while in service. With regard to the correlation between edu­ cation and political participation, the difference between the Soviet political system and other political systems would ap­ pear to be that in non-Soviet type systems, education is con­ sidered a factor in making the citizen want to be politically ac­ tive. In the Soviet system it is the more educated worker, other things being equal, who is wanted as a civic activist, par­ ticularly in such a position as that of elected representative.

TURNOVER AMONG DEPUTIES The use of the soviets as "a school of government administra­ tion for the masses" involves a constant turnover of deputies, with new people constantly being brought into the work of the soviets. The 1961 Party program states that "it is desirable that at least one-third of the total number of deputies to a soviet should be elected anew each time so that new millions of working people may learn to govern the state."67 System­ atic renewal of the leading bodies of the soviets is also consid­ ered necessary, and, like the deputies, chairmen and other officials of the soviets are supposed to be limited to three terms in office, except in cases where a three-fourths majority vote declares the incumbent to be irreplaceable.68 In fact, more than one-third of new deputies are elected consistently at all levels of soviets, while the renewal of executive bodies of relation between levels of education and political activity. Volkov, Tah rozhdaetsia, pp. 35-38, brings similar findings from his research in which 93 percent of the technically educated staff of a factory were active in commu­ nity and political life, as compared to 55-60 percent of those with secondary education and 45-50 percent of those with only elementary education. (The percentages at all levels are strikingly high.) 67 CPSU,Program, p. 103. The Party bylaws had a similar clause regarding Party offices, which was adopted in ig6i but dropped at the 23rd Congress in 1966. es Ibid.

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the soviets is observed approximately at the lower levels, but not in the higher soviets. Perhaps it is an indication of a slowly cumulative improve­ ment in the soviets that the replacement rate is dropping slowly toward the statutory one-third. In 1975 the overall rate was 44.8 percent, while the range was from a low of 41.2 per­ cent in the villages to a high of 54.6 in rural districts.69 Since the 1 9 6 4 abolition of the system of separate industrial and agriculture soviets instituted by Khrushchev in 1962, the rate of deputy turnover and the relative rate at each level have continued their moderate downward trend. Aimbetov and Baimakhanov consider that the nonrecommendation of a deputy for a second term is a sign of displeasure with his per­ formance as a deputy, or a sign that he has neglected his pro­ duction work.70 Thus, a rotation of 60 percent of the depu­ ties, such as occurred in the urban district soviets in 1969, in­ dicates that there is a considerable problem. Understandably, excessive replacement damages the con­ tinuity of the work of soviets. The phenomenon of an 83 per­ cent turnover in the district soviets of Karaganda in 1 9 6 5 , with one soviet electing 73 new incumbents out of 75 seats, shows the need for desirable limits.71 In particular, this is rel­ evant to the operation of committees and deputies' groups in the soviet, which need a stable core of experienced leadership to ensure the continuity of their work.

THE DEPUTY AS REPRESENTATIVE The deputy, operating within the system of the soviets, plays many roles during his period of service and, depending on his personal characteristics, may emphasize one or the other of these roles. The deputy is very much the "man in the mid­ dle." He is supposed to represent the regime to the citizens and be the vox populi to the soviet executive and apparatus. The growth in numbers of the deputies, bringing many new 69

SDT, no. 8 (August 1975), p. 24. Aimbetov and Baimakhanov, Problemy, p. 90. 71 Ibid,., pp. 99, 101. The authors suggest a statutory maximum of 50 per­ cent renewal. 70

The Deputy as Representative

183

and inexperienced citizens into office, and the heightened ac­ tivity of the soviets have fostered the growth of many organi­ zational frameworks within the soviet or attached to it, so many of the deputies' activities are carried on not as individ­ uals but as members of groups. The rights and duties of the elected deputies were codified in September 1972 in the Law on the Status of Deputies adopted by the Supreme Soviet. Some of the specific charac­ teristics of the deputy to the local soviet emerge from this law, in its discussions of his activities in the institutions of the soviet and in his constituency. Many more aspects of the dep­ uty's activities find only vague expression in the law. He has no formal competence to implement solutions or to force the administrative organs to grant requests. He does, however, have access to the executive committee and to the standing committees of the soviet, and through them he can put pres­ sure on the administrative organs of the soviet to respond to legitimate requests.72 Thus, a deputy, having assured himself that a citizen's re­ quest is well founded, may issue a spravha, or certificate— essentially a note addressing the citizen to a particular official or department—requesting that the department handle the citizen's request. In doing this, the deputy acts as a "first fil­ ter," screening out obviously unreasonable requests and di­ recting the others to the proper authorities. At the same time, the endorsement given by the deputy lends authority to the citizen's request, adding to the citizen's self-assurance when he turns to the offices of the soviet. This relieves the load on the administrative departments, lessening the friction be­ tween the citizen and the bureaucracy that administers his daily life. This screening process is one of the central func­ tions of many of the participatory frameworks we shall exam­ ine. The type of requests the deputy handles will vary with his position, his own interest, and the location of his soviet. The 72 Izvestiia, January 14, 1969, writes: "Strictly speaking, the deputy of the soviet has no personal administrative power. He cannot order any official or institution to do such and such, nor does he issue any instructions which are binding. At the same time, his word carries authority for every Soviet citizen."

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The Local Soviets at Work

deputies of Moscow University, and of Moscow in general, reported in interviews that housing matters were by far the most frequent requests tendered to them. Deputies also ap­ pear to perform many of the duties of the old-time American precinct captains, or latter-day social workers. They will help a citizen apply for a permit, assist another in duplicating lost documents, and give information on pension rights to a third.73 The deputy is often expected to involve himself in a constituent's family affairs if necessary: try to prevent a di­ vorce, mediate in neighbors' disputes, or see that an unsuper­ vised child is put into a long-day school or boarding institu­ tion.74 Deputies interviewed in Kutaisi mentioned such family intervention as an infrequently called-upon function, but in­ cluded it within the sphere of their duties. Such mediating functions are perhaps typical of the inti­ mate, traditional community. The "tribal elders" are con­ sulted, or considered to have competence in all aspects of life and there is a subsequent fusion of political and social iden­ tities. As society modernizes and communities grow larger, functions become more specialized and political attitudes and activities shed much of their general social significance. Poli­ tics becomes one of many compartments in society, in which the individual may or may not choose to take part, just as do religion, family life, work, and other subjects that were once "everybody's business." In this respect, the Soviet political system is bent on pre­ venting "decline of community,"75 both in terms of commu­ nity structure and in terms of the functioning of social institu­ tions. There is a deliberate attempt to invest all aspects of life with political significance and, through public activism—led by Party members and elected deputies—to stimulate total community involvement, whether the subject be work, family life, or neighborly relations. Within an urbanizing society this 7S Izvesttia, January 13, 1967, gives these examples of the activities of depu­ ties working in a village soviet. 74 Vasil'ev, Rabota, p. 40. 75 The "decline of community" model of political participation in an urban­ izing society is discussed, with copious bibliographic references, in Verba and Nie, Participation in America, pp. 230-247.

The Deputy as Representative

185

requires continuous and conscious effort, and the institutions and mechanisms by which intimate political communities are maintained will engage us at some length. In addition to meeting his constituents' personal needs, the deputy has a great deal of work to do in his constituency as a representative of the regime. He is the voice of the local soviet in the neighborhood and is expected to familiarize the citi­ zens with the achievements and plans of the local soviets. Where once few deputies bothered to report to their constit­ uency, two reports a year are the legal obligation of the dep­ uty to a local soviet. In addition, deputies are being urged to report after every meeting of the soviet not only to their con­ stituency at large but also to the work collective that nomi­ nated them.76 The deputy is also the organizer of the neighborhood and it is his job to be the main channel through which citizens' groups take part in the work of the soviet. He thus helps rally the residents of streets or blocks to do Sunday work, whether to fulfill a voters' mandate, extend aid to a kolkhoz at harvest time, or to refurbish a school that needs repair but has no budget for labor. In doing this, the deputy—who is often himself a new recruit into active political participation—has the task of discovering and educating new activists in the dis­ trict.77 In organizing the district, the deputy is expected to re­ cruit a citizens' aktiv, often chosen, as he was, from among the best producers, and presumably potential future deputies. With the help of this aktiv, organized into various community self-help formations, the deputy is able to transmit messages from the soviet executive committee to every part of his con­ stituency, organizing them for permanent and ad hoc under­ takings. The above-mentioned functions of the deputy are often 76 Law on the Status of Deputies, article 20. See also Bulletin, no. 10-640 (May 1968), p. 11. 77 This is discussed in A. A. Askerov, Ocherki sovetskogo stroitel'stva (Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1953), p. 58. This is one of the early textbooks for students of the soviets, and contains much of what has more recently been developed into the central focus of ways of public participation in Soviet local politics.

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The Local Soviets at Work

paralleled by other bodies. The same deputy may serve as a member in some of these bodies, though not necessarily in all of them. He is thus not the only channel of information through which the executive committee can find out what is happening in the neighborhoods, nor is he the only point of access to the administration for the citizen. In cities and urban districts, the standing committees, for instance, are organized on functional lines: health, education, consumer services, and so on. At the same time, deputies' groups exist which are responsible for geographic areas. Parallel to these there are neighborhood, block, or street committees, which report to the secretary of the executive committee and operate independently of, though often in cooperation with, the other bodies of the soviet and the indi­ vidual deputies. In 1969 Kutaisi, for instance, had 8 standing committees, 11 deputies' groups of 20-25 members each, and 54 neighborhood committees. The chairmen of the neigh­ borhood committees acted in almost exactly the same way as the deputies, gathering requests from the citizens and direct­ ing them to the soviet, organizing the citizens for special cam­ paigns, and providing a channel of information to the execu­ tive committee. There thus exists a dense network of organizations provid­ ing the citizens with a variety of points of access to the admin­ istration and the administration with a variety of sources of information on the aspirations of the citizens and the effects of policy output at the grass-roots level. In this way, while maintaining all the characteristics of a mobilization system, the Soviet authorities attempt to prevent the loss of informa­ tion that is one of the central weaknesses of such a system and has so plagued the Soviet system in many of its political and economic activities.78 The deputy, while playing an important part in this, has no monopoly on any part of it. 78 David E. Apter, The Polities of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 387-390, discusses what he terms mobilization sys­ tems and their characteristically low level of information flow. In Apter's model, the coercive aspects of a mobilizing regime result in suppression or falsification of much information, denying the authorities much of the knowledge needed for informed policy making and efficient performance.

The Deputy as Representative

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The result of this parallelism is at times disorganization, as was the case in Oktiabr' District, where a chairman of a com­ rades' court complained of having to show her court records to three different inspection groups in the course of one week. On the other hand, it may result in the creation of the type of massive public pressure of which even the most stub­ born and hard-pressed administrator must take notice. Thus, when citizens in a housing project in Moscow complained of inadequate service due to lack of personnel, the situation was investigated separately by the local soviet standing committee on housing, the deputies' group responsible for that area, and the local house committee. The reports were then discussed jointly by these bodies with the project's management in a public meeting at which the hiring of adequate personnel was resolved and accepted publicly by the manager.79 Like the massed artillery favored by Soviet military strategists, the use of numerous joint bodies for discussion and investigation is cumbersome and takes lengthy preparation, but cannot help making a substantial impression on its target. The institutional frameworks within which the deputy op­ erates have been mentioned briefly. Their structure and rela­ tions to the soviet and to the public are both central to the un­ derstanding of the forms and areas of participation open to the Soviet citizen and are an indicator of the changes affected or contemplated in the system of the soviets. The greater part of the deputy's work is carried on within or through these frameworks today, or with the mass community self-help or­ ganizations rather than with individual constituents.80 The proliferation of these frameworks (deputies' councils, depu­ ties' groups, standing committees, deputies' posts, and other ad hoc forms) is intended to provide an appropriate form of organization for any local condition or need. The structure 79

Bulletin, no. 15-597 (August 1966), p. 19. Vasil'ev, Rabota, p. 39, devotes some discussion to this point. It was also discussed at length in lectures to students at Moscow University. The ra­ tionale is simply that the strengths of an experienced and devoted deputy are multiplied when he works in an organized framework, while the weakness and inexperience of new, untrained deputies are offset by their working in a group. 80

188

The Local Soviets at Work

and operation of the soviets is still uncrystallized in this re­ spect and there is an ongoing effort to form bodies of depu­ ties that will expedite and coordinate the general work of the soviet and provide some alternative to the excessive responsi­ bility traditionally held by the executive committees.

THE STANDING COMMITTEES Most important among the group frameworks existing for deputies is that of the standing committees of the soviets. Such committees exist in varying numbers in every level of soviet. In a small village soviet there may be only 3-5 standing committees, while a regional soviet may have as many as 17.81 In 1975 there were a total of 328,765 standing committees in the local soviets, engaging the energies of 1,776,309 deputies (80.8 percent of all local soviet deputies) as members, and an additional 2,611,000 volunteer activists.82 The standing committees of the local soviets were the focus of attention of the debate discussed in the first chapter on development of the soviets. Whether the opinion was that the deputies should supplement, supplant, or supervise the executive and administrative bodies of the soviets, the stand­ ing committees, composed of a mixture of elected deputies and citizen volunteers, were looked to as the most promising body to carry out the change. The marks of this discussion still remain, and even comparatively recent writings show the influence of these differing schools of thought. The standing committees are not a new feature of the soviets, although like so many features of the system they have had to be revived and redeveloped in recent years. Fol­ lowing a decision of the 7th Congress of soviets of the RSFSR in 1919, "sections" composed of deputies, members of factory committees, and trade union administrators were set up in each soviet to parallel the administrative departments of the local soviets. A little later activists from the public were mobilized to take part in the activities of these sections. At this 81

Barabashev and Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, p. 249. no. 5 (May 1975), p. 30.

s2 SDT,

TheStandingCommittees

189

time membership in a "section" was mandatory for every deputy, and nonparticipation was considered grounds for re­ call. The sections were chiefly concerned with control of the administrative organs and mobilization of the public. These sections were converted into the present standing committees of the local soviets following the adoption of the 1936 con­ stitution.83 Some differences exist regarding the standing committees of various soviets, chiefly between the various republics. Safarov claims that in Azerbaijan, activity in a standing com­ mittee is still mandatory for every deputy.84 In the village and settlement soviets of the Estonian Republic, citizens of the aktiv are full voting members of the standing committees.85 Consistent in his advocacy of strengthening the state repre­ sentative structures rather than nonelected public groups, Varchuk objects to the inclusion of the aktiv as full members of the committee on the grounds that the committee should be made up only of elected deputies who will be responsible to the soviet plenum.86 The elected basis of the committee is the constitutional foundation on which is based the role of the standing committees as agencies that supervise the activities of the administrative organs rather than concentrate on mobilization functions among the public. Not all deputies are members of standing committees and, indeed, in several republics of the Soviet Union certain depu­ ties are specifically exempted, or even barred from serving on standing committees. Again, this is connected with the con­ cept of the committees' role and its relations with the execu­ tive and administrative organs of the soviet. Iu. V. Todorskii, writing at the beginning of the reform of local government in 1957, suggested that on principle, executive committee mem­ bers and heads of departments and administrations should be 83 V. Morgailo, "Forerunners of the Standing Committees of the Soviets," Bulletin, no. 18-624 (September 1967), p. 30. 84 Safarov, Territorial'nye deputatskie gruppy, p. 57. Not all the deputies in Azerbaijan are members of the standing committees, however. Itogi (1961), pp. g, 108, shows only about 2/3 of the deputies as committee members, while Itogi (1971), pp. 28, 204, shows the situation persisting. 85 Barabashev and Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, p. 248. 86 Varchuk, "Puty," p. 146.

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The Local Soviets at Work

barred from membership on the standing committees.87 Safarov, writing near the end of 1961, after the new Party program had indicated that the standing committees were to move more and more actively into executive and administra­ tive activity, and in the period when there was a tendency to have the standing committees replace the paid administrative apparatus, suggested the inclusion of directors and deputy di­ rectors of administrative departments as members of the standing committees ex officio.88 The difference between these two approaches represents two very different views of the rights of the deputies and of the standing committees; indeed, two different concepts of the internal structure of the local soviets. Todorskii writes as one of those who would establish some system of checks among the three parts of the soviets, in an attempt to balance the powers of the various bodies, while Safarov's views are the more traditional Leninist-Soviet merging of legislative and executive—continuing in effect the superiority of the execu­ tive committee. At present, in Moscow, deputies who are executives of the administrative departments of the Moscow soviet are barred from serving on the standing committees dealing with their departments. 89 A similar rule holds in four republics.90 Four other republics ban department heads of city soviets from all membership in standing committees, along with all members of the executive committees.91 While these laws are explicitly intended to give the standing committees independent status vis-a-vis the executive commit­ tees and the administrators, the change in relations appears to be slow in coming, and there is consistent criticism of the 87 Iurn V. Todorskii, "Postoiannye kommissii mestnykh sovetov" (avtoreferat), Abstract of Candidate Dissertation, Moscow: Moscow State Uni­ versity, 1957, p. 13. 88 Safarov, "Ob osushchestvlenii . . .," in Sovety vpenode, p. 232. 89 Bulletin, no. 18-624 (September 1967), p. 9, Section a, article 8 of the Interim Statute on Standing Committees. 90 V I. Vasil'ev (ed.), V pomoshch' deputatu mestnogo soveta (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literature, 1968), p. 92. 91 Barabashev and Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, p. 249.

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191

persisting edge that the professionals have over citizen partic­ ipants of the standing committees.92 Despite the advocated change, our discussion of the stand­ ing committees will show that there remains a strong orienta­ tion toward supportive, rather than control work. This tend­ ency gains strength from the direction now being taken by the Soviet regime, of strengthening and improving the paid ad­ ministrative apparatus while using citizen volunteers to sup­ plement the administrators. In the Central Committee Resolution of January 22, 1957, the executive committees of the local soviets and the various Party organizations were urged to "strive toward achievement of an active role for the standing committees in preparing questions for the sessions of the soviet and its executive com­ mittee; in checking up on the implementation of decisions of the soviet and of superior organs and in the carrying out of mass organization work."93 Essentially this meant an activa­ tion of the standing committees within their former orienta­ tion of kontrol and mobilization, without substantive adminis­ trative power. Only with the new Party program was it stated authoritatively that "an increasing number of questions which now come under the jurisdiction of the administrations and departments of executive bodies must gradually be referred to the standing committees of the local soviets for decision."94 The first actual attempts to broaden the powers of the standing committees were made in Gorkii Oblast', which had been praised by the Central Committee in 1957 for its initia­ tive and efficiency in running its soviets.95 In fact, there had been discussion since 1957 of a new role for the standing committees, not as substitutes for the administrative bureau­ cracy, as the reference in the Party program was interpreted by some observers, but as a relatively autonomous body that could act as a watchdog and a counterbalance against the 92 See Kaiumov, "Rasshirenie," SGP, no. ι (1963), p. 110, n. 3; Karapetian and Razin, Sovety, pp. 76-77; and Varchuk, "Puty," 1968, p. 152. 9 3 C.C., CPSU, "Ob uluchshenii . . . ,"Spravochnik (1957), p. 455. 9 4 CPSU, Program , pp. 103-104. 9 5 Varchuk, "Puty," p. 148.

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executive committee and the administrative organs,96 much as congressional committees in America do. In April of 1962, some months after the adoption of the Party program, the Moscow City Soviet gave its standing committees the right to "take decisions binding on the leader­ ship of all institutions, enterprises and organizations in any question linked with the fulfillment of decisions of the Mos­ cow City Soviet, except changes in plan, budget and material allotment of resources."97 The resolution also gave the stand­ ing committees the right to bring public opprobrium on ex­ ecutives of enterprises and organizations for delay in fulfill­ ment of soviet decisions and the right to bring committee de­ cisions for review to sessions of the soviet. Clearly this resolution is aimed at creating an instrument of support for the executive committee rather than any counter­ balance to it, and the denial of influence on matters regarding budgetary and material allotments keeps the committee from having any substantive powers. During 1962, resolutions simi­ lar to that passed in Moscow were adopted in other soviets. While certain administrative functions were handed over to the committees in this period, these were chiefly functions of overseeing local enterprises and organizations and not mat­ ters of policy initiatives. According to Volkov, the leadership of many local soviets feared that giving the standing commit­ tees real powers would lead to administrative confusion and economic loss.98 96 Todorskii, "Postoiannye kommissii. . . ," p. 24 suggests a draft statute for standing committees which includes: an "obligation" to root out bureaucracy; the right of standing committees to make decisions that will be binding on enterprises and institutions on the territory of a soviet even if they are not administratively subordinated to the soviet; the right to bring any issue to the agenda of a session of the soviet; the right to make decisions that bind the administrative departments of the soviet; the right to allot money from the soviet's budget to carry on committee work and to pay committee members for time spent on committee affairs. With the exception of the last item, some variant of Todorskii's suggestions eventually found expression in the statutes regarding standing committees, passed by the various republics. 97 Bulletin, no. 10-496 (June 1962), p. 9. 98 Volkov, Tak rozkdaetsia, p. 126.

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Considering the background of most of the deputies, there may have been substance to these fears. Certainly, the trans­ fer of all the functions of the soviet administrative apparatus to the standing committees would have put the committees under a strain. In a study of one city soviet, it was found that only two of the nine committees were functioning regularly. The housing and consumers' services committee in that soviet was made up of forty-two deputies, most of them workers be­ tween the ages of 28 and 40. Their background ill-prepared them to discuss complex, technical aspects of housing prob­ lems, about which the majority of the complaints and applica­ tions of citizens in the town were connected." Even with all the good will in the world, the committee, functioning as citi­ zen volunteers who carried on their civic activity in spare time, could neither replace nor effectively lead the housing administration of the soviet. A similar situation was observed by the author in the Oktiabr' District Soviet in Moscow in 1970. There, the standing committee on health was composed of thirteen members, of whom only three had any expertise in health matters. The others were five factory workers, a trade union official, a Party official, a physicist and two administrators of scientific and construction organizations. The members themselves raised the question of having more doctors on their committee to facilitate its work.100 In preparing a report requested by the executive commit­ tee of the soviet, the committee undertook to canvass the health and medical institutions of the district, interviewing leading staff and eliciting their problems and opinions. This was to be done with the help of the twenty activists who as­ sisted the committee. The presentation at the session of the executive committee would be made jointly by the committee and the Health Department of the soviet, with the assistance 99 Varchuk, "Puty," pp. 141-145. Varchuk's work refers to research obser­ vations made in 1967 in an urban district soviet in Moscow and in Lipetsk, a city of nearly 300,000 population. 100 The three medical specialists occupied the central positions of chair­ man, deputy chairman, and secretary on the committee. The Oktiabr' District Soviet listed among its deputies at that time nine doctors or other medical workers.

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The Local Soviets at Work

of leading medical personnel who would be invited to the ses­ sion at the initiative of the standing committee. Thus, the committee aimed at overcoming its own lack of professional expertise by fulfilling the administrative maxim that experts should be "on tap and not on top." In Kutaisi, a city of 160,000 in the Georgian Republic, the important committee on public works and community serv­ ices, drew its expertise from its aktiv. The committee, headed by a deputy with considerable experience in administrative, soviet, and committee work, had an aktiv of sixteen members, all of whom were employees of the soviet in the departments of public works and consumer services. The eifect of this was to interlock the standing committee and the departments. Since the aktiv was said to prepare the bulk of the informative material for the sessions of the committee, the committee ap­ peared to function as an advisory board to the administrative departments—fulfilling only the mildest sort of kontrol and concentrating on mobilization. It was the committee, for in­ stance, which, informed by the department of a water short­ age in the city, organized a public campaign carried out by means of slogans and lectures in the neighborhoods of the town to encourage the citizens not to waste water. On the other hand, it was claimed that a substantial portion of the committee's time was spent on problems of personnel, since the two departments were responsible for some 2,000 work­ ers in the city. Although the aktiv was supposed to be working as a volunteer group, its composition makes it reasonable to think—as is often the case, according to Soviet sources—that the "public, volunteer work" was indistinguishable from, and carried on in conjunction with, the activists' normal paid em­ ployment. What do these cases teach us of the nature of citizen par­ ticipation? Clearly, neither the technical nor institutional re­ sources for political power exist here. The initiative for the activity of the committees came from the executive and ad­ ministrative organs of the soviet, and the subsequent infor­ mation and recommendations remain only that. There is no suggestion that committee recommendations should bind the

The Standing Committees

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soviet. However, the deputies and the aktiv are partners in planning. They are involved and deal with affairs that influ­ ence the quality of life in their immediate community. They have access to the authorities in their community and ac­ knowledged legitimacy within the field of their committee's competence. Much of the sense of efficacy of the citizen participants is dependent on the understanding and leadership qualities of the soviets' executives. However, even where this is lacking and the bureaucrat attempts to stifle or ignore the deputy, the latter is not defenseless. If the deputy is actively inclined and ready to have his participation involve him in conflict, he can make an issue of the bureaucrat's behavior in the general or specialized press. If the deputy has a case, the matter may be given wide publicity and used as an object lesson for deputies and administrators in general.101 In doing so, however, the deputy must remember the lesson learned from the fate of deputy Kissileva that his resources are from "the outside," but that he must go on in everyday life under the supervision of the local political leaders. Former Soviet citizens interviewed noted in a number of cases that cooperative, rather than con­ scientious, individuals were sought out as activists, and that those citizens who bucked the system were quickly shunted aside.102 Conflict with lower enterprises or services of the soviets is a different story, however. In exercising their supervisory au­ thority over local bakeries, breweries, shoe repair shops, and vegetable stores, the standing committees act in the name of both the people and the administration, laboring to improve 101

A deputy in Leningrad, frustrated by the obstruction of an adminis­ trator, complained to the journal Sovety deputatov trttdiashchikhsia, which in­ vestigated and published sharp criticism of the bureaucrat, moving her to promise action on the deputy's recommendations. See A. Sidorkevich and N. Monchadskaia, "Nenuzhnaia opeka," SDT, no. 9 (September 1970), pp. 56-59. See also the ongoing exchange between a deputy and the executive committee of a soviet in Izvestiia, January 14, February 15, and February 18, 1965. Also Bulletin, no. 6-540 (March 1964), p. 7. 102 Cf. William H. WhyteJr., The Organization Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956).

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The Local Soviets at Work

service and supply.103 In this field it has been claimed that the standing committees are sufficiently respected for the simple fact of their discovering and addressing themselves to a prob­ lem to motivate improved performance in the persons under investigation.104 The committee may act here not only as an auditor but as a mediator, determining whether shortcomings have remediable objective causes, and attempting to obtain from the administrators facilities, manpower, or equipment necessary for improvement of service. The standing committees still continue in their role as di­ rect mobilizers of the public in addition to whatever other functions may be suggested for them. The standing commit­ tee, formed on a functional basis, may subdivide itself by territorial units, each deputy taking on responsibility for im­ plementation of the committee's project in a given area, work­ ing with the aktiv or the local street, block, or neighborhood group. When such a plan is followed, the deputies and the aktiv of the standing committee become levers, transmitting the decisions of the executive committee or of a department of the soviet to other, more massive volunteer groups for im­ plementation. Here the type of activity undertaken will prob­ ably be the periodic cleaning, planting, and improvement drives often scheduled for the eve of a holiday or anniversary. The project will be based on public self-help organized in each block or street by a local committee, but the soviet (perhaps at the initiative of the local Party committee) origi­ nates the project, while deputies and the aktiv see that the ini­ tiative is followed up in all areas of the locality. The aktiv of various standing committees varies greatly in size and character. In Kutaisi, the aktiv of the public works and consumer services committee was relatively small—six­ teen members—but all of them were drawn from the ad103

References to such activity abound. See Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia,

pp. 113-122; Bulletin, no. 2-512 (January 1963), p. 24, and ibid., no. 7-541 (April 1964), pp. 30, 32. 104 This proposition, voiced in ibid., no. 2-512 (January 1963), p. 25 is not unique to the USSR. Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, p. 352, discuss an­ ticipatory responsiveness of officials who seek to avoid the disruption caused by citizen complaints.

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ministrative apparatus. The committee on socialist legality in one of the districts of Moscow had fifty people in its aktiv, Party and soviet workers, members of comrades' courts, members of the druzhiny, members of house committees, legal instructors, and members of the organization and instruction department of the district soviet.105 The general trend in the standing committees is to have the aktiv include persons of expertise or experience in the field in which the committee is working. If these people are employed in the field, they are often expected to act as liaison between the committee and the department in which they work. Besides adding expertise to a committee, the aktiv adds to its operative manpower, enabling it to subdivide into sections for preparing questions to be considered by the entire com­ mittee, or for solving problems brought before the commit­ tee. In some cases, a standing committee on socialist legality will act as a quasi-judicial board of review for the complaints of citizens against each other or against various institutions of the soviet. In such cases a subcommittee may decide the com­ plaint without recourse to the whole committee.106 The aktiv is recruited from deputies who are not committee members, former deputies, pensioners with knowledge and experience in the committee's area of work, people who are employed in the area of work, and citizens who are consid­ ered promising as future activists. In part, the recruiting is done through the members of the committee and in part through trade union groups and Party groups who are asked to suggest likely candidates for the aktiv from among their members. The chairman of the committee will determine the size and nature of the aktiv needed by his committee and will be responsible for its adequacy. The principle of having volunteers from the public to sup­ plement the work of the various deputies' organizations and the administrative departments of the soviet is an important source for mobilization of knowledge and experience, re­ cruitment of new talents, and socialization of the citizenry. To 105

Bulletin, no. 10-496 (June 1962), p. 30. no. 10-496 (June 1962), p. 32, notes a committee in which only three out of fifteen complaints came before a full committee for decision. i m Ibid.,

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The Local Soviets at Work

the extent that they participate in correcting deficiencies in the operation of the cultural and economic services of the soviet and assist the executive committee in determining pub­ lic priorities and aspirations, the volunteer activists become protagonists of the system and have an investment in it. How­ ever small this may be in terms of actual time and effort, such an investment of effort is a factor working against paro­ chialism and alienation of the citizen and a significant re­ source for the local officials in stretching the limited staff and monetary resources allotted them. An instance of the use of the resources of the aktiv is in the fight against "parasitism" carried on by one standing commit­ tee on socialist legality in a Moscow district. Creating leverage in the way we have already noted, this committee used its con­ tacts with the local house committees, housing authority ad­ ministrations, druzhiny groups, and factory organizations— the sources from which many of its aktiv were drawn. The ak­ tiv, directed by the deputies who were members of the com­ mittee, thus became a mobilizing force, activating other pub­ lic organs in the campaign.107 While the actual effectiveness of such an extended chain of influence will vary greatly from case to case, it is instructive to see the structure of penetration of society which is formed in this way, drawing people into the campaign through a multiplicity of overlapping organiza­ tions and creating the possibility of reaching every citizen in a number of ways. At this point we cannot help but recall Selznick's analysis of grass-roots politics in modern society. Basing his thesis on the phenomenon of increasing governmental responsiblity in so­ ciety and the parallel need for governments to take into ac­ count popular sentiment, and use it as a political resource, Selznick analyzes the nature and aims of social and political control. In his view, as we have noted, such control centers about "attempts to organize the mass, to change an undiffer­ entiated and unreliable citizenry into a structured, readily ac­ cessible public." In the Soviet case, one need only add the word "active" to the last two adjectives. It is through the repeated penetration of society in this way 107

I b i d . , no. 2-512 ( J a n u a r y 1963), p. 24.

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199

and the utilization of as many aspects as possible of social or­ ganization that the regime seeks to create its own political cul­ ture and socialize the citizens to the values it represents. By utilizing the deputies and their aktiv, both within the standing committees and in other mobilization frameworks to be dis­ cussed shortly, the authorities can hope to give the citizen a first-hand source that will hear his demands and help him re­ ceive whatever allocations are available, and this same source will in turn levy extractions of energy as well as supportive ac­ tivity and expression on behalf of the regime. Only at the level of the village soviets have the standing committees expanded their administrative activities to the fullest. At this level there is generally no administrative ap­ paratus whatsoever attached to the soviet, the only paid functionaries being the chairman, a deputy chairman, and in some cases a treasurer. Some of the committee's work may be simply technical, for example, the registration of school-age children on the territory of the soviet by members of the Committee on Education. Other administrative functions may have more significance, such as consideration of applica­ tions of individuals for allotment of construction materials available to the village soviet for house repairs, and so on.108 The budget committee of the local soviet is expected to maintain supervision over the budgets and operation of the kolkhoz and sovkhoz units on their territory, though this is evidently pure formalism—the production units being larger and more powerful in every way than the soviet.109 The agricultural committees, however, may act as investigative bodies when there is suspicion of misuse or waste of land and resources, reporting to the executive committee of the village soviet, or if necessary to the local prosecutor.110 In the vil108 Vasil'ev, Rabota, pp. 3, 31. The right to determine these allocations is particularly sensitive in view of the chronic shortages of such materials. The deputy may also exercise patronage powers in picking out local youngsters for technical training. See Bannykh, Ispolnitel'nyi komitet, p. 33. 109 Izvestiia, March 14, 1971, carries a sharp criticism of the lack of control over kolkhoz and sovkhoz operations by the rural district soviets—units far stronger than the village soviets. 110 Vasil'ev, Rabota, p. 9. In the cities as well, we will find the committees utilized as investigative agencies to try to deter corruption and administrative irregularity.

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The Local Soviets at Work

lages, as in urban areas, the work of the standing committees is carried on with the help of an aktiv, built around village volunteer committees and the use of village meetings for in­ formation and mobilization purposes. The focus of attention on the standing committees of the soviets over the last decade, resulting in widespread discus­ sion and the regularization of their work through legislation, has made them probably the most significant representative organ in the system of soviets. Certainly, much more is ac­ complished, in terms of government activity, in the standing committees than in the sessions of the soviets.

DEPUTIES' GROUPS, COUNCILS, AND POSTS While the standing committees have been assigned a substan­ tive role in the work of the soviets and, at least theoretically, an independent function in them, the framework of the "deputies' group" is clearly set up as an auxiliary. Organized on a territorial basis and including all the deputies at every level of soviet on that territory, the deputies' groups reinforce the strength of the individual deputy and provide a comple­ ment to the functional focus of the standing committee and the administrative departments of the soviet, often taking over from them the responsibility for implementation of a particular project on the territory of the deputies' group. As with many institutions of the soviets, the deputies' groups have their origin in the first years of the revolutionary period when many experimental forms of social and political organization were attempted. At that time, deputies were elected on the basis of work collectives, and a December 1920 article in Pravda advocated the formation of deputies' groups made up of all the deputies elected from any single factory or institution.111 It was not, however, until the mid-twenties, with the growth of more urban, industrial centers, and anxiety over how to reach the unmobilized mass of popu­ lation represented by housewives, cooperative artisans, and others, that deputies' groups became common.112 111

Safarov, TerritonaVnye deputatskie gruppy, p. 4. p. 5; and Bulletin, no, 18-624 (September 1967), p. 32. The same

112 Ibtd.,

Deputies' Groups, Councils, and Posts

201

As was the case with so many of the organizational forms evolved in the twenties, the deputies' groups were largely neglected until the beginning of the revival of local govern­ ment in the mid-fifties. The revival of the deputies' groups began as a result of the amalgamation of village soviets into larger units. In 1 9 5 5 , the Kirov Village Soviet had some 5 0 0 households scattered in a number of populated points, 3 - 1 5 kilometers distant from the soviet's seat. To keep organized government close to the citizens of these isolated villages, deputies' groups of four or five local deputies were formed in each populated area, headed by the senior deputy in each case. In 1967, there were some 800 such deputies' groups operating in Tambov Oblast'. The organization of deputies' groups was evidently not practiced by all the eligible soviets in the region, for this number amounts to an average of only a little more than two deputies' groups for each of the 329 elig­ ible soviets.113 One such group, composed of a school principal who is deputy in both the village and rural district soviet, a brigade leader from the local kolkhoz and another village deputy, is responsible for the village of Rybkino—a settlement of about 100 families. The deputies' group meets with the villagers about twice a week, hearing requests, aiding the citizens to prepare applications for construction and repair permits (a particularly important function since the adoption of the policy of "phasing out" isolated villages and moving their populations into the central villages, preventing any new con­ struction and repair in many populated rural areas); giving pension information and processing applications; and advis­ ing on the organization of the work of the village which con­ stitutes a livestock brigade in a large kolkhoz.114 The picture motivation, stemming from the growth of leisure time in urban communities and the growing numbers of pensioners, has guided the activation of many of the volunteer groups based on place of residence, as well as residential Party primary organizations. For a discussion of this trend, see Arie L. Unger, "Soviet Mass-Political Work in Residential Areas," Soviet Studies, Vol. 2 2 , no. 4 (April 1971), p. 556; and I. Kozin, "Pomestu xhiiei'slva," Izvestiia, November 1 6 , 1 9 7 1 , p. 3 . 113 RSFSR, administrativno-temtorial'noe delenie (Moscow: Izvestiia, 1 9 7 4 ) , P- 298· 114 Izvestiia, January 1 3 , 1 9 6 7 .

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is one of an effort to aid an underdeveloped and unacculturated sector of the population in coping with adjustment to a complex, bureaucratic state. This is not, however, a totally ac­ curate picture, for the deputies' function is not simply to assist the citizens because they are unable to fill in the forms or face the administrators, but to act as an extension of the adminis­ tration and a link between it and the citizen. By including deputies from all the various levels of soviets, the overlap of jurisdiction is turned into a reinforcing factor of the deputies' ability to solve problems. Not only does the new deputy have the veteran deputy with him to draw on for experience but the village deputy also has the district deputy in his group, with whom he can coordinate efforts to solve a given problem beyond the scope of the village. He may also demand a joint effort of the two authorities. The principle of the territorial deputies' groups is that they are set up within the smallest units of representation and in­ clude deputies from higher soviets. Thus, the Moscow City Soviet does not have deputies' groups, for its deputies serve in the deputies' groups organized in the districts of Moscow. Nor will a rural district, for its deputies will assist in the groups organized in the villages. In some instances, deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and those of the Union republics are not called upon to serve in the deputies' groups, but in the Krasnodar Krai they are specifically included in the makeup of these groups.115 The deputies' groups have never been given any executive or administrative powers resembling those of the standing committees. They are seen as an organizational reinforce­ ment for the standing committees, the executive committee, and the administrative departments, and a mobilizational force in their districts. Naturally, much duplication of effort results, with the deputies' groups doing the same jobs as standing committees. Thus, deputies' groups are credited with organizing cleanups and plantings in a settlement, just as the previously noted standing committee on public works. In the same fashion, the deputies' groups often duplicate the 115 "Statute of Territorial Deputies' Groups in Krasnodar Territory Soviets," in Bakurskii (ed.), Normativnye materialy, pp. 376-378.

Deputies' Groups, Councils, and Posts

203

work of block, street, and neighborhood committees which do not prove strong enough to carry out their functions. This practice is attacked in some circles as "a leftover from the times when deputies' groups were inattentive to the abilities of local initiative."116 It is of interest to note that the same complaints of usurpa­ tion of functions voiced against the executive and administra­ tive organs by the defenders of the representative bodies are also voiced against the representatives by the volunteer com­ munity self-help groups. The process of trying to establish the right to some area of responsibility appears to have fil­ tered down to the grass roots of the political structure. The insistence that there should be coordination of reinforcing ac­ tion rather than competition between the standing commit­ tees and the deputies' groups or the deputies' groups and the neighborhood organizations is repeated with sufficient fre­ quency to indicate that this is a persistently recurring problem in the organizational structure of activity of the soviets.117 As has been noted in previous sections of this work, how­ ever, it is the author's belief that the existence of numerous parallel and essentially duplicative organizations is a funda­ mental feature of the administrative organization of activity in local soviets and that its advantages to the authorities in terms of social penetration, mobilization potential, and in­ formation processing outweigh the inefficiencies of duplica­ tion. On its administrative side, the deputies' group is supposed to take over some part of activities formerly entirely concen­ trated in the executive committee's apparatus, thus attempt­ ing to streamline government through devolution of certain functions.118 The way in which any group will carry on its activities is largely dictated by the balance of strength of the other or­ ganizations within the particular soviet. This was particularly evident in Kutaisi, where the neighborhood committees 116

Safarov, Territorial'nye deputatskw gruppy, p. 41. See, for instance, Vasil'ev, Rabota, p. 47; and V. I. Samsonov, "Deputatskaia deiatel'nost' ν izbiratel'nom okruge," in Sovety υperiode, p. 146. 118 Sheremet, Sel'skie sovety, p. 40. 117

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The Local Soviets at Work

(uchastkovyi komitet) were organized on a more intimate level (54 of them as against 11 deputies' groups) and appeared to have a high level of organization and activity. This resulted in the deputies' groups organizing and handling matters of more general welfare, such as street repairs, electric and water sup­ ply, or mass education and culture campaigns, while the neighborhood committees had closer contact with the citizens on local clean-ups, individual problems of documents, work, or child welfare. This is also dependent on the individual deputy's natural inclinations and the additional respon­ sibilities he bears. The deputy who is a factory manager and standing committee chairman as well as member of a depu­ ties' group will naturally put less time into work in the group than into his other tasks. The deputies' groups also vary in the way in which they handle their relations with the citizens. The Tambov group mentioned earlier worked as a whole—it was a small group. A deputies' group in the town of Kopei had a duty roster of deputies from the group who would sit to receive citizens' complaints each Thursday from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m.119 In Kutaisi, where the deputies' groups had from twenty-five to forty deputies each, four or five deputies of one group would sit to receive citizens' requests each Saturday afternoon, checking the validity of the requests and, finding them valid, passing them on to the group chairman who presented them to the executive committee or appropri­ ate administrative department. When they are large, the groups meet in full session fairly rarely. One Kutaisi group, though nominally scheduled to meet monthly, had actually met only twice between the March elections and December. The chairman claimed, however, to be in constant contact with the deputies by written report on their activities—which had been divided among them at the first meeting of the committee—and by conversations with individuals. The work of the deputies' groups, as is the cus­ tom among all organizations of the soviets, is planned in ad­ vance on a quarterly basis. 119

Safarov, TerritoriaVnye deputatskie gruppy, p. 38.

Deputies' Groups, Councils, and Posts

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The deputies' group, when it operates in direct contact with the citizen, has two definite advantages from the citizen's viewpoint. It gives the citizen direct, institutionalized contact with his elected representative, who is supposed to be his peer, rather than having the citizen appear before the ad­ ministrative authorities. In a society whose hallmark through most of its modern history has been the remoteness of the re­ gime from the people and the stultifying bureaucracy of all its operations, the direct contact of citizen and regime at any level may provide both sides with new and fresh insights into the nature of their society and its problems. The deputy alone can in some measure serve as this con­ tact, for, as has already been pointed out, he is supposed to combine in his person both the citizen and the representative of the state. Indeed, the vision of future "Communist public self-government" is that society and state will fuse, with the entire adult population engaging in public activism. How­ ever, the present level of deputies' skills and activities is such that the reinforcement given by group activity is necessary. In attempting to learn something from former Soviet citi­ zens regarding the prominence and authority of elected dep­ uties, it became quickly clear that on a city or urban district level, few of those questioned knew the identity of their closest deputies. Many more remembered republic or su­ preme soviet deputies who were drawn from the political, cul­ tural, and academic elites of the country. Here, too, the factor of ascription comes into play, for the local personality who has become an oblast' or republic deputy will very often be someone with strong political connections, and his presence, even a relatively inactive one, within the deputies' group, lends weight to the participation of the rest. Even without the intervention of influential deputies, the banding together of deputies in a group offers better access to the administrative bureaucracy than is available to the indi­ vidual. An illustration of this is a deputy who balked at the prospect of having to become an "expediter" (tolkach) in order to have a local office allocate material for the repair of a pri­ vate dwelling. In place of a private, direct effort (eased per­ haps by some quid pro quo) to arrange things, he chose to bring

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The Local Soviets at Work

the problem to the deputies' group. The group recom­ mended implementation to the executive committee of the soviet, which then ordered the housing office to undertake the necessary repair and report its completion to the deputies' group. 120 This was most certainly a lengthier proceeding than the direct intervention of the deputy, but had the sanction of formal correctness and the influence of the executive commit­ tee behind it. It also illuminates the limitations of the depu­ ties' group. Having neither executive nor administrative powers, it is dependent for its effectiveness on the energy and skill of its leadership, and particularly the chairman, to utilize the formal structure and procedures of the soviet. This regularization of procedures and creation of channels designed to enable the deputies to have greater effectiveness is one of the main currents of government reforms of the past twenty years. A variant of the deputies' groups originated in Moscow some ten years ago to meet the administrative organization and needs of large.cities, in which most of the deputies found themselves faced with very similar problems and conditions. In 1957, attempts were made to base the deputies' groups on individual apartment-building administrations ( domoupravleniia), but the unit was found too small to work with full ef­ fectiveness. Then councils of city and urban district deputies (deputatskie sovety) were set up on the territory of each hous­ ing operations office (Zhilishchno-Ekspluatatsionnaia Kontora: Zh.E.K. for short). These councils, composed of anywhere up to thirty deputies, were meant to provide a minisoviet (minus its executive and administrative functions) in each Zh.E.K., of from 5,000 to 8,000 population. The Moscow City Soviet passed a model statute governing the deputies' councils in January 1962. It varies little from the statute governing the deputies' groups in other areas except that it calls for the council to meet at least once a month and subjects the election of the chairman to ratification by the dis­ trict soviet.121 120 121

Izvesliia, March 15, 1967. Moscow City Soviet, "Model Statute for Deputies' Councils in

Bulletin, no. 2-488 (January 1962), pp. 2-4.

Zh.E.K. s,"

Deputies' Groups, Councils, and Posts

207

The establishment of the deputies' group on the territory of the housing operations office means that there is a group of elected deputies working parallel to the unit of housing ad­ ministration. Since problems of housing allocation and repair are still among the most frequent, urgent, and irritating of the many problems Soviet citizens face, there is sound reason for this structure. In addition, however, as Osborn points out, the mikroraion, close in structure and boundaries to the Zh.E.K., has been set up as the basic community in the Soviet city, both in an ad­ ministrative and sociopolitical context.122 The deputies' coun­ cil thus functions as an organizer of participatory activity in the grass-roots community of the Soviet city. The urban environment, while providing the level of de­ velopment and variety of opportunity necessary to maintain intense political stimulus also provides the physical mobility, anonymity of the mass, and alternative preoccupations that may counteract the effectiveness of political stimulation. In addition, it has been suggested that in any political system the development of large urban centers is generally accompanied by an increase in the distance between the citizen and the au­ thorities, necessitating the creation of new channels of or­ ganization and communication to maintain contact between citizen and regime.123 The distractions and mass anonymity of the city are the basis of the "decline of community" model, which predicts a decrease in participation due to the creation of large urban communities, as against the mobilization model, which pre­ dicts higher participation in urban centers on the basis of in­ tensity and variety of organized stimuli.124 The work of Verba and Nie tends to support the "decline of community model" and to support the idea that the more a community is a well-defined unit with local organs of gov122 Osborn, Soviet Social Policies, pp. 2 5 0 - 2 5 2 . See also Churchward, "Soviet Local Government Today," p. 4 4 3 . 123 Scott Greer, "Individual Participation in Mass Society" in Roland Young (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1 9 5 8 ) , p. 3 3 6 . 124 See the discussion in Verba and Nie, Participation in America, p. 2 3 2 .

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The Local Soviets at Work

ernment and local organization of social, political, economic, and cultural functions, the higher will be the rates of partici­ pation. The highest general rate of participation, both by community size alone, or by community size corrected to ac­ count for socioeconomic characteristics, is said to occur in communities of from 10,000 to 25,000 population.125 It is exactly this same assumption that guides the Soviet au­ thorities in their attempts to set up structures such as the deputies' councils. The Zh.E.K. and the mikroraion are in­ tended not only as an administrative convenience, but as frameworks of political and social community. In Moscow, the deputies' councils are now a general feature of the urban district soviets. Following the 1967 elections, 442 such coun­ cils were formed, with a total of 7,000 deputies participat­ ing.126 The councils work closely with instructors of the organiza­ tion and instruction departments of the soviets. The latter, even when not members of the councils, as was the case with one council in Oktiabr' District of Moscow, attend all meet­ ings, keep a file of each council's activities, and help advise the council. They also coordinate its activities with other bodies such as the standing committees with whom the councils are supposed to work closely, and arrange meetings of the coun­ cil or its chairman with heads of administrative departments and other officials.127 The councils, among their other duties, review applications of citizens for better housing and in 1966 are reported to have allotted 300,000 square meters of new housing.128 The review of citizens' complaints is one of the central ac­ tivities of the deputies' councils. The councils are credited with a large part of the reduction in the requests of citizens to the executive committee of the Moscow City Soviet. These re1 2 5 Ibid.,

pp. 233-237. Bulletin, no. 15-645 (August 1968), p. 1. Altogether 7,642 deputies were elected to the city and urban district soviets of Moscow in 1967. 1 2 7 Ibid., no. 11-545 Qune 1964), p. 18. 1 2 8 Ibid., no. 21-603 (November 1966), p. 7. By rough calculation this would be about 1 ο percent of the new housing distributed by the Moscow City Soviet in 1966. 126

Deputies' Groups, Councils, and Posts

209

quests are said to have been reduced to between one-half and one-third of the number before the formation of the coun­ cils.129 In 1966, the councils are reported to have reviewed 79,000 applications, complaints, and letters from citizens, screening out those that were baseless and directing the ac­ ceptable ones to the proper authorities.130 As part of its work on behalf of the citizens, the deputies' council may also lend some weight to local lobbying for im­ proved allotment for repairs or construction,131 as well as providing state authority in discussions as to the administra­ tive operation of the Zh.E.K. According to deputies in the Oktiabr' District, 3 percent of the rent money of each Zh.E.K. is supposed to be devoted to local educational and cultural needs. These, and similar discretionary questions, or com­ plaints as to the management of the Zh.E.K. are decided in joint session of the house committees, the Party Bureau or­ ganized in the Zh.E.K., and the deputies' council—a combina­ tion of bodies carrying the full weight of social and official au­ thority. Deputies' groups and deputies' councils are, as we have seen, somewhat different from the standing committees of the soviets in that they have no pretensions to involvement in legislation and none of the tendency to independent status and statutory competence possessed by the standing commit­ tees. In the eyes of the professional administrators they are thus less of a competitor and more of an auxiliary than the standing committee may be. While some of their activities may duplicate those of the standing committee, the deputies' groups and councils have an important part to play in the organization of government in an individual constituency. The processing of applications and complaints, the review and allocation of housing needs, the creation of a territorial subsoviet to see that the message 129 Ibid,, 110. 6-540 (March 1964), p. 4. These figures are part of a report of the organization and instruction department of the Moscow City Soviet re­ garding its work with the deputies' groups. ' 30 Ibid., no. 21-603 (November 1966), p. 7. This averages out at about 180 complaints or applications per council in the course of a year. 131 Ibtd., no. 11-641 (June 1968), p. 20.

210

TheLocalSovietsatWork

of the regime gets to the individual citizen at home, all these are important in the Soviet system of government. The deputies and aktiv participating in the work of a depu­ ties' group or council have considerable influence over the citizen, for their initial screening of requests and complaints can in large measure determine the final allocation. In his role as mobilizer as well, the member of the deputies' group enjoys authority, and is identified with the regime in his ac­ tivities. There is a mutual flow of contact, the citizens turning to the deputy for allocations, the deputy demanding material and ceremonial supports from the citizen in the form of work on some public project or participation in some activity. Little initiative is demanded of the deputies, for they are essentially a transmission belt both from citizen to authorities and vice versa. In addition, the dimension of conflict in this participa­ tion is limited, and where it exists is chiefly in relation to the citizens, who are on the whole weaker than the deputy. Where the citizen-deputy may clash with authorities over some demand on behalf of his community, he is reinforced by being part of a group. All in all, the deputy's participation in the work of the deputies' councils and groups has consider­ able potential for satisfaction and for feelings of competence, with relatively low costs in conflict and initiative, though it cannot be said that these are totally absent. While the stand­ ing committees may give assurances that the experience and skill needed for managing a complex urban development will be recruited and exploited in their aktiv, much of the concern of the soviets is still centered around activation and organiza­ tion of the masses and it is under the guidance of the territo­ rial representative groups that each and every Soviet citizen can be fitted into some framework. The deputies' group or council, accepting its role as ad­ ministrator along with its representative role, constitutes a significant extension of the apparatus of the soviet into the community, both for the citizens and for the paid full-time administrators. Though it may appear that the machinery for activating the deputies and their aktiv is unwieldy and ineffi­ cient in terms of the results produced, it has the advantage of close contact with the citizen and from the Soviet point of

Deputies, Volunteers, and Executives

211

view is cost-free; the drain of energy and activity and the diversion of the deputies' attention from their basic occupa­ tion is not calculated as an expenditure. When an ad hoc formation is needed to supervise the im­ plementation of a specific resolution or to overcome a particu­ lar problem, a deputies' post is formed. Such a group may be called into being by the executive committee, the plenum of the soviet, a standing committee, or a deputies' council. The deputies' post consists generally of one, but sometimes of two or three deputies assisted by such citizens as are needed in the specific case. Their job is to observe and report, serving as liaison between the project in question and the institution that has called the post into existence. Frequently such posts will be established at construction projects, with the deputies and activists maintaining contact with the construction director regarding adherence to schedules. Problems will be reported to the standing committee or other body that established the post, which will take up these problems either with the con­ struction directors or the executive committee of the soviet.132 The deputies' post thus serves to extend the effectiveness of other organs of the soviet and create channels of information through the deputies and the citizens of the aktiv. If the members of the post and the directors of the project being investigated have some rapport, this naturally helps the project directors to overcome difficulties stemming from lack of personnel, funds, transport, and materials, because they can enlist the support of the sponsoring group.

DEPUTIES, VOLUNTEERS, AND EXECUTIVES A situation of understanding and support such as that just described is the ideal of Soviet (or any other) administration. Soviet theorists deny the existence of conflicts between par­ ticular interest groups and their resolution through freely competing pressures for public and governmental support, on the grounds that absence of class antagonisms removes the 132 A full description of the procedures for establishing and operating a deputies' post will be found in Barabashev and Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, pp. 280-282.

212

The Local Soviets at Work

element of active public conflict. The single-party regime is said to foster an optimalization of allocations scientifically de­ termined and accepted by each particular interest as part of social unity. It should be noted that the existence of particular interests is not denied, nor is the fact that they cannot all be simultaneously requited. The Soviet solution is to attempt to submit the entire priority-setting debate to the discipline of a Party, or Party-controlled, forum, limiting free public debate, extensive though it may be, to the peripheral details of the issue.133 The reality would appear to be far less harmonious, with all the tensions, competition, and maneuvering typical of com­ peting organizations anywhere. The evidence suggests that the executive and administrative people on the one hand (to­ gether with the public volunteers grouped directly under their supervision) and the deputies' frameworks on the other (together with their aktiv) often view each other as opponents and tend to blame each other for shortcomings in the smooth operation of the soviets. Deputies report great difficulty in getting to see executive committee and administrative officials in order to solve problems; one deputy in the Lenin District of Moscow rated this as his most serious problem.134 When the deputies, organized in standing committees, groups, posts, or as individuals, fulfill their duty of uncover133 Frolic, "Decision Making," p. 52, quotes a Soviet political scientist as commenting: "You Westerners are obsessed with conflict and have trouble understanding our system. You insist that conflict exists, is good and must be resolved publicly. In our system, however, because of our class viewpoint and the existence of our Party, our bases of disagreement are not the same, and we resolve our disagreements in a different manner." The author heard simi­ lar arguments from members of the Moscow University faculty. 134 Varchuk, "Puty," p. 101. The essential theme of this book is that the deputy and his institutions are still relatively powerless in the face of the executive and administrative organs. Varchuk's proposed solution is to give the elected deputies more strength through legislative acts (pp. goff.). This puts Varchuk with the group advocating de facto a separation of function be­ tween the various branches of the soviet rather than a blending of functions as advocated in the works of Safarov and Tikhomirov. Article 24 of the Law on the Status of Deputies states that a deputy has the right to be received without delay by executives or other officials of any agency, enterprise, or in­ stitution controlled by the soviet.

Deputies, Volunteers, and Executives

213

ing deficiencies in services and administrative functions, the administrators and executives, chronically overloaded and short on staff and resources, begin to look upon the deputies not as state representatives, but as "muckrakers."135 The problem is handled both "by stick and carrot." The soviets pass resolutions stating that if the administrative organs ig­ nore recommendations and decisions of various deputies' or­ ganizations, this will be "strictly punished."136 This creates a dilemma for the administrators. If the citizens are to be useful as a mobilized force, then the virtues of activism must be kept prominent in their consciousness. This, however, stimulates the probability of citizen demands on the regime, demands beyond the material possibilities of the local authorities. Much of the effort to set up local participatory frameworks appears, as a result, to be aimed at channeling demands into areas ac­ ceptable to the authorities, forestalling "embarrassing" de­ mands both at the local and higher levels, with the implicit or explicit criticism of local officials and their activities that the latter involves. This attempt to coopt and tame the citizen participants, which in many localities apparently takes the form of crude falsification and obstruction, is blamed by some interviewees for driving a certain number of citizen activists out of the political arena, and leaving others nominally active but actually cynically complaisant.137 In addition to threatening unresponsive bureaucracy with resolutionary measures, the Soviet authorities attempt to lead them into the paths of righteousness by publicizing the type 135 See Karapetian and Razin, Sovety obshchenarodnogo gosudarstva, p. 87, for a discussion of this point. This book, sharply worded and entirely devoid of the "Panglossic" style that characterizes a large part of Soviet works on this subject, has been attacked sharply for a number of its unorthodox statements and proposals. For a discussion of volunteer-bureaucrat relationships within Party bodies, see Paul Cocks, "The Rationalization of Party Control," in Chalmers Johnson (ed.), Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 170-171. 136 Bulletin, no. 6-540 (March 1964), p. 7. The resolution, adopted in the Kalinin District Soviet of Moscow, notes that the greatest obstruction to suc­ cessful work of deputies' groups and councils is the incorrect attitude of the administrative departments and "lack of appreciation of the importance of deputies' work." 137 Interviews 0-6762, 0-4761, 0-4762.

214

The Local Soviets at Work

of responsive administration considered appropriate. An ideal relationship is portrayed in the description of the ses­ sion of the executive committee of the Proletarian District Soviet in Moscow held in the "Red Corner" of Zh.E.K. number six. The executive committee had toured the whole housing project and talked with the people before hearing a report that the local deputies' council had prepared and discussed ahead of time. The report, dealing with numerous aspects of community activities, use of housing resources, organization of sports and culture, consumer services, and other matters, was then commented on by the Zh.E.K. director in his own report. The evening was summed up by the executive com­ mittee chairman, who touched on the accomplishments and shortcomings of all the groups involved—Zh.E.K. adminis­ trators, deputies, and the community self-help organiza­ tions.138 The integration of effort and contact of all levels of public authority pictured in this account is the ideal toward which the Soviet authorities claim to strive. It is based on the close contact of the executive authorities of the soviet with all the links of community organization down to the citizen at his place of residence. It involves a free and frank exchange of information and opinion among all these groups and the ac­ ceptance by each of the other's competence. This, in turn, is based on a high standard of activity among the deputies and a circulation of personnel so that today's citizen will be tomor­ row's deputy and administrator. As yet, this appears to be more the exception than the rule. One of the difficulties in achieving this ideal lies in the con­ tinuing concentration of power in the executive and adminis­ trative organs of the soviet. Repeatedly the charge is made that the deputies' frameworks—and particularly the standing committees—do not as yet exercise even those rights which formally are theirs under legislation.139 Varchuk, in particu138

Bulletin, no. 16-670 (August 1969), p. 24. These complaints come from a wide variety of sources. They can be found in high-level Party statements, in academic writings, and in the discus­ sions of local soviet personnel. See for instance, the Central Committee reso139

Deputies, Volunteers, and Executives

215

lar, presses this point, noting that the staff workers of the executive apparatus tend to give support to a situation in which there is no effective framework for the standing com­ mittees of the soviet to be a continuing and substantive body. He notes that even with existing legislation a standing com­ mittee could strive for changes in personnel or changes of ac­ tivity by administrative departments but, in fact, does not do so—exercising supervision only over enterprises and organi­ zations, essentially on behalf of the executive committee and the administrative departments. 140 At no point, not even in the most outspoken criticisms of Varchuk, Razin, or Karapetian, was it suggested that part of the trouble might be that a large body of the most senior and authoritative deputies were the very people whom the depu­ ties had to face in their attempts to establish effective supervi­ sion over the administration. Though it has been noted that the 1957 Central Committee resolution on the local soviets expressed disapproval of deputies' election ex officio, the tone of the criticism was such that it was not interpreted as being against nomination of leading administrators. Control of the plenum of the soviet and all its representative bodies by the "professionals" in their role as deputies thus remains undis­ turbed even while the relations between the parts of the soviets are debated widely. The question of control of citizens' volunteer activities en­ ters into this discussion as well. One of the difficulties faced by the various deputies' frameworks is in their relations to the "non-staff" departments in the soviets, or other groups of volunteers. These groups of volunteers, replacing and assist­ ing professional administrators on an unpaid basis, stand in fact as equals to the deputies and their aktiv, although as nonelected administrators the volunteers are formally under the watchful eye of the deputies, having to answer inquiries or present information on demand. 141 Iution "O rabote mestnykh sovetov Poltavskoi oblasti," Izvestna, March 10, 1967; Varchuk, "Puty," p. 153; and Kaluga, Vozrastame, pp. 78-85. 140 Varchuk, "Puty," p. 163. 141 "Interim Statute on Standing Committees of the Moscow City Soviet," Section 3, article 11 ,Bulletin, no. 18-624 (September 1967), p. 9.

216

The Local Soviets at Work

The non-staff departments, once apparently viewed as a model for public administration in the era of Communist public self-government, continue to function today, though their numbers have diminished in the past decade. The movement to establish them began in 1960 in Sverdlovsk Oblast'. Volunteers were found to replace the paid staff which had hitherto supervised public trade and catering. The de­ partment had twenty-two volunteers—pensioners, workers in stores and restaurants, teachers from a trade school, and fac­ tory hands. It was given powers of supervision and recom­ mendation, but all powers of decision and enforcement were reserved for the soviet's executive committee.142 So successful was this movement in attracting approbation that by 1963 it was noted that all the executive committees of district and town soviets in Leningrad Oblast' had non-staff organization and instruction departments with hundreds of volunteers working in them.143 By 1965, when the movement had peaked, it was claimed that there were more than 10,000 non-staff departments in local soviets, with over 100,000 vol­ unteers working in them.144 Since the village soviets had no administrative departments to be replaced, the significance of this movement should be measured within the framework of the 8,113 remaining local soviets existing at that time. A typical district or urban soviet might have a dozen ad­ ministrative departments.145 The large number of non-staff departments breaks down to little more than one per soviet. Moreover, as we have noted, it was first of all the organization and instruction departments that went on a non-staff basis on a large scale. In 1975, when the number of non-staff depart142 Iurii A. Tikhomirov, "Usilenie obshchestvennykh nachal ν deatel'nosti mestnykh organov gosudarstvennogo upravleniia," SGP, no. 8 (August i960), pp. 129-130. See also Robert J. Osborn, "The Role of Social Institu­ tions," in Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), The Future of Communist Society (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 86-87. 143 R. K. Kaiumov, "Rasshirenie obshchestvennykh nachal ν deiatel'nosti mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia," SGP, no. 1 (January i960), p.m. 144 Vasil'ev, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, p. 302. 145 See G V. Barabashev, Raionnyi, gorodskoi sovet na sovremennom etape (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1975), pp. 96-97.

Deputies, Volunteers, and Executives

217

ments had fallen to 7,684, the volunteer organization and in­ struction departments, which act primarily as troubleshooters for the executive committee of the soviet and as supervisors of the acitivity of elected deputies of the soviet rather than as administrators of any branch of services, were over 40 per­ cent of all non-staff departments.146 Other departments set up on a voluntary basis have been (in descending frequency) trade; public works and consumer services; culture and edu­ cation; and health and social welfare. A comparison of the non-staff departments of the RSFSR in 1964 with non-staff departments of the USSR in 1975 shows this distribution to be stable.147 The great majority of the soviets in which non-staff de­ partments were established were those lower-level soviets that had been stripped of part of their staff during Khrushchev's administrative reforms. It may thus be suggested that much of the enthusiasm for replacing administrators with volun­ teers was a case of accepting the inevitable, and when the soviets were once more able to employ paid administrators the number of volunteers went into a natural decline. At the time, however, theoretical support was voiced for pushing on to even greater use of volunteers, on the premise 146

SeeSDT, no. 5 (May 1975), p. 29. The number of non-staff departments grew slightly between 1974 and 1975—from 7,272 to 7,684, cf. SDT, no. 5 (May 1974), p. 74, reversing a drop from 7,383 on January 1, 1973 (Barabashev and Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, p. 498). The change in num­ bers of non-staff departments is not evenly spread throughout the USSR; most of the diminution has been outside the Russian Republic. In the RSFSR, non-staff departments declined from 6,212 in 1964 to 5,230 in 1972 (Hough, "Participation," p. 5), at which time they constituted about three-quarters of all such volunteer units in the USSR. 147 RSFSR, 1964 USSR, 1975 Total number of non-staff departments 6,212 7,684 OrganizationandInstruction 1,700 3,221 Trade 1,516 2,052 Public Works and Consumer Services 671 927 EducationandCulture 533 417 HealthandWelfare 475 255 Other 1,317 812 Source: RSFSR 1964: P. S. Cheremnykh (ed.), Sochetanw gosudarstvennykh 1 obshchestvennykh nachal ν upravlenii obshchestva (Moscow: Mysl', 1965), p. 34. USSR 1975: SDT, no. 5 (May 1975), pp. 28-31.

218

TheLocalSovietsatWork

that administrative work would have no place in a mature Communist society. In the discussion of the new Party pro­ gram a prominent Sovietjurist wrote: "The withering away of the state assumes a steady diminution, and finally the full liq­ uidation of the state apparatus. Its functions will be given over to society itself, i.e., the voluntary organizations of the entire population."148 From the time of their appearance, the non-staff depart­ ments faced criticism from academic commentators studying the problems of administration and the state structure. In the face of official enthusiasm, however, this criticism was tenta­ tive and indirect. Tikhomirov noted that in "complex" areas such as industry, transport, and construction where skilled judgment is needed, it would be "premature" to introduce non-staff departments. He added that such departments are only one way of drawing the masses into administration and that others must be found.149 Another commentator, who was carrying on his own field research into citizen participation in government in Sverdlovsk Oblast' at the time the idea was introduced there, was even more blunt in his criticisms. In an article on partici­ pation, he devoted only one paragraph to the new phenome­ non, writing: "This is one way to substitute Communist public self-government for state administration, but it is clear that a total replacement of paid departments by volunteers is (for the foreseeable future) totally impracticable."150 Volkov noted that the tasks of public administration are complex and must be learned, and he therefore recommended a different form—the volunteer council—as an advisory group, assisting rather than replacing the paid administration. Volkov makes it clear that the volunteer council should be directly subordi­ nate to the paid administrators. His understanding of the council's role is enlightening for what it implies about one part of the duties of citizens participating in Soviet govern148 P. S. Romashkin, "Voprosy razvitna gosudarstva i prava ν proekte programmy KPSS," SGP, no. 10 (October 1961), p. 33. 149 Tikhomirov, "Usilenie," p. 130. 150 Iu. E. Volkov, "O privlechemi obshchestvennosti k gosudarstvennomu upravleniiu," SGP, no. 8 (August 1961), p. 120.

Deputies, Volunteers, and Executives

219

ment. "The main aim of its activity is to assist the administra­ tion in reviewing the most pressing questions. . . . Of course, studying the needs of the population does not mean demand­ ing a clearly unrealistic quantity of consumer goods, stores and restaurants for immediate use. The council's task is to find the most rational use of available possibilities. . . ."151 As shown in note 147, the supplanting of paid bureaucracy by volunteers declined greatly after Khrushchev's time, but appears still to hold some place in local administration, and is even called "the highest stage of development of volunteer elements in the executive apparatus of the local soviets."152 The decline in their numbers is more than offset by the number of volunteer councils within administrative depart­ ments, of which more than 6,000 exist in the RSFSR alone, providing activity for about 100,000 volunteers. These, en­ gaged primarily in advisory and auditing work, are aug­ mented by an additonal 100,000 persons organized in 15,000 volunteer inspectorates.153 What has taken place is not a decline in numbers of partici­ pants. If anything, there has been an increase in the number of citizens involved in the administration of the local soviets. Their relations to the administrators have, however, changed. They are now subordinates working for the administrators rather than replacing them in government. In the opinion of those who would strengthen the representative organs, the deputies should be in charge of all volunteer activity and none of it should be under the control of professional ad­ ministrators.154 This, however, comes into conflict with the campaign for efficient and effective administration and lowcost government. There is an opposite tendency to recruit volunteer organs on the basis of expertise and attach them to the responsible administrative organs.155 This is certainly not a situation unique to the USSR. The tension between public control and administrative effectiveness is a point of conten151

Ibid., p. 117. Barabashev and Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, p. 153Ibid., pp. 497-499· 154 Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, pp. 1 27-129. 155 Tikhomirov, Vlast' i upravlente, p. 1 78.

152

498.

220

The Local Soviets at Work

tion within any government, but in the Soviet case it is exacerbated by a history of lack of independent authority. Those who would promote reform and enlist citizen partici­ pation on the side of control are put at a distinct disadvan­ tage.

DEPUTIES' ACTIVITIES One of the great difficulties of the soviet system of mobilizing mass participation appears to be the overloading of those who are intended to be the backbone of the system, the most re­ sponsible members of their communities. This results partly from the principle that there should be no "professional class of legislators" and that deputies should continue in their reg­ ular work, fulfilling their deputies' duties as an added job. Volkov notes that 11 percent of Sverdlovsk deputies were prevented from carrying out any tasks in public administra­ tion because their basic work prevented it (they were truck drivers, railway workers, etc.), or because they had personal problems that deterred them from such activity.156 As a result of such factors, and others, sociological inquiries have generally found deputies putting relatively little time into their duties as elected representatives. A survey of 4,320 dep­ uties in Estonia and Armenia showed 81.3 percent devoting under 1 ο hours per month and less than 5 percent devoting 26 or more hours per month to deputies' duties.157 Not only the time spent, but the deputies' perception of it, is of signifi­ cance to us. Of the Armenian deputies polled, 40 percent de­ clared that they had sufficient time to perform their tasks as deputies,158 as did 70 percent of the 300 deputies (out of 2 156 Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 130. This is in addition to the previously men­ tioned 25 percent who were basically underqualified. 157 I. V. Pavlov and V. P. Kazimirchuk (eds.), Upravlenie, sotsiologiia, pravo (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1971), p. 183. It may give us some per­ spective on terminology to note that in an analysis of the Armenian part of this research (Effektivnost' deputatskoi deiateV nosti, SGP, no. 1 (January 1969), p. 111) it was claimed that a "significant number" of deputies reported spend­ ing more than ten hours a month on deputies' duties. 158 Ibid., p. 113.

Deputies' Activities

221

million) who bothered to respond to an open questionnaire published by Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia.159 The time spent by these deputies on their duties averaged 9.8 hours per month, including all aspects of activity (partici­ pation in sessions, committee work, public meetings, and work with constituents). Though no general time-norm of work for deputies has been set, one group of sociologists sug­ gested, on the basis of their observations, that a minimum of one hour a day should be considered necessary for optimal fulfillment of deputies' duties.160 From this, we can under­ stand the unrelenting pressure for greater activity, and the subsequent overloading of those in the forefront of commu­ nity activism. At times the overload on deputies becomes extreme, caus­ ing the breakdown of community organs in some cases and their ineffective operation in many others. Aimbetov and Baimakhanov note one factory in which 13 people had six or more permanent community tasks, 16 had five, 16 had four, and 17 had three. This situation was sufficiently widespread and serious for the Georgian Supreme Soviet to call in 1964 for a broader spreading of responsibilities. In 1966 the Kazakh Supreme Soviet did the same.161 Volkov also notes this as a pressing problem. Of 209 activists whom he inter­ viewed, 54 had three to five permanent public assignments and 7 others had more than five. The secretary of the local Party organization had nine separate posts as did another ac­ tivist (who totally neglected three of them, was demanding re­ lease from three others, and was functioning conscientiously only in the remaining three). Volkov's interviewees noted that these tasks were essentially assigned, not volunteered for.162 The emphasis on public activity as a measure of social con­ sciousness and the tendency to coopt proven activists for new tasks exacerbate this problem. A deputy in Kutaisi was, in ad­ dition to his work as a maintenance mechanic in a factory: a 159 SDJ · 160

no

10

(October

1966),

p.

68.

Nekotorye voprosy sotstologu ipravo (Irkutsk, 1967), p. 140, cited in Pavlov

and Kazimirchuk (eds.), Upravlenie, sotsiologiia, pravo, p. 161 Aimbetovand Baimakhanov, Problemy, p. 188. 162 Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, pp. 38-39.

182η.

222

The Local Soviets at Work

member of the Party Bureau in his factory; chairman of the People's Control Commission in the factory; a member of the soviet's standing committee on public works and consumer services (evidently an active committee member, he had pre­ pared three questions for presentation to the executive com­ mittee and had delivered one of the committee's reports to the session of the soviet over the course of a year); and a member of a deputies' group in the soviet. In Moscow, the same picture emerged. Deputies had responsible jobs—for instance direction of all the food-handling services of Moscow University—and had additional Party, trade union, or public posts as well as being members of standing committees and other groups in the soviet. In every discussion with deputies, the term peregruzka (overloading) would appear sooner or later. A major effort was made to activate those who were par­ ticipating only nominally, and to mobilize new thousands of activists during the exchange of Communist Party documents in the years 1971 to 1974. Indeed, the effort devoted to as­ signing new public tasks during this campaign became one of its prominent features. The Party press emphasized in its treatment of the exchange of documents that it was a Party member's duty to see that he was active.163 The mass assign­ ment of Party members to new volunteer posts and the nearuniversal involvement of Party members in public activism were put forward as major achievements of the Party card ex­ change. In the Maritime Territory, 10,000 Communists took on new assignments; in Baku, 12,000. In Gomel Oblast', 75,000 Communists (93.7 percent of the region's Party mem­ bers) were said to have permanent public assignments.164 Though we may have some reservations as to the effective­ ness of such universal assigning of tasks, the mass involve­ ment of Party members emphasizes for us once more, as it did in our discussion of the electoral system, the importance of 163 See thePravda editorial,June 24, 1972; Pravda Ukramy, August 1, 1974; "O tekh kto stoit ν storone," Partunaia zhizn', no. 15 (August 1971), p. 71; and Baktnsku rabochn, March 31, 1971. l64 Pravda, January 4, 1974; Bakinskn rabochn, September 3, 1974; Partnnaia zhizn', no. 5 (March 1975), p. 42.

Deputies' Activities

223

Party numbers, discipline, and organization in providing the backbone of the entire participatory system. In trying to carry out this task, they are also the first to feel the burden of over­ loading. The Party program recognizes this situation by suggesting that there be periodic release of deputies from their basic duties for full-time work in the standing committees.165 Tikhomirov, noting a survey which showed that only 31 per­ cent of deputies had sufficient time for both production work and for their obligations as deputies, noted that a majority of those interviewed had suggested that they should receive days off work to be used as "deputies' days." Tikhomirov approves this suggestion, saying that it will "deepen" their work as dep­ uties, but should be done on a limited scale so as not to affect production. 166 Other authors also suggest the same thing, re­ ferring to Polish experiences in freeing deputies from work for legislative and representative duties.167 To date, nothing has come of this suggestion, but certain deputies are in a position to use the facilities of their work to assist them in their duties as deputies. A school director in Kutaisi had his deputies' group's files in his school office and conducted his work as group chairman with the assistance of the school secretary and on school time. The factory director who was chairman of the public works committee was meet­ ing his volunteer aktiv (all workers of the town soviet) in his factory boardroom in the middle of a working day. Thus, a certain amount of what is called public volunteer work is car­ ried on at the expense of other institutions. In additon, there are posts in every town that are essentially sinecures, leaving the incumbent with a certain amount of free time to devote to assisting in any public work that comes up. The director of a public park could take time off to be Party observer at an elec165

CPSU 7 Program, p. 166 Tikhomirov, Vlast'

103. 1 upravlenie, pp 50, 179. Here, the objection to freeing deputies from their basic work is not the fear of creating "profes­ sional legislators," but interference with production of material goods, thus once more emphasizing the production-oriented nature of Soviet society. 167 See Grigorian, Sovety, p. 53; Aimbetov and Baimakhanov, Problemy, p. 132.

224

The Local Soviets at Work

tion taking place in the local touring association, "just to see how things go." The director of the Spartak sports organiza­ tion in Kutaisi was also a chairman of a neighborhood com­ mittee and available to assist the instructors of the local soviet in projects in which they might need help. It also appeared that a number of employees of the organization were "avail­ able" for whatever needs might arise. Cheap government is therefore partly in formal bookkeeping terms only, with non­ governmental organizations bearing costs of government ac­ tivity indirectly. The above may be one reason why it was found that directors of enterprises and institutions were far more active as deputies than all other occupational cate­ gories.168

CITIZEN COMPLAINTS AND REQUESTS Direct contact with a local official or political leader is ranked by Verba and Nie as one of the "more difficult" political acts, in that it requires initiative and effort.169 About one-fifth of the population they investigated had turned to some local leader or functionary with a request or problem. In the USSR, the political system is so structured that the citizen must almost surely turn at some time to local officials or politi­ cal figures for their help. As we have noted, a significant part of the deputies' work is to expedite such requests, which are so numerous that they overload the whole administrative staff. The way to handle them is a perennial subject of discus­ sion. An August 1958 resolution of the Central Committe of the Communist Party noted that the number of complaints and requests being presented to the local soviets was growing rapidly and expressed displeasure with the fact that the lack 168 Pavlov and Kazimirchuk, Upravlenie, sotsiologiia, pravo, p. 185. While the overall average of time spent was found to be 9.8 hours per month, directors of enterprises and institutions spent 12.1 hours per month at such duties; en­ gineers, doctors, agronomists, etc., 9.1 hours; heads of departments in in­ stitutions and enterprises, 8.8 hours; workers, 8.6 hours; kolkhoz members, 8.2 hours. 169 Verba and Nie, Participation in America, pp. 31-40.

Citizen Complaints and Requests

225

of response on the part of the local authorities was leading to the same complaints being resubmitted at a higher level.170 The number of requests appears to have been truly enor­ mous. Evidently the policy of the regime at that time, of ex­ panding the competence and activities of the soviets and pay­ ing more attention to consumers' needs, set off a "revolution of rising expectations" whose chief manifestation was a wave of citizens' requests of all sorts for help from the soviets. R. J. Osborn notes the experience of the executive committee chairman of an oblast' soviet who in 1959 received 7,815 re­ quests in writing, in addition to 1,561 office visits. Most of these requests dealt with matters of housing and pensions, and 3,707 of them had been handed down from a higher source. Of these, one-third were sent further down the chain by the oblast' soviet chairman. Of the requests passed down by him, almost two-thirds went unanswered and reappeared as repeat requests directed by the citizens to the higher soviets.171 The weight of citizen requests reflected above is not unusual. In the first four months of 1962, the executive committee in the Kirov District of Moscow and its administra­ tive departments received 11,803 applications from citizens, of which 6,160 went directly to the executive committee.172 The executive committee admitted that close to a quarter of these were not handled within the required time limit, but further investigation showed that the percentage was actually much larger. The deputy chairman of the executive commit­ tee was found to have 5 6 4 requests on his desk, of which 2 5 7 were already overdue. Hundreds of housing requests were simply never answered. Additionally, requests that were ap170 C.C., CPSU, "O sereznykh nedostatkakh ν rassmotrenii pisem, zhalob i zaiavlenii trudiashchikhsia," Spravochnik (1959), p. 550. 171 Robert J. Osborn, "Public Participation in Soviet City Government," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York: Columbia University, 1963, p. 165. Testimony that such phenomena are not yet a thing of the past may be found in an election speech by Nikolai V. Podgornyi, who noted that the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was the recipient of numerous complaints about local matters, which, after intervention from Moscow, were ultimately settled (as they should have been in the first place) by local officials. Pravda, June 14,

974·

1

172

Bulletin, no. 15-501 (August 1962), p. 9.

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The Local Soviets at Work

proved were sometimes not implemented after approval. There is record of a citizen having her request for new hous­ ing approved fourteen times without ever getting actual hous­ ing.173 As much as any other aspect of the operation of the soviets, this impasse reflects the concentration of all activity within the executive committee, which limited the soviets' ca­ pacity for effective government. In addition to officials of the executive committee being the only people who could make official allocations, there ap­ peared a concomitant phenomenon of institutions refusing to accept the validity of any document or statement unless it was attested to by a spravka from the executive committee. Thus, despite a citizen's address being registered in his internal passport, the executive committee secretaries of the Millerovskii Urban Soviet issued 25,605 certificates attesting to place of residence in the course of a single year. The Orekho-Zuevskii Urban Soviet in Moscow Oblast' issued 30,000 spravki of which 15,000 attested to the residence of children, 5,000 were in connection with pension payments, "thousands" dealt with the allotment of fuel and many more dealt with notarization of signatures on applications to the militia or to other institutions.174 It became clearly apparent that new administrative organization had to be created if the growing demands on local government both from the central authorities and from the citizens were to be met. What is the nature of the Soviet citizen's applications to the authorities? Mostly, as was the case noted in Osborn's work, they are applications for housing or for pension rights. As the local soviets take on more responsibility for housing, and as the number of pensioners continues to grow, this pressure is maintained. In Altai Territory these two items accounted for 43-48 percent of all 3,000 or more letters written to the krai executive committee in each of the years 1966-1969. Applica­ tions of all kinds outnumbered complaints and suggestions by a large margin throughout the period.175 In rural areas, as 173 Ibtd.,

u l SDT, no. 1 (January 1957), p. 82. p. 10. V. Gordeev, Rassmotrenu pisem ι organizatsna priema trudiashchikhsia ν ispolkomakh sovetov Altai (Barnaul: Altaiskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, ig6g), pp. 40-42. 175

Citizen Complaints and Requests

227

can be seen from the analysis of requests by voters of Bel­ gorod Region and from other similar sources, small items of daily importance, such as fuel, materials for house repair, and other scarce items, take their place along with housing and pensions. The direction taken for solution of the problem was a devolution of responsibility for primary screening of com­ plaints to volunteer and deputies' bodies. The role of the deputies' groups and the individual deputies in receiving and routing these requests has already been noted. In Kalinin Dis­ trict of Moscow, deputies' councils meet several times a week with applicants. In the course of one year, the district's coun­ cils interviewed 15,000 citizens and accepted 5,000 applica­ tions from them. The deputies' councils were credited with reducing the number of direct appeals to the executive com­ mittee from 17 ,000 a year in i 9 6 0 to 10,000 a year in 1963. 1 7 6 In many local soviets, a volunteer public council (obshchestuennyi soviet) for review of citizens' applications has been set up. In Kutaisi, this was a group of fifteen citizens headed by the rector of a poly technical institute. In the Kiev District of Moscow, such a council was formed of thirty pensioners who handled some 14,000 requests during 1961. 177 The council was able to keep up to date on handling these requests and reported a clear desk on January 1, ig62. However, "handling" in this case means that the request has either been returned to the citizen as unbased or in need of further doc­ umentation, or that it has been passed to the appropriate au­ thority for decision. What has been eliminated is the stack of unanswered letters on the desk of the deputy chairman. What has also been created is a series of parallel access routes to the executive of the soviet for the citizen. Where once he was lim­ ited to an application to the officials of the executive commit­ tee, he now may approach a variety of institutions with his re­ quests, saving the executive committee for a "court of appeal" should other routes fail. In a resolution of August 29, 1967, the Central Committee of the Communist Party emphasized the above points as im176 177

Bulletin, no. 11-545 (June 1964), p. 20. Ibid., no. 23-509 (December 1962), p. 24.

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The Local Soviets at Work

portant in the proper handling of complaints. They noted that the letters and applications of citizens constitute one of the important links between citizen and regime and that re­ sponse to these applications has a considerable influence on the citizen's attitude to the regime. There is also explicit rec­ ognition of the communicative role played by complaints to higher organs in signaling the inefficiency of lower organs.178 Letters to the press play the same role, and a Sovietjournalist noted in an interview both the use made of letters for illustrat­ ing current campaigns on one subject or another and the use of letters to the central press as a signal that local organs— whether press or government—were not able to respond to citizens' complaints in a satisfactory manner. The way in which citizens' complaints are handled and the mechanisms by which they are reviewed illustrate what ap­ pears to be an important characteristic of the information flow and feedback structure of Soviet local government. Free exercise of the right of petition by the citizens, a feature of the Soviet system since its earliest days and, indeed, a Russian tradition, acts as an independent signal to the central au­ thorities of breakdowns and deficiencies at the local level. Whether these are through petitions to Supreme Soviet depu­ ties or letters to central newspapers, they create a flow of in­ formation unmonitored by local officials. The citizen does not necessarily go through "channels" but expresses his demands directly to a central level if denied satisfaction on the local level. In this, we have a parallel to the freedom of the citizen to cast a negative vote against a local official—despite the fact that the local authorities might feel most uncomfortable about it. The local officials must therefore see that they at least meet the formalities, acknowledging the citizen's request and promising attention. They must create some sort of order of priorities that will enable them to meet the most urgent needs of the citizens—one measure of urgency being defined as demands that might reflect badly on the local officials if brought to the attention of higher authorities. The adminis178 C.C., CPSU, "Ob uluchshenii raboty po rassmotreniiu pisem i organizatsii priema trudiashchikhsia," Spravochnik (1968), p. 299.

Citizen Complaints and Requests

229

trator must attempt to protect himself by keeping ahead of demands where he can and, since this is generally beyond his means, maintaining formal correctness and contact with the citizens to minimize and explain away deficiencies. Local officials do this by replicating on the territory of their soviets the strategy by which they themselves are monitored. The deputies' groups and the standing commissions are sent into the constituency to meet the citizens, hear their requests, and expedite, mobilize, and explain to pacify petitioners. The deputy thus takes the onus of direct contact and the executive committee and administrators become instances of appeal to be approached if the deputies fail to provide sufficient atten­ tion. Insulated from part of the burden of routine requests, the administrator has more time and energy to devote to ac­ tual problem solving. He therefore has an interest in main­ taining the deputies as an administrative layer between him­ self and the citizens, and can judge the effectiveness of the deputies' activities much in the same way that his own effec­ tiveness is judged by central authorities. As for the citizens, the scope of governmental activity and the institutional structure of the Soviet system invite direct contact with officials. The regime "reaches out" to the com­ munity by means of the deputies and other volunteers, and the combined result of regime demands and structural ac­ commodation would appear to be a high rate of contact be­ tween citizens and officials. The city of Orekhovo-Zuevo men­ tioned earlier had only a little over a 100,000 population at the time that the city soviet was issuing 25,000 authoriza­ tions,179 and the Kirov soviet, which handled about 34,000 citizen applications in a year, might have up to a quarter mil­ lion population. Thus, the cumulative number of adults mak­ ing some sort of application to local officials or political lead­ ers over a period of years would seem to approach the total population. In view of the habit of turning to various layers of authority if there is no immediate response from local offi­ cials, a broad spectrum of deputies and offices may be in­ volved. However, we have not a completely clear picture as to how many of these applications go to the deputies and how 179

Narkhoz y 7922-72, p. 25, lists the city's 1959 population as 108,000.

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The Local Soviets at Work

many are presented directly to the administrative and execu­ tive organs of the soviet. A research project carried out in Ir­ kutsk in the early 1960s found that only about one-eighth of a sample of 7,767 citizens interviewed had turned to their dep­ uties for assistance.180 The average deputy, in the study of Armenian soviets cited earlier, had eight visitors per year. One-quarter of the deputies surveyed had twenty or more constituents apply to them, while 7 percent—particularly from the very small district-subordinated towns and from the workers' settlements—had no requests at all in the course of a year.181 In attempting to ascertain the social structure of the com­ munity that turns to the deputies and the soviets, it appeared that it was particularly the lower layers of workers and em­ ployees who were involved in such contacts. Interviewees from the scientific and technical intelligentsia generally solved their housing problems either through the institute in which they worked or through membership in a cooperative, and had little need for, or interest in, contact with deputies or officials of the soviets. In most cases in which direct contact was made, the initiative was from a local deputy or Party offi­ cial attempting to draw the citizen into activity, rather than by the citizen turning to the official for assistance. In the course of this chapter, we have traced the develop­ ment of the framework of the soviets since the mid-1950s. It seems clear that the first problems to which the regime ad­ dressed itself—those of simply setting up a functioning mechanism of soviets which met on schedule and elected deputies according to law—have been solved. In the same way, the great majority of executive committees and deputies appear to meet, however perfunctorily, the demand that they report with at least minimal regularity to their electors. As yet unsettled are problems regarding the functions of each part of the soviet and the relations between them. While great debates have been held as to the rights of the represent180 V. A. Pertsik, "Puty sovershenstvovaniia deiatel'nosti deputatov mestnykh sovetov," SGP, no. 7 (July 1967), p. 17. 181 "EfiFektivnost' deputatskoi deiatel'nosti," S G P , no. 1 (January 1969), p. 112.

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231

ative organs and the necessity for their independence as over­ seers of the administrative and executive branches, the depu­ ties are still clearly auxiliaries of the administrators in most cases.182 Clearly, there exists a broad area of need in which the par­ ticipation of the deputies can aid both citizens and regime in problem solving to ease the rough spots of daily Soviet life. Almost as clear is the great investment of energy and re­ sources involved in training deputies, and in establishing and activating group frameworks within which the deputies can operate. The deputies, their aktiv, the volunteer inspectors, and the non-staff departments total nearly 5 million persons. Nevertheless, this potent combination of need and effort seems to result more in potential than in real activity. Though the formalities are undoubtedly better observed today than they were before 1957, certain persistent phenomena cast doubt on just how effective deputies are. Their continuing anonymity is one example. Although it may be proposed that the fact that they work in groups rather than as individuals keeps them relatively unknown to their constituents, the overwhelming response of former Soviet citizens has been that neither the deputy nor his work hold a prominent place in citizens' consciousness. Soviet research projects have reported similar results.183 One reason for this would seem to be that, despite all that is written on the impor­ tance of work with constituents, the deputies spend nearly 6 0 percent of their time in sessions of the soviet and public meet­ ings, and only 5 percent (an average of half an hour per month) in meeting constituents.184 With all that has been done to guide and ease the deputy in carrying the burden of public service, certain basic barriers remain firmly entrenched. Despite the suggestions we noted 182

See for instance, comments in Barabashev and Sheremet, Sovetskoe

stroitel'stvo, pp. 261-262. 183 p er tsik, "Puty sovershenstvovaniia," p. 17, who notes that less than 10 percent of his interviewees knew who their city or urban district deputy was, and even less knew the identity of their Supreme Soviet deputy. See also Friedgut, "Kutaisi," pp. 274-275. 184 Pavlov and Kazimirchuk (eds.), Upravlenie, sotsiologiia, pravo, p. 194.

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that deputies be given time off from work beyond the time necessary for participating in sessions of the soviet, nothing has been done in this direction. In such a situation, the cost of conscientious fulfillment of duty by the deputy is high, and a considerable number of deputies would appear to perform only minimally, spreading themselves thinly among many public tasks. In addition, the denial of substantive planning and budget­ ary influence to the standing committees keeps them at a permanent disadvantage in relation to the paid executive and administrative organs. There exists a fundamental clash be­ tween the ostensible sovereignty and influence of the repre­ sentative organs and their actual activity. Even the stubborn and active deputy who exercises his right to voice criticism and invokes the power of higher authority to support his campaign will find that he has no power individually or within a committee to do more than recommend and plead. The situation of the deputy in relation to the administration is thus similar in many respects to that of the local soviet in rela­ tion to higher government organs. The limits of effectiveness of cooptation are clear here. The element of control, present at every phase of the deputy's ac­ tivity, appears to do a great deal in offsetting the great need for and investment in citizen participation. The deputy may or may not have an interest in holding office, but is hard put to refuse or to withdraw.185 If this were a static situation, we might be tempted to point to a fundamental clash between the structure and function of the soviets, to suggest that the whole effort to revive repre­ sentative institutions in the USSR was doomed to failure, and that the participation of elected deputies and citizen activists had no future. There are, however, processes affecting the scope and quality of participation that open new perspectives of future development, and it is in the perspective of a gradual social and political process that changes in participa­ tion must be viewed. 185 On the "extraordinary and unusual case" of Comrade Lazarenko who tried unsuccessfully to resign as a deputy because he felt himself useless, see Izvestiia, September 22, 1965, October 15, 1965, December 30, 1965.

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An important factor in any future change is the improve­ ment in the educational level of the deputies. More and more, they become a body of educated and more sophisticated people, capable of equal discussion with the paid executives of the soviet or with Party functionaries. As the body of elected deputies moves out of its "underdog" status, in which participation does not even approach the objective possibil­ ities offered by the system, a cumulative process may be set in motion in which successful participation engenders feelings of competence, which in turn reinforce participation.186 Together with growing capacity and an objective need for effective deputies, proponents of meaningful participation can point to a full legitimacy in the political system as its normative framework now stands. Whereas the election sys­ tem would have to be totally revolutionized in order to realize the full potential of electoral participation, no such problem exists regarding the work of the elected deputies. To imple­ ment in daily life the full measure of the deputies' participa­ tory potential requires only the realization of the norms and institutions already provided for under Soviet law. While all the above is in itself insufficient for full develop­ ment of the deputies as effective participants in local govern­ ment, the burgeoning growth of local services and continuing restrictions on administrative expenditures, though less than in the Khrushchev period, still make the work of the deputy and his public aktiv crucial to the success of the soviets. The deputies have thus become functionally important in maintaining the multitude of interwoven frameworks that guarantee the regime a flow of information, total penetration of the community and a reserve of mobilizing power that can help meet shortages, campaigns, and emergencies at the local level. The deputy, operating within the institutions set up by 186 por a general development of this thesis, see Erik Allardt, Pentti Jartti, Faina Jyrkila, and Yrjo Littunen, "On the Cumulative Nature of Leisure Ac­ tivities" in Edwards and Booth, Social Participation, p. 72. The same thesis is put forth in Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell1Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships," Part 1 ,APSR, Vol. 63, no. 2 (June 1969), p. 372. The authors suggest that the cumulative effect of participation growth may be strong enough to alter the political structures of society.

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the soviet, serves as a liaison between the authorities and the citizens. He is also the focus of the organization of the community-level groups which complete the chain of mobili­ zation, control, and participation at the grass-roots level. It is to these organizations and their role as ancillary bodies to the soviets that we turn in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Social Mobilization and Social Control When the Bolshevik regime was established, Lenin had be­ fore him a number of differing views of society, which he tried to reconcile and integrate. From Marxist theory he drew the picture of the modern capitalist economy where every­ thing could supposedly be broken down to simple operations of accounting and control that could be performed by any­ one. From the study of the Paris Commune he drew the les­ son of replacement of the old bureaucracy and state institu­ tions by mass public participation. From his own experience as a revolutionary he drew the ideas of the elitist revolu­ tionary party controlling the reins of society and directing it. Essential to the successful working of this composite view of social organization was the participation of the masses as will­ ing executors of regime policy. The exact way in which this was to be done, it was thought, would be the result of experi­ ence and experimentation. "Our aim is to draw the whole of the poor into the practical work of administration and all steps that are taken in this direction—the more varied they are, the better—should be carefully recorded, systematized, studied and embodied in law."1 Organization, participation, and control have remained since that time the cornerstones of Soviet policy in the resi­ dential community, but in the period with which we are deal­ ing the question of achieving these three objects, not always 1

Lenin, Works, Vol. 27, p. 243.

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Social Mobilization and Social Control

easily reconcilable, has been raised more frequently and sharply. The development of Soviet society has much to do with this. The political climate changed greatly after Stalin's death, permitting a renewal of the inquiry and experimenta­ tion into urban planning and social structures that had been so prominent in the 1920s.2 An additional factor was the continuing rapid urbanization of the USSR, and particularly the growth of the large cities. Not only was it important that, by 1961, a majority of Soviet citizens were living in cities, but that twenty-five such cities had more than half a million inhabitants and that this was the fastest growing class of city. Added to this was the fact that the urban growth was as yet primarily a result of internal migra­ tion from rural localities to urban, and from small towns to large. The new metropolites were therefore a disparate lot, from differing backgrounds and localities without a strong communal basis to link them. They were thus perhaps more naturally inclined to disperse into the anonymity of the large city than to create the social and political solidarity which is the ideal postulated by the Soviet regime. With the declaration of the end of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the imminent onset of Communism, the forms and conditions under which the entire population could be brought into the administration of public affairs at neighborhood level became the object of much discussion. Three main subjects may be discerned in the discussion of the political organization of Soviet neighborhood life. The first is the creation, or maintaining, of community, despite urbanization and growing physical mobility. As we noted in the previous chapter, much is done in terms of both physical and administrative arrangements to bring government into contact with neighborhood constituencies by organizing the elected representatives. The multitude of grass-roots commit­ tees and councils which deal with local conditions under the guidance of the local soviet are the other side of the coin. 2 For a brief survey of some of the physical and social planning of this early period see Osborn, Soviet Social Policies, pp. 232-237; and Ernst May, "Cities of the Future" in Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), The Future of Communist Society (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 179-185.

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They are an effort to "reach up" from the community to gov­ ernment, complementing the local soviet's effort to "reach down" into the community. The second object of community organization is to give ideological coloration to all types of local campaigns or or­ ganization, injecting political values into the social environ­ ment. Improvement of services becomes "improvement of services to the toilers," and the preservation of public prop­ erty the preservation of "socialist public property." The community is to be organized for conscious ideological ends to which the population must be socialized. The third focus of the discussion is how to develop an in­ ternalized self-government in the community, as a reliable and effective local instrument for implementation of Party and state policies. Much of the success of the physical and psychological community and its socialization depends on such a local instrument. As Osborn points out, even the more imaginative architectural expressions of the Soviet commu­ nity are based on the presumption of an effective system of self-government.3 Perhaps the ultimate point of the whole system is the at­ tempt to substitute social sanctions for the legal sanctions of the state. Arguing from the localized nature of community organizations, one prominent Soviet legal scholar states that such groups can reflect only the interests and will of a limited community, and therefore cannot be considered organs of the Soviet state representing the entire people—merely as auxiliaries that assist the state only by participating in admin­ istration.4 This clearly sets the tasks of community organiza­ tions in the sphere of mobilization. Kozlov, however, notes later the establishing of community organizations' rights to bring public opprobrium to bear on inadequacies in adminis­ tration, emphasizing that this means moral, but not judicial, pressure. In a yet later passage he describes the transition to Communist society as one in which moral norms gradually supersede judicial norms.5 3 4

Osborn, Soviet Social Policies, p. 240. Kozlov, Sootnoshenie, p. 72.

5Ibid.,

pp. 78, 147.

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Social Mobilization and Social Control

The full significance of these passages becomes apparent when we examine the possible objects of mobilization in a political system. Clearly, mobilization may be used for very diverse ends: economic development, creation of identity and community, creation of a particular social climate, and more. Kozlov's work points out that one of the prominent aims of Soviet community-level mobilization is social control. Volun­ teer public activity within the framework of such institutions as the druzhiny and the comrades' courts comes into focus as a means by which the state mechanism becomes more effec­ tive and more active through the agency of public volunteer organs.6 The aim of the Soviet authorities, then, is the organization of grass-roots frameworks capable of reaching, mobilizing, and controlling all citizens. These are by no means spontane­ ous or independent groups, but are the creatures of the local authorities, who mobilize them from the controlled social frameworks of factory, trade union, or residential commu­ nity. The point has been made that a population deprived of in­ dependent secondary associations is vulnerable to mobiliza­ tion by elites, for the elites' own ends.7 In addition, we have repeatedly referred to Selznick's opinion on the advantages that any regime can derive from cooptation of previously un­ structured communities. In the Soviet case, the control values so prominent in the regime are employed to ensure that no independent associations exist in society and that no unmobilized potential lies fallow. Even such traditionally separa­ tist islands of organization as the church and the family are subject to attempts at penetration and pressure. The regime-sponsored community groups, based on mass citizen participation, attempt to preempt as far as possible, spontaneous, local, or family-based social groupings in the so­ lution of daily problems, drawing the citizen out of his paro­ chial circle and into a community-based orientation. Grass­ roots organizations are employed in this effort because it is 6 7

This view is also stated by Volkov in Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 19. Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, p. 33.

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recognized that face-to-face organizations of a semiofficial na­ ture will often be called upon for help by the citizen more readily than will more distant and formal organizations.8 These findings, based on non-Soviet research efforts, were found valid by Soviet sociologists who interviewed young Leningraders to find out to whom they turned for advice. Not unexpectedly, the respondents put relatives and friends at the top of the list, while trade union, Komsomol, and Party officials ranked lowest.9 The point of the Soviet community organizational effort— and this holds true both at place of residence and place of work—is to make the regime your neighbor by having your neighbor represent the regime. Deputies, house committee chairmen, and neighborhood representatives are therefore all expected to involve themselves in family or neighborly af­ fairs, making "private" matters into public concern, and at the same time trying to make grand public matters (such as con­ cern for the international situation and fulfillment of the current economic plan) into matters for private, individual attention. While the aims of the Soviet regime in this area are clear, evaluation of reality often shows that there is yet a long way to go in achieving these aims. Many of the more hortatory writ­ ings so prominent in Soviet work on this subject make much of the multitude of organizations; however, many Soviet scholars take a more reserved and sober view of the effective­ ness of community organization in Soviet conditions. Volkov calls claims that the building of Communist self-government is well advanced "illusory."10 The making of necessity into a virtue is condemned by other writers, who note that there is something inherently unhealthy in unloading on the com­ munity work that is the responsibility of officials.11 Varchuk sets five conditions for the participation of the adult popula­ tion in the administration of public affairs, making it clear 8

Verba, "Political Participation," p. 29. S. N. Ikonnikova and V. T. Lisovsky, Molodezh 0 sebe, 0 ivoikh sverstnikakh (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1969), p. 45. 10 Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 5. 11 Karapetian and Razin, Sovety obshchenarodnogo gosudarstva, p. 135. 9

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that these are to be considered attainable only in some future time.12 The present stage of development of Soviet society and the prospects for future changes are of some importance for our analysis, for they cast light on the environment in which the Soviet regime operates, as well as the ultimate goal it wishes to reach. These constitute "the state of the system," in the sense proffered by. Rokkan as a potentially fruitful area of investi­ gation.13 A full analysis of the present state of the Soviet polit­ ical system will be presented as part of our conclusions. Some attention, however, may be given at this point to the points raised by Varchuk, and the implied reasons why he sees "Communist public self-government" as attainable only in the future. While a high material level is a relative matter, the chronic shortages of housing, services, and consumer goods, as well as the distribution difficulties of the Soviet economy, are, for the regime as well as for the observer, evidence of an unsatisfac­ tory level of economic development. Even with the relatively great progress of the last decade and a half, too much of the citizen's attention, in terms of nonworking time, must be de­ voted to producing or obtaining goods and services not read­ ily supplied by the economic system. The state of the economy, of course, impinges directly on the citizen's available free time. Not only is his consciousness directed to the welfare of himself and his immediate family, but his nonworking time is consumed by personal, rather than social, service. Growing leisure time, with the introduc12 Varchuk, "Puty," p. 9. The conditions he lists are: (a) a high material level of welfare in society; (b) available free time; (c) available forms of or­ ganization to cover all sectors of social activity and all of the population; (d) high cultural and technical levels and a basic mastery of administrative tech­ niques; (e) a general tendency on the part of citizens to demand participation in administration together with their basic production work. Razin, in Politwheskaia organizatstia obshchestva, p. 151, sets forth virtually the same five conditions. Razin, who supervised Varchuk's dissertation, published his work in 1967, a year before the filing of Varchuk's dissertation. 13 See Rokkan, "The Comparative Study of Political Participation," p. 65; as well as my discussion in Chapter 1.

Social Mobilization and Social Control

241

tion of the five-day week, certainly rouses the prospects of in­ creased civic activism but, as we shall see when we examine Soviet studies of citizens' time budgets, free time devoted to public affairs is as yet severely limited. Perhaps the only one of Varchuk's five conditions fully present in Soviet society today is the availability of forms of organization covering the entire society in all its activities. Certainly no citizen seeking an outlet for public activity sup­ portive of the regime, or providing for community welfare, need look far to find appropriate possibilities. The educational and technical levels of Soviet society are rising rapidly and the "scientific-technical revolution" has been raised in recent years very nearly to cult status. From a general reverence for scientific organization of work, various subsectors have been born, including the "scientific organiza­ tion of administrative work" (nauchnaia organizatsiia upravlencheskogo truda).14 However, as we noted in our opening chap­ ter, the same spirit that gave birth to this fervor for scientific organization has also established the status of administration and professional administrators, subordinating the citizen volunteer to them in the general governing of the Soviet community. Nevertheless, the spread of the Soviet commu­ nity culture, and particularly two central aspects of it, appears far from universal. The principles of procedural regularity, accountability, and defined responsibility fundamental to administration can hardly be said to have deep roots in Soviet practice, and were rightly the first object of reform. On the other hand, the Soviet citizen with his background of peasant parochialism or intelligentsia individualism is still far from the ideal of the self-governing community-oriented personal­ ity envisioned in descriptions of "Communist public selfgovernment." All the same, considerable pressure is main­ tained to develop the collectivist social culture as well as an 14

For a detailed disquisition on this subject, including a sharply em­

phasized differentiation between scientific organization of volunteer work such as that of the deputies, and the paid professional work of the adminis­ trative personnel of the soviets, see Barabashev and Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, pp. 83-90.

242

Social Mobilization and Social Control

effective administration, which, while not abandoning politi­ cal control, will know how to integrate citizen participation into its operation. As regards the last of Varchuk's five points, any conclusions regarding the Soviet population as a whole must await publi­ cation of massive research results on this subject from the USSR—an event that unfortunately does not appear immi­ nent. The best that may be hazarded from those studies pub­ lished so far, and from non-Soviet research with emigrants is that while a considerable segment of the public probably accepts the burdens and demands of public service there is nothing remotely resembling a universal demand to partici­ pate in administration. There does, however, appear to exist a core of public activists, drawn first of all from the Party but also from other groups in society, sufficient to maintain the framework of mobilization in the Soviet community, and a periphery which, while not consistently active, is available for mobilization, responding with greater or lesser alacrity ac­ cording to the particular circumstances. As will be noted in discussion of the various forms of com­ munity organizations, citizens are drawn into very diverse ac­ tivities in their community, some of which may involve direct benefit for the participant in terms of facilities or conven­ iences which he would not get otherwise. These, presumably, elicit a very different response than would other activities, which might be viewed as beneficial only to the regime and utterly without redeeming social value in the daily world of the citizen.

SELF-HELP ORGANIZATIONS The community self-help organizations (obshchestvennye samodeiatel'nye organizatsii) with which we deal here are to be differentiated from the non-staff (vne-shtatnye) organizations attached to the administrative departments of the soviet, dis­ cussed earlier. The latter are simply unpaid personnel who are operating within the framework of the administrative or­ gans of the soviet and fulfilling the functions of these or-

Self-Help Organizations

243

gans.15

They have no structure of their own, but are fused within the paid administrative framework, under its exec­ utives who provide them with leadership. The former are chiefly neighborhood committees and councils serving a par­ ticular locale or institution, or else they are volunteer councils operating as discrete units attached to the executive commit­ tee of the local soviet. The community self-help organizations generally operate under a locally elected leadership which is guided indirectly or directly by various organs and officials of the soviet. The community self-help organizations are a fea­ ture of every Soviet town and village, and since innovations in one locality are publicized and transplanted if successful, there are a multitude of forms of committees of a similar na­ ture in various localities.16 The community-level organizations in the Soviet Union may be divided by function into three main groups. The first group includes organizations whose dominant function is the control and prevention of deviant behavior. The clearest examples of such organizations are the comrades' courts and the druzhiny. The second group, of which the house, street, and neighborhood committees are typical, deals primarily in mobilization, attempting to elicit from the citizens forms of social and political behavior regarded as desirable by the re­ gime, and assisting in making the local population available for regime projects. The third group, typified by the mul­ titude of volunteer councils (obshchestvennye sovety) and the re­ pair squads (remontnye druzhiny) of Moscow, act mainly within the realm of work, supplementing the services controlled by the local soviet. In doing this, they may act either as a sup­ plement to the bureaucracy or as representatives of the citi­ zens. 15 See Kozlov, Sootnoshenie, pp. 103, 306, for this discussion and for further differentiation of community self-help groups from the mass public organiza­ tions such as the Nature Preservation Society, the Red Cross, and DOSAAF (the Society for Cooperation with the Armed Forces). Odom, Soviet Volunteers, is a detailed analysis of the development arid workings of the latter. 16 Kozlov, Sootnoshenie, pp. 108-109, notes how a committee to coordinate voluntary committees on housing in Vorkuta was widely emulated elsewhere. Bulletin, no. 3-489 (February 1962), p. 24, recounts how such an institution was brought to the Dzherzhinskii District of Moscow.

244

Social Mobilization and Social Control

Any given group may carry on more than one function at any time, or may change its area of operation to adapt to changing demands. The attempt has been made here, how­ ever, to group the organizations by the function that gen­ erally predominates in their activities. The emphasis on public mobilization into community affairs has brought a great increase in the number of those listed as participating in the various committees and councils. In Sverdlovsk Oblast' the number of people involved in such work is said to have grown by close to tenfold between 1955 and 1965 and reached '15 percent of the adult population.17 In Georgia in 1967, there were 20,000 community self-help organizations enlisting 240,000 citizens.18 This is about 9 percent of the electorate. A 1965 publication listed twenty different categories of self-help organizations in the USSR, under which there were 9 6 6 , 4 1 2 organizations with 9 , 7 2 4 , 3 7 2 members. This makes up about 7 percent of the 1965 elector­ ate of the Soviet Union.19 In these figures we get a sense of the type of organizations involved here—they have an aver­ age of ten members and in most cases are closely focused on one type of activity. Exceptions to this in terms of size are the druzhiny groups whose units average some forty members (85,182 organizations with a total of 3,351,078 members re­ ported) and, in terms of function, the pensioners' and women's councils, which may take on a wide range of ac­ tivities. A closer look at organization in various localities con­ firms the general picture while giving us a sense of local peculiarities. Table 11 shows the full range of public volun­ teer activity in government as of 1963 in Sakhalin Oblast', in the Soviet Far East, an area taken from the Japanese at the 17 Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 119. It is not completely clear here whether Volkov is counting in this only the community self-help organizations or the aktiv of the deputies' frameworks as well. 18 Papidze, Razvitie, p. 186. 18 Victor M. Chkhikvadze (ed.), Sotsializm 1 narodovlastte (Moscow: Politicheskaia Literatura, 1965), p. 88. This handbook of volunteer organiza­ tions includes in its listings such production-oriented organizations as kol­ khoz brigade councils and technical-economic councils in factories, but does not include the aktiv of the deputies' groups and standing committees.

Self-Help Organizations TABLE

11.

245

COMMUNITY SELF-HELP ORGANIZATIONS IN SAKHALIN O B L A S T '

(as of July 1, 1963)

Areas of activity Work with Executive of Soviets Housing and Public Works Trade and Catering Transport Public Health Education Culture Public Order Fire-fighting

Average No. of group groups size

Total members

%of participants

Of these* % who are Party Deputies members

107

20

2,180

2-49

19-9

43-5

777

28

22,233

25-35

2-9

14.2

353

6

2,169

27

865

40

32 38

i.5'9

804

10

532 M23 462

19

2.47

11.5

30.8

28.9

74-9

14-9 1 5-5

25

8,171

°-99 1-73 9-32

4

2,208

2.52

10.3

25

36,333 8.919

41.42

5.6

24.7

10.17

2.1

!5-9

!7 '9

a Since some deputies are also Party members, we cannot add the percentages in these columns to find the combined Party-deputy strength in community groups. b Discrepancy due to rounding of decimals. Source: P. S. Cheremnykh (ed.), Sochetanie gosudarstvennykh i obshchestvennykh nachal v upravlenii obshchestva (Moscow: Mysl', 1965), p. 65.

end of World War II and settled by the government with a new population transferred from other areas of the USSR. While the population is therefore not totally typical o f the USSR, its social organizations will in all likelihood reflect the attempts of the authorities to organize the new communities

246

Social Mobilization and Social Control

in keeping with the social theories prevalent in the regime at that time. The total population of Sakhalin Oblast' in the 1959 census was 649,405. While the exact number in the electorate is not available here, the census figures give the population aged twenty and over as 376,523. It is therefore not unreasonable to put the electorate—which is roughly equivalent to the population available for public activity—at about 400,000. The public aktiv of the soviets in Sakhalin thus appears to be close to 25 percent of the adult population. This is not far from the proportion of activists in the population in other studies cited earlier in this work, although various researchers have used differing framework^ of activism in their research, making comparisons tentative, at best.20 The total listed, however, contains much double counting. A note appended to the table in Cheremnykh's book states that 23,400 persons of those listed as participating in the preservation of public order work in a number of organiza­ tions simultaneously. The deputies listed, numbering 5,613, are probably very nearly all the deputies of the oblast', though it is difficult to separate out the effects of double counting.21 Other aspects of the involvement, both of deputies and of Party members in these groups, appear quite clearly. Depu­ ties are involved both in straight "work" groups, such as the public order or firefighting groups, and groups involving or­ ganizational and advisory functions. Though the percentage of deputies in the public order groups may appear low, the percentages translate into 2,034 of the 5,613 deputy-tasks re­ corded in Sakhalin, or 36 percent of the whole. Party mem­ bers, as is natural, make up a consistently higher percentage of community activists than do the deputies. With little ex­ ception, their activism follows a pattern similar to that of the 20 This listing includes the community self-help groups and the aktiv around the soviets, without the factory and farm production-oriented groups. 21 Aimbetov and Baimakhanov, Problemy, p. 192, bring an example of 141 deputies of a city soviet doing community volunteer work in a city of 38,000. In the study of Armenian deputies' activity, only 17.6 percent of the deputies polled had no other public tasks. SeeSGP, no. 1 (January 1969), p. 114.

Self-Help Organizations

247

deputies. Nearly a quarter of those involved in maintaining public order are Party members, and the 8,974 Communists in public order groups are nearly half of all active Party members, while close to two-thirds of those manning depu­ ties' posts and Party-state control commission posts are Party members.22 This prominence would appear to be derived from the principle that the Party must have direct responsibil­ ity in anything related to organized force, crisis prevention, and crisis management, whether the field is social, cultural, or economic. The druzhiny, as organized bodies enforcing the law, are kept under close Party control as will be discussed be­ low, though the form of control has changed in recent years. Deputies' posts and control commission posts are, by nature, such that as troubleshooters and coordinators in problem areas, they are entrusted particularly to Party members. The focus of Sakhalin's volunteers on public order and on housing problems is instructive. Over 40 percent of all the volunteers are active in maintaining public order. In this we see not only a local problem of alcoholism or lack of recre­ ational facilities giving rise to petty crime and disorder, but a general characteristic of community organization in the USSR, for the previously cited survey for the whole of the USSR included 3,351,078 druzhinniki—34.4 percent of all ac­ tivists noted. In addition, more than a half million people are noted as members of comrades' courts.23 The focus on con­ trol of deviant behavior of citizens is prominent throughout Soviet life, underlining the continuing need for, and effort toward, socialization. The prevalence of the housing shortage in the Soviet Union and the urgency of housing-related problems in al­ most every soviet underlies the scale of organization of volun­ teer labor in this field, second only to public order in Sakhalin 22 Deputies' posts were described in the previous chapter. The Party-state control commission existed from November 1962 to December 1965, when it was divided—the job of auditing Party matters reverting to the Party's audit­ ing commission and the general auditing of administrative and economic af­ fairs in soviet society being turned over to a Committee of People's Control, which now numbers over nine million controllers. 23 Chkhikvadze (ed.), Sotstalizm 1 narodovlastie, p. 88.

248

Social Mobilization and Social Control

and third in size (organization of parents in school commit­ tees takes second place) in the ail-Union survey. The organization of these groups thus reflects both the ef­ fort to control the Soviet community and the bringing to bear of mass efforts on problems of urgent social and economic character. It may be added that in the case of the druzhiny, ef­ fectiveness contributed to the growth and spread of such groups, as will be noted in the detailed discussion of their ac­ tivity. In addition, local problems and conditions will often play a part in shaping the scope and nature of participatory institutions. With up to one person in four or five of the adult popula­ tion enrolled at any given time in community organizations, it is not too difficult to project a situation in which very nearly the whole citizenry has had some experience in such activity. Volkov's investigations of a sample of 3,500 people in Sverdlovsk Oblast' in the early 1960s revealed that 55 percent had been active in community affairs at some time, "active" being defined as serving at least one term in a permanent community organization.24 Ten years later, it was noted that Sverdlovsk Oblast' had 479,700 community activists, con­ stituting one-fifth of the voting-age population.25 While the general configuration of the groups is not radically different from that noted in other areas and earlier years, it may be of interest to note that the volunteer militia (druzhiny) groups have grown even more predominant. In Sverdlovsk these groups averaged over 100 members each, and accounted for 244,100 of the activists, over half of the region's total. The community self-help groups are, then, a widespread and well-established phenomenon, above and beyond the many groups working within the framework of the soviets. Having surveyed their general nature and scope, let us now 24

Volkov, Tak roxhdaetsia, pp. 31, 35. Barabashev and Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, p. 474. The groups were: 6,923 street committees; 2,076 house committees; 184 block (kvartal) commit­ tees; ιοί village committees; 9,242 parents' committees; 1,414 parents' coun­ cils; 1,826 shop and restaurant councils; 17,027 sanitary groups and posts; 4,281 voluntary fire brigades; 2,330 voluntary militia groups; and some 3,000 volunteer neighborhood delegates. It should be noted that the aktiv of the soviets does not appear to have been included here. 25

Comrades' Courts and the Druzhiny

249

turn to an examination of the principal functional groups of such organizations to see how they are organized and what they do.

CONTROL ORGANIZATIONS: COMRADES' COURTS AND THE Druzhiny Typical of the community-based organizations that specialize in control of popular behavior are the comrades' courts, which have become an almost ubiquitous feature of Soviet life in the past twenty years. These courts appear to vary greatly from place to place in level of activity and in the way they deal with the cases brought before them. The changes they have undergone in recent years may be seen as typifying the transi­ tion from the more ambitiously populist "revolutionary" par­ ticipation favored by Khrushchev, to the more organized, bureaucracy-subordinated participation that succeeded it. Comrades' courts were an early revolutionary device, estab­ lished first in 1918 and spreading from the Red Army to places of work and residence. Though they seem never to have disappeared totally, these courts played almost no role in Soviet citizens' lives from the end of the 1930s to the end of 1959, when their status was revived by a lively public cam­ paign and given renewed formal standing by a statute of the USSR Supreme Soviet.26 The formalizing of the comrades' courts by statute was one phase of the campaign started in 1959 to transfer a portion of the functions of the state to public organs. Together with the druzhiny they represent an effort to give an appearance of a self-policing community in which social norms have the force of law and each citizen is accountable to his neighbor. The text of the law establishing the comrades' courts emphasizes their educational and preventive function rather than the 26 See hvestiia, October 23, 1959. A brief account of the history and activity of comrades' courts may be found in Harold J. Berman ,Justice m the USSR (New York: Vintage, 1963), pp. 288-289. A detailed listing of the original laws of the Soviet republics regulating comrades' courts, and subsequent amendments, will be found in Ε. M. Vorozheikin, Kratkii spravochnik predsedatelia 1 chlena tovanshcheskogo suda (Moscow: Profizdat, 1966).

250

Social Mobilization and Social Control

punitive aspect. Although the comrades' courts cannot de­ prive a citizen of his liberty, they still have the possibility of applying strong sanctions, ranging from fines to a recom­ mendation of eviction from housing. Attempts are made to have the proceedings of the courts publicized as widely as possible in the locality, so that resi­ dents of the housing development will attend the proceed­ ings, aiding the court "to educate people by persuasion and public influence, and to create an intolerant attitude towards any anti-social acts."27 Each Zh.E.K. is obliged to provide proper quarters for public trials, and if it does not do so, it may be criticized for hampering the full social effect of the courts.28 To help assure maximum attendance, court sessions are supposed to be held outside regular working hours. Comrades' courts are supposed to be founded at each place of work or residence having more than fifty persons. Elected by open vote, they are supposed to be representative of the public they serve, rather than legal experts. Indeed, with the formal recognition of the courts by statute and their election in factories and housing developments, an effort was made to avoid having trained jurists picked for the court panels. As the activity of the courts broadened, this was declared an er­ ror, and attempts were made to attract jurists to the com­ rades' courts.29 Nevertheless, they are still largely composed of untrained people. A Moscow soviet official cited this as one reason why these courts were working less, stating that the people preferred trial before a regular court, where proce­ dures were stricter and more impersonal. Of the 431 mem­ bers of 32 comrades' courts supervised by the Oktiabr' Urban District Soviet of Moscow in 1970, only 10 had any legal train­ ing. These courts, subordinate to the soviet, were all based on Zh.E.K. frameworks. Additional comrades' courts, operating 27RSFSR, Polozhenie 0 tovarishcheskikh sudakh (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1967), article 1. See also A. B. Sakharov (ed.), Tovarishcheskie sudy (Moscow: Znanie, ig66), p. 3. The latter is a text intended for students in Popular Universities of Juridical Studies. 28 Bulletin, no. 2-512 (January 1963), p. 27. 29 Bulletin, no. 20-506 (October 1962), p. 31.

Comrades' Courts and the Druzhiny

251

in factories in the district, were supervised by the trade union organization, although the volunteer council of the soviet, formed to assist and oversee the activities of the comrades' courts, was active with both sets of courts.30 In the expressed preference of citizens for the security of a court working under defined procedures and applying known and ascertainable laws, rather than the less certain pressures of public opinion armed with many of the prescriptive powers of law, we meet one of the problems facing the Soviet leaders in their attempt to create a socialized community which will voluntarily meet the regime's demands. The community is not of one mind or one aim. The moral and social prescrip­ tions of the Communist Party are not engraved on the hearts of all Soviet citizens, and the attempt to enforce them through the comrades' courts raises the specter of mob rule among people, many of whom have learned at bitter personal cost the meaning of arbitrary rule and the value of a society gov­ erned by law. In addition to controlling the behavior of citizens and call­ ing them to task for antisocial behavior, the comrades' courts were an instrument of relief to the overburdened people's courts, relieving them of many lesser cases. Thus, the statute now calls for the comrades' courts to hear cases of minor em­ bezzlement, petty hooliganism, and so on and they may have these cases referred to them at the discretion of the druzhiny, the procuror's office, or the people's courts. These areas of competence were added by amendments to the original July 1961 RSFSR statute. 31 30 The comrades' courts in factories appear to have developed more rapidly than those based on residence, for a i960 essay notes that they exist only in the factories in Moscow, and are almost totally absent from the city's housing developments. See Ζ. K. Ivanova, "Uchastie samodeiatel'nykh organizatsii mass ν rabote raionnykh sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia," in V. V. Mal'kevich (ed.), 21 s'ezd KPSS i voprosy razvitiia Sovetskogo gosudarstva (Moscow: Gosiurizdat, i960), p. 163. 3 1 An amended version of the Statute on Comrades' Courts, published in 1967, shows that article 5 of the 1961 law dealing with the competence of the courts has had two paragraphs added, empowering them to handle these minor criminal cases. Note that the comrades' courts enjoy neither automatic jurisdiction nor initiative in these cases.

252

Social Mobilization and Social Control

The comrades' courts also assist the administrative au­ thorities of the housing administrations by issuing warnings to tenants that they will be brought before the court if their rent payments are not kept up to date.32 The courts, however, have at times been exploited by administrative authorities as an extension of their apparatus and have been used to solve problems that the Zh.E.K. authorities should be solving.33 What we have here is a clear instance of a natural tendency of bureaucracy to coopt volunteer organs to the bureaucrats' own needs. The structure of the Soviet system, in which vol­ unteer organs have little or no autonomy, but are integrated into units of the administrative network, only serves to strengthen this tendency. The fact that each comrades' court operates on the territory of a Zh.E.K. must have in itself sug­ gested to the housing authorities that the court could be a natural instrument to serve them. In effect, there seems little reason why the work of volunteer citizens on behalf of their housing officials should be regarded differently from volun­ teer work which makes up for the lack of construction, repair, or any other service. In all of these cases, the problem of sub­ ordinating volunteer initiatives to administrative exigencies is prominent.34 The comrades' courts have spread steadily and are a nearubiquitous feature of Soviet social organization. In Moscow by 1965 there were 5,580 such courts, involving 52,000 people.35 Each of the 32 Zh.E.K.-based courts of Oktiabr' Dis­ trict in Moscow had a dozen members. In Kutaisi, each of the 54 neighborhoods of the city had a comrades' court with five to seven members. The nature of the district in which a court operates will generally determine the type of cases brought before the courts. In Kutaisi, where family structures were strong and 3 2 Bulletin, no. 20-506 (October 1962), p. 31. The court under discussion had issued seventeen such warnings in the course of a year. 3 3 Ibtd., no. 2-512 (January 1963), p. 27. In this case it was found that half the case load of the court had been wrongfully passed on to it by the housing authorities. 34 Cf. Selznick, TVA, p. 2 26, who finds this to be a general tendency regard­ ing citizen participation in administrative areas of activity. 3 5 Bulletin, no. 22-580 (November 1965), p. 14.

Comrades' Courts and the Druzhiny

253

communal solidarity appeared well developed, the courts did little. At times they participated in delegations with deputies and other dignitaries to mediate some family quarrel. Other­ wise, their existence was said to be more formal than actual. In Moscow, a report of a court in the Sverdlovsk district noted that in the course of a year it had handled "many" disputes between residents within communal flats, six cases of public drunkenness, three cases of filching public library books, four intra-family disputes, and four cases of "parasitism."36 This analysis of the cases handled by a court indicates that it only marginally served any administrative purpose at this time. The amendments broadening the functions of the com­ rades' court so that it might handle part of the load of the regular courts were introduced in October 1963 and January 1965, enabling the comrades' courts to branch out from cases of public drunkenness and hooliganism to small civil suits, cases of minor embezzlement, and other criminal matters. This change in focus—from social to administrative—began before Khrushchev's ouster but is typical of the post-Khrush­ chev outlook attenuating the populist nature of citizen par­ ticipation in government. It also makes the comrades' courts institutions which supplement the bureaucracy in some re­ spects, though their control function still dominates.37 As the accelerated Soviet housing program gradually nib­ bles away at the shortage of accommodation, and the number of communal flats dwindles, the activity of the courts flags, for as may be seen from the example given above, disputes in communal flats were one of the sources of much of the litiga­ tion in these courts. In Oktiabr' District of Moscow, the rela­ tively new and sufficient stock of housing was cited as a reason for the courts having little to do. Another change in the courts' activities was stimulated by public complaint about the lack of training of court members and the arbitrary rulings that were made in the absence of 36 Ibid.,

no. 20-506 (October 1962), p. 31. Pravda, September 22, 1965, signaled this turn with an article "for dis­ cussion," surveying the state of the comrades' courts and other, similar, in­ stitutions and suggesting that government agencies rather than citizen-based groups should be the main agencies of legal adjudication. 37

254

Social Mobilization and Social Control

rigorous procedural rules. When it was found that a large proportion of the rulings of the courts was being disputed by the defendants, that the decisions were being found faulty and returned for rehearing, and that the courts were feared rather than favored by large sectors of the citizens who were supposed to regard them as their own, a turn was made to­ ward having the courts mediate disputes between citizens rather than decide on questions of guilt and innocence. An account of comrades' court proceedings in Moscow in 1968 noted that one-quarter of all cases brought before the courts were now mediated rather than decided in favor of one party or the other.38 Among the courts of Oktiabr' Dis­ trict, in their reports for 1969, one court reported 20 out of 40 cases as ending in conciliation and another reported the same for 6 out of 11.39 The lack of legal training of comrades' courts and the lack of actual supervision over them has often resulted in un­ founded decisions. The citizen who feels himself wronged by such a court has no appeal to a higher authority or to the people's courts. He may, however, complain to the trade union or the soviet, which, if it sees that there is a foundation for the complaint, may order the case reheard.40 This tended to overburden the executive organs of the soviets and led to the formation of volunteer councils to supervise the working of the comrades' courts in the districts of Moscow. These vol­ unteer councils, today part of the table of organization of dis­ trict soviets in Moscow, are directly under the executive committee of the soviet and work parallel to the committee on socialist legality which exists in the soviets. A typical commit­ tee will have from fifteen to twenty-five members and will be based primarily on retired jurists. The model statute govern­ ing such councils gives them the right to review complaints 38

Bulletin, nos. 23-24-653-654 (December 1968), p. 30. this material was gathered early in January 1970, the remaining courts had not yet reported. Note the great variance in numbers of cases handled. 40 RSFSR, Polozhenie 0 tovarishcheskihh sudakh, article 18. The supervisory organ may not dismiss charges or overturn a comrades' court decision; it may only order a rehearing. 39 As

Comrades' Courts and the Druzhiny

255

about court decisions as well as demanding that the council members carry out periodic reviews of the work of individual comrades' courts.41 By the time the statute was passed, such councils had been in operation for close to two years. The first one to be re­ ported in Moscow was in the Kiev District Soviet. Eight of its eleven members had legal training and their duties consisted of reviewing activities of the courts, counseling court mem­ bers and advising litigants on their appeals. Where the coun­ cil found that a court was neglecting its function of arousing public opinion against law violators, council members would sit jointly with the comrades' court, the local house commit­ tee, and the Party committee of the Zh.E.K. to remedy this, and to activate the court. As so many times before, we have here an example of mass mobilization of overlapping organi­ zations.42 The work of these councils was evidently much needed to make the comrades' courts' work effective, for an early report of one such council notes that it found over half the complaints against comrades' courts to be justified.43 In Oktiabr' District in 1 9 7 0 , the volunteer committee on comrades' courts was made up of twenty-three people, of whom a majority were themselves members of comrades' courts and had a legal background. The council as a whole meets monthly, but members make themselves available once a week to receive court officials or citizens, reviewing com­ plaints and dispensing advice. During one such session,44 the deputy chairman of the council, a retired jurist and himself a chairman of a comrades' court in a factory, received two complaints. The first was from the chairman of a local court who came to ask his help in freeing her from what she felt were overly frequent inspections of court records by various groups of officials and volunteers from the local soviet. Ac­ cording to the council member, these officials had no right to demand to see court records because only the volunteer 41

Bulletin, no. 2-536 (January 1964), p. 10, contains the statute. Ibid., no. 8-494 (April 1962), p. 24. 43 Ibid., no. 23-557 (December 1964), p. ig. 44 Attended by the author in the quarters of the Oktiabr' District Soviet, January 1970 42

256

Social Mobilization and Social Control

council on comrades' courts had supervisory powers over the courts. This would appear to be a typical case of waste through parallelism of organization. The second illustrated both the difficulties of work with volunteers in social control and the almost certain oppres­ siveness of such a system. A young man came with two court members, both elderly ladies, to appeal a court decision in a dispute between the young man and a neighbor. The dispute, as it unfolded, proved to be a continuation of a quarrel be­ tween two families which had been going on for years—and had originally involved the grandfather of the present plain­ tiff and the parents of the second party to the case. As the council member heard the story and examined the docu­ ments the court members had brought, he detected numer­ ous technical errors in the proceedings and immediately or­ dered a rehearing to be held within two weeks. The two court members, who had four years experience on comrades' courts, had drawn up a decision completely inconsistent with the statute of the court. When told this, they offered the ex­ cuse that they were not trained legal experts. Further discussion led to the plaintiff accusing them of not taking into consideration documents that he had requested be brought to the court to prove his case. When the court mem­ bers were asked about this they stated that the material was in the possession of the house committee, which claimed it could not release it. The plaintiff then informed the council mem­ ber that the two comrades' court members were also members of the house committee. Further questioning revealed that there were only five active members of the comrades' court and the house committee out of twelve who had been elected—and that these five carried on the business of both institutions. It became progressively clearer that personal prejudice was the key to the whole situation. After the plaintiff had been sent away with the assurance that his case would be reheard and with a lecture to the court members that they must consider all evidence and conduct fault-free proceedings, the council member and the judges continued the meeting without him. Thejudges informed the councillor that they were sick of the young man's complaints,

Comrades' Courts and the Druzhiny

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saying: "He's a type and if you had to listen to him you would be as sick of him as we are." The young man had meanwhile alienated the council member first by impugning the court's objectivity and then by responding to a statement that Soviet law gave every citizen full protection by muttering that such protection seemed to be mainly theoretical. The end result of the session was that the councillor informed the two judges that he himself would prepare an airtight decision against the young man which they would present at the rehearing. He then reminded them that their proceedings must be abso­ lutely correct and sent them away. It would be difficult to find a better example of the arbi­ trary nature and faults of such organs of social control. While a general extrapolation from such an incident may be unwar­ ranted, this case can and should serve as an indicator of the difficulty of maintaining an individual's autonomy against any institutions operating in a totally mobilized framework. In bringing to bear the legal skills lacking in the comrades' courts, the volunteer councils are intended to give the courts the level of skill and probity necessary to maintain them as ac­ cepted social bodies. More important in practice, however, appears to be the maintaining of institutional power and au­ thority, whether potential or realized. The pensioner or Party member who undertakes the task of chairman or secretary of a comrades' court wields influence over his neighbors, and represents a reflection of higher authority within his im­ mediate community. Even when, as in the above case, this is done poorly, it is still done, and can be redone under guid­ ance of the volunteer councils, thus assuring the executive committee of the soviet and ultimately the Party authorities of some knowledge of the activities of the courts, keeping the courts from declining into total desuetude, and contributing to control of the community. Control and observation of the behavior of population at work is not difficult, and after the mass institutionalization of committees on a residential basis, the citizen at home was also brought within range of the regime. It remained for the au­ thorities to organize supervision of the citizen's conduct while he was neither at home nor at work. By a resolution of both

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the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, "On the Participation of the Working People in the Preservation of Public Order in the Country," the units known as the Volunteer Popular Detachments (Dobrovol'nye Narodnye Druzhiny) were formed in 1959.45 The druzhiny, drawn from Komsomol groups, student bodies, trade union, or other work or residence groups have evidently had some effect on the incidence of crime in the streets.46 In addition, they carry out other activities, providing manpower for mass raids on places of entertainment or gathering places where youth might fall prey to an "undesirable way of life," includ­ ing such baneful influences as Western jazz or foreign styles of dance and dress. By implementing these mass inspections, the druzhiny serve to bring a crushing weight of conformity against those who, though not violating any law, are not acting in an approved manner. The druzhiny, which today have over 7 million mem­ bers, thus serve as an extension of the regime's power to reach the citizen and control his daily behavior even beyond the letter of the law and without direct involvement of state agencies. In the first years of their operation, they were closely and directly led by Party authorities, as was noted previously. In the city of Kutaisi, in 1970, the 3,000 enlistees were com­ manded by the second secretary of the city Party committee, with the head of the local DOSAAF and the chairman of the trade union committee as his deputies.47 Candidates for the druzhiny were generally nominated by the Party, by trade union groups, factory and institute directors, or Komsomol 45 For the text of the resolution establishing the druzhiny, see Spravochnik (1961), pp. 577-579. 46 Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. go. A former Soviet citizen (interview 0-2762) states that an intolerable situation of crime in the streets, with which the militia could not cope, was one of the main reasons for establishing the druzhiny. Pravda, February 8, 1975, p. 3, speaks of offences being reduced by half in a mikroraion of Moscow that organized neighborhood druzhiny num­ bering several hundred members. 47 This constellation of forces appears typical. Partiinaia zhizn', no. 23 (1964), p. 58, notes that the second secretary of the appropriate Party organi­ zation generally directs thedruzhiny. See also Spravochmk (1961), p. 579.

Comrades' Courts and the Druzhiny

259

groups, and were, in the first years, specifically subject to ratification by the local Party committee. With the publication in mid-1974 of a new model statute for the organizing and functioning of druzhiny, a clear differ­ ence may be noted.48 The operative leadership (rukovodstvo) of the druzhiny has been entrusted to the local soviets. No longer is it stated, as it was in 1959, that "the druzhiny and their city or district commands should be led, generally, by senior person­ nel of the Party organs."49 As befits a Soviet volunteer body, the unit and staff commanders are now to be elected by gen­ eral meetings of the druzhinniki.50 While it would be surprising if an elected city or urban dis­ trict commander of druzhiny were not a Party member, we have here evidence of a process typical of the volunteer selfhelp organizations in the Soviet community. When the or­ ganization is new and being introduced into the community, the incidence of Party members in it is high and Party in­ volvement in its operation and control may be prominent and direct. As the institution in question becomes established and routinized, the part played by Party members diminishes and Party control is exercised less openly while a cadre of activists of the particular organization carry on its day-to-day activ­ ities.51 The shifting of the organization into the domain of the general public permits a broadening of the volunteer frame­ work far beyond the limited numbers of Party members and, while a core of Party activists will remain in any participatory group, the broadening of its membership base marks a step forward toward Communist public self-government. Even with this change the emphasis in recruiting the members of the druzhiny is on having "reliable people," so that, for in48 "Ob osnovnykh obiazannostiakh i pravakh dobrovolnykh narodnykh druzhin po okhrane obshchestvennogo poriadka." Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, no. 22 (1732, 1974), article 326, pp. 412-415. 49 Spravochnik (1961), p. 579. For criticism of direct Party control of the druzhiny and a suggestion that the local soviets take on their operative leader­ ship, seeSDT, no. 3 (March 1966), pp. 69-74. 5(1 Izvesttia, June 4, 1974. 51 Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 26, discusses the phenomenon of high inci­ dence of Party membership in the early stages of a volunteer organization, with a later tapering-off.

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stance, out of a detachment of ι,145 druzhinniki in one educa­ tional institute in Moscow, 524 were Party members and another 324 belonged to the Komsomol.52 The principal task of the druzhiny is simply to patrol the streets, preventing, by their presence, personal violence and thefts. In Kutaisi they were expected to stand by the en­ trances of the city's restaurants, preventing drunken brawls and assisting those who had difficulty getting home. In addi­ tion, the druzhinnik is expected to represent law and order on his own street. In each of the neighborhoods of Kutaisi all members of the druzhiny are asked to report cases of potential or actual juvenile delinquency to the neighborhood commit­ tee chairman. The committee then calls in whatever other groups are necessary (e.g., parents' groups, the local soviet committee on juvenile affairs) to solve the problem. Similar arrangements have been reported from a Zh.E.K. in Oktiabr' Raion of Moscow, with a population of 16,000, where several hundred druzhinniki patrol the area.53 Although the work of a druzhinnik is not entirely without danger—cases have been reported of individuals injured and killed while on duty—it is often considered a fairly easy way to fulfill the social obligations demanded of students and Kom­ somol members.54 The time demanded is minimal. In Kutaisi, 50 to 60 persons out of the 3,000 enrollees were on duty at one time. Thus, an evening tour of duty might be demanded once in six weeks to two months. In a Moscow educational in­ stitution, the students' stint was two hours a week of patrol duty, about the same as was reported from other universities and institutions. Students and Komsomol members, educated from pre­ school days to respect and support the kollektiv as a basic social orientation, are expected to respond to calls for social ac­ tivism as druzhinniki, or for a host of other public tasks. In­ deed, their stipends as students may depend on their fulfill­ ing such duties.55 Those Komsomol members who have any 52 Ν. V. Zhogin, Borba s khuliganstvom-delo vsekh i kazhdogo (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1967), p. 50. 53 Pravda, February 8, 1975, p. 3. 54 Interviews 0-1751 and 0-3761. 55 See Izvestiia, September 25, 1974, and January 31, 1973.

Comrades' Courts and the Druzhiny

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inclination toward more than minimal activity are encour­ aged to join the elite Komsomol action groups affiliated with the druzhiny, which undertake particular responsibility for supervision of youth cafes, religious ceremonies, and so on. To bolster their willingness to accept this extra responsibility, the members of these groups are granted a red-covered iden­ tity book emblazoned with the seal of the USSR, and with the gold letters K.O.O.D. (.Komsomokkie operativnye otriady druzhinnikov). The participants thus have a tangible source of satis­ faction and power beyond that of the ordinary druzhinnik. The incentives offered to druzhinniki are more than for most public volunteers. Each druzhinnik is entitled to wear a large membership pin, identifying him as a volunteer militia aide. For fulfilling his duty he may also receive a citation or an honor scroll. In addition, when it was found difficult to main­ tain the more than a quarter million volunteers who patrol Moscow, those fulfilling their duties faithfully were offered extra paid vacation and preference in the assignment of places in summer resorts. This was also done in Kutaisi, and evidently was a general custom, which found explicit expres­ sion in the 1974 law, along with the awarding of gifts and prizes to outstanding enrollees.56 Mobilization for control of the behavior of the Soviet citizen ranks high among the forms of citizen participation. As we have previously noted, participants in the druzhiny and in the comrades' courts make up a significant percentage of the vol­ unteers taking part in the affairs of the state and society in the USSR. What would appear significant is the fact that although the direction may be in the hands of the authorities, the actual work of upholding social norms and invoking sanctions for their violation is done from within society. To all outward ap­ pearances a man is being judged and regulated directly with­ in his community, and by his peers—and it is they, rather than any remote or abstract authority, who express society's displeasure against violators, and maintain conformity. Also, and perhaps more important, is that much of this process takes place within the citizen's immediate community, either work or residential or both. The peer is also neighbor, and Izvestiia, J u n e 4 ,

1974.

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the entire process of popular justice and behavior control is put on a personal basis. As we have noted, this can easily lead to perversion of the entire process, yet prevention of "loss of community" in the urban setting is fundamental to the Soviet effort of organizing participation. The intent of such arrangements is to give stability to the system, enabling it to generate some self-sustaining forms of community which, though originating and directed from above, are supported by the mass of people who will accept them as the proper way of life without the exercise of overt compulsion or arbitrary terror. While no great confidence as to the depth of this socialization appears to exist among Party leaders, it is being built as a rational substitute for the force that was so prominent in the period of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." The potential for armed coercion remains in the hands of the regime—as indeed it does in any organized gov­ ernment—but its application is much more restrained and selective than previously because the greater part of the citi­ zenry accepts economic improvements and a more reg­ ularized and responsive administration as the quid pro quo for their acquiescence and participation in the regime. Control of the citizens by the threat of arrest or public trial for deviant behavior is not the only aspect of social control in the USSR. Were it sufficient to proscribe wrongdoing, the druzhiny and the comrades' courts might well make up an even greater part of the participation of citizens in commu­ nity organization. However, along with the suppression of unsanctioned actions the regime has a clear intent to elicit from the citizens active support of its norms and goals. The citizen is expected to turn out to meetings, join in competi­ tions, exhort his neighbor as he himself is exhorted, and be an integral part of the effort of building Communism.

MOBILIZATION ORGANIZATIONS The second major group of neighborhood self-help organiza­ tions that we will study devotes itself primarily to this type of mobilization, though as will soon be seen it is closely linked to the control agencies and often takes some part in their func-

Mobilization Organizations

263

tioning. In some cases, the comrades' courts and the druzhiny have assumed some of the functions once performed by the more general mobilization organizations, but where the latter function effectively they often perform tasks which might, by their content, fall more naturally within the competence of the courts and druzhiny. As Soviet society has developed, the importance of organiz­ ing on a residential, as well as a work-place, basis has grown. The beginnings of the five-day working week have given ad­ ditional impetus to such organization and the formation of citizens' groups that can exercise mobilization functions in the housing developments has been stimulated.57 Neighborhood, block, street, and house committees are formed in accordance with the size and nature of the population, together with suborganizations which extend to representatives of individual floors and entrances in large buildings. The network of or­ ganization thus reaches down to the basic levels of the com­ munity. These residence organizations have a multiple role to fulfill, and their part in both the mobilization and control of society is far from negligible. The residentially based committees are the instrument of the executive committee, and though deputies will at times take part in them and will work with them in the implementa­ tion of specific campaigns, the committees report to the executive committee and take their cues from it directly, either by means of regular meetings with the secretary or through the orginstruktorskii otdel.58 In Kutaisi, where the basic form of such organization is the neighborhood committee, with fifty-four committees existing in the city, the third Friday 57 The secretary of the Oktiabr' district soviet executive committee, K. Godina, makes this point explicitly in a discussion of the importance of house and neighborhood committees in the district. See Bulletin, no. 11-641 (June 1968), p. 22. 58 N. Fedorov, Ulichnye komitety (Stalingrad: 1957), p. 4; and Β. N. Gabrichidze and A. K. Konev, Uhchnye komitety (Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1968), pp. 56-70. This principle is incorporated into the statute governing the formation of street and block committees in Krasnodar Terri­ tory, article 1, para. 4, in Bakurskii (ed.),Normativnye matenaly, p. 388; and in the Moscow City Soviet statute on house committees, article 1, para. 2, \nBul­ letin, no. 18-648 (September 1968), p. 4.

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of each month is devoted to a meeting of the committee chairmen with the executive committee secretary to review problems and set goals for the coming month. The residence committees are a form of mass organization. Frolovo, a town in Volgograd Oblast', had in 1957 a commit­ tee of 7 or 8 members for each 30-50 households—a total of 38 street committees for the town. There, as in Kutaisi, the committee chairmen met monthly with the executive commit­ tee secretary.59 The number of house and neighborhood committees in Moscow has been variously reported as be­ tween 2,200 with 29,000 members and 3,500 with a mem­ bership of 50,000.60 Around the committees an aktiv is formed, numbering in Moscow an added 161,500 people. An additional aktiv of 103,000 people is claimed in the housing organizations of factories, institutions, and organizations.61 It must be assumed that some people serve in several capacities, but nevertheless the total of those who are thus made avail­ able for mobilization is large. The quarter million or more adults represented in these groups alone is perhaps 5 percent of Moscow's adult population. In Leningrad the number of house and street committees was said to have doubled be­ tween 1958 and i960 and involved some 2,000 committees with 30,000 members.62 The result of this mass organization, according to the secretary of the Oktiabr' District Soviet, is that "no violation of morals and rules goes unnoticed."63 While the secretary may be exaggerating the actual effec­ tiveness of her apparatus, she has certainly summed up in a single sentence the essence of "penetrating the community." The morals and rules guarded include, of course, any type of deviation from the political and intellectual norms laid down 59

Fedorov, Uhchnye komitety, p. 11. The lower figure is to be found in Bulletin, no. 7-589 (April 1966), p. 26, and no. 8-614 (April 1967), p. 29. The larger number is in ibid., no. 20-554 (October 1964), p. 26, and no. 15-645 (August 1968), p. 7. 61 Ibid., no. 8-614 (April 1967), p. 29. 62 Kotovoi,Novoe ν rabote, p. 53. Gabrichidze and Konev, Ulichnye komitety, dealing with Krasnodar Territory; and S. Polimbetov, Domovoi komitet (Mos­ cow: Profizdat, 1968), dealing with Kazakhstan, both marshal numerous (and essentially similar) examples intended to illustrate the near-ubiquitous mass existence of these bodies, and the broad scope of their activities. 63 Bulletin, no. 11-649 (June !968), p. 22. 60

Mobilization Organizations

265

by the regime. It is not enough for the Soviet citizen to work industriously. Even inside his home he must meet regime demands. A member of a "brigade of Communist labor" was found to be a member of a religious sect, to have ikons in use for worship at home, and to have brought up her daughter, also a worker, in a religious fashion. "Had local public activists exercised a timely influence, all this might have never oc­ curred."64 On Budenny Street in the settlement of Novo Annenskii, N. G. Afonina was street committee chairman for six years. When the committee took up the problem of vandalism by young delinquents, it called a general meeting of citizens at which people spoke of specific cases and criticized parents who were not bringing up their children properly. "Thus a public opinion was created against violators of public or­ der."65 Most important of the control functions exercised by these residence committees is routine maintenance of the "passport regime"—the registration system controlling an individual's right to reside in a given place. In Kutaisi, the neighborhood committee chairman maintains an up-to-date population list, and with committee members drawn from every street or apartment house, the chairman is able to check on those who might attempt to settle illegally in a town. In Novorossisk, block committee number 59 also takes the passport regime seriously. Whenever a newcomer settles in the block, activists from the committee pay him a welcoming visit, checking his credentials and inquiring about his former residence and place of work as well as his occupational intentions for the immediate future.66 To see that no violation or deviance goes unnoticed, par64

Gabrichidze and Konev, Ulichnye komitety, p. 40. I. D. Gusev, 20 s'ezd. KPSS i rabota sovetov (Stalingrad: 1957), P- 25. Afonina, incidentally, was identified as a pensioner who had previously headed a village soviet. The case illustrates both the important part played by pensioners, particularly in the residential organizations, and the continuing public activity of those who have served as deputies or other officials. See also Gabrichidze and Konev, Ulkhnye komitety, p. 43, for the application of neigh­ borhood displeasure and a threat of eviction from the community against a couple accused of drunkenness and child neglect. 66 Gabrichidze and Konev, Ulkhnye komitety, p. 48. 65

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ticular emphasis is placed on close organization and on hav­ ing "reliable people" in charge of these committees. The block committee will spawn suborganizations of a specialized nature: women's and pensioners' councils, lecturers' groups, druzhiny, committees on juvenile affairs, and so forth. These, by their nature, have liaison with other public activist groups, drawing the web of organization over the entire community and anchoring it as firmly as possible in public institutions.67 This is regarded as desirable, inasmuch as the house and pod'ezd committees are even closer to the citizen than are such institutions as the comrades' court. Elected by the citizens on the spot, and backed by the authority of the local soviet^ these committees can claim the population's support in enforcing the standards of "socialist living" at the place of residence. While the block or street committee lacks the statutory sanctions of fine and punishment, or arrest, available to the druzhiny and the comrades' courts, the sanctions available to it in terms of public opprobrium, control over the fate of many of the citizens' requests from the regime, and ultimately its status as the extension of the regime into the community give it power to command a considerable degree of compliance. In discussing the effectiveness of the agencies of mobilization that the Soviet regime has promoted, we will consider possible reasons for the substitution of direct sanction-wielding in­ stitutions of control for the more generalized institutions of authoritative mobilization. Through the residence-based committees, citizens are fre67 Bulletin, no. 11-649 (June 1968), p. 22, reporting on the Oktiabr' District of Moscow, states: "In each house and entrance (pod'ezd) of Zh.E.K. 32 there is a council. Two hundred Communists and Komsomol members are active in these councils." See also Gabrichidze and Konev, Ulichnye komitety, p. 49, for a description of a block committee which supervises a committee on juvenile delinquents; a 21-member women's council; a 54-member group oidruzhinniki; a comrades' court; a nature protection association; a 23-member lectur­ ers' group and a monthly wall newspaper. The block committees are also incorporated upwards. In Oktiabr' raion of Moscow, the mikrorawn on the territory of Zh.E.K. no. 24 had a 20-member council coordinating the Kom­ somol groups, deputies' groups, the local druzhiny, the comrades' court, and the house committees, all under the leadership of the Communist Party group of the local Mining Institute. See Pravda, February 8, 1975, p- 3.

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quently called upon to take part in competitions for exem­ plary social relations, best-decorated and kept entrances or apartments, and "Communist life-style," organized within housing developments. In Moscow, the house committee winning such a competition had held lectures on "The moral code of the builders of Communism," had arranged meetings between the residents and young writers, and had organized a youth club and record room within their block.68 Frequent campaigns of this sort, often linked to some signal event or anniversary—a Party Congress, a Five Year Plan's comple­ tion, the iooth anniversary of Lenin's birth—are meant to stimulate a general sense of social solidarity and to predispose the citizens to an attitude of active participation in election campaigns, public discussions of legislative proposals or other major campaigns, organized nationwide but implemented both at place of work and of residence. In addition to this building of an active and intimate community, an effort is made to stimulate a consciousness of linkage between the ac­ tivity of the citizen for his own immediate well-being and the general policies of the regime for economic development.

COMMUNITY WORK AND SERVICE COMMITTEES Such control and mobilization activities do not, however, exhaust the role of the residence-based volunteer committees, for they often share with more functionally specialized groups, organized either within the territory of a housing administration or around a particular administrative unit or institution, the function of the third of the major groups of volunteer organizations, the supplementing of services to the citizen or the extension of the effectiveness of the bureau­ cracy. While control of citizens and the elicitation of positively regarded actions are matters of high priority within Soviet so­ ciety, the supplementing function of mass participation apes Bulletm, no. 5-515 (March 1963), p. 1. A similar competition was re­ ported in Kutaisi. See also Polimbetov, Dtrmovoi komitet, pp. 40-42, which dis­ cusses methods of organizing such competitions so as to achieve "in the nearest future, 100 percent participation of residents in the competition for the honorary title of 'House of Communist Life-Style.' "

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pears to involve a greater scope of activity and a broader vari­ ety of organizational forms. Citizen volunteers are organized in councils and groups to augment every facet of local gov­ ernment activity. These councils provide coordination for the mass of public committees. They provide a reservoir of expe­ rience to guide grass-roots organizations. They add physical capacity to the administration where manpower and re­ sources are limited. They extend to the limit the effectiveness of needed skills and they bring to bear as much as possible the energies of what might otherwise be a passive portion of soci­ ety. Similar social councils have been formed to upgrade the operation of the many residential committees in urban areas. In this, it is not so much the control aspects of the residence committees that are in question, as the committees' task of coordinating relations between the tenants and the housing administrations. In accordance with the statutes under which they operate, the residence committees, whether neigh­ borhood, street, or block, are responsible for seeing to the proper use and maintenance of housing, for cooperating with the housing authorities in planning finance and repairs, and for receiving complaints and applications of citizens regard­ ing repairs.69 Whatever the efforts of the executive committee of the local soviet to prepare the house committees for this work, it is clear that as citizens operating in a voluntary capacity they will have some difficulties in their relation to the permanent ad­ ministrative staff of the housing estates. The typical prepara­ tion a committee will get is that planned by the Liublin Dis­ trict of Moscow executive committee. It consisted of a one-day seminar in which lectures were to be delivered on the devel­ opment prospects of the district in the context of the current Five Year Plan; on the tasks of the volunteer public organs in the district; and on the organization of the work of the house committees.70 69 "Statute on House Committees in State Housing," Bulletin, no. 18-648 (September 1968), article 6; and "Statute on Neighborhood (Street) Commit­ tees," Bakurskii, Normattvnye materialy, p. 388, article 2, para. 1, and article 3, paras. 4 and 5. 70 Liublin Urban District Soviet, Moscow, Plan raboty tspolkoma na IV kvartal,

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In Moscow, complaints have been voiced that the housing administrations of the districts and the Zh.E.K. officials do not appreciate the importance of the house committees and do not support them sufficiently.71 The volunteer council, work­ ing directly under the executive committee of the soviet, lends prestige to the local committee and may help to arrange its relations with the administrators and other institutions. When it was considered that a house committee in Zh.E.K. number 3 of a Moscow district was working badly, the volun­ teer council sent representatives to uncover the reasons for the "abnormal relations" with the housing authorities. The representatives spoke with the local deputies' council, with the Party group in the Zh.E.K., the house aktiv, and the gen­ eral population. A basis for new relations was laid and new elections were held to replace ineffective members of the former house committee.72 In this case, the volunteer com­ mittee appears to have sided with the Zh.E.K. authorities in removing part of the house committee. As has been noted previously, citizens and deputies can often obtain the support of higher authorities against local administrators when the latter are trying to slough off their workload onto the volun­ teers, but in the above case such help was evidently not con­ sidered justified. Since the house and neighborhood commit-

/969 g. (Moscow: 1969), p. 7. Whatever the occasion, the plan of develop­ ment for the district, as part of the general Five Year Plan is a central point of discussion. The reader will recall that in the election campaigns agitators were urged to prepare statistics on this subject for presentation to the voters, and that in the evening university of legal studies operated by the Oktiabr' raion Soviet in Moscow, a lecture was devoted to this subject. 71 Bulletin, no. 15-645 (August 1968), p. 9. The municipal housing adminis­ trations, made up of full-time paid workers and augmented by whatever vol­ unteer group works with them, are the central housing authorities of the dis­ trict soviet. The Zh.E.K. officials, responsible for a smaller unit, report to the district administrations. Both the district housing administrations and the Zh.E.K. officials have essentially the same sort of relation with the house and block committees as a New York landlord may have with his tenants' associa­ tion regarding expenditure for repairs, maintenance, and improvements. While a certain veneer of mutual interest may be maintained, the two bodies are essentially seeing matters from opposite viewpoints. 72 Bulletin, no. 20-554 (October 1964), p. 26. Unfortunately, we are given no hint as to the substantive issues involved.

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tees, like most elected institutions in the USSR, are subject to recall by their electors, the substitution of new members for old in a crisis presented no great procedural difficulties. Volunteer councils often assist the administrative depart­ ments both in determining their course of action and in carry­ ing it out, particularly where implementation is to be based on volunteer activity. The volunteer council is expected to con­ tribute both expertise and energy, helping implement the plans it conceives. This makes for large bodies, spreading the load among many citizens. The paid department of culture in the Leningrad District of Moscow had a volunteer council consisting of forty-one people. Of these, eighteen were active in libraries and clubs in the district, while the rest were pen­ sioners and housewives with free time to help organize cul­ tural projects.73 The extent to which the expansion of some areas of ad­ ministrative activity has proceeded on the basis of volunteer activity is aptly illustrated in an example offered by James Oliver. He notes an urban district in which the paid staff of the department of culture in 1948 consisted of a director and a single inspector. Their bailiwick encompassed one movie house, two clubs, and two libraries. By 1961 the growth of cul­ tural services in the district was such that the department was supervising 15 libraries, 12 clubs, 2 houses of culture, 65 "Red Corners," 10 movie theaters, 4 music schools, and 6 book­ stores. The number of paid staff in the department had not changed, but was now supplemented by a volunteer council of twenty-nine pensioners, housewives, employees of cultural institutions, and others.74 In this way, whatever additional budget allotments were available for culture went for the running of the institutions serving the district's citizens rather than for administrative staff in the department. 73

Ibid., no. 23-509 (December 1962), p. 26. Oliver, "Citizen Demands in the Soviet Political System," APSR, Vol. 63, no. 3 (September 1969), pp. 470-471. Even this does not reveal the full extent of citizen work in such cases, for though Oliver does not note it, the volunteers in the departmental councils are often representatives of lower-level advisory or working councils formed around individual cultural institutions, planning and implementing their activities in coordination with the soviet. 74 James

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The assistance of volunteer councils goes far beyond the mere provision of ideas and working time that was the case in the cultural department. They are sometimes an instrument for trying to overcome the bottleneck of limited resources from which the local governments suffer. This was the case when a serious lag in the construction and repair of houses was reported in one district of Moscow. The difficulty ap­ peared to be first of all in the planning of repairs and drawing up of the technical specifications. A volunteer council, made up originally of twelve experts, was formed. By the end of a year it had grown to thirty people and was handling all doc­ uments and correspondence relating to the repair of housing in the district, as well as choosing those houses that were to be repaired and drawing up the plans. The chairman of the council was the deputy chairman of the soviet's executive committee and the deputy chairman of the council was the head of the district housing administration. In short, the in­ dividuals who in their official capacities might have been ex­ pected to be involved around the clock in solving what was undoubtedly an urgent problem of local government were enlisted as volunteers to see that the job was done. The volun­ teer council remained in existence for several years and even­ tually burgeoned to 120 such volunteers.75 This type of coun­ cil exemplifies the trend toward supplementing the paid officialdom with volunteers, rather than supplanting official­ dom through the formation of "non-staff departments." The council, charged with overcoming the overload of administra­ tive arrangements for housing repairs without incurring any additional manpower expense, worked in addition to the existing staff, and under its direction. However, the composition of this volunteer committee, along with the previously cited example of the aktiv of the Kutaisi standing committee on public works and consumer services, leave the impression that many "volunteer" commit­ tees are in reality inter-departmental or inter-institutional coordinating committees composed of executives whose or­ dinary course of work (in a non-Soviet context, at least) would 75

Bulletin, no. 3-561 (February 1965), p. 19.

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Social Mobilization and Social Control

involve them in a certain number of after-hours meetings for consultation with other executives. In Kutaisi, the supervisory commission for juvenile affairs, attached to the executive committee of the soviet, had only one paid employee, its sec­ retary. The rest of the committee were volunteers drawn from various institutions, all of which had some relevance to youth affairs.76 While the bulk of the committee's work ap­ pears to be in the realm of coordination, it also exercises some executive powers, appointing volunteer guardians for diffi­ cult children and holding hearings with such children, their parents and their teachers or work supervisors. Similar councils are recruited at the lower community levels as well. At the height of the period of replacing paid person­ nel by volunteers, a neighborhood committee chairman re­ cruited a technical supervision council for his Zh.E.K., replac­ ing a paid official. Members of the council were responsible for formal acceptance from the construction authorities of new and renovated buildings. Presumably familiar with con­ struction, and presumably having some interest in highquality construction and repairs in their home neighborhood, they were to inspect the quality of all construction, plumbing, electrical, and other work done in the area. While the council was composed of local volunteers recruited by the chairman of the neighborhood committee, the local Party group and the whole neighborhood committee were called on to ratify the composition of the council.77 The house committee level is the end of the mobilization chain which we noted in the discussion of the deputies' activ­ ity in organizing the citizens to carry out their own requests through volunteer free-time work. A school principal in76 The committee was made up of a deputy chairman of the executive committee of the soviet; the deputy director of its education department; an instructor from the city Party committee; an assistant to the city prosecutor; a

judge; personnel directors from two factories that employed large numbers of young people; the third secretary of the local Komsomol committee; a teacher; a factory director; a school principal; a representative of the militia; the leader of a young pioneer group in an elementary school; an official of the city trade union council; and two directors of unspecified municipal ad­ ministrative departments. 77 Bulletin, no. 8-494 (May !962). P- 25·

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duced the village deputies to call a meeting of community committees to discuss and implement repair of the local school. "Without outlay of money, the school was soon pre­ pared for winter."78 In Artem city, with a population of 55,000, eighteen massive working Sundays were organized in 1960, and the work done in cleaning and modernizing the city's facilities was valued at 900,000 rubles.79 Citizens in new housing developments are organized by their house commit­ tees not only to plant grass and trees, but if they want to be free of mud and have their houses heated when the local con­ struction authorities have not managed to complete construc­ tion, may turn out on Sundays to lay sidewalks and to dig trenches for laying the heating pipes.80 The cumulative effect of these mobilizations can be consid­ erable. In the rural areas of Krasnodar Territory, with a population of 2,222,000 in 1963, the neighborhood commit­ tees organized voluntary labor which laid 594 kilometers of water pipe and 500 kilometers of sidewalks; strung 1,779 ki­ lometers of electric and radio loudspeaker wires and planted over a million and a half trees and bushes.81 Unless citizens turn out for labor, work would simply not be done, or at least not without great delay. In cases such as sidewalks or radio loudspeakers, this may be more convenience than necessity. In a case such as the laying of heating pipes, the matter is simple necessity. Whether the consideration is one of neces­ sity, convenience, or even socialization, the active participa­ tion of community level organizers is the key to its success. As the movement for mobilization of the Soviet population into active participation in administration of its life has had more substantive questions put within its competence, it has developed more refined and specialized organizational 78

S. Karataev,Deputatskte gruppy (Stalingrad: 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 9 . Starovoitov, in Sovety ν periode, p. 210. m Bulletin, no. 2-488 (January 1962), pp. 16-17. Fedorov, Ulichnye komitety, pp. 4-6, claims that the street committee is the ultimate link ensuring the suc­ cess of any mobilization campaign. He offers as an example a committee that organized 25-30 people a day for two months. In a total of 1,150 man-days, an area of 5,200 square meters was paved. 81 Gabrichidze and Konev, Ulichnye komitety, p. 26. 79

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Social Mobilization and Social Control

forms. The general committees organized by place of resi­ dence remain, and carry on general mobilizations for clean­ ups, tree plantings, organization of meetings at election time, and the like. Other specialized groups have been formed, however, to provide continuous work and advice in the oper­ ation of cultural, social, and educational services to the com­ munity. These self-help working groups represent the blend­ ing of mobilization to supplement scarce governmental re­ sources and skills, with an attempt to create a socialized com­ munity with a collective culture and consciousness.82 Such an institution originating in Moscow is the volunteer repair squad or remontnaia druzhina. Organized through the house committees, these groups mobilized skilled citizens to carry out routine maintenance and emergency repairs in housing projects, relieving the overburdened municipal hous­ ing repair administrations. A typical group of this sort might have a dozen members, headed by a carpenter or plumber on pension. Among the jobs the group undertakes will be the re­ placing of glass or repairing of minor plumbing and electrical disorders, and the organizing of repainting or plastering jobs in apartment stairwells and entrances.83 In particular these groups are of assistance to the elderly in getting done those minor jobs for which it is almost impossible to find a craftsman in the modern world. In 1968, 1,213 such forma­ tions were said to exist in Moscow, encompassing 17,366 workers. They were credited with having carried out 0.25 mil­ lion rubles worth of work in the city in 1967.84 While the number of remontnye druzhiny appears to have continued to grow in the recent past, the character of their work would ap82 Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 119, discusses the development, out of the more general residence-based committees, of functionally specific groups working on particular problems. 83 SDT, no. 7 (July 1968), p. 64. 84 Bulletin, no. 15-645 (August 1968), p. 7. This comes out to about 15 ru­ bles worth of work per volunteer per year. While we have no indication of whether the "value" of the work is in wages saved, materials used, or some combination of the two, the annual effort per mobilized citizen remains min­ imal, while the cumulative effect achieved is considerable. Gabrichidze and Konev, Vlichnye komitety, p. 33, write of 500,000 rubles saved and 2,127 apartments refurbished in Sochi, on the Black Sea Coast.

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changing.85

pear to be In 1961, these volunteers were said to have repaired 73,968 rooms and 45,311 places of public use. In 1966 they renovated only 46,000 rooms but 106,500 public halls and entrances.86 The emphasis has been transferred from the physical need to maintain an old and overstrained housing plant to the establishment of public consciousness for responsibility to maintain decent standards of public conven­ iences. To this end, model remdruzhiny are urged to mobilize children into their work, both teaching repair skills and incul­ cating a sense of responsibility for property. An official of the Moscow City Soviet emphasized the latter, calling it an at­ tempt to establish "socialist consciousness" and belittling the economic necessity of the remontnye druzhiny. In Oktiabr' Dis­ trict, however, the soviet does not organize these squads, say­ ing that they are a phenomenon of the older parts of the city, where there is run-down housing and repairs are a greater part of the total housing effort. If the augmenting of scarce labor and resources appears to be a primary motivating force for such institutions as the re­ montnye druzhiny, community service appears to motivate the activity of citizens in setting up volunteer clinics, libraries, and nurseries. One such clinic, equipped by local medical institu­ tions but staffed by volunteer medical personnel, was directed by a seven-man council made up of community and medical representatives and chaired by the head doctor of the clinic. The council was supported by a sixty-man aktiv, whose prin­ cipal function was to speak to local people about the clinic's facilities, urging them to take advantage of it. The clinic was open three times a week for four hours each time, offering the services of a radiologist, gynecologist, neuropathologist, surgeon, and therapist. In addition, a school of hygiene, run in conjunction with the clinic, offered lectures on sanitation and hygiene once every two weeks and exercise classes were

85 Bulletin, no. 6-588 (March 1966), p. 11, puts the number of such units in Moscow at 750 and the number of members at 16,100. 86 Places of public use would include stairways, vestibules, halls, etc. 1961 figures: Bulletin, no. 2-488 (January 1962), p. 13. 1966 figures: ibid., no. 24-606 (December 1966), p. 19.

276 Social Mobilization and Social Control attended by pensioners and housewives.87 In other cases, vol­ unteer councils audit and assist regular state clinics.88 In 1966, Moscow was said to have 486 medical points and poly­ clinics operating on a community self-help basis.89 In similar fashion, libraries, day-care centers, and play­ grounds are established in housing developments to meet the needs of the population there. These are staffed almost com­ pletely by pensioners, with some help from parents and older schoolchildren in taking care of younger children. In each case, the local house committees appear to be the source of the initiative in setting up the institutions, and the link be­ tween the volunteers and the administrators of housing who control the funds and facilities available for cultural devel­ opments in the housing projects. Through the house commit­ tees the volunteers can call deputies' councils or groups into action to support their demands for more space and money or for refurbishing library quarters. Thus, a standing com­ mittee on culture of a local soviet was brought into action to press a reluctant Zh.E.K. director to furnish a volunteer li­ brary with its needs—out of funds budgeted for the library but not released by the Zh.E.K. authorities. On the other side of the question, the same standing committee established a procedure of checking the libraries to see that they were open at the specified hours. (Six libraries in the district had been found closed in a recent check.) This was done through vol­ unteers attached to the district soviet's cultural department. A deputies' post was also established to oversee implementation of all aspects of the arrangements.90 Here we see the whole chain of institutions of the soviet brought into play: the repre­ sentatives, the administrators, the volunteers—each group with its own sphere of interest and mode of action—com87

Bulletin, no. 11-497 (J une 1962), p. 29. 15-597 (August 1966), p. 22, for an account of a 22-person vol­ unteer council headed by a retired nurse and including housewives, pension­ ers, and clinic personnel. 89 Ibid., no. 6-588 (March 1966), p. 6. Even when a sufficiency of regular medical facilities will be readily available throughout the country, there will be, as was illustrated above, areas of activity in which community volunteers will draw the citizenry into broader contact with the medical authorities. 90 Bulletin, no. 1-535 (January 1964), p. 25. as Ibid., no.

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bining into a massively unwieldy machine but eventually suc­ ceeding in implementing some of the cultural policies of the soviet. Parents' committees, both in housing developments and in schools, are an attempt to extend the school system's effec­ tiveness and unify it with the home and the recreational envi­ ronment. Such committees are not solely the concern of the parent or the school. The school director will generally take part in the committee, but it operates under the supervision of the local soviet.91 The parents' committees are generally small, three to five people, but they serve as a liaison between the school or the housing authorities and the general body of parents. In Oktiabr' District in Moscow they were first estab­ lished in 1955 and by 1965 existed in 77 schools, 155 kinder­ gartens, and 120 Zh.E.K. subdistricts. There were 2,500 par­ ents involved in the committees and the district soviet had or­ ganized a district-wide parents' committee to supervise and coordinate all the local parents' committees.92 A typical proj­ ect of such a committee might be the organization of a new playground with the approval of the district executive com­ mittee and the general meeting of residents. While the actual setting up of the playground may well be a subbotnik project of all the residents of the area, the subsequent staffing of the playground and supervision over the children will be the task of parents organized by the parents' committee. The problem of maintaining such projects through continuing supervision and activity of volunteers emerges from the statement that in Moscow during J967, 11,000 play and sports fields were reequipped and activated,.93 The problems of persistence and consistency stand at the heart of the effectiveness of citizen volunteers. It is in view of this problem, as we will see, that many Soviet scholars studying political participation adopt the position that a professional administration is needed to organize the volunteers. While the above survey of the three principal functions of citizens' groups and the work done by them gives some indica91 I. M. Chekharin, Uchastie naseleniia ν rabote sel'skogo poselhovogo soveta (Moscow: luridicheskaia Literatura, 1969), pp. 24-27.

Bulletin, no. 5-563 (March 1965), p. 17. Ibid., no. 15-645 (August 1968), p. 7. Emphasis supplied.

92 n

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tion of the part that participation is intended to play in the day-to-day life of the community in the Soviet Union, and il­ lustrates the almost universal scope of organization, we have yet to consider the effectiveness of the activity undertaken by these groups, the extent to which the wide range of territorial and functional organizations succeeds in mobilizing the entire population, and the impact of mobilization on the individual's activities when he is drawn into volunteer activities. As will easily be seen from considering the nature of the various groups reviewed above, there are certain functions for which volunteers must be drawn from the active popula­ tion. Such groups as the druzhiny and the remdruzhiny must be drawn from people capable of the physical effort involved or having certain technical skills, but for much of the work of supplementing inadequate institutions and extending serv­ ices to the community, unskilled pensioners whose main asset is free time are relied on, along with other "nonworking" elements in the community. When volunteer inspectors were needed to help maintain and improve the "passport regime," the Moscow City Soviet's resolution on the question noted that these volunteers should be handpicked from pensioners who had served in the Procu­ racy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Committee on State Security.94 In this case, as in a case involving pension audits that we will examine later, both the free time and the previous experience of the pensioners are employed in their public activism. The volunteer work thus provides a certain professional satisfaction along with the satisfaction of simple involvement. Similarly, volunteers for libraries, playgrounds, and clinics are drawn largely from among pensioners. The pensioners are considered a valuable pool of talent and experience for administration as well. In April 1959 a resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU set forth the advantages of drawing large numbers of pensioners into work related to supervision of consumer services, culture, education, and health as well as into mass volunteer commit­ tees.95 With the number of those receiving old-age pensions s4 Ibtd.,

no. 13-499 (July 1962), p. 12. C.C., CPSU, "O privlechenii pensionerov k aktivnoi obshchestvennoi rabott," Spravochnik (1959), p. 546. 95

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reaching 28 million by the beginning of and growing by a million each year, the pensioners could indeed be con­ sidered an important source of mass manpower, even though many of them work part- or full-time despite their pensions. Of the above number of pensioners, over a million and a half are members of the Communist Party, thus combining the time resources of the pensioner and the Party demand for public activism.97 Along with Party members and Komsomol students, the pensioners form an important part of the core of public participation. The use of pensioners for administra­ tive work has been criticized both from the point of view of the consistency and intensity with which they are able to apply themselves, and in connection with the quality of their skills in a rapidly changing administrative culture. Nevertheless, when the goal is a creation of community at residential level, and furtherance of the ideal of Communist public selfgovernment, the pensioner of today, with his time resources, and having grown up in the early years of the revolution, may be an ideal socializer from the Party's point of view. We have noted here the availability of time as one of the pensioner's main resources, as we noted earlier the effect of lack of time on deputies' activeness, and the possibility of in­ corporation of working time into volunteer activities by cer­ tain officials. What is the effect of the growth of leisure time in the Soviet Union as a whole on the public activeness of Soviet citizens? Lenin is often quoted by Soviet advocates of broader citizen participation to the effect that "Our aim is to ensure that every toiler, having completed his eight hours' task in produc­ tion, shall perform state duty without pay. The transition to this is particularly difficult, but this transition alone can guarantee the final consolidation of socialism."98 The greatest obstacle to achieving Lenin's aim appears to be the lack of free time to devote to public affairs. In particu­ lar this appears to apply to rural residents, and rural women 1974, 9 6

96

Narkhoz, 1973, p. 641. Parthnaia zhizn', no. 14 (July 1973), p. 19, shows 1,542,079 Party mem­ bers above the age of sixty as of January 1, 1973· To this should be added the number of female communists between ages 55 and 60. 98 Lenin, Works, Vol. 27, p. 243. 97

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Social Mobilization and Social Control

even more than men. Time-budget studies conducted through virtually all of the period we have considered show some regional variations, but little sign of a developing trend. One survey of time spent in public activity in Krasnoiarsk Territory showed men spending 1.2 hours a week in public work in 1 9 5 9 and 1 . 7 8 in 1 9 6 3 . For women, the figure was 0 . 4 hours per week in 1959 and 0.66 in 1963." Another survey, covering the time budgets of 28,254 individuals in twelve large cities between 1959 and 1961, found both men and women giving about a half-hour a week to public affairs.100 A more recent study based on the population in Pskov in 1 9 6 5 and rural population in Krasnodar Territory in 1970 finds both men and women in the rural areas devoting 12 minutes per week to public work, while urban men and women devote between 40 and 45 minutes.101 In a study among urban work­ ers, the question was asked, "If you had more time, how would you use it?" Only 7 percent of the respondents in­ cluded public affairs among the five choices allowed them, among thirteen possible answers. In no category did public activity rank higher than ninth place.102 Soviet authors ascribe a portion of the responsibility for such limited time expenditure on public affairs to the exces­ sive amount of time taken up by unsatisfactory operation of public services. One survey showed that Muscovites spend as much as 70 percent of their nonworking time waiting in line for service in food shops, laundries, restaurants, and other service enterprises.103 The "second shift" worked by rural 99

Tikhomirov, Vlast' 1 upravlerue, p. 51. G. S. Petrosian, "Vnerabochee vremia trudiashchikhsia ν periode razvernutogo stroitel'stva kommunizma," Voprosy filosofii, no. 2 (February 1965), pp. 38-41. Petrosian notes that time-budget studies were an active research subject in the USSR in the twenties, but that from 1931 to 1958 such research was totally neglected. 100

1 0 1 V. D. Patrushev, in Sotstologicheskw issledovanim, no. 1 (July-September 1974). P- 91 1 0 2 L. A. Gordon and Ε. V. Klopov, Chelovek posle raboty (Moscow: Nauka, 1972), Appendix, Table 44, p. 41. Perhaps the most complex and sophisti­ cated of recent Soviet time-usage studies, this research was carried on over a three-year period in seven factories in four Soviet cities. Altogether, 900 people were interviewed and observed. 103 L. Karlinskii and V. Povichalov in Pravda, January 23, 1966. See also

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women in particular—a full day of household chores after the official day's farm labor is finished—is a familiar concept to Soviet readers. In this way the stage of development the Soviet economy has reached strongly affects the functioning of its society. Lack of consumer goods and services is paid for by the citizen in time and energy that might otherwise be channeled into public affairs. Participation cannot overcome the regime's preference for heavy industrial production. The general cultural level, again a function of Soviet social and economic development, also affects citizens' time budgets. In the study conducted by Gordon and Klopov, it was found that the less-educated workers would prefer to spend both actual and potential leisure time on such family-oriented activities as housework, gardening, and home repairs or improvements than on general cultural or socially centered activities. In the above authors' sample, workers with incom­ plete secondary education (seven grades or less) made up 68 percent of female workers and 51 percent of male workers in the large cities, and 72 percent of both males and females in the small city group.104 In the Taganrog survey, 96 percent of female workers and 70 percent of male workers were clas­ sified as being of low or medium skills.105 For the Soviet popu­ lation above the age of ten years, the 1970 census showed 53.41 percent as having only primary or unfinished sec­ ondary education.106 While an intensive campaign for univer­ sal full secondary education is under way, and will undoubt­ edly do much to change Soviet society in future generations, the above statistics and the findings of Soviet sociological re­ search emphasize the importance to the Soviet regime of the promotion of socialization and the prevention of loss of Z. Kruglova, Izvestiia, October 18, 1966, which shows that this burden falls more heavily on women than on men. Mervyn Matthews, Class and Society in Soviet Russia (London: Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 97-105, deals with Soviet studies of time usage. 104 Gordon and Klopov, Chelovekposle raboty, p. 288, and Appendix, Table 8, p. 10. 105 Ibid., p. 353. The Taganrog survey was a pioneering attempt at a total sociological analysis of work and leisure patterns in a large Soviet city. 106 ItOgi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia, 1970 goda, torn 3 (Moscow: Statistika, 1972), pp. 6-7.

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community in the urban setting. We will have occasion to re­ turn to this point in drawing up our conclusions regarding the citizen's participation in Soviet life. The relatively complex differentiation of categories that Gordon and Klopov present in their study makes it possible for us to understand some of the problems involved in creat­ ing a permanent and self-sustaining apparatus of citizen par­ ticipation. For instance, public activism varies greatly with the life-cycle. The most active among those studied were young husbands in childless families, who devoted an hour and twenty minutes a week to public activity, while husbandless mothers of young children were the least active of all, devot­ ing only ten minutes per week.107 Thus, while 70 percent of males and 50 percent of females were found to have perma­ nent volunteer assignments in public affairs, the amount of time that each individual devoted to these varied greatly with his own circumstances. Were all the volunteer organizations to function effectively, the Soviet citizen's life might flow much more smoothly, and his participation would be well and visibly rewarded. How­ ever, the nature, extent, and persistence of criticisms of these organizations lead to the conclusion that the organization of many community self-help agencies is a sporadic and sketchy affair and often resembles the labors of Sisyphus, rebuilding from a new base after the ebb of each campaign. In particular, it seems from the nature of much of the criti­ cism that the more closely a group is linked with regular ad­ ministrative institutions and the more integrated it is into their operations, the less actual effect it has on improving the provision of services or conveniences. Thus, the auditors of the social welfare department have been less effective as a volunteer group than have many of the library and clinic 107 Gordon and Klopov, Chelovek posle raboty, Appendix, Table 38, pp. 34-35. The complete listing is· Women: unmarried young, 50 minutes; child­ less married, 20 minutes; mothers in 2-generation family, 15 minutes; mothers in 3-generation family, 15 minutes; husbandless mothers, 10 min­ utes; elderly, 10 minutes. Men: unmarried youth, 30 minutes; childless married, 1 hour 20 minutes; fathers in 2-generation family, 40 minutes;

fathers in 3-generation family, 50 minutes; elderly, 25 minutes.

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councils, whose work is centered far from the department in charge of them and is less concerned with changing patterns of activity than in strengthening and extending existing pat­ terns. Volkov notes that many of the 25,000 activists listed in Sverdlovsk in 1954 existed only on paper and that even in 1961, when a survey in one of the oblast' towns showed that 50 percent of workers and employees in the town were partic­ ipants in community affairs, "many participated only formally and their influence on the life of the city was insignificant." He comments that the artificial forcing of mass participation does not yield effective results.108 Varchuk notes the same type of situations, citing as an ex­ treme example one citizen who was totally unaware of the ex­ istence of a committee of which he was supposedly a mem­ ber.109 While the structures within which citizens are organ­ ized have proliferated over the past fifteen years, the Moscow City Soviet still finds that the help given to the citizen organs by the executive committees of the soviets is inadequate, and this is said to contribute to the perennially unsatisfactory situ­ ation in the level of work carried out among citizens.110 However minimal the impact of mobilization on the indi­ vidual citizen, and however small the impact of citizen par­ ticipation on the nature and operation of the state organs of administration, two features of the existence of the commu­ nity self-help organs emerge clearly. One is that when it comes to helping the citizen in individual areas in which the administrative organs' lack of capacity might render life ex­ tremely uncomfortable, the cumulative effect of volunteer ac­ tivity in finishing construction and making minor repairs staves off discontent and even disaster. Moreover, in the event of crisis, the organized reserve that can be mobilized is a valu­ able asset to the administrative organs, enlarging their capac­ ity when it is most needed. In Kutaisi, subbotniki for the cleaning of yards and streets 108

Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, pp. 60, 118, 80. Varchuk, Puty, p. 186. See also pp. 164, 187, for additional discussion of this theme. 110 Bulletin, no. 10-640 (May 1968), pp. 6 fF. 109

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were carried out under the leadership of the neighborhood committees on a routine monthly basis. So routine had they become, in fact, that one neighborhood chairman noted that most people had their children do the bulk of the work. How­ ever, in the summer of 1970 when fear of the possible spread of cholera arose, the full potential of these groups was brought into play to save the local authorities from the embarrassing criticism that the city was in a totally unsanitary state.111 The assumption of the authorities in their mobilization of the citizens into working projects is that there are few people who will not willingly respond to a call to take part in some volunteer project, particularly if it is in fulfillment of their own basic needs and comforts. Some scholarly writers, how­ ever, dispute this thesis and in particular the willingness with which citizens respond, claiming that all too often the indi­ vidual comes not out of civic pride but because an administra­ tive authority which ought to provide needed services has been negligent.112 At every level there are examples of the mobilization of citi­ zen skills to augment the capacity of government without in­ volving additional hired staff or expenses, but the efficiency of such mobilization for government administration is open to question. In May 1964 the RSFSR Council of Ministers had called for the broadening of citizen participation in the ad­ ministration of social welfare programs, citing difficulties in maintaining efficient service in view of the expansion of ac­ tivities. This was followed by a resolution of the Moscow City Soviet, together with the Presidium of the Moscow Trade Union organization and the Moscow Sovnarkhoz. They noted that the number of pensioners was increasing rapidly and that the shortage of skilled labor in Moscow caused factory authorities to hire pensioners without reporting to the au­ thorities. The result had been overpayment of 3,312,000 ru­ bles to pensioners in 1963. Other administrative errors had resulted in additional overpayments of 508,000 rubles.113 To 111 See T. Friedgut, "Kutaisi," pp. 281-282, and n. 46 for the full details of this event. 112 Karapetian and Razin, Sovety obshchenarodnogo gosudarstva, p. 125. 113 Bulletin, no. 15-549 (August 1964), p. 2.

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correct the situation, the Moscow Soviet set up a volunteer council to assist the municipal social welfare department. The council, made up of 178 retired jurists, bookkeepers and former workers of the social welfare department, reviewed all documents handled by the department, recording the type and frequency of errors committed. This gave the authorities an audit over the bureaucracy, lessening the chance of ar­ rangements to conceal illegal practices in the hiring of pen­ sioners.114 What is remarkable here is that there were already 1,340 volunteer inspectors working in the Moscow City social wel­ fare department, aided by 15,000 activists on committees formed in enterprises and organizations for pension ques­ tions, and another 2,000 activists in the house committees.115 This volunteer apparatus of 18,340 was exclusive of whatever paid staff existed. Their level of activity can be judged by the fact that they passed on 1,500 pension applications during 1962 out of a total of 98,120 pensions granted in the city dur­ ing the year. The picture of a vast apparatus laboring might­ ily to little effect emerges most clearly here.116 True, the committees also supervise the payment of pen­ sions and carry on social tasks as well, keeping in touch with retired workers, arranging their vacations in sanatoria, and seeing that they are invited to factory-sponsored cultural eve­ nings. They also carry on an audit of pensions, and exposed some cases of fraud and overpayment.117 The fact remains, however, that there are ten volunteers to every pension appli­ cation handled and that the volunteers end up handling less than 2 percent of the entire pension case load of the social welfare department. This gives a clear perspective to the complaints of those who saw the reliance on volunteer work­ ers as an invitation to administrative chaos and insisted on a strengthening and improvement of the administrative ap­ paratus, with the citizen's role being centered on volunteer work with the representative institutions. In attempting to evaluate the community self-help groups i l i IbiA., n o . 19 -577 ( O c t o b e r 1 9 6 5 ) , p . 1 9 . 1 1 5 Ibid., n o . 1 0 - 5 2 0 (May 1 9 6 3 ) ^ . 3 2 . 1 1 6 Ibid., p . 3 3 .

l l l Ibtd., p . 3 4 .

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we must analyze them from several distinct points of view. On the one hand, these groups are generally formed with a defi­ nite administrative function in mind. The druzhiny are a civil­ ian extension of the militia; the house and block committees have functional links to the housing administration in terms of maintaining residence registration and rent records; vol­ unteer staffs attached to clinics help carry out the nonmedical and paramedical work of the clinics. From another point of view, however, all these community groups have an impor­ tance in that they are social frameworks of organization, drawing the citizen into the community and subjecting him to the norms of behavior of the community. Membership repre­ sents acquiescence to community norms and the massed strength of the multiplicity of groups is the living symbol of the social unity so assiduously promoted in Soviet communi­ cation media. In another sense, these organizations, regard­ less of functional content, are frameworks of reserve man­ power for the regime and can be called forth at a time of campaign or crisis to augment the machinery of the govern­ ment. Finally, and indispensably, they represent the means by which control is extended down to the level of every Soviet citizen in his home. From the Party, representing a small group of leading activists and a mass of members—together perhaps 10 percent of the Soviet adult population—through the soviets and their aktiv, particularly those who are officials, pensioners, and Komsomol youth, structured to reach into the community, and finally through the community volun­ teers, channels of influence are opened and overlapping or­ ganizational frameworks created. It is in this tight interlacing of organizations that a great part of the volunteer organiza­ tions' importance lies and, while functional effectiveness is not to be ignored, the yardstick of creation of political and com­ munity structure must also be applied in assessing the com­ munity self-help organizations. Finally, the mobilization of the community is considered by the Soviet authorities to be "a good thing," irrespective of functional or other advantages to be derived. The idea of the solidary, mobilized community is a basic value of Soviet society transcending, and independent of, other reasons for mobilization.

Community Work and Service Committees

287

The expenditure of effort and time in organizing the Soviet community down to its smallest units is aimed at increasing the salience of the community in the life of the individual, legitimizing the precedence of social demands and priorities over personal and particular inclinations. This, to the extent that it is successful, creates a moral climate which can substi­ tute for direct governmental control of the citizen, eliciting "spontaneous" supports for the work of the administration. It is also intended to affect the nature and channeling of citizen demands. The involvement of the citizen in a multiplicity of groups in his community, each of them treating a different aspect of community life, has much the same function ascribed to membership in such groups in a democratic society, with an important difference imposed by the highly structured and mobilizational aspects of Soviet society. In the theory of de­ mocracy, multiple affiliations are said to promote stability in society, preventing polarization by subjecting the citizen to conflicting "pulls."118 A multitude of associations is also sup­ posed to provide the citizen with the chance to choose an ap­ propriate framework for political activity whenever he feels that a salient political problem calls for his active participa­ tion.119 In brief, multiple association in a democracy tends to lessen social divisions and makes it easier for the political sys­ tem to function in an orderly way. In the Soviet system, the organization of citizens' associations is carried on with initia­ tive and control from above and with content related to the unification of local public activities in support of centrally de­ termined goals. An explicit goal of participation in a democratic society is to attain a balance between accommodation of individual, au­ tonomous interests and community involvement, and to pre­ serve the existence of both individual and citizen roles. The Soviet aim is the elimination of parochialism through the es­ tablishment of a universal and channeled participation, build­ ing community through involvement. 118

Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday,

1963). P- 77· 119

Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, pp. 351-352.

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Social Mobilization and Social Control

This aim flows from a number of sources: the parochial and fragmented nature of Soviet society with its still large rural sector and its multiplicity of ethnic groups; the strong ideological component in the development of Soviet life with its emphasis on totalism of government and collective values; the economic framework and priorities within which the needs of local communities and citizens are considered. In organizing public participation down to the grass-roots level, the Soviet government attempts to set up a series of screens which will turn all demands articulated at the local level into supportive and positive elements in the functioning of the system. Thus, while the grass-roots community self-help or­ ganizations are outside the state structure, they are essentially an extension of the state's capacities.

Chapter 5

Mechanisms and Processes of Soviet Political Participation If the findings of the preceding pages were to be summed up in a few lines, their essence would be that more and more Soviet citizens are becoming more and more involved as ac­ tors within the developing framework of local government. In this, the citizen, whether as mobilized individual or elected representative, is cast almost exclusively as an extra on the stage of politics, taking part in the mass aspects of govern­ ment, interpreting and coloring the workings of the local soviet through the degree of his commitment and under­ standing, but having relatively little influence on the choice of issues, the setting in which he acts, or the flow of events. His influence on policy is indirect, often marginal, but cumulative in that he is needed, and participates in the ultimate determi­ nation of success or failure of policy implementation at local levels. After a great leap forward of enthusiasm for wide­ spread direct citizen administration of local affairs under Khrushchev, the main thrust of participation under the pres­ ent leaders has been to mobilize the Soviet citizen in support of state administrators. The changing role of the Soviet citizen as participant is more a product than a source of change in the Soviet society and political system. This appears to be so despite the fact that political participation at all levels is one of the most con­ sistently applied instruments of socialization in Soviet life. Nevertheless, this does not rule out the possibility of partici­ pation patterns eventually influencing the nature of the Soviet political system and its workings.

290

Mechanisms and Processes

MATURITY OF THE SOVIET POLITICAL SYSTEM The debate over the relations between elected representative institutions, administrative organs, and volunteer citizens having been more or less resolved, a discussion of the implica­ tions of Soviet sociopolitical development has taken its place. The theoretical category of "a developed socialist society," (razvitoe sotsialistkheskoe obshchestvo), or the more recently popular "mature [zreloe] socialist society" has been offered by Soviet scholars as a framework for analysis of political and so­ cial relations within the contemporary Soviet Union.1 However, the exact meaning of this phrase is unclear. Barabashev and Sheremet, drawing almost directly on the terms of analysis of the 1961 program of the CPSU, and con­ fining themselves to social and political phenomena, state that a mature socialist society comes into being as a result of the transformation of the state of the dictatorship of the pro­ letariat into a state of the entire people. This form of state is said to be founded on universal socialist democracy and the strengthening of social homogeneity resulting from "con­ vergence [sblizhenie] of all classes, social groups and nations, and the strengthening of the leading role of the CPSU in so­ ciety and the state."2 1 The preamble to the new Soviet Constitution states that a "developed socialist society has been constructed in the USSR," and that it is a society of "mature socialist social relations." The terms "developed socialist society" and "mature socialist society" are used interchangeably throughout A. K. Belykh and L. T. Krivushin (eds.), Pohtika 1 obshchestvo (Leningrad: Leningrad Uni­ versity Press, 1 9 7 5 ) , pp. 4 - 5 , passim. Hough, "Political Participation," p. 7 , credits Fedor Burlatskii, "O stroitel'stve razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva," Pravda, December 21, 1966, with introducing the term in print. Burlatskii quotes the Bulgarian Communist leader, Zhivkov, who used the term somewhat earlier, though the Pravda November 15, 1966, paraphrase of Zhivkov's speech omits the term. The whole subject was widely discussed by communist political leaders and social scientists in various issues of ProbIemy mtra 1 sotsializma during 1 9 6 6 . Belykh and Krivushin, Politika, pp. 5 , 7 , credit V. I. Lenin with the concept See also the usage in R. A. Safarov, "Organy gosudarstvennogo upravleniia i obshchestvennoe mnenie naseleniia," SGP, no. 1 (January 1975), p. 20; and Belykh, Upravlenie 1 samoupravlente, P- 3· 2 Barabashev and Sheremet, "Razvitie sovetov i zadachi nauki," p. 13. Pro-

Maturity of the Soviet Political System

291

A somewhat wider net is cast in the work of Belykh and Krivushin, who devote nearly half their book to an exposition of the "essence and social structure of developed socialist so­ ciety." Basing themselves on a three-stage process of devel­ opment, the authors identify the "developed socialist society" with the beginnings of "large-scale construction of Com­ munism," that is, a process of rapid but relatively shock-free transformation of social relations, embracing the whole of Soviet society.3 More precisely, though without giving any quantitative index, they claim the following to be the peculiarities of the developed socialist society, (i) Economic production—"unprecedented production of material goods and a powerful material and technical base . . . union of sci­ ence and production." (2) An unprecedentedly rapid rise in welfare of the population. (3) Elimination of the differences between city and country, between physical and mental labor. (4) "The political superstructure of the developed socialist state is the system of the political organization of the entire people. It is characterized by the stable political power of the working class, and of the entire people, led by the Communist Party." (5) "In the mental-ideological realm, it is the preemi­ nence of a single socialist ideology, drawing in ever-widening masses."4 None of the above claims to describe the ultimate form of Soviet society, the stage of "higher Communism" that will in­ clude "Communist public self-government." Rather, "devel­ oped socialist society" appears to coincide with what elsewhere might be called a modern industrial society, a de­ veloped welfare state, or an integrated consensus-based politgramma KPSS (Moscow: Politizdat, 1968), part 2, pp. 62-66, gives a scheme of phases of development toward a complete communist society. 3 Belykh and Krivushin, Politiha 1 obshchestvo, pp. 7-8. The authors' refer­ ence to Lenin having divided communism into a lower, middle, and higher phase is based on Lenin's essay "Left Wing Communism: an Infantile Disor­ der," in Works, Vol. 31, pp. 5-84, particularly p. 26. After carefully dividing the development of communism into periods, Belykh warns that we must "in every possible way underline the organic connections and uninterrupted na­ ture of the development of socialism as well as the transition from socialism to communism" (p. 7). 4 Ibid., pp. 8-9.

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Mechanisms and Processes

ical system, depending on which particular aspects of the sys­ tem were emphasized. In this intermediate maturity, considerable differences of economic and political level are recognized as still existing be­ tween various groups in Soviet society. "This is expressed in the differing ways in which workers and peasants participate in social production, and in their possibilities of obtaining the means of existence. Even greater differences exist in the so­ cial, political and ideological spheres of social life."5 Reviewing the picture of political participation we devel­ oped in the previous chapters, it seems that the above-mentioned differences in social, political, and economic level are what cause the Soviet regime to focus such great resources on participatory activities, one of whose main anticipated ben­ efits would appear to be socialization of the citizenry. Apart from the administrative or economic benefits derived from mass volunteer activity, the creation of social and ideological community is the first goal of participatory activity, and the structuring of the community as an accessible public is one of the main mechanisms by which attempts are made to strengthen its social and political aspects. Can we find some measure of the social and economic gaps separating various groups in Soviet life? None of the works we have mentioned give either absolute or comparative yardsticks of measurement. Belykh and Krivushin even reject Burlatskii's tentative effort to suggest that before socialism can be considered "developed," labor productivity in the USSR must surpass that in capitalist countries.6 The impor­ tance, for our purposes, of identifying the actual level of de­ velopment of Soviet society lies not only in the sphere of theory but in what we have discovered about the negative in­ fluence on the participation of both elected deputies and citi­ zen volunteers that results from low levels of education, serv­ ices, and available free time. When we begin to seek out quantitative indicators of eco­ nomic and social development, we find that although Soviet 5 6

Ibtd., p. 21. Ibid., p. io, n. 18. Cf. Burlatskii, "O stroitel'stve."

Maturity of the Soviet Political System

293

society is dynamic and developing, closing numerous gaps of inter-sector and intra-sectoral inequalities of income, services, education, and culture, the inequalities held over from prerevolutionary times, and new inequalities created during Soviet rule are still far from being erased. Moreover, the modernization process taking place in the USSR creates new social problems and disorientations, as it does anywhere. These hold back the integration of society, and must be over­ come by a combination of time and tactics. In any event it does not seem justified to proceed on a basis of regarding the USSR as a mature system, either in terms of its own criteria or in the more widely used terms of urban-rural proportions, structure of the economy and labor force, and overall rates of change in social and economic indices. A mature system is generally considered to have developed functional and in­ stitutional specializations that enable it to deal with any new problems. The maturing system develops such systemic dif­ ferentiation as part of the maturation experience and, like the human adolescent, is subject to considerable strain and fre­ quent temporary failure while engaged in the effort to cope.7 Perhaps a comparison of a few of Belykh's criteria of the developed socialist society with some of the realities of Soviet life will give us a better perspective on the state of Soviet de­ velopment today. On November i, 1974, a welfare policy was initiated, granting 12 rubles per month for every child up to age 8 in families with less than the officially set minimum liv­ ing standard of 50 rubles per person per month. The sum of 1.8 billion rubles was allocated for this. We may thus estimate that 12 .5 million children, or about one-third of the total 0-8 age group, are expected to benefit from this policy.8 While 7 For a general discussion of problems of systemic development and mat­ uration, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political De­ cay,"World PolitKs, Vol. 17 (April 1965), pp. 386-430. For a discussion of the rewards and pitfalls of applying this type of analysis to the Soviet system see William Taubman, "The Change to Change in Communist Systems: Modern­ ization, Postmodernization, and Soviet Politics," in Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tokes, Soviet Politics and Society in the iyjos (New York: Free Press,

1974), pp. 369-394. 8 The figures of the population are derived from Itogi perepisi, 1970, Vol. 2, pp. 12-13. The estimate that the new grants will embrace one-third of the

294

Mechanisms and Processes

inauguration of this policy must be considered an important step forward in welfare policy, it also reveals the specter of "one-third of the nation living in poverty, ill-housed, illclothed and ill-fed." What is more, though there is no doubt that these child-support grants will alleviate poverty, we do not know whether they are sufficient to eliminate it. Applying these findings to the state of Soviet society, it would seem rea­ sonable to postulate that a developed socialist society, while not necessarily wealthy, should have only marginal poverty, if any. A great deal of this poverty undoubtedly is concentrated in rural areas, and particularly in the less-developed Central Asian republics. A great deal has been written recently on the difficulties of the Soviet rural community and the inequalities within that community as well as on the persisting gap be­ tween town and country. 9 Most certainly, despite vast re­ sources and effort invested in the rural sector, there is sound reason to doubt that the Marxian vision of eliminating the dif­ ferences between town and country will be soon achieved. The differences in life-style and in living standards will evi­ dently remain for another generation at least. This situation not only contradicts Belykh's third characteristic of developed socialist society but, because it lies at the root of the great con­ tinuing rush of urbanization, creates social problems well known to Europe and America in earlier periods. As two Soviet scholars see it: "The developing of urban life children in this age group is confirmed by Μ. N. Rutkevich, "Sotsial'noe planirovanie ν usloviiakh razvitogo sotsialisma," Sotswlogicheskie issledovanna, no. 3 (July-September 1975), pp. 10-21. Emigrant sociologists and economists from the USSR state that the 50 ruble per person poverty line (prozhitochnyi minimum) is, in fact, deep poverty, and that a sum of about go rubles per person per month is the minimum for "normal cultured living." 9 See David E. Powell, "The Rural Exodus," Problems of Communism, Vol. 23, no. 6 (November-December 1974), pp. 1-13; Theodore H. Friedgut, "Inte­ gration of the Rural Sector into Soviet Society," Hebrew University Soviet and East European Research Centre, research paper no. 15, January 1976. For Soviet studies of these problems see Yu. V. Arutunian, Sotsial'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia (Moscow: Mysl', 1971); and V. I. Staroverov, Gorod ill derevnia? (Moscow: Politicheskaia Literatura, 1972). An interesting collection of Soviet articles on rural sociology is G. V. Osipov (ed.), Town, Country and People (London: Tavistock, 1972).

Maturity of the Soviet Political System

295

creates contradictory and sometimes even directly dangerous social consequences. The gap between aspirations and reali­ ties of the urban environment makes the behavior of many less-educated males extremely unstable. To a great extent they have lost the ability to pattern their lives in former fash­ ion, but have not yet formulated for themselves any organic set of needs constituting a new life-style. The danger of an­ tisocial behavior in such conditions is exceptionally great. The city lacks the communal-neighborly supervision of conduct so powerful in the village where each person knows each other, and adjusts his conduct to the rest."10 In light of the above quotation, the comrades' courts, the druzhiny, and the myriad house and street organizations de­ signed to mobilize and direct the Soviet citizen, take on their full perspective. Samuel Huntington has suggested a sequen­ tial chain of relationships from which the degree of political stability of a changing society can be judged. Huntington's equations are as follows:11 (ι) Social mobilization

„ . , _ = Social frustration

Economic development (2) Social frustration

„ . , = Political participation

Mobility opportunities (¾) Political participation „ . ,. 0 £i= Political instability Political institutionalization

In the Soviet case, there will be little disagreement that social mobilization has outstripped economic development. How­ ever great the gains of the latter have been, there remains a high level of social frustration as social plenty remains on the horizon and consumer shortages persist. 10 Gordon and Klopov, Chelovek posle raboty, p. 292. Cf. Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (New York- Harper & Row, 1970), PP- 36-37' who sees the basic changes in Soviet society as from traditional to modern, and religious to secular, changes that are also said to result in a dis­ orientation of social frameworks and value patterns. 11 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 55.

296

Mechanisms and Processes

A part of these social frustrations can be dissipated or deferred through increased mobility—physical or social. Mi­ gration from the village to the city and improvement of qual­ ifications through education are two forms of such mobility. However, as we have seen, urbanization transfers rather than dissipates frustration, and the growing competition for all forms of higher education is beginning to limit social mobil­ ity, despite various programs of assistance to rural and working-class students. The failure of mobility to offset frus­ tration leads, in Huntington's scheme, to political participa­ tion, particularly in the form of "want formation." Such participation, unless processed through adequate political institutions, could easily be translated into political disruptions that could threaten the stability of the regime. The Soviet answer to this situation is the intricate net of over­ lapping organs of the soviet, based on the deputies and their volunteer aktiv and backed up by the self-help organs of the community. These serve to provide a multitude of legitimate channels for participation, while at the same time turning some of the citizens' energies to increasing the devel­ opmental capacities of the regime—particularly in sectors directly and immediately of benefit to the citizen. The sig­ nificance of political participation in Soviet communities thus includes the augmenting of administrative and economic ca­ pacity, but goes far beyond it.12 However, the workings of these participatory organizations are in the framework of a political system which is, as yet, far from mature. However defined, Soviet society does not measure up to criteria of overall maturity, though certain as­ pects of development and institutionalization are certainly more developed than others. For example, it may well be claimed that the Soviet political system is indeed based on the 12 Odom, Soviet Volunteers, p. 305, sees the Soviet voluntary associations as essentially substitutes for insufficient administrative capacity, suggesting that they may diminish in importance as administration improves. However, the associations have additional functions and it appears more likely that they will continue to develop, simply changing their focus of activity in a way similar to that illustrated in our discussion of the remontnye druzhiny.

Maturity of the Soviet Political System

297

power of the Communist Party and that the political organi­ zation of Soviet society embraces the entire Soviet people. The recurrent problems of formal or superficial work, of failure to make use of rights and fulfill duties, and the need for incessant campaigning all point to an incongruity between the forms of the political superstructure and the social and economic base. Those Soviet authors who claim that the USSR has reached the stage of a developed socialist society and is well on the way to Communist public self-government appear to be indulging in "Webbism"—the confusion of the ultimate aims of the system with its present state and ways of functioning.13 Despite whatever gap may exist between the green tree of Soviet social theory and the rather greyer realities of Soviet life, we are dealing with a developing system which has existed for half a century and overcome almost every type of crisis imaginable. It is certainly not far-fetched to suggest that despite all the instabilities still prevalent in the Soviet political system it has accumulated sufficient adaptive capacity to con­ tinue functioning and developing. This is not only a Hegelian "what is, is right," but a much more complex interaction be­ tween the persistence of institutions and their impact on citi­ zens. What we have attempted to investigate here is the way in which the Soviet regime has incorporated participation into both local government and the community organizations subordinated to local government, utilizing the potential of citizen participation to alleviate systemic strain and trans­ forming the instabilities that might threaten the system's ex­ istence into motive power for further development. 13 Huntington, Politwal Order, p. 35, coined the term while warning against confusion between two sorts of political modernity characterized by a differ­ entiated political structure: rationalization of authority and expansion of political participation on the one hand, and the political effects of economic, social, and cultural modernization, which may be accompanied by disorienta­ tion and dissolution of political frameworks on the other. Throughout our discussion we have tried to point out the many examples of Soviet authors who fight the "Webbist" tendencies of their colleagues, interpreting the offi­ cially sanctioned terms of reference in cautious and realistic terms.

298

Mechanisms and Processes

DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITIES The coexistence of the centralized hierarchy under Party con­ trol and the elected soviet consisting mainly of mobilized citi­ zens creates a tension that provides the dynamic for the func­ tioning of the political system on the local level, its adaptive development, and long-term stability. The Party exercises the power of the last word, staffing all critical positions and exer­ cising at least supervisory control over all decisions made. The soviets, however, have popular legitimacy and are re­ peatedly urged by Party leaders to exercise it. Moreover, they provide the frameworks of socialization, decision implemen­ tation, and information flow without which Party power would have to resort once more to naked force as the basis of government. The entire system is integrated by an interlock­ ing of personnel and the cofunctioning of separate bodies of Party and soviets, and is impaired by malfunction or weakness in any of its constituent parts. It is doubtful whether any single decree or action of the Communist Party can be considered a "Bill of Rights" of the Soviet people, assuring them that for the ordinary citizen the "years of tyranny" have forever ended. Many of the legal and social reforms undertaken by the post-Stalin leaders, as well as many symbolic gestures, were aimed at dissociating the Soviet present from much of the Stalinist past.14 The pro­ nouncements of the Party program declaring the period of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to be at an end and a new 14 Arrigo Levi, "The Evolution of the Soviet System," in Z. Brzezinski (ed.), Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 139, says that Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech at the 20th CPSU Congress represented a "constitutional charter" between the Party leaders and the rank and file that terror would henceforward be excluded from intra-Party politics, while the anti-Stalin discussions at the 22nd Party Con­ gress in 1961 (at which the new Party program was adopted) represented a repetition of this for public consumption. Though the first half of this propo­ sition is acceptable, the second part ignores too much of the internal political conflict connected with the 22nd Congress. For a brilliant discussion of the politics of the 22nd Congress, see Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin (New York: Viking, 1969), part 2.

Development of Governmental Capacities

299

"state of the entire people" to be in the making simply served as an ideological focal point for the changes. The stated rationale behind the Stalin purges had been the claim that the class struggle becomes sharper as a revolu­ tionary state moves closer to achieving Communism. On this basis supposed enemies were summarily dealt with and arbi­ trary police rule justified. The new Party program declared internal class struggle largely at an end and renewed the call for universal citizen participation in government within a framework of "democratic centralism."15 In reality, the Party program was post facto legitimation of a process which, as has been noted, began several years earlier. The reform of the soviets had started earlier and at the 21st Party Congress Khrushchev had begun to push the transfer of state functions to public bodies. The importance of the programmatic pronouncement was its opening of the pos­ sibilities for wide discussion of many possible forms of or­ ganization within the framework of local government, for the "state of the entire people" had neither prescriptive definition in the works of Marx and Lenin, nor extensive historical precedent. Soviet scholars and administrative specialists thus took widely divergent stands as to the most effective forms of organization, and, despite the enthusiasm of Khrushchev for volunteers, a great measure of debate remained. Even after Khrushchev's downfall and the replacement of his "mass populist" approach by the more cautious adminis­ trative outlook of the Brezhnev-Kosygin group, there was no sharp reversal of development but rather a shift of emphasis commensurate with the new reverence for "the technicalscientific revolution." The broad framework of citizen par­ ticipation was brought into harness with professional admin­ istration in a somewhat unsettled coexistence. The new combination of scientific administration with "public self-government" has proven a fertile field for Soviet scholars and an important focus of reform within the system of local government. The continuing activity of the re15

CPSU,Program, pp. 100-102.

300

Mechanisms and Processes

searchers in Departments of the System of the Soviets at uni­ versities and institutes throughout the USSR provides a spur to development both in the field of the theory of government and in providing in-service training for officials as well as trained graduates for local administration.16 While the development and regularization of the function­ ing of the soviets is neither even nor universal throughout the Soviet Union, there is a clear spread of more regularized practices at every level and an evident progress toward meet­ ing new types of problems. This is most clearly evident when we compare the Central Committee's January 1957 resolution on the local soviets with that of March 1971. The earlier reso­ lution concentrated most of its discussion on the mechanics of regular sessions and reports, the upholding of the elective principle, and the establishment of the soviet as an effective mobilizing system. The more recent resolution notes in a single paragraph that the soviets have met these demands; it concentrates instead on the need for a stronger financial base for the local soviets, as well as for a clear delineation of their areas of administrative competence.17 This is a very different order of problem from the questions of regular sessions, re­ ports of deputies to voters, and revival of the standing com­ mittees. Regularization of the procedures of the local soviets and es­ tablishment of respect for the forms of election and responsi­ bility were necessary from both a symbolic and a functional point of view. In terms of symbolism it was important for the regime to establish a legitimate functioning governmental sys­ tem if it was to proceed with development on a basis other than the crisis and terror-oriented life of the late thirties and 16 The use of "System of the Soviets" appears to be a more accurate render­ ing of the sense of Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo than is the more frequently used "Soviet Construction." For a discussion of how Soviet centers of learning conduct experiments in conjunction with local soviets seeking forms of improving local government, see Barabashev and Sheremet, Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, pp. 31-32. The authors present this as a resumption of work car­

ried on in the late 1920s. 17 The Central Committee resolution and Supreme Soviet decree will be found in Izvestiia, March 14, 1971, and March 20, 1971, respectively. For a description of the problems of defining and implementing the legal compe­ tence of the local soviets see Taubman, Governing Soviet Cities, pp. 28-34.

Development of Governmental Capacities

301

the wartime period. A legitimized style of government was necessary both internally, as a rallying point for the energies and loyalty of Soviet citizens, and externally, for the estab­ lishment of a new image of the post-Stalin USSR in the world community. Functionally, the system of soviets had to be made into an operative instrument to handle the administra­ tive load and distributive duties which are an important di­ mension of the material expression of de-Stalinization. The soviets were found to have the best potential for integrating both of these functions in a single institution, for they repre­ sent the whole Soviet people, rather than any particular sec­ tor or class as was the case with the Party, the trade unions, or the kolkhoz. The soviets also provided a comprehensive, unified network of institutions within which administrative policy could be implemented. The improvement of the local soviets as administrative and representative organs gave the Soviet regime a working base from which to attempt to overcome the deleterious effects of social and economic underdevelopment. Equally important, the highly structured and controlled participation on which the work of the soviets is based maintains the fundamental difference between the Soviet regime today and the preced­ ing Stalinist period. Under Stalin, as Frederick Barghoorn suggests, the "subject" element in Soviet political culture, de­ manding conformity (and enforced by arbitrary terror), was as yet unsynthesized with the "participant" aspect, which re­ quires purposive activity, and relies more on organized per­ suasion than overt coercion.18 In the operation of community institutions, the continuing attempt to build up the role of socialized persuasion and rely as little as possible on state-initiated coercion finds its expres­ sion both in the restructuring of existing social institutions and in a redefinition of some of their functions. Aryeh Unger, for instance, links increasing attention to agitation and propaganda at places of residence to the diminution of open repression in Soviet life, as well as to the demographic and economic development of the USSR.19 In addition, recent 18

Barghoorn,Politics in the USSR (2nd ed.), p. gi. Aryeh L. Unger, "Soviet Mass-Political Work in Residential Areas," Soviet Studies, Vol. 22, no. 4 (April 1971), pp. 556-561. 19

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Mechanisms and Processes

discussions on the druzhiny embody a new emphasis on crime prevention, while, as has been noted, the tendency of the comrades' courts has been toward social reconciliation rather than determination of guilt. Even as we recognize the importance of a shift from the dynamic of terror to one of mobilized public activism, we must emphasize once more that all of the foregoing relates to the creation of participatory institutions and to the regime's effort to have the populace support them as legitimate and self-sustaining forms of government. Such an effort was cer­ tainly a necessary precondition to creation of citizen partici­ pation, but it has had only limited success. Its significance lies more in the fact that it was made, and continues to be made, than in the results achieved thus far. Wherever we have been able to examine empirical findings regarding the Soviet citizen's public activity, whether from conversations with emigrants, from Soviet field surveys, or from some of the more frank and penetrating discussions published by Soviet scholars, we note a distinct lack of the di­ mension of citizen initiative. We find chronic recurrence of formal activity devoid of content, accompanied by avoidance of activity in population groups which, by their social and economic attributes, should be among the most active partici­ pants in Soviet society and politics. The Party and administra­ tive organs continue to dominate the workings of the various elected bodies of the community. The activization of partici­ patory institutions has not eliminated the subject element so prominent in Soviet political culture. Conformity rather than initiative still guides the Soviet citizen. Administrative raison d'etat is served before community self-determination, and preserves its primacy through control of both the form and content of the participatory structures of the community.

BUILDING A SOCIALIZED COMMUNITY The attempt to give the community self-help organizations and the representative and volunteer organs of the soviets some self-sustaining momentum based on mass public ac­ ceptance marks a critical phase in the social and political

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303

development of the Soviet regime. This is the phase of "con­ tinuum socialization," involving the citizens in system mainte­ nance and development, as compared with the earlier stage of "revolutionary socialization," which involves demonstrations of loyal conformity on the order of the May Day and Novem­ ber 7 parades and mass participation in elections.20 The difficulties of achieving such a transition do not di­ minish the Soviet regime's strivings toward this end. Even in the past when social conditions were much less favorable, adherence to participatory forms of life was an avowed norm. Vyshinsky's alleged remark that "all this talk about public aktiv and assistance groups can be done away with" was almost surely not made publicly, and was only published—branded as cynical—thirty years later.21 The political structure that enables the Soviet regime to pursue its goals today despite an unfavorable environment is basically the same as it was in the thirties. "Even in Stalin's days," writes Volkov, "there was mass participation in public administration in the form of Party activists—an ever-growing vanguard of people working through the soviets, the trade unions and other social organs."22 It is the backbone of Party activism in the body of mass participation that, as Samuel Huntington points out, creates the possibility of mov­ ing the Soviet political system toward an adaptive stage, creat­ ing institutional capacity and flexibility to meet new chal­ lenges from the social environment.23 The picture that has emerged from our study of Soviet par­ ticipation is of a community in which control, totalism, and personalization are the principal characteristics. Control is based on direct participation by Party members as well as hierarchical supervision. As we noted in our exami­ nation of the community self-help organizations, Party mem20

The terms "revolutionary socialization" and "continuum socialization" were coined by Ivan Volgyes, and are analyzed by him in "Political Socializa­ tion in Eastern Europe," Problems of Communism, Vol. 23, no. 1 (JanuaryFebruary 1974), pp. 46-55. 21 See N. Mironov, in Pravdn, May 8, 1964, p. 2. 22 Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 13. 23 Huntington, in Huntington and Moore, Authoritarian Politics, p. 24.

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bers are detailed to initiate and staff new groups, so that their incidence is high in any innovative activity, tapering off as it is routinized and its competence defined by legislation. At every level, however, Party members, augmented by Komsomol youth, will provide a percentage of activists far beyond their weight in the population. The pressure of Party committees on rank-and-file members, to whom they hand out as many assignments as possible, creates an identity between Party member and activist which often goes far beyond the convic­ tions underlying either role—and it is this that often under­ mines the effectiveness of participatory activity.24 Given the nature of the Soviet political system and the norm that a large proportion of the most desirable jobs are reserved primarily if not exclusively for Party members, the joining of the Communist Party will, as it has been through­ out Soviet history, remain subject to a considerable weight of non-Communist and nonpolitical motivation.25 Those who join the Party primarily for careerist motives will almost surely perpetuate the phenomenon of "paper participation," despite all campaigns to the contrary. To bring the largely work-based Party structure into line with residence-based participatory bodies, Party groups in industrial enterprises or governmental and educational in­ stitutions are given shefstvo—the duty of advising, supervising, and reinforcing participatory activity—in a defined area, generally a mikroraion, thus adding a new dimension of mobil­ ization and control to those already in existence.26 The Party group of the work place is thus added to the Party activists already working in the street committees, druzhiny groups, or deputies' groups. Party control is so much a norm of Soviet life, and its arm so 24

This is emphasized by Voikov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 40. For an account of early problems in this area, see Rigby, Communist Parly Membership, Chapter 2, and for Party saturation of various areas of employ­ ment, see Chapter 14. For a discussion of "careerist professional" Party members see L. G. Churchward, The Soviet Intelligentsia (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 136. 26 For a brief discussion of this mechanism see SDT, no. 9 (September '975). P- 5· The reader will recall discussion of this in the assignment of agitators to election districts in Chapter 2. 25

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long, that it tends to serve its purpose even when not actually applied. The potential nonvoter believes that a list of absen­ tees will go to the raikom. The student and the scientist assume that compliance with norms of public activism is an integral part of professional advancement. They then act in keeping with these perceptions, relieving the control organs of much actual work. The totalism of participatory organization, ubiquitous and dealing with every aspect of the citizen's life, creates a pres­ sure to recognize participation and participatory penetration of the community as a norm. Whether at work or at leisure the citizen is confronted with a broad assortment of opportu­ nities and demands for participation, attempting to overcome by pressure and repetition whatever social resistance may exist. Darrell Hammer has suggested that even where interest and belief may be low, citizens' attitudes and patterns of thought may nevertheless be affected.27 Even a dissident may adopt part of the regime's "rules of the game" and terms of reference, because these are what exist and have at least some appearance of public legitimacy. In such an environment no language or behavior pattern other than those persistently presented by the official media can serve for effective com­ munication with the regime or with the citizenry at large.28 The pressure for socialization toward Soviet participatory norms and the particular values they represent is stepped up by the fact that within the small frameworks into which the political and social community is divided and subdivided, an attempt is made to build participatory activity on personalized interaction. Whether the context is a residential community, a 27 Darrell P. Hammer, USSR: The Politics of Oligarchy (Hinsdale, 111.: Dryden Press, 1974), p. 88. See also Vitaly Rubin, "Moscow Testimony "Present Tense, Vol. 2, no. 3 (Spring 1975), p. 56, for reference to this phenomenon. 28 Some examples of this can be seen in attempts by such neo-Marxist dissi­ dents as Roy Medvedev to write social and political criticism that may possibly be published in the USSR, e.g., Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge (New York: Knopf, 1971). One is reminded of the hero of Ilf and Petrov's Twelve Chairs, who, annoyed by a Party functionary's boring platitudes, resolved to stir up the crowd with something fresh and to the point. He is horrified, but help­ less, once he gains the platform, to hear himself mouthing the same phrases on "the international situation."

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scientific institute, or some other place of work, the refusal to participate in some activity must be made to a friend or col­ league who has been designated to organize the particular project, and who, along with the nonparticipant, may be held responsible by some higher authority. A variety of pressures is thus brought to bear: the hesitation to cause possible harm to a neighbor or colleague; the thought that at some future time the nonparticipant might be cast in the role of mobilizer, and would be dependent on his neighbors' cooperation; the fear that, somewhere, nonparticipation will be noted and could possibly cause unpleasantness at some future date. In this way a mechanism of constant social pressure is created, promoting conformity which may sometimes be mistaken for belief. Direct contact among members of communities is not diffi­ cult in Soviet conditions. This is certainly the case in rural communities in which over half the population lives in settle­ ments of less than 1 ,000 inhabitants. Even these small settle­ ments (regarded as too small for optimal economic and social development) are further subdivided for participatory pur­ poses. A deputy to a village soviet, representing 45 voters, may serve 27 households in an electoral district which has, in addition to the deputy and possibly a deputies' group, its own neighborhood committee.29 In the many new development towns throughout the Soviet Union, though the tradition and stability of the village are lacking, some social community ties may be forged out of newness and necessity, augmented by a strong and con­ sciously projected sense of common creation. Where a settle­ ment is based on a single factory or other economic object, identity is further strengthened by the interweaving of the work kollektiv with the residential community. Even in older centers, the administrative practice of allotting houses through enterprises and institutions so that workers of a single factory or office may live as neighbors assists this build­ ing of personalized community, and even where such solidar­ ity is far from complete it provides at least a nucleus of com29

E. Butko and M. Yarovoi, "Deputat sel'skogo soveta," S D T , no. 1 (Janu­ ary 1975). P- 5 6 ·

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munity to facilitate organization. Some effort, though by no means always a successful one, is made to combat the relative anonymity of deputies by matching the residential area they represent with the work collective nominating them. A city deputy whose entire constituency consisted of two apartment buildings, each with sixty apartments, notes happily that in addition to the territorial compactness of her constituency, a large group of residents works together with her in the same factory. "A deputy's task," she observes, "is to serve as organ­ izer of various matters in the constituency . . . and to unite people is of course easier if they are already linked by some common interest at their place of work."30 Where natural processes of migration or other causes erode the compact homogeneity of a district, the structure of par­ ticipatory organizations and the attempt to build the mikroraion as an optimal urban unit prevent loss of community, and encourage the strengthening of close civic interaction by community residents. It is interesting to note that the empiri­ cal investigation of optimal size of community for participa­ tion which Verba and Nie discuss is approximately the same as that arrived at through experience by Soviet social scien­ tists and planners. It should be noted that, in addition to structuring urban society to prevent loss of community, the Soviet government is now engaged in a long-term campaign to consolidate isolated rural settlements into larger units that permit economic, social, and political organization more commensurate with the Soviet image of developed socialist society.

WHO PARTICIPATES? Having discussed the structure and primary mechanisms that are the core of Soviet political participation, we now turn to the question of the periphery, and the process of building up 30 E. Butko and M. Yarovoi, "Deputat gorodskogo soveta," S D T , no. 2 (February 1975), pp. 49-50. The deputy's constituency in the city of Armavir in the Krasnodar Territory consisted of 282 voters and a total population of 450 persons. This is slightly less than the 1975 USSR average of 356 voters per urban deputy.

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Mechanisms and Processes

the participatory structures. Who is drawn into these and why? What factors promote or retard identification with the norms and modes of Soviet participation? As we have already emphasized, the members of the Party, augmented by Komsomol members, provide the active core of political participation. This core is sufficient to maintain the potential of the participatory frameworks, enabling the regime to activate them when needed for elections, crises, or other occasions deemed worthy of attention. Once this core is in existence, the organization of the periphery is more a mat­ ter of development than of systemic survival. While the Soviet system could operate more effectively were all the participa­ tory groups to function consistently, the system has demon­ strated the capacity for survival, relying on its Party activists. Nevertheless, we find that beyond the core of Party and Komsomol there are two additional layers of public activists attracted for various reasons to participatory groups. The first of these consists of those who find that participation brings either social and psychological satisfaction or career advantages or some combination of the two. The second is made up of the great mass of citizens. For these, personal need satisfaction or the climate of community pressure cre­ ated and applied through the mechanisms described above, suffice to elicit compliance with at least minimal norms and forms of participation. In the case of pensioners, active participation gives them a place of prominence in the community, assuring status and occupation. We have noted the use of former professional qualifications in some participatory groups. Beyond this there is the satisfaction of wielding power to maintain order and culture through the comrades' courts and the residential committees. It would seem natural that many pensioners, whose origins are in the village, are as anxious as is the regime to overcome the loss of community and to exercise the tradi­ tional communal right to intervene and judge. This is where the Soviet striving for the structuring of outlook and behavior converges with the concept of traditional society that any individual's deviation from social norms poses a threat to

Who Participates?

309

the community as a whole and is therefore punishable by the community. For students, highly visible to both academic and Kom­ somol authorities, and for those holding scientific, academic, or other privileged posts, some measure of cooperation in participation may be part of the conditions of advancement. If positive action is not demanded, then at least nonopposition is expected. Should an individual not take part in a pre­ scribed activity, he must at least prepare a plausible alibi, as we have shown that so many apparently do at election time. Failing that, he is expected to express regret at having been unable to participate. For the individual whose lack of response to the authorities appears to have exceeded the permissible, the conscientious Party or Komsomol committee has a prescription. The of­ fender is summoned for a conversation in which, depending on the nature and degree of the offense, the Party or Kom­ somol secretaries may be reinforced by administrative or se­ curity officials. Former Soviet citizens have noted the general characteristics of such encounters. They generally begin in a low key, attempting to establish an expression of common outlook and regret for errors of omission or commission. If such is forthcoming, specific penalties or reprisals may not be mentioned, though generally something will be said regard­ ing the possible negative consequences of persisting in behav­ ior patterns regarded as asocial or antisocial. If the desired rapport is not established, the tones become harsher and pos­ sible reprisals range from public opprobrium to eviction from housing, and possible loss of advancement, employment, or study opportunities. To understand this mechanism it is im­ portant to recognize that its primary goal is the prevention of open dissent or scandal which might draw unwanted atten­ tion from higher authorities. Once the core of activity is estab­ lished, the actual activity of the periphery is a desideratum but not a necessity. The external appearance of compliance is, however, an immanent rule of the game. While modes of participation differ in their attractiveness or difficulty for the ordinary citizen, many of the participa-

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tory activities within the Soviet community are connected with the individual's immediate welfare, thus compensating him in some degree for whatever effort is demanded. Here we have in mind not only the volunteer work of residents in paving sidewalks, planting trees, or equipping playgrounds at their places of residence. The auditing of the work of groceries, bakeries, and other services by volunteer citizen groups, the evaluation of medical facilities by the volunteer activists of a local soviet's health committee, the patrolling of industrial plants for violation of antipollution laws, all yield easily per­ ceived benefits to the Soviet citizen. In the smaller com­ munities in particular, where alternatives to unsatisfactory services are not easily obtainable, such benefits may be of con­ siderable importance. All of this tends to bring large numbers of citizens into some measure of participatory activity. Since the number of groups is great, and the overlapping of func­ tions considerable, the investment of effort demanded of any single group is generally minimal, and as we have seen, the amount of time actually spent by both citizen activists and deputies is indeed small. Just as public opprobrium is often brought to bear as an in­ strument of socialization, public recognition provides a stimu­ lus for participation. Citizens, tardy in responding to a campaign to clear village yards of noxious weeds are "in comradely and neighborly fashion, shamed" into complying, while the deputy of the soviet and his aktiv of citizens person­ ally visit and thank all those who responded promptly. At the deputy's report meeting with his constituents, the names of all those whom he wishes to thank for active cooperation are read publicly.31 Such recognition brings with it the type of so­ cial satisfaction and solidarity which Volkov found to be the greatest single factor mentioned by his interviewees as motivating their participation.32 The differences in degree to which core and periphery groups are available for participation may be summarized in 31

Butko and Yarovoi, "Deputat sel'skogo soveta," pp. 56, 61. In the four factories that he investigated, 66-78 percent of the inter­ viewees included "closeness to comrades" among eight possible categories of answer. Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsw, p. 48. 32

Who Participates?

311

terms of pressures, gratifications, and costs. The core is sub­ ject to stronger pressures, but also includes groups for whom the gratifications of participation take on greater saliency. In addition, the cost of participation for members of core groups in terms of sacrifice of leisure time may often be lower than for periphery participants. Discussions with former Soviet citizens often showed that their willingness to take on Party assignments or other public tasks was predicated on the pos­ sibility of carrying out such a task at the expense of work time with minimal personal sacrifice. This was sometimes possible for some key activists, as we have shown in Chapter 3, by vir­ tue of their economic or social position, and appears to be a structural feature of the Soviet political system. In assessing the factors facilitating political participation in the Soviet context, we should keep in mind the essentially nonconflictual nature of virtually any kind of public activity. There are, of course, exceptions, particularly in the work of the deputies in attempting to exercise their auditing func­ tions. In addition, we indicated certain election situations in which the citizen, by deviating from the accepted patterns of organization and activity, purposely invites confrontation with the authorities. On the whole, however, the Soviet politi­ cal system is so ordered that the participating citizen is not precipitated into any situations of conflict or friction. This lowers the costs of participation, enhancing its attractiveness. The obverse of such structuring is, of course, the control mechanism we have discussed, which carries the implicit or explicit threat of sanctions. Whether or not any given Soviet person would freely choose to devote time and energy to public activism were there no environmental pressure is an open question, but es­ sentially irrelevant. The environment of Soviet social norms lauding active participation and the political and administra­ tive structure, which incorporates participation as an organic element, both provide strong reinforcement to any positive inclination existing among the core groups of the population. However, environment and structure are not all, and, as Alexander Dallin and George Breslauer point out, the social processes set in motion by policies aimed at promoting large-

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scale participation often contain contradictory currents and may produce unanticipated results while attempting to "lead citizens to do voluntarily what they had been or would other­ wise have been coerced to do."33 An example of such internal inconsistency appears when we begin to inquire as to how personal attributes affect participation—in particular education. At first glance Soviet research findings on the correlation between education and participation seem to parallel those in non-Soviet systems. Gordon and Klopov find that a patriarchal life-style and a concentration on personal and family life predominate among the less educated.34 Volkov's work shows engineers and other highly educated personnel participating more than assembly-line workers.35 While the highly educated as a whole are said to have a higher rate of participation, there appear to be considerable divisions within this very large group. Directors of factories and institutions, apparently on the basis of using their di­ rectorial prerogatives, devote between one-third and one-half more time to public activism than do their subordinates, en­ gineers in factories, doctors in hospitals, and the like, who have higher education but not a position that allows on-thejob participation. In this connection we must also take into ac­ count the correlation between education, Party membership, and activism. Ambition motivates the educated citizen to join the Party to improve his chances of being a factory director or school principal, and Party membership obliges him to activ­ ity, particularly if he has been entrusted with a post of great responsibility. Thus, Party members participate more both as deputies and as citizen activists, adding numerous members of the intelligentsia to the ranks of public activism.36 However, we have already noted that the practice of vote 33 Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, "Political Terror in the Post-Mobilization Stage," in Chalmers Johnson (ed.), Change in Communist Systems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 211-212. 34 Gordon and Klopov, Chelovekposle raboty, p. 288. 35 Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsia, p. 44. See also Pavlov and Kazimirchuk, Upravlenie, p. 185, for similar results among deputies, and SGP, no. 1 (January 1969), p. 113. 36 PavIovand Kazimirchuk, Upravlenu, pp. 185, 191.

Who Participates?

313

evasion is common among the intelligentsia. Also, emigres from this group nearly all agreed when interviewed that they accepted participation as gracefully but as passively as possi­ ble at their place of work, where they were particularly vul­ nerable, but tried to avoid it at their place of residence. Sev­ eral such informants claimed that activities having to do with matters beyond the particular building rarely occurred in the cooperative housing in which many members of the intel­ ligentsia live. Such activity as does exist appears to be carried on by Party members almost exclusively. Evasion seems to be the result of a basic skepticism about both the style and the content of such participatory activity, on the grounds of its lack of autonomy and effectiveness. No less a deterrent appeared to be a resentment of needless and crude intrusion of political values into private life.37 Even outside intelligentsia circles the ceaseless saturation with polit­ icized propaganda and the crudity and shallowness of its pre­ sentation often blunt the response of citizens. A deputy may successfully mobilize support for a campaign to repair ag­ ricultural machinery, improve sanitation, or strengthen pub­ lic order, even though such campaigns may be wrapped up as raising "a feeling of civic duty, respect for social labor and a scrupulous attitude to law and the rules of socialist living." One can only wonder, however, what the response of the vil­ lagers is when their deputy summons them to hear him read a series of prepared lectures with such titles as "Wherein Lies the Kolkhoz' Strength? Is it not in Each Individual's Contri­ bution to the Social Economy?" or "How are the Directives of the 24th Congress of the CPSU Being Fulfilled?" or "What Does the Soviet State Give to Each and Every Soviet Per­ son?"38 It may be suggested that there is an inherent conflict be­ tween the incessant pressure on citizens to join together in 37 Townsend, Participation in China, p. 204, finds a similar reaction in China. 38 Butko and Yarovoi, "Deputat sel'skogo soveta," p. 5g. For a satire on the apathy with which all parts of Soviet society react to such ritual utterances, see "Kak Klim Petrovich vystupal na mitinge ν zashchitu mira," in Alexander Galich,Pokolenie Obrechennykh (Frankfurt: Posev, 1972), pp. 263-266.

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participatory groups, and the atomized social structure gen­ erated by the regime's demand for orthodoxy and by the control mechanisms of totalist community penetration. The individual, witness to the "Webbist" tendencies of official proclamations, but curbing his inner feelings and forced, in Solzhenitsyn's terms, "to live the lie," is held back from the spontaneous and sincere participation which Huntington suggests as characterizing the mature, or adaptive, stage of single party systems.39 The tutelary nature of the regime, intruding into every as­ pect of the citizens' lives, is more, however, than a matter of style. At first glance it might seem that this is a leftover from the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, dating back to the distrust and suspicion that prevailed when Soviet power consisted of little more than revolutionary enthusiasm. However, it is more probable that what we observe here is some form of the attempt to merge civil society and political society, using the instrument of universal participation to ob­ literate as much as possible of the distinction between public and private interests. This was part of Marx's theoretical scheme for the latter days of existence of the state.40 The dif­ ficulties and contradictions that beset the implementation of this scheme are further testimony to the lingering im­ maturities of the Soviet political system.

SYSTEMIC FUNCTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES The persistent spread of organizational structures and con­ tinuing encouragement of widespread participation are one of the keys to overcoming these systemic immaturities. It is with the aid of the administrative mechanisms staffed by the 39 Huntington, in Huntington and Moore, Authoritarian Politics, p. 38. A discussion of the social and psychological effects of this splitting of Soviet citi­ zens into separated public and private worlds will be found in Inkeles and Bauer, The Soviet Citizen (New York: Atheneum, 1968), pp. 286-291. 40 For a stimulating discussion of this topic see Michael Evans, "Karl Marx and Political Participation," in Geraint Parry (ed.), Participation TO Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1972), particularly pp. 128-130, 150.

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deputies and their citizen aktiv that much of the growing social demand is processed. These institutions also audit and assist the professional administrators, with the aim of maxi­ mizing their effectiveness within the limits of the existing structure and allocation priorities of the Soviet regime. As we have seen in the case of the election system, the cen­ tral authorities tolerate free expression of citizen dissatisfac­ tion with local conditions and officials (whether by negative ballot, rejection of nomination, or appeals to the central press and higher soviets) and provide channels for it as an instru­ ment of control over the local apparatus.41 It is in this sense and within the framework of the prescribed channels of com­ plaint that the Soviet regime will view dissent as functional to the Soviet political system and will make provision for free expression. Expression of "functional dissent," however, is only one, far from major, aspect of the mobilization of the Soviet citizen into participatory frameworks. Mass participation within or­ ganized frameworks means the possibility of controlling the population and eliciting from it at least pro forma acknowl­ edgment of the regime's legitimacy. The penetration of the community, which makes it possible to detect, isolate, and eliminate deviant behavior, is a far from negligible factor, from the point of view of the regime, in the organization of all the grass-roots-level frameworks of participation. The integration of participatory frameworks into the func­ tioning of the Soviet political system and the role of such groups in its mobilizing and informational aspects have given distinctive structural characteristics to the organization of Soviet local government. One such is the creation of a dense, interwoven network of functional and territorial groups pro­ viding both multiple independent channels of access to gov­ ernment and a multiplicity of bases on which the citizen may 41 This technique is, of course, repeated on lower levels down to the ubiquitous "complaint book" found in every Soviet shop and restaurant and the subject of endless cartoons and satire in the Soviet press. Its limitations have even been immortalized in a Soviet underground song with the lines: "Est zhalobnaia kniga ν liubom pivnom larke/No zhalovat'sia nekomu chto tochno na dushe."

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be mobilized. Cumbersome and wasteful as such a system may be, it provides for a high information flow and prevents any single group in the community from exercising a monopoly on the presentation of citizen demands to the local au­ thorities. A second characteristic, related in function, is the "layer­ ing" of institutions in the hierarchy. This provides opportuni­ ties to apply, appeal, and complain not only to those nomi­ nally responsible for a particular function, but in the absence of responsiveness (and it bears repeating that the test is not necessarily satisfaction of the citizen's demand, but responsive­ ness to it), to their superiors, thus promoting the "anticipatory response" of officialdom that has been noted as the essence of a citizen's sense of administrative competence. As we have seen, the participatory frameworks organized within the Soviet political system are a product of the ideolog­ ical values of the regime, but also have clear administrative purpose. Without the institutions of participation that have developed, the Soviet system would lack components essential to its functioning. It has been shown that the beginnings of these institutions go back to the early years of the Soviet sys­ tem, but were largely ignored and inactive during Stalin's "to­ talitarian years." A different dynamic ruled Soviet Russia then, and it is one from which Stalin's successors have tried to dissociate their rule. We must now address ourselves to the effects of this new dynamic of rule on the system itself. Scholars have suggested that "successful participation may alter the political structure of society so that participation itself is facilitated." They state that there are feedback loops in a political system through which the success of any participatory institution engenders strengthened participation.42 Does this mean that the citizen who successfully complains against an overbearing bureau­ crat, or the deputy whose representations for an augmented housing allocation for his constituents are successful will de­ mand broadened political rights which could transform the 42

Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation,"

P- 372-

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Soviet political system? Several characteristics of the situations we have discussed make this doubtful. First of all, as was stated with some emphasis at the beginning of this work, we are dealing here only with the local level of Soviet govern­ ment. This is a portion of the political system with strictly cir­ cumscribed powers and functions and the system is still one of centralized power in all that is essential to its own preserva­ tion. Second, the matters dealt with in the local soviets are generally those of administration rather than policy making. How these affairs are carried on at the local level does not necessarily influence the manner in which central decisions will be made. If change can be induced in the political system through successful participation it is largely in the local arena that this will take place, and it will very largely be concentrated, at least in the beginning, on the realization of rights that now exist in a formal sense only. The educated and experienced deputy may be less and less content to be an ancillary of the adminis­ tration and executive and will want to make decisions of his own about the practical running of the soviets. In effect this is the burden of reform urged by those who would make the standing committees still more active, as it was the theme of much of the most recent Central Committee resolution on the soviets. In this process, we can discern an attempt to create on the local level a regulatory rule that will replace prescriptive cen­ tral control, allowing the local soviet a greater sense of compe­ tence. Within those areas already deemed regulatory, there is the search for a wider option of independent judgment, thus permitting local officials more frequent exercise of inde­ pendent judgment as well as broader choice among possible courses of action within any regulated area. In recent years the theme of civic competence has appeared a number of times in the Soviet press. It takes diverse forms, but it returns to one basic plea: Let people do the jobs as­ signed to them without interference from above. This is not a revolt against Party control or centralized planning, but an at­ tempt at assertion of competence and a demand for trust, a demand by the citizen that he be included in the system.

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Within the Komsomol organization this demand for trust erupted into the open with the rejection of an officially ap­ proved candidate for secretary of a local branch and the elec­ tion of a candidate proposed and approved by the branch members. In defending this action, M. Zhuravleva, a member of the Komsomol Central Committee, attacked critics of the local branch for "violating democracy" and "neutralizing the immense force contained in a healthy self-governing collec­ tive of young people." Accusing the Komsomol leadership of "petty tutelage," a phrase popular in the attack on bureau­ cratic interference in economic affairs, she concluded that "only where there is trust is it possible to develop a genuine sense of responsibility."43 The same theme was brought out by an economist, V. Kantorovich, while discussing the recent economic reforms. He quoted a bank manager who admitted exercise of detailed financial control over industrial enterprises with which he dealt. The manager claimed that he was not free to act in any other way. "We are not trusted," he complained, and sug­ gested that the central authorities should "formulate the principles of policy and set the limits—but trust us to do the rest."44 A third such expression came from a member of the CPSU Central Committee, then the First Secretary of the Tambov Oblast' Party committee and widely regarded as a spokesman for agricultural interests. He noted that the authorities had mistrusted the kolkhoz peasants throughout the collectiviza­ tion period and that this attitude had continued even after the kolkhoz peasantry had performed heroically during the war. The result, he claimed, was that "the collective farm managers and the farmers too, lost their sense of being mas­ ters of the land and the artel'. It undermined their sense of truth and honesty."45 In each of the above examples we see total bureaucratic control frustrating the desire of the Soviet citizen to exercise 43

Pravda, January 15, 1967. Literaturnata gazeta, December 24, 1966. 45 Grigorii S. Zolotukhin, in Oktiabr', no. 10 (1965). English translation in CDSP, Vol. 17, no 45, December 1, 1965, pp. 9-10. 44

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some measure of initiative in his various roles as worker or as participant citizen. In each of these instances we see the de­ mand for change, not so much in the fundamental nature or structure of the political system as in the style and methods of political and administrative leadership. In each case, the claim is that the affected citizens are socialized to the aims of the re­ gime and can be led in the direction that the authorities desire without authoritarian interference. They do not claim what Almond and Verba call citizen competence, that is, the ability to influence policy and decision making.46 They are, however, claiming subject competence—the expectation that when a decision is made and a policy set, they can know what their place is within the framework of that policy and can expect to be allowed to act autonomously in accordance with its dic­ tates. The link between this claim for subject competence and the campaign to regularize the operation of the soviets is clear. Each is the complement of the other. The claim for compe­ tent status can only be made with relation to a set of reg­ ularized procedures established by a regime. Regularized procedures are needed only where some dynamic other than arbitrary force is used as the moving force in society. How­ ever, when citizen mobilization becomes an important factor in the working of the political system, its effectiveness will in the end be dependent on maintaining a congruence between the general level of competence of the active citizens and the style of leadership employed.47 A mobilizing polity whose citi­ zens acquire some knowledge of political skills, as well as a sense of efficacy in using them, will eventually encounter de46 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, pp. 168-172, contains a discussion of the differences between citizen and subject competence as well as a distinction between political (decision-influencing) competence and administrative com­ petence (responsiveness of institutions). It is the latter, as we have seen, which is the focus of much of the effort to improve Soviet political participation. 47 This is the central thesis of Samuel H. Barnes, "Leadership Style and Political Competence," in Lewis Edinger (ed.), Political Leadenhip in Indus­ trialized Societies (New York: Wiley, 1967), pp. 59-60. Although Barnes differs somewhat in his understanding of competence from Almond and Verba, the essence is the same: a sense of knowing the institutions of politics and believ­ ing that they can be used effectively for the attainment of satisfactions.

320

Mechanisms and Processes

mands similar to the three just quoted. The alternatives be­ fore a leadership faced with such demands are not, however, repression of citizens' demands or complete abdication of power. Barnes suggests a form of leadership that he names democratic-manipulative, in which goals and decisions are formulated exclusively by the leadership, whose task then consists of manipulating their followers into acceptance of the goals.48 While the need may exist for a style of leadership commen­ surate with the level of citizen competence, there are no guarantees that the necessary changes will be forthcoming at all levels and in sufficiently broad areas of political activity to avoid disruptive pressures and a decline of effective integra­ tion of the political system.49 However, the weight of our ob­ servations on the course of local government in the past twenty years indicates that the development of a system basi­ cally similar to that described by Barnes as democraticmanipulative has been the principal trend, and though it is far from universally effective and far from complete, its direc­ tion is still the same. The alternative is a stagnation of political institutions, which carries with it a danger presumably well understood by Soviet leaders. Assuming some correlation of educational level and participation, and notwithstanding all the counter­ vailing exceptions we have noted, it is reasonable to expect that the rapid increase in educational level in the Soviet 48 Ibid., p. 60. Though Barnes is attempting here to formulate a generally applicable model, his observations appear particularly apt with reference to Soviet development. Particularly relevant to the community self-help organi­ zations is his observation that mobilization of persons of low political compe­ tence into intermediary structures presents the opportunity to generate more informed and active participation in relation to the objects of the inter­ mediary group's activities, without involving the governmental structure it­ self. See tbid., p. 82. This view is also similar to Selznick's analysis of the func­ tions and political advantages of cooptation. 49 Z. Brzezinski (ed.), Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics (New York- Co­ lumbia University Press, 1969), centers around this problem. While the weight of opinion in the volume sides with adaptive change, discounting the probability of systemic upsets, individual analyses range from a forecast of complete transformation to stagnation and collapse. For a graphic summa­ tion of the range of opinion see the chart at the end of his volume, p. 157.

Systemic Functions and Consequences

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Union will promote the spread of political activism, particu­ larly as the fight continues against nonparticipation and for the attempt to channel the citizen's efforts and expectations through the political institutions of Soviet society. The tensions created between centralized authoritarian control and the "objective" conditions of a modernizing soci­ ety with a complex administrative system are not necessarily tensions between Party and non-Party people. Though in many respects there may be a gap between the Communist Party and society as a whole, the essential focus of the tensions we have discussed is on the division between actors in sup­ posedly sovereign or autonomous institutions and those who actually monopolize control. Here Party officials and exec­ utives of the soviets stand on one side, and a mixture of Party and non-Party citizens on the other, though the two camps are not entirely separate. Tito's reforms in Yugoslavia, which introduced experi­ ments in "Communist self-government" not only in adminis­ trative but also in economic matters, came from within the Party, though the very particular historic circumstances of the Tito-Stalin rift had much to do with their emergence and per­ sistence. The "Czechoslovak spring" of 1968 was also con­ ceived and led from within the Communist Party, but again its fate was determined by forces outside the framework of Czechoslovakia's political system. Poland in 1970 represented an example of what may occur when adaptive forces within the regime are either too weak or unwilling to initiate needed change. What emerges most strikingly here is the weakness of the Party monopoly of control on political organization. The en­ tire complex of Soviet political institutions is attuned to essen­ tially supportive participation, with the mechanisms of what we have called functional dissent aimed at providing efficient hierarchical control of the apparatus. No adequate legitimate outlet exists for the sort of participation that would bring about basic changes of policy or express major discontent. Such participation therefore takes on almost necessarily such illegitimate features as conspiracy and violence. It is within this framework of understanding the relations between par-

322

Mechanisms and Processes

ticipation, political institutionalization, and systemic stability that Huntington's third equation takes on its full significance. In a discussion on China we find special note being taken of the role of sub-elites whose main characteristic is that though they are removed from positions of decisive power, they are differentiated from the ordinary citizen by a clear perception of political responsibility.50 These people occupy a position that gives them the opportunity to inject their own percep­ tions and interests when interpreting elite-determined policies to the masses. At the outset of this work the crucial role of such a sub-elite was discussed. In the Soviet political system it may be said that the elected deputies and the aktiv of citizens gathered around them and in other frameworks connected to the soviets are that sub-elite. This is particularly so because the elected depu­ ties have among them so many of the economic, cultural, and administrative notables of the country. They are not only a major source of recruitment into the Party and government but the basis of many channels of political communication, both bringing policy down from above and communicating estimates of its effectiveness upward. The activity of the soviets represents an attempt to promote closeness of regime and citizens, the creation of face-to-face politics in which civil society and political society, community and regime, can merge. One prerequisite for success in this effort is that the representatives of the regime should have not only power but authority in the community. The persistence of authoritarianism at central or local levels, resisting any substantive devolution of authority to the citizens is counterweighted to some extent by the importance to the system of the functions of citizen participation dis­ cussed throughout this work. The administrative develop­ ment of the Soviet system thus carries within itself destabiliz50 Townsend, Participation in China, ρ xiii. While Townsend does not com­ pare his description of the political functions of the sub-elite to the evaluation by Mosca cited at the beginning of this work, the two complement each other perfectly in producing a complete picture of the position and functions of such a sub-elite, particularly in a political system grappling with problems of development.

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323

ing elements which create tensions between the conservative principles of control and the need for mass participation. These tensions create pressure for adaptation of the control mechanism, threatening the system with loss of effectiveness and perhaps ultimate breakdown if it does not meet the needs created by changing conditions. As Huntington notes, the challenges to authority at this stage of the development of a one-party system are largely the products of its own successes. Having destroyed the former bases of authority and estab­ lished the Party as a legitimate successor to the charismatic leader of the revolutionary period, the Party is faced with finding rational-legal responses to rational-legal challenges.51 Huntington outlines a scheme of social structuring of postrevolutionary society essentially similar to that we have found to exist in the USSR. He adds an explicit discussion of an ele­ ment that has found only implicit expression in our analysis. The participatory organizations mobilized to transform and socialize the population are an expression of bifurcation in society, a rallying of the masses against the intelligentsia, de­ spite the prominence of the themes of political unity and so­ cial harmony.52 Much of the social control function exercised in the USSR is aimed at suppression of nonconformism among intelligentsia groups, and the reader reviewing the evidence presented in the body of this work will note how applicable this appears to be even today in Soviet conditions. However, Huntington describes this phenomenon as char­ acterizing the transformation stage of a one-party revolu­ tionary political system, and suggests that in the later, adap­ tive phase, social unity becomes more real than nominal. In the adaptive stage, Huntington suggests that participation takes on a more spontaneous character, and the electoral process becomes more important than previously. As we have noted, Soviet electoral politics, though abounding in phe­ nomena that indicate great potential for adding authoritative dimensions to voters' preferences, are as yet largely symbolic and socializing in their function. Similarly, though in a some­ what different frame of reference, Dallin and Breslauer refer 51 52

Huntington, in Huntington and Moore, Authoritarian Politics, p. 32. Ibid., p. 38.

324

Mechanisms and Processes

to a postmobilization stage of Communist social and political development, in which "majority tyranny" replaces overt ter­ ror as an instrument of political control and socialization.53 Chalmers Johnson, however, adds another dimension to the discussion when he notes that mobilization is used by a revo­ lutionary regime to hasten development in keeping with its particular social goals, but that overall development can be divided into economic, social, and political development, and that mobilization policies designed to advance development in one sphere may conflict with development in another sphere.54 Moreover, imbalance of development, with political insti­ tutionalization outrunning the social transformation of the population (measured in such terms as overall educational at­ tainment or urbanization), or economic development as measured by the general standard of living within the coun­ try, may tend either to lower the qualitative level of the rela­ tively overdeveloped sector as capacities are drained off to promote the lesser developed sectors or, alternatively, to promote continued dominance by the leading sector as it con­ tinues to absorb capacities at the expense of the underdevel­ oped sector. This has been particularly evident in the eco­ nomic sector of Soviet life but, as we have attempted to show in our analysis of the workings of the soviets and the commu­ nity self-help groups, the phenomenon exists in the sphere of politics and society as well. Thus, within the sphere of political development, that is, "increases in per capita representation in the political proc­ esses by which legitimate priorities binding on all are estab­ lished," the "aberration" of the Stalin purges and the trau­ matic disruption of World War II, stopped the comple­ tion of revolutionary transformation. So protracted and deep-reaching were the crises of these years that they virtu53 DalIin and Breslauer, in Chalmers Johnson (ed.), Change in Communist Systems, pp. 196-199. The above authors are discussing propositions put for­ ward by Alfred G. Meyer in The Soviet Polttical System (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 331-332. 54 Chalmers Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," in Chalmers Johnson (ed.), Change in Communist Systems, pp. 12-13·

Systemic Functions and Consequences

325

ally constituted a new revolution in Soviet life, necessitating after Stalin's death a new start at consolidation which appears to be still under way.55 Within this consolidation, mass par­ ticipation at the local level plays a prominent part. There appear to exist pressures in the Soviet Union for movement into a stage of adaptation in which detailed, allembracing Party control and the centralized monopoly on political power would give way to a more balanced distribu­ tion of forces composed of functional groups, intellectual critics, and participating citizens, all exercising some initiative in the determination of social priorities within an overall framework of Communist Party power. The reader will easily see the parallel between this tendency in political develop­ ment and the economic reforms proposed in the early 1960s. Both these reform movements, the political and the eco­ nomic, remain largely a matter of potential. They are frus­ trated by the constraints imposed by the straitjacket of tradi­ tional central Party control and the strains created by fixation on rapid economic growth centered in the sector of heavy in­ dustry. The potential for citizen, as opposed to subject, par­ ticipation, flows from the institutional and legislative founda­ tions that have been renovated and reinforced since 1957. Such potential undoubtedly exists, but as we have seen in the example of the single-candidate electoral system, any exten­ sive realization of this potential in daily practice would involve a basic change of political values in the Communist Party leadership. Such changes are as yet nowhere visible. In the meantime we find the social and governmental institutions of the Soviet Union caught between a transformation of society in which citizens are mobilized to protect the dominance of authority, and a consolidation in which revolutionary fervor has waned and the Party rules through bureaucratic^^, tem­ pered only slightly by the pressures of economic and social modernization. 55

Levi, "The Evolution of the Soviet System," pp. 139-140, expresses this view, writing: "Fifty years after the October revolution, and fourteen years after Stalin's death, one is finally justified in speaking of the halting begin­ nings of a system which the Revolution was designed to usher in half a cen­ tury ago."

Select Bibliography The following bibliography is a listing of the sources cited as well as a number of relevant items consulted, but not cited. While monographs, journal articles, decrees, statutes, and speeches cited in the text are noted in the bibliography, newspaper items are not unless they appear to have impor­ tance as monographic articles. Several sources in the bibliog­ raphy are indicated by abbreviations. A full rendering of the titles of these items will be found following the Preface. The majority of the books, periodicals, and newspapers cited are available in the United States. The author, however, benefited greatly from a term spent as exchange fellow in the Department of the System of Soviets in the Law Faculty of Moscow State University in 1969-1970. During this period documents of local soviets were examined and noted. In addi­ tion, Soviet dissertations, collections of brochures, the Bulletin of the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Soviet, and other materials not easily available outside the Soviet Union were examined in the Lenin Library and the legislative collection of the Law Faculty. A portion of the material is based on personal interviews in the Moscow City Soviet, the Oktiabr' Urban District Soviet in Moscow and the Kutaisi City Soviet. More recently, a substan­ tial number of former Soviet citizens has been interviewed about forms of political participation. Wherever material from these people is cited without other specific source refer­ ences, the facts were gathered in a personal interview in which it was understood that the interviewee would remain anonymous. Soviet Materials Books and Articles Aimbetov, A. and Μ. T. Baimakhanov. Problemy sovershenstvovaniia organizatsn i deiatel'stva mestnykh sovetov. Alma Ata: Nauka, 1967.

328

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Alexandrov, N. G. and S. N. Bratus'.Razvitieteoriigosudarstvaiprava 22 s'ezdom KPSS. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1963. Ananov, I. N. Mestnye sovety na sovremennom etape. Moscow: Znanie,

*957Arutunian, Iu. V. Sotsial'naia struktura sel'skogo naselenita. Moscow: Mysl', 1971. Askerov, A. A. Ocherki sovetskogo stroitel'stva. Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1953. Azovkin, I. A. "Rasshirenie uchastiia mass ν rabote apparata sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo apparata," SGP, no. g (September 1961), pp. 47-56. Bannykh, Mikhail P. IspolniteVnyi komitet sel'skogo, poselkovogo soveta. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, ig6g. Barabashev, G. V. Raionnyi, gorodskoi sovet na sovremennom etape. Mos­ cow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1975. . "Razvitie form uchastiia deputatov ν operativnoispolnitel'noi organizatorskoi deiatel'nosti mestnykh sovetov," in S. S. Kravchuk (ed.), Voprosy razvitiia sovetov na sovremennom etape. Moscow: Moscow State University Press, 1966. Barabashev, G. V. and K. F. Sheremet. "Razvitie sovetov i zadachi nauki," SDT, no. 8 (August 1975), pp. 9-18. . Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura,

1974· Barabashev, G. V., K. F. Sheremet and P. Titov. "Rol sovetov ν razvitii sotsialisticheskogo khoziaistva," SDT, no. 12 (December 1965), pp. 7-20. Belykh, A. K. Upravlenie 1 samoupravlenie. Leningrad: Nauka, 1972. Belykh, A. K. and L. T. Krivushin (eds.). Politka i obshchestvo. Len­ ingrad: Leningrad University Press, 1975. Bezuglov, A. Deputatu dan nakaz. Moscow: Moskovskii Rabochii, 1967. Bubentsov, B. F. Za vse ν otvete pered narodom. Moscow: Znanie, 1965Burlatskii, F. "O stroitel'stve razvitogo sotsializma," Pravda, Decem­ ber 21, ig66. Butko, E. and M. Yarovoi. "Deputat gorodskogo soveta," SDT, no. 2 (February 1975), pp. 49-60. . "Deputat sel'skogo soveta," SDT, no. 1 (January 1975), PP- 53-64· Chekharin, I. M. The State and Social System in the U.S.S.R. Moscow: Novosti, 1974. . Uchastie naseleniia ν rabote sel'skogo, poselkovogo soveta. Moscow: IuridicheskaiaLiteratura, ig6g.

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C h e r e m n y k h , P. S. (ed.). Sochetanie gosudarstvennykh i obshchestvennykh nachal v upravlenh obshchestva. Moscow: Mysl', 1965. C h k h i k v a d z e , Victor M. The State, Democracy and Legality in the Moscow: Progress, 1972.

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"Effektivnost' deputatskoi deiatel'nosti," SGP, no. 1 (January 1969), pp. 1 1 0 - 1 1 5 . Fai berov, N . P. "Razvitie o b s h c h e n a r o d n o i sotsialisticheskoi d e m o k ratii," SG.P, no. 10 ( O c t o b e r 1975), p p . 1 2 5 - 1 3 2 . . Razvitie sovetskoi demokratii. Moscow: Gosiurizdat, i g 6 o . F e d o r o v , N . Panfilovskii sel'skii sovet. Stalingrad: 1957. Ulichnye komitety. Stalingrad: 1957. Gabrichidze, B. N . a n d A . K. K o n e v . Ulichnye komitety. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1968. G o r d e e v , V. Rassmotrenie pisem i organizatsiia priema trudiashchikhsia v ispolkomakh sovetov Altai. B a r n a u l : Altaiskoe k n i z h n o e izdatel'stvo, 1969G o r d o n , L. A . a n d E. V. K l o p o v . Chelovek posle raboty. Moscow: N a u k a , 1972. G o r k i n , A . F. " O sovetskoi d e m o k r a u i , " Partiinaia zhizn', no. 2 (January !959)> PP-

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G r i g o r ' e v , V. K. Poriadok organizatsii 1 provedeniia vyborov v verkhovnyi sovet SSSR. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1966. . Poriadok provedeniia vyborov v verkhovnyi sovet SSSR. Moscow: Izvestiia, 1970. . Vybory v mestnye sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia. Moscow: Izvestiia, 1969. G r i g o r i a n , L. A . Sovety-organy vlasti i narodnogo samoupravlenna. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1965. G r u z d e v a , E. "Characteristics o f the Way o f L i f e o f ' E d u c a t e d W o r k ers' ", Rabochii klass 1 sovremennyi mir, no. 2 ( M a r c h - A p r i l 1975), pp. 89-99. English translation in JPRS, Translations on USSR Political a n d Sociological A l l a n s , no. 6 3 1 , p p . 21-33. Gusev, I. D. 20 s'ezd KPSS i rabota sovetov. Stalingrad: 1957. Iampolskaia, Tsetsiliia A . Organy sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo upravleniia v sovremennom periode. Moscow: Gosiurizdat, 1954. . " O s n o v n y e cherti o b s h c h e s t v e n n y k h organizatsii v SSSR v s o v r e m e n n y i p e r i o d , " S G P , no. 9 ( S e p t e m b e r 1961), p p . 37-46. . Voprosy teoru i istorii obshchestvennykh organizatsii. Moscow: Nauka, 1971. I k o n n i k o v a , S. N. and V. T . Lisovsky. Molodezh 0 sebe, 0 svoikh sverstnikakh. L e n i n g r a d : L e n i z d a t , 1969. Ivanova, Z. D. "Uchastie samodeiatel'nykh organizatsii mass v rabote r a i o n n y k h sovetov d e p u t a t o v trudiashchikhsia," in V. V.

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Sheremet, Konstantin F. Kompetentsiia mestnyhh sovetov. Moscow: Moscow State University Press, ig68. . Povyshenie roll mestnyhh sovetov ν khoziaistvennom i sotsial'nokulturnam stroitel'stve. Moscow: Znanie, 1 9 6 7 . . Sel'skte 1 poselkovye sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia. Moscow: Mysl', 1 9 6 7 . Shevchenko, S. "Sovershenstvovat' apparat raiona," SDT, no. 2 (Au­ gust 1 9 5 7 ) , pp. 4 1 - 4 4 . Sidorkevich, A. and N. Monchadskaia. "Nenuzhnaia opeka," SDT, no. 9 (September 1 9 7 0 ) , pp. 5 6 - 5 9 . Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia ν periode razvernutogo stroitel'stva kommunizma (sbornik statei). Moscow: Higher Party School and Academy of Social Sciences, Central Committee, CPSU, 1 9 6 1 . Spirina, Ε. V. "Postoiannye kommissii mestnykh sovetov ν sovremennom periode." (Abstract of a Candidate Dissertation.) Mos­ cow: Moscow State University, 1 9 6 6 . Staroverov, V. I. Gorod ili derevnia? Moscow: Politicheskaia Literat­ ure, 1 9 7 2 . Starovoitov, N. G. "Nakazy izbiratelei "Agitator, no. χ 1 (June 1 9 7 3 ) , P- 13· . Poriadok organizatsii iprovedeniia vyborov ν mestnye sovety. Mos­ cow: IuridicheskaiaLiteratura, 1 9 6 5 . Tarasov, M. "K itogam vyborov ν mestnye sovety," Partiinaia zhizn , no. 5 (March 1 9 5 7 ) , pp. 9 - 1 4 . Tikhomirov, Iurii A. "Predstavitel'nye organy vlasti i razvitie gosudarstvennogo upravleniia," SGP, no. 2 (February 1962), pp. 35- 46 . "Razvitie sotsialisticheskoi gosudarstvennoi vlasti," SGP, no. 5 (May 1 9 6 3 ) , pp. 2 6 - 3 8 . . "Usilenie obshchestvennykh nachal ν deiatel' nosti mestnykh organov gosudarstvennogo upravleniia," SGP, no. 8 (August i 9 6 0 ) , pp. 1 2 5 - 1 3 0 . . Vlast' 1 upravlenie ν sotsialisticheskom obshchestve. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1 9 6 8 . . "Voprosy razvitiia mestnykh organov gosudarstvennoi vlasti ν SSSR," SGP, no. 1 (January i 9 6 0 ) , pp. 7 6 - 8 8 . Todorskii, Iurii V. "Postoiannye kommissii mestnykh sovetov." (Abstract of Candidate Dissertation.) Moscow: Moscow State Uni­ versity, 1 9 5 7 . Ulitskii, P. S. "Automobilizatsiia ν razvitom sotsialisticheskom ob­ shchestve," Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia, no. 1 ( 1 9 7 6 ) , pp. 1 2 8 - 1 3 8 . Varchuk, V. V. "Puty privlecheniia mass k upravleniiu." (Candidate Dissertation.) Moscow: Moscow State University, ig68.

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Itogi vyborov i sostav deputatov mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia, 1971· Moscow: Izvestiia, 1971. Itogi vyborov i sostav deputatov mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia RSFSR, 1971. Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1971· Itogi vyborov i sostav deputatov mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia RSFSR, 1973. Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1973· Kalinychev, F. I. (ed.)· Polititheskaia organizatsiia sovetskogo obshchestva. Moscow: Politizdat, 1968. Kaluga Oblast' Soviet. Vozrastanie roli mestnykh sovetov (Materials of the Kaluga Oblast' conference of activists of the soviets, November 24, 1967). Kaluga, 1968. Kutaisi City Soviet. "Materialy ob otchete Kutaiskogo soveta de­ putatov." Kutaisi: typescript, 1969. Liublin Urban District Soviet, Moscow. Plan meropriatiipo vypolneniiu nakazov izbiratelei. Moscow, 1969. . Plan raboty ispolkoma na IV kvartal 1969 goda. Moscow, 1969. Moscow City Soviet. "Model Statute for Deputies' Councils in Zh.E K.'s," Bulletin, no. 2-488 (January 1962), pp. 2-4. Narodnoe Khoziautvo SSSR, 1922-1972. Moscow: Statistika, 1972. Oktiabr' Urban District Soviet, Moscow.Narodnyiuniversitetpravovyhh znanii. Moscow: Znanie, 1967. . Proekt reshenie oktiabr'skogo raionnogo soveta, "O biudzhete raiona na 1970 god." Moscow: mimeo, 1970. . "Statisticheskii otchet ο sostave Oktiabr'skogo raionnogo soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia goroda Moskvy, 12 sozyva, 1969-1971." Moscow: typescript, n.d. Rossiiskaia Federatsiia, (Statisticheskii sbornik). Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1959. RSFSR. Administrativno-temtorial'noe delenie. Moscow: Izvestiia, 1965. . Administrativno-temtorial'noe delenie. Moscow: Izvestiia, 1974· . Polozhenie 0 tovarishcheskikh sudakh. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1967. . Polozhente 0 vyborakh ν kraevye, oblastnye, okruzhnye, raionnye, gorodskie, sel'shie i poselkovye sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia RSFSR. Moscow: Iuridicheskaia Literatura, 1968. RSFSR, Supreme Soviet. "O praktike raboty postoiannykh kommissii mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudiashchikhsia Gorkovskoi oblasti," in Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, no. 49, 1961. "Soobshchenie ob itogakh vyborov ν verkhovnye sovety soiuznykh, avtonomnykh respublik i mestnye sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia," SDT, no. 8 (August 1975), pp. 19-25. USSR. Administrativno-temtorial'noe delenie soiuznykh respublik. Mos­ cow: Izvestiia, 1974.

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Non-Soviet Materials Books and Articles Allardt, Erik. "Community Activity, Leisure Use and Social Struc­ ture,^"Acta Sociologica, Vol. 6, fasc. 1 (1961), pp. 67-82. Allardt, Erik, Pentti Jartti, FainaJyrkela and Yrjo Littunen. "On the Cumulative Nature of Leisure Activities," Acta Sociologica, Vol. 3 (March 1959), pp. 165-172. Almond, Gabriel A. and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. Comparative Politics. Boston: Little, Brown, 1966. Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba. The Civic Culture. Boston: Lit­ tle, Brown, 1965. Amalrik, Andrei. Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? New York: Harper & Row, 1970. Apter, David E. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965. Avtorkhanov, Abdurakhman. The Communist Party Apparatus. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966. Barghoorn, Frederick C. Politics vn the USSR. (2nd ed.) Boston: Lit­ tle, Brown, 1972. Barnes, Samuel H. "Leadership Style and Political Competence," in Lewis Edinger (ed.), Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies. New York: Wiley, 1967, pp. 59-83. Berman, WaroM ]. Justice in the USSR. New York: Vintage, 1963.

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Birch, A. H. "Political Participation in England and Wales," Interna­ tional Social Science Journal, Vol. 12 (i960), pp. 15-26. Bottomore, Thomas B. Elites and Society. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968. Breslauer, George W. "Khrushchev Revisited," Problems of Com­ munism, Vol. 25, no. 5 (September-October 1976), pp. 18-33. Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. (ed.). Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969. Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. and Samuel P. Huntington. Political Power, USA/USSR. New York: Viking, 1964. Campbell, Angus. "The Passive Citizen," Acta Sociologka, Vol. 6, fasc. 1 (1961), pp. 9-21. Carson, George B., Jr. Electoral Practices in the USSR. New York: Praeger, 1955. Cattell, David T. Leningrad: A Case Study of Soviet Urban Government. New York: Praeger, 1968. . "Local Government and the Sovnarbhoz in the USSR 19571962," Soviet Studies, Vol. 15, no. 4 (April 1964), pp. 430-442. Churchward, Lloyd G. Contemporary Soviet Government. New York: Elsevier, 1968. . The Soviet Intelligentsia. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973 ^

l . "Soviet Local Government Today," Soviet Studies, Vol. 17, no. 4 (April 1966), pp. 431-452. Clarke, Roger A. "The Composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 1958-1966," Soviet Studies, Vol. 19, no. 1 (July 1967), pp. 53-65. Cocks, Paul. "The Rationalization of Party Control," in Chalmers Johnson (ed.), Change in Communist Systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, pp. 153-190. Dallin, Alexander and George W. Breslauer. "Political Terror in the Post-Mobilizational Stage," in ChalmersJohnson (ed.), Change in Communist Systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 191214. Danielov, Malkiel. "Todjikistoni Sovety: The Tadjik Republic News­ paper in the Tadjik Language." Jerusalem: Hebrew University Soviet and East European Research Centre, Soviet Institutions Series, paper no. 5, 1976. Easton, David. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: Wiley, 1965Edwards 5 John N. and Alan Booth. Social Participation in Urban Soci­ ety. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1 9 7 3 . Engels, Frederick. "On Authority," in Lewis S. Feuer (ed.), Aiarx and Engels. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959, pp. 481-485.

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Evans, Michael. "Karl Marx and Political Participation," in Geraint Parry (ed.), Participation in Politics. Manchester: Manchester Uni­ versity Press, 1 9 7 2 , pp. 1 2 7 - 1 5 0 . Fainsod, Merle. Smolensk Under Soviet Rule. Cambridge, Mass.: Har­ vard University Press, 1 9 5 9 . Ferro, Marc. "The Aspirations of Russian Society," in Richard Pipes (ed.), Revolutionary Russia. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1 9 6 9 , pp. 1 8 3 - 2 0 8 . Fischer, Louis. The Life of Lenin. New York: Harper & Row, 1 9 6 4 . Friedgut, Theodore H. "Community Structure, Political Participa­ tion and Soviet Local Government: the Case of Kutaisi," in Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tokes (eds.), Soviet Politics and Society in the Seventies. New York: Free Press, 1 9 7 4 , pp. 2 6 1 - 2 9 6 . . "Integration of the Rural Sector into Soviet Society." Jerusalem: Hebrew University Soviet and East European Research Centre, paper no. 15, 1 9 7 6 . . "Interests,and Groups in Soviet Policy-Making: the MTS Re­ forms," Soviet Studies, Vol 2 8 , no. 4 (October 1 9 7 6 ) , pp. 5 2 4 - 5 4 7 . Frolic, B. Michael. "Decision Making in Soviet Cities "American Polit­ ical Science Review , Vol. 6 6 , no. 1 (March 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. 3 8 - 5 2 . . Soviet Urban Politics. Boston: MIT Press (forthcoming). Galich, Alexander. Pokolenie Obrechennykh. Frankfurt: Posev, 1 9 7 2 . Gilison1Jerome. "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: the Miss­ ing One Per Cent," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, no. 3 (September 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. 8 1 4 - 8 2 6 . Gitelman, Zvi. "Values, Opinions and Attitudes of Soviet Jewish Emigres," paper delivered at the meeting of the American Associ­ ation for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Atlanta, Georgia, Oc­ tober 9 -11, 1975. Greer, Scott. "Individual Participation in Mass Society," in Roland Young (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1 9 5 8 , pp. 3 2 9 - 3 4 2 . Hammer, Darrell P. USSR: The Politics of Oligarchy. Hinsdale, 111.: Dryden Press, 1 9 7 4 . Harper, Samuel N. Civic Training in Russia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 9 2 9 . Hazard, John N. The Soviet System of Government. ( 4 t h ed.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 9 6 8 . Hill, Ronald J. "Continuity and Change in USSR Supreme Soviet Elections," British Journal of Political Science , Vol. 2 , pt. 1 ( 1 9 7 2 ) , pp. 4 7 - 6 7 . . "The CPSU in a Soviet Election Campaign," Soviet Studies, Vol. 2 8 , no. 4 (October 1 9 7 6 ) , pp. 5 9 0 - 5 9 8 .

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Hill, Ronald J. "Patterns of Deputy Selection to Local Soviets," Soviet Studies, Vol. 25, no. 2 (October 1973), pp. 196-212. . Soviet Political Elites: the Case of Tiraspol. London: Martin Robertson, 1977. Hough, Jerry F. "Political Participation in the Soviet Union," Soviet Studies, Vol. 28, no. 1 (January 1976), pp. 3-20. . The Soviet Prefects. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 969 · Huntington, Samuel P. "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, Vol. 17 (April 1965), pp. 386-430. . Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale Univer­ sity Press, ig68. . "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds.), Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society. New York: Basic Books, 1970, pp. 3-47. Inkeles, Alex and Raymond Bauer. The Soviet Citizen. New York: Atheneum, 1968. Ionescu, Ghita. The Politics of the European Communist States. New York: Praeger, 1967. Jacobs, Everett M. "The Composition of Local Soviets," Government and Opposition, Vol. 7, no. 4 (Autumn 1972), pp. 503-519. . "Jewish Representation in Local Soviets 1959-1973," Soviet Jewish Affairs, Vol. 6, no. 1 (1976), pp. 18-26. . "What Soviet Elections Are, and What They Are Not," Soviet Studies, Vol. 22, no. 4 (July 1970), pp. 61-76. Johnson, Chalmers. "Comparing Communist Nations," in Chalmers Johnson (ed.), Change in Communist Systems. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, pp. 1-32. Juviler, Peter H. "Family Reforms on the Road to Communism," in Peter H. Juviler and Henry W. Morton (eds.), Soviet Polity-Making. New York: Praeger, 1967, pp. 29-60. . "Functions of a Deputy to the Supreme Soviet." Unpub­ lished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, i960. Kassoff, Allan. "The Administered Society," World Politics, Vol. 16, no. 4 (July 1964), pp. 558-575. Kornhauser, William. ThePolitics of Mass Society. Glencoe: Free Press, 1959·

Lane, Robert E. Political Life. New York: Free Press, 1959. Levi, Arrigo. "The Evolution of the Soviet System," in Zbigniew Brzezinski (ed.), Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 135-150. Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963.

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Little, D. Richard. "Mass Political Participation in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.: A Conceptual Analysis," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 8, no. 4 (January 1976), pp. 437-460. Marx, Karl. The Civil War in France. New York: International Pub­ lishers, 1933. Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels.Basic Writings (ed. Lewis S. Feuer). Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959. Matthews, Mervyn. Class and Society in Soviet Russia. London: Pen­ guin Books, 1972. May, Ernst. "Cities of the Future," in Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), The Future of Communist Society. New York: Praeger, 1962, pp. 179-185. Medvedev, Roy A. Let History Judge. New York: Knopf, 1971. Medvedev, Roy A. and Zhores A. Medvedev.Khrushchev: The Yearsin Power. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. Meyer, Alfred G. Leninism. New York: Praeger, 1957. . The Soviet Political System. New York: Random House, 1965. Michels, Robert. Political Parties. Glencoe: Free Press, 1949. Milbrath, Lester W. Political Participation. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965· Miller, Robert F. "The New Science of Administration in the USSR," Administrative Science Quarterly (September 1971), pp. 247-257. Moore, Barrington, Jr. Soviet Politics—the Dilemma of Pouter. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Mote, Max E. Soviet Local and Republic Elections. Stanford: Hoover In­ stitute, 1965. Narkiewicz, Olga A. "Political Participation and the Soviet State," in Geraint Parry (ed.), Participation in Politics. Manchester: Manches­ ter University Press, 1972, pp. 169-217. Nie, Norman H., G. Bingham Powell 1 Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt. "So­ cial Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relation­ ships," pt. 1 ,APSR, Vol. 63, no. 2 (June 1969), pp. 361-378. Odom, William E. The Soviet Volunteers. Princeton: Princeton Univer­ sity Press, 1973. Oliver, James. "Citizen Demands in the Soviet Political System," APSR, Vol. 63, no. 3 (September 1969), pp. 465-475. Osborn, Robert J. "Citizen vs. Administration in the USSR," Soviet Studies, Vol. 17, no. 2 (October 1965), pp. 226-237. . "Public Participation in Soviet City Government," Unpub­ lished Ph.D. dissertation, New York: Columbia University, 1963. . "The Role of Social Institutions," in Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), The Future of Communist Society. New York: Praeger, 1962, pp. 80-90.

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Osborn, Robert J. Soviet Social Policies. Homewood,111.: Dorsey, 1 9 7 0 . Osipov, G. V. (ed.). Town, Country and People. London: Tavistock, 1972.

Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 7 0 . Powell, David E. "The Rural Exodus," Problems of Communism, Vol. 2 3 , no. 6 (November-December 1 9 7 4 ) , pp. 1 - 1 3 . Pye, Lucian and Sidney Verba. Political Culture and Political Develop­ ment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 6 5 . Reed, John. Ten Days ThatShook the World. New York: Vintage, i 9 6 0 . Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. A History of Russia. ( 2 n d ed.) New York: Oxford University Press, 1 9 6 9 . Rigby, Τ. H. Communist Party Membership in the USSR 1 9 1 7 - / 9 6 7 . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 6 8 . Rokkan, Stein. "Approaches to the Study of Participation," Acta Sociologica, Vol. 6 , fasc. 1 ( 1 9 6 1 ) , pp. 1 - 8 . . "The Comparative Study of Political Participation: Notes Towards a Perspective on Current Research," in Austin Ranney (ed.), Essays on the Behavioral Study of Politics. Urbana: Universityof Illinois Press, 1 9 6 2 , pp. 4 7 - 9 0 . Rubin, Vitaly. "Moscow Testimony," Present Tense, Vol. 2 , no. 3 (Spring 1 9 7 5 ) , pp. 5 5 - 5 6 . Rustow, Dankwart A. A World of Nations. Washington, D.C.: Brook­ ings Institution, 1 9 6 7 . Salisbury, Robert H. "Research on Political Participation," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 1 9 , no. 2 (May 1 9 7 5 ) , pp. 3 2 3 - 3 4 1 . Scammon, Richard H. "Why the Russians Bother With Elections," New York Times Sunday Magazine, April 6 , 1 9 5 8 , p. 6 2 . Schonfeld, William R. "The Meaning of Democratic Participation," World Politics, Vol. 2 8 , no. 1 (October 1 9 7 5 ) , pp. 1 3 4 - 1 5 8 . Schwartz, Joel J. and William R. Keech. "Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union," APSR, Vol. 62, no. 3 (Septem­ ber 1 9 6 8 ) , pp. 8 4 0 - 8 5 1 . Scott, Derek J. R. Russian Political Institutions (rev. ed.). New York: Praeger, 1 9 6 5 . Selznick, Philip. TVA and the Grass Roots. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 9 5 3 . Seton-Watson, Hugh. The Decline of Imperial Russia. New York: Praeger, 1 9 5 2 . Shanin, Teodor. "The Peasant as a Political Factor," in T. Shanin (ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1 9 7 1 . Sharlet, Robert S. "Concept Formation in Political Science and

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Communist Studies: Conceptualizing Political Participation," in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. (ed.), Communist Studies and the Social Sciences. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969, pp. 244-253. Simon, E. D., Lady Simon, W. A. Robson and J. Jewke. Moscow in the Making. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937. Skilling, H. Gordon. "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," World Politics, Vol. 18, no. 3 (April 1966), pp. 435-451. Spiegel, Hans B. C. Citizen Participation in Urban Development. Wash­ ington: NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Science, ig68. Stewart, Philip D. Political Power in the Soviet Union. New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968. Sukhanov, Ν. N. The Russian Revolution. (2 vols.) New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Swearer, Howard R. "The Functions of Soviet Local Elections," MidwestJournal of Political Science, Vol. 5 (May 1961), pp. 129-149. . "Local Government in the USSR: Public Participation in a Totalitarian Society." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, i960. . "Popular Participation: Myths and Realities," Problems of Communism, Vol. 9, no. 5 (September-October i960), pp. 42-51. Tatu, Michel. Power in the Kremlin. New York: Viking, 1969. Taubman, William C. "The Change to Change in Communist Sys­ tems: Modernization, Postmodernization, and Soviet Politics," in Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tokes (eds.), Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's. New York: Free Press, 1974, pp. 369-394· . Governing Soviet Cities. New York: Praeger, 1973· Tokes, Rudolf L. (ed.). Dissent in the USSR. Baltimore: Johns Hop­ kins University Press, 1975. Townsend, James R. Political Participation in Communist China (new ed.). Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969· Unger, Arie L. "Soviet Mass-Political Work in Residential Areas," Soviet Studies, Vol. 22, no. 4 (April 1971), pp. 556-561. Verba, Sidney. "Political Participation and Strategies of Influence: A Comparative Study," Acta Sociologica, Vol. 6, fasc. 1 (1961), pp. 22-42. Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie. Participation in America. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. Volgyes, Ivan. "Political Socialization in Eastern Europe," Problems of Communism, Vol. 23, no. 1 (January-February 1974), pp. 46-55. Wesson, Robert G. "Volunteers and Soviets," Soviet Studies, Vol. 15, no. 3 (January 1964), pp. 231-249.

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Whyte, William H., Jr. The Organization Man. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1956. Wittfogel, Karl A. Oriental Despotism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957. Zemtsov, Ilya. "IKSI: The Moscow Institute of Applied Social Re­ search," Jerusalem: Hebrew University Soviet and East European Research Centre, Soviet Institution Series, paper no. 6, 1976. Documentary Materials Radio Liberty, Munich, Arkhiv Samizdata.

Index absenteeism, electoral, 123, 126 access, 186 accommodation, 101 administration, 56-58, science of, 62, 66 administrative apparatus, 6, 33, 44, 46n, 60, 63, 65-66, 69, 145, 159, 166, 174, 209-210, 218, 232, 277, 299, 315; abolition of, 37, 60, 62, 68; coexistence with participation, 66; growth of, 58n; Lenin on, 4; and standing committees, 190 administrative capacity, 17, 44, 57, 154, 157, 233; enhancement of, 283-284 administrative culture, 41 administrators, professional, 60, 65; and volunteers, 46, 59, 191, 215, 218-219 See also administrative apparatus agitation, 99-100, 110 agitators, 95-97, 107, 130, 142-143, 269, 304; as early-warning system, 101-102; numbers of,98-99; Party members among, 99n; as percentage of electoiate, 9911; tasks of, 99-100; and voter turnout, 114 agitpiop, 77 agitpunkt, 96-98 Aimbetov, A. and M. T. Baimakhanov, 93, 134, 182, 221 aktiv, 60, 69, 175, 178, 185, 189, 196-200, 210-211, 215, 231, 233, 244n, 246n, 248n, 269, 296, 303, 310, 315, 322; assisting administrators, 60, in Kutaisi, 194, 223; in Moscow, 197; as potential deputies, 185, relations with adminis-

trators, 212; of residence-based committees, 264; in Sakhalin, 246, of soviets, 46, 58, 286; of standing committees, 189, 195; of volunteer council, 275 Allardt, Erik, 22-23 Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba, 8, 28, 319 anticipatory responsiveness, ig6n apathetics, 74 apathy, 117, 123 apparatchihi, 144, 165 ascription, 165, 205; of deputy status, 83-84, 12211, 140; to higher soviets, 121, negative aspects, 84 attentive publics, 151 Baimakhanov, M. T., see A Aimbetov and M T . Baimakhanov ballots, 79 Barabashev, G. V., 62-63, 67 Barabashev, G. V. and K. F Sheremet, 290 Barghoorn, Frederick C , 301 Barnes, Samuel, 3 i g n , 320 Belgorod Oblast'Soviet, 104 Belorussian SSR statute on village and settlement soviets, 153 Belykh, A. K., 2 9 3 ^ 4 Belykh, A. K. and L. T . Krivushm, 291-2g2 Be/uglov, A., 50, g3 Birch, A. H., 75 "Bloc of Communists and non-Party People," 72, 83, 8g, g6-g7, 138, 162 block committees, 186, 265, 266. Sec also residence-based committees

346

Index

Bogoraz, Larissa, 124 Bolsheviks, 33, 3411, 37, 64, 132, 235; use of recall by, 133 Bolshevik Revolution, see revolution, of October 1917 boycott, election, 102, 123-124 Breslauer, George W., 65-66. See also Dallin, Alexander and George W. Breslauer Brezhnev, Leonid I., 65-66, n 8 n , 148, 149n, 299; election speech, 143n; nominated to Supreme Soviet, 82 Bukharin, Nikolai I., 37, 39-40 bureaucracy, see administrative apparatus Burlatskii, F., 290n, 292 Campbell, Angus, 109, 180 candidates, election, 76-77 Central Asia, 91 certificate of the right to vote in another place, 110, 110n, 116, 118 Cheremnykh, P S , 246 Churchwaid, Lloyd G., 85, 112 citizen participation,.see participation communication, see information Communists, see Communist Party of the Soviet Union, members Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 4, 9, 52, 64, 69, 79, 84, 88-89, 94.96-102,115,130,130-131 137-138, 144-145. 151. 156, 161164, 169, 191, 209, 222, 237, 247, 251. 255- 258-259, 262, 272, 279, 289, 291, 297-298, 301-304, 308309, 311, 321, 323, 325; activists, 24; arbiter of social interests, 212; committee ratification of druzhiny membership, 259; Conference April 1917, 40; control functions, 49, 257, 317; core of participation, 54-55. 223, 242, 279. educational level, 30; election activity, 85, 97, 116, 119; growth of, 162; housing office group, 269, 272; integrating role, 2i2n; leads

druzhiny, 258n, 259; leadership legitimized in elections, 93n, 140; Moscowgorkom, 53, 83; in nomination process, 81-83, 85-87; overrepresentation in soviets, 172; Party card renewal, 222; "Partyfree" areas of life, 131; pensioners in, 279; praised on election ballots, 1 i2n-i i3n; primacy of, 9, 24, 44, 69, 151, 184, 290, 298, 302, 321, 325; recall initiation by, 135; recruitment o f workers, 169, i6gn, 197; residential activity organized by, 266n; role in forming election commissions, 79; rural weakness of, i64n; saturation of professions, 304n; schools, 174; secretaries' role, 151, 221; and soviets, 51-53, 156, 163; structure altered (1962), 5gn apparat: 52-53, i24n, ig3, 197, 233. 239, 321; as deputies, 93-g4; mobilizing role, 43, 230; nominated ex officio, 83; power of, 54, 88; size of, 141, 1 4 m ; small town, 126-127 Central Committee: 50, 76, 88, 154, i g i , 318; assigns election constituencies, 8 i n , 82; 1957 resolution on local soviets, 47-48, 52, 84, 133, 167, 169, 178, 191, 215, 300; 1958 resolution on citizens' complaints and requests, 224, 1959 resolution establishing druzhiny, 258; 1959 resolution on pensioners as volunteers, 278; 1967 resolution on citizens' requests and complaints, 227-228; 1967 resolution on rural soviets, 43, 153, 160, 174, 1971 resolution on urban soviets, 53, 300, 317; November ig62 Plenum, 57; resolutions as reference points, 51 Congress'. 74, 267; as reference point, 73; rescheduling of, 73n; 8th Congress (1919), 52; 17th Congiess (1934), 133; 20th Con-

Index gress (1956), 55, 29811; 21st Congress (1959), 299; 22nd Congress (1961), 56, 147, 298n; 23rd Congress (1966), 143, 159, 176, 1 8 m ; 24th Congress (1971), 313 members: 107, 115, 155, 165, 246247, 257, 260, 312-313; as administrative officials, 140; agitators, 98, ggn, 102; correlation between education and participation, 312; as deputies, 162; educators among, 165; as election commissioners, 79; in executive committees, 163; in new activist groups, 259; in Moscow, 118; in volunteer groups, 259n; motivation for Party membership, 54-55 Communist public self-government, see public self-government community self-help organizations, 45, 187, 203, 214, 242-244, 244n, 248, 259, 276, 283, 285, 296, 302, 32on, 324 competence, 8, 32, 123, 137, 152, 158, 166, 210, 214, 317; administrative, 300, 316; citizen, 319-320; education and, 180; political, 22, 28; result of participation, 233; subject, 319 complaints, citizens', 224, 225n, 226, 268; regime response to, 228; screening by volunteers, 227. See also requests, citizens' comrades'courts, 187, 197, 238, 243, 247, 249-257, 261-263, 266, 266n, 295, 302, 308; amendments to law, 253; arbitrary nature of, 254; growth of, 252; supervised by volunteer council, 255 conflict, 117, 123, 124, 210 consensus, 85 consolidation, political, 32 constituencies, single-member, 76 constituency commissions, see election commissions constitution of the USSR, 159; (1936),

71,

72,

134,

147,

149,

189;

347

(1977). 9, 72. 72n 147-149, 290n control, 29n, 44, 46, 80, 117, 130, !52, 154. 19 8 - 220, 232, 235, 238, 243, 248, 257, 267, 302, 3 1 1 , 321, 323-324; arbitrariness of, 256; of behavior, 261-262; bureaucracy and, 39; as characteristic of participation, 303; deputies and, 234; dual structure of, 49; functions of, 91; historical development of, 31; Party, 52, 321; of volunteers' activity, 215 cooptation, 151, 157, 232, 238 costs of voting, 109 Council of Ministers, 50 "cult of personality," i04n "Czechoslovak Spring" (1968), 321 Dallin, Alexander and George W Breslauer, 311, 322 decline of community, see loss of community democratic centralism, 299 deputies, 8, 9n, 24-25, 34n, 45-47, 60, 69, 78, 81, 91-94, 103-106, 120, 132-146, 155-156, 160-162, 166, 169-190, 194, 196-207, 210214, 217, 223-224, 227, 229-233, 239, 24111, 246, 263, 265n, 269, 272-273, 292, 296, 300, 306-307, 310-317, 322; activities discussed in press, 45n; administrative work of, 61; and administrators, 6, 68, 195m 212-213, 231; administrators as, I 7 i n - i 7 2 n , 215; age 24 and under, 89-90; agriculturalists among, 170; anonymity of, 205, 231, 23111, 307; ascribed ex officio, 83-84, i65n, 215; assistance to, 177; authority of, 183m and comrades' courts, 253; constituency size, 164, 306-307; criteria for nomination of, ggn, 169, 183; duties of, i65n; educational level of, 30, 172-173, 181, 233; effectiveness of, 171, 17111, 180; functions of, 202; group work of,

348

Index

deputies (cont.) 18711, 200; guidance for, 50n, 161n; inactivity of, 134n, 159, 171, 220; as information source, 186; Jews as, 90; kolkhoz members among, 170; in Kutaisi, 204, 221; law on, 155n, 183; limits of powers, 87n, 212n; Moscow University, 82-83; nomination of, 82; non-Party, 138n; numbers of, 71, 167, 182, 2o8n; overloading of, 221; Party and government officials among, 93-94, 140, Party members among, 162, i62n, 164, 312; patronage powers of, 199m qualifications of, 92, 193; recall of, 133n, 134, as recruiter of activists, 185; as regime representative, 185; reports to constituents, 106, 106n, representative status, 155; requests to, 183, 230, responsibilities of, 58, 222; rights of, 190; roles of, 155, 166, 182, in Sakhalin Oblast', 246; screening function, 183, small-town, 12711; social composition of, 30, 94, in standing committees, 195-196, strengths and weaknesses, 68, 195, 2i2n; time budgets of, 220-221, 223, 224n, 231, 279, training of, 173, 176, 176n, 180, turnover among, 171, 181, 182: and volunteers, 215, 219, 220, votes against, 122; wartime attrition of, 158n, whitecollar persons among, 167, 171, women, 91; work background of, 166, workers and peasants among, 166-167, 170 deputies'councils, 187, 207-211, 214, 227, 269, 276; origin of, 206; statute on, 206 deputies' days, 177, 223 deputies'groups, 53, 182, 186-187, 203-206, 209-213, 222-223, 227, 229, 266n, 276, 304, 306; assistance to executive, 203, description

of activity, 200-202; in Kutaisi, 186, 204 deputies'posts, 187, 211-212, 247, 276 de-Stahnization, 157, 301. See also Stalin developed socialist society, 218, 2 g o - 2 g i , 294, 297, 307 dictatorship of the proletariat, 56, 236, 262, 2go. 298, 314 diffusion of experience, 177 direct democracy, 147-148, 154 dissent, 7, 28, 74, 76, 108, 117, 119120, 123-124, 156, 305; electoral, 117, 123; functional, 315, 321; isolation of, 77; as participation form, 28n; roots of, 64 dissidents, see dissent D O S A A F , 9, 155, 243n, 258 druzhiny, 51, i g 7 - i g 8 , 238, 243-244, 247-251, 258-263, 266, 278, 286, 2g5, 302, 304; in Kutaisi, 260-261; in Oktiabr' District of Moscow, 260; Party leadership of, 258, 260; prominence among forms of activism, 248; ig74 statute on, 25g elected representatives, see deputies elections, 14, 24, 26, 41, 56, 69, 71-72, 74n, 77, 79, 86n, 92, 95-g6, 100, 103, io6n, 108, 110-121, 126, 130-131, 137-148, 154" >55' 1 58, 169, 1 7 4 , 2 3 3 , 2 7 4 , 3 0 4 ^ 308-311, 315, 325; absenteeism in, 122-128, 130, 132, 134-135; as affirmation, 72, 76; as apparatus test, 80, 1 1 1 ; avoidance of, 116-119, 123; citizen perceptions of, 75; competition in, 76, 146, 1460, defeats, 76, 86, 88-89, 130-132, 134-135. H 4 ; frequency of, 72-73; functions of, 13, 72, 137; honesty of, 75, 80, 108, 115, 1 i6n, 119; indirect, 119; as information source, 142; irresponsibility of, 71, 7 i n ; legitimation by, 77, 139, 142; multiple

Index candidacies in, 76n; noncompetitive, 75-76; nonsaliency of, 73; non-Soviet disparaged, 76; participation in, 10, 109, 303; Party control of, 144; postponement of, 73-74; press coverage of, 74-75, 94; as recruitment, 145, schedule of, 73n; as socialization, 142; Supreme Soviet, 124; symbolic nature of, 323; unanimity of, 85 election campaign, 69, 73, 94-100, 104, 107, 116, 138-139, 161, 267, 269n election commissions, 77-81, 85, 95-96, 110, 115-116, 119 election commissioners, 107-108, 112; Party members among, 79 election law, RSFSR, 110, 112 election meetings, 103, 144 electorate, size of, 117, 1 i8n; Moscow , 118, 118n elite, 10-11, 322n; differentiation within, 145n; mobilization of mass by, 238 emigrants, 27 Engels, Frederick, 33-34, 36 executive committee, 53, 8on, 84, '74-175. 177-178, 185, 188-193, 199, 203-208, 211, 215-217, 223, 225-230, 243, 254, 257, 263-264, 268-269, 272, 283; citizens' requests to, 225; competition with other institutions, 156n; coordination with residence-based committees, 186; deputies' access to, 183, Kaluga Oblast' Soviet, 46; Kutaisi, 186; Party domination of, 163164; and standing committees, 198; task in election preparations, 79-80; traveling sessions of, 214

Five Year Plan, 142-143, 267, 26911 franchise, 71-72, 77; defined, 109n, limitations on, 72

349

Gilison, Jerome, 121, 132 Golem of Prague, 70 Gordon, L. A. and E. V. Klopov, 281-282, 312 Grigorenko, Peter, 119 Hammer, Darrell P., 305 Hawthorne experiments, 48-49 Hough, Jerry F., 19, 52, 66n house committees, 51, 53, 187, 197198, 209, 239, 255-256, 266-269, 272-276, 285. See also residencebased committees Huntington, Samuel P., 32, 8on, 295. 303. 314. 322-323 Iampolskaia, Tsetsiliia A., 26 imperative mandate, see voters' mandates information, 46, 72, 83, 100, 102, 142, 154, 175, 180, 186, i86n, 203, 228, 298, 316; deputies' role in, 233; exchange in elections, 98, loss prevented, 186 intellectuals, see intelligentsia intelligentsia, 44n, 112-115, 146, 167,171,230,241,313,323 135, interest groups, 211 131, interests, bureaucratic, 64 interests, local, 39, 50, 143 tspolkom, see executive committee Jacobs, Everett M., 7111 Jehovah's Witnesses, 124 Jews, 124, 15811; as deputies, go Johnson, Chalmers, 324 Juvrler, Peter H., r 12 Kaluga Oblast'conference, 171, 174 Kanlorovich, V , 318 Karapetian, L., 158, 177, 215 Kautsk), Kail, 37 Khr ushchev, Nrkita S , 42-43, 55-60, 63,65, 143, 149-150, 182, 217, 2 1 9 . 233. 2 49. 253. 289, 2gg, anti-Stalin speech, 2g8n, on volun-

350

Index

Khrushchev, Nikita S. (cont.) teer administration, 299; views on society, 64, 64n Kirilenko, Andrei P., 82 Kissileva, 87-88, 195 Klopov, E. V., see Gordon, L. A. and E. V. Klopov kollektiv, 306 Komsomol, 9, 89, 98, 155, 239, 258, 200-261, 266n, 272n, 286, 304, 309, 318; action groups, 261; as agitators, 98; as core of participation, 279, 308; election activity, 97 kontrol, 191, 194 K.O O.D., see Komsomol, action groups Kornhauser, William, 23 Kosygin, Alexei N., 65, 66n, 82, 119, 299 Kotok, V. F., 147-148, 150 Kozlov, Iurii M., 65-66, 237-238 Krivushin, L. T,,see Belykh, A. K. and L. T . .Krivushin Kutaisi, 143, 184, 186, 194, 203-204, 221, 223-224, 227, 265, 268, 271; aktiv in, 196; comrades' courts in, 252; deputies in, 84, 89-90; deputies' groups in, 204; druzhiny in, 258, 260; residence-based committees in, 263; standing committee activity in, 63;subbotnik in, 283 Lane, Robert E., 14, 107 Lavrent'eva, Aleksandra A., 87, 88n legislators, professional, 223 legitimation, 76, 139-140, 148, 150 leisure time, 66. See also time budgets Lenin, Vladimir I., 4, 17, 33-40, 43, 63, 65-68, 103, 110, 132, 138, 143, 166, 190, 267, 29on, 299; on administration, 40-41, 67, i72n, as agitation theme, 99; antibureaucratic elements in, 64; and central control, 29, on Communist public self-government, 39; "On Cooperation," 67; elected to village soviet, 82n, on participation, 279;

praised on election ballot, 113m on socialization, 45, 49; theory of state, 35n; view of society, 235 State and Revolution: 36, 38; change in aim of book, 37; atypical nature of, 37-38; Party role unmentioned in, 43 localism, see interests, local "loss of community," 184, i84n, 207, 262, 281-282, 307-308 machme-tractor stations, 149 Marx, Karl, 2g, 33-38, 132, 235, 294, 299, 314; The Civil War in France, 34

mass participation, see participation mature socialist society, see developed socialist society Medvedev, Roy A., 305n Meyer, Alfred G., 4 Michels, Robert, 39-40 mikroraion, 152, i52n, 207-208, 258n, 266n, 304, 307 Milbrath, Lester W , 14, 21, 30, 119 mobilization, 22, 107, 114, 130, 166, 169, 191, 194, 197, 199, 203, 207, 237-238, 243-244, 255, 261-263, 266-267, 272-274, 278, 283-284, 286, 315, 319, 32on, 324; capacity, 76; deputies' role in, 234; economic effects of, 273-274; election, 113; objectives of, 238, 324; of Party members, 102; system, i86n; of women, 91 modernization, 293 Moore, Barrington, Jr., 3 Mosca, Gaetano, ion Mote, Max E., 85, 107, 112 multiple affiliation, 287 negative voting, 7 i n , 112-113, 117, 119-120, 122, i22n, 126, 144, 315; cyclical change, 121; decline of, 132; in national okrug, 122-123; and recall compared, 134-135 neighborhood committee, 103, 186, 224, 263, 2630, 269-270, 272-273,

Index 306; in Kutaisi, 186, 203-204, 265, See also residence-based committees nominations, 72, 74, 77, 8on, 81-86, 93.95-96, 132, 135, 138, 146, 166; control of, 8g; ex officio, 83; meetings, 83, 85-88, 91, 96, 154; rejected by meeting, 87, 144, 315; right of, 82, 84 non-staff departments, 60-61, 215218, 231, 242, 271; history of, 216; numbers of, 217 Odom, William E., 157 Oktiabr' District of Moscow, 105, i6on, 176, 187, 208-209, 253, 263n 264, 266n, 26gn, 277; comrades' courts in, 250, 252, 254255; deputies in, 84, go, 193n; druzhiny in, 260 Oliver, James, 270 opinion leaders, 95, 95n organization and instruction department, 177, 197, 208, 263; in Kutaisi, 90n; non-staff, 216-217 orginstruktorskn otdel, see organization and instruction department orgotdel, see organization and instruction department Orlov, Sergei, 131 Osborn, J. R., 207, 225-226, 237 overloading, 221-224 parents' committees, 277 Paris Commune, 34-37, 41, 132, 235 participation, 12-16, 19-33, 39' 44-50. 55-57, 67, 72, 77, 83-86, 91, 101, 107-110, 138-139, 145-147, 150-155, 180, 185, 187, 207-208, 220, 230-233, 242, 262, 267, 273, 277-278, 281-283, 287-289, 292, 296-317, 321-325; in administration, 69, 235, 249, 284-285; autonomous, 30, 86; bibliography of, i4n; Brezhnev and Khrushchev periods compared, 65, 253, 289; and capacity enhancement, 29; in

351

China, 4gn; citizen, 41, 63, 70, 91, g2, 194, 252n, 299, 302; community size and, 208; conflict dimension of, 210; control and, 38, 4g, 220, 232, 261; core groups in, 279; definition of, 13-15, 19-20, 23-24, 26; deputy status as recruitment to, 145; deputy as focus of, 155, 234; education and, 30, 39-40, 118, 180-181, 312, 320; election, 71-72, 76, 80, 106, 109, 113, 115, 124, 126, 137, 233, 303; and legitimation, 29; Lenin on, 279; life-cycle and, 282; mass, 64, 66, 148, 303; mechanisms of, 10, 19; and mobilization, 17; mobilized, 18, 30, 273; modes of, 20-21; in nominations, 81-82; "paper," 55, 283, 304; Party domination of, 54; and Party membership, 55; pseudo-, 48; revolution, 11; revolutionary, 12, 103; socialization and, 157, 289; socioeconomic status and, 30; in Stalin period, 24; studied in Sverdlovsk Oblast', 218; USSR and USA compared, 21, 108 participatory democracy, 38 Party, see Communist Party of the Soviet Union Party program, 55, 57, 60, 63, 66, 143, 147, 181, 190-192, 218, 223, 290, 298-2gg Party-state control commission, 247, 247n passport regime, 265, 278 Pateman, Carole, 48 penetration, 95, 198, 203, 233, 264, 35. 3 ! 4 " 3 I 5

pensioners, 197, 2 0 m , 216, 227, 257, 265n, 270, 276, 27g, 284-286, 308; available time of, 278; councils, 244, 266; numbers of, 226, 27gn,284 People's Control Commission, 222, 2

47N

peregruzka, see overloading

352

Index

Plekhanov, George V., 37 pod'ezd committees, 266. See also block committees, house committees Podgornyi, Nikolai V., 82, 13411, 1 4 3 . ' 5 9 . 225N

politburo, 76, 82 political culture, 31, 139, 153, 199, 301 political development, 324 precinct commissions, see election commissions public self-government, 24-25, 45, 47, 49, 67, 205, 216, 218, 239-241, 259, 2 7 9 - 2 9 1 , 297, 299, 32,

self-help organizations, see community self-help organizations sel'skn skhod, 152-154, 200 Selznick, Philip, 16-19,22-25-26,48 151, 198, 238, 320n Shanin, Teodor, 18 Sharlet, Robert S., 14-15, 18 shefstvo, 304 Sheremet, Konstantin F., 67, 179, 290. See also Barabashev, George V and Konstantin F Sheremet single-party regime, 212 social control, 257 socialization, 9, 45, 47, 49-50, 72, 76, 139, 1 5 7 . 180. 197, 2 4 7 . 2 7 3 . 2 8 1 , 2 9 2 . 303, 310, 3 2 4

Rathenau, Walther, 157n Razin, V I., 25, 62, 177; criticism of non-staff departments, 61; criticism of executive predominance, 215 recall, 93, 132-137, 158, 189; meetings, 137n lecruitment, 72, 145 referendum, 147-148 remontnye druzhiny, 243, 274-275, 278; changing functions of, 275, 296n representation, norms of, 106 requests, citizens', 47, 103, 210, 224228, 266, 287, 316 residence-based committees, 186, 196, 203, 243, 248n, 257, 263-270, 274n,286, 308 revolution, 31, 33, 36, 64; of 1905, 132, of October 1917, 35 revolutionary transformation, 41, 43 Rokkan, Stem, 20, 31, 139, 240 Safarov, R A., 62, 189-190, 212n Salisbury, Robert H., 50 "scientific organization of administrative woi k," 66 Scott, Derek J. R , 111-112 secret ballot, 119-120, 144 sections, see standing committees self-government, see public selfgovernment

Society for the Support of the Armed Forces,.sec D O S A A F Solzhenitsyn, Alexander 1 , 3 1 4 Sovetskoe stroitel'stvo, 158. See also Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia, 5, 158, 178, 221 Sovety narodnykh deputatov, 5. See also Sovety deputatov trudiashchikhsia a soviets, 3, 5, 8-9, i7n, 24, 41, 44-53, 57-58, 61, 6211, 68-74, 78-84, 89-94, 99"i°5> 1 1 1 , 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 , 1 2 6 , ^ " ' S

6

.

'39"'45.

1

53-161,

164-

166, 174-206, 210, 213, 217, 222, 224, 227, 230, 232, 234-237, 2422 43' 2 54. 2 5gn, 266, 277, 286, 289, 298, 300-303, 317; in Altai krai, 46; Belorussian law on, 51; competence of, 43, 47, 57n, 175, i8on, 226, 3oon; and comrades' courts, 250, 254, consolidation of, 1580, 201, deputies' role in, 183; executive of, 160, 180-182, 195, 214; hierarchical subordination of, 50-51; of Kaluga Oblast', 51; of Kazakhstan, i53n; kolkhoz members in, 167; Iegitrmacy of, 44, 298; in 1905, 40, 103; in 1917, 40; officialsof, 58, 67, 93-94, 142, 174, 197, 301, and Party, 51-52, 57n, 69, 156, 163, 298, Party members in, 164; ratification of appoint-

Index ments, 3411; reform of, 65, 92, 156-159, 167, 230, 232, 300; representative nature of, 166; sessions of, 151, 211, 215, 222; social composition, 169-170; state nature of, 67; structure changed, 59n; universality of, 44, 155; volunteers in, 219 spravka, 183, 226 Stalin, Joseph V., 24, 31, 39, 41-43, 64-65, 111, 133, 150, 157, 236, 298-301, 316, 321, 325; deputies during period of, 167; period as aberration, 28, 32, 63, 103, 157, 324; theory of sharpening class struggle, 55, 169 standing committees, 46, 50-51, 61-63, 133. 159. 161n, 186-193, 196, 199-200, 203-204, 208-212, 223, 229, 232, 276, 300, 317; and administators, 58, 60, 62; aktw of, 197; in Azerbaijan, i8g; and deputies' groups, 202, in Kutaisi, 186; membership, i8gn; in Party program, 190; subordinate to executives, 214-215 state of the entire people, 56, 61, 63, 290, 299 street committees, 186, 264-266,

353

193. 197. 222, 238, 239, 258, 272, 284, 301, 303; and comrades' courts, 251, 254 Trotsky, Leon D., 3g Unger, Aryeh L., 301 urbanization, 42, 68, 184, 236, 294, 296, 324 Varchuk, V. V., 173, 189, 2i2n, 214-215, 23g-242, 283 Verba, Sidney, 22, 180. See also Almond, Gabriel A. and Sidney Verba Verba, Sidney and Norman H. Nie, i4 _1 5> 17. 20-21, 26, 207, 224, 307 Volkov, Iu. E , 93, 192, 218, 220221, 239, 248, 283, 303, 310, 312 voluntary associations, 16-17, 59. 61-63, 68 volunteer committees, 271, 278 volunteei councils, 218-219, 227, 243, 270-271, 276, 285; and comrades'courts, 251, 254-257 volunteer inspectorates, 219, 231 voters' clubs, g6-g7 voters' mandates, 3411, 72, 95, 103106, 144, 185 Vyshinskii, Andrei, 303

273N,304

subbotnik, 272, 277, 283 Supreme Soviet, 50-51, 81, 112, 119, 132, 134-135, 165, 167, 202; composition of, 83, 164, 167; petitions to, 228; of Republics, l o g , of RSFSR, 143 Suslov, Michael A., 82

"Webbism," 297, 314 withering away of the state, 218 Women's Day, 74 working Sundays, see subbotnik World War II, 40, 41-42, 52, 74, 97, 156, i57n, 245, 301, 324 write-in votes, i24n

Taganrog survey, 281 Tikhomirov, Iurii A., 56, 58-59, 142, 212n, 218, 223 time budgets, 241, 280-281 Tito, Joseph B., 321 Todorskn, lurii V., 189-190 tolkach, 205 totalitarian society, 22-23, 181 Townsend, James R., 18, 22, 322n trade unions, 9, 24, 84, 155, 188,

Young Pioneers, 110, 177 Zh.E.K., 206, 208-209, 214, 250, 252, 255, 260, 266n, 26gn, 272, 276-277, comrades' courts based on, 252, and house committees, 269; as organizing framework, 266n; Party group in, 269 Zhivkov, T., 2gon Znanie, 176

STUDIES OF THE RUSSIAN INSTITUTE

ABRAM BERGSON, Soviet National Income in 1937 (1953)ERNEST J. SIMMONS, JR., ed., Through the Glass of Soviet Literature: Views of Russian Society (1953)· THAD PAUL ALTON, Polish Postwar Economy (1954). DAVID GRANICK, Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR: A Study in Soviet Economic Planning (1954). ALLEN S. WHITING, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924 (1954). GEORGE S. N. LUCKYJ, Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934 (1956). MICHAEL BORO PETROVICH, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism, 1856-1870 (1956). THOMAS TAYLOR HAMMOND, Lenin on Trade Unions and Revolution,

1893-1917 (1956). DAVID MARSHALL LANG, The Last Years of the Georgain Monarchy, 1658-1832 (1957). JAMES WILLIAM MORLEY, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia, 1918 (1957). ALEXANDER G. PARK ,Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-/927 (1957). HERBERT MARCUSE, Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis (1958). CHARLES B. MCLANE, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 19311 94 6 (195 8 )· OLIVER H. RADKEY, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism: Promise and Defeat

of the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries, February to October, 1917 (I95 8 )· RALPH TALCOTT FISHER, JR., Pattern for Soviet Youth: A Study of the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-1954 (1959). ALFRED ERICH SENN, The Emergence of Modern Lithuania (1959). ELLIOT R. GOODMAN, The Soviet Design for a World State (I960). JOHN N. HAZARD, Settling Disputes in Soviet Society: The Formative Years of Legal Institutions (I960).

DAVID JORAVSKY, Soviet Marxism and Natural Science, 1917-1932

(1961). MAURICE FRIEDBERG ,Russian Classics in Soviet Jackets (1962). ALFRED J . RIEBER, Stalin and the French Communist Party, 1941-1947

(1962). T HEO DORE K. VON LAUE, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia

(1962). JOHN A. ARMSTRONG, Ukrainian Nationalism (1963). Οΐ -ivER H. RADKEY, The Sickle under the Hammer: The Russian Socialist

Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule (1963). KERMIT E. MCKENZIE, Comintern and World Revolution, 1928-1943:

The Shaping of Doctrine (1964). HARVEY L. DYCK, Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926-1933: A

Study in Diplomatic Instability (1966). (Above titles published by Columbia University Press.) HAROLD J . NOAH , Financing Soviet Schools (Teachers College, 1966). JOHN M.

THOMPSON, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace

(Princeton, 1966). PAUL AVRICH, The Russian Anarchists (Princeton, 1967). LOREN R. GRAHAM, The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist

Party, 192-/-1932 (Princeton, 1967). ROBERT A. MAGUIRE, Red Virgin Soil: Soviet Literature in the 1920's

(Princeton, 1968). T . H. RIGBY, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R, 19/7-/967

(Princeton, 1968). RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, Soviet Ethics and Morality (University of

Michigan, 1969). JONATHAN FRANKEL, Vladimir Akimov on the Dilemmas of Russian

Marxism, 1895-1903 (Cambridge, ig6g). WILLIAM ZIMMERMAN, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations,

1956-1967 (Princeton, 1969). PAUL AVRICH, Kronstadt, 1921 (Princeton, 1970) E/RA MENDELSOHN, Class Struggle in the Pale: The Formative Years of the

Jewish Workers' Movement in TsaristRussia (Cambridge, 1970).

EDWARD J. BROWN, The Proletarian Episode in Russian Literature lumbia, 1971).

(Co-

REGINALD E. ZELNIK, Labor and Society in Tsarist Russia: The Factory Workers of St. Petersburg, 1855-1870

(Stanford, 1 9 7 1 ) .

PATRICIA K. GRIMSTED, Archives and Manuscript

Repositories in the

USSR: Moscow and Leningrad (Princeton, 1972). RONAID G. SUNY, The Baku Commune, 1917-1918

(Princeton, 1972).

EDWARD J. BROWN, Mayakovsky: A Poet in the Revolution

(Princeton,

1 973)-

MILTON F.HRE, Oblomov and his Creator: The Life and Art of Ivan Goncharov (Princeton, 1973). HENRY KRISCH, German Polities under Soviet Occupation

(Columbia,

1974)H E N R Y W . M O R I O N a n d R U D O L F L . T O K E S , e d s . , Soviet

Polities

and

So-

ciety in the 1 g jo's (Free Press, 1974). WILLIAM G. ROSENBERG, Liberals in the Russian Revolution

(Princeton,

1974)RICHARD G. ROBBINS, Jr., Famine in Russia, 1891-1892

(Columbia,

!975)VERA DUNHAM, In Stalin's Time: Middleclass

Values in Soviet Fiction

( C a m b r i d g e , 1976). WAITER SABLINSKY, The Road to Bloody Sunday (Princeton, 1976). WILLIAM MILLS TODD III, The Familiar Letter as a Literary Genre in the Age of Pushkin (Princeton, 1976). ELIZABETH VALKENIER, Russian Realist Art. State and Society: The Peredvizhniki and Their Tradition (Ardis, 1977)SUSAN SOLOMON, The Soviet Agrarian Debate (Westview, 1978). SHEILA FITZPATRICK, ed., Cultural (Indiana, 1978).

Revolution

in Russia,

1928-1931

PETER SOLOMON, Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Poliey. Specialists in Policy-Making

(Columbia, 1978).

KENDALI E. BAILES, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Technical Intelligentsia, 1978)

1917-1941

(Princeton,

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Friedgut, T h e o d o r e H Political participation in the U S S R . (Studies o f the Russian Institute, C o l u m b i a University) Bibliography p Includes index 1

Political participation—Russia.

2.

Russia—Politics and g o v e r n m e n t — 1 9 1 7 -

I.

Title.

II.

Series- C o l u m b i a University.

Russian Institute. Studies JN6581. F74 320-9 4 7 0 8 4 I S B N 0-691-07608-1 I S B N 0 - 6 9 1 - 0 2 2 1 5 - 1 pbk.

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