Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey 9781400870622

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Acknowledgments
List of Tables
1: Introduction: Socio-Economic Change and Political Participation
I. A Definition of Political Participation
II. Socio-Economic Change and Political Participation
III. Voting as a Participatory Act
IV. Mobility, Equality, and Group Consciousness
V. The Method and Scope of the Study
2: The Transformations of the Social Cleavages and the Party System
I. The Ottoman Period
II. Republican Turkey
3: Equality, Mobility, and Organizational Involvement
I. Socio-Economic Equality
II. Mobility
III. Organizational Involvement
4: Regional Variations in Political Participation
I. Introduction
II. Regional Variations in Political Attitudes
III. Voting Participation
IV. Regional Bases of Support for Political Parties
V. Changes in the Support for Major Political Parties
5: Urban-Rural Differences in Political Participation
I. Urban Residence and Voting Turnout
II. Urban Residence and Party Preferences
III. Rate of Urbanization
IV. City Size
6: Political Participation: Developmental Relationships
I. Introduction
II. Voting Participation
III. Electoral Support for Political Parties
IV. The Strength of the Two-Party System
V. The Rate of Development and Support for the Government Party
VI. Patterns of Inter-Party Competition
VII. Participation in National and Local Elections
7: Political Participation in Rural Turkey
I. Peasant Participation and National Integration
II. Political Attitudes and Political Participation
III. Voting Participation
IV. Party Competition
V. Electoral Support for Political Parties
VI. The Strength of the Two-Party System
8: Political Participation in Major Cities
I. Urban Poor and Politics
II. General Characteristics of Urban Migrations
III. Voting Participation
IV. Party Voting
V. Motives for Political Participation
Conclusion
Appendix 1: A Note on the Indicators of Socio-economic Development
Appendix 2: Social Rank of Izmir and Ankara Precincts
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

SOCIAL AND P O L I T I C A L IN

CHANGE PARTICIPATION

TURKEY

Written under the auspices of T H E CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Harvard University A list of" other Center publications of related interest appears at the back of this book

Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey

Ergun Ozbudun

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

PRESS

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

COPYRIGHT ©

1 9 7 6 BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PRINCETON AND LONDON

COPYRIGHT © 1 9 7 6 BY PRINC.ETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, GUILDFORD, SURREY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA WILL BE FOUND ON THE LAST PRINTED PAGE OF THIS BOOK PUBLICATION OF THIS BOOK HAS BEEN AIDED BY THE WHITNEY DARROW PUBLICATION RESERVE FUND OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS THIS BOOK HAS BEEN COMPOSED IN LINOTYPE BASKERVILLE PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

To Umay, Ipek, and Yasemin

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

T H I S book is the product of my participation in the Harvard University Center for International Affairs project on "Participation Patterns in Modernizing Societies." I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Center, as well as that of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University, in enabling me to continue my research for a second year. I am especially thankful to the directors of the Project, Professor Samuel P. Huntington and Dr. Joan Nelson, both of whom contributed many valuable insights and suggestions and provided general support and stimulation. I am particularly indebted to Professor Frederick W. Frey, who, besides making some of his unpublished data available to me, read and commented extensively upon various earlier drafts of the manuscript. I also wish to thank to Professors Feroz Ahmad, Douglas Ashford, Wayne Cornelius, Michael Hudson, Kenneth Janda, Ahmet Mumcu, Leslie Roos, William Schneider, Joseph Szyliowicz, Frank Tachau, Sidney Verba, Walter Weiker, and Nur Yalman, who have taken time to comment on the manuscript and made valuable suggestions. Although I have been extremely fortunate to have such help, responsibility for errors of fact and interpretation remains, of course, mine. ERGUN OZBUDUN

Vll

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS LIST OF TABLES

vii xi

ONE: INTRODUCTION: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION I. A DEFINITION OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION II. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION III. VOTING AS A PARTICIPATORY ACT I V MOBILITY, EQUALITY, AND GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS V. T H E METHOD AND SCOPE OF T H E STUDY

TWO: T H E TRANSFORMATIONS OF T H E SOCIAL CLEAVAGES AND T H E PARTY SYSTEM I. T H E O T T O M A N PERIOD II. REPUBLICAN TURKEY

3 3 5 13 16 18

23 25 41

THREE: EQUALITY, MOBILITY, AND ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

60

I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC EQUALITY II. MOBILITY III. ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

62 82 93

FOUR: REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION I. II. III. IV.

INTRODUCTION REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN POLITICAL ATTITUDES VOTING PARTICIPATION REGIONAL BASES OF SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL PARTIES V. CHANGES IN T H E SUPPORT FOR MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES

FIVE: URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION I. II. III. IV.

URBAN RESIDENCE AND VOTING T U R N O U T URBAN RESIDENCE AND PARTY PREFERENCES RATE OF URBANIZATION CITY SIZE IX

97 97 102 104 104 n I

118 118 123 126 126

CONTENTS

SIX: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: DEVELOPMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS I. II. III. IV. V.

INTRODUCTION VOTING PARTICIPATION ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL PARTIES T H E STRENGTH OF T H E TWO-PARTY SYSTEM T H E RATE OF DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT FOR T H E GOVERNMENT PARTY VI. PATTERNS OF INTER-PARTY C O M P E T I T I O N VII. PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS

SEVEN: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN RURAL TURKEY I. PEASANT PARTICIPATION AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION II. POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION III. VOTING PARTICIPATION IV. PARTY C O M P E T I T I O N V. ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL PARTIES VI. T H E STRENGTH OF T H E TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

EIGHT: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN MAJOR CITIES ' I. URBAN POOR AND POLITICS II. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN MIGRATIONS III. VOTING PARTICIPATION IV. PARTY VOTING V. MOTIVES FOR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

CONCLUSION

129 129 129 135 142 145 147 149

152 152 155 158 169 173 179

183 183 187 199 204 209

214

APPENDIX 1: A NOTE ON T H E INDICATORS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

225

APPENDIX 2: SOCIAL RANK OF IZMIR AND ANKARA PRECINCTS BIBLIOGRAPHY

228 231

INDEX

249

χ

LIST OF

TABLES

TABLE 2.1. Changes in the Occupational Composition of the Grand National Assembly and the Rise of Localism During the Transition to the Multi-party Period TABLE 2.2. Voting Turnout and Party Choices in National Elections, 1950-1969 TABLE 3.1. Distribution of Income Among Families TABLE 3.2. Distribution of Income by Income Groups TABLE 3.3. Distribution of Income by Region, Occupation, and the Size of Community TABLE 3.4. Family Land Holdings by Size of Area Cultivated: 1952 Agricultural Survey TABLE 3.5. Landholdings by Size of Area Cultivated: 1963 Agricultural Census TABLE 3.6. Landholdings by Size of Area Cultivated: 1970 Agricultural Census TABLE 3.7. Changes in the Distribution of Land: 1963 and 1970 Censuses TABLE 3.8. Occupational Distribution of the Labor Force and Their Share of Income TABLE 3.9. Social Mobility: Respondents' Professions by Their Fathers' Professions TABLE 3.10. Social Mobility: Fathers' Professions by Respondents' Professions TABLE 3.11. Summary of School Enrollment and Scholarization Rates, 1925/1926-1965/1966 TABLE 3.12. Number of Unionized Workers: 1963-1971 FIGURE 4.1. The Main Agricultural Regions of Turkey TABLE 4.1. Regional Rankings According to the Level of Development TABLE 4.2. Regional Variations in Political Attitudes: Percentage of Peasants Ranking High on Selected Political Indices TABLE 4.3. Voting Participation and Vote for Major Parties by Region: 1950, 1954, 1957 XI

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 4.4. Voting Participation and Party Votes by Region: 1961 TABLE 4.5. Voting Participation and Party Votes by Region: 1965 TABLE 4.6. Voting Participation and Party Votes by Region: 1969 TABLE 4.7. Shifts in the Support for Major Parties by Region: 1950-1957 TABLE 4.8. Shifts in the Support for Major Parties by Region: 1961-1969 TABLE 5.1. Voting Participation and Party Votes by Urban and Rural Areas: 1961, 1965, 1969 TABLE 5.2. Shifts in Major Party Votes in Urban and Rural Areas by Region: 1965-1969 TABLE 5.3. City Size, Voting Participation, and Major Party Votes: 1961, 1965, 1969 TABLE 6.1. Correlation Coefficients between Voting Participation and Provincial Characteristics: 1961, 1965, 1969 TABLE 6.2. Correlation Coefficients between the J P and the RPP Voting Percentages and Provincial Characteristics: 1961, 1965, 1969 TABLE 6.3. Correlation Coefficients between Minor Party Votes and Provincial Characteristics: 1961, 1965, 1969 TABLE 6.4. Correlation Coefficients between the Combined J P and RPP Vote and Provincial Characteristics: 1961, 1965, 1969 TABLE 6.5. Inter-Party Correlations in Voting Behavior: 1961-1969 TABLE 7.1. Correlation Coefficients between Voting Turnout and the Indices of Socio-Economic Development: 1961, 1965, and 1969 Elections TABLE 7.2. Correlation Coefficients between Changes in Voting Turnout and the Indices of Socio-Economic Development: 1961-1965, 1965-1969, 1961-1969 TABLE 7.3. Party Organization and Voting Participation in Less Developed Villages: 1961 Elections Xll

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 7.4. Party Organization and Voting Participation in Less Developed Villages: 1965 Elections TABLE 7.5. Degree of Party Competition: 1961-1969 TABLE 7.6. Party Competition by Level of Village Development: 1961 TABLE 7.7. Party Competition by Level of Village Development: 1965 TABLE 7.8. Party Competition by Level of Village Development: 1969 TABLE 7.9. Correlation Coefficients between the JP and the RPP Vote and the Indices of Socio-Economic Development: 1961, 1965, 1969 TABLE 7.10. Correlation Coefficients between the N T P and Independent Vote and the Indices of Socio-Economic Development: 1961, 1965, 1969 TABLE 7.11. Correlation Coefficients between Combined JP and RPP Vote and the Indices of Socio-Economic Development: 1961, 1965, 1969 TABLE 8.1. Crude Population Movement Rates: 19661967 TABLE 8.2. Voting and the Type of Urban Community: Istanbul TABLE 8.3. Voting and the Type of Urban Community: Ankara TABLE 8.4. Voting and the Type of Urban Community: Izmir TABLE 8.5. Changes in Party Votes: 1965-1969

Xlll

SOCIAL AND P O L I T I C A L IN

CHANGE PARTICIPATION

TURKEY

ONE

INTRODUCTION: SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

I. A

DEFINITION OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

POLITICAL participation has, no doubt, become one of the focal concepts in much of the recent research in comparative politics and its sub-field, political development. Many writers have rightly argued that political participation is the distinguishing mark of the modern state. "More than by anything else," Huntington (1968: 36) wrote, "the modern state is distinguished from the traditional state by the broadened extent to which people participate in politics and are affected by politics in large-scale political units. . . . The most fundamental aspect of political modernization . . . is the participation in politics beyond the village or town level by social groups throughout the society and the development of new political institutions, such as political parties, to organize that participation." Lerner (1958: 50-51) argued in the same vein that the modern society is "participant society," whereas the traditional society is distinctively non-participant. Besides its obviously important descriptive (how much participation there actually is in a particular society) and analytic (what are the causes and consequences of political participation) aspects, the concept also has strongly normative overtones. High levels of political participation are usually associated with democracy and, therefore, considered beneficial to both the individual and the society.

Despite such wide currency of the term "political participation," there is less than complete agreement about its meaning. Frey (1970 a: 15-16), for example, cites six different meanings in which the term is currently used. Some 3

INTRODUCTION

times political participation is defined in such a way as to include the exercise of power in "non-governmental" as well as "governmental" spheres. Some definitions include "orientations" or "attitudes" (such as knowledge of and interest in politics, identification with a political unit, sense of political competence or efficacy, sense of civic duty) as well as "behavior." Within the range of political behavior itself, some purely supportive or ceremonial acts (e.g., obeying laws, paying taxes, expressing support for the government, working in a government project, voting in ceremonial elections, etc.) are sometimes considered participatory acts (see, for example, Townsend, 1967), and sometimes they are not. There is no consensus among respected scholars on whether to include in the definition illegal as well as legal activity, unsuccessful as well as successful attempts of influence, involuntary as well as voluntary action. In the present study, I have chosen a somewhat narrow definition, following the tendency in some of the most significant recent research in this area (Verba and Nie, 1972: 2-3; Weiner, 1971 a: 164; Huntington and Nelson, 1973: 2/1-2/5). First, my definition is. restricted to the "governmental" (both national and local) sphere, although much allocation of resources among groups in society (i.e., political activity) may admittedly take place without intervention by government, and therefore "governmental participation" may be just a sub-type of political participation in the broader sense. There may be little theoretical justification for such restriction; but considerations of manageability, no doubt, favor a more restricted conceptualization. Secondly, the present definition includes activity, but not attitudes. While political attitudes can fruitfully be studied as important intervening variables, they do not, in themselves, constitute political "participation." Thirdly, neither illegal participatory activities (e.g., riots, unlawful demonstrations, political violence), nor unsuccessful attempts of influencing public authorities (i.e., those not having the desired effect) are excluded by the present definition.

4

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps one of the most controversial questions to be answered in arriving at a definition of political participation is the element of will or intent. Weiner (1971 a: 164) restricts his definition to "voluntary" action. Similarly, Verba and Nie (1972: 2-3) seem to stress the "intention" of the actor by defining political participation as "those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take." 1 Huntington and Nelson (1973: 2/5-2/9), on the other hand, have argued that voluntary (autonomous) and manipulated (mobilized) "participation are not clearly distinguished, dichotomous categories. Rather, they form a spectrum. The point on the spectrum which divides mobilized from autonomous participation cannot be other than arbitrary." Furthermore, they "both have important consequences for the political system. To say that a mobilized as distinguished from an autonomous actor does not participate in politics is like saying that a conscripted as distinguished from a volunteer soldier does not participate in a war." Thus, while autonomous participation can be defined as "activity which is designed by the actor himself to influence governmental decision-making," mobilized participation refers to "activity which is designed by someone other than the actor to influence governmental decision-making" (Huntington and Nelson, 1973: 2/5).

II.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Socio-economic change or modernization seems to affect four dimensions of political participation. These are the nature, motives, bases, and the amount of political participation in a society. 1 Verba (1967: 55, n. 6) recognizes that "the 'intentionality' of an act is a complicated notion. . . . The act is intentional so long as those who are participating want the political leaders to 'get the message,' even if the message has no more precise content than an expression of general discontent."

5

INTRODUCTION

1. The Nature of Political Participation By the "nature" of a participatory act, we mean the extent to which it is autonomous or mobilized. Indeed, one of the principal hypotheses of the present study is that the amount of mobilized political participation in a society is inversely related to the level of socio-economic development, and that modernization tends to increase the amount of autonomous participation and to decrease that of mobilized participation. Politics of developing countries often provide examples of substantial numbers of voters being mobilized into political (especially voting) participation by their traditional leaders (clan heads, tribal chiefs, religious leaders, or wealthy landlords). Such mobilization does not have to result from actual or threatened coercion. Motives for mobilized participation may be deferential, solidary, or even instrumental, as we shall see below. In all these cases, however, the actor himself is not motivated by a desire to influence governmental decision-making and is not concerned with the political consequences of his act. He is simply engaged in a political activity designed by someone else. 2. Motives for Political Participation It may be hypothesized that modernization affects not only the nature (i.e., autonomous vs. mobilized) of political participation, but also the motives for political participation. These two dimensions are, to some extent, interrelated, as will be shown below. Broadly speaking, four kinds of motives seem to lead people to take part in politics: deferential, solidary, instrumental, and civic (Scott, 1969; Schneider, 1971). "Deferential participation" results from the actor's deep respect for and strong identification with the influencer and his concomitant desire to be and appear to be influenced by him (Frey, 1971). Deferential participation is typically found in the rural areas of less developed countries, where villagers often vote en masse out of deference to their traditional leaders. "Solidary participation" is motivated by a desire to

6

INTRODUCTION

affirm one's solidarity and loyalty to his larger social group (village, clan, tribe, ethnic or religious community, social class, etc.). "Instrumental participation" is participation in anticipation of some kind of material gain. This type of participation may take a variety of forms, depending on the kind of incentives or inducements to which the voters respond. Such inducements may be individual, communal, or sectoral. Individual inducements such as cash payments, patronage, various favors, etc., are usually observed in patron-client relationships and in urban party machines. Communal inducements are provided by such indivisible rewards as public works or schools ("pork-barrel" type of inducements), while sectoral inducements are offered by policy commitments or legislations involving favorable changes in tax laws, subsidy or welfare programs, distributive policies, etc. As Scott (1969: 1147) succintly puts it, "material inducements are as characteristic of occupational or class loyalties as they are of local or family loyalties; what is different is simply the scope and nature of the group being 'bribed' by the party, not the fact of 'bribery.' " Finally, "civic participation" is based on a sense of moral obligation or duty to participate. This sense of obligation may derive from beliefs about the nature of the good society or state (ideological participation), or from strongly held positions on a single issue or set of issues (crusading participation). In either case, the participant does not anticipate personal, communal, or sectoral gain. Obviously, several patterns of participation may coexist within the same society. Even a single participatory act may, and often does, involve more than one type of motive. For example, a worker voting for a working-class party may be motivated by solidary (affirmation of loyalty to his class), instrumental (anticipation of sectoral gains), and ideological (beliefs about the nature of the good society) motives. We have pointed out above that the nature and motives of political participation are, to some extent, interrelated. Thus, deferential participation is, by definition, mobilized

7

INTRODUCTION

participation, just as civic participation is autonomous participation. However, solidary and instrumental motives may coincide with both autonomous and mobilized forms of participation. For example, a rural client or an urban worker casting his vote as he is told by his patron or party boss in exchange for some personal material reward acts, no doubt, with instrumental motives. But he cannot be considered an autonomous participant, since he has no personal intention to influence governmental decision-making and since he is not interested in the political consequences of his participatory act. Similarly, solidary motives may be combined with either autonomous or mobilized participation patterns. If the actor acts out of a belief that his group is likely to gain some advantage by displaying a solidary political behavior, he is acting as an autonomous participant. If, on the other hand, he is mobilized into participation by his group leaders' appeal to his group loyalties, without any intention to influence governmental decisionmaking, he is a mobilized actor. There seems to be an association between the level of socio-economic modernization and the dominant type of motive for political participation. Thus, deferential participation is associated with very low levels of modernization. Such participation is typical of traditional societies, and especially of rural areas. With increasing modernization, deference patterns weaken and deferential motives for participation tend to be replaced by instrumental motives. Thus, in societies at medium levels of modernization, political loyalties can be maintained chiefly through relationships involving greater reciprocity and the widespread use of concrete, short-run, individual, or communal inducements (Scott, 1969: 1146). The urban party machines and rural patron-client relationships, both characteristic of such "transitional" societies, depend on such reciprocity and the use of material rewards (Powell: 1970: 412). Finally, higher levels of socio-economic modernization tend to increase both civic participation and instrumental participation based on "sectoral" inducements. In other words, with in8

INTRODUCTION

creasing modernization, sectoral inducements tend to replace individual and communal inducements as the primary type of instrumental motives. Civic participation, on the other hand, although positively associated with modernization, remains largely a middle-class phenomenon even in highly modernized societies. While deferential, instrumental, and civic motives for participation thus seem to be associated with different levels of modernization, we do not perceive such a neat relationship with respect to solidary motives. Solidary participation, as indicated above, can be found in all types of society, traditional, transitional, and modern. What modernization appears to affect here is the "object" of solidary feelings, rather than their existence. But this is a question pertaining to the "bases" of political participation, rather than to its motives. 3. Bases of Political Participation The primary object of one's feelings of identification, loyalty, and solidarity does have an impact on the nature and the style of his participatory behavior, and this object seems to change with modernization. In traditional societies, the actor is primarily loyal to and identifies with his kinship (family, clan, tribe) or communal (village, region, religious community) group. The set of corresponding orientations to politics has been aptly called "parochial political culture" by Almond and Verba (1963). In such societies, participatory political behavior, to the extent that it exists, tends to be mobilized and deferential. Modernization, on the other hand, tends to increase class-based participation and to decrease communal-based participation. Since the importance of functional (class) cleavages increases with modernization (see Ch. 2), we would expect to find greater class voting (a majority of lower-class persons voting for the Left parties as opposed to a majority of upper and middle-class persons voting for the Right parties) in more modern societies. This class-based political activity seems to be one of the major ways in which lower status citizens may be able to reduce 9

INTRODUCTION

the participation disparity between themselves and upper status citizens (Verba and Nie, 1972: 149-173, 340). 4. The Amount of Political Participation Social mobilization theorists have long argued that the "amount" of political participation in a society tends to increase with social and economic modernization. The cluster of certain major processes of socio-economic change, cumulatively referred to as social mobilization, brings with it "an expansion of the politically relevant strata" of the population, and increases demands for a wider range of governmental services. This, in turn, tends to translate itself into increased political participation (Deutsch, 1963: 586588; also Lerner, 1958: 46, 50-51). Economic modernization affects political participation mainly through the changes it brings about in the social stratification and the organizational structure of a society. As societies develop economically, their class structure changes from a pyramidal to a diamond-shaped one, with an increasingly larger middle class. Since numerous surveys have consistently shown that political participation (or, at least, most of its dimensions) correlates positively with high socioeconomic status, an increase in the number of middle-class citizens means a corresponding increase in the over-all amount of political participation. Economic development also spurs organizational differentiation and specialization. A larger part of social life is organized by an increasing number of various secondary organizations which "take over duties formerly carried out by the extended family or the small, face-to-face social group. Additional organizations become necessary to coordinate activities of an increasingly interdependent social and economic life." Such organizational involvement, in turn, increases the likelihood of one's engaging in political activities (Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, 1969 a: 362). Two recent studies of political participation indicated, however, that there was one significant difference between participation based on high socio-economic status and participation based on organizational membership. While high social status affects the likelihood of po10

INTRODUCTION

litical participation through the intervening attitudinal variables—such as political information, political attentiveness, sense of political efficacy and of citizen duty— participation through organizational involvement seems to occur without an intervening state of change in attitudes (Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, 1969 b; Verba and Nie, 1972: 125-137, 174-208). Obviously, changes in the class structure and the organizational structure of a society may not be the only intermediary variables through which economic development increases the likelihood of political participation. One may argue that other development-associated changes—such as urbanization, education, factory experience, increasing communications, etc.—may also affect participation independently of class or organizational changes. Nie, Powell, and Prewitt (1969 a: 369-370) have demonstrated, however, that when social status and organizational involvement were controlled, the association between economic development and political participation became essentially zero, suggesting that these "two variables alone account for all of the difference between the participation levels of citizens in the more and the less developed nations." Inkeles (1969), on the other hand, has found that what he called "participant citizenship syndrome" (which includes such traits as identification with or allegiance to non-traditional authorities, interest in and information about politics, participation in civic affairs, and political rationality) correlated positively with education, mass media exposure, and factory experience. He then singled out the effects of factory experience by controlling for education and other variables, and observed that the factory still had a "definite, regular, and appreciable" effect, confirming the assumption that the factory is a "school for citizenship." 2 The independent effect of education is also somewhat 2 In contrasting the Inkeles data with those of Nie, Powell, and Prewitt, we should note that the two research projects used quite different samples. Nie et al. have used cross-sections of entire populations, while Inkeles has used factory workers and small control groups of non-factory blue-collar workers.

11

INTRODUCTION

unclear. Benjamin (1972: 43-46), for example, found a strong correlation between literacy and the voting rate in India. Another Indian study indicated, however, that the effects of education were positive on some aspects of political participation (e.g., interest in politics, talking about politics, and attempting to influence governmental decisions), but negative on others (e.g., voting, attending political meetings, and donating money to political parties) (Goel, 1970). Finally, recent research has cast increasing doubt upon the earlier assumption that urbanization leads to increased political participation. The effects of urbanization on participation will be discussed separately in Chapter 5. Evidently, a great deal of further comparative research is needed before we may be able to disentangle the independent effects of numerous developmental variables. To the extent that political participation is a multidimensional phenomenon, we should recognize the possibility that modernization may have different impacts on different aspects of participation. If there indeed are different "modes" of political participation and if such modes are not strongly intercorrelated (Verba and Nie, 1972: 44-81; cf. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954: 24), it is at least conceivable that modernization may lead to higher levels of participation in some modes, but to lower levels in others. Voting, especially, which appears to be somewhat independent of the other modes of political participation, may not be affected by modernization in the same way as are the others. Certainly, it would not be warranted, on the basis of available cross-national data, to conclude that voting participation tends to decline with modernization. Yet in the United States, the most intense period of industrialization (between about 1900 and 1930) witnessed a steep decline in voting turnout and a weakening of party loyalties (Burnham, 1965). In Turkey, not only did rapid socio-economic modernization coincide with a substantial decline in voting participation, but also such participation correlated negatively with indices of regional, provincial, and village modernization. Even if these two 12

INTRODUCTION

cases remain exceptional, they nevertheless warrant caution against assuming an almost automatically positive association between modernization and voting participation. The decline in voting turnout in Turkey and its probable causes will be discussed extensively throughout the book. To recapitulate our major hypotheses on the effects of socio-economic modernization on various dimensions of political participation: (a) with respect to the "nature" of political participation, modernization tends to increase autonomous participation and to decrease mobilized participation; (b) with respect to the "motives" for political participation, low levels of modernity seem to be associated with deferential motives, medium levels of modernity with instrumental motives, and high levels of modernity with instrumental and civic motives. However, with change from medium to high levels of modernity, instrumental participation also tends to change its character, and individual or communal inducements are likely to be replaced by sectoral inducements. On the other hand, there does not seem to be a clear association between the level of modernity and solidary participation; (c) with respect to the "bases" of political participation, modernization tends to increase class-based participation and to decrease communal-based participation; (d) with respect to the "amount" of political participation, modernization seems to increase the "over-all" amount of participation, but its effects on voting participation alone are not clear.

III.

VOTING AS A PARTICIPATORY A C T

Even when we use the term political participation to denote only that behavior intended to influence governmental deision-making, the list of participatory acts still covers an impressive range, from holding a public office to voting, from membership in a political party to wearing a campaign

!3

INTRODUCTION

button (for example, Milbrath, 1965: 18). Verba, Nie, and Kim (1971: 15-19), in one of the most recent and noteworthy efforts at conceptualization, have distinguished four modes of participatory behavior: voting, campaign activity, cooperative (communal) activity, and personalized contacts with government officials. No doubt, many more participatory acts can be added to conventional lists. As Frey (1970 a: 18; also Pizzorno, 1970: 29-31) has argued, participation may "take the form of spreading malicious gossip about a town or village official, making business opportunities disproportionately available to those with congenial outlooks, or implicitly threatening vulnerable groups to create anticipations of dire sanctions if they even attempt certain behaviors." Furthermore, certain forms of participatory behavior have significance in some social and cultural contexts, but not in others. For example, writing to one's Congressman on a political issue is very common in the United States, but hardly practiced at all in Turkey. Membership in a party of social integration has a meaning quite different from membership in a party of individual representation (Duverger, 1959: 116-124; Neumann, 1956: 404-405). Personalized contacts with government officials may vary enormously in importance from trying to persuade a military chief to instigate a coup, to talking to a municipal official about garbage collection. Even the meaning and significance of the act of voting vary greatly with the social context. Voting out of deference to traditional leaders is not quite the same kind of participatory behavior as voting out of a sense of civic duty. Among so many forms of participatory political behavior, the present study concentrates mostly on voting, despite the fact that, as recent comparative research indicated, voting participation is only moderately correlated with other forms of political participation (Verba, Nie, and Kim, 1971; Verba and Nie, 1972: 44-81). This choice is based not only on the availability of better data on voting, but also on the assumption that voting participation, with all its shortcom-

INTRODUCTION

ings, may still be a particularly effective means of securing the responsiveness of political leaders to the citizenry. As Verba and Nie (1972: 322-327) have pointed out, voting has certain special features that other forms of political participation (such as campaign activity and communal activity) do not have. The voting population is relatively representative of the whole society. Thus, the voting rate in the community seems to have a powerful impact on leader responsiveness—an impact that increases responsiveness to all citizens, participant or not. Campaign and communal activists, on the other hand, tend to be a rather unrepresentative minority, especially in communities where the overall amount of participation is moderately low. Consequently, while their activities should lead to greater concurrence of community leaders with such activists, concurrence with the inactive citizens should decline, and the gap between leader responsiveness to the most active citizens and to the others should be most severe. Voting data provide us with information not only on the rates of voting turnout, but also on the distribution of party preferences, which may supply other, if less direct, measures of political participation. By observing the distribution of votes among parties, we can make inferences about the bases of and the motives for political participation. For example, strong support for the Left parties in low-income areas may suggest a high degree of class-based participation. Strong correlations between religion or ethnicity, on the one hand, and preference for a particular political party, on the other, may be indicative of solidary participation. Sudden and erratic changes in party votes from one election to the next may indicate the prevalence of deferential participation and a low level of institutionalization in the party system (Przeworski and Sprague, 1971: 196-197). The same can be said for voter support for independent candidates. The higher the levels of such support, the greater the amount of deferential (or mobilized) participation and the lower the level of institutionalization in the party system (Benjamin et al., 1972: 35-36, 55). 1

5

INTRODUCTION IV.

MOBILITY, EQUALITY, AND GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS

If it is true that the two basic sources of political participation are high socio-economic status (SES) and organizational involvement, and that socio-economic modernization increases political participation mainly through its effects on the social and organizational structure of the society, then the next question is: What are the important intervening variables, if any, in the flow from socio-economic modernization to high SES and organizational involvement? Or, at the individual level, how does one attain high SES or get organizationally involved to become politically participant? To what extent are those two channels compatible with one another or mutually exclusive? The process by which an individual attains higher SES is termed "social mobility." But while social mobility leads to higher SES and, hence, to greater political participation in the long run, it may sometimes reduce it in the short run. An individual with limited time and resources may find it more to his immediate benefit to follow the route of individual mobility rather than that of collective political action. This may be especially true if the society offers sufficient opportunities for such mobility. As Lipset (1963: 215; see also Huntington, 1968: 54-55; Huntington and Nelson, 1973: 4/19-4/23) has argued, "the more open the class structure of any society, the more politically apathetic its working class should be; and, conversely, the more rigidly stratified a society, the more likely that its lower classes will develop their own strong form of political activity." By the same token, "geographical" mobility can also be an alternative to political participation, since such mobility may well reflect the individual's preference for "exit" rather than for "voice" (i.e., collective political action) (Hirschman, 1970; Huntington and Nelson, 1973: 4/23-4/29). However, individual mobility and political participation are not necessarily mutually exclusive, even in the short run. As we will discuss in Chapters 3 and 8, such incompatibility does not seem to be case in Turkey. The Turkish 16

Ι Ν Τ R Ο D U C ΤΙ Ο Ν

data indicate that the extent of social and geographical mo­ bility affects the nature and direction, rather than the over­ all amount, of political participation in a society. It may be hypothesized that while high levels of mobility tend to en­ courage intra-system and often more conservative political action, the lack of opportunities for such mobility is likely to lead to extra-system and often more radical political participation. Organizational involvement, the second route to political participation, seems to be associated with a sense of group consciousness. "The more intense the identification of the individual with the group, the more likely he is to be or­ ganizationally involved and politically participant." Group consciousness, in turn, is likely to be the product of such factors as the rigidity of class structure, the intensity of inter-group conflict, and the degree to which the members of the group are insulated from outside influences and con­ tacts (Huntington and Nelson, 1973: 4/12-4/19). Thus, the conditions that give rise to participation via organizational involvement are usually the opposite of those which lead to participation via social mobility. Here, one may also wonder about the role of socio­ economic equality as a possible intervening variable in the flow from socio-economic modernization to political par­ ticipation. In fact, what may be called the "liberal" model of development assumes that socio-economic modernization promotes both socio-economic equality and broader political participation. However, recent research has cast consider­ able doubt upon the first assumption of this model, and today it is generally conceded that, in modernizing coun­ tries, high rates of economic development tend to increase, rather than to decrease, socio-economic inequalities. As for the second assumption, it has not been convincingly dem­ onstrated that socio-economic equality leads to higher rates of political participation, independently of the level of socio-economic development. "Status level rather than status equality," conclude Huntington and Nelson (1973: Ch. 3, esp. 45), "would appear to be the more decisive 17

INTRODUCTION

factor." One may even argue that the overall degree of socio-economic inequality may produce greater group consciousness and thus increase the propensity toward political participation via organizational involvement. In the absence of glaring inequalities, there is relatively little incentive for organized, collective political action. 3 While this seems more likely to be the case for the society as a whole, at least in the early phases of modernization, the opposite causal relationship may prevail within each individual group. In other words, a high degree of real and/or perceived status equality within a particular group, plus the perception of a probable threat to that group from outside, may lead to high group consciousness and to greater propensity toward political participation. This relationship has been observed in the corporate village pattern, which displays a high degree of landholding equality, and in urban squatter settlements, where the degree of status equality also tends to be very high (Powell, 1972: 4/9; Huntington and Nelson, 1973: 3/43). V.

THE

METHOD AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The present study is based essentially on the ecological analysis of subnational aggregate voting data. Because of the non-existence of pertinent nationwide survey data, the non-voting modes of political participation (democratic or otherwise) remain largely unexplored. In many instances, however, reference will be made to the principal findings of available survey research on particular social groups, especially peasants and urban squatters. My reliance on ecological analysis admittedly has certain disadvantages as well as some advantages. In addition to 3 Allardt and Pesonen (1967: 343-344) have observed, for example, that the absence of a rural stratification system (i.e., the relative equality of landholdings) has led to the absence of class-based politics and to political conservatism in the South Pohjanmaa region of Finland. Rokkan (1967: 410-411) makes a similar observation for the southern and western regions of Norway.

18

INTRODUCTION

the exclusion of the non-voting aspects of political participation, it is clear that aggregate voting data would allow us neither to inquire into the motivations of the voters (except by way of inference), nor to introduce other psychological "intervening variables" between the information about the ecological characteristics and the recorded aggregate political behavior. Furthermore, the much emphasized dangers of the "ecological fallacy" come readily to mind in this type of analysis. However, although such dangers may be real enough, one should be equally aware of the dangers of the opposite error, the "individualist fallacy" (i.e., the tendency to generalize findings for individual behavior without controlling for the characteristics of the social, cultural, and political context) (Dogan and Rokkan, 1969: 88). As Scheuch (1969: 141) puts it succinctly, "in ordinary survey research the individual is usually treated—albeit by implication—as an atom. Merely adding atoms of course does not make for molecules." In fact, recent research has often demonstrated the important effects of "system-level" or "contextual" variables on individual behavior. If it can be shown that a system has a certain property that influences the individuals within it, "then identification of the system within which an observation is made raises our ability to predict a score on the dependent variable above the prediction based only on the mean score for the entire . . . population. . . . It is not sufficient for comparative purposes to state the aggregate parameter of a system. It is necessary to treat it as a potential determinant of behaviors at a different level of analysis" (Przeworski and Teune, 1970: 40, 57; see also, Linz, 1969: 107). No doubt the relative advantages and disadvantages of survey research and ecological analysis vary with the particular area of research. For example, Linz (1969: 95-96) has argued that the ecological approach is particularly useful in the study of rural society, because of the wide variety of social characteristics (such as patterns of land tenure, settlement patterns, types of crop and their rotation, etc.) l

9

INTRODUCTION

"over many easily identifiable and often fairly homogeneous administrative . . . units." Thus, "the social context of the village becomes a prime determinant of the occupants' different political and social behavior." One example of such contextual effect is the propensity toward high voting turnout in the corporate village pattern mentioned above. Similarly, Cornelius (1973: 23, 25-26) has observed that "the immediate residential environment is an important source of variance in individual attitudes and behavior among migrants to the city." For example, "a social unit characterized by a high frequency of political participation among its members provides a context that directly stimulates participation and is perceived by the individual member as sanctioning such behavior. Thus, persons possessing the same set of individual attributes may participate politically in significantly different ways, depending upon the proportion of those within their immediate social environment who are politically active." Finally, we should note that the choice of ecological or survey techniques in political participation research depends, in large part, on the researcher's own focus of interest. If he is primarily interested in the attitudinal bases of participation, or in the underlying psychological processes by which individuals become politically active, then there is no substitute for survey research. If, on the other hand, he is more interested in political participation as a systemic property (i.e., the ways in which the nature and amount of participation in a political system affect the functioning of that system), then ecological analysis would probably suit his needs better. Clearly, the focus of the present study is on the latter. This book deals with political participation in Turkey, with emphasis on voting participation. More specifically, it is concerned with the ways in which political participation is affected by economic and social modernization. In fact, Turkey offers a very interesting case for the student of the relationship between modernization and political participation. First, Turkey is one of the very few developing countries that have been able to maintain a relatively stable 20

INTRODUCTION

democratic system for a considerable length of time. Secondly, it has undergone rapid socio-economic change in the last two decades, and if there is indeed an association between such change and political participation, this should be clearly seen in the changing patterns of participation. Thirdly, Turkey displays a great deal of regional and urban-rural variation in the level of socio-economic modernity, and this makes comparison among sub-national units particularly fruitful for our purposes. Fourthly, despite rapid modernization, the rates of voting turnout in that country have fallen sharply since 1950, which presents a phenomenon of considerable theoretical interest and definitely requires explanation. Although the emergence of a multi-party system in Turkey goes back to 1945 (not counting earlier brief experiences), here we will concentrate essentially on the 19601970 period, partly because of the availability of better voting and socio-economic data, and partly because some of the trends to be described made themselves apparent in this period. In fact, election statistics pertaining to the pre-1960 period provide data only at the provincial level. Therefore, the kinds of analysis presented in Chapters 5, 7, and 8 could not be carried out for the pre-1960 elections. The 1973 elections, which took place after the completion of this study were also excluded, since its detailed results had not yet been released at the time of the final revision of the manuscript. However, some of the highlights of the 1973 elections will be brought out in the concluding section, to ascertain whether the changes observed in the late 1960's were merely minor and accidental fluctuations or whether they really did originate new patterns. Since I have hypothesized that socio-economic change affects the bases of political participation by changing the nature of dominant social cleavages in a society, Chapter 2 will be devoted to an analysis of the transformations of social cleavages and the party system in Turkey. It will be argued that the so far dominant center-periphery cleavage in Turkish politics shows signs of being gradually replaced by a functional cleavage. 21

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 3 will consider the relationships between equality, mobility, and organizational involvement, on the one hand, and political participation, on the other. In particular, we will discuss the distribution of land and income, geographical and social mobility, access to education, and associational activity in Turkey as they affect political participation. Chapter 4 will deal with regional variations in political participation. Since socio-economic modernization in Turkey shows marked regional variations, this analysis will provide us with a first, even though gross, overview of the relationship between modernization and political participation. Chapter 5 will probe into urban-rural differences in political participation. Turkey is one of the few countries where rural voting turnout rates are consistently higher than those of the urban areas. We will discuss the possible causes of this deviation from the politicization model implied by social mobilization theories. Chapter 6 will focus on the socio-economic correlates of voting participation and party votes, using province-level data. Special attention will be given to the decline in voting participation, the negative relationship between voting participation and provincial modernity, and the recent shifts in party votes. Finally, Chapters 7 and 8 will concentrate on political participation patterns among the two major strata that comprise a large majority of the Turkish population: peasants and the urban poor, respectively. Chapter 7 will repeat essentially the same kind of analysis as attempted in Chapter 6, using village-level modernization and voting data. The distinction between autonomous and mobilized participation will be treated in greater detail there, since mobilized participation in Turkey is largely a rural phenomenon. Chapter 8 will probe into aggregate socioeconomic characteristics of the urban poor (more particularly the migrant poor) and its propensity toward political participation. 22

TWO

T H E TRANSFORMATIONS OF T H E SOCIAL CLEAVAGES A N D T H E PARTY SYSTEM

I have hypothesized above that socio-economic change affects the bases of and motives for political participation through its impact on social cleavages and on the type of political alignments they produce. Territorial cleavages, for example, tend to give rise to communal and solidary participation, while functional cleavages are usually associated with class-based and instrumental participation: hence the need to study the nature of social cleavages and political alignments in Turkey. This is a particularly urgent task in view of the fact that there seems to be a substantial area of disagreement and uncertainty on the subject. What is the nature of the most important social cleavage in Turkey? Is it based primarily on a confrontation between the center and the periphery, or is it an essentially cultural one between secularist modernizers and religious traditionalists? To what extent do the present political alignments in Turkey reflect a rural-urban cleavage? What role do functional (i.e., class) cleavages play? What sort of changes have taken place in the cleavage structure of the country as a result of socio-economic modernization, and what are the most likely trends of change in the future? In this chapter, I shall try to address myself to such questions from a comparative and historical perspective. As Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 10-13) have pointed out, the early phases of nation-building are often characterized by territorial and cultural, rather than functional, oppositions. The typical cleavage in this stage involves the "reac* tions of peripheral regions, linguistic minorities, and culturally threatened populations to the pressures of the centralizing, standardizing, and 'rationalizing' machinery of 23

TRANSFORMATIONS

the nation-state." Such territorial and cultural oppositions may even survive the initial phases of democratization, i.e., the extension of the suffrage. Functional oppositions, on the other hand, cut across the territorial units of the nation-state, and are characterized by a commitment to a class and its collective interests. Obviously, a particular cleavage may have both territorial and functional elements. However, if the distinguishing mark of a political alignment is commitment to a particular locality and its culture, if individuals tend to act together with the majority of their local community, regardless of their socio-economic status, we may speak of a territorial cleavage. If, on the other hand, individuals act together with other individuals of similar socio-economic status, regardless of their locality, we may conclude that the cleavage is a primarily functional one. Generally speaking, socio-economic modernization tends to increase the relative importance of functional cleavages at the expense of territorial cleavages. Social modernization increases geographical and social mobility, facilitates communications and transportations across the country, and leads to a standardization of culture. Thus, regional cultures that produce peripheral oppositions tend to lose their distinctiveness. This development is also aided by the growing efficiency of governmental structures, and the penetration of government more and more deeply into social life. In fact, party systems of modern Western societies are based, by and large, on functional cleavages. Even within a single country, regions with a higher level of socioeconomic modernization usually exhibit more marked functional cleavages. In Norway, for example, the most notable examples of territorial oppositions are found in the less industrialized, sparsely populated south-western periphery (Rokkan, 1967: 408-409; Valen and Katz, 1964: 166, 184). One must not assume, however, that territorial cleavages would automatically disappear with socioeconomic modernization. If such cleavages are based on a strong local cultural tradition that cannot be easily inte24

TRANSFORMATIONS

grated into the national culture, they can possibly survive in a highly modernized society. Rokkan (1967: 415-425), for example, attributes the persisting strength of territorial cleavages in the south-western periphery of Norway to the linguistic and cultural characteristics of the region rather than to its socio-economic underdevelopment. Similarly, the relative weakness of functional cleavages in the Wales and the notable regional strength of the Liberal party can be explained by the continuing resistance of the Welsh culture to the dominant English culture (Cox, 1970). Nevertheless, there seems to be a strong relationship between the level of socio-economic modernization and the predominance of functional cleavages. We shall start our analysis of the transformations of the social cleavages and the party system in Turkey with a discussion of such cleavages in the Ottoman Empire. For, as Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 35, 46) have pointed out, "the crucial differences among the party systems emerged in the early phases of competitive politics, before the final phase of mass mobilization." In Europe, such earlier cleavages as those of center-periphery, state-church, and land-industry were "the ones that appeared to account for most of the variance among systems." This is particularly true for Turkey, where much of the present can be properly understood only by studying the past. Thus, it will be argued below that the center-periphery cleavage, which played a dominant role in Turkish politics until very recently, had its roots firmly in the Ottoman past. I. T H E OTTOMAN

PERIOD

It is usually agreed that the cleavage structure of the Ottoman society conformed to that of an "Oriental despotism," rather than to that of a European-type feudal system. The Ottoman society, notes Inalcik (1964: 44), "was divided into two major classes. The first one, called askeri, literally the 'military,' included those to whom the sultan had delegated religious or executive power through an imperial diploma, 25

TRANSFORMATIONS

namely, officers of the court and the army, civil servants, and ulema. The second included the reaya, comprising all Muslim and non-Muslim subjects who paid taxes but who had no part in the government. It was a fundamental rule of the empire to exclude its subjects from the privileges of the 'military'. . . . It was, in fine, the sultan's will alone that decided a man's status in society." This accorded well with the fundamental concepts of state and society in the Otto­ man Empire, which held that the social order (nizam-ι Mem) was of divine origin and, hence, immutable. It was the sul­ tan's duty to maintain this order by keeping everyone in his appropriate social position. The sultan, in this function, was assisted by the members of the ruling (askeri) class, who, however, were considered merely sultan's tools in the mat­ ter of administration, rather than the representatives, even in the most rudimentary sense, of social classes. Thus, the state was above and independent of the society. Political power did not derive from the society, but was imposed upon it by the will of God (in effect, by conquest) from outside (Berkes, 1973: 27-28). It was this primacy of poli­ tics over society that was to affect the nature of social and political changes in the Ottoman Empire for many centuries. Two features of the Ottoman system reinforced the rigid dichotomy between the ruler and the ruled. One was the dev§irme (recruitment) system, which was a periodic levy of the male children of Christian subjects, reducing them to the status of slaves, and training them for the service of the state. This system, although not unknown in some earlier Islamic states, was practiced to such an extent that, in time, free-born Muslims were all but entirely excluded from the administration and the army. "Whereas in its earlier days the administration of the growing Empire had been con­ ducted by free Moslems, now these were almost without exception replaced by the Sultans' slaves on an ever larger scale, until nearly every post, in what has been described as the 'Ruling Institution' of the Empire, was filled either by a Christian conscript or by a slave otherwise acquired. . . . (T)he Ottoman Empire was a Moslem state in which it was 26

TRANSFORMATIONS

paradoxical that any institution should be reserved for the infidel born" (Gibb and Bowen, i, 1950: 43-45). The significance of this development for our purposes is that, since these slaves became the Sultan's property and since he could take their lives and confiscate their wealth without legal process, they were in no position to challenge his authority. Furthermore, the fact that they were entirely cut off from their former social environments prevented the development of locally entrenched, semi-autonomous elements in the provinces. A second feature, which was also instrumental in maintaining a strong central authority over the large territories of the Empire, was the Ottoman land tenure system. This system vested in the state the original ownership of all the land, and limited the rights of the fief (timar) holders (SipahL·), to the collection of taxes and the supervision of peasants under their jurisdiction. The fiefs were worked partly by the holders, and partly by the peasants, who lived on them as tenants. The Sipahi's source of livelihood derived from the crops he grew himself and from the tithes and dues he collected from the peasantry. In return for the land grant, the Sipahi was expected to recruit, train, and support a local contingent of soldiers, the size of which varied with the size of his holding. Again significantly for our purposes, the fiefs were granted by the central government; and, although in normal circumstances when a Sipahi died his fief passed to his son, "in many cases their fief was taken away because of the interests of the central authorities" (Mardin, 1967: 122; Gibb and Bowen, i, 1950: 46-51, 238). Furthermore, the largest fiefs (Hass) were the perquisite of an office. Thus, Gibb and Bowen (i, 1950: 52) have noted that "the Ottoman feudal system seems to have differed from that of Western Europe chiefly in that the principal feudatories held their lands temporarily, in virtue of their offices. Less than half the lands concerned appear to have appertained to the Sipahis, who alone enjoyed any hereditary rights. Hence the monarchy was exposed to little danger from the rivalry of this class of its tenants-in-chief." 27

TRANSFORMATIONS

Two more social groups deserve to be mentioned here to complete our picture of the Ottoman society in its classical period. These are the ulema (the students of the §eri'a), and the merchants and artisans. While the former was part of the ruling (askm) class, the latter was included in the reaya, the ruled. The ulema was different from the military proper and the administrators in that they were free-born Muslims. However, the ulema did not constitute a hierarchy independent of government, since the most important among them, i.e., the Kadis (judges) and the Muftis (consultative jurists), held appointive posts. As for the merchants and artisans, although at one time they constituted an important group in the Empire, and the government pursued deliberate policies to make them prosperous, "the independent and powerful position of the guilds in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries weakened under the centralist system of government of the Ottomans" (Inalcik, 1970: 216 and passim). Furthermore, "the change in trade routes caused many of these to shift to internal commerce and to reduce drastically the scale of their undertaking. With time, they almost became indistinguishable from the artisan craftsmen class, the esnaf (Mardin, 1967: 123). Thus, with no feudalism comparable to that of Western Europe, no hereditary aristocracy, no independent church hierarchy, no strong and independent merchant class, no self-governing cities, and with a ruling institution (i.e., the administration and the army) staffed with slaves, the Ottoman Empire represented a close approximation of an Oriental despotism. 1 This dichotomy led to a class con1 Mardin (1967: 111, 120-123) forcefully argues that this dichotomous view of the Ottoman society "is hedged with a number of qualifications," and that certain sub-strata existed both within the "soi-disant monolithic official set" and within the great mass of the ruled-over. He admits, however, that "the pressure on the part of the central slave executive to erase all these features of the Empire which did not fit the dual model were enduring and strong." For areas that were governed by a special system, usually by semi-autonomous local dynasts with little control by the central government, see Gibb and Bowen (i, 1950: 160-173).

28

TRANSFORMATIONS

sciousness very different from the West, "that of askeri on the one hand and of their opponents on the other. . . . The saliency of these strata replaced the European saliency of strata connected with the production and distribution of goods and services" (Mardin, 1967: 127). Mardin (1973: 170 and pasam.), in a later article, described this dichotomy as a center-periphery cleavage, and suggested that until recently this "was the most important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics and one that seemed to have survived more than a century of modernization." It should be stressed, however, that he used the term in an essentially cultural sense rather than in its more general, ecological sense. Thus, "relative to the heterogeneity of the periphery," he maintained, "the ruling class was singularly compact: this was, above all, a cultural phenomenon. . . . For much of the population, nomad or settled, rural or urban, this cultural separation was the most striking feature of its existence on the periphery. . . . This was particularly true of the lower classes, both rural and urban, for in this matter the urban masses could also be counted as part of the periphery" (Mardin, 1973: 173). To put it differently, Mardin's view equates center with the "state." When he spoke of the center of the OttomanTurkish society, he was referring to the centrality of the state. In this sense, the cleavage between the center and the periphery was one between the political ins and outs, between the political elite and the rest of the society. The ins were "the incumbents of the Ottoman institutions. The outs were people who were excluded from the state" (Akarh, 1975: 139). Obviously, such a cleavage exists in all political systems. But, while in Europe it reflected other social cleavages in the society, in the Ottoman Empire it became largely independent of them. Thus, in a sense, the cleavage was between the state and the other sectors of the society. This notion of centrality and peripherality differs clearly from the ecological notion of center-periphery cleavage in that it does not necessarily identify the periphery with the local dominance of subject or minority cultures, with geo29

TRANSFORMATIONS

graphical isolation or distance from the center, and with socio-economic underdevelopment (see, for example, Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan, 1967). However, both notions have something in common in their description of the mutual attitudes of the center and the periphery. In either case, the center is identified with policies designed to maintain and to increase central (i.e., state) authority over the nodal points of the society, and the periphery with attitudes that spell localism, particularism, and a negative view of officialdom. In the final analysis, it may be these distinct "operational codes," more than anything else, that distinguish the center and the periphery in the Ottoman Turkish society. Certain changes in the Ottoman society in the eighteenth century brought about some important new dimensions in the picture. One was the appearance of a strong peripheral force of local notables (dyan) in the provinces as an intermediary group between the rulers and the ruled. The other was the fragmentation of the old consensus at the center (i.e., among the ruling class) as a result of the growing impact of the West. The dyans were rural notables; they were not government employees, but were elected by the local people, presumably to represent them vis-a-vis the governmental authorities (especially in matters of tax assessment). However, their election was recognized by aferman (imperial rescript) of the central government. It also seems possible that the descendants of elected ayans came to be regarded, whether elected or not, as ayans themselves. Their status seems to have derived from ownership of land, legally or illegally converted of fief and other lands into private property, "since in the original scheme of landholding there would appear to have been no place for such persons" (Gibb and Bowen, i, 1950: 198-199, 256-257; Berkes, 1973: 97-98). Indeed, the rise of the dyans seems to be parallel to the transformation of the Ottoman land tenure system. As early as the end of the sixteenth century, the central government, faced with increasing military and financial dif30

TRANSFORMATIONS

ficulties, proceeded to let state lands and fiefs to taxfarmers (miiltezims). Certainly, the fiefs were not abolished immediately. Rather, when a Sipahi died and left no suitable heir, instead of regranting it as the law required, the treasury retained it and put it out to farm. "In this way the strength of the Sipahi cavalry diminished till in the eighteenth century it stood at no more than a quarter of what it had once been. . . . Nor was it only Sipahi fiefs that were so abolished. The majority also of those that had originally been devoted to the support of officials both of the central and of the provincial governments were likewise converted into state lands" (Gibb and Bowen, i, 1950: 253-254). Such practices as tax-farming and leasing state lands enabled the ayans to increase their wealth and power. "The ayan's influence on, and close cooperation with, local authorities favored them in these leasing operations. Later, in the eighteenth century, the leases were made for lifetime and prior rights to the leases were granted to the sons of lessees" (inalcik, 1964: 47-48; also, Lewis, 1968: 446-447). Thus, in the eighteenth century, it was the ayans who controlled, partly owing to their already recognized position, partly owing to the relaxation of government and military control, the civil and financial administration of the towns (Gibb and Bowen, i, 1950: 198-199, 257). To this peripheral force of the ayans, one should add another one, namely the derebeyis (lords of the valleys). In contrast to the former, who had local roots, the latter were rebellious pashas and officers, who, in time, raised enough military force to defy the government and to found veritable dynasties. However, the distinction between the two is not clear, and in some cases the derebeyis seem to have emerged from the ranks of the ayans. The appearance of the derebeyis, which took place by the beginning of the eighteenth century, was associated with the growing weakness of the central government, and "by the beginning of the nineteenth century almost the whole of Anatolia was in the hands of the various derebey families" (Lewis, 1968: 447, 37-38; Gibb and Bowen, i, 1950: 193-194; Berkes, 1973: 31

TRANSFORMATIONS

97-98). In any event, the relations of such derebeyis and the ayans with the central bureaucratic order, Karpat (1972: 244) summarizes, "formed the central dynamics of the internal transformation which occurred in Ottoman society in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries." It is important to note that in this center-periphery dichotomy, the "silent majority" (i.e., the peasants) generally sided with the ayans rather than with the representatives of the central bureaucracy. While in some cases the ayans were no less exploitative in their dealings with the peasantry than the state, "at least they saw it was in their interest to provide those minimum services that kept the system going" (Mardin, 1973: 174-175; Inalcik, 1964: 47-48; Kugukomer, 1969: 65). Thus, Mardin (1967: 131132) argues that the so-called Celali revolts of the seventeenth century "were not, in fact, peasant revolts but revolts of disgruntled minor gentry (sipahis) who felt they had been wrongfully deprived of their grant of land. These sipahi took with them as allies peasants who had fled the tax farmers who had succeeded the sipahi. The bands thus constituted marched not on local feudatories but on the centers of power; they fought not local landlords, but the representatives of state authority." The common denominator of this and the later types of local revolts is that "the ayans and the peasantry were driven into the same camp, if only because their antagonism to official policy was more enduring than their differences." The growing influence of the ayans can best be observed in a significant constitutional document called Sened-i tttifak (Deed of Agreement) signed in 1808 between the representatives of the ayans and those of the central government. The first of its kind in the Ottoman history and very much against the autocratic tradition of the Empire, this agreement provided for mutual support between the two, and recognized and confirmed the status of the ayans. "Thus at the dawn of the nineteenth century," observes Lewis (1968: 448; also Berkes, 1973: 121-128; Karpat, 1972: 253-254, Inalcik, 1964: 52-53), "the Sultan was brought to Run32

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nymede, to sign a Charter that gave formal recogni­ tion to feudal rights and autonomies in the Ottoman Empire." This agreement, signed reluctantly by Sultan Mahmud II, was of short duration. H e was determined to suppress the autonomy of rebellious pashas and local notables, which he saw as a great obstacle to his reform program. In this, he was largely successful. But the elimination of the principal ayans and the reestablishment of the central authority did not put an end to peripheral influences, for "while Mahmud deprived the ayan of their armies and their courts . . . he left them in full, indeed in increased con­ trol of their lands." In the early nineteenth century, the proportion oimiilk (freehold) estates grew rapidly as a re­ sult of direct and indirect 2 sale of miri (state) lands. Com­ mercial and agricultural developments "created a class of persons with sufficient cash to bid for leases, buy estates, and lend money on land. . . . In this way, in the course of the nineteenth century, a new freehold landlord class came into existence, controlling much of the countryside of the Empire" (Lewis, 1968: 448-450; also, inalcik, 1964: 54; Kugukomer, 1969: 57; Karpat, 1972: 256; Aydemir, π: 1967: 303-310). This class was to play an important politi­ cal role towards the end of the nineteenth century. The "Land Code of 1858 (Arazi Kanunu) established pri­ vate ownership of land, and thus legally confirmed the de facto property rights of leaseholders. This was one area where the interests of local notables and the centralizing Tanzimat bureaucrats converged, since the latter, when in­ troducing Western conceptions of private property, no doubt sought to legalize and protect their own accumulated 2 This was "the sale . . . of a special kind of lease conferring very extensive rights and powers on the purchaser. . . . T h e purchaser had, in theory, no legal right to freehold ownership, but only a lease of revenues. In fact, however, his rights were steadily extended and confirmed, and the trend of most of the agrarian laws of the Tanzimat period was to transform these leases into something barely distinguishable from freehold" (Lewis, 1968: 449).

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wealth (Mardin, 1967: 135; Kugukomer, 1969: 61-63). Despite this temporary alliance, however, there remained a substantial element of conflict between the two. For one thing, the modernizing reforms envisaged by the bureaucracy required the concentration of the authority at the center. For another, the self-interest of the bureaucrats led them to increase central authority, upon which their status, wealth, and power depended. The local gentry, on the other hand, resented any encroachment by the central government upon their local influence and privileges. Thus, measures taken by the reformist Grand Vezir Re§id Pasha to protect the peasantry against local notables (e.g., abolition of tax farming, appointment of revenue collectors attached to the central government, measures against forced labor and usury) met with strong local opposition and remained without much effect. In contrast to the Balkans, where the Christian peasants were ready to rebel to obtain the promises of the Tanzimat, the Anatolian notables were usually able to incite the conservative Muslim peasants against the government and to take them as allies (Inalcik, 1964: 59-61). This center-periphery conflict, while fundamentally important, was not the sole basis of political alignments in the late Ottoman Empire. Beginning in the eighteenth century, this cleavage was complicated by another one that resulted from the efforts of Westernization. The adoption of, first, Western military technology and, then, Western laws and administrative practices, was strongly opposed by the old religious and the military elites, namely the Ulema and the Janissaries. This opposition was motivated not only by religious grounds, but also from the fear that such reforms would undermine the bases of their power and status in the society. In contrast to the center-periphery cleavage described above, this one was located at the very center and had an intra-elite character. In other words, the Westernization movement undertaken first by reforming sultans and then the newly emerging "Westernized" bureaucrats fractured the old intra-elite unity, and produced a conflict that

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remained for many years one of the principal cleavages in Turkish political life. In a sense, this cleavage was not very different from the familiar Western one between the supporters of the state and those of the church, between the secularizers and the clericals. However, it differed from the latter in that while in Europe the main thrust for secularization came from the bourgeoisie, in the Ottoman Empire secularizing reforms were undertaken by the Sultans and their modernizing bureaucrats. To the extent that the secularizers established their supremacy at the center, Islam was increasingly identified with the peripheral culture. Modernization of educational institutions and mass media "perpetuated the premodern, cultural cleavage between the center and the periphery. . . . A clinging to Islam, to its cultural patrimony, was the province's response to the center's inability to integrate it into the new cultural framework. The provinces thus became centers of 'reaction.' Most significant, however, was the fact that the provincial world as a whole, including both upper and lower classes, was now increasingly united by an Islamic opposition to secularism" (Mardin, 1973: 178-179). Somewhat paradoxically, the victory of the secularist modernizers at the center gave the peripheral opposition a unity of outlook, "an Islamic, unifying dimension," that it never had had before. This had two important consequences for the later political developments in Turkey. First, peripheral and religious oppositions to the centralizing and secularizing bureaucracy were often merged into one, rendering it difficult for even the experienced political analysts to distinguish the elements of the two from each other. This explains the frequency of conflicting views on the nature of many political alignments in Turkey. Secondly, the merger gave the peripheral-Islamic opposition a much stronger command of popular loyalties than the "officials" can ever hope to enjoy. This provided an almost irresistible temptation for the factions of the national elite, contending for power when there was some measure of freedom of political com35

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petition, to appeal to the sentiments of the peripheralIslamic opposition. Thus, the political "outs" found a rich source of support in the periphery, even though their own leadership differed little in its social background characteristics from that of the "official" party. This was true, as will be shown below, for the Liberal Party (Ahrar) of 1908, the Liberal Union (Hurriyet ve Itil&f) of 1911, the "Second Group" in the First National Assembly of 1920-1923, the Progressive Republican Party of 1924, the Free Party of 1930, the Democrat Party and the Justice Party of the post-World War II period. The "officials" (Union and Progress of 1908, the Republican People's Party, and the military in the 1960 Revolution), in their turn, reacted with characteristic intolerance to such "threats" to their position, since in their world view, the interests of the state and society were identified with those of the center (For a similar theme, see Kugukomer, 1969: 81-84, and passim; Mardin, 1973: 181-186). A third cleavage, which appeared in the second half of the nineteenth century, pitted the constitutionalists (called the Young Ottomans) against the supporters of monarchic autocracy. This was also an intra-elite conflict, since both the constitutionalists and the autocratic Tanzimat reformers to whom they were opposed, came from the ranks of the Westernized, official elite. The Young Ottomans did not represent the ayans, or the urban merchants and artisans (Berkes, 1973: 150). However, their advocacy of a parliament put them in a dilemma, one that was to be faced by many generations of future modernizers: the modernizers wanted to have a parliament as an alternative (and modern) source of legitimacy. But they soon realized that when a parliament was convened, it "did not increase the power of the modernizing officials vis-a-vis the Sultan, but that it rather increased the power of notables against state officials" (Akarh, 1975: 143). In fact, the Young Ottomans were often bitterly critical of the abuses of the local notables, and charged them with oppressing the countryside. Ironically, the first Ottoman Parliament of 1877-1878,

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which they helped to create, included many such notables since the local election committees that elected the deputies "consisted mainly of notables, ulema, and the communal representatives of the non-Muslims." The short life of this Parliament provided clear manifestations of the deep conflict between the central bureaucracy and the local (peripheral) forces (Karpat, 1972: 263, 268-270; Aksin, 1971: 168). Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909), who dismissed the Parliament in 1878, tried to steer a middle course between the forces of the center and those of the periphery. While he succeeded in controlling the higher ranks of the bureaucracy, his real source of support rested with the lower ulema and the lower classes (Berkes, 1973: 304). His "pious nature, ascetic habits, frugal life and occasional resistance to outside demands seems to have enhanced his stature among the religious-minded, as well as the traditionalists" (Karpat, 1972: 272). Although he was not opposed to change and reform in selected areas, he stressed the Islamic character of the Ottoman government, with the belief that only by consolidating the unity of its Muslim subjects could the Empire preserve its integrity. Thus, in Mardin's (1973: 176) words, he "attempted to bring to the Moslem Ottoman periphery a sense of unity with the center." However, Abdulhamid's autocratic policies increasingly alienated the modernizing bureaucratic and military elites, who saw a return to constitutionalism as the most effective remedy to the plight of the Empire. Furthermore, these young bureaucrats, officers, and professionals were not satisfied with the Sultan's gradual approach to reforms. Thus, the constitutionalist opposition (the Young Turks) can be described as the reaction of the centralizing elites to the Sultan who attempted to come to terms with the periphery. Lewis (1968: 194-195, 206) has accurately expressed the intra-elite character of this opposition: ". . . the government of Turkey was still the accepted and recognized prerogative of an elite of professionals, who retained all the rights and duties of politics, including that of

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opposition. It was, therefore, among the servants of the state that the pioneers of revolutionary change emerged; it was in the schools—those nurseries of the civil and military elite, so carefully tended by the Sultan himself—that the seeds of revolution were sown." The constitutionalist opposition was divided within itself between the centralists, led by Ahmed Riza (the Union and Progress group), and the decentralists, led by Prince Sabahaddin, who advocated a federalized, decentralized Ottoman state based on private iniative in economic affairs. This division was to provide the basis of party alignments after the restoration of the Constitution in 1908 (Lewis, 1968: 196-205; Tunaya, 1952: 102-117). We should point out, however, that although Sabahaddin was opposed to centralization, he and his close associates were very much part of the central elite, members of the "establishment." His advocacy of decentralization derived, not from his identification with or representation of the peripheral forces, but from his own personal philosophical inclination, which developed under the profound influence of a French writer, Edmond Demolins. Nevertheless, we shall see below that these ideas were well received by some elements of the periphery (especially, certain ethnic minorities) in the Second Constitutionalist period (1908-1918). This period witnessed a bitter opposition between the Union and Progress that, at first, influenced and then took over the direct control of government, and various opposition parties. The Union and Progress was centralist, nationalist, authoritarian, and—to some extent—etatist 3 and secularist (Lewis, 1968: 213-219; Tunaya, 1952: 174206; Ahmad, 1971: 98-100, 201-202; Berkes, 1973: 359). This has been a rather familiar syndrome for many centralizes (i.e., nation-builders) in Europe. The drive for cen3 While the Young Turks attempted to create a new class of Turkish entrepreneurs, they also came out more and more clearly for a statedirected "national economy." T h e contradictions between these two "caused a tension which has marked the development of the Turkish economy since then" (Mardin, 1967: 141-142).

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tralization is observed in the cultural, administrative, and economic policies of the Young Turks. Culturally, they followed a policy of Turkification, to the chagrin of the nonTurkish elements of the Empire. Administratively, they sought to tighten central control over the provinces. Economically, they excluded the laissez-faire in favor of a more government-controlled "national" or welfare economy. These policies met with opposition on two fronts: the first was formed by liberals who opposed the centralist and authoritarian aspects of the Young Turk government; the second reflected the reaction of the religious traditionalists against its secularist aspects. In the early years of the constitutional regime, the liberal opposition was represented by the Liberal Party (Ahrar) and the Moderate Liberals (Mutedil Hiirriyetperveran). The Liberals favored parliamentary democracy, secularism, Ottomanism, and decentralization, and, especially because of the latter, were joined cause by members of non-Turkish minorities (Arabs, Albanians, Greeks, and Armenians) (Tunaya, 1952: 239-254, 277285; Ahmad, 1971: 53, 67; Aksjn, 1972). The Islamic opposition, on the other hand, although favorable to constitutionalism, was critical of both the Young Turks and the Liberals because of their secularism, and it found its most radical political expression in the Muhammedan Union (Ittihad-i Muhammedi Firkasi) founded in 1909 (Tunaya, 1952: 261-275; Ahmad, 1971: 69-72; Berkes, 1973: 379382). The short-lived revolt of April 12-13, 1909 (known as the "31 March Incident") against the Young Turk domiated government was carried out by the cooperation between the Liberal and the Islamic oppositions. 4 Such cooperation was also observed in the formation of the Liberal Union (Hurriyet ve Itildf) in 1911 as the main opposition 4

The "Incident" cannot be seen as a pure reactionary movement. Recent research has shown that the Liberal opposition was instrumental in preparing the uprising. Religion was exploited largely as a means of inciting the soldiers. As such, the uprising was neither pro-Abdulhamid, nor anti-Constitutionalist (Aksin, 1970; Ahmad, 1971: 72-73).

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party against the Union and Progress. The Union was a motley group formed by the merging of almost all opponents of the Young Turks: liberal intellectuals, religious traditionalists, and ethnic minorities (Tunaya, 1952: 315— 344; Ahmad, 1971: 135-137, 152; Lewis, 1968: 221). When we characterize the dominant social cleavage in the second Ottoman constitutional regime as a centerperiphery one, we must make some important qualifications. It is true that the issue of centralization versus decentralization, which constitutes an important element in the center-periphery syndrome, dominated much of the political debates of the era. But the Liberal opposition, which tried to make political capital out of its advocacy of decentralization, could not take strong local roots in the countryside. In this sense, it was more a party of the elite than of the periphery. The Union and Progress, on the other hand, was able to incorporate some local notables, especially by utilizing the factionalism among them (Akarh, 1975: 143; Ahmad, 1971: 53, 238; Karpat, 1972: 280281). However, the predominantly official character of its cadres was unmistakably clear. Ak§in (1971: 169-172; 1970: 5) has argued that, while in some provinces the Union and Progress had but little choice to nominate local notables for Parliament, its true recruitment criteria were to be Turkish, educated, young, and from the "official" class. The Union and Progress leadership always treated local notables with some distrust. "In the Young Turk parliament," observed Mardin (1973: 181)," the notables' bills aiming at decentralization and less military control singled them out for suspicion at a time when separatist currents were beginning to be seen as a real threat." The notables, in their turn, did not hide their opposition against the Young Turk efforts to further centralize the administrative structure of the state (Ahmad, 1971: 2 0 1 202). One may argue, therefore, that had the opposition been given sufficient time and opportunity, they could have gained substantial support among local notables (i.e., the anti-official periphery). This may be the main reason 40

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for the reluctance of the Young Turks to give the opposition freedom to organize and propagate in the provinces while tolerating it, to some degree, in Istanbul. Apparently, the Union and Progress leadership was well aware of the potential threat that such an alliance could pose to its position (Aksjn, 1972: 559). II.

REPUBLICAN TURKEY

The political alignments of the late Ottoman Empire persisted, by and large, in the Republican Turkey, and helped to shape the present Turkish party system. The role of the Union and Progress as the centralizing, secularizing, and nationalistic element was now played by the Republican People's Party (RPP). As was the case in the Ottoman constitutional regime, these policies were opposed by the forces of the periphery, joined by Muslim traditionalists. The internal uprisings against the Kemalists during the War of Independence (1919-1922) and the frequent Kurdish revolts after the proclamation of the Republic often combined both elements of opposition, namely the religious reaction against secularism, and the local hostility against the centralizing tendencies of the officialdom. However, the most visible power struggle was still at the center, within the official elite itself. "It is . . . very difficult to isolate and identify any clear economic factors or forces in the earlier phases of the Turkish revolutionary struggle. The contenders for power were different groups or factions within the governing elite—all of them dependent on the state for a livelihood, and regarding the public service as a natural and proper career for men of their kind" (Lewis, 1968: 463, 485). Thus, the Progressive Republican Party opposition of 1924—1925 contained an even larger proportion of officials (including some of the top military leaders of the War of Independence) than the governing RPP (Frey, 1965: 332-335). The short-lived Free Party opposition of 1930 was also hardly distinguishable from the RPP in terms of the social background characteris41

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tics of its deputies (Frey, 1965: 342-343). Nevertheless, the fact remains that, had these opposition parties been in existence for a sufficient length of time, they would conceivably have capitalized on the discontent in the periphery. The temptation to do so would be too great for almost any opposition party to resist. Thus, the Progressive Republicans could not help wooing the Islamic opposition by stating in their party program that they would be respectful of religious opinions and beliefs, and reportedly there was considerable interest in the party in Eastern Turkey (Tunaya, 1952: 611, 613, 617). Similarly, the Free Party did pretty well in the municipal elections of 1930 in many provincial towns, despite the doubtful fairness of elections (Weiker, 1973 a: 110-116). Another similarity with the second Constitutional period is that the RPP, like the Union and Progress and probably to an even greater extent, was able to co-opt a substantial number of local notables into its ranks. In fact, the RPP has generally been described as a party born out of an alliance between the central military-bureaucratic elite and local notables (Mardin, 1973: 182-183; K ^ u k o m e r , 1969: 99; Ozbudun, 1970: 387-390; Gune§, 1961; Hyland, 1969: 239-261). Frey (1965: 89-98, 133-134 and passim) has shown, in his profound analysis of the social background of Turkish deputies, that government officials and intellectuals were clearly dominant in the National Assembly during the single-party era, but that there was also in the Assembly a sizable group of locally based deputies. "The local potentate," he observed, "was usually of moderate education, less urban, and less broad in his cultural values, but a power in his own community and probably viewed as a man of great capacity at that lower level." Frey's findings seem to reflect accurately the relative strength of the two distinct elements in the RPP coalition: the national military-bureaucratic elite was the major partner, but the local notables, most of whom were undoubtedly large landlords, also wielded considerable influence. This influence was naturally greater at the local than at the national level. Thus, although the "local 42

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leader" type constituted a relatively small contingent in the National Assembly, they generally dominated local governments and the local levels of the RPP apparatus. This alliance was, at least partly, dictated by the circumstances of the Turkish War of Independence. The military-bureaucratic elite and the local gentry were probably the two groups with the greatest interest in maintaining an independent Turkish state, and the only groups capable of mobilizing the peasant majority into a war of national liberation. Both the impressionistic accounts of the nationalist struggle and a few available studies of modern social science provide strong evidence for such an alliance. It was probably during this period that the Kemalist elite was most dependent upon the support of the local notables. This is indicated by the fact that local elements were more strongly represented in the First Assembly of 1920-1923 (as measured by the percentage of deputies born in the area they represented in the Assembly) than in all the following single-party assemblies (Frey, 1965: 187-188). Another reason for this alliance lies in the nature of the "modernization" program that the Kemalist leadership envisaged for Turkey. The Kemalist conception of modernization involved mainly the adoption of Western political and cultural institutions, with no radical change in the existing social structure. The main components of the RPP's philosophy were nationalism, secularism, and etatism, all conceived as means of strengthening the state (or the center). The Kemalist concept of populism "had undertones of plebiscitarian democracy and the State's duty to eliminate 'intermediate' groups," rather than economic and political liberalism (Mardin, 1973: 182-183). As Frey (1965: 40-43; 1963 a: 313) points out, the immediate goal of the revolutionary leaders was not to improve the peasant's lot fundamentally or to grant him increased political power. The Ataturk Revolution exploited the basic bifurcation between the educated elite and uneducated masses, rather than deploring it or immediately attacking it. The essence of the Turkish Revolution is that it concentrated on 43

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the extension and consolidation of the precarious beachhead won by the Westernized intellectuals, to make it secure beyond all possible challenge. "It was not . . . a revolution 'from the bottom up'—an attempt to remold the society by starting with the peasant masses." Given the nature of this modernization program, small wonder that the RPP's military-bureaucratic leadership felt no need to change their wartime allies. On the contrary, the support of local notables was essential to maintaining law and order in the countryside and to enabling the central leadership to devote its energies to the program of Westernization. The notables, in their turn, had little reason to oppose such a program, since, by its nature, it did not pose a threat to their local power. Furthermore, their cooperation with the government, which increasingly penetrated into the countryside, seems to have enhanced their power, rather than decreasing it. Thus, an implicit tradeoff materialized between the two groups. The provincial notable class supported the modernization efforts of the national elite, in return for which it was allowed to retain its land, status, and local influence, as evidenced by the conspicuous absence of any land reform under the Republican governments. Further benefits accrued to the local gentry in this trade-off were the abolition of the tithe (the A$ar tax), the final legal recognition of their private land ownership through the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code in 1926, and their acquisition of sizable land holdings formerly held by the Greek and Armenian minorities. The nature of the alliance was also reflected in the organizational structure of the RPP, which chose to remain a cadre party, an elite organization. Interestingly, the RPP leadership made little effort to broaden the party's popular base and to enlist the support of the peasant masses. The main loser in this trade-off seems to be the peasant majority. In terms of public policy, little was done, apart from the abolition of the tithe, to improve the lot of the peasantry. In terms of the organization of political power, the ruling coalition of bureaucrats and notables excluded

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the peasant masses from any effective share of power (Mardin, 1973: 183). Thus, in Huntington's (1970: 15-16) typology of one-party systems, the RPP rule neatly fits the "exclusionary one-party" type, where "the party maintains its monopoly over political participation by limiting the scope of political participation," rather than by either liquidating or assimilating the subordinate social force. The Turkish rural masses were further alienated by the excessive economic hardships of the World War II years and the authoritarian methods of the bureaucracy. In the typical peasant image, the RPP rule came to be identified with the gendarmery (rural military police) and the tax collector. However, the alliance between the national bureaucratic elite and the provincial notables was more a marriage of convenience than a manifestation of a genuine integration between the center and the periphery. Each maintained distinctive identities, outlooks, priorities, and "operational codes" throughout the single-party years. As Mardin (1973: 182) notes, "between 1923 and 1946 the periphery—in the sense of the provinces—was suspect, and because it was considered an area of potential disaffection, the political center kept it under close observation." The first serious crack in the ruling alliance became evident in the land reform debates of 1945. The National Assembly debates on the reform bill submitted by the government show, perhaps better than anything else, the dual nature of the RPP. While the bureaucratic-intellectual wing of the party strongly supported the measure, the representatives of landed interests vehemently opposed it. Even though the bill was eventually passed, the RPP governments could not apply its more radical provisions in the face of strong intra-party and extra-party opposition. Finally, in 1950, such provisions were repealed by the Assembly on the proposal of the RPP government (Aydemir, 1967: n, 320349; Karpat, 1959: 117-125; Ozbudun, 1970: 397-398). Although the only land reform attempt of the RPP thus ended in total failure, it cost the party some support among the large landowners. The newly established Democratic

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party (DP) was quick in coming to the defense of the landed interests, and two of the founders of the DP, former RPP members Adnan Menderes (himself a landowner and lawyer) and Refik Koraltan, were among the severest critics of the reform bill during the National Assembly debates. The 1950 elections are undoubtedly a most important turning point in the recent political history of Turkey. The RPP, which ruled the country as a single party for more than two decades, was voted out of office, and for the first time in Turkey the government changed hands by means of free and honest elections, certainly a very rare, if not unique, case in developing countries. It is a particularly important question for us to determine the social bases of the Democrats and the Republicans, and to probe into the causes of such a realignment in the party system. The most commonly accepted interpretation of the 1950 elections attributes the victory of the Democrats to their successful appeal to the peasantry and to the new commercial and industrial middle class, joined by religious leaders who had never forgiven the RPP for its policy of enforced secularization (Lewis, 1968: 316-318, 473-474; Huntington, 1968: 452-455, and 1970: 20-22; Roos and Roos, 1971: 39-40, 45). While this explanation is basically sound, a closer look suggests certain important modifications. As for the commercial middle classes, it is certainly true that they became increasingly unhappy with the etatist economic policies of the RPP after 1930's, and especially with the stringent economic controls of the World War II years. The punitive capital levy (Varhk Vergisi) of 1942, even though directed, in practice, mainly against non-Turkish enterprises, further alienated the business groups. The Democrats, on the other hand, strongly attacked the etatist policies and advocated a shift toward a more liberal reliance on private enterprise. Consequently, the DP found particularly strong support in the business community. However, this new commercial middle class was not strong enough to constitute a sizable portion of the Democratic coalition. As for the peasantry as the other main source of support for the DP, it should be born in mind that an urban46

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rural cleavage that developed in some European countries, especially in the early phases of industrialization, "between the primary producers in the countryside and the merchants and the entrepreneurs in the towns and the cities" (Lipsetand Rokkan, 1967: 19-21) has never materialized in Turkey. In fact, in the 1950 elections, the DP seems to have done somewhat better in the cities than in the countryside. Although Turkish voting statistics do not provide an urban-rural breakdown for elections prior to 1961, in 1950 the Democrats carried all provinces with a heavy urban population. The DP vote in 1950 was meagerly, but positively, correlated with provincial urbanization (as measured by the proportion of the population of province living in settlements with more than 10,000 inhabitants), while the RPP vote correlated with a relatively higher rural population (Frey, 1970 b: 24). On the basis of such evidence, it can be estimated that an even split in the rural vote plus a substantial majority in the cities gave the Democrats a nationwide majority of 53 percent in 1950 (Robinson, 1965: 142). Thus, although the rural vote was an important element in the Democratic victory, it is not accurate to describe the Turkish party system in the 1950's in terms of a conflict between a primarily urban RPP and a heavily rural DP. One should also emphasize in this respect that few genuinely rural types were included in the Democratic national elite. For example, in the heavily Democratic Ninth Assembly (1950-1954), agriculturists numbered only 10 percent of the deputies, as opposed to 45 percent for the professional category and 17 percent for the merchants. A great majority of the DP deputies (69 percent in the Eighth Assembly, and 73 percent in the Ninth) had university-level education, only slightly lower than the figures for the RPP group (Frey, 1965: 181, 353, 358). The bulk of the Democratic leadership was drawn, not from rural elements proper, but from provincial professionals and merchants. While these were undoubtedly closer to rural voters and more favorable to rural interests than was the bureaucratic elite, they were, in many respects, as "urban" as the RPP leadership. The

47

TRANSFORMATIONS

Turkish election of 1950 differs, therefore, from Huntington's (1968: 448-460) model of ruralizing elections. It may perhaps be more appropriately described as a "provincializing election." We can gain a better understanding of the differential appeals of the DP and the RPP by studying the regional variations in and socio-economic concomitants of each party's vote. A detailed analysis along these lines will be presented in the following chapters. It suffices to say here that in 1950 the DP did relatively better in the more modern regions of the country, and the RPP performed best in the least modernized eastern regions. Similarly, the DP's provincial voting percentage correlated positively with such indicators of modernization as national taxes collected, all-weather roads, persons hospitalized, and primary school students. There was also a strong positive correlation between the DP vote and Turkish as the native language. The RPP vote, on the other hand, correlated negatively with all these as well as with some other indicators of modernization. It seems clear that, in contrast to the DP, the RPP received disproportionately greater support from the more backward provinces in the 1950 elections (Frey, 1970 b· 24-26). These differential appeals tell us a great deal about the nature of social cleavages within the Turkish society. The DP successfully appealed to both some urban elements and to the more developed peasantry, since it was precisely among these more mobilized sectors that the grievances against the RPP rule were more acutely felt and more freely expressed. 5 Historically, the emergence of political 5 Interestingly, the same trend could be observed in the abortive Free Party experiment in 1930. Thus, according to Weiker's (1973 a: 115, n. 3) figures, out of 31 localities where the Free Party won municipal elections, 27 were in the Marmara-Aegean region. Frey (1965: 343) has similarly argued that the real strength of the Free Party was "lying in the expanding and increasingly restive professional and commercial classes in the country, in the modern, locally oriented, but anti-People's Party denizens of littoral Turkey."

48

TRANSFORMATIONS

parties has often been a response to a demand for greater political participation by some groups heretofore excluded from political power. But a demand for political participation, in turn, presupposes some degree of objective and attitudinal modernization (LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966: 17-21). This may suggest why the DP found a more fertile ground among the more modernized, mobilized sectors of the population. In this sense, the emergence and victory of the DP can be said to be associated with a "participation crisis." It is also interesting that the RPP, the party of the modernizing elite, performed best of all in the least modernized, semi-feudal eastern regions. T h e most plausible explanation for this apparent paradox is that, in 1950, the RPP was able to retain much of its support among local notables, and in those areas where such notables could control and deliver large blocs of votes, this provided a winning margin for the party. In other words, the old alliance between the bureaucratic-intellectual elite and local notables was apparently still alive, despite some defections caused by the abortive attempt at land reform. But with increasing social modernization and under the conditions of a free multi-party competition, these forces were not able to command a nationwide popular majority. More specifically, while local notables were influential enough to mobilize their supporters in the less developed east, they could not exert much influence upon the more modern peasantry of the west, who were more responsive to the leadership of provincial merchants and professionals. This is supported by some findings of a survey of local party leaders in the Izmir area. A majority of our respondents stated that there were no persons in their district who could personally influence the voting decisions of a large number of voters. In addition to the continuing strength of the RPP in less modern rural areas, the dyadic power structure in many Turkish villages helped maintain a relatively even split in the peasant vote. (See Ch. 7.) A glance at the social composition of the leading cadres 49

TRANSFORMATIONS

of the RPP and the DP may provide further insights into the nature of the dominant social cleavage in Turkey. The top leadership of the DP did not differ significantly from that of the RPP, since the DP itself was formed by some prominent members of the RPP. In that sense, Mardin (1973: 184-185) has argued that the DP "was not so much a party of notables as it was a party that speculated with a political ideology which it thought would be strongly supported by the rural masses and by their patrons. . . . Ironically, the four official founders were just as much part of the bureaucratic 'class' as other People's Party members." However, when we look at the lower echelons of party leadership, we begin to see significant inter-party differences. Thus Frey (1965: 180-192, 350-353, 357-359), studying the changes in the social composition of the Grand National Assembly concomitantly with the transition to a multi-party system, has demonstrated that the proportion of the professionals (especially lawyers) and merchants in the Assembly began to rise modestly in the last single-party Assembly (1943-1946), rose further with the introduction of the multi-party system in the Eighth Assembly, and "jumped ahead with a bound when the Democrats came to power in 1950" (Table 2.1). The professional and commercial contingents that constituted 27 and 10 percent, respectively, of the total number of deputies in the Sixth Assembly (19391943) rose sharply to 45 and 17 percent in 1950. This corresponded to an equally marked decline in the representation of the "official" group (government officials, military personnel, and educators) from 47 percent in the Seventh Assembly to merely 22 percent in the Ninth (1950-1954). Another important, and related, development was the rise of the local politicians. If "localism" is measured by the proportion of deputies born in the region they represent, such proportion increased from 47 percent in the Sixth Assembly to 68 percent in the Ninth. No doubt, both trends were also reflected in the composition of the RPP elite. The RPP group in the Eighth Assembly differed from the RPP

5°

TRANSFORMATIONS TABLE

2.1

Changes in the Occupational Composition of the Grand National Assembly and the Rise of Localism During the Transition to the Multi-Party Period (Percentages)

Occupation Official Professional Trade Agriculture Other

VI 1939

Assembly VII ' 1943

VIII 1946

IX 1950

47% 27 10 6 10

47Vc 31 7 7 7

36% 35 13 9 6

22% 45 17 1C 7

47

49

66

68

XXX

Born in the region of constituency represented

Source. Adapted from Frey (1965: 181, 190). g r o u p in the Seventh Assembly in t h a t it i n c l u d e d m o r e locally b o r n d e p u t i e s (56 to 4 5 percent) a n d fewer in official occupations (39 to 47 p e r c e n t ) , which suggests that the p a r t y was e n g a g e d in a major a d j u s t m e n t effort. H o w e v e r , t h e r e still r e m a i n e d a substantial difference between the R P P a n d the DP, which was "even f u r t h e r d o w n the r o a d which the People's Party was traveling." T h e real r e p r e s e n tatives a n d beneficiaries of the new t r e n d s in T u r k i s h politics were, u n d o u b t e d l y , the D e m o c r a t s . " M u c h of the political history of the era," concludes Frey (1965: 1 9 5 - 1 9 6 ) , "is w r a p p e d u p in the decline of t h e officials a n d t h e rise of the professional a n d economic contingents in t h e G r a n d National Assembly. T h e 'new m a n in T u r k i s h politics' is t h e lawyer a n d the m e r c h a n t , r e p l a c i n g the soldier a n d the b u r e a u c r a t at the pinnacle of formal power. . . . (T)he d e p u t i e s h a v e c h a n g e d from b e i n g primarily a national elite g r o u p , oriented t o w a r d the tutelary d e v e l o p m e n t of the c o u n t r y , to b e i n g primarily a n assemblage of local 51

TRANSFORMATIONS

politicians, oriented toward more immediate local and political advantages." Frey's findings on the national political elite have been supported by the limited available data on local party leaders. Tachau (1973 a), who studied certain social background characteristics of the members of provincial party committees in the early 1960's, found that in twelve selected provinces, more than two-thirds of the Justice party (JP) committee members were engaged in commerce and industry, and another one-fourth in professions. The RPP provincial committees included fewer merchants and industrialists, and a larger number of professionals and farmers. As for the educational background, a majority (57 percent) in both parties have completed high school or better, although the RPP has a slightly higher proportion of university graduates. In one of the provinces he studied more intensively (Adana), Tachau observed that the "new wealth" represented mainly by the industrialists favored the JP, while the "older wealth" represented by landowners generally remained loyal to the RPP. To summarize, in the political alignments of the late 1940's and the 1950's, the RPP, which combined government officials, some large landowners, and a substantial portion of the more backward peasantry still under the influence of their patrons, was opposed by the DP backed by the commercial middle class, the urban poor, and the more modern sections of the rural population. The heterogeneous character of the DP coalition suggests that the dominant social cleavage of the era was cultural and territorial, rather than socio-economic in nature. The common denominator of the DP supporters was their opposition to the center of officialdom. In this sense, the rise of the DP can be interpreted as the victory of the periphery over the center, which could have taken place decades ago had the earlier experiments with multi-party politics not been abruptly terminated. Just as in the late Ottoman Empire the peasants and the local gentry were driven into the same camp because of their common enmity to government 52

TRANSFORMATIONS

officials, the common grievances against the RPP elite brought about an alliance among the businessmen and workers, landlords and landless peasants, clerics and urban professionals. This alignment proved remarkably stable in the 1950's, and survived the 1960 military coup, which was essentially a reaction by the official (i.e., militarybureaucratic-intellectual) elites to what they considered a serious threat to the interests of the state (the center). That the Turkish party system in the 1950's rested on a center-periphery cleavage can also be observed by studying the ideological orientations of the two major parties. Although neither of them was much interested in ideological consistency, and the partisan conflict centered around what we may term "valence issues," such as Ataturk reforms, economic development, and democracy, rather than on "position issues,"6 underlying attitudinal inter-party differences could often be discerned. The DP and the RPP differed significantly from each other in their attitudes toward the proper role of the state, of bureaucracy, of private enterprise, of local initiative, and toward peasant participation in politics. While the RPP-oriented national elite had a more tutelary conception of development, the provincial elites around the DP emphasized local initiative and "the immediate satisfaction of local expectations" (Frey, 1965: 196-197). While there may be some unique aspects of these political alignments, a broad parallel can be drawn with the development of certain European party systems. In Lipset and Rokkan's (1967: 33-50) suggestive typology, an alignment of secular and centralist nation-builders with the 6 Valence issues, as distinct from position issues, "are characterized by only one body of opinion on values or goals—they define a condition or a situation which is highly valued by the electorate, and political leaders do not take 'one side or the other.' Valence issues are exemplified by peace and prosperity. . . . Conflict over valence issues consists primarily in each party trying to associate the other party with an undesirable condition . . . and to associate itself with the 'good' side of the valence issue" (Schneider, 1972: 2).

53

89.3 86.6 76.6 81.4 71.3 64.3

Year

1950 1954 1957 1961 1965 1969

53.3 56.6 47.3

DP

34.8 52.9 46.5

JP

39.9 34.8 40.6 36.7 28.7 27.4

RPP

DP: Democrat P. JP: justice P. RPP: Republican Peoples' P. NP, RNP, RPNP: Nation P., Republican Nation P., Republican Peasant Nation P. NAP: National Action P.

Voting Turnout

TABLE

2.2

3.1 4.8 7.0 14.0 6.3 3.2

NP, RNP, RPNP

3.8

FP

3.0 2.7

TLP

¥P: Freedom P. TLP: Turkish Labor P. NTP: New Turkey P. UP: Unity P. RP: Reliance P. Ind: Independents

2.2 3.0

RPNP NAP

13.7 3.7 2.2

NTP

Voting T u r n o u t a n d Party Choices in National Elections 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 6 9 (in percentages)

2.8

UP

6.6

RP

4.8 1.5 0.1 0.8 3.2 5.6

Ind.

TRANSFORMATIONS

landed interests is likely to produce an opposing alliance among the peripheral forces, the Church, and the industrial interests. Restoration Spain (1875-1923) has been given as the closest empirical approximation of this possibility. Thus, the conflict between the industrial and industrializing periphery of Catalonia and the Basque country, and "the bureaucratic capital of Madrid and its supporters in the largely underdeveloped rural and provincial Spain," argues Linz (1967: 199, 208), "is a unique characteristic of Spanish politics in the early twentieth century. . . . This cleavage is particularly visible in the 'tale of two cities': Barcelona and Madrid—the industrial metropolis and the capital of the . . . centralistic state." One wonders if this statement would not read equally well by substituting the Marmara and the Aegean regions for Catalonia and the Basque country, Istanbul for Barcelona, and Ankara for Madrid. The main difference between the two countries is that while in Spain the peripheral opposition could not become a national party, probably because of the cultural, historical, and linguistic distinctiveness of Catalonia and the Basque country, in Turkey the DP was able to unite the peripheral, cultural (i.e., religious) and socio-economic (i.e., bourgeois) oppositions. In this sense, the Turkish party system showed much greater adaptability than that of Restoration Spain. However, center-periphery conflicts tend, by their nature, to be transitional phenomena, unless they are based on more enduring ethnic, religious, historical, or cultural cleavages. With increasing industrialization and social mobilization, they tend to be replaced by functional cleavages. Turkey, being a relatively homogeneous country in terms of language, religion, ethnicity, culture, and historical traditions, seems to have a good potential for the development of functional cleavages. Furthermore, the wide scope of governmental activities makes the control of the machinery of government an important prize to be fought over by competing functional groups. Turkish attitudes toward the government may also work in the same direction:

55

TRANSFORMATIONS

Turks are generally inclined to depend on the state for the solution of their problems. Such factors make likely the emergence of a functional cleavage as the new basis of the Turkish party system. Indeed, evidence indicating that such a change has already started to manifest itself in the late 1960's will be presented throughout the book. So far, our discussion of the present Turkish party system has been limited to the two major parties, the RPP and the DP (later the JP). Now, a few words on the minor parties seem to be in order (Table 2.2). The Nation Party (NP), the oldest of the present minor parties, dates back to 1948, when it was formed by a group of dissident Democrats. The party, which changed its name first to the Republican Nation Party (RNP) and then to the Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP) in the 1950's, appealed to a somewhat more conservative and traditionalist clientele than did the DP. But, despite the energetic leadership of Osman Bolukba§i, the party's electoral success was limited in the 1950's. After a brief surge in the 1961 elections, the party split in 1962, when Bolukba§i left it, along with a group of National Assembly members, to reestablish the Nation Party, which has now become almost extinct, with only 0.6 percent of the total vote in the 1973 elections. The remaining elements of the RPNP, after a few years of weak leadership and poor showings in the 1963 local elections and the 1964 Senate elections, elected in August 1965 as party leader ex-Colonel Alpaslan Turke§, who had joined the party only a few months earlier. Under Turkes's leadership the RPNP changed not only its name (to National Action Party, NAP, in 1969), but also its character. One of the masterminds of the 1960 coup, Tiirkes, glorified by his followers as "The Leader" (Ba§bug) and vilified by his opponents as a fascist with dictatorial ambitions, has turned the moribund RPNP into a highly dedicated, strictly disciplined, and hierarchically organized political force, with special emphasis on the militialike youth organizations. The NAP's ideology combines an ardent nationalism and anti-communism with strongly

56

TRANSFORMATIONS

etatist policies. Despite its organizational strength, however, the party has so far shown very limited electoral appeal. The New Turkey Party (NTP) was established in 1961 by Ekrem Alican, one of the leaders of the short-lived Freedom Party and an ex-Finance Minister under the National Unity Committee administration of 1960-1961. A moderately conservative party, the NTP competed with the JP for the votes of the former Democrats. It was relatively successful in the 1961 elections, especially in Eastern Turkey, due to its lead in organizing the former Democrats there. However, as the J P established itself as the principal heir to the DP, the NTP lost ground steadily, and in 1973 decided to merge with the J P. The Turkish Labor Party (TLP) was also established in 1961 by a group of trade unionists. But it was only after Mehmet Ali Aybar, a writer and a former university professor, became the leader of the party in 1962 that the TLP turned into an active political force. The TLP's ideology was of Marxist orientation, although the ideological rift between the proponents of the more and the less orthodox versions of Marxism consumed a great deal of the party's energies in the late 1960's, and this affected adversely its fortunes in the 1969 elections. The party was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1972, following the military intervention of March 1971. The Unity Party (UP) was founded in October 1966. While the party appears to receive disproportionately greater support from the Alevis (Shiites), its program and public statements do not bear the marks of a denominational party. The party has openly social-democratic views, and claims to be somewhat to the left of the RPP. The UP has not fared quite well electorally, with 2.8 percent of the vote in 1969 and only 1.1 percent in 1973. The Reliance Party (RP) was founded in May 1967 by a group of dissident members of Parliament who resigned from the RPP, accusing the new left-of-center policy of the latter as excessively socialistic. Led by ex-Professor Turhan Feyzioglu and expounding center-Right views, the RP was

57

TRANSFORMATIONS

joined in 1973 by a new group of dissident ex-RPP members and, consequently, changed its name to the Republican Reliance Party (RRP). The party received 6.6 percent of the vote in the 1969 National Assembly elections, and 5.3 percent in 1973, a decline that seems to have continued since 1973. The two new actors in Turkish politics in the 1970's (not covered by the present study) are the National Salvation Party (NSP) and the Democratic Party (Dem.P). The NSP originated as the National Order Party (NOP) in early 1970. Led by Necmeddin Erbakan, a former university professor, industrialist, and an ex-JP member, the NOP had an explicitly Islamic orientation. The party was banned by the Constitutional Court in 1972, but was reestablished prior to the 1973 elections under the name of the National Salvation Party. It seems to combine its defense of Islamic moral and cultural values with a defense of the interests of the Anatolian merchants, artisans, and small businessmen. The NSP accuses the JP of having become a tool of the big and cosmopolitan business groups in Istanbul and having neglected the small businessmen of Anatolia. The Democratic Party (Dem.P) was formed also in 1970 by a group of former JP members who disagreed with Demirel mainly on the question of party leadership. The party received 11.9 percent of the vote in the 1973 elections, but has lost a good number of its deputies (and probably a large part of its popular support as well) to the JP since then. Without a clear-cut social base of support, the party's electoral strength seems to be declining. This description of the transformations of the Turkish party system tends to support our major argument that the center-periphery cleavage is being replaced by a functional cleavage as the new basis of the party system. Both the changes within the major parties and the changing fortunes of the minor parties attest to the growing importance of socio-economic issues in Turkish politics. Thus, the RPP has undergone a significant ideological transformation since 1965, to become a social-democratic party with a more 58

TRANSFORMATIONS

homogeneous membership, more coherent views on socioeconomic policies, and a more populist approach in matters of political style and organization. The JP, on the other hand, seems to have moved closer to the big business groups, thereby alienating, to some extent, the small businessmen and merchants as well as the urban workingclass. Although the changes in the JP were admittedly less clearly perceivable than those in the RPP, such an interpretation would explain the substantial losses of the JP in the 1973 elections. As for the minor parties, it seems that the personalistic or regional minor parties (the NP, the NTP, and the RP) have declined in the last decade and ideological minor parties (the NAP, and the TLP) have appeared on the scene for the first time. Interestingly, even the NSP, which, on the surface, does not depend on a functional cleavage, feels it necessary to include a heavy dose of socioeconomic planks in its program. All these changes represent an increase in the relative importance of socioeconomic issues and a sharpening of ideological cleavages. The degree to which such changes are reflected in voting patterns will be the subject of more detailed analyses in the following chapters.

59

THREE

EQUALITY, MOBILITY, AND ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

IN this chapter we shall deal with the role of three major intervening variables (viz., equality, mobility, and organizational involvement) in the flow from socio-economic modernization to political participation in Turkey. However, some inevitable limitations of the attempted analysis should be made clear at the outset. First, in the absence of pertinent nationwide survey data, it is impossible to establish with any certainty how these variables are related to political participation at the individual level. We will concentrate, therefore, on the aggregate changes in equality, mobility, and organizational involvement in the period under study, and compare them with the aggregate changes in voting participation. Secondly, since different sets of available longitudinal data on certain aspects of socio-economic equality are not readily comparable, conclusions about the changes over time in the relative shares will necessarily remain rather tentative. Our discussion of socio-economic equality as measured by the distribution of income and land will be followed by an analysis of geographical and social mobility, and the closely related question of access to education. Organizational involvement will be analyzed in terms of the changes in the number and kinds of voluntary associations. Obviously, this analysis is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the processes of social change in Turkey, a task much beyond the scope of the present study. Rather, I have concentrated on those aspects of socio-economic change which are most likely to affect political participation. 60

4.5 8.5 11.5 18.5 57.0

Families

20 20 20 20 20

4.2 6.4 10.7 17.7 61.0

Boratav 1963 3.0 7.0 10.0 20.0 60.0

Bulutay et. al. 1968

Percentage of Income

Source: Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel (1971: 16).

of

SPO 1963

Percentage

TABLE

3.1

20 40 60 80 100

Cumulative Percentage of Families

Distribution of I n c o m e A m o n g Families ( F r o m t h e Poorest to t h e Richest)

4.5 13.0 24.5 43.0 100.0

SPO 1963

4.2 10.6 21.3 39.0 100.0

Boratav 1963

3.0 10.0 20.0 40.0 100.0

Bulutay et. al. 1968

Cumulative • Percentage of Income

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND

INVOLVEMENT

I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC EQUALITY

1. Distribution of Income Data on income distribution in Turkey are of relatively recent origin. The first such study was carried out by the Turkish State Planning Organization (SPO) in 1963 (State Planning Organization, 1966). The SPO study's figures were later re-examined and somewhat modified by Boratav (1966). The most recent and comprehensive study is the one by Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel (1971) carried out in 1968, based on a national survey of about 5,000 households. The summary results of all three studies are presented in Table 3.1. Table 3.1 reveals that income distribution in Turkey is highly skewed. While the top one-fifth of the families receive some 60 percent of the total national income, those in the bottom fifth get only about 3 to 4 percent. Based on the studies quoted, Boratav (1966: 74) calculated the Gini coefficient as 0.557, and Bulutay et al. (1971: 15) as 0.5648. Although differences in data sources and methodology make rigorous cross-national comparisons very difficult, the TABLE

3.2

Distribution of I n c o m e by I n c o m e G r o u p s Percent of Families Income Size T.L.

Less than 2,500 2,500-5,000 5,000-10,000 10,000-15,000 15,000-25,000 25,000-50,000 50,000-100,000 More than 100,000

Simple

Cumulative

Percent of Income Simple

Cumulative

19.4 22.9 27.4 12.3 8.9 6.6 1.5

19.4 42.3 69.7 82.0 90.9 97.5 99.0

2.8 7.7 17.9 13.4 15.1 19.6 8.7

2.8 10.5 28.4 41.8 56.9 76.5 85.2

1.0

100.0

14.8

100.0

Source: Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel (1971: 171). 62

EQUALITY, MOBILITY,

AND

INVOLVEMENT

authors of both studies have observed that income inequality in Turkey is greater than in most of the other developed or developing countries for which they presented comparable data (Boratav, 1966: 75-76; Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel, 1971: 17, 19). Table 3.2 shows the distribution of household income by income groups. At the top of the pyramid, 2.5 percent of the families with an annual income of 50.000 T.L. (1 U.S. dollar = 13.5 T.L.) or more receive 23.5 percent of the total national income. The authors of the 1968 study also observed that, among geographical regions, the most equal distribution of income is found in the most highly developed Marmara and Aegean regions, while the least developed Eastern region has the most unequal distribution (Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel, 1971: 29-33,172-174). 1 The level and distribution of income also seem to be associated with the size of the community. The highest average income per household is found in the three largest cities (Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir), and the lowest such income in the villages. Medium-size cities and towns occupy an intermediate position. As for the distribution of income, village households display the most unequal pattern, followed by the three largest cities. Greater income inequality among village households can be partly explained by the substantial differences among villages in the level of socioeconomic development. The most equal distribution seems to be found in towns and medium-size cities. Among the three metropolises, income equality is greatest in Ankara; this can be attributed to the substantial number of government employees in this city. The more active industrial and commercial life in Istanbul and Izmir, on the other hand, appears to attract both rich and poor migrants, thus mak1

T h e Gini index (G) is (0.4487) for the Aegean-Marmara region, and (0.6211) for the Eastern region. It should be pointed out that the regional breakdown employed in the 1968 Income Distribution Study is considerably different from the one I have used here. For provinces included in each region, see Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel (1971: 30).

63

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

ing income distribution highly skewed (Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel, 1971: 67-75, 174-175). Among major occupational categories, government employees display the most equal pattern of income distribution, to be rather closely followed by industrial workers (Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel, 1971: 119-123, 176-177; Boratav, 1966: 92-93). Bulutay et al. have argued that the most unequal distribution is found among agriculturists (farmers and agricultural workers). Indeed, the 1963 SPO study demonstrated that about one-fourth of total agricultural income went to 68.8 percent of the agricultural holdings, while about one-third of total agricultural income was earned by only 3.7 percent of such holdings (State Planning Organization, 1966: 39, 59; 1967: 239-240). This seems to be mainly a function of the inequalities in the distribution of land. Boratav (1966: 85-86, 94-98), on the other hand, found a more equal distribution in the agricultural sector (G = 0.432) than in the non-agricultural sector as a whole (G = 0.594). But he warned that certain assumptions made by the SPO in the calculation of agricultural income could have caused the distribution of such income to look more equal than it really was. At any rate, both studies seem to agree that income inequality was also considerable among non-wage earners in the non-agricultural sector (i.e., big and small merchants, industrialists, and professionals). Table 3.3 provides a summary description of income distribution by region, occupation, and size of the community. It has been hypothesized above (Ch. 1) that socioeconomic inequality breeds group consciousness, which, in turn, leads to organizational involvement and, consequently, to higher levels of political participation. If so, then changes over time in income distribution are even more important for our purposes than income distribution at any particular point in time, since it can be plausibly argued that groups tend to be more sensitive to changes in their level of income than to the absolute level of such income. Here, one should make a further distinction between relative changes and absolute changes. It is entirely

64

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND TABLE

INVOLVEMENT

3.3

Distribution of I n c o m e by Region, O c c u p a t i o n a n d t h e Size of C o m m u n i t y (in p e r c e n t )

Community Size

Trade, Industry, Professions

2

1

2

3

1

1

Richest 10% of the Population

45

33

52

43

31

49

46

3

24

Farmers, Agricultural Workers

Villages (under 2.000)

1

Industrial Workers, Technicians

15.000-50.000

Poorest 10% of the Population

Government Officials

Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir

Occupation

Eastern

Region

Aegean and Marmara

All Turkey

2

1

30

49

Source: Bulutay, Timur and Ersel (1971: 170). Of regions and communities, only those with the most equal and the most unequal distribution have been shown in the Table. Equality (or inequality) of distribution has been measured by the Gini index. All percentage figures represent approximate values.

possible that a social group improves its average income over a certain period of time, while its relative share in national income diminishes. Unfortunately, data on relative changes are less direct and conclusive than those pertaining to absolute changes. It is difficult, therefore, to write with certainty about the distributive gains or losses of any particular social group in the period under study. The general picture that emerges out of the available studies of national income (State Planning Organization,

65

EQUALITY,

M O B I L I T Y , AND

INVOLVEMENT

1963: 8-9; Hershlag, 1968: 284-287; Cohn, 1970: 17-20, 30-32) is that the average per capita income rose during the 1930's mainly as a result of industrial growth, but that it fell considerably during the World War II years because of the market conditions and high military expenditures. Thus, per capita income in 1949 at constant prices was actually lower than that in 1938. "Only after 1950, following the post-War reconstruction period, did a more or less stabilized trend of real growth per capita start again. Except for the sudden j u m p from 1950 to 1951, the real growth for the period 1951-1965 was T.L. 177 p/c, or somewhat more than 36 percent, which amounts, on an annual average, to more than 2.4 percent" (Hershlag, 1968: 286). However, this upward trend was far from even. The impressive increases of 1950-1953, due mainly to agricultural expansion and unusually favorable weather, were followed by some decrease in 1954 and 1955 because of poor or mediocre crops; the average p/c income rose between 1955 and 1959, fell in 1960 and 1961 (probably as a result of the governmental instability associated with the 1960 coup), and started to rise again after 1962. Hershlag (1968: 286) attributes the moderate growth in the 1960's "mainly to industry and tertiary sectors, with agriculture affecting the trend adversely and favourably, alternately, in a rather erratic way." As for the changes in the distribution of income, the First Five Year Development Plan (State Planning Organization, 1963: 48-52) suggests that while all major social groups probably benefitted, in absolute terms, from the economic growth of the 1950-1960 period, such gains were extremely unequal. Thus, although the GNP increased by 38.6 percent in this period, the average real income (at 1950 prices) of government employees increased only by 9 percent; in other words, their share in the total national income decreased by some 22 percent. Boratav (1969 a: 218) has reached the same conclusion with respect to government employees: While their average per capita income was over four times the national average

66

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

(parity ratio) in 1950, it fell to 2.4 in the early 1960's. Simi­ larly, the parity ratio for government employees fell from 1.2 to 0.9 in the non-agricultural sector. In other words, while the average per capita income for government employees was above the average per capita income in the non-agricultural sector in 1950, it fell below this figure in 1965. The situation for industrial workers is somewhat more complicated. According to the estimates of the State Plan­ ning Organization (1963: 20-21, 48-52; see also Poroy, 1972: 354; cf. Ηίς, 1970: 108-109, 167), the relative share of the industrial workers declined about 10 percent be­ tween 1950 and 1960. Boratav (1969 a: 219-221), on the other hand, has argued that the relative share of industrial workers both in the national economy and in the non-agri­ cultural sector has improved in the 1950-1965 period. This improvement was more marked and linear for wor­ kers in public economic enterprises. Although workers in the private sector also benefitted from an overall im­ provement in the entire 15-year period, a relative decline was observed between 1957 and 1965. This decline would have been more substantial had it not been for the positive effects of two exceptional years, 1961 and 1964. In 1961, the effects of the May 27, 1960 military intervention caused a stagnation, if not an actual decline, in commercial and industrial profits, and thus improved the relative share of the wages. In 1964, the introduction of collective bargaining led to a sudden increase in the wages of the industrial workers. Boratav (1969 b: 191-193) has also observed an inverse relationship between the rate of eco­ nomic growth and the relative income improvement of the industrial working-class in the 1950-1965 period. Obviously, these averages may not reflect the changes in the earnings of different sub-strata within each social group. This is especially true for the agricultural sector, which, as has been shown above, displays a rather unequal distribution. According to the State Planning Organiza­ tion's estimates (1963: 50), the rise of per capita income in

67

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agriculture did not keep pace with the overall rise in the GNP, although the relative distributive losses of farmers in the 1950-1960 period (about 7 percent) were less than those of the government employees and industrial workers. Undoubtedly, the agricultural changes affected in the 1950's (expansion of the physical area of cultivation, farm mechanization, commercialization, increasing use of fertilizers, expanding agricultural credits and subsidies) benefitted the owners of large estates much more than they did small landowners and agricultural workers (Boratav, 1969 b: 187-189; Nicholls, 1955: 64, 71). Some village studies suggested that these agro-economic changes have increased the inequality of income among villagers, and may even have caused a decline in the living standards of the landless peasants (Hinderink and Kiray, 1970: 120166, esp. 164). However, such impoverishment in absolute terms seems to be rather exceptional in the agricultural sector. The 1968 Rural Development Research Project Survey carried out by the SPO (a followup of the 1962 Survey) revealed that a majority of Turkish peasants perceived improvement in their life conditions: sixty percent of all male respondents thought that they were financially better-off than before, and only 18.3 percent stated that they were worse-off. This sense of improvement was strongest in the more developed regions (South Central, Aegean, Marmara, and Mediterranean), and weakest in the least developed ones (Southeastern and Northeastern regions) (State Planning Organization, 1970 a: 84-86). Similarly, not all urban middle-class groups (non-wage earners) have been affected in the same way by economic development. While merchants and industrialists seem to be the main relative beneficiaries of economic development (State Planning Organization, 1963: 51), the situation is not so clear for the small bourgoisie (i.e., artisans and small shopkeepers). Some studies indicate that their share in national income is declining, and that they show signs of growing dissatisfaction with their life conditions (Bulutay, 1970: 68

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

89-90; Yucekok, 1971: 98-102, 226-229). However, the rate of industrialization has not been sufficiently high to start a process of rapid proletarianization among these strata. On the contrary, the proportion of urban middleclass within the non-agricultural sector seems to have increased in the 1950-1965 period. Apparently, some ruralto-urban migrants find a place for themselves in this amorphous social category, rather than becoming part of the industrial working-class. To the extent that the relative share of income of small bourgeoisie has declined, the downward social mobility pattern seems to be toward the lower echelons of government service rather than toward the industrial working-class (Boratav, 1969 a: 215, 217218, 1969 b: 149-151, 181-183). In short, while the real income of all major groups increased, in absolute terms, in the last two decades, this was not accompanied by efforts to achieve greater equality of income. To put it differently, it is not true that the rich got richer and the poor got poorer; rather, they both got richer, but the rich got richer at a faster rate (Boratav, 1969 a: 223, n.18). It seems plausible, however, that at the early stages of socio-economic modernization, the degree of social frustration is determined less by the relative changes than by the absolute changes in the standard of living. This may be especially true for the agricultural sector, where differences in consumption patterns are less striking and empathy is more limited than in the urban areas, and it may account for the general political conservatism of a majority of rural voters. Among non-agricultural groups, further distinctions can be made regarding their degree of sensitivity to the relative changes in their share of national income. Government employees probably constitute the most sensitive group, because of their higher levels of education and political information. Furthermore, the fact that their relative income deterioration was the worst in the last two decades might have led them to more intense political participation and to more liberal or radical political perspectives. This deterio69

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

ration was among the major causes of the 1960 military intervention, and of the substantial support given by this group to Leftist parties (the RPP and the TLP) in the 1960's. Industrial workers in the public sector are generally older, better educated, more skilled, more experienced, and with longer urban residence than the average industrial worker, since public economic enterprises tend to be much larger, to utilize higher levels of technology, and to pay higher wages than the average private enterprise. One would have expected, therefore, that this group would have provided the political cadres for a vigorous workingclass movement. Such has not been the case. On the contrary, public enterprises generally give rise to conservative trade unions. This can be explained by the relative improvement in the income of public sector workers. Private sector workers, on the other hand, tend to be younger, less skilled, less experienced, and with shorter urban residence. In other words, recent rural-to-urban migrants seem to provide much of the working force for the private sector. Although their wages are somewhat lower than in the public sector and although they experienced a relative decline since 1957, urban migration itself constitutes an important channel of mobility. Average wages for industrial workers are considerably higher than the average income in the agricultural sector. This sudden improvement makes the new industrial workers in the private sector less sensitive to relative changes in their income situation and more conservative in their political preferences. It will be shown below that the urban migrants provided for a significant source of support for the conservative parties (the DP and the JP) in the last twenty years. Nevertheless, it is interesting that some of the more radical unions that developed in recent years were among the private sector workers (Boratav, 1969 a: 224—227). This was accompanied by a shift of vote away from the JP in the 1969 elections; this will be analyzed below (Ch. 8). We have seen that the relative income loss among the old

7°

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

urban lower-middle class (artisans and shopkeepers) has not so far reached very high proportions. If and when it does, one may expect to see more active political participation and possibly radical political behavior within this group, since they, like the government employees, have the necessary resources, information, and experience for such participation. Conceivably, a sub-conscious nostalgia for the past may involve them with radical Right-wing tendencies. Some observers already see a connection between the strength of such tendencies and the frustrations of the urban small bourgeoisie. However, their gradual absorption by and identification with the urban working-class is also a possibility in the long run. 2. Distribution of Land Despite recent increases in industrialization and urbanization, Turkish economy still remains essentially based on agriculture. As of 1961, the agricultural sector provided 42 percent of the total GNP (State Planning Organization, 1963: 9) and, in 1965, some 70 percent of the population still lived in rural settlements (i.e., those with less than 10,000 population). In other words, for a majority of Turks, land ownership continues to be the main source of wealth. Three principal sources of information on the distribution of land in Turkey are the 1952 Agricultural Survey, and the two agricultural censuses conducted in 1963 and 1970. To these, we might add the 1962 and 1968 Rural Development Research Project surveys, the 1968 income distribution study by Bulutay et al., and the "Village Inventories" conducted by the Turkish Ministry of Village Affairs between 1962 and 1969. Information provided by the 1963 and 1970 censuses pertain to the size of the landholdings held or operated by agricultural households, rather than to the question of ownership. However, data provided on the type of tenure, as well as available survey data, indicate that landless families constitute a small fraction of agricultural households. The percentage of landless families was 8.8 in

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E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

the 1963 Census and 11.6 in the 1970 Census. The census defined "landless families" as those who live in settlements with less than 5,000 population but not engaged in farming or animal husbandry. Consequently, these figures include agricultural laborers and people in non-agricultural occupations (artisans, shopkeepers, non-agricultural workers, and government employees) residing in rural areas, but do not include non-owners who are engaged in farming as tenants or sharecroppers (Boratav, 1972: 785, 799). Frey (1967: 7-10) found that 20 percent of the farming families did not own all or part of the land they farmed; 15 percent them were tenants, 3 percent were agricultural laborers, and 2 percent had some other tenure arrangement. The proportion of landless families was 18.4 percent according to the SPO's rural survey of 1968 (State Planning Organization, 1970 a: 32), and 17.5 percent according to the 1968 income distribution study (Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel, 1971: 17-18). Although this degree of land ownership "compares very favorably with most developing societies" (Frey, 1967: 7), an examination of the distribution of landholdings by size reveals considerable inequality. Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show such distribution on the basis of the 1952, 1963, and 1970 censuses, respectively. Table 3.4 demonstrates that, in 1952, the 62.15 percent of farming families who operated holdings smaller than 50 decares cultivated only 18.64 percent of the total land, while the 1.5 percent of the families with holdings larger than 500 decares held almost one-fourth of the total cultivated land. To put it somewhat differently, about half of the total land is held by 90 percent of the farming families, while the other half is held by just 10 percent. The same can be said about the results of the 1963 Census as revealed by Table 3.5. Small holdings of 1-30 decares amount to 52.17 percent of all agricultural holdings, but include only 12.23 percent of the total cultivated area, whereas large holdings of more than 500 decares constitute 0.49 percent of all holdings, with 11.02 percent of the total cultivated land (Celebican, 1968; 1970; Boratav, 1972: 775). Similarly, the 1970 72

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T TABLE

3.4

Family Land Holdings by Size of Area Cultivated: 1952 Agricultural Survey Size of Holding (Decares)

Percent of Families

Percent of Total Area Cultivated

1-20 21-50 51-75 76-100 101-150 151-200 201-300 301-500 501-700 701 +

30.6 31.5 13.3 8.6 6.7 3.6 2.7 1.5 0.7 0.8

4.3 14.3 10.8 9.9 10.8 8.5 8.8 7.8 5.2 19.6

Source: Qelebican (1968: 32).

TABLE

3.5

Landholdings by Size of Area Cultivated: 1963 Agricultural Census She of Holdings

Percent of Holdings

Percent of Total Area Cultivated

(Decares)

Simple

Cumulative

Simple

Cumulative

1-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-100 101-200 201-500 501-1,000 1,001-2,500 2,501-5,000 5,000+

12.86 12.10 15.95 11.26 9.39 7.20 18.12 9.41 3.22 0.36 0.09 0.03 0.01

12.86 24.96 40.91 52.17 61.56 68.76 86.88 96.29 99.51 99.87 99.96 99.99 100.00

0.68 1.90 4.45 5.20 6.12 6.03 23.88 23.74 16.98 4.51 2.21 1.88 2.42

0.68 2.58 7.03 12.23 18.35 24.38 48.26 72.00 88.98 93.49 95.70 97.58 100.00

Source: Boratav (1972: 775).

73

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T Census revealed that while 60.36 percent of agricultural holdings held 16.51 percent of the total cultivated area, 0.49 percent of holdings with more than 500 decares amounted to 11.18 percent of the total cultivated lands (Table 3.6).

TABLE

3.6

Landholdings by Size of Area Cultivated: 1970 Agricultural Census Percent of Holdings

Area Cultivated

Size of Holdings (Decares)

Simple

Cumulative

Simple

1-5 6-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-100 101-200 201-500 501-1,000 1,001-2,500 2,501-5,000 5,000+

14.89 13.14 20.18 12.15 8.41 6.36 14.68 7.15 2.55 0.42 0.04 0.02 0.01

14.89 28.03 48.21 60.36 68.77 75.13 89.81 96.96 99.51 99.93 99.97 99.99 100.00

1.02 2.36 6.25 6.88 6.64 6.45 23.16 21.80 14.26 5.76 1.48 1.33 2.61

Cumulative 1.02 3.38 9.63 16.51 23.15 29.60 52.76 74.56 88.82 94.58 96.06 97.39 100.00

Source: Boratav (1972: 776).

Since the 1952 and the 1963 censuses did not use com­ parable units (the former was based on farming families, and the latter on agricultural holdings), it seems difficult to determine the direction and the extent of change in the distribution of land, although it has been argued that "dur­ ing these 11 years a very mild tendency toward equalization of land-holdings may have taken place" (Frey, 1967: 7; see also, State Planning Organization, 1966, Part I I : 6-7, 40; Ηΐς, 1970: 140, 168; cf. Boratav, 1966: 87-88). However,

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E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

more direct comparisons can be made between the results of the 1963 and the 1970 Censuses. Table 3.7, which provides such a comparison, indicates an increase in the relative shares of the top 20 percent, as well as the bottom 40 TABLE

3.7

Changes in the Distribution of Land: 1963 and 1970 Censuses

Landholdings Lowest % 20 Next % 20 Next % 20 Next % 20 Highest % 20

Percent of Total Area Cultivated 1963 1970 1.8 3.7 11.7 22.0 60.8 100.0

2.0 5.0 9.3 21.2 62.5 100.0

Source: Boratav (1972: 777).

percent in these seven years. Boratav (1972: 777-783) has observed that the concentration of landholdings as measured by the Gini index seems to have increased in 1970 compared with 1963: G1963 = 0.5914, G1970 = 0.6053. While the number of large holdings has apparently decreased in this period, there seems to be a genuine increase in the number and total area of small holdings with less than 30 decares. The decrease in the number of large holdings may be due partly to sales (sometimes fictive) and fragmentation and partly to underreporting. Indeed, the 1970 Census seems to be more seriously handicapped by the problem of under-reporting than was the 1963 Census, because of the increasing political agitation for land reform. The total cultivated area reported in 1970 was 2.800.000 hectares less than what was reported in 1963, and both figures were well below the area shown by the Current Agricultural Statistics. If, as is very likely to be the case, under-reporting has been

75

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

a more serious problem for large landholdings, then the increase in the concentration of landholdings may be much greater than it was revealed by the census figures. These national figures do not, of course, reveal substantial regional variations in the distribution of land ownership. Both the 1962 and 1968 Rural Development Research Project Surveys indicate that the Black Sea region has the best land distribution, followed by the Marmara and the North Central regions. The Mediterranean and the Southeastern regions, on the other hand, display the poorest (i.e., the most unequal) distribution (Frey, 1967: 15-16; State Planning Organization, 1970 a: 32). Similarly, "Village Inventories" show that the most unequal land distribution is found in the Southeastern region. Thus, five of the six provinces with the poorest distribution in all Turkey are in this region, and the sixth (Adiyaman) is a neighboring province. In these six provinces, 95.7 percent of farming families cultivate less than half of the total land, and 4.2 percent of such families cultivate more than half of it. Predictably, the percentage of landless families is much higher (41 percent) in these provinces than in all Turkey (Celebican, 1970: 162-165). "Village Inventories" also established that 2.1 percent of all Turkish villages (750 villages) belonged to a single person, family, or kin group, and that such villages were concentrated mostly in the east and the southeast (Boratav, 1972: 792). Eleven percent of the villages in the provinces of Tunceli, Agn, Hatay, Mardin, Erzurum, Diyarbakir, Siirt, Urfa, and Gaziantep are in this category (Boratav, 1969 b: 134; also Yasa, 1970: 71-76). The type of tenure arrangement, as distinct from the size distribution of landholdings, may also be an important determining factor in rural political behavior. The 1963 Census revealed that 85.3 percent of the cultivated area was farmed by the owners, and only 14.7 percent by tenants, sharecroppers, or under some other arrangement. However, categories employed in this census do not allow us accurately to establish the proportion of farming families in different tenure arrangements. This has been done in the 76

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

1970 Census, which indicated that the 83.5 percent of farming families owned all the land they farmed, and another 12.0 percent owned part of the land they farmed. Within the latter category, 8.2 percent owned more than 50 percent of the land they farmed, and 3.8 percent less than 50 percent. Farming families who do not own any land constitute only 4.5 percent; 3 percent of them are sharecroppers and 1.5 percent are tenants (Boratav, 1972: 783-791, esp. Tables v m , xi). Boratav (1972: 800-801) found a strong positive correlation between the concentration of landholdings and the ratio of non-owner cultivators (including those who own less than 50 percent of the land they farm) to total rural population. In other words, tenants and sharecroppers are more likely to be found in provinces where land ownership is more concentrated. Another source of information on the types of land tenure has been provided by the 1962 and 1968 Rural Development Research Project Surveys, which employed the same sample and similar questions. In 1962, 58 percent of all respondents reported that their family owned all the land they farmed, and another 22 percent owned part of the land they farmed; 20 percent of the respondents were tenants or agricultural laborers who did not own any land (Frey, 1967: 10). The 1968 results indicated some changes in the land tenure patterns. Although the percentage of landless families remained about the same (18.4), the proportion of full owners rose to 70.2 percent, while the part-owner category was down to almost half (11.4 percent) (State Planning Organization, 1970 a: 32). In view of the gross inequalities in the distribution of land and, consequently, of agricultural income, it is surprising that land is not perceived by the Turkish villagers as a major village or personal problem. One of the interesting findings of the 1962 Rural Development Research Project Survey was that land seemed much less salient to the peasants than did some other issues. "For the total sample, land received the fourth highest percentage of mentiones as the village's most important problem. Water ranked first, being

77

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

designated by 29% of the peasantry, roads (15%) ranked second, 'poverty' (12%) ranked third, and land (10%) was next" (Frey, 1967: 18). Despite intense agitation for land reform by various Leftist groups in the 1960's, the same tendency was also evident in the 1968 follow-up survey, in which land ranked still lower, being mentioned only by 5.9 percent of the respondents as the most important village problem (State Planning Organization, 1970 a: 20). Political behavior in rural Turkey seems to be more deeply affected by the type of land tenure than by the size distribution of landholdings. As we have seen above, a very large majority of Turkish peasants are small ownercultivators (75-80 percent). One would have expected that the mechanization of Turkish agriculture since the 1950's would have led to a much greater concentration of landholdings and, consequently, to a rapid decline in land ownership. This, however, does not seem to be the case. On the contrary, the number of small holdings, as well as the proportion of total cultivated area held by them, appear to have increased. Although income inequality between small and large land owners has become greater in the last two decades, the former have also improved their income in absolute terms. While certain changes in the rural sector (e.g., mechanization, increasing credit facilities, etc.) may have benefitted large land owners much more than the rest of the agricultural population, some others (e.g., roads, irrigation, change to cash crops, favorable agricultural prices) have benefitted all farmers. 2 Finally, the existence 2 Changes in the basic crop, in agricultural equipment and supplies, in agricultural methods, and changes from agricultural to industrial work are usually associated with greater economic opportunities. A comparison of the findings of the 1962 and 1968 Rural Development Research Project Surveys is indicative in this respect. In 1962, 29 percent of the villages reportedly changed their main occupation in the last 10 years (the 1962 figures have been obtained through the courtesy of Professor Frederick W. Frey). In 1968, this proportion rose to 46.8 percent. In both cases, the most common change was in the basic crop. However, changes in agricultural methods, which were barely mentioned in 1962, ranked second in

78

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

of "exit" possibilities (urban migration and emigration) helped to prevent a decline in land ownership. Thus, the large group of small farmers, not perceiving a threat to their status, felt little need to engage in intense organizational and political activity (except for voting), and exhibited a generally conservative direction in its voting preferences. The second category is that of tenants and sharecroppers. We have seen that, according to the 1970 Census, this group constitutes 4.5 percent of farming families, and 8.3 percent taken together with those who own less than 50 percent of the land they farm. However, this category is not homogeneous within itself. In some tenancy relationships, the tenant rents the land from another small land owner who, for a variety of reasons, is unable to cultivate the land himself. Such tenants are mostly part-owners, and we may expect their political behavior to be not appreciably different from small owner-cultivators. A fundamentally different sub-category is that of the sharecroppers of large land owners (agas). In most cases, this exhibits the characteristics of a feudal or semi-feudal relationship, and is the principal source of mobilized participation in certain rural areas. Even though such tenants tend to be worse off than the small owners and though their relative share of income may be declining, they usually vote for conservative parties or independents under the influence of their landlords (See Ch. 7). It is estimated that this category constitutes 2.6-3.3 percent of the agricultural population, and is concentrated mainly in the Eastern and the Southeastern regions (Boratav, 1969 b: 135-136).

1968, being designated in 15.5 percent of the villages where the main occupation has changed (State Planning Organization, 1970 a: 66-67). For two particularly interesting case studies that vividly demonstrated the impact of such changes on the economic and social life of the villagers, see Szyliowicz (1966 a: esp. 25-30, 161-183) and Kolars (1963: 184-201). Hinderink and Kiray (1970) suggest, however, that such agro-economic changes may not always be beneficial for the entire village population.

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E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

A third category consists of agricultural laborers. Although estimates vary about the size of this group, they may be expected to include nearly 10 percent of the agricultural population (Boratav, 1969 b: 138-139). Agricultural laborers are much worse off than the industrial workers in terms of wages, unionization, and social security. To the extent that they are former small owners who lost their land as a result of recent technological changes in agriculture, their relative (and maybe also absolute) deterioration is clearly perceivable. Consequently, this group may be expected to provide a source of support for radical or reformist political parties and movements. Some instances of such support have been observed in areas where capitalistic farms are most widespread (notably in the Aegean region). However, the possibility of urban migration alleviates the situation considerably. Lack or loss of land is among the major causes of urban migration. In several studies of urban migrants, this was mentioned by 40-50 percent of the respondents as their cause of migration (Yasa, 1966: 73; Sewell, 1964: 101; Kiray, 1972: 567). To summarize: the general pattern of relationships between socio-economic equality and political participation in Turkey is not entirely clear, at least at the level of aggregate analysis presented here. Nonetheless, somewhat unexpectedly, increasing socio-economic inequalities in the last two decades seem to have gone with a marked decline in voting participation. As our analysis appears to indicate, this may be due to the fact that large segments of Turkish population are less sensitive to relative changes than to absolute changes in their income level. To put it differently, the relatively high rate of economic growth has so far prevented rapid politicization and radicalization of the urban and rural lower classes. Nevertheless, there are some signs of change in that direction. Further industrialization and further modernization of agriculture may speed up this change, through their adverse effects on the urban small bourgeoisie and small land owners. The reverse causal relationship (i.e., the effects of politi8o

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

cal participation on socio-economic equality) also deserves to be briefly mentioned here. Verba and Nie (1972: 310318) have argued that the relationship between leader responsiveness (as measured by the concurrence between citizens and community leaders on the agenda of community priorities) and the rate of political participation in a community is a curvilinear one: "Where participation in the community is very widespread, leaders are likely to concur with the overall priorities of the citizenry because the largest proportion of that citizenry is active. But the lowest rate of leader-citizen concurrence is not in communities where the rate of participation is lowest. . . . The rate of concurrence would be lowest in communities with moderate amounts of participation. As one moved from very low participation communities, where leaders are relatively free to act on whatever priorities they choose to communities of moderate participation, where leaders are under pressure and receive information about citizen preferences from participants— but from a small minority—the attitudes and actions of leaders would tend to diverge from those of the citizens as a whole. . . . In communities where participation is moderately low (where a small segment of the population is participating) the gap between leader responsiveness to the most active citizens and to the others is most severe. Leaders in such communities are more attentive to the activists and less attentive to the inactives than are the leaders in the communities with very little participation." Although this argument is based on data on a number of local communities and is not, therefore, readily generalizable to national societies, one may suspect that a similar change took place in Turkey with the transition to a multiparty system. It seems likely that with the increase in political participation from low to moderate levels, leaders became more responsive to the most active groups (especially industrial and commercial middle-classes, and large land owners). This has widened the gap between leader responsiveness to the activists and to the inactives and, con8i

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

sequently, increased socio-economic inequalities. More specific policies, such as the extremely unequal distribution of agricultural credits (Yasa, 1970: 166-167) and the substantial government incentives offered to private sector investments (Boratav, 1969 b: 174) are examples of greater leader responsiveness to politically more active groups. II.

MOBILITY

1. Geographical Mobility Since the nature of urban migration in Turkey will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8, I shall confine myself here to some of the other aspects of geographical mobility. Two rather crude measures of such mobility are the extent of urbanization and the proportion of persons born in provinces other than where they live. From 1935 to 1970, the population of Turkey more than doubled from 16.4 million to 35.6 million. During this period, the percentage of urban population, defined as the population of localities with 10,000 or more population, rose from 16.6 in 1935 to 35.8 in 1970. Urbanization has become particularly rapid since about 1950. While the percent increase in urban population has been 1.4 between 1935 and 1940, 0.4 between 1940 and 1945, and 0.3 between 1945 and 1950, it has risen to 3.8 between 1950 and 1955, 3.4 between 1955 and 1960, 3.9 between 1960 and 1965, and 6.0 between 1965 and 1970. Similarly, the percentage of population born outside the province in which they live has been 6.8 in 1935, 9.3 in 1945, 8.3 in 1950, 10.4 in 1955, 11.0 in 1960, and 12.8 in 1965. The anomalous rise between 1935 and 1945 can be attributed mainly to the wartime movement of a large part of the population under arms, as evidenced by the fact that this proportion fell in 1950. The rise has become especially noticeable since 1950. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that these figures fail to reveal the true extent of migratory activities in Turkey, since they do not include population movements within the same province. Only the 82

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

1945 Census provides data on within-province migration, which seems to be rather substantial (Tiimertekin, 1968: 97, 149-150). More specialized information on the non-migratory geographical mobility of villagers has been obtained through the 1962 and 1968 Rural Development Research Project Surveys. It has been found that, in 1968, the proportion of villagers who almost never go outside their villages was 21.6 percent of the total sample. This percentage was 38.3 among the women, and 4.9 among the men, which indicates that the Turkish peasant women are much less mobile than the men. Villagers of the least developed regions (Southeastern and Northeastern) were also found to be less mobile than the villagers from other regions. The most frequently visited place outside the village seems to be the county center (ilge merkezi), mentioned by 52.1 percent of all respondents in the 1968 Survey. The provincial center ranks second, with 24.9 percent. Another indication of geographical mobility in rural Turkey is that, according to the 1968 Survey, 21.5 percent of all rural families have at least one member of the family living temporarily outside their villages, a majority of whom (70.6 percent) are employed as temporary workers, mostly in the cities (State Planning Organization, 1970 a: 56-58, 94-96). Increasing geographical mobility is a function of both the development of a market economy and improvements in transportation. Developments in transportation for the period prior to 1960 have been well documented by Frey (1963 a), and a comparison of the findings of the 1962 and 1968 Rural Development Research Project Surveys shows that impressive gains were also made in the 1960's. Thus, in 1962, only 14 percent of the villages were at less than one hour's distance to the nearest county center by the most common means of transportation. This proportion rose to 45.0 percent in 1968. The percentage of villages at a distance of four or more hours, on the other hand, fell from 30.0 in 1962 to 8.6 in 1968 (State Planning Organization, 1970 a: 28). Frey (1963 a: 319, 321, 325) rightly argues that 83

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

"the most momentous communications change of all in recent years may have been . . . improvements in road transportation," and characterizes this communications explosion as "the second stage of the Turkish Revolution." 2. Social Mobility The major part of the available data on inter-generational social mobility in Turkey has been obtained through the "Income Distribution Survey" of 1968, the principal findings of which have been presented in Tables 3.8 through TABLE

3.8

Occupational Distribution of the Labor Force and their Share of Income Percentage of Households

Business and industry Trade Professions High gov't, officials Small gov't, employees Technicians Shopkeepers and artisans Skilled workers Unskilled workers Farmers Agricultural workers Total

0.55 2.27 0.66 1.06 7.64 0.59 15.56 6.44 11.35 49.58 4.31 100.00

Percentage of Household Income

3.51 11.09 3.76 2.59 9.20 0.77 14.75 7.60 7.23 38.77 0.73 100.00

Source: Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel (1971: 180).

3.10. Table 3.8 provides the proportion of each occupational group in Turkish population. Table 3.9, which gives the percentage of respondents in each occupational category by their father's occupation, demonstrates that there is a rather strong tendency toward occupational inheritance. In other words, a substantial proportion of respondents are in the same occupational category as were their 84

3.9

0.48 0.00

0.00

0.00 0.00

0.00

1.52 1.06

3.65 3.63

0.16 0.00

0.11 0.00

14.98

43.61 62.50 0.00

0.00

28.93 0.72 0.00

Business and Industry

0.00

0.00 0.00

0.00 0.00

0.00 0.00

1.74

0.00 0.00 16.89

0.00

0.00 0.00

1.03 0.41

2.63 0.00

26.79

0.00 1.14 4.06

0.00

2.02 0.00

5.84 10.19

23.20 9.65

23.04

12.99 8.21 47.62

0.00

0.38 0.00

0.06 0.00

0.00 0.00

0.00

0.00 0.00 0.00

0.56

12.12 0.00

36.52 19.97

15.56 22.84

9.41

0.00 11.11 11.68

0.00

0.00 0.00

1.96 5.04

2.58 0.00

13.13

0.00 1.64 0.00

0.00

18.81 0.09

9.73 22.77

8.11 2.64

0.55

9.97 2.50 4.57

Father's Profession High Small ShopGovt Govt Keepers UnProfes- Offi- Employ- Tech- and Ar- Skilled skilled Trade sions ciah ees nicians tisans Workers workers

Source: Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel (1971: 183).

η Pi

r, 0

V •Ό

c

ΙΛ

Ο

0 0-,

Ά

u

c

Business and industry Trade Professions High Govt officials Small Govt employees Technicians Shopkeepers and artisans Skilled workers Unskilled workers Farmers Agricultural workers

TABLE

45.51

63.41 99.48

40.53 38.20

44.12 61.24

10.35

4.49 11.24 15.18

Farmers

Social Mobility: Respondents' Professions by Their Fathers' Professions (percent)

53.94

2.78 0.43

2.70 2.36

0.00 0.00

0.00

0.00 0.95 0.00

Agricultural Workers

100.00

100.00 100.00

100.00 100.00

100.00 100.00

100.00

100.00 100.00 100.00

Total

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND

INVOLVEMENT

fathers. This tendency is particularly strong among farmers (99.48 percent), merchants (62.5 percent), agricultural laborers (53.94 percent), shopkeepers and artisans (36.52 percent), and high administrators (26.72 percent). It is moderately strong in all other occupational categories, except among technicians and skilled workers. This exception is easy to explain, since both groups are the products of industrialization and, therefore, of relatively recent origin. Table 3.9 also shows a considerable amount of mobility from farming to other occupations: A majority of technicians and unskilled workers, and over 40 percent of artisans, shopkeepers, and small government employees (white-collar workers) come from farming families. On the basis of evidence to be presented in Chapter 8, it seems possible to argue that much of this movement represents upward social mobility. Despite this tendency to move away from farming, however, some 70 percent of farmers have sons also engaged in farming (Table 3.10). The tendency toward occupational inheritance is portrayed again in Table 3.10, which provides the distribution of fathers' professions by respondents' professions. It is particularly strong among professionals (for example, 85.3 percent of professional fathers have sons engaged in professions), businessmen and industrialists (73.44 percent), farmers (70.19 percent), agricultural workers (67.85 percent), and traders (59.37 percent). The "white-collar" category shows both upward (to professions, trade, and higher levels of government service) and downward (to "artisanshopkeeper" and "skilled worker" categories) mobility. A majority (55.53 percent) of the sons of artisans and shopkeepers continue their fathers' occupation; but if they do not, they seem to be more likely to move downward (to skilled or unskilled labor) than upward. It must be noted, however, that movement from artisan-shopkeeper category to that of skilled workers may not always involve downward mobility: very small shopkeepers and many artisans may not have much higher status than skilled work86

c

(S

00.

c

c

V)

OH

Q I-

IT,

.0

2.17 0.00

0.00 100.00

0.00 100.00

9.30 2.83

11.04 0.90

6.71

7.67 59.37 0.00

Trade

0.00 0.00

9.80 0.00

6.95 0.00

0.00

73.44 9.80 0.00

Business and Industry

0.00 100.00

0.00 " 0.00

0.00 0.00

0.00 0.00

14.69

0.00 0.00 85.31

Professions

Source: Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel (1971: 186).

Business and industry Trade Professionals High Govt officials Small Govt employees Technicians Shopkeepers and artisans Skilled workers Unskilled workers Farmers Agricultural workers Total

TABLE

3.10

0.00 100.00

0.00 0.00

21.39 3.68

26.92 0.00

40.64

0.00 3.68 3.68

cials

ojfi-

High Govt

0.00 100.00

5.09 0.00

20.14 15.28

39.48 1.35

5.80

1.29 4.39 7.17

0.00 100.00

81.07 0.00

18.93 0.00

0.00 0.00

0.00

0.00 0.00 0.00

0.25 100.00

13.50 0.00

55.53 13.21

11.67 1.41

1.04

0.00 2.62 0.78

0.00 100.00

0.00 0.00

29.58 33.01

19.14 0.00

14.44

0.00 3.82 0.00

9.60 70.19 2.72 100.00

0.00 100.00

8.37 3.43

4.50 0.51

0.16

0.03 0.36 0.14

35.58 0.78

25.12 25.56

10.33 0.28

0.10

0.74 1.00 0.51

Father's Profession Small ShopGovt Unkeepers Employ- Tech- and Ar- Skilled skilled ees nicians tisans Workers Workers Farmers

Social Mobility: Fathers' Professions by R e s p o n d e n t ' s Professions (percent)

67.85 100.00

8.87 6.41

11.75 4.47

0.00 0.00

0.00

0.00 0.64 0.00

Agricultural Workers

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

ers, and may well make less money. Consequently, the direction of mobility here seems to depend on the size of the father's shop or the nature of the artisan trade. An apparent inconsistency between Tables 3.9 and 3.10 involves farmers and agricultural workers. According to Table 3.9, 45.5 percent of agricultural workers had fathers who were farmers. This would seem to be a fairly major category of downward mobility. However, the picture is muddled by Table 3.10, which shows only 2.7 percent of fathers who were farmers having sons who are agricultural workers. This may be due to the fact that agricultural workers constitute a much smaller category than the farmers (see Table 3.8). The rather odd behavior of technicians (i.e., more than 80 percent of technician fathers have unskilled sons) (Table 3.10) may be explained partly by the smallness of this category in the survey, and partly by the difficulties of classification. 3. Access to Education Access to education is one of the most important elements of social mobility (Adelman and Morris, 1967: 34). This is especially true for a country like Turkey, where education has traditionally been "the hallmark of the elite" (Frey, 1965: 29). The accomplishments of the Republican governments in the field of education have been uneven and less than spectacular. Although the rate of literacy rose from little over 10 percent in 1927, to 20.4 percent in 1935, 30.2 percent in 1945, 40.9 percent in 1955, 48.7 percent in 1965 and 54.7 percent in 1970, this still compares unfavorably with many other developing countries. In particular, rapid socio-economic changes in the 1950's were not matched by corresponding increases in literacy. The literacy rate actually fell from 40.9 percent in 1955 to 39.5 percent in 1960. After 1960, however, the renewed emphasis on achieving universal primary-school attendance seems to have brought about a substantial increase in literacy. Sex and place of residence appear to be major sources of 88

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

variation in literacy. In 1970, 69 percent of males, as opposed to 40 percent of females, were literate. Similarly, in 1965, the rate of literacy was 66.9 percent in the cities and 38.5 percent in the villages. Female villagers have the lowest rate of literacy with only 22.9 percent. Table 3.11 presents school enrollment figures and scholarization rates for the last 40 years. We may observe that the objective of universal primary-school attendance seems to have been nearly achieved. As of 1965-1966, 94 percent of children aged 7-11 are enrolled in primary schools. "At the primary school level, the hard core of the problem of making education universal consists of the 5,000 or more villages so small and isolated that they cannot justify a school and a teacher" (Cohn, 1970: 101, 77). As in the case of literacy, the biggest increases in primary-school enrollment seem to have occurred between 1940-1945 and 1960-1965. While the rise in primary-school enrollment was noticeably slow during the 1950's, middle-school, lycee, and university enrollment increased rapidly in the same period. This analysis seems to indicate that the overall increase in social and geographical mobility in Turkey has coincided with a decrease in voting participation. Although we do not know how mobility and participation are interrelated at the individual level, this finding appears to lend some support to the hypothesis that mobility can, at times, be a substitute for political participation (Huntington, 1968: 5 3 56). However, a closer look would suggest certain modifications for the Turkish case. As I have pointed out above, geographical mobility in Turkey (especially in the form of permanent rural-tourban migration) is often associated with upward social mobility. Thus, the proportion of provincial population born outside the province in which they live can be taken as a crude measure of both geographical and social mobility. This proportion has not been found to be significantly related to provincial voting turnout: r = 0.128 in 1961, r = 0.164 in 1965, and r = - 0 . 1 6 9 in 1969. However, 89

3.11

407 489 688 956 1,358 1,617 1,984 2,867 3,924

n.a. n.a. 34 39 57 69 74 81 94

Primary School ScholarEnrollization Rate ment n.a. 30 55 103 93 90 169 327 492

n.a. n.a. 6.3 9.1 6.7 6.5 12.1 17.7 21.6

Middle School ScholarEnrollization Rate ment n.a. 12 20 37 52 54 71 149 238 n.a. n.a. 3.3 4.0 4.2 3.7 4.9 10.6 12.9

Lycee ScholarEnrollization ment Rate 4 4 7 13 19 25 37 65 97

n.a. n.a. 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.8 3.1 4.3

University Level" ScholarEnrollization ment Rate

b

Including post-lycee institutions not classified as universities. In the absence of age-distribution data in the 1940 census the number of youth in the various age groups was estimated by interpolation. Source: Cohn (1970: 102).

a

1925-26 1930-31 1935-36 1940-41" 1945-46 1950-51 1955-56 1960-61 1965-66

TABLE

S u m m a r y of School E n r o l l m e n t a n d Scholarization Rates, 1 9 2 5 - 1 9 2 6 , 1 9 6 5 - 1 9 6 6 (Enrollment in 1,000's; Scholarization Rate is Percent of School-Age Youth Attending School)

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

there is a stronger correlation between the percentage of such mobile people and the drop in voting turnout between 1965 and 1969 (r = 0.375), which suggests that mobile voters were more likely to withdraw from voting in this period. This is consistent with our other findings to be presented in Chapter 6. Generally speaking, the decline in voting participation was greater in the more modern, socially and economically more developed provinces. Another indicator of the political behavior of the mobile people may be found in the voting records of the gecekondu areas in large cities, where recent rural-to-urban migrants are heavily concentrated. As will be shown in Chapter 8, there are no appreciable differences between the turnout rates of the gecekondus and other urban neighborhoods, but the urban turnout rates are considerably lower than the rural ones. It appears, therefore, that while the recent urban migrants vote as often as the other urban residents, they vote less often than they did in their villages. Nonetheless, the association between mobility and voting participation, based on such indirect evidence, seems neither very clear nor particularly strong. On the other hand, there is some evidence to indicate that social mobility tends to affect the nature, rather than the overall amount, of political participation. Lack of social mobility and especially downward social mobility are likely to increase social frustration; this, in turn, may lead to extra-system anomic and violent political participation or to support for radical political movements. Socially mobile groups, on the other hand, are more likely to engage in intra-system electoral and organizational participation and to support more conservative parties. A survey of party leaders in the province of Izmir carried out in 1968 provides pertinent, if limited, evidence. Among the three parties studied, the JP leaders manifest the greatest upward social mobility, while the leaders of the Leftist TLP display the lowest level of such mobility. In contrast to 63 percent of the JP leaders in the three urban county organizations, only 19 percent of the TLP leaders could be classified as 91

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

upwardly mobile. Similarly, the T L P leaders manifest the greatest downward mobility (11 percent of the urban T L P leaders as opposed to none among the urban J Ρ leaders). T h e RPP occupies an intermediate position, with 37 per­ cent of its urban leaders being upwardly mobile. We may also note, in this respect, that throughout the 1950's and the 1960's, more conservative parties (DP and JP) did particularly well in the gecekondu neighborhoods. The J P vote correlated positively, although not very strongly, with the proportion of provincial population born outside their province: r = 0.244 in 1961, 0.241 in 1965, and 0.221 in 1969. The same correlation for the RPP, on the other hand, was close to zero in 1961 and 1965, but moderately strong in 1969 (r = 0.335), which suggests that the RPP began to find some new support among the more mobile sections of the population. It seems that differences in the amount of social mobility and, consequently, of social frustration tend to determine the nature and direction of political participation among the recent urban migrants, about whom we shall have more to say in Chapter 8. Further evidence for the association between social mobil­ ity and political participation can be found in the political behavior of the artisan-shopkeeper category. It has been pointed out above that this group's share in the benefits of economic development and, consequently, its opportunities for socio-economic mobility tended to decline in recent years; this phenomenon has been cited as one of the major reasons for this group's support for Right-wing movements of religious variety. Yucekok (1971) has found that artisans and shopkeepers were highly over-represented among the founders of the radical religious associations. Furthermore, this trend was particularly noticeable in the more de­ veloped provinces, where the adverse effects of industrial­ ization on this group have been more keenly felt. It is more than coincidental that the National Order (now National Salvation) Party, which openly advocated a return to the Islamic state, claimed to be the defender of the small Anatolian bourgeoisie against both the "Godless Com92

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

munism" on the Left, and the alien, materialistic, cosmopolitan, big capitalism supposedly represented by the JP. Tachau (1974) observed, in the same vein, that the National Salvation Party in the National Assembly of 1973 contained a higher proportion (23 percent) of people in commerceindustry category than the other three major parties (RPP, JP, and DP). III.

ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Unfortunately, nationwide data on organizational involvement in Turkey are inadequate, and there is as yet very little empirical research on the subject. However, certain observations can be made on the basis of the number of unionized workers and on an important recent study of religious associations (Yucekok, 1971). Table 3.12 gives the TABLE

3.12

Number of Unionized Workers: 1963-1971 Year

Number

1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971

295,710 338,769 360,285 374,058 834,680 1,057,928 1,193,908 2,088,219 2,362,787

Source: Qahsma Dergtst (1972), Vol. I, No. 2, p. 121.

number of unionized workers, on the basis of the figures reported by the unions to the Ministry of Labor, for the period 1963-1971. The sudden jumps in 1966-1967 and

93

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

1969-1970 can be partly explained by the particular intensity with which the Ministry of Labor sought such reports in those years. Even though these figures are not entirely reliable, they still show a tremendous increase in the number of unionized workers in the 1960's. Once again, we observe that such a substantial increase in organizational involvement, which should have led to more intense political participation, has gone with a decline in voting participation. Furthermore, correlations between provincial voting turnout rates and the percentage of voters under social security (the latter can be taken as an approximation of the percentage of unionized workers; see Appendix 1) were close to zero in 1961 and 1965, and negative (r = -0.231) in 1969. The percentage of voters under social security correlated positively with the J P vote in all three national elections; but the strength of the correlation declined considerably from 1961 to 1969. The RPP vote, on the other hand, did not correlate significantly with this percehtage in 1961 and 1965, but a moderately strong correlation (r = 0.340) appeared in 1969. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, this may be interpreted as an indication of a switch among the industrial workers from the JP to the RPP. Parallel to the rise in the number of unionized workers, the number of all voluntary associations increased very rapidly in the last two decades. Thus, population/ association ratio (i.e., the number of people per association) declined from 20.868 in 1950, to 1.088 in 1968, indicating that the number of associations increased almost 20 times, even when population increases are accounted for. Secondly, the population/association ratio is noticeably higher in the less developed provinces than in the more developed ones. Both findings suggest a positive relationship between socio-economic development and the intensity of associational activity. Among all types of associations, religious associations constitute by far the most numerous category (28.4 percent of all associations in 1968), and their numbers increased 94

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

more rapidly than any other kind of association between 1946 and 1968. A majority (almost 80 percent) of them are mosque aiding and building societies, and the rest are mostly Koran courses and aid associations for religious functionaries. Yucekok (1971) cogently argues that these two types of religious associations perform different functions and are based on different social strata. The former are generally rural and apolitical in character, and concentrated in the less-developed regions of the country. The latter, on the other hand, tend to represent the fundamentalist Right-wing reaction of lower-middle class urban groups (especially artisans and shopkeepers), which are adversely affected by recent economic development. Such politically oriented religious associations are found mostly in the more developed regions, and their numbers correlate strongly with the number of artisan associations in each province. Cultural associations (mostly school building and aiding societies) constitute the second largest category, and they are followed by sports clubs, local development associations, and artisan associations. The number of cultural and local development associations also seems to be positively associated with the level of socio-economic development, in that they both represent efforts by local communities to integrate with the larger society. Interestingly, the number of artisan associations rose very rapidly in the 1950's, but noticeably tapered off in the 1960's, again suggesting that the share of this group in economic growth might have declined in recent years. Finally, agricultural associations are relatively few in number, which reflects the low level of associational activity in rural areas (Yucekok, 1971: 111—141; see also Weiker, 1972: 63). The 1968 Rural Survey also indicated that only 24.6 percent of the villages had associations (agricultural cooperatives not included) and 37 percent of those were mosque building and aiding societies. In 1968, 56.8 percent of villages were affiliated with an agricultural cooperative (several villages can be affiliated with one cooperative) and 95

E Q U A L I T Y , M O B I L I T Y , AND I N V O L V E M E N T

the percentage of such affiliated villages showed extremely high regional variation, ranging from 88.2 in the most highly developed Marmara region to 11.7 and 12.5 for the least developed Northeastern and Southeastern regions, respectively (State Planning Organization, 1970 a: 75-81, 151-152). To summarize, we have seen in this chapter that Turkish society has, in the last two decades, experienced rapid social mobilization by every conceivable criterion. We would normally have expected that such mobilization would be accompanied by increased political participation. However, this period has witnessed a steep decline in voting participation. Of course, it can be argued that voting is largely independent of other forms of political participation and, consequently, it is possible that the overall amount of political participation may have increased while voting participation has declined. It would appear, however, that this is only a partial explanation, and that these seemingly contradictory tendencies may have some deeper meaning. First, the amount of mobilized, as opposed to autonomous, participation tends to decrease with socio-economic modernization. Since mobilized participation manifests itself chiefly in the form of voting, a decline in the mobilizing capacity of local notables may result in a drop in voting turnout, but not in other forms of political participation, which are essentially autonomous activities. Secondly, and more importantly, comparative evidence shows us that voting turnout declines in periods of realignment in the party systems, since voters who desert their old parties experience psychological difficulty in immediately switching their loyalties to another party. It is a contention of this book that the Turkish party system is now in the midst of such a realignment. This change and its effects on political participation will be explained more fully in the following chapters.

96

FOUR

R E G I O N A L V A R I A T I O N S IN PARTICIPATION

I.

POLITICAL

INTRODUCTION

is a country characterized by great regional diversity, caused chiefly by the fact that its modernization proceeded from western and coastal regions to the eastern and interior areas. Although Turkey is probably more homogeneous than most other developing countries in terms of language, religion, ethnicity, culture, and history, almost all indicators of social and economic modernization reveal sharp differences among regions. To give a few examples: a study by the Turkish State Planning Organization (S.P.O.) has shown that, in 1967, the most highly developed Marmara region had an index value of 145 on a composite index of socio-economic development, 1 while the least developed eastern region had an index value of only 65. Almost twice as great a proportion of the active population is employed in industrial and service sectors in the Marmara region as in the eastern region. An index of urbanization shows the Marmara region as the first with an index value of 106, while the Black Sea and eastern regions rank last, with index values of 36 and 57, respectively. In literacy, Marmara ranks first with 128, and the eastern region last with 58, etc. (SPO, 1970 b: 99, 169-175). 2 Although several schemes of regional breakdown have TURKEY

1

For more information on this index, see Appendix 1, No. 15. For more detailed inter- and intra-regional comparisons, see State Planning Organization (1969; 1970 b: 96-207), Hyland (1969: 411-429); for the eastern region, see Besikfi (1969) and Magnarella (1967). 2

97

REGIONAL

VARIATIONS

been used in the official and unofficial studies of Turkey, 3 the one that will be used here seems to enjoy wider cur­ rency among both the Turkish census administrators and American scholars, such as Frey (1966), Hyland (1969), and Tachau (1973 b). This scheme divides Turkey into nine agricultural regions: North Central, Aegean, Mar­ mara, Mediterranean, Northeastern, Southeastern, Black Sea, East Central, and South Central regions. T h e nine re­ gions include the following provinces (see also Figure 4.1): Region 1 (North Central): Ankara, Bilecik, Bolu, Cankin, Corum, Eskisehir, Kirsehir, Kutahya, Nevsehir, Usak, and Yozgat. Region 2 {Aegean): Aydin, Bahkesir, Burdur, Canakkale, Denizli, Isparta, Izmir, Manisa, and Mugla. Region 3 (Marmara): Sakarya, Bursa, Edirne, Istanbul, Kirklareli, Kocaeli, and Tekirdag. Region 4 (Mediterranean): Adana, Antalya, Gaziantep, Hatay, ίςεί, and Maras. Region 5 (Northeastern): Agri, Artvin, Erzincan, Erzurum, and Kars. Region 6 (Southeastern): Bingol, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mu§, Siirt, Urfa, and Van. Region 7 (Black Sea): Giresun, Gumu§hane, Kastamonu, Ordu, Rize, Samsun, Sinop, Trabzon, and Zonguldak. Region 8 (East Central): Adiyaman, Amasya, Elazig, Malatya, Sivas, Tokat, and Tunceli. Region 9 (South Central): Afyon, Kayseri, Konya, and Nigde. Since this study is concerned mainly with the effects of socio-economic development on political participation, we should attempt to rank these regions on a developmental 3 The SPO and other Turkish governmental agencies seem to have shown little consistency in the use of regional breakdowns. For example, a detailed SPO study (1969) on regional differences divided Turkey into 8 main regions, 4 of which were further divided into 15 sub-regions (or "planning regions"). However, a year later, another SPO study (1970 b) employed a six-fold classification scheme.

98

FIGURE

4.1

The Main Agricultural Regions of Turkey

REGIONAL VARIATIONS

scale, before dwelling on their variations with respect to political behavior. Fortunately, several such attempts exist, and there seems to be a substantial area of agreement on the rankings. For example, Frey (1966: 8-10, 30), employing data obtained through the Turkish Rural Survey of 1962, ranked the regions according to their level of rural development, which, in turn, was measured by such developmental indices as the Village Centrality, Village Establishments, Village Social Services, Village Mass Media Access, Village Governmental Contacts, Village Literacy, and a composite Village Development Index. 4 Hyland (1969: 418-421) based his rankings on the number of people whose main occupations in 1965 were industry and manufacturing, trade and commerce, transportation and communication. Finally, a recent study by the Turkish SPO (1970 b: 97-99) ordered the regions on the basis of their average index values of provincial socio-economic development. 5 The average index values for the nine regions in 1967 are as follows: Marmara (168), Mediterranean (131), Aegean (124), North Central (109), Black Sea (94), South Central (91), East Central (82), Northeastern (70), and Southeastern (56). Table 4.1 shows that all three rankings generally accord well with each other. The final regional ranking that will be used in this study corresponds to the average of these three rankings. However, more substantive considerations have also been taken into account in this re-ordering. For example, the fact that the Marmara region ranks second in Frey's ranking is probably due to the exclusion of urban areas from his survey; in the other two studies, Istanbul, by far the largest and most highly industrialized metropoli4

For further information on these indices, see below, Ch. 7, n. 2. Since this SPO study was concerned primarily with the provincial rankings, the regional scores were obtained by the rather crude method of averaging the index scores of all provinces in each region. Actually, this study employed a six-fold regional breakdown; consequently, computations of the regional index scores for our "nine" regions are mine. I followed the same procedure of averaging provincial index scores. 5

lOO

REGIONAL VARIATIONS TABLE 4.1

Regional Rankings According to the Level of Development

Region Marmara Aegean Mediterranean North Central South Central Black Sea East Central Northeastern Southeastern

Rural Mam Provincial Development Occupation Development Average (Frey) (Hyhnd) (SPO) Rankings 1 2 4 3 5 6 7 8 9

2 1 4 5 3 6 7 8 9

1 3 2 4 6 5 7 8 9

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

tan center of Turkey, has apparently tipped the balance in favor of the Marmara region. Similarly, the inclusion of ur­ ban areas might have had the effect of moving u p the rela­ tive positions of the North Central (which includes Ankara and Eskisehir, the second and sixth largest cities of Tur­ key) and the Mediterranean (which includes such large cities as Adana, Gaziantep, Mersin, and Antalya) regions. Interestingly, all three studies agree on the order of the three least developed regions. So far, we have talked about only the "objective" aspects of regional development. Frey's (1966: 38-41) findings suggest, however, that objective and attitudinal modernity need not always be the same. While the Black Sea, East Central, Northeastern, and Southeastern regions all rank low in terms of objective socio-economic development, "the apparent attitudinal obstacles to development are signifi­ cantly greater in Southeastern and East Central Regions than in the Northeastern and Black Sea Regions"—which is evident from "the distinctly higher relative attitudinal rat­ ings" of the latter two regions. It is an intriguing question whether such regional varia­ tions are also reflected in political behavior. In the following ιοί

REGIONAL VARIATIONS

pages, I shall present an analysis of regional variations with respect to electoral participation and party preferences. Before doing this, however, we should look at Frey's survey findings on attitudes relevant to political participation.

II.

REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Some items in the Turkish Rural Survey were intended to measure certain peasant attitudes relevant to political participation. For this purpose, indices were formed to measure the respondents' sense of political efficacy (how they would react if local and national authorities were about to do something they thought harmful or unjust), their ability to name Turkey's major political parties, and their desire for political participation (whether they desired to be consulted by government). They were also queried about the person they admired most, admiration for Ataturk being considered an indicator of national identification. Finally, they were asked how often and how recently they had voted in national elections. 6 Table 4.2 shows some interesting regional variations in these political characteristics. While political party knowledge, desire for political participation, and admiration for Ataturk seem to be of a relatively higher level in the more developed regions, the two least developed regions (the Northeastern and Southeastern regions) rank highest in their voting participation and sense of political efficacy. That voting participation and socio-economic development tend to be negatively associated in Turkey is confirmed throughout the present study. As for the greater sense of political efficacy (mostly local) in the least developed regions, it can be attributed either to the greater ease of contacting the locally elected officials (village headman and the Council of Elders) in the smaller and more tightly knit village communities of Eastern regions, or to a lack of political 6

For further information on these indices, see below, pp. 155-158. 102

57%

38 41

44

34

36 33

38

31

2 Aeg.

49%

1 Mar.

Source: Frey (1966: 21, 48).

Sense of political efficacy Political party knowledge Voting participation Desire for political participation Atatiirk as person most admired

Indices

TABLE

4.2

28

43

33 33

52%

3 Med.

26

44

32 36

52%

4 N.C.

30

36

44 45

48%

Region 5 S.C.

20

53

35 40

61%

6 B.S.

27

35

21 31

52%

7 E.C.

19

25

29 47

62%

8 N.E.

Regional Variations in Political Attitudes (Percentage of Peasants Ranking High on Selected Political Indices)

10

24

17 47

67%

9 S.E.

25

40

32 39

57%

Nation

REGIONAL VARIATIONS

realism usually associated with low levels of objective and attitudinal modernization. III.

VOTING PARTICIPATION

Tables 4.3 through 4.6 present data on voting participation for all national elections from 1950. While voting participation declined almost constantly, with the single exception of a slight increase in 1961 over 1957, participation rates have remained relatively uniform across the country until the 1969 elections. In 1950, 1961, and 1965, the range between regions with the highest and lowest turnout rates was no more than 4 percentage points. In 1954 and 1957, it was somewhat wider, with 6.3 and 8.1 percentage points, respectively. But such regional disparities have never been as sharp as in the 1969 elections, when the range reached 12.9 percentage points. Furthermore, until 1969, voting turnout rates did not seem to be associated with the level of regional socio-economic development, although the most developed Marmara region consistently had the lowest rates throughout the entire period. In this respect, too, the 1969 elections differ from the earlier ones. In 1969, the two most developed regions (Marmara and Aegean), plus the moderately developed South Central region, ranked lowest in voting participation, while the three least developed Eastern regions ranked highest. The sharpest drops in voting turnout were recorded in the more developed regions. The Eastern regions, on the other hand, either declined slightly or actually increased their turnout rates over 1965. This rather unexpected phenomenon and its possible causes will be discussed in detail in the subsequent chapters. IV.

REGIONAL BASES OF SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL PARTIES

As Table 4.3 indicates, the DP found its strongest support in the more developed regions of the country, while the RPP did relatively better in the less-developed regions, particularly in the East. In 1954 and 1957, the Marmara and 104

All Turkey Marmara Aegean Mediterranean North Central South Central Black Sea East Central Northeastern Southeastern

Region

TABLE

4.3

89.3 87.2 89.5 89.1 91.1 89.5 89.5 90.9 88.0 88.3

88.6 84.8 88.9 91.1 89.2 88.4 87.3 91.9 89.8 89.5

76.6 71.9 80.0 76.9 76.4 75.7 76.2 80.0 78.2 75.8

Voting Participation (%) 1950 1954 1957 53.3 55.3 57.8 55.0 53.9 59.8 49.7 48.4 48.8 44.9

39.9 33.7 40.2 40.9 36.2 37.7 41.9 46.0 43.4 47.7

1950 DP RPP 56.6 62.0 61.3 55.0 54.2 56.4 57.3 50.0 52.4 52.2

34.8 29.4 36.0 39.0 31.9 32.0 33.7 44.8 37.8 32.6

Party Votes (%) 1954 DP RPP

Voting Participation and Vote for Major Parties by Region: 1950, 1954, 1957

47.3 53.3 53.7 45.3 42.9 45.3 45.6 40.9 42.5 47.0

DP

40.6 36.7 37.3 47.1 37.0 38.9 41.0 50.2 44.2 42.7

1957 RPP

TABLE

4.4

No. of Registered Voters (inOOO's)

12.925,4 2.031 2.197 1.240 1.981 1.035 1.777 1.074 740 849

Region

All Turkey Marmara Aegean Mediterranean North Central South Central Black Sea East Central Northeastern Southeastern 81.4 79.6 83.1 82.5 82.9 81.5 80.6 81.6 80.5 78.4

Participation (%)

34.8 40.6 55.0 45.7 27.2 29.9 36.9 16.2 16.1 10.0

]P (%)

36.7 35.7 36.4 41.0 33.5 33.6 35.5 42.6 39.3 38.1

RPP (%)

14.0 10.5 4.0 3.9 33.4 27.3 13.5 9.2 11.5 10.6

RPNP (%)

Voting Participation a n d Party Votes by Region: 1961

13.7 11.2 4.3 8.6 5.3 9.2 14.1 30.2 32.8 40.0

NTP (%)

0.8 2.0 0.3 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.0 1.8 0.3 1.3

Ind. (%)

All Turkey Marmara Aegean Mediterranean North Central South Central Black Sea East Central Northeastern Southeastern

Region

TABLE

4.5

13.679,7 2.109,4 2.302,3 1.344,5 2.115,6 1.097,6 1.872,0 1.124,0 774,8 939,2

71.3 69.7 71.1 71.3 72.1 70.7 72.7 71.1 71.8 70.8

No. of Registered Voters Participation (inOOO's) (%) 52.9 57.8 63.7 56.1 50.7 54.6 55.8 41.0 44.7 28.9

]P (%) 28.7 28.0 27.9 31.9 26.0 25.9 29.1 35.4 29.1 28.7

RPP (%) 2.2 1.6 0.9 1.4 3.4 3.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.5

RPNP (%) 6.3 5.0 3.2 4.0 14.6 9.3 6.1 5.1 3.5 1.5

NP (%)

Voting Participation and Party Votes by Region: 1965

3.0 5.0 2.9 3.1 2.4 2.2 1.6 3.9 2.4 3.2

TLP (%)

3.7 1.7 1.1 1.9 2.3 1.6 2.1 5.8 11.0 17.5

NTP (%)

3.2 1.0 0.4 1.7 0.6 2.8 2.7 6.5 6.9 17.6

Ind. (%)

No. of Registered Voters (inOOO's)

14,789,4 2,352,5 2,441,0 1,492,9 2,288,2 1,162,4 1,983,8 1,185,1 830,6 1,052,9

Region

All Turkey Marmara Aegean Mediterranean North Central South Central Black Sea East Central Northeastern Southeastern

TABLE

4.6

64.3 58.6 63.6 66.0 64.0 61.1 65.8 67.8 67.7 71.5

Participation (%) RPP (%) 27.4 30.8 29.1 29.3 26.8 21.0 30.7 27.7 27.4 16.1

JP (%) 46.5 52.0 57.5 43.2 48.0 50.5 46.3 29.7 46.8 29.9

—

0.9 13.2 1.7

—

2.8 1.4 1.4 3.7 4.1

UP (%) 6.6 4.3 4.9 6.5 4.9 13.6 6.9 4.7 9.5 10.2

RP (%) 3.2 2.7 1.4 1.3 7.9 4.3 3.9 1.5 2.4 1.7

NP (%)

Voting Participation and Party Votes by Region: 1969

3.0 2.3 1.9 4.9 3.2 4.2 3.3 3.7 3.3 1.3

NAP (%) 2.7 4.2 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 1.8 4.5 3.6 1.6

TLP (%)

2.2 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.6 2.4 3.3 16.4

NTP (%)

5.6 1.5 1.0 8.7 2.1 3.4 5.5 12.5 2.1 22.8

Ind. (%)

REGIONAL

VARIATIONS

the Aegean regions were clearly the strongholds of the Democrats. In 1957, when the RPP made its strongest bid for power, the three regions in which it outvoted the DP were two Eastern regions and the moderately developed Mediterranean region. The same pattern held true for the 1961 elections, although the fragmentation of the old DP vote among three parties (the JP, the N T P and the RPNP) makes it difficult to draw definite conclusions (Table 4.4). Nevertheless, the JP was able to capture much of the former DP support in the Marmara, Aegean, and Mediterranean regions, while it almost conceded the Eastern regions to the NTP; in the North Central and South Central regions, the RPNP emerged as a strong competitor to the JP. The RPP, by contrast, performed relatively better in the Eastern regions and the Mediterranean. In the 1965 elections, the JP, having established itself as the principal heir to the DP, recaptured most of the DP vote in regions where it had made a poor showing in 1961 (Table 4.5). Still, the general pattern of the earlier elections persisted: the JP drew its greatest strength from the most developed regions; its voting strength was 10.8 percent above its national average in the Aegean region, and 4.8 percent above the national figure in the Marmara region. In the three Eastern regions, by contrast, the J P vote was well below its national average. The RPP trend was somewhat more complicated: the two regions where the RPP performed substantially better than its national average were the East Central and Mediterranean regions. However, unlike the earlier elections, the RPP seemed no longer to enjoy its relatively strong position in the East. The most plausible explanation for this is that the "left-of-center" policy and the party's new enthusiasm for land reform cost it considerable support among local notables, and thus heralded the breakdown of the old RPP alliance. The 1969 elections can be interpreted as the beginning of a new alignment of social forces in Turkey (Table 4.6). Although the J P continued to draw relatively greater strength from its traditional strongholds, such as the Mar109

REGIONAL

VARIATIONS

mara and Aegean regions, its vote became more uniformly distributed across the country. This was due, as we shall see shortly, to the fact that the J P vote declined substantially in the more developed regions and increased slightly in the least developed ones. The RPP's voting profile contrasts even more sharply with those of the earlier elections. The RPP continued to lose support in the East, but increased its strength in the more developed regions. Thus, the region in which the party was weakest in 1950 (Marmara) was the region of its greatest strength in 1969, and vice-versa (the Southeastern region) (Tauchau, 1973 b). Tables 4.4 through 4.6 also show the regional bases of strength of minor parties. T h e NTP's strength is clearly concentrated in the East. The party polled between 30 and 40 percent of the vote in three Eastern regions in 1961. While its national percentage of vote dropped sharply in 1965 from 13.7 to 3.7, and further declined in 1969 to 2.2, it still could muster a respectable 16.4 percent of the vote in the Southeastern region. The UP, predictably, drew its strongest support from the East Central region, which has a heavy concentration of Alevi population. The NP (the RPNP in 1961) has consistently shown greatest strength in the North Central and South Central regions. The RP, which mainly represented the local notables who broke with the RPP, did relatively better in the South Central, South­ eastern, and Northeastern regions, where such notables appear to have greater influence. The T L P and the NAP (the RPNP in 1965), which differ from other minor parties in their doctrinaire orientations, display greater uniformity in their regional strength, as expected. In 1965, the T L P drew disproportionately more votes from the Marmara re­ gion, mainly because of its successful performance in Istan­ bul. But in 1969, the party's vote became more evenly dis­ tributed across the country. Another area of relative strength for the TLP is the East Central region, which may have something to do with the Alevis, who have generally shown a greater propensity to vote for the Left parties. Finally, both in the 1965 and 1969 elections, the indepen1 ίο

REGIONAL VARIATIONS

dent candidates received disproportionately greater support from the Eastern regions; this suggests that politics in the less developed areas tend to be more personalistic, and local notables are capable of mobilizing large numbers of voters without having to use the more institutionalized channels of appeal. V. CHANGES IN THE SUPPORT FOR MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES

Since this study is broadly concerned with the question of political change in Turkey, it is important for our purposes to determine the direction and magnitude of changes in the support for political parties. The following analysis has been confined to the two major parties, the DP (later JP) and the RPP. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 provide the net shift of vote (percentage difference in one party's vote between two consecutive elections), and the deviation from the mean (i.e., national) shift for each party between two such elections. The latter measure may give us a better idea of the relative performance of the party in different regions. Several conclusions can be drawn from Table 4.7. First, one is struck by the uniformity of swing both in the 19501954 and 1954-1957 periods. In the former period, the DP increased its vote in all regions except one (South Central), and the RPP lost support across the country. Between the 1954 and 1957 elections, the exact opposite took place: In all regions, the DP lost, and the RPP gained support. Secondly, the magnitude of the swing did not show much regional variation for either party and either election. Between 1950 and 1954, the DP performed relatively better (i.e., registered its biggest gains) in the Marmara, Black Sea, and Southeastern regions, while the RPP did so (i.e., incurred its smallest losses) in the East Central and Mediterranean regions. In the 1954—1957 period, the heaviest DP losses were in the North Central and Black Sea regions, and the most substantial RPP gains were in the Southeastern and Mediterranean regions. In all these cases, 111

Net DP Shift 1950-54

+ 3.3 +6.7 +3.5 0 + 0.3 -3.4 + 7.6 + 1.6 +3.6 +7.3

Region

All Turkey Marmara Aegean Mediterranean North Central South Central Black Sea East Central Northeastern Southeastern

TABLE

4.7

Net DP Shift 1954-57 -9.3 -8.7 -7.6 -9.7 -11.3 -11.1 -11.7 -9.1 -9.9 -5.2

Deviation from Mean DP Shift 195054

0 + 3.4 + 0.2 -3.3 -3.0 -6.7 +4.3 -1.7 + 0.3 +4.0

0 + 0.6 + 1.7 -0.4 -2.0 -1.8 -2.4 + 0.2 -0.6 +4.1

Deviation from Mean DP Shift 195457 -5.1 -4.3 -4.2 -1.9 -4.3 -5.7 -8.2 -1.2 -5.6 -15.1

Net RPP Shift 1950-54 0 + 0.8 + 0.9 + 3.2 + 0.8 -0.6 -3.1 + 3.9 -0.5 -10.0

Deviation from Mean RPP Shift 195054

Shifts in the Support for Major Parties by Region: 1950-1957

+ 5.8 + 7.3 + 1.3 + 8.1 + 5.1 +6.9 + 7.3 +5.4 + 6.4 + 10.1

Net RPP Shift 1954-57

0 + 1.5 -4.5 + 2.3 -0.7 + 1.1 + 1.5 -0.4 + 0.6 +4.3

Deviation from Mean RPP Shift 195457

REGIONAL VARIATIONS

however, deviations from the parties' national shifts were relatively small. Thirdly, there does not seem to be a relationship between the magnitude of the swing and the regional level of socio-economic development, with the exception that the most backward Southeastern region appears somewhat more volatile in the party preferences. This pattern, prevalent in the 1950's, closely resembles the working of the British type two-party system, with its characteristic uniformity of partisan swing across the country. In Britain, both major parties have their alternative and enduring bases of electoral support, but there is also a tendency for vote switching and flexibility around the middle, so that an election is in some degree responsive to forces that move the electorate across the board (Butler and Stokes, 1971: 71-94; Schneider, 1972). Similarly, the preceding analysis has shown that in the 1950's both major parties in Turkey had their enduring regional strongholds, the DP mainly in the west, and the RPP mainly in the east; but that the Turkish electorate also displayed considerable flexibility, presumably in response to some issues that affected the nation as a whole, as evidenced by the relative uniformity of the partisan swing. Most political observers of this period (Robinson, 1965: 160, 208; Szyliowicz, 1966 a: 158-159; Karpat, 1960: 99, and 1961: 438, 444, 450-451; Hanson, 1955: 69; Brunner, 1971: 185; Bulutay and Yildin n 1968) have agreed that such vote switching was essentially a response to economic issues. Thus, the DP gains in the 1954 elections have been attributed to the general economic boom of 1951-1953, and to the new economic policies of the DP government, favoring rural areas, such as expanded agricultural credits, crop subsidies, construction of village roads, and improvement of drinking water facilities. Similarly, the DP losses in the 1957 elections have often been explained by economic difficulties, especially the rising prices, the shortage of certain consumer goods, and rural unemployment resulting from the intense farm mechanization efforts of the early 1950's. Table 4.8 presents similar data on the 1961-1969 period. H3

Net JΡ Shift 1961-65

+ 18.1 + 17.2 + 8.7 + 10.4 + 23.5 + 24.7 + 18.9 + 24.8 +28.6 + 18.9

Region

All Turkey Marmara Aegean Mediterranean North Central South Central Black Sea East Central Northeastern Southeastern

TABLE

4.8

0 -0.9 -9.4 -7.7 + 5.4 +6.6 + 0.8 + 6.7 + 10.5 + 0.8

JP Shift 196165

Devia­ tion from Mean

-6.4 -5.8 -6.2 -12.9 -2.7 -4.1 -9.5 -11.3 + 2.1 + 1.0

Net JΡ Shift 1965-69 0 + 0.6 + 0.2 -6.5 + 3.7 + 2.3 -3.1 -4.9 + 8.5 + 7.4

Deviation from Mean fP Shift 196569 -8.0 -7.7 -8.5 -9.1 -7.5 -7.7 -6.4 -7.2 -10.2 -9.4

Net RPP Shift 1961-65

Shifts in the Support for Major Parties by Region: 1961-1969

0 + 0.3 -0.5 -1.1 + 0.5 +0.3 + 1.6 + 0.8 -2.2 -1.4

Deviation from Mean RPP Shift 196165 -1.3 + 2.8 + 1.2 -2.6 + 0.8 -4.9 + 1.6 -7.7 -1.7 -12.6

Net RPP Shift 1965-69

0 + 4.1 + 2.5 -1.3 + 2.1 -3.6 + 2.9 -6.4 -0.4 -11.3

Devia­ tion from Mean RPP Shift 196569

REGIONAL VARIATIONS

It can easily be observed that, between 1961 and 1965, the JP vote increased substantially in all regions. However, the JP gains were not uniform. The most significant gains were registered in the Northeastern, East Central, South Central, and North Central regions. These were the regions where either the N T P or the RPNP captured a substantial portion of the DP votes in 1961. In 1965, a majority of such voters returned to the J P as the established successor of the DP. The RPP, by contrast, lost votes in all regions, and the magnitude of such losses were relatively uniform. Deviation from the national shift did not exceed 3 percent of the vote in any region. Hence, at least in the case of the RPP, the uniformity of the swing is reminiscent of the pattern in the 1950's. The lack of such uniformity for the J P may well be attributed to the exceptional circumstances of the 1961 elections and the temporary fragmentation of the old DP vote. The shifts between 1965 and 1969 display quite different picture. While the JP lost support in seven out of nine regions, these losses were noticeably uneven. The drop in the JP vote was sharpest in the Mediterranean, East Central, and Black Sea regions. Interestingly, the only regions where the J P was able to increase its strength were the two least developed regions, the Northeastern and Southeastern. Thus, there seems to be a generally positive association between the decline in the JP support and the regional level of socio-economic development. The two regions that do not fit this pattern are the East Central and Black Sea regions. They both rank low in development, and yet showed a substantial drop in their support for the JP. In the case of the East Central region, this may be due partly to the large Alevi vote, which apparently went to the UP, and partly to the large number of votes garnered by the independents. As for the Black Sea, it should be remembered that this region, although relatively low in objective socio-economic development, ranks high on the attitudinal aspects of modernization. Furthermore, the Black Sea region has the most equitable land distribu115

REGIONAL VARIATIONS

tion in Turkey, and does not seem to be subject to the political influence of large landlords. It is not surprising, therefore, that it displays a political behavior pattern essentially similar to those of the more developed regions. The shifts in the RPP support are in the opposite direction. First, the shift in the RPP vote showed greater regional variation than ever before. The party increased its vote in four regions, while declining in five. The regional deviation from the national shift varied between (+4.1) and (—11.3) percent. Although the party lost further ground nationally, it was able to increase its vote in the two most developed regions (Marmara and Aegean), the moderately developed North Central region, and the Black Sea region, the special characteristics of which have been mentioned above. It seems that in the more developed regions, where political participation tends to be autonomous, the left-of-center policy gained some modest support, presumably among the lower-classes. Conversely, the RPP incurred its heaviest losses in the two least developed regions, the Southeastern and East Central regions, which indicates that the local notables who abandoned the party after 1965 were able to lead a substantial number of their clients away from the RPP. This regional analysis seems to lend support to our characterization of the 1969 elections as a turning point in recent Turkish politics. First, there appeared in 1969 an inverse relationship between the level of socio-economic development and the rate of voting turnout. We shall offer an explanation of this phenomenon after this negative association is more rigorously tested in the subsequent chapters. Secondly, our study of regional voting patterns indicated that the electoral changes that took place in the late 1960's were qualitatively different from those of the 1950's. As opposed to the relatively uniform, across-the-board shifts of party preferences in the 1950's, the 1969 elections suggested that the two major parties' regional bases of strength were changing, the RPP picking up strength in the more modern regions while losing support in the less mod116

REGIONAL

VARIATIONS

ern ones, and the JP doing the opposite. This provides evidence for an ongoing process of voter realignment in Turkey, which represents, in our view, the waning of the old center-periphery conflict and the emergence of a new functional cleavage. This theme will also be elaborated upon in the following chapters. Thirdly, it is interesting that the most sudden and erratic changes in party preferences, which we associate with mobilized and deferential political participation, are observed in the Southeastern region, the least developed and the most feudalistic region in Turkey. This finding clearly supports our hypothesis that low levels of socio-economic development are associated with mobilized and deferential participation.

117

FIVE

URBAN-RURAL DIFFERENCES IN PARTICIPATION

POLITICAL

I. URBAN RESIDENCE AND VOTING TURNOUT

T H E effect of place of residence on political behavior in general and voting turnout in particular has been ambiguous. Modernization theory has assumed a positive relationship between urban residence and higher levels of political participation. Deutsch (1963), for example, has argued that urbanization, combined with other component processes of social modernization, would create among citizens new ties to the national state, increase the amount of political communication, lead to greater awareness of instrumental stakes of politics, and shift the political orientations of citizens from parochial to national and participant. It should be pointed out, however, that Deutsch was interested in the combined political effects of a cluster of various social modernization processes, which he termed "social mobilization," rather than the independent effects of urbanization. Lerner (1958: 46, 58-61), on the other hand, was more specific about the place of urbanization in his sequential model of modernization. He has asserted that, historically, urbanization has been the first stage of the modernization process: "everywhere . . . increasing urbanization has tended to raise literacy; rising literacy has tended to increase media exposure; increasing media exposure has 'gone with' wider economic participation (per capita income) and political participation (voting)." One may argue further that urban residence is usually correlated with high socio-economic status and high organizational involvement, which themselves have a powerful impact on political participation. However, cross-national data do not present a close fit 118

URBAN-RURAL

DIFFERENCES

between urban residence and high levels of political participation. For example, Nie, Powell, and Prewitt (1969 a) have observed that, when controlled for socio-economic status and organizational involvement, urbanization has no significant relationship to political participation. 1 Similarly, Inkeles (1969: 1132-1138) has found a mild relationship between urban residence and his "active citizenship scale" in Argentina, Chile, and Nigeria, but a much weaker one in India and East Pakistan. Furthermore, when he controlled for other variables such as education and factory experience, these relationships disappeared and even became negative in some countries, implying that urban residence had no independent effect on active citizenship. Urban voting turnout is usually higher in most Western democracies and in India (Milbrath, 1965: 128-129). But the Indian data display significant variations from year to year and among different states, and the gap between the urban and rural turnout rates seems to be narrowing (Weiner and Field, 1972). The more significant exceptions in this respect are France and Japan, where voting turnout rates have consistently been higher in rural areas (Dupeux, 1960: 46-47; Tarrow, 1971: 344-345; Ward, 1960: 147, 163 ff; Kyogoku and Ike, 1960: 169-170; Richardson, 1973: 436; Kim, 1971: 185-186; Benjamin et al., 1972: 142-145). Interestingly, rural residents in these two countries compare favorably with their urban compatriots not only with respect to voting, but also with respect to some other forms of political participation. Dupeux (1960: 4 1 42), for example, has shown that participation in various kinds of campaign activity is higher among the residents of rural communities than in the rest of French society. Similarly, Richardson (1973: 437, 440-441) has observed that 1

It should be pointed out that voting participation was excluded from the political participation scale used by Nie, Powell, and Prewitt (1969 a: 364). Their scale included the following items: talking politics, contacting local authorities, contacting national authorities, involvement in electoral campaigns, and membership in political organizations and political parties.

"9

URBAN-RURAL

DIFFERENCES

discussion of public affairs with neighbors or in meetings, articulation of self-interest, and solicitation of other people's votes are also more common in rural districts than in cities in Japan. In both countries, this high level of participation is combined with a low level of partisanship as indicated by weak party identification and emphasis on personalities rather than on party labels (Tarrow, 1971: 344, 349; Kyogoku and Ike, 1960: 173). Standard explanations for higher levels of voting turnout in rural areas are often based on compactness and social cohesion of villages, stronger pressures toward social conformity, and the greater ease with which rural voters can be mobilized into voting by local notables. Alternatively, it has been argued that the urban setting usually provides other, and presumably more effective, channels of political participation, such as organized interest group activity. One may also speculate that the cultural shock of urban migration leads to social isolation, insecurity, pessimism, alienation, and consequently to lower levels of participation than is found in the villages (Ward, 1960: 148-153; Kyogoku and Ike, 1960: 171-172; Richardson, 1973: 437, 441-445; Tarrow, 1971: 345, 355-356; Milbrath, 1965: 129-130. In neither France nor Japan does the mobilizing potential of local influentials loom as the single most important factor, although it seems to play a more substantial role in Japan than in France. Indeed, high levels of literacy and political information, intense associational involvement, and the relatively equitable distribution of land in rural France make such mobilization highly unlikely (Tarrow, 1971: 353-355). In neither case can the high rural turnout be adequately explained without reference to some cultural and historical characteristics of the countries involved (e.g., the early extension of franchise to rural areas, and the intensity of republican-clerical cleavage in France; stronger feeling of obligation to vote, and greater awareness of the instrumental potentialities of politics in rural Japan) (Tarrow, 1971: 352-353; Richardson, 1973: 445-448). Turkey is another major exception to the assumed rela120

URBAN-RURAL

DIFFERENCES

tionship between urban residence and high political participation. Unfortunately, Turkish voting statistics have not provided an urban-rural breakdown for elections prior to that of 1961. However, the picture for the 1960's seems quite clear (Table 5.1). In all three national elections, rural turnout rates were considerably higher than the urban turnout rates. 2 Furthermore, this pattern held true for all nine geographical regions in the three national elections I studied. Local elections conformed to the same pattern. In the J u n e 1968 local elections, participation rates in the provincial assembly elections (65.7 percent) exceeded those in the elections for mayor (59.4 percent) and the municipal council (57.6 percent). Since only those communities with more than 2,000 population can, in principle, become a municipality under the Turkish law, the latter figures are an approximately accurate measure of the urban turnout rates. It is also interesting that the difference between urban and rural rates of turnout increased from 6.8 percent in 1961, to 7.1 percent in 1965, and to an impressive 11.8 percent in 1969. These figures demonstrate that the rural turnout rates not only have been consistently higher throughout the 1960's, but also that they declined less sharply than the urban turnout. Although we do not have comparable data on the other forms of political participation of urban and rural populations in Turkey, some aggregate data as well as much impressionistic evidence suggest that it would be highly unrealistic to assume that city residents are less politically informed, concerned, interested, and involved than the villagers. As we shall see below (Ch. 8), rural-to-urban migrants in Turkey seem to be younger, better educated, and more skilled than the average rural population, and there is little evidence supporting the argument of widespread social isolation, disorganization, and pessimism 2 In this study, "urban" areas have been defined as settlements with more than 10,000 population, a most commonly used cut-off point in Turkish urban studies. However, five provincial capitals that had less than 10,000 inhabitants in the 1965 Census are also included in the urban category.

121

a

5.1

76.4 83.2 66.2 73.3 56.3 68.1

Partici­ pation (%)

39.1 33.3 55.9 51.7 47.5 46.1

JΡ 39.3 35.9 30.1 28.2 32.8 25.3

RPP

4.7 6.8 2.7 3.4

RPNP NP

1.6 2.5 2.8 3.1

RPNP NAP

The 1961 figures have been computed only for the two major parties.

1961 a Urban Rural 1965 Urban Rural 1969 Urban Rural

TABLE

1.7 4.5 1.2 2.5

NTP

4.6 2.4 3.2 2.5

TLP

Voting Participation and Party Votes by Urban and Rural Areas: 1961, 1965, 1969

3.8 7.6

RP

2.7 2.9

UP

1.4 3.8 3.1 6.6

Ind.

URBAN-RURAL

DIFFERENCES

among urban migrants. Cities clearly surpass the countryside in organizational activity directly or indirectly associated with politics. Why, then, do we have lower and more rapidly declining rates of voting participation in the cities? One plausible answer to this question may lie in the social conformity and mobilized voting hypotheses mentioned above. In urban centers, where voting is largely an autonomous act, a matter of individual will, some voters may simply lack the motivation to go to the polls, whereas in certain less developed rural areas, large numbers of peasants may be mobilized into voting by their traditional leaders. We shall return to this point when we discuss, more specifically, the participation patterns in rural Turkey. However, an interesting piece of evidence is that the difference between urban and rural turnout rates is greatest in the most feudal and least developed Southeastern region: the percentage difference is 15.6 in 1961, 24.4 in 1965, and a dramatic 31.4 in 1969. A difference of such magnitude within the same region is strongly indicative of the mobilized nature of voting participation in some rural areas. Urban-rural differences in voting turnout can also be discussed in the context of the general decline in voting since 1950. Frey (1970 b: 18-18a), commenting on this decline, observed that it can be interpreted either as a manifestation of a growing disillusionment with the present party system, or as "merely a settling-in process and a natural decline as the novelty of elections wears off." That urban participation rates fell more sharply in the last decade seems to lend some support to the more pessimistic interpretation. If there indeed is an alienation from party politics, one would expect it to be more marked among the urban residents, whose expectations are naturally higher and, therefore, more likely to be frustrated. II.

URBAN RESIDENCE AND PARTY PREFERENCES

Several conclusions can be drawn from Table 5.1, which shows the relative strength of political parties in urban and 123

URBAN-RURAL

DIFFERENCES

rural areas. First, the JP, despite its common image of a rural-based party, did better in the cities than in the coun­ tryside in all three national elections. The J P vote also cor­ related positively (r = 0.311 in 1961, r = 0.279 in 1965, r = 0.198 in 1969) with the degree of provincial urbaniza­ tion, as measured by the percentage of provincial popula­ tion living in cities with more than 10,000 population. However, between 1965 and 1969, the J P lost proportion­ ately more votes in urban areas, or held on better in rural areas: a loss of 8.4 percent in the cities against 5.6 percent in the villages. Similarly, the RPP performed somewhat bet­ ter in the cities, but the difference between its rural and urban strength became marked only in the 1969 elections. In fact, between 1965 and 1969, the RPP lost 2.9 percent of the rural vote and gained 2.7 percent of the urban vote (Table 5.2). Correlations between the RPP vote and provin­ cial urbanization were small in 1961 (r = 0.140) and 1965 (r = 0.077), but considerably stronger in 1969 (r = 0.309). That the RPP gains paralleled the J Ρ losses in urban areas

TABLE

5.2

Shifts in Major Party Votes in Urban and Rural Areas By Region: 1965-1969 (Percentages) Region

JP Shift Urban

JP Shift Rural

All Turkey Marmara Aegean Mediterranean North Central South Central Black Sea East Central Northeastern Southeastern

-8.4 -5.8 -7.5 -16.4 -5.5 -10.9 -9.7 -9.8 -4.0 -7.2

-5.6 -5.3 -5.5 -11.3 -1.6 -1.6 -9.5 -11.7 + 2.7 + 2.1 124

RPP Shift Urban

RPP Shift Rural

+ 2.7 + 4.2 +4.8 + 2.9 + 3.7 -2.0 + 1.9 -2.3 -3.9 -9.3

-2.9 + 0.8 -0.4 -5.1 -1.1 -4.9 + 1.6 -8.8 -1.6 -13.1

URBAN-RURAL

DIFFERENCES

while they both lost support in the countryside is reminiscent of the regional patterns discussed above. Table 5.2, which shows the percentage losses or gains for the two major parties between 1965 and 1969 by region and by urban-rural breakdown, may provide a clearer insight in this respect. It can easily be observed that the J P lost urban support across the country and, with a single exception (the East Central region), its urban losses exceeded its rural losses. However, in the rural areas of the two Eastern regions the J P was able to increase its strength. The RPP, on the other hand, lost rural support in most regions, with the exception of the Marmara and Black Sea regions, while increasing its urban strength in five out of nine regions. The RPP's urban gains were recorded mainly in the more developed regions. In the three Eastern regions and the South Central region, the RPP vote declined both in the urban and rural areas. These findings, together with the regional analysis presented in the preceding chapter, suggest that the RPP's left-of-center demarche has its strongest appeal in the cities of the more modern regions, while the rural areas of the less developed regions have become the weakest spots for the party. As for the minor parties, the general tendency is to do better in the countryside. In 1961, the RPNP and the NTP votes correlated negatively (-0.136 and - 0 . 2 6 2 , respectively) with provincial urbanization. In the 1965 and 1969 elections, only the TLP seemed a more urban-oriented party, although its support became more evenly distributed in 1969. Independents are more likely to be favored in the villages than in the cities. If support for independent candidates is indeed an indication of "mobilized participation," as I have argued above, this finding is again in the expected direction. Table 5.1 also indicates that the combined strength of the two major parties is considerably greater in urban areas, whereas the rural vote is more fragmented among minor parties and independents. The total percentage of the combined JP and the RPP votes in each province correlated !25

URBAN-RURAL

DIFFERENCES

positively with provincial urbanization in all national elections (0.347 in 1961, 0.304 in 1965, and 0.309 in 1969). If support for major, more established parties is taken as a measure of political institutionalization, then we may conclude that party politics is more institutionalized in urban areas than in the countryside. III.

RATE OF URBANIZATION

The rate of provincial urbanization (the average annual percentage increase in the proportion of urban population in each province for the period 1963-1967), as distinct from the level of urbanization, does not seem to have much effect on voting turnout and party preferences. The rate and level of urbanization show a weak negative correlation between themselves ( — 0.100), which suggests that those provinces which were urbanized more rapidly in recent years were generally among the less urbanized ones. The rate of urbanization correlates negatively with the JP (-0.247 in 1961, -0.242 in 1965, - 0 . 1 8 1 in 1969) and the RPP (-0.148 in 1961, - 0 . 0 7 8 in 1965, and - 0 . 1 9 1 in 1969) vote, and positively with the support for minor parties and independents (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3 below). In both cases, however, the correlations tend to be weak. Nor does the rate of urbanization seem to be associated with voting turnout (r = - 0 . 0 3 4 in 1961, 0.053 in 1965, 0.185 in 1969). IV.

CITY SIZE

As in the case of India (Weiner and Field, 1972: 24), city size appears to be a poor indicator of voting turnout. In none of the three elections studied is there a significant relationship between city size and voting turnout (Table 5.3). However, city size seems to be a source of variation, albeit a relatively minor one, in the distribution of party preferences. Thus, the RPP's weakest category in 1961 and 1969 and the second weakest in 1965 is that of medium-size towns (population 25,000-50,000). Conversely, such towns 126

TABLE

5.3

75.9

78.2

76.6

50.000-100.000 Ν = 18 in 1961 Ν = 16 in 1965,1969

25.000-50.000 Ν = 29 in 1961 Ν = 42 in 1965,1969

10.000-25.000 Ν = 96 in 1961 Ν = 112 in 1965 , 1969

65.4

65.4

66.0

67.2

59.8

56.2

56.9

56.4

31.6

39.0

42.2

42.2

1961

52.2

57.0

61.1

53.6

JP (%) 1965

42.1

36.0

51.4

43.7

41.0

38.6

1961

48.8

43.6

1969

31.8

29.0

28.6

32.4

RPP (%) 1965

30.5

29.5

31.7

33.6

1969

City size is based on the 1960 Census for 1961 elections, and on the 1965 Census for the 1965 and 1969 elections.

77.9

Participation (%) 1961 1965 1969

over 100.000 Ν = 9 in 1961 Ν = 14 in 1965,1969

City Size

City Size, Voting Participation, and Major Party Votes 1961, 1965, 1969 (Averages)

URBAN-RURAL

DIFFERENCES

were the JP strongholds in 1965 and 1969: the two strongest categories for the JP in both elections were towns with 25,000-50,000 and 50,000-100,000 population. This fits well with our characterization of the DP and the J P as the party of the more mobile, dynamic, modernizing peripheral sectors of the Turkish society in the 1950's and the 1960's, since it was probably such towns that were the major source and beneficiaries of rapid social change in this period. Interestingly, the JP did not perform particularly well in either small towns (population 10,000-25,000), which are supposed to be the repository of conservative values in Turkey, or in largest cities (population over 100,000). In both 1965 and 1969, the RPP received its greatest share of urban votes from such large urban centers. Between 1965 and 1969, the J P lost more votes in large and medium-size (population 50,000-100,000) cities (10 percent in the former and 12.3 percent in the latter) than in smaller towns, while the RPP increased its strength, although not dramatically, in the top two categories. In other words, the shift between the two major parties in the late 1960's seems to be more pronounced in the big and medium-size cities. To summarize, the place of residence is a major source of variation in voting participation in Turkey. Rural areas clearly and regularly surpass the cities in voting turnout. This has to be explained more fully, since Turkish villagers seem to be behind the city residents in terms of such supportive socio-economic and attitudinal characteristics as high socio-economic status, organizational involvement, and political information. A more detailed discussion of rural and urban voting patterns will be presented in Chapters 7 and 8. Another point of interest is that we have observed evidence of a shift of support between the two major parties in urban areas, and more specifically in the large cities. Together with the regional patterns discussed in the preceding chapter, this may be interpreted as an indication of a beginning realignment in the Turkish party system. 128

SI X

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: DEVELOPMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS

I.

INTRODUCTION

IN this chapter, we shall probe more deeply into some socio-economic concomitants of voting participation and party voting, using province-level data. Provincial voting data have been obtained from the National Assembly elections of 1961, 1965, and 1969. Although this study is mainly concerned with participation in national politics, I also collected data from the 1968 provincial council (ilgenel meclisi) elections as a basis for comparison between participation in national and local politics. Such voting data were correlated with a number of provincial characteristics reflecting the level of provincial socio-economic development, such as the degree and rate of urbanization, population density, per capita income, percentage of population in agriculture and in manufacturing industry, the concentration of manufacturing industry, value added per person in manufacturing industry, percentage of population born outside the province in which they live, literacy, primary and secondary school graduates, number of physicians, percentage of population whose native language is Turkish, and the Turkish State Planning Organization's index and rate of provincial socio-economic development. Such socio-economic data have been obtained from the 1965 census and other studies carried out in the mid-1960's (see Appendix 1). II.

VOTING PARTICIPATION

Table 6.1 presents the correlations between the rates of voting turnout in three general elections, and our indi129

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION TABLE

6.1

C o r r e l a t i o n Coefficients b e t w e e n Voting P a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d Provincial Characteristics: 1 9 6 1 , 1965, 1969 Ν = 67

Provincial

Characteristics

Urbanization Literacy Population density People born out of province Location quotient in manuf. No. of people per physician People in agriculture Males in manuf. Voters under Soc. Security Primary school grad. Secondary school grad. Per capita income Value added per person SPO Dev. Ind. 1963 SPO Dev. Ind. 1965 SPO Dev. Ind. 1967 SPO Dev. Rate, 1963-67 Rate of urbanization Turkish as native language

1961

0.035 0.284 -0.216 0.128 -0.023 -0.226 -0.004 0.009 -0.065 0.329 -0.089 0.029 -0.212 0.050 0.041 0.050 -0.034 -0.034 0.258

1965

-0.041 -0.057 -0.154 0.164 -0.077 -0.065 0.029 -0.082 0.034 -0.069 -0.063 0.016 -0.052 -0.019 -0.008 -0.003 0.136 0.053 -0.088

1969

-0.301 -0.557 -0.361 -0.169 -0.412 0.419 0.320 -0.452 -0.231 -0.549 -0.366 -0.342 -0.130 -0.403 -0.375 -0.380 0.194 0.185 -0.631

Change in Participa­ tion 1965-1969

-0.327 -0.626 -0.286 -0.375 -0.427 0.582 0.363 -0.470 -0.318 -0.603 -0.386 -0.436 -0.087 -0.475 -0.452 -0.463 0.099 0.166 -0.685

Regression equations for voting participation in the 1961 and 1969 elections (the 1965 elections are omitted, since the statistical associations are not significant) can be written as follows: Participation 1961: y = 79.144 + 0.218 (% Primary - 0.0264 (Density (0.06) School grads.) (0.008) per km 2 ) R = 0.483 R 2 = 0.233, ρ < 0.001 Participation 1969: y = 81.022 - 0.1635 (% Turkish - 0.0026 (T.L., Value (0.023) Speakers) (0.001) added) R = 0.673 2 R = 0.453, ρ < 0.001

cators of provincial socio-economic development. It can be seen that, in 1961, voting participation was not strongly correlated with the overall level of development. However, 130

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

there were modest positive correlations with literacy, primary school education, and Turkish as the native language, and still more modest negative correlations with population density, and value added in manufacturing industry. Primary school education, alone, explained 10.8 percent of the variation in voting participation, and 18.6 percent of such variation when population density was controlled. Correlations between the 1965 turnout rates and developmental indicators were much weaker and practically insignificant. The picture changed considerably, however, in 1969 when strong negative correlations appeared between voting participation and all developmental indicators. Correlations with the percentage of Turkish speakers, of literates, primary school graduates, and males in manufacturing industry were particularly strong, which meant that the more economically developed and predominantly Turkishspeaking provinces voted less in the 1969 elections. Furthermore, the greatest drop in voting turnout between 1965 and 1969 occurred in the more developed areas. As clearly indicated by the fourth column of Table 6.1, decline in voting participation between the two elections correlated strongly with all the indicators of modernization. The "rates" of provincial development and urbanization, on the other hand, correlated weakly, but positively with voting turnout in 1969 and increases in voting participation between 1965 and 1969. We should bear in mind, however, that such rates themselves were negatively correlated with the "level" of socio-economic development; in other words, those provinces which had the highest rates of urbanization and socio-economic development in the 1963-1967 period were among the less developed provinces. How do we explain this situation, which runs counter to the expectations of the social mobilization theory? Why have the populations of the more modern provinces become less participant in the last decade? Several tentative answers can be offered to this question. One may argue, for example, that the more developed provinces are less de-

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

pendent on government and, consequently, more indifferent to elections. Low rates of turnout, in this sense, may be indicative of a "politics of happiness" (Eulau, 1956; quoted by Burnham, 1965: 26). Or, one may emphasize the greater availability of other modes and means of political participation (particularly, participation in interest group activities) in the more modern regions of the country. Finally, it may be argued that the more modern provinces are generally the JP strongholds, and the fact that the J P was in no electoral jeopardy anyway might have led to a low turnout rate, especially in the 1969 elections. Yet, such explanations leave many questions unanswered. The prosperity of the more developed regions is certainly not great enough to generate a "politics of happiness." These regions, with their more modern and complex socio-economic structures, may indeed be more deeply affected by particular governmental policies than the less developed regions based primarily on traditional agriculture; therefore, they tend to be more, not less, concerned about the outcome of elections. Similarly, the availability of other means of participation does not quite explain the low voting turnout in the more modern provinces. Comparative research has generally shown that although some people limit their political participation mainly to voting (hence the relatively weak correlation between voting and the other modes of political participation), those who are active in other modes of participation are also likely to vote. Finally, the JP's predominance in the more modern provinces should not be a sufficient cause for indifference among this party's supporters, since under the proportional representation system every single vote counts and parties actively seek to increase their pluralities. Perhaps a more cogent explanation can be found in the different motivational bases of political participation among the different sectors of the Turkish population. Socioeconomic modernization tends to increase autonomous and instrumental participation and to decrease mobilized and 132

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

deferential participation. In the more backward areas of the country, traditional local notables can often mobilize their clients into voting at consistently high levels of turnout. Where voting has become an autonomous act, on the other hand, individual voters may or may not feel motivated to vote. Therefore, modernization may bring about a decline in the rate of voting participation by limiting the mobilizing capacity of local notables or, to put it differently, by reducing the amount of mobilized participation in a society. In this sense, one does not expect to find very high rates of participation in a transitional society where the traditional mobilizing influences have weakened, and the necessary supporting features of a modern participatory society (namely, widely shared high SES, and a high level of organizational involvement) have not yet fully developed. A second reason for the decline in voting participation in Turkey may well be the process of voter realignment the country seems to be presently undergoing. In times of such realignments, the rates of voting participation are likely to fall, since many voters who are disillusioned with their old party may find it psychologically easier to withdraw temporarily from politics than to switch immediately to their erstwhile rival. Indeed, this seems to be the case for the RPP defectors in 1965, and the J P defectors in 1969. Finally, the effects of socio-economic modernization on the "attitudinal" components of political participation may sometimes be mixed and contradictory. Just as certain attitudinal concomitants of political participation (such as political information and awareness, sense of political efficacy, perceived salience of governmental action, desire for political participation, etc.) are associated with modernization, so may be political cynicism and alienation. Modernization raises the level of expectations and lowers the threshold of frustration and alienation. Impressionistic observations suggest that such feelings are not uncommon among the modern and modernizing segments of the Turkish population.

»33

Urbanization Literacy Population density People born out of province Location quotient in manuf. No. of people per physician People in agriculture Males in manut. industry Voters under Soc. Security Primary school grad. Secondary school grad. Per capita income Value added per person SPO Dev. Ind. 1963 SPO Dev. Ind. 1965 SPO Dev. Ind. 1967 SPO Dev. Rate, 1963-67 Rate of urbanization Turkish as native language

Provincial Characteristics

Ν = 67

TABLE

6.2

1969 0.309 0.363 0.314 0.335 0.374 -0.204 -0.336 0.408 0.340 0.311 0.327 0.307 0.222 0.403 0.405 0.418 0.023 -0.191 0.306

1965 0.077 -0.049 0.057 0.026 0.036 -0.014 -0.058 0.026 0.076 -0.090 0.064 -0.040 0.192 0.035 0.038 0.047 0.047 -0.078 -0.095

1961 0.140 -0.007 0.034 0.037 0.106 -0.007 -0.143 0.109 0.079 -0.031 0.098 0.065 0.247 0.114 0.093 0.106 -0.131 -0.148 -0.121

1969 0.198 0.640 0.135 0.221 0.358 -0.442 -0.340 0.416 0.264 0.704 0.235 0.341 -0.058 0.350 0.334 0.343 -0.072 -0.181 0.590

1965 0.279 0.667 0.230 0.241 0.429 -0.475 -0.340 0.522 0.334 0.688 0.246 0.367 0.018 0.437 0.419 0.429 -0.105 -0.242 0.722

1961

0.311 0.524 0.261 0.244 0.456 0.430 0.335 0.524 0.389 0.564 0.248 0.396 0.139 0.445 0.430 0.441 0.035 0.247 0.538

Correlation Coefficients between the JP and the RPP Voting Percentages and Provincial Characteristics: 1961, 1965, 1969 JP RPP

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION III.

ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL PARTIES

Table 6.2 presents correlation coefficients between the pro­ vincial voting percentages of the two major parties (the J P and the RPP) and the socio-economic characteristics of the provinces. Frey (1970 b: 22-26) has found that in the 1950's, the DP vote was positively associated with provincial modernity, while the RPP displayed differential support from the more backward provinces in 1950 and almost no such association (positive or negative) in 1954 and 1957. The association between the DP vote and provincial mod­ ernity was further strengthened in the 1960's, when the J P replaced the DP, but somewhat weakened in 1969. Nevertheless, Table 6.2 clearly shows that the JP still re­ ceives stronger support from the more developed prov­ inces. In all three national elections, the JP vote correlated particularly strongly with literacy, primary school educa­ tion, Turkish as native language, and the percentage of males in manufacturing industry. For example, Turkish as native language and primary school education together explained 59.2 percent of the variation in the J P vote in 1965. In 1969, primary school education alone explained almost half of the variation, and when controlled for the value added per person in manufacturing industry, it explained 56.2 percent of such variation. 1 The RPP vote, on the other hand, did not correlate significantly with our developmental indicators in 1961 and 1965, but it did so in ' T h e regression equations for the JP vote in 1965 and 1969 are as follows: J P vote in 1965 = 13.73 + 0.276 ( ?° T u b r k * h + 0.698 ^ (0.064) S P e a k e r s > (0.210) R = 0.769 R 2 = 0.592, ρ < 0.001

1 S c h o o l

^ , Srads)

J P vote in 1969 = 22.72 + 1.3974 Ζ° u ' T ^ , ~ 00067 ^ % ^ (0.1540) S c h o o l g r a d s > (0.0020) ^ d e d per Person) R = 0.752 R z = 0.566, ρ < 0.001 l

35

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

1969. Correlations between the RPP vote in 1969 and mod­ ernization indicators were all positive, and some of them were rather strong. For example, the SPO's index of pro­ vincial development for 1967 explained 17.5 percent of the variation in the RPP strength in 1969. 2 It seems that the JP's differential appeal to the more modern sectors of the popu­ lation has somewhat weakened in the late 1960's, while a positive association has appeared between provincial mod­ ernity and the RPP vote. 3 How do we explain these reverse trends in the bases of support for the two major parties? One of the basic assump­ tions underlying the present work is that socio-economic development increases the relative importance of func­ tional cleavages in a society and the amount of class-based political participation. Consequently, as societies develop economically, we would expect to find a higher level of class voting, or class polarization in the party system. With in­ creasing socio-economic development, politics tends to be­ come less personalistic and more issue-oriented, with economic issues presumably playing a predominant role. This assumption suggests a possible association between the recent changes in the social bases of major political parties and changes in their ideological orientations. In the mid-1960's, the RPP initiated a "left-of-center" policy. This represented a significant shift from the party's earlier elitist attitudes and its ambivalent positions on socio-economic is­ sues to a more populist political style and a more coherent, reform-oriented, social democratic program with special emphasis on "bread-and-butter" issues. It is plausible, therefore, that the recent defections from the J P and the 2

The regression equation is:

RPP vote in 1969 = 20.56 + 0.053 ( f P < ? D e v ' (0.014) I n d 6 X ) R = 0.418 R 2 = 0.175, ρ < 0.001 3 T a c h a u (1973b), based on his analysis of regional voting patterns, makes the same observation. 136

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

modest increases in the RPP strength in the more developed provinces may be due to the appeal of the new RPP policy to the urban and rural lower classes. It can also be argued that the same strategy would not (as it did not) work as successfully in the more backward sections of the country, where voting participation and party choices of the villagers are still largely guided and controlled by the traditional social elite. In such areas, a Leftist party would face the enormous difficulty of reaching and mobilizing individual villagers against the strong opposition of the traditional elite. Predictably, the heaviest losses of the RPP after the initiation of the "left-of-center" policy were incurred in the least developed provinces, where, understandably, the need for social reform remains most urgent. Frey (1970 b: 26) has argued that "an obvious electoral strategy for the People's Party . . . would be to let the Justice Party continue its effective appeal to the more modern segments of Turkish society, uncontested, especially in the rural areas. This would then open the opportunity for the RPP to make its appeal to the relatively more backward sectors of that population. After all, are these not the most needy, the 'have nots' to whom a liberal party should appeal?" If my preceding analysis is correct, however, this suggestion should be modified, and the RPP should concentrate its efforts on the urban and rural lower classes of the more developed regions, rather than on the backward areas, where such efforts are likely to be frustrated by the opposition of the traditional elites. Obviously, such a strategy is beset with a number of difficulties. Urban lower classes are not yet large enough, and the more modern sectors of the Turkish peasantry presently seem committed to the JP. However, in the long run, these very strata may offer a social-democratic party the best chance of success, since their political participation, unlike that of the more traditional peasantry, tends to be based on instrumental, rather than deferential and solidary, motives. Table 6.3 presents the results of a similar analysis for

!37

-0.136 -0.039 -0.100 -0.153 -0.139 0.041 0.166 -0.130 -0.078 -0.057 -0.024 -0.043 -0.154 -0.110 -0.089 -0.097 0.061 0.173 0.102

Urbanization Literacy Population density People born out of province Location quotient in manuf. No. of people per physician People in agriculture Males in manuf. industry Voters under Soc. Security Primary school grad. Secondary school grad. Per capita income Value added per person SPO Dev. Ind. 1963 SPO Dev. Ind. 1965 SPO Dev. Ind. 1967 SPO Dev. Rate, 1963-67 Rate of urbanization Turkish as native language

Abbreviations: RPNP: Republican Peasant Nation Party NTP: New Turkey Party TLP: Turkish Labor Party

1961

Provincial Characteristics

Ν = 67

TABLE

6.3

-0.059 0.106 -0.020 -0.048 -0.078 -0.105 0.093 -0.061 -0.061 0.066 0.008 0.044 -0.161 0.003 0.012 0.009 0.034 0.122 0.286

-0.112 0.037 -0.031 -0.114 -0.101 -0.046 0.127 -0.081 -0.068 -0.001 -0.028 -0.016 -0.182 -0.053 -0.045 -0.043 0.069 0.190 0.187

(RPNP) NP 1965 1969 -0.262 -0.501 -0.211 -0.155 -0.402 0.371 0.270 -0.463 -0.348 -0.521 -0.289 -0.367 -0.122 -0.411 -0.399 -0.409 0.038 0.179 -0.548

1961 -0.268 -0.592 -0.230 -0.177 -0.352 0.373 0.247 -0.438 -0.266 -0.559 -0.257 -0.355 -0.040 -0.402 -0.388 -0.401 0.063 0.112 -0.764

NTP 1965 -0.142 -0.557 -0.191 -0.117 -0.296 0.319 0.204 -0.371 -0.161 -0.551 -0.202 -0.265 0.091 -0.326 -0.306 -0.313 0.183 0.341 -0.729

1969 1969 0.038 0.070 0.109 0.117 0.016 0.365 ·-0.059 -0.047 -0.009 0.017 0.121 0.007 0.128 0.010 0.015 0.012 0.068 0.076 0.024

TLP I

0.455 0.146 0.371 0.432 0.301 -0.064 -0.382 0.209 0.234 0.112 0.410 0.317 0.370 0.367 0.368 0.357 -0.056 0.134 -0.101

1965

C o r r e l a t i o n Coefficients b e t w e e n M i n o r p a r t y Votes a n d Provincial Characteristics: 1961, 1965, 1969

Characteristics

Abbreviations: NAP: National Action Party RP: Reliance Party

Urbanization Literacy Population density People born out of province Location quotient in manuf. No. of people per physician People in agriculture Males in manuf. industry Voters under Soc. Security Primary school grad. Secondary school grad. Per capita income Value added per person SPO Dev. Ind. 1963 SPO Dev. Ind. 1965 SPO Dev. Ind. 1967 SPO Dev. Rate, 1963-67 Rate of urbanization Turkish as native language

Provincial

NAP

0.032 0.060 0.002 -0.122 0.017 -0.272 0.056 0.059 -0.012 0.008 0.013 0.011 -0.119 0.077 0.046 0.056 -0.125 -0.091 0.327

1969

UP: Unity Party Ind.: Independents

-0.178 -0.151 -0.092 -0.123 -0.145 -0.088 0.188 -0.142 -0.128 -0.159 -0.113 -0.136 -0.182 -0.172 -0.152 -0.158 0.101 -0.095 -0.006

1965

0.163 0.299 0.212 0.183 0.214 0.027 0.164 0.228 0.199 0.253 0.219 0.159 0.032 0.250 0.252 0.264 0.062 0.059 0.391

RP 1969

0.037 -0.027 0.001 -0.035 -0.027 -0.089 0.041 -0.027 -0.027 -0.069 0.024 -0.026 0.047 0.035 0.028 0.033 -0.021 -0.095 0.171

UP 1969

-0.094 -0.200 -0.018 -0.012 -0.093 0.296 0.032 -0.155 -0.047 -0.205 -0.022 -0.093 -0.457 -0.109 -0.101 -0.106 0.109 0.112 -0.340

1961

-0.226 -0.506 -0.182 -0.217 -0.297 0.571 0.267 -0.350 -0.267 -0.499 -0.232 -0.268 -0.059 -0.343 -0.336 -0.337 0.098 0.225 -0.518

Ind. 1965

-0.230 -0.544 -0.139 -0.228 -0.316 0.511 0.326 -0.364 -0.274 -0.557 -0.271 -0.347 -0.067 -0.350 -0.339 -0.353 -0.014 0.049 -0.507

1969

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

minor parties and independents. In general, we see that the Nation Party, the National Action Party, and the Unity Party voting percentages do not correlate significantly with provincial modernity. There is a moderately strong nega­ tive correlation between the Reliance Party vote in 1969 and provincial modernity, and a much stronger correlation for the New Turkey Party in all three national elections. Among the minor parties, only the Turkish Labor Party displayed differential support from the more modern pro­ vinces; however, this association, quite strong in 1965, largely disappeared in 1969. Further analysis of the TLP vote in 1965 suggests that the party did comparatively well in urban areas, but not among the industrial workers; when provincial urbanization is controlled, the partial correlation between the T L P vote and the percentage of males in man­ ufacturing industry became strongly negative. 4 This accords well with the impressionistic observations of many political analysts that the main strength of the T L P in 1965 was derived largely from the urban middle classes. It appears, however, that the TLP lost part of this support in 1969 (presumably to the RPP; see below, Ch. 8), while it made some gains in rural areas, which explains the disappear­ ance of the positive relationship between the T L P vote and provincial modernity observed in 1965. The New Turkey Party's voting profile differs from those of the other parties in that the party's strength has consis­ tently shown a strong negative association with provincial modernity. T h e N T P received disproportionately stronger support from the provinces with a substantial non-Turkish (mostly Kurdish) speaking population. Language alone ex­ plained 58.4 percent of the variation in the N T P voting in 4

The regression equation is as follows: ,».,, TLP vote in 1965 = 1.590 + 0.107 ( * (0.02) p o p ' R = 0.534 R 2 = 0.285, ρ < 0.001 140

(% males in - 0.187 manuf. (0.07) industry)

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION 5

1965, and 53.2 percent of such variation in 1969. There were also particularly strong negative associations between the N T P vote and such developmental indicators as literacy, primary school education, percentage of males in manufacturing industry, and the SPO's index of pro­ vincial development. T h a t a party which is based essen­ tially on the support of local notables did best in the least developed areas of the country supports my hypothesis that political participation tends to be less au­ tonomous in such areas. Similar observations can be made with respect to the in­ dependent vote. Obviously, a vote for independent candi­ dates cannot always be taken as an indicator of the political influence of the traditional elites. In the United States, for example, party-oriented voting of the nineteenth century gave way to a marked degree of ticket-splitting (i.e., inde­ pendent voting) in the twentieth century. Whether this is seen as a sign of "increasing maturity" in the electorate, or as a sign of intense political alienation (Burnham, 1965, esp. 26-28), it certainly has nothing to do with the power of the traditional elites. On the contrary, such weakening of party loyalties coincided with the most intense period of industrialization and modernization in the United States. In Turkey, however, independents perform much better in the less developed provinces. In 1969, of the 19 prov­ inces where independents received more than 10 percent of the total valid votes cast, 13 were in the three eastern 5

Regression equations are:

% NTP vote in 1965 = 33.00 - 0.3151 (Turkish as (0.03) native lang.) R = 0.764 R 2 = 0.584, ρ < 0.001

% NTP vote in 1969 = 19.49 - 0.1912 (Turkish as (0.02) native lang.) R = 0.729 R 2 = 0.532, ρ < 0.001 141

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

regions, and most of the rest were bordering provinces. In all three national elections studied, particularly in the 1965 and 1969 elections, the percentage of votes for independent candidates correlated negatively with provincial modernity. Such correlations were especially strong with literacy, primary school education, Turkish as native language, and the percentage of males in manufacturing industry. Clearly, the lack of a sizeable independent vote does not necessarily indicate the absence of traditional influences upon voters. If powerful local notables run on a party ticket, as they often do, there is little room for independent candidacy. If, however, parties fail to satisfy their electoral ambitions, they may choose to run as independents, often with considerable success.6 In this sense, a large independent vote reflects the strength of personahstic influences and is more likely to be found in the less developed areas. IV.

T H E STRENGTH OF THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

Table 6.4 presents correlation coefficients between the indicators of provincial modernity, on the one hand, and the combined voting percentages of the JP and the RPP, on the other. The table shows clearly that the combined strength of the two major parties (or the strength of the two-party system) is greater in the more developed provinces. One plausible reason for such an association may be that most of the minor parties in Turkey are essentially "parties of notables," drawing their support less from their issue positions than from the personal influence of certain local notables; and, as I have argued above, such influence is likely to be stronger in the less developed areas. Two exceptions to this generalization are the ideological minor parties, the TLP and the NAP; but there is some evidence that even these two parties are not completely immune to the temptation of recruiting influential local notables to increase their voting strength. Thus, Nuhrat h

For some examples of this, see Szyliowicz (1966 b: 483) 142

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

TABLE 6.4

Correlation Coefficients between the combined JP and RPP vote, and Provincial Characteristics: 1961, 1965, 1969 Ν = 67 Provincial Characteristics Urbanization Literacy Population density People born out of province Location quotient in manuf. No. of people per physician People in agriculture Males in manuf. Voters under Soc. Security Primary school grad. Secondary school grad. Per capita income Value added per person SPO Dev. Ind. 1963 SPO Dev. Ind. 1965 SPO Dev. Ind. 1967 SPO Dev. Rate, 1963-67 Rate of urbanization Turkish as native language

1961 0.347 0.506 0.264 0.249 0.476 -0.419 -0.371 0.543 0.403 0.536 0.272 0.404 0.223 0.469 0.447 0.462 -0.076 -0.288 0.482

1965 0.304 0.606 0.247 0.242 0.425 -0.456 -0.351 0.507 0.355 0.604 0.266 0.326 0.144 0.432 0.415 0.430 -0.075 -0.269 0.633

1969 0.309 0.708 0.259 0.340 0.474 -0.468 -0.442 0.540 0.379 0.738 0.349 0.430 0.067 0.481 0.468 0.483 -0.051 -0.241 0.640

(1971: 236) cites an example of eight Adiyaman villages giving their unanimous support to the TLP in 1965 under the influence of an "Alevi dede-aga" (sheikh) who headed the T L P list in that province. By contrast, the voters of the more developed provinces are more likely to base their voting decisions on more enduring party loyalties, if not exactly on issue positions of the parties. This tends to favor the more firmly established major parties rather than the more fluid and personalistic minor parties. We must recog­ nize, however, that the extreme ideological parties (if al­ lowed to operate by the government) may be expected to make some gains at the expense of the major parties in the more developed regions. M3

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

My findings support those of Bulutay (1970: 95, 114), who has shown that those provinces with the highest proportion of combined J P and RPP vote are generally in the Western regions, while the lowest combined strength of these parties is usually found in the Eastern provinces. Thus, among the 10 provinces with the highest combined JP and RPP vote in 1969, 6 were in the Aegean and Marmara regions, and another 2 (Samsun and Zonguldak) were the most developed provinces of the Black Sea region. By contrast, 8 of the 10 provinces with the lowest combined J P and RPP strength were in the least developed Southeastern and East Central regions. We make a similar observation when we employ the SPO's index of provincial socioeconomic development: 9 out of 10 provinces with the highest JP-RPP vote are among the more developed half of the Turkish provinces, while all 10 of those with the lowest JP-RPP vote are among the lower half (S.P.O., 1970 b: 39-40). If the combined strength of the major parties is taken into consideration together with the provincial voting turnout rates, another interesting finding emerges. Bulutay (1970: 94-96, 113-114) calculated the total vote for both parties as a percentage of all registered voters, by multiplying the combined voting percentages of the JP and the RPP with the provincial voting turnout rates. He thus observed that, while in the 10 more developed provinces voting participation is low, but the combined JP-RPP vote is high, in the 10 less developed provinces the reverse is true, i.e., the voting participation is high but the combined JP-RPP vote is low. Consequently, in both groups of provinces, the combined J P and RPP strength as a percentage of all registered voters is pretty much the same. Bulutay has interpreted this as two different forms of protest: in the more developed provinces, where traditional influences on voting are negligible, the disenchantment with the present party system manifests itself as a passive protest (non-voting); in the more backward areas, it is channeled by the traditional 144

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

elite toward either personalistic minor parties or independent candidates. While the findings presented in this chapter tend to support the first part of this argument (i.e., non-voting in the more developed provinces is a form of protest against the major parties), I find it difficult to agree with the argument that voting for minor parties or independent candidates constitutes an "active" protest in the less developed regions. As I have shown above, the JP has always been comparatively weaker in the less developed Eastern regions, and, if anything, it increased its strength in such regions between the 1965 and 1969 elections. In fact, the Southeastern and Northeastern regions were the only regions where the JP was able to increase its voting percentage in this period. Thus, it seems more accurate to speak of an increasing penetration by the JP into the Eastern regions, rather than an active protest against the JP. On the other hand, part of the increase in the independent and minor party vote may be attributed to the alienation of some local notables from the RPP as a result of the left-ofcenter policy. V. T H E RATE OF DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT PARTY

It can be argued that the level of electoral support for the government party depends, in large measure, on the performance of the government. Thus, Bulutay (1968; 1970) has recently suggested that economic considerations play a dominant role in determining the party choices of the Turkish voters, and that there is a positive association between the rise of per capita income and the increase in support given to the government party. He further argued that a government has to achieve an average 5 percent annual increase in per capita income in order to maintain its electoral support at about the same level. Other political analysts (Robinson, 1965: 160, 208; Szyliowicz, 1966 a: *45

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

158-159; Karpat, 1960: 99, and 1961: 438, 444, 450-451) have also associated the DP gains in the 1954 elections with the general economic boom, and its losses in 1957 with the economic stagnation of the mid-1950's. Obviously, it is difficult to subject this hypothesis to a rigorous test with the kind of data we have. Nevertheless, if we take the annual "rate" of provincial socio-economic development as a rough indicator of the governmental performance in each province, we may be able to measure the effects of such performance on the percentage of votes for the government party. The Turkish SPO has computed the rates of provincial development for the period 1963-1967, during most of which time the J P was in power. If the electoral support for the governing party were indeed a function of the government's performance, then we would expect the JP to do better in provinces with higher rates of development. However, our data did not reveal such a relationship. Rates of provincial development were very meagerly correlated with the changes in the JP support between 1965 and 1969 (r = 0.065). One may suggest several reasons to account for this lack of association. First of all, it is not at all certain that the benefits of development would always be equitably distributed among all social groups. Thus, it is possible that even in a province with a high rate of development, some groups may be absolutely worse-off. It is more likely, however, that some groups would be relatively worse-off, even though they are absolutely better-off. In fact, it has been explained above (see Ch. 3) that modernization tends to increase, not to decrease, socio-economic inequalities. Whether voters are more responsive to the absolute or the relative changes in their standards of living is more difficult to establish. But it seems plausible that voters' responsiveness to the relative changes also tends to increase with modernization, which, through the higher levels of communication, education, and geographical mobility it brings about, raises expectations and leads to a clearer perception of the existing or increasing inequalities. It is not surprising, then, that the 146

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION rate of provincial development does not seem to be as­ sociated with the changes in the level of support the gov­ ernment party receives.

VI.

PATTERNS OF INTER-PARTY

COMPETITION

Table 6.5 presents the correlation coefficients (a) between the provincial voting percentages of the J P and the RPP in TABLE

6.5

Inter-Party Correlations in Voting Behavior, 1961-1969 Ν = 67

%JP 1961 JP 1965 JP 1969 RPP RPP RPP NP NP NP NTP NTP NTP TLP TLP NAP NAP RP UP Ind. Ind. Ind.

1961 1965 1969 1961 1965 1969 1961 1965 1969 1965 1969 1965 1969 1969 1969 1961 1965 1969

1961

%J.P. 1965

1969

1961

%R.P.P. 1965

1969

1.000 0.636 0.632 -0.071 -0.079 0.206 -0.293 -0.012 -0.103 -0.776 -0.466 -0.473 0.028 -0.227 -0.132 -0.065 -0.225 0.023 -0.248 -0.393 -0.408

0.636 1.000 0.822 -0.190 -0.166 0.239 -0.097 -0.096 -0.182 -0.436 -0.714 -0.486 -0.159 -0.192 -0.249 0.149 -0.340 -0.100 -0.437 -0.500 -0.509

0.632 0.822 1.000 -c0332 -U.354 0.094 0.016 0.017 -0.045 -0.515 -0.460 -0.488 -0.208 -0.258 -0.219 0.043 -0.181 -0.212 -0.275 -0.439 -0.715

-0.071 -0.190 -0.332 1.000 0.661 0.482 -0.519 -0.403 -0.345 0.112 -0.042 -0.058 0.237 0.142 -0.231 -0.020 0.076 0.244 0.054 0.209 0.128

-0.079 -0.166 -0.354 0.661 1.000 0.336 -0.422 -0.394 -0.303 0.128 0.079 0.012 0.176 0.136 -0.253 0.171 0.198 0.139 0.186 -0.149 0.123

0.206 0.239 0.094 0.482 0.336 1.000 -0.230 -0.165 -0.140 -0.226 -0.259 -0.472 0 044 0.081 -0.072 0.103 -0.094 0.001 0.044 -0.212 -0.402

two consecutive general elections; and (b) among the pro­ vincial voting percentages of these two parties and every other party's percentages. While the former provides a 147

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

measure of the stability of voting patterns, the latter informs us about the nature of inter-party competition. Thus, a positive correlation between two parties' provincial voting percentages indicates that they both appeal to the same regions of the country, and that they are in greater competition in a "symbiotic" sense. This does not necessarily show, however, that the two parties are competing for the same electorate. A similarity between the provincial voting profiles of the JP and the RPP, for example, may result from the fact that their different blocs of supporters tend to live in the same provinces (such as modern peasants for the JP and urbanites for the RPP). A negative correlation, on the other hand, means that one party's areas of strength tend to coincide with the other's areas of weakness, which may indicate a greater "zero-sum" competition (Frey, 1970 b: 21-22). For example, if the J P and the N T P captured higher percentages of the anti-RPP (or the former DP) votes in different regions of the country (as actually happened in the 1961 elections), their provincial voting profiles would correlate negatively, and this would mean greater competition in a zero-sum fashion, since the higher the percentage of votes in a province one party secures, the less the percentage obtained by the other. Several conclusions can be drawn from the Table. First, it appears that the JP's voting patterns are considerably more stable than those of the RPP. The correlation between the JP vote in 1965 and the JP vote in 1969 is quite strong (0.822), while the same correlation for the RPP is much weaker (0.336). This provides further proof of the changing social base of the RPP. Among the minor parties, the NP seems to have the most stable electoral base of support. The correlation between its 1961 and 1965 voting profiles in 0.675, and the correlation between its 1965 and 1969 profiles is 0.877. The equivalent correlations for the N T P and the TLP (not shown in the Table) average about 0.45. As for the inter-party correlations, we see that there were particularly strong negative correlations between the provincial voting percentages of the JP and the N T P in all 148

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

three elections. This can be explained by the fact that, in the early 1960's, the JP concentrated its efforts mainly in the West and did not seriously contest the NTP's position in the Eastern provinces. This negative correlation somewhat weakened in 1969, as the J P increasingly penetrated the Eastern regions. The JP vote in 1965 and 1969 also correlated negatively with the independent vote, again demonstrating the fact that the J P displays differential support in the more developed provinces, while the independents do much better in the more backward areas. The voting profiles of the two major parties correlated negatively in 1961 and 1965, but positively in 1969, even though both correlations were very weak. This may be taken as another sign of increasing symbiotic competition between the JP and the RPP for the support of a similar geographical, if not social, base. Among the minor parties, the voting profile of the Nation Party (NP) correlates negatively with those of both major parties. This seems to be due to the concentration of the NP's strength mainly in Central Anatolia and its relative weakness in the rest of the country. Negative correlations between the NP and the RPP voting percentages are particularly strong for the 1961 and 1965 elections, which suggests that in the Central regions the NP captured a comparatively larger share of the anti-DP (and anti-JP) vote at the expense of the RPP. Our data also indicate that the Turkish Labor Party's provincial voting profile is somewhat more similar to the RPP's profile than to the JP's. Other correlations shown in the table do not seem strong enough to allow definite conclusion.

VII.

PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS

Local politics in Turkey seem so fully integrated with national politics that national issues tend to become the chief ones in local politics and "local electoral results are indeed a mirror of their national counterpart" (Weiker, 1973 b). The M9

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

results of the 1963 and 1968 elections for provincial councils, city councils, and mayors matched closely with those of the 1965 and 1969 national elections. For example, the participation rate in the 1968 provincial council elections (65.7 percent) was about the same as in the 1969 elections (64.4 percent). Provincial voting participation rates in these elections correlated positively (0.594). We also observed strong positive correlations between the 1968 and the 1969 provincial voting percentages of the J P (0.870), the UP (0.932), the NP (0.907), and the RP (0.728). Corresponding correlations for the RPP (0.663), the N T P (0.469), the TLP (0.452), and the NAP (0.293) were weaker, indicating less stability in the electoral bases of the latter parties. An interesting difference between the national and local voting patterns is the much higher percentage of votes obtained by independents in mayoral elections. Thus, independent candidates for mayor received 9.7 percent of the vote in 1963 (in contrast to 3.2 percent in the 1965 national elections) and 13.2 percent in 1968 (in contrast to 5.6 percent in the 1969 national elections). In provincial and city council elections, on the other hand, the size of the independent vote was about the same as in the national elections (6.8 percent for provincial councils and 4.7 percent for city councils in 1968). In other words, voters seem to be almost twice as likely to vote for independents for mayor than for the National Assembly, provincial council, or city council. I have argued above that the independent vote in national elections is largely a reflection of the political influence of local notables in the more traditional areas. This explanation does not quite hold for independent mayors. Although, in general, they tend to come from smaller towns and from the less developed regions (Weiker, 1973 b), many of them were elected in big cities located in the highly developed areas. In 1968, 7 out of 67 provincial capitals, including Bursa, the fifth largest city in Turkey, returned independent mayors. One plausible reason for this exceptionally good performance of independents in mayoral elections may be that 150

POLITICAL

PARTICIPATION

the indivisibility of the office of mayor, unlike that of provincial and city councils, may create bipolar tendencies and encourage weaker parties to coalesce around a single candidate. It is likely that many such candidates remained independent because their electoral chances would have been reduced had they identified with a single opposition party. In the 1968 mayoral elections, for example, all minor parties received a total of 8.8 percent of the vote as opposed to 20.5 percent in the 1969 national elections and 16.2 percent in the 1968 provincial council elections. In many cases, these independent candidates were defectors from the JP, who thus obtained open or tacit support of some of the opposition parties. In short, independent candidacy in mayoral elections seems to have a meaning quite different from that in national elections. The analysis presented in this chapter confirmed our earlier observation that in 1969 a significant negative association appeared between voting participation and the level of socio-economic development. It also supported our argument that the 1969 elections marked the beginning of a realignment in the Turkish party system, with the JP losing its appeal in the more developed provinces and the RPP gaining strength there. This realignment, in turn, seems to be a function of socio-economic modernization, which tends to increase the importance of functional (class) cleavages in the society. Thus, the center-periphery conflict which has, for centuries, provided a basis for political alignments in Turkey finally appears to be waning. Our analysis also tends to confirm the hypothesis that mobilized and deferential participation is associated with low levels of socio-economic modernity. That independents and the personalistic minor parties receive disproportionately greater support in the less developed parts of the country provides clear proof for such a relationship. Conversely, the combined strength of the two older and more established major parties, which can also be taken as a measure of political institutionalization, is positively associated with socio-economic modernization. !5!

SEVEN

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION TURKEY

IN

RURAL

I. PEASANT PARTICIPATION AND NATIONAL INTEGRATION UNDERLYING many studies of recent Turkish politics has been the assumption that Turkey's current difficulties are intimately related to a crisis of participation. In Frey's (1964: 2) words, "there appears to be an unmistakable connection between Turkey's recent problems and the fact that she is engaged in bringing her previously isolated peasant masses into active political and economic participation for the first time." The first genuinely free election in Turkish political history, which resulted in a dramatic defeat for the ruling RPP in 1950, has been conceptualized as a "ruralizing election" (Huntington, 1968: 448-461; Roos and Roos, 1971: 2,7). It has been argued that, with the transition to a multiparty system, "the peasantry had assumed new importance, emerging as potentially the country's major political force," and that "the villager is becoming an integral part of his country's social, political, and economic development" (Szyliowicz, 1966 a: 16). Robinson (1965: 208-209) noted in the same vein that, ". . . economic incentive began working with tremendous force at town and village level . . . the ordinary folk were now conscious of the vast difference between their own standard of material wellbeing and that of Western Europe and North America. . . . And, so long as democratic government continued, there seemed to be no method available to the leaders to curtail this enormous economic incentive. . . . The masters of Turkey were, in reality, the political slaves

152

RURAL T U R K E Y

of the village farming masses and the new lower class urban group." One can hardly doubt that, in recent decades, Turkey has gone a long way toward integrating its peasant masses with its social, economic, and political life. The construction of a highway and village road network shattered the village community's geographical isolation. Mass media (especially radio) exposure increased sharply. Substantial urban migration (permanent or temporary) exposed ever-increasing numbers of villagers to urban influences. A great many villages made the crucial transition from a self-sufficient subsistence economy to a cash-crop, market-oriented economy (Hinderink and Kiray, 1970; Szyliowicz, 1966 a: Chap, iv; Kolars, 1963: Chap, x, and 1964; see also, Ch. 3 above). Political changes were no less instrumental in closing the gap between the urban elite and the rural masses. Since the beginning of the multi-party period, political party organizations in the countryside served as important channels of political communication and socialization and helped to induct the peasantry into the political process. In Szyliowicz's (1966 a: 159, and Chaps, vn-ix; also Kolars, 1964: 10-11, 24-25) words, the DP "had integrated the villager into the national political scene and had placed the government's relations with the peasants in a new and much needed perspective. Never before had the villager been courted by all the political parties; now deputies and politicians visited his village and asked for his vote. This was a change of great and fundamental importance." Despite such fundamental social and political changes in rural Turkey, some important questions regarding peasant political participation remain to be answered. For example, are the present political leaders of Turkey indeed the "slaves" of the rural masses? Do such masses really control the country's, and their own, destiny? Or, is the political behavior of the peasants shaped and controlled largely by forces outside their village community? To what extent is voting the outcome of an independent, individual choice, !53

RURAL TURKEY

and to what extent is it directed or mobilized by traditional rural leaders? How effective is the peasants' political participation in terms of influencing the actual exercise of power? Can the DP and the JP truly be characterized as predominantly rural-based parties? Can we treat Turkish peasants as a single, relatively undifferentiated mass? If not, what sort of demographic, social, and economic characteristics vary among Turkish villages and villagers, and what is the differential impact of such characteristics upon their political behavior? Obviously, my purpose here is to stimulate discussion along these lines, rather than to attempt to provide definitive answers. The data used in this chapter came mainly from two sources: Turkish election statistics, and the 1962 Rural Development Research Project Survey carried out under the direction of Professor Frederick W. Frey of M.I.T. Three kinds of survey instruments were utilized in the latter project: (1) a basic interview schedule applicable to all respondents, (2) supplementary interview schedules for elite respondents, and (3) a "village information sheet" (completed by the leader of the interviewing team) furnishing important ecological data about the village as a whole (Frey, 1963 b). Thanks to Professor Frey's kind permission, I was able to utilize data furnished by the "village information sheet." I then traced the voting records of these villages in the election statistics for 1961, 1965, and 1969, the only national elections for which we have a breakdown at the village level.1 Thus, the following is essentially an ecological analysis of rural voting data. Before we turn to such an 1

Frey has collected ecological information about a total number of 461 villages; 15 of these, which constitute his "sub-sample 3," are not included in his regular sample; so, I also decided not to include them in my analysis. Of the remaining 446 villages, I could not trace the voting records of 27, possibly because of changes of name or of merger with other villages. This left me with a total of 419 villages. However, comparisons between certain frequency distributions in Frey's sample and mine indicated that the omission of the 27 villages did not seriously affect the representativeness of the original sample.

154

RURAL T U R K E Y

analysis, however, it may be well to summarize some of the major findings of available survey research regarding political attitudes of Turkish peasants.

II.

POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

1. Knowledge of Political Parties About one third (34 percent) of the entire sample of villagers in the 1962 Rural Survey could not name any political party. Both sex and literacy (the latter more strongly) seem to be related to differential awareness of political parties: males and literates are appreciably more knowledgeable about political parties. Formal education and exposure to mass media are also positively associated with knowledge of political parties when sex and literacy are controlled (Frey, n.d.: 8-19). Frey (1966: 57-58) found that mass media exposure was the best predictor of political party knowledge. Exposure to mass media reduced the predictive uncertainty regarding the respondent's party knowledge by 13.06 percent. 2. National Identification It is widely believed that identification with the national state, as opposed to the more parochial forms of identification, is likely to lead to increased participation in national politics. "The more a person identifies with the nation, the more he tends to feel that what benefits the nation benefits him and what harms the nation harms him. Such feelings appear to stimulate many kinds of behavior that are difficult to evoke in individuals lacking national identification—behaviors ranging from obeying laws, saluting the flag and taking the trouble to vote in elections, through paying taxes in money and goods, to willingness to risk death in armed combat" (Frey, 1968). National identification among Turkish villagers was measured by their admiration for Atatiirk, their perception of the main characteristics of Turks as people, and their ten155

RURAL T U R K E Y

dency to teach national loyalty (as opposed to loyalty to province, to village, or to family) to their children. By all three criteria, national identification seems to be strongly associated with sex and literacy, and "the more modern coastal and western areas of Turkey exhibit greater national identification than the more traditional interior and eastern regions." As in the case of political party knowledge, national identification is also positively associated with mass media exposure and formal education, when sex and literacy are controlled (Frey, 1968). 3. Sense of Political Efficacy Frey (1964), comparing data from the 1962 Rural Survey with those of Almond and Verba (1963), found that Turkish peasants display a low level of "national" political efficacy combined with a relatively high level of "local" political efficacy. While the proportion of Turkish villagers who felt efficacious vis-a-vis the national government (26 percent) was lower than all five Western countries studied by Almond and Verba, the sense of local political efficacy among Turkish villagers (67 percent felt efficacious) was stronger than in three of the Western nations. This may be due to the fact that, unlike the Turkish sample, the Almond and Verba national samples were not limited only to rural populations, and communities with less than 10,000 inhabitants were excluded from the Mexican sample. The term "local government," as used in the Turkish survey, designated the village headman and the Council of Elders. Since both are elected by the village people and come from social backgrounds similar to the rest of the villagers, such village officials generally maintain easy face-to-face relationships with their fellow villagers (Frey and Roos, 1967). It is not surprising, therefore, that Turkish peasants feel efficacious vis-a-vis their elected village leaders. On the other hand, if the term "local government" had been used to include municipal governments in the cities and towns, and especially the local agents of the national government, local political efficacy would probably have been much weaker. 156

RURAL TURKEY

Local political efficacy among Turkish peasants seems to be associated with sex and literacy, but not with the size of the village community. Surprisingly, the sense of political efficacy appears to be strongest in the least developed regions of the country, notably in the Southeastern and the Northeastern regions (Frey, 1966: 21-22; also see, Ch. 4 above). Another finding of interest is that the predominant style of attempting to exert influence upon local (or national) government is to act alone or possibly with one's family. Enlisting others in combatting perceived governmental harm is a strategy not widely employed by Turkish peasants: only 1 percent of the respondents mentioned such a strategy, in contrast to 66 percent who said they would act alone. While acting alone may not be an inappropriate strategy with respect to village-level decisions, it is no doubt entirely inadequate to influence the actions of the national government. As Frey (1964: 21) rightly points out, the villager has scant familiarity with the necessary mediating institutions, such as parties, and the world outside the village. "He naturally applies his rather effective intra-village techniques for influence to the outside world and is usually rebuffed, or else he knows just enough of the difference between the two worlds to sense the futility of attempting to alter in even the smallest way the course of national events." 4. Desire for Political Participation Desire for political participation was measured by the villagers' preference for consultative government at both the village and national level. The villagers were asked if they preferred a strong and decisive village headman (and national government) or one that stressed consultation. Presumably, a preference for being consulted expresses a desire for being active in politics. Three-fourths of the respondents preferred a consultative village headman, but there was an even split between those who preferred a consultative national government and those who preferred one that was decisive. Desire for political participation was 157

RURAL

TURKEY

found to be strongly associated with literacy, but only weakly associated with sex, males having somewhat stronger participatory inclinations (Frey, 1964: 31-34). Also, villagers in the more developed regions displayed a generally stronger desire for political participation (Frey, 1966: 21-22). III.

VOTING PARTICIPATION

1. Rural Socio-Economic Development and Voting Participation Our summary of the major relevant findings of the Rural Development Research Project survey has shown that the attitudinal concomitants of political participation (with the exception of the sense of political efficacy) are associated with the level of modernity. Voting participation, on the other hand, clearly differs from this pattern. At the indi­ vidual level, voting does not seem to be significantly related to sex, literacy, ethnicity, village elite status, and knowl­ edge of political parties (Frey, n.d.: 22). In fact, correla­ tions between the respondent's voting participation and his TABLE

7.1

C o r r e l a t i o n Coefficients b e t w e e n Voting T u r n o u t a n d t h e I n d i c e s of Socio-Econojnic D e v e l o p m e n t : 1961, 1965, a n d 1969 Elections Ν =419

Index

1961

1965

1969

Social Service ind. Village est. ind. Development ind. Media ind. Gov. contact ind. Centrality ind.

-0.003 0.070 0.036 0.052 -0.024 0.053

-0.110 -0.085 -0.120 -0.087 -0.086 -0.021

-0.068 -0.191 -0.169 -0.110 -0.076 -0.023

Regression equation for voting participation in 1969 is as follows: y=75.690 - 2.178 (Village est. ind.) (0.55) Range 0-5 Ri= 0.191 R 2 = 0.036, ρ < 0.001 i58

RURAL T U R K E Y

knowledge of political parties were insignificant and, in some cases, even negative (Frey, Kessler, and Rothchild, 1967). Thus, voting seems to be largely independent of the attitudinal dimensions of political participation, a finding that much of the following analysis tends to confirm. Since one of the main concerns of the present study is the relationship between political participation and socioeconomic development, I correlated voting turnout rates for the 1961, 1965, and 1969 elections with six composite indices of village socio-economic development. These indices are those of social services, establishments, mass media access, governmental contact, centrality-isolation, and development. The last is a composite index formed from four of the preceding indices (mass media, centrality, establishments, and social services).2 The results of these correlations are presented in Table 7.1. Several points can be made regarding this table. First, 2

T h e Village Centrality-isolation Index is a measure of the physical centrality-isolation of the village in terms of its distance from the nearest regularly traveled road, railroad station, county center, and city with over 50,000 population. The Village Establishments Index displays the existence in the village of a coffee-house, fountain, guest room, store, and artisan's establishment. The Village Governmental Contact Index portrays the frequency of visits to the village by selected government officials: the county governor (kaymaham), military personnel, police or gendarmes, tax collector, educational officials, agricultural agents, health officials, and postal workers. T h e Village Social Services Index displays the presence or absence in the village (or within 15 km.) of 24 different social services such as: telephone, postal service, cinema, doctor, midwife, teacher, veterinarian, priest (imam), agricultural agent, clinic, school, evening courses, etc. For further information on the construction and validation of these indices, see Frey, Kessler, and Rothchild (1967). Frey (1966: 10-11) observes that "the least regional variation seems to occur with regard to the Village Centrality Index. . . . The variations in location seem simply to be presently less extreme than the developmental variations. One also marks the fact that the Index of Village Governmental Contact is slightly anomalous in its results. . . . But we should contend that this is perhaps the index which is least closely related to any measure of 'development,' particularly since there are some important variations in the content of this governmental contact."

!59

RURAL TURKEY there does not seem to be any significant relationship be­ tween socio-economic development and voting turnout in 1961. However, all correlations with the 1965 turnout rates turned negative, although none of them were strong. Four of the six negative correlations became somewhat stronger in 1969. This does not confirm the expectation that the more developed villages would have a higher rate of voting participation. It is also interesting that the strongest nega­ tive correlations are with those indices which presumably best reflect the level of socio-economic development (mass media, village establishments, and development indices). Similarly, the general decline in voting turnout from 1961 to 1969 has been more substantial in the more de­ veloped villages. To describe this situation, I correlated the changes in voting turnout (computed by subtracting the turnout rates for a particular election from those of the subsequent election) with the developmental indices men­ tioned above (Table 7.2). T h e table clearly indicates that the greatest drop in voting turnout between 1961 and 1969 TABLE

7.2

Correlation Coefficients between Changes in Voting Turnout and the Indices of Socio-Economic Development: 1961-1965, 1965-1969, 1961-1969 Ν = 419 Index Social Service ind. Village est. ind. Development ind. Media ind. Gov. contact ind. Centrality ind.

1961-1965

1965-1969

1961-1969

-0.108 -0.140 -0.151 -0.128 -0.070 -0.067

0.032 -0.116 -0.061 -0.029 -0.002 -0.001

-0.068 -0.247 -0.200 -0.147 -0.063 -0.060

Regression equation for the change in voting turnout between 1961 and 1969 is as follows: y =-7.989 - 2.659 (Village est. ind.) (0.514) Range 0-5 R {= 0.247 T R = 0.061, ρ < 0.001

i6o

RURAL T U R K E Y

occurred in the more developed villages. This association is stronger for the 1961-1965 period; however, the same trend continued, albeit in a somewhat weakened form, in the 1965-1969 period. Again, the developmental indices most strongly correlated with the decline in voting turnout were those of the village establishments, development, and mass media access. I also sought to establish the statistical associations be­ tween voting turnout and a number of developmental vari­ ables that are either not included in the composite indices, or seemed important enough to justify separate analysis. Thus, I found that the 1969 voting turnout rate was nega­ tively associated with the existence of a primary school (y = —0.252, ρ < 0.01), and Turkish as the main language (y = -0.277, ρ < 0.05). Similarly, participation in the 1965 elections was negatively associated with the existence of a primary school (γ =—0.437, ρ < 0.001), and with the change in the main village occupation in the last ten years (γ = —0.148, ρ < 0.05). There were statistically significant negative associations between changes in voting turnout in the 1961-1965 period, and the existence of a primary school (γ = -0.350, ρ < 0.001), the existence of a market (γ = —0.175, ρ < 0.01), and a change in occupation in the last ten years (y = - 0 . 1 8 1 , ρ < 0.05). This negative association between voting participation and the level of rural socio-economic development con­ firms the provincial-level analysis presented in the preced­ ing chapter. I had argued there that the nature of political participation tended to vary with socio-economic develop­ ment, and the less developed areas were more likely to display mobilized or deferential participation. Where tradi­ tional rural leaders are influential enough to mobilize sub­ stantial numbers of their supporters into voting, higher rates of turnout can be obtained more easily. While voting tends to become autonomous in the more developed vil­ lages, peasants in the more backward parts of the country may be exercising "their franchise in accordance with guid­ ance from their husbands, kinsmen, clan and tribal lead161

RURAL T U R K E Y

ers, landlords, agas, and so on"; and the stronger such traditional influences, the greater the pressure to vote. As Frey (1970 b: 17) rightly observes, "one forms the impression that many Turkish peasants may be more voted than voting." This is also indicated by the fact that, unlike voting, many attitudinal concomitants of political participation— such as political party knowledge, national identification, and desire for political participation—are correlated positively with socio-economic development. While very high turnout rates are likely to be found in the less developed villages, extremely low voting turnout or complete abstention from voting do not seem to be significantly related to the level of rural development. A recent study (Nuhrat, 1971) indicated that the number of nonvoting villages rose from 3 in 1961, to 12 in 1965, to 56 in 1969. Similarly, those with a turnout rate of less than 10 percent rose from 5 in 1961, to 32 in 1965, to 68 in 1969. In 1969, a majority of the non-voting villages (55.3 percent) and over two-fifths of the low turnout villages (41.2 percent) were in the Eastern region. However, judged by the limited available information on their socio-economic characteristics, many of them were not among the least developed villages. Thus, although it is conceivable that in some cases non-voting or very low turnout may also be due to traditional influences, they are more likely to be a manifestation of protest and alienation. 3 Our distinction between autonomous and mobilized political participation may also help to explain the greater decline in voting participation in the more developed villages. Peasants in such villages, being better informed about and more attentive to national politics, may have more reasons to be disillusioned with particular outputs of the political system and are more likely to express it by non-voting. In the less developed villages, on the other 3

Nuhrat (1971: 235) cites two villages that abstained from voting to protest the lack of certain services (especially roads and drinking water) in their villages. l62

RURAL T U R K E Y

hand, national political events tend to play a much smaller role in the voter's decision to vote, and local notables are generally able to mobilize a consistently high level of turn­ out, regardless of the changes in national politics. Since their influence upon parties and governmental authorities is proportional to their ability to deliver the votes, they are not likely to forgo electoral activity unless they have very particular reasons to do so. Village size also seems to have an adverse effect on the turnout rates. For the three national elections studied, rela­ tively strong and consistent negative correlations have been observed between village size and voting participation. Cor­ relation coefficients are (-0.332) for 1961, (-0.336) for 1965, and (-0.313) for 1969. Although village size and village development are not necessarily correlated, this finding seems to furnish further evidence for the preced­ ing argument. Presumably, the smaller the village com­ munity, the easier for the traditional village elite to in­ fluence villagers to turn out to vote in higher percentages. 2. Land Ownership and Voting Participation Since I had hypothesized that local notables tend to induce villagers to vote as a bloc in the more backward villages, I had expected that certain variables concerning the land ownership system would bear a strong relationship to the level of voting turnout. However, such was not the case. Percentage of villagers owning land, percentage of villagers working on others' land, and the number of large land­ owners correlated insignificantly, if at all, with voting par­ ticipation in all three national elections. The association be­ tween voting turnout and the presence of an aga in the village was even more in the unexpected direction. It seems that villages with agas have a lower turnout rate than the other villages. For the 1961 and 1969 elections, the associa­ tion between these two variables was statistically significant (γ = 0.208, ρ < 0.05 for 1961; and γ = 0.251, ρ < 0.01 for 1969). Although the apparent lack of relationship between vot163

RURAL T U R K E Y

ing turnout and land ownership in general, and the negative relationship between voting turnout and the presence of a£a may cast some doubt on my original hypothesis, they do not seem sufficiently strong to invalidate it. First of all, that the landownership system is not a good predictor of voting turnout should come as no great surprise, since the Turkish Rural Survey of 1962 also established that, at the individual level, a peasant's land ownership status "is a very weak or poor predictor of other peasant attributes. Knowledge of whether or not a peasant has reported that his family owns all the land it farms does not contribute much to an understanding of peasant orientations and behavior" (Frey, 1967: 26). Part of the problem may be due to the bluntness of the distinction between owner and non-owner categories. The survey questionnaire elicited no information on the amount, quality, and degree of fragmentation of a peasant's land; nor did the intermediate category of "owns part of the land he farms" make any distinctions based on the respective amounts of land owned or rented (see also Frey, 1967: 3-4). As Stirling (1965: 54-56) observed, "those who put their land out to share-croppers are not necessarily the well-to-do. They include the aged, the sick, the widows, or those who have lost or been forced to sell their oxen or are short of seed. . . . Others let out their land to free themselves for some other occupation. Correspondingly, those who take on share-cropping are not the poorest village households. To share-crop a man needs resources—oxen and supporting manpower. In fact most share-croppers are middle range owners who prefer to take on more land rather than supplement their income by other means." Furthermore, when studying the political impact of the land ownership patterns, we should distinguish between the feudal and capitalistic forms of large land ownership. The attitudes, values, and political behaviors of the peasants living on large-scale feudalistic estates, argues Powell (1972: Chap. 3), "are not shaped and framed autonomously, but are tied quite directly to the attitudes, values, and political 164

RURAL T U R K E Y

behaviors of the patrons on whom they are dependent. . . . In the latifundia situation . . . class struggle in the Marxist sense is often curiously absent. . . . The most prominent patterns of cooperation will be inter-class— occurring among the patron and his entourage of clients—and the most prominent patterns of conflict will be intra-class—among patrons competing with each other for scarce values, and among their dependent peasants." Peasants attached to large-scale capitalist enterprises, on the other hand, "tend to belong to organizations such as trade unions and political parties to a much greater extent," although such membership does not necessarily lead to "modern" (i.e., conscious and solidary) political behavior. An examination of the regional land tenure patterns in Turkey, based on data from the Rural Development Research Project Survey, supports our reservations about the political implications of the land ownership system. The Mediterranean region, characterized by its modern, largescale capitalist enterprises, displays the most unequal land distribution, while the Southeastern region, by far the most backward and feudalistic region of Turkey, is a close second. The distribution of land also seems highly inequitable, both in the modernized, capitalistic Aegean region and the largely feudalistic, underdeveloped East Central region (Frey, 1967: 15-16). Thus, it is small wonder that the kind of data we have on land tenure patterns do not shed much light on the political attitudes and behaviors of the peasants. Finally, it is likely that the Turkish Rural Survey ran into some terminological problems regarding the agas. For example, the Marmara region, where feudal relationships hardly exist, ranked second highest in the proportion of villages with an aga, only one percent behind the Southeastern region (Frey, 1966: 45-47). This may be due to the absence of a single, consistent concept of aga among Turkish villagers. Furthermore, in some cases, the agas may be absentee landowners with little or no interest in the politics of the village. Or, a village may be controlled by several 165

RURAL TURKEY

agas, in which case no single aga can mobilize the votes of more than a certain portion of the village population. Or, there may be severe land disputes between the aga and the villagers, which restrict the political influence of the former. 4 Obviously, land ownership is not the only source of "traditional" political influence upon villagers. Especially in the Eastern regions, }eyhs (religious or pious personages) and the chiefs of nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes also enjoy considerable political power (Yalman, 1969: 189—190,215). Sometimes land ownership and religious status are combined in the same persons or families, mutually reinforcing each other's effects (Bejikci, 1968: 179-180, 184-186). Or, land ownership may be combined with the ownership of business establishments in nearby towns or cities. In fact, many wealthy landlords choose to invest their profits from the land in urban areas. This gives the agas control over the employment opportunities of the cityward migrant villagers and further increases their political influence (Bejikci, 1968: 67-69, 83-84, 121-124; Ozankaya, 1971: 37). 5 In the 4

Yalman (1969: 198) notes that the recent increase in land disputes in Eastern Turkey is due mainly to the introduction of tractors: "In traditional agriculture the landlord needed the tenant to cultivate the land, and the tenant needed the protection of the landlord. . . . The dependence of the landlord upon the peasants under the traditional forms of cultivation is such that he would have been loath to alienate the tenants by trying to press for higher shares of the crop. . . . Around 1950 . . . the introduction of tractors into large-scale dry farming fundamentally affected the agrarian structure of Eastern Anatolia. . . . From the point of view of the villagers, the introduction of tractors . . . has been disastrous. It is now extremely important for the villagers not to permit, if possible, the claims of the landlord to operate the land with tractors, or in desperation to frighten him and induce him to stay away from the land as usual in the towns." On this point, see also Karpat (1960). 5 Kiray (1964: 60-63) vividly describes the political influence of the town merchants upon the villagers. The merchant and the villagers are involved in a highly personalized social relationship. The merchant not only provides the villager with all his necessary supplies, but also purchases his products, extends him credit, mediates in his dealings with governmental authorities, acts as a friend and counselor. "Sometimes a whole village is

166

RURAL

TURKEY

non-Turkish-speaking areas of Eastern Turkey such influ­ ence is also augmented by the fact that, given the linguistic and cultural barriers, the villagers depend on the help and counsel of their agas in their dealings with administrative authorities. Finally, just as the political power of the agas is based on their social and economic power, the reverse is also often true. Their positions in the national and local gov­ ernments and in political party organizations, give them additional leverage vis-a-vis the villagers. 3. Party Organization and Voting Participation We would normally expect that exposure to political party activity is positively associated with high voting turnout. One good measure of such exposure is the existence of a party cell (ocak) in the village. Although party organizations below the county level were banned after the 1960 Revolu­ tion, about two-thirds of the Turkish villages had at least one party cell at that time. Moreover, a majority of the villages had more than one party cell; of those villages with one or more party cells, only 12.2 percent had only one. Predictably, the existence of party cells was positively as­ sociated with various indicators of socio-economic de­ velopment. 6 In Frey's (n.d.: 3-7, 19) words, "politicization suffuses across a developing nation in much the same fash­ ion as other processes of modernization. It moves from

involved with a single merchant. In such cases, the merchant has more influence upon the villagers than the headman, gendarmerie commander, and even the county governor." 6 The existence of party cells is positively associated with all the compos­ ite indices of development mentioned above: Index

Ύ

Level of Significance

Social Service Ind. Village Est. Ind. Development Ind. Media Ind. Gov. Contact Ind. Centrality Ind.

0.359 0.334 0.433 0.408 0.309 0.213

ρ < 0.001 ρ < 0.001 ρ < 0.001 ρ < 0.001 ρ < 0.001 ρ < 0.01

167

RURAL T U R K E Y

urban areas to rural, via the literates, the males, those ex­ posed to the mass media, residents of larger villages, resi­ dents of more modern regions, and those of adult status but comparatively young." However, the anomaly of voting participation in Turkey once again becomes apparent here, since it is in the villages that had no party organizations prior to 1960 that we find the highest rates of voting turnout. In the 1969 elections, for example, only 4.7 percent of the villages with a party cell had a voting turnout rate of over 90 percent, as op­ posed to 21.4 percent of the villages without a party cell (γ = 0.169, ρ < 0.05). Similarly, in the 1965 election, 25.6 percent of the villages without a party cell had a turnout rate of over 90 percent, as opposed to 6.1 percent of the villages with a party cell (γ = 0.328, ρ < 0.001). The rela­ tionship is in the same direction, but substantially weaker, for the 1961 election. Between 1961 and 1965, decline in voting participation was greater in party villages than in non-party villages (γ = 0.220, ρ < 0.01). T h e number of party cells, on the other hand, does not seem to have a significant effect on voting turnout. Since the existence of party cells is itself associated with socio-economic development, it may be well to separate the TABLE

7.3

Party Organization and Voting Participation in Less Developed Villages: 1961 Elections Voting Participation

Party Cells

(%)

Yes

No

Total

0-70 71-80 81-90 91-100

18.4% 20.4% 36.7% 24.5%

9.4% 15.1% 34.0% 41.5%

13.7% 17.6% 35.3% 33.3%

(%) Total

48.0 52.0 49 53 γ = 0.304, ρ < 0.05

168

RURAL

TURKEY

effects of party organization by controlling for the level of 7 development. When such controls are introduced, we ob­ serve no significant relationship between party cells and vot­ ing turnout in moderately or highly developed villages, but the negative association strongly persists in the less de­ veloped villages, especially for the 1961 and 1965 elections (Tables 7.3 and 7.4). In such villages, high turnout rates TABLE

7.4

P a r t y O r g a n i z a t i o n a n d Voting Participation in Less D e v e l o p e d Villages: 1965 Elections

Voting Participation (%)

Yes

No

Total

0-60 61-70 71-80 81-90 91-100

22.4% 18.4% 16.3% 32.7% 10.2%

9.3% 5.6% 9.3% 33.3% 42.6%

15.5% 11.7% 12.6% 33.0% 27.2%

Party Cells

47.6 52.4 49 54 γ = 0.555, ρ < 0.001

(%) Total

combined with a low level of exposure to party activity provide further evidence for mobilized participation in­ duced by traditional rural leaders. IV.

PARTY COMPETITION

As Frey (1970 b: 18; also n.d.: 24-27) has pointed out, "the common notion that Turkish villagers vote en bloc for a single party that has captured them seems quite false." To provide a measure of party competition, I divided our vil7

The Village Development Index has a range of 0-8. Higher score indicates greater development. Villages that score 0-2 have been classified as less developed, 3-5 as moderately developed, and 6-8 as highly developed.

169

RURAL T U R K E Y

lages into three categories: those in which no party received an absolute majority of the total valid votes cast (fragmentation), those where one party received between 50 and 80 percent of such votes (clear majority for one party), and those where one party obtained more than 80 percent of the votes (predominant one-party support) (Table 7.5). TABLE

7.5

Degree of Party Competition, 1961-1969 Villages in which . . . no party received more than 50% one party received 50-80% one party received more than 80%

1961

1965

1969

17.8%

18.9%

29.2%

63.2%

60.3%

56.9%

19.0%

20.8%

13.9%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Several points can be made regarding the table. In all three elections we studied, a majority of villages fell into the second category. In other words, the typical village seems to be one with a clear majority for one party, but also with considerable support for other parties. The cases of fragmentation and one-party domination are much less common, although not very rare. However, the proportion of fragmented villages seems to be increasing, while predominant one-party villages are decreasing. Both trends are in the expected direction: with the recent increase in the number of parties, we would expect to find less villages with a one-party majority. Predominant one-party support, on the other hand, is often a manifestation of mobilized participation. We may hypothesize, therefore, that the lack of effective party competition is associated with low socioeconomic development, and that the proportion of such villages would decrease as modernization proceeds. To test this hypothesis, I cross-tabulated our villages by 170

RURAL

TURKEY

their level of socio-economic development and by the type of party competition (Tables 7.6, 7.7, and 7.8). The tables demonstrate that, while fragmentation does not seem to be related to socio-economic development, predominant TABLE

7.6

Party C o m p e t i t i o n by Level of Village D e v e l o p m e n t , 1961 Percentage of Votes by One Party Less t h a n 5 0 % 50-80% More than 80% (%) Total

Level of Development Medium

Low 20.6% 54.2% 25.2%

16.6% 66.8% 16.6%

100.0 107 TABLE

100.0 193

High 17.2% 65.6% 17.2% 100.0 116

7.7

Party C o m p e t i t i o n by Level of Village D e v e l o p m e n t , 1965 Percentage of Votes by One Party Less t h a n 5 0 % 50-80% More than 80% ( % ) •

Total

Level of Development Medium

Low

20.3% 49.1% 30.6%

20.1% 62.9% 17.0%

00.0 08 TABLE

100.0 194

High

15.5% 66.4% 18.1% 100.0 116

7.8

Party C o m p e t i t i o n by Level of Village D e v e l o p m e n t , 1969 Percentage of Votes by One Party

Less than 50% 50-80% More than 80% (%) Total

Level of Development Medium

Low

22.2% 55.6% 22.2% 100.0 108 171

34.0% 55.2% 10.8% 100.0 194

High

27.6% 61.2% 11.2% 100.0 116

RURAL TURKEY

one-party strength is indeed more likely to be found in the least developed villages. This relation is stronger for the 1965 and 1969 elections. Checks with some of our other developmental indices also supported our hypothesis. For example, in 1969, 21.1 percent of the villages with low scores on the Village Establishments Index were predominant one-party type, but only 6.9 percent of the villages that scored high on this index belonged to that category. Our findings support those of Nuhrat (1971), who has studied strictly one-party villages (i.e., those which unanimously supported one party or an independent candidate) in the period 1961-1969. The number of such villages rose from 1,018 in 1961 to 1,061 in 1965, and to 1,384 in 1969. A great majority of them (68.5 percent in 1961, 73.3 percent in 1965, 69.9 percent in 1969) are concentrated in the Eastern region. In 1969, 44.1 percent of such villages gave their support to the JP, and another 29.0 percent to the independent candidates. From 1961 to 1969, the proportion of one-party J P villages rose sharply, while the RPP villages decreased drastically. This attests the shifting geographical and social bases of support for the two major parties, the RPP losing its older strongholds in the East and the JP making headway in that region. Of minor parties, the NTP and the RP, both based largely on the support of local notables, received disproportionate support from oneparty villages. The mobilized nature of voting in such villages can also be inferred from the fact that a majority of them seem to have switched parties at least once in the period under study. Nuhrat (1971) also found that one-party villages tended to be less populous (46 percent with less than 150 inhabitants), less literate (61 percent with less than 20 percent literate), and less educated (21 percent with school) than the average Turkish village. They are more isolated from the outside world, as indicated by the relative infrequency of seasonal migration and of visits to and from the village. They tend to have a greater proportion of landless peasants (in 46 percent of such villages, more than 40 percent of the 172

RURAL T U R K E Y

families have no land). Finally, almost half of them (48 percent) have Kurdish (or Zaza) as their main native lan­ guage. Thus, the less developed a village, the more likely it is to display one-party or predominant one-party support. V.

ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL PARTIES

1. The Justice Party We have observed earlier (Ch. 6) that the provincial voting strength of the J P correlated positively with provincial modernity. T h e present analysis confirms this for rural Turkey (Table 7.9). T h e association between the J P vote and village development was strongest in the 1965 elec­ tions, but somewhat weakened in 1969. 8 Correlations with village size display the same curvilinear pattern. It seems that the differential appeal of the J P to the more developed villages reached a peak in 1965, and then began to decline. For example, in 1965, the J P did relatively better in villages with a market (γ = 0.196, ρ < 0.01), with a political party cell (γ = 0 . 1 9 4 , ρ < 0.05), and with a primary school (γ = 0.204, ρ < 0.01). Similarly, the J P had a stronger ap­ peal to villages where Turkish was the main language (y = 0.563, ρ < 0.001) and farming was not the main occu8

Regression equations for the J.P. vote are as follows:

Range 0-8 JP vote in 1961 = 17.476 + 3.487 (Dev. Ind.) (0.68) R = 0.245 R 2 = 0.06, ρ < 0.001 Range 0-8 J P vote in 1965 = 34.771 + 3.657 (Dev. Ind.) (0.6) R = 0.285 R 2 = 0.081, p < 0.001 Range 0-8 J P vote in 1969 = 34.737 + 2.262 (Dev. Ind.) (0.62) R =0.177 R 2 = 0.031, ρ < 0.001

!73

RURAL TURKEY TABLE

7.9

C o r r e l a t i o n Coefficients b e t w e e n t h e J P a n d t h e R P P Vote a n d t h e I n d i c e s of Socio-Economic D e v e l o p m e n t : 1 9 6 1 , 1965, 1969 Ν = 419

JP

Index

1961

1965

1969

1961

Social Service Ind. Village est. ind. Development ind. Media ind. Gov. contact ind. Centrality ind. Village size

0.197 0.228 0.245 0.198 0.079 0.092 0.076

0.220 0.235 0.285 0.246 0.074 0.111 0.103

0.148 0.165 0.177 0.159 0.018 0.026 -0.015

-0.037 -0.008 -0.032 -0.006 -0.009 0.017 0.047

RPP 1965

1969

0.050 -0.041 0.018 0.053 0.026 0.004 0.060

0.065 0.066 0.107 0.119 0.061 0.087 0.053

pation (γ = 0.254, ρ < 0.01). In 1969, most of these associa­ tions fell below the statistically significant level. 2. The Republican People's Party The rural RPP vote in the 1961 and the 1965 elections does not seem to be related to village development. In 1969, however, a weak but positive association appears (Table 7.9). 9 This supports the findings of our province-level analysis presented in the preceding chapter. T h e RPP seems to be slowly developing a differential appeal to the more developed villages. Nevertheless, this is due less to the party's gains in such villages than to its heavy losses in the less developed ones (see Chap. 5). Since rural development usually entails the commercialization of agriculture, the transformation of share-croppers into wage laborers, and an increasing inequality of income (Hinderink and Kiray, 1970), it is especially in those "developed" villages that the 9

T h e regression equation is:

Range 0-8 RPP vote in 1969 = 19.781 + 1.2 (Med. Ind.) (0.49) R = 0.119 R 2 = 0.014, ρ < 0 . 0 5

174

RURAL T U R K E Y

potential for class voting and issue-oriented politics is greatest. Similarly, other processes of modernization (such as increasing literacy, mass media exposure, geographical mobility, and the introduction of new governmental ser­ vices) tend to integrate the rural population with the larger society and to weaken the influence of traditional local notables. Thus, there appears to be room among the more modern sectors of the Turkish peasantry for an appeal based on an effective social reform program. It should be admitted, however, that so far the RPP's success in gaining the support of the rural voters has been limited. Even in the 1973 elections, when the party in­ creased its urban votes by a substantial 8 percent of the total vote, its gain in the rural areas was only about 3 percent (see the Conclusion). One reason for the apparently greater difficulties of the party among peasants may be that the overall attitudinal climate of such more modern rural areas is not favorable to the more controlled (in terms of social and economic policies) society the RPP advocates. 3. Minor Parties and Independents Correlations between the composite indices of rural de­ velopment and the percentage of votes for minor parties were generally insignificant, with the exception of the New Turkey Party (NTP), whose voting strength correlated negatively with the level of socio-economic development. However, our data also revealed certain statistically signifi­ cant associations between support for other minor parties and some of the more specific developmental indicators. (a) Nation Party (NP): The oldest of the minor parties, the Ν Ρ did relatively better in 1961 in villages with a gen­ erally low level of development, but a somewhat equal distribution of land. T h e party's voting percentage was as­ sociated positively with farming as the main village occupa­ tion (γ = 0.471, ρ < 0.001), the percentage of villagers owning land (y = 0.183, ρ < 0.01), and the percentage of villagers working regularly outside their villages (γ = 0.139, ρ < 0.01). The NP received relatively less support from the

!75

RURAL TURKEY

aga-villages' (γ = 0.232, ρ < 0.05) and from those where a large proportion of villagers work on others' land ( γ = 0 . 1 4 8 , ρ < 0.01). Some of these relationships persisted in the 1965 and 1969 elections. In 1969, the party's voting strength corre­ lated negatively with the presence of agas (y = 0.249, ρ < 0.05) and the percentage of villagers working on others' land (γ = 0 . 1 2 5 , ρ < 0.05), and positively with Turkish as the main language (y = 0.342, ρ < 0.01) and the percentage of villagers working regularly outside their vil­ lages ( γ = 0.164, p < 0.01). (b) National Action Party (NAP): The NAP, which strongly emphasizes Turkish nationalism, received disproportion­ ately more votes from the Turkish-speaking villages (y = 0.456, ρ < 0.001 for 1965, and y = 0.463, ρ < 0.001 for 1969). The NAP support was also associated with the existence of a market in the village (y = 0.218, ρ < 0.01 for 1965, and γ = 0.150, ρ < 0.05 in 1969) and the percentage of villagers owning land (y = 0.183, ρ < 0.05 in 1965). (c) Turkish Labor Party (TLP): Since a vote for the TLP would normally be considered a more or less conscious pro­ test vote, it is surprising that our rural data revealed almost no significant relationships between the TLP support and the level of village development. T h e only significant posi­ tive associations for the 1969 elections were with the per­ centage of villagers working regularly (γ = 0.136, ρ < 0.05) or seasonally (γ = 0.184, ρ < 0.05) outside their villages, and with the existence of a primary school in the village ( γ = 0 . 1 7 1 , ρ < 0.05). (d) Unity Party (UP): While the UP strength in 1969 was not significantly correlated with any of our composite in­ dices of development, the party's voting profile still shows some interesting characteristics. The UP vote was positively associated with a change in the main village occupation in the last ten years (γ = 0.201, ρ < 0.05), the existence of a primary school (γ = 0.286, ρ < 0.05), Turkish as the main language (γ = 0.257, ρ < 0.05), the percentage of villagers working regularly (γ = 0.219, ρ < 0.001) or seasonally 176

RURAL T U R K E Y

(γ = 0.195, ρ < 0.05) outside their villages, the percentage of villagers working on others' land (y = 0.344, ρ < 0.001), and the presence of large landlords (y = 0.268, ρ < 0.001). There was also a strong negative association between the UP support and the percentage of villagers owning land (γ = 0.268, ρ < 0.001). Thus, the UP's appeal seems to be stronger in villages characterized by a particularly unequal distribution of land and a relatively high level of integra­ tion with the larger society. (e) Reliance Party (RP): As in our province-level analysis, we have found no statistically significant relationship be­ tween the RP support in 1969 and the socio-economic characteristics of villages. This suggests that the RP receives its support largely from the disaffected old-guard of the RPP, without having a particularly strong base of support in any major socio-economic sector of the Turkish population. (f) New Turkey Party (NTP): The N T P proved to be the major exception to the general absence of relationship be­ tween minor party support and rural development. The N T P vote correlated negatively with socio-economic de­ velopment and village size (Table 7.10). 10 In other words, the NTP, which is essentially a party of local notables with greatest strength in the Eastern provinces, received dispro10

Regression equations for the NTP vote are as follows:

Range 0-5 N T P vote in 1961 = 26.32 - 4.093 (Vil. Est. Ind.) (0.89) R = 0.222 R 2 = 0.049, ρ < 0.001 Range 0-8 NTP vote in 1965 = 12.523 - 1.878 (Dev. Ind.) (0.32) R = 0.277 R 2 = 0.077, ρ < 0.001 Range 0-8 NTP vote in 1969 = 7.244 - 1.197 (Dev. Ind.) (0.22) R = 0.257 R 2 = 0.066, ρ < 0.001

177

RURAL TURKEY TABLE

7.10

Correlation Coefficients between the NTP and Independent Vote and the Indices of Socio-Economic Development: 1961, 1965, 1969 Ν = 419 Index

1961

NTP 1965

1969

1961

Independents 1965 1969

Social Service Ind. Village est. ind. Development ind. Media ind. Gov. contact ind. Centrality ind. Village size

-0.129 -0.222 -0.215 -0.201 -0.054 -0.054 -0.070

-0.219 -0.240 -0.277 -0.232 -0.089 -0.087 -0.193

-0.218 -0.166 -0.257 -0.200 -0.011 -0.119 -0.128

0.017 -0.029 -0.014 -0.010 0.036 -0.011 0.045

-0.196 -0.190 -0.244 -0.242 -0.091 -0.087 -0.056

-0.111 -0.144 -0.185 -0.189 -0.036 -0.075 0.029

portionate support from the smallest and most backward villages: another finding that furnished evidence for our hypothesis on the mobilized nature of voting participation in such areas. T h e N T P vote was also strongly associated with Kurdish as the native language. In the 1969 elections, for example, the N T P received more than 10 percent of the vote in 22.6 percent of the Kurdish-speaking villages, as opposed to only 1.2 percent of the Turkish-speaking vil­ lages (y = 0.401, ρ < 0.001). This relationship held true for the 1965 (7 = 0.538, ρ < 0.001) and the 1961 (γ = 0.529, ρ < 0.001) elections. There were also statistically significant negative associa­ tions between the N T P vote in 1965, and a number of developmental indicators: the existence of a primary school ( γ = 0 . 2 0 5 , ρ < 0.05), of a market (γ = 0 . 1 5 5 , p < 0.05), and of a party cell (γ = 0.217, ρ < 0.01); the percentage of boys (γ = 0.208, ρ < 0.05) and girls (γ = 0.313, ρ < 0.001) in school. T h e party did relatively better in villages where there was an aga (y = 0.192, ρ < 0.05), where farming was the main occupation (y = 0.387, ρ < 0.001), and where the main occupation of the village has not changed in the last ten years (γ = 0.235, ρ < 0.01). The vote for independent candidates display a similar 178

RURAL TURKEY 11

pattern (Table 7.10). The independent vote correlated negatively with the indicators of development. Such corre­ lations were insignificant for 1961, mainly because the in­ dependents polled a very small percentage (0.8 percent) of the total vote. However, in 1965 and 1969, when indepen­ dent vote increased sharply (3.2 and 5.6 percent of the national total, respectively), negative correlations between such vote and our developmental indicators became sig­ nificant. Independent vote was strongly associated with Kurdish as the native language (γ = 0.386, ρ < 0.001 in 1969, γ = 0.513, ρ < 0.001 in 1965), but negatively as­ sociated with the percentage of boys (γ = 0.258, ρ < 0.001) and girls (γ = 0.252, ρ < 0.001) attending school, and the existence of a market in the village (γ = 0.185, ρ < 0.05). If the size of the independent vote can be taken as an indica­ tion of personalistic influences and patron-client relation­ ships, then this finding again fits well with our earlier argu­ ment: the lower the level of socio-economic development, the greater the role of the traditional rural elites in control­ ling the political behavior of the villagers. VI.

T H E STRENGTH OF THE TWO-PARTY

SYSTEM

Although the two major parties, the J P and the RPP, per­ form somewhat better in urban areas than in villages (see above, Ch. 5), they still command impressive rural strength. The combined rural voting percentage of the J P and the RPP was 79.9 in 1965 and 71.4 in 1969. This is a remarka11

Regression equations are:

Range 0-8 Independent vote 1965 = 12.860 - 2.01 (Dev. Ind.) (0.39) R = 0.244 R 2 = 0.059, ρ < 0.001 Range 0-8 Independent vote 1969 = 14.96 - 1.832 (Med. Ind. (0.47) R = 0.189 2 R = 0.036, ρ < 0.001

*79

RURAL T U R K E Y

bly strong tendency toward a two-party system, given the generally parochial political orientations of the villagers, their low level of political information and awareness, and the personal influence of local notables in rural areas. One may wonder, indeed, how an essentially two-party system is maintained in rural Turkey despite such adverse conditions. In addition to the more general factors leading to a twoparty tendency in Turkey, a tentative answer to the preceding question may be sought in the nature of the village party structures. It has often been observed that rural party organizations tend to be based on already existing groups (especially kinship groups) and the initial party choices are frequently determined by rivalries among such groups (Szyliowicz, 1962: 432; Kolars, 1964: 19-20). As Beeley (1968: 5-6) notes, "party affiliation at the village level in Turkey is not yet organized on the basis of strictly political criteria but rather have political party labels, in many cases, been attached to groups within the village which previously looked upon themselves as groups for quite different reasons. . . . In the years since 1950, much of the discussion in the coffee-houses has been political in the strict sense of the word, but some appears to have been nothing more than the expression of the rivalry and differences of the past in political terms." Similarly, Stirling (1965: 281-282; see also Rustow, 1966: 123; Sayan, 1975: 123-126) has observed that in most rural communities two sharply defined rival factions already existed when the transition to a multi-party system took place. "The reigning faction had necessarily already identified itself with the existing government, so that the headman and his supporters were automatically RPP. Those who opposed them were thus committed to the DP. . . . This conversion of existing local factions into local sections of the national parties made possible the very rapid establishment of a two-party political system in full-scale activity. . . . This analysis implies that the DP in fact captured the support of most of the local oppositions which existed 180

RURAL TURKEY in every town and village in Turkey. Once this had hap­ pened third parties had relatively little chance of becoming established in rural areas on a national scale." We have observed above (Ch. 6) that the strength of the two-party system in Turkey, as measured by the combined voting percentages of the J Ρ and the RPP, correlated posi­ tively with provincial socio-economic development. O u r village-level analysis confirmed this observation (Table 7.11). Combined JP-RPP voting strength was found to be TABLE

7.11

Correlation Coefficients between Combined JP and RPP Vote and the Indices of Socio-Economic Development: 1961, 1965, 1969 Ν =419 Index

1961

1965

1969

Social Service ind. Village est. ind. Development ind. Media ind. Gov. contact ind. Centrality ind. Village size

0.162 0.214 0.212 0.187 0.069 0.103 0.112

0.283 0.214 0.323 0.313 0.103 0.123 0.166

0.191 0.209 0.251 0.243 0.062 0.091 0.027

associated with all the indices of village development. As in most other tables in this chapter, village development, vil­ lage mass media access, and village establishments indices seemed to be the best predictors of the dependent political variable. To the extent that voting for minor parties or independents is, within the Turkish context, an indicator of mobilized participation, such a positive association is in the expected direction. To summarize, one of the main findings of our analysis of Turkish rural voting behavior is the essentially negative re­ lationship between rural socio-economic development and voting participation. Voting participation in rural Turkey 181

RURAL

TURKEY

does not increase with individual and village modernity, and seems to be largely independent of supporting attitudinal characteristics, such as political information, national identification, and desire for political participation. This suggests the existence of a considerable amount of mobilized participation among Turkish peasants, especially in the less developed villages. In such villages, traditional notables (wealthy landlords, tribal chiefs, or religious leaders) are usually able to secure high turnout rates and high voting percentages for the parties they support. If the major parties fail to accommodate their interests and political ambitions, they often run on a minor party ticket or as independents relying on the personal loyalty of their clients: hence, the greater strength of independents and personalistic minor parties and the more unstable nature of party allegiances in the less developed villages. With increasing modernization, such deferential voting patterns are likely to give way to a more autonomous and instrumental form of political participation. An interesting case of this is the political behavior of rural-to-urban migrants, which will be examined in some detail in the next chapter.

182

E I G H T

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION CITIES

IN

MAJOR

I. URBAN POOR AND POLITICS

IN this chapter we shall deal with the political participation patterns in major Turkish cities, with particular emphasis on low-income groups. Since a substantial majority of the urban poor are recent migrants to the cities, we shall thus be able to study the effects of urban migration on the political behavior of the migrants. In fact, it is probably those rural-to-urban migrants which are probably most profoundly exposed to the effects of social change and, therefore, pose some of the most intriguing problems for comparative research in developing countries, as attested by the fast growing body of literature on the subject. Much has been said about the disruptive political effects of urban migration. 1 Social scientists of varying theoretical backgrounds have frequently argued that urban migration involves a breakdown of traditional value systems and of controls on deviant behavior, the weakening of family and kinship ties, and consequently, a general state of uprootedness, disorientation, social atomization, insecurity, isolation, and anomie (Park, 1967; Hauser, 1963: 210-211; Kornhauser, 1959). It is also assumed that the relatively slow rate of industrialization in many of the developing countries often lags behind the rate of urbanization, causing widespread unemployment or under-employment among the urban migrants, thereby contributing to their sense of disappointment and frustration. Related to this phenome1

For a useful discussion of various implications of urban migration, see Weiner (1971 b: 600-607).

l83

MAJOR

CITIES

non of "objective deprivation" is the increased "relative (or perceived) deprivation" resulting from exposure to the city life and to the gross inequalities in living conditions. Small wonder, then, that predictions about the political impact of urban migration have been strongly pessimistic. Although urbanization has sometimes been associated with such "desirable" political changes as increased political awareness and electoral participation (Deutsch, 1963; Lerner, 1958), the more common line of argument presents rapid urban migration as one of the major causes of political radicalization, instability, violence, or, more generally speaking, of disruptive political behavior (Ray, 1969). Pye (1969: 404) argued, for example, that such highly politicized new urban populations "have become in a sense loaded revolvers pointed at the responsible government and on the verge of being triggered off at the slightest provocation." Available evidence from a number of recent studies indicates, however, that such pessimistic predictions have often proved unfounded. (For two excellent critical reviews of the "disruptive migrant" literature, see Nelson, 1969, and Cornelius, 1971.) Although urban violence is quite common in developing as well as many developed countries, migrants do not seem to play a major role in it. Their political behavior appears to be more conservative than revolutionary, more apathetic than activist. Several factors have been cited to explain this apparent paradox. First, urban migrants do not constitute an undifferentiated, homogeneous mass; on the contrary, they vary significantly in terms of their motivation for migration, skills and education, place of origin, prior exposure to urban life, existing ties with their home villages, earlier patterns of political socialization, and the kind of political system they have moved into. Therefore, they cannot be expected to display uniform political behavior. Secondly, rural areas in developing countries, which supply a majority of urban migrants, are often noted by their conservatism, and such conservative and deferential 184

MAJOR

CITIES

attitudes may well be carried over to the urban setting. Related to this is the fact that some forms of rural social affiliation, such as kinship and regional ties, may persist in the city, and help to alleviate the initial material hardships and the cultural shock of the newcomer. Thirdly, even though employment opportunities and living conditions for the urban migrants leave much to be desired, migration to the city often brings about a substantial improvement in their level of income, style of life, and access to public services (Nelson, 1969: 10-25; Huntington, 1968: 278-281). Such observations led some political scientists to a "second-generation hypothesis"; that is, political radicalization occurs after the urban migrants have been absorbed into the urban environment, discarded their rural outlook and conservative attitudes, and gained a certain amount of political awareness and skills (Huntington, 1968: 281-283; Soares, 1964: 192-195). However, this theory has also received little empirical support (Nelson, 1969: 35-44; Cornelius, 1971: 107-108). On the contrary, there are indications that second-generation urban migrants tend to be more interested in individual mobility, in "making it" than in organized collective action. Some observers noted that the political participation of the urban poor tends to focus on the immediate needs of the community, most notably legalization (official recognition to the title to the land) and the installation of basic urban services, and that once such immediate needs are satisfied the rates of cooperative political activity are likely to decline sharply (Cornelius, 1973). Hence, members of the second generation tend to be less politically participant than their parents. Obviously, the propensity for political participation among the second-generation urban migrants also depends on the extent of opportunities for individual social mobility. Where such opportunities are, or are perceived to be, insufficient, "collective mobility" (the mobility of an entire class relative to other classes) is much more likely to be sought by the urban poor (Landsberger, 1970; Lenski, 1966: 417-419). 185

MAJOR

CITIES

Some of the factors we have discussed in connection with the supposed radicalization of the urban poor are also relevant to their potential for intra-system political participation. It can be argued that the urban poor, not unlike the rural poor, are usually politically inactive, due to low political efficacy; low perceived salience of governmental action; vulnerability to and fear of reprisal; lack of information, leadership, money, contacts, time, and other organizational resources; ethnic, religious, regional, and other cleavages cutting across class lines; unstable residence and employment, etc. (Nelson, 1972). Yet, there are cases where the political participation of the migrant poor is both intense and democratic (i.e., intra-system). A recent study of six low-income communities located on the periphery of Mexico City indicated that urban migrants tended to be more politically participant than non-migrants (native-born residents of the city) (Cornelius, 1972: 1). The same study also demonstrated that low socioeconomic status per se has not proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to involvement in political activity. Thus, overall socio-economic status accounted for less than one percent of the variance in participation. Community of residence, or the residential context, on the other hand, seemed to be a much better predictor of the political participation of the migrant poor. Such community characteristics as the size and density of population, socioeconomic homogeneity, stability of residence, location within the city, type of origin of the community, history of relationships with supra-local authority structures, community leadership and organization, patterns of internal political cleavage and competition, developmental problems and needs lead to different kinds of political learning experiences, and account for a large part of the wide variations in political participation (Cornelius, 1973). In short, generalizations about the political participation of the urban poor as a category should be treated with great caution. 186

MAJOR II.

CITIES

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF URBAN

MIGRATIONS

1. The Destination of Migrations The most important part of the migratory activity in Turkey seems to be directed to urban centers. In 1960, 74 percent of the out-migrants living in provinces other than those of their birth were in settlements with more than 10,000 inhabitants. Also, 70 percent of the latter preferred cities with more than 100,000 population (Tiimertekin, 1968: 126-128). In 1965, the percentage of the migrants living in settlements with more than 10,000 population rose to 76.7. Furthermore, not all of the remaining one-fourth of the migrants living in places with less than 10,000 population can be considered true rural migrants. Although there have been some cases where rural out-migrants settled in other villages or even formed new ones (e.g. Black Sea coast migrants in the plain of Adapazan), a much greater proportion of them settled either in small towns, in time transforming them into new urban settlements, or in villages in the vicinity of large metropolitan centers. This last type of migration constitutes, no doubt, a variation of urban migration, since such villages become economically, and often physically, integrated with the cities. The predominantly cityward direction of migrations in Turkey is also attested to by the rise in the percentage of urban population. As we have pointed out above, the percentage of urban population, defined as the population of localities with 10,000 or more population, rose from 16.6 in 1935 to 35.8 in 1970. Parallel to the rise in the urban population is the familiar phenomenon of squatter settlements (gecekondu), which has become a major problem for the large metropolitan centers of Turkey. The word "gecekondu" (literally, built overnight) has sometimes been used to denote those houses built on illegally invaded land, and sometimes to include all lowstandard, unsanitary houses that lack adequate urban services and that were built recently in or around large cities. 187

MAJOR

CITIES

Keles (1972 a: 176-177, 184-186) estimates that the proportion of gecekondu-dv/ellers among the total city population is 65 percent in Ankara, 45 percent in Istanbul, 35 percent in Izmir, 45 percent in Adana, and 25 percent in Bursa. Yasa (1966: 52) observed that in 1962, 450,000 persons, or more than half of the total population of Ankara, 2 lived in some 80,000 gecekondus; his estimates for the year 1965 were 85,000 to 90,000 gecekondu units. A survey of social change in Izmir carried out in 1968 indicated that more than one-fourth (26.7 percent) of all dwelling units in the Izmir metropolitan area were gecekondus. In the last twenty years, many new shanty-towns were created around the larger cities, or small villages in their neighborhood were transformed into such towns and were integrated with the cities. To give a few striking examples, Kagithane, a village near Istanbul with only 3,084 population in 1955, had a population of 56,157 in 1965. Gultepe, near Izmir and non-existent until the late 1950's, had grown to a population size of 28,115 in 1965. Camdibi, also in the neighborhood of Izmir and virtually non-existent before 1950, had a population of 23,993 in 1965. Although gecekondu areas may include some displaced native-born residents of the city (Hart, 1964: 62), a great majority of their residents are undoubtedly recent urban migrants. Hart (1969: 18-19), for example, has found that only 3 percent of the heads of households in the Zeytinburnu gecekondu area in Istanbul were born within that province. 2. The Origin of Migration Turkish census data do not tell us anything about the origin of migrations or, more precisely, about the respective proportions of rural-to-urban and urban-to-urban migrations. However, the Turkish Demographic Survey indicates that in the three largest cities of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, as well as in urban Turkey in general, urban-tourban migration consistently exceeds rural-to-urban migra2

Ankara had a population of 650,067 in I960, and 905,660 in 1965.

188

MAJOR

CITIES

tion. J u s t as a majority of u r b a n i n - m i g r a n t s c a m e f r o m u r b a n a r e a s , m o s t of t h e u r b a n o u t - m i g r a n t s w e n t to o t h e r u r b a n a r e a s (Table 8.1). Similarly, t h e I z m i r S u r v e y r e vealed t h a t 35.5 p e r c e n t of t h e city p o p u l a t i o n of 22 y e a r s

TABLE

8.1

C r u d e P o p u l a t i o n M o v e m e n t Rates: 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 7 ( p e r 1000 p o p u l a t i o n ) 3 In-Migrations RuralUrbanTotal Urban Urban

Total

Out-Migrations UrbanUrbanRural Urban

URBAN TURKEY

Total Male Female

88.7 95.0 82.6

35.2 35.4 35.0

51.4 56.6 46.3

71.3 78.1 64.6

19.6 19.5 19.6

49.6 56.5 42.9

67.1 72.4 61.8

26.4 28.7 24.1

38.6 41.9 35.4

50.3 55.7 44.9

19.0 20.3 17.8

26.5 31.0 22.0

56.3 62.1 50.8

12.9 13.3 12.5

38.6 45.4 32.2

ANKARA

Total Male Female

118.5 127.4 109.5

48.9 50.9 46.8

67.8 73.9 61.5 ISTANBUL

Total Male Female

83.2 94.9 71.9

30.3 32.4 28.1

47.8 56.4 39.6 IZMIR

Total Male Female

100.7 110.3 91.5

23.5 22.7 24.2

71.4 80.5 62.8

Source: Tiirkiye Nufus Ara§tiundan Elde Edilen Hayati Istatistikler (Vital Statistics from the Turkish Demographic Survey), 1966-1967 (Ankara: Hacettepe Basimevi, 1970), p p . 161-164. a "Crude pop. movements rates were computed by relating the total number of movements . . . for a given type of move by the mid-year population of the area . . . [T]he number of movements does not necessarily correspond to the number of people because in many instances one person can make several types of moves in any given survey year." (Ibid., p. 95.) l89

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and over was born in another city (defined as a provincial or county seat), and only 17.9 percent in a village. On the other hand, available case studies on the squatter settlements describe their dwellers as people of predominantly rural origin. 3 Conceivably, this contradiction may be due to the fact that urban-to-urban migrants, being relatively better off and including a much greater proportion of people in non-manual occupations, can afford to live in better neighborhoods, while the predominantly poor rural-to-urban migrants concentrate naturally in the gecekondus. One may also speculate that, given the rapid increase in the total percentage of urban population, the predominance of urban-to-urban migration is suggestive of a considerable amount of jtep-migration," i.e., migration from villages to towns, and later to the larger cities. Now, whether the urban-to-urban migrants are mainly step-migrants of rural origin, or the native inhabitants of provincial towns and smaller cities, the political implications are that they should have been better prepared for urban life and less susceptible to the cultural shock and anomie associated with the sudden change from a rural to an urban environment (Nelson, 1969: 10-13). 3. The Distance of Migration Related to the preceding argument in terms of its political implications is the distance of migration. Tumertekin (1968: 144-148) has observed that "the main parts of the non-local population in all provinces . . . excluding Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara, are from the neighboring provinces." Similarly, Yasa (1966: 262) has found that 28.8 percent of the Turkish-born gecekondu families in Ankara were from the province of Ankara, and an additional 37.7 3

Hart's (1969: 97-98) findings in Zeytinburnu reveal that 86.3 percent of the household heads were in agricultural professions (farmer, agricultural worker, shepherd) in their places of origin. This percentage was even higher (93 percent) among the Turkish-born migrants. Yasa (1966: 240) also observed that a great majority of Ankara gecekondu dwellers came from villages. 190

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percent from the neighboring provinces. In an Ankara gecekondu settlement studies by Sewell (1964: 304), twothirds of those surveyed had travelled less than 125 miles. Istanbul seems to be the major exception to this pattern, mainly because the province is already heavily urbanized, and the neighboring provinces are themselves migrantreceivers. Thus, Hart (1969: 18-19, 133-135) found that in the Zeytinburnu gecekondu area in Istanbul, almost half of the Turkish-born migrants were from the Black Sea provinces. Presumably, the shorter the distance of urban migration, the greater the prior exposure to urban life, and the less disturbing the effects of the transition (Nelson, 1969: 12-13). This is especially true in the case of the migrants from what Kolars (1967: 70-71) calls "satellite villages," which, through their daily contacts and economic integration with the neighboring cities, have been heavily exposed to urban influences. 4. Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Urban Migrants Who are the urban migrants in Turkey? The picture emerging from the available studies on squatter areas is far from presenting a destitute mass. Generally speaking, urban migrants seem to be younger, better educated, and more skilled than the average rural population. Yasa (1966: 108) found that the mean age among the heads of the Ankara gecekondu families was 38 (he acknowledges, however, that this age might be somewhat higher than the actual mean age, due to the over-representation of older gecekondu areas in his sample). Sewell (1964: 90) computed the mean age as 34.5 for the household heads, and as 29 for their wives. Hart (1969: 30-31, 129-130) observed that the mean age for males when they first arrived in Zeytinburnu was 30-31. At the time of his survey, the mean age was 42.7 for the fathers, and 38.1 for the mothers; Turkish-born migrants were somewhat younger than the immigrants. As for literacy, it has been found that 70 percent of the household heads in the Ankara gecekondu areas were literate (Yasa, 1966: 190). !9!

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Although the occupational composition of the gecekondu settlements varies from city to city, and even from one gecekondu area to the other, there remain some basic similarities. In the Ankara gecekondu areas, the largest occupational groups are skilled workers and craftsmen, and small merchants, 27 percent and 17 percent respectively. Civil servants (mostly low-level) constitute another 14.5 percent. Unskilled laborers and public service workers (street sweepers, garbage collectors, janitors, office workers, etc.), i.e., the lower stratum of the gecekondu population, comprise little over one-fourth (26.5 percent) (Yasa, 1966: 123-129). Similarly, Sewell (1964: 91) found that in the Aktepe gecekondu neighborhood in Ankara, one-third of the household heads were skilled workers, 20 percent merchants, 20 percent unskilled workers, 18 percent civil servants and public service workers, and 8 percent drivers. Another study of some gecekondu areas in Ankara (Yorukhan, 1965: 24-25) revealed a similar pattern: workers (skilled and unskilled) 53.1 percent, merchants and craftsmen 11.1 percent, civil servants 9.8 percent, and public service workers 11.6 percent. 4 Hart's (1969: 221-222) findings in Zeytinburnu were not much different: both in his landlord and tenant categories, factory workers constituted the largest group (34.6 and 40.4 percent respectively); and those with non-manual or semi-manual occupations (merchants, craftsmen, civil servants, and teamsters) comprised another 31.7 percent of the landlords and 30.0 percent of the tenants. In interpreting these figures on the occupational breakdown of the gecekondu populations, we must exercise caution. Since recent urbanization in Turkey has clearly outpaced industrialization, many of the urban migrants listed as skilled or unskilled workers in the studies mentioned above may, in reality, be service workers or workers in small, traditional 4 The occupational composition of the Ankara's gecekondu population clearly differs from older low-income neighborhoods in its higher percentage of workers and lower percentage of civil servants and small merchants. For interesting comparisons, see Keles. (1971: 157-162).

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artisan shops (Kele§, 1972 a: 57-58, 187-191). As one observer noted in regard to a similar situation in Cairo, "in the netherworld of services—some of dubious legitimacy, most of dubious productivity—there is room for the least prepared migrants" (Abu-Lughod, 1969: 171). On the other hand, the gecekondu dwellers do not seem to be afflicted by widespread unemployment (cf. Kele§, 1972 a: 56-58). One study of the Ankara gecekondus found the rate of unemployment among the household heads as 3.5 percent (Yasa, 1966: 123), and another study as 6.4 percent (Yorukhan, 1965: 24-25). The proportion was 10 percent in Zeytinburnu; however, if those unable or unwilling to work are subtracted from these figures, the percentage of those actively seeking work may be even lower (Hart, 1969: 68-71, 226). In addition to the household heads, other members of the family often work, too. In Zeytinburnu, for example, over one-half of the sons over 13 years of age, and about two-thirds of those 18 years or older are employed. Employment rate for daughters in the age category of 13-18 varies between one-fourth and onethird, and in the category of 18 and older, between onethird and one-half (Hart, 1966: 72-76, 229-236). Consequently, income levels for the gecekondu families represent a substantial improvement over their incomes in their places of origin. Although existing gecekondu studies vary slightly in their estimates of mean monthly income for the household heads and for the whole families (Yasa, 1966: 130-137; Kele§, 1972 a: 191-192; Sewell, 1964: 90-91; Hart, 1969: 58-59, 214-216; Tankut, 1961; Yorukhan, 1965; Kiray, 1972: 569-570), they all agree that such income is considerably higher than the average income for rural families. Hart (1969: 59-63, 219) asserts that the average income of the Zeytinburnu gecekondu families is three times higher than those of the Denizli and Tarsus villages, and four times higher than those of the Erzurum villages. Moreover, in his follow-up study of Zeytinburnu, he observed that the average income had risen some 80 percent between 1962 and 1965. 193

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A more recent study of income distribution in Turkey (Bulutay, Timur, and Ersel, 1971: Tables 1.1.A, 2.1.6, 2.1.7, 2.1.8) is also revealing in this respect: while 42.3 per­ cent of all households in Turkey have an annual after-tax income of less than 5,000 T L (approximately $350), this percentage is only 10.6 percent for Ankara, 3.7 percent for Izmir, and 1.6 percent for Istanbul. Thus, even the lowest income groups in the cities seem to be doing substantially better than a majority of the villagers. A majority of the gecekondu families own their houses (Yasa, 1966: 63; Hart, 1969: 127; Tankut, 1961; Kiray, 1972: 565). Indeed, this is one of the characteristics that distinguish the gecekondu areas from the older low-income neighborhoods in the city. Thus, Keles. (1971: 155) noted that the proportion of tenants in the traditional quarters of Ankara ("old Ankara") was much higher than in the gecekondu neighborhoods (72.6 percent versus 31 percent). House ownership and the high emotional value attached to it are indicative of a strong commitment to the city on the part of urban migrants. 5. Family and Kinship Ties, and Social Organization There is little evidence in the Turkish case supporting the argument of widespread social disorganization and anomie among the urban migrants. It is true that males tend to become migrants more often than do females. Thus, the 1965 census reveals that of persons living in a province 5 other than those of their birth, 61.1 percent are males. The Turkish Demographic Survey mentioned above displays a similar pattern, males being over-represented among the urban migrants. However, the male-female difference is not great and, especially in the case of rural-to-urban mi­ grants, very slight (Table 8.1). An indirect measure of selective migration is an unbal­ anced sex ratio in the cities. "Extremely high sex ratios in cities usually indicate temporary migration, i.e., a high turn5

T . C. Ba§bakanhk Devlet Istatistik Enstitiisu (1969 b: 71-75).

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over and many urban-rural cross-currents, such as have been found in Indian cities. When the ratio begins to bal­ ance, it usually indicates a more permanent 'settling in,' a relocation of families and a reduced turnover of migrants" (Abu-Lughod, 1969: 168). My computation of sex ratios in major Turkish cities and some gecekandu areas (for the year 1965) presented a rather well-balanced picture: Sex ratio / males Ankara, χ χ()Λ w a s n g for I s t a n b u l U 4 f o r \ females ' 109 for Izmir, 125 for Adana, and 103 for Bursa. Many gecekandu communities also had balanced sex compositions. Sex ratios for some gecekandu precincts were as follows: Altindag-Izmir (102), Gultepe-Izmir (103), Camdibi-Izmir (104), Gazi Osman Pasa-Istanbul (110), SagmalcilarIstanbul (117), Zeytinburnu-istanbul (122), Kagithaneistanbul (132). Whatever male-female difference exists among the urban migrants, it seems to be due to the fact that single males often migrate, while single females very seldom do. In fact, if seasonal migrant workers are excluded, a great majority of married male migrants to the cities either take their immediate family with them, or send for them as soon as they become settled. Yasa (1966: 75-78) observed that 69 percent of the married migrants came to Ankara with their wives, 19 percent brought them in one year, and another 8 percent in 2-3 years. Thus, we may argue that this pattern of family migration is one of the factors preventing social isolation and alleviat­ ing the effects of the urban cultural shock. Relatives and friends, who earlier migrated to the city, play a similar role. There is a strong tendency among migrants from a given region to concentrate in a particular city, or even in particu­ lar neighborhoods of that city, although this tendency may now be somewhat weakening (Suzuki, 1966: 430; Yasa, 1966: 206). Migrants usually go to a city where they can count on the help (especially in finding employment, free lodging until renting, or building a gecekandu, etc.) of some friends or relatives. Hart (1969: 95, 265) observed that 39.1 percent of the Zeytinburnu residents received such help !95

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from their relatives when they first arrived, and an additional 17.8 percent did so from their friends or fellowvillagers. Only 35 percent of his respondents stated that they did not receive help from anyone; this figure might conceivably have been inflated by their sense of pride and forgetfulness. Similarly, about two-fifths of the Ankara gecekondu residents exchange some form of help with their neighbors (Yasa, 1966: 207-209; Kiray, 1972: 571). Sometimes such help is more institutionalized in the form of mutual aid funds or associations (Suzuki, 1966: 432434). Finally, the associational ties of the urban migrants seem to be much more developed than those of the rural population. Yasa (1966: 212) found that about one-third of the household heads in the Ankara gecekondu areas were members of a formal organization, such as trade unions, professional associations, co-operatives, political parties, and charitable organizations. Particularly worth mentioning among such organizations are Gecekonduyu Guzellestirme Dernekleri (literally, Gecekondu Beautification Associations). Karpat (1975: 92-93) observes that such associations, "whose outward purpose is to improve the settlement's appearance, actually functions as a liaison office between dwellers and political parties, and conducts political bargains with city and even national politicians." The associations are also major social centers where leaders are selected chiefly on the basis of their "organizational skill and ability to represent and defend the interests of the settlement in political and administrative circles." These findings again undercut the assumptions of anomie and social disorganization among urban migrants and indicate a relatively successful adaptation to the urban setting. 6. Ties with Villages and Return Migration It can be argued that the continuation of ties with the place of origin and the possibility of back-migration provide a safety-valve against the trauma of urban migration (Nelson, 1969: 20). Such a possibility, in turn, depends on the comparative economic opportunities in the villages and in the urban areas, on the kind of rural social organization, and 196

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on the cultural values that prevent or demand return. 6 In Turkey, return migration seems to be of negligible importance (Keles, 1972 a: 32-33). Although a majority of Turkish villagers have a favorable urban image (Frey and Roos, 1967: 33; Keles. and Turkay, 1962: 66-67) and, consequently, rural cultural values do not prevent a return migration, better social and economic opportunities offered by the cities make such return undesirable and unlikely. Over 90 percent of the respondents in Zeytinburnu (97.8 percent of the landlords and 90.6 percent of the tenants), and 78 percent of the respondents in Ankara (with only 7 percent desiring to return, and another 7 percent undecided) expressed their intention to stay (Hart, 1969: 83, 240-243; Yasa, 1966: 85). Among Sewell's (1964: 109-110) respondents in an Ankara gecekondu community, only 2 percent thought that they were better off in their villages. Although village ties continue in the form of correspondence and occasional visits (about two-thirds of the respondents both in Ankara and Zeytinburnu occasionally visit their villages), most of the urban migrants seem to have severed their economic ties with their home villages. Only 3 percent of the Ankara respondents stated economic reasons for their visits, most of the visits being motivated by kinship and friendship ties. Among the Zeytinburnu respondents, the proportion of those who own land in their home villages is 35 percent; and this proportion is much lower among the landlords than the tenants (27.7 and 44.4 percent respectively) , which indicates that urban migrants tend to dispose of their landholdings once they become firmly settled in the city (Hart, 1969: 96, 264-266; Yasa, 1966: 78-83; Keles, and Turkay, 1962: 59). 7. Mobility Aspirations and Integration with Urban Life Some of the aspects of urban migration we have discussed above indicate a generally successful integration of the mi6

Joan Nelson, comments in "Participation Seminar" at Harvard University, CFIA, December 10, 1971.

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grants into city life. Gecekondu areas appear not as "urban villages," pockets of isolation and traditionalism within the urban setting, but transitional settlements of "people gradually incorporating themselves into the city, while changing it" (Karpat, 1975: 91-92). Such incorporation is also reflected in the social mobility aspirations of the urban migrants. Two separate surveys clearly indicated that a majority of gecekondu dwellers aspire to middle-class living standards, rather than to some collective improvements within the working-classes. Hart (1964: 66-68) observed that "factory work is not highly valued nor is it included in the upward mobility pattern, except as a starting place." Similarly, over 70 percent of his respondents in Zeytinburnu stated that they wanted their children, boys and girls alike, to have university-level education. Karpat's (1975: 118) findings were essentially similar: A large majority of his respondents (69 percent of the men and 83 percent of the women) believed that the city offered their children the best opportunity for advancement, and that their children could reach the highest positions available if they had the ability to do so. Most of them named distinctly middle-class occupations as those to which they personally aspired, thus expressing a high degree of self-esteem, confidence, and optimism for the future. Such attitudes and aspirations obviously have farreaching political implications. On the one hand, they suggest that the urban migrants tend to display a high degree of attitudinal modernization and a successful adaptation to urban culture. On the other, they present serious obstacles to the efforts of achieving collective mobility for the urban poor by way of class-oriented political action. However, if such middle-class aspirations are not reasonably well satisfied, as they are unlikely to be with the present rate of economic development, individualistic political attitudes may give way to more collective political orientations, and a radicalization of the urban poor may eventually take place. The "second-generation" hypothesis remains to be tested within the Turkish context. 198

MAJOR III.

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CITIES PARTICIPATION

Turkish election statistics since 1961 have provided breakdowns at the village level in rural areas, and at the "polldistrict" (segim sandigi) level in the cities, the latter comprising approximately 300 registered voters and a relatively small geographical area (roughly the equivalent of a cityblock). Thus, it is possible to delimit the gecekondu neighborhoods, and to compare their rates of voting turnout and party preferences with those of the middle- or high-income precincts. In the present study, I carried out this analysis for the three largest metropolitan centers, namely Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. In classifying the precincts (mahalle) of Izmir, I relied upon a recent study by Ru§en Keles. (1972 b), who applied a modified version of Shevky and Bell's social area analysis to Izmir. 7 Keles, distinguished four types of social areas in Izmir, roughly representing upper-middle class, middle class, lower-middle class, and lower class (gecekondu) precincts. (For a complete listing of precincts in each category, see Appendix.) Based on such information, the present analysis was able to cover over 80 percent of all registered voters in the Izmir metropolitan area. Our knowledge of the precincts of Ankara is less complete, although the gecekondu areas and the predominantly lower-middle class precincts of "old Ankara" 8 have been 7 Shevky and Bell used the indices of social rank, urbanization, and segregation in their analysis, while Keles used only the first two. In the present study, I classified Izmir precincts solely on the basis of their "social rank" scores, since my main concern was the effects of socio-economic status upon political participation. Furthermore, the urbanization index, as it is applied to Turkey, seemed neither very reliable nor particularly significant, and it correlated very weakly with the social rank index (r = 0.096). The latter is a composite index which includes such variables as occupation, income, education, and the type of dwelling. See Kele§ (1972 b: 3-15). 8 "Old Ankara" is a typically lower-middle class community with considerable socio-economic homogeneity. About two-thirds of the residents are small merchants, government officials, and skilled workers. Relatively few

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carefully studied by Yasa (1966) and Keles. (1971), respectively. Lamentably, we do not have comparable data on the middle class and upper-middle class precincts. However, on the basis of somewhat more impressionistic classifications (Kele§, 1971:64-67; 1972 a: 131-132), I was able to select a number of such precincts and to maintain the four-fold breakdown. (For a listing of the precincts in each category, see Appendix.) All told, some 50 percent of all registered voters in Ankara is covered by this analysis. We are least fortunate with respect to istanbul, since no comparable studies exist on the social ranks of istanbul precincts. I, therefore, followed the admittedly less satisfactory procedure of selecting some known gecekondu neighborhoods (in this case, they are Eyup, Zeytinburnu, and Gazi Osman Pa§a counties, all of which are predominantly gecekondu areas) and comparing their voting patterns with those of the city as a whole. For 1969, I also gave the figures for the municipality. Since many of the gecekondu communities are outside the municipal boundaries of Istanbul, this can be taken as a rough approximation of non-gecekondu areas. (For a similar analysis of the gecekondu voting in Istanbul, see Makofsky, 1972.) Tables 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4 clearly demonstrate that voting turnout rates were relatively uniform within the cities both in the 1965 and the 1969 elections. In all cases but one, the difference between the highest and lowest turnout rates in the same city was no more than 3 percent. It seems that socio-economic status and the type of neighborhood do not significantly affect voting participation of the Turkish urban-dwellers, and that the gecekondu residents vote as often as the highest income groups. This finding is sup-

of them are recent migrants; half of them have lived in Ankara for at least 20 years. Almost three-fourths of them are tenants, 80 percent of whom pay a monthly rent of less than 200 T.L. A large majority (78 percent) are in the income bracket of 400-1.500 T.L. per month, and half have primary school education. Such socio-economic characteristics clearly differentiate "old Ankara" from the gecekundus. See Keles (1971: 24-48, 149-163). 200

64.6 63.6 51.0 51.5

51.7

144.0 912.9 164.4 1.085,8

896,0

JP

45.4

62.4 52.0 53.8 46.3

(%)

36.6

19.1 30.4 21.8 34.9

RPP (%)

2.7

2.2

_ — 2.4 2.2

_ — 3.4 3.0

v

RP (%)

UP (%)

2.7

6.2 4.7 3.4 2.7

NP (%)

2.5

1.4 1.5 3.2 2.6

NAP (%)

5.7

8.4 8.5 9.8 6.1

TLP