Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development: The Pursuit of the Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination [1st ed.] 978-3-319-53386-5, 978-3-319-53387-2

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-xxviii
Introduction (Ayesah Uy Abubakar)....Pages 1-18
Literature Review of Theories, Concepts, and Case Studies in Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding (Ayesah Uy Abubakar)....Pages 19-86
The Study Area: Mindanao and the Bangsamoro Conflict Communities (Ayesah Uy Abubakar)....Pages 87-123
Research Methods (Ayesah Uy Abubakar)....Pages 125-144
Research Findings and Analysis (Ayesah Uy Abubakar)....Pages 145-192
Conclusions (Ayesah Uy Abubakar)....Pages 193-200
Back Matter ....Pages 201-208

Citation preview

The Anthropocene: Politik–Economics–Society–Science

Ayesah Uy Abubakar

Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development The Pursuit of the Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination

The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics— Society—Science Volume 16

Series editor Hans Günter Brauch, Mosbach, Germany

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/15232 http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/APESS.htm http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/APESS_16.htm

Ayesah Uy Abubakar

Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development The Pursuit of the Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination

123

Ayesah Uy Abubakar Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Heritage Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS) Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia

This research was funded by the Peace Research Grant Program of the International Peace Research Association Foundation. More on this book is at: http://www.afes-press-books.de/html/APESS_16.htm ISSN 2367-4024 ISSN 2367-4032 (electronic) The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science ISBN 978-3-319-53386-5 ISBN 978-3-319-53387-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53387-2 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018960178 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Copy-editing: PD Dr. Hans Günter Brauch, AFES-PRESS e.V., Mosbach, Germany English Language Editor: Vanessa Greatorex, England Cover photo: A schoolgirl holding on to her “baon” or meal for the day while at school. Source The author who granted permission for using this and all other photos in this book This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

I came to Malaysia with the intention of promoting interest in the Bangsamoro peace process among NGOs, academics and students and hopefully encouraging them to appreciate their government’s role as facilitator of the formal negotiations. Little did I realise that working on this objective became my opportunity to learn about myself and the journey to peace of my own people in the Bangsamoro. When I started my Ph.D. work in 2007, I read everything about the history, revolutionary movement started by the Moro National Liberation Front, followed by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the birth of the Bangsamoro civil society, and the policy of diplomacy and conflict management of the Philippine government with these groups. Because the scholarship in the field of peace studies is mostly action research, this has opened new doors for me to take part in peacebuilding training, workshops and conferences throughout South-East Asia. During this time, the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN) was actively promoting this field of study in this part of the world. I have been fortunate that the SEACSN has introduced me to many scholars and practitioners who possessed the vision to be part of the solutions to conflict and peacebuilding. Writings and publications about the Bangsamoro and the peace process were prolific but not many were written by the Bangsamoro themselves. And it was this point that led me to aspire to become a researcher. Prominent scholars have already written much about the Bangsamoro topic and conscientiously followed the events of the peace process. What else can I write? In 2006, through the Research and Education for Peace Unit at the Universiti Sains Malaysia, we started the Consolidation for Peace Program (COP) with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The COP was a peacebuilding platform for the Bangsamoro peace process, the Aceh peace process and the Patani

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dialogue stakeholders. In this workshop and conference type of activity, I have discovered and learned so much about conflict, the peace process and the involvement of many actors. However, there was one concern that I started to think about, after the long and tedious peacemaking, what kind of development will the new leaderships take on? In a normal society, development issues continue to be a source of conflict. How much more for a society that will be transitioning from peacemaking to a peace agreement phase? Do the negotiators have the same views on development? It is through these questions that I finally found my purpose in conducting my research. I wanted to find out if the actors are as clear about the “what’s next” as they are so passionate about getting a peace agreement signed. So, my research journey started. As a researcher at the Research and Education for Peace at Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM), I have been lucky to have been working with fellow researchers and students from Aceh who were all part of the peacebuilding movement during the most difficult times of the military rule in their own homeland. Through them I became familiar with the conflict and the peace process of the Acehnese people as if we were breathing the same air and environment of this struggle for freedom. Events in our histories were like each other’s mirror that reflected how a right to self-determination conflict shaped our generation of peacebuilders. We would exchange stories about sacrifices and the invincible courage of communities in the conflict areas despite the sufferings from violence. I naturally followed the peace process in Aceh until the tsunami devastation in 2004, when they reached the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding in 2005, and the succeeding years that the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) came into power. In witnessing the transitions in Aceh, I picked up many lessons that struck me as important for the process in the Bangsamoro. Some of these lessons are included in this book and are used as the basis of my study on why it was important for the non-state actor groups like GAM, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to have their own understanding of development. Similarly, a review of the peace process of the MNLF proves that even a well-designed development strategy and programme by the UNDP failed to address the political issue of the conflict—debunking the idea that development can be a “be-all and end-all” solution to the right to self-determination aspirations of groups like the Bangsamoro, generally interpreted by these groups as counter-insurgency development rather than part of the conflict resolution and peacebuilding.

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Shaded map of Philippines. Source Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas Libraries at Austin. This map is in the public domain

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In the course of my readings, I found the work of Robert Chambers on his methods on Rural Development to be most appealing to me. He emphasised how easy it is to interview and survey the communities which are the most accessible to researchers and planners—those along the highways or the main roads in rural areas. Therefore, he makes a compelling argument for researchers to dare to find subject communities which are extremely difficult to access, because it is this type of communities that should be counted and whose views need to be heard. If development interventions are to be employed, it is this group of communities who will eventually benefit most. These ideas made perfect sense with my research objectives. If I wanted to investigate the truth of the revolutionary groups’ claims that they represent the marginalised people, then I would have to find them and understand the dynamics that have propelled them to support groups like the MNLF and the MILF. In contrast, I was also clear that the Bangsamoro who belong to the middle class, who have gone to university and are gainfully employed were not my main research subjects—and this included me. Having identified my research subjects, I realised that it was a chance for me to actually immerse myself in the most difficult environments where I assumed that people were not only languishing in poverty in terms of basic needs and services but who were also most vulnerable to military armed confrontations. I challenged myself to undertake research that would require me find answers to my questions from these communities that should matter most to this rhetoric of the search for peace in Mindanao. Even before locating the two MILF-controlled communities in mainland Mindanao, I took it upon myself to do a rapid assessment of the Bangsamoro areas. I visited not only the Bangsamoro communities in mainland Mindanao, but my travels also took me to Zamboanga City to see the urban poor in the Taluksangay area. I also went to Sulu and Basilan islands, where the Abu Sayyaf Group, the government forces, the MILF and MNLF, and private armed groups are normally engaged in armed confrontations that make the community highly vulnerable to violence. Lastly, I went to Tawi-Tawi islands and as far as Simunul Island for the first time. I listened to stories from elders who have experienced the Martial Law period and have joined the MNLF, and the Bajau Laut community that have been cared for by the government military and church leaders. During these travels, I have been fortunate that my friends in these places introduced me to new friends and that I was never treated as an outsider or foreign researcher but someone who is one of them but from Cotabato. This facet of personal relations has made my research convenient and allowed more open discussions during my interviews. Although I have conducted numerous interviews, I intentionally did not do a content analysis of these interviews. Instead, these interviews helped informed my rapid assessment in designing the kind of research methodology that I employed in the selected MILF communities. It is also through these travels that I gained general knowledge of current realities in the Bangsamoro areas apart from what is written and heard, especially from mass media. My Ph.D. research became interdisciplinary in nature because I made use of development research methods, mainly participatory rural appraisal and participatory learning and action (PRA/PLA) in trying to understand how notions of

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Political map of Philippines. Source Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas Libraries at Austin. This map is in the public domain

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peace, conflict and development permeate the consciousness of the subject communities. The results of this PRA/PLA allowed me to elicit the elements that helped shape the right to self-determination (RSD) context as a political struggle of the MILF and its communities. I was surprised, therefore, to discover that RSD politics are firmly entrenched in these communities, despite the attempts of the government and donor-driven projects to make use of development and development projects to downplay the political negotiations and peace agreement—or what the MILF would often claim to be the use of development as a counter-insurgency tactic of the government. This book would show that the right to self-determination politics/context should be regarded by governments in a positive light—not as a means to break away from the state but as a means for a group of people to uphold a similar vision of sustainable human development within a shared political participation and leadership in their own region. A unitary state-centric development has not been successful in regions where there is a pursuit of RSD, mainly due to the failure of the existing political framework in which groups like the Bangsamoro are not able to fully participate. Should there be a new political framework or governance system, will development and peace succeed in the Bangsamoro region? Maybe, maybe not. In this book, the experience of Aceh and the Moro National Liberation Front in its own peace process demonstrated many lessons on where peace agreements and mechanisms fail and succeed. As such, this book presents an opportunity for the MILF peace process to take heed of these lessons and perhaps make use of this explanation on how sustainable human development and peacebuilding can be used as pillars in the achievement of their RSD vision. These two conceptual frameworks are not new. The sustainable human development framework is relevant to RSD since Mahbub ul Haq emphasised that human rights are vehicles for human development. Also, Amartya Sen has enriched it with his ideas on capabilities approach, in which he asserts that capabilities are substantive freedoms that would allow people to fulfil their functionings and agency as part of development. In terms of peacebuilding, the hard work of civil society groups throughout Mindanao has shown on many occasions that peacebuilding activities and programmes cannot be used on an ad hoc basis and that many of these should be part of the reform or the building of new institutions, including peace education. I completed this research in February 2013. It was my hope then that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Bangsamoro civil society would know about my findings and recommendations. Months later, I took a month-long vacation in Cotabato. While there, I was grateful that the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies made the effort to organise a public seminar where I presented this work. Some of the

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important civil society leaders—young and old—listened and gave their feedback. In general, I was not really sure if they understood my presentation or I was just not giving them any “magic pill” that is drastic enough to answer the difficult realities of the peace process at that time. However, one thing is sure: there were no opposing views to my main findings—that the RSD should be viewed positively and that both sustainable human development and peacebuilding should be vehicles for the achievement of durable peace in the Bangsamoro region. Moreover, I was fortunate to have had an audience with the MILF Central Committee, which was mostly composed of senior leaders. At this event, my presentation was more succinct and clear, despite my anxiety about how to best explain it. In the end, it was a pleasant surprise that a conservative ulama reacted by saying that this was what he had been waiting for—a framework that would suit their struggle. More of the Committee members gave their feedback and asked for more clarifications on the framework and philosophy behind it. They accepted it and agreed to make use of it as the Bangsamoro Development Agency was about to undertake a development planning exercise. However, they also suggested that, together with the “electric fan” framework, there should be an addition of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) values as another guide for the BDA and all development actors to employ part of the philosophy of the development that the MILF wants to build. In 2015, the BDA published the Bangsamoro Development Plan. In that Plan, the BDA Development Framework was introduced. MILF Chair Ebrahim Murad wrote: To ensure attainment of these objectives [of the Plan], we adopted a comprehensive framework that is based on Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding Frameworks combined with the Bangsamoro core values of khalifa [stewardship], piety, transparency, accountability and inclusiveness among others.1

Again, the concepts of sustainable human development and peacebuilding are not my original ideas. Instead, these are concepts that I used to explain the possibilities of fulfilling the right to self-determination aspirations of groups like the Bangsamoro, Acehnese, Patanis and others. Governments and non-state actor groups can view these ideas as guide posts in their attempts to define and rebuild the kind of society that they wish to achieve in the future. This small research will, hopefully, remind them that even after a peace agreement, they need to work harder to make sure that any development decisions they make will ensure two things: that development interventions will abate, if not totally uproot, the potentials of a return

1 Bangsamoro Development Agency (2015), Bangsamoro Development Plan, Promoting Just, Honorable and Lasting Peace and Sustainable Development in the Bangsamoro (Cotabato City: BDA), in pp. X, 12–14.

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to violence in the settling of protracted conflicts; and that conflict and peace actors develop a similar and coherent understanding in charting their journey towards durable peace.

Map of the proposed core territory of the Bangsamoro for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Source Bangsamoro Development Agency, 2013

Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia

Ayesah Uy Abubakar

Acknowledgements

This research would not have been possible without the cooperation and moral support of many people, not only in USM Penang, Malaysia, but also friends from Mindanao and Manila in the Philippines, from Aceh in Indonesia and even from Southern Thailand. I have drawn much inspiration in conducting this study from learning and unlearning the many aspects of the struggle for the right to self-determination and the journey towards the attainment of peace from the Bangsamoro, Acehnese and the Patanis. As such, this output is mainly dedicated to them. In Mindanao, I wish to extend my gratitude to the senior Bangsamoro leaders, namely, Dr. Abas Candao, Dr. Danda Juanday and Ustadz Shuaib Yaacob of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) who have re-introduced me to my own communities. I am also grateful to the rare but interesting conversations I have had with MILF Chair Ebrahim Murad; the hardworking and principled negotiators of the MILF Peace Panel, namely Abdullah Camlian, Datu Michael Mastura and Mohagher Iqbal; MILF AHJAG Chair Atty. Abdul Dataya; MILF CCCH Secretary (Allahyarham) Rashid Ladiasan; and the many MILF senior and youth leaders throughout the various places in Mindanao that I have visited. Similarly, I wish to mention the support and help of some of the senior and youth leaders of the MNLF whom I have met and conversed with in Manila, Zamboanga areas, Sulu, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi and Saranggani areas. In particular, I wish to mention, Dr. Abdurahman Amin and his family, Alvarez Isnaji and his family, Hatimil Hassan and a group of MNLF commanders from Saranggani Province who remain loyal followers of MNLF Chair Nur Misuari. Also, among those who have truly inspired me to go down to the rural communities and work with the people are the numerous NGO leaders and workers in Mindanao. The Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS), led by Guiamel Alim, Mike Kulat and Sammy Maulana has particularly shown me their exceptional commitment to work for peace for the Bangsamoro and the Indigenous Peoples. Other civil society workers with whom I have had the privilege to discuss and share the many travails of life in rural Mindanao include Gandhi Kinjiyo, Jocelyn Lambac and Cheche of General Santos City; Rahib Kudto and his friends at

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UNYPAD and UNYPHIL; the strong-willed human rights worker, Atty. Raissa Jajurie of SALIGAN; and Norina Usman and her dawah group in Western Mindanao. With the companionship of Norina, and the hospitality of former MSU Chancellor Eddie Alih, his daughter Kate and the whole of their family, I have been able to reach Bongao and Simunul Islands in Tawi-Tawi and see a glimpse of the life in those remote islands. In conducting my fieldwork in the two communities in Maguindanao Province, it is with deep appreciation that I mention the names of the Campong Family of Labungan and the Dalgan Family of Dalgan; MILF commander Jack Abbas and all other commanders I have met in these two areas; my research staff, namely Morsidy Husain, Guiamel Campong; our adviser, school principal Taib Mangulamas; and my exceptional lead facilitator, Hasim Iskak; and the members of the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies (IBS), who have immensely contributed in the brainstorming meetings and facilitated the introductions (of this research) to various community leaders. I am especially indebted to Prof. Abhoud Syed Lingga (the founder and executive director of IBS), who has constantly pushed my world view in the numerous arguments I often had with him. In Aceh, there are many people who need to be mentioned who have helped me gather data for this work. For simplicity’s sake, I wish to acknowledge this group as “friends of the Aceh-Penang connection”. The same goes for the insights that I have learned from our “Southern Thailand Universities for Peace (STUfPeace) friends”. I wish to recognise the many exchanges of ideas that I have had with them that have in many ways deepened my understanding of conflict and peace, not only as a field of study, but as a lived reality and a dream for the future. There are two people from these places that I especially wish to highlight, namely Malik Mahmud of GAM and Dr. Che Wan Kadir of PULO, with whom I have had the honour of conversing on several occasions. I have also been very lucky to have friends who have been very supportive of my research and in the greater goal of helping build peace in Mindanao. I thank Ms. Alma Evangelista of the UNDP in Manila, who has helped me gather data and introduced me to more people who are involved in various peacebuilding programmes in Mindanao. Also, I express my sincerest gratitude to former University of the Philippines Professor Cesar Torres and his wife, Lydia, who are now residents of San Francisco, California, USA. They have been very generous in sending me books that were useful to my work. Back in Penang, I wish to express my sincerest gratitude to my colleagues and friends at the Research and Education for Peace, Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM), namely Norazrina binti Mohd. Jabarullah, Pakchi Adnan bin Ahmad, Suyatno, Aizat bin Khairi, Mior Khairol Azreen bin Mior Jamaluddin, Che Mohd. Aziz bin Yaacob, Eleonora Emkic from Bosnia and Sachiko Ishikawa from Japan, who have all helped me in many ways to complete this work and have become each other’s support system in our endeavours at REPUSM. Special mention to Lukman Age of Aceh as my friendly challenger in “getting peace first” between Aceh and Mindanao. Most especially I wish to thank our mentor, Professor Dr. Kamarulzaman bin Askandar, who is slowly but surely succeeding in his mission to help us become scholars and practitioners in this field of conflict and peace studies. It is through

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Professor Kamarulzaman’s project of starting the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (SEACSN), based at REPUSM, that a generation of peace workers became more motivated and visible. It is also with great respect that I extend my appreciation to my two supervisors, Associate Professor Dr. Salfarina binti Abd. Gapor and Dato Professor Dr. Jamaluddin bin Sulaiman, who have generously spent their time and effort advising me throughout this research work until its completion. I could have not found a more complementary pair of supervisors than the two of them. I am also thankful for their immense patience and their sincere interest in learning more about Mindanao and its peoples. Also, I wish to extend my gratitude to Universiti Sains Malaysia for the USMResearch University Postgraduate Research Grant Scheme (USM-RU-PRGS) which has funded my fieldwork in Mindanao. Not only was the grant scheme very useful in my work, but it also effectively prodded me to publish parts of this thesis in other international publications. I would also not have been able to pursue my studies here in Malaysia without the generous grant I have received as a Malaysia Third Country Program (MTCP) scholar from the Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE). MTCP has helped many students like me (from many parts of the world) who are eager to experience academic life in the Malaysian higher institutions of learning. And for this, I am very thankful. In the Philippines, I have many families to whom I am truly grateful for constantly giving me moral support in completing this Ph.D. work. Among them are my mother, Baby Abubakar, Uncle Farouk and his wife, (Allahyarham) Auntie Mariam, Auntie Sheba, cousins Fawziah and her husband, Abib, Lailah, Yusuf and other relatives in the Bangsamoro areas. Also, my utmost appreciation is extended to my best friends, Ms. Chona Guia in Manila, and Ms. Sheila Ygot-Riikonen in Finland, who have proved to be my greatest motivators throughout my achievements. If there were times that I have ever doubted myself, it is these two ladies who have always believed in me. As such, these words of appreciation are not enough to express how important they really are as the “wind beneath my wings”. Last but not least, I am dedicating this accomplishment to my father, Hj. Abdullah Abubakar, and to my late grandmother and grandfather, Hja. Bai Halimah Abubakar and Sheik Datu Abubakar Guiama of Kidapawan City, Cotabato Province, Mindanao. It is through their good names that I have had the privilege of being warmly welcomed in the homes of the Bangsamoro communities without being associated with any politics of any kind, except with the mission to help bring about peace in our homeland. It is this same good name that I am passing on to my daughter, Puteri Sofea binti Kamarulzaman, who is a source of great joy and inspiration to me and her father. Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia December 2017

Ayesah Uy Abubakar

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Background to the Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.1 The Mindanao Conflict and the Peace Process . . . . . 1.2.2 The Concept of Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2.3 Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding 1.3 Problem Statement and Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Research Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Research Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 Structure of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2 Literature Review of Theories, Concepts, and Case Studies in Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Sustainable Human Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 The SHD Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 The Human Development Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.3 Sustainable Human Development and Mindanao . . . . . 2.3 Peace and Peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Definitions and Meanings of Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Peacebuilding Concepts and Framework . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4 International Peacebuilding and Post-conflict Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Peace Process and Post-conflict Development and Formulating a Theoretical Framework for the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2.4.1 The Moro National Liberation Front Peace Process and its Post-conflict Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2 The Aceh Conflict and Its Post-conflict Development 2.5 Conclusion: Building Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding Theoretical Framework in an RSD Conflict Paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Study Area: Mindanao and the Bangsamoro Conflict Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 History and the Bangsamoro People . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Conflict and the Peace Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 The Jeddah Accord . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 The 1996 Final Peace Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 The Moro Islamic Liberation Front Peace Talks . . . . 3.3.4 The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao . . . . . 3.3.5 The Bangsamoro Development Agency as an Agency for Post-conflict Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Conclusion: A Continuing Search for Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Research Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Participatory Rural Appraisal and Participatory Learning and Action (PRA/PLA) as a Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Data Collection, Verification and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Consultation with Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 Selection of Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Preparatory Visit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.4 Facilitator’s Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.5 Research Questions Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.6 Research Team Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.7 PRA/PLA 1 and 2, Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.8 Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 The PRA/PLA Design and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Fieldwork Implementation/Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Limitations and Constraints in the Fieldwork . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Conclusion: Embracing the PRA/PLA Approach . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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126 128 129 130 130 131 132 132 132 133 133 136 141 142 143

5 Research Findings and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 5.2 Barangay Labungan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Contents

xix

5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.2.4 5.2.5

History of Barangay Labungan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Entry of Developments in the Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Resources and Potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The State of Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Perspectives on Peace, Development and Right to Self-determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.6 Participatory Learning and Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Barangay Dalgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 History of Dalgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Entry of Development in the Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.3 Resources and Potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.4 State of Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.5 Perspectives on Peace, Development and Right to Self-determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.6 Participatory Learning and Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Research Outcomes and the Theoretical Frameworks . . . . . . . . 5.4.1 SHD and Peacebuilding in Conflict-Affected Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2 Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding as a Part of Institution-Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Summary: Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding – Learning from the Communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.1 Strengths and Limitations of Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1.2 Observations for the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Achievements of the Study and Recommendations for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . .

147 148 149 151

. . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

153 158 161 161 164 166 168

. . 173 . . 176 . . 178 . . 178 . . 185 . . 188 . . 191

. . . . . . . 193 . . . . . . . 193 . . . . . . . 193 . . . . . . . 198 . . . . . . . 199

Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 Universiti Malaysia Sabah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Abbreviations

ACT AFP AHJAG AMM ARMM ODA ARMM ASG BDA BIMP-EAGA BJE BMLI BRA BRR CA CAFGU CCCH COMELEC COP CPC DDR DENR DEPED DinSos DOM EO EU

Action for Conflict Transformation Armed Forces of the Philippines Ad Hoc Joint Action Group Aceh Monitoring Mission Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Overseas Development Office Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Abu Sayyaf Group Bangsamoro Development Agency Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines-East Asia Growth Area Bangsamoro Juridical Entity Bangsamoro Management and Leadership Institute Aceh Peace-Reintegration Agency or Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh Agency for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Aceh and Nias, or Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi Consultative Assembly Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities Commission on Elections Consolidation for Peace Civilian Peacekeeping Component Demilitarisation, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Department of Environment and Natural Resources Department of Education Social Development Office or Dinas Sosial Daerah Operasi Militer Executive Order European Union

xxi

xxii

FGD FPA GAM GDI GEM GoI GoP-UN-MDP GPH GRP HDI HDN HDR HS IBS ICG IDP IMT IP IRA JICA JNA KDP KPA KPI LMRDC LMT MEDCO MILF MinDA MINSUPALA MNLF MoU MPI MRDP MSR MTF-RDP MTR NAPE NCSB NEDA NGO NPE NSO

Abbreviations

Focus Group Discussion Final Peace Agreement Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Gender-related Development Index Gender Empowerment Measure Government of Indonesia Government of the Philippines-United Nations-Multi-Donor Programme Government of the Philippines Government of the Republic of the Philippines Human Development Index Human Development Network Human Development Report Human Security Institute of Bangsamoro Studies International Contact Group Internally Displaced Person International Monitoring Team Indigenous People Internal Revenue Allocation Japan International Cooperation Agency Joint Needs Assessment Kecamatan Development Programme Komite Peralihan Aceh Key Performance Indicator Ligawasan Marsh Research and Development Council Local Monitoring Team Mindanao Economic and Development Council Moro Islamic Liberation Front Mindanao Development Agency Mindanao, Sulu (including Basilan and Tawi-Tawi), Palawan Moro National Liberation Front Memorandum of Understanding Multidiminensional Poverty Index Mindanao Rural Development Project Multi-Stakeholder Review Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconctruction and Development Programme Mid-Term Report New Autonomous Political Entity National Statistical Coordination Body National Economic Development Authority Non-Government Organisation New Political Entity National Statistics Office

Abbreviations

NUC ODA OIC OLBARMM OMA OPAPP PASA PDA PDC PHP PMO PNP PR PRA/PLA RA RCC-MM RRA RSD SANREM SD SERD-CAAM SHD SIDDR SOCCKSARGEN SPCPD SPDA SSR SZOPAD TNI UNDP USA USAID USD VTT WB WFP

xxiii

National Unification Commission Overseas Development Aid Organisation of Islamic Cooperation Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao Office of Muslim Affairs Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Protected Area Suitability Assessment Peace and Development Advocates Peace and Development Communities Philippine Peso Project Management Office Philippine National Police Poverty Reduction Participatory Rural Appraisal/Participatory Learning and Action Republic Act Regional Consultative Commission-Muslim Mindanao Rapid Rural Appraisal Right to Self-Determination Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Sustainable Development Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development for the Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao Sustainable Human Development Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration South Cotabato, Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Saranggani, General Santos Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development Southern Philippines Development Authority Security Sector Reform Special Zone of Peace and Development Tentera Nasional Indonesia United Nations Development Programme United States of America United States Agency for International Development United States Dollars Values Transformation Training World Bank World Food Programme

List of Figures

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6

Fig. 2.7 Fig. 2.8 Fig. 2.9 Fig. 2.10 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5 Fig. 3.6 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2

Fig. 4.3 Fig. 5.1

The human development conceptual framework . . . . . . . . . . . Galtung’s models of conflict, violence and peace . . . . . . . . . . Transforming asymmetric conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Actors and approaches to peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An integrated framework for peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The rationale and implementation process of the ACT for Peace Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Organizational chart of the GoP-UN-MDP and the ACT for Peace Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The BRR role as an integrator of post-tsunami and post-conflict development in Aceh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The BRA relationship structure with other organizations . . . . An SHD and Peacebuilding theoretical framework in a Right to Self-Determination (RSD) conflict paradigm . . . . . Map of the Philippines showing the various regions and provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A map of Mindanao showing the areas covered in the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A stakeholders map of the GPH-MILF peace process . . . . . . A map of the Philippines showing all the different political regions including the ARMM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A map of the ARMM, identifying the five provinces and one city included in its domain as of 2012 . . . . . . . . . . . Key causes of the conflict in Mindanao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The PRA/PLA process flowchart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An inset map of Maguindanao Province showing the two conflict communities covered in this study – Barangays Labungan and Dalgan, within the ARMM political region . . . A chart linking the PRA/PLA questions to the research objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A resource map of Barangay Labungan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

23 37 39 42 43

..

61

..

63

.. ..

70 72

..

80

..

88

. . . . .

.. 95 . . 106 . . 112 . . 113 . . 118 . . 129

. . 131 . . 135 . . 148 xxv

xxvi

List of Figures

Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 5.4 Fig. 5.5 Fig. 5.6 Fig. 5.7 Fig. 5.8 Fig. 5.9 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

5.10 5.11 5.12 5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16

Fig. 5.17 Fig. 5.18 Fig. 5.19 Fig. 5.20 Fig. 5.21

The minimum average four-monthly income per household in Barangay Labungan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The day care centre and masjid at Barangay Labungan . . . . . A sample drawing of a vision of peace by a participant from Barangay Labungan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The conflict tree drawn by one of the female group of participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The conflict tree drawn by one of the group of male participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A picture of the ducks being raised by one of the women in Barangay Labungan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pictures of the poultry project in Barangay Labungan . . . . . . The boats used as a mode of transportation in the Ligawasan Marsh area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Historical transect map of Barangay Dalgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A transect map of Barangay Dalgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Seasonality diagram of Barangay Dalgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A social map of Barangay Dalgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pictures of children going to school in the morning . . . . . . . . Pictures of the school buildings in Barangay Dalgan . . . . . . . A schoolgirl holding on to her “baon” or meal for the day while at school . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conflict tree discussion with the lead facilitator . . . . . . . . . . . Pictures of the water system built by the community in Barangay Dalgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The common goal of Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A Sustainable Human Development (SHD) and Peacebuilding framework for the Bangsamoro. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An integrated peacebuilding framework for the BDA . . . . . . .

. . 151 . . 152 . . 155 . . 156 . . 157 . . 159 . . 160 . . . . . . .

. . . . . . .

162 163 167 167 168 169 170

. . 171 . . 175 . . 177 . . 180 . . 181 . . 187

List of Tables

Table Table Table Table Table Table

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1

Table 3.2 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3

Table 4.4 Table 4.5

Table 4.6 Table Table Table Table

5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4

Table 5.5

Dimensions of conflict transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transformers of conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Development stages for PDC empowerment . . . . . . . . . . . . . The roles of the Governor, BRA, and DinSos . . . . . . . . . . . . Key challenges in post-conflict Aceh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Moro-Lumad-Migrant populations in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan according to mother tongue classification, by province, in the year 2000 census . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Distribution of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Mindanao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The relationship between the research questions, objectives and PRA/PLA questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The PRA/PLA activities conducted in 2010 and 2011 workshops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The PRA/PLA tools used in the discovery of the many aspects of the life of the communities and the corresponding themes and areas of research that it covered . . . . . . . . . . . . . A checklist of SHD areas for projects provided by development agencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A guide matrix for discussion on the SHD definition vis-à-vis the right to self-determination and long lasting peace used during the PRA/PLA workshops . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of interviews that were used as part of secondary sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SHD chart in Barangay Labungan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of hard and soft infrastructures needed in Labungan . . . . SHD chart of Barangay Dalgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of development-related infrastructures lacking in Dalgan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Description of the social, cultural and religious life of the Maguindanao group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

44 45 60 73 76

..

90

. . . . .

. . 114 . . 134 . . 137

. . 140 . . 140

. . 141 . . . .

. . . .

143 152 154 172

. . 173 . . 174 xxvii

xxviii

Table 5.6 Table 5.7

List of Tables

Definition of concepts in Barangay Dalgan PRA/PLA . . . . . . . . 176 An organizational transformation matrix for the BDA using Lederach’s four dimensions in conflict transformation and time frame activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1

Introduction

The longstanding struggle for self-determination and subsequent direct armed conflict between the Bangsamoro1 revolutionary movements and the Philippine government have created greater challenges for the people of the Bangsamoro in terms of development compared with the other parts of the Philippines. The pursuit of peace and development has become a “catch-22” phenomenon as the conflict has yet to be fully resolved. In this context, introducing development in an effort to help build peace is something that needs to be examined. The framework of Sustainable Human Development (SHD) is of great relevance to the Bangsamoro situation since not only does it aim to quantify the levels of development through an HDI, but more importantly, it is an approach that promises to embrace a concept of development that can respond to the aspirations of capabilities and freedoms. In as much as the Bangsamoro revolutionary movements bear this primary objective of pursuing their Right to Self-Determination (RSD), it is imperative that a study can explain how development or development approaches could effectively respond to this RSD aspiration. Can SHD be useful for peacebuilding? With the prospects of a “Bangsamoro” consists of two words, bangsa and Moro. Bangsa is a Malay word, the political connotation of which means nation, and Moro is the name given by the Spanish colonialists to the Muslim population of Mindanao similar with the name they call the Muslims of North Africa, who for centuries ruled the Iberian peninsula. Combining the two words, Bangsamoro means Moro Nation. The Muslims who traditionally inhabited Mindanao, Basilan, Palawan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi call themselves Bangsamoro. They are Iranun, Maguindanaon, Meranao, Tao-Sug, Sama, Yakan, Jama Mapun, Kalagan, Kolibugan, Sangil, Molbog, Palawani, and Badjao.” Quoted from Lingga (2007) in his Powerpoint presentation “Conflict Situation in Mindanao”, published in www.bangsamorostudies.org (27 August 2010). In this thesis, the term Bangsamoro is also interchangeably used with the term Moro, and while the term Muslim Filipinos is a term used by Filipino historians and the Philippine state and its agencies to refer to the Bangsamoro. On the other hand, at present, the Moros themselves use the term Muslim Filipinos to include those who may not be part of the thirteen ethno-religious grouping but who profess Islam as their religion. This includes those who are balik-Islam or Muslim reverts or converts in the Philippines.

1

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 A. U. Abubakar, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 16, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53387-2_1

1

2

1

Introduction

peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)2 and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in its ongoing peace process, what can ensure a long-lasting peace? These are the key questions that the study hopes to answer within the framework of development. It aims to look at the concept of SHD and discuss its viability in the context of a conflict-affected area, using the Bangsamoro case as a reference point.

1.2

Background to the Research

On 4 July 1946, the colonial government of the United States of America fully turned over its power to the new Government of the Republic of the Philippines. As the Americans left, the new Philippine state was not only saddled with the challenges of development and nation-building but was also faced with “internal instabilities such as the Huk guerilla movement in Luzon and the resistance of Muslims in Mindanao” (World Bank 1976: 9). However, it was the Bangsamoro armed conflict that commenced in the early 1970s that became a major obstacle in the development of Mindanao and in turn created a burden on the Government’s resources.3 Government attempts to solve the Bangsamoro conflict included formal negotiations with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1973 coupled with the introduction of various programmes that would deliver better economic opportunities to the people (World Bank 1976). However, it took at least three decades before the GRP-MNLF peace process finally bore fruit with the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA).4 And due to the ongoing problems with the implementation of the agreement and unsuccessful leadership of the MNLF in governing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM),5 this peace agreement is still largely viewed as a failure. The MNLF case renders many lessons in post-conflict development and its transition towards the longer-term stage of sustainable peace and development. It is a crucial period of the peace process that is worth evaluating. 2

The acronym GRP was later changed to GPH, or Government of the Philippines, to follow the ISO standards naming system. See explanations in: Mindanews; at: http://www.mindanews.com/ mindaviews/comment/2011/01/%E2%80%9Cgrp%E2%80%9D-to-%E2%80%9Cgph%E2%80% 9D-why/ (9 August 2012). 3 Ibid. Glang (2003) cites the American government official, Najeeb Saleeby (during the American history in the Philippines) in defining the Moro problem. 4 The story behind the negotiations of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that started during the time of President Marcos and continued in the term of President Corazon Aquino are written by Majul (1998), while the events that culminated to the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine government are written by Iribani (2006). 5 See Bacani (2006). See also various interviews with MNLF commanders – the Pro-Misuari Group in Bgy. Sapu Padido, Malapatan, Saranggani Province, and the Pro-government (Sema Group or ICC) were part of the UNDP Act for Peace Programme in Bgy. Baliton, Glan, Saranggani Province from May to June 2008. Problems of corruption in the governance of the ARMM are highlighted in Rasul (2003). Another book on the GRP-MNLF 1996 FPA was written by Rasul (2007).

1.2 Background to the Research

3

For example, what kind of transition was put in place for the combatants and their families, the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, militia groups, and other conflict victims at the stage of post-conflict development, as well as in the longer-term peacebuilding setting? What peace dividends did the stakeholders expect and what did they achieve? Were former combatants successfully rehabilitated to join mainstream society? The World Bank portrays the Philippines as a growing economy that expanded to 7.3% in GDP in early 20106 but with its performance barely translating to the goal of poverty reduction.7 The national statistics show high levels of poverty incidence, with 33 out of 100 Filipinos categorized as poor in 2006, compared with 30 in 2003.8 But what is worth noting is that the areas of Mindanao are consistently on top as the poorest in the country.9 For example, in 2006, the island of Mindanao records 38.8 percent in poverty incidence level in contrast to the 26.9% national average.10 In the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) alone, half the families belong to the poor category. The national budget normally allocates 9– 10 billion pesos (or less than 1%) of its annual budget programme to the region,11 however, this is mostly spent on paying for the administration overhead costs of the regional government. Funding constraints coupled with inefficiencies in government spending have consequently contributed to the poor development of the people and the region in general.12 Mindanao is tagged as the Land of Promise, the region that serves as the food basket of the Philippines that generates much of the agricultural produce that the country needs. While the central government in Manila does respond to the development needs of Mindanao, the complex history and present conflict situation have impeded much of the development programme. Most importantly, it is the people of Mindanao who continue to be disenfranchised. And while development needs to be realized in Mindanao, the fact remains that there is a continuing self-determination struggle between the Bangsamoro people and the Philippine

6

The World Bank Country Brief, Recent Economic Developments, explains that this positive 7.3% growth can be attributed in part to the national elections spending factor besides the overall impact of improved economies in the Asian region. Nevertheless, this Philippine growth continues to be an average performance compared to countries like Singapore at 15.5%, Thailand at 12.0, China at 11.9, Malaysia at 10.1, India at 8.6, Vietnam at 5.8, and Indonesia at 5.7. See at: http://go. worldbank.org/9MDA4VTP20 (2 August 2010). 7 See at: www.worldbank.org.ph under Country Brief (2 August 2010). 8 See the Presentation Slide No. 13 of Virola, Romulo A, at: http://pcij.org/blog/wp-docs/NSCB_ Poverty_2006.pdf (10 March 2008). 9 Ibid. 10 Philippine poverty statistics Table 12: Poverty Incidence, Magnitude of Poor and Share to the Total Poor in Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao, 2000, 2003, 2006. 11 See the National Expenditure Program FY 2008–2010 in the Philippine Department of Budget and Management website; at: https://dbm.gov.ph/35-budget-documents (7 August 2010). 12 More discussions on the weak fiscal state of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) can be found in LGSPA and INCITEGov (2007).

4

1

Introduction

state. As such, both peace and development issues require immediate and equal attention.

1.2.1

The Mindanao Conflict and the Peace Process

The ongoing peace process between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that started in 1987 continued to face numerous problems until it finally reached a deadlock in 2008.13 But this peace process had also resulted in some success stories, one of which was the signing of the 2001 agreement on the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and development of conflict areas. This agreement helped commence reconstruction and development projects on a small scale while waiting for the final peace agreement. This study then, holds such significant relevance as it can provide concrete contributions to the peace process. Specifically, it aims to offer directions towards post-conflict development and peacebuilding (in a medium to long-term period) through the emphasis on sustainable human development as a strategic framework. Of utmost relevance to this, the MILF as the main conflict party, clearly states its aspirations for a kind of development appropriate to the culture and traditions of the Bangsamoro people.14 This aspiration also merits a thorough investigation in order for a balance to be found between the practices of development intervention and the realities and context of the stakeholders. The research, therefore, identifies the unique qualities and needs of the Bangsamoro in the process towards development.

1.2.2

The Concept of Development

Traditionally, the concept of development was defined in economic terms and mainly referred to the capacity of a country’s economy to generate growth and increase output. Thus, development strategies have normally been focused on the structure of production and employment. Often, they lean towards rapid industrialization which marginalizes agriculture and rural development in the process.15 By the end of Second World War and the founding of the Bretton Woods institutions, 13

This was marked by the non-signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain schedule in August 2008 in Putrajaya. The Government of the Philippines was prevented from signing this agreement due to a Temporary Restraining Order by the Philippine Supreme Court. The developments of this post-MOA-AD are explained in the succeeding chapters. 14 Interview with Bangsamoro Development Agency Chair, Dr. Abas Candao, Cotabato City, May 2008. 15 See Todaro/Smith (2006) and the definition of development as economic growth by Sachs (1992: 12–13).

1.2 Background to the Research

5

the international community, with greater responsibility, began the reconstruction and development of conflict-devastated areas in Europe and Japan. The reconstruction and development of Europe markedly emphasized the need for institutional building as the main foundation. On 20 January 1949, United States President Harry Truman announced a mission for the richer countries to help the underdeveloped states. This statement attracted much controversy because it was seen as a bold statement both of the American position as an emerging global power and also in putting forward “a development program based on the concepts of democratic dealing.”16 In this instance, not only did Truman give distinctions of two spheres in the world – the developed world and the underdeveloped world (where many of the countries were located) – but also promoted the US brand of democratic government.17 Throughout the 1950s and ’60s, the concept of development, however, was challenged by scholars and social scientists because of the failure of the development concept, which is based on modernization, urbanization and industrialization, to solve the rising poverty across all nations.18 Development policies and projects using modern technology to improve productivity in the economy have also marginalized the vast majority.19 The assumption that economic growth would carry a trickle-down effect and benefit the people through job creation and increased economic activities was found to be weak.20 In 1970, World Bank president Robert S. McNamara emphasized that a high rate of growth in the economies did not result in much progress in social development.21 Since then, economic development was re-defined to emphasize the re-distribution of growth and the elimination of poverty, inequality and unemployment in a growing economy (Todaro/ Smith 2006: 16). In recent decades, the world has come to understand a wider and more precise idea of development. A post-modernist era of development has begun, in which development means not just economic development but includes both economic and non-economic values, such as social, cultural, and environmental aspects. The mainstream theories on development, mainly focused on modernization and economic growth, have been challenged by counterpoint theories that

As cited by Gustavo Esteva in his article ‘Development’, in Sachs (1992), Chapter 2. The ideas and values of development and democracy were considered to be counter-strategies to arrest the spread of the communist/socialist ideology espoused by the Soviet Union, China, and others. 18 The building of modern facilities and process of industrialization do not necessarily bring development to local communities, as expounded by Verhelst (1987: 11–13). 19 See Todaro/Smith (2006), Chapter 2, pp. 77–78. Also see a discussion of the development theory from the 1950s to 1990s in Haynes (2005: 5–8). 20 Ibid., p. 16. A criticism of the global impact of the trickle-down theory or catching-up theory is discussed in Verhelst (1987: 10–13). 21 As cited in Gustavo Esteva’s chapter on ‘Development’, p. 13, in The Development Dictionary by Sachs (1992). On the same page Esteva also mentions an earlier initiative of the UN in 1962, which defined development as growth plus change – which includes social, cultural and economic, and both in qualitative and quantitative ways. 16 17

6

1

Introduction

present the superiority of small-scale, decentralized, ecologically sound, community-centred, human and stable models of societal development (Hettne 2005: 27). The latter is sometimes known to be anti-modern, but it is this populist and civil society perspective, in fact, that significantly influences and modifies the mainstream ideas. Among these counterpoint theories is the human development paradigm (Hettne 2005: 27). When the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) introduced the Human Development Reports (HDR) in 1990, it gave a valuation of developed or developing economy in the context of human development. In the HDR, the levels of development of nations are presented through a Human Development Index (HDI) ranking. While the earlier schools of thought were driven by economic growth and focused on income, human development, by contrast, “embraces the enlargement of all human choices – whether economic, social, cultural or political” (ul Haq 1995: 14). Human development centres on people and welfare, and is at the heart of development itself. While there are many criticisms of the simplified HDI measurement, nevertheless, the concept of human development as defined by its founders has captured a new perspective in the international community.22 Preceding SHD’s conceptualization is Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach that identifies an individual being’s functioning or capability as the core of development, a viewpoint which has found acceptance in the mainstream international community and organizations. Sen explains that it is not the resources that matter but the capability of people to make use of these resources that has the greatest impact on their development. Further, the discourse on development has sharpened with the recognition of the objective of development as a means and end in itself for people’s well-being23 and as the expression of their freedoms.24 The use of the terms “human development” and “sustainable human development” is clarified by the founder of the HDR, Mahbub ul Haq. He builds a clear understanding by asserting that these terms are one and the same. He states: Sustainability is an essential feature of the human development paradigm. It matters little whether the paradigm is labelled “sustainable human development” or “sustainable development” or simply “human development”. What is important is to understand that the essence of the human development paradigm is that everyone should have equal access to development opportunities – now and in the future (ul Haq 1995: 199).

Ibid., see Paul Streeten, ‘Foreword’, in ul Haq (1995: xii). The deficiencies of HDI in terms of geographic incompleteness and representation of economy, knowledge and level of “a long and healthy life” of the individual are discussed by Hastings (2009). 23 See ul Haq (1995: 4). Esteva (1992: 14–15) cites the 1974 Declaration of Cocoyoc on the purpose of development. 24 The ideas of Paulo Friere on the pedagogy of the oppressed and the consequential programmes of conscientization of NGOs had bolstered the pursuit of freedom in crafting development of the oppressed communities. See Verhelst (1987: 15). For arguments on the assertion of freedom as constitutive of development, see Sen (1999: xii, 10–11). 22

1.2 Background to the Research

7

Further, Ul Haq maintains that “what must be sustained are worthwhile life opportunities, not human deprivation.”25 Upon the evolving concepts of development, the SHD paradigm holds an assumption that a much improved human development should result in narrower disparities, long-term prevention of conflicts, and a more equitable world order. It is this multi-dimensional character that is highly significant to post-conflict reconstruction and development work in general. In Mindanao, not only is there a need for human development, but this development has to be sustainable, and able to lay the foundation for peace or peacebuilding as the ultimate goal.

1.2.3

Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding

Two theoretical frameworks from both fields of development and peace studies were used in this study. First is sustainable human development (SHD), which is a strategic framework in evaluating the conditions of the local communities and their prospects (in terms of capacities and resources) towards achieving peace as a vision of a self-determination struggle. At a macro level, the study locates SHD as a cross-cutting theme in the overall peacebuilding and post-conflict development paradigm. Therefore, peacebuilding and post-conflict development are the other concepts that are explored as important trajectories of a peace process. The field of conflict resolution and peace studies is shaping the development of peacebuilding as a distinct area of study. In the pursuit of peace processes in, for instance, protracted or intractable social conflicts,26 peacebuilding has become a

25

Ibid. He makes this argument in counterpoint to the environmental Puritanism that puts the protection of the environment before the needs of humanity, p. 18. 26 See Kriesberg et al. (1989). Intractable social conflict is defined as “a conflict that is unresolvable and this state also comes close to being defined as ‘stubbornness’,” as cited by Thorson (1989: 2). He also cites Kriesberg’s concept that “conflicts have varied degrees of intractability”. But more significantly, this nature of intractability is not without solution. Thorson states (pp. 4–5) that even intractable conflicts can be made tractable depending on how the conflict is understood and re-framed. Added to this, Kriesberg suggests two ways of pursuing this process of transforming intractability by (1) doing historical sequencing of events (2) and at certain times, by carefully identifying the appropriate time of doing this – see p. 9. Kriesberg further explains (p. 110) the many bases for the development of intractable conflicts as follows: (1) “the primary adversaries do not recognize the legitimacy of their opponents as possible bargaining partners; (2) one or more adversaries believe that the differences with the opponents are too large to be bridged without further and intensified struggle; (3) one or more of the parties includes major groups for whom the struggle against the enemy has become a major reason for their existence; (4) parties may have such different conceptions about the conflict that they have difficulty agreeing how to de-escalate or that it would be desirable to do so”. Kriesberg suggests that conflict can be prevented “from becoming frozen or to transform one that has become non-negotiable by requiring a strategy. The strategy entails selecting the appropriate parties, issues, and combination of inducements for the desired movement at a particular time. Three matters are important in preventing this intractability: (1) absence of vested interests by parties in the struggle; (2) lack of hope that the status quo can be fundamentally altered; (3) movement toward reconciliation among the adversaries” (Kriesberg et al. 1989: 119).

8

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Introduction

very crucial facet. Lederach defines peacebuilding as “a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships.” Thus, this process involves what he calls “a wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace accords” (Lederach 1997: 20). Further, he proposes that peacebuilding is a process that also involves various roles, functions, and activities as components that together create the possibility of sustainable transformation, moving the conflict dynamic toward the goal of more peaceful relations (Lederach 1997: 70).

In studying intra-state conflicts and the viable means to conflict resolution in South East Asia, Kamarulzaman defines the emergence of peacebuilding as: …the foundation for peace. It is the building block upon which long-term sustainable peace can and should be built. Peace is the objective and building peace is the process. It is usually employed as a part of the peace process in situations of long, destabilizing, protracted conflict as a means of transforming the situation through the promotion of processes and structures which will transform the socio-economic and political context-leading from insecurity to security, and instability to stability (Askandar 2007: xxviii).

Peacebuilding is interconnected with sustainable human development in such a profound manner that development interventions in conflict societies are crucial drivers in the achievement of sustainable peace in these societies. Using Lederach and Kamarulzaman’s definition of peacebuilding, it can be said that SHD is a part and means of this process. Therefore, it is worth analysing SHD with reference to the overall peacebuilding process or the end goal of sustainable peace. An empirical study of the world’s experience of economic development reveals how poor countries are able to reduce poverty through growth in agriculture and how the solution to rural poverty should be founded on the linking of the rural economies to the dynamic urban economies as part of a structural transformation.27 This finding is relevant in understanding how ideas about economic growth and poverty are perceived. While economic growth is deemed important, the UNDP’s Human Development Report states clearly how “economic growth and human development do not always coincide” and that, “…the forces driving improvements in health and education are different from those driving improvements in income” (UNDP 2010: 46). By no means is economic development put aside in this context. but it does deepen the basis for human development as a compelling framework in pursuing development in general.28 The World Development Report of 2011, the UN Human Development Report of 2010 and the Philippine Human Development Report of 2005 recognize how 27

See Timmer/Akkus (2008: 54); at: www.cgdev.org (11 May 2012). The HDR 2010 fully explains this relationship between economic growth and other human development areas, with the conclusion that both should be viewed as complementing each other. What is deemed more important is that economic growth must positively impact the human development aspect. See Chapter 3: Diverse Paths to Progress of HDR (2010).

28

1.2 Background to the Research

9

human development in conflict communities continues to be hampered by failures in conflict resolution and peacebuilding.29 As mentioned in these reports, while there is no absolute quantitative explanation of how violence and conflict directly affect poverty and underdevelopment, it is clear that countries that continue to experience violence and conflict also continue to underachieve in their human development goals. The impact of violence and conflict on a country can be demonstrated in terms of their impact on economic growth, but worse, the greater impact can be found on the human development situation of the conflict-affected communities.30 The complexity of pursuing development goals in conflict-affected communities is widely acknowledged. Related to this complexity are the nuances of the relationships in the fields of development, peace and conflict studies. Dennis Sandole reinforces this observation by other scholars: Other factors that may account for the priority given negative peace over positive peace include an absence of operational coherence between sustainable development, economic growth, and social justice, such that they do not lead to and reinforce one another in practice as they are supposed to in theory (Victor 2006). This results, in part, from an absence of integration among development and conflict resolution/peacebuilding researchers and practitioners and an absence of efforts to translate research-based insights into appropriate policy (Paffenholz 2008; Carpenter 2008; Sandole 2010: 435).

In addition, Johan Galtung also observes: Many are convinced that, ‘economic and social development will lead to peace.’ If development includes building the capacity for non-violent conflict transformation, then peace will be an outcome. However, if development merely intensifies the desire for more material wealth and resources, then the consequences may be more war than peace.31

With ongoing conflict and peace processes in Mindanao, there is a great challenge ahead in ratifying the peace dividends resulting from a peace agreement. Practitioners in this field rightly acknowledge the difficulty of installing the intangible elements (e.g. social infrastructure) as opposed to the hard and tangible infrastructures in the process of building peace. It is much easier to build roads and bridges in a conflict area and count them than to re-build or reconcile a society (e.g. in terms of relations) torn by violence and conflict. While the influx of donor

29

The HDR 2010 also goes to the extent of explaining how there is also no direct correlation between the employment of democracy and improvements in human development; however, there are strong foundations to believe that democratic policies and institutions tend to result in better chances of realizing human development in the long run. 30 See the discussion on the economic dimension of conflict in the article by Kim/Conceicao (2010); at: http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol15_1/KimConceicao15n1.pdf (23 July 2011). For discussions of repercussions on the conflict-affected communities as shown in terms of statistics, see the report by the World Bank and the World Food Programme (2011) and the report by the Human Development Network (2005). See also a study on the impacts of war and conflict at household level by Justino (2012); at: www.ids.org (11 May 2012); and by Justino (2009); at: www.hicn.org (11 May 2012). 31 See Galtung (2010: 26); at: http://tps.sagepub.com/content/47/1/20 (1 August 2012).

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Introduction

funding and peace and development-orientated activities can be widely seen in a conflict area during the peace process even without the post-conflict stage, a reliable indicator of its impact would be in the area of sustainable human development (SHD). In this regard, using the tools of SHD, such as the Human Development Index (HDI) and other measurements, gives an approximation of how much improvement or non-improvement is being felt by communities on the ground. Thus, the use of sustainable human development as a theoretical framework can help give a closer image of sustainable peace. The following chapter will extensively discuss the SHD concept in the context of the Mindanao setting where the conflict communities are located. It will also explain how peace is defined and how peacebuilding, conflict resolution, international peacebuilding and post-conflict development are used in this study as its theoretical concepts. The theoretical framework that connects SHD with peacebuilding will be expanded in Chap. 2 of this study. The framework being offered in this study is located in the domain of the ongoing peace process from the stance that it is possible for theoretical frameworks to be applied in practice.

1.3

Problem Statement and Research Questions

The Mindanao conflict has made many attempts to bring sustainable peace through various development programmes and other capacity building or human development programming. These were done by various agencies, such as the UNDP Multi-donor Fund (during the 1996 MNLF post-conflict development), USAID and many others, yet nothing seems to come closer to any positive change. It may be because the programmes have been inadequate or irrelevant, or the local people themselves have not had a sense of ownership in this development process, or simply because the whole environment itself was not conducive to supporting the greater goal of a sustainable peace.32 The Bangsamoro people have long aspired for their Right to Self-Determination (RSD) as a primary objective in their general development. Therefore, it is crucial that development should be anchored in this objective. Can sustainable human development as a development framework be useful in building peace in Mindanao? Given the possibilities and hopes for a peace agreement between the

32

The reality of a still ongoing conflict with the government and the MILF and other MNLF groups, such as the Pro-Misuari group, is another factor of an inconducive environment. It is also interesting to note the Pospisil (2005) study on how USAID money is spent in Mindanao. Another assessment of US official development assistance to Mindanao highlights the perceived success of using aid money as part of its counter-terrorism programme (Stuebner/Hirsch 2005). Interviews with Bangsamoro communities on the impact of donor money in the areas of Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Marawi, and General Santos City were done by the author in May to July 2008. Among those that are highly criticized by the local communities are the USAID programmes.

1.3 Problem Statement and Research Questions

11

Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), what can help guarantee the realization of long lasting peace? These questions are what the study hopes to answer. It aims to look at the framework of sustainable human development and find out how viable it would be to implement it in the context of conflict-affected communities by using the Mindanao conflict case. While many scholars and practitioners in development regard human development as the “expansion of education, health care, and other conditions of human life” (Sen 1999: 41), its conceptual approach is founded on the “process of enlarging people’s choices and enhancing human capabilities (the range of things people can be and do) and freedoms, enabling them to live a long and healthy life, have access to knowledge and a decent standard of living, and participate in the life of their community and decisions affecting their lives.”33 In more simple terms, sustainable human development or SHD pertains to individual or community capacities and the enabling environment that accordingly supports it – be it in economic, social, and political arrangements within that society. Therefore, the Bangsamoro future depends on their present SHD sources, options, and opportunities, which, as stakeholders, they should help to plan. A viable SHD framework can be created by reviewing the lessons learned in post-conflict developments and understanding the challenges of human development programmes in other similar conflict areas. In the end, a strategy for bringing sustainable human development as a core foundation in the mission towards the achievement of sustainable peace in Mindanao is proposed.

1.4

Research Questions

In the conduct of this study, the following research questions are proposed: • How can sustainable human development, as a development framework, be more effective towards the achievement of peace in Mindanao? • How can sustainable human development respond to the right to self-determination aspirations of the Bangsamoro people? • What are the needs and challenges of the conflict communities in Mindanao in their vision of sustainable peace? • How can the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) contribute to the success of post-conflict development and peacebuilding in Mindanao?

33

See website of Human Development Report under the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev/ (20 December 2010).

12

1.5

1

Introduction

Research Objectives

The general objective of this research, then, is to determine the relationship between sustainable human development and the attainment of sustainable peace through using peacebuilding strategies. It will attempt to identify the factors that could “decrease the incentives to a return to conflict” and guarantee greater support for pursuing and maintaining peace. There are four specific objectives that this study hopes to achieve. These are: • To design a new framework on which sustainable human development can help build peace in the ongoing GPH-MILF peace process. • To analyse how sustainable human development interacts with post-conflict development and peacebuilding in the context of a right to self-determination conflict. • To analyse the needs and challenges of the conflict communities in their vision for sustainable peace. • To study the role of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) in laying down the foundations for peace and peacebuilding in Mindanao.

1.6

Research Methods

The research relies on secondary and primary data from work of relevance to post-conflict development and peacebuilding. It includes case studies written on Aceh and Mindanao, particularly the post-conflict development programme for the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM). Interviews with practitioners and stakeholders in this field were also conducted in both locations in Mindanao and Aceh, and in meetings held in Penang. Existing data and analyses from multilateral agencies, international organizations and government agencies were used as baseline data. In the course of the research fieldwork, the method of participation-observation was utilized. In this regard, it is very fortunate that the researcher had access to important meetings with stakeholders – the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) parties and civil society – on many occasions in Mindanao, Manila, and even in Penang and Kuala Lumpur. The area of this study is located in the conflict-affected communities in Mindanao, Philippines. As such, the Bangsamoro communities, as the conflict-affected communities, are the primary subjects/stakeholders of this research. The definition of the Bangsamoro includes the thirteen ethno-linguistic groups in Mindanao who are Muslims and other indigenous peoples (IPs) who have maintained their own religions/cultural beliefs or chosen other religions. This definition follows the historical view of the Bangsamoro revolutionary movements

1.6 Research Methods

13

like the MNLF and MILF. Therefore, it is imperative that the study includes the IP community in its fieldwork. This study takes a qualitative approach in which it uses the participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and participatory learning and action (PLA) methods. These methods are deemed to be effective ways of community immersion and engagement by the researcher. Through these methods, the researcher was able to gain direct knowledge from the people in conflict communities, enabling the researcher to take an insider and learner position.34 At the same time, this method also allowed the participants to learn about their own resources and capacities in the process. By using the PRA/PLA, the communities were encouraged to reflect on their views of and visions for sustainable human development and other concepts, facilitate community assessment, and initiate further collective action. It is important that the researcher is an insider since the context of the social actors as a marginalized group posed some degree of sensitivity in some issues. Moreover, the researcher also took the learner position rather than the expert in order that the biases (of the researcher) did not interfere in evincing the perspectives and world view of the social actors (Blaikie 2007: 90). The PRA/PLA is a powerful method that is already being utilized by non-government organizations (NGOs) in Mindanao.35 While one of the subject communities is familiar with some of the PRA/PLA tools, this method has not yet been used for conducting discussions and understanding the community perspectives on peace, conflict, development and right to self-determination concepts.36 In many cases of interventions and engagements with the conflict communities by various organizations, the methods of choice remained focus group discussions (FGD) and field surveys.37 In choosing the communities that were tested for the 34

The roles of a social scientist researcher using the abductive strategy are explained in Blaikie (2007: 90). 35 In Mindanao, this method is more commonly known as PRA, although it has evolved as PLA, as explained by Chambers (1997). An NGO, Balay Mindanao has institutionalized Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) as a method for local development planning in its various programmes. It has published a resource book which is translated into the local Bisayan language. See Balay Mindanaw Foundation Inc. (BMFI) and Resource Center for Empowerment and Development (RCED), 2002, Kab-ot Gahum: A Resource book on Local Development Planning through Participatory Rural Appraisal (Cagayan de Oro City: BMFI/RCED). 36 Among the two communities, Baranggay Dalgan has not experienced PRA/PLA, but Baranggay Labungan has used some of the PRA methods, such as community mapping, as part of its work with the Bangsamoro Development Agency. 37 Many of the NGOs under the Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society have been using FGDs and some community mapping tools in their community assessment and development programmes. The more comprehensive study is the recent Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP) for Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao, implemented by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Philippines through its Japan Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD), presented during the “Mindanao Educators for Peace Summit: Transforming the Conflict in Mindanao through Peace Education and Quality Higher Education”, 11–16 January 2010, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia, organized by the Mindanao Association of State Colleges and Universities Foundation (MASCUF), the Research and

14

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Introduction

PRA/PLA exercise, a set of criteria was used. These criteria and the process of selection are explained in the following section on the scope and limitations of the study.

1.7

Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study mainly focuses on the interconnections of sustainable human development in the context of conflict and peace. Thus, it addresses issues of conflict-affected communities in their transition from conflict to a normalized society or the longer-term sustainable peace vision. It is to be noted that there are only limited and specific areas in Mindanao that are identified as conflict areas and not the entire region. These are also the same areas covered by the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA)38 and the ongoing Government of the Philippines (GPH)–Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) peace negotiations. Two barangays (villages)39 were chosen from these areas for fieldwork according to a set of criteria. The first was that the villages had to be the least accessible to previous research (by WB, JICA, etc.) and this is borne out of the idea of selecting the most marginalized communities. Taking the example of Robert Chamber’s “Putting Last First”, it makes more sense to prioritize the most marginalized communities as it is widely known that the poorest suffer the most in perennial situations of violence and conflict. The second criterion dictated that the areas should be included in the envisioned New Political Entity (NPE).40 This criterion took note of the possible areas included in the ongoing peace negotiations. Third and last was the viability and relevance of the study areas according to discussions with the BDA. This was cognizant of the actual conditions in the communities that could be a viable community for research as discussed and recommended by the BDA. By consulting

Education for Peace Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The SEDP also used FGDs and key informant interviews as its method. And similar to the method of PLA, it implemented Quick Impact Projects (QIP) as its pilot testing phase. Another example is the Bangsamoro Development Agency – World Bank Multi-donor Trust Fund (MTF) programme. This programme conducts similar development training and project implementation using the World Bank’s own Community Driven Development (CDD) framework. 38 The BDA is the development arm of the MILF. It was created by the Philippine government and the MILF as an entity that commenced rehabilitation, reconstruction and development in the conflict-affected areas in Mindanao as part of its confidence-building measures while the peace negotiations are still ongoing. 39 A barangay is the smallest political unit in the local government system in the Philippines. 40 This is a technical term being coined by the peace negotiations. It refers to the area that will be included as part of a territory that will be placed under a new political government system led by the Bangsamoro vis a vis the Philippine State. On 7 October 2012, President Aquino officially gave the name ‘Bangsamoro’ to this NPE when announcing it on national television.

1.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study

15

the BDA, the cooperation of the communities selected was also guaranteed in the process. One of the limitations of the study is the inaccessibility of the conflict communities. This is mainly due to several factors: the prevailing presence of government military forces in the areas which makes it unsafe for travel; unpredictable weather, given that heavy rains normally cause flooding in the rural parts of Mindanao; and the challenging geographic locations of BDA/MILF communities that are difficult to reach on a regular basis. As a result, the selected communities for research were both found in the Maguindanao Province, which is the most accessible and familiar to the researcher. Secondly, the decision of selecting the subject areas arguably limited the scope and representativeness of the communities. At best, the two chosen communities have some differences. The first community is composed of a homogenous ethnic and religious group – the Maguindanao, who are also Muslims – while the second community is composed of a mixture of ethnic and religious groups – the Tedurays, Bisaya and Maguindanao. Both Tedurays and Maguindanaos are Muslims, but the Bisaya are Christians. Lastly, in relation to the fieldwork at community level, the study was focused on asking only five questions that were answered by using the participatory rural appraisal and participatory learning and action (PRA/PLA) method. These questions probed the conceptual understanding of the communities on the dimensions of peace, development and right to self-determination as part of their social and political mindset. Other constraints of the study are explained in Chap. 4 (Research Methods) and Chap. 5 (Research Findings).

1.8

Structure of the Book

This book has six chapters. The first chapter is an introductory discussion on the rationale and design of the research work as well as the scope and limitations of the study. Chapter 2 builds on the literature review of the theoretical concepts of sustainable human development or SHD as the central framework, peacebuilding concepts and framework, peacebuilding and post-conflict development, and on how these are located in the field of development and peace studies. It also presents some lessons learned in post-conflict development work. In particular, it draws lessons from the post-conflict development experiences of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Mindanao, Philippines and of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or Free Aceh Movement in Aceh, Indonesia. Chapter 3 gives the contextual background of the area of study and the Bangsamoro people as the main subjects. It also discusses the history of the conflict and peace processes and the current realities that impact the conflict situation in Mindanao. In this chapter, a section on the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) as a mechanism of the initial reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of the ongoing peace process is also included.

16

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Introduction

Chapter 4 elaborates on the participatory rural appraisal and participatory learning and action (PRA/PLA) methodology as the selected approach in this study, and provides an explanation of the research design, including the process of data collection, verification and analysis. Chapter 5 presents the findings and analysis from the PRA/PLA workshops in the two conflict-affected communities as case studies. These findings are analysed using the theoretical frameworks previously presented in Chap. 2. As an important output of this research, this chapter also discusses how the proposed theoretical framework can be operationalized in the context of the ongoing peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. This chapter culminates in a proposal to use the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) as the institutional mechanism for laying the foundations of the sustainable human development (SHD) and peacebuilding frameworks as a strategy for achieving durable peace in Mindanao. Chapter 6 further discusses the relevance of sustainable human development and peacebuilding in Mindanao. This chapter summarizes the various key conclusions and their potential contributions to other conflict-affected communities and to the field of peace and conflict and development studies in general. Also, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the research. The chapter concludes with some recommendations for future research that could be further explored in the study of the peace process and peacebuilding in Mindanao.

References Bacani, Benedicto (Ed.), 2006: “The 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement: 10 Years After”, in: Autonomy and Peace Review, 2, 3. Balay Mindanaw Foundation Inc. (BMFI) and Resource Center for Empowerment and Development (RCED), 2002: Kab-ot Gahum: A Resource Book on Local Development Planning Through Participatory Rural Appraisal (Cagayan de Oro City: BMFI/RCED). Blaikie, Norman, 2007: Approaches to Social Enquiry, 2nd Edition (UK, US: Polity Press). Chambers, Robert, 1997: Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last (London: ITDG Publishing). Esteva, Gustavo, 1992: “Development”, in: Sachs, Wolfgang (Ed.): The Development Dictionary, A Guide to Knowledge as Power (London & New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd.). Galtung, Johan, 2010: “Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution: The Need for Transdisciplinarity”, in: Transcultural Psychiatry, 47, 20. Glang, Alunan C., 2003: “Assessment of Government Negotiations and Modes of Conflict Resolution”, in: Rasul, Amina (Ed.): The Road to Peace and Reconciliation: Muslim Perspective on the Mindanao Conflict (Makati: AIM): 67–74. Hastings, David A., 2009: “From Human Development to Human Security: A Prototype Human Security Index”, in: UNESCAP Working Paper (Bangkok: UNESCAP). Hettne, Bjørn, 2005: “Discourses on Development”, in: Haynes, Jeffrey (Ed.): Development Studies (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan): 27. Iribani, Abraham, 2006: Give Peace a Chance: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks (Mandaluyong: Magbassa Kita/PCID).

References

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Justino, Patricia, 2009: “The Impact of Armed Civil Conflict on Household Welfare and Policy Responses”, in: IDS (Ed.): Households in Conflict Network Working Paper 61 (UK: Institute of Development Studies). Justino, Patricia, 2012: “War and Poverty”, in: IDS Working Paper, 2012, 391 (UK: Institute of Development Studies). Kim, Namsuk; Conceicao, Pedro, 2010: “The Economic Crisis, Violent Conflict and Human Development”, in: International Journal of Peace Studies, 15, 1. Kriesberg, Louis; Northrup, Terrell A.; Thorson, Stuart J. (Eds.), 1989: Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation (New York: Syracuse University Press). Lingga, Abhoud Syed M., 2007: Powerpoint presentation entitled “Conflict Situation in Mindanao, Root Causes and Status”; at: https://studylib.net/doc/5504771/-ppt–unknown- (27 August 2010). Majul, Cesar, 1998: “A Case Study in the Role of International Islamic Institutions: Arbitration and Mediation in the Philippine Case”, in: Salmi, R.H.; Majul, C.A.; Tanham, G.K. (Eds.): Islam and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practices (Maryland: United Press of America). Rasul, Amina, 2003. “A Look at Corruption in the ARMM and the Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Fighting Corruption”, in: The Road to Peace and Reconciliation: Muslim Perspectives on the Mindanao Conflict, 2003 (Makati: AIM). Rasul, Amina, 2007: Broken Peace? Assessing the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (Manila: PCID, MKFI and KAF). Sachs, Wolfgang, 1992: The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power (London: Zed Books Ltd.). Sandole, Dennis, 2010: “Conflict Resolution, Methods, and Enforcement”, in: Young, Nigel (Ed.): The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace (UK & US: Oxford University Press). Sen, Amartya, 1999: Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books). Stuebner, William A.; Hirsch, Richard, 2005: “Mindanao: A Community-based Approach to Counterinsurgency”, in: PRISM: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations 1, 3 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press). Timmer, Peter; Akkus, Selvin, 2008: “The Structural Transformation as a Pathway out of Poverty: Analytics, Empirics, and Politics”, in: Working Paper 150: The Center for Global Development (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development). Todaro, Michael P.; Smith, Stephen C., 2006: Economic Development, Ninth Edition (England: Pearson/Addison Wesley). Ul Haq, Mahbub, 1995: Reflections on Human Development (London: Oxford University Press). UNDP, 2010: Human Development Report, Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development (New York: UNDP): 46. Verhelst, Thierry G., 1987 (Translated by Bob Cumming), 1990: No Life Without Roots (London & New Jersey: Zed Books). World Bank, 1976: The Philippines, Priorities and Prospects for Development: World Bank Country Economic Report (Washington, D.C.: World Bank).

Other Literature Center for Global Development Website; at: www.cgdev.org (11 May 2012). Department of Budget and Management-Government of the Philippines Website; at: www.dbm. gov.ph. Department of Budget and Management Website, FY 2010 Budget Program 2008–2010; at: www. dbm.gov.ph/data/FileNEP2010/general_intro.htm#nep_2 (7August 2010). Government of the Philippines; at https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/president-aquinoannounces-framework-agreement-between-government-and-milf-peace (7 October 2012). Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 2005 20(2): 100–124 (UP Diliman: Third World Studies Center, 2005).

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1

Introduction

Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) website; at: https://psa.gov.ph/. Virola, Romulo A., 2006, Powerpoint presentation entitled “2006 Official Poverty Statistics”; at: http://pcij.org/blog/wp-docs/NSCB_Poverty_2006.pdf (10 March 2008). World Bank Website; at: www.worldbank.org.ph, under Country Brief (2 August 2010).

Chapter 2

Literature Review of Theories, Concepts, and Case Studies in Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding

2.1

Introduction

This chapter discusses sustainable human development (SHD) and peacebuilding. These two conceptual paradigms are applied in the context of conflict-affected communities. The Right to Self-Determination is also explained as part of human rights and human needs discussions about SHD. Given the dynamism in the theory and practice of development studies and conflict and peace studies, the two main theoretical frameworks, namely sustainable human development and peacebuilding, are distinguished from other theories and concepts. Theories and concepts of sustainable development, poverty reduction, and human security are explained in contrast to SHD. While peacebuilding is defined by laying the foundations of the definitions and meaning of peace in general, international peacebuilding and post-conflict development are also reviewed as related conceptual frameworks. Further, the differences and convergences of peacebuilding and conflict resolution are also discussed. This chapter also includes discussions of two case studies, namely the post-conflict development experiences of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Mindanao, Philippines, and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) in Aceh, Indonesia. Data from these case studies were gathered from various secondary data, actual interviews and meetings with various stakeholders from these communities, and actual participant-observation methods. Upon these literature-concepts and theories and case studies, a theoretical framework is drawn and presented. This framework is further augmented with input from the participatory rural appraisal and participatory learning and action (PRA/PLA) research findings and analysis from the selected conflict communities in this study.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 A. U. Abubakar, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 16, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53387-2_2

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2.2

Sustainable Human Development

The relevance of sustainable human development (SHD) has been found in both poor and rich nation settings (Streeten 1995: viii). Paul Streeten emphasizes how “human development goes beyond basic needs in that it is concerned with all human beings – not only the poor and not only in poor countries and not only basic needs. Human development applies to the advanced countries as much as to the middle-income and low-income countries.”1 This will also, in effect, produce variations in how human development is evaluated in different contexts while the core areas may be the same. For example, in some rich countries, indicators of unemployment, personal security and freedom of expression would show how these aspects widen or limit the range of people’s choices in the process. On the other hand, Amartya Sen admits that “human development is first and foremost an ally of the poor rather than of the rich and the affluent” (Sen 1999: 144). This is mainly due to the fact that human development contributes more to the welfare of those who invariably have very few choices or no choice at all, and have limited capabilities in life compared to those who have more choices and capabilities. The traditional discourse on economic development changed drastically with the introduction of the more interdisciplinary area of human development. In support of this development idea, Amartya Sen’s capability approach has enriched the concept and introduced the significance of putting people at the heart of development. It is this approach that has successfully captured the imagination of mainly economists and philosophers (Gasper 2000).

2.2.1

The SHD Concept

The framework of human development was introduced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on the launch of its first Human Development Report in 1990. Since then, these reports have been thoroughly developed with much support from UNDP leaders, who championed a new vision of adding a human dimension to the usual gross national product (GNP) as the world’s measurement of development. The founder of the Human Development Reports (HDR), Mahbub Ul Haq, articulated this concept of SHD as follows: The basic purpose of development is to enlarge people’s choices. In principle, these choices can be infinite and can change over time. People often value achievements that do not show up at all, or not immediately, in income or growth figures: greater access to knowledge,

1

The human development concept is explained here in relation to the basic needs theory which was introduced earlier. Streeten (1995: ix) says the basic needs concept is centred on the possession of commodities which often the poor do not have.

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better nutrition and health services, more secure livelihoods, security against crime and physical violence, satisfying leisure hours, political and cultural freedoms and sense of participation in community activities. The objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives.2

The human development framework is also based on four important components: equity, sustainability, productivity, and empowerment. Ul Haq explains that these components provide the route to human development compared with other traditional models of development or economic growth. Equity is defined as equitable access to opportunities across various groups. Thus, ul Haq acknowledges that this is a very powerful concept that demands fundamental changes in the power structures of a society. While sustainability mainly refers to the sustainability of human opportunities that emanate from physical, human, financial, and environmental sources as forms of capital, he reiterates that “what should be sustained are worthwhile life opportunities and not human deprivation.” Productivity, meanwhile, is regarded as an important aspect of economic growth but with an emphasis on investments in people that will enable them to reach their full potentials. The idea of productivity, however, cannot be limited to the outputs of human capital investments. The fourth essential component of sustainable human development is empowerment. Empowerment ascertains that it is the people who become the focus of development and that it is their participation in activities, events, and processes that will prove to be transformative in the way they live their lives (Ul Haq 1995: 16–20). In this regard, the human development paradigm, therefore, includes all choices – not just economic ones, but also political, social, and cultural choices. These four components are plural principles that are equally crucial in ensuring sustainable human development.3 To encapsulate the human development paradigm, its definitions should include the following: • Development must put people at the centre of its concern. • The purpose of development is to enlarge all human choices, not just income. • The human development paradigm is concerned with building up human capabilities fully (through enabling framework for growth and employment). • Human development has four essential pillars: equity, sustainability, productivity, and empowerment. It regards economic growth as essential but

2

See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report Website; see also Ul Haq (1995: 14). 3 Alkire explains these sustainable human development components as plural principles that cannot be prioritized (in terms of ranking) but are all equally at play in achieving sustainable human development, Alkire (2010: 28–30). The UNHDR (2010: 117) concludes that considering the improvements in human development, there continues to be widespread dissatisfaction with key aspects of life, like security. Therefore, this substantiates the importance of attaining all these plural principles or components when advancing the cause of sustainable human development. While improvements in indicators in education, health, and income may be good, it is equally important to note the ways and means it can be accessed by individuals and groups and the degree to which improvements correspond to people’s needs and aspirations.

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emphasizes at length its link with human lives and questions its long-term sustainability. • The human development paradigm defines the ends of development and analyses sensible options for achieving them (Ul Haq 1995: 21). Ul Haq traces back the ideas on human development to the times of great thinkers like Aristotle (384–322 B.C.), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Adam Smith (1723–90), and many others who followed in emphasizing the importance of promoting “human good” to making development bring about “flourishing lives” and dignity to a person (Ul Haq 1995: 13). However, it was in the 1980s that Amartya Sen’s writings on the capability approach helped raise substantive discussions on re-defining development. Alkire (2010: 24) cites Sen’s article Development as Capability Expansion, published in 1989, as having laid the foundations of the 1990 Human Development Report. In a review of the Human Development Reports, it is found that the concept of development has evolved but at the same time it has kept the same objectives of achieving well-being and opportunity freedom, and focusing on the value of agency or process freedom and the pursuit of justice or plural principles in a society.4 The HDR 2010 provides a short version of the human development definition as follows: Human Development is the expansion of people’s freedoms to live long, healthy and creative lives; to advance other goals they have reason to value; and to engage actively in shaping development equitably and sustainably on a shared planet. People are both the beneficiaries and drivers of human development, as individuals and in groups.5

Further, a longer version of the human development definition maintains the following: Human development aims to enlarge people’s freedoms to do and be what they value and have reason to value. In practice, human development also empowers people to engage actively in development on our shared planet. It is people-centred. At all levels of development, human development focuses on essential freedoms; enabling people to lead long and healthy lives, to acquire knowledge, to be able to enjoy a decent standard of living and to shape their own lives. Many people value these freedoms in and of themselves; they are also powerful means to other opportunities. Human development also encompasses other worthwhile freedoms associated with human well-being in both developing and industrialized nations. The emphasis and particularities vary but often include secure and meaningful livelihoods; caring and dignified relationships; protection against crime and violence; artistic, cultural and spiritual activities; participation in political and community activities; self-respect; and emotional well-being. Human development is development by the people, of the people, and for the people. For it is people, both poor and rich, as individuals and in groups, who create human development.

4

See UNHDR (2010: 22). A similar definition was offered by Alkire (2010: 37–40). See Alkire (2010: 40). It is this shorter version of the definition that the research used in explaining this development concept to the conflict-affected communities during the PRA/PLA workshops.

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Fig. 2.1 The human development conceptual framework. Source Based on Alkire (2010) and UNHDR (2010)

So, human development empowers people to be responsible and innovative actors. Because human development views people not as passive victims but as entrepreneurs and active agents, it helps people to help themselves. Human development sets priorities among goals using several principles at the same time. Commonly used principles include poverty reduction, equity, efficiency, voice and participation, sustainability, respect for human rights and fostering common good. Human development is multidimensional and its components are interconnected. Thus analyses and policies to advance human development take a holistic view. They identify how powerful means such as economic growth best advance human development across time. They clarify the sequence and type of investments that expand key capabilities most effectively. And they engage in periodic public debate about values and priorities.6

The recent progress in human development is captured in a conceptual framework drawn by Sabina Alkire and adopted in the HDR 2010. Figure 2.1 shows how the elements are interdependent and on which they all evolve in a shared environment.

6

See Alkire (2010: 43–44). This longer version of the definition is added here to show the multidimensional aspect of the concept, which includes human rights, freedoms and capabilities as part of human development goals.

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2.2.1.1

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Sen’s Capability Approach

Scholars acknowledge that the conceptualization of human development had its origins in Amartya Sen’s capability approach.7 Fukuda-Parr (2003: 303) cites Sen’s (1989: 43) definition of human development as the process of enlarging a person’s “functionings and capabilities to function, the range of things that a person can do and be in her life.” Sen moved on to collaborate with other scholars in presenting concepts and tools that further elaborate on the paradigm of human development.8 There are two key elements in Sen’s human development approach: the evaluative aspect and the agency aspect. The evaluative aspect mainly refers to the ways in which development or people’s well-being is measured and monitored as a picture of achievement or non-achievement. On the other hand, the agency aspect asserts the defining moment of placing people at the centre of development. Sen puts emphasis not only on the individual but also on the collective role of people in their development, and the importance of human rights (Fukuda-Parr 2003: 308–309). In Sen’s work on Development as Freedom, he articulates how the employment of human rights is, in fact, crucial in removing the unfreedoms that posed obstacles to people’s capabilities and well-being. Human capability is inextricably linked to the opportunities and constraints emanating from the social, political, and economic arrangements of our society. Thus, the role of freedom is very important in that it serves both as an end (constitutive) and means (instrumental) to development (Sen 2000). However, the idea that the capability approach automatically translates into aspects of human rights (a capability as a human right) is something that cannot be held in absolute terms. This issue becomes problematic since human rights declarations and instruments do not necessarily correspond to capability lists.9 Alkire enumerates the features of Sen’s capability approach as follows: • A focus on people as the ‘ends’ of development: clarity about ends and means. People-centred. • A substantive notion of freedom related to well-being (capabilities) and agency (empowerment). • A focus on that freedom being ‘real’ – not just paper freedom but an actual possibility. • A well-being objective that includes multiple capabilities that need not be one-dimensional.

7 Among these scholars are Fukuda-Parr (2003), Alkire (2010), Des Gasper (2000), and Todaro/ Smith (2006). 8 Sen and Nussbaum worked together on the concept of capability and agency. Sen and Anand cooperated in developing the human development index (HDI) among others. 9 Drydyk (2011: 39–61) thoroughly discusses these incompatibilities, citing the capability list of Vizard and Nussbaum when explaining this dilemma. In this regard, he proposes the application of responsible pluralism in approaching capabilities as human rights.

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• Stable, curiously regarding the causal interconnections between different dimensions of human development and between economic growth and human development. • A focus on supporting people as active agents, not passive victims, of development. • An ability to prioritize capabilities for poor people across time while keeping in view the development of rich people and of non-material capabilities (Alkire 2010: 24–25). No definitive capability list is currently being promoted because the idea of capability (substantive and opportunity freedoms) having a well-defined profile remains to be debated.10 However, the operations of the capability approach can be tested using three aspects of a person’s position: (1) functioning – the things that people actually achieve are deemed to be highly contextual and open to public reasoning; (2) treatment – arbitrary interference, discrimination and other forms of detrimental treatment, such as lack of dignity and respect; and (3) autonomy – examples of empowerment with critical decision-making, choice and control. A list of capabilities can be extracted from direct consultations with people (from various sectors) combined with the identification of relevant human rights instruments.11

2.2.1.2

Sustainability in Human Development

The Human Development Reports say sustainable human development means that “we have a moral obligation to do at least as well for our successor generations as our predecessor did for us; and that it [SHD] meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (Alkire 2010: 19). Ul Haq explains that “sustainability is an essential feature of the human development paradigm. It matters little whether the paradigm is labelled ‘sustainable human development’ or ‘sustainable development’ or ‘human development’. What is important is to understand that the essence of the human development paradigm is that everyone should have equal access to development opportunities – now and in the future” (ul Haq 1995: 19). According to ul Haq’s explanations, the debate between the use and the non-use of the prefix ‘sustainable’ may be endless and both options are valid. However, in this study of finding the relationship between development and peace dynamics, it 10 See Vizard et al. (2011), Nussbaum (2011), Drydyk (2011), Burchardt/Vizard (2011). Sen argued that the development of capability lists cannot be fixed but is subject to deliberations based on various contexts and considerations. See Burchardt/Vizard (2011: 95). Contrary to this, Nussbaum did come up with a central capability list and explains how capability should be perceived as a species of human rights. Therefore, there are central capabilities that must be secured as the basis of people’s real needs and urgent entitlements; see Nussbaum (2011: 23–37). 11 This has been done in a measurement framework of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights, or EHRC in the United Kingdom; see Burchardt/Vizard (2011).

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cannot be overemphasized how the attainment of both development and peace in conflict areas is essential for sustainability. The word in itself is a strong reminder that whatever developments and resolutions are made today with regard to a conflict situation, they must include the longer-term horizon for future generations so that the same conflict will not arise again or, better yet, will have transformed into a better situation. And this is why the adjective sustainability is deemed important.

2.2.1.3

Sustainable Human Development and Poverty Reduction

Apart from the developments in SHD, the World Bank (WB) has also introduced its own framework of Poverty Reduction (PR). In 1990, the WB developed the World Development Report, followed by other policy papers and instruments that put the eradication of poverty at the centre of the Bank’s activities. Although SHD and PR may not be compatible, they do show some points of complementation. Under PR, poverty is not only measured by income and consumption but also with indicators of child mortality and school enrolment, making it similar in this respect to SHD.12 Since poverty itself is attributed to the lack of material and non-material needs, both concepts of PR and SHD, therefore, find some resonance (cited by Askwith 1994: 12). However, it has to be noted that the WB’s PR is aimed at short-term remedy compared with UNDP’s SHD longer-term vision for people’s general welfare and well-being (Askwith 1994: 25). While poverty reduction or alleviation is a very important goal in a country’s development programme, it cannot be equated with human development’s goal. Ul Haq explains further that poverty can be explained in terms of having no access to resources (e.g. income, assets, credit, social services and job opportunities), but it is not a residual of economic growth because the essence of human development is investment in people, their well-being, and their full participation in their development (ul Haq 1995: 27). As a case in point, the theme of poverty and poverty alleviation or reduction in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) can be a very contentious issue. For one thing, this theme can easily be viewed as the main source or driver of the conflict in Mindanao. Thus, the Government and the donor community often cite this as an urgent reason for development programming. In the Philippines, the poverty threshold is as follows: a family of five needs to have an income of at least PHP 4,869.00 (PHP 162.00 per day or USD 3.90 per day) to meet its food requirements; and PHP 7,017.00 (PHP 234.00 per day or USD 5.60 per day) to meet its food and non-food requirements.13 In the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) region, poverty incidence remains constantly high since 2003, 12

Askwith explains how the poverty reduction approach at the World Bank also includes several aspects of human development areas which directly and indirectly contribute to the attainment of poverty reduction at the country levels. See Askwith (1994: 23–24, 34–36). 13 This calculation uses the Philippine Central Bank foreign exchange rate of USD 1.00 is PhP 41.83 (rounded off to the tenth place); at: http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/sdds/exchrate.htm (1 August 2012).

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2006, and 2009. While extensive evidence effectively illustrates how conflict intensifies the situation of poverty in many ways among communities, the Philippine Human Development Report 2005 and the World Bank Joint Needs Assessment 2005 similarly make it clear that solving the poverty issue will not be sufficient to resolve the conflict.

2.2.1.4

Sustainable Human Development

Sustainable Human Development (SHD) is a development paradigm that brings the people to the forefront of development. It pursues an objective of economic growth that focuses on the multi-faceted aspects of human development. On the other hand, sustainable development (SD) is a principle in the development paradigm that ensures balance between humankind and the environment. If SHD brings the people in the forefront of development, SD brings the environment to the forefront of mankind’s development. The history of sustainable development started when the UN first organized a conference on the human environment in 1972. Eventually, in 1987, the United Nations Brundtland Commission published a landmark report entitled “Our Common Future” which invoked the environment agenda. The report reiterates that “…the environment does not exist as a sphere separate from human actions, ambitions, and needs, and therefore it should not be considered in isolation from human concerns… The environment is where we all live; and development is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within that abode. The two are inseparable.” 14 In this report, sustainable development is defined as: development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two concepts: the concept of ‘needs’, in particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of ‘limitations’ imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs.15

Upon studying the topics and themes of human development and sustainable development, it can be said that both areas do respond to the social, economic, environmental, and political requirements of development. And to some extent, they do interconnect.16 Beyond this interconnection, however, it is the human development framework that is clear on the importance of freedom in the realization of peoples’ expansion of human capabilities. It is this value that makes human

Cited in “The History of Sustainable Development in the United Nations”. See the report “Our Common Future”; at: www.un-documents.net/ocf-ov.htm#1.2 (14 October 2011). 16 To review the similarities and differences of human development and sustainable development, in terms of topics, see the United Nations; at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol= A/67/757&Lang=E (21 January 2013), and the Global and Regional HDR; at: http://hdr.undp.org/ en/reports/global/hdr2011/ (20 October 2011). 14 15

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development a more compelling framework in relation to the aspiration of achieving peace in conflict-ridden societies.

2.2.1.5

Sustainable Human Development and Human Security

The pursuit of sustainable human development faces greater challenges in an environment where there are high levels of threats, instabilities, risks and other insecurities. It is on this context that the paradigm of state security has been countered with the framework of human security. In the 1994 Human Development Report, Human Security (HS) was introduced with a re-framing of a security concept traditionally defined from a military and state or national security interest perspective to one that is centred on the people itself. This concept was born from ordinary people’s views on what they perceive to be their sources of security or insecurity (Haq 1995: 116–117). Human security is defined as “safety from chronic threats like hunger, diseases, and repression; and protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns of lives – whether in homes, jobs and communities.17 The level and nature of human security may differ from one community to another. This also depends on the context and perception of the people themselves who are affected by it. The 1994 HDR adds: In defining human security, it is important that human security is not equated with human development. Human development is a broader concept – defined in previous Human Development Reports as a process of widening the range of people’s choices. Human security means that the people can exercise these choices safely and freely – and that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today are not totally lost tomorrow.18

In the process, human security finds its relevance as a means to sustainable human development. The relationship between the two can clearly be viewed as follows: the failure or improvement of one area of human security will be reflected in the outcomes of human development and vice versa. Further, the addition of the human security dimension in the pursuit of human development is argued on the basis that problems of poverty and conflict (i.e. intra-state conflicts) can best be prevented by resolving the root causes of the conflict instead of intervening after the escalation of a conflict.19 The concept of human security had been adopted by the international community since its introduction in 1994. It has become a framework for policy and a tool for analysing non-traditional security issues which include economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political issues. An example is the Canadian government report that states:

17

Human Development Report (1994: 23), Chapter 2. Human Development Report (1994: 23), Chapter 2. 19 This was cited by Streeten on ul Haq’s work on human security in ul Haq (1995: xv–xvi). 18

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human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, their safety, or even their lives (Cited in Jolly/Ray 2006: 4).

However, the definition of human security further evolved in the Human Security Now Report in 2003, which expanded the issue of security to include empowerment of the people in order for them to overcome threats and risks. The human security concept places equal emphasis on its protective (freedom from fear) and empowerment (freedom from want) components that rightly emphasise not only the participation of people themselves but, more importantly, their great potential and capacity for ensuring their own survival and security. Thus, it is the centrality of the people or the agency aspect of human security that is deemed important. In general, the traditional security framework upholds the very same people that it wants to protect, mainly from physical violence. Therefore, in this regard, human security effectively complements state security (Ogata/Sen 2003: 2– 12).

2.2.1.6

The Right to Self-determination as a Human Right and Part of Human Development

The conflict in Mindanao between the Bangsamoro and the Philippine government is characterized as an identity conflict. This is also widely known as a Right to Self-Determination (RSD) conflict within which an indigenous and marginalized group of people are re-claiming their Right to Self-Determination as their political agenda. The concept of the Right to Self-Determination can be found in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It states: Article 1. (1) All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of the right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. (2) All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. (3) The State Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.20

20

See Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights/International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICCPR/ICESCR), and Article 1 (2) UN Charter; at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm (17 February 2013). Also see Article 20 (1) African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR); at: http://www.achpr.org/instruments/ achpr/#a20 (17 February 2013).

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Another relevant document to the Right to Self-Determination is the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This declaration affirms the following: Article 1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and international human rights law…Article 3. Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.21

The concept of RSD is often used by indigenous and marginalized peoples in their aspiration for freedom and justice. The RSD agenda is not only rooted in rights to land and territory as an important foundation for a people’s identity and culture but also includes the pursuit of human development. The RSD as a human right is criticized as having a weak basis. Hannum Hurst explains that although there is an attempt of “creating a new right in international law – the right of every people defined ethnically, culturally, or religiously to have its own independent state”, this has yet to be supported by international law. On the other hand, he suggests that RSD can be pursued by using two human rights aspects: (1) the protection of the cultural, religious, linguistic, and ethnic identity of individuals and groups, and (2) the right of individuals and groups to participate effectively in the economic and political life of the country.22 The Right to Self-Determination is generally viewed as an inherent human right of indigenous and marginalized peoples. Therefore, this RSD aspiration and context would have to be part of the greater human development goals. It is this RSD context that will shape the capabilities and functions of the people – of what they are able to do and achieve.

2.2.2

The Human Development Report

In launching the Human Development Reports (HDR), a new parameter called the Human Development Index (HDI) was also introduced that is used to indicate people’s access to health (longevity, life expectancy), education (education and literacy) and income (poverty and levels of income). Further, various annual themes are also included to give more qualitative understanding of the numbers within the HDI. With this, the HDR then tries to reflect on the data and give the closest picture of people’s lives and their realities. One example of this thematic reporting is the Philippine Human Development Report 2005, which focused on peace, human security and human development in the Philippines. This report rightly gives a

21

Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 61/295, The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 22 This section is partly adapted from the article by Abubakar/Askandar (2011: 48–151).

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deeper insight into human development and the reality of a protracted armed conflict in some communities in the Philippines. At the United Nations in 2000, world leaders pledged to banish extreme poverty by the year 2050. As such, this commitment to the UN Millennium Development Goals is evaluated through the Human Development Reports. In as much as the globalization of economies and trade markets has become a competition for nations, the HDI, too, in parallel, generates more political competition. And rightly so, it attempts to temper the negative tendencies of poor and developing countries’ pure adventurism for industrial and economic development that may be in conflict with the general sustainable development paradigm.23

2.2.2.1

Human Development Index

The Human Development Index (HDI) is a simplified measurement of a country’s development. In its calculations, it includes three aspects of people’s progress – health, education, and income. While the concept of human development maintains a more comprehensive dimension of development, the HDI formulation is designed to show a snapshot of the status of development of the people (in their respective countries) that is reflected in a single number. By using this single number, peoples’ (or countries’) progress can then be compared with that of others, and they can assess their own standing across time. The HDI measurement is a great improvement on the gross domestic product (GDP) measurement that limitedly evaluates development in purely economic terms. Paul Streeten explains the Human Development Index (HDI) as follows: The Human Development Index comprises (1) the logarithm of gross domestic product (GDP) per head, calculated at the real purchasing power, not at exchange rates, up to the international poverty line (after 1990 this was modified in various ways); (2) literacy rates (and, since the 1991 report, mean years of schooling); and (3) life expectancy at birth. These disparate items are brought to a common denominator by measuring the distance between the best and the worst performers and producing a ranking of countries.24

2.2.2.2

The Freedom Index

Furthering the vision of human development and capturing it in a measurement, other indices have also been developed to complement the HDI. These include the political freedom index or freedom index and the gender-related index. At the start, the freedom index was viewed with scepticism and opposition by many sectors,

As Inge Kaul explains in the HDR video documentary, “People First: The Human Development Reports”, HDR-UNDP website; at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/videos/humandev/ (28 June 2012). 24 See Paul Streeten, in ul Haq (1995: xii). 23

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especially governments. There was caution about the index mainly because the complexity of political freedoms cannot be sufficiently reflected in an index, considering the differences of context of every country. Nevertheless, this does not dampen the inspiration behind the conceptual foundations of human development. It will be superficial if political freedoms are not given importance when these are just as essential as the other aspects of development for people from all walks of life.25 Consequently, the freedom index was included in the 1994 HDR. The measurement of this index included political participation, rule of law, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination. Each cluster is evaluated according to available reports from national government agencies and local and international organizations like Amnesty International, Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, United Nations Commission on Human Rights and many others.

2.2.2.3

The Gender Index

Against the backdrop of wider calls for gender equality and improvements to the status of women all over the world, the Human Development Reports timely introduced the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) as an addition to the HDI. The 1995 HDR carried the theme “Gender and Human Development” and extensively showed findings on how the disparities between men and women (to the detriment of women), in terms of development, effectively gives a lower HDI for countries. In this sense, a low HDI of women becomes a lost potential for a higher HDI of any country. In the recent Human Development Reports of 2010 and 2011, the indices were improved. There is now an Inequality-adjusted HDI, a Gender-Inequality Index, and a Multidimensional Poverty Index. Both the Inequality-adjusted HDI and the Gender-Inequality Index not only allow an insightful comparison of countries but, more especially, show how inequalities exist among the populations within that country. This picture certainly presents several policy implications about how governments can, in fact, not only improve their HDIs or Gender Index, but also respond to the need for a more equitable distribution of development across genders, ethnic groups, and rural and urban communities. On the other hand, the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) was developed in order to better describe the nature of poverty amongst populations apart from the traditionally accepted income-based poverty measurements. With the MPI, the incidence of poverty and its intensity of deprivations on people can be seen and compared with other countries and within groups and locations in that same country. While the MPI attempts a more comprehensive image of poor people, it is, nevertheless, limited. For one, it includes only 109 countries in its evaluation due to lack of available data from other countries. Another missing component is that the MPI is not able to

25

Ibid. For more discussion on the controversies behind the introduction of the political freedom index, see ul Haq (1995: 67–69).

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33

illustrate the level of empowerment of the poor, which should include both the empowerment of men and women and their political freedom. Further discussion on the updated HDI that includes the Freedom Index, Gender Index and other measurements in relation to the case of Mindanao is not included in this study. The basis for sustainable human development is instead mainly drawn from the Human Development Report of 2005 and other similar reports that attempted to discuss human development within the context of conflict, such as in the case of Mindanao. While the HDI does provide adequate rationale on the many issues that fuel the conflict, the study, however, uses the framework of sustainable human development (SHD) in general (beyond HDI) to build its arguments on the need to bring SHD closer to the framework of peacebuilding and post-conflict development. The context of SHD in the Mindanao setting is discussed in the next section.

2.2.3

Sustainable Human Development and Mindanao

The work towards sustainable human development becomes more tricky for countries in conflict as it faces more structural obstacles in society – the roots of the conflict to begin with. Therefore, in the mission of achieving sustainable human development, it is highly important to constantly pursue its direct correlation and impact in building a parallel path to a sustainable peace way beyond the peace agreement stage. In Mindanao’s case, sustainable human development should be defined as the building of resources and capacities for the conflict-affected communities, taking into account the distinct needs – social, cultural, religious, historical, environmental, economic – and political aspirations of this unique Bangsamoro society. And since the Mindanao case is a story of self-determination and identity conflict, it is crucial that any development should be firmly founded to respond to their goals of freedom and self-preservation. It is a well-accepted norm among the international community that any development efforts in conflict areas are only initiated upon the intervention mode of “peace-first, development next.”26 This became a dilemma for agencies such as the World Bank and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) when they first considered programmes for the conflict areas in Mindanao in 2003 and in 2005 respectively.27 During that time, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines

26

Overton (2000–2011). In September 2003, the Philippine government requested the World Bank to set-up a multi-donor trust fund that could start work on the rehabilitation and development of the conflict-affected areas. This resulted in a Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) conducted in 2004 and completed in 2005. Meanwhile, the Japanese government has been undertaking consultations on its plan to take part in the ongoing peace process between the GRP and the MILF since 2005. Finally, upon some initial assessment as a result of the Consolidation for Peace Seminar 1 for Mindanao and Aceh, organized by the Research and Education for Peace-Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM) and JICA in

27

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(GRP)–Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Process was calling for the participation of the donor community in starting some rehabilitation and development work in Mindanao, despite the non-completion of the peace negotiations. However, other governments and agencies like the United States government and the European Union community maintain their policy of funding only upon the signing of a peace agreement between the parties.28 Nevertheless, both the WB and, later on, JICA realized the need to support the ongoing process through their development programme. They understood that they should start as early as possible in order to further build the confidence of the parties. It was also clear that the prevailing humanitarian and rehabilitation needs of the communities that were destroyed by the armed violence in the years 2000 and 2003 in the Central Mindanao area can no longer wait. Therefore, in 2006, the World Bank commenced its Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconstruction and Development Programme (MTF-RDP) with additional investments from the governments of Canada, Australia, Sweden and New Zealand. The programme aimed to “support economic and social recovery and promote inclusive and effective governance in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao.”29 Concretely, it supported the capacity-building needs of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) as the agency mandated by the GRP-MILF in their 2001 agreement on the rehabilitation and development of the conflict-affected areas. On the other hand, JICA joined the International Monitoring Team (IMT) in late 2006 and focused its involvement on socio-economic monitoring. Eventually, the Japanese government, through JICA, further invested in a socio-economic programme study and planning work aptly called Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development for the Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (SERD-CAAM) in 2007, with the BDA as its partner. The Philippine Human Development Report of 2005 (HDN and UNDP) presents the multifaceted ways on how human development is closely linked with the armed conflict in the Philippines. It states:

January 2006, the Japanese government officially announced its involvement in Mindanao on that same year. On the other hand, the United Nations, through its UNDP, is not yet fully engaged in the GRP-MILF peace process. They, however, continue to operate their Act for Peace Programme as part of the GRP-MNLF post-conflict development implementation. 28 As a result, both USAID and EU contributed to the World Bank Mindanao Trust Fund-Reconstruction and Development Programme (MTF-RDP). While the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Philippines do have the experience of post-conflict development in its Act for Peace Programme for the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) communities, it was agreed upon among these international agencies that, for the MILF peace process, it is the World Bank that will take the lead in initiating development programming for the MILF communities. 29 See the World Bank Website on MTF-RDP General Information, at: http://siteresources. worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPSOCDEV/Resources/MTFRDPGeneralInformation.pdf and the news on BDA partnership.

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The incidence of income poverty does not ‘predict’ the frequency of armed conflict across provinces. Neither do aggregate measures of income of inequality. Measures of deprivation – such as disparities in access to reliable water supply, electricity, and especially education – however, do predict the occurrence of armed encounters.30

Many studies on Mindanao and similar self-determination/identity conflicts clearly show that it is this sense of deprivation among neglected constituencies that fuels the rationale for armed rebellion. The state’s response of pacifying this type of rebellion through developmental projects continues to fail, as indicated by the persistence and escalation of the conflict. A World Bank Human Development Report similarly evaluated the state of human development in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and identified three critical factors that contribute to the inadequacy of human development: extreme poverty, conflict, and historical disadvantage. It explains how the region’s history of conflict has resulted in the “absence of the institutional, human, and social capital that is so essential to human development.”31 In summary, the report concludes that “finally, no strategy for human development would be complete without a call for a humane and permanent resolution of the ongoing conflict in the region.”32 Therefore, it is on this ground that this study is aimed at finding how development or post-conflict development (as in the case of Mindanao) can be built as part of peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

2.3

Peace and Peacebuilding

Peace and peacebuilding are defined as process-structures. Lederach defines process-structures in terms of understanding the characteristics of circular and linear motions in a phenomenon. He illustrates this by describing how ‘change’ itself is taking place in a circular and linear motion that produces adaptability and purpose towards an ‘end.’ Inherent to a circle, ‘change’ continuously moves forward and backward and going to a full circle while it further continues to spiral leading towards a straight line – as the ‘end’ (Lederach 2003: 40–47). Similarly, in this inquiry, the idea of peacebuilding is presented both as a means and a dynamic goal in itself. This research defines peacebuilding as a process that brings about constructive transformation of a conflict situation in a manner that is comprehensive, creative, sustainable, and utilizing peaceful means. Peacebuilding

30

See Balisacan (2005: ix). See “Executive Summary”, Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Manila: The World Bank Human Development Sector Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region, November 2003). 32 Ibid. 31

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envisages a process which brings dynamic change to conflict situations and an end in which relationships, coupled with justice and equity, are of the greatest value.33 In application, the workings of peace processes follow some predictable stages – from ceasefire to peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace agreement, post-conflict development and reconciliation. However, these stages are not static but are instead very dynamic. Although the signing of a peace agreement should somewhat signal the start of a transition from conflict to peace, and specifically to post-conflict development, the most crucial work of constant peacebuilding takes place between these periods. Peacebuilding, then, is the glue that binds all these peace processes and involves all the horizontal and vertical actors and stakeholders.

2.3.1

Definitions and Meanings of Peace

In a review of the history of peace studies, Michael Howard cites some important issues in defining peace. First, he emphasizes the basis for personal peace in pursuing the greater goal of societal peace. He states: “one’s capacity to achieve a degree of personal tranquillity and balance and calm is an essential prerequisite, I would suggest, to an ability to create peaceful social relations” (Howard 1987). He acknowledges the generally accepted definition of peace that not only involves the absence of war but also includes advocacy against any kind of oppression – the two conditions alluding to negative and positive peace respectively. Moreover, he explains that the aim of peace is to create and maintain a society living in order and justice, where conflicts are resolved peacefully through generally accepted norms such as the rule of law or reconciliation. However, he also brings up the dilemma of the values of order and justice. He asks, “how much injustice to tolerate for the sake of order and how much disorder can we accept to be used in provoking the interest of justice.”34 While peace is dialectical by nature or can only be viewed in its absence, Webel (2007: 9), on the other hand, implores that conflict is not the antithesis of peace Instead, it is violence or the threat of violence that is deemed as its opposite. In line with Johan Galtung’s concept of violence as direct, structural and cultural, it is to this triangular model that peace and peacebuilding must be directed (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 10–11). While conflict is widely deemed as natural social phenomena resulting from the incompatible goals of two or more actors, it is the reality and possibilities of violence that make peace a very compelling response to conflict. While conflict is viewed as a positive or negative change, the field of peace studies 33 In Lederach (1997), Galtung (2000, 2002), Kamarulzaman (2005), and Cockell, in “Peacebuilding and Human Security Frameworks for International Responses to Internal Conflict” in Peter Wallensteen (ed.), Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges, Report No. 48, (Uppsala, Sweden: Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Uppsala University, 1998). 34 Ibid.

2.3 Peace and Peacebuilding

Contradiction

37

Structural violence

Attitude Behaviour Cultural Direct violence violence

Peacebuilding

Peace making

Peace keeping

Fig. 2.2 Galtung’s models of conflict, violence and peace. Source Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Third Edition, 2011, p. 10

and conflict resolution both reiterate the more important ways in dealing with it – in a constructive and peaceful way. Scholars like Johan Galtung (and his Transcend Group) and John Lederach have been known to build on this precept of “peace by peaceful means.” This precept is founded on the need to respond to the consequences of conflict – the episodes of violence. It is, then, this phenomenon of violence – be it direct, structural, or cultural – that the field of peace studies is studying and intervening with. In dissecting what peace is and is not, it is Galtung’s definition of negative and positive peace that greatly contributed to this understanding. Negative peace means that while there is an absence of war and other direct violence within a society, there is a presence of conflict as manifested in discord in society and a pervasive sense of injustice and inequity. On the other side of negative peace is what is called positive peace. Positive peace is defined as a situation where these injustices and inequities within a society are overcome and responded to. Looking at the Galtung model in Fig. 2.2, negative peace is founded or built on the vertex of direct violence while positive peace covers the vertices of structural and cultural violence. On the other hand, scholars do take note that negative peace is not to be viewed negatively, especially since, in reality, many if not all of our societies possess this kind of peace, and positive peace in itself can also be a debatable point of view (tregarding who are exploited and the exploiters) (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 11–12). Nevertheless, Galtung’s definition of negative and positive peace lays the foundation of what societies are aspiring for. As Galtung and many other scholars also view the fact that conflict or contradiction is constantly moving or dynamic, so should be the interventions of peace and peacebuilding that need to transform societies for the better (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 11–12). Further, positive peace becomes a constant challenge and never an absolute end that is finitely achievable. Yet, it is both negative and positive peace that humanity seeks. Therefore, peace is generally defined as not only the absence of war and direct violence but also includes the more important removal of structural and cultural violence in a society.

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As Galtung identifies the three types of violence that emerge from contradiction/ conflict situations, he enumerates how these forms of violence should be responded to when helping to build a peace infrastructure as follows: • direct acts of violence should be countered by support for peace and conflict transformation, such as dialogue, active non-violence struggle, and refusal to surrender to or allow injustices, oppression, and violence/cruelty to take place; • structures that provide for the needs of all members of a community, providing opportunities for individuals and groups to develop to their full potential, not exploiting, oppressing, or denying rights to any one or group of individuals; and • cultures of peace which promote peace as a value, which respect and celebrate differences and which protect/promote the political, civil, social, economic and cultural rights of all individuals, communities and groups, and which are inclusive (by choice and dialogue rather than by force) rather than exclusive in vision.35 While Galtung presents the conflict triangle composed of elements of contradiction, behaviour, and attitude (and as points of intervention or transformation), Lederach (1997) makes use of the Curle matrix that describes conflict as “a progression”, reinforcing his idea that peacebuilding roles and activities can be located throughout the various stages of this conflict matrix. In describing conflict and violence, it is, then, with more meaning that we understand the rationale of peace as the ability to handle conflict with empathy, non-violence, and creativity.36 A more tangible picture of the achievement of peace within a society is referred to as conditions of peace. Carter (2010: 389) writes, Creating conditions for peace entails a multifaceted approach: reducing the likelihood of conflicts turning into war; providing peaceful means of settling conflict; changing the attitudes that exacerbate conflict between groups and encouraging cooperation; and addressing fundamental social injustices.

Apart from defining peace based on overcoming direct, structural, and cultural violence, the writings of Adam Curle on peaceful and unpeaceful relationships can also be deemed important in relation to the further understanding of peace. Curle views Galtung’s conceptualization of violence as “unpeaceful relations” that consequently result in the deprivation of people’s full human development and their potential (Curle 1971: 1–2). Tom Woodhouse reiterates Curle’s view on how: …he should see peace broadly in terms of human development rather than as a set of ‘peace-enforcing’ rules and organizations. The quest for peace is not solely a quest for appropriate structures and organizations which are only means to human ends; there is also

35 Galtung, Johan, Jacobsen, Carl G. and Brand-Jacobsen, Kai Frithjof, Searching for Peace, The Road to Transcend (London, Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2000, 2002). 36 The Transcend Group led by Johan Galtung espouses a basic formula for peace by peaceful means, transforming attitudes through empathy, behaviour through non-violence/peace struggle, and contradiction through creativity. For more discussions on this philosophy, see Galtung et al. (2000, 2002: 16–24).

2.3 Peace and Peacebuilding

Unpeaceful relations 3. Negotiation

Balanced power

Fig. 2.3 Transforming asymmetric conflicts. Source Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Third Edition, 2011, p. 25

39

Unbalanced power

1. Conscientization

Latent conflict

Peaceful relations 4. Peaceful development

2. Confrontation Overt conflict

room in peace research to identify the kinds of social structures which enhance rather than restrain or even suppress human potential.37

Curle’s matrix of peaceful and unpeaceful relationships was later added to Lederach’s conceptual framework where peace interventions are located in the transformation of asymmetric conflicts (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 24–25). In Fig. 2.3, a peaceful development is located where there is a balanced power and peaceful relations between the actors in an asymmetric conflict. This illustration, therefore, also can be viewed as the meeting point of both negative and positive peace dimensions. In an asymmetrical conflict “the root of the conflict lies not in particular issues or interests that may divide the parties, but in the very structure of who they are and the relationships between them. It may be that this structure of roles and relationships cannot be changed without conflict”.38 In many cases, identity and right to self-determination (RSD) conflicts are asymmetrical conflicts since they are rooted on this imbalance of power structures within their societies that impel groups to assert their rights. These groups pursue a re-structuring of such an unjust and inequitable relationship with the majority or with those who have more power and influence. The right to self-determination struggle by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fits very well into this asymmetrical conflict. In his seminal work on Why Men Rebel, Ted Gurr emphasizes that “…mass revolutionary and secessionist movements are likely to develop if discontent is widespread and intense among both elite and mass, the result of

Woodhouse, T., “Adam Curle: Radical Peacemaker and Pioneer of Peace Studies”, in Journal of Conflictology, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (2010), (Spain: Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, 2010): 4; at: http:// www.uoc.edu/ojs/index.php/journal-of-conflictology/article/view/vol1iss1-woodhouse (5 November 2011). 38 Ibid., p. 24. 37

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relative or absolute deteriorations of many conditions of social existence” (Gurr 1970: 343). This relative or absolute deterioration of many conditions of social existence among the Bangsamoro people is what is being felt as their social reality in relation to the Christian majority who are now the dominant power and influence in Mindanao. Kamarulzaman Askandar and Ayesah Abubakar connect the MILF struggle to Curle’s theories wherein they say: The MILF has no qualms about turning this revolutionary war into an armed conflict. That they have acted violently as a reaction to their perceived enemies and invaders is deemed normal under this revolutionary war circumstance. Adam Curle noted that this is part of the process of pushing for change – transforming a perceived unbalanced situation. It involves a process of “conscientization” and of “confrontation” before a balanced situation can be achieved (Curle 1971). 39

Upon review of Fig. 2.3, the conflict and its corresponding peace process is a manifestation of how relations and balance of power are achieved as a means to an end that is peace. In conclusion, this study defines peace by taking into account the various points discussed by the various schools of thought. Peace is defined as a condition in a society where conflict is viewed as part of social change and handled with empathy, non-violence and creativity. Peace is achieved through the transformation of structures of violence into peaceful structures in which the relationships of peoples are founded on social justice. The ultimate goal of peace is to build an environment in which people can fulfil their full human development potentials. The discussion on how peace or sustainable peace is achieved continues in the next section, where the concepts and framework of peacebuilding and its process are presented.

2.3.2

Peacebuilding Concepts and Framework

Peacebuilding is mainly defined as a point of engagement wherein conflict actors and stakeholders re-define their relationships into one that has increased awareness of their conflict situation and what drives it and towards an acceptance of a common responsibility towards cooperation with a view to building and sustaining durable peace. The idea of peacebuilding is described as “the foundation of bringing people and groups in conflict together.”40 John Paul Lederach asserts that peacebuilding should reinforce the peacemaking process and move it to a higher desired state of

Askandar, Kamarulzaman, and Abubakar, Ayesah, “Foreword”, in Mastura, Datu Michael, Bangsamoro Quest: The Birth of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Penang: SEACSN and REPUSM, 2012): xii–xiii. 40 See Askandar, Kamarulzaman, “Peacebuilding in Southeast Asia: Overview, Observations, and the Way Forward”, in The Official Newsletter of the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network Bulletin, January–June 2005 (Penang: SEACSN, 2005), pp. 26–27. 39

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eventual reconciliation.41 He explains reconciliation as the meeting point of “truth and mercy” and “justice and peace”. Truth pertains to acknowledgement, transparency, revelation, and clarity of the conflict issues, while mercy speaks of the acceptance, forgiveness, support, compassion and healing among the conflict parties. On the other hand, justice deals with the issues of equality, right relationships, making things right, and restitution needed by the conflict parties and stakeholders, while peace refers to the attainment of harmony, unity, well-being, security and respect by all parties and stakeholders (Lederach 1997: 27–29). In dissecting the framework of peacebuilding, some of the basic concepts had their origins in John Paul Lederach’s work. Among them is the concept of the actors and approaches to peacebuilding (see Fig. 2.4). He identified the three types of actors or levels of leadership in a society with which approaches to peacebuilding would also vary. However, among these levels, it is the middle-range leadership that is regarded as key in bringing about the link between the grass roots and the top leadership (Lederach 1997: 38–55). Another basic concept is the time dimension in peacebuilding. Lederach explains how peacebuilding approaches should be defined as an immediate action (2–6 months), short-range planning (1–2 years), decade thinking (5–10 years), and generational vision (20+ years). In building an integrated peacebuilding framework, Lederach combines this time dimension with Marie Dugan’s nested paradigm of conflict foci. This nested paradigm of conflict foci illustrates the narrow to broader aspects of conflict resolution and peacebuilding – from the issue to relationship to subsystem to system. By using these two concepts, Lederach appropriated the various levels of responses vis-à-vis the timeframe activity (Fig. 2.5). It is through this integrated framework of peacebuilding that Lederach demonstrates the effective practice of peacebuilding (Lederach 1995: 11–22). On the other hand, the dominant top-down approach in peacebuilding (explained in the next section) has also been opposed by Lederach’s concept of peacebuilding from below, which emphasizes the need for local ownership, indigeneity, and participation of the actors at grass-roots level. Similarly, an earlier work by Adam Curle also cited how “…it is essential to consider the peacemaking potential within the conflicting communities themselves” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 235). It is this peacebuilding concept that has constantly drawn civil society groups to empower themselves in the process. However, Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 236) argue that the peacebuilding from below concept can also be problematic in itself, since communities inherently bear power asymmetry, patriarchy and other structures in society that can be obstacles to peacebuilding. Therefore, they put forward a

In an earlier work of Lederach, he mentions the four paradoxes of peacemaking – personal and systemic transformation, justice and mercy, process and outcome, and empowerment and interdependence. He explains, however, that these seeming paradoxes are, in fact, key to shaping a “transformative peacemaking” that is “based on understanding fair, respectful, and inclusive process as a way of life and envisions outcome as a commitment to increasing justice, seeking truth and healing relationships”. See Lederach, John Paul, Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformations Across Cultures (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995), pp. 11–22.

41

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Fig. 2.4 Actors and approaches to peacebuilding. Source Lederach (1997: 39)

peacebuilding redefinition based on a transformative cosmopolitan model. This model “exemplifies a model of global governance where a cosmopolitan human rights agenda is consistent with the communitarian defence of political autonomy and cultural diversity” (Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 237). In this context, peacebuilding is viewed not only as “top-down” and “peacebuilding from below” but is also aimed at creating synergy and harmonization of local and universal values that should help in the attainment of sustainable peace. The peacebuilding process is also a process of conflict transformation from a state of conflict to a state of peace (see Fig. 2.5 – an integrated framework for peacebuilding, which locates conflict transformation in the subsystem level of response, during the preparation, training and design of social change time frames). Lederach gives four dimensions in conflict transformation, namely the personal, relational, structural, and cultural. Similarly, Raimo Väyrynen enumerates five transformers, namely context, structural, actor, issue, and personal.42 These transformers slightly vary in terms of scope but all of them share the same foundations: 42

For more discussions on conflict transformers by Lederach, see Lederach (1997: 81–85); and on conflict transformers by Väyrynen, see Miall, Hugh, “Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task”, in Austin, Alex, Fischer, Martina, Ropers, Norbert (eds.), Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook (Germany: VS Verlag Fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2004): 77–79.

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Fig. 2.5 An integrated framework for peacebuilding. Source Lederach (1997) with modifications, p. 80

that what needs to be transformed are the unbalanced relationships, distribution of power and resources, and the polarization of perspectives and images of “the other.” Lederach and Väyrynen’s dimensions and types of transformers in conflict transformation are presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Conflict transformation addresses the issue of social justice by taking the view that conflict is an agent for positive change (Reimann 2004: 54). Cordula Reimann defines conflict transformation as: … an open-ended, long-term, multi-track and dynamic process, which significantly widens the scope of actors involved. It effectively combines Track I, II and III activities along the continuum of short, middle, and long-term involvement. It is thus likely to engage a wide variety of actors, including: official, military and political leaders (Track I); informal conflict resolution experts, INGOs, and NGOs working in conflict resolution assistance (Track II); grass-roots, indigenous NGOs providing development cooperation and humanitarian assistance (Track III). …As far as outcomes are concerned, conflict transformation aims to achieve a settlement of substantive issues raised by the needs and fears of the conflict parties. This has two elements: first, a process orientation approach emphasizing the need to change the mutually negative conflict attitudes and values among parties in order to increase cooperation and communication between them; second, a change-orientated approach stressing the political imperative to create a new infrastructure for empowerment and recognition of

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Table 2.1 Dimensions of conflict transformation. Source Adapted from Lederach (1997) Dimension

Descriptive

Prescriptive

Personal, refers to the changes affected in and desired for the individual

Transformation suggests that individuals are affected by conflict both negatively and positively – for example, in terms of their physical well-being, self-esteem, emotional stability, capacity to perceive accurately, and spiritual integrity Transformation refers to the effects of conflict on relational patterns of communication and interaction. It looks beyond the tension around visible issues to the underlying changes produced by conflict in the patterns of how people perceive themselves, one another, and the conflict itself, and in their hopes for their future relationship: how close or distant; how interdependent, how reactive or proactive a role to play, what the other party will want Transformation refers to the analysis of social conditions that gives rise to the conflict and the way that conflict affects change in existing decision-making structures and patterns

Transformation represents deliberate intervention to minimize the destructive effects of social conflict and maximize its potentialities for personal growth at physical, emotional, and spiritual levels

Relational dimension depicts the changes affected in and desired for the relationship

Structural dimension highlights the underlying causes of the conflict and the patterns and changes it brings about in social structures. At times understood as the “content” or “substance” of a conflict, the structural dimension may encompass issues such as basic human needs, access to resources, and institutional patterns of decision making

Cultural dimension refers to the changes produced by conflict in the cultural patterns of a group, and to the ways that culture affects the development and handling of conflict

Transformation is interested in how conflict affects and changes the cultural patterns of a group, and how those accumulated and shared patterns affect the way people in that setting understand and respond to conflict

Transformation represents intentional intervention that minimizes poorly functioning communication and maximizes mutual understanding, and that brings to the surface the relational fears, hopes and goals of the people involved in terms of affectivity and interdependence

Transformation represents deliberate intervention to provide an insight into the underlying causes and social conditions that create and foster violent expressions of conflict and to openly promote non-violent mechanisms that reduce adversariness, minimize and ultimately eliminate violence, and foster structures that meet basic human needs (substantive justice) and maximize participation of people in decisions that affect them (procedural justice) Transformation seeks to understand the cultural patterns that contribute to the rise of violent expressions of conflict, and to identify, promote, and build on the resources and mechanisms within a cultural setting for constructively responding to and handling conflict

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Table 2.2 Transformers of conflict. Source Miall (2004) Type

Examples

Context transformations Structure transformations Actor transformations Issue transformations

Change in the international or regional environment

Personal/elite transformations

Change from asymmetric to symmetric relations; change in power structures; changes of markets of violence Changes of leadership; changes of goals, intra-party change; change in party’s constituencies; changing actors Transcendence of contested issues; constructive compromise; changing issues; de-linking or re-linking of issues Changes in perspectives; changes of heart; changes of will; gestures of conciliation

underprivileged groups, thus fostering and enabling social justice. In short, the satisfaction of basic needs on the personal and relational levels will not be sufficient. Rather, practitioners must work to achieve equal access to resources and assemble the infrastructure that will make it possible to address structural inequalities with the aim of longer-term societal reconstruction and reconciliation. To define a successful outcome is more difficult under the conflict transformation approach that it was in the simpler cases of conflict settlement and resolution. For peace is now defined in positive terms. Forms of negative peace must be transcended as the diverse forms of structural and cultural violence are successively addressed. This will require, for many contemporary protracted conflicts, nothing less than a root-and-branch transformation of social relationships and social structures (Reimann 2004: 54–55).

In assessing the definition and concepts in peacebuilding, this section concludes with the study’s own conceptual framework of peacebuilding in relation to the achievement of peace or sustainable peace. Peacebuilding is described as a process of conflict transformation wherein multiple stakeholders (of various levels – horizontal and vertical) are engaged to increase their understanding of the violent structures that breed conflict, build their capacity and skills in conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and bring about various avenues of cooperation that would allow them to constructively change from asymmetric to symmetric structures and relationships. Peacebuilding is related to the sustainable human development concept because it carries the same goal of bringing about the full human development potentials of communities and individuals through a process of social change and transformation and without the use of coercion and violence. Peacebuilding should also be comprehensive by including the attainment of reconciliation among peoples.

2.3.3

Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution

Peacebuilding as a programme or strategy is categorized into two types: first, peacebuilding as post-conflict peacebuilding or international peacebuilding that is applied in the event of an end of violence and the implementation of a peace

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agreement as part of a peace process; and second, peacebuilding as an intervention aimed at responding to the structural violence or the roots of the conflict and thereby creating structural change within the society that will build on both negative and positive peace (Jayme-Montiel 2010: 360). The first type can also be described as institutional peacebuilding, while the latter can be called conflict transformation.43 Peacebuilding can be viewed as part of the multi-disciplinary field of conflict resolution. Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 199) argued: Peacebuilding…comes from the peace research and conflict resolution tradition. It is most succinctly characterized as the project of overcoming structural and cultural violence (conflict transformation), in conjunction with peacemaking between conflict parties (conflict settlement) and peacekeeping (conflict containment).

On the other hand, conflict resolution has evolved as an area of study and practice of reducing, if not totally resolving, the conflict between intra-state or inter-state actors.44 Both fields of conflict resolution and peace studies (including peacebuilding) overlap at some points since they borrow many theoretical foundations from each other.45 However, the rationale of conflict resolution came closer to the aims of peacebuilding and sustainable human development (SHD) when linked to human needs theory as the basis of conflict resolution by John Burton. Although there is no mention of either peacebuilding or SHD in Burton’s work, his ideas do correspond to these concepts. Burton’s work on The Conflict Series was founded on the human needs theory that posits that the sources of social conflict originate from humankind’s universal and unsatisfied basic needs, particularly the need for identity. It should then be the goal of conflict resolution to study these needs and to understand how to fulfil them. Burton also emphasizes that the field of conflict resolution should put humankind at the centre of its problem-solving approach instead of solely looking at organizations and institutions as the point of analysis. He reasons that it is mainly individuals and groups, or societies at large, that should be focused on as a point of analysis.46

43

Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 199). See also peacebuilding as part of an institutional adjustment in Jeong, Ho-Won, Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies (USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005): 1–3. 44 In this study, conflict resolution is defined according to inter-state and intra-state conflicts, although the history of this field involves a very wide area that includes peacemaking, mediation and arbitration, conciliation and dialogue, labour management, problem-solving workshops, alternative dispute resolution, de-escalation and confidence-building measures, among many others. For a historical background of the development of this field, see the article by Kriesberg, Louis, “Conflict Resolution: An Overview”, in Young, Nigel J., The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace (UK & US: Oxford University Press, 2010). 45 Crews, Robin, “Conflict Resolution, Peace Research, Studies, and Activism”; and Miall, Hugh, “Conflict Studies Versus Peace Studies”, in Young, Nigel J., The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace (UK & US: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 440–445. 46 See various chapters of Burton, John, Conflict: Human Needs Theory (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1990).

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Taking into account the definition of peacebuilding as a set of activities that will transform a conflict situation to a more peaceful situation, sustainable human development, in this same vein, must also transform a conflict from an insecure and dependent/non self-reliant community to one that is more peaceful, secure, and self-reliant. In effect, the end goals of both peacebuilding and sustainable human development are the same – a peaceful, dynamic, secure and self-reliant community. There are many peacebuilding initiatives by civil society in conflict areas like Mindanao and Aceh. These activities continue to operate in divided societies.47 Kamarulzaman Askandar enumerates some recommendations for peacebuilding (that also define the framework itself) in South East Asia: (1) The acknowledgement of peacebuilding as a foundation of conflict resolution and peacemaking; (2) The need to balance the internal and external interests of all stakeholders, including peace workers and donor agencies; (3) The need for capacity building for civil society involved in peacebuilding; (4) Identifying priorities like peace or justice among conflict stakeholders; (5) Defining what is more effective between enforcement of available institutions or the employment of institutional building as a locally-owned process; and (6) A much-needed focus on reforms on institutions, social and economic development.48 Among these recommendations, it is important to note that the facet of internal and external interests/actors is included. While the earlier section did mention this contrasting approach of top-down peacebuilding, peacebuilding from below and the synthesizing cosmopolitan model of peacebuilding, this facet should be emphasized as it is often viewed as one of the problematic areas related to local ownership. This is further explained in Sect. 2.4. An example of a peacebuilding programme and strategy in the context of South East Asia is the annual meeting of stakeholders from Aceh, Mindanao, and Southern Thailand in the Consolidation for Peace (COP) Program of the Research and Education for Peace, Universiti Sains Malaysia. The COP is a platform for dialogue among various interest groups in the conflict-affected areas, including the main actors themselves.49 This COP can also be described as a conflict resolution

See Askandar (2005: 22–23); also Askandar, Kamarulzaman, “Introduction”, in Building Peace: Reflections from Southeast Asia (Penang: SEACSN, 2007). See also Lederach (1997: 18–19). 48 Ibid., Askandar (2005). 49 The Consolidation for Peace Program involves the main actors and other stakeholders in the case of the Mindanao and the Aceh Groups. However, in the case of Southern Thailand, mostly civil society groups have been involved. The programme not only provides an internal dialogue among the stakeholders within the conflict area, but also offers a venue for sharing their learnings with similar groups. For more information on the COP, see unpublished proceedings from the period of 2007–2012, The Consolidation for Peace Program (Penang: REPUSM/SEACSN). This kind of group dynamic has been recognized by Curle as part of the contribution of citizen peacemaking in 47

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strategy wherein it becomes a Track II of a peace process.50 One of the outputs of the COP is the consensus among the stakeholders of the three conflict-affected communities that in a conflict regarding right to self-determination (RSD), the following are identified as vital areas of peacebuilding: • • • • • • • •

Community participation and capacity building Establishment of conflict resolution and public dialogue mechanisms Enforcement of justice and rule of law Strengthening of institutions and institution building Good governance Promotion and enforcement of human rights Reconciliation programme Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Demilitarization, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) • Peace education • Social and economic developments.51

These areas fall under the various conflict transformation dimensions/ transformers as enumerated by Lederach and Väyrynen. While these areas are distinct in interventions, it has to be noted that in practice and outcomes, they are all interdependent. Again, this illustrates the wide scope of work and actors involved in the process of peacebuilding and conflict transformation.

2.3.4

International Peacebuilding and Post-conflict Development

International peacebuilding, also known as post-conflict peacebuilding, came about as a result of the United Nations institutionalization of its interventions in countries

his article, “New Challenges for Citizen Peacemaking”, in Medicine and War, Vol. 10:2, pp. 96– 105 (UK: Routledge, 1994). Also, the ideas on initiatives such as the COP as an important platform are discussed in Curle’s work, Making Peace (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971), Part II – The Practice of Peacemaking. 50 See the discussions on Track II diplomacy, like problem-solving workshops, as part of the multi-track conflict resolution, in Ramsbotham et al. (2011: 25–30). Also discussed in Mitchell, Christopher, 2001, From Controlled Communication to Problem Solving: The Origins of Facilitated Conflict Resolution, in The International Journal of Peace Studies, Vol. 6, Number 1, ISSN 1085-7494; at: http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol6_1/Mitchell2.htm, accessed 20 July 2012. Earlier discussion can be found in Curle, Adam (1994), “New Challenges for Citizen Peacemaking”, Medicine and War, Vol. 10:2 (UK: Routledge); and Curle, Adam (1971), Making Peace (London: Tavistock Publications). 51 See Kamarulzaman, A. and Abubakar, A. (eds.), Proceedings of the Consolidation for Peace Seminar 2: Building Sustainable Peace in Aceh, Mindanao and Southern Thailand, 2008 (SEACSN: Penang); and Peace for Mindanao, 2009 (Penang: SEACSN), pp. 9–11.

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that have emerged from armed conflict and civil wars. The former United Nations Secretary, General Kofi Annan, defined peacebuilding as “actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation.”52 Similarly, Roland Paris follows the above definition but elucidates that beyond the goal of international peacebuilding to stabilize countries from their experience of violence and conflict, it is also effectively promoting the idea of how states as a political unit should be, as founded on the principles of liberal democracy and a market-orientated economy.53 The concept of international peacebuilding has been institutionalized through the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission at the United Nations, therefore its definition has mainly followed the interventions that the UN undertakes as part of their brand of peacebuilding. These interventions include peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction, DDR, protecting and resettling refugees and IDPs, and various humanitarian and developmental activities that are needed by a post-conflict society. The UN Department of Political Affairs states that: Effective peacebuilding also requires concurrent and integrated action on many different fronts: military, diplomatic, political, economic, social, humanitarian, and the many imponderables that go to make up a coherent and stable social fabric. These efforts range from demilitarization to building up national institutions, including police and judicial systems; promoting human rights; monitoring elections; encouraging formal and informal processes of political participation; providing sustainable resources of livelihood to demobilized combatants and returning refugees and displaced persons, through training programmes, the reactivation of the economy and the provision of social services; and stimulating the normal process of economic and social development which will benefit the population as a whole and provide the most secure basis for lasting peace (Cutter 2005: 780).

With the above definition, peacebuilding has become a be-all and end-all intervention of the international community in post-conflict countries. This complexity of meaning is something that needs to be deconstructed, as asserted by Tobias Denskus. He observes how the definitions of peacebuilding have ranged from its goals, values and principles, and operational requirements to frameworks contested by scholars and practitioners alike (Denskus 2010: 236–238). It is, however, clear that the transition of post-conflict countries or societies to

Annan, Kofi (1998), “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Peace in Africa”, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, par. 63. 53 Paris likens international peacebuilding to a “mission civilisatrice” or a mission by the European imperial powers in the colonial era of carrying out their duty to civilize other populations and territories. Although he is very critical of how peacebuilding can be used for various interests of richer countries on the poorer ones, he, however, makes it clear that there is no basis for saying that richer countries profit from their peacebuilding activities. In the end, he concludes that peacebuilding remains a noble agenda of ensuring an international system that affirms the state as a political unit – see Paris, Roland, “International peacebuilding and the mission civilisatrice”, Review of International Studies (2002), 28, 637–656 (UK: British International Studies Association, 2002). 52

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normalization is brought together in the form of peacebuilding wherein all other developments (not only socio-economic development but all aspects of development in the areas of politics, security and military aspects, economy and industry, justice system, and institutions and processes that would lead to peace consolidation and nation building) that follow are part of the general post-conflict development that should occur therein. In the practical sense, development programmes and activities carried out in post-conflict situations are categorized as post-conflict development. Post-conflict development is also understood as a stage in the peace process when an agreement has been signed by the conflict parties, who are now preparing for its implementation. A huge portion of this would be in the area of reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of a conflict area. Post-conflict development presents many challenges distinct from the usual development strategy or approach because it deals with the move towards normalization of a conflict area. Scholars and practitioners have recognized the dynamics of development organizations according to various viewpoints. Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren illustrate this difference between organizations involved in conflict resolution, humanitarian, and development agencies (Junne/Verkoren 2005: 4, Table 1.1). They explain how the politics of development which heavily pertains to economic development presents some inadequacies that fail to address the possible root causes of the conflict, or worse, can perpetrate more conflict in the process. Further, in understanding the basic needs of communities, they make use of an analysis of different priorities for societies where individually-orientated societies have ‘self-fulfilment’ as a first priority while group-orientated societies have ‘honour’ as their first priority.54 These societies are best described as a normal society and an abnormal or conflict-ridden society, respectively. And this is where the perspective on post-conflict development is required to be more holistic and relevant to the situation. Verkoren takes the case of Cambodia’s 1991 Peace Accord, when post-conflict did not result in the absence of fighting and violence among conflict parties. The influx of donor money to Cambodia and the donor agencies’ various efforts proved to be a failure due to the inability to address the key issues important to the country’s effective development. These issues were reconciliation, demobilization, reintegration of soldiers into society, and the re-establishment of confidence in the government and judiciary institutions. In this case, sustainable development and peace are continuously at risk with the absence of conflict management mechanisms that can prevent the escalation of conflicts to violent manifestations.55

54

Ibid., as cited by Junne and Verkoren, p. 10. This is discussed in several parts by Askandar, Kamarulzaman, in the “Introduction”, Building Peace: Reflections from Southeast Asia (Penang: SEACSN, 2007), and in Askandar, Kamarulzaman (ed.), “Rethinking Conflict Management in Southeast Asia”, Management and Conflict Resolution of Inter-State Conflicts in Southeast Asia, (Penang: SEACSN, 2002), pp. xvii– xxxvi.

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In furthering the discussion on the aspects of post-conflict development, the Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (SIDDR), led by Swedish experts, proposes making the DDR process for former combatants an intrinsic element of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict development stages. It is found that the utter neglect of DDR during peace processes in many conflict cases in the world has threatened the sustainability of peace in these areas. DDR programmes are often haphazardly implemented and lack sufficient funding and other resources. The practice of DDR in peace processes is often limited by trade-offs such as the surrender of guns in exchange for monetary compensation and other economic packages. States negotiating with belligerent groups are more concerned with breaking the military resources and structures (the ‘DD’ part) of these groups which immediately result in the cessation of hostilities or negative peace, than in increasing the incentives for their successful reintegration into society at large (the ‘R’ part), which should have a positive peace outcome. On the other hand, experts maintain that in order to effectively tackle DDR, it should cover the four domains of post-conflict reconstruction, namely governance and participation; social and economic well-being; security; and justice and reconciliation.56 It should also undergo two stages of programming in this order: (1) re-insertion or transitional re-integration that includes the immediate needs and concerns of the combatants, transitional justice and reconciliation efforts, and (2) sustainable reintegration as part of the medium- and longer-term development needs of combatants and the corresponding security sector reform and other institutional reforms that will guarantee a more secure, just and equitable environment for all.57 As a good case in point, Mindanao has had its own experience of DDR. The 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) has stipulated a limited disarmament and demobilization of the former MNLF combatants. Amongst them, there were 5,700 who were integrated into the State’s military forces while many others have kept their guns and other armaments. Yet all of the MNLF combatants have been included in the re-integration or economic package programmes initiated by both the Government and the donor agencies through direct livelihood resources and equipment. The involvement of monetary compensation was unclear. Further, this limited DDR was meant for MNLF members exclusively. Some of the former MNLF combatants may have had considerable improvements in their opportunities for livelihood. However, problems remain as most MNLF members and the rest of the Bangsamoro communities in Mindanao

Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration – Background Studies (Sweden: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2005), p. 12; and in various chapters of case studies from around the world in the same book. 57 Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration – Final Report (Sweden: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006), p. 31. 56

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feel insecure and less hopeful of a better future.58 While the GRP contends that it has fully implemented the 1996 FPA, the MNLF asserts its dissatisfaction with the peace process. In a report by the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in June 2006, which the MNLF supports, its findings showed that: Muslims in Southern Philippines, whose population is estimated at 8 to 10 Million, are still living under deteriorating political, economic, and social conditions, which are evident in the extreme backwardness and acute lack of educational and health services. These conditions are in fact due to the central government’s control of natural resources in the Muslim areas, in addition to the political marginalization of Muslims that is manifest in the absence of fair representation in government and judiciary posts. Moreover, military operations have continued, leading to the displacement of more and more Muslims from their villages and towns on top of the continued demographic reengineering that has encouraged the migration of non-Muslims to the south in order to turn the Muslims there into the minority.59

Therefore, the shortcomings of DDR in the context of the 1996 FPA have similarly manifested as crucial pitfalls in making the promise of peace dividends real to the conflict-affected areas or communities in Mindanao. In the past, the SIDDR approached both the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and proposed the initiation of discussions and possible inclusion of DDR in their ongoing peace talks. While the GRP viewed this with enthusiasm, the MILF, on the other hand, was lukewarm on this topic. Instead, the MILF argues that DDR should be deemed irrelevant, especially if any upcoming peace agreement should fully resolve the roots of the conflict and unequivocally guarantee provisions for human security to the Bangsamoro people.60 For many observers in the Mindanao peace process, the discussion of DDR comes at a time when the progress on the peace talks has yet to show immense incentives and guarantees to the MILF and its constituencies. Thus, any talks on a DDR plan are perceived more as a threat and undermining the MILF’s political power in the face of the unfinished peace talks. Another development related to post-conflict development work is the case of the World Bank (WB). The WB has also evolved its expertise from post-conflict reconstruction or post-conflict development to conflict prevention in many parts of

58

Interviews with MNLF members aligned with Chair Nur Misuari and those who are non-aligned with him and now part of the UNDP Act for Peace Programme, located in General Santos and Saranggani areas, June 2008. 59 See “Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Muslims in the Southern Philippines”, in the Report of the Secretary General on Muslim Minorities and Communities in Non-OIC Member States Submitted to the 33rd Session of the International Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan, on 19–21 June 2006. 60 The concept of human security is gaining more acceptance from the international community, in contrast, and as a response, to the traditional view of “state security” in the realm of international politics. Human security is defined as the “freedom from fear and want.”

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world.61 This new approach became very significant as the WB research presented a conclusion that “post-conflict countries face a 44 percent chance of reverting to conflict during the first five years after the onset of peace.”62 The WB’s participation in the rehabilitation and development of the tsunami-wrecked and conflict-devastated Aceh is one that is worth investigating. It fully deployed its Conflict Prevention Unit, which has undertaken various studies and consultations on the ongoing peace process in Aceh (post agreement). It was actively involved in engaging the international community present in Aceh and improving their interventions. However, considering the perceived weakness of the government-created entity, the Bureau of Reintegration Agency (BRA), the WB attempted to address some of these gaps and shortcomings together with other donor agencies by providing programmes that would improve the delivery of services to former combatants in need of rehabilitation and livelihood.63 From the vast experiences of the WB, the field of conflict prevention offers many theoretical and practical frameworks. Some of these include the concept of sensitivity to conflict, discourses on gender and conflict, education and conflict, and the strategies for closing the relief-to-development gaps. All these are highly relevant discussions and can also be found in the Mindanao dynamics that are crucial to its future peacebuilding and development. Similarly, these issues challenge development professionals when creating programmes for sustainable human development (SHD) at the onset of post-conflict or during the ongoing conflict or on-conflict development work,64 and upon which SHD forms a very strategic part both in the short-term, medium-term, and long-term. An SHD framework can be appropriately located within the nerve centre of activities of peacebuilding and post-conflict/ on-conflict development, and, if successfully implemented, can ensure that the mission of peacebuilding is “a sustainable process of preventing internal threats to human security from causing protracted, violent conflicts” (Cockell 1998: 211). In practice, the window and timing for working with conflict stakeholders appear to be unclear and can work like a moving target all the time. When do conflict parties start becoming more open to differences or uncommon grounds? How can polarization of positions be helped or prevented? It appears that post-conflict developments and peacebuilding should go hand in hand when resolving a conflict situation for the longer term. Therefore, future research should attempt to define

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The World Bank was formerly known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that took the role of “post-conflict rehabilitation” in Europe. 62 See World Bank Conflict Prevention Unit Website; at: www.worldbank.org. 63 Interviews by the author with WB staff, BRA staff, and GAM ex-combatants in Aceh in April 2007. 64 As in the case of Mindanao while the peace process is still ongoing and the conflict remains – as attested by the continued armed violence and asymmetrical relations between the government and the Bangsamoro people, development programmes continue to be implemented by the government, the international donor community and local non-government organizations. Thus, this phenomenon can be termed “on-conflict development”, meaning a kind of development in an ongoing conflict and peace process situation.

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how these can be operationalized, as in the situation of Mindanao. To build on the existing theories, investigations can be done into how a conflict situation or society can be prepared for post-conflict development and peacebuilding, and how to identify the social conditions that would bring about these two processes.

2.4

Peace Process and Post-conflict Development and Formulating a Theoretical Framework for the Study

There are many lessons to be learnt from various peacemaking and post-conflict developments specifically in intra-state conflicts. One of the areas that is not widely studied but is deemed crucial is the political economy in peacemaking and its consequent impact on the post-conflict development phase. Taking the cases of Aceh, Sudan and Sri Lanka, Wennmann (2011) explains how economic issues (e.g. natural resource management and income sharing, development assistance, private sector investments, financing peace processes and post-conflict transitions, etc.) are not normally included as part of the peace negotiations but are secondary to the political issues in hand. The economic dimension of the peace process is effectively perceived more as an obstacle than as an opportunity that can drive and sustain post-conflict developments. Yet, in reality, the political economy is one of the key drivers in the attainment of durable peace. Another critical issue in the post-conflict peacebuilding process is the empowerment or imposition of local ownership that Timothy Donais opposes. Donais introduces the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the practice of local ownership has become a contest between local actors and the international community. Even within the local actors themselves, there is a tendency of those who are in power to dominate policies and practices on the ground, sometimes to some extent supported by the international community. This situation will effectively disenfranchise the rest of the sectors by preventing them from fully participating in peacebuilding work. As such, local ownership needs to be contextualized in a balance of interests between local and international actors with respect to a joint vision for sustainable peace.65 While the idea of local empowerment is very enticing as part of the developmental paradigm, it is also good to note the intricacies of this idea. In the case of West Africa, it is found that bringing development to an agricultural society ridden by conflict can be very difficult. A study found that:

65

For more discussions about the criticisms of local and international actors in their contestation for local ownership, see Donais, Timothy, “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes”, Peace & Change, Vol. 34, No. 1, January 2009 (Wiley-Blackwell); at: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0130.2009.00531. x/pdf (7 August 2012).

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The process of empowering local people to take charge of their own economic and social development is slow and complex. Participation, the core of the SANREM approach, is not only inherent in many of the tools introduced to assist local populations in realizing their goals, but is also a development outcome in its own right.66

On the other hand, the success and failure of post-conflict developments can also be attributed to a good or bad peace agreement to begin with. Boltjes (2007) point out several lessons worth noting from the cases of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland, the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord in Bangladesh, the South Tyrolean Autonomy, the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding of Aceh in Indonesia, and the Treaty of Waitangi Claims of Maori Groups in New Zealand. Their recommendations include: (1) an agreement needs to be designed with a commitment of implementing it; (2) institutions and processes need to be built as part of power-sharing; (3) dispute resolution mechanisms – at both local and international level – also need to be agreed upon; (4) human rights standards have to be included to ensure the protection of minority groups; and (5) the time frame for implementation must not be closed but kept open for future re-opening and review of the peace agreement. This analysis of peace agreement implementation shows how peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding and post-conflict development, as a whole spectrum of the peace process, are intricately related. A deeper review of two specific cases is presented in the next section to further discuss the outcomes of peace agreements in post-conflict developments. The first case involves the post-conflict re-integration programme for the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The second case is a general assessment of Aceh’s post-conflict developments.

2.4.1

The Moro National Liberation Front Peace Process and its Post-conflict Development

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) signed the 1996 Final Peace Agreement on 2 September 1996. This agreement consisted of two phases of implementation. The first phase was the transition period which involved the establishment of the Special Zone of

Moore, Keith M, et al., “What We Have Learned”, in Moore, Keith M. (ed.), Conflict, Social Capital and Managing Natural Resources: A West African Case Study (UK and USA: CABI Publishing, 2005), p. 249. The Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management (SANREM) in West Africa is a programme of the USAID with universities in the US led by Virginia Tech. This programme made use of Participatory Landscape/Lifescape Appraisal (PLLA), similar to PRA, and conflict management training in order to actively involve the community. This region of West Africa has experienced violent conflict among the different communities due to their competing access to and use of natural resources. The SANREM programme was aimed at improving this conflict situation and instead making the communities work together, since they all seek a healthy economy and environment.

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Peace and Development (SZOPAD) areas and the institution building of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and the Consultative Assembly (CA).67 It was through the SPCPD and the CA that the three-year commencement of post-conflict development was to take place.68 The political reform aspect known as the New Autonomy was to be implemented in Phase 2. This second phase included the expansion areas of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the enactment of a law in the Philippine Congress. This law is known as the Republic Act 9054, “An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the ARMM, Amending for the Purpose of RA 6734, entitled ‘An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao’.” To further contextualize the framework of post-conflict development in the MNLF process, it is also important to point out the law that became its road map. The Executive Order 371 was the basis for the establishment of the SZOPAD, SPCPD and CA. It specifically identified twelve projects to be implemented by the SPCPD and CA. At the top of this list was the focus on human development that is described as follows: “Human development projects, including but not limited to health and sanitation services, educational development, and welfare services, to promote the well-being of families in depressed communities and enhance their capabilities to participate in economic programmes.”69 The rest of the list included projects on socialized housing to address housing needs, water supply development, roads and bridges to connect depressed communities to economic centres, airports and seaports to address the needs of communities, telecommunication and power/electrification programmes, development and promotion of tourism to harness tourism potential and enhance appreciation and awareness of history and culture in the SZOPAD, environmental and marine resources improvement, agricultural production enhancement through irrigation and post-harvest and marketing facilities, establishment of food processing facilities to generate employment, and establishment of industrial centres and enterprises. The twelfth and last project on the list is stated as: “People empowerment programmes to ensure greater participation of women and other disadvantaged

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The SZOPAD covered the 152 provinces throughout Mindanao that included both the Muslim and non-Muslim areas as part of a reconciliation process and general strengthening of the peace and order situation in the region. 68 However, as soon as the SZOPAD, SPCPD and the CA were established, they faced intense opposition from the non-Muslim local executives/political leaders. MNLF Chair Nur Misuari was installed as the head of both the SPCPD and the CA, but eventually ended up exerting very weak influence as leader of these organizations, while much of their workings and decisions emanated from the Office of the President. The SPCPD was technically abolished when the new ARMM Law or RA 9054 was approved in a plebiscite on 14 August 2011, signalling the start of Phase 2 or the New Autonomy. However, it was only on 11 March 2002 that the three institutions were officially closed down by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. 69 The complete list of specific projects identified in EO 371 is enumerated by Fr. Eliseo Mercado in his speech, “The 10th Anniversary of the Historic Final Peace Agreement between the GRP-MNLF: A Personal Note”, GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement Memorial Lectures (Cotabato City: IAG, 2006).

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groups in governance and in the determination of their political, economic and social destinies.”70 Based on the EO 371, it can be assumed that the incorporators of the law and perhaps those that have been involved in this MNLF peace process viewed the concept of human development as mainly referring to the basic needs of the communities and being more strongly related to economic empowerment. Moreover, while appreciation of people’s history and culture is mentioned, it is nevertheless regarded as part of the bigger tourism industry development and not as a crucial part of human development itself. Upon review of this list, it does not show any uniqueness in specifically responding to the more political issues that the 1996 FPA hoped to address or resolve. Instead, it gives an impression that the ARMM is just another poor region that needs the attention of the national government to be provided with basic services. And while the words “people empowerment programmes” do come out in the list, it only narrowly connects to “women and other disadvantaged groups.” In spite of the fact that EO 371 has long been abolished and superseded by programmes such as the United Nation’s ACT for Peace Programme (as its concrete post-conflict and peacebuilding programme), this part of the MNLF’s post-conflict development history is worth mentioning because it explains how post-conflict development and human development frameworks were viewed and used in the MNLF peace process. In April 2007, the United Nations in the Philippine Office signed an agreement with the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) to establish the Government of the Philippines-United Nations-Multi-Donor Programme (GoP-UN-MDP) as the main structure for resource mobilization and programme implementation of post-conflict development for the MNLF. Under this GoP-UN-MDP, the newly installed SPCPD became its implementing partner. Phase 1 of the programme involved the first group of MNLF communities designated as Peace and Development Communities (PDCs), and many of its former leader-combatants took a new role as Peace and Development Advocates (PDAs). With the help of training from various NGOs, these PDCs and their PDAs were engaged to undertake various development projects that benefited them in many ways (e.g. access to health, education, livelihood, emergency relief assistance and other services).71 There were some administrative delays in commencing Phase 1, which was the most needed in response to the thousands of MNLF ex-combatants.72 Phases 1, 2 and the preparatory stages of Phase 3 were implemented by the SPCPD during the period of 1997–2001. With the abolition of the

70

Ibid. Maulana, Nash B., Kadtabanga: The Struggle Continues (Cotabato City: GoP-ACT for Peace Programme, 2009): IX–X. 72 It was only in early 1997 that the GoP-UN-MDP started its needs assessment, pilot-testing and other preparatory work. 71

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SPCPD, the Mindanao Economic Development Council (MEDCO) became the overall implementing partner of the programme.73 One of the criticisms hurled at the 1996 Final Peace Agreement Implementation is that while the SZOPAD, SPCPD and CA were established soon after the peace agreement, there was no clear transition mechanism that responded to the immediate needs of the 80,000 MNLF ex-combatants that were identified by the MNLF leadership.74 This issue of reintegration of 30,000 MNLF ex-combatants into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) was one of those peace agreement provisions in which implementation became problematic due to unclear criteria and unfinished discussions between the Government and the MNLF group. Eventually, only 7,500 MNLF were fully integrated into the government forces.75 The development of the PDCs continued with the commencement of Phase 3 of the GoP-UN-MDP under the theme “Strengthening the Foundations of Lasting Peace and Development in Southern Philippines.” The programme operated from 2001 to 2005. However, it was during GoP-UN-MDP Phase 4, more popularly known as the Action for Conflict Transformation for Peace Programme or ACT for Peace, that the beneficiaries saw more stable and tangible outcomes of post-conflict development.76 The Programme became more inclusive by not only focusing on the MNLF communities but also including other Indigenous Peoples and Christians

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The SPCPD was created as part of an interim phase in transition to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) that should have been made more powerful as part of the MNLF agreement. The MEDCO is a government agency put under the Office of the President. It serves as the main source of economic development planning and programming for Mindanao. One of its tasks is to coordinate the bulk of international donor funding and interventions for Mindanao, since this is one region that attracts immense funding. There is no other similar agency put in place in the regions of Luzon and Visayas. MEDCO is also assigned as the representing government agency in the Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines-East Asia Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), which is an economic and trade partnership linking Mindanao to these three neighboring countries. In 2010, MEDCO became the bigger Mindanao Development Authority or MinDA. For more information about MinDA’s role, see at: www.minda.gov.ph. 74 This criticism was mentioned as part of a review of the peace agreement ten years later in Fr. Eliseo Mercado’s speech (2006), op cit. The number of MNLF former combatants is quoted from the speech of MNLF Maj. Gen. Abdul Sahrin during the Bangsamoro People’s National Congress, 23 December 2003 in Davao City, published in The Bangsamoro Parsugpatan, March 2004 (Cotabato City: ARMM Publication, 2004), p. 30. However, a UN Report puts the number of former combatants at 70,000 in Curry, S. (Team Leader), Assessment of Development Results: The Republic of the Philippines (US: UNDP, 2010), p. 42. 75 The numbers are quoted from Fr. Eliseo Mercado’s speech (2006). However, the numbers do vary depending on the source – whether it is the government, MNLF, or other stakeholders who are discussing this issue. 76 It is mainly the United Nations Development Programme – as part of the greater UN institution that played the key role in the post-conflict development for the MNLF communities. However, other UN agencies were also brought in to provide other projects that could help this task of development in Mindanao. Thus, the programme was formally known as the Government of the Philippines-United Nations-Multi Donor Programme.

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who are nonetheless affected by the conflict and are living side by side with the MNLF communities. The ACT for Peace Programme was implemented from 2005 until 2010.77

2.4.1.1

UNDP Action for Conflict Transformation for Peace Programme

The commitment to post-conflict development for the MNLF Peace Process moved forward with the implementation of the Action for Conflict Transformation (ACT) for Peace Programme. The Programme was aimed at strengthening peacebuilding efforts to sustain peace and development in Southern Philippines by working with multiple stakeholders. It carried the following objectives: • To sustain the transformation of Peace and Development Communities (PDCs) and other conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas, as well as to harness community efforts to develop and advance their own initiatives for peace and human security; • To strengthen and institutionalize peacebuilding and the conflict transformation (prevention, management and resolution) capacities of players and institutions; and • To strengthen critical partnerships towards sustaining an environment of trust, confidence, and collaboration for peace and development.78 During the initial implementation of the GoP-UN-MDP (Phase 1 to the beginning of 3), the MNLF leadership identified the communities to be covered by the Programme. There were a total of 163 MNLF communities that underwent the various stages of post-conflict rehabilitation and development. At the close of Phase 4 of the Programme, this number had reached 278 communities/barangays that were fully-developed as Peace and Development Communities or PDCs.79 Among these 278 PDCs, 77 belonged to the ARMM region, 102 were in South Central Mindanao area, 65 were in the Western Mindanao area (excluding the Island Provinces), and 34 were located in the CARAGA region.80 Within these PDCs, 70% of those involved in the Programme were MNLF former combatants and their

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Email interview with Ms. Diosita Andot, Programme Manager of the ACT for Peace Programme, 28 March 2012. 78 These objectives are translated as Outcomes in Fig. 1. The Rationale and Implementation Process of the Programme. 79 The formation of PDCs was initially based on ‘sitios’ (inside the baranggay local government unit) where précised groupings of MNLF combatants and their families were located. However, this PDC formation was later on expanded to comprise one or more baranggays. Eventually, for purposes of organization and synchronization to baranggay development planning, a PDC was duly identified as a baranggay itself. Therefore the 278 PDCs were equivalent to 278 baranggays. 80 The operations in the CARAGA region included the provinces of Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur, Agusan del Norte, and Agusan del Sur.

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families while 30% were non-MNLF who were either members of the Indigenous Peoples, Christian communities, or sometimes members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).81 Together with the development of the PDCs, around 1,000–1,500 MNLF members have been trained and transformed as Peace and Development Advocates or PDAs.82 The ACT for Peace Programme is a comprehensive development framework. It employed a two-pronged development framework by not only engaging the target communities but also ensuring a more enabling environment for implementing it. The first focal point of transformation was the PDCs – by building their capacities not only in doing development but also in becoming peacebuilders. These PDCs underwent the six stages of empowerment, as can be seen on Table 2.3. The graduation of every PDC from one stage to another is an immense task in itself. Throughout the course of the Programme, many of the PDCs were able to reach stages 3 and 4 after a considerable amount of time. However, it would normally take greater effort and constant monitoring for a community to reach stage 5 and, finally, stage 6. It was during these stages that the second development framework was particularly crucial – “Strengthening the Enabling Environment” by involving and improving the capacity of duty holders/partner institutions to deliver basic services to the PDCs. These included Local Government Units, Non-Government Agencies/Organizations and other Civil Society Organizations like the academe, media, and others. It was this linkage that ensured the sustainability of the gains of development in the PDCs beyond the Programme’s life. Through this development framework, the ACT for Peace Programme worked with different stakeholders from the grass roots to the macro level.83 The entire development stages of empowering a PDC would normally take Table 2.3 Development stages for PDC empowerment. Source Government of the Philippines-United Nations-Multi-Donor Programme 3 Stage

Major activity

Intended result

1

Social preparation

2

Community participation Community planning Plan implementation PDC strengthening Phase out

Social/Political acceptability of establishing PDC (Peace and Development Community) Collective agreement to own PDC and plan for development

3 4 5 6

81

Peace and development plan/project proposals Resource mobilized for plan/project implementation PDCs capacitated, inter and intra linkages developed Self-reliant PDCs

Telephone interview with Mr. Suharto Abas, former ARMM Project Manager for ACT for Peace Programme, 5 April 2012. 82 Email interview with Ms. Diosita Andot, 2012. 83 Ibid.

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four to five years. Here, the timeliness of project implementation and the availability of resources would become crucial in achieving positive results, most especially on the ground. Another contributing factor to the success of the ACT for Peace Programme was the systematic approach and clear linkage of the Components to the desired Outcomes or Objectives and to the greater Purpose and overarching Goal of the Programme. As can be seen in Fig. 2.6, the Strategy used (capacity-building and Culture of Peace) and Methodology (participatory and inclusive approaches) were very good foundations in mobilizing the communities to fulfil all the activities of the ACT for Peace Programme. To a large extent, the Programme was somehow insulated from the distractions or failures of the rest of the MNLF peace process (mainly the Phase 2 of New Autonomy) precisely because of how it gained a great amount of momentum and support from the communities themselves. Ultimately the PDCs and PDAs were themselves the absolute key performance indicators (KPIs) who invested in the ACT for Peace Programme (peace and development) framework.

Goal : Promoting national harmony and a just conclusion of the government’s peace process Purpose: To strengthen peace building efforts and sustain the gains for peace and sustainable development in Southern Philippines

Outcome

Implementation process

Component (inputs & outputs)

1) Transformation of PDCs and other conflict-affected and conflict-vulnerable areas is sustained, and community efforts to develop and advance their own initiatives for peace and human security are harnessed

Component 1 - Strengthening social capital for peacebuilding; Component 2 - Promoting human security through improved access to basic services; Component 3 - Promoting human security through community economic development

2) Peace building and conflict transformation (prevention, management and resolution) capacities of actors and institutions are strengthened and institutionalised

Component 4 - Building stakeholder capacity for conflict transformation

3) Critical partnerships towards sustaining an environment of trust, confidence and collaboration for peace and development are enhanced

Component 5 - Promoting and advocating a culture of peace towards peace-building and conflict transformation (which cuts across the other components)

Strategy

Methodology

Capacity building and

Participatory and inclusive approaches

Culture of Peace

Gender, women’s empowerment, youth empowerment, etc.

A C T I V I T I E S

Fig. 2.6 The rationale and implementation process of the ACT for Peace Programme (The elements of this illustration are taken from the UNDP Report – see p. 13 in ACT for Peace Mid-Term Review, 30 May 2008). Source Adapted from the ACT for Peace Mid-Term Review, 30 May 2008

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It is likewise significant to consider the issue of political empowerment of the MNLF. While many of the MNLF leaders at the grass-roots level fully participated in the ACT for Peace Programme, there was, however, a lack of participation from the MNLF leadership at the top level. During the implementation of the GoP-UN-MDP 1, 2, and initial part of 3, the MNLF Chair was effectively the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) Chair, and consequently, he also headed the implementation of the post-conflict developments, the development of the PDCs and ACT for Peace.84 The implementation of the Programme was distributed to both the ARMM Overseas Development Office (ARMM ODA) and to the Mindanao Economic Development Council MEDCO85 to cover their respective areas. There was also a direct relationship between the GoP-UN-MDP through the UNDP with the SPCPD. But with the abolition of the SPCPD, MEDCO or its successor, the Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA) took over. The Project Management Office (PMO) of the Programme has been located in Davao City and is headed by the Technical Head of MinDA. There are three Area Managers’ Offices (ARMM, South Central Mindanao and Western Mindanao) and one Coordinator’s Office in the Caraga region.86 All of these offices function similarly in that they approve plans, programmes, projects and activities with the supervision of the Presidential Management Office (PMO). The ARMM Area Office, however, does have greater autonomy in terms of operations but is not fully independent since it has had to abide by the rules and regulations of the GoP-UN-MDP. By looking at the organizational chart in Fig. 2.7, one may understand the MNLF leadership’s87 dissatisfaction and even sense of neglect due to their limited roles in policy and decision-making at the top level. In the past, the MNLF leadership took control and accountability of the GoP-UN-MDP, but was later sidelined and, at best, together with the ARMM officials, only invited for consultations or meetings on the ACT for Peace Programme “on a need basis.”88 The Programme Manager of ACT for Peace further explained the situation, saying:

84

Chair Nur Misuari became Chair of the SPCPD. MEDCO was established in 1992 but was later expanded and renamed Mindanao Development Authority (MINDA) in 2010. 86 Caraga is the administrative region of Region XIII, located in Northeastern Mindanao. It is composed of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur, Dinagat Islands, Surigao del Norte and Surigao del Sur. 87 The MNLF leadership became problematic when Chair Nur Misuari fled to Sabah and was later incarcerated in Manila. This led to Hatimil Hassan taking over as Chair in December 2003 – representing the MNLF Executive Council group, while there is also the Islamic Command Council group; the Alvarez Isnaji group; and the Misuari Breakaway Group as the fourth grouping of fragmented MNLF leadership. 88 See activities of the ARMM Regional Planning and Development Office; at: http://rpdo.armm. gov.ph/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14&Itemid=69 (22 June 2012). See the recommendations in the ACT for Peace Mid-Term Review, 30 May 2008. The perceived limited involvement of the MNLF leadership has also been discussed during field interviews with MNLF commanders in Cotabato City, Saranggani, and Manila in May to July 2008; and during a 85

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Fig. 2.7 Organizational chart of the GoP-UN-MDP and the ACT for Peace Programme. Source The author, based on interviews with ACT for Peace management staff

What may appear to be limited participation of the ARMM could be traced to their long-advocacy for self-determination that some sectors in the region would like to see in the way development programmes are implemented and governed. When such a programme is donor-funded, its structure and processes are largely set by national government and the donors (as in the case of A4P). MEDCo (now MinDA) served as integrator of the programme because of its Mindanao-wide mandate but left to the ARMM RG most of the decisions in so far as the ARMM A4P operations are concerned.

It is also worth citing that in relation to the above issue, the Programme’s terminal evaluation report indicated that MinDA supported the advocacy and need for the ARMM regional government to be given more authority on donor-funded programmes.89 However, the problem was complex because the situation is such that both ARMM and the MNLF leaderships separately pursued the work but they did not necessarily come together as the same stakeholder group. The issue of MNLF empowerment is highly relevant because of the public expectation that the agreement would bring the needed resolution and consequential transformation of the group from that of a revolutionary organization into a more peaceful entity. At present, the MNLF is a fragmented organization with several telephone interview with Mr. Suharto Abas, former ARMM ACT for Peace Programme Manager, 2012. 89 Interview with Ms. Diosita Andot, 2012.

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leaderships. As a group, they continue to express their dissatisfaction with the Government over the implementation of the peace agreement, especially feeling their lack of influence with the present ARMM regional government.90 This situation, therefore, poses threats to any gains in the peacebuilding process that the ACT for Peace Programme has painstakingly built.

2.4.1.2

Lessons Learned from the ACT for Peace Programme

The goals of peacebuilding and development have been clearly met by the ACT for Peace Programme’s development framework. Various interviews and reports from the communities themselves attest to how the Programme has not only improved their quality of life but also affected their own views and mindsets towards conflict and peace, government institutions, civil society, and opportunities for livelihood and enterprises.91 The PDCs and the PDAs have developed skills in community organizing, development planning, leadership, good governance, and the ability to work with government agencies, non-government organizations and access donor funding institutions. Considering the continuing unresolved political issues surrounding the MNLF peace process, the Programme had been able to move and inspire the PDCs to re-build their communities given the limited resources. In addition, there are several critical observations on the implementation of the Programme and the wider context of implementing the MNLF peace process in Mindanao. These are as follows: While the development of the PDCs is successful, it remains fragile and vulnerable to the wider conflict dynamics in Mindanao that continue to be unresolved. This is why the national government’s policy and action on the Mindanao conflict needs to be prioritized. Otherwise, any good interim programme would not be sustainable in the long run.92 The convergence of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in post-conflict development is one difficult challenge. This is mainly because there is a very real and clear difference in the

90

Based on the speeches of MNLF leader Mr. Hatimil Hassan, Alvarez Isnaji, and Dr. Alipikre Basher (representing Chair Nur Misuari) during the Consolidation for Peace for Mindanao (COP5) held 16–20 January 2012 in Penang, Malaysia, in Abubakar, Ayesah, Unpublished Proceedings Reports from the Consolidation for Peace Program (Penang: REPUSM/SEACSN, 2007–2012). 91 See Ilagan, Gail (ed.), Living in Peace (Mindanao: Act for Peace Programme, 2008); Tan-Ilaga, G., Sanz-Zarate, Dy, C., Mainstreaming Political Participation in Marginal Communities (Davao City: ACT for Peace Programme, 2004); and Maulana, N. (2009). Various interviews with MNLF leaders and ACT4Peace staff who are part of the ACT4Peace Programme in the Provinces of Sultan Kudarat, Saranggani, General Santos City and Cotabato City in May to July 2008. 92 Curry (2010: 47–48). The aspect of ‘durability’ of the ACT for Peace Programme is mentioned in another UNDP report wherein it puts forward the possibilities of reversal of the situation on the ground or loss of achievements. See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Philippines, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Component, 2006 CPAP Annual Review (Makati City: UNDP Philippines, 2006): 13.

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world-views of both groups with regard to development and peace. The MNLF accepted the Act for Peace Programme framework and made use of it by adding on their cultural and religious nuances. The MILF communities, on the other hand, through the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), have a contrasting perspective on political arrangements and envision a development according to the principles of Islam.93 As an outcome of post-conflict development, the MNLF combatants were transformed to become development workers and the MNLF as an organization was turned into multi-purpose cooperatives that aimed to serve and intended to pursue the economic upliftment of their communities.94 This outcome is relevant to any future post-conflict development in Mindanao (especially with the MILF peace process) as something that can be followed or further improved. The peace and development framework of the ACT for Peace Programme demonstrates how the issue of economic security is deemed a priority vis-à-vis other threats to human security. This has further heightened the prospects of participation in post-conflict development. In a way, this economic issue has become a key driver in achieving the goals of the Programme. This viewpoint is significant because it contributes to the discourse on the root causes of the conflict and the ways of addressing these root causes as part of conflict resolution. Consequently, this discussion leads to the identification of factors that would build on sustainable peacebuilding.95 As indicated in the UN Report, the programme reached only 3% of the total number of barangays in the whole of Mindanao.96 In as much as not all of Mindanao is a conflict-affected area, the coverage of the Programme in the conflict-affected areas both in ARMM and in the non-ARMM is regarded as low. The fact also remains that the Programme has not covered many MNLF communities – even those that are near the PDCs – due to political reasons and allegiance to different leaderships. This unknown number can also be a threat, considering that these groups have not experienced the dividends of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement.97 The envisioned transformation among the stakeholders of the Programme did not only occur among the PDCs and the PDAs but also included the government institutions, non-government agencies, and other civil society groups that were

93

ACT for Peace Mid-Term Review, 30 May 2008, pp. 38–40. See Ahmed, R. Kulessa, M., and Malik, K. (eds.), “Report on the Philippines”, Lessons Learned in Crises and Post Conflict Situations: The Role of UNDP in Reintegration and Reconstruction Programme (New York: UNDP Evaluation Office, 2002): 96. 95 A UN report cites how some findings identify economic and environmental issues as greater sources of threats to human security, reinforcing the earlier National Unification Commission Report of 1993 as another basis for the Philippine government’s peace policy vis-à-vis the internal armed conflicts. See Curry (2010: 44). 96 Ibid., p. 46. 97 Interviews with MNLF commanders in Saranggani in May to July 2008. Due to the factionalism problem among the MNLF leadership and followers, there were many who have not been included in any post-conflict activity, or have willingly chosen to be excluded. 94

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engaged to assist and accompany the PDAs towards the Programme’s peace and development framework. In this case, it is also relevant to note that while these existing institutions were moved to build and re-build linkages and cooperate and provide service to the PDCs (or the barangays as part of the legitimate local government unit), it is still the PDCs’ own institutional sustainability that remains to be guaranteed. Among the Local Government Units, it is recorded that only the Provincial Government of Saranggani has established a permanent office that is tasked to further support the PDCs and PDAs in its area.98 The UNDP has recognized the many lessons learned from the ACT for Peace Programme for any upcoming post-conflict developments with the MILF peace track.99 The sustainability of this Programme will be further observed during this stage when the Programme has ended and as the MNLF peace process is also being put into a closure.100 It is interesting to note that after long years of interventions on post-conflict development and a review of the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (FPA), there is no MNLF faction or leadership that unequivocally declares the success of this peace process.101 This points to the relevance of interconnecting the vision for development and peace as a way of ultimately ensuring sustainable and durable peace. Another useful case in relation to Mindanao is the case of the Aceh conflict. Aceh’s own post-conflict development experience is also presented here.

2.4.2

The Aceh Conflict and Its Post-conflict Development

Another relevant case in post-conflict development is the province of Aceh in nearby Indonesia. Like Mindanao, Aceh experienced a right to self-determination (RSD) type of conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) and the Government of Indonesia. The first phase of the Acehnese independence movement started with the Darul Islam rebellion in 1953. This was triggered by the disappointment of Acehnese leaders over the status of Aceh after the independence of Indonesia from the Dutch colonial government. With the introduction of the pancasila as the basis of philosophy of the new republic, the Acehnese were more

Interview with Ms. Jocelyn Lambac, manager of “Kalinaw Saranggani” (Peace) Office at the Provincial Government Office of Saranggani in June 2008. 99 ACT for Peace Mid-Term Review, 30 May 2008. 100 See news article at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/156051/phgov%E2%80%99t-no-new-peacetalks-with-mnlf (15 March 2012). Also, see the perspective of the MNLF in a column article by Rasul. Amina, 8 March 2012, on the Relevance of the MNLF: at: http://www.bworldonline.com/ content.php?section=Opinion&title=The-relevance-of-theMNLF&id=48028 (15 March 2012). 101 Based on discussions regarding the MNLF peace process during the Consolidation for Peace for Mindanao (COP5), held 16–20 January 2012, Penang, Malaysia, in Abubakar (2007–2012). 98

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determined to pursue an autonomous Aceh, with Islam as its religion and philosophy of the state. In 1959, the Government of Indonesia responded to the Aceh conflict by conferring on Aceh the status of “special territory”, which effectively gave the region some autonomy in religious, educational, and cultural matters. However, this did not end the conflict between the Acehnese and the Government. By 1976, the movement for independence by the Acehnese gained further momentum with the establishment of the Free Aceh Movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), led by Hasan de Tiro. Henceforth, GAM carried on its guerrilla warfare against the Indonesian military until the Government imposed the Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM) or martial law in the region. The DOM period started in 1989 and lasted until the tsunami devastation in Aceh in December 2004. It has been reported that at least 12,000 people were killed or went missing during the imposition of martial law.102 In December 26, 2009, Aceh was heavily devastated by a great earthquake and tsunami. This havoc resulted in the loss of at least 150,000 people, who were all drowned or lost in the tsunami waters. The situation of Aceh as a conflict area and as a tsunami-disaster region moved many people all over the world. This has also brought about a great sense of sympathy and urgency within the Government of Indonesia and GAM to immediately provide humanitarian help and pursue the reconstruction of Aceh in a peaceful environment. While the foundations of peacebuilding and initiatives of peace mediation had already started before the tsunami occurred, this incident made it more compelling for the two conflict parties to come together, re-start the peace talks, and forge a peace agreement.103 The Aceh conflict ended with the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on August 15, 2005 between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Republic of Indonesia (RoI). Since then, there have been ongoing post-conflict development programmes in Aceh, one of which is the rehabilitation of GAM combatants and their families through the Aceh Peace-Reintegration Agency or Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh (BRA). On a larger coverage, the Agency for the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Aceh and Nias (BRR-Aceh/Nias) has taken on the role of post-conflict reconstruction and post-tsunami rehabilitation throughout

102

Parts of this paragraph are adapted with permission from the article by Askandar, Kamarulzaman and Abubakar (2007), in “The Struggle for Self-determination in Aceh”, Autonomy and Peace Review, April–June 2007 (Cotabato City: IAG). 103 For more background stories of peacebuilding and mediation initiatives before the Aceh tsunami period, please read the article by Askandar, Kamarulzaman (2011), “Aceh refugees and conflict transformation, in Paix sains frontieres: building peace across borders”, Accord Issue 22 (London: Conciliation Resources). The number of at least 150,000 Acehnese who died and went missing from the tsunami is cited from “Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency of Aceh and Nias” (BRR), in Aceh and Nias: Two Years after the Tsunami, 2006 Progress Report, December 2006 (Banda Aceh: BRR and Partners, 2006).

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the whole province.104 Among the other significant steps towards the implementation of the peace agreement was the demobilization and decommissioning of the GAM armed forces by the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM),105 the passing of the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA), the law that embodied the Helsinki MoU; and the transformation of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) into a political party called Komite Peralihan Aceh (KPA). Aceh’s case is very useful as part of this study’s general review of cases relevant to Mindanao.

2.4.2.1

Agency for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Aceh

The Agency for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, or Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi dan BRR, was created and started its work in May 2005. The agency was created by the Indonesian government for Aceh (later to include Nias) rehabilitation in the aftermath of the tsunami and natural disasters. The mandate for the BRR was to rebuild Aceh’s destroyed infrastructure and help the victims of the disasters. It was crucial that although the head of the BRR was from outside Aceh, the other positions within the BRR were taken up by Acehnese, including former GAM combatants. The second highest ranking BRR official, for example, is Teuku Kamarulzaman, the former GAM negotiator, imprisoned during the martial law period in 2003. He is responsible, among other things, for bringing GAM people into the BRR and ensuring that the rehabilitation process is not Jakarta-dominated. It is important for the Acehnese themselves to be involved in the rehabilitation work to avoid feelings of being alienated from and discriminated against by Jakarta. With so many GAM-connected people within the BRR, this, too, is giving GAM a sense of responsibility towards the BRR and the rehabilitation process. They need to be involved and be seen by the Acehnese and the outside world to be involved. Their struggle for independence had been about the ability to decide their own future, and the rehabilitation of the very area they were fighting for is crucial to this struggle. BRR functioned as a supra-government agency that implemented, coordinated (other projects by other donor agencies not within BRR), monitored, and evaluated the huge responsibility of rehabilitation and development with USD 8.1 billion of committed funds from the Government, multilateral agencies, and other donor agencies. In effect, the BRR is an ‘integrator’ in undertaking the full-scale recovery, rehabilitation, and development programmes. However, as part of its main strategy (exit strategy), the BRR has constantly worked with the Provincial Government of Aceh and other local government agencies from the beginning in order to ensure the 104

Various interviews with officials from BRA, BRR, the World Bank, and the Aceh Institute in Banda Aceh in April 2007. Yusny Saby of BRA, Muslahuddin Daud of the WB, Lukman of the Aceh Institute. REPUSM research trip. Also, see Lingga, Abhoud Syed M., “The Aceh Peace Process and Lessons for Mindanao”, Autonomy and Peace Monograph, 15 October 2007 (Cotabato City: Institute for Autonomy and Governance and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2007). 105 For more discussion on the role of the AMM and its efforts in the initial phase of post-conflict work in Aceh, see at: http://www.aceh-mm.org/english/info_menu/archive.htm (12 April 2012).

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eventual transition and turn-over of responsibilities to these respective agencies. Due to the nature of the disaster, the rehabilitation and development framework used by the BRR were executed in these five work areas: (1) meeting vital needs through relief and humanitarian delivery of temporary shelters and daily food subsistence; (2) providing social services which included developing institutional capacity of various agencies, child protection, re-establishing the education sector, and health service provision; (3) managing disaster risk and the environment through the setting-up of a tsunami warning system and ensuring the building of good quality infrastructures that could help in disaster prevention, and institutionalizing environment-friendly systems; (4) establishing infrastructure which includes public works, airports, port facilities, and other transport networks, water and sanitation systems; (5) improving livelihoods through the rebuilding of the agricultural industry, private sector development, and restoration of rural livelihoods. In terms of methodology, the BRR programmes also made use of the existing Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP) infrastructure. This Programme operates in 221 kecamatan (equivalent to 5,698 villages) throughout Aceh Province.106 Like the Peace and Development Communities (PDCs) in the case of Mindanao, the kecamatan is founded on participatory approaches and has developed local capacity in community organizing, development planning, and project implementation with relevant government agencies. As part of the post-tsunami and post-conflict reconstruction, the programmes through the KDP were both funded by BRR and the Aceh Peace-Reintegration Agency (BRA).107 The Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) is a national Government of Indonesia Program aimed at alleviating poverty, strengthening local government and community institutions, and improving local governance. KDP is implemented by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Community Development office (PMD). The program is funded through government budget allocations, donor grants and loans from the World Bank.108

Upon review of the many development programmes in Aceh, it is notable that apart from the GAM returnees, the villagers, the women and youth sectors, civil society groups, and the ulama are often included as an important sector. The involvement of the ulama is perceived to be important, especially in influencing the community and in possibly taking the role of mediator or arbitrator in times of conflict disputes in the communities. While there is a vibrant civil society, the Acehnese society remains traditional and holds traditional leaders in high regard. Thus, it was in the interests of building social cohesion that these traditional leaders, such as the ulama and mukim,109 were also invited to be involved in the wide-ranging development work. Refer to Fig. 2.8 for an illustration of the BRR role.

“Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency of Aceh and Nias (BRR)”, in Aceh and Nias: Two Years after the Tsunami, 2006 Progress Report, December 2006 (Banda Aceh: BRR and Partners, 2006), p. 29. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. 109 A mukim is a traditional leader who plays a role between the village and a sub-district in Aceh. 106

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GoI and WB-MDF WFP Shipping Service

BRR Local Government

RAN Database Public Info

Integrator

Tim Terpadu Anti-Corruption Unit

Implementor

Coordinator

Kecamatan/village level: heads of villages, NGOs, mukims

Supreme Audit Agency & Corruption Eradication Comm.

Fig. 2.8 The BRR role as an integrator of post-tsunami and post-conflict development in Aceh. Source Based on the 2006 Progress Report, Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi (BRR)

The BRR closed its offices and turned over its work to the Provincial Government of Aceh in 2010. Mostly, the institution had gained integrity over the years as a result of its performance in efficiently distributing the funds for the reconstruction work, and in carrying out its own projects.

2.4.2.2

Aceh Peace-Reintegration Agency

The Aceh Peace-Reintegration Agency, or Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh (BRA) was specifically created to help in the re-integration process of former GAM returnees back into society.110 It was set up in February 2005 as part of the greater peace process mechanism. The reintegration of GAM into society was recognized as a crucial element, as thousands of former combatants with little or nothing to do can be destabilizing to the process. The number of active members to be reintegrated and rehabilitated has fluctuated between 5,000 and 25,000 depending on who is doing the counting, as well as on the compensation involved. There were voices of dissent with regard to the compensation as the combatants were claiming that the amount

110 BRA provides for all GAM returnees – this includes active and non-active GAM members, and political prisoners. But there are differences in the kind of reparations or incentives that each group gets. Mainly, the active and non-active GAM members receive more rehabilitation incentives.

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was not enough while non-combatants were asking why they were left out of the compensation process as they too had been victims of the conflict. This was especially in the middle of Aceh province and the east Aceh areas, which were affected by conflict but not by the tsunami. In the tsunami areas, everybody received housing and other types of compensation regardless of whether they were GAM members or not, but in the non-tsunami-affected areas only former combatants were helped. There were also some overlapping BRR and BRA areas, especially in Aceh Besar and North Aceh, which made both the rehabilitation and re-integration work difficult. On another note, there had also been some dissatisfaction regarding the allocation of compensation and reintegration money to former combatants. There had been claims that the compensation given was not what was originally promised. For example, if a person was supposed to get 25 million Rupiah, he received only 5 million Rupiah or less. There were also rumours of dissatisfaction among the GAM rank and file with the way the GAM leadership was benefiting from the general post-conflict and post-tsunami reconstruction. Many of them became rich overnight by being contractors, government officials working with BRR and BRA or engaging in other types of employment, while the majority of the rank and file continues to live in poverty and hardship. All these are issues that have jeopardised the ongoing post-conflict development and peace process in Aceh.111 The Aceh Government had direct control over BRA but funds were managed and disbursed by Provincial Department of Social Affairs, or Dinas Sosial (DinSos) which is a national government agency.112 The MSR Report 2009 indicated that the total of direct and indirect commitments of funds for the post-Helsinki MoU re-integration and peacebuilding was USD 895.1 million. This number is one-seventh of the total amount that was given to the post-tsunami rehabilitation programmes. Out of this amount, there were 38 organizations that funded the work of the BRA. The largest contributor was the Government of Indonesia with USD 150 million, followed by the European Commission with USD 50 million, AusAid with USD 40 million, and USAID, Government of Japan, and the Provincial Government of Aceh with USD 20 million each.113 BRA’s post-conflict programmes had a very clear and simple criteria: (1) The project objective is directly related to post-conflict recovery, re-integration or peacebuilding, and that objective is overtly stated in project documents; (2) The majority of the beneficiaries are conflict victims, conflict participants, conflict-affected communities or people/groups actively working for peace. 111

This part is adapted with permission from the article of Kamarulzaman Askandar and Ayesah Abubakar, “The Struggle for Self-determination in Aceh”, Autonomy and Peace Review, April– June 2007 (Cotabato City: IAG, 2007). 112 Interview with Dr. Yusny Saby, former head of the BRA, during a research field trip in Banda Aceh, 16–22 April 2007. 113 World Bank, Aceh Peace-Reintegration (BRA), National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), et al., 2009, Multi-Stakeholder Review of Post-Conflict Programming in Aceh: Identifying the Foundations for Sustainable Peace and Development in Aceh (MSR 2009) (Aceh: World Bank): 52.

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The BRA supported the institutional implementation of DDR114 with emphasis on the Re-integration part, where it targeted the GAM returnees as a whole (prisoners, combatants, and non-combatants) with different levels of support for rehabilitation.115 As part of a DDR approach, GAM returnees were provided with their immediate individual needs for economic assistance, health services, employment, and other incentives. On the other hand, the medium to long-term programming for the rehabilitation of the conflict-affected communities (besides GAM returnees) was built through BRA’s funding of various community-driven projects through the

Fig. 2.9 The BRA relationship structure Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh (BRA), 2006

114

with

other

organizations.

Source

Badan

The Demobilisation and Decommissioning of the GAM armed forces was implemented by the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). 115 In MSR, 2009, there are discussions regarding the DDR approach used in Aceh, in p. 169.

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KDP.116 Every district and municipality in Aceh has been reached by BRA programmes and funds, but the biggest recipient of these are the east coast districts of Aceh, Utara, Biruen, Aceh Timur and Pidie. These areas were the most conflict-affected and the poorest in the whole of Aceh. The four areas are also the stronghold of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) during the conflict years.117 It is revealing that even if these four areas received huge funding, the cost of recovery from conflict damages continues to cause a large gap.118 This clearly shows the intensity and high cost of destruction brought about by the many years of conflict in Aceh, even more than the tsunami.119 The illustration in Fig. 2.9 shows the well-defined but complex organizational relationship of the BRA with other national and local government agencies, international organizations and donors, and its interface at the community level. The national agency, DinSos, carries the fiduciary accountability in relation to the management of funds while it works alongside BRA to deliver the programmes at community level. The roles of the Governor of Aceh, the BRA, and DinSos are defined in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4 The roles of the Governor, BRA, and DinSos. Source Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh (BRA), 2006 Governor BRA

DinSos

116

Ibid., Ibid., 118 Ibid., 119 Ibid., 117

The Governor of NAD oversees BRA and DinSos, and is the official interface between the advisory committee at national level BRA is responsible for the overall implementation of the programme. Key responsibilities include the following: • Coordinate with the Governor’s Office, PMD, Bappenas, KDP, and the World Bank on any major policy issues arising from the programme • Address both policy and technical (e.g. misuse of funds, misconduct) issues in collaboration with appropriate stakeholders • Provide regular feedback to the Governor’s Office, PMD, Bappenas, KDP and the WB on the progress of the programme DinSos is the Satker for the programme, hence, DinSos is held accountable by BPKN for auditing. DinSos bears the following responsibility: • Ensure that the BRA funds are disbursed in a timely manner through proper disbursement flow • Work closely with KDP RMU and BPKP to ensure that comprehensive fiduciary controls are in place and that the funds are used properly • Address any misuse of funds in collaboration with BRA and KDP RMU • Prepare financial reports as necessary in collaboration with KDP RMU

p. 60. pp. 54–55. p. 7. p. 32.

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2.4.2.3

2 Literature Review of Theories, Concepts, and Case Studies …

Lessons Learned from BRR and BRA

It is understandable that soon after the signing of the Helsinki MoU, the Acehnese people were still uncertain of their future, especially as there was very little information about the peace negotiations and the peace agreement itself. A Conflict and Recovery Assessment in Aceh by the World Bank portrayed the difficult situation and challenges regarding how to make the Helsinki MoU deliver peace dividends to all Acehnese. One interviewee expressed a sense of reality check: “The agreement between GAM, GoI and the TNI will not solve all the problems. There are many problems between GAM and the community, between TNI and the community, and within the community itself. The agreement will not resolve all these problems.” (NGO, West Aceh).120 This sentiment proved to be valid with the succeeding internal dynamics of GAM’s reintegration and the problems of general social cohesion among Acehnese civil society groups, politicians, traditional leaders and emerging youth leaders. Nevertheless, this sentiment did not last long enough to become the norm. Eventually, the vision and the commitment to keep and sustain the peace in Aceh proved to be very strong. Not only were the Acehnese able to hold their first elections in December 2006 in a peaceful and credible manner, but there was great support for self-government in Aceh from many sectors of society, however challenging it might be.121 The project of the Consortium of Aceh civil society of visioning and socializing a New Aceh or “Aceh Baru” attests to this unity and high social capital among civil society groups.122 This umbrella group has made it its mission to ensure the gains of the peace agreement between GAM and the Government of Indonesia and to further promote and maintain the vision for sustainable peace in Aceh. Aceh’s success in post-tsunami and post-conflict recovery and development must also be attributed to the immense commitment not only from both the Government and GAM, the Acehnese people themselves, but also from the numerous donor agencies and workers who have helped to rebuild Aceh. In the process, the influx of huge donor funding that it received provided a great driver and incentive to all the people in Aceh. It is this vast coverage and intensity of focus on seeing through the rebuilding of Aceh and the implementation of the Helsinki MoU of 2005 that have effectively created a new Aceh from its past of martial rule and armed conflict. The MSR Report of 2009 indicates that: “Nearly all population

120

As cited in a World Bank Report by Barron, Patrick, Clark, Samuel, Daud, Muslahuddin, 2005, Conflict and Recovery in Aceh: An Assessment of Conflict Dynamics and Options for Supporting the Peace Process, 23 August 2005 (Banda Aceh: World Bank Office): 2. 121 Various meetings with civil society groups, traditional leaders, GAM leaders, and Governor Irwandi in Banda Aceh during a research trip, 16–22 April 2007. 122 The Consortium of Aceh Civil Society was launched on 8 October 2008 in preparation for the exit of the international community and the need for consolidating the peace gains in Aceh.

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groups are benefiting from Aceh’s economic recovery since the end of the conflict – particularly from the resumption of agriculture and small-scale trade.”123 In contrast to the Aceh case, the MNLF case points to the pragmatic view of the MNLF/PDAs at grass roots, wherein a UN Report finds that: The above suggests the possibility of a common Bangsamoro “vision” for peace and development is unlikely in the short to medium term. MTR team discussions with communities and PDAs indicate that some have taken a more pragmatic approach to peace. On being asked about the 1996 Final Peace Agreement, one informant stated, ‘we are doing the peace, we leave the agreement to them (sic: MNLF leadership)’.124

The above perspective is not unusual given the dire situation of many MNLF communities who are banking on the peace dividends of the 1996 FPA. In the long run, however, successful development programmes can operate at community level, like the ACT for Peace Programme. This paves the way for durable peace while the peacemaking process (MNLF) is under threat and a parallel peace process (the MILF peace track) is ongoing and unresolved. There are more gaps to be filled in the functions of the BRA as it continues to operate and ensure the re-integration of GAM returnees and the building of better opportunities for the conflict-affected areas. The Multi-Stakeholder Review 2009 sums up various recommendations in three aspects: (1) Livelihoods and Economy; (2) Politics, Security and Social Cohesion; and (3) Governance and Institutions. In assessing the outcomes of these aspects, these structural changes (as pillars of sustainable peace and development) have to be felt and measured at the Individual, Community and Macro Levels. Table 2.5 presents the key challenges in post-conflict Aceh as adapted from the MSR 2009.125 This analysis and set of recommendations are presented here as a good review of Aceh’s post-conflict developments that are potentially relevant to Mindanao. In concluding the Multi-Stakeholder Review regarding Aceh’s post-conflict developments, the authors found that: The greatest determinants of stability in Aceh have not been post-conflict programs per se, but rather the high level political agreement on the necessity of peace, the structure of the peace agreement that allowed for the rapid accession of former fighters to political power, and the presence of other developmental resources that helped create a peace dividend.126

Upon examining the MSR, this study finds staggering gaps between the achievements of the peace process of GAM and the MNLF. Firstly, it is important to take a clear stand on peacemaking through writing an agreement that can be implemented and institutionalized in the country’s constitutional system/parliament. Second, the political will of the Government to provide the needed monetary resources and cooperation of all relevant agencies cannot be overemphasized to

123

Ibid., p. xix. In ACT for Peace Programme Mid Term Review (MTR), 30 May 2008, p. 38. 125 MSR (2009: 161). 126 MSR (2009: 170). 124

Socio-Political and Security

Economic

• As the tsunami boom draws to an end, expansion in non-reconstruction related sectors is needed • While modest growth has been seen in agriculture, manufacturing and service sectors are still not expanding • Large scale transport, agriculture, and other productive infrastructure is lacking or in poor condition • Corruption and perceptions of an increase in crime and conflict discourage investment and inflate costs • Finance and other business development services are lacking

• Aid has often created or exacerbated conflict • While too early to consider establishing new provinces, grievances held by provincial divisionist movements in the central highlands and south-western districts could undermine peace if they are not addressed • The continued presence of conflict-era organizations pose a challenge to political instability and security and their rising membership perpetuates both conflict-era identities, pressure for individual assistance, and an entitlement mentality • Incomplete implementation of the Helsinki accords is an ongoing source of tension and suspicion (continued)

• Conflict damage to village and sub-district infrastructure hinders agricultural and economic recovery and access to services • Many conflict-affected communities and households still lack private goods and productive assets • Community-driven approaches have not been utilized enough despite their relative success

• Deeper re-integration of former combatants and displaced persons still has to happen • Many post-conflict programs have failed to take advantage of strong existing social capital • Communities’ trust in local leaders and institutions is an underutilized socio-political resource

• Individually targeted re-integration assistance has not led to significant improvement in most recipients’ welfare and has had some negative impacts • Most ex-combatants are working but unmet expectations remain • Some ex-combatants, female-headed households, IDPs and ex-political prisoners are benefiting less from Aceh’s recovery than others • Initial re-insertion assistance provided benefits, but future assistance should not be based on conflict-era identities • People unable to work due to conflict trauma or disability are not receiving adequate social security support • There has been a significant improvement in security since the MoU but new localized violence increased until the end of 2008, with a fall in the first half of 2009 • Violent disputes about aid distribution are common and domestic disputes frequently end in violence • Groups that pose potential threats to peace include disgruntled former combatants, PETA members and unemployed or under-employed youth

Macro

Community

Individual

Table 2.5 Key challenges in post-conflict Aceh. Source The Multi-Stakeholder Review (2009). Unit of Analysis

76 2 Literature Review of Theories, Concepts, and Case Studies …

Governance and Institutions

Community Community

Macro • Village communities’ capacity for collective action is relatively weak • Local decision-making is constrained by absence of legislation on village governance • Women’s participation in local governance and political knowledge are limited • Effective links between villages and higher levels of government are lacking

Macro

Table 2.5 (continued)

• A broad government-wide strategy for consolidating peace is lacking. The initial Presidential Instruction No. 15, 2005 has not been systematically implemented • Despite a broad mandate and delivery of assistance to hundreds of thousands of conflict affected people, BRA’s authority and role are limited to mainly facilitating compensation-type assistance. Moreover, it lacks capacity and a focused strategy to move from re-integration assistance to broader conflict-sensitive development in cooperation with government ministries. There is also lack of institutional consensus with the central government on its role • These issues have limited coordination between government and donors and negatively affected resource mobilization • Peacebuilding and conflict-sensitivity are not mainstreamed within government development planning and program management • Lack of coordination of peacebuilding and tsunami reconstruction programming has resulted in an imbalance between tsunami and conflict affected areas • Over the long term Aceh has enough financial resources to build back better from conflict with committed resources exceeding the provincial cost of conflict. However, the capacity of provincial and district agencies to effectively utilize Aceh’s vastly expanded fiscal resources is weak. Effective consultative mechanisms-between Jakarta and Aceh and between government and communities are lacking • TNI is still cautious toward the activities and motives of KPA and GAM members and is taking an assertive interpretation of the clauses in the LoGA regarding security. This risks alienating the Aceh public • While crime rates have fallen and more crimes are being solved, there is still room for improvement on the police’s investigative capacity and overall professionalism

2.4 Peace Process and Post-conflict Development and Formulating … 77

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ensure success during the post-conflict development stage. Third, the support of international actors and guarantors of the peace process is also crucial, not only in terms of monetary commitments but also of other resources, such as the transfer of knowledge, monitoring, and evaluation,127 and building the local capacities of the people in a conflict area that needs to transform itself (e.g. governance and institution-building). Fourth, the participation and dynamism of civil society groups as the foundation of peacebuilding is also another form of insurance during a peace process. Fifth, the viable transformation of a revolutionary group like GAM into a political party and its consequential re-integration into society as members of the community, civil society group, and government is a development that effectively promotes inclusive and democratic processes in a new equitable and peaceful society. Sixth and last, the hypothesis of the transformed centre-periphery relations between the Acehnese people and the Government of Indonesia (as a vertical and asymmetrical relationship) must also be extended to the greater challenge of pursuing sustainable peace through equitable and transparent distribution of political power and resources across the rural and urban communities, elite and masses, men and women, young and old, in the wider Acehnese society (as a horizontal and uneven relationship).128

2.5

Conclusion: Building Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding Theoretical Framework in an RSD Conflict Paradigm

Sustainable human development brings forward the centrality of people in the development process. This centrality clearly focuses on the full development potential (beyond the HDI and other measures) of both individuals and the collective community, including their guarantees for freedom and human rights. Development, therefore, becomes more valuable when people and communities do not just become the subjects of development per se, but possess the capability and power to make decisions and participate in this process. It is this matter of 127

Compared to the MNLF peace process, specifically the post-conflict development stage, the Aceh post-conflict developments attracted more scholars, practitioners and international organizations that systematically analysed the impacts of the conflict and the succeeding implementation of the peace agreement. Examples of these are the numerous WB reports and papers, joint research projects by various multilateral agencies and other donor agencies like the MSR, other independent research by scholars in peace, conflict and development fields, and even the many research studies done by postgraduate students from all over the world who flocked to Aceh soon after the post-tsunami and post-conflict developments. 128 This centre-periphery inequality resolution as a guarantee to durable peace is discussed in the Summary Findings by Barron, Patrick and Clark, Samuel, “Decentralizing Inequality? Center-Periphery Relations, Local Governance, and Conflict in Aceh”, in Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction, Paper No. 39/December 2006 (Washington DC: World Bank, 2006).

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development that is relevant to the context of peacebuilding in conflict communities, especially with regard to identity conflicts. As this chapter clearly defines, the goal of peace and peacebuilding and conflict resolution in general is to work for the achievement of negative and positive peace. Essentially, positive peace, as the ideal form, can only be achieved by re-educating societies, recalibrating attitudes and behaviour to adhere to the values of peace and justice, and by establishing institutional structures that also govern the use of these same values. The peace and conflict studies scholars mentioned in this chapter appropriately reiterate how peace should not be the end in view but rather the development of the full potential of people and their societies. There is certainly no debate on which should come first – development or peace. It is clear that both are equally important and that the absence of one will lead to the unsatisfactory fulfilment of the other. The succeeding chapters address the challenge of how these two frameworks – sustainable human development and peacebuilding – can be made more useful not only in theory but also in practice. The core concept of sustainable human development (SHD) based on Amartya Sen’s capability approach is one of the pillars of this study. The emphasis on capabilities and freedoms which are dependent on social, political and economic arrangements in society is similarly reflected in the concept of peacebuilding that is founded on the required structures in society that will breed positive peace. In this context, sustainable human development becomes the framework of a structure or structures that need to be built in order to address the collective capabilities and freedoms of group-orientated societies. Further, SHD builds on and drives peacebuilding as it attempts to bring about transformation from conflict to a peace phase in conflict communities. In reviewing lessons learned from post-conflict developments, the experiences of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) peace process through the ACT for Peace Programme and the outcomes of the work of the BRR and the BRA in post-conflict Aceh have enumerated many indicators for success and weaknesses. With these in mind, development programming in the ongoing Government of the Philippines-Moro Islamic Liberation Front (GPH-MILF) peace process will clearly have to respond to the needs of the communities who are struggling for the right to self-determination. The worst scenario is to repeatedly undertake development programming in a business-as-usual mode, armed with the tools that donor agencies and governments normally use for development. This chapter has dedicated great effort to showing the experiences in Aceh and with the MNLF peace process precisely to ascertain how future post-conflict developments, like that of the MILF, can be charted with better success. Given the circumstances, a theoretical framework is proposed in Fig. 2.10 that presents the timing, relevance, and interfaces of sustainable human development (SHD), peacebuilding and right to self-determination (RSD) throughout the peace process period.

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Fig. 2.10 An SHD and Peacebuilding theoretical framework in a Right to Self-Determination (RSD) conflict paradigm. Source The author

The figure illustrates the stages of the Mindanao peace process (the MILF peace track): from a conflict situation to the preliminary achievement of a ceasefire situation129 to the formal establishment of peacemaking or peace negotiations to the maintenance of a third-party peacekeeping mission, and while the peace negotiations continue, initial post-conflict developments are put in place as part of confidence-building measures and immediate alleviation of the sufferings of the conflict-affected communities. With the impending result of a peace agreement, the Stage of Initial reconstruction, rehabilitation and development provides a tremendous window in re-thinking the options for strategies and framework in the Stage of Post-conflict Development in the future. The timeframe within this “Window of Intervention” is where the conceptualization and institutionalization of Sustainable Human Development and peacebuilding should happen. The simplified definition of SHD according to three areas is used in this framework as follows: • Live long and healthy life • Access to knowledge and decent standard of living • Participate in the life of the community and decisions affecting their life The ceasefire between the government and the MILF is deemed to be the first and formal engagement in their peace process.

129

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These definition areas are further dissected during the fieldwork to capture the full range of what is included in the attainment of both development and peace as processes and as ends. Also, as an output of the PRA/PLA, the conflict-affected communities identified the areas of development that they perceived to be necessary to the fulfilment of their needs. On the other hand, the theoretical framework of peacebuilding used here is based on the definition of peacebuilding as a process of conflict transformation. It should: • • • • •

Be based on a multi-stakeholder approach; Increase understanding of the violent structures that breed conflict; Build capacity and skills in conflict resolution and peacebuilding; Create avenues of cooperation; and Help attain reconcilation among communities.

In this framework, the concepts and framework of peacebuilding are used in order to demonstrate how they can be very useful and relevant to the achievement of sustainable human development and the ultimate goal of peace or sustainable peace as the end vision. The concept of multi-stakeholder approach or the inclusion of the various levels of leaders and groups in activities such as dialogues and conferences will help increase the involvement and sense of ownership of the communities. As part of peacebuilding, the various sectors of society should also gain a deeper understanding of how violent structures (in society) breed conflict. This will help them develop the capacity and skills to foster conflict resolution and peacebuilding as part of the wider formal and informal peace education. During the process of various human development programmes, spaces and avenues of cooperation should be integrated to allow communities to experience solidarity and unity. Lastly, during the process of implementing human development programmes, a reconciliation programme should also be built-in in order for the various communities to re-establish their relationships constructively and positively. A reconciliation programme is useful in allowing communities to uncover the truth/ s with mercy, behind the violence and atrocities of the past and to pursue justice with the goal of achieving peace. Peace processes are mainly about political and power-sharing negotiations, but cannot lose sight of resolving the roots of the conflict that have started and shaped the conflict dynamics. Therefore, this study recommends that during peace negotiations, the frameworks of SHD and peacebuilding should be considered and integrated in their discussions early on. A peace agreement that reflects the values and principles of SHD and peacebuilding will be an agreement that should withstand the tests and challenges of the post-conflict development stage. Often, only after evaluating peace and development programmes (as shown both in the MNLF and GAM peace processes) can stakeholders in a peace process gain a better insight into what went wrong along the way, and how it could have been prevented in the first place.

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In further testing and re-thinking of these theoretical frameworks, the succeeding chapters will expound on the right to self-determination (RSD) conflict of the Bangsamoro – that of the MNLF and the MILF peace track – and present a more in-depth study of two conflict-affected communities in the rural areas of Maguindanao Province. The RSD is placed as the interface and meeting point of both the SHD and Peacebuilding frameworks, taking into account that group-orientated societies, as mentioned by Junne and Verkoren, uphold ‘honour’ more than ‘self-fulfilment’, and thus it is this dimension that can help define the politics of development in this kind of society. Following the definition of peacebuilding as a foundation of peace and as a process of conflict transformation, the framework of peacebuilding is located throughout the whole peace process spectrum as a constant mission. However, it is during the Window of Intervention that both SHD and peacebuilding can be operationalized as part of an explanation of how development per se can be a peacebuilding strategy in itself and can therefore help achieve sustainable peace in the end.

References Abas, Suharto. Personal Interview. 5 April 2012. Abubakar, Ayesah, 2007–2012: “Unpublished Proceedings Reports from the Consolidation for Peace Program” (Penang: REPUSM/SEACSN). Abubakar, Ayesah, 2012: “Unpublished Conference Proceedings Report from the Consolidation for Peace Program, 16–20 January 2012” (Penang: SEACSN). Abubakar, Ayesah; Askandar, Kamarulzaman, 2011: “Defining the Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination in the MILF Peace Process”, in: Sharom, A.; Petcharamesree, S.; Sumarlan, Y. (Eds.): Human Rights in Southeast Asia Series 1: Breaking the Silence (Bangkok: SEAHRN, Mahidol University). ACT for Peace Programme, 2007a: South Central Mindanao 2007 Annual Report (General Santos City: ACT4Peace South Central Mindanao Office). ACT for Peace Programme, 2007b: Peace Links, July–December (Davao City: ACT4Peace Programme) Ahmed, Rafeeuddin; Kulessa, Manfred; Malik, Khalid (Eds.), 2002: “Report on the Philippines”, in: Lessons Learned in Crises and Post Conflict Situations, The Role of UNDP in Reintegration and Reconstruction Programme (New York: UNDP Evaluation Office). Alkire, Sabina, 2010: “Human Development: Definitions, Critiques and Related Concepts”, in: Human Development Research Paper (New York: UNDP). Annan, Kofi, 1998, “The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Peace in Africa”, in: Report of the United Nations Secretary-General to the Security Council (New York: UN). Askandar, Kamarulzaman, 2005: “Peacebuilding in Southeast Asia: Overview, Observations, and the Way Forward”, in: SEACSN Bulletin, January–June (Penang: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network). Askandar, Kamarulzaman; Abubakar, Ayesah, 2007: “The Struggle for Self-determination in Aceh”, in: Institute of Autonomy and Governance (Ed.): Autonomy and Peace Review (Cotabato City: IAG).

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Askandar, Kamarulzaman, 2007: “Introduction: Building Peace- Reflections from Southeast Asia”, in: Askandar, Kamarulzaman (Ed.): Building Peace: Reflections from Southeast Asia (Penang: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network). Askandar, Kamarulzaman; Abubakar, Ayesah (Eds.), 2008: Building Sustainable Peace in Aceh, Mindanao, and Southern Thailand, Proceedings of the Consolidation for Peace Seminar 2 (Penang: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network). Askandar, Kamarulzaman, 2011: “Aceh refugees and Conflict Transformation”, in: Paix Sains Frontieres: Building Peace Across Borders - Accord 22 (London: Conciliation Resources). Askandar, Kamarulzaman; Abubakar, Ayesah, 2012: “Foreword”, in: Mastura, Datu Michael (Ed.): Bangsamoro Quest: The Birth of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Penang: SEACSN and REPUSM): xii–xiii. Askwith, Michael, 1994: “Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Human Development: Semantics or Substance?”, in: IDS Discussion Paper 345 (Brighton: Institute of Development Studies). Balisacan, Arsenio M., 2005: “Foreword 3”, in: Human Development Network (Ed.): Philippine Human Development Report 2005 (Manila: HDN – UNDP – NZAID): ix. Barron, Patrick; Clark, Samuel; Daud, Muslahuddin, 2005: Conflict and Recovery in Aceh: An Assessment of Conflict Dynamics and Options for Supporting the Peace Process, August 23, 2005 (Banda Aceh: World Bank Office) Boltjes, Miek, 2007: Implementing Negotiated Agreements: The Real Challenge to Intrastate Peace (The Hague: TMC Asser Press). BRR and Partners, 2006, “Aceh and Nias: Two Years after the Tsunami”, in: 2006 Progress Report (Banda Aceh: BRR) Burchardt, Tania; Vizard, Polly, 2011: “Operationalizing the Capability Approach as a Basis for Equality and Human Rights Monitoring in Twenty-first-century Britain”, in: Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 12,1 (Oxfordshire: Routledge). Burton, John W., 1990: Conflict: Human Needs Theory (New York: St. Martin’s Press). Carter, April, 2010: “Conditions of Peace”, in: Young, Nigel J. (Ed.): The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Cockell, John G., 1998: “Peacebuilding and Human Security Frameworks for International Responses to Internal Conflict”, in: Wallensteen, Peter (Ed.): Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges, Report No. 48 (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Resolution). Crews, Robin, 2010: “Conflict Resolution, Peace Research, Studies, and Activism”, in: Young, Nigel J. (Ed.): The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press). Curle, Adam, 1971: Making Peace (London: Tavistock Publications). Curle, Adam, 1994: “New challenges for citizen peacemaking”, in: Medicine and War, 10:2, 96– 105, https://doi.org/10.1080/07488009408409148. Curry, Stephen, 2010: Assessment of Development Results: The Republic of the Philippines (New York: UNDP Evaluation Office). Cutter, Anna, 2005: “Peacebuilding: A Literature Review”, in: Development in Practice, 15,6: 778–784, https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520500296682 Denskus, Tobias, 2010: “Peacebuilding Does Not Build Peace”, in: Deconstructing Development Discourse, Buzzwords and Fuzzwords (Warwickshire: Oxfam). Donais, Timothy, 2009: “Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local Ownership, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes”, in: Peace & Change, 34,1: 3–26 (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell). Drydyk, Jay, 2011: “Responsible Pluralism, Capabilities, and Human Rights”, in: Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 12,1. Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group. Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko. 2003: “The Human Development Paradigm: Operationalizing Sen’s Ideas on Capabilities”, in: Feminist Economics, 9,2–3: 301–317. Galtung, Johan; Jacobsen, Carl G.; Brand-Jacobsen, Kai Frithjof, 2000, 2002: Searching for Peace, The Road to Transcend (London/Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press).

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Gasper, Des, 2000: “Development as Freedom: Taking Economics Beyond Commodities – The Cautious Boldness of Amartya Sen”, in: Journal of International Development, 12,7: 989– 1001. Gurr, Tedd, 1970: Why Men Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). Howard, Michael, 1987: “Peace Studies: The Hard Questions”, in: Kaye, Elaine (Ed.): Oxford Peace Lectures 1984–85 Peace Studies: The Hard Questions (London: Rex Collings). Ilagan, Gail T.; Zarate, Charina S.; Dy, Claire A., 2004: Mainstreaming Political Participation in Marginal Communities (Davao City: GoP-UN-MDP3). Ilagan, Gail T., (Ed.), 2008: Living in Peace (Davao City: Act for Peace Programme). Jayme-Montiel, Cristina, 2010: “Peacebuilding: An Overview”, in: Young, Nigel J. (Ed.): The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press). Jolly, Richard; Ray, Deepayan Basu, 2006: “The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports”, in: UNDP (Ed.): National Human Development Report Series, NHDR Occasional Paper, 5, May 2006, UNDP. Junne, Gerd; Verkoren, Willemijn, 2005: Postconflict Development, Meeting New Challenges (London: Lynne Rienner). Kaul, Inge, 2012: “People First: The Human Development Reports”, HDR (New York: UNDP). Kriesberg, Louis, 2010: “Conflict Resolution: An Overview”, in: Young, Nigel J., (Ed.): The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press). Lambac, Jocelyn. Personal Interview, June 2008, Saranggani, Philippines. Lederach, John Paul, 1995: Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformations Across Cultures (New York: Syracuse University Press). Lederach, John Paul, 1997: Building Peace, Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace). Lederach, John Paul, 2003: The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (PA: Good Books). Lingga, Abhoud Syed M., 2007: “The Aceh Peace Process and Lessons for Mindanao”, in: Institute of Autonomy and Governance (Ed.): Autonomy and Peace Monograph (Cotabato City: IAG & Konrad Adenauer Stiftung). Maulana, Nash B., 2009: Kadtabanga: The Struggle Continues (Cotabato City: GoP-ACT for Peace Programme). Mercado. Fr. Eliseo, 2006: “The 10th Anniversary of the Historic Final Peace Agreement between the GRP-MNLF: A Personal Note”, in: GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement Memorial Lectures (Cotabato City: IAG). Miall, Hugh, 2004: “Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task”, in: Austin, Alex; Fischer, Martina; Ropers, Norbert (Eds.): Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). Miall, Hugh, 2010: “Conflict Studies Versus Peace Studies”, in: Young, Nigel J. (Ed.), The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press). Mitchell, Christopher, 2001: “From Controlled Communication to Problem Solving: The Origins of Facilitated Conflict Resolution”, in: The International Journal of Peace Studies, 6,1: 59–67. Moore, Keith M.; Brewster, Charlene; Bertelsen, Michael, 2005: “What We Have Learned”, in: Moore, Keith M. (Ed.): Conflict, Social Capital and Managing Natural Resources: A West African Case Study (Virginia, USA: CABI Publishing). Nussbaum, Martha C., 2011: “Capabilities, Entitlements, Rights: Supplementation and Critique”, in: Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 12,1: 23–38. Ogata, Sadako; Sen, Amartya, 2003: Human Security Now (New York: Commission on Human Security). Overton, John, 2000: Development in Chaos? (Auckland: The Aotearoa New Zealand International Development Studies Network, 2000–2011). Paris, Roland, 2002: “International Peacebuilding and the Mission Civilisatrice”, in: Review of International Studies, 28, 4: 637–656. Ramsbotham, Oliver; Woodhouse, Tom; Miall, Hugh, 2011: Contemporary Conflict Resolution (Cambridge & Malden: Polity).

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Reimann, Cordula, 2004: “Assessing the State-of-the-art in Conflict Transformation”, in: Austin, Alex; Fischer, Martina; Ropers, Norbert (Eds.): Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften). Sahrin, Abdul, 2003: Bangsamoro People’s National Congress, 23 December 2003 in Davao City, in: The Bangsamoro Parsugpatan, March 2004 (Cotabato City: ARMM Publication). Sen, Amartya, 1989: “Development as Capabilities Expansion”, in: Journal of Development Planning, 19,43: 41–58. Sen, Amartya, 1999: Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books). Streeten, Paul (1995): “Foreword”, in: Ul Haq, Mahbub (Ed.): Reflections on Human Development (New York: Oxford University Press). Todaro, Michael P.; Smith, Stephen C., 2006: Economic Development, 9th edition (Harlow, England: Pearson/Addison Wesley) Ul Haq, Mahbub, 1995: Reflections on Human Development (New York: Oxford University Press). United Nations Development Program – Philippines, 2006: Crisis Prevention and Recovery Component, 2006 CPAP Annual Review (Manila: UNDP). Vizard, Polly; Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko; Elson, Diane. 2011: “Introduction: The Capability Approach and Human Rights”, in: Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 12,1: 1–22. Wennman, Achim, 2011: The Political Economy of Peacemaking (London & New York: Routledge). Webel, Charles, 2007: “Introduction: Toward a Philosophy and Metapsychology of Peace”, in: Webel, Charles; Galtung, John (Eds.): Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies (London: Routledge). World Bank, Aceh Peace-Reintegration (BRA) & National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), 2009: Multi-Stakeholder Review of Post-Conflict Programming in Aceh: Identifying the Foundations for Sustainable Peace and Development in Aceh (Aceh: World Bank). Woodhouse, Tom, 2010: “Adam Curle: Radical Peacemaker and Pioneer of Peace Studies”, in: Journal of Conflictology, 1,1: 1–8. Young, Nigel J., 2010: The Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

Internet Sources ACT for Peace Programme, ACT for Peace Mid-Term Review, 30 May 2008. African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, 1981: African Charter on Human and People’s Rights; at: http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/#a20 (17 February 2013). ARMM, Regional Planning and Development Office, 2012; at: http://rpdo.armm.gov.ph/index. php?option=com_content&view=article&id=14&Itemid=69 (22 June 2012). Australian Government, AusAid, 2012: Recommendations in the ACT for Peace Mid-Term Review, 30 May 2008. Central Bank of the Philippines; at: http://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/sdds/exchrate.htm (1 August 2012). Human Development Report Website of the United Nations Development Programme. National Anti-Poverty Commission Website. National Statistics Office. Organization of Islamic Cooperation, 2006: “Report of the Secretary General on the Question of Muslims in the Southern Philippines”, in: Report of the Secretary General on Muslim Minorities and Communities in Non-OIC Member States Submitted to the 33rd Session of the International Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan, 19–21 June 2006.

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Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005: Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration – Background Studies (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2005). Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005: Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration – Final Report (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006). United Nations, 1987: “Our Common Future”; at: www.un-documents.net/ocf-ov.htm#1.2 (14 October 2011). United Nations, Global and Regional HDR, 2011. United Nations, 1994: Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press). United Nations, 1966: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights/International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICCPR/ICESCR), United Nations, 1945: UN Charter; at: http://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/introductory-note/ index.html (17 February 2013). United Nations, 2007: Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, 61/295, The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports: http://hdr.undp.org/en/ humandev/. United Nations Development Programme Philippines, 2006: Crisis Prevention and Recovery Component, 2006 CPAP Annual Review (city: UNDP Philippines): 13. UNDP Report, 2008: ACT for Peace Mid-Term Review, 30 May 2008. World Bank, MTF-RDP General Information, 2012; at: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTEAPREGTOPSOCDEV/Resources/MTFRDPGeneralInformation.pdf and its news on the BDA partnership; at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2012/06/08/wb-bda-partners-signagreement-to-promote-peace-development-in-mindanao (28 June 2012). World Bank, “Executive Summary”, 2003: Human Development for Peace and Prosperity in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (Manila: The World Bank Human Development Sector Unit, East Asia and Pacific Region, November 2003). World Bank, Aceh Peace-Reintegration (BRA) & National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS), 2009: Multi-Stakeholder Review of Post-Conflict Programming in Aceh: Identifying the Foundations for Sustainable Peace and Development in Aceh (MSR 2009) (Aceh: World Bank): 52.

Chapter 3

The Study Area: Mindanao and the Bangsamoro Conflict Communities

3.1

Introduction

Mindanao is the second largest group of islands in the Philippines, with an area of 105,712.2 km2.1 This southern part of the country is bounded by the Sulu Sea right next to Sabah, Malaysia in the south west, the Mindanao Sea right next to Celebes Sea of the Indonesian Archipelago in the southernmost part, and the Philippine Sea leading to the Asia Pacific Ocean in the south-eastern part. Politically, Mindanao is divided into six regions, namely the Zamboanga Peninsula (Region 9), Northern Mindanao (Region 10), Davao (Region 11), Soccksargen (Region 12), Caraga (Region 13), and the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The ARMM is placed under an autonomous government among all other regions in Mindanao (Fig. 3.1). The majority of the Bangsamoro people live in the ARMM but many also reside in other Mindanao regions and as far as the Visayas and Luzon areas of the country.2 The ARMM consists of five provinces: Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Basilan,3 Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Its capital is located in Cotabato City, although it is not a part of the ARMM region. Historically, the Bangsamoro people lay claim to the whole of Mindanao as their homeland, including the island of Palawan as part of their ancestral domain (Fig. 3.1). The issue of ancestral domain is further mentioned in the succeeding sections on conflict and peace processes. There are thirteen ethno-linguistic groups that comprise the Bangsamoro. These groups are the Tausug, Maguindanao, Maranao, Iranun, Kalagan, Kolibugan, Sama-Bangingi/ Samal, Yakan, Badjao, Jama Mapun, Sangil, Palawani and Molbog. The first three are the biggest groups in terms of population.

1 See Tri-People Consortium for Peace and Progress and Development of Mindanao (TRICOM 1998: 3). 2 The three groupings of islands of the Philippine archipelago are Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. 3 In Basilan, the city of Isabela is not part of ARMM.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 A. U. Abubakar, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 16, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53387-2_3

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Fig. 3.1 Map of the Philippines showing the various regions and provinces. Source CeRGIS-UMS (2017)

3.1 Introduction

89

According to the Philippine census of the year 2000, there were 18.1 million people in Mindanao. The Philippine Human Development Report 2005 states that one-fifth (20.1%) of this population were Muslim Filipinos residing in Mindanao. They constituted 5.1% of the total population of the entire country.4 The national statistics, however, have always encountered problems in properly reflecting the population figures of this group due to incomplete surveys that occurred during times of armed conflict. On the other hand, the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA)5 census of the year 2000 shows that 10.9% of the population in the Philippines were Muslim, with over one-third or 34.0% of that population living in Mindanao. OMA’s census shows that out of a total of 8,349,183 Muslims in the Philippines, about three out of four (or 6,157,576) were living in Mindanao when the census was conducted.6 Apart from the Bangsamoro people, Mindanao is also the historical homeland of the Indigenous Peoples (IPs) locally known as Lumads. They, too, maintain their traditional cultures and religions and also assert their right to self-determination. The third group of people inhabiting Mindanao is the Christian majority. The early Christian settlers from Luzon and the Visayas regions came during the American colonial times and continued to migrate to Mindanao during the first Filipino government as part of state-sponsored homestead programmes.7 The rest came in more recent years. Mindanao scholar, Rudy Rodil presents a distribution of these three groups of inhabitants using the Year 2000 Census as presented in Table 3.1. The Indigenous Peoples or Lumads (consisting of 35 tribes and sub-tribes) constitute 8.45% of the population, the Bangasamoro people (the 13 ethno-linguistic groups) 20.12%, and the Christian settlers and their descendants 71.43%. In Table 3.1, the distribution of the Bangsamoro/Moro, IP/Lumad and Christian Migrants in Mindanao also shows the addition of the province of Palawan, which has historically been part of the ancestral domain claims of both the Bangsamoro and the indigenous people (IP) groups but is now under the jurisdiction of the Luzon group of Islands. While the majority of the IP groups have developed on their own throughout the centuries, several groups trace their origins to some Bangsamoro ethnic groups. Examples are the oral histories of the Maguindanao and the Tedurays, the Higaonon and the Maranao, the B’laan and the Maguindanao,

4

Muslim Filipino is a term used by the Philippine National Statistics Office. Generally, this identity mainly refers to the thirteen ethno-linguistic groups of the Bangsamoro people and may not include Muslim converts – although, from the point of view of the Bangsamoro, it would be more appropriate for the term ‘Muslim Filipino’ to include Muslim convert groups, while the term ‘Bangsamoro’ should remain particular to the thirteen ethno-linguistic groups historically found in Mindanao. Also see explanations in the Philippine Human Development Report (2005: 14–15). 5 This office has now become the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF) since 2010. 6 Philippine Human Development Report (2005: 14–15). 7 See Rudy Rodil, “Peace in 20 Years!”, PowerPoint presentation at a seminar held in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, 31 January 2009; see also Gutierrez, Eric; Borras, Saturnino, Jr.: The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies, Policy Studies 8 (Washington, D.C.: East West Center, 2004): 7–13.

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Table 3.1 Moro-Lumad-Migrant populations in Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan according to mother tongue classification, by province, in the year 2000 census (Adapted from Rodil (2010: 29). In this published article, there is one region missing in Table 3.1 but a correction was made by the author in an email correspondence, 17 May 2012. The census of the year 2000 remains the most cited census among scholars as the 2010 Census is highly questioned, especially by officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao). Source Philippine NSO, Census 2000

Mindanao Basilan Zamboanga del Norte Zamboanga del Sur Bukidnon Camiguin Misamis Occidental Misamis Oriental Davao del Norte Davao del Sur Davao Oriental South Cotabato Sarangani Compostela Valley Lanao del Norte North Cotabato Sultan Kudarat Cotabato City Marawi City Lanao del Sur Maguindanao Sulu Tawi Tawi Agusan del Norte Agusan del Sur

Total

Moro number

%

Lumad number

%

Migrant number

%

18,104,337 332,579 821,921

3,643,032 255,239 41,335

20.12 76.75 5.03

1,530,266 197 139,265

8.45 0.06 16.94

12,931,039 77,143 641,321

71.43 23.20 78.03

1,930,822

261,224

13.53

124,421

6.44

1,545,177

80.03

1,060,253 74,134 485,978

8,684 152 1,055

0.82 0.21 0.22

201,387 131 21,809

18.99 0.18 4.49

850,182 73,851 463,114

80.19 99.62 95.30

1,123,529

9,689

0.86

30,671

2.73

1,083,169

96.41

742,206

16,005

2.16

45,276

6.10

680,925

91.74

1,902,993 445,733 1,100,511 410,137 579,719

49,778 18,041 50,636 37,633 9,779

2.62 4.05 4.60 9.18 1.69

269,400 73,238 126,624 120,638 65,846

14.16 16.43 11.51 29.41 11.36

1,583,815 354,454 923,251 251,866 504,094

83.23 79.52 83.89 61.41 86.95

757,084

189,120

24.98

5,509

0.73

562,455

74.29

957,294 585,768 161,517 129,809 668,860 800,369 619,550 322,066 551,265

187,195 129,373 97,218 125,072 616,873 632,382 590,948 306,804 4,698

19.55 22.09 60.19 96.35 92.23 79.01 95.38 95.26 0.85

60,062 45,682 1,573 120 1,316 58,983 213 112 14,407

6.27 7.80 0.97 0.09 0.20 7.37 0.03 0.03 2.61

710,037 410,713 62,726 4,617 50,671 109,004 28,389 15,150 532,160

74.17 70.12 38.84 3.56 7.58 13.62 4.58 4.70 96.53

558,414

1,640

0.29

103,851

18.60

452,923 81.11 (continued)

3.1 Introduction

91

Table 3.1 (continued) Total Surigao del Norte Surigao del Sur Mindanao Palawan Grand Total

Moro number

%

Lumad number

%

Migrant number

%

480,691

679

0.14

2,534

0.53

477,478

99.33

501,135 18,104,337 752,114 18,856,451

1,780 3,643,032 51,829 3,694,861

0.36

17,001 1,530,266 51829 1,582,095

3.39

482,354 12,931,039 648,456 13,579,495

96.25

6.89 19.59

6.89 8.39

86.22 72.02

et al. As such, there are close affinities between the Bangsamoros and some IP groups. In spite of the seemingly chaotic environment in Mindanao, the general Mindanao economic indicators show that the economy continues to be resilient. The National Statistical Coordination Body (NSCB) July 2007 reports that the Northern Mindanao area posted the highest growth (from 4.4% in 2005 to 6.8% in 2006) among the Mindanao regions and third among all the Philippine regions. However, these positive indicators are valid for non-ARMM areas. This disparity in performance indicators vis-à-vis the ARMM clearly shows uneven development and growth, which can be perceived as one of the causes of the conflict.

3.2

History and the Bangsamoro People

Mindanao and the history of all Indigenous Peoples started even before the coming of Islam in the region in the early thirteenth century. The period of this Islamization epitomized the history of the Bangsamoro people. The Bangsamoro first recorded the coming of Tuan Mashaika from the Malacca Sultanate (Malaysia) to the Sulu Islands. Tuan Mashaika introduced Islam to the people of the Sulu Islands. By the fifteenth century, Raja Baginda and his son-in-law started the Sulu Sultanate, which reigned over the Sulu Islands, including Palawan. In 1515, Sharif Kabungsuan (from the Johor Sultanate, Malaysia) founded the Maguindanao Sultanate that included the vast parts of mainland Mindanao as its territory. By the mid-sixteenth century, the majority of the peoples of Sulu, Mindanao, and other parts of the Philippines (as far as Cebu and Manila) had become Muslims.8 In 1521, the first Spanish expedition successfully reached the island of Mactan in Cebu with a mission to colonize, but it was abruptly stopped by a local Muslim chieftain named Lapu-Lapu. It was only in 1565 that Islamization in the Philippines was halted with the arrival of the Legazpi Expedition. This also signalled the start of 8

For a comprehensive account of the historical lineage of the development of the Sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao, see the extensive work of Majul (1973).

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Spanish colonization in the Luzon and Visayas Islands and in some parts of Mindanao. However, this colonial conquest met its fiercest resistance from the Muslims in Mindanao, who engaged the Spaniards in a war that lasted for 300 years and in trying to take full control of the Philippine territories. This was known as the “Moro Wars” (Majul 1973: 121–189; 233–297). The name ‘Moro’ was given to the Muslims of Mindanao, who reminded the Spaniards of their ‘Moor’ enemies back in their Spanish kingdom (Majul 1973: 121–189; 233–297). The Philippines gained their freedom from the Spaniards in 1898 and simultaneously inherited another foreign rule from the then emerging super power – the United States of America. Spain ceded the Philippines to the USA under the Treaty of Paris. In the treaty, Spain also claimed to have control over the islands of Sulu and Mindanao and included them as part of its sovereign rule in the Philippine territory. However, upon the US take-over, the Americans found themselves lost and in no position of control in Mindanao, where the vast majority remained beholden to the Sultans and Datus. Contrary to the Spanish claim, the people of Mindanao had not been effectively colonized by them, but instead continued to flourish under their own well-structured and indigenous datuship government system.9 In the census year of 1918, only the Bangsamoro and other Indigenous Peoples (IPs) were the main inhabitants of the islands. There were no Christian settler communities then. By 1970, however, due to the mass migration policy started by the American government in 1903, there were already 38 towns that made up the Christian settler group, which effectively marginalized the Bangsamoro and the IPs (Rodil 2008: 32). Since the early 1900s, Mindanao had been regarded as the last frontier of the American government in the Philippines. The integration of the Moro people of Mindanao into the Philippine nation state became their main project (Fulton 2007; Gowing 1983). American rule in the Philippines was briefly halted by another foreign power – the Japanese. The Japanese Imperial Army landed in the Philippines in December 1941, but reached Davao and Sulu in April 1942. The Bangsamoros regarded this as another occupation by foreigners and fought against the Japanese. Some of the prominent Moro leaders enlisted with the American forces,10 while others joined the Japanese. Both sides of collaborators thought of their survival in the face of two colonialists (Jubair 1999: 111–113). The Japanese occupation in the Philippines ended in February 1945 and the Americans again assumed power. By 1946, the Americans finally turned over the rule of the Philippine government to the Filipinos. The newly formed Philippine government was dominated by Tagalogs and Christians from Luzon.11 But for the first time, then Philippine 9 See Fulton (2007: 12, 33, 38–43) discussing the U.S.-Spain’s Treaty of Paris in relation to Mindanao with reference to the organized leaderships among the Bangsamoro groups. 10 Among the prominent Moros who became generals in the US forces in Mindanao was Salipada Pendatun. For stories of his war exploits, together with other Moro and Christians who fought together during the Japanese Occupation period, see Baclagon (1988). 11 The Tagalogs are a distinct ethno-linguistic grouping found in the northern part of the country called the Luzon group of islands. They speak the Tagalog language and most of them, if not all,

3.2 History and the Bangsamoro People

93

President Sergio Osmena appointed two Moros to government posts, namely Salipada Pendatun as Governor of Cotabato and Datu Manalao Mindalano as part of the Executive Committee of the Philippine Veterans Legion in Manila. Also, with the help of the new president, three Moro leaders were successfully elected during the 1946 national elections – Salipada Pendatun became senator, while Datu Ombra Amilbangsa of Sulu and Manalao Mindalano of Lanao became congressmen (Jubair 1999: 114). The new Philippine government pursued a policy of integration for the Bangsamoro groups, despite their firm resistance. It also carried on with its various development projects, making Mindanao its major source for food, timber, agricultural produce, energy power, and other natural resources. In turn, the Government installed public institutions and services that were meant to help develop the people. Nonetheless, this process of development was sceptically viewed by the Moro people who were suspicious of the Government’s aims to integrate them into the new Filipino society.12 The government’s perceived centrist approach and political assertions in developing Mindanao resulted in the marginalization of the Moro people in their own lands.13

3.3

Conflict and the Peace Processes

It is important to note that the Moros did not only continue to fight the Spanish colonizers but also the succeeding Americans and Japanese who ruled the Philippines. It was this same spirit of struggle for freedom that the Bangsamoro revolutionary movements have continued to resist against the present Philippine government.14 The contemporary armed conflict in Mindanao started in the early 1970s between the Philippine military forces and the Bangsamoro liberation groups.15 Young and well-educated leaders, namely Dimas Pundato, Abulkhayr Alonto, Nur Misuari, Hashim Salamat and many others led the formation of the

are Roman Catholics and Christian by religion. The entry of Christian Filipinos in governing Mindanao started during the American period. See Fulton (2007: 370, 375). 12 See the Foreword by Alejandro Melchor, in Majul (1999), where he clearly states the aims of the Philippine government to develop the tribal peoples by integrating them into the new political system. To quote, “One of the happy effects of martial law was to begin the process of breaking down the many tribalistic enclaves into which the Filipinos had come to enfold themselves, and merging all of them as so many cooperating unit is into one single unitary system.”, in p. xii. See also an article by de los Santos, Jr. (1998: 102). 13 In various parts of the study by Gutierrez/Borras Jr. (2004); in Mastura (1988); in various parts of the book by Mastura (1984); in Jubair (1999, 2007); an earlier discussion of the impact on land ownership in Mindanao can be found in Glang (1969:13–14). 14 A precursor to the MNLF was the Muslim Independence Movement started by Datu Udtog. See McKenna (1998: 144–149). 15 For a better understanding of the situation of the Bangsamoro and the difficult relationship dynamics between the Filipinos and the Bangsamoros in Mindanao and under the early Filipino government, see Glang (1969).

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Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).16 This armed movement was the resolute response of the Bangsamoro to a series of events: • the Jabidah Massacre; • the non-recognition of the Muslim Independence Movement Manifesto; • the numerous occasions of Christian and military atrocities against Moro communities (known as the Ilaga operations); and • the Manili Massacre and worsening militarization and suppression of the Moros during the time of Martial Law declared by President Ferdinand Marcos.17 At the height of military rule and violence, the MNLF was successful in exposing the atrocities committed against the Bangsamoro and brought about the internationalization of the conflict. Thus, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) became involved. It was the OIC led by Libya that initiated the peace negotiations between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)18 and the MNLF. OIC’s successful intervention pressured President Marcos to negotiate and recognize the MNLF as the representative of the Bangsamoro. At the start of the peace negotiation, the MNLF’s position was clear – gaining independence for Mainland Mindanao, the Sulu Islands including Basilan and Tawi-Tawi and Palawan (MINSUPALA). However, international relations and diplomacy (between GRP and OIC) emerged more prominently as the OIC successfully convinced MNLF’s Nur Misuari to accept ‘autonomy’ and the conditions of “constitutional procedures” as given by President Marcos.19 The GRP and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement on 23 December 1976. This agreement, covering the areas indicated in Fig. 3.2, was unfortunately not fully implemented, causing the breakdown of the relationship between the GRP and the MNLF in the succeeding years.20 As a show of moral support to the MNLF, the OIC granted 16

According to interviews with MNLF and MILF officials, the initial stages of forming the MNLF occurred in the late 1960s and started among Bangsamoro students at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, and continued with students in Manila and with some traditional leaders in Mindanao. 17 For a detailed discussion on the Jabidah massacre and other violent episodes in Mindanao, see Jubair (1999: 131–143). See also the four part series of Mindanews articles on the Jabidah Massacre and updates on the lone survivor; at: http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2011/02/ 14/lone-survivor-of-jabidah-massacre-dies-in-vehicular-accident/ (17 May 2012). 18 This GRP acronym for the Philippine government was later changed to GPH in 2010 as part of an ISO naming system. Thus, the old documents in relation to the peace processes show GRP, while the recent ones use GPH. 19 In interviews with senior MNLF officials, it was stated that MNLF success against the government forces during the early Martial Law years could have brought them outright independence since many parts of the Bangsamoro areas have been taken over by them militarily. However, the OIC persuaded them to pursue its aims in a negotiated settlement. Reports of this military campaign in a book by Abat (1993) showed the strength of the MNLF. Conversely, the erosion of loyalty within the MNLF was shown by the defections of some of its commanders to the Marcos government. The internal politics of the early MNLF is discussed by McKenna (1998). 20 The whole section relies on the article of Abubakar (2007). For more details of these events that led to the formation of the MNLF, see Jubair (1999). To know more about the oil embargo imposed by the OIC on the Philippines, see also Majul (1998). See the Organization of Islamic

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Fig. 3.2 A map of Mindanao showing the areas covered in the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. Source CeRGIS-UMS (2017)

MNLF observer status during the 1977 Islamic Conference (under Resolution No. 2/8-P). In the following year, the MNLF was bestowed the status of “legitimate representative of Moslems in the Southern Philippines” (Rodil 2000: 70–72). The conflict between the MNLF and the Government continued throughout the administration of President Marcos. To allay the doubts of the OIC countries regarding his commitment to the Tripoli Agreement, President Marcos created two autonomous regions in Mindanao – Regions 9 (Western Mindanao) and 12 (Central Mindanao).21 On 21 September 1977 there occurred another significant challenge to the MNLF organization. Hashim Salamat’s group broke away from the MNLF soon after the collapse of the Tripoli Agreement. The reason behind this split is mainly attributed to leadership differences between Misuari and Salamat over the years.22 Consequently, Salamat formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Hence,

Countries website; at: https://www.oic-oci.org/home/?lan=en where documents on the Bangsamoro issue and the MNLF’s observer status as the Bangsamoro representative are available. 21 Ibid., pp. 72–73. Region 9 includes the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Zamboanga, Pagadian, Dipolog and Dapitan, while Region 12 includes provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat and the cities of Marawi, Cotabato, and Iligan. 22 A more thorough explanation of this MNLF break-up is explained in Iribani (2006: 40–42).

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the quest for the right to self-determination and the peace process have been pursued in two parallel peace tracks – those of the MNLF and the MILF.

3.3.1

The Jeddah Accord

The fall of the authoritarian regime of President Ferdinand Marcos opened the start of a democratic-orientated government ushered by President Corazon Aquino in 1986. Soon after the successful People Power Revolution in February 1986, President Aquino immediately met MNLF’s Nur Misuari in Jolo on 5 September 1986. This meeting resulted in a Joint Statement in which the two leaders agreed on three points: (1) that the Government and the MNLF would uphold a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities; (2) that MNLF would organize consultations with leaders in other provinces in Mindanao; and (3) that the Government and the MNLF agreed to hold peace negotiations under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) (Rodil 2000: 76–77). Consequently, the ceasefire took immediate effect while Misuari proceeded to conduct his public consultations throughout the key cities in Mindanao. President Corazon Aquino went on to organize a Constitutional Commission23 which she tasked with the establishment of an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras as part of this new Philippine Constitution. The peace re-negotiations between the Government and the MNLF officially commenced with the signing of the Jeddah Accord on 3–4 January 1987. The Accord’s main message was for “the two panels to continue discussion on the proposal for the grant of full autonomy to Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi and Palawan, subject to democratic processes” (as cited by Rodil 2000: 79). The said meetings were scheduled to be completed between 9 February and 9 May 1987. As observed by historian Rudy Rodil, these peace negotiations were also done in the Philippines for the first time without the presence of the OIC, without the MNLF Chair Nur Misuari heading the delegation, and with both parties effectively not making use of the Tripoli Agreement (Rodil 2000: 79). In the February–March 1987 meetings, the MNLF asserted three points as follows: (1) the granting of outright autonomy to twenty-two provinces; (2) the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to be replaced by a new armed force composed of at least 85% of the Bangsamoro armed forces; and (3) the nomination by the MNLF of the autonomous region’s chief minister and other officials.

23

Under the aegis of President Corazon Aquino, who declared a revolutionary government after the People Power Revolution, a new Philippine Constitution was written in 1987, departing from the Marcos’ established Constitution and its governing policies.

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While both parties compromised on the granting of autonomy to the thirteen provinces as stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, they reached a deadlock due to the condition made by the Government that stipulated the establishment of a Regional Consultative Commission (RCC) to draft the autonomy bill for submission to Congress. Chair Nur Misuari appealed to President Aquino to issue an executive decree granting the autonomy, but this was not heeded. The decision regarding the autonomy was then effectively put in the hands of Congress when it convened on 27 July 1987 (Majul 1998: 170). As a result of these meetings, the intention of the Jeddah Accord was not fulfilled (Rodil 2000: 79). The GRP-MNLF peace negotiations reached a stalemate. In the absence of cooperation from the MNLF, President Aquino pursued the establishment of the Regional Consultative Commission to create the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (RCC-MM). In this commission, fifty-two leaders from various communities throughout Mindanao were appointed. The RCC experience was said to be the first experiment of a more comprehensive participation in drafting the Organic Act of the would-be Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This experience reflected the many difficulties in forging the vision for power-sharing among the tri-people of Mindanao. Mostly, it showed how deeply-rooted bias and suspicion were against the Bangsamoro groups by the Christian and the Indigenous Peoples or Lumads. Eventually, the RCC passed its draft for the Organic Act to Congress and Congress further deliberated on this draft. The ensuing Mindanao plebiscite on 19 November 1989 yielded a strong statement. Only four Muslim-dominated provinces – Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi – voted to be part of the ARMM (Rodil 2000: 60–89). As a result, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao was established and started its functions on 9 July 1990 with Zacaria Candao as its Regional Governor.24

3.3.2

The 1996 Final Peace Agreement

The new Philippine democratic government experience, together with the seemingly unilateral establishment of an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), did not dampen the enthusiasm of the Bangsamoro liberation groups. Both the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) led by Nur Misuari and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) led by Hashim Salamat remained steadfast in building up their strength and influence on the ground. In spite of the failure in negotiations with President Corazon Aquino’s government, the MNLF gained more influence on the diplomatic front, specifically within the circle of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) (Iribani 2006: 44–47). The latter declared the MNLF as the “sole and legitimate representative of the Bangsamoro people.” On a regular basis, OIC members were encouraged to support and extend help to the MNLF in

24

See the ARMM website.

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its fight for the right to self-determination of the Bangsamoro people. In parallel, the OIC maintained its encouragement on the Philippine government to continue to talk to the MNLF and honour its commitments in the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. President Corazon Aquino’s term of office ended and was succeeded in 1992 by a former military general, President Fidel Ramos. Upon assumption to office, he officially announced his intention to negotiate with the MNLF and other military rebels. It was in September 1992 that the Government started its communications with the MNLF. This was immediately followed by the first exploratory talks in Tripoli, Libya between the GRP Panel led by Batangas Congressman and former military colonel general Eduardo Ermita, together with Tawi-Tawi Congressman Nur Jaafar and Silvestre Afable, Jr., and the MNLF Panel led by Chair Nur Misuari, with Hatimil Hassan, Ustadz Abdulbaki Abubakar, Habib Mujahab Hashim, and Ibrahim Omar.25 The process of negotiations between these two parties was marked by many challenges from increasing problems of peace and security issues, mainly the regular spate of kidnappings in Mindanao with which the MNLF were asked to help,26 to what seems to be a tug-of-war between the offices of Congressman Ermita and the National Unification Commission (NUC) in carrying out the peace agenda of the Ramos administration, to the controversial issue of insisting on conducting the opening ceremony inside the Philippines or in a third country as agreed upon by the OIC, to the near confrontations between AFP and MNLF forces due to miscommunications and misperceptions, and even to the usual moments of scepticism and low morale that both parties felt in many instances.27 In the end, the parties reached the First Round of Formal GRP-MNLF Peace Talks held in Indonesia between 23 October and 7 November 1993. Under the auspices of the OIC, the Government of Indonesia hosted and brokered the meetings. As this series of peace negotiations quickly gained momentum, the negotiations on what the Government could give vis-à-vis the demands of the MNLF proved to be the most difficult. Abraham Iribani, a consultant to the talks, observed the last defining moments of the negotiations, citing a conversation between Chair Nur Misuari and Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, as follows: The GRP position was the declaration of the Zone of Peace and Development (ZOPAD) and the establishment of the SPCPD with an Executive Council and the Consultative Assembly to be deputized by COMELEC during the referendum or plebiscite. It would be

Ibid. The first series of contacts were detailed on pp. 57–62. Later on the composition of the negotiating panels was changed, except for the part of the MNLF. Misuari remained the chair throughout the process. 26 It is during this period that the Abu Sayyaf group slowly emerged as a main perpetrator of kidnap for ransom operations in Mindanao. However, there were also several instances of ordinary individuals and families being involved in armed confrontations with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) because they were either victims of human rights violations by the AFP or it was a story of mistaken identity by the AFP. These unique stories that were often misperceived by the media are given in the book of Iribani (2006). 27 Ibid. All these stories can be found in Iribani’s accounts. 25

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administrative and developmental in character. With regard to the terms of office, this is not yet certain. But this can always be extended. ‘Even if there is a change in Administration, Torres told (me), ‘you do not have to worry because they will need you – they will need peace. But you have to make good, the first two or four years. Regarding the referendum, the COMELEC can delegate the SPCPD. For the area, you must control the ARMM and then add the remaining 10 provinces. The wisdom here is that the ARMM has political control. The present ARMM officials (particularly Gov. Pangandaman) did not know how to use it. As to funding, President Ramos has contingency funds. He gave his word. President Ramos wants you to decide on projects; the funds will be coming also from existing Departments of Government. With regards to the Consultative Council, the members can be increased so that the MNLF or its representatives will be the majority. The Head of the Executive Council will be the same as the Head of the Assembly. The Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) can be utilized for development because it has assets. MNLF integration with the AFP can be further discussed and so can the Regional Security Force. The 123 consensus points in the Interim Agreements can be part of this and those that do not need congressional approval can be implemented. The Provisional Government will come after the plebiscite. The Constitution cannot really be avoided.28

Hearing the above cited Government’s offer, the MNLF Panel drafted its own counter-offer. Among the main points that it put forward were: (1) the granting of autonomy in fourteen provinces and ten cities without referendum/plebiscite; (2) the establishment of a political institution, a Provisional Government which should be installed as soon as the agreement is signed; (3) peace and order; (4) free hand in planning for development of the area and budgeting including representation in the BIMP-EAGA29; (5) referendum to be handled by the authorities in the area; (6) implementation of Shariah for the Muslims; (7) appropriations of existing Departments including the SPDA30; (8) administrative authority, particularly over the local government and line agencies in the area; (9) withdrawal of AFP troops in the area; and (10) administrative funds.31 Items 3–10 were all included in the Tripoli Agreement. Related to the Government’s offer, the MNLF was also confronted with the issue of having Chair Nur Misuari accept the offer of running for governor in the ARMM elections under President Fidel Ramos’ political party. This offer was reluctantly decided by more MNLF officials who may have felt that the ARMM was not the political entity that they wanted. There was a great deal of urgency for this decision

28

Ibid. One-on-one meeting of Chair Misuari and Executive Secretary Ruben Torres in Dubai on 29 May 1996, as documented by Chair Misuari (2006: 300). 29 This is the Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines-East Asia Growth Area economic and trade programme started by President Ramos. 30 The Southern Philippines Development Authority is a government-controlled corporation project of President Marcos created to be part of his catch-up plan for Mindanao. 31 See Iribani (2006: 302–303). Although this was a draft counter proposal, as part of the back-channelling process which may have not reached the formal negotiations talk, it is included here as relevant information in order to understand the mindset of the MNLF peace panel during that time when they learned of the government offer through Secretary Torres.

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to be made by the MNLF. Because this event was happening even before any peace agreement could be forged, its impact proved to be more crucial.32 On 12 July 1996, Chair Nur Misuari filed his candidacy for election as governor of the ARMM, fully assisted by President Fidel Ramos’ high-ranking officials (Iribani 2006: 315). By putting the MNLF in the ARMM leadership, this was supposedly the start of a good cooperation between the Government and the MNLF in laying the path towards a peace agreement. As a result, the Final Peace Agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front was signed on 2 September 1996 in Manila in the presence of the OIC Secretary General, Dr. Hamid Al-Gabid, and the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas. Subsequently, Chair Nur Misuari, with full support from President Fidel Ramos’ political party, won as the governor of the ARMM on 11 September. He also became Chair of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). The content of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the Government and the MNLF is mainly divided into two phases of implementation and mechanisms. The elements of these phases are described below. Phase 1 provided for the transitory period of three years from 2 September 1996: • Establishment of Special Zones of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) Areas covering the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, South Cotabato, Sarangani, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, and Palawan, and the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, Pagadian, Zamboanga, Marawi, Iligan, General Santos, and Puerto Princesa. • Establishment of Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) which would have the following powers in SZOPAD: • Exercise control and supervision over appropriate agencies engaged in peace and development activities in the area • Monitor, promote and coordinate development efforts • Attract foreign investment • Implement peace and development projects • Be deputized by the Commission on Elections to assist in the preparation of the holding of elections, referenda or plebiscites and people’s initiatives • Creation of the Darul Iftah (Advisory Council) • Establishment of the Consultative Assembly having powers, among others, to make rules and regulations to the extent necessary for the effective and efficient administration of the affairs of the area • Channelling of public and private investment into the area to spur economic development

32

In a hindsight, the Government’s offer for Misuari to run as governor can also be viewed as a tactic for the MNLF to have an early “buy-in” to the rest of the government offer in the formal peace negotiations. At one point, soon after Misuari’s official candidacy, and before the peace agreement signing, Misuari threatened to back out of the elections.

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• Integration of 5,750 members of the MNLF into the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Joining of 1,500 MNLF elements with the Philippine National Police • Legislative enactment to incorporate all the pertinent provisions of the 1996 Peace Agreement by amending Republic Act 6734, otherwise known as the Organic Act of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao • Conduct of plebiscite Phase 2 covers the establishment of a genuine autonomous government with powers that include: • The Executive Council, Legislative Assembly, Administrative System and Right of Representation in the National Government • The establishment of the Special Regional Security Forces for the Autonomous Region • Educational System to develop total spiritual, intellectual, social, cultural, scientific and physical aspects of Bangsamoro people to make them God-fearing, productive patriotic citizens conscious of their Filipino and Islamic values and Islamic cultural heritage • The economic and financial system, control over mines and minerals • Shariah • While other powers would remain within the National Government, namely, Foreign Affairs, National Defence and Security, Postal Service, Coinage, Fiscal and Monetary Policies, Adminstration of Justice except Shariah, Quarantine, Customs and Tariff, Citizenship, Naturalization, Immigration, Deportation, General Auditing, Civil Service and Elections, Foreign Trade, Patents, Trademarks, Trade-names and Copyrights (as cited by Parcasio 2006: 1–32). As the implementation of the peace agreement unfolded, the bill containing the specific powers and mandate of the ARMM, drafted by the MNLF through the ARMM’s Legislative Assembly, was passed on to the Philippine Congress as the newer version of the ARMM Organic Act, named the Republic Act 9054. However, this new law was a revision of what was originally submitted by the MNLF. This was only the start of the many arguments between the Government, the MNLF and the OIC regarding the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement.33 Crucial to this peace agreement was the impact on the post-conflict developments and the expected dividends of peace that the people were waiting for. The lack of financial resources and inadequate management as failure factors in the implementation of the MNLF peace process have been widely discussed by observers, civil society groups, and the officials of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). While Mindanao may be identified as the beneficiary of the many donor funded development programmes in collaboration with the Philippine government, it remains unclear how much of these programmes 33

For a thorough discussion on the arguments regarding the failure of the 1996 FPA, see Rasul (2007) and IAG (2006).

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benefited the conflict-affected areas. What is clear, however, is that during the period of 2000–2006, the ARMM received an average of only 1% of the total number of development loans (by the national government) and less than 1% of the committed amounts (Rasul 2007: 77). On the other hand, the GoP-UN-MDP became the flagship programme of post-conflict development as part of the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement with the MNLF. The Philippine government itself was constrained by limited financial resources, making donor funding more important in delivering the peace dividends, especially to the immediate MNLF communities (Ahmed et al. 2002: 93). It is common knowledge that the Philippine government did not provide ample monetary investments in fulfilling the post-conflict development needs of the MNLF communities and the ARMM region.34 As of 2012, the MNLF has remained consistent in its position that the Philippine government has not delivered its commitments and continues to request the OIC to facilitate the review of the implementation process.35 On the other hand, the Philippine government contends that it has fulfilled its obligations.36

3.3.3

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front Peace Talks

Early in 1974, just before the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was born as a faction group within the MNLF. A major reason for this fracture was the differences on the direction of the organization within the leadership ranks. The New MNLF, later renamed the MILF, was led by Ust. Hashim Salamat. In later years, what would distinguish the MILF’s position is Ust. Hashim Salamat’s vision for the Bangsamoro armed struggle to be guided by the following aims: (1) the establishment of a true Muslim community (2) establishment of a genuine Islamic system of government (3) application of a real Islamic way of life in all aspects of life.37 With the final signing of the GRP-MNLF peace pact in 1996, President Fidel Ramos started another round of peace negotiations with the MILF in 1997. The process began as a direct negotiation between the two parties. This was continued when President Joseph Estrada assumed office and had achieved substantial

See Rasul (2007) in Part VI, entitled “The Economics of Peace: Debating Fiscal Autonomy”, and Part VII, entitled “Overseas Development Assistance in Mindanao.” 35 In discussions by MNLF’s Hatimil Hassan during the Consolidation for Peace for Mindanao Seminar (COP5) held in Penang, Malaysia, 16–20 January 2012. 36 See the official statement of OPAPP Secretary Teresita Deles at the 2 March 2012 meeting in Banding. 37 As cited by Mastura (2012: 12), who cites this vision from the Bangsamoro Mujahid book of the MILF. 34

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progress.38 In spite of this development, the nation was caught by surprise with the imposition of an “all-out-war” by the Government against the MILF in 2000.39 This episode of full-scale armed confrontation lasted for more than six months and brought the whole peace negotiations to a halt.40 Contrary to President Joseph Estrada’s view that he was winning the peace in Mindanao by neutralizing the MILF, it was also this same event that contributed to his downfall in December of that same year.41 In a Mindanews report, the National Security Adviser gave a statement that during the “all-out-war” at least 6 billion pesos was spent by the Government.42 A study by the World Bank in 2005 gave an estimated direct economic cost of at least 2–3 billion USD brought about by the continuing conflict with the Bangsamoro since the 1970s (Schiavo-Ocampo/Judd 2005: 5). But as the people in Mindanao would personally experience, the human and social costs proved to be far greater. The conflict not only brought suffering to the 800,000 Internally Displaced Peoples,43 killed 1,073 lives and injured 413 people during this time of President Joseph Estrada’s term (as cited in PHDR 2005: 4), but also renewed the discrimination against the Bangsamoro, who have been viewed negatively throughout the Philippines.44

38

This progress was manifested when the MILF divulged the location of its twenty-three camps in Mindanao to the GRP as part of the peace negotiations. This is based on interviews with the MILF in Mindanao in 2007. 39 This part of history was mainly triggered by an episode wherein the MILF took over a town hall in Lanao del Norte sometime in March. As such, despite the ongoing peace talks, and perhaps due to the surrounding personal scandals involving President Estrada, he declared an “all-out-war” against the MILF as a show of force in bringing peace to Mindanao. 40 This section relies on Abubakar (2007). The eruption of confrontation between the government and MILF forces started in March in Lanao del Sur area, while there were no indications of a ceasefire until early January 2001. The events of the all-out-war were taken over by the impeachment trial of President Estrada that that heightened in December 2001 until his departure from Malacanang during the People Power of 17–20 January 2001. 41 President Estrada was impeached in the Senate public hearing in relation to his corruption and his links to gambling syndicates. However, the ongoing armed conflict between the government and MILF forces in Mindanao also caused a heavy toll on his government. A people power ensued in January 2001, forcing Estrada to leave Malacanang Palace and making way for the installation of Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to become President. 42 As cited by AFRIM in the Mindanews article by Carolyn Arguillas, 3 December 2003. 43 See the table of IDPs in Mindanao from 2000–2004, in: Philippine Human Development Report (2005: 10). 44 For more discussions on the impact of the conflict on the communities in Mindanao, see the World Bank (2003). The negative views of non-Muslims in Manila became fuel for President Estrada’s campaign of eliminating the MILF. All major newspapers in Manila would banner headlines to this effect, thereby alienating the whole of the Bangsamoro population throughout the country.

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President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took over from President Joseph Estrada in January 2001 as a result of People Power II.45 Knowing the great impact of the “all-out-war” on the MILF, she immediately invited the Government of Malaysia, through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, to take up the role of the third party facilitator and encouraged the MILF to accept the resumption of the process. It was on 24 March 2001 that the Government and the MILF first met in Kuala Lumpur with the facilitation of the Malaysian government. Three months later, in Tripoli, Libya, the two parties signed the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 22 June 2001 that became the formal agreement for pursuing the peace talks. This same document is regarded as the mother agreement that set the guidelines and agenda of the negotiations. The agenda were mainly divided into three aspects of security; relief and rehabilitation; and ancestral domain (Jubair 2007: 36). Malaysia’s role would prove to be very important, as its facilitator role was sometimes also described as a mediator in the process.46 Since 2001, the GRP-MILF peace negotiations have reached achievements and delays, namely: • the agreement on the ceasefire and the creation of the Joint Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH), and the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group (AHJAG)47; • agreement on socio-economic issues and the setting up of a Bangsamoro Development Authority (BDA).48 The setting up of a Bangsamoro Management and Leadership Institute (BMLI) as a training facility for MILF leaders; a long impasse in the peace talks from September 2006 to early July 2008 that was caused by the government panels’ admission that they have no mandate to further negotiate on matters of territory49; • the announcement of the Malaysian contingent’s withdrawal from the IMT in April 2008 as a consequence of the peace talks impasse50;

45

This researcher was able to join People Power II, held at Edsa on 17–20 January 2001. During these events, she witnessed a speech by a Moro activist who condemned President Estrada’s “all-out-war” as a show of her support for a change of leadership. But in spite of this occasion to bring the Bangsamoro plight to the attention of the public at this Edsa rally, it was apparent from the crowd’s reaction that the issue did not have an impact on the people there. 46 In Santos (2003) a deeper discussion on Malaysia’s role is presented. 47 In Gurrea (2008: 144) the security and ceasefire arrangements between the government and the MILF forces are explained. 48 See Abubakar (2007: 216) and also Juanday (2008). 49 See Jubair (2007: 144–147). However, this impasse period does not mean there were no exploratory talks that happened along the way. Eventually, the formal peace talks resumed in late July 2008. 50 Possibly in order to pressure both parties to resume formal peace talks, the Malaysian government declared its unhappiness by announcing its phased withdrawal from the IMT deployed in Mindanao; see the article by Lingga (2008).

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• the aborted agreement on the ancestral domain that was to be signed in Putrajaya on 5 August 200851; • the deployment and expansion of the International Monitoring Team,52 the addition of an International Contact Group (ICG) as observers in the peace talks, and the establishment of a Civilian Protection Component as part of the IMT.53 All these also happened against the backdrop of large-scale escalations in the armed conflict in February 2003 (the Buliok Attack), August 2008 (the post-MOA-AD armed confrontations), July 2007 (Al-Barka, Basilan misencounters), October 2011 (Al-Barka, Basilan and Zamboanga Sibugay military operations), and many other small-scale encounters between the Government and the MILF forces across Mindanao. On the other hand, there were also several incidences of cooperation between the two in rescuing kidnap-for-ransom victims and even in jointly investigating the July 2007 misencounter in Al-Barka, Basilan that effectively halted more military offensives in the area.54 By the time President Gloria Arroyo’s term ended in early June 2010, the peace process was marred by the non-signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain that was declared by the Supreme Court as ‘unconstitutional’ and seen as abandoned by the President’s own panel of negotiators. In an attempt to provide a diplomatic closure by the Arroyo administration, the new and short-lived government peace panel signed a “Declaration of Continuity of Peace for Peace Negotiations” on 3 June 2010. This document basically re-affirmed consensus points that had already been agreed upon throughout the nine years of negotiations between the two parties during President Gloria Arroyo’s time. It was hoped that this would ensure the incoming administration to honour the achievements of the peace process. A stakeholders map is shown below in Fig. 3.3, indicating the many sectors and organizations being engaged in this ongoing peace process. The inauguration of President Benigno Aquino, Jr. brought much hope to the MILF and the civil society groups in Mindanao who were working very hard for peace. Because President Benigno Aquino Jr. won the election with a great majority, it was thought that his immense social capital would provide the much-needed impetus and political will for the Government to forge a peace agreement. Along with the establishment of President Benigno Aquino Jr.’s cabinet was the re-appointment of Teresita Quintos-Deles as the Official Adviser in the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) – the government

51

For a good understanding of the context of this event, see the proceedings by Askandar/ Abubakar (2009). 52 See the article on the initial operations of the IMT by Abubakar (2005). 53 See the basis and composition of ICG and CPC in Mindanews, in Our Mindanao Volume 1, Issue 1: Let the Talks Begin (Davao City: Mindanews, 2010): 13. 54 Unfortunately, the killing of twenty-three Marines by the MILF during this July 2007 event continued to reverberate in the October 2011 incident in the same area, allegedly as part of some military official’s act of revenge. But the October 2011 incident also resulted in the killing of nineteen AFP soldiers, four MILF combatants and one civilian.

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EU (2011)

US (2003)

OIC (2008)

Masses Ulama

Masses

ICG (2009): Japan, UK, TAF, CR, Turkey, Muhammadiyah,

Church

HDC (2010), Saudi Arabia (2011) Malaysia, Brunei, Libya, Japan (2007),

NGOs Business Media Politicians

Business Media

EU, Norway (Jan 2011) CPC (2010): MPC, NPF, MOGOP, MinHRAC

NGOs

AHJAG (2004):

CCCH (1997):

LMT (2001):

GPH-MILF

GPH-MILF

GPH-MILF

Youth Politicians Sultans, Datus

ARMM Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)

Fig. 3.3 A stakeholders map of the GPH-MILF peace process. Source The author, based on the Consolidation for Peace (COP 4) seminar, 21–25 February 2011, held at USM Penang

office charged with overseeing the peace process.55 Fresh appointments to the government panel in the MILF peace talks renewed hope that the peace process would be resumed. The Chair of the new panel was a well-known lawyer, academic, and indigenous people’s rights activist, Marvic Leonen. Another academic and peace activist, Miriam Ferrer, was also included as panel member. The two other members were themselves leaders from Mindanao.56 However, this resumption was first marred by disagreements over procedural issues relating to the peace talks themselves. The new government peace panel wanted a new Malaysian facilitator due to allegations of bias observed by the previous government peace panel. This observation was not shared by the MILF, which wanted to retain the

55

Teresita Quintos-Deles had previously been Presidential Adviser during the early years of the Arroyo presidency, but she resigned together with other cabinet members who had lost confidence in Arroyo due to various scandals and allegations of corruption and electoral fraud. 56 The third member is Mayor Ramon Piang, a Teduray from Maguindanao, and the fourth member is former Agriculture Secretary Senen Bacani, who is well-known for working as a consultant to big agricultural companies based in Mindanao.

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current facilitator.57 After considerable backtracking by the parties themselves and the civil society groups and more speculation over possible solutions to this obstacle, the Malaysian Government decided to replace Dato’ Othman Abdul Razak as the facilitator.58 The Government also called on the GPH-MILF panels and met in Kuala Lumpur for its 20th Exploratory Talks on 9–10 February 2011, at which they resolved some of the administrative issues relating to the IMT, the AHJAG and other matters. The MILF also submitted to the government panel its revised draft of a Comprehensive Compact, describing a “Bangsamoro sub-state” as its proposed political entity. The two parties met again on 27–28 April 2011. On this occasion, Dato’ Othman handed over the duties of the facilitator to Tengku Dato Ab Ghafar Tengku Mohamad. The peace process reached a high point when President Aquino met MILF Chair Ebrahim Murad in Tokyo on 4 August 2011. The meeting was personally requested by President Aquino as a show of his sincerity regarding the peace talks. While no formal or informal agreements were made at that meeting, it would later on become a marker of the commitment of the two parties to the peace process. This high point was suddenly replaced by a low point when the government panel presented its counter-proposal of a “3 for 1 formula” that was rejected by the MILF panel during its 22nd Exploratory Talks on 23 April 2011. The GPH proposal comprised three point, namely: (1) massive economic development through the transformation of the ARMM and a partnership with the MILF to deliver the social services and development in these areas (2) political settlement through the creation of a Bangsamoro Commission composed of the #government, the MILF and other Mindanao stakeholders that would supervise the implementation of the peace agreement (3) and cultural-historical acknowledgement by correcting the historical narratives and fostering appreciation of the different cultures, including that of the Bangsamoro. 57

There were also insinuations that, in fact, the Philippine government was not only attempting to replace the Malaysian facilitator but was keen to supplant Malaysia as the facilitator of the peace process. During those times, the Philippine government had been considering the involvement of the Indonesian government in order to possibly unite the MNLF and MILF peace processes. For a more detailed story on this “facilitator row” between the government and the MILF, see the article by Askandar of 21 November 2010, in “Transforming the facilitation in the Mindanao peace process”; at: http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2010/11/21/peacetalk-transforming-thefacilitation-in-the-mindanao-peace-process-by-kamarulzaman-zam-askandar/ (23 May 2012), and another series of articles by Patricio Diaz, 27 November 2010: Racing against time. Datu Mastura describes Dato’ Othman’s style of facilitation which could have been viewed negatively by the Seguis-led GRP Peace Panel in Mastura (2012: 172–173). 58 According to confidential sources, it was only when the possible scenarios for Dato’ Othman’s honourable exit had been laid out in the article by Askandar (2010) that the government peace panel became quieter about pursuing its own ideas and ways of replacing Dato’ Othman or even the Malaysian government as the facilitator. These options also reached the office of the Malaysian facilitator. That article was also important because it gave a brief insight into the point of view of the Malaysian facilitator with reference to allegations of his perceived bias in handling the task. Otherwise, the discussions attacking the facilitator were mostly dominated by the media in Manila and the e-groups of peace advocates in Mindanao and in Manila.

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This proposal was deemed very disparate from MILF’s proposal of a sub-state with its defined ancestral domain territory and its equitable power-sharing arrangements. This sub-state proposal had been vigorously promoted by the MILF to the public as something beyond the present powers of the ARMM but keeping within the parameters of Philippine sovereignty and, at the same time, falling short of its original objective of independence. To the MILF, the “3 in 1 formula” was an insult, especially since it had already dropped its initial objective of independence with its proposal of a sub-state. Thus, it would be up to the Government to determine how much it would be willing to compromise in response to the MILF’s own proposal and accommodation. Amidst the slow progress on the substantive GPH-MILF negotiations, there were some significant developments. One was the addition of two female consultants to the MILF panel, which had been publicly requested as part of female representation during the process. The GPH, too, added another female member to its panel. Second, the issue of increasing the participation of the Indigenous Peoples in the process was also addressed through increased consultations with these groups by both parties. Third, the involvement of some Bangsamoro traditional politicians was launched even though this has been started informally through civil society peacebuilding meetings.59 In contrast to the past government administrations, the current OPAPP was noticeably and consistently active in publicizing the peace process throughout the country through various popular culture means. Furthermore, perhaps as part of the Government’s showcasing of its formula, it was also during this period that the reform of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) began with the appointment of a new governor and other officials.60 The succeeding peace talks continued only to reiterate the present Government’s offering of the same ARMM as a viable political entity. Just as civil society groups started publicly expressing their disappointment at the deadlock in the negotiations, the government and MILF peace panels managed to generate hope when they signed the GPH-MILF Decision Points on Principles on 24 April 2012. The most important of these points was the turn-around consensus in which they agreed to create “a new autonomous political entity in place of the ARMM.”61 The rest of this document is given below:

59

It was at the Consolidation for Peace for Mindanao (COP5), organized by the REPUSM and JICA, held in Penang, Malaysia on 16–20 January 2012 that members of the government and MILF panels, civil society, members and staff from Congress, Senate, and the five provincial governors from the ARMM, together with members of the IMT and ICG, met in a groundbreaking dialogue and seminar to discuss the peace process. The impact of this meeting would soon after result in the more active involvement of politicians. See Abubakar (2007–2012). 60 The new governor of ARMM, Mujiv Hataman, an ally of President Aquino, assumed office in December 2011. 61 See the Joint Statement and the GPH-MILF Decision Points on Principles as of April 2012, published by OPAPP and the MILF.

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The Parties agree to the following principles, which shall further guide discussions on the substantive agenda of the negotiations. This preliminary list does not contain all points so far agreed upon and does not preclude future agreements on other key points. • The Parties recognize Bangsamoro identity and the legitimate grievances and claims of the Bangsamoro people. • The Parties agree that the status quo is unacceptable and that the Parties will work for the creation of a new autonomous political entity in place of the ARMM. • The Parties agree to the continuity of negotiations in the context of agreed documents. • The Parties agree that the new autonomous political entity shall have a ministerial form of government. • The Parties agree to the need for a transition period and the institution of transitional mechanisms in order to implement the provisions of the agreement. • There will be power-sharing and wealth-sharing between the National Government and the new political entity. In the matter of power sharing, the National Government will have its reserved powers, the new political entity will have its exclusive powers, and there will be concurrent powers shared by the National Government and the new political entity. The Parties agree that the following matters are reserved for the competence of the National Government: • Defence and external security; • Foreign policy; • Common market and global trade (footnote: the power to enter into economic agreements already allowed under R.A. 9054 shall be transferred to the new political entity.); • Coinage and monetary policy; • Citizenship and naturalization; • Postal service. This list is without prejudice to other powers, which the Parties may agree to reserve to the National Government in the course of the negotiation. • The Parties agree that wealth creation (or revenue generation and sourcing) is important. The Parties also acknowledge the power of the new political entity to create its own sources of revenue, subject to limitations as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties, and to have a just share in the revenues generated through the exploration, development or utilization of natural resources. • The Parties recognize the need to strengthen the Shariah Courts and to expand their jurisdiction over cases. The new political entity shall also have competence over the Shariah justice system.

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• The Parties agree to the creation of (third party) monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, which may utilize competencies already available in existing mechanisms, e.g. ICG, IMT, CCCH. In addition to basic rights already enjoyed, the following rights of all citizens residing in the new political entity bind the legislature, executive and judiciary as directly enforceable law and are guaranteed: • • • • • • • • • • • •

Right to life and to inviolability of one’s person and dignity; Right to freedom and expression of religion and beliefs; Right to privacy; Right to freedom of speech; Right to express political opinion and pursue democratically political aspirations; Right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means; Right of women to meaningful political participation, and protection from all forms of violence; Right to freely choose one’s place of residence and the inviolability of the home; Right to equal opportunity and non-discrimination in social and economic activity and public service, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity; Right to establish cultural and religious associations; Right to freedom from religious, ethnic and sectarian harassment; and Right to redress grievances and due process of law.

The recently signed Decision Points on Principles is included here to provide a scenario or vision of the post-conflict development that may come with any peace agreement. This document will be useful in understanding how the peacemaking or peace agreement workings may or may not reflect the sentiments on the ground (the results of the community fieldwork of this study). Also, by looking at this output of peacemaking, this study can be guided on the possibilities of putting the sustainable human development framework as another value-added principle to this right to self-determination negotiation process. This MILF peace process is greatly significant in the assertions of the Bangsamoro people of their rights and freedom. Although the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) continues to be invited to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) meeting as the sole representative of the Bangsamoro people, the Conference has also started to officially recognize the ongoing GPH-MILF peace process as the only viable means to help solve the conflict.62 Recently, OIC has assumed the role of an

62

The OIC has facilitated the unity between the MILF and the MNLF. Since the 37th Session of the ICFM (OIC), the MILF had been constantly invited to the meetings together with the MNLF. See Edd Usman and Francis Wakefield: “MNLF, MILF sign pact to cooperate on peace”, in Manila Bulletin (24 May 2010); at: http://www.mb.com.ph/node/258865/mnlf-milf (5 April 2011).

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official observer of the ongoing peace talks.63 On the official MILF website, the MILF claims that there are 11,000 members of the group, making it a non-state force in the country to be reckoned with.64 In the last Bangsamoro Assembly held in 2005 in Maguindanao Province, it was reported that an estimate of more than two million people attended as a show of support for the MILF.65

3.3.4

The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao

The Philippine government project of establishing the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) as its offer for political settlement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) remains a problematic government system.66 The ARMM areas include the provinces of Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, and the City of Marawi (see Figs. 3.4 and 3.5). These are areas where the Bangsamoro form the majority of the population. On the other hand, the ARMM’s existence is plagued by its poor fiscal capability, rendering it subservient to budgetary allocations from the Philippine’s central government. Exacerbating this situation is the fact that the ARMM has become a vehicle for political patronage and has not shown any sustainable programme for effective government and development in the ARMM areas. Thus, it has not been regarded as responsive to the needs of the ordinary Bangsamoro. Performance indicators in the ARMM areas continue to be dismal. It has the highest poverty incidence, the greatest magnitude of poverty, the lowest education levels, and the lowest health indicators, among others. Poverty in the ARMM is more pronounced due to the increased vulnerability of its people to conflict and violence situations. The poor residing in the ARMM would require more resources. The Philippines poor live on 47 pesos per day while the typical Bangsamoro poor live on 50–70 pesos per day.67 Moreover, as a result

The OIC representative, Mr. Ali Demerci first attended the GPH-MILF peace talks in Kuala Lumpur in May 2012. See the article by Carolyn Arguillas, 1 June 2012, in: Mindanews. 64 See Luwaran, article published on 6 June 2012 on the Luwaran Website. 65 The first Bangsamoro Assembly in 1999 attracted one million people. In 2001 it attracted 2.5 million people. See Abhoud Syed Lingga: “Philippines: The Muslim Minorities”, in: The SEACSN Bulletin, January–June 2004. 66 In the ARMM General Elections of 2005, the MNLF lost its leadership posts in the ARMM. The leadership went to traditional Moro politicians who were allies of the then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Soon after the Maguindanao Massacre on 23 November 2009, ARMM Governor Zaldy Ampatuan and his cabinet were replaced with a care-taker government. ARMM was due to hold its elections in August 2011, but newly installed President Benigno Aquino signed a law postponing the said elections and synchronizing them with the national elections in 2012. With this law, President Aquino also had the power to appoint all officials of the ARMM as part of his reformation plans. In December 2011, Mujiv Hataman, an ally of current President Benigno Aquino, Jr. was installed as an appointed governor of the ARMM, along with many others. 67 The amount of 50–70 pesos per day income is part of the research fieldwork finding discussed in Chap. 6. The Philippine National Statistical Board defines the poor as “those whose income is not 63

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Fig. 3.4 A map of the Philippines showing all the different political regions including the ARMM (Notice that the Palawan Islands form part of Region 4-B although they are historically included as part of Mindanao and included in the Tripoli Agreement of 1976.). Source Philippine’s Department of Science and Technology; at: http://kidlat.pagasa.dost.gov.ph/ffb/floodbulletins.htm

sufficient to pay for the basic (minimum) requirements. Basic requirements are those for food (the food threshold) and for nonfood (the nonfood threshold).” The 47 peso per day benchmark is taken from the 1,403 peso monthly per capita poverty threshold data of 2009 by the National Statistics and Census Board (NSCB). This is the latest statistics record; see the presentation of Romulo A. Virola of 8 February 2011.

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Fig. 3.5 A map of the ARMM, identifying the five provinces and one city included in its domain as of 2012. Source CeRGIS-UMS (2017)

of the conflict situation and the general atmosphere of instability in their communities, the access of the Bangsamoro poor to basic government services and facilities remains low. As such, this severe inadequacy further intensifies the vicious cycle of poverty that they now experience. Apart from the occasional armed conflict between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the MILF and some MNLF fighters, the population is also threatened by other types of violence. These include the rido or feudal wars between families, the impact of the Abu Sayyaf kidnappings and bombings, violence from private armies and individuals68 and political violence and human rights abuses brought by various state apparatuses, especially in the conduct of the recent anti-terrorism military campaigns. An example is the killing of eight civilians by the government military forces on 4 February 2008 at Barangay Ipil, Maimbung, Sulu. The resulting investigation and conclusion that did not lead to the punishment of the perpetrators clearly demonstrate a lack of concern and interest from the Government to protect the rights and lives of ordinary people.69

68

The Philippines follow the American gun-ownership laws. As such, ordinary people can own a gun and other ammunition with corresponding licences from the security forces. 69 See the Zabida Website for details of the massacre that happened in Ipil, Maimbung, Sulu on 4 February 2008.

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Table 3.2 Distribution of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Mindanao. Source World Bank Joint Needs Assessment Report, December 2005

Area

No. of IDPs

ARMM Region 12 (Central Mindanao) Region 11 (Davao Region) Region 10 (Northern Mindanao) Region 9 (Zamboanga Peninsula) Other Cities in Mindanao

227,688 142,002 636 28,782 7,790 4,106

The escalation of armed conflict or violence in the area has also translated to hundreds and thousands of Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs). At the height of the MILF-AFP “all-out-war” against the MILF, there were more than 930,000 IDPs. In 2003, at least 411,000 IDPs were recorded as a result of the AFP offensive actions in MILF areas.70 It is a fact that every Bangsamoro generation has experienced armed conflict and displacement from the early 1970s to the more recent escalations of violence in 1997, 2000, 2001, 2003, and even in isolated armed clashes in the succeeding years up to present. In 2005, the World Bank reported that there were 411,004 IDPs in various locations in Mindanao that had yet to return to their homes. Some of them were temporarily staying in government or NGO-operated evacuation centres, while others were staying in the homes of extended families. Table 3.2 shows the spread of Mindanao’s IDPs by region. During the term of President Gloria Arroyo, the ARMM was further dogged by infamy due to allegations of electoral fraud in the 2004 presidential elections that mostly transpired in the ARMM areas. Again, this situation put the Muslim areas in a bad light as venues for electoral corruption and manipulation by traditional politicians allied with national politicians.71

3.3.5

The Bangsamoro Development Agency as an Agency for Post-conflict Development

In 2001, the GPH-MILF peace process introduced the conceptualization and establishment of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA).72 Its remit was to “determine, lead and manage relief, rehabilitation and development in the

70

See the CFSI Website; at: www.cfsi.ph. There was an ongoing case against President Arroyo on electoral fraud which also linked her to political patronage with the former Maguindanao Governor Andal Ampatuan, Sr as her godfather in this fraud. President Arroyo was detained at the Philippine Veterans Hospital. 72 Most parts of this section rely on an earlier article by Abubakar/Askandar (2011). 71

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conflict-affected areas of Mindanao.”73 The BDA’s birth mainly came about as part of the confidence-building mechanism of the peace process to allow the MILF to have a free hand in undertaking development programmes in the conflict-affected areas. In anticipation of post-conflict development in Mindanao, the BDA also took up the challenge to build a development philosophy and programme which would remain fit for purpose in the longer term. The BDA envisions a Bangsamoro community that upholds sustainable development for its people. The vision is as follows: “An enlightened, progressive, self-sustaining and healthy Bangsamoro community living in harmony, dignity, security and peace.”74 The existence of the BDA and its activities is very significant in this peace process for two important reasons: (1) the dynamics of post-conflict development have taken place within a much shorter than anticipated time frame in Mindanao – even before the signing of a peace agreement, and (2) being the development arm of the MILF, the BDA presents ideas and strategies for undertaking development in the greater Bangsamoro constituency. While the BDA’s mandate was formalized in 2001, it was only in 2003 that the organization started to operate. This was due to the scepticism towards a new institution that evolved from an incremental agreement within a peace process that had not yet been fully completed. Thus, donor agencies and other organizations were understandably reluctant to work with it early on. The added difficulty faced by the BDA was that it was not a duly registered organization under Philippine laws since the MILF assumes a non-state characteristic and does not uphold Philippine laws.75 As an emerging development organization, the BDA is a learning-in-progress type of project. It recruits volunteers from the young and old among MILF communities to be included as part of the would-be Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE).76 The BDA’s history gained more importance in the way it was doing its work. It designed a Values Transformation Training (VTT) Programme for its volunteers and staff with the objective of inculcating a new mind-set in working for development. The VTT not only focuses on the skill-set areas of development See the presentation by Danda Juanday: “Development and Peacebuilding in Mindanao”, during the Mindanao Educators Peace Summit: Transforming the Conflict in Mindanao Through Peace Education and Quality Higher Education, 11–16 January 2010, USM Penang, Malaysia. 74 Interview with Dr. Abas Candao, 2–6 September 2007, Penang, Malaysia. 75 See the article by Abubakar (2007). Interviews with the BDA Chair and Executive Director during the period of 2004–2010 in Cotabato City and Penang provided further information on this subject. 76 This includes the ARMM areas and other contiguous and non-contiguous areas which form part of the claimed ancestral domain territory. See the MOA-AD document in the website of the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies (IBS). Throughout the peace negotiations, this BJE term has evolved into a New Political Entity (NPE) and into a New Autonomous Political Entity (NAPE) – all technical terms used during the peace negotiations while the final term has yet to be decided. The MILF negotiators in particular intentionally avoided referring to an “autonomous region” since they were trying to negotiate for a new territory and government form beyond the present set-up in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). 73

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workers, but teaches mainly on personal integrity as a crucial asset for the BDA. In the VTT Programme, BDA volunteers unlearn many of the negative notions towards work and in developing themselves and their communities. Here they renew their religious beliefs, cultural identity, and social relationships as part of one community. In return, the volunteers and their communities are expected to practise the VTT values that they have now acquired.77 The BDA has since undertaken various small community-based projects as part of its capacity-building phase. Two of the biggest funders of BDA activities are the World Bank (WB)78 and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).79 However, these donor agencies were hesitant in allowing the BDA to include the VTT in their programming, given that these institutions have well-established development frameworks and values system, such as the Community Driven Development (CDD) of World Bank. With the BDA’s perseverance, the VTT was eventually accepted as part of the social preparation component of all their programmes with donor agencies, including the WB and JICA. As a result, the completion of projects with the World Bank and JICA has not only demonstrated strong community participation, but also shown that there is a strong community ethic towards work. This also explains why the BDA accepted projects from both donor agencies in a way that would help it build its capacity first before more donor funding is poured in. Dr. Abas Candao, the former BDA Chair, further explains that: “no amount of dollars can bring development to the Bangsamoro areas if we cannot change the attitude of the people first.”80 Therefore, he upholds that it is only through the BDA’s VTT that the organization can be successful in showing the people the possibilities of true development in their communities. He adds that “the Bangsamoro have grown tired and weary of the harsh environment of conflict and violence in Mindanao. There must be a values transformation that needs to occur first in order for them to start believing and take the path towards their BDA vision of development.”81

The BDA started floating the idea of its VTT Programme among donor agencies but none of them were interested in funding this because of the notion that it was primarily religious training and irrelevant to development programming. Eventually, the first VTT was funded by a peace studies scholar and practitioner who believed in indigenous knowledge and capacity-building as a first step towards any development programme. 78 The World Bank’s engagement in the MILF peace process has been led by Mary Judd since 2004. But it was in 2005 that the WB worked jointly with BDA to produce the Joint Needs Assessment of 2005. 79 JICA’s initial engagements with BDA began during the Consolidation for Peace (COP1) held at USM, Penang, Malaysia on 23–26 January 2006. It was also during this same meeting that the MILF representatives, supported by the rest of the participants, including the government representatives, invited the Japanese government to take part in the International Monitoring Team in conducting the socio-economic monitoring aspect. See Askandar/Abubakar (2008). 80 Interview with Dr. Abas Candao during the Consolidation for Peace Seminar 2 held at USM Penang, Malaysia, 2–6 September 2007. 81 Ibid. 77

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The BDA approach of institutionalizing its VTT Programme is a social preparation strategy that is becoming a norm in development implementation. However, what is notable is that this initiative is something that bears indigenous creativity and content. The programme itself is a demonstration of the Bangsamoro right to self-determination in charting their own means to development and starting with the community’s education on planning and implementing projects. The effectiveness of this approach is recognized in the success rate of the many projects that the BDA has carried out. There is high accountability among the community members as stakeholders in the projects. They are able to demonstrate to the donors how it is possible to implement a project with 100% efficiency in the use of funds (Paredes 2008). Since its inception, the BDA has achieved good results in its pilot programmes of teaching and doing various small-scale development projects (basic community infrastructures) in several conflict-affected areas in Mindanao. These projects are all funded and supervised by the World Bank under its Mindanao Trust Fund Program-Reconstruction and Development Program (MTF-RDP),82 and the Japanese Government under its Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD).83 Both programmes by WB and JICA are focused on building the capacity of the BDA through its own needs assessment work and pilot project implementations which cover the identified conflict-affected communities.84 With the ongoing peace talks, the BDA and the rest of the donor community remain in need of a comprehensive development plan for Mindanao. A Study for Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development of Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao undertaken by J-BIRD85 has indicated that its parameters are limited and do not fully encompass the entire development concept that the BDA envisages.

82

Through its working relationship, the BDA accepted the WB’s framework of a community-driven development approach, but with the inclusion of its own VTT as its social preparation stage. According to subsequent peace talks, the WB programme is supposed to have reached Phase 2, but because there is an assumption that by Phase 2 the stage of post-conflict development has been reached, there are competing ideas about achieving this end. As Mastura proposes, community-driven development must graduate to a social-objective-driven phase. The view of the MILF on the WB’s MTF-RDP can be read in Mastura (2012: 72–73). 83 When J-BIRD was launched together with the BDA in 2008, it was described as the joint endeavour of Japan’s development programme in the conflict-affected areas. However, in the succeeding years, it has been observed that non-conflict areas and institutions have also benefited from J-BIRD without the involvement of the BDA. This was the result of observations and interviews with the BDA and MILF during the 2010 fieldwork in Mindanao. 84 The WB needs assessment was completed in the report of the Joint Needs Assessment of 2005, while its pilot programmes were started with Phase 1 of the MTF-RDP and the ongoing Phase 2. JICA’s assessment was completed in the report of the SERD-CAAM of 2010. Throughout the course of the study, there were Quick Impact Projects (QIP) that were done as part of pilot testing. At present, various projects continue to be funded by JICA in the conflict-affected areas, together with the BDA and other NGOs, as part of its commitment to the peace process. 85 The result of this SERD-CAAM is the report known as the Socio-Economic Development Plan for the Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (SEDP).

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K E Y C A U S E S O F C O N F L I C T

Source: World Bank, 2005

Proliferation of Armed Groups/ Militarization

Local Election Disputes

Inter-tribal & Inter-ethnic Perceived Conflict Suppression of Islamic Practices, Traditional Customs & Social Institutions Deprivation Exclusion & of Basic Marginalization Amenities Land/Natural Resources Dispossession

Competition for Scarce Resource & Opportunities

Clan Warfare

Extreme Poverty Ineffective/ Imposed Institutions of Governance, Law Enforcement & Service Delivery

on rati c la De t-War u F ll-O MIL of A t the s n i aga

Fig. 3.6 Key causes of the conflict in Mindanao. Source World Bank Joint Needs Assessment Report, December 2005

Furthermore, it may hardly respond to the transition from a conflict society to a post-conflict environment in terms of its immediate social and welfare needs. Another milestone of the BDA-WB engagement in the discourse of development and conflict is the result of the Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) in 2005. This report shows that the core of the key causes of the conflict is the ‘injustice’ that the Bangsamoro people have experienced and continue to experience in many dimensions. It is this sense of injustice that fuels their dissatisfaction even while they are part of the Philippine body politic (see Fig. 3.6). These causes of conflict include injustices in the aspects of the people’s social, economic, religious, cultural and environmental life, extending to their physical security and political conditions as a marginalized group (Juanday 2007: 79). The findings of the 2005 JNA reaffirm the assertions of the BDA as they cite that development funding in the past has failed because: (1) of its failure to address the real cause of the problem and the complex personality of the Moro people (2) development initiatives were not in consonance with the Moro way of life, and (3) the cultural and religious tradition of the Moros have not been considered in effecting social change.86

86

Ibid.

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119

The BDA’s view on development and peace is expressed by its current executive director, thus: Peace building and development paradigm in Mindanao is depleted of foundation without first achieving a just and acceptable comprehensive resolution which is essentially a negotiated political settlement to the Bangsamoro Question.87

This clearly shows that the development objectives of the BDA are fully integrated with the political objectives of the MILF.88 In the past, social and economic developments by the Philippine government were carried out in conflict-affected areas in spite of the continuing war economy that persists in the Bangsamoro areas. A study by Miriam Ferrer explains the cost of war in the year 2000 and how ‘illegitimate’ economic dimensions of war benefited armed groups, non-state actors’ groups, governments and other elites and many others, such as non-combatant populations in rebel-controlled areas, business groups and monopolies, among many others. She also points out that the “peace and development” framework started to be mentioned during the time of President Fidel Ramos and his administration’s peace negotiations.89 Ramos further emphasizes this framework through the introduction of the Six Paths to Peace by the National Unification Commission (NUC) wherein principles of social, economic and political reforms are spelt out to support the peace processes.90 However, all these remained general and often contradictory statements, as perceived by the negotiating actors and communities like the Bangsamoro groups. As in the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, ‘development’ as a construct within the Bangsamoro peace process refers to “relief, rehabilitation and development.” These words become important because they are left open to interpretation by whoever provides the funds to the peace process institutions like the BDA, as long as it is in the name of relief, rehabilitation and development.

3.4

Conclusion: A Continuing Search for Peace

The conflict with the Bangsamoro groups and the Philippine state has been a major factor in the underdevelopment of the greater Mindanao island and the surrounding areas, making it one of the poorest areas in the country. This is notwithstanding attempts to address the development issues there. The Government of the Philippines (GPH) which has continuously engaged in peace negotiations with the See Shuaib Yacob in a presentation on: “Bangsamoro Development Agency Strategy Plan”, in the Seminar: Lessons Learned from Aceh held on 13–14 July 2011 in Davao City, organized by JICA, CBCS, and REPUSM. 88 For more discussions about MILF’s views on development, see Mastura (2012: 71–79). 89 Ferrer, Miriam Coronel, 2013, Costly Wars, Elusive Peace: Collected Articles on the Peace Processes in the Philippines 1990–2007 (Quezon City: UP Press), pp. 5–10. 90 Ramos, Fidel V., 1996, Break Not the Peace: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Process, 1992–1996 (Manila & Quezon City: Friends of Steady Eddie, Capitol Bookstore), pp. 107–110. 87

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Bangsamoro groups has invested in development projects, along with the international aid community. The people have also been anticipating that development might eventually help to de-escalate the conflict and end the Bangsamoro insurgency. This is the normative perception of the Philippine military.91 These experiences now add to the ongoing debate on what should come first – peace (meaning the signing of a peace agreement) or development (leading to peace). It may be recalled that the peace agreement between the GRP and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) signed in 1996 has not resulted to sustainable peace in Mindanao. More than twenty years on, the implementation of the GRP-MNLF peace agreement is deemed a failure. Against this backdrop of a continuous search for peace, development conditions in Bangsamoro areas have not drastically changed. Seven out of the ten provinces at the bottom of the Human Poverty Index (HPI) are located in the region. These same areas are also described as the conflict-affected communities. The HPI is significant in that it does not base its definition of poverty on income alone. It also covers deprivation from access to health, literacy, and economic resources, among others.92 This index reflects the stark reality that, despite the donor funding pouring in since the onset of the peace process, the vision for sustainable human development is far from the horizon. Besides the reasons set forth by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as its rationale for the 2005 JNA, many additional reasons explain the dismal state of development. There was simply not enough funding to cover the scale of needs; or the programmes failed due to design; or funding and programmes did not go to the areas where they are needed; or the momentum for full-blown development is interrupted by an unresolved conflict. In spite of the mandate of the Bangsamoro Development Agency as the development arm of the MILF, by no means is the BDA wholly independent in charting its directions for development. Mostly, BDA programming is done with donor agencies and the Office of the President on the Peace Process (OPAPP) as the main source of funding and oversight of the peace process respectively. As the ongoing peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF takes place and the rate it is taking is slow, the need to carefully think and re-think about development and development frameworks as part of the post-conflict development stage becomes timely. In the following chapters, this study discusses how this may be approached, guided by local context at the levels of the community or grass roots.

91

See Stuebner/Hirsch (2010). See HDN, UNDP, NZAID (2005): 110.

92

References

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References Abat, Fortunato, 1993: The Day We Nearly Lost Mindanao – The CENCOM Story (Quezon City: SBA Printers). Abubakar, Ayesah, 2005: “Keeping the Peace: The International Monitoring Team (IMT) Mission in Mindanao”, in: Askandar, Kamarulzaman; Abubakar, Ayesah (Eds.): The Mindanao Conflict (Penang: REPUSM, SEACSN). Abubakar, Ayesah, 2007: “Challenges of Peacebuilding in the GRP-MILF Peace Process”, in: Askandar, Kamarulzaman (Ed.): Building Peace: Reflections from Southeast Asia (Penang: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network). Abubakar, Ayesah; Askandar, Kamarulzaman, 2011: “Defining the Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination in the MILF Peace Process”, in: Sharom, A.; Petcharamesree, S.; Sumarlan, Y. (Eds.): Human Rights in Southeast Asia Series 1: Breaking the Silence (Bangkok: SEAHRN, Mahidol University). Ahmed, Rafeeuddin; Kulessa, Manfred; Malik, Khalid (Eds.), 2002: “Report on the Philippines”, in: UNDP (Ed.): Lessons Learned in Crises and Post Conflict Situations, The Role of UNDP in Reintegration and Reconstruction Programme (New York: UNDP Evaluation Office). Arguillas, Carolyn, 2012: “No Breakthrough but no Breakdown Either in GPH, MILF Talks”, in: Mindanews, 1 June; at: http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2012/06/01/no-breakthroughbut-no-breakdown-either-in-gph-milf-talks/ (1 June 2012). Askandar, Kamarulzaman; Abubakar, Ayesah (Eds.), 2008: “Building Sustainable Peace in Aceh, Mindanao, and Southern Thailand”, in: Proceedings of the Consolidation for Peace Seminar 2 (Penang: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network). Askandar, Kamarulzaman; Abubakar, Ayesah (Eds.), 2009: Peace for Mindanao, COP3 Proceedings, 2009 (Penang: SEACSN). Askandar, Kamarulzaman, 21 November 2010: “Transforming the facilitation in the Mindanao peace process”, in: Mindanews. Baclagon, Uldarico S., 1988: Christian-Moslem Guerillas of Mindanao (Manila: Lord Avenue Printing Press). Candao, Dr. Abas. Personal Interview. 2–6 September 2007. CeRGIS-UMS, 2017: Maps of Mindanao and Philippines. Remote Sensing & GIS Unit, Universiti Malaysia Sabah, December 2017 (CeRGIS-UMS). Coronel, Miriam Ferrer, 2013: Costly Wars, Elusive Peace: Collected Articles on the Peace Processes in the Philippines 1990–2007 (Diliman, Quezon City: UP Press). De los Santos Jr., R. Joel, 1998: “Reflections on the Moro Wars and the New Filipino”, in: Gowing, Peter (Ed.): Understanding Islam and the Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers). Diaz, Patricio, 27 November 2010: “Racing Against Time”, in: Mindanews; at: http://www. mindanews.com/mindaviews/comment/2010/11/27/comment-racing-against-time-sixth-of-aseries-by-patricio-p-diaz/ (23 May 2012). Ferrer, Miriam Coronel, 2013: Costly Wars, Elusive Peace: Collected Articles on the Peace Processes in the Philippines 1990–2007 (Quezon City: UP Press). Fulton, Robert A., 2007: Moroland (1899–1906) America’s First Attempt to Transform an Islamic Society (Bend, Oregon: Tumalo Creek Press). Glang, Alunan C., 1969: Muslim Secession or Integration? (Quezon City: Alunan C. Glang and RP Garcia Publishing). Gowing, Peter Gordon, 1977, 1983: Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899–1920 (Quezon City: New Day Publishers). Gurrea, Edgardo, 2008: “Peacekeeping and Conflict Prevention”, in: Askandar, Kamarulzaman; Abubakar, Ayesah (Eds.): Proceedings of the Consolidation for Peace Seminar 2-Building Sustainable Peace in Aceh, Mindanao and Southern Thailand (Penang: REPUSM, SEACSN).

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Gutierrez, Eric; Borras Jr., Saturnino, 2004: “The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected Policies”, in: East West Center (Ed.): Policy Studies 8 East West Center Washington (Washington D.C.: East West Center). Human Development Network, 2009: Philippine Human Development Report 2008/2009 (Quezon City, Philippines: HDN, UNDP, NZAID). Human Development Network, 2005: Peace, Human Security and Human Development in the Philippines: Philippine Human Development Report 2005 (Manila: HDN, UNDP and NZAID). Iribani, Abraham, 2006: Give Peace a Chance: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Talks, 2006 (Mandaluyong: Magbassa Kita/PCID). Juanday, Danda, 2007: “The Role of the BDA in the Conflict Affected Areas in Mindanao”, in: Askandar, Kamarulzaman; Abubakar, Ayesah (Eds.): Proceedings of the Consolidation for Peace 2 (COP2) – Building Sustainable Peace in Aceh, Mindanao and Southern Thailand (Penang: REPUSM, SEACSN). Juanday, Danda, 2008: “The Role of the Bangsamoro Development Agency in the Conflict Affected Areas of Mindanao”, in: Proceedings of the Consolidation for Peace Seminar 2-Building Sustainable Peace in Aceh, Mindanao and Southern Thailand (Penang: REPUSM, SEACSN). Juanday, Danda, 2010: Presentation on: “Development and Peacebuilding in Mindanao”, in: The Mindanao Educators Peace Summit: Transforming the Conflict in Mindanao Through Peace Education and Quality Higher Education, 11–16 January 2010, USM Penang, Malaysia. Jubair, Salah, 1999: Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny, 3rd expanded edition (Kuala Lumpur: IQ Marin Sdn. Bhd.). Jubair, Salah, 2007: The Long Road to Peace, Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process (Cotabato: Institute of Bangsamoro Studies). Lingga, Abhoud Syed, 2004: “Philippines: The Muslim Minorities”, in: The SEACSN Bulletin, SEACSN Website. Lingga, Abhoud Syed, 2008: “Malaysia’s Pull-out from the International Monitoring Team: Implications to Peace and the Peace Process in Mindanao”, in: IAG Policy Forum Paper 31 May 2008 (Cotabato City: IAG). Majul, Cesar, 1973: Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press). Majul, Cesar, 1998: “A Case Study in the Role of International Islamic Institutions: Arbitration and Mediation in the Philippine Case”, in: Salmi, R.H.; Majul, C.A.; Tanham, G.K. (Eds.): Islam and Conflict Resolution: Theories and Practices (Maryland: United Press of America). Mastura, Michael O., 1988: “Development Program for Mindanao and Sulu: Retrospect and Prospect”, in: Gowing, Peter (Ed.): Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines (Quezon City: New Day Publishers). Mastura, Datu Michael, 2012: Bangsamoro Quest: The Birth of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Penang: SEACSN & REPUSM). McKenna, Thomas M., 1998: Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines (Manila: Anvil Publishing Inc.). Melchor, Alejandro, 1999: “Foreword”, in: Majul, Cesar (Ed.): Muslims in the Philippines, 3rd ed. (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press). Parcasio, Randolph, 2006: “The GRP-OIC-MNLF Peace Agreement: The Unaccomplished Mission”, in: Institute of Autonomy and Governance (IAG) 1996 GRP-MNLF Peace Agreement: 10 Years After (Cotabato City: IAG). Paredes, Artha Kira Isabel R., 2008: “Spirituality and Reality Do Co-Exist”, in: Yes, Pigs Can Fly, Facing the Challenges of Fighting Corruption in Procurement (Pasig City: Procurement Watch, Inc.). Ramos, Fidel V., 1996: Break not the Peace: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Negotiations, 1992–1996 (Manila & Quezon City: Friends of Steady Eddie, Capitol Bookstore). Rasul, Amina, 2007: Broken Peace? Assessing the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (Manila: PCID, MKFI and KAF).

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Rodil, Rudy B., 2010: “Achieving Peace and Justice in Mindanao Through the Tri-people Approach”, in: Mindanao Horizons, Vol. 1, No 2010-01 (Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University-Ateneo School of Government, Institute of Bangsamoro Studies and AusAid). Rodil, Rudy B., 2000: Kalinaw Mindanao: The Story of the GRP-MNLF Peace Process, 1975– 1996 (Davao City: AFRIM). Rodil, Rudy B., 2008: “Challenges of Starting, Maintaining and Sustaining the Peace Process”, in: Proceedings of the Consolidation for Peace Seminar: Building Sustainable Peace in Aceh, Mindanao and Southern Thailand (Penang: REPUSM, SEACSN). Rodil, Rudy B., 2009: Presentation on: “Peace in 20 Years!” at a seminar in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, on 31 January 2009. Santos, Soliman, M. Jr.; Santos, Paz Verdades M., 2010: Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines (Geneva: Small Arms Survey and Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies). Schiavo-Ocampo, Salvatore; Judd, May, 2005: The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs and Potential Dividend, Social Development Papers No. 24 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank). Stuebner, William A.; Hirsch, Richard, 2005: “Mindanao: A Community-based Approach to Counter-insurgency”, in: PRISM: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations Vol. 1, No. 3. (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press). Tri-People Consortium for Peace and Progress and Development of Mindanao (TRICOM), 1998: Defending the Land: Lumad and Moro People’s Struggle for Ancestral Domain in Mindanao (Davao City: TRICOM, SNV, ICCO and AFRIM). Usman, Edd; Wakefield, Francis, 2010: “MNLF, MILF Sign Pact to Cooperate on Peace”, in: Manila Bulletin Website, 24 May; at: http://www.mb.com.ph/node/258865/mnlf-milf (5 April 2011). Virola, Romulo A., Presentation on 8 February 2011, on the National Statistics and Census Board (NCSB) Website. World Bank, 2003: Social Assessment of Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao-Summary (Manila: World Bank). Yacob, Shuaib, 2011: Presentation on: “Bangsamoro Development Agency Strategy Plan” on 13– 14 July 2011 in Davao City at the Seminar: Lessons Learned from Aceh, organized by JICA, CBCS, and REPUSM.

Internet Sources Luwaran Website: Article of 6 June 2012. Mindanews, 2010: Our Mindanao Volume 1, Issue 1: Let the Talks Begin (Davao City: Mindanews): 13. Philippine Daily Inquirer Website; at: https://globalnation.inquirer.net/583/malaysia-appointsnew-mediator-in-mindanao-peace-talks (23 May 2012). OPAPP, 2012: Joint Statement and the GPH-MILF Decision Points on Principles as of April 2012, published by OPAPP and the MILF; at: www.opapp.gov.ph.

Chapter 4

Research Methods

4.1

Introduction

This study’s conceptual definition of sustainable human development (SHD) is based on ul Haq’s original definition, Amartya Sen’s definition that includes capabilities expansion, and the Human Development Report 2010 definition, as mentioned earlier in Chap. 2. The working definition of this thesis is stated, thus: Sustainable human development is the process of enlarging people’s choices and enhancing human capabilities (the range of things people can be and do) and freedom, enabling them to: live a long and healthy life, have access to knowledge and a decent standard of living, and participate in the life of their community and decisions affecting their lives. The essence of SHD is that everyone should have equal access to development opportunities – now and in the future.

This study makes use of participatory rural appraisal and participatory learning and action (PRA/PLA). Drawing from the earlier mentioned definition, it is operationalized by breaking down human development into three areas, as follows: • living a long and healthy life as indicated by the community’s access to health facilities and services, availability of a healthy environment, quality of life/ lifestyle, and access to sports and recreation facilities; • access to knowledge and a decent standard of living as indicated by the community’s access to information and non-formal education; and their sources and levels of income and general access to sustainable livelihoods; and • participation in the life of their community and decisions affecting their lives as indicated by their political empowerment, participation and access to government, the development of their culture, religion and social life as a whole. This simplified assessment of SHD areas was done since there are no available HDI measurements at the provincial levels in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the fact that Maguindanao Province, where the two selected conflict communities are located, belongs to the bottom of the Human © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 A. U. Abubakar, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 16, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53387-2_4

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Development Index (HDI) rankings is an indication of its state of human development. While not specified in figures (e.g. indices and other measurements), this bottom ranking is further magnified through the PRA/PLA. The method provides a snapshot of the way people in these communities live their day-to-day lives. Thus, the conceptual definition and framework of sustainable human development is then tested by investigating the actual development conditions in the conflict communities and gaining the perspectives of the communities themselves. The PRA/PLA methodology is further explained in the next section.

4.2

Participatory Rural Appraisal and Participatory Learning and Action (PRA/PLA) as a Methodology

Rural development and the focus on agricultural economy emerged in the 1960s. Despite efforts of industrialization during this period, especially in the urban centres, a great number of the population remained untouched by the economic growth. Worse, they were marginalized in the process. People and communities, far isolated from the highways and nearest town centres, were often left out despite the state-sponsored development projects. Robert Chambers, in his work on Putting the Last First, describes a dysfunctional paradigm that has long misperceived rural dwellers and their development needs. He observes how development professionals coming from educated and richer urban centres have forgotten to make the most marginalized peoples their first priority. He then suggests that these development professionals not only regard them as plain beneficiaries of development but also as the most learned planners and development decision-makers of their communities. They are the best persons, in fact, to comprehend their state of deprivation, considering their indigenous knowledge and the sources of strength or social safety nets available to them. Chambers’ work, therefore, contributes to a de-learning process among development professionals on how they perceive rural development and how they behave when working with rural people. This promotional work for marginalized communities has led to the development of participatory rural appraisal (PRA), which was found most useful and timely in the field of rural development research. PRA is defined as “a family of approaches and methods to enable rural people to share, enhance and analyse their knowledge of life and conditions, to plan, act, monitor and evaluate.” Among PRA methods are mapping and diagramming which provide alternatives to the usual questionnaire surveys in research. The strength of PRA lies in the new role and behaviour of the researcher as a facilitator, listener, and learner, instead of a more dominant and traditional lecturer. By using PRA, the researcher “shares methods which local people can use for their own appraisal, analysis, planning, action, monitoring, and evaluation; there is no imposed reality by the outsider/researcher; and it encourages and allows local people to express their views.”

4.2 Participatory Rural Appraisal and Participatory Learning …

127

While PRA’s history is traced to the convergence of many rural development research traditions, it was at the 1985 Khon Kaen International Conference that the term ‘participation’ began to be linked more closely to rapid rural appraisal (RRA). Finally, it was in India’s NGO community that PRA was first tested among other NGOs and government agencies. The successful adoption of the new PRA volunteers helped spread this practice to nearby places like Nepal, Sri Lanka, and subsequently, to South Africa and Indonesia. In the late 1990s, PRA became a widely accepted phenomenon among development professionals with more dimensions added to the method itself, namely: • In emphasis, from stressing methods to stressing behaviour and attitudes; • In impact, from methods to professional change, from behaviour and attitudes to personal change, and from field applications to changes in organizational procedures and cultures; • In focus, from appraisal to analysis, planning, action and monitoring and evaluation; • In location, from rural to include urban; and • In analysis, from practice to theory, finding what works, and then asking why. There are several methods that are similar to and even influence the PRA approach. Among them is the more prolific rapid rural appraisal (RRA) method that started in the late 1970s. Both RRA and PRA break away from the straitjacket questionnaire surveys and their limited information and make the researcher take a proactive role in gathering data directly from local communities. Nevertheless, Robert Chambers points to their differences in several ways: (1) The RRA focus is on local people’s knowledge, while the PRA focus is on local people’s capabilities. (2) The researcher mode is elicits information while PRA mode facilitates the exchange of information among the participants. (3) The RRA main actors are the outsiders/researchers, while the PRA main actors are the local people themselves. (4) The RRA objective is to collect data, while the PRA objective is to empower the main actors. (5) The RRA results in plans, projects and publications, while PRA results are sustainable local action and institutions. Considering these differences, PRA is aptly described as a participatory RRA. However, it has to be noted that both are distinct methods and approaches that merit application according to different circumstances and end goals of a research project. PRA approaches and methods have been applied in many research areas, such as natural resources management; agriculture; people, poverty and livelihood; health and nutrition; urban life; education; organizational analysis, participatory monitoring and evaluation; and in the context of emergencies and refugees. Not only does the method provide an alternative to questionnaire surveys, it also gives more information for policy appraisals and insights. Thus, the application of PRA in

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conducting research in Mindanao’s conflict-affected areas is appropriate and timely, considering that recent research has been confined to the norm of counting or statistical methods or limited to focus group discussions (FGDs). The idea of testing PRA as a participatory method proves to be a step in the right direction, just as this study attempts to articulate the social reality in conflict areas. Somehow, the challenge of studying the viability of the framework of sustainable human development draws from Mahbub ul Haq’s principles: A human development strategy must be decentralized to involve community participation and self-reliance. It is ironic to declare human beings the ultimate objective of economic planning and then to deny them full participation in planning for themselves. Many developing countries are confused on this subject. Laudable objectives of human development adopted in national plans are often frustrated because the beneficiaries are given little say in planning and implementation.

PRA practitioners from different parts of the world have increasingly adapted their methods according to context and needs. This has given rise to a second name, participatory learning and action (PLA), to reflect this dynamic methodology. Thus, for the purpose of this research, the term PRA/PLA is used as an evolving process, maintaining PRA as its core concept. PLA is defined as: “A growing family of approaches, tools, attitudes and behaviours to enable and empower people to present, share, analyse and enhance their knowledge of life and conditions, and to plan, act, monitor, evaluate, reflect and scale up community action.” And “A way to help people to participate in learning, and then to act on that learning.”

4.3

Data Collection, Verification and Analysis

An initial area assessment was conducted in May to July 2008 that covered the Bangsamoro areas located in Central and Western Mindanao. Ordinary people in these villages were interviewed. Some were identified as supporters of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), others of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), while there were also others who were neither MNLF nor MILF, but who strongly identified themselves with the rest of the Bangsamoro people. The communities there live in an environment where they face occasional threats to their security and welfare. Generally, the people felt that the Bangsamoro, as a community, continues to be neglected, and worse, is being used by the government and non-government organizations to attract donor funding, but with this funding not benefiting them. The consequences of armed confrontations between the MILF and government forces, while happening in isolated areas, have also reached nearby communities, often driving hordes of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to seek refuge. Moreover, the continued tense atmosphere of the armed conflict was also felt by Bangsamoro people who live in Christian-dominated areas like Sultan Kudarat, Saranggani, Iligan City, Davao City, and even as far as the Metro Manila area (in Luzon) among others. The problems brought by the non-resolution of the conflict

4.3 Data Collection, Verification and Analysis

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Fig. 4.1 The PRA/PLA process flowchart. Source The author

have also extended to the Indigenous Peoples and the dominant Christian communities in the country. Given the above context, the study attempted a set of activities that led to the actual PRA/PLA implementation. This PRA/PLA process flowchart is shown in Fig. 4.1. The next level of the process flowchart included consultation with stakeholders, the selection of communities and preparatory visits to these communities. These are described in the following sections.

4.3.1

Consultation with Stakeholders

With the cooperation of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), a series of consultations took place with its leadership and staff. From the discussion, the following are the set of criteria agreed upon as basis for selecting the two conflict-affected communities.

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(1) (2) (3) (4)

have barely been accessed by development projects; are composed of a variety of ethno-linguistic groupings; are located far from the highways and in the interior of the main villages; and the community leaders grant their consent and cooperation in this study.

The issue of security and safety for the research team was also fully considered in deciding which communities were to be included in the study.

4.3.2

Selection of Communities

Out of the general assessment of the Bangsamoro areas in Mindanao, this study selected two conflict-affected communities as its sample communities. Their views on conflict, sustainable human development, right to self-determination, and peace were sought. These same communities became the subjects and participants of the PRA/PLA workshops. A conflict-affected community is defined as a community that has experienced armed confrontation between the Bangsamoro liberation groups and government forces. This is also a community that remains poorly developed and has very little access to government facilities and services as a result of unstable security conditions in the area. Through discussions with the BDA and its own consultation work with various communities, two conflict-affected communities were finally selected. These were the communities of Barangay Dalgan and Barangay Labungan/Datu Campong. See Fig. 4.2 for the location of the two communities in the Maguindanao map. Both are located in the Maguindanao Province area where most of the armed confrontations between the MILF and the government forces occur. The province of Maguindanao is bounded by the provinces of Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato and Lanao del Sur. It also has a coastal area on its Eastern side where it is bounded by the Illana Bay. The terrain of Maguindanao ranges from mountainous to flat lands to marshland areas. It has fertile soil and much of its land is used for agricultural purposes.

4.3.3

Preparatory Visit

As part of the preparation for the PRA/PLA, it is important to highlight the commitment of the BDA and the community leaders who were in constant communication about the research through telephone conversations and informal meetings. Trust-building was crucial in gaining entry into the communities. It was also an advantage that a member of the selected communities was hired as a research assistant. The task of the research assistant was to arrange the meetings and workshops at the community site. The research team consisted of three people – one each from the two partner communities, and an overall facilitator from a local

4.3 Data Collection, Verification and Analysis

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Fig. 4.2 An inset map of Maguindanao Province showing the two conflict communities covered in this study – Barangays Labungan and Dalgan, within the ARMM political region. Source CeRGIS-UMS, 2017

non-government organization. A volunteer of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) also joined the team. The overall facilitator served as the focal point in Mindanao. His skills in community organizing and his own access to the community leaders and elders were invaluable assets to this fieldwork. The third level of the process flowchart included other preparations in conducting the PRA/PLA work. These activities included the facilitator’s training, testing the research questions, and the research team preparation. These processes are described in the following sections.

4.3.4

Facilitator’s Training

Training in PRA/PLA methodology was undertaken by the research team. The team was composed of the researcher, the facilitator, and two research assistants, who were based in the selected communities. Discussions also took place to appropriately identify the PRA/PLA tools and how these tools and exercises could be fully explained to the community/participants. It was crucial for the research team, especially the facilitator and the two research assistants, to be well equipped before undertaking PRA/PLA. The PRA/PLA approach prevented the researcher

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interfering with the process and maintained the integrity of the data collected. In this way, the process gave a greater role to the community members and empowered not just them but also the research team facilitator and assistants, who are members of the community. Thus, any bias or influence on the part of the researcher was controlled by using this approach.

4.3.5

Research Questions Testing

The research questions of this study were discussed and initially tested by the research team with the help of some NGO workers who were also familiar with the selected communities. These research questions and other key concepts used in this PRA/PLA were also translated into the local Maguindanao, Bisaya, and Filipino languages.

4.3.6

Research Team Preparation

All preparations and communications with the selected communities were finalized during this meeting with the research team. Issues regarding administration and logistics for PRA/PLA were also decided. Finally, the actual PRA/PLA workshops were conducted. During these workshops, the follow-up and feedback from the participants were simultaneously done while the research team was still on-site. The workshops were done twice in every community. These processes of data collection and verification are described below.

4.3.7

PRA/PLA 1 and 2, Verification

The PRA/PLA workshops with the community were held over two and a half days. These workshops were conducted in the two communities in consecutive weeks. Workshop 1 was undertaken in June 2010, while Workshop 2 was conducted after thirteen months. Since the PRA/PLA results were actual data collected by the communities/participants, these were also verified by them during their big group presentations. Data details were also verified by the facilitator and the research team during further discussions with the participants during break times. In addition, at the end of PRA/PLA Workshop 2, another process of verification was also done. The facilitator and the research assistants were tasked with re-visiting the communities ten months later. During this visit, the team investigated the results of the community projects as part of the PLA exercise. These results were discussed with the BDA.

4.3 Data Collection, Verification and Analysis

4.3.8

133

Data Analysis

All data collected from the PRA/PLA in the two communities were analysed using content analysis. The answers/data of the community PRA/PLA were studied within the context of the conflict situation and the prospects for peace and development as part of the ongoing peace process. On the whole, the discussions of sustainable human development were analysed using the lens of peacebuilding – on how the achievement of human development can be translated into long-lasting peace. This analysis is presented in the next chapter.

4.4

The PRA/PLA Design and Implementation

In preparing for the design and implementation of the PRA/PLA, an in-depth observation of the conduct of a PRA workshop in a community was done. In July 2008, the researcher attended a PRA workshop implemented by a non-government organization based in Cagayan de Oro City. The workshop was held at Baranggay Murallon in Gingoog, Misamis Oriental as part of a watershed environment programme by the local government and assisted by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Conducting a PRA methodology on a government-led programme may be done through the many avenues with which the community can harness government resources and political support. As such, the PRA was assured of institutional support in the process and provided tangible outputs by the communities. When community plans are available, it is easier for the communities to work directly with government, non-government organizations (NGOs) and with overseas development agency/ies (ODA). Unfortunately, this political-organizational context is absent in the setting of conflict-affected communities. The PRA/PLA processes in these communities may be hampered by the reality that while people mainly expect the local government to provide them with basic services, they might also be sceptical about the idea of working with the government. Thus, they may inhibit themselves from engaging with local government and would rather be self-reliant or access other means of support. Similarly, the community may hesitate to work directly with some NGOs or ODAs. In designing the PRA/PLA for this study, the tradition of the participatory rural appraisal (PRA) approach was followed. This involved the formulation of a minimum number of guide questions for use during the workshops. The PRA/PLA questions are shown in Table 4.1. These questions were designed to appropriately respond to the research objectives of this study, while the research objectives also corresponded to the research questions stated earlier in Chap. 1. These five questions were translated into the local languages and tested with local community members/research staff of a non-government organization operating in the same areas (Fig. 4.3).

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Table 4.1 The relationship between the research questions, objectives and PRA/PLA questions. Source The author Research questions (RQ)

Research objectives (RO)

PRA/PLA questions (PPQ)

1. How can sustainable human development as a framework be more effective towards the achievement of peace in Mindanao? 2. How can sustainable human development respond to the right to self-determination aspirations of the Bangsamoro people?

1. To design a framework on which sustainable human development can help build peace in Mindanao

1. What resources and capabilities does the community have?

2. To analyse how sustainable human development interacts with post-conflict development and peacebuilding in a context of a right to self-determination conflict 3. To analyse the needs and challenges of conflictaffected communities in their vision for sustainable peace 4. To study the role of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) in laying the foundations for peace and peacebuilding in Mindanao

2. Given the United Nations definition of sustainable human development (state the definition), do you think that your community is experiencing SHD? If not, what will help you achieve it? 3. What does the right to self-determination mean to you?

3. What are the needs and challenges of conflictaffected communities? 4. How can the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) contribute to the success of post-conflict development and peacebuilding in Mindanao?

4. What does long-lasting peace means to you?

5. Can the attainment of SHD help you achieve the right to self-determination and long-lasting peace?

This study limited the number of PRA/PLA Questions to five because it wanted to focus on only two areas of inquiry: mainly (1) to assess the state of human development and capabilities of the conflict communities, and (2) to thoroughly discuss the perspectives of these communities regarding the concepts of conflict, sustainable human development, right to self-determination and peace. Also, in anticipation of discussions on these concepts, the research kept to simple, clear and straightforward treatment of meanings. It did not intend to provide a venue for the contestation of concepts and values. Many of the participants from these communities were very poor with low access to education. They were, therefore, quite limited in their capacity to engage in intellectual discussions. Thus, the methodology and the questions used were simple and clear in accordance with the objective of finding out how ordinary people in these conflict-affected communities actually define and relate to these complex concepts which can be deemed political. To answer the PRA/PLA questions, the following PRA/PLA tools/exercises were used:

4.4 The PRA/PLA Design and Implementation

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Fig. 4.3 A chart linking the PRA/PLA questions to the research objectives. Source The author

• handing over the stick or giving the microphone to the local facilitator: the study trained one main facilitator plus another member of each community, who mainly conducted the exercises; • local analysis of secondary sources: the communities themselves secured their geographical maps from the government agency and explained the boundaries of the area to the rest of the participants; • mapping and modelling: the communities drew their community map and social map that showed their resources and facilities, and a transect map that showed their crops, animals, and the trees, soil and vegetables found in their area; • timelines that presented their community history; • seasonal calendars that showed their sources of food and livelihood; • charting their daily/monthly income and expenditure and the various development areas that they describe as part of their community development – namely, political, education, health, social life, cultural, and religious; • analysis of difference: they listed the various development projects across the three areas of human development that the community received from the Government, NGOs, and the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA); • shared presentations and analysis: they drew their conflict tree maps as groups and each participant also presented their drawings of meanings or visualizations of peace and conflict; and

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• participatory planning, budgeting, implementation and monitoring: groups presented their community project plans and budgets. The conflict tree maps, and peace and conflict definition drawings are not identified as PRA/PLA tools but these have origins in the peace and conflict studies tradition. The conflict tree map is used as part of a group/collective analysis of the roots of the conflict while the peace and/or conflict drawings are individual reflections that become basis for further group discussions on perspectives on peace and conflict. Meanwhile, the exercise of participatory planning, budgeting, implementation, and monitoring is intended to capture the concept of participatory learning and action (PLA) in particular, through the culmination of a community activity or project. However, it should be noted that the above cited definition of PLA, specifically the part of “reflect and scale up community action”, presented a real challenge to this study due to time constraints on monitoring this phase.

4.5

Fieldwork Implementation/Activities

Table 4.2 presents the PRA/PLA activities conducted during the two workshops. In conducting the PRA/PLA, the community leaders randomly invited participants to the workshops. The participation of girls and women, young and old, was highly encouraged. In the first workshop conducted in 2010, there was a total of 64 participants from Barangays Labungan and Dalgan, 34% of whom were female. Participation increased in the second workshop. In the 2011 workshop, a total of 110 participants joined in, with half of them female. Overall, with the combined participation in the two workshops, the resulting gender balance was 56% male and 44% female. It was also interesting to note that during this second workshop many of the mothers brought their children with them simply because nobody was left at home to take care of them. The PRA/PLA workshops were conducted in two and a half days. In Table 4.3, the PRA/PLA tools used are listed together with the themes and areas of research output they generated. During the workshops, the participants were given tasks and divided into several groups. Each group consisted of five to ten members. The results of the workshops were presented to the wider group as part of a plenary discussion and validation. As such, working on the community maps and other information generated very interesting discussions among the community members and participants. The group dynamics in conducting the workshops naturally showed dominance in the discussion of some community leaders. However, the facilitator was tasked to intervene and make sure that every participant’s voice was heard throughout the process. This situation often led to a longer and sometimes circuitous discussion. However, it served the purpose of making the workshop more representative of the community as a whole. Additionally, the participants appreciated the fact that they could speak out and participate in the discussions no matter

4.5 Fieldwork Implementation/Activities

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Table 4.2 The PRA/PLA activities conducted in 2010 and 2011 workshops. Source The author Activity

No. of days

First PRA/PLA (June 2010) Who What

(1) Preliminary visit – meeting with the community leaders, and physical inspection of the site

2 days

(2) Facilitator’s training workshop, research questions testing

2.5 days

Formal and informal community leaders – village heads/barangay chair and officials, religious leaders, female leaders, youth leaders The two community-based research assistants and one overall trainer and facilitator, also one member of the Bangsamoro Development Agency and another member of the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies were also invited to join the workshop

(3) Research team preparations

1 day

Research team

Explanation of the research, its objectives, and activities; asking for permission to conduct the research with the community

The research questions and objectives, and the PRA/PLA methodology were explained. Examples of PRA/PLA tools and exercises were presented. The research questions were thoroughly discussed and translated into the local language that was most suited to the communities selected Updates on the arrangements with the communities by the research assistants

How Things were made easier by hiring research assistants who belonged to the community and were also regarded as youth leaders in Barangays Labungan and Dalgan It was agreed by the research team that the Maguindanaon language would be used in Barangay Dalgan, while a mixture of Filipino, Maguindanaon and Bisaya languages would be used in Barangay Labungan. Therefore, the PRA/ PLA questions were translated into these languages

Updates on the arrangements with the communities by the research assistants. Further discussions on the conduct of the workshop with the research team (continued)

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Table 4.2 (continued) Activity

No. of days

First PRA/PLA (June 2010) Who What

(4) Barangay Labungan workshop

2.5 days

Total of 35 participants – 21 males, 14 females. Age range was 18 to 61, with an average age of 43

(5) Barangay Dalgan workshops

2.5 days

Total of 29 participants – 21 males, 8 females. Age range was 20 to 64, with an average age of 35 None Not applicable Second PRA/PLA (July 2011) Who What Formal and Meeting with the informal community in community preparation for the leaders-village second workshop heads/barangay chair and officials, religious leaders, female leaders, youth leaders None Not applicable

Same as above

Research team

Updates on the arrangements with the communities by the research assistants. And a review of the outcomes of the past workshop (continued)

(6) Verification Activity (1) Preliminary visit – meeting with the community leaders, and physical inspection of the site (2) Facilitator’s training workshop, research questions testing (3) Research team preparations

No. of days 2 days

1 day

The workshops were facilitated by the lead facilitator together with the research assistant, while the team leader (researcher) observed the whole process and intervened occasionally to further explain some concepts or language when needed Same as above

Updates on the arrangements with the communities by the research assistants

How The workshop used the PRA/PLA tools listed in Sect. 4.4 and Table 4.3. Discussions and presentation of the workshop results were facilitated as part of the “handing the stick” method in PRA/PLA

Not applicable How This meeting is mainly organized by the research assistant assigned in the community

Not applicable

4.5 Fieldwork Implementation/Activities

139

Table 4.2 (continued) Activity

No. of days

First PRA/PLA (June 2010) Who What

(4) Barangay Labungan workshop

2.5 days

Total of 42 participants – 28 males, 14 females. Age range was 17 to 68, with an average age of 45

(5) Barangay Dalgan workshops

2.5 days

(6) Verification

1.5 days

Total of 68 participants – 27 males, 41 females. Age range was 18 to 68, with an average age of 41 The research team visited Barangay Labungan in April 2012, and Barangay Dalgan in May 2012 in order to verify the PLA project activity and to get feedback from the communities

How

The workshop was facilitated by the lead facilitator together with the research assistant, while the team leader (researcher) observed the whole process and intervened occasionally to further explain some concepts or language when needed Same as above

The workshop used the PRA/PLA tools enumerated in Sect. 4.4 and Table 4.3. Discussions and presentation of the workshop results were facilitated as part of the “handing the stick” method in PRA/PLA

Lead facilitator and research assistant

Interviews were conducted with the community leaders and some of the workshop participants. The PLA project sites were also inspected

Same as above

how simple their words and thoughts. This emerged as one of the positive feedbacks soon after the PRA was done in 2011 (Table 4.4). In the process of discussing these various development interventions, the participants showed some problems of comprehension and acceptance. Foremost, the very idea of development in itself was construed in many ways by communities. One is the idea of ‘projecticized’ development. This was a view of development in terms of projects that are often seen as imposed (on them) and carried out by outsiders – government and non-government organizations alike. Another connotation of development which has become a norm is that it is something that only partly or temporarily helps them deal with their varied community problems. Worse, it actually added more problems in the end. The participants identified very few development initiatives in their locality during the period of 2006–2011.

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Table 4.3 The PRA/PLA tools used in the discovery of the many aspects of the life of the communities and the corresponding themes and areas of research that it covered. Source The author PRA/PLA tool

Themes/Areas of research

(1) Peace drawings (2) Conflict tree

Conceptual views on peace Mapping the roots, trunk, and branches of the conflict Community profile – population, territory and area Environment, source of livelihoods History, social relations, community life Government services/facilities, other community facilities Sources of food and livelihoods Monthly income and expenses per family Government services/facilities, other community facilities Conceptual views on sustainable human development and right to self-determination/ freedom Participatory planning and budgeting of group projects

(3) Community mapping (4) Transect/resource map (5) Timeline, history (6) Social map (7) Seasonal calendar (8) Income and expenditures chart (9) Matrix of SHD projects/programmes by various sectors (10) Matrix of meanings of right to self-determination, freedom, peace; SHD table (11) Project plans and budget

Table 4.4 A checklist of SHD areas for projects provided by development agencies. Source The author SHD areas

(1) Live long and healthy lives ∙ health services, facilities ∙ healthy environment ∙ quality of life/lifestyle ∙ sports and recreation (2) Access to knowledge and decent standard of living ∙ information and education ∙ sources and levels of income ∙ access to sustainable livelihoods (3) Participate in the life of the community and decisions affecting their lives ∙ development of culture, religion and social life ∙ political empowerment and access to government

Government

Donors/ NGOs

Bangsamoro Development Agency

4.5 Fieldwork Implementation/Activities

141

Table 4.5 A guide matrix for discussion on the SHD definition vis-à-vis the right to self-determination and long lasting peace used during the PRA/PLA workshops. Source The author Sustainable human development

Right to self-determination

Long-lasting peace

The process of enlarging people’s choices and enhancing human capabilities (the range of things people can be and do) and freedoms, enabling them to: live a long and healthy life, have access to knowledge and a decent standard of living, and participate in the life of their community and decisions affecting their lives The essence of SHD is that everyone should have equal access to development opportunities—now and in the future

Another matrix was also presented during the workshop, shown in Table 4.5. This matrix was used in order to elicit definitions of SHD, RSD, and long-lasting peace as concepts and visions. The results of this dynamic discussion on how the communities perceive SHD vis-à-vis the RSD and long-lasting peace/sustainable peace concepts can be found in Chap. 5. As a concluding part of the PRA and PLA, a small project-planning exercise was organized. The participants were divided into smaller groups of their own selection. These groups were given the time to develop the projects they felt were most needed by their community. The project proposals were presented to the bigger group for comments. A consensus was reached on all these proposals, and one proposal was selected to demonstrate the participatory learning and action (PLA) part of the exercise. This study (i.e. the author) provided the seed funding for the project while the community members provided their time, effort and other materials needed to accomplish the project. The community projects and other results of the PRA/PLA were later verified. This verification of results can be found in the next chapter.

4.6

Limitations and Constraints in the Fieldwork

The primary constraint in conducting the PRA/PLA workshops in the two conflict-affected communities was the constant security threat in the area. In spite of the ceasefire between the MILF and the government forces, there were occurrences of small-scale and isolated armed clashes between the two groups as well as the threat of ‘rido’ or family wars in various areas in Maguindanao Province. This seriously challenged the researcher’s visits to the conflict-affected areas throughout Mindanao since the start of the fieldwork in 2008. Beyond this constraint, however, the cooperation from the communities was positive and overwhelming. The PRA/

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PLA participants, in particular, displayed a great sense of commitment in attending the workshops, considering that they had to sacrifice their time without any due compensation.

4.7

Conclusion: Embracing the PRA/PLA Approach

This qualitative study sought to obtain sufficient data to explain the realities and perspectives of people living in conflict-affected communities. As such, the researcher took inspiration from Robert Chambers, who advocated studying and reaching the most inaccessible communities as part of the field of rural development work. While Barangay Labungan may not be classified as physically inaccessible, it remained a community less penetrated by NGOs and donor agencies for development programming. Both Barangays Labungan and Dalgan can be described as conflict-affected areas and identified as part of the BDA domain of intervention. With this in mind, the experience of studying the areas and engaging its peoples became a watershed of ideas on how these communities view development in relation to their aspirations to the right to self-determination. The data in this study was mainly collected through the conduct of PRA/PLA workshops in the conflict-affected communities whose residents served as the main participants. Verification of these data was done during the PRA/PLA activity by the participants themselves as part of the process. Further verification was also made by the research team soon after the PRA/PLA stages. The final analysis of the data was carried out by the researcher. Various PRA/PLA tools were used during the workshops. These tools allowed the participants to become their own researchers in their community as they discovered the many facets of their state of development, capabilities and resources as a community group. As part of feedback, the workshops were seen to be very good venues for community learning and discovery, and for forging community solidarity. At the beginning, the community held simplistic views of peace and development. As a result of the discussions, these concepts became more substantive by breaking down their meanings, especially in relation to the participants’ realities and context. In analysing the data from the PRA/PLA experiences with the two communities, data from secondary sources were also used. These included the various interviews with a broad range of stakeholders, not only from Mindanao but also from Aceh. These interviews and exchanges of ideas with stakeholders from conflict-affected communities (both from the Mindanao and Aceh cases) provided many insights into the complexity of working on human development and sustainable peace. The list of interviews is presented in Table 4.6. In conclusion, the fieldwork experience has shown that the design of a PRA/PLA workshop for a community poses many challenges and uncertainties, especially during the actual implementation. The limited number of PRA/PLA questions and the technology of participation through appropriate PRA/PLA tools were major

4.7 Conclusion: Embracing the PRA/PLA Approach

143

Table 4.6 List of interviews that were used as part of secondary sources Abas, Suharto, former ARMM Programme Manager, ACT for Peace Programme, telephone interview, 3:00 p.m., 5 April 5 2012 Andot, Diosita, former Programme Manager, ACT for Peace Programme, email interviews, 28 March–16 April 2012 Candao, Abas, Bangsamoro Development Agency Chair, interview in Cotabato City, May 2008 Hernandez, Vladimir, programme manager, Community and Family Services International (CFSI), interview in Pasay City, May 2008 Lambac, Jocelyn, manager of “Kalinaw Saranggani”, (Peace) Office at the Provincial Government Office of Saranggani, June 2008 Tordicillas, Roy, programme manager, World Bank (Manila office), Pasig City, June 2008 Various Acehnese government officials, GAM, leaders, NGOs, and community members, interviews and meetings, Banda Aceh, April 2007 Various Acehnese government officials, GAM leaders, NGOs, community leaders, interviews and meetings in Penang, September 2007 and December 2010; and in Davao City, July 2011 Various MNLF Commanders, meetings in Cotabato City, General Santos City, Sultan Kudarat, Saranggani, May, June, July 2008 Various community leaders, NGOs, government institution officials at the local government agencies, community members, MILF and BDA officials and staff, interviews and meetings Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Zamboanga City, Davao City, Marawi City and Cotabato City, May, June, July 2008 Various MILF peace panel members, interviews and meetings, Penang, January to June 2012; and telephone and email correspondence, July to August 2012

factors in successfully facilitating the discussions. Otherwise, the nature and dynamics of community workshops could have led the research team to lose focus and get entangled in issues that might not be relevant to the research itself. Lastly, in spite of the limitations of this research in covering only two conflict communities, it is safe to say that the results are replicable in other MILF communities, given the high socialization of the right to self-determination aspirations among the people. Clearly, the MILF and the MNLF are resilient and continue to survive based on the strong support they get from the Bangsamoro communities.

References Ager, Maila, News article published on 13 June 2012: “Not one human rights violator convicted-CHR chief”, in: Philippine Daily Inquirer Online; at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/ 228337/not-one-human-rights-violator-arrested-or-jailed%E2%80%94chr-chief (13 July 2012). Ager, Maila, News article published on 17 July 2012: “CHR clarifies: There have been arrests but no convictions yet”, in: Philippine Daily Inquirer Online; at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/ 230153/chr-clarifies-there-have-been-arrests-but-no-convictions-yet (17 July 2012). Alkire, Sabina, 2010: “Human Development: Critiques, and Related Concepts”, in: Human Development Research Paper 2010/01, UNDP Website; at: www.undp.org/hdr.

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Chambers, Robert, 1983: Rural Development, Putting the Last First (Essex: Longman Scientific & Technical). Chambers, Robert, 1997: Whose Reality Counts? Putting the First Last (London: ITDG Publishing). Chambers, Robert, 2002: Participatory Workshops: A Sourcebook of 21 Sets of Ideas & Activities (London–Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications). Chambers, Robert, 2008: Revolutions in Development Inquiry (London: Earthscan Publications). Human Development Network, 2009: Philippine Human Development Report 2008/2009 (Philippines: HDN, UNDP, NZAID). Sarmiento, Bong S., News article published on 5 May 2012: “Finally, a CHR office in ARMM”, in: Mindanews; at: http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2012/05/05/finally-a-chr-office-inarmm/ (13 July 2011). Ul Haq, Mahbub, 1995: Reflections on Human Development (London: Oxford University Press).

Chapter 5

Research Findings and Analysis

5.1

Introduction

In the conduct of fieldwork, the participatory rural appraisal (PRA) and participatory learning and action (PLA) approach were employed in studying two conflict-affected communities in Mindanao. These two communities were selected based on three reasons, namely: (1) they had not been accessed by past research studies; (2) they are included in the envisioned New Autonomous Political Entity (NAPE) as indicated by the ongoing Government of the Philippines – Moro Islamic Liberation Front (GPH-MILF) peace talks; and (3) they were identified as viable and relevant study areas following a consensus from discussions with the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA). There were two series of PRA/PLA meetings and workshops organized from May to June 2010. In these meetings, the communities carried out exercises in which they themselves assessed their state of development and identified their needs. A year later, a second series of workshop was held in June to July 2011. The same exercises were done, but this time with more clarity on the part of the facilitators on giving instructions and increasing the active participation of community members who joined in. There were three commissioned facilitators. The lead facilitator was an NGO worker and BDA volunteer; the two assistant facilitators each belonged to the subject/research communities – one from Barangay Labungan and another from the neighboring village of Barangay Dalgan. Workshop 1 in Barangay Labungan, held in 2010, had a total number of 35 participants, a third of whom were teenage girls and women, while in Workshop 2, held in 2011, the number of participants rose to 42, with 40% of them female. The PRA/PLA exercises were held in the area over two and a half consecutive days on the dates agreed by the community leaders, when many of them were available (not working in their farms or doing their livelihood activities).

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 A. U. Abubakar, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 16, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53387-2_5

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In Barangay Labungan, one family was well-known as its founder. It is this family that has continued to lead the community in both a formal and informal manner. It is also the biggest land owner in this area. Yet its members have remained in the same farming class, just like everybody else in the whole community. The vicinity of Labungan has very rich and fertile agricultural land that includes plains and mountainous areas. Although the area is very accessible and only twenty minutes from Cotabato City, it remains rural, with no other industries. Many of the people’s houses are made of light materials, such as wood, bamboo and a traditional house material made of leaves and branches called nipas. However, there are also some houses that are made of concrete. In Barangay Dalgan there were 29 participants in Workshop 1, 27% of them female. This number increased to 68 participants, with 60% female participation. As in Labungan, the workshops in Dalgan were conducted over two and a half consecutive days. Dalgan is a very difficult place to reach and transportation alone is a big challenge. It takes an hour of driving on rough roads from the main highway to the jetty where boats will take you to the Ligawasan Marsh area. The boat ride to Dalgan takes another hour, depending on the volume of water lilies that the boat has to pass through. Dalgan is a marshland devoid of trees that provide shade from the direct heat of the sun. The houses are mostly made of indigenous and light materials, without toilets or sanitation systems. Therefore the people rely heavily on the marsh river and have no other source of clean water. An interesting feature of some of these homes is that they are constructed in such a way that they are movable in times of flooding. Dalgan is manifestly an impoverished community. One wonders how people survive in this very harsh natural environment so far from civilization. All results of the PRA/PLA exercises are presented here as part of the research findings. A validation of the data was done by the communities/participants themselves, along with the research team. In analysing the perspectives of the communities/participants on the concepts of conflict, sustainable human development, right to self-determination and peace, a ranking valuation was done. Since this ranking valuation does not necessarily offer a straight and unanimous answer, the results of the discussions by the community were then qualitatively analysed. The results of the PRA/PLA exercises were mainly analysed using the lens of sustainable human development and peacebuilding theoretical concepts as explained in Chap. 2. This analysis is found in the succeeding sections of this chapter. This chapter concludes by answering the research questions and objectives given in Chap. 1 through further explanations of the proposed theoretical framework discussed in Chap. 2. It also presents the application of this theoretical framework through its institutionalization within the ongoing peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

5.2 Barangay Labungan

5.2

147

Barangay Labungan

The first community is Barangay Labungan, located in the highland areas of a mountain known as Upi in the vicinity of Maguindanao Province. This area covers 1,341 ha of flat land, 3,950 ha of forest cover, and another 4,575 ha of land that was earmarked for a resettlement programme by the Government. The native inhabitants of Labungan are Indigenous Peoples (IPs), namely the Tedurays. While many of them maintained their indigenous religious belief system, some became Muslims and a smaller number became Christians. The Tedurays are the majority group but there are also some Maguindanao and Bisaya (ethno-linguistic groupings) who have migrated to the area. Although the barangay and its local leaders are active participants in local governance and politics, they have not benefited much from basic government services. An example of this is that they have an “Annexe High School”, the Datu Campong High School, but the building was solely built by the community. Also, they have a multi-purpose hall (room) built by the local government, but with no other facilities or equipment. This is the same building used as a health centre, meeting hall/room, barangay justice hall/room, and day care centre for children.

5.2.1

History of Barangay Labungan

Barangay Labungan’s oral history started from its name origin. The place used to be called ‘lebengan’, the burial ground of the Campong family ancestors. Among these ancestors was an American soldier named Captain Edward, who married a member of the Campong family. Captain Edward was the same person who later founded the Upi Agricultural School located in Poblacion Upi that still exists today. In the 1930s, the place was inaccessible and had only rough roads. There were no houses near the road because most of the communities lived in the mountain areas. It was during this period that the name was changed to Labungan and officially became part of the local government structure of Maguindanao Province. The first official of Barangay Labungan was a family member of the Campong family, paving the way for the emergence of formal leadership in the area. Public education in Labungan started in 1945, when the Labungan Elementary School was established. Another school was put up in 1979 – the Datu Andong Elementary School. This same year was historic also because of the establishment of a resettlement project by the government national agency, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). This resettlement project covered a vast area of 4,575 ha. With this, the people of Labungan felt that they were becoming tenants in their own ancestral land. This history was made worse when, in the 1960s, more than a tenth of the land – 478 ha – was claimed by outsiders, namely Leon Hermenes, Don E. Sero, Ocampo and Balabaran. Although these people did not live in this area, they took ownership of these lands based on the land titles that they obtained from the Government. By the

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Fig. 5.1 A resource map of Barangay Labungan. Source The author

year 1998, the barangay was renamed Barangay Datu T. Campong. See Fig. 5.1 showing a resource map of the barangay as drawn by the PRA/PLA participants. The people of Barangay Labungan are no strangers to the violent history of the conflict in Mindanao. They recall the first armed confrontations between government forces and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) during the Martial Law year of 1972. This violent period resulted in their mass evacuation to many nearby places in Maguindanao to seek refuge. When the conflict subsided, they returned home to Labungan. The second episode of armed conflict was experienced during the declaration of the Philippine President Joseph Estrada’s “all-out-war” against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Again, they became internally displaced peoples (IDPs). A second “all-out-war” was declared against the MILF in the year 2003 by President Gloria Arroyo. It is from these hardships for survival that the people have fully internalized this intense aspiration for peace and the fulfilment of their right to self-determination.

5.2.2

Entry of Developments in the Area

In 2005, the Datu Campong People’s Organization was organized as an initiative which aimed to undertake development projects for the community. This was the

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result of the growing consciousness of putting NGOs and other community-based organizations in the conflict-affected areas brought about by the influx of donor funding. The emergence of this organization can also be attributed to the preparations of the BDA in starting its development programming along with donor agencies. In 2007, the ARMM Social Fund built seven solar-driers as part of the community’s post-harvest facility. In 2008, the barangay was finally able to build a Level II water system project with the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). In 2009, the Mindanao Rural Development Project (MRDP) conducted a reforestation programme to prevent soil erosion in some parts of the barangay. Along with it was a water system installed at Sitio Paningusan. Also, by 2010, a national road that passes through this area was completed and it was one of the biggest infrastructure projects of the national government. The installation of this road made the area highly accessible. With this road network, it takes only twenty minutes to reach Barangay Labungan from Cotabato City.

5.2.3

Resources and Potential

Many of the constituents in Labungan are traditional farmers. Some of the youth seek blue-collar employment in nearby Cotabato City. The area has an abundance of natural resources, such as spring water, a lake, ricefields, and white stones/chalk. It has fertile farmlands but with no irrigation system. Since the year 2000, the farmers have observed that their fertile soil and rocky lands have become acidic in some areas. This change in soil quality may have resulted in the disappearance of some species of trees (e.g. molave, apitong, lawaan, and native narra) that used to grow in the area until the 1970s. In the past, some animals used to roam around this place (e.g. deer and other wild animals) but not any more. Only domesticated animals, such as carabao, horse, goat, cow, chicken and duck, remain in Labungan. Among the tree varieties that can still be found in the area are the paper tree, mahogany, giant narra, ipil-ipil, acacia and bamboo. During the rainy season, the farmers produce rice, corn, monggo beans, peanuts, vegetables, coconut, banana, cassava and camote. In summer, the sources of livelihood are making charcoal, gathering firewood and making handicrafts (e.g. nigo, basket and bukag). Traditionally, it is also a time for hunting wild animals (e.g. pig, birds) and collecting honey. From the lake, the fishermen can catch many varieties of fish (e.g. haluan, tilapiya, katipa, bungkong/gurami and kasili). The people source their herbal medicine from various plants, and they also have alternative food called kerot or kayos (a kind of root crop). The people of Labungan have also identified unexploited sources of sulphur, gold and petrol in their area. In the latest census of 2010, the local government barangay population count was 3,153 people from 542 households living in Labungan. Out of this number, 2,108 were men with 1,108 of them single (children and adults). There were

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1,045 women, with 503 of them single (children and adults). The minimum average monthly income per household of two or more children is estimated at PHP 2,500.00 or USD 59.76. Out of this, the biggest portion or nearly three-quarters is spent on food. Household expenditure also includes the following: 10% for savings, often used for emergency expenses 6% for education-related expenses (like notebooks and pens) 6% for medicine (basic medication such as medicine for fever and headache) 2.4% is spent on buying water for household consumption 2.4% for paying electricity 1.2% for the cost of communication – mainly use of mobile phones According to Fig. 5.2, the participants estimated their net income for every four months as PHP 6,000 or USD 143.44. Also, they normally estimate an additional extra income of PHP 1,000 or USD 41.83 each month. From a total yearly income of PHP 30,000 or USD 717.19, they deduct the debts that they tend to incur during the planting season from their harvest season three times per year. Once they’ve repaid their debts, the remaining cash income is what they use for their living expenses. The budget for food is mostly spent on buying rice (if they do not have rice grains on their farm), fish and other cooking ingredients. Other foods, such as poultry, meat, vegetables, and other staples, are sourced from their own backyards and farms. As part of the social map, other facilities found in Barangay Labungan include a masjid (mosque), a church, and a day care centre that is also used as a madrasah (school), barangay hall, and health centre (see Fig. 5.3). The community has access to the national road and the electricity line that runs through it (but the electricity supply is limited to houses located along the national road). With the help of donor funding, they have acquired a solar dryer facility and a Level II water system located in some parts of the area. There are also farm-to-market roads provided by the local government, namely the 7-km road connecting Sitio Tuburan from the national road, another 7-km road connecting Sitio Maman, and a 5-km road connecting Sitio Rebok. Supporting the daily life of the people of Labungan are some of its formal and informal leaders and workers who extend help to them. These internal leaders/ service people include the barangay captain and his other officials, the ustadz (for the Muslims), priest (for the Christians), a volunteer barangay health worker, a midwife, a traditional masseuse or manghihilot, volunteer teachers for the High School Annexe, and some traditional leaders from the Teduray and Maguindanao groups (e.g. datus and other royalties). Inside this community, there is also the presence of a paramilitary force (composed of two military detachments of company size) called Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs). They are designated by the government military forces in this area as part of their extended operations in exercising their mandate to secure peace and order, especially in the countryside of Mindanao. Other important leaders/sources of services can only be found outside the barangay. They include the many teachers of the government

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Fig. 5.2 The minimum average four-monthly income per household in Barangay Labungan. Source The author

school system who commute to Labungan on a daily basis; midwives and medical mission groups, who sometimes visit the community and are the occasional source of health services; and other health professionals, such as the medical doctor and nurse, who are based in the government hospital in Cotabato City.

5.2.4

The State of Development

A thorough discussion of the community’s experience of development initiatives demonstrates their limited delivery. During the workshops, projects or tangible experience of the “facets of sustainable human development” were plotted.

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Fig. 5.3 The day care centre and masjid at Barangay Labungan. Source The author

Table 5.1 illustrates this exercise. Among the three actors of development, it is the Government that is most relied upon for basic needs and service rather than the non-government agencies and donors, including the Bangsamoro Development Agency, a newcomer to this area (see Table 5.1). Nevertheless, the penetration of government institutions mostly refers to the presence of educational institutions. In relation to these government schools, the parents in Labungan constantly cite the poor educational facilities and the quality of education that is significantly lacking for their children. As reiterated in the concept of sustainable human development, education is one area that “raises the capability of the people and Table 5.1 SHD chart in Barangay Labungan. Source The author Sustainable human development

Government

NGOs/Donor agencies/Private sector

BDA/Donor agencies

Live a long and healthy life

Health centre, no facilities, only once a month service There are three elementary schools and one annexe high school

(2006) The NGO, Kadtuntaya Foundation Inc. (KFI), built a structure for day care centre and health centre The NGO KFI trained a group from the community in identifying and using plants for their herbal medicinal needs, in food processing, and in creating handicrafts (2007) Through the ARMM Social Fund, funded by the World Bank, solar driers were built as part of the farmer’s post-harvest facility (2009) The Mindanao Rural Development (MRDP) under the auspices of the Department of

(2008) Installed Level II water system

Access to knowledge and decent standard of living

(continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) Sustainable human development

Participate in the life of the community

Government

There is a barangay government system that is under the local government system. The community participates in local and national elections by exercising their right to vote

NGOs/Donor agencies/Private sector

Agriculture (DA) undertook a reforestation programme and built a water system in Sitio Paningusan (2010) The Department of Public Works and Highways completed the national road throughout the Municipality of Upi, including this area The masjid and the church respectively organize their religious activities that involve the community In the past, KFI also initiated some activities to revive the native culture of the Tedurays in this area

BDA/Donor agencies

The BDA trained some leaders from the community in a Values Transformation Programme as part of its social preparation in implementing the water system project

enlarges their choices in life”. The parents in Labungan themselves are fully aware how crucial education is for their children and how their human development is fully dependent on access to this basic service. Further, the community attributes its lack of development to the absence of many infrastructures and services. In Table 5.2, a list of these needs is divided into hard and soft infrastructures. The utter lack of these infrastructures clearly contributes to the quality of their individual and community life in the areas of environment, basic needs, health, education, livelihood and economy, social, cultural and religious life. For the people of Labungan, hard infrastructures are secondary. Soft infrastructures are of foremost priority. They refer to the establishment of Islamic institutions and a governance system as the vehicle for development and social change in their community.

5.2.5

Perspectives on Peace, Development and Right to Self-determination

The initial exercise for the PRA/PLA workshops was the drawing and reflection discussion on the meaning of peace by the community. The participants drew images of their view of a “peace end” and explained this to the wider group. Their definitions of peace were expressed in various languages. These were:

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Table 5.2 List of hard and soft infrastructures needed in Labungan. Source The author Hard infrastructures

Soft infrastructures/Services

Agricultural facilities like warehouse, irrigation, solar drier, seeds Drinking water

Financial capital services for farmers and small entrepreneurs Medical services including availability of medicines – local pharmacy Alternative education for illiterate men and women Community programmes that include the development of their culture and traditions Islamic institutions including governance system Religious teachers for the madrasah Cooperative system/ventures that can help the community’s economic needs

Waiting shed High school building Health centre Sturdier housing Ambulance Community centre/training centre Farm to market roads Sustainable water systems Recreational facilities

• Maguindanaon: Kadkuya-kuya nu mga taw lemudep sa Islam. (A coming together of different peoples to Islam.) • Filipino: Ang lugar at pamayanan na kung saan napakayaman sa natural na yaman tulad ng halaman at hayop. (A place and a home where there are rich natural resources, e.g. plants and animals.) • Bisaya: Usa ka yugto sa pagkahi-usa sa mga Kristiano ug mga Muslim. (An event of solidarity among Christians and Muslims.) • Bisaya: Panahon sa pag-bag-o sa kalinaw kung diin tanan kasamok na kalimuot na mawagtang ug mahanaw. (A time of change towards peace wherein all sorts of conflicts and ills in a community can be swept away.) • Teduray: I gai we ke teredam be kageye bayabaya be kelungone brab ge terdamatom soy kepenoyewe geliwet betom brab gelefas i katome sentimanan ideng. (A time for enjoying a peaceful night in the rural areas where there is abundance of nature and security for families.) • Maguindanao: Dalpa nu mga Muslim a makalilintad su gatamanan endu kawyag-uyag sia kanu kalupan a kawasa mangawasa i kawyaganin. (A place where Muslims can experience peaceful living and in an environment where land and all its natural resources can be enjoyed.) A visual example of a peace definition is presented in Fig. 5.4. The above images of peace demonstrate what may appear to be simple aspirations of this rural community. However, what they may picture to be simple is, in reality, something that cannot be easily achieved and this they know profoundly. During the first workshops in 2010, the initial discussions on the concepts of sustainable human development, peace, and right to self-determination did not lead to a clear understanding. Later, 70% of the participants prioritized the concept of

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A picture of a Muslim rebel commander giving a peace greeting to a Christian police officer. Fig. 5.4 A sample drawing of a vision of peace by a participant from Barangay Labungan. Source The author

Self-reliance/Self-government/Independence (as an equivalent meaning to the Right to Self-Determination concept) over all other concepts, such as the general ideas on Development, Peace and even Unity. A year later, during the 2011 workshops, the participants unanimously gave top priority to the concept of peace, while they rated both the concepts of Self-reliance/Self-government/Independence (equivalent in meaning to the Right to Self-Determination concept) and Sustainable Human Development as number 2 and number 3, respectively. However, the difference between the ranking of numbers 2 and 3 is an insignificant two points. This simple exercise explains how the people in Labungan value the achievement of peace, mainly the success of the ongoing peace talks between the Government and the MILF. For them, there is evidently a high expectation that the key to this peace is the achievement of Self-reliance/Self-government/Independence in a new political structure, and the fulfilment of sustainable human development as a by-product of both Peace and Self-reliance/Self-government/Independence or RSD. It is observed that the politics of the right to self-determination are highly socialized among the people of Labungan. There is no debate about which should come first – development or peace. This indicates a clear grasp of the reality that development may not be met when issues of identity, territory, political

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participation, and even their immediate physical security are threatened. This is in spite of a seemingly peaceful environment (the lull of armed confrontation between the government forces and the MILF in this area) and notwithstanding their active participation in the local government unit structure and politics. This heightened understanding is also based on their perceptions of the root causes of the conflict in Mindanao in terms of a “conflict tree” (see Figs. 5.5 and 5.6). It is

Fig. 5.5 The conflict tree drawn by one of the female group of participants. Source The author

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Fig. 5.6 The conflict tree drawn by one of the group of male participants. Source The author

interesting to note that both male and female groups identify the “lack of independence” and the “lack of an Islamic State” as the trunk of the conflict tree, while the ‘roots’ of the conflict are attributed to “problems of history”, “wrong form of government” and “religious discrimination.” Looking at the branches of a conflict tree, there are slight differences of opinion between the men and women. To the women,

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many of the branches refer to the lack of development in the aspects of social life, cultural, and religious, economy and livelihood, political system, basic needs, environmental protection, education, and many infrastructure needs of the community. The men’s group, however, include the following as branches of the conflict tree: usurpation of lands, lack of education, the Government’s lack of sincerity, lack of peace and order/security and lack of medicine. They express the following in a mix of Maguindanaon and Bisaya languages: Inagawan kami sa lupa, dala kami makapangagi, dili kasaligan i gubirnu, dili kami pakalilintad, endu dala gamut nami. Gikuha giud an lupa, dili naka adtu sa eskwela, dili giud gihasaan kining gubirnu. (Our lands were grabbed, we haven’t studied, the Government can’t be trusted, we can’t be at peace, and we don’t have medicines.)

On the whole, all their answers showed how greatly the protracted conflict in Mindanao has heavily impacted on people’s lives and their strong perception of any possibilities for their future. Their views reflected a preference for a new form of government and institutional structures and also suggested an intense desire for freedom and better choices in life. Under the existing circumstances, the participants overwhelmingly felt that their human development potentials could not be achieved because of their marginalization.

5.2.6

Participatory Learning and Action

The 2011 workshop in Barangay Labungan presented a good opportunity for introducing a planning exercise for small community projects. Two groups of women and another two groups of men presented their plans. The first group of women planned for a poultry-raising (native chicken) project. The start-up capital for this project was budgeted at PHP 7,500.00 or USD 179.30. The raising of a hundred chicks would be done at the home of one of the group members, with all other members taking turns to oversee the chicks on a daily basis. The second group of women presented a “sari sari” store, or small community store venture. The starting capital for this store was pegged at PHP 30,000.00 or USD 717.20, a third of which would be spent on buying a ready-made little house structure, locally known as a ‘kamalig’, while the rest of the money would be used to buy stock. The first group of men presented a project for the installation of a water and irrigation system throughout the community. This was a large-scale project that was estimated to cost millions of pesos, but they felt that they should start planning for it. As an initial action, they wanted to write it as a formal undertaking by the barangay officials – a barangay resolution – so that they could formally approach government and non-government organizations for help to facilitate the project.

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Lastly, the second group of men presented their plans to build another solar drier in the community because they felt that they had many agricultural products which could not be processed due to the lack of this facility. This solar drier project was budgeted at PHP 96,900.00 or USD 2,316.52. As a result of this exercise, and with the group consensus, the study invested in the most viable project – the poultry-raising project suggested by the first group of women. In April 2012, verification of this project showed that three poultry-raising sites were developed. The first site had fifteen chickens and three ducks, the second site had seven chickens while the third site had ten chickens. Pictures of these are shown in Figs. 5.7 and 5.8. The project is still in progress and the group continues to be involved in this livelihood initiative. Meanwhile, the other project proposals presented during the PRA/PLA have not yet materialized. Given the limited financial support, the objective of the PRA/PLA through this small community project was fulfilled with the end view of not only providing a livelihood opportunity but with the more important practice of allowing the participants to be creative and to decide matters for themselves as part of their learning experience and empowerment.

Fig. 5.7 A picture of the ducks being raised by one of the women in Barangay Labungan. Source The author

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Fig. 5.8 Pictures of the poultry project in Barangay Labungan. Source The author

5.3 Barangay Dalgan

5.3

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Barangay Dalgan

The second community is called Barangay Dalgan and is located in the middle of the Ligawasan Marsh. It covers at least 11,266 ha. Hardly accessible, this community can be reached only by using small, narrow motorboats or ordinary boats without motor engines (see Fig. 5.9). Although the whole area is part of this vast marshland, patches of land have grown in this barangay as an effect of siltation from the nearby development of the Maridagao-Malitubog Irrigation System that traverses this region. As a boon and bane, the inhabitants have built their houses on land and planted their rural livelihoods as well. The people mostly survive through subsistence farming. The marshland is their primary source of water and marine life. This natural resource is still limitedly exploited and is facing threats due to: (1) degradation of the natural environment through weak government conservation efforts; (2) its potential as a source of natural gas and petrol and the consequent political interests at play; (3) its inclusion in Maguindanao’s ancestral domain claim; (4) it being one of the occasional battlegrounds between the Government and the MILF forces in times of armed conflict. Although there is no clear study of this petrol source and its exact location, the people in Dalgan strongly believe that their area carries a great wealth of natural resources. Because of this, the communities have strongly guarded this area from outsiders and even from the intrusion of development activities from government and non-government agencies.

5.3.1

History of Dalgan

The oral history of Barangay Dalgan started in the 1960s when Mr. Dalgan, the father of the current barangay chair, Amil Dalgan, arrived in this place with his family. It is on this marshland that the family grew and found its source of livelihood (see Fig. 5.10). Since then, more families started to live in the whole of the Ligawasan Marsh area, including Dalgan. It was in 1975 that a community was fully established and the area became known as Dalgan. Amil Dalgan describes the marshland environment of the place (in Maguindanaon language): Kanu paganay a timpu na kapawasan i Dalgan uged na sabap sa kina iseg a gay na nidtampul su pawas ka naanudan a lupa. Madakel i mga binatang endu mga pamumulan ataw palakayuan ugayd na daden saguna. (In the past, Dalgan was a lake. However, as time goes by, the lake has been clogged due to soil erosion. Before, there were many animals, plants and trees but they’ve all gone now.) By 1988, its first elementary school (a temporary wooden structure) was established, allowing the children of Dalgan access to a formal education. The school was later buried in mud due to flooding. In 1991, Dalgan was officially included in the local government structure of the Municipality of Pagalungan under the Maguindanao Province and had been named Barangay Dalgan. In the year

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Fig. 5.9 The boats used as a mode of transportation in the Ligawasan Marsh area. Source The author

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Fig. 5.10 Historical transect map of Barangay Dalgan. Source The author

2000, an elementary school and a high school were established in Dalgan. During the “all-out-war” of 2000 between the Government and the MILF forces, the area suffered bombardment from indiscriminate bombings by the government forces. In 11 February 2003, the people of Dalgan experienced armed conflict brought about by another “all-out-war” by the government military against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The women recall how this happened (in Maguindanaon language): Su mga taw sa Dalgan na timala sa malasay sabap sa kinabunu na gubirnu sa MILF nakalalagit kami kanu 11 February 2003. Yanin nasabapan nasu gubirnu na binunu nin su MILF sa Buliok mapita pita kabedsambayang sa buka Eidl Adha na masiken gayd su Dalgan sa Buliok nasabapan a kinambakwet nami sa embala bala na North Cotabato. Adden pan bag’da sa awang (Bangka) binumba na eluplanu limakataw I Minatay na duapulu e nangapalian. Sabap sa niaba a kinambunua madakel nabinasan a mga tamuk endu kawyagan sampay saguna penbunuabun. Samaya saguna pedtatagituan su paidu paidu a kabaguyag-uyag. (The residents of Dalgan have suffered a lot because of the Government’s atrocity against the MILF which has affected us since 11 February 2003. The cause of it was that a government [military] killed an MILF in Buliok during the Eidl Adha prayer. Buliok is near to Dalgan and when armed conflict erupted, it displaced us in several places in North Cotabato. There was also an incident where passengers of a boat were bombed by a military plane, resulting to the death of five civilians and twenty wounded. Because of the armed conflict, many properties and livelihoods were destroyed and up to now there is still armed conflict. And now, we are trying our best to find ways to start a small livelihood.)

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This conflict started with the Government’s military operations in Buliok area (close to Dalgan and the rest of the Ligawasan Marsh area) during the early morning of the Eidl Adha festival and quickly escalated into an armed confrontation throughout this area. As a result, the people of Dalgan had to evacuate the settlement and seek refuge in the adjacent town of North Cotabato Province. At the height of the conflict, boats lying along the marsh area were fired at by aerial bombings which caused people to panic. In Dalgan alone, at least five civilians were killed and twenty were wounded. Due to this conflict, many families lost their sources of income and their homes were severely damaged. The following year, 2004, the Dalgan IDPs started to return to their community. They experienced a gradual recovery, and even up to 2010 they were still in the process of achieving a normal life.

5.3.2

Entry of Development in the Area

The only semblance of government service in the community is the permanent structure of a three-classroom primary school building made of concrete built in 1997. Yet this is unusable because it has been submerged in mud due to regular flooding in the area. Instead, the community took the initiative of installing a temporary wooden structure that is currently being used as a school. This primary education facility is operated by two volunteer teachers who only come to the community twice a week. The barangay chair, Mr. Amil Dalgan, was elected to office in the 10 October 2010 elections. With his new designation, he hoped to increase and improve the delivery of service to his barangay by seeking the assistance of the Office of the Mayor of Pagalungan to access the community’s Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA). The people had not previously experienced any benefit from this IRA, even though they had been entitled to tap into it for various community projects and services since Barangay Dalgan became part of the local government’s responsibilities in 1991. Barangay Dalgan is included as one of the stakeholder communities of a non-government organization (NGO) named the Ligawasan Marsh Research and Development Council (LMRDC). Established in 2006, the LMRDC envisioned bringing sustainable development to the Ligawasan Marsh area with the cooperation of the residents there. Thus far, the LMRDC has carried out consultation workshops since 2008, discussing the development priorities of the communities living in this area. The result of this consultation mainly emphasized the three goals of the communities: (1) preservation and protection of the biodiversity of Ligawasan Marsh; (2) the social and economic well-being of the people; and (3) preservation of the cultural integrity of people and the area. Together with these goals, four strategies were also enumerated as part of this development priorities setting. The strategies are as follows:

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Government and NGOs should not implement any programme or project in Ligawasan Marsh without the free, prior, and informed consent of the people through the Ligawasan Marsh Research and Development Council (LMRDC) and the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies (IBS). All programmes and projects for the Ligawasan and its immediate environment should take into consideration the environmental impact on the marsh and the welfare of the people. Exploration of gas, oil and other mineral resources should only be undertaken after the establishment of the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and should ensure the preservation of the marsh biodiversity, and the economic, social, religious and cultural well-being of the people. The planning and implementation of programmes and projects should be with the active participation of the people of Ligawasan Marsh. In the past, the Government, through the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) Region XII, organized and presented the “Ligawasan Marsh Development Master Plan (1999–2025).” This was the first and only event that put this area in the spotlight as an area of development among government agencies. The Master Plan is described as a “blueprint for a more holistic, integrated and comprehensive development of the entire Marsh, for both its natural and human resources. It is conceived to guide planners and policy-makers in determining the appropriate mix of interventions and strategies, the type and level of development for the Marsh and some spatial considerations needed for the next three decades covered by this Plan.” The Plan enumerates three purposes as follows: • Formulate a set of spatial and sectoral development strategies and policies for the development of the Marsh and its inhabitants within the context of a sound and balanced ecosystem; • Identify programmes and projects, with their corresponding investment requirements that shall spur the development of the area, including those with inter-regional/provincial and inter-municipal impacts; and • Recommend institutional and financing alternatives to facilitate the implementation of the Master Plan. The Rationale of the Project (the initiation of this Master Plan study) states that: “the development of the Marsh and its immediate borders, could be made a showcase of the national leadership’s sincere efforts to assimilate the armed resistance groups back to the mainstream of society.” The rest of the Master Plan showed the huge potential and investments required to develop the area and its communities. It is worth noting that this was typical development planning using the “top-down” approach by the Government. Very few, if any, consultations were conducted with the communities involved. Such consultations would have been far-fetched, considering that the security in the area could not be guaranteed by government forces. In the end, the plan did not reach any implementation point.

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Resources and Potential

The people living in Dalgan are of the Maguindanao ethnic group. Their population is estimated to be at least 7,000, with many of them adults. Among them, there are twenty-eight widowed women and another thirty-six widowed men whose spouses died as victims of the armed conflict or due to various illnesses including pregnancy-related deaths. The orphaned children were also counted, with thirty of them male and thirty-five female. Typical of the rural poor, the people in Dalgan earned their daily livelihood by subsistence farming and fishing. The lack of fishing equipment limited their activities to small-scale fishing. Yet this has remained their major source of income. They also earn extra income from traditional handicrafts and products, like the weaving of kalakat (bamboo walling), bagumbong (a species of Chinese bamboo), and libi (river palm) and the production of a traditional food called natek (made out of the core of libi). To augment the family’s earnings, younger adults and teenagers are employed as store helpers or household help. These young people work in various jobs in the nearby towns of Kabacan, Pikit, Mlang and a few others as far as Marawi City. Barangay Dalgan’s typical family of three to four children would have a minimum income of PHP 1,500.00 a month (or USD 1.20 per day) or an average of PHP 2,100.00 a month (or USD 1.70 per day). In their monthly consumption, almost 80% of this income/budget goes on the purchase of food (e.g. rice, sugar, coffee). Another 13.5% is spent on transportation (going to Pikit town for weekly marketing or selling), 5.6% is used for buying medicines and 2.1% is used for education-related expenses. The whole of Dalgan area is situated along the vast Ligawasan Marsh. This environment has a clay loam type of soil, and, as such, people manage to cultivate vegetables for their food and livelihood. Their backyard plots are planted with various crops and plants, namely lowland rice, mangoes, green and red beans, peanuts, watermelons, bananas, sugarcane, libi, cassava, squash, bantad, linggay, ubi, okra, tangan-tangan, lansuna, aubergines, tomatoes, bittergourds, labo, cucumbers, butil and sa’wa (see Fig. 5.11). While there are many plants that grow, farming is mostly affected by the regular flooding in this area. During the rainy season, the people are only able to harvest rice and a vegetable called suli and catch fish from the marsh waters as a source of food and income (see Fig. 5.12). The tree varieties that can be found here are acacia, ipil-ipil, bamboo, libi, coconut, balikakab, and lipao. There are also many animals reared in this area such as cows, carabaos, goats, chickens, ducks, ganso, and bibi (the last two are types of duck). The bird varieties that roam the area include Beguk, Gengeb, Tanepul, Tabpesa, Bagumbung, and Talung. Along the marsh waters and rivers there is an abundance of water lilies, kangkong, and driftwood, which the people gather. Even though these water lilies are known to be processed in other places as raw materials for handicrafts, this type of industry has not yet reached the people of Dalgan, mainly due to inaccessibility. On the other hand, the kangkong and driftwood can easily be sold in the nearby town of Pikit.

5.3 Barangay Dalgan

Fig. 5.11 A transect map of Barangay Dalgan. Source The author

Fig. 5.12 Seasonality diagram of Barangay Dalgan. Source The author

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Fig. 5.13 A social map of Barangay Dalgan. Source The author

The community social map includes an elementary school, which is inadequate in facilities and service, two sari-sari stores (kedai runcit), a balon tanker or groundwater source, a madrasah (with poor structure facility but with six asatiz or religious teachers), and the vast river/marsh water body, which is used and exploited by all the community members (see Fig. 5.13). The women in the community mainly rely on the help of a lone traditional midwife for services on all pregnancy-related conditions. Dalgan’s peace and security issues are managed by its own community police team. There are many other sources of services for local residents, but these are all situated outside the community. Health clinics and hospitals, a loan/finance company, pawn shops, banks, etc. come from the Pagalungan Municipal government unit to which Barangay Dalgan belongs to. The various products of the community, including fish, would have to be delivered and sold in the marketplaces outside Dalgan, particularly at Rajamuda Fish Landing and the Baguainged Fish Landing.

5.3.4

State of Development

For many years, the people of Dalgan have barely benefited from development in their community, whether coming from the Government, the NGOs, or even the

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BDA. This community continues to live in a constant cycle of violence in which most residents feel neglected and their human development needs unmet (see Figs. 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16). Dalgan’s whole environment and ecosystem has not only been left at a standstill, but worse, it has had to suffer the effects of armed conflict and climate change. In the past, there were attempts by NGOs like the Ligawasan Marsh Research and Development Council (LMRDC) and the Institute of Bangsamoro Studies (IBS) to organize the community, provide some livelihood enhancement training, and involve the community in a consultation workshop in charting a development agenda. The Bangsamoro Development Agency had been able to include Barangay Dalgan as a beneficiary of the World Food Programme’s (WFP) Food for School Program in 2007–2008. The Food for School Program gives out 2.5 kg of rice to every student who is registered on the programme. Under this programme, 375 primary school students benefited during that school year.

Fig. 5.14 Pictures of children going to school in the morning. Source The author

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Fig. 5.15 Pictures of the school buildings in Barangay Dalgan. Source The author

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Fig. 5.16 A schoolgirl holding on to her “baon” or meal for the day while at school. Source The author

The community’s interface with government has been limited to three instances: (1) the presence of the two volunteer teachers for the elementary school; (2) the appointment of one community member as an official statistics enumerator of the local government’s statistics office; and (3) the occasional communication with local government leaders and politicians, especially at the time of elections. The results of the Dalgan PRA/PLA are shown in Table 5.3, which charts the community’s sustainable human development areas and its corresponding services and facilities initiated by the Government, NGOs and donor agencies, and the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA). This chart shows a picture of a community with very low access to human development services. During the PRA/PLA exercises, the Dalgan community members also listed their unaddressed development-related infrastructure needs (see Table 5.4). Their list emphasizes the comparative importance of the physical infrastructures with the social, economic, legal and political institutions as the tangible indicators of development. It is very interesting to observe that although the community is bereft of cultural and religious artifacts, books and other instruments, the people are not lacking in the oral history and indigenous knowledge of the cultural and religious practices which define their identity. They enumerate the aspects of their social, cultural and religious life in Table 5.5. They strongly feel that these aspects need to be

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Table 5.3 SHD chart of Barangay Dalgan. Source The author Sustainable human development

Government

NGOs/Donor agencies/ Private sector

BDA/Donor agencies

Live a long and healthy life Access to knowledge and a decent standard of living

No health centre or even visit from any government institution There is one elementary school but with only two volunteer teachers supplied by the Government. No new building has been built since the old one has been submerged and unused

None

None

(2007–2008) The BDA and the World Food Programme (WFP) implemented a Food for Education scheme where every child/student was given 2.5 kilos of rice

Participate in the life of the community

There is a barangay government system that is under the local government system. Members of the community participate in local and national elections by exercising their right to vote

(2009 and onwards) The NGO, Ligawasan Marsh Research and Development Council (LMRDC), and the Institute of Bangsamoro (IBS) Studies organized some livelihood enhancement seminars in the past LMRDC and IBS included some leaders of Barangay Dalgan in their Consultation Workshop on Development Priorities for Ligawasan Marsh in 2008

developed as part of their future. In spite of their dire situation of poverty, they maintain that they can continue to survive under such circumstances. However, they feel most threatened by their slowly vanishing identity and territory resulting from what they perceive as continued colonization of their homeland by outsiders. This strong sense of identity can be seen as part of the “additional choices” stated in the 2010 Human Development Report thus: Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights and self-respect – what Adam Smith called the ability to mix with others without being “ashamed to appear in public”.1

In the above, the issue of identity is at the core of what the participants regard as part of their political freedom, guaranteed human rights and self-respect. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 further underscore how the lack of development of their identity (history,

1

In United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2010, Human Development Report 2010 (New York: Palgrave McMillian), p. 12.

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Table 5.4 List of development-related infrastructures lacking in Dalgan. Source The author Hard infrastructures

Soft infrastructures/Services

Drinking water and other sustainable water systems Toilet and sanitation systems applicable to the area Elementary school building

Financial capital services for farmers and small entrepreneurs Medical services including availability of medicines – local pharmacy Alternative education for illiterate men and women Community programmes that include the development of their culture and traditions. Islamic institutions, including governance system Religious teachers for the madrasah

High school building Health centre Ambulance or any other transportation that the community can use during health emergencies Community centre/training centre Recreational facilities

Masjid and madrasah buildings

Cooperative system/ventures that can help the community’s economic needs Direct access and communication with the local government and other government agencies Community waste management system Access to a Shariah Court institution

culture, and religion) has also effectively brought shame to the community, to the extent of experiencing discrimination and persecution that have consistently threatened their lives.

5.3.5

Perspectives on Peace, Development and Right to Self-determination

Based on the PRA exercise and discussions, the people of Dalgan demonstrate strong comprehension of the various challenges that they face, such as issues on human security, environmental degradation including climate change, and the dynamics of local and national politics and governance. It may be perceived that they do not welcome the government and non-government organizations (NGOs) which bring development interventions to their communities. This attitude of caution is due to their past experience of development interventions that did not benefit but instead tended to exploit them (see Fig. 5.17). The PRA/PLA discussions gave a good insight into how the participants defined the concepts of conflict, peace, development, and right to self-determination. Notice that in Table 5.6 the concept of conflict was listed separately from the concept of armed conflict, which they defined as physical confrontation and fighting. In these

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Table 5.5 Description of the social, cultural and religious life of the Maguindanao group. Source The author Social

Cultural

Religious

Playing traditional musical instruments, like the agung, kulintang, gandingan, debak and kutyapi

Wearing Maguindanao attire/costume; Tubao or headdress for males; Inawl or locally-wovene cloth

Practising hobbies like listening to local radio, playing sipa mangkis, Quran reading sessions, playing chess, and local travel – visiting relatives in nearby towns

Practising hospitality by offering coffee to visitors and guests; holding kanduli or thanksgiving feast; kabpiyaw-time for visiting relatives during harvest season, especially rice harvest Inculcating the values of honesty, respect for elders and visiting the sick

Attending Islamic school, da’wah or Islamic propagation activities, halaqat or Quran memorization sessions Celebrations of Eid or Islamic holidays, practice of congregational prayers

Playing children’s games like Chinese garter, jackstones, swimming and sack-racing

Practice of conflict settlements through traditional mediation (family or community), and access to the Shariah Court for conflicts that require arbitration and judgement

Wedding and courtship rituals, like the bangengedung or marriage proposal, salangguni or marriage engagement, and the kalilang or wedding ceremony Rites of baptism of a child: aqeqah or naming of a newborn baby, and circumcision upon reaching puberty

two concepts, they enumerated the causes according to their context, i.e. their sense of possible causes of conflict and armed conflicts involving their communities. On the other hand, the concepts of peace and development were defined based on the preferred values in the attainment of these states of peace and development. They cite the value of freedom in various facets of their life, such as the value of unity, solidarity, and harmonious living as the ideal relationship amongst peoples living in a “state of peace.” Similarly, the concept of development was defined through the enumeration of their end view of what constitutes development. To the participants, development is indicated by a united and organized community life where there is intellectual growth, positive change, better knowledge, obedience and respect between peoples and their leaders, and the undertaking of projects that benefit the community. While, interestingly, both concepts of peace and

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Fig. 5.17 Conflict tree discussion with the lead facilitator. Source The author

development were defined in positive terms, their sense of reality of the processes of peace and development, including their manifestation and incompatibility with preferred values, are not something fully grasped and shared by participants. To them, the very fact that there is an ongoing conflict and armed conflict attests to the absence of peace and development.

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Table 5.6 Definition of concepts in Barangay Dalgan PRA/PLA. Source The author Concept

Definition

Conflict

A disagreement or misunderstanding about certain things Possibly caused by: Economic competition that results in limited and uneven distribution of resources; land disputes, especially as a result of land-grabbing in Muslim areas; political differences resulting in greedy politicians who use every means to ensure that they are elected and gain power; and religious differences with non-Muslim who view Islam with biases and prejudices More than a quarrel, there is physical confrontation and fighting Possibly caused by: Rido or family feud driven by social, economic and political differences; conflict between the government and MILF forces; and lawless elements in the communities such as the car-jackers, kidnappers, looters or thieves Peace is present when people are free to exercise their religious, cultural, social and economic activities. There is peace if there is also harmoniously with each other Development is indicated by a united and organized community life where there is intellectual growth, positive change, better knowledge, obedience and respect between the people and their leaders, and the undertaking of various projects that benefit the community as a whole

Armed conflict

Peace

Development

Further, the participants, being Muslims, displayed their strong adherence to the belief that their ancestral domain is an amanah or heritage and is part of their collective property. Thus, they take this obligation very seriously. It is on this basis that they seriously assume their obligation to protect the Ligawasan Marsh area as part of their ancestral domain. In eliciting the participants’ views on the right to self-determination (RSD), it was learned that their definition of RSD included the enumeration of various facets of the first and second generation human rights, mainly their right to peace. For them, “there will be peace if they achieve independence from the Government.” The vision for a sustainable human development is also inextricably linked to this RSD aspiration.

5.3.6

Participatory Learning and Action

A project-planning workshop was undertaken by the participants/community members in the 2011 PRA/PLA. The workshop allowed the participants to discuss their needs and the possible ways that they could fulfil these needs. Four groups of ten (or more) members were formed. The first group, called Group Kalimudan (or gathering/assembly), which was composed of women, proposed a project to obtain fishing boats for twenty families/beneficiaries. They wanted to respond to the urgent need for some of their poorest neighbours/community members to make a living. In this proposal, they planned to set up a Women’s Organization of Dalgan as the project proponent. They intended to explore the possibilities of submitting

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their proposal to relevant government agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture office located in the province. The proposal estimated a cost of PHP 1,500.00 or USD 35.86 per boat to be given to twenty families/beneficiaries, generating a total project cost of PHP 30,000.00 or USD 717.19. The second group, named Group Kambayabaya (or freedom), proposed the construction of a masjid for the community. They estimated materials and transportation costs at PHP 75,000.00 or USD 1,792.97 excluding labour, which they would freely provide as equity. Another group of men, called Group Mapanduwaya (or polygamous), presented a project proposal to build a gymnasium which the community’s old and young could use for recreation and various purposes. This group wanted to explore the possibilities of getting funding agencies to finance this project. The last group, composed of women, Group Kalilintad (or peace), identified four projects: the setting up of a water system level II – use of a jetmatic pump; the building of a latrine for a public toilet to be located next to the school; the building of a barangay health station; and the establishment of a community sari-sari store or variety store which could offer the cheapest price of goods to the community members. This group planned to approach the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) to help them work on these project proposals. Group Kalilintad put the water system as a priority project and gave an estimated cost for materials and labour of PHP 11,500.00 or USD 274.92. Among the various project proposals, the water system appeared to be the most viable and urgently needed by this community. As such, this proposal was agreed upon by the participants. The study (the author) financially invested in this project. A month later, field verification was done and it was found that the community had successfully built the water pump right next to the school. Pictures of this project can be found in Fig. 5.18. Another verification was conducted in May 2012 and showed that the PRA/PLA started a momentum for the barangay leaders to pursue discussions with the local government regarding their development plans and proposals with the town mayor. As a result, a fish landing (or a jetty for fishermen and buyers) accessible to the people of Dalgan had been completed. Also, a better

Fig. 5.18 Pictures of the water system built by the community in Barangay Dalgan. Source The author

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school building, though not yet permanent and concrete, was being constructed. These small-scale improvements in the community directly benefited their livelihoods and education as part of their human development. The PRA/PLA exercise became an impetus for more confidence and initiative among the community members to be the main actors in their own development.

5.4

Research Outcomes and the Theoretical Frameworks

This study presents sustainable human development (SHD) as a framework that is multi-dimensional and appropriately responsive to the needs of the conflict communities, mainly in the context of right to self-determination. The essence of SHD that puts the people at the centre of development and ensures their capacities and freedom is what makes SHD a compelling approach. Related to this, the process and goals of peace and peacebuilding are similarly entrenched in the vision of peace and development as an end in which people should be provided with an environment that would enable them to build on their full human development potentials. In general, there is no argument that sustainable human development as a development approach is a key driver in building peace in the case of the Bangsamoro areas. This development framework cannot be employed only as an after-thought during the post-conflict development phase. Instead, it should be encapsulated as part of an ongoing peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The phrase “peace and development” is often cited as the solution to the conflict in Mindanao. Yet, how does it exactly solve the conflict? What possible scenarios can be proffered in order to make this peace and development rhetoric a reality? These questions, together with the research questions and objectives presented in Chap. 1, will be answered in the following sections.

5.4.1

SHD and Peacebuilding in Conflict-Affected Communities

The outcomes of the PRA/PLA fieldwork in conflict-affected communities provided a deeper insight into the right to self-determination struggle of the Bangsamoro people in Mindanao. The impacts of the structural violence and asymmetric relationship within this Mindanao setting are reflected in the marginalization of the conflict-affected communities in all aspects of their life. Apart from the more visible poor security conditions and weak protection from various human rights abuses (as a result of the armed conflict), the existence and well-being of these communities are threatened by the disregard or trivialization of their unique indigenous identities found in their culture, religion and social life. It is

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this identity issue that has fuelled much of the conflict and stunted the possibilities of development in these communities. As a consequence, their access to security, economic, environment and political resources has been weakened. Here, John Burton’s thesis of identity as a foremost “human need” in his human needs theory (as the basis for conflict resolution) clearly resonates with the needs identified by the community members of Barangays Labungan and Dalgan in Maguindanao Province. This collective aspect of identity is apparently the source of honour and self-respect in these communities. This reiterates the “additional choices” referred to by the 2010 Human Development Report in terms of political freedom, guaranteed human rights and self-respect, or what Adam Smith called the “ability to mix with others without being ashamed to appear in public.” Among some of the findings of the PRA/PLA is the existence of a very high social capital within these communities. It is this social capital that has served as their social safety net in times of conflict and other calamities. As such, the state does not necessarily serve its purpose. To them the State is very far and unreachable and is not familiar with their own identity. Even if there are services from the Government, these are regarded as guberno a sarwang (foreign or alien government). While these government services are also perceived as rightly due to them, they see it as inadequate compensation for the hardships (that they continue to experience) that have been caused mainly by the Government itself – the conflict, armed violence, and destruction of their properties and lands. In relation to the aspect of development actors, the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) has the potential to carry out development initiatives for the conflict-affected communities. Clearly, out of all other groups or organizations including the State, the communities perceive the BDA as an organization that would look after their interest. The development aims of the BDA of bringing about a kind of development well-suited to the Bangsamoro people provide comfort to the conflict-affected communities, who are very keen to pursue a form of development in which their cultural and religious identity form a huge part. In a way, this mentality of an average Bangsamoro (as shown in the sample of the conflict-affected communities) reflects a rejection of the prevailing notions of development introduced by the State and other actors, who may disregard the values of identity held most precious by the people. This idea of giving the BDA a role in the institutionalization of SHD and peacebuilding will be discussed further in the next section. In planning and programming for development, the dynamics of this right to self-determination context have to be fully understood and accounted for. Developmental strategies or approaches cannot be separated from the greater peacebuilding process and strategies. The two must meet and complement each other to bring out the same desired results of human development goals. The founders of SHD, Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen, both emphasize how human development is dependent on the different societal structures and institutions and relationships between peoples. Sen also points out how crucial it is for unfreedoms to be removed in order to obtain human development. Similarly, Galtung, Lederach and Curle, define peace positively, as a state in which structures

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in society should be founded on social justice. In the context of conflict, specifically in a right to self-determination conflict, Gurr and Burton explain how the issue of identity is very powerful and that it is found to be a human need that forms the basis of a community/society’s well-being. This human need must then be embedded in the goals of human development and peace/peacebuilding (see Fig. 5.19). It is this integration of the sustainable human development and peacebuilding frameworks, with the human development goals including the right to self-determination aspirations, which will essentially bring about sustainable peace. Inasmuch as right to self-determination is normally perceived negatively as a source of conflict in some societies, it can also be perceived as a driver for peace, given that it is recognized as an inherent human need. In effect, this right to self-determination context embodies the freedoms and capabilities that sustainable human development espouses as the factors that people value in life. In the case of Bangsamoro, the study concludes that sustainable human development (SHD) can be made effective towards the achievement of peace when it is aligned with the bigger peacebuilding process and strategy. In Fig. 5.20, a Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding framework for the Bangsamoro illustrates how this can be done. This framework evolved from the theoretical framework presented in Chap. 2, Fig. 2.11, an SHD and Peacebuilding theoretical framework in a Right to Self-Determination (RSD) conflict paradigm. Figure 5.20 is the result of the consolidation of Fig. 2.11, the enumeration of the various SHD areas by the conflict-affected communities and the proposed peacebuilding framework that can be applied (which will be discussed further in this section).

Fig. 5.19 The common goal of Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding. Source The author

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Fig. 5.20 A Sustainable Human Development (SHD) and Peacebuilding framework for the Bangsamoro. Source The author

SHD can equally respond to the needs and challenges of conflict-affected communities with regard to the freedoms and capabilities on which it is based. These freedoms and capabilities can be founded in institution building and governance systems that should be the result of reforms in structures and relationships (from asymmetrical to symmetrical). This becomes the output of the peacemaking process (with a peace agreement as its by-product) between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and consequently the organic law to be legislated by Government to create a new political structure. In operationalizing the freedoms and capabilities identified by the conflict-affected communities, various human development areas include the following: The social dimension that involves aspects of health, education, including the institutionalization of peace education at formal and informal levels as a long-term

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strategy of peacebuilding, and other institutions that promote the social life of individuals and communities; The cultural dimension that includes the preservation of history and cultural heritage and their development for future generations to value; The religious dimension that includes strengthening the Shariah Court as an institution of justice and rule of law and the establishment of other religious-related institutions, such as zakat and wakaf (donation collecting and management) bodies, an agency that manages pilgrimages (like Malaysia’s Tabung Haji), educational institutions, halal institutions and many others; The economic dimension involving the development of sustainable livelihoods in rural areas, the development of trade and industries, the generation of jobs and employment, and resource management and allocation in relation to natural resources; The environmental dimension, which involves the conservation and protection of the environment, sustainable development, and resource management and allocation in relation to the economic distribution of wealth; The security dimension, which involves the general structuring of the local security system in relation to the national system, implementation of a security sector reform, and a demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration programme for combatants and fighters of MILF and other non-state forces and actors; and The essential political dimension that should establish a new governance system, create new legal frameworks and build institutions that will form a new political structure and relationships based on social justice, not only vertically (between the Philippine State and the new autonomous political entity) but also horizontally (within the various levels and sectors of society). The process of achieving the various human development areas will be a long one. Most likely, its substantial results can be observed and felt by the communities only after several years. In the case of Aceh, it has taken the Acehnese five years of post-conflict and post-tsunami reconstruction to see the developments at macro-level. In this instance, therefore, while human development programmes are to be implemented, peacebuilding programmes (foundations) should be implemented in parallel. This environment will not only support development programming but also ensure that development gains are also peace gains/dividends. In applying the peacebuilding framework (refer back to Fig. 5.20), development/ s should be carried out with the foundations of a multi-stakeholder approach. Given the situation in which the conflict communities themselves found “lack of unity” among the Bangsamoro people as one of the roots of the conflict, it is thus relevant to continuously inculcate this multi-stakeholder approach in order to bring about a sense of consensus and unity. However, this multi-stakeholder approach should also be extended not only among internal actors but also with external actors. The array of international actors who are currently involved in the peace process poses a big challenge in peacebuilding. A lesson learned in Aceh’s case is how the resources of the international community can be harnessed to contribute to the peacebuilding process. Local actors must know how to manage this internal/ external relationship so that it would not only result to the achievement of mutual

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gains but also ensure local ownership. This multi-stakeholder approach can be achieved by conducting regular consultations and dialogues with various levels of leaderships and communities in the implementation of development programmes. A second component of peacebuilding is education, so that communities can increase their understanding of the violent structures that breed conflict. By doing this, more people should develop knowledge on how peace structures can be built and how these structures can result in sustainable peace. With the diversity of communities in Mindanao, there is a great need for the Bangsamoro and indigenous communities to forge new relationships and ties with the Christian settlers or the current Christian population who also regard Mindanao as their home. The story of conflict and peace in Mindanao must also find its relevance and value among the Christians and other communities. In the same manner, all communities should also be made aware that inequalities do not only occur between communities (inter-), but, more importantly, they also exist within communities (intra-). In close relation to the above component is the third component of developing the society’s capacity and skills in conflict-resolution and peacebuilding. The sustainability of peace and peacebuilding in Mindanao can only be guaranteed when communities are given the alternative of handling conflict with empathy, non-violence and creativity. The transition of conflict-affected communities in the context of the history of armed conflict in Mindanao is very challenging. While reforms in the Security aspect should be addressed as part of sustainable human development, the longer-term strategy should include peace education. Peace education is included in Fig. 5.20 as part of the social dimension in sustainable human development. Peace education should be institutionalized in the public and private school systems and in the many informal institutions of the communities. It is peace education that is crucial to nurture the values of respect, empathy, cooperation, unity, justice, equality and non-violence, especially among all youths, whether they are Bangsamoro, Indigenous People, or belong to the Christian settler groups. The fourth component of peacebuilding involves the creation of spaces and avenues for cooperation. This component will be very useful in implementing human development programmes. The diversity of the conflict-affected communities presents itself as a good opportunity for cooperation. While many of the conflict-affected communities may be regarded as having weak capacities for doing development, this study has demonstrated, through its PRA/PLA, that the communities have local knowledge and perspectives that are key to their own development. Therefore, development actors must take note of this and view the communities as partners, rather than mere beneficiaries of development programmes. It is within these communities that sustainability in development and peacebuilding can be found. The framework of peacebuilding in conflict-affected communities cannot be complete without the inclusion of a reconciliation programme. Mindanao’s history of armed conflict has not only claimed thousands of lives but has also scarred the memories of those who have been left behind. For many of the victims of the armed conflict, justice is of as much importance as peace. Although the process of

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reconciliation can be very difficult, it needs to be done nonetheless. Atrocities of past killings, especially mass killings, and other human rights abuses should be investigated by establishing truth commissions. In the armed conflicts between the Government and the MILF forces in the years 2000, 2001, 2003 and 2009, the public should be made aware of how the violence came about and how it has made many people suffer. While the perpetrators may not be successfully held responsible, the truth behind these stories should serve as lessons to everyone that violence must never be made an option in the work for peace – even temporary peace. The framework of SHD and Peacebuilding in Fig. 5.20 emphasizes that reforms in structures and relationships will arise from the political dimension. This political development is a key driver in the entire peace process. With peacebuilding as foundation of the sustainable human development framework, the concept of employing a multi-stakeholder approach with the involvement of the various levels of leadership and constituencies in the whole political process becomes key. On the whole, to peacebuilding concepts and framework should not only be applied to politics but also be made part of the social dimension through peace education as a long-term strategy of peacebuilding. It is the dream of the people of Barangays Labungan and Dalgan to achieve a peaceful future for their children. In their peace drawings, they dream of living in their natural environment where: • their ancestral lands and livelihoods are not threatened; • their children can go to a public school system and a madrasah or an Islamic school system; • their families can have access to health facilities and services, a masjid and other religious institutions, and various government and private sector sponsored programmes; • everyone can participate in the political life and decision-making of their communities; • they have access to a Shariah Court system as an institution of justice and rule of law; • they can live a life where they are able to preserve and develop their identity as Bangsamoro; • they will not be against discriminated due to their culture and religion. These dreams are what constitute their aspirations of sustainable human development and peace. However, the realization of these dreams mainly depends on any upcoming peace agreement between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front on reforming the political and social structures and relationships (between the Bangsamoro people and the Philippine State) as a solution to the right to self-determination conflict. It is upon this solution/reform that a comprehensive and multi-dimensional sustainable human development can emerge. In the process of achieving sustainable human development as part of the peace agreement implementation, peacebuilding should be laid as its strategy and foundation in order to ensure sustainable peace.

5.4 Research Outcomes and the Theoretical Frameworks

5.4.2

185

Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding as a Part of Institution-Building

In the process of peacemaking between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the core issue lies in the extent of the power of self-governance given to the Bangsamoro people. Within it, the power to be involved in development planning is what will ensure the application of various development principles in attaining the vision that they want to achieve, including that of sustainable human development. During the peace negotiations and signing of the GPH-MILF Decision Points on Principles on 24 April 2012, there were indications pertaining to some human development areas, but the issue of the power to participate in development planning has remained unmentioned. From the text of the document, it can be surmised that this will form part of the discussions on power-sharing that the two parties have yet to agree on in detail. Therefore, it is this top-level peacemaking phase that the Bangsamoro’s right to development planning and authority to establish institutions must be guaranteed by incorporating it into the new basic law for the establishment of the anticipated new autonomous political entity (NAPE), and making it part of the wider national laws and regulations. Through this institution-building, the various facets of Bangsamoro social life and identity can be secured and developed, including the Bangsamoro community’s primary goal of establishing a new system of government that is responsive to their aspirations. It is this political arrangement in society that is indicative of the possibilities of pursuing sustainable human development, as explained in the 2010 United Nations Human Development Reports (UNHDR). The 2010 UNHDR emphasizes how human development goals often fall short in an environment where people have limited freedoms and capabilities as a result of their political and social structures not necessarily responding to their needs, especially in the context of conflict-affected communities.

5.4.2.1

Institution-Building and Governance System

The establishment of a new governance system and the building of various institutions is the core actualization of the right to self-determination (RSD) context. Institutions should be built covering all the human development areas that are crucial to the RSD goals of the Bangsamoro people. These areas include the political, social, cultural, religious, economic, security, and environmental aspects. Among the institutions enumerated by the conflict-affected communities are the Shariah Court, madrasah or religious education system, a local security/police system and others. As part of the analysis and recommendation of this study, the institutionalization of a peace education system at both formal and informal levels is included. It also recommends the establishment of a peace education and reconciliation programme. The very nature of these programmes requires a legal framework and political will

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in order that resources can be provided by the State. As such, the power to participate in development planning and implementation, the setting up of a new government system and institution-building can only be made possible through the process of peacemaking. Further, the idea of institutionalizing the SHD and Peacebuilding frameworks can also be extended to the possible role/s of the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) as an agency of reconstruction, rehabilitation and development in the conflict-affected areas in the Bangsamoro region. This recommendation is explained in the next section.

5.4.2.2

The Role of the Bangsamoro Development Agency in Peacebuilding

At the implementation level, the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) should be at the forefront of embracing and promoting the sustainable human development and peacebuilding frameworks as part of the bigger strategy of attaining sustainable peace. The mandate of the BDA in the rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of the conflict-affected communities can only be effective when it institutes a development framework that can equally respond to the human development and peacebuilding needs. This may be included in the implementation of the peace agreement with a long-term view of pursuing sustainable peace. This study shows that it is possible to do this. While the BDA does espouse the values of people-centred development, it needs to be more comprehensive in fulfilling both human development and peacebuilding goals. The BDA can formulate a comprehensive and strategic plan in delivering sustainable human development (SHD) to the conflict-affected communities. In their planning exercise, the BDA can make use of Lederach’s integrated peacebuilding framework. By using the concepts of level of responses and time dimension (as earlier explained in Chap. 2), the BDA plans can be clearer on how a transformation from conflict to normalization to sustainable peace can be achieved. An example is presented in Fig. 5.21. In one of the conflict tree drawing exercises in Barangay Labungan, the participants identified “problems of history” as one of the root causes of the conflict. Using this root cause, planning can be made by charting the vision on how this root cause should be resolved. In this case, the vision is to use Bangsamoro and indigenous people’s history in the education system in Mindanao, and for it to find its place, too, in the wider Philippine educational system. However, in order for this vision to be attained, points of transformation or the conflict transformers have to be identified and processed. The transformation of the problems of history can only be possible when there is political will on the part of the government/s (national and local) to re-instate the historical narratives of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples. This step should also be coupled with the re-establishment of mechanisms in institutionalizing this history in the formal educational system. Following the time dimension, planning and tracking the level of responses (from an issue to relationship to subsystem to system), human development plans can also be

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Fig. 5.21 An integrated peacebuilding framework for the BDA. Source Adapted from Lederach (1997: 80), with modifications

guaranteed greater success in the area of peacebuilding using this integrated peacebuilding framework. It is accepted that human development planning can be overwhelming for the institution – such as the BDA – tasked to do this. However, it would be even more futile if, in the process of bringing development to the conflict-affected areas, institutions do not heed the lessons learned in past post-conflict development cases. The BDA can play a role and provide directions in ensuring that development does bring about peace in the end instead of more conflict in Mindanao. Another possible role is that the BDA can also become a focal institution in peacebuilding by providing the middle-range leadership described by Lederach in his actors and approaches of peacebuilding concept. The BDA can be that important link between top-level leaders, grass roots and the international community as external stakeholders (review Fig. 5.20). But for the BDA to do this, it has to be equipped with the skills and capacity not only in development work but also in peacebuilding. The BDA can make use of this SHD and Peacebuilding framework on the understanding that both frameworks should go hand in hand. In hindsight, the BDA’s description as an agency tasked “to lead in the reconstruction, rehabilitation and development of the conflict-affected communities” can be reviewed by the GPH-MILF peace panels and be made more responsive by further defining the

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BDA’s lead role in pursuing human development and using peacebuilding as its strategy in the process of achieving sustainable peace. This addition of roles can transform the BDA itself towards becoming a proactive middle-range leader. The BDA as a potential middle-range leader can plan out its own organizational transformation by following Lederach’s four dimensions of conflict transformation. To illustrate this, Table 5.7 presented below describes how the BDA can be transformed along the Personal to Relational to Structural and to Cultural dimensions, and from the time frame of preparation and training to the design of social change until the ultimate goal of the desired future. The BDA’s own potential transformation can be an important resource for the general peacebuilding efforts in the Bangsamoro case, considering that it has been positioned to lead the development-orientated goals of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). With the BDA facing the right direction of developing its core values and philosophies and its own approach of community development, it would be a lost opportunity for it to be limited to its current mandate. As part of the long-term strategy of the whole peace process, the BDA should be viewed as a work in progress with regard to institution-building and forming a governance system. Undeniably, the BDA is confronted with two natural challenges in its transformation process: first, it needs to step beyond its historic role as the development arm of the MILF and become an agency of post-conflict development for the Bangsamoro region in which it includes multi-stakeholder actors – Bangsamoro, Indigenous Peoples, Christian settlers, government actors, international agencies, academia, media and other civil society groups. Second, the BDA would have to find its identity and role as a peace process institution or project. Like Aceh’s BRA, the BDA can also make a choice as to whether it wants to be a temporary and transitional-type of agency or evolve to become a legitimate institution in anticipation of a new government in the Bangsamoro.

5.5

Summary: Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding – Learning from the Communities

The two conflict-affected communities show differences in terms of their ethnic composition, accessibility to outside resources, level of education, and even level of poverty. In this regard, the people of Barangay Labungan appear to be a more advanced community compared to the people of Barangay Dalgan. The latter is poorer in terms of access to many government services and other outside resources. However, in terms of sources of income from its rural livelihoods, both communities appear to fare similarly. In engaging the two communities, the people of Dalgan showed more enthusiasm in welcoming the research team. This could be due to their inaccessible location and being virtually cut off from the outside world. On the other hand, both communities recognize the vast natural resources that they have and that have yet to be exploited. As such, in spite of their poverty, the people

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Table 5.7 An organizational transformation matrix for the BDA using Lederach’s four dimensions in conflict transformation and time frame activity. Source Adapted from Lederach (2003: 27), and Lederach (1997: 80), with modifications Dimension

Preparation and training (short-range planning)

Design of social change (decade thinking)

Desired future (generational vision)

Personal, refers to the changes affected in and desired for the individual

Continuation of the values transformation training programme (VTT)

Relational dimension depicts the changes affected in and desired for the relationship

Creation of platforms for networking, public discussions, conferences and other fora; capacity-building, social marketing, public relations, and using communication tools and other media, such as the Internet and the traditional television, radio, and print media Building organizational development capacity; institution-building and good governance; capacity-building in concepts and frameworks of sustainable human development and peacebuilding

Training in leadership skills; development of mentoring/ coaching programmes Institutionalization of networking and social marketing practices in various public and private organizations

To increase the pool of outstanding leaders and followers from all walks of life and in every community To achieve a vibrant social life and interactions among and between communities of diverse origins

Institutionalization of sustainable human development and peacebuilding as part of organization development in the public and private sectors

To build various institutions that actively respond to social change and the general development of the society

Institutionalization of peace education at the formal and informal levels

To achieve a society that nurtures the values of peace

Structural dimension highlights the underlying causes of the conflict and the patterns and changes it brings about in social structures. At times understood as the “content” or “substance” of a conflict, the structural dimension may encompass issues such as basic human needs, access to resources, and institutional patterns of decision-making Cultural dimension refers to the changes produced by conflict in the cultural patterns of a group, and to the ways that culture affects the development and handling of conflict

Development of peace education at the formal and informal levels

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remain quite hopeful that there is this unexploited wealth that they can hand over to their children. Yet, they are also aware that the means to this wealth and its potentials can only be guaranteed with the required peace and social justice that they aspire to. Given the right opportunities, the communities believe that they can be self-reliant with the right government structure that can deliver to them their freedom, peace, development and right to self-determination. Under the international human rights covenants, there is an unclear reference to the term ‘peoples’ identified in the Right to Self-Determination concept. With clarity, however, the Bangsamoro people, with their own unique identity and historical territory, aptly belong to the Indigenous Peoples that are recognized (in the human rights covenants) as having collective cultural rights. Based on the latter, “there is a trend in the international law that does recognize people’s cultural right.” Given the context of arguments in the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) of attributing the rights of Indigenous Peoples, including cultural rights and others to the Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination (RSD) framework, it is imperative that the Bangsamoro communities be provided with the avenues to articulate these aspirations, especially in their development life. This research revealed a limited level of assistance given by the Philippine State to the two conflict-affected communities. As a consequence, this has contributed to more hardships for the people in realizing their full human development potentials. The people in these communities carry very strong views about their conditions and future under this present citizen-state relationship in a Philippine democracy. As such, any development to be introduced, and for the people to be involved in, would have to be hinged on this RSD aspiration. This RSD aspiration can only be delivered when there is a more equitable relationship between the Bangsamoro people and the Philippine State, wherein new structures of government and institutions are built to respond to the kind of development/s that the Bangsamoro want for themselves. Throughout the study and constant monitoring of the ongoing peace processes with the Bangsamoro liberation groups, it is evident that there is a heightened awareness of the need for a political solution to this conflict. As part of the discussions during the PRA/PLA, the stakeholders/participants were all aware of the fact that peace can only come with a good peace agreement which is equally followed by effective implementation, both in terms of the political package and the promise of development. Yet, it is this development issue that can be lost along the way, as proven in the experience in Aceh and with the MNLF. It is therefore crucial that the dimensions of development need to be deconstructed and reconstructed within a framework that will resonate with the political needs of the Bangsamoro people. This view is clearly expressed by the MILF in its social objective. In a nutshell, the MILF objective, as re-echoed by the conflict-affected communities, is to establish/re-establish a territory and a government for the Bangsamoro people where they can preserve and develop their full human development potentials according to their distinct identity. This identity issue includes the aspirations of a development of a Bangsamoro society in contrast to the Filipino society in terms of

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culture, history, heritage, education, religion and other social institutions, and even in terms of political institutions or system of government. The use of the PRA/PLA method in conducting research with the communities proved to be powerful and insightful in this research. This fully participative method allowed the communities to be active participants and social change agents themselves in the assessment and generation of ideas in development planning. For the first time, they have become participants of bottom-up development planning. The case of Barangay Dalgan shows how the community was able to make use of their PRA/PLA output as a basis to negotiate for more development projects from their local politicians. The whole exercise of applying PRA/PLA in these two communities proved the efficacy of the methods in community development and effectively eliciting a genuinely local understanding of the concepts of peace, development and right to self-determination as elements of the problematique of this social inquiry. While this method is already being used in rural development in other parts of Philippines, the very idea of using it in a politically and security controlled community – such as these two MILF communities – is significant. This exercise allowed them to experience participation in development planning and taught them many skills along the way. Towards the end of this chapter, an analysis was made on how the results of the PRA/PLA workshops can be reflected in the frameworks of sustainable human development and peacebuilding. Both frameworks were shown to carry similar goals of human development. However, both can be made more meaningful if they are fully integrated as part of the greater peacebuilding process with an end view of sustainable peace. The chapter concludes by explaining how sustainable human development and peacebuilding can be applied and ensured in the ongoing peacemaking process and in the eventual post-conflict development phase. It also recommends that the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) play the role of a strategic planner and a middle-range leader that can guide development work in fulfilling the goals of human development and peace.

References Abubakar, Ayesah; Askandar, Kamarulzaman, 2011a: “Strengthening Democracy through a Development-Oriented Peace Process: The Interface of the Right to Self-Determination and Sustainable Human Development in Mindanao, the Philippines”, in: Pettyjohn, Gabriel (Ed.): Peace Forum: Democratization in East Asia, February 2011, 27,1 (Korea: Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University). Abubakar, Ayesah; Askandar, Kamarulzaman, 2011b: “Defining the Bangsamoro Right to Self-Determination in the MILF Peace Process”, in: Sharom, A.; Petcharamesree, S.; Sumarlan, Y., (Eds.): Human Rights in Southeast Asia Series 1: Breaking the Silence (Bangkok: SEAHRN, Mahidol University). Arnado, Janet; Mary Ann, 2004: Casualties of Globalization: Economic Interest, War and Displacement along Ligawasan Marsh, November 15, 2004 (Manila: Social Science Research Council).

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Institute of Bangsamoro Studies (IBS), 2008: Consultation-Worship on Development Priorities for Ligawasan Marsh (unpublished report) (Cotabato: Institute of Bangsamoro Studies and the Ligawasan Marsh Research and Development Council, 28 February). Lederach, John Paul, 2003. The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (Intercourse, PA: Good Books). Lenzerini, Federico, 2008: “Indigenous People’s Cultural Rights and their Controversy over the Commercial Use of their Traditional Knowledge”, in: Francioni, Francesco; Scheinin, Martin (Eds.): Cultural Human Rights (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP). Mapandi, Tarhata S., 2005: “Ligawasan Marsh: On the Crossroads”, in: Askandar, Kamarulzaman; Abubakar, Ayesah (Eds.): The Mindanao Conflict (Penang: SEACSN). National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), Region XII, 1998: Marsh Development Master Plan (1999–2025). Volume I, Executive Summary (Liguasan, Philippines: NEDA, November). United Nations Development Programme, 2010: Human Development Report 2010 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

Chapter 6

Conclusions

6.1

Introduction

This chapter concludes this study on sustainable human development and the application of the peacebuilding framework in the context of conflict-affected communities in the Bangsamoro areas in Mindanao. First, it reviews the strengths and limitations of this joint approach with regard to its viability and also offers recommendations on how these can be further addressed. It is followed by a section which provides an update on the current situation of the ongoing peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Moreover, it discusses future prospects for these conflict-affected communities. Finally, it presents a review of how the objectives set forth in this study were achieved as well as recommendations for future research related to this field.

6.1.1

Strengths and Limitations of Sustainable Human Development and Peacebuilding

The peace negotiations between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) hold much hope, especially for the conflict-affected communities in Mindanao. At this stage of the peace negotiations, the prospect of signing a final peace agreement has become closer, and with it, the phase of post-conflict developments. The study has learned several lessons on this theme of post-conflict developments from Aceh, in Mindanao itself and other situations. There are major lessons that are worth noting: (1) Peace negotiations should be able to resolve the roots of the conflict and provide a road map of how it plans to achieve this, not only in the immediate future but also in the longer term; © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 A. U. Abubakar, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 16, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53387-2_6

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(2) Development principles and approaches such as sustainable human development have to be included early on in the discussions and planning of peacemaking, initial reconstruction, rehabilitation and developments; (3) Sustainable human development must be embraced by the communities and development actors as a means to address their human needs; and (4) Sustainable human development will be strengthened by peacebuilding in both its goals of achieving sustainable peace. During the conduct of this research, answers were found to the research questions set forth in Chap. 1. These answers are as follows: (1) The realization of sustainable human development (SHD) can be more effective towards the achievement of peace in Mindanao by laying the foundations of peacebuilding as part of the strategy. Both SHD and peacebuilding have a common goal of human development. Within this common goal, the SHD and peacebuilding framework and the goal of human development should be located in the right to self-determination (RSD) paradigm. It is this RSD that is, in fact, viewed by the conflict-affected communities as their core human need. (2) Sustainable human development responds to the RSD context through its concepts of freedoms and capabilities. With it, human rights and freedoms are deemed important principles and means to human development. As such, the fulfilment of this RSD is key to the sustainable human development of the conflict-affected communities in Mindanao. (3) While the immediate needs of the conflict-affected communities may be quickly perceived with the basic human needs as indicated by the Human Development Index (HDI), the core need remains the issue of identity and the people’s right to self-determination. It is this aspect that has to be addressed, mainly in terms of political development through the peace negotiations and other development areas that involve the transformation of structures and relationships in this asymmetrical conflict between the Bangsamoro people and the Philippine State. The outcome of this peace process is what will determine the attainment of the people’s vision for sustainable peace in Mindanao. (4) The Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) can contribute to the success of post-conflict development in Mindanao by taking a middle-level leadership role in pursuing sustainable human development and peacebuilding as the means to achieve sustainable peace. The BDA can play important roles not only by fulfilling its mandate of reconstruction, rehabilitation and development in the conflict-affected communities, but also by transforming itself as an important stakeholder/actor in peacebuilding. This study presents several strengths and limitations in discussing the frameworks of sustainable human development and peacebuilding in Mindanao. The strengths are enumerated as follows: (1) One of the strengths of studying the viability of sustainable human development (SHD) as a development concept in the Mindanao case is its ability to capture the compelling idea of people empowerment. Putting people at the

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centre or heart of development is what best describes people empowerment. It regards people and communities as the agents of development and not merely as beneficiaries. Also, it looks at development not as a market or economicorientated goal, but more as an approach that relates the people’s human development needs to the rest of the environment – be they social, cultural, religious, political, security or environmental. The concept is strongly founded on the capabilities approach and the powerful idea that development is about the removal of the unfreedoms that people experience in their goals for human development. These ideas, expounded by Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen, became the basis of this study in attempting to connect how human development can be made even more meaningful in the search for long-lasting peace (and vice versa) in the Bangsamoro. (2) In the process of the community fieldwork, through participatory rural appraisal and participatory learning and action (PRA/PLA), it was learned that long-lasting peace is envisioned as the achievement of the Bangsamoro’s quest for the right to self-determination (RSD). This study views RSD as part of the human rights and freedoms that Amartya Sen explains as constitutive and instrumental to development. As such, the SHD framework can be more effective towards the achievement of peace in Mindanao when it is able to respond to this RSD aspiration. Given the nature of this RSD dynamic, the conflict-affected communities perceive development in general to be an outcome of their RSD aspirations. How SHD is to respond to these RSD aspirations of the Bangsamoro people can be found on the inclusion of peacebuilding as its foundation. (3) This study presented case studies from other conflicts such as Aceh, Mindanao (MNLF) and other places. These provided directions on the design of human development programmes as they are matched with the peacebuilding agenda. The experience of these cases shows how the frameworks of sustainable human development and peacebuilding have to be built and strengthened early on as part of the peacemaking process and not as the consequence of the peace agreement. Structural and relational transformations are needed as part of the peace agreement itself, since this will form the basis and source of power distribution and sharing. As such, the study offers a theoretical framework wherein SHD and peacebuilding are located in the spectrum of the peace process and in which they are bonded within the context of the right to self-determination paradigm (see Chap. 2, Fig. 2.11: An SHD and peacebuilding theoretical framework in a Right to Self-Determination conflict paradigm, and Chap. 5, Fig. 5.20: An SHD and peacebuilding framework for the Bangsamoro). At macro level, the joint framework can be realized by making institutionbuilding and the governance system the core vehicles for providing this muchneeded power distribution and sharing between the national government and the upcoming new autonomous political entity.

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(4) In understanding how development in general is implemented in the context of conflict, the study also found that sustainable human development and peacebuilding goals cannot be isolated from the phase of peacemaking. The successful implementation of a peace agreement, including SHD and peacebuilding, is dependent on the quality of the agreement itself, i.e. how effective its solutions are in the prevailing conflict situation. Also, the development agenda should be coupled with the greater peacebuilding strategy. It is both development and peace that could bring a society to a gradual shift from conflict to one that is peaceful, dynamic, secure and self-reliant. This is what the peace processes should envision. (5) This study cites the view of Johan Galtung on how development interventions will not necessarily result in peace or, specifically, the building of capacity for non-violent conflict transformation. However, it further argues that is possible to build sustainable peace, given that development frameworks such as sustainable human development synergize with the concept and framework of peacebuilding. The interactions of SHD and peacebuilding as processes of social change can enhance the prospects for a decrease in incentives to a return to conflict. Lederach’s conceptualization of peace and peacebuilding as process-structures stresses how peacebuilding can be critical in effecting social change from one point to a progress point. In the course of development, some basic human needs can be delivered in the immediate term, while others, such as bigger infrastructure needs, can only be realized in the medium term and the long term. Throughout these, the process of transformation within the society, from conflict and violence to dynamism, non-violence and self-reliance, can only happen upon the foundation of peacebuilding. (6) The study also showed its strength in selecting participatory rural appraisal and participatory learning and action (PRA/PLA) as its main research method/tool in its fieldwork. This has proven effective in engaging the participants/ communities as the most reliable researchers. The conflict-affected communities themselves identified their needs and challenges through their vision for sustainable peace. Their participation did not only improve but attests to their guaranteed capacity for social change and transformation. Through the PRA/PLA, this angle of local ownership has been demonstrated and this needs to be built into the various levels of the stakeholders in the Bangsamoro. Development and peacebuilding, as has been learned from many places, is as much about the process of participation, empowerment and local ownership as about the ends. However, this goal of empowerment is also limited. The conflict-affected communities themselves explain that while they have been able to endure the conflict and lack of development mainly through their own self-reliance and social capital, the structures and relationships outside their communities (emanating from the existing political and social structures at local and national levels) are overwhelming hindrances to any potential developments that they may want for themselves. These have become the very obstacles to their “functionings and capabilities to function, the range of things that a person can do and be in her life”, as emphasized by Sakiko-Fukuda Parr.

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This point, again, demonstrates how the immediate need and challenges facing the communities in their vision for peace does not refer to the traditional basic human needs but instead clearly refers to this human need of identity and right to self-determination. The research also had limitations and weaknesses, among which are the following: (1) While the SHD basis of freedoms and capabilities does respond to the Right to Self-Determination concept, it does not clearly show the means of achieving it. This is especially useful in the context of an intra-state conflict where existing political structures and relationships may be the obstacles to any sustainable human development. Instead, this research assumed that the roots of the conflict are based on these existing political structures and relationships that were oppressive and that obstructed the human development potentials of the people. Therefore, it is here that the framework of peacebuilding becomes relevant. The use of the lenses of peace and peacebuilding theories enables the study to analyse human development problems as having their origins in asymmetrical relationships and structures that breed violence. It also shows how peacebuilding can provide the infrastructure and means to correct this imbalance in order to facilitate sustainable human development. The SHD-peacebuilding synergy shown in the study works and can be actualized in the case of the Bangsamoro at the levels of the ongoing peacemaking process and even the local peacebuilding through the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) mechanism. (2) The BDA, as a product of the peace process, has the potential to become the key middle-range leader in the paradigm of development and peacebuilding work throughout Mindanao. The conflict-affected communities and even the general Bangsamoro community affirm the BDA as a locally created and operated institution. This is where its strength comes from. Yet, as an emerging institution, the BDA is also limited and trapped in the nature and pace of the peacemaking process. Due to this, the BDA’s reliance on its volunteer staff negatively affects the sustainability and development of the organization itself. Its access to sources of funding in its own organizational development is another weakness. The BDA’s lack of a legal framework of existence remains problematic. While the BDA is the recognized development arm of the MILF, it suffers from a lack of clarity in its identity as a comprehensive development arm. It is not part of the national government nor is it a part of a new government that is still in the making. Therefore, its transactions are limited to its brokering relationships with NGOs that become conduits of funding from donor agencies and government. Nevertheless, the BDA is highly regarded among the people. Its efforts are also being recognized by its partner institutions – the donor community and the Government – which have started to work with it. It must not only limit itself to its mandate of reconstruction, rehabilitation and development. The kind of development that the Bangsamoro areas require is

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one that should also resolutely bring about peace as its process and end goal. Thus, the BDA should be able to transform itself as a resource not only in sustainable human development (as this study proposes) but also in peacebuilding. Moreover, it should not only deliver development projects on the ground. It should also bring about reconciliation efforts within the conflict-affected communities and among all other communities in Mindanao as part of its contribution to sustainable peace. These possibilities for the BDA are other areas worth exploring and advocating in the ongoing peacemaking process, including the next discussions and agreements.

6.1.2

Observations for the Future

Since the Decision Points on Principles were signed on 24 April 2012 by the peace panels of the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (GPH-MILF), the peace process reached another milestone – the signing of a framework agreement in October 2012. This framework agreement started a road map leading to 2016, when it was envisioned that the compact peace agreement would be signed. While this framework agreement was not fully complete at the time of writing this chapter, it did provide ideas about some of the agreed aspects on how new structures and relationship would be defined between the national Government and the soon-to-be-created Bangsamoro Government. The 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) shows some general directions in relation to post-conflict developments. In particular, it discusses the viability of this thesis within this recent development. The following are implications from the developments: (1) The agreement concerns the establishment of a new autonomous political entity to be named Bangsamoro. This entity will be created upon the writing of a Basic Law containing its various powers and authority as a new governing entity. It is this legal framework that will ascribe a new structural and relational transformation between the Bangsamoro Government and the Philippine Government. It is here that the right to self-determination (RSD) concept will be realized. (2) There is no mention of a human development framework in this agreement, but there is a clear mention of sustainable development in relation to the conservation, utilization and development of natural resources. This sustainable development framework is placed under revenue generation and wealth sharing. In this regard, the environment and its natural resources are viewed as a means to a better quality of life for the people. (3) Some facets of human development in politics, social matters, security, culture, religion, and economy were included throughout the framework agreement, but the details of these needed to be negotiated and included as annexes (of this agreement) in the ensuing months.

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(4) Some vital areas of peacebuilding are also mentioned like the normalization process (or the decommissioning and re-integration of the former combatants and the setting up of a local police force), the creation of transitional justice mechanisms, the establishment of third-party monitors (on the peace agreement implementation), and the establishment of dispute resolution mechanisms. The agreement also demonstrates its recognition and involvement of multi-stakeholders – women, indigenous peoples, civil society and the international community in various capacities. (5) In terms of post-conflict developments, the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) and the Bangsamoro Management and Leadership Institute (BMLI) are identified as the institutions that will coordinate existing development programmes. This means that the potential of the BDA has been recognized and future expansion of its roles can be expected. Considering the developments in the GPH-MILF peace process, there was room to influence the directions of post-conflict developments while the negotiations continued. The framework agreement was enriched with the concepts and frameworks of peacebuilding, incorporating many strategies on how to implement it. However, policymakers/peacemakers required time to fully grasp the framework of the sustainable human development framework, together with peacebuilding, as a potential vehicle in the process of achieving sustainable peace. Within this framework, the idea of building on resources, such as middle-level leaderships, has yet to be recognized. Failure to do so would open this to the risk of becoming another top-down approach and thus de-emphasize the concept of peacebuilding from below which benefited this whole peace process. However, there is still time to correct this perception throughout the peace process.

6.2

Achievements of the Study and Recommendations for Further Research

This study explored how development can be made more effective in the context of conflict. Primarily, it made use of sustainable human development (SHD) as a responsive development concept to intra-state conflict, such as the right to self-determination/identity conflict. It argued that the foundations of SHD – freedoms and capabilities – are the same needs of conflict-affected communities. Further, it proposes the framework of peacebuilding as the foundation and strategy for achieving SHD. The SHD and peacebuilding framework carry the common goal of human development in the context of right to self-determination. In operating the peacebuilding framework, there were two levels of implementation presented, namely, the top-level institution-building and governance system and the lower level (middle) of the implementation process of the Bangsamoro Development Agency as an agency of development. This peacebuilding framework and mechanism are what will ensure peace in Mindanao.

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The BDA can be a crucial driver not only in bringing about the developments but also, ultimately, in helping bring about peace throughout Mindanao. The mandate, structure, philosophy, plans and programmes of the BDA can be another area for further research. The BDA’s own organizational development can be studied as to how an institution, as a product of peacemaking, can achieve its role and transform itself through the various phases of the peace process until it reaches the reconciliation phase. While the BDA is managed by professionals and volunteers, it bears the image of being the development agency of a non-state actor – the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). This characteristic of the BDA is another interesting area of inquiry. In particular, a study can be made on how a non-state actor can effectively establish institutions and how these institutions fulfil not only their political objectives, but, more importantly, respond to the expectations of their supporters and constituencies as a political organization. Further, in this peace process of the GPH and MILF, research can be done into how the MILF, through the BDA, faces the challenges and potentials of the MILF of transforming itself to become a resource for peace and peacebuilding. This type of research can make important contributions to the field of studying protracted and intra-state conflicts and their possible ways of transformation. In the area of theory, the study recommends that this SHD and Peacebuilding framework (as a joint framework) be tested in other types of conflict, such as cases of inter-state conflict in the South East Asian region which involve the environment, economy, culture and others. These types of cases are relevant to this region because they have great implications for general human development goals, especially of the less developed and developing countries. An example of an ongoing conflict in the region is the conflict in Southern Thailand, where similar identity issues have given rise to the conflict and many other similarities in the context and dynamics of the conflict are also present. By studying these other intra-state conflicts, the application of the framework of sustainable human development and peacebuilding can be further strengthened as a field in itself instead of viewing it as two separate and sometimes competing frameworks in the achievement of human development goals.

Epilogue

As part of the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Bangsamoro Transition Commission submitted to President Rodrigo Duterte the Bangsamoro Basic Law on 18 July 2017. This BBL was crafted following the CAB but had to be subjected to deliberations by both Senate and Congress. Exactly a year later, the Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (OL-BARMM) was finalized and approved jointly by the two parliamentary bodies. President Duterte signed the Republic Act 11054 or simply referred as the Bangsamoro Law on 6 August, 2018.1 This law mandates the creation of a new Bangsamoro government with a parliamentary and ministerial-type system. A Bangsamoro Transition Authority will be put in place to replace the existing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The BTA will have 60 days to constitute itself and chart a new plan to bring about the transition to this new government structure. A plebiscite will also be held to define the territory and its constituents that will form part of this new autonomous region. BTA will serve as a transitionary government structure until the first elections in 2022 can be held to duly elect all parliamentary leaders of the new BARMM. The passing of the law and the plebiscite commences the post agreement phase of the GPH-MILF Peace Process.2

1

See the news in The Philippine Star, in https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/08/06/1840186/ hoping-peace-duterte-leads-ceremonial-signing-bol (6 August 2018). The event was witnessed by the MILF Chair Murad Ebrahim, Philippine Senate President Vicente Sotto III and Philippine House Speaker Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. See also the video recording on https://www.youtube. com/watch?v=UhTRgp_Yt5k (6 August 2018). 2 The term post agreement phase is a preferred term in this peace process contrary to the term “post-conflict” that is mainly used by the international community. This post agreement phase was primarily promoted by Abhoud Syed Lingga of the MILF peace panel. By doing this, it puts equal emphasis on the peace negotiations and the implementation of the agreement. © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 A. U. Abubakar, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 16, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53387-2

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In this Organic Law, many of the aspects pertaining to sustainable human development of the region are provided with new powers for governance that are exclusive and shared powers. Among the exclusive powers are in the area of political re-structuring (with the new parliamentary and ministerial form and with a wali or ceremonial head), fiscal policy and management, economic development, cultural heritage and development, the creation of religious-related institutions, transferred management of natural reserves and protected areas, development of the Shariah and tribal court system, human rights institution, and the establishment of a Bangsamoro Economic and Development Council. Also, the law recognizes the Bangsamoro Development Plan as an important document to be followed in the various developments to be undertaken once the transition government is in effect. Among the important fiscal policy and autonomy gains in this law is the 75–25% revenue sharing in taxes in favour of the Bangsamoro government and the allocation of the 5% annual block grant (from the national revenue). This block grant is to be spent on various development programmes for the region to catch up with the rest of the country, given the impact of the centuries-old conflict. There are also shared powers that allow the Bangsamoro government some flexibility, as in the development of the education sector that will include the establishment of madaris schools as part of formal education and even schools for other indigenous peoples; the exploration, management and development of other natural resources, such as fossil fuels, mining, land, inland waters like Lake Lanao, and the Sulu Seas and Moro Gulf that are all within the territory of the region. Other aspects that have been included in the peace agreement but not in this OL-BARMM are: (1) the creation of a local police force; instead the new law allows former combatants to be absorbed into the military and police forces of the national government (2) exclusive rights over bodies of water within the territory; but instead the new law states a co-management arrangement (3) automatic inclusion of the thirty-nine barangays in North Cotabato, cities of Isabela and Cotabato, and all other contiguous areas; but with the new law, this will now have to go through a plebiscite, with the whole municipality (to which the barangays belong) also agreeing to their inclusion. In particular this issue number 3 is crucial because the MILF and the Government agreed on flexibilities to gradually include Bangsamoro communities in known ancestral domain areas where they continue to be a significant population. It is interesting to note how the work of peacebuilding has found its way in this law. Firstly, peace education will be institutionalized in the education system. Also, throughout the various levels of governance, there will be an Intergovernmental Relations Body that will serve as a venue for coordination, dialogue and resolution of any disagreements or problems in addition to the several intergovernmental structures for the national and Bangsamoro parliament, infrastructure development, fiscal policy, zones of cooperation, energy, and others. There will also be an alternative dispute resolution mechanism between the Shariah and tribal courts. Beyond this law, the CAB and the FAB will continue to be a living agreement until such time that both parties – the MILF and the Government – sign an Exit Agreement that will irrevocably declare the full implementation of the peace

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agreement and termination of the peace process. While the OL-BARMM is said to be 80 to 90 per cent closer to the CAB according to the MILF Chair Al Haj Murad Ebrahim,3 during the transition period the challenge for both the MILF and the Government to work harder and show tangible indicators of how durable peace will take root in the Bangsamoro will continue to intensify. In hindsight, the Bangsamoro Development Plan and its Framework can be a useful tool as an immediate first step. The new government may also choose to change it over time, considering the dynamics and priorities during this transition. However, the essence of the framework – on placing equal importance on the goals of sustainable human development and peacebuilding – should not be lost among development practitioners, political leaders and the communities themselves, who will all be competing with ideas on how to exercise self-governance in the new Bangsamoro region.

3

In a news article on Mindanews website, http://www.mindanews.com/peace-process/2018/07/ milf-chair-on-bicam-version-of-bangsamoro-law-80-to-90-cab-compliant1/ (14 July 2018).

Universiti Malaysia Sabah

Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS) was established on 24 November 1994. It has three campuses, with the main campus located in Kota Kinabalu City, Sabah. The other two campuses are located at the Federal Territory of Labuan and on the east coast of Sabah in Sandakan. The university offers bachelor programmes in science, engineering, medicine, food science, agriculture, forestry, social science, arts and humanities, business, accounting and finance. As of January 2018, UMS has more than 843 full-time academics, 57% of whom have a Ph.D. or equivalent qualification. Many of these highly committed and dedicated academics have published in high-impact journals and won awards nationally and internationally in recognition of their research and innovation. According to the QS World Rankings 2018, UMS is ranked 151–200 in Subject Rankings and 222 in Asian University Rankings. For more information, visit the website at www.ums.edu.my.

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About the Author

Ayesah Uy Abubakar is a Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Heritage at the Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS) in Kota Kinabalu, Sabah, Malaysia. Her fields of discipline include development management, human rights and IHL, development and peace studies. At UMS she is a Fellow of the Research Unit for Ethnography and Development Studies and a member of the teaching staff of the International Relations Programme. Her peacebuilding work has been mainly focused on the ongoing GPH-MILF peace process in the Philippines. In 2006 she co-developed the Consolidation for Peace (COP) programme for South East Asia and Mindanao as part of a collaboration between the Research and Education for Peace at Universiti Sains Malaysia (REPUSM) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). Ayesah Uy Abubakar received the JICA Presidential Recognition Award in 2014 as a result of her continuing contribution to JICA’s peacebuilding aims. She completed her Ph.D. in 2013 at the Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) in Pulau Pinang, Malaysia. In her Ph.D. work, she brings together the sustainable human development and peacebuilding frameworks as a viable means of achieving durable peace in the Bangsamoro areas in Mindanao, Philippines. This framework has been adopted by the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) as the core of the Bangsamoro Development Plan (BDP) 2015. It is now known as the Bangsamoro Development Framework. In 2014, Dr. Ayesah Uy Abubakar’s work received the Best Thesis Award at Ph.D. Level for the Liberal Arts & Social Sciences Category from the Universiti Sains Malaysia.

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 A. U. Abubakar, Peacebuilding and Sustainable Human Development, The Anthropocene: Politik—Economics—Society—Science 16, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53387-2

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About the Author

Address: Dr. Ayesah Uy Abubakar, Faculty of Humanities, Arts & Heritage, Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS), Jalan UMS, Kota Kinabalu 88400, Sabah, Malaysia. Email Address: [email protected]. Website: http://www.ums.edu.my/fksw/.